Manual On Social Accountability Concepts and Tools
Manual On Social Accountability Concepts and Tools
At the same time, the region has also witnessed a flourishing of creative efforts from the civil
society to monitor the state, pushing forth transparency, participation and accountability
as parameters of good governance. The strategies and tools, however, have been confined
to a few organisations and experiments whereas their potential could be harnessed only
when these are used widely.
In this context, the present manual aims to provide a comprehensive overview of the various
social accountability tools that are being used by civil society actors towards promoting
accountable governance. The manual also discusses in detail three of these tools, namely,
Citizen Report Card, Social Audit and Budget Analysis. The methodology of the three
tools has been stated in detail along with the various other ‘extra-procedural’ tenets that
must be kept in mind while using any of the tools. We hope this manual will contribute
towards civil society efforts in India and its neighbouring countries on popularising social
accountability tools.
Executive Director
CBGA
Contents
Section 1: Introducing the Objective and Structure of the Manual 1
Part 1: Tools that can be used to monitor the policy priorities underlying the budget
proposals/allocations; budgetary processes and institutions 17
Part 2: Tools that can be used to monitor implementation of policies and programmes 23
References 106
Introduction
Section 1
Introducing the Objective and Structure
of the Manual
1
2
The most important feature of democracy is the accountability that elected public officials
owe to the citizens. This accountability has been attempted to be achieved in almost all
major democracies of the world through the instrument of elections. Periodically held,
elections oblige officials to be accountable to the electorate for the policies formulated
and actions undertaken after their stipulated period in office. This mechanism, however,
has proved ineffective in many ways. In most developing nations, primordial loyalties of
ethnicity, race, caste and religion continue to play an important role in determining people’s
political choices instead of issues of governance and accountability. Moreover, many public
servants, who are largely responsible for implementation of various policies and schemes,
do not even have to face elections. This absolves them of any kind of accountability, which
underscores the need for devising new ways and mechanisms to exact accountability from
elected public officials and non-elected public servants.
Other conventional forms of political representation and accountability have also been
found to be rather inadequate. Some of the most commonly encountered shortcomings in
conventional accountability systems include “secrecy in auditing, the extended time delays
between elections, ineffective policy reviews in legislatures, excessive delays in courts, and
inadequate sanctions for failure to apply administrative rules or respect standards. These
have created pressure for establishing better channels for vertical information flows and
new accountability relationships between state agents and citizens” (Goetz and Gaventa,
2001, p.4).
To most people in the developing countries, the state institutions as experienced by them
in their everyday dealings with it appear to be distant, unaccountable and corrupt. The
general perception is that the state institutions are either not accountable to anyone or
accountable only to the politically connected and powerful. This is based on concerns of
corruption and lack of responsiveness to the needs of the poor. Participation by ordinary
citizens, especially the poor, in determining the contours of policy are almost absent.
Realisation of the problem has created pressure for establishing new forms of engagement
between the state and citizens. This challenges the convention in representative democracies
of citizens expressing their preferences exclusively through elections, leaving the job of
holding the public officials accountable to elected representatives. In this regard, “manifest
limitations in traditional accountability mechanisms have led to a growing recognition of
the role of direct citizen oversight of the state, and increasingly, direct citizen engagement
in the policy making process” (Posani and Aiyar, 2009). This new form of state-citizen
engagement called ‘social accountability’ has the potential to strengthen accountability
and responsiveness in service delivery.
3
The concept of ‘social accountability’ has evolved significantly over the years. The citizens
directly engage with institutions of the state in an attempt to influence policies and monitor
functions. The emphasis is now on influencing the policies and monitoring operations
either by being a part of the state apparatus (Porto Alegre, Brazil) or at least working very
closely with it.
It is argued that these interventions can also occasionally generate hybrid forms of
accountability that bridge the horizontal and vertical divide (of accountability) wherein it
uses ‘voice’ rather than ‘vote’ as the tool for public accountability.
While the tools and methods of social accountability are diverse and varied, there
are certain basic similarities. Common components include collection, analysis and
dissemination of information, mobilisation of public support, advocacy and negotiation
for change. Social accountability practices may also include enhancing citizen knowledge
regarding the conventional mechanisms of accountability and efforts to enhance citizen/
CSO participation in the ‘internal’ mechanisms of accountability (e.g., citizen involvement
in public hearing and commissions). Social accountability mechanisms become extremely
effective when institutionalised and linked to the various structures of governance and
institutions involved in service delivery.
The aim of this manual is to provide a comprehensive overview of the various social
accountability tools that are being used by civil society actors in an attempt to hold the
state accountable. Another objective of the manual is to provide a detailed treatment of at
least three of these tools, namely, Citizen Report Card, Social Audit and Budget Analysis.
The methodology of the three tools has been stated in detail along with the various other
‘extra-procedural’ tenets that must be kept in mind while undertaking the execution of any
of the tools.
Here, ‘methodology’ entails not just the procedure to be followed while implementing
a tool but is necessarily a description of the various factors and variables that help in
successful implementation of the tool. Like several others, this manual while describing the
methodology of the Citizen Report Card and Social Audit, draws extensively upon instances
(case studies) of successful implementation of the respective tools. It is, then, a derivative
description of methodology. The steps and procedures that were followed in the various
instances of successful implementation of the tools are then delineated and elaborated
upon. It must, however, be remembered that there are various ‘extra-procedural’ factors
that impinge on the successful/unsuccessful implementation of the various tools. It is an
‘overdetermined’ reality with no linear causal lines drawn between two factors or variables.
It is always a conjunction of factors that make a tool successful or unsuccessful.
4
The choice of these tools is very important and the reasons for it must be clearly stated.
Each of these tools can be seen as an attempt to monitor the several stages of public
expenditure. The process of public expenditure begins with allocation of money. This
is done through the instrument of budget. Allocation is, thus, the first stage of public
expenditure. This stage is monitored through the instrument of Budget Analysis. In the
next phase, physical outcomes of the investments made subsequent to the allocations
(buildings constructed, the books bought through the instrument of public money) are
assessed. This assessment (interrogating whether the money allocated has actually been
spent on the stipulated heads and questioning the rationale of this expenditure, assessing
the quality of the outcome) can be accomplished through a tool called Social Audit,
the second tool to be discussed in detail in the manual. The next thing that needs to be
examined is whether the investments augmenting physical infrastructure are producing
the developmental outcomes the investment aims at. It would include the improvement
in public service delivery, improvement in literacy rates etc. This could be accomplished
through a tool like the Citizen Report Card, the third tool detailed in the manual. The
choice of tool suffers from one limitation. The issues being interrogated are implicated
either directly or indirectly in the process of public expenditure.
5
6
Section 2
Introducing Social Accountability
7
8
a). Social Accountability: Concept and Tools
9
b). Why is Social Accountability important?
One key concern of social accountability mechanisms is the budget. The policies formulated
by the government become effective only if they have resources committed to their
implementation. Resource allocation towards various schemes and policies through the
budget is, however, not an exercise governed purely by the logic of economic rationality
or technocratic considerations but is a product of political choices, subject to the interplay
of political forces. For instance, there are stakeholders who try to manoeuvre the resource
allocation by using their political and economic influence. Consequently, the interests,
needs and concerns of various sections of society that do not enjoy political and economic
power and cannot influence the process of resource allocation, are liable to be ignored in
budget formulation process.
10
c). Factors that contributed to the emergence of Social Accountability
Initiatives
Many interventions have been initiated because of poor and inefficient public services.
Public service provisioning in many countries too has been inadequate with no in-built
feedback or grievance redressal mechanism to correct it. This, along with the reported
widespread corruption in government structures of several countries, especially developing
ones, has led to the emergence and wide use of social accountability tools. Instances of
inefficiency and corruption range from public officials delaying completion of transactions,
release of papers to charging arbitrary fees and so on. Citizens are quite often helpless in
the absence of tools or mechanisms to question these practices and have to concede to the
demands of the officials. These practices needed to be checked and the governments made
more accountable and transparent. Hence, social accountability tools evolved to check
corruption and inefficiency.
There have been several cases of alleged corruption against bureaucrats and politicians,
particularly in South Asia. Some have been accused of ignoring developmental priorities to
reward their constituencies alone and some of colluding with local officials and contractors
to perpetuate corruption.
A number of social accountability tools have come to be widely promoted and used by
various civil society groups in the event of negligence and/or violation of peoples’ rights –
social, economic, civil and political. The tools might be put to
use to highlight the violations of these rights or even to indicate
the failure of the government to provide necessary conditions
for the exercise of the rights mentioned above. The fact that the
government must be transparent and accountable also derives
from the notion of citizen’s rights. The social accountability
tools offer mechanisms to ensure and monitor the protection
of these rights. The tools help ensure that governments protect
these rights and promote these rights.
The functioning of the state and the representative democratic institutions in South Asia
has come to be questioned. The modernisation theories of the 1950s and 1960s advocated
models of state-led development for developing countries as there was some ambiguity
regarding whether or not democracy is important to achieve the desired consequences.
The state was expected to take a lead in the economic development process but this model
of state led economic development has since come in for criticism. Some social scientists
have attributed the failure to lack of autonomy of the state from the organised interests
in society, which led to distorted decision-making and prevented implementation of
redistributive policies. The state was unable to pursue public goals, causing the ‘crisis
of governability’ (Kohli, 1991), according to them. Some have emphasised the role of
rent-seeking bureaucracies perpetuating corrupt and inefficient systems while others
have avoided societal explanations and focussed instead on weaknesses of the political
leadership, criminalisation of politics and authoritarian leadership styles.
As a result, several neoliberal theories postulating a limited role of the state and greater
role for the market gained attention. These theories advocated slimming down of
bureaucracies, privatisation, deregulation and removal of subsidies but the experiments
did not prove successful in the African and developing countries. The political instability
that followed due to the implementation of structural adjustment programmes led to
12
the need for reforms and the state (supported by a democratic polity) was once again
required to play a greater role in promoting development and economic growth. The need
for revamping the administration was also emphasised. Hence, a crucial link between
democracy on one hand and good governance and development on the other was forged.
The notion of democracy that was promoted included rule of law, guaranteed rights,
accountability and participation. Democracy was now considered as a necessary
precondition for change and it was hoped that the non-state, non-party political processes
would play an important role in further democratisation of the state and society. It is in
this regard that the concept of civil society and more importantly social accountability
came to occupy an important position. There is now an increasing attempt to build
horizontal linkages between the State and civil society to make the state more accountable
and sensitive to the people’s needs.
Theories of civil society make claims about the beneficial effects of an active civil society for
the health of a democratic government. It has been argued that an active civil society could
build support for democratic government by articulating new issues and people’s needs
and encouraging greater public participation in different schemes. The official interest
in civil society today has been in using CSOs as sub-contactors for more targeted and
efficient delivery of services. Under the neoliberal influence, the state is willing to devolve
more of its functions to civil society and several CSOs are being encouraged to take up
development and welfare functions. There is also an opening of spaces within and outside
the state for political intervention by the masses. Civil society actors are increasingly
using these spaces to articulate the needs and demands of the people and to persuade the
government to fulfill its obligations; to be more responsive and accountable to the citizens.
It is in this larger socio-political context that the concept of social accountability has
emerged. The enhanced space for citizen/CSO engagement with the state has led to
emergence of various social accountability practices. These practices underscore the
relevance of information availability and accessibility for the citizens and in examining
the use and misuse of public resources. The various social accountability practices have
come to play an important role in promoting democratic governance, development and
more importantly social justice.
The tools and methods of social accountability are diverse and varied but there are
certain basic similarities. The key common components include collection, analysis and
dissemination of information, mobilisation of public support, advocacy and negotiation
13
for change. Social accountability practices may also include enhancing citizen knowledge
regarding the conventional mechanisms of accountability and efforts to enhance citizen/
CSO participation in the ‘internal’ mechanisms of accountability (e.g., citizen involvement
in public hearing and commissions).
Social accountability mechanisms become where is
Various strategies and tools have been developed and are being used to promote social
accountability. We would begin by categorising them as follows:
1. Tools that can be used to monitor the policy priorities underlying the budget
proposals/allocations; budgetary processes and institutions.
2. Tools that can be used to monitor implementation of policies and programmes.
3. Tools that can be used to monitor the development outcomes.
The following section deals with social accountability tools that are not directly tied up
with public expenditure but can be used to hold elected and non-elected government
officials accountable.
14
Section 3
The World of Social Accountability Tools
15
16
Section 3-1
Tools that can be used to monitor the policy priorities underlying budget
proposals/allocations; budgetary processes and institutions
(a) Participatory Budget Formulation: Public spending begins with the allocation
of public resources for various sectors, which is done through “budgeting”. The process of
budget formulation needs to be made more participatory and representative as the essential
first step to ensure that budgetary allocations reflect and, seek to address the needs of the
poor and marginalised. The government must therefore devise new mechanisms with the
aim of engaging citizens/CSOs in consultations and get a thorough view of their needs
and budgetary demands before finalising its spending priorities. This process would help
make the budget and the macro-economic policies of the government articulated through
it more representative/inclusive and allow for greater interrogation of the government’s
commitment to its promises. This is effectively pursued through Participatory Budgeting
(PB).
This social accountability tool entails direct citizen/CSO participation in the formulation
of various public policies and budgets at the national and regional levels. It can be pursued
through a variety of strategies. In some cases it involves direct participation of citizens and
civil society actors in formulation of public policies. It could also mean that civil society
actors formulate alternative budgets expressing people’s preferences and priorities, to
influence budget formulation.
The accountability tool of PB also aims at making budgetary allocations more equitable
by creating channels through which citizens can voice their needs/ priorities, which can
then be incorporated in the budget. This involves providing people with information
regarding revenue and expenditure of public resources. Access to information along with
enhanced ability to shape fiscal decisions by the people ensures greater transparency of
the budgetary process and more sensitivity to the people’s needs. Greater participation
by the people ensures better needs identification, which in turn leads to improved fiscal
planning. Greater transparency helps in reducing the scope of clientelistic practices and
elite domination. The process thus ensures greater participation and representation of
the interests and concerns of the people in budget formulation, enhancing greatly the
credibility of the government and the people’s faith in its functioning.
The rules of PB are similar but not identical. The rules are usually designed by elected
representatives with important inputs from the people. The participants must approve the
rules and any change in these. The central guiding tenets of PB are:
17
1. Sustained mobilisation of the participants and elected representatives.
Consultations may include informational sessions, year-end reports, negotiation
and deliberation.
2. Division of municipalities into smaller regions to facilitate consultations and
appropriate distribution of resources.
3. Distribution of resources is based on a quality of life index. The regions with higher
poverty, higher population and less infrastructure are allocated larger proportion
of the resources and vice-versa. Each municipality here devises its own method to
ensure equitable distribution of resources.
4. Public deliberation and consultations between citizens’ groups and elected
representatives. The citizen groups should have acquired enough information
about the various projects and policies. They should also be aware of the amount
of resources available with the government. The various projects are analysed and
their social utility assessed. In addition, other programmes and policies thought
necessary by the people are proposed.
5. Elected representatives then vote on all the proposals.
Depending on the institutional structure, this process is replicated at the higher level.
Implementation and execution is constantly monitored after the final approval of various
projects. After formulating the budget proposals, each deliberative unit (constituted of
citizens and elected representatives), elect their representatives to a higher body, which
then works with the government to monitor the projects. During the consultations, the
focus is either on specific public works projects or on general spending priorities.
P articipatory Budgeting, Porto Alegre, Brazil: The first full Participatory Budgeting
process was developed in the city of Porto Alegre, Brazil, in 1989. Participatory
budgeting was part of a number of innovative reform programmes initiated in 1989 to
overcome severe inequality in living standards among city residents. One third of the
residents lived in isolated slums on the city outskirts without proper public amenities
(water, sanitation, healthcare facilities and schools). PB in Porto Alegre occurs annually,
starting with a series of neighborhood, regional, and citywide assemblies, where residents
and elected budget delegates identify spending priorities and vote on which priorities to
implement.
18
The various stakeholders participate in the programme with different motivations. Local
governments initiate it to build the base of political support, to promote transparency,
accountability and equitable distribution of resources. The process helps citizens to
gain access to public decision-making avenues. It also ensures greater transparency in
formulation of fiscal policies and that distribution of public resources are determined
by considerations of justice and equity; not by clientelistic means. It guarantees better
public service delivery and has an important role in formulating proposals for allocation
and in monitoring the execution of various projects and policies. PB provides important
opportunities to non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and voluntary organisations
to work with the citizens to tackle pressing social concerns. In some places, NGOs play
important advisory roles where they may be part of the governing board or act as mediators
between the people and the government, getting the opportunity to influence public policy.
(c)Budget Review and Analysis: The next step towards making the budget proposals
more inclusive and representative of the interests of the vulnerable sections of society is the
review of allocations for various sectors made in the budget in the beginning of the fiscal
year. This process often referred to as ‘Budget Review’, analyses budgetary allocations
for various sectors from the perspective of the marginalised sections. In this category of
social accountability mechanisms, the budgets – states and national – are analysed to
evaluate budgetary allocations from the perspective of marginalised sections.
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rights-based democratic polity. Yamini Aiyar and Amitabh Behar point out that “Budget
work effectively uses the tools and instruments of institutional democracy for furthering
substantive democracy” (ibid).
Democracy as a form of government obliges the state to be responsive to the needs and
concerns of the people, many of whom are poor, illiterate and much in need of social
welfare services, particularly in developing nations. The state needs to be held accountable
if it fails to fulfill the most basic and fundamental expectations of the people. In this regard,
budget analysis serves as an important tool towards ensuring accountabity. Budget,
the most important policy document of the government, reflects its macro philosophy,
articulates the fiscal policies and their impacts related to provisioning of basic social
services, unemployment and poverty alleviation all of which significantly influence the life
of the poor and marginalised. The budget thus reflects the “choices that the governments
make to realise their socio-economic agenda (ibid, p.110)”. How effectively the budget is
implemented is indicative of the extent to which policy is translated into outcomes.
Quite often, the economic policies of a government as articulated in the budget represent
the interests and concerns of the politically and economically dominant sections.
While formulating various macroeconomic policies, the government seldom takes into
consideration the view of the poor or even organisations representing people’s interests.
Budget analysis reports are either presented to Parliament or disseminated to the public.
The Budget Information Programme at the Institute of Economic Affairs (IEA) in Kenya
focusses on gathering information about the budget and extensively disseminating the
information to the public, enabling them to understand the policy document and its
implications for them.
Budget groups focus on national budgets (CBPP, USA) as well as at the State level or regional
budgets. Other groups analyse budgets sectorally, assessing, evaluating and comparing
the resources allocated to various sectors in the budget document. The comparative
assessment of sectoral allocation of resources enables the citizens to evaluate whether the
20
social and economic sector spending vis-à-vis other sectors is adequate and appropriate,
whether the spending on sectors is not lopsided and based on an inaccurate assessment
of people’s priorities. An alternative way in which the budget can be analysed is from the
perspective of the marginalised and vulnerable groups – women, children, minorities and
so on. Such an analysis looks at allocations made towards various schemes and policies
meant exclusively for these groups, as well as allocations for these groups under general
social programmes. It also indicates the amount/level of allocations and steps needed to
address inadequacies.
D isha, a Gujarat-based CSO began their foray into budget work in 1995, setting up
a budget unit called ‘Patheya’. It analyses the State budget to assess whether the
budget policy and priorities reflect interests of the poor and marginalised, in particular
Dalits and members of indigenous communities. It is active at the legislative review
and implementation stage. Once the budget is tabled, Patheya analyses the budgetary
allocations, collates the information and disseminates it to the public. The civil society
group also sends its reports and findings to legislators to be used for debates and discussion
in the Gujarat Legislative Assembly once the budget is tabled for discussion
(e) Civil Society Interventions in the Budget Process: Stages and Methods
Civil society budget groups can intervene at various stages of the budget process. The
drafting stage is the most closed process and is usually dominated by the
executive. Opportunities for intervention usually exist through informal meetings and
consultations and are dependent upon the sympathetic attitude of governmental officials.
21
Budget groups can influence policy through
(i) release of research reports around the
time of drafting; (ii) extensive use of media
for capturing government attention; and
(iii) providing pre-budget inputs during the
drafting stage based on extensive research
and consultations with the people. An
example of this kind can be seen in Kenya
the IEA conducts extensive consultations
with the citizens and submits reports to the
government informing it about the agreed priorities.
The next stage of the budgetary cycle is legislative. This is an extremely crucial stage
and gives opportunities to NGOs to influence the policy process directly. The fundamental
ways in which civic groups can contribute at the legislative stage are by producing accessible
and simplified summaries and guides to the budgets of the country. These documents
provide citizens and civic groups their first opportunity to understand the government’s
budgetary policies, along with implications, and monitor its expenditure. Budget training
for legislators, the media and CSOs is another major role that budget groups can play at
this stage. Sometimes, the budget groups provide training and technical support (Institute
for Democracy in South Africa, a South African CSO that provides training and technical
support to provincial legislatures). Budget groups also coordinate and prepare independent
budget analyses (the activity has been discussed previously in this manual).
At the implementation stage, budget groups play a limited role in collating data about
programme impact through surveys like Public Expenditure Tracking Surveys
(PETS), most successfully implemented in Uganda.
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(f) Limitations of Civil Society Budget Work
There are certain limitations of civil society budget work, the most significant being
that resource allocation through the budget does not guarantee availability of funds for
various programmes. Capacity building is extremely important if the exercise has to be
successful. Budgets are technical documents and CSOs need to develop the expertise and
skills required to comprehend the document before they begin to suggest policy changes.
Budget analysis could therefore be understood as a social accountability tool used at the
resource allocation stage of public expenditure. It gives people the opportunity to evaluate
the performance of the government in fulfilling its social commitments at the policy
formulation stage.
Section 3-2
The next essential step is the process of monitoring public expenditure. There are several
civil society groups that monitor how the government actually spends funds. They focus
on leakages of funds at various levels to determine exactly how much of the fund originally
allocated to a particular programme or scheme gets diverted from the main plan or scheme
and get absorbed (through corruption, system inefficiencies) on their way to the actual site
of service delivery. The usual method is to compare the records documenting disbursement
of government funds to the records of the various agencies actually delivering the services.
The lacunae revealed in such findings are, then, shared with the public officials concerned,
the media and the larger public. PETS and Social Audits are two popular tools that
have been used in such endeavours. The Right to Information movement has emerged
through the efforts of various civil society groups in their attempts at tracking the flow of
allocated government funds from the disbursing agency to service provider. Procurement
Monitoring could also be considered a part of this process.
23
can, however, only partially predict the development outcomes. Adequate and appropriate
budgetary allocation notwithstanding, it can only have a significant development if funds
for frontline service providers reach the intended beneficiaries instead of being diverted
due to corruption or funds mismanagement.
The PETs survey in 250 schools in Uganda found that only 13 percent of non-wage
expenditure for primary school education actually reached the target group. Equity
considerations were sidelined and grants were based on the political economy of the region.
While schools of the upper and middle class received larger proportion of the intended
share, schools where the poor sent their children received nothing at all. Moreover, Dehn,
Reinikka and Svensson who conducted the research, have pointed out that even if the
allocated funds reach the frontline service agencies, the incentives to efficiently provide
services is extremely low. The staff is poorly paid and monitored. They contended that
even if services are effectively provided, the people are often not motivated enough to
avail of them. Despite an effective primary schooling system, people may not send their
children to schools due to economic or other considerations. There are several factors
on the demand and supply side that reinforce each other to produce low levels of service
delivery and developmental outcomes for the poor. Hence, it is important to assess the
efficiency of public spending and the quantity and quality of services provided. It is also
important to assess the developmental impact of the policy changes.
The budgetary allocation earmarked for particular services need to flow through several
layers of the government apparatus, especially the bureaucracy. A significant portion of
the allocated fund often does not reach the frontline service provider, being diverted at
various levels due to corruption or mismanagement. It is then important to track the flow
of resources to assess the amount of funds lost, the level of leakage of funds and the reasons
thereof. PETS as a monitoring tool attempts to accomplish this. It recognises that the
public service delivery agent has a strong incentive to misreport and uses multi-angular
data (data from sources least likely to be contaminated and corrupted as also identifying
sources and agents most likely to provide wrong data). The strategy is that of triangulation
of information, which is done to crosscheck data procured from different sources.
P ETS, Uganda: One of the first countries to implement PETS was Uganda in 1996.
The important motivation behind the initiative was that though public spending
on education had increased substantially, primary school enrolment did not show any
improvement. PETS assessed both education and health services. It compared budgetary
allocations to actual spending through the various levels of government, including frontline
service delivery agencies like primary schools and clinics. The survey was conducted in
250 schools. It revealed that on an average, only 13 percent of non-wage funds provided by
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the central government reached schools during 1990-1995. A bulk of the funds allocated
was diverted due to corruption and mismanagement and almost 70 percent schools did
not receive anything. It was also found that parents contributed to almost 73 percent of the
total school spending in 1991.
1
These are questions regarding characteristics of the facility, measurable inputs and outputs of the service,
quality of the service, and sources of finance for the service and monitoring and supervision mechanisms
for the particular service.
25
provider in the sample – government/non-governmental and private. In case the field test
leads to major modifications of the questionnaire, these need to be duly made before the
questionnaire is administered.
(4) The next step includes data entry and verification. The output from this
stage is a complete data set, which needs to be documented. The next stage
involves analysis of the survey results followed by sharing of the results with the public
through extensive media use. This helps in communicating to them the poor state of public
service delivery, the urgent need for improvement and for initiating an informed debate
with the aim of building public pressure to address or alleviate the problem. It has to be
kept in mind that in countries with weak accountability systems, budgetary allocations do
not necessarily reflect the quality of public services provided. As already discussed, a large
proportion of funds allocated to the service (resources leaving the exchequer) are diverted
due to mismanagement or corruption and does not reach the service provider agencies.
26
for the entire period under scrutiny. (2) Expected level of community involvement in
the audit. (3) Resources available to the coordinating agency. (4) Relationship between
government officials and members of the coordinating agency (sympathetic officials play
an important role in organisation of an audit). (5) Specific area of work and expertise
of the facilitating agency. Depending on the focus area, the group may choose to audit
specific programmes.
(3) The third step in the process is to obtain information about programmes
that require auditing. The facilitator organisation needs access to a variety of
government documents for conducting a social audit including accounting records (e.g,
cash books, wage rolls), technical records (project engineers measurement book), and
managerial records (utilisation certificates). The kinds of records to be accessed should
be decided well in advance. The procurement of information is not easy as government
officials, both elected and non-elected, feel threatened due to its possible implications and
evade disclosing information to the community. The right to information is therefore a
critical and necessary part of this exercise. Public access to information needs to be ensured
and guaranteed as a right since discrepancies revealed by an audit are often the outcome
of corruption and fund mismanagement. Government officials primarily responsible for
releasing information could also be the ones held accountable for the discrepancies and,
hence, actively resist provision of any information to the public. This situation could be
countered if right to information is guaranteed as a Constitutional right to the people.
(5) The next step is that of disseminating information that has been collected
from official records to the larger community. This entails taking information
in the form of project files to the villagers and getting their feedback to validate the
27
information originally collected from official records. The facilitator group should also
visit project sites to ensure physical completion of steps mentioned in the official records.
Beneficiaries of social service schemes must be met to ensure that they are receiving the
requisite welfare package. All information collected from the community must be noted
down in relevant files.
(6) The next stage is public hearing or ‘jan-sunwai’. It is the most important
phase of a social audit and usually attended by all the important stakeholders including
government officials, the organisation responsible for conducting the audit, community
members, members of the local media and eminent members of the community. Volunteers
from the surveyor organisation read out discrepancies found during the course of validating
official records with the help of local knowledge provided by community members. The
villagers listen to the findings and give their testimony.
Under the RTI Act in India, CSOs have the right to access government information
regarding the budget, development plans, policies and projects. It is only after civic
groups obtain information from the government that they can assess its policies and
priorities from the perspective of the poor and marginalised sections and bear pressure
on the government to be responsive to the needs and demands of the people. Passage
Mazdoor Kisan Shakti Sangathan is an organisation founded by Aruna Roy, Nikhil Dey and Shankar Singh
2
in the Indian State of Rajasthan in 1990. Their initial work focussed on the campaign for minimum wages
for farm workers.
28
of the Act has contributed to improved transparency and accountability in government
functioning. In Bangladesh, the ‘Right to Information Ordinance, 2008’, loosely based on
the Indian RTI, was approved by the government in October 2008 to ensure transparency,
good governance and accountability. It is understood that a three-member information
commission headed by a chief information commissioner is being set up to resolve public
complaints.
There is a slight ambiguity as to whether the right to access information also applies
to legislative, judicial and constitutionally established bodies. There is also an urgent
need to introduce measures to protect the independence of the information commission
by associating greater inputs from civil society. Bhutan is going through an important
transformation in adopting democracy. While the country still does not have any legislation
guaranteeing the right to information, its government has recognised the need for one.
Nepal adopted the Right to Information Bill in 2006 and the government passed the
RTI Act in 2007. Pakistan’s Freedom of Information Ordinance is a Presidential decree
promulgated in 2002 but considered to lack legitimacy, as it has never been debated in
Parliament. The categories of information that can be sought are too small and the appeal
procedure for information denied inadequate. A democratically elected government would
perhaps address its shortcomings.
29
T he combination of RTI coupled with social audit has led to improvements in the use
of developmental funds allocated for the poor. Inspired by the Sangathan’s success,
similar campaigns were launched elsewhere with State governments realising the utility of
the MKSS approach to social accountability. In several instances, the State governments
initiated social audits themselves to be held under the supervision of a civic group. This
has proved to be an effective example of government and civil society partnership in
furthering accountability, transparency and good governance.
Govt Money
30
public services but is also highly susceptible to corruption and malpractices. CSOs /social
actors that seek to monitor and evaluate public spending need to take cognizance of the
process of procurement and ensure its transparency.
The procurement process involves a number of stages – pre-bidding stage, bidding stage,
issuance of purchase offer, inspection of goods and services procured, and, documentation
of accounts. In some cases, a government agency/department has a separate agency
for managing/overseeing procurement. It purchases goods directly from the supplier
agency except when a specialised good/service is requisitioned whereupon it conducts
bidding, specifying requirement details and technicalities of the procurement process.
Procurement is usually an open process and entails calling for tenders. The supplier is
selected based on considerations of price quoted, reliability, experience and submitted
purchase requirements. The quality of goods is inspected once delivered by the vendor
agency and quality reports then issued. If the services are found satisfactory in all respects,
the amount due to the vendor is paid. This process is extremely vulnerable to corruption
and requires close monitoring.
There are several cases (in the courts and in the public domain) of government officials
allegedly flouting procurement norms to allow a favoured supplier to secure a particular
tender. Other alleged malpractices include tailoring of specific project requirements to
suit particular suppliers, and bypassing of the public tendering process via split contracts
and reduction of the amount quoted in the original contract. The procurement process
could be assessed and closely monitored with the active engagement of civil society actors,
allowing for public scrutiny.
A number of NGOs have evolved useful tools and mechanisms to monitor various stages
of the process of public procurement. They have suggested civic participation in the pre-
bidding and bidding stages as an effective mechanism to check corruption. Public scrutiny
of the process acts as a deterrent against corruption and clientelism with civil society
volunteers acting as observers who examine various documents to ascertain whether the
supplier agencies have followed guidelines and stipulations as well as met the technical/
financial eligibility criteria. Civic groups have also demanded that they be included in
quality inspection teams to ensure timely delivery of quality goods and services.
31
by a CSO called G-Watch (Government Watch), was aimed at monitoring procurement
and supply of more than one million school textbooks each year. A large number of civic
groups collaborated with the government under the initiative, which focuses on monitoring
the bidding process, production of textbooks and their supply.
Section 3-3
The various tools under this category like Citizen Report Cards, Community Scorecards
assess and evaluate the performance of a particular public service, programme or
scheme to determine whether it is being implemented efficiently, according to a set of
indicators decided by the organisation. It also undertakes impact assessments of schemes/
programmes to determine its socio-economic impact. The underlying assumption
behind this exercise is that the government schemes/ programmes are not able to make
any significant difference in the lives of the people due to two reasons – (1) inefficient
implementation of scheme, plan or programme and (2) inappropriate policy design not
geared to the needs of the people. This is necessary because there could be schemes
functioning effectively that are of limited purpose since they do not cater to the needs and
aspirations of the people. Performance monitoring assesses the schemes and programmes
to evaluate them on both these counts.
The monitoring procedure could be initiated by civil society groups or the government
itself. There are a number of mechanisms used by civic groups and governments the world
over to monitor the performance of public agencies delivering services for government
schemes, plans and programmes. A few of these are summarised below.
32
community closely monitors various public service delivery schemes, projects and
plans regarding compliance with the charter of standards and compels the public
officials to address any discrepancy.
c) Corruption Surveys: The surveys are conducted to gauge the level of corruption
among government officials. These involve gathering information directly from the
people on their experiences with malpractices, based on which corruption-prone
services and agencies are identified. The corruption surveys also try to determine the
number of times an individual is forced to pay bribes to avail a particular service (e.g.,
applying for licence, permit). The corruption survey could be conducted at the local
and/or national level for measuring the extent of corruption.
d) Integrity Pacts: The government enters into an agreement with a citizen’s group
wherein it is obligated to maintain and uphold utmost integrity in its transactions.
This implies that the government is duty bound to ensure there is no corruption with
decision-making being transparent, open and responsive to the needs and aspirations
of the people. It is also committed to formulating more practical and realistic budgetary
plans, particularly geared for the poor and the marginalised sections of society.
e) Citizen Report Cards (CRC): This involves participatory community surveys that
register perceptions of users regarding quality, adequacy and efficiency of public
services being availed by them. It is not just an exercise in data collection but serves
as an instrument for holding public service providers accountable through extensive
media coverage and civil society advocacy.
f) Community Score Cards (CSC): These are tools for local level monitoring
and public evaluation of various services, projects, programmes and functioning
of governmental administrative units. It involves a combination of techniques like
social audit, community monitoring and Citizen Report Cards. Like CRC, the CSC
registers perceptions of public service users and satisfaction with the public service
availed by them. It attempts to hold public officials accountable for inadequacies in
public service delivery by registering perceptions of users and making the results of
the survey known through the print and electronic media,
The two monitoring mechanisms directly involving the local community – Citizen Report
Cards and Community Scorecards – are described in detail in the following pages.
33
(A) Community Score Card: This community-based monitoring tool aims to ensure
accountability and responsiveness of service providers to recipients through an “interface
meeting” that allows for an immediate feedback on the level of satisfaction with particular
services. It uses the ‘community’ as the unit of analysis and focusses on facilities at the local
level for determining user satisfaction with particular government schemes, programmes
and policies. Besides gauging user perception on the quality, efficiency and transparency of
particular services, CSCs : (a) track inputs or expenditures, (b) monitor quality of services/
projects, (c) develop benchmark performance criteria for use in resource allocation and
budget decisions, (d) compare facilities of performance across facilities/districts, (e)
stimulate direct feedback mechanism between users and providers, (f) build local capacity
and (g) strengthen citizen’s voice and community empowerment.
Like other social accountability tools, CSC needs the following for successful and effective
use: (1) a comprehensive understanding of socio-political context, (2) sensitivity to needs
and requirements of the people of the community, (3) understanding of the structure
of public finance at the local/decentralised level, (4) an organisation or group that can
facilitate the process, (5) an effective campaign to publicise the process to ensure maximum
participation of the people, publicising the results of the process, and an effective campaign
to institutionalise the necessary changes.
CSC is not just meant to register the level of satisfaction of the people with various public
services, projects and programmes but to bring about changes in their actual functioning.
A comprehensive CSC should entail: (1) Input tracking stage, (2) community generated
scorecard to assess performance of a particular scheme or project, (3) self-evaluation
scorecard by service providers, and, (4) interface feedback meeting to familiarise the
service provider with results of the CSC, to perceptions of users.
34
must try to find volunteers for the work within the community. An effective
campaign should also be carried out through CSC and by trying to convince local
elected and non-elected public officials on the need for community monitoring.
Finally, since data collection is usually based on focussed group discussions, the
population should be stratified according to usage of service being evaluated. The
stratification involves finding out who uses what service, how much of the service
is used besides the demographic and income distribution of the users. This is
done through extensive interactions with community members or based on the
results of a similar prior exercise.
(2) The next step is Development of Input Tracking Exercise, which starts
with supply side data. This can be in the form of (a) inventories of inputs like
drugs, textbooks, (b) financial records of the project, (c) budgetary allocations
for the project or scheme, and, (d) entitlements based on some kind of national
policy. The information is communicated to the people, by informing client groups
of rights and providers of obligations. The participants need to be divided into
various focussed groups based on their differential involvement with the project
(e.g., project workers, users of the service, facility staff). The resultant groups
should have sufficient numbers of respondents from each aspect of the project
and, ideally, be a mix of gender and age. Focussed discussions are then held
with each of these groups and a set of indicators evolved regarding the particular
service being evaluated through inputs from the supply side and discussions with
the sub-groups. The indicators finalised after the focussed group discussions are
the ones that will be tracked. The indicators are used for comparing the variance
between planned and actuals in order to expose the discrepancies between the
allocations made towards a particular service or scheme under scrutiny and the
actual resources that reach the target.
(3) Filling up the input-tracking matrix: In the next stage, the facilitating
organisation notes down whatever information it has collected regarding actual
resources through its interaction with the various groups. The information
should be substantiated through evidence in the form of receipts, accounts and
validated across the various participants. The data recorded now belongs to the
community. A final step of inspecting inputs (e.g., whether the village dispensary
has been supplied adequate quantity and quality of drugs required) is conducted
to substantiate information.
35
generally used for classification is use of the service to ensure that there are a
significant number of users in the group. The group must have a heterogeneous
combination of age, gender and occupation. Focussed group discussions help in
finalisation of various performance criteria/indicators needed to evaluate the
service/ facility. Participants are asked to give relative scores for each indicator
stating reasons for low and high scores and their suggestions sought on how
things can be improved based on the performance criteria. This is the last stage
with regard to collection of information from the community. The next two stages
are concerned with responsiveness of CSC.
(6) Interface between Community and Facility Staff: The next step is an
interface meeting between community and the staff. This is the only way in which
grievances of citizens can be taken into account and pressure mounted on the
staff to take concrete action. It is important to sensitise the community members
as well as the staff about each other’s constraints to prevent the meeting from
turning adversarial. The community members and the facility staff should also be
mobilised so that the meeting is well attended. The facilitator group must play an
effective role to assist the dialogue between the two, which would legitimise the
entire process and help in the future proceedings.
36
C ommunity Score Cards: Malawi3 Community Scorecard has been one of the most
extensively used social monitoring tool, helping communities claim their right to
basic services. It was used during a pilot study in Malawi, Africa, to assess the state of
health services in 81 poor rural villages served by the Chileka and Nthondo health centres.
This initiative began in 2002 with villagers deciding to develop an evaluatory scorecard
to assess the performance of their health centres. The health services in turn developed
their own self-evaluation scorecards. In both cases, the stakeholders suggested measures
for improvement. After both sides fill in their scorecards, there is an interface meeting
debating suggestions for improvement and assigning responsibilities for each action item
and the time frame. By repeating them, the improvement of the services can be monitored
and assessed. There are significant examples of its successful use and implementation in
South Asia particularly in Sri Lanka and Bangladesh.
(B) Citizen Report Card Surveys: CRC surveys are a participatory performance
monitoring and evaluation exercise first started by Bangalore-based CSO Public Affairs
Centre (PAC) on the lines of the private sector practice of collecting consumer feedback.
PAC applied the same exercise to public goods and services. Data aggregates collected
through CRC are, indeed, scores given by the community regarding satisfaction with
services like education and health, based on criteria such as availability, accessibility,
quality and reliability. CRC is hence a collective measure of satisfaction of users with
services based on an array of indicators. It was first used in Bangalore to assess various
public services and subsequently in other contexts – cross-state comparisons access, use
and reliability of public service delivery (India), supplementing national service delivery
surveys (Uganda) and for governance reform projects (Bangladesh).
The success of the CRC depends on several factors like degree of participation, ability of the
CSO to negotiate/lobby for change, presence of a political ally willing to champion the cause
of the people. Factors important for its success are: (1) a comprehensive understanding of
the socio-political context, (2) understanding of the public finance structure, (3) expertise
to conduct the survey scientifically, (4) media support and effective campaign to put the
findings in the public domain, (5) lobbying for institutionalising the necessary changes to
address the needs of the people.
For a more detailed discussion see From Shouting to Counting: A New Frontier in Social Development,
3
37
based on the report card). The choice can be based on a number of criteria – services
that are closest to the people or those saddled with service delivery problems. Given that
the survey is extremely technical, it is advised that it be conducted by a credible policy
institute or NGO, which then needs to be identified. In some cases, affiliation with another
credible national or international organisation can add to its standing while in others,
such affiliation could prove counter-productive.
(2) The next step is to design the questionnaire. This requires interactions with certain
focus groups like service providers and client groups. The former gives an indication about
the mandate of the service and areas where user feedback would help in improvement of
service delivery while the latter covers shortcomings of various services and areas that
deserve more probing. Before its full-scale launch, the design needs to be tested. The
questionnaire should be carefully thought-out so that it is not cumbersome for people
answering it and structured in a manner convenient for both enumerator and respondent.
The questionnaire should be broken into modules to be answered by different members
of a household depending on demographic statistics and income/expenditure. Next, the
sample size needs to be decided to ensure greater representation (and not just through
expansion of numbers), followed by the sampling frame and, finally, selection of sample
respondents. The aim of the questionnaire should be to ensure equitable representation in
terms of gender and age. If the questionnaire is broken into modules, different members
can answer different modules.
(3) The next stage is execution of the survey. This requires selection and training
of a cadre of surveyors. The work of enumerators has to be pre-tested with preliminary
feedback used to modify the tactics for questioning. The survey should then be conducted.
Random spot-checking should be done to ensure that the information being filled is
accurate. The enumerators then go through data, sort out inconsistencies, fill the data
into tables and analyse, aggregate and average the scores to produce a satisfaction score
(in percentage). This is the report card. After finalisation of the scores, the data needs to
be used constructively. The findings, including criticism, should first be shared with the
service providers and their problems in terms of staff and inadequate funding noted in the
survey. The survey findings must be extensively shared and publicised with the help of the
media. After publication of the report, there should be an interface meeting between users
and providers, to bear pressure on the latter to improve service delivery.
38
Bangladesh and Ukraine. Institutionalisation depends on the political commitment of
leaders apart from media support and external financing. CRC, however, has its constraints
in terms of actors being unpredictable and limits to comparing different services based on
user perception.
SAc tools also help citizens monitor various stages of public expenditure. While tools like
Participatory Budget Analysis and Review assist civic groups in examining the stage of
resource allocation, CRC and CSC are concerned with assessing the performance of public
service schemes or projects and Performance Monitoring for effective implementation or
developmental impact of a particular scheme/programme. Within these parameters the
utility and application of accountability tools appear limited to evaluation and monitoring
of public expenditure. Beyond the sphere of public spending, SAc tools can and should
hold the government accountable on issues concerning the rights and needs of the more
vulnerable sections of society. This is discussed in the following section of the manual,
which deliberates on accountability tools falling outside the ambit of public expenditure
but contributing to governance accountability nonetheless.
Section 3-4
Other Tools:
This section deals with social accountability tools that are not directly tied
up with public expenditure but can be used to hold elected and non-elected
government officials accountable.
39
Two of these tools will be discussed at length.
(a) Public Interest Litigation
(b) Recall of Parliamentarians
(a) Public Interest Litigation (PIL) is a petition in a court of law for the protection
of public interest. It is a litigation introduced in the court not by the aggrieved party
but by the court itself or any other private party on behalf of the aggrieved party.
It is not necessary for the aggrieved party to personally approach the court for its
jurisdiction. In the event of violation of rights, the court can take cognizance of the fact
independently or suo motu. The court can also commence proceedings on the petition
by any individual/group of citizens concerned. The PIL can serve as an effective tool in
the hands of the public through which it can ensure that their rights are not violated.
In many cases, the aggrieved party does not possess the resources to start proceedings,
or its freedom to move court has been violated or suppressed. In such cases, a PIL helps
reclaim the rights of the victims. The emergence of judicial activism, in India at least, can be
functionally correlated to PIL though it would be incorrect to consider these synonymous.
In the late 1970s, the Supreme Court enlarged the scope of its jurisdiction in two ways – by
reinterpreting the Constitution to expand the scope and content of fundamental rights, and,
by moderating the requirement of locus standi for access to judicial redress. Where a gross
violation of rights was felt, the procedural requirement was relaxed to enable individuals/
groups of people to petition the courts on behalf of the aggrieved. These cases dealt mostly
with the gross violation of rights of the most vulnerable sections of the population like
women and children. The courts intended PIL as an empowerment tool in the hands of
those excluded from political and administrative processes due to their socio-economic
standing. However, as the procedural requirements were relaxed, it came to include not
just rights of the socially excluded but cases involving a gamut of issues from environment,
consumer rights and rights of the poor to education, to rights of detainees.
In the early 1990s, the courts took up public interest cases involving corruption and
accountability of public servants. With the expansion of the scope of PIL, it is now regarded
as an instrument of social change. This kind of judicial activism has become a source of
annoyance for the political and bureaucratic establishments. They have accused the courts
of assuming extra-constitutional authority and threatened to curb their power through
enactment of legislation. PIL can serve as an effective instrument by which the poor can
hold elected and non-elected government officials accountable for their actions. It can
also be used to hold the government accountable for policies it formulates by assessing its
constitutional validity to ensure it does not violate the rights of the people.
40
Public Interest Litigation, Human Rights Law Network, New Delhi
S ince the 1990s, PIL has been extensively used by civil society organisations in India
to pursue their causes. This strategy has proved extremely successful, condidering the
argument that the state responds to civil society only when the court intervenes. Human
Rights Law Network (HRLN), a collective of lawyers and social activists based in New
Delhi, has extensively used the instrument to provide legal support to some grassroots
organisations by filing PILs on a variety of cases. An example is the HRLN’s support to
the Right to Food campaign in which the issue was brought to the notice of the Supreme
Court through a petition filed by the Network. The apex court then issued instructions to
the government to undertake schemes and programmes that provide improved access of
the people to food and nutrition throughout the country. The rights organisation draws
largely on civil society budget work to support its initiative and is working on the issue of
making the budget ‘justiciable’ or litigable, to ensure the government’s accountability to
the people.
In India, the people have not been granted the right to recall legislators by the constitution
or by any statute. The system of representative democracy in the country entitles citizens
to elect representatives to the legislature but not to decide their continuation in office.
This decision lies with Parliament alone. The candidates who fight elections are seldom
people’s choice. Choice of candidates is not determined by achievements and credibility of
individual candidate, but on the exigencies of politics that they manifest. However the right
to recall Parliamentarians has been granted in some countries like Uganda, Switzerland
and Venezuela. Other nations like Sweden, Zambia and New Zealand have initiated a
debate on the right as a significant tool to ensure accountability of elected representatives.
41
This tool has also been criticised by advocates of representative democracy. They argue that
such an accountability mechanism is likely to erode the system of representative democracy
by undermining the role and responsibility of elected representatives.4 However, since the
accountability of elected representatives has been taken for granted, effective institutional
mechanisms are necessary so that representatives do not abuse their power.
The recall procedure is prone to misuse but can prove a powerful accountability tool when
institutionalised along with other procedural and institutional mechanisms that regularly
review the work and conduct of elected representatives. Monitoring procedures like regular
review of the work and mandatory communication with the electorate to inform them of
their work can be put in place. The parliament can adopt effective procedures to review the
work of legislators, annually or during every session. The work review needs to be carried
out by an independent official body or parliamentary commission, which should assess
and evaluate the work and report it to the respective parties, electorate and media. People
can base their judgments on various profile reports and impose certain sanctions much
before the elections. Formal bodies and commissions to which parliamentarians are held
accountable can also be set up.
R ight to Recall Legislators: The Chattisgarh Experiment5 In India, the right to recall
legislators does not exist anywhere other than local bodies in Chhattisgarh and
Madhya Pradesh. Section 47 of the Nagar Palika Act in Chhattisgarh grants the right to
recall the president of the Nagar Palika (urban body) and provides for holding elections to
fill the vacancy. At least three-fourths of the total number of elected representatives need
to write to the district collector and demand recall to exercise the right. Three presidents
have been recalled till date. The recall elections in Chhattisgarh have sent clear indications
to elected representatives that they cannot ignore needs and priorities of the people while
in office. It has also raised questions about the right to recall in its present form being
prone to misuse and the need for plugging the loopholes.
4
Critics of the recall procedure argue that the system may be manipulated by interest groups with money and
power to threaten genuine representatives. The position of even the prime minister may not be secure and
it may threaten the independence of elected representatives, leading to “excess of democracy”. The elected
representatives act on behalf of the people. They are accountable to the people for their performance and the
integrity of their conduct.
5
For a more detailed discussion, see Bhanu (2008).
42
Section 4
Using the Tools
43
44
Using the Tools:
This section deals with Budget Analysis, Social Audit and CRC, detailing the methodology
for those who want to undertake an exercise in holding the government accountable.
Before dealing with SAc tools, it looks at issues that could influence such an exercise. A
discussion on SAc tools that could reinforce conventional modes of political representation
and accountability must, however, take into cognizance developments that shape various
initiatives aimed at enlarging the meaning and scope of citizenship rights and entitlements.
New mechanisms of accountability and political representation also need to be developed
and opportunities created for citizens to participate in influencing policy agenda and the
process of governance.
Goetz and Gaventa (2001) point out that a conception of universal needs to be addressed
through policies without taking into account specific needs of the poor is inadequate. In
the current scenario, the processes of globalisation and decentralisation are increasingly
shaping the role of the state in public service delivery. The capacity of the state to provide
public service has also come under enormous stress due to the fiscal crisis. Hence, there
is a greater urgency to put in place mechanisms to enforce accountability of the state to
provide services to the people, especially the poor and socially excluded groups.
Conventional modes of political representation and accountability have over time been
found highly inadequate. The common inadequacies are secrecy in auditing, delays
in elections, ineffective policy reviews in legislatures and delays in courts. This has
created pressure for new accountability relationships between state agents and citizens
and for alternative mechanisms to ensure political accountability towards the poor and
marginalised. There is widespread dissatisfaction especially among the poor with the state’s
role as a public service provider, for they have come to believe that the state is either not
accountable at all or only so for the
rich. The situation is worse for them
as they do not possess the resources
to procure services from alternative
sources. In this context, Goetz and
Gaventa observe, “The call for new
forms of engagement between the
state and the citizens challenges
the convention in representative
democracies of citizens expressing
their preferences through elections
45
exclusively, leaving the jobs of holding public officials accountable to
elected representatives” (ibid,p.23),
The relationships between new and conventional modes of political accountability and
political representation are also explored in the following sections. Conceptual linkages
between accountability, citizenship rights and entitlements, state responsiveness, and
participation are also explored through the various case studies.
(1) Citizenship rights define the relationship of the citizens and the state. These are a set
of entitlements. The range and scope of citizenship rights delimit opportunities available
to articulate their needs and the range of services that the citizens can force the state to
provide. Goetz and Gaventa state that, “the extent to which the citizen voice will trigger
an improved service response will depend upon the strength and the coherence of the
accountability systems within the state. For this reason, a considerable portion of (social
accountability) initiatives focus on strengthening accountability systems” (ibid, p.34).
46
(2) Responsiveness indicates the willingness of the state public agencies to address
problems confronted by citizens. The responses could range from redressal of particular
grievances with the agencies to internal administrative reforms within the agencies. It
may be noted in this regard that the state is generally more receptive to the demands and
grievances of socially and economically powerful groups while the disadvantaged sections
remain on the fringes in so far as influencing policies and issues are concerned.
Citizens of various democracies across the world seem dissatisfied with some conventional
modes of accountability. Vertical modes have limitations in that they blunt the impact of the
articulation of citizens’ voices. Goetz and Gaventa argue that efforts at strengthening either
mechanism tend to examine them independently and there is no attempt to combine the
exercise. However, the horizontal-vertical divide is gradually getting bridged and citizens’
involvement in horizontal mechanisms being accepted. Goetz and Gaventa conclude that
47
this represents “an effort to augment the limited effectiveness of civil society’s watchdog
function by breaking the state’s monopoly over responsibility for official executive
oversight” (ibid, p.36). Social accountability is an effort in this direction; to move beyond
vertical accountability and focus on clients’ needs on the plane of horizontal accountability.
Several civil society initiatives have emerged because of dissatisfaction with public service
delivery systems in various countries, particularly in South Asia. These range from
expression of citizens’ collective concern and dissatisfaction about public service delivery,
to creation of more appropriate ways to deliver services, to setting up mechanisms for
stronger accountability relationships between service delivery agents and users. This
manual is chiefly concerned with the accountability relationships between service delivery
agents and users, which represents
efforts of civil society to, “enter into
horizontal accountability functions and
influence the way government behaviour
is scrutinised”(ibid, p.37).
48
programme arrives at the site of expenditure without significant leakages and spent in
‘appropriate’ ways, consistent with the needs and aspirations of the people. Goetz and
Gaventa state that such a mechanism, “helps promote citizen awareness of what their
government is doing, equips citizens to judge the effectiveness of public policies, and
allows people to participate in and influence the development process”(ibid,p.39). The
social audit conducted by MKSS is a similar initiative. In some countries,
frameworks of participatory planning have been institutionalised through
legislative reforms or government-sponsored programmes. This allows
for a systematic mechanism of citizen participation in the areas of policy-
making. Participatory Municipal Budgeting in Brazil is such an example.
An important factor that determines the capacity of any citizens’ group to articulate its
demands depends upon the social, economic and political power of the client group in
question. The next determinant is nature of the political system. This variable incorporates
important considerations like whether the political system is democratic/not; the extent
to which the democratic processes are institutionalised; whether the democratic liberties
enjoyed by citizens are substantive or merely formal; the system of checks and balances
and the relative strength of the legislature, executive and judiciary. It is also important to
look at the nature of political competition in terms of number and types of parties, their
ideologies and memberships, relative importance of the various parties in elections and
their probability of coming to power, the influence of money and muscle power in exercise
of the electoral choice. Yet another determinant is the nature of the state.
The political milieu of a nation is an important factor determining how effectively its citizens
can engage with the state, demand and secure their rights and entitlements. “Politics is
the intervening variable between citizen voice and public sector response. A civil society
group may be equipped with all the preconditions for effectively pressing its demands on
the state – a united and well-organised constituency, allies in the right places, generalised
social support, and even a crisis event to concentrate public concern on the group’s needs
49
- but the political environment may undercut its impact if the group does not contribute
to prevailing political agendas and patronage systems” (ibid, p.44). The political system
needs to be assessed for important preconditions like basic civil and political rights before
any sort of engagement with the state.
Another important parameter that determines amenability of the political system to any
such initiative is the nature of the party system, the way it has come to evolve, the number
of political parties, the extent to which the parties are institutionalised and the level of
ideological polarisation that they represent. Where there are institutionalised political
parties with a high degree of ideological polarisation and well-entrenched culture of political
competition, CSOs can pursue confrontational politics and question state behaviour using
“high visibility strategies”. They can effectively lobby with opposition parties to take up
their issues in the legislature. On the other hand, where the culture of political competition
is weakly institutionalised, “political parties lack programmatic platforms and rely on
appeals to identity politics, civil society groups will not have effective access to policy
forums,” they assert. This results in a clientelistic relationship somewhat of a reversal of
vertical accountability, with clients having to please power holders to get work done and
perhaps be accountable to them. Such a situation would be extremely detrimental to any
sort of collective effort.
The next important determinant is the nature of the state and the kind of rights and
entitlements extended to citizens as well as opportunities for citizens to question
inadequacies in service delivery. The rights and entitlements accorded to citizens by the
constitution ascertain the identities of the clients as citizens. Goetz and Gaventa argue
that apart from these rights and entitlements, “state services also construct some political
and social spaces in which interests are debated and aggregated”(ibid,p.54). A classic
example is the role of the Rural Employment Guarantee (REG) Scheme in Maharashtra in
organising the poor and the identities of rural workers. Studies of the REG scheme suggest
that its delivery structure, which calls for work-seekers to organise group demands for
employment from state officials, has encouraged rural workers associations and NGOs to
organise poor labourers in ways that have led to cooperation with State and national level
trade unions. Their chief demands revolve around job rights and minimum wage laws for
rural workers. The statutory right to employment guaranteed by the scheme, equipped
activists with the right to litigate in cases of non-implementation or corruption – a right
which is not automatic in case of poor service delivery.
The extent to which the state can respond to demands of citizens is also important. Its
responsiveness depends on a number of conditions, notably a well-functioning bureaucracy
committed at least in principle to the rule of law, merit-based recruitment and promotion,
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working for public interest, neutrality and impartiality. These conditions give citizens
an essential vantage point to engage with the state. Initiatives discussed in this manual
require rearranging of relationships of command and reporting to accommodate views and
demands of citizens through institutionalised supervision by citizens on the working of the
state’s agencies. However, improvement in service delivery to the poor and marginalised
sections of society involve more. It might also involve physical changes in structure of the
service delivery.
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Tool 1- Budget Analysis:
However, more often than not, the decisions regarding generation, allocation and
expenditure of public resources are considered to be the exclusive preserve of the
executive, precluding participation of any kind, direct or indirect, by ordinary citizens.
Budget initiatives aim at making transparent and participatory, both the content as well
as the process of budget formulation. Budget initiatives that aim to make the budget more
people centered also aim at improving governance.
Budget Analysis is undertaken with the explicit objective of advancing policy goals to
protect and advance the interests of the poor and vulnerable sections of the population.
It is research, aimed at advancing the interests of those sections of the population which
generally find their interests excluded from the policy making arenas. Budget Analysis
combines quality analysis with advocacy aimed at making available the information and
analysis to the variety of stakeholders in a timely manner. Budget Analysis also aims to
advance the understanding of budgetary issues. The aim is to enhance the understanding
of those engaged in the budget debates, especially the legislators, to improve the debate
on budget issues. It is also aimed at improving the level of budget literacy amongst the
people.
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Budget Analysis and Advocacy can be seen as a part of a larger project of making the
macroeconomic policy formulation in various countries more democratic and inclusive of
the interest, needs and priorities of the common citizens of the country. Macroeconomic
policy framework needs to be made more sensitive to the demands and priorities of the
ordinary citizens, especially the socially and economically underprivileged sections of the
population.
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affecting the stock markets have been commanding enough media attention. The poor and
marginalised sections of India’s population- those who live in the rural areas, who depend
on agriculture for their livelihood, who are in acute need of welfare measures from the
state, who need free or inexpensive educational and healthcare facilities- hardly find their
case being argued strongly in the limited scrutiny of the budget in the mainstream media.
Their needs get acknowledged at best in certain sections of the academia, which may not
have much influence on the policymakers in the government.
(e) Economically and socially weaker sections of the population are most
vulnerable to negligence in the budgets
When budgets pursue unjust economic policies and when the pro-poor budgetary
proposals do not get translated into reality, the poor and marginalised sections are the
worst hit. Also, in many countries, there exists no direct and timely mechanism which can
perform the necessary task of making the government answerable to such sections for its
budget policies and implementation.
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miniscule proportion of the population understands the technicalities involved with
budgets and the most crucial stage of budget process, that of budget preparation, does not
allow any kind of participation by civil society organisations. Thus, public understanding
and involvement in the budget process is critical for ensuring that the government
is accountable to the public. Such a process of seeking accountability can lead to the
formulation and proper implementation of pro-poor and pro-marginalised budgets.
(4) Context:
Budgetary process, thus far, has been treated as an exclusive preserve of the policy
makers, a purely technical enterprise meant for expert consideration. In most countries,
the budget process is dominated by the executive with the legislators playing a peripheral
role. Their relatively insignificant role in the process is furthered by their lack of awareness
about issues of public spending and limited access to the budget information. Very often,
the scope for legislative oversight of the budget process is reduced by constitutional
provisions that limit the authority of the legislature to make significant changes in the
budgetary allocations as an outcome of deliberation. The capacity of the legislature to
make significant intervention is, in most countries, heavily compromised. As far as the
civil society involvement is concerned, it is more often than not limited to participation
by lobby groups of the socially and economically affluent sections of the population who
have the requisite information, knowledge and power to influence the process of public
spending.
There are, however, significant changes that have occurred in the past decade, especially
in the developing countries. Budget is now no longer considered to be the exclusive
preserve of the executive or the technical experts. The legislators are now more involved
in reviewing budgetary allocations and expenditure priorities through their informed
and active participation in legislative debates on budget. Civil society involvement is
now no more restricted to participation by the business lobby in pre-budget formulation
consultations groups and has expanded to include a range of organisations, including
research and policy institutes, development organisations and grassroots movements that
have acquired the necessary skills and information to intervene in the budget process in
an informed and effective manner. The media too, has come to play an important role in
highlighting misuse and abuse of public money.
Openness in the public budget process has resulted from a number of factors. From the
1990s onwards, democracy and good governance agenda infiltrated the discourse and
practice of development assistance that was to be given to the developing and transitional
economies and had an important bearing on the way democracy and development came
to be conceptualised. Accountability and transparency are one of the key dimensions of
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‘good governance’. Opening up of the budget process to citizen and greater legislative
oversight came to be seen as an important step in improving government accountability.
Also, the decade of the 1990s saw the emergence of a wide range of civil society groups
working with the specific aim of increasing involvement of citizens in the process of public
budgeting. This development must be seen as part of the wider process of democratisation
and compulsion of the states to be more accountable to the citizens. The main objective of
these budget groups was to assess the budgetary allocations and government’s expenditure
priorities from the perspective of the poor and marginalised sections of the population.
They also aimed to improve the accountability of the government officials (both elected
and non-elected) in decisions concerning allocations and expenditure of public resources.
Another important development that proved to be extremely influential in this regard
was the successful Brazilian experiment of participatory budgeting. This experiment
emphasised the need for mass citizen participation in deliberating public expenditure
priorities in an attempt to make the budgetary allocations correspond more closely to local
needs. Development assistance in the 1990s has come to regard state budgets as important
instruments for extending development assistance to the developing economies of the
world. This trend emanates from a concern with predictability and transparency in the
utilisation and deployment of scarce resources and measures to ensure that expenditure
commitments reflect domestic policy priorities and are supported by appropriate revenue
generating strategies.
Also, in a number of countries where democracy was just about establishing itself, the
consolidation of democracy was seen to be threatened by the complete lack of transparency
and openness in economic policy making. It was thought important, for the sustainability
of the policies and their better implementation and design, that a minimum consultation
with affected constituencies must be carried out. Greater participation by the affected
groups improved the credibility of the policies and lent them greater legitimacy. The same
approach in now reflected in World Bank’s approach to economic strategy for the poorest
countries as can be seen in Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers.
Budget advocacy and analysis has increasingly come to be seen as one of the primary
strategies to be deployed by civil society organisations for fostering and promoting public
accountability. While there is a growing recognition that budget analysis and advocacy
does, indeed, have the potential to influence the government expenditure priorities as
expressed in the budget, there is however, very little evidence of the impact that these
groups have been able to generate in terms of improved governance, public expenditure
management and public accountability. Budget work helps improve the budget process
and makes it more sensitive to the needs and demands of the poor and the marginalised.
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The more immediate objectives of the budget groups are to ensure that the government
budget priorities are consistent with declared policy objectives and that the financial
resources allocated to priority areas are expended fully and properly. These objectives are,
however, intermediate and further the long term objective of strengthening democratic
institutions, particularly in societies where formal political institutions are weak and
not consolidated. Civil society budget initiatives have the capacity to strengthen public
accountability of officials responsible for public budget formulation and execution and
make the process of public expenditure more transparent. It also expands the range of
actors involved in the deliberation of public spending priorities.
These accountability mechanisms complement the mechanisms and strategies that are
already present within the state institutions. While the former are referred to as vertical
accountability mechanisms, the latter are called horizontal mechanisms of accountability.
In most democracies where democratic institutions are weak and unconsolidated, elections
invariably produce governments that are more likely to produce policies that favour the
socially and economically powerful sections of the population. This underscores the
importance of transparency and accountability from the perspective of equity and justice.
Greater transparency in the budget process results in reduced corruption, otherwise
resulting from the misuse and abuse of public resources for private purposes. Greater
transparency also lends greater legitimacy to the process of public budgeting. It obliges the
government to reveal the data sources and facts on the basis of which decisions regarding
the revenue and expenditure priorities are taken. This information enables the hitherto
uninformed legislators to engage in budgetary debates in a more informed and effective
manner. This also compels the government to be absolutely certain of the accuracy and
validity of the data sources and facts used while making the various decisions. All this
confers greater legitimacy to the budget process.
What you decide eventually depends upon the information available: For
example if information is available on budget allocation and expenditure priorities, we can:
1) Measure a government’s commitment to specific policy areas
2) Determine the trends in spending
3) Determine the cost implications of various budgetary proposals
4) Analyse the impact of budgetary choices on specific groups, such as children, disabled.
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(c) Analysis of the effect of the budget on different sections of the population
with a special focus on the disadvantaged sections:
One kind of assessment can be done through examining the impact of the executive budget
proposals on different income groups. This might involve examining the proportion of
the total government spending on programs and schemes meant for the welfare of the
disadvantaged sections of population like women/children or people living below poverty
line. The assessment of the budget vis-à-vis the allocations made towards women and
children is increasingly being undertaken by a number of civil society organisations. In
many cases, these allocations are not shown separately in the budget document and are
derived from various other sources within and outside the budget.
While the human rights discourse initially focused on civil and political rights, gradually
the emphasis has shifted towards social and economic rights. These include right to fair
wages, decent working and living conditions, social insurance, food, housing etc. Budget
analysis can prove to be a useful tool for advancing these rights. Budget analysis can help
the policy makers by estimating the cost of operationalising a particular right and facilitate
the translation of policy commitments into budget allocations. Budget analysis can also
be undertaken to evaluate the budget in order to see if it is consistent with the various
rights, conventions, i.e., to see whether the budget allocations are adequate enough to
help protect, promote and realise the various rights which the governments are obliged to
realize for their people.
These clearly are instances of violation of the rights of the people, enforcement of which
would hold financial implications for the government. It would entail (on part of the
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government) making budgetary allocations towards fulfilling government’s obligation to
provide these essential services to its citizens.
We may, then safely, conclude that every action that the state takes towards realisation
of rights of its people necessarily has financial implications which make the exercise
of assessing the budget extremely crucial to any kind of rights activism. A number
of economists are skeptical about this approach that would allow the citizens to make
claims on the state for the fulfillment of their social and economic rights. They argue
that this puts at risk prudent fiscal management. Implementation of any state policy
or decision has financial implications and prioritisation of a decision or policy over the
other necessarily involves choice determined by several considerations. The rights-based
approach emphasises realisation of various rights, particularly economic and social rights
for vast sections of population as a crucial criteria for making these choices. A rights-based
approach to budget analysis helps the civil society organisations involved in it to respond
to popular movements who are in the process of continuously expanding and adapting
the rights framework as a basis for claiming social justice. Rights-based approach sees
people as agents and subjects rather than as objects of their development. The rationale of
the work is no longer justified on the basis of the needs of individuals but on the basis of
rights-entitlements that give rise to legal obligations on the part of others.
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(e) Analysis of trends in budget allocations over time: An analysis of this nature
helps in assessing the evolution of government’s commitment to solving the problems of a
particular sector/section of population.
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(6) Budget Processes and Institutions:
A consolidated annual national budget as a policy instrument dates back to the late
19th century. It can be seen as an evolution from a system characterized by ad-hoc and
‘idiosyncratic’ processes, weak executive and little central control to one characterized
by strong central control exercised by the executive (Elson 2002). This was born to
prevent leakage resulting from substantial corruption owing to lack of central control.
Traditionally, therefore, the public expenditure management system has stressed on the
values of economy and control over those of performance and achievement. The focus
in the last decade or so has shifted from concerns of control and economy to that of
transparency, accountability and openness. The emphasis is towards making the process
of public expenditure management, particularly the budgetary formulation process and
the content of the budget more responsive to the larger policy direction. The main aim of
this section is to serve as a guide to the budget process.
There are a number of important points that can be made about this process.
• The time frame for the budget cycle (beginning with the preparation and concluding
with the finalization of accounts) is usually three years. The preparation of the
budget might begin a year ahead of its presentation in the legislature, the execution
of the budget lasts a year and the finalisation of accounts including the audit takes
another year. This implies that at any given time there is more than one budget at
one of its several stages.
• The budget process needs to be clearly linked to the overall policy and planning
process. Addressing developmental concerns requires formulation and
implementation of policies on a sustained basis and each budget must be, then, in
sync with the larger developmental goals and policy priorities of the government.
• The various key stages of the budget are the responsibility of different departments
and ministries and the flow of information between the various departments and
ministries, in a number of cases, is far from adequate.
• The budget cycle is supposed to be a ‘planning cycle’ wherein the process of
monitoring and evaluation must inform the formulation stage of the cycle. This
translates only imperfectly in practice. The audit findings are supposed to assess
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compliance and lack the analytical content which is crucial for the formulation
process. Apart from this, the most recent data is usually for two years which cannot
contribute significantly towards the formulation of budget priorities.
The budget is a document that includes government’s expenditure and revenue proposals,
reflecting its policy priorities and fiscal targets. National Budget, in words of Elson, is
a “document that once approved by the legislature, authorizes the government to raise
revenue, incur debts and effect expenditures in order to achieve certain goals. Since the
budget determines the origin and application of public financial resources, it plays a central
role in the government, fulfilling economic, political, social, legal and administrative
functions” (ibid, p.12).
The stages involved in the process of budget formulation and its subsequent implementation
are as follows:
1. Budget Formulation
2. Budget Enactment
3. Execution
4. Auditing and Assessment
This basic process is applicable to most if not all countries with a democratic government.
Across the various countries, there are differences in emphasis, time frame and the role
and importance of various institutions across the various stages.
The formulation stage takes place almost exclusively within the executive branch of the
government. The budget office in the Ministry of Finance is the main body responsible
for coordinating and managing the budget formulation process. The process begins with
the budget office (Ministry of Finance) requesting information from various ministries.
The Ministry of Finance issues guidelines, detailing the parameters that must be kept in
mind by the spending department before they prepare their expenditure requirements
from the budget. The budget office tries to balance the various competing priorities,
proposes several trade-offs in the process and calculates the total budget expenditure. The
process might take from a few months up to a year. The process, as a convention, takes
the previous year’s budget as the baseline and makes changes measured from that. This is
not to say that there cannot be significant differences between two consecutive budgets.
Substantial changes can be brought about in the budget in response to emerging economic
challenges or changing priorities of the government.
The next major step in the process is the determination of the available resources.
This entails a rather thorough evaluation of the macro-economic situation, developing
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growth projections, trends in revenue generation etc. It also involves assessing the non-
discretionary spending and also funds that might be required for meeting the contingencies.
It is, then, that a comprehensive assessment of the available resources can be done.
The process of budget formulation involves reconciling of various, and very often
competing, expenditure requirements with the resources available. A number of important
considerations determine the contours of the budget such as economic growth, inflation,
demographic changes etc. In this regard, government’s policy priorities also play an
important role in determining the budget allocations.
Scope for CSO intervention: During the formulation stage, the legislature or civil
society organisations have little direct access. The executive formulates the budget behind
closed doors. The budget making process and its documents are always shrouded in
secrecy. The executive might release some information about the budget in advance in the
form of a discussion paper/overview before the process begins. The important fact that
must be kept in mind in this regard is that more often than not the previous year’s budget
serves as a crucial starting point in the formulation process. The forthcoming budget,
therefore, in many respects can be anticipated and this creates the opportunity for analysis
and advocacy for the civil society organisations. The civil society organisations can release
analyses on various issues anticipating the policy priorities or on the basis of information
of issues under consideration. The analysis, in most instances, is normative laying down
the policy priorities and concomitant allocations as they should be. In this kind of analysis,
it is usually carried out from the perspective of the marginalised and vulnerable groups
of the population. This must be considered an important stage to be influenced in cases
where the legislature has little or no role to play in the formulation of the budget.
Budget Enactment:
The second stage of the budget cycle occurs when the executive’s budget is presented and
discussed in the legislature. In a representative democracy, the government cannot spend
or raise money without authorisation of Parliament, i.e in principle without people’s
sanction. It is only after this stage that the budget becomes a law. The process entails
discussion and eventual adoption of the executive’s expenditure and revenue proposals
and decides to approve, amend or reject them. The exact form of approval or otherwise
may differ from country to country. In parliamentary democracies across the world, the
role of Parliament in the budget process is diminishing. Infact, it is common for the budget
proposals to not be discussed properly in Parliament. It is important to strengthen the role
of Parliament in this regard to make the budget process more accountable and responsive
to the needs of the people at large, particularly the marginalised sections of population.
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The legislature: The legislature is the primary institution responsible for enacting/
approving the budget at a formal level. The stage begins with the submission of budget-
expenditure and revenue proposals - by the executive. This is followed by discussions on
the various proposals which might involve general vote on the proposals and in some
cases considerations by various committees. Under the parliamentary system, more often
than not, the space available to make substantial changes in the budget is very little.
Congressional system provides for greater scope for amendments and changes in the
executive’s proposals. The process of budget enactment in the legislature involves a great
deal of debate and discussion and therefore, presents important opportunities for civil
society engagement. The legislature also, by approving the report of audited accounts,
closes the budget cycle.
Scope for CSO intervention: Budget is the most important policy tool of the
government. It embodies socio-political and economic priorities and fiscal targets of the
government. Any attempt to influence public policy to be effective needs an engagement
with the budget. For civil society organisations, the crucial opportunity to engage with the
budget is when the budget expenditure and revenue proposals are presented in Parliament.
This is the first time budget is made public and submitted for legislative scrutiny. This can
be effectively used by the civil society organisations for media and advocacy campaigns.
The civil society organisations can form informal channels of communication with the
legislators (legislators outside the ruling party in particular), provide them with relevant
information on budget and associated issues and encourage them to raise questions
regarding the government priorities reflected through the budget. In this way, the various
civil society organisations can attempt a reprioritisation of government’s budget.
This is also indicative of the fact that legislative scrutiny is the most crucial opportunity
present to the civil society organisations to influence the budget. Parliamentary scrutiny
of the public expenditure can be carried out in two ways-control and scrutiny before
appropriation and control after appropriation. The former is carried out through the
debates and discussions in Parliament, cut motions etc. These debates are usually short
and address content of the budget very superficially and therefore are largely ineffective.
The presentation of the budget is followed by a general discussion on various aspects of
the budget. The house is then adjourned and during the intervening period, demands
for grants are considered by various select committees. These committees report their
observations within a specified time period. After the session resumes, individual demands
for grants are discussed along with the reports of the various standing committees. The
house discusses and votes on the various demands for grants. It is at this stage that cut
motions are proposed.
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The Parliament on the whole lacks the institutional capacity to undertake a thorough
and comprehensive scrutiny of the budget. More often than not, the members lack the
necessary expertise to comprehend and evaluate the budget document. Most of them
cannot understand the meaning and implication of the figures mentioned in the budget
for the lives of the people. As Bhanu (2007, p.1080) states, “departmentally related
standing committees are microcosms of parliament. Deliberations in these committees
are not closed process. The public can put up submissions or memorandums that can
be heard before the committees. The committees need to enlarge these practices while
discussing the demands for grants so that people’s concerns can be accommodated in the
reports to parliament”.
Budget Execution:
Budget execution occurs only after the budget is enacted by the legislature. Governments
across the world have different mechanisms in place to ensure that the actual expenditure
adheres closely to the budget. In most of the cases, the Ministry of Finance exercises a strong
central control, reviewing allocations and approving major expenditure. In practice, the
actual expenditure, more often than not, deviates from the allocations as delineated in the
budget. The deviation can result from conscious policy changes. It can also be attributed
to changing economic conditions. However, these deviations or differences between the
budget as it was enacted and budget as executed cannot be very large. Large gaps between
budgetary allocations and actual expenditures will be reflective of a poor budget system,
making it difficult to execute the budget as it was enacted.
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can have the effect of rewarding those States which already perform well on a set of
specified criteria. Countries with a federal system of government have three dominant
levels of budget authority-Centre, State and local. This multi-level system brings,
contends Elson, “multilevel systems of allocation, discretion and governance” (ibid, p.10).
Developing countries like India, Pakistan have this kind of structure. The discretionary
authority available to the local government to raise their revenues and spend on priorities
determined by them creates challenges when institutions of self governance are still under
development. While some challenges have to deal with capacity constraints, others are
concerned with developing a genuine culture of democratic decentralisation with the
central government genuinely trying to provide autonomous space for decision making to
the lower levels of government.
Scope for CSO intervention: The budget is executed by the executive and there is
little scope for non-government organisations to monitor the status of expenditure unless
if the executive releases reports on the status of expenditure. This, notwithstanding, many
non-government organisations do undertake independent monitoring and evaluation
which would result in greater adherence to the budget and reduction in corruption/
mismanagement of funds. They can also evaluate quality of spending.
Scope for CSO intervention: This stage presents an important opportunity to the non-
government organisations. The audit reports usually reveal the various instances of mis-
expenditure along with various other irregularities like the ones involved in procurement.
By obtaining such information and publicising it, it can put pressure on the executive
to function more efficiently and effectively. This can help enhance the accountability of
the government as the adequacy of the response to the various irregularities can reveal
government’s commitments to their goals. NGOs should facilitate wide circulation of
these documents for them to be used by the people and civil society organisations.
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(b) Common Problems with Budgeting:
Each budget cycle has several stages and each stage has its own set of issues that impede
the smooth operation of the cycle. In order to achieve the intended outcomes from the
budget, an efficient budget system is needed. The developing economies are particularly
vulnerable to various macro-economic factors such as narrow tax base and limited
capacity to absorb external shocks that make it difficult for the expenditure to comply with
the budget outlines. While a lot of factors causing the deviance is outside the purview of
national economies, there are other factors resulting largely from poor budgeting practices
that exacerbate the problems mentioned. Most of such problems emanate in the executive
and weak institutions-legislature and audit - and only worsen the situation. On the
contrary, a strong and independent oversight by the legislature and the audit institutions
can help, curb these problems. The Auditor General can lack independence and political
clout to undertake investigations that might reveal financial management and corruption.
The problems can be overwhelming and more often than not demand systemic solutions.
Many countries are, therefore, about to undertake budget reforms.
The IBP guide to budget analysis (2001) provides a useful account of common problems
with budget processes in developing countries, which include the following:
• Difficulties in making accurate macro-economic projections due to vulnerability to
external shocks and dependence on erratic revenue flow;
• Lack of independence from political control of the audit function;
• Lack of accurate budget;
• Lack of information on socio-economic trends and conditions;
• Weaknesses in the capacity of the legislature to hold the executive accountable due to
lack of information and access to technical skills.
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about the nature and the role of the state rather than establishing a public expenditure
management system is the real challenge” (ibid, p.15).
“Studying politics of the budget process essentially means examining the ways in which
the distribution of power within that process affects the subsequent distribution of public
resources” (ibid, p.22). In order to examine ways in which power can be seen to influence
the budgetary process, Elson points out that, power needs to be studied in two important
ways. The first way is to see power as it manifests in formal structures and institutions.
Power must also be looked at as “informal incorporation of dominant norms and values
into information systems, the legitimisation of knowledge, operating procedures and
bureaucratic practice” (ibid, p.34). Following from these two conceptions of power, we
need to see it manifesting in the budgetary process-formulation and execution-in two
important ways:
Inclusion/exclusion or proximity of certain groups/social sections in the decision
making process.
Norms and values expressed overtly through the statement of purpose, or implicitly
rooted in the various assumptions and priorities informing the process, structure and
content of the budget.
In the present situation, the existing balance of power-be it social, economic and political-
it is highly unlikely that the distribution of resources through the budget favours the
excluded sections of population. It predominantly favours the social, economic and
politically powerful sections of population. The present system also resists sharing of
information with the population at large or including either the disadvantaged sections of
population into the policy making process.
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The composition of the elite in every economy or society is different. The elite in India
has been identified as being constituted by the bourgeoisie, the kulak (farmer) capitalist
and the bureaucracy. This composition, of course, varies across countries. In some of the
countries in South Asia, Pakistan being the most instructive example, the military is a
powerful stakeholder in this process and therefore, an important group that influences
policy outcomes through the budget. An attempt to understand the politics of the budget
process, therefore, entails an understanding of (a) the formal structure of roles and
responsibilities within the budget process and (b) the formal rules governing the decision
making, political choice and accountability within the process of public budgeting. At the
same time, it is also important to have knowledge of the networks of stakeholders that
possess the power to influence the budgetary process, incentives for actions for the various
officials-the political executive and the bureaucrats-during the budget process, both in the
formulation phase and during its execution. These incentives can be both overt and covert,
i.e. the power or the ability to exercise discretion available to the bureaucrats. The rules
and norms-both explicit and implicit-must be discerned in order to have a comprehensive
understanding of the process.
Focus, purely on factors (a) and (b) would mean a technocratic understanding of the
process and produce procedural solutions like strengthening opportunities for a more
transparent assessment of the process. In contexts where the larger political ethos is
not antagonistic to the furtherance of transparency and accountability, this approach
could prove to be satisfactory. This approach, however, is inadequate in most situations,
particularly in contexts where the budget outcomes are skewed in favour of select sections
of the population. The stakeholders that influence and determine budget allocations
exclude, largely, the interests of the disadvantaged sections during the budget formulation
process. It is important for a comprehensive understanding of the budget process that the
underlying power dynamics that shape the process, structure and content of the budget
must be understood and taken into account when using budget as an entry point for
promoting policy change and improved implementation.
The attempt to assess the incentives operating within the budget process might run into
overt and covert resistance by those involved in the process. The central budget office
is usually closed and defensive. The incentives might involve practices that are either
formally illegal, or would be perceived as unethical if publicly revealed. To develop a public
account of this level of budget formulation is therefore, a challenge and involves complex
negotiations with key stakeholders.
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them down to convenient levels. The final decision lies with the cabinet and it usually takes
place according to certain rules and norms that remain more or less consistent. These
include the previous year’s allocation to the implementing agency which is infact, treated
as a benchmark for the contest for resources. The implementing agencies simultaneously
refer to the policy commitments of the government to demand additional resources.
Many a times, the budgets of various spending departments/implementing agencies is
determined by particularistic factors like the political clout of the ministers to effectively
argue the case for resources for their respective ministries.
Diane Elson using Prescod’s account of the politics in Jamaican budget formulation and
execution contends that many a times:
Trends in budget execution consistently demonstrate that social sector suffers more than
other sectors through various cuts that are made during the execution phase. Elson indicates
that the macroeconomic considerations do not just determine the initial overall resource
envelope for the budget. In practice, the releases to the line ministries are determined on
a month to month basis with macroeconomic considerations in mind and in case cuts are
required to be made, more often than not, they fall on the social and community services
category. A consistent bias is visible against social sector in the process of budget execution.
She contends that priorities expressed through the budget, therefore, need to be contested
throughout the process of formulation and execution, because of the biases against social
sector expenditure (ibid).
Problems of leakage, corruption and distorted priorities are big hindrances in the process
of strengthening the poverty focus and realisation of rights in the process of budget
execution. “The networks of stakeholders who benefit from untransparent procedures are
so diverse and multifaceted that it may seem inevitable that any attempt to initiate real
change will be bound to fail”(ibid, p.27).
There is politics of competition between geographical units for access to budget resources.
The allocation of resources to different geographical units is determined on the basis of
criteria of scale (population), need (numbers in poverty, level of social infrastructure
provisioning) and performance (bureaucratic efficiency, competence). Elson (2002)
argues that the system of determination and application of these formulae, the process of
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negotiation for resources is far from transparent. Different regions can lobby for greater
allocations both through overt and covert means. Greater transparency and openness in
the system of redistributive equalisation between the richer and poorer regions is very
important and can lead to an increased pro-poor, gender responsive and equitable focus
in the budget.
Summary points:
• The budget process is cyclical and is characterized through the functional stages
(formulation, enactment, execution and evaluation/audit).
• The time frame for the budget cycle (beginning with the preparation and concluding
at the finalization of the accounts) is usually three years.
• The budget process needs to be clearly linked to the overall policy and planning
process.
• The various key stages of the budget are the responsibility of different departments
and ministries.
• The budget cycle is supposed to be a ‘planning cycle’ wherein the process of monitoring
and evaluation must inform the formulation stage of the cycle.
• The budget is a document that includes government’s expenditure and revenue
proposals, reflecting its policy priorities and fiscal targets.
• The formulation stage takes place almost exclusively within the executive branch of
the government.
• The second stage of the budget cycle occurs when the executive’s budget is presented
and discussed in the legislature.
• This is the last stage of the budget cycle and entails activities that ‘aim to measure
whether there is an effective use of public resources’.
1 # In the remaining sections the term budget work has been used instead of budget analysis for these deal
with generic issues concerned not just with budget analysis but with a larger body of work concerned with
budgets
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relation with the other actors, including the government, media and other civil society
actors. The funding agencies also play an important role in shaping the outcome of any
budget initiative and the manner in which they are able to influence public policies.
Knowledge of these rules and laws is important in assessing the opportunities available
for intervention, and in deciding the strategies for the same. Also, while planning the
intervention in the process the civil society budget groups must have complete knowledge
of the relative power of each of the actor in the process to influence any kind of change.
In a number of cases, for instance in Mexico, the President has an extremely important
role in the budget process. In other cases, for example in Croatia, South Africa and even in
India, Parliament has an extremely limited role to play in the budget process with limited
or no amending powers.
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Apart from the knowledge of the relative power of various actors involved in the budget
process, the other rules and procedures determining the process of public spending
like decentralisation can shape significantly the opportunities available for civil society
intervention. An important example that can be stated here is that of Uganda and Brazil
where civil society actors decided to focus on local budgets due to decentralisation of
government resources to the local level governments.
(1) Capacity:
Budget Analysis requires technical skills that are not easily available. Various successful
budget groups have managed to acquire analytical expertise in analysis of the budget
from a pro-poor perspective. They use a variety of strategies to build internal capacity.
While acquiring the requisite expertise and skills is a big challenge for any organisation,
retaining skilled capacity in the organisation is a bigger challenge. Organisations have to
use a number of strategies to prevent the skilled personnel from leaving the organisation.
These include health and pension benefits, creation of stimulating and engaging work
environment & commensurate remunerations.
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and substantial technical analysis. On the other hand, media and grassroots organisations
would prefer the same analysis to be presented to them in a manner that is more accessible
and comprehensible. The key findings and observations of the analysis, in the latter case,
must be presented in lucid and easy-to-understand language, conveying to the layperson
the meaning and implications of these findings for their lives. Parliamentarians, on the
other hand, would prefer the information to be presented along with the context of the
research. This would facilitate their attempt to influence the executive. As Renzio and
Krafchik contend “the information presented must, most certainly be, timely, diverse,
and clear. The budget groups must carry out the dissemination making sure that the
stakeholder gets enough time to go through the findings and use them in an effective
fashion”(ibid,p.18).
(2) Media:
The next important stakeholder that the budget groups closely work and collaborate with
is the media. Government takes media reporting of any public issue into account before
taking a decision on these issues. Writing columns for various newspapers and usage of
local radios are some of the ways that the budget groups use for communicating their
message. Budget groups can develop a reputation of an authoritative source of information
on issues of budget and public spending for the journalists. In case of Disha, IBASE and
IDASA lack of clear media strategy has led to limited impact of their work.
(3) Executive:
The relationship between the budget groups and the executive is extremely crucial since
it is the final organ of the state that the budget groups aim to reach and influence. This
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relationship is not straightforward but rather complex. More often than not, policy makers
are not interested in improvements in transparency and accountability as far as the issue
of allocations and utilisation of public resources is concerned. Establishing effective means
of communication with them is extremely crucial for civil society organisations working
on budget work and is a necessary component of effective budget advocacy. Budget groups
need to identify the level of government that needs to be approached. They also need to
identify some of the like-minded and sympathetic officials who can be approached in
the initial stages with their findings and recommendations. Secondly, the budget groups
need to use both formal and informal channels creatively to approach the government
officials. It is also important for the budget groups to determine the manner in which the
information is going to be presented to the government officials. The group can attempt
to influence the policy makers by convincing them of the recommendations, supporting
their analysis and the subsequent findings with substantial evidence. The government
must be convinced of the accuracy and credibility of the findings. On the other hand, civil
society budget groups could adopt a confrontational approach. A careful analysis of the
situation is required before any such decision is taken. The IDASA case study provides
us with an important example in this case. They resisted from adopting a confrontational
approach right from the beginning and instead attempted to build sustained channels of
communication, presenting the findings along with substantial evidence. A range of such
strategies were used to influence the government officials.
(4) Legislature:
The legislature and the budget groups share the important function of holding public
officials accountable during the budget process. While the budget groups need “advocacy
channels” as Renzio and Krafchik put it, “the parliamentarians need research and advice
to participate effectively in the parliamentary debates” (ibid, p20).
There is ample evidence to indicate that budget work in various countries has led to
improved budget policies, as can be seen in the case of budget work in Mexico which led
to increased public spending on reproductive health. Another example of this is increased
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budgetary allocations towards the wellbeing of the more vulnerable sections of the
population, e.g. children in South Africa, for indigenous people in India. Further, there
has been an improvement in quality of expenditure as well.
It is important to acknowledge the role that civil society budget work has played in
improving the capacity of the legislators and the media to engage with the budget process
more constructively. With the help of various budget groups and information provided by
them on various issues, legislators participate in the budget debates in a more informed
manner.
This is pursued through providing educational material, training and discussion forums
on budget issues. A number of them have produced informative budget guides informing
the audience on a range of issues including processes of public expenditure, various actors
involved, the procedural and extra-procedural factors shaping the process through various
stages. These budget guides are usually written in a lucid and engaging manner and are
coupled with training and discussions to facilitate a better understanding of budget issues.
In an effort to spread budget literacy, civil society budget groups try to link the rather
complex sounding macroeconomic issues to the everyday experiences of people. This helps
people to relate these issues to their lives and problems and understand the relevance and
implication of budget in their lives.
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groups apart from providing the basic information on budget regarding the allocations
made towards various sectors also analyse and interpret this information, informing
people of the implications that it holds for them.
It must be noted that even though the government is open to sharing information regarding
the budget, it might be reluctant to reveal sensitive information. Once the information is
available, the budget groups simplify and collate the information in a manner that is more
accessible to facilitate its usage by the other civil society actors. Idasa in South Africa
analysed the budget to assess the allocations made towards children, the adequacy of the
allocations and highlight the shortfalls therein. It also compared the allocations made with
the promises and commitments made by the government for the realisation of social and
economic rights of the children. Similar initiatives have been undertaken analysing the
impact and implications of the budgetary allocations for women and tribals.
This effort would be incomplete without advocacy efforts aimed at the effective
dissemination of the information to the various actors interested in engaging with the
budget process. These may include other civil society actors, media, and parliamentarians.
A variety of strategies and methods are used for effective dissemination of the information,
ranging from the print and electronic media, community radio, publications etc. IBASE
in Brazil has transferred the entire budget information as online database. Most groups
have to collaborate with other civil society groups working with various sections of the
population to reach various constituencies more effectively and raise their level of budget
literacy.
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budget debates providing them with requisite information and skills to participate more
actively in the budget debates. This information and analysis helps them ask appropriate
and relevant questions and holding the executive accountable. Disha’s work provides an
instructive example in this case who have worked relentlessly to enhance the role played
by the legislators in the budget process. Finally, budget groups help improve the quality
of financial and budget reporting in the media by providing journalists with the results of
analysis and influence the media coverage of issues related to public spending. Idasa,
Fundar and Disha have paid systematic attention to the work with media.
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Budget work also facilitates citizens’ participation in the budget process. Citizen
engagement with the budget process has been limited and governments have usually
been reluctant to extend opportunities for participation to people. The members of the
executive branch of the government are considered to possess the requisite expertise to
take decisions regarding the allocation and utilisation of public resources. The legislators
and the people at large are not considered competent enough to engage with matters
related to public expenditure.
Budget work, contends Robinson (2006.p.12) has a definite “potential to deepen democracy
by strengthening accountability, fostering transparency and encouraging participation”.
The budget groups might have differences of perspectives and organisational structure, but
they all share some fundamental similarities. They all share commitment to social justice
and upholding the rights of the vulnerable sections of the population. This is evident from
the social groups that are accorded priority in their work like dalits, adivasis etc. The three
important components that are integral to any budget initiative are information analysis,
advocacy and capacity building. Most of the budget work centres on national and State
budgets and only in some cases local government budgets are scrutinised.
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Tool 2 - Social Audit:
The next tool under consideration is the social audit, which seeks to streamline
development interventions through transparency and accountability in
public expenditure. It has been successfully used by the community-based
organisation Mazdoor Kisan Shakti Sangathan (MKSS). The social audit
methodology described in this manual is derived from the MKSS movement,
which demonstrated that citizens’ participation in public expenditure
management can be brought about through access to information.
MKSS organises jan sunwais or public hearings to garner focus on issues of public
expenditure involving the people, members of government and civil society. These forums
have had a tremendous impact in fighting corruption and ensuring accountability from
public officials.
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apathy and indifference down the line towards the wage seekers contribute in varying
measures and block achievement of the intended objectives”(Aakella and Kidambi, 2007,
p.5). “It emerges that corruption is verily in the fabric of our society. To root it out would
require untangling of the tangled webs and putting a flashlight on the micro processes of
public programmes, like a social audit does, and deal with each part. Placing details of the
programme in the public domain, taking the information down to the primary stakeholders,
discussing the non-negotiables and implementation details with all stakeholders on a
common platform and holding officials accountable for their work, bringing individual
issues to the forefront and forcing the system to take cognizance – all of this constitutes
a social audit process. In an ideal setting the social audit would infact ensure transfer of
power… to the beneficiaries of the scheme” (ibid).
Social audit and the RTI campaign have not just been able to question the
rather opaque internal accountability mechanisms in governance but also
to work out mechanisms to help people access information and interpret it.
Social audit reveals the allocated money and expenditure gap, helping to identify reasons
behind leakages and to expose impractical norms in development programmes that are
largely products of a closed, top-down system of implementation.
In theory, no public official is unaccountable. There are checks and balances on the
functioning of public officials, but the power to review and audit the functioning of
government offices vests with special audit agencies, the judiciary and the legislature.
People have rarely had a role in this process and their non-participation meant minimal
transparency/accountability of public officials. Social audit and RTI underscore people’s
role in assessing and monitoring the planning and implementation of public projects.
Social audit however does not just audit accounts; it examines the objectives and relevance
of projects undertaken for the people. It therefore tries to include people in formulation
and implementation of policies.
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THE METHODOLOGY:
It also became clear that any viable alternative has to be based on procuring,
analysing and presenting existing facts before the people. The RTI campaign
worked on the premise that a democratic set-up does not allow withholding
of information from the public, who have the constitutional rights to demand
information or take copies of documents related to decisions taken in their
name.
The right to information is inherent in the fundamental right of every citizen to life, liberty
and expression without which democracy is unimaginable and social audit is a means of
collectively probing and understanding this information instead of it being the exclusive
preserve of any single person, power elite or institution. Futher, this right should not simply
be a device for management of resource distribution. Its importance must be underlined
to facilitate enhancement of public space for citizens to engage in effective dialogue with
the state to influence its policies, spending priorities and to hold it accountable.
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The MKSS struggle demonstrated that RTI is not just a part of citizens’ right
to freedom of speech and expression but also right to life and liberty. It was
needed to secure the right to minimum wages, entitlements under the public
distribution system (PDS) and medicines from public health centres. Social
audit assumes added significance in the context of democratic decentralisation given
that structures and modes of accountability are weakest at the local level –panchayats
(village councils) and municipal bodies – the executive bodies responsible for
implementing developmental programmes and for providing social services to the poor
and marginalised.
MKSS employed a range of techniques to secure minimum wages for rural workers. In
the absence of redress from the judiciary or executive, sympathetic officials provided
information needed by the sangathan, as there was no legal entitlement to seek the
information. The documents obtained were subjected to collective scrutiny (participatory
social audit by the panchayats) with the idea of ensuring honest and credible governance
to those most affected by the problems in the system. The rules and procedures that
public officials must abide by and facts and data relevant to specific problems that need to
be addressed must be kept in mind while seeking information. For example, if corruption
needs to be reduced in the PDS, the field investigator must be aware of quantity of food
grains allotted to each shop, the amount to be distributed and to whom.
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from outright refusal to the citizens’ demands, to finding loopholes for circumventing
the legislation. Therefore, systematic identification of relevant documents is necessary.
Preliminary fieldwork along with inspection help in identifying documents considered
doubtful. The inspection would require people with the technical expertise and knowledge
of local conditions. Once identified, certified copies of the documents need to be obtained,
perhaps through legal entitlements since administrative orders may be flouted.
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The methodology of jan sunwai begun by MKSS, is simple, finding its
bearings in the desperation and resentment of the people who have for
years had to put up with corruption in their everyday dealings with public
service delivery agencies. They have usually been the passive victims of
the evil of corruption and rarely had any role in addressing it. The public
hearings that MKSS organises is on the premise of the fundamental rights of
citizens to obtain information regarding all aspects of functioning, acts and
decisions, of the state apparatus and seeks to provide a systemic redressal
of the problem. The relevant documents of the project/programme to be assessed are
procured and verified by the community. It is through this process that the community has
gained unprecedented access to “official” information on various aspects of government
public works.
It is then verified with information obtainable from local people who have been involved in
the public works and at times those who are the victims of corruption in the government
project. The local people get equipped to deal with corruption by getting evidence of
such instances from official documents. Only then are they in a position to initiate any
concrete action against the errant officials. In the past, the people have not been able to
take remedial action due to lack of evidence against public officials. The ‘public hearing’
has dramatically changed this. People speak fearlessly and give evidence of corruption and
the government officials concerned are called to defend themselves. The public hearings
have proved extremely educative for the local populace and their participation in exposing
corruption has given them a sense of empowerment.
This is the most important stage of the social audit for it is when the
collective scrutiny actually takes place. The other stages are actually
preparatory to this stage. Preparation for the public hearing requires
extensive dissemination of information on the public works or project to be
scrutinised by the affected people. The information sharing is followed by
inviting people to participate in the collective scrutiny through jan sunwais.
The MKSS experience illustrates that people can be mobilsed through
creative modes of mobilisation like theatre, songs, dance, wall writings, and
pamphlets. These creative methods are derived from their everyday lives,
drawing from local idioms and examples, making the idea of participatory
monitoring of public funds intelligible and relevant. It also helps simplify
the abstract notions of governance and participatory development. At
this stage, the nodal organisation might have to face stiff resistance from
the power holders, including pubic officials. The resistance might be both
overt (employing violent means) and covert (appealing to caste and clan
loyalties).
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The most effective jan sunwais have been organised by MKSS and exude an extremely
festive atmosphere about them. There is also tremendous anticipation among the people
about possible outcomes of the day. It is usually an open meeting and a place chosen that is
convenient for people to attend. Special efforts are made to ensure that people participate
in large numbers. The meetings are attended by representatives of the government, elected
public officials, the media and village residents. A panel of eminent citizens of the area is
also set up to chair the meetings. Sangathan members control the flow of information
and conduct of the discussion as depositions made often revolve around corruption and
malpractices and might assume ugly proportions if the meeting is not kept in order. The
process has a dramatic impact, with people actively testifying against officials they have
feared and the latter admitting to their wrongdoing. The impact of public hearings on
corruption has been wide-ranging. Some jan sunwais have revealed that people listed as
beneficiaries of a particular programme did not receive their dues; others show that large
sums of money were paid to contractors without the works being done; yet others unveil
that workers were paid less than
billed in the record books and muster
rolls. With the public hearings, it
was for the first time that there
were systematic reviews of public
expenditure carried out collectively
by the people.
The jan sunwai process proved to be an effective mechanism for making government
records on public expenditure available to the public. Kidambi (2008) states that, “jolting
the government and administration out of their complacency required a new method of
placing our demands. Because repeated complaints and protests had yielded little action,
it was felt that the best approach would be to go to the people and ask for justice”.
Used as a tactical forum, the jan sunwai is somewhat like a court, but does
not pronounce judgment. In these public hearings, local people can come
forward to speak the truth about what they have seen and experienced. It
creates more accountability as those participating are from the same village, making the
utterance of a false statement less likely. Those who want to speak are allowed to do so
after making a request. MKSS has certain rules of conduct for the jan sunwai, which
makes it a flexible forum. The findings derived from government documents are shared
with the village community and its veracity assessed based on their testimonies. There
is also a strong emphasis on ethics with respect to the testimonies. Initial assessment is
done through inspection of work sites and speaking to the labourers who worked there.
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During the course of the MKSS movement, it was realised that comprehension
of complex government documents was necessary before these could be
questioned. A simplified and special methodology had to be devised if this
particular tool was to be used by the common people. They also recognised
that without legal entitlements and evolution of strategies to involve more
people in the process, the issue would remain localised. Kidambi is of the view
that the public hearing has become a common method for addressing the larger issues of
hunger, displacement and other rights across the country. The dialectic is never a clean and
tidy process, especially since those engaging in it are from completely different paradigms,
with truths that cannot always be proven. Yet, there is a need to go beyond clearing the
confusion, beyond information, and towards participatory democracy.
Jenkins and Goetz rightly contend, “The jan sunwais not only exposed the misdeeds of
the local politicians, government engineers and private contractors – in a number of cases
leading to voluntary restitution – but also demonstrated the potential for collective action
among the groups that tend to shun organised political activity.” The amount diverted
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through these specific instances of corruption might seem insignificant to many, but the
cumulative effect of the diversion of funds is enormous, according to Jenkins and Goetz.
Open and collective verification of records by the community in the public hearings has
promoted mobilisation of public opinion to take up organised action against officials
allegedly involved in corruption and those refusing to release documents/information for
conduct of a social audit of government expenditure on public works and service delivery
functions. Public hearings, according to some scholars, have an important educative
function: the struggle for access to information challenges the obscurantist and remote
culture of bureaucracy and reinforces democratic notions regarding obligations of
government officials and elected representatives as public servants.
The instrument of social audit has helped the common people understand the links
between their personal lives and the political process of democratic functioning. They
came to believe that they could also be part of the process of running the country. The
bureaucracy, on the other hand, view it with suspicion and feel threatened by the concept
of transparency.
While delineating the methodology of social audit through the MKSS example, this
manual also tries to outline extra-methodological considerations that can contribute to
successful implementation of the tool. These considerations too are derived from the
MKSS experience of using the tool.
During the MKSS movement, there was a sustained attempt to make the “idiom, mode
and involvement” of the campaign wider, and for transition from the particular to the
universal. The methodology of the tool might not be developed or articulated by the local
people themselves. In this regard, civil society actors play an important role in defining
the methodology of the tool with active involvement of the people through their inputs.
They should also keep in mind the need for constant dialogue, debate and discussion with
the local population who are the end users of the tool. It is also important to network with
other CSOs working on the issue of the people’s rights so that more and more people are
included in the campaign for institutionalisation of social audit and RTI.
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There are some important lessons derived from the movement.
The first, as Kidambi (ibid.p.12) states, is: “One of the most powerful tools
we have as human rights activists in India is actually the government’s
own statement and commitments.[MKSS] has been able to effectively use these
expressions of hypocrisy to develop creative methods for demanding accountability”.
The second is that the civil group undertaking such an initiative should make
intelligent, innovative and effective use of cultural resources such as song,
dance, theatre and national cultural and political practices like yatras, to
engage local people in dialogue. Communication in any such initiative is extremely
important. It is through the usage of these resources that, “(MKSS) is able to make a direct,
symbolic link between the roots of the human rights problem and the local population’s
experience with related abuses”. MKSS made effective use of slogans in their campaign.
“Slogans are the language of the people and come from the understanding and thoughts of
the people themselves. They are succinct expressions that represent not only ideology but
also the campaign’s direction, and are used to harness the collective voice of the people
attending the public meeting, to help them identify with each other and the issue. Slogans
are easy to remember and effective communication tools,” contends Kidambi (ibid, p.14).
It is also important to involve people from different walks of life, which lend the campaign
credibility.
The movement made sure that the issues had immediacy and relevance to
the local population. “Poor people made a connection among deprivation,
endemic poverty, exploitation, denial of participation in institutions of
governance with secrecy, opaqueness, and unaccountable governance”(ibid).
Access to livelihood, wages, medicine and other essentials inspired the workers and peasants
in central Rajasthan to protest against the opaqueness of the local government. The Right
to Information campaign of the MKSS is symbiotically connected to an understanding that
without information and transparency there can be no genuine participation of the poor in
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democracy, no ability to demand and access their rights. There was a careful selection of
tactics and strategies which helped MKSS achieve its objectives. “Without the involvement
in the local issue, forging the connection with the larger macro issue would have been
difficult,” states Kidambi (ibid, p.15). She adds that one of the important reasons for the
success of MKSS was its firm belief. “Campaign for human rights must always be firmly
rooted in the realities of local people who are affected by human rights violations. The
challenge lies in linking of this immediate concern with the root of the problem. [They]
were determined that the underlying problems affecting working conditions and wages in
Rajasthan… were corruption and lack of transparency.”
Kidambi contends, “It was clear to MKSS members that access to records was a means to
challenge the power that lay with the powerful, the influential and the administration. It
was also a way to effectively ask for a share of governance. Until that moment, people had
been battling a system in which they were discriminated against on the basis of poverty,
caste, religion and gender. And yet here was a tool whereby the poor person found a
foothold to push the door open and demand transparency from a system accustomed to
slamming that door in faces of poor people who asked for their rights”(ibid).
An important lesson derived from the MKSS experience is that the success
tactics and strategies that were used by old social movements like hunger
strikes depends on the level of receptiveness of the government. The government
appears unsympathetic to the fate of those involved due to which there is a need to invent
new and innovative tactics and strategies. The objective behind the range of new tactics
and strategies was obviously mass involvement and mobilisation through processes such
as jan sunwais.
Right to Information:
It is only when access to information is a legal
entitlement that people can be empowered to
control and fight corruption directly. An act
guaranteeing RTI means that citizens must have
the right to obtain documents connected with
expenditures on all local development works. It
is through this information that people uncover
incidences of corruption and other malpractices. With access to such information,
people would be empowered to present relevent documents before public hearings so that
evidence of corruption is verified by the village community and punitive action demanded/
initiated against corrupt officials.
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As Jenkins and Goetz (1999,p.10) state, “In the process of experimenting with methods
of compiling, sharing and verifying expenditure data at every local levels – thus far, in
the absence of a statutory entitlement to such information – the MKSS has developed a
radical interpretation of the notion that citizens have a right both to know how they are
governed and to participate actively in the process of auditing their representatives. The
MKSS interest in the right to information arose from its work in the late 1980s and 1990s
on livelihood issues, such as the failure of the State government to enforce minimum wage
regulations on drought relief works, to ensure availability of subsidized food and other
essential commodities through the Public Distribution System (PDS), or to prevent the
illegal occupation of government land by powerful local interests. It is particularly these
struggles around wages and prices which generated a belief that access to official documents
was an essential part of the struggle to demand accountability from local authorities.”
The idea that government decision making should be transparent is not new. A range of
factors have pushed the concern with transparency to the centre of contemporary policy
and governance discourse. Transparency came to
occupy the importance as a reaction against arbitrary
exercise of powers in state dominated economies.
It was also a reaction to what Goetz and Jenkins
describe as “the secretive processes by which liberal
economic policies were introduced” (ibid, p.12).
The link between the concepts of transparency and
accountability is not obvious. It is in fact, far from clear. There are a range of meanings
that can be attributed to both these concepts resulting in a high degree of conceptual
ambiguity. This in turn, usually leads to dismissal of the movement as offering nothing
new. But the MKSS struggle and the essential link that it has forged between information
and transparent government functioning has reinvigorated the debate on transparency
and accountability.
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practical relevance to the poor and marginalised. This bias is, however,
unfounded, based on what Goetz and Jenkins (ibid) consider false dichotomy
between the ‘political rights’ and ‘resource rights’ or more significantly
between ‘formal’ and ‘substantive’ democracy. The evolution of the demand
for RTI through the struggle carried out by MKSS has strengthened the
impression that the dichotomy is indeed artificially created. MKSS has
linked the right to information inextricably to the livelihood issues of the
poor and marginalised. MKSS has radically redefined the discourse on RTI
in India and located it within the constitutional provision for right to life and
livelihood. The assertion of the demand for right to information by MKSS
has been rather confrontational – as is evident from its political struggle –
and this is an important reason why it has not been pursued by other CSOs
involved in service delivery.
Citizen Report Cards (CRCs) are participatory client feedback surveys enabling
quantitative assessment of user perceptions of public service agencies in terms
of quality, efficiency and other variables. These instruments create public
awareness, prompting public agencies to address the problems pertaining to
service delivery and be more responsive to the needs of the people. Citizens are
the end users and in an important position to give authentic feedback on the quality and
adequacy of the public services. In several countries, the state through its various agencies
provides citizens with various services like electricity, water, education, healthcare and
transportation.
The citizens interact with providers of these essential services on a regular basis and
their organised feedback provides the basis for judging service performance on various
criteria. Since the citizens are clients of several services, surveys could also be conducted
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for comparing the various services. The CRC ranks the services in terms of overall client
satisfaction and specific dimensions such as quality, corruption and so on. The card also
serves to articulate the needs and grievances of the people, forming the basis for civil society
engagement with the state. This would go a long way towards ensuring accountability and
responsiveness of public agencies to the people.
CRC started in Bangalore in 1994 through the initiative of a small group of citizens who
were alarmed at the condition of public services in the city. They embarked on an effort to
use “organised public feedback” to raise public awareness regarding unsatisfactory public
services in India, on the premise that intervention in the form
of collective action would help improve the services. The idea
was borrowed from the private sector practice of collecting
consumer satisfaction feedback regarding particular goods
and services, for improved delivery to better compete in the
market with other private service providers.
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Step 1: Assessment of Local Conditions:
This first step aims at investigating whether CRC is suitable for execution
under given local conditions or context. A number of critical factors determine
suitability of CRC in the particular context, which plays an important role
in success, failure or plausibility of the exercise. This is applicable for other
social accountability tools as well.
The literature on social movements and party systems suggest that groups of socially
excluded sections of the population are best able to influence political processes and
institutions in the contexts where there are well-institutionalised, ideological and numerous
parties. The political competition compels the political parties to form alliances with the
excluded social groups. This provides the citizens with the opportunities to influence
policy issues by allying with the political parties who promise to fulfill their agenda in
return of support at the time of election, the moment of regime change in democracies.
The context where the political competition between ideologically diverse and numerous
political parties is not institutionalised, the socially and economically excluded groups
of people are caught in a patron-client relationship with the service providers. In such a
situation, instead of demanding accountability and responsiveness of people, the citizens
are compelled to demonstrate their loyalty to the political parties and officials holding
state power to obtain services from them. Apart from the political framework, it is also
important to investigate the nature of the state which again is an important determinant
of the success of such accountability mechanisms.
The degree of institutionalisation of the state, in terms of the efficiency of its bureaucracies
and the probity of its accountability institutions, is the main determinant of the effectiveness
of responsiveness initiatives. State capacity, however, is the bottom line in determining
the attentiveness to citizen voice and client focus in service delivery” (Goetz and Gaventa,
op.cit, p.13). It is also important to assess whether citizens enjoy civil and political rights to
freely express their opinion on matters of public concern even if it involves criticising the
government without any sense of threat or anticipation of punitive action. Where citizens
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enjoy full rights, the feedback through a survey would be genuine but it would not be as
reliable in places/countries where there are limited civil and political rights.
The assessment cannot be complete without focus group discussions with people familiar
with the local conditions like government functionaries, civil society representatives,
academics and citizens. The group discussions should focus on whether the area would
benefit from such an exercise and whether there are sympathetic/ enthusiastic officials
willing to use the information to stimulate reforms within the agency.
The next important decision is selection of an institution that would lead the exercise.
The institution needs to enjoy credibility in the city/sector where the exercise is being
conducted. It should not be biased towards any political formation, committed to
improvement in services, have expertise to oversee the exercise even if not conducted on
its own, willing to disseminate information extensively and eager to work with several
stakeholders like the media, other CSOs and the government.
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Some scholars are of the view that an independent consortium constituted by members of
like-minded and motivated CSOs, individuals with a variety of skills, government officials
and academics is better than a single organisation leading the accountability exercise.
It is useful to conduct focus group discussions before the statement of purpose is finalised.
These should attempt to gather information regarding service(s) most relevant to people
in the decided context, problems in service delivery experienced by them daily, any recent
positive innovations attempted by the service provider and aspects of service delivery
most important to the people interviewed and reasons for the same. It is important to
incorporate feedback from the focus group discussions in the statement of purpose and to
assess whether the human and financial resources available with the lead institution are
adequate for project execution.
A range of technical and advocacy skills are needed to conduct a CRC, starting with an
assessment of whether the skills are already available or additional staff is required.
The range of skills include familiarity with local conditions, knowledge of aspects of
service provision, knowledge of social science survey methods, expertise in working with
stakeholders, skills in managing fieldwork, analysis of data, collating the findings in report
form, and ability to conduct follow up advocacy in subsequent stages of the exercise.
In a number of instances, a professional survey agency is hired for fieldwork and data
entry. Additional training might also be given to individuals conducting interviews with
respondents.
Costs to be incurred during the survey need estimation and budgeting before hand. These
include survey related costs, salaries of in-house staff and additional experts hired for
the purpose, costs incurred in analysis of data collected (computing, data entry) and
preparation of material for dissemination and advocacy. The costs can be minimised
with the help of other civil society and academic institutions that volunteer to provide the
requisite skills. It could also be done by involving students of the statistics department of
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the local university or with the assistance of partner organisations that have volunteered
to provide field investigators. If a professional survey agency is hired, the investigators
employed must be adequately skilled, follow sound statistical procedures and fieldwork
methodologies.
The last stage of planning includes drawing up a schedule for execution of the survey
wherein dates are identified for the various stages and people entrusted with responsibility
for each stage.
After the questionnaire is ready, the sample design (sample size and sampling method)
and fieldwork procedures must be identified after which the questionnaire, which includes
conducting a pilot survey, is revised and finalised. Sample design would include:
1. Delimitation of population to be surveyed
2. Selection of unit of analysis (individual/household/organisation)
3. Identification of subgroups within population to be surveyed (women, slum
dwellers)
4. Selection of sample size and determining sample frame
5. Selection of appropriate sampling method
6. Organisation of field staff (based on sample size, time required to complete survey,
total time available). There are three categories of field staff. The first manage
all aspects of the survey, have strong managerial skills and report to the lead
institution. The next category includes those who supervise the survey done by
field investigators, perform regular quality checks and report to field coordinators.
The last are those who conduct the actual survey.
7. The questionnaire needs to be finalised after conducting a pilot survey to identify
problems regarding flow and internal arrangement of questions, and flaws regarding
instructions for investigators. The design and content of the questionnaire should
facilitate information collection, should be comprehensible to the people being
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surveyed and should be of appropriate length. The questionnaire should then be
revised with questions being changed or relocated and questions added if need be.
Training of investigators requires introducing them to the survey objectives and making
them familiar with every question of the survey. The investigator-in-training could be
asked to conduct mock interviews to be acquainted with the method. This could be followed
with intensive training and observers should oversee interviews to ensure conduct in an
unbiased fashion. They should also crosscheck whether the questionnaire has been filled
satisfactorily. The questionnaire is then thoroughly checked by a team. Simultaneous
data entry during the survey is preferred as this helps in on-the-spot identification and
rectification of errors in the questionnaire. The investigators must understand the purpose
of CRC and communicate it clearly to the respondents.
The findings then need to be interpreted and translated into the CRC. An extensive
summary of the findings needs to be written as part of the interpretation process. Both
positive and negative results of the survey need to be highlighted. The CRC report must
include:
1. Executive Summary
2. Survey Objectives
3. Methodology
4. Major Findings
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Step 6: Dissemination of Findings:
The last stage in the process involves ‘dissemination of findings’. This is
one of the most crucial stages of the CRC. The entire effort at collecting
citizen feedback is meaningless if not accompanied with dissemination of
information among the people. The exercise should generate mass awareness
about problems in public service delivery with the idea of engendering
reforms within the agency. The CRC findings must be disseminated to the public
within a given time-frame so that follow-up action is timely. The dissemination strategy
involves:
(1) Identification of stakeholders and target audience
(2) Deciding mechanisms through which target audience can be reached
(3) Focusing on presentation of findings
Identification of stakeholders and target audience – These include all those with
whom the findings should be shared to fulfill the CRC objectives
such as:
(1) Public Service Providers
(2) Members of government
(3) Members of various CSOs
(4) The public
(5) The media
Media coverage is useful for extensive circulation of the findings and for
building public awareness on the state public service provisioning. The media
glare also helps put pressure on service providers to initiate reforms.
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The public is very important as they constitute the end users or clients of the
services. They need to be informed about the positive and negative aspects of the public
service provision in their locality. In some cases, the people are informed in open meetings
in the presence of service providers to initiate a public dialogue on issues that directly
concern them. The service providers are expected to respond to the findings and answer
questions from the public.
Media or press conferences –. There are formal press conferences for sharing findings
with local and national newspapers and television channels. This is to improve the reach
of the findings. The formal presentation is usually short and emphasis is on highlighting
the findings.
Press Note – It is a brief document answering questions about the community surveyed,
survey methodology, services and aspects of services covered, findings, problems in
the public service delivery, suggestions for improvement and information about the
organisation that conducted the survey.
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Step 7: Advocacy for Change:
The CRC is different from other user feedback surveys and is incomplete
without effective dissemination and advocacy. The advocacy strategy
requires a comprehensive understanding about stakeholders in the system
and their influence on the public service provision besides recognising
critical incentives that each of them have for improving the services.
From the point of view of advocacy, CRC can help build awareness on issues of collective
importance and provide a credible database of information from which citizens can lobby
for changes in policies. It can be used effectively as an accountability tool by allowing
people to monitor the state of public service provision. The citizens can hold service
providers accountable through continuous assessment of provisioning problems and the
steps taken or not to address them. CRC provides a platform for active citizen engagement
in issues of public concern through people’s involvement in services monitoring. The
constant consultations also promote minimum standards and a culture of responsiveness
among service providers.
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Lessons:
(b) Goetz and Gaventa (ibid) point out that the nature of access opportunities
and redress mechanisms empower some citizens over others. For instance,
redress mechanisms that oblige the citizens to use legally literate ways will mean that
mainly empowered and socially elite citizens will engage with the state. It would involve
opportunities for the marginalised in remote areas as also special facilities for the disabled
along with the knowledge of people’s rights and entitlements. The scheme that Goetz and
Gaventa (ibid) present about patronage-based states is applicable to most rural areas
in India and other countries of South Asia where accountability mechanisms are weak,
citizens’ voice channelled through civil servants and services delivered as a matter of
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favour to the citizens. In such instances, citizens and state agents are engaged in a patron-
client relationship and the people usually consider it safer to procure services on ascriptive
identity and through offering bribes. The influence of clients when they demand for better
performance is exceptionally weak. This makes setting up of alternative and parallel
informal accountability functions as the only option”.
(c) Social accountability initiatives have used media and other means of
public communication to exact a response from the government. The objective
is to bring the problems of public service delivery in the public glare, exposing weakness
as also praising the positive aspects. Both PAC and MKSS have successfully used this
strategy. While PAC has used popular media to this effect, MKSS has made innovative
use of the public hearing to share details of public expenditure in the village with the local
population as a mechanism to expose malpractices that scuttle development.
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done by articulating the right to information in a manner that effectively links it with the
livelihood issues of poor and demonstrating its social relevance.
(f) The poor are best able to influence policy in a context where political
competition between ideologically diverse parties is well institutionalised.
This encourages parties to seek alliances with new social groups and to promote their
interests. Opportunities may come from moments of system change, such as changes in
government, or even changes in political regime. MKSS exploited the State level election
campaign of 1999 to ensure that the right to information became a campaign issue.
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