Problem of Universals: Realism vs. Nominalism
Problem of Universals: Realism vs. Nominalism
Nominalism
Debated at least since the days of Plato, the question known as the “problem of
universals” reached a high point of discussion during the Middle Ages. The
problem posits two theories about the nature of reality that oppose each other and
argue the question of whether “universal” things are in fact “real.” The question is
whether or not a property of something is “real.”
A property is an inherent quality or label that describes that thing. For example, all
balls share the property of being shaped like a sphere. However, for properties that
are not physical, observable, or measurable, philosophers debated whether the
property was real. For an abstract property such as love, justice, or beauty,
philosophers have disagreed throughout history about “realness”. For example, all
laws are assumed to share the property of fairness, but do they? And is fairness
“real”?
Realism is the philosophical position that posits that universals are just as real as
physical, measurable material. Nominalism is the philosophical position that
promotes that universal or abstract concepts do not exist in the same way as
physical, tangible material. A debate that heavily influenced multiple areas of
study throughout the Middle Ages, it was of specific importance for theological
scholars. Questions about miracles, God’s love, and salvation were central in the
minds of medieval philosophers, and they often supported their opinions very
sternly—it was a matter of eternal truth.
One of the most important realist philosophers of the Middle Ages was Thomas
Aquinas, who argued an Aristotelian theory that essence and existence were clearly
distinct. About two centuries later, William of Ockham was one of the most
important High Middle Ages nominalist philosophers; he argued the extreme
position for his day that universals are no more than psychological labels.
How Do Realists Understand Reality?
Realists postulate the existence of two kinds of entities, particulars, and universals.
Particulars resemble each other because they share universals; for example, each
particular dog has four legs, can bark, and has a tail. Universals can also resemble
each other by sharing other universals; for example, wisdom and generosity
resemble each other in that they are both virtues.
The intuitive plausibility of realism is evident. Realism allows us to take seriously
the subject-predicate structure of discourse through which we represent the world.
When we say that Socrates is wise it is because there are both Socrates (the
particular) and wisdom (the universal) and the particular exemplifies the universal.
Realism also can explain the use we often make of abstract reference. Sometimes
qualities are subjects of our discourse, as when we say that wisdom is a virtue or
that red is a color. The realist can interpret these discourses as asserting that there
is a universal (wisdom; red) that exemplifies another universal (virtue; color).
How Do Nominalists Understand Reality?
Nominalists offer a radical definition of reality: there are no universals, only
particulars. The basic idea is that the world is made exclusively from particulars
and the universals are of our own making. They stem from our representational
system (the way we think about the world) or from our language (the way we
speak of the world). Because of this, nominalism is clearly tied in a close manner
also to epistemology (the study of what distinguishes justified belief from opinion).
If there are only particulars, then there is no "virtue," "apples," or "genders." There
are, instead, human conventions that tend to group objects or ideas into categories.
Virtue exists only because we say it does: not because there is a universal
abstraction of virtue. Apples only exist as a particular type of fruit because we as
humans have categorized a group of particular fruits in a particular way. Maleness
and femaleness, as well, exist only in human thought and language.