Technology Technology

Railway Technology Today 10 (Edited by Kanji Wako)

Minimizing the Effect of Natural Disasters

Tatsuo Noguchi and Toshishige Fujii

Geology and Weather— earthquakes indicate. As a result, Japan’s

Introduction geological makeup is quite different from
Formidable Forces
that of many continental areas where strata
Japan is situated in one of the most active The earth’s crust is divided into more than often date back to pre-Mesozoic times and
crustal zones in the world. The country’s 10 plates of different sizes. The plates rise the land is relatively stable.
extremely diverse topography and from submarine ridges, move laterally at Rain and snowfall are heavy in Japan
geology combine to create generally a speed of 1 to 10 cm per year, then sink because it stretches from the monsoon
unstable conditions, including frequent into oceanic trenches. The Japanese climate zone to the sub-arctic. Mean
earthquakes. The weather, too, can be archipelago is located along several annual precipitation (total rainfall and
unmerciful, bringing heavy rain and snow. plate boundaries. As Figure 1 shows, the snowfall) is about 1700 mm, or twice that
It is not surprising that a wide variety of Japanese islands are subjected to of much of Europe and the USA. And
natural disasters strike different parts of tremendous stresses caused by the because Japan’s landmass is elongated
Japan each year. collision of four massive plates. and narrow, with steep mountain ranges,
The nationwide rail network needs The archipelago’s configuration was there is a relatively high tendency—four
protection from natural disasters. This determined by these forces. Violent times greater than in Europe and the
article looks at efforts taken by Japanese upthrusts throughout the entire island chain USA—for rain and meltwater to wash
railways, and research conducted by the during the Quaternary period, about 2 away the ground. Weathering and erosion
Railway Technical Research Institute million years ago, produced topographical result in extensive surface degradation,
(RTRI), to prevent damage caused by features with generally steep gradients, and causing frequent landslides and other
heavy rain and snow, gale-force winds, geological formations of faulted, weak rock disastrous events.
major earthquakes and other natural that extends far below the surface. Japan
disasters. is still subject to great crustal stresses today
Natural Disasters and Their
as the many active volcanoes and frequent
Impact on Railways
Figure 2 shows the number of times since
1966 that natural disasters (not including
Figure 1 Japan’s Proximity to Four Tectonic Plates and Plate Movement
earthquakes) have damaged railway tracks
in Japan. About 30 years ago, there were
about 8000 incidents annually. But this
figure has declined substantially since
then, to stand at about 1000 incidents
Okhotsk
plate now.
Kuril
trench Figure 3 shows a breakdown of different
Eurasian
plate Japan natural forces that have interrupted train
trench Pacific
plate operations over the last 10 years. Flood
damage caused by typhoons and
ugh
ai tro Izu-Ogasawara localized downpours occupies a
Nank trench
prominent position, followed by storm
Ryukyu
trench Philippine and snow damage.
sea plate
Steps to mitigate the effects of natural
disasters have helped reduce the number
of times railway operations have been
interrupted, but natural forces still cause
derailments and accidents that kill and
injure passengers each year, so further
measures are required.

52 Japan Railway & Transport Review 23 • March 2000 Copyright © 2000 EJRCF. All rights reserved.
 Figure 2 Incidence of Damage to Japanese Railways by Natural Disasters Figure 3 Different Natural
Forces Interrupting
Train Operations in
Last 10 Years
8,000

7,000

6,000
No. of disasters

5,000 Others
Rock fall Flood
4,000 damage
Lightning Average
damage number of cases
3,000
Earthquake per year
2,000 damage 606
Snow damage
1,000
Storm damage

1966 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95
JNR JR Companies

Figure 4 Typical Train Operation Controls

Protective Measures
80
To limit the impact of natural disasters on Operation suspended
railway operations, we need to be able to Speed regulated
70
predict time, location, and type. But we Past records of disasters
are dealing with natural phenomena that
are extremely hard to predict accurately, 60
even with today’s advanced technology.
Hourly rainfall r (mm/h)

So Japanese railways have concentrated

50
their efforts on achieving safety and
uninterrupted operations by combining
the following three types of measures: 40

• Strengthening infrastructure 30
and installing protection devices
Railways try to mitigate the forces of
20
nature and prevent track damage in a
number of ways, particularly by
strengthening infrastructure. Tracks for 10
shinkansen and other lines laid in the
relatively recent past are generally 0
designed to withstand the forces of nature. 100 200 300 400 500

However, most conventional lines were Accumulated rainfall R (mm)

built decades ago and have many sections
that cannot withstand natural forces.

Copyright © 2000 EJRCF. All rights reserved. Japan Railway & Transport Review 23 • March 2000 53
Technology

These sections are being reinforced

gradually.
Typical measures, discussed later in more
detail, include slope protection, erection
of avalanche fences and wind barriers, and
seismic reinforcement of infrastructure.
These measures are the most effective
possible but would be prohibitively
expensive if applied to every section of
every track, explaining why priority is given
to track sections that are at most risk of
natural disasters.

• Train operation controls

When natural forces are strong enough to
indicate the possibility of damage to track
or trains, trains are run at slower speeds
or operations are suspended. Indices
indicating accumulated rainfall (absolute
rainfall) and hourly rainfall (rainfall
Embankment collapse caused by heavy rain (RTRI)
intensity) are generally used to express
both of these factors in combination.
Figure 4 gives an example of train warn of future trouble—for example, a effective, but, as previously mentioned,
operation controls applied to reduce the partial land slippage or changes in they require huge expense. Another
risks associated with rain. Rainfall underground water level can indicate an reason why they are not the answer to
amounts and indices indicating reduced imminent landslide. We can use measuring every problem is that they are not disaster-
speeds and interrupted service are shown. devices to predict and detect such an proof if the natural force is stronger than
Rising river indices are based on actual occurrence. But the installation of such the design force. This means that we must
water levels, wind indices are based on devices and measurements and also use train operation controls and,
instantaneous wind speed, and seismic observations require significant manpower where necessary, detection devices even
indices are based on the seismic motion and expense, so these devices are installed after erection of protective structures.
at ground level. The important question only in a limited number of locations. Slope failure is the most common problem
regarding these train operation controls associated with heavy rainfall, so measures
remains; how to determine the values that Safeguarding Trains from to prevent rain damage begin by preventing
govern operations? In actual practice, slope failure. However, before deciding
Heavy Rainfall
they are determined through experience, which preventive measure would be most
taking into account data from previous Heavy rain can seriously disrupt rail effective, we must first evaluate how much
disasters. services. Rainwater can flood tracks, rainfall will trigger a slope collapse.
wash away ballast and collapse slopes Preventive structures and train operation
• Disaster detection (e.g. embankment slopes, cut slopes, and controls will be effective countermeasures
If natural forces create conditions that could natural slopes). Flooding rivers can scour to heavy rainfall only if we can make such
interfere with train operations, systems can bridge and revetment foundations. Rock a prediction with a high degree of
quickly detect these conditions to stop the falls are another serious problem exactitude.
train and prevent damage. For example, encountered on slopes, although they To increase prediction accuracy, RTRI
devices are installed to detect rock falls and do not necessarily occur during heavy recently devised a new risk estimation
avalanches, and the Urgent Earthquake rainstorms. method for slope failure during heavy
Detection and Alarm System (UrEDAS) has Various preventive structures are installed rainfall. Risk estimations are made for
been developed. Both are discussed below. along the track to prevent these problems three types of slope failure: embankment
In some cases, one can detect signs that (Fig. 5). Such structures are often the most collapse, surface collapse on cuttings, and

54 Japan Railway & Transport Review 23 • March 2000 Copyright © 2000 EJRCF. All rights reserved.
deep collapse on cuttings. The estimated
slope failure risk value is expressed using
Figure 5 Major Structures to Prevent Damage by Landslides and Flooding
the term ‘critical rainfall’.
Figure 6, which indicates both hourly and
accumulated rainfall, plots sample results
obtained through this risk estimation
method. The critical rainfall curve
indicates withstanding force, with the
Rock catch fence Rock catch net
highest withstanding force in the upper Restraining piles
right of the figure. When the actual rainfall
is more than the values plotted on the
curve, the risk of collapse is great. This Cut slope protection
Rock catch wall Rock shed
risk estimation method has already been
adopted by the JR group of companies, Embankment slope
protection
which are now using it to estimate slope
failure risks.
The extent to which a soil slope collapses Anti-scour protection
is closely related to the amount of rain,
but this is not necessarily the case with
falling rocks, which may fall even during
fine weather. Train operation controls are
therefore not very effective in preventing
damage caused by falling rocks.
Protective barriers and detection devices
are more effective. Such devices consist Figure 6 Critical Rainfall Curve
of cables laid near track areas where there
is a risk of falling rocks. When a cable is
50
severed by a falling rock, an alarm is
activated and the train is stopped. Area of probability of
slope failure occurrence
40
Safeguarding Trains from
Heavy Snowfall Deep collapse
Hourly rainfall r (mm/h)

Snow can seriously interfere with train

30
operations. Trains may be stopped by snow
accumulating on the tracks and turnouts, Embankment collapse
or by drifting snow or avalanches.
Surface collapse
Avalanches and snow drifts can derail a 20
train, snow can damage rolling stock, snow
adhering to rolling stock may fall off while
the train is in motion and cause an accident,
and railway structures may collapse under 10 Safe area

the weight of snow. Current operation

control threshold
A number of structures can be erected to
prevent these and other problems (Fig. 7).
0
The snow can also be removed before it 100 200 300 400
becomes a serious nuisance using rotary Accumulated rainfall R (mm)
snowplows or Russel (pushing) snowplows.
In addition, winter schedules can be

Copyright © 2000 EJRCF. All rights reserved. Japan Railway & Transport Review 23 • March 2000 55
Technology

devised to permit the alternate use of

Figure 7 Major Structures to Prevent Snow Damage snowplows and trains on the same track.
Tr a i n o p e r a t i o n c o n t r o l s c a n b e
implemented on a phased basis, depending
on the amount of snow on the tracks and
Cornice fence
snow removal conditions.
Avalanche risk is evaluated from the air
Avalanche wedge using helicopters, and on the ground during
patrols. When an avalanche is anticipated,
especially during the snowmelt season,
nche
Avalance
Av uctu
special surveillance measures are taken to
str
Gu ucture

fe
ala re
str
ys

protect rail operations. A different problem

nc

nce
upp s

he

w fe is seen in tunnels—freezing of leaking

Sno
d
or t

efl

Avalanche Avalanche water. To prevent this, structures equipped

ed

ec

protection
tin

breaking
forest with thermal insulators are being developed
g

structure
and installed.
d The following measures are taken to
ppe
Ste race fence protect shinkansen from snow damage. In
ter n che
Avala the case of the Tokaido Shinkansen line,
all shed
ing w Snow
retain Snow fenc sprinklers spray water on ballasted track
Snow e
during snowfalls. This makes snow wet,
Snow melt
otherwise it would fly up when trains
speed by, and prevents snow from
adhering to rolling stock.
The Tohoku and Joetsu shinkansen lines run
Snow run off ditch
through areas subject to greater snowfalls.
Ballasted track sections are shorter there,
and rolling stock is designed to inhibit snow
adherence. Viaducts on the Tohoku
Shinkansen line have been constructed to
withstand snow depth equivalent to the
annual return in a 10-year period. On the
Joetsu Shinkansen line, water sprinklers
melt snow on track sections in the plains
and on long, tunnel-free sections in
mountainous areas. Snow sheds and snow
shelters have been constructed over shorter
sections between tunnels.

Testing avalanche detection and alarm system at Shiozawa Snow Test Site. Pole in middle for avalanche detection Interruption of rail services caused by heavy snow
(RTRI) (RTRI)

56 Japan Railway & Transport Review 23 • March 2000 Copyright © 2000 EJRCF. All rights reserved.
Typical wind barrier (JR Hokkaido) Wind-tunnel test on aerodynamic forces of gale-force winds on rolling stock (RTRI)

RTRI is now developing an avalanche

detection and alarm system for railway Figure 8 External Forces on Rolling Stock and Critical Conditions for
tracks. We have completed basic research Overturn (typical)
on a system that will be extremely
accurate in detecting the occurrence of
avalanches and evaluating their size, and
that will issue alarms when required. Our
prototype experiments have indicated that Storm
the system can perform these functions
and we have every reason to believe that
it will be put to practical use soon. rce
Side fo
rce
Lifting fo
Safeguarding Trains from force
iner tia
Gale-force Winds Lateral
t
The greatest danger posed to a train by Momen
rce
gale-force winds is derailment. Wind is ugal fo
Centrif
said to have caused 29 derailments during r force
Couple
the more than 120 years of rail transport
in Japan.
Other external forces also come into play,
especially lateral inertia force and
centrifugal force. These external forces
can combine with gravitational force to
exert a pressure that is directed toward
nt of
the leeward side of the wheels. This Resulta l forces
externa vity
pressure pushes the wheels away from and gra
their point of contact with the rails,
Gravity
causing the train to derail (Fig. 8).
One way to prevent this is to reduce
aerodynamic forces acting on rolling stock.
Another way is to measure wind speeds

Copyright © 2000 EJRCF. All rights reserved. Japan Railway & Transport Review 23 • March 2000 57
Technology

with trackside anemometers, and to stop Safeguarding Trains from before coming to a complete halt. Thus,
train operations on wind-prone track this type of precaution may be inadequate,
Earthquakes
sections when wind speeds indicate a need especially in the case of a fast shinkansen.
to do so. The first approach involves Japan is one of the most earthquake-prone To address this issue, RTRI developed the
installation of wind fences or windbreaks. countries in the world. A recent example above-mentioned Urgent Earthquake
The second approach involves use of train is the Great Hanshin Earthquake that Detection and Alarm System (UrEDAS),
operation controls, which generally stop struck the Kobe region in January 1995, which is designed to detect earthquake
services when the instantaneous wind causing considerable damage to railway forces more rapidly and transmit alarms
speed reaches 30 m/s, or 25 m/s in areas infrastructure, including the San’yo more accurately. As Figure 9 shows, the
where even greater caution is warranted. Shinkansen line. system detects an earthquake by picking
Once the train is halted, operation Measures to protect railways from up small seismic waves called P-waves,
guidelines call for it to stay halted for a full earthquakes include: (1) strengthening which are the first to reach the Earth’s
30 minutes, and then to proceed only if infrastructure and equipment so that they surface. The system then immediately
conditions indicate that wind speeds are can withstand the anticipated earthquake estimates the epicenter and the magnitude
dropping. motion; and (2) stopping the train as soon of the earthquake, and then uses this data
RTRI is conducting wind-tunnel tests to as an earthquake occurs, in order to to determine risk levels. If the risk is great,
determine the extent to which various minimize damage. the system transmits alarms to areas that
rolling stock shapes, and the various The second measure involves installation could be affected. The object here is to
shapes of structures like bridges and of trackside seismometers and the halt trains, or at least reduce their speed,
embankments, can determine the intensity application of train operation controls. before the main shock arrives and causes
of wind-generated aerodynamic forces The controls vary according to detected damage. When UrEDAS was first installed
against moving rolling stock. We are also seismic motion. Train operation controls in 1992, it covered the entire Tokaido
examining wind conditions along track generally call for reduced speed when the Shinkansen line. It has now been installed
sections to discover the various earthquake acceleration is between 40 on all shinkansen tracks.
characteristics of wind. The results of this and 79 gals, and a rapid stop when the The other earthquake countermeasure—
research will be used to establish safe and acceleration is 80 gals or greater. The strengthening infrastructure and
effective train operating control norms. objective is to prevent the train from equipment—follows seismic design
entering a zone that has been damaged standards established by the Japanese
by an earthquake. But the problem government. Work has been carried out
remains that the train must travel some to increase the earthquake resistance of
distance while the ground is shaking new structures and equipment, and of

Figure 9 Principle of Urgent Earthquake Detection

and Alarm System (UrEDAS)

UrEDAS warning Acceleration

warning
P-wave arrival S-wave arrival Time
Initial tremor Main shock

Viaduct collapsed during Great Hanshin Earthquake (RTRI)

58 Japan Railway & Transport Review 23 • March 2000 Copyright © 2000 EJRCF. All rights reserved.
Seismometer (left) installed at UrEDAS site (middle) and data processing unit at Seismic Data & Analysis Center (Photos: RTRI)

existing structures and equipment in areas also been used recently.

where it is thought a major earthquake Conclusion Effective train operation controls require
could strike. continuous and accurate assessment of
However, the motion of the 1995 It is impossible to prevent an act of God meteorological conditions. Over the years,
earthquake in the Kobe area greatly from inflicting damage on railway this has meant trackside installation of rain
exceeded any earthquake movement infrastructure, but appropriate measures gauges, anemometers and other devices.
expected at the time. Therefore, RTRI can make infrastructure less vulnerable. In some cases, such devices can now be
revised its seismic design principles. Two First, for any protective measure to be accessed online, making it possible to
notable results of this revision are: (1) in effective, railways must always remain collect data in real time. Greater precision
the past, any study of extremely strong aware of conditions on and near their is also achieved using data from Japan’s
earthquake motion focused on interplate tracks, and must take appropriate steps Meteorological Agency. We must also
earthquakes, but consideration is now also whenever there is a risk of disaster. increase the reliability of technologies used
given to earthquakes along inland active Japanese railway companies inspect their to predict natural disasters, and develop
faults; and (2) structural design is based on tracks and equipment on a regular basis, other effective and economical means to
the principle that structures must not and information obtained from these safeguard railways from the forces of nature.
collapse during an earthquake even though inspections is used when devising RTRI is conducting serious research to
they may sustain damage. Decisions protective measures. Inspections are tackle these issues. ■
regarding structural seismic capacity are conducted mainly by engineers, but new
based on each structure’s importance. techniques, such as remote sensing, have

Kanji Wako
Mr Kanji Wako is Director in Charge of Research and Development at the Railway Technical Research Institute (RTRI). He joined JNR in 1961 after graduating in engineering from Tohoku
University. He is the supervising editor for this series on Railway Technology Today.

Tatsuo Noguchi Toshishige Fujii

Mr Noguchi joined JNR in 1973 after graduating in geology from Mr Fujii joined JNR in 1974 after completing a postgraduate science
Tohoku University. He left the Structure Maintenance Section of JNR course at Hokkaido University. He held a variety of posts in the Track
Head Office in 1987 to join the newly formed Railway Technical & Structure Department before becoming Chief Researcher in the
Research Institute (RTRI) where he is now General Manager of the Geotechnical Engineering Laboratory of RTRI in 1987. He is currently
Environmental Preservation & Disaster Prevention Technology Chief Research Engineer in the Meteorological Disaster Prevention
Development Division. Group.

Copyright © 2000 EJRCF. All rights reserved. Japan Railway & Transport Review 23 • March 2000 59