Judgment and Decision Making, Vol. 17, No. 1, January 2022, pp.

1–13

Affect and prosocial behavior: The role of decision

mode and individual processing style

Manja Gärtner∗ David Andersson† Daniel Västfjäll‡

Gustav Tinghög§

Abstract

We study the effects of experimental manipulation of decision mode (rational

“brain” vs. affective “heart”) and individual difference in processing styles (intuition
vs. deliberation) on prosocial behavior. In a survey experiment with a diverse sample
of the Swedish population (n = 1,828), we elicited the individuals’ processing style
and we experimentally manipulated reliance on affect or reason, regardless of subjects’
preferred mode. Prosocial behavior was measured across a series of commonly used
and incentivized games (prisoner’s dilemma game, public goods game, trust game,
dictator game). Our results show that prosocial behavior increased for the affective
(“heart”) decision mode. Further, individual differences in processing style did not
predict prosocial behavior and did not interact with the experimental manipulation.
Keywords: prosocial behavior; intuition; affect; reason; experiment

1 Introduction
When and why do humans act prosocially? The answer to this question is key to understand
much of human behavior and integral for finding solutions to many of the challenges we
∗ German Institute for Economic Research (DIW Berlin), Germany. ORCID: 0000-0002-7007-9661.
† Linköping University, Sweden.
‡ Linköping University, Sweden. ORCID: 0000-0003-2873-4500.
§ Corresponding author. Linköping University, Sweden. ORCID: 0000-0002-8159-124. Email: gus-

[email protected].

Experimental instructions, data and code are available at: https://osf.io/6s83n/.

Financial support by Marianne and Marcus Wallenberg foundation (grant number MMW 2014.0187)
and Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft through CRC TRR 190 (project number 280092119) is gratefully
acknowledged. An earlier version of this paper was circulated under the title “Inducing cooperation with
emotion – who is affected?” and can be found as a working paper in Gärtner et al. (2020). Discussions and
comments from seminar participants at the JEDI lab, ESA Berlin 2018, SABE/IAREP 2018, and the CRC
TRR 190 workshop in Berlin 2019 are also gratefully acknowledged.
Copyright: © 2022. The authors license this article under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution
3.0 License.

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Judgment and Decision Making, Vol. 17, No. 1, January 2022 Affect, intuition, and prosociality

face globally. The hypothesis that intuition promotes cooperation has attracted considerable
interest across disciplines (Rand et al. 2012; Tinghög et al. 2013; Krajbich et al. 2015;
Mishkowski et al. 2016; Alós-Ferrer et al. 2020; Isler et al. 2021). According to this notion,
a first, intuitive response to social dilemmas is linked to prosocial behavior, while reason
and deliberation is linked to self-interest. The empirical evidence in support of this Social
Heuistics Hypothesis is mixed (Rand et al. 2014; Bouwmeester et al. 2017) and recent
meta-analyses have revealed considerable between-study heterogeneity depending on the
type of manipulation that is used to induce intuition (Rand 2016; Kvarven et al. 2020).
Accordingly, intervening in decision processing by directly asking people to either rely on
affect or reason seems to be an effective way to alter cooperation in social dilemmas, while
time pressure and cognitive load do not seem to systematically affect prosocial behavior.
Individuals also exhibit individual differences in how much they prefer to rely on
intuition (i.e., spontaneous, affect-based) and deliberation (i.e., effortful, planned, and
analytical) when making decisions. Such individual differences describe a disposition of
the individual (Allport & Odbert 1936; Spielberger & Sydeman 1994) and can interact with
exogenously induced states (Block 2005; Hammond et al. 1987; Betsch & Kunz 2008).
Interactions between individuals’ personal processing style and the decision mode favored
by the situation has so far received little attention in the literature on dual-processes. (See
Capraro, 2019, for a review of the experimental dual-process literature). The present paper
provides an experimental test of how decision mode and individual differences in processing
styles jointly affect prosocial behavior in a range of incentivized social dilemmas using a
large, diverse sample of the Swedish population.
Our experiment randomized individuals into one of three treatments. We chose to
implement the intervention producing the largest, positive effect on cooperation as reported
in meta-studies (Rand 2016; Kvarven et al. 2020), which was to induce affect and reason
using a direct instructions intervention (Levine et al. 2018; Horstmann et al. 2010; Capraro
& Barcelo 2021). Accordingly, our treatments either directly instructed subjects to rely on
either affect or reason when making decisions or provided no such instructions (baseline
condition). Individual differences in processing styles were measured with the Unified Scale
to Assess Individual Differences in Intuition and Deliberation (USID, Pachur & Spaar 2015).
Prosocial behavior was measured for each subject with a set of incentivized social dilemmas,
including the prisoner’s dilemma game, public goods game, trust game, dictator game, and
charitable giving. Thus, we, first, provide a test of whether the causal effects of affect-
and reason-inducing treatments on cooperation (Levine et al. 2018) generalize to a more
comprehensive, cross-game measure of prosocial behavior. Second, we provide a test of the
relation between the individuals’ preferred processing style and prosocial behavior. Third,
manipulating decision mode and measuring individual differences in processing styles
allowed us to ask whether the causal effects of inducing affect and reason on prosocial
behavior vary across individuals with intuitive and deliberative processing styles.

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2 Method
2.1 Subjects and Procedure
A survey experiment programmed in Qualtrics was sent to a diverse sample of the Swedish
population above 18 years old through the survey company CMA Research in April and
May of 2017.1 The company collects data from their nation-wide panel of about 20,000
adults who were selected to be representative of the Swedish population in terms of socio-
demographic characteristics. Quota sampling was provided to make sure that the recruited
sample had approximately the same proportion of individuals in terms of different age
groups, gender, and geographical regions as the general Swedish population. Data were
collected until our pre-paid sample of 1800 complete survey responses was reached. At-
trition from the survey was 20.6%. Overall, we have data of 1,828 individuals (mean age:
47.3; 51.6% females), after excluding subjects with incomplete responses and missing val-
ues in key variables.2 Our sample of about 600 subjects per treatment allows us to detect
the full size of the main effect reported in Levine et al. (2018) with more than 99 percent
power and up-to small interaction effects with at least 80 percent power.3

2.2 Experimental design

We designed an online survey that allows us to identify the causal effect of affect and
reason decision modes on prosocial behavior across different decision-making styles in a
between-subject design. Subjects were randomized into one of three treatments, a baseline
treatment and two others, which induced subjects to make their decisions based on affect
or reason using a direct instructions intervention (Horstmann et al. 2010). Based on the
wording in Levine et al. (2018, study 3), the affect treatment instructed subjects to rely
on their emotions (but not their reason) when making their choices in the games, while
the reason treatment instructed subjects to rely on their reason (but not their emotions).
Subjects in the affect [reason] treatment read the following;
Sometimes people make decisions by using reason and relying on their brains. Other
times, people make decisions by using emotion and relying on their hearts.
Many people believe that the heart [brain] is the part of our body that is most connected
with good decision-making. When we feel with our hearts [think with our brains], rather
than think with our brains [feel with our hearts], we make emotionally [rationally] satisfying
decisions.
In this part of the experiment, please make your decisions by relying on your heart
[brain], rather than your brain [heart].
1Data from the same data collection are also described and analyzed in Gärtner et al. (2019; 2020).
2We focus here on the analysis on subjects who completed the full survey. The substantive results are the
same if all subjects are included.
3These estimates are based on Models 2a and 3a of Experiment 3 reported in Levine et al. (2018), from
which we derive Cohen’s d = 0.45, and assuming 𝛼 = 0.05.

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The last sentence of the instructions was repeated for each game. The baseline treatment
gave no additional instructions. Subjects in this condition could follow their “regular”
decision mode.
We conducted a number of manipulation checks to corroborate whether the instructions
actually affected the decision mode during the experiment. Four questions elicited how
subjects themselves judged their decision mode during the experiment, asking them to rate
on 5-point Likert scales how much they relied on deliberation, intuition, and emotions as well
as how much the instructions made them think more about their decisions. In addition, we
tested the effect of instructions on the likelihood with which subjects choose the dominated
option in the jellybean task (Denes-Raj & Epstein 1994; Kirkpatrick & Epstein 1992; Peters
et al. 2006). Responses in the jellybean task has previously been associated with deliberative
and intuitive decision processing. The task involves a hypothetical decision between two
bowls containing 100 and 10 jellybeans respectively. Subjects are asked to imagine that
they can draw one jellybean from one of the bowls, hidden behind a screen. If they draw
a colored jellybean, they win a prize. The two bowls are depicted graphically with a label
below the large bowl saying “9% colored jellybeans” and below the small bowl saying
“10% colored jellybeans”. The rational choice is to choose the small bowl because this
maximizes the chances of drawing a colored jellybean, as the small bowl contains more
colored jellybeans in percentage terms. However, the intuitive choice is to choose the large
bowl as it contains a higher number of colored jellybeans.

Measures of prosocial behavior Prosocial behavior was elicited within-subject in a series

of incentivized choices presented in random order: Cooperation in the prisoner’s dilemma
game (PDG), cooperation in the public goods game (PGG), trust and trustworthiness in
the trust game, giving in the dictator game played with another individual (DG) and giving
in the dictator game played with a charitable organization (DG charity). Table 1 gives an
overview of the social dilemmas used to measure prosocial behavior.
The PDG followed the instructions and trade-offs in payoffs used in Levine et al. (2018).
Subjects were paired with another, randomly chosen subject. Each subject was endowed
with 30 SEK (about $3.4) and subjects simultaneously chose to either keep or transfer
their endowment to the other subject. Transferred money was multiplied by two. Subjects
received the money they chose to keep plus twice the money that was transferred to them
by the other subject.
The PGG followed the instructions and trade-offs in payoffs used in Rand et al. (2012).
Four randomly grouped subjects simultaneously chose to either keep their endowment of
40 SEK (about $4.6) or to give it to the group. Contributions were pooled, multiplied by
two, and equally distributed among all members of the group. Thus, subjects received the
amount they kept, and one-fourth of the money pooled in their group.
Our measure of trust behavior was a sequential version of the PDG, which is equivalent
to a binary trust game. The first-mover choice in the sequential PDG measures trust, while

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the second-mover choice (conditional on the other player having contributed) measures
trustworthiness.4
In the DG, subjects chose how much of 60 SEK (about $6.9) to give to another, randomly
selected player. In the DG charity, subjects had two opportunities to give any amount of
60 SEK to a charity (Red Cross, Unicef). The order of the PDGs, the PGG, the DG and
DG charitable giving was randomized. No feedback about the outcomes of the games was
given before the end of the experiment.

Table 1: Measures of prosocial behavior in experiment.

Prisoner’s dilemma game (PDG) Two players made simultaneous, binary choice
whether to contribute money or not
Public goods game (PGG) Four players made simultaneous, binary choice
whether to contribute money or not
Trust game First-mover binary choice in a sequential PDG (trust)
Second-mover binary choice in sequential PDG
conditional on contribution by other player
(trustworthiness)
Dictator game (DG) Amount between 0–60 given to another player
Dictator game charity (DG charity) Amount between 0–60 given to a charitable
organization (played twice with different
organizations)

For the main analysis, we converted each incentivized measure to a z score and con-
structed a composite measure of prosocial behavior. As shown in Table 2, all six measures
of prosocial behavior correlate modestly, indicating that there is a single component that
accounts for most of the common variance. The estimated reliability coefficient (Cronbach
alpha) of the combined composite measure is respectable .72. All incentivized measures of
prosocial behavior correlated positively with self-reported charitable giving during the last
12 months (Rushton et al., 1981).

Individual differences in processing style Individual differences in processing styles

were measured with the Unified Scale to Assess Individual Differences in Intuition and
Deliberation (USID, Pachur & Spaar 2015), which addresses weaknesses of previously
used processing style measures and unifies them, such as the Preference for Intuition
and Deliberation scale (PID, Betsch 2004) and the Rational-Experiential Inventory (REI,
Pacini & Epstein 1999). Subjects rated 32 statements according to how well they describe
4To allow for the matching of all possible cases, we also elicited the second-mover choice conditional on
the other player having defected.

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Table 2: Correlations among the measures of prosocial behavior (n=1828). All correlations
are significant (p<0.001).

M 2 3 4 5 6 7
1. Dictator game (charity) 0.53 0.34 0.20 0.29 0.23 0.17 0.36
2. Dictator game 0.38 · 0.27 0.37 0.26 0.25 0.17
3. Prisoners’ dilemma 0.66 · · 0.30 0.48 0.36 0.13
4. Public goods game 0.58 · · · 0.30 0.26 0.16
5. Trust game (trust) 0.64 · · · · 0.42 0.15
6. Trust game (trustworthiness) 0.74 · · · · · 0.10
7. Charitable giving (self-reported) 2.93 · · · · · ·
Note: Mean for dictator game (charity) and dictator game represent mean % of endowment
given. Mean for charitable giving (self-reported) represent how often subjects stated that
they had given money to charity during the last 12 month measured on a 5-point scale
ranging from 1 (never) to 5 (very often). For all other measures mean values represent
share who acted prosocially in binary choice situations.

their own decision-making style in life in general on 5-point Likert scales. One half of
the statements described intuitive and spontaneous decision making, the other half of the
statements described decision making that is based on reason and knowledge. Taking the
mean of all statement ratings in the USID for each individual, we constructed three measures
of processing styles: (i) a score that measures the individual tendency to rely on intuition in
decision making, (ii) a score that measures the individual tendency to rely on deliberation
in decision making, and (iii) a measure for decision style subtracting the tendency to rely
on deliberation (i) from the tendency to rely on intuition (ii): 4(max intuitive) to –4(max
deliberation). The latter is the measure of processing style we use in our main analyses.
The order in which subjects responded to the trait elicitation questionnaire (USID) and
the incentivized prosocial choices was randomized. Order had no significant effect on
processing style.

3 Results
Manipulation checks Table 3 shows the result of our manipulation checks. Subjects
reported lower reliance on deliberation and higher reliance on their emotions and intuition
in the affect treatment, compared to the reason treatment. The share of rational choices
in the jellybean task was lower in the affect treatment than the reason treatment. Thus,
our manipulation checks suggest that the instruction treatments successfully manipulated
decision processing.

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Table 3: Manipulation checks.

Treatments Difference
Baseline Affect Reason Affect vs. Reason
Relied on intuition (mean rating) 3.23 3.51 3.02 <0.001
Relied on emotions (mean rating) 3.10 3.53 2.69 <0.001
Relied on deliberation (mean rating) 3.84 3.66 3.95 <0.001
Instructions: thought more (mean rating) 3.46 3.42 3.50 0.215
Jellybean task: rational choices (in percent) 0.67 0.63 0.70 0.010
Note: Averages were estimated using full sample. The last columns present p-values of
two-sided t-tests and 𝜒2 -tests, respectively. “Relied on intuition” measures the answer
to “I relied on my intuition when making the decisions in this experiment.”, “Relied
on emotions” measures the answer to “I relied on my emotions when making decisions
in this experiment.”, “Relied on deliberation” measures the answer to “I relied on my
deliberation when making the decisions in this experiment.”, and “Instructions: thought
more” measures the answer to “The instructions in this experiment made me think more
about my decisions.” All responses were on 5-point Likert scales, except for the jellybean
task, which reports the share of rational (non-dominated) choices in the jellybean task.

Effects of decision mode on prosocial behavior Figure 1 shows the effects of our
experimental manipulation of decision mode on prosocial behavior. We find that inducing
affect, rather than reason, increased prosocial behavior (0.09 vs. –0.11, t(1214) = –5.51,
p < 0.001, d = 0.32). The effect of inducing a affective decision mode was positive and
significant for five out of the six prosocial choices included in our composite measure
of prosocial behavior. The only choice where we did not detect a significant increase in
prosocial behavior was in the public goods game. Thus, the positive effect of inducing
affect, rather than reason, on cooperation in the prisoner’s dilemma game, as previously
found in Levine et al. (2018), extends to our comprehensive cross-game measure of prosocial
behavior. The effect was robust in different subsets of the six decisions, including when
looking only at “pure” prosocial choices (excluding trust), “strategic” prosocial choices
(PDG, PGG, and trust), and “non-strategic” prosocial choices (trustworthiness, DG, and
charitable giving).
Compared to the baseline treatment, the affect treatment had a positive effect on the
level of prosocial behavior (0.09 vs. 0.02, t(1222) = –1.94, p = .053, d = 0.11), while the
reason treatment had a negative effect (-0.11 vs. 0.02, t(1213) = 3.60, p < .001, d = 0.21).
Inducing a deliberative decision mode made up the largest part of the difference between
the Affect and Reason treatments.

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0.2

0.1
Level of prosocial behavior

0.0

−0.1

−0.2
Affect treatment Baseline Reason treatment
Figure 1: Level of prosocial behavior across experimental treatments. The value zero on
the Y-axis indicates the average level of prosocial behavior (composite measure) in our total
sample based on decisions made in the prisoner’s dilemma game, public goods game, trust
game (trust and trustworthiness), dictator game and dictator game with charity.

Effects of individual differences in processing style and prosocial behavior Figure 2

shows the relation between processing style and prosocial behavior across all conditions.
Prosocial behavior are not significantly correlated with processing style (r = .013, p = .571).
This lack of correlation holds when analyzing each condition separately, for different subsets
of games, and for five out of the six prosocial choices included in our composite measure.
There is a weak positive correlation between intuitive processing style and the amount given
in the dictator game (r = .048, p = .041). This significant result in the dictator game does
however not remain when taking multiple testing into account (Bonferroni). Overall, these
results suggest that individual differences in the tendency to use an intuitive or a deliberative
processing style do not affect prosocial behavior.

Interaction between decision mode and individual differences in processing styles

Next, we asked whether individual differences in decision style interacted with our experi-
mental manipulation of decision mode, i.e., whether the effect of inducing affect and reason
varied across the individually preferred processing style. Table 4 shows the results from
regression analyses where we include interactions and adjust for age, gender, and education.
We observe the same pattern as illustrated in Figures 1 and 2, with regard to the effect
of our experimental treatments and individual differences in processing style on prosocial

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1.0
Level of prosocial behavior
0.5

0.0

−0.5

−1.0
r=.013,
p=.571
−1.5
−4 −2 0 2 4
Deliberation/Intuitive decision style
Figure 2: Prosocial behavior and individual differences in processing style (n = 1828). The
figure shows scatter plot of the level prosocial behavior for processing different styles. –4
indicate maximum reliance on deliberation. 4 indicate maximum reliance on intuition.

behavior. We also observe that subjects who rely more on an intuitive processing style are
less likely to make rational choice in the jellybean task compared to subjects who primarily
rely on deliberation (Model 3). We detect no significant interactions between decision mode
and individual differences in processing style on prosocial behavior.

Table 4: Prosocial behavioral as function decision mode and processing style.

Prosocial behavior Jellybean

(1) (2) (3) (4)
Age 0.002∗∗ (0.001) 0.002∗∗ (0.001) 0.001 (0.001) 0.001 (0.001)
Female 0.064∗∗ (0.030) 0.063∗∗ (0.030) −0.094∗∗∗ (0.022) −0.093∗∗∗ (0.022)
Affect treatment 0.070∗ (0.036) 0.067∗ (0.038) −0.047∗ (0.027) −0.055∗ (0.029)
Reason treatment −0.131∗∗∗ (0.037) −0.126∗∗∗ (0.038) 0.021 (0.026) 0.015 (0.028)
Processing style 0.017 (0.019) 0.016 (0.032) −0.058∗∗∗ (0.014) −0.037 (0.023)
Affect treatment * Processing style −0.014 (0.046) −0.036 (0.032)
Reason treatment * Processing style 0.014 (0.045) −0.025 (0.031)
𝑅2 0.037 0.037 0.046 0.047
Note: All regressions are OLS adjusted for education level. The composite measure of prosocial
behavior is used as the dependent variable in model 1 and 2. Rational choice in the jellybean task is
used as the dependent variable in model 3 and 4. Processing style takes a value between –4 (maximum
reliance on deliberation) and 4 (maximum reliance on intuition). Robust standard errors adjusting for
heteroscedasticity in parenthesis.

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4 Discussion and conclusion

The conflict between affect and reason has traditionally been a focus of the research on
prosocial behavior. Less attention has been devoted to how decision mode and individual
differences in processing style jointly influence prosocial behavior. In this paper, we provide
results from a carefully designed test of the effect of decision mode and individual differences
on a series of choices measuring prosocial behavior in a large-scale survey experiment. The
key findings from this study can be summarized as follows.
First, we see a main effect of an affect/reason-intervention using direct instructions on
cooperation behavior, in line with Rand (2016) and Levine et al. (2018). We can show that
this effect extends to a more comprehensive, cross-game measure of prosocial behavior.
Noticeably, we find that the negative effect of inducing reason on prosocial behavior makes
up a larger share of the total effect of the affect/reason-distinction than the positive effect
of inducing emotion. Thus, future research should focus more on the impacts of (degrees
of) deliberation on prosocial behavior. Recent meta-studies find no evidence of an effect of
manipulating dual processing on cooperation games other than through direct instructions
(Kvarven et al. 2020), or when studying altruistic behavior (Fromell et al. 2020). We find a
positive effect of inducing affect rather than reason through direct instructions on prosocial
behavior in several games, including the prisoner’s dilemma game, the trust game, the
dictator game, and charitable giving.
We choose to experimentally manipulate intuitive/deliberative decision mode by directly
asking people to either rely on affect or reason, since previous meta-studies have shown this
to be the most effective way to alter cooperation in social dilemmas (Kvarven et al. 2020).
However, it should be noted that the experimental instructions to follow your “emotions”
could have a double meaning. One is indeed to follow your intuition. But the other is
to respond with empathy, akin to an experimenter’s demand effect. This response could
possibly explain why this type of affect manipulations seem to be more effective in altering
cooperative behavior in comparison to other manipulations of intuition, which has been
found to be largely ineffective.
Second, we see no effect of individual differences in the tendency to use an intuitive or
a deliberative processing style on prosocial behavior. It should be noted that our measure
of intuitive/deliberative processing style correlate with other measures of rational behavior
included in the survey e.g., jellybean task (Table 4). Similarly, our composite measure of
incentivized prosocial behavior correlates positively with self-reported measures of real-life
engagements of charitable giving and cooperative behavior. Thus, it is unlikely that the lack
of correlation found between prosocial behavior and individual differences in the tendency
to use an intuitive or a deliberative decision mode is due to poor measurement.
Third, interactions between decision mode and individual differences would occur if
intuitive decision makers reacted differently than deliberative decision makers to affect- and
reason-inducing modes. For example, an intuitive decision mode could increase prosocial
behavior more among individuals who prefer to rely on intuition when making decisions

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than individuals who prefer to rely on deliberation. Another possibility is that highly
deliberative individuals have more scope to raise the focus on their intuition than already
intuitive decision makers. Thus, an intuitive decision mode would have a larger positive
effect on prosocial behavior among individuals with a more deliberative processing style
than individuals with a more intuitive processing style. However, we see no systematic
interaction between decision mode and individual differences in either direction in the
current study.
Prosocial behavior, where individuals must sacrifice personal benefits for the sake of
the greater good, is central in dealing with some on the world’s most pressing issues such
as overuse of limited resources, poverty, climate preservation, and health. Understanding
the mechanism driving prosocial behavior is thus a central challenge. Here we demonstrate
that an induced affective decision mode induced, but not individual differences in affective
processing style, may increase prosocial behavior.

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