COGNITIVE

PSYCHOLOGY
(PSYC 105)

__________________
EUNICE A. PALOMO

Author
__________________
1ST Semester, SY 2022-2023

COLLEGE OF ARTS AND SCIENCES

Pursuing diversified excellences

Module I
 Course Outline

in

COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY
(PSYC 105)

COURSE DESCRIPTION

This course is an introduction to research and knowledge in the

psychological study of important cognitive abilities including sensation and
perception, attention, memory and representation, language and thinking.

OBJECTIVES

At the end of the course, the students should have been able to:

1. Demonstrate knowledge and understanding of well-established con-

cepts and theories in cognitive psychology;

2. Acquire an understanding of research methods in cognitive psychology

and the ability to discuss the classic experimental findings relating to
various cognitive processes and to critically evaluate research in this
area;

3. Understand the central role cognition plays in our everyday lives, and
apply theories or findings to real world situations and to one’s own
cognitive processes;

4. Develop an appreciation for the complexity of cognitive processes.

Module I
 COURSE REQUIREMENTS

1. Regularly attend the class

2. Have active class participation
3. Take the oral and written quizzes
4. Take and pass the required periodical examination; and
5. Submit the required reaction papers and reports before the end of
the term

GRADING SYSTEM
Module Assignments - 40%
Reaction Papers, Reports, Term Paper
Midterm/Final Examination - 60%
Total 100%

COURSE CONTENT

Module I INTRODUCTION TO COGNITIVE

PSYCHOLOGY
Lesson 1 Cognitive Psychology
Lesson 2 Perception
Lesson 3 Consciousness and Attention
Lesson 4 Concept and Knowledge Representation

Module II HUMAN MEMORY

Lesson 1 Encoding Memory

Lesson 2 Storing Memory
Lesson 3 Retaining Memory
Lesson 4 Retrieving Memory

Module I
 Module III LANGUAGE: STRUCTURE AND
COMPREHENSION

Lesson 1 Language Acquisition and Development

Lesson 2 Language and Intelligence
Lesson 3 Individual and Cultural Differences in
Language Usage
Lesson 4 Researches in Language and Cognitive
Development

Module IV OTHER COGNITIVE PROCESSES &

SKILLS

Lesson 1 Problem Solving

Lesson 2 Reasoning
Lesson 3 Decision Making
Lesson 4 Cognitive Flexibility

REFERENCES
Bakkar, B, et. al.(July 2021) Fear of COVID-19 Scale- Associations of Its
Scores with Socio-demographics, Anxiety Disorders, and Depression
among the Syrian Population: A National Survey. Journal of Brain,
Behavior, and Cognitive Sciences. Retrieved from
https://www.imedpub.com/scholarly/cognitive-psychology-journals-
articles-ppts-list.php

Blakemore, S.-J., & Frith, U. (2005). The learning brain: Lessons for
education. Hoboken: Wiley-Blackwell

Baumeister, R. F., & Tierney, J. (2011). Willpower: Rediscovering the

greatest human strength. New York: Penguin Books

Beilock, S. (2015). How the body knows its mind: The surprising power of
the physical environment to influence how you think and feel. New
York: Atria Books

Chabris, C., & Simons, D. (2009). The invisible gorilla: How our intuitions
deceive us. New York: Crown

Module I
CHED Memo No. 34, 2017. Policies and Standards for Undergraduate
Programs in Psychology. Retrieved from https://ched.gov.ph/wp-
content/uploads/2017/10/CMO-34-s-2017.pdf

Crothers, L. (January 2020) Cognitive Psychology. Internationa Journal

of School and Cognitive Psychology, Volume 7, Issue 2. retrieved from
https://www.longdom.org/school-cognitive-psychology.html

Davies, G. (July-August 2021). Applied Cognitive Psychology. Wiley

Online Library. Retrieved from
https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/10990720

Duckworth, A. L. (2016). Grit: The power of passion and perseverance.

New York: Schribner

Ericcson, K.A., & Pool, R. (2016). Peak: Secrets from the newscience of
expertise. New York: Eamon Dolan/Houghton Mifflin Harcourt

Foer, J. (2011). Moonwalking with Einstein: The art and science of

remembering everything. New York: Penguin

Goldstein, B. (2018). Cognitive psychology: Connecting mind, research

and everyday experience, 5th Edition. Wadsworth Cengage Learning

Gopnik, A., Meltzoff, A. N., & Kuhl, P. K. (2000). The scientist in the
crib: What early learning tells us about the mind. New York: William
Morrow Paperbacks

Iyengar, S. S. (2011). The art of choosing. New York: Twelve Books

Kellog, R. (2007) Fundamentals of Cognitive Psychology. Retrieved from

https://www.simplypsychology.org/cognitive%20psychology.pdf

Kurzban, R. (2012). Why everyone (else) is a hypocrite. Princeton

University Press; ISBN: 978-0-691-15439-8

Loftus, E. F., & Ketcham, K. (1994). The myth of repressed memory:

False memories and allegations of sexual abuse. New York: St.
Martin’s Griffin

Logan, G. (November 2021) Cognitive Psychology. Science Direct,

Volume 30. Retrieved from
https://www.journals.elsevier.com/cognitive-psychology

Matlin, M.W. (8th Edition.) Cognition ISBN 978-1-118-14896-9

McWhorter, J. (2016). Words on the move: Why english won’t - and can’t
- sit still (like, literally). London: Picador

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Mullainathan, S., & Shafir, E. (2013). Scarcity: Why having too little
means so much. New York: Times Books

Pennebaker, J. W. (2011). The secret life of pronouns: What our words

say about us. New York: Bloomsbury Press

Reisberg, D. (2005). Cognition (3rd ed.). W. W. Norton & Co.

Sharot, T. (2017). The influential mind: What the brain reveals about our
power to change others. New York: Henry Holt and Company

Shaw, J. (2016). The memory illusion: Remembering, forgetting, and the

science of false memory. London: Random House UK

Sternberg, R.J. & Sternberg, K. (6th Edition). Cognitive psychology.

Wadsworth Cengage Learning

Stone, A. (2013). Fooling houdini: Magicians, mentalists, math geeks and

the hidden powers of the mind. New York: Harper Paperbacks

Taral,S, et.al (June 2019) Neuroncognitive Perspective of Prosocial and

Anti-social Behaviors in Humans. Journal of Brain and Neurology.
Retrieved from https://publons.com/journal/49482/journal-of-
psychology-and-cognition

Tarvis, C., & Aronson, E. (2007). Mistakes were made (but not by me):
Why we justify foolish beliefs, bad decisions, and hurtful acts.
Wilmington: Mariner Books

Thaler, R. H., & Sunstein, C. R. (2009). Nudge: Improving decisions about

health, Wealth, and Happiness. London: Penguin Books

Selman, S. Introduction to Cognitive Psychology. Retrieved from

https://www.academia.edu/9970633/Cognitive_Psychology_-
_Introduction_to_Cognitive_Psychology

Sternberg, R, et.al Cognitive Psychology , 5th Edition. Retrieved from

http://cs.um.ac.ir/images/87/books/Cognitive
%20Psychology_Strenberg%206th%20.pdf

The Office of Learning and Teaching, 2004. Melbourne: Department of

Education and Training; OECD, 2010. Nature of Learning, Paris:
Author; http://www.p21.org/Most Influential theories in Learning.
International Bureau of Education. Retrieved from
http://www.ibe.unesco.org/en/geqaf/annexes/technical-notes/most-
influential-theories-learning

Module I
 MODULE I
INTRODUCTION TO COGNITIVE
PSYCHOLOGY

Lesson 1 Cognitive Psychology

Lesson 2 Perception

Lesson 3 Consciousness and Atte

ntion
Lesson 4 Concept and Knowledge
Representation

Module I
 MODULE I

INTRODUCTION TO COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY

 INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this module is to develop an advanced understanding

of the major concepts, theories, methodologies and empirical findings of co
ntemporary cognitive psychology. The module will also help students develo
p the skills necessary to understand and critique research in the field of cog
nitive psychology. As the emerging field of cognitive neuroscience is becomi
ng an increasing influence in our understanding of how the brain works, spec
ial attention will be given the neurological mechanisms thought to be respon
sible for cognitive phenomena.

OBJECTIVES

After studying the module, you should be able to:

1. Demonstrate understanding of the history, approaches, and

research methods of cognitive psychology;
2. Discuss thoroughly the concepts behind perception as a basic
cognitive process;
3. Explain and distinguish the nature and function of
consciousness and attention;
4. Master the process of concept and knowledge representation.

 DIRECTIONS/ MODULE ORGANIZER

There are four lessons in the module. Read each lesson carefully then
answer the exercises/activities to find out how much you have benefited
from it. Work on these exercises carefully and submit your output to your
instructor.

In case you encounter difficulty, discuss this with your instructor

during the face-to-face meeting.

Good luck and happy reading!!!

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Lesson 1

 Cognitive Psychology

Introduction to Cognitive Psychology

 
The word ‘cognition’ is derived from the Latin word “cognoscere”, m
eaning “to know” or “to come to know”. Thus, cognition includes the activit
ies and processes concerned with the acquisition, storage, retrieval and pro
cessing of knowledge. In other words, it includes processes that help us to p
erceive, attend, remember, think, categorize, reason, decide, and so on.
Cognitive Psychology is that branch of psychology that deals with cog
nitive mental processes. Sternberg (1999) defined Cognitive Psychology as th
at which deals with how people perceive, learn, remember, and think about
information. In 2005, Solso gave another definition of Cognitive Psychology a
s the study of processes underlying mental events. In general, Cognitive Psy
chology can thus be defined as that branch of psychology that is concerned
with how people acquire, store, transform, use and communicate language.
Cognitive psychologists study the various cognitive processes that make up t
his branch. These processes include attention, the process through which we
focus on some stimulus; perception, the process through which we interpret
sensory information; pattern recognition, the process through which we clas
sify stimuli into known categories; and memory, the process through which i
nformation is stored for later retrieval, and so on.

History of Cognitive Psychology

At the beginning of the 21st century, cognitive psychology is a broad f

ield concerned with memory, perception, attention, pattern recognition, co
nsciousness, neuroscience, representation of knowledge, cognitive develop
ment, language, thinking, and, human and artificial intelligence. But conte
mplation about the source of knowledge, how people think, solve problems,
and perceive their world is as ancient as human history and has occupied a v
enerated position in the musings of philosophers, theologians, mystics, and s
cientists for as long as we can tell. These notions started to be tested empir
ically during the latter part of the nineteenth century and throughout the t
wentieth century and became known in the history of science as cognitive p
sychology.
The history of cognitive psychology can be parsed into four periods: p
hilosophical, early experimental, the cognitive revolution, and modern cogni
tive psychology.

Philosophical Period

Ancient Egyptian hieroglyphics suggest that thoughtful people were c

oncerned with processes such as thought, memory, and most of all the “ka”,
or soul, Great energy was directed toward preserving the soul but also some

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theorized that knowledge was localized in the heart. Greek philosophers we
re obsessed with knowledge and cognitive matters and current models of co
gnition often have some ties to ancient Greece. Aristotle’s views on the locu
s of knowledge were similar to the Egyptians. However, Plato postulated tha
t the brain was the true locus of knowledge. Renaissance scholars considere
d thinking, logic, and the nature of the soul and, although divergent views w
ere expressed, the locus of the knowledge and rationality was thought to be
in the brain.
During the eighteenth century, philosophic debate over the source of
knowledge took place between the empiricist and the nativist. A British emp
iricist believed knowledge came from experience. However, the nativist beli
eved knowledge was innate and based on structural characteristics and prop
erties inherent in the brain. Modern cognitive psychologists continue to argu
e these matters, although usually with scientific data.
The philosophic period provided a context for understanding the mind
and its processes. In addition, these early thinkers identified some major th
eoretical issues that would later be studied empirically using scientific resea
rch methods.

Early Experimental Period

Cognition has been studied scientifically since the end of the ninetee
nth century. In 1879, philosophical aspects of mental processes gave way to
empirical observations when Wundt founded the first psychological laborato
ry in Germany in 1879. Psychology began to break away from philosophy and
form a discipline based on objective science rather than on speculation, logi
c, and conjecture. Many forces propelled the break with moral philosophy, b
ut certainly the development of new methods that allowed for the examinat
ion of mental events changed the way cognition was studied. Introspection,
or looking within, was one such method that allowed the observer to examin
e consciousness and the structure of mental representation by breaking dow
n an experience into sensations and images. By detecting patterns within int
rospective reports, the mind’s contents were presumed to be revealed.
Theories of knowledge representation became divided between intros
pectionists who studied observable sensations, and act psychologists, led by
Brentano, who studied the activities of the mind. Brentano considered inter
nal representations meaningless to psychology and chose to study mental ac
ts of comparing, judging, and feeling physical objects.
By the beginning of the twentieth century American psychology was b
eginning to take a distinctive form with a wide range of topics under investi
gation. Leading this expanded experimental psychology was William James,
the first president of the American Psychological Association. His ideas on p
hilosophy, religion, and psychology shaped the intellectual history of these t
opics throughout the twentieth century. No less important were his thoughts
about attention and memory, and his distinction of a dichotomy memory sto
re—primary and secondary memory—led directly to experiments in the 1960s
on that topic. Clearly, James’s ideas were important in shaping modern cog
nitive psychology.
During this time, American psychologists became interested in educat
ional matters and were greatly influenced by the objective nature of act psy

Module I
chology. Psychologists such as Thorndike were concerned with the effects of
reward and punishment on learning and less concerned with consciousness.
The introspective technique, in which a subject asks himself what sensations
he might experience, for example, were considered by American psychologis
ts as being sterile and leading to inconsistent results. There was, argued ma
ny, a need for a purely objective and scientific psychology in which mental
processes, such as memory, sensations, and learning, could be reliably meas
ured. Behaviorism, led by John Watson, was predicated on the idea that ove
rt behavior could be objectively observed, offered an attractive scientific a
pproach to psychology, and was an appropriate foil to the rapidly developing
interest in psychoanalysis.
Despite interest in overt behavior, cognitive process were not totally
neglected. During the early 1900s Donders and Cattell were conducting perc
eption experiments on imageless thought using brief visual displays to exami
ne the time required for mental operations to take place and using reaction
time data as dependent measures.
In several laboratories in America interesting research was being done
on memory, attention, perception, language, concept formation, and proble
m solving that was the pre formal stage of cognitive psychology. In addition
to these efforts within psychology, several forces outside of traditional expe
rimental psychology helped shape cognitive psychology. Among these forces
are the considerable influence of the Swiss psychologist, Jean Piaget, whose
central idea was that there are distinctive cognitive stages through which ch
ildren develop. In Russia, the brilliant young savant, Lev Vygotsky, suggeste
d a model of development psychology in which learning precedes developme
nt. Another important influence was the work of Frederic Bartlett, from Eng
land, who investigated memory from a naturalistic viewpoint and was partic
ularly concerned with the remembering of stories. From recall of stories, Ba
rtlett hypothesized that memory is largely determined by schemata, or the
way knowledge is organized and represented in the brain. Even some animal
studies were beginning to embrace cognitive themes. In 1932, Tolman, a we
ll-known behavioral psychologist, observed that rats learned a cognitive map
of their environment while learning to run a maze.
Although cognition was not the dominant school of psychological thou
ght in America during this time, some experimental psychologists demonstra
ted that scientific methodology could be used in the study of mental events.
The techniques, subject matter, procedures, and even the interpretations u
sed by these researchers anticipated the emergence of a cognitive discipline.
Concepts such as sensation, thinking, and mental imagery were anath
ema under the behaviorist’s influence, as they were considered subjective. I
nternal states were considered intervening variables and not necessary to un
derstand human behavior. Psychology had been concentrated on observable
behaviors and human subjects were largely replaced with rats and pigeons.
Gestalt psychology offered an alternative way to study sensory perce
ption to the problematic method of introspection that diffused the research
on cognition. Concurrently the behaviorists attempted to create a purely ob
jective psychology by successfully attacking the cognitive psychologists and
Gestaltists as well.

Cognitive Revolution

Module I
 Cognitive psychology began to take form as a new way of understandi
ng the science of the mind during the late 1950s. These formative events we
re spurred on by research discoveries in memory, learning, and attention as
well as ideas outside of the mainstay of experimental psychology, such as co
mmunication theory, developmental psychology, social psychology, linguisti
cs, and computer science, which gave cognitive psychologists additional bre
adth to deal with the complexity of human information processing and thinki
ng.
The reemergence of cognitive psychology during this period is commo
nly referred to as the Cognitive Revolution, emerging in 1956 with a confere
nce on communication theory at Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
(Solso, 1998) in which seminal papers were presented by Noam Chomsky, Je
rome Bruner, Allen Newell and Herbert Simon, and George Miller. The coale
scence of cognitive psychology during this period was probably not due to a
single group of people (and certainly no precise date of a movement is possi
ble) but was a reflection of a larger Zeitgeist in which psychologists appreci
ated the complexity of the thinking human. At the same time, cognitive psy
chologists rejected the traditional, simplistic theories of the mind, but in m
any cases held on to the scientific methodology as had developed in the earl
y part of the twentieth century. The paradigm that offered a pertinent met
hodology and embraced a sufficiently wide latitude of intellectual topics wa
s cognitive psychology, which enjoyed widespread acceptance and growth.
Research in verbal learning and semantic organization led to the deve
lopment of testable models of memory and cognition, providing another em
pirical base for the study of mental processes. George A. Miller made a disti
nction between short-term and long-term memory and his influential paper
The Magic Number Seven, Plus or Minus Two (Miller, 1956) addressed the lim
ited capacity of short-term memory and introduced the concept of chunking
—the idea that the limits of short-term memory could be extended by groupi
ng information into larger units of information. In 1958, Peterson and Peters
on in America and John Brown in England found a rapid loss or decay of me
mory after the study of nonsense syllables after a few seconds when verbal r
ehearsal was absent, thus promoting the idea of a separate stage of short-te
rm memory. In 1960, Sperling showed that a very transitory memory (or info
rmation storage system) held information for a very brief period of time. Thi
s discovery further advanced the notion that humans were complex informat
ion-processing creatures who processed incoming information through a seri
es of stages. That simple idea was a perfect model for researchers and theor
ists interested in memory, and several models appeared about this time by
Atkinson and Shiffrin, Waugh and Norman, and later by Craik and Tulving.
Prior to this period, information theory was introduced by Shannon an
d Weaver, who used box diagrams to describe how information is communic
ated and transformed along a series of stages. Donald Broadbent, a psycholo
gist at Cambridge, began applying Shannon and Weaver’s ideas to selective
attention processes and introduced the concept of information flow to psych
ology and used box diagrams to describe cognitive processes. Broadbent’s in
formation flow referred to the series of operations that analyze, transform,
or change mental events such as memory encoding, forgetting, thinking, con
cept formation, etc. As such, Broadbent provided “a language to talk about

Module I
what happened inside a man which was not a mentalistic introspective langu
age” (Cohen, 1986, p. 23).
Elsewhere, technological advances in computer science called for ree
xamination of basic postulates of cognition. In 1955, Simon and Newell devel
oped a computer capable of solving a mathematical proof. Cognitive psychol
ogists were excited that machines could simulate human thought and compu
ters could possibly be operating according to the same rules and procedures
as the human mind. Furthermore, since computers were seen as intelligent,
it required us to analyze our own intelligence so that the intelligence of a m
achine could be determined. As a result the hypothetical Turing test was de
vised to determine if observers could discriminate the output of a computer
from that of human responses.
Meanwhile, the behaviorists came under attack from Chomsky, a ling
uist from MIT, who developed a method of analyzing the structure of langua
ge. Chomsky argued that language was too complicated to learn and produc
e via behavioral principles of reinforcement and postulated the existence of
a cognitive structure of an innate language acquisition device.
Another influence that aided cognitive psychology’s foothold was Wor
ld War II. Financial support in areas of military interest became readily avail
able during the war. Because of the military’s interest in developing and usi
ng new technology, research in vigilance, creativity, and human factors was
encouraged. One outcome was a seminal report in 1954 by Tanner and Swets
on signal detection demonstrating that cognitive processes can have a media
ting effect on sensory thresholds. Another outcome of the war was that man
y soldiers suffered from brain injuries. A vast amount of clinical data in perc
eption, memory, and language was a by-product of these victims’ afflictions.
In the 1950s, interest turned to attention, memory, pattern recogniti
on, images, semantic organization, language processes, thinking, and even c
onsciousness (the most dogmatically eschewed concept), as well as other co
gnitive topics once considered outside the boundary of experimental psychol
ogy. Behaviorism and its dogma failed to account for the richness and divers
ity of human experience. Behaviorists could not account for the results foun
d by Piaget’s and Chomsky’s developmental studies. And information theory
and computer science gave psychologists new ways to conceptualize and dis
cuss cognition.

Modern Cognitive Psychology

By the 1960s, cognitive psychology had experienced a renaissance. Co

gnitive Psychology, which systematized the new science, was written by Ulri
c Neisser and was published in America (1967). Neisser’s book was central to
the solidification of cognitive psychology as it gave a label to the field and d
efined the topical areas. Neisser used the computer metaphor for selecting,
storing. Recovering, combining, outputting, and manipulating information. A
nd in 1966 Hilgard and Bower introduced a chapter in their Theories of Lear
ning (New York) that developed the idea of using computer programs to serv
e as models on theories of cognition.

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 Ulric Nasser
Father of Modern Cognitive Psychology

The 1970s saw the emergence of professional journals devoted to cog

nitive psychology such as Cognitive Psychology, Cognition, Memory & Cogniti
on, and a series of symposia volumes, including the Loyola Symposium on Co
gnition edited by Solso and the Carnegie-Mellon series edited by Chase and o
thers, based on the Carnegie Symposium on Cognition. In the 1970s and 1980
s cognitive laboratories were beginning to be built, symposia and conference
s appeared at national and regional meetings, courses in cognitive psycholog
y and related topics were being added to curricula, grants were awarded to
people investigating memory, language processing, attention, and like topic
s, new textbooks were written on the theme of cognition, and universities r
ecruited professors of cognitive psychology to replace those of traditional ex
perimental psychology. In the 1980s and 1990s serious efforts were made to
find corresponding neural components that were linked to cognitive constru
cts. Thus, the cerebral location for a word, like hammer, as a noun, might b
e far different than the location for the same word if the word were used as
a verb. Furthermore, influential memory theories (such as Tulving’s semanti
c and episodic memory theory) were manifest in cerebral localization exper
iments using brain imaging technology. The science of human cognition is sti
ll undergoing transformation due to major changes in computer technology a
nd brain science. As a result cognitive psychology has converged with compu
ter science and neuroscience to create a new discipline called cognitive scie
nce.
Finally, with the advent of new ways to see the brain (e.g. functional
magnetic resonance imaging [fMRI], positron emission tomography [PET], ele
ctroencephalogram [EEG]) cognitive psychologists have expanded their oper
ations to neuroscience, which promises to empirically display the parts of th
e brain involved in cognition that were hypothesized by twentieth-century p
sychologists.

Approaches to Cognitive Psychology

A number of different approaches have been proposed in order to bet

ter understand the field of cognitive psychology. Each of these approaches e
mphasizes a different aspect and highlight distinct features underlying the c
ognitive processes. These provide us with an insight into how the human min

Module I
d functions by giving us a general idea about the workings of the basic cogni
tive processes that we engage in. Broadly, there are four major approaches
that try to explain the various cognitive
processes by highlighting the different important features. These approache
s are: Experimental Cognitive Psychology, Computational Cognitive Science,
Cognitive Neuropsychology, and Cognitive Neuroscience.
Experimental Cognitive Psychology involves conducting tightly control
led experiments under laboratory conditions on healthy individuals. It gener
ally includes experiments that are designed in such a way that they might di
srupt the cognitive processes and reveal their workings. The findings obtaine
d through such experiments then lead to formulation of the theories, which
in turn lead to testable claims. For example, a researcher wants to examine
the effect of arousal on reaction time. He uses the experimental approach,
and the reaction time is assessed through a machine where the buttons light
up and the time to respond is measured. The arousal is also assessed throug
h heart rate measurement, under the following conditions; after rest, after
cognitive overload, after exercise, after caffeine, and after both exercise an
d caffeine. The results obtained through such experimental methods can thu
s lead to formulation of some theories, which later can be tested.
Computational Cognitive Science – involves computational modeling t
hrough the recreation of some of the aspects of human cognition in the form
of some computer program, or formula in order to predict behavior in novel
situations. In other words, this approach basically involves creating compute
r-based models of human cognitive functions, as well as some work on artifi
cial intelligence. Usually, there are a number of ways in which a particular c
ognitive phenomenon can be modeled. However, there is a lack of a definite
method for relating a computational model’s behavior to human behavior, a
nd thus, It is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to take every cognitive f
actor into account when creating a model (e.g. Do models of language proce
ssing take into account the emotional connotations of particular sentences f
or particular individuals?).
Cognitive Neuropsychology investigates the various cognitive processe
s by studying the people who have suffered brain damage, and to find out w
hether damage to a particular brain region would result in a specific cogniti
ve impairment. For example, damage to region X disrupts ability Y, and the
people who have lost ability Y also have problems with ability. Thus, such st
udies involving people with brain damages help us to make assertions regard
ing the healthy brain functions. However, such studies are difficult and cann
ot be manipulated according to the wishes of the researcher as it would be
unethical to cause damage to a particular brain region of a person so that it
s role in a specific cognitive function can be observed. Also, if a person has s
uffered damage to several brain areas, then the interpretation of the result
ant findings is difficult. Cognitive Neuroscience gained popularity over th
e past decade or so, and involves brain-imaging devices to study cognitive fu
nctions. This can help to discover where these processes occur in the brain,
and when. In other words, this approach involves using brain imaging and br
ain anatomy to study ‘live’ cognitive functioning in healthy individuals. As t
he technology improves, these studies are becoming more influential and po
tentially useful. Some of the methods used in the cognitive neuroscientific a
pproach include:

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 Single Unit Recording
Event Related Potentials (ERPs)
Positron Emission Tomography (PET)
(Functional) Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI, MRI)
Magneto-encephalography (MEG)
Transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS)

However, these techniques might be of questionable use with high-or

der functioning which might not be organized in a concise way. Also, if data
from several individuals is averaged the interpretations become accordingly
blunt. Sometimes, when using these methods, tendency for research to be c
onducted is just for the sake of research. Papers can often be lacking any th
eoretical basis, and result in ad hoc hypotheses. Furthermore, threshold
levels need to be set to disregard noise, and these levels are a debatable iss
ue.

Information Processing Theory

Since the 1960s and 1970s, the information processing approach has d
ominated the field of cognitive psychology. Basically, this approach draws a
n analogy between cognitive processing in humans and processing of informa
tion by a digital computer. This theory aims to explain the sequence of trans
formations that input information undergoes in order for a computer mind t
o generate an output response. The researchers who follow this approach as
sume that the information is processed in stages and that it is then stored in
specific places while being processed.

Fig 1. Information Processing Model

Some basic assumptions underline the information processing model.

One assumption holds that the cognitive abilities of a person can be thought
of as ‘systems’ of interrelated capacities, and finding out the relationship b
etween these capacities can explain how individuals go about performing th
e specific cognitive tasks. This theory also assumes that like computers, peo

Module I
ple can also perform numerous cognitive feats by applying only a few menta
l operations to symbols.
Bottom–up Processing – In bottom-up processing, the stimulus reaches
an inactive, unprepared organism, and the processing is directly affected by
the stimulus input. In other words, the processing is essentially driven by wh
at information an individual acquires from his or her environment. So here, t
he processing starts from the input level which is invariably the lower level
of processing, and then goes on to its interpretation.
Serial Processing – As the name suggests, in serial processing, the pro
cessing of information happens ‘serially’. The processing happens one by on
e, and one process is completed before the next one can start.

Parallel Distributed Processing Theory

The parallel-distributed processing model states that information is p

rocessed simultaneously by several different parts of the cognitive system, r
ather than sequentially. In this type of processing model, the information th
at is received from the environment is processed in a number of different lo
cations simultaneously, and then stored.

Fig 2. Parallel-distributed Processing Model

In 1986, the parallel distributed processing model was further extend

ed. Rumelhart and McClelland extended it, and proposed the Connectionisti
c approach to processing. According to this, that information is stored in mu
ltiple locations throughout the brain in the form of networks of connections,
called ‘Nodes’.  In this model, cognition is basically thought of as a network
of connections among a number of simple processing units. Each unit is conn
ected to other units in a large network, and has some level of activation at
a given moment of time. This level of activation is dependent on the input t
hat the unit receives, both from the environment as well as from the other

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units to which it is connected. Thus, according to the Connectionistic frame
work, the various cognitive processes are a result of the different levels of a
ctivation, and a central processor is not required to direct the flow of infor
mation from one process or storage area to another.

Fig 3. Parallel-distributed Processing II Model

Research Methods in Cognitive Psychology

A number of methods are employed in cognitive psychology in order t

o get an insight into the workings of higher mental processes.
Experiments – In an experiment, a researcher manipulates a variable i
n order to see its effect on another variable. For example, suppose a person
wants to know whether background noise affects performances on quantitati
ve problems. One way of studying this would be to take a group of people an
d randomly assign them to two different groups, a no-noise group and a whit
e-noise group. The first group is asked to solve the problems in a quiet envir
onment and the second group tries to solve the problems while being expose
d to white noise. In this case, the presence or absence of white noise is refe
rred to as the independent variable. Our outcome measure is referred to as
the dependent variable.
The random assignment of participants and the ability to include vari
ables of interest while excluding many unwanted factors mean that the true
experiment is a particularly powerful kind of design. However, not all experi
ments involve the comparison of different groups. For instance, in the earlie
r example, one could have used a single group of people, but asked them all
to take part in the two conditions of the study. The two types of design are
referred to as between-subjects and within-subjects, respectively.
Psychobiological research – Some researchers investigate the relations
hip between cognition and the brain's structures and activities. This is psych
obiological research. One way of looking at such relationships is to conduct
post-mortem studies, to compare the brains of normal individuals with those
who were known to have some kind of cognitive deficit. Also, one can obser
ve the performance of brain-damaged individuals and their cognitive deficits

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 Researchers can monitor an individual doing a cognitive task, with the help
of various measures such as PET, MRI, or fMRI.
Case Studies – Case studies are intensive investigations of individuals,
usually people of exceptional ability or people with some sort of deficit. The
se studies may examine archival records, interviews, direct observation, or
participant-observations.
Naturalistic Observation – Another methodology open to researchers i
s to observe people in real-life settings, such as at home or at work. Observ
ations may be done with the knowledge and consent of those being watched,
or they may be covert, in which case people are not aware that they are be
ing watched. The latter type of observation obviously requires the researche
r to give particular thought to ethical considerations. Computer Simul
ations – Computer simulations aim to imitate aspects of human functioning.
A particular cognitive theory may be implemented in a computer program. If
the program runs successfully and produces outputs that resemble human re
sponses, then one might conclude that the theory is coherent and plausible.

Applications of Cognitive Psychology

Cognitive psychology research has produced an extensive body of prin

ciples, representations, and algorithms. Successful applications range from c
ustom-built expert systems to mass-produced software and consumer electr
onics:
(1) Development of computer interfaces that collaborate with users to m
eet their information needs and operate as intelligent agents,
(2) Development of a flexible information infrastructure based on knowle
dge representation and reasoning methods,
(3) Development of smart tools in the financial industry,
(4) Development of mobile, intelligent robots that can perform tasks usu
ally reserved for humans,
(5) Development of bionic components of the perceptual and cognitive n
eural system such as cochlear and retinal implants.
 
THINK!
1. Discuss the significance of studying Cognitive Psychology.
2. How can Cognitive Psychology be applied in real life?
3. Who is the Father of Cognitive Psychology? What contributions did
he share to humanity?
4. From the history of Cognitive Psychology, what led to its
development?
5. What other research methods could be used in cognitive
Lesson 2 processes? What are other applications of Cognitive Psychology?

 Perception

Traditionally, cognitive psychology includes human perception,

attention and consciousness, concept formation and knowledge

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representation, learning and memory, reasoning and judgment and
decision-making, problem solving, and language processing. For some, social
and cultural factors, emotion, animal cognition, evolutionary approaches
have also become part of cognitive psychology.

Perception Attention Knowledge Representation

Memory Intelligence
Areas of Study in Cognitiv
e Psychology

Reasoning Decision Making Problem Solving Language Processing

The information processing approach is built on the assumption that
an organism’s ability to perceive, comprehend, learn, decide, and act
depends on mental representations. A mental representation is an
unobservable internal code for information. It is helpful to contrast a
mental representation of an object with a physical external representation.
Take a robin, for example. Your mental representation of a robin codes
information about the bird’s shape, size, coloring, and perhaps even its
distinctive song. An artist’s drawing of a robin is an external representation
of the real thing. It, too, may convey properly the bird’s shape, size, and
coloring, but it would certainly lack its song.

Example of a mental representation

Fig 4. Mental Representation

Now, close your eyes and imagine a robin. You are using your mental
representations of birds to create an image that only you can experience.
Some mental representations can be consciously experienced as images that
are similar to visual, aural, and other kinds of perceptions. Unlike the
artist’s sketch, they cannot be observed by anyone but you. Mental
representations are private and are perceived, if at all, only by their
owners. Not all mental representations are perceived as images, and their
owners may not be conscious of them. Even with the new technologies for
examining the brain, scientists cannot read your thoughts because they
cannot process your conscious or unconscious mental representations.

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Observing patterns of neural activity is not the same as experiencing mental
representations. Look again, in your mind’s eye, at the robin. Can you hear
its song? Perhaps, but you will hear the real song of a robin only if you have
acquired a mental representation of how a robin sounds. If you confuse it
with the song of a cardinal or sparrow, that is because your mental
representation is in error.
Mental representations, then, provide the basis for all cognitive
abilities. To perceive your environment, you must compute mental
representations of the objects around you and the events that are taking
place. All that you know about the world, and your only basis for acting on
the world, is found in your mental representations.

Some Basic Concepts of Perception

In his influential and controversial work, James Gibson (1966, 1979)
provided a useful framework for studying perception. He introduced the
concepts of distal (external) object, informational medium, proximal
stimulation, and perceptual object. Let’s examine each of these.

Examples:

Fig 5. Concepts of Perception

The distal (far) object is the object in the external world (e.g., a
falling tree). The event of the tree falling creates a pattern on an
informational medium. The informational medium could be sound waves, as
in the sound of the falling tree. The informational medium might also be
reflected light, chemical molecules, or tactile information coming from the
environment. For example, when the information from light waves come
into contact with the appropriate sensory receptors of the eyes, proximal
(near) stimulation occurs (i.e. the cells in your retina absorb the light
waves). Perception occurs when a perceptual object (i.e. what you see) is
created in you that reflects the properties of the external world. That is, an
image of a falling tree is created on your retina that reflects the falling tree
that is in front of you.

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 So, if a tree falls in the forest and no one is around to hear it, does it
make a sound? It makes no perceived sound. But it does make a sound by
creating sound waves. So the answer is “yes” or “no,” depending on how
you look at the question. “Yes” if you believe that the existence of sound
waves is all that’s needed to confirm the existence of a sound. But you
would answer “no” if you believe the sound needs to be perceived (for the
sound waves to have landed on the receptors in someone’s ears).
The question of where to draw the line between perception and
cognition, or even between sensation and perception, arouses much debate
with no ready resolution. Instead, to be more productive in moving toward
answerable questions, we should view these processes as part of a
continuum. Information flows through the system. Different processes
address different questions. Questions of sensation focus on qualities of
stimulation. Is that shade of red brighter than the red of an apple? Is the
sound of that falling tree louder than the sound of thunder? How well do one
person’s impressions of colors or sounds match someone else’s impressions
of those same colors or sounds?
This same color or sound information answers different questions for
perception. These are typically questions of identity and of form, pattern,
and movement. Is that red thing an apple? Did I just hear a tree falling?
Finally, cognition occurs as this information is used to serve further goals. Is
that apple edible? Should I get out of this forest?
We never can experience through vision, hearing, taste, smell, or
touch exactly the same set of stimulus properties we have experienced
before. Every apple casts a somewhat different image on our retina; no
falling tree sounds exactly like another; and even the faces of our relatives
and friends look quite different, depending on whether they are smiling,
enraged, or sad. Likewise, the voice of any person sounds somewhat
different, depending on whether he or she is sick, out of breath, tired,
happy, or sad. Therefore, one fundamental question for perception is “How
do we achieve perceptual stability in the face of this utter instability at the
level of sensory receptors?” Actually, given the nature of our sensory
receptors, variation seems even necessary for perception. In the
phenomenon of sensory adaptation, receptor cells adapt to constant
stimulation by ceasing to fire until there is a change in stimulation. Through
sensory adaptation, we may stop detecting the presence of a stimulus.
To study visual perception, scientists devised a way to create
stabilized images. Such images do not move across the retina because they
actually follow the eye movements. The use of this technique has confirmed
the hypothesis that constant stimulation of the cells of the retina gives the
impression that the image disappears (Ditchburn, 1980; Martinez-Conde,
Macknik, & Hybel, 2004; Riggs et al., 1953).
The word “Ganzfeld” is German and means “complete field.” It
refers to an unstructured visual field (Metzger, 1930). When your eyes are
exposed to a uniform field of stimulation (e.g., a red surface area without
any shades, a clear blue sky, or dense fog), you will stop perceiving that
stimulus after a few minutes and see just a gray field instead. This is
because your eyes have adapted to the stimulus.
The mechanism of sensory adaptation ensures that sensory
information is changing constantly. Because of the dulling effect of sensory

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adaptation in the retina (the receptor surface of the eye), our eyes
constantly are making tiny rapid movements. These movements create
constant changes in the location of the projected image inside the eye.
Thus, stimulus variation is an essential attribute for perception. It
paradoxically makes the task of explaining perception more difficult.

THINK!
1. What occurs first, sensation or perception?
2. Why can't scientists read your thoughts?
3. What are some informational mediums necessary when
a tree falls from the forest?
4. Can we experience the same set of stimulus properties
we experienced before? Why or why not?
5. What is sensory adaptation?

Lesson 3

 Consciousness and Attention

The Nature of Attention and Consciousness

It can be difficult to clearly describe in words what we mean when w

e talk about attention (or any other psychological phenomenon). So what do

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we refer to exactly, when we talk about attention in this chapter? Attention
is the means by which we actively process a limited amount of information f
rom the enormous amount of information available through our senses, our s
tored memories, and our other cognitive processes (De Weerd, 2003a; Rao,
2003). It includes both conscious and unconscious processes. In many cases,
conscious processes are relatively easy to study. Unconscious processes are
harder to study, simply because you are not conscious of them (Jacoby, Lind
say, & Toth, 1992; Merikle, 2000). For example, you always have a wealth of
information available to you that you are not even aware of until you retriev
e that information from your memory or shift your attention toward it. You
probably can remember where you slept when you were ten years old or wh
ere you ate your breakfasts when you were 12. At any given time, you also h
ave available a dazzling array of sensory information to which you just do no
t attend. After all, if you attended to each and every detail of your environ
ment, you would feel overwhelmed pretty fast. You also have very little reli
able information about what happens when you sleep. Therefore, it is hard t
o study processes that are hidden somewhere in your unconsciousness, and o
f which you are not aware.
Attention allows us to use our limited mental resources judiciously. B
y dimming the lights on many stimuli from outside (sensations) and inside (t
houghts and memories), we can highlight the stimuli that interest us. This h
eightened focus increases the likelihood that we can respond speedily and a
ccurately to interesting stimuli. Heightened attention also paves the way for
memory processes. We are more likely to remember information to which w
e paid attention than information we ignored.
At one time, psychologists believed that attention was the same thing
as consciousness. Now, however, they acknowledge that some active attenti
onal processing of sensory and of remembered information proceeds without
our conscious awareness (Bahrami et al., 2008; Shear, 1997). For example,
writing your name requires little conscious awareness. You may write it whil
e consciously engaged in other activities. In contrast, writing a name that yo
u have never encountered requires attention to the sequence of letters.
Consciousness includes both the feeling of awareness and the content
of awareness, some of which may be under the focus of attention (Bourguign
on, 2000; Farthing, 1992, 2000; Taylor, 2002). Therefore, attention and cons
ciousness form two partially overlapping sets (Srinivasan, 2008; DiGirolamo
& Griffin, 2003).
Conscious attention serves three purposes in playing a causal role for
cognition. First, it helps in monitoring our interactions with the environment
Through such monitoring, we maintain our awareness of how well we are ad
apting to the situation in which we find ourselves. Second, it assists us in lin
king our past (memories) and our present (sensations) to give us a sense of c
ontinuity of experience. Such continuity may even serve as the basis for per
sonal identity. Third, it helps us in controlling and planning for our future ac
tions. We can do so based on the information from monitoring and from the
links between past memories and present sensations.
In this section, we will first explore common kinds of attention like se
lective attention and divided attention. Then we will consider what happens
when our attention does not work properly, and what strategies we use in or
der not to get overwhelmed in a world that is full of sensory stimuli. We will

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explore the nature of automatic processes, which help humans to make the
best use of their attentional resources. Last but not least, we will consider t
he topic of consciousness in more detail.

Attention

In this section, we will explore the four main functions of attention as

well as theories to explain them. Here are the four main functions of attenti
on:
1. Signal detection and vigilance: We try to detect the appearance of a
particular stimulus. Air traffic controllers, for example, keep an eye o
n all traffic near and over the airport.
2. Search: We try to find a signal amidst distracters, for example, when
we are looking for our lost cell phone on an autumn leaf-filled hiking
path.
3. Selective attention: We choose to attend to some stimuli and ignore o
thers, as when we are involved in a conversation at a party.
4. Divided attention: We prudently allocate our available attentional res
ources to coordinate our performance of more than one task at a tim
e, as when we are cooking and engaged in a phone conversation at th
e same time.

Selective Attention

Suppose you are at a dinner party. It is just your luck that you are sitt
ing next to a salesman. He sells 110 brands of vacuum cleaners. He describe
s to you in excruciating detail the relative merits of each brand. As you are l
istening to him, who happens to be on your right, you become aware of the
conversation of the two diners sitting on your left. Their exchange is much
more interesting. It contains juicy information you had not known about one
of your acquaintances. You find yourself trying to keep up the semblance of
a conversation with the blabbermouth on your right, but you are also tuning
in to the dialogue on your left.
Colin Cherry (1953, Bee & Micheyl, 2008) referred to this phenomeno
n as the cocktail party problem, the process of tracking one conversation in
the face of the distraction of other conversations. He observed that cocktail
parties are often settings in which selective attention is salient. Cherry did
not actually hang out at numerous cocktail parties to study conversations. H
e studied selective attention in a more carefully controlled experimental set
ting. He devised a task known as shadowing.
In shadowing, you listen to two different messages. Cherry presented a sepa
rate message to each ear, known as dichotic presentation. You are required
to repeat back only one of the messages as soon as possible after you hear it
In other words, you are to follow one message (think of a detective “shado
wing” a suspect) but ignore the other.
Cherry’s participants were quite successful in shadowing distinct mess
ages in dichotic-listening tasks, although such shadowing required a significa
nt amount of concentration. The participants were also able to notice physi
cal, sensory changes in the unattended message—for example, when the me
ssage was changed to a tone or the voice changed from a male to a female s

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peaker. However, they did not notice semantic changes in the unattended m
essage. They failed to notice even when the unattended message shifted fro
m English to German or was played backward. Conversely, about one third o
f people, when their name is presented during these situations, will switch t
heir attention to their name. Some researchers have noted that those who h
ear their name in the unattended message tend to have limited working-me
mory capacity. As a result, they are easily distracted (Conway, Cowan, & Bu
nting, 2001). Infants will also shift their attention to one of two messages if
their name is said (Newman, 2005). Think of being in a noisy restaurant.
Three factors help you to selectively attend only to the message of the targ
et speaker to whom you wish to listen:
1. Distinctive sensory characteristics of the target’s speech. Examples of
such characteristics are high versus low pitch, pacing, and rhythmicit
y.
2. Sound intensity (loudness).
3. Location of the sound source (Brungard & Simpson, 2007).

Attending to the physical properties of the target speaker’s voice has

its advantages. You can avoid being distracted by the semantic content of m
essages from non-target speakers in the area. Clearly, the sound intensity of
the target also helps. In addition, you probably turn one ear toward and the
other ear away from the target speaker. Note that this method offers no gre
ater total sound intensity. The reason is that with one ear closer to the spea
ker, the other is farther away. The key advantage is the difference in volum
e. It allows you to locate the source of the target sound. Recent psychophysi
cal studies have found, however, that spatial cues are less important than fa
ctors like how harmonious and rhythmic the target sounds (Darwin, 2008; Mu
ente et al., 2010).

Example:

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 Fig 6. Selective Attention

Divided Attention

Have you ever been driving with a friend and the two of you were eng
aged in an exciting conversation? Or have made dinner while on the phone w
ith a friend? Anytime you are engaged in two or more tasks at the same time
your attention is divided between those tasks.
Early work in the area of divided attention had participants view a vi
deotape in which the display of a basketball game was superimposed on the
display of a handslapping game. Participants could successfully monitor one
activity and ignore the other. However, they had great difficulty in monitori
ng both activities at once, even if the basketball game was viewed by one e
ye and the hand-slapping game was watched separately by the other eye (N
eisser & Becklen, 1975).
Neisser and Becklen hypothesized that improvements in performance
eventually would have occurred as a result of practice. They also hypothesiz
ed that the performance of multiple tasks was based on skill resulting from
practice. They believed it not to be based on special cognitive mechanisms.
The following year, investigators used a dual-task paradigm to study d
ivided attention during the simultaneous performance of two activities: read
ing short stories and writing down dictated words (Spelke, Hirst, & Neisser,
1976). The researchers would compare and contrast the response time (late
ncy) and accuracy of performance in each of the three conditions. Of course,
higher latencies mean slower responses. As expected, initial performance w
as quite poor for the two tasks when the tasks had to be performed at the s
ame time. However, Spelke and her colleagues had their participants practi
ce to perform these two tasks 5 days a week for many weeks (85 sessions in
all). To the surprise of many, given enough practice, the participants’ perfo
rmance improved on both tasks. They showed improvements in their speed o
f reading and accuracy of reading comprehension, as measured by comprehe
nsion tests. They also showed increases in their recognition memory for wor
ds they had written during dictation. Eventually, participants’ performance
on both tasks reached the same levels that the participants previously had s
hown for each task alone. When the dictated words were related in some w
ay (e.g., they rhymed or formed a sentence), participants first did not notic
e the relationship. After repeated practice, however, the participants starte

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d to notice that the words were related to each other in various ways. They
soon could perform both tasks at the same time without a loss in performan
ce. Spelke and her colleagues suggested that these findings showed that con
trolled tasks can be automatized so that they consume fewer attentional res
ources. Furthermore, two discrete controlled tasks may be automatized to f
unction together as a unit. The tasks do not, however, become fully automa
tic. For one thing, they continue to be intentional and conscious. For anothe
r, they involve relatively high levels of cognitive processing.
An entirely different approach to studying divided attention has focus
ed on extremely simple tasks that require speedy responses. When people tr
y to perform two overlapping speeded tasks, the responses for one or both t
asks are almost always slower (Pashler, 1994). When a second task begins so
on after the first task has started, speed of performance usually suffers. The
slowing resulting from simultaneous engagement in speeded tasks, as menti
oned earlier, is the PRP (psychological refractory period) effect, also called
attentional blink. Findings from PRP studies indicate that people can accom
modate fairly easily perceptual processing of the physical properties of sens
ory stimuli while engaged in a second speeded task (Miller et al., 2009; Pash
ler, 1994). However, they cannot readily accomplish more than one cognitiv
e task requiring them to choose a response, retrieve information from memo
ry, or engage in various other cognitive operations. When both tasks require
performance of any of these cognitive operations, one or both tasks will sho
w the PRP effect.
How well people can divide their attention also has to do with their i
ntelligence (Hunt & Lansman, 1982). For example, suppose that participants
are asked to solve mathematical problems and simultaneously to listen for a
tone and press a button as soon as they hear it. We can expect that they bot
h would solve the math problems effectively and respond quickly to hearing
the tone. According to Hunt and Lansman, more intelligent people are bette
r able to timeshare between two tasks and to perform both effectively.

Example:

Fig 7. Divided Attention

Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD)

Most of us take for granted our ability to pay attention and to divide
our attention in adaptive ways. But not everyone can do so. People with att
ention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) have difficulties in focusing thei

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r attention in ways that enable them to adapt in optimal ways to their envir
onment (Attention deficit hyperactivity disorder, 2009; Swanson et al., 200
3).
The condition was first described by Dr. Heinrich Hoffman in 1845. To
day, it has been widely investigated. No one knows for sure the cause of AD
HD. It may be a partially heritable condition. There is some evidence of a lin
k to maternal smoking and drinking of alcohol during pregnancy (Hausknecht
et al., 2005; Obel et al., 2009; Rodriguez & Bohlin, 2005). Lead exposure on
the part of the child may also be associated with ADHD. Brain injury is anoth
er possible cause, as are food additives—in particular, sugar and certain dye
s (Cruz & Bahna, 2006; Nigg et al., 2008). There are noted differences in the
frontal-subcortical cerebellar catecholaminergic circuits and in dopamine re
gulation in people with ADHD (Biederman & Faraone, 2005).
The three primary symptoms of ADHD are inattention, hyperactivity (i.
e., levels of activity that exceed what is normally shown by children of a giv
en age), and impulsiveness. There are three main types of ADHD, depending
on which symptoms are predominant: (a) hyperactive-impulsive, (b) inattent
ive, and (c) a combination of hyperactive-impulsive and inattentive behavior.
We will focus on the inattentive type here because it is most relevant to th
e topic.
Children with the inattentive type of ADHD show several distinctive sy
mptoms:
• They are easily distracted by irrelevant sights and sounds.
• They often fail to pay attention to details.
• They are susceptible to making careless mistakes in their work.
• They often fail to read instructions completely or carefully.
• They are susceptible to forgetting or losing things they need for tasks, suc
h as pencils or books.
• They tend to jump from one incomplete task to another.
Studies have shown that children with ADHD exhibit slower and more
variable reaction times than their siblings who are not affected by the disor
der (Andreou, 2007).
ADHD typically first displays itself during the preschool or early school
years. It is estimated that about 5% of children worldwide have the disorder,
though estimates range widely from less than 3% to more than 20% (Polanczy
k & Jensen, 2008). The disorder does not typically end in adulthood, althoug
h it may vary in its severity, becoming either more or less severe. There is s
ome evidence that the incidence of ADHD has increased in recent years. Dur
ing the period from 2000 to 2005, the prevalence of medicinal treatment inc
reased by more than 11% each year (Castle et al., 2007). The reasons for thi
s increase are not clear. Various hypotheses have been put forward, includin
g increased watching of fast-paced television shows, use of fast-paced video
games, additives in foods, and increases in unknown toxins in the environme
nt.
ADHD is most often treated with a combination of psychotherapy and
drugs. Some of the drugs currently used to treat ADHD are Ritalin (methylph
enidate), Metadate (methylphenidate), and Strattera (atomoxetine). This la
st drug differs from other drugs used to treat ADHD in that it is not a stimula
nt. Rather, it affects the neurotransmitter norepinephrine. The stimulants, i
n contrast, affect the neurotransmitter dopamine. Interestingly, in children,

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the rate of boys who are given medication for treatment of ADHD is more th
an double that of girls. However, in adults, the use of ADHD medication is a
pproximately equal for both sexes (Castle et al., 2007). A number of studies
have noted that, although medication is a useful tool in the treatment of AD
HD, it is best used in combination with behavioral interventions (Corcoran &
Dattalo, 2006; Rostain & Tamsay, 2006).

Consciousness

No serious investigator of cognition believes that people have conscio

us access to very simple mental processes. For example, none of us has a go
od idea of the means by which we recognize whether a printed letter such a
s A is an uppercase or lowercase one. But now consider more complex proce
ssing. How conscious are we of our complex mental processes? Cognitive psy
chologists have differing views on how this question is best answered.
One view (Ericsson & Simon, 1984) is that people have quite good acc
ess to their complex mental processes. Simon and his colleagues, for exampl
e, have used protocol analysis in analyzing people’s solving of problems, suc
h as chess problems and so-called cryptarithmetic problems, in which one h
as to figure out what numbers substitute for letters in a mathematical comp
utation problem. These investigations have suggested to Simon and his colle
agues that people have quite good conscious access to their complex inform
ation processes.
A second view is that people’s access to their complex mental proces
ses is not very good (e.g., Nisbett & Wilson, 1977). In this view, people may
think they know how they solve complex problems, but their thoughts are fr
equently erroneous. According to Nisbett and Wilson, we typically are consci
ous of the products of our thinking, but only vaguely conscious, if at all, of t
he processes of thinking. For example, suppose you decide to buy one model
of bicycle over another. You certainly will know the product of the decision
—which model you bought. But you may have only a vague idea of how you a
rrived at that decision. Indeed, according to this view, you may believe you
know why you made the decision, but that belief is likely to be flawed. Adve
rtisers depend on this second view. They try to manipulate your thoughts an
d feelings toward a product so that, whatever your conscious thoughts may
be, your unconscious ones will lead you to buy their product over that of a c
ompetitor. The essence of the second view is that people’s conscious access
to their thought processes, and even their control over their thought process
es, is quite minimal (Levin, 2004; Wegner, 2002; Wilson, 2002). Consider the
problem of getting over someone who has terminated an intimate relationsh
ip with you. One technique that is sometimes used to get over someone is th
ought suppression. As soon as you think of the person, you try to put the indi
vidual out of your mind. There is one problem with this technique, but it is
a major one: It often does not work. Indeed, the more you try not to think a
bout the person, the more you may end up thinking about him or her and ha
ving trouble getting the person off your mind. Research has actually shown t
hat trying not to think about something usually does not work (Tomlinson et
al., 2009; Wegner, 1997a, 1997b). Ironically, the more you try not to think a
bout someone or something, the more “obsessed” you may become with the
person or object.

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 THINK!

1. Why does heightened attention pave the way for memory

processes?
2. Name some factors responsible for selective attention to
wards a targeted speaker.
3. What is one intervening factor when two tasks done at th
e same time become successful in divided attention?
4. What is the Psychological Refractory Period (PRP) effect?
5. Differentiate Ericsson's and Nisbett's views on how consci
ous are we on our mental processes.

Lesson 4


Concept and Knowledge Repre
sentation

Module I
 Ideally, cognitive psychologists would love to observe directly how ea
ch of us represents knowledge. It would be as if we could take a videotape o
r a series of snapshots of ongoing representations of knowledge in the huma
n mind. Unfortunately, direct empirical methods for observing knowledge re
presentations are not available at present. Also, such methods are unlikely t
o be available in the immediate future. When direct empirical methods are
unavailable, several alternative methods remain. We can ask people to desc
ribe their own knowledge representations and knowledge representation pro
cesses: What do they see in their minds when they think of the Statue of Lib
erty, for example? Unfortunately, none of us has conscious access to our ow
n knowledge-representation processes and self-reported information about t
hese processes is highly unreliable (Pinker, 1985). Therefore, an introspectio
nist approach goes only so far.
Another possibility for observing how we represent knowledge in our
minds is the rationalist approach. In this approach, we try to deduce logicall
y how people represent knowledge. For centuries, philosophers have done e
xactly that. In classic epistemology—the study of the nature, origins, and lim
its of human knowledge—philosophers distinguished between two kinds of kn
owledge structures. The first type of knowledge structure is declarative kno
wledge. Declarative knowledge refers to facts that can be stated, such as th
e date of your birth, the name of your best friend, or the way a rabbit looks.
Procedural knowledge refers to knowledge of procedures that can be imple
mented. Examples are the steps involved in tying your shoelaces, adding a c
olumn of numbers, or driving a car. The distinction is between knowing that
and knowing how (Ryle, 1949). These concepts will be used later in this sect
ion.
There are two main sources of empirical data on knowledge represent
ation: standard laboratory experiments and neuropsychological studies. In e
xperimental work, researchers indirectly study knowledge representation be
cause they cannot look into people’s minds directly. They observe how peop
le handle various cognitive tasks that require the manipulation of mentally r
epresented knowledge.
In neuropsychological studies, researchers typically use one of two m
ethods:
(1) they observe how the normal brain responds to various cognitive tasks
involving knowledge representation, or
(2) they observe the links between various deficits in knowledge represe
ntation and associated pathologies in the brain.
In the following sections, we explore some of the theories researcher
s have proposed to explain how we represent and store knowledge in our mi
nds:
• First, we consider what the difference is between images and words when
they are used to represent ideas in the outside world, such as in a book.
• Then we learn about mental images and the idea that we store some of ou
r knowledge in the form of images.

Communicating Knowledge: Pictures versus Words

Knowledge can be represented in different ways in your mind: It can

be stored as a mental picture, or in words, or abstract propositions. In this c

Module I
hapter, we focus on the difference between those kinds of knowledge repre
sentation. Of course, cognitive psychologists chiefly are interested in our int
ernal, mental representations of what we know. However, before we turn to
our internal representations, let’s look at external representations, like boo
ks. A book communicates ideas through words and pictures. How do external
representations in words differ from such representations in pictures?
Some ideas are better and more easily represented in pictures, where
as others are better represented in words. For example, suppose someone a
sks you, “What is the shape of a chicken egg?” You may find drawing an egg
easier than describing it. Many geometric shapes and concrete objects seem
easier to represent in pictures rather than in words. However, what if some
one asks you, “What is justice?” Describing such an abstract concept in word
s would already be very difficult, but doing so pictorially would be even har
der.
Both pictures and words may be used to represent things and ideas, b
ut neither form of representation actually retains all the characteristics of
what is being represented. For example, neither the word cat nor the pictur
e of the cat actually eats fish, meows, or purrs when petted. Both the word
cat and the picture of this cat are distinctive representations of “catness.”
Each type of representation has distinctive characteristics.
As you just observed, the picture of a cat is relatively analogous (i.e.,
similar) to the real world object it represents. The picture shows concrete a
ttributes, such as shape and relative size. These attributes are similar to the
features and properties of the real world object the picture represents. Eve
n if you cover up a portion of the figure of the cat, what remains still looks l
ike a part of a cat.

Fig 8. Picture of a Cat and its Tail

In contrast, the word cat is a symbolic representation, meaning that t

he relationship between the word and what it represents is simply arbitrary.
There is nothing inherently catlike about the word. If you had grown up in a
nother country like Germany or France, the word “Katze” or the word “cha
t,” respectively, would instead symbolize the concept of a cat to you. Suppo
se you cover up part of the word “cat.” The remaining visible part no longer
bears even a symbolic relationship to any part of a cat.
Because symbols are arbitrary, their use requires the application of ru
les. For example, in forming words, the sounds or letters also must be seque
nced according to rules (e.g., “c-a-t,” not “a-c-t” or “t-c-a”). In forming se

Module I
ntences, the words also must be sequenced according to rules. For example,
one can say “the cat is under the table,” but not “table under cat the is.”
Symbolic representations, such as the word cat, capture some kinds o
f information but not other kinds of information. The dictionary defines cat
as “a carnivorous mammal (Felis catus) long domesticated as a pet and for c
atching rats and mice” (Merriam-Webster’s Online Dictionary, 2010). Suppos
e our own mental representations for the meanings of words resemble those
of the dictionary. Then the word cat connotes an animal that eats meat (“ca
rnivorous”), nurses its young (“mammal”), and so on. This information is abs
tract and general. It may be applied to any number of specific cats having a
ny fur color or pattern. To represent additional characteristics, we must use
additional words, such as black, Persian, or calico.
The picture of the cat does not convey any of the abstract informatio
n conveyed by the word regarding what the cat eats, whether it nurses its y
oung, and so on. However, the picture conveys a great deal of concrete info
rmation about this specific cat. For example, it communicates the exact pos
ition of the cat’s legs, the angle at which we are viewing the cat, the length
of the cat’s tail, whether both of its eyes are open, and so on.
Pictures and words also represent relationships in different ways. For
any given picture showing a cat and a table, the spatial (positional) relation
ship (e.g., beside, above, below, behind) will be represented concretely in t
he picture. In contrast, when using words, we must state spatial relationship
s between things explicitly by a discrete symbol, such as a preposition (“The
cat is under the table.”). More abstract relationships, however, such as clas
s membership, often are implied by the meanings of the words. Cats are ma
mmals or tables are items of furniture. But abstract relationships rarely are
implied through pictures.

Fig 9. Picture of a Cat Under the Table

To summarize, pictures aptly capture concrete and spatial informatio
n in a manner analogous to whatever they represent. They convey all featur
es simultaneously. In general, any rules for creating or understanding pictur
es pertain to the analogous relationship between the picture and what it rep
resents. They help ensure as much similarity as possible between the pictur
e and the object it represents. Words, on the contrary, handily capture abst
ract and categorical information in a manner that is symbolic of whatever th
e words represent. Representations in words usually convey information seq
uentially. They do so according to arbitrary rules that have little to do with
what the words represent. Pictures and words are both well suited to some
purposes but not to others. For example, blueprints and identification photo
s serve different purposes than essays and memos.

Module I
 Now that we have some preliminary ideas about external representati
ons of knowledge, let’s consider internal representations of knowledge. Spe
cifically, how do we represent what we know in our minds? Do we have men
tal scenarios (pictures) and mental narratives (words)? In subsequent chapte
rs on information processing and language, we discuss symbolic mental repr
esentations. In this section, we focus on mental imagery.

Pictures in Your Mind: Mental Imagery

Imagery is the mental representation of things that are not currently

seen or sensed by the sense organs (Moulton & Kosslyn, 2009; Thomas, 2003)
In our minds we often have images for objects, events, and settings. For ex
ample, recall one of your first experiences on a college campus. What were
some of the sights, sounds, and smells you sensed at that time—cut grass, ta
ll buildings, or tree-lined paths? You do not actually smell the grass and see
the buildings, but you still can imagine them. Mental imagery even can repr
esent things that you have never experienced. For example, imagine what it
would be like to travel down the Amazon River. Mental images even may rep
resent things that do not exist at all outside the mind of the person creating
the image. Imagine how you would look if you had a third eye in the center
of your forehead!
Imagery may involve mental representations in any of the sensory mo
dalities, such as hearing, smell, or taste. Imagine the sound of a fire alarm,
your favorite song, or your nation’s anthem. Now imagine the smell of a ros
e, of fried bacon, or of an onion. Finally, imagine the taste of a lemon, pickl
e, or your favorite candy. At least hypothetically, each form of mental repre
sentation is subject to investigation (e.g., Kurby et al., 2009; Palmieri et al.,
2009; Pecenka & Keller, 2009).
Nonetheless, most research on imagery in cognitive psychology has fo
cused on visual imagery, such as representations of objects or settings that
are not presently visible to the eyes. When students kept a diary of their me
ntal images, the students reported many more visual images than auditory, s
mell, touch, or taste images (Kosslyn et al., 1990). Most of us are more awar
e of visual imagery than of other forms of imagery.
We use visual images to solve problems and to answer questions invol
ving objects (Kosslyn & Rabin, 1999; Kosslyn, Thompson & Ganis, 2006). Whi
ch is darker red—a cherry or an apple? How many windows are there in your
house or apartment? How do you get from your home, apartment, or dormit
ory room to your first class of the day? How do you fit together the pieces of
a puzzle or the component parts of an engine, a building, or a model? Accor
ding to Kosslyn, to solve problems and answer questions such as these, we vi
sualize the objects in question. In doing so, we mentally represent the imag
es.
Many psychologists outside of cognitive psychology are interested in a
pplications of mental imagery to other fields in psychology. Such application
s include using guided-imagery techniques for controlling pain and for streng
thening immune responses and otherwise promoting health. With such techn
iques, you could imagine being at a beautiful beach and feeling very comfor
table, letting your pain fade into the background. Or you could imagine the
cells of your immune system successfully destroying all the bad bacteria in y

Module I
our body. Such techniques are also helpful in overcoming psychological probl
ems, such as phobias and other anxiety disorders. Design engineers, bioche
mists, physicists, and many other scientists and technologists use imagery to
think about various structures and processes and to solve problems in their c
hosen fields.
Not everyone is equally skilled in creating and manipulating mental i
mages, however. Research in applied settings and in the laboratory indicate
s that some of us are better able to create mental images than are others (R
eisberg et al., 1986; Schienle et al., 2008). These differences are even meas
urable with functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) (Cui et al., 2007).
Research also indicates that the use of mental images can help to improve
memory. In the case of persons with Down Syndrome, the use of mental ima
ges in conjunction with hearing a story improved memory for the material as
compared with just hearing the story (de la Iglesia, Buceta, & Campos, 2005
Kihara & Yoshikawa, 2001). Mental imagery also is used in other fields such
as occupational therapy. Using this technique, patients with brain damage tr
ain themselves to complete complex tasks. For instance, by means of imagin
ing the details of the tasks in the correct order so as to remember all the de
tails involved, brain-damaged patients can wash dishes or take medication
(Liu & Chan, 2009).
In what form do we represent images in our minds? According to an e
xtreme view of imagery, all images of everything we ever sense may be stor
ed as exact copies of physical images. But realistically, to store every observ
ed physical image in the brain seems impossible. The capacity of the brain
would be inadequate to such a task (Kosslyn, 2006; Kosslyn & Pomerantz, 19
77).
Amazingly, learning can indeed take place just by using mental image
s. A study by Tartaglia and colleagues (2009) presented participants with a v
ertical parallel arrangement of three lines. The middle one was closer either
to the right or left outer line. Practice using mental images resulted in parti
cipants becoming more sensitive to the asymmetry toward either the left or
right side. A study with architects also showed the importance of mental im
ages. Whether or not they were permitted to draw sketches in the early desi
gn phase of a project did not impact the design outcome and cognitive activ
ity—if they were not allowed to draw sketches, they just used mental imagin
g (Bilda, 2006).
Example:

Fig 10. Mental Imagery

Module I
 THINK!

1. Give an example of declarative knowledge.

2. Give an example of procedural knowledge.
3. In what instances could you rely on communicating knowl
edge, through pictures or through words? Expound.
4. Name one situation/experience when visual or mental ima
ges can help solve your problems or answer some questions.
5. Name one application of mental images to health/phobias
/anxiety/design engineering/scientists/technologists/memory/therapy.

 LEARNING ACTIVITY

Students are asked to:

1. highlight or underline key concepts for each lesson;
2. prepare five questions for each lesson for a group oral
quiz;
3. list concepts that are difficult to understand or read fu
rther concepts that are difficult to comprehend.

 MODULE SUMMARY

 Cognitive Psychology is a science that deals with how the mind works.
 The areas of study in Cognitive Psychology are perception, attention
and consciousness, knowledge representation, memory, reasoning,
decision making, problem solving, and language processing.
 Cognitive Psychology began as a broad field focusing on knowledge,
how people think, solve problems, and perceive the world. Armchair
theorists and philosophical debates were the earliest forms of
scientific activities. Later, a shift from theoretical frameworks to
empirical studies was the interest of scientists. Experiments and field
studies were conducted to test theories and prove research findings.
Then, social science disciplines were included in the educational
curriculum of schools while psychology was gaining the limelight
through its accreditation in the American Psychological Association.
Animal Psychology, Behaviorism and other schools of thought became
the trend to study forms of sensation, perception, and memory.
During the Cognitive Revolution, Cognitive Psychology became the
topic of papers, articles, and researches. Other sciences emerged:
experimental psychology, developmental psychology, communication

Module I
 theory, social psychology, psycholinguistics, and computer science. In
the Modern Era, journals were published, symposia were held, and
cognitive laboratories were built. New textbooks were written, grants
were given to scientists studying on memory, language processing,
and the like. New technologies emerged to study the human brain.
 Four major approaches have been proposed directed to Cognitive
Psychology: Experimental Cognitive Psychology, Computational
Cognitive Psychology, Cognitive Neuropsychology, and Cognitive
Neuroscience.
 Two approaches that dominated the field of Cognitive Psychology
are: Informational Processing Theory and the Parallel-distributed
Processing Theory.
 Five research methods are commonly utilized in the study of
cognitive behavior: the use of experiments, psychobiological
research, case studies, naturalistic observation, and computer
stimulations.
 Perception is a cognitive process involved in interpreting the stimuli
received from the environment. It occurs after they process of
sensation.
 Attention refers to awareness and focusing on certain stimuli. It is a
means of gathering knowledge. Attention may come in two forms:
selective and divided attention.
 Consciousness includes both the feeling of awareness and the content
of awareness, some of which may be under the focus of attention.
 There are ways to represent knowledge: direct empirical methods,
describing people's own knowledge representations, deducing
logically how people represent knowledge, observe how the normal
brain responds to various cognitive tasks, and observe the links
between various deficits in knowledge representation and associated
pathologies in the brain. People communicate knowledge through
pictures and words.

Congratulations! You have just studied Module I. Now you are ready t
o evaluate how much you have benefited from your reading by answering th


e summative test. Good Luck!!!

SUMMATIVE TEST

Instruction: Read the items and determine whether they convey

correctness. Write TRUE if the statement is correct, and FALSE if not.
(10pts.)
1.Cognitive Psychology started as an empirical science.
2.Introspection was a method that allowed the observer to identify patterns
of individual reports to examine consciousness.
3.The reemergence of Cognitive Psychology is commonly referred to as
Cognitive Revolution.
4.Ulric Neisser is the Father of Cognitive Psychology.

Module I
5.Experimental psychology uses controlled conditions in order to produce
the best results.
6.Researchers adopt a series of procedures to bring out a desired response
in Informational Processing Theory.
7.The most common branch of perception is visual perception.
8. Attention can occur even without some degree of consciousness.
9.Adults are not spared of having symptoms of ADHD, although it manifests
early in children.
10.Symbols used in mental representation are arbitrary because of standards
to follow.

Module I