PEREGRINA MACUA VDA. DE AVENIDO, Petitioner, vs.

TECLA HOYBIA A VENIDO,

Respondent.

2014-01-22 | G.R. No. 173540

SECOND DIVISION

DECISION

PEREZ,J.:

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45.ofthe Rules of Court, assailing the 31 August
2005 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 79444, which reversed the 25 March
2003 Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 8 of Davao City, in a complaint for Declaration
of Absolute Nullity of Marriage· docketed as Civil Case No. 26, 908-98.

The Facts

This case involves a contest between two women both claiming to have been validly married to the same
man, now deceased.

Respondent Tecla Hoybia Avenido (Tecla) instituted on 11 November 1998, a Complaint for Declaration
of Nullity of Marriage against Peregrina Macua Vda. de Avenido (Peregrina) on the ground that she
(Tecla), is the lawful wife of the deceased Eustaquio Avenido (Eustaquio). In her complaint, Tecla
alleged that her marriage to Eustaquio was solemnized on 30 September 1942 in Talibon, Bohol in rites
officiated by the Parish Priest of the said town. According to her, the fact of their marriage is evidenced
by a Marriage Certificate recorded with the Office of the Local Civil Registrar (LCR) of Talibon, Bohol.
However, due to World War II, records were destroyed. Thus, only a Certification3 was issued by the
LCR.

During the existence of Tecla and Eustaquio’s union, they begot four (4) children, namely: Climaco H.
Avenido, born on 30 March 1943; Apolinario H. Avenido, born on 23 August 1948; Editha A. Ausa, born
on 26 July 1950, and Eustaquio H. Avenido, Jr., born on 15 December 1952. Sometime in 1954,
Eustaquio left his family and his whereabouts was not known. In 1958, Tecla and her children were
informed that Eustaquio was in Davao City living with another woman by the name of Buenaventura
Sayson who later died in 1977 without any issue.

In 1979, Tecla learned that her husband Eustaquio got married to another woman by the name of
Peregrina, which marriage she claims must be declared null and void for being bigamous – an action she
sought to protect the rights of her children over the properties acquired by Eustaquio.

On 12 April 1999, Peregrina filed her answer to the complaint with counterclaim,4 essentially averring
that she is the legal surviving spouse of Eustaquio who died on 22 September 1989 in Davao City, their
marriage having been celebrated on 30 March 1979 at St. Jude Parish in Davao City. She also
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contended that the case was instituted to deprive her of the properties she owns in her own right and as
an heir of Eustaquio.

Trial ensued.

Tecla presented testimonial and documentary evidence consisting of:

1) Testimonies of Adelina Avenido-Ceno (Adelina), Climaco Avenido (Climaco) and Tecla herself
to substantiate her alleged prior existing and valid marriage with (sic) Eustaquio;

2) Documentary evidence such as the following:

a. Certification of Loss/Destruction of Record of Marriage from 1900 to 1944 issued by the

Office of the Civil Registrar, Municipality of Talibon, Bohol;5

b. Certification of Submission of a copy of Certificate of Marriage to the Office of the Civil

Registrar General, National Statistics Office (NSO), R. Magsaysay Blvd., Sta Mesa, Manila;6

c. Certification that Civil Registry records of births, deaths and marriages that were actually
filed in the Office of the Civil Registrar General, NSO Manila, started only in 1932;7

d. Certification that Civil Registry records submitted to the Office of the Civil Registrar
General, NSO, from 1932 to the early part of 1945, were totally destroyed during the
liberation of Manila;8

e. Certification of Birth of Apolinario Avenido;9

f. Certification of Birth of Eustaquio Avenido, Jr.;10

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 g. Certification of Birth of Editha Avenido;11

h. Certification of Marriage between Eustaquio Sr., and Tecla issued by the Parish Priest of
Talibon, Bohol on 30 September 1942;12

i. Certification that record of birth from 1900 to 1944 were destroyed by Second World War
issued by the Office of the Municipal Registrar of Talibon, Bohol, that they cannot furnish as
requested a true transcription from the Register of Birth of Climaco Avenido;13

j. Certificate of Baptism of Climaco indicating that he was born on 30 March 1943 to spouses
Eustaquio and Tecla;14

k. Electronic copy of the Marriage Contract between Eustaquio and Peregrina.15

On the other hand, Peregrina testified on, among others, her marriage to Eustaquio that took place in
Davao City on 3 March 1979; her life as a wife and how she took care of Eustaquio when he already had
poor health, as well as her knowledge that Tecla is not the legal wife, but was once a common law wife
of Eustaquio.16 Peregrina likewise set forth documentary evidence to substantiate her allegations and to
prove her claim for damages, to wit:

1) Marriage Contract17 between Pregrina and the late Eustaquio showing the date of marriage on
3 March 1979;

2) Affidavit of Eustaquio executed on 22 March 1985 declaring himself as single when he

contracted marriage with the petitioner although he had a common law relation with one Tecla
Hoybia with whom he had four (4) children namely: Climaco, Tiburcio, Editha and Eustaquio, Jr.,
all surnamed Avenido;18

3) Letter of Atty. Edgardo T. Mata dated 15 April 2002, addressed to the Civil Registrar of the
Municipality of Alegria, Surigao del Norte;19 and

4) Certification dated 25 April 2002 issued by Colita P. Umipig, in her capacity as the Civil
Registrar of Alegria, Surigao del Norte.20
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In addition, as basis for the counterclaim, Peregrina averred that the case was initiated in bad faith so as
to deprive her of the properties she owns in her own right and as an heir of Eustaquio; hence, her
entitlement to damages and attorney’s fees.

On 25 March 2003, the RTC rendered a Decision21 denying Tecla’s petition, as well as Peregrina’s
counter-claim. The dispositive portion thereof reads:

For The Foregoing, the petition for the “DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF MARRIAGE” filed by
petitioner TECLA HOYBIA AVENIDO against respondent PEREGRINA MACUA is hereby
DENIED.

The “COUNTERCLAIM” filed by respondent PEREGRINA MACUA against petitioner TECLA

HOYBIA AVENIDO is hereby DISMISSED.22

Not convinced, Tecla appealed to the CA raising as error the trial court’s alleged disregard of the
evidence on the existence of her marriage to Eustaquio.

In its 31 August 2005 Decision,23 the CA ruled in favor of Tecla by declaring the validity of her marriage
to Eustaquio, while pronouncing on the other hand, the marriage between Peregrina and Eustaquio to be
bigamous, and thus, null and void. The CA ruled:

The court a quo committed a reversible error when it disregarded (1) the testimonies of [Adelina],
the sister of EUSTAQUIO who testified that she personally witnessed the wedding celebration of
her older brother EUSTAQUIO and [Tecla] on 30 September 1942 at Talibon, Bohol; [Climaco],
the eldest son of EUSTAQUIO and [Tecla], who testified that his mother [Tecla] was married to his
father, EUSTAQUIO, and [Tecla] herself; and (2) the documentary evidence mentioned at the
outset. It should be stressed that the due execution and the loss of the marriage contract, both
constituting the condition sine qua non, for the introduction of secondary evidence of its contents,
were shown by the very evidence the trial court has disregarded.24

Peregrina now questions the said ruling assigning as error, among others, the failure of the CA to
appreciate the validity of her marriage to Eustaquio. For its part, the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG), in its Memorandum25 dated 5 June 2008, raises the following legal issues:

1. Whether or not the court can validly rely on the “presumption of marriage” to overturn the validity
of a subsequent marriage;

2. Whether or not secondary evidence may be considered and/or taken cognizance of, without
proof of the execution or existence and the cause of the unavailability of the best evidence, the
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 original document; and

3. Whether or not a Certificate of Marriage issued by the church has a probative value to prove the
existence of a valid marriage without the priest who issued the same being presented to the
witness stand.26

Our Ruling

Essentially, the question before us is whether or not the evidence presented during the trial proves the
existence of the marriage of Tecla to Eustaquio.

The trial court, in ruling against Tecla’s claim of her prior valid marriage to Eustaquio relied on Tecla’s
failure to present her certificate of marriage to Eustaquio. Without such certificate, the trial court
considered as useless the certification of the Office of the Civil Registrar of Talibon, Bohol, that it has no
more records of marriages during the period 1900 to 1944. The same thing was said as regards the
Certification issued by the National Statistics Office of Manila. The trial court observed:

Upon verification from the NSO, Office of the Civil Registrar General, Manila, it, likewise, issued a
Certification (Exhibit “B”) stating that:

records from 1932 up to early part of 1945 were totally destroyed during the liberation of
Manila on February 4, 1945. What are presently filed in this office are records from the latter
part of 1945 to date, except for the city of Manila which starts from 1952. Hence, this office
has no way of verifying and could not issue as requested, certified true copy of the records
of marriage between [Eustaquio] and [Tecla], alleged to have been married on 30th
September 1942, in Talibon, Bohol.27

In the absence of the marriage contract, the trial court did not give credence to the testimony of Tecla
and her witnesses as it considered the same as mere self-serving assertions. Superior significance was
given to the fact that Tecla could not even produce her own copy of the said proof of marriage. Relying
on Section 3 (a) and Section 5, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, the trial court declared that Tecla failed to
prove the existence of the first marriage.

The CA, on the other hand, concluded that there was a presumption of lawful marriage between Tecla
and Eustaquio as they deported themselves as husband and wife and begot four (4) children. Such
presumption, supported by documentary evidence consisting of the same Certifications disregarded by
the trial court, as well as the testimonial evidence especially that of Adelina Avenido-Ceno, created,
according to the CA, sufficient proof of the fact of marriage. Contrary to the trial court’s ruling, the CA
found that its appreciation of the evidence presented by Tecla is well in accord with Section 5, Rule 130
of the Rules of Court.

We uphold the reversal by the CA of the decision of the trial court. Quite recently, in Añonuevo v.
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Intestate Estate of Rodolfo G. Jalandoni,28 we said, citing precedents, that:

While a marriage certificate is considered the primary evidence of a marital union, it is not
regarded as the sole and exclusive evidence of marriage. Jurisprudence teaches that the fact of
marriage may be proven by relevant evidence other than the marriage certificate. Hence, even a
person’s birth certificate may be recognized as competent evidence of the marriage between his
parents.

While a marriage certificate is considered the primary evidence of a marital union, it is not regarded as
the sole and exclusive evidence of marriage. Jurisprudence teaches that the fact of marriage may be
proven by relevant evidence other than the marriage certificate. Hence, even a person’s birth certificate
may be recognized as competent evidence of the marriage between his parents.

It should be stressed that the due execution and the loss of the marriage contract, both
constituting the conditio sine qua non for the introduction of secondary evidence of its contents,
were shown by the very evidence they have disregarded. They have thus confused the evidence
to show due execution and loss as “secondary” evidence of the marriage. In Hernaez v. Mcgrath,
the Court clarified this misconception thus:

x x x [T]he court below was entirely mistaken in holding that parol evidence of the execution
of the instrument was barred. The court confounded the execution and the contents of the
document. It is the contents, x x x which may not be prove[n] by secondary evidence when
the instrument itself is accessible. Proofs of the execution are not dependent on the
existence or non-existence of the document, and, as a matter of fact, such proofs of the
contents: due execution, besides the loss, has to be shown as foundation for the inroduction
of secondary evidence of the contents.

xxxx

Evidence of the execution of a document is, in the last analysis, necessarily collateral or
primary. It generally consists of parol testimony or extrinsic papers. Even when the
document is actually produced, its authencity is not necessarily, if at all, determined from its
face or recital of its contents but by parol evidence. At the most, failure to produce the
document, when available, to establish its execution may effect the weight of the evidence
presented but not the admissibility of such evidence.

The Court of Appeals, as well as the trial court, tried to justify its stand on this issue by relying on
Lim Tanhu v. Ramolete. But even there, we said that “marriage may be prove[n] by other
competent evidence.

Truly, the execution of a document may be proven by the parties themselves, by the swearing
officer, by witnesses who saw and recognized the signatures of the parties; or even by those to
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 whom the parties have previously narrated the execution thereof. The Court has also held that
“[t]he loss may be shown by any person who [knows] the fact of its loss, or by any one who ha[s]
made, in the judgment of the court, a sufficient examination in the place or places where the
document or papers of similar character are usually kept by the person in whose custody the
document lost was, and has been unable to find it; or who has made any other investigation which
is sufficient to satisfy the court that the instrument [has] indeed [been] lost.”

In the present case, due execution was established by the testimonies of Adela Pilapil, who was
present during the marriage ceremony, and of petitioner herself as a party to the event. The
subsequent loss was shown by the testimony and the affidavit of the officiating priest, Monsignor
Yllana, as relevant, competent and admissible evidence. Since the due execution and the loss of
the marriage contract were clearly shown by the evidence presented, secondary
evidence–testimonial and documentary–may be admitted to prove the fact of marriage.30

As correctly stated by the appellate court:

In the case at bench, the celebration of marriage between [Tecla] and EUSTAQUIO was
established by the testimonial evidence furnished by [Adelina] who appears to be present during
the marriage ceremony, and by [Tecla] herself as a living witness to the event. The loss was
shown by the certifications issued by the NSO and LCR of Talibon, Bohol. These are relevant,
competent and admissible evidence. Since the due execution and the loss of the marriage contract
were clearly shown by the evidence presented, secondary evidence – testimonial and
documentary – may be admitted to prove the fact of marriage. In PUGEDA v. TRIAS, the Supreme
Court held that “marriage may be proven by any competent and relevant evidence. The testimony
by one of the parties to the marriage or by one of the witnesses to the marriage has been held to
be admissible to prove the fact of marriage. The person who officiated at the solemnization is also
competent to testify as an eyewitness to the fact of marriage.”

xxxx

The court a quo committed a reversible error when it disregarded (1) the testimonies of [Adelina],
the sister of EUSTAQUIO who testified
that she personally witnessed the wedding celebration of her older brother EUSTAQUIO and
[Tecla] on 30 September 1942 at Talibon, Bohol; [Climaco], the eldest son of EUSTAQUIO and
[Tecla], who testified that his mother [Tecla] was married to his father, EUSTAQUIO, and [Tecla]
herself; and (2) the documentary evidence mentioned at the outset. It should be stressed that the
due execution and the loss of the marriage contract, both constituting the condition sine qua non
for the introduction of secondary evidence of its contents, were shown by the very evidence the
trial court has disregarded.31 The starting point then, is the presumption of marriage.

As early as the case of Adong v. Cheong Seng Gee,32 this Court has elucidated on the rationale behind
the presumption:

The basis of human society throughout the civilized world is that of marriage. Marriage in this
jurisdiction is not only a civil contract, but it
is a new relation, an institution in the maintenance of which the public is deeply interested.
Consequently, every intendment of the law leans toward legalizing matrimony. Persons dwelling
together in apparent matrimony are presumed, in the absence of any counter-presumption or
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 evidence special to the case, to be in fact married. The reason is that such is the common order of
society, and if the parties were not what they thus hold themselves out as being, they would be
living in the constant violation of decency and of law. A presumption established by our Code of
Civil Procedure is that a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have
entered into a lawful contract of marriage. (Sec. 334, No. 28) Semper – praesumitur pro
matrimonio – Always presume marriage.

In the case at bar, the establishment of the fact of marriage was completed by the testimonies of Adelina,
Climaco and Tecla; the unrebutted the certifications of marriage issued by the parish priest of the Most
Holy Trinity Cathedral of Talibon, Bohol.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV
No. 79444 is AFFIRMED. The marriage between petitioner Peregrina Macua A venido and the deceased
Eustaquio Avenido is hereby declared NULL and VOID. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

JOE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ANTONIO T. CARPIO

Associate Justice

Chairperson

ARTURO D. BRION

Associate Justice

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

Associate Justice

ESTELA M.PERLAS BERNABE

Associate Justice

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 ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO

Associate Justice

Chairperson, Second Division

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson's Attestation, it is
hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Chief Justice

_________________________

Footnotes

1 Rollo, pp. 10-24; Penned by Associate Justice Myrna Dimaranan-Vidal with Associate Justices
Teresita Dy-Liacco Flores and Edgardo A. Camello concurring.

2 Id. at 225-232; Penned by Judge Salvador M. lbarreta, Jr.

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3 Records, p. 116; Exhibit “A,” the certification states:

x x x [T]he records of marriages during the period 1900 to 1944 were totally destroyed by Second World
War. Hence, we cannot issue as requested a true transcription from the Register of Marriages or true
copy of the Certificate of Marriage between [EUSTAQUIO] and [TECLA], who are alleged to have been
married on September 30, 1942 in this city/municipality.

4 Id. at 22-28.

5 Id. at 116; Exhibit “A.”

6 Id.; Exhibit A-1.”

7 Id. at 117; Exhibit “B.”

8 Id.; Exhibit “B-1.”

9 Id. at 118; Exhibit “C.”

10 Id. at 119; Exhibit “D.”

11 Id. at 120; Exhibit “E.”

12 Id. at 121; Exhibit “F.”

13 Id. at 122; Exhibit “G.”

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14 Id. at 123; Exhibit “G-1.”

15 Id. at 124; Exhibit “H.”

16 TSN, 25 July 2001, pp. 11-12.

17 Records, p. 12; Exhibit “1.”

18 Id. at 143; Exhibit “2.”

19 Id. at 144; Exhibit “3.”

20 Id. at 145; Exhibit “4.”

21 Id. at 150-156.

22 Id. at 156.

23 Rollo, pp. 10-24.

24 Id. at 22.

25 Id. at 361-385.

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26 Id. at 373.

27 Id. at 229-230.

28 G.R. No. 178221, 1 December 2010, 636 SCRA 420, 429-430.

29 371 Phil. 693 (1999).

30 Id. at 705-707.

31 Rollo, pp. 20-22.

32 43 Phil. 43, 56 (1922).

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