Resolved: Japan should revise Article 9 of its Constitution to

develop offensive military capabilities.

April 2022 PF Brief*

*Published by Victory Briefs, PO Box 803338 #40503, Chicago, IL 60680‑3338. Edited by

Lawrence Zhou. Written by Ben Kirsch, Renee Li, Laurenn Vives, and Lawrence Zhou. Ev‑
idence cut by Jacob Nails, Nick Smith, and Lawrence Zhou. For customer support, please
email [email protected].
Contents

1 Topic Analysis by Renee Li 6

1.1 Introduction and Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
1.2 Strategic Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
1.3 Securitization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
1.4 Key Actors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
1.4.1 China . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
1.4.2 Russia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
1.4.3 North Korea . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
1.4.4 United States and Allies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
1.5 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21

2 Topic Analysis by Lawrence Zhou 22

2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
2.2 Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
2.2.1 Japan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
2.2.2 Article 9 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
2.2.3 Offensive Military Capabilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
2.3 Beyond Surface Level Clash . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
2.3.1 Theories of International Relations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
2.3.2 Analysis of Domestic Factors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
2.4 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39

3 Topic Analysis by Ben Kirsch 41

3.1 Intro . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
3.1.1 Japan’s Military . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
3.2 Pro Arguments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
3.2.1 Deterrence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
3.2.2 Clear Intentions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
3.2.3 The US Alliance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44

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3.3 Neg Arguments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45

3.3.1 Proliferation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
3.3.2 Security Dilemma . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
3.3.3 General Military Bad . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
3.4 A Word on Extinction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
3.5 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48

4 Topic Analysis by Laurenn Vives 49

4.1 Background Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
4.2 Current State of Affairs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
4.3 Affirmative Arguments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
4.4 Negative Arguments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
4.5 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58

5 Definitions 59
5.1 OMC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
5.1.1 General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
5.1.2 Strategic, Not Tactical . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60

6 Pro Evidence 64
6.1 General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
6.1.1 Uniqueness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
6.1.2 Constitutionality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
6.1.3 Clarity Key . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
6.1.4 Global Participation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
6.1.5 Active Foreign Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
6.1.6 Diplomacy Turn . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
6.1.7 Japan‑US Relations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
6.1.8 Active Denial . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
6.1.9 Amendments are Feasible . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
6.1.10 SDF Legitimacy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
6.1.11 PKOs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
6.1.12 PKOs – Bosnia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
6.1.13 Not Pacifist . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
6.1.14 Self‑Defense . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
6.1.15 Collective Self‑Defense . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106
6.1.16 Defense Planning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108

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6.1.17 F‑35s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110

6.1.18 AT: Polls . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
6.1.19 AT: Reinterpret . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
6.1.20 AT: Miscalc . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114
6.1.21 AT: Militarism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
6.2 Deterrence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123
6.2.1 Uniqueness – China . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123
6.2.2 Remilitarization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124
6.2.3 Deterrence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125
6.2.4 Collective Self‑Defense . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130
6.2.5 China Balancing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133
6.2.6 China Impact . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135
6.2.7 Taiwan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137
6.2.8 North Korea . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 146
6.2.9 AT: Russia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 151
6.2.10 AT: Perception . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 154
6.2.11 AT: Prolif . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 157
6.3 Limited Amendment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 162
6.3.1 Amendment Key . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 162
6.3.2 Article 9 Fails . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 167
6.3.3 Rule of Law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 176
6.3.4 Raz . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 179

7 Con Evidence 182

7.1 General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 182
7.1.1 Reverse Goldilocks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 182
7.1.2 Instability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 185
7.1.3 War Wounds . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 189
7.1.4 Stable Security Situation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 190
7.1.5 Lack Public Support . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 191
7.1.6 Unwritten Unamendability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 192
7.1.7 Low Judicial Review . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 195
7.1.8 Amendment Inevitable . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 197
7.1.9 Delay . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 199
7.1.10 CMR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 203
7.1.11 Right‑Wing Nationalism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 204

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7.1.12 Relations – General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 210

7.1.13 Relations – South Korea . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 215
7.1.14 Politics – Link . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 217
7.1.15 Defensive Nuclear Weapons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 222
7.1.16 AT: PKOs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 228
7.1.17 AT: China . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 231
7.2 Pacifism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 233
7.2.1 Uniqueness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 233
7.2.2 Modeling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 235
7.2.3 Pacifism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 239
7.2.4 Pacifism – Impact . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 242
7.3 Proliferation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 246
7.3.1 Prolif Impact – General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 246
7.3.2 Prolif Impact – China . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 247
7.3.3 Prolif Impact – Alliance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 250
7.3.4 AT: Stability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 251

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1 Topic Analysis by Renee Li

Renee Li competed in Public Forum debate for four years, completing their career as
a captain at Plano West Senior High School in Plano, Texas; they currently study In‑
ternational Political Economy at Georgetown University. During their career, they
earned five bids, qualifying to both TOC and NSDA Nationals twice. Most notably,
Renee placed 8th in NSDA Nationals in their junior year, reached quarterfinals at
the Texas state tournament, and appeared in late outrounds at tournaments such as
Harvard, Stanford, Yale, and UK. Renee taught at VBI last summer.

1.1 Introduction and Background

Hi friends! We begin our transition to the April topic this year, which is: Japan should
revise Article 9 of its Constitution to develop offensive military capabilities. While this
topic appears pretty limited in scope in terms of both geography and argument diversity,
I assure everyone that it is significantly more complicated—and more fun—than it first
looks. Unfortunately, what that also entails is more work on my end to try to give a
good overview of the history and politics behind the topic. Curse you, NSDA!

For now, I’ll just briefly summarize how Article 9 has influenced Japan’s military struc‑
ture and what the praxis of its militarization has actually played out, particularly in the
last decade or so. Apologies in advance for the amount of evidence cited in this section,
please bear with me before we get to the interesting stuff! Article 9¹ itself proves to be a
very short read:

Article 9. Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and

order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the
nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international dis‑
putes. (2) In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land,
¹No Author, 11‑3‑1946, “The Constitution of Japan,” National Diet Library,
https://www.ndl.go.jp/constitution/e/etc/c01.html#:~:text=Article%209.,means%20of%20settling%20international%20disputes

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 1 Topic Analysis by Renee Li

sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained.
The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized.

Article 9 was instituted as part of a new Japanese constitution, primarily due to a legacy
of imperialism in East and Southeast Asia in the years leading up to and during World
War II (which is both long and beyond the breadth of this topic analysis, but is defi‑
nitely worth looking into). Following the war, Japan sought to reshape its image into
that of a pacifist country more amenable to the liberal democratic values of western na‑
tions; Article 9 was a major component of this perceptual change. This does not mean
Japan also eschewed the possession of any sort of military capabilities, however, as Ya‑
maguchi² contextualizes that the country founded a military force known as the Self
Defense Force (SDF) in 1954; as of December 2021, Japan is actually the 5th most pow‑
erful overall military behind the U.S., Russia, China, and India. If you care about the
logistical specifics, the statistics provided by Global Firepower³ and the Wikipedia page
for the SDF⁴ are both useful primers of their own, each footnoted below. We’ll go into a
little more detail in just a couple pages, so sit tight.

If that fact seems strange for a state that seems deeply driven to de‑fang itself and evade
being re‑labelled as imperialistic or militaristic, it’s because of a convoluted timeline of
Japanese politicians attempting to both reinterpret and revise Article 9. The relevant
starting point to this conversation begins in 2007, which Washington⁵ explicates was
when the conservative former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe began his campaign to al‑
low Japan to “exercise its right to collective self‑defense given to U.N. member states,
which would allow the SDF to come to the aid of allies under armed attack with no
preconditions.” The public and political pushback from Abe’s proposition—which was
supported by a panel known as the Yanai Commission organized to assess the regional
security threats Japan faced—led him to briefly resign before continuing to maneuver
the Japanese political system in order to have Article 9 revised. Washington⁶ continues:

The Japanese people, comfortable with their peaceful constitution and

place in the world, were overwhelmingly against revising their governing
principles because they worried that Japan might be drawn into wars by

²Mari Yamaguchi, 12‑6‑2021, ”Japan’s military, among world’s strongest, looks to build,” ABC News,
https://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory/japans‑military‑worlds‑strongest‑build‑81576818
³https://www.globalfirepower.com/country‑military‑strength‑detail.php?country_id=japan
⁴https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Japan_Self‑Defense_Forces
⁵Brittney Washington, 4‑30‑2018, ”Abe’s push to change Japan’s defense strategy,” Japan Today,
https://japantoday.com/category/politics/abe%E2%80%99s‑push‑to‑change‑japan%E2%80%99s‑defense‑strategy?key=lofls3u8
⁶Washington, “Abe’s push”

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 1 Topic Analysis by Renee Li

the United States… In response, the Prime Minister decided the best policy
would be to “reinterpret” the constitution, rather than revise it… He also
reconvened the Yanai Commission and requested that it conduct a second
study to look at whether the Japanese government should reinterpret Article
9. The Commission found that the regional security challenges Japan faced
— the North Korea nuclear and cyber threat along with China’s growing
military might — had become even more severe than in 2007, when the
commission was first convened. The Commission also found it necessary to
reinterpret Article 9 in order to permit the SDF to participate in collective
security operations due to said security challenges… Japan passed its new
security laws in September 2015. These allowed the JSDF to exercise collec‑
tive self‑defense in four scenarios as outlined by the CLB in 2014: Defending
U.S. naval ships from attack in international waters while those ships are
protecting Japan. Intercepting ballistic missiles targeting the U.S. and U.S.
bases in the Pacific theater. Allowing GSDF to use weapons to respond
to attacks on allied forces during peacekeeping operations. Providing
logistical support to foreign forces during peacekeeping operations.

These conditions are closely related to Japan’s membership in the UN, which is involved
in international law and peacekeeping interventions. According to Kurosaki⁷, Article 51
of the UN Charter limits Japan’s right to self‑defense specifically to situations in which
the country is subject to the initiation of an armed attack (although the more precise
legalistic definition of “initiation” is both complicated and underdeveloped). Addition‑
ally, despite the expansion of the potential roles and capabilities of the SDF, Hornung⁸
writes that the first time SDF personnel actually participated in overseas peacekeeping
operations was in 2019; this is due both to numerous legal restrictions enacted by the
UN and to peacekeeping being a distant political priority domestically. Nonetheless,
the structural limitations on Japan’s militarizations have not stepped its capacity devel‑
opment. This was made clear when Abe paired his efforts to water down the prohibitive
nature of Article 9 with material increases in military spending; this has been continued
by the leaders who have followed him in recent years, those being Suga Yoshihide and
Kishida Fumio, the latter of whom is the current prime minister. There are four general
areas of discussion that we can consider when we talk about the state of the Japanese
⁷Masahiro Kurosaki, 9‑1‑2020, ”The Dynamics of Japan’s “Armed At‑
tack Initiation” Doctrine and Anticipatory Self‑Defense,” Lawfare,
https://www.lawfareblog.com/dynamics‑japans‑armed‑attack‑initiation‑doctrine‑and‑anticipatory‑self‑defense
⁸Jeffrey W. Hornung, 5‑3‑2019, ”With Little Fanfare, Japan Just Changed the Way It Uses Its Military,” For‑
eign Policy, https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/05/03/with‑little‑fanfare‑japan‑just‑changed‑the‑way‑it‑uses‑its‑military/

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military: conventional capabilities, nuclearization, regional and international coopera‑

tion, and new frontiers.
Yamaguchi⁹ from earlier paints a good picture of the first three of these categories (brace
yourself for a long wall of text):

[T]ens of billions of dollars each year have built an arsenal of nearly 1,000
warplanes and dozens of destroyers and submarines. Japan’s forces rival
those of Britain and France, and show no sign of slowing down in a pursuit
of the best equipment and weapons money can buy. Not everyone agrees
with this buildup. Critics, both Japan’s neighbors and at home, urge Tokyo
to learn from its past and pull back from military expansion. There’s also do‑
mestic wariness over nuclear weapons. Japan, the only nation to have atomic
bombs dropped on it in war, possesses no nuclear deterrent, unlike other top
global militaries, and relies on the so‑called U.S. nuclear umbrella… Japan
has more than 900 warplanes, 48 destroyers, including eight Aegis missile‑
combating systems, and 20 submarines. That exceeds Britain, Germany and
Italy. Japan is also buying 147 F‑35s, including 42 F‑35Bs, making it the
largest user of American stealth fighters outside of the United States, where
353 are to be deployed. Their deployment is crucial for Japanese defense in
the Indo‑Pacific, and the country is now retrofitting two flattops, the Izumo
and Kaga, as the country’s first aircraft carriers since the end of the World
War II… [Kishida’s] Cabinet recently approved a 770 billion yen ($6.8 billion)
extra budget for the fiscal year to accelerate missile defense and reconnais‑
sance activity around Japanese territorial seas and airspace, and to bolster
mobility and emergency responses to defend its remote East China Sea is‑
lands. That would bring the 2021 defense spending total to 6.1 trillion yen
($53.2 billion), up 15% from the previous year, and 1.09% of Japan’s GDP…
In part because of a relative decline of America’s global influence, Japan
has expanded military partnerships and joint exercises beyond its alliance
with the United States, including with Australia, Canada, Britain, France and
other European countries, as well as in the Association of Southeast Asian
Nations. Japan also cooperates with NATO.

Tl;dr: the current administration is continuing to enlarge the military and Japan’s bilat‑
eral and multilateral engagements with other states, but lingering hesitations toward
nuclearization mean the country still firmly sits under the security guarantee of the U.S.
⁹Yamaguchi, “Japan’s military”

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 1 Topic Analysis by Renee Li

nuclear arsenal—in other words, if Japan were to be threatened by nuclear means or

require nuclear retaliation, the U.S. would be the one carrying out attacks. The issue
of nuclearization remains a protracted debate among Japanese politicians, as leaders
must weigh the potential security risks and benefits while simultaneously courting pub‑
lic opinion for changing military policies. As for this notion of “new frontiers”, the
Economist¹⁰ reports that the Japanese National Security Council (NSC) released new
guidelines that “recognise for the first time that Japan needs to prepare for war in space,
cyberspace and on the electromagnetic spectrum. To that end, the air force is establish‑
ing a $240m unit to track threats to satellites, backed by a powerful new radar in the
south‑western city of Sanyo‑Onoda.”

This is all good and well (or is it?), but it begs the question: why is Japan upgrading its
military? And here lies the core of what will be most debates on this topic—that is, the
regional actors that are posing potential existential threats to Japan. Kurosaki¹¹ tell us:
discussions over whether Japan should acquire missile technology have been sparked
by “a series of recent negative impacts on the Japanese security environment: the unsuc‑
cessful U.S.‑North Korea dialogue for denuclearization and the return to pre‑2017 con‑
frontation; China’s assertive and provocative actions around Taiwan and the Senkaku
Islands in the East China Sea in conjunction with its aggressive maneuvers in the South
China Sea; and the creeping threat of Russia’s hypersonic glide missiles spurred by the
expiration last year of the U.S.‑Russia Intermediate‑Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF
Treaty).” And there we have it—the topic in a nutshell. Throw in declining U.S. military
presence in the East‑Southeast Asia region and Japanese military cooperation, and you
have everything you really need to be researching at your fingertips. If you develop a
solid understanding of each of these actors and of Japan’s assorted dimensions of mili‑
tarization, you should be set; in the next section, we’ll discuss how that knowledge can
be applied effectively. Phew, we’ve made it through the boring readings. With that out
of the way, let’s actually talk strategy. (Now’s the time when you get excited.)

1.2 Strategic Considerations

When it comes to approaching the April topic strategically, the big idea to remember is
that it is a prescriptive resolution—we are asked to evaluate advocacies for what should

¹⁰No Author, 4‑17‑2019, ”Japan’s Self‑Defence Forces are beginning to focus on China,” Economist,
https://www.economist.com/asia/2019/04/17/japans‑self‑defence‑forces‑are‑beginning‑to‑focus‑on‑china?utm_source=pocket_
¹¹Kurosaki, “Anticipatory Self‑Defense”

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 1 Topic Analysis by Renee Li

be done to change the status quo, whether that means advocating for or rejecting them.
This entails a dedicated focus to the uniqueness debate on two levels: one, the risks
that regional actors currently present to Japan; and two, the nature of Japan’s existing
military capacities. If debaters can win their specific vision of what these two aspects of
the status quo look like, the task of winning their link and impact will be much easier.
Much like the 2021 Septober topic, however, debates will be very prone to becoming
back‑and‑forth exchanges with no meaningful advancement on the flow. Think China
affs versus China negs and so on and so forth. To avoid being stranded in a perpetu‑
ally looping clash of Sisyphean proportions, figure out how to weigh your uniqueness
and link scenarios. For example, why should the judge prefer your aff causing‑Taiwan‑
invasion argument over a neg preventing‑Taiwan‑invasion argument? Thus, debaters
must evaluate the reasons why actors behave and react in certain ways—what they are
motivated by, what they are afraid of, and how they calculate security and economic
risks.

Rather than providing clarifications of my own, I believe it will be more useful to intro‑
duce four more questions (yippee!) that debaters should be able to answer about any case
argument that they want to win. If those responses are persuasive and well‑warranted,
they will underpin the weighing debate and hopefully carve a path to the ballot.

First, what would revision actually look like? Attempting to answer this question poses
two problems. One, the resolution provides no clarity vis‑à‑vis to what extent Article
9 would need to be altered to create the legal breathing room for Japan to “develop
offensive military capabilities”. Two, confrontation with the court of public opinion
will be unavoidable for debaters constructing their arguments. This is because—as we
saw earlier with Abe’s struggles to garner backing for his security‑oriented policies—
the Japanese public identifies strongly with pacifism and is generally averse to further
militarization. As of 2019, Sieg¹² reports that 64 percent of Japanese citizens opposed
any revisions to Article 9, with only 28 percent in support. Washington¹³ elaborates that
“Opponents of Abe’s efforts to reinterpret and change the constitution have not been
shy about voicing their opinions. In fact, as members of the Diet were voting on the
security bill, some 13,000 people gathered outside to protest its passage. A brawl broke
out between members of the opposition and supporters, showing just how passionate
both sides feel about the implications of such legislation.” While debaters may fiat that
some revision indeed takes place, there is potentially significant debate to be had over
¹²Linda Sieg, 11‑13‑2019, ”Abe’s mission unaccomplished: pushing to revise Japan’s pacifist charter,”
Reuters, https://www.reuters.com/article/us‑japan‑abe‑legacy‑analysis/abes‑mission‑unaccomplished‑pushing‑to‑revise‑japa
¹³Washington, “Abe’s push”

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 1 Topic Analysis by Renee Li

the extent and nature of that amendment given public opinion, as well as arguments
concerning the domestic consequences of affirming the resolution—both in terms of
civil stability and political gridlock.

Second, what counts as offensive capabilities? This is a question that leans most into in‑
ternational relations theory, which I personally believe is one of the worst man‑made
inventions ever. My professor might define offensive capabilities as anything that en‑
ables or bolsters a militarized invasion of or attack against another actor’s territory; aca‑
demics may also cite the facilitation of power projection, which is generally defined as a
state’s ability to sustain forces beyond their territory. These theoretical concepts are in‑
terrelated, although not always mutually present; debaters may find examining specific
technologies or personnel deployments to be better criteria for what constitutes an of‑
fensive capability. This may also help answer the first question of what revision would
entail.

Third, what would Japan use its capabilities for? Sure, peacekeeping might be a part of the
picture, but domestic prerogatives will most likely emphasize more imminent regional
security concerns. More importantly, in order to fulfill these specific needs, Japan has
many tools at its hypothetical disposal. What will it prioritize and what might be most
effective?

Finally, does any of that even matter? The first topic that came to mind when I was research‑
ing this topic was the Septober topic of 2017, from the archival days of yore before most
current debaters were even born. (I jest.) That topic asked whether South Korea would
benefit from the deployment of anti‑missile systems; consequently, a core feature of
many debates was not the objective features and drawbacks of particular technologies (al‑
though naturally that was important), but rather how antagonistic actors like China and
North Korea would assess and perceive the threat of a potentially shifting regional power
balance. I bring this up not just because backfiles and recorded debates from the topic
would be incredibly informative for strategy on the April topic, but more specifically
because this perception‑reality paradigm will likely assume the forefront of debates. It
is absolutely essential that debaters are able to separately debate how Japan’s actual
offensive capabilities change versus how their allies and adversaries will construe the
simple act of revision, divorced from what actually ends up being expanded, as well as
how these two levels of the discussion intersect and interact. It is very likely that argu‑
ments can be triggered by the mere act of affirming the resolution at its most bare‑bones
interpretation, regardless of whether Japan would actually further develop offensive ca‑
pabilities beyond what it already possesses in the status quo. This might be the most

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important question out of all four described here to answer, so don’t slack!

1.3 Securitization

No, this has nothing to do with finance (sorry finance bros). We’re going to pursue a
quick detour before we return to directly topical information. In international relations
theory as well as more progressive debate, Munster¹⁴ defines securitization as “a speech
act that has to fulfill three rhetorical criteria. It is a discursive process by means of which
an actor (1) claims that a referent object is existentially threatened, (2) demands the right
to take extraordinary countermeasures to deal with that the threat, and (3) convinces an
audience that rule‑breaking behavior to counter the threat is justified. In short, by label‑
ing something as”security,” an issue is dramatized as an issue of supreme priority.” If
that jargon is too confusing, securitization is essentially the act of turning otherwise nor‑
mal political issues into crises of urgent national or existential security, which enables
states to do whatever it takes to resolve them. For example, terrorism has been heavily
securitized in the U.S. following 9/11, with then‑President George W. Bush launching
a “war on terror” that has endured every presidency since 2001. Statistically speaking,
terrorism causes very few deaths worldwide relative to other causes, both violent and
nonviolent, and poses little to no true threat to American civilians; nonetheless, the secu‑
ritizing rhetoric used to inflate terrorism into an encroachment on domestic and interna‑
tional liberal freedom has justified the endless bombing, destruction, and marginaliza‑
tion of states across the Greater Middle East. Securitization is a useful framework for
re‑evaluating our foreign policy choices and propaganda critically, to reshape policy
against these constructed security interests. In progressive debate, the critical analysis
of the language that we use to describe security issues is called a securitization kritik
(K). More detailed literature regarding securitization exists, but unfortunately I don’t
have the time in this topic analysis to take a deeper dive—I highly recommend debaters
look into this on their own time.

That long‑winded exposition was meant to give debaters a quick introduction to a po‑
tential line of debate that I think should and will be utilized effectively on this topic; at
the very least, even if debaters choose not to run a securitization K or a securitization‑
related argument, it is quite useful in a couple of areas. One, debaters should know
how to respond to securitization as an underlying concept, regardless of the format in

¹⁴Rens Van Munster, 6‑26‑2012, ”Securitization,” Oxford Bibliographies,

https://www.oxfordbibliographies.com/view/document/obo‑9780199743292/obo‑9780199743292‑0091.xml

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 1 Topic Analysis by Renee Li

which it is being presented. Two, in our current foreign policy environment at large,
students can come to understand the implications of securitization on real‑world gov‑
ernance and foreign interventions. That said, if you are interested, securitization can be
run as a general idea, but I can see two more specific directions for debaters to take it.

One has to do with the indigenous populations of Japan, in particular those who re‑
side on the islands of Okinawa and Hokkaido. On these islands respectively live the
Ryukuan and Ainu people, who have been recognized by the international community
as having indigenous rights; simultaneously, Okinawa and Hokkaido are paramount
to securing Japan’s military endeavors, as Okinawa hosts the vast majority of American
military forces based in Japan, while Hokkaido is quite close to a number of territorial
disputes and military exercises conducted by China and Russia. Minami¹⁵ explains how
the military occupation of Okinawa specifically relates back to a securitization frame‑
work:

Okinawans, formerly known as the Ryukyuans, existed as the Ryukyu

Kingdom since the 13th century until Meiji Japan forcefully annexed the
island nation. Under the Japanese colonial rule and assimilation policy,
the Ryukyuans lost their own culture, language, land, and political institu‑
tions. After WWII, they experienced rule by U.S. occupation force, losing
their land to the building of American military facilities… the continuing
presence of American military bases violates the Okinawans’ rights to land
and self‑determination, because these bases are occupying their native
land despite their political demand to remove them… There is little legal
justification for Japan’s inaction on Okinawan indigenous rights. Instead,
there is strong strategic motivation: national security. Given the rise of
China and the Senkaku Island dispute, the maintenance of American
military presence in Okinawa seems all the more important for Japan. The
Japanese government may be thinking that the recognition of Okinawan
indigenous rights would necessitate the reduction or removal of American
military bases, which in turn could put Japan’s security at risk… As many
Okinawans continue the anti‑base movement, it will become more and more
difficult for the Japanese and U.S. governments to maintain the military
bases without political struggles. The recent protest rally in June, and the
loss of pro‑base incumbents from the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) in the
¹⁵Daisuke Minami, xx‑xx‑xxxx, ”The Okinawa Problem: The Forgotten History of Japanese Colo‑
nialism and Ryukyuan Indigeneity – Rising Powers Initiative,” George Washington University,
https://www.risingpowersinitiative.org/publication/the‑okinawa‑problem‑the‑forgotten‑history‑of‑japanese‑colonialism‑and

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July national election, attest to such difficulties that lie ahead.

The major takeaway is the last section of this excerpt: in the status quo, a growing anti‑
base movement is challenging the political ease with which Japanese leadership is able
to occupy indigenous land. This is where securitization comes into play. When de‑
baters presume the existence of exigent national security threats that demand mean‑
ingful deliberation over Japanese remilitarization, this very act of centering the conver‑
sation on security dismisses the structural violence committed against marginalized in‑
digenous populations—we see this reflected in the decision calculi that everyday people
and politicians alike utilize to determine our foreign policy priorities. In doing so, we
empower our political and military structures to continue pursuing drastic measures
to quell perceived dangers at the expense of those who have no seat at the table. Thus,
when we consider the major conclusion at the beginning of this paragraph, we find two
approaches to securitization through the lens of indigenous populations. One, we can
craft it as a traditional PF‑style argument: in the status quo, the conditions of Ryukuans
and Ainu people are potentially being ameliorated as popular support for military bas‑
ing wanes; however, by affirming and justifying remilitarization under the cause of secu‑
rity, Japan will perpetuate and exacerbate structural violence against their indigenous
peoples. Two, we can take this in a more progressive direction: by even entertaining
the presumptions embedded within the resolution itself, we are endorsing a national
security‑focused narrative that purposively erases marginalization from the public con‑
sciousness, at least within the debate space.

The second argument approach is based explicitly on our uniquely western perspective:
debaters will likely be able to run a kritik more specific to Sinophobia or Orientalism.
Orientalism as it pertains to China refers to how our security rhetoric renders China
into an “other” and a threat. In the U.S. particularly, Ooi and D’Arcangelis¹⁶ write that
China is painted as the tropes of “exotic other, yellow peril, red peril, and little brother”
through three issue areas: “(1) China’s currency valuation, (2) cyber intrusions that tar‑
get commercial and military information, and (3) maritime territorial and exclusive eco‑
nomic zone (EEZ) disputes”. This helps us frame our understanding of Japan‑China
relations as being filtered through the perspective of American securitization, in which
Japan is the bastion and ally of western values being pitted against a racially and ideo‑
logically inferior foreign enemy. Thus, we are made to believe China is an existential
threat to a territorial extension of our global hegemony. Given that a large proportion of
¹⁶Su‑Mei Ooi & Gwen D’Arcangelis, 2‑8‑2018, “Framing China: Discourses
of othering in US news and political rhetoric,” Global Media and China,
https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/2059436418756096

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 1 Topic Analysis by Renee Li

teams will be running China‑related arguments, particularly early on during the topic,
it might be useful to have higher‑level critical analysis to drop on opponents who do use
Sinophobic or Orientalizing rhetoric. I also highly recommend Ooi and D’Arcangelis’
article for some really informative reading. I promise it’s worth your time!

1.4 Key Actors

Unfortunately, I understand that not everyone will be receptive to those types of argu‑
ments. Hopefully you learned something new, though! We’re so close to the end—now
we’ll quickly look into the hodgepodge of relevant major actors on the topic.

1.4.1 China

In recent years, China has been ramping up its incursions into different territories that
threaten to draw Japan into escalating conflicts. There are three big areas to look into:
(1) Taiwan, (2) the Senkaku Islands, and (3) the South China Sea.

Taiwan may be the most salient issue of those three. Both the U.S. and Japan are con‑
cerned about China’s ability to invade and seize Taiwan, the two actors having an embat‑
tled history stemming from internal political competition following the Chinese Civil
War in 1949—it’s worth looking into this history to better understand why the possibility
of a Chinese invasion even exists now. Much of it has to do with perceptions of the U.S.’
faltering military presence in the region, Taiwan’s largely cooperative relations with
the U.S., and nationalist hardliners that view Taiwan as part of China. Consequently,
Inoue and Dooley¹⁷ write that China’s increasing maneuvers around Taiwan could be
the prelude to invasion or some sort of escalation, intentional or accidental. This would
prove to be problematic for the U.S. and its allies, as Myers and Buckley¹⁸ report that
China has improved its military capacities and would likely win any conflict over Tai‑
wan, particularly as a recently developed capability to “cripple communications around
the island… could hamper the arrival of American reinforcements.” Japan therefore en‑
ters the picture in two ways: one, an increased ability to help base American soldiers

¹⁷Makiko Inoue and Ben Dooley, 12‑23‑2021, ”Japan Approves Major

Hike in Military Spending, With Taiwan in Mind,” New York Times,
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/12/23/business/japan‑defense‑spending.html
¹⁸Steven Lee Myers & Chris Buckley, 10‑9‑2021, ”‘Starting A Fire’: U.S. And China Enter Dangerous Ter‑
ritory Over Taiwan,” The New York Times, https://getpocket.com/read/3567391396

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 1 Topic Analysis by Renee Li

and develop its own regional offensive capabilities could turn the tides on any conflict;
two, remilitarization could prove to have a deterrent effect on China.

On the other hand, many analysts warn that the likelihood of invasion is low. My‑
ers and Buckley¹⁹ continue that the cost of invasion and ensuing conflict would be
extremely high, in terms of economic loss, human lives, and China’s international
standing—however, China’s weighing calculus remains opaque, particularly as it
continues appearing aggressive in disputed waters. This could mean that Japanese
remilitarization could have the opposite effect, inducing China to feel a greater need
to secure their regional interests or to appear strong, subsequently responding in
turn with further posturing that could spark into full‑on conflict. Even if war does
not break out, Barbantan contextualizes that “enhanced economic cooperation would
undoubtedly mutually benefit the two countries. Japan needs to ensure stability for its
export‑centric economy, while China needs to maintain its current rates of growth in
order to be able to deal with its high levels of inequality and expanding middle class.”
Moreover, as Grady²⁰ explains, “Beijing is Tokyo’s largest trading partner and it also is
a key source in its own manufacturing supply chain, so cooperation is also necessary.”
The fallout of Japan‑China economic relations catalyzed by remilitarization, ignoring
whether conflict occurs, can be considered an impact of its own.

The Senkaku Islands—a set of islands in the East China Sea disputed by China and
Japan—and territory in the South China Sea represent similar flashpoints. Copp²¹ re‑
ports: “Japan’s Self Defense Forces are still responding to a rising number of Chinese
military aircraft incursions, regular and expanded reach of Chinese warships, includ‑
ing submarines, and other activities that are irritants, such as the regular presence of
Chinese civilian fishing craft lingering by the Senkakus.” The development of offensive
capabilities could likewise serve as a deterrent effect or a means of defending Japan’s
territorial integrity in the event of escalation—whether by miscalculations (e.g., acci‑
dental naval or aerial collisions) or intentional provocation—but, once again, there is
an argument to be made that affirming would uniquely push existing tensions over the
brightline to impel conflict. The histories of each of these different regional disputes are
lengthy and problematic, and so debaters must be careful to do sufficient background
research before settling on any particular argument. Some useful starting points may be

¹⁹Myers & Buckley, “ ‘Starting a Fire’ ”

²⁰John Grady, 4‑6‑2021, ”Panel: Japan Needs More Offensive Firepower to Counter Chinese Ambitions,”
USNI News, https://news.usni.org/2021/04/06/panel‑japan‑needs‑more‑offensive‑firepower‑to‑counter‑chinese‑ambitions
²¹Tara Copp, 1‑20‑2019, ”Japan surges new weapons, military roles to meet China’s rise,” Military Times,
https://www.militarytimes.com/news/2019/01/15/japan‑surges‑new‑weapons‑military‑roles‑to‑meet‑chinas‑rise/

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 1 Topic Analysis by Renee Li

looking into the Spratly and Paracel Islands, China’s conflicted relations with Southeast
Asian nations like Vietnam, and disputes over the 9‑Dash Line.

1.4.2 Russia

Russia can be treated as somewhat similar to China in that there is ambiguity with re‑
gards to how it might view Japanese militarization. However, given the ongoing events
in Ukraine at the time of writing, the probability of any sort of escalation scenario be‑
tween Russia and Japan appears to me to be markedly lower. Nonetheless, Russia still
has its own say in the matter.

Warrants for offensive militarization being net destabilizing do exist when specifically
appraising Russia’s geopolitical position. For example, Brown²² reports that

On May 24 [2021], a joint defense panel of Japan’s ruling Liberal Democratic

Party approved a draft proposal to sharply increase military spending. This
comes on top of nine consecutive years in which Japan’s defense budget
has increased, reaching a record $52 billion in 2021. Japan is actively de‑
veloping and buying new categories of military technology, while removing
long‑standing restrictions on the use of its Self‑Defense Forces. The rela‑
tive decrease in U.S. military strength in the region, especially compared
with China’s burgeoning power, is forcing Japan to become a leading mil‑
itary power in the Asia‑Pacific. This is inevitably causing alarm in Russia,
which never signed a peace treaty with Japan at the end of World War II,
and which has a long‑running territorial dispute with its neighbor over the
Kuril Islands… In January, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov spoke
out strongly against the prospect of Japan hosting new short‑ and medium‑
range ground‑based missiles on its territory. Locating the missiles on ships
rather than land would change little as well, added Lavrov, “because basing
them in the Sea of Japan… will mean that those missiles can reach a signifi‑
cant proportion of Russia’s territory.”

Nonetheless, they conclude that this should not be blown out of proportion, as Japan’s
spending is still dwarfed by the U.S. and Russia, and Japan has consistently demon‑
strated a deliberate avoidance of confrontation with Russian forces. These realities

²²James Brown, 8‑6‑2021, ”Is Russia Right to Fear Creeping Militarization in Japan?,” Carnegie Moscow
Center, https://carnegiemoscow.org/commentary/84701

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 1 Topic Analysis by Renee Li

would most likely remain true even in an aff world, although naturally that is still up
for debate.

Something more useful to consider might instead be Russia’s regional cooperation with
China. Larson²³ explicates that Russia and China conducted their first joint patrol in Oc‑
tober of 2021: “During the exercise, the Sino‑Russian flotilla passed through the Tsugaru
Strait, a body of water separating Japan’s northern Hokkaido island from the Honshu
mainland and connecting the Sea of Japan with the Pacific Ocean.” This could prove to
influence articulations of the status quo in two ways: one, China may be emboldened by
the material and rhetorical support of Russia to pursue inflammatory incursions; two,
regional war impact scenarios like that of a Taiwan invasion could very easily be war‑
ranted out into a great power war between the U.S., China, and Russia, all entangled in
a small geographical space.

1.4.3 North Korea

North Korea is where we start dealing with nukes at the outset. This is because North
Korea’s main diplomatic leverage to gain international recognition has always been the
threat of using its nuclear arsenal, which it shows off with missile testing. Such testing
has always presented itself as an acute threat to South Korea and Japan in particular,
who are U.S. allies and rely on the American nuclear umbrella, but would most likely
be first under fire if North Korea did end up initiating nuclear conflict. Johnson lays out
Japan’s current security dilemma vis‑à‑vis North Korea:

North Korea fired what appeared to be two ballistic missiles into the Sea of
Japan on Wednesday — an act Prime Minister Yoshihide Suga slammed as
“outrageous” — just days after testing a new weapon believed to be capable
of delivering a nuclear bomb to most of Japan… The latest launches come
just days after Pyongyang announced Monday that it had developed yet an‑
other weapon — a “new‑type, long‑range” cruise missile potentially capable
of evading missile defenses — that could put most of Japan within striking
distance… [However,] “The Biden administration is busy with Afghanistan
and China. It doesn’t want to tackle the North Korean issue…” Pyongyang’s
dogged pursuit of powerful new weapons despite the raging COVID‑19 pan‑
demic, which analysts believe has represented the greatest threat to leader

²³Caleb Larson, 10‑29‑2021, ”Why the U.S. and Japan Are Ramping Up Their Military Ties,” National Inter‑
est, https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/why‑us‑and‑japan‑are‑ramping‑their‑military‑ties‑195699

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 1 Topic Analysis by Renee Li

Kim Jong Un’s regime since he took power a decade ago, is perhaps indica‑
tive of its apparent desire to return the nuclear issue to the top of the U.S.
agenda.

Kim Jong Un’s regime stability could ride solely on whether his nuclear arsenal
gives him much‑needed political legitimacy in the international community; because
the Biden administration has clearly relegated this issue to a non‑priority, however,
North Korea may continue undertaking disruptive behaviors that would be most
likely to spark miscalculated conflict. Affirmative solvency may be enabling Japan to
develop offensive deterrence or greater anti‑missile technology, although the major
question is how this would differ meaningfully from increased spending in the status
quo—particularly as we have very little insight into Kim Jong Un’s security psychology.

1.4.4 United States and Allies

The issue of North Korean nuclearization relates well into the role of the U.S. and other
military allies who work with Japan, specifically because of the significance of the U.S.
nuclear umbrella.

The U.S. provides a few distinct benefits to Japan through their collaboration: nuclear
protection, forward based troops in Okinawa, and general allyship and military coordi‑
nation. These issues tend to operate independently from one another. American pres‑
ence in the East Asian region has been declining over the last few years, and some con‑
flicted sentiments do exist over Okinawan basing of U.S. troops, as discussed under the
Securitization section. Paired with aggression from regional actors, this current state
of geopolitical relations has been the scaffolding on which conservative Japanese politi‑
cians in particular have pushed for militarization within the bounds of Article 9. How‑
ever, Johnson²⁴ reports that even pro‑military Prime Minister Kishida has expressed
strong opposition to even the sharing of nuclear weapons with the U.S., especially on
the basis of a 1967 commitment against possession and production of nuclear weapons;
this is also largely true among the Japanese public. This will undoubtedly weaken the
basis for any teams to make an argument for Japanese nuclear proliferation, whether
aff or neg, or at least render the probability of such advocacies much harder to defend.
I might endeavor to say that this is also true for any perception arguments, as Japan
would likely continue to exude a very anti‑nuclearization image even if Article 9 were

²⁴Jesse Johnson, 2‑28‑2022, ”Kishida Calls Idea Of Japan Sharing Nukes With U.S. ’Unacceptable’,” The
Japan Times, https://getpocket.com/read/3562894184

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to be revised. However, conventional cooperation may be impacted tangibly by revi‑

sion, and could be worth investigating.

Similarly for other bilateral and multilateral relations, nuclearization tends to be off the
table, but allies have been mixed on attitudes toward Japan’s current increases in spend‑
ing. For example, Gould²⁵ reports Australia’s Prime Minister Scott Morrison embracing
joint military exercises and praising Japan’s efforts to develop further capacities, but
Yamaguchi²⁶ writes that many other countries are hesitant to endorse Japan given their
history of imperialism and existing tensions in the region. This could mean affirming
could detriment multilateral relations with other actors who are loathe to welcome a
remilitarized Japan—subsequently, this might empower states like China to act more
recklessly, knowing Japan would not be able to muster the same level of assistance as
before.

1.5 Conclusion

The April topic is a nexus of mutually imbricated histories intersecting with traditional
international relations theory and ever‑changing conflict scenarios. Debaters who are
able to master the first two—historical knowledge and theoretical frameworks—will
find setting up and warranting their conflict scenarios to be much easier than those who
leap into rounds unprepared. Don’t be afraid to explore unconventional ideas and more
scholarly writings when doing topic research!

My space and time in making this topic analysis was limited, and that reflects on the
relatively small scope of arguments and historical background I was able to cover. Each
smaller subsection warrants a topic analysis of its own, but unfortunately I do not have
the willpower to do that. If you need any of the cards from this topic analysis or want to
do some further initial reading, I’ve footnoted the research document²⁷ I used in writing
it below. Happy prepping!

²⁵Joe Gould, 1‑7‑2022, ”US, Japan agree to two defense pacts amid China worries,” Defense News,
https://www.defensenews.com/pentagon/2022/01/07/us‑japan‑agree‑to‑two‑defense‑pacts‑amid‑china‑worries/
²⁶Yamaguchi, “Japan’s military”
²⁷https://bit.ly/3Kw0XLk

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2 Topic Analysis by Lawrence Zhou

Lawrence Zhou is the former Director of Lincoln‑Douglas Debate and current Di‑
rector of Publishing at Victory Briefs. He debated at Bartlesville HS in Oklahoma
(2010‑2014) in Lincoln‑Douglas debate where he was the 2014 NSDA Lincoln‑
Douglas national champion. While attending the University of Oklahoma, he placed
as the National Runner Up at the 2018 Intercollegiate Ethics Bowl National Com‑
petition, advanced to outrounds at the 2016 and 2018 Cross Examination Debate
Association National Tournament, and championed the Beijing Language and Cul‑
ture University in British Parliamentary debate. Lawrence graduated in 2019 with
degrees in MIS, Marketing, and Philosophy. He was formerly the Debate League
Director at the National High School Debate League of China and is currently a grad‑
uate assistant at the University of Wyoming, head coach of Team Wyoming, and an
assistant coach at Apple Valley High School. His students have advanced to late
outrounds at numerous regional and national invitational tournaments, including
finals appearances at the NSDA National Tournament and semifinals appearances
at the Tournament of Champions.

2.1 Introduction

Oh my goodness, I cannot tell you all how jealous I am that PF gets this incredible
topic. This topic is almost a word for word restatement of a potential LD topic that
we used at the VBI LA I session back in 2019 (the only difference is that the LD topic
said “ought to amend” instead of “should revise”).¹ I have pushed for topics in LD that
specified an actor that was not the United States. While it is obviously very important for
debaters of all levels of experience to get more familiar with the intricacies and details
of the policies of the United States, debate is also incredibly valuable because it teaches
students about the outside world and getting to simulate the decision making procedure

¹https://www.vbriefly.com/2019/06/25/vbi‑2019‑ld‑camp‑topics‑announced/

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 2 Topic Analysis by Lawrence Zhou

of a non‑US agent provides unique perspective about foreign policy issues that merely
debating about that non‑US agent from the perspective of the United States. In other
words, what the United States might find generally desirable isn’t necessarily aligned
with what other foreign agents might be generally desirable, and it’s very useful to make
more informed decisions based on knowledge gained from the perspective of different
agents.

For me, this topic is the gold standard. While I would like topics that were about actors
that aren’t democracies, the problem is that those actors are often so controversial that
the debate will often boil down to broad discussions about whether that particular actor
is legitimate or not as opposed to the general desirability of their actions. For example,
the other topic that could have been selected for April was “Resolved: The People’s
Republic of China should substantially decrease its control of state‑owned enterprises.”
Now I don’t think this topic is as susceptible to this problem as other topics, but it faces a
similar problem. The interests of the Chinese government are simply not going to align
with the interests of us here in the United States. An affirmative debater might say that
China should reduce its control of state‑owned enterprises in order to stop corporate
espionage against US firms and then argue that corporate espionage is harmful to the
bottomline of US firms. The problem with this is obvious—why would China care about
the harm to the economic performance of US firms?

As another example, while it would be good, from the perspective of the US, if China
just abandoned its claim over the nine‑dash line in the South China Sea,² such a move
is not “good” from the perspective of the CCP. This topic wouldn’t be very useful to
debate because the relevant question in the literature is about what the US should do
about Chinese claims in the SCS, not if China should magically abandon its claims.

This topic is different. While we do want to something that approximates stakeholder

analysis³ about what would be in the interest of the Japanese government, it just so
happens that the interests of the Japanese government and the US government more or
less align here, so there is actual value in debating about the decision‑making pressures
facing the Japanese government.

Anyways, I’ll stop gushing about the joys of non‑US topics and actually get into the de‑
tails of what this topic means and why I find this topic, in particular, to be an incredibly
important one.

²https://thediplomat.com/2016/06/what‑does‑the‑nine‑dash‑line‑actually‑mean/
³https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stakeholder_analysis

23
 2 Topic Analysis by Lawrence Zhou

2.2 Background

I feel like this topic could not have come at a more important time. In the wake of Rus‑
sia’s invasion against Ukraine, people have been worried about the prospects of China
invading Taiwan (personally, I’m not that worried,⁴ but many are). Similarly, some ex‑
perts are also concerned about the impact that the invasion will have on Japan. Already,
Japan’s foreign policy is becoming more assertive in the wake of the Ukraine invasion,⁵
and members of Japan’s government are already in the middle of rethinking their secu‑
rity strategy towards Moscow.⁶ Japan has recently joined in on sanctions against Russia,
a dramatic shift in the way that Japan approaches foreign policy.⁷ Japan didn’t make
such a decision lightly—it is in the middle of a long island feud with Russia and the
invasion of Ukraine doesn’t help that situation one bit.⁸

One of the reasons Japan was slow to join in on the international condemnation of Rus‑
sia is because of Japan’s constitution (which espouses pacifist principles, primarily in
Article 9) and because Japanese culture is generally reluctant to interfere in the affairs
of foreign countries.⁹ But now that Japan is actually stepping up and getting tough on
Russia, discussions about Japan’s relationship towards its military and Article 9 have
become more salient than ever.¹⁰

In this (somewhat comprehensive) background section, we’ll cover some of the impor‑
tant information you need to know about Japan and Article 9.

2.2.1 Japan

Japan is an island country in East Asia and I would strongly recommend that you take a
look at a map of that region because (A) many American students are absolutely terrible
at geography,¹¹ and (B) only when you see just how close Japan is to North Korea and
China will it make sense why Japan takes its territorial security so seriously. Couple
the geographical location of Japan with Japan’s turbulent history, and you begin to get

⁴https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/taiwan/2022‑03‑03/invasions‑are‑not‑contagious
⁵https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/03/05/japan‑ukraine‑russia‑foreign‑policy/
⁶https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2022/03/05/national/russia‑invasion‑national‑strategy/
⁷https://www.reuters.com/business/japan‑govt‑cbank‑executives‑meet‑ukraine‑crisis‑jolts‑markets‑2022‑02‑28/
⁸https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022‑03‑03/how‑ukraine‑war‑fuels‑japan‑s‑island‑feud‑with‑russia‑quicktake
⁹https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/03/02/japan‑ukraine‑sanctions/
¹⁰https://thediplomat.com/2022/03/what‑ukraine‑means‑for‑japan/
¹¹https://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2015/10/16/us‑students‑are‑terrible‑at‑geography

24
 2 Topic Analysis by Lawrence Zhou

a sense of just why the Japanese people are so concerned with heightened tensions in
Asia.

It makes sense to start with a basic history of Japan. I’d start by watching the now infa‑
mous YouTube video “history of japan”¹² which, despite its meme status, is shockingly
good at condensing down the history of Japan. After you get your daily dose of inter‑
net, you might then want to localize your understanding of Japanese history to the last
century or two. There are excellent resources and lectures available to get a good idea
of Japanese history, especially post‑World War II. There is a lot about Japanese history
to learn about, so I just want to point to five important facts about Japanese history that
all debaters should know about.

First, Japan has a security alliance with the US,¹³ long considered to be one of the most
important security alliances as stated by Secretary of State Anthony Blinken and Secre‑
tary of Defense Lloyd Austin in a State Department press release.¹⁴ Signed in 1951 at the
conclusion of World War II, the U.S.‑Japan Mutual Security Treaty¹⁵ was a pledge for
the United States to act as a security guarantor of Japan in exchange for the US utilizing
Japanese territory for US forwarded military presence. As of 2021, there are more than
eighty US military facilities in Japan (one of the more infamous areas where the US po‑
sitions its troops and equipment is Okinawa, which was debated on the March 2016 PF
topic,¹⁶ a collection of 13 US military bases on the island of Okinawa that houses over
half of US military bases in Japan¹⁷) and Japan remains the home to the largest collection
of permanently stationed US service members in a foreign country.

This is important. One of the reasons why Japan does not have a particularly large
standing army or (supposedly) offensive capabilities is because Japan agreed to aban‑
don imperial ambitions (and the military means to pursue those ambitions) in exchange
for the US providing security for the island nation, including putting Japan under the
US nuclear umbrella.¹⁸ Though this alliance has undergone a few adjustments (once
in 1960, once after the Vietnam War, once in 1978, and once in the 1990s¹⁹), it remains
fairly robust and has been considered an important contributor to peace and prosperity

¹²https://youtu.be/Mh5LY4Mz15o
¹³https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/us‑japan‑security‑alliance
¹⁴https://www.state.gov/reaffirming‑the‑unbreakable‑u‑s‑japan‑alliance/
¹⁵https://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n‑america/us/q&a/ref/1.html
¹⁶https://www.speechanddebate.org/topics/
¹⁷https://libguides.gwu.edu/okinawa/militarybases/maps
¹⁸https://thediplomat.com/2021/02/the‑us‑doesnt‑need‑to‑worry‑about‑japan‑or‑any‑other‑ally‑going‑nuclear/
¹⁹https://www.asianstudies.org/wp‑content/uploads/the‑us‑japan‑alliance‑a‑brief‑strategic‑history.pdf

25
 2 Topic Analysis by Lawrence Zhou

in Asia for decades.²⁰

Second, an important piece of this puzzle is the Yoshida Doctrine, a strategy that Japan
adopted in 1951 after its defeat in World War II.²¹ This doctrine is important to under‑
stand because it basically shaped much of Japanese foreign policy into the 21st century.
This doctrine stated that Japan would be firmly allied with the US against communism,
that Japan would rely primarily on American military forces and keep its own defense
forces to a minimum, and that Japan would emphasize economic diplomacy. In other
words, the US would focus on security and Japan would focus on growing its post‑war
economy (an economy that was decimated after the war but grew to one of the world’s
largest economies in mere decades, often called the Japanese Economic Miracle²²). This
doctrine, shaped by Article 9, is no longer the primary driving force behind Japan’s
foreign policy, but its historical importance cannot be understated since most modern
military developments in Japan should be understood against this historical backdrop
and understanding this doctrine helps explain why the Japanese public is so split on the
issue of developing offensive military capabilities.²³

Third, Japan has an unpleasant history with China. In 2016, Pew Research released a
survey that showed that Japan and China “view each other with disdain, harbor mostly
negative stereotypes of one another, disagree on Japan’s World War II legacy and worry
about future confrontations.”²⁴ The strains in the relationship between these two eco‑
nomic powerhouses have existed for centuries, but one more recent inflection point was
the Nanjing Massacre in World War II, where Japanese soliders murdered untold num‑
bers of Chinese soliders and civilians,²⁵ an event that has long continued to haunt Sino‑
Japan relations.²⁶ Though China and Japan have cooperated economically throughout
the years and relations were thought to have improved in recent times,²⁷ the current
atmosphere has turned increasingly frosty²⁸ (even though Japan is still hesitant to fully
break with Beijing due to China’s economic and military might²⁹). Understanding how
Japan sees China (The Economist argues that it’s as “mighty, but also dangerously over‑

²⁰https://sgp.fas.org/crs/row/RL33740.pdf
²¹https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yoshida_Doctrine
²²https://www.worldatlas.com/articles/what‑was‑the‑japanese‑economic‑miracle.html
²³https://thediplomat.com/2020/03/has‑japans‑foreign‑policy‑gone‑beyond‑the‑yoshida‑doctrine/
²⁴https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2016/09/13/hostile‑neighbors‑china‑vs‑japan/
²⁵https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/thoughts‑on‑the‑nanjing‑massacre/
²⁶https://thediplomat.com/2017/12/japan‑china‑and‑the‑strains‑of‑historical‑memory/
²⁷https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/25/world/asia/japan‑china‑xi.html
²⁸https://thediplomat.com/2021/04/is‑the‑china‑japan‑thaw‑over/
²⁹https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2021‑05‑04/surprising‑strength‑chinese‑japanese‑ties

26
 2 Topic Analysis by Lawrence Zhou

confident”³⁰) and Japan’s history with China is important to understand the motivations
behind those who wish to amend Article 9.

Fourth, Japan also has an unpleasant history with North Korea. North Korea has
ramped up its aggressive foreign policy in recent years, mostly by conducting more
long‑range missile tests and flouting international norms. This obviously worries
Japan who is well within range of North Korea’s nuclear weapons.³¹ One reason for
these poor tensions has to do, once again, with Japan’s history of imperialism against
the Koreans. They have fought since at least the 7th Century. More recently, Japan
annexed Korea in 1910 and by the late 1930s, Japan began enslaving and conscripting
many Koreans to fight for Japan.³² To this day, Japan’s relations with South Korea are
still weak.³³

Fifth, Japan’s government has undergone some drastic changes in recent years. Japan’s
government is not totally unlike other government structures and I don’t think it’ll be
important to know every detail of the government of Japan (although, again, a quick
skim of the Wikipedia page never hurt anyone³⁴), but at least some basic familiarity
with the leaders should be helpful.

The current Prime Minister of Japan is Fumio Kishika,³⁵ a member of the Liberal Demo‑
cratic Party (LDP) of Japan.³⁶ Despite the word “liberal” in its name, the LDP is actually
a fairly conservative political party in Japan (although Kishika is generally considered
more moderate than his more hardline predecessors³⁷). It is also the largest political
party in Japan and has held power almost continuously since its party’s formation in
1955.³⁸ Kishika has only been in power for about half a year after his predecessor, Yoshi‑
hide Suga, resigned after just one year in office due to low approval ratings from his
mishandling of Covid‑19.³⁹ Before Suga, the Prime Minister was Shinzo Abe (or Abe
Shinzo if you’re writing it correctly⁴⁰), the longest‑serving Prime Minister in Japanese
history.⁴¹
³⁰https://www.economist.com/asia/2022/01/01/how‑japan‑sees‑china
³¹https://www.rand.org/blog/2020/01/japans‑north‑korea‑challenge‑in‑2020.html
³²https://www.bbc.com/news/world‑asia‑49330531
³³https://thediplomat.com/2021/05/why‑is‑japan‑hesitant‑to‑improve‑relations‑with‑south‑korea/
³⁴https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Government_of_Japan
³⁵https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fumio_Kishida
³⁶https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Liberal_Democratic_Party_(Japan)
³⁷https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/09/29/japan‑ldp‑next‑prime‑minister‑kishida‑safe‑option/
³⁸https://www.britannica.com/topic/Liberal‑Democratic‑Party‑of‑Japan
³⁹https://www.bbc.com/news/world‑asia‑58784635
⁴⁰https://www.cnn.com/2019/05/21/asia/japan‑name‑abe‑shinzo‑intl/index.html
⁴¹https://www.britannica.com/biography/Abe‑Shinzo

27
 2 Topic Analysis by Lawrence Zhou

Understanding Abe (pronounced ah‑bay, not “Abe” like “Abe Lincoln”) is key to un‑
derstanding the modern context of this debate. In recent years, Japan has continued
to upgrade its defense capabilities amid a major buildup of Chinese military forces, in‑
creasing missile tests from North Korea, and increased Russian presence in East Asia.
The person responsible for this build up? Abe. Back in 2013, Japan announced a new
national security strategy,⁴² and in 2018, it adopted a ten‑year defense plan.⁴³ Spearhead‑
ing this effort was Abe who had a supermajority in the lower house of the National Diet
(Japan’s bicameral legislature⁴⁴) and thus was able to make broad changes to Japan’s
Constitution which allowed Abe’s government to make significant security reforms in‑
cluding upgrading its ballistic missile defense (BMD),⁴⁵ acquiring F‑35 fighter jets,⁴⁶ and
investing in improved cybersecurity.⁴⁷ (Even though Abe is merely a senior figure in
the LDP and not the prime minister, he continues to push for more hardline security
stances, including suggesting that Japan consider a nuclear‑sharing arrangement with
the US similar to NATO.⁴⁸)

However, these changes were controversial because they potentially flew in the face of
one of the core principles of Japan’s Constitution—Article 9.

2.2.2 Article 9

Unsurprisingly, I am once again going to recommend you spend a lot of time reading
through and understanding Wikipedia’s article on Japan’s Article 9.⁴⁹ I think that it is
still one of the best summaries of the history behind Article 9 and the modern contro‑
versies surrounding this expression of Japan’s pacifism, especially because much of the
academic literature on Article 9 is a bit dense.⁵⁰

Here is the exact text of the entirety of Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution:

CHAPTER II

RENUNCIATION OF WAR

⁴²https://www.mofa.go.jp/fp/nsp/page1we_000081.html
⁴³https://www.cfr.org/in‑brief/how‑japan‑upgrading‑its‑military
⁴⁴https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National_Diet
⁴⁵https://thediplomat.com/2018/11/is‑japans‑ballistic‑missile‑defense‑too‑integrated‑with‑the‑us/
⁴⁶https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/japan‑investing‑big‑its‑f‑35‑stealth‑fighter‑fleet‑184503
⁴⁷https://thediplomat.com/2021/10/how‑will‑japans‑cybersecurity‑posture‑impact‑its‑relations‑with‑china/
⁴⁸https://www.wsj.com/articles/a‑new‑nuclear‑debate‑in‑japan‑shinzo‑abe‑nato‑us‑russia‑ukraine‑vladimir‑putin‑china‑xi‑jinpin
⁴⁹https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Article_9_of_the_Japanese_Constitution
⁵⁰https://doi.org/10.1080/09555803.2021.1958902

28
 2 Topic Analysis by Lawrence Zhou

Article 9. Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and

order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the
nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international dis‑
putes.

In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and
air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right
of belligerency of the state will not be recognized.⁵¹

In less formal terms, the point of Article 9 is that it formally renounces both war and
the threat or use of force to settle international disputes, prohibits the maintenance of
armed forces and other war potential, and denies all rights to delligerency.⁵²

Generally, this commitment to pacifism has been a guiding principle of Japanese foreign
policy. There is some excellent history here, and I would definitely encourage at least
a little bit of reading on the history of Article 9 (This article by James Auer is a fantastic
exploration of the historical evolution of Article 9⁵³). The important thing to know for
this topic is that, in recent years, that has shifted. This video by PolyMatter has a great
explanation of what that shift looks like, covering why Japan doesn’t have a military,
why Japan is currently rearming, and includes some discussion of Article 9 in it.⁵⁴

Basically, Abe has been pushing to attempt to amend Japan’s constitution in an attempt
to legitimize Japan’s existing Self‑Defense Forces (SDF), traditionally relegated to pri‑
marily defensive functions. However, amending the Japanese constitution is very dif‑
ficult. This explainer by the Council on Foreign Relations is a great introduction to the
unique nature of Japan’s postwar constitution,⁵⁵ and one of the most interesting things
about Japan’s constitution has never once been amended (in contrast, the US Constitu‑
tion has been amended 27 times).⁵⁶ The unique situation of Japan’s governance structure
and culture makes the process of amending the Japanese constitution incredibly diffi‑
cult.⁵⁷ It is important to note that there have been recent, controversial moves to change
the amendment process precisely to make amending the constitution easier.⁵⁸

So, in 2014, instead of amending the Japanese constitution through Article 96, Abe sim‑
⁵¹https://japan.kantei.go.jp/constitution_and_government_of_japan/constitution_e.html
⁵²https://ssrn.com/abstract=1296667
⁵³https://www.jstor.org/stable/1191849
⁵⁴https://youtu.be/ChA2‑K1tZNI
⁵⁵https://www.cfr.org/japan‑constitution/
⁵⁶https://www.cfr.org/japan‑constitution/politics‑of‑revision
⁵⁷https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order‑from‑chaos/2018/12/15/why‑shinzo‑abe‑faces‑an‑uphill‑battle‑to‑revise‑japans‑constitu
⁵⁸https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/Bill‑to‑amend‑law‑on‑revising‑Japan‑constitution‑to‑pass‑Diet

29
 2 Topic Analysis by Lawrence Zhou

ply reinterpreted Article 9 to allow Japanese troops to fight overseas for the first time
since World War Two which was termed an affirmation of Japan’s “right to collective
self‑defense”⁵⁹ (the idea being that Japan would be allowed to deploy military forces
alongside allied military forces). The reinterpretation basically served to legitimize the
existence of a more militarized SDF and to signal a departure from Japan’s traditionally
more pacifist culture. The 2014 reinterpretation prompted public outcry from those who
strongly believed in Japan’s commitment to pacifism.⁶⁰

Since the 2014 reinterpretation, Japan has massively increased the size and power of its
military. This excellent Vice News video shows some of the upgrades that Japan has
made to its military and some of the public reaction to such moves.⁶¹ Abe originally set
a plan to revise Article 9 before he left office, but by the time that Abe retired in 2020,
Article 9 had yet to be revised.

Weirdly enough, the topic specifies an aim of revising Article 9—developing offensive
military capabilities. This complicates some of the actual debate about Article 9. As
RAND analyst Jeffery W. Hornung argues, “while constitutional revision could bring
minor changes to Japan’s defense establishment, it will likely do little more than codify
the current domestic status quo: a force exclusively focused on self‑defense and heavily
constrained by a domestic web of legal and normative constraints.”⁶² This is because
there are two groups advocating for revision of Article 9, as Wikipedia explains⁶³:

The different views can be clearly organized into four categories:

The current pacifists believe in maintaining Article 9 and claim the JSDF is
unconstitutional, and would like to detach Japan from international wars.

The mercantilists have divided opinions about Article 9 although the inter‑
pretation is broadened to include the JSDF, and believe that the JSDF’s role
should be retained to activities related to the United Nations and for non‑
combat purposes. They advocate minimal defense spending, and empha‑
size economic growth.

The normalists ”call for incremental armament for national defense and ac‑
cept using military force to maintain international peace and security”. They

⁵⁹https://www.reuters.com/article/us‑japan‑abe‑legacy‑analysis/abes‑mission‑unaccomplished‑pushing‑to‑revise‑japans‑pacifist
⁶⁰https://ilr.law.uiowa.edu/print/volume‑101‑issue‑3/japans‑reinterpretation‑of‑article‑9‑a‑pyrrhic‑victory‑for‑american‑foreign‑
⁶¹https://youtu.be/l‑qxsYkhN20
⁶²https://warontherocks.com/2018/03/revising‑japans‑peace‑constitution‑much‑ado‑about‑nothing/
⁶³https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Article_9_of_the_Japanese_Constitution

30
 2 Topic Analysis by Lawrence Zhou

support the revision of Article 9 to include a clause explaining the existence

and function of the JSDF.

The nationalists assert that Japan should remilitarize and build nuclear ca‑
pabilities in order to regain pride and independence. They also advocate
revision of Article 9 to promote armament.

Hornung is referencing revision as advocated for by the normalists, but this topic is
much more clearly assigned with revision as advocated by the nationalists which defi‑
nitely narrows the type of arguments the affirmative can advance.

2.2.3 Offensive Military Capabilities

This is a contested term because the line between an offensive and defensive capabil‑
ity is murky at best. Even as far back as 1984, foreign policy theorist Jack Levy argued
that the extreme ambiguity between what constitutes an offensive and defensive capa‑
bility makes the distinction somewhat unworkable.⁶⁴ Of course, experts recognize that
what constitutes an offensive military capability is an inherently political question and
is often determined by the external threat environment. For example, if the enemy is an
invading force armed only with katanas, then surely a tank would be a bit excessive and
might be classified as an offensive military capability in that context. Therefore, what
constitutes an offensive military capability has to be defined in the context of Japanese
law. Scholar Adam Liff notes that the Japanese government has traditionally defined
offensive military capabilities as any capability to allow for aggressive war or a possible
preemptive strike.⁶⁵ Practically speaking, this means forbidding intercontinental ballis‑
tic missiles (ICBMs), long‑range strategic bombers, and “offensive” aircraft carriers.

However, even these attempts to draw practical distinctions don’t often work. For ex‑
ample, despite the fact that Japan says that “offensive” aircraft carriers are prohibited,
Japan, in fact, has an aircraft carrier called Izumo,⁶⁶ which started as a helicopter carrier
but was modified into a ship capable of launching short‑takeoff, vertical‑landing air‑
craft such as the F‑35B and is called a “helicopter destroyer.” Of course, Japan claims
that such an aircraft carrier isn’t “offensive” but few seem to really believe that is the
case.

⁶⁴https://www.jstor.org/stable/2600696
⁶⁵https://www.jstor.org/stable/26403212
⁶⁶https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidaxe/2021/10/05/its‑official‑after‑a‑75‑year‑gap‑the‑japanese‑navy‑has‑an‑aircraft‑carrier/

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 2 Topic Analysis by Lawrence Zhou

This leaves us in a weird spot. Is Japan really interested in acquiring nuclear weapons,
for instance? Some think so, especially Japan has yet to sign onto the Treaty of the
Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons.⁶⁷ Would proliferation stabilize the region⁶⁸ or cause it
to light up in flames⁶⁹? Would it matter if Japan acquired long‑range strategic bombers?
Maybe. In reality, Article 9 revision is unlikely to materially change much of Japan’s
armed forces. They are already militarizing and rearming. In reality, Article 9 revision
is more likely to be an issue of perception than capabilities.⁷⁰ It is even possible to make
the case that Japan can acquire defensive nuclear weapons without violating Article 9,⁷¹
making this debate very complicated.

2.3 Beyond Surface Level Clash

As with most of my topic analysis essays, I am going to forgo simply diving into the
stock controversies. I think the other topic analysis essays do a good job of introducing
the reader to the core stock issues on this topic. I don’t feel the need to dive into those is‑
sues because, broadly, I think the main argument for the pro focuses around deterrence
and the main argument for the con focuses around escalation. If this sounds familiar, it
should be the core controversy for the NATO alliances topic from September/October
of this year. In fact, it’s really the core controversy for most topics about international
relations.

In lieu of basic surface level analysis, I want to talk about two topic areas that are not
themselves arguments but I think necessary to gain some additional perspective on the
issues at hand here. In particular, I think thinking through these two issues will help
make cases far more coherent and deeply warranted.

2.3.1 Theories of International Relations

First, debaters should familiarize themselves with the basic theories of international re‑
lations (IR). Some of the LD and PF lectures⁷² available at classroom.victorybriefs.com

⁶⁷https://www.rand.org/blog/2021/04/nuclear‑ban‑treaty‑offers‑rare‑chance‑for‑japan.html
⁶⁸https://www.forbes.com/sites/anderscorr/2017/01/31/japan‑go‑nuclear‑now/#555972517745
⁶⁹https://www.inss.org.il/wp‑content/uploads/sites/2/systemfiles/MASA6‑1Eng%20(4)_Cimbala.pdf
⁷⁰https://www.scirp.org/journal/paperinformation.aspx?paperid=104414
⁷¹https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/international_immersion_program_papers/26/
⁷²https://classroom.victorybriefs.com/ld‑pf‑lectures

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 2 Topic Analysis by Lawrence Zhou

cover the basics of IR (Inko Bovenzi has lectures on liberalism⁷³ and realism,⁷⁴ and Serena
Lu⁷⁵ and Max Hardt⁷⁶ each has a broad introduction to IR). If you don’t have a Class‑
rooms subscription, then a few readings I would suggest for getting a broad overview
are Stephen Walt’s “International Relations: One World, Many Theories”⁷⁷ and Jack
Synder’s “One World, Rival Theories.”⁷⁸ These two papers, coupled with some videos
introducing IR (such as this one from the London School of Economics⁷⁹ and this lecture
series from YaleCourses on power and politics⁸⁰), should provide a basic introduction to
the main theories of international relations, namely realism and liberalism. If you want
a fun read that provides a far more comprehensive introduction to IR, then I highly
recommend Daniel Drezner’s Theories of International Politics and Zombies (a book that I
read for one of my favorite classes that was literally just watching zombie movies and
applying that to international relations).⁸¹

The broad idea is that realism is very Hobbesian in nature. It starts by recognizing
that international politics is a struggle for power.⁸² The core assumption behind all
flavors of realist theories is that anarchy (the lack of a central, legitimate authority) is
the overarching constraint on world politics. By contrast, the central assumption behind
liberalism is that cooperation is still possible in a world of anarchy. While I leave it to
the reader to explore these theories on their own (there are countless quality resources
out there for learning about these theories), I want to spend a little bit of time explaining
why it is so important to learn these theories.

What is the point of these theories? As Walt argues in his piece “One World, Many
Theories,”

“...there is an inescapable link between the abstract world of theory and the
real world of policy. We need theories to make sense of the blizzard of in‑
formation that bombards us daily. Even policymakers who are contemptu‑
ous of ‘theory’ must rely on their own (often unstated) ideas about how the
world works in order to decide what to do. It is hard to make good policy

⁷³https://classroom.victorybriefs.com/ld‑pf‑lecture‑liberalism‑in‑international‑relations‑its‑applications‑to‑debate
⁷⁴https://classroom.victorybriefs.com/ld‑pf‑lecture‑realism‑in‑international‑relations‑its‑applications‑to‑debate
⁷⁵https://classroom.victorybriefs.com/ld‑pf‑lecture‑introduction‑to‑international‑relations
⁷⁶https://classroom.victorybriefs.com/ld‑pf‑lecture‑international‑conflict‑crash‑course
⁷⁷https://people.ucsc.edu/~rlipsch/migrated/pol160A/Walt.1998.pdf
⁷⁸https://foreignpolicy.com/2009/10/26/one‑world‑rival‑theories/
⁷⁹https://youtu.be/NVCDnUZqLzU
⁸⁰https://youtu.be/BDqvzFY72mg
⁸¹https://press.princeton.edu/books/paperback/9780691163703/theories‑of‑international‑politics‑and‑zombies
⁸²https://www.amazon.com/Politics‑Among‑Nations‑Struggle‑Peace/dp/B000H0PYCM

33
 2 Topic Analysis by Lawrence Zhou

if one’s basic organizing principles are flawed, just as it is hard to construct

good theories without knowing a lot about the real world. Everyone uses
theories—whether he or she knows it or not—and disagreements about pol‑
icy usually rest on more fundamental disagreements about the basic forces
that shape international outcomes.”⁸³

In other words, theory is crucial to making consistent and rational judgments about how
to proceed in the real world. Without theory, making sense of mountains of information
becomes impossible and would consume so much of the decision‑making process that
practical judgments about how to act would become impossible.

Take the debate about Russia and Ukraine today. Already, you see a flurry of op‑eds
arguing about the correct response for the West to take to respond to the Russian in‑
vasion of Ukraine. You have people like Alexander Vindman (yes, that one from the
impeachment trial from what seems like ages ago⁸⁴) arguing in favor of a lend‑lease
plan,⁸⁵ while others argue in favor a “no‑fly zone”⁸⁶ (although most seem to agree on
the importance of sanctions⁸⁷). Your view of IR will heavily shape how you think the
US should respond to the Ukraine invasion. Realists offer their explanations for the war
in Ukraine,⁸⁸ arguing that the liberals were just wrong about why Russia invaded,⁸⁹ and
that realist thinking is needed to solve the crisis.⁹⁰ Meanwhile, liberals argue in favor
of the liberal international order (LIO) and how that is the best bulwark against further
escalation.⁹¹

Similarly, your view of IR will shape how you think Japan and the US should respond
to China and North Korea. For example, if you subscribe to a view of realism known
as offensive realism (a subset of structural realism that emphasizes seeking power and
influence to achieve security through domination and hegemony whereas defensive re‑
alism encourages moderate and reserved policies to achieve security⁹²), then you are
more likely to view China as a threat and willing to utilize military power to domi‑
nate Japan. This strengthens the case for increasing Japan’s military capabilities since

⁸³https://people.ucsc.edu/~rlipsch/migrated/pol160A/Walt.1998.pdf
⁸⁴https://www.npr.org/2021/08/10/1026395534/alexander‑vindman‑key‑witness‑to‑trump‑impeachment‑shares‑his‑american‑sto
⁸⁵https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/ukraine/2022‑03‑05/america‑must‑do‑more‑help‑ukraine‑fight‑russia
⁸⁶https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2022/03/07/so‑you‑say‑you‑want‑no‑fly‑zone‑over‑ukraine/
⁸⁷https://www.nytimes.com/2022/02/24/opinion/ukraine‑russia‑putin‑war.html
⁸⁸https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2022/03/03/can‑realism‑explain‑war‑ukraine/
⁸⁹https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/01/19/ukraine‑russia‑nato‑crisis‑liberal‑illusions/
⁹⁰https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/02/03/putin‑biden‑russia‑ukraine‑nato/
⁹¹https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2022/02/vladimir‑putin‑ukraine‑invasion‑liberal‑order/622950/
⁹²https://doi.org/10.1093/acrefore/9780190846626.013.304

34
 2 Topic Analysis by Lawrence Zhou

only increasing the costs of China’s aggression will deter China from deploying mili‑
tary assets against Japan. In contrast, if you are more liberal (not in the political sense),
you are likely more optimistic than the realists and believe that peace can be achieved
through means that do not require hard power and military force.⁹³ (Here, hard power
refers to the sticks and carrots in international relations whereas soft power are tools like
cultural exchanges that do not punish, reward, or threaten other actors into preferred
behavior.⁹⁴)

Personally, I tend to view China through the lens of defensive realism.⁹⁵ I think that
this defensive view, rather than the offensive one, is most consistent with a view of
China looking to establish its own regional sphere of influence⁹⁶ in order to achieve its
security goals.⁹⁷ Coupled with historical readings of China’s imperial ambitions (and
humiliation it has suffered at the hands of Western powers in the past⁹⁸), I read China
as a status quo actor mostly interested in securing regime survival, protecting what it
perceives to be core national interests like Taiwan, and maintaining an international or‑
der favorable to China’s domestic prosperity.⁹⁹ I tend to think that readings of China as
a revisionist power (or a state whose objective is to change or put an end to the current
system) overread China’s interests. However, people far smarter and more steeped in
the literature than I have come to totally different views about China. I strongly recom‑
mend this recent piece from Foreign Affairs featuring several prominent foreign policy
experts debating over Washington’s approach to China as it will help you shape your
own views.¹⁰⁰

Similarly, when it comes to North Korea, your view on IR will shape what you think is
the best way to engage with and deter the dictatorship.¹⁰¹ I have much less to say about
North Korea since I’ve spent less time engaging with the relevant scholarship (unless
you count watching videos of people defecting¹⁰²). The only thing I do want to add
here is that most casual observers think of North Korea as being led by an irrational
and evil madman. While Kim Jong Un is undoubtedly evil, most experts think his for‑

⁹³https://doi.org/10.1177%2F1369148118791979
⁹⁴https://www.fpri.org/article/2020/09/the‑problem‑with‑soft‑power/
⁹⁵https://www.jstor.org/stable/48544287
⁹⁶https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united‑states/2020‑02‑10/new‑spheres‑influence
⁹⁷https://doi.org/10.7591/9780801456992‑009
⁹⁸https://thediplomat.com/2020/08/chinas‑never‑again‑mentality/
⁹⁹https://yalebooks.yale.edu/book/9780300251258/stronger
¹⁰⁰https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2022‑02‑11/china‑strategy‑rival‑americas‑making
¹⁰¹https://time.com/5494585/north‑korea‑dictator‑history/
¹⁰²https://youtu.be/Q42kRVCCkcQ

35
 2 Topic Analysis by Lawrence Zhou

eign policy doctrine¹⁰³ is far more rational than it first appears. North Korea is, as one
expert puts it, an actor that is “subject to constraints on rational decision‑making, and
sometimes just makes mistakes.”¹⁰⁴ A litany of pop news articles also support this view,
with Vox,¹⁰⁵ BBC,¹⁰⁶ The Wall Street Journal,¹⁰⁷ and the New York Times¹⁰⁸ all publishing
pieces about why North Korea isn’t “crazy” and far more rational than we initially give
it credit for. Everytime North Korea conducts more missile tests (including a few this
month before the South Korean presidential election¹⁰⁹),¹¹⁰ it’s likely doing so under a
cost‑benefit analysis that favors grabbing the West’s attention in hope of extracting eco‑
nomic concessions to help buoy the country’s devastated economy.¹¹¹

Again, theory helps us understand facts (and facts shape theory) in a way that gives
those facts coherence and value. The more robust the theory, the more useful it is for
predicting future state behavior. If your theory is robust and supports the view that
China is unlikely to launch an invasion of Japan, then that should reduce your confi‑
dence that Japan needs offensive military capabilities. In contrast, if your theory views
China as a revisionist state hellbent on subjugating the Japanese, then that should in‑
crease your confidence that Japan needs offensive military capabilities.

This requires being familiar with the basics of IR theory (again, the articles I linked
above should suffice) as well as some of the history of China, North Korea, and Japan.
The more you can defend your theory, the more coherent your story will be. Theory can
serve as an excellent framing issue for the judge, especially as rounds become littered
with examples and competing claims that never get resolved. If the pro just asserts that
offensive military capabilities deter China and the con just asserts it causes unnecessary
escalation, then it becomes very difficult to compare these contradictory but plausible
claims. Having a theory that can give shape to these claims (and being able to defend
that theory) should help immensely.

¹⁰³https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/12/21/north‑korea‑kim‑jong‑un‑doctrine‑decade‑10‑years/
¹⁰⁴https://doi.org/10.1080/00396338.2019.1568048
¹⁰⁵https://www.vox.com/world/2017/5/9/15516278/north‑korea‑more‑rational‑than‑you‑think
¹⁰⁶https://www.bbc.com/news/world‑asia‑39269783
¹⁰⁷https://www.wsj.com/articles/why‑the‑u‑s‑considers‑north‑koreas‑kim‑a‑rational‑actor‑1512497497
¹⁰⁸https://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/11/world/asia/north‑korea‑nuclear‑missile‑programs‑rational.html
¹⁰⁹https://www.nytimes.com/2022/03/04/world/asia/north‑korea‑missile‑launch.html
¹¹⁰https://www.bbc.com/news/world‑asia‑41174689
¹¹¹https://www.nytimes.com/2022/01/25/world/asia/north‑korea‑launches‑missiles‑kim.html

36
 2 Topic Analysis by Lawrence Zhou

2.3.2 Analysis of Domestic Factors

One potential weakness of theories of IR is that they are what we might call shallow
because they primarily focus on the interaction between states instead of the interaction
within states. Post‑Cold War scholarship has begun to focus on the characteristics of
states themselves, governmental organizations, and individual leaders. These theories
of domestic politics should be thought of complements to other paradigms of interna‑
tional relations rather than as a holistic and rival approach for analysis of the interna‑
tional system since they emphasize that states should not be thought of as unitary actors,
but do not have much to say about the way that the international system itself shapes
the interactions of states.¹¹² The problem of overarching systematic approaches, e.g.,
liberalism or realism, is that they might miss the “fine‑grained” power struggles that
take place within the confines of domestic politics that have a great impact on the way
that foreign policy is conducted. Research on the effect of domestic factors focuses on
concepts such as audience costs and disputes, the importance of domestic cultures and
attitudes, and a nation’s economic structure,¹¹³ and how those impact foreign policy
decision‑making.

I personally think it is difficult to really understand the significance of changes to Article

9 in East Asia without really examining the domestic factors that shape the decisions of
various actors at play in the region. Whereas America is a relatively new nation, many
powers in Asia have been around for centuries and ignoring the role of their history
and culture in shaping their contemporary foreign policy would be a grave mistake. It
would be akin to trying to look at the propensity for the US to engage in armed conflict
without looking at who was the current president at the time.

We should first start with Japan. We’ve already discussed much of Japan’s pacifist cul‑
ture and its history. There are two other concerns that we should briefly discuss. The
first is Japan’s rising nationalism. Johnny Harris, formerly a journalist at Vox, has an
older video about rising right‑wing nationalism in Japan that I think is worth a watch.¹¹⁴
As mentioned earlier, it is mostly the nationalists who want to rearm Japan and restore
Japan to what might be called a “normal” country with the conventional military ca‑
pabilities of other nations.¹¹⁵ However, there are conflicting accounts as to whether

¹¹²https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev‑polisci‑070209‑174835
¹¹³https://doi.org/204819
¹¹⁴https://youtu.be/IHJsoCAREsg
¹¹⁵https://www.prospectmagazine.co.uk/magazine/japans‑quiet‑rearmament‑shinzo‑abe

37
 2 Topic Analysis by Lawrence Zhou

Japanese nationalism is truly on the rise.¹¹⁶ Understanding the internal disputes be‑
tween the various factions of Japanese people who oppose or support amending Article
9 will help with figuring out precisely what arguments each side can advance. Second,
Japan has historically been an imperialist power with grand ambitions of conquering
territory and subjugating people. Yet today, Japan is a mostly pacifist country and most
people still oppose revising Article 9.¹¹⁷ These internal dynamics also shape the type of
arguments that each side deploys.

Next, we should look at Xi Jinping and China. Does the recent Chinese‑Russian conver‑
gence signal anything particularly dangerous?¹¹⁸ Does China have ambitions to remark
the international system?¹¹⁹ Is China likely to invade Taiwan?¹²⁰ Is a war with China
likely?¹²¹ What motivates Xi Jinping¹²² and the Chinese Communist Party?¹²³ Is China
even a rising power anymore or is it now a declining power?¹²⁴ These are all questions
that shape the decision‑making process of Japanese leaders, who are justifiably wary of
an increasingly assertive China in the region. Understanding the possible answers to
these questions will help give depth to your arguments.

Now we should briefly examine Kim Jong Un and North Korea. This PolyMatter video
on why North Korea is basically sanction proof should give a good idea of why North
Korea acts the way it does.¹²⁵ Tensions between the two countries are at an all‑time high,
with ballistic missile tests near the Sea of Japan prompting worry from Japanese policy‑
makers.¹²⁶ We’ve already briefly discussed why North Korea is likely to continue push‑
ing the line with Japan (because it perceives it as necessary to prevent regime change),
but understanding these motivations is important to understanding why North Korea
might ever choose to attack Japan and why Japan feels the need to arm itself against
North Korea.

Finally, we should talk a little about Russia and Vladimir Putin. There are so many
recent think pieces out about Putin and his recent state of mind. While I think that

¹¹⁶https://doi.org/10.1017/jea.2021.20
¹¹⁷https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2019/04/11/national/politics‑diplomacy/poll‑shows‑54‑oppose‑revision‑japans‑pacifist‑con
¹¹⁸https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2022‑02‑25/eurasian‑nightmare
¹¹⁹https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2021‑12‑09/xi‑jinpings‑new‑world‑order
¹²⁰https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2022‑02‑01/taiwan‑cant‑wait
¹²¹https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2021‑12‑16/washington‑preparing‑wrong‑war‑china
¹²²https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2021‑12‑08/decoding‑xi‑jinping
¹²³https://www.foreignaffairs.com/reviews/capsule‑review/2021‑12‑14/rethinking‑chinese‑politics
¹²⁴https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/09/24/china‑great‑power‑united‑states/
¹²⁵https://youtu.be/AuoqBGrQvyI
¹²⁶https://thediplomat.com/2022/01/japans‑north‑korea‑missile‑woes/

38
 2 Topic Analysis by Lawrence Zhou

Russia is unlikely to directly attack Japan anytime soon, they still represent a threat
to Japan. I think this video by Johnny Harris,¹²⁷ this FRONTLINE documentary about
Putin,¹²⁸ and this video by RealLifeLore¹²⁹ are the three that I would watch if I wanted to
get a better idea of why Putin is currently invading Ukraine, going through the history
of the Soviet Union and Putin’s relationship to it. Many recent pieces about Putin’s
current state of mind as being shaped by the pandemic,¹³⁰ information isolation,¹³¹ and
his power¹³² should provide any reader with a troubling view of the dictator.¹³³ Finally,
recent analysis of Putin reveals he is increasingly willing to gamble and deploy force
than once previously thought.¹³⁴ Understanding Putin’s motivations should help any
debater get a better sense of the relationship between Japan and Russia, including the
Kuril Islands dispute.¹³⁵

2.4 Conclusion

As I was chatting with VBI’s Director of Public Forum Debate Devon Weis, we remarked
on how we diverged on our assessment of the topic. We both agreed that the affirmative
was much more limited in the arguments it could make (the affirmative position is basi‑
cally, “The world is scary, we need more guns”), and the negative had a huge advantage
in terms of the quality, quantity, and diversity of literature (the negative can talk about
how revisions to Article 9 could prompt South Korea to proliferate, send shockwaves
throughout the region as old war wounds get reignited,¹³⁶ violate principled defenses of
pacifism,¹³⁷ or hurt civil‑military relations¹³⁸ among other arguments). However, where
we diverged was in our assessment of the quality of the topic. While Devon likes topics
with a broad array of arguments that promote creativity, I prefer topics that encourage
deep research over a few key arguments. This topic is the latter. It is a topic with only a
few core arguments on both sides, but understanding those arguments requires a lot of
¹²⁷https://youtu.be/FQ4hvLqNfqo
¹²⁸https://youtu.be/NIgqhU4lkgo
¹²⁹https://youtu.be/If61baWF4GE
¹³⁰https://www.nytimes.com/2022/03/05/world/putin‑pandemic‑mindset.html
¹³¹https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/russian‑federation/2022‑02‑04/bully‑bubble
¹³²https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2022‑03‑03/will‑putin‑lose‑russia
¹³³https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/russian‑federation/2022‑03‑02/beginning‑end‑putin
¹³⁴https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/ukraine/2022‑03‑10/putin‑gambler
¹³⁵https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the‑interpreter/why‑russia‑will‑not‑return‑kuril‑islands‑japan
¹³⁶http://isdp.eu/publication/amending‑japans‑pacifist‑constitution/
¹³⁷https://www.japanesestudies.org.uk/ejcjs/vol13/iss1/akimoto.html
¹³⁸https://warontherocks.com/2018/03/revising‑japans‑peace‑constitution‑much‑ado‑about‑nothing/

39
 2 Topic Analysis by Lawrence Zhou

reading to truly understand. This is, after all, a topic that brilliant scholars and policy‑
makers dedicate significant portions of their careers studying. There is so much history,
nuance, and context to be learned on this topic, all of which helps shape the way you
approach this topic and the arguments on it. I personally enjoy the research aspect of
the debate and I very much enjoyed the process of reading through the hundred plus
articles and books to learn more about an issue that is often overlooked in international
relations. That’s, of course, just my opinion. Whether you prefer topics that reward
ingenuity and creativity or topics that reward deep research is ultimately a personal
preference—what I can say is that success on this topic will almost certainly come from
dedicated research on the issue.

I have concluded many of these topic analysis essays with a plea to stick with literature‑
based arguments. I repeat this here. Please, let the evidence drive the position. There
is so much good literature on this topic and I’m incredibly jealous that PF gets this topic.
Even at camp, there was a strong tendency to try and cobble together some story and
then find evidence for it later. That is, to me, fundamentally inconsistent with the pur‑
pose of debate as a research‑based activity. It should always be the case that the evi‑
dence drives the argument, not the other way around.

Pedagogically, I find such practices very concerning—what type of educational activity

actively encourages students to run away from the prior literature and to take evidence
and twist it in a way inconsistent with the author’s intent?

Strategically, I find such strategies work well in throwing off weaker opponents but
rarely achieve consistent success against even moderately prepared teams or any team
capable of thinking on their feet. Positions that lack deep literature supporting it are
usually quite susceptible to obvious logical pushes on the link chain and if the opposing
team can find even a single piece of evidence to the contrary, they will probably win
since some evidence is usually better than no evidence.

Either way, this topic is fantastically deep and will reward debaters that tackle the nu‑
ances of the topic. Good luck!

40
3 Topic Analysis by Ben Kirsch

Ben Kirsch served as captain of and debated at Hackley in New York for four years.
He qualified to the Tournament of Champions twice, amassed seven bids, and was
ranked third in the country senior year. He won Apple Valley and Byram Hills,
semifinaled Blake and UK, and reached late outrounds at many others. He also has
experience coaching, working with local summer camps throughout high school. He
was an instructor at VBI this past summer.

3.1 Intro

The topic continues the trend of the last few years with the April topic focusing on
international relations. Like all international relations topics, most of the impacts are
going to center around war and the international economy. There are a wide variety of
arguments that can be read on this topic, and the teams that look deep in the literature
for unique arguments are going to be more successful.

It is interesting that instead of being from the perspective of the United States, we are
asked to debate a different country in a different environment. The teams that under‑
stand the geopolitical nuances of the various conflicts Japan is involved in will be set up
for success. And, learning about the current Japanese government and its structure is
probably a good idea.

Another thing to consider about the topic is that it is not focused on the construction
of actual military capabilities; it only focuses on the revision of the constitution. There
could be debate on whether the topic is asking if Japan should revise its constitution for
the purpose of building weapons, or if it is revising the constitution to allow it to build
weapons. We don’t know for sure whether the resolution implies that Japan actually
will build the weapons, but it seems fair to reason that if Japan had the option they
would.

41
 3 Topic Analysis by Ben Kirsch

In terms of tournaments, April contains a number of state championship tournaments

and the TOC. TOC for one is a more technical tournament, which is why many of the
arguments read on the April topic tend to lean more flow. Like always, the teams that
can effectively debate both lay and flow will go farthest in TOC and at whatever other
tournaments they go to.

3.1.1 Japan’s Military

As the topic suggests, Article 9 of the constitution does not permit Japan to construct
any offensive military capabilities. They don’t have any ballistic missiles, or any tech‑
nology that would aid in the attack of another country. However, there is obviously
not a clear divide between what capabilities are offensive and what capabilities are de‑
fensive, and more often than not, when in doubt, Japan has decided to push the line
on what defensive actually means. During the Iraq War, Japan sent a small number of
troops to Iraq, but other than that, the current Japanese government has never actually
fought another country. Japan is ranked as having one of the five strongest militaries in
the world, behind only the United States, Russia, India, and China. It’s not exactly clear
how Japan could have a military this size that doesn’t have any offensive capabilities,
but certainly, no matter what, every country understands that Japan does have a strong
military.

What all of this means is many of the links are going to be perceptual. Japan is sending a
signal when they make this change, and there is a ton of room for argumentation about
how different actors would respond to this.

3.2 Pro Arguments

3.2.1 Deterrence

Japan may have a strong military, but they do not have a strong deterrent as a result
of Article 9. The Article itself renounces the possibility of all war, making most of their
threats not credible, and it does not have the ability to impose costs on anyone who
would consider attacking them. A defensive force might raise the cost of an attack, but
Japan would not be able to attack back. Thus, they struggle to deter other nations.

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 3 Topic Analysis by Ben Kirsch

This can be shown in the standoff over the Senkaku islands. China bought the islands
from private citizens, which obviously doesn’t make any sense, and after that has sur‑
rounded the islands with warships. They are attempting to force Japan into conceding
that there is disputed territory, setting the stage for China to later control the islands
fully. China is able to do this because Japan has no way to functionally deter China.
Given that Chinese forces are currently surrounding the islands, there is no way with
their current constitution to attack those Chinese ships. Not only would that be starting
a war, which the constitution renounces, but it also would require offensive military
capabilities, which they do not have.

In this case, if Japan were to revise Article 9 and build offensive capabilities, China
would not be able to control the territory with the same impunity. Not only would this
allow Japan to enforce its territorial integrity, but Japan would also be able to reduce
tensions in the region.

This dynamic is not limited to just China. There are lots of other countries that Japan has
engaged in various conflicts with, like Russia and North Korea. And even if the dispute
isn’t today, there will certainly eventually be another time where Japan is forced to deter
other nations.

This is the real, public reason why former Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe pushed
strongly for this revision. He didn’t succeed, but this argument is the real world reason
why Japan has considered doing this.

The main response to this argument is going to be that there is already a strong deterrent
capability in the United States. There are a few problems with this though. Primarily,
the United States has become increasingly wary of defending international allies given
the unpopularity of military actions domestically. And, the United States, despite hav‑
ing troops in the region, is very unlikely to support Japan if it means starting a full scale
war with China. There is a reason why China has been so aggressive towards Japan
recently, and they don’t see any threat to them as credible.

The impacts of this are important. Japan has considered, and eventually probably will,
put naval forces near the Senkaku islands. This creates a situation that is ripe for miscal‑
culation. The hope would be that if Japan is successfully able to deter China and force
them to leave, that situation wouldn’t occur. A war between China and Japan would be
pretty catastrophic, and probably become a nuclear war between China and the US.

But even if you don’t want to run a war argument, the more likely impact is tensions.
Tensions is a really strategic impact to read because it’s vague, and therefore flexible.

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 3 Topic Analysis by Ben Kirsch

Tensions can impact the probability of war, but it can also impact lots of other things
like the economy and trade. Also, you can probably think of a reason why tensions link
into whatever your opponents are running, giving you multiple paths to the ballot.

3.2.2 Clear Intentions

Japan might very well be following their constitution, but it’s hard to imagine other
countries like Russia and China believe them. And while publicly they aren’t prolif‑
erating, who’s to say they aren’t doing so behind the scenes? Israel, for example, was
privately proliferating for years even though they publicly never did.

The problem with this is that differences in information lead to miscalculations. If coun‑
tries are skeptical over what type of military capabilities Japan actually possesses that
could increase tensions and possibly lead to an accidental war that nobody wants. Addi‑
tionally, if Japan can provide information to the international community, it can create
trust between them and their enemies. Right now, because of their constitutional obli‑
gations, if the military or the government ever elected to build any necessary offensive
equipment, it would have to be secret. And, there is always a risk that another coun‑
try will decide to carry out a preemptive strike, believing that Japan is proliferating in
secret.

If a team reads this argument, it is important to argue Japan will inevitably decide to
build a nuclear weapon, or at least certain offensive capabilities. The overall narrative,
though, is just that being trustworthy reduces tensions, and Japan being open about
what military technologies they possess will be good for the world.

3.2.3 The US Alliance

The most significant element of Japan’s security arrangement is their alliance with the
United States, which is almost as unconditional as their commitments to NATO. In any
potential conflict, the United States would support Japan, and in return Japan allows the
US to have military bases, most notably at Okinawa, in the country. This arrangement
is interesting given Japan’s aversion to any offensive weapons, because it ensures that
the United States is carrying the brunt of the security spending of the two countries.
Former president Donald Trump even cited this as the reason he thought we should
stop helping them.

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 3 Topic Analysis by Ben Kirsch

As the United States becomes generally more nationalist and isolationist, Japan’s se‑
curity arrangement will become more tenuous. When you affirm though, you send a
signal that Japan is more willing to take care of its own security. That could in turn make
policymakers in the United States more willing to continue spending to keep Japan safe,
knowing that Japan is not just freeloading along.

The impacts of the US alliance are numerous. Firstly, teams can run hegemony argu‑
ments and impact it out to either the economy or conflict with China. If the US loses a
major geopolitical ally in the region of their main competition, it would be damaging
to their ability to project power abroad. As China rises and challenges the global order,
having a strong US presence in all parts of the globe is essential to maintain global peace
and the systems of globalization. Secondly, teams can run arguments related to the se‑
curity of the other countries in the region, because a China that is no longer scared of US
presence in the East China Sea is likely to be more aggressive. And finally, teams can
run economy based arguments because if the US is no longer involved in Japan, there
will be more political uncertainty that will damage trade flows and general economic
growth.

The fundamental issue with this argument is that it’s not entirely clear that in the status
quo, the situation is trending towards the alliance breaking up. However, if a team
proves that the alliance is becoming more tenuous, that is still likely enough to generate
some level of offense.

3.3 Neg Arguments

3.3.1 Proliferation

A key tenet of Japan’s Article 9 is its ban on nuclear weapons. Nuclear weapons are,
obviously, an offensive weapon, so despite some internal pressure over the years, Japan
has never seriously considered constructing a nuclear weapon. Although it still may
be unlikely Japan would take this measure given the events of World War II, if they no
longer had an explicit ban on proliferation it is reasonable to suspect they might consider
it. Importantly, if any country has the capacity to proliferate, Japan does, and it is likely
they could do so quickly. All of Japan’s regional enemies (North Korea, Russia, China)
have nuclear weapons.

Like any proliferation argument, there are going to be a number of responses that teams

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will have to frontline. In 1976, Japan joined the nonproliferation treaty, which legally
binds them not to proliferate.¹ It is unlikely they would decide to internationally isolate
themselves, and the United States still offers them a security umbrella. However, de‑
spite all of this, as the security environment around them deteriorates, China continues
to rise, and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine continues, it is possible Japan could consider
the security risk too great to not decide to proliferate itself. And, the United States in‑
ternational reputation may decline further if Russia ends up successfully replacing the
Ukrainian government.

The impacts of proliferation are the same as always. Proliferation happens in cascades:
once one country does it all of the countries around them feel like they have to as well.
In this case, most of Japan’s regional enemies already have nuclear weapons, but there
are still smaller nations who might feel like they have to as well. Nuclear terrorism
is a constant risk as well, and new nuclear states often don’t have sufficient defense
mechanisms to keep terrorists away.

3.3.2 Security Dilemma

The rise of China and their wide claims of sovereignty over Japan’s backyard is a serious
security threat to Japan. It is inconceivable that China would ever decide to invade
Japan, but there are undoubtedly conflict flashpoints throughout the area. The Senkaku
Islands in particular are a point of tension.² And, it is worth mentioning that many
in China still harbor anti‑Japan sentiments from the various war crimes the Japanese
committed in WW2. 81% of Chinese people have an “unfavorable” view of Japan.³

Meanwhile, Japan and Russia are still quarreling over a border issue that has not been
resolved since World War II.⁴ And, despite 75 years of attempting reconciliation, they
have not ever signed a formal peace treaty and recently personally sanctioned Russian
President Vladimir Putin. Japan also has very unfriendly relations with North Korea,
and are diplomatically completely isolated from one another.⁵

It is very unlikely that in the status quo, any of these countries will go to war with Japan.
However, there is a possibility that if Japan decides to start building up its military, it
could start a conflict with any one of these countries.
¹https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog‑post/japan‑and‑creation‑npt‑regime
²https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog‑post/japan‑and‑creation‑npt‑regime
³https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2016/09/13/hostile‑neighbors‑china‑vs‑japan/
⁴https://www.tokyoreview.net/2022/02/putins‑invasion‑is‑a‑turning‑point‑in‑japans‑relations‑with‑russia/
⁵https://www.ncnk.org/resources/briefing‑papers/all‑briefing‑papers/overview‑north‑korea‑japan‑relations

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A security dilemma is when an action taken by one state to ensure its own security is in‑
terpreted by another state as a threatening, offensive action. A common example of the
security dilemma is the Cold War–neither the US nor the USSR aimed to be aggressive
/ invade the other, but because they each were afraid of what the other might do, they
built up weapons for deterrence. But both sides interpreted trying to achieve deterrence
as planning to attack the other country.

If Japan were to start building up their offensive military capabilities as they are threat‑
ened by numerous other countries in their region, it probably would not take them to
war now, but it would certainly inflame tensions with all of the countries in their neigh‑
borhood. It could increase the risk of miscalculation with China in the Senkaku Islands.
It could make Russia unwilling to engage in dialogue, and it could make North Korea
decide to lash out towards Japan or South Korea. All of these countries would probably
in turn build up their own military forces near the East China Sea and that could set off
an arms race that makes the region more insecure.

Any war that involves Japan would draw in the United States. The US has a significant
force in Japan, South Korea, and many of the other countries in the region, and does not
like Russia or China. That could spill over into a World War, or potentially, a nuclear
war.

3.3.3 General Military Bad

There are reasons why, outside of the international consequences of offensive military
capabilities, Japan would be worse off.

In a world where Article 9 of the constitution is abolished, Japan would quickly spend
a large percentage of their budget on the military. It would need to establish a large
amount of military capabilities and train a large number of soldiers. Military spending
is generally not good for the economy, and trades off with social spending. If a country
spends more of their budget on the military and less on the people, that can have dev‑
astating effects on the economy. And, large amounts of military spending leads to cuts
to healthcare, food programs, and international assistance.

The impacts of this are not likely to be terribly large, but if a team is comfortable going
with defensive arguments on the international relations ideas, it is possible to win with
a small amount of offense based on poverty in Japan.

In addition, military technology and construction tends to have severe effects on the

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environment and the climate. Militaries tend to not be focused on using green or sus‑
tainable technology, and a lot of carbon emissions occur when governments build more
and use more military technology.

3.4 A Word on Extinction

The last few go‑arounds of an international relations topic for TOC have involved lots
of extinction arguments, and a lot of extinction framing. This is not necessarily a bad
thing–but teams have been far too willing to concede into this framework in rounds on
past topics. There are numerous reasons to prefer more probable impacts, so I figured
I’d include some here.

First, saying that our entire lives are a probability times magnitude calculation is just
wrong. We all drive in cars, which provides us relatively minimal benefit, but puts us
at substantial risk of death, which is sort of a personal infinite impact. For ourselves,
life isn’t worth living if we do everything in our power to make sure we don’t die, and
the exact same thing applies on a societal level–if society just seeks to preserve itself,
there is very little benefit society can provide. Second, the logic of the argument is self
defeating. If extinction is truly an infinite impact, then any probability of it provides us
with infinite risk. And on that level, if there is a nonzero chance of voting the opposite
way causes extinction, that is an infinite impact too. And third, it’s unethical to think
that way. People who are facing starvation and poverty don’t care that the world is
ending–they need food now. As policymakers, are we really willing to go up to poor
people and tell them, “sorry, we don’t care that you need food because there’s a 1%
chance Russia nukes Japan if we don’t.” Personally, I don’t think so, and I think a lot of
judges will be persuaded by that argument as well.

3.5 Conclusion

Overall, this topic promises to be one of the more interesting topics we’ve had this year,
and it will be really interesting to see how the topic progresses as the month goes on.

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4 Topic Analysis by Laurenn Vives

Laurenn Vives is an undergraduate student at Boston University studying

political science and philosophy. She competed in public forum debate for 3
years in high school, where she earned 5 career bids and was ranked nation‑
ally. This is her 4th year coach‑ ing high school and middle school debaters.

Japan is an island nation located in East Asia with a rich culture and history. Japan’s
neighboring countries are South Korea, North Korea, Russia, and China. Japan’s geo‑
graphical location is extremely relevant to global international relations, both currently
and historically. In this topic analysis, I will first go over key moments in history that
shaped the current Japanese constitution, then I will go over the current state of Japanese
international relations, and then finally go over arguments for both sides of the debate.

4.1 Background Information

A strong understanding of the history of the 19th century is crucial to effectively debat‑
ing this topic. The League of Nations was an international organization founded after
World War 1 with the intention of keeping peace and preventing large‑scale war from
ever breaking out again. The League encouraged diplomacy and economic negotiation
as a means of solving international conflicts, as opposed to violence or weapons inno‑
vation. The League was dependent on the individual national governments that made
it up in enforcing its procedures, as it did not have a central authority of its own. While
the League worked hard and temporarily succeeded in creating peace, it was unfortu‑
nately unable to prevent armed conflict in the 1930s by the Axis powers; Germany, Italy,
and Japan. This was primarily due to the fact that the League was entirely reliant on
the individual countries’ economies and armies to enforce any of the League’s policies.
The lesson learned in this international peace attempt was that in order to actually create
an effective international peace organization, there needs to be commitments made by
each individual national government to disarm and avoid violent conflict. The goals of

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each autonomous national government need to be in line with the goals of the collective
international peace organization.

This lesson partially motivated the development of Article 9 in the Japanese constitu‑
tion. After World War 2, the Japanese public was absolutely traumatized by war. A
new constitution, negating the Japanese government’s ability to start any wars, was
popular with the grieving public. There is some dispute however on who’s idea the
article actually was; whether it was an idea planted by the United States, the country
that occupied Japan after World War 2, or if it was the idea of Japanese politicians. The
translated text of Article 9 is as follows:

“Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the

Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and
the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes. In order
to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces,
as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of bel‑
ligerency of the state will not be recognized.”¹

The authorship of this article is formally given to former Prime Minister Kijuro Shide‑
hara, who claims he came up with the idea on a train ride to Tokyo after thinking
through how to truly gain the respect of the Japanese people in the post‑war era. How‑
ever, there is suspicion that U.S. officials, Douglas MacArthur and Charles Kades, were
the ones who actually came up with the idea and introduced it, perhaps in order to cre‑
ate Japanese dependency on the United States as a military ally. Regardless of whose
idea it really was, Article 9 was signed under supervision by Douglas MacArthur (the
Supreme Commander of the Allied Forces, at the time) as a means of surrendering after
World War 2.

One important thing to note is that Article 9 as it exists today only prohibits the Japanese
government from offensive strikes, but does not prevent the government from building
up defense capabilities. The Japanese Self‑Defense Force has a 50 billion dollar budget
and actively develops weapons for self‑defense. This force was founded in 1954. During
the 8 year period after Article 9 was enacted and the Self‑Defense force was founded,
Japanese domestic politics changed dramatically. Cold War tensions escalated, forcing
United States occupational forces to move to fight in the Korean War in the early 1950s,
leaving Japan defenseless. It was during this period that the Japanese police force ex‑
panded, and eventually grew into the Self‑Defense Force. The Japanese Self‑Defense

¹Japanese Constitution. Japan 1946. https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Japan_1946

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Force works hand in hand with United States forces in the region to defend Japan from
any potential attacks. In January 1960, the deal between the JSDF and the United States
military was altered to give Japan more autonomy over its own defense, prohibiting the
United States from intervening in any domestic, internal conflicts within Japan, and forc‑
ing the U.S. to notify the Japanese government before mobilizing any troops stationed
in the region.

Japan’s military philosophy on nuclear weapons is at the core of their commitment to

peace. Japan is committed to the Treaty of Non‑Proliferation, promising to never “de‑
velop, use, or allow the transportation of nuclear weapons through its territory.” How‑
ever, because of Japan’s sheer amount of functioning nuclear power plants and high
technology, Japan does have the capabilities to proliferate nuclear weapons in under a
year’s time if the political climate changes significantly.

In the early 2000s, JSDF capabilities became broader and broader through altered leg‑
islation. In October 2001, right after 9/11, the Anti‑Terrorism Special Measures Law
allowed Japan to intervene in anti‑terrorism efforts. In 2007, JSDF’s capabilities abroad
were elevated from ”miscellaneous regulations” to ”basic duties.” In 2015, the National
Diet (the name for the legislative governing body in Japan) enacted the 2015 Japanese
military legislation, a law that allows Japan’s Self‑Defense Forces to defend their allies
in combat.The JSDF could now provide weapons to allies engaged in combat overseas,
and defend weapons platforms belonging to Japan’s allies. The justification for these
laws as still being for the sake of “Self‑Defense” was that not defending or coming to
the aid of an ally under attack weakens alliances and endangers Japan.

4.2 Current State of Affairs

Japan’s greatest international ally is the United States. Since World War 2, Japan and
the U.S. have made peace and regained trust with each other. After the United States
dropped atomic bombs on Japan, one might assume those foreign relations would suffer
for centuries. However, thanks to the U.S. strong, persistent presence in the region and
their incredibly successful diplomatic efforts, Japan and the U.S. have united while still
respecting each other’s autonomy as national countries. Additionally, China and South
Korea continue to harbor political resentment towards Japan’s behavior in World War 2.
These cultural wounds still have not healed, even in the midst of increasing economic
ties to neighboring east Asian countries.

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 4 Topic Analysis by Laurenn Vives

Japan and Russia dispute which country has the lawful ownership of the islands called
the Northern Territories that the U.S.S.R seized during World War 2. Both countries still
have oil ties with each other. However, Japan, like the United States, gets most of its oil
from the Middle East.

Most currently, after the invasion of Ukraine by Putin in February 2022, Japan has joined
Western nations in politically condemning Russia and enacting strict economic sanc‑
tions against Russia. Japan’s proximity to Russia makes it an ideal entry point (though,
on the opposite side of the continent from Ukraine) for the United States in the case that
their troops need one. This invasion of Ukraine comes at a time when Japan is already
debating amending their constitution, and might potentially create the most popular
support since World War 2 for increasing the Japanese military’s offensive capabilities.
The Council on Foreign Relations writes recently,

“Russia’s invasion will accelerate Japan’s ongoing strategic review. Tokyo

will be debating its own defense readiness this year, including the option
of adding offensive strike capabilities to its arsenal, and will now take more
of its cues from Europe when it comes to its military investments. German
Chancellor Olaf Scholtz’s announcement of increased defense spending to
2% of GDP will be music to the ears of those in Tokyo who similarly aspire
to dedicate a larger share of national income to their military. Germany’s
decision likely makes the politics of this ambition more palatable in Japan.”²

Shinzo Abe, the former prime minister of Japan who just stepped down in 2021, was very
invested throughout his prime ministership in strengthening the Japan‑U.S. alliance. In‑
terestingly, he was also interested in expanding Japanese military powers and amend‑
ing article 9 to allow for “the exercise of the right of self‑defense”, an amendment that
would allow the Japanese government to commit acts of war so long as they could jus‑
tify it as self‑defense. In the following paragraphs, I will outline a couple key arguments
that explain why Japanese politicians believe that amending article 9 to develop offen‑
sive capabilities might be a good idea, and what beneficial impacts that might have on
Japanese international relations and the rest of the world.

²Smith. March 2022. Council on Foreign Relations. “Tokyo Condemns Putin’s War, Aids Ukraine.”
https://www.cfr.org/blog/tokyo‑condemns‑putins‑war‑aids‑ukraine

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4.3 Affirmative Arguments

The Affirmative side of this debate will have to consider a couple different ways of fram‑
ing the round. First, the Affirmative has to choose which impacts are going to be the
most important when it comes to revising Japan’s constitution. Will it be domestic im‑
pacts within Japan? Or should the priority be impacts that contribute to international
peace? Or perhaps the most important impacts are related to maintaining U.S. hege‑
mony…these are all considerations for the Affirmative, and depending on what you
think is most important, you can make different arguments.

Prime Minister Shinzo Abe wanted to increase Japan’s military autonomy, while also
strengthening the allyship between the U.S. and Japan. Shinzo Abe wanted the alliance
to be mutually beneficial instead of one country depending on the other. The first big
argument to make on the Pro would be related to Japanese national autonomy. The
warrant for an increase in national autonomy is that with the allowance of offensive
capabilities, Japan no longer has to cling to stronger militaries of other countries to fur‑
ther their national interests. Japan’s military autonomy would lead to more cultural
and regional autonomy. Japan would no longer rely on the United States so heavily,
and would therefore have to develop a stronger independent national identity of their
own. This strong national identity could lead to unity in the Japanese public, and more
successful domestic affairs. Interesting, according to polls done in 2016, a larger portion
of the Japanese public supports ameliorating article 9. The most common reason is “to
ensure Japan can maintain the capability required for its self‑defense.” When the public
of a country feels safer and like they can trust their government to protect them, espe‑
cially in a democracy, individuals in the public have a stronger loyalty to their country
and less anxiety in their daily lives, as well as less polarizing domestic politics.

Japanese Public supports Amending Article 9

August 2016. Nippon.com. The Article 9 Debate At A Glance, https://www.nippon.com/en/features/h00146/

Within the ideologically diverse Democratic Party, a substantial number of

politicians favor amendment of Article 9 to explicitly delineate the scope of
Japan’s right of self‑defense. However, the party has denounced as unconsti‑
tutional the recently enacted security legislation (which sanctions collective
self‑defense), and has said that it will oppose any attempt by the current gov‑
ernment to amend the Constitution.The Japanese Communist Party firmly

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defends Article 9 and holds that Japan should ultimately aim for the SDF’s
dissolution in keeping with that article’s provisions. A survey on attitudes
toward the Constitution (Kenpō ni kansuru ishiki chōsa) conducted by na‑
tional broadcaster NHK last April found relatively low support for amend‑
ment of Article 9. Only 22.1% of those surveyed answered that “amend‑
ment [of Article 9] is necessary,” while 39.2% responded that “amendment
is unnecessary.” Among those who affirmed the need to amend Article 9,
the reason most often selected was “the Constitution should state clearly that
Japan can maintain the capability required for its self‑defense” (55.1%), fol‑
lowed by “It should allow participation in UN‑backed military operations”
(22.6%). Among those who deemed amendment of Article 9 unnecessary,
the most frequent reason was “It is the most important provision of our
pacifist Constitution (65%), followed by”We can address issues by way of
constitutional interpretation without resorting to amendment” (15.0%), and
“It would open the door to the use of force overseas” (12.4%).(*1)

Another argument on the Pro side of the debate is in regards to increasing Japan’s abil‑
ity to respond to urgent violent conflicts. If Japan changed its constitution to allow
for offensive capabilities, Japan would not have to jump through as many hoops when
conflict arises. This flexibility is a strategic advantage, especially considering the cur‑
rent international relations of Japan’s neighboring countries. China is rising as a world
power, and is building islands in the South China Sea to extract resources. China is
also committing human rights abuses in the Xinjiang region, which could be an entire
argument of its own; if Japan had offensive capabilities, they would be able to intervene
in this conflict and potentially prevent a genocide. Russia, another neighbor of Japan’s,
is invading Ukraine and committing cyberwarfare against the United States. North Ko‑
rea is also particularly volatile, and has nuclear weapon capabilities. The impacts of a
more flexible national army would be responding to these conflicts faster and more ef‑
fectively, making Japan’s presence stronger in the region. Additionally, it would make
the United Nations as a whole stronger, because Japan would commit to helping in UN
backed missions against oppressive authoritarian governments.

The last strong warrant on the Pro side in my opinion would be that increasing offensive
capabilities would provide better support for Japan’s allies. Japan’s strongest allies in‑
clude the United States, South Korea, and the European countries in the EEC (European
Economic Community). With offensive capabilities, Japan could better protect its allies
and support their interests worldwide. This would not only have benefits for those

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individual countries, but potentially for the whole world as well. There are many ar‑
guments for why the entire world benefits from the U.S.’s hegemonic status, and Japan
is perhaps our strongest military ally. Having Japan entirely on our side, equipped
with all the capabilities they need for strategic military action, especially in the fight
for power against China, would be very helpful. The U.S. currently uses their bases in
Japan to keep an eye on and deter North Korea and China from committing injustices or
initiating violent conflict. If Japan were to increase it’s offensive capabilities, while still
maintaining a strong, mutually beneficial relationship with the U.S., this would deter
China and North Korea even more strongly.

4.4 Negative Arguments

The Negative side of this debate not only has to argue against war or initiating violence,
but also has to find a tangible political, economic, or social benefit that Article 9 brings
to Japan, and then argue why that benefit outweighs any Japanese involvement in inter‑
national conflict. After all, the United States has a lot of allies, as well as a lot of money
allocated to defense spending. Is Japan increasing their offensive capabilities really go‑
ing to make a huge difference in the U.S.’s hegemonic endeavors? The U.S. has a strong
working relationship with China, and an even stronger partnership with South Korea.
While Japan is certainly a valuable ally, there is perhaps no urgent need for them to
develop offensive capabilities, in a way that would not do more harm than good.

One of the first Negative arguments is that Japan increasing it’s offensive capabilities
could potentially provoke it’s neighbors, especially North Korea, China, South Korea,
or countries in Southeast Asia, and start an arms race. To this day, Japan still has a very
negative reputation from World War 2, and political resentment is still strongly against
Japan for committing atrocities and not taking enough accountability. While there is al‑
ready a global arms race, a sudden increase in offensive capabilities from Japan would
accelerate weapons innovation, military training exercises, missile testing, etc…which
could lead to conflict very quickly, if not intentionally then through potential miscalcu‑
lation. The following evidence focuses on explaining how North Korea, one of Japan’s
most hostile neighbors, might react to a sudden increase in offensive capabilities.

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 4 Topic Analysis by Laurenn Vives

North Korea is against Japan increasing offensive capabilities

Bosak. December 2021. The Japan Times. “How Japan‑North Korea relations changed
during Kim Jong Un” https://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2021/12/22/commentary/japan‑commentary/ja

Citing the existential threat that Pyongyang’s nuclear and missile technology pre‑
sented, the Japanese government supported sanctions monitoring and enforcement
and pursued the acquisition of capabilities meant to counter the North Korean threat.
When the “Fire and Fury” period transitioned to one of diplomatic rapprochement
and engagement, the Japanese government was left largely on the sidelines, forced
to inject its interests into diplomatic efforts with North Korea through the White
House. To that end, then‑Prime Minister Shinzo Abe was successful in ensuring that
the U.S. government mentioned the abduction issue in its dealings with the Kim regime,
though raising the matter did little to stir the North Koreans to action. Prospects for
direct Japan‑North Korea engagement grew dimmer over time. After the U.S.‑North
Korea summit failed to produce a deal in February 2019, there was still a slim hope for
back‑channel dealing between Tokyo and Pyongyang in a so‑called cash‑for‑abductee
information deal. But that changed in January 2020. That month, North Korea sealed
its borders to protect the country from COVID‑19, and for nearly two years, there have
been few signs of opening up for substantive diplomacy between government offi‑
cials. The pandemic has not helped matters. Not only has North Korea locked down
its borders and focused on domestic issues, Japan has been a consistent target of crit‑
icism in North Korean state media. Over the past two years, there has been a steady
drumbeat of anti‑Japanese sentiment in reporting from North Korea state media out‑
lets like the Korean Central News Agency and Rodong Sinmun. The reporting has
decried Japan’s colonial and wartime acts, denounced Japan’s plans to increase mili‑
tary spending and discussions on strike capabilities, and criticized the government’s
territorial claims.

Another argument on the Negative side of the debate is that decreased dependence on
the U.S. for military power might ultimately weaken the Japan‑U.S. alliance instead of
strengthening it, and potentially weaken democracy as a whole in the region as well.
While the U.S. seems to be pushing for Japan to increase its capabilities, in the long run,
it might create less interdependence between the two nations. This lack of dependence
on each other could lead to less U.S. presence in the region (because troops are no longer
needed), which might be against U.S. interests, as the U.S. gains a lot of military power
from their strong presence in East Asia.

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 4 Topic Analysis by Laurenn Vives

Additionally, some scholars argue that amending article 9 would be undemocratic, as

it is the most important part of Japan’s new constitution. The Japanese government
being prohibited from offensive military capabilities has created a smaller role of gov‑
ernment, allowing the public more freedom. The Japanese public is still grieving the
awful impacts of World War 2 to this day, especially in those locations affected by nu‑
clear weapons, and pacifism has become a part of cultural philosophy. The following
piece of evidence is the conclusion of a series of scholarly arguments about why amend‑
ing article 9 would be bad policymaking.

Amending article 9 weakens democracy

Richter 2016. Iowa Law Review. Japan’s “Reinterpretation” of Article 9: A Pyrrhic Victory
for American Foreign Policy? https://ilr.law.uiowa.edu/print/volume‑101‑issue‑3/japans‑reinterpretation‑of‑a

Historical analysis shows that while Article 9 was enacted under the tutelage of the
United States during its occupation of Japan, the United States has been actively pres‑
suring Japan to violate the principles of Article 9 ever since the start of the Cold War.
Abe’s recent campaign against the pacifist clause cannot be divorced from this history.
Considering the immense amount of influence the United States continues to wield
in the affairs of Japan, the United States undoubtedly played a large role in pressur‑
ing Abe to declare a right to engage in collective self‑defense. It is unclear whether
that pressure took the form of expressly encouraging Abe to circumnavigate Japan’s
constitution, or simply compelling Abe to make some kind of change. Regardless, the
outcome of Abe’s reinterpretation not only poses serious risks to America’s foreign
policy in East Asia, it also runs contrary to the basic tenets of democracy and consti‑
tutional law.

Given the central role that the United States played in the promulgation of Japan’s cur‑
rent constitution, it arguably possesses a special responsibility as an advocate for that
document’s sanctity. If the United States works to reduce regional tensions in Asia
and encourages Abe to adhere to Japan’s rule of law, it will have upheld the princi‑
ples of democracy it so often espouses and set the foundations for achieving a true
foreign policy victory in the region.

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 4 Topic Analysis by Laurenn Vives

4.5 Conclusion

In conclusion, the debate about article 9 taps into a wider philosophical debate about
what security actually is and what the government’s role is in a democracy. Is the se‑
curity that one’s government is responsible for just quietly innovating weapons until
directly provoked? Or does better security come from one’s government intervening in
any dangerous situations around the world that could negatively affect your country,
even if indirectly? Does the best form of security come from strengthening international
alliances and furthering the goals of international peace, or does the best form of security
come from setting boundaries and focusing exclusively on a domestic defense system in
the case of an emergency? While writing your cases, I encourage you to think about how
you want to answer these wider philosophical questions about what policies truly cre‑
ate the best forms of security, and what the role of government is in a well‑functioning
democracy.

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5 Definitions

5.1 OMC

5.1.1 General

General definition of offensive military capabilities

Davis 11

Carmel Davis (Franklin Fellow at the U.S. Department of State; Ph.D. UPenn). “Power,
Threat, or Military Capabilities: US Balancing in the Later Cold War, 1970‑1982.” Uni‑
versity Press of America (November 23, 2011). JDN. Google Books.

Balance of military capabilities fills these gaps by arguing that countries balance against
the stability of others to conquer or compel them. Offensive military capabilities are
what may enable one country to conquer another and, by threat of conquest or imposi‑
tion of intolerable costs, to compel another. Generation and maintenance of sufficient
military capability to defend with good prospects of success against conquest, or, more
broadly, to dissuade by imposing high costs, constitutes balancing behavior. The result
is an equilibrium between a country’s ability to defend and dissuade and the ability of
others to attack.

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 5 Definitions

5.1.2 Strategic, Not Tactical

Offense should be defined in terms of strategy, not tactics

Glaser and Kaufmann 98

Charles L. Glaser (professor of political science and international affairs at George

Washington University and director of the Elliott School’s Institute for Security
and Conflict Studies) and Chaim Kaufmann (Professor, Department of Interna‑
tional Relations, Lehigh University). “What is the offense‑defense balance and
can we measure it?” International Security Spring. 1998. v22 n4 p44(39). JDN.
https://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/abs/10.1162/isec.22.4.44

We argue that of the three levels of war recognized by most analysts ‑ strategic, op‑
erational, and tactical ‑ the offense‑defense balance should be defined at the strategic
level.(35) Offense‑defense theory addresses states’ decisions about whether to go to war
based on their judgments about whether war is likely to be successful. Consequently,
when we say ”take territory” we really mean ”take and hold territory against counter‑
attacks,” because seizing territory only to lose it thereafter would not seem worthwhile
to most attackers.(36) Thus the offense‑defense balance should be defined in terms of
final war outcomes, not the results of intermediate battles or campaigns.(37)

Mobility is offensive

Glaser and Kaufmann 98

Charles L. Glaser (professor of political science and international affairs at George

Washington University and director of the Elliott School’s Institute for Security
and Conflict Studies) and Chaim Kaufmann (Professor, Department of Interna‑
tional Relations, Lehigh University). “What is the offense‑defense balance and
can we measure it?” International Security Spring. 1998. v22 n4 p44(39). JDN.
https://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/abs/10.1162/isec.22.4.44

The most widely agreed proposition is that improvements in mobility favor offense.56
Only offense inherently requires mobility; a force that cannot move cannot attack, and
a defender that can hold its positions need not move. The critical issue, however, is
the relationship between the two stages of a successful offensive: the attacker must first
achieve a breakthrough by defeating or destroying a section of the defender’s front;
the attacker must then exploit this breakthrough to advance into the defender’s rear.57

60
 5 Definitions

Breakthrough is logically and temporally prior to exploitation, and substantively more

important because the issue of exploitation arises only if and when breakthrough suc‑
ceeds. Improvements in operational mobility (the ability to move, supply, and concen‑
trate forces for battle), such as the introduction of motor trucks, mobile bridging equip‑
ment, and long‑range combat aircraft, improve the attacker’s ability to outflank the de‑
fender or concentrate to assault the defender’s weakest points?’ Increases in tactical
mobility (the ability to move under fire and survive), such as the introduction of tanks,
reduce the attacker’s losses while assaulting defending positions.5~ Thus increases in
mobility make breakthroughs more likely and therefore generally favor offense. The im‑
plications of mobility for exploitation and counterexploitation operations are less clear,
because in this phase both sides may be maneuvering to concentrate or attack enemy
forces simultaneously. Within the exploitation stage, it is not clear whether the attacker
or defender is favored by increases in mobility. The likelihood of reaching this stage,
however, depends on the offense‑defense balance in the breakthrough stage, including
mobility. Thus, whenever achieving a successful breakthrough is difficult or uncertain,
mobility improvements will favor offense. Only when attack is so easy that a successful
breakthrough is virtually assured does the impact of mobility become indeterminate.
Nearly all historical advances in military mobility‑chariots, horse cavalry, tanks, motor
trucks, aircraft, mobile bridging equipment‑are generally considered to have favored
the offense, while major counter‑mobility innovations‑moats, barbed wire, tank traps,
land mines‑have favored defense. The effect of mobility improvements, however, does
depend on whether they are equally usable by attackers and defenders, which in turn
depends on their dependence on infrastructure. Railroads, which depend on elaborate
networks of infrastructure which can easily be destroyed by retreating defenders but
which cannot be extended quickly, are much more useful to forces operating in friendly
controlled territory than they are to advancing forces. Thus they favor defense in com‑
parison with motor trucks or helicopters, which require less infrastructure and so can
more easily operate at or near the spearhead of an advance.

Improving firepower is defense

Glaser and Kaufmann 98

Charles L. Glaser (professor of political science and international affairs at George

Washington University and director of the Elliott School’s Institute for Security
and Conflict Studies) and Chaim Kaufmann (Professor, Department of Interna‑

61
 5 Definitions

tional Relations, Lehigh University). “What is the offense‑defense balance and

can we measure it?” International Security Spring. 1998. v22 n4 p44(39). JDN.
https://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/abs/10.1162/isec.22.4.44

Improvements in firepower are generally considered to favor defense on essentially the

reverse of the logic that applies to mobility. In battle, attackers are usually more vul‑
nerable to fire than are defenders because they must advance, often in plain sight of
defenders, making them easy to detect and to hit, whereas defenders are often well
dug‑in and camouflaged. Firepower innovations usually considered to have favored de‑
fense include machine guns in World War I, infantry antitank weapons during World
War 11, and antitank guided missiles (ATGMs) and surface‑to‑air missiles today. At
the operational level, the need to concentrate forces to achieve local superiority means
attackers are often more vulnerable than defenders to area‑effect weapons such as ar‑
tillery and tactical nuclear weapons.60 As with mobility, there can be exceptions when
specific firepower innovations are differentially useful against defenders, such as heavy
siege artillery before World War 11, whose main use was against fixed fortifications, or
today’s antiradiation missiles, whose function is to attack air defenses.”

Counter‑offense isn’t offense

Glaser and Kaufmann 98

Charles L. Glaser (professor of political science and international affairs at George

Washington University and director of the Elliott School’s Institute for Security
and Conflict Studies) and Chaim Kaufmann (Professor, Department of Interna‑
tional Relations, Lehigh University). “What is the offense‑defense balance and
can we measure it?” International Security Spring. 1998. v22 n4 p44(39). JDN.
https://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/abs/10.1162/isec.22.4.44

Since the offense‑defense balance is defined at the level of whole wars, but many of
the factors that influence it have their direct impact only at the tactical or operational
levels, measuring the offense‑defense balance requires integrating effects across the tac‑
tical, operational, and strategic levels. This integration problem breaks down into two
parts: direction and magnitude. Assessing the direction of effect is normally straight‑
forward: a change that shifts the balance in a given direction at one level will usually
also shift it in the same direction at all higher levels. Since any strategic offensive neces‑
sarily requires offensive operations, and offensive operations require offensive tactical
battles, a change that makes tactical offense harder will usually also make operational

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offense harder, which in turn makes strategic offense more diffiCUlt.88 Some analysts
contest this point, arguing that, because defenders need counteroffensive capabilities
for retaking lost territory., in practice the strategic defender may actually engage in just
as much or more offensive action at the operational and tactical levels as the strategic at‑
tacker. Therefore it is unclear whether a tactical or operational offense‑defense balance
that favors, say, defense will have the same effect‑r indeed any predictable effect‑on
the strategic offense‑defense balance.89 This objection is overstated because offense is
logically and temporally prior to counteroffense, and substantively more important to
the outcomes of strategic offensives; counter‑offense only arises if and to the extent that
initial offensives succeed. If the attacker’s initial offensive operations fail, the likelihood
that a hypothetical counteroffensive might also fail is irrelevant because the defender
will not need to undertake it. Conversely, arguments that offense‑strengthening inno‑
vations might make the difference in the defender’s ability to recover lost ground must
confront the possibility that they might also multiply the attacker’s initial success to
the point that the defender would be unable to regain the initiative. Thus the more the
operational and tactical offense‑defense balances favor defense, the less likely initial of‑
fensives are to succeed, the less counteroffensive capabilities matter, and the more the
overall strategic balance favors defense.

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6 Pro Evidence

6.1 General

6.1.1 Uniqueness

Japan is developing questionably offensive capabilities now

Onuorah 20

Darlene Onuorah, Former Contributing Writer, MA in International Affairs, ”Is Japan’s

Defense Policy Taking an Offensive Turn?,” INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS REVIEW, 7‑
8‑2020, https://www.iar‑gwu.org/blog/oo6h3mo5qy895akjv83zwgudjh38n2, accessed 3‑
14‑2022

On July 8, 2020, Japanese Defense Minister Taro Kono told the Japanese House of Rep‑
resentatives’ Security Committee that a preemptive first strike on an enemy’s missile
base or launch pad would be acceptable if an enemy were likely to launch a missile
attack on Japanese soil. This was in response to lawmaker Go Shinohara’s question of
whether a preemptive strike on an enemy’s missile system in the booster phase would
be unconstitutional per Article 9. Kono responded: ”It would not be unconstitutional
to strike an enemy launch pad or base before a missile launch, instead of waiting for
the missile’s booster phase.” This is just the latest development in Japan’s spurning of
its past defensive posture in favor of a more offense‑oriented one. The nation’s paci‑
fist constitution, specifically Article 9, constrains Japan’s defense policy; the clause pro‑
hibits the use of force in solving international disputes, the acquisition of military forces
and other means of war potential, as well as the right of state belligerency. However,
Japan’s establishment of the Self‑Defense Forces (SDF) was done to satisfy the inherent
right to self‑defense, which according to government interpretation is not denied by
the constitution and is allowed by Article 51 of the Charter of United Nations. Under
Japan’s Legislation for Peace and Security, the use of force is permitted under three con‑
ditions: 1) when an armed attack is against Japan or foreign nations that could threaten

64
 6 Pro Evidence

Japan’s survival; 2) if there are no other ways to deter such an attack; and 3) the action
taken is limited to the minimum extent necessary. Kono’s statement on Japanese de‑
fense posture seems to contradict Article 9 principles, Article 51 of the UN Charter, as
well as the conditions surrounding the use of force. By engaging in a preemptive strike
against an enemy prior to its missile’s booster phase, the use of force in this scenario
potentially violates constitutional and international law. On the contrary, Kono speci‑
fies that the strike would be done out of self‑defense, ensuring the safety of Japanese
territory through a determination of the enemy’s intentions, means of attack, and inter‑
national affairs landscape. However, the Japanese government deems the use of force
for self‑defense as being reserved for dire circumstances; the threat or likelihood of an
armed attack does not warrant a response. Many see Kono’s statement as controversial
because it bypasses political and legal boundaries of force, paints Japan as an aggres‑
sor, and increases the potential for war. The political debate surrounding acquisition
of first‑strike capable weapons is not new, and Japan’s ruling Liberal Democratic Party
(LDP) has increasingly pushed for this capability in order to combat North Korea’s nu‑
clear weapons advancements, as well as China’s growing military presence. On Au‑
gust 4, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe stated that Japan’s National Security Council will
deliberate the purchase of first‑strike capable weapons to heighten deterrence strate‑
gies. The recent discontinuation of the U.S.‑made Aegis Ashore missile defense system,
citing financial and collateral damage concerns, has spurred discussion on how to better
equip existing Aegis destroyers that can defend against foreign missile threats, as these
systems contain superior radar and interceptive abilities. Although the Aegis Ashore
systems may be reinstalled, establishing first‑strike capability in their place has been a
sought‑after option by the government. Still, a preemptive strike is debated to be an
offensive capability, and utilizing it seems to go against the nation’s framework for use
of force. Over the last two decades, Japan has been able to change its defense policy
without compromising Article 9. Japan’s shift away from pacifism in the 21st century is
not unfounded. Japan faces a strategic environment of Chinese military expansionism,
North Korean nuclear testing, and a resurgence in Russian presence in East Asia. Be‑
yond these direct threats, Japan faces a deterioration of relations with its closest regional
ally, South Korea, as well as pressure from the United States for a more robust security
presence with greater defense spending. The latter actually influenced Japan to enact
the Legislation for Peace and Security, which expanded the SDF’s peacekeeping roles
for international military conflicts, giving them the right to exercise force for collective
self‑defense through Article 9 reinterpretation. These developments have increasingly
strengthened Japan’s defense arsenal and brought about a record‑breaking defense bud‑

65
 6 Pro Evidence

get. Constitutional revision to amend Article 9, in relation to its second paragraph on

war potential and state belligerency, has been at the forefront of the LDP’s agenda since
its 1955 conception. Prime Minister Abe has made it his mission to revise Article 9 to
formally include the SDF in order to eliminate speculation that the forces are unconsti‑
tutional. The potential revision would keep the aforementioned paragraph and add a
paragraph to expand defense initiatives for the SDF. Defense Minister Kono has previ‑
ously commented on this issue of constitutional interpretation for self‑defense, echoing
larger sentiments of the LDP that the SDF requires proper acknowledgement, in order
to eliminate its uncertainty in deployment. However, this move continues to be unpop‑
ular amongst a pacifist‑leaning society, lacks sufficient parliamentary support, and due
to political scandals, has been delayed for the rest of 2020. As Prime Minister Abe re‑
cently announced he will be stepping down, the prospect of Article 9 revision has now
gone out of his reach. The LDP will hold an election on September 14 to determine
Abe’s successor, who will serve out the rest of his term until September 2021; the possi‑
ble successor is expected to have a close relationship with Abe, therefore inheriting his
policy tasks and goals. Front runner Yoshihide Suga, who has been a close aide to Abe
since the start of his prime ministerial career, is anticipated to continue Abe’s priority
of gaining first‑strike capability, amongst other objectives. However, Article 9 revision
is undesirable to both Suga, and Fumio Kishida, who is another notable candidate. The
chosen interim Prime Minister will likely focus on dealing with Abe’s more pressing
concerns, such as his handling of COVID‑19 and its impact on the economy. In order to
mitigate controversy and political opposition, Japan’s National Security Council must
clearly define what a preemptive strike means for self‑defense and what it would en‑
tail. As enemy intentions will be determined by Japan prior to a preemptive strike, so
should their own intentions be rightfully determined. The likelihood of a missile launch
by North Korea, for instance, could be perceived as a dire circumstance for Japan, thus
warranting preemption as a defensive measure if thoroughly explained. Furthermore,
if a missile strike on U.S. territory is imminent, could Japan launch a preemptive strike
on the attacking country, under collective self‑defense? The council should assess the le‑
gal and political implications of obtaining first‑strike capability and be transparent with
key allies, especially the United States, to gain approval. Above all, there has to be di‑
rect reassurance that this action would not violate the constitution, as there is sure to be
domestic backlash. If Aegis Ashore is still on the table, though an expensive endeavor,
Japan should appropriately refurbish the system to gain successful strike capabilities
and take away some of that burden from the United States; this primarily involves plac‑
ing the missile launchers and radars in more remote, yet strategic areas near the coast‑

66
 6 Pro Evidence

line to monitor foreign missile threats, and optimizing missile booster separation. The
United States has pushed Japan for greater security contributions and has supported
Article 9 reinterpretation in the past, with regard to the Legislation for Peace and Secu‑
rity. As the international security environment becomes more complex and conflictual,
combined with pressure from the U.S., perhaps this will compel Japan to revise Article
9 in the near future. Ever since Japan rearmed itself with the SDF, many of its defensive
pursuits have been speculated as offensive and unconstitutional. Even so, the option for
a preemptive strike does highlight a possible offensive shift in the nation’s traditionally
defensive posture and prompts debate over whether or not the move is supported by
the constitution.

Squo is reverse goldilocks—increased aggression by the SDF triggers every

perception DA—it’s locked in

Kafura 15

Craig Kafura, a research associate at The Chicago Council on Global Affairs, where he fo‑
cuses on public opinion and foreign policy. He holds a master’s degree from Columbia
University and a bachelor’s from Yale University. ”Asia’s Next Worry: An ’Assertive’
Japan?”, 5‑7‑2015, National Interest, https://nationalinterest.org/feature/asias‑next‑
worry‑assertive‑japan‑12824, accessed 7‑13‑2019

Japanese prime minister Shinzo Abe’s Congressional address made history: never be‑
fore has a sitting Japanese PM addressed a joint session of Congress. It must also have
been a deeply personal moment for Abe; his grandfather, Kishi Nobusuke, addressed
the House of Representatives in 1957 as the Japanese prime minister.

However, the truly historical shift came with last Monday’s revision of the U.S.‑Japan
Defense Guidelines, the first since 1997. This revision outlines how the Japanese Self
Defense Forces (JSDF) will interact with U.S. forces in a range of cases, including col‑
lective self‑defense. And there is room for expansion. While the phrasing of “countries
in a close relationship with Japan” applies now to the United States, in the future, such
phrasing could justify the defense of countries like Vietnam or the Philippines.

These revisions are the latest step in a long trend towards a more assertive Japanese
foreign policy. It follows last summer’s reinterpretation of Article 9, the clause of the
Japanese constitution that renounces war as a sovereign right of the nation of Japan,
and comes as Japan boosts its defense spending to new levels: a record 4.98 trillion yen

67
 6 Pro Evidence

($41.97 billion), a 2.8 percent increase from last year’s budget. Critics of the Abe adminis‑
tration, as well as some officials in neighboring nations with all‑too‑recent memories of
Japanese occupation, have argued these moves herald a return to Japanese militarism.

However, the Japanese public isn’t enthusiastic about a more active foreign policy. Six in
ten Japanese have consistently opposed changing Article 9 of the Japanese constitution.
When asked last summer if they supported Abe’s move to change the interpretation
of the constitution to allow for collective self‑defense, a similar proportion rejected the
move. And a recent survey by the Pew Research Center found that only one in four
Japanese thought their nation should play a more active military role in regional affairs.

So how long can Abe keep pushing Japan into a more muscular regional role? Despite
the unfavorable polling, Abe will probably have his way with Japanese foreign policy
for quite a while longer.

For one, the Japanese opposition is splintered, unable to effectively contest Abe’s
agenda. Despite lackluster economic performance in 2014, the opposition Democratic
Party of Japan (DPJ) only managed a gain of eleven seats in the December elections,
leaving Abe’s LDP in control of the Diet in coalition with Komeito. Nor has the DPJ
been able to formulate a coherent opposition to Abe’s military moves.

Abe will also benefit from China’s assertive moves in the region. There is no sign that
2015 will be the year the Chinese back off the regional claims they’ve staked, ranging
from their aggressive oil drilling and fishing operations in the region to the ongoing dis‑
pute over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands. While Japanese polling shows a public that is
amenable to negotiations or taking the dispute to an international organization like the
International Court of Justice, results from China are more confrontational: nearly two‑
thirds of Chinese (64 percent) say that, in order to protect the territory, China should
strengthen its hold over it. China’s assertions of its territorial claims will give Abe am‑
munition at home and abroad to justify a stronger role for Japan and the JSDF.

Finally, the United States has its own reasons to encourage a more capable Japanese mil‑
itary. While the U.S. alliance structure in Asia has long been based on an extensive series
of bilateral security commitments, such a “hub‑and‑spoke” system is less robust than
the multilateral security arrangements that serve the United States so well in Europe.
As the United States begins to draw down on its own military spending, it will need
its allies to step up, both with higher budgets and stronger cooperation. The danger, of
course, is that a more assertive Japan will prevent the stronger alliance between South
Korea and Japan that the United States also needs. Both nations are key elements of the

68
 6 Pro Evidence

U.S. alliance system and critical to U.S. military operations in the region, but bilateral
relations have been poor in recent years due in part to Abe’s own policies. But for the
United States, the benefits of a more capable Japanese ally outweigh the potential costs
in inter‑ally cooperation—for now.

The bottom line: Abe’s more muscular foreign policy is here to stay, supported by his
most important ally, encouraged by China’s regional assertiveness and enabled by his
opposition’s weakness. The Land of the Rising Sun is rising again.

69
 6 Pro Evidence

6.1.2 Constitutionality

Constitutions like Japan’s play a vital role in establishing predictability by

constraining the exercise of government power.

Martin 14

Craig Martin is a lawyer and legal scholar, and is currently an Associate Pro‑
fessor at Washburn University School of Law, teaching public international
law, the law of armed conflict, constitutional law, and professional responsi‑
bility, ”’Reinterpreting’ Article 9 endangers Japan’s rule of law”, The Japan
Times, 6/27/14, https://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2014/06/27/commentary/japan‑
commentary/reinterpreting‑article‑9‑endangers‑japans‑rule‑of‑law/#.XUhTKuhKiFG

To fully appreciate why this is so, we need to review briefly the relevant aspects of con‑
stitutionalism and the rule of law. Constitutions in democracies are typically the highest
law of the land. They define and distribute authority, enshrine individual rights, and
serve to limit the government’s power in important ways. Indeed, in this function of lim‑
iting the exercise of government power, particularly in moments of crisis, constitutions
serve as “pre‑commitment devices.” They constrain future generations to abide by the
principles, rights and power structures envisioned by the founders. A crucial element
of this constraining characteristic of constitutions, is that they typically provide for a
specific amendment procedure that governs precisely how the constitution itself may
be altered or revised. Such procedures typically make it difficult, but not impossible,
for limits on government action to be changed in the future. The Constitution of Japan
conforms to this model. The Constitution is the supreme law of the land (Article 97‑99),
and an independent judiciary, in particular the Supreme Court of Japan, is charged with
the authority to interpret and enforce this supreme law (Article 76 and 81). The Consti‑
tution explicitly provides for an amendment procedure (Article 96), which requires that
amendment proposals be initiated in the Diet and voted for by a two‑thirds majority in
each chamber, and approved by a majority vote of the people in a referendum.

Abe’s reinterpretations of the Constitution of Japan undermines the rule of law.

Martin 14

Craig Martin is a lawyer and legal scholar, and is currently an Associate Pro‑
fessor at Washburn University School of Law, teaching public international

70
 6 Pro Evidence

law, the law of armed conflict, constitutional law, and professional responsi‑
bility, ”’Reinterpreting’ Article 9 endangers Japan’s rule of law”, The Japan
Times, 6/27/14, https://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2014/06/27/commentary/japan‑
commentary/reinterpreting‑article‑9‑endangers‑japans‑rule‑of‑law/#.XUhTKuhKiFG

The advisory panel issued its updated report in May, and now, on the basis of these
“recommendations,” Abe stands poised to use a “Cabinet approval” as the mechanism
for trying to unilaterally change the meaning of Article 9. This is profoundly wrong for
two reasons. The first is that this process of trying to change the meaning of the Consti‑
tution, by its very nature, is invalid. It not only stands in direct violation of the explicit
constitutionally mandated amendment procedures, but it also violates democratic prin‑
ciples, given that the Diet and the public are cut out of the process. Moreover it subverts
the notion that the Constitution is the supreme law of the land, and that the law applies
equally to all. The executive, in this process, is placing itself outside of and above the
supreme law, and is acting through arbitrary discretion rather than valid legal author‑
ity. A change to fundamental provisions of the Constitution would thus be made with
less legal authority, and be subject to less democratic process, than an amendment to
the nation’s traffic law.

Article 9 of Japan’s Constitution can’t operate as a clear constitutional rule.

Martin 17

Craig Martin is a lawyer and legal scholar, and is currently an Associate Pro‑
fessor at Washburn University School of Law, teaching public international
law, the law of armed conflict, constitutional law, and professional responsibil‑
ity, ”Change It to Save It: Why and How to Amend Article 9” 18 Ritsumeikan
Journal of Peace Studies (2017), Posted: 12 Dec 2016 Last revised: 14 Mar 2017,
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2883588

As explained earlier, Article 9(1) has operated consistently and effectively as a relatively
clear constitutional rule, prohibiting the use of force for any purpose other than individ‑
ual self‑defense. But the Article 9(2) prohibition on the maintenance of armed forces
or �other war potential� has been historically interpreted in such a way that it cannot
operate as a clear constitutional rule. It is, at best, an ambiguous standard. This is
due primarily to two aspects of the way in which it was interpreted. First, the idea
that it permits such levels of military capability that would be necessary for individ‑
ual self‑defense, creates a sliding scale that depends on the perceived external national

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 6 Pro Evidence

security threat. The level of armed forces necessary for defense is thus relative to the
capability of other countries. Tied to this is the idea that the prohibition only really ap‑
plies to military capability and weapons systems that are inherently offensive, which
in turn depends on the notion that there is some intrinsic difference between offensive
and defensive weapons systems or levels of military capability. 27 This relative and
elastic interpretation of the prohibition on the maintenance of armed forces and other
war potential has allowed for Japan�s slow but inexorable development of a formidable
military force. While most Japanese continue to insist that the SDF is not a military, it
is most certainly a military in all but name. What is more, while the number of troops
in the Ground Self Defense Forces is small compared to China or the Koreas, Japan�s
armed forces comprise one of the best armed and most sophisticated militaries in Asia,
with a military budget that ranks Japan in the top seven or eight military spenders in
the World. 28 While Japan has always insisted that it does not have power projection
capability, and thus its military capability is inherently defensive rather than offensive,
even those claims are starting to sound hollow in the wake of its launch of a ship that
is a small aircraft carrier in all but name. 29 In any event, the very notion of a clear
distinction between offensive and defensive armed forces or military systems is rather
nonsensical.

As it stands, it is impossible to determine if the government has violated Article 9.

Martin 17

Craig Martin is a lawyer and legal scholar, and is currently an Associate Pro‑
fessor at Washburn University School of Law, teaching public international
law, the law of armed conflict, constitutional law, and professional responsibil‑
ity, ”Change It to Save It: Why and How to Amend Article 9” 18 Ritsumeikan
Journal of Peace Studies (2017), Posted: 12 Dec 2016 Last revised: 14 Mar 2017,
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2883588

There are two major problems arising from this situation. The first is that this clause
of Article 9(2) is an inherently non‑justiciable and unenforceable standard. While there
can be little doubt that Article 9(2) has operated over the decades to constrain the devel‑
opment of Japan�s military capability, it provides no clear guidelines for government
action. It is impossible to determine with any precision if the government has violated
the provision. If the courts were ever to consider the merits of a claim that the current
size and capability of the SDF violated Article 9(2), they would be unable to meaning‑

72
 6 Pro Evidence

fully assess the claim—how is a court to determine whether the size and capability of
the SDF is more than is necessary for individual self‑defense in relation to current threat
levels? It is not a reasonable task for a judiciary, and thus the interpretation of the pro‑
vision renders Article 9(2) unenforceable and relatively meaningless. That is dangerous
for a constitutional provision specifically designed to constrain government action.

There is a large gap between the language & intent of the first clause of Article 9 and
the capability of the SDF.

Martin 17

Craig Martin is a lawyer and legal scholar, and is currently an Associate Pro‑
fessor at Washburn University School of Law, teaching public international
law, the law of armed conflict, constitutional law, and professional responsibil‑
ity, ”Change It to Save It: Why and How to Amend Article 9” 18 Ritsumeikan
Journal of Peace Studies (2017), Posted: 12 Dec 2016 Last revised: 14 Mar 2017,
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2883588

Similarly, there is the larger problem posed by the huge and growing gulf between
the explicit language and obvious intent behind the first clause of Art. 9(2), and the
reality of the SDF being a very sophisticated and powerful military with considerable
war‑fighting capability. It is indeed this inconsistency that has tended to drive much of
the most bitter controversy over Article 9, and to fuel the allegations that the govern‑
ment is violating the provision. 30 This apparent gulf between the stated norm and the
reality that it is supposed to govern is acutely dangerous for a constitutional provision.
When the very existence and power of a government institution represents proof of the
meaninglessness and impotence of a fundamental constitutional norm, there is signifi‑
cant risk that the normative power of the constitution as a whole will be undermined.
If Article 9(2) can be so easily disregarded, if it exercises such little control over govern‑
ment action, what confidence should we have that other provisions of the Constitution
will respected or enforced? And indeed, in my view, this failure of Article 9(2) has
already served to undermine and erode the power and effectiveness of Article 9(1) in
many ways. Of course, many of the champions of Article 9 will wholeheartedly agree
that the existence and capability of the SDF constitutes a violation of Article 9(2), but
will argue that the solution is to either disband or, at minimum, significantly reduce the
size and capability of the SDF. But that is simply not a tenable argument. In the current
geopolitical and strategic context, it is simply utopian to cling to such proposals. As I

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will discuss below, the solution has to be found in amending Article 9(2) to bring the
Constitution back into alignment with the reality, in order to save the more important
constraints imposed by Article 9(1).

The disavowal of a right to belligerency in Article 9 has uncertain and disputed

meanings, which is grounds to amend it.

Martin 17

Craig Martin is a lawyer and legal scholar, and is currently an Associate Pro‑
fessor at Washburn University School of Law, teaching public international
law, the law of armed conflict, constitutional law, and professional responsibil‑
ity, ”Change It to Save It: Why and How to Amend Article 9” 18 Ritsumeikan
Journal of Peace Studies (2017), Posted: 12 Dec 2016 Last revised: 14 Mar 2017,
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2883588

A final word should be said about the second clause of Article 9(2), which constitutes
the third element of Article 9. This clause, which provides that the right of belligerency
will never be recognized, is typically ignored and very frequently misunderstood. As
mentioned earlier, there are two different theories in Japanese constitutional discourse
on what this means. 31 I have argued in more detail elsewhere that both the drafting
and ratification history of Article 9, and the distinct meaning of the rights of belligerency
in international law, make very clear that only one of these theories is correct—that is,
that as a matter of Japanese domestic law there will be no recognition or enforcement
of the rights of belligerency that are extended to members of Japanese armed forces
under international humanitarian law (IHL, also known as jus in bello, or the law of
armed conflict). 32 The rights and privileges of belligerency under IHL include the au‑
thority for lawful combatants in international armed conflict to use lethal force and to
destroy legitimate military objectives, and an immunity from prosecution or liability
under other legal regimes for such actions. 33 This clause poses two distinct problems,
which are grounds for amending it. The first is that there is again some ambiguity and
uncertainty as to what it means, which is cause for confusion. This is evidenced by there
being two competing and very different theories as to its meaning. This is good enough
reason to amend it, if other aspects of Article 9 are being amended in any event. Con‑
stitutional provisions that are of uncertain and disputed meaning, and thereby cause
confusion, are problematic. But in this case, both possible meanings of the clause call
out for amendment, even if we could decide once and for all which one was correct.

74
 6 Pro Evidence

6.1.3 Clarity Key

Blurred lines caused by Abe’s new expansive interpretation make arms races and
miscalc inevitable; it’s try‑or‑die for amendment

Hasebe 15

Yasuo Hasebe (Waseda University; former vice‑president of IACL).” The End of

Constitutional Pacifism in Japan?” International Associtaion of Constitutional Law. 24
December 2015. JDN. https://blog‑iacl‑aidc.org/new‑blog/2018/5/27/analysis‑the‑end‑
of‑constitutional‑pacifism‑in‑japan

On July 1, 2014, the cabinet made the statement that use of the right of collective self‑
defense is constitutional within some limits.9 According to the new interpretation, use
of force will also be permitted when Japanese people’s rights to life, liberty, and pur‑
suit of happiness are jeopardized because of military attacks against foreign countries
which are in close relationship with Japan. I will call this condition (1b) in order to dis‑
tinguish it from the former condition (1)—Japan itself is under on‑going or imminent,
unlawful armed attack—and rename this former condition (1) as (1a). After July 1, 2014,
conditions (2) and (3), mentioned above, remain unchanged. Hereafter, the use of force
will be permitted if condition (1a) or (1b) co‑exists with conditions (2) and (3). The new
condition (1b) was apparently extracted from the government statement on October 14,
1972, which was meant to explain why the exercise of collective self‑defense was not per‑
mitted under the current Constitution.10 Although the new interpretation of the Abe ad‑
ministration refers quite abstractly and ambiguously to changes of international circum‑
stances and military situations by which Japan is now surrounded, the exact grounds of
this newly declared interpretation are not clearly articulated. Whereas the tension be‑
tween China and Japan has recently heightened regarding islets called Senkaku, this is a
matter of individual self‑defense, and does not justify the change in interpretation to al‑
low collective self‑defense. This change of government view has caused a lot of concerns
that are shared by wide sections of the society.11 First, the denial of the right of collective
self‑defense under the current Constitution was a conclusion perfected through elabo‑
rate deliberations over many years by various government departments. It has been
steadily confirmed and repeated. If we may here borrow the expression of Sir Edward
Coke: “by many succession of ages, it hath been fined and refined by an infinite number
of grave and learned men.”12 If such a product of many minds of requisite art can be
changed in accordance with policy preference of a transitory premier who happens to
be in charge, the role of the Constitution to limit political power would almost evapo‑

75
 6 Pro Evidence

rate. Any interpretation of any constitutional clause seems now vulnerable to change.13
Second, authority of the Cabinet Legislation Bureau has become seriously undermined
in the eyes of many people because of this change of interpretation. Even several former
chiefs of the Bureau openly criticised this turnaround. 14 The Bureau has been highly
regarded because it has given legal advice to various governments from the standpoint
detached from party politics. However, on this issue, the current Bureau chief, Mr. Yū‑
suke Yokobatake, who succeeded Mr. Komatsu from within the Bureau, is suspected to
succumb to Mr. Abe’s pressures. If the Bureau has come to say that a government action
is constitutional because the prime minister wants it to be, there remains scarce respect
for its opinions. Third, it is difficult to understand the exact meaning of the newly issued
conditions for the use of force. On its face, the cabinet statement asserts that use of force
is permitted when (1b) Japanese people’s rights to life, liberty, and pursuit of happiness
are jeopardized because of military attacks against foreign countries.15 If understood
literally, it is quite hard to imagine concrete cases where such a situation is realized.
Some politicians, including Shinzō Abe, claim that under the new interpretation, the
Self‑defense Forces could be dispatched to the Hormuz Strait if it is blockaded. On the
other hand, since such a blockade would result in the sharp rise of oil prices and make
daily lives of the people difficult,16 other politicians of the governmental coalition—in
particular, those of Komei party—have asserted that it is hardly imaginable that trou‑
bles caused by higher oil prices could satisfy condition (1b) above.17 As to the question
of whether possible destabilization of the US‑Japan alliance caused by foreign military
attacks against American forces would satisfy the condition (1b), opinions of Foreign
minister, Humio Kishida, and Mr. Yokobatake have patently differed.18 Therefore, as a
result of this change of interpretation, the meaning of Article 9 has become much more
blurred, though the normal role of interpretation should have been to provide determi‑
nate meaning to an ambiguous text. Fourth, it is not certain whether such expansion of
the possible use of military forces would contribute to peace and security in East Asia.19
Though the government asserts that this change of interpretation increases the deterrent
effect of the US‑Japan alliance, it may also bring about military expansion on the part of
neighbouring countries, making all parties more prone to miscalculation. The risk that
Japan might be implicated in quarrels of other countries would also increase.

76
 6 Pro Evidence

6.1.4 Global Participation

Article 9 inhibits Japan’s ability to meaningfully participate in international affairs.

Gibbs 10

D. Bradley Gibbs‑ J.D. from the University of Houston Law Center, specializing in
oil and gas law, environmental law, and international law.This comment received
the 2010 Adams & Reese Writing Award for an Outstanding Comment on a Topic
in International Law and was inspired by the author’s three‑year tenure as an En‑
glish teacher in Wakayama Prefecture, Japan, “FUTURE RELATIONS BETWEEN
THE UNITED STATES AND JAPAN: ARTICLE 9 AND THE REMILITARIZATION
OF JAPAN”, HOUSTON JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, Vol. 33:1, 2010,
https://heinonline.org/HOL/P?h=hein.journals/hujil33&i=139

The Anti‑Terrorism Special Measures Law, which allowed Japanese navy oilers to re‑
fuel American war ships in the Indian Ocean, expired on November 1, 2007.144 Prime
Minister Yasuo Fukuda’s cabinet submitted a new refueling bill to ”[fulfill a responsi‑
bility to] the international community.”145 This sparked a great deal of debate within
Japan, particularly between the Democratic Party of Japan and the Liberal Democratic
Party.146 Fukuda was forced to defend the policy before by asserting that ”[tihe area in
which the [SDF] is operating is limited to a noncombat zone by the framework of the law,
and therefore the mission does not go against Article 9 of the Constitution.”147 ”Such
are the contortions and tortured arguments that Japan’s leaders have to try to use to
square their pacifist Constitutionwhich pretty plainly prohibits Japan from possessing
any armaments‑with its perceived international obligations as a major power and ally
of the [United States].”148 It is absurd that Japan must utilize such roundabout means
and empty rhetoric in order to fulfill its desire to participate in global conflicts and pol‑
itics. Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution, particularly paragraph 2, has outlived its
usefulness and is ripe for amendment. It has become a relic of idealistic fancy that does
not take into account the harsh reality that the political turbulence of the Far East shows
little sign of subsiding.

77
 6 Pro Evidence

6.1.5 Active Foreign Policy

Article 9 hampers effective foreign engagement—prevents contribution to

international coalitions.

Klingner 16

Bruce Klingner, Senior Research Fellow for Northeast Asia in the Asian Studies Cen‑
ter, of the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for National Security and For‑
eign Policy, at The Heritage Foundation. ”Japanese Defense Reform Supports Allied
Security Objectives”, 1‑11‑2016, Heritage Foundation, https://www.heritage.org/global‑
politics/report/japanese‑defense‑reform‑supports‑allied‑security‑objectives, accessed 7‑
13‑2019

Ineffective Defense Policy. Japan faced criticism for its “checkbook diplomacy” during
the 1991 Persian Gulf War. The international community expects Japan to play a more
proactive role for peace and stability in the world.

Japan’s minimalist security policy was outdated in today’s security environment. Con‑
cepts such as “rear area” were no longer valid in light of North Korea’s growing nuclear
and missile capabilities and newly developing issues such as cyberwarfare and the mil‑
itarization of space.

Prior to the 2015 defense reforms, Tokyo had limited itself to providing logistical
support only to U.S. forces in rear areas during emergencies on the Korean Peninsula.
Tokyo could not even refuel planes preparing for combat or transporting U.S. ammu‑
nition. Deploying the Japanese SDF for international peacekeeping operations was
cumbersome due to protracted legislative debate. When a security situation became
more risky, Japan withdrew its forces, leaving other coalition forces to pull their weight.

In April 2015, Prime Minister Abe stated that Japan should “take yet more responsibility
for the peace and stability of the world [based on] a proactive contribution to peace
based on the principle of international cooperation.”

78
 6 Pro Evidence

6.1.6 Diplomacy Turn

Revision increases Japan’s global influence.

Panton 10

Michael A. Panton (L.L.M., with Distinction, the University of Hong Kong; J.D., Syra‑
cuse University College of Law; M.A., Honors First Class, The University of Sydney;
B.S., Summa Cum Laude, Excelsior College). “Japan’s Article 9: Rule of Law v. Flexible
Interpretation.” Temple International & Comparative Law Journal 24:1. Spring 2010.
JDN. https://sites.temple.edu/ticlj/files/2017/02/24.1.Panton‑TICLJ.pdf

The diplomatic currency of a revised constitution may indirectly increase Japan’s influ‑
ence and ability to determine outcomes. That is probably the most important underly‑
ing factor encouraging revision. A stable nation that consistently does not aggressively
exercise its military options has the capability to gather significant support and respect
in the international community.291 If Japan revises its constitution, it must continue to
move cautiously and with reserve in the deployment of the SDF to keep from appear‑
ing overly threatening. Japan, if it revises Article 9, will increase its diplomatic influence
by being considered a world power that is operating primarily under U.N. mandates.
Japan then will have accomplished its goal of achieving global respect while champi‑
oning pacifism. If the revision happens, it will then mark Japan as a new type of global
leader.

79
 6 Pro Evidence

6.1.7 Japan‑US Relations

Amendment would increase cooperation with the United States

Chanlett‑Avery et al. 19

Emma Chanlett‑Avery Specialist in Asian Affairs; Caitlin Campbell Analyst in Asian

Affairs; Joshua A. Williams Research Associate, ”The U.S.‑Japan Alliance”, 13 June 2019,
Congressional Research Service, https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33740.pdf, accessed 7‑5‑
2019

Despite the passage of new security legislation in September 2015, several legal factors
restrict Japan’s ability to cooperate more robustly with the United States. The most
prominent and fundamental is Article 9 of the Japanese constitution, drafted by Amer‑
ican officials during the postwar occupation, which outlaws war as a “sovereign right”
of Japan and prohibits “the right of belligerency.” It stipulates that “land, sea, and air
forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained.” 27 However, Japan
has interpreted the article to mean that it can maintain a military for self‑defense pur‑
poses and, since 1992, has allowed the SDF to participate in noncombat roles overseas
in a number of U.N. peacekeeping operations (PKO), including in the U.S.‑led coalition
in Iraq. The 2015 security legislation adjusts the SDF rules of engagement (ROE) to al‑
low more proactive missions and expands the scope for the SDF to operate in theaters
where there is ongoing conflict, but not on the front lines. It also allows it to participate
in nonU.N. PKOs in a similar capacity.28 The SDF’s direct participation in combat op‑
erations is considered to be unconstitutional unless there is a threat to Japan’s existence.
Dispatching the SDF overseas requires the approval of Japan’s parliament, the Diet.

For years, Abe has spoken of his desire to amend the security provisions of Japan’s con‑
stitution. This could include revising Article 9. Although Abe and others seem to prefer
to make broad changes to Article 9, such as revising it to allow Japan to fully exercise
the right of collective selfdefense per the U.N. Charter, Abe has taken cues from a cau‑
tious public and advocated instead for a more narrowly defined revision to enshrine
the constitutional legitimacy of the SDF.29 Even as national support for changing the
constitution appears to have incrementally increased in recent years, the amendment
process is onerous, requiring approval by first a two‑thirds majority of both houses of
the Diet and then by a simple majority of a national referendum.30 Despite Abe’s polit‑
ical strength, his ability to push through an amendment, which has yet to be drafted, is
limited during his remaining years in office (his term is scheduled to end in September

80
 6 Pro Evidence

2021).

Japan‑US relations are deteriorating as Japan continues to rely on the US as its

protector.

Gibbs 10

D. Bradley Gibbs‑ J.D. from the University of Houston Law Center, specializing in
oil and gas law, environmental law, and international law. This comment received
the 2010 Adams & Reese Writing Award for an Outstanding Comment on a Topic
in International Law and was inspired by the author’s three‑year tenure as an En‑
glish teacher in Wakayama Prefecture, Japan, “FUTURE RELATIONS BETWEEN
THE UNITED STATES AND JAPAN: ARTICLE 9 AND THE REMILITARIZATION
OF JAPAN”, HOUSTON JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, Vol. 33:1, 2010,
https://heinonline.org/HOL/P?h=hein.journals/hujil33&i=139

There are increasing concerns within Japan about U.S. dedication to its role as Japan’s
protector. Yuko Nakano, a research associate at the Center for Strategic and Interna‑
tional Studies, exemplified this sentiment by noting that ”when there was a [North Ko‑
rean] Taepo Dong missile launch in 1998, a conspiracy theory appeared in the Japanese
press that the United States was aware of the launch but didn’t inform Japan in a timely
fashion.”109 Such accusations reveal Japanese skepticism about just how far the United
States will go in its role as Japan’s protector. The United States, however, has been in
favor of remilitarization for some time.110 American military resources are spread thin,
and U.S. officials have encouraged Japan to take a more robust military position.111 As
U.S. resources continue to dwindle, Japan must realize that the United States can no
longer offer the level of protection that it has in the past. Japan must begin to shoulder
a greater portion of its defensive burden.

The remilitarization of Japan is a necessary safeguard due to fraying Japan‑US

relations

Gibbs 10

D. Bradley Gibbs‑ J.D. from the University of Houston Law Center, specializing in
oil and gas law, environmental law, and international law. This comment received
the 2010 Adams & Reese Writing Award for an Outstanding Comment on a Topic

81
 6 Pro Evidence

in International Law and was inspired by the author’s three‑year tenure as an En‑
glish teacher in Wakayama Prefecture, Japan, “FUTURE RELATIONS BETWEEN
THE UNITED STATES AND JAPAN: ARTICLE 9 AND THE REMILITARIZATION
OF JAPAN”, HOUSTON JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, Vol. 33:1, 2010,
https://heinonline.org/HOL/P?h=hein.journals/hujil33&i=139

Since WWII, the United States and Japan have enjoyed excellent diplomatic relations,
and Japan has been chief among America’s economic allies.193 Japan has taken advan‑
tage of military protection from the United States, and the United States has maintained
its military bases on Japanese soil.194 U.S. President Barack Obama and others have
stressed that the unprecedented prosperity that Japan and other parts of Asia have en‑
joyed since WWII is a direct result of the U.S. alliance with Japan.195 2010 marks the
fifty‑year anniversary of thealliance, which is predicated on an unusual balance of mili‑
tary and economic power.196 Recently, however, there have been a number of disputes
between the United States and Japan regarding both foreign policy on the treatment
of China and North Korea, and a domestic Japanese dispute involving the Futenma
U.S. Marine Corps Air Station in Okinawa.197 The turmoil in Okinawa is the result of
a number of problems for local residents, created by the overwhelming concentration
of U.S. military bases, and little has been done to alleviate these problems.198 There is
currently intense scrutiny focused on the possibility of moving the Futenma base to a
location outside of Okinawa.199 However, Japanese ”footdragging” and botched han‑
dling of the issue caused considerable tension between the Hatoyama government and
the Obama administration, eventually leading to Hatoyama’s resignation as Prime Min‑
ister.200 The increasing tensions are further illuminated by a recent Kyodo News Sur‑
vey, which found that all Japanese prefectures except Okinawa showed reluctance to
accept U.S. military facilities or host training exercises by U.S. forces.201 This attitude
indicates the U.S. military may have overstayed its welcome, yet Japan is ostensibly de‑
fenseless without U.S. help. Controversies such as these could be useful as catalysts for
a long‑overdue look at constitutional amendment.

The US‑Japan security alliance is eroding as Japan distances itself from the US.

Martin 19

Craig Martin is a lawyer and legal scholar, and is currently an Associate Profes‑
sor at Washburn University School of Law, teaching public international law, the
law of armed conflict, constitutional law, and professional responsibility, ”Japan’s

82
 6 Pro Evidence

Dilemma in the Persian Gulf”, Australian Institute of International Affairs, 6/26/19,

https://www.internationalaffairs.org.au/australianoutlook/japans‑dilemma‑persian‑
gulf/?fbclid=IwAR0W‑eNhFE9hmMV7iS9sLwS‑Jzk7GmXAuzgoneQPQU7fnC5HCws3
gWKC5IE

Yet Japan’s response to these latest attacks was surprising. While the Trump adminis‑
tration ramped up its accusations of Iranian responsibility and sought to persuade the
world with video and photographic evidence, the Japanese government increasingly
distanced itself from the US position. Abe initially condemned the attack, but pointedly
added “no matter who” was responsible. He further added that “all parties concerned”
should exercise restraint. The owner of the Japanese ship contradicted the US govern‑
ment assertion that the attack was conducted with a limpet mine, stating that the crew
had witnessed a “flying object” hit the ship. Even more striking were statements made
by government officials in the days that followed. Chief Cabinet Secretary Hoshihide
Suga refused to comment on responsibility for the strike. A senior diplomat was quoted
as saying that the government cannot “make any statement based on a presumption,”
apparently rejecting the American evidentiary claims. Yet another diplomat raised the
false claims made by US intelligence prior to the invasion of Iraq in 2003, concluding “we
can’t unreservedly accept US claims.” A former cabinet minister even went so far as to
echo the Iranian government claims that the tanker attacks might be a false‑flag opera‑
tion. For those familiar with the Japanese government, for which the US‑Japan security
alliance is a bedrock article of faith, these are utterly astonishing statements. They may
reflect, for one, just how far the Trump administration has debased the credibility of the
United States, even in the eyes of its closest allies. The Japanese are certainly not alone
in this respect. But it also suggests that Japan, like the European countries, is struggling
to maintain some middle‑ground, some neutral position within the escalating conflict.

83
 6 Pro Evidence

6.1.8 Active Denial

Active denial good is the best defensive military strategy, but it requires offense

Heginbotham and Samuels 18

Eric Heginbotham (Principal Research Scientist at the Center for International Stud‑
ies at MIT) and Richard Samuels (Ford International Professor of Political Science
MIT). “A New Military Strategy for Japan.” Foreign Affairs. 16 July 2018. JDN.
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/asia/2018‑07‑16/new‑military‑strategy‑japan

Japan confronts an increasingly difficult security environment. Despite the current me‑
dia attention on North Korea, a very real but largely one‑dimensional nuclear threat,
Japanese strategists are concerned primarily with the broader and more multidimen‑
sional challenge posed by the rise of China and its territorial ambitions in the East China
Sea. Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe has been more forward‑looking regarding
security affairs than his predecessors. He has moved to strengthen Japan’s defense ca‑
pabilities, reorganize its security policymaking institutions, and increase its military
budget after a long period of decline, while loosening some restrictions on its military
forces and enhancing Japan’s intelligence capacity. These measures, however, can only
marginally slow a shifting balance of power. A rethink of military strategy, one that
looks to buttress deterrence even in the absence of military dominance, is urgently re‑
quired. Japan’s current approach might be labeled a strategy of “forward defense” and
is centered on defeating aggression as quickly as possible at the outer limits of Japanese
territory. To execute that strategy, it has built traditional maneuver forces designed
to fight decisive battles. Although forward defense was entirely reasonable during the
early post–Cold War period, it is a poor fit for an evolving environment in which China
would enjoy significant advantages at the outset of a conflict. To mitigate its vulnerabil‑
ity, harness the full potential of its alliance with the United States, and increase its ability
to deter China, Japan should shift instead toward a strategy of “active denial”—one fo‑
cused not on fighting pitched battles at the outset but on maintaining a force that can sur‑
vive an initial assault and continue to harass and resist enemy forces, thereby denying
them quick, decisive victories and driving up the risks and costs of military aggression.
EVOLVING BALANCE OF MILITARY POWER Over the past 20 years, China’s military
modernization has increased the magnitude and nature of Beijing’s strategic challenge
to Tokyo. China’s military budget has grown in step with the country’s economic expan‑
sion, increasing by an inflation‑adjusted 665 percent from 1996 to 2017 and now totaling
some $153 billion. Japan’s defense budget, in contrast, grew by only 22 percent during

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the same period. At $47 billion, it is now less than one‑third the size of China’s. The
development of China’s “anti‑access/area‑denial” (A2/AD) capabilities, designed to im‑
pede the flow of U.S. forces into the region and limit their operational freedom once in
the theater, poses particular challenges. These capabilities include roughly 40 modern
submarines, antisatellite systems, and, most important, a large and sophisticated arse‑
nal of conventionally armed missiles. Of China’s roughly 1,300 conventionally armed
ballistic missiles, some 150 to 500 have the range to strike targets in Japan, as do hun‑
dreds of its ground‑ and air‑launched cruise missiles. These highly accurate missile
systems could destroy key nodes in Japan’s defense infrastructure, including air bases,
air defenses, communications hubs, and military ports, crippling Tokyo’s ability to re‑
sist follow‑on attacks by Chinese air and/or naval forces. More recently, China has also
developed a formidable array of maneuver forces. It has doubled its modern fighter air‑
craft inventory over the last seven years, and its air forces now outnumber the combined
total of Japanese and local U.S. air forces (including U.S. aircraft forward‑deployed to
Japan and Guam) by a margin of two to one. Given current build rates, China’s ad‑
vantage in modern fighter aircraft is likely to rise to three to one by 2025. China has
greatly accelerated destroyer production, and by 2025 it will operate as many destroy‑
ers as the United States and Japan do in the western Pacific—and far more frigates. The
Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is also moving rapidly to address its remain‑
ing weaknesses in areas such as antisubmarine warfare, replenishment of ships at sea,
and cargo and tanker aircraft. The overall quality of Chinese systems and training is
not up to U.S. standards, though China has narrowed the gap across the board. In the
event of an attack on any of Japan’s four main islands, Japanese and U.S. forces would
enjoy inherent defensive advantages and could almost certainly repel a Chinese assault.
However, in the context of Beijing’s aspirations for greater control in the East China and
South China Seas, Tokyo has cause for concern about the security of its offshore islands,
where China is in a position to mount a serious military challenge. While a deliber‑
ate Chinese attack or invasion of these islands is unlikely, a clash there could escalate
quickly. Japan’s Ryukyu Islands chain stretches some 600 miles from Japan’s southern
island of Kyushu, and the disputed Senkaku Islands (known in China as the Diaoyu
Islands), as well as the Yaeyama Islands group at the end of the Ryukyu chain, are twice
as far from Kyushu as they are from China’s continental bases. There are some 29 PLA
air force and naval air bases within fighter range of the Senkaku Islands but only four
U.S. and Japanese bases within the same distance.U.S. and Japanese tankers could sup‑
port aircraft flying from more distant bases, but only at reduced sortie rates and with
greater stress on pilots and aircraft. The comparative scarcity of nearby Japanese and

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U.S. military infrastructure and the proximity to mainland bases magnify the threat of
a Chinese combined air and missile attack, possibly supported by submarines and sur‑
face ships. PROBLEM OF MILITARY STRATEGY To understand how Japan should
begin to rethink its military strategy, it is useful to consider that strategy in the con‑
text of three ideal‑type approaches to conventional defense and deterrence: forward
defense, denial, and punishment. Forward defense looks to defeat an attacker’s mili‑
tary forces as quickly and as far forward as possible, preferably at or near the state’s
frontiers. Denial strategies seek to prevent conquest through prolonged, active resis‑
tance, often by yielding at least some ground and avoiding a decisive battle until the
balance of forces has shifted in the defender’s favor. Punishment hinges on the ability
to inflict unacceptable losses on an attacker’s valued assets—for instance, by destroy‑
ing targets in its home country. During the early Cold War, Japan practiced a “shield
and spear” denial strategy. Japanese forces (the “shield”) would delay and harass an
invader until U.S. forces (the “spear”) could arrive. In the 1970s, however, Japan’s mil‑
itary emphasis began to shift toward forward defense. By the end of the Cold War it
had one of the world’s largest defense budgets, largely allocated to the maintenance
of traditional maneuver forces (such as large warships and large formations of aircraft
operating from full‑service air bases) that could engage any potential aggressor in a di‑
rect military confrontation. Despite the adoption of a “dynamic defense concept” in
2010, Japan continues to maintain its focus on forward defense. Indeed, by building an
expensive amphibious assault capability for an immediate counterattack on potential
adversary lodgments on Japan’s outer islands, it has effectively doubled down on that
forward defense strategy. This strategy made sense in the context of the late Cold War
and early post–Cold War periods, when Japan could meet any potential aggressor on
equal or better terms. With the rise of China, however, this assumption no longer holds.
China’s long‑range precision‑strike capability poses a lethal threat to Japan’s military
infrastructure and, to a lesser extent, its large military formations. Undertaking early
counteroffensive action in the Senkaku Islands or southern Ryukyu chain would risk
catastrophic defeat and potentially destroy Tokyo’s will or ability to continue the fight.
Missile defenses cannot provide a reliable or airtight solution, especially given their high
costs. A BETTER ALTERNATIVE A better option for Japan is an active denial strategy,
focused on demonstrating to Chinese leaders that any attack would likely turn into a
protracted conflict, one in which U.S. and Japanese forces would enjoy clear advantages.
The priority in a denial strategy would be not a quick victory but rather denying China
early and decisive success, allowing Japanese forces to effectively resist until U.S. rein‑
forcements could arrive. In contrast to Japan’s early Cold War denial strategy, which

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was built around relatively immobile and regionally organized ground forces, active de‑
nial would be dynamic and mobile and would include tactical offensive capability. The
active denial strategy has two mutually reinforcing elements: a resilient force posture
and a reordering of mission priorities. The first element, a resilient force posture, refers
to the ability of Japan’s military to absorb attacks and continue to operate effectively.
Resilience will require an expanded and strengthened system of military infrastructure,
even if such investments leave somewhat less money available for weaponry. Civilian
airports, for example, could be prepared to support air force operations, enabling the
quick dispersion of Japanese and U.S. aircraft, greatly increasing the number of targets
an attacker would need to strike, and reducing Japan’s vulnerability to missile attacks.
Expanding the number of ports and naval supply locations would similarly boost the
survivability and flexibility of the Japanese fleet. Mobility and deception can also play
an important part in developing resilience. Japan could employ new mobility concepts
similar to those currently being tested by the U.S. military to complicate an adversary’s
targeting problem. These include “agile combat employment,” the temporary dispatch
of small numbers of combat aircraft (usually two to four fighters) supported by a single
cargo aircraft with fuel and munitions to austere air bases. Other sorts of mobility en‑
hancements, such as the development of a civilian reserve fleet of fast transport ships
and the naval reservists to staff them, are central to maintaining coherent defenses in the
Ryukyu Islands, where the ability to reinforce positions and replace destroyed systems
and expended munitions will be critical. Active defenses against air and missile attacks
are also important but should be considered in the context of the larger resiliency effort.
Missile defenses, in particular, loom large in the public imagination, since they can, at
least in theory, protect civilian targets. But they also absorb inordinate amounts of the
defense budget, despite the fact that concealment, dispersion, and mobility are often
more economical and effective strategies. Luring China to fire missiles at empty shel‑
ters or low‑value targets would have the same effect as shooting down those missiles in
flight or penetrating Chinese airspace to destroy them prior to launch, but the former
may be achieved more cheaply. The second element of the active denial strategy flows
from the first. In keeping with the objective of resilience, Japan should establish a clear
hierarchy of mission priorities: first, defending key assets that enable the government
and military to continue functioning; second, isolating and striking adversary forces
that land on Japanese territory; and third, counterattacking to retake lost territory after
U.S. reinforcements arrive. The most immediate and important mission, the defense
of key military and civilian assets, is associated with integrated air and missile defense
(IAMD), antisubmarine warfare, and defensive antisurface warfare tasks. Modernizing

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older aircraft and acquiring additional 4.5‑generation fighters, such as the F/A‑18E/F or
F‑15SE, would allow the small number of F‑35As to serve as more effective force mul‑
tipliers for the air effort. Acquiring some number of F‑35Bs, capable of operating from
short runways or amphibious assault ships, would also enhance Japan’s ability to sus‑
tain an air battle while under attack in the Ryukyu Islands. In the maritime domain,
supplementing its fleet with smaller and cheaper multifunction frigates would help to
improve Japan’s ability to survive an initial Chinese attack in the southwestern islands.
Focusing on these tasks would require a reversal of Japan’s current budgetary priori‑
ties, which allocate 50 percent more money to the army than to either the air force or
the navy. It will also require improving coordination and introducing joint commands
so that the different services can function more effectively as an integrated whole. A
NEW DEFENSE STRATEGY Business as usual in U.S.‑Japanese military cooperation
and Japan’s own defense effort is a losing proposition. The alliance between the United
States and Japan continues to serve both parties’ critical interests—among other things,
it anchors the U.S. position in Asia—but it is entirely reasonable for the United States
to push for Japan to increase its military spending and continue defense reform. At the
same time, however, spending alone will not be sufficient to meet the evolving threat
posed by China. A fundamental rethink of strategy will be critical. With Chinese incur‑
sions into the Senkaku Islands on the rise, Japan would do well to adopt an active denial
strategy that demonstrates its capacity for a viable, long‑term defense of the islands. By
denying an adversary the possibility of an early knockout blow and promising to turn
any conflict into a protracted affair, the strategy would significantly buttress deterrence
at a time when achieving dominance in areas close to China at a reasonable price is fast
becoming unrealistic. Equally important, a denial strategy would increase crisis stabil‑
ity and mitigate first‑mover advantages. Japanese and forward‑deployed U.S. forces
would not be optimized for immediate offensive action, diminishing Chinese leaders’
fear of attack during a crisis and reducing their incentives for striking first. Similarly,
Japanese and U.S. forces would be less vulnerable to a first strike and, therefore, also
have less incentive to launch a preemptive attack. While all three governments should
seek ways to ease political tensions, military factors will also influence outcomes. An
active denial strategy has unique potential to improve deterrent capability while miti‑
gating crisis instability.

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6.1.9 Amendments are Feasible

Amendments to the Constitution of Japan are feasible.

Martin 14

Craig Martin is a lawyer and legal scholar, and is currently an Associate Pro‑
fessor at Washburn University School of Law, teaching public international
law, the law of armed conflict, constitutional law, and professional responsi‑
bility, ”’Reinterpreting’ Article 9 endangers Japan’s rule of law”, The Japan
Times, 6/27/14, https://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2014/06/27/commentary/japan‑
commentary/reinterpreting‑article‑9‑endangers‑japans‑rule‑of‑law/#.XUhTKuhKiFG

From shortly after the time Japan re‑emerged from the war as a fully sovereign state
in 1952, this has been consistently understood to prohibit Japan from engaging in any
use of force beyond the minimum necessary to defend Japan itself from armed attack.
In other words, it permits individual self‑defense, but prohibits collective self‑defense
and participation in U.N. collective security operations, even though these would be
sovereign rights under international law. Many within the ruling Liberal Democratic
Party (LDP) have sought to amend Article 9 for decades. This has proved impossible for
political reasons. The myth has thus arisen that the formal amendment procedure in the
Constitution is simply too difficult, and that other means of revision are thus justified.
But this is untrue. Recent comparative analysis of the relative difficulty of constitutional
amendment in many democracies has found that at least eight constitutions, including
that of the United States, are more difficult to amend than that of Japan, and yet they
have been amended many times.

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 6 Pro Evidence

6.1.10 SDF Legitimacy

Amendment secures the SDF against continued constitutional challenges and

bolsters self‑defense policy—key to shore up Japanese self‑defense.

Hornung 18

Jeffrey W. Hornung, a political scientist at the nonprofit, nonpartisan RAND Corpora‑

tion. ”Revising Japan’s Peace Constitution: Much Ado About Nothing”, 3‑21‑2018, War
on the Rocks, https://warontherocks.com/2018/03/revising‑japans‑peace‑constitution‑
much‑ado‑about‑nothing/, accessed 7‑13‑2019

The primary benefit of adding the SDF to the constitution is to give the organization a
constitutional basis to exist. More than 220,000 Japanese citizens voluntarily serve their
country in the SDF. At a time when Japan is under increased security challenges from
its neighbors, proponents argue that it is not the time to argue about the constitutional‑
ity of the very force that is defending Japan. By making explicit the status of the SDF,
the proposed change recognizes the value of these individuals who put their lives in
danger to defend Japan against both natural and man‑made crises. Abe is willing to
expend precious political capital on this because he wants to eradicate any question of
doubt about the constitutionality of the SDF. More broadly, he and his Liberal Demo‑
cratic Party have long sought to revise the constitution, which was written under the U.S.
occupation. Seen from this perspective, revision helps overcome some of the problems
associated with the origins of the document, long a source of contention for conservative
elements in Japan.

The change could also elevate the political discussion in the Diet about defense‑related
issues. Whenever security‑related bills are introduced for debate, an inordinate amount
of time is wasted on the SDF’s constitutionality. While opposition parties use this to
score political points against the government, it expends parliamentary time that could
otherwise be spent on debating policies for Japan’s security. Given Japan’s rising secu‑
rity profile, being able to spend time on matters of substance would help the govern‑
ment’s efforts to meet regional challenges. It could also lead to a more effective and
politically sustainable defense policy. Both outcomes, if realized, would be welcome
news to Japan’s U.S. ally as well as other regional security partners who want to see a
more engaged Japan.

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6.1.11 PKOs

Article 9 revision is crucial to participation in peacekeeping operations

Panton 10

Michael A. Panton (L.L.M., with Distinction, the University of Hong Kong; J.D., Syra‑
cuse University College of Law; M.A., Honors First Class, The University of Sydney;
B.S., Summa Cum Laude, Excelsior College). “Japan’s Article 9: Rule of Law v. Flexible
Interpretation.” Temple International & Comparative Law Journal 24:1. Spring 2010.
JDN. https://sites.temple.edu/ticlj/files/2017/02/24.1.Panton‑TICLJ.pdf

Throughout the decades following World War II, the buildup quietly coincided with
Japan’s quest for increased international involvement through participation in peace‑
keeping missions via the enactment of the U.N. Peace Keeping Operation Cooperation
Law (PKO Law).85 The Gulf War and its negative reflection upon Japan caused the
Diet to pass the PKO Law which allowed Japan to dispatch SDF personnel abroad to
participate in U.N. peacekeeping activities as long as the activities met five criteria: 1.
A cease fire must be in effect. 2. The parties in Conflict must approve Japan’s peace‑
keeping mission. 3. The peace keeping operation must be neutral. 4. Japan’s units
will withdraw if any of the above conditions are not met. 5. Japanese use of weapons
must be limited to the minimum necessary to prevent injury or death. (An amendment
after 9/11 allowed the SDF to use arms to not only protect themselves, but to also pro‑
tect those under “their care” such as asylum seekers, refugees or wounded.)86 Since
the enactment of the PKO Law, Japan has been active in a number of U.N. operations
in a variety of countries, including Cambodia, Zaire (the Congo), Mozambique, Golan
Heights, Afghanistan, and Iraq.87 The Iraq deployment was particularly significant as
it was the first time Japanese troops had been in a combat zone since World War II. In
Japan’s continued support of U.S. policy in Iraq, Tokyo also extended the SDF’s airlift
deployment assistance.88 Further, in support of Japan’s desire to take more of a role
in international humanitarian efforts, the SDF was sent to Timor‑Leste (formally East
Timor) in 2002.89 The SDF continued to be active in Timor‑Leste, where in 2007 it par‑
ticipated in a cooperative assignment for election monitoring. In August 2009 two SDF
officers were dispatched to Mali as instructors for training programs of peacekeeping
officers.90 Each peacekeeping mission increases the debate adds to the controversy re‑
garding whether the SDF is constitutional. The argument is that the deployment of
Japanese forces, even for peacekeeping missions, is contrary to the meaning of Article
9. Although the PKO Law may have dealt with that issue, the constitutionality of the

91
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PKO Law itself has not been submitted to judicial scrutiny. The actual constitutional‑
ity of the SDF may be supported, however, under strict adherence to international law,
which states that a nation has the sovereign right of self and collective defense.91 Ad‑
herence to this may be required under Japan’s Supremacy Clause, which subjects the
Japanese Constitution to Japan’s international obligations.92 Since Japan is a member
of the United Nations, an argument can be made that the limitations imposed on the
SDF by Article 9 are circumvented by Articles 43 and 51 of the U.N. Charter. In ana‑
lyzing the impact of international law, Kenneth Port, uses Japan as an example of how
international law can influence domestic policy even without the ability to be coercive.
He has argued that Japan has traditionally looked abroad for tools for social change
and consistently adopted and internalized international law norms.93 Applying Port’s
reasoning, it is not surprising that Japan has relied heavily on its U.N. obligations to
justify its SDF activities and subsequent need for constitutional revision. The flexible
interpretation which assaults the rule of law is evinced through the wording of Article
9 and the overt actions of the SDF, contrary to the original intent of the constitution.
Takehiko Yamamoto of Waseda University elaborated, “it seems the Japanese govern‑
ment believes it need only reinterpret ‑ not change ‑ the Constitution to justify its policy
shifts.”94 The government justifies the SDF’s actions under a number of doctrines, all
of which conveniently position nearly every SDF action, short of actual engagement,
as falling under “defensive measures.”95 Through these allegedly defensive measures,
the SDF has grown not only in size but also in capability and sophistication. Joint op‑
erations, collective security agreements with the United States, expanded peacekeeping
operations, and taking a supporting role in the War on Terror have stretched the cred‑
ibility of Article 9. Piotrowski, in arguing that SDF activity has recently increased at a
rapid rate, stated that Article 9 ought to be amended to explicitly allow for the activi‑
ties that Japan already participates in: For Japan to further increase its involvement in
peacekeeping operations and humanitarian missions, to gain a permanent seat on the
United Nations Security Council, and to gain first‑strike capabilities, all the while either
refusing to amend Article 9 or attempting to justify such changes as wholly constitu‑
tional under Article 9 threatens to undermine the significance of Article 9.96 Japan’s
reliance on the flexibility of Article 9 underscores the contention that change is not on
the horizon.

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 6 Pro Evidence

Article 9 interferes with the ability of Japan to effectively participate in

peacekeeping.

The Economist 17

The Economist online offers authoritative insight and opinion on international

news, politics, business, finance, science and technology, ”Time for Japan’s prime
minister to change the constitution”, The Economist, Leaders Section, 10/28/17,
https://www.economist.com/leaders/2017/10/28/time‑for‑japans‑prime‑minister‑to‑
change‑the‑constitution

Mr Abe is right to want to make clear in the constitution that Japan may, in fact, main‑
tain armed forces. The rule of law matters, and is undermined when the government
nakedly disobeys its principles. What is more, decades of double‑talk over Article 9
have muddled the debate that Japan ought to be having over what role it should play in
maintaining regional and global security. Every time a Japanese government tries to do
more to help its allies, or to contribute more to UN peacekeeping operations, pacifists
cry “unconstitutional”. Most of the time they are right, and even if they are overruled,
they usually delay things. Until last year Japan’s military forces were barred from help‑
ing allies who came under attack in its backyard. Japan’s UN peacekeeping forays are
a joke. Its troops in Iraq had to be protected by Australian forces, because they were not
allowed to shoot back at militants who attacked their base. This year Japanese UN peace‑
keepers pulled out of South Sudan after it was revealed that the war‑ravaged African
country was, yes, a bit dangerous. In July Mr Abe’s defence minister had to resign for
allegedly covering up this well‑known fact.

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 6 Pro Evidence

6.1.12 PKOs – Bosnia

Shrinking EU commitment to the Balkans invites illiberal intervention—Russia,

China, and Turkey fill the vacuum—causes secession crisis and escalating waves of
violence.

Bassuener 19

Kurt Bassuener, co‑founder of the Democratization Policy Council, a Berlin‑based

think tank. A Fulbright scholar, he is currently completing his Ph.D. at the Uni‑
versity of St. Andrews. ”Bosnia’s Last Best Hope”, 7‑10‑2019, Foreign Affairs,
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/bosnia‑herzegovina/2019‑07‑10/bosnias‑last‑
best‑hope, accessed 7‑17‑2019

It’s been almost a quarter century since the Dayton peace accords ended the war in
Bosnia and Herzegovina, in which approximately 100,000 people were killed. The agree‑
ment mandated that a “safe and secure environment” be maintained in the country.
NATO first shouldered that responsibility; later, at the end of 2004, the European Union
took it on. Over the next decade and a half, implementation of the peace accords stalled.
Yet the EU’s force, initially 7,000 strong, withered to an institutional fig leaf of 600 troops,
a shockingly small presence that advertises the EU’s lack of resolve. This force can’t de‑
fend itself against mounting security threats, much less fulfill the mandate of the Dayton
accords.

Weakness invites challenge, particularly in the Balkans. Illiberal actors such as China,
the Gulf states, Turkey, and Russia have all rushed in to fill the vacuum left by West‑
ern listlessness. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Serb‑majority entity, Republika Srpska
(RS), has fallen under Moscow’s influence to an even greater extent than neighboring
Serbia, reinvigorating the Bosnian Serb secessionist movement. Without a liberal, coun‑
tervailing force to restrain them, Bosnia’s unaccountable leaders grow ever bolder in
their ethnic brinkmanship, making renewed conflict more likely and the potential con‑
sequences more dire. Bosnia is experiencing a failure of deterrence that only liberal
democratic powers have the ability to redress.

Bosnian Serb leader Milorad Dodik, now chairing Bosnia and Herzegovina’s tripartite
presidency, has long advocated for the country’s dissolution so the RS can either be‑
come an independent state or unify with Serbia. Bosnian Croat leaders openly support
him, and NATO‑member Croatia does so tacitly, since its ruling party expects to benefit
politically from renewed ethnonational strife. Russia’s deepening engagement in the

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 6 Pro Evidence

region has only strengthened Dodik’s hand. After he applauded Russia’s annexation
of Crimea in 2014 as an expression of “self‑determination,” the Russian ambassador re‑
warded him with a visit. Later, he told Serbia’s then prime minister and now President
Aleksandar Vucic that he had Russian support for an independence bid. Vucic refused
to back him, presumably because he feared backlash from Western powers, but the two
leaders have since grown closer. In May 2014, the RS officially changed its policy on
the European Union Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUFOR) from support for the
mission to calling for its withdrawal.

There have been other worrying signs that Bosnia and Herzegovina is on the road to
violent dissolution. The RS National Assembly recently drew up plans to establish a
1,000‑member auxiliary police unit that many feared could become a de facto RS army,
separate from the national armed forces. RS lawmakers backed away from the plan late
last month after coming under intense domestic and international pressure, only to turn
around and announce a new gendarmerie that is sure to be just as divisive. (The coun‑
try’s Bosniak‑majority federal units predictably responded by planning to muster their
own reserve police force.) RS authorities have also cultivated the loyalty of Bosnian
Serb‑majority infantry units within the country’s armed forces, which are still not com‑
pletely integrated more than a decade after the war. A joint exercise between troops
from one such infantry unit and the thoroughly politicized RS police in May was a trou‑
bling escalation in Dodik’s efforts to stoke secessionist fervor.

Only Japan solves—Article 9 restrictions hamper effective PKO, BUT it’s in a

unique position to bring peace to the region

Bassuener 19

Kurt Bassuener, co‑founder of the Democratization Policy Council, a Berlin‑based

think tank. A Fulbright scholar, he is currently completing his Ph.D. at the Uni‑
versity of St. Andrews. ”Bosnia’s Last Best Hope”, 7‑10‑2019, Foreign Affairs,
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/bosnia‑herzegovina/2019‑07‑10/bosnias‑last‑
best‑hope, accessed 7‑17‑2019

THE NEW FACE OF BALKAN PEACEKEEPING?

With the United States and Europe unwilling or unable to step up, maintaining peace in
Bosnia may fall to two liberal democratic allies already involved: Japan and Canada. As
G‑7 members, both sit on the body that oversees implementation of the Dayton peace

95
 6 Pro Evidence

accords. Japan’s ambassadors in recent years have been refreshingly frank about politi‑
cal corruption in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the inefficacy of EU policy there. Canada,
although it closed its embassy in Sarajevo ten years ago as part of a broader shift of diplo‑
matic resources to the Asia‑Pacific region, has emerged as a leading power promoting
liberal democratic values on the international stage in this era of populist retrenchment.
Together, these two countries could help restore a credible deterrent to renewed conflict
in Bosnia—and by doing so, spark the EU to reassess its policy toward the region, as it
should have done long ago.

Japan and Canada both have long histories of contributing forces abroad. Credited with
having midwifed the United Nations’ first peacekeeping mission in response to the 1956
Suez crisis, Canada has since contributed to blue helmet missions in the Middle East,
Africa, and Haiti. More recently, it deployed troops to the Baltics to deter Russian ag‑
gression following the seizure of Crimea and the conflict in eastern Ukraine. Japan,
restricted by Article 9 of its constitution, which outlaws war as a means to settling the
country’s international disputes, only began participating in peacekeeping operations
in 1991. Since then, it has contributed to international surveillance and anti‑piracy op‑
erations in the Horn of Africa, peacekeeping operations in East Timor, and even the
U.S.‑led coalition in Iraq. Still, despite proclaiming itself a “proactive contributor to
peace” and promoting an increasingly assertive foreign and security policy, Japan has
refrained from contributing to missions with high potential for hostilities, such as the
U.N. peacekeeping mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo, and limited its de‑
ployments to small numbers of officers.

In Bosnia, Japan and Canada can make an enormous difference at relatively little cost.
By deploying a few hundred soldiers each, the two countries could prevent Bosnia from
descending into violence. For example, they could secure Brcko, a city in the northeast
of Bosnia that separates the eastern and western halves of the RS and is governed, un‑
der the terms of the Dayton accords, as its own district. Recognizing the city’s strategic
importance, the United States stationed a significant force near Brcko until it withdrew
in 2004. A deterrent force placed there today would deal a major blow to Dodik’s se‑
cessionist ambitions and reduce the potential for future conflict. Moreover, if Japan and
Canada offered troop contingents to bolster EUFOR and called for others to do the same,
EU and NATO allies might be roused to send troops as well.

The United States, long the anchor of the liberal democratic order, has come unmoored
under the administration of President Donald Trump. Both Japan and Canada have
found this development unsettling, as evidenced by the inability of prime ministers

96
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Shinzo Abe and Justin Trudeau to hide their frustration when Trump rejected hitherto
standard declarations at the G‑7 summit last year. Ottawa has responded to the loss of a
predictable North American partner by deepening its ties with Berlin and Paris. Work‑
ing with Japan to ensure an international peace agreement would strengthen Canada’s
liberal foreign policy project.

For Tokyo, leading in the Balkans would underscore its commitment to a rules‑based
world at a time of national foreign‑policy reassessment. By offering to deploy, in
short order, hundreds of soldiers to support an EU mission under European command
(though with the United Nations’ imprimatur), Japan and Canada could strengthen
ties among allies that historically have been more connected to the United States than
to one another. With a potential second term for Trump on the horizon, Canada, Japan,
and the European Union ought to make such a plan a priority.

That the people of Bosnia must once more look beyond Europe’s shores for allies who
are willing to deter or react to a potential conflict is a sad testament to our times. But
by demonstrating international, liberal, democratic solidarity on this issue, Japan and
Canada can maintain the peace in Bosnia that was so costly to establish nearly 25 years
ago.

EUFOR and the US fails

Bassuener 19

Kurt Bassuener, co‑founder of the Democratization Policy Council, a Berlin‑based

think tank. A Fulbright scholar, he is currently completing his Ph.D. at the Uni‑
versity of St. Andrews. ”Bosnia’s Last Best Hope”, 7‑10‑2019, Foreign Affairs,
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/bosnia‑herzegovina/2019‑07‑10/bosnias‑last‑
best‑hope, accessed 7‑17‑2019

Should a new round of armed violence threaten Bosnia, EUFOR will not be able to pre‑
vent or respond to it. Nearly a decade ago, EU military commanders assessed that a
brigade—about 5,000 troops—would be required for EUFOR to meet its responsibili‑
ties. The main reason the force has failed to maintain that number is lack of will on the
part of Europe. Bureaucratic EU institutions, and most EU member states, are unwilling
even to admit there is a security issue in Bosnia, let alone to address it. The United King‑
dom, typically inclined toward greater realism on the matter, has a contingent of troops
on call to reinforce EUFOR. But the still unresolved Brexit mess has made London less

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assertive in Europe. So long as its relationship with the EU remains unclear, the United
Kingdom is unlikely to intervene in the Balkans.

As European resolve to continue peacekeeping in Bosnia diminishes, the United States

has also become a dangerously unreliable leader in the Balkans. The Trump adminis‑
tration, which seems to practice its own form of Balkan politics at home, has actively
stoked tensions in the region, both by pushing a land swap between Serbia and Kosovo
that would effectively partition the latter—whetting the appetites of all those with unful‑
filled agendas—and with its overall nationalist ethos. Given that in the event of a crisis,
U.S. forces in Italy are supposed to provide backup to both EUFOR and NATO’s force
in Kosovo, the U.S. administration’s apparent lack of commitment to the region—and
the departure of its last internationalist, former Secretary of Defense James Mattis—has
worrying implications for Bosnia’s stability.

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 6 Pro Evidence

6.1.13 Not Pacifist

Article 9 doesn’t ensure commitment to pacifist principles.

Port 4

Kenneth L. Port (Professor of Law and Director of Intellectual Property Law Studies,
William Mitchell College of Law; J.D. 1989 University of Wisconsin). “Article 9 of the
Japanese Constitution and the Rule of Law.” Cardozo Journal of International and Com‑
parative Law, Vol 13:127. 2004. JDN.

Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution, on its face as translated into English, prohibits
the acquisition or maintenance of all war materiel. Yet, Japan has the fourth largest mil‑
itary in the world today, just behind France and far ahead of Great Britain. However,
in striking contrast to this basic fact, the Japanese people believe they are pacifists 1 and
that their Constitution requires Japan to be a pacifist nation. 2 Others cite Japan’s Con‑
stitution as the ”Peace Constitution”’ 3 and other such laudatory appellations. With the
fourth largest military in the world, how could anyone ever come to believe that Japan is
a pacifist state or that the Japanese Constitution mandates this? This might be one of the
strangest geo‑political disconnects in the modern era. The data presented below indi‑
cates that this claim to pacifism is simply impossible. Additionally, the constitutionality
of the Japanese military has been challenged numerous times. 14 Although lower courts
have found the existence of the military to be unconstitutional, the Supreme Court of
Japan has implied both that the right to defend a sovereign country is an inalienable
right of a nation state, and that the constitutionality of the military in Japan is a non‑
justiciable political question best left to the legislature. This raises the concern that the
Japanese Supreme Court does not follow the rule of law.15 In a different context, some
have argued that Japan relies on legal principles and follows the rule by law principle,
but not the rule of law principle. 16 This article attempts to answer whether, in light of
the consistent Japanese Supreme Court rulings, the SDF is constitutional. Such an ap‑
proach will focus on whether, in light of Article 9, this rule of law ought to be followed,
and whether the rule of law is indeed recognized and followed in Japan. Addition‑
ally, this article argues that the terrorist attacks in the United States on September 11,
2001, have caused the SDF to further expand in apparent disregard of Article 9.17 The
Japanese Diet and Cabinet have authorized a force of some 550 to join the United States
”coalition” in Iraq. This has led to intense debate and analysis in Japan regarding the
role Japan’s military should play in Iraq in light of Article 9. It is striking how little
attention Article 9 and the constitutionality of the SDF receive outside of Japan.

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 6 Pro Evidence

The Japanese public accepts a more militarized Japanese military.

Port 4
Kenneth L. Port (Professor of Law and Director of Intellectual Property Law Studies,
William Mitchell College of Law; J.D. 1989 University of Wisconsin). “Article 9 of the
Japanese Constitution and the Rule of Law.” Cardozo Journal of International and Com‑
parative Law, Vol 13:127. 2004. JDN.
The Japanese public is becoming increasingly sensitized to the dispatch of Japanese
troops to Iraq.18 These troops are expected to play a role in reconstructing the coun‑
try and building water purification plants and schools, but not to engage in overt mil‑
itary action. The troops are lightly armed and operate under the rules of engagement,
which allows them to defend themselves but not to initiate action. This is the first time
since World War II that Japanese troops have been so authorized. At the time of this
writing, there were 550 Ground Self Defense Force soldiers stationed in Samawah, Iraq.
The existence of Article 9 in the Japanese Constitution is interpreted as preventing the
Japanese troops from firing first. This is one tortured example of the effect Article 9 has
on Japanese society, but it is not by any means the only one. Although Japanese soci‑
ety is now waking up to this issue,19 it is not the first time Japanese troops have been
dispatched overseas in peacekeeping roles.20 In 1992, Japanese troops, for the first time,
went abroad on a peacekeeping mission related to elections in Cambodia.2’ In addition,
there are currently 45 Ground Self Defense troops stationed in the Golan Heights en‑
gaged in logistical support of UN troops. For these troops, ”logistical support” is a nice
way of saying they carry food and dirty laundry for other ”real” troops.22 Article 9 is
also interpreted to mean that Japan can engage in ”self‑defense,” but not in ”collective
self‑defense. ’23 This difference precluded Japanese Maritime Self Defense Forces from
dispatching Aegis‑class destroyers to the Indian Ocean in support of United States ef‑
forts in the war in Iraq and Afghanistan. The initial ships, dispatched in December of
2001, did not have the Aegis missile defense system that would have allowed Japanese
ships to collectively defend against missile threats to the fleet. However, weather over‑
came this obstacle. It turns out that the weather in or near the Indian Ocean is hot. The
Japanese sailors on the nonAegis ships were not sleeping well and therefore not perform‑
ing at their peak potential. The Aegis destroyers have better air conditioning systems.
Therefore, the Aegis‑class destroyers were deployed to replace the non‑Aegis destroy‑
ers. Although mention was made of the previous ban on collective self‑defense, the ban
was overcome by weather, 24 and by the claim that United States ships would indepen‑
dently verify data received from the Japanese Aegis‑class destroyers before taking any

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 6 Pro Evidence

action, thus preserving the sanctity of the Japanese Constitution. There are numerous
such anecdotes that only get odder and more tortured over time.25

The SDF already violates commitment to pacifist principles.

Port 4

Kenneth L. Port (Professor of Law and Director of Intellectual Property Law Studies,
William Mitchell College of Law; J.D. 1989 University of Wisconsin). “Article 9 of the
Japanese Constitution and the Rule of Law.” Cardozo Journal of International and Com‑
parative Law, Vol 13:127. 2004. JDN.

The first ”draft” of the Japanese Constitution was initially created by MacArthur’s staff.6
” It was submitted to the Japanese on February 13, 1946.69 The Japanese and Americans
together translated the document in 35 hours.7 0 This translated document was then ne‑
gotiated within the Japanese government for much of the summer of 1946. Reviewing
the negotiations that transpired within the Japanese government and interactions with
the Supreme Command for the Allied Powers (”SCAP”), one does not get the sense
that Article 9 could somehow be interpreted to justify the existence of the fourth largest
military in the world. The impression one gets is exactly the opposite. The Legisla‑
tive Bureau prepared minutes of many questionand‑answer dialogues regarding the
adoption of the new constitution. This was prepared for the Privy Council and the
Diet. These ”discussions” took place between April and June of 1946. Excerpts from
this dialogue reveal the original intent of Article 9. First, one gets the sense that the
Japanese drafters had a history in mind while contemplating Article 9: ”Our revised
Constitution has two guarantees. These make the document epoch‑making. The first
guarantee makes aggressive war impossible ... The second guarantee makes aggressive
war legally impossible by prohibiting the exercise of the nation’s war power. Because
of these guarantees, fighting a war becomes impossible in any case. 71 This article is
epoch‑making . . . [B]y deeply reflecting on its collapse in losing World War II, Japan
made a decision, a desperate decision, to eliminate any possibility to start a war and to
put its safety and security in the justice and fairness of the citizens of other countries in
the world who love peace. This is a fundamental notion of pacifism that is manifested
in Article 9.7 2 There is a clear indication that Japan feared that a war could be started
under the rubric of ”defense.” For those purposes, even the right to defend Japan mili‑
tarily from aggressors was thought abandoned under Article 9. These [constitutional]
guarantees are exhaustive. Although not directly addressed in paragraph 1 of Article

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9, [this article] prohibits even war for defensive purposes. This is unavoidable. First,
if the Constitution allows a defensive war, such prohibition can easily be evaded and
these guarantees watered down ... Second, there is a risk that Japan might start a war
under the name of self‑defense.73 Question: What is the relationship between Article
9 and selfdefense? Answer: Originally, the first paragraph of Article 9 dealt with an
affirmative, aggressive war. This paragraph had nothing to do with self‑defense. How‑
ever, the second paragraph prohibits Japan from having any armed force in addition
to prohibiting Japan from starting war from the first paragraph. Thus, even if a war is
self‑defensive in nature, Japan cannot fight such a war with other countries, pursuant
to paragraph 2. Japan might resist, but it cannot fight under its inherent war power.
Adding an exception for a defensive war may leave room for Japan to start an aggres‑
sive war under the name of a defensive war. An exception for defensive war was not
added in order to realize our pacifism.74 It is clear that the initial intent of Article 9 was
to abandon the ability to wage war. This did not mean that Japan gave up her inher‑
ent right of sovereignty to defend herself, only that she agreed not to do so militarily.
Question: What happens if a foreign country makes war against Japan? Answer: ... In
such a case, appealing to justice of an international society we may find a way to pre‑
vent the attack. We believe that the appropriate road for Japan is to pursue the ideal 75
The purpose of this article may simply be that we should rely on justice and fairness of
the countries of the world and that such an invasion does not occur.76 The following
excerpt sums up what was in the minds of the Japanese drafters when contemplating a
new constitution: [Article 9] is the one article where Japan declares to abandon all war
forever. This is the most distinguishable article in this draft. This is a unique declara‑
tion of pacifism. The first paragraph means that Japan will abandon war as an exercise
of the nation’s sovereignty and that Japan will never use armed force or threaten the
use of armed force. The second paragraph declares that Japan will not be allowed to
maintain any army, navy, or air force, or other armed forces even though the power to
wage war is a fundamental one for any nation.77 Even though these pronouncements
by the Legal Affairs Bureau are striking, perhaps the most surprising comments come
from MacArthur himself, upon announcing a new constitution for Japan on March 2,
1946: Foremost of its provisions is that which, abolishing war as a sovereign right of
the nation, forever renounces the threat or use of force as a means for settling disputes
with any other nation and forbids in the future the authorization of any army, navy, air
force or other war potential or assumption of rights of belligerency by the state. By this
undertaking and commitment Japan surrenders rights inherent in her own sovereignty
and renders her future security and very survival subject to the good faith and justice of

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the peace loving peoples of the world.78 Chillingly, records of the Privy Council kept
in April and May of 1946 indicate a discussion between Joji Matsumoto,7 9 on the one
hand, and several other Council members on the other. Matsumoto was questioned
about the right of self‑defense. He declared that the right to defend one’s self was not
a ”right of war” but should be thought of separately. He concluded that the Constitu‑
tion did not prevent Japan from defending itself, but that ”defense” must not be done
militarily. When Council Member Isaka questioned Matsumoto about the relationship
between the Emperor and the right of self‑defense, Matsumoto ended the conversation
by indicating that, ”[i]f the Emperor objected, it would be dangerous. ”80 It is impossi‑
ble to tell for sure to what Matsumoto was referring. However, one may surmise that he
meant that if the Japanese government insisted on the right to military defense, it would
mean the end of the emperor system ‑ something unfathomable at the time. Therefore,
the record is replete with confirmation that the original intent of Article 9 was to forever
abandon a military for all purposes.”’ It is thus clear that the SDF, as currently consti‑
tuted, is inconsistent with this original vision of Japan as a peace‑loving country that
has put her fate and security in the hands of peaceloving citizens of the world. Such
idealism is remarkably naive.

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 6 Pro Evidence

6.1.14 Self‑Defense

Rearmament is key to effective self‑defense

Ormsbee 20

Capt Matthew H. Ormsbee, USAF, ”Japan Reborn: Rearmament for Pacifism,” Air
University (AU), 1‑2‑2020, https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Wild‑Blue‑Yonder/Article‑
Display/Article/2007515/japan‑reborn‑rearmament‑for‑pacifism/, accessed 3‑14‑2022

Scoping Self‑Defense Article 51 of the UN Charter permits military action in self‑defense

and defines such self‑defense as using force to repel an attack or imminent threat of at‑
tack directed at the self‑defending state or a legally protectable interest. Article 51 states
in part: “Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or
collective self‑defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the UN, until the
Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and se‑
curity.” In practice, one would expect to find a definitive standard in international law
for demonstrating evidence necessary to justify self‑defense. Yet, there is no such stan‑
dard. In the absence of definitive guidance, states must rely on vaguely worded treaties
and court opinions that touch on self‑defense in nonbinding dicta. One such statement
comes from Judge Sergei Borisovitch Krylov in his dissenting opinion in Corfu Chan‑
nel (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland v. People’s Republic of
Albania), decided by the International Court of Justice in 1947. In his dissent, Judge
Krylov indicated that self‑defense acts must be based on realities rather than possibili‑
ties, stating that “one cannot condemn a State on the basis of probabilities. To establish
international responsibility, one must have clear and indisputable facts.” While gener‑
ally informative, such guidance is not concrete enough for states to rely upon it in use of
global self‑defense. Yet, the absence of a clear international standard for reasonableness
of self‑defense has not stopped the United States from adopting an understanding of
when self‑defense is justified. In 2016, former US State Department Legal Adviser Brian
Egan cited a famous work by Sir Daniel Bethlehem in describing the American stance
on self‑defense.7 Mr. Egan stated, “The absence of a specific evidence of where an attack
will take place or of the precise nature of an attack does not preclude a conclusion that
an armed attack is imminent for purposes of the exercise of the right of self‑defense, pro‑
vided that there is a reasonable and objective basis for concluding that an armed attack
is imminent.” However, no definition or guidance is given for the term “reasonable and
objective basis,” leaving states once again to reach for definitive guidance.8 Ultimately,
the reasonableness of use of self‑defense—as an international legal standard—should

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mirror a American common law standard that requires self‑defense to be reasonable

from both an objective and subjective point of view. Such a standard would mirror the
standard from Mr. Egan by requiring both objective justification and reasonableness.
From an objective point of view, one asks whether, under the circumstances, any state
would feel threatened to the extent that self‑defense is necessary. In Japan’s case, mili‑
tary chest‑puffing by neighbors—North Korean missile testing and Chinese aggression
vis‑à‑vis Taiwan—could cause any government to fear for future military aggression.9
Thus, it is conceivable that any state, without regard to Japan’s unique concerns, might
feel that acts of self‑defense are justified to counter a concrete threat. Assuming that the
use of self‑defense is objectively reasonable, such use must still be subjectively reason‑
able under the circumstances. From a subjective point of view, one asks whether the
state in question actually feels threatened to the extent that it feels the need to rely on
self‑defense for self‑preservation. Under this line of inquiry, one considers how threat‑
ened the Japanese actually feel in their particular situation. Doing so permits one to
consider the idiosyncratic history and relationships Japan has with North Korea and
China, for example, to decide if use of self‑defense is justified. Presumably, the subjec‑
tivity prong will almost always be met if one determines that the objectivity prong has
been also been met. That is, if any country in Japan’s position would feel that use of self‑
defense is necessary to counter a threat, then it may be a foregone conclusion that Japan
believes in good faith that self‑defense is required. Finally, even if military self‑defense
is not warranted today, preparation for widescale self‑defense may be warranted. Af‑
ter all, self‑defense on a state level is not an option without considerable preparation
to enable quick and effective reactions. Defense personnel and assets must already be
in place at the time of an attack to effectively counter an attack. Under a separate line
of reasoning, substantial investment in a self‑defense framework even without a con‑
crete threat may be permissible because deterrence of adversary aggression is itself an
effective form of self‑defense.

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 6 Pro Evidence

6.1.15 Collective Self‑Defense

Collective self‑defense is recognized in international law—SDF build up is key to

achieve such goals

Ormsbee 20

Capt Matthew H. Ormsbee, USAF, ”Japan Reborn: Rearmament for Pacifism,” Air
University (AU), 1‑2‑2020, https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Wild‑Blue‑Yonder/Article‑
Display/Article/2007515/japan‑reborn‑rearmament‑for‑pacifism/, accessed 3‑14‑2022

Collective Self‑Defense In 2014, Prime Minister Abe formed a legislative committee to

propose laws enabling collective self‑defense, so that Japan could claim defense not
only of its own territories but also of its allies.12 The public and members of the Diet fa‑
vored such laws and passed legislation authorizing collective self‑defense in March 2016.
When asked about the law, a senior Japanese diplomat admitted that the law was passed
largely in reaction to North Korea. Pyongyang’s missile capabilities have grown with
each passing year. If North Korea were to start a war with the United States, without
the collective self‑defense law, Japan might be sidelined and unable to help the United
States in the midst of armed conflict, absent a direct attack on Japan. The new law is an
acknowledgment of the delicate peace in the Indo‑Pacific Region and Tokyo’s obligation
to support Washington in the event of open hostilities on US Forces. Yet, if Tokyo has
demonstrated openness to broadening the aperture of self‑defense by acknowledging
collective self‑defense, could even broader authority be granted? For instance, if a ma‑
jority of Japanese lawmakers can support the notion that self‑defense includes defense
of Japanese and ally territories, would they support efforts to defend not only territorial
sovereignty but also Japanese economic interests? And would they find broad support
for deterrent forms of self‑defense as well? If the best offense is a good defense, then leg‑
islators may well support aggressive Japanese military maneuvers in the South China
Sea under the theory that military demonstrations act as deterrence and deterrence is
a potent form of self‑defense. In any case, the March 2016 collective self‑defense leg‑
islation is consistent with international law norms proscribing state rights to collective
and individual self‑defense. Notably, Japan joined the UN in 1956, matching Japan’s
pacifist hopes with the UN’s mandate for a peaceful world order. By joining the UN,
Japan thereby accepted the terms of the UN Charter. Article 2(4) of the UN Charter
prohibits the threat or use of force and calls on all members to respect the sovereignty,
territorial integrity and political independence of other states. Yet, as a signatory to the
UN Charter, Japan also became bound by Article 51 of the UN Charter, reaffirming “the

106
 6 Pro Evidence

inherent right of collective or individual self‑defense if an armed attack occurs against

a member of the United Nations.” The same right to self‑defense finds voice in interna‑
tional legal precedent, as affirmed by the International Court of Justice in The Republic
of Nicaragua v. The United States of America (1986).13 Article 51 of the UN Charter
enshrines the right to self‑defense and collective self‑defense but does not limit a state’s
right to self‑defense in the absence of an armed attack. In other words, Article 51’s rights
proclamation is confined to a situation when an armed attack has occurred, but does not
expand or limit a state’s self‑defense rights when an armed attack has not actually oc‑
curred. This is an important distinction, since states may exercise self‑defense for actual,
perceived threats of force by other states, though an armed attack may not yet transpire.
Indeed, the current leadership of North Korea seems to favor routine missile testing
and intimidation techniques while taking careful measures to avoid an actual armed
attack. There is no question that if a North Korean missile actually landed on Japanese
soil, Japanese and ally forces would instantly declare this an act of war and react with
proportional measures against North Korea. Fortunately, no such event has occurred.
However, this does not preclude Japan from monitoring the North Korean threat and
aggressively investing in the SDF to deter North Korean missile testing and to act deci‑
sively in the event of hostilities. Those favoring a lethargic Japanese response to Chinese
and Korean acts of aggression may cite the standard for self‑defense under international
customary law, as delineated in the Caroline case. The resulting test, reaffirmed in the
Nuremberg Tribunal, states that the necessity for preemptive self‑defense must be “in‑
stant, overwhelming, and leaving no choice of means, and no moment for deliberation.”
Yet, a steady buildup of SDF war potential, which is proportional to perceived threats
and necessary to counter a future attack, is not preemptive war. Importantly, Japanese
rearmament is not necessarily greater war potential toward warring ends. Rather, rear‑
mament can be viewed as cautious preparatory steps in the name of self‑defense and
collective defense. Globalism demands interconnected alliances with a strong backbone.
As Japan’s 75‑year‑old conversation about the role of its military continues, Japan will
continue to rely heavily on American military preeminence, but America must be able
to rely on Japanese fortification in the face of a threat. Embrace of collective self‑defense
gives Japan a loud voice in this dialogue and will allow transpacific partners to amplify
defense measures for its allies.

107
 6 Pro Evidence

6.1.16 Defense Planning

Military buildup is necessary to shore up the alliance

Ormsbee 20

Capt Matthew H. Ormsbee, USAF, ”Japan Reborn: Rearmament for Pacifism,” Air
University (AU), 1‑2‑2020, https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Wild‑Blue‑Yonder/Article‑
Display/Article/2007515/japan‑reborn‑rearmament‑for‑pacifism/, accessed 3‑14‑2022

Defense Planning In December 2018, Japan published its defense plan for the next
decade. Under the plan, Japan will create its first aircraft carrier since World War II,
spend roughly $240 billion on the SDF through 2024, increase its defense expenditures,
and purchase new fighter jets, including the F‑35. These allocations are a direct result
of relations with the United States and key Asian neighbors. As for the United States,
over Memorial Day weekend in 2019, President Trump was the first foreign dignitary
to visit Emperor Naruhito, who had recently ascended to the Chrysanthemum Throne.
As a cordial diplomatic gesture, the visit belied concerns that the United States is less
engaged in the Indo‑Pacific Region of late and that the US‑Japan alliance, in particular,
has been a secondary concern in the White House. If Japan’s faith in its alliance
with United States is shaken, then it is natural for Japan to invest in its own defense
infrastructure should the United States waver in its support of Japan. The allocations
also squarely address Tokyo’s concern over Pyongyang’s ability to strike Japan with
conventional and nuclear weapons. Kim Jong‑un has proven himself unpredictable
and dangerous. The proximity to an unstable head of state should understandably
lead Japan to take precautionary steps to defend itself if necessary. North Korea is
viewed by much of the world as a rogue state and Japan, if sufficiently provoked by
North Korea, must have the option to strike back proportionally. Finally, China’s
shadow extends far beyond Japan to the US mainland. Its undeniable economic
clout and global ambition make it a long‑term threat to neighboring countries and
leading democracies. Microaggressions in disputed international waters have created
territorial disputes with the threat of armed conflict.14 Leaders in China and Japan
have embraced a “warming period” in the Chinese‑Japanese relationship beginning
in 2018.15 Importantly, President Xi plans a diplomatic visit to Japan later in 2019.
Yet, Japan is right to strengthen its military capabilities and break from its postwar
hangover. However, in doing so it faces an unenviable dilemma: do so too quickly
and Japan risks appearing like it is stockpiling for war, which may provoke China; on
the other hand, do so too slowly and Japan will fall further behind Beijing in military

108
 6 Pro Evidence

capabilities. While Japan’s increased defense spending is a reaction to regrettable

provocations by neighboring states, its fiscal maneuvering strengthens the US‑Japan
alliance and should spur the United States to match investment in US‑Japan joint
exercises and the long‑term viability of the partnership. Particularly, if Japan is
signaling a willingness to loosen its purse strings in the name of international stability,
the United States should show receptiveness to a rearmed Japan. Ensuring maximum
self‑sufficiency between Japan and the United States is a catch‑22: a reassurance of
quick defensive measures from the United States would allow Japan to breathe easy
knowing a powerful ally is ever‑present, while a cool and distant approach from the
United States, while diplomatically unpalatable, may incentivize Japan to reinvigorate
its military for self‑serving purposes. Ultimately, as Japan continues to commit to a
policy of defense reinvigoration, a future reverse‑course from the United States would
ensure the strongest possible linkage between Japan and the United States, ensuring
that Japan can stand strong by itself, but together with the United States, it would be
an unquestioned military power.

109
 6 Pro Evidence

6.1.17 F‑35s

F‑35s are key to effective air power

Ormsbee 20

Capt Matthew H. Ormsbee, USAF, ”Japan Reborn: Rearmament for Pacifism,” Air
University (AU), 1‑2‑2020, https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Wild‑Blue‑Yonder/Article‑
Display/Article/2007515/japan‑reborn‑rearmament‑for‑pacifism/, accessed 3‑14‑2022

F‑35 Partnership On June 18, 2019, Japan formally requested information on the process
for joining the F‑35 program as a full partner country.16 The Pentagon has signaled that
it is unlikely to grant Japan’s request and would prefer for Japan to remain merely a cus‑
tomer of the program. Two issues supporting this stance are the changes that would be
required for the international production base, which would be politically fraught yet
required if Japan joined as a partner state, and the slippery slope argument that granting
Japan partner status would open the flood gates to other customer countries demanding
partner status. Included in its initial inquiry about partner status, Japan sought infor‑
mation about cost sharing among the industrial consortium states, clearly indicating a
willingness to adopt costs of partnership as well as the benefits of partnership. Ellen
Lord, the Pentagon acquisition head, will communicate with Japan’s defense ministry,
but the F‑35 Joint Program Office (JPO) has already indicated that partnership is limited
to the initial F‑35 investor countries, and that there are no plans to expand partnership
to other countries. Indeed, the window for F‑35 partnership closed on July 15, 2002.16 A
2007 memo reiterates this interpretation, stating that only initial partners would enjoy
partnership privileges during the production, sustainment, and modernization stages
of the F‑35 program. Yet, Japan’s interest in partnership comes at a critical moment
in which the Pentagon should not reflexively dismiss Japan’s interest without serious
consideration. In a time of leadership turnover in the JPO (as Vice Admiral Mat Winter
retires) and Turkey’s involuntary exit from the F‑35 consortium, Japan’s entreaty should
be more warmly received than ever.17 Moreover, aside from the United States, Japan
will be the state with the most F‑35’s in the near future. While the Pentagon must take
steps to enforce the original partnership agreement (and not aggravate initial partners),
the Department of Defense and Department of State originally drafted the agreement
and can create a process to allow states to become partner countries. Permitting Japan
to become a partner makes sense on many levels. Doing so would grant Japan direct
involvement in the JPO. This would also allow Japan to station national representatives
in the JPO, who would have a say in important decision making on future F‑35 capa‑

110
 6 Pro Evidence

bilities and industrial participation. While the former authority would allow Japan to
steer research and development for the F‑35 ahead of its Block 4 upgrade, the latter
authority could potentially allow Japan to net billions in revenue by permitting Japan
to manufacture jet parts that flow into a greater global supply chain. Moreover, Japan
would fit in nicely with the other partner states: Australia, Canada, Denmark, Italy, the
Netherlands, Norway, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Japan’s fu‑
ture stake in the F‑35 program is undeniable: in December 2018, the nation proclaimed
it planned to expand procurement of F‑35’s from 42 to 147 jets, instantly making it the
operator of the most F‑35’s, aside from the United States, along with one of just three
states to operate the F‑35B model. Japan’s letter of interest in becoming a partner state ac‑
knowledges that “partner countries share significant costs,” thus intimating that Japan
is willing to accept an important quid pro quo: substantial and timely investment in the
program in exchange for greater control of the program. Lastly, making Japan a partner
state need not open the door to every customer state demanding partnership. As noted
above, Japan’s purchase history and enthusiasm in the program is already exceptional
and unmatched. This sets the nation apart from South Korea, for example, which was
the first state in line to become a customer. Future partner hopefuls could match Japan’s
investment and make their case for partnership as well, thus growing the program and
ensuring all partners benefit. Further setting Japan apart from other countries is its
longstanding relationship of trust and support from the United States, Japan occupies a
singular place in this regard. While the history of this alliance is remarkable, the future
of the relationship will ultimately dictate the partnership’s influence and longevity.

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6.1.18 AT: Polls

Polls are biased by uninformed voters; the public supports amendment once they
learn about it

Abe 13

Shinzo Abe (Prime Minister of Japan). “Japan Is Back, A Conversation With Shinzo
Abe.” Foreign Affairs. 16 May 2013. JDN. http://www.asia.udp.cl/Informes/2013/
Japan_Is_Back.pdf

Why does the majority of the Japanese public still oppose constitutional revision? More
than 50 percent of Japanese nationals support the idea of changing the constitution [in
general], while less than 50 percent support the amendment of Article 9. But polls also
indicate that once told the rationale in more detail, they turn in favor of amendment. So
you think they just don’t understand the issue? Only 30 percent of the people support
enabling the right to use force for collective self‑defense. But when we present a specific
case involving, for instance, a missile launch by North Korea, and we explain to the
public that Japan could shoot down missiles targeting Japan, but not missiles targeting
the U.S. island of Guam, even though Japan has the ability to do so, then more than 60
percent of the public acknowledges that this is not right.

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 6 Pro Evidence

6.1.19 AT: Reinterpret

The Gulf War proves reinterpretation fails.

Panton 10

Michael A. Panton (L.L.M., with Distinction, the University of Hong Kong; J.D., Syra‑
cuse University College of Law; M.A., Honors First Class, The University of Sydney;
B.S., Summa Cum Laude, Excelsior College). “Japan’s Article 9: Rule of Law v. Flexible
Interpretation.” Temple International & Comparative Law Journal 24:1. Spring 2010.
JDN. https://sites.temple.edu/ticlj/files/2017/02/24.1.Panton‑TICLJ.pdf

The Gulf War presented a challenge to the sustainability of the executive office as Prime
Minister Kaifu attempted to reinterpret Article 9. After the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait,
Kaifu sought to extend the meaning of Article 9 and have it circumvented by a cabi‑
net ruling to allow SDF participation to enforce sanctions against Iraq. Kaifu’s attempt
failed to gain legislative support amidst public pressure over the impact the proposed
action would have on Article 9.36 When combat ensued in the Gulf War, it brought in‑
ternational criticism for Japan’s “checkbook diplomacy.”37 The negative international
attention was not enough to immediately and automatically force a change in policy.
Though Japan enacted its Peacekeeping Operations Law (PKO) in 1992, which allowed
for U.N. participation, it was only after months of bitter debate within the Diet.38 Al‑
though the PKO relegated the SDF to relatively safe positions far from combat, it still
generated tremendous domestic opposition. Prime Minister Kaifu’s successor, Kiichi
Miyazawa, attempted to enact reforms, which included constitutional revision.39 He
was forced to resign after a no confidence vote because his reform proposals led, in part,
to the LDP losing its first elections since its inception in 1955.40 While it is difficult to
gauge the impact that revision issues had on Kaifu and Miyazawa, due to the numerous
scandals that surrounded the LDP at the time, there is no question that such political
fallout could impact the executive office.41

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 6 Pro Evidence

6.1.20 AT: Miscalc

Amending Article 9 would reduce the chance that SDF readiness is miscalculated.

CFR 19

The Council on Foreign Relations (CFR), founded in 1921, is a United States nonprofit
think tank specializing in U.S. foreign policy and international affairs), “Japan Is Re‑
assessing Its Military Power as U.S.‑Japan Alliance Is Tested, Writes Sheila Smith in New
Book”, Council on Foreign Relations, 4/1/19, https://www.cfr.org/news‑releases/japan‑
reassessing‑its‑military‑power‑us‑japan‑alliance‑tested‑writes‑sheila‑smith‑new

Japanese leaders “understand that it is not in their best interest to limit their military
as others invest in their own,” Smith writes, and “the growing military power of China
and North Korea create pressures on Japan’s defenses.” With North Korea’s nuclear
ambitions and China’s increasingly assertive maritime activities, Northeast Asia has
become a more contested region where the SDF “now regularly runs up against the
expanding armed forces of its neighbors.” “As American political leaders openly de‑
bate their commitment to allied defenses, Japanese politicians are beginning to argue
for greater military capabilities,” Smith writes, “including limited strike capability, to
ensure potential adversaries do not miscalculate SDF readiness.” Smith identifies three
crisis scenarios that could prompt Tokyo to move in this direction: A missile launch by
North Korea. Such a launch could strike Japanese territory, “revealing the inability of
[U.S.] ballistic missile defense to ensure Japanese security.” The U.S. abandonment of
its longstanding maritime dominance in Asia, leaving Japan “open to greater Chinese
pressure.” A failure of the U.S.‑Japan alliance in a crisis, whereby “Washington might
sit on the sidelines, or worse yet, advocate against Japanese interests.”

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 6 Pro Evidence

6.1.21 AT: Militarism

Article 9 revision wouldn’t cause militarism

Krauss 19

Ellis Krauss, Professor Emeritus at the School of Global Policy and Strategy at the Uni‑
versity of California, San Diego. ”Japan’s constitutional revision debate isn’t asking the
right questions”, 2‑19‑2019, East Asia Forum, https://www.eastasiaforum.org/2019/02/19/
japans‑constitutional‑revision‑debate‑isnt‑asking‑the‑right‑questions/, accessed 7‑11‑
2019

Those who oppose any revision think the current status quo is fine and with almost‑
religious fervour insist that any change will open the floodgates for Japan to once again
become an aggressive military power or get drawn into a war because of the United
States.

The former fear is silly given the viability of Japan’s democracy, the public’s anti‑
militarist attitudes, the electoral accountability of the system and the influence of
political opposition. But the latter is quite rational. The ‘alliance dilemma’ is a crucial
consideration, especially for a country that has enjoyed the benefits of peace under US
protection for almost 75 years: how not to become abandoned by the bigger alliance
partner or become trapped in military adventures that are not in the smaller partner’s
interest.

Militarism is inevitable even without revision

Kingston 20

Jeff Kingston, Director of Asian Studies at Temple University, Japan, ”Japan’s quiet
rearmament,” Prospect Magazine, 11‑11‑2020, https://www.prospectmagazine.co.uk/
magazine/japans‑quiet‑rearmament‑shinzo‑abe, accessed 3‑14‑2022

In August, just four days after setting a record for the longest uninterrupted run as
Japanese prime minister, Shinzō Abe announced that he would be resigning due to ill
health. The 65‑year‑old had first been premier back in 2006, and had cut an instantly
recognisable figure on the world stage—not only because of his distinctive quiffed hair,
but also because of his approach to Japan’s wartime legacy. (Abe had visited controver‑
sial war memorials that honoured war criminals, and quibbled in Japan’s parliament,

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the Diet, about how much coercion was used to recruit the “comfort women” who were
forced into wartime military brothels.) His more recent spell in office had begun in
2012, and he now signalled it was time to step aside, saying he didn’t want his wors‑
ening ulcerative colitis to interfere with his decision‑making. As well as giving Japan a
level of stability at the top that it had not seen in years, Abe oversaw Japan’s recovery
from the devastating earthquake, tsunami and the nuclear disaster at Fukushima. His
bold, multi‑pronged “Abenomics” strategy promised to inject some life into the chron‑
ically anaemic Japanese economy; most experts were sceptical about its effectiveness
even before Covid‑19 struck. For a long time he enjoyed public standing as a man of
action. Yet the once‑popular leader had more recently dropped in the polls. He ex‑
ited under a cascade of sordid revelations—cronyism scandals, cover‑up allegations
and close links with politicians indicted for bribery—which leave a tarnished legacy.
For the man himself, however, there is little doubt what his biggest disappointment
is: the failure to revise the pacifist Article 9 of his country’s constitution. Written in
1947, under the supervision of the occupying Americans after the Second World War,
Abe and other conservatives argue that Article 9 hampers Tokyo’s capacity to respond
to the 21st‑century challenges in its region, such as China’s hegemonic ambitions and
North Korea’s nuclear weapons. In practice, Japanese governments—and the Abe gov‑
ernment in particular—have circumvented the restrictions, but the deeper issue is more
about identity: revising Article 9 was central to Abe’s ambitions to restore Japanese
autonomy, pride and power. For those who regret the world’s turn towards nation‑
alism and militarism in recent years, the collapse of the project might from a distance
appear to offer a case study in hope. But does it really? A family affair Fundamental
questions about Japan’s place in the world can be traced deep into the nation’s past.
Between the early 17th and the mid‑19th century, the country closed its doors under
the policy of “Sakoku,” locking out most trade, diplomacy and other forms of interna‑
tional engagement, which ended only when US Commodore Matthew Perry forced his
way in with a convoy of warships in the 1850s. At the turn of the 20th century, tenta‑
tive democratisation and internationalism appeared to be advancing hand‑in‑hand, but
the western‑dominated world order remained profoundly racist towards Japan, and the
effects of this—especially when compounded by the Great Depression—catapulted mil‑
itarists into power. They shunted civilian politicians aside, moved first into Manchuria
and then eventually into a wider war that aimed at the control of all China and subjuga‑
tion of much of Asia and beyond, plunging Japan and the entire region into catastrophe.
The deep faultline over contested memories of the Second World War is the real start‑
ing point for today’s debate over Article 9. Liberals believe Japan’s wartime aggression

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was a tragic mistake, and they regard Article 9 as a guard against any resurgence of ru‑
inous militarism, a reassuring talisman of the modern nation’s pacifist character. Con‑
servatives like Abe want to rehabilitate this controversial history to allow contemporary
Japan to become more assertive internationally. The argument is both about symbolism
and substance. The constitution’s practical strictures were sidestepped as long ago as
1954, with the establishment of the Ground Self‑Defence Forces (GSDF)—to all intents
and purposes an army, albeit one that operates with restraints. But that doesn’t detract
from the intensity of pacifist sentiments. Indeed, it is precisely because the Article is
so symbolic that it is—on both sides—a question of political identity. For Abe, it was
also about personal identity. Growing up in a powerful political family, he entered the
Diet in 1993 two years after his father, a former foreign minister, had left. A couple
of decades before, Abe’s great‑uncle Eisaku Satō—who was, until the grand‑nephew
broke the record, Japan’s previous longest‑serving PM—had successfully haggled with
Richard Nixon to return administrative control of Okinawa prefecture, which since the
Second World War had been commandeered by the US for military purposes. An even
more significant influence, perhaps, was his grandfather, Nobusuke Kishi, who was
also prime minister from 1957‑60: as a wartime cabinet minister, he was heavily impli‑
cated in war crimes but never prosecuted. Abe treated the rewriting of wartime history
as one aspect of unfinished family business. On his watch, school textbook accounts
of forced labour, chemical and biological warfare, and the “comfort women” system
have been toned down, pruned or removed, while in public discourse fellow revision‑
ists artfully depict Japan’s 1931‑45 rampage as a defensive war to liberate Asia from
western colonialism. But the constitution was another aspect which rankled Abe even
more. In office, grandfather Kishi resorted to literal strong‑arm tactics in 1960 (having
opposition politicians carried out of the Diet before holding a vote) in order to revise
and extend the 1951 US‑Japan Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security. The pro‑
cess sparked mass demonstrations, and Kishi was ousted before he could realise his
ambition to revise the constitution. But that was 60 years ago. Kishi was operating
in a nation still emerging from the immediate trauma of war, as well as the lingering
shadow of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The opportunities for his grandson to overturn
the pacifist settlement, bolstered by fading memories, heightened regional threats and
a less reliable ally courtesy of President Donald Trump should have been incomparably
greater. His biggest chance came in 2017, when his (traditionally dominant, if arguably
misnamed) Liberal Democratic Party won a landslide victory that gave it, along with
its coalition partners, two‑thirds of the seats in both houses of the Diet. Here at last
was the supermajority needed to push through a constitutional revision. But Abe had

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been too aggressive in his oft‑stated desire to revise Article 9: polls recorded strong mis‑
givings even among those who support that change about it happening on his watch.
On top of this, his coalition partner, the Buddhist‑affiliated Komeito, opposed any sig‑
nificant watering down of Article 9. Abe responded by incrementally whittling down
his proposed amendments of the Article to a mere tweaking of the phrasing, adding a
sentence recognising the nation’s military. But even this faced stubborn resistance. For
most voters, more concerned about stagnant wages, rising taxes and a gathering reces‑
sion, it looked like a distraction. Within Japan, there were never enough people who
shared Abe’s fixation to overcome those who considered it an irrelevance or a bad idea.
After Abe formally stepped down on 16th September, his chief cabinet secretary Suga
Yoshihide took over as prime minister, and is expected to remain in post until Abe’s
term ends in September next year. In his former post, Suga was immensely powerful,
combining the roles of chief of staff, government spokesman and party whip, acting
as Abe’s pit bull in dealing with media critics and ensuring cabinet ministers stayed
on message. Without Abe’s backstory and obsession, Suga is—like leaders around the
world—currently more preoccupied with coronavirus and its economic fallout, which
leaves constitutional reforms on the back‑burner. Thus, Abe’s mission to revise the
constitution has effectively been abandoned, but anxieties about North Korea, China
and the US alliance persist. The country will now have to navigate them without hav‑
ing answered the question that underlay the whole constitutional argument: what is
Japan’s place in the world? Decades of double‑think Back in 1947, Washington wrote
Article 9 into the constitution with a view to keeping a defeated and occupied foe at
heel. But very soon, the US came to regret it—starting with the outbreak of the Ko‑
rean War in 1950. Japan’s prolonged colonial rule in Korea from 1910‑45 meant that
many veterans and officials had first‑hand experience and knowledge that could have
made it a useful partner. When the US demanded it rearm, Tokyo brandished Article
9 and shrewdly concentrated on industrial redevelopment. But it gradually began the
manoeuvres that would make a fiction of the pacifist clause, establishing a relatively
small, lightly‑armed National Police Reserve in 1950, with 75,000 members; expanded
to 110,000 men and renamed the National Safety Force in 1952; and then reconstituted
and rebranded again as the Self‑Defence Forces (SDF) in 1954. Since then, under US pres‑
sure, Japan has gradually expanded its military capabilities while sidestepping constitu‑
tional constraints. This strange situation—the existence of a powerful military which is
theoretically banned by the constitution—clouds the Article 9 debate with cognitive dis‑
sonance. Japan now has a quarter of a million troops in uniform and, aside from the US
7th Fleet, the most advanced navy in Asia. On top of this, it has a large modern air force

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and an annual defence budget of about $50bn, which is similar to the UK and puts it in
the top 10 nations for security expenditures. Tokyo justifies this anomalous situation—
while pleading compliance with its own constitution—through its membership of the
United Nations, because the UN Charter gives every nation the right to self‑defence.
Abe stressed the absurdity of such sophistry to advance his demands to amend the con‑
stitution to reflect 21st‑century realities and threats. Over the years numerous lawsuits
against the article have been filed by citizens of very different leanings from Abe that
have challenged the constitutionality of the SDF, notching up some victories along the
way. But in the end, the Supreme Court has largely sided with the government’s in‑
terpretation. At the highest level, the country seems to have decided to have it both
ways. If this double‑think has proved strangely durable domestically, there have been
moments when it has looked like it could come unstuck diplomatically. During the first
Gulf War (1990‑1), Japan only contributed money in support of coalition forces, and it
drew flak internationally for practising “ATM diplomacy” while leaving the heavy lift‑
ing to others, particularly embarrassing for a country so reliant on oil and gas imports
from the Middle East. Unease about this “freeriding” saw Liberal Democratic Party
heavyweights take up the cause of making Japan a more “normal nation” on military
matters. The Diet passed legislation in 1992 allowing participation in UN peacekeep‑
ing operations under very strict rules of engagement. Later that year SDF members
were dispatched in support of the UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia, and have
participated in numerous peacekeeping missions since. But this was never going to be
enough for Japanese conservatives, or indeed for the US, which had originally imposed
the constraints. In 1997, amid tensions between Washington and Beijing over Taiwan,
US‑Japan defence guidelines were negotiated, expanding what Tokyo was willing to
do in support of the US in a conflict in the region. Previously, Japan was under no obli‑
gation to intervene, citing its constitutional constraints. The scope of Tokyo’s action
under the newly‑reciprocal arrangement was still limited to “areas surrounding Japan,”
but this nonetheless created potential new licence for it to act to maintain peace or sta‑
bility across the East Asia region. A military officially retained only for self‑defence was
later subject to more mission creep in the face of rising Chinese might—particularly in
relation to tensions over the uninhabited Senkaku Islands, claimed by both Beijing and
Tokyo—and North Korea’s escalating nuclear arms programme. But the most drastic
shift in Japan came under Abe, in 2014. On the anniversary of the establishment of the
SDF, Abe unilaterally reinterpreted Article 9 to allow Japan to engage in collective self‑
defence, a stealth “revision” of Article 9, bypassing normal procedures for such amend‑
ments by simply changing the government’s interpretation, with potentially sweeping

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implications. Awkwardly, Abe’s handpicked constitutional scholars testified that the

2015 enabling legislation was unconstitutional, but the measure was forced through the
Diet, and the Abe Doctrine came into being. Abe branded his country’s new stance
“pro‑active pacifism,” but this spin couldn’t draw its sting. The streets erupted with the
largest protests since the 1960 rallies that had toppled his grandfather, with polls show‑
ing 80 per cent opposition to his security initiative. In parallel, on the international stage,
the US‑Japan defence guidelines were again overhauled, greatly expanding once more
what Japan agreed to do militarily in support of the US, while also removing the previ‑
ous restriction to the East Asia region. The late US Senator John McCain—a former sol‑
dier and a powerful voice on defence—baldly spelled out that the new guidelines would
commit Japan to sending in combat troops if conflict erupted on the Korean Peninsula,
or if the US or its allies were under attack anywhere in the world. This was highly un‑
popular in Japan and Abe faced tough questioning in the Diet—but he prevailed. By
this point, Abe had radically changed the underlying terms of Japan’s defence policy.
The logic now was collective self‑defence, which in some ways resembles the logic that
underpins Nato. This was a big shift, not at all welcomed by a public in fear of be‑
ing dragged into conflict by Washington, and so Abe still had to tread carefully when
it came to specific decisions about wielding real power. Earlier this year, Washington
pressed Tokyo to join a US‑led coalition patrol of the Persian Gulf; it wouldn’t have
been hard for them to invoke “national interest,” since Japan imports nearly 90 per cent
of its oil from the Middle East. But in the event, Abe—who was desperate to avoid a
backlash that could snuff out his hopes of constitutional revision—demurred. Instead,
he dispatched a single destroyer on an intelligence gathering mission, ostensibly acting
separately from the US coalition while co‑ordinating with it. When the most hawkish
of Japanese prime ministers pulled back from an express request for help, the idea of
Japan becoming like the UK, a dependable deputy sheriff to the US, was exposed as a
pipe dream. A monstrous paradox Abe has come and gone, and pacifism is still a mat‑
ter of national self‑image. Anxiety about being dragged into war and Japan’s place in
the world permeates popular culture, and yet here—as much as in politics—we can see
a double‑think at work. Just as the US hydrogen bomb test loomed over the launch of
the Godzilla film series in 1954, four years ago Trump’s first presidential campaign pro‑
vided a troubling backdrop to the latest instalment, Shin Godzilla. Trump had called
into question the US commitment to the alliance with Japan, and suggested the country
might want to develop its own nuclear weapons. The film, a blockbuster hit, portrays
the Japanese government’s fumbling response to the notorious monster’s attack. The
US comes across as an overbearing, self‑seeking ally that puts its own interests ahead of

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Japan’s, threatening a nuclear attack on Tokyo to kill Godzilla in order to protect the US.
It’s only a film, and the bumper box office tallies arguably proved nothing other than the
allure of an enduring, familiar monster. But some took it as embodying a feeling that
Japan should get out from under the US thumb, stand alone and presumably rip up
Article 9. Clearly, the public is anxious, and there is an abiding crisis of confidence that
Abe didn’t quite dispel about Japan’s receding influence in a fraught region. The Trump
years have only aggravated these anxieties since: Japanese confidence in US foreign pol‑
icy plunged from nearly 80 per cent under Barack Obama to 24 per cent under Trump.
The 45th President is an aberration in many ways, but that did not harm him in an elec‑
tion where he held up better than expected. A poisonous campaign revealed an insular
American mindset on both sides: Joe Biden may have been politer about traditional al‑
lies, but he didn’t talk about them much, nor in any sustained way did he challenge the
presumptions of “America First.” Irrespective of the result, the US will remain in rel‑
ative decline as a world power. Staking everything on it continuing to make sacrifices
for Japan deep into the future looks like an obvious risk. And yet it was in his unwa‑
vering allegiance to a US partnership that Abe really ran aground, as his handling of
the grievances of Okinawa demonstrates. Three quarters of a century after the devastat‑
ing battle of Okinawa, American military facilities continue to cover around 17 per cent
of the island’s land area, alienating locals because bases can be noisy, environmentally
damaging and hotspots for crime. Two years ago, Okinawans voted against the US mil‑
itary presence in a series of local elections, installing the anti‑base Independent Denny
Tamaki as governor in a landslide victory over the pro‑base candidate backed by Abe, a
humiliation for a PM who had been determined to placate the Pentagon. In a local refer‑
endum held last year, 70 per cent of islanders voted against the construction of a new US
base, and yet Abe proceeded with the ill‑fated project anyway. As far as Abe was con‑
cerned, Japan lives in a dangerous neighbourhood and will inevitably, even as it builds
up its own forces, continue to rely on US protection. Herein lies a paradox that could be
important for where Japan goes next. The country has an unequal, almost “client‑state”
relationship with the US in matters of foreign and security policies, and yet, for all their
avowed nationalism, conservatives see the alliance as essential and the only option for
countering the threats from North Korea and China. Progressives, by contrast, fear the
country’s entanglement with the US could not only accentuate regional tensions, but
also encroach on sovereignty, contravene the constitution and subvert democratic val‑
ues. Abe and like‑minded conservatives believe the days of pacifism are numbered: in a
world of rising threats and fraying alliances, they argue it has already become a luxury
that Japan can ill‑afford. But just as deep‑rooted pacifist norms come into contact with

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the reality that Japan’s increasingly well‑armed country now has free rein to use force in
all kinds of scenarios, so too the pro‑Washington assumptions of right‑wingers like Abe
confront the unreliability and ebbing power of the US. Japan alone? The idea of “Japan
alone” sends a shiver up the national spine, which renders a rupture of bilateral relations
unlikely. Nonetheless, it is tempting to conclude that Shin Godzilla is more clear‑eyed
than politicians on either side of the constitutional divide. The film suggests relying
on Japan’s own technological ingenuity, social cohesion, teamwork, indomitable spirit,
and—yes—military power, but it does so on the assumption of a break with America.
In his 2020 biography The Iconoclast: Shinzō Abe and the New Japan, Tobias Harris
concludes that despite his long tenure and control of the Diet, Abe leaves a slight and
tenuous record as a statesman. As Abenomics sputtered and promises on gender equal‑
ity and corporate governance went unfulfilled, the former prime minister squandered
energy on his doomed efforts at constitutional revision. From his own nationalist point
of view, however, Abe leaves behind not only a country with a strengthened military
but, thanks to the expanded US‑Japan defence guidelines and enabling legislation, also
greatly enhanced licence for his successors to use it. His failure to prevail in his sym‑
bolic struggle to bury pacifism might be better understood as his failure to understand
that the strongest argument for doing so is America’s isolationist turn. Japan will not
be shaken out of its pacifist norms by a compliant conservative nationalism that auto‑
matically defers to the US. The pacifist clause was made in Washington all those years
ago; it was slowly subverted at the behest of Washington in the long decades since and,
if it is eventually abandoned, it seems a fair guess that the root cause will trace back to
Washington once more.

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6.2 Deterrence

6.2.1 Uniqueness – China

The South China Sea is causing increasing tensions between Japan and China.

Meierding 15
Emily Meierding is a visiting fellow at the Center for International Environmental Stud‑
ies (CIES) at the Graduate Institute, Geneva, ”The real reason tensions are rising in
the South China Sea”, Vox, 5/24/15, https://www.vox.com/2015/5/24/8646571/the‑real‑
reason‑tensions‑are‑rising‑in‑the‑south‑china‑sea
These incidents did not spiral into militarized clashes. However, they provoked intense
hostility and made the islands a flashpoint for nationalist sentiment on both sides. The
populations of both countries were primed for further conflict—such as in 2012, when
the Japanese government acquired three of the islands from private owners. In China,
the nationalization was met with major anti‑Japan protests. Beijing also retaliated by
increasing its military presence in the area. Violations of Japan’s territorial waters sky‑
rocketed from almost none to over seventeen per month over the next year. In Novem‑
ber 2013, China declared an Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) that included the
islands. In the past 18 months, violations have declined, but Japan is still reporting
an average of eight per month. Japanese and Chinese officials have also made little
progress toward resolving the island dispute. Last November, the countries jointly is‑
sued a four‑point consensus, aimed at improving bilateral relations. One of the points
addressed the Senkakus/Diaoyus, observing that China and Japan had ”different views”
of the situation, but would attempt to prevent it from escalating. Yet Japan still refuses
to acknowledge the existence of a dispute, and neither country has offered concrete pro‑
posals for resolving it. Relations between Xi and Abe may be thawing, but a cooperative
island agreement is a very long way off. Chinese and Japanese officials are constrained
by their countries’ shared history. The islands issue has acquired enormous symbolic
significance in both countries, so attempts to reach a compromise settlement will pro‑
voke intense domestic opposition. Consequently, island disputes are likely to remain a
thorn in government’s’ sides, persistently at risk of escalation. Countries have many in‑
centives to compete for authority in the East China Sea and South China Sea, including
islands, oil and natural gas, fisheries, sea lanes of communication, and national pride.
However, when it comes to inspiring conflict, not all causes are created equal. Hydro‑
carbon resources, alone, are not a significant threat to regional stability.

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6.2.2 Remilitarization

Japan’s remilitarization would help them counter the increasing threat that China
poses.

Gibbs 10

D. Bradley Gibbs‑ J.D. from the University of Houston Law Center, specializing in
oil and gas law, environmental law, and international law. This comment received
the 2010 Adams & Reese Writing Award for an Outstanding Comment on a Topic
in International Law and was inspired by the author’s three‑year tenure as an En‑
glish teacher in Wakayama Prefecture, Japan, “FUTURE RELATIONS BETWEEN
THE UNITED STATES AND JAPAN: ARTICLE 9 AND THE REMILITARIZATION
OF JAPAN”, HOUSTON JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, Vol. 33:1, 2010,
https://heinonline.org/HOL/P?h=hein.journals/hujil33&i=139

China is another menace lurking in Japan’s ”rough neighborhood.”102 It has substantial

nuclear capabilities,103 and its ”explosive economic growth” has disguised its under‑
lying instability.104 Under the surface, ”China is a political matchbook ready to ignite
at a moments notice.”105 It has also exacerbated North Korea’s continued disdain for
international opinion; and as North Korea’s ”principal patron,” China has protected
North Korea from the brunt of the international reaction to its continuing nuclear pro‑
gram.106 Additionally, Japan‑China relations have been particularly chilled in recent
years because Japanese officials‑including former Prime Minister Koizumi‑have made
formal visits to the Yasukuni Shrine, where several Japanese war criminals are enshrined
and commemorated.107 The relationship between the two countries has been further
strained by an ongoing disagreement over Japanese history textbooks that China argues
gloss over Japanese military atrocities.108

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6.2.3 Deterrence

Japanese rearmament is crucial to deter an increasingly aggressive China

Kapila 18

Dr Subhash Kapila, SAAG is the South Asia Analysis Group, a non‑profit, non‑
commercial think tank. The objective of SAAG is to advance strategic analysis and con‑
tribute to the expansion of knowledge of Indian and International security and promote
public understanding. ”Japan’s Security Challenges And Its Deterrent Military Posture
– Analysis”, 12‑27‑2018, Eurasia Review, https://www.eurasiareview.com/27122018‑
japans‑security‑challenges‑and‑its‑deterrent‑military‑posture‑analysis/, accessed
7‑12‑2019

Japan facing comprehensive threats from a militaristic China and its nuclear proxy
North Korea has finally woken up from its Peace Constitution Article 9 slumber
realising that the ‘China Threat’ to Japan’s National Security is real and embarked on
review of reinforcing its deterrent capabilities both in terms of military hardware and
operational doctrines.

Japan’s security environment as Japanese PM Shinzo Abe recently remarked “Has be‑
come more tough in the last five years”. Analytically interpreted this five year span is
coincident with ascension to power in China of incumbent Chinese President Xi Jin‑
ping and China’s switch‑over from use of ‘Soft Power’ strategies to adopting ‘Hard
Power’ muscular strategies incorporating aggressive military brinkmanship and politi‑
cal/military coercion.

Japan’s main Threat Perceptions focus on China, North Korea and the maritime threats
that could threaten her National Security and economic survival. The latter has acquired
pronounced and threatening contours with China’s disruptive activities in the South
China Sea and China’s increasing intrusiveness in the Indian Ocean posing potential
threats not only to Japan but also Indo Pacific security as a whole.

China strategically recognises that what stands between China establishing hegemony
over Western Pacific and East Asia is Japan with impressive Major Power credentials his‑
torically and existent in 2018 also. Japan’s Mutual Security Treaty with United States
and Japan’s hosting of US Forward Military Presence in Japan has been a strong de‑
terrent against Soviet Union earlier and more significantly against China’s military as‑
sertiveness manifested in last five years.

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Japan under leadership of incumbent PM Shinzo Abe has in view of the unsettled se‑
curity environment that surrounds Japan has set in motion reinforcement of Japanese
deterrent capabilities and formulation of new National Defense Program Guidelines to
replace the earlier 2008 version. This will also incorporate Mid Term Defense Program
Acquisitions for the next five years for the Japanese Armed Forces for the next five years.

Japan has in the preceding five years been engaged in an incremental gradual military
buildup of its military capabilities but with Japan perceiving that its security environ‑
ment having become more complicated with a downslide in US‑China relations seems
to be putting into place a faster pace in military buildup.

China’s propensity and temptations to use aggressive military brinkmanship stands re‑
flected in China’s actions in South China Sea which included forcible military occupa‑
tion of Vietnamese and Philippines islands in South China Sea and construction of ar‑
tificial islands to facilitate China’s ‘Full Spectrum Dominance’ of the South China Sea
maritime expanse.

China attempted the above strategy against Japan claiming sovereignty over the
Senkaku Islands until stopped in its tracks by Japan standing firm against China’s
military and political coercion and forcing the United States that the United States was
obliged to assist Japan in event of aggression against its Senkaku Islands.

China’s establishment of full control over the South China Sea is a direct military threat
to Japan’s National Security and its economic survival as Japan’s sea‑lanes of energy
supplies and trade and commerce travers the South China Sea. China is in a position to
choke Japan’s life lines.

China’s actions in the East China Sea against Japanese Senkaku Islands and China’s
continuance of aggressive naval activities and aerial combat air patrols in vicinity of East
China Sea besides declaring a Chinese ADIZ was and is highly provocative bordering
on it being a potential flashpoint. Chinese Navy submarines prowl around the seas of
Japan.

Both of China’s actions outlined above are manifestations of the’ china Threat’ to Japan
and by implication to the United States Forward Military Presence in Western Pacific
centred in Japan and South Korea. The China Threat existent in Western Pacific is a
crucial component of the overall ‘China Threat’ to Indo Pacific security.

The North Korea threat to Japan’s National Security is not a direct military threat to
Japan by North Korean military forces but a more potent threat manifested by North Ko‑
rean provocative missile tests overflying Japan’s mainland. China proxy use of North

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Korea’s long range missiles arsenal facilitated by Chinese assistance become s a provoca‑
tive tool to be used by China without initially getting actively involved in aggression
against Japan.

China’s main military threat against Japan is essentially a naval one either in terms of
interdiction of Japanese seaplanes in the South China Sea or forcibly occupying outlying
Japanese Islands by amphibious operations. To the potency of the ‘China Threat’ against
Japan must be added significant advances China has made in Cyber space and Outer
Space Warfare.

Japan now fully alive to its potential military threats and the nature of challenging
threats posed to Japan’s security. Japan in its new military preparedness is thinking of
switching over from an overall reinforcement of its conventional deterrent capabilities
to buildup of multi‑dimensional military capabilities aimed to cater for specific nature
of threats that are emerging. It is also taking into account China’s increasing focus and
buildup of Cyber Warfare and Space Warfare capabilities.

In terms of discernible shifts of Japan’s military postures there is now a greater weigh‑
tage in increased South‑centric military deployments catering for possible China threats
as opposed to the earlier North‑centric deployments focused on the Soviet threats.

In terms of operational doctrines, Japan has exhibited its readiness to increase the
frequency and reach of its naval deployments right upto the farthest end of the Indian
Ocean, namely the Gulf of Aden and opposite the Chinese new base at Djibouti.
Japanese Navy has conducted joint exercises with the navies of Indo Pacific and more
significantly with Indian Navy both in the Indian Ocean and the Western Pacific.

Japan is also engaged in creation of Rapid Deployment Forces and also an Amphibious
Rapid Deployment Brigade. Both are said to be for operations to regain control over
forcible occupation of outlying Japanese islands by hostile forces. While said to for de‑
fensive purposes these formations also provide Japan with force projection capabilities.
This is a welcome departure from long held Japanese defensive mindsets.

With Japan’s pronounced threat being naval and maritime in content, Japan has fo‑
cussed on a significant increase of Japanese Navy capabilities both in terms of acquisi‑
tions of naval combat destroyer ships and submarines. Japan had already in service two
Helicopter Carriers which with the acquisition of Stealth vertical take‑off F‑35 fighter
planes can be converted into full‑fledged Aircraft Carriers. As I have always maintained
that the Japanese Navy qualitatively can outmatch the Chinese Navy. Japan has a sec‑
ond Navy in the form of the Japanese Coast Guard whose larger ships match the tonnage

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of Japanese Navy destroyers and with fitting in of advanced weapon systems could be
speedily converted into full‑fledged destroyers.

The Japanese Air Force is in the process of replacing its combat fighter planes with the
Fifth Generation US advanced Stealth Fighters F‑35s. Israel is the only other country to
which the United States has supplied these Stealth Fighter Aircraft. This would add a
significant punch to the Japanese Air Force. Japan has major indigenous defence pro‑
duction capability of combat aircraft and other Air Force requirements.

The Japanese Army will see acquisition of advanced ant‑tank missiles and other weapon
with advanced surveillance sensors systems. The focus is likely be weapon systems
which can inflict heavy damage on any attempts by hostile forces amphibious landings
on Japanese territory.

In terms of weapons systems acquisitions and other military equipment no problems

exist for Japan for two reasons. First, Japan has advanced capabilities in indigenous
defence production of naval ships, fighter aircraft and submarines beside requirement of
the Japanese Army. Second, Japan feels obliged to acquire advanced weapons systems
from the United States which provide increased inter‑operability with weapon systems
of US Forces in Japan. Taken together both these avenues give Japan the option of a
fast‑track military buildup should the security environment so dictate.

Seldom publicised is Japan’s advanced capabilities in terms of indigenous production of

long range missiles and spacecraft. One can expect a major increase in effort in these two
fields ostensibly under the excuse of defensive operations like ballistic missile shields
and surveillance satellites. Japan has the capability I believe of advanced anti‑ballistic
missiles which could destroy incoming hostile missile launches against Japanese targets
far away from Japan over maritime spaces.

Japan exists in a hostile nuclear weapons security environment with China, Russia and
North Korea having nuclear weapons and long‑range missiles capabilities. Japan at
some stage has to face the challenge of going‑in for its own nuclear weaponisation how‑
ever distasteful the choice is presently. This has been advocated by me right from 2002
onwards in my writings. Besides nuclear weapons being the currency of power, Japan
cannot shy away from the nuclear option to maintain and sustain her rightful place as
a global Major Power.

Financial resources for Japan’s defence buildup to meet increased threats are not a prob‑
lem but there is a problem of manpower. Japan’s population base is small and so is the
rate of population growth. In that eventuality Japan may have no options but to go in for

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highly advanced weapons systems with limited manning yet greater lethality. Robotics
in which Japan has a lead of decades over other countries may provide the options.

Even with present military capabilities Japan is ranked fifth in terms of the world’s most
powerful Armed Forces and that speaks volumes for a small island nation. Japan has a
long history of martial traditions which may be latent presently because of Peace Consti‑
tution mindset fostered in the minds of the Japanese public for over decades. But when
Japan’s survival assumes criticality, I firmly believe that Japan would not be found want‑
ing in terms of political will to use all the instruments of power at its disposal to great
effect.

Since China figures high in Japan’s threat perceptions it may be worth pointing out that
in recent surveys it was found that 72% of Japanese citizens do not trust China. It is also
worth pointing that unlike India which abounds in China‑apologists despite a more
pronounced China threat to India, no China‑apologists are noticeable in Japan. That is
a critical additive for Japan’s political leadership.

Concluding, it needs to be reiterated that Japan along with India is a critical pillar of
Asian security and Indo Pacific stability. Conscious of that responsibility Japan has em‑
barked on reformulation of its National Defense Guidelines and buildup of its military
capabilities with particular reference to the nature and dimensions of emergent threats
to Japan’s security. That Japan is making headway in this direction is well indicated that
China thought it prudent to invite Japanese PM Shinzo Abe to Beijing recently—seven
years after the last Japanese Prime Ministerial visit to Beijing. This was also accompa‑
nied by a lessening of anti‑Japanese rhetoric in China.

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 6 Pro Evidence

6.2.4 Collective Self‑Defense

Article 9 revision is necessary to develop self‑defense capabilities to repel a Chinese

invasion

Kadota 21

Ryusho Kadota, author and journalist. Born in Kochi Prefecture in 1958, he graduated
from the Faculty of Law at Chuo University. He is the author of many books, includ‑
ing bestseller Ekibyo 2020, ”U.S.‑Imposed Article 9 of the Constitution Threatens the
Lives of Japanese People,” JAPAN Forward, 5‑18‑2021, https://japan‑forward.com/u‑s‑
imposed‑article‑9‑of‑the‑constitution‑threatens‑the‑lives‑of‑japanese‑people/, accessed
3‑14‑2022

Article 9 of the Constitution of Japan has been heralded by leftists as a symbol of peace
that denies Japan the right of belligerency and the right to possess land, sea, and air
forces. Ironically, Article 9 has become a threat to the very lives of the Japanese peo‑
ple. In the Midst of Drastic International Change The Constitution of Japan has been
in effect for 74 years. It is the world’s oldest constitution in the sense that not a single
word has been changed since its adoption. Meanwhile, Germany — a country defeated
in the same world war — brushed off Allied intervention and drafted its own consti‑
tution, the Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany, in May 1949 at a parliamen‑
tary council composed of politicians and lawyers. Since then, the German constitution
has been amended more than 60 times in response to changes in domestic and inter‑
national circumstances, in sharp contrast to Japan’s constitution, which has remained
completely unchanged to this day. So why has the Constitution of Japan become a
threat to the lives of the Japanese people? The last 76 years since the end of World War
II have seen unimaginable changes in international affairs. Moreover, the changes have
become more drastic in the last 10 years, and especially in the last five. The reason lies in
China’s attempts to alter the status quo by force. I confess that I had not been an ardent
supporter of constitutional amendment until this upheaval occurred. During the long
Cold War that came after the end of World War II, the need to revise the Japanese Con‑
stitution was not as urgent as it is today. That is because the frontline of the Cold War
was in Europe. The fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 brought on the rapid downfall of suc‑
cessive communist countries, and the ultimate dissolution of their leading power, the
Soviet Union, from which Russia emerged. Japan placed its security into the hands of
the United States and enjoyed peace under its “nuclear umbrella” — that is, until a coun‑
try emerged on the world stage to destroy the international order. No Countermeasures

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Against a Chinese Invasion Founded in 1949, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has
pushed out its borders to annex Tibet, the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, and
Southern Mongolia. It has trampled on the human rights of the people of Hong Kong,
and it makes no secret of its intention to invade Taiwan. China has turned reefs inside
the exclusive economic zones of countries in the South China Sea into Chinese military
bases, claimed ownership of the Senkaku Islands, and repeatedly intruded into Japan’s
territorial waters on an almost daily basis. “Take all necessary measures, including the
use of weapons when national sovereignty, sovereign rights, and jurisdiction are be‑
ing illegally infringed upon by foreign organizations or individuals at sea,” China tells
its maritime forces, making it’s view clear that the Senkaku Islands are included. The
words of its new law, which have been repeated by Chinese military leaders, are noth‑
ing but a declaration of the intent to seize the Senkaku Islands at any time. That is to
say, no country in East Asia is safe from China’s threat. It all started with the “great re‑
juvenation of the Chinese nation” or the “Chinese Dream,” which President Xi Jinping
has been proclaiming since 2013. His vision is to achieve global hegemony by 2049, the
100th anniversary of the founding of the People’s Republic of China, and is strongly
linked to the Sinocentric ideology boasted by successive Chinese dynasties. For China,
the ideal world revolves around the Chinese empire to which barbarians must obey
and pay tribute. The premise of the Chinese Dream is making right the injustices China
perceives it suffered in its “century of humiliation” (roughly 1839‑1949). The “great re‑
juvenation of the Chinese nation” can only be achieved if China dispels the humiliation
that started with the Opium War, and included Western (and Japanese) concessions in
its major cities, the founding of Manchuko, and continental rule by over a million for‑
eign troops. It must not be forgotten that Japan is the main target of China’s resentment.
And, yet, Japan has no means to counter a possible Chinese invasion, except to rely on
the United States to save its neck. Europe founded the North Atlantic Treaty Organiza‑
tion (NATO) in 1949 to counter the Soviet Union with the deterrent power of its collec‑
tive self‑defense. If a member state was attacked by the Soviet Union, it would be seen
as an attack on the alliance as a whole and would provoke collective retaliation. This col‑
lective security system has protected Europe from Soviet and Russian aggression for 72
years. A Constitution That Secures Peace Through Deterrence Since 2000, the success or
failure of becoming a NATO member has been a determining factor in the fate of several
countries. The Baltic States, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania successfully joined NATO
despite struggling with Russian intervention. In contrast, Ukraine and Georgia failed to
join NATO because of strong domestic pro‑Russian sentiment and their failure to sway
public opinion. The fate of the two countries is still fresh in my mind. Ukraine suffered

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the annexation of Crimea, and Georgia had two of its regions declared independent.
Their situations are eerily similar to that of Japan, with China encroaching on its poli‑
tics, business, and mass media. Right to Collective Self‑Defense The right to collective
self‑defense to secure the peace should be used as a deterrent — not by the United States
alone, but by countries forming an alliance to create an Asian version of NATO to stop
China’s attempts to alter the status quo by force. However, Japan is denied the right to
collective self‑defense under Article 9 of the Constitution. This is why the Constitution
has become a threat to the lives of Japanese people. Acquiring the right to collective
self‑defense and constitutionalizing the Japan Self‑Defense Forces are vital. With these
two points in mind, I would like to offer an example of what an amendment to Article
9 of the Constitution should look like. With these two points in mind, I would like to
offer an example of what an amendment to Article 9 of the Constitution should look like.
[Proposed] Article 9. Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and
order, in order to maintain international peace and to protect the lives, property, and
territory of its citizens, Japan shall possess the Self‑Defense Forces, shall not tolerate the
aggression or interference of any country, and shall maintain its independence forever.
Japan must fulfill its obligation to history to protect the lives of its families and future
generations.

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 6 Pro Evidence

6.2.5 China Balancing

An increasingly assertive Japan is key to balance against China

Nikkei 17

Nikkei Asian Review (the world’s largest financial newspaper). “For ASEAN, Japan is
a key counterbalance to China.” 14 August 2017. https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/For‑
ASEAN‑Japan‑is‑a‑key‑counterbalance‑to‑China2

TOKYO ‑‑ Five decades after the Association of Southeast Asian Nations was estab‑
lished, changing economic and political dynamics in the region are putting a spotlight
on Japan’s growing importance to the bloc as a counterbalance to China. Japan and the
10‑member ASEAN have maintained close relations for more than 40 years. In that time,
Japanese companies have made Southeast Asia their production and export hub, capi‑
talizing on cheaper labor costs. According to Japanese credit‑research agency Teikoku
Databank, more than 11,000 Japanese companies were operating in the region in 2016.
But rising wages are diminishing the region’s appeal as an investment destination. Even
Cambodia, one of the least‑developed ASEAN members, is no exception. Minimum
monthly wages in the country have surged 150% over the past five years, rising to $153
in 2017 from $61 in 2012. Less than a one‑hour drive from central Phnom Penh, Cambo‑
dia’s capital, sits a special economic zone. There used to be a sign at the site announcing
that a major Japanese motorcycle manufacturer was planning to set up operations there.
Early this year, however, the sign vanished. The manufacturer ”has apparently aban‑
doned its plans to step up operations there,” said one source familiar with the matter.
Perhaps this is symbolic of the fact that Japan is losing its long‑held status as ASEAN’s
most important economic partner. Chinese investment, China risk In June, Chinese au‑
tomaker Zhejiang Geely Holding Group agreed to buy 49.9% stake in Malaysian peer
Proton Holdings. Malaysian Prime Minister Najib Razak expressed hope at the time that
Geely would help Proton expand across the Southeast Asia. Proton is a ”national car”
manufacturer that once received technical support from Japanese companies. Geely’s
emergence as Proton’s major shareholder reflects the changing competitive landscape
of the auto industry in Southeast Asia. China’s presence in infrastructure projects in
the region is also growing. Based on data from ENR, a U.S. magazine specializing in
the construction industry, China is the top player in the Asian infrastructure market,
accounting for 17% of project deals by value. Japan ranks fifth, at 10%. With the U.S.
presence in Southeast Asia declining, China’s economic influence in the region will only
growing stronger. But this also means that Southeast Asia will face ”China risks.” In

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late July, Indonesian President Joko Widodo urged his transport minister and others
to get a derailed high‑speed railway project back on track and fast‑track it. In autumn
2015, the country chose a Chinese proposal for the project over a Japanese one. But
construction work has made virtually zero progress, making it all but impossible to
have the trains running in 2019 as planned. Chinese financing for the undertaking is
also behind schedule. One high‑ranking Indonesian official said the country should
have chosen the Japanese proposal. The diminishing presence of the U.S. and the rise
of China in Southeast Asia is deepening Japan’s importance to ASEAN as a counterbal‑
ance to China. After decades of close ties, Japan has won the bloc’s trust, an asset China
lacks in Southeast Asia. Japanese direct investment in the region totals nearly 20 trillion
yen ($180 billion). Along with that spending, Japan has made significant contributions
to developing human resources and legal systems ‑‑ not to mention the manufacturing
industry ‑‑ in Southeast Asia. In a survey of six ASEAN countries conducted by Mit‑
subishi Research Institute, 86% of respondents said they either ”like Japan very much”
or ”like Japan,” compared with only 36% who gave similar replies about China. Such a
welcoming region presents a stable growth market for Japan. In contrast, the massive
Chinese market is complicated by political risks. Take, for example, the auto industry.
Japanese carmakers are in the driver’s seat in Southeast Asia. They have a combined
market share of 80% in six major ASEAN countries, selling about 2.5 million vehicles
there annually. That is more cars than they sell in Europe or India, and about 30% less
than their total for China. Turning to the future One company ‑‑ Scientex, Asia’s largest
stretch film producer ‑‑ exemplifies the mutually beneficial relationship between Japan
and ASEAN. At its plants, there are signs carrying the slogan, ”Japan Quality at South
East Asia Cost.” Scientex was founded in 1968, a year after ASEAN was established, and
has since grown with the help of its partnerships with Japanese companies, such as Fu‑
tamura Chemical. The company now exports its products to some 80 countries. Today,
ASEAN is a massive economic zone with a population of 600 million. The 10‑nation
grouping is expected to overtake Japan in terms of gross domestic product in around
2025. ASEAN’s 50th anniversary presents an opportunity to reflect on how Japan and
the bloc can build a truly equal partnership both politically and economically over the
next five decades.

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6.2.6 China Impact

China threat is real and risks escalating to nuclear exchange

Chang 18

Gordon Chang (Served two terms at trustee at Cornell. Chang has spoken at Columbia,
Cornell, Harvard, Penn, Princeton, Yale, and other universities and at The Brookings
Institution, The Heritage Foundation, the Cato Institute, RAND, the American En‑
terprise Institute, the Council on Foreign Relations, and other institutions. He has
given briefings at the National Intelligence Council, the Central Intelligence Agency,
the State Department, and the Pentagon. He has also spoken before industry and
investor groups including Bloomberg, Sanford Bernstein, Royal Bank of Scotland, and
Credit Lyonnais Securities Asia. Chang has appeared before the House Committee
on Foreign Affairs and the U.S.‑China Economic and Security Review Commission.
Outside the United States he has spoken in Beijing, Shanghai, Taipei, Hong Kong, New
Delhi, Seoul, Singapore, Tokyo, The Hague, London, Ottawa, Toronto, and Vancouver.
Chang lived and worked in China and Hong Kong for almost two decades, most
recently in Shanghai, as Counsel to the American law firm Paul Weiss). “China and
Russia Have Set a Nuclear Collision Course With the United States.” The Daily Beast.
4 September 2018. JDN. https://www.thedailybeast.com/china‑and‑russia‑have‑set‑a‑
nuclear‑collision‑course‑with‑the‑united‑states

Nonetheless, China has a few critical advantages. Its naval assets are concentrated along
its shores and U.S. forces are spread around the globe; areas of likely conflict are near
China and far from America; and the PLAN has some crucial weapons that are better
than those of the United States, especially anti‑ship missiles. Beijing has also gone big
into “asymmetric” warfare, for instance militarizing fishing fleets, enlisting the “little
blue men” of what has become a maritime militia. The Chinese also have one other
advantage: the will to use force to take what is in the possession of others. In their
peripheral seas, they grabbed control of the Paracel Islands, in the northern portion
of the South China Sea, from South Vietnam in 1974 after a short battle. The Chinese
also seized Mischief Reef from the Philippines in a series of actions from late 1994 to
early 1995, and they snatched Scarborough Shoal, also from Manila, in early 2012. Now,
China is, among other things, pressuring other Philippine features in the South China
Sea and using menacing tactics to take over a chain of uninhabited islets currently under
Japanese control in the East China Sea.

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 6 Pro Evidence

Moreover, Beijing has clearly relished challenging the U.S. Navy and Air Force in the
global commons, threatening and on occasion harassing American ships, planes, and
drones. The seizure of an American drone in international waters in December 2016,
in sight of the USNS Bowditch and in defiance of radio commands, was brazen and
nothing short of an act of war.

Moreover, Beijing’s harassment of the USNS Impeccable in March 2009 in the South
China Sea, using its maritime militia, was so severe that it constituted an attack on the
United States.

“The key point is that China accepts the risk of escalation to a greater extent than does
the U.S., because China uses confrontation to alter the status quo in its favor,” Anders
Corr, editor of Great Powers, Grand Strategies: The New Game in the South China
Sea, told the National Interest at the beginning of this year. China is apparently willing
to escalate all the way. But the New York Times, in its reporting last month, did not
mention one Chinese threat to American forces in the region: nuclear attack.

“For regional warfare, especially in Asia, the People’s Liberation Army is equipped for
nuclear operations both offensive and defensive,” Richard Fisher of the International
Assessment and Strategy Center told The Daily Beast. “If China can conjure a ‘defen‑
sive’ political moral high ground to justify offensive military campaigns to retrieve ‘lost’
territory, we should be prepared for China’s very early use of nuclear weapons to sup‑
port its theater campaign. We can, for example, expect China to ‘demonstrate’ nuclear
weapons at sea to deter American or Japanese military support for Taiwan in the event
of a Chinese attack, or even outright Chinese use of nuclear weapons against Japanese
bases supporting U.S. forces coming to the defense of Taiwan.”

And American planners have to be concerned that China’s military partner, Russia,
would join a conflict on Beijing’s side. In September 2016 the two militaries, in an
eight‑day naval drill, practiced “joint island seizing missions” in the South China Sea.
Moscow might even take advantage of turmoil in Asia to try to further expand its terri‑
tory in Europe, perhaps using “little green men” as it did in Crimea in 2014 and later in
Eastern Ukraine.

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6.2.7 Taiwan

Article 9 amendment makes Japan a powerhouse capable of securing the Taiwan

Strait

Chung‑Yuan 22

Yao Chung‑Yuan, adjunct university professor and former deputy director of the Min‑
istry of National Defense’s Strategic Planning Department, ”Reform can give Japan
more Indo‑Pacific heft,” Taipei Times, 2‑8‑2022, https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/ ed‑
itorials/archives/2022/02/08/2003772727, accessed 3‑14‑2022

During a meeting at the Headquarters for the Realization of Constitutional Revision,

held at the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) headquarters on Dec. 21 last year, Japanese
Prime Minister Fumio Kishida spoke of his hope that the party would realize consti‑
tutional reform. Kyodo News reported that the four‑point draft proposed by the LDP
would amend Article 9 of the Japanese constitution and create an emergency clause.
The Japanese constitution was designed by the US after Japan’s defeat in World War II
and has never been revised, 75 years since its implementation. The constitution imposes
stringent restrictions on the Japan Self‑Defense Forces (JSDF) — most notably, in Article
9, Paragraph 1, which says: “The Japanese people forever renounce war.” Paragraph
2 as well says: “Land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be
maintained”; and: “The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized.” The
LDP won a landslide victory for the Japanese House of Representatives seven years ago,
and with a strong mandate, then‑Japanese prime minister Shinzo Abe revealed his plan
to amend the constitution to make Japan a “normal country,” to elevate the status of
the JSDF to a military better prepared to respond to emergencies and threats to national
security, and to lift the constitution’s restrictions on the JSDF’s foreign engagements.
However, the plan was shelved following objections from opposition parties. More re‑
cently, Japan has endured frequent missile tests by North Korea and increasing military
pressure from the Chinese Communist Party. For instance, in October last year, Chinese
and Russian warships sailed through the Tsugaru Strait and the Osumi Strait, almost cir‑
cumnavigating Japan and putting the country on high alert. This provocation helped
to revive the movement to amend Japan’s constitution. In the general election for the
49th House of Representatives on Nov. 1 last year, the LDP and the Japan Innovation
Party, which advocated for constitutional amendment, won more than two‑thirds of
the seats in Japanese Diet they required to act. If Japan’s constitutional reform and the
augmenting of the JSDF can be completed during the Kishida administration, it could

137
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not only provide the means to send troops overseas, but also give the forces legitimacy
to take part in operations with allies. The leaders of Japan and Australia held a video
summit on Jan. 6 and decided to increase the frequency, scale and intensity of joint mil‑
itary training and operations between the two countries. The next day, the ministers of
national defense and foreign affairs for Japan and the US also held a video conference,
after which the two sides pledged to cooperate to prevent China from destabilizing the
region. Japanese media reports said that the meetings had one thing in common — a
determination for Japan to play a more important role in Indo‑Pacific military and secu‑
rity cooperation. Japan has been shaken in recent years by the possibility of a nuclear
strike from North Korea, Chinese military expansion and Taiwan’s status as “the most
dangerous place on Earth.” Japanese politicians have acknowledged that if Taiwan is at‑
tacked, it would be difficult for Japan to stay out of the conflict. To increase its readiness,
the Japanese government is eager to revise its military strategy and to expand the role
of the JSDF through constitutional amendments. If it succeeds, it could exert greater
influence, allowing its armed forces to play a greater role in the Taiwan Strait and the
Indo‑Pacific region.

Lack of clarity on Article 9 hampers effective Taiwan response

Galic 21

Mirna Galic, senior policy analyst for China and East Asia at the United States Institute
of Peace and a nonresident senior fellow at the Japan Institute of International Affairs,
”Japan’s Authorities in a Taiwan Contingency: Providing Needed Clarity,” War on the
Rocks, 10‑6‑2021, https://warontherocks.com/2021/10/japans‑authorities‑in‑a‑taiwan‑
contingency‑providing‑needed‑clarity/, accessed 3‑14‑2022

A Chinese military intervention against Taiwan represents a major security threat for
Japan. So it is not surprising that a Japanese poll found 74 percent of respondents sup‑
portive of their government engaging to advance peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait.
Tokyo’s potential role in a military contingency involving Taiwan has also been in the
spotlight, however, following increased Chinese and U.S. tensions over the island and a
series of comments by senior Japanese officials, including Deputy Prime Minister Taro
Aso. Although Japan’s response in a Taiwan contingency would ultimately reflect the
nature of the threat, the U.S. approach, and the broader international reaction, Japan’s
constitution and security legislation create legal limits on Tokyo’s ability to defend Tai‑
wan. Yet these limits remain little explored with respect to various Taiwan scenarios,

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within either Japanese or U.S. policy circles. Because Japan’s security legislation is so
complex, particularly after changes that entered into force in 2016 to expand the author‑
ities of the Self‑Defense Forces (SDF), a potential Japanese response to a Taiwan contin‑
gency is much less clear than it may appear on the surface. This article briefly outlines
the range of Japanese responses to a Chinese invasion or blockade of Taiwan and then
examines two sets of key authorities — those related to an “important influence situa‑
tion” and to a “survival‑threatening situation.” The article argues that the authorities
under a survival‑threatening situation are less likely to be applicable to a defense of
Taiwan than recent commentary might suggest. Both the survival‑threatening situation
and the important influence situation, moreover, present ambiguities and conditionali‑
ties that Japanese and U.S. planners should clarify together. Doing so would eliminate
potential confusion, ensuring that the U.S.‑Japanese alliance can function smoothly in
relation to Taiwan and thus strengthening the deterrence that is key for the peace and
stability that Japan so strongly desires. What’s On the Books Article 9 of Japan’s consti‑
tution renounces war and the use or threat of force to settle international disputes. The
use of force in self‑defense is permitted in response to an armed attack against Japan
(we’ll place an asterisk here and come back to it), but only if an armed attack is initi‑
ated, not merely if there is a likelihood or threat of attack. If a Chinese attack on Tai‑
wan involved any attack on Japanese territory, from individual islands to U.S. bases,
Japan could respond with force in self‑defense using a spectrum of military operations.
However, Japan’s use of force would be permitted only in the absence of other “ap‑
propriate means” and to the “minimum necessary extent.” Absent a direct attack on
Japan, Japanese action can take various forms, depending on the circumstances. Per‑
haps most pertinently, Japan would have the option to allow the United States to use
U.S. bases in Japan for a military response to a Taiwan attack, based on prior consulta‑
tion requirements relating to “the use of facilities and areas in Japan as bases for military
combat operations to be undertaken from Japan.” Historically, Japan has maintained
public ambiguity about its willingness to provide acquiescence for such a request in
relation to Taiwan. Japan can also respond to an important influence situation, which
comprises contingencies short of armed attack on Japan that, if left unaddressed, could
develop to threaten Japan’s peace and security. In such a situation, Japan can provide
support for U.S. and other forces responding to the contingency. Japanese support may
include search and rescue activities, ship inspections, and logistics support, with the
last encompassing such elements as use of facilities, supply chains, transportation, com‑
munication, and repair and maintenance. Additionally, there is one scenario short of
a direct armed attack against Japan where the country is permitted to use force in self‑

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defense, per the asterisk we placed earlier. This involves the survival‑threatening situa‑
tion, which refers to “a situation where an armed attack against a foreign country that
is in a close relationship with Japan occurs and as a result threatens Japan’s survival
and poses a clear danger to fundamentally overturn people’s right to life, liberty and
pursuit of happiness.” In such a scenario, Japan could undertake similar military opera‑
tions to those designed to respond to an attack against Japan, including in collaboration
with the United States or other countries. This is effectively collective self‑defense, but
it is a narrower species of collective self‑defense than traditional interpretations because
Japan can only come to the defense of another nation if its own survival is directly jeop‑
ardized and not simply because that nation happens to be an ally or friend. Both the
important influence situation and survival‑threatening situation designations are part
of a controversial package of security legislation, passed in 2015 to attendant public
protests and sharp divisions within the Diet, that entered into force in 2016. Opponents
of the legislation feared it could be used to drag Japan into U.S. military adventurism.
The administration of then‑Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, meanwhile, argued that it was
necessary to address changing regional and global security environments and had built‑
in limitations. Realistically, the Japanese government — like any government — will try
to do whatever it believes is necessary for the country’s security and build the requisite
argument to back that. However, such an argument will need to pass muster with the
Diet, which is required to approve military operations under the security legislation.
As a result, the government will need to provide a solid legal basis and clearly identify
why the specific proposed response is needed, especially if it involves a Japanese use of
force. This is important given the presence of parties in the Diet with restrictive views
on the use of force and collective self‑defense, including the ruling party’s main coali‑
tion partner. When an Attack on Taiwan Threatens Japan’s Survival The applicability of
the survival‑threatening situation designation for a defense of Taiwan is thus interest‑
ing to examine, particularly given Aso’s direct reference to the term when he noted that
“if a major problem took place in Taiwan, it would not be too much to say that it could
relate to a survival‑threatening situation.” One significant point that remains unknown
is whether Taiwan qualifies as a foreign country for the purposes of Japan’s relevant se‑
curity laws, since Japan does not officially recognize Taiwan as a separate county from
China, despite its relations with Taipei. How much this technicality might matter in an
actual crisis likely depends on the mood in the Diet, but in Japan’s rule‑conscious politi‑
cal culture, the question might present a legal conundrum. Leaving the issue of Taiwan’s
status as a foreign country aside, the intentions behind the designation are also worth
examining. Although the specifics of when an attack on a foreign country might directly

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threaten Japan’s survival are not defined in relevant laws, it is telling that all the exam‑
ples of the potential application of the designation provided by the Abe government
and a legal advisory panel convened to examine the issue involve the United States. Be‑
cause Japan’s security is so deeply linked to the protective potential of the United States,
it is not difficult to see how an attack on the United States that might decrease U.S. de‑
fensive or offensive capacity could jeopardize Japan’s defenses and thereby threaten its
survival. An attack on Taiwan would not impact the mechanics of Japan’s security pro‑
vision in such a way. Indeed, an attack on the United States in a Taiwan contingency
may be more likely to spur a survival‑threatening situation designation than an attack
on Taiwan itself. For example, U.S. ships under missile attack by Chinese forces could
request Japanese assistance — a scenario similar to one the advisory panel contemplated
(in the general case) in its justification of the need for collective self‑defense permissions.
Abe himself warned that a failure to protect U.S. ships when requested could unravel
the very fabric of the U.S.‑Japanese security alliance upon which the country’s security
rests. The likelihood of such an outcome would obviously depend on the nature and
severity of the specific case, but the example underscores the U.S.‑centric focus the Abe
administration seemingly intended for designating a survival‑threatening situation. Re‑
gardless of the original intent, the language describing a survival‑threatening situation
is flexible enough to apply directly to Taiwan if the Japanese cabinet determined such a
course to be necessary. As noted, however, a solid case would be needed to secure Diet
approval for military operations under the law. According to guidance suggested by the
advisory panel, the clearest case could be made if there were a high probability that an
attack on Taiwan would lead to a direct attack against Japan. Although such a scenario
may appear open‑ended, only a few specific cases would likely qualify without ambigu‑
ity. Examples help illustrate the point. Take an attempted Chinese invasion of Taiwan.
This action alone would send extremely worrying signals to Tokyo about Beijing’s in‑
tent and self‑restraint, and, if successful, could facilitate a Chinese attack on Japanese
territory or supply chains. Such a scenario would doubtless put the Self‑Defense Forces
on high alert. However, absent a causal and temporal link between the attack on Taiwan
and an attack on Japan — such as clear indications that China intended to attack Japan
from Taiwanese territory once it gained control — it would be difficult to argue that a
Japanese use of force in defense of Taiwan was necessary to protect Japan from attack.
Even use of force for the defense of Japan itself, as noted earlier, would only be allowed
if China initiated an attack on Japan, not merely because it might now be in a better posi‑
tion to initiate one. Imagine, instead, if there were clear information or intelligence that
China planned to use the invasion of Taiwan as a necessary part of a sequenced attack

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on Taiwan and Japan — one focused, perhaps, on the Chinese‑claimed and Japanese‑
administered Senkaku Islands, or even on other islands in Japan’s Okinawa prefecture.
In such a scenario, an attack on Taiwan could constitute, in effect, the initiation of an at‑
tack on Japan, closely connecting an armed attack against Taiwan with a direct threat to
Japan’s survival. The defense of Taiwan could thus be seen as integral to the defense of
Japan. Although variations on the situation might also qualify, this is the basic scenario
under which a Chinese invasion of Taiwan would likely present a survival‑threatening
situation for Japan. If China were to opt to blockade Taiwan, it might also be possible
to apply the survival‑threatening situation designation, but again, likely only in a very
narrow range of circumstances. First, Japan would need to consider the blockade to con‑
stitute an armed attack — for example, in the gravity of its scale and effects on Taiwan.
Second, per the guidance of the advisory panel, the blockade would need to critically
impact Japan or its citizens, perhaps by strongly harming Japan’s economy. For Japan
to need to use force to defend Taiwan due to such effects, however, the blockade would
need to critically impact Japan through its impact on Taiwan specifically. Since Taiwan
is Japan’s fourth‑largest export marketand eighth‑largest import territory of origin, this
could be plausible if a blockade were to go on long enough. Again, there could be vari‑
ations to this scenario, but very few exist that would meet the pass‑through criterion.
All in all, the potential cases under which an attack on Taiwan would threaten Japan’s
survival in accordance with relevant security laws appear very limited. There is one
caveat here worth exploring. The advisory panel also suggested that a case might be a
made for a survival‑threatening situation if the “international order itself could be sig‑
nificantly affected” as the result of an attack on a foreign country. This notion could
introduce some flexibility for Japanese decision‑makers. China’s successful reunifica‑
tion with Taiwan by force would certainly affect the regional order and, in turn, U.S.
power in the region. There may be debate within Japan about whether such a scenario
would significantly impact the international order itself, however. Ultimately, Tokyo is
unlikely to authorize use of force in defense of Taiwan unless it feels it absolutely must,
because this will bring it into direct conflict with China. However, the lack of specificity
still leaves a range of scenarios for U.S. military planners to consider and/or eliminate,
even leaving aside the question of the international order. Moreover, an understand‑
ing of both Japanese law and Japanese interpretations of international law is required,
making this a complex task. When an Attack on Taiwan Could Develop to Threaten
Japan’s Security If a contingency involving Taiwan did not rise to the level of a survival‑
threatening situation, it would nonetheless present serious concerns and risks for Japan.
This is where the important influence situation designation comes in. The examples of a

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potential important influence situation provided by the Abe government and the advi‑
sory panel are again telling and boil down to U.S. forces responding to an attack by one
regional country against another. One example involves “a situation where an armed
attack against another country occurs in Japan’s neighboring area and the United States
is exercising the right of collective self‑defense in support of said country,” and “if such
a situation is left untouched, the conflict would enlarge, and eventually, Japan itself
would be affected by the conflict.” This example presents circumstances very similar
to a potential Chinese invasion of Taiwan. Although all the available examples of an
important influence situation involve an actual armed attack on a third country, the oc‑
currence of an armed attack is not an explicit requirement to define such a situation, so
it is likely that a blockade of Taiwan would qualify, even one not devastating enough
to constitute an armed attack. This is useful when considering that a quasi‑blockade
or “quarantine” limited to military materiel may be a more effective strategy for China
than a full blockade, according to a special report from the Council on Foreign Relations.
It is certainly plausible that a blockade or quarantine of Taiwan would fit the criteria for
a situation that, if left unaddressed, could develop to threaten Japan’s security. The
pertinent aspect of an important influence situation with respect to Japanese support
activities, however, is that it requires a U.S. response to support. The nature and cir‑
cumstances of that response would likely be determinative. This is particularly relevant
because Japanese and U.S. interpretations of collective self‑defense and the legal use of
force differ. It is unlikely that Japan would be able to provide support activities for a
U.S. response that it did not see as consistent with international law. Take, for example,
a Chinese quarantine of Taiwan. If the United States were to respond to the quarantine
by dispatching warships to the area to monitor the situation, Japan could likely refuel
or supply these ships or provide other relevant support activities. In contrast, imagine
a quarantine case in which the United States decided to respond with force. If Japan did
not categorize the quarantine as serious enough to constitute an armed attack, Tokyo
might not consider a U.S. use of force in defense of Taiwan as a legitimate example
of collective self‑defense under the United Nations Charter, constraining its ability to
act. It is, of course, unclear that the United States itself would respond with force in
such a scenario, but the case is meant to illustrate conditionalities at play in Japanese
support authorities. It also shows that the important influence situation designation is
not wholly free from the issue of Taiwan’s status as a foreign country, even though the
language in the law does not reference the term. Here, Taiwan’s status would certainly
play into the perceived legality of a U.S. use of force under international law. Ultimately,
an important influence situation designation is more flexible than a survival‑threatening

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situation designation, and thus more likely to apply to a Taiwan contingency. However,
the relevant variable for an important influence situation is the nature not only of the
threat itself, but also of the U.S. response. In this regard, the more information Japan
has about U.S. intentions and options, the better clarity it can generate about its own
possible responses. Providing Needed Clarity The ambiguities and conditionalities sur‑
rounding the applicability of the survival‑threatening situation and important influence
situation designations to Taiwan point to the need for U.S. and Japanese officials to think
through the many potential scenarios in a Taiwan contingency and clarify to each other,
privately, their potential responses. This would not require either partner to commit
itself to any specific course of action. It would simply clarify which response options
are actually on the table and how such options may be both shaped and constrained.
According to government sources, Japan is already conducting an internal review of
its options for a Taiwan contingency, a necessary first step for such consultation. If it
is not already doing so, Japan should also seek internal legal clarity on whether and
under what circumstances Taiwan could count as a foreign country for the purposes of
Japanese security law. Sharing this information privately with the United States and
seeking U.S. views on the same would be a useful follow‑up action. Understandably,
Japan may want to condition its views on Taiwan’s status based on how other members
of the international community proceed. Such nuances could be included in Japanese
information sharing with the United States. Additionally, a Taiwan contingency is likely
to require quick thinking and decision‑making. This will be important not only for U.S.‑
Japanese coordination, but also for Japan domestically. Most of the authorities granted
to the Self‑Defense Forces in 2016 remain unutilized and the internal coordination pro‑
cesses required legally for their deployment untested. To this end, it may be useful for
Japanese authorities to translate the results of their own Taiwan review and any subse‑
quent consultations with the United States into an internal exercise to ensure that na‑
tional and local officials are able to act quickly and seamlessly. Relatedly, the Japanese
government should work to increase the understanding of Diet members regarding var‑
ious potential Taiwan scenarios, given the Diet’s approval role. Some might argue that
the lack of clarity surrounding Japan’s designations of survival‑threatening situations
and important influence situations is helpful as a form of deterrence. If the issue were
simply about Japan’s intentions, as in the case of permission regarding U.S. use of bases
for a military defense of Taiwan, such an argument might hold water. However, in the
case of Japan’s legal authorities for addressing a Taiwan contingency, the key question
relates to Japan’s options rather than its intentions. By creating a space for confusion by
U.S. military planners and Japan’s own decision‑makers, the ambiguities and condition‑

144
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alities related to the application of these designations to Taiwan undermine deterrence

and give China an advantage that these allies need not concede. Remedying this con‑
fusion will help strengthen deterrence and ensure that a Taiwan contingency remains
purely hypothetical.

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 6 Pro Evidence

6.2.8 North Korea

The current threat environment requires a capable military that can keep pace with
emerging threats—failure to amend Article 9 severely hamper military effectiveness.

Bandow 17

Doug Bandow, a senior fellow at the Cato Institute, specializing in foreign policy and
civil liberties. He worked as special assistant to President Ronald Reagan and editor
of the political magazine Inquiry. He writes regularly for leading publications such
as Fortune magazine, National Interest, the Wall Street Journal, and the Washington
Times. ”Time to Let Japan Be a Regular Military Power”, 10‑29‑2017, Cato Institute,
https://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/time‑let‑japan‑be‑regular‑military‑
power, accessed 7‑13‑2019

Even so, Tokyo created competent armed forces. Outlays were close to $50 billion last
year. While Japan’s army is small, its air force and navy are capable and modern. Still,
potential threats outrange existing resources.

The PRC has sprinted past Japan and now spends upwards of four times as much on
the military. Moreover, Beijing possesses a modest nuclear arsenal. Although in a
war between the two Japan would be no pushover, its defense outlays have remained
roughly constant in real terms, ensuring a growing bilateral gap. Warned Jeff Kingston
of Temple University in Tokyo: “There is right now a one‑sided arms race that China
is winning.” (Without irony, China Daily USA editorialized against the “bellicose Abe”
for increasing military outlays even though Japan “certainly doesn’t need such military
equipment for national security.”)

North Korea adds another challenge. Although Pyongyang’s conventional forces have
little reach beyond the Korean Peninsula, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea
possesses a nascent nuclear capacity as well as chemical and likely biological weapons.
Missiles make Japan a possible target as an ally of the United States or victim of extor‑
tion.

The worsening security environment creates increasing pressure on Tokyo to do more.

Since becoming premier in late 2012, Abe has pushed his country into a more active role.
He proposed increased military outlays, acquisition of new weapons and broader SDF
responsibilities. The military is particularly interested in adding Aegis Ashore missile
defense systems, Tomahawk cruise missiles and F‑35 fighters.

146
 6 Pro Evidence

In 2014 the Abe government changed its interpretation of Article Nine to allow a lim‑
ited form of “collective security,” including assisting American personnel under attack.
Tokyo followed with legislation and revised Guidelines for Japan‑U.S. Defense Cooper‑
ation the following year.

These changes, though controversial, were modest. Although collective self‑defense fi‑
nally is considered legitimate under the constitution, such action is authorized only un‑
der extremely narrow circumstances. Japan’s Professor Narushige Michishita observed
that the new rules would not allow Japan to defend a U.S. ship if Japan’s security was
not directly threatened. Moreover, the government failed to move forward with its
plan to revise Article Nine. The failure to do so limits his military options. Argued Indi‑
ana University’s Adam P. Liff: “Without formal constitutional revision (at a minimum),
however, more ambitious efforts to fundamentally transform Article 9’s interpretation
or the scope of scenarios in which Japan can use force overseas are unlikely without
major domestic political realignments.”

Abe pushed for such a change by running against North Korea, playing on voters’ fears.
With his newly enhanced election mandate, he may move further and faster on security
issues. Liff noted that “Strategic and domestic political vicissitudes have been the major
drivers of changing interpretations of Article 9.” Defense Minister Itsunori Onodera
indicated that the government is considering revising military guidelines to acquire and
use weapons, such as cruise missiles, capable of hitting foreign bases. The government
also is likely to revive proposals to amend the constitution. There even is some support
among elites to consider the acquisition of nuclear weapons.

Still, opposition to such changes remains fierce. In fact, Abe’s coalition partner, the
Komeito Party, has been reluctant to join his effort. The Finance Ministry pointed to
the government’s massive debt in opposing accelerated military spending. The prime
minister’s effort to change the constitution diminished his poll ratings, before Kim Jong‑
un’s misbehavior helped revive them. Popular sentiment has been shifting, but perhaps
not enough. “The Japanese public is still not so sure about this,” observed Richard
Samuels of MIT’s Center for International Studies.

Moreover, loosening constitutional restrictions would not be enough. The government

would have to accept more cost and risk by adjusting its force structure and foreign
policy accordingly. And dramatic change remains unlikely. The Abe government has
been hedging, perhaps feeling greater uncertainty over Washington’s continued secu‑
rity commitment. But Tokyo does not want to take over responsibility for its defense.
Indeed, Yoichi Funabashi of the Asia Pacific Initiative warned that doing more might

147
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“induce or tempt the United States to lessen U.S. commitments to Japan’s defense.”

In contrast, Abe’s government is pushing for an ever‑stronger U.S. commitment.

One unnamed foreign‑ministry official said: “The strategic environment is becoming
harsher and we need to discuss how we will respond to that” (emphasis added).
Which primarily means Washington. “We will look for the U.S. to reaffirm its defense
commitment, including the nuclear deterrent,” declared Onodera as American and
Japanese ministers met: “In light of the threat of North Korea, [they] confirmed the
importance of the unwavering U.S. commitment to extended deterrence.”

Washington reciprocates such sentiments. The joint statement of the August meeting of
the U.S.‑Japan Security Consultative Committee confirmed the ministers’ “shared intent
to develop specific measures and actions to further strengthen the U.S.‑Japan Alliance,”
including “maintaining a robust U.S. force presence in Japan.” At the time Secretary
Tillerson explained that the two countries “stressed the critical role that U.S. extended
deterrence plays in ensuring the security of Japan, as well as the peace and stability of
the Asia Pacific region.”

While working to increase America’s entanglement, Japan is pushing an aggressive in‑

ternational response to the North. Foreign Minister Taro Kono said there “should be
no dialogue” absent a North Korean demonstration of “a clear intent with regard to de‑
nuclearization.” Abe advocated applying “an unprecedented higher level of pressure
on North Korea to force it to change policy.” He said countries should unite to deny
the North access to “the goods, funds, people and technology for nuclear and missile
development.” What is needed, he added, “is not dialogue, but pressure,” and even
backed the Washington mantra that “all options” are on the table, meaning war.

In advocating such aggressive policies, it would seem appropriate for Japan to pos‑
sess commensurate military capabilities. However, Narushige Michishita of Japan’s
National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies worried that “defense is all about hedg‑
ing risk and if you seek perfect defense, the cost would be enormous.” From Tokyo’s
perspective, why pay the bill when you can hand it off to Washington?

Article 9 revision is key

Straits Times 17

Straits Times, ”Japan’s LDP should make Constitution change to deter North Korea
an election pledge: Lawmaker”, 8‑15‑2017, https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/east‑

148
 6 Pro Evidence

asia/japan‑lawmaker‑says‑ldp‑should‑make‑constitution‑change‑to‑deter‑north‑korea‑
an, accessed 7‑13‑2019

TOKYO (BLOOMBERG) ‑ Japan’s ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) should make
it an election pledge to change the nation’s pacifist constitution as a way to strengthen
deterrence against North Korea’s provocations, a senior party lawmaker said.

In an interview on Tuesday (Sept 19), Mr Masahiko Shibayama said the party should
campaign for a possible election next month on revising the pacifist Article 9 of the
constitution.

Prime Minister Shinzo Abe has said he wants to change it to make clear the legitimacy
of Japan’s Self‑Defence Forces.

”We can’t permit North Korea to keep making threats and ignoring the rules. We need a
deterrent for those threats,” said Mr Shibayama, 51. ”We should add a promise to revise
the constitution to the party’s manifesto as a part of developing a security framework.”

Mr Shibayama, the deputy director‑general of a party group on constitutional revision

and adviser to LDP Secretary General Toshihiro Nikai, said deterrence towards North
Korea would likely become an issue in a general election expected next month.

Mr Abe is set to announce the dissolution of parliament for a snap poll, possibly on Oct
22, at a press conference on Monday, local media have reported.

North Korea’s recent spate of missile and nuclear tests has unnerved Japanese voters
and more than two‑thirds of respondents to an NHK poll last week approve of Mr Abe’s
strong line on the isolated nation.

Another reason why Mr Abe may call an election is that the main opposition Democratic
Party appears to be unravelling with the resignation of several members since a new
leader was voted in earlier this month.

Mr Seiji Maehara, the new head of the Democratic Party, said on Sunday that an election
at a time when North Korea is threatening Japan risks creating a political vacuum, and
that Mr Abe was seeking to escape questions from lawmakers on a series of cronyism
scandals.

Rewriting the constitution has been a longstanding goal of the LDP whose original mem‑
bers ‑ including Mr Abe’s grandfather, who was a prime minister ‑ saw the document
as a US imposition that humiliated Japan after World War II.

Article 9 of that law renounces the right to war and prohibits land, sea and air forces.

149
 6 Pro Evidence

Yet trying to change it also carries risks. The public is divided on the issue and some
members of Mr Abe’s own party don’t support it.

The ambiguous constitutional status of the Self‑Defence Forces has resulted in arcane
debates over limits on their role.

A study by consultant Deloitte found that Japan, as a result, had the least aggressive
defence posture of 18 Asia‑Pacific nations it compared this year, based on seven param‑
eters, such as military spending as a proportion of the economy.

Any constitutional change requires a two‑thirds majority in both houses of parliament,

followed by a referendum. In an October election, it would be crucial for Mr Abe’s
ruling coalition to retain this ”supermajority” in the lower chamber.

150
 6 Pro Evidence

6.2.9 AT: Russia

Militarization in Japan is directed at China, not Russia

Brown 21

James Brown, Associate Professor and Academic Program Coordinator for International
Affairs, Temple University, Japan Campus, ”Is Russia Right to Fear Creeping Militariza‑
tion in Japan?,” Carnegie Moscow Center, 8‑6‑2021, https://carnegiemoscow.org/ com‑
mentary/84701, accessed 3‑14‑2022

On May 24, a joint defense panel of Japan’s ruling Liberal Democratic Party approved
a draft proposal to sharply increase military spending. This comes on top of nine con‑
secutive years in which Japan’s defense budget has increased, reaching a record $52
billion in 2021. Japan is actively developing and buying new categories of military tech‑
nology, while removing long‑standing restrictions on the use of its Self‑Defense Forces.
The relative decrease in U.S. military strength in the region, especially compared with
China’s burgeoning power, is forcing Japan to become a leading military power in the
Asia‑Pacific. This is inevitably causing alarm in Russia, which never signed a peace
treaty with Japan at the end of World War II, and which has a long‑running territorial
dispute with its neighbor over the Kuril Islands. For many decades now, Japan has
had a reputation as a pacifist country that relies entirely on the United States in matters
of national security. This position is enshrined in two key documents. Firstly, Article
9 of the 1947 Japanese constitution states unequivocally that “the Japanese people for‑
ever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as
a means of settling international disputes.” Secondly, the 1960 Treaty of Mutual Coop‑
eration and Security between the United States and Japan is understood to guarantee
U.S. protection from any attack on Japanese territory in exchange for Japan hosting U.S.
military bases. Accordingly, the focus of the Japanese armed forces has been on defense,
rather than on attacking foreign targets. Now, however, military spending is—at $52
billion—comparable to that of European powers such as France, Germany, and the UK.
In 2020, Japan’s military expenditure was the ninth biggest in the world, according to
SIPRI. The additional spending is being used to develop Japan’s military potential in
new areas, such as an amphibious rapid deployment brigade established in 2018. This
elite unit of marines is tasked with regaining control over Japanese islands in the event
of their seizure. The Japanese government also took the decision in 2018 to convert two
Izumo‑class destroyers into light aircraft carriers. In addition, Tokyo has agreed to buy
forty‑two F‑35B fighter jets from the United States, and is developing new standoff mis‑

151
 6 Pro Evidence

siles with a range of 1,000 kilometers. Legislative changes have also been made: in 2014,
Japan lifted a ban on weapons exports, allowing (in theory) revenues from arms sales to
be pumped into making the Japanese defense complex more competitive, and in 2015,
the law was changed to allow the Self‑Defense Forces to fight in the event of an attack
on an ally’s forces, as well as on Japan itself. These large‑scale changes in Japan’s de‑
fense policy amount to nothing less than a quiet revolution, so it’s no surprise that they
have sparked concern in Moscow. In January, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov
spoke out strongly against the prospect of Japan hosting new short‑ and medium‑range
ground‑based missiles on its territory. Locating the missiles on ships rather than land
would change little as well, added Lavrov, “because basing them in the Sea of Japan…
will mean that those missiles can reach a significant proportion of Russia’s territory.”
Others have gone even further. In December 2020, Major General Mikhail Makaruk, a
member of the executive committee of the Officers of Russia organization, said that the
purpose of Japan’s new weapons was to seize the Southern Kuril Islands. Such reac‑
tions are not unexpected, but the fact that Tokyo is pushing through major changes in
its defense policy does not automatically constitute a threat to Russia. First, the scale
of Japan’s military might should not be exaggerated. Even its record military spending
doesn’t yet exceed 1 percent of GDP, compared to the United States, which spent 3.7
percent of its GDP on defense in 2020, and Russia, which spent 4.3 percent. Second,
Japan’s new military capability is not aimed at Russia. On the contrary: in recent years,
Tokyo has shown considerable restraint where Russia is concerned, and often does not
even react to clear provocations by Moscow, such as sending strategic bombers to fly
close to and, in some cases, violate Japan’s airspace. (Japanese fighter jets were scram‑
bled 206 times from April to December 2020 because of approaching Russian military
planes.) Nor has Japan used Russia’s deployment of anti‑ship missile systems to the
contested islands as a pretext for a military build‑up close to Russia’s borders. It is also
ludicrous to suggest that the Japanese government is planning to seize the Kuril Islands.
The use of military force for anything other than self‑defense is unacceptable to both the
Japanese leadership and public. In any case, despite Russia’s fears, in the last decade
Japan has actually been redeploying its armed forces away from the Russian border:
from the north to the southwest. The new amphibious brigade, for example, is based in
the city of Sasebo on the southwestern island of Kyushu—a full 1,700 kilometers from
the disputed islands. The reason for basing the brigade here is clear: to counteract the
potential threat from China, whose military spending has grown from $76.5 billion in
2010 to $209 billion in 2021, according to CSIS China Power data. China has started
behaving far more aggressively in the dispute over the Senkaku Islands, which Beijing

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claims as the Diaoyu Islands, and which have been under Tokyo’s administration since
the 1970s. This year, Chinese vessels have entered Japanese territorial waters around
the islands several times, and in February this year, the Chinese leadership passed a law
expanding the Chinese coast guard’s rights to use armed force against foreign vessels.
In other words, if Japan’s quiet military revolution is indeed aimed against a specific
threat, then that threat issues not from Russia but from China. Japan’s military mod‑
ernization program of recent years is also linked to the relative weakening of the U.S.
military presence in the region. Before, there was no doubt that Washington was capa‑
ble of protecting Japan from any threat. Now, however, with China challenging the U.S.
military dominance of the region, Tokyo understands that it cannot rely solely on Wash‑
ington. These fears have long existed in the background, but were brought into sharp
focus under former U.S. president Donald Trump and his “America First” policy. This
is not to say that the Japanese‑American alliance is in any kind of jeopardy: far from
it. It simply means that for the first time in many years, Japan feels the need to become
more self‑sufficient in its defense policy. Regardless of the scale of the military reforms
taking place in Japan, they are not an indicator that Tokyo has new ambitions in the
region. The Japanese government, having perceived a threat from China and decreased
U.S. involvement in its problems, has decided for the first time in modern history to sig‑
nificantly boost the capacity of its defense forces. Russia cannot, of course, ignore such
a rapid development of military capabilities among its neighbors. But in Japan’s case,
these changes do not target Russian interests in the region. The Japanese public and
leadership are strongly against the use of military force to resolve conflicts with their
neighbors, and have no immediate intention of eliminating Article 9 of the constitution.

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 6 Pro Evidence

6.2.10 AT: Perception

Perception non‑unique—Japanese weapons acquisition plus military involvement

sends all the wrong signals now.

Copp 19

Tara Copp, the Pentagon Bureau Chief for Military Times and author of the award‑
winning military nonfiction ”The Warbird: Three Heroes. Two Wars. One Story.”
”Japan surges new weapons, military roles to meet China’s rise”, 1‑20‑2019, Military
Times, https://www.militarytimes.com/news/2019/01/15/japan‑surges‑new‑weapons‑
military‑roles‑to‑meet‑chinas‑rise/, accessed 7‑11‑2019

TOKYO — Most Japanese military officials won’t name the potential adversary that has
spurred rapid Japanese modernization across its ground, maritime and air Self Defense
Forces, in a nod to sensitive diplomatic relations.

But it’s not Russia that has spurred Japan’s recent commitment to purchase up to 147
F‑35s, or moved Japan to produce the country’s first aircraft carrier since World War
II. It’s not North Korea that’s caused Japan to rapidly train, for the first time ever, an
amphibious assault brigade to seize or retake the Senkaku Islands to its southwest if
they have to.

It’s China. But among many U.S. and Japanese military officials in Japan, it’s “a com‑
petitor,” or “that country.”

“We have some weakness to defending Japan, especially on the southwest islands,” Maj.
Gen. Shinichi Aoki, commander that Amphibious Rapid Deployment Brigade, said.”So
that’s why our Self Defense Force is now trying to set up a strong posture toward that
country.”

Japan’s new amphibious rapid deployment brigade has 2,100 troops now and is on track
to have more than 3,000 trained by March, Aoki told Military Times during a December
visit to Okinawa.

The surge comes amid an intensifying internal discussion in Japan on what types of ca‑
pabilities are allowed under Japan’s constitution, which ”renounce[s] war as a sovereign
right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international dis‑
putes.” By literal reading it seems to forbid Japan from maintaining forces at all, but in
the 1950s Japan determined self‑defense only was allowed.

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 6 Pro Evidence

Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and the ruling LDP party have pushed for a rewrite of that
Article 9 clause to wording that says the Self Defense Forces are constitutional. But
Japan’s constitution has never been amended, and political analysts who spoke with
Military Times and other visiting reporters in Japan through a trip sponsored by the
Sasakawa Peace Foundation USA said it was unlikely Abe would risk the political cap‑
ital on an Article 9 vote in the near future.
Instead, in some respects, Japan’s military is moving ahead — constitutional revision or
not. From some military officials’ point of view, the changes are still about the defense
of Japan and its interests in the Pacific, even if that means it is also about becoming a
more expeditionary force that also looks out for its allies.
On board the Izumo, Japan’s three‑year‑old helicopter destroyer that will be converted
to carry F‑35Bs, Japanese Maritime Self Defense Forces briefed reporters on their ex‑
panding role, which calls not just for a regional presence in the East and South China
Seas, but also for a regular presence off the coast of Djibouti, where China established a
military base in 2017.
“We will never accept a compromise with any attempt to prevent us from keeping the
Indo‑Pacific free and open,” said Japanese Maritime Self Defense Forces deputy director
of plans and programs, Capt. Toshiyuki Hirata, without naming China specifically.
Other Japanese officials are more direct.
“Actually this trigger ... to be straight out [is] China. The expansion of China. I think
it’s clear,” said Keitaro Ohno, parliamentary vice minister for defense for Japan’s ruling
Liberal Democratic Party.”There is no need for us to operate such kind of aircraft carrier
if we don’t have to respond to China in the Pacific Ocean.”
Those Japanese officials emphasized that they do not seek conflict with China, and some
pointed to a recent warming of diplomatic relations between the two countries after the
U.S. launched a trade war with China. But Japan’s Self Defense Forces are still respond‑
ing to a rising number of Chinese military aircraft incursions, regular and expanded
reach of Chinese warships, including submarines, and other activities that are irritants,
such as the regular presence of Chinese civilian fishing craft lingering by the Senkakus.
Japanese defense officials call them “little green fishermen.”
“It’s just ... face to face that we are smiling, but under the table that we are some sort
of, like, kicking each other,” Ohno said.On Tuesday, the Defense Intelligence Agency
released a new assessment of China’s military power and concluded that the sheer num‑
bers of advanced ships, forces, aircraft, satellites and missiles China has fielded over the

155
 6 Pro Evidence

last 15 years has increased the risk it will engage in a regional conflict. However, it’s
likelier that conflict would arise with Taiwan, not Japan.

“It’s obviously a different situation [than Taiwan] because Japan ... has a significant
capability to defend their territory,” a defense intelligence official said as he briefed
reporters on the condition of anonymity.

“I think ... neither side has an interest or an intention to escalate the conflict at this point,
although there’s a lot of air and naval activity on a small confined space, so there’s
always potential for something.”

In response to the increased activity by Chinese aircraft, Japan moved a second

squadron to the military side of Naha Airport to be able to more rapidly sortie against
aircraft incursions over Japan’s Air Defense Identification Zone. In 2016, Japanese
fighters sortied 1,168 times — 70 percent of those were against Chinese jets. The
numbers for 2017 and 2018 fell a bit, but were an “unbelievable climb” from just a few
years before, said U.S. Forces Japan commander Air Force Lt. Gen. Jerry Martinez.

You can see the activity in person on Okinawa, where Japanese fighters take regular
flight and have the primary responsibility for conducting intercepts in the South China
Sea and East China Sea, said Air Force Brig. Gen. Case Cunningham, who commands
the 18th Wing at Kadena Air Base.

“Every time I fly out of Naha and see [Japan’s] 15s take off, it’s very likely they are
headed out to an intercept of some type or other,” Cunningham said.

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 6 Pro Evidence

6.2.11 AT: Prolif

Prolif wouldn’t cause arms racing or war

Corr 17

Anders Corr, Ph.D. in political science from Harvard University, worked in mili‑
tary intelligence for five years, including on nuclear weapons„ ”Japan: Go Nuclear
Now,” Forbes, 1‑31‑2017, https://www.forbes.com/sites/anderscorr/2017/01/31/japan‑
go‑nuclear‑now/#555972517745, accessed 6‑8‑2020

If Japan goes nuclear, it will not cause non‑nuclear authoritarian countries to do the
same. While some countries like China and North Korea hype a threat from Japan
in their state‑run media, no serious analysts see Japan as an aggressive power. It is
a democracy with a pacifist constitution. It has experienced the horrors of nuclear war
as has no other country. Vietnam, for example, will not see a Japanese nuclear weapon
as a threat. Rather, it will see a Japanese nuclear weapon as stabilizing Asia through a
check on China, Vietnam’s main threat. Such a weapon could even allow Japan to in‑
crease economic and military aid to Vietnam in the safety of knowing that China would
be less likely to retaliate.

Australia, South Korea and Taiwan might go nuclear, but not from fear of Japan. In fact,
Japan’s going nuclear might decrease the probability of these countries going nuclear
because they would feel safer with Japan’s new nuclear check on China. If they did go
nuclear, however, they would be additional bulwarks against authoritarian aggression
in Asia and thereby increase stability in the region. They are well‑developed democ‑
racies that would maintain security procedures such that nuclear weapons did not fall
into the hands of extremists. As responsible democracies, they can be counted on to
only maintain their nuclear deterrent for defensive purposes.

China shows little regard for human rights in its own country. One Chinese general
threatened hundreds of U.S. cities with destruction through nuclear war. China is a
territorially aggressive power. And as a result, countries near and far are increasingly
worried. Only by matching China’s nuclear weapons will Asian democracies be able
to defend themselves. Ringing China with nuclear democracies will force it to focus
on more productive pursuits than threats and the violent acquisition of its neighbors’
territory.

Asian democracies should not allow the authoritarian nuclear powers of the world to
bully them. Asia would be more stable if front‑line states against China had nuclear

157
 6 Pro Evidence

weapons. None of these countries are likely to go to war with each other, so the sim‑
plistic mathematical argument that ‘the more countries that have nuclear weapons, the
more likely is a nuclear war,’ does not apply. Democracies are not like autocracies. They
are defensive in orientation. The democratic peace theory has been proven: democra‑
cies do not fight each other.

Japanese prolif solves North Korean escalation

Carpenter 17

Ted Galen Carpenter, National Interest contributing editor, ”The North Korea Crisis
Proves Why Japan and South Korea Need Nuclear Weapons,” National Interest,
9‑5‑2017, https://nationalinterest.org/blog/the‑skeptics/the‑north‑korea‑crisis‑proves‑
why‑japan‑south‑korea‑need‑22171, accessed 6‑7‑2020

However, while such direct deterrence remains quite credible, there is always the dan‑
ger of a miscalculation. The development of a robust North Korean nuclear arsenal
and delivery system also significantly erodes the credibility of extended deterrence—
Washington’s commitment to risk nuclear war to protect such allies as Japan and South
Korea. A bold North Korean leader might very well wonder whether U.S. leaders would
really chance the destruction of American cities to protect third parties, even valued al‑
lies.

The credibility dilemma of extended deterrence often troubled Washington’s European

allies during the Cold War, and was a key reason why NATO members sought not only
multiple assurances but the presence of U.S. troops as a tripwire to guarantee that the
United States would honor its commitment if Moscow challenged it. The East Asian
allies now face a similar problem involving a far more unpredictable adversary.

Various analysts have argued recently that the United States must climb down from its
long‑standing demand that North Korea abandon its nuclear and missile ambitions. In‑
stead, they advocate moving to a new policy based on negotiations, containment and
deterrence. Such proposals are more realistic than the current bankrupt approach in‑
sisting that Pyongyang return to nuclear virginity, and they are far more prudent than
reckless suggestions that the United States consider launching a preemptive conven‑
tional or nuclear attack.

However, they still contain the central defect of retaining America’s role as the lead
player in trying to contain and deter Pyongyang. Washington’s chief objective instead

158
 6 Pro Evidence

should be to reduce America’s risk exposure in Northeast Asia’s increasingly dangerous

strategic environment.

That means recognizing the reality that primary deterrence has greater credibility than
extended deterrence. In other words, it is time for North Korea’s neighbors to acquire
their own nuclear deterrents, with America’s blessing. Unfortunately, too many Amer‑
ican officials, political figures and pundits believe that all forms of nuclear proliferation
are equally bad. That is not true, and in any case, nuclear proliferation is already far
advanced in Northeast Asia. When China, governed by a dictatorial regime, and North
Korea, a bizarre communist monarchy, already have nuclear weapons, it is misplaced
to fret about stable, status quo–oriented democracies such as South Korea and Japan
possessing modest nuclear deterrents.

Moving to empower Tokyo and Seoul in that fashion is necessary to credibly deter North
Korea over the coming decades. During the 2016 presidential election campaign, Don‑
ald Trump indicated that he would not necessarily object to Japan and South Korea
acquiring independent nuclear arsenals. He should return to that position. A doctrine
of mutually assured destruction between North Korea and its noncommunist neighbors,
along the same lines as the relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union
during the Cold War, is hardly an optimal solution. But it beats having America con‑
tinue being on the front lines of a potentially catastrophic confrontation. It is time to
offload that risk to the countries that have the most at stake in deterring North Korea.

It creates super‑deterrence

Corr 17

Anders Corr, Ph.D. in political science from Harvard University, worked in mili‑
tary intelligence for five years, including on nuclear weapons„ ”Japan: Go Nuclear
Now,” Forbes, 1‑31‑2017, https://www.forbes.com/sites/anderscorr/2017/01/31/japan‑
go‑nuclear‑now/#555972517745, accessed 6‑8‑2020

Japan needs nuclear weapons. Surrounded by authoritarian threats, including Russia,

China, and China’s close ally, North Korea, Japan would make all democracies safer by
protecting itself with a nuclear weapon. A stronger Japan will check China’s expansion
and free U.S. military resources for deployment elsewhere.

Russian and Chinese nuclear‑capable forces surround Japan with threatening patrols
that ring the country by air and sea. Over the last nine months through December, the

159
 6 Pro Evidence

Japanese air force was forced to scramble jets against mostly Chinese, but also Russian,
air incursions a record 883 times. North Korea regularly threatens Japan and its allies
with lurid language of nuclear attacks and storms of fire. Dozens of North Korean mis‑
sile tests took place near Japan over the last couple years, with some hitting Japan’s
exclusive economic zone (EEZ). North Korea has even threatened a nuclear attack on
U.S. bases in Japan. It is time for Japan to say, enough. To protect itself, Japan needs to
go nuclear now.

Japan supposedly enjoys protection from an American “nuclear umbrella”. But

Japanese leaders are unsure that the U.S. would come to its defense in a major war,
much less a nuclear war. Russian, Chinese, and possibly even North Korean missiles
can deliver nuclear weapons to the U.S., its territories, and its military bases in Asia.
North Korea could even put a nuclear weapon in a cargo container and ship it to a U.S.
mainland port. In defense of Japan, would the U.S. really strike a major conventional or
even nuclear blow against the military forces of one of these authoritarian states, and
thereby risk a cold‑hearted nuclear counter‑attack against Honolulu, San Francisco,
New York, or Washington, DC? Such a counter‑attack could destroy the U.S. economy
for decades, cause a fiscal crisis that would mean decreased military expenditures and
military retreat from U.S. forward‑deployed positions, and kill millions of Americans.

Military and diplomatic analysts in Japan are increasingly unsure that Washington
would take this risk after Japan itself may have suffered a conventional or nuclear blow
that devastates its military strength as an ally. If Japan questions the willingness of the
U.S. to counterstrike a nuclear‑armed adversary, then Russia, China, and North Korea
are likely questioning Washington’s commitment as well. They may see the current
lack of commitment as an opportunity for a preemptive conventional or nuclear strike
against Japan’s military. This is not a safe position for any country to be in, especially a
country like Japan whose military forces are daily threatened by the aggressive nuclear
and other brinkmanship of these same adversaries.

Because Russia, China, and North Korea may perceive a lack of U.S. commitment, Japan
needs an iron‑clad nuclear deterrent force. There is no better such deterrent than one
that Japan would own and control itself, coupled with a public announcement to reserve
the option of using that deterrent force against any state that attacks it or infringes its
sovereignty. This is a far stronger and more reliable nuclear deterrent than the current
U.S. umbrella.

Some have argued that a Japanese nuclear weapon would cause China or North Korea
to attack Japan militarily. They are wrong. Once Japan goes nuclear, China and North

160
 6 Pro Evidence

Korea cannot attack without factoring in the risk of a devastating nuclear counter‑blow.
A Japanese nuclear deterrent would also decrease worries in Japan that China dom‑
inates the upper rungs of the escalation ladder theorized by Herman Kahn. Japan’s
conventional military, combined with an indigenous nuclear deterrent and its strong
U.S. alliance, would thereby have far more latitude to stop Chinese, Russian, and North
Korean attacks and blustering.

161
 6 Pro Evidence

6.3 Limited Amendment

6.3.1 Amendment Key

Change without amendment erodes constitutionalism

Kitamura 16
Takahashi Kitamura (Assistant Professor, Faculty of Policy Studies, Doshisha Univer‑
sity, Kyoto; PhD). “Constitutional Change and Article 9 of The Constitution of Japan:
Is It Destruction of Constitutionalism?” In Globalized World: Advantage or Disad‑
vantage. Ed. Branislav Đorđević, Taro Tsukimura, and Ivona Lađevac. Belgrade 2016.
JDN. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/323812397_GLOBALISATION_AND_
THE_NEW_WORLD_ORDER
This paper seeks to consider the constitutional change, and the article 9 of the Consti‑
tution of Japan from the point of view of Constitutionalism. We must make a clear
distinction between “Constitutional Change” and “Constitutional Amendment”. The
word “Constitutional Change (Verfassungswandel)” means the substantial change in
the constitution without the regular procedures for the constitutional amendment. On
the other hand, the word “Constitutional Amendment” means the modification of the
constitution with the regular procedures for the constitutional amendment. These dif‑
ferences are not clearly recognized. However, these are strictly different concepts2 .
Constitutional changes are incompatible with constitutionalism. In the constitutional
states, the constitutional norms must control the reality. Namely, the reality must be
constitutional. However, if a constitutional change occurs, the reality will be out of sync
with the constitutional norm. In other words, the unconstitutional reality gives prior‑
ity over the constitutional norm. The normalization of the constitutional change may
cause not only the lowering value of the constitutional law, but also the destruction of
constitutionalism. Therefore, the constitutional changes are undesirable phenomena in
the constitutional states.3 With respect to the article 9 of the Constitution of Japan, there
has been a discrepancy between the constitutional norm and the reality. The current
Constitution of Japan was promulgated on November 3, 1946, and came into effect on
May 3, 1947. The norm of the article 9 has never been amended since 1946. However, the
reality of the article 9 has been out of sync with the original meaning since 1950 when the
United States changed its policy of demilitarizing Japan. Does the discrepancy between
the norm and reality of the article 9 mean the destruction of constitutionalism? This
paper analyzes and discusses this question. This paper consists of five sections. The

162
 6 Pro Evidence

first section shows the outline of the norm of the article 9 of the Constitution of Japan,
especially in its original meaning. The second section analyzes the history of the rear‑
mament and the expansion of the Self‑Defense Forces (SDF). The third section explains
the one of the most important issue in current Japan: collective self‑defense and new se‑
curity bills. The section 4 discusses whether the constitutional change about the article
9 ‑the destruction of constitutionalism‑ occurs or not. Finally, the Section 5 provides a
conclusion. Original Meaning of Norm of Article 9 The article 9 is probably the most
famous article of the Constitution of Japan. The article 9 expresses pacifism of Japan.
The pacifism in the article 9 of the Constitution of Japan is composed of two contents.
Section 1 of the article 9 provides “Renunciation of War”. It is provided that “Aspir‑
ing sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people
forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force
as means of settling international disputes.” Section 2 of the article 9 provides “Ban of
Maintenance of Armed Forces”. It is provided that “In order to accomplish the aim of
the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will
never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized”. The
original meaning of the article 9 is as follows. First, “Renunciation of War” in the section
1 originally means that Japan renounces not only the war of aggression, but also a war
for self‑defense. Second, “Ban of Maintenance of Armed Forces” in the section 2 origi‑
nally means that Japan is prohibited to maintain armed forces even for the purpose of
self‑defense. This original meaning was also shown by Sigeru Yoshida (the prime min‑
ister at that time) in the Examination Committee on Draft for a Revised Constitution of
the 90th (extraordinary) session of the Imperial Diet on June 1946.4 These interpretations
are the natural consequence of the literal construction, even though it is unique from the
perspective of the comparative constitutional law that the sovereign state does not hold
the armed forces for the purpose of self‑defense. Rearmament and Expansion of SDF
As explained in the Introduction, the reality of the article 9 has been out of sync with the
original meaning since 1950. In 1950, the Korean War began. Because of the moving of
the U.S. army stationed in Japan to South Korea, the U.S. needed to protect Japan, which
had no military power. Therefore, the U.S. changed its policy of demilitarizing Japan
and demanded Japan to establish a National Police Reserve (NPR). Nominally, the pur‑
pose of the NPR was to be a complement of the police force. However, there was doubt
that NPR was armed force in essence. Moreover, in 1952, the NPR was converted to the
National Security Forces (NFS) for complying with the U.S. expectations. The purpose
of the NSF was internal security. However, its scale was higher than the NPR’s. Further‑
more, in 1954, the NSF was converted to the Self‑Defense Forces (SDF). The purpose of

163
 6 Pro Evidence

the SDF is national defense and internal security. An internal security aside, national
defense is generally armed force’s purpose. Moreover, the scale of the SDF is such that
it is an armed force in essence. However, the government of Japan expressed their view
that “the SDF is NOT armed force, therefore it is constitutional”; nevertheless, it was
undoubtedly that the SDF was an armed force, which the article 9 prohibited the gov‑
ernment to maintain. The government of Japan justified their view as follows. First,
about the norm, the government of Japan advocated that “Minimum necessary level of
self‑defense capability is constitutional”. Second, about the reality, they advocated “the
SDF is the minimum necessary level of self‑defense capability”. In this way, while using
strong‑arm methods, the government of Japan showed their view that the SDF is Con‑
stitutional. Ever since, the capabilities of the self‑defense have been expanded. Figure 1
shows the change of the military expenditure in Japan5 . The expansion of the capabili‑
ties of the SDF means the expansion of discrepancy between the norm and reality.6 The
Defense Agency (external bureau of the Cabinet Office) had exercised the jurisdiction
of the SDF until 2006. In 2007, the Defense Agency was promoted to the Ministry of De‑
fense. Considering in a comprehensive way, the self‑defense force is one of the top 10
militaries in the world. The current SDF consists of about 137,000 army officers, about
41,000 navy officers and about 42,000 air force officers7 . For the equipment, the SDF has
50 destroyers, over 200 F‑15 fighter jets and 6 aegis vessels.8 However, the government
of Japan is still advocating that the SDF is NOT an armed force. Collective Self‑Defense
and New Security Bills Not only the capabilities, but also the activities of the SDF have
been expanded. Until the 80’s, the activities of the SDF had been limited to the domes‑
tic arena. However, since the 90’s, the SDF has been dispatched overseas because the
end of the cold war has changed the international situation9 . Moreover, the further
expansion of activities of the SDF has been discussed in recent years in Japan. The pre‑
vious overseas activities of the SDF have been limited to activities without exercising
force. However, the Prime Minister Shinzo Abe is pushing to expand the overseas ac‑
tivities, in particular exercising the right of collective self‑defense. This problem is one
of the most important issues in Japan. Since 2014, the view of the government of Japan
about collective self‑defense had been that “Japan has the right of collective self‑defense,
but cannot exercise it.” As mentioned in the United Nation’s Charter, the right of self‑
defense is the inherent right of each country. The Constitution of Japan does not deny
the right of self‑defense. Therefore, the exercise of the right of individual self‑defense
by the minimum necessary level of capability is allowed. However, the exercise of the
right of collective self‑defense is not allowed because it will exceed the minimum nec‑
essary level of capability. Namely, Japan has the right of collective self‑defense, but

164
 6 Pro Evidence

cannot exercise it. It is the previous government’s view about the right of self‑defense.
However, in July 2014, Abe reinterpreted the constitution10. Under the new view, the
exercise of the right of individual self‑defense is restrictively allowed. Abe argues that
“Armed attack occurring against a foreign country can threaten Japan’s survival and its
people; therefore, collective self‑defense does not exceed the minimum necessary level.”
Then, Abe shows “three requirements for collective self‑defense”. First, armed attack
occurring against a foreign country that are closely related to Japan, can fundamentally
threaten the Japanese people’s rights to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness. Sec‑
ond, there is no other means to protect the people. Third, the exercise of the collective
self‑defense is the minimum necessary level of exercising forces. These are the three
requirements Abe shows. Based on the reinterpretation of the article 9, Abe passed the
new security bills. These are mainly composed of two bills. One is “Peace and Safety
Legislation Amendment Bill” and another is “International Peace Support Bill”. There
are five contents: (1) Japan will be able to exercise the right of collective self‑defense. (2)
Japan will be able to support other militaries for keeping peace and safety in the interna‑
tional community. (3) Japan will be able to support other militaries for keeping safety in
Japan. (4) Japan will be able to participate in international peace cooperation activities
more than the PKO. (5) Japan will be able to protect the U.S. forces even in peacetime.
These five had not been allowed in former Japan. There has consistently been doubt
that the new security bills are inconsistent with the Article 9. The three constitutional
scholars testified in the Lower House Commission on the Constitution on June 4. They
all together concluded that “New Security Bills are Unconstitutional”, though one of
them was recommended by the government party (Liberal Democratic Party of Japan).
Not only abovementioned three scholars, but also most constitutional scholars argue
that they are clearly unconstitutional11. However, the new security bills were passed
by the House of Representatives on July 2015 and passed by the House of Councilors
on September 2015. About this problem, the constitutional review cannot be performed.
Because there must satisfy the requirement for cases or controversies in Japan12. This
is the one of the reasons why the discrepancy between the norm and reality has been
expanded. Destruction of Constitutionalism in Japan? The discrepancy between the
norm and reality of the article 9 has gradually, but absolutely expanded. Namely, it is a
stepwise expansion of discrepancy. Both of the rearmament and expansion of the SDF
in the cold war, the Overseas Dispatch since 1990’s had changed the norm of the Article
9 in essence. Moreover, new security bills put a new face on things. The norm has been
never amended, but the history of Reality of the Article 9 is nothing but the substantial
change of Article 9. The reality of the Article 9 has substantially changed the norm of

165
 6 Pro Evidence

the article 9. In other words, the unconstitutional reality has been given priority over
the norm. From this standpoint, the discrepancy between the norm and reality of the ar‑
ticle 9 is a typical example of the constitutional change. The change of the constitutional
norm without the constitutional amendment should not be allowed in the constitution‑
alism. Therefore, constitutional change about the article 9 brings the destruction of con‑
stitutionalism. Conclusion This paper analyzed and discussed the question: Does the
discrepancy between the norm and reality of the article 9 mean the destruction of consti‑
tutionalism? In conclusion, the discrepancy between the norm and reality of the article
9 is nothing but the constitutional change and the destruction of constitutionalism is
occurring. Owing to the enactment of the new security bills, discrepancy has further
expanded. In other words, the constitutionalism in Japan has been further destructed.
In that sense, the constitutionalism in Japan is in crisis situation now.

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 6 Pro Evidence

6.3.2 Article 9 Fails

Article 9 creates ambiguity and is fundamentally unenforceable—that creates the

worst of both worlds

Martin 17

Craig Martin (Co‑Director of the International and Comparative Law Center; Professor
of public international law, with a focus on rights and war powers in Anglo‑American
and Japanese constitutional law at Washburn University School of Law; LL.M. Osaka
University 1994; J.D. University of Toronto 1997). “Change It to Save It: Why and
How to Amend Article 9.” 18 Ritsumeikan Journal of Peace Studies (2017). JDN.
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2883588

A. Existing Weakness of Article 9

As explained earlier, Article 9(1) has operated consistently and effectively as a relatively
clear constitutional rule, prohibiting the use of force for any purpose other than individ‑
ual self‑defense. But the Article 9(2) prohibition on the maintenance of armed forces or
“other war potential” has been historically interpreted in such a way that it cannot oper‑
ate as a clear constitutional rule. It is, at best, an ambiguous standard. This is due primar‑
ily to two aspects of the way in which it was interpreted. First, the idea that it permits
such levels of military capability that would be necessary for individual self‑defense,
creates a sliding scale that depends on the perceived external national security threat.
The level of armed forces necessary for defense is thus relative to the capability of other
countries. Tied to this is the idea that the prohibition only really applies to military capa‑
bility and weapons systems that are inherently offensive, which in turn depends on the
notion that there is some intrinsic difference between offensive and defensive weapons
systems or levels of military capability.27 This relative and elastic interpretation of the
prohibition on the maintenance of armed forces and other war potential has allowed
for Japan’s slow but inexorable development of a formidable military force. While most
Japanese continue to insist that the SDF is not a military, it is most certainly a military
in all but name. What is more, while the number of troops in the Ground Self Defense
Forces is small compared to China or the Koreas, Japan’s armed forces comprise one
of the best armed and most sophisticated militaries in Asia, with a military budget that
ranks Japan in the top seven or eight military spenders in the World.28 While Japan has
always insisted that it does not have power projection capability, and thus its military
capability is inherently defensive rather than offensive, even those claims are starting

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to sound hollow in the wake of its launch of a ship that is a small aircraft carrier in all
but name.29 In any event, the very notion of a clear distinction between offensive and
defensive armed forces or military systems is rather nonsensical. There are two major
problems arising from this situation. The first is that this clause of Article 9(2) is an
inherently non‑justiciable and unenforceable standard. While there can be little doubt
that Article 9(2) has operated over the decades to constrain the development of Japan’s
military capability, it provides no clear guidelines for government action. It is impossi‑
ble to determine with any precision if the government has violated the provision. If the
courts were ever to consider the merits of a claim that the current size and capability of
the SDF violated Article 9(2), they would be unable to meaningfully assess the claim—
how is a court to determine whether the size and capability of the SDF is more than is
necessary for individual self‑defense in relation to current threat levels? It is not a rea‑
sonable task for a judiciary, and thus the interpretation of the provision renders Article
9(2) unenforceable and relatively meaningless. That is dangerous for a constitutional
provision specifically designed to constrain government action. Similarly, there is the
larger problem posed by the huge and growing gulf between the explicit language and
obvious intent behind the first clause of Art. 9(2), and the reality of the SDF being a very
sophisticated and powerful military with considerable war‑fighting capability. It is in‑
deed this inconsistency that has tended to drive much of the most bitter controversy over
Article 9, and to fuel the allegations that the government is violating the provision.30
This apparent gulf between the stated norm and the reality that it is supposed to gov‑
ern is acutely dangerous for a constitutional provision. When the very existence and
power of a government institution represents proof of the meaninglessness and impo‑
tence of a fundamental constitutional norm, there is significant risk that the normative
power of the constitution as a whole will be undermined. If Article 9(2) can be so easily
disregarded, if it exercises such little control over government action, what confidence
should we have that other provisions of the Constitution will respected or enforced?
And indeed, in my view, this failure of Article 9(2) has already served to undermine
and erode the power and effectiveness of Article 9(1) in many ways. Of course, many of
the champions of Article 9 will wholeheartedly agree that the existence and capability of
the SDF constitutes a violation of Article 9(2), but will argue that the solution is to either
disband or, at minimum, significantly reduce the size and capability of the SDF. But that
is simply not a tenable argument. In the current geo‑political and strategic context, it is
simply utopian to cling to such proposals. As I will discuss below, the solution has to be
found in amending Article 9(2) to bring the Constitution back into alignment with the
reality, in order to save the more important constraints imposed by Article 9(1). A final

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word should be said about the second clause of Article 9(2), which constitutes the third
element of Article 9. This clause, which provides that the right of belligerency will never
be recognized, is typically ignored and very frequently misunderstood. As mentioned
earlier, there are two different theories in Japanese constitutional discourse on what this
means.31 I have argued in more detail elsewhere that both the drafting and ratification
history of Article 9, and the distinct meaning of the rights of belligerency in international
law, make very clear that only one of these theories is correct—that is, that as a matter of
Japanese domestic law there will be no recognition or enforcement of the rights of bel‑
ligerency that are extended to members of Japanese armed forces under international
humanitarian law (IHL, also known as jus in bello, or the law of armed conflict). 32 The
rights and privileges of belligerency under IHL include the authority for lawful combat‑
ants in international armed conflict to use lethal force and to destroy legitimate military
objectives, and an immunity from prosecution or liability under other legal regimes for
such actions.33 This clause poses two distinct problems, which are grounds for amend‑
ing it. The first is that there is again some ambiguity and uncertainty as to what it means,
which is cause for confusion. This is evidenced by there being two competing and very
different theories as to its meaning. This is good enough reason to amend it, if other
aspects of Article 9 are being amended in any event. Constitutional provisions that are
of uncertain and disputed meaning, and thereby cause confusion, are problematic. But
in this case, both possible meanings of the clause call out for amendment, even if we
could decide once and for all which one was correct. On the one hand, if, as I have ar‑
gued, the clause denies the rights and privileges of belligerence to members of the SDF
engaged in armed conflict, that has profoundly problematic implications. If we accept
that Article 9(1) permits Japan to use force and thus engage in armed conflict for pur‑
poses of individual self‑defense, then we must also accept that such armed conflict will
be governed by IHL. It seems incongruous that Japanese law would refuse to recognize
the rights and privileges under IHL afforded to members of the armed forces engaged
in that conflict. To be clear, the members of the SDF would, of course, have all the duties,
obligations, rights and privileges under IHL as a matter of international law, and Arti‑
cle 9 cannot have any impact on their status or treatment under international law. But
consider the situation of a combatant member of the SDF engaging in lethal operations
in the context of an armed conflict. That SDF member would have been authorized by
IHL to conduct such action, and would be immunized by international law from pros‑
ecution for having caused civilian deaths collateral to those lethal attacks. But Article
9(2) raises the prospect that if such an SDF member were either prosecuted or made the
defendant in a civil suit for wrongful death in Japanese courts, he [they] would have

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that defense denied to him by reason that Article 9(2) provides that such rights will not
be recognized as a matter of Japanese law.34 This seems both an unjust result, and in‑
consistent with the established interpretation of Article 9(1), and so should be amended.
On the other hand, the second meaning attributed to this clause is that it merely restates
in different terms the prohibition in Article 9(1), denying Japan the right to engage in
“belligerent” or aggressive uses of force. I have argued elsewhere in detail why this
cannot be correct.35 That is not the meaning of the word “belligerent” in international
law, nor does Article 9(1) only prohibit the “aggressive” use of force in any event. But
leaving aside such arguments, and the drafting history of Article 9, this interpretation
suggests that this clause of Article 9(2) is entirely redundant. It is a trite principle of
constitutional interpretation that provisions should not be construed as being purely
redundant. But if it were true that this clause does no useful work whatsoever, that it is
entirely redundant yet nonetheless the cause for confusion, then for that reason alone it
should be deleted.

Failure to amend Article 9 results in worse proposals

Martin 17

Craig Martin (Co‑Director of the International and Comparative Law Center; Professor
of public international law, with a focus on rights and war powers in Anglo‑American
and Japanese constitutional law at Washburn University School of Law; LL.M. Osaka
University 1994; J.D. University of Toronto 1997). “Change It to Save It: Why and
How to Amend Article 9.” 18 Ritsumeikan Journal of Peace Studies (2017). JDN.
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2883588

B. Threat of Current Amendment Proposals

As is well known, there has been agitation for the amendment of Article 9 almost since
the promulgation of the Constitution. But more recently, in just the last decade there
have been a number of constitutional amendment proposals published. The most com‑
prehensive and serious of these was that of the LDP, published in 2005, 36 and then a
revised version of this proposal that was published in April, 2012. 37 Earlier this year, as
political discussion of constitutional amendment became more intense, there was some
suggestion by the LDP that it might not proceed on the basis of the 2012 proposals,38
but it is entirely unclear how genuine such statements were, or what the LDP intentions
are. For now, it is the only complete proposal on the table, and it is the proposal that

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the opposition must address. In summary, the 2012 LDP proposal provides that Ar‑
ticle 9(1) would be revised to clarify that Japan retains a right of self‑defense (without
specifying whether individual, collective, or both), and the language prohibiting the use
of force would be significantly relaxed. Article 9(2) would be entirely replaced, and it
would begin by making explicit the authority to maintain a “national defense military”
(kokubōgun – the NDM), for the purpose of, among other things, defending the peace
and independence of the country, and to engage in “international cooperation activities”
(kokusai kyōchō kastudō) 39 to guarantee the peace and security of the international so‑
ciety.40 Moreover, an entirely new Article 9(3) provides that the state, in cooperation
with the people, shall protect the land, territorial waters, and air space of the country,
together with all resources therein.41 While the LDP proposal for Article 9(2) does in‑
troduce new provisions to establish greater civilian control, placing the NDM under the
control of the prime minister, with several of its specified activities being subject to the
approval of the Diet, the overall effect of the revisions would be to significantly under‑
mine the constraints that Article 9 currently exercises on the use of force. Not only does
the revision to Article 9(1) itself weaken the explicit constraint imposed, but the pro‑
posed changes to Article 9(2), and the new Article 9(3) would operate in a manner that
would necessarily require a change to the current understanding of Article 9(1).42 What
is more, these changes are insidiously subtle, so that in the absence of careful analysis it
is not immediately obvious how much of a change they would cause to the meaning and
operation of Article 9(1). 43 Let us, therefore, explore these proposals in more detail, and
in order to understand how these changes affect Article 9(1), let us begin with the new
Article 9(2) and 9(3). To give credit where it is due, the deletion of the current Article
9(2) is not only acceptable, but as I explained above and will return to below, it is in my
view necessary. So the champions of Article 9 should not take issue with the deletion of
paragraph two – this is not where the dangers lie or where the battle should be fought.
The LDP draft replaces paragraph two with two new paragraphs, one of which has five
sub‑sections.44 The proposed Article 9(2)(i) explicitly authorizes the maintenance of the
NDM, as mentioned above, under the supreme command of the prime minister, for the
purpose of ensuring the peace and independence of the country, and the safety of the
state and its people. Article 9(2)(ii) provides that the NDM’s activities will be in accor‑
dance with law and the approval of the Diet.45 Again, to give credit where due, this
is a laudable attempt to create clearer civilian control over the military, and to firmly
condition all military activity upon Diet approval, though it arguably does not go far
enough. The mischief begins in the rest of the new provision. Article 9(2)(iii) stipulates
that in the NDM’s activities to fulfill its mission in accordance with Article 9(1), it may

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support the public order and “international cooperation activities” for the purpose of
ensuring the peace and security of the international community, as well as being able
to engage in operations to defend the life and freedom of the Japanese people.46 This
new provision, when considered in the context of the new Article 9(1), as I will explain
below, is highly significant. Article 9(2)(iv) provides that the activities of the NDM, as
defined in the previous provisions, as well as the organization, control, and protection
of the secrecy of the NDM, are all to be determined by law. Article 9(2)(v) provides for
the establishment of military courts within the NDM for the purposes of prosecuting
NDM personnel, as well as other public officials, for crimes connected to the execution
of their duties, or relating to the secrecy of the NDM, though it preserves a right of
appeal to the courts.47 This authority for military courts, entirely new, requires much
further explanation and clarity. The notion that civilian public officials could be pros‑
ecuted in military courts for offenses unrelated to national security issues is ominous
indeed. Finally, in the new paragraph three, Article 9(3), the state, in cooperation with
the people of Japan, for the purpose of defending the independence and sovereignty of
the state, is obligated to preserve the national territory, territorial waters, and airspace,
and all resources therein.48 This provision too, like Article 9(2)(iii), takes on particular
significance when considered in conjunction with Article 9(1), as will be explored below.
Returning then to Article 9(1), the proposed changes to this clause seem, deceptively, far
less radical and almost inconsequential. But when interpreted within the context of the
changes to Articles 9(2) and (3), they turn out to be profound and indeed insidious. This
paragraph, in the revised version, is divided into two sub‑sections. To take these in re‑
verse order, the entirely new Article 9(1)(ii) provides that the constraints in Article 9(1)(i)
do not impede the exercise of the right of self‑defense.49 This move to clarify explicitly
the scope of Article 9 is a step in the right direction, but it is insufficient – the provision
does not stipulate whether it is individual self‑defense or collective self‑defense, or both,
that is permitted, and thus rather than resolve the debates surrounding interpretation,
will likely exacerbate the conflicts over the scope of permissible activity under Article
9. Article 9(1)(i) looks little changed from paragraph one of the current Article 9. The
words remain virtually the same. Yet the slightest revision that has in fact been made
contains the basis for unraveling the binding power of the constraint, like a Trojan horse
smuggling in the forces of destruction. It will be recalled that Article 9(1) now reads, in
part, “the Japanese People forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and
the threat or use of force as a means of settling international disputes.” In contrast, the
proposed revision reads: “the Japanese People renounce war as a sovereign right of
the nation, and the threat and use of force as a means of settling international disputes

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will not be used.” For purposes of emphasis it bears repeating this with the revisions
illustrated in typical editorial fashion: “the Japanese People forever renounce war as a
sovereign right of the nation, and the threat or and use of force as a means of settling
international disputes will not be used.”50 In other words, the clause “threat or use of
force”, which is drawn from Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter, is no longer subject to the
“renunciation” or identified as a sovereign right of the nation. Now only “war” is iden‑
tified as the sovereign right and only it has been renounced, with the eternal nature of
that renunciation having also been deleted. War is no longer used as a legal term in in‑
ternational law, which only prohibits the use of force and governs armed conflict—and
there is certainly no “sovereign right” to engage in war under international law. Thus,
limiting the renunciation to “war” makes it rather meaningless. But turning to the use of
force, the only sovereign rights to use force under international law are for purposes of
individual and collective self‑defense, and for collective security operations authorized
by the U.N. Security Council. But the crucial phrase “threat or use of force” in Article 9
would now be divorced from both the renunciation and the concept of sovereign rights,
and it would only be limited by the feeble and passive phrase “will not be used.” Not
the mandatory prescriptive language of “shall not,” or “must not,” but merely “will
not.” So the non‑existent sovereign right of war is renounced, but the use of force is
subject only to a weak statement of intent. Particularly in light of the debates during
the drafting in 1946 over the nature of the verbs to be employed in Article 9, this re‑
vised provision would likely be interpreted as being merely aspirational or hortatory,
and certainly not as creating a binding legal prohibition on the use of force. That would
be a radical change from the current provision, which is understood to operate as a le‑
gal prohibition, renouncing the use of force as a sovereign right of the nation. Even
the change of the word “or” to “and” in the clause “threat or use of force”—which is
part of a clause in international law that is interpreted as prohibiting both the threat of
using force and the actual use of force, separately or together—suggests an attempt to
undermine the legal force of the clause. It does so by subtly distancing it from its inter‑
national law origins, and creating ambiguity over precisely what action is subject to the
constraint. Is a threat to use force now only prohibited when accompanied by an actual
use of force, for instance? Or would a threat of the use of force similarly be subject to the
now weak “will not be used”? It is unclear. What is more, the operation of the revised
Article 9(1) would be further hampered once its meaning is considered in the context
of the new provisions of Article 9. Not only does the new Article 9(1)(ii) carve out the
right of self‑defense, perhaps collective as well as individual, but Article 9(3) creates
an affirmative obligation on the state to preserve the nation’s territory and natural re‑

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sources. What if another country is said to be extracting resources from the territorial
waters of Japan? That is not a sufficient basis to justify the use of force in self‑defense
under international law (the use of force being only permissible in response to an actual
or imminent armed attack), but here in this new Article 9, in the renamed Chapter on
National Security, is an apparent constitutional obligation on the government to pre‑
serve the nation’s resources, with the implication that it has authority to do so with the
use of force if necessary. Similarly, Article 9(2)(iii) provides that the NDM may support
“international cooperation activities” for the purpose of ensuring international peace
and security.51 This sounds potentially like authority to participate in UN authorized
collective security operations—which is above and beyond the use of force permitted
by Article 9(1). But in actual fact, the clause “international cooperation activities” is
not a term with any meaning whatsoever in international law. In contrast to “collective
self‑defense” and “collective security operations authorized by the U.N. Security Coun‑
cil”, which are terms that reflect the two established exceptions to the prohibition on the
use of force in the U.N. Charter, this term has no basis in international law. Thus, this
ambiguous clause would appear to authorize the NDM to participate in any military
operations involving more than one other country, whether such operations are UN
sponsored or otherwise, and whether they are lawful or not. In sum, the LDP proposal
for the amendment of Article 9 contains some provisions that at first glance appear to
be positive steps towards clarifying the scope of the provision’s limits, while legitimat‑
ing the SDF and imposing some civilian control over the military. Indeed, it will no
doubt be argued that the intent was to make such changes while essentially preserving
the limits on the use of force. But such arguments are not to be believed. Upon close
inspection, it is clear that the operation of the subtle but pernicious changes to Article
9(1), in combination with the new paragraphs in Article 9, would lead to further con‑
flicts over interpretation, and effectively eviscerate the current constraints on the use of
force. The main point is that this and other proposed amendments to Article 9 would
utterly hollow out the provision’s constraints on the government’s ability to use armed
force, and would be a marked departure from the pacifist principle that is thought to be
one of the three pillars of the Japanese constitutional order. Yet these are concrete pro‑
posals, and it is increasingly likely that they will be the subject of substantive debate as
the prospect of amendment becomes more real. Supporters of Article 9 cannot continue
to simply stonewall the debate, and refuse to discuss the details of these amendment
proposals. They cannot continue to leave the field to the revisionists, and refuse to sub‑
mit some alternative proposals that are true to the underlying principles of Article 9.
They must address the fundamental question: how can Article 9 be amended in a man‑

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ner that addresses not only the very real security and diplomatic concerns, but also the
constitutional law imperatives for amendment, while nonetheless remaining true to the
spirit of the provision?

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6.3.3 Rule of Law

Amendment is necessary to align Japanese actions with the rule of law

Panton 10

Michael A. Panton (L.L.M., with Distinction, the University of Hong Kong; J.D., Syra‑
cuse University College of Law; M.A., Honors First Class, The University of Sydney;
B.S., Summa Cum Laude, Excelsior College). “Japan’s Article 9: Rule of Law v. Flexible
Interpretation.” Temple International & Comparative Law Journal 24:1. Spring 2010.
JDN. https://sites.temple.edu/ticlj/files/2017/02/24.1.Panton‑TICLJ.pdf

“Supremacy of laws,” or “rule of law,” is an abstract and often vaguely defined legal
maxim. Scholars such as Joseph Raz and Judith Shklar have attempted to create use‑
ful frameworks.63 Collective efforts by the international legal community have also at‑
tempted to crystallize a working definition for “rule of law.” The 1955 Act of Athens and
the 1959 Declaration of Delhi brought together jurists from several jurisdictions in an
effort to create a detailed universal understanding of what rule of law means.64 The di‑
verse number of interpretations is a reflection of the various levels of legal and political
theoretical debates which routinely center rule of law issues. Black’s Law Dictionary de‑
fines rule of law, in part, as “the supremacy of regular as opposed to arbitrary power.”65
The United Nations has further stated: [T]he rule of law refers to a principle of gover‑
nance in which all persons, institutions and entities, public and private, including the
State itself, are accountable to laws that are publicly promulgated, equally enforced and
independently adjudicated, and which are consistent with international human rights
norms and standards. It requires, as well, measures to ensure adherence to the prin‑
ciples of supremacy of law, equality before the law, accountability to the law, fairness
in the application of the law, separation of powers, participation in decision‑making, le‑
gal certainty, avoidance of arbitrariness and procedural and legal transparency.66 Thus,
the central idea of a rule of law is one of consistency of practice, irrespective of subjec‑
tive external influence. Domestically, it is seen as a legal structure backed by the state,
with recourse available for the most egregious breaches. That predictability of prac‑
tice extends to the international arena and enables nation states to evaluate and form
policy. The consistency accompanying the rule of law creates credibility and one state
should only need to refer to the ruling legal doctrine of another state to determine the
outcome of a particular situation. As such, the lack of predictability in the application
of Article 9 is seen in the disparity between the aspirational language and the reality of
Japan’s military forces. The divergence between language and reality originated at the

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onset of the Korean War, and further grew during the Cold War, as the SDF continued
to evolve. As it grew in both numbers and scope, it became clear that Article 9, in its
present form, is irreconcilable with reality. Article 9 states, in pertinent part, “land, sea,
and air forces as well as other war potential, will never be maintained.”67 Japan cur‑
rently maintains land forces known as the Ground Self‑Defense Force made up of ap‑
proximately 160,000 troops.68 It utilizes a large number of technically advanced tanks,
personnel carriers, mechanized artillery hardware, missiles, and avionics.69 The Japan
Maritime Self‑Defense Forcehas approximately 42,600 members and controls advanced
submarines, warships, combat aircrafts and armed helicopters.70 The Air Self‑Defense
Force has approximately 45,000 personnel in twelve fighter squadrons, utilizing approx‑
imately 400 combat aircraft in addition to roughly 300 interceptors.71 In seeking to es‑
tablish a stronger war potential, Japan has lobbied the United States to bolster Tokyo’s
F‑X fighter program by the inclusion of the F35, the next generation of U.S. fighters,
as its mainstay fighter jet.72 In support of Japan’s forces is a sophisticated fiscal pro‑
gram that allows for the procurement and development of advanced equipment that
is arguably second only to the United States in terms of its sophistication and destruc‑
tive capability. Most recently in December 2006, the Japanese Cabinet approved $41.75
billion dollar military spending package for FY 2007.73 The Stockholm International
Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), lists Japan’s 2008 expenditures at $42.751 billion dol‑
lars (4,785B yen), with no appreciable difference in the total amount of money spent
by other leading countries such as Russia, France, the United Kingdom and Germany,
all countries without “no war” clauses in their laws and constitutions.74 Professor Ken‑
neth L. Port, referring to Japan’s military expenditures and possession of technically
advanced weapon systems, stated, “how could anyone ever come to believe that Japan
is a pacifist state or that the Japanese Constitution mandates this? This might be one of
the strangest geo‑political disconnects in the modern era.”75 In terms of manufacturing
capabilities, Japan has quietly become a relevant force. In 2001, the top hundred arms‑
producing companies in the world were Japanese companies.76 Within Japan, there
are several companies that have taken the lead in military production. In 2006, Mit‑
subishi Heavy Industries derived roughly twenty‑three percent of its sales through its
military shipbuilding and oceanic development divisions.77 In regards to market share,
Mitsubishi Heavy Industries controls twenty‑two percent of Japan’s market share for
weapon business, Kawasaki Heavy industries controls twelve percent, and Mitsubishi
Electric, seven percent.78 The lack of clearly defined key terms results in the paradox
of Article 9 and the ambiguity which permits continued reinterpretation.79 The irony
focuses on the activities of the SDF as Japan seeks to become more involved in global

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affairs.80 During the LDP’s reign Tokyo continued to formulate increasingly sophisti‑
cated policies regarding its military structure and the role of the SDF, creating a schism
which has become a problem both domestically and internationally. The destruction of
the ideological motivations of Article 9 was precipitated (in addition to specific events
such as the Korean War) by the United States extending its protective shield over Japan
and the initiation of various security agreements, starting with the Treaty of Mutual
Cooperation in 1960.81 The erosion of Article 9 was continued by the 1997 revision of
the Guidelines for Japan‑U.S. Defense Cooperation (hereinafter “Guidelines for Coop‑
eration”), which further opened the door to Japanese rearmament because it gave Japan
“primary responsibility” in key areas.82 Ambiguity within the Guidelines is evident as
they state that Japan must operate within its constitutional limits, while failing to define
those limits. Use of vaguely defined terms such as “areas surrounding Japan” also al‑
lows for creative interpretation.83 The meaning of Article 9 became further mired as the
gradual buildup of the SDF was encouraged by the United States, which made frequent
calls for Japan to increase its military spending to three percent of GNP as opposed to
the roughly one percent that Japan traditionally spends.84

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6.3.4 Raz

Raz’s theory of authority explains why amendment is crucial to upholding rule of

law

Hasebe 15

Yasuo Hasebe (Waseda University; former vice‑president of IACL).” The End of

Constitutional Pacifism in Japan?” International Associtaion of Constitutional Law. 24
December 2015. JDN. https://blog‑iacl‑aidc.org/new‑blog/2018/5/27/analysis‑the‑end‑
of‑constitutional‑pacifism‑in‑japan

To understand this issue better, one should begin with Joseph Raz’s theory of authority.
20 According to Raz’s widely accepted Normal Justification Thesis, an authority claims
that those whom it addresses should not think or judge what to do by themselves; in‑
stead, they should obey orders issued by the authority because, in so doing, they are
likely to comply better with reasons that apply to them. Laws often claim that they are
authorities: people should not think and judge what to do by themselves; instead, peo‑
ple should duly obey laws, because they are likely to do better what they have reasons
to do when they follow the laws. In such cases, people should grasp the semantic, tex‑
tual meaning of the law. If a legal text requires interpretation to understand its meaning,
then people must think and judge what to do by themselves.21 A typical case of author‑
ity is traffic rules. We do not think and judge by ourselves whether or not we should
stop at a traffic light, because by following traffic lights loyally we can successfully co‑
ordinate our movements on the road. If a law is to function effectively as an authority,
its meaning should be clear, stable, consistent, and proactive. A legal text cannot act as
an authority unless it follows these requirements.22 The question is whether we should
regard Article 9 as an authoritative legal text, that is, a positive law whose semantic,
textual meaning should be obeyed, which allows us to better do what we have reason
to do. I think not, as it is clearly unreasonable to follow the textual meaning of Article 9
and not use any force if Japan were to be attacked from abroad.23 Therefore, we should
regard Article 9 not as an authoritative positive law, but as an object of interpretation.
We, the audience of Article 9, must think and judge for ourselves what to do in light of
the ideas expressed in Article 9. However, if different people interpret Article 9 differ‑
ently, we cannot say that there is a working Constitution limiting political power on this
issue. The Cabinet Legislation Bureau has provided authoritative interpretations of Ar‑
ticle 9 that successfully coordinated the interactions of various government departments
and demarcated clear boundaries for government power. In other words, the Bureau’s

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interpretation functioned as an authority. The functioning Constitution, 24 which ef‑

fectively restricts government power, is thus formed of authoritative constitutional in‑
terpretations as well as authoritative constitutional texts. To sustain constitutionalism,
however, an authoritative interpretation should not be changed unless there is suffi‑
cient reason to do so, which, in the case of the Bureau’s new interpretation of Article 9,
the government has failed to demonstrate.25 IV. SOME PROSPECTS The government
proposed the security bills, intending to enable the government to exercise the right of
collective self‑defense, to the National Diet on May 15th, 2015. Although it took more
than four months to finally enact the statutes, the populace are still not quite persuaded
by the government that these statutes are necessary at all. During the Parliamentary
deliberation, several former chiefs of the Cabinet Legislation Bureau,26 one former Jus‑
tice of the Supreme Court,27 and many constitutional law scholars argued that the bills
were unconstitutional. On the other hand, several political scientists argued that these
bills were necessary for the security of Japan. Perhaps, they tried to say that necessitas
non habet legem—necessity has no law. However, while the political scientists asserted
abstract necessity of the bills, indicating vaguely the change of security conditions sur‑
rounding Japan, they did not point out any specific factual circumstances which neces‑
sitated the bills. According to the opinion poll conducted by Asahi Shimbun on the 12th
and 13th of September 2015, around 54% responded that they were against the bills and
68% responded that it was unnecessary to enact the bills within the current session of
the Diet.28 Since the end of August, a large number of people opposing the bills have
been gathering around the National Diet in order to demonstrate their opinions. And
this movement still continues even after the enactment of the bills on September 19th.
Opposition parties claim that they will abolish the statutes when they take power at a
future national election. After the upper house election of July 2016, those who favour
amendment of the Constitution gained two thirds of both houses, however, these forces
differ significantly on what amendments should be implemented on which clauses. In
particular, it is unlikely that they will first touch on Article 9, the amendment of which is
highly unpopular. V. CONCLUSION If the Constitution of one country grants its gov‑
ernment the deployment of troops and the use of force, it is above all to preserve core
constitutional values of that country, not to discard them.29 If a country based on con‑
stitutionalism negates its constitutional principles under the pretext of defending itself,
the endeavour is clearly self‑defeating. In such a case, we cannot say that the state has
survived. In Jean‑Jacques Rousseau’s understanding, “The principle of life of the body
politic and, so to speak, the heart of the state, is the social pact which, as soon as it is
injured, causes the state instantly to die.”30 To change an established authoritative inter‑

180
 6 Pro Evidence

pretation of constitutional law without any sufficient reason amounts to a direct attack
upon constitutionalism. In my view, the Abe administration’s change of interpretation
of Article 9 is exactly such a self‑defeating exercise.

181
7 Con Evidence

7.1 General

7.1.1 Reverse Goldilocks

Amendment wouldn’t be sufficient to deter anyone—but it does provoke China and

undermine relations.

Watanabe 18

Hiroaki Watanabe, a Lecturer in the School of East Asian Studies at the Univer‑
sity of Sheffield. ”The case against Abe’s constitutional amendment ”, 4‑1‑2018,
East Asia Forum, https://www.eastasiaforum.org/2018/04/05/the‑case‑against‑abes‑
constitutional‑amendment/, accessed 7‑13‑2019

Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe announced his intention to amend Article 9 (the
‘peace clause’) of Japan’s constitution on 3 May 2017 — exactly 70 years after the con‑
stitution first came into effect in 1947. Abe’s proposal involves adding a third clause to
Article 9 that would legalise Japan’s Self‑Defense Forces (SDF) while maintaining the
original two clauses that renounce war as a sovereign right and prohibit Japan’s posses‑
sion of a military force.

Abe’s desire for constitutional amendment had been made clear long before the official
announcement in 2017. The Abe administration made a cabinet decision in 2014 to rein‑
terpret Article 9 in a way that would allow Japan to engage in collective self‑defence
under certain conditions, such as the existence of a clear threat to Japan. The cabinet
decision was followed by the enactment of a set of security bills in 2015 that effectively
enabled this constitutional reinterpretation. Abe’s proposed constitutional amendment
would confirm the legality of reinterpretation by writing the expanded function of the
SDF into the constitution.

182
 7 Con Evidence

Japan’s current regional security environment is indeed precarious. It could even fur‑
ther deteriorate if China becomes more assertive in its military posture or if North Ko‑
rea continues testing its nuclear missiles. From the perspective of the United States, a
stronger Japanese military presence in East Asia would help to maintain US influence
and a balance of power in the region.

But those who argue for Japan’s greater military involvement in regional security
through an amendment to Article 9 may want to consider the following.

From a geopolitical perspective, an increase in Japan’s security engagement in East Asia,

and the intensified US–Japan military pressure on North Korea that this would enable,
would be unlikely to force North Korea to succumb. It is not clear how an amendment
to Article 9 would create a shift in the regional military balance that would be significant
or threatening enough for North Korea to refrain from continued missile testing.

Constitutional amendment could also undermine Japan’s relations with China and
South Korea. Japan’s closest neighbours have not forgotten the historical legacy of
Japanese imperial aggression, nor are they willing to overlook the lack of serious
remorse or criticism about Japan’s imperial past among Japanese nationalists. Not sur‑
prisingly, China and South Korea view Japan’s move to increase its military capability
with a considerable degree of suspicion.

From a domestic perspective, the legality of the SDF will remain questionable even af‑
ter an amendment to the constitution so long as Clause 2 of Article 9 (which prohibits
Japan’s possession of a military) remains intact. Japanese legal scholars and a former
director general of the Cabinet Legislative Bureau have pointed out that it remains un‑
certain whether the SDF is distinct from a military force (and therefore constitutional)
because its military capacity is beyond the minimum force necessary for self‑defence.

For this reason, some members of the governing Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) such as
Shigeru Ishiba reject Abe’s third clause proposal and instead advocate for the replace‑
ment of Clause 2 with a new clause that permits Japan to possess a ‘national defence
army’.

But even if Clause 1 on the renunciation of war is maintained, that does not guarantee
sufficient constraints on the SDF’s activities. Clarifying and changing the constitutions’
interpretation means that the SDF’s engagement in international conflicts may become
almost unlimited, as the expanded scope of its activities are confirmed and legitimised.
On the flipside, if Abe’s proposal for constitutional amendment is rejected in the na‑
tional referendum, this could further undermine public confidence in the legality of the

183
 7 Con Evidence

SDF — which would also have implications for support of the US–Japan security treaty.

But the biggest cause for concern in the push for constitutional amendment is Abe’s
political ideology. It cannot be assumed that post‑war Japan is an entirely different
country with a new generation of leaders when the Prime Minister is a right‑wing revi‑
sionist. Other LDP politicians and many of Abe’s supporters share his revisionism. The
ultra‑nationalist group Nippon Kaigi — which has a parliamentary league for which
Abe serves as a special advisor — even dreams of restoring the fundamentals of impe‑
rial Japan.

Abe uses the deteriorating security environment in East Asia as an excuse to accomplish
his long‑term goal of constitutional revision. Abe is determined to release Japan from
the shackles of the 1951 San Francisco Peace Treaty, in which — for him and for other
nationalists like him — Japan is not recognised as a ‘normal’ country that has a right to
possess a military. Constitutional amendment is a step in that direction.

But an amendment to Article 9 as proposed by Abe would not meaningfully enhance

Japan’s contribution to regional security, and it would risk undermining Japan’s already
fragile relations with its closest neighbours. Abe’s intention to amend the constitution
is a serious cause for concern, not only for Japanese citizens but also for the region, and
it is not something that should be in the least bit embraced.

184
 7 Con Evidence

7.1.2 Instability

Amendment would spike instability in the region—it fundamentally alters the

balance of power and freaks out other countries

Barbantan 19

Alin Barbantan, A Foreign Affairs and International Relations Analyst With Speciali‑
sation In History And Politics. Regional Specialisation On Nato And East Asia. He Is
Currently An International Relations Phd Student At The Ucl Institute Of The Americas
On Hegemony, Burden‑Sharing And Alliance ”Free Riding”. Ma From Ucl, Ba From
Queen Mary, University Of London. Published Research On Country Case Studies
For International Organisations Concerning Democratisation And Anti‑Corruption.
Worked, Studied, And Did On‑Location Research In Diverse Environments, ”Japan:
military expansion and instability in East Asia”, 2‑22‑2019, Global Risk Insights,
https://globalriskinsights.com/2019/02/japan‑military‑asia/, accessed 7‑11‑2019

With an incursive China, relaxing American input, and an ambiguous Trump‑Kim re‑
lationship, Japan bolsters its military capabilities to face uncertain times. This action is
impacting East Asian politics in ways unfelt since the Second World War.

Since 2012, Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe has been working towards a reforma‑
tion of Japan’s military capabilities. The PM has also hinted at plans to revise Article
9 of Japan’s Constitution, which famously renounces the country’s ability to wage war.
Abe’s Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) controls both houses of government, yet it has not
gathered enough support to secure the two‑thirds majority that would enable a consti‑
tutional amendment. The Japanese public remains unconvinced that a stronger military
is what the country needs, considering Japan’s decades‑long history of pacifism. More‑
over, the pacifist Komeito party, the LDP’s coalition partners, may present a staunch
obstacle to Abe’s proposals.

Wheels in motion

In January, the US State Department approved the sale of two Aegis Weapons Systems
to Japan worth $2.1 billion. Japan has also committed to purchasing 147 F‑35 fighter
jets and produced its first aircraft carrier since World War Two. Moreover, the nation
has increased efforts to intercept Chinese incursions on Japanese airspace in the South
China and East China Seas. Australia’s Defense Minister Marise Payne applauded Japan
taking steps to bolster its defence force, particularly regarding the plans for a $340 billion
boost in military wares over the next few years.

185
 7 Con Evidence

Japan’s efforts in keeping pace with East Asia’s key military players highlight a break
from its trend of actively pursuing non‑aggressive security tactics. These developments
indicate that Japan is willing to reform its military capabilities regardless of the outcome
of the Article 9 debate.

Expansion, rhetoric and unhealed wounds

China’s attempts to expand its sphere of influence in East Asia have continued, as the
country refuses to back down on any of its territorial claims, including the Spratly and
Senkaku islands in the South and East China seas. North Korea’s fiery rhetoric and
worrying missile launches further add to the instability of the region. One of the most
alarming displays took place in August 2017, when North Korea launched a missile
over the Japanese main island of Hokkaido. President Trump’s pledge to “totally wipe
out” North Korea should they threaten the US or her allies did little to soothe regional
tensions. Indeed, Trump has pursued an inconsistent policy in East Asia, characterised
by a flippant mixture of tough talk and friendly relations with China and North Korea,
that is detrimental to political forecasting.

A major risk faced by Japan is the possibility of American retrenchment in the region
being substituted by an increased Chinese presence. The prospect of North Korea legit‑
imising its regime through Chinese and Russian support and negotiations with South
Korea is also a distinct threat. This is because atrocities committed by the Japanese army
during WW2 remains embedded in the political‑cultural fabric of these countries. They
are averse to the prospect of Japan once again emerging as a strong military power in
the region.

An unexpected partnership in the making

Few leaders have shown such amiable relations to President Trump than Shinzo Abe.
However, thus far the Prime Minister’s efforts have yielded few results. The US has
pulled out of the Trans‑Pacific Partnership, and the trade talks between the two nations
have stagnated. The increase in military cooperation between the two countries has
been one of the few recent progressions in the Japan‑US relationship. As for China, de‑
spite signs of cordiality between Trump and President Xi Jinping, the trade war between
the two countries has forced the Asian nation into an area of economic uncertainty. This
has prompted Abe and Xi to consider the possibility of exploring further economic co‑
operation. This would mainly focus on mutual infrastructural projects and developing
the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership.

Historically, China and Japan’s relationship has been tempestuous, however, enhanced

186
 7 Con Evidence

economic cooperation would undoubtedly mutually benefit the two countries. Japan
needs to ensure stability for its export‑centric economy, while China needs to maintain
its current rates of growth in order to be able to deal with its high levels of inequality
and expanding middle class.

A relationship of mutual dependency could aid in healing – at least in part, the animos‑
ity between the two nations. It certainly helped in the 1970s, when the US imposed
a policy of detente, forcing China and Japan to work together in establishing Chinese
independent of the USSR, whilst allowing Japan to enter the Chinese market. The nor‑
malisation of China‑Japan relations in the 70’s stabilised East Asia and there is a chance
this could be repeated in today’s circumstances. All the same, it is unclear if economic
cooperation would be enough for China and Japan to discard their territorial ambitions.

Is East Asia more stable with less American influence?

Dire economic conditions may force Japan and China to cooperate, but the vacuum
created by a decrease in US military and economic interest will likely fuel further in‑
stability in East Asia. Trump’s summit talks with Kim Jong‑un have offered only sym‑
bolic progress, with little sign of North Korea actually reducing its military threat. A
diminished US presence harbours the potential to stimulate more economic coopera‑
tion amongst regional powers, but the threat of unleashing armed hostility held back
by American intervention will also be present. An enhanced Japanese military will al‑
most certainly agitate these tension.

If Abe succeeds in changing Article 9, the balance of power in East Asia will change
considerably. A rearmed Japan would become, for the first time in almost 75 years, a
regional player capable of projecting military power to assert its overseas goals. Consid‑
ering the parliamentarian support behind the PM, it is highly likely that Abe’s amend‑
ments will take place, however his Komeito partners will fight to ensure that the consti‑
tutional changes are light.

Japan‑US relations will become increasingly strained as China rises in power.

Pickar 16

The George Washington University, Elliott School of International Affairs, BA 2014; The
University of Chicago Law School, JD 2017.), ”Japan ’s Defensive Constitution : Nuclear
Weapons as a Better Alternative Than Expanding Collective Self‑Defense”, University
of Chicago Law School Chicago Unbound International Immersion Program Papers Stu‑

187
 7 Con Evidence

dent Papers, 2016, https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=

1025&context=international_immersion_program_papers

In the case of Japan seeing a rising China, it is rational for Japan to feel insecure. In order
to alleviate their insecurity, Japan currently possesses a complete security and extended
deterrence agreement with the United States, which provides for Japan’s defense in
the case of an attack.91 However, as China’s power rises, it is reasonable for Japan to
question the sustainability of the security agreement.92 For the U.S., it is exceedingly
costly to ensure Japan’s security in the face of a rising China—the upkeep of military
bases in Japan may cost as much at $5.5 billion per year.93 As China’s conventional force
size grows, the United States will need to grow their force size to keep up. 94 Particularly
because of various territorial disputes, the United States could be drawn into an armed
conflict in East Asia. 95 The current strategy is too costly, and by allowing proliferation
in Japan, the U.S. will not need to increase its force size to mimic China’s. If Japan were
to acquire its own weapons, it would be able to use deterrence to come to a resolution of
disputes itself, and while the United States could provide assistance through diplomacy,
it would not be militarily required to defend Japan.

188
 7 Con Evidence

7.1.3 War Wounds

Amendment re‑opens war wounds, which spikes regional tension

ISDP 18

Institute for Security & Development Policy (Stockholm‑based non‑profit and non‑
partisan research and policy organization). “Amending Japan’s Pacifist Constitution.”
April 2018. JDN. http://isdp.eu/publication/amending‑japans‑pacifist‑constitution/

Whichever position one takes on the issue of constitutional revision, an amendment to

Article 9 would no doubt have great implications for regional security. Perhaps most
importantly, it would almost certainly ignite protest amongst the country’s neighbors
due to the historical association of Japanese imperialism and wartime aggression. From
the perspective of China and the Koreas, this has been followed by a post‑war period col‑
ored by textbook controversies over disputed histories and visits by Japanese officials to
the Yasukuni Shrine, where many of Japan’s wartime leaders are buried. Furthermore,
persisting territorial disputes between the East Asian countries pose major obstacles to
the improvement of relations. North Korea, South Korea and China consider Japan’s
claims to the disputed islands as illegitimate, as they stem from the period of Japanese
imperial expansion. The wide perception in China and the Koreas that Japan lacks re‑
morse for its imperialism is the background against which any change related to the
Japanese military will be understood. Despite the Japanese populace’s strong support
of pacifism, emotions related with the war run very high in the region. An amendment
to Article 9, if not done with sufficient tact, could increase regional tensions, and cause
more harm than good to Japan’s security situation.

189
 7 Con Evidence

7.1.4 Stable Security Situation

Japan is unlikely to experience a change in its regional security situation making

offensive military capabilities unnecessary.

Piotrowski 5

Karen Piotrowski ‑ B.A. Psychology and Government (2003), University of Texas

at Austin; J.D. (2006), Washington University School of Law, ”Keeping Pace with
the Progress of the World: Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution.” Washing‑
ton University Law Quarterly, vol. 83, no. 5, 2005, pp. 1653‑1678. HeinOnline,
https://heinonline.org/HOL/P?h=hein.journals/walq83&i=1667

A ”change in the regional security situation” means an outward event‑likely a terrorist

attack by a terrorist organization or an act of belligerence by one of Japan’s neighbors‑
causing a crisis that will force Japan to immediately confront the restrictions Article 9
places on its ability to defend itself or engage in preemptive strikes. However, neither
a terrorist attack nor an act of belligerency by a neighbor is likely to occur.158 First, be‑
cause Japan has limited its involvement internationally, it is not likely to be the target of
terrorist attack. 59 Second, an act of belligerency by one of Japan’s neighbors is similarly
unlikely 160 because these countries enjoy an uneasy status quo in spite of a decades‑
long brinksmanship giving the appearance of instability.’ 6’ The most obvious threat
source is North Korea, but despite its agitations and occasional provocations aimed at
extorting its neighbors, North Korea is unlikely to launch an offensive against Japan or
another country in the region in the near future. 162 Furthermore, given its historical re‑
fusal to participate in missions that might have a human cost, 163 it is even possible that
Japan might withdraw inward in the event that an act of belligerency was committed
within the region. Thus, the greatest potential for immediate change in Japanese law
and policy is a direct attack against Japan by a neighboring power. However, barring a
dramatic change to the status quo in the region, this is extremely unlikely. 64

190
 7 Con Evidence

7.1.5 Lack Public Support

The people of Japan oppose amending Article 9.

The Japan Times 19

The Japan Times is Japan’s largest & oldest English‑language daily newspaper), ”Poll
shows 56% of Japanese oppose amending Constitution under Abe government”, The
Japan Times, 7/24/19, https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2019/07/24/national/politics‑
diplomacy/56‑japanese‑oppose‑amending‑constitution‑abe‑government‑poll‑shows/
#.XUcW0OhKiFE

More than half of people in Japan oppose amending the nation’s postwar pacifist Consti‑
tution under Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s government, a Kyodo news survey conducted
after the Upper House election showed Tuesday. In the two‑day telephone survey, held
from Monday, 56.0 percent opposed Abe’s drive for constitutional revision, while 32.2
expressed support. The failure of pro‑amendment forces in the election to retain a two‑
thirds majority in the upper chamber, which is required to initiate constitutional revi‑
sion, was viewed positively by 29.8 percent and negatively by 12.2 percent.

191
 7 Con Evidence

7.1.6 Unwritten Unamendability

It is virtually impossible to amend Article 9

Albert 15

Richard Albert (Associate Professor, Boston College Law School; JD, BA, Yale Univer‑
sity; BCL, Oxford University; LLM, Harvard University). “Amending constitutional
amendment rules.” International Journal of Constitutional Law, 2015, Vol. 13 No. 3,
655–685. JDN. https://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1923&
context=lsfp

Like the unilateral provincial formula, Japan’s Pacifism Clause may have become un‑
writtenly unamendable. The clause traces its beginnings to General MacArthur’s three
essential requirements for Japan’s revised constitution, one of which was the renunci‑
ation of war.168 Despite entrenching an inherited disability,169 the clause has become
central to Japan’s legal and political culture,170 and so important that it is now seen
as constitutive of Japan’s constitutional identity.171 Though the Constitution had been
effectively imposed on Japan and the Allies had steered much of the design of the Consti‑
tution,172 “the vast majority of the Japanese citizenry, who felt betrayed by the wartime
leadership, quickly embraced the new Constitution, including Article 9.”173 The earli‑
est efforts to amend article 9 failed for many reasons, chief among them the already
overwhelming popular support for the clause.174 Subsequent efforts to amend arti‑
cle 9, from the Hatoyama administration after the Occupation in the 1950s and into
the Miyazawa administration in the 1990s, also failed in light of strong public opposi‑
tion.175 The Pacifism Clause seems more strongly entrenched in Japanese political cul‑
ture than it is in the constitutional text. Almost as soon as it was adopted, the Pacifism
Clause began to erode under pressure from the Korean War into which Japan became
involved passively, resulting in “a departure from both the letter and the spirit of Arti‑
cle 9.”176 This change occurred without amendment but with a declarative announce‑
ment that article 9 banned only the offensive use of force.177 Decades later, the Pacifism
Clause has been “reinterpreted creatively to allow the use of some forces,”178 Japan
now spends one of the world’s largest military budgets, and its Self‑Defense Forces
number 240,000.179 Yet even as article 9’s textual absolutism on war‑making has given
way to the reality of Japan’s militarism,180 the Pacifism Clause has become “an anchor
of [Japan’s] postwar identity,” the consequence of the “trauma of atomic bombing and
catastrophic defeat [that] discredited militarism and created a profound commitment
to peace in the new nuclear age.”181 Not unlike the Second Amendment in the United

192
 7 Con Evidence

States, article 9 is more than a textual rule.182 It is a “culturally embedded norm” that
has “shaped Japanese individual and group identities, social relations, and practices”
and which “provides a sense of security in the Northeast region, including China and
Korea, where bitter memories of Japan’s wartime aggression still linger.”183 Amending
article 9 would mark a fundamental change to Japan’s constitutional identity How ar‑
ticle 9 has become a super‑constitutional norm is as difficult to explain as it is to deny.
Part of the answer involves the constitutional text itself. As Mark Chinen observes, “the
values implicit in the Constitution have become ingrained in Japanese society over the
past 60 years, in part, precisely because of Article 9.”184 Next to the preambular declara‑
tion of popular sovereignty, the Pacifism Clause is seen as the most important part of the
Constitution.185 Part of the answer also involves social assimilation into a culture where
pacifism is a point of pride and article 9 is taught in schools to children.186 Article 9 has
become a legal, social, and constitutive norm also as a result of extraordinary public re‑
lations efforts, including the creation of a Committee to Popularize the Constitution,187
which once worked to culturally entrench pacifism as a cultural norm through public
lectures, books, free pamphlets and booklets, film, and songs.188 The entrenchment of
the Pacifism Clause in Japanese political culture is also attributable to geopolitics. Aki‑
toshi Miyashita has explored the origin and sustainability of the Japanese cultural norm
of postwar pacifism.189 He concludes that “the extent to which pacifist norms are sus‑
tained has a lot to do with Japan’s security environment and domestic political condi‑
tions, such as security ties with the United States, threat perception, economic prosper‑
ity, and political stability.”190 Pacifism grew in Japan when the country strengthened its
alliance with the United States: as the latter reinforced the former as its guarantor, sup‑
port for pacifism would likely have been unsustainable without the military security the
United States offered Japan.191 Miyashita acknowledges the role of history in shaping
pacifism in Japan, but he concludes that it is the product of powerful norms and cultural
forces as well as structural and material realities.192 Despite its significance in Japanese
political culture, the Pacifism Clause is not formally entrenched against amendment.
But political actors could argue that it has become so important that it should be im‑
mune to ordinary amendment. Political actors have in the past made a similar argument
that article 9 forever commits Japan to non‑militarism.193 Today the argument could
take one of two forms. First, political actors opposed amending the Pacifism Clause
could argue that it has by convention acquired the unwritten quality of unamendability
given its importance to Japanese political, social, and constitutional culture. The devel‑
opment of such convention of unamendability would reflect the historical significance
of the clause to Japan.194 Given that changing the Pacifism Clause would change not

193
 7 Con Evidence

only Japan’s Constitution but more broadly its national identity, political actors might
argue that the clause may be changed only by revision. Alternatively, political actors
could concede that the Pacifism Clause is amendable, though suggest that amendment
can occur only with a threshold higher than what article 96 requires; this argument
would claim that the clause is implicitly entrenched against ordinary amendment. Yet
the theory of unwritten unamendability is stronger in theory than reality. Although the
Pacifism Clause may hold special historical and contemporary significance, it is treated
in the constitutional text like all other provisions; it is freely amendable by ordinary
amendment. It is also problematic to claim that it should be subject to some form of
heightened threshold because the text neither states nor implies such a requirement.
There is no effective constraint preventing political actors from proposing or pursuing
its amendment, and opponents can point to no constitutional language nor identify any
entrenched rule to justify their defense of amendment rules. Amending the Pacifism
Clause is achievable through the ordinary amendment process as defined by article 96,
even though the clause is constitutive value of Japanese political culture.

194
 7 Con Evidence

7.1.7 Low Judicial Review

Judaical restraint makes amendment nearly impossible

Albert 15

Richard Albert (Associate Professor, Boston College Law School; JD, BA, Yale Univer‑
sity; BCL, Oxford University; LLM, Harvard University). “Amending constitutional
amendment rules.” International Journal of Constitutional Law, 2015, Vol. 13 No. 3,
655–685. JDN. https://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1923&
context=lsfp

In Japan, however, the Supreme Court appears unlikely to follow the lead of its Indian
counterpart in reviewing amendments to amendment rules.134 The court has generally
been reluctant to exercise its power of judicial review, having invalidated only eight
governmental acts through 2011,135 even though the Constitution expressly confers
on courts the right to “determine the constitutionality of any law, order, regulation or
official act.”136 The Supreme Court has resisted calls to clarify the scope of article 9,
specifically with regard to the constitutionality of the Special Defense Forces,137 opting
instead for a doctrine of avoidance.138 As one observer has written, “it seems clear that
Article 9 is not likely to be a constitutional provision enforced with vigor by the Japanese
courts.”139 Japanese courts have instead deferred to the political branches on article
9,140 and appear likely to do the same on article 96. Japanese constitutional review is
perhaps the most conservative in the democratic world.141 David Law has explained
that judges resist exercising their power of judicial review as a result of the formal and
informal institutions and practices that sensitize them to the views and preferences of
political actors.142 An additional factor is that judges “tend to view the Constitution not
as a law, but more as a political document stipulating political principles.”143 Judges
are therefore reluctant to judicialize politics by bringing political matters into the legal
arena.144 They favor stability and predictability, privilege democratic decision‑making,
and do not see themselves as catalysts of social change.145 The power of judicial re‑
view on some matters has effectively been internalized within the Cabinet Legislation
Bureau, which advises political actors on the constitutionality of proposed laws and
regulations, an arrangement upheld by the Supreme Court.146 The claim is not that
the Bureau enjoys judicial deference, but rather that its interpretation of contentious
political matters, for instance article 9, has mitigated the pressure on the court to re‑
solve the questions itself.147 Judicial restraint in Japan makes it a credible possibility
that political actors could successfully amend amendment rules without any interven‑

195
 7 Con Evidence

ing judicial review. Judicial constitutional review is therefore not likely to be invoked
as an implicit limit to amending amendment rules where political actors deploy arti‑
cle 96 to amend the amending clause and article 9. This inadequate design of Japanese
amendment rules leaves these rules susceptible to ordinary amendment. In Japan, as
in other constitutional democracies where the judiciary is unlikely to follow the bold
steps of the Indian Supreme Court to assert the unwritten power to review the consti‑
tutionality of amendments, political actors wishing to defend amendment rules against
ordinary amendment need to rely on other strategies to remedy the textual limitations
of the constitution’s current constitutional design.

196
 7 Con Evidence

7.1.8 Amendment Inevitable

A new generation ensures Article 9 amendment is inevitable

Piotrowski 5

Karen Piotrowski (J.D., Washington University School of Law). “Keeping Pace with the
Progress of the World: Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution.” 83 Wash. U. L. Q. 1653
(2005). JDN. http://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol83/iss5/7

The second source of change is already underway: a generational cycling reflected in

shifting cultural attitudes and norms. The younger generation—we might call them the
“après les après guerre”165—in Japan is already manifesting a different and more liberal
attitude toward the SDF and Japan’s need to be involved internationally.166 This gener‑
ation wants to see Japan have a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council
and realizes that Japan must prove itself worthy of the seat.167 It also is not scarred
by memories of war168 and has an attitude that might be described as “pragmatic re‑
alism.”169 War guilt as an international or regional currency seems to be running on
short reserve with this generation.170 Once this generation matures and gains control
of the Diet, the older generation will be swept out, and an Article 9 amendment will be
more likely. Change to Article 9 will come as an incident of this generation’s different
values.

Continued expansion is legally inconsistent

Piotrowski 5

Karen Piotrowski (J.D., Washington University School of Law). “Keeping Pace with the
Progress of the World: Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution.” 83 Wash. U. L. Q. 1653
(2005). JDN. http://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol83/iss5/7

While Japan has escaped amending Article 9 thus far, its continued efforts to expand
SDF operations and responsibilities mean that Japan should come face to face with Arti‑
cle 9 and amend it to explicitly allow for self‑defense, participation in peacekeeping op‑
erations, and humanitarian missions. Past SDF expansion came in small increments:142
except for sending a minor minesweeping team to Korea in the 1950s,143 Japan did
not contribute personnel to aid in conflict resolution again until 1992 when it sent eight
ceasefire monitors to Cambodia.144 Since 1992, Japan has become increasingly involved
in international affairs,145 and a defense ministry panel recently suggested that Japan

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be given first‑strike capabilities.146 Japan has been pushing for a permanent seat on
the United Nations Security Council if permanent seats are added.147 Prime Minister
Junichiro Koizumi is well‑known for his hawkish stance on what capabilities the SDF
should have.148 Furthermore, the governing Liberal Democratic Party released a draft
revision of the constitution in November 2004 that would remove restrictions on the
SDF and recognize it as a fully functioning military.149 However, for Japan to further in‑
crease its involvement in peacekeeping operations and humanitarian missions, to gain
a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council, and to gain first‑strike ca‑
pabilities, all the while either refusing to amend Article 9 or attempting to justify such
changes as wholly constitutional under Article 9 threatens to undermine the significance
of Article 9.150

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 7 Con Evidence

7.1.9 Delay

Debate about amendments should wait until after the pandemic

Nishimura 20

Rintaro Nishimura, Spring Research Assistant in Korean Studies at the Center for the
National Interest, ”Japan Should Have a Serious Debate on Revising Its Constitution—
But Not Now,” The Diplomat, 5‑7‑2020, https://thediplomat.com/2020/05/japan‑should‑
have‑a‑serious‑debate‑on‑revising‑its‑constitution‑but‑not‑now/, accessed 3‑14‑2022

May 3 was Constitution Memorial Day in Japan. Since its promulgation 73 years ago, the
Japanese Constitution has remained untouched. Many reasons for this have been cited,
including the length (4,986 words compared to the median 13,630 words), its vagueness,
and flexibility to handle changing circumstances. In short, amending the constitution
has been deemed unnecessary. Yet the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and its leader,
Shinzo Abe, would beg to differ. Since the party’s inception in 1955, the LDP has been
dead set on revising the constitution and adding certain elements to it. A major hurdle
has been the need to obtain a two‑thirds majority in the Diet and pass a national ref‑
erendum. Today, the LDP does not hold a super‑majority in the upper house, making
revision a difficult affair. Even still, Abe has continued to pursue this goal. On May
3 this year, the prime minister spoke at an online forum hosted by a pro‑amendment
group and said there is “no wavering in my resolve to amend the constitution.” Specifi‑
cally, he spoke of the need to pass the LDP’s 2018 reform proposal, which most notably
would add an emergency powers clause to give more power to the government in times
of crisis and revise Article 9 — the war‑renouncing clause. This speech could not have
come at a worse time. In fact, Abe and his cabinet have continued to send the wrong
messages during the coronavirus pandemic. From the “stay home” video to the mask
debacle, the government has shown time and again that they aren’t focused on pursuing
the interests of the people. The message on Constitution Memorial Day was no differ‑
ent. The fact that the leader of the nation was spending time to pursue his own political
interests in the midst of an emergency sent all the wrong signals. In addition, one of the
hosts of the online forum where Abe spoke mentioned that the group supports efforts to
amend the constitution during Abe’s tenure, which is set to end next year. Inadvertently
(or not), this suggests that Abe is more focused on cementing his legacy in the next year
than helping citizens who are in dire need of financial support. Of course, one can al‑
ways argue that Abe merely called for the need to “begin dialogue in the Diet” to a select
audience of conservative, pro‑amendment supporters. It was not a message aimed at

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the general public and never meant he would set aside the coronavirus response. How‑
ever, the very fact that the prime minister is calling for amendments unrelated to the
current pandemic response feels wrong. His speech has sent two messages that don’t
sit well with the people: that the constitution has prevented the government from re‑
sponding effectively and that his goal to amend the constitution is more important than
saving people from possible financial trouble. Does the Constitution Prevent an Effec‑
tive Response? Abe and the pro‑amendment camp argue that the government lacks
the power to effectively control the country during a disaster. In the proposed changes,
the cabinet would bypass the Diet and be able to issue directives under a state of emer‑
gency to protect lives and property. The justification is that during a disaster, there is
no time to wait for the Diet to deliberate and vote. The concern here is that the cabinet
may be able to issue directives and ask for authorization later, rendering the checks and
balance of the Diet ineffective. Currently, the constitution prohibits infringing upon
people’s rights to freedom and property. Article 22 states that “every person shall have
freedom to choose and change his residence and to choose his occupation to the extent
that it does not interfere with the public welfare.” A lockdown situation like in other
countries would violate this provision. Article 29 states that people have the right to
property. Taking up property for public use during a disaster would violate this. On
the other hand, those against amending the constitution argue that the current version
and laws are sufficient to respond effectively to a disaster. Specifically, they cite the
inclusion of “public welfare” in the constitution. For example, in Article 22, every per‑
son is free to move around as long as it doesn’t interfere with public welfare. Experts
argue that as long as the government is able to prove that public welfare is endangered,
they would be able to restrict movement. Others argue that current provisions in the Ba‑
sic Act on Disaster Management permit restrictions tantamount to a partial lockdown.
The main opposition Constitutional Democratic Party’s leader, Yukio Edano, states that
measures such as Article 63 (Mayor’s Right to Establish a Restricted Area) could force
people out of areas and incur penalties if violated. While the current Disaster Man‑
agement bill is only activated during natural disasters, Edano argues that coronavirus
could be included by a simple legal reform. This would make the far more burden‑
some constitutional amendment unnecessary. Mixed Messages Don’t Help There is no
clear winner in this debate yet. Despite having raged on for years, a recent NHK poll
found that 32 percent supported amendments to the constitution, while 24 percent were
against it. In terms of the emergency clause alone, a Kyodo poll conducted in March and
April reported that 51 percent supported the amendment, while 47 percent were against
it. These results warrant a discussion on this issue. However, as mentioned before, the

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Abe cabinet’s mixed messaging doesn’t help facilitate such a debate. Japan extended
its state of emergency on May 4, but relaxed restrictions on small gatherings and busi‑
nesses. Further loosening was authorized in areas with limited outbreaks, as public
libraries and museums were now allowed to be opened. Partial opening of the country
seems to contradict the exact measures Abe called for in his speech on May 3. There, he
seemed to point at the constitutional limits as a major reason the government responded
slowly to the outbreak. Now, the government is advocating for the opposite, opening
the country to alleviate economic pains. If the constitution were really the problem, the
government should have continued its former approach. This would have proven that
without penalties and stringent restrictions, Japan would be unsuccessful in containing
the outbreak. Loosening restrictions indicates that the government believes its current
response is working. In his press conference, Abe stated that this month was a prepa‑
ration for the next step: to end the state of emergency. If loosening measures is going
to prepare Japan, then where does the argument for an emergency clause come from?
These mixed messages allow opposition parties to insist that Abe is attempting to bene‑
fit from the pandemic by pursuing his policy goals. Even if Abe’s motives were purely
based on the frustration of not being able to pursue a more stringent response to the
pandemic, the messages he is sending say the opposite. In fact, the more Abe mentions
other amendments alongside the emergency powers clause, the more people believe the
emergency clause is a pretext for forcing a vote on Article 9 — arguably the most con‑
sequential amendment of the bunch. Time Is Running Out Coupled with that, the very
fact that Abe’s term runs out in September 2021 adds fuel to the fire. Speculation leads
to more speculation. Abe’s comments on potentially lifting the extended measures by
mid‑May seems to coincide with the end of the 201st session of the Diet (June 17). If Abe
were to force a vote, it would have to be by June 17 or during an “extraordinary” session
(which must be demanded by one‑fourth of either house) before the 202nd session set
to begin in January 2021. Either way, a swift end to the pandemic would be necessary
to focus on constitutional reform. Judging by the time constraints, it is understandable
why many believe it will be near impossible to amend the constitution during Abe’s
tenure. The process is long and arduous. First, the amendment would have to be in‑
troduced by either 100 lower house and 50 upper house members or submitted by both
Commissions on the Constitution. After a simple majority of members in both Commis‑
sions support the bill, passage by a supermajority in both houses will lead to a national
referendum where a simple majority completes the process. One thing Abe gets right
is the need to discuss whether the country ought to amend its constitution. This has
been debated for a long time to no avail. However, now is not the time. Attempting

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 7 Con Evidence

to expedite a delicate process to meet a personal political timeline is poor conduct. As

many politicians on both sides of the aisle have said, it’s important to hold this discus‑
sion when the pandemic has died down. That is when Japan should face the issue head
on. Until then, the priority should be to come up with policies to help citizens who need
help today.

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 7 Con Evidence

7.1.10 CMR

Amendment tanks civil military relations—shifts the balance of power too far
towards the military.

Hornung 18

Jeffrey W. Hornung, a political scientist at the nonprofit, nonpartisan RAND Corpora‑

tion. ”Revising Japan’s Peace Constitution: Much Ado About Nothing”, 3‑21‑2018, War
on the Rocks, https://warontherocks.com/2018/03/revising‑japans‑peace‑constitution‑
much‑ado‑about‑nothing/, accessed 7‑13‑2019

Similarly, some critics are worried that revision will alter civil‑military relations, tilt‑
ing more influence toward the SDF inside Japan’s policymaking circles, or completely
eliminate constitutional control over the SDF altogether. Currently, SDF personnel are
considered “special public servants” under Article 2 of the Public Servant Law. Revi‑
sion of the constitution’s Article 9 would provide the SDF as an organization with con‑
stitutional legitimacy, but it would not lead to SDF officers or enlisted personnel being
recognized as a “military.” For that to happen, the Public Servant Law, and associated
SDF Law statutes, would have to be revised. It’s true that, regardless of the official sta‑
tus of these personnel, an explicit legal basis for the force could enhance their de facto
status. This could, for instance, give SDF officers more room to insert their opinions
into decision‑making on defense matters with their civilian counterparts. Given how
firmly embedded civilian control is in Japan, however, the SDF would continue to have
no political authority.

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 7 Con Evidence

7.1.11 Right‑Wing Nationalism

Rearmament inflames regional tensions and emboldens right‑wing nationalists in

Japan

Rodriguez, 21

Gabriel Rodriguez, data scientist and freelance author. He has a master’s degree in
sociolinguistics from Georgetown University, where he studied the political underpin‑
nings of language endangerment with a focus in East Asia, ”No, Japan Should Not
Remilitarize,” Jacobin, 10‑24‑2021, https://www.jacobinmag.com/2021/10/japan‑jsdf‑
remilitarization‑article‑9‑us‑foreign‑policy‑biden‑asian‑pivot, accessed 3‑14‑2022

In 1983, Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone pledged to Ronald Reagan that Japan was
America’s “unsinkable aircraft carrier.” Today those words echo louder than ever. Since
2011, the United States’ pivot to Asia — the reorientation of its military power from the
Middle East to the Asia‑Pacific region — has escalated tensions between the United
States and China and North Korea, and Japan is the tip of America’s spear. This is ad‑
vantageous for Japan’s rising far right. Also in 2011, the Fukushima nuclear disaster pre‑
cipitated an economic slump, which compounded the effects of earlier financial crises
and contributed to the decay of Japanese civil society. As elsewhere, reactionary politics
have rushed in to fill the void. As China and North Korea loom large, the Japanese far
right has finally found an opportunity to carry out its long‑cherished project of trans‑
forming the Japanese Self‑Defense Forces (JSDF) into a fully functional and independent
military — with Washington’s encouragement. As the Japanese far right has established
a political presence over the last decade, the curtailing of civil liberties, a swell of nation‑
alist sentiment (articulated frequently in the demand for remilitarization), and even the
jailing of dissenters have followed. Other East Asian nations, including China, are un‑
derstandably concerned about Japanese remilitarization, as the forces unleashed in 2011
threaten to change Japan beyond all recognition. But the foreign policy cognoscenti who
forge Washington’s Japan policy appear totally blind to the legitimacy of East Asian ob‑
jections. They are either ignoring the fascist element pushing for and benefitting from
Japanese remilitarization or, worse yet, embracing it. The Road to Remilitarization Ever
since the formation of the modern Japanese state in 1945, there has been an ongoing
debate over Article 9 of the postwar constitution, which explicitly forbids the creation
of an offensively capable Japanese military. However, in 1954, Japan established the
Japanese Self‑Defense Forces, a functional military that is simply legally barred from
taking offensive actions. Hawks on the Japanese right have argued from the beginning

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that Japan must eventually regain total military independence. The conflict has turned
especially heated since North Korea’s development of ballistic nuclear missiles capable
of reaching the Japanese mainland. Japanese military investment has steadily risen, at
least since Nakasone’s term in the 1980s, and as of 2020 it has the world’s ninth‑largest
military budget at $49.1 billion. Unsurprisingly, the United States has played a large
role in pushing Japanese remilitarization, despite having written the constitution that
barred it in the first place. After 1948, the United States rapidly switched course on de‑
militarizing Japan in order to counterbalance China, and the driving force of the modern
militarization movement is the growth of China’s military strength and assertiveness in
the twenty‑first century. In fact, the ongoing confrontation between Japan and China
over the Senkaku Islands, a string of uninhabited islands near Taiwan, which began
in earnest when Japan nationalized the islands in 2012, has served as the pretext for
much of Tokyo and Beijing’s recent military buildup in the area. Arguments from the
American side are invariably couched in terms of Japan’s need to contribute more to the
US‑Japan alliance and to defend itself from China and North Korea. In this regard, the
Trump and Biden administrations have differed little. Joe Biden’s staff views the India‑
Australia‑Japan‑US “Quad” military alliance as key to containing China, and includes
remilitarization of Japan in its purview. His administration has aggressively pursued
this vision since taking office, even cutting Europe out of the Pacific to focus on Quad
allies. However, the primary forces pushing remilitarization within Japan are the right
wing of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), the country’s ruling party, and Nippon
Kaigi, a powerful far‑right lobbying group that counts a third of the Diet and many
prominent government ministers, including former prime minister Shinzō Abe himself,
among its members. Not unlike the Christian Democrats in West Germany, the LDP is
a center‑right party that was pushed into prominence in no small part by the Office of
Strategic Services and the Central Intelligence Agency after 1945. Its dominance has ren‑
dered Japan practically a one‑party state — the party has fallen out of power only twice
for brief interregnums from 1993 to 1996 and 2009 to 2012. The growing dominance of
Nippon Kaigi has pushed the LDP further to the right and intensified the belligerence
of the rhetoric coming out of Tokyo. The United States has repeatedly intervened to
fortify the LDP’s position for its own purposes — including pushing Yukio Hatoyama,
one of the few non‑LDP postwar prime ministers, out of office in 2010 for attempting to
close the US military base in Okinawa and normalize relations with China. The Social
Situation The rise of Japan’s far right and the renewal of its remilitarization campaign
are manifestations of Japan’s geopolitical strategic role and the country’s declining ma‑
terial conditions. Japan has suffered from a moribund economy since the 1990s. It was

205
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only worsened by the Fukushima disaster in 2011, which the nation still hadn’t recov‑
ered from when COVID‑19 hit in 2020. The nation’s economic troubles have coincided
with a rise in reactionary politics. Japan has maintained superficial racial harmony since
1945 due to the relative invisibility of its minority populations, but even that has begun
to change. In the 2010s, increasing campaigns of harassment and vandalism targeting
Southeast Asian immigrants and Koreans forced the Diet to pass anti‑hate‑speech legis‑
lation for the first time in its history — although the law is largely toothless, imposing
no actual penalty for its violation. As nationalism and xenophobia grow, the JSDF’s par‑
ticipation in disaster relief after Fukushima has rehabilitated its domestic image, with
over 90 percent of the country now approving of what is functionally Japan’s military.
Carrying the legacy of Japanese fascism, the LDP (and particularly Nippon Kaigi) is the
knowing driver of both this growing racism and nationalism and Japan’s swelling mil‑
itary fervor. The synthesis of remilitarization with reactionary politics is embodied in
the party’s longtime leader, Shinzō Abe, Japan’s longest‑serving prime minister, who
retired only last year due to his declining health. Abe has usually been treated as a
moderate by the foreign press due to his center‑right economic policy and unassuming
public figure, but he has been exposed multiple times as a far‑right reactionary on social
issues, particularly concerning nationalism and the Japanese military. This should come
as no surprise considering Abe is the grandson of Nobusuke Kishi, a founding father
of Japanese fascism and one of Japan’s most notorious postwar prime ministers. Kishi
served as the economic director of the Japanese puppet state in Manchuria, Manchukuo,
from 1936 to 1939, where he regularly visited the brothels staffed by “comfort women”
sex slaves and pioneered the use of forced labor in Japan’s work camps. After the war,
Kishi was charged as a Class‑A war criminal, the highest designation, and spent two
years in prison, but after 1948, the United States changed course in order to transform
Japan into an anti‑communist bastion. It released the fascist war criminals it had im‑
prisoned, including Kishi, and collaborated with the new government to systematically
cover up and deny Japanese atrocities (which is partly why, even in Korea, the “com‑
fort women” issue was not well known or understood until 1996). Throughout the ‘50s,
Kishi and his yakuza mafia allies were key players in controlling labor and forging the
Liberal Democratic Party from the warring Liberal and Democratic parties. After be‑
coming prime minister in 1957, Kishi undertook an agenda so openly fascist, not to
mention obeisant to the United States, that 30 million Japanese mobilized to protest his
rule, the largest demonstrations in Japan’s history. He stepped down in disgrace in
1960, but forty‑six years later his grandson Abe would himself be elected prime min‑
ister. Abe was close to his grandfather and claims to have learned about politics on

206
 7 Con Evidence

Kishi’s knee. He has credited his affinity with conservatism to what he considers the
“unfairness” with which Kishi was treated, and has objected to his grandfather being la‑
beled a war criminal at all. Abe has also systematically denied that women were forced
into sexual slavery by the Japanese empire, as well as many of its other crimes. In his
two periods as prime minister, from 2006 to 2007 and 2012 to 2020, Abe expanded the
military budget every year. His attempts to force a referendum on the reinterpretation
of Article 9 failed, but he did succeed at implementing several laws criminalizing dis‑
sent and whistleblowing, such as the controversial State Secrecy Law in 2013. This has
led to dire warnings from Reporters Without Borders and Edward Snowden over the
precipitous decline of free speech and press in Japan. Abe also continued the Japanese
right’s efforts to fight a culture war through primary school textbooks, leading a fight
to “take back textbooks” from the progressive left and introduce “moral and patriotic
education.” Abe’s wife famously served as honorary principal at Moritomo Gakuen,
the “racist kindergarten” where children were led in chants calling Koreans filthy and
subhuman, and Abe himself visited the controversial Yasukuni Shrine in 2013 and sent
offerings thereafter. There have even been cases of anti‑war protestors being arrested
and detained for extended periods, with Hiroji Yamashiro, the chair of the Okinawa
Peace Action Center, being jailed for five months in 2015. Abe’s remilitarization agenda
was ultimately derailed by his plummeting popularity after a series of corruption scan‑
dals, his failing health, and the arrival of COVID in 2020. Unfortunately, although his
replacement, Yoshihide Suga, was primarily concerned with COVID and the Olympics,
he approved a record high defense budget of over ¥5 trillion ($49 billion) for 2021. There
is little indication that Suga’s nominally more liberal successor, Fumio Kishida, intends
to change course — Abe’s hawkish brother Nobuo Kishi remains minister of defense —
and the already struggling anti‑war movement has made little progress during COVID.
Japanese liberalism appears to be in decline, and the remilitarization movement threat‑
ens the country’s greatest bulwark against fascism: its constitutional commitment to
pacifism. A twenty‑first century Japanese fascism will take a drastically different form
than it did in the 1930s, but there is no doubt it constitutes a major threat to East Asia and
Japan itself. Playing With Fire Before and during World War II, the Japanese military
committed some of the worst atrocities in recorded history, of which the Rape of Nanjing
is probably the most infamous. The enslavement of hundreds of thousands of primar‑
ily Korean women (euphemistically termed “comfort women”) for sexual exploitation
was so violent and widespread that it continues to be the defining event for a generation
of women in Korea. The testing of biological weapons on coastal Chinese cities killed
hundreds of thousands in man‑made bubonic plague epidemics. Precise numbers are

207
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almost impossible to come by due to the wholesale destruction of the Japanese archives,
but scholarly estimates of the number of civilians deliberately killed during the official
period of Japanese fascism reach into the millions. Considering this history, it’s not
surprising that Japan’s neighbors — particularly Korea and China — have objected to
any form of rearmament. The Japanese military has increasingly pushed for long‑range
strike capabilities with missiles that could reach Chinese and Korean cities, supposedly
to destroy North Korean missile launchers as a form of preemptive defense. China and
both Koreas have understandably viewed this as a provocation. Chinese state media
has been abundantly clear that China emphatically rejects any move by Japan to remil‑
itarize. Chi Wang, who was an honorary consultant on US‑China trade for the H. W.
Bush administration, has argued that China should be more afraid of the Japanese mil‑
itary than the American one. North Korea’s belligerent stance toward Japan obviously
has not been assuaged by the expansion of its military, and there are indications that
South Korea, nominally Japan’s ally, views a resurgent Japan as a greater threat to its
national security than China or even North Korea. In one of the worst‑case scenarios,
Japan’s acquisition of offensive‑strike capabilities triggers a North Korean or Chinese
preemptive attack. For that reason, international proponents of remilitarization tend
to agree that Japan should reassure its neighbors that it is exclusively building defen‑
sive capabilities, if only as a matter of strategic optics. But Japan’s actions belie the
claim: in 2020 the JSDF pushed for more investment in long‑range missiles and force‑
projecting aircraft carriers. Even bearing in mind the potential downsides, there are still
arguments for developing Japan’s defensive military capacities that are not prima facie
unreasonable. Building Japan’s military independence could reduce US involvement
in the region, and despite the risks of destabilization, it is not impossible that, if man‑
aged correctly, it could discourage “aggression” on the part of China and North Korea.
But this leads us to the problem with the Anglo‑American arguments. If there is a cost‑
benefit analysis to be made weighing the benefits of remilitarization against the rise of
reactionary politics in Japan and the East Asian response to remilitarization, no one in
“the Blob” appears to have done it. In fact, the glibness with which Washington experts
dismiss the discomfort Japan’s neighbors feel toward its growing military assertiveness
is remarkable, as is the absence of concern about the rise of the Japanese far right. In
the New York Times, Ian Buruma ultimately concludes that South Korea’s objections
are somewhat irrational and driven by “historical passions.” In the Wall Street Journal,
Patrick McCabe, an employee of US Indo‑Pacific Command, the agency in charge of the
military’s Pacific operations, claims that Japanese remilitarization is nothing more than
“Beijing’s narrative.” Perhaps most notably, an article written in Foreign Affairs in 2014

208
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by Biden’s Asia czar Kurt M. Campbell and his top Asia advisor in the Pentagon, Ely
Ratner, claims that “characteriz[ing] Japan’s constitutional reinterpretation and military
modernization as reactionary or militaristic” is “Chinese propaganda.” They acknowl‑
edge some of Abe’s more offensive gestures, but wave them off as unfortunate public
relations blunders rather than an indication of what lies beneath the surface of Japanese
remilitarization. Ignorance or Incentive? As for why Anglo‑American experts seem to
have averted their eyes from Japan’s obvious provocations, Debito Arudou makes the ar‑
gument that credulous American strategists are being taken in by a right‑wing Japanese
charm offensive, and simply fail to understand the danger of what they’re toying with.
That’s the charitable interpretation. The uncharitable interpretation is that they don’t
care, or even welcome it. In the postwar era, the Dulles brothers and the other pro‑
genitors of America’s East Asian strategy made the calculation that tipping Japan back
toward a managed parliamentary cryptofascism was the best way to block the com‑
munist threat. It’s entirely possible that their contemporary counterparts have already
come to the same conclusion, though they might not state it outright, or even in private.
Moreover, the financial incentives for the Blob to push remilitarization are profound. A
fully militarized Japan would raise its demand for American weapons even further, and
Biden’s foreign‑policy staff have deep connections to Japan hawk think tanks like the
Center for Strategic and International Studies and the Center for a New American Secu‑
rity. Biden’s Asia czar Kurt Campbell himself actually founded the latter, which counts
Lockheed Martin, Northrop Grumman, and BAE Systems among its major contributors,
and has publicly disclosed hundreds of thousands of dollars received directly from the
governments of Japan and Taiwan. It is difficult to say where a post‑Abe, post‑COVID
Japanese politics will lead. Kishida has at least gestured toward improving ties with
China, but given Abe’s continued stranglehold on the LDP, as well as the actions and
personnel of the Biden administration, there is little reason to hope for change from the
top. Fortunately, so far the Japanese people have not swallowed the proposition that
rearmament is a necessity. Despite the high approval rating of the JSDF, a majority of
the country remains opposed to any revision or reinterpretation of Article 9. However,
so long as Japan remains economically moribund and tensions with China continue to
escalate, that number may continue to fall. Any movement committed to preventing
war and building transnational solidarity must consider the threat of Japan’s remilita‑
rization, and the United States’ role in encouraging it. Empowering and arming Japan’s
far right could be the worst mistake in the pivot to Asia yet.

209
 7 Con Evidence

7.1.12 Relations – General

Amending Article 9 would prompt regional instability which crushes relations

Bell 17

Cameron Bell (writes for the Towson Journal of International Affairs). “Prime
Minister Shinzo Abe and the JDF: The Regional Implications of Repealing Article
9.” Towson University Journal of International Affairs. 17 December 2017. JDN.
https://wp.towson.edu/iajournal/2017/12/17/prime‑minister‑shinzo‑abe‑and‑the‑jdf‑
the‑regional‑implications‑of‑repealing‑article‑9/

The recent reelection of Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe has raised concerns about
the continuation of Japan’s pacifist nature. As the President of the Liberal Democratic
Party, Abe has called for repealing or re‑interpreting sections of the Japanese Constitu‑
tion, specifically Article 9, which forbids the threat and use of force to settle international
disputes, and surrenders the right to maintain offensive armed forces.[i] If successful,
the repeal of Article 9 would allow Japan to normalize their military, making offensive
war constitutional. While there are legitimate concerns about the long‑term viability of
Article 9 in the present regional environment, which contains an increasingly influential
and expansionist Chinese government and an aggressive North Korea, the normaliza‑
tion of the Japanese military and the repeal of Article 9 would destabilize the region,
jeopardize Japan’s relationship with at least one regional ally, and challenge Japan’s
friendship with its staunchest ally, the U.S.

Since 1949, Japan has operated under a Constitution that was largely written by the
United States. In the immediate post WWII environment, the United States and other
nations in the region such as Korea and China, feared a militarized Japan. This concern
prompted the inclusion of a pacifist clause in the new Japanese Constitution which pro‑
hibited Japan from using war as a means to settle international disputes. Furthermore,
Article 9 prevented Japan from maintaining offensive military weaponry. While Article
9 has shaped Japanese society, making pacifism one of its more dominant ideals, there
has been a growing trend towards normalizing the military in recent years. In 2009 only
41% of voters wanted to revise Article 9, however, by 2013 the same research team from
the University of Tokyo found that voters in support of changing Article 9 had risen to
50% and that 89% of members of Japan’s parliament desired a change to Article 9.[ii]
Furthermore, this trend has already produced significant changes to Japanese military
laws. For example, in 2014 Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe successfully, although

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on shaky legal ground, circumvented the Japanese parliament and re‑interpreted Article
9 to allow ‘collective self‑defense’.[iii] This change allowed Japan’s military to be used
in defensive multilateral operations for the first time. Additionally, it allowed Japan to
greatly expand its military capabilities while still adhering to the accepted interpretation
of Article 9.[iv] This ‘re‑interpretation’ should not be viewed as a singular, disconnected
event, but rather an event that corresponds with the increasingly pro‑normalization
trend in Japanese society and government. This trend has largely been in response to a
changing regional environment and holds the potential for rapid destabilization of the
East Asia power structure.

When the Japanese Constitution was created and signed, the region was considerably
different than it is today. China was immediately embroiled in a civil war which would
last until 1949, and outside of supporting the communists in Northern Korea, even af‑
ter Mao’s victory over Chiang Kia‑Shek’s Nationalists, the new Chinese government
was more interested in addressing domestic concerns than in expanding regional in‑
fluence. Korea was in a state of rebuilding after decades of Japanese colonization and
would be involved in a civil war, in part instigated by the Cold War, by June 1950. Ad‑
ditionally, China, Korea, and the United States sought to prevent Japan from ever remil‑
itarizing again. This regional context demanded Japan accept a pacifist constitution.
However, now almost 70 years later, the regional context has changed dramatically.
China, currently boasting a rapidly growing economy with a GDP over $11 trillion and
a growth rate of 6.7%, has begun to exert its influence in the region. This outward ex‑
pression of Chinese confidence is witnessed in China’s expansion into the Spratly Is‑
lands. Even more concerning to Japan, is China’s increased assertiveness in its claims
of ownership over the Japanese‑administered Senkaku Islands.[v] Furthermore, China’s
more regional aspirations are not simply talk: Chinese military expenditures have in‑
creased fourfold over the last decade. In 2013, in the waters surrounding the Senkaku
Islands, a Chinese warship weapons‑locked a Japanese helicopter, and twice in 2014
Chinese military aircraft have intercepted and nearly collided with Japanese surveil‑
lance planes over the Islands.[vi] These events along with others have created an envi‑
ronment where many in Japan are beginning to see China and Chinese influence as a
threat to the Japanese people. Additionally, China is now seen by many in Japan as
an “immoral state that has fundamentally different values” and whose bullying nature
threaten Japan’s ability to act independently.[vii]

Moreover, Japan now faces the threat of a nuclear North Korea. Japan agreed to the
pacifist constitution when Korea posed no threat to Japan. However, with the rogue

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state finding increasing success with its nuclear program, Japan is facing a threat which
no other people in the world can truly understand. Japan stands alone as the only coun‑
try to have experienced the use of a nuclear weapon against its people during wartime.
It is understandable then that the nuclear threat from North Korea would cause Japan
to seek more offensive powers for their military. The recent North Korean missile test
which flew over the Japanese Province of Hokkaido has been met with calls from within
the Japanese government to acquire cruise‑missiles for a preemptive strike of North Ko‑
rean nuclear facilities.[viii] Whether these specific calls should be taken seriously or not
is irrelevant. However, it is clear that due to the North Korean threat Japan is beginning
to seriously look at normalization of their military, or at the very least, debating the
acceptability of pre‑emptive war under the current Article 9 interpretation. Even the
less drastic change of adding pre‑emptive war as a self‑defense measure under the cur‑
rent interpretation would radically change the region’s power structure and threaten
stability in the region.

As the evidenced above, Japan faces growing hostile threats within the region, and to
confront these threats, granting their military more offensive capabilities is a legitimate
option worthy of discussion. However, as part of that discussion Japan should acknowl‑
edge and debate the possible negative reactions from their allies and neighboring coun‑
tries in the region. Reactions that could result in a destabilized East Asia, where the
threats facing Japan are exacerbated by the potential loss of a region ally in South Ko‑
rea, and a potential decrease in support from the United States.

While both are allies of the United States and at least superficially friendly towards
each other, South Korea and Japan have a multitude of unresolved issues which over‑
shadow Japan’s normalization efforts. Both historically and today, Japan views the Ko‑
rean peninsula as a ‘dagger pointed at the heart of Japan’. This geographic fear from
Japan, along with the desire for more resources, in part led to the Japanese coloniza‑
tion of Korea in the early 20th century and currently remains a key strategic concern for
Japanese defense plans. [ix] From the Korean perspective, Japan has refused to acknowl‑
edge war crimes committed against the Korean people during and prior to WWII and
the trend towards normalization has many Koreans worried about a revival of Japan’s
violent military past.[x] South Korea’s hesitancy to see an offensive Japanese military is
understandable given this background, and one should expect the South Korean gov‑
ernment to resist any Japanese attempts to grant greater offensive powers to its military.
There are many avenues with which South Korea could attempt this, including cutting
economic and military ties with Japan, as well as demanding greater military commit‑

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ments from the United States. These two options could have a potential ‘snowballing’
effect due to Japanese fear of Korea’s geographic position. For example, if South Ko‑
rea were to cut military and economic ties with Japan due to normalization efforts, one
could expect the Japanese government to view South Korea as a regional threat and in‑
crease calls for a more robust Japanese military. Furthermore, if the United States were
to grant South Korea greater military protection, the Japanese could feel abandoned by
their ally and again feel the need for a stronger Japanese military.

Moreover, Japanese efforts to repeal Article 9 will put additional strain on its relation‑
ship with the United States. As stated above the U.S. should be expected to try to bal‑
ance its relationships with South Korea and Japan; however, they must respond to each
nation while still considering the region as a whole. Some Japanese government of‑
ficials view China’s growing economy and increasing economic ties with the United
States as a sign that the United States is shifting away from Japan due to the shrinking
Japanese economy. While the United States has taken recent steps to allay these fears,
the worry remains and has been used to support the repeal of Article 9.[xi] Despite
reassurance from the United States, the intertwined relationships (both military and
economic), must be considered by the Japanese prior to shifting to a traditional military.
If the Japanese normalization process angers China enough, the Chinese could use its
economic ties with the U.S. to exert influence on American policymakers to either con‑
trol Japan and halt the shift toward offensive capabilities or to weaken its protection
commitments to the nation. This would worsen Japans position in the region and per‑
haps ironically force it to normalize faster and more aggressively, further destabilizing
the region. Japan’s military conversion will undoubtedly affect U.S.‑Japanese relations;
whether that change will favor Japan or not is difficult to predict. However, as Japan
debates the idea of normalization, the discussion must include the potential loss of al‑
lies such as South Korea, a weakening of its relationship with the United States and a
destabilization of the East Asian region.

The recent elections were an overwhelming success for Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and
the Liberal Democratic Party, whose platform calls for more offensive capabilities for
the Japanese military. Prime Minister Abe and the LDP now control enough parlia‑
ment seats to unilaterally change the Japanese Constitution and give the Japanese mili‑
tary more offensive capabilities.[xii] Despite this power, Prime Minister Abe has walked
back his initial timeline of changing the constitution by 2020 so the Japanese people
can debate the topic and, Abe expects, come to support the repeal of Article 9 and the
normalization of the Japanese military.[xiii] This time should be used to debate the re‑

213
 7 Con Evidence

gional implications of normalization. There are legitimate reasons for a more offensive
Japanese military. The regional environment has changed dramatically since the cre‑
ation of the Japanese Constitution and Article 9. Japan faces legitimate and growing
threats which a purely defensive military may not be able to confront. However, the
Japanese government and people must also consider the negative outcomes that may
occur due to normalization. By shifting to an offensive military, Japan risks destabiliz‑
ing the region. They may lose a key regional ally in South Korea, and could place the
United States in a position it may have to weaken its commitments to Japan to protect
its own economy and people. These concerns must be addressed and debated fully for
the Japanese people and government to make an informed decision.

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 7 Con Evidence

7.1.13 Relations – South Korea

Revision shreds relations with South Korea

Mason 21

Ra Mason, Lecturer in International Relations and Japanese Foreign Policy, University

of East Anglia, ”Japan: pressure from populist right to scrap ’peace constitution’ after
75 years,” Conversation, 11‑8‑2021, https://theconversation.com/japan‑pressure‑from‑
populist‑right‑to‑scrap‑peace‑constitution‑after‑75‑years‑171333, accessed 3‑14‑2022

Conservative political actors began to target Japan’s pacifism as a source of weakness.

This was made easier by a sabre‑rattling North Korea and a rising China, both of which
were recalibrated as grave risks to Japan’s security. This narrative was led by Japan’s
two most successful recent prime ministers, Junichiro Koizumi and Shinzo Abe. Both
rose to power on the back of a hawkish foreign policy stance, including the proposed re‑
vision of Japan’s constitution. The result has been a substantive shift to the right across
Japan’s major political parties, to the point where promoting pacifism is no longer politi‑
cally viable. The culmination of these winds of change is evident from the latest election
results, which saw Fumio Kishida, who had assumed the prime ministership when he
won control of the LDP in a leadership election just prior to the October general election,
retain power for the party, albeit with a reduced majority. Kishida is considered more
moderate and less hawkish than either long‑serving Abe or his loyal short‑term succes‑
sor, Yoshihide Suga. But with an increased number of seats gained by the JIP, the newly
elected prime minister is likely to be swayed by the growing momentum for legislative
changes. The combined forces of LDP, JIP and – albeit reticently – junior coalition part‑
ner, Komeito, now put those in favour of constitutional revision in a position to enact the
necessary legal reforms. Regional implications This has serious implications. Domesti‑
cally, it reflects the rise and dominance of revisionist conservatism, and the decimation
of more progressive, liberal opposition forces. Internationally, it will send alarm bells
ringing across the Asia‑Pacific. Any indication that Japan might revise its constitution
is likely to spark angry reactions from Japan’s former colonies and victims of militarist
wartime aggression. This risks worsening relations with two of Japan’s biggest trading
partners in China and South Korea, as well as damaging its regional image as a trustwor‑
thy leader of peaceful economic and investment regimes. It could also further isolate
Tokyo amid an already tense security environment. Japan’s relations with both Koreas
remain strained. And close alignment with its sole alliance partner, the United States,
perpetuates tension with a more muscular China. This includes the issue of Taiwan.

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 7 Con Evidence

Meanwhile Japan, China and Taiwan all claim the disputed Pinnacle Islands, which are
referred to respectively as Senkaku, Diaoyu and Diaoyutai. Recent reinterpretations of
Article 9 already allow Japan to operate various forms of collective defence with allied
countries in exceptional circumstances. Tokyo also regularly dispatches the Japan Self‑
Defense Forces (JSDF) overseas. In this regard, with American backing and a flexible
interpretation of “self defence”, there is little practical need to formally revise a consti‑
tution that has served Japan so well during peacetime.

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 7 Con Evidence

7.1.14 Politics – Link

Amendment would cost tremendous amounts of political capital

Gover 18

Ted Gover (adjunct instructor of political science at Central Texas College‑USMC Camp
Pendleton; director of the Tribal Administration Program at Claremont Graduate Uni‑
versity). “Abe should strike while the iron’s hot on revising Article 9.” The Japan Times.
19 September 2018. JDN. https://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2018/09/19/commentary/
japan‑commentary/abe‑strike‑irons‑hot‑revising‑article‑9/

Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s upcoming three‑year term as Liberal Democratic Party
president, if he is re‑elected to the position as expected, will be an opportune time
for him to realize his long‑held and controversial desire to revise Article 9, the war‑
renouncing clause of the Constitution. Following his all‑but‑assured victory in the LDP
presidential election on Thursday, Abe will be on course to become Japan’s longest‑
serving prime minister and will likely be best positioned politically to pursue consti‑
tutional revision by his stated timeline of 2020. You might call it Abe’s make‑or‑break
moment on Article 9. During his third term, he will need to capitalize on his remaining
political capital to see through revising the Constitution, which has never been amended
since its promulgation in 1947. Specifically, Abe wants to resolve the debate among
constitutional scholars in Japan about the legality of the Self‑Defense Forces. For years,
many have argued that the SDF is unconstitutional, asserting that it violates Article 9.
To address this, Abe wants to insert into the Constitution a reference to the SDF to clar‑
ify its legal status in the supreme law while also keeping in place the first two clauses
of Article 9 that renounce the right to wage war and ban the maintenance of a stand‑
ing military. Some critics argue that Abe’s proposal to revise Article 9 to make the
legality of Japan’s military unequivocal while still keeping the war‑renouncing clause
is merely symbolic. Abe’s supporters claim that the objective is to remove uncertainty
in a gray area of Japanese law, confirming that Japan may legally engage in individual
self‑defense. They also assert that the amendment would complement 2015 security
legislation that allowed the SDF to engage in limited forms of collective self‑defense.
Revising Japan’s Constitution, which was written during the U.S.‑led Occupation, and
recapturing the nature of the country that existed before the Occupation — most no‑
tably during the Meiji Era — has been an aspiration of the prime minister for years.
Abe thinks the U.S. Occupation imposed non‑Japanese principles on his country, and
he has stated a desire for Japan to stand proud again, escaping the “postwar regime.”

217
 7 Con Evidence

These sentiments parallel the LDP’s continued aim of constitutional revision that date
back to the late 1950s when Abe’s grandfather, Nobosuke Kishi, was prime minister.
Abe believes that his administration needs to deliver on his party’s promise, cement‑
ing his legacy, regardless of the limited scope of the proposed revision. Abe also cites
present‑day threats to Japan’s national security as further justifications for amending Ar‑
ticle 9, most notably North Korea’s menacing behavior and the rise of China. Yet some
confidants of the prime minister are advising that his third term focus on accomplish‑
ing other long‑desired policy goals, namely vanquishing deflation, structural reform of
the economy and putting Japan back on a footing of economic growth. Complicating
matters, the busy upcoming political calendar affords little time for Abe and his party
to pursue the contentious campaign necessary for amending Article 9. As part of this,
Japan’s new emperor will assume the throne in 2019 and Tokyo will host the Summer
Olympics the following year. Amid competition for Abe’s focus, time and resources
going forward, he will need to prioritize and dedicate sufficient bandwidth to reform
the Constitution. It appears that the prime minister has support within his party to re‑
vise Article 9. According to a Sept. 8 Kyodo News survey, more than half the LDP’s
rank‑and‑file members support Abe’s proposal to amend the Constitution. However,
to achieve the required two‑thirds majority in both chambers of the Diet for proposing
constitutional change for public referendum, the LDP will need support from its coali‑
tion partner, Komeito, as well as from minority opposition parties. Komeito, principally
supported by the pacifist lay Buddhist organization Soka Gakkai, is known to be wary
of Abe’s plans for changing Article 9.

Amendment would be politically controversial

Yoshida 18

Reiji Yoshida, a staff writer and deputy manager of the Domestic News Division.
Since joining The Japan Times in 1993, he has intensively covered domestic politics,
diplomacy and defense issues as well as the 2011 Fukushima nuclear crisis. ”Abe’s
route to revising Article 9 crosses minefield of legalese”, 3‑12‑2018, Japan Times,
https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2018/03/12/reference/abes‑route‑revising‑article‑9‑
crosses‑minefield‑legalese/#.XRMWuOgzaMo, accessed 6‑26‑2019

The ruling Liberal Democratic Party is now entering a critical phase of debate on what
has been one of the most contentious political issues throughout the postwar years:
whether and how the war‑renouncing Article 9 of the Constitution should be revised.

218
 7 Con Evidence

Masahiko Komura, vice president of the LDP, has said he hopes the party will draw
up a draft proposal to revise Article 9 and form a party consensus by March 25, when
the party’s annual convention is scheduled to be held. But technical discussions on the
proposed wording of the article are very difficult for the general public to fully under‑
stand, and average Japanese voters probably don’t appreciate all of the detailed legal
issues. Why does Japan possess a powerful military despite Article 9? What are the pos‑
sible implications of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s quest to revise the article? Today we
explore these issues related to Article 9. Article 9 stipulates that “the Japanese people
forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation” and “land, sea, and air forces,
as well as other war potential, will never be maintained.” But the Self‑Defense Forces,
which boast one of the largest defense budgets in the world, is in fact a potent military
force. How is this legal? It seems a simple question, but it’s not so easy to answer —
and has produced a sharp split among constitutional scholars. In fact many scholars re‑
gard the SDF as unconstitutional, while other experts and the central government have
long argued to the contrary. When the pacifist Constitution went into effect in 1947,
both the government and a majority of scholars agreed that the Constitution literally
banned any war potential, even that for self‑defense. But with the outbreak of the Ko‑
rean War, Japan faced pressure from the U.S. to form an armed force to defend itself.
When Japan set up the SDF in 1954, the government started arguing that self‑defense
is an inherent right for a sovereign state to “ensure its survival” and that possessing a
“minimum armed organization” to uphold that right is not banned even by Article 9.
Article 13 stipulates that the people’s “right to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness”
shall be the supreme consideration. Given this, the Constitution cannot be interpreted
as banning Japan from using the minimum force required for its defense when directly
attacked and in the absence of other alternatives, according to the government’s inter‑
pretation. But the second paragraph of Article 9 clearly stipulates “land, sea and air
forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained.” Isn’t the SDF “war
potential?” According to the government, “the minimum armed organization required
for self‑defense” is less powerful and with more restrictions than the “war potential” as
mentioned in Article 9. Thus the SDF does not violate Article 9, the government has
maintained. For example, Japan is not currently able to fully exercise the right of collec‑
tive self‑defense, although Article 51 of the United Nations Charter allows all member
states to exercise the right to attack a third country if it assaults an allied nation. Japan
is also not permitted to own such powerful weapons as intercontinental ballistic mis‑
siles, long‑range strategic bombers and attack aircraft carriers, according to the govern‑
ment. Japan has also maintained “an exclusively defense‑oriented posture,” meaning

219
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that Japan can use force only after having first been attacked — by another country,
for example. But didn’t Abe’s government change its interpretation of Article 9 so that
Japan can exercise the right of collective self‑defense? Yes, but only partially, according
to Abe. Before 2015, the government had long argued that Japan was not allowed to
engage in collective self‑defense because defending another country would exceed “the
minimum use of force” required for self‑defense. But Abe maintained that given recent
changes in the international situation, an alliance with other country is now essential
for Japan’s defense. Thus Article 9 does not ban the right of collective self‑defense if
“Japan’s survival” is at stake and it is feared that “the people’s right to life, liberty and
the pursuit of happiness is fundamentally overturned” due to an armed attack by an‑
other country, Abe has argued. In other words, even under Abe’s 2015 interpretation,
Japan is not allowed to engage in collective self‑defense just to defend an ally if it is not
also required to defend the fundamental rights of the Japanese people. Those phrases
are rather abstract. Specifically, in what kind of situations would Japan be allowed to
engage in collective self‑defense? Abe himself has emphasized in particular the need to
defend a U.S. military ship or aircraft involved in a joint operation to defend Japan. If
Japan does not try to defend U.S. military personnel risking their lives to defend Japan,
it could critically damage the Japan‑U.S. military alliance, Abe has argued. Opposition
lawmakers have argued that phrases on the conditions are in fact abstract, and that the
SDF’s military operations could be greatly expanded to aid those of the U.S. military
— Japan’s sole military ally. They have argued that Abe’s interpretation and the 2015
security laws based on it thus violate Article 9. What revisions to Article 9 are being
sought by Abe now? Abe and the LDP have long wanted Article 9 to be revised so that
Japan can fully exercise the right of collective self‑defense as defined under Article 51 of
the U.N. Charter. But apparently because of strong public preference for maintaining
the existing status of the SDF, Abe is only planning right now to add a third paragraph
to Article 9 that would clearly justify the legal status of the SDF. Would it change the
legal scope of the SDF’s military operations? Abe has argued that it would not change
any of the various legal restrictions currently imposed on SDF operations. His proposal
is designed to put an end to the long‑continuing constitutional debate over the status
of the SDF, according to Abe. Opinion polls have shown that a vast majority of voters
already consider the SDF constitutional, in line with the position of central government,
and that this is no longer such a contentious political issue. But, as Abe has pointed
out, many constitutional scholars still believe the SDF to be technically unconstitutional
given the literal meaning of Article 9. Is there any criticism of Abe’s proposal? Many
scholars and lawmakers argue that there is no need to have a national referendum over

220
 7 Con Evidence

Abe’s proposal, because — according to Abe himself — it would not change the sub‑
stance of the SDF’s operations. Some critics believe Abe is pushing for a constitutional
revision just because he wants to leave his name in history. In addition, neither Abe nor
the LDP has proposed any specific wording for revising Article 9 and instead are only
holding fairly abstract discussions. This also raises concerns. Scholars and opposition
lawmakers have argued that depending on specific wording of the article, the revision
could drastically widen the legal scope of the SDF’s activities. For example, Masahiro
Sakata, former head of the Cabinet Legislation Bureau, expressed such concerns in an
article he wrote for the January issue of the monthly magazine Sekai. If a third para‑
graph is added to Article 9 stating that “the Self‑Defense Forces do not fall within the
category of war potential” mentioned in the preceding paragraph, the general public
may believe this will settle the constitutional debate over the legal status of the SDF
without making any changes to that legal status. But Sakata pointed out that, such a
revision to Article 9 itself would in fact result in there being no restrictions on SDF’s
activities, adding that the government and Diet would instead have new authority to
decide what missions the SDF can perform. “Such a graph only mean what is called
‘the SDF’ is not war potential. … As long as it’s called the SDF, it can be constitutional
regardless of whatever scope of missions or weapons it might have,” he wrote. Some
LDP lawmakers want the second paragraph of Article 9 dropped so that Japan can fully
use the right of collective self‑defense. Why? According to their interpretation, the first
paragraph only obliges Japan to renounce the right to engage in war “as a means of set‑
tling international disputes” and that Japan is not prohibited from engaging in war for
“self‑defense” — including that which involves use of the right to collective self‑defense
as stipulated by Article 51 of the U.N. Charter. Under this interpretation, it is only the
second paragraph of Article 9 that fundamentally restricts Japan’s use of force because
it bans Japan from possessing any war potential “in order to accomplish the aim of the
preceding paragraph.” Thus deletion of the second paragraph would allow Japan to
fully engage in the right of collective self‑defense, they argue.

221
 7 Con Evidence

7.1.15 Defensive Nuclear Weapons

Defensive nukes are permissible under Japan’s Article 9.

Farley 19

Robert Farley, a frequent contributor to TNI, is a Visiting Professor at the United States
Army War College, ”Imagine This: Japan Builds Nuclear Weapons”, The National
Interest, 5/25/19, https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/imagine‑japan‑builds‑nuclear‑
weapons‑59512

Japan’s constitution prohibits the acquisition of offensive weapons, leading to an end‑

less series of linguistic obfuscation about the defensive nature of particular systems. Air‑
craft carriers, for example, become “helicopter destroyers.” There is little question that
Japanese and American legal authorities would have found ways around the constitu‑
tional prohibition. Indeed, nuclear weapons intended primarily for deterrent purpose
(rather tactical or strategic) arguably have an intrinsic “defensive” nature. And given
the advanced nature of Japan’s economy, the Japanese Self‑Defense Forces could have
deployed nuclear weapons very soon after any decision to begin development.

The best response to Japan’s current security dilemma is to obtain defensive nuclear
weapons.

Pickar 16

The George Washington University, Elliott School of International Affairs, BA 2014; The
University of Chicago Law School, JD 2017, ”Japan ’s Defensive Constitution : Nuclear
Weapons as a Better Alternative Than Expanding Collective Self‑Defense”, University
of Chicago Law School Chicago Unbound International Immersion Program Papers Stu‑
dent Papers, 2016, https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=
1025&context=international_immersion_program_papers

Japan faces a dilemma: the current administration has legitimate security fears given
increasing interactions between Japan and the rest of the world, while civilians, deeply
scarred as the only people in history to be attacked by nuclear weapons, want Japan
to maintain its pacifist roots. The crux of the citizens’ concern is that the government
will become too internationally entangled. 14 Therefore, I would argue that, in order
to resolve these competing interests, Japan should acquire defensive nuclear weapons
in order to quell the security concerns of the government while responding to the cries

222
 7 Con Evidence

from the citizenry to remain pacifist. While acquisition of nuclear weapons may breach
Japan’s duties under international law, other countries may acquiesce, particularly the
United States, as such proliferation will help to lessen the financial burden on the U.S.,
who currently provides for Japan’s defense. Other similarly situated nations, like the
members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), may acquiesce as well
given NATO’s desire to expand into Asia, which may allow Japan to proceed without
repercussions for its violations of international law. The following discusses the history
of the Japanese Constitution as well as the role of nuclear weapons in international pol‑
itics, and argues that defensive nuclear weapons are the most effective way for Japan
to obtain its desired result while maintaining a pacifist foreign policy to avoid citizen
outrage

Nuclear weapons favor defensive use for the purpose of deterrence.

Pickar 16

The George Washington University, Elliott School of International Affairs, BA 2014; The
University of Chicago Law School, JD 2017, ”Japan ’s Defensive Constitution : Nuclear
Weapons as a Better Alternative Than Expanding Collective Self‑Defense”, University
of Chicago Law School Chicago Unbound International Immersion Program Papers Stu‑
dent Papers, 2016, https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=
1025&context=international_immersion_program_papers

Unlike conventional forces, nuclear weapons are unique because offensive weapons can
be distinguished from defensive weapons. 85 For instance, a nuclear weapon that has
the ability to hit a precise mark is offensive, while an imprecise weapon is defensive.86
Precision allows targeting of another country’s nuclear stockpile, and by targeting the
stockpile, one can destroy the enemy’s ability to retaliate, therefore conducting an offen‑
sive first‑strike. 87 Defensive weapons are imprecise, counter‑value weapons that only
have the ability to strike large economic areas, as opposed to nuclear stockpiles.88 Ul‑
timately, nuclear technology favors defensive use, as it is difficult to produce precision
weapons. 89 By acquiring a small number of inaccurate weapons, a state can use strate‑
gies of deterrence to soothe its own security concerns, without other countries fearing
an offensive strike. 90

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 7 Con Evidence

The acquisition of defensive nuclear weapons is in line with Article 9 of Japan’s

Constitution.

Pickar 16

The George Washington University, Elliott School of International Affairs, BA 2014; The
University of Chicago Law School, JD 2017, ”Japan ’s Defensive Constitution : Nuclear
Weapons as a Better Alternative Than Expanding Collective Self‑Defense”, University
of Chicago Law School Chicago Unbound International Immersion Program Papers Stu‑
dent Papers, 2016, https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=
1025&context=international_immersion_program_papers

Both under the old interpretation of Article 9 and under Prime Minister Abe’s new in‑
terpretation, Japan could constitutionally obtain defensive nuclear weapons. Given the
large‑scale pushback against the new interpretation of Article 9,116 the current gov‑
ernment may normatively prefer to acquire such weapons under the standards of the
old interpretation. Nonetheless, even under the new interpretation, which allows for
collective self‑defense, acquisition of defensive nuclear weapons would quell the con‑
cerns of the citizens and would be preferable. Japan’s Constitution has no affirmative
prohibition against nuclear weapons.117 The portion of the Constitution that could pre‑
clude nuclear proliferation is Article 9, the prohibition against “war potential.”118 Yet,
no Japanese court decision considered the constitutionality of nuclear weapons because,
like in the United States, Japanese courts only review cases and controversies and, given
that Japan never had nuclear weapons, nobody challenged such an acquisition. 119
While arguments exist on both sides for whether nuclear proliferation would be consti‑
tutional, it is clear that obtaining nuclear weapons would be at least as permissible as
expanding ground forces to engage in collective security. Given the nature of cases chal‑
lenging the SDF,120 Prime Minister Abe’s plan to expand self‑defense forces is likely un‑
constitutional. But, even if Abe’s assertions were indeed unconstitutional, this would
not be dispositive of the constitutionality of nuclear weapons. Whereas self‑defense
forces could be seen as “war potential,” defensive nuclear weapons are just the opposite.
They are strictly responsive, never meant to provoke, and they would not initiate war,
but defend against it. While the Constitution itself may even preclude attacks taken in
self‑defense, 121 this view has been poorly received and even, under this view, one can
reason that defensive nuclear weapons function as defensive insurance against other
states’ offensive attacks, not as an attack taken out of self‑defense.

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 7 Con Evidence

Existing international non‑proliferation agreements are a surmountable barrier to

Japan proliferating.

Pickar 16
The George Washington University, Elliott School of International Affairs, BA 2014; The
University of Chicago Law School, JD 2017, ”Japan ’s Defensive Constitution : Nuclear
Weapons as a Better Alternative Than Expanding Collective Self‑Defense”, University
of Chicago Law School Chicago Unbound International Immersion Program Papers Stu‑
dent Papers, 2016, https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=
1025&context=international_immersion_program_papers
Japan’s acquisition of nuclear weapons would almost certainly violate its international
obligations under the NPT, as Japan is non‑nuclear weapons state ratifying party; how‑
ever, given that the U.S. would save a large amount of money by reducing troops in the
region, and NATO member states would welcome an Asian nation gaining membership,
they may acquiesce to Japan’s nuclear acquisition. First, it is important to recall that,
under Japan’s treaty obligations, it is able to act for the purposes of self‑defense, and
its decision to limit its “war potential” is a wholly domestic decision without repercus‑
sions for international law.122 Therefore, we must consider whether the acquisition of
nuclear weapons would violate international law—not domestic law. Not only is Japan
an NNWS ratifying party of the NPT, but it is also a signatory of a number of other inter‑
national commitments in the broader non‑proliferation regime, which would preclude
it from acquiring nuclear weapons. For example, Japan is a state party to the Additional
Protocol of the NPT which, “[S]ignificantly expands [Japan’s] reporting responsibility to
the International Atomic Energy Agency (”IAEA“) and enables inspections of declared
and suspected undeclared sites at short notice.”123 Additionally, Japan is a state‑party
to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (“CTBT”).124 Although the CTBT has not yet en‑
tered into force, it prohibits state parties from “conducting any nuclear test explosions
or any other nuclear explosions and establishes a comprehensive worldwide verifica‑
tion regime to monitor compliance.”125 Despite the fact that the CTBT has not entered
into force, Japan, as a signatory, is bound not to violate the object and purpose of the
treaty,126 and one could argue that acquisition of nuclear weapons would violate the
object and purpose.127 Finally, Japan has bilateral nuclear energy agreements with the
United States, the United Kingdom, France, China and Australia. 128 In these agree‑
ments, the aforementioned countries provide the necessary materials for the nuclear
fuel cycle, while Japan agrees to use such equipment only for non‑military purposes.129
Importantly, “[W]ere Japan to violate any of these agreements, sanctions would be se‑

225
 7 Con Evidence

vere and would include immediate return of all materials and equipment to the supply‑
ing country. Japan would then be blocked from world supplies of natural and enriched
uranium and related equipment.”130 This could be devastating for Japan’s economy
and, therefore, Japan would need to act thoughtfully and purposefully in determining
whether to breach such treaties. Yet, were the countries with which Japan had these bi‑
lateral agreements to allow Japan to acquire nuclear weapons, there would be no such
devastation. Recently, scholars have criticized the efficacy of the international nuclear
non‑proliferation regime, particularly given that India, Pakistan, North Korea, and Is‑
rael are not member states of many relevant international agreements.131 As professor
David Jonas argues, the nonproliferation regime will not survive without these coun‑
tries as members.132 Legally, it would not be difficult for Japan to leave the NPT, as
it requires only providing three months’ notice and a showing that, “[E]xtraordinary
events . . . have jeopardized [Japan’s] supreme interests.”133 The requirements to with‑
draw from the CTBT are identical, except a state party must provide six months’ notice
instead of three.134 Therefore, were Japan to desire nuclear weapons, it could easily
withdraw from the international agreements that bind it in order to acquire them,

The acquisition of defensive nuclear weapons by Japan would increase regional

peace and stability.

Pickar 16

The George Washington University, Elliott School of International Affairs, BA 2014; The
University of Chicago Law School, JD 2017, ”Japan ’s Defensive Constitution : Nuclear
Weapons as a Better Alternative Than Expanding Collective Self‑Defense”, University
of Chicago Law School Chicago Unbound International Immersion Program Papers Stu‑
dent Papers, 2016, https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=
1025&context=international_immersion_program_papers

Japan faces numerous contemporaneous regional conflicts, and by obtaining nuclear

weapons, Japan could broker a peaceful resolution between itself and other Asian
states. Currently, there exists a dispute regarding claims to the Senkaku (Japanese
name)/Daiyou (Chinese name) Islands in the East China Sea. 143 Without going
into all of the intricacies of the law of the sea, the dispute is as follows: both Japan
and China make claims to these seven square kilometer islands, as jurisdiction over
the islands would allow for extended rights to fishing and natural resources in the
Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ) under the rules of United Nations Convention on the

226
 7 Con Evidence

Law of the Sea. 144 Neither country maintains a particularly strong historical claim to
the Islands,145 which makes the determination of who properly retains jurisdiction
difficult. Under UNCLOS, a country may only extend its EEZ based on its jurisdiction
over islands, not over ”rock which cannot sustain human habitation or economic life on
their own. 146 These islands are so small that, according to some experts, they are only
rocks, in which case neither Japan nor China could extend its EEZ. 147 President Obama
refuses to comment on whether the land masses constitute islands.148 Presumptively,
both Japan and China consider these land masses to be islands, otherwise they would
not be in such a heated battle, each assuming that it will be able to extend its EEZ if
it gains control. But China refuses to negotiate.149 China asserts similar claims over
island chains in the South China Sea without negotiating. 150 China feels no incentive
to negotiate, as its power relative to the countries who also assert claims to these
island chains (Japan, the Philippines, Vietnam, Indonesia, etc.) is very strong. In fact,
China’s refusal to arbitrate ownership of the islands is in direct breach of UNCLOS.
151 Given China’s lack of willingness to comply with international obligations and
China’s manifestation of power as a means of settling international disputes, Japan’s
acquisition of nuclear weapons would balance China’s power and ensure the continued
relevance and implementation of international agreements governing disputes in Asia.

227
 7 Con Evidence

7.1.16 AT: PKOs

PKOs are legal; amendment isn’t key

Auer 90

James E. Auer (Director of the Center for U.S.‑Japan Studies and Cooperation, Van‑
derbilt Institute for Public Policy Studies, Vanderbilt University; the leading military
analyst of Article 9’s implications). “Article Nine of Japan’s Constitution: From
Renunciation of Armed Force”Forever” to the Third Largest Defense Budget in the
World.” Law and Contemporary Problems. Vol. 53, No 2, p 171. Spring 1990. JDN.
https://doi.org/1191849

As long as the character of the SDF and their relationship to U.S. forces remains as called
for in U.S.‑Japan security arrangements, even such tasks as the deployment of the SDF to
the Persian Gulf for minesweeping, described in 1987 as constitutional by Prime Minis‑
ter Nakasone, need not cause alarm. Such activities could demonstrate the importance
of the SDF to free navigation. With amendment to the SDF law, not to the Constitu‑
tion, the SDF could participate in peacekeeping activities. For example, the Maritime
Self‑Defense Force could protect commercial reprocessed plutonium shipments from
Europe against terrorist attacks.

Japan is still able to engage in peacekeeping operations with Article 9 intact.

Piotrowski 05

Karen Piotrowski ‑ B.A. Psychology and Government (2003), University of Texas

at Austin; J.D. (2006), Washington University School of Law, ”Keeping Pace with
the Progress of the World: Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution.” Washing‑
ton University Law Quarterly, vol. 83, no. 5, 2005, pp. 1653‑1678. HeinOnline,
https://heinonline.org/HOL/P?h=hein.journals/walq83&i=1667

In August 1950, SCAP ordered Japan to establish a National Police Reserve.82 A year
later, Japan and the United States signed a bilateral mutual security treaty. 83 The Na‑
tional Police Reserve became the National Safety Forces (NSF), and, in 1952, Japan estab‑
lished the National Safety Agency to manage the Safety Forces.84 By 1955, Japan had es‑
tablished ground, maritime, and air Self‑Defense Forces. 85 On January 19, 1960, Japan
and the United States signed the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security, 86 which
remains in effect today. Supplementing the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security

228
 7 Con Evidence

are the Guidelines for U.S.‑Japan Defense Cooperation.87 Since signing the Treaty of
Mutual Cooperation and Security, Japan has become involved in international peace‑
keeping operations and humanitarian missions, at first slowly, but more rapidly in the
past few years.88 From a meager police force evolved a fully functioning de facto mo‑
dem military. 89 The first Persian Gulf war focused the world’s attention on Japan’s
participation in international peacekeeping 90 when it contributed more than $13 bil‑
lion to the effort in 1990.91 Despite having made the third largest financial contribution
to the war,92 Japan was widely criticized for its refusal to contribute troops and was
accused of ”checkbook diplomacy., 93 In 1990, a United Nations (UN) Peace Coopera‑
tion Bill that would have sent SDF forces to the Persian Gulf failed to pass muster in the
Diet.94 In 1992, however, the Diet passed a different Peace Cooperation Bill allowing
SDF participation in UN peacekeeping operations, but prohibiting the SDF from using
force.95

The SDFs freedom to operate overseas is increasing in the status quo.

Hornung 19

Jeffrey W. Hornung is a political scientist at the Rand Corp, ”With Little Fan‑
fare, Japan Just Changed the Way It Uses Its Military”, Foreign Policy, 5/3/19,
https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/05/03/with‑little‑fanfare‑japan‑just‑changed‑the‑way‑it‑
uses‑its‑military/

But the Sinai mission is different. It will mark the first time that SDF personnel will take
advantage of a separate, often overlooked, 2015 revision to the 1992 law that enables
the SDF to participate in overseas peacekeeping operations even if they are not under
U.N. control. The difference may not seem important, but it is. Not only does this mark
the restart of SDF operations overseas since the South Sudan withdrawal in 2017, but
the Sinai operation is also a small, albeit visible, demonstration that Tokyo is putting its
2015 legislation into practice and changing how it deploys the SDF. Observers should
not expect the deployment to set up a chain of events that leads to the SDF suddenly
fighting shoulder to shoulder with coalition forces in combat to topple authoritarian
regimes or root out terrorists, but it is a significant step forward. Security policies change
incrementally in Japan. And should this new deployment go well, it could mark the first
of many international operations of much greater numbers in places where the SDF is
asked to contribute to peace and stability alongside multinational forces. No longer
tethered by a need to be under U.N. control, Japan will have greater freedom to deploy

229
 7 Con Evidence

its SDF overseas on a wider spectrum of possible missions. While it may not seem like
much now, we may be witnessing the start of a different kind of new era for Japan.

230
 7 Con Evidence

7.1.17 AT: China

China will interpret Japan amending Article 9 for offensive military capabilities as a
threat.

Wang 17
Chi Wang, a former head of the Chinese section of the US Library of Congress and
former university librarian at the Chinese University of Hong Kong, is president of
the US‑China Policy Foundation, ”Why the US is no threat to China, but a remili‑
tarised Japan, led by Shinzo Abe, may well be”, South China Morning Post, 11/5/17,
https://www.scmp.com/comment/insight‑opinion/article/2118257/why‑us‑no‑threat‑
china‑remilitarised‑japan‑led‑shinzo‑abe
Japan’s planned restoration of its military and the continued election of conservative
politicians are threatening events for countries it invaded in the past. I was in the sixth
grade in 1942, living with my family in Hong Kong, when the Japanese invaded. I
watched as Japanese torpedoes entered the harbour and killed British troops. Japanese
shell shrapnel damaged our house, blinding one of our household staff and killing an‑
other. Trapped indoors in fear of the occupying military, we were left with very little
food and water for nearly 25 days – and we were among the lucky ones. Japan’s modern‑
day actions must be interpreted through the lens of the second world war. Abe’s visit
in 2013 to the Yasukuni Shrine, the resting place of almost 1,000 war criminals from that
conflict, was for many a sign of his disregard for the atrocities committed abroad by the
Japanese. Because of his family history, his actions and his own hopes for the remili‑
tarisation of Japan’s armed forces, Abe has failed to set to rest any worries about the
military. The US, on the other hand, is not a threat to China. Although it has competed
and will continue to compete with China on trade, it has never invaded. It never will.
In the 20th century, the normalisation of Sino‑US relations, both economic and political,
gave China the opportunity to enter the world stage. Even during periods of tense rela‑
tions, America has helped China and endeavoured to engage, in the interests of better
cooperation. China need not worry about a threat from the US but, if Abe abolishes
Article 9 of its constitution, the future trajectory of Japan’s military will be threatening
indeed.

Revision trades off with relations with China

Zheng 21

231
 7 Con Evidence

Dino Zheng, ”Choose Your Starter: China or Article 9?,” Brown Political Review, 12‑
30‑2021, https://brownpoliticalreview.org/2021/12/choose‑your‑starter‑china‑or‑article‑
9/, accessed 3‑14‑2022

In the short‑run, however, it would be a diplomatic disaster for Japan if Kishida tries to
strengthen ties with China while also trying to revise the constitution. It is unlikely that
China would allow Japan to militarily threaten its position in East Asia even if their eco‑
nomic relations continue to grow. Kishida might be able to settle a deal with China to
stall their quarrel over the Diaoyu Islands (also known as the Senkaku Islands), presum‑
ably given China’s greater focus on Taiwan in the near future and desire to keep Japan
neutral. However, his conservative politics and growing tensions in the area suggest
that an expanded Article 9 might soon become a reality. If this is true, Japan will receive
intense condemnation from many East Asian countries, and most of Japan’s peripheral
ties with China will become secondary. However, if Kishida commits to revision by gar‑
nering internal support under current international tensions, he might be able to earn
one of the greatest achievements for an LDP leader. On the other hand, closer ties with
China will mean economic benefits, security in East Asia, and more bargaining power
with the United States. Either way, a choice is better than none.

232
 7 Con Evidence

7.2 Pacifism

7.2.1 Uniqueness

Northeast Asia is stabilizing now

Zhibo 19
Zou Zhibo (vice‑director of the Institute of World Economics and Politics of the Chinese
Academy of Social Sciences). “Time ripe for promoting peace in Northeast Asia.” China
Daily. 1 July 2019. JDN. http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/201907/01/WS5d19656fa3103
dbf1432b251.html
The dynamics of Northeast Asia are shifting. The Korean Peninsula is seeing positive
signs over denuclearization, with both the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and
the Republic of Korea making all the right gestures. Tension has been eased and moti‑
vation for regional cooperation boosted. There cannot be a better time for promoting a
regional political and security agenda, as well as economic and cultural exchange, for
a peaceful and prosperous Northeast Asia. These are the best times for Northeast Asia
since the 19th century. Countries in the region were colonized by the Western pow‑
ers, and later by their Asian neighbor, Japan. After World War II, Northeast Asia was
caught in the Cold War and divided into two camps. It has remained the only region
still plagued by the Cold War mentality, because the United States has refused to make
peace with the DPRK. To defend itself from the US, the DPRK resorted to developing nu‑
clear weapons. In 2018, the DPRK declared a major shift in its national policy, from the
previous parallel development of nuclear weapons and economy to the current focus on
the economy. This move has been viewed as an initiative to halt nuclear development
and extend an olive branch to the other nations. The DPRK’s concession on its nuclear
development has led to breakthroughs in its foreign relations. Two summits between
US President Donald Trump and DPRK top leader Kim Jong‑un have been held, as well
as three meetings between the DPRK and ROK leaders. China‑Japan relations, which
had hit rock bottom following differences over the Diaoyu Islands, are back on track.
The ROK and China have started to mend relations that were strained because of US
deployment of the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense anti‑ballistic missile system
in the ROK. China‑DPRK relations reached a new high. The positive signs in this re‑
gion and in the bilateral relations have created a favorable atmosphere for regional eco‑
nomic cooperation. Talks on a trilateral China‑Japan‑ROK free trade agreement have
resumed, and Japan has voiced its willingness to engage in the Belt and Road Initiative.

233
 7 Con Evidence

All stakeholders in the region should look at the bigger picture and build a peaceful and
prosperous Northeast Asia. First, all the Northeast Asian countries should reach a con‑
sensus on cooperation. All nations should safeguard regional stability and press ahead
for greater development for the long‑term goal of building a peaceful and prosperous
region. Second, all parties should strengthen cooperation and push for denuclearization
with one voice. Third, the Northeast Asian countries, while handling disputes between
each other, should be willing to make some compromises. All nations should learn to
meet each other halfway to resolve conflicts, including territorial disputes.

234
 7 Con Evidence

7.2.2 Modeling

Japan is a key model for constitutional pacifism

Beer 98

Lawrence W. Beer (The Fred Morgan Kirby Professor of Civil Rights Emeritus, Lafayette
College, Easton, Pennsylvania). “Peace in Theory and Practice Under Article 9 of Japan’s
Constitution”, originally presented at the Fourth World Congress of the International
Association of Constitutional Law, Tokyo, 1995, 81 Marq. L. Rev. 815 (1998). JDN.
http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/mulr/vol81/iss3/5

With her defeat fifty years ago in the Second World War, Japan stopped shooting. Japan
has never begun shooting again. That fact, by itself, is remarkable for a twentieth‑
century great power in Asia. Among all the world powers, Japan’s record since 1945
has been the most distinctively peaceful, in compliance with ideals of international law
and morality and of the United Nations, but also in compliance with the legal require‑
ments of what Japanese call their ”Peace Constitution.” My contentions here are that
Japan’s practice of quasi‑pacifism under Article 9 of the 1947 Constitution of Japan for
a half‑century represents an original and valuable contribution to the thought and prac‑
tice of constitutionalism in world civilization. In addition, the end of the Cold War, the
USSR, and colonialism have made the Japanese model appear less utopian and more
usefully suggestive for some other countries than was true in the past. There are in‑
consistencies between the ideals of Article 9 and certain elements in Japan’s defense
system, and in the old Liberal Democratic Party which ruled from 1955 until 1993, nu‑
merous leaders opposed the Constitution’s demands. Nevertheless, the anti‑pacifists
have been blocked repeatedly in their efforts to ignore or change Article 9, and in sub‑
stantive practices Japan now provides an anti‑militarist example of what is not only
desirable but now possible and advisable for many nation states. Japan’s record shows
that peace, security, and great power status need not depend heavily on military power,
and that war or quick belligerent responses to foreign provocations in violation of inter‑
national law is not a common sense necessity for national security. Geopolitical factors
and the Mutual Security Treaty with the United States (1960)2 has eased the pursuit
of pacifism in the decades since 1945; but Japan’s history and the continued resistance
of some nationalistic Japanese leaders to recognize the nature of her barbaric aggres‑
sion in wartime Asia suggest that a revival of the military’s ascendancy was more likely
than what happened—a decisive renunciation of war and political militarism, oppo‑
sition to nuclear weapons, unique restraints on military spending, military activities,

235
 7 Con Evidence

and weapons trade, and unmatched Official Development Act (ODA) support for non‑
military development efforts in the non‑West and for ecological protection.3

Article 9 is one of the three key legs of pacifism—amendment would spill over

Beer 98

Lawrence W. Beer (The Fred Morgan Kirby Professor of Civil Rights Emeritus, Lafayette
College, Easton, Pennsylvania). “Peace in Theory and Practice Under Article 9 of Japan’s
Constitution”, originally presented at the Fourth World Congress of the International
Association of Constitutional Law, Tokyo, 1995, 81 Marq. L. Rev. 815 (1998). JDN.
http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/mulr/vol81/iss3/5

Beginning in September, 1945, in the first months of the Allied occupation of Japan
(1945‑1952), and culminating with the promulgation of the Constitution of Japan on
November 3, 1946, the wartime system combining the Emperor, the military, and re‑
pression of the individual yielded to a new tripartite constitutional system in which the
people are sovereign, the state is pacifist,7 and respect for the individual’s freedom and
other human rights is the government’s prime directive.8 What has gradually become
institutionalized is one of the world’s most stable and peaceful democratic states with
a Constitution as its most widely trusted and respected national institution.9 Of some
180 single‑document national constitutions in the world, Japan’s is one of only about
twenty ratified before 1950 (roughly 130 current constitutions were ratified since 1970).”
In studying Japan’s vigorous constitutional debates since 1947, it has been important
to remember that any tampering with one of the three elements of the system—a pow‑
erless Emperor (or better, ”King”), pacifism, and human rights—has been commonly
seen as a possibly dangerous attempt to alter the other two components of the system.1
Thus, if the Emperor were to be ”restored” to his nominal suprahuman and manipu‑
lable status, it would bode ill for human rights and pacifism. If the military gained
significant political influence, diminution of rights and popular sovereignty might en‑
sue. State weakness in enforcing human rights might encourage right‑wing militarist
nationalism. For many, the three links have been inseparable. This imagery has been
crucial to Japan’s psychological pacifism.

Japan is a key model for practical pacifism, and Article 9 is key

Beer 98

236
 7 Con Evidence

Lawrence W. Beer (The Fred Morgan Kirby Professor of Civil Rights Emeritus, Lafayette
College, Easton, Pennsylvania). “Peace in Theory and Practice Under Article 9 of Japan’s
Constitution”, originally presented at the Fourth World Congress of the International
Association of Constitutional Law, Tokyo, 1995, 81 Marq. L. Rev. 815 (1998). JDN.
http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/mulr/vol81/iss3/5

Besides conscious choice, historical, geopolitical, economic and sociocultural factors

have made Japan’s distinctive quasi‑pacifism possible. What useful suggestions for the
international relations of other nations might Japan’s fifty‑year postwar experience con‑
tain? Japan has in practice and in policy brought to its own international relations and
to world politics a seriously proposed assumption that radical renunciation of war is
not only an acceptable and desirable option, but also an imperative and realistic option
for some countries, large and small. Second, in effect Japan calls into question the re‑
alism, in many countries and contexts, of assuming that unrestrained military develop‑
ment and an integrated government‑military‑industrial complex are necessary for the
national security of large powers. Japan’s experience suggests the uselessness of mili‑
tarism as a primary basis for international and national planning, and the importance
of economic, democratic, human rights, and environmental concerns in an adequately
comprehensive concept of national security. Third, Japan illustrates the possibility of
changing from domestic and international politics dominated by military leaders and
military considerations, to politics decisively subordinating the military to civilian lead‑
ers and military priorities to more productive socioeconomic and human rights needs.
Many nations now suffer from military indigestion, but none is more militarist, more
aggressive, or more extreme in its nationalism than Japan was until August, 1945. Major
peaceful change in a constitutional culture and system is possible. Fourth, the funda‑
mental change in Japan’s international outlook over the past fifty years illustrates the
educative power of schools, mass media, law and politics to support democracy and
exceptionally peaceable international behavior. Fifth, Japan’s example of peaceful suc‑
cess stands out in a century unsurpassed in deranged barbarism with modern weaponry.
Japan’s quiet exemplar style of leadership in recent decades in the movement to reduce
and eventually abolish nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons encourages other na‑
tions to limit their own military development. Like Japan, some can join in arms reduc‑
tion without fear of endangering their national security. Sixth, with Article 9 Japan’s
SDF is a much more modest military force and sociopolitical influence than it would be
without Article 9. Japan’s apparently utopian constitutional provisions against war and
militarism actually make an appreciable difference in legal, political, and diplomatic
practice. Many Japanese take pride in Japan being ”an international conscientious ob‑

237
 7 Con Evidence

jector nation” at a time when few feel intense patriotism. ”It is no exaggeration to say
that in contemporary Japan anyone who offered to sacrifice his or her life for the country
would be considered crazy.”” Although not easy, it may be easier to imagine Japanese
being willing to die for the international community under United Nations jurisdiction
than to envision citizens fighting for a Japanese interest, other than defense against an
invasion of Japan. Be that as it may, promotion of practical pacifism and human rights
can be a salutary counterforce to myopic nationalism (or ethnicism), militarism, and
predatory capitalism in the gradual formation of a more constitutionalist and civilized
world. Japan’s peaceful record, stable government, human resources, economic power,
contributions to the United Nations, and world‑leading provision of non‑military for‑
eign aid make it worthy of a permanent seat on the Security Council of the United Na‑
tions. Whether or not Japan has a permanent seat, as part of the small group of de facto
world leaders, Japan will ”have to take positions on how the [United Nations] should
deal with crises far from home on a daily basis.”45 It is not clear whether Japan will
be willing to deal in an aggressively peaceful manner with situations least amenable to
peaceful settlement; but Japan should remain a valuable exemplar of the nonmilitary
road to success.”

238
 7 Con Evidence

7.2.3 Pacifism

The reinterpretation Japan’s Article 9 has left it caught between its public and the
US.

Martin 19

Craig Martin is a lawyer and legal scholar, and is currently an Associate Profes‑
sor at Washburn University School of Law, teaching public international law, the
law of armed conflict, constitutional law, and professional responsibility, ”Japan’s
Dilemma in the Persian Gulf”, Australian Institute of International Affairs, 6/26/19,
https://www.internationalaffairs.org.au/australianoutlook/japans‑dilemma‑persian‑
gulf/?fbclid=IwAR0W‑eNhFE9hmMV7iS9sLwS‑Jzk7GmXAuzgoneQPQU7fnC5HCws3
gWKC5IE

From the Korean War through to the invasion of Iraq in 2003, Japan has successfully
resisted American pressure to assist in its wars on the grounds that the Japanese Con‑
stitution precluded any participation in armed conflict. But Abe’s explanation of the
“reinterpretation” has eliminated any constitutional basis for resisting US requests that
Japan assist in an American armed conflict with Iran. The conditions for triggering the
“reinterpreted” right of collective self‑defence may have already been satisfied. If asked
by the US to assist in a use of force against Iran, a reluctant Japanese government would
be left with either political excuses, or arguments that such a use of force would violate
international law. The latter would not only infuriate the US, but would highlight the
gap between the “reinterpretation” of the Constitution and international law. Yet one of
the major reasons for public opposition to the “reinterpretation” was a fear of involve‑
ment in “American wars.” Any move to now participate in an armed conflict for the
first time since World War II, with no obvious threat to Japanese security, and based on
the unpopular and controversial “reinterpretation,” would trigger a massive political
crisis at home. And given that important elections are looming, the timing could not be
worse. Seen in this light, it is not so surprising that the Japanese government is trying
so hard to mediate the tensions between the United States and Iran and is so uncharac‑
teristically rejecting US claims of Iranian responsibility for the attacks. No doubt there
are other factors at play, and this is surely not the whole story. But the situation has
exquisitely brought to a head problems the government created with its controversial
constitutional “reinterpretation.” It may have all seemed academic back then, but in the
context of possible war in the Gulf, it has now created the potential horns of a dilemma:
enrage the public by engaging in armed conflict, or defy Japan’s closest ally by refusing

239
 7 Con Evidence

to do so.

It would be better to amend Japan’s constitution to more accurately enshrine the

public’s pacifist sentiments.

Port 04

Kenneth L. Port ‑ Professor of Law and Director of Intellectual Property Law Studies,
William Mitchell College of Law; J.D. 1989 University of Wisconsin, ”Article 9 of the
Japanese Constitution and the Rule of Law.” Cardozo Journal of International and Com‑
parative Law, vol. 13, no. 1, Spring 2005, pp. 127‑160. HeinOnline.

Either by design or by accident, in the most critical part possible, the Japanese Consti‑
tution does not mean the same thing as the English ”translation” of the Japanese Con‑
stitution. The Japanese Constitution today reads significantly different than originally
intended, both by SCAP and by the original Japanese ”drafters.” The original intent (as
manifested in April‑May of 1946) of the Japanese Constitution is not consistent with ei‑
ther its current reading or its current reality. Japanese judges read the Japanese version,
and not the English version of the Constitution. Therefore, in critical part, the Japanese
read Article 9 as an aspirational notion that does not absolutely forbid the possession
or maintenance of arms, as the English version clearly contemplates. Given the fact that
the Japanese believe they live in a pacifist state and that Article 9 of the Constitution
supports this belief, any amendments to the Constitution currently being contemplated
ought to recognize this belief by the Japanese people. After all, a constitution is sup‑
posed to be a document that comes from the people of a given state. Considering that
the Japanese Constitution clearly vests the people of Japan with sovereignty, the people
of Japan, not a foreign power, ought to decide what the language of their Constitution
says. Given that the people of Japan believe their Constitution stands for pacifism 133
and the renunciation of war, the Constitution ought to be amended to bring the Consti‑
tution clearly in line with the public’s belief. If we were to follow the original drafter’s
intent, the SDF would go away. It should not, however, disappear completely. The SDF
can be transformed into a disaster relief agency and be given internal security obliga‑
tions that would serve the need of Japan to have internal security and disaster relief and
faithfully observe the pacifist objectives of the people. To be sure, to accomplish these
aims, Japan will not have to be the fourth largest military force by dollars spent in the
world. As Japan contemplates further expansion of their military and further engage‑
ment of the ”war on terror,” I call on Japan to reconsider this in light of the original

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intent of Article 9.

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 7 Con Evidence

7.2.4 Pacifism – Impact

Pacificism is preferable

Gustafsson et al 18

Karl Gustafsson (Associate Professor at Stockholm University), Linus Hagstrom

(Swedish Defence University) and Ulv Hanssen (Soka University) “Long live pacifism!
Narrative power and Japan’s pacifist model,” Cambridge Review of International Af‑
fairs, Vol. 0, No. 0, 1‑19, Taylor & Francis Online, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/
10.1080/09557571.2019.1623174

The anti‑pacifist narrative not only delegitimizes Japan’s pacifism, ensuring that it
is not seen as a model for other states to emulate, but also promotes its opposite—a
model of ‘normal state behaviour’ in the security policy realm. As with ‘pacifism’,
‘normality’ is regarded here as a narratively constructed identity. Its meaning is derived
not from an inherent property, but from the way in which it is differentiated from
abnormality (Hagström 2015Hagström, Linus (2015) ‘The ’abnormal’ state: Identity,
norm/exception and Japan’, European Journal of International Relations, 21:1, 122–
145[Crossref], [PubMed], [Web of Science ®], , [Google Scholar]). As they embrace and
reproduce narratives about the advantages of the normal state model—albeit without
ever labelling it as such—scholars and pundits find it completely unsurprising that
Japan is currently beefing up its security at the expense of relative pacifism. There is a
broad consensus that real threats, based primarily on material capabilities, have finally
begun to ‘limit the impact of other, more idealist, and value‑based role identities’ on
Japanese security policy (Catalinac 2007Catalinac, Amy L (2007) ‘Identity theory and
foreign policy: explaining Japan’s responses to the 1991 Gulf War and the 2003 US war
in Iraq’, Politics & Policy, 35:1, 58–100[Crossref], , [Google Scholar], 91). This return to
material factors is argued to be long overdue, as states are regarded as operating in an
anarchical system in which only self‑help can protect against threats. However, this
begs the following questions: If material factors show states how naive and dangerous
pacifism is, why did the Japanese people not realize this during the Korean War or
the Vietnam War? In addition, why did Japan not abandon pacifism in the face of a
materially superior and ideologically threatening Soviet Union?

Perhaps a pacifist model is unable to deal adequately with all the problems that the nor‑
mal state model produces. Here, Robert Cox’s distinction between problem‑solving and
critical theory is instructive. The former ‘takes the world as it finds it, with the prevail‑

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ing social and power relationships and the institutions into which they are organized, as
the given framework for action’. Its aim is ‘to make these relationships and institutions
work smoothly by dealing effectively with particular sources of trouble’ (Cox 1981Cox,
Robert W (1981) ‘Social forces, states and world orders: Beyond International Relations
theory’, Millennium: Journal of International Studies, 10:2, 126–155[Crossref], , [Google
Scholar], 128–129). The latter, by contrast, ‘does not take institutions and social and
power relations for granted but calls them into question by concerning itself with their
origins and how and whether they might be in the process of changing. It is directed
towards an appraisal of the very framework of action, or problematic, which problem‑
solving theory accepts as its parameters’ (Cox 1981Cox, Robert W (1981) ‘Social forces,
states and world orders: Beyond International Relations theory’, Millennium: Journal of
International Studies, 10:2, 126–155[Crossref], , [Google Scholar], 129). Clearly, the dom‑
inant normal state model takes a problem‑solving approach to the world. It advises that
conflicts can be prevented by designating threats and undertaking armed deterrence—
and if a war breaks out, it recommends that states should deal with it through military
means.

This article’s argument, by contrast, follows critical theory. It is conceivable that there
would not be such a high risk of conflict in the first place if the normal state model were
not so dominant. This acknowledges the contingency, rather than the naturalness or
necessity, of the dominant normal state model. It also recognizes the performativity of
the model: it seems more sensible and real the more states treat it as such. Tremendous
narrative power reproduces the normal state model. Consider again a few counterfac‑
tual questions. What if equal effort were to be invested in narratives advocating the
advantages of pacifism? What if pacifism could mobilize entrenched master‑narratives
as powerful as those that support the normal state model? What if peace education be‑
came the norm across the globe in lieu of patriotism? Moreover, what if states had to
pursue pacifism in order to acquire status and peer recognition as they currently pursue
armaments and wage wars to do so?

There is a predictable objection. What about rogue states that would refuse to adhere to
pacifism even if it became an internationally popular model? How would they be dealt
with? To put it starkly, Nazis might be ruling the world if the US had been pacifist
in 1941. From this perspective, hampering one’s own ability to wage war automati‑
cally puts potential aggressors in an advantageous position. This is why George Orwell
(1942Orwell, George (1942) ‘Pacifism and the war’, Partisan Review, August/September
[Google Scholar]) criticized pacifism as ‘pro‑Fascist’—or an ideology that is both more

243
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deceptive and potentially more dangerous than ideologies premised on war‑making,

such as Nazism and fascism. In his anti‑pacifist treatise, moreover, John Lewis wrote,
‘There is peaceableness which is mere acquiescence in evil and encourages it. There is
a refusal to fight which is the occasion of war’ (Lewis [1940] 1979Lewis, John ([1940]
1979) The case against pacifism (New York and London: Garland) [Google Scholar], 36).
While Lewis has a point, the normal state model arguably acquiesces in ‘evil’ more often
than pacifism; the willingness to fight is more often the reason for war than the refusal
to do so. First, while ‘normal states’ typically justify their power‑ and security‑seeking
behaviour with reference to the constant threat from aggressors and rogues, so do those
aggressors and rogues. For example, Japan and the US justify the deepening of their bi‑
lateral alliance by referring to North Korea’s acquisition of nuclear arms and missiles,
and North Korea justifies its defence posture by means of the existence of a US threat.
Second, no aggressor nation has ever followed a ‘pacifist’ doctrine or identity. Instead,
aggressors and rogues tend to be ‘normal states’ in the sense that they, based on the ‘nor‑
mal state model’, are preoccupied with power and security, defined in military terms.
Lewis wrote in 1940 that ‘Pacifism … is now upheld by a large and influential body of
public opinion’ (Lewis [1940] 1979Lewis, John ([1940] 1979) The case against pacifism
(New York and London: Garland) [Google Scholar], 13), and suggested that it had en‑
abled the appeasement of Germany. However, pacifist narratives were apparently not
sufficiently dominant, either in Germany or in the rest of Europe. Had they predomi‑
nated, it is highly doubtful that the Second World War would have broken out in the
first place.

Nonetheless, a narrative approach to pacifism faces a problem that is quite typical of

pacifism: it guarantees pacific outcomes only in the hypothetical scenario that most
states acquire pacifist identities (Lewis [1940] 1979Lewis, John ([1940] 1979) The case
against pacifism (New York and London: Garland) [Google Scholar], 20–21, 42–47).
Here, Lewis, who argues that the most certain way ‘to get nowhere’ is to demand ‘noth‑
ing less than perfection’ (Lewis [1940] 1979Lewis, John ([1940] 1979) The case against
pacifism (New York and London: Garland) [Google Scholar], 48) is instructive. This
article acknowledges that pacifism can be dangerous, but contends that it is not quite
as dangerous as the normal state model. The challenge is that while promoting pacifist
narratives a less than perfect situation must be navigated in which such narratives may
never become entirely dominant. The aim is thus not to find a perfectly safe strategy
for survival in international politics. Rather, it is to argue that if an equal narrative ef‑
fort were invested in the pacifist model as in the normal state model, and if entrenched
master‑narratives were mobilized in support of it, the world would be less violent, albeit

244
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not necessarily free of violence. Japan’s relative pacifism is instructive in this context.
While spreading pacifist narratives in the post‑war period, consecutive Japanese gov‑
ernments maintained a ‘necessary minimum’ defence capacity.

The promotion of pacifist narratives constitutes a step towards normalizing pacifism

as a model in world politics. However, such narratives should avoid differentiating
the Self’s pacifism from the aggressiveness of the Other (Jackson 2019Jackson, Richard
(2019) ‘Pacifism and the ethical imagination in IR’, International Politics, 56:2, 212–227
[Google Scholar], 11). Otherwise ‘pacifism’ risks being reduced to an identity that
simply perpetuates the normal state model by justifying war preparations to protect
our pacifism from their aggressiveness—not unlike Prime Minister Abe’s ‘proactive
pacifism’. Again, the Japanese case may be informative. Japan’s pacifist identity in
most of the post‑war period was mainly constructed in relation not to other unpeaceful
states, but to Japan’s own unpeaceful past (Hagström and Hanssen 2016Hagström,
Linus and Ulv Hanssen(2016) ‘War is peace: the rearticulation of “peace” in Japan’s
China discourse’, Review of International Studies, 42:2, 266–286[Crossref], [Web of
Science ®], , [Google Scholar]; Gustafsson 2019Gustafsson, Karl (2019) ‘Temporal
othering, de‑securitisation and apologies: Understanding Japanese security policy
change’, Journal of International Relations and Development, DOI:10.1057/s41268‑018‑
00168‑y[Crossref], , [Google Scholar]).

Does this mean that a pacifist model can only become successful once every country
has begun to define itself in relation to its unpeaceful past? This article asserts that
the pacifist identity should be transnational and inclusive. From such a perspective,
the entire non‑pacifist history of the world, with all its torture, violence and war, can be
relegated to a collective shameful past from which the world can differentiate its present
Self (Wendt 2003Wendt, Alexander (2003) ‘Why a world state is inevitable’, European
Journal of International Relations, 9:4, 491–542[Crossref], [Web of Science ®], , [Google
Scholar], 527–528).

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 7 Con Evidence

7.3 Proliferation

7.3.1 Prolif Impact – General

Japan prolif goes global and nuclear.

Cimbala 14
Stephen J. Cimbala, professor of political science at Pennsylvania State University, “Nu‑
clear Weapons in Asia: Perils and Prospects”, Military and Strategic Affairs, Volume 6,
No. 1, March 2014
Failure to contain proliferation in Pyongyang could spread nuclear fever throughout
Asia. Japan and South Korea might seek nuclear weapons and missile defenses. A
pentagonal configuration of nuclear powers in the Pacific basin (Russia, China, Japan,
South Korea, and North Korea – not including the United States, with its own Pacific
interests) could put deterrence at risk and create enormous temptation toward nuclear
preemption. Apart from actual use or threat of use, North Korea could exploit the mere
existence of an assumed nuclear capability in order to support its coercive diplomacy.19
In Paul Bracken’s terms, North Korea can use its nuclear weapons to support either a
“strategy of extreme provocation” or one intended to “keep the nuclear pot boiling”
without having crossed the threshold of nuclear first use.20 In October 2013 there were
reports of the DPRK renewing nuclear activities, and perhaps preparing for new nuclear
tests. A five‑sided nuclear competition in the Pacific would be linked, in geopolitical de‑
terrence and proliferation space, to the existing nuclear deterrents of India and Pakistan,
and to the emerging nuclear weapons status of Iran. An arc of nuclear instability from
Tehran to Tokyo could place US proliferation strategies into the ash heap of history
and call for more drastic military options, not excluding preemptive war, defenses, and
counter‑deterrent special operations. In addition, an unrestricted nuclear arms race in
Asia would most likely increase the chance of accidental or inadvertent nuclear war. It
would do so because: (a) some states in the region already have histories of protracted
conflict; (b) states may have politically unreliable or immature command and control
systems, especially during a crisis involving a decision for nuclear first strike or retalia‑
tion; (c) unreliable or immature systems might permit a technical malfunction resulting
in an unintended launch, or a deliberate but unauthorized launch, by rogue comman‑
ders; (d) faulty intelligence and warning systems might cause one side to misinterpret
the other’s defensive moves to forestall attack as offensive preparations for attack, thus
triggering a mistaken preemption.

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 7 Con Evidence

7.3.2 Prolif Impact – China

Even if Article 9 revision makes China nervous, only nuclearization causes Chinese
preemptive strikes‑ escalates to nuclear use.

Fink 10

Kelly Fink, BS at Senton Hal University, “Japan’s Evolving Military: East Asia the
United States and the International System” May 7, 2008, http://domapp01.shu.edu/depts/
uc/apps/libraryrepository.nsf/resourceid/AD96FEF19144767185257737004E0F9C/$File/Fink‑
Kelly‑T_Masters.PDF?Open, accessed July 16, 2010

As is evident, the ”remilitarization” of Japan has many possible facets. Some are in‑
herently connected, while others are not. Thus, analyzing possible reactions of the key
parties provoking the Japanese to move towards making any of these key decisions is
also more complicated. The Chinese interest in Japan’s decision to revise article 9 is a
consequence of the two countries’ volatile histories. In his article about Chinese ”re‑
alpolitik”, Tomas Christensen argues that the Chinese are very much concerned about
Japanese militarization. However, instead of recognizing their own role in the matter,
they closely tie Japanese militarization to the status of Japan’s relationship with the
United States; either the withdrawal of the United States from the region at any level,
or further encouragement of Japan’s military excess by the US and Japan’s ultranation‑
alists will be the leading causes of official militarization. Chinese officials identify the
potential for Japan’s rearmament as high, and claim it has been Japan’s intention since
the end of World War I1 to regain power and hegemony.169 According to Christiansen,
while Chinese foreign policy analysts recognize that post‑World War I1 cultural paci‑
fism, domestic politics, and economic issues in Japan will stand in the way of militariza‑
tion, they do not think such roadblocks will remain indefinitely. They ”anticipate and
fear Japan’s renaissance as a world‑class military power in the early 21” century.”170
is a Senior Associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace China’s fear
has been reflected in the many symbolic battles that the two countries have fought over
the years. Former Prime Minister Koizurni’s and others’ visits to the Yasukuni Shrine,
where the souls of war criminals, as well as of millions of ordinary soldiers are said to
rest, is a source of resentment and the cause of protests by the Chinese. They further
object to the toning down in textbooks of some of the Japanese atrocities committed
during World War 11, and Japan’s bid to become a member of the UN Security Council.
Also, the growth of the Japanese ”defense” forces has not been lost on the Chinese gov‑
ernment. It is difficult to gauge exactly how the Chinese government would respond if

247
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Japan were to remilitarize, however, there are likely to be two possible scenarios, and
China’s final reaction is certainly contingent on how far Japan decides to go with its
remilitarization efforts: just amending Article 9, or acquiring nuclear weapons. If the
former is true, Chinese authorities will probably continue to protest, and use the event
as another way to bolster unity within their own country without actually acting in
such a way to damage economic ties between the two powers. is a Senior Associate at
the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace However, if Japan were to go nuclear,
there is the potential that China would feel a real threat and thus act more dynami‑
cally. The first possibility is based on theories about Chinese nationalism discussed in
Caroline Rose’s article, ’Patriotism is not taboo’: Nationalism in China and Japan and
Implications for Sino‑Japanese Relations. Rose essentially describes the Chinese gov‑
ernment as using specific events to direct Chinese feelings toward a common enemy,
thus boosting national unity. In her article, Rose states that, ”patriotic rhetoric is not
necessarily translated into an aggressive foreign policy. In China’s case it is more often
aimed at creating the illusion of internal unity in the face of a perceived foreign or do‑
mestic threat.”17’ The majority of problems between the two countries since World War
I1 have been purely symbolic issues. Accordingly, the response has been essentially all
bark and no bite, and overall, most incidents tend to end in cooperation. Rose also cites
Downs and Saunders’ economic theories for why the two countries will, for the most
part, continue to act passively. Downs and Saunders have suggested that, because the
two economies are so intertwined, both governments have been acting in such a way
as to maintain bilateral relations. While Japan and China have had the opportunity
to act more aggressively, during specific conflicts the Chinese government has taken
a moderate stance.173 Along the same lines, according to Yang Beijing, China’s next
strategic diplomatic task will be to improve its soft power and moral image within the
international community [in light of its recent economic growth] to avoid unnecessary
obstacles to its continued development. Japan may be helpful to China in this regard
because neighboring countries will use China’s relationship with Japan as an impor‑
tant index by which to gauge how China will treat its neighbors during its rise.”174 If
this is the case, then acting too strongly in response to Japan’s remilitarization would
make the PRC look foolish to the rest of the international community, and provide Japan
with additional justification for its belief that it need to compete with China militarily.
While there is always the possibility is that China will take action against Japan by cut‑
ting diplomatic ties, or putting into place trade barriers, this would be a clear violation
of its own policy against mixing business with politics. In 1995, when Japan tried to
contain China’s military activity by sanctioning aid, the Chinese responded with the

248
 7 Con Evidence

public statement that, ”China opposes Japan’s attempt to attach political conditions to
the economic cooperation between the two countries because this attempt will harm
the healthier development of bilateral re~ations.”’~~ On the other hand, it is necessary
to also consider the possible reactions of China to nuclear expansion in Japan. It is in
this case that Japan has reason to worry. According to an annual report to Congress
about the military power of the People’s Republic of China issued in 2007, texts from
the People’s Liberation Army support the idea of preemptive strikes: PLA authors de‑
scribe preemption as necessary and logical when confronting a more powerful enemy.
Chinese doctrinal materials stress that static defenses are insufficient to defend territory
based on the speed and destructive power of modem forces. As a result, PLA opera‑
tional concepts seek to prevent enemy forces from massing and to keep the enemy off
balance by seizing the initiative with offensive strikes. According to PLA theorists, an
effective defense includes destroying enemy capabilities on enemy territory before they
can be employed.’76 The Chinese have proven in the past that they are willing to use
this excuse, and one can see now through smaller acts of intimidation against Japan,
Taiwan, and other countries in the region that they are not past utilizing military means.
The most worrisome issue is China’s own possession of nuclear weapons, and the con‑
cern that should they feel so threatened, they might use them. However, as long as the
United States promises to provide its nuclear umbrella, China might be hesitant to use
them.

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 7 Con Evidence

7.3.3 Prolif Impact – Alliance

It actually undermines the alliance.

Prasad 16

Nidhi Prasad, recently completed a Masters of Philosophy in Japanese Studies at the

Centre for East Asian Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi. ”Yes, Japan
Could Build Nuclear Weapons (But at What Cost?)”, 10‑12‑2016, National Interest,
https://nationalinterest.org/blog/the‑buzz/yes‑japan‑could‑build‑nuclear‑weapons‑
what‑cost‑18019, accessed 7‑23‑2019

Third, Japan’s development of nuclear potential would significantly impact its security
alliance with the United States. In 1968 Eisaku Sato defined Japanese nuclear policy
based on four pillars, which included a reliance on US extended deterrence. Japan break‑
ing out would mean undermining the foundations of the alliance which have become
hardwired into the strategic landscape of the region. Japan’s own security policy would
also have to be seriously modified.

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 7 Con Evidence

7.3.4 AT: Stability

Proliferation causes instability, not stability

Thakur 18

Ramesh Thakur, a former United Nations assistant secretary‑general, is an emeritus pro‑

fessor in the Crawford School of Public Policy, Australian National University. ”Japan’s
nuclear options”, 8‑5‑2018, Japan Times, https://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2018/08/
05/commentary/japan‑commentary/japans‑nuclear‑options/#.XTcUCugzaHs, accessed
7‑23‑2019

Unfortunately, the case for nuclear weapons rests on a superstitious belief in the utility
of the bomb and the theory of deterrence. The extreme destructiveness makes them
qualitatively different in political and moral terms from other weapons, to the point of
rendering them unusable.

They were not the decisive factor in Japan’s surrender in 1945, nor in the territorial ex‑
pansion of the former Soviet Union across central and eastern Europe during the 1945‑
1949 years when the U.S. held a monopoly on the bomb. They did not stop Argentina
from invading the Falkland Islands in the 1980s nor the Vietnamese and Afghans from
fighting and defeating the U.S. and the Soviet Union respectively. We know of no suc‑
cessful case of nuclear blackmail.

Conversely, each new entrant into the nuclear club will generate fresh pressures to fur‑
ther proliferation and the cascading numbers of nuclear‑armed states would multiply
nuclear risks and threats exponentially. Moreover, Japan’s quest for an independent
bomb would violate its legally binding NPT obligations, its own nuclear policy and
laws, and also send tremors through the Asia‑Pacific region based on historical memo‑
ries of Japanese aggression.

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