Study on

agricultural interbranch
organisations in the EU

This report has been prepared by Arcadia International,

LEI - Wageningen UR,
Dr. Luc Bodiguel, and national experts

30 October 2016
EUROPEAN COMMISSION
Directorate-General for Agriculture and Rural Development

E-mail: [email protected]

European Commission
B-1049 Brussels
 Study on
agricultural interbranch
organisations in the EU
 Europe Direct is a service to help you find answers
to your questions about the European Union.

Freephone number (*):

00 800 6 7 8 9 10 11
(*) The information given is free, as are most calls (though some operators, phone
boxes or hotels may charge you).

LEGAL NOTICE
The information and views set out in this report are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the
official opinion of the Commission. The Commission does not guarantee the accuracy of the data included in
this study. Neither the Commission nor any person acting on the Commission’s behalf may be held
responsible for the use which may be made of the information contained therein.

More information on the European Union is available on the Internet (http://www.europa.eu).

Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2016

ISBN: 978-92-79-53904-6
doi:10.2762/44455
© European Union, 2016
Reproduction is authorised provided the source is acknowledged.

Printed in Belgium
 Study on agricultural interbranch organisations (IBOs) in the EU

Authors:

Laurence Amat, Arcadia International E.E.I.G., Belgium

Denisa Assefová, Schoenherr, Prague, Czech Republic
Luc Bodiguel, Researcher at the French National Center of the Scientific Research
(CNRS), Prof. (Adjunct) at the University of Nantes, Research Institute "Droit et
changement social", France
Simona Chiricǎ, Schoenherr, Bucarest, Romania
Maria Christodoulou, Agra CEAS Ltd, Belgium
Alexandros Efstathiou, Chrysostomides & Co, Nicosia, Cyprus
Michiel van Galen, LEI – Wageningen, the Netherlands
Vladimìr Kordoš, BNT, Bratislava, Slovak Republic
Dora Lakner, LEI – Wageningen, the Netherlands
Francesco Montanari, Arcadia International E.E.I.G., Portugal
John Nanga, Agra CEAS Ltd, Belgium
Andreas Natterer, Schoenherr, Vienna, Austria,
Elena Todorova, Schoenherr, Sofia, Bulgaria
Daniel Traon, Arcadia International E.E.I.G., Belgium (project leader)
Cesare Varallo, Arcadia International E.E.I.G., Italy
Dina Vlahov-Buhin, Schoenherr, Zagreb, Croatia
Study on agricultural interbranch organisations (IBOs) in the EU
 Study on agricultural interbranch organisations (IBOs) in the EU

Table of Contents

INTRODUCTION ......................................................................................................... 1
1.1. Context of the study ...................................................................................... 3
1.2. Objectives and scope ..................................................................................... 4
1.3. General approach to the study ........................................................................ 5
1.4. Structure of the preliminary final report ............................................................ 7

PART 2: THE EU POLICY FRAMEWORK FOR INTERBRANCH ORGANISATIONS ............ 9

2.1. IBOs in the context of the Common Agricultural Policy and the Common
Market Organisation ................................................................................... 11
2.2. IBOs in the context of the EU policy on competition ........................................... 15
2.3. Balancing EU competition policy and CAP ......................................................... 17

PART 3: OVERVIEW OF NATIONAL LEGISLATION AND MEMBER STATE ACTIONS

ON IBOS (THEME 1) .......................................................................................... 21
3.1. Mapping of national legislation on IBOs across the EU ........................................ 22
3.2. Member States with national legislation on IBOs and recognised IBOs .................. 63
3.3. Member States with national legislation on IBOs but with no IBOs recognised ....... 66
3.4. Member States with no national legislation on IBOs ........................................... 67
3.5. National implementation of other forms of cooperation in accordance with
Regulation (EU) No 1308/2013 .................................................................... 69

PART 4: INVENTORY OF EXISTING IBOS ACROSS EU MS (THEME 2) ........................ 75

4.1. Overview (number of IBOs in the EU, distribution per MS, distribution per
sector, geographic coverage: national vs regional) ......................................... 75
4.2. History of creation and recognition of IBOs ...................................................... 81
4.3. Stages of the supply chain covered by the IBOs ................................................ 82
4.4. Economic importance of the IBOs in the relevant supply chain &
representativeness .................................................................................... 84
4.5. Objectives of the IBOs .................................................................................. 85
4.6. Members and non-members .......................................................................... 87
4.7. Governance of the IBOs ................................................................................ 90
4.7. Funding of IBOs (budget; budget evolution, funding, funding sources, funding
evolution)................................................................................................. 92
4.8. Use of extension of rules to imported products ................................................. 96

PART 5: ANALYSIS OF THE FUNCTIONING AND BENEFITS OF IBOS (THEME 3)...... 100
5.1. Key elements to understand the IBOs functioning and their challenges............... 100
5.2. Analysis of the functioning of IBOs................................................................ 111
5.3. Benefits and impacts of IBOs ....................................................................... 123

CONCLUSIONS ....................................................................................................... 134

 Study on agricultural interbranch organisations (IBOs) in the EU

List of tables

Table 1: The 3 themes ...................................................................................... 5

Table 2: EU legislation addressing IBOs and other forms of cooperation and contracts
between producers and other levels in the food supply chains ............................... 19
Table 3: Historical evolution of national legislation on IBOs in Member States where
such legislation exists ..................................................................................... 25
Table 4: Overview of national legislation in place before and after the adoption of
Regulation (EU) No 1308/2013, including, where applicable, main changes brought in
by legislation adopted after 1 January 2014 ....................................................... 29
Table 5: Overview of legal definitions and requirements for IBOs’ members set out in
Member States’ national legislation ................................................................... 32
Table 6: Overview of IBOs’ objectives pursuant to Member States’ national law ....... 34
Table 7: Overview of Member States’ national legislation regulating legal status and
governance aspects of IBOs ............................................................................. 37
Table 8: Overview of Member States’ legislation regulating sectors in which IBOs may
be set up, their geographical coverage and the maximum number of such
organisations allowed ...................................................................................... 40
Table 9: Overview of national provisions with regard to withdrawal of recognition,
applicable sanctions in case of violation of legal requirements applying to IBOs and
competent authorities responsible for recognition, withdrawal and enforcement ...... 42
Table 10: Overview of national provisions regulating IBO’s agreements, their approval
by competent authority, extension of rules and fees ............................................ 47
Table 11: Overview of national provisions laying down representativeness criteria for
the purpose of IBOs’ recognition, extension of rules of their agreements and right to
access IBOs’ membership for non-members. ...................................................... 57
Table 12: Overview of national provisions relevant to IBO’s financing..................... 61
Table 13: Overview of sugar agreements currently in place at MS level .................. 71
Table 14: Overview of the implementation of provisions regarding other forms of
vertical and horizontal cooperation pursuant to Regulation (EU) No 1308/2013 ....... 73
Table 15: IBOs established for “other products” .................................................. 77
Table 16: IBOs for wine in France per GI type .................................................... 79
Table 17: Withdrawal of recognition of IBOs dues to cessation of .......................... 80
Table 18: List of non-active IBOs ...................................................................... 80
Table 19: List of IBOS where food retailers are members ..................................... 83
Table 20: Importance of objectives per MS (% of IBOs) ....................................... 86
Table 21: Number of IBOs per budget category per Member State......................... 93
Table 22: IBOs with a yearly budget of more than EUR 10 million .......................... 93
Table 23: IBOs which apply extension to imported products ................................. 96
Table 24: Used of CVOs in France – 2010-2011 .................................................. 99
Table 25: Simplified comparison of different types of commodity associations ....... 106
Table 26: Mapping of IBOs and non-recognised IBOs in France ........................... 109
Table 27: Intangible benefits of IBOs as regards CAP objectives .......................... 130
 Study on agricultural interbranch organisations (IBOs) in the EU

List of figures

Figure 1: IBOs in the context of the CAP – history ............................................... 12

Figure 2: Legislation on IBOs at Member State level and its level of implementation
taking into account existence or absence of recognised IBOs ................................ 22
Figure 3: Evolution of number of IBOs in the EU (1970-2016) ............................... 75
Figure 4: Total number of IBOs per MS .............................................................. 76
Figure 5: Total number of IBOs per sector.......................................................... 77
Figure 6: Distribution of IBOs per sector and per MS ........................................... 78
Figure 7: Distribution of IBOs per MS and type (regional vs national) ..................... 78
Figure 8: Evolution of number of IBOs per decade in France and other MS .............. 81
Figure 9: Evolution of number of IBOs since 2013 per MS .................................... 81
Figure 10: Membership per supply chain stage (n=100) ....................................... 82
Figure 11: Top 5 objectives of IBOs (n=59)........................................................ 85
Figure 12: Importance of top-2 objectives per sector (% of IBOs) ......................... 86
Figure 13: ANIFELT (French processed F&V IBO) structure ................................... 89
Figure 14: Number of members per IBO per MS.................................................. 89
Figure 15: Provision vs non-provision of budget figures by IBOs ............................ 92
Figure 16: Average IBO budget per MS (in EUR 100,000)(n=72) ........................... 94
Figure 17: Average current IBO budget per sector............................................... 94
Figure 18: Number of IBOs requesting extension per MS (n=89) ........................... 96
Figure 19: Type of extensions per objective (in %) (FR-2013-2014-2015) .............. 98
Figure 20: Evolution of number of IBOs (France vs. other EU MS) (1990-2016) ..... 104
Figure 21: French IBO organisation and delegation of tasks ................................ 120
 Study on agricultural interbranch organisations (IBOs) in the EU

ACRONYMS

Member States/countries

AT: Austria IE: Ireland

BE: Belgium IT: Italy

BG: Bulgaria LT: Lithuania

CY: Cyprus LU: Luxembourg

CZ: Czech Republic LV: Latvia

DE: Germany MT: Malta

DK: Denmark NL: Netherlands

EE: Estonia PL: Poland

EL: Greece PT: Portugal

ES: Spain RO: Romania

FI: Finland SE: Sweden

FR: France SI: Slovenia

HR: Croatia SK: Slovakia

HU: Hungary UK: United Kingdom

Acronyms
AC Autorité de la concurrence

ACOFA Central Agency of Intervention Bodies in agricultural sector

AFE Almazaras Federadas de España

AGCM National Competition and Market Authority

AIBS Association Interprofessionnelle de la Betterave et du Sucre

AMTF Agricultural Market Task Force

ANIC Association nationale interprofessionnelle du champignon de couche

ANICC Association Nationale Interprofessionnelle du Champignon de Couche

ANIERAC Asociación Nacional de industriales envasadores e refinadores de aceites

comestibles
ANIFELT Association Nationale Interprofessionnelle des Fruits et Légumes Transformés

ANIVIT Association nationale interprofessionnelle du champignon de couche

ANPROGAPOR Anprogapor Asociación Nacional de Productores de Ganado Porcino

AOC Appellation d'origine controlee

APO Association of producer organisations

 Study on agricultural interbranch organisations (IBOs) in the EU

ARVALIS Institut technique au service des agriculteurs et des filières

ASAJA Asociación Agraria de Jóvenes Agricultores

ASBL Association sans but lucratif

ASICI Asociación interprofesional del cerdo ibérico

ASOLIVA Asociación española de la industria e del comercio exportador de aceites de

oliva y aceites de orujo
ASP Agency of Services and payments

ASP Single Agency of Payment

BIP Bureau interprofessionnel du pruneau

BNIC Bureau interprofessionnel du cognac

BRVE Bureau de répartition des vins et eaux-de-vie

CAE Cooperativas Agro-alimentarias

CAP Common Agriculture Policy

CEDECARNE Butchers and individual meat retailer

CEE Communauté économique européenne

CETIOM Centre Technique Interprofessionnel des Oléagineux Métropolitains

CGB General Confederation of Beet producers

CICAR Comité Interprofessionnel du Canard à Rôtir

CID Comité interprofessionnel de la dinde

CIPS Comité Interprofessionnel des Productions Saccharifères

CIVA Comité Interprofessionnel des Vins d'Alsace

CIVB Comité Interprofessionnel des vins de Bordeaux

CIVC Comité interprofessionnel du vin de Champagne

CIVCP Comité interprofessionnel des vins de Côte-de-Provence

CIVDN Comité interprofessionnel des vins doux naturels et des liqueurs d’appellation
contrôlée.
CIVRB Conseil interprofessionnel du vin de la région de Bergerac

CLIF Comité de liaison des sociétés interprofessionnelles des fruits et légumes

CMO Common Market Organisation

CNASEA Centre national pour l'aménagement des structures des exploitations agricoles

CNC Natiolnal Competition Commission

CNIEL Centre National Interprofessionnel de l'Economie Laitière

CNIV Comité National Interprofessional des Vins

COAG Coordinadora de Organizaciones de Agricultores

COM Common Organisation of Agricultural Markets

CPCS Comité Paritaire interprofessionnel de la canne et du sucre

CPPGA Cabinet for Planning, Policy and General Administration

CRIEL Centre Régional Interprofessionnel de l'Economie laitière

 Study on agricultural interbranch organisations (IBOs) in the EU

CS Case study

CTIFL Centre Technique Interprofessionnel des Fruits et Légumes

CV Contribution volontaire

CVO Contribution volontaire obligatoire

DB Database

DEFRA Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (the UK)

DG AGRI Directorate General Agriculture and Rural Development

DGCCRF French Government’s Competition Consumption and Fraud Repression General

Directorate

E.E.I.G. European Economic Interest Grouping

e.g. exempli gratia

EAGGF European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund

EC European Commission

EU European Union

EUR Euro

F&V Fruits & Vegetables

FAO Food and Agriculture Organization

FCB National Federation of beet Cooperatives

FGVB Fédération des Grands Vins de Bordeaux

FICT Butchers association

FIOM Fonds d'Intervention et d'Organisation des produits de la pêche Maritime

FIRS Fonds d'Orientation et de Régularisation du Marché du Sucre

FNSEA Fédération Nationale des Syndicats d’Exploitant Agricole

FNVBL Fédération des négociants de vin de Bordeaux et de Libourne

FORMA Fonds d'Orientation et de Régularisation des Marchés Agricoles

GIs Geographical indications

GNIL Groupement national interprofessionnel linier

GNIPB Groupement national interprofessionnel de la production betteravière

GNIS Groupement national interprofessionnel des semences et plants

IAOE Organización Interprofesional del Aceite de Oliva Español

IBO Interbranch organisation

INAPORC Interprofession nationale porcine

INFOLIVA Private oil mill associations

INTERBEV Association Nationale Interprofessionnelle du Bétail et des Viandes

INTERCEREALES interprofession représentative des céréales à savoir blé tendre, blé dur, orge,
maïs, avoine, triticale, seigle, sorgho et riz
 Study on agricultural interbranch organisations (IBOs) in the EU

INTERFEL Interprofession des fruits et légumes frais

INTERLAIT Société interprofessionnelle du Lait et de ses dérivés

INTERPORC Asociación Interprofesional del Porcino de Capa Blanca

IVB Interprofessionele Vereniging voor het Belgisch vlees

IVCC Institut des Vins de Consommation Courante

JRC Joint Research Centre

KO Kick off

LEI Landbouw Economisch Instituut (Agricultural Economics Institute) (NL)

LOA Loi d’orientation agricole /French Law of agricultural orientation

LTIA Long-term interbranch agreements

LTO Dutch Farmers organisation

M Month

MAGRAMA Ministerio de Agricultura, Alimentación y Medio Ambiente

MHKSZ Hungarian Cooling System and Packaging Union

MMB Milk Marketing Board

MS Member Sate

NCA National Competent Authority

NMV Dutch Dairy Farmers Union

NZO Dutch Dairy Processors Organisation

ODEADOM Office de Développement de l'Economie Agricole d'Outre-mer

ODG Organisme de Défense et de Gestion

OFIMER Office national Interprofessionnel de la pêche maritime et de l'aquaculture

OFIVAL Office national Interprofessionnel de la Viande, de l'Elevage et de l'aviculture

ONI Office national interprofessionnel du blé

ONIA Office national industrielle de l’azote

ONIB National Interbranch Office of wheat

ONIBEV Office National Interprofessionnel du Bétail et des Viandes

ONIC Office national interprofessionnel des céréales

ONIDOL Organisation nationale interprofessionnelle des graines et fruits oléagineux

ONIEP Office de l'Elevage

ONIFLHOR Office National Interprofessionnel des Fruits, des Légumes et de l'Horticulture

ONIGC Office Interprofessionnel des Grandes Cultures

ONILAIT Office National Interprofessionnel du Lait et des Produits Laitiers

ONIOL Office National Interprofessionnel des Oléagineux, Protéagineux et cultures

textiles

ONIPPAM Office National Interprofessionnel des Plantes à Parfum, Aromatiques et

Médicinales
 Study on agricultural interbranch organisations (IBOs) in the EU

ONIVIN Office national interprofessionnel des vins

ONIVIT Office national interprofessionnel des vins de table

PAs Producer associations

PDO Protected Designation of Origin

PGI Protected Geographical Indication

POs Producer organisations

Q Question

QCP Quality control plan

QNV Quantité normalement vinifiée

R&D Research and Development

sCMO Single Common Market Organisation

SIBEV Société interprofessionnelles du bétail et des viandes

SIOFA Syndicat Interprofessionnel des Oléagineux et des Fluides Alimentaires

SIPA Sociétés d’Intensification et de Production Agricole

SME Small and Medium size Enterprises

SNFS National Union of Sugar Manufacturers

SNIPOT Société Nationale Interprofessionnelle de la Pomme de Terre

SONITO Société Nationale Interprofessionnelle de la Tomate

TFEU Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union

ToR Terms of Reference

UNILEC Union nationale interprofessionnelle des légumes de conserve

UPA Unión de Pequeños Agricultores y Ganaderos

USA United States of America

VINIFLHOR Office national interprofessionnel des fruits, des légumes et de l'horticulture

WP Work Package

WTO World Trade Organization

WUR Wageningen University and Research Centre

 Study on agricultural interbranch organisations (IBOs) in the EU

ABSTRACT

The study provides a comprehensive inventory of existing recognised interbranch

organisations (IBOs) across all 28 Member States and the rules applicable to them under
EU and national law. The study further examines the impact of IBOs on the markets
where they operate with respect to its objectives and the benefits for producers
stemming from the participation in the IBO. It also illustrates the conditions which enable
a good functioning of the IBO.

The study is based on evidence gathered from existing literature, interviews with senior
policy officials within the European Commission and national competent authorities,
interviews with IBOs representatives, a survey of all recognised IBOs, and five case
studies.

The analysis shows that 19 Member States have adopted national rules on the
recognition and functioning of IBOs. In June 2016, 123 recognised IBOs, four of them
solely recognised only under national rules, are active in eight different Member States
but their total number is growing. Of all factors considered, internal organisation of the
IBO appears less important for its proper functioning. The working principles (such as
dialogue and consensus) within the IBO and the relations between the IBOs and other
actors of the supply chain (private stakeholders or public authorities) are the main pillars
underpinning a good governance of such organisations.

Cette étude présente un inventaire complet de toutes les organisations

interprofessionnelles reconnues au sein de l’Union Européenne (28 Etats membres) ainsi
que les législations européennes et nationales en la matière. De plus, l’étude analyse les
conditions d’un bon fonctionnement de ces organisations interprofessionnelles, leurs
impacts sur les filières agricoles et agroalimentaires en s’attardant, plus particulièrement,
sur les bénéfices de ce type d’organisation pour les producteurs et les acteurs de la
production primaire.

L’étude est basée sur une collecte d’information consistant, tout d’abord, en une analyse
bibliographique, une série d’entretiens avec la Commission européenne, les autorités
compétentes nationales, et les représentants d’organisations interprofessionnelles.
Ensuite, cinq organisations interprofessionnelles ont fait l’objet d’une étude de cas
individuelle afin d’analyser, en détail, leur fonctionnement.

L’analyse montre que 19 Etats membres ont adopté une législation nationale en matière
de reconnaissance et fonctionnement des interprofessions. Au 1er juin 2016, 123
organisations interprofessionnelles sont reconnues dans huit Etats membres dont 4 sur la
base exclusive du droit national. Ce nombre continue d’augmenter à un rythme régulier.
Toutes considérations faites, l’organisation interne des organisations interprofessionnelles
n’est pas un élément déterminant à leur bon fonctionnement. Ce qui compte ce sont les
liens relationnels (le dialogue, la recherche du consensus) entre, d’abord, les membres
de l’organisation et, ensuite, avec les autres acteurs de la filière. Enfin la reconnaissance
officielle des interprofessions crée les conditions du dialogue entre filières et pouvoirs
publics.

Page 1
Study on agricultural interbranch organisations (IBOs) in the EU

Page 2
 Study on agricultural interbranch organisations (IBOs) in the EU

INTRODUCTION

1.1. Context of the study

Interbranch organisations in the agricultural sectors exist for more than 50 years in some
European countries. They drew the European institutions' attention in the mid-eighties.
The Commission adopted a Communication on interbranch organisations’ future role and
functions under the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) regulatory regime in 19901.
According to the Communication, interbranch organisations may be defined in practical
terms as “the relationships woven between the various occupational categories involved
in the production, marketing and - where appropriate - processing of any given
agricultural product or product group”.
The Communication describes these relations as vertical rather than horizontal and
distinguishes them from horizontal cooperation such as those of producer organisations
(POs) and associations of producer organisations (APOs) which aim at promoting the
concentration of supply of agricultural products and its adaptation to market
requirements.
The Commission further underlined in its Communication that developing inter-branch
cooperation in agriculture can inter alia help “to improve the profitability of farming by
strengthening marketing coordination and exploiting qualitative and/or regional
characteristics”.
Initially, the Commission did not see it fit at this stage to envisage the extension of
interbranch cooperation to all agricultural sectors as under the previous CAP provisions
as regards recognition of interbranch organisations were present in the sectoral CMOs for
olive oil, fruits and vegetables, and tobacco only.
The move to cover interbranch activities for all agricultural sectors was only done 23
years later, when Regulation (EU) No 1308/20132 acknowledged interbranch
organisations to play an important part in allowing dialogue between actors in the supply
chain and in promoting best practices and market transparency. Regulation (EU) No
1308/2013 thus developed common provisions for the recognition of inter-branch
organisations for all sectors and stipulated clearly which advantages, e.g. certain
derogations from the EU competition rules, follow from the recognition status. Limited
sector specificities remain however, such as special requirements in the milk and milk
products sector or the obligation for mandatory recognition of interbranch organisations
in certain sectors (e.g. tobacco).
Following the entry into force of Regulation (EU) No 1308/2013, the Directorate General
for Agriculture and Rural Development of the European Commission (DG AGRI)
considered that the review of the existing legal framework for interbranch
organisations and future policy development in this area would benefit from a
study providing an overview of the current situation and activities of IBOs
across all 28 EU MS.
Against this background, DG AGRI commissioned a “Study on agricultural interbranch
organisations in the EU” that started in December 2015 for a duration of 11 months.

1
Commission Communication to the Council on Organizations and agreements linking different branches of within the
agricultural sector, Commission of the European Communities, SEC (90) 562, Brussels, 26 October 1990.
2
Regulation (EU) No 1308/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 December 2013 establishing a
common organisation of the markets in agricultural products and repealing Council Regulations (EEC) No 922/72, (EEC)
No 234/79, (EC) No 1037/2001 and (EC) No 1234/2007, in OJ L 347, 20.12.2013, p. 671–854.

Page 3
 Study on agricultural interbranch organisations (IBOs) in the EU

1.2. Objectives and scope

In the context of the study, “IBOs” means all organisations formally recognised as
IBOs by the Member States according to present (Regulation (EU) No 1308/2013) or
former CAP legislations. These recognised interbranch organisations will be
marked throughout the study as “IBOs”. Based on the information provided by
Member States, the study also includes a limited number of IBOs, which do not fall under
the scope of Regulation (EU) No 1308/2013, but are recognised solely under national
rules.

The study will examine the state of IBOs in the context of the Common Agricultural
Policy, in particular the Common Market Organisation. As mentioned in the tender
specifications3, the main objectives of the study are to:
 Provide a comprehensive inventory of the respective rules applicable to
IBOs under national law (national legislation) based on the most relevant
available data (Theme 1);
 Present an inventory and a comprehensive description of the current
existing IBOs in the EU28 MS (Theme 2); and
 Examine the role IBOs play in the food value chain, the economic, legal,
social, and policy-related factors influencing their functioning, and the
benefits offered by IBOs for agricultural products (Theme 3).

The objectives translate into two main parts, of descriptive or analytical nature:
 The descriptive part providing an inventory of existing IBOs and of the
respective national legislation in all EU MS; and
 The analytical part consisting of an analysis of the functioning and benefits
of IBOs, examined on the basis of five selected case studies of IBOs in different
sectors and MSs as well as desk research and analysis of the most recent
literature on this topic.

In order to fulfil the above mentioned objectives, the study will focus on IBOs within the
meaning of Article 157 of Regulation (EU) No 1308/2013, i.e. formally recognised IBOs,
including IBOs which have been recognised under former CAP legislation. These IBOs
gather representatives of the production as well as processing and/or distribution side of
the food supply chain and enable a dialogue between these food chain operators. By
bringing operators of the various stages of the supply chain together, the cooperation
within IBOs is vertical in nature.

The study will also consider other forms of vertical cooperation between producers
and other stages of the food supply chain recognised in the CAP legislation (such as
“agreements within the trade” in the sugar sector, based on Article 125 of Regulation
(EU) No 1308/2013. These agreements are presented under Theme 1 of the study.
Various other vertical organisations exist within the supply chain. In some Member States
some private (interbranch) entities carry out similar functions as IBOs without having
ever requested for recognition4. Sometimes public entities are involved in activities in the
interest of the entire food supply chain. The study will consider such vertical cooperation
or activities by public bodies in their appropriate context under Theme 3 of the study.

3
Available on the DG AGRI website at: http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/index_fr.htm
4
In the context of the study, these organisations are called “non-recognised IBOs”

Page 4
 Study on agricultural interbranch organisations (IBOs) in the EU

The study will look and refer to horizontal cooperation between producers in producer
organisations (POs) or associations of producer organisations, (APOs) only to a limited
extent and where necessary to contrast them with the cooperation in IBOs
For certain sectors, Regulation (EU) No 1308/2013 contains specific rules, e.g. the
explicit possibility of contractual negotiations in the sectors of olive oil, beef/veal and
certain arable crops as well as milk
The results of this study will be used by DG AGRI itself and by the other Commission
departments with an interest in this subject. In addition it can be envisaged that the
results of the study could be used by the Member States and stakeholders concerned
with interbranch organisations in the EU.

This report presents the situation on 01 June 2016.

1.3. General approach to the study

This chapter presents the overall approach to the study based on the work carried out,
comprising the definition of the empirical approach to the study (i.e. methodologies and
analytical tools), the data collection and validation.

1.3.1. Methodological approach

The consolidated methodology is organised in a sequence approach which is divided in
four work packages.5

WP 1: WP 2: WP 3: WP 4:
Structuring Observing Analysing Reporting

The methodology addresses throughout these work packages the three themes on which
this assignment focuses.

Table 1: The 3 themes

Description Type
1 Overview of national legislation and Member State action on IBOs Descriptive
2 Inventory of existing IBOs across EU countries

3 Analysis of the functioning and benefits of IBOs (for selected case Descriptive and
studies) Analytical

A number of methodologies were used in the conduct of this study. They are briefly
described below.

Data collection addressing the descriptive part of the study

This data collection process targeted two complementary objectives:
 Theme 1 consists of an overview of national legislation and Member States action
in relation to IBOs. This theme examines and catalogues the national laws on the

5
For a more detailed description, see section 2.2.6 of the tender specifications, http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/calls-for-
tender/tender-documents/2015/216343/specs_en.pdf

Page 5
 Study on agricultural interbranch organisations (IBOs) in the EU

recognition and operation of IBOs in all EU MS, including specific arrangements for
transnational IBOs, if any.
 Theme 2 provides an inventory of IBOs in all EU MS, with a description of their
respective situation, evolution and role in the market(s) concerned.

For Theme 1, the data collection was initiated through the NCAs that have been invited
to complete a survey which the Commission addressed to MS in 2015 and in which the
Commission inquired about legislation on IBOs, the number of IBOs in each MS and their
representation of their respective sector.
In case data gaps were observed, individual NCAs were invited to complete and validate
the data set. National literature has also been used to validate and triangulate legal
information. Contacts with individual NCAs were kept until all required information was
provided.
It should be noted that the Commission survey has focused on existing national
legislation on IBOs (pursuant to Article 157 of Regulation (EU) No 1308/2013) though did
not include any questions related to the “other forms of cooperation” within the supply
chain (e.g. agreements within the trade – Article 125 of Regulation (EU) No 1308/2013).
Therefore, contacts (via face-to-face meetings, email exchanges and phone calls) with
MS NCAs have been established to identify whether or not other types of agreements
exist at MS level. Additional interviews have been conducted with NCAs on the reasons
why IBOs have not been recognised in a particular MS.
For Theme 2, the preliminary inventory of IBOs recognised in each MS was compiled
based on responses to the Commission survey. Individual contacts with IBOs have been
made to complete the data set. The required characteristics of these IBOs may not all
have been described in the responses provided by MS to the Commission survey of 2015
and therefore data gaps were identified. Whenever necessary, NCAs were asked to solicit
participation of IBOs in the data collection, in case no reply was provided. In order to
increase the response rate, IBOs have been contacted in their national languages.
Data collection addressing the analytical part of the study (Theme 3)
The collection of information took mainly three forms:
 Literature review (scientific and grey);
 Case studies (5) based on field visits: face-to-face and phone interviews (6 to 8
interviews per case study); and
 Interviews with key actors in the supply chain and with IBO representatives.

The case studies have provided insights on the role, functioning and effects of IBOs
within the food supply chain in different sectors and different MS. The analysis served to
measure to what extent IBOs achieve the objectives they pursue and members obtain
benefits from their actions (Theme 3). The scope of a case study is a specific IBO in a
given MS, meaning one specific organisation of a given sector within one Member State.
The number of case studies may be considered as rather low with a view to drawing
conclusions that may suit all situations (sector, supply chain structure, geographic
coverage, etc.). For this reason, the selection of the case studies and the methodology
for their implementation has been developed with particular care so as to optimise
extrapolation of results whenever possible.
The final selection of IBOs that have been subject to case studies reads as follows:
 IAOE (Olive oil in Spain);
 INTERPORC (Pig meat in Spain);
 CIVB (Wine of Bordeaux in France);
 ZuivelNL (Milk and milk products in the NL); and
 FruitVeb (F&V in Hungary).

Page 6
 Study on agricultural interbranch organisations (IBOs) in the EU

Literature review and desk research

The objective of this methodology was to gather as much data and literature as possible
relevant to the different study themes. The literature review was dynamic in that it was
updated with information coming to light throughout the project. With the exception of
studies of inter-professional associations in France, there seem to be relatively few
studies that specifically analyse interbranch organisations. However, related (grey)
literature, e.g. on cooperatives and producer organisations (POs), notes the importance
of IBOs and their potential roles.
Field visits
The field visits for each selected case study were based on group interviews with both
members and non-members of the selected IBOs. The interview guidelines were adapted
to the objectives, mandates and missions of the individual IBOs. Interviews were
conducted in the national language. This guaranteed full understanding, fostered co-
operation amongst stakeholders and also ensures that secondary data and literature
produced in the local language were accessible to the study team.
For each case study the following interviews have been conducted:
 First interview with the NCA;
 Second interview with the coordination body of the IBO;
 Following interviews or group interviews with each of the supply chain actors that
are individual members of IBO; and
 Finally, one interview or a group interview with non-members of the IBO from the
same supply chain, whenever relevant.

Additional interviews (in addition to case studies interviews)

Additional interviews were performed in the context of the data collection for Theme 2.
When initially contacted by email, each director of an existing IBOs has been invited to
complete the IBO sheet relevant for its organisation but also to share its experience as
regard the functioning of its organisation via a phone interview with the study team.
Additional face-to-face interviews have been conducted with key actors of IBOs, mainly
in France.

1.4. Structure of the report

In addition to this initial part, this report is structured as follows:
 Part 2: The EU policy framework for interbranch organisations;
 Part 3: Overview of national legislation and Member State action on IBOs (Theme
1);
 Part 4: An inventory of existing IBOs across EU countries (Theme 2); and
 Part 5: Analysis of the functioning and benefits of IBOs (Theme 3).

Page 7
Study on agricultural interbranch organisations (IBOs) in the EU

Page 8
 Study on agricultural interbranch organisations (IBOs) in the EU

PART 2: THE EU POLICY FRAMEWORK FOR INTERBRANCH

ORGANISATIONS
The primary production sector is playing a key role in the economic and social
development of rural areas. Still today, half of the EU population lives in rural areas.6
Farmers are contributing towards the supply of high-quality and safe food products and
the protection of biodiversity and the natural environment, which they are increasingly
required to respect.
At the same time, farmers face numerous challenges. These include a still relatively
limited number of young people choosing farming as a profession, the need to ensure
constant modernisation of agricultural techniques, machinery and equipment as well as
the economic role that primary production plays within today’s agro-food chain. With
regard to the latter, farmers are generally viewed as a relatively weak link within the
agro-food supply chain due to their relatively small scale as opposed to other
downstream actors, such as manufacturers, processors and retailers, with farmers’
economic weakness often resulting in limited bargaining power and reduced
competitiveness for the sector as a whole7.
This considered, since the establishment of a common agricultural policy, the EU has
been trying to remedy this unbalance within the agro-food chain, namely by
strengthening farmers’ position on the market through different policy instruments,
including the establishment of producer organisations (POs), producer groups or
cooperatives (horizontal cooperation), but also interbranch organisations (IBOs)
(vertical cooperation) which create benefits also for farmers by establishing a dialogue
between the various food chain actors with a view to fostering marketing coordination,
improving knowledge, exploring marketing potentials and many other tasks.
In that context, it is important to highlight that IBOs have to be seen as a rather specific
grouping of actors in comparison to other forms, in particular horizontal types of
cooperation (POs, producers groups, cooperatives). IBOs are structures which are neither
involved in price setting nor price negotiation.
POs are economic organisations whose objectives are stipulated in Article 152 of
Regulation (EU) No 1308/2013 and include, amongst the others, adapting production to
market needs (both in terms of quantity and quality), concentrating supply and
marketing members' production, optimising production costs and streamlining producer
prices. Conversely, IBOs are actors not involved in price setting or price negotiation8 as
they do not sell products nor negotiate contracts with other parties of the supply chain,
see in particular Article 158 (1) d of Regulation (EU) No 1308/2013, which prevents IBOs
from engaging in production, processing or trade and Article 210(4) clarifies that
agreements of IBOs cannot entail price or quota fixation. Their main objective is to work
on collective projects that would benefit all members of the organisation and the food
supply chain.
The volatility of prices, the high cost of inputs and the instability of international markets
that have been further highlighted by the 2007-2008 food crisis have reduced the
competitiveness and profitability of the overall food sector of the primary sector in
particular and led to greater volatility of prices paid to producers. In addition to that, lack
of transparency as regards price formation and potentially unfair and anticompetitive

6
The EU’s Common Agricultural Policy (CAP): for our food, for our countryside, for our environment – A partnership
between Europe and farmers, European Commission, 2014, in particular p- 10.
7 Swinnen, J. F., & Vandeplas, A. (2014). Price transmission and market power in modern agricultural value chains.
8
See Article 158 par. 1 (d) of Regulation (EU) 1308/2013 that stipulates that IBOS do not, themselves, engage in production,
processing or trade.

Page 9
 Study on agricultural interbranch organisations (IBOs) in the EU

commercial practices lead to market distortions and asymmetries in bargaining power in

the supply chain.9
Against that background, the European Commission decided to tackle this issue and in
2009 published its Communication “A better functioning food supply chain”.10 Since then
several additional initiatives have emerged delving deeper into the analysis and
identifying the real issues that affect the functioning of the agro-food supply chain.
Other EU institutions have joined the initiatives that the European Commission has put in
place. The Council, the European Parliament and the Economic and Social Committee
which, thorough statements, decisions and reports, have consistently highlighted the
severity and global extent of this problem while stressing the needs for Member States to
take action to address this social and economic problem11. The decision of June 2015 to
renew the mandate of the High Level Forum (HLF) for a Better Functioning Food
Supply Chain12 is the most recent step taken by the European Commission to seek
solutions to ensure greater price transparency, improve competitiveness, prevent abuse
of bargaining power in negotiations and procurement, and encourage self-regulation. It
will hold discussions around a wide range of topics of relevance to the food supply chain,
including competitiveness, business-to-business commercial practices, internal market,
sustainability, innovation, and food prices. The HLF will be operational until December
2019.
The HLF bases itself on the work of the earlier HLF, which operated from 2010 to 2014,
and significantly contributed to a better understanding of the major factors determining
the competitiveness of the whole food supply chain. It recognised inter alia, the need for
greater consistency between all policy areas affecting the EU food chain. Core issues
were discussed also within dedicated expert platforms on B2B relations, the
competitiveness of the agro-food industry and the European Food Prices Monitoring
Tool.13 Amongst the different initiatives and actions undertaken, the 2011 paper, by
some of the members of the B2B Platform, merits attention. The paper sets out the
principles of good practices applying to vertical relations within the agri-food chain14,
whose implementation the Forum closely followed over the period 2013-2014.
As a response to the difficult situation for certain agricultural markets in 2015, the
European Commission set up an expert group in January 2016, the Agricultural Market
Task Force (AMTF). The mandate of the AMTF is to discuss relevant issues, such as
market transparency, access for farmers to financial instruments and futures markets to
hedge price risks, options for arranging contractual relations within the chain and legal
possibilities for organising farmers' collective actions; all of these with a view to

9
See: http://www.magrama.gob.es/es/alimentacion/temas/ley-de-medidas-para-mejorar-el-funcionamiento-de-la-cadena-
alimentaria/Ley_12-2013_de_2_agosto-EN_tcm7-297949.pdf
10
Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social
Committee and the Committee of the Regions - A better functioning food supply chain in Europe COM (2009) 591
final.
11
For instance, Council of the European Union, Presidency Conclusions on the Commission Communication "A better
functioning food supply chain in Europe", 8124/10, 29 March 2010; European Parliament Resolution of 7 September
2010 on fair revenues for farmers: A better functioning food supply chain in Europe OJ C 308 E, 20.10.2011, p. 22 as
well as Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on the ‘Communication from the Commission to the
European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions —
A better functioning food supply chain in Europe’ COM (2009) 591, OJ C 48, 15.2.2011, p. 145.
12
Commission Decision of 1 June 2015 establishing the High Level Forum for a better functioning food supply chain, in OJ
C 179, 2.6.2015, p. 3.
13
http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/sectors/food/competitiveness/forum_food/index_en.htm
14
Vertical relationships in the Food Supply Chain: Principles of Good Practice, 29 November 2011 is available at:
http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/sectors/food/files/competitiveness/good_practices_en.pdf

Page 10
 Study on agricultural interbranch organisations (IBOs) in the EU

improving the position of farmers in the food chain. The AMTF conducts regular thematic
meetings on these topics and aims to complete its work towards the end of 2016.15

2.1. IBOs in the context of the Common Agricultural Policy and the Common
Market Organisation
2.1.1. History
The first law related to the recognition of IBOs has been adopted in France in 1975 in
response to the 1973 crisis. The Law 1975 states that "the agreements reached within
the framework of an interbranch organisation must be compatible with the rules of the
European Community ". However in the absence of an EU legal framework to delimit the
EU intervention field, litigations at the European Court of Justice are numerous. Therefore
French authorities provided a memorandum to the European Commission in 1985. In
response the Commission communication of 1990 “recognised” inter-branch
organisations. However, instead of adopting a horizontal legislation across agricultural
sectors, the Commission proposed a sectoral adaptation of the “interprofessional”
principles through common market organisations (CMOs). Therefore the successive
reforms of the CMO for tobacco16 (in 1992), the fruit and vegetable CMO17 (in 1996),
the wine CMO18 (in 1999), and the olive oil CMO19 (in 2004) have been opportunities
to introduce the first provisions related to IBOs recognitions and working conditions.
Regulation (EC) No 1234/2007, the so-called Single Common Market Regulation,
includes provisions regarding the general recognition criteria and formalises the role of
producer groups and inter-branch organisations (see Chapter II). Article 123 provides
possibility for MS to recognise IBOs in the olive oil and table olives sector and in the
tobacco sector. Article 126 introduces payment of subscription by non-members for the
tobacco sector (similar to the current extension of rules according to Article 164 and 165
of Regulation (EU) No 1308/2013).
The new Common Market Organisation Regulation (EU) No 1308/201320 gives a
central role to POs and to IBOs from now on extended to every agricultural sectors
covered by the CMO. New provisions are included in the CMO regulation where Member
State may decide to formally recognise “Producer Organisations” or “Interbranch
organisations”21 in a range of sectors, as mentioned in article 1 par. 2 of the regulation.
Over twenty years after the Commission’s Communication mentioned above, IBOs are
formally part of the CAP regulatory regime for all sectors. Effectively, Regulation (EU) No
1308/2013 acknowledges the key role that IBOs may play in:
 Fostering dialogue between the different actors of the supply chain;
 Promoting best practices; and
 Ensuring marketing transparency (recital 132).

15
The webpage of the AMTF contains issue papers and presentation on the topics of market transparency, futures markets
and financial instruments, contractualisation, collective self-help, risk management and climate change. See
http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/agri-markets-task-force/index_en.htm
16
Council Regulation (EEC) No 2077/92 of 30 June 1992 concerning inter-branch organisations and agreements in the tobacco sector
17
Council Regulation (EC) No. 2200/96 on the common organization of the market in fruit and vegetables.
18
Council Regulation (EC) No 1493/99 on the common organisation of the market in wine
19
Regulation (EC) No 865/2004 of 29 April 2004 on the common organisation of the market in olive oil and table olives and
amending Regulation (EEC) No 827/68
20
Regulation (EU) No 1308/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 December 2013 establishing a
common organisation of the markets in agricultural products and repealing Council Regulations (EEC) No 922/72, (EEC)
No 234/79, (EC) No 1037/2001 and (EC) No 1234/2007.
21
Voluntary recognition of interbranch organisations by Member State except for sectors where recognition is already
mandatory (olive oil and table olives, and tobacco).

Page 11
 Study on agricultural interbranch organisations (IBOs) in the EU

Figure 1: IBOs in the context of the CAP – history

Recognition for all sectors

Recognition Sectoral recognition (for a limited number of agricultural sectors)
as defined in CMO

Regulation (EC)
No 261/2012
(milk package)

Council Regulation Council Regulation Council Regulation Regulation (EC) No Regulation (EC) No Regulation (EU)
(EEC) No 2077/92 (EEC) No 2200/96 (EEC) No 1493/99 865/2004 1234/2007 (Single No 1308/2013
(tobacco) (F&V) (Wine) (olive oil) CMO Regulation) (CMO Regulation)

Commission
Communication

1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015

Source: Arcadia International

2.1.2. Provisions in Regulation (EU) No 1308/2013

Title II of Regulation (EU) No 1308/2013 deals with rules concerning marketing and
producer organisations.
For the purpose of the study which focuses on IBOs, but also considers other vertical
cooperation forms and – to a limited extent – cooperation of a horizontal nature, chapter
II and III of that Title are relevant.
Chapter III contains general provisions for producer organisations and interbranch
organisations.
Due to the fact that Regulation (EU) No 1308/2013 often contains sector specific
provisions in various chapter of the Regulation, provisions relevant for IBOS and other
cooperation forms will be found also outside the general chapter. Chapter II deals with
specific sectors such as sugar, milk and milk products as well as wine.
The following section presents a brief overview about the main provisions, emphasing in
particular the interplay between EU Regulation and national legislation as well as division
of competence between the EU and the Member States. A distinction is made between
provisions relevant for IBOs and those pertaining to other forms of cooperation, in
particular horizontal cooperation.
2.1.2.1. Provisions relating to IBOs
Conditions for the recognition of IBOs: The core element of this chapter is the
requirement of recognition. The status of a recognised IBO grants the IBO certain
privileges, e.g. in the form that agreements of IBOs might be extended by the Member
State to non-members, Article 164 and that IBOs can avail of competition derogations
under certain conditions see Article 210.
Recognition of an IBO is Member States' competence and has to be decided by the
national competent authority upon request. The Member State is in general free to decide
on the recognition of an IBO (see Article 157 Regulation (EU) No 1308/2013, the Member
State 'may' on request recognise IBOs). It is only for certain sectors, namely the olive oil,
table olives and the tobacco sector that recognition is mandatory (“shall' recognise, see
Article 159 Regulation (EU) No 1308/2013.
Further, while the Member State is responsible for the recognition, it should inform the
European Commission about it. According to Article 158 Regulation (EU) No 1308/2013,
the Member State needs to inform the Commission by 31 March of each year of every
decision to grant, refuse or withdraw recognition taken during the previous calendar
year.
Most importantly, the Member State will have to respect the requirements which
Regulation (EU) No 1308/2013 lays down specific rules concerning the recognition of
IBOs and their activities of an IBO. More precisely, Article 157 par. 1 Regulation (EU)

Page 12
 Study on agricultural interbranch organisations (IBOs) in the EU

No 1308/2013 sets out that, upon request, Member States may recognise IBOs in a
specific sector listed in Article 1 par.2.
Member States may grant recognition to IBOs that fulfil the following general conditions:
 Gather representatives of economic activities linked to the production and to at
least one of the following stages of the supply chain: the processing of or trade
in, including distribution of, products in one or more sectors;
 Result from the initiative of all or some of the organisations or associations that
constitute them;
 Pursue, in the interest of their members and of consumers, a specific goal, which
may include, among others, the following activities:
o improving the knowledge and the transparency of the production and the
market through the publication of relevant statistical data in an aggregated
form as well as via the analysis of future market developments;
o Performance of market research and economic studies in order to improve
product marketing;
o Exploring potential markets for export;
o Drawing up standard contract in compliance with EU rules for the supply of
agricultural and processed products in the context of business-to-business
relations;
o Conducting research aimed at innovating, optimizing and improving the
production with a view to adjusting to the market requirements;
o Ensuring compliance with food safety, animal health and animal welfare
requirements as well as protection of the environment and of natural
resources also by seeking ways to reduce the use of veterinary and plant
protection products; and
o Exploiting the potential offered by organic farming as well as by EU quality
schemes.

In addition to the general criteria set by Article 157 par.1, Article 158 of the Regulation
lays down additional conditions that IBOs must meet in order to enjoy the status of
recognised entities. In particular, they must:
 Carry out their activities in one or more regions in the territory concerned;
 Account for a significant share of the economic activities referred to in point (a)
of Article 157 par. 1; and
 Not engage themselves in production, processing or trade, with the sole
exception of IBOs established in the olive oil, table olives and tobacco sectors
pursuant to Article 162 Regulation (EU) No 1308/2013.

Specific conditions apply to the following sectors: olive oil and table olives (Article
162), tobacco (Article 162), milk and milk products (Article 157 par. 3 and 163);

Procedural requirements related to the recognition status: The Regulation also

contains procedural and enforcement rules with regard to recognition of IBOs by
Member States (Article 158 par. 5). In particular, national competent authorities must:
 Take a decision whether or not to grant recognition within four months from when
the application that request it is lodged together with all relevant supporting
documents;
 Carry out the necessary checks to verify that IBOs are effectively complying with
the conditions set in the Regulation and impose penalties foreseen by national law
- including, where necessary, the withdrawal of the recognition - whenever non-
compliances or irregularities have been ascertained;
 Withdraw the recognition if the conditions laid down in the Regulation are no
longer met; and

Page 13
 Study on agricultural interbranch organisations (IBOs) in the EU

 Inform the Commission, by 31 March of each year, of any decision to grant,

refuse or withdraw recognition taken during the previous calendar year.

Regulation (EU) No 2016/232 with regard to certain aspects of producer cooperation also
deals with IBOs and stipulates details on the notification obligations of Member States. It
also deals with transnational IBOs.22

Privileges resulting from the status of recognition: Regulation (EU) No 1308/2013

provides that a recognised IBO enjoys certain prerogatives with regard to the supply
management for certain sectors,
 Availing of the possibility to extend its rules to non-members and
 Relying on derogations from the competition rules under certain conditions.

Rules for supply management: Regulation (EU) No 1308/2013 provides that

recognised interbranch organisations might be allowed to apply certain supply
management measures in specified sectors. Upon request of a recognised IBO, a Member
State might be allowed, for a limited period of time, to lay down binding rules for the
supply of cheese (Article 150) or ham (Article 172) with status of protected designations
of origin (PDO) or protected geographical indications (PGI).

While for these two sectors, also producer organisations may file a similar request, in the
wine sector, it is mainly IBOs which may lay down marketing rules to improve and
stabilise the common market in wine, Article 167. Like for cheese and ham, it is only
recognised IBOs which lay down the respective rules.

By derogating from the regime described above, Regulation (EU) No 1308/2013 provides
an obligation upon Member States to grant recognition to IBOs whenever an
application is submitted in the context of certain specific sectors. These sectors are olive
oil, table olives and tobacco (Article 159 point (b)).
Extension of rules, Article 164: Like POs and their associations, IBOs operating in a
specific economic area of a Member State may request the national authorities of the
latter to extend to operators that are not members - with binding effects though for
a limited period of time - some of the agreements, decisions or concerted practices
applicable to them. In accordance with Article 164 par. 4, such agreements, decisions or
practices may concern several activities, including, but not only, production and market
reports, production rules stricter than EU or national law, drawing up of standard
contracts, measures to protect organic farming and products under quality schemes.
For rules applying to an IBO to be extended to non-members, the IBO in question must
be representative of the production, of the trade or of the processing of a product or a
product category in the relevant economic area of the concerned Member State. More
precisely, it must account for at least 2/3 of the total volume of the relevant activity in
said area (Article 164 par. 1 and par. 3 point (a) (ii)).
When decisions involving the extension of rules are taken, Member States must ensure
that they are subject to adequate publication and promptly notified to the European
Commission (Article 164 par. 4 and 5). Whilst adopting decisions of the type under
consideration, Member States, following consultation with relevant stakeholders, may as
well require non-members to pay all or part of the financial contributions provided by IBO
members (Article 165).

22
Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2016/232 supplementing Regulation (EU) No 1308/2013 of the European
Parliament and of the Council with regard to certain aspects of producer cooperation, OJ L 44 of 19.2.2016, p. 1.

Page 14
 Study on agricultural interbranch organisations (IBOs) in the EU

Derogations from the competition rules: Article 210 CMO Regulation contains a
specific provision only available to recognised IBs to avail of certain derogations from the
competition rules, following a notification of the relevant IBO agreement to the European
Commission. This provision will be described in greater detail in Chapter 2.2 on IBOs in
the context of competition to place it in the wider context of the relationship between
agriculture and competition law.
2.1.2.2. Provisions on agreements within the trade for the sugar sector
Articles 125 and 127 lay down rules related to mandatory sugar sector agreements.
Article 125 lists obligations as regard pre-sowing delivery contracts the details of which
listed in point 6 of Section A of Part II of Annex II and in Annex X.
Article 127 presents requirements as regard delivery contracts that shall conform to the
purchase terms laid down in Annex XI.
2.1.2.3. Provisions on horizontal cooperation forms
Regulation (EU) No 1308/2013 contains several provisions on horizontal cooperation
forms between farmers.
 Articles 152, 154 and 156 contain the requirements for the recognition of
producer organisations and associations of producer organisations;
 Article 160 provides that producer organisations in the fruit and vegetable sector
either engage in production planning, concentration of supply or optimisation of
production costs within the meaning of Article 152 (1) c) i, ii, iii of Regulation (EU)
No 1308/2013. Producer members shall be required to market their entire
production concerned through the producer organisation;
 Article 149 provides for the possibility of contractual negotiations (joint sales) by
recognised POs for milk and milk products; and
 Articles 169, 170 and 171 provide for the possibility of contractual negotiations by
recognised POs on behalf of their members for certain sectors other than milk and
milk products and sugar. Article 169 concerns the olive oil sector, Article 170 the
beef and veal sector; and Article 171 is dedicated to certain arable crops.

2.1.2.4. General provisions

While not directly referring to producer or IBOs, Regulation (EU) No 1308/2013 contains
provisions which are/can be relevant for the analysis. Article 168 of Regulation (EU) No
1308/2013 allows MS to decide that deliveries of products from a sector listed in Article
1(2), other than milk and milk products and sugar by a producer to a processor must be
covered by a written contract between the parties. IBOs can be instrumental for such
task by drafting standard contracts. This has been acknowledged as one of the objectives
of an IBO in Article 157 (1) (c) (v) Regulation (EU) No 1308/2013.
For the milk sector, Article 148 lays down provisions for the situation where a Member
State decides that every delivery of raw milk in its territory by a farmer to a processor of
raw milk must be covered by a written contract and/or decides that first purchasers must
make a written offer for a contract for the delivery of raw milk by the farmers.
As stated above, Article 125 and 125 of Regulation (EU) No 1308/2013 provide for details
of agreements within the trade and delivery contracts between individual sellers and
buyers.
Lastly, Articles 173, 174 and 175 Regulation (EU) No 1308/2013 empower the European
Commission to adopt delegated and implementing acts also, but not only, with reference
to those provisions governing the recognition, the activities and the functioning of IBOs.

Page 15
 Study on agricultural interbranch organisations (IBOs) in the EU

2.2. IBOs in the context of the EU policy on competition

As the CAP, EU policy in the area of competition may be considered as one of the key
drivers of the European economic integration and, in particular, of the establishment of
the single market. Indeed, antitrust rules have been present in EU’s founding texts since
the early days of the European Economic Community23 and are presently enshrined in
Articles 101 and 102 TFEU.
Article 101 par. 1 TFEU considers incompatible with the internal market, and thus
prohibits, all agreements between undertakings, decisions by associations of
undertakings and concerted practices that may affect trade between Member States
and that have as their object or effect the prevention, the restriction or the distortion of
competition within the internal market.
Agreements and practices involving the fixing of prices or of other trade conditions,
limiting or controlling production or markets and resulting in the sharing of markets or
sources of supply are only some examples of conducts that are considered, in principle,
as not compliant with EU antitrust policy.
Agreements, decisions and practices put in place in breach of this provision are deemed
as automatically void (Article 101 par. 2 TFEU).
The provisions illustrated above, however, do not apply to agreements, decisions and
practices or categories of them whenever the latter meet the following four conditions
(Article 101 par. 3):
 Contribute towards the improvement of the production or the distribution of goods
or the promotion of technical or economic progress;
 Provide consumers with a fair share of the resulting benefits;
 Avoid the application to the concerned undertakings of restrictions that are not
necessary for the attainment of these objectives; and
 Avoid the possibility for such undertakings to eliminate competition in respect of a
substantial part of the products in question.

Article 102 TFEU prohibits the abuse by one or more undertakings of a dominant
position within the internal market, or in a substantial part of it, to the extent to which
such a conduct affects the trade between Member States. In accordance with this
provision, an abuse of a dominant position may take place whenever the concerned
undertaking, for instance, imposes, directly or indirectly, unfair purchase or selling prices
or other unfair trade conditions; limits production, markets or technical development,
thereby bringing prejudice to consumers; or applies different conditions to equivalent
transactions with other trading partners, thus placing them at a competitive
disadvantage.
The European Commission ensures the application of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU and, for
this purpose, EU law provides it with certain investigating powers besides the possibility
of inflicting sanctions. National competition authorities and national courts can also apply
the Treaty provisions. Procedural rules for the correct application of EU antitrust
provisions are laid down in Regulation (EC) No 1/2003.24
As regards State aid, Article 107 par. 1 TFEU considers incompatible with EU law any
aid granted by a Member State or through State resources in any form, which distorts or
threatens competition by favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain
goods to the extent that it affects the trade between Member States. Article 107 par. 2
and 3 lists, respectively State aid that are deemed compatible by law and those that may
be regarded as such.

23
Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community (1957).
24
Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the rules on competition laid down in
Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty, OJ L 1, 4.1.2003, p. 1.

Page 16
 Study on agricultural interbranch organisations (IBOs) in the EU

2.3. Balancing EU competition policy and CAP

Article 42 TFEU confers on the EU legislator (the European Parliament and the Council)
the power to determine the extent to which competition rules apply to the production of
and trade in agricultural products. More precisely, according to Article 42 TFEU the EU
legislator determines the extent of the application of competition rules to the agricultural
sector, taking into account the objectives of the Common Agricultural Policy (hereinafter
the “CAP objectives”) set out in Article 39 TFEU. According to the Court of Justice that
provision recognises the precedence of the objectives of the agricultural policy over the
aims of the Treaty in relation to competition.
Consistently confirmed through the successive reforms of the EU founding texts,25 the
provision recalled above is somehow symptomatic of the difficulties involved in finding a
balance between the policy objectives of EU antitrust rules and those that CAP must
pursue involves. The case law of the European Court of Justice explains the existing
tension between the ones and the others, referring that «the authors of the Treaty were
aware that the simultaneous pursuit of those two objectives might, at certain times and
in certain circumstances, prove difficult; hence the priority of the agricultural policy over
the objectives of the Treaty in the field of competition and the power of the Council to
decide to what extent the competition rules are to be applied in the agricultural sector».26
While the Court did not call into question that the maintenance of effective competition is
also one of the objectives of CAP27, it underlined the precedence of the objectives of
agricultural policy over the aims of the Treaty in relation to competition in several
cases.28
Against this background, the EU legislator has made use of this legal basis by adopting in
this area Regulation (EEC) No 26/62 on the application of competition rules to production
and trade of agricultural products29 subsequently replaced by Regulation (EC) No
1184/2006 and its successive modifications.30 In this context, EU legislation sets out the
principle in Article 206 of Regulation (EU) No 1308/2013 whereby competition rules apply
to agricultural agreements save as otherwise provided in the Regulation. General
derogations from the application of the competition rules are contained in Articles 206-
210 Regulation (EU) No 1308/2013, sector specific one in Articles 169-171 for
the olive oil, beef/veal and certain arable crops sectors which are
complemented by Commission guidelines for these sectors.31.
For IBOs, Article 210 Regulation (EU) No 1308/2013 lists the conditions by virtue
of which agreements, decisions and concerted practices put in place by IBOs may be
exempted from the general prohibition set in Article 101 par. 1TFEU.
For this purpose, agreements, decisions and practices must be attributable to IBOs
performing one of the activities listed under Article 157 par. 1 point (c) (or Article 157
par. 3 point (c) for IBOs in the milk and milk products sector and Article 162 for those
established in the olive oil, table olives and tobacco sectors).

25
Article 42 of the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community (1957) and Article 36 of the Treaty establishing
the European Community (1992) both mirror the wording of the corresponding TFEU provision.
26
Judgment Federal Republic of Germany v Council of the European Union, C-280/93, EU:C:1994:367, points. 60 and 61.
27
Judgment Milk Marque Ltd and National Farmers' Union, C-137/00, EU:C:2003:429.
28
Judgment in Maizena, 139/79, EU:C:1980:250, paragraph 23; Judgment in Germany v. Council, C-280/93,
EU:C:1994:367, paragraph 61.
29
Council Regulation (EEC) No 26/62 of 4 April 1962 applying certain rules of competition to production of and trade in
agricultural products in OJ L 30, 20.04.1962, p. 1275.
30
Council Regulation (EC) No 1184/2006 of 24 July 2006 applying certain rules of competition to the production of, and
trade in, agricultural products, in OJ L 214, 4.8.2006, p. 7.
31
Commission Notice — Guidelines on the application of the specific rules set out in Articles 169, 170 and 171 of the CMO
Regulation for the olive oil, beef and veal and arable crops sectors, OJ C 431, 22.12.2015, p. 1.

Page 17
 Study on agricultural interbranch organisations (IBOs) in the EU

From a procedural point of view, all agreements, decisions or practices fulfilling said
conditions must be notified to the European Commission and not to put into effect until
the two-month scrutiny period that follows the notification is elapsed (Article 210 par. 2
and 3). If, by the end of the scrutiny period, the Commission finds that the conditions
required for benefitting from a derogation are not fulfilled, it sets out these findings.
There are, however, cases for which the Regulation rules out the possibility of granting
an exemption, considering them, per se, incompatible with EU law. Article 210 par. 4
includes under this category agreements or practices which:
 May lead to the partitioning of markets within the EU in any form;
 May affect the sound operation of the market organisation;
 May create distortions of competition which are not essential to achieving the
objectives of the CAP pursued by the IBO activity;
 Entail the fixing of prices or the fixing of quotas; and
 May create discrimination or eliminate competition in respect of a substantial
proportion of the products in question.

Finally, Article 211 of Regulation (EU) No 1308/2013 stipulates the application of EU

State aid rules as enshrined in Articles 107 to 109 TFUE to the production of, and
trade in, agricultural products, with the exception of the payments performed by Member
States pursuant to and in conformity with:
 The measures provided for in the regulation which are partly or wholly financed
by the EU; or
 National payments for reindeer in Finland and Sweden (Article 213), for the sugar
sector in Finland (Article 214), for apiculture (Article 215), for distillation of wine
in case of crisis (Article 216), for distribution of products to children (Article 217)
and for nuts (Article 218).

In conclusion, the following table summarises all articles of the TFEU and CMO Regulation
that have to be considered under the scope of this study.

Page 18
 Study on agricultural interbranch organisations (IBOs) in the EU

Table 2: EU legislation addressing IBOs and other forms of cooperation and

contracts between producers and other levels in the food supply chains

Legal act Legal Act Contents

General provisions
TFEU Treaty provisions Article 39 - Overall objectives that CAP must pursue
related to Article 40 - Establishment of CMO and nature of measures that
agriculture may adopted in this context
Article 42 - Legal basis empowering the EU legislator to
determine the extent to which competition rules apply to
production of and trade in agricultural products
Article 43 - Legal basis for the adoption of legislative acts
implementing CAP.

Treaty provisions Article 101 - Declares incompatible with EU law undertakings’

on competition agreements, decisions and practices that have the object or the
effect to prevent, restrict or distort competition in the internal
market
Article 102 - Declares incompatible with EU law the abuse of a
dominant position by one or more undertaking within the internal
market, or in a substantial part of it, insofar as such a conduct
affects intra-EU trade
Article 106 – MS actions
Article 107 - Declares incompatible with EU law any aid granted
by a Member State or through State resources in any form
whatsoever which distorts or threatens competition by favouring
certain undertakings or the production of certain goods insofar as
it affects the trade between Member States.

Provisions related to IBOs

Reg. (EU) Article 157 - Principles and conditions governing voluntary
No recognition of IBOs by MS
1308/2013 Article 158 - Additional conditions and procedural rules
governing IBOs’ recognition by MS
Article 159 - Cases in which IBOs recognition by MS is
mandatory (olive oils and table olives sector and the tobacco
sector)
Articles 157 par. 3, 163 - Specific requirements applying to
voluntary recognition of IBOs by MS in certain sectors
Article 162 - Additional objectives of IBOs in olive oils and table
olives sector and the tobacco sector)
Articles 164 and 165 - Rules for the extension by MS of
agreements, decisions and practices adopted by IBOs, including
decisions on financing, to operators that are not members
Article 210 - Conditions under which agreements, decisions and
practices put in place by IBOs may be exempted from Article 101
TFEU.

Supply Article 150 and 172- Regulation of supply of cheese and ham
management with a PDO/PGI (applies to IBOs, but also to POs or group of
operators)
Article 167 - Possibility for MS to adopt, under certain
conditions, domestic marketing rules for regulating the supply of
wines (to be specified to which type of entities it could apply in
particular following decisions by IBOs).

Provisions related to other vertical cooperation, agreements within trade in sugar

Reg. (EU) Articles 125 and 127 - Sugar sector agreements and delivery
No contracts
1308/2013

Page 19
 Study on agricultural interbranch organisations (IBOs) in the EU

Legal act Legal Act Contents

Provisions related to contractual negotiations

Reg. (EU) Articles 169, 170 and 171 - Contractual negotiations in the
No olive oil sector, beef and veal sector and for certain arable crops
1308/2013 Articles 149 – Contractual negotiations in the milk and milk
products sector
Provisions related to contractual relations
Reg. (EU) Article 148 - Contractual relations in the milk and milk products
No sector
1308/2013 Article 168 - Contractual relations in respect of agricultural
products from a sector listed in Article 1 par. 2 other than milk
and milk products and sugar.

Empowerment new rules

Reg. (EU) Articles 173, 174 and 175 - Legal basis for the adoption of
No delegated and implementing acts concerning, among others, the
1308/2013 recognition and the operation of IBOs

State aids rules

Article 211 - Application of Article 107 to 109 TFEU to the
production of, and trade in, agricultural products
Articles 213, 214, 215, 216, 217 and 218 - Situations in
which State aid provisions enshrined in TFEU do not apply.

Antitrust rules
Art. 206 –Application of Article 101 to 106 TFEU to agriculture
Art. 209 – Exceptions for the objectives of the CAP and farmers
and their associations from the application of Article 101 (1)
TFEU.
Source: compiled by Arcadia International

Page 20
 Study on agricultural interbranch organisations (IBOs) in the EU

PART 3: OVERVIEW OF NATIONAL LEGISLATION AND MEMBER STATE

ACTIONS ON IBOS (THEME 1)
Currently, the majority of EU Member States (19) have in place national rules governing
the recognition and the functioning of IBOs. France is the Member State that first
adopted national legislation in this area (1975). Other Member States that have
introduced rules at a relatively early stage are Spain (1994), Portugal (1997), Italy
(1998) and Greece (1999). Germany (2013), Latvia (2013) and the Netherlands (2014)
are the Member States that, most recently, have passed, for the very first time, national
legislation in this area.
The implementation of legislation on IBOs in the 19 Member States that adopted such
legislation varies significantly, if one considers, in particular, the number of IBOs that
have been recognised in these Member States. Effectively, only in eight Member States
(namely France, Greece, Hungary, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, Portugal and Romania)
have IBOs been formally recognised by the competent authorities and are currently
performing the activities for which they have been set up.
Based on the information collected during the execution of this study, the current
scenario is unlikely to change in the near future. Indeed, in the remaining eleven
Member States (notably Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, the Czech
Republic, Germany, Latvia, Malta, Poland and Slovakia) that have national rules on IBOs,
due to different reasons, there seem to be no plans to grant IBO recognition to any
organisation operating in the agri-food sector in the short term.
Finally, in nine Member States (namely Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Ireland, Lithuania,
Luxembourg, Slovenia, Sweden and the United Kingdom), presently, there is no
framework for the establishment of IBOs in the agri-food sector. The reasons behind the
lack of a dedicated set of provisions in the legal order of those Member States are
examined in Section 3.4 of this report.
Figure 1 provides an overview of the current situation in the EU as regards the existence
of national legislation on IBOs at Member State level as well as its level of
implementation.

The following sections provide:

 An in-depth comparative analysis of Member States’ national legislation regulating
IBOs (Section 3.1);
 An assessment of the level of implementation of national legislation on IBOs with
regard to those Member States that have formally recognised organisations to
that effect (Section 3.2);
 An insight on the reasons why presently in a majority of Member States there are
no entities recognised as IBOs despite the existence of national legislation
(Section 3.3);
 An analysis of the reasons why in nine Member States there is currently no
legislation on IBOs (Section 3.4); and
 An overview of the implementation in all twenty-eight EU Member States of other
relevant provisions that Regulation (EU) No 1308/2013 contains with a view to
fostering cooperation between the stakeholders of the production chain of specific
agricultural products (Section 3.5).

Page 21
 Study on agricultural interbranch organisations (IBOs) in the EU

Figure 2: Legislation on IBOs at Member State level and its level of

implementation taking into account existence or absence of recognised IBOs

Source: compiled by Arcadia International

3.1. Mapping of national legislation on IBOs across the EU

This Section intends to provide an in-depth comparative analysis of the main features
of national legislation on IBOs in those Member States where such a framework is
currently in place, taking into account EU provisions and requirements as a starting
point.
3.1.1. Historical evolution of national legislation relating to IBOs
As referred earlier on, France is the first Member State that adopted a national
framework on IBOs (1975), whilst the Netherlands is the latest one (2014). Overall,
based on the year of the adoption of the first national legislation on IBOs, Member States
may be grouped in three main clusters:
 1975: France;
 1994-2004: Spain, Portugal, Italy, Greece, Romania, Cyprus, Malta, Poland and
Belgium (Wallonia);
 2005-2014: Bulgaria, Belgium (Flanders), Croatia, Austria, Czech Republic,
Slovakia, Hungary, Germany, Latvia and the Netherlands.

The reasons for the adoption of a dedicated framework for IBOs at national level at a
given moment in time vary from one Member State to another. In France, for instance, in
1975 the national Parliament introduced a law governing the recognition of IBOs mainly

Page 22
 Study on agricultural interbranch organisations (IBOs) in the EU

to lay down a proper legal framework for an area that until then had been regulated only
to a limited extent and where public and private entities had long coexisted.
On the other hand, in Spain, rules aimed at fostering vertical cooperation in the different
agri-food sectors already existed before a specific national framework was established in
1994, although they were dealt with under legislation regulating contracts in the agri-
food sector. The legislature opted then for giving such rules more prominence and, to
this end, designed a dedicated single framework, taking the French legislative experience
as a model.
In Portugal, the development of national legislation on IBOs was mainly prompted by the
establishment of EU rules in this area through the adoption of Regulation (EC) 2200/1996
on the common organisation of fruits and vegetables. Likewise, the intention of business
operators in the milk and milk products sector to structure their vertical cooperation in a
more efficient manner contributed towards the definition of a national framework during
the last years of the past century.
More recently, the adoption of Regulation (EU) No 1308/2013 on the common market
organisation of agricultural products is to be regarded as the main factor that prompted
the establishment of national rules in the Netherlands in 2014.
Following the adoption of the first legal framework for IBOs at national level, almost all
Member States have subsequently reviewed it. Only Latvia is an exception in this
respect.
With regard to the number of national acts regulating IBOs, this also varies from
one Member State to another one. In eight Member States (namely, Cyprus, Czech
Republic, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Latvia and the Netherlands) - which account
for nearly half of the Member States with national legislation on IBOs - the rules for the
recognition and the functioning of these entities are laid down in a single legislative
act.
On the other hand, Belgium and Portugal are the two Member States with the highest
number of legal acts (6) setting rules for IBOs. As regards Belgium, this situation may
be explained considering that the legislative competence in this area is held by the
regions. Over time, both Wallonia and Flanders have adopted three legal acts each.
Regarding Portugal, the high number of legal acts currently in force at national level is
justified by the fact that this Member State has developed a set of specific rules for the
setting up of IBOs in the forestry sector, in addition to a more general framework at
national level for the recognition of these organisations in the agri-food sector.

National vs. regional legislation

Due to the specificities of the administrative structure of certain Member States, national
legislation on IBOs may coexist with regional legislation. In the context of the study,
two relevant examples were identified in this regard.
 In Spain, national legislation on IBOs currently coexists with legislation adopted
by certain Autonomous Communities, namely Andalusia (2005), Basque Countries
(1996), Castilla La Mancha (2006), Castilla and León (2014) and Catalonia
(2015). With the sole exception of Catalonia, the legislation adopted by the
Spanish Autonomous Communities in the area of IBOs largely mirrors the rule set
at national level; and
 In Italy, the Region Emilia-Romagna adopted a regional legal framework for IBOs
in 2000. Unlike Spain, however, in Italy the national competent authorities are of
the view that, under national law, regions do not hold any legislative power in this
area and, thus, have been consistently questioning the legitimacy of the regional
framework adopted by Emilia-Romagna as well as the recognitions that this
Region has granted to a few IBOs.

Page 23
 Study on agricultural interbranch organisations (IBOs) in the EU

Current legislative developments

Four Member States (Cyprus, Latvia, Malta and Slovakia) are currently reviewing the
existing national framework for IBOs. Interestingly, these are all Member States
where IBOs have not been recognised to date.
In Cyprus, for instance, the legislature is currently examining a draft legislative text to be
adopted in 2016, which aims at simplifying the recognition procedure and facilitating the
establishment of IBOs in the agri-food sector.
Slovakia has also embarked upon a legislative review of national rules on IBOs with a
view to extending the possibility of establishing IBOs in sectors other than the milk and
milk products sector.
In Malta, there are also plans to revise the national framework for IBOs in order to
ensure full alignment with the provisions of Regulation (EU) No 1308/2013.
Finally, the competent authorities in Latvia are planning to consult stakeholders in the
second half of 2016 on, among others, the need to review rules governing the
establishment and recognition of IBOs.
Table 3 provides a detailed overview of the historical evolution of national legislation at
Member State level, including the list of acts currently in force and, where relevant, the
legislation developments in the pipeline.

Page 24
 Study on agricultural interbranch organisations (IBOs) in the EU

Table 3: Historical evolution of national legislation on IBOs in Member States where such legislation exists
MS Year of adoption of Years of adoption of other Main legal acts currently in force at national level Current developments
the first national national legal acts relevant to
legal act regarding IBOs
IBOs
AT 2011 2012 and 2015 Ordinance on the establishment of IBOs in the wine sector of 23 May 2011 and
Ordinance on Framework Conditions for Producers of 3 November 2015
BE 2004 (Wallonia), 2009 2013 and 2015 (Wallonia); 2012 and 2014 Wallonia: Order of 27 May 2004 regarding the common market organisation of
(Flanders) (Flanders) fruits and vegetables, Order of 29 August 2013 concerning contractual relations
in the milk and milk product sector as amended by Order of 10 December 2015
and Order of 22 January 2015 concerning the recognition of producer
organisations, associations of producer organisations and interbranch
organisations in other sectors; Flanders: Order of 8 May 2009 concerning the
common market organisation of fruits and vegetables as regards the recognition
of producer organisations, operational funds and programmes and the granting
of financial assistance, Order of 14 December 2012 concerning contractual
relations and cooperation in the milk and milk product sector as amended by
Order of 6 June 2014 and Order of 31 January 2014 on the recognition of
producer and interbranch organisations in other sectors
BG 2006 2015 Ordinance No 1 of 28 January 2015 on the agreements in the milk sector and on
the terms and conditions for recognition of producers organisations, their
associations and interbranch organisations in the milk and milk products sector
and Ordinance No 12 of 5 May 2015 on the terms and conditions for recognition
of producer organisations of agricultural products, associations of producer
organisations and interbranch organisations and producer groups
CY 2002 2004 Law No 164(Ι)/2002 on Recognition of Agricultural Producers Organisations as Revision of the current legislative
amended by Law No 160(Ι)/2004 framework ongoing with a view to
simplifying IBOs' recognition
procedure
CZ 2012 2014 Government Regulation No 282/2014 Coll. on certain conditions for the
implementation of the common organisation of markets in the milk and milk
products sector
DE 2013 2014 Regulation BGBI.IS.3998 of 15 November 2013 on the development of the
market structure in the agricultural sector
ES 1994 1996, 1997, 2000, 2009, 2013 and 2015 Law 38/1994 of 30 December laying down provisions on interbranch
organisations in the agri-food sector as amended by Laws 13/1996 and 12/2013
and Royal Decree 705/1997 of 16 May implementing Law 38/1994 as amended
by Royal Decrees 1660/2000, 1668/2009 and 64/2015
FR 1975 1998, 2010, 2014 and 2015 Articles L632-I and ff. of Rural and Maritime Fishery Code as amended by Order
No 2015-128 of 7 October 2015

Page 25
 Study on agricultural interbranch organisations (IBOs) in the EU

MS Year of adoption of Years of adoption of other Main legal acts currently in force at national level Current developments
the first national national legal acts relevant to
legal act regarding IBOs
IBOs
GR 1999 2000, 2001, 2005 and 2011 Law No 4015/2011 of 12 November on Agricultural Cooperatives and Producers
Organisations, Ministerial Decision No 336178 of 22 March 2000 on rules,
conditions and procedures for the recognition and operation of interbranch
organisations at national level as amended by Ministerial Decision No 334606 of
31 January 2001 and Ministerial Decision No 63179/2005 on Rules, conditions
and procedures for the recognition and operation of interbranch organisations at
regional level
HU 2012 2012, 2013 and 2015 Act XCVII of 2015
HR 2010 2011, 2013 and 2015 Agriculture Act of 17 March 2015 and Ordinance of 22 July 2015 on recognition
and aid for the establishment of producer organisations
IT 1998 2001, 2003, 2005 and 2015 Law n. 91 of 2 July 2015 converting in law Decree Law 51 of 5 May 2015 laying
down urgent provisions for the strengthening of agri-food sectors in crisis, in
support of agri-food business operators affected by circumstance of exceptional
nature and reorganisation of the ministerial departments
LV 2013 N/A Regulation No. 80/2013 laying down procedures for the recognition of producers Planning of a stakeholder
organisations in the milk and milk products sector and monitoring of their consultation including on the
performance possibility to expand the scope of
IBOs' national legislation to sectors
other than dairy
MT 2003 2004 and 2007 Producer Organisations Act of 6 January 2003 as amended by Legal Notices 426
of 2007, 346 of 2008 and 182 of 2012,
Fruit and Vegetable Producer Organisations Regulations of 15 February 2004 as
amended by Legal Notice 201 of 2011 and
Producer Organisations (Certain Products) Regulations of 21 August 2007
NL 2014 2015 Regulation No. WJZ/14152482 of 10 October 2015 on producer and interbranch
organisations
PL 2004 2015 and 2016 "Act 2004/897 of 20 April 2004 on the organisation of the market in milk and
milk products, Ministerial Regulation 2016/216 of 5 February 2016 on the
recognition of producer and interbranch organisations in the market of milk and
milk products of agricultural markets and the type and scope of documents
required for meeting the conditions for recognition, Act 2015/1419 of 10 July
2015 amending Act of 11 March 2004 with the view to introducing provisions on
interbranch organisations and Ministerial Regulation 2016/87 of 7 January 2016
on the recognition of producer and interbranch organisations in agricultural
markets other than milk, milk products and fruits and vegetables
PT 1997 1998, 1999, 2001, 2002 and 2008 Law n.123/97 of 13 November laying down the framework for interbranch

Page 26
 Study on agricultural interbranch organisations (IBOs) in the EU

MS Year of adoption of Years of adoption of other Main legal acts currently in force at national level Current developments
the first national national legal acts relevant to
legal act regarding IBOs
IBOs
organisations in the agri-food sector, Order n.967/98 laying down application
rules for the regime of interbranch organisations recognition as amended by
Order 35/2008 , Decree Law n.376/98 of 24 November laying down the
representativeness criteria that national, regional and local organisations must
fulfil to adhere to interbranch organisations, Law n.158/99 of 14 September
laying down the framework for interbranch organisations in the forestry sector,
Decree Law n.316/2001 of 10 December laying down application rules for the
recognition, functioning and monitoring of interbranch organisations in the
forestry sector, Order n.79/2002 of 22 January laying down representativeness
criteria for the recognition of interbranch organisation in the forestry sector as
well as equal participation of their members at the level of interbranch
organisations’ governing bodies
Government Emergency Ordinance No 103/2008 of 3 September 2008 on the
setting of interbranch organisations for agri-food products , Government
Decision No 1068/2009 of 23 September 2009 on organisation and functioning of
interbranch organisations regarding agri-food products and for the approval of
representation criteria, of the procedure for recognition and withdrawal of
RO 2001 2008, 2009 and 2010 recognition, of control and monitoring thereof, as well as delegation of duties
and Ministerial Order No 143/2010 of 16 June 2010 regarding the members and
functioning of the Committee for interbranch organisations in the agri-food
sector as well as the procedures for recognition, monitoring and control,
withdrawal of recognition, extension of interbranch agreements and delegation
of duties of the interbranch organisations
Law n. 491/2001 on the organisation of the markets in selected agricultural National legislation on the
products as amended by Law n. 353/2012 and Government Regulation n. establishment of IBOs in sectors
SK 2012 2015
55/2015 with regard to conditions on the common organisation of the market in other than milk and milk products is
milk and milk products in the pipeline
Source: compiled by Arcadia International

Page 27
 Study on agricultural interbranch organisations (IBOs) in the EU

3.1.2. Impact of the adoption of Regulation (EU) No 1308/2013 on national legislation on

IBOs
As of 1 January 2014, Regulation (EU) No 1308/2013 has introduced a few major
changes to the EU regime concerning IBOs. Amongst them, the possibility to establish
such vertical organisations in all agri-food sectors, as opposed to the regime previously in
force, stands out as one of the most prominent novelties introduced.
Following the entry into force of the regulation, it can be observed that in the
Netherlands the adoption of European legislation has prompted the development of the
first ever set of national requirements. Although previous laws were in place since 1950
on the establishment of so-called public statutory organisations (”Wet op de
bedrijfsorganisatie”), which regulated among other the functioning of the Commodity
Boards and which can in part be seen as predecessors of the current IBOs, the
Netherlands undertook encompassing legislation only after the adoption of Regulation
(EU) No 1308/2013.
Furthermore, nine Member States (notably, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, France,
Germany, Hungary, Italy and Poland) have amended, though to a varying degree, the
existing national framework in order to ensure full alignment with its provisions.
In so doing, certain Member States (for instance, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia and
Poland) have seized this opportunity to extend the application of rules on IBOs
recognition to other agri-food sectors as set by Regulation (EU) No 1308/2013, whilst
national legislation previously in force clearly restricted this possibility to a limited
number of sectors (mainly, milk and milk products and fruits and vegetables).
On the other hand, in the case of Germany, national legislation provides for the
establishment of IBOs in a list of sectors broader than the one set out in Regulation (EU)
No 1308/2013.
As already referred above, in Cyprus, Malta and Latvia IBOs’ national legislation is
currently being reviewed or there are plans to do so in the short-term.
With regard to the Czech Republic and Slovakia, following the entry into force of the new
rules on the common organisation of agricultural markets, the legislators of these two
countries have introduced minor changes to the legal framework on IBOs applicable at
national level. Such changes have therefore not resulted in a full alignment with the
provisions of Regulation (EU) No 1308/2013 with national legislation in both countries
still regulating for establishment of IBOs only in the milk and milk products sector instead
for all agricultural sectors. However, Slovakia is to be included amongst the group of
Member States that are planning to introduce amendments to the national framework
with a view to ensuring full consistency with applicable EU rules.
Finally, Greece, Portugal, Romania and Spain have not introduced any national rules
following the adoption of Regulation (EU) No 1308/2013 and there would be no plans to
do so. Indeed, in the case of Spain, the national competent authorities have ensured
alignment of the national framework with the new provisions set by the regulation before
its formal adoption at EU level. In Portugal, the competent authorities indicated to have
carried out an assessment of the national provisions on IBOs against the new regime
designed by Regulation (EU) No 1308/2013 for such organisations and concluded that no
amendment of the former was needed.
Table 4 provides an overview of the existing national legislation at Member State level
prior to and following the adoption of Regulation (EU) No 1308/2013 on the common
organisation of markets in agricultural products.

Page 28
 Study on agricultural interbranch organisations (IBOs) in the EU

Table 4: Overview of national legislation in place before and after the adoption
of Regulation (EU) No 1308/2013, including, where applicable, main changes
brought in by legislation adopted after 1 January 2014
National legislation prior National legislation
MS Main changes after 1 January 2014
to 1 January 2014 after 1 January 2014
Yes (only for the milk and mil Possibility of establishing IBOs in other sectors in line with
AT Yes
products and wine sectors) Art. 157 Regulation (EU) No 1308/2013
Yes (only for dairy and fruits and Possibility of establishing IBOs in other sectors in line with
BE Yes
vegetables sector) Art. 157 Regulation (EU) No 1308/2013
Possibility of establishing IBOs in other sectors relevant at
Yes (only for fruits and
BG Yes national level in line with Art. 157 Regulation EU (No)
vegetables sector)
1308/2013
Changes being considered concern, among others,
New legislation pending
CY Yes minimum requirements for recognition of IBOs and
approval
simplification of recognition procedure
Yes (only for the milk and milk Repealing of prior legislation with no substantial changes
CZ Yes
products sector) introduced with regard to IBOs
DE Yes Yes Minor changes to the national legal framework for IBOs
ES Yes No N/A
Alignment, among others, with Art. 157 and 164
FR Yes Yes
Regulation (EU) No 1308/2013
GR Yes No N/A
Alignment, among others, with Art. 157 and 164
HU Yes Yes
Regulation (EU) No 1308/2013
Yes (only for fruits and Possibility to establish IBOs in all sectors relevant to the
HR vegetables, olive oil and table Yes national economy in line with Art. 157 Regulation (EU)
olives, milk and milk sectors) No 1308/2013
Adoption of implementing rules ensuring overall
IT Yes Yes
alignment with Regulation (EU) No 1308/2013
Yes (only for the milk and milk
LV product sector)
No N/A

MT Yes No N/A
First national legal framework for IBOs intrducing legal
NL No Yes basis for the establishment of such entities in all sectors
relevant to the national economy
Possibility of establishing IBOs in all sectors in line with
Yes (only for the milk and milk Art. 157 Regulation (EU) No 1308/2013 and adoption of
PL Yes
products sector) implementing rules for their recognition except for fruits
and vegetables
PT Yes No N/A
RO Yes No N/A
Yes (only for milk and milk
SK Yes No substantial changes introduced with regard to IBOs
products sector)
Source: compiled by Arcadia International

3.1.3. National rules laying down definitions, objectives, legal status and governance
requirements for IBOs
Regulation (EU) No 1308/2013 does not provide a specific definition for IBOs as such. It
leaves the recognition process of IBOs to Member States’ competence, but lays down the
certain requirements that these organisations must fulfil in order to be granted
recognition at national level.
In this context, Article 157 par. 1 of the regulation stipulates that, upon request, Member
States may grant recognition to IBOs in one of the sector listed under Article 1 par. 2
that:
a) Are constituted of representatives of economic activities linked to the production
and to at least one of the following stages of the supply chain: the processing of
or trade in, including distribution of, products in one or more sectors;

Page 29
 Study on agricultural interbranch organisations (IBOs) in the EU

b) Are formed on the initiative of all or some of the organisations or associations that
constitute them;
c) Pursue a specific aim taking into account the interests of their members and of
consumers, which may include, in particular, one of the twenty-four objectives
that the EU legislation lists to this end.32
These requirements must be read in conjunction with the requirements set out in Article
158 par. 1 of the same regulation pursuant to which IBOs must:
 Carry out their activities in one or more regions in the territory concerned;
 Account for a significant share of the economic activities represented within its
membership base; and
 Do not engage themselves in production, processing or trade.

Further requirements are set out for the recognition of IBOs milk and milk products
sector in Article 157 par. 3. Similarly, with reference to IBOs in the tobacco, olive oil and
table oil sectors, Article 162 foresees a few additional objectives that organisations
operating in such sectors can pursue in order to obtain recognition by national competent
authorities; however recognition of IBOs in these sectors is mandatory as per Article 159
b) Regulation (EU) No 1308/2013.
As a regulation, Regulation (EU) No 1308/2013 is, by definition, directly applicable at
national level without the need for Member States to ensure its transposition. However, ,
Regulation (EU) No 1308/2013 is silent as to whether and to what extent Member States
may adapt EU legislation on IBOs to meet their own needs and/or lay down further
requirements with a view, for instance, to defining IBOs or setting their objectives.
Furthermore, EU legislation does not contain any provision as far as the legal status of
IBOs33 and their governance are concerned.
Against this background, the analysis of national legislation on IBOs indicates that
several Member States have adjusted to their own needs and/or supplemented the
applicable EU provisions.

32
Article 157 par. 1 point c) lists the following objectives that IBOs may pursue: (i) improving knowledge and the
transparency of production and the market, including by publication of aggregated statistical data on production costs, prices,
including, where appropriate, price indices, volumes and duration of contracts which have been previously concluded, and by
providing analyses of potential future market developments at regional, national or international level; (ii) forecasting of
production potential, and recording public market prices; (iii) helping to coordinate better the way the products are placed on
the market, in particular by means of research and market studies; (iv) exploring potential export markets; (v) without
prejudice to Articles 148 and 168, drawing up standard forms of contract, compatible with Union rules, for the sale of
agricultural products to purchasers and/or the supply of processed products to distributors and retailers, taking into account
the need to achieve fair competitive conditions and to avoid market distortions; (vi) exploiting to a fuller extent the potential
of the products, including at the level of market outlets, and developing initiatives to strengthen economic competitiveness
and innovation; (vii) providing the information and carrying out the research necessary to innovate, rationalise, improve and
adjust production and, where applicable, the processing and marketing, towards products more suited to market requirements
and consumer tastes and expectations, in particular with regard to product quality, including the specific characteristics of
products with a protected designation of origin or a protected geographical indication, and protection of the environment;
(viii) seeking ways of restricting the use of animal-health or plant protection products, better managing other inputs, ensuring
product quality and soil and water conservation, promoting food safety, in particular through traceability of products, and
improving animal health and welfare; (ix) developing methods and instruments for improving product quality at all stages of
production and, where applicable, of processing and marketing; (x) taking all possible actions to uphold, protect and promote
organic farming and designations of origin, quality labels and geographical indications; (xi) promoting and carrying out
research into integrated, sustainable production or other environmentally sound production methods; (xii) encouraging
healthy and responsible consumption of the products on the internal market and/or informing about the harm linked to
hazardous consumption patterns; (xiii) promoting consumption of, and/or furnishing information concerning, products on the
internal market and external markets; (xiv) contributing to the management of by-products and the reduction and
management of waste.
33
Contrary to Article 154 par. 1 for producer organisations, Regulation (EU) No 1308/2013 does not require the the IBO to
be a legal entity.

Page 30
 Study on agricultural interbranch organisations (IBOs) in the EU

Definition of IBOs
As to the definition of IBOs, over time several Member States (9) have codified their
own definitions of IBOs at national level and maintained them in spite of the evolution of
EU legislation in this area.
Overall, the majority of definitions codified by Member States reflect the requirement set
by EU legislation whereby IBOs must gather organisations or associations representative
of the production sector and of at least another stage of the relevant production chain.
However, whilst the national legislation of most Member States (for instance, France,
Greece, Portugal, Spain) defines IBOs as organisations operating in the agri-food sector
as a whole, national legislation of Bulgaria, Croatia and Slovakia lists the specific
sectors/products in which IBOs may be constituted individually (e.g. milk and milk
products, eggs, silkworms). In Slovakia, it is worth noting that the relevant definition is
contained in a guidance document developed by the national competent authority, which
has not the binding force of a legal act.
Consideration should also be given to the fact that certain definitions of IBOs laid down in
national legislation present some peculiarities.
For instance, the relevant definition provided by Spain legislation makes reference to the
geographical coverage - i.e. national or, in any event, broader than the territory of a
single Autonomous Community - that IBOs must have for the purpose of recognition
pursuant to national law.
On the other hand, the national legislation of certain Member States lays down specific
requirements for IBOs’ members other than producers, processors and distributors.
French and Italian legislation both allow that consumer organisations and trade unions
may join IBOs, although Italian legislation specifies that the role of these actors in such a
setting is purely consultative. In Portugal, instead, the national legislation provides for
the possibility to join IBOs for consumer organisations only. In the Netherlands, although
not regulated by law and not formally members of the IBO, trade unions, consumer
organisations and other stakeholders may be partners or advisors to the IBO.
Moreover, the national definition currently applicable in Romania defines IBOs in the first
place according to their legal status rather than as organisations gathering stakeholders
of the agri-food chain (“legal entities under private law, of public interest, with
professional and non-profit nature, recognised by the competent authorities”). Romania
is also the only Member State where national law sets out specific legal requirements for
the organisations willing to form an IBO by requiring that they are non-profit
associations, with legal personality, set upon the initiative of the representatives of the
economic activities from a given agri-food sector.
National legislation in Austria, Italy and the Netherlands explicitly refers to requirements
set out in this respect by Regulation (EU) No 1308/2013. In Latvia, where national
legislation currently provides for the establishment of IBOs only in the milk and milk
products sector pursuant to Regulation (EC) No 1234/2007, the definition set out by that
regulation applies.
Currently, only five Member States, notably Belgium, Cyprus, the Czech Republic,
Germany and Poland have not laid down specific definitions of IBOs in their national legal
framework.
Table 5 provides an overview of definitions of IBOs and requirements for IBOs’ members
as lay down by Member States’ national legislation.

Page 31
 Study on agricultural interbranch organisations (IBOs) in the EU

Table 5: Overview of legal definitions and requirements for IBOs’ members set
out in Member States’ national legislation
Specific
MS National definition requirements for
IBOs' members
AT Organisations complying with applicable EU requirements No
BE No No
Organisations composed by members that are representatives of the
production, the processing industry and/or of the wholesale/retail for
the following products a) Milk and milk products; b) Cereal and
oilseeds; c) Medicinal and aromatic plants; d) Legumes; e) Industrial
BG No
crops; f) Potatoes; g) Meat and wool; h) Honey and apiculture
products; i) Wine grapes; j) Eggs; k) Silkworms; l) Live trees and
other plants, bulbs, roots and the like, cut flowers and ornamental
foliage; m) Seeds and seedlings; n) Fruits and vegetables
CY No No
CZ No No
DE No No
Any organisation with national scope or with a geographical coverage
broader than the territory of an Autonomous Community which is
ES composed by organisations representing food production, processing No
and/or wholesale/retail, regardless of the legal nature of the members
of the latter
Consumers’
Groupings constituted by professional organisations, upon their own
organisations and
FR initiative, representing agricultural production and, as the case may
trade unions may
be, the processing, the trading and the retailing
integrate IBOs.
Private and non-profit legal entities representing producers and
GR processors and/or distributors of a specific product or group of No
products from the agricultural, agri-food, forestry and fisheries sector
Organisations regulated by the law which represent producers,
processors and distributor organisations and that are established
HU No
according to national legislation governing organisations of public
interest and which are recognised by the competent authorities
Organisations comprising several or all producer organisations or
associations of producer organisations which are constituted of
representatives of economic activities linked to the production and to
at least one of the following stages of the supply chain: the processing
of or trade in, including distribution of the following products(a) fruit
HR No
and vegetables; (b) processed fruit and vegetable products; (c) sugar;
(d) cereals; (e) flax and hemp;(f) wine; (g) tobacco; (h) olive oil and
table olives; (i) beef and veal; (j) milk and milk products; (k) pig
meat; (l) sheep meat and goat meat; (m) eggs; (n) poultry meat; (o)
apiculture products; and (p) other products
Consumer
organisations and
trade unions of the
IT Any organisation that complies with the applicable EU requirements agri-food sector
may integrate IBOs
with a consultative
role
An inter-branch organisation in the milk and milk product sector is
LV defined pursuant to Article 126b, paragraph 1 of Regulation (EC) No No
1234/2007
An association made of up representatives of economic activities
linked to the production, the trading in and the processing of the
MT No
product, and may include representatives of any one or more of such
economic activities
A branch organisation that is recognised by the national competent
authorities as referred to in Chapter III, Section 1, of Regulation (EU)
NL No
No 1308/2013 or the articles 161, first paragraph, or 163, first
paragraph, of the same Regulation

Page 32
 Study on agricultural interbranch organisations (IBOs) in the EU

Specific
MS National definition requirements for
IBOs' members
PL No No
Entities consisting of organisations representing producers, processors
PT and/or distributors of a specific agri-food product or group of products No
as well as consumers
Associative forms
with legal
personality, non-
profit, set upon the
Legal entities under private law, of public interest, with professional initiative of the
RO
and non-profit nature, recognised by the competent authorities representatives of
the economic
activities from a
given agri-food
product sector
An organisation comprising economic operators or professional
associations with legal personality whose economic activity is linked to
SK No
the production of raw milk and with at least another phase of the
supply chain, i.e. processing or trade, including distribution
Source: compiled by Arcadia International

IBOs’ objectives
As far as the objectives that IBOs must pursue, all Member States with national
legislation in this area have introduced provisions in this respect under national law with
the sole exception of the Czech Republic.
The national legislation of most Member States sets out that IBOs must pursue one or
more amongst the objectives laid down in:
 Regulation (EU) No 1308/2013 (Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Hungary and the
Netherlands);
 Other specific EU legal acts previously in force, such as Regulations (EC) No
1234/2007 and 1182/2007 (Latvia, Malta);
 Relevant CAP provisions enshrined in the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU
(Austria); and
 EU law as such (Cyprus, Italy).
In the case of Slovakia, as for the definition of IBOs, objectives of such organisations are
listed in a guidance document elaborated by the national competent authorities with
regard to the milk and milk product sector. The document expressly refers to the
objectives listed in Regulation (EU) No 1308/2013.
As to the remaining Member States (notably, France, Germany, Greece, Portugal, Spain
and Romania), national legislation sets out specific objectives that IBOs are allowed to
pursue on the respective markets.
In France, the national legislation lists only eight objectives for IBOs, as opposed to the
twenty-four currently listed in Regulation (EU) No 1308/2013. However, content wise,
there seems to be an overall correspondence between the national and EU legislation. In
any event, French legislation stipulates that the competent authorities may supplement
the national list of objectives with additional ones when considering requests for
recognition.
Currently, Spain appears to have the longest list of objectives set by national legislation.
This list is however not to be considered as exhaustive to the extent that it may be
supplemented by any specific objective that EU law may envisage.
Germany is the only Member State whose national legislation on IBOs combines a
positive list of objectives with a list of negative criteria. The latter one includes activities

Page 33
 Study on agricultural interbranch organisations (IBOs) in the EU

that EU law generally prohibits IBOs to conduct such as engaging in production,

processing and trading or putting in place anticompetitive practices.
Interestingly, the national legislation in Portugal, Romania and Spain attributes to IBOs
also a specific role to play in providing training for staff working in their respective
sectors.
Also, Romania is the only Member State where national legislation explicitly foresees that
IBOs may be established with the view to representing the interests of their membership
before public authorities as well as settling disputes that may arise between their
members.
Table 6 provides a detailed overview of the objectives that IBOs may pursue in
accordance with Member States’ national legislation.

Table 6: Overview of IBOs’ objectives pursuant to Member States’ national law

MS Objectives
National legislation does not list IBOs' objectives in detail but refers to the overall objectives
AT
of the Common Agricultural Policy set in Article 39 TFEU
National legislation requires IBOs to follow one or more of the the objectives that these
BE entities may pursue in accordance with Regulation (EU) No 1308/2013. However, these may
be supplemented by national competent authority when assessing requests for recognition.
National legislation requires IBOs to follow at least one of the the objectives that these
BG
entities may pursue in accordance with Regulation (EU) No 1308/2013.
National legislation requires IBOs to follow one or more of the the objectives that these
CY
entities may pursue in accordance with EU legislation
CZ No
National legislation stipulates that IBOs may perform the following activities 1. Market
research and marketing; 2. Improvement of producing, processing and sales; 3. Support of
good agricultural practices; 4. Improvement of product quality, i.e. organic agriculture and
regional products. National legislation prohibits IBOs from undertaking the following
DE
activities: 1. Production, processing or trade of agricultural products; 2. Conclusion of
agreements involving fixing of prices and similar acts with the same purpose; 3. Distort
normal trading conditions; 4. any activity/practice that is not in line with the Common
Agricultural Policy or, otherwise, with the proper functioning of the EU market.
National legislation foresees that IBOs must pursue one or more of the following objectives:
a) Monitor the proper functioning of the food chain and encourage the adherence to good
practices in the business relations that take place between their members; b) Carrying out
actions aimed at improving market knowledge, efficiency and transparency namely by
sharing information and studies of relevance to its members; c) Developing methods and
instruments to improve product quality at all stages of production, processing and
distribution; d) Promotion of research and development programmes fostering innovation in
the relevant sector; e) Improving the coordination between the different operators involved
in the marketing of new products, notably through the performance of research activities and
market studies; f) Designing campaigns to raise awareness and promote food products as
well as initiatives aimed at providing consumers with relevant information concerning those
ES products; g) Providing information and perform studies and other actions necessary to adjust
and improve food production in order to meet market requirements and consumers
expectations; h) Protecting and promoting organic agriculture, integrated production and any
other production method that respects the environments as well as products recognised
under quality schemes; i) Drawing up of standard contracts in the agri-food sector that are
compatible with national and EU competition law; j) Promoting the adoption of measures to
regulate the offer in accordance with national and EU competition law; k) Conducting
collective negotiations on price whenever mandatory contracts are in place in accordance
with EU law; l) Developing methods for the control and optimal use of veterinary drugs, plant
protection products and other production factors with a view to guaranteeing product quality
and environmental protection; m) Carrying out initiatives that ultimately aim at a better
protection of the environment; n) Promoting the effectiveness of the different stages of the
food chain through actions that aim at improving energy efficiency, reducing the impact on

Page 34
 Study on agricultural interbranch organisations (IBOs) in the EU

MS Objectives
the environment or limit food waste all along the chain; o) Developing and carrying out
training activities to the benefit of all operators in the food chain to ensure competitiveness
of agricultural farms, food businesses and staff as well as attracting qualified young staff in
the food chain; p) Carrying out studies on sustainable production methods and market
trends, including in relation to prices and costs which, provided that they are objective,
transparent and verifiable and having regard of EU provisions that may apply to a specific
sector, may be used as a benchmark for price fixing in the context of private contractual
agreements; q) Developing and implementing training activities with a view to ensuring
better professional qualifications and prospects for those working in the agri-food sector; r)
Any other activity that EU law may foresee.
National legislation lists 8 different objectives that IBOs may pursue. Although shorter than
the list set in Regulation (EU) No 1308/2013, overall the objectives identified by EU and
FR national law appear to be same. However, the national list is not exhaustive as other
objectives may be included in the statutes of the IBOs: their validation/rejection is then
made during the recognition process.
National legislation requires IBOs to follow one or more of the following objectives: a)
Contributing to the design, formulation and implementation of the strategy and development
policies of all activities referred to in par. 1 and, more generally, the institutional support of
products in the markets; b) Defining specific issues and promoting the conclusion of
agreements amongst members for a limited period or for a certain geographical area or to
tackle temporary needs, particularly through the establishment of interbranch agreements or
rules of action, codes of conduct or rules of application of concerted practices, provided that
these do not conflict with national or EU legislation; c) Contributing to the organisation and
management of markets with transparency, better adaptation of products to quality
GR improvement programs, and better coordination of product distribution; d) Strengthening
measures for the safety of products, mainly of the agri-food sector, particularly through
product checks, for the protection of users and consumers, and the proper management of
quality marks issued by the Agency for the Certification and Supervision of Agricultural
Products (AGROCERT); e) The development of research, improvement of knowledge,
collection of information, towards the orientation of production to products that better
respond to market needs, consumer preferences and expectations, in particular as regards
the quality of products, soil and water protection and generally respect for the environment;
f) The promotion and protection of organic farming and designations of origin, geographical
indications and quality labels.
National legislation requires IBOs to follow at least one of amongs the objectives of
HU
Regulation (EU) No 1308/2013 which national legislation refers to
National legislation replicates verbatim the objectives that IBOs may pursue in accordance
HR
with Regulation (EU) No 1308/2013
National legislation does not list IBOs' objectives in detail but instead refers to those
IT
identified by EU law
National law does not list any specific IBOs' objectives but refers instead to those contained
LV
in Regulation (EC) No 1234/2007
Only national legislation regulating IBOs in the fruits and vegetables sector contains some
MT provisions in this area which refer to the objectives listed in Regulations (EC) No 1234/2007
and 1182/2007
National legislation requires IBOs to follow one or more of the objectives that such entities
NL
may pursue in accordance with Regulation (EU) No 1308/2013
PL No
Among the objectives that IBOs in the agri-food sector may pursue, national legislation lists
the following: a) Contributing towards an improved knowledge and transparency of markets,
namely through the production of statistical information and analysis of trends, as well as
towards the establishment of contractual relations between the relevant economic operators;
b) Promotion of research and development programmes in cooperation with competent
PT authorities responsible for research with a view to innovating and introducing the necessary
adjustments that markets may require; c) Organisation of campaigns aimed at the
promotion of agri-food products in national or external markets, namely with a view to
boosting consumer confidence and entering new markets; d) Ensuring quality control at the
stage of production, processing and storage of the final product; e) Encouraging the
performance of safety and quality controls; f) Contributing towards the protection of the

Page 35
 Study on agricultural interbranch organisations (IBOs) in the EU

MS Objectives
environment, notably by designing and implementing solutions that take into account
economic as well as environmental sustainability; g) Organisation of actions aimed at
ensuring an adequate balance between the offer and the demand in the sector of relevance;
h) Contributing towards the certification of the final product. National legislation regulating
IBOs in the forestry sector lists these additional objectives: a) Contributing and encouraging
the implementation of training programmes aimed at upgrading professional qualifications of
staff working in the forestry sector; b) Encouraging reutilisation of forestry products for
energy production with a view to ensuring an optimal management of energy sources as well
as environmental protection.
National legislation foresees that IBOs may pursue at least two of the following objectives: a)
Contributing towards the proper functioning of markets, by promoting certain products taking
into account quantitative and qualitative market needs; b) Ensuring the necessary
transparency for the proper functioning of the common organisation of agricultural markets;
c) Establishing standard contracts compatible with the EU law; d) Contributing towards the
decentralised application of national and EU agricultural policies; e) Strengthening food
safety, especially by ensuring traceability of products, by acting in the interest of users and
consumers; f) Improving knowledge regarding demand and offer, offer concentration and
coordination and commercialisation of products of the member producers; g) Establishing a
better exploitation of products, especially through marketing and market research, by
promoting the products on internal and external markets; h) Participation of the IBO’s
members in the elaboration of development strategies and programmes for the sector that
RO
they represent; i) Establishment of research projects and studies regarding new methods of
production, processing, distribution and market evolution; j) Development of methods and
instruments necessary to improve the quality of products during the production and
processing stages; k) Promoting certain integrated and ecological production practices and
technologies that ensure environmental protection; l) Exploiting the potential of organic
agriculture and designations of origin, of quality labels and of geographical indications and
protecting them; m) Providing member organisations with consultancy and training services
and protecting their interests vis-a-vis governmental and state administration bodies, as well
as peacefully settling disputes between member organisations; n) Establishing relations and
working in cooperation with national and foreign financing entities for contracting credits and
implementing certain programmes in order to ensure the development of viable and
competitive production units.
National guidelines developed by the competent authorities reproduce the objectives listed in
SK
Regulation (EU) No 1308/2013
Source: compiled by Arcadia International

IBOs’ legal status and governance

As already referred earlier, EU legislation does not lay down any specific provision with
regard to the legal status and governance of IBOs. On the other hand, national law
often regulates these aspects in detail.
With regard to IBOs’ legal status, in most Member States (notably, in Bulgaria, France,
Greece, Hungary, Italy, Spain, the Netherlands, Portugal and Romania), these
organisations are generally regarded, under national law, as associations and/or
foundations, i.e. legal persons of public interest or utility under private law.
In Austria and in Malta, on the other hand, national legislation considers them merely as
legal persons without further characterization.
In Cyprus and Croatia, although legislation is silent on this point, the documents required
for the purpose of their recognition suggest that IBOs could take on different legal forms,
including, for instance, that of a company, a cooperative society, an association or a
grouping of economic interest.
On the other hand, the national legislation of five Member States (Belgium, the Czech
Republic, Latvia, Poland and Slovakia) does not contain any provision with regard to
IBOs’ legal status.
A number of Member States associate specific rights and obligations with the status of
IBO that certain organisations may acquire. For instance, in France national law

Page 36
 Study on agricultural interbranch organisations (IBOs) in the EU

stipulates that competent authorities must consult IBOs whenever they review policies
that directly concern the sector in which those organisations operate. French law also
recognises to IBOs the right to join up forces under federative or associative structures in
order to pursue their objectives in a more effective and efficient manner.
As in France, in Romania, national law stipulates as well the right for IBOs to be
consulted by public authorities on policy matters of their interest; in addition to that,
IBOs may perform official tasks to the extent to which competent authorities delegate
powers to them to that effect.
Finally, in Portugal, national legislation regulating IBOs in the forestry sector provides
IBOs with the right to have access to media similarly to any other professional
association as well as their duty to cooperate with competent authorities in the
implementation of projects or actions concerning the sustainable development of forests.
With regard to IBOs’ governance, whilst the national legislation of the majority of
Member States does not contain any provision in that respect, in Bulgaria, France,
Greece, Hungary, Portugal, Spain and Romania national law regulates this area to a
varying degree.
In Bulgaria, for instance, because of their nature of legal persons of public interest,
national law requires IBOs to set up a General Assembly and an Executive Board as
management bodies of the organisation. Similar rules can be found in Romania where the
national legislation envisages as well the setting up of an Arbitration and an Audit Panel.
In France, national law allows IBOs to group their members under specialised
departments or sections based on common interests, which may focus, for instance, on
specific products within a broader product category, besides imposing the setting up of a
mediation body to address disputes within their membership.
Furthermore, Greece, Hungary, Portugal, Romania and Spain have all specific rules in
place regulating IBOs’ access by new members. However, whereas in Greece, Hungary
and Romania the national legislation simply foresees that the IBO’s statutes must
regulate the modalities under which new members may join the organisation, both
Portuguese and Spanish legislation recognise a right to join to organisations meeting
the representativeness criteria that are set by law for this purpose (on this aspect see
also below paragraph f). Interestingly, Portugal and Spain are also the only two Member
States whose national legislation expressly prescribes IBOs to ensure equal participation
of their members at the level of the governing bodies of the organisation.
Table 7 provides an overview of Member States’ national legislation with regard to legal
status and governance requirements for IBOs.

Table 7: Overview of Member States’ national legislation regulating legal status

and governance aspects of IBOs
MS IBOs legal status Governance requirements
AT Entities with legal personality No
BE No No
As any other non-profit association
Non-profit associations registered pursuant to the IBO must have a General Assembly
BG
national Non-Profit Legal Persons Act and an Executive Board as governing
bodies
Not specified though IBOs would be likely to be
CY No
registered companies or cooperative societies
CZ No No
DE Legal persons under private or public law No
National legislation foresees that IBOs'
Entities of public interest under private law with statutes must a) Regulate the
ES their own legal personality distinct from that of modalities of access for new members
their members as well as situations involving the
withdrawal from the IBO's

Page 37
 Study on agricultural interbranch organisations (IBOs) in the EU

MS IBOs legal status Governance requirements

membership; b) Guarantee IBO's
membership to new members that
fulfill certain minimum
representativeness criteria; c) Make
IBOs' agreements and decisions
binding on all members; d) Ensure
equal participation in the governance
of the IBO between the production
side, on the one hand, and the
remaining stages of the production
chain, on the other.
IBOs' members may be regrouped by
Not specified though most of them have the status activity and cooperate within sections
of associations in accordance with national law. responsible for one or more
IBOs may be consulted by public authorities when product(s). National legislation also
FR policies affecting their sector are being reviewed. foresees that IBOs' statutes must
They may join efforts in federations to pursue their foresee the establishment of a
objectives and authorise other IBOs to act on their mediation body with a view to settling
behalf for the achievement of specific goals. disputes that may arise between IBO's
members
National legislation foresees that IBOs'
GR Legal persons of public interest under private law statutes must regulate the modalities
of access for new members
National legislation stipulates that
IBOs must be organisations open to
HU Legal persons of public interest under private law
any relevant stakeholder willing to join
them
Not specified although they should be subject to
the regime that applies depending on their legal
HR No
form (e.g. association, cooperative, grouping of
economic interest)
IT Legal person of public interest under private law No
LV No No
Entities with their own legal personality distinct
MT No
from that of their members
Not specified although in practice they are
NL commonly associations or foundations i.e. legal No
entities of public interest under private law
PL No No
National legislation stipulates that
IBOs' statutes must a) Guarantee the
Legal persons of public interest under private law.
access to the IBO by any relevant
National legislation regulating IBOs in the forestry
national, regional or local organisation
sector lists rights and obligations of these entities.
in accordance with the
These include, among others, the possibility to
representativeness criteria defined by
PT access media similarly to professional associations
national law; b) Ensure equal
and the duty to cooperate with competent
participation of each professional
authorities in the implementation of projects or
branch taking part in the IBO at the
actions concerning the sustainable development of
level of its governing bodies; c)
forests.
Empower the governing bodies of the
IBOs to set fees for its members.
National legislation requires IBOs'
statutes to foresee the establishment
of the following governing bodies:
Legal persons of public interest under private law General Assembly, Board of Directors,
with the rights to be a) consulted in relation to Auditor Panel and Arbitration Panel.
RO definition, orientation and regulation of sectoral IBOs' statutes must also comply with
policies and b) delegated specific official tasks by certain minimum requirements as
competent authorities. regards their contents including, inter
alia, provisions defining rights and
obligations of the IBOs' members,
access to/withdrawal from the IBO

Page 38
 Study on agricultural interbranch organisations (IBOs) in the EU

MS IBOs legal status Governance requirements

membership, composition of the
governing bodies ensuring equal
participation of all members, decision-
making procedures and sanctions in
case of breach of the provisions of the
statutes.
SK No No
Source: compiled by Arcadia International

3.1.4. National rules governing IBOs’ recognition

As referred earlier on, Regulation (EU) No 1308/2013 sets out a number of requirements
with a view to regulating IBOs’ recognition by Member States. Amongst them, under this
section consideration is given, in particular, to that IBOs:
 May be established in all the agri-food sectors that are listed under Article 1 par. 2
of the regulation (Article 157 par. 1, first sentence) (sectoral scope); and
 Must perform their activities in one or more regions within the territory of the
Member State concerned (Article 158 par. 1, point b) or in the territory of more
than one Member State in the case of transnational IBOs pursuant to
Commission’s Regulation 2016/232/EU (geographical scope).
On the other hand, EU legislation does not contain any provision with regard to the
maximum number of IBOs that may be recognised at national level.
In addition to that, whenever IBOs are recognised at national level, Article 158 par. 5 of
Regulation (EU) No 1308/2013 requires Member States to have in place rules permitting:
 Withdrawal of recognition, whenever the conditions for recognition cease to
exist;
 Monitoring of IBOs activities by means of regular checks aimed at verifying
that IBOs duly comply with the conditions of recognition; and
 Application of sanctions in the event of non-compliances or irregularities that
may be attributable to IBOs in the context of the implementation of the
regulation, including the withdrawal of recognition, if necessary.
IBOs’ sectoral scope
Regarding IBOs sectoral scope, it has already been noted that several Member States -
amongst which Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, France, Italy, Hungary, the
Netherlands and Poland – have regulated this issue at national level in full accordance
with Regulation (EU) No 1308/2013.
National legislation in Germany provides for a list of sectors broader than the list in that
Regulation, although it explicitly excludes wine as this product is subject to a specific
regulatory regime at national level.
On the other hand, national legislation in Greece, Malta, Portugal, Romania and Spain
refers to the possibility of establishing IBOs in the agri-food sector as a whole, however
without further defining the specific sub-sectors that may be concerned.
Finally, the national legislation in the Czech Republic, Latvia and Slovakia presently
provides for the legal basis for the setting of IBOs solely in the milk and milk products
sector.

IBO’s geographical scope

Concerning the geographical scope within which IBOs may operate, seven Member
States appear to have laid down provisions in this area in line with Article 158 par. 1,
point (b) of Regulation (EU) No 1308/2013, which allows recognition of IBOs operating in
one or more regions in the territory concerned.

Page 39
 Study on agricultural interbranch organisations (IBOs) in the EU

As already mentioned above, in Spain the competence for recognising national and
regional IBOs lies respectively with the competent authorities of the central government
and those of the Autonomous Communities that have developed legislation on IBOs.
In Italy, in spite of the fact that one Region has legislation in place for the recognition of
IBOs, the competent authorities at central level are of the view that granting of
recognition is their sole competence and have clarified that in the new framework for
IBOs that was adopted in 2015.
In Hungary, on the other hand, the national legislation provides for the establishment of
IBOs only if they have national relevance. The legislation of Austria, Bulgaria Cyprus, the
Czech Republic, Latvia, Malta and Slovakia does not contain any specific provision in this
regard.
In no Member State there seems to exist provisions dealing with the establishment of
transnational IBOs.

Number of IBOs
The national legislation of most Member States does not provide for any specific
restrictions as to the maximum number of IBOs that may be established within a sector
or a market segment identifiable via a product or a product category.
In the remaining Member States (i.e. France, Greece, Hungary, Malta, Portugal and
Spain), the general rule is that only one IBO may be established. However, the national
legislation of the Member States under consideration differs considerably as to the
relevant sector and/or specific market segment that must be taken into account for this
purpose.
Accordingly, national law in France, Greece, Hungary and Portugal stipulates that only
one IBO may be set up for each product or product category. On the other hand, Spanish
legislation makes reference to the sector or the product category, whilst Maltese law
refers only to product category. Finally, in Italy, the national legislation takes into
account the whole range of terms (i.e. sector, product and product category).
For the purpose of IBO’s recognition and in accordance with the national legislation of
France, Portugal and Spain, products that are recognised under EU quality schemes or of
a certified quality must be considered as self-standing products as opposed to similar
products manufactured through conventional production and processing methods.
Table 8 provides an overview of the sectoral and geographical scope that IBOs may have
in accordance with Member States’ legislation, in addition to any restriction that national
laws impose with regard to the maximum number of IBOs allowed per sector, product
and/or product category.

Table 8: Overview of Member States’ legislation regulating sectors in which

IBOs may be set up, their geographical coverage and the maximum number of
such organisations allowed
MS Sectors Geographical dimension
AT All sectors covered by Regulation (EU) No 1308/2013 No
All sectors covered by Regulation (EU) No 1308/2013
BE National and Regional
except sugar
All sectors covered by Regulation (EU) No 1308/2013 that
BG No
are relevant to national economy
CY All sectors listed in national legislation No
CZ Milk and milk products No
All sectors that are listed in national legislation with the
DE National and Regional
exception of wine which is subject to a special regime

ES All agricultural products including animal husbandry, National and Regional

forestry and fishery as well as their processing and

Page 40
 Study on agricultural interbranch organisations (IBOs) in the EU

MS Sectors Geographical dimension

marketing
All sectors covered by Regulation (EU) No 1308/2013,
FR National and Regional
including fishery sector
Agricultural, agri-food, fishery and forestry sectors as
GR National and Regional
defined by national law
HU All sectors covered by Regulation (EU) No 1308/2013 National
All sectors covered by Regulation (EU) No 1308/2013 that
HR No
are relevant to national economy
IT All sectors covered by Regulation (EU) No 1308/2013 National and Regional
LV Milk and milk products No
MT Agriculture and fishery sectors as defined by national law No
All sectors covered by Regulation (EU) No 1308/2013 that
NL National and Regional
are relevant to national economy
All sectors covered by Regulation (EU) No 1308/2013
PL No
except fruits and vegetables
Agricultural, agri-food and forestry sectors as defined by
PT National and Regional
national law
Agricultural and agri-food sectors as defined by national
RO National and Regional
law
SK Milk and milk products No
Source: compiled by Arcadia International

Withdrawal
Most Member States have currently in place provisions empowering competent
authorities to withdraw recognition from an IBO, whenever the conditions for
recognition are no longer fulfilled or in case of non-compliances with legal requirements
applying to IBOs. In Greece and Poland the withdrawal of recognition may be used as a
sanction against irregularities or non-compliances attributable to IBOs.
Only Austria and Belgium, two Member States with no recognised IBOs at present, have
no specific provisions on withdrawal of recognition set in their national legislation.

Monitoring
Most Member States have currently in place provisions enabling competent authorities to
supervise IBOs’ activities.
In accordance with national legislation, supervision by competent authorities may
consist of a different activities, which may range from the obligation for IBOs to submit
to competent authorities annual activity reports and financial statements (for instance, in
France, Greece, the Netherlands, Portugal and Romania) to the performance of on-site
inspections (for instance, in Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Croatia and Spain).
However, the national legislation in Belgium, Germany, Italy, Latvia and Malta does not
provide for detailed requirements on how IBOs’ monitoring should be performed by
competent authorities. Austria, Cyprus and Slovakia are the only Member States where
no explicit provisions on IBOs’ monitoring by competent authorities exist at present.
Sanctions
In relation to sanctions for infringements of legal requirements applying to IBOs
and with the exception of the possibility to withdraw recognition, the majority of Member
States (Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, France, Germany, Latvia, Portugal, Romania and
Slovakia) appears not to have specific provisions in place for the imposition of financial
penalties.
On the other hand, provisions establishing sanctions for non-compliance with
requirements applicable to IBOs exist in Croatia, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Italy,
Malta, the Netherlands and Spain. However, in Italy, the national legislation sets out the

Page 41
 Study on agricultural interbranch organisations (IBOs) in the EU

amount of the applicable financial penalties only for situations involving the violation by
non-members of IBOs’ rules that are subject to extension. Similar provisions exist also in
the Netherlands. The national legislation in Cyprus refers to sanctions as well although it
does not specify their nature and amount.

Competent authorities
For sake of completeness, it is worth noting that the legislation of all Member States with
a national framework on IBOs clearly identifies the competent authorities that are
responsible for granting and withdrawing recognition. Generally, where national
legislation provides for sanctions for violation of legal requirements applicable to IBOs,
the competent authorities that are in charge of recognition and withdrawal procedures
have also enforcement powers.
In the large majority of Member States these functions have been allocated to a single
competent authority, which is, in most cases, the ministerial entity responsible for
agriculture, rural development and/or food policy.
There are, however, some exceptions. In Germany, for instance, recognition of IBOs is
a competence of the Ministry of Justice and Consumer protection, which is assisted in this
task by a privatised entity. In France, the Ministry of Agriculture, Agri-food and Forestry
is responsible for recognition of IBOs and is assisted in this task by the Ministry for the
Economy and Finance. In the Netherlands, the competent authority for granting IBO’s
recognition is the Ministry of Economic Affairs. In Poland and in Slovakia, on the other
hand, two distinct competent authorities are involved in the recognition procedure of
IBOs pursuant to national law. Finally, with regard to Spain, national and regional
legislation designate the respective competent authorities, when it comes to recognition
of IBOs. The national competent authorities, in particular, run broad consultations on
recognition and withdrawal via the General Council for IBOs, a body which is composed
by representatives of several other authorities, the Autonomous Communities as well as
consumer organisations.
Table 9 provides an overview of the applicable Member States’ legislation concerning
withdrawal of recognition, sanctions for non-compliances by IBOs and competent
authorities for recognition, withdrawal and enforcement.
Table 9: Overview of national provisions with regard to withdrawal of
recognition, applicable sanctions in case of violation of legal requirements
applying to IBOs and competent authorities responsible for recognition,
withdrawal and enforcement
National
Sanctions for violation of IBOs'
MS provisions on Competent Authority
requirements
withdrawal
AT No No Agramarkt Austria
Ministry of Agriculture in both
BE No No
Wallonia and Flanders
BG Yes No Ministry of Agriculture and Food
Yes though type and amount of Ministry of Agriculture, Rural
CY Yes
sanction is not specified Development and Environment
Yes sanctions for the violation of
requirements of the common
CZ Yes market organisation apply in this State Agriculture Intervention Fund
case with penalties up to EUR
37,000.
Ministry of Justice and Consumer
DE Yes No
Protection and Juris GmbH
Yes, depending on the Ministry of Agriculture, Food and
seriousness, they may range from Environment (National IBOs) and
EUR 3 to 3,000,000. For the most the competent authorities of the
ES Yes
serious offences, the withdrawal of Autonomous Communities with
recognition is foreseen as an legislation in this area (Regional
ancillary sanction. IBOs)

Page 42
 Study on agricultural interbranch organisations (IBOs) in the EU

National
Sanctions for violation of IBOs'
MS provisions on Competent Authority
requirements
withdrawal
Ministry of Agriculture, Agri-food
FR Yes No and Forestry and Ministry for the
Economy and Finance
No financial sanctions but
temporary or permanent Ministry of Rural Development and
GR Yes
withdrawal of recognition may be Food
used for this purpose
Yes. National provisions set out
sanctions for violations of
EU/national requirements by IBOs
HU Yes and/or for violation of IBOs' rules Ministry of Agriculture
by members and non-members
(including the non-payment of
fees).
Yes, depending on the
seriousness, they may range from
HR Yes Ministry of Agriculture
EUR 3,900 to 6,500
approximately.
Yes though national legislation
sets them only for the violations of
Ministry of Agriculture, Food and
IT Yes extension of rules by non-
Forestry
members within the range EUR
1,000 to 50,000
LV Yes No Ministry of Agriculture
Yes though only national
legislation regulating IBOs in the
fruits and vegetables sector
currently foresees sanctions Ministry for Sustainable
MT Yes ranging from a minimum of EUR Development, the Environment and
1,500 to a maximum of EUR Climate Change
2,329.37 for any single violation of
the national or EU provisions
applicable to the concerned IBO
Yes though national legislation
sets them only for the violations of
NL Yes Ministry of Economic Affairs
extension of rules and non-
payment of fees by non-members
No financial sanctions but Local offices of the Agricultural
PL Yes withdrawal of recognition may be Market Agency and Ministry of
used for this purpose Agriculture
Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and
PT Yes No
Rural Development
Ministry of Agriculture and Rural
RO Yes No
Development
Agricultural Paying Agency and
SK Yes No Ministry of Agriculture and Rural
Development
Source: compiled by Arcadia International

3.1.5. National rules on agreements, decisions and concerted practices by IBOs, including
approval by competent authorities and extension of rules and fees to non-members
Regulation (EU) No 1308/2013 does not contain any detailed provisions which content
agreements, decisions and concerted practices that IBOs may negotiate within their
membership. However, IBOs will be able to conclude agreements or adopt decisions
within the objectives they pursue, as exemplified in Article 157 Regulation (EU) No
1308/2013. Limits to the content of IBO agreements are however set by Article 210 (4)
which stipulates that IBO agreements cannot entail price fixing, quota allocation and lists
other practices which would be considered incompatible with the Union rules.

Page 43
 Study on agricultural interbranch organisations (IBOs) in the EU

Article 164 par. 1 allows Member States to extend the rules of an IBO, for a limited
period of time, to other operators that are not members of the IBO and that act within its
economic area(s), provided that the IBO is considered as representative of the
production, the processing or the trade of a given product. For this purpose, economic
area is defined as a geographical zone made up of adjoining or neighbouring production
regions in which production and marketing conditions are homogenous (Article 164 par.
2).
Article 164 par. 4 specifies for which rules IBOs may request the competent authorities of
a Member State to grant an extension. Accordingly, these rules may have different
objectives, ranging from production and market reporting, the elaboration of standard
contracts, studies to improve product quality to animal health, plant health and food
safety. In any event, they must not:
 Cause any damage to other operators in the Member State granting the
recognition or at EU level;
 Produce any undesired effects on free competition, thereby complying with Article
210 par. 4; and
 Be incompatible with applicable EU or national law.
Furthermore, extensions of rules granted by Member States are subject to official
publication at national level, whilst any decision taken by Member States in this context
is to be notified to the European Commission (Article 164 par. 5 and 6).
Finally, whenever the rules of an IBO agreement have been extended in accordance with
Article 164, Regulation (EU) No 1308/2013 provides as well for the possibility that, upon
request of the concerned IBO, the payment of all or part of the fees intended to cover
the costs directly occasioned by the activities undertaken by the IBO is extended to non-
members (Article 165).

IBO’s agreements
The national legislation of a few Member States (Bulgaria, France, Germany, Greece,
Portugal, Romania, Spain and Slovakia) includes some general provisions empowering
IBOs to negotiate and conclude agreements, decisions and concerted practices. In such a
context, the national legislation in Romania stands out as the only one portraying the
potential benefits that the implementation of agreements, decisions and concerted
practices by IBOs, in fact, may bring about and namely the creation of a stable,
predictable and competitive business environment in accordance with consumers'
expectations.
Furthermore, the legislation of some countries (Bulgaria, France, Germany, Greece,
Spain and Slovakia) clearly defines the boundaries that such agreements must respect in
terms, for instance, of competition law and/or overall compatibility with national and EU
law For instance, in Germany national law expressly prohibits IBOs to conclude
agreements involving price fixing, whereas, in accordance with Spanish law, IBOs’
agreements must be compatible with EU and national competition law and notified to
competent authorities one month following their adoption.
No provisions regarding IBOs’ agreements are currently laid in the national legislation of
five Member States (namely, Austria, Cyprus, Croatia, the Czech Republic and Latvia).
In Poland, the current legal framework only provides for the legal basis for the adoption
of implementing rules in this area at national level.

Page 44
 Study on agricultural interbranch organisations (IBOs) in the EU

Approval of IBOs’ agreements by competent authorities

Rules regulating competent authorities’ approval of agreements, decisions and
concerted practices concluded by IBOs appear to exist only in a limited number of
Member States.
Portugal and Romania are the Member States with the more detailed framework in this
area. In both countries, the national competent authorities may approve only
agreements that have the form of standard contracts and joint actions aiming, for
instance, at ensuring product quality or environmental protection or at promoting a
certain product or sector. Whilst in Portugal agreements approved by the competent
authorities are subject to publication in the national official journal, in Romania national
law requires a public consultation before any approval is granted.
Spanish legislation, on the other hand, does not specify the agreements that may be
subject to approval by the national competent authorities, but simply stipulates that the
approval must be given through ministerial order.
France and Greece are the two other Member States where the approval of IBOs’
agreements, decisions and concerted practices is regulated to some extent.

Extension of rules to non-members

In several Member States (notably, in Bulgaria, Cyprus, Croatia, the Czech Republic,
Germany, Latvia, Poland and Slovakia) the national legislation currently does not lay
down any specific provision with regard to the approval by competent authorities of the
extension of rules of IBOs’ agreements to non-members.
The same could be observed in relation to Austria, although the competent authorities of
this Member State make a point of the direct applicability of the provisions of Regulation
(EU) No 1308/2013. In the case of Belgium and Hungary, the respective national
legislation explicitly refers to the applicability of Article 164 Regulation (EU) No
1308/2013.
As to the remaining Member States - i.e. France, Greece, Italy, Malta, the Netherlands,
Portugal, Romania and Spain – the respective national legislation has laid down rules that
implement and/or further specify the requirements set by EU law as regards the granting
of extension of rules.
For instance, in France the national legislation allows the extension of rules of an
agreement concluded by an IBO, whenever that agreement meets, at the same time, the
following conditions:
 Involves joint actions or serves the interests of the sector as well as the general
interest;
 Is compatible with EU law; and
 Is the result of the unanimous decision of all members of the IBO?
Spanish legislation, on the other hand, allows the granting of an extension - in full or in
part and, in any event, for no more than 5 years marketing campaigns - provided that
the following conditions are simultaneously met:
 The activities covered by the agreement for which the extension is sought are
relevant to the general objectives pursued by the IBO;
 The IBO requesting the extension is considered as being representative pursuant
to national law (75%); and
 The agreement has obtained the endorsement of the majority of IBOs members
that is required by national law (i.e. at least 50% of each professional branch
composing the IBO).

Page 45
 Study on agricultural interbranch organisations (IBOs) in the EU

Finally, in Italy the extension of IBOs’ rules is subject to the verification of the following
conditions:
 The agreement for which the extension is sought applies for a limited period of
time;
 The IBO meets the representativeness criteria fixed by Article 164 par. 3 (ii) of
Regulation (EU) No 1308/2013; and
 The agreement has the support of the majority of IBOs members that is required
by national law (85%).
Extension of fees to non-members
Non-members are economic actors present in the different stages of the supply chain
which are represented in the IBO but which are not members of the IBO.
Similarly to what observed in relation to the extension of rules, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus,
the Czech Republic, Germany, Latvia, Poland and Slovakia do not have any national
provision with regard to the extension of fees to non-members.
On the other hand, the national legislation in Hungary, the Netherlands and Italy
explicitly refers to Article 165 of Regulation (EU) No 1308/2013. Austria does not have
any national provisions for the extension of fees, but the competent authorities make a
point of the abovementioned provision as being directly applicable. Furthermore, Maltese
and Belgian legislation both reflect, to a large extent, the wording of Article 165.
In Greece, Portugal and Spain, which all have adopted legislation on IBOs prior to the
entry into force of Regulation (EU) No 1308/2013, the national provisions on the
extension of fees are very similar. Overall, national competent authorities may grant the
extension of fees only under the following circumstances:
 The extension of fees to non-members is solicited in the context of an IBO
agreement that has been approved and whose rules have been extended pursuant
to national law; and
 The fees imposed on non-members are proportionate to the costs deriving from
the implementation of the activities planned and exclusively intended for their
financing.
Also in France, the national legislation allows the extension of fees only in the context of
IBOs’ agreements whose rules have been extended to non-members. Notwithstanding
their mandatory nature, under national law the fees due by non-members to IBOs are
regarded as private claims and generally known as ''mandatory voluntary fees''.
Italy, the Netherlands and Portugal are the only Member States whose national
framework provides for sanctions for the non-payment of fees by non-members. In
Italy, for instance depending on their seriousness, sanctions may range from EUR 1,000
EUR up to 50,000. In Portugal, instead, the national legislation on IBOs in the forestry
sector foresees financial penalties from a minimum of EUR 125 up to a maximum of EUR
1,870, if the perpetrator is a natural person or EUR 22,445 in case the conduct is
attributable to a legal person. In the Netherlands, the law states that the IBO that wants
to have fees extended to non-members must have in its statutes the possibility of
imposing sanctions on those who are subject to the mandatory payment in case of non-
payment. With the formal application for the extension of fees, the IBO must indicate
how it will sanction non-payment. The same applies to extension of rules.
Table 10 provides an overview of Member States’ legislation with regard to existing rules
on IBOs’ agreements, approval of IBOs’ agreements by competent authorities and
possibility of extending their rules and related fees to non-members.

Page 46
 Study on agricultural interbranch organisations (IBOs) in the EU

Table 10: Overview of national provisions regulating IBO’s agreements, their approval by competent authority, extension of rules and fees
Sanctions for non-
Granting of the extension of members
Approval of agreements by Granting of the extension of fees to
MS Rules on IBOs agreements rules to non-members by infringing
competent authorities non-members by competent authorities
competent authorities extensions or rules
and/or fees
AT No No No though relevant provisions of No though relevant provisions of No
Regulation (EU) No 1308/2013 Regulation (EU) No 1308/2013 are
are regarded as directly regarded as directly applicable
applicable
BE National legislation does not No National legislation expressly National legislation sets out that the No
contain any specific requirements refers to the relevant provisions fees imposed on non-members a) must
for IBOs agreements except for of Regulation (EU) No be intended solely for the financing of
the granting of the extension of 1308/2013 in this respect the activities covered by the request of
rules and fees to non-members by extension submitted by an IBO and b)
competent authorities cannot exceed the total budget foreseen
for the implementation of those
activities
BG National legislation foresees an No No No No
obligation for IBOs to notify
agreements, decisions and
concerted practices to competent
authorities so that they can be
notified to the European
Commission and assessed against
the criteria laid down in Article 210
par. 4 Regulation (EU) No
1308/2013
CY No No No No No
CZ No No No No No
DE National legislation does not No No No No
contain any specific requirement in
this respect with the exception of
the activities that national law
prohibits IBOs to perform (e.g.
agreements or practices involving
price fixing)

Page 47
 Study on agricultural interbranch organisations (IBOs) in the EU

Sanctions for non-

Granting of the extension of members
Approval of agreements by Granting of the extension of fees to
MS Rules on IBOs agreements rules to non-members by infringing
competent authorities non-members by competent authorities
competent authorities extensions or rules
and/or fees
ES National legislation stipulates that IBO's agreements may be National legislation allows such National legislation allows so provided National legislation
IBOs' agreements must be approved by competent an extension, in full or in part, that certain conditions are met, i.e. if foresees the
compatible with EU and national authorities through provided that certain conditions the extension concerns an agreement application of
competition law and sets out the ministerial order. Approved are met, i.e. if the activity/ies that has been approved and whose rules financial sanctions
obligation for IBOs to notify them agreements are recorded in covered by the agreement is have been extended pursuant to whenever non-
to the competent authorities no the national IBOs' register. /are relevant to the general national law and if the fees are members do not
later than one month from their objectives pursued by the IBO proportionate to the costs deriving from pay the fees that
adoption and if the criteria regarding the the implementation of the activities have been
level of support expressed by planned, solely intended for the extended pursuant
IBOs' members vis-a-vis the financing of such activities and do not to national law.
agreement as well as the IBO's discriminate against IBO's members Deepening on the
minimum representativeness amount of the fees
that national law requires for due, the sanctions
this purpose are complied with. may range from a
When granted, extensions of minimum of 3 EUR
rules cannot exceed 5 years or to a maximum of
marketing campaigns. They are 3,000,000 EUR
adopted through ministerial
order and published in the
national official journal.
FR National law lists the agreements Yes National legislation allows so National legislation allows so in the No
that can be concluded by IBOs. provided that certain conditions context of agreements whose rules have
These include, for instance the are met, i.e. if the agreement in been extended to non-members.
elaboration of standard contracts question involves joint actions Notwithstanding their mandatory
and monitoring of their use, the or serves the interests of the nature, IBOs' fees are regarded as
development and dissemination of sector as well as the general private claims under national law and
statistical information and market interest, is compatible with EU therefore called ''mandatory voluntary
trends and the adoption of law and has been adopted fees''. Competent authorities may
labelling rules for the provision of unanimously by all members of provide assistance to IBOs for the
country-of-origin information. the IBO. Agreements consisting calculation of fees.
of standard contracts for which
an extension is solicited may be
subject to scrutiny of the
national competition authority
before the relevant extension is

Page 48
 Study on agricultural interbranch organisations (IBOs) in the EU

Sanctions for non-

Granting of the extension of members
Approval of agreements by Granting of the extension of fees to
MS Rules on IBOs agreements rules to non-members by infringing
competent authorities non-members by competent authorities
competent authorities extensions or rules
and/or fees
granted. The granting of an
extension takes generally the
form of an administrative
decision. IBO's agreements for
which extensions are granted
are not subject to the national
rules implementing Articles 101
and 102 TFUE.
GR National law foresees the IBOs agreements cannot National legislation allows such National legislation allows the imposition No
possibility for IBOs to conclude enter into force if the an extension, in full or in part, of fees to non-members in the context
agreements between their national competent so provided that certain of an agreement that has been
members and the obligation for authorities or the European conditions are met, i.e. if the approved whose rules have been
IBOs to notify them to the Commission finds them IBO meets the extended pursuant to national law. In
competent authorities so that the incompatible with national or representativeness this case, fees must be proportionate to
latter can assess them. They must EU law. To this end, they are requirements set by national the costs and benefits of the services
also be notified to the European notified and assessed by the law for this purpose, the provided in the implementation of the
Commission when required by EU competent authorities during agreement in question has been agreement and must not cover
law a two-month period. The adopted unanimously by IBO's administrative expenditure
assessment considers members, applies for at least
whether the agreement fulfil one marketing campaign and
a number of conditions, i.e. does not entail any
the functioning of the discrimination or elimination of
common market competition with regard to a
organisation is not affected, substantial part of the market
competition is not distorted concerned. When granted,
or eliminated with regard to extensions of rules cannot
a substantial part of the exceed 3 years.
concerned market, fixing of
prices is not involved,
overall compatibility with EU
or national law is ensured.

Page 49
 Study on agricultural interbranch organisations (IBOs) in the EU

Sanctions for non-

Granting of the extension of members
Approval of agreements by Granting of the extension of fees to
MS Rules on IBOs agreements rules to non-members by infringing
competent authorities non-members by competent authorities
competent authorities extensions or rules
and/or fees
HU National legislation refers to the No National legislation refers to the National legislation refers to the Yes
relevant provisions of Regulation relevant provisions of relevant provisions of Regulation (EU)
(EU) No 1308/2013 without any Regulation (EU) No 1308/2013 No 1308/2013 without any further
further specification without any further specification specification

HR No No No No No
IT National legislation does not lay No National legislation allows so National legislation allows so with a view Sanctions in the
down any specific requirements provided that certain conditions to financing IBOs' institutional form of financial
with regard to IBOs' agreements are met, i.e. if the agreement objectives and, in particular, the penalties may
except for the granting of the applies for a limited period of promotion of the relevant sector, range from 1,000
extension of rules and fees to non- time and is supported by the product or product category. The limits EUR to 50,000
members by competent authorities majority of IBOs members set by Article 165 Regulation (EU) No EUR, having
required by national law and if 1308/2013 apply in this context. regard to the
the IBO meets the seriousness of the
representativeness criteria fixed violation. When a
by Regulation (EU) No non-member does
1308/2013 for this purpose not comply with
IBOs’ rules
regarding the
application of
standard contracts
that regulate the
purchase of agri-
food products, the
application of a
sanction
amounting to 10%
of the value of the
contracts
concluded in
breach of those
rules is envisaged.

Page 50
 Study on agricultural interbranch organisations (IBOs) in the EU

Sanctions for non-

Granting of the extension of members
Approval of agreements by Granting of the extension of fees to
MS Rules on IBOs agreements rules to non-members by infringing
competent authorities non-members by competent authorities
competent authorities extensions or rules
and/or fees
LV No No No No
MT National legislation does not lay No "National legislation allows so
down any specific requirements provided that certain conditions
with regard to IBOs' agreements are met, i.e. if the agreement
except for the granting of the concerns one of activities
extension of rules and fees to non- identified by national law (e.g.
members by competent authorities drawing up of standard
in the fruits and vegetables sector contracts, adoption of marketing
rules, protection of the
environment, promotion of
organic farming and quality
schemes), has been applied for
at least one marketing year, its
duration does not exceed three
marketing years and its
implementation does not cause
any harm to other business
operators in Malta
NL National legislation does not No As a general rule, national National legislation allows so in Non-members
foresee any specific requirements legislation sets out that the accordance with the relevant provisions may be subject to
with regards to agreements extension of rules of IBOs' of Regulation (No) 1308/2013 sanctions for the
concluded by IBOs except for the agreements may be granted non-payment of
granting of the extension of rules only in case of agreements that the fees that have
and fees to non-members pursue IBOs' objectives as listed been extended to
under Regulation 1308/2013 them.
and provided that the freedom
of entrepreneurship is not
limited in a disproportionate
manner. The extension of
private quality schemes is not
possible in this context. Also,
the relevant provisions of
Regulation (EU) No 1308/2013
are explicitly referred to.

Page 51
 Study on agricultural interbranch organisations (IBOs) in the EU

Sanctions for non-

Granting of the extension of members
Approval of agreements by Granting of the extension of fees to
MS Rules on IBOs agreements rules to non-members by infringing
competent authorities non-members by competent authorities
competent authorities extensions or rules
and/or fees
PL Currently national law does not No No No No
contain any specific requirements
in relation to the agreements that
IBOs may conclude except for the
legal basis for the adoption of
national implementing rules with
regard to the procedure for the
granting of the extension of rules
by competent authorities
PT National legislation allows IBOs to Competent authorities may National legislation allows so in
conclude agreements between approve only certain relation to agreements
their members agreements that have the approved by competent Only national
form of a) Standard authorities provided that certain legislation
contracts or conditions are met, i.e. if the regulating IBOs in
b) Joint actions designed, agreement applies at least to the forestry sector
among others, to ensure one marketing campaign and foresees sanctions
product quality, does not give rise to any market for the violation of
environmental protection or compartmentalisation or National legislation allows the imposition rules of IBOs’
the promotion of a certain practice involving fixing of of fees to non-members in the context agreements that
product or sector. The prices, entail discriminations or of an agreement that has been have been
agreements approved are eliminate competition with approved whose rules have been extended. These
subject to publication in the regard to a substantial part of extended pursuant to national law. In may range from a
national official journal and the market concerned as well as this case, fees must be proportionate to minimum of 125
recorded in the national if the minimum criteria set by the costs and benefits of the services EUR up to a
IBOs' register. national law for IBO's provided in the implementation of the maximum of 1,870
representativeness and the level agreement. EUR, if the
of support expressed by the perpetrator is a
IBOs' members vis-a-vis the natural person; or
agreement are met. National 22,445 EUR in
legislation on IBOs in the case the conduct
forestry sector lays down more is attributable to a
stringent requirements in this legal person.
respect.

Page 52
 Study on agricultural interbranch organisations (IBOs) in the EU

Sanctions for non-

Granting of the extension of members
Approval of agreements by Granting of the extension of fees to
MS Rules on IBOs agreements rules to non-members by infringing
competent authorities non-members by competent authorities
competent authorities extensions or rules
and/or fees
RO National legislation allows IBOs to National legislation foresee National legislation allows so The competent authorities may grant No
conclude agreements between that only certain agreements provided that certain conditions the extension of fees to non-members
their members with a view to may be subject to approval are met, i.e. if the agreement whenever an IBO requests so following
facilitating the creation of a stable by competent authorities for which extension is sought for the extension of rules of one of its
and predictable business and notably agreements that covers one of the activities agreements
environment by developing a have the form of standard listed under national law (e.g.
competitive agri-food sector in contracts, conventions or reporting on the production and
accordance with consumers' joint actions in the context market; stricter production rules
expectations. of the objectives that IBOs than those established by EU or
may pursue. IBOs' national norms; elaboration of
agreements for which standard contracts compatible
approval is sought for are with EU provisions;
subject to public development of marketing
consultation and, if rules; environmental protection
approved, subsequently etc.), has been applicable for at
recorded in the national least one marketing campaign,
IBOs' register. applies for a limited period of
time and does not impact
adversely other operators in
Romania or in the EU market.
Before granting the extension,
competent authorities must run
a public consultation.
SK National legislation only provides No No No No
that IBOs' agreements must not
be in breach of EU law
Source: compiled by Arcadia International

Page 53
 Study on agricultural interbranch organisations (IBOs) in the EU

3.1.5. National rules on representativeness

Regulation (EU) No 1308/2013 considers that IBOs must be representative of the
economic activities of production, processing and trade. The criterion of
representativeness is reflected in:
 The requirements governing IBOs recognition and namely the significant share
of the economic activities represented within the IBO that is required for the
purpose of the recognition by the competent authorities of a Member State
(Article 158 par. 1 point c); and
 The requirements that regulate the extension of an agreement concluded by an
IBO, i.e. the mechanism whereby an IBO’s agreement may benefit from an
extension of rules and fees to non-members, as long as the IBO is
considered as representative (Article 164 par. 1).
The concept of “significant share” is not further elaborated in EU legislation and, thus,
leaves Member States free to define it. In contrast, EU provisions governing extension of
rules and fees set out specific requirements with regard to IBO’s representativeness.
More precisely, Article 164 par. 3 (a) point (ii) stipulates that an IBO is to be regarded as
representative where, in the economic area(s) where it operates, it accounts at least for
two thirds of the volume of production, processing and/or trade of the
product(s) concerned. Moreover, Article 164 par. 3 stipulates that, whenever
determining such a proportion gives rise to practical difficulties, Member States may lay
down national rules with a view to establishing the level of representativeness required
for the granting of an extension of rules. As it will be shown below, some Member States
availed of this possibility.
Regulation (EU) No 1308/2013 does not contain any specific provision regulating the
access to IBOs by other organisations. Nevertheless, as already referred above, in Spain
and Portugal, the national legislation establishes specific representativeness criteria that,
if met, guarantee the concerned organisations the right to join the IBO of interest.

Representativeness for the purpose of recognition

Several Member States have further elaborated and defined the concept of ‘significant
share’ provided for by Regulation (EU) No 1308/2013 through national provisions. The
representativeness criteria laid down under national law appear to vary to a significant
extent from one Member State to another and sometimes with different thresholds being
set depending on the sector (for instance, Bulgaria and Italy with regard to the
establishment of IBOs in the milk and milk products sector).
For instance, the national legislation in Spain currently requires organisations seeking
recognition as IBOs to demonstrate that they account for at least 51% of the concerned
production with regard to each professional branch part of the IBO within the
geographical area where the organisation operates. In Austria the threshold is the same
as in Spain, whilst, for instance, in the Netherlands, Greece and Italy is lower
(respectively, 25%, 33% and 40%). In Malta, the threshold required by the national
legislation governing the establishment of IBOs in the fruits and vegetables sector
appears to be the highest in absolute terms (66%).
Recent legislative developments in some Member States in this area seem to point out to
the existence of different national approaches. Indeed, in Italy, the recent revision of the
legal framework applicable to IBOs (2015) has resulted, among others, in the lowering of
the representativeness threshold required for the recognition of such organisations (i.e.
from 50% to 40% for IBOs in any agri-food sector other than the milk and milk products
sector). Conversely, in Spain, the most recent revision of the national legislation on IBOs
(2013) has resulted in an increase of the threshold required for the purpose of IBOs’
recognition (i.e. from 35% to 50%).
In certain Member States (Bulgaria, Portugal and Romania), the significant share of the
economic activities that is required for the purpose of IBOs’ recognition is coupled as
necessary with other additional criteria or requirements that, generally, concern the

Page 54
 Study on agricultural interbranch organisations (IBOs) in the EU

representativeness of the membership of the IBO to be constituted. Accordingly, in

Portugal the membership of IBOs must represent 20% of the total number of economic
operators involved in the economic activities covered by the IBO, whilst in Romania one
third of the professional organisations that operate in a given sector must be represented
in the future IBO.
Finally, in a few Member States (Belgium, Croatia, France, Germany and Poland), the
national legislation either simply refers to the relevant provisions of Regulation (EU) No
1308/2013 or mirrors their wording. In Latvia, the representativeness criteria are laid
down only with regard to the recognition of IBOs in the milk and milk products sector and
modelled on the provisions of Regulation (EU) No 1234/2007.

Representativeness for the purpose of the extension of rules

No national provisions setting representativeness criteria can obviously be found in the
national legislation of those Member States that do not allow the extension of rules of
IBOs’ agreements (i.e. Bulgaria, Cyprus, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Germany, Latvia,
Poland and Slovakia). Similarly, no representativeness thresholds appear to have been
set by national law in Malta and Romania.
As to the remaining Member States, the legislation of some of them explicitly refers to
the relevant provisions of Regulation (EU) No 1308/2013, which means that the
threshold of two thirds set in Article 164 par. 3 a) point (ii) applies. This is the case of
Belgium, Hungary and the Netherlands. In Austria, the national legislation does not
provide for such a reference, but the competent authorities regard the provisions of the
regulation as directly applicable.
On the other hand, the national legislation in France, Greece, Italy, Spain and Portugal
deviates, to some extent, from the EU regime applicable in this area as it requires the
fulfilment of different criteria for the granting of an extension of rules. For instance, in
Spain, the national legislation lays down two criteria in this respect and namely that:
 The IBO that requests the extension of rules must represent at least 75% of the
concerned production; and
 The agreement in relation to which the extension of rules is sought for must be
supported by at least 50% of each professional branch forming the IBO.

In France, the national legislation lays down as well two cumulative criteria in this
respect and notably that:
 The IBO that requests the extension must meet the representativeness criteria set
in Article 164 par. 3 a) point (ii) Regulation (EU) No 1308/2013. For primary
production, these criteria are presumed as being met when the farmers unions
accounting at least for 70% of the voting rights for the election of the Chambers
of Agriculture34 are involved in the trade organisation directly or through
specialised associations that are members of the latter. For the other stages of
the production chain, their fulfilment is presumed, as long as the IBO
demonstrates that the agreement for which an extension is sought has not been
opposed, in the month that follows its publication, by another organisation
representing more than one third of the volume of the economic activity
concerned; and

34
The French Chambers of Agriculture are self-governing public bodies regulated by national law, which were established
for the first time in 1924. Managed by elected representatives from the agriculture and forestry sectors, they operate as a
decentralised network comprising 88 Chambers of Agriculture at district level 21 regional Chambers of Agriculture, the
Permanent Assembly of Chambers of Agriculture (APCA). The Chambers have 4,200 elected members and about 8,000
permanent staff, among which 175 staff employed by APCA. Following the legislative review of the national Rural Code in
2014, their overall mission is to contribute to the economic, social and environmental improvement of farms and of the
relevant production chain; support the development of responsible farming activities as a catalyst of increased job
opportunities; and represent farmers’ interests before public authorities at national and local level.

Page 55
 Study on agricultural interbranch organisations (IBOs) in the EU

 The agreement in relation to which the extension of rules is sought must be

unanimously supported by all IBO members.
Finally, in Italy, the representativeness criteria that the national legislation requires to be
met are that:
 The IBO must be representative within the meaning of Article 164 par. 3 a) point
(ii) of Regulation (EU) No 1308/2013. The IBO is presumed to be representative
if, following the publication of the request of extension by the national competent
authorities, there is no opposition from any organisation that can demonstrate to
represent more than one third of the economic operators of the sector
concerned;
 The rules of the agreement for which the extension is sought for must have been
endorsed by at least 85% of the members of each professional branch that forms
the IBO, unless the statutes of the organisation foresee higher thresholds.

Table 11 provides an overview of Member States’ legislation with regard to

representativeness criteria set out at national level with regard to IBOs’ recognition,
extension of IBOs’ rules and access to IBOs’ membership by non-members.

Page 56
 Study on agricultural interbranch organisations (IBOs) in the EU

Table 11: Overview of national provisions laying down representativeness criteria for the purpose of IBOs’ recognition, extension of rules of
their agreements and right to access IBOs’ membership for non-members.
MS Recognition Extension of rules Right to access an IBO
AT More than a half of the annual turnover of the national production, No but relevant provisions of Regulation No
processing or marketing within the sector concerned (EU) No 1308/2013 are regarded as
directly applicable
BE National legislation refers to the relevant provisions of Regulation (EU) No National legislation refers to the relevant No
1308/2013 provisions of Regulation 1308/2013
BG For IBOs in the milk and milk products sector: 10% of milk-producing No No
animals on a national level and at least 10% of production and/or market
share for milk products. For IBOs in other sectors: one-third of the
production and/or trade and/or processing in the respective region of the
country or across the country represented by at least three members.
CY No No No
CZ National legislation refers to the relevant provisions of Regulation (EU) No No No
1308/2013
DE "National legislation stipulates that IBOs must represent a significant share
of the economic activities within the sector at least at a regional scale. No No
However, it is not specified what constitutes a significant share of activities.
ES At least 51% of the concerned production with regard to each of the National legislation lays down two "National legislation guarantees the
professional branches that form the IBO within the geographical where the cumulative criteria in this respect: a) The right to be an IBO’s member to any
organisation operates agreement in relation to which the organisation which a) at national level
extension of rules is sought for must be is willing to comply with their
supported by at least 50% of each provisions, provided that it proves that
professional branch forming the IBO; b) it represents at least 10% of the
The IBO that requests the extension of professional branch to which it
rules must represent at least 75% of the belongs; b) at a level of an Autonomy
concerned production. Community proves that it represents at
least 50% of the relevant professional
branch in that territory, provided that
it accounts at least for 3% of the final
production at national level or 8% of
the final production at the level of the
concerned Autonomous Community.
FR National legislation replicates the content of the relevant provisions of "National legislation lays down two NO
Regulation (EU) No 1308/2013 cumulative criteria in this respect: a) The
agreement in relation to which the
extension of rules is sought for must be
unanimously supported by all IBO

Page 57
 Study on agricultural interbranch organisations (IBOs) in the EU

MS Recognition Extension of rules Right to access an IBO

members; b) The IBO that requests the
extension must meet the
representativeness criteria set in
Regulation (EU) No 1308/2013 (2/3 of
volumes). For primary production, these
criteria are deemed as met when the
farmers unions accounting at least for
70% of the voting rights for the election
of the agricultural chambers of
agriculture are involved in the trade
organisation directly or through
specialised associations adhering to these
organisations. For the other stages of the
production chain, their fulfilment is
presumed if the IBO demonstrates that
the agreement for which an extension is
sought has not been opposed, in the
month following its publication, by
another organisation representing more
than one third of the volume of the
economic activity concerned.
GR At least one third of the production and/or processing and/or marketing of National legislation lays down two No
the products at national level cumulative criteria in this respect: a) The
agreement for which the extension is
sought for must be approved
unanimously by all members of the IBO;
b) The IBO must account for at least two
thirds of the production and/or
processing and/or marketing activities of
the product(s) in question at national
level.
HU National legislation refers to the relevant provisions of Regulation (EU) No National legislation refers to the relevant No
1308/2013 provisions of Regulation (EU) No
1308/2013
HR National legislation replicates and refers to the content of the relevant No No
provisions of Regulation (EU) No 1308/2013
IT For IBOs in the milk and milk products sector: In case of organisations National legislation foresees two No
operating at national level, the share of the economic activities represented cumulative criteria in this respect: a) The
by the IBO must be equal to or higher than 25% of the relevant sector or rules of the agreement for which the

Page 58
 Study on agricultural interbranch organisations (IBOs) in the EU

MS Recognition Extension of rules Right to access an IBO

market segment. For organisations operating in a single economic area, the extension is sought for must have been
threshold is 51% with respect to said area and 15% at national level. For endorsed by at least 85% of the
IBOs in other sectors: In case of organisations operating at national level, members of each professional branch
the share must correspond, at least, to 40% of the economic activities of the that forms the IBO, unless the statutes of
relevant sector or market segment for each product or product category. In the organisation foresee higher
the case of organisations operating within a single economic area, the share thresholds; b) The IBO must be
of the economic activities must correspond to at least 51% of the respective representative within the meaning of
economic activities in that area and, in any event, to 30% of such activities Regulation (EU) No 1308/2013. The IBO
on a national level is presumed to be representative if,
following the publication of the request of
extension by competent authorities,
there is no opposition from organisations
that can demonstrate to represent more
than one third of the economic operators
of the sector concerned.
LV National legislation implements the relevant provisions of Regulation (EU) No No
No 1234/2007 by foreseeing the following representativeness criteria for the
different stages of the relevant production chain: a) in relation to the
organisation’s members that are milk producers, the sale of at least 500
tonnes of raw milk over the last 12 months; b) in relation to the
organisation’s members whose activities involve milk processing and
production of milk products, the processing of at least 5,000 tonnes of milk
over the last 12 months; c) in relation to each member of the organisation
whose activities involve the trade in raw milk and milk products, a turnover
of at least 142,280 EUR.
MT For IBOs in the fruits and vegetables sector: two thirds of the production No No
and/or trade and/or processing of the product or products concerned
NL At least 25% of each of the economic activities represented by the IBO National legislation refers to the relevant No
provisions of Regulation (EU) No
1308/2013
PL National legislation refers to the relevant provisions of Regulation (EU) No No No
1308/2013
PT For IBOs in the agri-food sector: 20% of the economic operators involved in National legislation foresees two National legislation lays down the
the production, processing and/or distribution, whilst covering, at least, 20% cumulative criteria in this respect: a) The minimum number of producers,
of the volume of the production, processing and/or distribution of the rules of the agreement for which the processors and distributors that is
product(s) in question in the region where they perform their activity. For extension is sought must have been required by law for an organisation at
IBOs in the forestry sector: IBOs must consist of national or regional adopted by qualified majority by the national, regional and local level to be
organisations representing at least two stages of the forestry products’ professional branches represented within granted access to the IBO of its
chain, one of which must be the production segment. the IBO; b) The IBO must account for interest i.e. a) National level:

Page 59
 Study on agricultural interbranch organisations (IBOs) in the EU

MS Recognition Extension of rules Right to access an IBO

2/3 of the economic operators involved in production: 15%; processing: 25%;
the production, processing and/or trading: 30%. b) Regional level:
distribution of the product(s) in question production: 25%; processing: 20%;
in the region where they perform their trading: 20%. c) Local level:
activity. For IBOs in the forestry sector, production: 35%; processing: 10%;
the rules of the agreement subject to trading 15%.
extension must have been adopted
unanimously.
RO National legislation foresees two cumulative criteria in this respect. a) The No No
IBO must represent at least 30% of the total value of the economic activities
represented within the IBO within the geographical area where the
organisation operates, whilst each professional branch must account at least
for 15% of the value of the corresponding economic activity; b) Its
establishment must be based upon the initiative of at least one third of the
total number of professional organisations that exist within the relevant
product sector.
At least, for a 33% of the relevant economic activities represented within the
SK No No
IBO on a national level within the milk and milk products sector
Source: compiled by Arcadia International

Page 60
 Study on agricultural interbranch organisations (IBOs) in the EU

3.1.6. National rules on financing

Regulation (EU) No 1308/2013 does not foresee any specific provision with regard to the
financing of IBOs with the exception of the rules governing extension of fees to non-
members, Article 165 of Regulation (EU) No 1308/2013. Therefore, in most cases, it is
down to national law to define the sources and the modalities of financing of such
organisations.
In spite of that, only a few Member States expressly regulate IBOs’ financing in their
national legal framework. The national legislation in Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain
lays down a general clause enabling IBOs to benefit from public aid, fiscal and/or
economic incentives with a view to ensuring their establishment and/or pursuing their
activities. Legislation in Romania, Greece and Portugal also empowers IBOs to set
membership fees to ensure their functioning. Romania appears to be the only Member
State where the national legislation allows IBOs to extend membership fees - i.e. fees to
be paid simply for being a member of an IBO - to non-members following the granting of
an extension of rules. In Romania, the national legislation admits also that IBOs may be
beneficiaries of EU funds as well as of donations and sponsorships besides relying on the
income deriving from their own activities (e.g. provision of technical services, trainings).
As regards economic and fiscal incentives, only the national legislation in Portugal
and Spain lays down provisions in that regard. In both Member States, national law
recognises to IBOs the same fiscal incentives applying to legal persons of public interest
such as associations or foundations. Accordingly, in Portugal IBOs are exempted from
taxes concerning radio and television as well as from the payment of any fee for the
publication of their statutes in the national official journal.
Concerning public subsidies, Portugal is the Member State that has most recently
adopted national provisions in this regard in the context of the national Rural
Development Programme 2014-2020. The latter identifies IBOs and certain of their
activities as potential beneficiaries of public co-funding. The corresponding national
programme in Austria also refers to IBOs though no specific budget line has been
envisaged for the financing of those organisations. The same applies to Cyprus.
In Spain, the central competent authorities have supported the establishment of IBOs for
several years following the introduction of national legislation in this field. Public
subsidies, however, stopped in 2014 as the competent authorities considered that
sufficient efforts had been deployed in order to facilitate the uptake of IBOs within the
national territory.
Table 12 provides an overview of Member States’ national legislation with regard to IBOs’
financing, ad hoc economic and fiscal incentives and public subsidies.
Table 12: Overview of national provisions relevant to IBO’s financing
Economic and fiscal
MS Financing Subsidies
incentives
The National Rural And
Development
Programme 2014-
No except for the provisions empowering 2020 lists IBOs among
AT the national Wine Committee to charge No the entities that may
fees to its members benefit from public co-
funding although no
budget has been
earmarked
BE No No No
BG No No No
The National
Programme for Rural
Development
CY No No Programme 2014-
2020 lists IBOs among
the entities that may

Page 61
 Study on agricultural interbranch organisations (IBOs) in the EU

Economic and fiscal

MS Financing Subsidies
incentives
benefit from public co-
funding
CZ No No No
DE No No No
As a general rule, national legislation As non-profit
provides that IBOs may benefit from organisations, IBO No they stopped in
public aid or subsidises that may be benefit from fiscal 2014 after over fifteen
ES
foreseen with a view to promoting the incentives recognised years of public
attainment of the objectives that these by national law to such financial support
organisations pursue. entities
FR No No No
Besides empowering IBOs to set
membership fees, national legislation The Agriculture and
foresees that these organisations may Livestock Fund may,
benefit from financial support that upon decision of its
national law may provide for as a means Management Board,
GR No
to support the establishment, the finance IBOs which
functioning and the modernisation of submit a request, with
associations and the pursuit of the the aim to support
objectives for which they have been their activities
created.
HU No No No
HR No No No
As a general rule, national legislation
foresees that recognised IBOs may have
IT No No
access to public funding with a view to
pursuing their activities
LV No No No
MT No No No
No specific rules but national legislation
NL governing private organisations applies No No
to IBOs
PL No No No
National legislation
IBOs in the forestry
sector sets out that
IBOs enjoy the same
fiscal exemptions and
privileges recognised
to legal persons of
public utility. For
instance, IBOs are: a)
exempted from taxes
concerning radio and There is a specific
National legislation foresees that IBOs in TV; b) subject to fees budget line for the
the agri-food and forestry sectors may applicable to public co-financing of
be promoted, for instance, by means of household for certain IBOs activities
PT
fiscal incentives and public subsidies. electricity under the National
IBOs' statutes must contain provisions consumption; c) Programme for Rural
on membership fees. exempted from the Development 2014-
payment of any fee for 2020 for the mainland
the publication of their
statutes in the national
official journal.
Although specific
provisions of the type
described are foreseen
explicitly only in
relation to IBOs in the
forestry sector, they

Page 62
 Study on agricultural interbranch organisations (IBOs) in the EU

Economic and fiscal

MS Financing Subsidies
incentives
are considered of
general application to
all IBOs as legal
persons of public
utility.
National law stipulates that IBOs may
rely on the following sources: a)
Membership fees; b) EU funds; c)
Incomes deriving from IBO's own
RO activities; d) Donations and No No
sponsorships. Membership fees may be
requested also to non-members when an
extension of rules has been granted
pursuant to national law.
SK No No No
Source: compiled by Arcadia International

3.1.7. National provisions exempting IBOs from competition law

In none of the Member States analysed specific national provisions regarding IBOs and
derogating from competition law could be identified.
3.2. Member States with national legislation on IBOs and recognised IBOs
To date only eight Member States where national legislation on IBOs exists have formally
recognised organisations in the agri-food sector. These are France, Greece, Hungary,
Italy, Spain, the Netherlands, Portugal and Romania. Under this Section, consideration
will be given, in particular, to the following aspects:
 Level of application of the EU and national framework for IBOs, and level of
consensus on national policy in this area; and
 National competition cases involving IBOs.
3.2.1. Level of application of the EU and national framework for IBOs
Taking into account the experience of the Member States that have recognised IBOs to
date, one can conclude that almost in all of them EU and national rules in this area
have been applied to a significant extent.
Italy constitutes the only notable exception, given the low number (three) of IBOs
currently recognised by the competent authorities of this Member State, as opposed to
the wide range of agri-food sectors that exist at national level as well as to the size of the
country.
According to the Italian authorities, the main reason behind the limited success of
IBOs at national level primarily lies with the lack of willingness of the organisations
representing the different stages of the food chain to join forces under cross-sectoral
structures. In particular, conflicts between the organisations representing farmers and
agricultural workers’ trade unions would have prevented primary producers from
benefitting from the establishment of well-performing POs in the first place, which is a
prerequisite for the setting IBOs.
3.2.2. National competition cases involving IBOs
From the standpoint of competition law, national case law and administrative practice
regarding IBOs seem to exist only in a limited number of Member States where IBOs are
recognised and, mainly, in France and in Spain. In Italy, there is only some limited
experience in terms of administrative practice.

Page 63
 Study on agricultural interbranch organisations (IBOs) in the EU

IBOs and State aid

A first issue revolves around the qualification of fees imposed by IBOs on non-
members as a State aid because of the extension of their rules. More precisely,
mandatory contributions collected from non-members following the extension of an IBO
agreement were alleged to constitute State aid within the meaning of article 107 TFEU
and, as such, subject to prior notification and approval by the European Commission.
This legal issue was extensively debated over three decades before French courts, the
European Commission and the Court of Justice, resulting in numerous decisions.
French courts have traditionally held that mandatory contributions do not qualify as State
aid (not a State resource). Conversely, in 2008, the Commission took the view that
mandatory contributions were public resources that might constitute State aid. It
therefore proceeded to adopt several decisions stating that mandatory contributions did
constitute State aid in the meaning of article 107 TFEU. The same Commission decisions
were subsequently challenged before the Tribunal of the European Union.
Separately, in 2011, the question of the qualification of mandatory contributions as State
aid was referred for a preliminary ruling to the European Court of Justice. The latter,
in a landmark decision, found that mandatory contributions did not constitute
State aid, as long as it is ascertained that, in accordance with Article 107 par. 1 TFEU:
 They do not involve an intervention by the State or through State resources;
 The State intervention is not liable to affect trade between Member States;
 Such an intervention does not confer an advantage on the recipient; and
 It does not distort or threaten to distort competition35

In light of that, the Commission decisions referred to above and the related legal
challenges were subsequently dropped.
From the above, it follows that fees imposed by IBOs as a consequence of the extension
of rules of their agreements are currently not to be considered as State aid.
IBOs and antitrust rules
IBOs’ activities have been also assessed against antitrust rules.
In this context, it is worth recalling that the European Commission first established the
principle whereby the prohibition of price fixing applies also to IBOs, whilst EU and
French courts subsequently confirmed this interpretation (for instance, BNIC v Clair, 30
January 1985, 123:83).
The French competition authority (‘Autorité de la concurrence’, hereinafter ‘AC’) has
adopted a number of decisions and opinions regarding the application of antitrust rules in
the agricultural sector. However, there have been relatively few antitrust decisions of AC
applying to IBOs as such.
In 2006, AC rejected a complaint for an alleged restriction of competition against Bureau
national interprofessionnel du Cognac (BNIC).36 In this case, the plaintiff argued
that the IBO in question was controlling the determination of QNV (“quantité
normalement vinifiée”), a key criteria influencing the supply of distilled spirit, used as a
base to produce Cognac. In reply to the arguments of the plaintiff, AC observed that the
determination of QNV was adopted by ministerial decree and that, whilst BNIC had made
known to the competent authorities its official position as IBO on the desirable level, that
position had not necessarily conditioned the decision of public authorities.
Separately, in the sector of poultry meat, AC investigated ex officio price fixing
agreements over the period 2000-2007, including the active participation of the IBOs for

35
Judgment Doux Elevage, C-677/11, EU:C:2013:348, in particular paragraphs 25 and 45.
36
Decision n. 06-D-21 of 21 July 2006.

Page 64
 Study on agricultural interbranch organisations (IBOs) in the EU

turkey and ducks. In the context of an extended procedure between 2007 and 2015, AC
determined that the IBOs concerned had actively contributed to the breach of national
and EU antitrust rules by coordinating their economic conduct with a view to removing
price uncertainty (although charges against one of the IBOs were subsequently dropped
on the ground of insufficient evidence). The other IBO chose not to contest AC findings
and was ultimately subject to a 10,000 EUR fine. Based on the evidence gathered on that
case, AC concluded that the breach of antitrust rules resulted, in part, from the failure of
interbranch cooperation and, thus, that a new IBO should be constituted in line with the
provisions of Regulation (EU) No 1308/2013.37
More generally, in 2011 AC also issued an opinion on the application of antitrust rules
to IBOs whilst reviewing the draft agreements negotiated by the IBO Conseil
interprofessionnel du vin de la région de Bergerac (CIVRB)38. In so doing, AC
opinion provided detailed guidelines that should serve as a reference for all IBOs. In this
opinion, amongst others, AC recommended that IBOs do not issue price
recommendations and provide reference values in relation to price indexation or revision,
which would result in a restriction of the freedom of operators to decide on prices.
Separately, AC annual report of 2012 includes a topical study on competition and
agriculture. While that study predates the CMO regulation, it indicates that AC considers
IBO to be subject to competition rules but also as instrumental in making improvements
in the agricultural sector, including in the field of competition. In this context, AC also
points to the need to draft standard contract terms as well as the dissemination of
information subject to antitrust prohibitions.
In Spain, only two national IBOs – i.e. Propollo (2007-2012)39 and Inprovo (2007-
2013)40 - have been involved in competition cases at national level over the last decade.
The two cases in question are very similar to the extent that both:
 Originated from the food price crisis that hit, among others, the Spanish market in
2007;
 Were initiated ex officio by the then National Competition Commission
(‘Comisión Nacional de la Competencia, hereinafter ‘CNC’)41 following complaints
by consumer organisations;
 Concerned a violation of the prohibition of formulating collective
recommendation on price fixing set by national law; and
 Led to the application of financial sanctions by CNC (200,000 EUR for Propollo
and 100,000 EUR for Inprovo), whose amount was then reduced by the
competent administrative court (100,000 EUR and 50,000 EUR, respectively).

In both cases, CNC found that communication activities carried by the IBOs over the
summer 2007 (i.e. press release and media statements from the IBOs’ representatives)
contained explicit references to the amount of price increase likely to affect poultry meat
and eggs as a result of the rise of raw material costs. As such, it considered that they

37
Decision n. 15-D-08 of 5 May 2015
38
Opinion n. 11-1-14 of 26 September 2011.
39
Resolution of the Council of the National Competition Commission of 29 September 2009, Expte. S/0044/08 PROPOLLO;
Judgement of the Sixth Section of Audiencia Nacional of 10 November 2010, PROPOLLO v. National Competition
Commission, case 06479/2009 and Resolution of the Council of the National Competition Commission of 14 March
2012, VS/0044 PROPOLLO.
40
Resolution of the Council of the National Competition Commission of 28 September 2009, Expte. S/0055/08 INPROVO;
Judgement of the Sixth Section of Audiencia Nacional of 13 October 2011, INPROVO v. National Competition
Commission, case 06820/2009 and Resolution of the Council of the National Competition Commission of 9 January
2013, VS/0044/08 INPROVO.
41
Following a reorganisation of competences at national level, in 2013 CNC was renamed as Comisión Nacional de los
Mercados y la Competencia (CNMC).

Page 65
 Study on agricultural interbranch organisations (IBOs) in the EU

encouraged somehow all the actors of the respective sector to follow a common pattern
vis-à-vis price determination and, thus, unduly restricted the principles of freedom of
contracts and free competition. Whilst recognising the conduct of the two IBOs as
objectively anticompetitive, CNC recognised this was not deliberate but attributable to
negligence.
The reduction of the sanctions was granted as, according to the judge of the appeal, CNC
did not take duly into account some mitigating factors in the conduct of the two IBOs,
such as the absence of the intentionality and the short duration of the anticompetitive
practice.
In Italy, the National Competition and Market Authority (‘Autoritá Garante della
concorrenza e del mercato’, hereinafter AGCM) has not dealt with any case or complaint
involving IBOs in the agri-food sector. It has however been consulted a few times in the
past by other public authorities with regard to the lawfulness of agreements concluded
between POs and processor organisations involving price fixing. Against this background,
AGCM has consistently drawn the attention of the authorities seeking its advice to the
restrictive effects that such agreements have on competition.
This view has been restated by AGCM in a report adopted early in 2016 following an
investigation on the national milk and milk products sector.42 More precisely, following
the application of the new regime for the contractual relations in the milk and milk
products sector pursuant to Regulation (EU) No 261/2012 (now integrated within
Regulation (EU) No 1308/2013), AGCM expressed its support for the recognition of IBOs
promoting initiatives aimed at improving the efficiency of the relevant product chain. In
this context, AGCM points out that, whilst IBOs cannot fix the economic conditions for
product sale, such entities are nevertheless entitled to perform other activities including,
for instance, the drawing up of standard contracts.
3.3. Member States with national legislation on IBOs but with no IBOs
recognised
The reasons why in the majority of EU Member States, despite the existence of national
legislation on IBOs, these organisations have not yet been established are different.
Depending on the national context, the reasons reported as underpinning the lack of
recognised IBOs can be overall attributed to:
a) The preference for simpler structures, as opposed to IBOs, for the organisation
of, and the cooperation within, the relevant agricultural markets, such as producer
cooperatives (for instance, in Austria, Belgium (Wallonia) Cyprus, the Czech
Republic, Germany, Latvia and Malta), including the fact that, according to some
national stakeholders, the focus of competent authorities is on POs rather than
on IBOs (for instance, in Bulgaria and in Croatia);
b) The existence of long-standing and influential professional bodies such as
agriculture or commerce chambers that are able provide a wide range of services
to their affiliates (for instance, in Austria and in the Czech Republic);
c) An overall distrust towards vertical cooperation in the food supply chain due
to historical reasons (for instance, in the Czech Republic, Germany and in
Slovakia);
d) The lack of knowledge of the relevant EU framework in this area (for instance,
in Bulgaria, Croatia and Poland) and the fear that IBO’s activities may breach
competition rules (for instance, in Belgium and Bulgaria);

42
Report n. 25899 of 2 March 2016.

Page 66
 Study on agricultural interbranch organisations (IBOs) in the EU

e) The lack of understanding of the benefits that vertical cooperation fostered by

IBOs may bring to stakeholders of the food supply chain (for example, in Croatia,
Poland as well as in Slovakia);
f) The perception that the current EU regime for IBOs is complex and
bureaucratic (for instance, in Croatia, Cyprus, Latvia and Malta) and its results
can be ultimately achieved through less regulated forms of cooperation
(Belgium);
g) The lack of public support in terms of economic and financial incentives
associated with the creation of IBOs (for instance, in Bulgaria, the Czech Republic,
Latvia and Slovakia); and
h) The slow uptake and the relative weakness of POs recognised under
Regulation (EU) No 1308/2013 at national level. The existence of POs as a
horizontal cooperation form to gather the interests of the production is regarded
as a pre-requisite for the establishment of IBOs as vertical cooperation structures
within the food supply chain (for instance, in Croatia, Malta and Slovakia).
As regards the stance of national competent authorities towards the establishment of
IBOs, this appears to vary across Member States. In Bulgaria and Croatia, on the one
hand, the competent authorities generally refer a positive attitude towards IBOs,
although, according to some stakeholders, the setting up of these organisations would
not be their top priority at present. In Latvia, on the other hand, the competent
authorities have maintained a neutral position as regards the establishment of IBOs, as
they are of the view that relevant stakeholders must see their creation as beneficial in
the first place. In the Czech Republic, finally, some stakeholders regard the approach by
competent authorities in this area as too lax, which results in no IBOs being recognised
at present in this Member State.
In none of the Member States considered under this section has any request for
recognition been submitted to the competent authorities. Only in Bulgaria, following the
adoption of implementing rules for IBOs’ establishment at national level in 2015,
organisations of the tobacco sector have expressed a possible interest in obtaining formal
recognition. Other than that, there seem to be no indication that any formal recognition
may be granted in 2016.

3.4. Member States with no national legislation on IBOs

In nine Member States there is, as yet, no national legislation on IBOs in the agri-food
sector. These Member States are Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Ireland, Lithuania,
Luxembourg, Sweden, Slovenia and the United Kingdom. As it will be shown, the reasons
behind the absence of a dedicated legal framework in these Member States coincide to a
large extent with those justifying the lack of recognised IBOs in Member States with
national law in this field.
The reasons provided by both national competent authorities and industry stakeholders
to justify the absence of national legislation in this area would seem to be varied and, in
particular, to reflect differing priorities and agricultural structures. Overall, five such
reasons may be identified.
The first reason not to create legislation for the recognition of IBOs is simply that no
stakeholders have expressed interest in being recognised. Therefore, there seems to be a
certain reluctance to undertake the administrative burden associated with IBOs,
notwithstanding that both a harmonised and streamlined procedure for their recognition
and a light-touch regulatory regime were declared aims of Regulation (EU) No
1308/2013.43 Concerns to this effect have been expressed, for instance, in the case of

43
See, in particular, Recital (133): “[e]xisting rules on the definition and recognition of producer organisations, their
associations, and interbranch organisations should therefore be harmonised, streamlined and extended to provide for

Page 67
 Study on agricultural interbranch organisations (IBOs) in the EU

Denmark, Estonia and the United Kingdom. Hence, one could claim that the procedural
requirements currently applicable represent a barrier to the establishment of IBOs. In the
United Kingdom, the Food and Drink Federation had earlier pointed out further
administrative burdens and additional costs to industry as factors inclining against the
formal recognition of IBOs in the dairy sector under the Milk Package.44
Secondly, in several Member States a preference may be detected for other structures,
often allied to a strong tradition of cooperatives or other industry bodies.
For example, in Estonia, simpler types of cooperation are considered to be attractive to
an older generation, whilst in Denmark and Finland large collection and processing
cooperatives have been the structure of choice in the milk and milk products sector.
In Sweden, the various actors of the food chain handle promotion and commercialisation
on their own, without the need to give rise to recognised IBOs. For instance, producers
and processors are currently working together on a system of voluntary labelling with
country of origin on animal products. Sometimes, competent authorities can get involved
in various efforts. One recent example is the Action Plan for animal products, which
brought together the whole value chain as well as public authorities in a joint effort to
increase demand for Swedish meat and milk and milk products. Also, for companies
aiming for the export market, the organisation Business Sweden offers some assistance.
Likewise, in the United Kingdom a factor underlying the decision not to proceed with
formal recognition of IBOs was the availability of other forms of cooperation.45 However,
the absence of those forms of cooperation has for some time been identified as an
inherent weakness of England’s agriculture. As stated in the 2002 Curry Report, the
Policy Commission on the Future of Farming and Food that drafted it believes that “[…]
the security of a profitable production base in England depends on a much greater level
of collaboration than we have seen historically”.46

Thirdly, a lack of awareness of the relevant EU legislation on horizontal and

vertical cooperation in the agri-food sector is considered to be a reason for the fact
that no IBOs have been formally recognised. In this regard, it is worth noting that, in
Lithuania, due to historical reasons no POs have been recognised to date as no request
has ever been put forward. Against this background, national authorities are promoting
basic forms of cooperation between producers, whilst IBOs would be next step. In
addition to that, the competent authorities refer that economic operators are not familiar
with entities such as IBOs so more time is needed to recognise their tasks and benefits.
Fourthly, issues have also coalesced around funding, though with lower emphasis. For
example, Lithuania’s competent authorities report that the EU financial contribution
towards the start-up costs of POs is regarded as a motivating factor whereas the absence
of IBOs is attributed to the non-availability of such funding.

possible recognition on request under statutes set out in accordance with this Regulation for certain sectors”; and Recital
(142): “[i]n order to ensure that the objectives and responsibilities of producer organisations, associations of producer
organisations and interbranch organisations are clearly defined and to contribute to the effectiveness of their actions without
imposing an undue administrative burden and without undermining the principle of freedom of association in particular with
regard to non-members of such organisations, the power to adopt certain acts should be delegated to the Commission in
respect of…”.
44
Food and Drink Federation (FDF) (2013). FDF response to DEFRA consultation on producer organisations, the reporting
of milk volumes and other EU dairy package options (FDF: London).
45
Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (DEFRA) (2014). Consultation on the implementation of CAP
reform in England: Summary of responses and government response on remaining issues (DEFRA: London).
46
Curry Report (2002). Report of the Policy Commission on the Future of Farming and Food: Farming and food – a
sustainable future (Policy Commission on the Future of Farming and Food: London).

Page 68
 Study on agricultural interbranch organisations (IBOs) in the EU

Fifthly, competition law issues similarly come into play. In Slovenia, several
stakeholders are concerned that the national competent authorities might regard certain
IBOs’ activities as a breach of competition law (notwithstanding that Regulation (EU) No
1308/2013 would seem to lay down clear derogations in their favour). In the United
Kingdom, however, a wider focus is adopted as opposed to Slovenia, with the National
Farmers’ Union seeking to ensure that any recognition of IBOs should not “create barriers
to the free movement of goods and competition within the internal market”.47
Over and above these more specific reasons, the experience in several Member States
has been that engagement to create IBOs from stakeholders is not forthcoming. Indeed,
when, in Estonia, a public consultation was launched on its draft IBO legislation, there
was no reaction from stakeholders.

3.5. National implementation of other forms of cooperation in accordance with

Regulation (EU) No 1308/2013
Besides specific provision on IBOs, Regulation (EU) No 1308/2013 lays down provisions
which should ensure a fair balance between producers and their trading partners or
contribute to stabilising the markets and ensuring a fair standard of living for the
agricultural community concerned by e.g. allowing for certain supply management rules..
These provisions include:
 Agreements and delivery contracts negotiated by sugar beet growers’
organisations and sugar producers (Articles 125 and 127);
 The introduction of marketing rules to improve and stabilise the operations of the
common market of wines (Article 167); and
 The regulation of the supply of cheese and ham protected under EU quality
schemes (Articles 150 and 172).
With regard to sugar, agreements within the trade are currently in place in several
Member States (16). Whilst Germany has currently three agreements in place, France
and Spain have two and the remaining Member States only one.
With regard to wine, only Spain has adopted a national framework to give effect to
Article 167 of Regulation (EU) No 1308/2013, although it has not yet been implemented
in practice. In Romania, there is an IBO agreement in place to this effect which is similar
to the one in force in the sugar sector.
Italy has implemented the provisions of Regulation (EU) No 1308/2013 with regard to
the possibility to regulate the supply of cheese and ham protected under EU quality
schemes. To date it has done so six times, in four cases for national cheeses and in two
for hams. France has also made use of these provisions in relation to four cheeses.
Concerning the provisions of Regulation (EU) No 1308/2013 that allow producers
organisations to negotiate joint sales on behalf of their members, the Czech Republic,
France, Germany and Spain reported volumes covered by such negotiations for 2013 for
the milk and milk products sector.48 In the context of the study, Spain reported
relevant data also for 2014.
Also, Regulation (EU) No 1308/2013 lays down provisions with a view to fostering
horizontal cooperation between primary producers in order to strengthen their bargaining
power versus downstream operators. It does so by providing for the possibility for
recognised POs to negotiate agreements, on behalf of their members, concerning
contracts for the delivery of raw milk to a processor or a collector (Article 149) as well as

47
National Farmers’ Union (NFU) 2011. NFU consultation response: the reform of the CAP towards 2020 – consultation
document for impact assessment (NFU).
48
Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council Development of the dairy market situation and
the operation of the "Milk Package" provisions, COM(2014) 354 final, 13.06.2014.

Page 69
 Study on agricultural interbranch organisations (IBOs) in the EU

for the supply of olive oil (Article 169), live cattle (Article 170) and certain arable crops
(Article 171).
Overall, the analysis conducted during the study indicates that the level of
implementation of these provisions is still very low in the vast majority of Member
States. In certain Member States (for example, France and Portugal), the lack of action
in the first two years of application of Regulation (EU) No 1308/2013 has been justified
by the lack of EU guidelines with regard to certain provisions (for instance, Articles 169
to 171 of Regulation (EU) No 1308/2013 for contractual negotiations in the olive oil, beef
and veal and certain arable crops sectors). Such guidelines were adopted by the
European Commission at the end of 2015.49

49
Commission Notice — Guidelines on the application of the specific rules set out in Articles 169, 170 and 171 of the CMO
Regulation for the olive oil, beef and veal and arable crops sectors, OJ C 431, 22.12.2015, p. 1.

Page 70
 Study on agricultural interbranch organisations (IBOs) in the EU

Table 13: Overview of sugar agreements currently in place at MS level

MS Year Agreement Delegate Agreement conditions Link
Wallonie:
Association des betteraviers Wallons http://www.betteravierswallons.be/reglements-
BE 2014-2015 Interprofessional agreement Production conditions accords/accords-interprofessionnels
(ABW) and Sukerbiet (Flanders)
Flanders: http://www.suikerbiet.be/default.html

Basic framework for http://eagri.cz/public/web/mze/tiskovy-

CZ 2016 Interprofessional agreement Beet growers and sugar refineries cooperation expert beet servis/tiskove-zpravy/x2016_producenti-
growers and sugar producers cukrove-repy-a-provozovatele.html

North German beet growers (DNZ) and http://www.nordzucker.de/fileadmin/downloads

DE 2011-2012 Interprofessional agreement Applying the quota rule /Landwirte/2011-12_Branchenvereinbarung.pdf
Nordzucker
North German beet growers (DNZ) and http://www.agrarheute.com/news/liefervertraeg
DE 2016-2017 Interprofessional agreement Applying the quota rule e-zuckerrueben-2016-eckpunkte
Nordzucker
http://www.topagrar.com/news/Acker-
Anklamer Anbauerverband , Suiker Unie Agrarwetter-Ackernews-Ruebenanbauer-
DE 2017 Interprofessional agreement Prices and volumes Anklam-Neue-Branchenvereinbarung-
GmbH & Co.KG- Zuckerfabrik Anklam
ausgehandelt-3531457.html
http://www.danskesukkerroedyrkere.dk/nyhede
DK 2015-2016 Cultivation and supply of sugar Danish sugar beet and Nordic sugar Quota application r/2010/brancheaftale-for-2011-2014
http://www.paseges.gr/el/news/Proedros-EBZ:-
EL 2016 Ongoing agreement HSI and Piraeus Bank Cultivation conditions Aparaithtos-o-exorthologismos-toy-kostoys-
paragwghs-zaharhs

ES 2015-2016 Interprofessional agreement ACOR Purchase terms

http://www.qcom.es/v_portal/informacion/infor
ES 2016 Interprofessional agreement AB Azucarera Iberia Agreement on price macionver.asp?cod=27823&te=2&idage=30572
http://www.sjt.fi/wp-
Agreement on cultivation of Sugar beet cultivation sucros Ltd (Sucros) Cultivation condition / quota
FI 2015-2016 content/uploads/2015/04/Toimialasopimus_201
sugar beet and MTK/SLC application 5_3495487_snapshot1.pdf

Confédération Générale des Planteurs de

Betteraves, Syndicat National des http://www.snfs.fr/site/images/pdf/AIP201415t
Purchase and delivery of beet
FR 2014-2015 Interprofessional agreement Fabricants de Sucre de France, Fédération extecomplet.pdf
quota http://cips-france.fr/accord-interprofessionnel/
Nationale des Coopératives de Collecte et
de Transformation de la Betterave
Confédération Générale des Planteurs de
Betteraves (CGB), Syndicat National des http://www.snfs.fr/site/index.php?option=com_
Fabricants de Sucre de France (SNFS), Purchase and delivery of beet content&view=article&id=105:signature-de-l-
FR 2015-2016 Interprofessional agreement accord-interprofessionnel-2015-16-et-2016-
Fédération Nationale des Coopératives de quota
17&catid=13&Itemid=140
Collecte (FCB) et de Transformation de la
Betterave
HR 2016 Interprofessional agreement Osijek Ltd, Union of farmer Cultivation conditions http://www.secerana.com/index.php?option=co

Page 71
 Study on agricultural interbranch organisations (IBOs) in the EU

MS Year Agreement Delegate Agreement conditions Link

m_content&view=article&id=157:modernizacija-
proizvodnje&catid=39:frontpage-
category&Itemid=141

Sugar beet growers (CTOSZ) and Sugar http://www.ctosz.hu/index.php?muvelet=jog_m

HU 2016 Interprofessional agreement Quota application agyar_szakmakozi
producers (CIE)
http://www.anb.it/wp-
Confederazione Generale dei Bieticoltori
IT 2016-2017 Interprofessional agreement Applying the quota rule content/uploads/2016/01/ACCORDO-ERIDANIA-
Italiani and Eridania Sadam 2016-SINTESI.pdf
http://www.litfood.lt/paramos-
LT 2016-2017 Interprofessional agreement Arvi Sugar AB and Nordic Sugar Quota application priemones/naujienos/patvirtinti-cukraus-
gamintojai-2016-2017-prekybiniams-metams/

Südzucker Polska, Nordzucker Polska and

Krajowa Spółka Cukrowa http://kzpbc.com.pl/files/files/5.%20Porozumie
PL 2016 Interprofessional agreement Pfeifer & Langen Polska , Group Pfeifer & Quota application nia%20Bran%C5%BCowe%20w%20Polsce%20
Langen located in Gostyn, Pfeifer & Langen 287957.pdf

Glinojeck
Federation of sugar beet growers Romania http://lege5.ro/Gratuit/gyzdqnjzgu/acordul-
(FCSZR), Association of sugar producers in interprofesional-pentru-sfecla-de-zahar-recolta-
RO 2015-2016 Interprofessional agreement Quota application anului-de-comercializare-2015-2016-din-
Romania and Association Romania sugar
25022015
employers
Swedish beet growers association and http://www.betodlarna.se/radoinfo/pdf/Bransch
SE 2015-2016 Interprofessional agreement Quota application avtal_SE_2015.pdf
Nordic Sugar
https://www.nfuonline.com/sectors/nfu-
UK 2010-2015 Interprofessional agreement NFU and British Sugar Beet price sugar/nfu-sugar-rh-panel/useful-
documents/key-dates-in-the-uk-sugar-industry/

Page 72
 Study on agricultural interbranch organisations (IBOs) in the EU

Table 14: Overview of the implementation of provisions regarding other forms of vertical and horizontal cooperation pursuant to Regulation
(EU) No 1308/2013
Certain arable
PDO/PGI cheese and Olive oil - Art. 169 Live cattle- Art.
Milk and milk products - Art. Wine - Art. 167 Reg. crops - Art. 171
MS ham Art. 150 and 172 - Reg. (EU) No 170 Reg. (EU) No
149 Reg. (EU) No 1308/2013 (EU) No 1308/2013 Reg. (EU) No
Reg. (EU) No 1308/2013 1308/2013 1308/2013
1308/2013
No although a National
Wine Committee has
National rules exist but have been established in
AT not been implemented to No 2011 for the execution No No No
date of marketing measures
pursuant to Regulation
(EC) 1234/2007
BE No No No No No No
Two producer organisations would
BG No have made use of this provision in No No No No
2015 though data not yet available
CY No No No No No No
In 2013 collective negotiations for
CZ No delivery contracts covered 445,000 No No No No
tonnes of cow milk
In 2013 collective negotiations for
DE No delivery contracts covered 11, No No No No
158,000 tonnes of cow milk
DK No No No No No No
EE No No No No No No
For raw cow milk, three recognised
producer organisations have made
use of this provision in 2014
negotiating delivery contracts for a
National rules have
total volume of 840,413 tonnes.
been adopted in order
For sheep milk, in 2014 the only
ES No to give effect to this No No No
recognised producer organisation
provision but no
has negotiated delivery contracts
implementation to date
accounting for an overall
production volume of 70, 905
tonnes.

FI No No No No No No

Page 73
 Study on agricultural interbranch organisations (IBOs) in the EU

Certain arable
PDO/PGI cheese and Olive oil - Art. 169 Live cattle- Art.
Milk and milk products - Art. Wine - Art. 167 Reg. crops - Art. 171
MS ham Art. 150 and 172 - Reg. (EU) No 170 Reg. (EU) No
149 Reg. (EU) No 1308/2013 (EU) No 1308/2013 Reg. (EU) No
Reg. (EU) No 1308/2013 1308/2013 1308/2013
1308/2013
Implementing rules of these
provisions have been
adopted for the following In 2013 collective negotiations of
FR PDO cheeses: Beaufort, contract deliveries covered No No No No
Comté and Reblochon and 2,689,000 tonnes of cow milk
for the following PGI
cheese: Gruyère
GR No No No No No No
HU No No No No No No
HR No No No No No No
IE No No No No No No
Implementing rules of these
provisions have been
adopted for the following
PDO cheese: Asiago, Grana
IT Padano, Parmigiano No No No No No
Reggiano e Pecorino and for
the following PDO hams:
Prosciutto San Daniele e
Prosciutto di Parma
LT No No No No No No
LU No No No No No No
LV No No No No No No
MT No No No No No No
NL No No No No No No
PL No No No No No No
PT No No No No No No
One agreement in place
RO No No for the current No No No
marketing campaign
SE No No No No No No
SI No No No No No No
SK No No No No No No
UK No No No No No No

Page 74
 Study on agricultural interbranch organisations (IBOs) in the EU

PART 4: INVENTORY OF EXISTING IBOS ACROSS EU MS (THEME 2)

This chapter presents an inventory of the IBOs currently recognised at national and
regional levels. It follows the structure of the IBO sheets in order to allow comparison
and consultation between this chapter and the individual IBO sheets that are annexed to
the report (see Mater DB Theme 2).
Data have been collected through a questionnaire (IBO template) that was sent to all
IBOs with an invitation to complete it. IBO sheets were complemented with additional
information found in literature where data gaps were observed.
A response rate of nearly 80% was obtained (94 responses). The missing responses are
mainly from France from the regional wine IBOs (no direct interest for these IBOs to fill
the questionnaire) and from the fact that several IBOs have reported to be inactive or no
staff was available to complete the questionnaire.
By means of graphs or charts allowing comparisons and descriptive texts, this inventory
is presented in several sub-chapters.
4.1. Overview (number of IBOs in the EU, distribution per MS, distribution per
sector, geographic coverage: national vs regional)
The data collection leads to the identification of 123 IBOs in the EU as of 1 June 2016
(of which 4 IBOs concern sectors which are not included in Annex I of the CMO. These 4
IBOS are namely the BNIC-Cognac in France, the BNIA-Armagnac in France, INTERAL-
animal feed in Spain; and INTEHELIX-other products-snails in Spain).
In Figure 3 the number of IBOs between the period prior to 1970 and the period after
2010 is depicted.
Figure 3: Evolution of number of IBOs in the EU (1970-2016)

Source: Arcadia International

The total number of IBOs in the EU has continued to grow since 1970 and especially after
1980. This is explained by the adoption of Law 75-600 in France and Law 1994 in Spain.
Following enforcement of these 2 acts, the number of IBOs has significantly increased
during the following 10 years in each of these two countries. Afterwards, the number of
IBOs reached a plateau in each of these MSs around 2000. The recognition of IBOs in the
EU has gone on at the same pace but in other Member States (Section 4.2).
The cradle countries for IBOs, France and Spain, are still in the lead with the number of
IBOs (Figure 3). France reported that 63 IBOs are currently recognised within its national

Page 75
 Study on agricultural interbranch organisations (IBOs) in the EU

territory. Spain is the second MS for number of IBOs with a total of 27 IBOs50. Together,
the number of IBOs recognised in France and Spain amounts to 90 (about 73% of the
total number). The remaining 23 IBOs are scattered over 6 MS (EL, HU, IT, NL, PT and
RO).
It should be noticed that the NL is currently in the process of recognising additional IBOs,
in particular in the F&V and ornamental horticulture (live trees and other plants, bulbs,
roots and the like, cut flowers and ornamental foliage) sectors. This report presents the
situation as of 01 June 2016.

Figure 4: Total number of IBOs per MS

Source: Arcadia International

IBOs are currently recognised in 19 different sectors among the 24 listed in Article
1 (2) of Regulation (EU) No 1308/2013 (Figure 4). There are no IBO recognised in the
banana51, ethyl alcohol, hops, and silkworms sectors. A total of 31 IBOs are recognised in
the wine sector, representing 25% of the total number of IBOs. These IBOs often have a
regional coverage (see below), and as their main objective the marketing of wine
products. A total of 13 and 10 IBOs are recognised in the fruit and vegetables sector and
in the milk and milk products sector, respectively.
The allocation of sectors for each IBO does not tally with the CMO classification in all
cases. Several IBOs can concern groups of products that are not fully aligned to the CMO
Annex I classification. IBO representatives were invited to indicate in which sector their
IBO was operating. The following figure indicates what IBO respondents reported in their
IBO description. For example, there is no “processed F&V products” IBO, while ANIFELT
exists in France which could be classified as such. This is explained by the fact that the
IBO reported to be part of the fresh F&V sector. Additionally, when an IBO covers several
sectors (e.g. regional overseas IBOs), the IBO is allocated to the most important and
largest sector within the IBO in question.

50
This list also includes the two IBOs that have been recognised by the Andalusian region (Hortyfruta and Interfresa).
Organización Interprofesional Agroalimentaria del Higo Seco y Derivados is included, but was not listed on MAGRAMA’s
website
51
A French IBO for bananas has been recognised in September 2016.

Page 76
 Study on agricultural interbranch organisations (IBOs) in the EU

Figure 5: Total number of IBOs per sector

Source: Arcadia International

The sector “other products” (according to Article 1(2) of the CMO contains 14 IBOs for a
wide variety of products. Table 15 provides the overview. Two IBOs are involved in cider
processing.

Table 15: IBOs established for “other products”

Other products (MS)
Aromatic plants (lavender) and associated products (essential oils) (FR)
Chicory (FR)
Cider (2 IBOs) (FR)
Cork (PT)
Fats products derived from poultry (especially feet webbed birds like ducks, geese), mainly
foie gras (ES)
Fresh and frozen wild game meat (deer, boar, roe, mouflon, deer, partridge, rabbit, hare
mainly) (ES)
Game (FR)
Oilseeds and protein crops (FR)
Potatoes for human consumption (NC Code: 0701) (FR)
Rabbit (ES)
Seed potatoes, starch potatoes, ware potatoes, potato products (NL)
Snail (ES)
Starch, frozen products, chips, mashed potatoes (FR)
The geographical indications: Calvados , Calvados Pays d’Auge, Pommeau de Normandie ,
Pommeau de Bretagne, Pommeau du Maine, Cidre Pays d’Auge, Cidre Cornouaille and Poiré
Domfront (FR)
Source: Arcadia International

Most IBOs involved in wine are located in France and are regional IBOs. The French IBOs
also outnumber other countries in other sectors like milk and milk products, beef and
veal, poultry meat, flax and hemp and sugar. At the same time France has IBOs in 13
out of the 20 sectors for which IBOs are established in the EU. In Spain 12 out of those
20 sectors have IBOs. Other countries where IBOs have been established also show a
variety of sectors that have IBOs.

Page 77
 Study on agricultural interbranch organisations (IBOs) in the EU

Remarkably in the Netherlands no IBOs have been established in the pig sector and the
fruit and vegetable sectors yet - both large production sectors. Hungary and Italy have
large cereals sector and not yet IBOs present. Additionally, one would expect IBOs for
wine, milk and milk products and eggs in Italy based on its production volumes.

Figure 6: Distribution of IBOs per sector and per MS

Source: Arcadia International

About 68% of the IBOs are active at country level and 32% are regional. Most of the
regional IBOs are located in France (Figure 7) as these IBOs are linked to wines bearing
geographical indications (GIs).

The French regional IBOs share common national legislation, whereas in Spain the
regional focus is due to the regional recognition of 2 IBOs in Andalusia based on regional
legislation.

Figure 7: Distribution of IBOs per MS and type (regional vs national)

40 36
35
30 27
25
25 National
20 Regional
15
10 7 6 7
5 5
5 2 3
0 0 0 0 0 0
0
EL ES FR HU IT NL PT RO
Source: Arcadia International

Page 78
 Study on agricultural interbranch organisations (IBOs) in the EU

It can also be observed that the number of national IBOs in France and in Spain is quite
comparable (25 in Spain and 27 in France).

Table 16 provides an overview of the French regional IBOs involved in wine production
per geographic area and grouped per type of GI. It is interesting to observe that different
IBOs exist per type of GI.
Table 16: IBOs for wine in France per GI type
Production No of IBOs with of which both of which PDO of which PGI
areas GIs PDO/PGI only only

Alsace Lorraine 2 - 1 1
Champagne 1 - 1 -
Bourgogne
5 - 4 1
Beaujolais Jura
Vallée du Rhône
3 - 2 1
Provence
Corse 1 1 - -
Languedoc
4 - 2 2
Roussillon
Midi-Pyrénées 2 1 1 -
Aquitaine 4 - 3 1
Charentes
3 - 2 1
Cognac
Val de Loire
3 - 2 1
Centre
Source: Arcadia International

Demarcating geographic boundaries52 of regional IBOs is rather easy in the large

majority of cases as a majority of regional IBOs are based on geographical indications
(e.g. regional wine IBOs in France). There it is simple to identify e.g. the producers which
are in the IBO and the ones which are not. In Spain, the regional IBOs have been
recognised by the Autonomous Community of Andalucía and therefore their geographic
coverage corresponds to the Andalucía region. In France, several regional IBOs are
limited by their territory in the sense that they are based in islands (e.g. Corsica, la
Martinique, and la Réunion).
The study does not identify any transnational IBO. However, several interviewees
have indicated their interest in creating such transnational organisations especially for
the fresh F&V sector. Discussions have already taken place between the different IBOs
recognised in that sector, and most of them would favour the creation of a pan European
IBO. However, the national and EU legislations were not fully descriptive as regards the
possibility to recognise transnational IBOs. The delegated Regulation (EU) No 2016/23253
recently published clarifies the situation and provides provisions that would allow
recognition of such type of IBOs. Article 2(c) defines transnational IBOs as “transnational
interbranch organisation’ means any interbranch organisation of which the members are
engaged in production, processing or trade in the products covered by the organisation's
activities in more than one Member State“. This delegated Act also provides modalities
and responsibilities of national competent authorities as regards such type of IBOs.
A few IBOs only have seen their recognition withdrawn in the recent years. In France,
this is the case of UNIP (protein crops) and ONIDOL (oil crops) that merged to create the
IBO named Terre Univia in 2015 in order to optimise resources and staff dedicated to
protein and oil crops. This merger of 2 IBOs in one is also explained by the fact that the

52
Article 110.2 COM (2011) 626 final/2 mentions that “economic area shall mean geographic zone made up of adjoining or
neighbouring production regions in which production and marketing conditions are homogeneous”.
53
Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2016/232 of 15 December 2015 supplementing Regulation (EU) No 1308/2013 of
the European Parliament and of the Council with regard to certain aspects of producer cooperation

Page 79
 Study on agricultural interbranch organisations (IBOs) in the EU

responsible persons were the same in the two different IBOs. When the new IBO Terre
Univia has been officially recognised by authorities, both UNIP and ONIDOL recognitions
have been withdrawn.
In the cases listed in Table 17, withdrawal of recognition was due to cessation of
activities.
The few cases of withdrawal of recognition due to cessation of activities read as follows.
Table 17: Withdrawal of recognition of IBOs dues to cessation of
MS IBO (date of withdrawal)
- FIVAL (horses)

- ANIP (pigeon)
FR
- INTERMIEL (honey)

- CNIH (1996)

- OILE (flax) (March 2011)

- AIPEMA (pears and apples) (March 2011)

ES - OIHA (dry fig and derived products) (October 2013)

- IVIM (table wines) (October 2013)

- INTERMOSTO (must and grape juice) (October 2013)

Source: Arcadia International

In France, the three above mentioned IBOs (FIVAL, ANIP, and INTERMIEL) do not exist
any longer. However it seems that, to the contrary of the ones listed for Spain, French
authorities have not officially revoked recognition for these three organisations.
Additionally, it is not clear if the two associations which are based on Law 1901 have also
been withdrawn. The only clear case of withdrawal of recognition and withdrawal of the
legal body (association Law 1901) that has been mentioned during the data collection
process is the CNIH (horticulture) back to September 1996.
In addition to these withdrawals, a few IBOs have reported that they are inactive and
that no activities are currently ongoing (see Table 18).

Table 18: List of non-active IBOs

MS IBO
- INTERCITRUS (citrus)
ES
- INTERMIEL (honey)
- IBO on (Processed) Tobacco
EL
- IBO on Processed Peaches and Pears
Source: Arcadia International

These two lists (Table 17 and 18) may indicate the difficulties to manage and run IBOs in
the honey sector. Interviewees have indicated the specific nature of this sector which is
highly fragmented as it is grouping professional honey producers and “amateur”
producers. It seems that these two groups of actors have different views on a roadmap
for an IBO on honey.

Page 80
 Study on agricultural interbranch organisations (IBOs) in the EU

4.2. History of creation and recognition of IBOs

Figure 7 shows the evolution of the recognitions of IBOs in the EU over the time. In the
last two decades the number of IBOs increased significantly compared to the period
before. In France the growth of the number of IBOs slowed down during the last decade,
while in the other MSs the establishment of the IBOs started to take off.

Figure 8: Evolution of number of IBOs per decade in France and other MS

Source: Arcadia International

The first recognition of an IBO outside France dates back to 1994 with the recognition of
the wine IBO in Hungary. At that time, there were already 31 IBOs recognised in France.
Since then the number of IBOs has continued to grow from 33 in 1994 to 123 (119+4) in
2016.
Out of the 29 IBOs recognised since 2010, 20 were created and recognised after the
entry into force of Regulation (EU) No 1308/2013.

Figure 9: Evolution of number of IBOs since 2013 per MS

8
7
7

4
3 3
3
2 2 2
2
1 1
1

0
EL ES FR HU IT NL PT RO

Source: Arcadia International

About one third of these recent IBOs were created in the Netherlands (Figure 8). Here
public branch organisations (“Productschappen”- product - or commodity - boards) were
dismantled by the end of 2014 and a new national legal framework for IBOs was
established in 2014 based on provisions included in Regulation (EU) No 1308/2013 in

Page 81
 Study on agricultural interbranch organisations (IBOs) in the EU

order to allow national recognition of IBOs in the country. More details on the current
situation in the Netherlands can be found in the Dutch MS sheets.
Interviewees and competent authorities have been asked to indicate if new IBOs are
expected to be created and recognised in the coming years. In France, a new IBO on
honey is under creation for about 2 years already. It seems that negotiations are rather
difficult when it comes to the composition of the new organisation, its governance, and
its financing (e.g. which type of fees? which actors to pay? and how much?). The Dutch
authorities are expected to recognise additional IBOs in 2016, and more particularly for
the horticultural sectors (F&V sector and ornamentals sector). Portugal has also recently
created new IBOs and additional ones are expected in the near future. In Greece, 3 to 4
new IBOs are expected to be created in the coming 2-3 years54. No additional
information is available at this time.

4.3. Stages of the supply chain covered by the IBOs

Information on the stages of the supply chain covered is available for 100 IBOs. The
allocation of members of IBO to the main supply chain stages (primary production, first
processing, second+ processing55, distribution, and retail) has revealed to be a difficult
task as this categorisation of actors does not fit all structures of the variety of agricultural
and food supply chains. For example, the seed or animal feed supply chains are
completely different from others and therefore members of IBOs covering these sectors
cannot be allocated to the above mentioned categories. The retailers in the seed sector
are often the seed companies themselves or agricultural cooperatives which have little in
common with food retailers. For wine, the difficulty is to position the traders
(“négociants”). A wine trader can be a second stage processor (bottling wine) who also
sells bottles or only a seller (buying bottles from producers and only selling it). Then
some IBOs can act as stockbroker, not really trading in products but facilitating trade
between buyers and sellers, however they may be included in commodity trading and
distribution.
Few IBOs are involved in suppling farmers by producing inputs like seeds or feed; here
they are included in the primary production stage.

Figure 10: Membership per supply chain stage (n=100)

Source: Arcadia International

54
According to interviewees
55
Second+ processing refers to the second processing (milk to yoghurt, cheese) and any other further processing
cycle (example: cheese added on pizzas)

Page 82
 Study on agricultural interbranch organisations (IBOs) in the EU

IBOs can be grouped in two main categories56: “short IBOs” and “long IBOs”. By “short
IBOs” we mean IBOs involving only 2 groups of actors (e.g. primary production and first
processing). By “long IBOs” we mean IBOs involving more groups of actors (e.g. primary
production, first processing, and second+ and/or distribution and retail).
The analysis of the IBO sheets clearly identifies another segmentation between the IBOs
covering one single product category (e.g. wine) (“single-product IBOs”) and others
(“multi-product or sectoral IBOs”) covering a sector that includes a large number of
agricultural crops (e.g. fruit and vegetables, cereals, etc.). In the group of “multi-product
IBOs”, one could further segment between the IBOs for one group of crops (e.g. cereals
for which supply chains are rather similar) and several groups of crops (e.g. fruit and
vegetables). In this last case, actors, supply chains and processes are so different that
members of IBO may not know each other57.
The presence of modern retailers58 in IBOs is limited (see Table 19). On the basis of the
analysis of the individual IBO sheets, it can be considered that food retail (modern or
traditional or mass caterers) is present in only 13 IBOs. These IBOs are mainly located in
France and in Spain. Mass caterers are present in only 2 IBOs in France (INTERBEV and
INAPORC).

Table 19: List of IBOS where food retailers are members

MS Acronym Sector Retailers
Other
Asociación Sectorial del Hígado Graso
ES INTERPALM products (foie
gras)
Confederación Española de Detallistas de la Carne
ES INTERPORC Pig meat (CEDECARNE)

Confederación Española de Detallistas de la Carne

ES PROVACUNO Beef and veal (CEDECARNE)

Sheep meat Confederación Española de Detallistas de la Carne

ES INTEROVIC and goat (CEDECARNE)
meat
Fédération des Entreprises du Commerce et de la
Distribution (FCD),Union Nationale des Syndicats de
Fruit and
FR INTERFEL Détaillants en Fruits, Légumes et Primeurs, (UNFD),
vegetables
Restau Co (mass caterers), restauration collective

Fédération des Entreprises du Commerce et de la

Distribution (FCD),Union Nationale des Syndicats de
FR INTERBEV Beef and veal Détaillants en Fruits, Légumes et Primeurs, (UNFD),
Restau Co (mass caterers), restauration collective

Confédération Française de la Boucherie, Boucherie-

Charcuterie, Traiteurs (C.F.B.C.T.), Fédération des
entreprises du Commerce et de la Distribution (F.C.D.),
FR ARIV Poultry meat Confédération Nationale de la Triperie Française
(C.N.T.F.), Syndicat de la vitellerie française (S.D.V.F) –
Commercialisation veaux de boucherie

Trade and Retail Federation (FCD)

FR ARIBEV Beef and veal

56
This segmentation is largely used in France, less in other MSs.
57
Therefore F&V IBOs are often including crops or groups of crops working groups in their governance.
58
Non-traditional or modern retail channel refers to all other formats of retail stores like hyper markets, department stores,
discount stores, electric multiple stores, cash and carry stores, specialty stores, online, and direct selling.

Page 83
 Study on agricultural interbranch organisations (IBOs) in the EU

MS Acronym Sector Retailers

Fédération des Entreprises du Commerce et de la
FR CIP Poultry meat Distribution (FCD)

Other
Trade and Retail Federation (FCD)
FR CNIPT products
(potatoes)
FCD (Fédération du Commerce et de la Distribution),
CFBCT (Confédération Française de la Boucherie,
FR INAPORC Pig meat Boucherie-Charcuterie Traiteurs), CNCT (mass caterers),
RestauCo (mass caterers)

CASA DO APED - Associação Portuguesa Empresas de Distribuição

PT rice
ARROZ
Associação Nacional dos Comerciantes, e Exportadores
de Vinhos e Bebidas Espirituosas (ANCEVE), Associação
PT VINIPORTUGAL wine de Vinhos e Espirituosas de Portugal (ACIBEV),
Associação Nacional de Destiladores de Produtos e Sub-
Produtos (AND)
Source: Arcadia International

4.4. Economic importance of the IBOs in the relevant supply chain &
representativeness
IBOs were invited to provide statistics and information related to their overall importance
(in volume and in value) of the sector in which they are operating, the importance of the
different stages of the supply chain, and the representativeness of members of the IBO
for each stage of the overall supply chain.
The response rate for this series of questions is rather low as less than 40% of
respondents have provided clear evidence.
An additional issue is related to the level of representativeness of IBOs’ members of each
stage of the supply chain. This estimation has proven to be a difficult task especially for
primary production in some Member States. In the majority of cases, IBO members at
primary production level are farmers unions or technical committees of such unions (first
level membership of the IBO). Therefore it can be said that members of farmers union
are members of the IBO via their membership to the union (first level membership of the
IBO). However for these cases, it is not clear who can be considered as members of the
IBO: those individuals who have a membership card of the union or, alternatively, all
individuals who are voting for that union when election for identifying new union
committees and representatives takes place, even if the voters do not have a
membership of the producer organisation or farmers' union?
The difficulty of establishing representativeness is recognised in the CMO Regulation in
Article 164 (3b) as “However, where, in the case of interbranch organisations, the
determination of the proportion of the volume of production, or of trade in, or of
processing of the product or products concerned gives rise to practical difficulties, a
Member State may lay down national rules for determining the specified level of
representativeness referred to in point (a)(ii) of the first subparagraph.” This opportunity
to estimate representativeness on other criteria than volumes is applied in some MS. It
will be discussed in greater detail under Theme 2.
However, a few conclusions can be drawn from information received from IBOs:

Page 84
 Study on agricultural interbranch organisations (IBOs) in the EU

 To the exception of wine producers commercialising products under GIs59,

representativeness rarely reaches 100%. In the majority of cases, it ranges
between 80 and 95%; and
 In general, the level of representativeness is higher in primary production than for
the other stages of the supply chain. However, as referred above, there is very
little assurance that the statistics provided by IBOs are fully accurate.

4.5. Objectives of the IBOs

Eighty six IBOs have provided information about their objectives. However, only 59 IBOs
have provided their Top 5 objectives. The other IBOs have just indicated their objectives
without ranking them.
The following five objectives (Top 5) were mentioned most frequently:
1. Promoting consumption of, and/or furnishing information concerning, products on
the internal market and external markets (28 citations);
2. Improving knowledge and transparency of production and market (23 citations);
3. Provide information and perform the necessary research to innovate, rationalise,
improve and adjust production and, where applicable, processing and marketing
(11 citations);
4. Developing methods and instruments for improving product quality (11 citations);
and
5. Developing initiatives to strengthen economic competitiveness and innovation (10
citations).
Figure 11 provides for an overview of all objectives.

Figure 11: Top 5 objectives of IBOs (n=59)

Source: Arcadia International

Figure 12 shows the percentage of the IBOs per sector that have the objective of
improving knowledge and transparency of production and market and/or the objective of
promoting consumption of products.

59
In wine under GIs, all producers are members of an IBO as they membership to an ODG is mandatory, all producers are de
facto members of the IBO as ALL ODGs are members (directly or indirectly) of the IBOs.

Page 85
 Study on agricultural interbranch organisations (IBOs) in the EU

Figure 12: Importance of top-2 objectives per sector (% of IBOs)

Source: Arcadia International

Table 20 below presents the objectives per MS. It reveals among others the following
differences between countries:
 Improving knowledge and transparency of production and market: relevant
objective for a large majority of IBOs in all eight Member States;
 Promoting consumption of, and/or furnishing information concerning, products on
the internal market and external markets: very relevant objective in Portugal and
Spain, for example, but not in the Netherlands;
 Provide information and perform the necessary research to innovate, rationalise,
improve and adjust production and, where applicable, processing and marketing:
this objective appears to be important in Italy, France and Spain, but much less in
Romania, Greece, and the Netherlands;
 Developing methods and instruments for improving product quality: very relevant
objective in Greece and France, but not so much in Portugal and The Netherlands;
and
 Developing initiatives to strengthen economic competitiveness and innovation:
this objective is of relatively low importance in Romania, Spain, Hungary and
Portugal.

Table 20: Importance of objectives per MS (% of IBOs)

Objective EL ES FR HU IT NL PT RO
Improving knowledge and
100 83 92 100 100 100 80 100
transparency of production
Forecasting of production potential 80 42 53 100 33 14 80 75
Helping to better coordinate
40 75 82 80 67 0 20 75
placing on the market
Exploring potential export market 60 63 66 60 67 0 60 50
Drawing up standard forms of
80 38 42 100 33 10 20 5
contract
Developing initiatives to
strengthen competitiveness 100 58 79 6 100 8 6 5

Page 86
 Study on agricultural interbranch organisations (IBOs) in the EU

Objective EL ES FR HU IT NL PT RO
Provide information and perform
40 83 87 80 100 14 80 50
the necessary research
Seeking ways of restricting the use
of animal-health or plant 20 58 82 20 67 0 40 50
protection products
Developing methods and
instruments for improving product 100 79 89 60 67 0 40 75
quality
Taking all possible actions to
60 33 79 20 100 43 0 50
promote organic farming
Promoting and carrying out
research into integrated, 100 46 87 0 33 43 40 50
sustainable production
Encouraging healthy and
60 58 66 20 67 14 40 75
responsible consumption
Promoting consumption of
60 83 97 60 67 14 100 75
products
Contributing to the management
of by-products and the reduction 40 13 79 0 67 14 0 50
of waste
Source: Arcadia International

The objectives of existing IBOs may have changed over time in order to adapt to
changing socio-economic and political environments.
Leangro (2002) points out that most IBOs in the EU were created to promote specific
crops, address problems arising between actors of the supply chain, plan production and
regulate marketing (including fixing minimum prices). Law 75-600 in France clearly
stipulated that one of the major objectives of IBOs was to regulate market and to
implement market regulation tools60.
A few years down the road, they took on new goals such as promoting consumption,
fostering market transparency, and promoting price transparency. In recent years other
issues have emerged, namely food safety, traceability and environmental protection.
Market regulation and contractual relation objectives have become less predominant with
evolution of the CAP (suppression of direct support, of quotas, etc.).
Approximately only one third of 86 IBOs (26) that have answered the questions on their
objectives appear to have modified them over time to move to more promotion,
marketing, research activities and less market regulation actions. Note, however, that
also a third of the existing IBOs was established after 2010.
Last but not least, this analysis is based on the objectives that IBOs could pursue as
listed in Regulation (EU) No 1308/2013. Additionally to these objectives, it can be
highlighted that IBOs play also a role of lobbyist in the supply chain. This objective has
not been included in this analysis.

4.6. Members and non-members61

4.6.1. Who are the members?
Membership of IBOs is mainly defined pursuant to Article 157 par. 1 a) of Regulation
(EU) No 1308/2013 (IBOs “are constituted of representatives of economic activities
linked to the production and to at least one of the following stages of the supply chain:
the processing of or trade in, including distribution of, products in one or more sectors”).

60
Lederman T., 2001/2002, « La situation juridique des interprofessions agricoles et agroalimentaires au regard du droit
communautaire », Mémoire de fin d’études. Institut des hautes études de droit rural et d’économie agricole.
61
As regards extension of rules

Page 87
 Study on agricultural interbranch organisations (IBOs) in the EU

National legislation doesn’t include more detailed provisions as regards the types of
“organisations” that could be members of IBOs.
Therefore, membership can take a variety of different forms ranging from:
 Individual producers organised in any of the legal forms producers could take.
In several Hungarian IBOs members are individual producers (e.g. poultry,
livestock and meat, F&V). In France, the CIV Corse is composed of wine producers
and of wine traders who have legal personality62;
 Individual private companies (e.g. the members of the seed IBO in Hungary
are individual private companies that are breeding new varieties and possibly
produce seed, then organisations such as cooperatives that produce seeds, and
then private seed merchants organised as private companies are also members of
the IBO);
 Sectoral associations composed of members from the same stage of the supply
chain. This is the majority of cases. E.g. in the Netherlands in the case of DairyNL
the founding members are the Dutch Dairy Processors Organisation NZO
(Nederlandse Zuivel Organisatie) and Dutch Farmers Association LTO (Land- en
Tuinbouw Organisatie), while the members of the OVONED IBO in the Dutch eggs
sector are farmers Association LTO/NOP, sectoral branch organisation for the
trade in eggs ANEVEI and the union of poultry farmers NVP;
 Farmers unions or their sector committees.63 In Spain, farmers unions (e.g.
COAG, ASAJA) are direct members of several IBOs. In France, farmers unions are
present in all national IBOs. The most representative Union (i.e. FNSEA) is
indirectly represented in IBOs via its sector committees (e.g. Fédération Nationale
des Producteurs de lait-FNPL-milk producers national federation). The minority
Unions (e.g. Coordination Rurale, Confédération Paysanne) are members of a few
IBOs under their own legal entity. The same holds for the Netherlands, where LTO
is present in all IBOs as the largest general farmers association, while smaller
farmers unions that are active in a single sector are present in specific IBOs; and
 Non-recognised IBOs (only in France) that can be grouped into two main
categories:
o The regional ones which implement regional actions mandated by a
national IBO (e.g. the Centre Régionaux Interprofessionnels de l’économie
laitière, implement actions decided by the national IBO CNIEL). They are
legally independent from the national IBO, but all their actions are decided
by the CNIEL. A similar organisation is in place in INTERBEV, France's meat
sector IBO;
o The national ones which are independent structures that may be
members of an IB. Such organisations actively implement programmes
approved by the IBO as well as additional actions for the activities they
represent. The most obvious example of this type of IBOs is ANIFELT, the
French IBO on processed F&V, which is composed of 5 members which are
each non-recognised IBOs (see Figure 12).

62
typically in the form of EARL, “enterprise agricole à reponsabilité limitée”, for farmers, and SA, “Société Anonyme”, or
SARL, “Société Anonyme à Responsabilité Limitée”, for traders).
63
Farmers unions are also sectoral associations. A different group is proposed here to highlight the importance of farmers
Unions in IBOs.

Page 88
 Study on agricultural interbranch organisations (IBOs) in the EU

Figure 13: ANIFELT (French processed F&V IBO) structure

Source: ANIFELT web site

ANIFLET's members are non-recognised IBOs that are each working on a
different but complementary perimeter. Most of ANIFELT's actions, if not
all, are implemented by the members. ANIFELT is coordinating all actions
and is the direct link to authorities. The IBO has an overall budget of €
[… ]* million, the bulk of which is managed by its members. ANIFELT
manages directly a budget of only € [….] to cover coordination activities.

* Throughout the text, square brackets denote information which has been
deleted from the text for confidentiality reasons.

The large majority of IBOs are composed of farmers unions at primary level and sectoral
associations for the other stages of the supply chain. The ANIFELT type of structure, in
one hand, and the direct membership of individual producers or traders are the
exception.
When farmers unions are largely present as IBO members, business federations’
presence is rare and is limited to a few IBOs (e.g. presence of the Confederation for
Small and Medium Enterprises-CGPME in the CNIPT - processed potatoes and ARIBEV
(meat in La Réunion) in France).
The number of members per IBO differs a lot, ranging from 4 (the CNIEL in France) to
more than 500 (720 members in OICPOPPA, the poultry meat IBO in Romania). The
number of members per IBO is less than 10 in 65% of cases as shown in Figure 13.

Figure 14: Number of members per IBO per MS

Page 89
 Study on agricultural interbranch organisations (IBOs) in the EU

Source: Arcadia International

4.6.2. Who are the non-members (in the context of extension of rules)?
An IBO is a grouping of several actors of the supply chain. In nearly all cases, not all
actors of the supply chain, from primary production down to retail, are members of the
IBO(s). A minimum of two or more stages of the supply chain are present in the IBO. In
any case, primary production always has to be present present, as well as one additional
stage of the supply chain, which can be either the processing side or distribution or both,
see Article 157 Regulation (EU) 1308/2013.
Non-members are economic actors which are part of the stages of the supply chain which
are forming the IBO, but which are not represented by the members as they are
themselves not members of the IBO members. For example, in the French milk supply
chain, milk producers that are members of the Association des Producteurs de Lait
Indépendants (APLI) are non-members of the milk IBO called CNIEL as the APLI is not a
member of the IBO; and because other producers are represented in the IBO.
These non-members will have to respect the conditions of any agreement which is
extended. Extension rules do not apply to stages of the supply chain which are not
present in the IBOs.

4.7. Governance of the IBOs

From the analysis of the different IBOs we conclude that the top-level governance in a
large majority of IBOs is structured in a similar way. For the lower level governance we
have found two different approaches prevailing: governance based on colleges, and flat
governance.

4.7.1. Top-governance of the IBOs

The top governance of the IBOs is often built on the same several bodies:
 A General Assembly which usually meets once a year. In general, this body is
taking decisions on key issues relating to the basis of the IBO, such as changes to
the statutes, approval of members of the board of directors and the ratification of
certain key decisions taken by the board of directors including the details of
extensions of rules;
 A Board (of directors) that takes the majority of decisions which involves the
economic or financial commitment of the IBO. This includes the approval of
proposals developed by the working groups. The board also mandates working
groups with dedicated tasks;
 Working groups of 2 major forms that could be combined in the same multi-
products IBO :
o Horizontal aspects (promotion, quality, research, etc.); and
o By crop or group of crops (e.g. F&V).
In their domains, working groups typically analyse the various themes and
possible activities, develop strategic plans and propose activities for approval by
the board of directors, and oversee the implementation of the approved activities.
 Experts groups are set-up at the request of working groups or the board to
examine very specific subjects. They are dissolved when their mission is complete.

In general, IBOs are headed by a president, vice-president(s), secretary and

treasurer. Candidates are proposed by the Board (in most of cases based on a
consensus) to the General Assembly that votes. In order to ensure fair representation,
rules have been inserted in the statutes of the IBOs. For example, one approach which is
often observed in “short IBOs” is that the president and treasurer must come from the
same part of the chain (agricultural production or processing) and the vice president and
secretary from the other part of the chain. The length of mandate is variable but in

Page 90
 Study on agricultural interbranch organisations (IBOs) in the EU

general less than 5 years. Other IBOs have a rotating presidency: if today the president
is from the primary sector, next one shall come from another stage of the supply chain.
The day-to-day running of IBOs is taken care of by a manager and, possibly, other staff
members. In most of the French IBOs, staff is in place (in the smallest IBOs, only a
director is in place; in the largest ones, more than 50 staff can work for the IBO). Staff
members attend working group meetings. The manager sits on the board of directors.
4.7.2. Additional governance of the IBOs
The governance presented above describes the structure at the “top” of the IBO only. For
other levels in the IBO, two main approaches exist:
 Governance based on “colleges”; and
 Flat governance.

Governance based on “colleges”

In order to set-up workable governance, French IBOs are, for a large majority of them,
structured per “collège”. Each college represents a professional family (primary
production, first processing, second+ processing, distribution or retail). Therefore all
members of the IBO which are from the IBO stage are part of the same college. The
college is electing representatives who are present in the top governance. This
representation is based on 3 main principles: representativeness, parity, and
unanimity.
Representativeness is the prerequisite of the legitimacy of IBOs in France. The
criterion remains vague and that flexible concept of representativeness is well
appreciated, not quantitatively, but qualitatively as it is seen as functional.64 More
information is presented under Theme 3 (Analysis of the functioning of IBOs).
Parity is secured as each college has the same number of votes at Board and General
Assembly levels. This number of votes varies and is decided by individual IBOs.
Unanimity which has to be reached in order to allow IBO agreements to be extended.
Unanimity has to be proven before submitting a request for extension of rules to the
authorities. If consensus between colleges is not found, agreements cannot be extended.
When it relates to multi-product IBOs (e.g. F&V IBOs), unanimity has to be reached for
concerned parties only (i.e. in case of a request for extension for an agreement on
peaches, unanimity has to found between peaches representatives in the different
colleges, not with other product groups).
This principle of unanimity only applies at the top governance level (general assembly
and board). Within colleges, the decision–making process shows variability. Often, a
majority of 2/3 is requested to take decision in the colleges.

Flat governance
The organisation in colleges is a French specificity that exists in other French economic
and union areas and sectors. It is not specific to IBOs. However, not all French IBOs are
organised in colleges. For example, in INTERBEV (meat IBO), each of the 13 member
organisations has one voice. This “flat” decision making process may lead to difficulties
and longer decision making processes at general assembly and board levels, particularly
when the number of members is larger. However, as most IBOs have fewer than 10
members, in these IBOs the flat governance model prevails.
IBOs outside France have mostly established governance based on this fat governance.
The organisation per college does not exist in the other MS in which IBOs have been
recognised. Therefore most of them are based on governance similar to the INTERBEV
one.

64
Coronel and Liagre; 2006; « les interprofessions agroalimentaires an France » ; available at:
http://www.iram-fr.org/documents/note_redev_interprofession_iram.pdf

Page 91
 Study on agricultural interbranch organisations (IBOs) in the EU

For these IBOs, all members of the organisation are represented at the level of the
General Assembly and of the Executive Board. The actual number of representatives
sitting in such bodies depends on the economic weight that each member has in the
context of the organisation.
The number of votes varies as well as the required majority levels. All these elements
have been established at the creation of the IBOs and are fully detailed in the statutes.
The principle of unanimity generally does not apply for taking decisions unless it is for
request for extension.
Parity is present in several IBOs e.g. OIVE (Olive oil-ES), Ortofrutta Italia (F&V-IT), OIT
(tabacco-IT), and Tej Termektanacs (milk and dairy board-HU). The number of votes is
the same for each branch of the IBO.
All in all, membership follows a hierarchy with different levels of members:
 First level members which are the ones directly in relation with the top-
governance of the IBO and the decision making centres of the organisation. These
are direct producers and companies in the case of a flat governance with only one
level (Hungarian IBOs, CIV-Corse, Overseas IBOs in France);
 Second level members are economic actors which are members of an association
which is member of the IBO. Only the elected representatives of these
associations or organisations are in direct contact with the top-governance of the
IBO; and
 Third level+ members are members of associations, sections, working groups
which are members of the second level members of the IBO. This is for example
the case of the ODGs in the CIVB that can be considered as being a third level
member of the IBO.

4.7. Funding of IBOs (budget; budget evolution, funding, funding sources,

funding evolution)
Seventy two IBOs have provided information regarding their budget and its evolution
over time. Their breakdown per MS is presented in Figure 15.

Figure 15: Provision vs non-provision of budget figures by IBOs

Source: Arcadia International

Page 92
 Study on agricultural interbranch organisations (IBOs) in the EU

Budget is not available for 51 IBOs. This figure includes the 25 IBOs that have not
responded to the IBO questionnaire and 26 IBOs that have responded but considered
that budget information is confidential.

About one third (23) of the 72 IBOs from which budget data is available had a budget
between EUR 100.000 and EUR 1 million. About a quarter (19) had a budget below
EUR 100.000 and 20% (13) had a budget over EUR 10 million (Table 21 and Table 22).

Table 21: Number of IBOs per budget category per Member State
no Current EUR 100,000 < EUR 1 million < current
MS budget budget ≤ EUR current budget current budget ≤ budget > EUR
available 100,000 ≤ EUR 1 million EUR 10 million 10 million
EL 4 2 1 0 0

ES 10 7 4 4 2

FR 18 4 14 15 12

HU 4 0 2 0 0

IT 1 2 0 0 0

NL 0 1 5 0 1

PT 2 1 1 1 0

RO 2 3 0 0 0
Total 41 20 27 20 15
Source: Arcadia International

Table 22: IBOs with a yearly budget of more than EUR 10 million
Current
MS IBO Sector budget (in
K EUR)
ES […]
FR […]
NL […]
ES […]
FR […]
FR […]
FR […]
FR […]
FR […]
FR […]
FR […]
FR […]
Source: Arcadia International

Out of the [..] IBOs with a budget in excess of EUR 10 million, 10 are located in France
(6 of which are regional […] IBOs), 2 in Spain and one in the Netherlands. For some of
the IBOs in the Netherlands with budgets less than 1 million euro in 2015, like […] it is
expected that budgets will increase as extensions of rules and payments have been
granted or are applied for in 2016.

Page 93
 Study on agricultural interbranch organisations (IBOs) in the EU

The average budget is highest in France (EUR 5.5 million), followed by the Netherlands
(EUR 2.3 mio), Spain (EUR 1.5 million), and Romania (EUR 0.9 million) (Figure 15). This
is mainly explained by the fact that 10 French IBOs have a budget of more than EUR 10
million per year.

Average current budgets in Hungary, Portugal, Greece, and Italy were less than EUR
100.000.

Figure 16: Average IBO budget per MS (in K EUR)(n=82)

Source: Arcadia International

The average current budget per sector for IBOs for which budget information is available
ranges from EUR 0.001 to EUR 13 million (Figure 17). The seed sector has to be
considered separately as only one IBO in that sector has provided budget figures, and
the budget of that organisation includes fees levied to cover the cost of resource–
intensive official tasks performed under delegation (i.e. seed certification).

Average current budgets exceed EUR 8.0 million in the sectors cereals, milk and milk
products, wine, and beef and veal. Average current budgets are less than EUR 1.0 million
in the sectors dried fodder, rice, tobacco, and poultry meat.

Figure 17: Average current IBO budget per sector

Page 94
 Study on agricultural interbranch organisations (IBOs) in the EU

Source: Arcadia International

The average current budget of IBOs with a regional coverage (EUR 7.5 million) is over
50% higher than that of IBOs with a national coverage (EUR 4.8 million). This is
explained, again, by the large budget of several French wine IBOs.
From information that has been collected and completed by literature and interviews with
stakeholders, it can be assumed that the main source of funding for IBO is membership
fees paid directly by members and, when extension of rules applies, by non-members.
Members and non-members fees represent about 80 to 90% of the total budget of IBOs.
The second source of funding comes from national and EU subsidies to promotional
activities. These subsidies are based on past and current EU regulations65on information
provision and promotion measures concerning agricultural products implemented in the
internal market and in third countries. When the amounts of these grants are rather
modest compared to the amount of fees collected, they seem to have been very helpful
when starting IBO activities in Spain. Spain was used to provide financial support to
newly recognised IBOs for a limited period of time after the establishment of the
structure, for the launch of the first activities.
That approach stopped in early 2014, leaving IBOs without subsidies. As most of the
Spanish IBOs have never requested extension of rules to collect fees from non-members,
the current financial difficulties being faced by some IBOs can be explained by this
funding stop by MAGRAMA (13 IBOs have yearly budget of less than €1 million when 6
IBOs only have a budget over €million).
Several IBOs in France are currently carrying out official tasks under authorities’
delegation. These tasks are covered by specific CVOs which have been put in place and
collected when delegation applies. There is no official figure regarding the amount of
these CVOs but French authorities estimate that amount of these CVOs is very high. For
example, for animal rendering, those CVOs would amount to €[…] million for all
species.66 Regarding other tasks there is no figure available.
Other sources on funding that have been reported are coming from services to external
parties, and research funds coming from nationally funded projects.

65
The current legislation is Regulation Regulations (EU) No 1144/2014 of 22 October 2014
66
Source: interviews with stakeholders

Page 95
 Study on agricultural interbranch organisations (IBOs) in the EU

4.8. Use of extension of rules

Agreements defined by IBOs are applying to all IBO members. In case of extension of
rules these agreements also apply to non-members. Extension (in general, payment of
fees by importers) can also be requested and granted to imported products from the
same group of products.
Out of a total of 89 IBOs that have replied to the question, only 11 have indicated that
extension applies to imported products (6 IBOs in Spain and 5 in France, see Table
23). Quite obviously, this point is irrelevant for IBOs based on GIs (it is not possible to
import in France “vins de Bordeaux” as all is produced in Bordeaux).
Table 23: IBOs which apply extension to imported products
MS IBO Sector
ES ASICCAZA other products
ES IAOE olive oil and table olives
ES INLAC milk and milk products
ES INTERACEITUNA olive oil and table olives
ES INTEROVIC sheepmeat and goatmeat
ES INTERPORC Pigmeat
FR AILPLBPA milk and milk products
FR GNIS Seeds
FR INTERBEV beef and veal
FR INTERFEL fruit and vegetables
live trees and other plants, bulbs, roots and
FR VAL'HOR the like, cut flowers and ornamental foliage
Source: Arcadia International

When it relates to extension of agreements to non-members, 89 IBOs provided a

response to the question. 39 respondents indicated that they do not extend agreement to
non-members and 50 indicated to use the extension mechanism. Despite all Member
States considered under this section have national provisions allowing for approval of
IBOs’ agreements and extension of their rules and fees to non-members, these
mechanisms are used in practice only in some of them. These are France, Spain,
Hungary, Italy and the Netherlands (see Figure 18).

Figure 18: Number of IBOs requesting extension per MS (n=89)

Page 96
 Study on agricultural interbranch organisations (IBOs) in the EU

35
30
30

25

20 Yes - Fees
Yes - Others
15 13 13
No
10 9
6 6
5
5 4 4
3 3
2 2 2
1 1
0 0 0 0 00 00
0
EL ES FR HU IT NL PT RO
Source: Arcadia International

Extension is being applied mainly in France and in Spain. Figure 19 does not provide a
full picture of the actual situation as it does not take into account the frequency at which
extensions are requested.
France is by far the Member State with the highest average number of extensions of
rules granted on annual basis67. Effectively, the competent authorities of that Member
State receive about 70 to 80 requests for the extension of rules every year. The requests
entailing the extension of rules for the purpose of collecting fees are usually proposed for
a period of three years, whilst most of the other requests are for a shorter period of time
(in general, one year). Over the last three years, requests for extension for collecting
fees represent about 65% of the total number of request (i.e. 133 out of 211). In 2015,
the number of extensions of rules granted by the French authorities amounted to 67.
In Spain, there are currently nine extensions in force applying to different agri-food
sectors, including olive oil, pork and other types of meat and milk and milk products.68
Overall, the extensions of rules involves the collection of fees from non-members for the
pursuit of certain activities that may range from the organisation of promotion campaigns
to initiatives aimed at fostering technological innovation, research and development or at
improving knowledge and information about production and markets. In line with
national law, which requires extension of rules not to exceed five years/marketing
campaigns, most of the extensions of rules currently applicable have a maximum
duration of three marketing campaigns. In only two cases (rabbit meat and olive oil), the
respective extension applies for five marketing campaigns. Overall, this mechanism has
been applied quite regularly in Spain since the adoption of national legislation on IBOs in
1994.
In Italy, the competent authorities have granted the first extension of rules of an IBO
agreement only in 2014 in the fruits and vegetables sector (kiwi), despite a national legal
framework dating back to 1998. The most recent approval of an extension of rules took
place in 2015 and concerned an agreement promoted by the tobacco sector that
established a comprehensive framework for the conclusion of cultivation contracts of raw
tobacco and minimum quality requirements for such product.

67
List available at http://www.economie.gouv.fr/dgccrf/publications/juridiques/panorama-des-textes/Accords-
interprofessionnels
68
List available at http://www.magrama.gob.es/es/alimentacion/temas/interprofesionales-y-contratos-agroalimentarios-tipo-
/organizaciones-interprofesionales-agroalimentarias/

Page 97
 Study on agricultural interbranch organisations (IBOs) in the EU

In the Netherlands, which is the Member State with the most recent national framework
on IBOs, the mechanism of the extension of rules has already been applied within the
sugar, cereals and potato sectors in 2016. In Hungary, the extension of rules has been
granted twice over the period 2014-2015 with regard to the wine and milk and milk
product sectors.
The use of extension is rather limited in other MSs and not used at by IBOs in Greece,
Portugal and in Romania.
Extension of agreements can be granted by competent authorities for collecting fees for a
specific project or a group of projects; see Article 165 Regulation 1308/201369. In
general each request for extension contains several objectives. This leads to the difficulty
to analyse in details the objectives pursued by extensions. In order to identify all
objectives included in extension dossiers, it would be required to look into details in each
request for extension submitted to authorities, and then approved by authorities.
In order to get some order of magnitudes regarding the use of funding collected via
extensions, we have analysed the list of extensions accepted by the French authorities
and published on the DGCCRF website70, to identify for which objective(s) the request
was submitted. This analysis has considered the most recent data for a period of three
years (as several requests cover an extension for a three year period).

Figure 19: Type of extensions per objective (in %) (FR-2013-2014-2015)

80
70
70 67

60
48
50
2015
40
32
2014
30
2013
20 13
10 12 10 08
10 07 07
01 01 03 03 05
00
CVO Quality Subsidies Market regulation Delegation official Other
tasks

Source: Compiled by Arcadia International based on information available on the DGCCRF web site

69
Article 165 par. 4 of Regulation (EU) No 1308/2013 stipulates that the rules for which extension to other operators may be
requested shall have one specific aim as listed in that article (16 different aims/objectives are listed under this article).
70
http://www.economie.gouv.fr/dgccrf/publications/juridiques/panorama-des-textes/Accords-interprofessionnels

Page 98
 Study on agricultural interbranch organisations (IBOs) in the EU

Figure 20 shows that when consulting the title of the extension dossier, it is not possible
to assign the request to a specific task/objective in about 60% of cases (CVO + Other)71.
The following table, which is the single reference presenting a forecast of the use of the
fees collected through extensions in France (CVOs) that has been identified during the
study, presents a more detailed profile. However, it is still about one-third (EUR 87
million of “others” and EUR 19 million of technical assistance) that does not directly
relate to one of the objectives that an IBO could pursue). The exact sampling and list of
IBOs included in the summary presented below is not known.
Table 24: Used of CVOs in France – 2010-2011

Number of CVO Technical Research &

Quality Marketing Others
IBOs assistance Development
EUR Million In %
Beverage 27 110.66 36.26% 12.23 1.52 2.51 65.66 28.64
Meat 7 50.93 16.69% 0.62 0.55 2.11 23.30 24.23
Seeds 1 43.49 14.25% 1.80 20.97 3.30 5.72 11.70
Field crops 9 40.28 13.20% 1.21 0.76 28.19 11.05 -0.92
Milk products 2 39.83 13.05% 1.37 2.51 3.14 18.26 14.56
Fruits and vegetables 6 19.98 6.55% 1.63 0.60 1.46 7.37 8.92
Total 52 305.19 100.00% 18.86 26.91 40.70 131.36 87.14
Source: compiled by Arcadia International based of statistics from Ministry of Agriculture and Cour
des Comptes in France

71
Article 165 par. 4 of Regulation (EU) No 1308/2013 stipulates that the rules for which extension to other operators may be
requested shall have one specific aim as listed in that article (16 different aims/objectives are listed under this article).

Page 99
 Study on agricultural interbranch organisations (IBOs) in the EU

PART 5: ANALYSIS OF THE FUNCTIONING AND BENEFITS OF IBOS

(THEME 3)
This chapter includes a full analysis of the functioning and benefits of IBOs. It completes
the inventory of existing IBOs (Theme 2) and national legislation (Theme 1) in all 28
Member States, with a review and analysis of the role, functioning and effect of IBOs
within the food supply chain in different sectors and MS.
The analysis is based on a series of five case studies of existing individual IBOs:
 CIVB (Wine – Bordeaux) in France;
 FruitVeb (Fruit and vegetables) in Hungary;
 IAOE (olive oil) in Spain;
 INTERPORC (pigmeat) in Spain; and
 ZuivelNL (milk) in the Netherlands.

The variability of situations which is presented under Theme 1 and Theme 2, in terms of
i.a. national legislation, history of recognition of IBOs, structure, organisation of
individual IBOs and their maturity, leads to a situation where general conclusions cannot
be drawn from the analysis of these few cases only. Therefore in order to complete the
analysis, findings from literature review (mainly French literature) are added to sub-
chapters which are discussed under this part.
The functioning of the IBOs is analysed with respect to the objectives set out in the CMO
Regulation, including general and sector-specific objectives. The analysis is carried out in
relation to the CAP objective of viable food production.

Such analysis can only be conducted by considering the overall and specific environments
of the supply chain in which the IBO performs. Three specific external elements have
been considered as important factors in the analysis as each of them influence the role
and functioning of IBOs:
 The first factor is the history of development and recognition of IBOs in different
countries;
 Secondly it is important to understand the dynamic of actors and group of actors
in the supply chain and to position the IBOs in that overall dynamic. The role of an
IBO will be different if a given supply chain is highly concentrated or not, if the
number of groupings is high or low, if IBOs are in place for a long time or not
(maturity); and
 Contractual relationship between actors is also of key importance in this analysis.
The role and functioning of an IBO will again be different in a supply chain where
integration between primary production and first processing is high (e.g. most of
sectors in Spain, poultry and seed in France, Milk in the Netherlands) compared to
supply chains which are not integrated (e.g. F&V).

Therefore in support and in introduction to the analysis, each of these 3 external factors
is briefly described below in order to better understand the functioning of the IBOs and
the challenges they are facing.

5.1. Key elements to understand the IBOs functioning and their challenges
5.1.1. Lessons from history
This section presents a brief history of the development of vertical cooperation forms in
different EU Member States; starting from France and enlarging to many other Member
States.

Page 100
 Study on agricultural interbranch organisations (IBOs) in the EU

5.1.1.a. IBOs in France

The gestation of vertical organisation in agri-food-chain began about 100 years ago
during the 1920s. From then, the evolution of IBOs essentially followed the rhythm of
political and economic main events, with at first the Front populaire (1936-1938) and the
Régime de Vichy (1940-1944).
The First World War has strongly impacted agriculture. The importance of human losses
was such as it implied to intensify agriculture and to enhance labour productivity. As a
consequence, French government set up local “offices” for selecting animal breeds and
created an industrial national “office” of the azote in 192072. At the same time,
producers’ movement grew, especially with the “central office of Landerneau” that sold
most of local agricultural supply. Moreover, during the twenties, some specialised
cooperation structures appeared – Confederation of the planters of beets, 1921; General
Association of Milk 1924, General Confederation of Fruits and Vegetables, 1932;
“Interbranch Committee of Wheat Imports”, 193373 - and contributed to find agreements
particularly in the context of overproduction (beets, 1922 and 1931 to 1937 for e.g.).
These were the first steps towards professional (farmers) and “interbranch” (farmers,
processors and traders) organisations. It was also the first steps of self-discipline or self-
regulation, most of the time but not systematically under State supervision. The State
imposed its presence in the wine sector at the end of this first period with the Décret-loi
of the 8.08.1935 requiring quota agreements and with the creation of the “Service of
alcohol”74.
The French “new deal”, qualified as “abortive” by Wright (1964, 58), was initially marked
by the “irruption of the State in the agricultural economy” in order to develop a modern
agriculture for mass production75.This approach leads to the creation of the National
Interbranch Office of wheat (ONIB) in 193676 that aimed to address the persistent
imbalance of French wheat market by intervention on the market (purchase, storage and
sale).
During the Second World War, a new reform was implemented with the aim of imposing
a hierarchic, quasi-mandatory (in fact) and only horizontal organisation. This reform
planned the creation of specialised groups by production. Initially thought under the
power of National Corporative Council and syndicates, they have been finally created
without any reference to the law of 1940 and organised as vertical organisations under
the order of State. On that basis, were created several groups that may be qualified as
IBOs: for Cognac (1940)77, Champagne (1941)78 and sweet wine (1943)79, beet sector
(1940)80, linen (1941)81, meat (1941)82 and cider fruits (1942)83. Because of the war,
their mission was focused on management of food shortage.
At the end of war, the context was characterised by the necessity to increase productivity
and thus to modernise agriculture. To reach this goal84, a plan, called “Plan Monnet”,
using “Marshall Plan” financing, was established. Therefore the development of
interprofessions was reinforced. The 1953 economic crisis led to another State reform85

72
National Industrial Office of Nitrogen (azote) (ONIA), 1920.
73
The General Confederation of Winemakers was already created in 1907.
74
Décret 18.12.1935. Removed in 1985 when skills transferred to ONIVIN and FIRS.
75
Danet, 1982, 63
76
National Interbranch Office of wheat (ONIB) or Office of Wheat, Law 15.08.1936. Become ONIC in 1940, ONIGC in
2006.
77
Loi 27.12.1940, Office of distribution of wines and brandies. Becamed BNIC (1946).
78
Loi 12.041941, Interbranch Committee of Wine of Champagne (CIVC).
79
Loi 2.04.1943, Interbranch Committee of Protected Origin sweet Wines and Liquors.
80
Loi 7.08.1941, National Interbranch Group of Beet Production (GNIPB).
81
Loi 22.07.1941, National Interbranch Group of linen (GNIL).
82
Loi No 14194, 1.10.1941 and no 383 2.08.1943, National Interbranch Group of Seeds and Plants.
83
Loi 28.07. 1942, National Interbranch Group of Cider Fruits.
84
Faure, 1966, 109
85
Regulation 53-933, Décret, 30.09.1953.

Page 101
 Study on agricultural interbranch organisations (IBOs) in the EU

in which the government opted for the set-up of Intervention Society (sociétés
d’intervention) on agricultural markets aiming at prices regularisation by purchase,
storage and sale action). These organisations were interbranch private bodies but strictly
controlled by State86: INTERLAIT in milk sector87; SIBEV in cattle production88; SNIPOT in
potatoes sector89, IVCC in wine sector90; SIOFA for Oleaginous91; SIPA in poultry sector;
SONITO for tomatoes92.
The adoption of the CAP in 1962)93 with the European Agricultural Guidance and
Guarantee Fund (EAGGF) led to the set-up of the French Guidance and Regularisation
Fund of agricultural Markets (FORMA, Décret 61-827 29.07.1961) and the beginning of a
period during which several reforms have been adopted (1960, 1962, and 1964).94 The
FORMA95, composed by representatives from the agri-food chain and State, was together
one of the instrument to distribute European funds from the CAP (e.g. refund and levy)
and a sort of supervisor/coordinator of part of the French interbranch system
(INTERLAIT, SIBEV and SNIPOT). Progressively, it lost its competencies to the benefit to
other State agencies or to private IBOs96.
In 1974, the situation of the French interprofessions was not very different than in 1964:
State agencies, called “Offices” (e.g. FORMA, ONIC, ONIBEV) were co-existing with
private interbranch bodies. In early 1975, a new Regulation97 was adopted to define a
new legal background to the agricultural interprofessions9899. This law set-up the main
principles as regard recognition of interprofessions, the rules for governance, as well as
the main objectives that an IBO could pursue. This law also included the possibility for
interprofessions to draw agreements that could be extended to non-members.
With the creation of several new interprofessions, state agencies were coexisting with
private interprofessions. Thus, once again, the situation is not very different than before
even if the government was obviously in favour of a stronger control of state on agri-food
chain. The distribution of competencies between the two types of bodies was quite clear.
Offices were the national arm of the CAP, thus they controlled the payments, and private
interprofessions received part of the European fund via the offices. Interprofessions were
supposed to regulate their sector (self-discipline), but offices had originally also the
ability to develop or participate to action on the market. The mission of the offices was
simplified in 1986 and some tasks were transferred from offices to interprofessions100.

86
Malezieux, 1973, 291-294
87
Arrêté 1954 and Loi Laborde 1957. Became ONILAIT in 1999.
88
Arrêté 1954. Under the FORMA in 1961 ; became ONIBEV in 1974, OFIVAL in 1983 ; dissolution 1998.
89
Arrêté 1954. Under the FORMA in 1961, then under ONIFLHOR in 1983 ; dissolution 1999.
90
Décret No 54-437 du 16 avril 1954. Became ONIVIT in 1976.
91
Arrêté 1955. Became SIDO in 1970.
92
Arrêté 1957. We may mention that during this period was also created the Interbranch Comitee of wine of Côte-de-
Provence (Loi No 56-627, 25.06.1956); the Interbranch National Union for cider (1957) and the Interbranch Union of
wine of Beaujolais (Décret 25.09.1959).
93
CAP was planned in the Treaty of Rome (25.03.1957) but implemented further: first COM: Fruits and vegetable 1962;
Milk 1964.
94
Other events have to be mentioned: creation of IBOs in canned vegetables (UNILEC, 1961), button mushroom (ANNIC
1962) and prune (BIP, 1962) that will create, with the SONITO, the IBOS Fruit and vegetable (CLIF 1962).
95
It was a state agency : établissement public à caractère industriel et commercial (EPCI)
96
For example, after the European Sugar CMO established, the Guidance and Regularisation Fund of Sugar was created and
recovered skills of FORMA for the sugar market (Décret 68-616 9.07.1968). So did in their sectors the Interbranch
Society of Oleaginous, Protein Crops and Textile Plants (SIDO, Arrêté 12.01.1970) and the Interbranch National Office
of Cattle and Meat (ONIBEV, Décret 72-1067 1.12.1972).
97
Loi n°75-600, 10.07.1975 relative a l'organisation interprofessionnelle agricole.
98
It also created the Conseil supérieur d’orientation des productions agricoles CSOPA (see also décret 75-934) and revised
the FORMA.
99
Chevalier, 1976, §33-37
100
Loi n°86-1321, 30.12.1986 relative à l'organisation économique en agriculture.

Page 102
 Study on agricultural interbranch organisations (IBOs) in the EU

From 1998 until 2009, offices have been suppressed. First the intervention societies were
suppressed and their responsibilities were transferred to the offices. Law No 2006-11101
reformed once again the regime of offices and impacted even more the system. The
Single Agency of Payment (AUP) was created to carry out main responsibilities of the
former offices. This was followed by the creation of the new Agency of Services and
payments (ASP) that took over the responsibilities of the AUP and that oversees activities
of the newly created National Establishment of Products of Agriculture and Sea
(FranceAgriMer) which is one of the four payment agency in France today.
FranceAgrimer has also some responsibilities vis-à-vis private interprofessions. It is
responsible for monitoring the markets and provides economic expertise in all sectors of
competences (education and monitoring markets102) to help operators in their
development strategies, and organise dialogue and consultation in the implementation of
public policies in consultation with business organisations that are represented on its
Board of Directors as well as in the eleven specialised Councils.
History shows that when French Government decided to give a legal background to
private IBOs, for example to develop self-discipline rules or standard-contracts, it worked
only if the sector was already structured and the different actors ready to work together.
Therefore establishing official institution by law (e.g. recognition procedure) or organising
legal extension procedure for agreements of IBOs may be a necessary condition, but
cannot change the socio-economic reality of the supply chains.
Additionally, it can be highlighted that, over time, public intervention as regards vertical
cooperation of supply chain actors has changed several time during the last 80 years. At
a certain time, these cooperation structures were public, later they became private.
These changes make that, in the working principles, differences between interprofessions
and offices are not always so clear. This mixing conception of interprofessions (public vs.
private, interprofessions vs. offices) is not the fruit of a theoretical thought but the result
of several legal experimentations confronted to actors’ behaviours and socio-economic
situations. Nevertheless, we must underline that in the volatile and unbalanced context
of agri-food chain, the fact that state has always been one of the pillar of the different
system of the interprofessions has been one of the main factors of their sustainability103
as public authorities have acted/are acting, through these public bodies (e.g.
FranceAgrimer), as an interface between the different economic private actors present in
IBOs during conflicts.

5.1.1.b. IBOs: a French exception?

Commodity associations which main goal is to act for the common interest of all their
different members is often seen as a French particularity. The original idea behind this
concept is generally attributed to “interprofessional” organisations in the wine and spirits
industry already at the end of the 19th century in order to protect product denominations
from usurpation and to build a common industry strategy104. In the EU, this history is
reflected in the number of IBOs that were recognised in the 1990s. From that period, the
evolution of the number of IBOs and the comparison between France and other EU MS
show that the number of IBOs tends to quickly increase in several EU countries when the
number of IBOs in France is stable as IBOs are recognised in nearly all agricultural
sectors. During the last 25 years the total number of IBOs has been multiplied by more
than two (from 56 to 123:119+4).

101
Loi No 2006-11, 5.01. 2006 d'orientation agricole ; completed by Décret No 2006-634, 31.05.2006 relatif aux organismes
d'intervention agricoles et modifiant le titre II du livre VI du code rural.
102
FranceAgrimer is responsible for the French Observatory of prices and margins in agriculture and food.
103
Statement made by several interviewees and by the French competent authorities.
104
Cadilhon and al.; 2011; “Commodity associations: a widespread tool for marketing chain management.”; Centre for
studies and strategic foresight.

Page 103
 Study on agricultural interbranch organisations (IBOs) in the EU

Figure 20: Evolution of number of IBOs (France vs. other EU MS) (1990-2016)

Other
EU MS Other EU
12 MS 60 France 63

France
44

Total: 56 Total: 123

Source: Arcadia International

In addition, many EU countries have developed cooperation schemes between actors and
commodity associations within the supply chain which are operating together with
existing IBOs or not.
In Spain, In Spain, the origins of the current IBOs may be traced back to 1932. Indeed,
that year, during the short existence of the Second Spanish Republic, the country
adopted its first comprehensive legal framework for the regulation of the wine sector. In
that context, the legislator had foreseen the establishment of cross-sectoral bodies,
known as “Consejos Reguladores”, which, composed of representatives of wine
growers and exporters, were tasked with setting rules for the production and the
marketing of wines protected as designations of origins under the supervision of and
following the approval of the competent authorities.
Subsequently, during the last years of Franco’s dictatorship the legal regime governing
these bodies was largely reviewed through the adoption of Ley 25/1970, which laid down
a new national framework for wine and spirits. In accordance with the new framework,
“Consejos Reguladores” acquired a hybrid legal status since they were considered as
decentralised structures of the country’s Autonomous Communities though subject only
to private law.
Following that, the idea of establishing vertical organisations that could facilitate the
cooperation between the different actors of the food supply chain started to be publicly
debated in Spain only in the late 1970s of the last century, following the instauration of
the post-Franco democratic regime. At that time, the country lacked an adequate legal
framework that could serve this purpose but, most importantly, did not have a
sufficiently organised agri-food sector on which such cooperation could be possibly build
on. It was then mostly thanks to the initiative of the public authorities that the notion of
“interbranch agreements”, as we know them today, made its first appearance in the
national legislation in the early 1980s.
More precisely, Ley 19/1982 established an ambitious legal framework for the regulation
of contractual relations regarding agricultural products. In so doing, it laid down, among
others, requirements for the elaboration of standard purchase contracts and interbranch
agreements, by allowing the negotiation of such contracts only where cross-sectoral
agreements had been previously finalised. Overall, the legal framework designed by Ley
19/1982 prompted little interest from stakeholders and especially from manufacturers
and their representative organisations. For this reason, later legislation no longer linked
standard contracts to interbranch agreements.
Ten years later, in the early 1990s, manufacturers and their professional organisations
brought back the issue of vertical cooperation within the food supply chain to public
attention. Because of the rising economic pressure exerted by retailers, they realised the

Page 104
 Study on agricultural interbranch organisations (IBOs) in the EU

benefits that cooperation with primary producers could bring about under these
circumstances. This led to the adoption of the first dedicated national framework for
IBOs, i.e. Ley 38/1994. Largely modelled on the French experience where IBOs had
proved to be valuable platforms for structuring the dialogue between stakeholders of the
food supply chain, this legislation has undergone some significant changes over time,
although its core principles are still applicable today.
In the Netherlands, interprofessional institutions have been developed after the Second
World War with the set-up of the “productschappen” in between 1954 and 1956, inter-
professional organisation recognised under public law to which registration was
mandatory. These structures had the same objectives like the (private) IBOs, and,
mainly organisation and knowledge of the supply chain (statistics, market survey, rules
for quality) combined with social objectives (e.g. professional training, working
conditions). The “productschappen” had also competencies of co-management of the
supply chain meaning that the competent authorities could ask the “productschappen” to
implement public decisions. These structures can be compared to the French “Offices”. In
early 2010s, the Dutch authorities have decided to suppress the “productschappen” in
the context of public savings. To replace these public organisations, several IBOs have
been created in the last 5 years (as presented under Part 3).
In the UK, there is no interprofessional organisation per sector. Market regulation was
based on the “marketing boards” during the years 1960s to 1990s before they were
disbanded. For example, in milk, the Milk Marketing Board (MMB) was replaced by its
four divisions as independent businesses, with the marketing arm taken over by Milk
Marque. The Government made it clear at the time that no vertically integrated successor
organisation of the European model was desirable, and the UK dairy industry was left
without a cooperative structure to assist in protecting it. Many years of consolidation
have followed and Milk Marque itself was disbanded in 2000 following a further
competition law challenge over the way it set the price for milk.
In Germany, there is no comparable system to the French system. The only type of
organisation that can be found in the supply chain as regard vertical integration is
federations that are providing consultancy (technical, marketing, legal) to their members.
In addition, the cooperatives which are very strong in Germany are opposed to the set-
up of such type of organisations as they see these as potential threats.
In Belgium, several interprofessions exist. They are quite similar to the French ones in
term of structure and activities but none of them (e.g. Intersemza for seeds) has
requested to be recognised by competent authorities.
In Denmark, country in which cooperatives are well developed, interprofession
organisations take place in the context of export committee the mission of which is to
support promotion of export, as well as research and quality.
In Ireland, a marketing cooperative (the “Irish Dairy Board”) aims at developing milk
and milk products exports; and an interterprofessional organisation created by the
government is in charge of promoting beef and pig meat at export.
The term “inter-branch organisations”, “organisations interprofessionnelles” or
“organizaciones interprofesionales agrarias” are not widely used at international level
and in the Anglo-Saxons countries giving the first impression that this type of vertical
arrangements within the agro-food supply chain is an European specificity built on the
French model of “inter-professions”.
However, literature shows that organisations that bring together a wide spectrum
of interest groups related to a particular commodity or sector in a particular
country is rather common in most agricultural countries being developed or not.
They are generally called “commodity associations/organisations”.
First the French system has gradually been exported in many Francophone African
countries in West-Africa where the same principles have been promoted, either

Page 105
 Study on agricultural interbranch organisations (IBOs) in the EU

through the initiative of French technical assistance or because of promotion by

government themselves. For example, in Senegal, there are associations covering
peanuts, horticulture, processing tomatoes, milk and fish. One characteristics of the
situation in these countries is that the legal status inter-professional associations remains
unresolved in many countries.
In the USA, many commodity associations or councils cover the entire chain. Examples
include the U.S. Apple Association, the American Soybean Association, and the American
Sugar Alliance. They have a variety of structures, but do not follow the inter-professional
model in that members usually join on an individual basis, although committee members
are frequently nominated by state and other associations. The same type of
organisations exists in South-Africa
An alternative approach to commodity chain consultation is found in industry discussion
forums such as the “tables-filière” of Québec, Canada. These were developed in the
early 1990s as a response to a deficit in Québec’s terms of trade for agrifood products.
They are less formal arrangements than associations and bring together actors from
different sectors of a commodity chain for ad hoc meetings, with the secretariat being
provided by the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food. Each table-filière consists of
representatives of producers, processors, distributors and government agencies. A
similar approach has been developed in several countries such as Brazil and other
South-American countries.
Cadilhon and Dedieu105 have compared the French system with different types of
commodity associations providing a first overview of the different type of vertical
arrangements in the supply chain. Although commodity associations around the world
share similar major objectives, they can be distinguished by the way they function and
their relation with public authorities. The main characteristics and governance modalities
of several types of associations between actors within the supply chain are presented in
the table below.
Table 25: Simplified comparison of different types of commodity associations
France USA South Africa Canada
Name Inter-profession Commodity Commodity Value chain
Council forum roundtable
Not-for-profit Not-for-profit Not-for-profit
Legal status association association organisation None
Statutory
recognition criteria
Yes No Yes Yes
fixed by
Government
Possibility of
extending the
decisions of the Yes No Yes Yes
association to the
whole industry
Representative Representative Individuals
Individuals
associations or associations or representing
representing the
unions from the unions, industry
Members different
stages of the individual branches and
industry actors,
commodity businesses concerned
including
marketing chain institutions
labourers and

105
Cadilhon and Dedieu. 2011. Commodity associations: a widespread tool for marketing chain management. Centre for
studies and strategic foresight. No 31June 2011

Page 106
 Study on agricultural interbranch organisations (IBOs) in the EU

France USA South Africa Canada

consumers
Representativeness Compulsory to Necessary for Decided by the
in decision making become extension of members
of all the activity statutory No decisions according to the
sectors that are issue to be
member handled
Activity sectors of Defined by the No limitation Defined by the Decided by the
members founding act of founding act of members
the organisation the organisation according to the
issue to be
handled
Parity between Compulsory to
activity sectors in become No No No
decision making statutory
2/3 majority
Mode of decision Unanimity for vote of
Majority vote Consensus
making extension of members and of
decisions total production
Compulsory Registration Registration No own funds
levies on the fees, compulsory fees,
sales of the levies compulsory
Funding of the whole industry, levies, voluntary
organisation registration fees levies
of members,
voluntary levies
from members
Source: Cadilhon and Dedieu. 2011. Commodity associations: a widespread tool for marketing
chain management. Centre for studies and strategic foresight. No 31 June 2011

5.1.2.Mapping of groups of actors in the supply chain

In the strict economic sense the market players in the agricultural supply chain are the
individual companies or organisations of companies that form the different stages that a
product passes through from its beginning at the farm to the final sale to consumers.
These companies are in a form of dependency towards each other and transactions
between them occur as the product moves along the supply chain. Transactions are
governed by markets, contracts and other forms of cooperation.
Although IBOs do not produce or trade products themselves, they do play a role in
the economic structure of the supply chain. IBOs can influence the economic
performance of the supply chain by e.g. publishing aggregated statistical data on prices,
volumes and costs of production, helping to improve product quality or the way the
products are placed on the market (see objectives of IBOs in the CMO). By means of
collective research, production processes and product characteristics are improved, which
influences the functioning of the market.
IBOs, besides from the individual companies that constitute the supply chain, are not the
only organisations that influence the functioning of the supply chain.
Within the very structure of the supply chain, there are often many forms of cooperation
and different types of consultative bodies. These are exerting influence on production and
demand:
 Governments and public bodies like food safety authorities, competition
authorities and customs organisations monitor and control the market and the
conduct of the supply chain participants. Numerous non-profit organisations also
affect the supply chain;

Page 107
 Study on agricultural interbranch organisations (IBOs) in the EU

 Producer Organisations (POs) that exist in the EU since 1962, date of the first
PO106. They can group themselves into associations of producer organisations
(APOs) and participate in IBOs. POs (unlike IBOs) are economic organisations that
assist in the distribution and marketing of products. But like IBOs they also
promote a higher quality of products and encourage their members to adopt good
environmental practice.107 Legally recognised POs are eligible for support by EU
subsidies for the implementation of their operational programmes in the fruit and
vegetable sector;
 Producer associations and branch organisations that are not officially
recognised by authorities. As long as they do not infringe EU or national law,
notably competition law, producers may cooperate. Some producer organisations
and branch organisations do intentionally not seek for EU or national recognition,
as they think that the benefits do not outweigh the costs. As both recognised and
non-recognised POs perform comparable activities it is very difficult to establish
the benefits of POs and IBOs by just looking at recognised POs and IBOs; and
 Cooperatives (POs can also be cooperatives) have emerged in many EU
countries, but not to the same extent everywhere. According to Bijman et al
(2012) (based on SFC Cooperative Index), in 2010, cooperatives were most
prominent in Finland, the Netherlands and Denmark.108 In Romania, Bulgaria,
Luxemburg and Cyprus, no or very few cooperatives are found. The existence of
cooperatives has been influenced by social, historical and cultural differences
between countries. Gijselinckx and Bussels (2012) explain that trust in political
institutions and general trust (trust in people) correlates positively with the
membership intensity of cooperatives.109 A major part of the correlation can be
explained by political history. MS that have had a long history of communism
display a much lower intensity of cooperative membership than other EU
countries. In the EU, the total market share of cooperatives is the highest in dairy,
wine, fruit and vegetables and olives. In these sectors the total market share of
cooperatives exceeds 35%.

In addition to these collaborative platform that are present in various supply chains, it
should also be mentioned the presence of other inter-branch organisations, other
“interprofessions” which are fulfilling the same objectives than IBOs but which have not
been recognised by authorities (“non-recognised IBOs”). In Belgium, there are so far
no recognised IBOs. Yet, the term “interprofession” (literally, "interbranch organisation")
is widely used in Belgium, including for organisations that are not IBOs in the meaning of
this study. For example the “Comité Interprofessionel Maraîcher” is a group of vegetables
producers, which acts more as a producer organisation than an IBO. In other cases, the
membership, objectives, working principles and governance of the organisation are
similar to those of IBOs, but the organisation has never applied for recognition. That is
the case for the IVB (Interprofessionele Vereniging voor het Belgisch vlees), which is
composed of different federal and regional trade associations from all activities of the
supply chain (from feed production down to retail). Moreover, representatives of several
public authorities (food safety, finance, taxes, and regional ministries) sit on the IVB as
observers.
Another type of interbranch organisations is based on organisations that are
recognised as interprofessional organisation but on a different legal basis than
Regulation (EU) No 1308/2013. In the French sugar sector, the two IBOs (the
Association interprofessionnelle de la betterave et du sucre-AIBS for sugar from beets

106
SICA Saint Pol de Leon - France
107
http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/glossary/producer-organisation_en.htm
108
SFC index: the estimated market share of all cooperatives at farm gate sales level weighted for eight sectors. See Bijman
et al, 2012. https://www.wageningenur.nl/en/show/Support-for-Farmers-Cooperatives.htm
109
https://www.wageningenur.nl/en/show/Support-for-Farmers-Cooperatives.htm

Page 108
 Study on agricultural interbranch organisations (IBOs) in the EU

and the Comité Paritaire interprofessionnel de la canne et du sucre-CPCS for sugar from
cane co-exist with the CIPS (Comité Interprofessionnel des Productions Saccharifères).
The CIPS was created first by ministerial decree110. Its mission is different from any
objective of the IBOs as it is to examine all matters relating to relationships between
actors of the sector, and in particular to prepare interbranch agreements based on Law
No 68-678111, in accordance with Community rules.
In the large majority of cases, these different organisations are working on their own.
Collaboration may exist but case by case. An exception has been identified. Non-
recognised IBOs can be integrated within IBOs as demonstrated by the example of
ANIFELT (frozen fruit and vegetable IBO in France) (see section 5.2).
When considering the overall situation and mapping of the main commodity associations
in a given supply chain, it can be observed that the (large) variability of IBOs in terms of
organisation and structure which is described under Theme 2 is reduced when the overall
organisation of all these associations (recognised and non-recognised IBOs) is
considered, as demonstrated by the French example below.
Table 26: Mapping of IBOs and non-recognised IBOs in France
Wine sector (FR) Milk sector (FR) Beef sector (FR)
Centre national Association nationale
Conseil National
Interprofessionnel de inter-professionnelle du
National Interprofessional des
l'Economie Laitière bétail et des viandes
vins (CNIV)
(CNIEL) (INTERBEV)
25 individual IBOs
13 regional centers
Regional (e.g. CIVA, CIVB, 20 regional committees
(CRIEL)
CIVC,…)
In bold, the IBOs pursuant to Article 632-1 of French Code Rural

Finally, the last type of interbranch organisations that could be confused with recognised
IBOs pursuant to Article 157, 158 of Regulation (EU) No 1308/2013 is public
interbranch organisations such as the former “Productschappen“ (Commodity boards)
in the NL and the Product Councils in Hungary. These structured were performing similar
tasks than IBOs but had a public legal basis.
5.1.3. Contractual relationships between actors within the supply chain
Lannarelli (2012)112 provides a complete description as regards the development of
contracts in the agro-food supply chain. According to the author, who is summarising a
vast body of literature, contract farming (or production contracts, or out-grower
schemes) can be defined as a system for the production and supply of agricultural and
horticultural products by farmers or primary producers under advance contracts. The
relationships and cooperation between farmers and the buyers of their output may take 3
main forms:
1. Spot markets are governed by immediate market transactions with no prior or
post-purchase commitments on the part of buyers or suppliers. Buyers have no
prior involvement in terms of what is produced, when it will be available; and the
means of productions. In this context, market organisations such as auctions and
verbal agreements play an important role in some sectors;
2. At the extreme, there is vertical integration, of e.g. production and the first
processing stage, where at least two stages of the same supply chain are owned
by the same actor, for example, a milk processor that also owns a dairy farm, a
wine traders who is also a grape producer; and

110
Décret n°69-308 du 3 avril 1969 Groupement National Interprofessionnel de le Betterave, de la Canne et des industries
productrices de sucre et d’alcool (GNIBC)
111
Loi n°64-678 du 6 juillet 1964 tendant à définir les principes et les modalités du régime contractuel en agriculture.
112
Iannarelli, A. (2012). Contractual Frameworks and Inter-firm Co-operation in the Agricultural Sector. Unif. L. Rev., 17,
247.

Page 109
 Study on agricultural interbranch organisations (IBOs) in the EU

3. In between these two extremes, there are various types of vertical

cooperation, of which contracting is the most common. Buyers and
suppliers remain as distinct, separate actors but agricultural production is
supervised by pre-arranged terms in a written contract. Contracting is therefore a
quasi-vertical integration, an intermediate institutional arrangement which gives
buyers the ability to influence and – depending on the contract terms - partially
control the production process without owning or managing the farms directly.
One of the objectives of IBOs is to draw up “standard forms of contract, compatible with
Union rules, for the sale of agricultural products to purchasers and/or the supply of
processed products to distributors and retailers, taking into account the need to achieve
fair competitive conditions and to avoid market distortions” (See CMO). The rationale for
drawing up standard contracts at the level of the EU, the MS or the IBO is as mentioned
above that the position of farmers is in many cases weaker than that of processors
and/or distributors. Generally, large buyers will impose their own contracts on farmers, in
which they naturally protect their own interest first. To ensure a minimum level of
certainty and transparency for producers, standard contracts may be used. MS may
specifically, “in the absence of Union legislation on formalised, written contracts, under
national contract law, decide to make the use of such contracts compulsory, provided
that, in doing so, Union law is respected, and in particular that the proper functioning of
the internal market and the common market organisation is respected”; see Article 148
and 168 of Regulation (EU) No 1308/3013.
The drawing up of standard contracts and interprofessional agreements has been
indicated as an objective by 45% of the IBOs identified in this study. This objective is one
of the least mentioned objectives. With the CAP reform and consequent abolishment of
quota in several sectors, the activities of IBOs and other interbranch organisations in
relation to drawing up standard contracts that are related to the management of the
market have decreased. In general, standard contracts are used in all sectors of the
study but less so in meat products, milk and cereals than in e.g. wine and tobacco. In
general, the benefits of the use of standard contracts are thought to be greater in sectors
where the imbalance of power is larger, where cooperatives are less prominent, where
risks crop failures are higher, and where transactions costs are higher.
Even without the use of standard contracts that are drawn up by IBOs or governments,
transactions and deliveries are managed by private contracts. In cooperatives e.g.
contracts are used that usually entail that members of the cooperative have a right
and/or obligation to deliver their products to the cooperative. The cooperative will in
advance determine a price (the contract price) to be paid for the product (given a certain
quality). At some point (e.g. when the marketing year is finished) the members receive a
share in the net profits of the cooperative. The contract does restrict the freedom of the
farmer in some way, but also limits the risks. In any case it should be possible to
terminate the contracts within an reasonable period of time and at fair costs, to ensure
that contracts do not restrict the functioning of the market or lead to unfair practices in
contracts.113 Besides standard contracts and cooperative agreements, numerous form of
private contracts exist in agriculture. These include delivery contracts to processors and
retailers, but also forward and futures contracts.
Contract farming114 (as opposed to a cooperative agreement or the free market) is
another form of contracting used in agriculture. Contract farming is a form of economic
contract where a private company like a food processor provides farmers with inputs
such as seed and the farmer promises to sell his produce exclusively to that company.
This also reduces the risk for farmers. Contract farming (and similar contractual
arrangements) is – like the efforts of IBOs – another way to increase product quality and

113
See also article 168 of the CMO and e.g. http://www.supplychaininitiative.eu/about-initiative/principles-good-practice-
vertical-relationships-food-supply-chain on principles of good practice in vertical relationships.
114
Also called “integration contracts”

Page 110
 Study on agricultural interbranch organisations (IBOs) in the EU

stabilise markets. Full backward vertical integration means that distributors or processors
invest themselves in primary production capacity. Farmers in such cases are like
employees of the integrated companies, focussing mainly on their task as producer.
In many cases it is not individual firms that enter into contracts with processors or
distributors but the POs that they are a member of. In this way POs help to decrease
transaction costs. POs have a role in the negotiation of contracts and help to set standard
contracts for its members.
The brief introduction to historical considerations as regards the development of IBOs,
the dynamics of actors and grouping of actors in the supply chain, and the current
commercial relationships between producers and their customers provides insight for the
analysis presented below: analysing of the functioning of the IBOs without placing them
in the overall supply chain context would not make lead to any robust analysis.

5.2. Analysis of the functioning of IBOs

This sub-section complements and illustrates the inventory of existing IBOs (Theme 2)
and national legislations in all 28 Ms (Theme 1), with a full review and analysis of the
role, functioning and effect of IBOs within the food supply chain in different sectors and
Member States. It is based on the analysis of the 5 case studies and completed with
findings from literature review and desk research.

5.2.1. Creation of the IBOs and motivation for establishment

The creation and request of recognition of IBOs are, often, responses to crisis
situation (e.g. short food shortage during the Second World War for the CIVB in France,
economic crisis in Spain, and suppression of the “productschappen” in the NL). Literature
review and desk research reinforce this finding that economic actors do not decide,
naturally, on their own to cooperate. In most of cases, the main trigger is a diagnosis
that there is fundamental issue in the supply that should be overcome. The only
approach is to set-up a forum in which economics actors can discuss on how to address
the problem.

In several MS, the creation of IBOs is linked to the provision of financial support at
inception of the organisations. For example, in Spain, national authorities have provided
dedicated funding for a limited period of time to encourage the setting up of IBOs and
facilitate the fulfilment of the aims of the agri-food interbranch organisations. In
Romania, it seems that the creation of several IBOs was linked to the idea that IBOs
were going to be financially supported by the EU as for POs but this was not the case.
The initiative to create an IBO often comes from primary production. Often, it is
the producers that decide to contact the other stages of the supply chain to create a
platform for discussion but not always. External actors have, also, played a significant
role in the creation of IBOs too as demonstrated by the old example of CIVB in France
and the recent case of ZuivelNL in the Netherlands.
These findings are illustrated by the case studies.
INTERPORC is the IBO which represents products from white breeds of pig (“cerdo de
capa blanca”) which amounts about […]% of total Spanish pigmeat production. Impetus
for the establishment of INTERPORC came from the production sector; most notably from
ANPROGAPOR115 that was subsequently joined and supported by CAE116. Consequently
the production sector had to deal with several different interlocutors when it wished to
talk with the processing sector. Therefore it took the initiative of creating the IBO.
Additionally, the economic crisis in Spain had acted as a general impulse for the creation

115
Asociación Nacional de Productores de Ganado Porcino
116
Cooperativas agroalimentarias de Espana

Page 111
 Study on agricultural interbranch organisations (IBOs) in the EU

and/or development of IBOs in Spain, as with limited assistance from the ministry of
Agriculture, actors looked to find their own solutions to issues.
In Spain, IAOE is the IBO which represents all olive oils other than olive-pomice oils
(“orujo”). The category represented by IAOE includes extra virgin, virgin and olive oils.
There are separate IBOs for olive-pomice oil and table olives (see Theme 2). IAOE was
set up in November 2002 and officially recognised at national level in February 2003. The
motivations for the establishment of IAOE have been to have a collective approach for
promotion and R&D activities (improve oil quality). An additional direct motivation for
official recognition was the ability to apply for EU promotional funds, today, in the
framework of Regulation (EU) No 1144/2014.
The French CIVB representing “vins de Bordeaux” has been created in 1941 during the
Second World War by the government. This IBO has the particularity that it has been
created (and then recognised) by law […]. During the war, it was necessary to coordinate
food production and food supply for rationing.
FruitVeB was recognised as an IBO by competent authorities in 2005 in Hungary.
However the organisation already existed for several years and collective actions in the
fruit and vegetables sectors date back 1990s through the former Products Councils. The
main reason for recognition was linked to the potential possibilities to get national and
European funding support at adhesion of Hungary to the European Union. Secondly the
segmentation of the supply chain was very important at that period and it was necessary
to group actors to facilitate common actions between actors of the supply chain and
secure cohesion.
The creation and recognition of the ZuivelNL IBO for the milk sector in the Netherlands in
2015 is directly linked to the suppression of the Dutch product boards that was voted by
the Dutch government coalition in 2012. Product boards were Dutch public organisation
including companies that produce and process a certain product in successive stages of
the supply chain. Membership was mandatory. Product boards had a mandate to levy
taxes and impose certain rules. At the same time product boards acted as an interest
group for companies in the industry and as advisory body to the Dutch government.
When the board were abolished, actors in the supply chains considered necessary to
continue activities undertaken by public authorities in the product board via IBOs.
5.2.2. Members of IBOs, evolution of membership; and non-members
The analysis of the case studies further demonstrates the variability in terms of number
and type of members that was already highlighted under Theme 2.
Among these case studies, FruitVeb is the only IBO that allows membership of individual
producers and companies. This may be explained by the fact that no sectoral associations
exist at this stage in Hungary. None of the IBOs cover the complete supply chain. Unions
are present in the IBOs mainly at primary level (farmers union) when associations of
economic actors are members in processing and other stages of the supply chain. Modern
retailers (e.g. hypermarket, supermarket) are present in FruitVeb in Hungary only, not in
the other 4 case studies. This situation is mainly explained by the fact that modern
retailers are self-sufficient due to their economic power. They do not need to
“concentrate” to be able to discuss directly with public authorities and with other actors
in the supply chain as they are already concentrated through their buying centres.
Evolution in terms of membership is observed in each of the two Spanish case studies.
Withdrawal of membership has not been mentioned in any of these case studies leading
to the conclusion that membership is rather stable in time after the period of set-up
of the organisation that could take several years. Desk research and interviews allow
identifying a few cases of withdrawal of membership only. The most recent case (early
2016) is the withdrawal of the butchers association (FICT) from INAPORC in France due
to different view on the strategy to be developed in order to overcome the current crisis
in the sector in France. Additionally, FICT is opposed to mandatory labelling of country of
origin when producers favour mandatory labelling.

Page 112
 Study on agricultural interbranch organisations (IBOs) in the EU

This stability of membership should not hide a major issue as regards the
representativeness of the primary production branch in IBOs in France. Historically,
farmers are represented in the IBOs by technical sections of the “most representative”
farmers’ union: FNSEA (Féderation Nationale des Syndicats d’Exploitant Agricole). During
the last 20 years, a few new farmers’ unions have gained importance (more particularly,
the Confédération Paysanne and Coordination Rurale). During the last voting at election
of “Chambres d’Agriculture” these two unions have gathered together about […]% of
farmers vote. For several years, these unions have requested the possibility to join IBOs
as members of the primary production “college” side by side with FNSEA. [..…] . However
in 2012, the board of directors of FNSEA decided that minority unions could become
members of IBOs. Since then minority farmers’ unions became members of several IBOs
(e.g. CNIEL, CIVB, etc.). The presence of minority unions as members of IBOs is still
limited.
INTERPORC represents actors at the primary production and processing branches of the
chain. Interviewees estimated that overall INTERPORC represents […]% of the supply
chain by volume (both at primary production and first processing levels). All current
members were already part of the IBO at creation to the exception of CEDECARNE
(butchers and individual meat retailer) that officially joined four years after recognition of
INTERPORC in 2012. This adhesion was the result of a specific request of the IBO as it
provides a link to consumers and hence possibilities to better communicate on certain
issues. Members are national associations of farming organisations (farmers unions),
cooperatives, and live animal transporters for primary production; and slaughterhouses,
cutting rooms, processors, cooperatives, butcheries, and independent meat retailers.
Non-members representing less than […]% of the total volumes of production and
transformation are small farms, slaughterhouses and cutting plants which do not belong
to any of the indicated member organisations. Modern retailers are not members of
INTERPORC.
The Spanish olive oil IBO IAOE includes actors from primary production, processing (both
primary and secondary) and commercialisation (domestic and export) stages of the
supply chain. It does not cover wholesalers and modern retailers. Membership has
evolved over time as it can be observed that COAG (farmers) and AFE (processors)
joined about 10 years after the creation of the organisation (2010 and 2014 respectively)
(UPA-farmers joined immediately after the signature of the initial IBO agreement). These
delays can be explained by difficulties in agreeing on the overall governance of the
organisation (share allocation). Non-members representing less than […]% of the total
volumes of production and transformation are small farms, and a handful of generally
small and occasionally medium sized operators which are not members of the IBO
members’ associations.
CIVB, as all regional wine IBOs in France, is composed of the wine producers and of the
traders (“négociants”) and brokers (“marchants”). Food distributors and retailers are not
present in the IBO. This IBO is typically a “short IBO” as discussed under Theme 2,
meaning that it includes only 2 stages of the supply chain. Membership has evolved over
time as associations members of the CIVB have also evolved. All wine producers are
members of the CIVB as they are members of one ODG (“Organisme de Défense et de
Gestion”) in charge of defining standards as regard quality products. As all ODGs are
members of the CIVB, all producers are, indirectly, members too. About 400 traders are
represented in the CIVB via their membership to the FNVBL which a member of the CIVB.
They represent about […]% of the volumes traded in Bordeaux. The non-members are
traders and brokers which are not members of the FNVBL.
In Hungary, the producer organisations play an important role in FruitVeb. Processors are
organised through the MHKSZ which covers […]% of the Hungarian processing industry.
The non-members are small processors. The retail organisations joined FruitVeb,
however – at the moment – it seems their aim is mainly information gathering, rather
than active participation to the IBO activities. FruitVeb sees this as the first step to
facilitate the harmonisation of the whole chain.

Page 113
 Study on agricultural interbranch organisations (IBOs) in the EU

The newly created ZuivelNL has two founding pillar member organisations: the Dutch
Farmers organisation (LTO) which represents primary producers of agricultural products,
among which dairy farms; and the Dutch Dairy Processors Organisation (NZO) which
represents dairy processing companies that all together process […]% of all milk in the
Netherlands. The members include all Dutch dairy processors that are farmers’
cooperatives. Indirectly, the NZO represents almost all Dutch farmers. In addition, Dutch
Dairy Farmers Union (NMV) is also a member. Retailers are not represented in the IBO.
The non-members are actors which are not members of any of these IBO members.
5.2.3. Structure and governance
IBOs governance is generally based on two bodies: a board and a general assembly
which are both acting as a general supervisor of the organisation. Depending on the
importance of the sector(s), several other ad hoc bodies are attached to these two bodies
(a secretariat which includes the director and the staff of the IBO, regional structures,
and technical & marketing committees, etc.). The general assembly groups individuals
who have been elected to represent the different members of the IBOs. The board is
elected by the general assembly. The president of the IBO is elected by the general
assembly. He leads the board and coordinates the work of the secretariat and its staff,
through its president.
In addition to this top governance, two different governances exist at lowest level of the
structure. The first one which groups actors of the same branch in “colleges” and the
second which relies more on a flat governance meaning that each IBO member elects
separately individuals to the General Assembly based on principles which are defined in
the statutes of the organisation. The approach in “colleges” is a French specificity that
could not be found in other Member States. However it is not specific to IBOs as this type
of organisation and governance exists in trade unions.
It may be considered that it is difficult to exchange with all members of the IBO when the
number is high. With a large number of members in flat governance, the discussions and
decision-making process may be difficult and/or cumbersome.
This exchange of information could even be more complicated when the IBO is a multi-
crop IBOs which covers several crops or several groups of crops (e.g. F&V IBOs). One
could argue of the need to group in the same organisation peach and lettuces producers.
Their activities and their supply chains are different. Even for the same crop (e.g. seed)
the breeding and seed marketing approaches are rather crop/species specific. These
differences lead to the position of certain interviewees from the supply chain that
consider that IBOs should be organised on a crop level instead of a multi-crop
approaches as it the case today.
In the case of governance by “colleges”, interviewees have mentioned that decisions are
often taken without voting. It is only when no consensus can be found that a vote takes
place. Several French interviewees have mentioned that to their knowledge they have
never experienced a vote in writing in their IBO. However the absence of voting doesn’t
mean that there are no disputes. Interviewees are mentioning that sometimes
discussions may take a long period but they often lead to a decision/consensus after
exchanges of opinion between the different parties. The culture of IBOs is therefore to
search for consensus and avoid as much as possible voting in writing. This search leads
to the construction and reinforcement of the relationships between members of the
organisation. Literature confirms that search for consensus is often the preferred
approach. IBOs need to be governed based on confidence between the partners.
However this governance per “college” leads to a side effect at lower level in the
organisation. When it is recognised that the working and governance procedures at top-
governance are well established and described in the statutes of the association, one
may question about the decision making process within colleges and at lower level in the
organisation. A member placed at level 3 in the governance can certainly take position
during working groups and other technical committees but without any guarantees that
his view is going to be considered by all layers of the IBO (from the bottom to the top).

Page 114
 Study on agricultural interbranch organisations (IBOs) in the EU

This situation can lead to frustrations at low levels.

In general terms, an IBO is said to be functioning well when there is no disputes between
members or when they are not known outside the organisation itself. In opposition, when
issues are placed in the public debate, questions on the efficiency of the organisation are
asked regardless what is being achieved. This means that the efficiency of the
organisation mainly reflects the good relationship between all actors in the organisation.
Public personal conflicts between individuals or leaders of different “colleges” impact the
good functioning of the IBO. In these cases, one could say that personal interests have
over seeded general interests. Inevitably such issues are present in such type of
organisation. What is important is that these issues are not taking too long and that
solutions are found as quickly as possible. In that context it is interesting to note that
discussions take place before any significant change in the governance and new election.
The list of candidates for a new position seems to be discussed before the election takes
place. Therefore, elections do not lead to open-conflicts. One may consider that this
approach leads to better functioning of the IBO as general assemblies are not subject to
personal fights between candidates. In the other hand, it can be considered that this
approach relates to a type of “co-optation” and that the new representatives of the
organisation have been chosen by the old ones.
Governance may also adapt to avoid personal issues. For example, more and more
French IBO have inserted in their statutes that presidency has to rotate; meaning that a
new president has to be elected from another “college” than the “college” of the current
president.
The governance of the five IBOs under study read as follows.
The Spanish INTERPORC IBO is based on governance with five main bodies: the Standing
committee, the General assembly; the board of directors, the executive committee and
the working groups. In order to establish good governance, when the president and the
treasurer are coming from one part of the chain, the vice president and the secretary
shall come from the other part of the supply chain. This guarantees the participation of
all stages of the IBO at the top-governance of the IBO. It is interesting to note that these
roles rotate at each mandate. The General assembly and the Board of directors are
composed each of one member from each member association with a parity (50/50)
between primary production and processors sectors. In the General assembly, simple
majority must be obtained in each side (production and processing). In the Board, a 2/3
majority of present votes is applied regardless the sectors. In the Executive committee
and the working groups, decisions are taken through consensus, no voting foreseen. [….]
All major decisions except one have been taken through consensus without voting
procedure. […..].
The Spanish olive oil IBO IAOE has flat governance. The two main bodies (general
assembly and board) are composed of the same 20 members. The General assembly is
completed by several observers which have no voting rights. Weight are distributed
[…]% for each of the three farmers representatives (COAG, ASAJA, and UPA), […]% for
ACE ([..]% of this is under the primary production allocation, […]% is under the
processing allocation); […]% shared between the trading associations ANIERAC and
ASOLIVA at parity, and the remaining […]% shared between the private oil mill
associations INFOLIVA and AFE. IAOE is headed by a president, vice president, secretary
and treasurer. In order to ensure fair representation, the president and treasurer must
come from the same part of the chain (production or transformation) and the vice
president and secretary from the other part of the chain. The length of mandate is 4
years. It has thus far not necessary to vote for candidates as there has only been one
candidate for each post; therefore the appointment of people in these roles have always
been agreed through consensus. Only one case of formal voting in the history of IAOE
was identified by interviewees. This case related to the details of a promotional campaign
for the UK and France in 2012.

Page 115
 Study on agricultural interbranch organisations (IBOs) in the EU

The governance of the French CIVB has been established by Law (Decree 66-866) not by
the members. It is based on a General assembly (called Council –“Conseil”) which is
composed of 50 members which have a voting power and a large number of consultative
members which have no voting rights. These 50 votes are distributing at parity between
the 2 colleges (25 voting rights to the grape producers designated by the Federation des
Grands Vins de Bordeaux-FGVB and 25 votes for the Fédération des négociants de vin de
Bordeaux et de Libourne-FNVBL). The presidents of FGVB and FBVBL are CIVB council
members. CIVB Council members are appointed for a three year term renewable twice.
The second main body of the IBO is the Management board (“Bureau”) which is
designated by the Council and composed, on a parity basis, of a president (implicitly, of
CIVB) and a vice-president, a secretary and a deputy secretary, a treasurer, a deputy
treasurer, and sixteen members including the co-presidents of the three statutory
commissions as well as the presidents of FGVB and of FNVBL. Members of the
Management board are elected by secret ballot for three years mandates and must be
members of the Council either as producers or traders. […] The conciliation and the
arbitration procedures contained in decree 66-866 and reflected in CIVB articles of
association seem to have been used extremely rarely (no recollection from CIVB
representatives). Whereas disputes have taken place over the years, there seems to be a
clear imperative, widely accepted internally, that CIVB activities require a timely
settlement which cannot be accommodated by a formal dispute resolution mechanism.
This example demonstrates that consensus is searched for before voting, and therefore
voting is organised only when consensus is found between representatives of the 2
colleges in first the Management board and secondly in the Council.
The governance of the Dutch milk IBO (ZuivelNL) is rather similar to the ones presented
above as mainly based on a General assembly and a Board which are both supported by
several working groups. Due to the recent creation of the IBO, interviewees have
indicated that they have no remark to make on the functioning of the governance as they
have to see how it will work in the coming years. The Dutch Farmers organisation (LTO),
the Dutch Dairy Processors Organisation (NZO) and Dutch Dairy Farmers Union (NMV)
are statutory represented in the board of ZuivelNL with respectively two members from
LTO, one member from NMV; and two members from NZO. In addition, the board
includes one independent member which is the current chairman of the IBO and a
permanent advisor to the board assigned by Gemzu which represents dairy trade. As for
the previous cases, the working groups are in charge on drafting proposals which are
then discussed at the Board level before ratification, for the most important decisions at
the General assembly level. It should be noted that the working may profit from several
partner organisations that could be associated to the drafting of proposals on a case by
case basis (e.g.; cattle breeding, trade in dairy products, etc.).
In Hungary, FruitVeb, the F&V IBO governance seems to be more complex. First the
General assembly is the main decision making body. It consists of 59 members (15 from
producers, 15 from vegetable producers, 15 from fruit producers, 7 from processors, and
7 from retailers). It meets once a year and vote at single majority. The General assembly
is headed by a Presidium composed of 29 members (4 members from each Sector
Committee, the Director and the coordinator of the Sector Committee). The Presidium
has a mandate of 4 years. Then, the Management Board consisting of 6 members and
including the director and managing director. Additionally, the governance includes
several committees: audit, ethical, the sector and products committees which are vertical
bodies in the organisational structure of the IBO.
5.2.4. Use of extension of rules
The use of extension of rules has become the generality in France when it remains the
exception in other MSs (see Theme 2).
France has a large history in using the extension of rules in nearly all sectors. As one of

Page 116
 Study on agricultural interbranch organisations (IBOs) in the EU

the few exceptions117, INAPORC is the largest IBO that is not using extension for
collecting fees from non-members as it considers that based of its representativeness,
there is no need to invest a significant effort and related budget to try to gather some
few additional incomes. Therefore we searched for the number of requests that were not
rejected by authorities (ministry of agriculture and ministry of finance –DGCCRF). When
IBOs representatives were mentioning that there was no rejection of requests, the
ministry of agriculture indicated that they are used to reject requests on a regular basis.
At a first instance, this information looks contradictory but this can be explained when
understanding the mechanisms in place. It seems that most of the IBOs are first
presenting informally the text of the requests for extension to the ministry
representatives to discuss the content of the extensions and their validity. Then the
ministry provides its views on the first drafts. Following, the text is reviewed to secure
that when the request is officially submitted, no further issue emerged. Secondly, any
draft includes several requests for extension, and then the Ministry can reject the specific
demands without rejecting the complete document. Interviewees added that it is rather
frequent that extension is granted in general but not for all requirements. Therefore
these case studies indicate that negotiations between public authorities and IBOs take
place prior to submission of official request for extension.
The CIVB case study in France demonstrates that the procedure to set-up requests of
extensions is today well implemented as in place for a long time. Therefore it can be
observed that the process is running smoothly and that no severe issues can be observed
at CIVB level.
As of June 2016 there is no extension of rules granted in the case of ZuivelNL in the
Netherlands. ZuivelNL has been exploring the possibilities of extension of rules but until
so far there has not been an approval from the Ministry. Currently a process is underway
in which the Ministry and ZuivelNL exchange opinions on the exact criteria that ZuivelNL
needs to fulfil. In the past, Dutch Dairymen Board (association of farmers) has been
opposing the extension of fees to non-members openly.
In Spain, the two IBOs under case studies are using extension of rules to collect fees
from all members of the supply chain. In the context of the olive oil case study (IAOE), it
is important to note that interviewees considered the main achievement of the period
prior to 2008 was the obtainment of the extension of rules (fees). For interviewees, the
main aim of IAOE from the start was to obtain an extension of rules in order to obtain
financial contribution from the whole sector. However, this took until 2008 to do this as
time was needed to develop the necessary trust between organisations in IAOE and for
common interests to be found. It was also clarified that the method of formalising
payments took some time to agree, given that not only did the whole sector have to
agree on the details, but also the points of controls for payments had to be effective in
order for the extension of rules to work.
For INTERPORC in Spain, the process for approving the extension of rules following
internal agreement took time; the internally-agreed extension of rules was presented to
the ministry in June 2012 but there had to be a public consultation and the process for
approval from the ministry took more time. Approval from the Ministry of Agriculture
finally came in November 2012. The collection of mandatory contributions therefore
started on 1st January 2013, with a quarterly declaration to be used for collecting from
operators. A large part of the calendar year 2013 was spent implementing and refining
the collection system.
Spanish interviewees from INTERPORC reported that setting up the collection system was
a real challenge. While the ministry of agriculture produces statistics data on e.g. the
number of animals reared/slaughtered, there is no government agency in the sector
which has a register of all operators and production volumes (such an agency does, for

117
Others can be found in the Master DB for Theme 2.

Page 117
 Study on agricultural interbranch organisations (IBOs) in the EU

example, exist in the olive oil sector). The identification of operators and their volumes
was therefore a significant challenge. INTERPORC has subcontracted a company to obtain
this data through the company [….] and to follow up on animal movements so that the
mandatory contributions can be collected. The compliance rate for payments under the
extension of rules is now in the range of 95-98%. INTERPORC has a legal system for
starting proceedings against operators who do not pay the fee and so far has won all
cases.
5.2.5. Funding
Theme 2 identifies that several IBOs are facing financial limitations. Funding sources are
mainly including annual membership fees, collection of fees via extension, and public
support. These sources are rather limited and any significant reduction in any of this
source may jeopardise the IBO sustainability as it may affect their ability to carry out all
of the activities they would like.
For example, several Spanish IBOs appear endanger their existence by being dependent
on public funding (mainly subsidies from MAGRAMA and from promotional activities
provided by EU legislation on information provision and promotion measures concerning
agricultural products implemented in the internal market and in third countries). The
reduction/suppression of MAGRAMA subsidies leads to a situation where several IBOs do
not have any sufficient financial resources to guarantee the funding of an IBO
coordination body. Therefore activities of these IBOs are limited.
FruitVeb in Hungary is not applying the extension of rules mechanism and therefore is
facing funding issues.118 The current Zuivel
budget is about [….] euros. This is a limited budget that doesn’t allow the
implementation of large actions.
When extension of rules is applied, additional revenues are generated by fees collected
from non-IBO members. The case studies illustrate the importance of guaranteeing mid-
term funding of the organisation. This is a prerequisite before developing other actions
and plans.
In Spain, the history of IAOE shows that after a first attempt to establish the IBO that
failed, the second attempt started by drafting an agreement between members for
defining the payment conditions and the structure of the fees (who was going to pay?
and how much?). Then IAOE has asked for extension to MAGRAMA. This clearly shows
that IAOE considers that the first necessary steps have to be dedicated to secure mid and
long term funding of the organisation. Getting the request for extension accepted by
authorities is one thing, but defining and implementing all the required mechanisms to
collect the fees is another issue that is perceived as complex (e.g. how to identify all
targets in the supply chain?). This process may take significant time. It seems that the
objective No 1 of IAOE is to have these mechanisms established.
Similarly, INTERPORC has also decided to secure its funding via extension.
The situation in France is completely different as extension of rules to collect fees (CVOs)
is applied on a regular basis for most of the IBOs (see Theme 2). The general approach is
based on an agreement between members on who is paying within the IBO which is
extended every 3 years on a regular basis. This means that fees are collected every year.
These funding mechanisms are in place for several years. In most of cases they have
been set-up at the creation of the IBO.

This mechanism leads to several consequences:

 The French “Cour des Comptes” has highlighted in its 2010 report that “about
20% of the CVO fees do not enter into the framework working programmes that

118
In Hungary, only the milk and wine IBOs are using extension of rules

Page 118
 Study on agricultural interbranch organisations (IBOs) in the EU

could be funded by CVOs” meaning that CVOs are collected but not always used
for specific projects. Indeed, the structure of the CVOs is not modified every 3
years in order to keep certain stability. Therefore the collection of fees is more
related to an overall amount members agree to pay to the IBO without linking the
fees to dedicated actions/objectives of the IBO;
 In consequence, the same report mentions that “financial reserves of IBOs are
important”; and
 The funding mechanisms might not be neutral in the overall governance of the
IBOs and in its leadership. Several interviewees have mentioned that the
structure of the fees leads to the “real” leadership of IBOs: “the ones who are
paying, are the ones who are leading”. For example, in INTERFEL (French F&V
IBO), the modern retail contributes to […]% of the budget. In the former ONIDOL
(oil crop), primary production was contributing to more than […]% of the CVO.
Therefore it can be understood that if primary production is funding the IBO at the
level of […]%, it has the natural authority and leadership of the organisation. In a
large majority of IBOs, leadership is often with primary production. The producers
have a leading position due that fact that they have been the first to fund the
organisation at its creation and during the first years.

5.2.6. Relation between IBOs and national competent authorities

One could consider that relations between IBOs and national competent authorities
should be rather limited as IBOs are private associations and the State’s role is limited to
define the principle conditions for their recognition and activities. However, it seems that
relations between public authority and IBOs and the degree to which public authority are
involved in the activities of IBOs differ between Member States. Experience, mainly in
France, has shown benefits where the actors of the chain interact regularly and
frequently with each other, which involves in particular discussions with the public
authorities. It appears that IBOS are best functioning in an environment in which not
only the minimum legal requirements for their work have been implemented via a
regulatory framework, but where in particular public authorities go beyond and 'engage'
working with the IBO for the benefit of developing the supply chain, either by discussing
legislation and food supply chain related projects, by entering a dialogue on a possible
extension of rules and by financing the activities of the IBOS. In fact, the internal
structure of the IBO (its organisation) itself is less important for the proper functioning of
the IBO. The working principles within the IBO and the relations between representatives
of the IBOs, and other actors of the supply chain (being private stakeholders or public
authorities) are the main pillars underpinning a good governance of IBOs.

One of the reasons for the development of IBOs is the need to have a well-functioning
structure representing the relevant food supply chain able to engage in a dialogue with
public authorities. By being recognised, these commodity associations often play an
advocacy role to defend the interests of the industry in policy debates. IBOs are clearly
advocates of industry interests in policy making circles.
As an example, the IBOs in the F&V sector have indicated during the interviews that they
are interested in building an EU transnational IBO for two main reasons. First, to
exchange statistics and performing market research at EU level, instead of only at
national level; and secondly to be able to “lobby” directly at EU level with the body that
has recognised it (the European Commission).
Any other form of cooperation/alliance can also lobby but its recognition of being a party
in negotiation is lower as it may have difficulties to establish its legitimacy at official
level.
In some MS, such as Spain and the Netherlands, relationship between public authorities
and IBOs are limited to the strict minimum as defined by law (e.g. process for
recognition, for extension, and monitoring). This means that these Member States just
provide the necessary legal framework for enabling the functioning of the IBO.

Page 119
 Study on agricultural interbranch organisations (IBOs) in the EU

Other Member States go beyond this. For example in Romania, IBOs are consulted on
definition, orientation and regulation of sector policies. Portugal stipulates also a special
obligation for the public authorities to cooperate with the IBOs so that their goals can be
achieved.
Some MS have even supported the creation of IBOs financially (e.g. Spain). This was
done via national funding coming from CAP Pillar II (funding support for promotional
activities). These findings have been slightly reduced over time before their complete
suppression in early 2010s.
More intense relations exist when a Member State decides to delegates certain
(official and non-official) tasks to the IBO or allow for the extension of rules.
Theme 2 highlights that public authorities have delegated/are delegating official tasks to
IBOs in France only. The legislative developments in 2006 led to the addition of new
objectives for IBOs as regard protection against harmful organisms and the
implementation of national and Community economic policies. In France, for decades the
GNIS has been in charge of seed certification, which is an official task119. This task is
performed by the Service Officiel de Certification (SOC) that is a unit integrated in the
GNIS organigram. SOC is headed by a ministry representative civil servant.
Other delegations of official tasks can be listed. One of the most recent and important
one is concerning animal rendering, which is today a task carried out by animal IBOs in
France. Public authorities suggested that this task should be carried out by IBOs instead
of official control authorities and other public authorities. Therefore it was proposed to
IBOs to take over this task. Negotiations took quite lot of time (several years) before
agreement was reached.
These examples illustrate the following scheme indicating the general organisation of
IBOs in France where delegation of official tasks takes are integrated in the overall
governance of IBOs.

Figure 21: French IBO organisation and delegation of tasks

Supply chain
Missions

Sector (1)

Sector (2) Joint strategies Delegation

Public
Product and common of official
authorities
Sector (3) decision-making tasks

Sector (4) etc…

IBO agreements
Field of competence
Source: Rio Y. and Nefusi J..”Gérer les marches et la qualité alimentaire: double défi pour les
interprofessions”. Club Demeter. Cahier 10. Available at:
http://www.clubdemeter.com/pdf/cahier/10.pdf

119
See Seed Marketing Directives

Page 120
 Study on agricultural interbranch organisations (IBOs) in the EU

In addition to official tasks, authorities can transfer some public activities to the private
sector via IBOs. The case of the French F&V research centre (CTIFL) illustrates this
transfer (see above Section 5.3.1.a).
In conclusion, the delegation of tasks reinforces the relationship between authorities and
IBOs. This delegation is applied only in France.
The extension of rules is another area that favours regular and close contacts between
authorities and IBOs, as it is the State which extends the IBO agreement to non-
members. Especially when the number of requests is rather high (e.g. about 80 per year
in France), regular contacts between the authorities and the IBOs are likely to take place.
The long standing experience with extension has led French authorities to recommend
IBOs to discuss the content of the requests together with them before submitting the
official version. This allows clarifying certain issues before the official submission.
Delegation of tasks and the interaction when drafting agreements lead to the impression
that IBOs and competent authorities are co-managers of the supply chain. In France,
the umbrella organisation CLIAA clearly mentioned that, in its view, IBOs perform this
function.
The close relation between competent authorities and IBOs in France also emerges from
that representatives of such public bodies are sometimes even involved in the
management of the IBO through their participation in the board. For example, at the
level of the French IBO CIVB, representatives of public bodies have been taking part in
board meetings. As shown under Theme 2, the first 6 IBOs in France have been created
by Law and not by stakeholders’ initiatives. A representative of the public authorities
(“Commissaire au gouvernement”) used to be present at board level, mainly as an
observer but with also decision power (e.g. CIVC-IBO vins de Champagne). His role was
to act as a moderator in case of disputes and conflict between the members of the IBOs.
In Champagne, his role is also to take position vis-à-vis decisions taken by the IBO and
to transfer decisions to the Ministry of Agriculture for validation or refusal of a given
decision. […]. Today, it appears that the CIVC is the single remaining IBO in which a
public representative is present in the Board. The Ministry of Agriculture has indicated
that the members of the CIVC are still in favour of keeping the “Commissaire au
gouvernement” as part of the IBO as it acts as a moderator in case of disputes between
members.
Finally working principles and habits, based on history, exist between French IBOs and
public authorities and other public organisations (e.g. offices in France) and also
based on the fact that IBOs have been public structures in the past and that certain
public organisations (e.g. FranceAgrimer) play a role in the functioning of the IBOs and in
the funding of promotional activities.
All in all, the analysis of the relation between public authorities and IBOs shows that a
close relationship exists in France but is much more limited in all the other Member
States in which IBOs are recognised. The relationship between IBOs and public actors in
France leads to consider that IBOs are not perceived merely organisations established by
legislation in which economic actors discuss and plan actions or present interests. IBOs
are rather part of 'system' or 'concept' to develop the food supply chain positively and to
that end continuous working relationships between IBOs and public bodies are essential.
This term is often found in French literature and refers to the legislation itself, the IBOs
themselves but, also, any working mechanism and relationship that take place between
all involved actors of the supply chain.
As mentioned under Part 3, the internal organisational structures of IBOs can take a
large variety of forms, what remains (rather) similar are the working procedures. Several
French interviews have indicated that these working procedures are driven by legislation
and public authorities; and therefore consider that “institutionalisation” of IBOs took
place during the last 30 years. This is rather specific to France as there is there a long
history of IBOs and therefore of relationship between actors. In all other countries, one

Page 121
 Study on agricultural interbranch organisations (IBOs) in the EU

could consider that IBOs are too young to have yet this relationship (“system” or
“concept”) in place.

5.2.7. Other issues affecting the functioning of IBOs

Size of the IBOs.
IBOs main objective is to promote products of a given supply chain (see Theme 2).
Interviewees are of the opinion that IBOs are effective when it is composed of a limited
number of market actors who cooperate in order to retain the value added of a specific
quality product (e.g. IBO built around the “Comté” cheese). Large IBOs are perceived as
less effective as actions are based on consensus reached between a large numbers of
actors. Therefore one could promote the re-structuring of IBOs to develop more product-
specific structures to replace the large national IBOs which are covering a large number
of individual products. Competent authorities may not be of that opinion as a
multiplication of the number of IBOs will lead to an increase of the number of contacts in
the supply chain. French authorities have indicated that they would privilege to have
wider IBOs including all stages of the supply chain rather than only 2 stages, as it is
mainly the case today.

Subjects matters to be dealt with by IBOS

Projects that are not including any competitive dimension (between IBO members) are
seen to be the easiest to implement. For example a marketing project aiming at
developing Bordeaux wine export in China would certainly be well accepted by a large
majority of members of the IBO as it would benefit to all producers and traders, even to
the ones that are not exporting to China. In contrary, as soon as competitive factors are
identified in a given IBO project, these create tensions between members and therefore
more difficulties are faced during implementation. For example, French meat producers
are in favour of origin labelling when the butchers are opposed to this obligation for
economic and trade reasons. This obligation will add value to raw meat and creates
burden and additional costs for butchers that will have to adapt their sourcing and
selling. In such cases, tensions appear within the IBO.

Transparency issues
Both case studies and literature review reveal additional issues affecting the functioning
of IBOs is transparency. When the analysis has shown that activities carried by IBOs
helps improving knowledge and the transparency of production and the market, several
issues as regards transparency have been mentioned by interviews.
The first issue is related to transparency. When decision making process and the voting
rules which are defined in each IBO statute are clear for decision at the board or
assembly general levels, several interviewees have indicated that decision making
processes are not so clear “lower” in the organisation. When IBOs are organised per
college, several interviewees have mentioned that, to their opinion, there is not always
clear rules on how decisions should be taken within these colleges.
Other interviewees have also mentioned that day-to-day decision making is done by a
limited group of persons and that transparency is not always present for all decisions.
The French “Cour des Comptes” in its reports of 2007 and 2010 has indicated a certain
lack of transparency related to the statutes, the content of the IBO agreements, the
compiled list of extensions, the structure of the CVO fees (who is paying, how much)
which are only available on request at IBO level or at Ministry level. For the “Cour des
Comptes”, access to these documents should be made more easily. It can be observed
that is today easier to get access to some of these documents (since beginning of 2014,
all extensions are published on the Ministry of Agriculture website with a link to the
agreement file).
The data collection exercise which has been performed during this study also shows that
statistics related to market shares of the different actors in the supply chain,

Page 122
 Study on agricultural interbranch organisations (IBOs) in the EU

representativeness levels, value of production, etc.… are of sensitive nature and that IBO
actors have difficulties to communicate this information. This can be largely explained by
the fact that IBOs governance often does not have this information itself; and especially
for primary production. IBOs are supposed to demonstrate representativeness of their
members (in volume) when requesting extension, but as the large majority of requests
for extension are submitted in France that has established a system not linked to
production volumes (but on votes at Chambre d’Agriculture), IBOs themselves don’t
know volumes produced and traded by their members at primary level.
Timely withdrawal of inactive IBOs
An additional issue is linked to the fact that national legislations do not include detailed
provisions as regards the withdrawal of IBOs. Article 158 of Regulation (EU) No
1308/2013 stipulates that MS shall withdraw recognition in the event of non-compliance
or irregularities in the implementation of the measures provided by legislation and if the
requirements and conditions for recognition laid down in this Article 158 are not met,
however no indications are provided in the case IBOs cease to be active. Under these
cases, who should have the responsibility to withdraw the recognition if no request is
being sent by the IBO? What should the practical approach to secure that the list of
recognised IBOs do not include IBOs that are not active any longer and for years? This
leads to the situation that several IBOs are still listed as IBOs but have not any ongoing
activities. For example the peach processed IBO in Greece is not active for more than 6
years but it is still recognised.
Time and resources
Another limitation which has been expressed is related to time and resources of members
associations, in particular those representing primary producers. In some cases, various
meetings of IBOs may occur at the same time, making it impossible for the
representatives in question to attend all meetings; though progress still has to be made
by the IBO. The situation was noted as being different for associations from the
transformation part of the chain which is more likely to call upon people from individual
member companies of their association to attend meetings on the behalf of the
association. It was also noted that the strain produced from the involvement in multiple
IBOs means that representatives of primary producer associations have less time to
dedicate to their primary role of defence of their members.

5.3 Benefits and impacts of IBOs

This section aims at identifying and presenting the overall benefits of IBOs to actors in
the supply chain and for the overall supply chain. These specific IBO objectives have also
to be considered in broader terms in the context of the CAP objectives of viable food
production, with a dedicated focus on agricultural income, agricultural productivity and
price stability. More specifically this section presents benefits for agricultural producers in
e.g. productivity, sustainability, risk management, growth potential; and marketing, also
by comparison with alternative governance institutions available to farmers in the food
supply chain.

5.3.1. Benefits of IBOs

Analysis reveals that most of stakeholders that have been met during data collection
consider that IBOs could have a number of benefits and drawbacks which are presented
below in terms of:
 Organisation and governance of the supply chain, relation with authorities;
 Collecting and sharing knowledge, and communication; and
 Sharing responsibilities and risks.

However the assessment of success and consequently the benefits arising from IBOs has
to be considered carefully as the variety of situations and organisations may lead that the
realisation of benefits is not shown in several cases.

Page 123
 Study on agricultural interbranch organisations (IBOs) in the EU

Complexity is added by the very nature of mostly intangible or soft benefits that cannot
be measured nor quantified explicitly. A last influential factor, triggered by different types
of IBOs in different supply chains (in various compositions), is created by an abundance
of expected benefits that don’t materialise and therefore cannot be identified easily.
Additionally, the efficiency of an IBO leans on its legitimacy (e.g. effective participation of
all members, legitimacy of each group representative transparent mechanisms of
decision, funding, etc.). The establishment of such a body is a long and complex process,
which requires the identification of common interests and the collective margins of
progress. Although IBOs are today of private legal basis, history shows the important role
of public authorities in the emergence of inter branch bodies though the funding of some
activities (e.g. promotion activities in Spain) and in the durability and sustainability of the
system (e.g. FR).

5.3.1.a. Organisation and governance of the supply chain, relation with authorities
IBOs offer a platform for discussion between actors within the organisation and
create the conditions for collective communication with other partners in the supply
chain.
Such type of platforms allows for better communication between IBOs participants
which are, often, economic partners but, also, competitors. Interest of each group of
actors within IBOs differs. Communication is facilitated by the fact that members of IBOs
are often associations or organisations in which, already the economic dimension, is less
present that at operator/company level. The majority of the interviewees (case studies)
believes that the bringing together of the whole sector, hence allowing actors to
understand each other better and share concerns is a major intangible advantage of
IBOs. This was also reflected by the view of a non-member of INTERPORC. It was also
noted that the IBOs for different meat sectors in Spain (including INTERPORC) were
holding meetings with the aim of establishing joint strategies for key issues affecting all
livestock sectors.
Additional, this platform creates a focal point for policy dialogue with
government and public authorities. This focal point allows an advocacy role by either
making policy proposals to their governments or by commenting on government
proposals. For policy makers, IBOs allow appropriate consultation mechanisms at the
time of policy formulation. IBOs are the entry point in the supply chain. Dialogue is
formalised. This role is “officialised” by the fact that IBOs are recognised by public
authorities. Evidence from the literature review and the case studies suggest that IBOs
do play an important role in policy formulation and are much welcomed by policy-
makers, as well as by administrators, who generally prefer to deal with one association
rather than many. From this pivot role, IBOs can further disseminate and communicate
within the supply chain through its association members. This recognition provides that
legitimacy and makes IBOs quite unique as compared to other types of commodity
associations which have not the same level of legitimacy as they are recognised officially
by authorities. IBO recognition is generally not limited in time (only in the NL, recognition
of the newly created IBOs has been granted till 2020 only). Therefore this link between
supply chain stakeholders and public authorities is reinforced as continuity is guaranteed.
This security leads to an improved understanding between actors on both sides (supply
chain vs. authorities) and therefore confidence is reinforced.
Public authorities also benefit from the presence of IBOs in the supply chain in
emergency and crisis situations. For example, in the current food safety issue related
to the presence of Avian Influenza cases in south of France in the poultry sector; public
authorities have been able to implement immediately emergency programmes with the
implementation support of IBOs that could implement immediate actions. The privileged
relationship between public authorities and a given IBO associated with the possibility to
extend safety measures to the all actors within the sector provides a robust and
immediate response to food safety emergencies and crisis. No other type of commodity
associations provides such robust and reliable solution.

Page 124
 Study on agricultural interbranch organisations (IBOs) in the EU

The specific and unique relationship between the supply chain and public authorities and
the constant discussions between these parties allow discussing about the best
approaches in term of allocation of activities within the chain; and especially of official
tasks. In 2007, French authorities and animal IBOs discussed about the best approach
and most efficient approach as regards the animal rendering official task. Public
authorities suggested to IBOs that this task should be managed by IBOs in order to
increase efficiency (costs reduction). Then the relevant IBOs reflected on the request and
indicated their agreements in taking up the management of this task. Implementation
has been associated to extension of an agreement to cover all actors and to secure the
funding of such actions.
The most recent case of the technical R&D institute for F&V (the Centre Technique
Interprofessionnel des Fruits et Légumes-CTIFL) also demonstrates the capacity of
dialogue between public authorities and the supply chains to find arrangements that
would benefit both the sector and public authorities, and therefore optimise the
management of the supply chain activities. CTIFL is a technical institute that was
financed by a governmental fund (“taxes parafiscales”) for years. Public authorities were
of the impression that this type of activities should be better attached closer to the
supply chain than to the authorities as the main “clients” of the R&D activities are the
actors. Therefore the Ministry of agriculture decided to withdraw this tax and proposed to
replace it by a CVO claiming that the main advantage is that CVO ceiling is not limited to
the contrary to the fiscal tax. Additionally, other R&D institutes (e.g. ARVALIS for
cereals) are managed by the cereals IBO (INTERCERALES) for several years and this
approach has shown usefulness. After a long period of (difficult) negotiations between
the Ministry of Agriculture and INTERFEL (F&V IBO in France) INTEFREL agreed to take
over the funding of the CTIFL via a new CVO in 2015.
Finally the privileged relationship an IBO has with public authorities allows IBOs to act as
a guide for the sector as a whole. Longer this relation is, stronger the guidance is. This
leads to a French situation where it is difficult to say that there is only private IBOs. In
fact, one can observe that in France you have private IBOs and several others that have
been public IBOs. The CIVB case study demonstrates this situation. The CIVB was
created by Law in 1948 and public authorities were present at board level. This was the
same situation was existing at GNIS (seed IBO). In the CIVC (“vins de Champagne”),
public authorities are still present in the governance of the IBOs and the statutes of the
IBO indicates that authorities and ministry of agriculture himself has the right to validate
or not decisions taken at IBO level by its leaders. The statutes of these IBOs is currently
reviewed (both […]) but internal negotiations mechanisms remain and actors remain the
same. This is further explained under Section 5.1 (French history of IBOs).

5.3.1.b. Collecting and sharing knowledge; and communication

Most of the interviewees have indicated that supply chains have benefited from IBOs
activities as regards the collection and distribution of technical and economic
knowledge. IBOs are centres of expertise which collect technical and economic data,
discuss the findings and then distribute this knowledge to members of the IBOs. These
actions also lead to “normalisation” of production based on development and
implementation of technical norms which are reflections that happened in IBOs. This
leads to a form of standardisation favourable to the functioning of agricultural “global”
markets.
Another key benefit of IBOs relies to improved communication between IBOs
members. By participating to IBOs activities, actors learn to work together and with all
actors of the supply chain, from upstream to downstream. Several interviews have
indicated that the presence of the agricultural inputs industry (e.g. feed producers, seed
industry) within the IBO has helped to better understand their business model and their
issues. A given operator in a complex supply chain is communicating with its direct
suppliers and clients, and rarely with all actors of the chain. A butcher rarely
communicates with a feed producer. IBOs reinforce these communication channels.

Page 125
 Study on agricultural interbranch organisations (IBOs) in the EU

These relations can lead to the establishment of contractual links between different
operators which are particularly useful for the development of quality oriented products
where standards have to be negotiated. Additional, common languages between industry
stakeholders can be more easily set-up. Members can discuss issues, exchange views
and resolve problems together (by way of example, during the Spanish case study on
olive oil-IAOE, the Italian olive oil IBO was presented as a counterfactual situation where
the IBO is not as coordinated as the Spanish one and consequently different parts of the
chain often spent time disagreeing with each other).
All in all, IBOs strengthen collaboration and coordination between various ranges of the
supply chain and externally to the supply chain for domestic and international markets.

5.3.1.c. Sharing risks and profitability

The presence of an IBO in the supply chain allows for fairer distribution of risks. For
example, when a promotion campaign is carried out, benefits are for the supply chain
and its actors, being members of the IBO or not. However the distribution of these
benefits per group of actors or per actor is not known as IBOs are not economic bodies.
Evaluation of promotion campaigns is performed done and potential positive economic
impacts are identified after the completion of the campaign. However when these
economic impacts are quantified (e.g. the promotion campaign leads to a consumption
increase of 1.5%) no systems allows to measure how these benefits are distributed per
group of actors within the supply chain. One may consider that these benefits are also
distributed to the non-members of the IBO which are profiting from the promotion
campaign but not funding it if extension was not applied. However one may consider, on
a case by case basis, that benefits are not distributed to all actors (regardless if they are
members or non-members).
For example, if the promotion campaign objective is to increase sales of Bordeaux wine
in China, only the actors that are selling their wine on that market may directly benefit
from the campaign if it is successful. Producers in Bordeaux that have never marketed
wine in China will not directly benefit from the action, even if indirectly the campaign
may lead to an improved recognition of Bordeaux as a trademark, first in China but in
other parts of the world too. In these cases, all wine exporters and their producers will
indirectly benefit from the action mid-terms.
When a R&D programme aiming at identifying alternative crop protection or fertiliser
products to chemicals is conducted, its results first benefit to primary production but also
to the complete supply chain actors being members or not of the IBO.
However one may consider that these activities do not profit equally to all producers, and
especially to minorities (e.g. alternative agricultures, conservation varieties, etc.).
Development of new products and new production techniques led to standardisation of
production and to selection of the most competitive farmers who could adapt to
standards, then their concentration and ultimately their disappearance.
Same principles apply in case of emerging risks that the supply chain could be confronted
to (e.g. new animal disease in the supply chain). In these cases, trust built between IBO
members over time is also been seen as a benefit. For example, for several interviewees,
this trust has been as a supporting argument to implement an effective traceability
system in the agro-food supply chain.

5.3.2. Challenges to fully obtain these benefits

IBOs are confronted to several challenges that may limit obtaining these benefits.
The first main challenge is linked to the concerted management of interests. The
analysis of interbranch dynamics identifies the need for collective learning on dialogue for
the proper functioning of the supply chains for the interest of all actors. Dialogue is
adopted as a means which makes it possible to improve the functioning of the commodity
chain. However, the organisation of dialogue has to be preceded by a pre-condition,
which is the clarification of the interests of the different categories of actors and the

Page 126
 Study on agricultural interbranch organisations (IBOs) in the EU

construction of a common position. This dynamics is ongoing and the formulation of

common discussed and agreed positions still remains a big challenge on a good number
of commodity chains. Each time a new subject is at stake, an additional ad hoc dialogue
needs to be established.
Financing of IBOs. Theme 2 and Theme 3 clearly highlight that funding of IBOs
management and activities are an issue. Collective actions decided by individual IBOs can
only be implemented correctly if the IBO has enough resources to guarantee the correct
implementation of these actions which are in general organised on several months or
years. For example, funding of R&D activities has to be planned for several years and not
only for a few months. IBOs need to have clear view on resources to be expected for a
minima a period of five years. Funding issues is observed in several countries and in
almost all cases membership fees appear inadequate for the IBOs to carry out all
activities it would like to implement.
The role and interaction with public authorities. Analysis of the history of IBOs,
especially in France, shows that the success of dialogue between actors in the IBOs is
partly determined by the role of public authorities. Several interviewees have indicated
that dialogue within IBOs between economic actors with different objectives is not always
easy. Competitive issues may lead to internal disputes. Public authorities are considered
as potential moderators when such types of problems are being faced. Public authorities
are often, but not always, associated to these discussions due to the interactions
between the IBO and the public authorities especially when IBOs are carrying out
activities on the behalf of competent authorities (e.g. seed certification for GNIS in
France). They also have interests as an actor or observer but at the same time have to
protect the general interest. Its capacity to reconcile the interests of the different actors
has been determinant to guarantee the respect of engagements particularly within the
framework of the extension of agreements to all actors.

5.3.3. Impacts of IBOs actions and bargaining power within the supply chain
The role that IBOs play in term of bargaining power has been discussed during the
case studies and the interviews. Upstream actors (mainly farmers and processors) are
generally viewed as a relatively weak link in the agro food supply chain as opposed to
downstream actors, such as retailers, with operators’ economic weakness often resulting
in limited bargaining power and reduced competiveness for the sector as a whole120.
Evidence reveals the existence of unfair trading practices (UTPs) among different
members of the food supply chain within the context of the EU121.
A significant part of scientific argumentations pursue the assumption that trading
practices within the food supply chain can be characterised as being subject to a rather
top down hierarchy at the expense of less powerful actors, mainly farmers, suppliers or
small retailers122,123.
This considered, since the establishment of a common agriculture policy, the EU has been
trying to remedy to this unbalance within the agri-food chain, namely by strengthening

120
Bijman, J. G. Ton, G. Meijerink. 2007. Empowering Small holder Farmers in Markets: National and International Policy
Initiatives. WUR: Wageningen.
121
The present paper follows the thematic division of UTPs conducted by Renda et al. 2014. Its definition of UTPs
encompasses: 1) Lack of clarity in contract offer, 2) Lack of written contract, 3) Abuse of economic dependence/bargaining
power, 4) Liability disclaimers, 5) Unilateral modification clauses, 6) Terms unreasonably imposing or shifting marks, 7)
Unfair use of confidential information, 8) Unfair use of confidential information after contract expiry, 9) Unfair breaking off
of negotiation, 10) Unfair contract termination and 11) Refusal to negotiate.
122
Morgan, Kevin/Mardsen, Terry/Murdoch Jonathan (2006): Worlds of food: place, power, and provenance in the food
chain. Oxford: Oxford University Press
123
Konefal, Jason/Mascarenhas, Michaeal/Hatanaka, Maki (2005): Governance in the Global Agro-food System:
Backlighting the Role of Transnational Supermarket Chains. In: Agriculture and Human Values, 22 (3), 291-302.

Page 127
 Study on agricultural interbranch organisations (IBOs) in the EU

farmers’ position on the market through different policy instruments, including i.a. the
establishment of producer organisations (horizontal integration) and IBOs (vertical
integration). When several publications discuss the benefits of setting-up POs in the
supply chain with regard to bargaining power vis-à-vis other actors (manufacturers,
distributers, and retailers)124; it seems that very few literature exists that addresses
impacts of IBOs on the bargaining power of upstream actors in the agro-food supply
chain.
Interviewees met during the study have clearly indicated that, to their opinion, the
presence of IBOs in the supply chain has little, if any, impact on asymmetries in
bargaining power between actors. This is mainly explained by the fact that IBOs are not
involved in price fixing or price negotiations. IBOs are present in the supply chain, but
they are not active in any commercial relationship between actors. Commercial and trade
negotiations are not taking place in the context of the IBOs. This is a major difference
with POs as highlighted by Van Herck in a report for the European Commission in
2014125. Van Herck concludes that “It is well established in the economic literature that
individual farmers may benefit from being a member of a PO through different channels
(Williamson, 1985). First, by pooling their agricultural output, farmers may strengthen
their bargaining power vis-à-vis potential buyers (“downstream”) and input suppliers
(“upstream”). Second, by pooling their output, farmers may reduce the risks that are
associated with farming activities. This includes the price risk, but also the risk of a hold-
up by a buyer. Third, by pooling their agricultural output, farmers may gain market
access to marketing channels where previously they did not get access to (e.g. delivering
to supermarkets) as in some situations (but not in all), buyers prefer to purchase from
larger farmers (lower transaction costs). Fourth, by pooling their agricultural output,
farmers may be able to benefit from economies of scale. This may allow them to make
specific investments, in particularly in assets or services for which the fixed costs are
high as by pooling their output they are able to reduce the average fixed cost associated
with the investment. In addition, by pooling their output, transaction costs are reduced”.
There is however a few mechanisms that might enable IBOs’ actions to impact bargaining
power indirectly. The IBOs can e.g. influence the bargaining power of (part of) its
members by drawing up of standard contracts and implementing binding rules, by
increasing transparency, by collective promotion and by funding research. Creating
transparency may increase the bargaining power of farmers, although it cannot be the
task of an IBO to publish real-time and detailed price information. Promotion of (certain)
products nationally or internationally may increase demand and therefore create a
shortage of supply which could benefit the bargaining power of suppliers. Research
efforts may lead to better quality products or products that are better aligned with
consumer preferences, also increasing demand for these products. However, the
quantitative effects of such measures are very difficult to establish as the IBOs’ actions
are just few of many actions by many stakeholders.
With the absence of price negotiation activities IBOs can hardly contribute to a better
distribution of the margins in the chain in a direct manner. The first step for this would
be to understand how margins are distributed between actors and what the mechanisms
for any evolution are. IBOs can monitor prices within the supply chain but can hardly
work on monitoring actions related to margin distribution as this information is hardly
available and members of the supply chain are not ready to present all this information
to a forum in which commercial partners but also competitors are present.

124
A summary is provided by Van Herck K. 2014. Assessing efficiencies generated by agricultural Producer Organisations.
Report for the European Commission (DG COMP). Available at
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/sectors/agriculture/overview_en.html
125
Van Herck K. 2014. Assessing efficiencies generated by agricultural Producer Organisations. Report for the European
Commission (DG COMP).

Page 128
 Study on agricultural interbranch organisations (IBOs) in the EU

The research has not identified any studies that have analysed the benefits of being
members of an IBO on productivity and on farmers’ income. The rationale presented
above and the complexity of the subject matter explains this situation. As regards POs,
Van Herck adds that “in general studies do not distinguish between the different channels
through which membership of a PO affects farmers’ income or productivity (increase in
bargaining power, risk reduction, market access or provision of specific services enabled
by economies of scale). Often the different channels are interlinked and it is not possible
to disentangle the separate impact of the each channel”
Interviewees met during the study confirmed that to their knowledge they are not aware
of any study of that nature. For them, benefits for farmers are indirect and intangible
ones coming from the good functioning of the IBO itself, its positioning in the supply
chain, collective research, promotion, and increased transparency.

5.3.4. Impacts of IBOs activities as regards CAP objectives

This chapter present the impacts of IBOs activities as regard CAP objectives. This
assessment is mainly based on results of four case studies as literature hardly presents
evidences in that respect. Due to the recent creation of the milk IBO in the Netherlands,
no impact of the actions can be observed as actions have only been initiated recently.
The analysis of the activities of each of the remaining four case studies leads to the
situation where the main activities performed by these case studies are promotional
activities.
Therefore this chapter presents first conclusions regarding the impacts of promotional
activities on CAP objectives, before listing other identified benefits per IBO objective.

5.3.5.a. Benefits of promotional activities

It can be concluded that, through a contribution to the maintenance of a fairly steady
level of consumption domestically and the opening of new market in other countries,
promotional activities contribute to avoidance in adverse effects on farmer income and
indeed may have had positive impacts on farmer income through the mechanism of
volume.
It is difficult to draw conclusions on the impact of promotional campaigns on income
through the mechanism of price. While the move up the quality scale on the domestic
market has potentially had positive impacts in the domestic per unit sales price, it is
difficult to understand how these economic benefits are distributed between actors of
OBOs (see section on bargaining power above–5.3.3).

Same difficultly exists when it relates to directly connect domestic promotional activities
to CAP objectives given that the objectives of the promotional campaigns have been on
improving the sector image. That said, a positive sector image may lead to increased
consumption which in turn may ultimately have impacts on farmer income and growth.
Globally, while promotional activities may have had some positive impacts on per unit
export value which could in turn have positive impacts on growth as well as potentially
on farmer income, evidence for such a connection is more circumstantial than factual.

Additionally, it is reasonable to conclude that there is no connection between the

promotional activities and productivity or price stability. Similarly, it is difficult to
consider promotional activities to be a risk management tool; while the provision of
market outlets may be considered to reduce risk in the long term, promotional activities
cannot be considered a risk management tool.
Interviewees clarified that the main aim of promotional activities in terms of impacts was
to create a long term market outlet, the timeline for judging the impact of promotional
activities in relation to CAP objectives has then to consider these long term objectives.
This assessment should be done a period of minimum 10 years. This was not the case for
e.g. INTERPORC pig meat IBO in Spain.

Page 129
 Study on agricultural interbranch organisations (IBOs) in the EU

While promotional activities have not improved sustainability per se, evidence suggests
that they have made domestic consumers more aware of statutory sustainability
requirements in the production area.

5.3.5.b. Benefits of other activities

The following table lists the major additional benefits that have been observed and
inventoried during the case studies and completed by our expert judgement following
literature review. These benefits, mainly of intangible nature, are sorted per IBO activity.

Table 27: Intangible benefits of IBOs as regards CAP objectives

Benefit level of the action and impact on CAP objectives
IBO activities Farmer Price Risk
Productivity Sustainability
income stability management
(i)Improving the knowledge and
the transparency of the production
and the market through the
publication of relevant statistical data + + + + ++
in an aggregated form as well as via
the analysis of future market
developments
(ii)Forecasting of production
potential, and recording public + + + +
market prices
(iii)Helping to coordinate better
the way the products are placed on
+ + + +
the market, in particular by means of
research and market studies
(iv)Exploring potential export
+ + +
markets
(v)Drawing up standard forms of
contract, compatible with Union
rules, for the sale of agricultural
+ + + +
products to purchasers and/or the
supply of processed products to
distributors and retailers
(vi)Exploiting to a fuller extent
the potential of the products,
including at the level of market
+ + +
outlets, and developing initiatives to
strengthen economic competitiveness
and innovation
(vii)Providing the information
and carrying out the research
necessary to innovate, rationalise,
improve and adjust production and, ++ ++ ++ ++
where applicable, the processing and
marketing

(viii)Seeking ways of restricting

the use of animal-health or plant
protection products, better
managing other inputs, ensuring
product quality and soil and water ++ ++ +
conservation, promoting food safety,
in particular through traceability of
products, and improving animal
health and welfare
(ix)Developing methods and
instruments for improving + ++ +
product quality at all stages of

Page 130
 Study on agricultural interbranch organisations (IBOs) in the EU

Benefit level of the action and impact on CAP objectives

IBO activities Farmer Price Risk
Productivity Sustainability
income stability management
production and, where applicable, of
processing and marketing
x)Taking all possible actions to
uphold, protect and promote
organic farming and designations of + ++ +
origin, quality labels and geographical
indications
xi)Promoting and carrying out
research into integrated,
sustainable production or other + ++ +
environmentally sound production
methods
xii)Encouraging healthy and
responsible consumption of the
products on the internal market
+ ++ +
and/or informing about the harm
linked to hazardous consumption
patterns
(xiii)Promoting consumption of,
and/or furnishing information
Discussed under 5.3.5.a.
concerning, products on the internal
market and external markets
xiv)Contributing to the
management of by-products and
+ ++ +
the reduction and management of
waste.

5.3.6. What makes IBOs unique in the supply chain?

Many vertical associations may co-exist in the supply chain. IBOs are specific and unique
for several reasons in comparison to these other forms of cooperation (e.g. cooperatives,
POs, APOs), as follows:
 The recognition of the organisation by public authorities provides the IBO a
leading role in the supply chain. This recognition set-up a hierarchy in the supply
chain. It clearly indicates that public authorities have decided to design the IBO as
the primary contact point in the supply chain when it relates to objectives and role
of the IBOs;
 The IBO is, also, the entry into the supply chain (at least for stages covered by
the IBOs) for competent authorities. In case of crisis (e.g. food safety), the first
contact can be the IBO that can further communicate within the chain;
 Relationships in the IBOs are not forced by economic relationships. Members are
present in such organisations, not because they have commercial dealings with
the other members, but because they find advantages to be represented in an
entity which fosters the development of the entire food supply chain. The absence
of direct commercial considerations in IBOs and the focus on the 'chain' issues for
the benefit of all members provides flexibility in the overall governance of the
organisation;
 IBOs produce agreements. These agreements constitute the centrepiece and the
symbol of the organisation. Indeed, this agreement materialises the purpose of
the organisation and consolidates the common strategies set-up by the members.
It sets the “rules of the game” for (part) of the supply chain;
 IBO may ask competent authorities to make their decisions binding and have,
therefore, by using the mechanisms of extension, an “associated regulatory
power”;

Page 131
 Study on agricultural interbranch organisations (IBOs) in the EU

 In France IBOs fulfil general interests, in particular via the delegation of public
authority tasks (such as certification, etc.).

Page 132
Study on agricultural interbranch organisations (IBOs) in the EU

Page 133
 Study on agricultural interbranch organisations (IBOs) in the EU

CONCLUSIONS
This part of the report aims at providing some general conclusions regarding the overall
functioning of IBOs.
The research undertaken for this study allows presenting a detailed description of the
development of IBOs and an analysis of their functioning in the EU. These conclusions
emerge directly from the main findings presented in each of the three study themes.

A continuous grow of the number of IBOs in the EU.

Nineteen MS have developed national legislation dedicated to IBOs. The first
legislation was the French Law 75-600 of 1975. The Netherlands and Poland have
recently modified their national legal framework to include new provisions as regards the
recognition and functioning of IBOs (2014-2015).
Since the adoption of national laws the number of recognised IBOs defined in
practical terms as “the relationships woven between the various occupational categories
involved in the production, marketing and - where appropriate - processing of any given
agricultural product or product group” has been growing.
By 1 June 2016 123 IBOs have been recognised by national authorities in 8
different MS (EL, ES, FR, HU, IT, NL, PT, RO). From an initial analysis, it may be
considered that four IBOs concern sectors which are not included in Annex I of the CMO.
These 4 IBOS are namely the BNIC-Cognac in France, the BNIA-Armagnac in France,
INTERAL-animal feed in Spain; and INTEHELIX-other products-snails in Spain).
The number of IBOs has increased from 56 IBOs in 1990 to 123 (119+4) in 2016. The
recognition of additional ones is planned during the second semester (F&V in the NL,
banana in FR, 2-3 in EL). In the 1980-1995 period the growth was mainly observed in
France. Since then it has concerned 7 other MS (Greece, Hungary, Italy, the Netherlands,
Romania, Portugal, and Spain). To date, 8 MSs have recognised IBOs. More than half of
the recognised IBOs are located in France (63) for 60 located in the other 7 MS (7 in
Greece, 6 in Hungary, 3 in Italy, 27 in Spain, 7 in the Netherlands, 5 in RO, and 5 in
Portugal).

From the European Commission recognition of the role and functions of IBOs to
Regulation (EU) No 1308/2013
The existence of IBOs voluntarily established on the European market first drew the
attention of the European Commission in the mid-eighties. It prompted the Commission
to adopt a Communication on IBOs’ future role and functions under the Common
Agricultural Policy (CAP) regulatory regime in 1990.
During the period 1990-2013, provisions on the recognition and functioning of IBOs were
progressively introduced in a limited number of agricultural sectors (olive oil, fruits and
vegetables, milk and milk products, and tobacco). The move to cover interbranch
activities for all agricultural sectors was only done with adoption of Regulation (EU) No
1308/2013.
Provisions on IBOs included in Regulation (EU) No 1308/2013 are based on a number of
key principles, including:
 Recognition of IBOs by national authorities resulting from the initiative of all or
some of the organisations or associations that constitute them;
 Recognition is subject to general conditions, and in particular the need for the IBO
to gather representatives of economic activities linked to the production and to at
least one of the following stages of the supply chain account for a significant share

Page 134
 Study on agricultural interbranch organisations (IBOs) in the EU

of the economic activities in the supply chain (representativeness), and do not

engage themselves in production, processing or trade126;
EU legislation provides that IBOs operating in a specific economic area of a Member State
may request the national authorities of the latter to extend to operators that are not
members - with binding effects though for a limited period of time - some of the
agreements, decisions or concerted practices applicable to them. Such agreements,
decisions or practices may concern several activities, including, but not only, production
and market reports, production rules stricter than EU or national law, drawing up of
standard contracts, measures to protect organic farming and products under quality
schemes.
The analysis of national legislation at Member States, which was mainly adopted before
adoption of Regulation (EU) No 1308/2013, shows that this is based on the same main
principles laid down in Regulation (EU) No 1308/2013. Only a few MS have reviewed
their legislation to align it to provisions of Regulation (EU) No 1308/2013.

Analysis of the functioning of IBOs in the EU.

IBOs represent a very specific type of vertical cooperation within the agro-food
supply chain. They are the result of a long history and commitments of actors; in
particular of primary producers, often in difficult and very diverse situations (e.g.
responses to crisis).
Vertical cooperation and legislation on grouping of actors or on the official
recognition of interbranch agreements in the agro-food supply chain have existed in
certain EU Member States for more than 80 years. One of the first agreements
between different actors of the supply chain to be officially recognised concerns sugar
and dates back to 1931 in France. Beet producers and sugar factories agreed on rules for
fixing prices and for limiting volumes of production in order to overcome overproduction.
In Spain, the origins of the current IBOs may be traced back to 1932. In the Netherlands,
laws were in place since 1950 on the establishment of so-called public statutory
organisations (“Wet op de bedrijfsorganisatie”) which regulated, amongst the others, the
functioning of the Commodity Boards (“Productschappen”) which can in part be seen as
predecessors of the current.
Supply chain organisation (number and type of organisations and cooperations), type
and dynamic of actors are specific to each sector and to each MS: what is true in one
sector/MS may be false in another one. The functioning of IBOs has to take into
consideration these external factors present in the same supply chain. IBOs (when
recognised) are, only, one of the component of a given supply chain.
Additionally, the analysis of the functioning of an IBO depends on the maturity of
the organisation. Recently established IBOs (less than 10 years) may be too young to
analyse their full functioning. Finally, it is difficult to “compare” the functioning of
different IBOs and to assert that one national experience may be replicated in
other MS as the political, economic and historical context varies significantly.
The analysis of the case studies and the available literature suggests that IBOs may
play an important role in several areas. They promote dialogue between
government and stakeholders, and between actors/stakeholders present in the
supply chain. They maintain compliance with trade and other regulations, and
support the improvement of the quality and safety of products. Additionally,
they supply markets information.

126
To the exception of IBOs in olive oil, olive tables and tobacco sectors.

Page 135
 Study on agricultural interbranch organisations (IBOs) in the EU

Conditions for the good functioning of IBOs

On the basis of this analysis, the study identifies conditions that make that an IBO is
“working well”. Regardless of the historical facts that have played a significant role in the
emergence and in the shaping of IBOs, several main factors ideally ned to be present for
their optimal functioning:
 The IBO is a structure which is created on a voluntary basis and is an
entity of private nature. These two characteristics are essential: free initiative
from the sector and private status are in fact interrelated as one can hardly go
without the other. It is important to highlight that IBOs are created based on
initiatives coming from supply chain stakeholders (in most cases, from producers)
without any intervention from public authorities during their establishment. These
structures need to operate based on mechanisms of private law, completely and
freely negotiated by the members of the association. IBOs can only work if the
production sector is already structured (i.e. governance and relations between
actors are in place) and if the IBO guarantees the representativeness of all its
components, and therefore is able to develop a strategic vision shared by the
different sensitivities present in the organisation. Legislation promotes these
initiatives as the recognition principle provides for an unique position (an official
reference) of the organisation within the supply chain;
 IBO are effective when products or groups of products are clearly
identified. Products of second or third processing are not really manageable in
IBOs, especially if ingredients come from very different areas. This can certainly
be one of the reasons why second+ processors and retailers are not often
members of IBOs.
 Vision and leadership. The IBO is set up by organisations who are recognised
as leading by the members that they represent, and has a clear objective that and
idea about the tasks of the IBO that is warranting the support of potential
members from different stages of the supply chain.
 The IBO is an organisation that groups several “businesses”. It groups
economic actors which are competing on the market but who have decided to join
forces in a structure which has no dimension as regards price fixing and price
negotiations. Preferably, there is only one IBO per product or group of products to
avoid conflicts of competences. Commercial transactions are happening between
members of the IBOs but they are not part of the IBO. IBOs have no commercial
activities. This specificity differentiates IBOs from other cooperation forms such as
e.g. producer organisations, cooperatives, clubs, etc.);
 IBOs are effective when they focus on collective interests; issues of
commercial negotiations between members are kept out of any IBO
discussions. The goals of the IBO are to promote and discuss common interests.
These may relate to issues regarding market transactions or trading practices in
general, but never are commercial negotiations themselves part of the activities of
an IBO. Projects aiming at consolidating the positioning of the complete supply
chain via e.g. promotion campaigns of a generic product for export benefit all
members.
 When competing issues are being discussed within IBOs, tensions
appear. Their overall functioning is immediately impacted;
 The structure of the IBO is less relevant. It has to be developed in the IBO
statutes based on the specificities of the supply chain and it can take various
forms as legislation provides flexibility for that. Additionally, the actual legal
status and nature (public vs. private) of the IBO are all in all not that relevant for
its functioning. What matters is the trust, confidence, and relationship that exists
between members and their representatives;

Page 136
 Study on agricultural interbranch organisations (IBOs) in the EU

 IBOs are organisations that are legitimised by and associated to

regulatory authorities. Apart from recognition, the mechanism of extension of
rules or fees which results from interbranch agreements plays a pivot role in the
(good) functioning of IBOs. What is of critical importance is the full application of
the IBO principles consisting in recognition criteria and principles related to
extension of rules. It is largely when these two principles are fully applied that
IBOs are in a position of good governance and optimal functioning. The
application of these principles creates an “associated regulatory power” for IBOs.
Positive MS attitude towards IBOs are an additional factor of good functioning.
 Additionally; the regular use of the extension of rules principle leads to the
creation of a link between all actors of the supply chain that are present
in the IBO and with competent authorities. It is only when actors are
participating to the efforts that IBO objectives can be fully reached. There is a
hierarchical relationship of subordination of individuals and any other type of
cooperation (e.g. producer organisations, cooperatives, processors, and traders)
vis-à-vis the collective and central instance of IBOs which is created via the
recognition and extension of rules principles. The regular application of extension
of rules leads to several other consequences that reinforce the sustainability,
funding, and leadership of the IBO in the supply chain. It engages competent
authorities as they “validate” the agreements (members and non-members of the
IBO). This commitment provides credibility to IBOs and positions it as “the”
privileged interlocutor in the supply chain. This certainly explains the French
“unicity” principle that only one IBO can be recognised per sector in a given
economic sector. With several IBOs in the same sector, this leadership would have
to be shared between different parties, and therefore the strength of this principle
would be diluted (e.g. olive oil sector in Spain where 3 IBOs coexist). Conflicts
exist in the French cider supply chain as 2 IBOs have been recognised: IDAC and
UNICID.
 Clear relation to competition law is also a prerequisite for a good
functioning of IBOs. Competition rules at EU and national level have
occasionally conditioned the functioning of IBOs, by casting doubts on the
lawfulness of some of the core activities of these organisations, amongst which,
for instance, the possibility for an IBO to extend its own rules to non-members.
Against this background, in 2011 the intervention of the European Court of Justice
cleared some of such doubts by settling that the mandatory extension of fees to
non-members for the financing of IBOs does not constitute State aid, as long as it
is ascertained that the specific conditions set by Article 107 par, 1 TFEU do not
occur. The case law and/or the administrative practices of a few Member States
have also contributed, over time, to drawing the line between activities that IBOs
may legitimately pursue and those that, instead, are not permitted as deemed in
contravention of antitrust rules.
In this context, the activities that may be construed as price fixing agreements
are the practices that national competition authorities have been scrutinising most
frequently to date. Notwithstanding this, in certain Member States there seems
not to be yet a sufficient degree of legal certainty in this area, which ultimately
results in the absence of recognised IBOs and/or low support by public authorities
towards the establishment of such organisations127.

127
In this context Article 210 of Regulation (EU) No 1308/2013 clearly indicates what is never allowed (black list of
practices including price fixing). Additionally this is clearance system by the Commission to solve these issues. This
system can be used by IBO (and to a certain extent by the MS, who normally is informed by any such notification of the
IBO) to get legal certainty of what is possible and not.

Page 137
 Study on agricultural interbranch organisations (IBOs) in the EU

In light of the above, ensuring increased legal certainty, at EU as well as national

level, regarding the activities that IBOs may undertake without infringing
competition law is a desirable step to take with a view to facilitating the setting of
IBOs in the EU in the long term.

These pre-requisites for the good functioning of IBOs is the result of an analysis that has
taken several decades.
The analysis is largely based on the long experience with IBOs in France, although the
experiences in the other MS have contributed to the confirmation of the findings as well.
In the majority of the other MS in which IBOs have been recognised, IBOs have been
created much more recently. Therefore one could consider that these structures are too
recent for performing a full analysis of their functioning.
However it can be observed that the principle of extension of rules is rarely applied
outside France. This leads to numerous situations where the budget of IBOs is too low
to initiate interbranch dynamics or even to cases where IBOs carry out no activities for
several years.
The full implementation of these rules is essential to the proper functioning of
the IBO, but a few other elements may disrupt its functioning. This study
identifies that the most successful IBOs in terms of impact on the supply chain,
legitimisation by members and CA, as well as finances, are the ones that are most
inclusive terms of the tasks that they perform. Inclusive IBOs are lobbyists as well as
advocates of their members in the public debate; partners in policy making as well as
carrying out delegated tasks; sources of information for members and other
stakeholders, and promoting transparency to markets; carrying out collective research
and are partners in public-private partnerships (PPP) to the benefit of their members and
non-members; carrying out collective promotional activities to the benefit of their
members and non-members; they are legitimised by representativeness of their
members as well as by recognition in both legal and practical sense by the government;
and they are sufficiently financed.

Issues on the functioning of IBOs

The weak representation of some actors (e.g. lack of plurality at primary production level
in France, absence of retailers in a large majority of IBOs in all MS) of the supply chain is
also an aspect that clearly needs to be addressed. The issue of representativeness of
the primary production branch has been debated for 10 years in France now.
Members of minority producer unions are requesting their presence as members in the
IBOs. As they are paying fees via application of extension, they consider they must be
given the possibility to express their views within the IBO. For these actors IBOs are
working as if they were exclusive clubs. Progresses have been made during the last five
years and minority unions have become members of IBOs in a few selected cases.
Only a few IBOs are covering the entire supply chain (from the farm to the table). IBOs
do not cover the complete supply chain. In most cases, they are composed of 2
branches (primary production and first processing or distribution of agricultural
products). Food distributors and retailers are rarely present. From a competent authority
point of view, this means that the supply chain is segmented in two major blocks: the
IBO, on the one hand, and the distributors/retailers, on the other hand. This situation
does not create the best conditions for discussions and negotiations within the
supply chain.
Transparency is also considered as an issue as regards the functioning of IBOs. This
includes internal transparency (e.g. decision making process, publication of statutes
online, publication of annual reports) and external transparency (e.g. communication
with non-members, other stakeholders; and competent authorities in the supply chain).

Page 138
 Study on agricultural interbranch organisations (IBOs) in the EU

Members of IBOs are associations representing various segments of the supply chain (or
part of the supply chain). Considering the necessity to ensure broad representation of the
sector, this approach makes sense. However, this leads to inevitable problems. The
absence or delay in developing of producers' associations in some new MS, and the lack
of adequate associations representing minorities are other problems being faced by IBOs.

The real benefits of IBOs are hardly quantifiable, but they are clearly recognised
by Members.
The real benefits of IBOs, as regards CAP objectives, over other forms of vertical
cooperation are clearly present as mentioned by a large majority of interviewees but
under an intangible format. IBOs are entities which are not buying/producing/selling
products and which are not involved in price fixing or price negotiations. All discussions
revolve around technical and non-economic matters, even if they involve economic
actors. Therefore, benefits are indirect and of intangible nature as they are difficult to
quantify. Additionally, IBOs seem to have limited bargaining power in the supply chain.
To that, it can be responded that if economic actors are present in such types of
organisation against payment of fees, they consider that membership is valuable.

IBO: tools for the development of supply chain?

IBOs may play a key role in the functioning of the supply chain, and therefore in
developing the food supply chain for the benefit of all actors. However, the vertical
cooperation model cannot ensure such developments by itself alone. It is in fact only one
amongst the tools that could be implemented in the supply chain. In several MS in which
no IBOs are recognised, other types of vertical cooperation exist, according to the
description of the current landscape. There is quite a diversity of situations, which might
be seen as a sign of adaptation to national situations.
To obtain the benefits of interbranch organisations, components of the legislation
(especially possibility of extension of rules and financing) and the conditions of success
presented above must be implemented, even if these prerequisites do not provide
guarantees of effectiveness. Effective participation of members and real commitment to
collaborating must be present. Moderation by public authorities in stakeholders’
discussions and disputes could also be seen as a factor of sustainability.
Even if the number of IBOs continues to grow at a regular pace, the full implementation
of the “IBO concept” – i.e. the full use of legislative provisions, including extensions of
rules and financing to non-members, and the establishment and establishment of close
relationship between all actors being economic actors, other stakeholders and public
authorities - is still under development. A majority of Spanish and Romanian IBOs have
benefitted from national funding via subsidies at recognition. However, they currently
suffer from lack of funding as subsidies have been stopped and no extension of rules is in
place to date. The olive oil IAOE and INTERPORC IBOs in Spain have therefore considered
it necessary to implement the extension of rules mechanisms to secure their long term
funding. Finally, the Dutch IBOs have only been recently created and it is difficult to draw
conclusions on their efficiency.
All in all, it seems beneficial that Member States reflect on whether IBOs (good)
functioning is just brought about by further implementing Regulation (EU) No 1308/2013
or whether further steps are needed (e.g. how to set-up good working principles within
the chain) to make the best use of IBOs for contributing to a good functioning of the
supply chain. Each MS might thus consider defining the optimal conditions of the national
“concept” (full use of all IBO provisions and optimal relationship between actors within
and outside the IBOs). Under these conditions, IBOs could constitute efficient tools for
vertical cooperation leading to further development of the supply chain.

Page 139
Study on agricultural interbranch organisations (IBOs) in the EU

Doi: 10.2762/44455