Free Circulation-Not for Profit

Criminal Law Judgments, 2021

(A Comprehensive Compilation of
200 Judgments on Criminal Law pronounced
by the Supreme Court & Rajasthan High Court in
the year 2021)

RELEASED BY:
RAJASTHAN PROSECUTION OFFICERS
ASSOCIATION

COMPILED AND EDITED BY:

MOHIT KHANDELWAL & ASSOCIATES,
JAIPUR
(Advocates & Solicitors)

MEDIA AND OUTREACH PARTNER

 (ii)

Object and Vision

We decided to come up with this second edition considering the widespread
response from the readers of the compilation, who have been benefitted from such
reading. It is integral that the Ld. Public Prosecutors and advocates are aware about
the recent judicial pronouncements so as to keep themselves updated in this
dynamic field of law. In due discharge of its duties, the Association has taken this
initiative to release this compilation to benefit our member prosecutors and to assist
them in refreshing their memories about the legal developments, before entering
into the upcoming year. In future also, we would keep taking such initiatives to
render support to our Ld. Members.
Regards,
Pratibha Purohit, Jaswant Singh Chauhan,
President ex- President
Rajasthan Prosecution Officers Association

In this compilation, we have tried covering all the important judicial

pronouncements of the Hon'ble Apex Court and the Hon'ble Rajasthan High Court
relating to the criminal laws. In order to assist the readers, in each judgment we
have tried stating the relevant issue in brief and thereafter the finding of the Hon'ble
Courts have been mentioned. Further, the readers can directly read the original text
of the judgment by clicking on the name of the Judgment, which would re-direct
them to the entire judgment. We firmly believe that after reading these 170 pages
one would be able to appraise oneself with all the legal updates of the year 2021 in
the field of criminal law. I thank the Association for giving us this opportunity to
create this compilation and also thank the Lawctopus for joining with us. In the
end, I also thank Shubhang Gupta, Shubham Khandelwal, Akshay Singh, Harsh
Khandelwal, Arpit Khandelwal, Deependra Singh Rathore, Aditya Gupta,
Manvendra Singh, Aditi Gupta, Aditya Khandelwal, Aniket Kotnala and
Mahendra Khichi for working tirelessly on this compilation.
Regards,
Mohit Khandelwal
B.A., LL.B. (Hons.) (Gold Medalist), LL.M, C.S., PGCFS
Advocate,
Rajasthan High Court
M: +91-8947987290
E: [email protected]
O: 511, Paris Point Collectorate Circle, Jaipur
Alumni – NLU, Punjab
 (iii)

Index
S.NO Topic Page
No.
1. Supreme Court Judgements 1-151
A. Bail and Personal Liberty 1-19
B. Power u/s 482 Cr.P.C. 19-29
C. Investigation 29-34
D. Appreciation of Evidence during Trial 34-52
E. Cognizance and framing of Charges 53-56
F. Interpretation of procedural laws 57-83
G. Offences against Women 83-91
H. I.P.C 91-108
I. Special Acts 108-151
a) NDPS Act
b) SEBI Act
c) NI Act
d) NIA
e) Prisoner Act
f) Transfer of Prisoner Act
g) Prevention of Money Laundering Act
h) PCA
i) Juvenile Justice Act
j) ST/SC Act
k) Representation of People Act
l) Probation of Offender Act
m) Water (Prevention and Control Act)
n) Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act
o) POCSO Act
p) Prevention of Food Adulteration Act
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2. Reportable Judgments of Rajasthan High 152-163

Court
3. Disclaimer 164

Note: The reader can read the original text of the judgements by
clicking on the name of the judgement which will auto direct
to the judgement, as available on the website of the Hon'ble
Court.

Click here for Criminal Law Judgements 2020

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List of Cases
BAIL AND PERSONAL LIBERTY
1. Aparna Bhat v. State of Madhya Pradesh, Criminal Appeal No. 329/2021 ....................... 1

2. Bhagwan Narayan Gaikwad vs State Of Maharashtra, Criminal Appeal No(s). 1039 /

2021 ......................................................................................................................................... 18

3. Dharmesh @ Dharmendra @ Dhamo Jagdishbhai @ Jagabhai Bhagubhai Ratadia vs.

State of Gujarat, Criminal Appeal No. 432/2021 ............................................................... 16

4. Dilip Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh Criminal Appeal No.53 /2021 ....................... 14

5. Gautam Navlakha vs. National Investigation Agency, Criminal Appeal 510 /2021 ......... 4

6. GR Ananda Babu v. State of Tamil Nadu; Criminal Appeal No. 84 / 2021 ................... 15

7. Imran Jalal @ Bilal Ahmed @ Kota @ Saleem @ Hadi Vs. State Of Karnataka, Criminal
Appeal 636 /2021 ................................................................................................................... 17

8. Kamlesh Chaudhary v. State Of Rajasthan, Criminal Appeal No. 15 / 2021 .................. 14

9. Kanumuri Raghrama Krishnam Raju v. State of Andhra Pradesh, Criminal Appeal No.
515/2021 ................................................................................................................................... 9

10. Krishnan &Anr v. State By Deputy Superintendent Of Police &Anr, Crl.A. No. 001511 /
2021 ........................................................................................................................................... 8

11. Mahadev Meena vs. Praveen Rathore & Anr., Criminal Appeal No. 1089 / 2021 ......... 12

12. Mahavir vs. State of Madhya Pradesh, Writ Petition Criminal Appeal No.294/ 2021 ... 17

13. Manohar @ Manu v. State of Karnataka, Criminal Appeal No. 564 / 2021 .................... 16

14. Nathu Singh v. State of Utter Pradesh & Anr., Criminal Appeal No. 522/2021 ............... 6

15. Naveen Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh, Criminal Appeal No. 320/2021 ........................ 10

16. Pawandeepsingh Mahendrasingh Kholi v. State of Maharashtra, Criminal Appeal No.

513/2021 ................................................................................................................................. 12

17. Prashant Dagajirao Patil v. Vaibhav @ Sonu Arun Pawar Criminal Appeal Nos. 55-
56/2021 ................................................................................................................................... 15

18. Prem Shankar Prasad v. State of Bihar, Criminal Appeal No.1209 of 2021 ....................... 8

19. Sanjay Kumar Gupta v State of Uttar Pradesh and Anr, SLP(Crl.)Nos. 1928-1929 of
2021 ........................................................................................................................................... 5

20. Satender Kumar Antil v. Central Bureau of Investigation & Anr. Special Leave to Appeal
(Crl.) No(s). 5191/2021 ........................................................................................................... 2

21. Sonu v. Sonu Yadav and Ors., Criminal Appeal No 377 /2021 ........................................ 10

22. State of Haryana v. Raj Kumar, Criminal Appeal No. 721/2021........................................ 8

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23. State of Kerala v. Mahesh, Criminal Appeal No. 343 / 2021 ............................................ 15

24. Sudha Singh v. The State of Uttar Pradesh, Criminal Appeal No. 448/2021................... 11

25. Suresh Kukreja v. State of M.P., Criminal Appeal No. 465/2021....................................... 7

26. Syed Afsar Pasha Quadri v The State of Telangana, Special Leave to Appeal (Crl.)
No.5543/2021......................................................................................................................... 18

27. Vipan Kumar Dhir vs. State of Punjab & Anr., Criminal Appeal Nos.1161-1162 /2021 13

POWER U/S 482 CR.P.C.

1. Jitul Jentilal Kotecha v. State of Gujarat, Criminal Appeal Nos. 1328-1333/ 2021 ........26
2. Kanchan Sharma v. State of Uttar Pradesh, Criminal Appeal No. 1022/ 2021 ..............23
3. Kaptan Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Ors., Criminal Appeal No. 787 /2021 ......25
4. M/s Neeharika Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra and Ors., Criminal
Appeal No. 330 /2021 ...............................................................................................19
5. Priti Saraf v. State of NCT of Delhi, Criminal Appeal No(S). 296/ 2021 ......................22
6. Ramgopal vs. State of Madhya Pradesh, Criminal Appeal No. 1489/ 2012 ..................27
7. Ravuri Krishna Murthy v. State of Telangana Criminal Appeal Nos 274-275 /2021 .....25
8. Salimbhai Hamidbhai Memon Vs. Niteshkumar Maganbhai Patel, Criminal Appeal No.
884 /2021..................................................................................................................24
9. Saranya vs. Bharati, Criminal Appeal No. 873 of 2021 ................................................29
10. State Of Andhra Pradesh v. Chekka Guru Murali Mohan, S.L.P No. 2636/2021 .........26
11. State of Odisha v. Pratima Mohanty, Criminal Appeal1455-1456 /2021.......................28

INVESTIGATION
1. Arvind Kumar @ Nemichand and Ors v. State of Rajasthan, Criminal Appeal No.753 /
2017 ..........................................................................................................................32
2. Kapil Agarwal v. Sanjay Sharma, Criminal Appeal No. 142 /2021 ..............................29
3. Lala alias Anurag Prakash Aasre v. State of Maharashtra, Criminal Appeal No.
540/2018 ..................................................................................................................30
4. M.A Khaliq v. Ashok Kumar, Criminal Appeal No.1003 /2021 ..................................31
5. Nerella Chiranjeevi Arun Kumar vs. State of Andhra Pradesh, SLP(Crl.) 3978/2021 ...32
6. Pramila v. State of Uttar Pradesh Criminal Appeal No. 700 / 2021 ..............................31
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APPRECIATION OF EVIDENCE DURING TRIAL

1. Achhar Singh v. State of Himachal Pradesh, Criminal Appeal Nos. 1140 -1141 / 2010 .39
2. AT Mydeen v. Assistant Commissioner, Customs Department, Criminal Appeal No.
1306 / 2021 ...............................................................................................................42
3. Dhirendra Singh v. State of Jharkhand, Criminal Appeal No. 580 / 2018 .....................35
4. Goutam Joardar v. State of West Bengal, Criminal Appeal No.1181 / 2019..................41
5. Gulab v. State of Uttar Pradesh, Criminal Appeal No. 81 /2021 ..................................43
6. Guru Dutt Pathak v. State of Uttar Pradesh, Criminal Appeal No. 502 Of 2015 ...........37
7. Hari Om @ Hero v. State of Uttar Pradesh, Criminal Appeal No.1256 /2017...............50
8. Hari v. State of Uttar Pradesh, Criminal Appeal No. 186 /2018 ...................................51
9. Jaikam Khan v. The State of Uttar Pradesh, Criminal Appeal No.434-436 /2020 .........44
10. Jayan v. State of Kerala, Criminal Appeal No. 001246 / 2021 ......................................42
11. Parubai v. State of Maharashtra, Criminal Appeal No. 1154 / 2018 .............................47
12. Phool Singh vs. The State of Madhya Pradesh, Criminal Appeal No. 001520/2021 ......45
13. Pruthiviraj Jayantibhai Vanol v. Dinesh Dayabhai Vala and Others, Criminal Appeal
No. 177 / 2014 ..........................................................................................................38
14. Rahul v. State of Haryana, Criminal Appeal No. 262 /2021 ........................................51
15. Rakesh and Anr. v. State of UP and Anr., Criminal Appeal No. 556 / 2021 .................37
16. Satpal v. State of Haryana, Criminal Appeal No.261 / 2021 ........................................34
17. Shivaji Chintappa Patil v. State of Maharashtra, Criminal Appeal No. 1348 / 2013 ......36
18. State of Gujarat V. Bhalchandra Laxmishankar Dave, Criminal Appeal No.99 / 2021..49
19. State of Madhya Pradesh v. Mahendra alias Golu, Criminal Appeal No. 1827 /2011 ...48
20. State of Odisha v. Banabihari Mohapatra, Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No.1156/2021.35
21. Surajdeo Mahto and Anr. v. State of Bihar, Criminal Appeal No.1677 / 2011 ..............45
22. Surendra Kumar v. State of U.P., Criminal Appeal No. 000449/2021 ..........................49

23. Umesh Chandra v. State of Uttarakhand, Criminal Apppeal No. 801 / 2021 ................41

COGNIZANCE AND FRAMING OF CHARGES

1. M/s Supreme Bhiwandi Wada Manor Infrastructure Pvt Ltd vs State of Maharashtra
and another, Criminal Appeal No. 680 /2021 .............................................................53
2. Major M.C. Ashish Chinappa v. Central Bureau of Investigation, Special Leave to
Appeal (Crl.) No(s). 2576/2019 ..................................................................................56
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3. Netaji Achyut Shinde (Patil) and Anr. v. State of Maharashtra, Criminal Appeal No. 121
/ 2019 .......................................................................................................................54
4. Ravindranatha Bajpe vs. Mangalore Special Economic Zone Ltd. & Ors., Criminal
Appeal Nos.1047-1048/2021 ......................................................................................53
5. State of Rajasthan v. Ashok Kumar Kashyap Criminal Appeal No. 407 / 2021 ............55

INTERPRETATION OF PROCEDURAL LAWS

1. Ajay Kumar v. State Of Uttarakhand, Criminal Appeal No.88 / 2021..........................61
2. Anu Kumar v. State (UT Administration) &Anr, Criminal Appeal No. 001607 / 2021 .81
3. Banka Sneha Sheela v. State of Telangana, Criminal Appeal No. 733 /2021 ................79
4. Dinesh Mahajan v. Vishal Mahajan; Transfer Petition(s) (Criminal) No(s). 442/2021 ...66
5. Gurjant Singh v. State of Punjab, Criminal Appeal Nos. 1385-1386 /2021 ...................68
6. Jatinderveer Arora v. State of Punjab, Transfer Petition Criminal No. 452 of 2019 .......69
7. Jayamma v. State of Karnataka, Criminal Appeal No. 758 /2010 ................................78
8. K. Muruganandam vs. State Criminal Appeal No. 809/2021 .......................................81
9. Krishna Lal Chawla v. State of Uttar Pradesh, Criminal Appeal No. 283 / 2021 ..........71
10. M/s Cheminova India Ltd. and Anr. v. State of Punjab and Anr., Criminal Appeal No.
749 /2021..................................................................................................................67
11. Mofil Khan and Another v. The State of Jharkhand, Review Petition (Criminal) No. 641
/ 2015 .......................................................................................................................69
12. Nagabhushan v. State of Karnataka, Criminal Appeal No. 443 / 2020 .........................65
13. Nasib Singh v. State of Punjab, Criminal Appeal Nos. 1051-1054 / 2021 .....................57
14. Pravat Chandra Mohanty v. State of Odisha, Criminal Appeal No. 125 /2021 .............73
15. Rajendra v. State of Karnataka, Criminal Appeal No. 1438 /2011 ...............................80
16. Rajkumar Sabu v. M/s Sabu Trade Private Limited, Transfer Petition (Criminal) No. 17
/ 2021 .......................................................................................................................77
17. Ramesh Chandra Srivastava vs. State of UP, Criminal Appeal No. 990 / 2021 .............82
18. Sanjay Kumar Rai v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Another, Criminal Appeal No.
472/2021 ..................................................................................................................76
19. Sartaj Singh v. State of Haryana, Criminal Appeal Nos. 298-299 / 2021.......................59
20. Shakuntala Shukla v. State of U.P., Criminal Appeal No. 876 /2021 ...........................79
21. Siddharth v. State of Uttar Pradesh, Criminal Appeal No. 838 /2021 ...........................82
22. Srei Equipment Finance Ltd. v. Ramjan Ali, Criminal Appeal No. 6 /2021 .................75
23. State Of Kerala v. K. Ajith and Others, Criminal Appeal No 697 / 2021 ......................61
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24. Sunil Kumar @ Sudhir Kumar v. State Of Uttar Pradesh Criminal Appeal No. 526 /
2021 ..........................................................................................................................65
25. Swaati Nirkhi v. State (NCT of Delhi), Transfer Petition (Criminal) No. 262 / 2018 .....70
26. The State Represented By The Deputy Superintend v. Tr. N. Seenivasagan, Criminal
Appeal Nos. 231-232 / 2021.......................................................................................77
27. V.N. Patil v. K. Niranjan Kumar, Criminal Appeal No(S). 267 of 2021 ........................75
28. Vinod Dua v. Union of India and Ors., Writ Petition (Criminal) No.154 / 2020 ...........74
29. XXX vs State of Kerala, Criminal Appeal No(s). 1444/2021 .......................................69

OFFENCES AGAINST WOMEN

1. Gumansinh Alias Lalo v. State of Gujarat, Criminal Appeal Nos. 940-941 / 2021 ........86
2. Gurmeet Singh v. State of Punjab, Criminal Appeal No. 1731 /2010 ...........................86
3. Manoj Mishra alias Chhotkau v. State of Uttar Pradesh Criminal Appeal No.1167 / 2021
.................................................................................................................................83
4. Parvati Devi v. The State of Bihar Now State of Jharkhand & Ors., Criminal Appeal No.
574 & 575 / 2012 .......................................................................................................87
5. Patan Jamal Vali v. State of Andhra Pradesh, Criminal Appeal No 452 / 2021.............87
6. Sandeep Kumar v. State of Uttarakhand, Criminal Appeal Nos.1512-1513 / 2017 ........90
7. Satbir Singh and Anr. v. State of Haryana, Criminal Appeal Nos. 1735-1736 Of 2010...84
8. Sonu v. State of Uttar Pradesh, Criminal Appeal No 233 / 2021 ..................................83
9. Velladurai v. State, Criminal Appeal No. 953 of 2021..................................................89

I.P.C
1. Anversinh v. State of Gujarat, Criminal Appeal No. 1919 /2010 .................................99
2. Archana Rana v. State of Uttar Pradesh , Criminal Appeal No. 167 / 2021 ..................96
3. Bhima Razu Prasad v. State Rep. By Deputy, Criminal Appeal No. 000305 / 2021 ......91
4. Bijender @ Mandar v. State of Haryana, Criminal Appeal No. 2438 /2010 ................ 100
5. Ganesan v. State Represented by Station House Officer, Criminal Appeal No. 903 / 2021
.................................................................................................................................97
6. Geo Varghese v. State of Rajasthan & Anr., Criminal Appeal No. 1164 /2021 .............93
7. Indrapal Singh & Ors. v. State of U.P. Criminal Appeal Nos.313-314/2020 ............... 103
8. Kala Singh @ Gurnam Singh v. State of Punjab, Criminal Appeal Nos. 1040-1041 /
2021 ........................................................................................................................ 104
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9. Khokan v. State of Chhattisgarh, Criminal Appeal No. 121 / 2021 ............................ 100
10. Lakshman Singh v. State of Bihar (Now Jharkhand), Criminal Appeal No. 606 / 2021 .94
11. N. Raghavender v. State of Andhra Pradesh, CBI, Criminal Appeal No. 5 / 2010 ...... 105
12. Pardeshiram v. State of M.P. (Now Chhattisgarh), Criminal Appeal No. 1730 / 2015 ..95
13. Patricia Mukhim v. State of Meghalaya and Ors., Criminal Appeal No.141 / 2021 ......96
14. Prabhat Kumar Singh v. State of Bihar; SLP(Criminal) 2395-2396 /2021 ................... 105
15. Rajjan Khan v. State Of Madhya Pradesh Criminal Appeal No. 579 / 2021 .................92
16. Ramesh v. State of Himachal Pradesh, Criminal Appeal No. 347 /2021.......................94
17. Sadakat Kotwar v. State of Jharkhand, Criminal Appeal No. 1316 / 2021 .................. 102
18. Shabbir Hussain vs. State of Madhya Pradesh [SLP(Criminal) 7284/2017] ................ 103
19. Shaik Ahmed v. State of Telangana, Criminal Appeal No.533 / 2021 ........................ 104
20. Surinder Singh v State (Union Territory Of Chandigarh), Criminal Appeal No. 2373 /
2010 ........................................................................................................................ 101
21. Taijuddin v. State of Assam, Criminal Appeal No. 001526/2021 ............................... 107
22. Vinod Kumar v. Amritpal @ Chhotu & Ors., Criminal Appeal No. 1519 / 2021 ........ 102

SPECIAL ACTS
1. Alka Khandu Avhad v. Amar Syamprasad Mishra and Anr., Criminal Appeal No. 258 /
2021 ........................................................................................................................ 121
2. Ashim @ Asim Kumar Haranath Bhattacharya @ Asim Harinath Bhattacharya @
Aseem Kumar Bhattacharya v. National Investigation Agency Criminal Appeal No.
1525 /2021 .............................................................................................................. 148
3. Ashok v. State of Madhya Pradesh, Petition(s) for Special Leave to Appeal (Criminal)
No(s). 643/2020 ...................................................................................................... 138
4. Ashutosh Ashok Parasampuriya & Ord. v. M/s. Gharrkul Industries Pvt. Ltd. & Ors.,
Criminal Appeal No(S). 1206 / 2021 ....................................................................... 119
5. Attorney General for India v. Satish and another, Criminal Appeal No. 1410 / 2021 .. 149
6. Bharat Chaudhary v. Union of India, Petition for Special Leave to Appeal (Criminal)
No. 5703 / 2021 ...................................................................................................... 114
7. Bhupesh Rathod v. Dayashankar Prasad Chaurasia and Anr, Criminal Appeal No.1105
/ 2021 ..................................................................................................................... 125
8. Boota Singh v. State of Haryana, Criminal Appeal No.421 / 2021 ............................ 111
9. Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) and Anr. v. Thommandru Hannah Vijaylakshmi
alias T.H. Vijaylakshmi and Anr, Criminal Appeal No. 1045 / 2021 .......................... 131
10. Charansingh v. State of Maharashtra and Ors., Criminal Appeal No.363 / 2021 ........ 133
 (xi)

11. Fakhrey Alam v. State of Uttar Pradesh, Criminal Appeal No. 319 / 2021 ................. 146
12. Gimpex Private Limited v. Manoj Goel, Criminal Appeal No. 1068 / 2021 ................ 123
13. Gurdev v. State of Punjab and Ors., Criminal Appeal No. 375 / 2021 ........................ 111
14. Hariram Bhambhi v. Satyanarayana and Anr., Criminal Appeal No. 1278 / 2021 ...... 139
15. In Re: Expeditious Trial of Cases u/s 138 of N.I. Act,1881, Suo Motu Writ Petition
(Criminal) No. 2 /2020 ............................................................................................ 120
16. Kallu Khan v. State of Rajasthan, Criminal Appeal No. 1605 / 2021 ......................... 113
17. Kapur Singh v. State of Haryana and another, Interlocutory Application No.30881 /
2021 ........................................................................................................................ 118
18. Lakhvir Singh v. State of Punjab, Criminal Appeal Nos.47-48 / 2021 ........................ 143
19. M/s Kalamani Tex v. P. Balasubramanian, Criminal Appeal No. 123 / 2021............. 124
20. Mohd Zahid v. State Through NCB, Criminal Appeal 1457 / 2021............................ 113
21. N. Vijayakumar V. State Of Tamil Nadu, Criminal Appeal Nos. 100-101 / 2021 ....... 133
22. Narayana Prasad Sahu v. State of MP, Criminal Appeal No. 1312/2021..................... 150
23. Naser Bin Abu Bakr Yafai v. State of Maharashtra and Anr. Criminal Appeal No 1165 /
2021 ........................................................................................................................ 127
24. Noorulla Khan V. Karnataka State Pollution Control Board, Criminal Appeal No.599 Of
2021 ........................................................................................................................ 144
25. Opto Circuit India Ltd. V. Axis Bank, Criminal Appeal No.102 Of 2021................... 130
26. Prakash Gupta v. Security and Exchange Board of India, Criminal Appeal No 569 /
2021 ........................................................................................................................ 115
27. R. Kalai Selvi v. Bheemappa, Criminal Appeal No(S).747 / 2021 .............................. 126
28. R.S. Bharathi v. State Rep. by Assistant Commissioner of Police And Another, Criminal
Appeal No. 635 /2021 ............................................................................................. 141
29. Ram Chandra v. State of Uttar Pradesh Special Leave to Appeal (Criminal) No(s) .
8633/2017............................................................................................................... 138
30. Ram Vijay Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh, Criminal Appeal No. 175 /2021 .............. 137
31. Ramawatar v. State of Madhya Pradesh, Criminal Appeal No. 1393 / 2011 ............... 142
32. Ratan Babulal Lath v. The State of Karnataka, Criminal Appeal No. 949 of 2021 ....... 136
33. Sadique v. State of Madhya Pradesh, Criminal Appeal No.963 / 2021 ....................... 147
34. Samaul SK v. State of Jharkhand, Criminal Appeal No. 894 / 2021 ........................... 144
35. Sanjeev Chandra Agarwal & Anr. v. Union of India, Criminal Appeal No(s).1273/2021
............................................................................................................................... 112
36. Saritha S. Niar v. Hibi Eden, Special Leave Petition (Civil) No.10678 / 2020 ............. 142
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37. Shantaben Bhurabhai Bhuriya v. Anand Athabhai Chaudhari Criminal Appeal No. 967
/ 2021 ..................................................................................................................... 140
38. Sita Ram and Ors. v. State of Rajasthan Criminal Appeal No.462 / 2019 ................... 137
39. Sk Sakkar v. State of West Bengal, Criminal Appeal No. 1661 / 2010 ........................ 108
40. Sripati Singh (deceased) Through his Son Gourav Singh v. State of Jharkhand and Anr.
Criminal Appeal Nos. 1269-1270 / 2021 ................................................................... 116
41. State (GNCT Of Delhi) Narcotics Control Bureau v. Lokesh Chadha, Criminal Appeal
No 257 of 2021 ........................................................................................................ 108
42. State of Gujarat and Anr. v. Narayan alias Narayan Sai alias Mota Bhagwan Asaram
alias Asumal Harpalani Criminal Appeal No. 1159 / 2021 ........................................ 129
43. State of Kerala v. Roopesh, Criminal Appeal Nos. 1313-1315 / 2021 ......................... 128
44. State of Uttar Pradesh v. Jail Superintendent (Ropar) and Ors., Writ Petition (Criminal)
No.409 / 2020 ......................................................................................................... 129
45. Sudesh Kedia v. Union of India, Criminal Appeal Nos . 314-315 of 2021 ................... 147
46. Sumeti Vij v. Paramount Tech Fab Industries, Criminal Appeal No. 292 /2021 ......... 122
47. Sunil Todi v. State of Gujarat & Anr., Criminal Appeal No.1446 / 2021 ................... 124
48. The State of Jammu and Kashmir v. Dr. Saleem Ur Rehman, Criminal Appeal No. 1170
/2021 ...................................................................................................................... 135
49. Thwaha Fasal v. Union of India, Criminal Appeal No. 1302 / 2021 .......................... 147
50. Union of India Through NCB, Lucknow v. Md. Mawaz Khan, Criminal Appeal No.
1043 / 2021 ............................................................................................................. 110
51. Union Of India v. K.A. Najeeb, Criminal Appeal No. 98 / 2021 ............................... 145
52. Union of India v. Md. Nawaz Khan, Criminal Appeal No. 1043 / 2021 .................... 112
53. Union Of India v. Prateek Shukla, Criminal Appeal No 284 /2021 ............................ 109

RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT JUDGMENTS

1. Bhanwar Singh v. State of Rajasthan, S.B. Criminal Misc. II Bail Application No.
7695/2021............................................................................................................... 155
2. Gagandeep @ Goldy v. State of Rajasthan, S.B. Criminal Misc. Interim Bail Application
No. 6821 /2021 ....................................................................................................... 157
3. Gulveer v. State of Rajasthan, D.B. Criminal Writ Petition No. 541/2021 ................. 154
4. In Re A Ref. U/s 395 Cr.P.C. By District And Sessions Judge, Pali, D.B. Criminal
Reference No. 2/2020.............................................................................................. 152
5. Kamlesh Kumar Khandelwal v. State of Rajasthan (S.B. Criminal Miscellaneous
(Petition) No.3646/2021 .......................................................................................... 161
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6. Kayum & Ors. v. State of Rajasthan, S.B. Criminal Misc. Bail Application No. 95/2021
............................................................................................................................... 159
7. Khet Singh v. State of Rajasthan, S.B. Criminal Misc. Bail Application No. 861/2021160
8. Mahendra Singh v. State of Rajasthan, D.B. Criminal Appeal No. 232/2019 ............. 155
9. Narendra Kumar @ Kallu & Anr. v. State of Rajasthan & Ors., D.B. Criminal Appeal
No. 862/2011 .......................................................................................................... 158
10. Nathuram and Ors. v. State of Rajasthan, D.B. Crl. Ref. No. 1/2021 ......................... 159
11. Puneet Solanki V. State Of Rajasthan Criminal Misc. Petition 4889 / 2020 ............... 162
12. Rajanish Kumar Meena v. State of Rajasthan, S.B. Criminal Misc (Pet.) No. 6269/2021
............................................................................................................................... 152
13. Subhash Khichad v. State of Rajasthan, D.B. Criminal Writ Petition No. 382/2020 ... 160
14. Sunil Kallani V. State Of Rajasthan ( S.B. Criminal Misc. Bail Application No.
9155/2019).............................................................................................................. 161
15. Vimla Devi v. State Of Rajasthan & Anr. (S.B. Criminal Miscellaneous (Petition) No.
4400/2021............................................................................................................... 161

16. X Son of Laxman v. State, S.B. Criminal Revision Petition No. 494/2021 ................. 156
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Note- Click on the name of the judgement to read the original text of the judgement.

Supreme Court Judgements

BAIL AND PERSONAL LIBERTY

Name Aparna Bhat v. State of Madhya Pradesh, Criminal Appeal No.

329/2021
Issues ● In this case the Hon'ble Apex Court was called upon to
determine the correctness of the bail order passed by the
Madhya Pradesh High Court wherein bail was granted to the
rape accused on the peculiar conditions including that the
accused shall visit the house of the Complainant with Rakhi
and request the Complainant to tie the Rakhi to the accused.
● The Apex Court issued the detailed guidelines to be followed
by the judges while dealing with cases which involve such
sensitive issues related to women.
● Factors on which discretion should be exercised by the Judge
u/s 437(3)(c) and 438(2) of the Cr.P.C. while granting bail.
Held ● The Hon'ble Court issued the following directions:
a. Bail conditions should not mandate, require or permit
contact between the accused and the victim. Such conditions
should seek to protect the complainant from any further
harassment by the accused;
b. Where circumstances exist for the court to believe that there
might be a potential threat of harassment of the victim, or
upon apprehension expressed, after calling for reports from
the police, the nature of protection shall be
separately considered and appropriate order made, in
addition to a direction to the accused not to make any
contact with the victim;
c. In all cases where bail is granted, the complainant should
immediately be informed that the accused has been granted
bail and copy of the bail order made over to him/her within
two days;
d. Bail conditions and orders should avoid reflecting
stereotypical or patriarchal notions about women and their
 (2)

place in society, and must strictly be in accordance with the

requirements of the Cr. PC. In other words, discussion about
the dress, behaviour, or past “conduct” or “morals” of the
prosecutrix, should not enter the verdict granting bail;
e. The courts while adjudicating cases involving gender related
crimes, should not suggest or entertain any notions (or
encourage any steps) towards compromises between the
prosecutrix and the accused to get married, suggest or
mandate mediation between the accused and the survivor,
or any form of compromise as it is beyond their powers and
jurisdiction;
f. Sensitivity should be displayed at all times by judges, who
should ensure that there is no traumatization of the
prosecutrix, during the proceedings, or anything said during
the arguments, and
g. Judges especially should not use any words, spoken or
written, that would undermine or shake the confidence of
the survivor in the fairness or impartiality of the court.
● The Court should desist from expressing any stereotype
opinion, in words, during the court proceedings or in course of
its judicial order. The Hon'ble Court also illustrated the various
kinds of stereotypes which should not be basis of the opinion
of the Court.
● The module on gender sensitization should compulsorily be
included as a part of foundational training of every judge.
● The necessary directions were also issued to National Judicial
Academy and Bar Council of India for making necessary
addition in their modules.
Relevant 44 & 45
Para No.

Name Satender Kumar Antil v. Central Bureau of Investigation & Anr.

Special Leave to Appeal (Crl.) No(s). 5191/2021
Issues ● The Apex Court issued the guidelines to be followed while
deciding the bail application of the accused appearing before
the Court at the time of filing of the Chargesheet or in
furtherance of the process issued after taking cognizance on the
complaint, in the cases when the accused has not been arrested
 (3)

during investigation and he has cooperated during the

investigation.
Held ● The Hon'ble Supreme Court has categorized the offences on the
basis of punishment and laid down the guidelines that needs to
be complied with at the stage of granting bail.
Categories/Types of Offences
a. Offences punishable with imprisonment of 7 years or less
not falling in category B & D.
b. Offences punishable with death, imprisonment for life, or
imprisonment for more than 7 years.
c. Offences punishable under Special Acts containing stringent
provisions for bail like NDPS (S.37), PMLA (S.45), UAPA
(S.43D(5), Companies Act, 212(6), etc.
d. Economic offences not covered by Special Acts.
REQUISITE CONDITIONS
1) Not arrested during investigation.
2) Cooperated throughout in the investigation including
appearing before Investigating Officer whenever called.
CATEGORY A:-
After filing of chargesheet/complaint taking of cognizance
a. Ordinary summons at the 1st instance/including
permitting appearance through Lawyer.
b. If such an accused does not appear despite service of
summons, then Bailable Warrant for physical
appearance may be issued.
c. NBW on failure to failure to appear despite issuance of
Bailable Warrant.
d. NBW may be cancelled or converted into a Bailable
Warrant/Summons without insisting physical
appearance of accused, if such an application is moved
on behalf of the accused before execution of the NBW
on an undertaking of the accused to appear physically
on the next date/s of hearing.
e. Bail applications of such accused on appearance may be
decided w/o the accused being taken in physical
custody or by granting interim bail till the bail
application is decided.
 (4)

CATEGORY B/D
On appearance of the accused in Court pursuant to process
issued bail application to be decided on merits.
CATEGORY C
Same as Category B & D with the additional condition of
compliance of the provisions of Bail uner NDPS S. 37, 45
PMLA, 212(6) Companies Act 43 d(5) of UAPA, POSCO
etc.”
● Thus, it is not as if economic offences are completely taken
out of the aforesaid guidelines but do form a different nature
of offences and thus the seriousness of the charge has to be
taken into account but simultaneously, the severity of the
punishment imposed by the statute would also be a factor.
Relevant 3,4 and 5
Page No.

Name Gautam Navlakha vs. National Investigation Agency, Criminal

Appeal 510 /2021
Issue  Whether the court can order for house arrest of the accused while
remanding him to custody u/s 167 Cr.P.C.?
 Whether the time spent in detention under house arrest would
qualify as ‘custody’ for granting the default bail u/s 167?
 Whether the house arrest not purported to be ordered u/s 167
Cr.P.C. will be included for computing the period of custody so
as to entitle the accused for default bail?
 Brief Facts: In this case, the accused was detained by NIA and
thereafter produced before the Delhi District Court which
granted the transit remand of two days for taking the Accused to
Maharashtra. However, the said order was stayed by the Delhi
High Court on the same day and the accused was kept under
house arrest and later after 34 days, the Delhi High Court
declared the order of Delhi district Court to be illegal and the
accused was set free. Later, the accused surrendered before the
NIA in light of the liberty given by the Hon’ble Apex Court while
rejecting his plea for anticipatory bail. Subsequently, the accused
applied for default bail before the NIA Special Court by claiming
that the Chargesheet has not been filed within 90 days, which
included the period of 34 days of house arrest. The matter
 (5)

travelled to the Apex Court after rejection of the default bail plea
by the NIA Special Court and the Bombay High Court.
Held  There can be no quarrel with the proposition that a court cannot
remand a person unless the court is authorised to do so by law.
However, we are in this case not sitting in appeal over the
legality of the house arrest. But we are here to find whether the
house arrest fell under Section 167. We are of the view, that in
the facts of this case, the house arrest was not ordered purporting
to be under Section 167. It cannot be treated as having being
passed under Section 167.
 We observe that under Section 167 in appropriate cases it will be
open to courts to order house arrest. As to its employment,
without being exhaustive, we may indicate criteria like age,
health condition and the antecedents of the accused, the nature
of the crime, the need for other forms of custody and the ability
to enforce the terms of the house arrest. We would also indicate
under Section 309 also that judicial custody being custody
ordered, subject to following the criteria, the courts will be free
to employ it in deserving and suitable cases.
 The concept of house arrest as part of custody under Section 167
has not engaged the courts including this Court. However, when
the issue has come into focus, and noticing its ingredients we
have formed the view that it involves custody which falls under
Section 167.
 In view of the fact that the house arrest of the appellant was not
purported to be under Section 167 and cannot be treated as
passed thereunder, we dismiss the appeal. There will be no order
as to costs.
Relevant 136,138,139,141
Para No.

Name Sanjay Kumar Gupta v State of Uttar Pradesh and Anr,

SLP(Crl.)Nos. 1928-1929 of 2021
Issue ● Whether an Anticipatory Bail can be granted after the accused
is taken into custody by the investigation agency?
● Whether the anticipatory bail can be granted by making
generalized observations about the process of law, fundamental
rights or any particular study report?
 (6)

Held ● When the accused have surrendered and taken into custody, all
aspects related with the prayer of grant of anticipatory bail are
practically rendered redundant. However, their right to seek
regular bail during pendency of trial is not taken away.
● Anticipatory bail cannot be granted with generalized
observations and without adverting to the relevant
consideration and material circumstances of the case.
Relevant 15,16,26
Para No.

Name Nathu Singh v. State of Utter Pradesh & Anr., Criminal Appeal
No. 522/2021
Issue ● Whether the High Court can grant temporary protection from
any coercive action while rejecting an anticipatory bail
application u/s 438 Cr.P.C?
● Whether S. 438 Cr.P.C must be given liberal interpretation or
strict interpretation?
● Whether the High Court can grant the interim protection of
Ninety days to the accused for surrendering before the Trial
Court?
Held ● Even when the court is not inclined to grant anticipatory bail to
an accused, there may be circumstances where the High Court
is of the opinion that it is necessary to protect the person
apprehending arrest for some time, due to exceptional
circumstances, until they surrender before the Trial Court. For
example, the applicant may plead protection for some time as
he/she is the primary caregiver or breadwinner of his/her
family members, and needs to make arrangements for them. In
such extraordinary circumstances, when a strict case for grant
of anticipatory bail is not made out, and rather the investigating
authority has made out a case for custodial investigation, it
cannot be stated that the High Court has no power to ensure
justice. It needs no mentioning, but this Court may also exercise
its powers under Article 142 of the Constitution to pass such an
order.
● However, such discretionary power cannot be exercised in an
untrammeled manner. The Court must take into account the
statutory scheme under Section 438, Cr.P.C., particularly, the
proviso to Section 438(1), Cr.P.C., and balance the concerns of
 (7)

the investigating agency, complainant and the society at large

with the concerns/interest of the applicant. Therefore, such an
order must necessarily be narrowly tailored to protect the
interests of the applicant while taking into consideration the
concerns of the investigating authority. Such an order must be
a reasoned one.
● Any interpretation of the provision of section 438 Cr.P.C. has
to be take into consideration the fact that the grant or rejection
of an application under section 438 Cr.P.C. has a direct bearing
on the fundamental right of life and liberty of an individual. The
genesis of this jurisdiction lies in Article 21 of the constitution,
as an effective medium to protect the life and liberty of an
individual. The provision therefore needs to be read liberally,
and considering its beneficial nature, the court must not read in
limitations or restriction that the legislature have not explicitly
provided for.
● HC has to give reasons even for granting protection from
coercive action while dismissing an anticipatory bail
application us/ 438 Cr.P.C.
● While grating the relief for the period of 90 days the High Court
has seemingly not considered the concerns of investigation
Agency or complainant. Proviso to section 438 necessitates that
such protection can be granted for the shortest duration that is
reasonably required.
● The resultant effect of the High Court's order is that neither are
the Respondents found entitled to pre-arrest bail, nor can they
be arrested for a long period. High Court committed grave error
in passing such order and it exceeds the jurisdiction of the High
Court and amount to judicial largesse, which the Court does
not possess.
Relevant 20, 24, 25,26, 27
Para No.

Name Suresh Kukreja v. State of M.P., Criminal Appeal No. 465/2021

Issue  The accused challenged the onerous condition imposed by the

High Court while granting bail under section 439 Cr.P.C. as per
which the accused was directed to deposit National Saving
Certificates in the sum of Rs. 50 Lakhs with the Trial Court.
 (8)

Held  The condition imposed by the High Court while releasing the
Appellant on bail is definitely onerous and the Appellant
deserves to be relieved of the conditions. The condition imposed
by the High Court was set aside.

Relevant 2 and 3
Page No.

Name Prem Shankar Prasad v. State of Bihar, Criminal Appeal No.1209

of 2021
Issues  Whether absconder or proclaimed offender in terms of section
82 of Cr.P.C. are eligible to be granted anticipatory bail?
Held  An absconder/proclaimed offender is not entitled to relief of
anticipatory bail.
Relevant 7.3
Para No.

Name Krishnan &Anr v. State By Deputy Superintendent Of Police

&Anr, Crl.A. No. 001511 / 2021
Issue  Whether ex-parte enhancement of sentence is illegal?
Held  Ex-parte enhancement of sentence is against the statutory
mandate of the law as delineated in the conjoint reading of
Section 401(1) and first proviso to Section 386 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure, 1973. These sections adumbrate an
opportunity of showing cause before enhancement of sentence
in criminal revision.
Relevant 2
Page No.

Name State of Haryana v. Raj Kumar, Criminal Appeal No. 721/2021

Issue ● Scope of power of the State Government / Governor to order
for premature release of a person convicted with life
imprisonment.
● Scope of section 433-A of the Cr.P.C. and Article 161 of the
Constitution?
Held ● Section 433-A of the Code starts with a non-obstante clause
restricting the right of the appropriate Government, to suspend
 (9)

the sentence of imprisonment for life imposed on conviction of

a person for an offence for which death is one of the
punishments provided by law, that such person shall not be
released from prison unless he has served at least 14 years of
imprisonment. Therefore, the power of the appropriate
Government to release a prisoner after serving 14 years of
actual imprisonment is vested with the State Government. On
the other hand, the power conferred on the Governor, though
exercised on the aid and advice of the State, is without any
restriction of the actual period of imprisonment undergone by
the prisoner. Thus, if a prisoner has undergone more than 14
years of actual imprisonment, the State Government, as an
appropriate Government, is competent to pass an order of
premature release, but if the prisoner has not undergone 14
years or more of actual imprisonment, the Governor has a
power to grant pardons, reprieves, respites and remissions of
punishment or to suspend, remit or commute the sentence of
any person de hors the restrictions imposed under Section 433-
A of the Constitution. Such power is in exercise of the power
of the sovereign, though the Governor is bound to act on the
aid and advice of the State Government.
Relevant 17
Para No.

Name Kanumuri Raghrama Krishnam Raju v. State of Andhra Pradesh,

Criminal Appeal No. 515/2021
Issue ● Whether the High Court can entertain bail application u/s 439
Cr.P.C. if the accused has approached the High Court without
approaching the trial court?
Held ● The Jurisdiction of the trial court as well as the High Court
under Section 439 of the Cr.P.C is concurrent and merely
because the High Court was approached by the appellant
without approaching the trial court would not mean that the
High Court cannot consider the bail application of the accused.
Relevant 15
Para No.
 (10)

Name Sonu v. Sonu Yadav and Ors., Criminal Appeal No 377 /2021
Issue ● High Court granted bail under section 439 of Cr.P.C. to the
accused without application of mind and without giving any
reasons in the case for commission of offence under section
304-B of IPC, where there are specific allegations of harassment
against the accused on the ground of dowry.
Held ● An order without reasons is fundamentally contrary to the
norms which guide the judicial process. There has been a
judicial application of mind by the judge who is deciding an
application under Section 439 of the Cr.P.C. must emerge from
the quality of the reasoning which is embodied in the order
granting bail, while the reasons may be brief, it is the quality of
the reasons which matters the most.
● The sentence which we have extracted earlier contains an
omnibus amalgam of (i) “the entire facts and circumstances of
the case”; (ii) “submissions of learned Counsel for the parties”;
(iii) “the nature of offence”; (iv) “evidence”; and (v)
“complicity of accused”. This is followed by an observation
that the “applicant has made out a case for bail”, “without
expressing any opinion on the merits of the case”. This does not
constitute the kind of reasoning which is expected of a judicial
order. The High Court cannot be oblivious, in a case such as
the present, of the seriousness of the alleged offence, where a
woman has met an unnatural end within a year of marriage.
Relevant 11
Para No.

Name Naveen Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh, Criminal Appeal No.

320/2021
Issues ● If the accused is charged with the offence of tampering with
court documents and records, does filing of the chargesheet
become a valid ground to be released on bail?
● Gravity of offence of tampering with the court record and
taking benefit of such tempered document for getting acquitted
in another case.
In matters pertaining to tampering of court record, whether the third
party (other than complainant/victim) has the locus for filing the
application for bail cancellation?
 (11)

Held ● Merely because the chargesheet is filed is no ground to release

the accused on bail. Seriousness of the offence is one of the
relevant considerations while considering the grant of bail.
● Forging of court documents and manipulating evidence is a
very serious offence and merely because the documents are in
court’s custody and charge sheet has been filed are not valid
grounds for the court to grant Bail.
● If the Court record is manipulated and/or forged, it will hamper
the administration of justice. Forging/manipulating the Court
record and taking the benefit of the same stands on altogether a
different footing than forging/manipulating other documents
between two individuals.
● High Court ought to have been more cautious/serious in
granting the bail to a person who is alleged to have
forged/manipulated the court record and taken the benefit of
such manipulated and forged court record more particularly
when he has been chargesheeted having found prima facie case
and the charge has been framed.
● Where the allegations are of tampering with the court order and
for whatever reason the State has not filed the bail cancellation
application the locus is not that much important and it is
insignificant.
Relevant 8.2, 8.3 and 8.4
Para No.

Name Sudha Singh v. The State of Uttar Pradesh, Criminal Appeal No.
448/2021
Issue ● Duty of the Courts to consider the impact of release of accused
on the victim and witnesses, while granting bail in a criminal
case.
Held ● It is important that courts do not enlarge an accused on bail
with a blinkered vision by just taking into account only the
parties before them and the incident in question. It is necessary
for courts to consider the impact that release of such persons on
bail will have on the witnesses yet to be examined and the
innocent members of the family of the victim who might be the
next victims.
● There is no doubt that liberty is important, even that of a person
charged with crime but it is important for the courts to recognise
 (12)

the potential threat to the life and liberty of victims/witnesses,

if such accused is released on bail.
Relevant 8 and 12
Para No.

Name Pawandeepsingh Mahendrasingh Kholi v. State of Maharashtra,

Criminal Appeal No. 513/2021
Issue ● Grant of bail when co-accused already enlarged on bail and
charges are yet to be framed in the trail
Held ● Bail granted. Allegations against the Applicant were not on
higher pedestrian in comparison to the co accused persons
already enlarged on bail. Trial court is yet to frame the charges.
In these circumstances it is just and proper that the appellant be
released on bail.
Relevant 2 and 3
Page No.

Name Mahadev Meena vs. Praveen Rathore & Anr., Criminal Appeal
No. 1089 / 2021
Issue ● Whether the accused was entitled to be released on bail on the
ground of parity?
Held ● The accused cannot claim parity with the co-accused since the
allegations in the FIR and the material that has emerged from
the investigation indicate that a major role has been attributed
to him in the murder of the deceased. Bail was granted to the
co-accused primarily and substantially on the grounds that she
had a eleven months old child with her in the jail.
● The High Court ought to have had due regard to the seriousness
and gravity of the crime. The deceased was employed with the
Intelligence Bureau in New Delhi. The first Respondent is an
employee of the Anti-Corruption Bureau at Jhalawar. The
material which has emerged during the course of investigation
cannot simply be ignored or glossed over.
● Considering the role attributed to the first Respondent and the
likelihood of the evidence being tampered with if the first
Respondent were to remain on bail during the course of the
trial, the Apex court set aside the bail order of the High Court.
 (13)

Relevant 14, 15
Para No.

Name Vipan Kumar Dhir vs. State of Punjab & Anr., Criminal Appeal
Nos.1161-1162 /2021
Issue ● Relevant factors while considering the application for
cancellation of bail.
● Brief Facts:- The High Court granted anticipatory bail to the
person (mother in law of deceased) accused of commission of
offence u/s 302 and 304-B IPC on the ground that the accused
has joined the investigation and undertakes to join the trial,
moreover, one of the co-accused persons has already been
granted anticipatory bail. In the present case the accused was
absconding for more than two years and pursuant to the grant
of anticipatory bail to the co-accused, the accused applied for
grant of anticipatory bail and for setting aside of the order
declaring him absconder. The accused joined the investigation
only in pursuance of the interim bail order.
Held ● Bail can also be revoked where the court has considered
irrelevant factors or has ignored relevant material available on
record which renders the order granting bail legally untenable.
The gravity of the offence, conduct of the accused and societal
impact of an undue indulgence by Court when the investigation
is at the threshold, are also amongst a few situations, where a
Superior Court can interfere in an order of bail to prevent the
miscarriage of justice and to bolster the administration of
criminal justice system. This Court has repeatedly viewed that
while granting bail, especially anticipatory bail which is per se
extraordinary in nature, the possibility of the accused to
influence prosecution witnesses, threatening the family
members of the deceased, fleeing from justice or creating other
impediments in the fair investigation, ought not to be
overlooked.
● In the case in hand, the High Court seems to have been
primarily swayed by the fact that the Respondent Accused was
co- operating with investigation. This is, however, contrary to
the record as the Respondent Accused remained absconding for
more than two years after being declared a proclaimed offender.
 (14)

She chose to join investigation only after securing interim bail

from the High Court.
● Even if there was any procedural irregularity in declaring the
Respondent Accused as an absconder, that by itself was not a
justifiable ground to grant prearrest bail in a case of grave
offence save where the High Court on perusal of case diary and
other material on record is, prima facie, satisfied that it is a case
of false or over exaggerated accusation.
● Parity not applicable as different role has been assigned to
accused persons.
Relevant 9, 12, 13 and 14
Para No.

Name Kamlesh Chaudhary v. State Of Rajasthan, Criminal Appeal No.

15 / 2021
Issue ● Whether an accused who was released on default bail can be re-
arrested on filing of charge sheet?
Held ● An accused who was released on default bail cannot be re-
arrested on filing of charge-sheet by police and filing of the
charge sheet, cannot be a ground for cancellation of bail.
Although, it is open to the prosecution to file an application for
cancellation of bail on the grounds known to law.
Relevant 2
Page No.

Name Dilip Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh Criminal Appeal No.53

/2021
Issue ● Whether a Court can impose the condition to deposit the
money under dispute in court while granting the anticipatory
bail to an accused under section 438 of the Cr.P.C.?
Held ● The Supreme Court held that a criminal court, exercising
jurisdiction to grant bail/anticipatory bail, is not expected to act
as a recovery agent to realise the dues of the complainant and
that too, without trial.
Relevant 5
Para No.
 (15)

Name Prashant Dagajirao Patil v. Vaibhav @ Sonu Arun Pawar

Criminal Appeal Nos. 55-56/2021
Issue ● Whether at the time of considering the bail application of the
accused, the High Court can direct the Investigating Officer to
examine CCTV footage and submit his report before the Court?
Held ● When only the limited issue of grant of regular bail to the
accused is pending consideration before the High Court, it was
not appropriate for High Court to pass the aforesaid directions
which will have a direct bearing upon the trial. Thus, we are of
the considered view that the direction of the High Court
directing the Investigating Officer to examine the CCTV
footage and to submit a report, is not sustainable in the eyes of
law.
Relevant 3 and 4
Page No.

Name GR Ananda Babu v. State of Tamil Nadu; Criminal Appeal No.

84 / 2021
Issue ● Whether successive anticipatory bail applications can be
entertained on specious reason of 'changed circumstances'?
Held ● Successive anticipatory bail applications ought not to be
entertained and more so, when the case diary and the status
report, clearly indicated that the accused is absconding and not
cooperating with the investigation. The specious reason of
change in circumstances cannot be invoked for successive
anticipatory bail applications, once it is rejected by a speaking
order and that too by the same judge.
Relevant 3
Page No.

Name State of Kerala v. Mahesh, Criminal Appeal No. 343 / 2021

Issues ● Whether the High Court was justified in granting bail to the
persons accused under section 302 IPC, even before the filing
of the chargesheet? In this case the accused was alleged for
causing murder in the presence of eye-witness.
● Whether the directions issued by this Court from time to time
in In Re: Contagion of Covid 19 Virus in Prison be the basis to
grant bail to a murder accused?
● Factors to be considered while granting a Bail.
 (16)

Held ● In this case Hon'ble Court made a detailed discussion on

various judgments of the Court dealing with the factors to be
considered at time of granting the bail to an accused.
● High Court has completely mis-appreciated the object, scope
and ambit of the directions issued by this Court from time to
time in In Re: Contagion of Covid 19 Virus In Prisons.
● The orders of Supreme Court (passed in In Re: Contagion of
Covid 19 Virus In Prisons) are not to be construed as any
direction, or even observation, requiring release of under-trial
prisoners charged with murder, and that too, even before
investigation is completed and the Chargesheet is filed.
● The Hon'ble Court reserved the bail order of the High Court
Relevant 38
Para No.

Name Manohar @ Manu v. State of Karnataka, Criminal Appeal No.

564 / 2021
Issue ● Whether trial court can order for denial of remission to convicts
while imposing life imprisonment?
Held ● The Hon'ble Court relied on constitutional bench judgment in
the case of Union Of India vs V. Sriharan, (2016) 7 SCC 1 and
quashed the order of denial of remission before expiry of 20
years to the convict while imposing life imprisonment.
Relevant 2
Page No.

Name Dharmesh @ Dharmendra @ Dhamo Jagdishbhai @ Jagabhai

Bhagubhai Ratadia vs. State of Gujarat, Criminal Appeal No.
432/2021
Issue ● Whether bail condition to compensate victim can be imposed
by the Court?
Brief Facts: The accused were granted bail by the High Court
with a condition requiring them to deposit Rs.2.00 lakh each as
compensation to the victims.
Held ● The bail condition to compensate victim cannot be imposed by
the Court.
● The Hon'ble Court also referred to section 357 of the Cr.P.C.
and concluded that the compensation under the said section
 (17)

can be granted only after the conviction and after conclusion of

the trial.
Relevant 17, 18
Para No.

Name Imran Jalal @ Bilal Ahmed @ Kota @ Saleem @ Hadi Vs. State
Of Karnataka, Criminal Appeal 636 /2021
Issue ● Whether a court can direct the accused to undergo other
sentences consecutively (term sentence) after serving life
sentence? Whether the same would be permissible under
section 31 of Cr.P.C.?
● Brief Facts: The High Court has affirmed the trial court’s
conviction and sentence order wherein the trial court inter alia,
directed that sentence of imprisonment for 10 years for the
offence punishable under section 5(b) of Explosive Substances
Act, 1908, shall commence at the expiration of other sentences
of imprisonments (life imprisonment for IPC offences and other
sentences under other provisions),
Held  The direction to undergo other sentences (term sentence) after
life sentence is illegal. The Hon'ble Court relied on its judgment
in the case of Muthuramalingam v. State, 2016 8 SCC 313 to
conclude that once the prisoner spends his life in jail, there is no
question of him undergoing any other sentence. Court may
order the accused to first undergo term sentence and thereafter
the life sentence, however, the converse would not be true.
Relevant 9,10
Para No.

Name Mahavir vs. State of Madhya Pradesh, Writ Petition Criminal

Appeal No.294/ 2021
Issue  Can there be consecutive life imprisonments for accused
convicted for murder of more than one person?
Held ● In the present case, the Court was dealing the petition filed by
the prisoner claiming his release for the reason that he has
undergone more than 21 years of sentence including 16 years
of actual sentence. The petitioner was convicted for killing two
persons and was awarded life imprisonment twice, one for each
murder. As per the policy, a life convict, who has not been
convicted for any other period along with the life
 (18)

imprisonment, will be released after completing 20 years of

sentence. However, life convicts who have been sentenced for
more than one life imprisonment will be released only after
completion of 26 years of sentence.
● The Supreme Court held that there is no bar in imposing
concurrent life imprisonments (for each death) on accused
convicted for murder of more than one person, though there
cannot be consecutive life imprisonment one after the another.
Relevant 3
Page No.

Name Syed Afsar Pasha Quadri v The State of Telangana, Special Leave
to Appeal (Crl.) No.5543/2021
Issue ● Whether unilateral cancellation of Registered Sale Deed be a
condition to grant the Anticipatory Bail u/s 438 of CrP.C.? In
this case, while granting the anticipatory bail to the accused, the
High Court imposed the condition that the accused shall cancel
the registered sale deed executed by him and return the money
received from the Complainant.
Held ● The Supreme Court has held that a registered sale deed cannot
be unilaterally revoked by one party to the document in
purported compliance with a High Court order, because this
would be detrimental to the interests of purchasers who are not
parties before the High Court.
● The court also held that the High Court ought not to have
imposed a condition while granting anticipatory bail to the
petitioner, as it would tantamount to adversely affect the rights
of the parties to the registered documents, which can be
adjudicated upon by a Civil Court only.
● The said condition was deleted by the Court, without interfering
with the other conditions of the anticipatory bail.
Relevant 2
Page No.

Name Bhagwan Narayan Gaikwad vs State Of Maharashtra, Criminal

Appeal No(s). 1039 / 2021
Issue ● Whether compromise between Accused & Victim executed
after confirmation of the conviction of the accused by the High
 (19)

Court can be the solitary basis for reduction of sentence

awarded in Non-Compoundable cases?
● In this case the accused was convicted under section 326 of the
IPC wherein the victim was attacked with the lethal weapon
causing permanent disability.
Held ● The compromise if entered at the later stage of the incident or
even after conviction can indeed be one of the factor in
interfering the sentence awarded to commensurate with the
nature of offence being committed to avoid bitterness in the
families of the accused and the victim and it will always be better
to restore their relation, if possible, but the compromise cannot
be taken to be a solitary basis until the other aggravating and
mitigating factors also support and are favourable to the accused
for molding the sentence which always has to be examined in
the facts and circumstances of the case on hand.
● The Hon'ble Court denied to interfere with the sentence
awarded to the Appellant solely on the basis of the compromise
entered between the parties.
Relevant 29
Para No.

POWER U/S 482 CR.P.C.

Name M/s Neeharika Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra
and Ors., Criminal Appeal No. 330 /2021
Issue ● Scope of inherent powers of the High Court for quashing of FIR
under Section 482 of Cr.P.C.
● Whether the high court can grant interim protection to the
accused while hearing the petition for quashing of the FIR?
Held ● Police has the statutory right and duty under the relevant
provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure contained in
Chapter XIV of the Code to investigate into a cognizable
offence;
● Courts would not thwart any investigation into the cognizable
offences;
● It is only in cases where no cognizable offence or offence of any
kind is disclosed in the first information report that the Court
will not permit an investigation to go on;
 (20)

● The power of quashing should be exercised sparingly with

circumspection, as it has been observed, in the ‘rarest of rare
cases (not to be confused with the formation in the context of
death penalty).
● While examining an FIR/complaint, quashing of which is
sought, the court cannot embark upon an enquiry as to the
reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made
in the FIR/complaint;
● Criminal proceedings ought not to be scuttled at the initial
stage;
● Quashing of a complaint/FIR should be an exception rather
than an ordinary rule;
● Ordinarily, the courts are barred from usurping the jurisdiction
of the police, since the two organs of the State operate in two
specific spheres of activities and one ought not to tread over the
other sphere;
● The functions of the judiciary and the police are
complementary, not overlapping;
● Save in exceptional cases where non-interference would result
in miscarriage of justice, the Court and the judicial process
should not interfere at the stage of investigation of offences;
● Extraordinary and inherent powers of the Court do not confer
an arbitrary jurisdiction on the Court to act according to its
whims or caprice;
● The first information report is not an encyclopaedia which must
disclose all facts and details relating to the offence reported.
Therefore, when the investigation by the police is in progress,
the court should not go into the merits of the allegations in the
FIR. Police must be permitted to complete the investigation. It
would be premature to pronounce the conclusion based on hazy
facts that the complaint/FIR does not deserve to be investigated
or that it amounts to abuse of process of law. After
investigation, if the investigating officer finds that there is no
substance in the application made by the complainant, the
investigating officer may file an appropriate report/summary
before the learned Magistrate which may be considered by the
learned Magistrate in accordance with the known procedure;
● The power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. is very wide, but
conferment of wide power requires the court to be more
 (21)

cautious. It casts an onerous and more diligent duty on the

court;
● However, at the same time, the court, if it thinks fit, regard
being had to the parameters of quashing and the self-restraint
imposed by law, more particularly the parameters laid down by
this Court in the cases of R.P. Kapur (supra) and Bhajan Lal
(supra), has the jurisdiction to quash the FIR/complaint;
● When a prayer for quashing the FIR is made by the alleged
accused and the court when it exercises the power
under Section 482 Cr.P.C., only has to consider whether the
allegations in the FIR disclose commission of a cognizable
offence or not. The court is not required to consider on merits
whether or not the merits of the allegations make out a
cognizable offence and the court has to permit the investigating
agency/police to investigate the allegations in the FIR;
● The aforesaid parameters would be applicable and/or the
aforesaid aspects are required to be considered by the High
Court while passing an interim order in a quashing petition in
exercise of powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and/or
under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. However, an
interim order of stay of investigation during the pendency of the
quashing petition can be passed with circumspection. Such an
interim order should not require to be passed routinely, casually
and/or mechanically. Normally, when the investigation is in
progress and the facts are hazy and the entire evidence/material
is not before the High Court, the High Court should restrain
itself from passing the interim order of not to arrest or “no
coercive steps to be adopted” and the accused should be
relegated to apply for anticipatory bail under Section
438 Cr.P.C. before the competent court. The High Court shall
not and as such is not justified in passing the order of not to
arrest and/or “no coercive steps” either during the investigation
or till the investigation is completed and/or till the final
report/chargesheet is filed under Section 173 Cr.P.C., while
dismissing/disposing of the quashing petition under Section
482 Cr.P.C. and/or under Article 226 of the Constitution of
India.
● Even in a case where the High Court is prima facie of the
opinion that an exceptional case is made out for grant of interim
stay of further investigation, after considering the broad
 (22)

parameters while exercising the powers under Section

482 Cr.P.C. and/or under Article 226 of the Constitution of
India referred to hereinabove, the High Court has to give brief
reasons why such an interim order is warranted and/or is
required to be passed so that it can demonstrate the application
of mind by the Court and the higher forum can consider what
was weighed with the High Court while passing such an interim
order.
● Whenever an interim order is passed by the High Court of “no
coercive steps to be adopted” within the aforesaid parameters,
the High Court must clarify what does it mean by “no coercive
steps to be adopted” as the term “no coercive steps to be
adopted” can be said to be too vague and/or broad which can
be misunderstood and/or misapplied.
Relevant 10, 23
Para No.

Name Priti Saraf v. State of NCT of Delhi, Criminal Appeal No(S).

296/ 2021
Issues ● Whether the presence of arbitration clause or initiation of
arbitral proceedings be a ground to quash criminal proceedings?
● Scope of Inherent Powers of the High Court u/s 482 and Article
226 of the Constitution.
Held ● The Court relied on the case of Trisuns Chemical Industry Vs.
Rajesh Agarwal and Ors., 1999 8 SCC 686 wherein it was held
that "We are unable to appreciate the reasoning that the provision
incorporated in the agreement for referring the disputes to arbitration is
an effective substitute for a criminal prosecution when the disputed act
is an offence."
● Simply because there is a remedy provided for breach of
contract or arbitral proceedings initiated at the instance of the
appellants, that does not by itself clothe the court to come to a
conclusion that civil remedy is the only remedy, and the
initiation of criminal proceedings, in any manner, will be an
abuse of the process of the court for exercising inherent powers
of the High Court under Section 482 CrPC for quashing such
proceedings.
● Be it noted that in the matter of exercise of inherent power by
the High Court, the only requirement is to see whether
 (23)

continuance of the proceedings would be a total abuse of the

process of the Court. The Criminal Procedure Code contains a
detailed procedure for investigation, framing of charge and
trial, and in the event when the High Court is desirous of
putting a halt to the known procedure of law, it must use proper
circumspection with great care and caution to interfere in the
complaint/FIR/charge-sheet in exercise of its inherent
jurisdiction.
Relevant 28, 31, 32, 33 and 34.
Para No.

Name Kanchan Sharma v. State of Uttar Pradesh, Criminal Appeal No.

1022/ 2021
Issue ● Whether without positive act on the part of the accused to
instigate or aid in committing suicide, can the accused be
convicted under section 306 of IPC?
● Whether factual disputes can be decided in a petition under
section 482 CrPC?
Held ● Merely because deceased consumed poison in front of the
house of the appellant, that itself will not indicate any relation
of the appellant with the deceased. ‘Abetment’ involves mental
process of instigating a person or intentionally aiding a person
in doing of a thing. Without positive act on the part of the
accused to instigate or aid in committing suicide, no one can be
convicted for offence under Section 306, IPC. To proceed
against any person for the offence under Section 306 IPC it
requires an active act or direct act which led the deceased to
commit suicide, seeing no option and that act must have been
intended to push the deceased into such a position that he
committed suicide. There is nothing on record to show that
appellant was maintaining relation with the deceased and
further there is absolutely no material to allege that appellant
abetted for suicide of the deceased within the meaning of
Section 306, IPC.
● We are of the view that the High Court has committed error in
rejecting the application filed by the appellant by merely
recording a finding that in view of the factual disputes same
cannot be decided in a petition under Section 482, Cr.P.C.
 (24)

Relevant 9, 11
Para No.

Name Salimbhai Hamidbhai Memon Vs. Niteshkumar Maganbhai

Patel, Criminal Appeal No. 884 /2021
Issue ● Whether the high Court can issue oral instructions of not
arresting the accused while hearing the Petition for quashing of
FIR?
● Principles governing the grant of ad interim relief in petition
seeking quashing of FIR.
Held ● Oral observations in court are in the course of a judicial
discourse. The text of a written order is what is binding and
enforceable. Issuing oral directions (presumably to the APP)
restraining arrest, does not form a part of the judicial record and
must be eschewed. Absent a judicial order, the investigating
officer would have no official record emanating from the High
Court on the basis of which a stay of arrest is enforced. The
administration of criminal justice is not a private matter
between the complainant and the accused but implicates wider
interests of the State in preserving law and order as well as a
societal interest in the sanctity of the criminal justice
administration.
● Oral directions of this nature by the High Court are liable to
cause serious misgivings. Such a procedure is open to grave
abuse. Most High Courts deal with high volumes of cases.
Judicial assessments change with the roster. Absent a written
record of what has transpired in the course of a judicial
proceeding, it would set a dangerous precedent if the parties
and the investigating officer were expected to rely on
unrecorded oral observations.
● The petition before the High Court is for quashing the FIR
under section 482. While determining whether to grant ad-
interim relief in such a case, involving a stay of arrest, the High
Court must bear in mind the parameters for the exercise of the
jurisdiction for quashing, which has been invoked. The interim
order of a stay of arrest is in aid of the final relief which is sought
in the petition. Hence, the considerations germane to the
exercise of the jurisdiction to quash an FIR must be present to
the mind while deciding whether an interim stay of arrest is
 (25)

warranted. What is present to the mind must emerge from the

text of the order.
Relevant 23, 24, 29
Para No.

Name Kaptan Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Ors., Criminal

Appeal No. 787 /2021
Issue ● Whether the High Court is required to consider the
material/evidence collected during investigation in a petition
for quashing of FIR filed u/s 482 Cr.P.C., if the investigation
has been concluded by the Investigation Agency?
● Whether High Court can go into the merits of the case while
exercising its power u/s 482 Cr.P.C.?
Held ● If the petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. was at the stage of FIR
in that case the allegations in the FIR/Complaint only are
required to be considered and whether a cognizable offence is
disclosed or not is required to be considered. However,
thereafter when the statements are recorded, evidence is
collected and the charge-sheet is filed after conclusion of the
investigation/inquiry the matter stands on different footing and
the Court is required to consider the material/evidence
collected during the investigation.
● The Hon'ble Court held that the High Court in exercise of the
power u/s 482 Cr.P.C., cannot act as an appellate court or as if
its conducting the trial and as such it cannot quash criminal
proceedings by entering into the merits of the case.
Relevant 9.1,11
Para No.

Name Ravuri Krishna Murthy v. State of Telangana Criminal Appeal

Nos 274-275 /2021
Issues ● Whether the High Court was justified in passing a blanket
direction restraining the police from arresting the accused,
while at the same time having come to the conclusion that there
was no merit in the petition for quashing under Section 482?
Cr.P.C.?
Held ● A direction wherein the HC is restraining the police from
arresting an accused while also expecting that the IO must
complete the investigation and file an Final Report under S. 173
 (26)

without arresting the accused is not justified as such a direction

amounted to an exercise under Section 438 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure without satisfying any of the conditions
stipulated under that Section. The petition under section 482
was for quashing the FIR and therefore the matter should end
once the court finds no substance in such petition.
● Such a direction by the High Court has the effect of impeding
the course of the investigation and has no basis or justification
in law. Accused can protect his liberty by filing the anticipatory
bail or by obtaining the regular bail under section 439 Cr.P.C.
Relevant 10
Para No.

Name State Of Andhra Pradesh v. Chekka Guru Murali Mohan, S.L.P

No. 2636/2021
Issue ● Whether ‘insider trading’ in properties will qualify as an
offence u/s 420 IPC ?
● Whether the High Court could go into the facts of the case
while deciding the petition for quashing of the FIR under
section 482 Cr.P.C.?
Held ● The concept of insider trading in property dealings has also
been dealt with by the High Court and has been found to be
alien to the proceedings under IPC, being a concept related to
the trading in company scripts and is an offence only under the
Securities and Exchange Board of India Act, 1992.
● That without considering the facts of the case, the question as
to whether the allegations in the FIR or complaint prima facie
constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused,
cannot be decided.
Relevant 3 and 8
Page No.

Name Jitul Jentilal Kotecha v. State of Gujarat, Criminal Appeal Nos.

1328-1333/ 2021
Issue ● Whether High court is required to demonstrate application of
mind even for issuing an interlocutory direction?
● Whether High Court can quash Criminal Proceedings u/s 482
Cr.P.C. relying on 'Draft Charge Sheet' which is yet to be filed
before Magistrate?
 (27)

Held ● Even at the interim stage, the High Court must demonstrate an
application of mind and furnish reasons for issuing any
interlocutory direction, which is capable of being tested before
this Court in an appropriate case.
● High Court cannot quash Criminal Proceedings u/s 482
Cr.P.C. relying on 'Draft Charge Sheet' which is yet to be filed
before Magistrate. A distinct position arises when the
chargesheet has been filed before a Magistrate and proceedings
under Section 482 are pending before the High Court. In such
cases, the High Court must take into consideration the material
collected during the investigation.
Relevant 20, 21
Para No.

Name Ramgopal vs. State of Madhya Pradesh, Criminal Appeal No.

1489/ 2012
Issue ● Whether ‘non compoundable offences’ be compounded by a
criminal court in exercise of its powers under section 320
Cr.P.C.?
● Whether 'Non-Compoundable' criminal cases of
predominantly private nature be quashed u/s 482 Cr.P.C. if
compromise is reached after conviction?
● Factors to be considered while exercising power u/s 482
Cr.P.C. and Article 142 of Indian Constitution for
compounding.
Held ● The offences which are ‘non compoundable’ cannot be
compounded by a criminal court in purported exercise of its
powers under Section 320 Cr.P.C. Any such attempt by the
court would amount to alteration, addition and modification of
Section 320 Cr.P.C., which is the exclusive domain of
Legislature.
● The High Court, keeping in view the peculiar facts and
circumstances of a case and for justifiable reasons can press
Section 482 CrPC. in aid to prevent abuse of the process of any
Court and/or to secure the ends of justice.
● The criminal proceedings involving non heinous offences or
where the offences are predominantly of a private nature, can
be annulled irrespective of the fact that trial has already been
concluded or appeal stands dismissed against conviction.
 (28)

● As opposed to Section 320 Cr.P.C. where the Court is squarely

guided by the compromise between the parties in respect of
offences ‘compoundable’ within the statutory framework, the
extraordinary power enjoined upon a High Court under Section
482 Cr.P.C. or vested in this Court under Article 142 of the
Constitution, can be invoked beyond the metes and bounds of
Section 320 Cr.P.C. Nonetheless, we reiterate that such powers
of wide amplitude ought to be exercised carefully in the context
of quashing criminal proceedings, bearing in mind: (i) Nature
and effect of the offence on the conscious of the society; (ii)
Seriousness of the injury, if any; (iii) Voluntary nature of
compromise between the accused and the victim; & (iv)
Conduct of the accused persons, prior to and after the
occurrence of the purported offence and/or other relevant
considerations.
Relevant 11, 12, 13, 19
Para No.

Name State of Odisha v. Pratima Mohanty, Criminal Appeal1455-1456

/2021
Issue  Whether a criminal proceeding should be quashed if charge
sheet is filed after a thorough investigation?
 Whether at the stage of discharge and/or considering the
application under Section 482 Cr.P.C. the courts are required
to go into the merits of the allegations and/or evidence?
 Initiation of proceedings against the public servant in case of the
wrongful allotment of plots.
Held  While examining an FIR/complaint quashing of which is
sought, the court cannot embark upon any enquiry as to the
reliability or genuineness of allegations made in the
FIR/complaint.
 Quashing of a complaint/FIR should be an exception rather
than any ordinary rule. Normally the criminal proceedings
should not be quashed in exercise of powers under Section 482
Cr.P.C. when after a thorough investigation the chargesheet has
been filed.
 At the stage of discharge and/or considering the application
under section 482 Cr.P.C. the courts are not required to go into
the merits of the allegations and / or evidence.
 (29)

 The Hon'ble Court relied on the case of Common Cause, a

Registered Society v. Union of India, 1996 6 SCC 530 and
observed action has to be initiated against the
officials who are prima facie responsible for the illegality in
the allotment of the plots to the relatives and/or family members
Relevant 6.2, 8.1, 9
Para No.

Name Saranya vs. Bharati, Criminal Appeal No. 873 of 2021

Issue ● Whether appreciation of evidence is permissible while
considering a petition u/s 482?
Held ● The Hon'ble Apex Court has held that the appreciation of the
evidence is not permissible at all at this stage while considering
the application under Section 482 Cr.P.C. The High Court in
exercise of power u/s 482 Cr.P.C. does not conduct a trial
and/or exercise the jurisdiction as an appellate court against the
order of conviction or acquittal.
Relevant 9
Para No.

INVESTIGATION
Name Kapil Agarwal v. Sanjay Sharma, Criminal Appeal No. 142
/2021
Issue ● Whether lodging of the FIR is barred if on the same allegation
and averment the complaint has earlier been filed before the
magistrate u/s 156(3) Cr.P.C. and the complaint is pending
before magistrate?
● If an application is filed u/s 156(3) Cr.P.C. is pending before
the magistrate, then whether the FIR can be subsequently
lodged with the police?
Held ● As per Section 210 Cr.P.C., when in a case instituted otherwise
than on a police report, i.e., in a complaint case, during the
course of the inquiry or trial held by the Magistrate, it appears
to the Magistrate that an investigation by the police is in
progress in relation to the offence which is the subject matter of
the inquiry or trial held by him, the Magistrate shall stay the
proceedings of such inquiry or trial and call for a report on the
 (30)

matter from the police officer conducting the investigation. It

also provides that if a report is made by the investigating police
officer under Section 173 Cr.P.C. and on such report
cognizance of any offence is taken by the Magistrate against
any person who is an accused in the complaint case, the
Magistrate shall inquire into or try together the complaint case
and the case arising out of the police report as if both the cases
were instituted on a police report. It also further provides that
if the police report does not relate to any accused in the
complaint case or if the Magistrate does not take cognizance of
any offence on the police report, he shall proceed with the
inquiry or trial, which was stayed by him, in accordance with
the provisions of Cr.P.C.
● Merely because on the same set of facts with the same
allegations and averments earlier the complaint is filed, there is
no bar to lodge the FIR with the police station with the same
allegations and averments.
Relevant 5
Para No.

Name Lala alias Anurag Prakash Aasre v. State of Maharashtra,

Criminal Appeal No. 540/2018
Issue ● Whether failure to conduct the Test Identification Parade (TIP)
would vitiate the conviction of Appellant if his identity was
otherwise established by the statement of witnesses?
● Whether colloquial variation in naming the accused would
make the identification unreliable?
● Whether non-mentioning the name of the particular accused in
the FIR would confer any benefit to such accused?
Held ● The failure to conduct the TIP for the accused will not vitiate
his conviction if his identification by name is found in the
testimony of the eye witnesses. Moreover, TIP is not necessary
in the cases when the accused persons are known to the
witnesses.
● The colloquial variation in naming the accused (in this case-
Lala as Lalya) will not make the identification unreliable,
particularly when no other person by such name is amongst the
accused group.
 (31)

● The FIR is certainly the starting point of the investigation, but

it is well within the rights of the prosecution to produce witness
statements as they progress further into the investigation and
unearth the specific roles of accused persons. The FIR as is
known, only sets the investigative machinery into motion.
Relevant 13, 14 and 17
Para No.

Name Pramila v. State of Uttar Pradesh Criminal Appeal No. 700 /

2021
Issue ● Will the failure in putting the specific allegations to the accused
while examining him u/s 313 Cr.P.C. would cause any
prejudice to him?
Held ● The allegation that the appellant stuffed cloth in the mouth of
the deceased was serious and specific against her. We are of the
considered opinion that in absence of any question having been
put to her in this regard under Section 313 Cr.P.C. the appellant
has been seriously prejudiced in her defence. It has repeatedly
been held that the procedure under Section 313 Cr.P.C. is but a
facet of the principles of natural justice giving an opportunity to
an accused to present the defence. The burden of proof on an
accused in support of the defence taken under Section 313
CrPC is not beyond all reasonable doubt as it lies on the
prosecution to prove the charge. The accused has merely to
create a doubt. It will be for the prosecution then to establish
beyond reasonable doubt that no benefit can flow from the
same to the accused.
Relevant 3 and 4
Page No.

Name M.A Khaliq v. Ashok Kumar, Criminal Appeal No.1003 /2021

Issue ● Whether summoning or detaining a person without there being
any crime registered against him is justified?
● Brief Facts - In this case the Petitioner filed the contempt
application against the Police Official stating that the Police
Official called him to the police station in the name of
counselling with his wife and later detained him, despite the
interim orders of the High Court. The Single Judge allowed the
 (32)

contempt petition, however, the order was reversed by the

Divisional Bench.
Held ● The Supreme Court rejected the view taken by the Divisional
Bench of the High Court as per which it was held that the
conditions of Arnesh Kumar. v State of Bihar would not be
applicable since no crime was registered,
● The mere fact that no crime was registered, could not be a
defence, nor would it be an escape from the rigour of the
decision rendered by this Court. As a matter of fact,
summoning the person without there being any crime registered
against him and detaining him would itself be violative of basic
principles.
● There was clear violation of the directions issued by the
Supreme Court not only in Arnesh Kumar v. State of Bihar but
also in the case in D.K. Basu v. State of West Bengal. Thus, the
acts of the Police were found to be in violation of these
judgments.
Relevant 5
Page No.

Name Nerella Chiranjeevi Arun Kumar vs. State of Andhra Pradesh,

SLP(Crl.) 3978/2021
Issue ● Whether previous Sanction Of Central Government u/s 188
CrPC is required at the stage of initiation of investigation?
Held ● The ‘trial’ of the criminal case against an Indian citizen for
offences committed outside India cannot commence without
sanction of the Central Government under Section 188 of the
Code of Criminal Procedure. But such previous sanction is not
required at the stage of cognizance/investigation.
Relevant 2
Page No.

Name Arvind Kumar @ Nemichand and Ors v. State of Rajasthan,

Criminal Appeal No.753 / 2017
Issue  What should be the role of the investigation officer while
conducting an investigation?
 What is the difference between a defective investigation and a
colorable investigation?
 What is the scope of section 149 of the IPC?
 (33)

 Whether the court is required to look upon the motive of the

accused in the case based on circumstantial evidence where the
prosecution has intentionally not led the evidence on motive of
the accused?
Held  An Investigating Officer being a public servant is expected to
conduct the investigation fairly. While doing so, he is expected
to look for materials available for coming to a correct
conclusion. He is concerned with the offense as against an
offender. It is the offense that he investigates such an officer is
an officer of the court also and his duty is to find out the truth
and help the court in coming to the correct conclusion. He does
not know sides, either of the victim or the accused but shall only
be guided by law and be an epitome of fairness in his
investigation.
 There is a subtle difference between a defective investigation,
and one brought forth by a calculated and deliberate action or
inaction. A defective investigation per se would not ensure to the
benefit of the accused, unless it goes into the root of the very case
of the prosecution being fundamental in nature. While dealing
with a defective investigation, a court of law is expected to sift
the evidence available and find out the truth on the principle that
every case involves a journey towards truth. There shall not be
any pedantic approach either by the prosecution or by the court
as a case involves an element of law rather than morality.
 A fair investigation would become a colorable one when there
involves a suppression. Suppressing the motive, injuries and
other existing factors which will have the effect of modifying or
altering the charge would amount to a perfunctory investigation
and, therefore, become a false narrative. If the courts find that
the foundation of the prosecution case is false and would not
conform to the doctrine of fairness as against a conscious
suppression, then the very case of the prosecution falls to the
ground unless there are unimpeachable evidence to come to a
conclusion for awarding a punishment on a different charge.
 Section 149 of the Code deals with a common object. To attract
this provision there must be evidence of an assembly with the
common object becoming an unlawful one. The concept of
constructive or vicarious liability is brought into this provision
by making the offense committed by one member of the
 (34)

unlawful assembly to the others having the common object. It is

the sharing of the common object which attracts the offense
committed by one to the other members. Therefore, the mere
presence in an assembly per se would not constitute an offense,
it does become one when the assembly is unlawful. It is the
common object to commit an offense which results in the said
offense being committed.
 Motive might lose its significance when adequate evidence in the
form of eyewitnesses are available to the acceptance of the court.
But, when a motive might have the impact of introducing a
perceptible change to the very case projected by the prosecution,
in favour of the accused, it cannot be brushed aside. It becomes
more relevant when an accused sets up the plea of private
defence. A common object and a motive may get
interconnected. Thus, a deliberate and intentional avoidance of
unimpeachable evidence qua motive would make the version of
the prosecution a serious suspect.
Relevant 40, 41, 45, 50 and 51.
Para No.

APPRECIATION OF EVIDENCE DURING TRIAL

Name Satpal v. State of Haryana, Criminal Appeal No.261 / 2021
Issue ● Whether the presence of the family member of the victim in the
hospital at the time of making of the dying declaration would
make the dying declaration unreliable?
Held ● Merely because the parents and other relatives of the deceased
and the other relatives of the deceased were present in the
Hospital, when the statement of the deceased was recorded, it
cannot be said that the said statement was a tutored one. It is
quite natural that when such an incident happens, the parents
and other relatives try to reach the hospital immediately.
Merely because they were in the hospital, the same is no ground
to disbelieve the dying declaration, recorded by the Magistrate.
Relevant 16
Para No.
 (35)

Name Dhirendra Singh v. State of Jharkhand, Criminal Appeal No.

580 / 2018
Issue ● Whether non-recovery of weapon can be ground to acquit the
accused when the presence of the accused at the crime scene
has otherwise been established?
● Minor contradictions in the deposition of witnesses which were
examined after 15 years from date of incident, will it confer any
benefit to accused?
Held ● Merely because the weapon is not seized cannot be a ground to
acquit the accused when his presence and his active
participation and using firearm by him has been established and
proved.
● There may be some contradiction/contradictions with respect
to the role attributable to the appellant-accused and/or overt act
by the appellant-accused. The deposition was recorded after a
period of approximately 15 years, there are bound to be some
minor contradiction/contradictions.
Relevant 6.1 & 6.2
Para No.

Name State of Odisha v. Banabihari Mohapatra, Special Leave

Petition (Crl.) No.1156/2021
Issue ● Whether the criminal appeal can be dismissed on the ground of
delay?
● Case of Circumstantial Evidence – no conclusive evidence of
homicidal death as the PMR suggest that death was either
accidental or homicidal.
● Whether abnormal reaction of the accused be a ground to
presume his guilt?
Held ● In a criminal case involving the serious offence of murder, the
Courts do not ordinarily dismiss an appeal against a judgment
and order of the Trial Court, whether of conviction or of
acquittal, on the sole ground of some delay. This is to prevent
miscarriage of justice.
● There was no conclusive evidence that the death was
homicidal.
● It is well settled by a plethora of judicial pronouncement of this
Court that suspicion, however strong cannot take the place of
 (36)

proof. An accused is presumed to be innocent unless proved

guilty beyond reasonable doubt.
● The mere fact that the deceased was lying dead at a room held
by the Accused and that the Accused Respondents had
informed the complainant that the deceased had been lying
motionless and still and not responding to shouts and calls,
does not establish that the Accused murdered the deceased.
Relevant 4, 15, 18, 33, 34, 35, 37,38 & 39
Para No.

Name Shivaji Chintappa Patil v. State of Maharashtra, Criminal

Appeal No. 1348 / 2013
Issue ● Relevance of motive of accused in the case based on
circumstantial evidence.
● Does Section 106 of the Evidence Act absolve the prosecution
of its burden to prove beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of the
accused?
● Whether the fact that the accused failed to give any explanation
in the statement given under section 313 Cr.P.C. proves the
guilty conduct or motive?
Held The Hon’ble Supreme Court held-
● Section 106 of the Evidence Act does not directly operate
against either a husband or wife staying under the same roof
and being the last person seen with the deceased. Section 106 of
the Evidence Act does not absolve the prosecution of
discharging its primary burden of proving the prosecution case
beyond reasonable doubt. It is only when the prosecution has
led evidence which, if believed, will sustain a conviction, or
which makes out a prima facie case, that the question arises of
considering facts of which the burden of proof would lie upon
the accused.
● The factor of non-explanation under Section 313 Cr.P.C. is
only as an additional link to fortify the finding, that the
prosecution had established chain of events unquestionably
leading to the guilt of the accused and not as a link to complete
the chain.
● Though in a case of direct evidence, motive would not be
relevant, in a case of circumstantial evidence, motive plays an
important link to complete the chain of circumstances.
 (37)

● The prosecution cannot absolve itself of the responsibility to

prove beyond doubt the guilt of the accused and place the onus
on the accused to defend himself.
● In the present case homicidal death and motive could not be
established by the prosecution. Even the medical expert could
not rule out the possibility of suicidal death.
Relevant 19, 21, 22, 24, 26, 29 & 31
Para No.

Name Guru Dutt Pathak v. State of Uttar Pradesh, Criminal Appeal

No. 502 Of 2015
Court Supreme Court of India
Issue  Whether absence of proof of motive is insignificant in a given
case if there is direct evidence in the form of reliable
eyewitnesses?
 Whether non-examination of some of the
witnesses/independent witnesses and/or in absence of
examination of any independent witnesses would be fatal to the
case of the prosecution?

Held  When there is direct evidence in the form of eyewitnesses and

the eyewitnesses are trustworthy and reliable, absence of motive
is insignificant.
 Where there is clinching evidence of eyewitnesses, mere non-
examination of some of the witnesses/independent witnesses
and/or in absence of examination of any independent witnesses
would not be fatal to the case of the prosecution

Relevant 9, 10
Para No.

Name Rakesh and Anr. v. State of UP and Anr., Criminal Appeal No.
556 / 2021
Issue ● Whether evidence of witnesses can be rejected on the basis of
minor contradictions?
● Whether recovery of weapon used in commission of offence is
sine qua non for conviction of an accused?
● Whether the recovery of weapon be relied when the ballistic
report shows that the bullet recovered does not match with the
gun recovered?
 (38)

Held ● Minor contradictions which do not go to the root of the matter

and/or such contradictions are not material contradictions, the
evidence of such witnesses cannot be brushed aside and/or
disbelieved.
● One is required to consider the entire evidence as a whole with
the other evidence on record. Mere one sentence here or there
and that too to the question asked by the defence in the cross-
examination cannot be considered stand alone.
● For convicting an accused recovery of the weapon used in
commission of offence is not a sine qua non. Merely because
ballistic report shows that the bullet recovered does not match
with the gun recovered, it is not possible to reject the credible
and reliable disposition of eye-witnesses.
● At the most, it can be said that the gun recovered by the police
from the accused may not have been used for killing and
therefore the recovery of the actual weapon used for killing can
be ignored and it is to be treated as if there is no recovery at all.
● Conviction of the Accused under section 302 and 34 IPC was
upheld on the basis of the testimony of the eye witnesses,
through which the presence and participation of the accused
was established, and on the basis of multiple injuries inflicted
on the body of the deceased.
Relevant 9,11 and 13
Para No.

Name Pruthiviraj Jayantibhai Vanol v. Dinesh Dayabhai Vala and

Others, Criminal Appeal No. 177 / 2014
Issue ● Whether medical evidence would be given precedence over
Ocular evidence in case of contradiction between them?
● Whether non-availability of proper light at the place of incident
would make the testimony of eye-witness unreliable, when the
eye witness has been knowing the accused persons previously?
Held ● Ocular evidence is considered the best evidence unless there are
reasons to doubt it. It is only in a case where there is a gross
contradiction between medical evidence and oral evidence, and
the medical evidence makes the ocular testimony improbable
and rules out all possibility of ocular evidence being true, the
ocular evidence may be disbelieved.
 (39)

● There is evidence about the availability of light near the place

of occurrence. Even otherwise, that there may not have been
any source of light is hardly considered relevant in view of the
fact that the parties were known to each other from earlier.
● The criminal jurisprudence developed in this country
recognizes that the eye sight capacity of those who live in rural
areas is far better than compared to the town folks.
Identification at night between known persons is acknowledged
to be possible by voice, silhouette, shadow, and gait also.
Therefore, we do not find much substance in the submission of
the respondents that identification was not possible in the night
to give them the benefit of doubt.
Relevant 12, 17
Para No.

Name Achhar Singh v. State of Himachal Pradesh, Criminal Appeal

Nos. 1140 -1141 / 2010
Issue ● Whether the High Court while exercising its powers under
Section 378 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973
(“Cr.P.C”) was justified in interfering with the acquittal by the
trial Court?
● Whether the High Court can re-appreciate evidence in an
appeal against acquittal?
● The differentia between "Exaggerated Version" and "False
Version" of statement under Evidence Act. Whether the
statement of the witnesses can be discarded solely on the
ground of exaggeration?
● Whether the prosecution is required to examine every possible
witness?
Held ● The presumption of innocence is doubled when a competent
Court analyses the material evidence, examines witnesses and
acquits the accused. Keeping this cardinal principle of
invaluable rights in mind, the appellate Courts have evolved a
self-restraint policy whereunder, when two reasonable and
possible views arise, the one favourable to the accused is
adopted while respecting the trial Court’s proximity to the
witnesses and direct interaction with evidence. In such cases,
interference is not thrusted unless perversity is detected in the
decision making process. It is also a well crystallized principle
 (40)

that if two views are possible, the High Court ought not to
interfere with the trial Court’s judgment. However, such a
precautionary principle cannot be overstretched to portray that
the “contours of appeal” against acquittal under Section 378
CrPC are limited to seeing whether or not the trial Court’s view
was impossible. It is equally well settled that there is no bar on
the High Court’s power to re­appreciate evidence in an appeal
against acquittal u/s 378 Cr.P.C
● This Court has held in a catena of decisions., that the power,
scope, jurisdiction or limitation between appeals against
judgments of conviction or acquittal and that the appellate
Court is free to consider on both fact and law, despite the self--
restraint that has been ingrained into practice while dealing
with orders of acquittal where there is a double presumption of
innocence of the accused.
● There is a difference between an “exaggerated version” and a
“false version”. An exaggerated statement contains both truth
and falsity, whereas a false statement has no grain of truth in it
(being the “opposite” of “true”). It is well said that to make a
mountain out of a molehill, the molehill shall have to exist
primarily. A court of law, being mindful of such distinction is
duty-bound to disseminate “truth” from “falsehood” and sift
the grain from the chaff in case of exaggerations. It is only in a
case where the grain and the chaff are so inextricably
intertwined that in their separation no real evidence survives,
that the whole evidence can be discarded.
● It is not necessary for the prosecution to examine every cited or
possible witness. So long as the prosecution case can withstand
the test of proof beyond doubt, non--examination of all or every
witness is immaterial. (Sarwan Singh v. State of Punjab, 1976
4 SCC 369).
● The Hon'ble Supreme Court upheld the order of the High Court
which reversed the order of acquittal of the trial court by relying
on the testimonies of the eye-witnesses which were
corroborated by the medical evidences.
Relevant 14,15,24, 30, 32
Para No.
 (41)

Name Umesh Chandra v. State of Uttarakhand, Criminal Apppeal No.

801 / 2021
Issue ● Whether a Test Identification Parade (TIP) is a substantive
piece of evidence or it merely holds a corroborative value?
● Onus on the prosecution to prove that TIP is in accordance in
law.
Held ● A test identification parade under Section 9 of the Evidence Act
is not substantive evidence in a criminal prosecution but is only
corroborative evidence. The purpose of holding a Test
Identification Parade during the stage of investigation is only to
ensure that the investigating agency prima facie was proceeding
in the right direction where the accused may be unknown or
there was a fleeting glance of the accused. Mere identification
in the test identification parade therefore cannot form the
substantive basis for conviction unless there are other facts and
circumstances corroborating the identification.
● The onus lies on the prosecution to establish that the TIP was
held in accordance with law. It is only after the prosecution
prima facie establishes a valid TIP having been held, the
question of considering any objection to the same arises. If the
prosecution has failed to establish that a TIP was properly held
by examining the witnesses to the same, there is nothing for the
accused to disprove.
Relevant 3 and 4
Page No.

Name Goutam Joardar v. State of West Bengal, Criminal Appeal

No.1181 / 2019
Issues ● Can mere delay in recording eye witnesses' statement by itself
be a ground to reject their testimonies?
Held ● Mere factum of delay in recording the statements of the
concerned eye-witnesses by itself cannot result in rejection of
their testimonies if the delay was caused as the witnesses felt
terrorised and frightened and did not come forward for some
time, the delay in recording their statements stood adequately
explained.
Relevant 5
Page No.
 (42)

Name Jayan v. State of Kerala, Criminal Appeal No. 001246 / 2021

Issues ● Whether the testimony of witness who identified accused in
court be discarded merely because TIP was not conducted?
Held ● It is well settled that Test Identification Parade is a part of
investigation and it is not a substantive evidence. The question
of holding T.I Parade arises when the accused is not known to
the witness earlier. The identification by a witness of the
accused in the Court who has for the first time seen the accused
in the incident of offence is a weak piece of evidence especially
when there is a large time gap between the date of the incident
and the date of recording of his evidence. In such a case, T.I
Parade may make the identification of the accused by the
witness before the Court trustworthy. However, the absence of
T.I Parade may not be ipso facto sufficient to discard the
testimony of a witness who has identified the accused in the
Court. In a given case, there may be otherwise sufficient
corroboration to the testimony of the witness. In some cases,
the Court may be impressed with testimony of the prosecution
witnesses which is of a sterling quality. In such cases, the
testimony of such a witness can be believed.
Relevant 15
Para No.

Name AT Mydeen v. Assistant Commissioner, Customs Department,

Criminal Appeal No. 1306 / 2021
Issues ● Whether the evidence recorded in a separate trial of co-accused
can be read and considered by the appellate court in a criminal
appeal arising out of another separate trial conducted against
another accused for the commission of the same offence?
● Scope of the appellate court’s power in a criminal appeal
Held ● It is settled that each case has to be decided on its own merit
and the evidence recorded in one case cannot be used in its cross
case. Whatever evidence is available on the record of the case
only that has to be considered. The only caution is that both the
trials should be conducted simultaneously and in case of the
appeal, they should be heard simultaneously.
● The provisions of law and the essence of case-laws, as discussed
above, give a clear impression that in the matter of a criminal
trial against any accused, the distinctiveness of evidence is
 (43)

paramount in light of accused's right to fair trial, which

encompasses two important facets along with others i.e., firstly,
the recording of evidence in the presence of accused or his
pleader and secondly, the right of accused to cross-examine the
witnesses. These facts are, of course, subject to exceptions
provided under law. In other words, the culpability of any
accused cannot be decided on the basis of any evidence, which
was not recorded in his presence or his pleader's presence and
for which he did not get an opportunity of cross-examination,
unless the case falls under exceptions of law.
● In a criminal appeal against conviction, the appellate court
examines the evidence recorded by the trial court and takes a
call upon the issue of guilt and innocence of the accused. The
scope of the appellate court’s power does not go beyond the
evidence available before it in the form of a trial court record of
a particular case, unless section 367 or section 391 of Cr.P.C.
comes into play in a given case, which are meant for further
inquiry or additional evidence while dealing with any criminal
appeal.
Relevant 18, 25, 37, 39, 41
Para No.

Name Gulab v. State of Uttar Pradesh, Criminal Appeal No. 81 /2021

Issue ● Whether the testimonies of the witnesses should be discredited
on the ground that they are the relatives of the deceased?
● Should the failure to recover the weapon and the non-production
of report of ballistic expert discredit the case of the prosecution?
● Rules regarding the common intention, Section 34, IPC.
Held ● Merely because the witnesses are related to the deceased would
not discredit their testimonies if otherwise they are credible and
cogent.
● Non-recovery of the weapon would not discredit the case of the
prosecution as eyewitnesses have been relied and the injury on
the person of the deceased is a gun-shot wound with an entry
and exit point as corroborated by the eye-witnesses.
● Failure to produce a report by a ballistic expert who can testify
to the fatal injuries being caused by a particular weapon is not
sufficient to impeach the credible evidence of the direct eye-
witnesses
 (44)

● Principles underlying Section 34, IPC-

1. Constructive liability
2. Must be a pre-arranged and pre-mediated concert between
the accused persons for the act
3. A long interval need not have passed between the act and
the pre-mediation and the plan may be formed suddenly. It
isn’t necessary to prove that the act was done by a particular
person
4. It is intended to cover those cases where it is difficult for the
prosecution to prove who actually committed the crime.
● The conviction of the accused was upheld.
Relevant 15, 17, 19, 20, 24, and 27
Para No.

Name Jaikam Khan v. The State of Uttar Pradesh, Criminal Appeal

No.434-436 /2020
Issue ● Reliability of the Testimony of related witness and interested
witness.
● In what circumstances motive is not necessary to be proved by
the prosecution?
● Whether non- examination of independent witness will make
the prosecution case doubtful?
● Reliability on recoveries made from open places in case of non-
examination of public witnesses of recovery.
Held ● The Hon'ble Court reversed the findings of the trial court and the
High Court and ordered for the acquittal of the accused persons.
● Merely because the witnesses are interested and related
witnesses, it cannot be a ground to disbelieve their testimony.
However, the testimony of such witnesses has to be scrutinised
with due care and caution. Upon scrutiny of the evidence of
such witnesses, if the Court is satisfied that the evidence is
creditworthy, then there is no bar on the court in relying on such
evidence.
● In case of direct evidence and the ocular testimony of the eye-
witness being found to be trustworthy, reliable and cogent, it will
not be necessary for the prosecution to prove the motive for the
crime. However, in the case where the testimonies of the eye-
witnesses is not reliable, the motive would be a relevant factor.
 (45)

● Non-examination of independent witnesses, though available,

would make the prosecution version doubtful.
● Since no public witness has been examined to support the said
memo, the statement made therein will have to be scrutinised
with greater caution and circumspection. All the statements
made therein with regard to the confession of committing the
crime would not be admissible in evidence.
● It could thus be seen that the recoveries were made from the
places, which were accessible to one and all and as such, no
reliance could be placed on such recoveries.
Relevant 28, 56, 59,67
Para No.

Name Phool Singh vs. The State of Madhya Pradesh, Criminal Appeal
No. 001520/2021
Issue ● Whether rape conviction can be based on sole testimony of
victim without corroboration?
Held ● If the prosecutrix is trustworthy and there is no reason to doubt
her credibility then without any further corroboration, the
conviction of the accused relying upon the sole testimony of the
prosecutrix can be sustained.
Relevant 6
Para No.

Name Surajdeo Mahto and Anr. v. State of Bihar, Criminal Appeal

No.1677 / 2011
Issue ● Whether last seen theory is to be read along with other
evidences or in isolation to prove the case of the prosecution?
● Can the case of the prosecution be discarded on the plea that all
witnesses examined by the prosecution were related to the
complainant?
● Whether last seen theory is required to be substantiated by other
circumstantial evidences?
● Credibility of the document obtained after conviction for
raising the plea of juvenility of the accused.
Held ● The fact of last seen should not be weighed in isolation or be
segregated from the other evidence led by the prosecution. The
last seen theory should rather be applied taking into account the
case of the prosecution in its entirety. Hence, the Courts have
 (46)

to not only consider the factum of last seen, but also have to
keep in mind the circumstances that preceded and followed
from the point of the deceased being so last seen in the presence
of the accused.
● It is trite in law that the job of the prosecution is to put forth the
best evidence that is collected during the investigation.
Although it is ideal that the prosecution case is further
substantiated through independent witnesses, but it would be
unreasonable to expect the presence of third-parties in every
case. This Court has consistently held that the prosecution’s
case cannot be discarded merely on a bald plea of all witnesses
being related to the complainant party. Hence, in order to draw
an adverse inference against the non-examination of
independent witnesses, it must also be shown that though the
best evidence was available, but it was withheld by the
prosecution.
● Until and unless the last seen theory is substantiated by other
circumstantial evidence to constitute an unbreakable chain of
events, the conviction of the accused cannot rest solely on the
basis that the co-accused was also present along with accused
in the company of the deceased when they were seen together.
● In this case the Hon'ble Court considered the three
circumstances to arrive at the conviction of the main accused
i.e. Last seen theory, motive and the false information provided
and subsequent conduct of the accused. On these three factors,
the conviction of the accused was upheld and the co-accused
was acquitted due to benefit of doubt.
● The court relied on case of Abuzar Hossain, 2012 10 SCC 489
wherein it was held that The credibility and/or acceptability of
the documents like the school leaving certificate or the voters'
list, etc. obtained after conviction would depend on the facts
and circumstances of each case and no hard-and-fast rule can
be prescribed that they must be prima facie accepted or rejected.
Based on this, the Hon'ble Court declined to place reliance on
the documents in question and reject the plea of juvenility
raised by accused due to failure in producing any cogent
material on record.
Relevant 28, 30, 32, 43, 47 & 48
Para No.
 (47)

Name Parubai v. State of Maharashtra, Criminal Appeal No. 1154 /

2018
Issue ● Whether an Accused can be convicted only on the basis of
strong suspicion?
● Can the accused be convicted on the basis as she failed to
explain the reason of fire and failed to discharge the burden
under section 106 of the Evidence Act?
● Facts - In this case the accused was convicted for putting her
husband's first wife on fire in the house, though she moved out
of the same house unscathed. The First wife was shifted to the
hospital and she died on the next day. In her declaration she
had not alleged against the second wife. The High Court had
upheld the conviction and thus, the matter reached the Hon'ble
Apex Court.
Held ● The suspicion, however strong, cannot take the place of proof
as mere suspicion would not be sufficient, unless the
circumstantial evidence tendered by the prosecution leads to
the conclusion that it “must be true” and not “may be true”.
● The High Court holding the appellant guilty of pouring
kerosene around the deceased and her children and setting
them on fire since the appellant had failed to explain the reason
for eruption of fire in view of such obligation to explain under
Section 106 is also not sustainable in the present circumstance.
As held in Sharad Birdhichand Sarda, 1984 4 SCC 116, the
failure to explain can only be held as an additional link to
complete the chain of circumstance. In the instant case, since
the other circumstances in the chain are not established, the
same cannot be held against the appellant.
● There was an absence of strong motive to put on fire her own
house and that too without there being any incident of dispute
for six months since both the wives were residing in the same
house.
● Hon'ble Apex Court set aside the order passed by the Hon'ble
High Court
Relevant 14, 15, 17 and 18
Para No.
 (48)

Name State of Madhya Pradesh v. Mahendra alias Golu, Criminal

Appeal No. 1827 /2011
Issue ● What is the difference between the stage of ‘preparation’ and
stage of ‘attempt’ to commit an offence?
● Whether exaggeration of an incident by witness make his entire
testimony inadmissible?
● Whether Victim’s deposition even on a standalone basis is
sufficient for conviction?
Held ● There is a visible distinction between ‘preparation’ and
‘attempt’ to commit an offence and it all depends on the
statutory edict coupled with the nature of evidence produced in
a case. The stage of ‘preparation’ consists of deliberation,
devising or arranging the means or measures, which would be
necessary for the commission of the offence. Whereas, an
attempt’ is the execution of mens rea after preparation.
`Attempt’ starts where `preparation’ comes to an end, though it
falls short of actual commission of the crime.
● However, if the attributes are unambiguously beyond the stage
of preparation, then the misdemeanours shall qualify to be
termed as an ‘attempt’ to commit the principal offence and such
‘attempt’ in itself is a punishable offence in view of Section 511
IPC. The ‘preparation’ or ‘attempt’ to commit the offence will
be predominantly determined on evaluation of the act and
conduct of an accused; and as to whether or not the incident
tantamounts to transgressing the thin space between
`preparation’ and ‘attempt’. If no overt act is attributed to the
accused to commit the offence and only elementary exercise
was undertaken and if such preparatory acts cause a strong
inference of the likelihood of commission of the actual offence,
the accused will be guilty of preparation to commit the crime,
which may or may not be punishable, depending upon the
intent and import of the penal laws.
● An `attempt’ is a mixed question of law and facts. ‘Attempt’ is
the direct movement towards the commission after the
preparations are over. It is essential to prove that the attempt
was with an intent to commit the offence. An attempt is
possible even when the accused is unsuccessful in committing
the principal offence. Similarly, if the attempt to commit a
 (49)

crime is accomplished, then the crime stands committed for all

intents and purposes.
● Testimony of the child witness cannot be discarded on mere
exaggeration of the incident.
● Victim’s deposition even on a standalone basis is sufficient for
conviction unless cogent reasons for corroboration exist.
Relevant 12,13, 20, 23
Para No.

Name State of Gujarat V. Bhalchandra Laxmishankar Dave, Criminal

Appeal No.99 / 2021
Issue ● Whether the first appellate court should re-appreciate the entire
evidence on record while dealing with the first appeal against
the order of conviction?
Held ● In case of appeal against conviction, the First Appellate Court
is required to re-appreciate the entire evidence on record and
also the reasoning given by the Learned Trial Court while
convicting the accused. Non re-appreciation of the evidence on
record may affect the case of either the prosecution or even the
accused.
● In case of appeal against acquittal the Appellate Court would
have certain limitation as there is a presumption of innocence
which is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the
trial court. However, these restrictions are not applicable on
first appeal against conviction.
● That the High Court has erred by not re-appreciate the entire
evidence on record in detail, while reversing the conviction
order and is thus directed to consider the appeal afresh.
Relevant 6.1, 6.2, & 7
Para No.

Name Surendra Kumar v. State of U.P., Criminal Appeal No.

000449/2021
Issue ● Appeal against conviction for the offence u/s 302 and 120B
IPC.
● Brief Facts:- The accused were the husband and brother-in-law
of the deceased. The FIR was lodged by the father of deceased
alleging that the husband and his family members killed the
deceased by hatching the conspiracy as the accused husband
 (50)

was unhappy with the deceased. Trial court convicted the

accused persons and the same was upheld by the High Court.
● As per the Appellant the deceased was killed by 2 armed
miscreants who looted and robbed the deceased and brother-in-
law while they were returning back home. The Appellant never
killed the deceased nor have had hatched any conspiracy.
Held ● Acquittal.
● The prosecution failed to adduce acceptable evidence to prove
the crime against the appellants and the Court according to us
erred in shifting the burden of proving the innocence upon the
accused, with the aid of Section 106 of the Evidence Act.
● The question is whether failure of the brother-in-law to confront
the armed attackers and not suffer any injury thereby, can be a
circumstance to implicate him. The reaction of witnesses who
see violent crime can vary from person to person and to expect
a frightened witness to react in a particular manner would be
wholly irrational. Equally dangerous would be the approach of
the Courts to reach certain conclusion based on their
understanding of how a person should react and to draw an
adverse inference when the reaction is different from what the
Court expected.
● Conspiracy is a matter of inference and inference must be based
on solid evidence. In case of any doubt the benefit must
inevitably go to the accused.
Relevant 17, 18, 22
Para No.

Name Hari Om @ Hero v. State of Uttar Pradesh, Criminal Appeal

No.1256 /2017
Issue ● Can uncorroborated testimony of a child be the sole basis of
conviction of accused?
● Condition precedents for relying on the fingerprint evidence.
Held ● Corroboration of the testimony of a child witness is not a rule
but a measure of caution and prudence.
● Inconsistent testimony of five year old child cannot be relied
for convicting the accused in absence of any corroboration.
● Fingerprint evidence cannot be relied unless the procedure
adopted for taking the photographs of fingerprints is a trusted
and tested one. The concerned person (who collected the
 (51)

fingerprints) was not examined to throw light on these issues.

The record merely indicates that some photographs were sent
to the office of Director, Fingerprint Bureau but does not show
whether those glasses by themselves were made available for
appropriate analysis. Thus, there is no clarity in the procedure
adopted by the investigation machinery.
● The accused were acquitted by giving benefit of doubt.
Relevant 24, 26, 28, 30 and 35
Para No.

Name Rahul v. State of Haryana, Criminal Appeal No. 262 /2021

Issue ● Whether the evidence of an interested person can be
considered for conviction?
● Whether the appellant is convicted merely on the basis of
suspicion or has the prosecution proved its case beyond
reasonable doubt?
● Whether the circumstantial evidence is sufficient to establish
the guilt of an accused?
Held ● A close relative who is a natural witness cannot be regarded as
an interested witness. It is fairly well settled proposition that
even the evidence of interested person can also be considered
provided such evidence is corroborated by other evidence on
record. Merely because two of the witnesses are related to the
deceased, that by itself, is no ground to discard their testimony.
If their testimony is corroborated by other evidence on record,
same can be relied on to establish the guilt of the accused.
● In order to prove the guilt of the accused based on
circumstantial evidence, the evidence and circumstances must
form a chain of events. That, certain tests have to be fulfilled
while relying on circumstantial evidence for proving the guilt
of the accused. In the present case the corroborative evidence
on record has proven the guilt of the accused beyond any
reasonable doubt.
Relevant 11, 12, 15, 17
Para No.

Name Hari v. State of Uttar Pradesh, Criminal Appeal No. 186 /2018
Issue ● Whether evidence of a hostile witness can be accepted and
made basis of conviction?
 (52)

● Importance of granting protection to the witnesses and

formulation of witness protection schemes.
Held ● The evidence of Hostile witnesses cannot be treated as effaced
or washed off the record altogether but the same can be
accepted to the extent that their version is found to be
dependable on a careful scrutiny thereof. It is for the Judge of
fact to consider in each case whether as a result of such cross-
examination and contradiction, the witness stands thoroughly
discredited or can still be believed in regard to a part of his
testimony. If the Judge finds that in the process, the credit of
the witness has not been completely shaken, he may, after
reading and considering the evidence of the witness, as a
whole, with due caution and care, accept, in the light of the
other evidence on the record, that part of testimony which he
finds to be creditworthy and act upon it.
● The State has a definite role to play in protecting the witnesses,
to start with, at least in sensitive cases involving those in power,
who have political patronage and could wield muscle and
money power, to avert trial getting tainted and derailed and
truth becoming a casualty.
● The present case squarely falls under the situations
contemplated by this Court while necessitating the formulation
of scheme/guidelines/programmes for protection of witnesses.
Implementation of the Witness Protection Scheme at the time
when the witnesses were deposing in the present case, would
have prevented the prosecution witnesses from turning hostile.
Relevant 25,26, 29 and 31
Para No.
 (53)

COGNIZANCE AND FRAMING OF CHARGE

Name M/s Supreme Bhiwandi Wada Manor Infrastructure Pvt Ltd vs
State of Maharashtra and another, Criminal Appeal No. 680
/2021
Issue ● Whether the power under section 156(3) of Cr.P.C. can only
be exercised by the magistrate after recording the statement
under section 200 Cr.P.C.?
● Brief Facts:- In this case the Complainant approached the
Hon'ble Apex Court against the order of the High Court
wherein the anticipatory bail applications of the accused
persons were accepted by the High Court observing that the
order for lodging of the FIR under section 156(3) Cr.P.C. has
been passed by the Magistrate without complying with the
procedure of 200 Cr.P.C., which raises the doubt on the
legality of such order.
Held ● The Apex Court relied on several of its judgments to conclude
that the process under section 200 and 202 Cr.P.C. is not
required to be complied by the Magistrate while ordering for
lodging of the FIR under section 156(3) Cr.P.C., which is a
pre-cognizance stage.
● The High Court has evidently not been apprised of the above
judgments for, if it was, it would not have proceeded to
formulate a principle which is contrary to the line of precedent
of this Court.
● The order of the High Court granting the anticipatory bail was
reversed for being wrong on both facts and law.
Relevant 21, 23
Para No.

Name Ravindranatha Bajpe vs. Mangalore Special Economic Zone Ltd.

& Ors., Criminal Appeal Nos.1047-1048/2021
Issue ● Whether the Court can take cognizance against various officials
of the Company and issue summons, though no specific role
has been assigned to such officials in the complaint filed by the
Complainant?
 (54)

● Whether vicarious liability be imposed on the

directors/managing director of the Company in the case when
the offence has been committed by the Company?
Held ● The court held that the statement made by the complainant did
not have any specific allegations against the respondent-
accused about their involvement in the offence or their presence
for that matter. The complaint just had a bald statement stating
that the respondent accused have conspired with a common
intention to lay pipelines within the scheduled properties.
Therefore, in absence of any specific allegation and specific role
assigned to them, the learned Magistrate was not justified in
issuing process against Accused Nos. 1 to 8 for the offences.
● The magistrate must record his satisfaction about a prima facie
case made out against the accused who are Directors,
Chairmen, Company Secretary, etc. of the company and the
role played by them in their respective capacities which is sine
qua non for initiating criminal proceedings against them. In
addition to this, they cannot be held vicariously liable for the
offences committed by other accused.
Relevant 7.1, 8, 8.3, 9
Para No.

Name Netaji Achyut Shinde (Patil) and Anr. v. State of Maharashtra,

Criminal Appeal No. 121 / 2019
Issue  Whether a phone call without complete information or
containing part-information about the commissioning of a
cognizable offence can be treated as an FIR?
 Whether the accused can be held liable for offence under section
302 of IPC in case of absence of proof of overt injury to the
deceased by the accused?
 Whether presence of accused at the crime scene for the purpose
of facilitation of offence make him liable for common intention?
Held  A cryptic phone call without complete information or
containing part-information about the commissioning of a
cognizable offence cannot always be treated as an FIR, and a
mere message or a telephonic message which does not clearly
specify the offence, cannot be treated as an FIR.
 No physical injury could be attributed to the present accused
since the MLC and post-mortem did not reveal any
 (55)

corresponding wound on account of fist blows or kicks.

However, that does not conclude the issue in favour of the
appellants. The consistent testimony of all the eyewitnesses was
clearly that the present appellants were part of the attack; they
played an active role in assaulting and chasing him the
deceased... The absence of any overt injury on the person of the
deceased did not in any manner diminish the role played by the
present appellants.
 The presence of these accused, to facilitate the execution of the
common design amounts to actual participation in the criminal
act. The evidence i.e. the exhortation by these accused, their
active role in attacking the deceased, chasing him and leaving
the crime scene together, clinches that there was a consensus of
the minds of persons participating in the criminal action to bring
about a particular result.
 Conviction Upheld.
Relevant 21, 24, 30 and 34
Para No.

Name State of Rajasthan v. Ashok Kumar Kashyap Criminal Appeal

No. 407 / 2021
Issue  Whether at the stage of the framing of the charge, the court is
required to evaluate the material and documents on record with
a view to finding out whether the alleged offence is being
disclosed or not?
 Whether the revisional court can consider in detail the
transcript of the conversation between the complainant and the
accused at the stage of revision against framing of charge?
 Whether it was right for the High Court to evaluate the evidence
on record on merits at the stage of discharge application?
 Facts – The SLP wad filed by state against the order passed by
the High Court allowing the charge revision of the accused and
discharging him from charge under section 7 of the Prevention
of Corruption Act.
Held  That at the stage of Section 227, Cr.P.C. (framing of the charges
or while considering the discharge application), the Judge has
merely to sift the evidence in order to find out whether or not
there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused.
 (56)

 Defence on merits is not to be considered at the stage of framing

of the charge and/or at the stage of discharge application.
 At the stage of framing of the charge and/or considering the
discharge application, the mini trial is not permissible.
 That the High Court has clearly exceeded its jurisdiction in
going into the merits of the evidence on record and has acted
beyond the scope of Section 227/239, Cr.P.C.
 That at the time of the framing of the charge, it has to be seen
whether or not a prima facie case is made out or not and the
defence of the accused is not to be considered.
 Considering in detail the transcript of the conversation between
the complainant and the accused which exercise at this stage to
consider the discharge application and/or framing of the charge
is not permissible at all.
Relevant 9.1,11& 12
Para No.

Name Major M.C. Ashish Chinappa v. Central Bureau of

Investigation, Special Leave to Appeal (Crl.) No(s). 2576/2019
Issue  Whether validity of the Sanction order can be challenged before
the Trial Court?
Held  Since the cognizance has already been taken against the
petitioner and the trial is in progress, it is open for the petitioner
to raise the question of validity of sanction during the course of
trial and the Trial Court is bound to consider the said question
at an appropriate stage.
Relevant 2
Page No.
 (57)

INTERPRETATION OF PROCEDURAL LAWS

Name Nasib Singh v. State of Punjab, Criminal Appeal Nos. 1051-1054
/ 2021
Issue  Factors to be considered by the Appellate Court while passing
an order for re-trial.
 Principles governing the powers of the court to order for joint
trial.
 In this case, the accused was tried in two criminal cases. The
first one pertained to allegation of rape and the subsequent one
was for abetment of suicide, as the prosecutrix later committed
suicide. The trial court acquitted the accused in both the cases
due to severe lapse in the investigation. The High Court ordered
for joint re-trial in both cases. The said order was assailed by
the accused before the Hon'ble Apex Court.
Held  Principles on re-trial
1. The Appellate Court may direct a retrial only in
‘exceptional’ circumstances to avert a miscarriage of justice;
2. Mere lapses in the investigation are not sufficient to warrant
a direction for re-trial. Only if the lapses are so grave so as
to prejudice the rights of the parties, can a retrial be directed;
3. A determination of whether a ‘shoddy’ investigation/trial
has prejudiced the party, must be based on the facts of each
case pursuant to a thorough reading of the evidence;
4. It is not sufficient if the accused/ prosecution makes a facial
argument that there has been a miscarriage of justice
warranting a retrial. It is incumbent on the Appellant Court
directing a retrial to provide a reasoned order on the nature
of the miscarriage of justice caused with reference to the
evidence and investigatory process;
5. If a matter is directed for re-trial, the evidence and record of
the previous trial is completely wiped out; and
6. The following are some instances, not intended to be
exhaustive, of when the Court could order a retrial on the
ground of miscarriage of justice :
a. The trial court has proceeded with the trial in the absence
of jurisdiction.
 (58)

b. The trial has been vitiated by an illegality or irregularity

based on a misconception of the nature of the proceedings;
and
c. The prosecutor has been disabled or prevented from
adducing evidence as regards the nature of the charge,
resulting in the trial being rendered a farce, sham or
charade.
 Principles of Joint and Separate Trial.
1. Section 218 provides that separate trials shall be conducted
for distinct offences alleged to be committed by a person.
Sections 219 - 221 provide exceptions to this general rule. If
a person falls under these exceptions, then a joint trial for
the offences which a person is charged with may be
conducted. Similarly, under Section 223, a joint trial may be
held for persons charged with different offences if any of the
clauses in the provision are separately or on a combination
satisfied;
2. While applying the principles enunciated in Sections 218 -
223 on conducting joint and separate trials, the trial court
should apply a two-pronged test, namely, (i) whether
conducting a joint/separate trial will prejudice the defence
of the accused; and/or (ii) whether conducting a
joint/separate trial would cause judicial delay.
3. The possibility of conducting a joint trial will have to be
determined at the beginning of the trial and not after the trial
based on the result of the trial. The Appellate Court may
determine the validity of the argument that there ought to
have been a separate/joint trial only based on whether the
trial had prejudiced the right of accused or the prosecutrix;
4. Since the provisions which engraft an exception use the
phrase ‘may’ with reference to conducting a joint trial, a
separate trial is usually not contrary to law even if a joint
trial could be conducted, unless proven to cause a
miscarriage of justice; and
5. A conviction or acquittal of the accused cannot be set aside
on the mere ground that there was a possibility of a joint or
a separate trial. To set aside the order of conviction or
acquittal, it must be proved that the rights of the parties were
prejudiced because of the joint or separate trial, as the case
may be.
 (59)

 The Apex Court set aside the order of the High Court by
observing that there does not exist sufficient reasons to presume
the miscarriage of justice due to separate trial, inter alia. The
matter for remanded back to the High Court deciding the
appeals on merits.
Relevant 28, 38
Para No

Name Sartaj Singh v. State of Haryana, Criminal Appeal Nos. 298-299

/ 2021
Issue Scope and ambit of section 319 of the Criminal procedure Code.
 What is the stage at which power under section 319 CrPC can
be exercised?
 Whether the word “evidence” used in section 319(1) CrPC
could only mean evidence tested by cross-examination or the
court can exercise the power under the said provision even on
the basis of the said statement made in the examination-in-chief
of the witness concerned?
 Whether the word “evidence” used in section 319(1) CrPC has
been used in a comprehensive sense and includes the evidence
collected during investigation or the word “evidence” is limited
to the evidence recorded during the trial?
 What is the nature of the satisfaction required to invoke the
power under section 319 CrPC to arraign an accused? Whether
the power under section 319(1) can be exercised only if the
court is satisfied that the accused summoned will in all
likelihood be convicted?
 Does the power under section 319 CrPC extend to persons not
named in the FIR or named in the FIR but not charged or who
have been discharged?
Held  Section 319 CrPC is an enabling provision empowering the
court to take appropriate steps for proceeding against any
person not being an accused for also having committed the
offence under trial.
 That the power under section 319 CrPC cannot be exercised till
the case reaches the stage of inquiry or trial by the court.
 (60)

 That the accused can be summoned on the basis of even

examination-in-chief of the witness and the Court need not wait
till his/her cross examination.
 That, if on the basis of the examination-in-chief of the witness
the Court is satisfied that there exists a prima facie case against
the proposed accused, the Court may in exercise of its powers
under Section 319 CrPC array such a person as accused and
summon him to face the trial.
 That the power under section 319 CrPC can be exercised at the
stage of completion of examination-in-chief and the court does
not need to wait till the said evidence is tested on cross-
examination for it is the satisfaction of the court which can be
gathered from the reasons recorded by the court, in respect of
complicity of some other person, not facing the trial in the
offence.
 A person not named in the FIR or a person though named in
the FIR but has not been charge-sheeted or a person who has
been discharged can be summoned under section 319 CrPC,
provided from the evidence collected in the form of statements
made in the examination-in-chief of the witness concerned or
other evidence, it appears that such person can be tried along
with the accused already facing trial. However, a person who
has been discharged stands on a different footing than a person
who was never subjected to investigation or if subjected to never
charge-sheeted. Therefore, there must exist compelling
circumstances to exercise such power against him.
 The word “evidence” as envisaged under section 319 CrPC
would mean evidence recorded during the trial and apart from
that any material that has been received by the Court after
cognizance is taken and before the trial commences which can
be utilised for corroboration and to support the court to invoke
the power under section 319 CrPC.
 The Court can exercise its powers under section 319 Crpc
merely on the basis of the dispositions made during the
examination in chief and there is no need to wait till the cross-
examination.
Relevant 6.1.2 to 6.4, 7,
Para No.
 (61)

Name Ajay Kumar v. State Of Uttarakhand, Criminal Appeal No.88 /

2021
Issue  Whether the High court was justified dismissing the criminal
revision filed against the order to summon the accused u/s 319
of Cr.P.C., solely on the basis of the subsequent conduct of the
accused and without considering the order on merit?
 Should the High court have adjudged the correctness of the
order issued u/s 319 Cr.P.C. by the trial court before dismissing
the revision application?
Held  The High court did not examine the correctness of the order of
the trial court order before dismissing the application on the
ground that proceedings u/s 319 Cr.P.C. have already
commenced against the applicant. The High court erred in
coming to the said conclusion.
 Subsequent proceedings cannot be a ground to not consider the
correctness and validity of the earlier order.
Relevant 8, 11 & 12
Para No.

Name State Of Kerala v. K. Ajith and Others, Criminal Appeal No

697 / 2021
Issue CRIMINAL LAW
 Principles of Withdrawal of Prosecution under section 321 of
Cr.P.C.
 Duty of Court while dealing with an application for withdrawal
of Prosecution u/s 321 Cr.P.C
 Whether the prosecution sanction is required for prosecuting
the elected representative (MLAs)?
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
 Whether destruction of the public property in Legislative
Assembly by an MLA is protected by freedom of speech in
legislature or with the forms of protest legitimately available to
member of opposition?
 Whether the sanction of the Speaker of the House is required
for prosecuting MLAs for occurrences within the precincts of
the Assembly?
 When will be the immunity under Article 194 will be
applicable?
 (62)

 What is the interpretation of the term ‘publication’ as used in

Article 194(2)?
 Whether all acts done inside Legislative assembly (including
the acts of vandalism) would be covered by the term
‘proceedings’ used in Article 194(2)?
Held  The principles which emerge from the decisions of this Court
on the withdrawal of a prosecution under Section 321 of the
Cr.P.C. were formulated as under:
 Section 321 entrusts the decision to withdraw from a
prosecution to the public prosecutor but the consent of the
court is required for a withdrawal of the prosecution;
 The public prosecutor may withdraw from a prosecution not
merely on the ground of paucity of evidence but also to
further the broad ends of public justice;
 The public prosecutor must formulate an independent
opinion before seeking the consent of the court to withdraw
from the prosecution;
 While the mere fact that the initiative has come from the
government will not vitiate an application for withdrawal,
the court must make an effort to elicit the reasons for
withdrawal so as to ensure that the public prosecutor was
satisfied that the withdrawal of the prosecution is necessary
for good and relevant reasons;
 In deciding whether to grant its consent to a withdrawal, the
court exercises a judicial function but it has been described
to be supervisory in nature. Before deciding whether to
grant its consent the court must be satisfied that: (a) The
function of the public prosecutor has not been improperly
exercised or that it is not an attempt to interfere with the
normal course of justice for illegitimate reasons or purposes;
(b) The application has been made in good faith, in the
interest of public policy and justice, and not to thwart or
stifle the process of law; (c) The application does not suffer
from such improprieties or illegalities as would cause
manifest injustice if consent were to be given; (d) The grant
of consent sub-serves the administration of justice; and (e)
The permission has not been sought with an ulterior
purpose unconnected with the vindication of the law which
the public prosecutor is duty bound to maintain;
 (63)

 While determining whether the withdrawal of the

prosecution sub serves the administration of justice, the
court would be justified in scrutinizing the nature and
gravity of the offence and its impact upon public life
especially where matters involving public funds and the
discharge of a public trust are implicated; and
 In a situation where both the trial judge and the revisional
court have concurred in granting or refusing consent, this
Court while exercising its jurisdiction under Article 136 of
the Constitution would exercise caution before disturbing
concurrent findings. The Court may in exercise of the well-
settled principles attached to the exercise of this jurisdiction,
interfere in a case where there has been a failure of the trial
judge or of the High Court to apply the correct principles in
deciding whether to grant or withhold consent.
The true function of the court when an application under
Section 321 is filed is to ensure that the executive function
of the public prosecutor has not been improperly exercised
or that it is not an attempt to interfere with the normal
course of justice for illegitimate reasons or purposes. The
court will grant its consent if it is satisfied that it sub-serves
the administration of justice and the purpose of seeking it is
not extraneous to the vindication of the law. It is the broad
ends of public justice that must guide the decision. The
public prosecutor is duty bound to act independently and
ensure that they have applied their minds to the essential
purpose which governs the exercise of the powers. Whether
the public prosecutor has acted in good faith is not in itself
dispositive of the issue as to whether consent should be
given. Good faith is one and not the only consideration. The
court must also scrutinize whether an application suffers
from such improprieties or illegalities as to cause manifest
injustice if consent is given.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
 As any other citizen, a MLA is subject to boundaries of lawful
behaviour set by criminal law. No member of an elected
legislature can claim either a privilege or an immunity to stand
above the sanctions of the criminal law, which applies equally
to all citizens. The purpose and object of the Act of 1984 was to
 (64)

curb acts of vandalism and damage to public property including

(but not limited to) destruction and damage caused during riots
and public protests.
 Privileges and immunities are not gateways to claim
exemptions from the general law of the land, particularly as in
this case, the criminal law which governs the action of every
citizen. To claim an exemption from the application of criminal
law would be to betray the trust which is impressed on the
character of elected representatives as the makers and enactors
of the law. Committing acts of destruction of public property
cannot be equated with either the freedom of speech in the
legislature or with forms of protest legitimately available to the
members of the opposition.
 When no provisions warranting the sanction of the Speaker-
either specific to the offence (such as the PC Act) or specific to
the class (such as the MLAs given in Maharashtra Amendment
Act, 2015) are enacted, then sanction of speaker is not
specifically required and sanction by government is sufficient
for prosecution.
 To attract the immunity available under Article 194 of the
Constitution, the following three elements of Article 194(2)
must be present-first, there must be a publication; second, the
publication must be by or under the authority of the House; and
third, the publication must relate to a report, paper, vote or
proceedings.
 The acts of destruction of public property are not privileged
under the first limb of Article 194(2). Consequently, acts of
vandalism cannot be said to be manifestations of the freedom
of speech and be termed as “proceedings” of the Assembly. It
was not the intention of the drafters of the Constitution to
extend the interpretation of ‘freedom of speech’ to include
criminal acts by placing them under a veil of protest. Hence, the
Constitution only grants the members the freedom of speech
that is necessary for their active participation in meaningful
deliberation without any fear of prosecution.
Relevant 23, 52,56,58,59,65,69,71,80,81
Para No.
 (65)

Name Nagabhushan v. State of Karnataka, Criminal Appeal No. 443

/ 2020
Issue  Whether the High Court was right in re-appreciating the facts
in the appeal preferred against the order of Acquittal?
 What is the scope of section 378 Cr.P.C. and what are the
guidelines to be followed under the same?
 Whether the conduct of the accused in trying to save the victim
once he has put him/her in a imminently dangerous position
will bring the case out of clause four of Section 300 IPC or not?
 Brief Facts - In this case the accused was charged for killing his
wife by pouring the kerosene and putting her on fire in
furtherance of the quarrel between them which was also
accompanied by previous incidents of demand of dowry and
mental cruelty.
Held  The court of appeal has as wide powers of appreciation of
evidence in an appeal against an order of acquittal as in the case
of an appeal against an order of conviction.
 The accused enjoys the original presumption of innocence
which is the fundamental principle of criminal law
jurisprudence in an appeal against an order of acquittal. The
accused also enjoys the presumption of innocence due to the
acquittal granted to him by the order of the trial court.
 The High Court has given cogent reasons for interfering with
the order of the trial court and thus the same action cannot be
declared perverse.
 High Court has rightly convicted the accused as the medical
evidence as well as the dying declaration duly corroborated
towards proving the guilt of the accused.
 The conduct of the accused in trying to save the victim once he
had lit her with kerosene will not absolve him of the imminent
danger he put the victim in and thus he is rightly convicted u/s
302, IPC.
Relevant 4.8, 5.2.1, 5.2.3, 6 7, 9, & 10
Para No.

Name Sunil Kumar @ Sudhir Kumar v. State Of Uttar Pradesh

Criminal Appeal No. 526 / 2021
Issue  Whether S. 31(1) of Cr.P.C vest discretion with the Court to
order the sentence to run concurrently?
 (66)

 Whether Court of first Instance is legally obligated to specify

as to whether the sentences would run concurrently or
consecutively?
Held  Section 31(1) Cr.P.C. vests complete discretion with the Court
to order the sentences for two or more offences at one trial to
run concurrently having regard to the nature of offences and
the surrounding factors. Even though it cannot be said that
consecutive running is the normal rule but, it is also not laid
down that multiple sentences must run concurrently. There
cannot be any straitjacket approach in the matter of exercise of
such discretion by the Court; but this discretion has to be
judiciously exercised with reference to the nature of the
offence/s committed and the facts and circumstances of the
case. However, if the sentences (other than life imprisonment)
are not provided to run concurrently, one would run after the
other, in such order as the Court may direct.
 It is legally obligatory upon the Court of first instance, while
awarding multiple punishments of imprisonment, to specify in
clear terms as to whether the sentences would run concurrently
or consecutively. It needs hardly an emphasis that any
omission to carry out this obligation by the Court of first
instance causes unnecessary and avoidable prejudice to the
parties, be it the accused or be it the prosecution.
Relevant 10.2, 21
Para No.

Name Dinesh Mahajan v. Vishal Mahajan; Transfer Petition(s)

(Criminal) No(s). 442/2021
Issue  Whether mere apprehension of threat of life is sufficient ground
for seeking transfer of a criminal case u/s 406 Cr.P.C.
Held  Mere apprehension of threat of life is not a sufficient ground to
transfer a case under Section 406 Cr.P.C., without lodging a
complaint or substantiating the said ground.
Relevant 1
Page No.
 (67)

Name M/s Cheminova India Ltd. and Anr. v. State of Punjab and
Anr., Criminal Appeal No. 749 /2021
Issue  Whether the fresh period of limitation can start from the date
when the further report from the Central Insecticide Testing
Laboratory has been obtained by the State?
 Brief Facts:-In this case the State failed to file the Complaint
within three years from the date of receipt of the report from the
state laboratory and due to which the Compliant was
challenged for being barred by limitation u/s 468 of the Cr.PC.
The state claimed that the limitation must be computed from
the date from which the further report was obtained from
central laboratory.
 Whether proceedings against an accused can be quashed if the
Magistrate has taken Cognizance of offence under the
Insecticides Act, 1968 without conducting any inquiry or
investigation u/s 202 Cr.P.C. specifically in the case when the
Complainant is a public servant who has filed the complaint in
discharge of his official duties?
 Whether the Managing Director of the Company can be liable
for the Company under the Insecticides Act, 1968 when the
Company has passed the resolution through which the
responsibility has been fixed on a manager?
Held  When it is clear from the language of Section 469, Cr.P.C that
the period of limitation shall commence on the date of offence,
there is no reason to seek computation of limitation only from
the date of receipt of report of the Central Insecticide Testing
Laboratory, Faridabad. As per the procedure prescribed under
the Statute, i.e., Insecticide Act, 1968 and the rules made
thereunder, the Insecticide Testing Laboratory, Ludhiana was
the competent authority and when the report of the state
laboratory indicates misbranding, thus, the period of limitation
will start from the date of receipt of such report and the state
should not have waited for the report of central laboratory.
Thus, the complaint filed by the State was barred by limitation.
 The legislature in its wisdom has itself placed the public servant
on a different pedestal, as would be evident from a perusal of
proviso to Section 200 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
Object of holding an inquiry/investigation before taking
cognizance, in cases where accused resides outside the
 (68)

territorial jurisdiction of such Magistrate, is to ensure that

innocents are not harassed unnecessarily. By virtue of proviso
to Section 200 of Code of Criminal Procedure, the Magistrate,
while taking cognizance, need not record statement of such
public servant, who has filed the complaint in discharge of his
official duty. Further, by virtue of Section 293 of Code of
Criminal Procedure, report of the Government Scientific
Expert is, per se, admissible in evidence. The Code of Criminal
Procedure itself provides for exemption from examination of
such witnesses, when the complaint is filed by a public servant.
In the present case, 2nd Respondent / Public Servant, in
exercise of powers under provisions of the Insecticides Act,
1968, has filed complaint, enclosing several documents
including reports of the Government Laboratories, it is always
open for the Magistrate to issue process on such complaint
which is supported by documents
 A reading of Section 33 of the Insecticides Act, 1968 makes it
clear that only responsible person of the Company, as well as
the Company alone shall be deemed to be guilty of the offence
and shall be liable to be proceeded against.
 Though, the Managing Director is overall incharge of the affairs
of the company, whether such officer is to be prosecuted or not,
depends on the facts and circumstances of each case and the
relevant provisions of law. When a manager has been held to
be responsible, prosecuting the Managing Director is nothing
but the abuse of process of law.
Relevant 9, 10,11
Para No.

Name Gurjant Singh v. State of Punjab, Criminal Appeal Nos. 1385-

1386 /2021
Issue  Whether Criminal Appeal can be dismissed as infructuous
merely on the ground that the convict has served the entire
sentence?
Held  Appeal against conviction could not have been treated as
infructuous merely for the reason that the convicted appellant
had served out the sentence. The accused can nevertheless assail
his conviction.
 (69)

Relevant 2 and 3
Page No.

Name XXX vs State of Kerala, Criminal Appeal No(s). 1444/2021

Issue  Whether High Court can recall its judgment/order in exercise of
power u/s 362 Cr.P.C ?
Held  Section 362 Cr.P.C. only provides for correction of any clerical
or arithmetical error. The same does not empower the court to
recall the earlier order passed after contest and that too Suo
moto.
Relevant 2 and 3
Page No.

Name Mofil Khan and Another v. The State of Jharkhand, Review

Petition (Criminal) No. 641 / 2015
Issue  Whether possibility of the reformation and rehabilitation is a
mitigating factor to be considered at the time of awarding death
sentence to the accused?
Held  The possibility of reformation and rehabilitation of the convict
is an important factor which has to be taken into account as a
mitigating circumstance before sentencing him to death.
Relevant 10
Para No.

Name Jatinderveer Arora v. State of Punjab, Transfer Petition

Criminal No. 452 of 2019
Issue  Whether the person can seek the transfer of trial to another state
on the ground that the communally surcharged situation in the
state will deprive him of fair trial?
 Conditions for the transfer of trial of the case from one state to
another.
Held After going through the apprehensions faced by the petitioners and
looking into the question of whether the situation in Punjab is
conducive for a fair trial or not, Hon’ble Court held-
 The transfer of trial from one state to another would inevitably
reflect on the credibility of the State’s judiciary. Except for
compelling factors and clear situation of deprivation of fair
justice, the transfer power should not be invoked.
 (70)

 That, general allegations of surcharged atmosphere cannot be a

sufficient ground for transferring of the case but the reasons have
to be more compelling than that. General allegation of
surcharged atmosphere is not however sufficient. The
apprehension of not getting a fair and impartial trial cannot be
founded on certain grievances or convenience of the accused but
the reasons have to be more compelling than that. “If the courts
are able to function uninfluenced by public sentiment, shifting of trial
would not be warranted”.
 That the powers under section 406 CrPC are extraordinary
powers and thus are to be used very carefully and sparingly.
 That the court has to be fully convinced that there exist factors
in the region which would completely prohibit a fair and just
trial before transferring the case.
 That there is no single rule or yardstick to decide which cases
should be transferred and which shouldn’t, however every case
should be looked at according to the facts and circumstances
involved in the case.
 The convenience of only the person seeking transfer shouldn’t
be looked at, rather the court should consider the convenience
of all the parties involved in the case, viz, prosecution, witnesses,
accused and etc.
Relevant 8, 11, 18 & 21
Para No.

Name Swaati Nirkhi v. State (NCT of Delhi), Transfer Petition

(Criminal) No. 262 / 2018
Issue  Place of inquiry and trial of criminal cases pertaining to
matrimonial issues.
 Relevant factors to be considered for deciding the transfer
application filed u/s 406 of Cr.P.C.
Held  In a criminal case, the place of inquiry and trial has to be by the
Court within whose local jurisdiction, the crime was allegedly
committed as provided by Section 177 of Cr.P.C.
 A criminal case ought to be inquired and tried ordinarily where
the cause of action has accrued.
 The convenience of the parties does not mean the convenience
of the petitioner alone who approaches the court on
misconceived notions of apprehension. Convenience for the
 (71)

purposes of transfer means the convenience of the prosecution,

other accused, the witnesses and the larger interest of the society.
 In this case, the Hon'ble Court rejected the transfer application
of the Petitioner by stating that the cause of action lies in New
Delhi and most of the prosecution witnesses are situated in
Delhi, which includes the government official. If the transfer is
allowed then these witnesses would be required to travel from
New Delhi to Allahabad, which would cause hindrance in
performing their official duties. There exist no exceptional
circumstance warranting the transfer of trial.
 The transfer application filed by wife was rejected by the Hon'ble
Court.
Relevant 14, 15, 16, & 17
Para No.

Name Krishna Lal Chawla v. State of Uttar Pradesh, Criminal Appeal

No. 283 / 2021
Issues  Can a complainant after filing an initial complaint for non-
cognizable offence come up with another successive complaint
before the police depicting the commission of cognizable
offence, with improved material facts and charges relating to the
same offence?
 Whether a second FIR in respect of the same offence is violative
of Article 21 of the Indian Constitution?
 If the complainant is aggrieved by slow and lacklustre
investigation by the police, should he file a fresh complaint or
apply to the magistrate u/s 155(2) CrPC for directions to the
police?
 Role of Judiciary in preventing abuse of Court process.
 Role of the trial courts in disposing off frivolous complaints.
Held  Even in a non-cognizable case the police officer after the order
of the Magistrate, is empowered to investigate the offence in the
same manner as a cognizable case, except the power to arrest
without a warrant. Therefore, the complainant cannot subject
the accused to a double whammy of investigation by the police
and inquiry before the Magistrate.
 If the respondent was plagued by lack of speed in the
investigation, the appropriate remedy would’ve been to apply
 (72)

to the magistrate u/s 155(2), CrPC for directions to the police

in this regard.
 Article 21 encapsulates not only the right to a speedy trial before
the court, but also the preceding stages of inquiry and police
investigation as well. Thus, a just balance has to be struck
between rights of citizens under Articles 19 & 21 and the
expansive power of the police to investigate an offence.
 Permitting multiple complaints by the party in respect of the
same incident will lead to the accused being entangled in
numerous criminal proceedings and thus he would be forced to
surrender his liberty time and again which would violate his
right under Article 21.
 Curtailing vexatious and frivolous litigation is a crucial step
towards a more effective justice system- a step that cannot be
taken without the active involvement of the lower judiciary,
especially in criminal proceedings.
 The power conferred on the magistrate u/s 202 CrPC to
postpone the issue of process pursuant to a private complaint
also provides for filtering out of frivolous complaints that must
be fully exercised.
Duty of Magistrate while acting on complaints.
 On receipt of a private complaint, the Magistrate must first,
scrutinise it to examine if the allegations made in the private
complaint, inter alia, smack of an instance of frivolous
litigation; and second, examine and elicit the material that
supports the case of the complainant.
 The power to issue a summoning order is a matter of grave
importance, and that the Magistrate must only allow criminal
law to take its course after satisfying himself that there is a real
case to be made.
 Similarly, the power conferred on the Magistrate under Section
202, CrPC to postpone the issue of process pursuant to a private
complaint also provides an important avenue for filtering out of
frivolous complaints that must be fully exercised.
 It is said that every trial is a voyage of discovery in which the
truth is the quest. In India, typically, the Judge is not actively
involved in ‘fact­ finding’ owing to the adversarial nature of our
justice system. However, Section 165 of the Indian Evidence
Act, 1872 by providing the Judge with the power to order
 (73)

production of material and put forth questions of any form at

any time, marks the influence of inquisitorial processes in our
legal system. This wide-ranging power further demonstrates the
central role played by the Magistrate in the quest for justice and
truth in criminal proceedings, and must be judiciously
employed to stem the flow of frivolous litigation.
 The trial courts and the Magistrates have an important role in
curbing this injustice. They are the first lines of defence for both
the integrity of the criminal justice system, and the harassed and
distraught litigant. We are of the considered opinion that the
trial courts have the power to not merely decide on acquittal or
conviction of the accused person after the trial, but also the duty
to nip frivolous litigations in the bud even before they reach the
stage of trial by discharging the accused in fit cases. This would
not only save judicial time that comes at the cost of public
money, but would also protect the right to liberty that every
person is entitled to under Article 21 of the Constitution. In this
context, the trial Judges have as much, if not more,
responsibility in safeguarding the fundamental rights of the
citizens of India as the highest court of this land.
Relevant 5, 6, 7, 9, 11, 13, 15, 16, 17 & 18
Para No.

Name Pravat Chandra Mohanty v. State of Odisha, Criminal Appeal

No. 125 /2021
Issue  Whether the permission of compounding of offence can be
mechanically granted?
 Whether the offences of custodial violence are compoundable or
not?
Held  The grant of leave as contemplated by sub-section (5) of Section
320 is not automatic nor it has to be mechanical on receipt of
request by the appellant which may be agreed by the victim. The
statutory requirement, makes it a clear duty of the Court to look
into the nature of the offence and the evidence and to satisfy
itself whether permission should be or should not be granted.
The administration of criminal justice requires prosecution of all
offenders by the State.
 The Court denied the permission for compounding the offences
under Section 324 IPC. The present is a case where the accused
 (74)

who were police officers, one of them being in-charge of Station

and other Senior Inspector have themselves brutally beaten the
deceased, who died the same night. Their offences cannot be
compounded by the Court in exercise of Section 320(2) read
with sub- section (5).
 That whether an offence is compoundable or not is a question
which has to be decided with the help of the Court and not
mechanically.
 That while looking at what offence should be compounded the
court is to look at the seriousness of the offence and also the
impact it would have on the society at large.
 The question arises as to while granting leave of the Court for
composition of offence, what is the guiding factor for the Court
to grant or refuse the leave for composition of offence. The
nature of offence, and its affect on society are relevant
considerations while granting leave by the Court of
compounding the offence. The offences which affect the public
in general and create fear in the public in general are serious
offences, nature of which offence may be relevant consideration
for Court to grant or refuse the leave.
Relevant 21, 22, 28, 29, 30, 32, 38
Para No.

Name Vinod Dua v. Union of India and Ors., Writ Petition (Criminal)
No.154 / 2020
Issue  Whether dis-approbation of actions of the Government and its
functionaries would amount to offences u/s 124A and S.
505(1)(b) IPC?
 Whether every journalist will be entitled to get protection from
prosecution u/s 124A and 505 IPC in light of Hon'ble Supreme
Court Judgment in case of Kedar Nath Singh v. State of Bihar?
 Quashing of the FIR lodged for commission of offence under
Section 124-A and 500 IPC.
Held  Expression of disapprobation of actions of the Government and
its functionaries so that prevailing circumstances can be
addressed quickly is within the permissible limit. A citizen has a
right to criticize or comment upon the measures undertaken by
the Government and its functionaries, so long as he does not
incite people to violence against the Government established by
 (75)

law or with the intention of creating public disorder; and that it

is only when the words or expressions have pernicious tendency
or intention of creating public disorder or disturbance of law and
order that Sections 124A and 505 of the IPC must step in.
 It must however be clarified that every Journalist will be entitled
to protection in terms of Kedar Nath Singh, as every prosecution
under Sections 124A and 505 of the IPC must be in strict
conformity with the scope and ambit of said Sections as
explained in, and completely in tune with the law laid down in
Kedar Nath Singh.
 The FIR was quashed by the Hon'ble Apex Court
Relevant 43,44,45,51,67
Para No.

Name V.N. Patil v. K. Niranjan Kumar, Criminal Appeal No(S). 267

of 2021
Issue  Principles guiding the exercise of power under section 311
Cr.P.C.
Held  The aim of every Court is to discover the truth. Section 311
Cr.P.C. is one of many such provisions which strengthen the
arms of a court in its effort to unearth the truth by procedure
sanctioned by law. At the same time, the discretionary power
vested under Section 311 CrPC has to be exercised judiciously
for strong and valid reasons and with caution and
circumspection to meet the ends of justice.
 That in the said case the application filed u/s 173(5) read with
section 311 Cr.P.C. was intended to the examination of
additional witnesses which would help in coming to a
conclusion in the said case and thus the said application
shouldn’t have been set aside by the High Court.
Relevant 8, 11, 14, 15, 18, 21, & 24
Para No.

Name Srei Equipment Finance Ltd. v. Ramjan Ali, Criminal Appeal

No. 6 /2021
Issue  Whether the seized vehicle can be released in favour of a
financier when the original owner has perpetrated fraud with the
financier by wrongfully removing the hypothecation of financier
 (76)

from Registration Certificate, though he defaulted in repayment

of loan? Application for release of vehicle was filed u/s 451
Cr.P.C. by the subsequent purchaser.
Held  The Hon'ble Court held that in normal circumstances the vehicle
should be released in the favour of the registered owner, though
it was open for the financier to approach in the civil court for p-
roper relief. However, in this case the original owner has played
fraud with the financier by getting the entry of hypothecation in
the Registration Certificate removed after conniving with the
RTO, who issued the Clearance Certificate and fresh
Registration Certificate, without intimating the financier. Later
the Original Owner sold the vehicle to some other person, who
also got the fresh Registration Certificate issued in his name. On
getting the knowledge of these acts, RTO cancelled the
subsequent Registration Certificate and no-objection certificate.
Though subsequent purchaser claims to be bonafide purchaser
but fact remains that he is beneficiary of fraud.
 In such circumstances, the Financier has a valid hypothecation
on the vehicle and the Court ordered for release of vehicle to
Financier and set aside the order of the High Court in which the
vehicle was ordered to be released to subsequent purchaser.
Relevant 20,23
Para No.

Name Sanjay Kumar Rai v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Another,

Criminal Appeal No. 472/2021
Issue  What should be the approach of the High Courts while exercising
powers under Section 397 (2) of Cr.P.C.?
Held  Orders framing charges or refusing discharge are neither
interlocutory nor final in nature and are therefore not affected by
the bar of Section 397 (2) of Cr.P.C.
 As a caveat it may be stated that the High Court, while exercising
its jurisdiction ought to be circumspect. The discretion vested in
the High Court is to be invoked carefully and judiciously for
effective and timely administration of criminal justice system.
This Court, nonetheless, does not recommend a complete hands-
off approach. Albeit, there should be interference, may be, in
exceptional cases, failing which there is likelihood of serious
prejudice to the rights of a citizen. For example, when the
 (77)

contents of a complaint or the other purported material on record

is a brazen attempt to persecute an innocent person, it becomes
imperative upon the Court to prevent the abuse of process of law.
Relevant 15
Para No.

Name The State Represented By The Deputy Superintend v. Tr. N.

Seenivasagan, Criminal Appeal Nos. 231-232 / 2021
Issue  Scope of the powers conferred to the court under section 311 of
Cr.P.C.?
Held  Section 311 provides that any Court may, at any stage of any
inquiry, trial or other proceedings under the Cr.P.C., summon
any person as a witness, or examine any person in attendance,
though not summoned as a witness, or recall and re-examine any
person already examined and the Court shall summon and
examine or recall and re-examine any such person “if his
evidence appears to it to be essential to the just decision of the
case”. The true test, therefore, is whether it appears to the Court
that the evidence of such person who is sought to be recalled is
essential to the just decision of the case.
 Application under section 311 CrPC was allowed by the Hon'ble
Court.
Relevant 13
Para No.

Name Rajkumar Sabu v. M/s Sabu Trade Private Limited, Transfer

Petition (Criminal) No. 17 / 2021
Issue  Whether the Apex Court can transfer the case from one court to
another if both the cases involved points which could overlap
with each other?
 Can the court exercise its power under section 406 of CrPC on
the ground that the parties unable to follow the language of the
court.
Held  The Hon'ble Apex while dismissing the Transfer Petition held
that the suits being heard by one court would have points which
could overlap with those in the criminal case pending in the
other court. But that very fact would not justify transfer of the
said case.
 (78)

 If a Court hearing a case possesses the jurisdiction to proceed

with the same, solely based on the fact that one of the parties to
that case is unable to follow the language of that Court would
not warrant exercise of jurisdiction of this Court under Section
406 of the 1973 Code.
 Transfer of a criminal case under Section 406 of the 1973 Code
can be directed when such transfer would be “expedient for the
ends of justice”.
Relevant 7, 9
Para No.

Name Jayamma v. State of Karnataka, Criminal Appeal No. 758 /2010

Issue  Whether the High Court erred in reversing the findings of the trial
Court in exercise of its powers under Section 378 of the Cr.P.C.?
 Factors and circumstances to be considered while determining
the reliability of the dying declaration.
 Brief Facts:- Order of High Court was assailed in which the High
Court convicted the accused only on the basis of dying
declaration.
Held  The other important reason to depart from the High Court’s view
re. conviction of the appellants is that the power of scrutiny
exercisable by the High Court under Section 378, Cr.P.C. should
not be routinely invoked where the view formed by the trial court
was a ‘possible view’. The judgment of the trial court cannot be
set aside merely because the High Court finds its own view more
probable, save where the judgment of the trial court suffers from
perversity or the conclusions drawn by it were impossible if there
was a correct reading and analysis of the evidence on record. To
say it differently, unless the High Court finds that there is
complete misreading of the material evidence which has led to
miscarriage of justice, the view taken by the trial court which can
also possibly be a correct view, need not be interfered with. This
self-restraint doctrine, of course, does not denude the High Court
of its powers to re-appreciate the evidence, including in an appeal
against acquittal and arrive at a different firm finding of fact.
 The judgement of the High Court was reversed and the findings
of the Trial court was upheld wherein the Court had stated
detailed reasons for not relying on the dying declaration
considering the serious doubts on its authenticity. The Supreme
 (79)

Court in para no. 22 of its judgement discussed the detailed

circumstances pointing towards unreliability of the dying
declaration.
Relevant 11, 22, 23 and 28
Para No.

Name Banka Sneha Sheela v. State of Telangana, Criminal Appeal No.

733 /2021
Issues  Whether indulging in acts of cheating or criminal breach of trust
would affect ‘public disorder’ or ‘law and order’?
 Whether liberal meaning should be given to the term ‘public
order’ in context of a preventive detention statute?
Whether possible apprehension of breach of law and order can be
ground to detain the accused under preventive detention law?
Held  For public order to be disturbed, there must in turn be public
disorder. Mere contravention of law such as indulging in cheating
or criminal breach of trust certainly affects ‘law and order’ but
before it can be said to affect ‘public order’, it must affect the
community or the public at large.
 When a person is preventively detained, it is Article 21 and 22
that are attracted and not Article 19. Further, preventive
detention must fall within the four corners of Article 21 read with
Article 22 and the statute in question. To therefore argue that a
liberal meaning must be given to the expression ‘public order’ in
the context of a preventive detention statute is wholly inapposite
and incorrect.
 A possible apprehension of breach of law and order can be a good
ground to appeal against the bail orders granted and/or to cancel
bail but certainly cannot be a ground to move under a preventive
detention statute.
Relevant 13,17, 24
Para No.

Name Shakuntala Shukla v. State of U.P., Criminal Appeal No. 876

/2021
Issue  The Hon'ble Court explained the art of judgment writing and also
elaborated about the essential components of judgment.
 (80)

What should be the approach while deciding the suspension of

sentence application in the cases where the accused has been
convicted for serious offences?
Held  It is not adequate that a decision is accurate, it must also be
reasonable, logical and easily comprehensible. The judicial
opinion is to be written in such a way that it elucidates in a
convincing manner and proves the fact that the verdict is
righteous and judicious. What the court says, and how it says it,
is equally important as what the court decides.
 Every judgment contains four basic elements and they are (i)
statement of material (relevant) facts, (ii) legal issues or questions,
(iii) deliberation to reach at decision and (iv) the ratio or
conclusive decision. A judgment should be coherent, systematic
and logically organised. It should enable the reader to trace the
fact to a logical conclusion on the basis of legal principles.
 Once the accused have been convicted by the learned trial Court,
there shall not be any presumption of innocence thereafter.
Therefore, the High Court shall be very slow in granting bail to
the accused pending appeal who are convicted for the serious
offences punishable under Sections 302/149, 201 r/w 120B IPC.
Relevant 9.3, 11
Para No.

Name Rajendra v. State of Karnataka, Criminal Appeal No. 1438 /2011

Issue  Circumstances in which the Appellate Court can reverse the
order of Acquittal passed by the trial court.
Held  It is true that in various authoritative pronouncements, this Court
has circumscribed the scope of appeal under Section 378 of the
Cr.P.C., in cases where appeal is preferred against acquittal
recorded by the trial court. Further, it is also settled proposition
that unless the view taken by the trial court is not a possible view,
normally the High Court should not interfere with the acquittal
recorded by the trial court. There cannot be any straight-jacket
formula to apply readily for the cases in appeals arising out of
acquittal recorded by the trial court. Whether the view taken by
the trial court is a possible view or not; whether the findings
recorded by the trial court are in conformity with the evidence or
not; are the matters which depend upon facts and circumstances
of each case and the evidence on record. By reappreciating
 (81)

evidence on record if appellate court comes to conclusion that

findings recorded by the trial court are erroneous and contrary to
law, it is always open for the appellate court, by recording good
and compelling reasons for interference and overturn the
judgment of acquittal by converting the same to that of
conviction.
 From the evidence on record, it is clear that the assault was
intentional which resulted in the death of the deceased and all
accused had a common object, as such the High Court has rightly
convicted the accused for offence punishable under Section
302/149, IPC
Relevant 10, 11
Para No.

Name Anu Kumar v. State (UT Administration) &Anr, Criminal

Appeal No. 001607 / 2021
Issue  Whether the High Court, while deciding a petition for quashing
under section 482 Cr.P.C., can pass an adverse order or make
adverse observations against a third party who was not before
the Court nor given any opportunity before passing of the
impugned judgment?
 In this case the High Court, while dismissing the petition for
quashing of the charge, directed the trial court to proceed against
the Appellant.
Held  High Court in exercise of its quashing powers under Section 482
of Cr.P.C. cannot pass an adverse order or make adverse
observations against a third party who was not before the Court
nor given any opportunity before passing of the impugned
judgment.
Relevant 2 and 3
Page No.

Name K. Muruganandam vs. State Criminal Appeal No. 809/2021

Issue  Whether criminal appeal can be dismissed merely for non-
representation or default of Accused’s Advocate?
Held  The accused does not appear through counsel appointed by
him/her, the Court is obliged to proceed with the hearing of the
case only after appointing an amicus curiae, but cannot dismiss
 (82)

the appeal merely because of non-representation or default of the

advocate for the accused.
Relevant 8
Para No.

Name Ramesh Chandra Srivastava vs. State of UP, Criminal Appeal

No. 990 / 2021
Issue  Scope of powers of the Court under Section 319 CrPC to issue
summon against a person?
 Power of the Trial Court to summon a new accused person under
section 319 Cr.P.C. on the basis of the deposition of a witness.
Held  The test as laid down by the Constitution Bench of this Court for
invoking power under Section 319 Cr.P.C. inter alia includes the
principle that only when strong and cogent evidence occurs
against a person from the evidence the power under Section 319
Cr.P.C. should be exercised. The power cannot be exercised in a
casual and cavalier manner. The test to be applied, as laid down
by this Court, is one which is more than prima facie case which
is applied at the time of framing of charges.
Relevant 4 and 5
Page No.

Name Siddharth v. State of Uttar Pradesh, Criminal Appeal No. 838

/2021
Issue  Whether criminal court can refuse to accept a chargesheet if the
accused has not been arrested and produced before the court?
 Whether the investigation officer is obligated to arrest accused in
all cases?
 What is the meaning of the word “custody” as used u/s 170
Cr.P.C.?
Held  Criminal courts cannot refuse to accept a chargesheet simply
because the accused has not been arrested and produced before
the court.
 Section 170 of the Cr.P.C. does not impose an obligation on the
Officer-in-charge to arrest each and every accused at the time of
filing of the chargesheet. If the Investigating Officer does not
believe that the accused will abscond or disobey summons,
he/she is not required to be produced in custody.
 (83)

 The word “custody” appearing in Section 170 of the Cr.P.C. does

not contemplate either police or judicial custody but it merely
connotes the presentation of the accused by the Investigating
Officer before the court while filing the chargesheet.
Relevant 5&7
Page No.

OFFENCES AGAINST WOMEN

Name Sonu v. State of Uttar Pradesh, Criminal Appeal No 233 / 2021
Issues  Quashing of chargesheet filed against the accused u/s 376 of the
IPC for allegedly committing rape on the prosecutrix on pretext
of promise of marriage?
Held  There is no allegation to the effect that the promise to marry given
to the Prosecutrix was false at the inception. On the contrary, it
would appear from the contents of the FIR that there was a
subsequent refusal on the part of the accused to marry the second
respondent which gave rise to the registration of the FIR.
 Parties were having consensual relationship for about one and a
half year.
 The Court relied on the case of Pramod Suryabhan Pawar v. State
of Maharashtra, 2019 9 SCC 608 and quashed the chargesheet
filed against the accused.
Relevant 9, 10, & 11
Para No.

Name Manoj Mishra alias Chhotkau v. State of Uttar Pradesh Criminal

Appeal No.1167 / 2021
Issue  Whether the 10 years minimum sentence under the amended
section 376 will be applicable on the incidents that occurred prior
to amendment (before 2018)?
Held  The incidents in question took place before 21.04.2018, i.e. before
the amendment in the section 376 IPC came into force. Vide this
amendment the minimum sentence has been increased from 7
years to 10 years. Incident having occurred prior to amendment,
the pre-amended provision will have to be taken note.
Relevant 16
Para No.
 (84)

Name Satbir Singh and Anr. v. State of Haryana, Criminal Appeal Nos.
1735-1736 Of 2010
Issue  Whether the term "Soon Before" as used in Section 304-B would
mean “Immediately Before”?
 What are the essential ingredients to prove the offence U/S 304-
B of IPC?
 Importance of statement of accused recorded under section 313
of the Cr.P.C. and the duty of the trial court in this regard.
Held Conclusions: Principles to follow for case u/s 304-B IPC
The law under Section 304-B, IPC read with Section 113-B,
Evidence Act can be summarized below:
 Section 304-B, IPC must be interpreted keeping in mind the
legislative intent to curb the social evil of bride burning and
dowry demand.
 The prosecution must at first establish the existence of the
necessary ingredients for constituting an offence under Section
304-B, IPC. Once these ingredients are satisfied, the rebuttable
presumption of causality, provided under Section 113-B,
Evidence Act operates against the accused.
 The phrase “soon before” as appearing in Section 304­B, IPC
cannot be construed to mean ‘immediately before’. The
prosecution must establish existence of “proximate and live link”
between the dowry death and cruelty or harassment for dowry
demand by the husband or his relatives.
 Section 304-B, IPC does not take a pigeonhole approach in
categorizing death as homicidal or suicidal or accidental. The
reason for such non categorization is due to the fact that death
occurring “otherwise than under normal circumstances” can, in
cases, be homicidal or suicidal or accidental.
 Due to the precarious nature of Section 304-B, IPC read with
113-B, Evidence Act, Judges, prosecution and defence should be
careful during conduction of trial.
 It is a matter of grave concern that, often, Trial Courts record the
statement under Section 313, CrPC in a very casual and cursory
manner, without specifically questioning the accused as to his
defense. It ought to be noted that the examination of an accused
under Section 313, CrPC cannot be treated as a mere procedural
formality, as it based on the fundamental principle of fairness.
 (85)

This aforesaid provision incorporates the valuable principle of

natural justice “audi alteram partem” as it enables the accused to
offer an explanation for the incriminatory material appearing
against him. Therefore, it imposes an obligation on the court to
question the accused fairly, with care and caution.
 The Court must put incriminating circumstances before the
accused and seek his response. A duty is also cast on the counsel
of the accused to prepare his defense since the inception of the
Trial with due caution, keeping in consideration the peculiarities
of Section 304-B, IPC read with Section 113-B, Evidence Act.
 Section 232, CrPC provides that, “If, after taking the evidence
for the prosecution, examining the accused and hearing the
prosecution and the defence on the point, the Judge considers
that there is no evidence that the accused committed the offence,
the Judge shall record an order of acquittal”. Such discretion
must be utilized by the Trial Courts as an obligation of best
efforts.
 Once the Trial Court decides that the accused is not eligible to be
acquitted as per the provisions of Section 232, CrPC, it must
move on and fix hearings specifically for ‘defence evidence’,
calling upon the accused to present his defense as per the
procedure provided under Section 233, CrPC, which is also an
invaluable right provided to the accused.
 In the same breath, Trial Courts need to balance other important
considerations such as the right to a speedy trial. In this regard,
we may caution that the above provisions should not be allowed
to be misused as delay tactics.
 Apart from the above, the presiding Judge should follow the
guidelines laid down by this Court while sentencing and
imposing appropriate punishment.
 Undoubtedly, as discussed above, the menace of dowry death is
increasing day by day. However, it is also observed that
sometimes family members of the husband are roped in, even
though they have no active role in commission of the offence and
are residing at distant places. In these cases, the Court need to be
cautious in its approach.
Relevant 36
Para No.
 (86)

Name Gurmeet Singh v. State of Punjab, Criminal Appeal No. 1731

/2010
Issue  Whether it is necessary to charge the accused under section 498A
of the IPC for convicting him under section 304B of the IPC?
Held  The offences under Section 498-A and Section 304-B IPC are
distinct in nature. Although cruelty is a common thread existing
in both the offences, however the ingredients of each offence are
distinct and must be proved separately by the prosecution. If a case
is made out, there can be a conviction under both the sections.
Relevant 20 and 21
Para No.

Name Gumansinh Alias Lalo v. State of Gujarat, Criminal Appeal Nos.

940-941 / 2021
Issue  Reliability and evidentiary value of the statement of the interested
witnesses in the case pertaining to cruelty (S. 498A IPC) and
abetment to suicide (S. 306 IPC) when the deceased wife
committed suicide by consuming pesticides within 8 months of
her marriage.
 Applicability of presumption under section 113A of Evidence Act.
Held  Most often the offence of subjecting the married woman to cruelty
is committed within the boundaries of the house which in itself
diminishes the chances of availability of any independent witness
and even if an independent witness is available whether he or she
would be willing to be a witness in the case is also a big question
because normally no independent or unconnected person would
prefer to become a witness for a number of reasons. There is
nothing unnatural for a victim of domestic cruelty to share her
trauma with her parents, brothers and sisters and other such close
relatives. The evidentiary value of the close relatives/interested
witness is not liable to be rejected on the ground of being a relative
of the deceased. Law does not disqualify the relatives to be
produced as a witness though they may be interested witness.
 However, when the Court has to appreciate the evidence of any
interested witness it has to be very cautious in weighing their
evidence or in other words, the evidence of an interested witness
requires a scrutiny with utmost care and caution. The Court is
required to address itself whether there are any infirmities in the
evidence of such a witness; whether the evidence is reliable, trust-
 (87)

worthy and inspires the confidence of the Court. Another

important aspect to be considered while analyzing the evidence of
interested witness is whether the genesis of the crime unfolded by
such evidence is probable or not. If the evidence of any interested
witness/relative on a careful scrutiny by the Court is found to be
consistent and trust-worthy, free from infirmities or any
embellishment that inspires the confidence of the Court, there is
no reason not to place reliance on the same.
 We find no fault with the Trial Court and the Appellate Court
placing reliance on the evidence in drawing the presumption
under Section 113-A particularly, when there was no material
brought on record by the defence to disprove the facts.
Relevant 21, 22, 45
Para No.

Name Parvati Devi v. The State of Bihar Now State of Jharkhand &
Ors., Criminal Appeal No. 574 & 575 / 2012
Issue  Presumption under 113-B of the Evidence Act in reference to the
offence under section 304-B of the IPC
Held  Section 304B IPC read in conjunction with Section 113B of the
Evidence Act leaves no manner of doubt that once the prosecution
has been able to demonstrate that a woman has been subjected to
cruelty or harassment for or in connection with any demand for
dowry, soon before her death, the Court shall proceed on a
presumption that the persons who have subjected her to cruelty or
harassment in connection with the demand for dowry, have
caused a dowry death within the meaning of Section 304B IPC.
The said presumption is, however, rebuttable and can be dispelled
on the accused being able to demonstrate through cogent evidence
that all the ingredients of Section 304B IPC have not been
satisfied.
Relevant 17
Para No.

Name Patan Jamal Vali v. State of Andhra Pradesh, Criminal Appeal

No 452 / 2021
Issues  The Hon'ble Apex Court issued some guidelines to make
criminal justice system more disabled-friendly.
 (88)

 Relevancy and extent of reliability of testimony of a prosecutrix

with a visual disability.
 Can the scope of offence under section 3(2)(v) of the ST/SC Act
be restricted to the cases where the offence is committed "only on
the ground that the victim was the member of the Scheduled
Caste"?
Held The Hon'ble Supreme Court while dealing with the matter of sexual
violence issued the following guidelines as under -
 The National Judicial Academy and state judicial academies are
requested to sensitize trial and appellate judges to deal with cases
involving survivors of sexual abuse. This training should
acquaint judges with the special provisions, concerning such
survivors, such as those outlined above. It should also cover
guidance on the legal weight to be attached to the testimony of
such witnesses/survivors, consistent with our holding above.
Public prosecutors and standing counsel should also undergo
similar training in this regard. The Bar Council of India can
consider introducing courses in the LL.B program that cover
these topics and the intersectional nature of violence more
generally;
 Trained special educators and interpreters must be appointed to
ensure the effective realization of the reasonable
accommodations embodied in the Criminal Law Amendment
Act, 2013. All police stations should maintain a database of such
educators, interpreters and legal aid providers, in order to
facilitate easy access and coordination;
 The National Crimes Record Bureau should seriously consider
the possibility of maintaining disaggregated data on gender-based
violence. Disability must be one of the variables on the basis of
which such data must be maintained so that the scale of the
problem can be mapped out and tailored remedial action can be
taken;
 Police officers should be provided sensitization, on a regular
basis, to deal with cases of sexual violence against women with
disabilities, in an appropriate way. The training should cover the
full life cycle of a case involving a disabled survivor, from
enabling them to register complaints, obtain necessary
accommodations, medical attention and suitable legal
representation. This training should emphasize the importance of
 (89)

interacting directly with the disabled person concerned, as

opposed to their care-taker or helper, in recognition of their
agency; and
 Awareness-raising campaigns must be conducted, in accessible
formats, to inform women and girls with disabilities, about their
rights when they are at the receiving end of any form of sexual
abuse.
 We are of the view that the testimony of a prosecutrix with a
disability, or of a disabled witness for that matter, cannot be
considered weak or inferior, only because such an individual
interacts with the world in a different manner, vis-a-vis their able-
bodied counterparts. As long as the testimony of such a witness
otherwise meets the criteria for inspiring judicial confidence, it is
entitled to full legal weight. It goes without saying that the court
appreciating such testimony needs to be attentive to the fact that
the witness’ disability can have the consequence of the testimony
being rendered in a different form, relative to that of an able-
bodied witness.
 The Hon'ble court raised doubt on correctness of previous
judgements of the courts wherein the scope of offence u/s 3(2)(v)
of the ST/SC Act has been restricted to the cases where the
offence is committed "only on the ground that the victim was the
member of the Scheduled Caste". Though the issue was not
referred to large bench and was kept open for the appropriate
case.

Relevant 39, 45, 55

Para No.

Name Velladurai v. State, Criminal Appeal No. 953 of 2021

Issue  Whether quarrel on the date of suicide can attract offence of
abetment of suicide u/s 306 IPC against the husband?
 Prerequisites for attracting the charges of S. 306 of IPC?
Held  The Hon'ble Supreme Court in this case observed that mere
quarrel on the day of occurrence will not amount to abetment to
suicide. The bench reiterated that mere harassment without any
positive action on the part of the accused proximate to the time
of occurrence which led to the suicide would not amount to an
offence under Section 306.
 (90)

 The court also held that in order to bring a case within the
provision of Section 306 IPC, there must be a case of suicide and
in the commission of the said offence, the person who is said to
have abetted the commission of suicide must have played an
active role by an act of instigating or by doing a certain act to
facilitate the commission of suicide.
Relevant 9, 9.1
Para No.

Name Sandeep Kumar v. State of Uttarakhand, Criminal Appeal

Nos.1512-1513 / 2017
Issue ● Whether the death of the accused had been such as warranting
the application of section 304-B of the IPC against the accused?
● The law relating to the death due to poisoning.
● Admissibility of circumstantial evidence in deaths due to
poisoning.
● Brief Facts:- The accused persons were acquitted by the
Hon'ble Court due to failure of prosecution to establish
unnatural death.
Held  Dowry Death
a. That the necessary ingredients of an offence under section
304-B, namely that, the death should be within 7 years of the
marriage, the death must be unnatural and that soon before
the death, the deceased wife must have been at the receiving
end of cruelty or harassment, on account of demand for
dowry, have not been made out in the present facts and
circumstances and proven beyond reasonable doubt by the
prosecution.
b. Section 113B of the Evidence Act comes to the rescue of the
prosecutor by providing for a presumption that a person has
caused dowry death if, it is shown that soon before her death,
she was subjected by such person for cruelty or harassment for
or in connection with demand for dowry.
c. That, the appellant after having been acquitted by the trial
court was wrongly convicted by the High Court as there
clearly wasn’t enough evidence on record to make out the
guilt of the accused for having committed the said crime.
● Law regarding death due to poisoning.
 (91)

● The Hon'ble Court referred to the case of Sharad Birdhichand

Sarda v. State of Maharashtra wherein, the circumstances in the
case of death by poisoning were discussed as under:-
1. there is a clear motive for an accused to administer poison
to the deceased,
2. that the deceased died of poison said to have been
administered,
3. that the accused had the poison in his possession,
4. that he had an opportunity to administer the poison to the
deceased
● Murder by poisoning is run like any other murder. In cases
where dependence is wholly on circumstantial evidence, and
direct evidence not being available, the court can legitimately
draw from the circumstances an inference on any matter one
way or the other.(Anant Chintaman Lagu v. State of Bombay)
● In this case there were no symptoms, which point to poisoning.
Nothing in the post mortem appearance is brought out to show
poisoning. The evidence of witnesses do not establish
poisoning.
Relevant 36, 47, 48, 49, 50, and 55
Para No.

I.P.C
Name Bhima Razu Prasad v. State Rep. By Deputy, Criminal Appeal
No. 000305 / 2021
Issue  Whether section 195(1)(b)(i) of Cr.P.C. will bar prosecution by
the investigating agency for offence punishable under Section
193, IPC, which is committed during the stage of investigation?
In this case the false evidence was yet to be produced before the
trial court.
 Whether the words “stage of a judicial proceeding” under
Explanation 2 to Section 193, IPC can be equated with
“proceeding in any court” under Section 195(1)(b)(i), Cr.P.C.?
Held  Section 195(1)(b)(i), CrPC will not bar prosecution by the
investigating agency for offence punishable under Section 193,
IPC, which is committed during the stage of investigation. This
is provided that the investigating agency has lodged complaint or
 (92)

registered the case under Section 193, IPC prior to

commencement of proceedings and production of such evidence
before the trial court. In such circumstance, the same would not
be considered an offence committed in, or in relation to, any
proceeding in any Court for the purpose of Section 195(1)(b)(i),
CrPC.
 The object and purpose of Section 195(1)(b), CrPC must be borne
in mind whilst determining whether the fabrication of false
evidence during a stage of a judicial proceeding amounts to
having made such fabrication in relation to a proceeding before
the Court. At the cost of repetition, it must be emphasized that
Section 195(1)(b) is meant to restrict the right to make complaint
in respect of certain offences to public servants, or to the relevant
Court, as they are considered to be the only party who is directly
aggrieved or impacted by those offences. Furthermore, for the
purpose of Section 195(1)(b)(i), CrPC, there must be an intention
on part of the alleged offender to directly mislead the Court into
forming a certain opinion by commission of offence under
Section 193, IPC. Though a criminal investigation is certainly a
stage of a judicial proceeding insofar as it may culminate in issue
of process and trial against the accused, it would not be a
proceeding in relation to a certain Court under Section
195(1)(b)(i), CrPC before the Court has even taken judicial notice
of such investigation. The difference between a “stage” of a
judicial proceeding and the judicial proceeding itself must be
emphasized in this regard.
Relevant 20.2, 24
Para No.

Name Rajjan Khan v. State Of Madhya Pradesh Criminal Appeal No.

579 / 2021
Issue  Whether mere factum of recovery of money from the house of
Accused is sufficient to convict him for offence of Robbery u/s
397 IPC?
Held  Mere factum of recovery of some money from the house of the
accused by itself, would not be sufficient to sustain order of
conviction for robbery.
Relevant 3
Page No.
 (93)

Name Geo Varghese v. State of Rajasthan & Anr., Criminal Appeal

No. 1164 /2021
Issue  What actions can constitute an alleged abetment of suicide under
Section 306 Indian Penal Code?
 Whether a school teacher can be held liable under section 306 of
IPC for adopting disciplinary measures or for reprimanding a
student for indiscipline?
 Whether FIR is liable to be quashed when the complaint does not
disclose the commission of the offence under Section 306 IPC?
Held  What is required to constitute an alleged abetment of suicide
under Section 306 Indian Penal Code is there must be an
allegation of either direct or indirect act of incitement to the
commission of offence of suicide and mere allegations of
harassment of the deceased by another person would not be
sufficient in itself, unless, there are allegations of such actions on
the part of the Accused which compelled the commission of
suicide. If the person committing suicide is hypersensitive and the
allegations attributed to the Accused is otherwise not ordinarily
expected to induce a similarly situated person to take the extreme
step of committing suicide, it would be unsafe to hold the
Accused guilty of abetment of suicide.
 It is a solemn duty of a teacher to instil discipline in the students.
It is not uncommon that teachers reprimand a student for not
being attentive or not being upto the mark in studies or for
bunking classes or not attending the school. The disciplinary
measures adopted by a teacher or other authorities of a school,
reprimanding a student for his indiscipline, in our considered
opinion, would not tantamount to provoking a student to commit
suicide, unless there are repeated specific allegations of
harassment and insult deliberately without any justifiable cause
or reason. A simple act of reprimand of a student for his
behaviour or indiscipline by a teacher, who is under moral
obligations to inculcate the good qualities of a human being in a
student would definitely not amount to instigation or
intentionally aid to the commission of a suicide by a student.
 In the absence of any material on record even, prima-facie, in the
FIR or statement of the complainant, pointing out any such
circumstances showing any such act or any intention to place the
 (94)

deceased in such circumstances that there was no option

available to him except to commit suicide cannot be attributed to
the accused.
 In the absence of any specific allegation and material of definite
nature, not imaginary or inferential one, it would be travesty of
justice, to ask the Appellant-Accused to face the trial. A criminal
trial is not exactly a pleasant experience and the Appellant who
is a teacher would certainly suffer great prejudice, if he has to face
prosecution on absurd allegations of irrelevant nature.
 The Apex Court concluded that no element of mens rea can be
attributed to the accused teacher so as to make an offence under
S. 306 IPC and the FIR was quashed.
Relevant 22, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 40, 41, 43
Para. No.

Name Lakshman Singh v. State of Bihar (Now Jharkhand), Criminal

Appeal No. 606 / 2021
Issue  Whether production of injury report is essential condition to
prove the case of ‘voluntarily causing hurt’ u/s 323 IPC?
 Whether ‘use of force’ by just one member of Unlawful Assembly
is sufficient to make liable all other members for ‘riot’ u/s 147
IPC?
 Whether HC should consider all evidences qua the accused(s) in
first Appeal against conviction?
Held  Production of an injury report for the offence under Section 323
IPC is not a sine qua non for establishing the case for the offence
under Section 323 IPC.
 The use of the force, even though it be the slightest possible
character by any one member of the assembly, once established
as unlawful constitutes rioting. It is not necessary that force or
violence must be by all but the liability accrues to all the members
of the unlawful assembly.
 High Court should discuss and consider all evidences qua the
accused(s) while deciding first appeal against conviction.
Relevant 8,9.1
Para No.

Name Ramesh v. State of Himachal Pradesh, Criminal Appeal No. 347

/2021
 (95)

Issue  Relevant factors to be considered while fastening the vicarious

liability on the accused u/s 34 of the IPC.
 When no overt act or action is attributed to the accused by
witnesses and no evidences to prove the common intention of the
accused in committing murder, should he be given the benefit of
the doubt or not?
Held  The Hon'ble Court relied on its earlier judgments wherein it has
been observed that criminal court fastening vicarious liability
must satisfy itself as to the prior meeting of the minds of the
principal culprit and his companions who are sought to be
constructively made liable in respect of every act committed by
the former. There is no law to our knowledge which lays down
that a person accompanying the principal culprit shares his
intention in respect of every act which the latter might eventually
commit.
 In a situation where the overt acts were attributed to principal
accused and not to a person accompanying such principal
accused, then the benefit of the doubt will have to be given to the
appellant.
 The Hon'ble Court acquitted the co-accused persons for the
charge under section 302 IPC, however, their conviction under
section 323 and 34 of the IPC was upheld.
Relevant 15
Para No.

Name Pardeshiram v. State of M.P. (Now Chhattisgarh), Criminal

Appeal No. 1730 / 2015
Issue  Whether the accused should’ve been convicted under 302 IPC or
304-I IPC?
Held  That the accused and the deceased were from the same family
and that there was sudden and grave provocation without
premeditation which led to the accused throwing a stone at the
deceased. In the present facts and circumstance the accused
should have been convicted under Section 304 Part 1 of the IPC.
Relevant 6
Para No.
 (96)

Name Patricia Mukhim v. State of Meghalaya and Ors., Criminal

Appeal No.141 / 2021
Issue  FIR was lodged for commission of offence under section 153A
and 505 of the IPC by the Petitioner who made a Facebook post.
 What the essential ingredients and components of offence under
section 153A of the IPC?
 Whether disapprobation of governmental inaction would
amount to constitute an offence under Section 153A and
505(1)(c) of IPC?
Held  Only where the written or spoken words have the tendency of
creating public disorder or disturbance of law and order or
affecting public tranquillity, the law needs to step in to prevent
such an activity. The intention to cause disorder or incite people
to violence is the sine qua non of the offence under Section 153A
IPC and the prosecution has to prove the existence of mens rea
in order to succeed.
 The gist of the offence under Section 153A IPC is the intention
to promote feelings of enmity or hatred between different classes
of people. The intention has to be judged primarily by the
language of the piece of writing and the circumstances in which
it was written and published. The matter complained of within
the ambit of Section 153A must be read as a whole. One cannot
rely on strongly worded and isolated passages for proving the
charge nor indeed can one take a sentence here and a sentence
there and connect them by a meticulous process of inferential
reasoning.
 Disapprobation of governmental inaction cannot be branded as
an attempt to promote hatred between different communities.
Free speech of the citizens of this country cannot be stifled by
implicating them in criminal cases, unless such speech has the
tendency to affect public order. Therefore, no case can be made
out for an offence under Section 153A and 505(1)(c) of IPC.
Relevant 9, 10, 15
Para No.

Name Archana Rana v. State of Uttar Pradesh , Criminal Appeal No.

167 / 2021
Issue  What are the ingredients which constitute an offence under
Section 419 & 420 of the IPC?
 (97)

Held  Essential ingredients of offence u/s 420 IPC (Prof. R.K.

Vijayasarathy v. Sudha Seetharam, (2019)16 SCC 739)
i) a person must commit the offence of cheating under Section
415; and
ii) the person cheated must be dishonestly induced to
a) deliver property to any person; or
b) make, alter or destroy valuable security or anything
signed or sealed and capable of being converted into
valuable security.
Thus, cheating is an essential ingredient for an act to
constitute an offence under Section 420 IPC.
 Essential ingredient of cheating
 There should be fraudulent or dishonest inducement of a
person by deceiving him:
 The person who was induced should be intentionally induced
to deliver any property to any person or to consent that any
person shall retain any property, or
 The person who was induced should be intentionally induced
to do or to omit to do anything which he would not do or omit
if he were not so deceived.
 Thus, a fraudulent or dishonest inducement is an essential
ingredient of the offence under Section 415 IPC.
Relevant 5, 6 & 7
Para No.

Name Ganesan v. State Represented by Station House Officer,

Criminal Appeal No. 903 / 2021
Issue  In what cases ‘constructive liability’ can be resorted for the
offences of robbery and dacoity? Can a person be convicted for
offence u/s 397 IPC though he has himself not "used" any deadly
weapon?
 Whether 5 or more person are necessary for ‘trial’ of offences u/s
391 & 395 IPC ?
 Whether acquittal of a co-accused in a separate trial, conducted
after 15 years, on the same evidence is a ground to seek acquittal?
 Minor contradiction in the testimony of the witness.
Held Constructive Liability
1. S. 391 & S. 396 IPC
 (98)

● For bringing the offence u/s 391 (“dacoity”) IPC and u/s S.
396 (“dacoity with murder”) IPC an accused can be
convicted on the basis of ‘constructive liability’, however the
only requirement would be involvement of 5 or more
persons.
2. S. 397 IPC
● The principle of constructive liability cannot be used u/s 397
IPC as term ‘Offender’ u/s 397 IPC is confined to the
‘offender’ who uses any deadly weapon and use of deadly
weapon by one offender at the time of committing robbery
cannot attract S. 397 IPC for the imposition of minimum
punishment on another offender who has not used any
deadly weapon.
3. Difference between Section 397 & Section 398 IPC
● The word used in Section 397 is ‘uses’ any deadly weapon
and the word used is Section 398 IPC is ‘offender’ is armed
with any ‘deadly weapon’. Therefore, for the purpose of
attracting S. 397 IPC the ‘offender’ who ‘uses’ any deadly
weapon shall be attracted.
4. S. 390,392,393,394,397
● To convict a person under the aforesaid section, constructive
liability cannot be used and it is required to be proved that
the offender/person who committed robbery and/or
voluntarily causes hurt or attempt to commit such robbery
and who uses any deadly weapon or causes grievous hurt to
any person, or commits to cause death or grievous hurt any
person at the time of committing robbery or dacoity.
 Merely because some of the accused absconded and less than five
persons came to be tried in the trial, it cannot be said that the
offence under Section 391 IPC punishable under Section 395 IPC
is not made out. What is required to be considered is the
involvement and commission of the offence of robbery by five
persons or more and not whether five or more persons were tried.
Once it is found on evidence that five or more persons conjointly
committed the offence of robbery or attempted to commit the
robbery a case would fall under Section 391 IPC and would fall
within the definition of ‘dacoity’. Therefore, in the facts and
circumstances, the accused can be convicted for the offence
under Section 391 IPC punishable under Section 395 IPC.
 (99)

 Mere acquittal of one of the accused in subsequent trial on the

same evidence by itself does not lead to a conclusion that all
deserve to be acquitted in case appropriate reasons have been
given on appreciation of evidence both in regard to acquittal and
conviction of the accused.
 If an accused is charged with a grave offence but the same is not
established on merits or for default of technical nature, he can be
convicted and punished for a minor offence without altering of a
charge.
 Minor contradiction in the testimony of the witness examined
after 14 years would not affect its credibility. Only contradictions
which are material contradictions may create the doubt and
benefit of such material contradiction can be given to the
accused.
Relevant 11, 12.4, 12.7, 14, 16 and 17
Para No.

Name Anversinh v. State of Gujarat, Criminal Appeal No. 1919 /2010

Issue  Whether a consensual affair can be a defence against the charge
of kidnapping a minor under section 361, 366 of IPC?
Held  A bare perusal of the relevant legal provisions, as extracted
above, show that consent of the minor is immaterial for purposes
of Section 361 of IPC. Indeed, as borne out through various other
provisions in the IPC and other laws like the Indian Contract Act,
1872, minors are deemed incapable of giving lawful consent.
Section 361 IPC, particularly, goes beyond this simple
presumption. It bestows the ability to make crucial decisions
regarding a minor’s physical safety upon his/her guardians.
Therefore, a minor girl’s infatuation with her alleged kidnapper
cannot by itself be allowed as a defence, for the same would
amount to surreptitiously undermining the protective essence of
the offence of kidnapping.
 Section 366 of IPC postulates that once the prosecution leads
evidence to show that the kidnapping was with the
intention/knowledge to compel marriage of the girl or to
force/induce her to have illicit intercourse, the enhanced
punishment of 10 years as provided thereunder would stand
attracted.
 (100)

Relevant 15 and 16
Para No.

Name Khokan v. State of Chhattisgarh, Criminal Appeal No. 121 /

2021
Issues  The accused and the deceased had some quarrel over money and
the accused pushed him down and stood up on his abdomen
which resulted into the internal injuries. Later the deceased died
in hospital. Whether the case would be covered under the
exception 4 to section 300 IPC?
 Whether in the present facts and circumstances the accused is
rightly convicted u/s 302, IPC or should he be convicted u/s 304-
I, IPC?
Held  The said act of the accused cannot be held to be imminently
dangerous as falling under the fourth part of section 300, IPC.
 There is no evidence that there was any premeditation on the part
of the accused. The accused did not carry any weapon. There was
a sudden quarrel and the accused pushed the deceased and stood
on the abdomen in the heat of the passion upon a sudden quarrel.
Therefore, the case would fall under exception 4 to section 300
IPC. As per explanation to exception 4 to section 300 IPC, it is
immaterial in such cases which party offers the provocation or
commits the first assault.
Relevant 7, 8 and 9
Para No.

Name Bijender @ Mandar v. State of Haryana, Criminal Appeal No.

2438 /2010
Issue  Whether conviction based on Disclosure Statement & recovery
memo can be sustained in absence of any corroborative evidence?
 Brief Facts:– In this case the accused was convicted for the
offence under section 392 and 397 of the IPC and the conviction
was upheld by the High court. Though all the material witnesses,
including the eye witness, had turned hostile, however, the Court
convicted the accused on the basis of the disclosure statement and
the subsequent recoveries. The accused filed the SLP against such
concurrent findings and also contended that the other co-accused
(charged under 120-B IPC) were also acquitted by the Apex
Court due to lack of sufficient evidence.
 (101)

Held  At times the Court can convict an accused exclusively on the

basis of his disclosure statement and the resultant recovery of
inculpatory material. However, in order to sustain the guilt of
such accused, the recovery should be unimpeachable and not be
shrouded with elements of doubt.
 We may hasten to add that circumstances such as (i) the period
of interval between the malfeasance and the disclosure; (ii)
commonality of the recovered object and its availability in the
market; (iii) nature of the object and its relevance to the crime;
(iv) ease of transferability of the object; (v) the testimony and
trustworthiness of the attesting witness before the Court and/or
other like factors, are weighty considerations that aid in gauging
the intrinsic evidentiary value and credibility of the recovery.
 Incontrovertibly, where the prosecution fails to inspire
confidence in the manner and/or contents of the recovery with
regard to its nexus to the alleged offence, the Court ought to
stretch the benefit of doubt to the accused.
 The Apex Court reversed the findings of the lower courts and the
accused was acquitted.
Relevant 13, 16, 17
Para No.

Name Surinder Singh v State (Union Territory Of Chandigarh),

Criminal Appeal No. 2373 / 2010
Issue  What are the two ingredients that a Court must consider for
constituting an offence u/s 307, IPC?
 Whether the requirement of ‘motive’ is indispensable for proving
the charge of attempt to murder under Section 307 IPC?
 Whether section 27 of Arms Act is attracted only in the cases
where the offence u/s 5 and/or u/s 7 of the Arms Act is
committed?
Held  First, whether there was any intention or knowledge on the part
of accused to cause death of the victim, and, second, such intent
or knowledge was followed by some overt actus rea in execution
thereof, irrespective of the consequential result as to whether or
not any injury is inflicted upon the victim.
 ‘Motive’ is distinct from ‘object and means’ which innervates or
provokes an action. Unlike ‘intention’, ‘motive’ is not the
yardstick of a crime. A lawful act with an ill motive would not
 (102)

constitute an offence but it may not be true when an unlawful act

is committed with best of the motive. Whilst motive is infallibly
a crucial factor, and is a substantial aid for evincing the
commission of an offence but the absence thereof is, however, not
such a quintessential component which can be construed as fatal
to the case of the prosecution, especially when all other factors
point towards the guilt of the accused and testaments of
eye-witnesses to the occurrence of a malfeasance are on record.
 Illegal use of a licensed or sanctioned weapon per se does not
constitute an offence under Section 27, without proving the mis-
demeanour under Section 5 or 7 of the Arms Act. At best, it could
be a ‘misconduct’ under the service rules, the determination of
which was not the subject of the trial.
 The Apex Court also discussed the sentencing policy and the
factors to be considered while determining the quantum of
sentence.
Relevant 20,22,30
Para No.

Name Vinod Kumar v. Amritpal @ Chhotu & Ors., Criminal Appeal

No. 1519 / 2021
Issue  Whether intention to cause death is required to be proved to
convict a person under ‘thirdly’ of 300 IPC?
Held  Once the prosecution establishes the existence of the three
ingredients forming a part of “thirdly” in Section 300, it is
irrelevant whether there was an intention on the part of the
accused to cause death.
 It does not matter that there was no intention even to cause the
injury of a kind that is sufficient to cause death in ordinary course
of nature. Even the knowledge that an act of that kind is likely to
cause death is not necessary to attract “thirdly”.(Virsa Singh)
Relevant 18.
Para No.

Name Sadakat Kotwar v. State of Jharkhand, Criminal Appeal No.

1316 / 2021
Issue  Factors through which the intention of the accused can be
ascertained in a case of allegation of attempt to murder case u/s
307 IPC.
 (103)

Held  The Hon’ble Apex Court held that nobody can enter into the
mind of the accused and his intention has to be ascertained from
the nature of weapon used, part of the body chosen for assault
and the nature of the injury caused.
Relevant 4
Para No.

Name Indrapal Singh & Ors. v. State of U.P. Criminal Appeal Nos.313-
314/2020
Issue  In what circumstances section 34 be invoked with section 302
IPC?
 The court found that there was no inherent contradiction in the
statements and cross examination of the primary witnesses. The
invocation of S. 34 along with S. 302 was found correct by the
court because the defence had no contra evidence to explain as to
why all the four assailants came together and three of them were
with fire-arms.
 Additionally, the antecedent enmity between the Accused and
the victims as narrated in detail by PW-1 clearly brings out the
fact that there existed a common intention on the part of the
Accused inasmuch as they went together armed with guns in
broad day light on the land where the victims were engaged in
irrigation.
 The consistent and coherent testimonies of the eye witnesses
(PW1 and PW2) cannot be discarded solely on the ground they
were related to the victim.
Relevant 29, 31, 35.
Para No.

Name Shabbir Hussain vs. State of Madhya Pradesh [SLP(Criminal)

7284/2017]
Issue  Whether mere harassment would amount to an offence of
abetment of suicide under Section 306 of the Indian Penal Code?
Held  In order to bring a case within the provision of Section 306 IPC,
there must be a case of suicide and in the commission of the said
offence, the person who is said to have abetted the commission of
suicide must have played an active role by an act of instigating or
by doing a certain act to facilitate the commission of suicide. Mere
 (104)

harassment without any positive action on the part of the accused

proximate to the time of occurrence which led to the suicide
would not amount to an offence under Section 306 IPC
Relevant 2 and 3
Page No.

Name Shaik Ahmed v. State of Telangana, Criminal Appeal No.533 /

2021
Issue  What are the essential ingredients of Section 364A, IPC?
Held Essential ingredients to convict an accused under Section 364A are:
(i) Kidnapping or abduction of any person or keeping a
person in detention after such kidnapping or abduction;
and
(ii) threatens to cause death or hurt to such person, or by his
conduct gives rise to a reasonable apprehension that such
person may be put to death or hurt or;
(iii) causes hurt or death to such person in order to compel the
Government or any foreign State or any Governmental
organization or any other person to do or abstain from
doing any act or to pay a ransom.
 Thus, after establishing the first condition, one more condition
has to be fulfilled since after the first condition, the word used is
“and”. Thus, in addition to the first condition either condition (ii)
or (iii) has to be proved, failing which conviction under Section
364A cannot be sustained.
Relevant 33,34
Para No.

Name Kala Singh @ Gurnam Singh v. State of Punjab, Criminal Appeal

Nos. 1040-1041 / 2021
Issue  Whether absence of "Intention" be a ground to reduce the
sentence awarded for the offence under Section 304 Part I to
section 304 Part II of IPC?
Held  Hon'ble Court observed that it is clear from the evidence on record
that the scuffle had taken place on the spur of the moment and a
sudden fight had taken place in the heat of passion upon a sudden
quarrel.
 It was not a premeditated one and as there was no intention on
the part of the appellant and co-accused either to cause death or
 (105)

cause such bodily injury as is likely to cause death, the High Court
ought not to have convicted the appellant for the offence
under Section 304 Part-I IPC. In absence of any intention on the
part of the appellant, it is a clear case where the conviction of the
appellant is to be modified to one under Section 304 Part-II IPC.
Relevant 9 and 11
Para No.

Name Prabhat Kumar Singh v. State of Bihar; SLP(Criminal) 2395-2396

/2021
Issue  Whether mens rea is required to be established in medical
negligence Cases under section 304 and 304A IPC?
 Whether the trail Court can summon the doctor for the allegations
of medical negligence solely on the statement of private witness
and without examining the medical evidence or professional
doctor?
Held  Mens Rea as intent not required in medical negligence cases.
 Medical evidence or examination of another professional Doctor
by the complainant is prerequisite before prosecuting a doctor in
medical negligence cases.
Relevant 2 and 3
Page No

Name N. Raghavender v. State of Andhra Pradesh, CBI, Criminal

Appeal No. 5 / 2010
Issue  Whether the non-examination of a witness, who was central to
the issue with which the accused is involved with fatal to the case
of the accused in the present facts and circumstances?
 Whether the appellant should be held to be guilty if there was no
mens rea involved. Also if the person who received the benefit
through the said transaction has since then been acquitted,
should the appellant also be acquitted on the same ground?
 Whether if no loss was caused to the bank should the appellant
be excused?
 Ingredients necessary to prove a charge under Section 409, 420,
& 477-A, IPC.
 Ingredients necessary to prove a charge under Section 409 IPC:
Section 409 IPC pertains to criminal breach of trust by a
public servant or a banker, in respect of the property entrusted
 (106)

to him. The onus is on the prosecution to prove that the

accused, a public servant or a banker was entrusted with the
property which he is duly bound to account for and that he
has committed criminal breach of trust.
The entrustment of public property and dishonest
misappropriation or use thereof in the manner illustrated
under Section 405 are a sine qua non for making an offence
punishable under Section 409 IPC.
 Section 405 IPC essentials:
(i) Entrusting any person with property or with any dominion
over property;
(ii) That person has dishonestly mis-appropriated or converted
that property to his own use;
(iii) Or that person dishonestly using or disposing of that property
or wilfully suffering any other person so to do in violation of
any direction of law or a legal contract.
 Section 409 IPC essentials:
(i) The accused must be a public servant or a banker, merchant
or agent;
(ii) He/She must have been entrusted, in such capacity, with
property; and
(iii) He/She must have committed breach of trust in respect of
such property.
 Section 420 IPC essentials:
It is paramount that in order to attract the provisions of
Section 420 IPC, the prosecution has to not only prove that
the accused has cheated someone but also that by doing so, he
has dishonestly induced the person who is cheated to deliver
property. There are, thus, three components of this offence,
i.e.,
(i) deception of any person,
(ii) fraudulently or dishonestly inducing that person to
deliver any property to any person, and
(iii) mens rea of the accused at the time of making the
inducement. It goes without saying that for the offence
of cheating, fraudulent and dishonest intention must
exist from the inception when the promise or
representation was made.
 (107)

It is equally well-settled that the phrase ‘dishonestly’

emphasizes a deliberate intention to cause wrongful gain or
wrongful loss, and when this is coupled with cheating and
delivery of property, the offence becomes punishable under
Section 420 IPC. Contrarily, the mere breach of contract
cannot give rise to criminal prosecution under Section 420
unless fraudulent or dishonest intention is shown right at the
beginning of the transaction. It is equally important that for
the purpose of holding a person guilty under Section 420, the
evidence adduced must establish beyond reasonable doubt,
mens rea on his part. Unless the complaint showed that the
accused had dishonest or fraudulent intention ‘at the time the
complainant parted with the monies’, it would not amount to
an offence under Section 420 IPC and it may only amount to
breach of contract.
 Ingredients necessary to prove a charge under Section 477-A
IPC:
In an accusation under Section 477A IPC, the prosecution
must, therefore, prove—
a. that the accused destroyed, altered, mutilated or falsified the
books, electronic records, papers, writing, valuable security
or account in question;
b. the accused did so in his capacity as a clerk, officer or servant
of the employer;
c. the books, papers, etc. belong to or are in possession of his
employer or had been received by him for or on behalf of his
employer;
d. the accused did it wilfully and with intent to defraud.
Relevant 44,45,47,48,50
Para No

Name Taijuddin v. State of Assam, Criminal Appeal No. 001526/2021

Issue  Whether the accused can be said to have common object of
unlawful assembly (section 149 IPC) if he has disclosed victim’s
hideout to the assembly?
Held  Merely because accused was not brave enough to conceal where
the victim was hiding did not make him a part of the unlawful
assembly. There must be reasonable direct or indirect
 (108)

circumstances which lend assurance to the prosecution case that

they shared common object of the unlawful assembly.
 Not only should the members be part of the unlawful assembly
but should share the common object at all stages. This has to be
based on the conduct of the members and the behaviour at or near
the scene of the offence, the motive for the crime, the arms carried
by them and such other relevant considerations.
Relevant 10,11
Para No.

SPECIAL ACTS
NARCOTIC DRUGS AND PSYCHOTROPIC SUBSTANCES
ACT, 1985

Name Sk Sakkar v. State of West Bengal, Criminal Appeal No. 1661 /

2010
Issue  Whether Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances
(Amendment) Act, 2001 would be applicable on the offences
committed prior to enforcement of the amendment act, 2001?
Held  The punishment for contravention in relation to cannabis plant or
any other provision of the NDPS Act, would be regulated by the
unamended Section 20 of the NDPS Act, as the crime was
committed before the amendment of 2001.
Relevant 10,11
Para No.

Name State (GNCT Of Delhi) Narcotics Control Bureau v. Lokesh

Chadha, Criminal Appeal No 257 of 2021
Issues  Difference between the grant of bail under section 439 Cr.P.C. in
case of pre-trial arrest and suspension of sentence under section
389 Cr.P.C. and grant of bail, post-conviction.
 Suspension of sentence in NDPS case and the applicability of
condition stipulated u/s 37 of NDPS Act.
Held  The Hon'ble Court referred to the case of Preet Pal Singh v. State of
Uttar Pradesh, (2020) 8 SCC 645 wherein it was held that "there is a
difference between grant of bail under section 439 of the Cr.P.C.
in case of pre-trial arrest and suspension of sentence under Section
 (109)

389 of the Cr.P.C. and grant of bail, post-conviction. In the earlier

case there may be presumption of innocence, which is a
fundamental postulate of criminal jurisprudence, and the courts
may be liberal, depending on the facts and circumstances of the
case, on the principle that bail is the rule and jail is an exception.
However, in case of post- conviction bail, by suspension of
operation of the sentence, there is a finding of guilt and the
question of presumption of innocence does not arise. Nor is the
principle of bail being the rule and jail an exception attracted, once
there is conviction upon trial. Rather, the Court considering an
application for suspension of sentence and grant of bail, is to
consider the prima facie merits of the appeal, coupled with other
factors. There should be strong compelling reasons for grant of
bail, notwithstanding an order of conviction, by suspension of
sentence, and this strong and compelling reason must be recorded
in the order granting bail, as mandated in Section 389(1) of the
Cr.P.C."
 Condition stipulated u/s 37 of the NDPS Act are required to be
complied even while considering the application for suspension of
sentence.
 The Hon'ble Court reversed the order of suspension of sentence
passed by the High Court.
Relevant 7, 9, and 10
Para No.

Name Union Of India v. Prateek Shukla, Criminal Appeal No 284 /2021

Issue  Applicability of section 37 of the NDPS Act, while deciding the
bail application for offence under NDPS Act.
 Need for recording the reasons, and not merely the submissions
of parties, while passing the order grating bail to the accused.
Held  Merely recording the submissions of the parties does not amount
to an indication of a judicial or, for that matter, a judicious
application of mind by the Single Judge of the High Court to the
basic question as to whether bail should be granted. The
provisions of Section 37 of the NDPS Act provide the legal norms
which have to be applied in determining whether a case for grant
of bail has been made out.
 The High Court clearly mis applied the law to the facts in arriving
at a decision for the grant of bail. Indicating that the respondent
 (110)

as “an educated person with a bachelor of technology” and that

he “may not commit any offence” is an extraneous circumstance
which ought not to have weighed with the High Court in the grant
of Bail for an offence under the NDPS act.
Relevant 10, 11, & 12
Para No.

Name Union of India Through NCB, Lucknow v. Md. Mawaz Khan,

Criminal Appeal No. 1043 / 2021
Issue  Can absence of possession of contraband on person of the accused
absolve him of the level of scrutiny under S. 37(1)(b)(ii)?
 Factors to be considered while granting bail in NDPS cases
Held  High Court while granting bail to the Respondent adverted to two
circumstances, namely (i) absence of recovery of the contraband
from the possession of the Respondent and (ii) the wrong name in
the endorsement of translation of the statement Under Section 67
of the NDPS Act. The court observed that in order to make the
possession illicit, there must be conscious possession, i.e.
possession coupled with requisite mental element. In the present
case, all the accused knew each other and there was no
explanation provided to them travelling in the same private
vehicle, from the same destination and the contraband was
concealed in the vehicle. Therefore, the court held that mere
absence of possession of the contraband on the ‘person’ of an
accused does not absolve him of the level of scrutiny required
under S. 37(1)(b)(ii) and therefore does not create a ground for
granting him bail. The court held that a statement Under Section
67 of the NDPS Act is inadmissible.
 The test which the courts are required to apply while granting bail
is whether there are reasonable grounds to believe that the accused
has not committed an offence and whether he is likely to commit
any offence while on bail. Additionally, given the seriousness of
offences punishable under the NDPS Act and in order to curb the
menace of drug-trafficking in the country, stringent parameters for
the grant of bail under the NDPS Act have been prescribed.
Relevant 20, 21, 24, 25, 30, 32
Para No.
 (111)

Name Gurdev v. State of Punjab and Ors., Criminal Appeal No. 375 /
2021
Issue  Whether the Court can consider the factors other than those
enunciated in section 32B of the NDPS Act, while imposing the
sentence higher than the minimum sentence?
 Whether the quantity of narcotic substance recovered can be
considered as a relevant factor for imposing punishment higher
than the minimum punishment under the NDPS Act?
 Whether the interest of society as a whole is to be considered
while awarding the punishment in NDPS case?
Held  On fair reading of Section 32B of the Act, it cannot be said that
while imposing a punishment higher than the minimum term of
imprisonment or amount of fine, the Court has to consider only
those factors which are mentioned/enumerated in Section 32B of
the Act.
 The quantity of substance would fall into "such factors as it may
deem fit" and while exercising its discretion of imposing the
sentence/imprisonment higher than the minimum, the Court can
take into consideration such factor of larger/higher quantity of
substance.
 While awarding the sentence/punishment in case of NDPS Act,
the interest of the society as a whole is also required to be taken
in consideration. Therefore, while striking balance between the
mitigating and aggravating circumstances, public interest, impact
on the society as a whole will always be tilt in favour of the
suitable higher punishment.
Relevant 6, 6.1, 7
Para No.

Name Boota Singh v. State of Haryana, Criminal Appeal No.421 / 2021

Issue  Whether a private vehicle parked on public road can be treated as
a public place under the provisions of section 43 of the NDPS act?
 Whether the accused can be acquitted solely on the ground of
complete non-compliance of section 42 of the NDPS Act?
Held  That the vehicle in which the appellants were found was a private
vehicle thus Section 43 would not apply as it deals with a public
place, which includes only the public conveyance.
 (112)

 That total non-compliance of Section 42 of the NDPS act is

impermissible. The rigor may be lessened in certain situations, but
in no case, total non-compliance of Section 42 can be accepted.
 The Hon'ble Apex Court acquitted the accused persons for failure
in compliance of section 42 of the NDPS Act.
Relevant 12, 13, 14, & 15
Para No.

Name Union of India v. Md. Nawaz Khan, Criminal Appeal No. 1043
/ 2021
Issue  Whether bail can be granted merely on a finding of the absence of
possession of the contraband from the accused?
 Brief Facts:- In this case, the High Court had granted bail to the
accused after noticing that a search was conducted in the presence
of a gazetted officer in view of the provisions of Section 50 of the
NDPS Act but nothing objectionable was recovered from the
accused in the course of the personal search. However, the search
of the car revealed two polythene packets hidden under the place
where the wiper is connected to the front bonnet of the car.
Held  The Supreme Court held that bail cannot be granted to an accused
under Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, merely
on a finding of the absence of possession of the contraband on the
person of the accused.
 Such a finding does not absolve the court of the level of scrutiny
required under Section 37(1)(b)(ii) of the NDPS Act.
Relevant 25
Para No.

Name Sanjeev Chandra Agarwal & Anr. v. Union of India, Criminal

Appeal No(s).1273/2021
Issues  Whether charges be framed against an accused under section 27-
A and 29 of the NDPS Act on the basis of the statement of co-
accused, when no narcotic drugs or psychotropic substances
were recovered from the premises of the accused?
Held  The Apex Court quashed the charges to the extent of section 27-
A and 29-A of NDPS as no narcotic drugs or psychotropic
substances were recovered from the premises.
 High Court was not justified in relying on the statement made by
the other accused u/s 67 of the NDPS Act in light of the
 (113)

judgment of this Court in Toofan Singh v. State of Tamil Nadu,

(2021) 4 SCC 1.
Relevant 1 and 2
Page No.

Name Kallu Khan v. State of Rajasthan, Criminal Appeal No. 1605 /

2021
Issue  Whether section 50 of NDPS Act is required to be complied with
in case of search of motor cycle at public place?
Held  The provisions of Section 50 of the Narcotic Drugs and
Psychotropic Substance Act are required to be complied in the
case of personal search only but not in the case of search of
motor cycle on public road.
Relevant 15
Para No.

Name Mohd Zahid v. State Through NCB, Criminal Appeal 1457 /

2021
Issue  Whether the sentences imposed by two different courts in two
different trials but against the same accused/person should run
concurrently or consecutively?
 How discretion under S. 427 should be exercised in NDPS
cases?
Held  The Hon'ble Court summarized the law pertaining to Section
427 and principles governing concurrent as under:
(i) if a person already undergoing a sentence of
imprisonment is sentenced on a subsequent conviction to
imprisonment, such subsequent term of imprisonment
would normally commence at the expiration of the
imprisonment to which he was previously sentenced;
(ii) ordinarily the subsequent sentence would
commence at the expiration of the first term of
imprisonment unless the court directs the
subsequent sentence to run concurrently with
the previous sentence;
(iii) the general rule is that where there are different
transactions, different crime numbers and cases
have been decided by the different judgments,
 (114)

concurrent sentence cannot be awarded under

Section 427 of Cr.P.C.;
(iv) under Section 427 (1) of Cr.P.C. the court has the
power and discretion to issue a direction that all
the subsequent sentences run concurrently
with the previous sentence, however discretion
has to be exercised judiciously depending upon
the nature of the offence or the offences
committed and the facts in situation. However,
there must be a specific direction or order by
the court that the subsequent sentence to run
concurrently with the previous sentence.
 Considering the offences under the NDPS Act which are very
serious in nature and against the society at large, no
discretion shall be exercised under section 427 Cr.P.C. in favour
of such accused.
Relevant 9, 10, and 11
Para No.

Name Bharat Chaudhary v. Union of India, Petition for Special Leave

to Appeal (Criminal) No. 5703 / 2021
Issue  Whether a person can be held liable under the NDPS Act on the
basis of statement of co-accused?
 In this case, the DRI seized huge volume of tablets of various
kinds described as psychotropic substances. Due to want of
facilities, the report of the Forensic Examiner could not mention
the quantitative analysis about the quantity of psychotropic
substances present in the seized tablets, though the accused
persons were charged under commercial quantity. The same was
under challenge before the Hon'ble Court.
Held  In the absence of any psychotropic substance found in the
conscious possession of an accused, the order passed by relying
on the statement of co-accused recorded under section 67 of the
NDPS Act cannot be sustained. The Hon'ble Apex Court in the
case of Tofan Singh, [2021] 4 SCC 1 has already held that the
confessional statement recorded under section 67 of the NDPS
Act cannot be read in as evidence.
 In the absence of any clarity so far on the quantitative analysis
of the samples, the prosecution cannot be heard to state at this
 (115)

preliminary stage that the petitioners have been found to be in

possession of commercial quantity of psychotropic substances as
contemplated under the NDPS Act
Relevant 10,11
Para No.

SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE BOARD OF INDIA ACT, 1992

Name Prakash Gupta v. Security and Exchange Board of India, Criminal

Appeal No 569 / 2021
Issue  Whether consent of SEBI would be required before compounding
any offence under section 24-A of the SEBI Act?
 Powers to compound an offence under section 24A of the SEBI
Act. Difference between the powers to compound under section
147 of the NI Act and section 24A of the SEBI Act.
 Whether powers of compounding of offence conferred u/s 24 A
of SEBI Act are trammelled by the provisions of section 320 of the
Cr.P.C.?
 Guidelines to be considered by the Court while exercising powers
under section 24 A of the SEBI Act.
Held  SEBI’s consent cannot be mandatory before SAT or the Court
before which the proceeding is pending, for exercising the power
of compounding under Section 24A. However, it is also important
to remember that proceedings for the trial of offences under the
SEBI Act are initiated on a complaint made by SEBI by virtue of
Section 26 of the SEBI Act. SEBI is a regulatory and prosecuting
agency under the legislation. Hence, while the statutory
provisions do not entrust SEBI with an authority in the nature of
a veto under the provisions of Section 24A, it is equally necessary
to understand the importance of its role and position.
 Before taking a decision on whether to compound an offence
punishable under Section 24 (1), the SAT or the Court must obtain
the views of SEBI for furnishing guidance to its ultimate decision.
These views, unless manifestly arbitrary or mala fide, must be
accorded a high degree of deference.
 Section 24A specifies the authorities vested with the powers to
compound offences under the SEBI Act, while Section 147 of the
NI Act merely states that the offence under the Act shall be
 (116)

compoundable. In a complaint filed under the NI Act, the

complainant is an aggrieved party, invariably being the payee in a
dishonored instrument. Permission of court is not required in case
of compounding under section 147 of the NI Act but the same is
required in the case of compounding under section 24 A of the
SEBI Act.
 Section 24A of the SEBI Act starts with a non-obstante provision
indicating a legislative intent to the effect that the power to
compound offences punishable under the SEBI Act is not
trammelled by the provisions of Section 320 of the Cr.P.C.
 The Apex Court had also laid down the detailed guidelines which
the SAT or Court must take into consideration while adjudicating
the application under section 24 A.
Relevant 72, 80, 84,85, 90, 91 and 92
Para No.

NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS ACT, 1881

Name Sripati Singh (deceased) Through his Son Gourav Singh v. State
of Jharkhand and Anr. Criminal Appeal Nos. 1269-1270 / 2021
Issue  Whether every dishonourment of cheque can be considered as a
deliberate act with the intention to cheat so as to make an offence
u/s 420 of IPC?
 Whether Cheque issued towards ‘security’ can be treated as
Cheque issued towards the discharge of ‘legally recoverable debt’
for the purpose of making the drawer liable u/s 138 of the NI Act?
 Brief Facts:- In this case, the High Court quashed the order of
cognizance u/s 138 of NI Act and 420 IPC by observing that the
cheque was issued for the purpose of security and no offence is
made out upon dishonouring of such cheque.
Held  Mere dishonourment of the cheque cannot be construed as an act
on the part of the accused with a deliberate intention to cheat and
the mens rea in that regard cannot be gathered from the point the
amount has been received.
 A cheque issued as security pursuant to a financial transaction
cannot be considered as a worthless piece of paper under every
circumstance. ‘Security’ in its true sense is the state of being safe
and the security given for a loan is something given as a pledge of
 (117)

payment. It is given, deposited or pledged to make certain the

fulfilment of an obligation to which the parties to the transaction
are bound. If in a transaction, a loan is advanced and the borrower
agrees to repay the amount in a specified timeframe and issues a
cheque as security to secure such repayment; if the loan amount
is not repaid in any other form before the due date or if there is no
other understanding or agreement between the parties to defer the
payment of amount, the cheque which is issued as security would
mature for presentation and the drawee of the cheque would be
entitled to present the same. On such presentation, if the same is
dishonoured, the consequences contemplated under Section 138
and the other provisions of N.I. Act would flow.
 When a cheque is issued and is treated as ‘security’ towards
repayment of an amount with a time period being stipulated for
repayment, all that it ensures is that such cheque which is issued
as ‘security’ cannot be presented prior to the loan or the instalment
maturing for repayment towards which such cheque is issued as
security. Further, the borrower would have the option of repaying
the loan amount or such financial liability in any other form and
in that manner if the amount of loan due and payable has been
discharged within the agreed period, the cheque issued as security
cannot thereafter be presented. Therefore, the prior discharge of
the loan or there being an altered situation due to which there
would be understanding between the parties is a sine qua non to
not present the cheque which was issued as security. These are
only the defences that would be available to the drawer of the
cheque in a proceedings initiated under Section 138 of the N.I.
Act. Therefore, there cannot be a hard and fast rule that a cheque
which is issued as security can never be presented by the drawee
of the cheque.
 The appellant cannot be non-suited for proceeding with the
complaint filed under Section 138 of N.I. Act merely due to the
fact that the cheques presented and dishonoured are shown to
have been issued as security, as indicated in the loan agreement.
In our opinion, such contention would arise only in a
circumstance where the debt has not become recoverable and the
cheque issued as security has not matured to be presented for
recovery of the amount, if the due date agreed for payment of debt
has not arrived.
 (118)

 Therefore, to contend that the cheque should be held as security

even after the amount had become due and payable is not
sustainable.
 The Judgment of the High Court was reserved by the Hon'ble
Supreme Court
Relevant 11, 16,17,19
Para No.

Name Kapur Singh v. State of Haryana and another, Interlocutory

Application No.30881 / 2021
Issue  Whether the accused is required to surrender/ seek exemption
from surrender for filing an SLP in reference to his failure to
comply with directions issued under 143A, NI Act?
 Whether the bail bonds of the accused person can be forfeited by
the Trail Court in case of failure of accused in paying the interim
compensation u/s 143(A) of the NI Act?
 What are possible recourses in the case where the accused person
fails to deposit the interim compensation required u/s 143(A) of
the NI Act?
Held  The question of the petitioner surrendering before the Trial Court,
as a pre-condition for entertaining the SLP, does not arise. Order
XXII Rule 5 of the Supreme Court Rules, 2013, makes it
mandatory for a person to surrender or seek exemption from
surrendering only when he has been sentenced to a term of
imprisonment. The petitioner has not been sentenced to any term
of imprisonment, by the orders impugned in the SLP. The orders
out of which the above SLP arises, are orders passed for failure to
comply with the directions issued under Section 143A of the N.I.
Act.
 The consequences of failure to comply with the directions issued
under Section 143A are spelt out in sub-section (5) of Section
143A. Sub-section (5) merely provides for the recovery of the
interim compensation ordered under Section 143A, as if it were a
fine, under Section 421 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.
Section 421(1) Cr.P.C. prescribes two methods for recovery of
fine. They are (i) recovery by attachment and sale of any movable
property; and (ii) recovery through the Collector of the district as
if the amount represents arrears of land revenue. The proviso to
sub-section (1) of Section 421 Cr.P.C deals separately with cases
 (119)

where imprisonment for a particular term is awarded in default of

payment of fine. That situation has not arisen here.
 When Section 143A(5) of the N.I. Act read with Section 421(1) of
the Cr.P.C. does not prescribe a term of imprisonment and when
the orders impugned in the SLP do not challenge any penalty of
imprisonment for a particular term, the question of the petitioner
surrendering or seeking exemption from surrendering does not
arise. In other words, in cases of this nature, the Registry cannot
insist upon either a surrender certificate or an application for
exemption from surrendering under Order XXII, Rule 5 of the
Rules.
Relevant 3,4,5
Page No.

Name Ashutosh Ashok Parasampuriya & Ord. v. M/s. Gharrkul

Industries Pvt. Ltd. & Ors., Criminal Appeal No(S). 1206 / 2021
Issue  Whether the cognizance can be taken against the director of a
company who was not the signatory to the dishonoured cheque.
 Whether the role of the appellants in the capacity of the Director
of the defaulter company makes them vicariously liable for the
activities of the defaulter Company as defined u/s 141 of the NI
Act?
 Scope of powers of the High Court under Section 482 of Cr.P.C.
while considering the quashing of proceedings against the
directors of accused companies in cases pertaining S. 138 of NI
Act?
Held  So far as Directors who are not the signatories to the cheques or
who are not Managing Directors or Joint Managing Directors are
concerned, it is necessary to aver in the complaint filed Under
Section 138 read with Section 141 of the NI Act that at the
relevant time when the offence was committed, the Directors were
in charge of and were responsible for the conduct of the business
of the company.
 The court held that since the complaint mentions that at the time
at which the cheques were issued by the Company and
dishonoured by the Bank, the Appellants were the Directors of the
Company and were responsible for its business and all the
 (120)

Appellants were involved in the business of the Company and

were responsible for all the affairs of the Company.
 If statutory compliance of Section 141 of the NI Act has been
made, it may not open for the High Court to interfere Under
Section 482 Code of Criminal Procedure unless it comes across
some unimpeachable, incontrovertible evidence which is beyond
suspicion or doubt or totally acceptable circumstances which may
clearly indicate that the Director could not have been concerned
with the issuance of cheques and asking him to stand the trial
would be abuse of process of Court. Despite the presence of basic
averment, it may come to a conclusion that no case is made out
against the particular Director for which there could be various
reasons.
Relevant 23, 25, 26, 27, 28
Para. No.

Name In Re: Expeditious Trial of Cases u/s 138 of N.I. Act,1881, Suo
Motu Writ Petition (Criminal) No. 2 /2020
Issue  The Hon'ble Court suo moto decided to examine the reasons for
the delay in disposal of the section 138 NI Act Cases.
 Whether a Magistrate is empowered to stop the proceedings
under Section 258 of Cr.P.C. in respect of the complaints filed
under 138 of N.I. Act.
 Undue delay in service of summons due to filing of separate
complaints for dishonour of cheques which are part of same
transaction.
 Applicability of Section 202(2) of Cr.P.C. in complaints under
Section 138 of N.I. Act.
 Conversion of summary trial to summons trial by the Trial Court.
Held  If Trial Court lacks jurisdiction to issue process for complaints
under Section 138 of N.I. Act then the proceedings shall be stayed
and the case shall be submitted to the Chief Judicial Magistrate.
 Section 258 of Cr.P.C. empowers the Magistrate to stop the
proceedings at any stage for reasons to be recorded in writing and
pronounce a judgment of acquittal in any summons case
instituted otherwise than upon complaint. Section 258 of the
Cr.P.C. is not applicable to a summons case instituted on a
complaint. Therefore, Section 258 of Cr.P.C. is not applicable to
 (121)

complaints u/s 138 of N.I. Act. Moreover, the Trial Court cannot
be conferred with inherent power either to review or recall order
of issuance of process.
 The High Courts are requested to issue practice directions to the
Trial Courts to treat service of summons in one complaint under
Section 138 forming part of a transaction, as deemed service in
respect of all the complaints filed before the same court relating to
dishonour of cheques issued as part of the said transaction.
 To reduce the burden on the docket of the criminal courts, we
recommend that a provision be made in the Act to the effect that
a person can be tried in one trial for offences of the same kind
under Section 138 in the space of 12 months, notwithstanding the
restriction in Section 219 of the Code.
 It was held that Section 202(2) of Cr.P.C. is inapplicable to
complaints under Section 138 (N.I. Act) in respect of examination
of witnesses on oath. The evidence of witnesses on behalf of the
complainant shall be permitted on affidavit.
 The conversion by the Trial Courts of complaints under Section
138 from summary trial to summon trial is being done
mechanically without reasons being recorded which resulted in
contributing to the delay in disposal of cases. The second proviso
to Section 143 mandates that the Magistrate has to record an
order spelling out the reasons for such conversion. The discretion
conferred on the Magistrate by the second proviso to Section 143
is to be exercise with due care and caution, after recording reasons
for converting the trial of the complaint from summary trial to
summons trial.
 For the conduct of inquiry under Section 202 of the Code,
evidence of witnesses on behalf of the complainant shall be
permitted to be taken on affidavit. In suitable cases, the
Magistrate can restrict the inquiry to examination of
documents without insisting for examination of witnesses.
Relevant 12, 14, 20 and 24.
Para No.

Name Alka Khandu Avhad v. Amar Syamprasad Mishra and Anr.,

Criminal Appeal No. 258 / 2021
Issue  Whether a person can be held liable for offence under section 138
NI Act when such person is neither the signatory to the cheque
 (122)

nor the dishonoured cheque was drawn from the account of such
person?
 Scope of Joint liability under Section 138 of N.I. Act
 Question of invoking Section 141 of N.I. Act against an
individual.
Held  Section 138 of N.I. Act does not speak about the joint liability.
Even in case of a joint liability, in case of individual persons, a
person other than a person who has drawn the cheque on an
account maintained by him, cannot be prosecuted for the offence
under Section 138 of the NI Act. A person might have been jointly
liable to pay the debt, but if such a person who might have been
liable to pay the debt jointly, cannot be prosecuted unless the bank
account is jointly maintained and that he was a signatory to the
cheque.
 Section 141 of N.I. Act is relating to the offence by companies and
it cannot be made applicable to the individuals, and two private
individuals cannot be said to be “other association of
individuals”. There is no question of invoking Section 141 of the
N.I. Act against the wife, as the liability is the individual liability
(may be a joint liabilities), but cannot be said to be the offence
committed by a company or by a corporate or firm or other
association of individuals.
Relevant 6,7 and 8
Para No.

Name Sumeti Vij v. Paramount Tech Fab Industries, Criminal Appeal

No. 292 /2021
Issues  Whether the statement of accused under section 313 of the
Cr.P.C. is the substantive evidence to rebut the presumption
under section 139 of the NI Act?
 Scope of burden of proof to be discharged by the accused to rebut
the evidence of the complainant as required under Section 139 of
the N.I act?
 Whether the principle which apply to acquittal in other criminal
cases are applicable to the cases instituted under the N.I act?
Held  That the scope of the Section 139 of the act is that when an
accused has to rebut the presumption, the standard of proof for
doing so is that of “preponderance or probabilities”.
 (123)

 That the proceedings under section 138 of the act are quasi-
criminal in nature, and the principles which apply to acquittal in
other criminal cases are not applicable in the cases instituted
under this act.
 The statement of the accused recorded under Section 313 of the
Code of Criminal Procedure is not a substantive evidence of
defence to rebut the presumption under Section 139 of the
Negotiable Instruments Act that the cheques were issued for
consideration.
Relevant 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 21
Para No.

Name Gimpex Private Limited v. Manoj Goel, Criminal Appeal No.

1068 / 2021
Issues  Can a complaint registered u/s 138 NI Act be acted upon once
the parties have entered into a settlement agreement?
 Brief Facts:– In this case, the Complainant filed complaints
under section 138 of the NI Act, however, later the compromise
was entered between the parties by executing the settlement
agreement under which fresh cheques were issued to the
Complainant. The accused defaulted in honouring the new
cheques and thereafter fresh complaints were filed by the
Complainant on dishonouring of new cheques and the earlier
proceedings were also kept open. The accused challenged the
subsequent proceedings before the High Court and the High
Court quashed the second complaint. Aggrieved by which the
Complainant approached the Apex Court.
Held  A complaint under Section 138 of Negotiable Instruments Act
cannot be proceeded with once the accused and the complainant
enter into a settlement agreement.
 Once parties have voluntarily entered into such an agreement
and agree to abide by the consequences of non-compliance of the
settlement agreement, they cannot be allowed to reverse the
effects of the agreement by pursuing both the original complaint
and the subsequent complaint arising from such non-compliance.
The settlement agreement subsumes the original complaint.
Non-compliance of the terms of the settlement agreement or
dishonour of cheques issued subsequent to it, would then give
rise to a fresh cause of action attracting liability under Section
 (124)

138 of the NI Act and other remedies under civil law and
criminal law.
 The Apex Court quashed the first set of Complaints and while
reversing the order of the High Court, the complaints filed in the
second round were allowed to be continued.
Relevant 38, 39
Para No.

Name Sunil Todi v. State of Gujarat & Anr., Criminal Appeal No.1446
/ 2021
Issue  Whether the Magistrate Court can take cognizance against the
Managing Director/Director for the offence under section 138 of
the NI Act?
 Facts - In this case the Magistrate Court took the cognizance
against the Managing Director and Directors of the Accused
Company for the commission of offence under section 138 of NI
Act. This said order was challenged before the High Court, which
quashed the proceedings to the extent of the nominee
directors/non-executive directors. The remaining directors
assailed the said order before the Hon'ble Apex Court.
Held  The test to determine if the Managing Director or a Director must
be charged for the offence committed by the Company is to
determine if the conditions in Section 141 of the NI Act have been
fulfilled i.e., whether the individual was in-charge of and
responsible for the affairs of the company during the commission
of the offence. However, the determination of whether the
conditions stipulated in Section 141 of the MMDR Act (NI Act)
have been fulfilled is a matter of trial. There are sufficient
averments in the complaint to raise a prima facie case against
them. It is only at the trial that they could take recourse to the
proviso to Section 141 and not at the stage of issuance of process.
Relevant 44
Para No.

Name M/s Kalamani Tex v. P. Balasubramanian, Criminal Appeal No.

123 / 2021
Issues  In what circumstances can the powers of the High Court under
Section 378 Cr.P.C. be invoked?
 (125)

 Whether the Apex Court is required to re-appreciate the evidence

when the High Court has reversed the finding of acquittal under
section 138 of the NI Act?
 When does the statutory presumption drawn under Section 118
and Section 139 of NIA becomes operative?
 Whether the presumption under section 139 of NI Act would
exist even when the accused contest that only a blank cheque and
signed blank stamp papers were given to the Complainant?
Held  The powers of the High Court under Section 378 Cr.P.C. can be
invoked if the trial Court had, inter alia, committed a patent error
of law or grave miscarriage of justice or it arrived at a perverse
finding of fact.
 The powers of this Court under Article 136 of the Constitution do
not encompass the re-appreciation of entirety of record merely on
the premise that the High Court has convicted the appellants for
the first time in exercise of its appellate jurisdiction.
 The Statute mandates that once the signature(s) of an accused on
the cheque/negotiable instrument are established, then these
‘reverse onus’ clauses become operative. In such a situation, the
obligation shifts upon the accused to discharge the presumption
imposed upon him.
 Statutory presumption under section 139 of the NI Act would be
operative even in the case when it is argued by the accused that
only a blank cheque and signed blank stamp papers were given to
the Complainant.
Relevant 12, 13, 14, 18
Para No.

Name Bhupesh Rathod v. Dayashankar Prasad Chaurasia and Anr,

Criminal Appeal No.1105 / 2021
Issue  Whether the complaint u/s 138 NI Act filed with the name of
Managing Director's Name followed by the name of company
would rendered the complaint being filed in personal capacity and
not on the behalf of company?
 Whether the Complaint can be defeated merely because the body
of the Complaint does not state about the authorization of the
representative of the Company who is filing the complaint on
behalf of the Company?
 (126)

 Brief Facts:- The trial court and the High Court dismissed the NI
Complaint of the Complainant company on the ground inter alia
that the complaint was not filed on behalf of the company but in
the personal capacity of the managing director as Complaint
Mentions Managing Director's Name First followed by the name
of the Company.
Held  Merely because the name of the Managing Director is stated first
followed by the name of the Company, it cannot be termed as a
‘fundamental defect’ to dismiss the complaint of the company.
 It would be too technical a view to take to defeat the complaint
merely because the body of the complaint does not elaborate upon
the authorisation. The artificial person being the Company had to
act through a person/official, which logically would include the
Chairman or Managing Director. Only the existence of
authorisation could be verified.
 No Magistrate could insist that the particular person whose
statement was taken on oath alone can continue to represent the
Company till the end of the proceedings. Not only that, even if
there was initially no authority the Company can at any stage
rectify that defect by sending a competent person.
Relevant 18, 19, 22 and 23
Para No.

Name R. Kalai Selvi v. Bheemappa, Criminal Appeal No(S).747 / 2021

Issue  Whether the deposit of fine amount can be made a condition
precedent for hearing revision petition under Section 397 of the
Criminal Procedure Code when the accused was convicted for the
offence under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act
Held  Depositing of fine amount cannot be made a condition precedent
for the purpose of even hearing of the revision petition so filed by
the appellant.
Relevant 3
Page No.
 (127)

NATIONAL INVESTIGATION AGENCY ACT, 2008

Name Naser Bin Abu Bakr Yafai v. State of Maharashtra and Anr.
Criminal Appeal No 1165 / 2021
Issue  When will the power of investigation of a scheduled offence is said
to be taken over by the NIA from police officers of the State
Government?
 Whether Section 16(1) of the NIA Act, 2008 invalidate/affect
antecedent events (investigation by the ATS and chargesheet
submitted to CJM) prior to taking up of the investigation by NIA?
 In this case the investigation was transferred to NIA Mumbai from
ATS vide the order dated 08.09.2016. However, the NIA took the
investigation from ATS only in November, 2016. In the
meanwhile the ATS had completed the investigation and
submitted the chargesheet before the CJM, Nanded. The Ld. CJM
took cognizance and committed the matter to the Court of
sessions. The accused challenged the jurisdiction of the Court by
stating that the case is exclusively triable by special NIA Court in
light of provisions of section 11 and 22 of the NIA Act.
Held  Upon the issuance of a direction under sub Sections (4) and (5) of
Section 6,NIA Act 2008 the State government and a police officer
of the state government investigating the offence are not to
proceed with the investigation and have to forthwith transmit the
documents and records to the NIA (Section 6(6)) but equally, it is
the duty of the officer in-charge of the police station to continue
the investigation till the NIA actually takes up the investigation of
the case (Section 6(7)). In other words, the power of the officer in-
charge of the police station to continue with the investigation is
denuded upon the issuance of a direction under sub Sections (4)
or (5) of Section 6 and the NIA actually taking up the investigation
of the case. Thus, both the issuance of directions under sub-
Sections (4) and (5) of Section 6 and the NIA actually taking up
the investigation of the case would result in the power of the officer
in-charge of the police station being denuded. Until then, the
power of the State government to investigate and prosecute any
scheduled offence, by virtue of the provisions of Section 10, is
preserved.
 (128)

 Sub-Section (1) of Section 11 empowers the Central government

to constitute Special Courts “for the trial of scheduled offence”.
Sub-Section (1) of Section 13 provides that, notwithstanding
anything contained in the CrPC, every scheduled offence
investigated by the NIA shall be tried only by the Special Court.
Hence, the exclusive jurisdiction of the Special Court to try a
scheduled offence under sub Section (1) of Section 13 attaches
where the scheduled offence has been “investigated by the [NIA]”.
Further, sub-Section (1) of Section 16 is an enabling provision
which empowers a Special Court to take cognizance of any
offence without the accused being committed to it for trial upon
receiving a complaint of facts which constitute such offence or
upon a police report of such offence. However, this clearly would
not affect either the antecedent investigation by the ATS Nanded
prior to the NIA Mumbai having taken up the investigation or the
submission of the charge-sheet as a logical consequence of the
investigation which was conducted by the ATS Nanded. The
enabling provisions of sub-Section (1) of Section 16 would not
invalidate the submission of the charge-sheet to the CJM, Nanded
or the order of committal made to the ASJ, Nanded.
 Though in pursuance of the order dated 08.09.2016 issued by the
Ministry of Home Affairs, UOI the NIA renumbered the case on
14.09.2016. However, NIA informed the ATS of having taken
over the investigation and sought the records only on 23.11.2016.
Thus, the twin condition of section 6 was not met only 23.11.2016.
Relevant 23,27 and 40
Para No.

Name State of Kerala v. Roopesh, Criminal Appeal Nos. 1313-1315 /

2021
Issue  Whether the revision application against the order passed by the
Special Court, constituted under the NIA Act, refusing to
discharge the accused ought to have been heard by the Division
Bench.
Held  In light of provisions of section 21 of the NIA Act such Revision
Application can be heard by Divisional Bench of the High Court
and not by single bench.
Relevant 2 and 3
Page No.
 (129)

PRISONERS ACT,1894

Name State of Gujarat and Anr. v. Narayan alias Narayan Sai alias
Mota Bhagwan Asaram alias Asumal Harpalani Criminal
Appeal No. 1159 / 2021
Issue  Principles governing the grant of furlough and Parole to prisoners
Held  The principles may be formulated in broad, general terms bearing
in mind the caveat that the governing rules for parole and furlough
have to be applied in each context. The principles are thus:
1) Furlough and parole envisage a short-term temporary release
from custody;
2) While parole is granted for the prisoner to meet a specific
exigency, furlough may be granted after a stipulated number of
years have been served without any reason;
3) The grant of furlough is to break the monotony of
imprisonment and to enable the convict to maintain continuity
with family life and integration with society;
4) Although furlough can be claimed without a reason, the
prisoner does not have an absolute legal right to claim
furlough;
 The grant of furlough must be balanced against the public interest
and can be refused to certain categories of prisoners.
Relevant 20
Para No.

TRANSFER OF PRISONERS ACT, 1950

Name State of Uttar Pradesh v. Jail Superintendent (Ropar) and Ors.,

Writ Petition (Criminal) No.409 / 2020
Issue  Whether a state can be termed as “party interested” within the
meaning of Section 406 of Cr.P.C. for transfer of cases and
appeals.
 Transfer of criminal proceedings during the pendency of
investigation.
 Powers of Supreme court under Article 142 of the Constitution to
transfer an under-trial prisoner from one state to another.
 (130)

 Applicability of the Transfer of Prisoners Act, 1950 on an under-

trial prisoner.
Held  Section 406 of Cr.P.C. clearly states that power is conferred on
the Supreme Court to transfer of cases and appeals on the
application filed by the Attorney-General of India or by a party
interested. State being a prosecuting agency in the criminal
administration can be said to be a party interested within the
meaning of Section 406(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure,
1973.
 In the absence of filing of Final Report and the case is at the stage
of investigation, no case is made out for seeking transfer under
Section 406 of Cr.P.C.
 The transfer of prisoners from one prison to another prison in
different states is covered by the provisions of The Transfer of
Prisoners Act, 1950. Section 3 of the Act reads as “the
Government of that state with the consent of the Government of
any other state, by order, provide for removal of the prisoner from
that prison to any prison in the other state.” There being no
provision for transfer of an under-trial prisoner, thus the Supreme
court is empowered under Article 142 to order for such transfer.
Relevant 18, 21, 25, 28
Para No.

PREVENTION OF MONEY LAUNDERING ACT,

2002

Name Opto Circuit India Ltd. V. Axis Bank, Criminal Appeal No.102
Of 2021
Issue  What are the pre-requisites for exercising powers of seizure under
section 17 of the PMLA Act?
 Whether it is necessary to record the reasons before seizing a
property u/s 17 of the PMLA Act?
 Whether the freezing of the bank account of the appellant was
done in a manner complying with the provisions of the Prevention
of Money Laundering Act?
 (131)

Held  That procedure to be followed under section 17 of the Prevention

of Money Laundering Act necessitates that the director or officer
exercising the said power should have reason to believe on the
basis of the information at hand that the said person has
committed acts relating to money laundering and there is need to
seize any record or property found in the search. Such belief of the
officer should be recorded in writing.
 The scheme of the PMLA is well intended. While it seeks to
achieve the object of preventing money laundering and bring to
book the offenders, it also safeguards the rights of the persons who
would be proceeded against under the Act by ensuring fairness in
procedure. Hence a procedure, including timeline is provided so
as to ensure that power is exercised for the purpose to which the
officer is vested with such power and the Adjudicating Authority
is also kept in the loop.
 That there is no material placed before court to indicate
compliance of Section 17 of PMLA, more particularly recording
belief of commission of act of money laundering and placing it
before Adjudicating authority or for filing application after
securing freezing of account to be made, thus, the freezing or
continuation thereof is without due compliance of legal
requirement and not sustainable.
Relevant 9 and 11
Para No.

PREVENTION AND CORRUPTION ACT

Name Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) and Anr. v. Thommandru

Hannah Vijaylakshmi alias T.H. Vijaylakshmi and Anr, Criminal
Appeal No. 1045 / 2021
Issues  What is the Scope of Preliminary Enquiry before registration of
FIR in Corruption Cases?
 Whether court can issue a direction to conduct preliminary
enquiry before registration of FIR?
 What is the scope of the review of a High Court while entertaining
a petition for quashing of an FIR under Article 226 of the
Constitution or Section 482 of the Cr.P.C.?
 (132)

Held  A Preliminary Enquiry is not mandatory in all cases which

involve allegations of corruption. The decision of the Constitution
Bench in Lalita Kumari v. State of UP holds that if the information
received discloses the commission of a cognizable offence at the
outset, no Preliminary Enquiry would be required. It also clarified
that the scope of a Preliminary Enquiry is not to check the veracity
of the information received, but only to scrutinize whether it
discloses the commission of a cognizable offence. Even when a
Preliminary Enquiry is initiated, it has to stop as soon as the
officer ascertains that enough material has been collected which
discloses the commission of a cognizable offence.
 Since the institution of a Preliminary Enquiry in cases of
corruption is not made mandatory before the registration of an
FIR under the Cr.P.C., PC Act or even the CBI Manual, for this
Court to issue a direction to that affect will be tantamount to
stepping into the legislative domain. Hence, it was held that in
case the information received by the CBI, through a complaint or
a “source information” under Chapter 8, discloses the
commission of a cognizable offence, it can directly register a
Regular Case instead of conducting a Preliminary Enquiry, where
the officer is satisfied that the information discloses the
commission of a cognizable offence.
 The above formulation does not take away from the value of
conducting a Preliminary Enquiry in an appropriate case. The
registration of a Regular Case can have disastrous consequences
for the career of an officer, if the allegations ultimately turn out to
be false. In a Preliminary Enquiry, the CBI is allowed access to
documentary records and speak to persons just as they would in
an investigation, which entails that information gathered can be
used at the investigation stage as well. Hence, conducting a
Preliminary Enquiry would not take away from the ultimate goal
of prosecuting accused persons in a timely manner. However, we
once again clarify that if the CBI chooses not to hold a Preliminary
Enquiry, the accused cannot demand it as a matter of right.
 While exercising its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the
Constitution to adjudicate on a petition seeking the quashing of
an FIR, the High Court should have only considered whether the
contents of the FIR – as they stand and on their face – prima facie
make out a cognizable offence. Since, a court cannot conduct a
 (133)

mini trial at the stage of framing of charge, doing so at the stage

of considering a petition for quashing an FIR under Section 482
of the Cr.P.C. or Article 226 of the Constitution is obviously also
impermissible.
Relevant 29, 32,33 40,41
Para No.

Name N. Vijayakumar V. State Of Tamil Nadu, Criminal Appeal Nos.

100-101 / 2021
Issue  Whether mere recovery of tainted money from the accused is
sufficient to prove the offence u/s 7 of the PC Act?
 When there are 2 possible views, is the High court justified in
interfering with the acquittal order passed by the trial court?
Held  It is fairly settled that mere recovery of tainted money, divorced
from the circumstances under which such money and article is
found is not sufficient to convict the accused when the substantive
evidence in the case is not reliable.
 It has to be proved beyond reasonable doubt that accused
voluntarily accepted money knowing it to be bribe. Absence of
proof of demand for illegal gratification and mere possession or
recovery of currency notes is not sufficient to constitute such
offence.
 That initial presumption of innocence in the criminal
jurisprudence gets doubled by acquittal recorded by the trial court.
 That, so long as the view taken by the trial court can be reasonably
formed, regardless of whether the High court agrees with the same
or not, the view taken by the trial court cannot be interdicted.
Relevant 9, 10, 11, & 12
Para No.

Name Charansingh v. State of Maharashtra and Ors., Criminal Appeal

No.363 / 2021
Issue  Whether an enquiry is permissible at pre-FIR stage where
allegations are made against a public servant under Section
13(1)(e) of Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 for accumulating
assets disproportionate to his own source of income?
 What is the scope and ambit of the enquiry at pre-FIR stage?
 (134)

 Whether statement made during enquiry at pre-FIR stage can be

treated as a confession or a statement made u/s 160 of Cr.P.C.?
 Categories of cases where the preliminary enquiry may be made
before lodging the FIR.
Held  An enquiry at pre-FIR stage is held to be permissible and not only
permissible but desirable, more particularly in cases where
allegations are of misconduct of corrupt practice acquiring
assets/properties disproportionate to his own source of income.
After enquiry at pre-registration of FIR stage, if, on the basis of
material collected during such enquiry, it is found that complaint
is vexatious and there is no substance at all in complaint, FIR shall
not be lodged. However, if material discloses prima facie a
commission of offence alleged, FIR will be lodged and criminal
proceedings will be put in motion and further investigation will be
carried out in terms of Code of Criminal Procedure. Such a
preliminary enquiry would be in the interest of the alleged accused
and also against whom complaint is made. Therefore, as such,
holding such an enquiry at pre-registration of FIR stage in case of
allegation of corrupt practice of accumulating assets
disproportionate to his own sources of income, cannot be said to
be per se illegal.
 Such an enquiry would be conducted to ascertain whether a
cognizable offence is disclosed or not. As observed hereinabove,
even at the stage of registering the first information report, the
police officer is not required to be satisfied or convinced that a
cognizable offence has been committed. It is enough if the
information discloses the commission of a cognizable offence as
the information only sets in motion the investigative machinery,
with a view to collect all necessary evidence, and thereafter to take
action in accordance with law. Therefore, as such, holding such
an enquiry, may be discrete/open enquiry, at pre- registration of
FIR stage in the case of allegation of corrupt practice of
accumulating assets disproportionate to his known sources of
income, cannot be said to be per se illegal.
 This enquiry will be restricted to facilitate the accused to clarify
his sources and cannot be said to be roving or fishing enquiry. The
Statement made during enquiry at pre-FIR stage cannot be said to
be statement under Section 160 and/or the statement to be
recorded during the course of investigation as per the Code of
 (135)

Criminal Procedure. Statement so received during the course of

discrete enquiry shall be only for the purpose to satisfy and find
out whether an offence under Section 13(1)(e) of the PC Act, 1988
is disclosed and such a statement cannot be said to be confessional
in nature.
 The categories of cases in which preliminary enquiry may be
made are as under:
a. Matrimonial disputes/family disputes
b. Commercial offences
c. Medical negligence cases
d. Corruption cases
e. Cases where there is abnormal delay/laches in initiating
criminal prosecution, for example, over 3 months' delay in
reporting the matter without satisfactorily explaining the
reasons for delay.
 The aforesaid are only illustrations and not exhaustive of all
conditions which may warrant preliminary inquiry.
Relevant 9, 10, 11, 12
Para No.

Name The State of Jammu and Kashmir v. Dr. Saleem Ur Rehman,

Criminal Appeal No. 1170 /2021
Issue  Whether prior sanction of Magistrate is required for investigating
Non-Cognizable Offence along with Cognizable Offence?
 Whether a detailed preliminary enquiry is permissible into
allegations against accused before registration of FIR?
 Whether preliminary enquiry before registration of FIR cause
any prejudice to the accused?
 Brief Facts:- High Court quashed the criminal proceedings
against the accused on the grounds inter alia that prior sanction
of the Magistrate was not obtained by the Investigation Agency
before investigating for offences of 120B (non-cognizable),
5(1)(d) r/w 5(2) PC Act (cognizable), and also on the ground that
detailed inquiry/investigation was not permissible before
registration of FIR.
Held  Prior sanction of Magistrate is not required for investigating Non-
Cognizable Offence along with Cognizable Offence. Merely
because the offence of the conspiracy (in present case) may be
involved, investigation into the substantive offence, i.e., in the
 (136)

present case, offence under the PC Act which is cognizable is not

required to await a sanction from the Magistrate, as that would
lead to a considerable delay and affect the investigation and it will
derail the investigation.
 Whatever enquiry is conducted at the stage of Preliminary
Enquiry, by no stretch of imagination, will be considered as
investigation under the code of criminal procedure which can
only be after registration of the FIR. Merely because while
holding a Preliminary Enquiry a detailed enquiry is made into the
allegations against accused only for the purpose of finding out a
prima facie case for the purpose of registration of the FIR and
merely because some more time is taken in conducting the
Preliminary Enquiry before registering the FIR, the entire
criminal proceedings cannot be quashed.
 There shall not be any prejudice caused to the accused at the stage
of holding Preliminary Enquiry as it is done only for the purpose
of satisfying whether any prima facie case is made out with
respect to the allegations made in the complaint which requires
further investigation after registering the FIR or not
Relevant 10, 13
Para No.

Name Ratan Babulal Lath v. The State of Karnataka, Criminal Appeal

No. 949 / 2021
Issue  Whether Bank Account of a person accused of offence under
Prevention of Corruption Act be Attached u/s 102 Cr.P.C.?
Held  The Supreme Court has held that a person's bank account cannot
be attached under the Prevention of Corruption Act, invoking
Section 102 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
 PC Act provides for the procedure for attachment of Bank
account under the PC Act.
Relevant 1 and 2
Page No.
 (137)

JUVENILE JUSTICE ACT, 2015

Name Sita Ram and Ors. v. State of Rajasthan Criminal Appeal No.462
/ 2019
Issue  Whether the accused is liable u/s 302 IPC for the injuries caused
to the deceased by a blunt object?
 Whether claim of Juvenility can be raised at any stage before any
Court?
Held  The Hon’ble Apex Court observed, inter alia, that the Deceased
had died as a result of the injuries which were suffered by a blunt
object (lathi); Not a single injury could be associated with any
sharp cutting weapon and therefore the matter would be covered
by Exception fourthly to Section 300 IPC and as such, the crime
in question would not be ‘murder’ but “culpable homicide not
amounting to murder”
 The claim of Juvenility can be raised at any stage and even for
the first time before the Supreme Court though not pressed before
the Trail Court and the Appellate Court.
Relevant 10,11,12
Page No.

Name Ram Vijay Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh, Criminal Appeal No.
175 /2021
Issues  Whether an ossification test conducted on an accused aged
around 40-55 years can be conclusive to declare him as a juvenile
on the date of the incident?
 If the testimony of a witness is not believed in respect of one
accused, should his testimony relating to another accused be
disbelieved on the same reason?
Held  At that stage, when a person is around 18 years of age, the
ossification test can be said to be relevant for determining the
approximate age of a person in conflict with law. However, when
the person is around 40-55 years of age, the structure of bones
cannot be helpful in determining the age. When the ossification
test cannot yield trustworthy and reliable results, such test cannot
be made a basis to determine the age of the person concerned on
the date of incident.
 (138)

 Merely because a prosecution witness was not believed in respect

of another accused, the testimony of the said witness cannot be
disregarded qua the present appellant
Relevant 15, 16, 18, and 19
Para No.

Name Ram Chandra v. State of Uttar Pradesh Special Leave to Appeal

(Criminal) No(s) . 8633/2017
Issues  Whether claim of juvenility can be claimed by a person who has
been convicted for an offence prior to the enactment of the
Juvenile Justice Act, 2000.
 Whether delay in taking the claim of juvenility should be a factor
in refusing bail?
Held  The plea of juvenility had possibly not been taken before the Trial
Court as the trial was concluded and the applicant was convicted
before the Juvenile Justice Act, 2000 was enacted. However,
Section 2(k) of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of
Children) Act, 2000, defines a "juvenile" or "child" as a person
who has not completed eighteen years of age. A person who was
a juvenile at the time of commission of offence is entitled to the
protection. The claim of juvenility may be raised at any stage,
even after the final disposal of the case. The delay in raising the
claim of juvenility is no ground for rejection of such a claim.
Relevant 2 and 3
Page No.

Name Ashok v. State of Madhya Pradesh, Petition(s) for Special Leave

to Appeal (Criminal) No(s). 643/2020
Issue  Whether claim of juvenility can be raised before any court, at
any stage, even after final disposal of the case?
Held  The claim of juvenility can be raised before any Court, at any
stage, even after final disposal of the case and if the Court finds
a person to be a juvenile on the date of commission of the
offence, it is to forward the juvenile to the Board for passing
appropriate orders, and the sentence, if any, passed by a Court,
shall be deemed to have no effect.
Relevant Page No. 3
Para No.
 (139)

SCHEDULED CASTE AND SCHEDULED TRIBE

(PREVENTION OF ATROCITIES) ACT, 1989

Name Hariram Bhambhi v. Satyanarayana and Anr., Criminal Appeal

No. 1278 / 2021
Issue  Whether is it permissible to allow bail application under SC/ST
Act without hearing and issuing notice to Complainant?
 Whether duty to record reasons in bail order can be obviated by
recording submissions of the parties?
Held  Allowing Bail Application without issuing notice and hearing to
Complainant will be a clear infraction of the mandate of the
SC/ST Act. Sub-sections (3) and (5) of Section 15A have been
introduced by the Parliament to ensure a right to be heard to the
person against whom the offence is committed or to the
dependents. These provisions must be scrupulously observed. We
cannot agree with the findings of the single judge that the defect
in not issuing notice to the victim or their dependent and
depriving them of the opportunity to be heard in the concerned
proceedings (for grant of bail) can be cured by providing them a
hearing in a proceeding that arose subsequently (for cancellation
of bail) Compliance with the principles of natural justice must be
observed at every stage under the mandate of the statute.
 Sub-section (3) of Section 15A provides that a reasonable and
timely notice must be issued to the victim or their dependent. This
would entail that the notice is served upon victims or their
dependents at the first or earliest possible instance. If undue delay
is caused in the issuance of notice, the victim, or as the case may
be, their dependents, would remain uninformed of the progress
made in the case and it would prejudice their rights to effectively
oppose the defense of the accused. It would also ultimately delay
the bail proceedings or the trial, affecting the rights of the accused
as well.
 The duty to record reasons cannot be obviated by recording
submissions, followed by an omnibus “in the facts and
circumstances” formula. Brief reasons which indicate the basis
for granting bail are essential, for it is the reasons adduced by the
court which indicate the basis of the order.
 (140)

 The bail order was set aside by the Apex Court.

Relevant 19, 20, 21 and 23
Para No.

Name Shantaben Bhurabhai Bhuriya v. Anand Athabhai Chaudhari

Criminal Appeal No. 967 / 2021
Issue  Whether criminal proceedings can be quashed on ground that
cognizance of offences under Atrocities Act is not directly taken
by Special Court rather the case was committed to the Court
pursuant to cognizance taken by the Magistrate?
 Can delay in lodging FIR is ground to quash it in exercise of
power u/s 482?
 Can the criminal proceedings be quashed u/s 482 Cr.P.C. on the
ground that the prior sanction was not obtained u/s 197 Cr.P.C.?
Held  Merely on the ground that cognizance of the offences under the
Atrocities Act is not taken directly by the Special Court
constituted under Section 14 of the Atrocities Act, the entire
criminal proceedings cannot be said to have been vitiated and
cannot be quashed and set aside solely on the ground that
cognizance has been taken by the learned Magistrate after
insertion of second proviso to Section 14 which confers powers
upon the Special Court also to directly take cognizance of the
offences under the Atrocities Act and thereafter case is committed
to the Special Court / Court of Session.
 If the intention of the legislature would have to confer the
jurisdiction to take cognizance of the offences under the
Atrocities Act exclusively with the Special Court, in that case, the
wording should have been “that the Court so established or
specified only shall have power to directly take cognizance of
offences under this Act”.
 Even considering Section 460 of the Code of Criminal Procedure,
if any Magistrate not empowered by the law to take cognizance
of an offence under clause (a) or clause (b) of sub-section (1) of
Section 190, takes cognizance, such irregularities do not vitiate
proceedings. At the most, it can be said to be irregular
proceedings for which, it does not vitiate the proceedings.
 On the ground of delay in lodging FIR / complaint, the criminal
proceedings cannot be quashed in exercise of powers under
 (141)

Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The aspect of

delay is required to be considered during the trial and during the
trial when the complainant is examined on oath and a question
is put to him/her on delay and he/she can very well explain the
delay in his/her cross examination. But on the aforesaid ground,
entire criminal proceeding cannot be quashed in exercise of
powers under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
 Bar under Section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and no
sanction was obtained cannot be ground to quash criminal
proceedings in exercise of powers under Section 482 of the Code
of Criminal Procedure... It is very debatable whether power
under Section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure would
apply and the acts which are alleged to have been done by the
accused / Police Officers can be said to be part of official duties...
Even assuming that the High Court was right that in absence of
sanction under Section 197, the proceedings are vitiated, in that
case, the High Court could have directed the authority to take
sanction and then proceed, instead of completely quashing the
entire criminal proceedings.
Relevant 9.1,9.2, 12, 14 and 15.
Para No.

Name R.S. Bharathi v. State Rep. by Assistant Commissioner of Police

And Another, Criminal Appeal No. 635 /2021
Issue  Quashing of charge sheet for commission of offence u/s 3(1)(u)
and 3(1)(v) of the ST/SC Act. The accused was alleged for giving
hate speech to disrespect, provoke enmity and ill-will against
members of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes community.
Held  A perusal of Section 3(1)(u) of the Act would show that it is
attracted only in a case where a person not belonging to
Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe has through his speech
promotes or attempts to promote feeling of enmity, hatred or ill
will against members of Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe.
 In so far as Section 3(1)(v) of the Act is concerned, a person is
liable for prosecution in case there is a speech made by him which
shows disrespect to any late person held in high esteem by
members of the Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe
community.
 (142)

 A careful analysis of the speech shows that the Appellant

indulged in intemperate rant which should have been avoided.
However, there is nothing in the speech which attracts an offence
under either Section 3 (1) (u) or 3(1)(v) of the SCST Act.
 A careful reading of the speech does not show that there is any
attempt made by the appellant to promote or attempt to promote
enmity, hatred or ill will against the members of Scheduled Caste
and Scheduled Tribe community.
 Chargesheet was quashed by the Apex Court.
Relevant 4,5 and 6
Page No.

Name Ramawatar v. State of Madhya Pradesh, Criminal Appeal No.

1393 / 2011
Issues  Whether the High Court/ Supreme Court can exercise their
inherent power to quash the offence committed under the special
statute (ST/SC Act)?
Held  When considering a prayer for quashing on the basis of a
compromise/settlement, if the Court is satisfied that the
underlying objective of the Act would not be contravened or
diminished even if the felony in question goes unpunished, the
mere fact that the offence is covered under a ‘special statute’
would not refrain this Court or the High Court, from exercising
their respective powers under Article 142 of the Constitution or
Section 482 Cr.P.C.
 In this case the Apex Court quashed the proceedings under the
ST/SC Act on the basis of compromise effected between the
parties, inter alia. The Court also considered that even the
accused person belongs to the lower strata of society and resides
in the neighbourhood of the Complainant.

REPRESENTATION OF PEOPLE ACT, 1951

Name Saritha S. Niar v. Hibi Eden, Special Leave Petition (Civil)

No.10678 / 2020
Issue  Whether suspension of execution of sentence enough to save the
person convicted in criminal cases from disqualification under
Section 8(3) of the Representation of People Act?
 (143)

Held  The Hon'ble Apex Court held that mere suspension of the
execution of the sentence is not sufficient to take the rigour out of
Section 8(3). The disqualification under Section 8(3) will
continue so long as there is no stay of conviction.
 The date of conviction is what determines the date of
commencement of the period of disqualification. However, it is
date of release which determines the date on which the
disqualification will cease to have effect.
Relevant 55, 56, 61
Para No.

PROBATION OF OFFENDERS ACT, 1958

Name Lakhvir Singh v. State of Punjab, Criminal Appeal Nos.47-48 /

2021
Issue  Whether Section 6 of Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 is
mandatory in nature?
 What would be the relevant stage for determining the age of
accused, so as to confer the benefit u/s 6 of the Probation of
Offenders Act?
 Whether the benefit u/s 4 of Probation of Offenders Act be
denied to person convicted u/s 397 IPC as it provides for
minimum sentence?
Held  Section 6 of the Probation of Offenders Act applies to the
offenders who were under the age of 21 years on the date of
sentencing and not on the date of commission offence.
 The distinction between Section 6, which is in nature of an
injunction for courts to follow as distinct from Section 3 or 4 of
the Act, which are discretionary in nature. Section 6 provides that
a court "must not" sentence a person under the age of 21 years to
imprisonment unless sufficient reason for the same are recorded,
based on due consideration of the probation officer's report. The
relevant aspects while giving benefit under Section 6 of the 1958
of the Act are: the nature of offence, the character of the offender,
and the surrounding circumstances as recorded in the probation
officer's report.
 (144)

 Thus, the benefit of probation under the 1958 Act is not excluded
by the provisions of the mandatory minimum sentence under
Section 397 IPC.
Relevant 9, 13
Para No.

Name Samaul SK v. State of Jharkhand, Criminal Appeal No. 894 /

2021
Issue  Whether the person convicted for the offence u/s 498-A of the
IPC be granted the benefit of the Probation of Offenders Act and
the sentence be reduced in case of agreement for payment of
compensation to the wife?
Held  The Apex Court held that if the petitioner/appellant is showing
remorse and is willing to make arrangements for the wife and his
two children born out of the wedlock, the court would not like to
come in the way of such an arrangement. The court also held the
object of any criminal jurisprudence is reformative in character
and to take care of the victim. It is towards this objective
that Section 357 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is enacted in
the statute.
 The Hon'ble Supreme Court reduced sentence to period already
undergone as man convicted u/s 498A IPC agreed to pay
compensation to his wife & children.
Relevant 8, 9, 10
Para No.

WATER (PREVENTION AND CONTROL OF POLLUTION)

ACT, 1974

Name Noorulla Khan V. Karnataka State Pollution Control Board,

Criminal Appeal No.599 Of 2021
Issues  Whether S. 48 of the Water (Prevention and Control of Pollution)
Act, 1974 overrides the requirement of prosecution sanction u/s
197 Cr.P.C.?
 Whether the ‘Head of a Department’ is deemed to be guilty for
violation of provisions of Water Act by a department?
 (145)

Held The Hon'ble Court relied on the Judgment in the cse of Karnataka
State Pollution Control Board v. B. Heera Naik and laid the following
legal principles:
 If the violation of the provisions of the Water Act was at the hands
of a Department, subject to the satisfaction of the requirements
under Section 48 of the Water Act, “the Head of the Department”
would be deemed to be guilty. This would of course be subject to
the defences which are available to him to establish whether the
offence in question was committed without his knowledge or that
he had exercised all due diligence to prevent the commission of
such offence.
 By virtue of the decision of this court in V.C. Chinnappa Goudar,
because of deeming fiction under Section 48 of the Water Act, the
protection under Section 197 of the Code would not be available
and the matter ought to be considered de hors such protection.
 If the concerned public servant happens to be a Chief Officer or
Commissioner of a Municipal Council or Town Panchayat, he
cannot strictly be called “the Head of the Department of the
Government”. Therefore, in terms of decision of this Court in B.
Heera Naik, (2020) 16 SCC 298 the matter would not come under
Section 48 of the Water Act. But the matter would come directly
under Section 47 of the Water Act. According to said decision,
even in such cases, the deeming fiction available under Section 47
of the Water Act would dis-entitle the public servant from the
protection under Section 197 of the Code.
 If the offenders are other than public servants or where the
principal offenders are corporate entities in private sectors, the
question of protection under Section 197 would not arise.
Relevant 11
Para No.

UNLAWFUL ACTIVITIES (PREVENTION) ACT, 1967

Name Union Of India v. K.A. Najeeb, Criminal Appeal No. 98 / 2021

Issues  Whether section 43D(5) of the UA(P) Act envisages that the guilt
of the accused should be ascertained at the time of granting bail as
done under section 37 of the NDPS act or not?
 (146)

 Whether undue delay in trial proceedings could act as a factor for

the grant of bail for an accused charged with serious and grave
offences?
 Under what circumstances should the higher court interfere with
the bail order given by the lower court?
Held  Presence of statutory restrictions like section 43D(5) of UA(P) Act
per-se does not oust the ability of constitutional courts to grant
bail on the grounds of violation of Part-III of the Constitution.
 The charges against the accused are of a serious nature. Had it
been the case at the threshold we would have outrightly turned
down the application for Bail. However, keeping in mind the
length of the period spent by him in the custody and the
unlikelihood of the trial being completed any-time soon, granting
of bail was the only option left for the High Court.
 Unlike, section 37 of the NDPS Act, where the competent court
needs to be satisfied that prima facie the accused is not guilty while
granting the bail; there is no such precondition under the UA(P)
Act.
Relevant 9, 10, 16, 18, 19 and 20
Para No.

Name Fakhrey Alam v. State of Uttar Pradesh, Criminal Appeal No. 319
/ 2021
Issue  Whether default bail should be granted to an accused under
UA(P) Act when the chargesheet has not been filed within 180
days?
Held  The Apex court held that default bail under first proviso of Section
167(2) Cr.P.C. is a fundamental right and not merely a statutory
right as it is a procedure established by law under Article 21 of the
Constitution. Thus, a fundamental right is granted to an accused
person to be released on bail once the conditions of the first
proviso to Section 167(2) Cr.P.C. are fulfilled.
Relevant 5 and 6
Page No.
 (147)

Name Sudesh Kedia v. Union of India, Criminal Appeal Nos . 314-315

of 2021
Issue  Whether payment of extortion money would tantamount to terror
funding and commission of offence under UA(P) Act?
 Duty of court while considering bail application under Section 43
(5) D of UA(P) Act.
Held  Payment of extortion money does not amount to terror funding.
The Appellant is carrying on transport business in the area of
operation of the organization and paid money to the members of
the TPC for smooth running of his business. Prima facie, it cannot
be said that the Appellant conspired with the other members of
the TPC and raised funds to promote the organization.
 While considering the grant of bail under Section 43 (5) D of
UA(P) Act, it is the bounden duty of the Court to apply its mind
to examine the entire material on record for the purpose of
satisfying itself, whether a prima facie case is made out against the
accused or not.
Relevant 11
Para No.

Name Sadique v. State of Madhya Pradesh, Criminal Appeal No.963 /

2021
Issue  Whether Magistrates can extend time to complete investigation in
UA(P) Act cases by exercising the powers under Section 43-D
(2)(b) of the UA(P) Act?
Held  The magistrates would not be competent to extend he time to
complete investigations in UAPA cases. The Magistrate would
not be competent to consider the request for extension of time to
complete the investigation and the only competent authority to
consider such request would be “the Court” as specified in the
proviso in Section 43-D (2)(b) of the UA(P) Act i.e. the Special
Court and in its absence, the Sessions Court.
Relevant 4 and 5
Page No

Name Thwaha Fasal v. Union of India, Criminal Appeal No. 1302 /

2021
Issues  In what circumstances will section Sections 20, 38 and 39 of the
UAPA, 1967 be attracted in a particular case?
 (148)

Held  The offence punishable under Section 20 is attracted when the

accused is a member of a terrorist gang or a terrorist organisation
which is involved in terrorist act. Section 20 is not attracted
unless the terrorist gang or terrorist organisation of which the
accused is a member is involved in terrorist act as defined by
Section 15.
 The offence punishable under section 38 will be attracted if the
accused associates himself or professes to associate himself with
a terrorist organisation included in First Schedule with intention
to further its activities. In such a case, he commits an offence
relating to membership of a terrorist organisation covered by
Section 38.
 The offence under sub-section (1) of Section 38 of associating or
professing to be associated with the terrorist organisation and the
offence relating to supporting a terrorist organisation under
Section 39 will not be attracted unless the acts specified in both
the Sections are done with intention to further the activities of a
terrorist organisation. To that extent, the requirement of mens
rea is involved. Thus, mere association with a terrorist
organisation as a member or otherwise will not be sufficient to
attract the offence under Section 38 unless the association is with
intention to further its activities. Even if an accused allegedly
supports a terrorist organisation by committing acts referred in
clauses (a) to (c) of subsection (1) of Section 39, he cannot be held
guilty of the offence punishable under Section 39 if it is not
established that the acts of support are done with intention to
further the activities of a terrorist organisation. Thus, intention
to further activities of a terrorist organisation is an essential
ingredient of the offences punishable under Sections 38 and 39 of
the 1967 Act.
 The Apex Court confirmed the order of bail finding that the
provisions of section 38 and 39 are not prima facie found to be
made out against the accused.
Relevant 10, 11, 12, 13, 15
Para No.

Name Ashim @ Asim Kumar Haranath Bhattacharya @ Asim

Harinath Bhattacharya @ Aseem Kumar Bhattacharya v.
National Investigation Agency Criminal Appeal No. 1525 /2021
 (149)

Issue  Whether in light of section 43(D)-5 of UAP Act, can bail be

granted on account long incarceration pending trial?
Held  Section 43(D)-5 of UAP Act does not oust the ability of the
constitutional courts to grant bail on grounds of violation of Part
III of the Constitution. Deprivation of personal liberty without
ensuring speedy trial is not consistent with Article 21 of the
Constitution of India. While deprivation of personal liberty
for some period may not be avoidable, period of deprivation
pending trial/appeal cannot be unduly long.
Relevant 13,14
Para No.

POCSO ACT, 2012

Name Attorney General for India v. Satish and another, Criminal

Appeal No. 1410 / 2021
Issue  What is the meaning of word ‘Touch’/ ‘Physical Touch’ as used
in section 7 of the POCSO Act?
 What is the meaning of the word ‘sexual intent’ as used in section
7 of the POCSO Act?
 Whether an act of touching any part of the body, other than the
sexual organs, can be trivialized or held insignificant or
peripheral so as to exclude such act from the purview of “sexual
assault" under section 7 of the POCSO Act?
Held  The words ‘Touch’ and ‘Physical Contact’ have been
interchangeably used in Section 7 by the legislature. The word
“Touch” has been used specifically with regard to the sexual
parts of the body, whereas the word “physical contact” has been
used for any other act. Therefore, the act of touching the sexual
part of body or any other act involving physical contact, if done
with “sexual intent” would amount to “sexual assault” within
the meaning of Section 7 of the POCSO Act.
 The expression “sexual intent” having not been explained in
Section 7, it cannot be confined to any predetermined format or
structure and that it would be a question of fact.
 Restricting the interpretation of the words “touch” or “physical
contact” to “skin to skin contact” would not only be a narrow
and pedantic interpretation of the provision contained in Section
 (150)

7 of the POCSO Act, but it would lead to an absurd

interpretation of the said provision. “skin to skin contact” for
constituting an offence of “sexual assault” could not have been
intended or contemplated by the Legislature. The very object of
enacting the POCSO Act is to protect the children from sexual
abuse, and if such a narrow interpretation is accepted, it would
lead to a very detrimental situation, frustrating the very object of
the Act, inasmuch as in that case touching the sexual or non
sexual parts of the body of a child with gloves, condoms, sheets
or with cloth, though done with sexual intent would not amount
to an offence of sexual assault under Section 7 of the POCSO
Act. The most important ingredient for constituting the offence
of sexual assault under Section 7 of the Act is the “sexual intent”
and not the “skin to skin” contact with the child.
 The act of touching any sexual part of the body of a child with
sexual intent or any other act involving physical contact with
sexual intent, could not be trivialized or held insignificant or
peripheral so as to exclude such act from the purview of “sexual
assault” under Section 7 of the POCSO Act.
Relevant 32,33
Para No.

PREVENTION OF FOOD ADULTERATION ACT, 1954

Name Narayana Prasad Sahu v. State of MP, Criminal Appeal No.

1312/2021
Issues  Whether mere dispatch of report of public analyst would be
sufficient to fulfil the Requirement under Section 13(2) of the
Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 which require the
service of report of the food analyst to accused?
Held  Mere dispatch of the report of public analyst to the accused is not
a sufficient compliance with the requirement under Section 13(2)
of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954, to serve the
report on him/her. Apart from the right of the accused to contend
that the report is not correct, he has the right to exercise an option
of sending the sample to Central Food Laboratory for analysis by
making an application to the Court within ten days from the date
of receipt of the report.
 (151)

 The copy of the report must be served to the accused. The finding
of the High Court to presume the compliance on the ground of
refusal on the part of accused to accept the report was found to
be erroneous as the post man was not examined before the Trial
Court to prove the said fact.
Relevant 5, 7, 8
Para No.
 (152)

Rajasthan High Court

Name Rajanish Kumar Meena v. State of Rajasthan, S.B. Criminal
Misc (Pet.) No. 6269/2021
Issue  Whether trial court (POCSO) is justified in refusing to provide
the copy of the Examination-in-chief to the accused for the
purpose of cross examination?
 Brief Facts:- In this case the Counsel for accused asked for the
copy of the statements recorded in examination-in-chief and
sought for reserving the right for cross-examination under
section 309 of Cr.P.C. The Trial Court rejected the application
of the accused and discharged the witness. The accused
approached the Hon'ble High Court praying for an opportunity
to cross-examine the witness.
Held  The refusal of the trial court for providing a copy of the
Examination-in-Chief of P.W.2 does not suffer from any
infirmity. More particularly, the discretion exercised by the trial
court, in the facts and circumstances of the present case, was just
and proper. As per Section 231 and 309 Cr.P.C., the discretion
is solely with the trial court to adjourn the matter for cross
examination. Learned Trial court has rightly exercised the
discretion by refusing the counsel for the accused petitioner to
provide copy of Examination-in-Chief for the purpose of cross
examination, and therefore, as per the established procedure of
law the same does not call for any interference.
 However, the in order to meet the ends of justice the Hon'ble
Court allowed an opportunity to the accused to cross-examine
the prosecutrix.
Relevant Page No. 5
Para No.

Name In Re A Ref. U/s 395 Cr.P.C. By District And Sessions Judge,

Pali, D.B. Criminal Reference No. 2/2020
Issue  Whether the Magistrate is precluded to pass a sentence, in an
application under section 125(3) Cr.P.C., beyond a period of one
month in pursuance of Execution Warrant on a consolidated
application made within one year from the date on which the
amount became due?
 (153)

Held  The proviso to Section 125(3) Cr.P.C. reads that “no warrant
shall be issued for the recovery of any amount due under this
Section unless the application be made to the Court to levy such
amount within a period of one year from the date on which it
became due. Thus, the proviso stipulates that an application has
to be filed to the Court to levy the amount due and that such
application should be made within a period of one year from the
date on which the amount becomes due. The legislature has
made it clear that even though the maintenance, which is
awarded under Section 125 Cr.P.C., is recurring every month,
an option has been given to the claimant to file an application for
the recovery of the amount within a period of one year from the
date on which it becomes due. There is no requirement in law
that a separate application should be filed for every month’s
maintenance. Thus, there is no doubt in the mind of this Court
that the claimant/claimants can file a consolidated application
for levying the amount due for the period of preceding 12 months
and there is no impediment there against. A consolidated
application would rather facilitate the procedural wrangles for
the claimant and also, ease the burden on the Courts. Dealing
with separate applications for each month’s default/dues would
unnecessarily complicate the issues because it would require
repetition of the entire procedure right from the issuance of
recovery warrants against the defaulter for each month’s
allowance and to wait for service thereof. Without any doubt,
for defaults of 12 previous months, the Court may
simultaneously issue separate warrants for levying every month’s
due amount and if, despite service, the defaulter fails to make the
payment, then separate sentences of imprisonment upto one
month may be passed for every month’s default. Needless to say,
the sentences would have to be passed by maintaining the
sequence in the descending order of defaults limited upto
previous12 months.
 That the Court will deal with the application in 12 separate
compartments and shall issue separate warrants of recovery of
every month’s dues, subject to the condition that the application
shall not be entertained for maintenance dues beyond a period of
12 months. In the event of non-payment/non-recovery of the
maintenance, the Court may pass separate sentences upon the
 (154)

defaulter extending to one month’s imprisonment for each

default.
 We also clarify that in cases where, no order of interim
maintenance has been passed and the Court, while finally
deciding the application for maintenance, orders that the
maintenance shall be payable from the date of filing of the
application, the claimant may file an application for recovery of
the accrued amount and such application shall be considered to
be within time if filed within 12 months from the date of the
order.
 The Hon'ble Court recommended that the appropriate
Government should consider suitable amendments in Section
125 Cr.P.C. so that the procedure of recovery can be simplified.
 Further, the Hon'ble Court as an interim measure directed all the
Magistrates/ Family Courts across the State of Rajasthan seized
of the applications under Section 125 Cr.P.C. that after passing
of the order, the Court shall facilitate the claimant to move an
application for recovery of maintenance amount on the same day
when the application is decided. The notice of the application
shall be served on the defaulter on the date of the decision and
consequently, he/she shall be under an obligation to deposit the
maintenance amount by the particular date to be stipulated
failing which, the Court may initiate the procedure of recovery
in terms of Section 125(3) Cr.P.C.
Relevant 18,19 and 20
Page No.

Name Gulveer v. State of Rajasthan, D.B. Criminal Writ Petition No.

541/2021
Issue  Whether parole application can be rejected on the ground that
the other co-convicts, who belongs to same family, have been
released on parole?
Held  When the parole applications are filed by more than one convicts
belonging to the same family, the same shall not be rejected
citing the reason that the other family members have been
released on parole. In such circumstances, the parole application
of convicts, who are not being released on parole for this reason,
shall be kept pending and shall be considered after parole facility
has been availed by the other related convicts.
 (155)

Relevant 2 and 3
Page No.

Name Mahendra Singh v. State of Rajasthan, D.B. Criminal Appeal

No. 232/2019
Issue  Whether the victim has the right under Section 372 of Cr.P.C to
challenge the judgment of a criminal court on account of
inadequacy of sentence awarded to the accused?
Held  The statutory provision under Section 372 Cr.P.C. gives the
victims a right to challenge Judgments of the trial courts in
criminal cases without depending upon the State to do so. The
provision contemplates appeal against the acquittal of the
accused; to question the conviction for a lesser offence or against
imposition of inadequate compensation. The provision begins
with the non-obstante clause that no appeal shall lie from any
judgment or order of a criminal court except as provided for by
this Code or by any other law for the time being in force.
Manifestly, the proviso gives a right to the victim to challenge
the judgment of a criminal court only in three circumstances
which have specifically been qualified by the proviso.
Challenging a judgment of a criminal court on account of
inadequacy of sentence awarded to the accused, is not an option
available to the complainant/victim by the proviso to Section
372Cr.P.C.. As per Section 377 Cr.P.C., the State Government
has been given the exclusive right to file an appeal against
inadequacy of sentence. In view of the above, the victim does
not have any right to question the judgment of a criminal court
on the count of inadequacy of sentence.
Relevant 3 and 4
Page No.

Name Bhanwar Singh v. State of Rajasthan, S.B. Criminal Misc. II

Bail Application No. 7695/2021
Issue  Whether a bail application under Sec.439 CrPC would lie before
the High Court against an order rejecting default bail
application under Sec.167(2)(a)(i) of Cr.P.C?
 While hearing the bail application u/s 439 of Cr.P.C., is the
High Court required to check the veracity of the rejection order
of the lower court?
 (156)

Held  The powers exercised under Section 439 Cr.P.C. by High Court
are co-extensive to these exercised by the learned District &
Sessions Judge. At the stage while hearing bail application
under Section 439 Cr.P.C., the High Court does not examine
the legality and veracity of an order passed by the learned
Sessions Judge and a different view can be taken without setting
aside the order of the learned Sessions Judge while granting bail
or rejecting the bail.
 While examining an order passed by the learned Sessions Judge
or Magistrate as the case may be allowing or rejecting an
application under Section 167(2)(a)(i) Cr.P.C., the High Court
will have to examine the legality of the view taken by the lower
Court. While in the present case, the application under Section
167(2)(a)(i) Cr.P.C. was decided by learned Additional Sessions
Judge, there may be several cases where the case might be
decided at the level of the Magistrate and therefore, the revision
would lie before the learned District Judge against an order
passed by the Magistrate under Section 167(2) Cr.P.C. and the
District Judge would not be examining the case under Section
439 Cr.P.C. Similarly, the High Court would also be examining
the order on merits when an order under Section
167(2)(a)(i) Cr.P.C. is assailed before him. Thus, the High Court
would be exercising its inherent power/revisional power
depending upon the case coming up after revision or directly to
the High Court. In view of above, in no circumstance an
application under Section 439 Cr.P.C. would be maintainable
against an order passed on an application under Section
167(2)(a)(i) Cr.P.C.
Relevant Paragraph no. 6 and 7
Para No.

Name X Son of Laxman v. State, S.B. Criminal Revision Petition No.

494/2021
Issue  Whether revision under Section 102 of Juvenile Justice Act can
be decided in absence of notice to the complainant/ victim.
Held  It was held that there is no legislative mandate under the
Juvenile Justice Act that the victim should be notified before
hearing the bail application of a child in conflict with law, be it
before the Juvenile Justice Board, Appellate Court or before the
 (157)

High Court exercising the revisional powers under Section 102

of the Juvenile Justice Act.
Relevant 6 and 7
Page No.

Name Gagandeep @ Goldy v. State of Rajasthan, S.B. Criminal Misc.

Interim Bail Application No. 6821 /2021
Issue  The Court was considering the issue pertaining to difficulty in
determining the veracity of facts stated in the application
seeking interim/temporary bails.
 Directions given to all the learned trial courts to give necessary
details while allowing or rejecting the interim/temporary bail
application(s) of any accused person.
Held  The Hon'ble Court directed that all the learned trial courts in the
State shall, while allowing or rejecting the interim/temporary
bail application(s) of any accused person, seek and compile, in
a tabular form, all the necessary details in a comprehensive
manner.
 The parameters, which need to be observed, as per the
applicability in the facts and grounds of the interim/temporary
bail application(s), are as follows:-
 Previous criminal antecedent(s) of the concerned petitioner.
 Whether the petitioner has any background of being a
history-sheeter and/or hardcore offender.
 Whether any previous interim/temporary bail(s) have been
granted to the concerned petitioner, and if granted, for how
long, and also whether the concerned petitioner
surrendered in time.
 The concerned Jail authorities shall be required to provide
a report regarding conduct of the concerned petitioner in
Jail along with the schedule of previous releases of the
concerned petitioner on interim/temporary bail, if any.
 The details regarding the immediate family of the
concerned petitioner shall also be noticed, so that the
requirement of the petitioner can be adjudged.
 In regard to the assessment of custodial release, in case of
illness of the concerned petitioner or his family member, the
details to be provided, shall include the duration of
treatment, operation or any surgical intervention, if
required. The date(s) of operation or any such surgical
 (158)

intervention, if required, shall also be provided. The list of

medical record produced by the concerned petitioner is also
required to be furnished. The verification of the medical
record shall be required to be made by a Government
Doctor.
 The details of the family member(s) of the concerned
petitioner shall also be required to be attested by the
concerned Patwari or Gram Sewak, and any other details
which are necessary for the grounds, on which the
concerned petitioner is seeking interim/temporary bail.
 Any other information, which is relevant to the grounds
mentioned in the interim/temporary bail application(s).
 Such compilation of details shall be mandatory only if the
perspective of the grounds mentioned in the
interim/temporary bail application(s) are connected to it.
 If any interim/temporary bail application is preferred directly
before the High Court, then it shall be the duty of the learned
counsel for the concerned petitioner to provide the necessary
information, as per the aforesaid direction, well in advance to
the learned Public Prosecutor, and in case, such advance
information is not provided by learned counsel for the
concerned petitioner, then the learned Public Prosecutor shall
have a right to seek an adjournment in the concerned case, until
such information comes on record.
Relevant 13, 14 and 17
Para No.

Name Narendra Kumar @ Kallu & Anr. v. State of Rajasthan & Ors.,
D.B. Criminal Appeal No. 862/2011
Issue  Whether defence can claim any right to cross-examine an
approver when his statements are being recorded at pre-
committal stage?
Held  There is no such requirement of law that the defence must be
allowed to cross-examine the Approver when his statement is
recorded at the pre-committal stage.
Relevant 29 and 30
Para No.
 (159)

Name Nathuram and Ors. v. State of Rajasthan, D.B. Crl. Ref. No.
1/2021
Issue  What would be the nature of an offence (whether cognizable or
non-cognizable) punishable by imprisonment which “may
extend to three years”, under the laws other than the IPC?
Held  It was held that for determination of nature of offence whether
it is cognizable or non-cognizable, the maximum punishment
that may be awarded for particular offence, is relevant and not
the minimum sentence, thus unless otherwise provided under
the relevant statute, the offences under the laws other than IPC
punishable with imprisonment to the extend of three years, shall
fall within the classification II of offences classified under Part
II of First Schedule and thus, shall be cognizable and non-
bailable.
Relevant 25
Para No.

Name Kayum & Ors. v. State of Rajasthan, S.B. Criminal Misc. Bail
Application No. 95/2021
Issue  Applicability of conditions stated in section 37 of the NDPS Act
on the bail application for the offence under the NDPS Act.
 Whether the accused can be granted bail on the ground that the
other co-accused person has been granted bail by the coordinate
bench of the Court?
Held  It is held that recording a satisfaction under Section 37 of the
NDPS Act is imperative before granting bail to a person accused
of the offence under the NDPS Act and failure to do so, would
violate the mandatory requirement of the statute and thereby
vitiate the bail order. Thus, the court has to record findings
mandated by Section 37 of NDPS Act which is a sine-qua-non
for grant of bail.
 Court denied to release the accused on the basis of the order of
the coordinate bench as the mandatory condition under section
37 of the NDPS Act was not considered by the Coordinate
Bench while releasing the accused persons on bail.
Relevant 6,7 and 9
Page No.
 (160)

Name Khet Singh v. State of Rajasthan, S.B. Criminal Misc. Bail

Application No. 861/2021
Issue  Whether subordinate court can reject bail application of co-
accused in case where bail application of other accused was
accepted by High Court?
Held  It is expected from all Subordinate Courts that where similarly
situated co-accused has been granted bail by High Court and
bail application of other accused comes up for consideration,
High Court’s order shall be referred to while deciding such bail
application and shall be followed unless distinguishable features
or any special circumstances exist.
Relevant 3
Page No.

Name Subhash Khichad v. State of Rajasthan, D.B. Criminal Writ

Petition No. 382/2020
Issue  Whether the convict is entitled to be released on regular parole
if he previously absconded from parole?
 Whether show of good conduct during incarnation is a
necessary condition of release of prisoner on parole under Rule
9 of the Rajasthan Prisoners Release on Parole Rules, 1958?
 Whether emergent parole can be equate with regularly
sanctioned parole in terms of Rule 18 of Rajasthan Prisoners
Release on Parole Rules, 1958?
Held  The primary requirement of Rule 9 of Rajasthan Prisoners
Release on Parole Rules, 1958 is that the convict must have
shown good conduct in the jail during the period of his
incarceration. Needless to say that abscondence from parole, by
no stretch of imagination can be considered to be good conduct.
As per Rule 13 of the Rules of 1958, grant of parole should be
regarded as a concession to encourage good conduct and it shall
not be claimed by prisoners as a matter of right.
 A sanctioned parole means a parole, which has been granted
with due sanction of the authority concerned. Any kind of
parole, whether it be regular or emergent, can only be availed
after being duly sanctioned by the competent authority. Thus,
the language of Rule 18 of the Rules of 1958 does not make any
distinction between regular parole or emergent parole and over-
staying of a prisoner after the period of parole whatever its
nature be or the breach of any other condition thereof would
 (161)

entail the consequences laid down in clauses (i), (ii) and (iii)
thereof.
Relevant 4, 5 and 6
Page No.

Name Sunil Kallani V. State Of Rajasthan ( S.B. Criminal Misc. Bail

Application No. 9155/2019)
Issue  Whether an Anticipatory Bail Application is maintainable if the
Accused is already in judicial custody in another Crime?
Held  The anticipatory bail would not lie and would not be
maintainable if a person is already arrested and is in custody of
police or judicial custody in relation to another criminal case
which may be for similar offence or for different offences.
Relevant 26
Para No.

Name Kamlesh Kumar Khandelwal v. State of Rajasthan (S.B.

Criminal Miscellaneous (Petition) No.3646/2021
Issue  Whether police can proceed to investigate in subsequent FIR
involving similar subject matter, if final report has been
submitted in the initial FIR?
 In what cases a second FIR is maintainable on same subject
matter?
Held  Right of complainant to file protest petition and to decide
whether the final report is to be accepted or not, will not change
the commission of crime, which is alleged by complainant
independently in respect of specific allegations, which are
made in the subsequent FIR.
 Second FIR can be maintainable when there are different
versions or discovery is made on factual foundations and such
discovery may be made by the Police Authorities, at a
subsequent stage.
Relevant 24,25, 26
Para No.

Name Vimla Devi v. State Of Rajasthan & Anr. (S.B. Criminal

Miscellaneous (Petition) No. 4400/2021
Issue  In case where there are several accused and one of the accused
has been declared absconder, whether the statement of witness
recorded during the trial of other accused persons be treated as
 (162)

statement recorded under section 299 Cr.P.C. and whether the

depositions of such witnesses can be given in evidence against
absconding accused in subsequent trial conducted on his arrest,
if the witness is dead or has become incapable of giving
evidence?
Held  If the accused has absconded in a criminal case and there is no
immediate prospect of arresting him, the witnesses produced by
the prosecution can be examined in his absence and the
depositions of such witnesses can be given in evidence against
him in subsequent trial conducted on his arrest, if the witness is
dead or has become incapable of giving evidence or in other
circumstances as prescribed.
 The provisions of Section 299 Cr.P.C. have been incorporated
as exception to the general provisions of Section 33 of the
Evidence Act with the object to secure the ends of justice and to
curb the abuse of process, so that an accused cannot take
advantage of his own wrong and he may not succeed in
frustrating the very purpose of criminal justice system.
Relevant 8 and 11
Para No.

Name Puneet Solanki V. State Of Rajasthan Criminal Misc. Petition

4889 / 2020
Issue  Whether multiple FIRs relating to a same case registered under
different Acts would amount to abuse of process of law?
 Whether police is empowered to investigate/ exercise power
under Rajasthan Excise Act in view of the specialized agency
provided under the Act?
Held  Two FIRs relating to a same case registered under different
Sections would amount to abuse of process of law as it would
result not only in two different investigations being conducted
by two different agencies but also would be in violation of the
basic principles laid down under the Rajasthan Excise Act.
 A police officer cannot act like an excise inspector. The
investigation and the other powers conferred under the act is
solely available with the Excise Officer who could take
assistance of the local Police for the purpose of carrying
investigation in terms of Section 43 of the Excise Act. In a case
where there is specialized agency provided under the Excise
 (163)

Act, no other person can be allowed to erode or usurp such

power available with the Excise Department.
Relevant 15, 42,50(1)
Para No.
 (164)

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