Santos, Jamila Arianne Y.

Section 3B
Hoseña, Joshua Medel Elpidio A. Civil Procedure
Borneo, Victor Earnest Benedict M. Dean Attorney R. Quicho

Case Briefs

A. Bernabe v. Alejo
G.R. No. 140500, January 21, 2002

Facts: The late Fiscal Ernesto Bernabe allegedly fathered a son with Carolina
Alejo, his secretary for 23 years. The son was born on September 18, 1981 and was
named Adrian Bernabe. Fiscal Bernabe died on August 13, 1993, while his wife
Rosalina died on December 3 of the same year, leaving Ernestina as the sole
surviving heir. Carolina, in behalf of Adrian, filed a complaint praying that Adrian
be declared an acknowledged illegitimate son of Fiscal Bernabe and as such he
(Adrian) be given his share in Fiscal Bernabe's estate, which was being held by
Ernestina as the sole surviving heir. |||

Procedural History: The Regional Trial Court dismissed the complaint, ruling
that under the provisions of the Family Code, the complaint was already barred. On
appeal to the Court of Appeals, the latter ruled that the subsequent enactment of
the Family Code did not take away the right of Adrian to file a petition for
recognition within four years from attaining majority age.|||

Issue: Whether or not respondent has a cause of action to file a case against
petitioner, the legitimate daughter of the putative father, for recognition and
partition with accounting after the putative father’s death in the absence of any
written acknowledgment of paternity by the latter|||

Holding: In affirming the decision of the Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court
ruled that Adrian's right to an action for recognition, which was granted by Article
285 of the Civil Code, had already vested prior to the enactment of the Family
Code. This vested right was not impaired or taken away by the passage of the
Family Code. He has up to four years from attaining majority age within which to
file an action for recognition. The Court's over-riding consideration is to protect the
vested rights of minors who could not have filed suit, on their own, during the
lifetime of their putative parents. Adrian was only seven years old when the Family
Code took effect and only twelve when his alleged father died in 1993. The minor
must be given his day in court. Under the new law, an action for the recognition of
an illegitimate child must be brought within the lifetime of the alleged parent.
The Family Code makes no distinction on whether the former was still a minor
when the latter died. Thus, the putative parent is given by the new Code a chance
to dispute the claim, considering that "illegitimate children are usually begotten
and raised in secrecy and without the legitimate family being aware of their
existence. The putative parent should thus be given the opportunity to affirm or
deny the child's filiation, and this, he or she cannot do if he or she is already
dead."|||

B. Bergonia v. CA
G.R. No. 189151, January 25, 2012

Facts: The petitioners were the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. Br. 23-749-03
entitled "Spouses David Bergonia and Luzviminda Castillo v. Amado Bravo, Jr." in
the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 23, Roxas, Isabela. On January 21, 2008,
the RTC rendered a decision adverse to the petitioners. The petitioners
consequently sought a reconsideration of the said decision but the same was denied
by the RTC in an Order dated April 25, 2008 which was received on May 6, 2008.
On May 7, 2008, the petitioners filed a Notice of Appeal.|||

Procedural History: In January 2009, the Law Firm of Lapeña & Associates filed
with the CA its formal entry of appearance as counsel for the petitioners, in
view of the withdrawal of the former counsel, Atty. Panfilo Soriano. The
substitution of lawyers was noted and the CA further directed the appellants
therein to remit the deficient amount of P20.00 within 5 days from notice.
Thereafter, the CA required the filing of appellant’s brief.

Respondent Amado Bravo, Jr. (the defendant-appellee therein), filed a Motion to

Dismiss Appeal stating that the petitioners failed to file their Appellant's Brief
within the 45-day period granted to them by the CA. Citing Section 1 (e), Rule
50 of the Rules of Court, respondent prayed for the dismissal of the petitioners'
appeal.
The CA issued a Resolution which stated, among others, that the notice to file brief
addressed to petitioners' counsel was received by a certain Ruel de Tomas.
Petitioners then filed a Compliance and Motion for Reconsideration praying that
the dismissal of their appeal be set aside in the interest of justice and equity. The
petitioners claimed that their failure to file their brief was due to the fact that they
were never furnished a copy of the said January 30, 2009 Resolution of the CA
directing them to file their brief.
Subsequently, in a Manifestation, the petitioners asserted that their counsel — the
Law Firm of Lapeña and Associates — has no employee in the name of Ruel de
Tomas. However, they explained that Atty. Torenio C. Cabacungan, Jr., an
associate of the law firm personally knows a person named "Ruel" who sometimes
visits their office and who may have accidentally received the said January 30,
2009 Resolution of the CA. In such a case, the same should not be considered
officially served upon them as the latter was not connected with nor authorized to
perform any act for and in behalf of counsel. The CA denied the motion for
reconsideration.
\
Issue: Whether or not the dismissal of the petitioners' appeal for their failure to file
the appellants' brief within the reglementary period was proper

Holding: In a long line of cases, the Court has held that the CA's authority to
dismiss an appeal for failure to file the appellant's brief is a matter of judicial
discretion. Thus, a dismissal based on this ground is neither mandatory nor
ministerial; the fundamentals of justice and fairness must be observed, bearing in
mind the background and web of circumstances surrounding the case. Procedural
rules are tools designed to facilitate the adjudication of cases. Courts and litigants
alike are, thus, enjoined to abide strictly by the rules. And while the Court, in some
instances, allows a relaxation in the application of the rules, this, we stress, was
never intended to forge a bastion for erring litigants to violate the rules with
impunity. The liberality in the interpretation and application of the rules applies
only in proper cases and under justifiable causes and circumstances. While it is
true that litigation is not a game of technicalities, it is equally true that every case
must be prosecuted in accordance with the prescribed procedure to insure an
orderly and speedy administration of justice. The instant case is no exception to
this rule. In the present case, we find no cogent reason to exempt the petitioner
from the effects of its failure to comply with the Rules of Court. The right to
appeal is a statutory right and the party who seeks to avail of the same must
comply with the requirements of the Rules. Failing to do so, the right to appeal is
lost. More so, as in this case, where petitioner not only neglected to file its brief
within the stipulated time but also failed to seek an extension of time for a cogent
ground before the expiration of the time sought to be extended.

C. BPI v CA
G.R. No. 168313, October 6, 2010

Facts: First Union borrowed from BPI the sums of Five Million Pesos
(PhP5,000,000.00) and One Hundred Twenty Thousand U.S. Dollars and 32 cents
(USD123,218.32), evidenced by separate promissory notes. As partial security for
the loan obligations of First Union, defendant Linda and her spouse (Eddy Tien)
executed a Real Estate Mortgage Agreement dated August 29, 1997, covering two
(2) condominium units. Linda executed a Comprehensive Surety Agreement where
she agreed to be solidarily liable with First Union for its obligations to BPI.
Despite repeated demands to satisfy the loan obligations upon maturity, First
Union failed to pay BPI the amounts due.
BPI initiated with the Office of the Sheriff of the RTC of Pasig extra-judicial
foreclosure proceedings against the two (2) mortgaged condominium units to
satisfy First Union and Linda's solidary obligations. After due notice and
publication, the properties were sold at public auction on June 29, 2001. BPI was
the highest bidder and the proceeds of the auction sale were applied to the costs
and expenses of foreclosure, and thereafter, to First Union's obligation of Five
Million Pesos (PhP5,000,000.00). After so applying the proceeds, First Union still
owed BPI a balance of Four Million Seven Hundred Forty Two Thousand Nine
Hundred Forty Nine & 32/100 Pesos (PhP4,742,949.32), inclusive of interests and
penalty charges. First Union's foreign currency loan obligation remained unpaid
and, as of December 21, 2001, amounted to One Hundred Seventy Five Thousand
Three Hundred Twenty Four Thousand & 35/100 US Dollars (USD175,324.35),
inclusive of interest and penalty charges.

Procedural History: First Union's and Linda's continued failure to settle their
outstanding obligations prompted BPI to file, on January 3, 2002, a complaint for
collection of sum of money with the RTC of Makati City, Branch 61. The
complaint's verification and certificate of non-forum shopping were signed by Ma.
Cristina F. Asis (Asis) and Kristine L. Ong (Ong). However, no Secretary's
Certificate or Board Resolution was attached to evidence Asis' and Ong's
authority to file the complaint. First Union and Linda filed a motion to
dismiss on the ground that BPI violated Rule 7, Section 5 of the Rules of Civil
Procedure (Rules); BPI failed to attach to the complaint the necessary board
resolution authorizing Asis and Ong to institute the collection action against First
Union and Linda.
BPI filed an "Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss," arguing that the verification
and certificate of non-forum shopping sufficiently established Asis' and Ong's
authority to file the complaint and proof of their authority could be presented
during the trial. Further, BPI alleged that a complaint "can only be dismissed
under Section 5, Rule 7 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure if there was no
certification against forum shopping." The provision, according to BPI, "does not
even require that the person certifying should show proof of his authority to do
so." Instead of submitting a board resolution, BPI attached a "Special Power of
Attorney" (SPA) dated December 20, 2001 executed by Zosimo A.
Kabigting (Zosimo), Vice-President of BPI. The SPA authorized Asis and Ong or
any lawyer from the Benedicto Versoza Gealogo and Burkley Law Offices to
initiate any legal action against First Union and Linda.
In their Comment, First Union and Linda challenged BPI's reading of the law,
charging that it lacked jurisprudential support. First Union and Linda argued that
the failure to attach a board resolution "shall not be curable by mere amendment of
the complaint or other initiatory pleading but shall be cause for dismissal of the
case without prejudice . . . ." First Union and Linda likewise questioned the belated
submission of the SPA, which in any case, "is not the board resolution envisioned
by the rules since the plaintiff herein is a juridical person."
The RTC granted the motion to dismiss and subsequently denied the motion for
reconsideration filed by BPI.
BPI filed a petition for certiorari before the CA and alleged that that lower court
acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in
dismissing the complaint despite the submission of the SPA and the Corporate
Secretary's Certificate.
First Union and Linda submitted that the petition is an improper remedy since an
order granting a motion to dismiss is not interlocutory. They contended that the
dismissal is final in nature; hence, an appeal, not a petition for certiorari under
Rule 65, is the proper recourse. The CA disagreed with First Union and Linda's
contention. The assailed order, according to the CA, categorically stated that the
dismissal of the complaint was without prejudice. As a dismissal without prejudice,
the order is interlocutory in nature and is not a final order.
The CA, however, found that BPI failed to comply with the procedural
requirements on non-forum shopping. Citing Sec. 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court,
the CA ruled that the requirement that a petition should sign the certificate of non-
forum shopping applies even to corporations since the Rules of Court do not
distinguish between natural and civil persons. The CA lastly refused to accord
merit to BPI's argument that it substantially complied with the requirements of
verification and certification; BPI only submitted the SPA and the Board
Resolution after it had filed the complaint.

Issue: Whether or not there was substantial compliance with the submission of
verification and certificate of non-forum shopping

Holding: The verification of a complaint and the attachment of a certificate of

non-forum shopping are requirements that — as pointed out by the Court, time and
again — are basic, necessary and mandatory for procedural orderliness. Thus, we
cannot simply and in a general way apply — given the factual circumstances of
this case — the liberal jurisprudential exception in Shipside and its line of cases to
excuse BPI's failure to submit a board resolution. While we may have excused
strict compliance in the past, we did so only on sufficient and justifiable grounds
that compelled a liberal approach while avoiding the effective negation of the
intent of the rule on non-forum shopping. In other words, the rule for the
submission of a certificate of non-forum shopping, proper in form and substance,
remains to be a strict and mandatory rule; any liberal application has to be justified
by ample and sufficient reasons that maintain the integrity of, and do not detract
from, the mandatory character of the rule.

BPI, interestingly, never elaborated nor explained its belatedly claimed

inadvertence in failing to submit a corporate secretary's certificate directly
authorizing its representatives to file the complaint; it particularly failed to specify
the circumstances that led to the claimed inadvertence. Under the given facts, we
cannot but conclude that, rather than an inadvertence, there was an initial
unwavering stance that the submission of a specific authority from the board was
not necessary. In blunter terms, the omission of the required board resolution in the
complaint was neither an excusable deficiency nor an omission that occurred
through inadvertence. In the usual course in the handling of a case, the failure was
a mistake of counsel that BPI never cared to admit but which nevertheless bound it
as a client. From this perspective, BPI's case is different from Shipside so that the
ruling in this cited case cannot apply. |||

D. CMTC v. Bhagis International Trading Corp.

G.R. No.170488, December 10, 2012

Facts: Petitioner instituted a Complaint for Unfair Competition and/or Copyright

Infringement and Claim for Damages with Prayer for Temporary Restraining
Order and Writ of Preliminary Injunction against respondent before the Regional
Trial Court of Makati.

Procedural History: The trial court rendered a Decision dismissing the complaint
filed by petitioner.||| After receiving a copy of the trial court's Decision, petitioner
seasonably filed a Notice of Appeal before the Court of Appeals (appellate
court) on March 4, 2005. Thereafter, the appellate court issued a Notice to File the
Appellant's Brief on May 20, 2005, which was received by the law office
representing petitioner. However, despite said notice, petitioner failed to file its
appellant's brief timely. Hence, on August 19, 2005, the appellate court issued a
Resolution dismissing the appeal filed by petitioner.
Upon receipt of the order of dismissal, petitioner filed its Motion for
Reconsideration with Motion to Admit Appellant's Brief, which was filed forty-
two (42) days late from the date of its expiration on July 15, 2005. The appellate
court denied petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration with Motion to Admit
Appellant's Brief. It ruled that one of the grounds by which the Court of Appeals
may, on its own motion or that of the appellee, dismiss the appeal is the failure on
the part of the appellant to serve and file the required number of copies of his brief
within the time prescribed by the Rules of Court.

Issue: Whether or not the dismissal of petitioner's appeal for its failure to file the
appellant's brief within the reglementary period was proper

Holding: Procedural rules should be treated with utmost respect and due regard,
since they are designed to facilitate the adjudication of cases to remedy the
worsening problem of delay in the resolution of rival claims and in the
administration of justice. From time to time, however, we have recognized
exceptions to the Rules, but only for the most compelling reasons where stubborn
obedience to the Rules would defeat rather than serve the ends of justice. In the
instant case, it is apparent that there is a strong desire to file an appellant's brief on
petitioner's part. When petitioner filed its motion attaching therewith its appellant's
brief, there was a clear intention on the part of petitioner not to abandon his appeal.
As a matter of fact, were it not for its counsel's act of inadvertently misplacing the
Notice to File Brief in another file, petitioner could have seasonably filed its
appellant's brief as its counsel had already prepared the same even way before the
receipt of the Notice to File Brief. Also, it must be stressed that petitioner had no
participatory negligence in the dismissal of its appeal. Hence, the ensuing dismissal
of its appeal was completely attributable to the gross negligence of its counsel. For
said reason, the Court is not averse to suspending its own rules in the pursuit of
justice. Where reckless or gross negligence of counsel deprives the client of due
process of law, or when the interests of justice so require, relief is accorded to the
client who suffered by reason of the lawyer's gross or palpable mistake or
negligence.

E. A.L. Ang v. Mondejar

G.R. No. 200804, January 22, 2014

Facts: Petitioner filed a complaint for sum of money under the Rule of Procedure
for Small Claims Cases before the MTCC, seeking to collect from respondent the
amount of P23,111.71 which represented her unpaid water bills for the period June
1, 2002 to September 30, 2005.
Petitioner claimed that it was duly authorized to supply water to and collect
payment therefor from the homeowners of Regent Pearl Subdivision, one of whom
is respondent. From June 1, 2002 until September 30, 2005, respondent and her
family consumed a total of P28,580.09. However, respondent only paid the amount
of P5,468.38, thus, leaving a balance of P23,111.71 which was left unpaid despite
petitioner's repeated demands.
In defense, respondent contended that since April 1998 up to February 2003, she
religiously paid petitioner the agreed monthly flat rate of P75.00 for her water
consumption. Notwithstanding their agreement that the same would be adjusted
only upon prior notice to the homeowners, petitioner unilaterally charged her
unreasonable and excessive adjustments (at the average of 40 cu. m. of water per
month or 1.3 cu. m. of water a day) far above the average daily water consumption
for a household of only 3 persons. She also questioned the propriety and/or basis of
the aforesaid P23,111.71 claim.
In the interim, petitioner disconnected respondent's water line for not paying the
adjusted water charges since March 2003 up to August 2005.

Procedural History: The MTCC rendered a Decision holding that since petitioner
was issued a Certificate of Public Convenience by the National Water Resources
Board only on August 7, 2003, then, it can only charge respondent the agreed flat
rate of P75.00 per month prior thereto or the sum of P1,050.00 for the period June
1, 2002 to August 7, 2003. Thus, given that respondent had made total payments
equivalent to P1,685.99 for the same period, she should be considered to have fully
paid petitioner. Moreover, the MTCC noted that petitioner failed to submit
evidence showing (a) the exact date when it actually began imposing the NWRB
approved rates; and (b) that the parties had a formal agreement containing the
terms and conditions thereof, without which it cannot establish with certainty
respondent's obligation. Accordingly, it ruled that the earlier agreed rate of P75.00
per month should still be the basis for respondent's water consumption charges for
the period August 8, 2003 to September 30, 2005.
Petitioner then filed a petition for certiorari before the RTC, which the latter
dismissed, finding that the said petition was only filed to circumvent the non-
appealable nature of small claims cases as provided under Section 23 of the Rule
of Procedure on Small Claims Cases. To this end, the RTC ruled that it cannot
supplant the decision of the MTCC with another decision directing respondent to
pay petitioner a bigger sum than that which has been awarded. Petitioner moved
for reconsideration but was denied; hence, the instant petition.
||
Issue: Whether or not the RTC erred in dismissing petitioner's recourse under Rule
65 of the Rules of Court assailing the propriety of the MTCC Decision in the
subject small claims case.|||

Holding: Section 23 of the Rule of Procedure for Small Claims Cases states that:
After the hearing, the court shall render its decision on the same day, based on the
facts established by the evidence (Form 13-SCC). The decision shall immediately
be entered by the Clerk of Court in the court docket for civil cases and a copy
thereof forthwith served on the parties.
The decision shall be final and unappealable. Considering the final nature of a
small claims case decision under the above-stated rule, the remedy of appeal is not
allowed, and the prevailing party may, thus, immediately move for its
execution. Nevertheless, the proscription on appeals in small claims cases, similar
to other proceedings where appeal is not an available remedy, does not preclude
the aggrieved party from filing a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules
of Court.
Verily, a petition for certiorari, unlike an appeal, is an original action designed to
correct only errors of jurisdiction and not of judgment. Owing to its nature, it is
therefore incumbent upon petitioner to establish that jurisdictional errors tainted
the MTCC Decision. The RTC, in turn, could either grant or dismiss the petition
based on an evaluation of whether or not the MTCC gravely abused its discretion
by capriciously, whimsically, or arbitrarily disregarding evidence that is material to
the controversy.
In view of the foregoing, the Court thus finds that petitioner correctly availed of
the remedy of certiorari to assail the propriety of the MTCC Decision in the
subject small claims case, contrary to the RTC's ruling.

II. JURISDICTION

F. Medical Plaza Makati v. Cullen

G.R. No. 181416, November 11, 2013

Facts: Respondent Robert H. Cullen purchased from MLHI condominium Unit

No. 1201 of the Medical Plaza Makati covered by Condominium Certificate of
Title No. 45808 of the Register of Deeds of Makati. Said title was later cancelled
and Condominium Certificate of Title No. 64218 was issued in the name of
respondent.
Petitioner, through its corporate secretary, demanded from respondent payment for
alleged unpaid association dues and assessments amounting to P145,567.42.
Respondent disputed this demand claiming that he had been religiously paying his
dues shown by the fact that he was previously elected president and director of
petitioner. Petitioner, on the other hand, claimed that respondent's obligation was a
carry-over of that of MLHI. Consequently, respondent was prevented from
exercising his right to vote and be voted for during the 2002 election of petitioner's
Board of Directors. Respondent thus clarified from MLHI the veracity of
petitioner's claim, but MLHI allegedly claimed that the same had already been
settled. This prompted respondent to demand from petitioner an explanation why
he was considered a delinquent payer despite the settlement of the obligation.
Petitioner failed to make such explanation. Hence, the Complaint for Damages
filed by respondent against petitioner and MLHI.

Procedural History: The RTC rendered a Decision granting petitioner's and

MLHI's motions to dismiss and, consequently, dismissing respondent's complaint.
The trial court agreed with MLHI that the action for specific performance filed by
respondent clearly falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the HLURB. As to
petitioner, the court held that the complaint states no cause of action, considering
that respondent's obligation had already been settled by MLHI. It, likewise, ruled
that the issues raised are intra-corporate between the corporation and member.
On appeal, the CA reversed and set aside the trial court's decision and remanded
the case to the RTC for further proceedings. Contrary to the RTC conclusion, the
CA held that the controversy is an ordinary civil action for damages which falls
within the jurisdiction of regular courts. It explained that the case hinged on
petitioner's refusal to confirm MLHI's claim that the subject obligation had already
been settled as early as 1998 causing damage to respondent. Petitioner's and
MLHI's motions for reconsideration had also been denied.

Issue: Whether or not the instant case involves an intra corporate dispute, and
hence, falls within the jurisdiction of the RTC as a special commercial court

Holding: In determining whether a dispute constitutes an intra-corporate

controversy, the Court uses two tests, namely, the relationship test and the nature
of the controversy test.
An intra-corporate controversy is one which pertains to any of the following
relationships: (1) between the corporation, partnership or association and the
public; (2) between the corporation, partnership or association and the State insofar
as its franchise, permit or license to operate is concerned; (3) between the
corporation, partnership or association and its stockholders, partners, members or
officers; and (4) among the stockholders, partners or associates themselves. Thus,
under the relationship test, the existence of any of the above intra-corporate
relations makes the case intra-corporate.
Under the nature of the controversy test, "the controversy must not only be rooted
in the existence of an intra-corporate relationship, but must as well pertain to the
enforcement of the parties' correlative rights and obligations under the Corporation
Code and the internal and intra-corporate regulatory rules of the corporation." In
other words, jurisdiction should be determined by considering both the relationship
of the parties as well as the nature of the question involved.
Applying the two tests, we find and so hold that the case involves intra-corporate
controversy. It obviously arose from the intra-corporate relations between the
parties, and the questions involved pertain to their rights and obligations under
the Corporation Code and matters relating to the regulation of the corporation.
Admittedly, petitioner is a condominium corporation duly organized and existing
under Philippine laws, charged with the management of the Medical Plaza Makati.
Respondent, on the other hand, is the registered owner of Unit No. 1201 and is thus
a stockholder/member of the condominium corporation. Clearly, there is an intra-
corporate relationship between the corporation and a stockholder/member. The
nature of the action is determined by the body rather than the title of the complaint.
Though denominated as an action for damages, an examination of the allegations
made by respondent in his complaint shows that the case principally dwells on the
propriety of the assessment made by petitioner against respondent as well as the
validity of petitioner's act in preventing respondent from participating in the
election of the corporation's Board of Directors. Respondent contested the alleged
unpaid dues and assessments demanded by petitioner.

G. City of Manila v. Judge Grecia-Cuerdo

G.R. No. 175723, February 4, 2014

Facts: The record shows that petitioner City of Manila, through its treasurer,
petitioner Liberty Toledo, assessed taxes for the taxable period from January to
December 2002 against private respondents. In addition to the taxes purportedly
due from private respondents pursuant to Sections 14, 15, 16, 17 of the Revised
Revenue Code of Manila (RRCM), said assessment covered the local business
taxes petitioners were authorized to collect under Section 21 of the same Code.
Because payment of the taxes assessed was a precondition for the issuance of their
business permits, private respondents were constrained to pay the P19,316,458.77
assessment under protest. Private respondents filed with the RTC a complaint
denominated as one for "Refund or Recovery of Illegally and/or Erroneously-
Collected Local Business Tax, Prohibition with Prayer to Issue TRO and Writ of
Preliminary Injunction" which was docketed as Civil Case No. 04-0019-CFM
before public respondent's sala. In their amended complaint, they alleged that in
relation to Section 21 thereof, Sections 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19 and 20 of the RRCM
were violative of the limitations and guidelines under Section 143 (h) of Republic
Act No. 7160 [Local Government Code] on double taxation. They further averred
that petitioner city's Ordinance No. 8011 which amended pertinent portions of
the RRCM had already been declared to be illegal and unconstitutional by the
Department of Justice.

Procedural History: The RTC granted private respondents' application for a writ
of preliminary injunction. Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration but the
RTC denied it. Petitioners then filed a special civil action for certiorari with the
CA, but the CA dismissed petitioners' petition for certiorari holding that it has no
jurisdiction over the said petition. The CA ruled that since appellate jurisdiction
over private respondents' complaint for tax refund, which was filed with the RTC,
is vested in the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA), pursuant to its expanded jurisdiction
under Republic Act No. 9282, it follows that a petition for certiorari seeking
nullification of an interlocutory order issued in the said case should, likewise, be
filed with the CTA.|||

Issue: Whether or not CTA has jurisdiction

Holding: While it is clearly stated that the CTA has exclusive appellate
jurisdiction over decisions, orders or resolutions of the RTCs in local tax cases
originally decided or resolved by them in the exercise of their original or appellate
jurisdiction, there is no categorical statement under RA 1125 as well as the
amendatory RA 9282, which provides that the CTA has jurisdiction over petitions
for certiorari assailing interlocutory orders issued by the RTC in local tax cases
filed before it.
The prevailing doctrine is that the authority to issue writs of certiorari involves the
exercise of original jurisdiction which must be expressly conferred by
the Constitution or by law and cannot be implied from the mere existence of
appellate jurisdiction.
In the same manner, Section 5 (1), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution grants
power to the Supreme Court, in the exercise of its original jurisdiction, to issue
writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus. With respect to the Court of
Appeals, Section 9 (1) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 gives the appellate court, also
in the exercise of its original jurisdiction, the power to issue, among others, a writ
of certiorari, whether or not in aid of its appellate jurisdiction. As to Regional
Trial Courts, the power to issue a writ of certiorari, in the exercise of their original
jurisdiction, is provided under Section 21 of BP 129.
The foregoing notwithstanding, while there is no express grant of such power, with
respect to the CTA, Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution provides,
nonetheless, that judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such
lower courts as may be established by law and that judicial power includes the duty
of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are
legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has
been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the
part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.
On the strength of the above constitutional provisions, it can be fairly interpreted
that the power of the CTA includes that of determining whether or not there has
been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the
part of the RTC in issuing an interlocutory order in cases falling within the
exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the tax court. It, thus, follows that the CTA, by
constitutional mandate, is vested with jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari in
these cases.

H. Cabrera v Francisco
G.R. No. 172293, August 28, 2013

Facts: Respondents' father, Atty. Lorenzo C. Gella (Atty. Gella), executed a

private document confirming that he has appointed Severino Cabrera (Severino),
husband of Araceli and father of Arnel as administrator of all his real properties
located in San Jose, Antique. When Severino died in 1991, Araceli and Arnel, with
the consent of respondents, took over the administration of the properties.
Respondents likewise instructed them to look for buyers of the properties,
allegedly promising them "a commission of five percent of the total purchase price
of the said properties as compensation for their long and continued
administration" thereof.
Accordingly, petitioners introduced real estate broker and President of ESV
Marketing and Development Corporation, Erlinda Veñegas, to the respondents
who agreed to have the said properties developed by Erlinda's company. However,
a conflict arose when respondents appointed Erlinda as the new administratrix of
the properties and terminated Araceli's and Arnel's services.
Petitioners, through counsel, wrote respondents and demanded for their five
percent commission and compensation to no avail. Hence, on September 3, 2001,
they filed a Complaint for Collection of Agent's Compensation, Commission and
Damages against respondents before the RTC. Attached to their Complaint is a
copy of the tax declaration for Lot No. 1782-B.

Procedural History: Petitioners prayed that they be paid commission and

compensation in the form of real properly equivalent to five percent of the 24-
hectare Lot No. 1782-B as well as damages. Respondents filed a Motion to
Dismiss based on the following grounds: (1) lack of jurisdiction, (2) failure to state
a cause of action, and (3) lack of legal capacity of Araceli and Arnel to sue in
behalf of the other heirs of Severino.
Respondents argued that for RTCs outside of Metro Manila to take cognizance of a
civil suit, the jurisdictional amount must exceed P200,000.00 pursuant to Section 5
of Republic Act (RA) No. 7691 which amended Section 19 of Batas Pambansa
Blg. (BP) 129. And since the total market value of Lot No. 1782-B is
P3,550,072, five percent thereof is only P177,506.60 or less than the said
jurisdictional amount, then the RTC has no jurisdiction over petitioners'
Complaint. Respondents also posited that the Complaint states no cause of action
since petitioners' supposed right to any commission remained inchoate as Lot No.
1782-B has not yet been sold; in fact, the Complaint merely alleged that petitioners
introduced a real estate broker to respondents. Lastly, respondents averred that
petitioners have no legal capacity to sue on behalf of Severino's other heirs and that
the verification and certification of non-forum shopping attached to the Complaint
only mentioned Araceli and Arnel as plaintiffs. The RTC granted the said motion
to dismiss.
On appeal, petitioners averred that their claim is one which is incapable of
pecuniary estimation or one involving interest in real property the assessed value
of which exceeds P200,000.00. Hence, it falls under the exclusive original
jurisdiction of the RTC. Moreover, they asserted that they are not only claiming for
commission but also for compensation for the services rendered by Severino as
well as by Araceli and Arnel for the administration of respondents' properties.
Citing Section 3, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, petitioners justified the inclusion of
Severino's other heirs as plaintiffs in the Complaint. The CA concluded that the
Complaint is mainly for collection of sum of money and not one which is
incapable of pecuniary estimation since petitioners are claiming five percent of the
total purchase price of Lot No. 1782-B. Neither does it involve an interest over a
property since petitioners are merely claiming payment for their services. The
appellate court also ruled that the Complaint did not state a cause of action since it
failed to show the existence of petitioners' right that was allegedly violated by
respondents. Moreover, it found no evidence of Araceli's and Arnel's authority to
file the Complaint for and in behalf of Severino's other heirs. In sum, the CA found
no error on the part of the RTC in granting respondents' Motion to Dismiss.

Issue: Whether the CA erred in affirming the RTC's findings that it has no
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case
Holding: To determine whether the RTC in this case has jurisdiction over
petitioners' Complaint, respondents correctly argued that the same be
considered vis-a -vis Section 19 (8) of BP 129, which provides:
This jurisdictional amount of exceeding P100,000.00 for RTC's outside of Metro
Manila was adjusted to P200,000.00 effective March 20, 1999 in pursuance to
Section 5 of RA 7691 which further provides:
SEC. 5. After five (5) years from the effectivity of this Act, the jurisdictional
amounts mentioned in Sec. 19(3), (4), and (8); and Sec. 33(1) of Batas Pambansa
Blg. 129 as amended by this Act, shall be adjusted to Two hundred thousand pesos
(P200,000.00). Five (5) years thereafter, such jurisdictional amounts shall be
adjusted further to Three hundred thousand pesos (P300,000.00): Provided,
however, That in the case of Metro Manila, the abovementioned jurisdictional
amounts shall be adjusted after five (5) years from the effectivity of this Act to
Four hundred thousand pesos (P400,000.00).
Hence, when petitioners filed their Complaint on September 3, 2001, the said
increased jurisdictional amount was already effective. The demand in their
Complaint must therefore exceed P200,000.00 in order for it to fall under the
jurisdiction of the RTC.
Moreover, there is no merit to petitioners' averment that their demand for moral
damages should be included in the computation of their total claims. Paragraph 8,
Section 19 of BP 129 expressly speaks of demand which is exclusive of damages
of whatever kind. This exclusion was later explained by the Court
in Administrative Circular No. 09-94 dated June 14, 1994 as follows:
2. The exclusion of the term "damages of whatever kind" in determining the
jurisdictional amount under Section 19 (8) and Section 33 (1) of B.P. Blg. 129, as
amended by R.A. No. 7691, applies to cases where the damages are merely
incidental to or a consequence of the main cause of action. However, in cases
where the claim for damages is the main cause of action, or one of the causes of
action, the amount of such claim shall be considered in determining the jurisdiction
of the court.
Here, the moral damages being claimed by petitioners are merely the consequence
of respondents' alleged non-payment of commission and compensation the
collection of which is petitioners' main cause of action. Thus, the said claim for
moral damages cannot be included in determining the jurisdictional amount.

I. Platinum Tours v. Panlilio

G.R. No. 133365, September 16, 2013

Facts: Petitioner Platinum Tours and Travel Inc. (Platinum) filed a complaint for a
sum of money with damages against Pan Asiatic Travel Corporation (PATC) and
its president Nelida G. Galvez. Platinum sought to collect payment for the airline
tickets which PATC bought from it.|||

Procedural History: The Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 62,
rendered a judgment by default in favor of Platinum and ordered PAT and Nelida
G. Galvez to solidarily pay Platinum actual damages of P359,621.03 with legal
interest, P50,000 attorney's fees and cost of suit. A writ of execution was issued on
motion of Platinum. Pursuant to the writ, Manila Polo Club Proprietary
Membership Certificate No. 2133 in the name of Nelida G. Galvez was levied
upon and sold to a certain Ma. Rosario Khoo. Private respondent Jose M. Panlilio
filed a motion to intervene in Civil Case No. 94-1634. Panlilio claimed that Galvez
had executed in his favor a chattel mortgage over her shares of stock in the Manila
Polo Club to secure her P1 million loan and that Galvez had already delivered to
him the stock certificates valued at P5 million. The trial court denied Panlilio's
motion for intervention: Panlilio filed against Galvez a collection case (Civil Case
No. 96-1634) with application for a writ of preliminary attachment of the disputed
Manila Polo Club shares Panlilio again attempted to intervene in Civil Case No.
94-1634, by incorporating in his complaint a motion to consolidate Civil Case No.
96-365 and Civil Case No. 94-1634. Judge Salvador Tensuan of Branch 146
granted the motion for consolidation on condition that Judge Roberto Diokno of
Branch 62, who was trying Civil Case No. 94-1634, would not object thereto.
Judge Diokno later issued an order allowing the consolidation of the two cases and
setting for hearing Panlilio's application for a writ of preliminary attachment.
Platinum then filed a petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals assailing, order
of Judge Diokno allowing the consolidation. The Court of Appeals annulled the
assailed order, but left it to Judge Diokno to decide whether to return Civil Case
No. 96-365 to Judge Tensuan in Branch 146, or to keep it in his docket and decide
it as a separate case. Platinum's motion for partial reconsideration of the decision
of the Court of Appeals, was denied. |||

Issue: Whether or not Makati RTC has no jurisdiction

Holding: The subsequent annulment of Judge Diokno's order granting the

consolidation of Civil Case No. 96-365 and Civil Case No. 94-1634 by the Court
of appeals did not affect the jurisdiction of Diokno's court which issued the said
order. The Court explained that "jurisdiction" should be distinguished from the
"exercise of jurisdiction." Jurisdiction refers to the authority to decide a case, not
the orders or the decision rendered therein. Accordingly, where a court has
jurisdiction over the person and the subject matter, as in the instant case, the
decision on all questions arising from the case is but an exercise of such
jurisdiction. Any error that the court may commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction
is merely an error of judgment which does not affect its authority to decide the
case, much less divest the court of the jurisdiction over the case.|||

J. People v. Cawaling
G.R. No. 117970, July 28, 1998

Facts: Accused-appellants Mayor Ulysses M. Cawaling and Policemen Ernesto

Tumbagahan, Ricardo De los Santos and Hilario Cajilo were convicted of murder
by the Regional Trial Court of Romblon. Appellants Tumbagahan and Cajilo argue
that the trial court erred when it assumed jurisdiction over the criminal case.

Procedural History: Finding the prosecution witnesses and their testimonies

credible, the court a quo convicted the appellants. The killing was qualified to
murder because of the aggravating circumstances of abuse of superior strength and
treachery. The trial court ruled that there was a notorious inequality of forces
between the victim and his assailants, as the latter were greater in number and
armed with guns. Appellants Tumbagahan and Cajilo argue that the trial court
erred when it assumed Jurisdiction over the criminal case. They insist that the
Sandiganbayan, not the regular courts, had jurisdiction to try and hear the case
against the appellants, as they were public officers at the time of the killing which
was allegedly committed by reason of or in relation to their office.

Issue: Whether or not SB has jurisdiction

Holding: The Information filed against the appellants contains no allegation that
appellants were public officers who committed the crime in relation to their office.
The charge was for murder, a felony punishable under Article 248 of the Revised
Penal Code. As clarified in Aguinaldo, et al. vs. Domagas, et al., "[I]n the absence
of such essential allegation, and since the present case does not involve charges of
violation of R.A. No. 3019 (the Anti-Graft etc. Act), the Sandiganbayan does not
have jurisdiction over the present case. Even before considering the penalty
prescribed by law for the offense charged, it is thus essential to determine whether
that offense was committed or alleged to have been committed by the public
officers and employees in relation to their offices." Jurisdiction is determined by
the allegations in the complaint or information. In the absence of any allegation
that the offense was committed in relation to the office of appellants or was
necessarily connected with the discharge of their functions, the regional trial court,
not the Sandiganbayan, has jurisdiction to hear and decide the case.|||
 K. Magpale v. CSC
G.R. No. 97381, November 5, 1992

Facts: Petitioner started his career in government as an employee in the

Presidential Assistance on Community Development in 1960. Fifteen years later,
or in 1975, he transferred to the Philippine Ports Authority (PPA) as Arrastre
Superintendent. He was promoted to the position of Port Manager in 1977 of the
Port Management Unit (PMU), General Santos City. Then he was reassigned, in
the same year, to PPA-PMU, Tacloban City where he likewise discharges the
functions of Port Manager. On December 1, 1982, the PPA General Manager
designated Atty. William A. Enriquez as officer-in-charge of PPA-PMU, Tacloban
City effective December 6, 1982. On January 6, 1983, petitioner was ordered to
immediately report to the Assistant General Manager (AGM) for Operations, PPA,
Manila. Petitioner reported at PPA, Manila on the same date and performed the
duties and functions assigned to him.
In an Internal Control Department Report, the PMU-Tacloban Inventory
Committee and the Commission on Audit (COA) stated that petitioner failed to
account for equipment of PPA valued at P65,542.25 and to liquidate cash advances
amounting to P130,069.61. He was found also to have incurred unauthorized
absence from May 25, 1984 to July 23, 1984. On July 23, 1984, or nineteen
months after he began reporting in Manila, a formal charge for Dishonesty, Pursuit
of Private Business without permission as required by Civil Service Rules and
Regulations, Frequent and Unauthorized Absences and Neglect of Duty was filed
against petitioner. Based on said charges, he was ordered preventively suspended
and has been out of service since then.

Procedural History: A Decision was rendered by the Secretary of the Department

of Transportation and Communications (DOTC), through its Administrative Action
Board, finding petitioner guilty of Gross Negligence on two counts: (a) for his
failure to account for the forty-four (44) assorted units of equipment, among them
a Sony Betamax, and a TV Camera, and (b) for failing to render the required
liquidation of his cash advances amounting to P44,877.00 for a period of four
years. Petitioner was also found guilty of frequent and unauthorized absences.
Accordingly, he was meted the penalty of dismissal from the service with the
corresponding accessory penalties.
When petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the aforesaid Decision was denied
in the DOTC's Order of February 20, 1989, he appealed to the Merit Systems and
Protection Board (MSPB) of respondent Civil Service Commission. The MSPB
rendered a Decision reversing the Decision of the DOTC. Petitioner filed with the
MSPB a Motion for Implementation of the MSPB decision.|||
Issue: Whether or not the Decision of the MSPB is appealable to the CSC

Holding: While it is true, as contended by respondent Civil Service Commission

that under Section 12 (par. 11), Chapter 3, Subtitle A, Book V of Executive Order
292, the CSC does have the power to —
"Hear and decide administrative cases instituted by or brought before it directly or
on appeal, including contested appointments, and review decisions and actions of
its offices and of the agencies attached to it . . ."
The exercise of the power is qualified by and should be read together with the
other sections of the same sub-title and book of Executive Order 29, particularly
Section 49 which prescribes the following requisites for the exercise of the power
of appeal, to wit:
(a) the decision must be appealable;
(b) the appeal must be made by the party adversely affected by the decision;
(c) the appeal must be made within fifteen days from receipt of the decision, unless
a petition for reconsideration is seasonably filed; and
(d) the notice of appeal must be filed with the disciplining office, which shall
forward the records of the case, together with the notice of appeal to the appellate
authority within fifteen days from filing of the notice of appeal, with its comments,
if any.
Under Section 47 of the same Code, the CSC shall decide on appeal all
administrative disciplinary cases involving the imposition of: C
(a) a penalty of suspension for more than thirty days; or
(b) fine in an amount exceeding thirty days salary; or
(c) demotion in rank or salary or transfer; or
(d) removal or dismissal from office.
The February 5, 1990 decision of the MSPB did not involve dismissal or
separation from office, rather, the decision exonerated petitioner and ordered him
reinstated to his former position. Consequently, in the light of our pronouncements
in the aforecited cases of Mendez vs. Civil Service Commission and Paredes vs.
Civil Service Commission, the MSPB decision was not a proper subject of appeal
to the CSC.
Settled is the rule that a tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial functions acts
without jurisdiction if no authority has been conferred by law to hear and decide
the case.

L. Sandoval v. Caneba
G.R. No. 90503, September 27, 1990
Facts: Private respondent filed a complaint in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Manila for the collection of unpaid installments regarding a subdivision lot,
pursuant to a promissory note, plus interest.

Procedural History: It appears that petitioner was declared in default so much so

that after receiving the evidence of private respondent, the trial court rendered its
decision and ordered petitioner to pay the defendant the unpaid installments plus
interests. Subsequently, the trial court ordered the issuance of a writ of execution to
enforce its decision that had become final and executory.
Petitioner filed a motion to vacate judgment and to dismiss the complaint on the
ground that the lower court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter and that its
decision is null and void. A motion for reconsideration of the writ of execution was
also filed by petitioner. An opposition to both motions was filed by private
respondent to which a reply was filed by petitioner. The trial court denied motion
to vacate the judgment on the ground that it is now beyond the jurisdiction of the
Court to do so and directed the issuance of a writ of execution anew.

Issue: Whether or not the ordinary courts have jurisdiction over the collection of
unpaid installments regarding a subdivision lot.||

Holding: Under Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 957 the National Housing
Authority (NHA) was given the exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide certain
cases as follows:
"SECTION 1. In the exercise of its function to regulate the real estate trade and
business and in addition to its powers provided for in Presidential Decree No. 957,
the National Housing Authority shall have exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide
cases of the following nature:
A. Unsound real estate business practices:
B. Claims involving refund and any other claims filed by subdivision lot or
condominium unit buyer against the project owner, developer, dealer, broker or
salesman; and
C. Cases involving specific performance of contractual and statutory
obligations filed by buyers of subdivision lot or condominium unit against the
owner, developer, dealer, broker or salesman. (Emphasis supplied.)"
The language of this section, particularly, the second portion thereof, leaves no
room for doubt that exclusive jurisdiction over the case between the petitioner and
private respondent is vested not on the RTC but on the NHA. The NHA was re-
named Human Settlements Regulatory Commission and thereafter it was re-named
as the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB).
Undeniably, the sum of money sought to be collected by private respondent from
petitioner represented unpaid installments of a subdivision lot which the petitioner
purchased. Petitioner alleges that he suspended payments thereof because of the
failure of the developer to develop the subdivision pursuant to their agreement.
Considering that the trial court has no jurisdiction under the circumstances
obtaining in this case, the decision it rendered is null and void ab initio. It is as if
no decision was rendered by the trial court at all.|||

M. Quesada v. DOJ
G.R. No. 150325, August 31, 2006

Facts: Respondent filed with the Office of the City Prosecutor, Mandaluyong City,
an affidavit-complaint charging Edgardo V. Quesada (herein petitioner), Ramon P.
Camacho, Jr., and Rodolfo Corgado with the crime of estafa under Article 315,
paragraphs 2 and 3 of the Revised Penal Code. The affidavit-complaint alleged that
Quesada, Camacho, and Corgado represented themselves to Teruel as the
president, vice-president/treasurer, and managing director, respectively, of VSH
Group Corporation; that they offered to him a telecommunication device called
Star Consultant Equipment Package which provides the user easy access to the
internet via television; that they assured him that after he pays the purchase price
of P65,000.00, they will immediately deliver to him two units of the internet access
device; that relying on their representations, he paid them P65,000.00 for the two
units; and that despite demands, they, did not deliver to him the units.
It was only petitioner Quesada who filed a counter-affidavit. He alleged that he,
Camacho, and Corgado are Star Consultant Trainers of F.O.M. Philippines, Inc., a
corporation engaged in the business of selling and marketing telecommunication
products and technologies; that they formed the VSH Group as a corporation "for
the principal purpose of pooling the commissions they will receive as Star
Consultant Trainers and then dividing said commissions among themselves
according to their agreement"; that while he admitted that the two units of internet
access devices purchased by herein respondent Teruel were not delivered to him,
however, this was not due to their alleged fraudulent representations since they
merely acted as sales agents of F.O.M. Phils., Inc.; and that they found out too late
that the said company could not cope with its commitment to them as it ran short
of supplies of telecommunication products.

Procedural History: While an information was filed before the RTC, petitioner
filed with the Department of Justice a Petition for Review challenging the
resolution of the Investigating Prosecutor. The Secretary of Justice issued a
Resolution 5dismissing the petition. While the RTC was hearing Criminal Case
No. MC-00-2510, petitioner filed again with the Supreme Court the instant Petition
for Certiorari alleging that the Secretary of Justice, in dismissing his Petition for
Review acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction. Petitioner contends that the element of fraud or deceit in the crime of
estafa is not present and that there is no evidence which will prove that the
accused's promise to deliver the purchased items was false or made in bad faith.

Issue: Whether or not there was violation of hierarchy of courts

Holding: The present petition was directly filed with this Court, in utter violation
of the rule on hierarchy of courts. A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, must be filed with the Court of
Appeals whose decision may then be appealed to this Court by way of a petition
for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the same Rules. A direct recourse to this
Court is warranted only where there are special and compelling reasons
specifically alleged in the petition to justify such action. Such ladder of appeals is
in accordance with the rule on hierarchy of courts.
The Supreme Court is a court of last resort, and must so remain if it is to
satisfactorily perform the functions assigned to it by the fundamental charter and
immemorial tradition. It cannot and should not be burdened with the task of
dealing with causes in the first instance. Its original jurisdiction to issue the so-
called extraordinary writs should be exercised only where absolutely necessary or
where serious and important reasons exist therefor. This Court's original
jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari (as well as prohibition, mandamus, quo
warranto, habeas corpus and injunction) is not exclusive. . . . . It is also shared by
this Court, and by the Regional Trial Court, with the Court of Appeals. This
concurrence of jurisdiction is not, however, to be taken as according to parties
seeking any of the writs an absolute, unrestrained freedom of choice of the court to
which application therefor will be directed. There is, after all, a hierarchy of courts.
That hierarchy is determinative of the venue of appeals, and should also serve as a
general determinant of the appropriate forum for petitions for the extraordinary
writs. Here, there was no compelling reason to justify the direct invocation to the
court.

N. Zamora v. Heirs of Carmen Izquierdo

G.R. No. 146195, November 18, 2004

Facts: In 1973, Carmen Izquierdo and Pablo Zamora entered into a verbal
stipulation whereby the former leased to the latter one of her apartment units
located at 117-B General Luna Street, Caloocan City. They agreed on the
following: the rental is P3,000.00 per month; the leased premises is only for
residence; and only a single family is allowed to occupy it.
After the death of Carmen (lessor) in 1996 her attorney-in-fact, Anita Punzalan,
representing the heirs, herein respondents, prepared a new contract of lease
wherein the rental was increased from P3,000.00 to P3,600.00 per
month. However, petitioners refused to sign it. In January 1997, Pablo (lessee)
died. His wife, Avelina Zamora, and their children (two of whom have their own
families), herein petitioners, continued to reside in the apartment unit. However,
they refused to pay the increased rental and persisted in operating a photocopying
business in the same apartment.
Meanwhile, petitioner Avelina Zamora applied with the Metropolitan Waterworks
& Sewerage System (MWSS) for a water line installation in the premises. Since a
written consent from the owner is required for such installation, she requested
respondents' attorney-in-fact to issue it. However, the latter declined because
petitioners refused to pay the new rental rate and violated the restrictions on the
use of the premises by using a portion thereof for photocopying business and
allowing three families to reside therein. This prompted petitioner Avelina Zamora
to file with the Office of the Punong Barangay a complaint against Anita
Punzalan.

Procedural History: During the barangay conciliation proceedings, petitioner

Avelina Zamora declared that she refused to sign the new lease contract because
she is not agreeable with the conditions specified therein. The following day, Anita
Punzalan sent Avelina a letter informing her that the lease is being terminated and
demanding that petitioners vacate the premises within 30 days from notice.
Despite several barangay conciliation sessions, the parties failed to settle their
dispute amicably. Hence, the Barangay Chairman issued a Certification to File
Action. Consequently, respondents filed with the Metropolitan Trial Court a
complaint for unlawful detainer and damages against petitioners. The MTC issued
an Order denying petitioners' motion to dismiss and considering the case submitted
for decision in view of their failure to file their answer to the complaint. Petitioners
filed a motion for reconsideration, contending that a motion to dismiss the
complaint on the ground of failure to refer the complaint to the Lupon for
conciliation is allowed under Section 19 of the 1991 Revised Rules on Summary
Procedure. The MeTC ruled in favor of respondents which the RTC and CA
eventually affirmed.

Issue: Whether or not there was substantial compliance with the law requiring
conciliation proceedings
Holding: In the case at bar, the Punong Barangay, as Chairman of the Lupong
Tagapamayapa, conducted conciliation proceedings to resolve the dispute between
the parties herein. Contrary to petitioners' contention, the complaint does not only
allege, as a cause of action, the refusal of respondents' attorney-in-fact to give her
consent to the installation of water facilities in the premises, but also petitioners'
violation of the terms of the lease, specifically their use of a portion therein for
their photocopying business and their failure to pay the increased rental.
Notwithstanding the mandate in Section 410(b) of R.A. No. 7160 that
the Barangay Chairman shall constitute a Pangkat if he fails in his mediation
efforts," the same "Section 410(b) should be construed together with Section
412(a) of the same law, as well as the circumstances obtaining in and peculiar to
the case." Here, while the Pangkat was not constituted, however, the parties
met nine (9) times at the Office of the Barangay Chairman for conciliation wherein
not only the issue of water installation was discussed but also petitioners' violation
of the lease contract. It is thus manifest that there was substantial compliance with
the law which does not require strict adherence thereto.

O. Lumbuan v. Ronquillo
G.R. No. 155713, May 5, 2006

Facts: Petitioner Milagros G. Lumbuan is the registered owner of Lot 19-A, Block
2844 with Transfer Certificate of Title No. 193264, located in Gagalangin, Tondo,
Manila. On February 20, 1995, she leased it to respondent Alfredo A. Ronquillo
for a period of three years with a monthly rental of P5,000. The parties also agreed
that there will be a 10% annual increase in rent for the succeeding two years, i.e.,
1996 and 1997, and the leased premises will be used exclusively for the
respondent's fastfood business, unless any other use is given, with the petitioner's
prior written consent. While the respondent at the start operated a fastfood
business, he later used the premises as residence without the petitioner's prior
written consent. He also failed to pay the 10% annual increase in rent of
P500/month starting 1996 and P1,000/month in 1997 to the present. Despite
repeated verbal and written demands, the respondent refused to pay the arrears and
vacate the leased premises.

Procedural History: Petitioner referred the matter to the Barangay Chairman's

office, but the parties failed to arrive at a settlement. The Barangay Chairman then
issued a Certificate to File Action. Petitioner then filed against the respondent an
action for Unlawful Detainer with the MeTC. The MeTC ordered respondent to
vacate the premises. On appeal to the RTC, the RTC set aside the ruling of the
MeTC. espondent sought reconsideration but the RTC denied the motion in an
Order dated March 15, 1999. Thus, he sought relief from the Court of Appeals
through a petition for review. The appellate court promulgated a decision,
reversing the decision of the RTC and ordering the dismissal of the ejectment case.
The appellate court ruled that when a complaint is prematurely instituted, as when
the mandatory mediation and conciliation in the barangay level had not been
complied with, the court should dismiss the case and not just remand the records to
the court of origin so that the parties may go through the prerequisite
proceedings.|||

Issue: Whether or not CA erred in dismissing complaint for failure to comply with
the mandatory mediation and conciliation proceedings in the barangay level

Holding: Here, the Lupon/Pangkat Chairman and Lupon/Pangkat Secretary signed

the Certificate to File Action stating that no settlement was reached by the parties.
While admittedly no pangkat was constituted, it was not denied that the parties met
at the office of the Barangay Chairman for possible settlement. The efforts of
the Barangay Chairman, however, proved futile as no agreement was reached.
Although no pangkat was formed, in our mind, there was substantial compliance
with the law. It is noteworthy that under the aforequoted provision, the
confrontation before the Lupon Chairman or the pangkat is sufficient compliance
with the precondition for filing the case in court. This is true notwithstanding the
mandate of Section 410(b) of the same law that the Barangay Chairman shall
constitute a pangkat if he fails in his mediation efforts. Section 410(b) should be
construed together with Section 412, as well as the circumstances obtaining in and
peculiar to the case. On this score, it is significant that the Barangay Chairman
or Punong Barangay is herself the Chairman of the Lupon under the Local
Government Code.
Finally, this Court is aware that the resolution of the substantial issues in this case
is pending with the Court of Appeals. While ordinarily, we would have determined
the validity of the parties' substantial claims since to await the appellate court's
decision will only frustrate speedy justice and, in any event, would be a futile
exercise, as in all probability the case would end up with this Court, we find that
we cannot do so in the instant case.

P. Heirs of Hinog v. Melicor

G.R. No. 140954, April 12, 2005

Facts: Private respondents filed a complaint for "Recovery of Ownership and

Possession, Removal of Construction and Damages" against Bertuldo Hinog. They
alleged that: they own a 1,399-square meter parcel of land situated in Malayo
Norte, Cortes, Bohol, designated as Lot No. 1714; sometime in March 1980, they
allowed Bertuldo to use a portion of the said property for a period of ten years and
construct thereon a small house of light materials at a nominal annual rental of
P100.00 only, considering the close relations of the parties; after the expiration of
the ten-year period, they demanded the return of the occupied portion and removal
of the house constructed thereon but Bertuldo refused and instead claimed
ownership of the entire property. Accordingly, private respondents sought to oust
Bertuldo from the premises of the subject property and restore upon themselves the
ownership and possession thereof, as well as the payment of moral and exemplary
damages, attorney's fees and litigation expenses.

Procedural History: Atty. Petalcorin, counsel of Bertuldo, filed a motion to

expunge the complaint from the record and nullify all court proceedings on the
ground that private respondents failed to specify in the complaint the amount of
damages claimed so as to pay the correct docket fees; and that non-payment of the
correct docket fee is jurisdictional. The trial court ordered the complaint to be
expunged from the records. However, on March 22, 1999, the trial court reinstated
the case after private respondents have paid the deficiency docket fee. Aggrieved,
petitioners filed before the Supreme Court a petition for certiorari and prohibition.

Issue: Whether or not there was violation of hierarchy of courts

Holding: In this case, no special and important reason or exceptional and

compelling circumstance analogous to any of the above cases has been adduced by
the petitioners so as to justify direct recourse to this Court. The present petition
should have been initially filed in the Court of Appeals in strict observance of the
doctrine on the hierarchy of courts. Failure to do so is sufficient cause for the
dismissal of the petition at bar.
In any event, even if the Court disregards such procedural flaw, the petitioners'
contentions on the substantive aspect of the case fail to invite judgment in their
favor. The unavailability of the writ of certiorari and prohibition in this case is
borne out of the fact that petitioners principally assail the Order dated March 22,
1999 which they never sought reconsideration of, in due time, despite receipt
thereof on March 26, 1999. Instead, petitioners went through the motion of filing a
supplemental pleading and only when the latter was denied, or after more than
three months have passed, did they raise the issue that the complaint should not
have been reinstated in the first place because the trial court had no jurisdiction to
do so, having already ruled that the complaint shall be expunged.
After recognizing the jurisdiction of the trial court by seeking affirmative relief in
their motion to serve supplemental pleading upon private respondents, petitioners
are effectively barred by estoppel from challenging the trial court's jurisdiction. If a
party invokes the jurisdiction of a court, he cannot thereafter challenge the court's
jurisdiction in the same case. To rule otherwise would amount to speculating on
the fortune of litigation, which is against the policy of the Court.

Q. Manchester Development Corp. v. CA

G.R. No. 75919, May 7, 1897

Facts: Petitioners in support of their contention that the filing fee must be assessed
on the basis of the amended complaint cite the case of Magaspi vs. Ramolete. They
contend that the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the filing fee should be levied
by considering the amount of damages sought in the original complaint.|||

Procedural History: The trial court directed plaintiffs to rectify the amended
complaint by stating the amounts which they were asking for. It was only then that
plaintiffs specified the amount of damages in the body of the complaint in the
reduced amount of P10,000,000.00. Albeit no amount of damages were specified
in the prayer, said amended complaint was admitted. On appeal to the CA, the CA
ruled that the basis of assessment of the docket fee should be the amount of
damages sought in the original complaint and not in the amended complaint.

Issue: Whether or not the court acquired jurisdiction over the case in view of the
insufficient payment of docket fee and the amendment of the complaint
Holding: The rule is well-settled "that a case is deemed filed only upon payment of
the docket fee regardless of the actual date of filing in court." Thus, in the present
case the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the case by the payment of only
P410.00 as docket fee. Neither can the amendment of the complaint thereby vest
jurisdiction upon the Court. For all legal purposes there is no such original
complaint that was duly filed which could be amended. Consequently, the order
admitting the amended complaint and all subsequent proceedings and actions taken
by the trial court are null and void. The Court acquires jurisdiction over any case
only upon payment of the prescribed docket fee. An amendment of the complaint
or similar pleading will not thereby vest jurisdiction in the Court, much less the
payment of the docket fee based on the amounts sought in the amended pleading.

R. Sun Insurance Ltd. v. Asuncion

G.R. No. 79937-38, February 13, 1989

Facts: Petitioner Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. filed a complaint with the Regional
Trial Court of Makati for the consignation of a premium refund on a fire insurance
policy with a prayer for the judicial declaration of its nullity against private
respondent Manuel Uy Po Tiong. Private respondent was declared in default for
failure to file the required answer within the reglementary period. On the other
hand, private respondent filed a complaint in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City for the refund of premiums and the issuance of a writ of preliminary
attachment which was docketed as Civil Case No. Q-41177. The complaint sought,
among others, the payment of actual, compensatory, moral, exemplary and
liquidated damages, attorney's fees, expenses of litigation and costs of the suit.
Although the prayer in the complaint did not quantify the amount of damages
sought said amount may be inferred from the body of the complaint to be about
Fifty Million Pesos (P50,000,000.00). Only the amount of P210.00 was paid by
private respondent as docket fee which prompted petitioners' counsel to raise his
objection. Said objection was disregarded by respondent Judge Jose P. Castro who
was then presiding over said case.

Procedural History: The records of said case together with twenty-two other
cases assigned to different branches of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City
which were under investigation for under-assessment of docket fees were
transmitted to this Court. The Court thereafter returned the said records to the trial
court with the directive that they be re-raffled to the other judges in Quezon City,
to the exclusion of Judge Castro. Civil Case No. Q-41177 was re-raffled to Branch
104, a sala which was then vacant. Thereafter, the Court en banc issued a
Resolution in Administrative Case No. 85-10-8752-RTC directing the judges in
said cases to reassess the docket fees and that in case of deficiency, to order its
payment. The Resolution also requires all clerks of court to issue certificates of re-
assessment of docket fees. All litigants were likewise required to specify in their
pleadings the amount sought to be recovered in their complaints.
Judge Antonio P. Solano, to whose sala Civil Case No. Q-41177 was temporarily
assigned, issued an order to the Clerk of Court instructing him to issue a certificate
of assessment of the docket fee paid by private respondent and, in case of
deficiency, to include the same in said certificate.
On January 7, 1984, to forestall a default, a cautionary answer was filed by
petitioners. On August 30, 1984, an amended complaint was filed by private
respondent including the two additional defendants aforestated.
Judge Maximiano C. Asuncion, to whom Civil Case No. Q- 41177 was thereafter
assigned, after his assumption into office on January 16, 1986, issued a
Supplemental Order requiring the parties in the case to comment on the Clerk of
Court's letter-report signifying her difficulty in complying with the Resolution of
this Court of October 15, 1985 since the pleadings filed by private respondent did
not indicate the exact amount sought to be recovered. On January 23, 1986, private
respondent filed a "Compliance" and a "Re-Amended Complaint" stating therein a
claim of "not less than P10,000,000.00 as actual compensatory damages" in the
prayer. In the body of the said second amended complaint however, private
respondent alleges actual and compensatory damages and attorney's fees in the
total amount of about P44,601,623.70.
On January 24, 1986, Judge Asuncion issued another Order admitting the second
amended complaint and stating therein that the same constituted proper compliance
with the Resolution of this Court and that a copy thereof should be furnished the
Clerk of Court for the reassessment of the docket fees. The reassessment by the
Clerk of Court bases on private respondent's claim of "not less than
P10,000,000.00 as actual and compensatory damages" amounted to P39,786.00 as
docket fee. This was subsequently paid by private respondent.
Petitioners then filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals
questioning the said order of Judge Asuncion dated January 24, 1986.
On April 24, 1986, private respondent filed a supplemental complaint alleging an
additional claim of P20,000,000.00 as damages so the total claim amounts to about
P64,601,623.70. On October 16, 1986, or some seven months after filing the
supplemental complaint, the private respondent paid the additional docket fee of
P80,396.00. The CA subsequently denied the motion to dismiss and granted the
writ of preliminary attachment.
|||
Issue: Whether or not the plaintiff may be considered to have filed the case even if
the docketing fee paid was not sufficient|||

Holding: It is not simply the filing of the complaint or appropriate initiatory

pleading, but the payment of the prescribed docket fee, that vests a trial court with
jurisdiction over the subject- matter or nature of the action. Where the filing of the
initiatory pleading is not accompanied by payment of the docket fee, the court may
allow payment of the fee within a reasonable time but in no case beyond the
applicable prescriptive or reglementary period.||| The principle in Manchester could
very well be applied in the present case. The pattern and the intent to defraud the
government of the docket fee due it is obvious not only in the filing of the original
complaint but also in the filing of the second amended complaint.
However, in Manchester, petitioner did not pay any additional docket fee until the
case was decided by this Court on May 7, 1987. Thus, in Manchester, due to the
fraud committed on the government, this Court held that the court a quo did not
acquire jurisdiction over the case and that the amended complaint could not have
been admitted inasmuch as the original complaint was null and void.
In the present case, a more liberal interpretation of the rules is called for
considering that, unlike Manchester, private respondent demonstrated his
willingness to abide by the rules by paying the additional docket fees as required.
The promulgation of the decision in Manchester must have had that sobering
influence on private respondent who thus paid the additional docket fee as ordered
by the respondent court. It triggered his change for stance by manifesting his
willingness to pay such additional docket fee as may be ordered.

S. Ayala Corp. v. Madayag

G.R. No. 88421, January 30, 1990

Facts: Private respondents filed against petitioners an action for specific

performance with damages in the Regional Trial Court of Makati. Petitioners filed
a motion to dismiss on the ground that the lower court has not acquired jurisdiction
over the case as private respondents failed to pay the prescribed docket fee and to
specify the amount of exemplary damages both in the body and prayer of the
amended and supplemental complaint. |||

Procedural History: The trial court denied the motion as well as the motion for
reconsideration filed by petitioners. Thus, the present petition.

Issue: Whether or not the amended complaint suffers from material defect in
failing to state the amount of exemplary damages prayed for

Holding: In the latest case of Tacay vs. Regional Trial Court of Tagum, this Court
had occasion to make the clarification that the phrase "awards of claims not
specified in the pleading" refers only to "damages arising after the filing of the
complaint or similar pleading . . . . as to which the additional filing fee therefor
shall constitute a lien on the judgment." The amount of any claim for damages,
therefore, arising on or before the filing of the complaint or any pleading should be
specified. While it is true that the determination of certain damages as exemplary
or corrective damages is left to the sound discretion of the court, it is the duty of
the parties claiming such damages to specify the amount sought on the basis of
which the court may make a proper determination, and for the proper assessment
of the appropriate docket fees. The exception contemplated as to claims not
specified or to claims although specified are left for determination of the court is
limited only to any damages that may arise after the filing of the complaint or
similar pleading for then it will not be possible for the claimant to specify nor
speculate as to the amount thereof.
The amended and supplemental complaint in the present case, therefore, suffers
from the material defect in failing to state the amount of exemplary damages
prayed for.
As ruled in Tacay the trial court may either order said claim to be expunged from
the record as it did not acquire jurisdiction over the same or on motion, it may
allow, within a reasonable time, the amendment of the amended and supplemental
complaint so as to state the precise amount of the exemplary damages sought and
require the payment of the requisite fees therefor within the relevant prescriptive
period. Thus, the trial court is directed either to expunge from the record the claim
for exemplary damages in the amended and supplemental complaint, the amount of
which is not specified, or it may otherwise, upon motion, give reasonable time to
private respondents to amend their pleading by specifying its amount and paying
the corresponding docketing fees within the appropriate reglementary or
prescriptive period.

T. Negros Oriental Planters Association v. Presiding Judge of Negros

G.R. No. 179878, December 24, 2008

Facts: Campos filed a Complaint for Breach of Contract with Damages, docketed
as Civil Case No. 99-10773, against NOPA before the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Negros Occidental, Bacolod City. According to the Complaint, Campos and
NOPA entered into two separate contracts denominated as Molasses Sales
Agreement. Campos allegedly paid the consideration of the Molasses Sales
Agreement in full, but was only able to receive a partial delivery of the molasses
because of a disagreement as to the quality of the products being delivered. On 17
August 2005, more than six years after NOPA filed its Answer, NOPA filed a
Motion to Dismiss on the ground of an alleged failure of Campos to file the correct
filing fee. According to NOPA, Campos deliberately concealed in his Complaint
the exact amount of actual damages by opting to estimate the value of the
unwithdrawn molasses in order to escape the payment of the proper docket fees.

Procedural History: The RTC issued an Order denying the Motion to Dismiss.
NOPA filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was also denied by the RTC.
NOPA filed a Petition for Certiorari before the Court of Appeals. The CA issued
the first assailed Resolution dismissing the Petition for Certiorari for failure to
comply with requirements under the Rules of Court. NOPA filed a Motion for
Reconsideration of the above Resolution, attaching thereto an Amended Petition
for Certiorari in compliance with the requirements of the Court of Appeals
deemed to have been violated by NOPA.|||

Issue: Whether or not the case should be dismissed for failure to pay docket fees
Holding: The case at bar demonstrates a situation in which there is no effect on the
substantial rights of a litigant. NOPA's Petition for Certiorari is seeking the
reversal of the Orders of the RTC denying NOPA's Motion to Dismiss on the
ground of failure to pay the proper docket fees. The alleged deficiency in the
payment of docket fees by Campos, if there is any, would not inure to the benefit
of NOPA.
There is therefore no substantive right that will be prejudiced by the Court of
Appeals' exercise of discretion in the case at bar. While the payment of docket fees
is jurisdictional, it is nevertheless unmistakably also a technicality. Ironically, in
seeking the leniency of this Court on the basis of substantial justice, NOPA is
ultimately praying for a Writ of Certiorari enjoining the action for breach of
contract from being decided on the merits. What's sauce for the goose is sauce for
the gander. A party cannot expect its opponent to comply with the technical rules
of procedure while, at the same time, hoping for the relaxation of the technicalities
in its favor.
There was therefore no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Court of
Appeals warranting this Court's reversal of the exercise of discretion by the former.
However, even if we decide to brush aside the lapses in technicalities on the part of
NOPA in its Petition for Certiorari, we nevertheless find that such Petition would
still fail.
NOPA seeks in its Petition for Certiorari for the application of this Court's ruling
in Manchester Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals wherein we ruled
that the court acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon payment of the
prescribed docket fee. An amendment of the complaint or similar pleading will not
thereby vest jurisdiction in the court, much less the payment of the docket fee
based on the amount sought in the amended pleading. Since the circumstances of
this case clearly show that there was no deliberate intent to defraud the Court in the
payment of docket fees, the case of Sun should be applied, and the Motion to
Dismiss by NOPA should be denied.

U. Spouses Go v. Tong
G.R. No. 151942, November 27, 2003

Facts: Petitioner Juana Tan Go issued a cashier's check bearing the words "Final
Payment/Quitclaim," payable to private respondent. Private respondent deposited
the check but the same was dishonored because the words "Final
Payment/Quitclaim" was already erased. His request for the replacement of the
check was not granted, so he filed a complaint for sum of money, damages and
attorney's fees. During the pendency of the case, petitioners' son filed a criminal
complaint against private respondent for falsification of the check, but the same
was dismissed. Subsequently, a supplemental complaint was filed by private
respondent praying for an increased amount of damages sought to be recovered
due to the damages caused by the filing of a criminal complaint for falsification
against him by petitioners' son. |||

Procedural History: Petitioners deposited to the court the money representing the
amount of the check which was later on released to private respondent by an order
issued by public respondent. Considering the huge amount involved, the public
respondent issued another order allowing private respondent to pay the docket fees
on staggered basis. Petitioners' motion for reconsideration was denied. Petitioners
filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals (CA) alleging that
respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the said orders,
but the CA ruled that the orders were not issued with grave abuse of discretion.
Hence, this petition.|||

Issue: Whether or not the CA erred in allowing the payment of docket fee on a
staggered basis

Holding: The Court clarified the rule in Sun Insurance thus: ". . . It is not simply
the filing of the complaint or appropriate initiatory pleading, but the payment of
the prescribed docket fee, that vests a trial court with jurisdiction over the subject-
matter or nature of the action. Where the filing of the initiatory pleading is not
accompanied by payment of the docket fee, the court may allow payment of the fee
within a reasonable time but in no case beyond the applicable prescriptive or
reglementary period." Plainly, while the payment of the prescribed docket fee is a
jurisdictional requirement, even its nonpayment at the time of filing does not
automatically cause the dismissal of the case, as long as the fee is paid within the
applicable prescriptive or reglementary period; more so when the party involved
demonstrates a willingness to abide by the rules prescribing such payment. While
the cause of action of private respondent was supposed to prescribe in four (4)
years, he was allowed to pay; and he in fact paid the docket fee in a year's time.
We do not see how this period can be deemed unreasonable. Moreover, on his part
there is no showing of any pattern or intent to defraud the government of the
required docket fee. We sustain the CA's findings absolving respondent judge of
any capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.

V. Tamano v. Ortiz
G.R. No. 126603, June 29, 1998
Facts: Senator Mamintal Tamano married private respondent Zorayda in civil
rites. Their marriage supposedly remained subsisting until his death. Prior to his
death, Tamano also married petitioner Estrellita in civil rites. After the death of the
Senator, Zorayda joined by her son filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of
Marriage of Tamano and Estrellita on the ground that it was bigamous. Petitioner
filed a motion to dismiss the case alleging that the RTC of Quezon City was
without jurisdiction over the subject and nature of the action.

Procedural History: The lower court denied the motion to dismiss and ruled that
the case was properly cognizable by the RTC of Quezon City since Estrellita and
Tamano were married in accordance with the Civil Code and not exclusively in
accordance with PD No. 1083 or the Code of Muslim Personal laws. The motion
for reconsideration was likewise denied; hence, this petition before the Supreme
Court. The case was, however, referred to the Court of Appeals. The Court of
Appeals, likewise, denied the motion to dismiss. The petitioner now comes before
the Supreme Court reiterating her earlier argument that it is the shari'a court and
not the Regional Trial Court which has jurisdiction over the subject and nature of
the action. |||

Issue: Whether the shari’a court has jurisdiction over the case

Holding: Under the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, Regional Trial Courts
have jurisdiction over all actions involving the contract of marriage and marital
relations. Personal actions, such as the instant complaint for declaration of nullity
of marriage, may be commenced and tried where the plaintiff or any of the
principal plaintiffs resides, or where the defendant or any of the principal
defendants resides, at the election of the plaintiff. There should be no question by
now that what determines the nature of an action and correspondingly the court
which has jurisdiction over it are the allegations made by the plaintiff in this case.
In the complaint for declaration of nullity of marriage filed by private respondents
herein, it was alleged that Estrellita and Tamano were married in accordance with
the provisions of the Civil Code. Never was it mentioned that Estrellita and
Tamano were married under Muslim laws or PD No. 1083. Interestingly, Estrellita
never stated in her Motion to Dismiss that she and Tamano were married under
Muslim laws. That she was in fact married to Tamano under Muslim laws was first
mentioned only in her Motion for Reconsideration. Nevertheless, the Regional
Trial Court was not divested of jurisdiction to hear and try the instant case despite
the allegation in the Motion for Reconsideration that Estrellita and Tamano were
likewise married in Muslim rites. This is because a court's jurisdiction cannot be
made to depend upon defenses set up in the answer, in a motion to dismiss, or in a
motion for reconsideration, but only upon the allegations of the complaint.
Jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is determined from the allegations of
the complaint as the latter comprises a concise statement of the ultimate facts
constituting the plaintiff's causes of action.|||

W. Villagracia v. Fifth Shari’a District Court

G.R. No. 188832, April 23, 2014

Facts: On February 15, 1996, Roldan E. Mala purchased a 300-square-meter

parcel of land located in Poblacion, Parang, Maguindanao, now Shariff
Kabunsuan, from one Ceres Cañete. On March 3, 1996, Transfer Certificate of
Title No. T-15633 covering the parcel of land was issued in Roldan's name. At the
time of the purchase, Vivencio B. Villagracia occupied the parcel of land. By 2002,
Vivencio secured a Katibayan ng Orihinal na Titulo Blg. P-60192 issued by the
Land Registration Authority allegedly covering the same parcel of land. On
October 30, 2006, Roldan had the parcel of land surveyed. In a report, Geodetic
Engineer Dennis P. Dacup found that Vivencio occupied the parcel of land covered
by Roldan's certificate of title.
To settle his conflicting claim with Vivencio, Roldan initiated barangay
conciliation proceedings before the Office of the Barangay Chairman of Poblacion
II, Parang, Shariff Kabunsuan. Failing to settle with Vivencio at the barangay
level, Roldan filed an action to recover the possession of the parcel of land with
respondent Fifth Shari'a District Court. In his petition, Roldan alleged that he is a
Filipino Muslim; that he is the registered owner of the lot covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 15633; and that Vivencio occupied his property, depriving
him of the right to use, possess, and enjoy it. He prayed that respondent Fifth
Shari'a District Court order Vivencio to vacate his property.
Respondent court took cognizance of the case and caused service of summons on
Vivencio. However, despite service of summons, Vivencio failed to file his
answer. Thus, Roldan moved that he be allowed to present evidence ex parte,
which motion respondent Fifth Shari'a District Court granted in its order.

Procedural History: The Fifth Shari'a District Court ruled that Roldan, as
registered owner, had the better right to possess the parcel of land. It ordered
Vivencio to vacate the property, turn it over to Roldan, and pay P10,000.00 as
moderate damages and P5,000.00 as attorney's fees. Subsequently, it issued the
notice of writ of execution to Vivencio.
Vivencio filed a petition for relief from judgment with prayer for issuance of writ
of preliminary injunction In his. petition for relief from judgment, Vivencio cited
Article 155, paragraph (2) of the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines
and argued that Shari'a District Courts may only hear civil actions and proceedings
if both parties are Muslims. Considering that he is a Christian, Vivencio argued
that respondent Fifth Shari'a District Court had no jurisdiction to take cognizance
of Roldan's action for recovery of possession of a parcel of land. He prayed that
respondent Fifth Shari'a District Court set aside the decision dated June 11, 2008
on the ground of mistake.
Respondent Fifth Shari'a District Court ruled that Vivencio "intentionally [waived]
his right to defend himself." It noted that he was duly served with summons and
had notice of the following: Roldan's motion to present evidence ex parte,
respondent Fifth Shari'a District Court's decision dated June 11, 2008, and the writ
of execution. However, Vivencio only went to court "when he lost his right to
assail the decision via certiorari."
According to respondent Fifth Shari'a District Court, Vivencio cited the wrong
provision of law. Article 155, paragraph (2) of the Code of Muslim Personal Laws
of the Philippines refers to the jurisdiction of Shari'a Circuit Courts, not of Shari'a
District Courts. It ruled that it had jurisdiction over Roldan's action for recovery of
possession. Regardless of Vivencio being a non-Muslim, his rights were not
prejudiced since respondent Fifth Shari'a District Court decided the case applying
the provisions of the Civil Code of the Philippines.
Respondent Fifth Shari'a District Court denied Vivencio's petition for relief from
judgment for lack of merit. It reiterated its order directing the issuance of a writ of
execution of the decision dated June 11, 2008. Aggrieved, Vivencio filed the
petition for certiorari with prayer for issuance of temporary restraining order
before the Supreme Court.

Issue: Whether or not shari’a court has jurisdiction over the case

Holding: Jurisdiction over the subject matter is "the power to hear and determine
cases of the general class to which the proceedings in question belong." This power
is conferred by law, which may either be the Constitution or a statute. Since
subject matter jurisdiction is a matter of law, parties cannot choose, consent to, or
agree as to what court or tribunal should decide their disputes. If a court hears,
tries, and decides an action in which it has no jurisdiction, all its proceedings,
including the judgment rendered, are void. To determine whether a court has
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action, the material allegations of the
complaint and the character of the relief sought are examined.
In this case, the allegations in Roldan's petition for recovery of possession did not
state that Vivencio is a Muslim. When Vivencio stated in his petition for relief
from judgment that he is not a Muslim, Roldan did not dispute this claim.
When it became apparent that Vivencio is not a Muslim, respondent Fifth Shari'a
District Court should have motu proprio dismissed the case. Under Rule 9, Section
1 of the Rules of Court, if it appears that the court has no jurisdiction over the
subject matter of the action based on the pleadings or the evidence on record, the
court shall dismiss the claim.
In real actions not arising from contracts customary to Muslims, there is no reason
for Shari'a District Courts to apply Muslim law. In such real actions, Shari'a
District Courts will necessarily apply the laws of general application, which in this
case is the Civil Code of the Philippines, regardless of the court taking cognizance
of the action. This is the reason why the original jurisdiction of Shari'a District
Courts over real actions not arising from customary contracts is concurrent with
that of regular courts.
However, as discussed, this concurrent jurisdiction arises only if the parties
involved are Muslims. Considering that Vivencio is not a Muslim, respondent Fifth
Shari'a District Court had no jurisdiction over Roldan's action for recovery of
possession of real property. The proceedings before it are void, regardless of the
fact that it applied the provisions of the Civil Code of the Philippines in resolving
the action.

III. GENERAL PROVISIONS

X. Spouses Yu v. Pacleb
G.R. No. 172172, February 24, 2009

Facts: Respondent Baltazar N. Pacleb and his late first wife, Angelita Chan, are
the registered owners of an 18,000-square meter parcel of land in Barrio Langcaan,
Dasmariñas, Cavite, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-
118375 (Langcaan Property). In 1992, the Langcaan Property became the subject
of three (3) documents purporting to transfer its ownership. On February 27, 1992,
a Deed of Absolute Sale was entered into between Spouses Baltazar N. Pacleb and
Angelita Chan and Rebecca Del Rosario. On May 7, 1992, a Deed of Absolute
Sale was entered into between Rebecca Del Rosario and Ruperto L. Javier (Javier).
On November 10, 1992, a Contract to Sell was entered into between Javier and
petitioner spouses Ernesto V. Yu and Elsie Ong Yu. In their contract, petitioner
spouses Yu agreed to pay Javier a total consideration of P900,000. Six hundred
thousand pesos (P600,000) (consisting of P200,000 as previous payment and
P400,000 to be paid upon execution of the contract) was acknowledged as received
by Javier and P300,000 remained as balance. Javier undertook to deliver
possession of the Langcaan Property and to sign a deed of absolute sale within
thirty (30) days from execution of the contract.nAll the aforementioned sales were
not registered.
Spouses Yu filed with the Regional Trial Court of Imus, Cavite, a Complaint for
specific performance and damages against Javier, docketed as Civil Case No. 741-
93, to compel the latter to deliver to them ownership and possession, as well as title
to the Langcaan Property. In their Complaint, they alleged that Javier represented
to them that the Langcaan Property was not tenanted. However, after they already
paid P200,000 as initial payment and entered into an Agreement dated September
11, 1992 for the sale of the Langcaan Property, they discovered it was tenanted by
Ramon C. Pacleb (Ramon). Petitioner spouses demanded the cancellation of their
agreement and the return of their initial payment. Thereafter, petitioner spouses
and Javier verified from Ramon if he was willing to vacate the property and the
latter was agreeable. Javier then promised to make arrangements with Ramon to
vacate the property and to pay the latter his disturbance compensation. Hence, they
proceeded to enter into a Contract to Sell canceling the Agreement mentioned.
However, Javier failed to comply with his obligations.

Procedural History: Javier did not appear in the proceedings and was declared in
default. The trial court rendered a Decision which ruled in favor of the plaintiff.
The said Decision and its Certificate of Finality were annotated on TCT No. T-
118375 as Entry No. 2676-75 and Entry No. 2677-75, respectively. Spouses and
Ramon and the latter's wife, Corazon Bodino, executed a "Kusangloob na
Pagsasauli ng Lupang Sakahan at Pagpapahayag ng Pagtalikod sa
Karapatan." Under the said agreement, petitioner spouses paid Ramon the amount
of P500,000 in exchange for the waiver of his tenancy rights over the Langcaan
Property.
On October 12, 1995, respondent filed a Complaint for annulment of deed of sale
and other documents arising from it, docketed as Civil Case No. 1199-95. He
alleged that the deed of sale purportedly executed between him and his late first
wife and Rebecca Del Rosario was spurious as their signatures thereon were
forgeries. Respondent moved to have summons served upon Rebecca Del Rosario
by publication since the latter's address could not be found. The trial court,
however, denied his motion. Respondent then moved to dismiss the case, and the
trial court granted the motion, dismissing the case without prejudice.
Meanwhile, petitioner spouses filed an action for forcible entry against respondent
with the Municipal Trial Court (MTC). They alleged that they had prior physical
possession of the Langcaan Property through their trustee, Ramon, until the latter
was ousted by respondent in September 1995. The MTC ruled in favor of
petitioner spouses, which decision was affirmed by the Regional Trial
Court. However, the Court of Appeals set aside the decisions of the lower courts
and found that it was respondent who had prior physical possession of the property
as shown by his payment of real estate taxes thereon.
Respondent filed the instant case for removal of cloud from title with damages to
cancel Entry No. 2676-75 and Entry No. 2677-75, the annotated Decision in Civil
Case No. 741-93 and its Certificate of Finality, from the title of the Langcaan
Property. During the pendency of the instant case before the trial court, respondent
died without having testified on the merits of his case. Hence, he was substituted
by his surviving spouse, Antonieta S. Pacleb, and Lorna Pacleb-Guerrero,
Florencio C. Pacleb and Myrla C. Pacleb representing the children with the first
wife.
The trial court dismissed respondent's case and held that petitioner spouses are
purchasers in good faith. The trial court ratiocinated that the dismissal of
respondent's complaint for annulment of the successive sales at his instance "sealed
the regularity of the purchase" by petitioner spouses and that he "in effect admits
that the said sale . . . was valid and in order". Further, the trial court held that the
Decision in Civil Case No. 741-93 on petitioner spouses' action for specific
performance against Javier is already final and can no longer be altered.
Accordingly, the trial court ordered the cancellation of TCT No. T-118375 in the
name of respondent and the issuance of a new title in the name of petitioner
spouses. The trial court also ordered the heirs of respondent and all persons
claiming under them to surrender possession of the Langcaan Property to petitioner
spouses.
On appeal by respondent, the Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the decision
of the trial court. The Court of Appeals ruled that petitioner spouses are not
purchasers in good faith and that the Decision in Civil Case No. 741-93 did not
transfer ownership of the Langcaan Property to them. Accordingly, the appellate
court ordered the cancellation of the annotation of the Decision in Civil Case No.
741-93 on the title of the Langcaan Property. The Court of Appeals denied
reconsideration of said decision. Hence, the instant petition.

Issue: Whether or not decision of the Regional Trial Court in Civil Case No. 741-
93 as to the rightful owner of the Langcaan Property is conclusive and binding
upon respondent even if the latter was not a party thereto

Holding: Civil Case No. 741-93 is an action for specific performance and damages
filed by petitioner spouses against Javier to compel performance of the latter's
undertakings under their Contract to Sell. As correctly held by the Court of
Appeals, its object is to compel Javier to accept the full payment of the purchase
price, and to execute a deed of absolute sale over the Langcaan Property in their
favor. The obligations of Javier under the contract to sell attach to him alone, and
do not burden the Langcaan Property.
The Court has held in an unbroken string of cases that an action for specific
performance is an action in personam. In Cabutihan v. Landcenter Construction
and Development Corporation, we ruled that an action for specific performance
praying for the execution of a deed of sale in connection with an undertaking in a
contract, such as the contract to sell, in this instance, is an action in personam.
Being a judgment in personam, Civil Case No. 741-93 is binding only upon the
parties properly impleaded therein and duly heard or given an opportunity to be
heard. Therefore, it cannot bind respondent since he was not a party therein.
Neither can respondent be considered as privy thereto since his signature and that
of his late first wife, Angelita Chan, were forged in the deed of sale.

Y. Domagas v. Jensen
G.R. No. 158407, January 17, 2005

Facts: Petitioner Filomena Domagas filed a complaint for forcible entry against
respondent Vivian Jensen before the MTC of Calasiao, Pangasinan. The petitioner
alleged in her complaint that she was the registered owner of a parcel of land
covered by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. P-30980, situated in Barangay
Buenlag, Calasiao, Pangasinan, and with an area of 827 square meters. On January
9, 1999 the respondent, by means of force, strategy and stealth, gained entry into
the petitioner's property by excavating a portion thereof and thereafter constructing
a fence thereon. As such, the petitioner was deprived of a 68-square meter portion
of her property along the boundary line.

Procedural History: The summons and the complaint were not served on the
respondent because the latter was apparently out of the country. This was relayed
to the Sheriff by her (the respondent's) brother, Oscar Layno, who was then in the
respondent's house at No. 572 Barangay Buenlag, Calasiao, Pangasinan. The
Sheriff left the summons and complaint with Oscar Layno, who received the same.
Nonetheless, on May 17, 1999, the court rendered judgment ordering the
respondent and all persons occupying the property for and in the latter's behalf to
vacate the disputed area and to pay monthly rentals therefor, including actual
damages, attorney's fees, and exemplary damages. The respondent failed to appeal
the decision. Consequently, a writ of execution was issued on September 27, 1999.
The respondent then filed a complaint against the petitioner before the RTC of
Dagupan City for the annulment of the decision of the MTC in Civil Case No. 879,
on the ground that due to the Sheriff's failure to serve the complaint and summons
on her because she was in Oslo, Norway, the MTC never acquired jurisdiction over
her person. The respondent further alleged that the MTC had no jurisdiction over
the subject matter of the complaint in Civil Case No. 879 because the petitioner,
the plaintiff therein, failed to show prior possession of the property. She further
claimed that the alleged forcible entry was simply based on the result of the survey
conducted by Geodetic Engineer Leonardo de Vera showing that the property of
the respondent encroached on that of the petitioner.
In her answer to the complaint, the petitioner alleged that the respondent was a
resident of Barangay Buenlag, Calasiao, Pangasinan and was the owner of the
subject premises where Oscar Layno was when the Sheriff served the summons
and complaint; that the service of the complaint and summons by substituted
service on the respondent, the defendant in Civil Case No. 879, was proper since
her brother Oscar Layno, a resident and registered voter of Barangay Buenlag,
Calasiao, Pangasinan, received the complaint and summons for and in her behalf.
After due proceedings, the trial court rendered a decision in favor of the
respondent.
The trial court declared that there was no valid service of the complaint and
summons on the respondent, the defendant in Civil Case No. 879, considering that
she left the Philippines on February 17, 1999 for Oslo, Norway, and her brother
Oscar Layno was never authorized to receive the said complaint and summons for
and in her behalf. The petitioner appealed the decision to the CA which, on May 6,
2003, rendered judgment affirming the appealed decision with modifications. The
CA ruled that the complaint in Civil Case No. 879 was one for ejectment, which is
an action quasi in rem. The appellate court ruled that since the defendant therein
was temporarily out of the country, the summons and the complaint should have
been served via extraterritorial service under Section 15 in relation to Section 16,
Rule 14 of the Rules of Court, which likewise requires prior leave of court.
Considering that there was no prior leave of court and none of the modes of service
prescribed by the Rules of Court was followed by the petitioner, the CA concluded
that there was really no valid service of summons and complaint upon the
respondent, the defendant in Civil Case No. 879.

Issue: Whether or not the action of the petitioner in the MTC against the
respondent herein is an action in personam or quasi in rem.|||

Holding: The settled rule is that the aim and object of an action determine its
character. Whether a proceeding is in rem, or in personam, or quasi in rem for that
matter, is determined by its nature and purpose, and by these only. A proceeding in
personam is a proceeding to enforce personal rights and obligations brought
against the person and is based on the jurisdiction of the person, although it may
involve his right to, or the exercise of ownership of, specific property, or seek to
compel him to control or dispose of it in accordance with the mandate of the
court. The purpose of a proceeding in personam is to impose, through the judgment
of a court, some responsibility or liability directly upon the person of the
defendant. Of this character are suits to compel a defendant to specifically perform
some act or actions to fasten a pecuniary liability on him. An action in personam is
said to be one which has for its object a judgment against the person, as
distinguished from a judgment against the propriety to determine its state. It has
been held that an action in personam is a proceeding to enforce personal rights or
obligations; such action is brought against the person. As far as suits for injunctive
relief are concerned, it is well-settled that it is an injunctive act in
personam. In Combs v. Combs, the appellate court held that proceedings to enforce
personal rights and obligations and in which personal judgments are rendered
adjusting the rights and obligations between the affected parties is in personam.
Actions for recovery of real property are in personam.
On the other hand, a proceeding quasi in rem is one brought against persons
seeking to subject the property of such persons to the discharge of the claims
assailed. In an action quasi in rem, an individual is named as defendant and the
purpose of the proceeding is to subject his interests therein to the obligation or loan
burdening the property. Actions quasi in rem deal with the status, ownership or
liability of a particular property but which are intended to operate on these
questions only as between the particular parties to the proceedings and not to
ascertain or cut off the rights or interests of all possible claimants. The judgments
therein are binding only upon the parties who joined in the action.
An action for unlawful detainer or forcible entry is a real action and in
personam because the plaintiff seeks to enforce a personal obligation or liability on
the defendant under Article 539 of the New Civil Code, for the latter to vacate the
property subject of the action, restore physical possession thereof to the plaintiff,
and pay actual damages by way of reasonable compensation for his use or
occupation of the property.|||
On the issue of whether the respondent was validly served with the summons and
complaint by the Sheriff on April 5, 1999, the petitioner asserts that since her
action of forcible entry against the respondent in Civil Case No. 879 was in
personam, summons may be served on the respondent, by substituted service,
through her brother, Oscar Layno, in accordance with Section 7, Rule 14 of
the Rules of Court. The petitioner avers that Oscar Layno, a person of suitable age
and discretion, was residing in the house of the respondent on April 5, 1999. She
avers that the fact that the house was leased to and occupied by Eduardo Gonzales
was of no moment. Moreover, the Sheriff is presumed to have performed his duty
of properly serving the summons on the respondent by substituted service. There is
no showing that as of April 5, 1999, the house where the Sheriff found Oscar
Layno was the latter's residence or that of the respondent herein. Neither is there
any showing that the Sheriff tried to ascertain where the residence of the
respondent was on the said date. It turned out that the occupant of the house was a
lessor, Eduardo Gonzales, and that Oscar Layno was in the premises only to collect
the rentals from him. The service of the summons on a person at a place where he
was a visitor is not considered to have been left at the residence or place or abode,
where he has another place at which he ordinarily stays and to which he intends to
return.|||

Z. Go v. UCPB
G.R. No. 156187, November 11, 2004

Facts: Petitioner Jimmy T. Go and Alberto T. Looyuko are co-owners of Noah's

Ark International, Noah's Ark Sugar Carriers, Noah's Ark Sugar Truckers, Noah's
Ark Sugar Repacker, Noah's Ark Sugar Insurers, Noah's Ark Sugar Terminal,
Noah's Ark Sugar Building, and Noah's Ark Sugar Refinery. Sometime in August
1996, petitioner Jimmy T. Go and Alberto T. Looyuko applied for an Omnibus
Line accommodation with respondent United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB) in
the amount of Nine Hundred Million (P900,000,000) Pesos, and was favorably
acted upon by the latter.
The transaction was secured by Real Estate Mortgages over parcels of land,
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 64070, located at Mandaluyong
City with an area of 24,837 square meters, and registered in the name of Mr.
Looyuko; and TCT No. 3325, also located at Mandaluyong City with an area of
14,271 square meters, registered in the name of Noah's Ark Sugar Refinery. The
approved Omnibus Line accommodation granted to petitioner was subsequently
cancelled by respondent UCPB. As a consequence, petitioner Jimmy T. Go
demanded from UCPB the return of the two (2) TCTs (No. 64070 and No. 3325)
covered by Real Estate Mortgages earlier executed. UCPB refused to return the
same and proceeded to have the two (2) pre-signed Real Estate Mortgages
notarized on 22 July 1997 and caused the registration thereof before the Registry of
Deeds of Mandaluyong City on 02 September 1997.
UCPB filed with the Office of the Clerk of Court and Ex-Officio Sheriff of
Mandaluyong City an extrajudicial foreclosure of real estate mortgage covered by
TCT No. 64070, for nonpayment of the obligation secured by said mortgage. As a
result, the public auction sale of the mortgaged property was set on 11 April 2000
and 03 May 2000.

Procedural History: To protect his interest, petitioner Jimmy T. Go filed a

complaint for Cancellation of Real Estate Mortgage and damages, with prayer for
temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction. Respondent
bank, instead of filing an answer, filed a motion to dismiss based on the following
grounds: 1) that the court has no jurisdiction over the case due to nonpayment of
the proper filing and docket fees; 2) that the complaint was filed in the wrong
venue; 3) an indispensable party/real party in interest was not impleaded and,
therefore, the complaint states no cause of action; 4) that the complaint was
improperly verified; and 5) that petitioner is guilty of forum shopping and
submitted an insufficient and false certification of non-forum shopping.
The trial court issued an order granting petitioner's application for a writ of
preliminary injunction. Correspondingly, the auction sale, scheduled on 11 April
2000 and 03 May 2000, was enjoined. The trial court denied respondent bank's
motion to dismiss Civil Case No. 67878. A motion for reconsiderationwas filed,
but the same was likewise denied.
Respondent bank questioned said orders before the Court of Appeals via a petition
for certiorari alleging that the trial court acted without or in excess of jurisdiction
or with grave abuse of discretion in issuing an order denying the motion to dismiss
and the motion for reconsideration thereof. The CA set aside the Orders ssued by
the trial court and directed the trial court to dismiss Civil Case No. 67878 on the
ground of improper venue. A motion for reconsideration was filed by petitioner
which was, however, denied.

Issue: The issue to be resolved in this case is whether petitioner's complaint for
cancellation of real estate mortgage is a personal or real action for the purpose of
determining venue. |||

Holding: In a real action, the plaintiff seeks the recovery of real property, or as
provided for in Section 1, Rule 4, a real action is an action affecting title to or
possession of real property, or interest therein. These include partition or
condemnation of, or foreclosure of mortgage on, real property. The venue for real
actions is the same for regional trial courts and municipal trial courts — the court
which has territorial jurisdiction over the area where the real property or any part
thereof lies.
Personal action is one brought for the recovery of personal property, for the
enforcement of some contract or recovery of damages for its breach, or for the
recovery of damages for the commission of an injury to the person or property. The
venue for personal actions is likewise the same for the regional and municipal trial
courts — the court of the place where the plaintiff or any of the principal plaintiffs
resides, or where the defendant or any of the principal defendants resides, at the
election of the plaintiff, as indicated in Section 2 of Rule 4.
Petitioner in this case contends that a case for cancellation of mortgage is a
personal action and since he resides at Pasig City, venue was properly laid therein.
He tries to make a point by alluding to the case of Francisco S. Hernandez v. Rural
Bank of Lucena.
Petitioner's reliance in the case of Francisco S. Hernandez v. Rural Bank of Lucena
is misplaced. Firstly, said case was primarily an action to compel the mortgagee
bank to accept payment of the mortgage debt and to release the mortgage. That
action, which is not expressly included in the enumeration found in Section 2(a) of
Rule 4 of the Old Civil Procedure and now under Section 1, Rule 4 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure, does not involve titles to the mortgaged lots. It is a
personal action and not a real action. The mortgagee has not foreclosed the
mortgage. The plaintiffs' title is not in question. They are in possession of the
mortgaged lots. Hence, the venue of the plaintiffs' personal action is the place
where the defendant or any of the defendants resides or may be found, or where the
plaintiff or any of the plaintiffs resides, at the election of the plaintiff. In the case at
bar, the action for cancellation of real estate mortgage filed by herein petitioner
was primarily an action to compel private respondent bank to return to him the
properties covered by TCTs No. 64070 and No. 3325 over which the bank had
already initiated foreclosure proceedings because of the cancellation by the said
respondent bank of the omnibus credit line on 21 July 1997. The prime objective is
to recover said real properties. Secondly, Carandang distinctly articulated that the
ruling in Hernandez does not apply where the mortgaged property had already
been foreclosed. Here, and as correctly pointed out by the appellate court,
respondent bank had already initiated extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings, and
were it not for the timely issuance of a restraining order secured by petitioner Go in
the lower court, the same would have already been sold at a public auction.|||

AA. Cabutihan v. Landcenter Construction

G.R. No. 146594, June 10, 2002

Facts: Petitioner filed an action for specific performance with damages against the
respondent before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City praying, inter alia, that
the respondent be ordered to execute the necessary deeds of transfer and
conveyance of a portion of a property situated in Kay-biga, Parañaque, Metro
Manila covered under TCT No. S-30409, corresponding to 36.5 percent of its total
area, as compensation for the undertakings she and her companions had performed
and accomplished in favor of the respondent.

Procedural History: The RTC dismissed the complaint on grounds of improper

venue, non-joinder of necessary parties, and nonpayment of the proper docket
fees. In so ruling, it held that the allegations in the Complaint show that its primary
objective was to recover real property. Equally important, the prayer was to
compel respondent to execute the necessary deeds of transfer and conveyance of a
portion of the property corresponding to 36.5 percent of its total area or, in the
alternative, to hold respondent liable for the value of the said portion, based on the
prevailing market price. The RTC further ruled that, since the suit would affect the
title to the property, it should have been instituted in the trial court where the
property was situated. Furthermore, the action was filed only by petitioner. There
was no allegation that she had been authorized by Forro, Radan and Anave to
represent their respective shares in the compensation. Finally, since this case was
an action in rem, it was imperative for petitioner to pay the appropriate docket or
filing fees equivalent to the pecuniary value of her claim, a duty she failed to
discharge. Consequently, following Manchester Development Corp. v. Court of
Appeals, the trial court never acquired jurisdiction over the case.

Issue: Whether or not the RTC erred in dismissing the case on the ground of
improper venue, non-joinder of necessary parties, and non-payment of docket fees.

Holding: Actions affecting title to or possession of real property or an interest

therein (real actions) shall be commenced and tried in the proper court that has
territorial jurisdiction over the area where the real property is situated. On the other
hand, all other actions (personal actions) shall be commenced and tried in the
proper courts where the plaintiff or any of the principal plaintiffs resides or where
the defendant or any of the principal defendants resides. In the present case,
petitioner sought payment of her services in accordance with the undertaking the
parties signed. Breach of contract gives rise to a cause of action for specific
performance or for rescission.
The Court held that neither a misjoinder nor a non-joinder of parties is a ground for
the dismissal of an action because parties may be dropped or added by order of the
court, on motion of any party or on the court's own initiative at any stage of the
action. The RTC should have ordered the joinder of such party, and non-
compliance with the said order would have been ground for dismissal of the action.
Moreover, the non-inclusion of a necessary party does not prevent the court from
proceeding with the action, and the judgment rendered therein shall be without
prejudice to the rights of such party.
Anent the non-filing of appropriate docket fee, the Court clarified that the Rule
requiring that the assessed value of the real estate, subject of an action, should be
considered in computing the filing fees, does not apply to an action for specific
performance which is classified as an action not capable of pecuniary estimation,
such as the case at bar. The Court granted the petition and ordered the remand of
the case to the court of origin.

BB. Gochan v. Gochan

G.R. No. 146089, December 13, 2001

Facts: Respondents filed a complaint against petitioners for specific performance

and damages with the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City. In their answers,
petitioners raised as affirmative defenses: lack of jurisdiction by the trial court for
non-payment of the correct docket fees, unenforceability of the obligation pursuant
to the Statute of Frauds, extinguishment of the obligation by payment, non-joinder
of indispensable parties and waiver, abandonment and renunciation by respondent
of all their claims against petitioners. Subsequently, petitioners filed with the trial
court a motion for a preliminary hearing on the affirmative defenses.

Procedural History: The trial court denied the said motion. Petitioners filed a
petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals, but it was dismissed by the
appellate court.

Issue: Whether or not the CA erred in finding that the docket fees have been
correctly paid

Holding: The rule is well-settled that the court acquires jurisdiction over any case
only upon the payment of the prescribed docket fees. In the case of Sun Insurance
Office, Ltd. (SIOL) v. Asuncion, this Court held that it is not simply the filing of the
complaint or appropriate initiatory pleading, but the payment of the prescribed
docket fee that vests a trial court with jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature
of the action.
Respondents maintain that they paid the correct docket fees in the amount of
P165,000.00 when they filed the complaint with the trial court. Petitioners, on the
other hand, contend that the complaint is in the nature of a real action which affects
title to real properties; hence, respondents should have alleged therein the value of
the real properties which shall be the basis for the assessment of the correct docket
fees. The Court of Appeals found that the complaint was one for specific
performance and incapable of pecuniary estimation. We do not agree.
It is necessary to determine the true nature of the complaint in order to resolve the
issue of whether or not respondents paid the correct amount of docket fees
therefor. In this jurisdiction, the dictum adhered to is that the nature of an action is
determined by the allegations in the body of the pleading or complaint itself, rather
than by its title or heading. The caption of the complaint below was denominated
as one for "specific performance and damages." The relief sought, however, is the
conveyance or transfer of real property, or ultimately, the execution of deeds of
conveyance in their favor of the real properties enumerated in the provisional
memorandum of agreement. Under these circumstances, the case below was
actually a real action, affecting as it does title to or possession of real property.
Consequently, the basis for determining the correct docket fees shall be the
assessed value of the property, or the estimated value thereof as alleged by the
claimant. Rule 141, Section 7, of the Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 00-
2-01-SC.

CC. Tacay v. RTC of Tagum

G.R. No. 88075-77, December 20, 1989

Facts: In the Regional Trial Court at Tagum, Davao del Norte, three (3) actions for
recovery of possession were separately instituted by Godofredo Pineda against
three (3) defendants. The complaints all alleged the same essential facts: (1) Pineda
was the owner of a parcel of land measuring 790 square meters, his ownership
being evidenced by TCT No. T-46560; (2) the previous owner had allowed the
defendants to occupy portions of the land by mere tolerance; (3) having himself
need to use the property, Pineda had made demands on the defendants to vacate the
property and pay reasonable rentals therefor, but these demands had been refused;
and (4) the last demand had been made more than a year prior to the
commencement of suit. Motions to dismiss were filed in behalf of each of the
defendants by common counsel. Every motion alleged that the Trial Court had not
acquired jurisdiction of the case.

Procedural History: Judge Matas denied the motion to dismiss filed in Civil Case
No. 2210 but ordered the expunction of the "allegations in paragraph 11 of the . . .
complaint regarding moral as well as nominal damages." The motions to dismiss
submitted in Civil Cases 2211 and 2209 were also denied in separate orders
promulgated by Judge Marcial Fernandez.
Ascribing grave abuse of discretion to both Judges Matas and Fernandez in the
rendition of the Orders above described, the defendants in all three (3) actions have
filed with the Supreme Court a "Joint Petition" for certiorari, prohibition
and mandamus, with prayer for temporary restraining order and/or writ of
preliminary prohibitory injunction," praying essentially that said orders be annulled
and respondent judges directed to dismiss all the complaints "without prejudice to
private respondent Pineda's re-filing a similar complaint that complies with
Circular No. 7." The joint petition (a) re-asserted the proposition that because the
complaints had failed to state the amounts being claimed as actual, moral and
nominal damages, the Trial Courts a quo had not acquired jurisdiction over the
three (3) actions in question — indeed, the respondent Clerk of Court should not
have accepted the complaints which initiated said suits, and (b) it was not proper
merely to expunge the claims for damages and allow "the so-called cause of action
for 'reivindicatoria' to remain for trial" by itself.

Issue: Whether or not the RTC has jurisdiction

Holding: Under the Rules of Court, docket or filing fees are assessed on the basis
of the "sum claimed," on the one hand, or the "value of the property in litigation or
the value of the estate," on the other. There are, in other words, as already above
intimated, actions or proceedings involving real property, in which the value of the
property is immaterial to the court's jurisdiction, account thereof being taken
merely for assessment of the legal fees; and there are actions or proceedings,
involving personal property or the recovery of money and/or damages, in which
the value of the property or the amount of the demand is decisive of the trial court's
competence (aside from being the basis for fixing the corresponding docket fees).
Where the action is purely for the recovery of money or damages, the docket fees
are assessed on the basis of the aggregate amount claimed, exclusive only of
interests and costs. In this case, the complaint or similar pleading should, according
to Circular No. 7 of this Court, "specify the amount of damages being prayed for
not only in the body of the pleading but also in the prayer, and said damages shall
be considered in the assessment of the filing fees in any case."
Two situations may arise. One is where the complaint or similar pleading sets out a
claim purely for money or damages and there is no precise statement of the
amounts being claimed. In this event the rule is that the pleading will "not be
accepted nor admitted, or shall otherwise be expunged from the record." In other
words, the complaint or pleading may be dismissed, or the claims as to which the
amounts are unspecified may be expunged, although as aforestated the Court may,
on motion, permit amendment of the complaint and payment of the fees provided
the claim has not in the meantime become time-barred. The other is where the
pleading does specify the amount of every claim, but the fees paid are insufficient;
and here again, the rule now is that the court may allow a reasonable time for the
payment of the prescribed fees, or the balance thereof, and upon such payment, the
defect is cured and the court may properly take cognizance of the action, unless in
the meantime prescription has set in and consequently barred the right of action.
Where the action involves real property and a related claim for damages as well,
the legal fees shall be assessed on the basis of both (a) the value of the property
and (b) the total amount of related damages sought. The Court acquires jurisdiction
over the action if the filing of the initiatory pleading is accompanied by the
payment of the requisite fees, or, if the fees are not paid at the time of the filing of
the pleading, as of the time of full payment of the fees within such reasonable time
as the court may grant, unless, of course, prescription has set in the meantime. But
where — as in the case at bar — the fees prescribed for an action involving real
property have been paid, but the amounts of certain of the related damages (actual,
moral and nominal) being demanded are unspecified, the action may not be
dismissed. The Court undeniably has jurisdiction over the action involving the real
property, acquiring it upon the filing of the complaint or similar pleading and
payment of the prescribed fee. And it is not divested of that authority by the
circumstance that it may not have acquired jurisdiction over the accompanying
claims or damages because of lack of specification thereof. What should be done is
simply to expunge those claims for damages as to which no amounts are stated,
which is what the respondent Courts did, or allow, on motion, a reasonable time for
the amendment of the complaints so as to allege the precise amount of each item of
damages and accept payment of the requisite fees therefor within the relevant
prescriptive period.

DD. Redeña vs. Court of Appeals,

GR. 146611

Facts:
Petitioner, Tancredo Redeña, filed an action for partition against his older half-
brother, herein respondent Leocadio Redeña, before the CFI (now RTC) of San
Pablo City, Laguna, and was subsequently inherited by the RTC of Siniloan,
Laguna. The allegation in the complaint was that the both parties are sons of
Maximo Redeña; Tancredom by Maximo’s marriage to Magdalena Fernandez, and
Leocadio, by Maximo’s previous marriage to Emerenciana. There was also an
allegation that Maximo left several pieces of realty.

Procedural History:
The trial court rendered decision based on presented evidence ordering the
defendant to partition only the property located at Maate, Famy, Laguna after
plaintiff's reimbursement of the expenses incurred by the defendant in relation to
the said lot. However, partition cannot be effected with regard to properties located
at M. Calim Street, Famy, Laguna and the property located at Poroza, Famy,
Laguna, as the same belong to the defendant. No pronouncement as to costs.
Tancredo then filed with the trial court a Notice of Appeal. The court gave due
course to the notice and directed the elevation of the records of the case to the CA
whereat petitioner’s appeal was docketed as CA-G.R.CV No. 59641. The CA then
issued a resolution directing the petitioner to file his appellant’s brief, however,
even with the period of filing was extended, petitioner still failed to file the
appellant’s brief. Consequently, the CA issued a resolution considering the appeal
abandoned and dismissed. After 8 months, petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration thereof, the CA denied the motion. Petitioner filed a Petition for
Relief praying CA to set aside its dismissal, reinstate his appeal and grant him a
fresh period of forty-five (45) days from notice within which to file his appellant’s
brief, which the CA denied. Petitioner filed special civil action for certiorari under
Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure to SC.

Issue:
Whether or not the petition for relief should be granted.

Ruling:
No. The SC applied the settled principle that petition for relief under Rule 38 of the
Rules of Court is of equitable character, allowed only in exceptional cases as when
there is no other available or adequate remedy. Hence, a petition for relief may not
be availed of where a party has another adequate remedy available to him, which is
either a motion for new trial or appeal from the adverse decision of the lower court,
and he is not prevented from filing such motion or taking the appeal. The rule is
that relief will not be granted to a party who seeks to be relieved from the effect of
the judgment when the loss of the remedy at law is due to his own negligence, or a
mistaken mode of procedure; otherwise, the petition for relief will be tantamount to
reviving the right of appeal which has already been lost either because of
inexcusable negligence or due to a mistake in the mode of procedure taken by
counsel.

Conclusion:
Therefore, Petitioner is not entitled to relief under Rule 38, Section 2 of the Rules
of Court. In the case at bar, he failed to file his notice of appeal due to fraud,
accident, mistake or excusable negligence, as in fact he filed one. As a general
rule, the relief afforded by Rule 38 will not be granted to a party who seeks to be
relieved from the effects of the judgment when the loss of the remedy of law was
due to his own negligence, or a mistaken mode of procedure for that matter;
otherwise, the petition for relief will be tantamount to reviving the right of appeal
which has already been lost, either because of inexcusable negligence or due to a
mistake of procedure by counsel.

EE. Juana Complex Homeowners vs. Fil-Estate Land,

GR. 152272 and GR. 152397

Facts:
The petitioner, Juana Complex Homeowners (JCHA), instituted a complaint for
damages in its own behalf and as a class suit representing the regular commuters
and motorists of JCHI and neighbouring subdivisions. They contented in the
complaint that they were deprived of the use of La Paz Road (the Road) against
Fil-Estate. The complaint alleged that JCHA et al were regular commuters and
motorists who travelled towards Manila and Calamba; they used SLEX by passing
through the right-of-way, the stated Road; they used the Road for more than (10)
years; that Fil-Estate destroyed the Road that led to SLEX so JCHA, et al. would
not be able to pass through the road; that the Road was restored by residents but it
was excavated again; that JCHA reported the matter to the Municipal Government
whom failed to repair the road; and that the Road caused damage to them because
traffic was re-routed to congested areas and its permanent closure would prejudice
their right to free us of the property.

Procedural History:
JCHA prayed for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and Writ of
Preliminary Injuction to enjoin Fil-Estate from stopping and intimidating them in
their use of the Road. Then the RTC granted the said Writ of Preliminary Injuction
of JCHA against Fil-Estate. Then the Fil-Estate filed an Motion to dismiss arguing
that the complaint failed to state a cause of action and that it was improperly filed
as a class suit. The RTC then issued two orders denying Fil-Estate’s Motion to
dismiss and their Motion for Reconsideration of the Temporary Restraining Order
and Writ of Preliminary Injuction. Fil-Estate filed a petition for certiorari and
prohibition before the CA to annul the two orders, reiterating that the complaint
failed to state a cause of action and that it was improperly filed as a class suit. They
also assert that the Writ of Preliminary Injuction was unwarranted since JCHA et al
failed to show that they had a clear and unmistakable right to use the Road and that
the Road was a torrens registered private road. The CA ruled that Fil-Estate was
correct in alleging the impropriety of the issuance of the Writ of Preliminary
Injuction and it was rendered void. The CA upheld the sufficiency of the CoA
when JCHA, et al. alleged in their complaint that they had been using the Road for
more than (10) years and that their right was violated when Fil-Estate closed and
excavated the Road. It also sustained the RTC ruling that a class suit was properly
filed since it was shown that the case was of common interest and that the
individuals represented were so numerous that it was impractical to include all of
them as parties. Hence the current petition of both parties. JCHA argues that the
complaint sufficiently stated a cause of action when they proved that the Road was
a public road burdened by an easement of public right of way and that commuters
had used the road as a means of access to SLEX. They also argue that their right to
use the Road was undeniable, and that the Writ of Preliminary Injuction was
proper. Fil-Estate argues that the Road was covered by a TCT all registered in the
name of La Paz, in order to provide a passageway for projects to the south. They
allege that after the projects were finished. The available lots were converted to
public roads and became open for public use. It was even donated to the Municipal
Government. They argue that the Writ of Preliminary Injuction should not have
been issued since the Road was a registered private road, and that there was neither
a voluntary not legal easement to entitle JCHA et al the right to issue a Writ of
Preliminary Injuction. Finally, they also state that the class suit was improperly
filed since each of the petitioners had a separate and distinct purpose and each may
be affected differently than others.

Issue:
Whether or not the petitioners sufficiently stated their cause of action.

Ruling:
Yes. The Court finds the allegations in the complaint sufficient to establish a cause
of action. Under Rule 2 Section 2 of the Rules of Court, the essential elements of a
cause of action are: legal right of the plaintiff; correlative obligation of the
defendant; act or omission of the defendant in violation of said legal right. The
question of whether the complaint states a cause of action is determined by the
averments regarding the acts committed by the defendant. It must contain a concise
statement of the ultimate or essential facts constituting the plaintiff’s cause of
action.

Conclusion:
Petition is denied.

FF. Samson vs. Sps. Gabor,

GR. 182970

Facts:
Respondents, spouses Gabor, are the registered owners of a parcel of land located
at Tanay, Rizal. In 1985, the spouses Gabor executed a Deed of Assignment
transferring undivided portion of the aforementioned parcel of land in favor of
petitioner Emiliano Samson as attorney’s fee in payment for the services rendered
by the latter to the former. After sometime, Emiliano Samson executed a Deed of
Asssignment transferring the same undivided portion in favor of Ma. Remedios P.
Ramos. Upon learning of the sale, respondents filed an action for legal redemption
with the RTC of Tanay, Rizal. Immediately thereafter, petitioner Samson and
Ramos executed an Agreement of Rescission revoking the transfer of the
undivided portion. On April 4, 2006, petitioner Samson filed a Complaint before
the RTC of Pasig City for Recovery of Property or its Value against respondent
spouses, Tanay Rural Bank, Inc., and the Register of Deeds of Morong, Rizal,
claiming that he had been paying his one-third (1/3) share of realty taxes covering
the subject portion of land for the years 2002 to 2004. In 2005, however, his
payment was rejected by the Municipal Treasurer of Tanay, Rizal, at such time he
discovered that respondent spouses had already mortgaged the entire property in
favor of respondent Bank back in November 2002.

Procedural History:
The RTC dismissed the suit for legal redemption. On appeal, however, the CA, in
CA-G.R. CV No.25530, reversed the decision of the RTC and upheld the Spouses
Gabor’s right of legal redemption. No further appeals were pursued. Petitioner
Samson filed an action for Partition of Real Property and Damages against
respondent spouses with the RTC of Morong, Rizal, which dismissed the same on
the ground that the finality of CA-G.R. CV No. 25530 effectively barred the action
for partition. The RTC of Pasig City dismissed the complaint on the grounds of
improper venue, res judicata, and that the complaint states no cause of action. It
held that the suit is a real action which should be filed in the RTC of Morong,
Rizal, where the property subject of the case is situated. Moreover, the lower court
pointed out that as early as 1991, herein petitioner had already filed a Complaint
for Partition of Real Property and Damages involving the same subject property
against the same parties, which complaint was already dismissed by this Court with
finality. Thus, the principle of res judicata applies. Finally, the trial court held that
petitioner’s complaint states no cause of action against herein respondent Bank as
it does not allege any details as to the liability or any violation of petitioner’s
rights.

Issue:
Whether or not there is cause of action.

Ruling:
No. While the complaint was denominated as one for “Recovery of Property or its
Value,” all of his claims are actually anchored on his claim of ownership over the
portion of property. Therefore, the case is a real action and should have been filed
in the RTC in Rizal, not Pasig. Moreover, petitioner failed to specify details of his
cause of action against respondent Bank, and bare allegation is insufficient to
establish any right or cause of action.
Conclusion:
Petition is denied.

GG. Del Rosario vs. Far East Bank and Trust Company,
GR. 150134

Facts:
A loan agreement entered into by the Petitioner Davao Timber Corporation
(DATICOR) and respondent Private Development Corporation of the Philippines
(PDCP) where the latter extended to the former a total amount of P4.4 million. The
loan agreement provided, among other things, that DATICOR shall pay: a service
fee of one percent (1%) per annum (later increased to six percent [6%] per annum)
on the outstanding balance of the peso loan; 12 percent (12%) per annum interest
on the peso loan; and penalty charges of two percent (2%) per month in case of
default. The loans were secured by real estate mortgages over six parcels of land,
one of which is the Otis property owned by Ernesto Del Rosario and by chattel
mortgages over pieces of machinery and equipment. DATICOR paid P3 million
but it was applied by PDCP as payment for interest, service fee and penalty
charges. This allegedly left DATICOR an outstanding balance of P10 million. In a
deed of assignment between PDCP and its co-respondent, Far East Bank and Trust
Company (FEBTC), the former assigned receivables to the latter from petitioners.
Being an assignee of receivables, FEBTC and petitioner DATICOR executed
Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) where DATICOR agreed to pay P6.4 million
as full settlement of the receivables to FEBTC. It was determined in a case that
DATICOR overpaid P5 million to FEBTC. It should have only paid P1.4 million
and not P6.4 million. This made DATICOR to file a complaint before RTC Makati
for sum of money against the two, mainly to recover the excess payment of P4.335
million from PDCP and P965,000 from FEBTC. RTC Makati ruled in favour of
DATICOR in so far only as ordering PDCP to refund DATICOR P4.335 million
and to cancel the mortgages.

Procedural History:
DATICOR filed a complaint before RTC Makati for sum of money against the
two, mainly to recover the excess payment of P4.335 million from PDCP and
P965,000 from FEBTC. RTC Makati ruled in favour of DATICOR in so far only
as ordering PDCP to refund DATICOR P4.335 million and to cancel the
mortgages. However, in so far as FEBTC is concerned, the trial court held that it
was not a party to the case. The Court of Appeals rendered a decision holding
FEBTC liable to refund the excess payment of P5 million by virtue of the doctrine
of solution indebiti. Since FEBTC was the one that received the excess amount, it
is only right and just that it refunds it. However, the CA also ruled that FEBTC’s
liability should only be P965,000 and not P5 million because it is the amount
which DATICOR originally claimed in its complaint. The CA is powerless to grant
a relief different from the one that is originally prayed for. The CA’s decision has
become final and executory. Petitioner DATICOR filed a new complaint before
RTC Makati to recover the whole excess amount it paid, this time against FEBTC.
FEBTC contended that it has already paid an amount of P965,000 as ordered by
the CA in the first case, hence, DATICOR is barred from claiming more. The
complaint was denied by RTC Makati on the ground of res judicata and splitting of
cause of action.

Issue:
Whether or not the complaint is dismissible on the ground of res judicata and
splitting of the case.

Ruling:
Yes. First rule of res judicata known as “bar by prior judgment” or “estoppel by
judgment,” is one which makes the judgment rendered in the first case an absolute
bar to the subsequent action since that judgment is conclusive not only as to the
matters offered and received to sustain it but also as to any other matter which
might have been offered for that purpose and which could have been adjudged
therein.

The case at bar satisfies the four essential requisites of “bar by prior judgment,”
viz: (a) finality of the former judgment, (b) the court which rendered it had
jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties, (c) it must be a judgment on the
merits, and (d) there must be, between the first and second actions, identity of
parties, subject matter and causes of action.

Conclusion:
The Petition is denied. There is no doubt that the judgment on appeal relative to the
first complaint was a final judgment. Not only did it dispose of the case on the
merits, it also became executory as a consequence of the denial of Far East‘s
motion for reconsideration and appeal. Neither is there room to doubt that the
judgment in the first complaint was on the merits for it determined the rights and
liabilities of the parties.
 HH. Progressive Dev’t Corp. vs. Court of Appeals
GR. 123555

Facts:
Westin Seafood Market to file a complaint against Progressive for forcible entry
with damages before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City. Petitioner,
Progressive Development Corporation, leased to private respondent, Westin
Seafood Market, Inc., a parcel of land with a commercial building thereon located
at Araneta Center, Cubao, Quezon City, for a period of nine (9) years and three (3)
months with a monthly rental ofapproximately P600,000.00. Private respondent
failed to pay its rentals amounting to P8,608,284.66. Admittedly, non-payment of
rentals constituted breach of their contract; thus, pursuant to the express authority
granted petitioner under the lease agreement, petitioner repossessed the leased
premises, inventoried the movable properties found within and owned by private
respondent and scheduled public auction for the sale of the movables with notice to
Westin Seafood Market.

Procedural History:
A complaint against Progressive filed by private respondent for forcible entry with
damages before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City. Then the Court
issued a temporary restraining order (TRO) to enjoin the selling of Westin Seafood
Market’s properties. The parties agreed, among other things, that Westin will pay
its back rentals and hence, Progressive will defer the sale of properties of Westin.
Westin still did not pay its back rentals. This case was still pending before the
MTC when Westin Seafood Market instituted before the RTC of Quezon City
another action for damages against Progressive, which the latter moved to dismiss
on the ground of litis pendencia and forum shopping but to no avail. The same fate
awaited Progressive before the Court of Appeals which dismissed his special civil
action for certiorari and prohibition due to its failure to file a motion for
reconsideration of the RTC order. Hence, Progressive found its way to the
Supreme Court on petition for review on certiorari.

Issue:
Whether or not a motion for reconsideration should have been first filed before
resorting to certiorari.

Ruling:
No. While generally a motion for reconsideration must first be filed before
resorting to Certiorari in order to give the lower court an opportunity to correct the
errors imputed to it this rule admits of exceptions and is not intended to be applied
without considering the circumstances of the case. The filing of the motion for
reconsideration before availing of the remedy of certiorari is not sine qua non when
the issue raised is one purely of law, or where the error is patent or the disputed
order is void, or the questions raised on certiorari are the same as those already
squarely presented to and passed upon by the lower court.

Conclusion:
The Petition is denied.

II. Joseph vs. Bautista

GR. L-41423

Facts:
Patrocinio Perez is the owner of a cargo truck for conveying cargoes and
passengers for a consideration from Dagupan City to Manila. On January 12, 1973,
said cargo truck driven by defendant Domingo Villa was on its way to Valenzuela,
Bulacan from Pangasinan. Petitioner Joseph was a paying passenger in a cargo
truck. The cargo truck tried to overtake a tricycle proceeding in the same direction.
At the same time, a pick-up truck tried to overtake the cargo truck, thus the cargo
truck was forced to veer towards the shoulder of the road & rammed a mango tree
in the process. As a result, Joseph sustained a bone fracture in one of his legs.

Procedural History:
Petitioner filed a complaint for damages against respondent Patrocinio Perez, as
owner of the cargo truck, based on a breach of contract of carriage and against
respondents Antonio Sioson and Lazaro Villanueva, as owner and driver,
respectively, of the pick-up truck, based on quasi-delict. Respondent Sioson filed
his answer alleging that he is not and never was an owner of the pick-up truck and
neither would he acquire ownership thereof in the future.-On September 24, 1973,
petitioner, with prior leave of court, filed his amended complaint impleading
respondents Jacinto Pagarigan and ascertain Rosario Vargas as additional
alternative defendants.-Petitioner apparently could not ascertain who the real
owner of said cargo truck was, whether respondents Patrocinio Perez or Rosario
Vargas, and who was the real owner of said pick-up truck, whether respondents
Antonio Sioson or Jacinto Pagarigan.-Respondent Perez filed her amended answer
with crossclaim against herco-defendants for indemnity and subrogation in the
event she is ordered to pay petitioner's claim, and therein impleaded cross-
defendant Alberto Cardeno as additional alternative defendant.
On September 27, 1974, respondents Lazaro Villanueva, Alberto Cardeno, Antonio
Sioson and Jacinto Pagarigan, thru their insurer, Insurance Corporation of the
Philippines, paid petitioner's claim for injuries sustained in the amount of P
1,300.00.By reason thereof, petitioner executed a release of claim releasing from
liability the following parties, viz: Insurance Corporation of the Philippines,
Alberto Cardeno, Lazaro Villanueva, Antonio Sioson and Jacinto Pagarigan. On
December 2, 1974, respondents Lazaro Villanueva, Alberto Cardeno and their
insurer, the Insurance Corporation of the Philippines, paid respondent Patrocinio
Perez' claim for damages to her cargo truck in the amount of
P7,420.61.Consequently, respondents Sioson, Pagarigan, Cardeno and Villanueva
filed a "Motion to Exonerate and Exclude Defs/ Cross defs. Alberto Cardeno,
Lazaro Villanueva, Antonio Sioson and Jacinto Pagarigan on the Instant Case",
alleging that respondents Cardeno and Villanueva already paid P7,420.61 by way
of damages to respondent Perez, and alleging further that respondents Cardeno,
Villanueva, Sioson and Pagarigan paid P 1,300.00 to petitioner by way of amicable
settlement. Thereafter, respondent Perez filed her "Opposition to Cross- defs'
motion dated Dec. 2, 1974 and Counter Motion" to dismiss. The so-called counter
motion to dismiss was premised on the fact that the release of claim executed by
petitioner in favor of the other respondents inured to the benefit of respondent
Perez, considering that all the respondents are solidarity liable to herein petitioner.
On July 8, 1975, respondent judge issued the questioned order dismissing the case,
and a motion for the reconsideration thereof was denied. Hence, this appeal,
petitioner contending that respondent judge erred in declaring that the release of
claim executed by petitioner in favor of respondents Sioson, Villanueva and
Pagarigan inured to the benefit of respondent Perez; ergo, it likewise erred in
dismissing the case.

Issue:
Whether or not the judgment on the compromise agreement under the cause of
action based on quasi-delict is not a bar to the cause of action for breach of
contract of carriage.

Ruling:
No. The Court held that the judgment on the compromise agreement under the
cause of action based on quasi-delict, is not a bar to the cause of action for breach
of contract of carriage, is untenable. A cause of action is understood to be the delict
or wrongful act or omission committed by the defendant in violation of the primary
rights of the plaintiff. It is true that a single act or omission can be violative of
various rights at the same time, as when the act constitutes juridically a violation of
several separate and distinct legal obligations. However, where there is only one
delict or wrong, there is but a single cause of action regardless of the number of
rights that may have been violated belonging to one person. The singleness of a
cause of action lies in the singleness of the delict or wrong violating the rights of
one person.

Conclusion:
Petition is granted. The respondents having been found to be solidarity liable to
petitioner, the full payment made by some of the solidary debtors and their
subsequent release from any and all liability to petitioner inevitably resulted in the
extinguishment and release from liability of the other solidary debtors, including
herein respondent Patrocinio Perez. The claim that there was an agreement entered
in to between the parties during the pre-trial conference that, after such payment
made by the other respondents, the case shall proceed as against respondent Perez
is both incredible and unsubstantiated. There is nothing in the records to show,
either by way of a pre-trial order, minutes or a transcript of the notes of the alleged
pre-trial hearing.

JJ. Flores vs. Mallare-Philipps

GR. L-66620

Facts:
The petitioner, Flores, sued the respondents for the collection of sums of money
with the RTC. The first cause of action alleged in the complaint was against
respondent Ignacio Binongcal for refusing to pay the amount of P11,643.00
representing cost of truck tires which he purchased on credit from petitioner. The
second cause of action was against respondent Fernando Calion for allegedly
refusing to pay the amount of P10,212.00 representing cost of truck tires which he
purchased on credit from petitioner. The counsel for respondent Binongcal filed a
Motion to Dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction since the amount of the
demand against said respondent was only P11,643.00, and under Section 19(8) of
BP 129 the regional trial court shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction if the
amount of the demand is more than twenty thousand pesos P20,000.00. Petitioner
Flores has appealed by certiorari from the order of Judge Heilia S. Mallare-
Phillipps of the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City and Benguet Province which
dismissed his complaint for lack of jurisdiction. The order appealed from states
that the first cause of action alleged in the complaint was against respondent
Ignacion Binongcal for refusing to pay the amount of P11,643.00 representing the
cost of truck tires which he purchased on credit from petition on various occasions;
and the second cause of action was against respondent Fernando Calion for
allegedly refusing to pay the amount of P10,212.00 representing the cost of truck
tires which he purchased on credit from petitioner on various occasions.
Procedural History:
The counsel for respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction since the amount of the demand against said respondent is less than
P20,000.00 which is the jurisdictional amount in order for RTC to exercise original
jurisdiction of the case under section 19(8) of BP 129. It was further averred in
said motion that although another person, Calion, was allegedly indebted to
petitioner in the amount of P10,212.00, his obligation was separate and distinct
from that of the other respondent. At the hearing, counsel for respondent Calion
joined in moving for the dismissal of the complaint on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction. The trial court dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction. Hence,
the instant petition for certiorari.

Issue:
Whether or not the trial court correctly ruled on the application of the permissive
joinder of Parties.

Ruling:
No. In cases of permissive joinder of parties, whether as plaintiffs or as defendants,
under Section 6 of Rule 3, the total of all the claims shall now furnish the
jurisdictional test. Needless to state also, if instead of joining or being joined in one
complaint separate actions are filed by or against the parties, the amount demanded
in each complaint shall furnish the jurisdictional test.

Conclusion:
The order appealed from is affirmed.

KK. Lourdes Suites vs. Binaro

GR. 204729

Facts:
The petitioner Lourdes Suites who is the owner and operator of a hotel located
along Kalayaan Avenue, Makati City executed two (2) contracts with respondent
Noemi Binarao for room accommodations for two groups of students. According
to petitioner's records, respondent was able to pay the total contract price
P4,262,010.00. However, petitioner claimed that there was an unpaid balance of
P47,810.00 representing the charges for damages to the furniture, a lost key and
excess guests. Thus, on 25 July 2011, petitioner sent a demand letter to respondent
for the unsettled amount. Respondent failed to pay the amount, prompting
petitioner to file a Statement of Claim for collection of sums of money plus
damages before the MeTC. In her Response, respondent alleged that she is not
obliged to pay the claimed amount because petitioner billed the charges twice.
Petitioner then impugned the validity of the Response, stating that "it was not made
in the form of an Answer as required by Section 1, Rule 11 of the Revised Rules of
Court."

Procedural History:
The MeTC dismissed the complaint with prejudice for lack of cause of action. It
found that plaintiff failed to successfully prove by preponderance of evidence the
existence of an obligation in its favour and that the defendant has an unpaid
account in the amount of P47,810.00. Defendant, on the other hand, confirmed that
she requested plaintiff several times to make a proper accounting to include
specifically the actual number of student/s who stayed in the hotel and the number
of rooms actually used by the students. Defendant even asked for a computation of
the unpaid amount but was continuously ignored by the plaintiff. It would appear
therefore that the defendant has already paid her monetary obligation and even
made an overpayment in the amount of Php43,060.00. Petitioner filed a petition for
certiorari before the RTC. Petitioner argued that "a dismissal based on the ground
that the complaint states no cause of action cannot be deemed a dismissal with
prejudice under the Rules." Petitioner further argued that lack of cause of action is
not a valid ground for dismissal of case, much more a dismissal with prejudice.
RTC ruled against petitioner and found that there was no grave abuse of discretion
on the part of the MeTC. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration which was
denied by the RTC.

Issue:
Whether or not dismissal was proper.

Ruling:
Yes. The basis of the respondent in dismissing the complaint for lack of cause of
action is the failure of petitioner to preponderantly establish its claim against the
private respondent by clear and convincing evidence. The dismissal with prejudice
was not an exercise of wanton or palpable discretion. It must be noted that the case
was an action for small claims where decisions are rendered final and
unappealable, hence, decision dismissing the same is necessarily with prejudice.

Conclusion:
The Petition is denied.
 LL. Pacana-Contreras vs. Rovila Water Supply
GR. 168979

Facts:
Petitioners, Rebecca Pacaña-Contreras and Rosalie Pacaña, children of Lourdes
Teves Pacaña and Luciano Pacaña, filed a complaint against Rovila Inc., Earl,
Lilia, Dalla and Marisa for accounting and damages. Their family has long been
known in the community to be engaged in the water supply business; they operated
the "Rovila Water Supply" from their family residence and were engaged in the
distribution of water to customers in Cebu City. Petitioners alleged that Lilia, a
former trusted employee in the family business, allegedly hid business records,
burned and ransacked the family files, posted security guards and barred the
members of the Pacaña family from operating their business. She then claimed
ownership over the family business through a corporation named "Rovila Water
Supply, Inc." Rovila Inc. Upon inquiry with the SEC, the petitioners claimed that
Rovila Inc. was surreptitiously formed with the respondents as the majority
stockholders. The respondents did so by conspiring with one another and forming
the respondent corporation to takeover and illegally usurp the family business'
registered name. The respondents allegedly used the name of Lourdes as one of the
incorporators and made it appear in the SEC documents that the family business
was operated in a place other than the Pacaña residence. Thereafter, the
respondents used the Pacaña family's receipts and the deliveries and sales were
made to appear as those of the respondent Rovila Inc. using this scheme, the
respondents fraudulently appropriated the collections and payments.

Procedural History:
RTC: Petitioners filed the complaint in their own names although Rosalie was
authorized by Lourdes through a sworn declaration and special power of attorney
(SPA). The respondents filed a first motion to dismiss on the ground that the RTC
had no jurisdiction over an intra-corporate controversy. The RTC denied the
motion. During the pendency of the case, Lourdes died and the petitioners
amended their complaint, with leave of court. They still attached to their amended
complaint the sworn declaration with SPA, but the caption of the amended
complaint remained the same. Later on, Luciano also died. The respondents filed
their Answer. The petitioners' sister, Lagrimas Pacaña-Gonzales, filed a motion for
leave to intervene and her answer-in-intervention was granted by the trial court. At
the subsequent pre-trial, the respondents manifested to the RTC that a substitution
of the parties was necessary in light of the deaths of Lourdes and Luciano. They
further stated that they would seek the dismissal of the complaint because the
petitioners are not the real parties in interest to prosecute the case. The pre-trial
pushed through as scheduled and the RTC directed the respondents to put into
writing their earlier manifestation. The RTC issued a pre-trial order where one of
the issues submitted was whether the complaint should be dismissed for failure to
comply with Section 2, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court which requires that every
action must be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest.
CA: The respondents filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court with the CA, invoking grave abuse of discretion in the denial of their motion
to dismiss. They argued that the deceased spouses Luciano and Lourdes, not the
petitioners, were the real parties in interest. Thus, the petitioners violated Section
16, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court on the substitution of
parties. Furthermore, they seasonably moved for the dismissal of the case and the
RTC never acquired jurisdiction over the persons of the petitioners as heirs of
Lourdes and Luciano. CA granted the petition and ruled that the RTC committed
grave abuse of discretion as the petitioners filed the complaint and the amended
complaint as attorneys-in-fact of their parents. As such, Rebecca and Rosalie were
indeed not the real parties in interest because: (a) they filed the complaint as mere
attorneys-in-fact of their parents, and (b) they had no legal right to institute the
action in behalf of their parents because they have not yet been declared heirs at
the time the action was filed.
The CA further ruled that, in denying the motion to dismiss, the RTC judge acted
contrary to established rules and jurisprudence which may be questioned via a
petition for certiorari. Hence, the instant petition.

Issue:
Whether or not the CA erred when it reversed the RTC ruling and granted the
respondents’ second motion to dismiss based on failure to state a cause of action.

Ruling:
Yes. Respondents' second motion to dismiss based on failure to state a cause of
action should have been denied because it was filed out of time, and thus was
deemed to have been waived. As per the records, this motion was filed after an
Answer had been filed and after the conclusion of the pre-trial. There was therefore
no reason for the CA to have granted it. Also, contrary to the respondents' assertion
that they made a passing allegation (read: affirmative defense) in their Answer that
the Pacaña sisters were not the real parties-in- interest in the case, such an assertion
was nonetheless not supported by any evidence. It is basic that the respondents had
the duty to prove by substantial evidence their positive assertions. Clearly, other
than the respondents’ bare allegations, the CA had no basis to rule, without proof,
that the respondents alleged the grounds for dismissal as affirmative defenses in
their Answer.
Conclusion:
Petition is granted.

Golangco vs. Fung, GR. 157952

Facts:
The petitioner commenced a special civil action for certiorari C.A.-G.R. SP No.
66616 to assail the order issued by the Regional Trial Court in Criminal Case No.
95-145703 entitled People v. Jone B. Fung--prosecution for libel initiated by the
petitioner as the complainant against the respondent which was commenced in
1995. Allegedly, herein respondent had issued an office memorandum maliciously
imputing against the petitioner the commission of bribery and had sent copies of
the memorandum to the petitioner's superiors in the Philippine Overseas
Employment Administration (POEA) and to other public officers and personalities
not connected with the POEA. The RTC whereby declared the Prosecution to have
terminated the presentation of further evidence and required the Prosecution to file
a written offer of evidence within 20 days, furnishing a copy of the offer to the
accused who in turn had to comment on the offer within 15 days from receipt. The
Prosecution after almost 6 years had presented only two witnesses in Criminal
Case No. 95-145703 and continue to fail to present Atty. Oscar Ramos, Resident
Ombudsman of the POEA, to testify. Consequently, RTC judge issued an order
terminating the Prosecution's presentation of evidence.

Procedural History:
The petitioner assailed on certiorari in the Court of Appeals the order dated May
23, 2001, claiming that the RTC judge thereby committed grave abuse of
discretion for not issuing the subpoena to require Atty. Ramos to appear and testify
in the May 23, 2001 hearing. He contended that his prior request for the subpoena
for the February 20, 2001 hearing should have been treated as a continuing request
for the subpoena considering that the Rules of Court did not require a party to
apply for a subpoena again should it not be served in the first time. Court of
Appeals rebuffed the petitioner and dismissed the petition for certiorari. It held that
axiomatically, any request for a subpoena to a witness must indicate the date and
time when the witness must appear in court to give his or her testimony. It is based
on that request that the court personnel prepare the subpoena indicating the title of
the case, the date and time for the appearance of the intended witness.

Issue:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals correctly ruled on the petition for certiorari of
the petitioner.
Ruling:
Yes. First, he ignored that the People of the Philippines were indispensable parties
due to his objective being to set aside the trial court’s order The omission was fatal
and already enough cause for the summary rejection of his petition for certiorari.
Secondly, the petitioner did not also obtain the consent of the OSG to his petition
for certiorari. At the very least, he should have furnished a copy of the petition for
certiorari to the OSG prior to the filing.

Conclusion:
The Court of Appeals decision is affirmed.

MM. Equitable PCI Bank, Inc. vs. Heirs of Tiu

GR. 178529

Facts:
A loan obtained by Gabriel Ching from petitioner, Equitable PCI Bank the
aggregate amount of 7 million through Antonio C. Tiu of which herein respondents
allege to be heirs, executed on July 6, 1994 a Real Estate Mortgage (REM) in favor
of petitioner covering a lot located in Tacloban City. Before the words "With my
Marital Consent" appearing in the REM is a signature attributed to Antonio's wife
Matilde. Antonio executed an Amendment to the Real Estate Mortgage (AREM)
increasing the amount secured by the mortgage to P26 Million, also bearing a
signature attributed to his wife Matilde above the words "With my Marital
Consent". The property mortgaged was covered by TCT No. T-1381 of the
Tacloban Register of Deeds which, the AREM states, was "registered in the name
of the Mortgagor". On December 26, 1999, Antonio died and the loan obligation
remained unsettled. From the facts of the case, herein plaintiffs/petitioners are so
situated that they will either be benefited or injured in subject action. They are
therefore real parties in interest, as they will be dignified and injured or their
inheritance rights and interest on the subject property protected and preserved in
this action. As they are real parties in interest, they therefore have a cause of action
against herein defendant.

Procedural History:
Petitioner filed in November 2003 before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Tacloban City a "Petition for Sale" dated November 4, 2003, for the extrajudicial
foreclosure of the AREM and the sale at public auction of the lot covered thereby.
Acting on the petition, the RTC Clerk of Court and Ex- Oficio Sheriff scheduled
the public auction on December 17, 2003. A day before the scheduled auction sale
or on December 16, 2003, the herein respondents, Heirs of Antonio C. Tiu, namely
Arlene T. Fu, Michael U. Tiu, Andrew U. Tiu, Edgar U. Tiu, and Erwin U. Tiu,
filed a Complaint/Petition 7 before the RTC of Tacloban against petitioner and the
Clerk of Court-Ex Officio Sheriff, docketed as Civil Case No. 2003-12-205 for
annulment of the AREM, injunction with prayer for issuance of writ of preliminary
injunction and/or temporary restraining order and damages, alleging, among other
things. RTC issued a temporary restraining order, and subsequently, a writ of
preliminary injunction. Petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss. However, RTC denied
motion to dismiss and ordered petitioner to file answer within reglementary period.
Having been denied, Petitioner filed Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition, and
Mandamus with prayer for preliminary injunction before the Court of Appeals
which was also subsequently denied.
Issue:
Whether or not the petitioners not being the real parties-in-interest, their complaint
states no cause of action.
Ruling:
No. Petitioners are so situated that they will either be benefited or injured in
subject action. They are therefore real parties in interest, as they will be injured or
their inheritance rights and interest on the subject property protected and preserved
in this action. It is thus she, following Art. 1397 of the Civil Code vis a vis Sec. 2
of Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, who is the real party in interest, hence, the action
must be prosecuted in her name as she stands to be benefited or injured in the
action.
Conclusion:
Petition is granted.

White Light Corporation vs. City of Manila, GR. 122846

Facts:
Mayor Alfredo Lim of manila signed into law the ordinance the prohibition of
“wash up rates” or short time admissions in their combat to reducing immoral
services such as prostitution and illegal acts such as concubinage, drug trade, etc.
Furthermore, the Ordinance No. 7744 that prohibits hotels, motels, inns, lodging
houses, pension houses and similar establishments. Petitioners White Light
Corporation (WLC), the Malate Tourist and Development Corporation (MTDC),
and Sta. Mesa Tourist and Development Corporation (STDC) filed a petition on
the ground that the Ordinance directly affects their business interests as operators
of drive-in-hotels and motels in Manila.
Procedural History:
On December 15, 1992, the Malate Tourist and Development Corporation
(MTDC) filed a complaint for declaratory relief with prayer for a writ of
preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order ( TRO) with the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 9 impleading as defendant, herein
respondent City of Manila (the City) represented by Mayor Lim. MTDC prayed
that the Ordinance, insofar as it includes motels and inns as among its prohibited
establishments, be declared invalid and unconstitutional. MTDC claimed that as
owner and operator of the Victoria Court in Malate, Manila it was authorized by
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 259 to admit customers on a short time basis as well
as to charge customers wash up rates for stays of only three hours. On December
21, 1992, petitioners White Light Corporation (WLC), Titanium Corporation (TC)
and Sta. Mesa Tourist and Development Corporation (STDC) filed a motion to
intervene and to admit attached complaint-in-intervention on the ground that the
Ordinance directly affects their business interests as operators of drive-in-hotels
and motels in Manila. The three companies are components of the Anito Group of
Companies which owns and operates several hotels and motels in Metro Manila.
On December 23, 1992, the RTC granted the motion to intervene. The RTC also
notified the Solicitor General of the proceedings pursuant to then Rule 64, Section
4 of the Rules of Court. On the same date, MTDC moved to withdraw as plaintiff.
On December 28, 1992, the RTC granted MTDC's motion to withdraw. The RTC
issued a TRO on January 14, 1993, directing the City to cease and desist from
enforcing the Ordinance. The City filed an Answer dated January 22, 1993 alleging
that the Ordinance is a legitimate exercise of police power. On February 8, 1993,
the RTC issued a writ of preliminary injunction ordering the city to desist from the
enforcement of the Ordinance. A month later, on March 8, 1993, the Solicitor
General filed his Comment arguing that the Ordinance is constitutional. During the
pre-trial conference, the WLC, TC and STDC agreed to submit the case for
decision without trial as the case involved a purely legal question. On October 20,
1993, the RTC rendered a decision declaring the Ordinance null and void.
Issue:
Whether or not the petitioner has locus standi.
Ruling:
Yes. The Court recognizes the petitioners’ right to assert the constitutional rights of
their clients to patronize their establishments for a "wash-rate”experience. Standing
or locus standi is the ability of a party to demonstrate to the court sufficient
connection to and harm from the law or action challenged to support that party's
participation in the case. The constitutional component of standing doctrine
incorporates concepts which concededly are not susceptible of precise definition.
In this jurisdiction, the extancy of "a direct and personal interest" presents the most
obvious cause, as well as the standard test for a petitioner's standing The general
rules on standing admit of several exceptions such as the Overbreadth Doctrine,
Taxpayer suits, Third Party standing and, especially in the Philippines, the
Doctrine of Transcendental Importance. Herein, it is clear that the business
interests of the petitioners are likewise injured by the Ordinance. They rely on the
patronage of their customers for their continued viability which appears to be
threatened by the enforcement of the Ordinance.
Conclusion:
The Petition is granted.

Rayo vs. Metrobank, GR. 165142

Facts:
MIDAS Diversified Export Corp., through its president, Mr. Samuel U. Lee,
obtained six (6) loans from Metrobank and trust Company amounting to Php
588,870,000. To secure this loan, Samuel Lee and also the president of Louisville
realty and Development Corp. executed in favor of Metrobank, a real estate
mortgage over three parcels of land situated at No. 40 Timog Ave., Brgy. Laging
Handa, Quezon City, with all the buildings and improvements thereon. When the
debtor-mortgagor failed to pay, Metrobank extra-judicially foreclosed the real
estate mortgage in accordance with Act No. 3135,3 as amended. Thereafter, in a
public auction, Metrobank was the highest bidder. A Certificate of Sale4 dated
December 11, 2000 was duly registered with the Registry of Deeds of Quezon
City. When the debtor-mortgagor failed to pay, Metrobank extra-judicially
foreclosed the real estate mortgage in accordance with Act No. 3135, 3 as
amended. Thereafter, in a public auction, Metrobank was the highest bidder. A
Certificate of Sale 4 dated December 11, 2000 was duly registered with the
Registry of Deeds of Quezon City on December 13, 2000.
Procedural History:
When Louisville refused to turn over the real properties, on March 17, 2001,
Metrobank filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 223, Quezon City,
an ex parte petition for the issuance of a writ of possession. After presentation of
evidence ex parte, the RTC granted the petition in an Order Petitioner Eduardo L.
Rayo filed a complaint docketed as Civil Case No. Q02-46514 against Metrobank
for Nullification of Real Estate Mortgage Contract(s) and Extrajudicial Foreclosure
Sale, in the RTC, Branch 99, Quezon City and filed with the Court of Appeals a
Petition for Annulment of Judgment on the ground of "absolute lack of due
process." Petitioner alleged that his predecessor, Louisville, was not notified of the
proceedings. CA denied the petition for lack of merit. The C ruled that since
petitioner is neither a registered owner nor a successor-in interest of a registered
owner, he is not a real party-in-interest. But petitioner insists that he has legal
standing with legal personality to institute annulment of judgements case against
Metrobank since he is a co-assignee over the subject real properties.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner has the legal personality to seek the annulment of the
judgement in the case.
Ruling:
No, petitioner has not a real party-in-interest. The Supreme Court recognizes that
while petitioner would be injured by the judgment in this suit, they found that
petitioner has no present substantial interest to institute the annulment of judgment
proceedings and nullify the order granting the writ of possession.
Conclusion:
Petition is denied.

Sps. Oco vs. Limbaring, GR. 161298

Facts:
Sabas Limbaring subdivided his Lot 2325-D, covered by TCT No. 5268, into two
lots. He then executed in favor of Jennifer Limbaring a Deed of Sale in favor of
Sarah Jane Limbaring for P14,440. Accordingly, the TCT was cancelled and TCT
Nos. T-21921 and T-21920 were issued in the names of Jennifer and Sarah Jane,
respectively. Sensing some irregularities in the transaction, Percita Oco, the
daughter of Sabas Limbaring, left Puerto Princesa City and went to Ozamis City.
She then filed a case of perjury and falsification of documents against respondent,
her uncle. The pre-litigation conference called by City Prosecutor Luzminda Uy on
July 1, 1996, the parties agreed that the two parcels of land should be reconveyed
to Percita, who was to pay respondent all the expenses that had been and would be
incurred to transfer the titles to her name. Pursuant to their agreement, respondent
facilitated the transfer of the titles to her from the names of his daughters. After the
transfer had been effected on July 12, 1996, Percita left for Puerta Princesa on July
17, 1996, without paying the P25,000. Several demands were made, but she
refused to pay.
Procedural History:
On April 6, 1999, respondent filed against Spouses Anthony and Percita Oco a
Complaint for the rescission of the sales contracts, with recovery of possession and
ownership of the two parcels of land. Among others, he claimed that he was the
actual buyer of the lots, but the vendees whose names appeared on the Deeds were
his daughters; that he initially refused to reconvey the properties because he had
paid for them with his hard-earned money, which was partly used by Sabas
Limbaring for medical expenses; that Percita had prepared the two Deeds of Sale,
which his daughters signed despite receiving no consideration as stated in the
Deeds; that because she refused to pay the P25,000, the Limbaring clan held a
meeting on October 26, 1996, during which it was agreed that P1,000 per month
would be given to respondent from the rentals of Sabas Limbaring's house; and that
the agreement was not implemented, because Percita had failed to cooperate. On
May 27, 1999, Spouses Oco filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the
plaintiff (herein respondent) was not the real party in interest. In his Opposition to
the Motion to Dismiss, respondent contended that he was a trustor, whose property
was being held in trust by his daughters. He also averred that, on the assumption
that he was not the real party in interest, he was entitled to an amendment of the
pleadings. On August 30, 1999, the RTC issued an Order denying the Motion to
Dismiss. It ruled that evidence was required to resolve the parties' respective
allegations. On October 4, 1999, Spouses Oco filed an Answer with Counterclaim,
alleging in the main: that respondent had tried to secure a DAR clearance and to
have a certificate of title issued in his name, but failed because Republic Act (RA)
6657 prohibited the acquisition of more than five hectares of agricultural land; 2)
that through deceit and manipulation, respondent was able to convince Sabas
Limbaring to execute the two Deeds of Sale, notwithstanding the lack of any
consideration; 3) that Sabas informed Percita that the agricultural land had never
been sold; 4) that she refused to pay the P25,000, because the suspensive
conditions stated in the Promissory Note had not been complied with; 5) that she
paid for all the expenses incurred in their transaction; 6) that for her alleged failure
to pay the P25,000 and for "other deceits," respondent filed a criminal Complaint
docketed as Criminal Case No. 2985; 7) that respondent was guilty of forum
shopping for filing that case despite the institution of the civil aspect in the
criminal case; 8) that respondent was not the real party in interest and had no legal
standing to sue; 9) that the lots, which were acquired by Jennifer and Sarah Jane
without paying any consideration, should be returned to Percita without any
consideration; and 10) that the Deeds of Sale reconveying the lots acknowledged
receipt of consideration. Respondent testified on his behalf. He then formally
offered his exhibits. After filing their Comments to Plaintiff's Formal Offer of
Exhibits, Spouses Oco filed a Demurrer to Evidence, to which he filed his
Opposition. On October 2, 2000, the RTC granted the demurrer and dismissed the
Complaint and Counterclaim, on the ground that respondent was not the real party
in interest. The trial court also held that Jennifer and Sarah Jane had already
acknowledged receipt of the consideration for the reconveyance of the lots. The
CA held that a trust relationship was created when respondent purchased the lots in
favor of his daughters. Thus, he was a real party in interest. The appellate court
also ruled that the P25,000 was part of the consideration for the reconveyance of
the two parcels of land. The CA held that, since Percita had admitted her failure to
pay the amount, respondent had the right to rescind the contracts of reconveyance.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent was a real party in interest in the suit to rescind the
Deeds of Reconveyance.
Ruling:
No. Respondent was not a party to the contracts and has not demonstrated any
material interest in their fulfillment. To show material interest, respondent argued
that a trust was created when he purchased properties from Sabas Limbaring in
favor of his daughters. However, the respondent only presented bare assertions that
a trust was created. Absent any clear proof that trust was created, he cannot be
deemed a real party in interest.
Conclusion:
Petition is granted.

Domingo vs. Carague, GR. 161065

Facts:
The petitioners, Eufemio C. Domingo, Celso C. Gangan and Pascasio S. Banaria,
are retired Chairmen, while Sofronio B. Ursal, and Alberto P. Cruz are retired
Commissioners of COA, claim "to maintain a deep-seated abiding interest in the
affairs of COA," especially in its Organizational Restructuring Plan, as concerned
taxpayers. These petitioners claim that they were unceremoniously divested of
their designations/ranks as Unit Head, Team Supervisor, and Team Leader upon
implementation of the COA Organizational Restructuring Plan without just cause
and without due process, in violation of Civil Service Law. Moreover, they were
deprived of their respective Representation and Transportation Allowances
(RATA), thus causing them undue financial prejudice. Petitioners basically alleged
therein that this Plan is intrinsically void for want of an enabling law authorizing
COA to undertake the same and providing for the necessary standards, conditions,
restrictions, limitations, guidelines, and parameters. Petitioners further alleged that
in initiating such Organizational Restructuring Plan without legal authority, COA
committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
Petitioners now invoke this Court's judicial power to strike down the COA
Organizational Restructuring Plan for being unconstitutional or illegal. Procedural
History: Petition for Certiorari was filed to assail the legality of the Organizational
Restructuring Plan. Petitioners claim the COA committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. The COA is a quasi judicial body and
its decision may be brought to the Supreme Court on Certiorari. Respondents,
through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), counter that petitioners have no
legal standing to file the present petition since following our ruling in Kilusang
Mayo Uno Labor Center v. Garcia, Jr. Petitioners does not seek any affirmative
relief nor impute any improper or improvident act against the said respondents and
are not motivated by any desire to seek affirmative relief from COA or from
respondents that would redound to their personal benefit or gain. Petitioners failed
to show any "present substantial interest" in the outcome of this case.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioners have the legal standing to institute this petition.
Ruling:
No. petitioners have not shown any direct and personal interest in the COA
Organizational Restructuring Plan. There is no indication that they have sustained
or are in imminent danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of its
implementation. In fact, they admitted that "they do not seek any affirmative relief
nor impute any improper or improvident act against the respondents" and "are not
motivated by any desire to seek affirmative relief from COA or from respondents
that would redound to their personal benefit or gain." Clearly, they do not have any
legal standing to file the instant suit.
Conclusion:
Petition is dismissed.

Heirs of Bertuldo Hinog vs. Melicor, GR. 140954

Facts:
Sometime in 1991, private respondents, all surnamed Balane, filed a complaint for
"Recovery of Ownership and Possession, Removal of Construction and Damages"
against Bertuldo Hinog. Bertuldo filed his Answer alleging ownership of the
disputed property by virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale. However, on June 24,
1998, while trial was still pending, Bertuldo died without completing his evidence.
On August 4, 1998, Atty. Tinampay withdrew as counsel for Bertuldo as his
services was terminated by petitioner Bertuldo Hinog III. Atty. Petalcorin then
entered his appearance as new counsel for Bertuldo. Atty. Petalcorin filed a motion
to expunge the complaint from the record and nullify all court proceedings on the
ground that private respondents failed to specify in the complaint the amount of
damages claimed so as to pay the correct docket fees; and that non-payment of the
correct docket fee is jurisdictional. The trial court ordered the complaint to be
expunged from the records. However, on March 22, 1999, the trial court reinstated
the case after private respondents have paid the deficiency docket fee. On
November 24, 1999, petitioners filed before the Supreme Court petition for
certiorari and prohibition. They alleged that Judge Melicor committed grave abuse
of discretion in allowing the case to be reinstated after payment of the deficiency
docket fee.
Issue:
Whether or not direct recourse to the Supreme Court for Petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition is proper.
Ruling:
No. The Supreme Court's original jurisdiction to issue writ of certiorari is not
exclusive. It is shared with Regional Trial Courts and the Court of Appeals.
Although the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial Courts have
concurrent jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo
warranto, habeas corpus and injunction, such concurrence does not give the
petitioner unrestricted freedom of choice of court forum. There is after all a
hierarchy of courts. That hierarchy is determinative of the venue of appeals, and
also serves as a general determinant of the appropriate forum for petitioners for
extraordinary writs.
Conclusion:
The petition is dismissed.

Comm. Domingo vs. Scheer, GR. 154745

Facts:
Respondent, Herbert Markus Emil Scheer, a native of Ochsenfurt, Germany, was a
frequent visitor of the Philippines. On July 18, 1986, his application for permanent
resident status was granted. The Bureau of Immigration and Deportation (BID)
issued in favor of the respondent Alien Certificate of Registration No. B-396907
dated September 16, 1987 and Immigration Certificate of Residence No. 256789
dated February 24, 1988. The Commissioner stated that the granting of the petition
would redound to the benefit of the Filipino people. Later, the BID received
information that respondent was wanted by the German Federal Police. The BOC
thereafter issued a Summary Deportation against Scheer, relying on the
correspondence from the German Vice-Consul on its speculation that it was
unlikely that the German Embassy will issue a new passport to the respondent; on
the warrant of arrest issued by the District Court of Germany against the
respondent for insurance fraud; and on the alleged illegal activities of the
respondent in Palawan. When the apprised of the deportation order, respondent
aired his side to then BID Commissioner Verceles, who allowed the respondent to
remain in the Philippines, giving him time to secure a clearance and a new passport
from the German Embassy. Respondent filed an MR. However, the BOC did not
resolve the respondent's motion. The respondent was neither arrested nor deported.
Meanwhile, the District Court of Straubing dismissed the criminal case against the
respondent for physical injuries. Respondent was then issued a temporary passport
to the respondent, later a permanent passport. In a Letter, the respondent informed
Commissioner Verceles that his passport had been renewed following the dismissal
of the said criminal case. He reiterated his request for the cancellation of the
Summary Deportation Order, and the restoration of his permanent resident status.
The BOC still failed to resolve the respondent's MR while Commissioner Verceles
did not respond to the Letter. Petitioner Commissioner Andrea T. Domingo then
assumed office and inquired if the respondent was wanted by the German police.
The German Embassy replied that the respondent was not so wanted. Respondent
was then apprehended by Marine operatives and BID agents apprehended on
orders of the petitioner. He was whisked to the BID Manila Office and there held
in custody while awaiting his deportation. Respondent, through his lawyer. filed
with the BID a motion for bail. Respondent’s counsel filed with the Court of
Appeals a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with a prayer for
temporary restraining order and writ of preliminary injunction, to enjoin the
petitioner from proceeding with the respondent’s deportation. He asserted that
there was no speedy remedy open to him in the ordinary course of law and that his
MR of the Summary Deportation Order of the BOC had not yet been resolved
despite the lapse of more than six years.
Procedural History:
The BOC ruled that its Order had become final and executory after the lapse of one
year, that it was not competent to reverse the same Order. It declared that the
respondent may seek the waiver of his exclusion via deportation proceedings
through the exceptions provided by Commonwealth Act No. 613, Section 29
(a)(15), but that his application for the waiver presupposes his prior removal from
the Philippines. The Court of Appeals then issued a status quo order restraining the
petitioner from deporting the respondent on a bond of P100,000.00.[32] On July
18, 2002, the BOC issued an Omnibus Resolution, pendente lite denying the
respondent’s Urgent Motion for Reconsideration, Motion for Bail/Recognizance,
and the Letter.
During the hearing of the respondent’s plea for a writ of preliminary mandatory
injunction before the CA, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) manifested
that the State had no opposition to the respondent’s re-entry and stay in the
Philippines, provided that he leave the country first and re-apply for admission and
residency status with the assurance that he would be re-admitted. In view of the
Omnibus Resolution of the BOC, the respondent in his Memorandum prayed for
the nullification of the BOC’s Order, as well as its Omnibus Resolution denying
his MR considering that with the issuance of a new passport, there was no more
basis for his deportation. The Court of Appeals rendered a Decision in favor of the
respondent granting his petition for certiorari and prohibition and permanently
enjoining the petitioner from deporting the respondent.
Issue:
Whether or not the Board of Commissioners is an indispensable party.
Ruling:
Yes. BOC was an indispensable party to the respondent’s petition for certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus in the Court of Appeals. The respondent was arrested
and detained on the basis of the Summary Deportation Order of the BOC. The
petitioner caused the arrest of the respondent in obedience to the said Deportation
Order. The respondent, in his Memorandum, prayed that the CA annul not only the
Summary Deportation Order of the BOC but also the latter’s Omnibus Resolution,
and, thus, order the respondent’s immediate release. The respondent also prayed
that the CA issue a writ of mandamus for the immediate resolution of his Urgent
Motion for Reconsideration. The said motion had to be resolved by the BOC as the
order sought to be resolved and reconsidered was issued by it and not by the
petitioner alone. The powers and duties of the BOC may not be exercised by the
individual members of the Commission. Section 7, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, as
amended, requires indispensable parties to be joined as plaintiffs or defendants.
The joinder of indispensable parties is mandatory. Without the presence of
indispensable parties to the suit, the judgment of the court cannot attain real
finality. Strangers to a case are not bound by the judgment rendered by the court.
The absence of an indispensable party renders all subsequent actions of the court
null and void. Lack of authority to act, not only to the absent party but also as to
those present. The responsibility of impleading all the indispensable parties rests
on the petitioner/plaintiff.
Conclusion:
The petition is denied.

Iron and Steel Authority vs. Court of Appeals, GR. 102976

Facts:
Iron and Steel Authority (ISA) was created by PD no. 272 in order to develop and
promote the iron and steel industry in the Philippines. ISA was initially created for
a term of five years, when its original term expired, its term was extended for
another 10 years. The National Steel Corporation (NSC) embarked on an
expansion program embracing, among other things the construction of an
integrated steel mill in Iligan City, which was considered a priority and major
industrial project of the Government. Proclamation no. 2239 was issued by the
President withdrawing from sale or settlement a large tract of public land located in
Iligan City, and reserving that land for use and immediate occupancy of NSC.Since
certain portions of the subject public land were occupied by a non-operational
fertilizer plant owned by Maria Cristina Fertilizer Corporation (MCFC), a Letter of
Instruction (LOI) was issued for the negotiation between NSC and MCFC
regarding the compensation of MCFC’s occupancy rights on the subject land. The
LOI also directed that should NSC and MCFC fail to reach an agreement within a
period of 60 days from the date of the LOI, petitioner ISA will exercise its power
of eminent domain under PD 272 and initiate expropriation proceedings. When the
negotiations failed, ISA commenced eminent domain proceedings against MCFC
in the Regional Trial Court of Iligan praying that ISA be placed in possession of
the property upon depositing 10% of the declared market values of the property.
Procedural History:
A writ of possession was issued by the trial court in favor of ISA. ISA in turn
placed NSC in possession and control of the land occupied by MCFC’s fertilizer
plant installation. However, while trial was on- going, the statutory existence of
ISA expired. MCFC then filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that ISA had
ceased to be a juridical person. The trial court granted the motion to dismiss based
on the provision of the Rules of Court stating that “only natural or juridical persons
or entities authorized by law may be parties in a civil case”. ISA moved for
reconsideration contending that despite the expiration of its term, its juridical
existence continued until the winding up of its affairs could be completed. ISA also
contends that the Republic of the Philippines, being a real party-in-interest, should
be allowed to substitute them. The trial court denied the motion. The Court of
Appeals affirmed the trial court decision stating that petitioner is “a government
regulatory agency exercising sovereign functions”, it did not have the same rights
as an ordinary corporation and is not entitled to a period for winding up its affairs.
The action for expropriation could not prosper because ISA’s exercise of its
delegated authority to expropriate had become ineffective as a result of its
dissolution. It could not be continued in the name of the Republic of the
Philippines. The Solicitor General argues that since ISA initiated and prosecuted
the action in its capacity as agent of the Republic of the Philippines, the Republic,
as principal of ISA, should be entitled to be substituted and to be made a party-
plaintiff after its agent, ISA’s term had expired. MCFC, on the other hand, argues
that the failure of Congress to enact a law extending the term of ISA evidenced a
clear legislative intent to terminate its juridical existence. It also contended that the
exercise of eminent domain by ISA or the Republic is improper, since the power
would be exercised not on behalf of the National Government but for the benefit of
the NSC.
Issue:
Whether the Republic of the Philippines is entitled to be substituted for the
petitioner in view of the expiration of petitioner’s term.
Ruling:
Yes. Petitioner appears to be a non-incorporated agency or instrumentality of the
government. The principal or real party in interest is the Republic of the
Philippines and not the NSC, even though the latter may be an ultimate user of the
properties involved.
Conclusion:
The Decision of the Court of Appeals to the extent that it affirmed the trial court's
order dismissing the expropriation proceedings, is hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE and the case is REMANDED to the court a quo which shall allow the
substitution of the Republic of the Philippines for petitioner Iron and Steel
Authority and for further proceedings consistent with this Decision.
Air Transportation Office vs. Sps. Ramos, GR. 159402
Facts:
Spouses David and Elisea Ramos discovered that a portion of their land registered
under Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-58894 of the Baguio City land records
with an area of 985 square meters, more or less, was being used as part of the
runway and running shoulder of the Loakan Airport being operated by petitioner
Air Transportation Office. The respondents agreed after negotiations to convey the
affected portion by deed of sale to the ATO in consideration of the amount of
P778, 150.00. However, the ATO failed to pay despite repeated verbal and written
demands. Thus, the respondents filed an action for collection against the ATO and
some of its officials in the RTC.
Procedural History:
The respondents filed an action for collection against the ATO and some of its
officials in the RTC. ATO invoked as an affirmative defense the issuance of
Proclamation No. 1358, whereby President Marcos had reserved certain parcels of
land that included the respondents’ affected portion for use of the Loakan Airport.
They asserted that the RTC had no jurisdiction to entertain the action without the
State’s consent considering that the deed of sale had been entered into the
performance of governmental functions. The RTC denied the ATO’s motion for
the preliminary hearing of the affirmative defense. ATO then commenced a special
civil action for certiorari in the CA to assail RTC’s orders. The CA dismissed the
petitioner upon fining that the assailed orders were not tainted with grave abuse of
discretion. Subsequently, the RTC rendered its decision ordering ATO to pay
respondents the agreed amount including damages. ATO appealed to the CA,
which affirmed the RTC’s decision.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner can be sued without the State's consent.
Ruling:
Yes. The CA thereby correctly appreciated the juridical character of the ATO as an
agency of the Government not performing a purely governmental or sovereign
function, but was instead involved in the management and maintenance of the
Loakan Airport, an activity that was not the exclusive prerogative of the State in its
sovereign capacity. Hence, the ATO had no claim to the States immunity from suit.
We uphold the CAs aforequoted holding.
Conclusion:
Petition is denied.

Department of Health vs. Phil Pharmawealth, Inc., GR. 182358

Facts:
On December 22, 1998, Administrative Order (AO) No. 27 series of 1998 5 was
issued by then Department of Health (DOH) Secretary Alfredo G. Romualdez
(Romualdez). AO 27 set the guidelines and procedure for accreditation of
government suppliers of pharmaceutical products for sale or distribution to the
public, such accreditation to be valid for three years but subject to annual
review.On January 25, 2000, Secretary Romualdez issued AO 10 series of 2000 6
which amended AO 27. Under Section VII 7 of AO 10, the accreditation period for
government suppliers of pharmaceutical products was reduced to two years.
Moreover, such accreditation may be recalled, suspended or revoked after due
deliberation and proper notice by the DOH Accreditation Committee, through its
Chairman.Section VII of AO 10 was later amended by AO 66 series of 2000, 8
which provided that the two-year accreditation period may be recalled, suspended
or revoked only after due deliberation, hearing and notice by the DOH
Accreditation Committee, through its Chairman. HDTSIE. On August 28, 2000,
the DOH issued Memorandum No. 171-C 9 which provided for a list and category
of sanctions to be imposed on accredited government suppliers of pharmaceutical
products in case of adverse findings regarding their products (e.g., substandard,
fake, or misbranded) or violations committed by them during their accreditation.
In line with Memorandum No. 171-C, the DOH, through former undersecretary
Ma. Margarita M. Galon (Galon), issued Memorandum No. 209 series of 2000, 10
inviting representatives of 24 accredited drug companies, including herein
respondent Phil Pharmawealth, Inc. (PPI) to a meeting on October 27, 2000.
During the meeting, Undersecretary Galon handed them copies of a document
entitled "Report on Violative Products" 11 issued by the Bureau of Food and Drugs
12 (BFAD), which detailed violations or adverse findings relative to these
accredited drug companies' products. Specifically, the BFAD found that PPI's
products which were being sold to the public were unfit for human
consumption.During the October 27, 2000 meeting, the 24 drug companies were
directed to submit within 10 days, or until November 6, 2000, their respective
explanations on the adverse findings covering their respective products contained
in the Report on Violative Products.Instead of submitting its written explanation
within the 10-day period as required, PPI belatedly sent a letter 13 dated November
13, 2000 addressed to Undersecretary Galon, informing her that PPI has referred
the Report on Violative Products to its lawyers with instructions to prepare the
corresponding reply. However, PPI did not indicate when its reply would be
submitted; nor did it seek an extension of the 10-day period, which had previously
expired on November 6, 2000, much less offer any explanation for its failure to
timely submit its reply.
Procedural History:
Respondent Pharmawealth filed a complaint for injunction, mandamus and
damages with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and/or
temporary restraining order with the Regional Trial praying, inter alia, that the trial
court ―nullify the award of the Penicillin G Benzathine contract to YSS
Laboratories, Inc. and direct petitioners DOH et al. to declare Pharmawealth as the
lowest complying responsible bidder for the Benzathine contract, and that they
accordingly award the same to plaintiff company‖ and ―adjudge defendants
Romualdez, Galon and Lopez liable, jointly and severally to plaintiff. Petitioners
DOH et al. subsequently filed a motion to dismiss praying for the dismissal of the
complaint based on the doctrine of state immunity. The trial court, however, denied
the motion to dismiss. The Court of Appeals (CA) denied DOH‘s petition for
review which affirmed the order issued Regional Trial Court of Pasig City denying
petitioners‘ motion to dismiss the case.
Issue:
Whether or not the Civil Case should be dismissed for being a suit against the
State.
Ruling:
Yes. As a general rule, a state may not be sued. However, if it consents, either
expressly or impliedly, then it may be the subject of a suit. There is express
consent when a law, either special or general, so provides. On the other hand, there
is implied consent when the state "enters into a contract or it itself commences
litigation." However, it must be clarified that when a state enters into a contract, it
does not automatically mean that it has waived its non-suability.
Conclusion:
The appeal is granted.

Gochan vs. Young, GR. 131889

Facts:
Felix Gochan and Sons Realty Corporation (Gochan Realty, for brevity) was
registered with the SEC on June, 1951, with Felix Gochan, Sr., Maria Pan Nuy Go
Tiong, Pedro Gochan, Tomasa Gochan, Esteban Gochan and Crispo Gochan as its
incorporators. Felix Gochan Sr.'s daughter, Alice, mother of herein respondents,
inherited 50 shares of stock in Gochan Realty from the former. Alice died in 1955,
leaving the 50 shares to her husband, John Young, Sr. In 1962, the Regional Trial
Court of Cebu adjudicated 6/14 of these shares to her children, herein respondents
Richard Young, David Young, Jane Young Llaban, John Young Jr., Mary Young
Hsu and Alexander Thomas Young. On 25 September, at which time all the
children had reached the age of majority, their father John Sr., requested Gochan
Realty to partition the shares of his late wife by cancelling the stock certificates in
his name and issuing in lieu thereof, new stock certificates in the names of herein
respondents. On 17 October 1979, respondent Gochan Realty refused, citing as
reason, the right of first refusal granted to the remaining stockholders by the
Articles of Incorporation. On 21, 1990, John, Sr. died, leaving the shares to the
respondents.
Procedural History:
Respondents Cecilia Gochan Uy and Miguel Uy filed a complaint with the SEC for
issuance of shares of stock to the rightful owners, nullification of shares of stock,
reconveyance of property impressed with trust, accounting, removal of officers and
directors and damages against respondents. A Notice of Lis Pendens was annotated
as real properties of the corporation. On 16 March 1994, herein petitioners moved
to dismiss the complaint alleging that; the SEC had no jurisdiction over the nature
of the action; (2) the respondents were not the real parties- in-interest and had no
capacity to sue; and (3) respondents' causes of action were barred by the Statute of
Limitations. The motion was opposed by herein respondents. On 29 March 1994,
petitioners filed a Motion for cancellation of Notice of Lis Pendens. Respondents
opposed the said motion. On 9 December 1994, the SEC, through its Hearing
Officer granted the motion to dismiss and ordered the cancellation of the notice of
lis pendens annotated upon the titles of the corporate lands. 'Section 5, Rule III of
the Revised Rules of Procedure
in the Securities and Exchange Commission provides: Section 5. Derivative Suit.
— No action shall be brought by stockholder in the right of a corporation unless
the complainant was a stockholder at the time the questioned transaction occurred
as well as at the time the action was filed and remains a stockholder during the
pendency of the action. Respondents moved for a reconsideration but the same was
denied for being pro- forma. Respondents appealed to the SEC en banc,
contending, among others, that the SEC had jurisdiction over the case. Petitioners,
on the other hand, contend that the appeal was 97 days late, beyond the
30-day period for appeals. On 3 March 1995, the SEC en banc ruled for the
[petitioners,] holding that the respondents' motion for reconsideration did not
interrupt the 30-day period for appeal because said motion was pro- forma.
Aggrieved, herein respondents then filed a Petition for Review with the Court of
Appeals.The CA ruled that the SEC had no jurisdiction over the case as far as the
heirs of Alice Gochan were concerned, because they were not yet stockholders of
the corporation. On the other hand, it upheld the capacity of Respondents Cecilia
Gochan Uy and her spouse Miguel Uy. It also held that the Intestate Estate of John
Young Sr. was an indispensable party. The appellate court further ruled that the
cancellation of the notice of lis pendens on the titles of the corporate real estate
was not justified. Moreover, it declared that respondents' Motion for
Reconsideration before the SEC was not pro forma; thus, its filing tolled the appeal
period.
Issue:
Whether or not the spouses Uy have the personality to file an action before the
SEC against Gochan Realty Corporation.
Ruling:
No. The petitioner’s contention that Cecilia and Miguel Uy have no capacity or
legal standing to bring the suit due to the fact that they were no longer stockholders
at the time of the suit is untenable. Cecilia Uy remains a stockholder of the
corporation in view of the nullity of the Contract of Sale.
Conclusion:
Petition is Denied.

Chua vs. Torres, GR. 151900

Facts:
Jonathan Chua purchased 9,849.20 pesos worth of diesel oil from 9 the avenue
Caltex Service Center of Jorge Torres. As payment, Jonathan issued an RCBC
check but the check bounced because it was issued on a closed account. Antonio
Beltran, employee of Torres sent a demand letter to Christine Chua. Since the
demand letter did not pertain to her, rather to her brother Jonathan, Christine
ignored it. Beltran, then, issued a case for violation of BP22 against Christine and a
warrant of arrest was served upon her in her residence and in her school. this
resulted to the embarrassment of Christine, prompting her to issue a complaint for
damages against the respondent for malicious prosecution.
Procedural History:
Christine Chua filed a complaint for damages with RTC, Caloocan against Jorge
Torres and Antonio Beltran for the latter’s suit against her regarding a check issued
by her brother, Jonathan Chua, as payment for diesel oil purchased--but that check
bounced. Christine claims that the suit filed by Torres and Beltran against her for
violation of BP22 was tantamount to malicious prosecution or serious defamation
because the check in that criminal action was issued by her brother but she was the
one served with the warrant of arrest in her residence, and in her school. The
damages claimed is for moral damages for the social humiliation and for
exemplary damages because of the failure of the respondents to observe the
diligence of a good father of a family for a total of 2 million pesos. Christine
impleaded her brother, Jonathan, as a necessary plaintiff but the latter had no claim
against the respondents. The RTC dismissed the claim for damages for the reason
that the under Rule 5, Sec. 5 of the Rules of court, the plaintiff is required to
execute a certification against forum shopping but in the case at bar the CAFS was
not signed by Jonathan, instead it was just Christine—that Jonathan, as a necessary
plaintiff, also had to sign the complaint otherwise it would be a valid cause to
dismiss the petition. Christine filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but it was
denied. Christine filed a Petition for Review under Rule 45 raising a purely legal
question of whether a necessary party who has no claim for relief should also
execute a CAFS. – Christine seeks to have the complaint for damages prosper
because it was denied for the mere reason of lack of signature of the necessary/
misjoined party.
Issue:
Whether or not the absence of the signature in the required verification and
certification against forum-shopping of a party misjoined as a plaintiff is a valid
ground for the dismissal of the complaint.
Ruling:
No. A misjoinder of parties is not fatal to the complaint. The rule prohibits
dismissal of a suit on the ground of non-joinder or misjoinder of parties. Moreover,
the dropping of misjoined parties from the complaint may be done motu proprio by
the court, at any stage, without need for a motion to such effect from the adverse
party. Section 11, Rule 3 indicates that the misjoinder of parties, while erroneous,
may be corrected with ease through amendment, without further hindrance to the
prosecution of the suit.
Conclusion:
Petition is denied.

Lotte Phils. vs. dela Cruz, GR. 166302

Facts:
Private respondent, Lotte Phils., Inc. is a domestic corporation. Petitioners are
among those who were hired and assigned to the confectionery facility operated by
private respondent.On December 14, 1995 - and yearly thereafter until the year
2000 - 7J Maintenance and Janitorial Services "7J"entered into a contract with
private respondent to provide manpower for needed maintenance, utility, janitorial
and other services to the latter. In compliance with the terms and conditions of the
service contract, and to accommodate the needs of private respondent for
personnel/workers to do and perform "piece works," petitioners, among others,
were hired and assigned to private respondent as repackers or sealers.
However, either in October, 1999 or on February 9, 2000, private respondent
dispensed with their services allegedly due to the expiration/termination of the
service contract by respondent with 7J. They were either told "hwag muna kayong
pumasok at tatawagan na lang kung may gawa"; or were asked to wait "pag
magrereport sila sa trabaho." Unfortunately, petitioners were never called back to
work again.
In 1995 and yearly thereafter until 2000, 7J Maintenance and Janitorial Services
entered into a contract with Lotte Phil. Co. Inc. to provide manpower for
maintenance, utility, and janitorial services to Lotte. In compliance with the
contract and to accommodate the needs of Lotte for personnel, Dela Cruz et al
were hired as repackers or sealers. However, Lotte dispensed their services due to
termination of the service contract and were told that they will be called if they are
needed. They were never called back again.
A declared 7J as employer of respondents and finding 7J guilty of illegal dismissal.
NLRC denied the MR.CA reversed LA and NLRC and declared Lotte as the real
employer of respondents and that 7J who engaged in labor-only contracting was
merely the agent of Lotte.
Procedural History:
Aggrieved, petitioners lodged a labor complaint against both private respondent
Lotte and 7J, for illegal dismissal, regularization, payment of corresponding
backwages and related employment benefits, 13th month pay, service incentive
leave, moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees based on total judgment
award. On February 28, 2001, Labor Arbiter Cresencio G. Ramos, Jr., rendered
judgment5 declaring 7J as employer of respondents. The arbiter also found 7J
guilty of illegal dismissal7 and ordered to reinstate respondents, pay P2,374,710.00
as backwages, P713,648.00 as 13th month pay and P117,000.00 as service
incentive leave pay. Respondents appealed to the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC) praying that Lotte be declared as their direct employer
because 7J is merely a labor-only contractor. In its decision10 dated April 24,
2002, the NLRC found no cogent reason to disturb the findings of the labor arbiter
and affirmed its ruling that 7J is the employer of respondents and solely liable for
their claims. Respondents' motion for reconsideration was denied by the NLRC in
a resolution dated June 18, 2002. Undaunted, they filed a Petition for Certiorari in
the Court of Appeals11 against the NLRC and Lotte, insisting that their employer
is Lotte and not 7J. Lotte, however, denied that respondents were its employees. It
prayed that the petition be dismissed for failure to implead 7J who is a party
interested in sustaining the proceedings in court, pursuant to Section 3, Rule 46 of
the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. On July 9, 2004, the Court of Appeals
reversed and set aside the rulings of the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC. In its
decision, the Court of Appeals declared Lotte as the real employer of respondents
and that 7J who engaged in labor-only contracting was merely the agent of Lotte.
Respondents who performed activities directly related to Lotte's business were its
regular employees under Art. 280 of the Labor Code. As such, they must be
accorded security of tenure and their services terminated only on "just" and
"authorized" causes.
Issue:
Whether or not the 7J Maintenance and Janitorial Services is an indispensable
party.
Ruling:
Yes. 7J Maintenance and Janitorial Services is an indispensable party. It is a party-
in-interest because it will be affected by the outcome of the case. The Court of
Appeals however rendered Lotte, jointly and severally liable with 7J Maintenance
and Janitorial Services, who was not impleaded by holding that the former is the
real employer of respondents. Plainly, its decision directly affected 7J Maintenance
and Janitorial Services. No final ruling on this matter can be had without
impleading 7J Maintenance and Janitorial Services, whose inclusion is necessary
for the effective and complete resolution of the case and in order to accord all
parties with due process and fair play.
Conclusion:
The case was REMANDED to the Court of Appeals to include 7J Maintenance and
Janitorial Services as an indispensable party to the case for further proceedings.

National Power Corporation vs. Provincial Government of Bataan, GR.

180654
Facts:
Petitioner National Power Corporation (NPC) received a notice of franchise tax
delinquency from the respondent Provincial Government of Bataan for P45.9
million covering the years 2001, 2002, and 2003. May 12 and 14, 2003 the
Province again sent notices of tax due to the NPC, calling its attention to the
Court's Decision in National Power Corporation v. City of Cabanatuan that held
the NPC liable for the payment of local franchise tax. The NPC replied, however,
that it had ceased to be liable for the payment of that tax after Congress enacted
Republic Act (R.A.) 9136, also known as the Electric Power Industry Reform Act
(EPIRA) that took effect on June 26, 2001. The new law relieved the NPC of the
function of generating and supplying electricity beginning that year. Consequently,
the Province has no right to further assess it for the 2001, 2002, and 2003 local
franchise tax. When NPC chose to reserve its right to contest the computation
pending the decision of the Supreme Court, the Province sent notices of tax due to
the NPC. The NPC replied that Bataan has no right to further assess because NPC
had ceased to be liable for the payment of that tax after Congress enacted RA
9136, also known as the Electric Power Industry Reform Act (EPIRA) that took
effect on June 26, 2001. Ignoring the NPC’s view, the Province issued a Warrant
of Levy on 14 real properties that it used to own in Limay, Bataan. In 2004, Bataan
caused a sale at public auction, with it being the winning bidder.
Procedural History:
The NPC filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Mariveles, Bataan, a
petition for declaration of nullity of the foreclosure sale with prayer for preliminary
mandatory injunction against the Province, the provincial treasurer, and the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan. The NPC alleged that the foreclosure had no legal
basis since R.A. 7160 which authorized the collection of local franchise tax had
been modified by the EPIRA. The latter law provided that power generation is not
a public utility operation requiring a franchise, hence, not taxable. What remains
subject to such tax is the business of transmission and distribution of electricity
since these required a national franchise. As it happened, NPC had ceased by
operation of the EPIRA in 2001 to engage in power transmission, given that all its
facilities for this function, including its nationwide franchise, had been transferred
to the National Transmission Corporation. Thus, the NPC asked the RTC to issue a
preliminary injunction, enjoining the transfer of title and the sale of the foreclosed
lands to Bataan and, after trial, to make the injunction permanent, declare NPC
exempt from the local franchise tax and annul the foreclosure sale. On November
3, 2005 the RTC dismissed the NPC's petition, stating that the franchise tax was
not based on ownership of property but on the NPC's exercise of the privilege of
doing business within Bataan. Further, the NPC presented no evidence that it had
ceased to operate its power plants in that jurisdiction. The NPC appealed the RTC
Decision to the Court of Appeals (CA) but the Province moved to dismiss the same
for lack of jurisdiction of that court over the subject matter of the case. The
Province pointed out that, although the NPC denominated its suit before the RTC
as one for declaration of nullity of foreclosure sale, it was essentially a local tax
case questioning the validity of the Province's imposition of the local franchise tax.
Any appeal from the action should, therefore, be lodged with the Court of Tax
Appeals (CTA). On November 27, 2007 the CA granted the Province's motion and
dismissed the petition on the ground cited.
Issue:
Whether or not the petitioner is an indispensable party.
Ruling:
Yes. NPC is a real party interest, which stands to gain or lose from the judgment
that the trial court may render. According to the Rules of Court, Rule 3, Sec. 2 “A
real party in interest is the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the
judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit.” Napocor ‘s
complaint has sought two things: a.) the nullification of the foreclosure sale and
also b.) a declaration from the trial court that it is exempt from local franchise tax.
Despite the claim for exemption by Napocor, the respondents pursued its collection
of the franchise tax delinquency by issuing the warrant of levy and conducting the
sale at public auction to enforce collection of the said delinquency against
Napocor. Thus, Napocor had to assail the correctness of the local franchise tax
assessments made against it by instituting the complaint with the Regional Trial
Court, otherwise, the assessment would become conclusive and unappealable.
Conclusion:
The Court GRANTS the petition of the National Power Corporation and SETS
ASIDE the Resolution of the Court of Appeals. It further REMANDS the case to
the Regional Trial Court so that the Power Sector Assets and Liabilities
Management Corporation and the National Transmission Corporation may be
impleaded as proper parties.

Bulawan vs. Aquende, GR. 182819

Facts:
Petitioner Bulawan filed a complaint for annulment of title, reconveyance and
damages against Lourdes Yap (Yap) and the Register of Deeds before the trial
court. Bulawan’s claim: she is the owner of a Lot covered by Transfer Certificate
of Title (TCT) No. 13733 having bought subject lot from the Yaptengco brothers,
who claimed to have inherited the property. Bulawan alleged that Yap claimed
ownership of the same property and caused the issuance of TCT No. 40292 in
Yap’s name. Yap’s claim - Asserts her ownership over the lot. Yap also mentioned
that the trial court already declared that Psd-153847 was simulated by the
Yaptengco brothers and that their claim on Lot No. 1634-B was void.
Procedural History:
The trial court likewise adjudged Yap Chin Cun as the rightful owner of Lot No.
1634-B. Yap also stated that Lot No. 1634-B was sold by Yap Chin Cun to the
Aquende family. Procedural History: RTC: ruled in favor of Bulawan and declared
the TCT in the name of Yap as null and void. CA: dismissed Yap’s appeal. The
trial court’s Decision became final and executory per entry of judgment and
subsequently issued a writ of execution. The Register of Deeds informed
Respondent Aquende through a letter that he must produce his TCT so that a
memorandum of the lien may be annotated on the title. Aquende, who only came
to know of the RTC case through such letter of the Register of Deeds, filed a Third
Party Claim against the writ of execution because it affected his property and, not
being a party in Civil Case No. 9040, he argued that he is not bound by the trial
court’s Decision. Aquende then filed a Notice of Appearance with Third Party
Motion and prayed for the partial annulment of the trial court’s 26 November 1996
Decision. Aquende also filed a Supplemental Motion where he reiterated that he
was not a party in Civil Case No. 9040 and that since the action was in personam
or quasi in rem, only the parties in the case are bound by the decision. The trial
court denied Aquende’s motions. According to the trial court, it had lost
jurisdiction to modify its 26 November 1996 Decision when the Court of Appeals
affirmed said decision. Thereafter, Aquende filed a petition for annulment of
judgment before the Court of Appeals on the grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of
jurisdiction. Aquende arguments: There was extrinsic fraud when Bulawan
conveniently failed to implead him despite her knowledge of the existing title in
his name and, thus, prevented him from participating in the proceedings and
protecting his title. He is an indispensable party and the trial court did not acquire
jurisdiction over his person because he was not impleaded as a party in the case.
Aquende also pointed out that the trial court went beyond the jurisdiction conferred
by the allegations on the complaint because Bulawan did not pray for the
cancellation of Psd-187165 and TCT No. 40067. a certificate of title should not be
subject to collateral attack and it cannot be altered, modified or canceled except in
direct proceedings in accordance with law. The Court of Appeals ruled in favor of
Aquende. And declared the RTC decision null and void. The CA also reinstated the
TCT registered in the name of Aquende. Bulawan filed a motion for
reconsideration, which was denied. Hence, this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the respondent is an indispensable party.
Ruling:
Yes. Both Aquende and Bulawan trace their ownership of the property to Yap Chin
Cun. Aquende maintains that he purchased the property from Yap Chin Cun, while
Bulawan claims to have purchased the property from the Yaptengco brothers, who
alleged that they inherited the property from Yap Chin Cun. The trial court should
have taken the initiative to implead Aquende as defendant or to order Bulawan to
do so as mandated under Section 11, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court. 38 The burden
to implead or to order the impleading of indispensable parties is placed on
Bulawan and on the trial court, respectively.
Conclusion:
Petition is denied.

Office of the City Mayor of Paranaque vs. Ebio, GR. 178411

Facts:
The respondents claim that they are the owners of a parcel of land in Parañaque
City in the name of respondent Mario D. Ebio. Said land was an accretion of Cut-
cut creek. The Office of the Sangguniang Barangay of Vitalez passed a resolution
seeking assistance from the City Government of Parañaque for the construction of
an access road along Cut-cut Creek. The proposed road will traverse the lot
occupied by the respondents. When the city government advised all the affected
residents to vacate the said area, respondents immediately registered their
opposition thereto. As a result, the road project was temporarily suspended.
Respondents were surprised when several officials from the barangay proceeded to
cut coconut trees planted on the said lot. Respondents filed letter-complaints before
the Regional Director of the Bureau of Lands, the Department of Interior and Local
Government and the Office of the Vice Mayor. Respondents asserted their
opposition to the proposed project and their claim of ownership over the affected
property. The City Administrator sent a letter to the respondents ordering them to
vacate the area within the next thirty (30) days, or be physically evicted from the
said property. Meanwhile, in 1961, respondent Mario Ebio married Pedro's
daughter, Zenaida. Upon Pedro's advice, the couple established their home on the
said lot. In April 1964 and in October 1971, Mario Ebio secured building permits
from the Parañaque municipal office for the construction of their house within the
said compound. 7 On April 21, 1987, Pedro executed a notarized Transfer of
Rights 8 ceding his claim over the entire parcel of land in favor of Mario Ebio.
Subsequently, the tax declarations under Pedro's name were cancelled and new
ones were issued in Mario Ebio's name.
Procedural History:
Threatened of being evicted, respondents went to the RTC of Parañaque City and
applied for a writ of preliminary injunction against petitioners. Respondents
admitted before the trial court that they have a pending application for the issuance
of a sales patent before the DENR.
The RTC issued an Order denying the petition for lack of merit and held that
respondents were not able to prove successfully that they have an established right
to the property since they have not instituted an action for confirmation of title and
their application for sales patent has not yet been granted. Additionally, they failed
to implead the Republic of the Philippines, which is an indispensable party.
Respondents moved for reconsideration, but the same was denied. Respondents
elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals issued its
Decision in favor of the respondents.
Issue:
Whether or not the State is an indispensable party to respondents’ action for
prohibitory injunction.
Ruling:
No. The State is neither a necessary nor an indispensable party to an action where
no positive act shall be required from it or where no obligation shall be imposed
upon it, such as in the case at bar. Neither would it be an indispensable party if
none of its properties shall be divested nor any of its rights infringed.
Conclusion:
Petition is denied.

Oposa vs. Factoran, GR. 101083

Facts:
The plaintiff-petitioners are minors represented and joined by their respective
parents. Impleaded as additional plaintiff is Philippine Ecological Network, Inc.
(PENI), a domestic, non-stock, and non-profit corporation, engaged in the
protection of the environment and natural resources. The complaint was instituted
as a taxpayers’’ class suit and alleges that plaintiffs are “all citizens of the Republic
of the Philippines, taxpayers, and entitled to the full benefit, use and enjoyment of
the natural resource treasure that is the country’s virgin tropical rainforests”. The
same was filed for themselves and others who are equally concerned about the
preservation of said resource but are "so numerous that it is impracticable to bring
them all before the Court." The minors further asseverate that they "represent their
generation as well as generations yet unborn." The complaint (summary) included
the following: Description of the Philippine rainforests and their ecological
benefits; Scientific evidence revealing that a ratio of 54% forest cover and 46%
agricultural, residential, industrial, commercial, and other uses of land is needed to
maintain a balanced and healthful ecology; An enumeration of environmental
tragedies that have resulted from deforestation; Plaintiff’s assertion that the
consequences of deforestation are so capable of unquestionable demonstration that
they may be submitted as a matter of judicial notice An intention to present expert
witnesses, as well as documentary, photographic and film evidence in the course of
the trial. Under the Cause of Action (mentioned few only): Plaintiffs replead by
reference the foregoing allegations; Records showing adverse effects, disastrous
consequences, irreparable damage of continued deforestation to the minor’s
generation and to generations yet unborn are evident and incontrovertible.
Procedural History:
Secretary Factoran, filed an MTD on the grounds:1. Plaintiffs have no cause of
action against him; The issue raised by the plaintiffs is a political question which
properly pertains to the legislative or
executive branches of government 12 July 1990 Petitioners filed Opposition to the
Motion maintaining: Complaint shows a clear and unmistakable cause of action;
Motion is dilatory; and the action presents a justiciable question as it involves the
defendant’s abuse of discretion 18 July 1991 Respondent Judge issues an order
granting MTD.
Issue:
Whether or not the petitioner-minors have a cause of action in filing a class suit in
the case at bar.
Ruling:
Yes. The Supreme Court ruled that they can, for themselves, for others of their
generation, and for the succeeding generation, file a class suit. Their personality to
sue in behalf of succeeding generations is based on the concept of intergenerational
responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned.
Such a right considers the “rhythm and harmony of nature” which indispensably
include, inter alia, the judicious disposition, utilization, management, renewal and
conservation of the country’s forest, mineral, land, waters, fisheries, wildlife,
offshore areas and other natural resources to the end that their exploration,
development, and utilization be equitably accessible to the present as well as the
future generations.
Conclusion:
Petition is granted.

Newsweek vs. IAC, GR. L-63559

Facts:
Petitioner, Newsweek, Inc., a foreign corporation licensed to do business in the
Philippines, in this special action for certiorari, prohibition with preliminary
injunction, seeks to annul the decision of the Intermediate Appellate sustaining the
Order of the then Court of First Instance of Bacolod City which denied petitioner's
Motion to Dismiss the complaint for libel filed by private respondents, and the
Resolution which denied its Motion for Reconsideration.

It appears that private respondents, incorporated associations of sugarcane planters

in Negros Occidental claiming to have 8,500 members and several individual sugar
planters, filed Civil Case in their own behalf and/or as a class suit in behalf of all
sugarcane planters in the province of Negros Occidental, against petitioner and two
of petitioners' non-resident correspondents/reporters Fred Bruning and Barry
Came. The complaint alleged that petitioner and the other defendants committed
libel against them by the publication of the article "An Island of Fear" in issue of
petitioner's weekly news magazine Newsweek. The article supposedly portrayed
the island province of Negros Occidental as a place dominated by big landowners
or sugarcane planters who not only exploited the impoverished and underpaid
sugarcane workers/laborers, but also brutalized and killed them with impunity.
Complainants therein alleged that said article, taken as a whole, showed a
deliberate and malicious use of falsehood, slanted presentation and/or
misrepresentation of facts intended to put them (sugarcane planters) in bad light,
expose them to public ridicule, discredit and humiliation here in the Philippines
and abroad, and make them objects of hatred, contempt and hostility of their
agricultural workers and of the public in general. They prayed that defendants be
ordered to pay them PlM as actual and compensatory damages, and such amounts
for moral, exemplary and corrective damages as the court may determine, plus
expenses of litigation, attorney's fees and costs of suit. A photo copy of the article
was attached to the complaint.
Procedural History:
Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds that (1) the printed article sued
upon is not actionable in fact and in law; and (2) the complaint is bereft of
allegations that state, much less support a cause of action. It pointed out the non-
libelous nature of the article and, consequently, the failure of the complaint to state
a cause of action. Private respondents filed an Opposition to the motion to dismiss
and petitioner filed a reply.
The trial court denied the motion to dismiss, stating that the grounds on which the
motion to dismiss are predicated are not indubitable as the complaint on its face
states a valid cause of action; and the question as to whether the printed article
sued upon its actionable or not is a matter of evidence. Petitioner's motion for
reconsideration was denied.
Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with respondent Court seeking the
annulment of the aforecited trial court's Orders for having been issued with such a
grave abuse of discretion as amounting to lack of jurisdiction and praying for the
dismissal of the complaint for failure to state a cause of action.
Respondent Court affirmed the trial court's Orders and ordered the case to be tried
on the merits on the grounds that -(1) the complaint contains allegations of fact
which called for the presentation of evidence; and (2) certiorari under Rule 65
cannot be made to substitute for an appeal where an appeal would lie at a proper
time. Subsequently, the respondent Court denied petitioner's Motion for
Reconsideration of the aforesaid decision.

Issue:
Whether or not the absence of any actionable basis in the complaint cannot be
cured by the filing of a class suit.
Ruling:
No. It is not a case where one or more may sue for the benefit of all or where the
representation of class interest affected by the judgment or decree is indispensable
to make each member of the class an actual party. We have here a case where each
of the plaintiffs has a separate and distinct reputation in the community. They do
not have a common or general interest in the subject matter of the controversy.

The disputed portion of the article which refers to plaintiff Sola and which was
claimed to be libelous never singled out plaintiff Sola as a sugar planter. The news
report merely stated that the victim had been arrested by members of a special
police unit brought into the area by Pablo Sola, the mayor of Kabankalan. Hence,
the report, referring as it does to an official act performed by an elective public
official, is within the realm of privilege and protected by the constitutional
guarantees of free speech and press.

The article further stated that Sola and the commander of the special police unit
were arrested. The Court takes judicial notice of this fact.
Conclusion:
The decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court is reversed and the complaint of
the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental is dismissed.

VIII. KINDS OF PLEADINGS

1. Mongao v. Pryce Properties

G.R. No. 156474, August 16, 2005

Facts: Mongao and Pryce Properties executed a memorandum of agreement

wherein Mongao sold to Pryce Properties a parcel of land. To pay for the
purchase price, Pryce Properties issued a check payable to Mongao and her
mother. However, Mongao refused to accept the check as it was not payable
solely to Mongao. Mongao then filed a complaint for rescission of the deed
of sale and memorandum of agreement against Pryce Properties. Pryce
Properties filed an answer contending that it issued a check payable to both
Mongao and her mother as Mongao was a mere trustee and is not the proper
party to receive the payment. Mongao then moved for the judgment on the
pleadings.

Procedural History: The Regional Trial Court ruled in favor of Mongao

thereby rescinding the agreement. The Court of Appeals reversed the RTC’s
ruling and held that a judgment on the pleadings was improper since there
were actual issues in the present case.

Issue: Whether or not the trial court's judgment on the pleadings was
proper?

Holding: If an answer does in fact specifically deny the material averments

of the complaint in the manner indicated by said Section 10 of Rule 8, and/or
asserts affirmative defenses (allegations of new matter which, while
admitting the material allegations of the complaint expressly or impliedly,
would nevertheless prevent or bar recovery by the plaintiff) in accordance
with Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 6, a judgment on the pleadings would
naturally not be proper.
There is joinder of issues when the answer makes a specific denial of the
material allegations in the complaint or asserts affirmative defenses which
would bar recovery by the plaintiff. Where there is proper joinder of issues,
 the trial court is barred from rendering judgment based only on the pleadings
filed by the parties and must conduct proceedings for the reception of
evidence. On the other hand, an answer fails to tender an issue where the
allegations admit the allegations in support of the plaintiff's cause of action
or fail to address them at all. In either case, there is no genuine issue and
judgment on the pleadings is proper.
In the present case, nothing from the allegations in respondent corporation's
answer makes out a proper joinder of issues. Petitioners' cause of action for
rescission is founded mainly on a perfected contract of sale allegedly entered
into between petitioners and respondent corporation as embodied in
the Memorandum of Agreement attached to the complaint. First, the
allegations in respondent corporation's answer do not make out a specific
denial that a contract of sale was perfected between the parties. Second,
respondent corporation does not contest the due execution and/or
genuineness of said Memorandum of Agreement.

The express terms of the Memorandum of Agreement, the genuineness and

due execution of which are not denied, clearly show that the contract of sale
was executed only between petitioner Mongao and respondent corporation.
Where there is an apparent repudiation of the trust by petitioner Mongao,
such claim or defense may properly be raised only by the parties for whose
benefit the trust was created. Respondent corporation cannot assert said
defense in order to resist petitioners' claim for rescission where it has been
sufficiently shown by the allegations of the complaint and answer that
respondent corporation has breached its contractual obligation to petitioners.
There being no material allegation in the answer to resist petitioners' claim,
the trial court correctly rendered judgment based on the pleadings submitted
by the parties.

2. Dio v. SBME
G.R. No. 189532, June 11, 2014

Facts: In 2002, SBME decided to expand its business by operating a beach

resort inside the property administered by the Subic Bay Metropolitan
Authority (SBMA). For the business venture to take off, SBME needed to
solicit investors who are willing to infuse funds for the construction and
operation of the beach resort project. HSE (formerly known as Westdale
Assets Limited) agreed to invest the amount of US$2,500,000.00 with
SBME by purchasing 750,000 common shares with a par value of P100 per
share from the increase in its authorized capital stock. The agreement was
reduced into writing wherein HSE, in order to protect its interest in the
company, was afforded minority protection rights such as the right to
appoint a member of the board of directors and the right to veto certain
board resolutions. After HSE initially paid US$200,000.00 for its
subscription, it refused to further lay out money for the expansion project of
the SBME due to the alleged mismanagement in the handling of corporate
funds.

Consequently, SBME initiated an intra-corporate dispute before the RTC of

Balanga City, Bataan against petitioners HSE and Dio. Before petitioners
could file their answer to the complaint, respondents impleaded its Corporate
Secretary, Atty. Winston Ginez, as additional defendant. In their Amended
Complaint docketed as Civil Case No. 7572, SBME essentially alleged that
HSE unjustly refused to pay the balance of its unpaid subscription
effectively jeopardizing the company's expansion project. Apart from their
refusal to honor their obligation under the subscription contract, it was
further alleged by SBME that Dio tried to dissuade local investors and
financial institutions from putting in capital to SBME by imputing
defamatory acts against Desmond. To protect the interest of the corporation
and its stockholders, SBME sought that petitioners be enjoined from
committing acts inimical to the interest of the company.
To refute the claims of respondents, petitioners maintained in their Answer
with Compulsory Counterclaim that it would be highly preposterous for
them to dissuade investors and banks from putting in money to SBME
considering that HSE and Dio are stakeholders of the company with
substantial investments therein. In turn, petitioners countered that their
reputation and good name in the business community were tarnished as a
result of the filing of the instant complaint, and thus prayed that they be
indemnified in the amount of US$2,000,000.00 as moral damages.
Constrained to litigate to protect their rights, petitioners asked that they be
indemnified in the amount of P1,000,000.00 in litigation expenses.
Petitioners likewise sought to recover their investment of US$1,500,000.00
since they were purportedly inveigled by Desmond into putting in money to
SBME under the pretext that they will be accorded with minority protection
rights. It was alleged that after the filing of the instant complaint, Desmond,
in collusion with other Board of Directors of SBME, managed to unjustly
deny HSE and Dio their rights under the Subscription Agreement. To curb
similar socially abhorrent actions, petitioners prayed that SBME and its
 Board of Directors, namely, Desmond, John Corcoran, Gaile Laule and
Gregorio Magdaraog, be jointly and severally held liable to pay exemplary
damages in the amount of US$2,000,000.00.
After petitioners filed their Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim, the
RTC, instead of setting the case for pre-trial, issued an Order dismissing
Civil Case No. 7572. The dismissal was grounded on the defective
certificate of non-forum shopping which was signed by Desmond without
specific authority from the Board of Directors of SBME. respondents moved
that Civil Case No. 7572 be reinstated and further proceedings thereon be
conducted. A copy of such authority was attached by respondents to their
Motion for Reconsideration.

|||
Procedural History: The RTC denied respondents' motion and affirmed the
dismissal. In refusing to reinstate respondents' complaint, the court a
quo ruled that the belated submission of a board resolution evidencing
Desmond's authority to bind the corporation did not cure the initial defect in
the complaint and declared that strict compliance with procedural rules is
enjoined for the orderly administration of justice.

Aggrieved, respondents elevated the matter before the Court of Appeals.

However, for failure to their appellants’ brief, the CA proceeded to dismiss
the same. Subsequently, it became final and executory.
Petitioners went back to the RTC to file a motion to set their counterclaims
for hearing which was opposed by the respondents on the ground that the
filing of the compulsory counterclaims was not accompanied by payment of
the required docket fees precluding the court from acquiring jurisdiction
over the case.
The RTC granted the motion of the respondents, thereby directing the
dismissal of petitioners' counterclaims but not on the ground of non-payment
of docket fees. In disallowing petitioners' counterclaims to proceed
independently of respondents' complaint, the lower court pointed out that in
view of the dismissal of the main case, which has already been affirmed with
finality by the appellate court, it has already lost its jurisdiction to act on
petitioners' counterclaim, the compulsory counterclaim being merely
ancillary to the principal controversy. This prompted petitioners to file a
Petition for Review on Certiorari before the Court.
 Issue: Whether or not the RTC erred in dismissing the counterclaims

Holding: The nature of the counterclaim notwithstanding, the dismissal of

the complaint does not ipso jure result in the dismissal of the counterclaim,
and the latter may remain for independent adjudication of the court,
provided that such counterclaim, states a sufficient cause of action and does
not labor under any infirmity that may warrant its outright dismissal. Stated
differently, the jurisdiction of the court over the counterclaim that appears to
be valid on its face, including the grant of any relief thereunder, is not abated
by the dismissal of the main action. The court's authority to proceed with the
disposition of the counterclaim independent of the main action is premised
on the fact that the counterclaim, on its own, raises a novel question which
may be aptly adjudicated by the court based on its own merits and
evidentiary support. As such, the counterclaim of petitioners must proceed
independently of the complaint of respondents.

3. Padilla v. Globe Asiatique

G.R. No. 207376, August 6, 2014

Facts: From the years 2005 to 2008, Philippine National Bank (PNB)
entered into several Contracts to Sell (CTS) Facility Agreements with
respondents Globe Asiatique Realty Holdings Corporation (Globe Asiatique)
and Filmal Realty Corporation (Filmal) represented by Delfin S. Lee and
Dexter L. Lee, President and Vice-President, respectively, of the two
corporations. PNB thereby agreed to make available to Globe Asiatique and
Filmal CTS Facility in the amount not exceeding Two Hundred Million
Pesos (P200,000,000.00) to finance the purchase of certain Accounts
Receivables or the in-house installment receivables of respondents arising
from the sale of subdivision houses in their real estate/housing projects as
evidenced by contracts to sell. These availments were later increased to a
total amount of One Billion Two Hundred Million Pesos
(P1,200,000,000.00).
Pursuant to and as a condition for the CTS Facility availments, respondents
executed in favor of PNB several Deeds of Assignment covering accounts
receivables in the aggregate amount of One Billion One Hundred Ninety-
Five Million Nine Hundred Twenty-Six Thousand Three Hundred Ninety
Pesos and Seventy-two centavos (P1,195,926,390.72). In the said
instruments, respondents acknowledged the total amount of One Billion
Three Hundred Ninety Five Million Six Hundred Sixty-Five Thousand Five
Hundred Sixty-Four Pesos and Sixty-nine centavos (P1,395,665,564.69)
released to them by PNB in consideration of the aforesaid accounts
receivables.
Respondents defaulted in the payment of their outstanding balance and
delivery to PNB of transfer certificates of title corresponding to the assigned
accounts receivables, for which PNB declared them in default under the CTS
Facility Agreements. Subsequently, respondents made partial payments and
made proposals for paying in full its obligation to PNB as shown in the
exchange of correspondence between respondents and PNB. After its final
and forma demand, PNB instituted Civil Case No. R-PSY-10-04228-
CV (Philippine National Bank v. Globe Asiatique Realty Holdings
Corporation, Filmal Realty Corporation, Delfin S. Lee and Dexter L.
Lee) for recovery of sum of money and damages with prayer for writ of
preliminary attachment before the RTC of Pasay City. It alleged in detail the
fraudulent acts and misrepresentations committed by respondents in
obtaining PNB's conformity to the CTS Facility Agreements and the release
of various sums to respondents in the total amount of P974,377,159.10. PNB
accused respondents of falsely representing that they have valid and
subsisting contracts to sell, which evidently showed they had no intention to
pay their loan obligations.

Procedural History: The Pasay City RTC issued an Order granting PNB's
application for issuance of preliminary attachment after finding that
defendants Globe Asiatique and Filmal "through the active participation or
connivance/conspiracy of defendants Delfin and Dexter Lee from the
revealing evidence presented by plaintiff are guilty of fraud in contracting
their outstanding loan applications to plaintiff Philippine National Bank.
Meanwhile, and before the Pasay City RTC could act upon the foregoing
motions, defendants Globe Asiatique, Filmal, Delfin S. Lee and Dexter L.
Lee filed on August 10, 2011 a complaint for Damages in the RTC of Pasig
City, Branch 155 docketed as Civil Case No. 73132.|||The Pasig RTC
dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction.
Issue: Whether or not a court can take cognizance of a compulsory
counterclaim despite the fact that the corresponding complaint was
dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.

Holding: A counterclaim is any claim which a defending party may have

against an opposing party. It is in the nature of a cross-complaint; a distinct
and independent cause of action which, though alleged in the answer, is not
part of the answer.
Counterclaims may be either compulsory or permissive. Section 7, Rule 6 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
SEC. 7. Compulsory counterclaim. — A compulsory
counterclaim is one which, being cognizable by the regular courts of
justice, arises out of or is connected with the transaction or
occurrence constituting the subject matter of the opposing party's
claim and does not require for its adjudication the presence of third
parties of whom the court cannot acquire jurisdiction. Such a
counterclaim must be within the jurisdiction of the court both as to
the amount and the nature thereof, except that in an original action
before the Regional Trial Court, the counterclaim may be considered
compulsory regardless of the amount.
In this case, petitioner's counterclaim for damages raised in her answer
before the Pasig City RTC is compulsory, alleging suffering and injury
caused to her as a consequence of the unwarranted filing of the baseless
complaint filed by respondents. Said court, however, dismissed her
counterclaim upon the same ground of lack of jurisdiction as its resolution
supposedly would entail passing upon the validity of orders and processes
still pending before the Pasay City RTC.
In the present case, the RTC of Pasig City should have allowed petitioner's
counterclaim to proceed notwithstanding the dismissal of respondents'
complaint, the same being compulsory in nature and with its cause not
eliminated by such dismissal. It bears stressing that petitioner was hailed to a
separate court (Pasig City RTC) even while the dispute between PNB and
respondents was still being litigated, and she already incurred expenses
defending herself, having been sued by respondents in her personal capacity.
The accusations hurled against her were serious (perjury and
misrepresentation in executing the affidavit in support of the application for
writ of attachment before the Pasay City RTC) — with hints at possible
criminal prosecution apart from that criminal complaint already lodged in
the Pasig City Prosecutor's Office. The Pasig City RTC clearly erred in
refusing to hear the counterclaims upon the same ground for dismissal of the
complaint, i.e., lack of jurisdiction in strict observance of the policy against
interference with the proceedings of a co-equal court.
 Respondents contend that if petitioner is allowed to prove her counterclaims
before the Pasay City RTC, they have no choice but to justify their action in
filing their case before the Pasig City RTC by going back to the allegations
in their complaint that they are merely vindicating themselves against the
perjured affidavit executed by petitioner which led to t he issuance of the
illegal orders of the Pasay City RTC that resulted to the damage and injury
sustained by respondents. Obviously, respondents are invoking the same
principle of judicial stability which we find inapplicable insofar as
petitioner's counterclaim arising from respondents' unfounded suit.
As petitioner set forth in her Compulsory Counterclaim, there is actually no
necessity for the Pasig City RTC, in ruling on the merits of the counterclaim,
to pass upon the validity of the writ of attachment and related orders issued
by the Pasay City RTC. Precisely, petitioner faulted the respondents in
prematurely, and in a contumacious act of forum shopping, filing a separate
damage suit when there is no final judicial determination yet of any
irregularity in the attachment proceedings before the Pasay City RTC.

4. Bungcayao v. Fort Ilocandia Properties

G.R. No. 170483, April 19, 2010

Facts: Bungcayao, Sr. claimed to be one of the two entrepreneurs who

introduced improvements on the foreshore area of Calayab Beach in 1978
when Fort Ilocandia Hotel started its construction in the area. Thereafter,
other entrepreneurs began setting up their own stalls in the foreshore area.
They later formed themselves into the D’Sierto Beach Resort Owner’s
Association, Inc. (D’Sierto). In July 1980, six parcels of land in Barrio
Balacad (now Calayad) were transferred, ceded, and conveyed to the
Philippine Tourism Authority (PTA) pursuant to Presidential Decree No.
1704. Fort Ilocandia Resort Hotel was erected on the area. Petitioner and
other D’Sierto members applied for a foreshore lease and was granted a
provisional permit. Fort Ilocandia Property Holdings and Development
Corporation (respondent) filed a foreshore application over a 14-hectare area
abutting the Fort Ilocandia Property, including the 5-hectare portion applied
for by D’Sierto members. The foreshore applications became the subject
matter of a conflict case. DENR Regional Executive Director Victor J.
Ancheta denied the foreshore lease applications of the D’Sierto members,
including petitioner, on the ground that the subject area applied for fell either
within the titled property or within the foreshore areas applied for by
respondent. Respondent, through its Public Relations Manager Arlene de
Guzman, invited the D’Sierto members to a luncheon meeting to discuss
common details beneficial to all parties concerned. Petitioner alleged that his
son, Manuel Bungcayao, Jr., who attended the meeting, manifested that he
still had to consult his parents about the offer but upon the undue pressure
exerted by Atty. Marcos, he accepted the payment and signed the Deed of
Assignment, Release, Waiver and Quitclaim in favor of respondent.
Petitioner then filed an action for declaration of nullity of contract before the
Regional Trial Court of Laoag.

Procedural History: The trial court ruled that the alleged pressure on
petitioner’s sons could not constitute force, violence or intimidation that
could vitiate consent. As regards respondent’s counterclaim, the trial court
ruled that based on the pleadings and admissions made, it was established
that the property occupied by petitioner was within the titled property of
respondent. The CA affirmed the decision in toto. The Court of Appeals
ruled that the counterclaims raised by respondent were compulsory in nature,
as they arose out of or were connected with the transaction or occurrence
constituting the subject matter of the opposing party’s claim and did not
require for its adjudication the presence of third parties of whom the court
could not acquire jurisdiction. The Court of Appeals ruled that respondent
was the rightful owner of the subject property and as such, it had the right to
recover its possession from any other person to whom the owner has not
transmitted the property, including petitioner.

Issue: Whether or not the respondent’s counterclaim is compulsory

Holding: A compulsory counterclaim is any claim for money or any relief,

which a defending party may have against an opposing party, which at the
time of suit arises out of, or is necessarily connected with, the same
transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the plaintiff’s
complaint. It is compulsory in the sense that it is within the jurisdiction of
the court, does not require for its adjudication the presence of third parties
over whom the court cannot acquire jurisdiction, and will be barred in the
future if not set up in the answer to the complaint in the same case. Any
other counterclaim is permissive. The criteria to determine whether the
counterclaim is compulsory or permissive are as follows: (a) Are issues of
fact and law raised by the claim and by the counterclaim largely the same?
(b) Would res judicata bar a subsequent suit on defendant’s claim, absent the
compulsory rule? (c) Will substantially the same evidence support or refute
plaintiff’s claim as well as defendant’s counterclaim? (d) Is there any logical
 relations between the claim and the counterclaim? A positive answer to all
four questions would indicate that the counterclaim is compulsory.

In this case, the only issue in the complaint is whether Manuel, Jr. is
authorized to sign the Deed of Assignment, Release, Waiver and Quitclaim
in favor of respondent without petitioner’s express approval and authority. In
an Order dated 6 November 2003, the trial court confirmed the agreement of
the parties to cancel the Deed of Assignment, Release, Waiver and
Quitclaim and the return of ₱400,000 to respondent. The only claim that
remained was the claim for damages against respondent. The trial court
resolved this issue by holding that any damage suffered by Manuel, Jr. was
personal to him. The trial court ruled that petitioner could not have suffered
any damage even if Manuel, Jr. entered into an agreement with respondent
since the agreement was null and void. Respondent filed three
counterclaims. The only counterclaim that remained was for the recovery of
possession of the subject property. While this counterclaim was an offshoot
of the same basic controversy between the parties, it is very clear that it will
not be barred if not set up in the answer to the complaint in the same case.
Respondent’s second counterclaim, contrary to the findings of the trial court
and the Court of Appeals, is only a permissive counterclaim. It is not a
compulsory counterclaim. It is capable of proceeding independently of the
main case. The rule in permissive counterclaim is that for the trial court to
acquire jurisdiction, the counterclaimant is bound to pay the prescribed
docket fees. Any decision rendered without jurisdiction is a total nullity and
may be struck down at any time, even on appeal before this Court. In this
case, respondent did not dispute the non-payment of docket fees.
Respondent only insisted that its claims were all compulsory counterclaims.
As such, the judgment by the trial court in relation to the second
counterclaim is considered null and void without prejudice to a separate
action which respondent may file against petitioner.

5. Fernando Medical Enterprises, Inc. Wesleyan University

G.R. No. 207970, January 20, 2016

Facts: Petitioner delivered and installed medical equipment and supplies at

Wesleyan’s hospital. According to petitioner, respondent left an unpaid sum
on its total obligation. However, the parties entered into another agreement
whereby the former agreed to reduce its claim and allowed the latter to pay it
in an installment basis within 36 months. Meanwhile, respondent notified
the petitioner that its new administration had reviewed their contracts and
had found that the contracts were defective and rescissible. For failure of
respondent to pay as demanded, petitioner filed a complaint for sum of
money. Respondent moved to dismiss the complaint. After the RTC denied
the said motion, petitioner filed it motion for judgment on the pleadings
which respondent opposed, arguing that it had specifically denied the
material allegations in the complaint.

Procedural History: The RTC denied the motion for judgment based on the
pleadings since the allegations stated on the motion are evidentiary in nature.
The CA rules that a judgment on the pleadings would be improper since the
balance due to the petitioner remained to be an issue in the allegations of
respondent in the complaint for rescission it filed.

Issue: Whether or not the denial of judgment of the pleadings was proper

Holding: The controversion of the ultimate facts must only be by specific

denial. Section 10, Rule 8 of the Rules of Court recognizes only three
modes by which the denial in the answer raises an issue of fact. The first is
by the defending party specifying each material allegation of fact the truth
of which he does not admit and, whenever practicable, setting forth the
substance of the matters upon which he relies to support his denial. The
second applies to the defending party who desires to deny only a part of an
averment, and the denial is done by the defending party specifying so
much of the material allegation of ultimate facts as is true and material and
denying only the remainder. The third is done by the defending party who
is without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the
truth of a material averment made in the complaint by stating so in the
answer. Any material averment in the complaint not so specifically denied
are deemed admitted except an averment of the amount of unliquidated
damages.
In the case of a written instrument or document upon which an action or
defense is based, which is also known as the actionable document, the
pleader of such document is required either to set forth the substance of
such instrument or document in the pleading, and to attach the original or a
copy thereof to the pleading as an exhibit, which shall then be deemed to
be a part of the pleading, or to set forth a copy in the pleading. The adverse
party is deemed to admit the genuineness and due execution of the
actionable document unless he specifically denies them under oath, and
 sets forth what he claims to be the facts, but the requirement of an oath
does not apply when the adverse party does not appear to be a party to the
instrument or when compliance with an order for an inspection of the
original instrument is refused.
The respondent qualified its admissions and denials by subjecting them to
its special and affirmative defenses of lack of jurisdiction over its person,
improper venue, litis pendentia and forum shopping was of no
consequence because the affirmative defenses, by their nature, involved
matters extrinsic to the merits of the petitioner's claim, and thus did not
negate the material averments of the complaint.|||

In order to resolve the petitioner's Motion for Judgment Based on the

Pleadings, the trial court could rely only on the answer of the respondent
filed in Civil Case No. 09-122116. Under Section 1, Rule 34 of the Rules of
Court, the answer was the sole basis for ascertaining whether the complaint's
material allegations were admitted or properly denied. As such, the
respondent's averment of payment of the total of P78,401,650.00 to the
petitioner made in its complaint for rescission had no relevance to the
resolution of the Motion for Judgment Based on the Pleadings. The CA thus
wrongly held that a factual issue on the total liability of the respondent
remained to be settled through trial on the merits. It should have openly
wondered why the respondent's answer in Civil Case No. 09-122116 did not
allege the supposed payment of the P78,401,650.00, if the payment was true,
if only to buttress the specific denial of its alleged liability. The omission
exposed the respondent's denial of liability as insincere.|||

IX. Parts and Contents of Pleadings

1. Vallacar Transit, Inc. v. Catubig

G.R. No. 175512, May 30, 2011

Facts: On January 27, 1994, respondent's husband, Quintin Catubig, Jr.

(Catubig), was on his way home from Dumaguete City riding in tandem
on a motorcycle with his employee, Teddy Emperado (Emperado).
Catubig was the one driving the motorcycle. While approaching a curve
at kilometers 59 and 60, Catubig tried to overtake a slow moving ten-
wheeler cargo truck by crossing-over to the opposite lane, which was
then being traversed by the Ceres Bulilit bus driven by Cabanilla, headed
for the opposite direction. When the two vehicles collided, Catubig and
Emperado were thrown from the motorcycle. Catubig died on the spot
where he was thrown, while Emperado died while being rushed to the
hospital. Cabanilla was charged with reckless imprudence resulting in
double homicide in Criminal Case No. M-15-94 before the Municipal
Circuit Trial Court

Procedural History: After preliminary investigation, the MCTC issued a

Resolution on December 22, 1994, dismissing the criminal charge against
Cabanilla. It found that Cabanilla was not criminally liable for the deaths
of Catubig and Emperado, because there was no negligence, not even
contributory, on Cabanilla's part.
Thereafter, respondent filed before the RTC a Complaint for Damages
against petitioner, seeking actual, moral, and exemplary damages, in the
total amount of P484,000.00, for the death of her husband, Catubig,
based on Article 2180, in relation to Article 2176, of the Civil Code.
Respondent alleged that petitioner is civilly liable because the latter's
employee driver, Cabanilla, was reckless and negligent in driving the bus
which collided with Catubig's motorcycle.
Petitioner, in its Answer with Counterclaim, contended that the
proximate cause of the vehicular collision, which resulted in the deaths of
Catubig and Emperado, was the sole negligence of Catubig when he
imprudently overtook another vehicle at a curve and traversed the
opposite lane of the road. As a special and affirmative defense, petitioner
asked for the dismissal of respondent's complaint for not being verified
and/or for failure to state a cause of action, as there was no allegation that
petitioner was negligent in the selection or supervision of its employee
driver. Trial then ensued.
The RTC admitted all the evidence presented. Finding preponderance of
evidence in favor of petitioner, it held that it was respondent’s husband
who was the reckless and negligent driver and dismissed the
counterclaim of petitioner.
The appellate court held that both Catubig and Cabanilla were negligent in
driving their respective vehicles. Catubig, on one hand, failed to use
reasonable care for his own safety and ignored the hazard when he tried to
overtake a truck at a curve. Cabanilla, on the other hand, was running his
vehicle at a high speed of 100 kilometers per hour. The Court of Appeals
also brushed aside the defense of petitioner that it exercised the degree of
diligence exacted by law in the conduct of its business. Maypa was not in a
 position to testify on the procedures followed by petitioner in hiring
Cabanilla as an employee driver considering that Cabanilla was hired a
year before Maypa assumed his post at the Dumaguete branch of
petitioner.

Issue: Whether or not respondent’s complaint for damages should be

dismissed for the latter’s failure to verify the same

Holding: The 1997 Rules of Court clearly provides that a pleading

lacking proper verification is to be treated as an unsigned pleading which
produces no legal effect. However, it also just as clearly states that
"[e]xcept when otherwise specifically required by law or rule, pleadings
need not be under oath, verified or accompanied by affidavit." No such
law or rule specifically requires that respondent's complaint for damages
should have been verified.
Although parties would often submit a joint verification and certificate
against forum shopping, the two are different. As a general rule, a
pleading need not be verified, unless there is a law or rule specifically
requiring the same.||| In contrast, all complaints, petitions, applications,
and other initiatory pleadings must be accompanied by a certificate
against forum shopping, first prescribed by Administrative Circular No.
04-94, which took effect on April 1, 1994, then later on by Rule 7,
Section 5 of the 1997 Rules of Court. It is not disputed herein that
respondent's complaint for damages was accompanied by such a
certificate.
In addition, verification, like in most cases required by the rules of
procedure, is a formal, not jurisdictional, requirement, and mainly
intended to secure an assurance that matters which are alleged are done in
good faith or are true and correct and not of mere speculation. When
circumstances warrant, the court may simply order the correction of
unverified pleadings or act on it and waive strict compliance with the
rules in order that the ends of justice may thereby be served.

2. Chua v. Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company

G.R. No. 182311, August 19, 2009

Facts: Sometime in 1988, petitioners obtained from respondent

Metrobank a loan of P4,000,000.00, which was secured by a real estate
mortgage (REM) on parcels of land covered by Transfer Certificates of
Title (TCTs) No. (108020) 1148, No. 93919, and No. 125185, registered
in petitioner Chua's name (subject properties). Since the value of the
collateral was more than the loan, petitioners were given an open credit
line for future loans. On 18 September 1995, 17 January 1996, 31 July
1996, 21 January 1997, and 12 October 1998, petitioners obtained other
loans from respondent Metrobank, and the real estate mortgages were
repeatedly amended in accordance with the increase in petitioners'
liabilities. Having failed to fully pay their obligations, petitioners entered
into a Debt Settlement Agreement with respondent Metrobank on 13
January 2000, whereby the loan obligations of the former were
restructured. The debt consisted of a total principal amount of
P79,650,000.00, plus unpaid interest of P7,898,309.02, and penalty
charges of P552,784.96. Amortization payments were to be made in
accordance with the schedule attached to the agreement.
The lawyers of respondent Metrobank demanded that petitioners fully
pay and settle their liabilities, including interest and penalties. When
petitioners still failed to pay their loans, respondent Metrobank sought to
extra-judicially foreclose the REM constituted on the subject properties.
A notice of sale was subsequently issued.
Petitioner Chua, in his personal capacity and acting on behalf of
petitioner Filiden, filed before the Regional Trial Court a Complaint for
Injunction with Prayer for Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order
(TRO), Preliminary Injunction and Damages.
Procedural History: After the expiration of the TRO and no injunction
have been issued, respondent reset the auction sale. The auction sale,
however, proceeded, and a Certificate of Sale was accordingly issued to
respondent Metrobank as the highest bidder of the foreclosed
properties. Petitioners filed the RTC-Branch 257 a Motion to Admit
Amended Complaint in Civil Case No. CV-01-0207. The Amended
Verified Complaint, attached to the said Motion, impleaded as additional
defendant the incumbent Register of Deeds of Parañaque City. Petitioners
alleged that the Certificate of Sale was a falsified document since there was
no actual sale that took place. And, even if an auction sale was conducted,
the Certificate of Sale would still be void because the auction sale was
done in disobedience to a lawful order of RTC-Branch 257. In an Order,
the RTC-Branch 257 denied petitioners' application for injunction on the
ground that the sale of the foreclosed properties rendered the same moot
and academic. The auction sale, which was conducted by respondents
Metrobank and Atty. Celestra, after the expiration of the TRO, and without
knowledge of the Order dated 8 November 2001 of RTC-Branch 257, was
considered as proper and valid. In a Decision dated 26 July 2002, the Court
of Appeals reversed the 6 March 2002 Order of RTC-Branch 257 and
remanded the case for further proceedings. The Supreme Court dismissed
the appeal of respondents with finality. |||

Petitioners filed with Branch 195 of the Regional Trial Court of Parañaque
(RTC-Branch 195) a Verified Complaint for Damages against respondents
Metrobank, Atty. Celestra, and three Metrobank lawyers, namely, Atty.
Antonio Viray, Atty. Ramon Miranda and Atty. Pompeyo Maynigo. The
Complaint was docketed as Civil Case No. CV-05-0402. Petitioners sought
in their Complaint the award of actual, moral, and exemplary damages
against the respondents for making it appear that an auction sale of the
subject properties took place, as a result of which, the prospective buyers
of the said properties lost their interest and petitioner Chua was prevented
from realizing a profit of P70,000,000.00 from the intended
sale.||| Petitioners also filed with RTC-Branch 195 a Motion to
Consolidate seeking the consolidation of the action for damages pending
before said court, with the injunction case that was being heard before
RTC-Branch 258. After the cases were consolidated, the Court of Appeals
affirmed the RTC order. The appellate court observed that although the
defendants in the two cases were not identical, they represented a
community of interest. It also declared that the cause of action of the two
cases, upon which the recovery of damages was based, was the
same, i.e., the feigned auction sale, such that the nullification of the
foreclosure of the subject properties, which petitioners sought in Civil Case
No. CV-01-0207, would render proper the award for damages, claimed by
petitioners in Civil Case No. CV-05-0402. Thus, judgment in either case
would result in res judicata. |||

Issue: Whether or not successively filing Civil Case No. CV-01-0207 and
Civil Case No. CV-05-0402 amounts to forum shopping.

Holding: Forum shopping exists when a party repeatedly avails himself

of several judicial remedies in different courts, simultaneously or
successively, all substantially founded on the same transactions and the
same essential facts and circumstances, and all raising substantially the
same issues either pending in or already resolved adversely by some
other court.
Ultimately, what is truly important in determining whether forum
shopping exists or not is the vexation caused the courts and party-litigant
by a party who asks different courts to rule on the same or related causes
and/or to grant the same or substantially the same reliefs, in the process
creating the possibility of conflicting decisions being rendered by the
different fora upon the same issue.
Forum shopping can be committed in three ways: (1) filing multiple
cases based on the same cause of action and with the same prayer, the
previous case not having been resolved yet (where the ground for
dismissal is litis pendentia); (2) filing multiple cases based on the same
cause of action and the same prayer, the previous case having been
finally resolved (where the ground for dismissal is res judicata); and (3)
filing multiple cases based on the same cause of action, but with different
prayers (splitting of causes of action, where the ground for dismissal is
also either litis pendentia or res judicata).
In the present case, there is no dispute that petitioners failed to state in
the Certificate of Non-Forum Shopping, attached to their Verified
Complaint in Civil Case No. CV-05-0402 before RTC-Branch 195, the
existence of Civil Case No. CV-01-0207 pending before RTC-Branch
258. Nevertheless, petitioners insist that they are not guilty of forum
shopping, since (1) the two cases do not have the same ultimate objective
— Civil Case No. CV-01-0207 seeks the annulment of the 8 November
2001 public auction and certificate of sale issued therein, while Civil
Case No. CV-05-0402 prays for the award of actual and compensatory
damages for respondents' tortuous act of making it appear that an auction
sale actually took place on 8 November 2001; and (2) the judgment in
Civil Case No. CV-01-0207, on the annulment of the foreclosure sale,
would not affect the outcome of Civil Case No. CV-05-0402, on the
entitlement of petitioners to damages. The Court, however, finds these
arguments refuted by the allegations made by petitioners themselves in
their Complaints in both cases.
Petitioners committed forum shopping by filing multiple cases based on
the same cause of action, although with different prayers. There is no
question that the claims of petitioners for damages in Civil Case No. CV-
01-0207 and Civil Case No. CV-05-0402 are premised on the same cause
 of action, i.e., the purportedly wrongful conduct of respondents in
connection with the foreclosure sale of the subject properties.

3. Zarsona Medical v. PHIC

G.R. No. 191225, October 13, 2014

Facts: ZMC filed a claim with the Philippine Health Insurance Corporation
(PhilHealth) on the confinement of National Health Insurance Program
(NHIP) member Lorna M. Alestre (Alestre) on 10-12 August 2003. Said
claim was denied on the ground of "extended confinement." It was stated on
the claim form that Alestre was admitted to ZMC on 6 August 2003 and was
discharged on 12 August 2003. It was also revealed in her Salaysay that
Alestre's actual confinement at ZMC was on 10-11 August 2003. Alestre,
who is a teacher at Rizal Elementary School, was found to have reported for
work on 12 August 2003. In defense of ZMC, Dr. Sylvia Bragat (Dr.
Bragat), its Medical Director, stated that ZMC's Midwife/Clerk Jennifer R.
Acuram (Acuram) committed an honest mistake when she wrote 6-12
August 2003 as the confinement period in the claim form. ZMC also
presented an Affidavit of Explanation from Alestre recanting her
previous Salaysay. Alestre explained that the previous statement she gave
does not reflect the truth because she was protecting herself when she
logged-in at the school's time record on 12 August 2003 when she was
supposedly still confined at ZMC. Alestre narrated that she and her son were
admitted at ZMC on 10 August 2003 at around 1:30 p.m. and was
discharged on 12 August 2003. In the morning of 12 August 2003, after her
attending physician went to check on her, she managed to slip out of the
hospital. She proceeded to the school, which was a mere ten minute drive
away from ZMC. She reported for work and came back to the hospital at
noon to take her medicines and look after her child. Thereafter, she again
went back to the school and at about 1:30 p.m., she asked permission from
the school principal that she needed to go back to the hospital. She then went
back to ZMC to attend to her child and process her discharge papers. At
around 2:00 p.m., she finally came back to the school.|||

Procedural History: ZMC was found liable for the charge of "Extending
Period of Confinement" in violation of Section 149 of the Revised Rules and
Regulations of Republic Act No. 7875 and was meted the penalty of
suspension from participating in the NHIP for a period of three (3) months
and a fine of P10,000.00. While Health Insurance Arbiter Michael Troy
Polintan considered the admission date of 6 August 2003 reflected in
Alestre's clinical record as a mere clerical error, he refused to believe
Alestre's claim that she was discharged only on 12 August 2003 but on that
day, she was travelling back and forth from hospital to the school where she
teaches. The PhilHealth Arbiter gave more evidentiary weight to the
signature of Alestre in the school's attendance logbook which established the
fact that she reported for work on 12 August 2003. ZMC appealed but the
PhilHealth Board of Directors dismissed the appeal.

ZMC filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals putting in the
forefront of its arguments Alestre's Affidavit of Explanation. ZMC admitted
to Alestre's recantation but in its defense, ZMC emphasized that the
Affidavit, being notarized and executed under oath, should weigh more than
the Salaysay, which was not so. ZMC added that Alestre's retraction rang
true because she was willing to incriminate herself in exchange for telling
the truth. the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for failure on the part
of ZMC to attach a valid SPA. The appellate court found the SPA defective
on the ground that it does not explicitly authorize Dr. Bragat to sign and
execute the required verification and certification of non-forum shopping in
this case. The appellate court noted that the powers granted to Dr. Bragat
pertain only to her administrative functions as Medical Director of ZMC.

Issue: Whether or not the SPA authorizing Dr. Bragat to sign the
verification and certification of non-forum shopping was sufficient

Holding: Verification of a pleading is a formal, not jurisdictional,

requirement intended to secure the assurance that the matters alleged in a
pleading are true and correct. Thus, the court may simply order the
correction of unverified pleadings or act on them and waive strict
compliance with the rules. It is deemed substantially complied with when
one who has ample knowledge to swear to the truth of the allegations in the
complaint or petition signs the verification, and when matters alleged in the
petition have been made in good faith or are true and correct.
As to certification against forum shopping, non-compliance therewith or a
defect therein, unlike in verification, is generally not curable by its
subsequent submission or correction thereof, unless there is a need to relax
the Rule on the ground of "substantial compliance" of presence of "special
circumstances or compelling reasons." Rule 7, Section 5 of the Rules of the
 Court, requires that the certification should be signed by the "petitioner
principal party" himself. The rationale behind this is "because only the
petitioner himself has actual knowledge of whether or not he has initiated
similar actions or proceedings in different courts or agencies."
A reading of the SPA reveals that the powers conferred by Dr. Zarsona to his
attorneys-in-fact pertain to administrative matters. The phrase, "claims,
benefits and privileges belonging to or owing to Zarsona Medical Clinic"
clearly does not include the filing of cases before the courts or any quasi-
judicial agencies. The term "claims" in particular refers to those claims for
payment of services rendered by the hospital during a PhilHealth member's
confinement. These claims are filed by the hospital with PhilHealth.
Furthermore, the SPA makes no mention of any court, judicial or quasi-
judicial bodies. The enumeration of agencies in the first paragraph of the
SPA, such as PhilHealth and Department of Health, refers to those agencies
which are health-related.
There is no explicit authorization for Dr. Bragat to sign and execute the
requirement verification and certification in this case. At the very least, the
SPA should have granted the attorneys-in-fact the power and authority to
institute civil and criminal actions which would necessarily include the
signing of the verification and certification against forum-shopping.
The defects in the SPA notwithstanding, ZMC should be given the
opportunity to rectify the defects in the petition since ZMC had in good faith
complied by submitting an SPA which it thought was sufficient and
encompasses the filing of the instant suit.
|||
4. Anderson v. Ho
G.R. No. 172590, January 7, 2013

Facts: Anderson filed a Complaint for Ejectment against respondent Enrique

Ho (Ho) before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Quezon City. She
alleged that through her mere tolerance, Ho is in possession of her parcel of
land at Roosevelt Avenue, Quezon City covered by Transfer Certificate of
Title No. N-193368 (Roosevelt property). As she was already in need of the
said property, Anderson served upon Ho a Demand Letter to Vacate but
despite receipt thereof, Ho refused. Because of this, Anderson prayed that
the MeTC order Ho to vacate the Roosevelt property and pay her damages
and attorney's fees.
 In his Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim, Ho denied that his
occupation of the Roosevelt property is through Anderson's mere
tolerance. He claimed that since Anderson is an American citizen, he
managed her affairs in the Philippines and administered her properties in
Quezon City and Cebu. When Anderson sought his assistance in ejecting
her relatives from the Roosevelt property and in demolishing the St.
Anthony de Padua Church built thereon, Ho (1) secured the services of a
lawyer to file an ejectment case against the occupants of the property; (2)
dutifully appeared in court on Anderson's behalf who was then in the
United States of America (U.S.A.); and (3) was able to secure a judgment
from the court in favor of Anderson. For all these, Anderson did not pay
Ho a single centavo and instead executed a written document dated
January 14, 1999 which states that as partial payment for Ho's services,
Anderson is authorizing him "to make use of the Roosevelt property as his
residence free of charge provided he vacates [it] if there is a buyer for the
lot" and "that the balance of Ho's compensation shall consist of 10% of the
proceeds [of the sale of any or all of her properties located in Roosevelt
Avenue, M.H. del Pilar Street and Ana Maria Street, all in Quezon City;
Cebu City; and Cebu province]". In view of this, Ho averred that he
possesses the property not through mere tolerance but as part of his
compensation for services rendered to Anderson. Hence, he is entitled to
the continued possession thereof until such time that the property is sold
and he is paid the 10% of the proceeds of its sale.
|||
Procedural History: The MeTC dismissed the case for lack of cause of
action. The RTC modified the MeTC ruling and dismissed the complaint
without prejudice.

Intending to file with the CA a Petition for Review under Rule 42 of

the Rules of Court, Anderson's counsel, filed a Motion for Extension of
Time of 15 days within which to file a petition allegedly due to the revisions
required in the initial draft and on account of heavy pressure of work. This
was granted by the CA. Subsequently, another extension was sought, this
time claiming that the petition had already been finalized and sent to
Anderson in Hawaii, U.S.A. for her to read as well as sign the certification
and verification portion thereof. However, as of the last day of the extended
period on June 4, 2005, the petition has not yet been sent back, hence, the
additional extension being sought. In the interest of justice, the CA once
again granted the said motion for extension. On June 20, 2005, Atty. Oliva
 was finally able to file the Petition for Review but the certification against
forum shopping attached thereto was signed by him on Anderson's behalf
without any accompanying authority to do so.||

Issue: Whether or not there was substantial compliance with the rules on
certification of non forum shopping

Holding: The requirement that it is the petitioner, not her counsel, who
should sign the certificate of non-forum shopping is due to the fact that a
"certification is a peculiar personal representation on the part of the principal
party, an assurance given to the court or other tribunal that there are no other
pending cases involving basically the same parties, issues and causes of
action." "Obviously, it is the petitioner, and not always the counsel whose
professional services have been retained for a particular case, who is in the
best position to know whether [she] actually filed or caused the filing of a
petition in that case." however, if a petitioner is unable to sign a certification
for reasonable or justifiable reasons, she must execute an SPA designating
her counsel of record to sign on her behalf. "[A] certification which had been
signed by counsel without the proper authorization is defective and
constitutes a valid cause for the dismissal of the petition."|||

In this light, the CA correctly dismissed Anderson's Petition for Review on

the ground that the certificate of non-forum shopping attached thereto was
signed by Atty. Oliva on her behalf sans any authority to do so. While the
Court notes that Anderson tried to correct this error by later submitting an
SPA and by explaining her failure to execute one prior to the filing of the
petition, this does not automatically denote substantial compliance. It must
be remembered that a defective certification is generally not curable by its
subsequent correction. And while it is true that in some cases the Court
considered such a belated submission as substantial compliance, it "did so
only on sufficient and justifiable grounds that compelled a liberal approach
while avoiding the effective negation of the intent of the rule on non-forum
shopping."|||

5. Vda. De Hermoso v. PNB

G.R. No. 154704, June 1, 2011

Facts: Nellie Panelo Vda. De Formoso (Nellie) and her children namely:
Ma. Theresa Formoso-Pescador, Roger Formoso, Mary Jane Formoso,
Bernard Formoso, and Benjamin Formoso, executed a special power of
attorney in favor of Primitivo Malcaba (Malcaba) authorizing him,
among others, to secure all papers and documents including the owner's
copies of the titles of real properties pertaining to the loan with real estate
mortgage originally secured by Nellie and her late husband, Benjamin S.
Formoso, from Philippine National Bank, Vigan Branch (PNB) on
September 4, 1980.
The Formosos sold the subject mortgaged real properties to Malcaba
through a Deed of Absolute Sale. Subsequently, Malcaba and his lawyer
went to PNB to fully pay the loan obligation including interests in the
amount of P2,461,024.74. PNB, however, allegedly refused to accept
Malcaba's tender of payment and to release the mortgage or surrender the
titles of the subject mortgaged real properties.
Petitioners filed a Complaint for Specific Performance against PNB
before the Regional Trial Court of Vigan, Ilocos Sur (RTC) praying,
among others, that PNB be ordered to accept the amount of
P2,461,024.74 as full settlement of the loan obligation of the Formosos.

Procedural History: The RTC ruled in favor of petitioners. On appeal, the

CA dismissed the petition since the verification and certification of non-
forum shopping was signed by only one of the petitioners. Likewise, the
certification of non-forum shopping requires personal knowledge of the
party who executed the same and that petitioners must show reasonable
cause for failure to personally sign the certification. Utter disregard of the
Rules cannot just be rationalized by harping on the policy of liberal
construction.

Issue: Whether or not there was substantial compliance with the rule on
the verification and certification of non-forum shopping

Holding: Among the seven (7) petitioners mentioned, only Malcaba

signed the verification and certification of non-forum shopping in the
subject petition. There was no proof that Malcaba was authorized by his
co-petitioners to sign for them. There was no special power of attorney
shown by the Formosos authorizing Malcaba as their attorney-in-fact in
filing a petition for review on certiorari. Neither could the petitioners give
at least a reasonable explanation as to why only he signed the verification
and certification of non-forum shopping.||| Indeed, liberality and leniency
were accorded in some cases. In these cases, however, those who did not
 sign were relatives of the lone signatory, so unlike in this case, where
Malcaba is not a relative who is similarly situated with the other petitioners
and who cannot speak for them. As such, the Court has no reason to
compel itself to relax the requirement of strict compliance with the rule
regarding the certification against forum shopping.|||

6. Metrobank v. Santos
G.R. No. 157867, December 15, 2009

Facts: Respondent Manfred Jacob De Koning (De Koning) obtained a

loan from Metrobank. To secure the payment of this loan, De Koning
executed a real estate mortgage (REM) in favor of Metrobank dated July
22, 1996 over a condominium unit and all its improvements. The unit is
located at Unit 1703 Cityland 10 Tower 1, H.V. Dela Costa Street,
Makati City, and is covered by Condominium Certificate of Title No.
10681. When De Koning failed to pay his loan despite demand,
Metrobank instituted extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings against the
REM. Metrobank was the highest bidder at the public auction of the
condominium unit held on November 24, 1998 and a Certificate of Sale
was issued in the bank's favor. Metrobank duly registered this Certificate
of Sale with the Registry of Deeds for Makati City on January 18, 2000.
The redemption period lapsed without De Koning redeeming the
property. Thus, Metrobank demanded that he turn over possession of the
condominium unit. When De Koning refused, Metrobank filed on July
28, 2000 with the RTC Makati, Branch 65, an ex parte petition for a writ
of possession over the foreclosed property, pursuant to Act No. 3135, as
amended. ICESTA
The lower court issued an order setting the ex parte hearing of
Metrobank's petition and directing that a copy of the order be given to De
Koning to inform him of the existence of the proceedings. During the
scheduled ex parte hearing on August 18, 2000, De Koning's counsel
appeared and manifested that he filed a motion to dismiss on the ground
that Metrobank's petition violated Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of
Court (Rules) which requires the attachment of a certification against
forum shopping to a complaint or other initiatory pleading. According to
De Koning, Metrobank's petition for the issuance of a writ of possession
involved the same parties, the same issues and the same subject matter as
the case he had filed on October 30, 1998 with the RTC of Makati, to
question Metrobank's right to foreclose the mortgage. De Koning also
had a pending petition for certiorari with the CA, which arose from the
RTC case he filed. When Metrobank failed to disclose the existence of
these two pending cases in the certification attached to its petition, it
failed to comply with the mandatory requirements of the Rules so that its
petition should be dismissed.

Procedural History: The RTC agreed with De Koning and dismissed

Metrobank's petition in its September 18, 2000 order on the ground De
Koning cited, i.e., for having a false certification of non-forum shopping.
The lower court denied Metrobank's motion for reconsideration.
Metrobank thus elevated the matter to the CA. The CA affirmed the
dismissal of Metrobank's petition. It explained that Section 5, Rule 7 of
the Rules is not limited to actions, but covers any "initiatory
pleading" that asserts a claim for relief. Since Metrobank's petition for
writ of possession is an initiatory pleading, it must perforce be covered
by this rule.
Issue: Whether or not the petition was fatally defective for violating
Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court

Holding: The certification against forum shopping is required only in a

complaint or other initiatory pleading. The ex parte petition for the
issuance of a writ of possession filed by the respondent is not an initiatory
pleading. Although the private respondent denominated its pleading as a
petition, it is, nonetheless, a motion. What distinguishes a motion from a
petition or other pleading is not its form or the title given by the party
executing it, but rather its purpose. The office of a motion is not to initiate
new litigation, but to bring a material but incidental matter arising in the
progress of the case in which the motion is filed. A motion is not an
independent right or remedy, but is confined to incidental matters in the
progress of a cause. It relates to some question that is collateral to the main
object of the action and is connected with and dependent upon the principal
remedy. An application for a writ of possession is a mere incident in the
registration proceeding. Hence, although it was denominated as
a "petition," it was in substance merely a motion. Since a petition for a writ
of possession under Section 7 of Act No. 3135, as amended, is neither a
complaint nor an initiatory pleading, a certificate against non-forum
shopping is not required. The certificate that Metrobank attached to its
petition is thus a superfluity that the lower court should have disregarded.|||
7. Jocson and Tuising v. CA
G.R. No. 162836, July 30, 2009

Facts: Petitioner Ceferina Argallon-Jocson (Jocson) filed a complaint for

Reconveyance and Damages against Marcelo Steel Corporation and Maria
Cristina Fertilizer Corporation (MCFC), which were represented by Jose
Marcelo as president of both companies. The trial court ruled in her favor.
Thus, Marcelo Steel Corporation and MCFC (private respondents) appealed
to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the trial court's decision. Private
respondents did not appeal the Court of Appeals' decision, which became
final and executory. Jocson then filed a Motion for Issuance of a Writ of
Execution. The trial court issued an order for the issuance of a writ of
execution in accordance with the tenor of the decision.
The Sheriffs then proceeded with the execution sale and sold the properties
of Marcelo Steel Corporation for the full satisfaction of the judgment
against private respondents. A certificate of sale was issued to petitioner
Rodolfo Tuising (Tuising), who was the highest bidder at the auction sale
for P9.9 million. Jocson filed with the trial court a Very Urgent Ex-Parte
Motion for Issuance of a Break-Open Order and Petition for Contempt of
Court. Marcelo Steel Corporation filed an Extremely Urgent Omnibus
Motion, praying for the annulment of the execution sale and for the
issuance of an order directing the Sheriffs not to deliver the properties sold
to Tuising pending resolution of Marcelo Steel Corporation's motion.
Marcelo Steel Corporation alleged that its obligation was merely joint with
MCFC and that the total price of the properties sold on execution was
unconscionably inadequate.

Procedural History: The trial court ruled that the liability of Marcelo
Steel Corporation was limited to its proportional share in the entire money
judgment. Considering that the dispositive portion of the Decision dated 24
February 1999 in this case did not state that the obligation of private
respondents was solidary, then their obligation was merely joint.
The Court of Appeals found no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
respondent judge. On the merits of the case, the Court of Appeals held that
the obligation of private respondents to Jocson was merely joint. The Court
of Appeals noted that the trial court's Decision dated 24 February 1999 was
silent as to the nature of the liability. Solidary obligations are not presumed
in the absence of an express determination thereof in the judgment. When
the judgment does not provide that the defendants are liable to pay jointly
and severally a certain amount of money, none of them may be compelled
to satisfy in full said judgment. The Court of Appeals found that the
Sheriffs disregarded the trial court's 24 February 1999 Decision, and
deviated from the trial court's Order dated 9 December 2002 and the writ
of execution dated 20 December 2002, which directed them to execute the
writ in accordance with the tenor of the decision.

Issue: Whether or not there was substantial compliance with the rule on the
verification and certification of non-forum shopping

Holding: The petition supposedly filed by petitioners Jocson and Tuising

was not signed by Jocson's counsel. It was Tuising's counsel who signed in
behalf of Jocson's counsel. Tuising's counsel had no authority to sign the
petition in behalf of Jocson. The records are bereft of any proof that Jocson
ever authorized Tuising's counsel to be her counsel or to act in her behalf.
Under Section 3, Rule 7 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, every pleading
must be signed by the party or counsel representing him, otherwise the
pleading produces no legal effect.
Furthermore, only Tuising signed the Verification and Certification for
Non-Forum Shopping. Jocson did not sign the Verification and
Certification. Section 1, Rule 45 of the Rules of Civil Procedure requires
the petition for review on certiorari to be verified. A pleading required to
be verified which lacks proper verification shall be treated as an unsigned
pleading. Although Tuising belatedly filed on 24 September 2004 a
"Special Power of Attorney" allegedly signed by Jocson and authorizing
Tuising to file the petition for review and to verify and to certify the
petition, no explanation was given by Tuising why the Special Power of
Attorney was belatedly filed four months after the petition for review was
filed on 12 May 2004. The lack of a certification against forum shopping
or a defective certification is generally not curable by its subsequent
submission or correction, unless there is a need to relax the rule under
special circumstances or for compelling reasons. There is thus no
compelling reason for a liberal application of the rules especially in this
case where the petitioner who did not sign the verification and certification
for non-forum shopping already filed with the trial court a Motion for
Issuance of Alias Writ of Execution. By filing the Motion for Issuance of
 Alias Writ of Execution, Jocson was in effect abiding by the Court of
Appeals' Decision dated 16 January 2004.

8. Maranaw Hotel and Resort Corp. v. CA

G.R. No. 149660, January 20, 2009

Facts: Private respondent Oabel was initially hired by petitioner as an

extra beverage attendant on April 24, 1995. This lasted until February 7,
1997. Respondent worked in Century Park Hotel, an establishment
owned by the petitioner. Petitioner contracted with Manila Resource
Development Corporation (MANRED). Subsequently, private respondent
Oabel was transferred to MANRED, with the latter deporting itself as her
employer. MANRED has intervened at all stages of these proceedings
and has consistently claimed to be the employer of private respondent
Oabel. Private respondent filed before the Labor Arbiter a petition for
regularization of employment against the petitioner. However, private
respondent Oabel was dismissed from employment. Respondent
converted her petition for regularization into a complaint for illegal
dismissal.

Procedural History: The Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaint. The

NLRC reversed the ruling of the Labor Arbiter and held that: (1)
MANRED is a labor-only contractor, and (2) private respondent was
illegally dismissed. Petitioner subsequently appealed before the Court of
Appeals. In a resolution, the appellate court dismissed the petition on
account of the failure of the petitioner to append the board resolution
authorizing the counsel for petitioner to file the petition before the Court of
Appeals.

Issue: Whether or not there was substantial compliance with the

requirement on the certification against forum shopping

Holding: Well-settled is the rule that the certificate of non-forum

shopping is a mandatory requirement. Substantial compliance applies
only with respect to the contents of the certificate but not as to its
presence in the pleading wherein it is required.
Petitioner's contention that the filing of a motion for reconsideration with an
appended certificate of non forum-shopping suffices to cure the defect in the
pleading is absolutely specious. It negates the very purpose for which the
certification against forum shopping is required: to inform the Court of the
pendency of any other case which may present similar issues and involve similar
parties as the one before it. The requirement applies to both natural and juridical
persons. Specific authorization, the Court held, could only come in the form of
a board resolution issued by the Board of Directors that specifically authorizes
the counsel to institute the petition and execute the certification, to make his
actions binding on his principal, i.e., the corporation.

||
9. Cagayan Valley v. CIR
G.R. No. 151413, February 13, 2008

Facts: Petitioner alleged that in 1995, it granted 20% sales discounts to

qualified senior citizens on purchases of medicine pursuant to Republic
Act No. (RA) 7432 and its implementing rules and regulations. In
compliance with Revenue Regulation No. (RR) 2-94, petitioner treated the
20% sales discounts granted to qualified senior citizens in 1995 as
deductions from the gross sales in order to arrive at the net sales, instead of
treating them as tax credit as provided by Section 4 of RA 7432.
On December 27, 1996, however, petitioner filed with the Bureau of
Internal Revenue (BIR) a claim for tax refund/tax credit of the full amount
of the 20% sales discount it granted to senior citizens for the year 1995,
allegedly totaling to PhP123,083 in accordance with Sec. 4 of RA 7432.
The BIR's inaction on petitioner's claim for refund/tax credit compelled
petitioner to file on March 18, 1998 a petition for review before the CTA
docketed as C.T.A. Case No. 5581 in order to forestall the two-year
prescriptive period provided under Sec. 230 of the 1977 Tax Code, as
amended. Thereafter, on March 31, 2000, petitioner amended its petition
for review.

Procedural History: The CTA dismissed the case for lack of merit. The
CTA sustained petitioner's contention that pursuant to Sec. 4 of RA 7432,
the 20% sales discounts petitioner extended to qualified senior citizens in
1995 should be treated as tax credit and not as deductions from the gross
sales as erroneously interpreted in RR 2-94. The CTA reiterated its
consistent holdings that RR 2-94 is an invalid administrative interpretation
of the law it purports to implement as it contravenes and does not conform to
 the standards RA 7432 prescribes. Aggrieved, petitioner elevated the matter
before the CA, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 59778. The CA dismissed the
petition on procedural grounds. The CA held that the person who signed the
verification and certification of absence of forum shopping, a certain Jacinto
J. Concepcion, President of petitioner, failed to adduce proof that he was
duly authorized by the board of directors to do so.|||

Issue: Whether or not there was substantial compliance with the requirement
on verification and certification on non-forum shopping

Holding: Petitioner substantially complied with Secs. 4 and 5, Rule 7 of

the 1997 Revised Rules on Civil Procedure. First, the requisite board
resolution has been submitted albeit belatedly by petitioner. Second, the
ruling in Lepanto is instructive, the President of petitioner is in a position
to verify the truthfulness and correctness of the allegations in the
petition. Third, the President of petitioner has signed the complaint
before the CTA at the inception of this judicial claim for refund or tax
credit. Consequently, the petition should be reinstated.

10. Fuentebella v. Castro

G.R. No. 150865, June 30, 2006

Facts: Respondent Darlica Castro is the widow of the late Freddie Castro
who died on September 18, 1997 in Bacolod City, Negros Occidental.
Respondent engaged the funeral services of petitioner Rolling Hills
Memorial Park, Inc. in Bacolod City for the interment of the remains of her
husband. During the burial, when the casket of her deceased husband was
about to be lowered into the vault, it was discovered that the dimensions of
the vault did not correspond to the measurements of the casket. As a result,
the casket was lifted and placed under the heat of the sun for about one hour
in front of all the mourners while the vault was being prepared. To make
matters worse, the employees of petitioner corporation measured the casket
by using a spade.
Insulted by the events that transpired at the funeral, respondent, through
counsel, wrote to the management of petitioner corporation demanding an
explanation for its negligence, but the latter did not respond nor attempt to
apologize to the former. Consequently, respondent filed a complaint for
 damages against the corporation and its Park-in-Charge Art Fuentebella,
jointly and solidarily, before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) of
Bacolod City asking for moral and exemplary damages, attorney's fees, and
litigation costs. Respondent filed a similar complaint with the RTC of
Negros Occidental. Attached in the complaint was the Verification and
Certification against Forum Shopping required under Section 5, Rule 7 of
the Rules of Court. Petitioners filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that
the certification is false because respondent had previously filed an identical
complaint with the MTCC.

|||

Procedural History: The MTCC denied the motion for lack of merit. A
motion for reconsideration was filed by petitioners arguing that the motion
to dismiss was not based on the ground that respondent had filed two similar
actions at the same time but rather on the submission by the latter of a false
certification. The trial court denied said motion. Petitioners filed with the
Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction and/or
restraining order. The petition, however, was dismissed by the Court of
Appeals. It declared that petitioners submitted a Secretary's Certificate
showing the authorization of Mrs. Lourdes Pomperada to represent the
petitioner corporation. However, there is still no showing that the said Mrs.
Lourdes Pomperada is duly authorized to act for and in behalf of the other
petitioner.

Issue: Whether or not the petition was correctly dismissed for providing a
false certification

Holding: Contrary to petitioners' assertion, it is obligatory that the one

signing the verification and certification against forum shopping on behalf of
the principal party or the other petitioners has the authority to do the same.
The Rules of Civil Procedure mandates that the petitioner or the principal
party must execute the certification against forum shopping. The reason for
this is that the principal party has actual knowledge whether a petition has
previously been filed involving the same case or substantially the same
issues. If, for any reason, the principal party cannot sign the petition, the one
signing on his behalf must have been duly authorized. Hence, a certification
which had been signed without the proper authorization is defective and
constitutes a valid cause for the dismissal of the petition.
11. Sameer Overseas Placement Agency v. Santos
G.R. No. 152579, August 4, 2009
Facts: Private respondents Lord Nelson Santos, Danilo Balcita, Nicson
Cruz, Pepito Manglicmot, and Allan Aranes (Santos, et al.) were
recruited by petitioner Sameer Overseas Placement Agency, Inc.
(Sameer) as aluminum products manufacturer operators for Ensure
Company Ltd. of Taiwan (Ensure), under a one-year employment
contract with a basic monthly salary of NT$14,800.00.
Santos, et al. were deployed and were able to work for Ensure. However,
they were repatriated even prior to the expiration of their contracts.
Consequently, in July and August 1996, Santos, et al. filed complaints
against Sameer before the National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC) for illegal dismissal, underpayment of salaries, and unauthorized
salary deductions.
Sameer filed a third party complaint against private respondent ASBT
International Management Service, Inc. (ASBT). It claimed that the latter
should be liable for all the contractual obligations of Ensure since
Sameer's accreditation was transferred to ASBT on June 9, 1997.

Procedural History: The LA ordered Sameer to pay the complainants.

The NLRC reversed and set aside the ruling of the LA. ASBT elevated the
case to the Court of Appeals via a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court. However, in a Resolution dated June 19, 2001, the
Court of Appeals denied due course and dismissed ASBT's petition on the
ground that the attached Verification and Certification of Non-Forum
Shopping was signed by Mildred R. Santos as President of ASBT without
any proof of authority to sign for and bind ASBT in the proceedings.

Issue: Whether or not there was substantial compliance with the

requirement on verification and certification of non-forum shopping

Holding: Forum shopping is defined as an act of a party, against whom an

adverse judgment or order has been rendered in one forum, of seeking and
possibly getting a favorable opinion in another forum, other than by appeal
or special civil action for certiorari. It may also be the institution of two or
more actions or proceedings grounded on the same cause on the
supposition that one or the other court would make a favorable disposition.
There is forum shopping where the elements of litis pendentia are present,
namely: (a) there is identity of parties, or at least such parties as represent
the same interest in both actions; (b) there is identity of rights asserted and
relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same set of facts; and (c)
the identity of the two preceding particulars is such that any judgment
rendered in the pending case, regardless of which party is successful,
would amount to res judicata in the other. It is expressly prohibited
because it trifles with and abuses court processes, degrades the
administration of justice, and congests court dockets. A willful and
deliberate violation of the rule against forum shopping is a ground for
summary dismissal of the case, and may also constitute direct contempt.
In this case, there is clearly no forum shopping committed by ASBT. The
July 5, 2001 motion it filed praying for reconsideration of the June 19,
2001 Resolution of the Court of Appeals, dismissing the petition on the
technical ground of lack of proof of the authority of ASBT President
Mildred R. Santos to bind the corporation in its appeal, is simply what it
is, a motion for reconsideration. Sameer cannot insist that it be treated as
a new petition just to make it fit the definition of forum shopping in an
attempt to evade liability to pay the amounts awarded to Santos, et al.
Nor was Sameer correct when it asseverated that the Seventh Division,
that initially dismissed then reinstated ASBT's petition, and the Former
Fourth Division, that rendered the questioned Decision and Resolution in
favor of ASBT, can be considered as different fora within the ambit of
the prohibition. They are mere divisions of one and the same Court of
Appeals. And as explained by the appellate court, what actually happened
was that after the Seventh Division issued its June 19, 2001 Resolution
dismissing the case for failure of ASBT to show that Mildred R. Santos
was authorized to sign and bind the corporation in the proceedings,
ASBT complied and submitted the requisite proof of authority.