Unit ID 1 Learning Outcome - 5

Unit ID1
Know – workplace health
and safety principles
(International)
Learning outcome 5

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Contents
Learning outcome 5..................................................................................................................... 3
5.1 Explain different types of loss causation theories/models, tools and techniques and
how data can be used to calculate loss rates - Loss causation, Quantitative analysis of
data ................................................................................................................................................ 4
5.1.1 Theories/models and use of loss causation techniques ............................................. 4
5.1.2 The quantitative analysis of accident and ill-health data....................................... 34
5.2 Outline the purpose of health and safety performance measurement, monitoring
and review - Measuring and monitoring................................................................................. 43
5.2.1 The purpose and use of health and safety performance measurement ............. 43
5.2.2 Health and safety monitoring ...................................................................................... 53
5.2.3 Health and safety monitoring and measurement techniques ............................... 60
5.2.4 Reviewing health and safety performance............................................................... 79

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Learning outcome 5
You will be able to develop and implement proactive and reactive health and
safety monitoring systems and carry out reviews and auditing of such systems.

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5.1 Explain different types of loss causation theories/models, tools

and techniques and how data can be used to calculate loss rates -
Loss causation, Quantitative analysis of data

5.1.1 Theories/models and use of loss causation techniques

Understand some of the underlying principles

connecting causes and outcomes

Losses occur because of a result of a lack of control. The consequences of an

event are often dictated by luck. The following example demonstrates this when
a sling fails and falls from height:

Because of an unsafe condition (poorly secured sling) and unsafe act (walking
under a live load) the following consequences could arise:

 The load does not fall: undesired circumstance.

 The load falls onto soft ground, narrowly missing people underneath: near
miss.
 The load falls onto solid ground and is badly damaged: equipment
damage.

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 The load strikes the people causing injury: accident.

The variation in different consequences is often random and down to luck. In this
case, the load could have been affected by the wind, or the individuals
stopped to tie their shoelaces just at the wrong moment. It is just as important to
investigate near miss and damage events because it gives us an opportunity to
correct the problem before an injury occurs in the future.

Unfortunately, many organisations only investigate accidents where someone

has been injured, and they fail to investigate properly all of the near misses
which could have had a much more serious outcome if things had happened a
little differently.

Incidents with the same cause(s) usually have a range of

possible outcomes

There is an underlying randomness to outcomes in incident loss causation

techniques:

 often difficult to predict exactly when or where incidents will happen or

their severity
 whether severity is minor or major can just be a matter of chance
 more severe incidents will happen sooner or later if you just leave it to
chance

In probability and statistics, a 'random variable' is a quantity whose value

depends on a set of possible random events. For example, the failure of a sensor
could be a random variable.

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The ‗outcome‘ is the result of an experiment, so for example if a coin was tossed
and landed on its tail side, the outcome of the experiment (the toss) would be
heads.

A particular 'outcome' is also an 'observation'. 'Data' are a collection of

'observations'.

The collection of all possible outcomes is called the 'population'.

In most instances, it is not possible to be able to survey/observe an entire

population, therefore a sample is used. For the simple to be unbiased it must be
random, where everyone is equally likely to be selected for inclusion. For
example, if we are interested in conducting a survey of the amount of physical
exercise undertaken by the general public, surveying people entering and
leaving a gym would provide a biased sample of the population, because
many people in the general population do not exercise in gyms.

Variables fall into one of two categories – qualitative or quantitative.

Qualitative variables do not have numeric outcomes and can include gender,
type of house, etc. Quantitative variables have outcomes which are numeric
such as race times, age, height, etc.

In 1969 Frank E. Bird created the most well-known of the accident/incident ratio
studies, building upon that produced by H.W Heinrich. Birds extensive study
identified that there are far more non-injury related incidents than there are
accidents resulting in injury. This means that there are many potential indicators
of failures (near misses) in the systems which companies can learn from and
improve before an injury actually occurs.

The study indicated that it is foolish to direct all our efforts to the relatively
uncommon injury events when there is a much larger opportunity (damage only

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and near miss events) for identifying and correcting safety management
failures. These minor incidents are often overlooked because of their lack of
serious consequences. Investigation resources should be allocated based on
the potential severity instead of the actual severity. Furthermore, numerous near-
misses can share the same root causes and can reveal serious management
failures before a serious injury occurs.

In each incident investigation process consideration should be given to:

 potential outcomes as well as actual outcomes

 tackling root causes to avert far more serious outcomes

Organisational requirements for internally reporting and recording of potential

and actual loss causing events will usually be wider than the legal minimum.
Legislation will tend to focus on the most serious incidents, whereas organisations
will recognise the financial benefits of reporting, investigating, and preventing all
incidents. Whilst less serious incidents may only have a minor potential for
consequences, they still represent a loss to the organisation. If they occur
frequently, they will warrant corrective and preventive action to avoid
recurrence.

The organisation should have a system to record and report these events, as
well as the more serious ones, because they provide an opportunity to identify
immediate and root causes that may lead to more serious incidents.
Organisations may have separate recording and reporting forms for near-misses
to ensure they are focused on. Or they may have a single form on which the
type of incident is identified.

The worst-case scenario must be considered when determining the level of the
investigation rather than the actual outcome which occurred. For example, a
roof worker tripped on the roof close to the edge but did not suffer any injuries,

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however the potential was for a fatal injury; so, the level of investigation should
represent this.

A supervisor will review the event circumstances for minimal level incident
investigations, to prevent re-occurrence.

For low level incident investigations, the supervisor or line manager will conduct
a short investigation to look at the circumstances which occurred and the
immediate and root causes. The aim is to learn general lessons to try and
prevent reoccurrence.

A more detailed investigation by the supervisor/line manager/safety

advisor/employer representatives is required for medium level incident
investigations. Here the immediate, underlying and root causes will be identified.

Cautionary use of incident ratio data studies

Whilst the actual numbers vary between the various studies undertaken, it
should be noted that for every serious or fatal injury, there are many more minor

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injuries and near-misses (and, in the case of the Bird triangle, damage only
events.). Accident triangles can be used to help convince workers of the benefit
of reporting all events, even minor events, so these can also be investigated. It is
also true that any event is a result of a failure of control measures. All events
however minor can, therefore, provide learning. There are many examples of
this in health and safety magazines. For example: the report into the 1999 UK
Ladbroke Grove train crash said the crash might have been avoided and 31
lives saved "if management had applied the lessons of past incidents of 'signals
passed at danger' (SPAD), and if signallers had been adequately instructed and
trained in how to react to a SPAD."

Still useful in communicating the importance of safety

Accident triangles can be useful to help convince people of the value of

reporting a wide range of events and show that there are usually more near-
misses than injury events.

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Accident triangles — often called Bird‘s (or Heinrich‘s) Triangle — are based on
a theory of industrial accident prevention, and particularly a human factors
approach to safety.

The above is a typical pyramid or triangular representation of the theory.

Essentially, it shows a statistical relationship between the number of major, minor
and near misses, with the implication that if the number of minor accidents is
reduced then the number of serious accidents will correspondingly reduce. In
this iteration, for every six hundred accidents with no injury or damage there is
likely to be one involving serious or disabling injury.

A significant advantage to Bird's Triangle is that it provides a strong visual

representation of the relationship between near misses, minor accidents and the
potential for more serious incidents (bearing in mind that incident is a term that is
more likely to be used today).

It can be used for any level of staff and as a training aid, clearly communicates
that even relatively minor actions can have serious consequences.

Accident triangles can influence staff and wider organisational thinking on risk
exposure, particularly where there might be an unspoken toleration of unsafe

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acts in some work environments. It provides a talking point for further risk
assessment and understanding the complex factors that leads to safety
incidents arising. Most importantly, Bird's Triangle shows a link between a certain
volume of relatively trivial incidents and a more serious one. In other words,
accident triangles can lead to positive change. They can also, extrapolating
statistics from serious incidents, indicate that near miss reporting needs to be
improved.

Limitations of Ratio Studies

Accuracy in statistics

The statistics on which Heinrich based his theory are hard to verify now. Bird's
statistics are based on insurance statistics available to his employer in the 1960s.
That means this ratio of near misses to serious accidents is, today, indicative at
best.

Even if the statistics were valid, the triangle assumes that an individual
organisation's datasets are complete, which is only true in some cases. In other
words, serious incidents will almost certainly be known, but perhaps not all minor
injuries will be recorded and certainly complete transparency of all near misses
cannot be assumed. Might two serious injury accidents over a defined period of
measurement with only a 100 or so near misses reported indicate an under-
reporting of near misses?

Datasets can also be skewed by the fact that not all near misses or unsafe acts
are of the same gravity. So, in an individual case, if an accident had occurred
— rather than the reported near miss — would the outcome have been a minor
accident, a RIDDOR-reportable incident or perhaps even a fatality? It assumes
we lump all near misses together, regardless of possible outcome.

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Of course, sometimes, it is difficult to tell how serious a near miss could have
been, especially if the near miss triggered a chain of events that did lead to a
serious incident. This domino effect of failures is the so-called ―Swiss cheese‖
event which, again, Bird's Triangle doesn't overtly take into account.

Figure - Different accident type triangles, showing how the ratio can vary
between accident types.

Near-misses may also be under-reported compared to other organisations, and

this will distort the triangle. A near-miss may mean different things to different
people. For example, an office employee who enters a production area will
have a higher perception of danger than a worker who has been at work there
for several years. The office employee may perceive normal work activities as
very hazardous where they are under control.

Consider numbers as guide rather than an absolute

The incident ratio data has limitations, particularly in terms of how accurate — in
real terms — the statistical correction between near misses and serious injury
accidents is. It is a guide rather than an absolute.

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Bird's Triangle is about actual event outcomes. It doesn't particularly consider risk
potential, ie that the possibility of certain serious incidents occurring may not
necessarily be indicated by a higher volume of near misses. Equally, reducing
the number of minor incidents doesn't necessarily, in practice, reduce fatalities.

Does not consider failure of management systems

The incident ratio data does not consider failure of management systems as
part of its data, ie all accidents are the cause of operator non-conformance
(be this lack of training or adherence to procedures).

Bird's Triangle assumes human factors in safety are the predominate,

probabilistic indicators of accidents and also assumes this is chiefly based on the
behaviours of workers. However, this does not take into account factors such as
management systems and management decision making. For example, a
serious incident might arise due to, say, a design flaw in a machine or a failure of
management to have a maintenance contract for the machine — neither of
which are related to operator non-compliance at all. This is a significant
limitation, although some modern iterations of the triangle attempt to include
management activity. So, when looking at a Triangle for the first time, check
whether all staff activity is included within it.

Usually look at incidents as a single sequence of events influenced by an

intervention

Bird's Triangle assumes accidents arise in a sequence of events that can be

influenced by an intervention — the single cause domino theory of accidents.
They have little, if any, direct impact on multi-casual theories of incidents, ie
where an unrelated event occurs at the same time which turns a minor incident
into a major one.

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Understand the following theories/models, tools

and techniques

Multi-causality theory

Usually, simple accidents have a single cause, but the consequences tend to be
minor. A major accident has catastrophic consequences, but the causes tend
to be much more complex, with many chains of events and causes leading to
the catastrophe. This is normally referred to as Multi Causality Theory.

Behind every accident, there are many contributing factors, causes and sub-
causes.

The Multi-causality theory is based around the fact that these contributing
factors all combine randomly to cause an accident. Therefore, during accident
investigations, it is vital to identify as many of these causes rather than one
cause as per the domino theory model.

The accident model is a mixture of both the domino and multi-causality theories,
such as shown below:

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The purpose of an incident investigation is to determine as many causes as

possible, and to correct them. When investigating the more serious incidents it is
necessary to go beyond identifying Immediate causes. The Immediate cause is
the most obvious reason why an adverse event happens. For example: putting a
hand on a sharp guillotine blade. In such cases, it is vital to identify the
Underlying and Root causes, the less obvious ‗system‘ or ‘organisational' or
'management' reasons for an adverse event happening. For example: no
system in place for maintenance or inspection of machine guards.

The accident model is in reality an amalgam of both the domino and multi-
causality theories, such as that shown below.

ROOT CAUSE BASIC CAUSE IMMEDIATE INCIDENT

CAUSE
(Lack of Control) LOSS
 cause a   cause d   cause f 
 cause b  cause e
  

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 cause c

Immediate Causes

Immediate causes are often broken down into 'unsafe acts' or 'unsafe
conditions'.

An unsafe act may be defined as "the performance of a task in such a

manner as to threaten the health and safety of workers". It is often contrary
to a safety procedure. Examples include:

 Unauthorised use or operation of equipment.

 Removing or making safety devices inoperative.
 Using defective tools or equipment.
 Working at height without fall protection.
 Using tools or equipment in an unsafe manner.
 Riding on hazardous moving equipment.
 Engaging in horseplay, which is distracting and sometimes dangerous.
 Failure to wear personal protective equipment.

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Root Causes

Root causes are much deeper and rooted in problems within management,
planning, and organisational culture. These root causes lead to the situations,
events and behaviours that lead to the incident occurring. The definition of a
root cause is: "The most basic cause (or causes) that can reasonably be
identified that management has control to fix and, when fixed, will prevent
(or significantly reduce the likelihood of) the problem‘s recurrence."

Examples of root causes include:

 Production pressures leading to workers and managers taking shortcuts

in safety procedures.
 No consideration given to health and safety in scheduling production
or deliveries.
 Lack of resources or commitment to safety by management.
 Lack of supervision, or a culture of tolerating unacceptable safety
behaviours.
 Lack of safe working practices tolerated and condoned by all.
 Failure to risk assess new or changed activities or equipment, or failure
to act on the findings of risk assessments.
 Mixed messages (actions and behaviour contradict verbal
commitment to safety).
 Lack of procedures, or procedures not implemented, maintained or
followed.
 Equipment not maintained adequately due to lack of time, resources
or management oversight.
 Previous near-misses not reported as not seen as important.

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 Blame culture leading to investigations focusing on the fault of people

instead of root causes, or individuals attempting to avoid blame by
hiding mistakes.

Underlying causes

Underlying causes are the systems or organisational reasons why an incident

occurred are known.

Conclusion

All accidents, whether major or minor are caused. There is no such thing as an
accidental accident. Very few accidents, particularly in large organisations and
complex technologies are associated with a single cause. The causes of
accidents are usually complex and interactive.

Latent and active failures: Reason’s model of

accident causation (Swiss Cheese Model)

No matter how robust your safety procedures are, accidents inevitably happen.
But why do accidents occur? Where do they originate? And what can we do to
stop them from happening? These are the types of questions the swiss cheese
accident causation model attempts to answer.

What is the Swiss Cheese Accident Causation Model?

The swiss cheese accident causation model is a theoretical model used in risk
analysis, risk management, and risk prevention.

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―any components of an organization is considered a slice [of cheese] in this

model. Management is a slice. Allocation of resources is a slice. An effective
safety program is a slice. Operational support is a slice.‖

But if there are any deficiencies or flaws in any of these ―slices‖ of your
organization or agency, then you will have a hole in that slice. Hence, swiss
cheese.

If holes within each slice of your organization line up, meaning one weakness
carries over into another weakness and so on, it creates a single hole throughout
your organization – causing an accident.

What are the Key Concepts of the Swiss Cheese Model?

Reason was able to construct his integrated theory of accident causation

through in-depth research into the nature of accidents, leading him to the
following insights:

 Accidents are often caused by the confluence of multiple factors.

 Factors can range from unsafe individual acts to organizational errors.
 Many contributing factors to an accident are latent errors – they‘re lying
dormant waiting to be triggered by any number of active errors.
 Humans are prone to operational errors which require properly designed
systems to mitigate the errors humans inevitably commit.

What are Active and Latent Errors in the Swiss Cheese

Model?

The term ‗human error‘ can include a great variety of human behaviour.
Therefore, in attempting to define human error, different classification systems

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have been developed. Identifying why these errors occur will ultimately assist in
reducing the likelihood of them occurring.

The distinction between the hands on ‗operator‘ errors and those made by
other elements of the organisation has been described by Reason as ‗active‘
and ‗latent‘ failures.

Active Failures

Active Failures have an immediate consequence and are usually made by

front-line people such as drivers, control room and machine operators. These
immediately proceed, and are the direct cause, of the accident.

Latent failures

Latent Failures are those aspects of the organisation which can immediately
predispose active failures. Common examples of latent failures include:

 poor design of plant and equipment;

 ineffective training;

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 inadequate supervision;
 ineffective communications; and
 uncertainties in roles and responsibilities.

Latent failures are crucially important to accident prevention for two reasons:

1. If they are not resolved, the probability of repeat (or similar) accidents remains
high regardless of what other action is taken;

2. As one latent failure often influences several potential errors, removing latent
failures can be a very cost-effective route to accident prevention.

The principles and application of root cause

analysis tools

5-Whys

Using the ‗Five whys‘ approach can help to identify the root causes of good or
bad health and safety practice, and therefore help bring about behavioural
change.

By asking ‗Why?‘ up to five times, you can:

 investigate the causes of an accident or incident;

 identify solutions to prevent an incident happening again;
 make links between the root causes of good or bad practice; and
 learn good practice lessons to improve health and safety in your business.

How to conduct a ‘Five whys’ analysis

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For any incident of good or bad practice you want to know more about, ask the
individual or team to describe this and write what they say down. This not only
helps better understand the issue but also helps in terms of teamwork.

 Then ask why this situation happened and write that answer down too.
o Discuss with them whether this answer describes the root cause of
the problem.
o If it doesn‘t, then ask ‗Why?‘ again.
 Keep asking why, whether up to five times or more.

When using the ‗Five whys‘ analysis, try to:

 Ask proper questions that delve deeper into the issue. Simply repeating
the word ‗Why?‘ is not likely to help.
 Avoid being or appearing confrontational.
 Avoid making questions personal or accusatory (eg say ‗Why do you think
the ladder slipped?‘ not ‗Why did you make the ladder slip?‘

An example of the 5 whys system can be observed in this image:

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Fishbone Diagram or Ishikawa Diagram

Derived from the quality management process. A fishbone diagram, also called
a cause and effect diagram or Ishikawa diagram, is a visualization tool for
categorizing the potential causes of a problem in order to identify its root
causes. The design of the diagram looks much like the skeleton of a fish, hence
the designation ―fishbone‖ diagram.

When does it work best?

The tool quickly helps you to fully understand an issue and to identify all the
possible causes – not just the obvious. If you know the cause of the delay, you
are then better placed to implement the solution.

What does it do?

 Enables a team to focus on the content of the problem rather than its
history or the differing interests of team members
 Creates a snapshot of the collective knowledge and consensus of a team
around a problem
 Focuses the team on the root cause of the problem – not its symptoms

How to use it

Firstly, identify the problem. Write it in a box and draw an arrow pointing towards
it. Think about the exact problem in detail. Where appropriate, identify who is
involved, what the problem is, and when and where it occurs.

Identify the major factors and draw four or more branches off the large arrow to
represent main categories of potential causes. Categories could include:
equipment, environment, procedures, and people. Make sure that the
categories you use are relevant to your particular problem / delay. An

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alternative way of creating the branches of a cause and effect diagram is to

carry out the Affinity Diagram technique and use the group headings produced
there.

For Example:

Take each of the main categories and brainstorm possible causes of the
problem. Then, explore each one to identify more specific ‘causes of causes‘.
Continue branching off until every possible cause has been identified. Where a
cause is complex, you might break it down into sub-causes. Show these as lines
coming off each cause line.

Analyse your diagram. By this stage you should have a diagram showing all the
possible causes of your delay / problem. Depending on the complexity and
importance of the problem, you can now investigate the most likely causes
further. This may involve setting up interviews (see getting patient perspectives),
carrying out process mapping or surveys which you can use to decide whether
the causes identified are correct.

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Fault tree

The concept of fault tree analysis (FTA) has been around since at least 1961. It is
a deductive methodology, that is it involves reasoning from the general to the
specific, working backwards through time to examine preceding events leading
to failure. FTA is used for determining the potential causes of incidents, or for
system failures more generally. The safety engineering discipline uses this
method to determine failure probabilities in quantitative risk assessments.

A fault tree is a graphic model that displays the various logical combinations of
failures that can result in an incident, as shown in the figure below. These
combinations may include equipment failures, human errors and management
system failures. The tree starts with a ‗top event‘ which is a specific undesired
event (accident) or system condition. This top event is then broken down into a
series of contributory events that are structured according to certain rules, and
logic. This process of breaking down the events to identify contributory causes
and their interaction continues until the root causes are identified.

Once the fault tree is completed it can be analysed to determine what

combinations of failures or other faults may cause the ‗top event‘.

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The aim of the fault tree is to find the minimal cut set (MCS). This is a group of
basic events whose occurrence will cause the top event to occur. A first order
cut set consists of one base event that will cause the top event to occur on its
own. A second order cut set consists of two events which, in combination, will
lead to the top event; a third order cut set consists of three base events and so
on. Clearly, a first order cut set identifies the most serious failures that could
affect the system, a second order cut set identifies the next most serious
combination of failures, etc. By examining the cut sets the analyst can prioritise
actions to prevent the top event from occurring.

Figure: Structure of a Simple FTA

Conducting an Analysis

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The first step in conducting a FTA is to define the ‗top event‘, or undesired failure.
This is one of the most important steps in the process if the analysis is going to be
meaningful. The definition must not be vague or ambiguous.

The top event is broken down by the analyst who identifies the failures and
events that contributed to the top event. In addition, the logic behind the
combination of the contributory failures must be developed and incorporated
into the fault tree diagram. Clearly, the analyst needs to have a thorough
knowledge of the system under review, in order to ensure that the fault tree is
constructed correctly.

Figure: Very Basic Fault Tree Symbols

The process of breaking down the events in the tree and evaluating the logic
continues until the base events are reached. Typically, where fault trees are
used in quantitative analysis, the base event will be defined by the available
reliability data. If data is available the analysis will stop, if not the analysis will
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continue. In the context of root causes analysis, the definition provided by

Paradies and Busch (1988) could be used to define the base events, i.e. events
that management have the control to fix.

The analyst should check the output to make sure that the cut sets make sense,
by working through the logic and verifying that the base events will in fact lead
to the top event.

Example:

Event tree analysis

Event trees are graphical representations of binary logic models which identify
and can quantify possible consequences resulting from an initiating event (e.g.

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component failure). The event tree provides systematic coverage of the time
sequence for the event‘s propagation.

Event trees have been widely applied in risk assessments for both the nuclear
and chemical industries. Two distinct applications can be identified:

1. The ―pre-incident‖ application examines the normal ship functions, crew

interventions and protective systems in place which would prevent a pre-
incident developing into an actual incident. The event tree analysis of
such systems is often sufficient in itself for the purposes of estimating the
safety of the system.
2. The ―post-incident‖ application is used to allocate the many possible
consequences following an event, e.g. flammable/toxic releases. The
event tree analysis is rarely sufficient in itself for this application; it is usually
an input to the determination of outcome frequency used in the risk
calculation.

The construction of an event tree is sequential, and like fault-tree analysis, it is

top-down (or left-right in the usual event tree convention). Analysis starts at the
initiating event and the consequences of this event are then followed through a
series of possible branches (outcomes) working through each branch in turn. The
questions defining the branches are placed across the top of the tree and are
sometimes called nodes. The answers are usually binary (e.g. ‗yes‘ or ‗no‘), with
the convention usually adopted of upward branches signifying ‗yes‘ and
downward ones for ‗no‘, but there can also be multiple outcomes (e.g. 100%,
20% or 0% in the operation of a control valve). Each branch is conditional on the
answers to the previous defining questions (nodes).

Advantages

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 It is widely used and well accepted and can be used for cross-discipline
system analysis
 It is suitable for many hazards in QRA that arise from sequences of
successive failures
 An event tree is clear and logical and therefore simple to understand
 The analysis is not limited to equipment related events
 It can be used to diagnose system difficulties
 ―Pre-incident‖ Event Trees highlight both the value and potential
weaknesses of protective systems (especially identifying outcomes with no
intervening protective measures).

Disadvantages

 It is not efficient where many events must occur in combination, as it

results in many redundant branches
 All events are assumed to be independent which can lead to missing
systematic and common-mode failures
 As the technique uses binary logic it may not work for some accident
scenarios which include uncertainty such as human error or adverse
weather conditions
 The analysis is limited to one initiating event. If ETA is being used to identify
potential causes of accidents, other techniques such as HAZOP, FMEA,
what-if or checklists should be considered.

The following diagram shows a quantified event tree for the action following a
fire on a conveyor system.

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Bowtie model

The bow tie approach was utilised to present the major hazards of the facility in
such a way as to facilitate workforce understanding of hazard management
and their role in it. In this approach hazard is represented by a top event
(realization of hazard) which can be triggered by one or several threats. The
barriers are provided to protect the system from these threats.

The objective is to achieve the optimal balance between workforce

competence and supervision, the following observation is made. Balancing
competence and supervision is just one of the processes within the safety
management system. Opportunities for decay and erosion of the hazard
protection system are many, from inadequate design, insufficient maintenance,
unworkable procedures, conflicting goals, failure in communication, insufficient
training, etc. While the monitoring and auditing procedures should be designed

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for a continuous improvement in reality these are often transformed into

compliance audits. The improvements in overall safety level cannot be reached
by monitoring and targeting annual safety indicators alone, but also requires
improving processes of the system from which these indicators originate.
Therefore an approach for optimizing the management process for balancing
workforce competence and the need for supervision is developed in this study.
The method enables an organisation to demonstrate that so far as is reasonably
practicable the optimal balance between competence and supervision can
be achieved.

The proposed approach has the potential for significant improvement of

workforce involvement and understanding in the following areas:

Comprehension of major hazards

Visualisation of threat / barrier / initiating event / consequence systems in bow

tie diagrams facilitates comprehension of hazard prevention and protection
required for safe operations on an offshore facility. The interaction and
interdependence between the primary barriers and their decay/failure modes
and the secondary barriers are also visually displayed. Removing a barrier or a

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set of barriers for the purpose of maintenance can immediately indicate the
possible weakening of the system.

Safety case

The HSE has highlighted the central role that the offshore workforce can play in
safety case preparation by being involved in the engineering task of identifying
real improvement in safety, improvements that are reasonable from an
engineering perspective that makes full use of the day-to-day and grass-roots
operational experience of various workforce disciplines. The bow ties facilitate a
more intimate participation of the workforce in the processes of hazard
identification which forms the solid foundation on which the continuous safety
improvement is built.

Safety management system

Increased and focused information about the major hazard accidents, barriers,
procedures and tasks should facilitate discussions, assessment and
improvements of safety. This is in particular important with the human /
organisational barriers such as Job Risk Assessments, Permit to Work systems,
plans, manuals, etc. Both the workforce and the management can also visualise
the importance of fundamental barriers such as management of change,
procedural reviews, corporate audit, etc.

Improved auditing

The proposed approach linking the major hazards, underlying causes of barrier
decay/failure, complexity of safety critical tasks, barrier decay levels and the
workforce provides more opportunity for proactive monitoring and
consequently improved auditing system.

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5.1.2 The quantitative analysis of accident and ill-health data

The impacts that statistics can have on an

organisation and organisational reputation

Figures show that in the UK currently, there are 1.4 million workers suffering from ill
health caused by occupational tasks. New cases of work-related ill health
generate annual costs of £9.8billion (excluding long latency illness such as
cancer), this includes financial costs and human costs.

The HSE‘s latest statistical update ‗Health and safety at work: Summary statistics
for Great Britain 2019‘ reveals that:

 1.4 million working people suffer from a work-related illness

 497,000 workers suffered from a new case of work-related ill health in
2018/19
 23.5 million working days were lost due to work-related ill health in 2018/19
 13,000 deaths each year are linked to past exposure at work, primarily to
chemicals or dust

The highest risk industries include agriculture, construction, wholesale, retail and
manufacturing. These sectors have shown significantly higher work-related ill
health and non-fatal injury rates than the rate for all other industries.

The annual report explores work-related ill health, workplace injuries, working
days lost, enforcement action taken, and the associated costs to England,
Wales and Scotland.

Great Britain continues to be one of the safest places to work, however these
figures highlight the importance of managing risk and show that there are still
huge improvements to be made to prevent fatalities, injuries and ill-health.
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The HSE‘s ever-increasing focus on work-related ill health means that, now more
than ever, it is imperative to do all that you can to protect you people and your
business. The organisation must reduce ill health amongst your workforce to
protect their reputation.

The companies at the forefront of this thinking treat their health and safety
reputation as a business asset. They have built their success on a strong
reputation for doing the right thing – and they like to report on it.

This speaks to the notion of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR). CSR has
become one of the standard business practices of our time, and is now a core
strategy for any modern business, big or small. It is the process of building trust
with consumers, partners, governments, suppliers, and employees.

The ILO also estimates that some 2.3 million women and men around the world
succumb to work-related accidents or diseases every year; this corresponds to
over 6000 deaths every single day. Worldwide, there are around 340 million
occupational accidents and 160 million victims of work-related illnesses
annually.

Methods of calculating loss rates from raw data

By analysing accident and ill-health data, we can determine trends. These

trends permit us to focus on the key areas for action. We can use the data to
compare organisational trends with national trends, or compare these with
other organisations in a similar industry and of a similar size. In doing so we must
ensure that we are comparing "like for like" because not all organisations or
countries use the same formulae. For example, the frequency rate multiplier
used by the ILO is 1,000,000 whilst the USA uses 200,000.
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It is important to remember that the only purpose of the multiplier is to create a

small useable number. It serves no other purpose. When comparing two or more
accident rates, you must ensure the multipliers used were the same. Or else the
rates cannot be compared.

Two widely used methods are 'accident frequency rate' and 'accident
incidence rate'. Both types of rate help compare health and safety
performance between similar organisations or departments.

The two approaches do this in slightly different ways. In the UK, published HSE
injury rates give the number of people injured over a year in a group of 100,000
workers. This approach does not consider the number of hours worked. The
'accident frequency rate' is the number of people injured over a year for each
million hours worked by a group of employees or workers.

Which approach is right? If there are big differences in the hours worked by the
groups being compared, or if the hours worked change significantly over time,
then frequency rates are better. If not then incidence rates are easier to
calculate and aren‘t affected by uncertainties in the estimates of hours worked.

The following formulae are standards for the health and safety industry. For
exam purposes you could be asked to do some calculations of accident rates,
so you do need to be very familiar with these formulae.

Accident and Incident Frequency Rate

Frequency rates are the accident and incident rates compared with time, and
is calculated as:

(Total number of accidents / Total number of man hours worked) x 1,000,000.

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The multiplier of 1,000,000 is favoured by the ILO, UK and Japan, whilst OSHA in
the USA favours 200,000. Some organisations use 100,000. Please remember, the
multiplier is only important when attempting to compare different rates.

Considering the number of hours worked, rather than the total number of
workers, avoids the problems of part-time workers giving a distorted rate (as it
does in the incidence rate calculation).

Accident and Incident Incidence Rate

Incidence rates are the rate of accidents an organisation has over a period of
time. Calculated as:

(Total number of accidents / Average number of persons employed) x 100,000.

The UK calculates incident rates using a multiplier of 100,000 as above. Japan

uses a multiplier of 1,000. Organisations tend to use the smaller multiplier, 1000.

Accident and Incident Severity Rate

Provides data on the average days lost due to accidents in relation to the
number of hours worked in a period of time. Calculated as:

(Total number of days lost / Total number of man hours worked in the period) x
1,000.

The figure may be affected by a number of factors, including how inclined

workers are to take time off after an injury. Additionally, a fatality is not reflected
in a severity rate calculation.

Ill-Health Prevalence Rate

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The LFS gives estimates of the number of people who have conditions which
they think have been caused or made worse by work (regardless of whether
they have been seen by doctors). Information is presented as estimated
prevalence and rates of self-reported illness and estimated incidence and rates
of self-reported illness where:

 Estimated prevalence is the estimated number of people with a work-

related illness at any time during the 12-month reference period. It
includes the full range of illnesses from long standing to new cases;
 Prevalence rate is defined as the prevalence estimate divided by the
population at risk of having a work-related illness;
 Estimated incidence is the estimated number of new cases of work-
related illness occurring in the 12 month reference period ie people first
becoming aware of their illness in this 12 month period;
 Incidence rate is defined as the incidence estimate (restricted to
individuals working in the 12 month period) divided by the population at
risk of experiencing a new case of work-related illness during the
reference period (generally defined as people working in the last 12
months).

The formulae used to calculate the prevalence estimate and rate of work-
related illness relating to individuals ever employed for overall and individual
characteristics such as age and sex are given by:

The estimated number of people ever

employed with a work-related illness in the 12
month reference period.

Note:
Annual prevalence 1. This includes illnesses caused or made
estimate of work-related worse by any job, and includes individuals
illness for people ever who have ever worked but are not
employed = necessarily employed in the reference

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period

The estimated number of people

ever employed with a work-
related illness in the 12 month
Annual estimated reference period
prevalence rate of
work-related illness per
100 000 people ever Estimated number of people
employed = ever employed x 100 000

More info - https://www.hse.gov.uk/statistics/lfs/illness.htm

The limitations of accident and ill-health data

Organisations may have different definitions of what constitutes an accident.

For example, some may only count 'Lost-Time Accidents' (also called LTA), whilst
others may focus on all accidents, including damage only accidents. Even the
definition of an LTA can vary. Some organisations will classify an accident as an
LTA if the worker is unable to finish their shift.

It can be difficult to calculate the average number of workers during a period of

time. Absence due to sickness, the use of agency workers, and contractors, can
all affect the calculation. Part- time workers will count as one worker, even
though they do not work the same number of hours. It is also difficult to
calculate the total number of hours worked, especially where a project varies in
workload, or where there are part-time employees. Organisations will have to
decide whether to include contractors in their calculations. If so, then they must
ensure that contractors report incidents to the client and this does not always
happen consistently.

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Levels of reporting may vary widely between departments and organisations.

An organisation may have very low accident rates, but this may only be a
reflection of a very low level of reporting. This is even more of a problem where
organisations have targets and incentives for accident reduction, because this
creates an incentive for workers to not report accidents.

In some organisations, workers may have a greater propensity to take time off
work after an accident. In other organisations, workers may continue to work
despite pain and discomfort. This is often due to the financial consequences of
not working. Organisations that offer a sick pay scheme, or who are more
tolerant of absence from work, will often have a higher accident severity rate,
because the days lost can be higher. In others, there may be a culture of
coming to work regardless of how the worker feels.

Ill-health prevalence rates can be affected by lower levels of awareness and

reporting of what constitutes work-related ill-health. Ill-health conditions are
often not reported because the worker does not realise it is work-related or that
they need to report it. In some cases, the ill- health condition will only be
identified when the worker returns to work and completes a 'Return to Work
Interview' with their manager. The findings of the interview can be
communicated to the Human Resources Department, but they do not always
report the ill-health condition to the Health and Safety Department, believing it
to be a confidential medical problem.

Importance of representative samples

According to Austin Research a representative sample should, as far as possible,

be representative of the target population. To be representative, the
characteristics (demographic, attitudinal and behavioural) of the people
interviewed should, as far as is possible, match those of the entire target

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population. Representative samples are important because they ensure that all
relevant types of people are included in the sample and that the right mix of
people are interviewed. If your sample isn‘t representative it will be subject to
bias.

Certain groups may be over-represented and their opinions magnified while

others may be under-represented.

Sampling a population

In probability and statistics, a 'random variable' is a quantity whose value

depends on a set of possible random events. For example, the failure of a sensor
could be a random variable.

The ‗outcome‘ is the result of an experiment, so for example if a coin was tossed
and landed on its tail side, the outcome of the experiment (the toss) would be
heads.

A particular 'outcome' is also an 'observation'. 'Data' are a collection of

'observations'.

The collection of all possible outcomes is called the 'population'.

In most instances, it is not possible to be able to survey/observe an entire

population, therefore a sample is used. For the simple to be unbiased it must be
random, where everyone is equally likely to be selected for inclusion. For
example, if we are interested in conducting a survey of the amount of physical
exercise undertaken by the general public, surveying people entering and
leaving a gym would provide a biased sample of the population, because
many people in the general population do not exercise in gyms.

Variables fall into one of two categories – qualitative or quantitative.

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Qualitative variables do not have numeric outcomes and can include gender,
type of house, etc. Quantitative variables have outcomes which are numeric
such as race times, age, height, etc.

Target population: A target population is the group that is the focus for the
research/study – the group the conclusions will be made upon.

Sample: A sample is a proportion selected as a representation of the target

population, when the target population is too large. The conclusions reached
about the sample group are hoped to be mirrored/valid for the target
population.

Figure - Example of a non-representative sample

Errors in Data

There are two types of errors in data: random and systematic.

When undertaking experiments unknown and unpredictable changes can

occur which result in random errors.

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Random errors limit the precision of the measurements but can be identified by
repeating the measurements. Precision is determined by the closeness of the
measurements to each other so if you do 10 tests and 9 results show similar
outcomes but one shows a completely different outcome – this can be classed
as a random error.

Systematic errors are based around the measuring equipment/instruments being

wither faulty or misused.

The misuse of equipment could include:

 The incorrect placing of radiometers in shaded areas when measuring

solar radiation.
 Too great a distance between a substance and the thermometer leading
to temperature measurement errors.

5.2 Outline the purpose of health and safety performance

measurement, monitoring and review - Measuring and monitoring
5.2.1 The purpose and use of health and safety performance
measurement

This section provides a description of the assessment of the effectiveness and

appropriateness of health and safety objectives and arrangements, including
control measures. The health and safety policy statement is where managing
health and safety in the workplace begins. It lays out the way in which health
and safety in the organisation is managed. It is a unique document that shows
who does what, and when and how they do it.

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The meaning of key performance indicators and

their role in setting business objectives

Businesses use key performance indicators (KPIs) to measure progress toward

specific health and safety goals or simply to monitor trends associated with
corporate and facility activities or special projects. KPIs are used as a means to
collect data and communicate trends, which can then be used to indicate
where further improvements and resources are required.

KPIs that represent what has already happened are referred to as "lagging
indicators." Lagging indicators are commonly used in company
communications to provide an overview of performance, such as the tracking
of injury statistics, exposure incidents, and regulatory fines. "Leading indicators"
are more predictive of future performance results.

a) Existence and quality of safety policy

b) Accident / near miss records
c) Staff roles and responsibilities
d) Documented health and safety plans measured
e) Quality of risk assessments
f) Type and quality of training
g) Level of monitoring whether pro-active or reactive
h) Safety committee meetings
i) Timely preventive maintenance tasks performed.

Selecting KPIs

Which KPIs are best for a particular organization depends on several factors:

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 Where is the organization today with respect to health and safety

performance?
 Where does the organization want to be tomorrow?
 Who receives the KPI data and what do they do with it?
 How are KPIs and the conclusions that are drawn from the KPIs
communicated to others?

To develop meaningful KPIs, health and safety managers first need to

understand the safety risks of their operations, evaluate the systems that are in
place to manage risk, and understand the company‘s business plan and
culture. From there health and safety managers can decide where they would
like the organization to be in the short and long term. It‘s great to be recognized
as one of the industry leaders in the area of safety, but if the organization has a
reactive or emerging culture, it might want to set a short-term goal of ensuring
that it is in compliance with applicable legal requirements.

Key performance indicators for reviewing overall performance can include:

 Assessment of the degree of compliance with health and safety system

requirements;
 Identification of areas where the health and safety system is absent or
inadequate (those areas where further action is necessary to develop the
total health and safety management system);
 Assessment of the achievement of specific objectives and plans; and
 Accident, ill health and incident data accompanied by analysis of both
the immediate and underlying causes, trends and common features.

The types, benefits and limitations of leading

and lagging indicators

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The performance indicators most frequently used, such as loss time incidents
(LTIs) or sickness absence, reflect health and safety performance in the past.
These are called ‗lagging‘ indicators because the information, ―lags‖ behind – it
is historical. In other words, they have already occurred. Outcomes of the past
management process rather than the current condition of the present
management process is measured here and can identify the failures of the
management process. There is little value with this type of indicator other than
enabling the organisation to learn from past errors. It is more effective to use
information with greater predictive value, such as leading indicators. However
they can demonstrate levels of improvement.

The alternatives for lagging indicators are leading indicators. These provide
feedback on performance before a problem arises so that action can be taken
to prevent it. Unfortunately, there are few generally accepted and standardised
health and safety leading indicators. This is due to the complexity of health and
safety, and the uniqueness of many workplaces and management systems.

Leading indicators

Leading indicators have predictive value and can therefore be used to improve
health and safety management in general, or to intervene in risky situations
before an incident occurs. Often they measure factors that are generally
regarded as essential elements of good health and safety management.

Examples of leading indicators are:

 The number of managers who have completed suitable health and safety
training.
 Percentage of workers with adequate training.
 Percentage of management meetings that had health and safety on the
agenda.
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 Percentage of management-worker meetings which discuss health and

safety.
 Number of management visits to the shop floor where health and safety is
addressed.
 Percentage of business partners (suppliers, contractors, etc.) evaluated
and selected on the basis of their safety performance.
 Number of workplace inspections carried out in a period.
 Frequency of (observed) (un)safe behaviour.
 Number of health and safety audits performed.
 Percentage of safety-related actions and activities that are finished on
time.
 Percentage of suggestions or complaints where feedback is given to
those reporting within two weeks.
 Percentage of pre-use inspections carried out on equipment.
 Safety climate (survey).

Benefits

As the examples show, leading indicators tend to focus on the positive rather
than the negative. They focus primarily on actions undertaken to prevent
incidents. KPI‘s can be regarded as positive or negative depending on how they
are defined or what they are used for. For example, a high number of reported
dangerous situations can be regarded as negative if there are too many
dangerous situations. It can also be positive in that employees are motivated to
report dangerous situations.

When done correctly, there is a strong link between high numbers of leading
and proactive activities and a decrease in incidents and ill-health.

Limitations

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Leading indicators are only effective if they are used by the management team
to identify and introduce improvements to the health and safety management
system, by means of an action plan and by allocating sufficient resources.

Lagging Indicators

Even though lagging indicators do not, by themselves, allow an accurate

assessment of current performance, they are still frequently used in
organisations. Choices can be made as to whether to express the KPIs in terms
of percentages, rates, or absolute numbers. The most important health and
safety lagging indicators are:

 Injuries and work-related ill health in terms of LTIs. This could involve a
calculation of the Lost Time Incident Frequency Rate or similar calculation.
 A record of days lost through sickness absence (% of total work days lost
by sickness absence).
 Incidents or near misses.
 Complaints about work that is carried out in unsafe or unhealthy
conditions.

As shown above, there is often a strong emphasis on the negative, i.e. on

measuring what went wrong. However, most people and organisations tend to
prefer positive feedback. Then the focus is on what went well (what was safe
and healthy) and according to plan.

Examples of positive lagging indicators are:

 The percentage of completed productive planned work days (i.e. 95%

productive work days as opposed to 5% sickness absence).

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 The number of hours worked (by the total work force) without lost time
injury.
 The number of working days since the last accident.
 The percentage of employees without early signs of ill-health (identified
through health surveillance).
 Employee satisfaction (survey).

The assessment of the effectiveness and

appropriateness of health and safety objectives
and arrangements, including control measures

The objectives are steps that are taken to achieve an overall aim. There may be
occasions when objectives are not ―SMART‖ or they do not help to fulfil the
overall aim of an organisation.

Performance measurement should include an assessment of the effectiveness

and appropriateness of objectives and to ensure that arrangements are
suitable, sufficient and achieve the original purpose. This will help to confirm that
the objectives are focusing on the correct areas, and that the arrangements to
manage health and safety are appropriate and working effectively.

Some objectives may be inappropriate. It is the measurement of progress

against objectives and KPIs that will show if this is the case. For example, an
organisation may believe that it is the lack of up to date risk assessments which is
the root cause of their high rate of accidents. If by quickly updating the risk
assessments, there is little or no impact on the accident rate then this may be
the issue. The organisation can then determine whether it is the supervision of

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managers that is lacking, or the controls in the risk assessments are not being
implemented or used.

Therefore, the organisation could change its objective to focus on providing

effective supervision.

It may be found that objectives require more resources, in terms of people time,
finances, or expertise, than is available. Therefore, the objective cannot be
achieved in the agreed timeframe. Further steps may need to be incorporated
here or the objective may need to be completely re-structured.

Performance measurement can determine if the current health and safety

arrangements are effective and appropriate. Monitoring of the amount of a
solvent in the atmosphere may show that people are being exposed to high
levels. This would suggest that existing controls to prevent exposure are not
effective. It could be due to the extraction ventilation not working effectively, or
workers are not closing the containers of chemicals after use. It is important to
determine what the cause of the problem is in order to rectify the matter.

Making recommendations, based on

performance, for the review of current health
and safety management systems

Organisations should plan to learn from their experiences and take opportunities
to improve performance. One of the purposes of measuring performance is to
review the performance, learn lessons, and make recommendations to improve

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the current health and safety management system. This is a part of the continual
improvement process.

Performance measurement will generate a large amount of data, especially if

both active and reactive measures are used. When reviewed, this will help the
organisation understand whether their management system is achieving the
desired goals. It may be necessary to change the health and safety policy, to
modify people's roles and responsibilities, or to allocate or prioritise resources
differently.Case Study

A pharmaceutical manufacturer had been experiencing a high number of lost

time accidents for the last 2 years. During the management review of
performance, it was found that a common root cause for these incidents was a
lack of clarity over the role of line-managers and health and safety
representatives. The line-managers believed the representatives were
responsible for supervising safe working practices. The representatives were full-
time workers, and did not have the time to supervise anything except their own
work. There was a lack of communication between the two groups.

The organisation updated its health and safety policy to make it very clear that
supervision of health and safety standards is a line-manager responsibility. This
was communicated to all managers, and their teams (including the
representatives). The managers were then sent on an IOSH Managing Safely
course, and on internal workshops to help them understand the organisation's
risk assessment and inspection systems. They were then coached and assisted
by the organisation's safety team for 6 months, until they were able to manage
the safety of their areas themselves with very little assistance. During this process,
it was found that some of the line-managers lacked the organisational and
people-management skills to carry out their role effectively. This was causing
other problems, such as quality defects and missed production deadlines. These

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managers were eventually relocated, and improved selection processes

implemented for future recruitment.

The result was a significant decrease in the accident rate. The organisation
decreased its minor accidents by a factor of three. And its lost time accident
rate soon reached zero, and stayed that way for over three years.

The benefits of measuring what goes right

(proactive safety management)

Proactive safety management is all about keeping ahead of the game,

resolving any issues before an incident or an accident occurs.

 Inspections
 Interviewing
 Audits
 Monitoring performance
 Monitoring behaviour
 Checking procedures
 Safety sampling

In the short term, proactive safety measures can seem more expensive. You are
putting in place (and spending money) on health and safety before any safety
or health issues may have developed.

Proactive safety inspections, regular auditing, ongoing training, near-miss

reporting and active supervision will all form part of a proactive safety
management structure.

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The benefits of a proactive safety regime are that it will enforce a positive safety
culture, help to prevent accidents from occurring, and improve health and
safety budgeting.

5.2.2 Health and safety monitoring

The objectives of active monitoring

The objectives of active monitoring are to:

 Check that health and safety plans have been implemented.

 Monitor the extent of compliance with:
o The organisation's systems and procedures.
o Any relevant legal and technical standards.

Other benefits include:

 Helping to determine whether systems are effective and reliable.

 Enabling decisions to be made about improvements.
 Affirming the management's commitment to health and safety objectives.
 Reinforcing a positive health and safety culture by recognising success
and positive actions.

The objectives of reactive monitoring

Reactive systems, by definition, are triggered after an event and include

identifying and reporting:

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 Injuries and cases of ill-health (including monitoring of sickness absence

records),
 Other losses, such as damage to property,
 Incidents, including those with the potential to cause injury, ill-health or
loss;
 Hazards;
 Weakness or omissions in performance standards.

Each of the above provides opportunities for an organisation to check

performance, learn from mistakes, and improve the health and safety
management system and risk control. In certain cases, it must send a report of
the circumstances and causes to the appropriate enforcing authority.
Statutorily-appointed safety representatives are entitled to investigate.

Events also contribute to the ‘corporate memory‘. Information gathered from

investigations is a useful way to reinforce key health and safety messages.
Common features or trends can be discussed with the workforce, particularly
safety representatives. Employees can identify jobs or activities which cause the
greatest number of injuries, where remedial action may be most beneficial.

Investigations may also provide valuable information in the event of an

insurance claim or legal action.

Collecting information on serious injuries and ill-health should not present major
problems for most organisations, but learning about minor injuries, other losses,
incidents and hazards can prove more challenging.

Accurate reporting can be promoted by:

 Training which clarifies the underlying objectives and reasons for

identifying such events;

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 A culture which emphasises an observant and responsible approach and

the importance of having systems of control in place before harm occurs;
 Open, honest communication in a just environment, rather than a
tendency merely to allocate 'blame';
 Cross-referencing and checking first-aid treatments, health records,
maintenance or fire reports and insurance claims to identify any otherwise
unreported events.

The objectives of reactive monitoring are to:

 Measure the negative health and safety outcomes, such as incidents,

accidents, ill- health, damage-only incidents, complaints, claims,
enforcement action, etc.
 Investigate and identify the immediate and underlying causes of
accidents and incidents.

Reactive monitoring provides information on what has gone wrong. It does not
focus on predicting situations that might have negative consequences, as with
active monitoring. The negative outcomes that are measured have already
happened. As such, reactive monitoring can provide clear information on the
failings of the management system that need to be corrected and insight into
how similar negative situations could occur. It is important to identify, in each
case, why performance was below that expected.

Trends and common features may be identified from the analysis of data. For
example, when, where, why and how incidents occur. This provides an
opportunity to learn and put in place improvements to the overall management
system and relevant specific control measures.

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The distinction between, and applicability of,

active/reactive, objective/subjective and
qualitative/quantitative performance measures

To get a true picture of performance, it is necessary to draw from a range of

performance indicators. These can be classified in groups as follows:

 Active/reactive
 Objective/subjective
 Qualitative/quantitative

Sole reliance on one particular type of indicator (e.g. reactive) will be unlikely to
yield a useable picture of an organisation‘s health and safety performance.

Active/Reactive

Active means ‗before the event‘. Active monitoring systems are often required
by law e.g. to conduct examinations of lifting equipment , LEV systems. They are
used to check compliance with an organisation‘s occupational health and
safety activities, the object being to identify potential problems so they can be
dealt with before they have the chance to develop into major problems.

There are many types of proactive monitoring available and these are:

a) Safety audits

b) Safety inspections

c) Safety survey

d) Safety tour
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e) Safety sampling

f) Attitude surveys

g) Behavioural monitoring

h.) Benchmarking

i) Hazard and operability studies

j) Health surveillance

k) Performance review

Reactive techniques and measures are used to investigate, analyse and record
occupational health and safety management system failures. In other words,
they are employed after the event. A good example is an accident
investigation.

A company may look at other reactive indicators as a means of judging

performance e.g.

 The number of defects reported following safety inspections

 Any enforcement action against the company
 Prosecutions
 Legal mandates

None of these can be relied on to give an accurate picture.

Objective/Subjective

If something is ‘Objective’, it is detached from the assessor‘s personal

judgement. Examples include direct readings (e.g. from meters) or

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straightforward yes/no answers where there can be little or no realistic argument

to the contrary.

They are better left for repetitive jobs where a specific definitive action is
required, or it isn‘t, and are useful for benchmarking. However, it needs to be
used carefully and often to support a more subjective measure. Safety can be
compromised by setting objective targets in production that result in workers
competing and cutting corners in order to fulfil the standard set.

Subjective measures are capable of being influenced by the perceptions,

biases and experience of the person doing the measurement. What one person
thinks is a high risk might be thought to be a very low risk by somebody else.

Subjective performance measures reflect the opinions, feelings and impressions

of the observer. It will require some interpretation (for example: reviewing a risk
assessment and judging whether or not it is satisfactory, or carrying out an audit
and allocating an opinion-based level of performance). This is a performance
measure often used by managers or supervisors to assess an individual‘s work
performance. It can incorporate objective figures to support the decision taken.
(for example: a staff member‘s performance is unsuitable as they have been
late 5 times to perform a safety inspection and then the results were rushed and
as such cannot be relied upon).

Quantitative/Qualitative

Quantitative indicators can be given a value. According to BS8800, “Where

possible, it is desirable to quantify performance measures so that comparisons
can be made over time.” An example would be the number of safety
inspections performed compared to the target number.

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Qualitative measures describe conditions or situations. These may be difficult to

relate to other performance indicators due to the apparent lack of precision
and an element of subjectivity inherent with them. Examples include reports that
describe findings without representing the information numerically.

Qualitative measures:

 Can observe and describe data, but cannot measure it numerically.

 Use subjective, opinion based, comparisons. For example, they can rate
the performance in different areas as "high", "medium", or "low". Or as
"good", "average", or "bad".
 Because the information is not quantified, the results become less precise.

Figure - Quantitative and Qualitative Data

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5.2.3 Health and safety monitoring and measurement techniques

Collecting and using sickness absence and ill-

health data to develop occupational policy,
strategy and targets

Sickness absence data is a valuable source of information. When workers are off
sick, it allows organisations to use the data in order to look for patterns or trends.
This may indicate deficiencies in parts of the health and safety management
system (such as defective or outdated control measures, working practices,
procedures or behavioural issues) and may suggest that changes are needed
(such as improved health surveillance, training, or an improved procedure).

Data can be collected from a variety of sources, including the organisations':

 Accident and ill-health reporting procedures.

 Return to work interviews.
 Compensation claims.
 Discussions with workers or worker representatives.

Significant trends may justify a change in strategy or policy. For example, a trend
of call-centre agents taking one or two days off work may indicate a work-
related ill-health problem. The return to work interviews could identify a common
complaint of neck pains, or wrist discomfort. If the workers do not recognise
these symptoms as work-related, they would not get reported through the usual
reporting procedures. However, analysis of the absence data could reveal this
trend, and this would be an opportunity for an investigation and early
intervention to support the workers.

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The role, purpose and key elements of health

and safety audits

The HSE define an audit as ―a structured process of collecting independent

information on the efficiency, effectiveness and reliability of the health and
safety management system. If deficiencies are found, then the audit will result in
plans for corrective action‖.

The principle of auditing has long been established in both financial

management and quality assurance. It is essential that systems are devised so
that the safety of the operation can be checked in the same way that
organisations look at efficiency and economy. It monitors safety procedures
and is integral in ensuring that safety is maintained at the right level.

Audits do not just focus on documentation. That is only part of the audit. The
audit has three sources of information:

 Observations of the workplace, activities, and behaviours.

 Interviews of managers and workers.
 Documentation relating to the system e.g. policies, procedures, records,
reports, etc.

The purpose of an audit is to:

 To confirm the existence of a system, and to carry out a systematic critical

examination of that system.
 To collect objective evidence and information.
 To check whether the system is effective at managing risk and whether it
is reliable.

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 To compare the system against the requirements of a known standard (for

example, an internal standard or procedure, or an external standard such
as ISO 45001:2018).
 To draw up plans for corrective action if the audit identifies any
deficiencies or the potential for improvement.
 To identify the strengths and weaknesses of the health and safety
management system.

Internal and External Audits

Audits can be both internal and external. An internal audit is carried out by
employees of the organisation. Some organisations even have their own
dedicated Audit Team. The benefit of this is that they have good knowledge of
the organisation, and they are much cheaper than hiring external auditors.
However, they may lack independence, can be influenced by internal politics,
and may not have up to date knowledge of industry best practice. External
auditors are more expensive, more difficult to arrange, have less familiarity with
the organisation and people, but are much more independent, less likely to be
influenced, and have knowledge of industry best practice.

The table below compares internal and external audits:

Internal Audit External Audit

Easier to arrange. More time needed to organise.

Auditors familiar with organisation. Less familiar with organisation.

Informal, less threatening. More formal, more "threatening".
Cheaper. More expensive.

May be influenced by internal No internal relationships.

relationships.
May be biased. Unbiased.

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Assumptions may influence Independence requires auditors to

conclusions. ask obvious questions.

Workplace inspections

Routine monitoring of the basic provisions for Health and Safety within the
organisation by internal personnel, usually using a checklist to ensure
consistency of inspections. Inspections cover items such as fire extinguishers, fire
doors, access/egress, lighting etc. but the content of the checklist will vary
according to the activities taking place in any location, and the findings of
relevant risk assessments.

There are different types of inspection. These include:

 A general inspection of the workplace, often conducted by line

supervisors, worker representatives or health and safety personnel. This
involves a walk around the workplace, often using an appropriate check
list, to identify poorly controlled hazards or to check compliance with
standards. This can include hazards or standards associated with the
workplace itself, equipment, or activities being undertaken e.g. examples
of poor housekeeping, spillage equipment intact and ready to use, all
necessary guards in place, use of PPE, fire exits are clear, etc.
 Pre-use inspection, where the user of equipment or line-manager checks
it is safe to use before using for the first time on that particular day or shift.
For example, a pre-use inspection of a forklift, or a pre-shift guarding
check of a production line.
 Statutory inspection, where the inspection type and frequency is
determined by law. For example, in the UK, lifting appliances, such as
cranes, are required to be thoroughly examined every 12 months.

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 Compliance inspection: involves checking on workers to see whether a

specific safety procedure is being complied with. For example, permit to
work compliance.
 Commissioning inspection: involves checking a new installation, such as a
building or equipment, to check that all essential safety features are in
place before commissioning or start up. For example, handrails fitted to
stairways and platforms have edge protection.

Safety tours
A safety tour is an unscheduled examination of a work area. The examination is
often carried out by a manager, who is usually accompanied by a member of
the health and safety committee. The purpose of the tour is to determine
whether control measures are being observed and maintained i.e. fire exits kept
clear, good housekeeping being observed etc.

The safety tours are usually unscheduled in order to assess the reality of how
people work. By doing this, the person observing can see whether risk
assessments and controls are being understood and relevant procedures are
being followed.

The people involved will check that workplace conditions and standards are
good and in accordance with any written procedures and systems of work.
Health and safety issues will be discussed with the workers giving the observer
the opportunity to listen to any comments, suggestions or complaints.

Safety tours can highlight any deficiencies in supervision. With workers being
able to speak directly to a manager, concerns that have previously been raised
to a supervisor and gone unheeded can be uncovered.

Another important purpose of a safety tour is to demonstrate management

commitment to health and safety. Workers will see them visibly getting involved
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in safety in the workplace and feel that they are given the opportunity to discuss
concerns or queries with them directly.

Overall, a safety tour can intercept bad practice or ineffective procedures

before any accident, ill-health or injury occurs and in this way can be referred to
as proactive. A reactive tour would be one that is done in order to see new
procedures in practice after a previous incident to ensure any previous bad
habits or techniques are corrected.

Safety sampling

This method or technique is used to measure (by random sample) the potential
for accidents and incidents in a specific area or place by identifying hazards
and risks in situations.

For example, an area or workplace is divided into sections, with an observer

appointed in each section. A pre-determined route through the area is
undertaken where observers follow the itinerary in a pre-determined allowed
time, during which the observer will record on a safety sampling sheet the points
they have observed.

Observers (who are members of staff) should be trained in the techniques of the
safety sampling process, along with being able to define hazards and risks as
well as actual hazard spotting.

A small sample of a particular topic is taken. Some examples are:

 A small number of lifts are observed.

 A small number of forklifts are checked.
 A small number of people are checked for PPE compliance.

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The results of this small sample are assumed to represent the performance of the
whole (all of the lifts, all of the forklifts, all of the PPE compliance, etc.).

Safety Surveys

A safety survey is a detailed examination of a specific area of the organisation

in health and safety terms. For example, stress in the workplace.

Much will depend on the inherent hazards that are present in the workplace or
organisation, and the risks that have been identified.

These involve a detailed investigation of a specific aspect of the workplace

when, for example, a health and safety inspection has shown a possible hazard
that needs further analysis. For example, an inspector might perceive high levels
of noise in an area, and this will need detailed measurement and analysis. The
purpose of the survey is to determine whether there is a hazardous situation, or
not. Surveys can look at hazards such as:

 Lighting levels.
 Noise.
 Vibration levels and duration.
 Hazardous substances such as dust, fumes, vapours, etc.
 Temperature.
 PPE compliance.
 Behavioural attitudes such as worker attitude to safety.

Safety conversations

Safety conversations are informal conversations that take place in the

workplace. They are usually carried out by visiting managers, worker
representatives, or health and safety personnel. On a scheduled basis, they will

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tour the workplace and speak to a number of workers to have a casual and
informal discussion about the work being done and the safety implications.
These tours and conversations will normally happen several times a month.

These conversations will include the following elements:

 Introductions. Who you are and what your role is. Ask the other person
who they are, what they do, and what job they are carrying out at that
moment.
 Possible questions are:
o How can you get injured? What are the risks?
o What have you done to protect yourself?
o What else could you do?
o Where do you think the next injury will occur?
o How will you contribute to the prevention of this injury?

These are "open" questions that require more than a "yes" or "no" answer and will
encourage the worker to respond with a longer answer and engage in the
conversation.

The person doing the job should then be encouraged to put in place any safety
improvements they identify as quick fixes. Those that are not quick fixes (i.e.
those which require significant costs or change) should be recorded and raised
with management.

Safety conversations are a useful tool to ensure safety is being considered and
discussed in the workplace at worker level. They are especially useful when the
organisation is trying to encourage worker ownership and involvement in health
and safety. Recording the number and results of safety conversations also help
demonstrate legal compliance. They increase the awareness of risks, and
create an opportunity for safety improvements.

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Behavioural observations

There are a variety of different methods of behavioural observation. But they all
have one thing in common: behavioural observations are essentially the
observation of workers in the workplace. What they are doing, how they do it,
what tools and equipment they are using, the general area around them. Risky
behaviours are challenged. Safe behaviours are praised. The results are
reported to management, who then takes action to improve behaviours further.

The purpose of this activity is to reduce the incidence of risky behaviours,

resulting in fewer accidents and ill-health.

The organisation must first identify the risky behaviours it seeks to eliminate, and
what safe behaviours it wishes to encourage. Official observers must be
nominated (preferably volunteers, who are trusted by the workers and
respected for their fairness). All employees and workers can potentially be an
observer, if they are given suitable training. Checklists of undesirable and
desirable behaviours will be created.

Using these checklists, the observers will carry out observations of behaviour.
Safe behaviour is recognised, praised, and recorded. If poor behaviour is
observed, then the observer will intervene and offer constructive feedback.
Both safe and poor behaviours are recorded. But the names of those behaving
unsafely is NOT recorded. If it were, then the observers would not be trusted or
respected.

The findings are reported back to management. They review the levels of safe
and unsafe behaviour, and act to improve behaviour further. This could mean
further training, toolbox talks, safety conversations, supervision, etc.

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The observation is then repeated periodically, to identify whether behaviour

improves or deteriorates.

The in-house health and safety professional’s

role in audits carried out by external/third
parties

External audits can be very stressful, but the key to decreasing the stress and
increasing the benefits is preparation. It is here that the organisations' safety
practitioner has a big role to play. The more organised the safety practitioner is
during the audit, the more organised the organisation will appear to the auditor.
In the auditing world, initial impressions of the premises, the safety practitioner‘s
preparation, and the availability of documentation are often difficult to
overlook.

The OHS practitioner has a key role in ensuring:

 The audit is booked well in advance of any due date.

 Realistic time is allocated (base it on the duration of the previous audit)
and flexibility is in the timetable.
 The business and processes will be working and producing normally at the
time of the audit. No audits when the business is closed and work is not
taking place.
 Key staff (management and interviewees) know the audit date, are
available, and attend their appointment.
 The findings of the previous audit are reviewed, and all corrective actions
have been completed.

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 Any documentation required by the auditor is readily available. If it isn't

and it can't be readily found, the auditor is hardly likely to have
confidence in the system.
 Relevant senior management are available for the opening and close out
meeting.
 Staff have been briefed about the audit. Some staff members can
become very stressed during an audit, especially if it‘s their first time. Let
them know what to expect, what questions they may be asked and what
to do if they are unsure of how to reply.
 Facilities must be made available for the auditor. For example, a quiet
office, access to drinks and other welfare facilities, and a guide for the
duration of the audit. Usually this will be the safety practitioner.

Comparison of previous performance data with

that of similar organisations/industry sectors and
with national performance data

The main sources of information for review come from measuring activities and
from audits. We have previously discussed both active and reactive monitoring
and measurement of performance.

 Results of internal and external audits, main findings, areas of non-

conformance, and possible best practices that could be introduced.
 Evaluations of compliance with legal requirements.
 Evaluation of compliance with any applicable external standards or
codes of practice.

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 Results of participation and consultation, including employee thoughts

about health and safety performance, their main concerns, their
suggestions for improvement.
 Health and safety performance. This will include:
o Results of active measurements, such as inspections, surveys, and
sampling.
o Results of reactive measurements, such as numbers of accidents,
near misses, cases of ill-health, civil claims, enforcement action, etc.
o Other data from the management system, such as the percentage
of actions completed on time, amount of training delivered or yet
to be completed, numbers of risk assessments reviewed, etc.
o Details of incident investigations, corrective actions, and preventive
actions. If corrective or preventive action has been implemented,
or whether investigations into incidents are still in progress.

Benchmarking gives practical information by encouraging analysis of our own

organisation and by close examination of other organisations, looking at their
methods, processes, procedures and performance. Benchmarking is a process,
not an outcome. It should be used to examine particular issues and can be used
to promote continuous improvement within our own organisations.

Organisations can partner together to benchmark against each other. Finding

another suitable organisation to partner can be challenging if benchmarking is
a new process. Organisations of similar size and using similar processes should be
considered. Finding a competitor to benchmark against is both challenging and
beneficial to both parties. However, companies are often willing to share health
and safety information, where they would not consider sharing information on
other business activities. This is because improvements in safety protection are
seen as a benefit to the community at large and not a threat to shareholder
value.

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The benefits of benchmarking include:

 Improved OHS performance.

 Reduced injury and ill-health costs.
 Reduced incident response costs.
 Improved reputation (held in high regard by public and industry).
 Striving to be "best in class".
 Lower insurance costs.
 Learning from others and adopting "best practices" instead of inventing
new systems.
 Motivated workforce, increased productivity, and less turnover of staff.

Use and potential benefits of benchmarking

‗Benchmarking‘ is the term given to the technique of comparing one

organisation‘s safety performance with that of another organisation in the same
industry, or with national performance figures. It is often done against
companies that are considered to be exemplary performers and can be used
to provide an indication of performance relative to that standard.

Benchmarking techniques can range from the relatively simple to the more
complex. A simple technique is to take your company‘s accident incidence
rate and compare it to the annual figures for the industry as a whole. More
complex systems are based around answers to a series of questions, which are
then scored to give an indication of performance. Typical areas for analysis
include the safety management system, occupational health, injury rates,
serious incidents and sickness absences.

The benefits of benchmarking include:

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 It helps to avoid complacency by allowing companies to have an

external standard to measure themselves against;

 Management can get a good sense of how their investment in safety is

bringing about improvements relative to an external standard over time;

 It is visible and can be used to show management commitment to safety

initiatives and improvements;

 It provides a different perspective and new insights on health and safety

management systems;

 It can lead to the sharing of best practice;

 It allows external stakeholders to put the organisation‘s health and safety

performance in context;

 Results can be published and used to motivate staff to improve standards.

 Improve your reputation – this is increasingly important in getting and

keeping contracts;

 Develop relationships with your customers and suppliers, including

contractors;

 Save money and help keep your competitive edge. Savings can come
for example, from reduced insurance premiums, increased productivity
and staff turnover;

 Improve overall management of health and safety and reduce risks to

people‘s health and safety.

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There are five steps top benchmarking: In their free leaflet, the Health and Safety
Executive explain the concept of benchmarking as follows:

Step 1: Decide what to benchmark.

Step 2: Analyse where you are.

Step 3: Selecting partners.

Step 4: Working with your partner.

Step 5: Acting on the lessons learned.

Step One:

You can apply benchmarking to any aspect of health and safety. It makes
sense to prioritise. High hazard and risk topics are good places to start as these
are areas where most harm could be done. You could identify priorities by
looking at the findings of your risk assessment.

Accident and ill-health patterns in your organisation or industry may also

indicate priorities, especially if you can identify any common causes. You may
have other priorities, which could make equally good places to start.

Safety representatives, team leaders and trade association representatives may

have good ideas on suitable topics for health and safety benchmarking as they
have good contacts with employees and other organisations. You can
encourage these people to make the most of these contacts.

Think about both your health and safety processes (how you do things) and your
performance (the results of what you do); you could benchmark both.
Performance data (accident and ill-health statistics, percentage of risk
assessments completed etc) give an indication of where priorities may be.

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You should be careful how you use some types of performance data,
particularly accident statistics. Accident statistics can be useful, but remember
that they only show the ‗tip of the iceberg.‘ Process benchmarking allows real
improvement to be made as you examine what goes on and how it could be
done better.

Processes may be at workplace level (e.g. how you control a particular hazard)
or management level (e.g. how you investigate incidents, carry out risk
assessments).

Health and safety benchmarking work can be led by, or involve, various people,
for example managers, safety representatives or trade association
representatives. You will need both senior management and employee
commitment and involvement at all key stages.

Step Two:

You need to identify your starting position - are you meeting health and safety
law or relevant codes of practice in your chosen topic? HSE and other guidance
can help you find out.

You need to think about how you will measure where you are and where you
want to be. This will help you measure your improvement from benchmarking.
You can use measures based on numbers, for example the percentage of
managers who have completed health and safety training, or you may prefer to
use qualitative measurements.

If you use an audit system, you could use your results (sometimes these are
‗scores‘) as a measure. Later, you could compare your results with others that
use the same system.

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As part of this process, you may choose to survey employees to find out what
they think the current position is. Involvement of safety representatives can help
to make surveys more successful.

Check that health and safety benchmarking is the best way to progress. It may
be that HSE (or other) guidance will give you all the help you need. Preparation
work in analysing your processes may reveal problems that can be sorted
without the need to benchmark.

Step Three:

If you are part of a large organisation you could find partners both within your
organisation (internal benchmarking) and outside (external benchmarking).
Smaller organisations will probably need to look outside, as they are too small to
have a wide range of potential partners to choose from inside their firms. The
chart shows the advantages and disadvantages of both approaches.

You may choose to work with one partner or a number of them. You could join a
benchmarking club where you will have a range of potential partners from
whom to choose. Your trade association or benchmarking organisations
sometimes offer this service. ‗Off-the-shelf‘ benchmarking packages are also
available.

You can use different ways to find partners. Your existing networks are likely to
include potential partners, for example networks created by trade associations,
local business organisations, your contractors and suppliers, health and safety
organisations, trade unions, or neighbouring firms.

Initially, it‘s probably best to make contact by phone - explaining who you are,
why you‘re contacting them, the purpose of the health and safety

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benchmarking exercise, your areas of interest and, importantly, what‘s ‗in it‘ for
them.

Confirm the arrangement. Look for an organisation that leads in your chosen
topic, but is not so far in the lead that it would be unrealistic to work together.

For workplace processes (e.g. safeguarding for a machine), it is probably best to

look for partners in a similar industry with similar processes.

For management processes (e.g. carrying out risk assessment), you will have a
wider choice of partners, as these processes are common across industries.
When you agree a partnership, there needs to be mutual benefit - ‗give and
take ‘. You should be prepared to give your partner something in return.

Decide whether you will need to visit your partner‘s workplace. Sharing
information by phone may be enough. It is usually best to meet, so you can see
for yourself, and talk to relevant people. If you decide to visit, involve your
managers and safety representatives in the visit because they are the ones who
will be helping to put in place any improvements you identify.

Step Four:

With the right planning and preparation (Steps 1 to 3), this stage should be
straightforward:

 Be realistic – don‘t try to do too much in one go.

 When exchanging information, you need to make sure it's comparable.
 Respect your partner – remember confidentiality, give and take equally.

During contact with partners, make sure you really understand what they do,
how they do it and why it‘s better. This is the information you will need to learn.

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Step Five:

This is a key step - if you don‘t get this right, all the work you‘ve done so far will
be lost! Remember the purpose of health and safety benchmarking is not to
copy but to learn from others, learn more about yourself and, as a result, take
action to improve.

Devise an action plan, based on your findings. It‘s important to make sure your
plan fits in with the ‗culture‘ of your organisation. Your partner may have a very
different culture, and the language and methods they use may need to be
adapted for your organisation.

Make your action plan S M A R T T (Specific, Measurable, Agreed , Realistic,

Trackable and Time bound).

Identify what you need to do, who should do it and when. Make sure you get
senior management and employee commitment to the action plan. Remember
to involve safety representatives.

Implement your action plan and regularly review progress with it. Are you where
you want to be?

If there are problems it may be useful to contact your partner(s) again to see if
they can help you overcome them.

Remember continuous improvement – keep an eye out to see if standards have

moved on. If they have, reset your benchmark and you can start from Step 1
again. As in any other area of business, you shouldn‘t stand still.

To succeed in health and safety benchmarking, you need:

 Senior Management resources and commitment;

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 Employee involvement;
 A commitment to an open and participative approach to health and
safety, including a willingness to share information with others;
 An ability to identify your strengths and weaknesses;
 To compare data on a meaningful ‗apples with apples‘ basis.

5.2.4 Reviewing health and safety performance

Reviewing is the process of making judgments about the adequacy of

performance and taking decisions about the nature and timing of the actions
necessary to remedy deficiencies. Organisations need to have feedback to see
if the health and safety management system is working effectively as designed.
The main sources of information come from measuring activities and from audits
of the RCSs (Rich Communication Services) and workplace precautions. Other
internal and external influences include delivering, new legislation or changes in
current good practice. Any of these can result in redesign or amendment of any
parts of the health and safety management system or a change in overall
direction or objectives. Suitable performance standards should be established to
identify the responsibilities, timing and systems involved.

Feeding information on success and failure back into the system is an essential
element in motivating employees to maintain and improve performance.
Successful organisations emphasise positive reinforcement and concentrate on
encouraging progress on those indicators which demonstrate improvements in
risk control.

The aims of the review process reflect the objectives of the planning process.

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Need for formal and informal performance

reviews

It is important that organisations review their health and safety performance.

Reviewing performance tells the organisation whether the health and safety
systems are effective in managing risks and protecting people. It informs
management whether the basic health and safety principles, such as effective
leadership and management, competence, worker consultation and
involvement, have been embedded in the organisation. If any deficiencies are
identified, the review process then needs to determine what actions are
necessary to remedy these. This will include allocating the appropriate
management focus, resources, priorities and delegating responsibility to specific
―action owners‖ with deadlines.

The objectives of a review are:

 To make judgements about the adequacy of health and safety

performance.
 To obtain assurances that the system for managing health and safety is
working.
 To ensure the law is complied with.
 To set standards of performance.
 To improve performance.
 To respond to change.
 To learn from experience.

Formal Performance Reviews

The formal management review is a requirement of most health and safety

management system standards, such as ISO 45001:2018 and ILO OSH 2001. A
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formal review is also one of the ways senior managers demonstrate they have
carried out all ―due diligence‖, thereby showing that they have complied with
any personal legal requirements as senior managers.

This is a formal scheduled review involving senior management, in collaboration

with the relevant people involved in the day to day management of the health
and safety systems. They take place at pre-determined intervals. Usually at least
annually, but can also be quarterly. The frequency depends on the level of risk
and change.

Formal performance reviews can also take place at a Departmental level,

involving the management of that department.

Informal Performance Reviews

The informal review usually occurs at a Departmental level when circumstances

require one. A recent change in performance, especially a degradation in
performance, will be noted by the Departmental management who will want to
identify the reasons for this. They will then collect all the safety performance
information, review this, and identify the necessary actions to carry out internally
within their Department. This allows them to correct deficiencies before they are
noted at the more senior, more formal, management review.

The importance of reviewing positive outcomes

There is often a strong emphasis on the negative, i.e. on measuring what went
wrong. However, most people and organisations tend to prefer positive
feedback. Then the focus is on what went well (what was safe and healthy) and
according to planning. Examples of positive lagging indicators are:

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 the percentage of productive planned work days realised (i.e. 97%

productive work days as opposed to 3% sickness absence);
 the number of hours worked (by the total work force) without lost time
injury;
 the number of working days since the last accident;
 employee satisfaction (survey).

Erik Hollnagel, an industrial safety expert, suggests we need to move towards

Safety II which is a practice of considering what went well as well as what went
wrong, and looking closely at the causes of both.

The review process

Reviewing is the process of making judgments about the adequacy of

performance and taking decisions about the nature and timing of the actions
necessary to remedy deficiencies. Organisations need to have feedback to see
if the health and safety management system is working effectively as designed.
The main sources of information come from measuring activities and from audits
of the RCSs and workplace precautions. Other internal and external influences
include delivering, new legislation or changes in current good practice. Any of
these can result in redesign or amendment of any parts of the health and safety
management system or a change in overall direction or objectives. Suitable
performance standards should be established to identify the responsibilities,
timing and systems involved.

Management reviews of health and safety performance will be scheduled at

regular intervals. There will be a certain amount of preparation for each review.

The manager or director responsible for health and safety performance will
collect all the necessary information (in other words, the ―inputs‖) that is required

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for the review. This will be presented in a format that is useful for the senior
managers to understand.

Firstly there will be a management review ―pack‖. This is a pre-meeting pack of

information which can be studied by senior managers prior to the meeting. This
gives them the opportunity to learn what the main problems are and what
decisions will be expected of them in the meeting.

Secondly, there will usually be a presentation given to senior management, by

the manager or director responsible for health and safety. Since senior
managers will have limited time, the presentation on performance will need to
follow a strict agenda, and only bring important or significant matters to senior
management‘s attention. The information must be precise, clearly
communicating what the problems are, what the potential risks are, and what
the possible actions are, along with the advantages and disadvantages of
each course of action. The senior managers can then discuss the various options
and agree which is best. These decisions and actions are then documented.
They will include:

 The names of the people responsible for implementing the actions.

 The deadline by which the action should be completed. The speed of
action should be influenced by the level of risk.
 The resources that are necessary and who will provide these.
 Any new targets or objectives.
 The introduction of new policies, and how these should be
communicated and implemented.

At the subsequent performance reviews, one of the first items on the agenda is
the progress against these actions.

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Senior management will want assurances that all agreed actions have been
completed, and are proving effective.

Reviewing should be a continuous process that is completed at all levels in the

organisation from Executive management to apprentices. It includes:

 Remedying failures to implement workplace precautions during routine

activities (first line supervisors or other managers).
 Correcting substandard performance identified by active and reactive
monitoring.
 Assessing plans at individual, departmental, site, group, or organisational
level.
 Assessing the effectiveness of the safety and health management system.
 Responding to the results of audits.

Key performance indicators that are used for reviewing performance should
include:

 Assessment of safety and health system against legal requirements.

 Identification of areas where the safety and health system has not been
applied or
 requires improvement identifying what action is required (a ―Gap
Analysis‖).
 Assessment of how specific objectives and plans have been achieved.
 Accident, ill-health and incident data with a breakdown of the
immediate and underlying causes, trends and any common features.

The review process should note successes and achievements as well as areas
that have not performed. Positive information given to workers and
management alike is an essential element in motivating employees to maintain
and improve performance. Successful organisations promote positive

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reinforcement and concentrate on encouraging progress, rather than focusing

on lack of achievement.

The inputs to a review process

The information driving and used in a review come from various sources:

 Internal performance data.

 Health and safety objectives.
 Organisational arrangements and change.
 External standards and expectations.

Internal performance data

The main sources of information for review come from measuring activities and
from audits. We have previously discussed both active and reactive monitoring
and measurement of performance.

 Results of internal and external audits, main findings, areas of non-

conformance, and possible best practices that could be introduced.
 Evaluations of compliance with legal requirements.
 Evaluation of compliance with any applicable external standards or
codes of practice.
 Results of participation and consultation, including employee thoughts
about health and safety performance, their main concerns, their
suggestions for improvement.
 Health and safety performance. This will include:
o Results of active measurements, such as inspections, surveys, and
sampling.

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o Results of reactive measurements, such as numbers of accidents,

near misses, cases of ill-health, civil claims, enforcement action, etc.
o Other data from the management system, such as the percentage
of actions completed on time, amount of training delivered or yet
to be completed, numbers of risk assessments reviewed, etc.
o Details of incident investigations, corrective actions, and preventive
actions. If corrective or preventive action has been implemented,
or whether investigations into incidents are still in progress.

Health and safety objectives

Other sources include new legislation or changes in current good practice. Any
of these can require changes to be made to the aims and objectives or specific
areas of the safety and health management system.

Extent of meeting objectives i.e. whether the objectives agreed at the last
review or in the policy been achieved and if not, the extent of any progress
made.

Follow-up on previous management review actions. Have they been

completed? Are they effective? If they have not been completed, why not?

Organisational arrangements and change

 Knowing any developments in legal requirements for the organisation.

 New technologies which could allow better control of risks.
 New processes being introduced in the organisation.
 Changes in the organisation and the potential health and safety impact,
such as restructuring, new products, large projects, etc.
 New external standards that must be adhered to.

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 Changes in expectations from clients, shareholders, regulatory agencies,

insurers, workers, and society in general.

External standards and expectations

Legislation and ACOPs

 Requirements for reviews on policy.

 Risk assessments especially for specified risks that may be covered in
specific legislation.
 Changes in legislation.
 Treaties shaping national ratification or standards.

Insurance

 Increased claims.
 Additional requirements requested following incidents or national policy
changes.
 Changes in standards required to obtain insurance.

Shareholders

 Requirements for review following decline in profits or increase in reported

incidents.

Stakeholders

 Feedback from customers.

 Changing requirements from the neighbourhood such as new
developments.
 More stringent controls being requested following incidents and
accidents, etc.

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Manufacturers

 Change in instructions for use of equipment.

 New data and safe use requirements for chemicals and materials.

Unions

 Changes in policy for acceptable working conditions.

 Following strike action or opinion polls for change.

The outputs from a review process

From the above inputs, there are a few ―outputs‖, including decisions and
actions from the review that need to be made. They can result in:

 Actions and improvement plans.

 Stakeholder reports.
 Performance targets.

Actions and improvement plans

As previously discussed, the performance review will result in action and

improvement plans. These should identify:

 What needs to be done.

 Who will be responsible for implementation.
 A specified date for implementation (when it needs to be done by).
 Resource implications covering impact on time, staff, capital, ongoing
costs.
 Additional risks that may require assessment, etc.
 Date for review.

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Stakeholder reports

The output of the review will be communicated to a variety of stakeholders. For

this reason, it is necessary to keep a record of:

 What was reviewed.

 Conclusions drawn.
 Decisions made.
 Actions agreed.

This information can be communicated to a wide number of stakeholders:

 Internally, within the organisation, to all employees. Seeing that health

and safety management is being addressed at a senior level can be
motivating and can boost morale.
 Externally:
o In the annual shareholder report, if the organisation is publicly
owned.
o With insurers, if they require to see evidence of reviews being
carried out.
o With regulators, possibly during a prosecution or other enforcement
action.

Performance targets

The final output of a review is the amendment or creation of performance

targets. Since the organisation is attempting to continually improve, new
performance targets will need to be created. Targets can also create a focus
on specific areas where senior management wishes to improve performance.
For example, if the management review determines that too many workers are
suffering from cuts from knives, they may introduce a new target for the
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reduction of hand injuries, or a target to get all workers trained in the safe use of
knives and the supply of specific PPE.

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