Angelaki

Journal of the Theoretical Humanities

ISSN: 0969-725X (Print) 1469-2899 (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/cang20

AN ANTI-POSITIVIST CONCEPTION OF PROBLEMS

Sean Bowden

To cite this article: Sean Bowden (2018) AN ANTI-POSITIVIST CONCEPTION OF PROBLEMS,

Angelaki, 23:2, 45-63, DOI: 10.1080/0969725X.2018.1451461

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Published online: 10 Apr 2018.

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 ANGELAKI
journal of the theoretical humanities
volume 23 number 2 april 2018

I n a very interesting article, “‘A History of

Problems,’” Elie During makes several
important claims about the relation between
Bergson and the French epistemological tra-
dition, represented most particularly by Bache-
lard and Canguilhem. Firstly, he argues that
Bergson’s work troubles the oft-made distinc-
tion between the two orientations in thought
that supposedly characterize twentieth-century sean bowden
French philosophy: on the one hand, a philos-
ophy of the concept, and on the other, a philos-
ophy of experience (also called, variously, a AN ANTI-POSITIVIST
philosophy of consciousness, the subject, life,
etc.). This is because Bergson, despite Fou- CONCEPTION OF
cault’s view of him as a philosopher of experi-
ence, has a fully fledged philosophy of the
PROBLEMS
concept that shares important features with deleuze, bergson and the
the work of Bachelard and Canguilhem. In par-
ticular, they share the “anti-positivist” idea that french epistemological
the development of concepts and knowledge
takes place not by means of the progressive
tradition
acquisition and verification of empirical facts
as a positivist view of scientific history would
maintain but as a response to problems. The problems and concepts, while at the same time
second claim that During makes is that, of all managing to overcome the different kinds of
three philosophers, Bergson alone was able to positivism that remain attached to their con-
develop an anti-positivist conception of pro- ceptions of problems.
blems themselves. The essay will thus proceed in the following
What I will argue here is that, firstly, During manner. Firstly, I will sketch the so-called
is not entirely fair to Bachelard and Canguil- “divide” in twentieth-century French philos-
hem. Their accounts of problems are no more ophy and critically engage with During’s argu-
“positivist” than Bergson’s own, albeit not in ments vis-à-vis Bergson’s proximity to the
the same way. Secondly, I will argue that it is French epistemological tradition. Secondly, I
Deleuze who develops a veritable anti-positivist will outline how each of Bergson, Bachelard
account of problems. This is because he incor- and Canguilhem conceive the problem in
porates, whether intentionally or not, important relation to the formation and development of
elements of Bergson’s, Bachelard’s and Canguil- concepts. Finally, I will explicate Deleuze’s con-
hem’s reflections on the relation between ception of problems, showing how certain

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https://doi.org/10.1080/0969725X.2018.1451461

45
 anti-positivist problems

features of his conception echo elements of the concept seems to refer essentially to the
Bergson’s, Bachelard’s and Canguilhem’s con- structuralist idea that the subject is consti-
ceptions, while also doing away with the linger- tuted as an effect of (social or psychological)
ing forms of positivism found in these latter. structures that the subject does not determine.
For Foucault, finally, the philosophy of the
concept becomes the philosophy of knowl-
1 bergson and the “philosophy of edge, a philosophy that centres itself on the
analysis of knowledge, in opposition to a phil-
the concept” osophy that finds its foundations in the
In the wake of claims made by several promi- description of our immediate experience. (234)
nent French philosophers of the twentieth Despite the differences between the ways in
century – especially Cavaillès, Canguilhem and which this opposition has been characterized,
Foucault – it has become common to speak of however, I tend to agree with Cassou-Noguès
two different and opposed orientations in twen- that it is not entirely meaningless. It captures
tieth-century French philosophy. On the one something that distinguishes the self-understand-
hand, we find what has been called a “philos- ing of twentieth-century French philosophy from
ophy of the concept,” typically represented by that of other traditions. At the very least, the
the works of those associated with the French simple possibility of opposing concepts and con-
epistemological tradition: Cavaillès, Lautman, sciousness would make no sense in the context of
Bachelard, Canguilhem, Althusser and Fou- German idealism, analytic philosophy or Ameri-
cault. On the other, we find what has variously can pragmatism. Moreover, it is clear that the
been called a “philosophy of consciousness” development of alternatives to phenomenology
(by Cavaillès); a philosophy of “consciousness,” is a significant feature of this period of French
“the subject” or “the person” (by Canguilhem); philosophy (Cassou-Noguès 218–19).
or a “philosophy of experience, meaning and the It is perhaps worth noting here that, more
subject” (by Foucault).1 The philosophers recently, Badiou has also distinguished
associated with this latter camp tend to be phe- between two French traditions. On the one
nomenologists – Husserl for Cavaillès, and hand, he speaks of a tradition of “mathematis-
Sartre and Merleau-Ponty for Canguilhem and ing idealism,” “the concept” or “the mathemat-
Foucault. That said, and as will be seen in ically based concept,” which begins with
more detail below, Foucault also counts Brunschvicg and passes through Cavaillès,
Bergson among the philosophers of experience, Lautman, Desanti, Althusser, Lacan and
meaning and the subject. Badiou himself. On the other, he speaks of a tra-
As Cassou-Noguès rightly points out, there dition of “vitalist mysticism” or a “philosophy
are significant differences between the ways in of life,” inaugurated by Bergson and persisting
which this divide has been figured by Cavaillès, in the work of Canguilhem, Foucault, Simondon
Canguilhem and Foucault. Firstly, as is evident and Deleuze (see Badiou, Logics 7–8; “Adven-
from the very terms used, there is some ambigu- ture”). Clearly, the terms in which this divide
ity surrounding exactly what is being opposed to is figured are slightly different again, and the
a philosophy of the concept in each case. Sec- distribution of philosophers on either side of
ondly, in each configuration, what is called the the divide does not align with the distribution
philosophy of the concept represents a quite effectuated by Cavaillès, Canguilhem and Fou-
different response to phenomenology. As cault. Indeed, Badiou appears to have disasso-
Cassou-Noguès helpfully summarizes it: ciated the philosophy of the concept and the
For Cavaillès, the philosophy of the concept French epistemological tradition, with Canguil-
first means a change in methodology: it is hem and Foucault having been evicted from the
useless to investigate the becoming of former camp. Nevertheless, Badiou shares with
science by a reflection on the acts of the Foucault a view of Bergson as a key early
subject. For Canguilhem, the philosophy of opponent to a philosophy of the concept.2

46
 bowden

In a piece written prior to the publication of positivist approaches to the history of science
the two works of Badiou referenced above, present this history as a progressive and “Whig-
During’s “‘A History of Problems’” examines gish” narrative of the elimination of falsehoods
Bergson’s philosophical proximity to the by the discovery, verification and systematiza-
French epistemological tradition. He takes as tion of empirical truths or facts – a narrative
his starting point Foucault’s tribute to written from the point of view of present scienti-
Canguilhem, which initially appeared as the fic truths, which tend to be confused with eternal
Introduction to the English translation of Can- truths (see Canguilhem, Vital Rationalist 41–
guilhem’s On the Normal and the Pathological, 22; During 10; Chimisso 155). What anti-positi-
before being modified and republished in 1985 in vists such as Bachelard and Canguilhem accuse
the Revue de métaphysique et de morale (see such a position of is not primarily its dependence
Foucault, “Life”). In the first text, Foucault upon a naive view of the scientist’s immediate
echoes the earlier oppositions established by contact with the real (although this is certainly
Cavaillès and Canguilhem by claiming that a also at issue), but rather its naive view of scienti-
“dividing line” runs through twentieth-century fic concepts: positivism presents concepts as the
French philosophy, between: on the one hand, more or less adequate replica of verified facts
“a philosophy of knowledge, of rationality, and and neglects the concrete setting of their for-
of the concept” represented by Cavaillès, Bache- mation and functioning. An anti-positivist
lard and Canguilhem; and on the other, “a philos- account of concepts, by contrast, gives priority
ophy of experience, of meaning, of the subject,” not only to concepts over facts but even more
represented by Sartre and Merleau-Ponty fundamentally to the problems which are the
(“Introduction” x). In the later text, Foucault points of departure for concept formation and
then adds that one can trace this cleavage back scientific research more generally. In other
through the nineteenth century, to Bergson and words, the primary objects of an anti-positivist
Poincaré, Lachelier and Couturat, Main de approach to scientific development are not the
Biran and Comte (“Life” 466). During rightly acquisition and systematization of verified
questions why Bergson should be assimilated truths but “problems, along with the conditions
into the category of the philosophies of experi- under which problems are formulated, posed
ence, meaning and the subject. Indeed, he and sometimes solved” (During 12; see also
argues that Bergson in fact developed a philos- Lecourt 166–67, 175). But now, as During
ophy of the concept that shares an important rightly notes, such a view of problems and their
feature with the French epistemological tra- relation to conceptual knowledge belongs to
dition, namely, the claim that problems are the Bergson as much as to philosophers of the
genetic element in the production of concepts, concept such as Canguilhem and Bachelard.
theories and knowledge. Moreover, as he pro- During proceeds to argue, moreover, that it is
ceeds to argue, it is Bergson more than Bachelard Bergson, much more than Bachelard or Canguil-
and Canguilhem who furnishes us with an ade- hem, who furnishes us with an anti-positivist
quate conception of such problems (4–5). conception of problems themselves. During
In order to prosecute this argument, During claims that the anti-positivists of the French
first of all draws attention to the distinction epistemological tradition tended
between positivist approaches to the history of
science and the anti-positivism characteristic to degenerate into a positivist view of pro-
of Bachelard, Canguilhem and others. As blems as “historically given,” or merely
deduced from the examination of possible
During notes, in the context of the French epis-
“moves” in a given situation, i.e., what it is
temological tradition, “positivism” does not
possible to say within the limits of a certain
refer primarily to a verificationist theory of system of propositions and concepts. (17)
factual meaning but more particularly to a phil-
osophy of scientific history. For Canguilhem, As During notes, such a “positivist” view of pro-
whom During cites on precisely this issue, blems was singled out for criticism by Bergson

47
 anti-positivist problems

himself. During cites Bergson’s 1935 letter to truth and creation at the level of the positing of
Floris Delattre, but he might equally have refer- problems themselves. It is in this sense, then,
enced the famous second introduction to The that, for During, only Bergson “managed to
Creative Mind, where Bergson critiques a extend the anti-positivist view of the positivity
view of philosophical problems as things that or priority of problems to a conception of their
can be posited using already-established con- intrinsic determination” (22).
ceptions. On such a view, the philosopher is Now, I agree with During that, given Berg-
“condemned in advance to receive a ready- son’s account of the role of problems in the
made solution or, at best, simply to choose development of concepts, he was an anti-positi-
between the two or three only possible solutions, vist philosopher of the concept avant la lettre. I
which are co-eternal to this positing of the also think During is correct to suggest that the
problem” (Creative Mind 36). In other words, philosophers of the French epistemological tra-
the positivist view effectively treats the dition are unable to evaluate the truth or
problem as an inverted double of the series of falsity of problems themselves, except with
possible solutions that are implicit in the reference to their subsequent solutions.
already-established terms used to state the However, I would question whether Bergson’s
problem. As opposed to this positivist view method for probing the truth or falsity of pro-
which effectively models problems on their sol- blems – the method of intuition – is compatible
utions, Bergson’s anti-positivist conception with a fully anti-positivist conception of pro-
prioritizes the problem over its solution, in so blems. This is because the truth or falsity of pro-
far as genuine problems demand the creation blems, for Bergson, is confirmed as such by a
of the concepts that will be used to posit certain kind of empirical experience: the non-
them, in the very movement of solving them intellectual but nevertheless contentful intui-
(36–37; During 17). tion of duration.3 Bergson, after all, is a self-pro-
It should be noted, however, that During does claimed empiricist, even if he qualifies his
not justify in a direct way the claim that French empiricism as “true” as opposed to British
epistemologists such as Bachelard and Canguil- “atomic” empiricism (Creative Mind 147).
hem think problems in terms of their solutions, Given this, Bergson’s otherwise anti-positivist
at least in the way just outlined. Indeed, and as conception of problems harbours a positivist
will be seen more fully below, these latter element. Of course, this is not to say that
clearly recognize that scientists “create unprece- Bergson holds a positivist philosophy of
dented concepts to pose and solve problems of history, of the kind critiqued by Bachelard
their own devising” (During 18). During and Canguilhem. Indeed, During convincingly
instead argues that invention at the level of pro- demonstrates that Bergson approaches the
blems remains something “inexplicable” for the history of philosophy, as much as the history
French epistemologists since, unlike Bergson, of science, as a history of problems (13–16).
they do not possess a means for evaluating pro- Nevertheless, in so far as Bergson takes the
blems in terms of their truth or falsity, except truth or falsity of problems themselves to be
with reference to the eventual solutions that evaluable with reference to a form of immediate
would, as it were, verify them (20–21). In other and contentful, albeit non-intellectual, experi-
words, for Canguilhem and Bachelard, the only ence – the intuition of duration – his conception
criteria available to them for talking about the of problems is one that depends on a type of
truth or falsity of problems are the truth or empirical verification or disverification. As
falsity of the solutions to which they give rise Gunter has put it, and as During concedes,
(20). Things are otherwise with Bergson, as will “intuitionism must run the gauntlet of obser-
be seen in more detail below, in so far as his vation and experiment” (Gunter, “Dialectic of
method of intuition, and a certain interplay Intuition” 24; During 9). However, During
between intuition and intelligence, allow him to does not draw the conclusion that follows from
identify and debunk false problems and reconcile this concession, namely, that if Bergson’s

48
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conception of a problem’s truth or falsity is one In doing so, it discovers that these concepts
that depends on the idea of the direct intuition refer not to absences in an absolute sense but
of duration, it is no less positivist than Bache- only to things or orders that do not interest us
lard’s and Canguilhem’s, albeit in a different (think here of the way in which the concept of
way: whereas for the latter the truth of problems “nothing,” when employed as a response to
is retrospectively verified by their subsequent the question “what did you do today?,” signifies
solutions, for the former it is verified by a only “nothing of significance” or “nothing
certain kind of empirical experience. worth talking about”). In short, what this play
To bolster this claim, let us examine a key of intuition and the intellect discovers is that
Bergsonian text which During does not touch the philosopher has formulated a false
upon: Bergson’s account of the debunking of problem by transplanting our already-existing,
false problems such as “why is there something everyday and practical concepts of nothingness
rather than nothing?” or “how does order and disorder into the realm of metaphysical
emerge from chaos?” in the second introduction speculation. Moreover, in virtue of this same
to The Creative Mind (see 46–49). Here, play of the intuitive grasp of duration and the
Bergson argues for a two-step process involving intellectual deployment of concepts, the philo-
both intuition and the intellect. The first step, sopher is now able to formulate the true
he claims, takes place when we immerse ourselves problem in line with the experience of real dur-
in duration and, contrary to the terms of the ation: not nothingness and being but the actua-
above-mentioned problems, intuitively grasp no lization of the virtual; not order and disorder
lack of order or lack of being, only the fullness but the differentiation of order etc.4
of an ever-flowing reality and the ongoing cre- In short, then, in so far as the truth or falsity of
ation of novelty: problems is evaluated with reference to the intui-
tive, contentful grasp of duration, Bergson’s con-
To the extent that we distend our will, tend to ception of problems retains a positivist element.
reabsorb our thought in it and get into
In what follows, then, I intend to argue that it
greater sympathy with the effort which
is Deleuze who, although deeply influenced by
engenders things, these formidable problems
recede, diminish and disappear. For we feel Bergson, provides us with a thoroughly anti-posi-
that a divinely creative will or thought is tivist account of problems in his 1968 Difference
too full of itself, in the immensity of its and Repetition, and especially in the third
reality, to have the slightest idea of a lack chapter of that work, “The Image of Thought.”
of order or a lack of being. (47) Before doing so, however, I will outline in a
little more detail Bergson’s, Bachelard’s and Can-
In a second step, then, guilhem’s claims about the relation between pro-
as soon as we have intuitively perceived the blems and conceptual thought. This will prepare
true, our intellect recovers itself, corrects the ground for the final section of the paper on
itself, intellectually formulates its errors. It Deleuze’s conception of problems which, I will
has received the suggestion; it furnishes the argue, echoes key aspects of the work of all
verification [ … ] [T]he intellect immersed three philosophers, while also doing away with
in the conceptual environment verifies from their lingering positivism.
point to point, by contact, analytically, what
had been the object of a synthetic and
super-intellectual vision. If it had not been 2 problems and concepts in
for a warning from without, the thought of bergson, bachelard and Canguilhem
a possible illusion would never even have
occurred to it. (48) 2.1 bergson
In other words, after having intuitively The key text for Bergson’s view of the relation
grasped the true, the intellect is tasked with ana- between problems and concepts is, as has
lysing the concepts of nothingness and disorder. already been mentioned, the second

49
 anti-positivist problems

introduction to The Creative Mind, “Stating of great problems are set forth only when they
the Problems” (perhaps more appropriately are solved. (Creative Mind 36–37)
translated as “On the Posing of Problems”
Or again, as Deleuze has put it in his monograph
[“De la position des problèmes”]). Here,
on Bergson,
Bergson denounces the philosophical conserva-
tism involved in posing problems using terms the problem always has the solution it
whose meanings are already given in language. deserves, in terms of the way in which it is
For Bergson, the words of a language signify stated (i.e., the conditions under which it is
concepts that carve up reality according to the determined as a problem), and of the means
practical needs and interests of a linguistic and terms at our disposal for stating it. (Berg-
group. To pose problems using such terms not sonism 16)5
only risks obfuscating the real “joints” of
But apart from this demand that genuine pro-
nature, such a procedure also determines in
blems require the invention of novel concepts to
advance the range of possible solutions to the
pose and solve them, Bergson also views the
problem posed, since these are already implicit
relation between problems and concepts from
in the familiar terms in which the problem is
another angle. Specifically, for Bergson, the
couched and need only be “uncovered.” For
very human activity of establishing general
example, the solution to the “elementary” philo-
ideas or concepts needs to be understood as a
sophical problem mentioned by Bergson, “Is
response to “vital problems.” In other words,
pleasure happiness, or not?,” can be viewed as
the intellect and its conceptual fabrications
already implicit in the terms used, needing
have a vital and evolutionary significance: they
only to be uncovered by finding out how the
emerge and develop historically as a function
words “pleasure” and “happiness” have been
of the human need to act in response to the
employed by the best writers on these topics.
novel problems they encounter in an ever-chan-
For Bergson, such a procedure condemns phil-
ging environment. Moreover, for Bergson, this
osophy to the status of a “jig-saw puzzle where
capacity to develop general ideas or concepts
the problem is to construct with the pieces
in order to solve problems is something that
that society gives us the design it is unwilling
human beings share with all forms of organic
to show us” (Creative Mind 36).
life. As he puts it:
For During, as we have seen, Bergson’s
remarks function here as the simplest definition [E]very living being, perhaps even every
of a positivist view of problems. Here, “pro- organ, every tissue of a living being general-
blems are considered as given, and yet as truly izes, I mean classifies, since it knows how to
secondary to their solutions, because they are gather, in the environment in which it lies,
entirely designed after them, like neutralized from the most widely differing substances
doubles of supposedly pre-existent propositions or objects, the parts or elements which can
which may or must serve as responses” (During satisfy this or that one of its needs; the rest
it disregards. Therefore it isolates the charac-
17). On an anti-positivist conception of pro-
teristic which interests it, going straight to a
blems, however, as Bergson puts it:
common property; in other words, it classi-
it is a question of finding the problem and fies, and consequently abstracts and general-
consequently of positing it, even more than izes. (Creative Mind 39)
of solving it [ … ] [S]tating the problem is
The primary difference between the general
not simply uncovering, it is inventing [ … ]
ideas of human beings and those of non-
Already in mathematics and still more in
metaphysics, the effort of invention consists human lifeforms is, of course, that the latter
most often in raising the problem, in creating tend to be “automatically extracted” in the con-
the terms in which it will be stated. The frontation of a particular body with its environ-
stating and solving of the problem are here ment (as a function of that body’s physiology),
very close to being equivalent; the truly whereas the former can also be reflected upon

50
 bowden

and even created with intention (40). At an even which the problem will be stated and solved.
more general level, the evolution of life itself is For now, however, let us turn to examine
understood by Bergson as the act of avoiding some of Bachelard’s and then Canguilhem’s
obstacles by means of the posing and solving work on the relation between problems and
of problems. Indeed, for Bergson, the progress- the development of concepts and knowledge.
ive construction of the organism, and even an
organ such as the eye, is both the stating of a
problem and a solution (see Bergson, Creative
2.2 bachelard
Evolution 58, 87–90; Deleuze, Bergsonism 16; Bachelard is known primarily in the English-
“Lecture Course” 74; Osborne 6). As Lefebvre speaking world for his work on the poetic
helpfully puts it, for Bergson, “life proceeds imagination. In France, however, he is better
by an increasing dissociation according to the known for his work on scientific rationality
demands of problems and their corresponding and the history and philosophy of science.
solutions” (32). Indeed, it is his work on the historical develop-
Finally, it can be noted that Bergson sees a ment of scientific knowledge which is of concern
close relation between these two ways of to us here. For Bachelard, the progress of
viewing the relation between problems and con- science is discontinuous, proceeding by “rup-
cepts: namely, that genuine problems need to be tures” which are needed to overcome various
posed and solved by means of the invention of “epistemological obstacles” to scientific knowl-
novel concepts, and that concept creation has a edge. Such obstacles include – as indicated in
kind of vital significance. Indeed, Bergson’s the table of contents of Bachelard’s The For-
major argument in Creative Evolution is that mation of the Scientific Mind – primary experi-
there is a type of reciprocity between knowledge ence, general knowledge, over-extended familiar
and life. On the one hand, in terms of knowl- images, pragmatic knowledge, substantialism,
edge, the work of the human intellect must be realism, animism and the libido (see also Chi-
understood in terms of the movement of life misso 144). These obstacles have their origin
itself: conceptual knowledge is a response to in the human mind, and especially, for Bache-
the “fundamental exigencies of life” (Creative lard, in the imagination and emotions.
Mind 39). On the other, the thought of this Whereas scientific thought deals in concepts,
movement of life demands a critique of existing common sense and everyday thinking deal in
knowledge, which is to say the dissolution of images. However, products of the imagination
certain pre-existing conceptual frames and the also tend to infect scientific conceptualizations,
re-posing of the problem of life in terms of the and so science develops by breaking not only
time of duration (Bergson, Creative Evolution with common sense and everyday experience
ix, xiii; see also Marrati 1101–02). but also with previous science (internal rup-
Now, as will be seen, Deleuze follows Bergson tures). As Bachelard summarily declares, the
on many of these points. It appears, however, “scientific mind can only establish itself by
that he will not follow the Bergsonian claim destroying the non-scientific mind” (Philosophy
explicated at the end of the previous section. of No 8).
Indeed, as I will argue more fully below, These moments of rupture are not, however,
Deleuze makes the evaluation of the truth or purely negative. What Bachelard calls the “phil-
falsity of problems depend not on some content- osophy of no” must be understood as a construc-
ful experience à la Bergson (the intuitive grasp tive activity. Indeed, the agent of an
of duration) but rather on a type of shock or epistemological rupture is a certain “dialectiza-
“encounter.” This shock or encounter does not tion of concepts” through which conceptualiz-
deliver anything contentful but is simply the ations which are at first obstacles to knowledge
bearer of a problem that thought is constrained are negated, emptied of their content and
to pose by thinking something it cannot yet actively reconceptualized or systematically rede-
think, calling for the creation of the terms in fined on an enlarged, more rational or

51
 anti-positivist problems

“rectified” scientific basis (Bachelard, Philos- linked to the concept of an epistemological

ophy of No 115; Ross and Ahmadi 92; Maniglier rupture (Maniglier 22). As Bachelard puts it, a
23). problematic involves a “specific doubt”
Another key aspect of Bachelard’s treatment applied to an older conceptualization or object
of science is his insistence on the constructed of knowledge (an epistemological obstacle),
nature of the scientific object. As Ross and but where the mind that doubts is determined
Ahmadi note, “for natural observation and the as a programme of experiments, and where
objects which supply it contemporary science this programme of experiments determines
substitutes phenomena that are in a radical what is doubted as the subject of a to-be-recti-
sense constructs of the equipment and pro- fied or to-be-consolidated construction (Bache-
cedures of scientific practice” (90). Bachelard lard, “Corrationalism” 27, 29). Indeed, it is in
even coins the term “phenomeno-technology” this sense that, for Bachelard, all scientific
to emphasize that scientific objects are phenom- research and progress demands the constitution
ena that are technically and experimentally of a problematic, and a constituted problematic
defined, created and studied, more than they is the cutting edge or “active summit of
are immediately experienced (New Scientific research” (30). To put the point another way –
Spirit 13; see also Chimisso 143). The “immedi- in terms of the “dialectization of concepts”
ate,” Bachelard claims, “must yield to the con- which was presented above as the agent of an
structed” (Philosophy of No 123). epistemological rupture – if scientific thought
It is also important to note that, for Bache- is a dialectical process that progressively struc-
lard, scientific knowledge is mediated in a tures a set of concepts, then the problematic
second way: not only technically and experimen- of a science is its experimentally grounded and
tally but also inter-subjectively. Bachelard’s “unified field of questions and hypothetical
“dialectical rationalism” is thus also a dialectical expectations” (Eyers 56) which determines the
“co-” or “inter-rationalism” (Bachelard, “Corra- “vector” of this conceptual structuration (Man-
tionalism” 30). This is to say that scientific con- iglier 23).
cepts and knowledge are the products of a Secondly, then, the problematic furnishes
culture, albeit a “rational culture” that dis- Bachelard with a new, anti-Cartesian conception
tinguishes itself from the biases, interests and of the relation between subject and object –
errors of everyday culture, and that is materia- between the scientific mind and the object of
lized in the form of institutions, meetings and science. In short, what Bachelard calls “the pro-
colloquia (Lecourt 82; Rheinberger 24; Tiles blematic” simultaneously determines the
25). Indeed, for Bachelard, one cannot do subject to think and the object to be thought
science alone. The practice and progress of (Maniglier 22). Bachelard speaks in this regard
science is inseparable from a rational, dialectical of the object as an “instructor,” by which he
exchange between minds, in so far as this latter means that the object of science constrains the
is the source of objective control, verification, scientific mind to think, not by demanding
confirmation, instruction, normativity and the that the mind grasp it in its brute reality but
rational coordination and codification of truths by being taken up in a constructive problematic
in a system of apodictic knowledge (“Corration- where “every experiment on the reality already
alism” 31; see also Lecourt 82; Chimisso 148). informed by science is at the same time an
In his 1949 work a Le Rationalisme experiment on scientific thought” (“Corration-
applique,́ Bachelard introduced a concept alism” 29). Or again, as Bachelard puts it
which is of interest here: that of a problematic. elsewhere:
By means of this concept, whose extreme rich- It is no longer a question of confronting a
ness has been highlighted by Lecourt (79), solitary mind with an indifferent universe.
Bachelard was able to bring together many of It is necessary henceforth to place oneself at
the key ideas already noted. In the first place, the centre where the knowing mind is deter-
Bachelard’s concept of a problematic is closely mined by the precise object of its knowledge

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and where, in exchange, it determines its means for probing problems themselves, no cri-
experience [or experiments] with greater pre- teria for the intrinsic determination of the true
cision. (Le Rationalisme appliqué 4 quoted and the false at the level of the posing of pro-
in Tiles 25) blems. As During rightly notes, then, the only
Finally, for Bachelard, it is the problematic criteria that remain for evaluating problems
that makes possible the very rational, scientific are the solutions themselves, which entails a lin-
culture which will bring about the resolution gering form of positivism in Bachelard’s con-
of the problematic. As he puts it, “it is by the ception of problems (20). As will be seen in
exchange of protocols in a problematic that the final section of the paper, however,
inter-rationalism begins; it is by this precise Deleuze’s conception of problems effectively
doubt that the union of those working on a does away with this particular form of positiv-
proof is founded” (“Corrationalism” 30). In ism, as much it does with the Bergsonian one.
other words, a common problematic is what
guarantees the unity of direction of a pro-
gramme of research on a given object, carried
2.3 canguilhem
out by a plurality of scientists over time, and Canguilhem, like Bergson and Bachelard,
controlling for the production of a rationally claims that there is a tight connection between
coordinated system of novel concepts and the formation of scientific concepts and pro-
truths. blems (Lecourt 172; Macherey 176). Moreover,
Now, it is clear that Deleuze was influenced this connection between concepts and problems
by Bachelard’s work in formulating his con- is central to Canguilhem’s approach to the
ception of problems in Difference and Rep- history of science – an approach which is expli-
etition. He references Le Rationalisme citly opposed to the positivist and Whiggish his-
applique ́ and applauds Bachelard for opposing torical narrative of the progressive acquisition
problems to Cartesian doubt, and for denoun- and verification of truths culminating in the
cing the “model of recognition” in favour of a current state of science. For Canguilhem, if
constructivism with regard to the objects of pro- the object of a science is an object that is con-
blems (320 n. 9). However, and although structed by means of propositions and theories
Deleuze does not explicitly argue for this that are testable and falsifiable, then the object
point, it is also clear that he does not follow of the history of science is the complex set of
Bachelard in one important respect: the de conditions in which this scientific object comes
facto evaluation of the truth or falsity of pro- to be determined (see Canguilhem, “Object”
blems in terms of their solutions. Indeed, as 203; Rheinberger 67). More particularly, the
has been seen, for Bachelard, a problematic object of the history of science for Canguilhem
can be said to begin by calling into question tends to be the history of the concept in which
past “solutions.” A problematic can also be the object of scientific knowledge is reflected:
said to be “resolved” in so far as it issues in a from the complex process of the concept’s for-
system of truths that are “rationally coordinated mation where it initially articulates little more
and codified in books provided with the guaran- than a problem to be resolved, to the elaboration
tee of the scientific city” (“Corrationalism” 31). of the concept within a given theory, and even
Finally, it is possible that the work carried out displacement of the concept from one theoreti-
within a problematic might give rise to some fal- cal context to another, where the theoretical
sehoods and errors, but these will be premature elaboration of the concept appears as the
and isolated outcomes – unjustified convictions current meaning of the problem which the fledg-
– to be quickly overcome, if not discarded and ling concept initially stood for (Lecourt 175;
forgotten. But there is little else to say about Macherey 171–72, 176; Schmidgen 247).
the relation between the problematic and truth For Canguilhem, concepts are comprised of
and falsity. Bachelard certainly gives us no three things: a phenomenon, a word and a

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definition that ties word and phenomenon It can be summarized as follows (with the
together (Canguilhem, La Formation 68–69; names of the authors who first formulated
Vital Rationalist 188–89; Schmidgen 245). or incorporated certain basic notions
However, the historical process of the appear- included in parentheses): a reflex movement
ance and formation of the concept is a (Willis) is one whose immediate cause is an
antecedent sensation (Willis), the effect of
complex one. At the moment of its initial
which is determined by physical laws
appearance, a concept is little more than a (Willis, Astruc, Unzer, Prochaska) – in con-
rough précis which, by means of a summary junction with the instincts (Whytt, Pro-
definition, helps us discern the contours chaska) – by reflection (Willis, Astruc,
of some phenomenon (Canguilhem, Vital Unzer, Prochaska) in the spinal cord
Rationalist 188–89; La Formation 68–69). In (Whytt, Prochaska, Legallois), with or
relation to its subsequent applications in pro- without concomitant consciousness (Pro-
grammes of experiments, and the way it is sub- chaska). (Vital Rationalist 194; La For-
sequently made sense of within a theory or mation 131)
theories, the concept at its birth merely gives
Another striking feature of Canguilhem’s
shape to “a problem to be solved,” and has
work on the historical formation of scientific
the status of a “waiting position” on the road
concepts is that he sees a role for factors
to more precise knowledge (Canguilhem and
which would not typically be called scientific.
Planet 96 cited in Schmidgen 247). To take
In particular, in his study of the concept of
the example of the formation of the scientific
reflex movement, he speaks of the important
concept of reflex movement which Canguilhem
role played by the imagination in Willis’s
studies, if we can say in general and non-scien-
initial formulation of the concept. Willis, it
tific terms that the problem was one of
appears, interpreted biological phenomena in
distinguishing between voluntary and involun-
terms of the optical laws of reflexion, and by
tary movement, then we must also say that
teasing out all of the consequences of this fantas-
this problem came to be posed and resolved
tic “explanatory” comparison he was able to for-
in a conceptual language that scientists them-
mulate for the first time a rough conceptual
selves had to forge (see Canguilhem, La For-
précis of the scientific object that is now
mation 148–49; “Object” 204). Moreover, for
known as reflex movement (Canguilhem, Vital
Canguilhem, in the case of the reflex concept,
Rationalist 187–88; La Formation 65–66; Chi-
this conceptual invention took place over
misso 157; Macherey 174–75). Moreover, it
approximately 150 years, and implicated a
seems, Willis also made good use of a series of
large network of contributing scholars. As
imaginative comparisons with elements of
Schmidgen rightly notes, these
material and technological culture. He refers,
scholars cooperated almost blindly with one for example, to gun powder and cannons, and
another over time [ … ] [W]hat one of these “conceives of the phenomenon of sensori-motri-
scholars neglected, was highlighted by city as explosions or detonations of animal
another. They used different instruments spirits in the muscles, where they cause contrac-
and tools, but posed similar questions. tions and subsequent movements” (Schmidgen
They came from different countries, were
248; Canguilhem, Vital Rationalist 186–87;
trained in different disciplines, and still
La Formation 63). Of course, Bachelard would
they were connected – by means of a
concept, a problem. (249–50) have rejected these imaginative elements of
Willis’s theory as non-scientific. Canguilhem’s
Indeed, as Canguilhem argues at length, begin- concern, however, is not so much to determine
ning with the work of Willis in the last third what is scientific and what is not as to determine
of the seventeenth century, it wasn’t until what is involved in the complex historical process
1800 that the complete definition of the reflex of the formation of scientific concepts – a
concept was in place: process which progressively invents a conceptual

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language in order to pose and resolve novel pro- (Schmidgen 232; Sholl 122). Moreover, if we
blems (see Chimisso 158–59; Canguilhem, consider that the life or milieu of the human
“Object” 201). scientist has natural and social as much as con-
It is also worth mentioning in this context ceptual and theoretical dimensions, then, as
Canguilhem’s view, highlighted by Macherey, Schmidgen has rightly noted, Canguilhem’s
of the role of language in the mutations of the work on the history of science presents us with
meaning of a concept over time. As Macherey an account of the formation of concepts as a
puts it, process tied to scientists’ confrontation with
the structures of scientific life and vital net-
Behind the concept, the word guarantees the works of research (250; see also Osborne 6).
transfers of meaning. It is the constituted
For Canguilhem, then, if to speak of an
presence of the same word that allows the
“object” of science such as the reflex movement
passage of the concept from one domain to
another. From a non-scientific domain to a – or again, if to speak of the scientific concept in
scientific domain [ … ] [but also] from one which this object is made visible – is “to speak
science to another [ … ] [T]his labour of of a problem to be posed and then resolved,”
language on itself perhaps precedes, in fact then “to speak of the history of science is to
definitely aids, the mutation of meaning. show how – for what theoretical or practical
(173–74) motives – a science ‘has gone about it’ to pose
and resolve this problem” (Lecourt 175). That
But as well as the imagination and language,
said, During is correct to have argued that Can-
Canguilhem also stressed the role played in
guilhem’s work, like Bachelard’s, gives us no
the formation of concepts by non-scientific
indication of how we might evaluate the truth
factors as diverse as “the state of contemporary
or falsity of these problems as they are concep-
technology, the model of scientificity formu-
tually posed except with reference to their sub-
lated in an adjunct scientific domain, practical
sequent resolution in a developed theory.
and pragmatic requirements imposed by the
Indeed, the starting point for Canguilhem’s his-
economy or political system, [and] the ideol-
tories is the current state of science. He “pro-
ogies and myths and metaphors of the social
ceeds from the present model of science
imaginary” (Ross and Ahmadi 95).
toward the beginning of a science which is the
Finally, we must mention the fact that Can-
object of study,” even if he also makes it clear
guilhem, like Bergson, sees a tight connection
that the present is never more than a provisional
not only between the formulation of novel pro-
point of culmination of a history (Ross and
blems and the formation of concepts but also
Ahmadi 94). And it is in this ultimate reference
between concept formation and the problems
to the solutions of the conceptual problems
encountered by human beings in their confron-
that science poses for itself that lies the linger-
tation with their environment.6 As Canguilhem
ing positivism of Canguilhem’s account of
has put it, the development of conceptual
problems.
knowledge is “a general method for the direct
or indirect resolution of tensions between man
and milieu” (Knowledge xviii). Moreover, as
for Bergson, human cognitive practices for Can-
3 deleuze on problems
guilhem are simply “a particularly powerful I would now like to present three key features of
instance of a tendency that is expressed by all Deleuze’s conception of problems such as these
living beings: the capacity to solve problems in can be gleaned from the third chapter of Differ-
new and creative ways” (Marrati and Meyers ence and Repetition, where we find his most
ix). In other words, then, Canguilhem’s his- extended discussion of problems and their
tories of the formation of various biological con- relation to thought. I intend to argue that it is
cepts such as that of reflex movement are tied in Deleuze who furnishes us with a thoroughly
his thought to a biology of conceptual thinking anti-positivist conception of problems. He does

55
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this, in part, by echoing (and not always inten- subject and object of thought (Difference
tionally) the most promising features of Berg- 320 n. 9).7 We might even say, with Maniglier,
son’s, Bachelard’s and Canguilhem’s accounts, that Deleuze elaborates here a feature of Bache-
while at the same time furnishing us with a lard’s conception of problems that was not fully
means to evaluate the truth or falsity of pro- appreciated and developed by the latter (see
blems without reference to their solutions, and Maniglier 22). Be that as it may, Bachelard is
without reference to any direct and contentful not the only influence on Deleuze’s reflections
experience of reality. on the objective reality of problems. Bergson
also looms large. Indeed, quite apart from the
role of problems in correlating and determining
3.1 problems are the objectively real, the thinking subject and the objects of thought,
Deleuze echoes Bergson (and, by extension,
transcendental conditions of thought Canguilhem)8 in claiming that organic things
What Deleuze calls a problem is not to be con- in general are “solutions” to the objective differ-
flated with subjective doubt (see Difference ential problems characterizing their particular
139–40, 320 n. 9). Problems are not the experi- fields of constitution. As he puts it with an
ence of, nor do they depend upon, a thinking example, which comes directly from Bergson:
subject who exists in an independent and prior an “organism is nothing if not the solution to
way. Problems for Deleuze are rather respon- a problem, as are each of its differenciated
sible for the genesis of the thinking subject organs, such as the eye which solves a light
(see Difference 139–41). This is the first sense ‘problem’” (Difference 211; see also Bergson-
in which problems, for Deleuze, are objectively ism 103; Bergson, Creative Evolution 58, 87–
real (on this, see also Wasser 50). 90). In other words, for Deleuze, pre-individual
But now, to say that problems are objectively reality in general is objectively problematic, and
real is not to say that they exist as determinate individuated beings – whether they are things,
thises or thats “out there” in the world. Pro- subjects, thoughts, etc. – are the provisional
blems are not unified and independently exist- “solutions” to this problematic pre-individual
ing entities that might be perceived, reality (Difference 246).9 Be that as it may, for
conceptualized or picked-out as such by true the purposes of the present argument we will
empirical propositions. In fact, for Deleuze, pro- put to one side this deeper, ontological aspect
blems are not only responsible for the genesis of of problems in order to focus on their noetic
the thinking subject, they are also responsible aspects.
for the determination of the objects of this sub- As has just been indicated, problems for
ject’s thought, without themselves ever being Deleuze concern the transcendental conditions
determinate objects of thought (see Difference of our representational and recognitive acts.
154, 157). Problems are thus objectively real We can thus say that problems are “critical,”
for Deleuze in a second way, that is, in so far in the sense of “critical” that we find in
as they are a type of transcendental condition Kantian critical philosophy. Unlike Kant,
for the relation between the thinking subject however, Deleuze is at pains not to think these
and the corresponding objects of this subject’s transcendental conditions in the image of the
thought, neither of which exists in a prior, deter- representational and recognitive acts they are
minate way. supposed to condition. Indeed, in Difference
We can note here that, even if Bachelard does and Repetition, Deleuze references the well-
not claim a transcendental status for his con- known post-Kantian claim that, in the first
ception of the problematic, it is clearly an influ- edition of the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant
ence on Deleuze, as indicated by the already- copied the form of the transcendental syntheses
mentioned reference to Le Rationalisme (of apprehension, reproduction and recognition)
applique ́ and Deleuze’s approval of Bachelard’s from the empirical acts of the psychological con-
use of the problematic to reconceptualize the sciousness that the transcendental syntheses

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were supposed to ground (Difference 135). determined objects of such thought (Difference
Needless to say, the empirical syntheses 162, 267).
cannot be presupposed in the determination of
the transcendental syntheses, on pain of
circularity. 3.2 problems force thought to
More generally, Deleuze argues that we must
refrain from tracing problems from pre-existent
constitute them in and for thought
propositions that would serve as their solutions, To better understand the way in which, for
and from evaluating the truth or falsity of pro- Deleuze, problems engender the thinking
blems according to the “form of possibility” of subject along with the objects of this subject’s
their finding a propositional solution (159–61). thought, without themselves ever being deter-
With respect to the first argument, Deleuze is minate objects of thought, we must turn to
clearly following Bergson’s second introduction Deleuze’s discussion of the relation between
of The Creative Mind, examined above, where problems and the “transcendental operation”
the latter denounces the philosophical conserva- of the faculties of thought, beginning with the
tism involved in posing problems using terms faculty of sensibility.
whose meanings are already given. Such a pro- For Deleuze, problems are inseparable from
cedure is clearly circular. It determines in an encounter with something that is not recog-
advance the range of possible solutions to the nizable – something that disturbs habitual cat-
problem posed, since these are already implicit egories of thought. Not being recognizable,
in the familiar terms in which the problem is what is encountered cannot be said to be a par-
stated (see Bergson, Creative Mind 36–37; ticular this or that. At best, what is encountered
During 17). In other words, problems are effec- can be said to be, simply, “a shock,” or an
tively modelled here on the propositional sol- “intensive difference.” It may be grasped in a
utions to which they are rather supposed to range of affective tones: wonder, love, hatred,
give rise. suffering, etc. However, “in whichever tone,
With respect to the second argument, the its primary characteristic is that it can only be
issue is no longer simply that problems are sensed” (Difference 139) – which is to say, not
traced from, or posed in terms of, propositions identified, understood, known, imagined,
of common sense, but that problems are held remembered, conceptualized, and so on. We
to be veritable or not depending upon whether might say that the object of encounter is a
they are solvable in a true propositional form, problem for which thought has no ready-made
where the form of possibility for a true prop- schema, but which it will nevertheless be
osition is variable (logical, mathematical, trans- forced to think. As Deleuze puts it, “that
cendental, etc.) and given independently of the which can only be sensed [ … ] moves the
problem. This, once again, is circular. Even soul, ‘perplexes’ it – in other words, forces it
though solutions are supposed to follow from to pose a problem: as though the object of the
their corresponding problems and not the encounter, the sign, were the bearer of a
reverse, problems are evaluated as true or false problem – as though it were a problem” (140).
with reference to the possibility of their being So, the encounter with a problem “forces
solved in a propositional form that can be speci- thought,” but at the same time the encountered
fied in advance. problem must be “posed,” which is to say, given
To avoid these two forms of circularity, expression in the thought thus forced: it must
Deleuze will argue that problems fulfil the be made sense of, “implying acts of constitution
transcendental critical requirement in so far and investment in [ … ] symbolic fields” (159).
as they resemble neither the representable The particular solution to the problem – the
nor existing forms of representation but are determinate objects of the thinking subject’s
rather the “sub-representational” genetic con- thoughts – will then follow “from the complete
ditions for thinking in general, along with the conditions under which the problem is

57
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determined as a problem, from the means and form that are unique to that faculty, but also
the terms which are employed in order to pose in a way that transcends what that faculty was
it” (ibid.). previously capable of. For example, memory
Now, several things must be noted in this will be constrained to recall something that
regard. Firstly, it should be clear that the differs from every empirical memory. The
encounter with that which “can only be imagination will be brought to phantasize
sensed” is not a contentful one. Problems, for about previously unimagined connections
Deleuze, are not “ready-made” or “‘givens’ between phenomena. Conceptual thought will
(data)” (158–59). Rather, as Deleuze puts it, find itself compelled to devise new concepts
the encounter with a problem is a type of con- and “senses,” and so on. Moreover, each
tentless or purely differential “violence” which faculty will be provided with an impetus from
sets thought in motion (139). the work of each other faculty (146). For
Secondly, to say that the problem must be example, when the imagination is constrained
“posed” or “constituted” in thought does not to produce something previously unimaginable,
entail that Deleuze takes thought to be voluntar- this will incite the understanding to devise new
istic in nature. For Deleuze, thinking is not the concepts and definitions. Obviously, this will be
natural exercise of a faculty; thinking is only a groping and experimental process, but what is
ever involuntary (ibid.). The posing of the produced will provide thought with potentials
problem, then, is something thought is forced for further development over a sustained
to undergo, under the impulse of an intensive period of “learning” and “apprenticeship.” As
encounter with difference (132). Deleuze puts it in an illuminating passage
Thirdly, thought is not forced by the encoun- which is worth quoting at length:
ter with a problem to bring already-established
categories to bear upon it. Indeed, the object Problems and their symbolic fields stand in a
of the encounter is a problem precisely relationship with signs. It is the signs which
because it disturbs such categories. It follows, “cause problems” and are developed in a
then, that for thought to be constrained to symbolic field. The paradoxical functioning
make sense of the problem is for thought to be of the faculties [ … ] thus refers to the
constrained to creatively transform its existing Ideas [i.e., problems] which run throughout
categories, producing novel solutions (on this, all the faculties and awaken each in turn.
see Zourabichvili 203). Conversely, the Idea [problem] which itself
offers sense to language refers each case to
But the question now is: how are problems
the paradoxical functioning of the faculty.
creatively constituted and resolved in and for
The exploration of Ideas [i.e., problems]
an involuntary process of thought? In brief, and the elevation of each faculty to its trans-
for Deleuze, thought creatively constitutes pro- cendent exercise amounts to the same thing.
blems in so far as thought’s different and incom- These are two aspects of an essential appren-
mensurable faculties or capacities – the ticeship or process of learning. For, on the
imagination, memory, language, conceptual one hand, an apprentice is someone who con-
thought, etc. – are forced by a contentless but stitutes and occupies practical or speculative
violent encounter with difference to transcend problems as such. Learning is the appropriate
their prior limits and to “think differently” in name for the subjective acts carried out when
response to this problem (Difference 140–41, one is confronted with the objecticity of a
problem (Idea) [ … ] The apprentice, on the
143–46). Indeed, it is in this sense that pro-
other hand, raises each faculty to the level
blems, for Deleuze, engender the thinking
of its transcendent exercise [ … ] We never
subject along with the objects of this subject’s know in advance how someone will learn:
thought, without themselves ever being deter- by means of what loves someone becomes
minate objects of thought. Each particular good at Latin, what encounters make them
faculty is forced by the encounter to pose the a philosopher, or in what dictionaries they
problem in its own way, in terms and in a learn to think. (See Difference 164–65)

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Although Deleuze never cites Canguilhem in thought, constraining it to resolve the problem
this regard, a good example of this process of through the very process of determining it.
apprenticeship and the differential communi- In any case, it should be clear from this brief
cation of different faculties of thought can in sketch that, for Deleuze, problems are the sub-
fact be found in Canguilhem’s history of the representative genetic conditions both of the
concept of reflex movement in the biological thought of the thinking subject and of the deter-
sciences. As we examined above, Canguilhem mined objects of this thought. Our represen-
highlights the way in which Willis’s obsessive tational and recognitive acts emerge as
phantasizing about a “luminous” connection solutions to a problem that is progressively
between optical and biological phenomena pro- posed and determined by our discordant but
voked the development of a conceptual parallel communicating faculties of thought over a sus-
of “reflected” or “reflex” movement, which in tained period of learning or apprenticeship.
turn required more precise conceptual articula-
tions before finally bringing the object – the
reflex – into sharp view for biological scientists. 3.3 the truth of problems is a matter
Deleuze’s own account of the development of
specifically conceptual or propositional thought
of their intrinsic productivity
in relation to problems is outlined over several We come, now, to the point at which Deleuze
pages in the “Image of Thought” chapter (see parts ways with Bergson, Bachelard and Can-
esp. Difference 153–57, 162–63).10 It comprises guilhem with respect to their conceptions of
several arguments and claims which can be problems: namely, on the question of the evalu-
reconstructed as follows.11 Firstly, Deleuze ation of the truth or falsity of problems them-
argues that if, as many have claimed, the sense selves. Now, as has been seen, Deleuze
of a proposition is the mode of presentation of effectively agrees with Bergson, and so contra
the reality designated by that proposition, then the de facto position of Bachelard and Canguil-
the relation between a proposition and what it hem, that the truth or falsity of problems cannot
designates must be established within the be evaluated with reference to the solutions to
dimension of sense (154). Secondly, Deleuze which they give rise, on pain of circularity.
claims that sense is produced in so far as the But Deleuze is also not guilty of the lingering
faculty of language is constrained by “an uncon- positivism to be found in Bergson’s account of
scious of pure thought” to “speak infinitely of or problems. Indeed, we can recall that, for
about [the sense of] words themselves,” specify- Bergson, the truth or falsity of problems is eval-
ing and transforming their meaning (155). In uated with reference to the non-intellectual but
other words, the dimension of sense and the nevertheless contentful, intuitive grasp of dur-
development of meaningful conceptual or prop- ation. For Deleuze, by contrast, there is no
ositional thought is inseparable from the such contentful experience that could confirm
problem that traverses all of the disjointed fac- the truth or falsity of the position of a
ulties of thought (157). Thirdly, then, prop- problem. There is only the shock of an encoun-
ositions endowed with sense, along with the ter with something unrecognizable that forces
determined objects that will be said to realize thought to creatively pose and resolve a
the empirical truth of these propositions, problem. To say here that Deleuze’s encounter
should be understood as the solutions to this is not contentful is not to say that it constitutes
problem (162). Finally, the problem is at once a lack or lacuna. It is rather to say that the object
transcendent and immanent in relation to this of the encounter can only be sensed, forcing sen-
propositional thought that emerges as its sol- sibility to transcend itself in the direction of
ution (163). The problem does not exist or thought.
have content outside of the propositional But how, then, does Deleuze evaluate the
thought to which it gives rise by differing truth or falsity of a problem without an empiri-
from and forcing the renovation of such cal touchstone of the Bergsonian kind? In short,

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a true problem for Deleuze is one that is intrinsi- Bachelard and Canguilhem, namely, that the
cally productive, which is to say, one that trans- formation and development of conceptual
forms thought and produces novel solutions thought depends on the posing and resolution
(empirically true propositions) without reference of problems, and not on the acquisition of
to something external to this process, such as a facts or truths by means of observation and
privileged contentful experience or ready-made empirical experience. I have also argued,
conceptual content imported from elsewhere. contra During’s fine study, that it is Deleuze,
Or again, as Deleuze puts it: and not Bergson, who furnishes us with an
anti-positivist conception of problems that is
The only way to take talk of “true and false adequate to this anti-positivist conception of
problems” seriously is in terms of a pro-
conceptual formation and development. He
duction of the true and the false by means of
does so, in part, by refusing to think and evalu-
problems, and in proportion to their sense.
To do so, it is sufficient to renounce copying ate the truth and falsity of problems with refer-
problems from possible propositions, and ence to their subsequent solutions. He shares
defining the truth of problems in terms of this refusal with Bergson, and it is this that
the possibility of their finding a solution. On sets their conceptions of problems apart from
the contrary, “solvability” must depend those of Bachelard and Canguilhem. But
upon an internal characteristic: it must be Deleuze goes further than Bergson in so far as
determined by the conditions of the problem he does not measure the truth or falsity of pro-
along with the real solutions. (Difference 162) blems with reference to a contentful experience
– the intuitive grasp of duration. For Deleuze,
The truth of the problem, then, has to do with
the truth or falsity of problems rather has to do
its intrinsic genetic power. A true problem is a
with their intrinsic, differential productivity. A
kind of ongoing, groping and experimental
true problem is one that generates an open-
process: a process in which a problematic encoun-
ended process of learning wherein the thinking
ter forces the transformation of the subject’s
subject undergoes a transformation of its
thought, while at the same time this thought
thought in relation to a problematic encounter,
whose categories are ceaselessly undergoing trans-
while at the same time this thought that is under-
formation is the vehicle for the posing and resol-
going transformation is the vehicle for making
ution of the problem. A false problem, by
sense of the problem and producing its solutions.
contrast, does not take the form of an intrinsic
A false problem, by contrast, is one that circum-
genesis. It is one whose determination depends
vents this process, determining
on something external: an extrinsic conditioning
the position of the problem with
as opposed to an intrinsic genesis (154).
reference to ready-made content,
In the fourth and fifth chapters of Difference
or to a contentful experience,
and Repetition, Deleuze will give a formal
that is external to the problem’s
account of problems (or problematic Ideas) and
process.
their intrinsic genesis and mutation in terms of
a purely differential structure whose merely
determinable terms are brought into relation disclosure statement
and progressively determined and transformed
No potential conflict of interest was reported by
by the work of differential, intensive encounters.
the author.
An exploration of this account is, however,
beyond the scope of the present paper.
notes
4 conclusion 1 For Cavaillès’s claim, see his Sur la logique et la
théorie de la science 78. For Canguilhem, see gener-
I have argued that Deleuze’s work shares an ally Vie et mort de Jean Cavaillès; Cassou-Noguès
important feature with that of Bergson, 223. For Foucault, see his “Introduction” x.

60
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2 For a good account of the uses of the name 8 Deleuze never deals at length with Canguilhem,
“Bergson” in various interpretations of the but he was clearly aware of his work. In Difference
history of twentieth-century French philosophy, and Repetition (323 n. 22), Deleuze references,
see Bianco. though without further treatment, Canguilhem’s
problem–theory distinction in On the Normal and
3 On the “content” of intuition, as well as Berg-
the Pathological.
son’s “nonstandard positivism,” see Gunter, “Dia-
lectic of Intuition” 25: 9 On the objectivity of problems in Deleuze, see
also Domenech-Oneto and Roque.
intuition can, by “dividing and subdividing”
10 We also find an extended version of it through-
itself, give rise to concepts that have meaning
out Deleuze’s Logic of Sense. See also Deleuze and
and use [ … ] because they have, in their
Guattari 16.
purely intuitive and ultra-linguistic state, a
unique kind of meaning and significance. It is 11 On this, see also Bowden 189–95.
difficult to talk about the unspeakable. But it
is clear that Bergson’s intuition cannot be noe-
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