OFFSHORE STANDARD

DNV-OS-C503

CONCRETE LNG TERMINAL

STRUCTURES AND
CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS
OCTOBER 2004

DET NORSKE VERITAS

FOREWORD
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B) Materials Technology
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 Offshore Standard DNV-OS-C503, October 2004
Contents – Page 3

CONTENTS

Sec. 1 Introduction........................................................... 5 B 700 Current load .................................................................... 19

B 800 Wind loads ...................................................................... 19
A. General.................................................................................... 5 B 900 Functional loads.............................................................. 19
A 100 Introduction....................................................................... 5 B 1000 Accidental loads.............................................................. 19
A 200 Objective........................................................................... 5
A 300 Scope and applications...................................................... 5 C. Load Combinations and Partial Safety Factors ....................21
A 400 Non DNV codes and standards......................................... 6 C 100 Partial load factors, γf ..................................................... 21
A 500 Classification .................................................................... 6 C 200 Combinations of loads .................................................... 21
C 300 Consequence of failure ................................................... 21
B. References .............................................................................. 6
B 100 General.............................................................................. 6 D. Structural Analysis................................................................22
D 100 General............................................................................ 22
C. Definitions .............................................................................. 7 D 200 Special load effects ......................................................... 22
C 100 Verbal forms ..................................................................... 7 D 300 Analyses requirements.................................................... 22
C 200 Terms ................................................................................ 7 D 400 Analysis of construction stages ...................................... 23
D 500 Transportation analysis................................................... 23
D. Abbreviations and Symbols.................................................... 9 D 600 Installation and deck mating analysis ............................. 23
D 100 Abbreviations.................................................................... 9 D 700 In-service strength and serviceability analyses............... 23
D 200 Symbols ........................................................................... 9 D 800 Fatigue analysis .............................................................. 23
D 900 Seismic analysis.............................................................. 23
Sec. 2 Safety Philosophy................................................ 11 D 1000 Accidental and overload analyses................................... 24
D 1100 Terminal removal/reuse .................................................. 24
A. General.................................................................................. 11
A 100 Objective......................................................................... 11 E. Topside Interface Design......................................................24
A 200 Systematic review ........................................................... 11 E 100 Introduction..................................................................... 24
A 300 Safety class methodology ............................................... 11
A 400 Quality assurance............................................................ 11 Sec. 6 Detailed Design of Offshore Concrete terminal
A 500 Health, safety and environment ...................................... 11 Structures............................................................. 25
A 600 Qualifications of personnel............................................. 11
B. Design Format ...................................................................... 12 A. General..................................................................................25
B 100 General............................................................................ 12 A 100 Introduction..................................................................... 25

C. Identification of Major Accidental Hazards ......................... 12 B. Design Principles Concrete Terminal...................................25

C 100 General............................................................................ 12 B 100 General............................................................................ 25
B 200 Limit states...................................................................... 25
Sec. 3 Design Documentation........................................ 13 B 300 Characteristic values for material strength ..................... 25
B 400 Partial safety factors for materials .................................. 25
A. Overall Planning ................................................................... 13 B 500 Design by testing ............................................................ 25
A 100 General............................................................................ 13 B 600 Design material strength ................................................. 26
A 200 Description of offshore concrete LNG terminal ............. 13
A 300 Meteorological and ocean conditions ............................ 13 C. Basis for Design by Calculation ...........................................26
A 400 LNG terminal layout ...................................................... 13 C 100 Concrete grades and in situ strength of concrete ............ 26
A 500 Primary functions............................................................ 14 C 200 Concrete stress – strain curves for strength design......... 27
A 600 Standards......................................................................... 14 C 300 Geometrical dimensions in the calculation of
A 700 Documentation................................................................ 14 sectional capacities ......................................................... 29
A 800 Documentations required prior to construction .............. 14 C 400 Tension in structural members........................................ 29
A 900 AS-BUILT Documentation............................................. 15 C 500 Fatigue strength relationships ......................................... 29
A 1000 Inspection/monitoring plans for structure in service ...... 15 C 600 Deformation induced loads, prestressing and creep ....... 29
C 700 Effect of water pressure .................................................. 29
Sec. 4 Structural Materials ........................................... 16
D. Design of Structural Members..............................................29
A. General.................................................................................. 16 D 100 Design capacity in ultimate limit state (ULS) ................ 29
A 100 Concrete and Concrete Constituents............................... 16 D 200 Capacity in fatigue limit state (FLS) .............................. 29
A 200 Grout and Mortar ............................................................ 16 D 300 Design for accidental limit state (ALS) .......................... 29
A 300 Reinforcement................................................................. 16 D 400 Design for ductility ......................................................... 29
A 400 Prestressing Steel and anchorage.................................... 16 D 500 Design in serviceability limit state (SLS)....................... 30
A 500 Embedded Steel .............................................................. 16 D 600 Design by testing ............................................................ 30
A 600 Repair Material ............................................................... 16
A 700 LNG Primary Containment Tank ................................... 16 E. Detailing of Reinforcements.................................................30
A 800 Insulation ........................................................................ 16 E 100 General............................................................................ 30

Sec. 5 Loads and Analyses Requirements ................... 17 F. Corrosion Control .................................................................30

F 100 General............................................................................ 30
A. Requirements to Design of Concrete Support Structure ...... 17
A 100 General............................................................................ 17 Sec. 7 LNG Containment System................................. 31
A 200 Structural requirements................................................... 17
A 300 Design principles ............................................................ 18 A. Introduction...........................................................................31
A 100 General............................................................................ 31
B. Load and Load Effects.......................................................... 18 A 200 Storage containment systems.......................................... 31
B 100 General............................................................................ 18
B 200 Environmental loads ....................................................... 18 B. Design of LNG Containment Structure ................................32
B 300 Extreme wave loads ........................................................ 18 B 100 Design principles ............................................................ 32
B 400 Diffraction analysis......................................................... 18 B 200 Design basis .................................................................... 32
B 500 Additional requirements for dynamic analysis B 300 Design of LNG primary tanks ........................................ 32
under wave load.............................................................. 19 B 400 Containment systems ...................................................... 32
B 600 Model testing .................................................................. 19 B 500 Process facilities ............................................................. 33

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Offshore Standard DNV-OS-C503, October 2004
Page 4 – Contents

C. Safety Systems...................................................................... 33 A 1100 Emergency shutdown......................................................43

C 100 General ............................................................................33 A 1200 Fire protection .................................................................43
C 200 Cargo system and equipment ..........................................34 A 1300 Seismic protection...........................................................43
C 300 Instrumentation and automation......................................34 A 1400 Confinement....................................................................43
C 400 Gas detection systems .....................................................34
C 500 Emergency shutdown systems ........................................34 App. B Hazard Definitions (Guidelines) ....................... 44
Sec. 8 Construction........................................................ 35 A. Hazard Definitions................................................................44
A 100 Probabilities ranges .........................................................44
A. General.................................................................................. 35 A 200 Classes of consequence...................................................44
A 100 General ............................................................................35 A 300 Levels of risk...................................................................44
B. Specific to LNG/LPG Containment Structures .................... 35 App. C General Design Principles LNG Containment
B 100 Construction, Commissioning and Turnaround ..............35
B 200 Performance testing.........................................................35 Structures (Guidelines) ..................................................... 45
B 300 Inspection of independent steel containment tanks.........35
B 400 Inspection of membranes of membrane tanks.................36 A. General Design Principles .................................................... 45
B 500 Hydrostatic testing ..........................................................36 A 100 Design considerations .....................................................45
B 600 Pneumatic testing ............................................................36 A 200 General requirements ......................................................46
B 700 Liners and coatings .........................................................36 A 300 Fluid and gas tightness....................................................46
B 800 Cool-down.......................................................................36 A 400 Tank connections ............................................................46
B 900 Extreme design conditions ..............................................36 A 500 Thermal insulation ..........................................................46
B 1000 Painting, fire proofing and embrittlement protection......37 A 600 Operating loads ...............................................................47
A 700 General design rules........................................................47
Sec. 9 In-service Inspection, Maintenance and A 800 Liquid level .....................................................................48
Conditional Monitoring of A 900 Pressure ...........................................................................48
Support Structure and Tank.............................. 38 A 1000 Temperature ....................................................................48
A 1100 Density ............................................................................48
A. General.................................................................................. 38 A 1200 Pressure and vacuum protection .....................................48
A 100 Concrete Substructure .....................................................38 A 1300 Vacuum ...........................................................................48
A 1400 Bund wall and impounding area .....................................49
B. Special for LNG containment system................................... 38 A 1500 Safety equipment.............................................................49
B 100 General ............................................................................38 A 1600 Reliability and monitoring of structure...........................49
B 200 Gas detection...................................................................38 A 1700 Tank piping .....................................................................49
B 300 Cold detection .................................................................38
B 400 Smoke detection..............................................................39 App. D Detailed Structural Design of Containment
B 500 Fire detection...................................................................39 System (guidelines) ............................................................ 51
B 600 Meteorological instruments.............................................39
B 700 Safety control system ......................................................39 A. Detailed Structural Design ...................................................51
A 100 Introduction.....................................................................51
App. A Hazard Assessment of LNG Terminals A 200 Functional requirements..................................................51
(Guidelines) ........................................................................ 41 A 300 Permanent actions (G).....................................................52
A 400 Variable actions (Q) ........................................................52
A. Hazard Assessment............................................................... 41 A 500 Environmental loads (E) .................................................52
A 100 Hazards and operability study (HAZOP)........................41 A 600 Accidental actions (A) ....................................................53
A 200 Methodology ...................................................................41 A 700 Analysis...........................................................................54
A 300 Identification of hazards of external origin.....................41 A 800 Design criteria .................................................................54
A 400 Identification of hazards of internal origin .....................41 A 900 Earthquakes.....................................................................54
A 500 Hazards which are not specific to LNG/LPG .................41 A 1000 Action combinations for design of containment tanks....55
A 600 Hazardous area classifications ........................................42 A 1100 Specific methods to determine the actions......................55
A 700 Estimation of probabilities ..............................................42 A 1200 Structural detailing..........................................................56
A 800 Estimation of consequences ............................................42 A 1300 Liners ..............................................................................56
A 900 Safety measures on the LNG plant .................................42 A 1400 Insulation.........................................................................57
A 1000 LNG terminal layout .......................................................43 A 1500 Membrane storage vessels ..............................................57

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 Offshore Standard DNV-OS-C503, October 2004
Sec.1 – Page 5

SECTION 1
INTRODUCTION

A. General ed onto LNG carriers. An LNG export terminal generally in-

cludes:
A 100 Introduction
— an incoming natural gas metering and receiving station, in-
101 This offshore standard provides principles, technical re- cluding in the case of a two phase incoming pipeline, a
quirements and guidelines for the design, construction and in slug catcher
service inspection of LNG export/import concrete terminal — condensate stabilisation and storage
structures and containment systems. The terminal structures — gas treatment units in which any acid gases, water, heavier
may be a floating or gravity based structure. hydrocarbons and, if appropriate, mercury which might be
102 The standard covers the design of the concrete structure present in the incoming gas are extracted
supporting the LNG tanks of different storage types and iden- — liquefaction units which produce LNG and within which,
tifies different hazards of importance for the design of the con- ethane, propane, commercial butane, heavier hydrocar-
crete structure from such storage. bons and nitrogen can be extracted. A proportion of the ex-
tracted hydrocarbons can be used as refrigerant make up.
103 The standard shall be used together with the DNV stand- A liquefaction unit uses very specific equipment such as
ard DNV-OS-C502 “Offshore Concrete Structures”. cryogenic spool-wound or brazed plate-fin exchangers
104 Design of the LNG Containment system may be de- and high-powered turbo compression units. Two refriger-
signed either in accordance with the DNV Rules for Classifi- ant cycles in cascade are usually employed
cation of Ships “Pt.5 Ch.5 – Liquified Gas Carriers” or relevant — LNG storage tanks and the relevant loading plants for fill-
standards for the design of the Containment system. ing LNG carriers
Special considerations are required for the application of — generation and/or purchase and distribution of the utilities
above standards in an Offshore Terminal Structure. necessary for the plant to operate (electricity, steam, cool-
ing water, compressed air, nitrogen, fuel gas etc.)
105 Guidelines for the design of containment systems based — general off-site installations, (gas and liquid flare systems,
on traditional structures on land are given in Appendices A-D. effluent treatment, fire fighting systems etc.).
106 LNG containment structures on land are generally de-
signed using a double barrier system. Prestressed concrete can Most of the gas treating steps can be commonly found in gas
be used both as primary and secondary barrier with provision treatment plant for the production of sales gas. e.g. acid gas re-
of a gas tight barrier. This barrier may be of carbon steel if lo- moval, dehydration, hydrocarbon dew point and liquid natural
cated on the inner surface of the secondary barrier. gas (LNG) recovery.
107 A carbon steel membrane may also be required for LNG 303 LNG Import Terminals
terminals using concrete as secondary barrier in order to pro- LNG import terminals are designed to receive LNG from LNG
tect the insulation from external humidity caused by the miti- carriers, to unload, store and convert it into the gaseous phase
gation of moisture through the concrete secondary barrier. for sending it out to the gas network or gas consumers.
108 The insulation shall also be protected against all forms Thus an LNG receiving terminal provides several essential
of humidity caused by condensation of water on the cold sur- functions which are:
faces.
— unloading
109 Floating LNG import/export terminals structures should — storage
be designed with freeboard and intact stability in accordance — LNG recovery and pressurising
with DNV-OS-C301. For temporary phases the stability — vaporising
should be in accordance with DNV Rules for Planning and Ex- — gas quality adjustment.
ecution of Marine Operations.
304 Appendices A-D are appended to the standard. These
A 200 Objective appendices contain guidelines for the design of Terminals in
201 The objectives of this standard are to: accordance with approach for Land LNG Terminal Structures
in accordance with the approach used for the design of Land
— provide an international standard for the design, construc- LNG Terminal Structures modified with the environmental
tion and in-service inspection of Offshore Concrete Ter- condition of an offshore terminal.
minal Structures with an acceptable level of safety by 305 The standard is combining the design and construction
defining minimum requirements for design, construction experience from the fixed/floating offshore structures DNV-
control and in-service inspection OS-C502, DNV Rules for Classification of Ships Pt.5 Ch.5,
— serve as a contractual reference document between suppli- IMO - IGC Code “the International Code for the Construction
er and purchasers related to design, construction and in- and Equipment of Ships Carrying Liquefied Gases in Bulk”
service inspection and the experience from design and construction of land based
— serve as a guideline for designer, supplier, purchasers and storage tank for LNG as presented in EN-1473 and NFPA 59A.
regulators.
306 For the detailed design of primary steel containment
A 300 Scope and applications tanks reference is made to Rules for Classification of Ships
Part 5 Chapter 5, IGC- IMO Code, EN-1473 and NFPA 59A.
301 The standard is applicable to LNG Export and Import
Terminal Structures using concrete as the structural material in See Appendices C “General Design Principles LNG Contain-
the support structure as defined in 302 and 303 below. ment Structures” and D “Detailed Structural Design of Con-
tainment System” for Guidelines for the design of the primary
302 LNG Export Terminal Structures steel containment tanks in accordance with conventional tanks
LNG export terminals are, by nature, located near the coast and at land. The environmental impact on offshore terminals are
are designed to liquefy the natural gas which will then be load- included in these guidelines.

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Offshore Standard DNV-OS-C503, October 2004
Page 6 – Sec.1

307 On ships, the IGC-IMO type B independent tanks are the actual DNV Offshore Standard.
widely used. These tanks are designed, constructed and in-
spected in accordance with the requirements in the IGC - IMO Table B1 DNV Reference Documents
Code. The DNV Rules for Classification of Ships Part 5 Sec- Reference Title
tion 5 gives detailed requirements for the design of Independ- DNV Rules Rules for the Classification of Ships.
ent tanks Type B. Pt.5 Ch.5 “Liquified Gas Carriers”
Site specific data shall be considered in the design of Terminal DNV Rules DNV Rules for Planning and Execution of Ma-
rine Operations
Structures and Containment Systems.
DNV-OS-A101 Safety Principles and Arrangement
308 The development and design of new concepts for LNG DNV-OS-B101 Metallic Materials
terminals requires a systematic hazard identification process in DNV-OS-C401 Fabrication and Testing of Offshore Structures
order to mitigate the risk to an acceptable risk level. Hazard
identification is therefore a central tool in this standard in order
DNV-OS-E301 Position Mooring
to identify hazards and mitigate these to an acceptable risk lev-
el. Rules for Planning and Execution of Marine Op-
erations
A 400 Non DNV codes and standards DNV-RP-C201 Buckling Strength of Plated Structures
DNV-RP-C202 Buckling Strength of Shells
401 In case of conflict between the requirements of this
standard and a reference document other than DNV standard,
DNV-RP-C203 Fatigue Strength Analysis of Offshore Steel
the requirement of this standard shall prevail. Structures
Non-DNV codes or standards may be used provided the same DNV-RP-E301 Design and Installation of Fluke Anchors in
safety level as provided by this DNV standard, is obtained. Clay
402 Where reference is made to non - DNV codes, the valid DNV-RP-E302 Design and Installation of Plate Anchors in Clay
revision shall be taken as the revision which is current at the
date of issue of this standard, unless otherwise noted. Classification Buckling Strength Analysis,
Note 30.1 Sec.2 Bars and Frames
403 In addition to the requirements mentioned in this stand- Classification Foundations
ard, it is also the responsibility of the designer, owner and op- Note 30.4
erator to comply with additional requirements that may be Classification Environmental Conditions and Environmental
imposed by the flag state or the coastal state or any other juris- Note 30.5 Loads
dictions in the intended area of deployment and operation.
Classification Structural Reliability Analysis of Marine Struc-
Note 30.6 tures
A 500 Classification
Classification Fatigue Assessments of Ship Structures
501 Classification principles, procedures and application Note 30.7
class notations related to classification services of offshore
units are specified in the DNV Offshore Service Specifications
given in Table A1. Table B2 DNV Offshore Object Standards for Structural
Design
Table A1 DNV Offshore Service Specifications
Reference Title
Reference Title
DNV-OS-C101 Design of Offshore Steel Structures, General
DNV-OSS-101 Rules for Classification of Offshore Drilling and (LRFD Method)
Support Units
DNV-OS-C102 Structural Design of Offshore Ships
DNV-OSS-102 Rules for Classification of Floating Production
and Storage Units DNV-OS-C103 Structural Design of Column-stabilised Units
(LRFD method)
DNV-OSS-103 Rules for Classification of LNG/LPG Floating
Production and Storage Units or Installations DNV-OS-C104 Structural Design of Self-elevating Units (LR-
FD method)
DNV-OSS-121 Classification Based on Performance Criteria
Determined by Risk Assessment Methodology DNV-OS-C105 Structural Design of TLP (LRFD method)
DNV-OSS-309 Verification, Certification and Classification of DNV-OS-C106 Structural Design of Deep Draught Floating
Gas Export and Receiving Terminals. Units
DNV-OS-C502 Offshore Concrete Structures

B. References Table B3 Other references

Reference Title
B 100 General
IGC-IMO Code International Code for the Construction and
101 The DNV documents in Tables B1 and B2 and recog- Equipment of Ships Carrying Liquified Gases
nised codes and standards in Table B3 are referred to in this in Bulk
standard. EN 1473 Installation and Equipment for Liquified Natu-
ral Gas. Design of Onshore Installations.
102 The latest valid revision of the DNV reference docu- NFPA 59A A Standard for Production, Storage and Han-
ments in Tables B1 and B2 applies. These include acceptable dling of Liquified Natural Gas.
methods for fulfilling the requirements in this standard. See ISO 13819-1 Petroleum and natural gas industries – Offshore
also current DNV List of Publications. structures – Part 1: General requirements
103 Other recognised codes or standards may be applied pro- NORSOK N-003 Actions and Action Effects
vided it is shown that they meet or exceed the level of safety of NORSOK N-004 Design of Steel Structures

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 Offshore Standard DNV-OS-C503, October 2004
Sec.1 – Page 7

C. Definitions 214 Corrosion allowance: Extra wall thickness added during

design to compensate for any anticipated reduction in thick-
C 100 Verbal forms ness during the operation.
101 Shall: Indicates a mandatory requirement to be followed 215 Cryogenic Concrete Tank: A cryogenic concrete tank is
for fulfilment or compliance with the present standard. Devia- either a double containment tank or a full containment tank.
tions are not permitted unless formally and rigorously justified, For this type of tanks, the walls of the primary and secondary
and accepted by all relevant contracting parties. containers are both of prestressed concrete.
102 Should: Indicates a recommendation that a certain 216 Cryogenic Temperature: The temperature of the stored
course of action is preferred or particularly suitable. Alterna- LNG.
tive courses of action are allowable under the standard where 217 Deformation loads: Loads effects on the Terminal
agreed between contracting parties but shall be justified and caused by termal effects, prestressing effects, creep/shrinkage
documented. effects, differential settlements/deformations etc.
103 May: Indicates a permission, or an option, which is per- 218 Design brief: An agreed document where owners re-
mitted as part of conformance with the standard. quirements in excess of this standard should be given.
C 200 Terms 219 Design temperature: The design temperature for a unit
201 Accidental Limit States (ALS): Ensures that the structure is the reference temperature for assessing areas where the unit
resists accidental loads and maintain integrity and performance can be transported, installed and operated. The design temper-
of the structure due to local damage or flooding. ature is to be lower or equal to the lowest daily mean tempera-
ture in air for the relevant areas. For seasonal restricted
202 Accidental Loads: Rare occurrences of extreme environ- operations the lowest daily mean temperature in air for the sea-
mental loads, fire, flooding, explosions, dropped objects, col- son may be applied. The cargo temperature shall be taken into
lisions, unintended pressure differences, leakage of LNG etc. account in the determination of the structural temperature.
203 Air Gap: Free distance between the 100 year design 220 Design value: The value to be used in the deterministic
wave and the underside of a topside structure supported on col- design procedure, i.e. characteristic value modified by the re-
umn supports allowing the wave to pass under the topside sistance factor or load factor.
structure. When air gap is sufficiently large, then no wave pres-
sure is applied to the topside structure. 221 Double Containment Tanks: A double containment tank
is designed and constructed so that both the inner self-support-
204 AS-BUILT Documentation: Documentation of the off- ing primary container and the secondary container are capable
shore Terminal as finally constructed. Includes design basis/ of independently containing the refrigerated liquid stored.
design brief documents, updated designed calculations, updat-
ed construction drawings, construction records and approved 222 Driving voltage: The difference between closed circuit
deviations reports. anode potential and the protection potential.
205 Atmospheric zone: The external surfaces of the unit 223 Ductility: The property of a steel or concrete member to
above the splash zone. sustain large deformations without failure.
206 Cathodic protection: A technique to prevent corrosion 224 Ductility level Earthquake (DLE): The ductility level
of a steel surface by making the surface to be the cathode of an earthquake is defined probabilistically as an earthquake pro-
electrochemical cell. ducing ground motion with a mean recurrence as a minimum
of 10000 years.
207 Characteristic load: The reference value of a load to be
used in the determination of load effects. The characteristic 225 Environmental Loads: Loads from wind, wave, tide,
load is normally based upon a defined fractile in the upper end current, snow, ice and earthquake.
of the distribution function for load. 226 Expected loads and response history: Expected load and
208 Characteristic resistance: The reference value of struc- response history for a specified time period, taking into ac-
tural strength to be used in the determination of the design count the number of load cycles and the resulting load levels
strength. The characteristic resistance is normally based upon and response for each cycle.
a 5% fractile in the lower end of the distribution function for 227 Expected value: The most probable value of a load dur-
resistance. ing a specified time period.
209 Characteristic material strength: The nominal value of 228 Fatigue: Degradation of the material caused by cyclic
material strength to be used in the determination of the design loading.
resistance. The characteristic material strength is normally
based upon a 5% fractile in the lower end of the distribution 229 Fatigue critical: Structure with calculated fatigue life
function for material strength. near the design fatigue life.
210 Characteristic value: The representative value associat- 230 Fatigue Limit States (FLS): Related to the possibility of
ed with a prescribed probability of not being unfavourably ex- failure due to the effect of cyclic loading.
ceeded during some reference period. 231 Full Containment Tank: A tank designed and construct-
211 Classification Note: The Classification Notes cover ed so that both the primary container and the secondary con-
proven technology and solutions which is found to represent tainer are capable of independently containing the refrigerated
good practice by DNV, and which represent one alternative for liquid stored and one of them its vapour.
satisfying the requirements stipulated in the DNV Rules or oth- 232 Functional Loads: Permanent and variable loads, except
er codes and standards cited by DNV. The classification notes environmental loads, to which the structure can be exposed.
will in the same manner be applicable for fulfilling the require- 233 Hindcasting: A method using registered meteorological
ments in the DNV offshore standards. data to reproduce environmental parameters. Mostly used for
212 Coating: Metallic, inorganic or organic material applied reproducing wave parameters.
to steel surfaces for prevention of corrosion. 234 IGC-IMO Type B Independent Tank: LNG containment
213 Concrete Grade: A parameter used to define the con- tank designed, fabricated, maintained and inspected in accord-
crete strength. Concrete Grade for different characteristic val- ance with the requirements for such tanks in IGC-IMO Rules.
ues of concrete strength is provided in Sec.6, Table C1. The design is based on the principle of detection of small quan-

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Offshore Standard DNV-OS-C503, October 2004
Page 8 – Sec.1

tities of LNG prior to failure of the steel support structure. load categories dependent on the individual uncertainties in the
235 Inspection: Activities such as measuring, examination, characteristic loads.
testing, gauging one or more characteristics of an object or 249 Permanent Functional Loads: Self-weight, ballast
service and comparing the results with specified requirements weight, weight of permanent installed part of mechanical out-
to determine conformity. fitting, external hydrostatic pressure, prestressing force etc.
236 Limit State: A state beyond which the structure no long- 250 Primary Tanks: The function of the primary tank is to
er satisfies the requirements. The following categories of limit contain the refrigerated liquid (LNG) under normal operation
states are of relevance for structures: of the Terminal.
— ULS = ultimate limit states 251 Quality Plan: A plan implemented to ensure quality in
— FLS = fatigue limit states the design, construction and in-service inspection/mainte-
— ALS = accidental limit states nance. An interface manual shall be developed defining all in-
— SLS = serviceability limit states. terfaces between the various parties and disciplines involved to
ensure that the responsibilities, reporting routines and informa-
237 Limit State Design: Design of the Terminal in the limit tion routines are established.
states of ULS, SLS, FLS and ALS. 252 Recommended Practice (RP): The recommended prac-
238 LNG Containment System: The primary and secondary tice publications cover proven technology and solutions which
barrier, insulations, safety devices etc. ensuring the safe stor- have been found by DNV to represent good practice, and
age, handling and operation of the offshore LNG Terminal. which represent one alternative for satisfy the requirements
stipulated in the DNV offshore standards or other codes and
239 Load and Resistance Factor Design (LRFD): Method standards cited by DNV.
for design where uncertainties in loads are represented with a
load factor and uncertainties in resistance are represented with 253 Robustness: A robust structure is a structure with low
a material factor. sensitivity to local changes in geometry and loads.
240 Load effect: Effect of a single design load or combina- 254 Redundancy: The ability of a component or system to
tion of loads on the equipment or system, such as stress, strain, maintain or restore its function when a failure of a member or
deformation, displacement, motion, etc. connection has occurred. Redundancy may be achieved for in-
stance by strengthening or introducing alternative load paths
241 Lowest daily mean temperature: The lowest value on the
annual mean daily average temperature curve for the area in 255 Reliability: The ability of a component or a system to
question. For temporary phases or restricted operations, the perform its required function without failure during a specified
lowest daily mean temperature may be defined for specific sea- time interval.
sons. 256 Risk: The qualitative or quantitative likelihood of an ac-
Mean daily average temperature: the statistical mean average cidental or unplanned event occurring considered in conjunc-
temperature for a specific calendar day. tion with the potential consequences of such a failure. In
quantitative terms, risk is the quantified probability of a de-
Average: average during one day and night. fined failure mode times its quantified consequence.
242 Lowest waterline: Typical light ballast waterline for 257 Secondary Tanks: The secondary tanks shall contain the
ships, transit waterline or inspection waterline for other types refrigerated liquid (LNG) if there is a failure in the primary
of units. containment system. The secondary tank shall be designed ca-
243 Membrane tank: The membrane tank consists of thin pable of containing the leaked contents for an agreed period of
(barriers) of either stainless steel, GRP/aluminium foil com- time consistent with the approval scenarios for safe disposal of
posite, or “invar” that are supported through the insulation by the same.
the boundary structure of the cargo tank itself. 258 Service temperature: Service temperature is a reference
244 Object Standard: The standards listed in Table B2. temperature on various structural parts of the unit used as a cri-
terion for the selection of steel grades or design for crackwidth
245 Offshore Standard: The DNV offshore standards are etc. in SLS.
documents which presents the principles and technical require-
ments for design of offshore structures. The standards are of- 259 Serviceability Limit States (SLS): Corresponding to the
fered as DNV’s interpretation of engineering practice for criteria applicable to normal use or durability.
general use by the offshore industry for achieving safe struc- 260 Slamming: Impact load on an approximately horizontal
tures. member from a rising water surface as a wave passes. The di-
246 Offshore installation: A general term for mobile and rection of the impact load is mainly vertical. Slamming can
fixed structures, including facilities, which are intended for ex- also occur within the LNG tanks due to LNG.
ploration, drilling, production, processing or storage of hydro- 261 Specified Minimum Yield Strength (SMYS): The mini-
carbons or other related activities or fluids. The term includes mum yield strength prescribed by the specification or standard
installations intended for accommodation of personnel en- under which the material is purchased.
gaged in these activities. Offshore installation covers subsea
installations and pipelines. The term does not cover traditional 262 Specified value: Minimum or maximum value during
shuttle tankers, supply boats and other support vessels which the period considered. This value may take into account oper-
are not directly engaged in the activities described above. ational requirements, limitations and measures taken such that
the required safety level is obtained.
247 Operating conditions: Conditions wherein a unit is on
location for purposes of production, drilling or other similar 263 Splash zone: The external surfaces of the unit that are pe-
operations, and combined environmental and operational load- riodically in and out of the water. The determination of the
ings are within the appropriate design limits established for splash zone includes evaluation of all relevant effects includ-
such operations (including normal operations, survival, acci- ing influence of waves, tidal variations, settlements, subsid-
dental). ence and vertical motions.
248 Partial Load Factor: The specified characteristic per- 264 Stability: The ability of the floating structure to remain
manent, variable, deformation, environmental or accidental upright and floating when exposed to small changes in applied
loads are modified with a load factor. This load factor is part of loads.
the safety approach and varies in magnitude for the different The ability of a structural member to carry small additional

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 Offshore Standard DNV-OS-C503, October 2004
Sec.1 – Page 9

loads without buckling. DNV Det Norske Veritas

265 Strength level Earthquake (SLE): The strength level EN European Norm
earthquake is defined probabilistically as an earthquake pro- ETM Event tree method
ducing ground motion with a mean recurrence at a minimum ESD Emergency shut down
interval of 100 years.
FLS fatigue limit state
266 Submerged zone: The part of the unit which is below the FM Fracture mechanics
splash zone, including buried parts.
FMEA Failure mode effect analysis
267 Survival condition: A condition during which a unit may FTM Fault tree method
be subjected to the most severe environmental loadings for HAT highest astronomical tide
which the unit is designed. Drilling or similar operations may
have been discontinued due to the severity of the environmen- HAZOP Hazop and operability study
tal loadings. The unit may be either afloat or supported on the HISC hydrogen induced stress cracking
sea bed, as applicable. HS high strength
268 Target safety level: A nominal acceptable probability of ID Infra red detectors
structural failure. IGC international Gas Carrier
269 Temporary conditions: Design conditions not covered IMO international maritime organisation
by operating conditions, e.g. conditions during fabrication, ISO international organisation of standardisation
mating and installation phases, transit phases, accidental LAT lowest astronomic tide
270 Temporary Phases: Construction, mating, transit/tow- LNG Liquified Natural Gas
ing and installation phases. LRFD load and resistance factor design
271 Tensile strength: Minimum stress level where strain MPI magnetic particle inspection
hardening is at maximum or at rupture for steel. For concrete it MSL mean sea level
is the direct tensile strength of concrete. NACE National Association of Corrosion Engineers
272 Transit conditions: All unit movements from one geo- NDT non-destructive testing
graphical location to another. NS Norwegian Standard
273 Unit: is a general term for an offshore installation such PWHT post weld heat treatment
as ship shaped, column stabilised, self-elevating, tension leg or QRA quantitative risk analysis
deep draught floater. RP recommended practise
274 Utilisation factor: The fraction of anode material that SLS serviceability limit state
can be utilised for design purposes. For design of Terminal SLE strength level earthquake
structures, the utilisation factor also means the ratio of used
SMYS specified minimum yield stress
strength to failure strength of concrete, reinforcement or pre-
stressing steel. ULS ultimate limit state
UV Ultra violet detectors
275 Variable Functional Loads: Weight and loads caused by
the normal operation of the Terminal. Variable Functional D 200 Symbols
Loads may vary in position, magnitude and direction during
the operational period and includes modules, gas weight, 201 Latin characters
stored goods, pressure of stored components, pressures from
stored LNG, temperature of LNG, loads occurring during in- A Accidental Loads
stallation, operational boat impacts, mooring loads etc. av vertical acceleration
276 Verification: Examination to confirm that an activity, a C Concrete Grade (normal weight concrete)
product or a service is in accordance with specified require- D deformation load
ments. E environmental load
277 Ultimate Limit States (ULS): Corresponding to the max- Ecd Design value of Young’s Modulus of concrete used in the
imum load carrying resistance. stress-strain curve
Ecn Normalized value of Young’s Modulus used in the stress-
strain curve
Esd Design value of Young’s Modulus of reinforcement
D. Abbreviations and Symbols Esk Characteristic value of Young’s Modulus of reinforcement
fcd Design compressive strength of concrete
D 100 Abbreviations
fcn Normalized compressive strength of concrete
101 Abbreviations as shown in Table D1 are used in this ftd Design strength of concrete in uni-axial tension
standard.
ftn Normalized tensile strength of concrete
Table D1 Abbreviations fsd Design strength of reinforcement
Abbreviation In full fsk Characteristic strength of reinforcement
AISC American Institute of Steel Construction Fd design load
ALS accidental limit states Fk characteristic load
API American Petroleum Institute G permanent load
BS British Standard (issued by British Standard Insti- g, go acceleration due to gravity
tute) h height
CN classification note M moment
DDF deep draught floaters n number
DFF design fatigue factor P load
DLE ductility level earthquake

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Offshore Standard DNV-OS-C503, October 2004
Page 10 – Sec.1

p pressure γc material coefficient concrete

pd design pressure γf load factor
Q variable functional load γM material factor (material coefficient)
R radius γs material coefficient reinforcement
rc radius of curvature µ friction coefficient
Rd design resistance ρ density
Rk characteristic resistance σd design stress
Sd design load effect
203 Subscripts
Sk characteristic load effect
202 Greek characters d design value
k characteristic value
δ deflection p plastic
ε strain y yield.

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 Offshore Standard DNV-OS-C503, October 2004
Sec.2 – Page 11

SECTION 2
SAFETY PHILOSOPHY

A. General It should be noted that legislation in some countries requires risk

analysis to be performed, at least at an overall level to identify
A 100 Objective critical scenarios that might jeopardise the safety and reliability
of a Terminal. Other methodologies for identification of potential
101 The purpose of this section is to present the safety phi- hazards are Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (FMEA) and Haz-
losophy and corresponding design format applied in this stand- ard and Operability studies (HAZOP).
ard. ---e-n-d---of---G-u-i-d-a-n-c-e---n-o-t-e---
102 This section applies to Offshore Concrete LNG Termi-
nal Structures and Containment Systems which shall be built A 300 Safety class methodology
in accordance with this standard.
301 The Offshore Concrete Structure is classified into the
103 This section also provides guidance for extension of this safety class 3 based on failure consequences. For definition see
standard in terms of new criteria etc. Table A1.
104 The integrity of a Offshore Concrete LNG Terminal
Table A1 – Safety Classes
Structures and Containment Systems designed and constructed
in accordance with this standard is ensured through a safety Class for consequences of failure Safety Class
philosophy integrating different parts as illustrated in Figure 1. Minor seriousness 1
105 An overall safety objective shall be established, planned Serious 2
and implemented, covering all phases from conceptual devel- Very Serious 3
opment until abandonment.
A 400 Quality assurance
401 The safety format within this standard requires that
gross errors (human errors) shall be controlled by requirements
for organisation of the work, competence of persons perform-
ing the work, verification of the design, and quality assurance
Safety during all relevant phases.
Objective 402 For the purpose of this standard, it is assumed that the
owner of the Offshore Concrete LNG Terminal has established
Systematic a quality objective. The owner shall, in both internal and exter-
Review (QRA) nal quality related aspects, seek to achieve the quality level of
products and services intended in the quality objective. Fur-
ther, the owner shall provide assurance that intended quality is
Safety Class Quality being, or will be, achieved.
Methodology assurance 403 The quality system shall comply with the requirements
of ISO 9000 and specific requirements quoted for the various
engineering disciplines in this Standard.
Figure 1 404 All work performed in accordance with this standard
Safety Philosophy structure shall be subject to quality control in accordance with an imple-
mented Quality Plan. The Quality Plan should be in accord-
ance with the ISO 9000 series. There may be one Quality Plan
A 200 Systematic review covering all activities, or one overall plan with separate plans
201 As far as practical, all work associated with the design, for the various phases and activities to be performed.
construction and operation of the Offshore Concrete Terminal 405 The Quality Plan shall ensure that all responsibilities are
Structure shall be such as to ensure that no single failure will defined. An Interface Manual should be developed that defines
lead to life-threatening situations for any person, or to unac- all interfaces between the various parties and disciplines in-
ceptable damage to the Terminal or the environment. volved, and ensure that responsibilities, reporting and informa-
202 A systematic review or analysis shall be carried out for tion routines as appropriate are established.
all phases in order to identify and evaluate the consequences of A 500 Health, safety and environment
single failures and series of failures in the Offshore Concrete
Terminal, such that necessary remedial measures can be taken. 501 The objective of this standard is that the design, materi-
The extent of the review or analysis shall reflect the criticality als, fabrication, installation, commissioning, operation, repair,
of the Offshore Concrete Terminal, the criticality of a planned re-qualification, and abandonment of the Offshore Concrete
operation, and previous experience with similar systems or op- LNG Terminal Structures and Containment Systems are safe
erations. and conducted with due regard to public safety and the protec-
tion of the environment.
Guidance note:
A methodology for such a systematic review is quantitative risk A 600 Qualifications of personnel
analysis (QRA). This may provide an estimation of the overall
risk to human health and safety, environment and assets and 601 All activities that are performed in the design, construc-
comprises: tion, transportation, inspection and maintenance of offshore
structures according to this Standard shall be performed by
— hazard identification, skilled personnel with the qualifications and experience neces-
— assessment of probabilities of failure events, sary to meet the objectives of this Standard. Qualifications and
— accident developments, and relevant experience shall be documented for all key personnel
— consequence and risk assessment. and personnel performing tasks that normally require special

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Offshore Standard DNV-OS-C503, October 2004
Page 12 – Sec.2

training or certificates. 103 The following inputs are normally required in order to
develop the list of critical elements:
602 National provisions on qualifications of personnel such
as engineers, operators, welders, divers, etc. in the place of use — description of Terminal and mode(s) of operation, includ-
apply. Additional requirements may be given in the project ing details of the asset manning
specification. — equipment list and layout
— hazard identification report and associated studies
— safety case where applicable.
B. Design Format
104 The basic criteria in establishing the list of critical ele-
B 100 General ments is to determine whether the system, component or
equipment which – should they fail – have the potential to
101 The design format within this standard is based upon a cause, or contribute substantially to, a major accident. This as-
limit state and partial safety factor methodology, also called sessment is normally based upon consequence of failure only,
Load and Resistance Factor Design format (LRFD). not on the likelihood of failure.
The design principles are specified in Sec.2 of DNV-OS-C101. 105 The following methodology should be applied for con-
firming that prevention, detection, control or mitigation meas-
The design principle is based on LRFD, but design may addi- ures have been correctly identified as critical elements:
tionally be carried out by both testing and probability based de-
sign. — identify the major contributors to overall risk,
The aim of the design of the Terminal and its elements are to: — identify the means to reduce risk,
— link the measures, the contributors to risk and the means to
— sustain loads liable to occur during all temporary operating reduce risk to the assets’ systems – these can be seen to
and damaged conditions if required equate to the critical elements of the asset.
— maintain acceptable safety for personnel and environment
— have adequate durability against deterioration during the 106 The record of critical elements typically provides only a
design life of the Terminal. list of systems and types of equipment or structure etc. In order
to complete a meaningful list, the scope of each element should
102 The design of a structural system, its components and be clearly specified such that there can be no reasonable doubt
details shall, as far as possible, account for the following prin- as to the precise content of each element.
ciples: 107 The above processes should consider all phases of the li-
fecycle of the Terminal.
— resistance against relevant mechanical, physical and
chemical deterioration is achieved 108 The hazard assessment shall consider, as a minimum the
— fabrication and construction comply with relevant, recog- following events:
nised techniques and practice
— damage to the primary structure due to:
— inspection, maintenance and repair are possible.
— extreme weather
103 Structures and elements thereof, shall possess ductile re-
— ship collision
sistance unless the specified purpose requires otherwise.
— dropped objects
104 Requirements to materials are given in Sec.4, design of — helicopter collision
LNG Containment systems in Sec.5, loads and methods of — exposure to unsuitable cold/warm temperature
analyses Sec.6, detailed design of the Terminal Structure in
— exposure to high radiation heat.
Sec.7, Construction in Sec.8 and in-service inspection, mainte-
nance and conditioned monitoring in Sec.9. — earthquake.

— fire and explosion

— loss of primary liquid containment (duration shall be de-
C. Identification of Major Accidental Hazards termined based on an approved contingency plan)
— LNG leakage
C 100 General — release of flammable or toxic gas to the atmosphere or in-
side an enclosed space
101 The Standard identified common accidental hazards for
an Offshore Concrete LNG Terminal Structures and Contain- — roll over (thermodynamic instability due to LNG stratifi-
ment Systems. The designer shall ensure itself of its complete- cation)
ness by documenting through a hazard identification and risk — loss of stability
assessment process that all hazards which may be critical to the — loss of any single component in the station keeping/moor-
safe operation of the Offshore Concrete LNG Terminal have ing system
been adequately accounted for in design. This process shall be — loss of ability to offload LNG or discharge gas ashore
documented. — loss of any critical component in the process system
102 Criteria for the identification of major accident hazards — loss of electrical power.
shall be:
More details of hazards related to LNG storage are provided as
— significant damage to the asset guidelines in Appendix A “Hazard Assessment of LNG Termi-
nals”.
— significant damage to the environment.
109 The results of the Hazard Identification and Risk As-
There should be a clear and documented link between major sessment shall become an integrate part of the structural design
accident hazards and the critical elements. of the Offshore Concrete Structure.

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 Offshore Standard DNV-OS-C503, October 2004
Sec.3 – Page 13

SECTION 3
DESIGN DOCUMENTATION

A. Overall Planning An earthquake is defined by the horizontal and vertical accel-

erations of the ground. These accelerations are described by
A 100 General their:
101 A fixed/floating concrete offshore LNG Terminal Struc- — frequency spectrum
tures and Containment Systems shall be planned in such a
manner that it can meet all requirements related to its functions — amplitude.
and use as well as its structural safety and durability require- A site specific earthquake analysis shall be performed. This
ments. Adequate planning shall be done before actual design is analysis shall be reported in a Seismic Report where geological
started in order to have sufficient basis for the engineering and and seismic characteristics of the location of the gravity based
by that obtain a safe, workable and economical structure that facilities and the surrounding region as well as geotectonic in-
will fulfil the required functions. formation from the location have to be taken into account. As
102 The initial planning shall include determination and de- a conclusion this report shall recommend all seismic parame-
scription of all the functions the structure shall fulfil, and all ters required for the design.
the criteria upon which the design of the structure are based. The potential of earthquake activity in the vicinity of the pro-
Site-specific data such as water depth, environmental condi- posed site is determined by investigating the seismic history of
tions and soil properties shall be sufficiently known and docu- the region (320 km radius) surrounding the site, and relating it
mented to serve as basis for the design. All functional and to the geological and tectonic conditions resulting from the soil
operational requirements in temporary and service phases as survey.
well as robustness against accidental conditions that can influ-
ence the layout and the structural design shall be considered. These investigations involve thorough research, review and
evaluation of all historically reported earthquakes that have af-
103 All functional requirements to the Terminal affecting the fected, or that could reasonably be expected to have affected
layout and the structural design, shall be established in a clear
format such that it can form the basis for the engineering proc- the site.
ess and the structural design. The geological, tectonic and seismological studies help to es-
104 Investigation of site-specific data such as seabed topog- tablish:
raphy, soil conditions and environmental conditions shall be — strength level earthquake (SLE)
carried out in accordance with requirements of DNV-OS- — ductility level earthquake (DLE).
C101, ISO 19901-1 and ISO 19901-4.
Guidance note:
A 200 Description of offshore concrete LNG terminal
SLE and DLE shall be established as either:
201 The objective is to provide an overview of the LNG Ter-
minal, highlighting key assumptions and operational phases of — probabilistically, as those that produce ground motions with
the development. the mean recurrence as a minimum interval of 10 000 years
for the DLE and 100 years for the SLE, and/or
202 The overview should be presented in three sections: — deterministically, assuming that earthquakes which are
analogous to maximum historically known earthquakes are
— overview of LNG Terminal liable to occur in future with an epicentre position which is
— development bases and phases the most severe with regard to its effects in terms of intensity
— staffing philosophy and arrangements. on the site, while remaining compatible with geological and
seismic data. In this case, the SLE accelerations shall be
Cross-references to data sources, figures etc. should be provid- one-half those determined for the DLE.
ed.
---e-n-d---of---G-u-i-d-a-n-c-e---n-o-t-e---
A 300 Meteorological and ocean conditions
301 The objective is to summarise key design parameters A 400 LNG terminal layout
with cross-references to key technical documents.
401 The objective is to provide a description of the LNG Ter-
302 The metocean/climatology conditions section should minal, its unique features (if any), equipment layout for all
cover at least the following: decks, and interaction with existing offshore/onshore facilities.
— storm/wave/current conditions 402 This section should include a description of at least the
— wind following (where applicable):
— seawater/air temperature
— earthquakes — general:
— cyclones
— other extreme conditions — terminal
— seabed stability — geographical location
— tsunami — water depth.
— atmospheric stability
— range and rates of changes of barometer pressure — layout:
— rainfall, snow
— terminal orientation
— corrosive characteristics of the air
— frequency of lightening strikes — elevation/plan views
— relative humidity. — equipment
— escape routes
303 Seismology for Gravity Based LNG Terminal in Seis- — access to sea deck
mic Active Zones: — emergency assembly area etc.

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Offshore Standard DNV-OS-C503, October 2004
Page 14 – Sec.3

— structural details, including modelling of structure and A 600 Standards

loadings.
601 A design brief document shall include references to
— interaction with existing facilities: Standards and design specifications.

— physical connections A 700 Documentation

— support from existing facilities. 701 Documentation shall be prepared for all activities that
are to be performed in the design, construction, transportation
— interaction with expected facilities (where applicable). and installation of offshore concrete LNG Terminal Structures
A 500 Primary functions and Containment Systems. Documentation shall also be pre-
pared showing records of all inspection and control of materi-
501 To provide a description of the functions of the Terminal als used and execution work performed that has an impact on
by describing key processes; LNG Containment system; pipe- the quality of the final product. The documentation shall be to
line systems; and marine and helicopter operations. a standard suitable for independent verification.
For design of the LNG Terminal structure, this information is 702 Necessary procedures and manuals shall be prepared to
required as background information essential for identification ensure that the construction, transportation, installation and in-
of structural hazards of importance for the design of the struc- service inspection are performed in a controlled manner in full
tural load bearing structure of the terminal. compliance with all assumptions of the design.
502 The primary functions section should include a descrip- 703 The most important assumptions, on which the design,
tion of at least the following (where applicable): construction and installation work is based with regard to the
Process systems: Offshore Concrete LNG Terminal Structures and Containment
Systems, shall be presented in a Summary Report. The Sum-
— process description (overview) mary Report shall be available and suitable for use in connec-
— process control features tion with operation, maintenance, alterations and possible
— safety control systems for use during emergencies e.g. repair work. The summary report will normally be based on the
controls at the TR or emergency assembly area. documentation identified in A800 and A900.
LNG Containment System A 800 Documentations required prior to construction
— primary barrier system 801 The technical documentation of concrete LNG Terminal
— secondary barrier system Structures and Containment Systems, available prior to con-
— insulation systems struction, shall comprise:
— piping
— layout — design calculations for the complete structure including
— electrical individual members
— monitoring. — project specification and procedures
— drawings issued for construction and approved by design
Pipeline and riser systems: manager.
— location, separation, protection 802 All technical documentation shall be dated, signed and
— riser connect/disconnect system. verified.
Utility systems: 803 The Project Specification shall comprise:
— power generation and distribution — construction drawings, giving all necessary information
— communications such as geometry of the structure, amount and position of
— other utility systems (e.g. instrument air, hydraulics, reinforcing and prestressing steel and for precast concrete
cranes). elements, tolerances, lifting devices, weights, inserts, etc.
— description of all products to be used with any require-
Inert gas systems ments to the application of the materials. This information
should be given on the drawings and/or in the work de-
— safety features (e.g. blow-out prevention systems) scription. Material specifications, product standards, etc.,
— integration with platform systems shall be included
Workover and wireline systems: — work description (procedures) related to the construction
activity.
— extent and type of activity planned
— integration with platform systems. 804 The work description should also include all require-
ments to execution of the work, i.e. sequence of operation, in-
Marine functions/systems: stallation instructions for embedment plates, temporary
supports, work procedures, etc.
— supply
— standby vessels 805 The work description shall include an erection specifica-
— diving tion for precast concrete elements comprising:
— ballast and stability systems — installation drawings consisting of plans and sections
— mooring systems showing the positions and the connections of the elements
— LNG offloading system in the completed work
— LNG vessel mooring system. — installation data with the required materials properties for
Helicopter operations: materials applied at site
— installation instructions with necessary data for the han-
— onshore base dling, storing, setting, adjusting, connection and comple-
— capability of aircraft tion works with required geometrical tolerances.
— helicopter approach. — quality control procedures.

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 Offshore Standard DNV-OS-C503, October 2004
Sec.3 – Page 15

A 900 AS-BUILT Documentation — a description of accepted changes to the project specifica-

901 The As-Built documentation shall comprise: tion
— records of possible dimensional checks at handover
— quality records — a diary or log where the events of the construction process
— method statements
— sources of materials, material test certificates and/or sup- are reported
pliers' attestation of conformity, Mill Certificate, approval — documentation of the inspection performed.
documents — geotechnical design report (GDR).
— applications for concessions and responses
— as-built drawings or sufficient information to allow for A 1000 Inspection/monitoring plans for structure in serv-
preparation of as-built drawings for the entire structure in- ice
cluding any precast elements
— a description of non-conformities and the results of possi- 1001 Plans for monitoring and inspection of the installation
ble corrective actions shall be prepared.

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Offshore Standard DNV-OS-C503, October 2004
Page 16 – Sec.4

SECTION 4
STRUCTURAL MATERIALS

A. General DNV.OS-B101 apply.

602 Concrete and grout material exposed to cryogenic tem-
A 100 Concrete and Concrete Constituents perature are considered applicable for cryogenic exposure un-
101 Shall be in accordance with DNV-OS-C502 Sec.4 A, B der normal conditions. The repair shall be design for the actual
and C. temperature exposure expected in the remaining lifetime in ac-
cordance with this standard.
A 200 Grout and Mortar
603 For repair of ductile joints in earthquake active areas, the
201 Shall be in accordance with DNV-OS-C502 Sec.4 E. repaired concrete shall be reinforced with sufficient confining
A 300 Reinforcement reinforcement to remain ductile.
301 Shall be in accordance with DNV-OS-C502 Sec.4 F. A 700 LNG Primary Containment Tank
302 Reinforcement exposed to cryogenic temperature shall 701 The material in the primary containment tank shall be
additionally possess ductile properties for the temperature of made of material remaining ductile under cryogenic tempera-
design exposure. ture. Reference is made to DNV-OS-B101 and/or alternative-
ly, the material shall comply with the requirements in the
A 400 Prestressing Steel and anchorage standard used for the design of the primary Containment Tank,
401 Shall be in accordance with DNV-OS-C502 Sec.4 G. i.e. Either DNV Rules for the Classification of Ships (LNG
402 Prestressing steel and steel anchorages shall have ductile Vessels), IGC-IMO Code, EN1473 or NFPA-59A. Special
properties under the design temperatures of the concrete tank. considerations shall be made to account for cyclic loads when
applicable.
A 500 Embedded Steel
A 800 Insulation
501 Embedded steel shall behave ductile for the applicable
loads. The material shall be in accordance with the require- 801 The insulation used in LNG containment structures shall
ments of DNV-OS-B101. be made of material remaining its functions under repeated cy-
cles of temperature cycles down to cryogenic temperature and
A 600 Repair Material also provide required insulation effect under the applied loads.
601 Repair material exposed to LNG shall have ductile prop- 802 Material complying with the requirements in IGC-IMO
erties under the design temperatures of the concrete tank. For Code, EN1473 or NFPA-59A can be used. See also Appendix
repair using steel as structural material, the provisions of C for further Guidelines.

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 Offshore Standard DNV-OS-C503, October 2004
Sec.5 – Page 17

SECTION 5
LOADS AND ANALYSES REQUIREMENTS

A. Requirements to Design of Concrete Support adequate safety against damage to the structure or pollution to
Structure the environment.

A 100 General A 200 Structural requirements

101 The engineering/design of a fixed/floating offshore con- 201 Structures and structural members shall perform satis-
crete LNG Terminal Structures and Containment Systems factorily during all design conditions, with respect to structural
shall be carried out in such a way that all functional and oper- strength, mooring, stability, ductility, durability, displace-
ational requirements relating to the safety of the installation ments, settlements and vibrations. The structure and its layout
and its operation are met, as well as those requirements relating shall be such that it serves as a safe and functional base for all
to its functions as an offshore facility. mechanical installations that are needed for the facility to op-
erate. Adequate performance shall be demonstrated in design
102 The functional requirements will affect the layout of the documentation.
Terminal including the loading scenarios that will have to be
considered in the design of the Terminal. The functional re- Structural Concept Requirements
quirements will be related to both the site-specific conditions 202 The structural concept, details and components shall be
as well as the requirements related to the use of Terminal for such that the structure:
Import and Export of LNG.
a) has adequate robustness with small sensitivity to local
103 The design life of the Terminal structure shall be 100 damage
years if not otherwise govern by local legislation.
b) can be constructed in a controlled manner
Site related Functional Requirements
c) provides simple stress paths that limit stress concentra-
104 The Terminal shall be positioned and oriented on site tions
such that it takes account of other Terminals, governing wind
directions, accessibility of ships and helicopters and safety in d) is resistant to corrosion and other degradation
case of fire or leakages of hydrocarbons. e) is suitable for condition monitoring, maintenance and re-
Environmental Considerations pair
105 There shall be a site-specific evaluation of all types of f) remains stable in a damaged condition
environmental conditions that can affect the layout and design g) fulfils requirements for removal if required.
of the structure, including rare events with a low probability of
occurrence. Materials Requirements
106 If relevant, the deck elevation shall be determined in or- 203 The materials selected for the Terminal shall be suitable
der to give an adequate air gap, based on site-specific data, al- for the purpose and in accordance with Sec.4. The material
lowing the passage of extreme wave crests under the deck, properties and verification that these materials fulfil the re-
higher than the design wave crest and taking due account of quirements shall be documented.
possible interacting ice or icebergs. Interaction with deck sup- 204 The materials, all structural components and the struc-
ports and underwater caisson effects shall be considered. For ture itself shall be ensured to maintain the specified quality
barge type structures, the deck elevation is governed by the during all stages of construction. The requirement to quality
freeboard, stability calculations and wave pressure on the deck assurance is given in Sec.2.
structure.
Execution Requirements
107 The water depth used in establishing layout and in the
design shall be based on site-specific data taking due account 205 Requirements to execution, testing and inspection of the
of potential settlements, subsidence, etc. various parts of the structure shall be specified on the basis of
the significance (risk level) of the various parts with regard to
Facility Operational Requirements the overall safety of the completed and installed LNG Termi-
108 The functional requirements of the Terminal shall be nal Structures and Containment Systems as well as the Termi-
considered related to the production/operational system are nal in temporary conditions. See Sections 4, 8 and 9.
such as: Temporary Phases Requirements
a) layout. 206 The structure shall be designed for all stages with the
b) storage volume, compartmentation, densities, tempera- same intended reliability as for the final condition unless oth-
tures, etc. in case of stored products erwise agreed. This applies also for moorings or anchorage
systems applied for stages of construction afloat. Reference is
c) safeguards against spillage and contamination made to DNV Rules for the Planning and Execution of Marine
d) access requirements both internal and external, both for Operations.
operation, inspection and condition monitoring, etc. 207 For floating structures and all floating stages of the ma-
e) interface to topsides/plant rine operations and construction afloat of fixed installations,
sufficient positive stability and reserve buoyancy shall be en-
f) installations for LNG vessels and other vessels servicing sured. Both intact and damaged stability should be evaluated
the Terminal. on the basis of an accurate geometric model. Adequate free-
109 All hazard scenarios that can be associated with the op- board shall be provided. One compartment damage stability
erations/maloperations and the functions of the Terminal shall should normally be provided except for short transient phases.
be established and evaluated, such as fire, explosions, loss of Intact and damaged stability, watertight Integrity, freeboard
intended pressure differentials, flooding, leakages, rupture of and weathertight closure appliances shall be in accordance
pipe systems, dropped objects, ship impacts, etc. The Terminal with DNV-OS-C301.
shall be designed to give adequate safety to personnel and an Stability and freeboard under temporary conditions (construc-

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Offshore Standard DNV-OS-C503, October 2004
Page 18 – Sec.5

tion afloat and towing) shall meet the requirements in DNV ture, relevant environmental and soil conditions, and the limit
Rules for the Planning and Execution of Marine Operations. state under examination.
208 Weight control required for floating structures and tem- 104 Simplified methods to compute load effects may be ap-
porary phases of fixed installations should be performed by plied if it can be verified that they produce results on the safe
means of well-defined, documented, robust and proven weight side.
control. The system output should be up to-date weight reports 105 If dynamic or non-linear effects are of significance as a
providing all necessary data for all operations. consequence of a load or a load effect, such dynamic or non-
A 300 Design principles linear effects shall be considered.
General 106 Load effects from hydrodynamic and aerodynamic loads
shall be determined by methods which accounts for the kine-
301 The design shall be performed according to the limit matics of the liquid or air, the hydrodynamic load, and the in-
state design as detailed in DNV-OS-C101 and DNV-OS-C502. teraction between liquid, structure and soil. For calculation of
The design shall provide adequate strength and tightness in all global load effects from wind, simplified models may normal-
design situations such that the assumptions made are complied ly suffice.
with:
107 Seismic load effect analyses shall be based on character-
— the design of concrete structures shall be in accordance to istic values described by an applicable seismic response spec-
this Standard trum or a set of carefully selected real or artificially simulated
— the foundation design shall be in accordance DNV-OS- earthquake time histories. A combination of these methods
C101 Sec.11 may be used if such combination will produce a more correct
— the design of steel structures (supports for independent result. The analysis shall account for the effects of seismic
tanks, deck support structure etc.) shall be in accordance to waves propagation through the soil, and the interaction be-
DNV-OS-C101 tween soil and structure.
— the possible interface between any steel structure and the Terminals located in seismically active area shall be designed
support concrete structure shall be included in the design to possess adequate strength and stiffness to withstand the ef-
— the design for load and load effects shall be in accordance fect of strength level earthquake (SLE) as well as sufficient
with DNV-OS-C101 Sec.3. See also special requirements ductility to remain stable during the rare motions of greater se-
to concrete structures in this Section verity associated with ductility level earthquake (DLE). The
— the design for accidental limit states shall be in accordance sufficiency of the structural strength and ductility is to be dem-
with DNV-OS-C101 Sec.7. See also identifications of onstrated by strength and, as required, ductility analyses. See
hazards in Sec.2 Sec.3 A303 for definition of SLE and DLE.
— the Cathodic Protection shall be designed in accordance 108 The soil-structure interaction shall be assessed in the de-
with DNV-OS-C101 Sec.10 termination of the soil reactions used in the calculation of load
— stability of the structure afloat shall be calculated in ac- effects in the structure. Parameters shall be varied with upper
cordance with DNV-OS-C301. and lower bound values to ensure that all realistic patterns of
— this standard is primary addressing containment systems distribution are enveloped, considering long and short term ef-
and Terminals built in concrete. In cases where the load fects, unevenness of the seabed, degrees of elasticity and plas-
carrying support Terminal is constructed in steel, the de- ticity in the soil and, if relevant, in the structure. See DNV-OS-
sign of structural members shall be designed in accordance C101 Sec.11.
with DNV-OS-C101 and the relevant object standard
DNV-OS-C102 to C106. Structural steel shall meet the re- B 200 Environmental loads
quirements in DNV-OS-A105.
201 Wind, wave, tide and current are important sources of
environmental loads (E) on many structures located offshore.
In addition, depending on location, seismic or ice loads or both
B. Load and Load Effects can be significant environmental loads.
202 General procedures for the estimation of seismic actions
B 100 General are provided in DNV–OS-C101 Sec.3. For DLE, non-linear re-
101 The load and load effects shall be in accordance with sponse analyses may be required. See DNV-OS-C502 for more
DNV-OS-C502 Sec.4. The loads are generally classified as: details.
203 The computation of ice loads is highly specialized and
a) environmental, E location dependent and is not covered in detailed by this Stand-
b) functional ard. Ice loads shall be computed by skilled personnel with ap-
propriate knowledge in the physical ice environment in the
— permanent, G location under consideration and with appropriate experience
— variable, Q in developing loads based on this environment and the load re-
— imposed deformation, D turn periods in accordance with DNV-OS-C101 Sec.3.
— accidental, A.
B 300 Extreme wave loads
102 The loads shall include the corresponding external reac- 301 Wave loads from extreme conditions shall be deter-
tion. The level of the characteristic loads shall be chosen ac- mined by means of an appropriate analysis procedure supple-
cording to the condition under investigation: mented, if required, by a model test program. Global loads on
— under temporary conditions (construction, towing and in- the structure shall be determined. In addition, local loads on
stallation) various appurtenances, attachments and components shall be
— during operation determined. For more details see DNV-OS-C502 Appendix A.
— when subject to accidental effects B 400 Diffraction analysis
— in a damaged condition.
401 Global loads on large volume bodies shall generally be
103 The load effects shall be determined by means of recog- estimated by applying a validated diffraction analysis proce-
nized methods that take into account the variation of the load dure. In addition, local kinematics, required in the design of
in time and space, the configuration and stiffness of the struc- various appurtenances, shall be evaluated including incident,

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 Offshore Standard DNV-OS-C503, October 2004
Sec.5 – Page 19

diffraction and (if appropriate) radiation effects. For more de- 903 Variable Functional Loads (Q) originate from normal
tails, see DNV-OS-C502, Appendix A. operations of the structure and vary in position, magnitude, and
direction during the period considered. They include loads
B 500 Additional requirements for dynamic analysis from:
under wave load
501 In cases where the structure can respond dynamically, — personnel
such as in the permanent configuration (fixed or floating), dur- — modules, parts of mechanical outfitting and structural
ing wave load or earthquakes or in temporary floating condi- parts planned to be removed during the operation phase
tions, additional parameters associated with the motions of the — weight of gas and liquid in pipes and process plants
structure shall be determined. Typically, these additional ef- — stored goods, tanks, etc.
fects shall be captured in terms of inertia and damping terms in — weight and pressure in storage compartments and ballast-
the dynamic analysis. ing systems
— temperatures in storages, etc. (may also be considered as
502 Ringing can control the extreme dynamic response of deformation loads)
particular types of concrete gravity structure. A ringing re- — loads occurring during installation and drilling operations,
sponse resembles that generated by an impulse excitation of a etc.
linear oscillator: it features a rapid build up and slow decay of — ordinary boat impact, rendering and mooring.
energy at the resonant period of the structure. If it is important,
ringing is excited by non-linear (second, third and higher or- 904 The assumptions that are made concerning variable
der) processes in the wave loading that are only a small part of loads shall be reflected in a Summary Report and shall be com-
the total applied environmental load on a structure. plied with in the operations. Possible deviations shall be eval-
503 The effects of motions in the permanent configuration uated and, if appropriate, shall be considered in the assessment
such as those occurring in an earthquake, floating structures or of accidental loads.
in temporary phases of fixed installations during construction, 905 Certain loads, which can be classified as either perma-
tow or installation, on internal fluids such as ballast water in nent or variable, may be treated as imposed deformations (D).
tanks, shall be evaluated. Such sloshing in tanks generally af- Load effects caused by imposed deformations shall be treated
fects the pressures, particularly near the free surface of the flu- in the same way as load effects from other normal loads or by
id. demonstration of strain compatibility and equilibrium between
applied loads, deformations, and internal forces.
B 600 Model testing
906 Potential imposed deformations are derived from sourc-
601 The necessity of model tests to determine extreme wave es that include:
loads shall be determined on a case-by-case basis. See DNV-
OS-C502 Appendix A for more details. — thermal effects
— prestressing effects
B 700 Current load — creep and shrinkage effects
701 Currents through the depth, including directionality, — differential settlement of foundation components.
shall be combined with the design wave conditions. The Char- See also D201.
acteristic current load shall be determined in accordance with
DNV-OS-C101 Sec.3. For more details, see DNV-OS-C502 B 1000 Accidental loads
Appendix A.
1001 The Accidental Loads (A) are generally defined in
702 If found necessary scour protection should be provided DNV-OS-C101 Sec.3, G Accidental Loads. See also Sec.2 and
around the base of the structure. See DNV-OS-C101 Sec.11. Appendix D of this standard. The hazards identified in the haz-
ard identification process described in Sec.2, shall be mitigat-
B 800 Wind loads ed/accounted for in the design.
801 Wind loads may be determined in accordance with 1002 Accidental loads can occur from extreme environmen-
DNV-OS-C101 Sec.3 E700. tal conditions, malfunction, mal operation or accident. The ac-
802 Wind forces on a Offshore Concrete Terminal (OCT) cidental loads to be considered in the design shall be based on
will consist of two parts: an evaluation of the operational conditions for the structure,
due account taken to factors such as personnel qualifications,
— wind forces on topside structure operational procedures, installations and equipment, safety
— wind forces on concrete structure above sea level. systems and control procedures.
For more details, see Appendix A. 1003 Primary sources of accidental loads include:

B 900 Functional loads — rare occurrences of extreme environmental loads

— fires
901 Functional loads are considered to be all loads except — flooding
environmental loads, and include both permanent and variable — explosions
loads. The functional loads are defined in DNV-OS-C101 — dropped objects
Sec.3, C “Permanent Loads” and D “Variable Functional — collisions
Loads”. — unintended pressure difference changes.
902 Permanent loads (G) are loads that do not vary in mag- — leakage of LNG through primary barrier or couplings etc.
nitude, position or direction during the time period considered.
These include: 1004 Rare occurrences of extreme environmental loads
This will include extreme environmental loads such as the ex-
— self weight of the structure treme seismic action, DLE, and all other extreme environmen-
— weight of permanent ballast tal loads when relevant.
— weight of permanently installed parts of mechanical outfit-
ting, including risers, etc. 1005 Fires
— external hydrostatic pressure up to the mean water level The principal fire and explosion events are associated with hy-
— prestressing force (may also be considered as deformation drocarbon leakage from flanges, valves, equipment seals, noz-
loads). zles, etc.

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Offshore Standard DNV-OS-C503, October 2004
Page 20 – Sec.5

The following types of fire scenarios (relevant for LNG Termi- assumption of uncontrolled operation of the ship. See Sec.2.
nals) should among others be considered: In the early phases of Terminal design, the mass of supply
— fire related to loading/unloading or process equipment, or ships should normally not be selected less than 5000 tons and
storage tanks; including jet fire and fire ball scenarios the speed not less than 0.5 m/s and 2 m/s for ULS and ALS de-
— burning oil/gas on sea sign checks, respectively. A hydrodynamic (added) mass of
— fire in equipment or electrical installations 40% for sideways and 10% for bow and stern impact can be as-
— pool fires on deck or sea sumed.
— fire jets. The most probable impact locations and impact geometry
should be established based on the dimensions and geometry
The fire load intensity may be described in terms of thermal of the Terminal and vessel and should account for tidal chang-
flux as a function of time and space or, simply, a standardized es, operational sea-state and motions of the vessel and Termi-
temperature-time curve for different locations. nal which has free modes of behaviour. Unless more detailed
The fire thermal flux may be calculated on the basis of the type investigations are done for the relevant vessel and Terminal,
of hydrocarbons, release rate, combustion, time and location of the impact zone for supply vessel on a fixed Offshore Concrete
ignition, ventilation and structural geometry, using simplified LNG Terminal should be considered to be between 10 m below
conservative semi-empirical formulae or analytical/numerical LAT and 13 m above HAT.
models of the combustion process. Special considerations shall be made with respect to impact en-
1006 Explosions ergy and impact zone for LNG Vessels serving the LNG Ter-
minal.
The following types of explosions should be considered:
1008 Dropped objects
— ignited gas clouds Loads due to dropped objects should for instance include the
— explosions in enclosed spaces, including machinery spac- following types of incidents:
es and other equipment rooms as well as oil/gas storage
tanks. — dropped cargo from lifting gear
— failing lifting gear
The overpressure load due to expanding combustion products — unintentionally swinging objects
may be described by the pressure variation in time and space. — loss of valves designed to prevent blow-out or loss of other
It is important to ensure that the rate of rise, peak overpressure drilling equipment.
and area under the curve are adequately represented. The spa-
tial correlation over the relevant area that affects the load ef- The impact energy from the lifting gear can be determined
fect, should also be accounted for. Equivalent constant based on lifting capacity and lifting height, and on the expected
pressure distributions over panels could be established based weight distribution in the objects being lifted.
on more accurate methods.
Unless more accurate calculations are carried out, the load
The damage due to explosion should be determined with due from dropped objects may be based on the safe working load
account of the dynamic character of the load effects. Simple, for the lifting equipment. This load should be assumed to be
conservative single degree of freedom models may be applied. failing from lifting gear from highest specified height and at
When necessary non-linear time domain analyses based on nu- the most unfavourable place. Sideways movements of the
merical methods like the finite element method should be ap- dropped object due to possible motion of the structure and the
plied. crane hook should be considered.
Fire and explosion events that result from the same scenario of The trajectories and velocity of objects dropped in water
released combustibles and ignition should be assumed to occur should be determined on the basis of the initial velocity, impact
at the same time, i.e. to be fully dependent. The fire and blast angle with water, possible reduction in energy as the object hit
analyses should be performed by taking into account the ef- the water surface, possible current velocity effects and effects
fects of one on the other. of hydrodynamic resistance
The damage done to the fire protection by an explosion preced- The impact effect of long objects such as pipes should be sub-
ing the fire should be considered. ject to special consideration.
1007 Collisions 1009 Unintended pressure difference changes
The impact loads are characterised by kinetic energy, impact Changes in intended pressure differences or buoyancy caused
geometry and the relationship between load and indentation. for instance by defects in or wrong use of separation walls,
Impact loads may be caused by: valves, pumps or pipes connecting separate compartments as
well as safety equipment to control or monitor pressure, shall
— vessels in service to and from the installation including be considered.
supply vessels
— LNG vessels serving the terminal Unintended distribution of ballast due to operational or techni-
— ships and fishing vessels passing the installation cal faults should also be considered.
— floating installations, such as flotels 1010 Floating structure in damaged condition
— aircraft on service to and from the field
— dropped or sliding objects Floating structures, which experience buoyancy loss, will have
— fishing gear an abnormal floating position. The corresponding abnormal
— icebergs or ice. variable and environmental loads should be considered.
Adequate global structural strength should be documented for
The collision energy can be determined on the basis of relevant abnormal floating conditions considered in the damage stabil-
masses, velocities and directions of ships or aircraft that may ity check, as well as tightness or ability to handle potential
collide with installation. When considering the installation, all leakages in the tilted condition.
traffic in the relevant area should be mapped and possible fu-
ture changes in vessel operational pattern should be accounted 1011 Combination of accidental loads
for. Design values for collisions are determined based on an When accidental loads occur simultaneously, the probability
overall evaluation of possible events. The velocity can be de- level (10-4) applies to the combination of these loads. Unless
termined based on the assumption of a drifting ship, or on the the accidental loads are caused by the same phenomenon (like

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 Offshore Standard DNV-OS-C503, October 2004
Sec.5 – Page 21

hydrocarbon gas fires and explosions), the occurrence of dif- mations. Due account shall be taken of the time dependent ef-
ferent accidental loads can be assumed to be statistical inde- fects in calculation of effective characteristic forces. The more
pendent. However, due attention shall be taken to the result of conservative value of 0.9 and 1.1 shall be used as a load factor
any quantitative risk assessment. in the design.
Guidance note: 106 The definition of limit state categories is valid for foun-
While in principle, the combination of two different accidental dation design with the exception that failure due to cyclic load-
loads with exceedance probability of 10-2 or one at 10-3 and the ing is treated as an ULS limit state, alternatively as an ALS
other at a 10-1 level, correspond to a 10-4 event, individual acci- limit state, using load and material coefficients as defined for
dental loads at a probability level of 10-4, commonly will be most these limit state categories.
critical. See Appendix D for guidance related to combining the
loads in design of the containment structure. The load coefficients are in this case to be applied to all cyclic
loads in the design history. Lower load coefficients may be ac-
---e-n-d---of---G-u-i-d-a-n-c-e---n-o-t-e---
cepted if the total safety level can be demonstrated to be within
1012 Accidental leakage of LNG through the primary barrier acceptable limits.
shall be considered in design. In the case of a concrete second- 107 Where a load is a result of high counteracting and inde-
ary Barrier, the potential local change in temperature shall be pendent hydrostatic pressures, the pressure difference shall be
considered in the design of the tightness control under this con- multiplied by the load factor. The pressure difference shall be
dition. For a containment structure supported by a steel support taken as no less than the smaller of either one tenth of the high-
structure, the leakage has to be small and controlled, or the sec- est pressure or 100 kPa. This does not apply when the pressure
ondary barrier is placed within the secondary barrier or the is balanced by direct flow communication. The possibility of
main structure is built using steel with cryogenic properties as communication channel being blocked shall then be part of the
may be required. risk assessment.
108 For LNG containment tanks, the Load factor for LNG
loads (Q, pressure from LNG containment on primary barrier
and secondary barrier) shall be taken as 1.6. The loads from the
C. Load Combinations and Partial Safety LNG Containment tanks shall be combined with other loads in
Factors the most unfavourable way, provide that the combination is
physically possible and permitted according to the specifica-
C 100 Partial load factors, γf tion. See Appendix D for detailed guidance on load combina-
101 The Load Factors for design of the Concrete terminal are tions for the design of the LNG containment tanks.
specified in DNV-OS-C502 Sec.4, C “Load Combinations and 109 In the ALS, the Load factor shall be 1.0 for all loads. For
Partial Safety Factors” and in Table C1. structures exposed to DLE and the in-plane shear walls may be
design using a strength design in stead of a ductility design ap-
Table C1 - Recommended partial factors for loads for the proach. In this case a sufficient earthquake load increase factor
ultimate limit state (ULS) Load combinations shall be identified and applied in design. This factor shall not
(from DNV-OS-C101) be less than 1.1.
Combination of Load categories
design loads C 200 Combinations of loads
G Q E D
a) 1.3 1.3 0.7a 1.0 201 Table B2 of DNV-OS-C101 Sec.3 B gives a more de-
tailed description of how loads shall be combined. When envi-
b) 1.0 1.0 1.3a 1.0 ronmental and accidental loads are acting together, the given
Load categories are: probabilities apply to the combination of these loads. For com-
G = permanent load bination of loads in design of LNG containment structure, see
Q = variable functional load Appendix D as guidelines.
E = environmental load
D = deformation load 202 For temporary phases, where a progressive collapse in
a Factor may have to be amended for areas with other long term dis- the installation does not entail the risk of loss of human life, in-
tribution functions than North Sea conditions. jury, or damage to people or the environment, or of significant
For description of load categories, see DNV-OS-C101 Sec.2 and financial losses, a shorter return period than that given in Table
C102 through C109 below. B2 of DNV-OS-C101 for environmental loads may be consid-
ered.
102 The loads shall be combined in the most unfavourable 203 The return conditions to be considered should be related
way, provided that the combination is physically possible and to the duration of the operation. As a general guidance, the cri-
permitted according to the load specifications. Loading condi- teria given in Table C2 may be applied:
tions that are physically possible but not intended or permitted
to occur in expected operations, shall be included by assessing Table C2 Environmental criteria
probability of occurrence and accounted for as either acciden-
tal conditions in the accidental damage limit state (ALS) or as Duration of use Environmental criteria
part of the ordinary design conditions included in the ULS. Up to 3 days Specific weather window
Such conditions may be omitted in case where the annual prob- 3 days to 1 week More than 1 year, seasonal
ability of occurrence can be assumed to be less than 10-4. 1 week to 1 month 10 years return, seasonal
103 For permanent loads, a load factor of 1.0 in load combi- 1 month to 1 year 100 years return, seasonal
nation a) shall be used where this gives a more unfavourable More than 1 year 1000 years return, all year
load effect. For external hydrostatic pressure, and internal
pressures from a free surface, an load factor of 1.2 may nor- C 300 Consequence of failure
mally be used provided that the load effect can be determined 301 Structures can be categorised by various levels of expo-
with normal accuracy. Where second order effects are impor- sure to determine criteria that are appropriate for the intended
tant, a load factor of 1.3 shall be used. service of the structure. The levels are determined by consid-
104 A load factor of 1.0 shall be applied to the weight of soil eration of life safety and consequences of failure.
included in the geotechnical calculations. 302 Life safety considers the manning situation in respect of
105 Prestressing loads may be considered as imposed defor- personnel on the terminal when the design environmental

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Offshore Standard DNV-OS-C503, October 2004
Page 22 – Sec.5

event would occur. 203 Creep effects shall be considered where relevant. For
303 Consequences of failure consider the potential risk to further details, see DNV-OS-C502, Sec.6, C705.
life of personnel brought in to react to any incident, the poten- Effect of Water Pressure
tial risk of environmental damage and the potential risk of eco- 204 The effect of water pressure in the concrete is to be fully
nomic losses. considered when relevant.
304 LNG Terminal Structures and Containment Systems are
classified as Structures with high Consequence of Failure and 205 The effect of hydrostatic pressure on the concrete
shall be designed in accordance with the requirements of this strength is to be evaluated where relevant.
standard for environmental and functional loads including ac- 206 The effect of hydrostatic forces acting on the faces of
cidental loads. cracks is to be taken into account in the analytical models used
Inspection during construction shall be extended inspection in for prediction of concrete strength. This effect is also to be tak-
accordance with this Standard. en into account when actual load effects are evaluated.
Loss of Intended Underpressure
207 For structures designed with an intended underpressure,
D. Structural Analysis relative to external pressure, a design condition, where the in-
tended underpressure is lost, shall be evaluated.
D 100 General This load effect may be categorized as an accidental load ef-
101 Structural analysis is the process of determining the load fect. Load combinations, and load and material factors shall be
effects within a structure, or part thereof, in response to each taken according to ALS criteria.
significant set of loads. DNV-OS-C502 Sec.5 D specifies re- More stringent criteria may be specified by the Client for this
quirements for the various forms of structural analysis neces- situation (e.g. increased material factor, load factors etc.) due
sary to define the response of the structure during each stage of to e.g. costly and excessive repair.
its life. Load effects calculated by structural analysis shall be
used as part of the design documentation. Weight of Concrete
208 The long-term effect of water absorption is to be consid-
D 200 Special load effects ered in the estimation of concrete weights. This is especially
Deformation Loads important for floating concrete structures.
201 Deformation induced loads created by imposed defor- D 300 Analyses requirements
mations in the structure, are loads to be treated as either defor-
mation loads (D) or as Functional Loads. See B900. 301 All structural analyses performed shall simulate, with
sufficient accuracy, the response of the structure or component
Examples of such loads may be: for the limit state being considered. This may be achieved by
appropriate selection of the analysis type with due regard to the
— differential settlement nature of loads applied and the expected response of the struc-
— temperature effects ture.
— shrinkage
— loads in flexible members connected to stiff members may 302 The following table gives general guidance as to the type
in some cases be seen as deformation induced loads of analysis that shall be adopted for each design condition for
— changes in strain due to absorption. the structure. Further details are provided in DNV-OS-C502.

For Terminals with a ductile mode of failure, and where sec- Table D1 - Appropriate Types of Analysis
ond order effects are negligible, the effect of deformation loads Condition Appropriate types of analysis
may normally be neglected. Construction Linear static analysis is generally appropriate.
A typical example of a ductile mode of failure is a flexural fail- Towing to Linear static analysis is generally appropriate.
ure provided sufficient rotational capacity exists. Verification location Dynamic effects may be significant in response to
of sufficient rotational capacity may in most cases be based on hydrodynamic motions. These can normally be
simplified considerations. simulated by pseudo-static analysis.
Installation Linear static analysis is generally appropriate.
202 Imposed deformations normally have a significant influ-
ence on the shear resistance of a section, and shall be duly con- In-service Linear, static or pseudo-static analysis is general-
sidered in the design. strength and ly appropriate for global load path analysis.
Serviceability Analyses of temperature distribution within
The characteristic value of deformation imposed loads is nor- structure as input to strength analysis in ULS,
mally evaluated on the basis of defined maximum and mini- SLS and FLS.
mum values for the parameters governing its magnitude. Fatigue Linear analysis is generally appropriate. Dynamic
An accurate calculation of deformation loads caused by tem- effects may be significant for short period waves.
A pseudo-static deterministic approach is nor-
perature effects can only be obtained from a non-linear analy- mally acceptable.
sis, reflecting realistic material properties of reinforced
concrete. In practice, effects due to imposed deformations may Seismic Dynamic analysis is normally required, where
seismic ground motion is significant. Non-linear
be calculated using a linear elastic model, and a constant mod- effects might need to be considered for ductility
ulus of elasticity throughout the structure. Possible reductions level earthquakes.
due to cracking may be estimated separately. Accidental Non-linear analysis is normally required for sig-
The temperature expansion coefficient (α) may be taken as nificant impacts. Dynamic response can be signif-
1.0⋅10-5 /°C for concrete. Where the temperature induced loads icant.
are significant testing is normally to be carried out to determine Temperature analyses will be required to predict
(α). temperature distribution and following tempera-
ture stresses in case of accidental leakage of LNG
Concrete members exposed to temperature below -60°C shall through the primary containment. This applies for
require special evaluation of the temperature expansion coeffi- containment systems where the concrete is de-
cient (α) to account for the actual temperature and relative hu- signed to act as secondary containment structure.
midity of the concrete. Removal/reuse As per transportation and installation.

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 Offshore Standard DNV-OS-C503, October 2004
Sec.5 – Page 23

D 400 Analysis of construction stages formed in its in-service configuration suitable for subsequent
401 Sufficient analyses shall be performed on components of strength and serviceability assessment. The structure shall also
the structure during construction to ensure their integrity at all be analysed for extreme wave effects using ALS load factors,
significant stages of the construction and assembly process and unless it can be conclusively demonstrated that this limit state
to assess built-in stresses from restrained deformations. Con- is always less onerous than the corresponding ULS condition.
struction stages shall include onshore and inshore operations. 702 Local analysis shall be performed to assess secondary
402 Consideration shall be given to the sequence of con- structure and details that appear from the global analysis to be
struction in determining load effects and to the age of the con- heavily loaded or that are complex in form or loading. Such
crete in determining resistance. Specific consideration shall be analyses may be based on non-linear methods if these are more
given to the stability of components under construction. Ade- appropriate to the component behaviour.
quate support for temporary loads, such as crane footings, shall 703 It is generally acceptable to base all strength analysis of
be provided in the analysis. an in-service concrete platform on deterministic analysis, pre-
403 Assessment of the structure during construction stages dicting response to specific extreme waves. Sufficient wave
may normally be performed using static analysis. However, periods, directions and wave phases shall be considered to ob-
dynamic response to wind turbulence might need to be calcu- tain maximum response in each type of component checked.
lated for tall, slender structures and consideration shall be giv- Consideration shall be given to waves of lower than the maxi-
en to other possible dynamic load effects, such as earthquakes, mum height if greater response can be obtained due to larger
occurring during the construction phase. dynamic effects at smaller wave periods.

D 500 Transportation analysis D 800 Fatigue analysis

501 Analysis of a fixed concrete structure shall include the 801 When required, detailed fatigue analysis shall be based
assessment of structural integrity during significant stages of on a cumulative damage assessment performed over the pro-
the sea tow of the structure, whether it is self-floating, barge posed lifetime of the structure. The analysis shall include
supported or barge assisted. The representation of the structure transportation stages, if significant, and should consider the ef-
during such operations shall be consistent with the stage being fects of the range of sea states and directions to which the
represented, incorporating the correct amount of ballast and structure will be subjected.
simulating only those components of the topsides actually in- 802 A linear representation of the overall structure is gener-
stalled. ally acceptable for the evaluation of global load paths for fa-
502 Analysis during sea tow should normally be based on tigue analysis. The structural analysis shall include the effects
linear static analysis, representing the motion of the concrete of permanent, live, hydrostatic and deformational loads. It
structure by peak heave, sway, surge, pitch and roll accelera- shall be justifiable to use reduced topside and other loads in the
tions as predicted by hydrodynamic analysis. For such analysis fatigue analysis, on the basis that typical rather than extreme
to be valid, it shall be demonstrated that motions in the natural loads through its life are required. Significant changes in static
periods of major components of the structure, will not be sig- load through the lifetime of the structure shall be analysed sep-
nificantly excitated by this global motion. If dynamic effects arately and fatigue damage shall be accumulated over each
are deemed important, they shall be incorporated in accord- phase. For details in fatigue life prediction, see Sec.6, D200.
ance with DNV-OS-C502, Sec.5, D1000. The analysis of the 803 Dynamic amplification is likely to be more significant
tow shall be in accordance with the DNV Rules for Planning for the relatively short wave periods causing the majority of fa-
and Execution of Marine Operations. tigue damage. Fatigue analysis shall therefore consider the ef-
503 Fatigue damage can result from extreme tow duration in fects of dynamic excitation in appropriate detail, either by
heavy seas. If this is significant, fatigue damage accrued shall pseudo-static or by dynamic response analysis. Deterministic
be accumulated together with that calculated for in-service or stochastic types of analysis are both permissible, subject to
conditions in accordance with DNV-OS-C502, Sec.5, D2000. the following provisions.
504 Consideration shall be given to possible damage scenar- 804 For deterministic analysis, the selected individual waves
ios during sea tow. Sufficient structural analyses should be to which the structure is subjected shall be based on a repre-
performed to ensure adequate integrity of the structure, pre- sentative spread of wave heights and periods. For structures
venting complete loss in the event of collision with tugs or oth- that are dynamically sensitive, these shall include several wave
er vessels present during the transportation stage. In particular, periods at or near each natural period of the structure, to ensure
progressive collapse due to successive flooding of compart- that dynamic effects are accurately assessed. Consideration
ments shall be prevented. shall also be given to the higher frequency content in larger
waves that may cause dynamic excitation.
D 600 Installation and deck mating analysis 805 Sufficient wave cases shall be analysed for probabilistic
601 Structural analysis shall be performed at critical stages analysis to adequately represent the stress transfer functions of
of the deck mating (if applicable) and installation stages. Such the structure. Non-linear response of the structure shall be in-
analyses shall, as a minimum, cover times of maximum pres- corporated into the analysis using appropriate methods, if sig-
sure differential across various components of concrete struc- nificant.
ture. The configuration of the structure at each stage of the
setting down operation should reflect the planned condition D 900 Seismic analysis
and inclination of the structure and the associated distribution 901 Two levels of seismic loading on an offshore concrete
of ballast. structure shall be considered:
602 Deck mating, ballasting down and planned setting down — strength level earthquake (SLE), which shall be assessed
on the sea floor shall normally be analysed by a linear static ap- as a ULS condition
proach. As these phases normally represent the largest external — ductility level earthquake (DLE), for which ductile behav-
water heads, implosion or buckling should be analysed. The ef- iour of the structure assuming extensive plasticity is per-
fect of unevenness in the seabed shall be considered in assess- missible provided the structure survive.
ing seabed reactions in an ungrouted state.
LNG containment structures shall be designed for both the
D 700 In-service strength and serviceability analyses SLE and DLE earthquakes. Systems which is vital for the plant
701 At least one global analysis of the structure shall be per- system shall remain operational following both a SLE and a

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Offshore Standard DNV-OS-C503, October 2004
Page 24 – Sec.5

DLE. No leakage of LNG is acceptable from a DLE. For fur- components of the structure shall be removed from this analy-
ther details see Sec.6, D400. sis, or appropriately weakened to simulate their reduced
902 The load effects on components that are simulated as lin- strength and stiffness.
ear elastic in either SLE or DLE analyses shall be evaluated For accidental case of local leakage in the primary barrier, it
and used to confirm that these components satisfy ULS crite- will be required to carry out special temperature analyses to de-
ria. termine the temperature distribution and the resulting stress
Components that demonstrate ductile response shall be so de- distribution from this load case.
signed, and assessed against acceptance criteria relevant for
the actual limit state with respect to all relevant response pa- D 1100 Terminal removal/reuse
rameters. 1101 Analysis of the structure for removal shall accurately
Ductility of reinforced concrete structures in seismic active ar- represent the structure during this phase. The analysis shall
eas is ensured by sufficient confinement of the concrete by stir- have sufficient accuracy to simulate pressure differential ef-
rup reinforcements. fects that are significant during this stage. The analysis shall
include suction forces that shall be overcome prior to separa-
D 1000 Accidental and overload analyses tion from the sea floor, if appropriate. Suitable sensitivity to
1001 Analysis of the structure under accidental conditions, the suction coefficient shall be incorporated. The possibility of
such as ship collision, helicopter impact or iceberg collision, uneven separation from the seabed and drop-off of soil or un-
shall consider the following: derbase grout shortly after separation shall be considered and
structural response to subsequent motions shall be evaluated.
— local behaviour of the impacted area 1102 Weights of accumulated debris and marine growth
— global strength of the structure against overall collapse shall also be considered if these are not to be removed. Items
— explosions to be removed from the structure, such as the topsides, conduc-
— local cold spots in concrete secondary barrier due to local tors, and risers, shall be omitted from the analysis.
leakage in primary barrier
— post-damage integrity of the structure. 1103 The condition of the concrete and reinforcement should
account for degradation of the materials during the life of the
1002 The resistance of the impact area may be studied using platform. If the analysis is carried out immediately prior to re-
local models. The contact area and perimeter shall be evaluat- moval, then material degradation shall take account of the re-
ed based on predicted non-linear behaviour of the structure and sults from recent underwater surveys and inspections.
of the impacting object. Non-linear analyses may be required
since the Terminal will generally deform substantially under
the accidental loads. Appropriate boundary conditions shall be
provided far enough away from the damaged region for inac- E. Topside Interface Design
curacies to be minimized.
1003 Global analysis of the Terminal under accidental loads E 100 Introduction
may be required to ensure that a progressive collapse is not in- 101 The design of the interface between a steel topsides
itiated. The analysis should include the weakening effect of structure and a concrete substructure requires careful consider-
damage to the structure in the impacted area. If ductile re- ation by both the topsides and substructure designers.
sponse of the structure is likely for the impact loads determined
global non-linear analysis may be required to simulate the re- 102 Particular attention shall be paid to ensure that all rele-
distribution of load effects as section resistances are exceeded. vant information is exchanged between the topsides and sub-
The global analysis may be based on a simple representation of structure design teams.
the structure sufficient to simulate progressive collapse. De- 103 If topside and substructure construction are separate
flection effects shall be included, if significant. contracts, special care shall be taken to handle the interface re-
1004 Energy absorption of the structure will arise from the sponsibility. It shall be clear who is responsible for input to and
combined effect of local and global deformation. Sufficient de- from the topside engineering contractor as part of a technical
formation of the structure to absorb the impact energy from the coordination procedure.
collision not absorbed by the impacting object shall be docu- 104 For a barge type structure, the deck structure supporting
mented. the topside modules will normally be constructed as an integral
1005 Analysis of the structure in its damaged condition may part of the Terminal structure. This simplifies the topside inter-
normally be performed using linear static analysis. Damaged face design.

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 Offshore Standard DNV-OS-C503, October 2004
Sec.6 – Page 25

SECTION 6
DETAILED DESIGN OF OFFSHORE CONCRETE TERMINAL STRUCTURES

A. General — compression zone.

A 100 Introduction B 300 Characteristic values for material strength

101 The detailed design of prestressed/reinforced concrete 301 The characteristic strength of materials shall be deter-
shall be carried out in accordance with DNV-OS-C502. This mined according to design standards and recognized standards
standard is generally making references to this standard. for material testing.
102 Other design standards may as an alternative be used for 302 For concrete, the 28 days characteristic compressive
detailed design of the Offshore Concrete Structures. An open- strength fcck is defined as a 5% fractile value (5th percentile)
ing is made for this within DNV-OS-C502 provided the re- found from statistical analysis of testing 150 mm x 300 mm cy-
quirements to the detailed standard given in DNV-OS-C502 lindrical specimens.
Appendix E “Use of Alternative Detailed Design Standard” 303 In Table C1, a normalized compressive strength, fcn, is
are sufficiently covered. The level of safety shall be as required tabulated based on this characteristic concrete cylinder
by DNV-OS-C502. The compliance with these requirements strength. The normalized compressive strength of concrete,
shall be documented. Special considerations for design re- fcn, is less than the characteristic cylinder strength, fcck, and
quired by this standard shall be considered. considers transition of test strength into in situ strength, ageing
effects due to high-sustained stresses etc.
304 For reinforcement steel, the minimum yield stress shall
B. Design Principles Concrete Terminal be taken as characteristic strength fck, determined as the 5%
defective fractile. The reinforcement shall be of quality in ac-
B 100 General cordance with Sec.4, A300 Reinforcement.
101 Design in compliance with this standard can be based ei- 305 For prestressed reinforcement the in situ strength is tak-
ther on calculations or on testing, or a combination of these. en equal to the yield strength fsy or the 0.2-proof stress. The
102 Reference is made to DNV-OS-C502 which provides quality of prestressing steel and anchorage shall be in accord-
more details on strength and serviceability calculations of re- ance with Sec.4, A400 Prestressing Steel and Anchorage.
inforced concrete structural members. 306 For geotechnical analyses, the characteristic material re-
sistance shall be determined so that the probability of more un-
B 200 Limit states favourable materials occurring in any significant extent is low.
201 Structures shall satisfy the requirements in the following Any deteriorating effects during the operation phase shall be
limit states: taken into consideration. See DNV-OS-C101.
— ultimate limit state (ULS) 307 For the fatigue limit state FLS, the characteristic materi-
— accidental limit state (ALS) al strength shall be determined statistically as a 2.5% fractile
— fatigue limit state (FLS) for reinforcement, prestressing assemblies, couplers, welded
— serviceability limit state (SLS) connections, etc. unless other values are specified in the refer-
ence standard for that design. For concrete, design reference
202 In ULS and ALS, the capacity is demonstrated by testing strength shall be used. For soil, the characteristic strength shall
or by calculation based on the strain properties and design ma- be used. For other materials, acceptance criteria shall be spec-
terial strengths. ified which offer a safety level equivalent to that of the present
203 In FLS, it shall be demonstrated that the structure can provision.
sustain the expected load cycles at the applied load levels for 308 Where high resistance of a member is unfavourable (e.g.
the intended service life. in weak link considerations), an upper value of the character-
The documentation shall include: istic resistance shall be used in order to give a low probability
of failure of the adjoining structure. The upper value shall be
— bending moment chosen with the same level of probability of exceedance as the
— axial force probability of lower values being underscored. In such cases,
— shear force the material factor shall be 1.0 in calculating the resistance that
— torsional moment is applied as a load on adjoining members.
— anchorage of reinforcement
— partial loading B 400 Partial safety factors for materials
401 The partial factors for the materials, γm, in reinforced
and combinations of these. concrete shall be chosen in accordance with this standard and
204 The design in SLS shall demonstrate that the structure, for the limit state considered.
during its service life, will satisfy the functional requirements 402 For structural steel members, the material factor shall be
related to its use and purpose. Serviceability limit state require- in accordance with DNV-OS-C101.
ments shall also ensure the durability and strength of the struc-
ture. 403 Foundation design shall be performed in accordance
with DNV-OS-C101 Sec.11. The soil material factors shall
The documentation shall include: also be in accordance with Sec.11.
— cracks
— tightness/leakage B 500 Design by testing
— strains 501 If the loads acting on a structure, or the resistance of ma-
— displacements terials or structural members cannot be determined with rea-
— dynamic effects sonable accuracy, model tests can be carried out. Reference is
— concrete stress level made to DNV-OS-C502, Sec.5 P.

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Offshore Standard DNV-OS-C503, October 2004
Page 26 – Sec.6

502 Characteristic resistance of structural details or structur- 606 Design values for the reinforcement are:
al members or parts may be verified by a combination of tests
and calculations. Esd = Esk / γs
fsd = fsk / γs
503 A test structure, a test structural detail or a test model
shall be sufficiently similar to the installation to be considered. where
The results of the test shall provide a basis for a reliable inter-
pretation, in accordance with a recognized standard. Esd = Design value of Young’s Modulus of reinforcement
Esk = Characteristic value of Young’s Modulus of reinforce-
B 600 Design material strength ment
601 The design material strength shall be taken as a normal- fsd = Design strength of reinforcement
ized in-situ strength in accordance with Table B1 divided by a fsk = Characteristic strength of reinforcement
material coefficient γm. γs = Material coefficient Reinforcement
The design strength in compression, fcd, is found by dividing 607 The material coefficient, γm, for concrete and reinforce-
the normalized compressive strength fcn by the material coef- ment are given in Table B1.
ficient, γc, in Table B1.
The characteristic tensile strength, ftk, and the normalized ten- Table B1 Material coefficients for concrete and reinforcement
sile strength, ftn, in the structure are defined in Table B1 and Limit State Ultimate Accidental Servicea-
are both derived from the characteristic strength of concrete in limit state and Fatigue bility limit
compression. limit state state
1.251 1.101 1.0
602 In design by testing, the requirements given in DNV- Concrete, γc (1.40)2 (1.20)2
OS-C502 P500 shall be applied. Reinforced
concrete Reinforce- 1.151 1.001 1.0
603 If a high design strength is unfavourable, a special ap- ment. γs (1.25)2 (1.10)2
praisal of the material coefficients and the nominal value of the Plain γc 1.501 1.251 1.0
in-situ strength, shall be performed. An example is the design Concrete (1.75)2 (1.50)2
of a potential plastic hinge as part of the ductility design of a
1) When the design is to be based on dimensional data that include speci-
structure in a seismic active area. fied tolerances at their most unfavourable limits, structural imperfec-
604 The material coefficients,γm, take into account the un- tions, placement tolerances as to positioning of reinforcement, then
these material coefficients can be used. When these coefficients are
certainties in material strength, execution, cross-sectional di- used then any geometric deviations from the “approved for construc-
mensions and the theory used for calculation of the capacity. tion” drawings must be evaluated and considered in relation to the tol-
The material coefficients are determined without accounting erances used in the design calculations.
for reduction of capacity caused by corrosion or mechanical 2) Design with these coefficients allows for tolerances in accordance with
detoriation. C400 or alternatively on cross sectional dimensions and placing of re-
inforcements that do not reduce calculated resistance by more than 10
605 Design values for the concrete are: percent. If specified tolerances are in excess of those given in C400 or
the specified tolerances lead to greater reductions in calculated resist-
Ecd = Ecn /γc ance, the excess tolerances or the reduction in excess of 10 percent is to
fcd = fcn /γc be accounted for in resistance calculations. Alternatively, material co-
efficients may be taken according to those given under 1.
ftd = ftn/γc
where
Ecd = Design value of Young’s Modulus of concrete used in C. Basis for Design by Calculation
the stress-strain curve
Ecn = Normalized value of Young’s Modulus used in the C 100 Concrete grades and in situ strength of concrete
stress-strain curve 101 The characteristic strength of concrete cylinders is de-
fcd = Design compressive strength of concrete fined in B300.
fcn = Normalized compressive strength of concrete In Table C1, normalized values for in situ strength of concrete
ftd = Design strength of concrete in uni-axial tension are given. The given tensile strength is valid for concrete in
ftn = Normalized tensile strength of concrete uni-axial tension.
γc = Material strength factor concrete
The values are specific for concrete, not exposed to cryogenic
In the ultimate limit state and the accidental limit state, the temperatures.
Young’s Modulus for Concrete, Ec, is taken equal to the nor- Normal weight concrete has grades identified by C and light-
malized value, Ecn, in the serviceability limit state. weight aggregate concrete Grades are identified by the symbol
In the fatigue limit state, the Young’s Modulus for Concrete, LC. The grades are defined in Table C1 as a function of the
Ec, is taken equal to the characteristic value, Eck. Characteristic Compression cylinder strength of concrete, fcck.

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 Offshore Standard DNV-OS-C503, October 2004
Sec.6 – Page 27

Table C1 Concrete grades and structural strength (MPa).

Concrete grade (MPa) 1)
Strength - C25 C35 C45 C55 C65 C75 C85 C95 C105
LC15 LC25 LC35 LC45 LC55 LC65 LC75 LC85
Characteristic Comp, cube 15 25 35 45 55 65 75 85
strength, fck
Characteristic Comp. cylinder 12 20 28 36 44 54 64 74 84 94
strength, fcck
Norm. structural 11.2 16.8 22.4 28 33.6 39.2 44.8 50.4 56 61.6
comp. strength, fcn
Characteristic Tensile strength, ftk2) 1.55 2.10 2.55 2.95 3.30 3.65 4.00 4.30 4.60 4.90
Norm. structural 1.00 1.40 1.70 2.00 2.25 2.50 2.60 2.70 2.70 2.70
tensile strength, ftn
1) Concrete grades are related to the characteristic compressive cylinder strength and is denoted by C for normal dense aggregate concrete and LC for light-
weight aggregate concrete. The grades are defined in this Table.
2) The given tensile strength applies to concrete subjected to uni-axial tension.

102 The strength values given in Table C1 apply to light- tures where the concrete strength is unknown, the strength
weight aggregate concrete with the following limitations and shall be determined on the basis of drilled core specimens tak-
modifications: en from the structure. For interpretation of the drilled core ref-
fcck < fcck2 (/ρ1)2 erence is made to DNV-OS-C502, Sec.6 C107.
where C 200 Concrete stress – strain curves for strength design
fcck2 = 94 MPa and ρ1 = 2200 kg/m3 201 The shape of the stress/strain relationship for concrete in
Tensile strength, ftk, and in situ strength, ftn, shall be multiplied compression of a specified grade is to be chosen such that it re-
by the factor (0.15 + 0.85 ρ/ρ1) sults in prediction of behavioural characteristics in the relevant
limit states that are in agreement with results of comprehensive
where: tests. In lieu of such data, the general relationship given DNV-
OS-C502 Sec.6 C300 can be used.
ρ1 = 2200 kg/m3 if the tensile strength is not determined by
testing 202 For normal dense concrete of grades between C25 and
ρ = Density of the lightweight concrete. C55, the following simplified stress/strain diagram may be
used.
For lightweight aggregate concrete with intended concrete
strength fcck > fcck3 (ρ/ρ1)2, where fcck3 = 64 MPa and ρ1 = σc
2200 kg/m3, it shall be shown by test samples that a character-
istic strength, 15% higher than the intended, can be achieved.
The test shall be carried out on concrete samples with the same -f cr
σc
material composition as intended used.
103 For normal density concrete of grade higher than C85
and lightweight aggregate concrete of all grades, it shall be
documented by testing that the concrete satisfies the require-
ments on the characteristic compressive cylinder strength. This
also applies if the regular compliance control of the concrete
production is performed by testing the compressive cube
strength.
104 For concrete at high temperatures for a short period ε c (‰)
0 εco = -2,0 -3,5
(fire), it may be assumed, provided more accurate values are
not known, that the compressive strength reduces linearly from
full value at 350°C to zero at 800°C. The tensile strength may Figure 1
Simplified stress-strain diagram for normal density concrete of
be assumed to decrease from full value at 100°C to zero at grades between C25 and C55 subject to compression
800°C. If the concrete is exposed to temperatures above 200°C
for a longer period of time, the strength properties of the con-
crete shall be based on test results.
εc εc
105 For concrete exposed to temperatures below -60°C, the σ c = – f cr -------  2 – -------
possible strength increase in compressive and tensile strength ε co  ε co
may be utilized in design for this conditions provided the
strength are determined from relevant tests under same condi- εco = - 2 ‰ is strain at the point of maximum stress.
tions (temperature, humidity) as the concrete in the structure. 203 For lightweight aggregate concrete of grades between
An increase in tensile strength of concrete caused by low tem- LC15 and LC45, a simplified bilinear stress – strain diagram
peratures will generally tend to increase the distance between may be applied for calculation of capacities.
the cracks, hence increase the crackswidth.
The maximum strain limit for LWA concrete in compression is
106 The characteristic tensile strength of the concrete, ftk,
may be determined by testing of the splitting tensile strength 0, 7 ρ
for cylindrical specimens at 28 days in accordance with ISO ε cu = ε 1  0, 3 + ------------
 ρ1 
4108. The characteristic tensile strength, ftk, shall be taken as
2/3 of the splitting strength determined by testing. where ε1 = - 3.5‰ , ρ1 = 2400 kg/m3 and ρ = density of the
107 By rehabilitation or by verifying the capacity in struc- LWA.

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Offshore Standard DNV-OS-C503, October 2004
Page 28 – Sec.6

Any deviating properties in compression shall be considered.

σc 207 Where the assumed composite action with the concrete
does not impose stricter limitations, the strain in the reinforce-
ment shall be limited to 10 ‰. For prestressed reinforcement
the prestressing strain is added to this limit.
-f cr 208 For reinforcement in accordance with Sec.4, the steel
stress may be assumed to increase linearly from 0 to fsd when
the strain increases from 0 to εsy = fsk/Esk.
The reinforcement stress may be assumed to be equal to fsd
when the strain varies between εsy and εsu. The strain εsu shall
not exceed 10 ‰.
The steel can be assumed to have the same strain properties
ε c (‰) and yield stress in both compression and tension.
0 -2,0 εcu
σc

Figure 2
Simplified stress-strain diagram for lightweight aggregate con- f sk
crete of grades LC15 to LC45 f sd

204 For calculation of capacities for axial forces and bending

moments, different stress distributions from those given herein
(C201, C202, C203) may be applied as long as they do not re-
sult in a higher sectional capacity.
ε c (‰)
205 Another stress distribution than that given in C301 to 0 ε sy ε su =10,0
C304 may be assumed when calculating the capacity for axial
force and bending moment, provided this will not give a larger Figure 3
capacity for the cross section. Stress-strain diagram for reinforcement in accordance with
Sec.4.
206 For reinforcement, a relationship between force and
strain which is representative for the type and make in question
shall be used. 209 For temperatures above 150°C, the stress-strain diagram
The stress-strain diagram for design is found by dividing the for ribbed bars in accordance with Sec.4 can be assumed to be
steel stress σs by the material coefficient γs. in accordance with figure 4.

σs
f sy
20°C
1,0 300
150
200
400
0,8
500

0,6
fsy and εsy denotes
characteristic yield
stress and yield 600
strain at 20°C 0,4

700
0,2

0 εs ε
sy
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8

Figure 4
The relation between stress and short-term strain for ribbed bars at temperatures above 150°C

The diagram in Figure 4 does not include thermal strain or ductile under the applicable temperature range.
creep strain caused by high temperature. 211 Spiral reinforcement in columns, shear reinforcement,
210 Reinforcement exposed to low temperature shall remain torsional reinforcement, and reinforcement in construction

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 Offshore Standard DNV-OS-C503, October 2004
Sec.6 – Page 29

joints, shall be calculated in accordance with Sec.6 D, F, G and C 600 Deformation induced loads, prestressing and
J of DNV-OS-C502. The utilized stress shall not be higher than creep
the stress corresponding to 2.5 ‰ strain. For prestressed rein- 601 Deformation induced loads created by imposed defor-
forcement, the prestressed strain is added. mations in the structure, are loads to be treated as deformation
For confinement of the concrete compression zone in DLE de- loads (D), and not as a force which requires equilibrium. For
sign, special considerations shall be made. more details reference is made to DNV-OS-C502 Sec.6 C700.

C 300 Geometrical dimensions in the calculation of sec- C 700 Effect of water pressure
tional capacities 701 The effect of water pressure in the concrete is to be fully
considered when relevant.
301 When allowing larger deviations in dimensions than
those specified in Table C2, the deviations in sectional dimen- 702 The effect of hydrostatic pressure on the concrete
sions and reinforcement position shall be considered in the de- strength is to be evaluated where relevant. (For lightweight ag-
sign. See also B607 Table B1. Smaller deviations than the gregate concrete, this effect may be significant.)
specified tolerances may be considered. 703 The effect of hydrostatic forces acting on the faces of
cracks is to be taken into account in the designs for ULS, SLS,
Table C2 Acceptable Deviations. ALS and FLS.
Type of Dimensional Deviation Maximum Tolerance
Overall dimension ± 25 mm
Cross-sectional ± 8%
D. Design of Structural Members
perpendicularity 8‰
Inclination 3‰ D 100 Design capacity in ultimate limit state (ULS)
Local variations 8 mm 101 Detailed design of moment capacity under different
(1 m measuring length) magnitudes of axial loads shall be in accordance with DNV-
Local variations 12 mm OS-C502 Sec.6 D.
(2 m measuring length)
102 Slender structural Members shall be designed in accord-
For structures of special shapes and geometry alternative toler- ance with DNV-OS-C502, Sec.6 E.
ances may be specified from a strength point of view provided 103 Design of shear capacity in beams, slabs and wall shall
the capacity calculated, based on the specified tolerances, does be in accordance with DNV-OS-C502, Sec.6 F.
not reduce the capacity with more than 10%.
104 Design for torsional moments in beams shall be in ac-
302 If the most unfavourable combinations of specified tol- cordance with DNV-OS-C502, Sec.6 G.
erances for section’s dimensions and reinforcement positions 105 Design of structural members subjected to in-plane forc-
are considered and conformity control verifies that the actual es shall be in accordance with the general method outlined in
deviations do exceed those specified, then the increased mate- DNV-OS-C502, Sec.6 H.
rial coefficients in accordance with Table B1 may be used.
106 Regions with discontinuity in Geometry or loads shall
Should the As-Built documentation show that the intended de- be designed in accordance with DNV-OS-C502, Sec.6 I.
viation in tolerances are not met, then the section shall be re-
evaluated in all relevant limit states. 107 Design for shear forces in construction joints shall be in
accordance with DNV-OS-C502, Sec.6 J.
303 For structures cast under water, the outer 100 mm of 108 Design for bond strength and sufficient anchorage of re-
concrete at horizontal construction joints and in the contact inforcement shall be in accordance with DNV-OS-C502,
area between the ground and the concrete shall not be taken Sec.6 K.
into account as effective cross section for transfer of forces. If
the structure is set at least 100 mm into rock, the entire con- 109 Designed of partially loaded areas shall be in accordance
crete section can be calculated as effective for transfer of forc- with DNV-OS-C502. Sec.6 L.
es to the ground.
D 200 Capacity in fatigue limit state (FLS)
C 400 Tension in structural members 201 Design for fatigue strength of members exposed to stress
fluctuations shall be in accordance with DNV-OS-C502.
401 Tensile forces shall be provided for by reinforcement Sec.6 M.
with the following exceptions:
D 300 Design for accidental limit state (ALS)
— tension caused by shear force, anchorage or splicing of re-
inforcement, and by partially loaded areas, may be as- 301 Design for Accidentental strength shall be in accordance
sumed transferred by the concrete for design purposes in with DNV-OS-C502, Sec.6 N.
accordance with this standard. D 400 Design for ductility
C 500 Fatigue strength relationships 401 Terminals located in seismically active areas shall be de-
signed to possess adequate strength and stiffness to withstand
501 Fatigue strength relationships (S-N curves) for concrete the effect of strength level earthquake (SLE) as well as suffi-
are to take into account all relevant parameters, such as: cient ductility to remain stable during the rare motions of great-
er severity associated with ductility level earthquake (DLE).
— concrete quality The sufficiency of the structural strength and ductility is to be
— predominant load effect (axial, flexural, shear, bond or ap- demonstrated by strength and, as required, ductility analyses.
propriate combinations of these)
402 Design in SLE, using ULS load and material factors in
— state of stress (cycling in pure compression or compres- accordance with this Standard, is to demonstrate that the struc-
sion/tension) ture is adequately designed for strength to withstand this load-
— formulas for prediction of fatigue life for concrete are pro- ing without damage. The earthquake loading shall be
vided in DNV-OS-C502, Sec.6 M. combined with other environmental loads at a magnitude
— surrounding environment (air, submerged). shown likely to occur at the same time as the strength level

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Offshore Standard DNV-OS-C503, October 2004
Page 30 – Sec.6

earthquake. accordance with DNV-OS-C502, Sec.6, O500. For structural

403 Design in the DLE, using ALS load and material factors, concepts, where concrete acts as secondary barrier for LNG
it is to be demonstrated that the structure has the capability of leakage and insulation may become saturated by the permea-
absorbing the energy associated with the ductility level earth- bility of the concrete, then a metal membrane is required. This
quake without reaching a state of incremental collapse. The metal membrane may not possess cryogenic properties, if the
distortion should be, at least, twice as severe as those resulting purpose of the membrane is to protect the insulation from get-
from the SLE earthquake. This applies to seismic active areas. ting saturated and shall not be exposed to cryogenic tempera-
ture during normal operation.
The stored LNG shall be contained in the containment struc-
ture after the DLE. 505 Concrete is not gas tight and special measures shall be
taken to ensure a gas tight concrete structure, when this is re-
404 In United States’ offshore regions, reference is be made quired. An example is concepts where the concrete wall is de-
to the API RP 2A for design criteria for earthquake. In other signed to be part of the primary containment system.
seismically active locations around the world, a seismic report
may be prepared that presents the seismic design parameters in 506 Crackwidth calculations shall be in accordance with the
a manner consistent with the approach taken in the RP 2A. approach outlined in DNV-OS-C502. Sec.6, O700.
405 The compressive strain in the concrete at its critical sec- 507 The maximum stress levels in prestressed concrete
tions (including plastic hinges locations) is to be limited to structure under SLS loading shall be limited to the values giv-
0.3%, except when greater strain may be accommodated by en in DNV-OS-C502, Sec.6, O800.
confinement steel. 508 Structures exposed to repeated freeze/thaw action shall
406 For structural members or sections subjected to flexural be design in accordance with the requirements in DNV-OS-
bending or to load reversals, where the percentage of tensile re- C502, Sec.6, O900 and Sec.4, D306.
inforcement exceed 70% of the reinforcement at which yield
stress in the steel is reached simultaneously with compressive D 600 Design by testing
failure in the concrete, special confining reinforcement and/or 601 Concrete members can be designed by testing or by a
compressive reinforcement shall be provided to prevent brittle combination of calculations and testing in accordance with
failure in the compressive zone of the concrete. DNV-OS-C502, Sec.6 P.
407 Web reinforcement of flexural members is to be de-
signed for shear forces which develop at full plastic bending
capacity at end sections. In addition
E. Detailing of Reinforcements
— the diameter of rods used as stirrups is not to be less than
10 mm E 100 General
— only closed stirrups (stirrup ties) shall be used 101 Requirements to positioning of reinforcement are pro-
— the spacing of stirrups is not to exceed the lesser of d/2 or vided in DNV-OS-C502, Sec.6, Q100.
16 bar diameters of compressive reinforcement, where d is
the distance from the extreme compression fibre to the 102 Concrete cover to reinforcement shall be in accordance
centroid of tensile reinforcement. Tails of stirrups shall be with DNV-OS-C502, Sec.6, Q200. The requirements to con-
anchored within a confined zone, i.e. turned inward. crete cover is given in DNV-OS-C502, Sec.6, Q201.
103 Reinforcement shall be spliced in accordance with
408 No splices are allowed within a distance d from a plastic DNV-OS-C502, Section 6, Q300.
hinge. Lap splices shall be at least 30 bar diameters long, but
not less than 460 mm. 104 The reinforcement bars shall be bent in accordance with
DNV-OS-C502, Sec.6, Q400.
D 500 Design in serviceability limit state (SLS) 105 Minimum area of reinforcement shall be provided in the
501 Design in SLS shall in general be in accordance with re- structural member in accordance with DNV-OS-C502, Sec.6,
quirements in DNV-OS-C502, Sec.6, O100. Q500 and C502, Sec.6 R.
502 The durability of the concrete structure is ensured by de-
signing the structure in accordance with DNV-OS-C502,
Sec.6, O200. F. Corrosion Control
503 Design for displacement and vibration in the structure
shall be in accordance with DNV-OS-C502, Sec.6, O400 and F 100 General
O500. 101 Corrosion control shall be carried out in accordance with
504 Tightness against leakage of fluid shall be designed in DNV-OS-C502, Sec.6 S.

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 Offshore Standard DNV-OS-C503, October 2004
Sec.7 – Page 31

SECTION 7
LNG CONTAINMENT SYSTEM

A. Introduction The tanks are designed using model tests, refined analytical
tools and analysis methods to determine stress levels, fatigue
A 100 General life and crack propagation characteristics. IGC Code has spe-
cial requirements to material documentation, construction su-
101 For the design of primary steel containment tanks (mem- pervision, detection system, monitoring system and in-service
brane or independent tanks) reference is made to DNV Rules inspection which shall be followed for these tanks. A partial
for the Classification of ships (LNG Vessels), IMO - IGC Code secondary barrier is use by which the cargo tanks insulation
"the International Code for the Construction and Equipment of system contains any leakage of LNG and directs it to the drip
Ships Carrying Liquefied Gases in Bulk" and EN-1473 and trays located around the support chocks.
NFPA 59A as the general design standard for the LNG Con-
tainment System. See also Guidelines for design of LNG Con- The support structure for the tank either floating or fixed grav-
tainment systems in Appendices C "General Design Principles ity platform shall be designed in accordance with this standard.
LNG Containment Structures (Guidelines)" and D "Detailed The difference in dynamic performance of the two platforms
Structural Design of Containment System(Guidelines)". types shall be accounted for in the design of the containment
In applying the above referenced standards the special impact structure.
of the marine environment on safety shall be especially evalu- 202 Double containment tank
ated.
A double containment tank is designed and constructed so that
102 For vessels, the IMO type B independent tanks are wide- both the inner self supporting primary container and the sec-
ly used. These tanks are designed, constructed and inspected in ondary container are capable of independently containing the
accordance with the requirements in the DNV Rules for the refrigerated liquid stored. To minimise the pool of escaping
Classification of Ships (LNG Vessels) and the IMO- IGC liquid, the secondary container should be located at a distance
Code. These tanks are designed under the principle of mini- not exceeding 6 m from the primary container.
mum leak detection of LNG before failure of the steel support
structure. The primary container contains the refrigerated liquid under
normal operating conditions. The secondary container is in-
103 LNG containment structures on land are generally de- tended to contain any leakage of the refrigerated liquid, but it
signed using a double barrier system. Prestressed concrete may is not intended to contain any vapour resulting from this leak-
be used both as primary and secondary barrier with provision age.
of a gas tight barrier. This barrier may be of carbon steel if lo-
cated on the inner surface of the secondary barrier. 203 Full containment tank
The use of a concrete primary barrier of concrete will require A tank designed and constructed so that both self supporting
a special design minimizing the temperature stresses. primary container and the secondary container are capable of
independently containing the refrigerated liquid stored and for
104 The standards DNV Rules for the classification of Ships one of them its vapour. The secondary container can be 1 m to
(LNG Vessels), IGC – IMO Code, EN-1473 and NFPA-59A 2 m distance from the primary container.
shall not be interchanged in the design of the primary contain-
ment system. The same standards shall be used throughout. The primary container contains the refrigerated liquid under
Guidance note:
normal operating conditions. The outer roof is supported by
the secondary container. The secondary container shall be ca-
In mixing of standards, use of other design standards, methods pable both of containing the refrigerated liquid and of control-
and modifications the same overall safety level as this standard
shall be documented. led venting of the vapour resulting from product leakage after
a credible event.
---e-n-d---of---G-u-i-d-a-n-c-e---n-o-t-e---
204 Membrane tank
A 200 Storage containment systems The membrane tank consists of thin layers (barriers) of either
stainless steel, GRP/aluminium foil composite, or “invar” that
201 IGC- IMO Type b TANKS are supported through the insulation by the boundary structure
Under the category of Type B independent tanks, there are cur- of the cargo tank itself.
rently two approved systems: A membrane tank should be designed and constructed so that
the primary container, constituted by the membrane, is capable
— the “Moss Spherical” Tank system of containing both the liquefied gas and its vapour under nor-
— the “IHI Self-Supporting Prismatic” Type B (IHI-SPB) mal operating conditions and the concrete secondary contain-
system er, which supports the primary container, should be capable of
The Moss Spherical Tank system is most widely used on ships. containing all the liquefied gas stored in the primary container
The spherical, single containment tank system consists of an and of controlled venting of the vapour resulting from product
unstiffened, sphere supported at the equator by a vertical cyl- leakage of the inner tank.
inder. The cylinder is monolithically connected to the tank by The vapour of the primary container is contained by a steel
a profile in the tank wall. Both sphere and outer shell may be roof liner which forms with the membrane an integral gastight
made in aluminium alloy, stainless steel or 9% nickel steel. containment. The action of the liquefied gas acting on the pri-
The IHI-SPB system, currently approved has tanks, which may mary container (the metal membrane) is transferred directly to
be constructed of aluminium, stainless steel or 9% nickel steel. the prestressed concrete secondary container through the load
The IHI-SPB prismatic tanks would be supported by a system bearing insulation.
of chocks, which in addition to the chocks supporting the ver- Different types of membranes are available in the marked as
tical weight of the tank, incorporate lower and upper rolling the insulation may contain both a primary and a secondary bar-
chocks to cater for the dynamic behaviour of the tank system rier or alternatively only a primary barrier, the concrete sup-
under different loading conditions. porting structure acting as the secondary barrier.

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Offshore Standard DNV-OS-C503, October 2004
Page 32 – Sec.7

For steel vessels it is normal to have the primary and secondary duces higher magnitude load effects. As applicable, when a
barrier built into the insulation. National Authority having jurisdiction over the LNG Terminal
For a concrete terminal either floating or gravity based, the specifies the use of a lower return period, this shall be specially
concrete hull may be used as secondary barrier based on an ap- considered.
propriate hazard identification and risk evaluation of the lay- 102 All hazards and mitigation actions to reduce the risk to
out. an acceptable level is to be included in the design of the termi-
The design of the membrane tanks shall be done incorporating nal, the layout and the containment structure.
the possible deformation of the concrete structure from envi-
ronmental response in accordance with Section 4. B 200 Design basis
Sloshing effects in the membrane tanks shall be carefully ex- 201 The design of the Primary Containment System is to be
amined. in accordance with the criteria defined in this standard.
Fatigue approval of the membrane design itself is another area Detailed guidelines for the design of the containment structure
that needs careful consideration at the system approval stage are provided in Appendices A - D.
and during design approval. The fatigue capability of key weld 202 In addition to the above requirements mentioned , it is
connections in the containment systems barriers, are depend- also the responsibility of the designer, owner and operator to
ent upon the global stress level of the concrete structure. comply with additional requirements that may be imposed by
The stress variation in a gravity base/fixed concrete platform is the flag state or the coastal state or National Authority or any
considered to be less severe than in a steel vessel. other jurisdictions in the intended area of deployment and op-
eration. Examples are several EU Directives in Europe and US
The membrane may be designed in accordance with NFPA Coast Guard requirements in US.
59A and EN-1473. Environmental load effects and terminal
structure responses shall be included in the design. 203 The complete basis for the design is to be stated in the
operational manual and is to include the intended location, the
205 Cryogenic concrete tank envelope of environmental operational conditions and the stor-
A cryogenic concrete tank is either a double containment tank age capacities and throughputs of the production/re-gasifica-
or a full containment tank. For this type of tanks, the walls of tion systems.
the primary and secondary containers are both of prestressed
concrete. B 300 Design of LNG primary tanks
For more details of possible cryogenic concrete tanks on land, 301 The structural strength design shall take into account
see EN1473. For land structures, the primary containment will necessary strengthening of support structures for equipment
be made from cryogenic prestressed concrete, the base being applied in and forces introduced by the production facilities
made from cryogenic material (nickel steel, aluminium or and operation.
stainless steel) and a cryogenic prestressed concrete secondary 302 Support structure in steel for independent LNG tanks is
container. to comply with the requirements in DNV-OS-C101.
No concepts have currently been developed using concrete as
primary barrier for offshore terminals. It is, however, anticipat- 303 When the strength of the independent cargo tanks are de-
ed that such containment structures may be developed. One of signed in accordance with DNV Rules for the classification of
the main challenges is the handling of temperature stresses. Ships (LNG Vessels), the strength of the independent cargo
Material properties shall be derived for the temperature range tanks shall comply with the requirements in the Rules for Clas-
to which the material is exposed. sification of Ships Pt.5 Ch.5 Sec.5.
Several combinations are possible for the use of prestressed re- Accelerations acting on the tanks shall be determined by direct
inforced concrete in the cryogenic storage due to the good per- calculations based on location specific environmental data
formance of prestressed concrete under cryogenic temperature. with a return period of 100 years. DNV-OS-C101 replaces all
references to the Rules for Classification of Ships Pt.3 Ch.1.
Concrete at cryogenic temperature has increased strength in
tension and compression, increased Young’s modulus, in- The containment systems shall be designed to withstand the
creased conductivity dependent on moisture content, increased loads referred to in 303 at all loading conditions.
thermal conductivity, increased specific heat and a coefficient Material selection shall comply with the requirements in
of thermal expansion which is reduced at cryogenic tempera- DNV-OS-C101. Cargo tanks and supporting structure subject
ture (dependent of moisture content). to reduced temperature due to cargo shall comply with the re-
Reinforced concrete is not gas tight and a membrane is re- quirements in the Rules for Classification of Ships Pt.5 Ch.5
quired to ensure gas tightness. The membrane may be located Sec.2. DNV-OS-C101 replaces all references to the Rules for
on the inside of the secondary barrier. In the latter case, the ap- Classification of Ships Pt.3 Ch.1 Sec.2.
plication of the gas barrier can be made from carbon steel.
B 400 Containment systems
Reinforcement and prestressed steel exposed to cryogenic tem-
perature shall be ductile under the cryogenic temperature. 401 The LNG containment system is to be designed and con-
structed in accordance with the requirements of this standard,
In the design of a cryogenic tank system, temperature effects DNV Rules for the Classification of Ships (LNG Vessels),
on the tank systems shall be accounted for. IGC-IMO Code, NFPA 59A or EN -1473. The application of
Temperature stresses caused by constraints may control the NFPA 59A and EN-1473 requires special considerations in
prestressing level to ensure the required liquid tightness. handling environmental loading and the marine environment.
See also Appendices A-D.
The design shall incorporate the following features:
B. Design of LNG Containment Structure — a secondary containment system such if there is a failure
in the primary system, the secondary system is to be capa-
B 100 Design principles ble of containing the leaked contents for an agreed period
101 The minimum recurrence interval used to establish the of time consistent with the approval scenarios for the safe
magnitude of the Design Environmental Condition is 100 disposal of same (special considerations for IMO Type B
years, except where use of a shorter recurrence interval pro- Independent tanks)

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 Offshore Standard DNV-OS-C503, October 2004
Sec.7 – Page 33

— there is to be a minimum of two independent means of de- — survey procedure in IGC-IMO Code Clause 1.5
termining the liquid level in the LNG storage tanks — a partial secondary barrier is use by which the cargo tanks
— means to fill the tank from both the top and bottom to insulation system contains any leakage of LNG and direct
avoid stratification it to the drip trays located around the support chocks.
— independent high and high-high level alarms
— at least one pressure gauge connected to the vapour space IGC-IMO Type B independent tanks designed, constructed
— two independent overpressure protection devices and maintained in accordance with the requirement of the IGC-
— devices for measuring the liquid temperature at the top, IMO Code can be used in both floating and gravity based con-
middle and bottom tank crete terminals.
— a gas detection system which will alarm high gas concen- 406 Design of containment structures using concrete as a
trations in the space between the primary and secondary structural material shall be in accordance with this standard.
barrier Relevant material properties for the concrete for the exposure
— no pipe penetrations though the base or the walls. temperature shall be documented.
402 Tanks together with their supports and fixtures shall be 407 Prestressed concrete may be used as secondary barrier in
designed with considerations of appropriate combinations of a membrane tank system, the design, construction and in-serv-
the following loads: ice inspection shall be in accordance with this code.
— internal pressure B 500 Process facilities
— external pressure The process facilities are not covered by this standard.
— dynamic loads due to motion of the floating terminal
— seismic Loads
— thermal Loads
— sloshing C. Safety Systems
— loads corresponding to vessel deflection on floating units
— loads corresponding to global deformation in gravity C 100 General
based structures
— tank and cargo weight with corresponding reactions in 101 The safety systems are intended to protect life, property
way of the supports and the environment and are applicable to the entire installa-
— insulation weight tion, including the loading and off-loading arrangement for
— loads in way of towers and other attachments. gas, LNG and LNG Vapour. The overall safety system should
be comprised of subsystems providing two levels of protec-
The sloshing loads are to consider any level of filling in each tion; primary and secondary. The primary system is to provide
tank. protection against risk of fire or explosion and the secondary
system is intended to reduce the consequence of fire by afford-
On floating terminal structures, the loads on the supports, are ing protection to the people and the facility and reducing the
also to consider the terminal structure inclined up to the worst risk of fire spread. The primary and secondary safety measures
angle of inclination resulting from flooding consistent with the required consist of both active and passive systems as de-
terminal's damage stability criteria up to an angle of 30 de- scribed in DNV-OS-A101. The effectiveness of this system
grees. should be established by conducting a fire and explosion haz-
403 For containment systems designed in accordance with ard analysis.
IGC-IMO Code, the containment system shall be fully design, Each space is considered a fire risk, such as the process equip-
constructed and inspected during the service life in accordance ment, cargo deck area, spaces containing gas processing equip-
with IGC –IMO Code. Special conditions apply to IMO Type ment such as compressors, heaters, etc. and the machinery
B Independent tanks. equipment of category *A* as defined by SOLAS, is to be fit-
Guidance note: ted with an approved gas detection, fire detection and fire ex-
Documented inspection regimes with the same safety levels as tinguishing system complying with DNV-OS-A101.
achieved by the IDC-IMO Code may be applied.
102 In addition to the DNV requirements of DNV-OS-A101,
---e-n-d---of---G-u-i-d-a-n-c-e---n-o-t-e--- depending on the flag of registry of the unit and the area of op-
eration, the flag state and the coastal state may have additional
404 For containment systems designed in accordance with requirements or regulations which may need to be complied
the principles outlined in NFPA 59A or EN-1473, the contain- with.
ment system shall be fully design, constructed and inspected
during the service life in accordance with this standard, NFPA 103 Primary Systems
59A or EN-1473. The effect of sloshing and other effects from Many of the products being handled on board an offshore LNG
the marine environment shall be accounted for in the design. terminal are highly flammable and therefore examples of some
Such load effects are not accounted for in the above standards. of the measures that may be necessary to protect against fire or
405 The IGC-IMO Code Type B independent tanks are de- explosion risks are as follows:
signed using model tests, refined analytical tools and analysis
methods to determine stress levels, fatigue life and crack prop- — avoid the possibility of liquid or gas escaping where there
agation characteristics. The following references to IGC-IMO is a source of vapour ignition
shall be noted: — provide fixed gas detection comprised of two different
types of elements, which will activate an audible alarm at
— the requirements to analysis of such tanks are defined in a manned control station to alert of a gas release before the
IGC –IMO Code Clause 4.4.5 gas can mitigate to an unclassified area
— the limitations in stress level is defined in IGC –IMO Code — a low temperature detection system in and around the
Clause 4.5.1.4 LNG tank storage facility to sound and alarm at a manned
— requirements to secondary Barrier in accordance with IGC station to alert in the event of a liquid or vapour leak
-IMO Code Clauses 4.7.3 and 4.7.4 — a multi-tiered Emergency Shutdown system capable of
— requirements to insulation in IGC –IMO Code Clause 4.8 isolating an upset condition with local system or single
— requirements to materials IGC-IMO Code Clause 4.9 train shutdowns before the conditions requires a complete
— construction and testing IGC-IMO Code Clause 4.10 platform shutdown

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Offshore Standard DNV-OS-C503, October 2004
Page 34 – Sec.7

— maintain integrity of the containment boundary at all times Reference to Pt.5 Ch.5 Sec.14 includes only A104 and A106.
to reduce the possibility of a controlled discharge of LNG A106 shall read: The hull shall be inspected for cold spots.
or LNG vapour. Where, it is possible for LNG to leak in
the event of a failure, such as a joint, valve, or similar con- C 300 Instrumentation and automation
nection, a spill tray immediately underneath these compo-
nents should be provided 301 Control and instrumentation systems are to provide an
— maintain a positive separation between process areas, car- effective means for monitoring and controlling pressures, tem-
go storage, cargo handling area and area containing source peratures, flow rates, liquid levels and other process variables
of vapour ignition for a safe and continuous operation of the process and storage
— eliminate direct access from the space containing process facilities.
equipment to the spaces containing machinery such as 302 Control and instrumentation systems for the process,
electrical equipment, fire equipment, or other similar process supports, utility and electrical systems shall be suitable
equipment which may be considered an ignition source. for the intended application.
104 Secondary System 303 All control and safety shutdown system shall be de-
The secondary systems are systems which are employed to signed for safe operation of the equipment during start-up,
prevent the spread of fire and may be categorized as follows: shutdown and normal operational conditions.
304 The requirements given in the Rules for Classification of
— fire detection system Ships Pt.5 Ch.5 Sec.13 shall be complied with. These require-
— fire extinguishing systems ments are supplemented as follows:
— water deluge system
— personnel protection and life saving appliances — the alarm shall be so that the operator will have sufficient
— structural fire protection time to stop the flow without exceeding the maximum per-
C 200 Cargo system and equipment missible filling level.
— the automatic shut off valve shall be operated as part of the
201 The requirements given by the Rules for Classification shutdown logic for the emergency shutdown system or
of Ships Pt.5 Ch.5, shall be complied with as referenced below: process shutdown system integrating the process systems.
— piping systems in cargo area (Pt.5 Ch.5 Sec.6 A, B and C) — alarm levels for gas detections are covered by DNV-OS-
— cargo pressure or temperature control (Pt.5 Ch.5 Sec.7 A) D301 Sec.D104; at levels of 25% and 60% of lower explo-
— cargo heating arrangements (Pt.5 Ch.5 Sec.7 B) sion limit.
— insulation for tanks, hold spaces and piping (Pt.5 Ch.5
Sec.7 C) C 400 Gas detection systems
— marking of tanks, pipes and valves (Pt.5 Ch.5 Sec.8) 401 The fixed gas detection system is to comply with the re-
— gas-freeing and venting of cargo tanks and piping systems quirements in DNV-OS-A101.
(Pt.5 Ch.5 Sec.9)
— tests after installation onboard (Pt.5 Ch.5 Sec.14, see be- C 500 Emergency shutdown systems
low)
— gas operated propulsion machinery (Pt.5 Ch.5 Sec.16) 501 Emergency shutdown shall be design in accordance with
— filling limits for cargo tanks (Pt.5 Ch.5 Sec.17) DNV-OS-A101.

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 Offshore Standard DNV-OS-C503, October 2004
Sec.8 – Page 35

SECTION 8
CONSTRUCTION

A. General missioning and shutdown procedures. These include, before

start up:
A 100 General
— inerting in order to eliminate oxygen to obtain a maximum
101 Fabrication and construction of reinforced and pre- oxygen content of 8 mol %
stressed concrete LNG terminal shall be carried out in accord-
ance with DNV-OS-C502 Sec.7. The scope and definition are At the time of any shutdown for servicing which requires open-
provided in DNV-OS-C502, Sec.7 A. ing of a circuit, it is necessary to:
102 The approved for construction documentation specified
in DNV-OS-C502, Sec.7 C shall be made available at the con- — eliminate liquid hydrocarbons
struction site, prior to start of construction. — defrost (or derime) by circulating warm dry gas and inert
by scavenging with nitrogen before being able to open up
103 A supervision and inspection activity in accordance with to atmosphere.
DNV-OS-C502, Sec.7 D shall be implemented at the construc-
tion site in order to ensure appropriate compliance between the 103 Commissioning and decommissioning of LNG/LPG
“For Construction Documentation” and the “As Built Struc- storage tanks should not be regarded as a normal operational
ture”. requirement and should not be attempted on any routine basis.
104 The construction activity shall be planned in accordance 104 LNG/LPG facilities should be designed to ensure that
with DNV-OS-C502, Sec.7 E prior to start of construction. commissioning, de-commissioning and re-commissioning can
105 The constituent materials, reinforcement, prestressing be carried out in a controlled and safe manner. In this respect,
systems and concrete shall be documented in accordance with special attention should be given to the following:
DNV-OS-C502, Sec.7 F prior to start of construction. — purge connections
106 The Formworks shall be designed in accordance with — instrumentation for monitoring and recording of gaseous
DNV-OS-C502, Sec.7 G. and liquid content during emptying and purging opera-
107 The reinforcement, prestressing bars and embedded tions.
steel shall be placed in the formwork in accordance with the re- — sufficient monitoring and/or control devices to ensure that
quirements given in DNV-OS-C502, Sec.7 H. the inner and outer tanks are not subjected to positive or
negative pressures beyond the design limits during the
108 The production of concrete and grout shall be in accord- purge (in particular, upheaval of the bottom centre of the
ance with DNV-OS-C502, Sec.7 I. tank should be prevented).
109 The transport, casting, compaction and curing of the — instrumentation to permit regular sampling and monitor-
concrete shall be in accordance with DNV-OS-C502, Sec.7 J. ing of the atmosphere in the tank during inspection and re-
pair to ensure absence of hydrocarbons or any
110 The prestressing system shall be stressed and completed combustible/toxic gases.
in accordance with DNV-OS-C502, Sec.6 K. — instrumentation and piping for a controlled cool-down.
111 Repair of the concrete structure shall be in accordance
with the requirements of DNV-OS-C502, Sec.7 L. The tank contractor has to supply a detailed procedure for com-
missioning and decommissioning of the tank, to ensure that the
112 The corrosion protection system is to be installed and design criteria are not exceeded.
tested in accordance with DNV-OS-C502, Sec.7 M.
113 During construction as-Built construction records and B 200 Performance testing
As-Built documentation shall be assembled and reworked in 201 Generally the adequacy of the tank design shall be dem-
accordance with DNV-OS-C502, Sec.7 N. onstrated by means of engineering calculations and proven
114 The use of precast elements shall be designed for all material properties, supplemented with adequate quality assur-
temporary phases and its use documented in accordance in ac- ance and quality control procedures.
cordance with DNV-OS-C502, Sec.7 O. 202 Performance aspects, however, which cannot be fully
115 Geometric tolerances for the placements of reinforce- ensured, shall be verified by means of testing the LNG/LPG
ment, local and global dimensions etc. shall be in accordance tank or parts thereof. Tests may include material testing under
with DNV-OS-C502, Sec.7 O. extreme conditions, structural details of tank, parts of storage
system and/or the entire tank.
B 300 Inspection of independent steel containment
B. Specific to LNG/LPG Containment tanks
Structures Guidance note:
It is recommended that the following steps are carried out:
B 100 Construction, Commissioning and Turnaround
1) material identification
101 Acceptance tests. Equipment installed on the plant shall
be tested in accordance with the relevant codes and standards 2) approval and qualification of weld procedures
especially for: 3) qualification of welding operators
4) NDT requirements for liquid containing steel and outer
— high pressure pipework tanks. Radiographic techniques and interpretation accept-
— pressure vessels ance standards must be included in the specification.
102 Preparation at start-up and shutdown. The presence of a) 100% radiography of all bottom annular plate butt
hydrocarbons and of low temperatures, requires special com- welds

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Offshore Standard DNV-OS-C503, October 2004
Page 36 – Sec.8

b) 100% radiography of all vertical seam welds — inspect the bottom insulation for cracks and or damage
where possible.
c) 100% radiography of all horizontal seam welds
— inspect anchor bolts for buckling/slack.
d) 100% radiography of butt welds of shell stiffeners
e) 100% crack detection shall be made to the following. ---e-n-d---of---G-u-i-d-a-n-c-e---n-o-t-e---

areas: After hydrostatic testing it is recommended to vacuum-box test

the primary tank bottom again.
i) shell to floor fillet welds
ii) shell to roof annular fillet welds B 600 Pneumatic testing
iii) all shell and roof attachments including fittings 601 The tank shall be pneumatically tested. This can be done
and penetrations in accordance with the relevant BS or API codes.
iv) all ground areas after removal of welded tempo- B 700 Liners and coatings
rary attachments.
701 Concrete can not be considered fully vapour tight.
f) vacuum box testing shall be carried out at the following Therefore, the inside surface of concrete outer tanks of full
areas of both inner and outer tanks prior to and where containment tanks and of membrane tanks should be provided
applicable also after the hydrotest: with a vapour tight liner to ensure gas tightness during normal
i) all floor lap welds operation. Such liner should also reduce the ingress of water
vapour into the tank which could reduce the insulation capacity
ii) all floor butt welds of the insulation system.
iii) welds in outer tank floor. 702 The internal surface of the concrete (dome) roof is usu-
g) leak testing of possible outer steel roof.
ally provided with a carbon steel liner, which serve also as
formwork during casting of the roof. Concrete walls and bot-
toms slabs are usually provided with either a carbon steel liner
---e-n-d---of---G-u-i-d-a-n-c-e---n-o-t-e---
or with a mastic or other non-metallic coating.
B 400 Inspection of membranes of membrane tanks Reinforced concrete outer tank bottoms are sometimes provid-
ed with a secondary low temperature steel bottom to ensure liq-
401 The tightness of a corrugated membrane should be in- uid tightness after a leakage from the inner tank.
spected by means of dye penetrant tests and an ammonia test
should be carried out on all welded joints. 703 Non-metallic liners such as special coatings with a low
permeability for methane and water vapour should have a good
Guidance note: adhesion to the concrete and should have crack bridging prop-
The ammonia test is performed as follows; all the welds are erties (to bridge cracks in concrete) which ensures the sealing
painted with a very sensitive reagent which changes colour when capacity during normal operating conditions.
in contact with ammonia. Ammonia gas mixed with air is inject-
ed in the insulation space under a low pressure. The control of the 704 Steel liners are usually checked for vapour tightness by
ammonia/air ratio is performed at some calibrated leaks. means of vacuum box testing.
Possible leaks are detected and repaired. Then, the test is repeat- 705 Testing of non-metallic liners. As part of the selection
ed. procedure of a suitable non-metallic liner, the required proper-
---e-n-d---of---G-u-i-d-a-n-c-e---n-o-t-e--- ties for gas and water vapour permeability and crack bridging
capabilities should be verified.
B 500 Hydrostatic testing Inspection of non-metallic liners occurs visually during and af-
501 To verify liquid tightness, strength of the tank, bottom ter installation.
insulation and tank foundation and for reasons of stress reliev- B 800 Cool-down
ing of steel tanks, the primary tanks of an IMO Type B inde-
pendent tank shall be water tested. 801 A gradual and equal cool down of a non-restrained pri-
mary tank will result only in shrinkage of the inner tank with-
502 The composition of the test water shall be determined out stress generation in the tank material. A local cool-down
before any hydrotest is carried out and, if necessary, measures (resulting in temperature differences), however, will result in
taken to avoid corrosion. abnormal shrinkage and stress. These stresses combined with
Primary tanks shall be water-tested to a level equal to the max- those already existing from fabrication and welding may result
imum product level specified or the level 0.5 m below the top in cracking at location of stress concentration. Therefore, the
of the shell, whichever is higher. The ullage for earthquake cool-down of the tank shall be done very carefully. Special
sloshing need not be included in the design water test height. cool-down skin thermocouples should be connected to the in-
ner tank bottom and inner tank shell. The permissible temper-
503 Measurements during hydrotesting. ature difference between adjacent thermocouples should be
Guidance note: established by the designer.
— during filling and emptying of the tank, deformation of the
The use of nitrogen in cool-down may result in sub-cooling of
inner tank shall be carefully monitored at various locations. the tank below its design temperature e.g. butane to -45°C, pro-
The frequency of the measurements depends on the defor- pane to -70°C and LNG to -180°C. This sub-cooling should al-
mation behaviour. As a minimum, surveys shall be carried ways be avoided by the careful introduction of refrigerated gas
out at water levels of 25, 50, 75 and 100% of the full water into the tank, a slow cool-down and frequent, proper tempera-
test height. ture monitoring.
— if unpredicted deformations are observed, water filling shall
be stopped and the cause investigated. B 900 Extreme design conditions
— when the full water test height has been reached, the water
shall be left in the tank for at least 48 hours, whereafter a vis- 901 Subjecting an LNG tank or parts of it to extreme design
ual inspection shall be carried out for evidence of leaks, e.g. conditions should be avoided as it implies testing of the struc-
water leaking through welds or seeping out of the founda- ture to its ultimate design condition with inevitably some de-
tion ring supporting the inner tank shell, etc. gree of damage.

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 Offshore Standard DNV-OS-C503, October 2004
Sec.8 – Page 37

B 1000 Painting, fire proofing and embrittlement protec- All painting, galvanising, colour coding and marking shall be
tion designed and executed in accordance with local rules.
1001 Painting. Protective coating of metal surfaces of equip- 1002 Fire Proofing. Equipment and specific bulk material in
ment, pipelines and metallic structures in an LNG installation LNG plants shall to be protected from the effects of heat input
is required. Concrete structures may also be coated to protect from fires.
them from wear and tear. Supports for equipment and bulk material have to be protected
The coating system shall primarily protect metal surfaces in such a way that their function and form are not adversely af-
against corrosion at operating conditions in the actual environ- fected during a certain period of fire.
ment of the LNG plant location. Fire proofing is also required on control equipment and cables
Saliferous or aggressive atmospheres have to be taken into ac- in order to maintain their operability in case of fire.
count. Fire proofing can be provided by:
Before any coating special preparation of the surface shall be — preformed or sprayed concrete
carried out. Coating usually consists of various layers starting — plate material made of mineral fibre, ceramic calcium sil-
with primer coat, intermediate and finish coat on carbon ste icate or cellular glass
low alloy steel with less than 12% Cr and austenitic stainless — intumescent coatings.
steel surfaces.
High quality hot-dip galvanising is required on all platform Fire proofing shall be designed and executed in accordance
and platform support steel work, stairway and handrail assem- with the appropriate International standards.
blies, ladder side rails and cages, plates, stair treads and open 1003 Embrittlement protection. Equipment and specific bulk
grid flooring etc. unless impracticable. material which could be affected by an LNG leak (for example
from flanges) shall be protected from brittle failure.
Galvanised surfaces shall normally be left unpainted except for
marine environment for which additional painting is recom- Such a protection shall be achieved by an appropriate material
mended. Galvanised metal jackets used to cover insulation of selection (concrete, stainless
piping or equipment can receive further anti corrosion coating. steel, etc.) or by a tagging with material that will protect the
It is recommended that galvanised surfaces are located so as to equipment and specific bulk material from the cold shock.
avoid the possibility of molten zinc contaminating stainless This layer shall be designed and installed in accordance with
steel piping and equipment in the event of a fire possibly lead- appropriate standards. Provision shall be taken to protect their
ing to inter granular corrosion and brittle failure. outer surface from wear and tear due to outdoor conditions.
For safety reasons all equipment and piping in LNG installa- Equipment and specific bulk material have to be protected in
tions shall have a specific colour or marking for identification such a way that their function and form are not adversely af-
of the contents. fected during the plant operation.

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Offshore Standard DNV-OS-C503, October 2004
Page 38 – Sec.9

SECTION 9
IN-SERVICE INSPECTION, MAINTENANCE AND CONDITIONAL
MONITORING OF SUPPORT STRUCTURE AND TANK

A. General — potential leakage zones are identified

— the maximum tolerable time of leakage corresponding to
A 100 Concrete Substructure the risk acceptability level in question is determined for
101 The purpose of this Section is to specify requirements each zone that leakage time depends on the following, in
and recommendations for in-service inspection, maintenance particular:
and condition monitoring of offshore concrete LNG Terminal — the maximum leakage flow rate which can be envis-
Structures and Containment Systems and to indicate how these aged
requirements and recommendations can be achieved. Alterna- — the existence of a retention system.
tive methods may also fulfil the intent of these provisions and
can be applied provided they can be demonstrated and docu- — failure of a sensor is tolerated if with the other sensors in
mented to provide the same level of safety and confidence. service, the safety system as a whole allows the leak to be
102 The scope of In-Service inspection, monitoring and sealed off within the period of time laid down.
maintenance shall be in accordance with DNV-OS-C502,
Sec.8, A200. B 200 Gas detection
103 Qualification of personnel involved in inspection plan- 201 Gas detectors are installed for fast detection of gas,
ning and condition assessment shall be in accordance with which can be present because of gas leaks or LNG leaks which
DNV-OS-C502, Sec.8, A300. evaporate.
104 Planning of the in-service inspection, maintenance and 202 Gas detectors should be of the following types:
monitoring activities shall be in accordance with DNV-OS- — catalytic combustion sensors
C502, Sec.8, A400. — semi-conductor sensors
105 A programme for inspection and condition monitoring — thermal conductivity sensors
shall be prepared in accordance with DNV-OS-C502, Sec.8, — equivalent or improved sensors.
A500.
These detectors shall be conform to EN 50054 and EN 50057
106 Inspection and condition monitoring milestones and in- or equivalent standards.
tervals shall be in accordance with DNV-OS-C502, Sec.8,
A600. 203 The gas detectors which will be used in an LNG plant
shall be calibrated to a value equal to or less than 25% of the
107 Documentation of inspection, condition monitoring and lower flammability limit in air of the gas monitored.
maintenance shall be in accordance with DNV-OS-C502,
Sec.8, A700. 204 The range of gas concentrations to be measured shall be
between 0% and the lower flammability limit.
108 Recommended items for inspection and condition mon-
itoring are given in DNV-OS-C502, Sec.8, A800. 205 Gas detectors shall be installed in an LNG plant as a re-
sult of the hazard assessment and particularly near to the fol-
109 Recommendations for inspections related to corrosion lowing units:
control is given in DNV-OS-C502, Sec.8, A900.
110 Inspection and condition monitoring types shall be in ac- — throughout the liquefaction plant
cordance with DNV-OS-C502, Sec.8, A1000. — loading/ unloading areas
— vaporisers
111 A marking system shall be established in accordance — at the inlet of burners of vaporisers, air compressors, diesel
with DNV-OS-C502, Sec.8, A1100. engines, gas turbines and gas engines
112 A guideline for inspection of special areas is provided in — LNG pumps
DNV-OS-C502, Sec.8, A1200. — flanges
— points of possible concentration of LNG in any impound-
ing basins
— boil off gas compressors.
B. Special for LNG containment system — buildings and enclosed spaces where gas can accumulate
— at the inlet of building heating, venting and air condition-
B 100 General ing systems.
101 A Gas detection system shall be installed. The detection 206 The detectors shall be installed taking into account the
system shall give warning of leakage of LNG or natural gas or specific gravity of the gas, ventilation, the atmospheric condi-
other flammable refrigerants or noxious vapours from the tions and the results of the dispersion calculations. Their loca-
LNG plant, and indicate the presence of smoke or flames in the tion shall allow fast and accurate detection of possible leaks.
event of the outbreak of fire.
The detection systems provided for each equipment item shall B 300 Cold detection
be specified in the description of the installation. 301 Cold detectors are installed for the detection of LNG
102 The level of back-up required for safety equipment de- leaks. They can be of the following types
pends on the risk acceptability level of the event which can re-
sult from failure of that equipment. — fibre optic systems
— temperature probes (thermocouples, resistance type
103 Up to a certain level of risk, it is not necessary to dupli- probes, etc.)
cate every piece of detection equipment, but the detection sys- — equivalent or improved sensors.
tem installed shall ensure detection of an event. The level of
acceptability is arrived as follows: 302 The detectors shall be chosen for optimum efficiency at

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 Offshore Standard DNV-OS-C503, October 2004
Sec.9 – Page 39

LNG temperatures. They shall be insensitive to long term en- B 700 Safety control system
vironmental changes. Their mechanical characteristics shall al- 701 The safety control system shall be designed for loss pre-
low simple installation and maintenance. vention:
303 Unlike other detection systems, fibre optic systems al-
low distributed detection for which the minimum necessary — detection of loss of containment:
equipment shall be a self check unit for checking the correct
operation of the system at fixed intervals. At the same time a — LNG spillage
second unit shall check the correct operation of the self check — natural gas leakage
unit. An alarm shall be connected to these units. — fire
304 The use of cold detectors is recommended in LNG stor- — activation of ESDs
age tank impounding areas, if any, in LNG impounding collec- — monitoring and control of protection equipment.
tion basins, around LNG pumps and in LNG spillage
collection channels, if any. This system shall permit automatic detection of unsafe condi-
tions and shall activate automatically and/or manually the ap-
305 They shall be installed at low points where LNG is likely propriate ESD, for example:
to collect. Their location shall allow fast and accurate detection
of possible leaks. — loading or unloading
B 400 Smoke detection — send out
— liquefaction.
401 Smoke detectors can be of the following types:
702 Emergency shut down (ESD). The emergency shut down
— ionisation smoke detectors system can include some process shut down functions. For the
— photoelectric smoke detectors purpose of this clause, only the primary safety functions are
— equivalent or improved sensors. described.
402 It is recommended to choose detectors that are capable 703 In respect with the hazard assessment, a cause and effect
of stabilising their sensitivity with respect to variation in pres- matrix shall be established in order to perform the right ESD as
sure, moisture and temperature. a function of the location and nature of abnormal conditions
detected.
403 It is recommended that the detectors are installed in are-
as containing electrical cubicles and cabinets. Within these 704 Additionally, when an operator in the control room or
buildings they shall be installed at points where smoke is most on-site presses an "ESD push button", the corresponding ESD
likely to concentrate. shall be performed.
705 Fire and gas detectors are located so as to be able to han-
B 500 Fire detection dle the incidents determined in the hazard assessment. See
501 Fire detectors are installed for fast detection of fire. Sec.2.
502 Fire detectors can be of the following types: 706 The safety control system shall be designed to:

— ultra-violet detectors (UV) — monitor and control the protection equipment, for exam-
— infra red detectors (IR) ple:
— equivalent or improved sensors, e.g. thermal detectors.
— water curtains
503 These devices can give false alarms. Sources of false de- — foam generators
tection for UV detectors are, for — fixed powder-extinguishers
— pressurisation of dedicated rooms.
example, X rays and arc welding. IR detectors are sensitive to
solar radiation and infrared sources such as hot equipment — monitor and control the protection auxiliaries, for exam-
commonly found in an LNG plant. UV/IR detectors are recom- ple:
mended.
504 Depending on the reliability-needed the detectors can be — fire pumps
equipped with self checking devices. It is recommended that — fire water system valves
these detectors be installed in close proximity to places where — foam agent pumps
leaks and ignition are most likely, i.e.: — emulsifier or foam agent network valves (if any).

— loading-unloading areas — inform the operator of any incident

— in any impounding basins — activate automatically the appropriate ESD
— all other positions appropriate to the installation. — activate automatically the appropriate protection equip-
ment
B 600 Meteorological instruments — inform the process control system of ESD activation and
activate PSD (if applicable).
601 A meteorological station shall be installed in LNG lique-
faction plants and receiving terminals in order to measure: 707 Data acquisition. The safety control system detection
may be based on the following types of detectors:
— air temperature
— barometric pressure — specific point gas detectors
— humidity — linear gas detectors
— wind direction — smoke detectors
— wind velocity — flame detectors
— wave heights. — specific point cold detectors
— linear cold detectors.
The measurements obtained shall enable the deployment of ac-
tive fire protection equipment to be determined. The required The safety control system shall collect:
reliability shall be determined in accordance with the hazard
assessment. — information of each detector

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Offshore Standard DNV-OS-C503, October 2004
Page 40 – Sec.9

— ambient temperature, the wind direction and its velocity — a general procedure to open all emergency exits
— information from the protection equipment, the protection — an external audible alarm (siren or klaxon).
auxiliaries and the safety process equipment (LNG valves,
blow down valves, pressure switches, etc.). 711 Furthermore, in case of computerised control system,
critical alarms shall be hard wired to the special alarm annun-
708 Monitoring and control. The safety control system shall ciator in the main control room.
enable the operator in the control room to: 712 The reliability of the system shall be consistent with the
safety level of the plant. An ESD shall always be performed
— monitor and control protection equipment even in case of dysfunction of the safety control system.
— monitor and control protection auxiliaries
— activate any ESD with the corresponding push button 713 Access control system. Access points for entering inside
— inhibit the automatic activation of any ESD with a key. the plant boundary shall be controlled through separate, spe-
cially adapted barriers.
The safety control system shall give the operator in the control The opening of these barriers shall be authorised through a spe-
room: cific access control which shall be able to:
— the status of each detector — verify the level of authorisation
— the status of protection equipment — count the number of people going through an opened door
— the status of protection auxiliaries — automatically open all the barriers, including fire fighting
— the meteorological parameters and emergency access roads, as part of a plant evacuation
— the list of all the detectors that have detected an incident. procedure following an incident.
and it shall be able to print reports and save data. Depending on the size of the plant, access to process zones
where gas is stored, piped or processed can be controlled. Such
709 The system shall automatically start pumps to prevent control can be limited to process zones or extended to a wider
the fire water system pressure from dropping below a set value. area. Control of access can be put into practice either by secu-
710 In addition, the safety control system can automatically rity guards or by using a physical device (lock, magnetic
activate in case of incident: badge, etc.).

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 Offshore Standard DNV-OS-C503, October 2004
App.A – Page 41

APPENDIX A
HAZARD ASSESSMENT OF LNG TERMINALS (GUIDELINES)

A. Hazard Assessment 202 The deterministic approach consists in:

A 100 Hazards and operability study (HAZOP) — list of potential hazards of external and internal origin.,
— establishment of credible hazards
101 All LNG/LPG projects shall be subjected to a prelimi-
nary process hazard review at process flow sheet definition — determination of the consequences necessary
stage, for example to minimise the number of equipment items — justification of the necessary safety improvement meas-
and the total inventory of hazardous materials. ures to limit the risks.
102 A HAZOP shall be conducted when the piping and in- 203 The hazard assessment can be based on conventional
strumentation diagrams (P&IDs) are sufficiently developed methods such as:
and approved by the Owner.
— hazard and operability study (HAZOP)
103 The HAZOP shall be developed to identify and elimi- — failure mode effect analysis (FMEA)
nate or minimise hazards. — event tree method (ETM)
104 The HAZOP shall be conducted by a multi-disciplinary — fault tree method (FTM).
team who shall systematically address the piping and instru-
mentation diagrams (P&IDs) and identity credible events Implementation of the over-all procedure shall be initiated as
caused by deviations from the design intent. early as possible and shall be repeated when unacceptable risks
105 The analysis shall include the following principles: are identified during the design.

— be systematic, following a proven approach based on pip- A 300 Identification of hazards of external origin
ing and instrumentation diagrams (P&IDs), applied to all 301 The studies of the natural, urban and industrial environ-
normal modes of operation, to commissioning, to start-up, ment and also of external communication routes enable haz-
to emergency shutdown and to normal shutdown ards arising from outside the plant to be listed. Such hazards
— be conducted by a review panel to be chaired by an expe- can be caused by:
rienced and competent engineer, and including other per-
sons competent in design and operation. At least one — LNG carriers and ships at berth or when manoeuvring
member of the team should have intimate Knowledge of — heat radiation (fire)
this type of installation — clouds of flammable, toxic or asphyxiant gas
— the review panel shall be given sufficient resources, for ex- — the impact of projectiles (ship, helicopters, plane, etc.)
ample in terms of time and access to specialist knowledge — natural events (extreme waves, lightning, flooding, earth-
— give rise to a formal written report describing the findings quakes, etc.)
and recommendations concerning the changes to plant de- — high energy radio waves, etc.
sign or operating procedures
— proper follow up leading to the resolution of all points A 400 Identification of hazards of internal origin
shall be documented. 401 Hazard arising from LNG/LPG
106 New facilities shall be analysed before start-up. To al- Possible loss of containment of LNG shall be listed for all
low the necessary modifications to be made without compro- items of equipment including the loading or unloading of LNG
mising the start-up schedule, a full analysis shall normally be carriers. To simplify the study, scenarios may be established.
performed before the Approved for Construction issue. A re- The following events shall as a minimum be considered:
view and approval procedure shall be established for the man-
agement of change during construction, with if necessary a full — loss of primary liquid containment (for a duration to be de-
and final analysis based on "As Built” drawings. termined based on an approved contingency plan)
107 Operating facilities shall be analysed following a plant — LNG release
modification, with if necessary a full and final analysis before — release of flammable or toxic gas to the atmosphere or in-
restart. A review and approval procedure shall be established side an enclosed space
for the management of minor change during normal operating — roll over (thermodynamic instability due to LNG stratifi-
periods. cation)
A 200 Methodology These scenarios shall be defined in terms of:
201 The methodology of the hazard assessment can be prob- — the probability of the hazard
abilistic and/or deterministic. The probabilistic approach con- — the location of the leak
sists of — the nature of the fluid (LNG or gas, specifying the temper-
— collection of failure rate data, ature thereof)
— list of potential hazards of external and internal origin — the rate and the duration of the leakage
— determination and classification of the probability of these — weather conditions (wind speed and direction, atmospher-
hazards ic stability, ambient temperature, relative humidity)
— determination of the consequences of each hazard and — for spillage of LNG, the effect of the environment (includ-
their allocation into classes of consequence ing any impounding area) and the effect on the properties
— classification of accidents in accordance with their conse- of structural steelwork leading to brittle failure due to low
quences and probability criteria in order to determine the or cryogenic.temperatures.
level of risk
— verification that no hazard comes within the "Unaccepta- A 500 Hazards which are not specific to LNG/LPG
ble Risk" category 501 The following causes of hazards which are not specific
— justification of the measures necessary to limit risks to LNG shall be considered:

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Offshore Standard DNV-OS-C503, October 2004
Page 42 – App.A

— damage to the primary structure due to extreme weather, — design pressures and temperatures of piping and equip-
impact/collision, dropped objects, helicopter collision, ex- ment shall be selected to cover all anticipated normal and
posure to unsuitable cold temperatures, exposure to high upset conditions
radiant heat — wherever possible plant and equipment containing flam-
— fire and explosion mable fluid shall be located in the open, however, mainte-
— LPG and heavier hydrocarbon storage nance and climatic conditions will affect this decision
— poor communication between ship and terminal — plant layout shall be designed to avoid congestion
— leakage of other hazardous substances, in particular flam- — appropriate piping flexibility to suit all operating condi-
mable refrigerant tions
— pressurised and steam raising equipment — the number of flanges in pipe runs shall be minimised by
using welded inline valves where practical. Where flanges
— rotating machinery are used they should be oriented so that if a leak occurs the
— utilities, catalysts and chemicals (fuel oil, lubricating oils, jet stream shall not impinge on nearby equipment
methanol, etc.) — the orientation of flanges and relief valve tail pipes shall be
— electrical installations such as to minimise hazard
— docking installations associated with the LNG plant. — design pressures shall leave a sufficiently wide margin
— loss of any single component in the station keeping/moor- above operating pressures so as to minimise the frequency
ing system of the lifting of relief valves
— loss of ability to offload LNG or discharge gas ashore — pumps with high integrity seals or submerged pumps and
— loss of stability motors shall be used for LNG and LPG
— structures supporting piping and equipment handling
A 600 Hazardous area classifications flammable fluids shall be designed to withstand the ulti-
mate limit state
601 All installations shall be subjected to an hazardous area — techniques for industrial risk management shall be em-
analysis. The terms of reference for such an analysis shall be ployed from the design through to start up, operation, dur-
laid down in accordance with DNV-OS-A101 or equivalent In- ing maintenance and modifications.
ternational Standard.
602 The extent of hazardous zones shall be as given in DNV- 903 Internal overpressure protection
OS-A101 or equivalent International Standard. The selection Safety devices shall be provided to cover all internal overpres-
of equipment for use in particular locations shall be determined sure risks including those due to fire.
by the hazardous zone classification of these locations in ac-
cordance with DNV-OS-A101 or equivalent International It is recommended that the discharge from conventional safety
Standard. devices (safety valves, relief valves), unless those from tanks
and vaporisers, are routed to the flare/vent system or the stor-
A 700 Estimation of probabilities age tank.
701 The estimation of the probability associated with a given In fact, the temperature and the height of the discharge of the
hazard. where utilised, shall be based on reliable data bases released gas from tanks and vaporisers allow a good atmos-
which are suitable for the LNG industry or on recognised pheric dispersion. This point shall be confirmed by the hazard
methods as in A200 which will determine the probability range assessment. In addition, this measure avoids pressure drop
for this hazard. The human factor shall be taken into account. and/or obstruction inside the flare system and consequently re-
duces the risk.
A 800 Estimation of consequences If the hazard assessment shows that the consequences of the
801 The consequences of each scenario will depend on the discharge directly to atmosphere are acceptable, then connec-
tion to the flare/vent system is not necessary.
characteristics of LNG and other phenomena. For the conse-
quences of leakage or spillage of fluids other than LNG refer- 904 Emergency depressurising
ence shall be made to their Material Safety Data Sheets. If no appropriate protection is installed such as fire insulation,
802 Evaporation of spilled LNG water deluge system etc., it is recommended that automatic or
semi-automatic depressurising systems are provided when a
The phenomenon of instantaneous vaporisation (flash) shall be BLEVE risk due to overpressure and elevated wall tempera-
taken into account. Calculation of evaporation due to heat ture is present (see EN 1160).
transfer shall be carried out using appropriate validated mod-
els. The intention of this measure is to:
The model shall, as a minimum, take the following into ac- — reduce the internal pressure
count: — reduce the effect in case of leakage
— avoid the risk of failure of LNG or gas filled pressure ves-
— the LNG flow rate and duration sels and piping from external radiation including those due
— the LNG composition to fire.
— the temperature of the water
— the atmospheric conditions (ambient temperature, humid- Devices for depressurising high pressure equipment shall al-
ity, wind velocity) low the pressure of one or more than one item of equipment to
— the atmospheric stability or temperature gradient. be reduced quickly. Reduction from the design pressure to
50% of the design pressure, or 7 bar (gauge) if that value is
A 900 Safety measures on the LNG plant higher than 50% of the design pressure, in 15 min., should gen-
erally be provided for. The gases thus extracted shall be sent to
901 Leaks of LNG and refrigerants produce flammable va- the flare system which shall be capable of handling the low
pour clouds denser than air. The terminal shall therefore be de- temperatures generated during depressurise.
signed to eliminate or minimise the quantity and frequency of
accidental and planned emissions of these fluids. Isolating valves, activated from the control room or other re-
mote location shall be provided so that the unit can be isolated
902 This shall be achieved by that the best available rules of into several sub-systems and where it is required to isolate sen-
technology are implemented. Particular consideration shall be sitive equipment. This will make it possible to depressurise
given to the following: only one part of the plant, while limiting the entry of hydrocar-

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 Offshore Standard DNV-OS-C503, October 2004
App.A – Page 43

bons into a fire containing zone. flux. Adaption of methods proposed elsewhere in this Europe-
an Standard for LNG may be used.
A 1000 LNG terminal layout
1205 Protection of the tanks and safety equipment against ra-
1001 The layout of an LNG Terminal with respect to the sur- diation from fire in the retaining basin, if any, of adjacent tanks
roundings shall be covered by a hazard assessment. See also shall be taken into account.
DNV-OS-A101.
1002 The prevailing wind direction shall be considered in A 1300 Seismic protection
LNG Terminal layout. Where practicable, control rooms, ac- 1301 The following systems shall withstand actions result-
commodation area and ignition sources shall not be downwind ing from earthquake:
of accidental and planned releases of flammable materials, but
they shall be located as far as possible outside hazardous areas, — systems for which rupture can create a hazard for the plant
assuming a wind in any direction. — protection systems for which operation is required to keep
1003 The LNG terminal shall be laid out to provide safe ac- a minimum safety level.
cess for construction, operation, maintenance and for fire 1302 For earthquake design purpose, the plant systems and
fighting: their components shall be classified on basis of their impor-
— separation distances shall take into account, in particular tance, from a safety point of view, such classification being an-
— radiation flux levels alysed during hazard assessment:
— lower flammability limit contours — Class A: systems which are vital for the plant safety. They
— noise shall remain operational for both SLE and DLE.
— blast effects.
— Class B: systems performing vital functions for the plant
1004 The LNG Terminal main control room shall be located operation or for which collapse could cause a major im-
outside hazardous areas. Furthermore, it shall be designed to pact on the environment or could lead to additional hazard.
suit explosive atmospheres resulting from gas dispersion. and These systems shall remain operational after SLE and
to resist overpressure created by explosions '. The control room shall keep their integrity in case of DLE. Class B shall in-
shall be designed to protect the occupants for as long as neces- clude as a minimum the secondary containment of all
sary to effectuate the emergency procedures and then allow LNG tanks.
them to safely escape from the incident. — Class C: other systems. These systems shall remain oper-
ational after SLE and shall not fall on or impact other sys-
1005 For diesel driven fire water pumps and emergency gen- tems classes and components after DLE.
erators the air intake shall be located outside the predicted va-
pour cloud envelope. 1303 The systems include the related equipment, piping,
valves, instrumentation, power supply and their supports.
A 1100 Emergency shutdown Structures shall be designed as for the class of the most strin-
1101 An emergency shutdown ESD system independent gent system component they are supporting.
from the process control system shall be provided. See DNV- 1304 The structure shall be designed to keep their integrity
OS-A101. in case of DLE. Heating, ventilating and air conditioning shall
A 1200 Fire protection be designed in order to fulfil the criteria of the classified sys-
tems which are located in the structure.
1201 Equipment, including ESD valves and vessels contain-
ing quantities of liquid hydrocarbon which can cause an esca- 1305 The most commonly used methods for qualification are
lation of an incident shall be protected from thermal radiation. hereafter listed:
Piperack supports and vessel skirts and ESD valves which can
receive thermal radiation resulting from an ignited leak shall — time history analysis
be provided with at least 90 min. protection. — modal spectral analysis
— load coefficient method
1202 Fire protection in the form of insulation or water deluge — spacing chart.
shall be provided for pressure vessels which can receive ther-
mal radiation fluxes from external sources in excess of allow- They range from the most sophisticated one (time history anal-
able thermal radiation flux inside the boundary / EN1473 ysis), containing the least undue conservatism, to the most
4.3.1/. This to prevent such vessels failing and releasing super- coarse (spacing chart), including a very high degree of con-
heated liquid, which can result in a BLEVE. servatism.
1203 It shall be recognised that pressure vessels subject to When it is estimated that qualification by analysis is unfeasi-
radiation in excess of that defined in /EN1473 4.3.1/ from a ble, qualification by test shall be performed.
major incident such as an LNG tank fire shall require protec-
tion for much more than 90 min. This is not likely to be A 1400 Confinement
achieved by insulation and a water deluge system is necessary. 1401 Confined or partially confined zones shall be avoided
1204 The calculation of water deluge, insulation for fire pro- as far as possible, in particular the space situated under the base
tection of structures etc. as protection against fires shall be per- slab of raised tanks, if any, shall be sufficiently high to allow
formed for the fluid which gives rise to the highest radiation air to circulate.

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Offshore Standard DNV-OS-C503, October 2004
Page 44 – App.B

APPENDIX B
HAZARD DEFINITIONS (GUIDELINES)

A. Hazard Definitions 206 Class 5: Nil consequences:

A 100 Probabilities ranges This concerns events which arise during day to day operation
of the system, The quantity of the LNG concerned is lower
Range 1: Frequent or quasi-certain event. than 0.06 m3.
This corresponds, in quantitative terms, to a A 300 Levels of risk
probability of occurrence of more than 10-2/
Year. 301 General
Range 2: Possible but not very frequent event. Tables A1 and A2 give examples of risk levels.
Probability of occurrence lying between over 302 Level 1: Situation which is undesirable and therefore re-
10-2 up to 10-4 /Year. fused. (Not acceptable).
Range 3: Rare event. Arrangements for processes, procedures and items of equip-
Probability of occurrence tying between over ment shall be provided as quickly as possible.
10-4 up to 10-6 /Year. 303 Level 2: Situation which shall be improved.
Range 4: Extremely rare event. A level at which it shall be demonstrated that the risks is made
Probability of occurrence lying between over as low as reasonably practical.
10-6 up to 10-8 /Year. 304 Level 3: Normal situation. (Acceptable).
Range 5: Improbable event.
Table A1 Determination of level of risk inside the Boundary
Probability less than 10-8 /Year. Plant
Range 6: Event of non-quantifiable probability (failing of Probability classes 5 4 3 2 1
meteorite, attempt on life or property, etc.).

Nil Consequences

Consequences

Consequences

Consequences

consequences
A 200 Classes of consequence

Catastrophic
Significant
Repairable
201 Classes of consequence take into account the extent of

Serious
injury and damage.
202 Class 1: Catastrophic or major consequences
— total stoppage of the plant and 6 Non quantifiable 3 3 3 3 3
— one or more than one person dead or 5 Entirely improbable 3 3 3 3 3
— one or more than one external system damaged or de- (< 10-8 /year)
stroyed or 4 Extremely rare 3 3 3 2 2
— the quantity of the LNG concerned is greater than 60 m3 or (l0-8 to 10-6 /year)
— the cost of the damage is greater than 10% of the new val- 3 Rare 3 3 2 2 1
ue of the installation. (10-6 /year to 10-4 /year)
2 Possible 3 2 2 1 1
203 Class 2: Serious or critical consequences: (10-4 /year to 10-2 /year)
— total stoppage of the plant and 1 Frequent (> 10-2) 3 2 2 1 1
— the quantity of the LNG concerned is greater than 6 m3 and
lower than 60 m3 or
— one or more than one system destroyed inside the plant or Table A2 Determination of level of risk outside the Boundary
— the cost of the damage is greater than 1% and lower than Plant
10% of the new value of the installation. Probability classes 5 4 3 2 1
Nil Consequences

204 Class 3: Significant consequences:

Consequences

Consequences

Consequences

consequences

— there is appreciable degradation of the system which could

Catastrophic
Significant
Repairable

bring about interruption of the plant. There are only limit-

Serious

ed material losses and not any irreversible damage of the

system
— the quantity of the LNG concerned is greater than 0.6 m3
and lower than 6 m3 or 6 Non quantifiable 3 3 3 3 3
— the cost of the damage is greater than 0.1% and lower than 5 Entirely improbable 3 3 3 2 2
1% of the new value of, the installation. (< 10-8 /year)
205 Class 4: Minor or repairable consequences: 4 Extremely rare 3 3 2 2 2
(l0-8 to 10-6 /year)
— there is no appreciable degradation of performance likely 3 Rare 3 3 2 2 1
to jeopardise the task of the plant or (10-6 /year to 10-4 /year)
— the quantity of the LNG concerned is lower than 0.6 m3 or 2 Possible 3 2 2 1 1
— the cost of the damage is lower than 0.1% of the new value (10-4 /year to 10-2 /year)
of the installation 1 Frequent (> 10-2) 3 2 2 1 1

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 Offshore Standard DNV-OS-C503, October 2004
App.C – Page 45

APPENDIX C
GENERAL DESIGN PRINCIPLES LNG CONTAINMENT STRUCTURES
(GUIDELINES)

A. General Design Principles — the appropriate choice of protective structural systems

— the identification and assessment of relevant testing oper-
A 100 Design considerations ation and hazard scenarios
101 The design principles outline below is issued as guide- — the modelling of these scenarios in terms of design combi-
lines for the detailed design of concrete secondary containment nations of actions
structures and the main load bearing structure of a LNG con- — the limit state design against the action effects resulting
tainment structure. from these combinations
— appropriate structural detailing in view of cross-sections,
102 The design of retaining and processing facilities of ex- — definition of critical regions.
plosive or poisonous materials includes:
107 Corresponding functional requirements are the same as
— the conceptional design-resulting in the final configura- for conventional design:
tion of the plant
— the final shaping of the individual structure — load bearing
— the detailed design resulting in the assessment of the struc- — tightening against liquids and gas
tural performance — insulating against inside and outside temperature states
— the safety verifications
— the detailing of the structural components for the practical However, different from conventional design are the required
construction. performances during a hazard. Since the design objective is the
limitation of damage, the limit states to be verified may allow
The structural design should take into account all relevant stag- for damages which are not acceptable under usual operation.
es of the structure from erection, testing to operation. For safe- For example tightness requirements during a hazard may allow
ty reasons this includes the consideration of possible accidents for a controlled loss of the stored material unless the conse-
and the assessment of the structural performance under corre- quences of this loss are unacceptable.
sponding hazard scenarios.
108 In view of the built-in structural resistance the choice of
103 The verification of the required structural performance the appropriate protective structural system is of paramount
under construction, testing, operation and during accidents importance. Three principle functions must be fulfilled by the
shall be based on limit state design. For action scenarios result- structural system:
ing from construction testing and operation. It is of primary
importance to assure appropriate service behaviour. — retaining of the stored material
This requires a design in relevant serviceability limit states — insulating between cryogenic and environmental tempera-
(SLS), (for example deformation limit states, limit states of tures
crack width etc.) and in relevant ultimate limit states (ULS) — shielding against hazards
concerning resistance, stability and eventually deformability.
109 The appropriate choice of structural systems includes
It should be noted that very often serviceability limit states that these functions are clearly assigned to corresponding
(SLS) govern the final dimensioning and detailing of the con- structural elements. Furthermore redundancy of the operating
crete structures. and protective performance should be assured in the event of
104 For action scenarios resulting from possible hazards de- the failure of those structural elements which are important to
sign shall assure that the damages liable to occur during these guarantee trouble-free operation and adequate protection.
hazards are limited. The acceptable damage levels depend on Redundancy during operation will generally be assured by ap-
conditions imposed by the necessary protection of persons, of propriate process engineering, redundancy during hazards re-
the environment and of properties. In general all safety consid- quires the design of appropriate shielding barriers. The degree
erations are governed by the required limitation of damage of redundancy during hazards depends on the damage level
consequences in the case of accidents. which is acceptable as a consequence of a failing structural el-
105 To assure adequate safety of structures which bear high ement. Such acceptable damage levels should be chosen in
risk potentials both the event probability (Pevent) and the fail- view of the pertaining event probability.
ure probability (Pfailure) must be limited. Limitation of the 110 Analytical design of storage and processing facilities has
event probability means active safety measures aiming at re- to assess and to analyse design scenarios related to
ducing the hazard initiating event probabilities.
These measures comprise among others: — construction
— testing
— adequate decisions concerning the location of the facility — usual operation
— adequate choices concerning tank layout and spacing — hazards
— active fire protection
— active protection to limit the probability of explosions and 111 The structural requirements to be met during construc-
impacts tion, testing, operation and hazard scenarios are related to
— provision for pressure and vacuum reliefs tightness, load bearing, shielding and insulating. Verification
— provision of alarm systems indicating leakage and spillage of the required structural performance is based on limit state
— provision of protective systems against lightning design. Corresponding design limit states are defined in Ap-
pendix D "Detailed Design Structural Design of Containment
106 Passive safety measures which limit the failure probabil- System" and comprise fire resistance, cold spot and shock re-
ity to acceptable levels. These measures comprise: sistance, energy dissipation, ultimate load bearing, structural
integrity and repairability, fluid tightness and insulation capac-
— lay-out and site studies ity.

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Offshore Standard DNV-OS-C503, October 2004
Page 46 – App.C

112 The material factors for concrete, structural steel, rein- — for double and full containment tanks where the secondary
forcing and prestressing steel and the factors to apply to the container is made of metal, it shall be of cryogenic grade
prestressing force for verifications of ultimate (ULS) and serv- — when the secondary container is made of prestressed con-
iceability limit states (SLS) under permanent, transient and ac- crete, the temperature of the prestress cables shall remain
cidental action combinations are those specified in Sec.5 for compatible with the strength of the maximum hydrostatic
the design of the concrete barriers and support structure. head. It is to be assumed for calculation that the tempera-
ture of the LNG is applied directly onto the internal face,
A 200 General requirements including the insulation, if any.
201 Equipment for which the design pressure is more than
500 mbar shall meet the requirements of applicable standards A 400 Tank connections
or codes used for the design of pressure vessels. 401 External connections shall be designed to accept loads
202 Metal storage tanks for the storage of LNG shall be de- imposed from the external piping and internal piping, if any.
signed in accordance with the requirements of Sec.7 B Design 402 The fluid and gas transfer pipelines which penetrate the
of LNG Containment Structure. container shall satisfy the following requirements:
203 IMO type B independent tanks designed, constructed — penetrations shall not give rise to excessive heat input
and inspected in-service in accordance with the requirements — where penetrations are subject to thermal contraction and
of IGC - IMO Code can be used for offshore terminals provid- expansion which can be rapid if necessary the internal
ed the independent tanks are fully designed in accordance with connections shall be strengthened and the external connec-
the IGC-IMO Code and DNV Rules for Classification of Ships tions shall be designed to transmit external piping loads to
Pt.5 Ch.5 Sec.5. The support concrete structure shall be de- a thermal expansion compensating system
signed in accordance with this standard. — there shall be no penetrations of the primary and second-
204 The LNG tanks shall be designed to: ary container walls or base. Overflow pipes are not recom-
mended. If overflow pipes cannot be avoided, the
— safely contain the liquid at cryogenic temperature associated additional risk shall be included in the hazard
— permit the safe filling and removal of LNG assessment.
— permit the boil off gas to be safely removed — if needed, connections shall be provided for nitrogen into
— prevent the ingress of air and moisture except as a last re- the annular space between the inner tank and the outer
sort to prevent unacceptable vacuum conditions in the va- containment to enable air to be purged out before commis-
pour space sioning and LNG to be purged out after emptying for
— minimise the rate of heat leak, consistent with operational maintenance.
requirements
— withstand the damage leading to loss of containment due 403 The absence of wall or base penetrations requires the use
to credible external factors as defined in Appendix A of submerged pumps. A platform on the roof shall be provided
— operate safely between the design maximum and mini- to allow pumps to be removed for maintenance.
mum (vacuum) pressures 404 The design shall prevent any siphoning effects.
— withstand the number of filling and emptying cycles and
the number of cool down and warming operations which A 500 Thermal insulation
are planned during its design life 501 Materials used for thermal insulation shall be document-
— withstand deformations from the support structure caused ed suitable for its use.
by environmental conditions.
502 The minimum thermal conductivity of insulating mate-
A 300 Fluid and gas tightness rials shall be specified.
301 The tank shall be gas and liquid tight in normal opera- The installed insulation systems shall be free from contami-
tion. See Sec.7 for liquid tightness of prestressed concrete nants which can corrode or otherwise damage the pressure-
structures. containing components with which they come into contact.
302 The degree of resistance to leakage required in the event 503 Insulation and heating system may be installed beneath
of external overloads such as impact damage, thermal radiation the primary container base to reduce cold heat transfer into the
and blasts shall be defined in the hazard assessment (See foundation and the sea. Likewise, all parts of the side walls be-
Sec.2) low the water level may have to be insulated and heated by air
303 LNG tightness of the primary container shall be ensured to avoid freezing of the sea. The final solution should require a
by a continuously welded plate, membrane or cryogenic con- detailed temperature study as the solution will be concept de-
crete prestressed with cryogenic reinforcement and crack con- pendent.
trol in accordance with Sec.5. 504 Base and side wall insulation shall be designed and spec-
304 LNG tightness of the secondary container shall be en- ified to be able to withstand any kind of action combinations
sured by: as defined in Appendix D.
505 The thermal expansion of components shall be taken
— continuously welded plate into account therefore insulation installed outside the primary
— prestressed concrete with lining container, when it is made up of expanded perlite, can be pro-
— other proven suitable material tected from settling, for example, by glass wool padding which
— crack control in accordance with sec.5. absorbs variations in the diameter of the primary container.
305 The outer envelope of the tank which is exposed to the 506 The thermal insulation of a membrane tank shall with-
atmosphere (metallic or concrete) shall be designed in such a stand the hydrostatic load, both static and dynamic behaviour.
way as to prevent all water penetration, whether this is sea wa- 507 Insulation of spherical tanks is outside the sphere and is
ter, surface water, firewater, rainwater or atmospheric humidi- not exposed to any hydraulic or mechanical actions.
ty. The humidity may introduce corrosion problems,
deterioration of the insulation and of the concrete which shall 508 External insulation shall be protected from moisture.
be covered by the design. 509 Exposed insulation shall be non-combustible.
306 To contain liquid in case of LNG leakage the following 510 The quality of insulation shall be such that no single
requirement shall be followed point of the external envelope of the tank will remain at a tem-

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 Offshore Standard DNV-OS-C503, October 2004
App.C – Page 47

perature below 0°C by an air temperature above or equal to — density

5°C. — blowing
511 Fire behaviour — moisture
— ageing.
When selecting insulation materials and designing insulation
systems made of several products such as the insulation mate- All materials permeable to water vapour are sensitive to mois-
rials themselves, mastics, coatings, metal jacketing, it is im- ture. Consequently, the thermal conductivity correction ap-
portant to take their fire behaviour into consideration. plied on the measured values to take this into account shall be
Insulation systems, as a whole, likely to be in contact with fire, greater than in the case of temperatures close to ambient con-
shall not cause the fire to spread. ditions, as the moisture intake is much greater.
Fire behaviour of insulation systems shall be documented The thermal conductivity value used for thickness calculation
512 Gas absorption will need to take account of the following:
For obvious safety reasons, porous insulation products likely — selection of insulation material
to absorb gaseous methane shall be avoided.
— water vapour tightness
513 Moisture resistance — dimensional changes at cryogenic temperatures, espe-
Moisture present in insulation systems very quickly impairs cially in expansion loops
the performance of the insulation materials. For example, 1% — deterioration
moisture in volume contained in an insulation material reduces
its thermal efficiency by 20 to 30%. — selection and application of the vapour barrier:
Water can penetrate into an insulation material in 2 different — film or coatings
ways: — single layer on the outside or multiple layers
— longitudinal partitioning or not
— either in the liquid state — quality of the products and source of supply
— or as water vapour which condenses within the insulation — reinforcement or not
material. — risks of deterioration and, if the equipment has been
damaged, study of the risk of local or widespread
Some insulation materials are waterproof to a certain extent, damage
but most of them are permeable to gases and thus to water va- — resistance to maintenance activity
pour.
In order to avoid water vapour ingress, an efficient vapour bar- — climatic conditions:
rier shall be provided and placed around the insulation materi-
al, except when the insulation is itself is water vapour tight. — dry, temperate or tropical zones
— risk of outside thaw
514 Differential movements
A water vapour tight system should be achieved. It shall thus — risk of mechanical damage:
be designed to remain gas tight even after undergoing the an- — foot traffic on piping or equipment
ticipated differential movements between the pipe and the var- — design and quality of critical points such as tees, el-
ious products that make up the insulation system (including the bows, supports, flanges, valves, etc.
vapour barrier(s), coatings, cell fillers, metal jackets). — maintenance quality
The joints, mostly contraction joints, shall be designed to resist
differential movement cycles in relation to both internal and — qualification of the insulation contractor:
external temperature variations. Global displacement due to
stress variations in the load carrying structure shall be account- — quality of workmanship
ed for. — jobsite protection in case of bad weather
515 Surface Condensation — operating temperature
The consequences of condensation are (examples): — variable or constant service temperature
— job complexity:
— in temperate or cold zones, outside surface condensation
can turn into ice, which can lead to premature ageing of the — number of elbows, connections, valves, etc.
vapour barriers or protective coatings A 600 Operating loads
— in humid regions, a large quantity of condensation can
cause corrosion and has a negative influence on plant, al- 601 LNG Tanks shall be capable of withstanding the combi-
gae and micro-organism proliferation, which in turn would nations of loads as defined in Appendix D and those resulting
accelerate ageing of the vapour barriers or external coat- from changes in temperature and pressure during
ings.
— initial cool down and warm up to ambient temperature
In order to avoid outside surface condensation on the insula- — filling and emptying cycles.
tion system, the difference between the ambient external tem-
perature and the surface temperature shall be limited, to ensure 602 The manufacturer shall indicate the maximum rate of
that the outside surface temperature is higher than the dew temperature change which the tank can withstand during cool
point temperature for about 75% of the time when it is not rain- down and warm up operations.
ing. 603 For double and full containment tanks, the primary con-
516 Thermal conductivity tainer shall be designed to withstand the maximum differential
pressure which could occur during all operating phases and a
The thickness depends on the thermal conductivity of the ma- system shall be provided to prevent lifting of the floor.
terial(s) at temperatures ranging from the fluid temperature to
ambient temperature. A 700 General design rules
As far as plastic foams are concerned, this value heavily de- 701 The structures of the tank shall be designed to withstand
pends on several factors such as: at least the combination of actions defined in Sec.4.

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Offshore Standard DNV-OS-C503, October 2004
Page 48 – App.C

702 In addition, structures and structural elements shall: — the wall and the bottom temperature of the primary con-
tainer
— perform satisfactorily during normal conditions, with re- — the wall and the bottom temperature of the secondary con-
gard to degradation, displacement, settlement and vibra- tainer except for the impounding area.
tion
— have adequate safety with regard to resisting fatigue fail- A 1100 Density
ure 1101 density of the LNG shall be monitored throughout the
— show optimum ductile properties and little sensitivity to liquid depth.
local damage
— be simple to make A 1200 Pressure and vacuum protection
— provide simple stress paths with small stress concentra- 1201 The various reference flow rates of gaseous discharges
tions which shall be taken into consideration
— be suitable for simple condition monitoring, maintenance
and repair. Sufficient margin shall be provided between the operating
pressure and the design pressure of the tank to avoid unneces-
703 The materials selected for the load bearing structures sary venting.
shall be suitable for the purpose. The quality of the materials 1202 Irrespective of the means for recovery of boil off gas
shall be documented. which might exist elsewhere (e.g. reliquefaction, compres-
704 Requirements for the fabrication, testing and control sion), the vapour space of the tank shall be connected to a flare/
shall be determined on the basis of the significance of the var- vent, safety valve, or possibly a rupture disc which is capable
ious parts with regard to the overall safety of the structure. of discharging flow rates from any likely combination of the
following:
A 800 Liquid level
— evaporation due to heat input
801 High accuracy and independent level devices are recom- — displacement due to filling
mended as the means for protection against overflow in prefer- — flash at filling
ence to overflow-pipes. — variations in atmospheric pressure
802 The tank shall be fitted with instruments which enable — the recirculation from a submerged pump.
the level of LNG to be monitored and which enable protective 1203 The tank shall be fitted with at least two over pressure
action to be taken. These instruments shall in particular allow: valves. The valves shall be linked to the flare network or vent
— continuous measurement of the fluid level from at least system. Sizing of valves shall be on the assumption that one of
two separate systems (except for peak shaving tanks), of them is out of service. The maximum flow to be discharged, at
suitable reliability each system shall include high level maximum operating pressure, is either the gas flow due to the
alarms and high high level alarms heat input in the event of a fire or any likely combination of the
— detection of high high level based on instrumentation of following flow due to:
suitable reliability which is independent of the above men- — evaporation due to heat input
tioned continuous measurements of level detection shall — displacement due to filling
initiate the ESD function for feed pumps and valves in — flash at filling
feed and recirculation lines. — variations in atmospheric pressure
— the recirculation from a submerged pump
A 900 Pressure — control valve(s) failure
901 The tank shall be fitted with instruments, permanently — rollover, in case of no other device is envisaged
installed and properly located which enable the pressure to be
monitored as follows: 1204 If the calculation of the overpressure valves or the
flare/vent system does not take into account the rollover, a rup-
— continuous pressure measurement ture disc or equivalent shall be installed whatever the other
— detection of too high pressure, by instrumentation which is measures taken (for example, stock management policies, var-
independent of the continuous measurement ious filling lines).
— detection of too low pressure (vacuum) by instrumenta- 1205 A rupture disk can be used to protect the tank from
tion, which is independent of the continuous measure- overpressure. This device which is regarded as a last resort
ment. Following vacuum detection, the boil off makes it possible to retain overall tank integrity without inter-
compressors and pumps shall be stopped and if necessary, rupting plant operation by temporarily sacrificing gas tight-
vacuum breaker gas injected under automatic control ness.
— if the insulated space is not in communication with the in-
ternal container, differential pressure sensors between the 1206 The rupture disc shall be designed in such a way that:
insulation space and the internal container or separate — it can be replaced in operation following failure
pressure sensors in the insulation space shall be installed- — fragments will not fall into the tank
— fragments will not damage any other part of the tank.
902 For energy saving purposes, to reduce the boil off it is
recommended that a constant absolute pressure be maintained Rupture of the disk shall cause all boil off gas compressors to
inside the tank. trip automatically.
A 1000 Temperature A 1300 Vacuum
1001 The tank shall be fitted with properly located, perma- 1301 The tank shall be prevented from going into negative
nently installed instruments which enable the temperature to pressure beyond the permissible limit, by timely automatic
be monitored as follows: shutdown of pumps and compressors and by two vacuum
breaker systems:
— the liquid temperature shall be measured at several depths
the vertical distance between two consecutive sensors — a gas or nitrogen injection system which shall act first
shall not exceed two metres — vacuum relief valves which allow air into the tank as intro-
— gaseous phase temperature duction of air can bring about a flammable mixture, this

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 Offshore Standard DNV-OS-C503, October 2004
App.C – Page 49

safety device shall act only as a last resort in order to pre- tural condition of the tank are slow and limited, on the one
vent permanent damage to the tank. hand, and permits monitoring of representative parameters of
this condition, on the other.
1302 Gas shall be injected under automatic control following
too low pressure detection. The level of reliability which it is necessary to achieve as re-
quired can lead to the back-up of certain components of the
1303 The tank shall be fitted with at least two vacuum relief structure; the dual hydraulic barrier (primary container and
valves. Sizing of valves shall be on the assumption that one of then secondary container) concept forms part of this type of
them is out of service. The flow to be admitted at maximum back-up.
negative pressure to 1, 1 times that required to mitigate any
likely combination of the following causes: 1602 Monitoring of structure
Devices for monitoring the general condition of the structure,
— the variation of the atmospheric pressure including the foundation, shall be designed in such a way as to
— pump suction leave sufficient time for action if anomalies are detected.
— boil off gas compressor suction.
The monitored values shall be interpreted in terms of prede-
A 1400 Bund wall and impounding area fined
1401 For tank systems where individual impounding area is — normal values
required as the secondary container. The impounding areas of — alarm values
two tanks may be adjacent. — critical values.
1402 Retention system materials shall be impermeable to
LNG. The thermal conductivity of the material affects the rate The parameters which are deemed to be representative of the
of evaporation following a spill which is an important factor in general condition of the structure are stated below.
the hazard assessment. 1603 Temperature sensors
1403 The need for insulation will depend on the result of the Three sets of temperature sensors shall be considered
hazard assessment
1404 Impounding areas for LNG in which rain or firewater — on the outer skin of the primary container wall and bottom,
can collect shall include a means for removing it to ensure that to monitor cool down and warm up, except for membrane
the required volume is maintained and to prevent flotation of tanks
the tank. — on the warm side of the insulation (wall and bottom) to de-
1405 The water shall drain to an extraction sump within the tect any leakage and to monitor any deterioration of the in-
sulation due for example to settling
impounding basin within the impounding area and be removed
by pumping or by gravity flow. A reliable method shall be pro- — on the outer surface of concrete wall of full containment
vided for preventing spilled LNG from being transferred from tanks and/or membrane tanks and on the outer surface of
the pond. concrete raft or point of support for all types of tanks to
monitor the temperature gradient.
1406 The dimensions of each impounding area shall be such
that its equivalent capacity will be at least 100% of the maxi- Plots from all sensors shall be recorded in the control room and
mum volume which can be stored in the tank. any confirmation of leakage shall sound the alarm. The cover-
1407 Means for limiting evaporation and reducing the rate of ing of sensors shall be sufficient to ensure that any leakage is
burning of ignited spills shall be considered. detected and the temperature gradient is monitored.
1604 Heating system control
A 1500 Safety equipment
In the case of tanks which have a heating system, consumption
1501 Anti-rollover devices of power by the system shall be continuously recorded.
In order to avoid rollover at least the following measures shall 1605 Primary container leak detection
be taken.
For all tanks where the insulation space is not in communica-
— filling systems as defined in C1702 tion with the primary container, a system shall be provided for
— a recirculation system nitrogen circulated within the insulation space. Monitoring of
— monitor boil off rate the tightness of the primary container is then possible by detec-
— temperature/density measurements throughout LNG tion of hydrocarbons in the nitrogen purge.
depth.
A 1700 Tank piping
Other preventive measures can be used, such as: 1701 Cool down piping
— avoiding storing significantly different qualities of LNG in A system for cool down shall be provided to prevent cold liq-
the same tank; appropriate uid from failing onto the bottom of a warm tank. It can termi-
— filling procedure considering. the respective densities of nate for example, in a spray nozzle or a perforated ring.
the LNG The pipe used for filling by spraying can also be used for cool
— nitrogen content of LNG at failing below 1 mol down.
These measures lead to the practical elimination of stratifica- 1702 Filling piping
tion of LNG.
Filling shall be able to be carried out, as a function of the LNG
1502 Protection against lightning quality, both from the roof and at the lower part by a line going
The tank shall be protected from lightning. to the bottom of the tank.
For the bottom filling, at least one of the following features
A 1600 Reliability and monitoring of structure shall be provided (except for tanks used for peak shaving):
1601 Reliability
— jet nozzles placed at the bottom of the tank and oriented to-
LNG tanks are structures which shall have high reliability. ward the surface
This requires a design which ensures that changes in the struc- — a vertical pipe perforated for part or for all of its length

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Offshore Standard DNV-OS-C503, October 2004
Page 50 – App.C

— a jet breaker, located at the extremity of a pipe for spray overflow pipe crosses the side sheet of the primary container at
filling. a height at least equal to the level of the high high level alarm.
It shall be equipped at its base with one or more rupture disks
1703 LNG pumping with a burst pressure determined from the hydrostatic head of
Transfer of LNG from the tank and LNG recirculation shall be the liquid in the overflow pipe. One or more valves shall allow
done with electrically driven submerged pumps. maintenance of the disk(s) without releasing gas. A tempera-
1704 Overflow ture alarm shall detect the presence of liquid in the lower por-
tion of the overflow pipe.
The overflow pipe, if envisaged as a last resort and authorised
by the hazard assessment, shall be sized to handle a flow cor- The design of this pipe shall take account of the movements
responding to the maximum flow rate of the filling pumps. The due to differential temperatures between the two walls.

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 Offshore Standard DNV-OS-C503, October 2004
App.D – Page 51

APPENDIX D
DETAILED STRUCTURAL DESIGN OF CONTAINMENT SYSTEM
(GUIDELINES)

A. Detailed Structural Design Overfill of the inner container is not a design requirement of
this appendix, provided that multiple independent facilities
A 100 Introduction (i.e. at least 2 independent level gauges with alarms and an in-
101 Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) storage tanks are designed dependent instrument with high and high-high level alarms
to contain liquefied gases at atmospheric pressure and low with automatic cut-off arrangement) are installed to prevent
temperatures during their service life for a range of conceiva- overfill. Overfill would lead to refrigerated product in the an-
ble and relevant conditions. This Appendix provides detailed nular space of a full containment tank, and to exposure to re-
guidelines for design of a containment system for import and frigerated product of the roof of a single wall, and membrane
export terminals. tank.
102 LNG Containment systems on ships are designed using 202 Gas Tightness
the IGC-IMO Code. The IMO Type B Independent Tank sys- In case of vapour leakages, a hazardous situation may be cre-
tem is of particular interest. For application of this tank system ated in view of possible formation of a flammable or explosive
in a floating or gravity based concrete terminal, the provisions vapour cloud (e.g. in case of methane, ethane, propane or bu-
of IGC-IMO Code shall be followed with respect to material tane), or a poisonous vapour cloud (e.g. for ammonia). Vapour
selection and documentation, design documentation, construc- leakages are, therefore, unacceptable and consequently LNG
tion and in-service inspection. The DNV Rules for Classifica- tanks shall be designed gas tight for normal operating condi-
tion of Ships (LNG Vessels) are based on this approach. The tions.
special operational differences between a ship and a terminal Under emergency conditions such as nearby fires, explosions
shall be incorporated in the design. and extreme earthquakes, or a leaking inner-tank/membrane,
103 LNG Containment systems on land are designed using the owner may consider to accept limited vapour leakages.
EN1473 or NFPA 59A. These standards can be used for the de-
sign of the containment system provided the added influence As concrete in itself cannot be considered vapour tight, nor-
of the marine environment is included in the design. This ap- mally a vapour barrier coating or steel liner is provided at the
pendix is based on principles as outlined in EN1473 and NFPA inner surface of the concrete outer tank. Such liner or vapour
59A. The special operational differences between a land based barrier coating should also sufficiently limit the migration of
concept and a terminal located either floating or fixed to the water from the outside, through the concrete structure into the
bottom as a gravity platform shall be accounted for in the de- tank.
sign. For membrane tanks, the possibility of product vapour leakage
is generally further reduced under normal operating conditions
A 200 Functional requirements as the insulation space between membrane and concrete struc-
201 Liquid Tightness ture should be continuously purged with nitrogen when con-
crete is designed as the secondary barrier.
LNG storage systems are designed to provide full liquid tight-
ness under normal operating conditions 203 Boil-off
IMO Type B tanks, double wall, full containment, and mem- The owner or operator of the storage system should specify the
brane type tanks shall also be liquid tight under emergency allowable maximum boil-off in order to design the insulating
conditions. capacity. For tanks in exporting terminals the optimum boil-off
follows from considerations of product loss, re-liquifaction
Under normal operating conditions, liquid tightness is provid- costs and insulation costs.
ed by the inner tank of a single wall, double wall or full con-
tainment tank, and by the corrugated membrane of a For import terminals the boil-off requirements may be less
membrane type tank. stringent than for export terminals because boil-off gas may be
sent directly into the distribution grid.
In this respect, the need for attention to design aspects to min-
imize the risk of leakage (e.g. by avoiding connections on a liq- 204 Heating system.
uid containing tank below the maximum liquid level) is LNG tanks of which the base (and wall) are in direct contact
highlighted. with the soil/sea water may be provided with a base (and wall)
By definition, the outer tank of a double wall and full contain- heating system.
ment tank are designed liquid tight. Also, the concrete struc- The heating system, in combination with the insulation, shall
ture of a membrane tank shall be designed for liquid tightness. prevent the zero isotherm from penetrating into the soil/water.
This to avoid leakage of product into the environment after the
exceptional event of a leak from the inner tank or membrane. The control of the heating system is obtained by temperature
sensors which are strategically located over the heated area.
Leakage from an inner tank or a membrane may lead to a uni-
form built up of refrigerated product in the annular space (be- 205 Pressure and vacuum relief
tween inner and outer tank), or in the insulation space (between LNG tanks are protected against overpressures and vacuum.
membrane and concrete tank) respectively. In particular, the
wall-to-bottom connection is vulnerable for the effects of low The following facilities/control are normally used for over
temperatures due to such leakage and, therefore, special atten- pressure protection.
tion should be given in the design to guarantee the liquid tight-
ness of the wall-to-bottom connection under such conditions. 1) Boil-off compressor.
Also, leakage of the inner tank or membrane may lead to local 2) Relief to safe location, e.g. flare or vent.
cold spots on the concrete (outer) wall and bottom. 3) Closure of liquid inlet.
Both the above mentioned loading cases shall be considered in 4) Emergency relief valves, relieving directly to atmosphere
the tank design. (for ultimate protection).

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Offshore Standard DNV-OS-C503, October 2004
Page 52 – App.D

The following facilities/control are normally used for vacuum 402 Product/Liquid Load
(gauge) protection.
a) Inner tanks
1) Supply of hot liquid/gas.
i) The inner tank shall be designed for a liquid load at the
2) Trip of boil-off compressor and shut-down liquid outlet specified minimum design temperature, including
flow from the tank. sloshing and possible movement of the floating struc-
3) Opening of vacuum relief valves to allow entrance of air ture or global deformation of the concrete support
into the tank (ultimate protection). structure due to global response.
The design product level shall be the maximum prod-
A 300 Permanent actions (G) uct level specified or the level 0.5 m below the top of
301 The permanent actions [G] are: the shell, whichever is higher.
ii) The inner tank and its foundation shall also be de-
— prestress (the probable value of the prestressing, if any) signed for the water test
— own weight (on raft, foundations)
— weight of items of equipment (pipe work and fittings) b) Outer Tanks (double and full containment tanks only)
— gaseous pressure
— thrust of thermal insulating material (for example in the i) The outer tank shall be designed to contain maximum
case of perlite insulation) liquid content (and intermediate volumes) of the inner
— external hydrostatic pressure up to mean water level tank at the minimum design temperature specified.
— soil pressure on foundation and/or on the tank. ii) Steel outer tanks and their foundations shall also be
designed for the water test (see also Sec.8 B).
302 Vapour Pressure
c) Concrete Structures of Membrane Tanks
a) internal vacuum
The roof shall be designed for the internal vacuum. i) The concrete tank shall be designed for the combina-
This is included in the live load specified under A400. tion of the hydrostatic load resulting from tank con-
tents and a temperature loading following from a leak
b) internal pressure in the membrane.
The value for the internal pressure shall be specified by the ii) The concrete tank and its foundation shall also be de-
purchaser. signed for the water test.
303 Pressure from Insulation
403 Settlements
The loose perlite powder in the annular space between the in-
ner and outer shells will exert a pressure on the inner tank shell. The storage tank and its foundations shall be designed taking
The presence of resilient blankets, which allow movements of account of the predicted maximum total and differential settle-
the tank shell, will reduce these pressures. The compressive ments that can occur during the life of the tank.
load acting on the inner tank shell shall be determined by the
tank contractor based on investigations and test work. a) Cone down
The maximum expected difference between the average
304 Prestressing displacement along the circumference of the tank and the
The effects of prestress induced by prestressing cables shall be displacement of the bottom centre (cone down) shall be
incorporated. Eccentricity, anchor slip, friction losses and re- determined. Its effect in terms of membrane tension in the
laxation of stress in prestressing cables, as well as creep and tank bottom and moments in the wall-to-bottom connec-
shrinkage of concrete, shall be taken into account. tion shall be taken into account.
b) Circumferential Displacement
A 400 Variable actions (Q)
Differential displacement along the circumference of the
These are: tank may lead to high bending moments in the wall-to-bot-
[Q1] : loading during construction (scaffolding/staging, hoist- tom junction and the roof-to-wall junction. The effect of
ing gear, partial prestressing or "Construction loading" maximum expected differential displacement shall be in-
corporated in the design.
[Q2] : overloads with respect to permanent actions, as deliber-
ately applied to test strength and fluid tightness ("Overloads") c) Local soft spots
For tanks on a raft foundation the effects of local soft spots
[Q3] : hydrostatic action of LNG and fatigue through filling/ shall be considered in the design of the concrete tank.
emptying cycles noted "LNG"
[Q4] : forces induced by thermal contractions or "Thermal A 500 Environmental loads (E)
stresses", during tank life, commissioning and decommission- 501 These are:
ing
401 Live Load — [E1] : climatic loading (hours of sunshine, daily and sea-
sonal atmospheric temperature change, snow, ice) or “Cli-
a) Roof matic loading”
A uniformly distributed load and a concentrated load shall — [E2] : Strength Level Earthquake (“SLE”)
be specified for the roof. — [E3] : Wind, current and Wave loads
Usually, for steel roofs a uniformly distributed load of 1.2 502 General
kN/m2 of projected area and a concentrated load of 5 kN
over an area of 0.1 m2 placed at any location on the roof The environmental conditions shall be collected and specified
are specified. In general, concrete roofs are capable of car- by the owner. In general, local codes provide guidelines for the
rying higher concentrated loads. determination of environmental loads (actions) such as wind,
snow, temperatures, earthquakes, etc. The owner should verify
b) Platforms and Access ways whether the statistical basis of these guidelines is commensu-
A uniformly distributed load of 5kN/ m2 is often used. rate with the required level of reliability. More details are giv-
en in Sec.4.

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 Offshore Standard DNV-OS-C503, October 2004
App.D – Page 53

503 Wind Load hazardous products might have for life, property and environ-
The wind load shall be determined, based on local data (wind ment, due attention should be given to extreme design condi-
speed records or codes). tions, i.e. hazard loads and hazard or accident scenario's.
504 Wave and Current loads Hazards can be classified into three categories:
The wind load shall be determined, based on local data. Refer- A. Internal hazards
ence is made to Sec.4. Definition:
505 Snow Load Any internal situation of either technical, physical or opera-
The snow load shall be in accordance with local requirements. tional nature, that might jeopardize the functioning, strength or
Also, the case with only half the roof area loaded should be stability of the liquid retaining component of the storage sys-
considered. tem and might give rise to a thermal, physical, and/or mechan-
ical loading of the concrete protective structure.
506 Ambient Temperatures
Internal hazards are:
The maximum and minimum ambient temperatures shall be
specified by the owner. 1) roll over
The effect of seasonal variation in ambient temperatures shall 2) overfilling
be taken into account. Sun radiation and other short term vari- 3) inner tank failure
ations of temperature should also be taken into account for
structural detailing. For structures exposed to sea water, the ef- — local failure; "cold spot"
fect of the sea temperature shall also be included in the design. — overall failure; whether or not in a zipping mode
507 Earthquakes
B. External hazards
The effect of earthquakes is three fold. it causes acceleration of
the tank structure resulting in horizontal and vertical loads, Definition:
sloshing of the liquid contents and it results in deformation of Any external action resulting from natural phenomena or near-
the subgrade for fixed platforms. by industrial or anyhow man-made accidents.
a) Seismic Loads Relevant external hazards are:
For the assessment of effects of seismic loads, a distinction 1) blast
can be made between a static and a dynamic analysis of the
tank structure. 2) impact
A (pseudo) static approach is often used for preliminary 3) fire
concrete tank designs for areas with high seismicity or for 4) earthquake
detailed designs for areas with low seismicity.
For the detailed design of tanks exposed to more severe 5) hurricanes
seismic loads, a dynamic analysis (e.g. by means of modal 6) flood
analysis or direct integration technique) may be used. The 7) lightning
input for such calculation is a time-ground acceleration
history or a design response spectrum. They are based on 603 ROLL OVER
a certain recurrence interval (See Sec.3 A303, Sec.5 B107,
Sec.5 D900). Precautions shall be taken to prevent stratification and subse-
quent roll over.
b) Sloshing Effects
604 OVERFILLING
Sloshing pressures due to earthquake is to be predicted
based on the results from the dynamic analyses. Precautions in the form of multiple independent measuring de-
vices shall be installed to prevent overfilling of the inner tank.
c) Subgrade Deformation If nevertheless overfilling does occur, the scenario for "inner
The deformation of the subgrade follows from shear tank failure" shall be considered.
waves and compression waves progressing along the sur-
605 Leakage of an inner tank or membrane may result in a
face of the earth. They can be magnified if a soft subgrade
covers the hard stratum. In such case a site investigation local drop in temperature of the concrete protective structure
should be carried out to determine ground accelerations ("cold spot") or, if leakage continues, to gradual filling up of
the annular space between inner and outer structure with cold
and subgrade deformation.
liquid, in which case the outer structure is submitted to a ther-
A 600 Accidental actions (A) mal and hydrostatic load ("inner tank failure"). A consistent
failure scenario shall reveal whether, for the storage system in
601 These are: view, a cold spot loading case must be considered as an inter-
[A1] over pressure (one cause of which can be rollover) ("Over mediate stage prior to an inner tank failure.
pressure") 606 In case an inner tank fails in a sudden mode, the resulting
[A2] negative pressure ("Negative pressure") load case is indicated as “zipping".
[A3] primary container leakage, including the thermal shock 607 The extent and duration of a "cold spot" shall be estab-
on the secondary container ("Leak action") lished on the basis of consistent and realistic leakage seenar-
io's.
[A4] over-filling ("Over-filling")
In case of a pipe-break just on the roof of the tank (caused by,
[A5] Ductility Level Earthquake ("DLE") for example, an
[A6] impact of a projectile ("Impact") external explosion), the possibility of an externally induced
[A7] radiation due to fire ("Radiation") "cold spot" shall be considered.
[A8] Blast due to external ("Blast”). 608 In a consistent failure scenario the following points shall
602 General be considered:
In view of the high consequences an uncontrolled release of — rate and height of filling of the annular space

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Offshore Standard DNV-OS-C503, October 2004
Page 54 – App.D

— the role of the insulating system in the calamity stage 804 The crack width analysis shall be carried out in accord-
— the effect of excessive evaporation when the concrete pro- ance with Sec.6.
tective outer structure is filled with cold liquid (built-up of 805 For the determination of the load bearing capacity
overpressure). (shear, flexure, membrane forces) the temperature dependency
Thermal and structural analysis shall be carried out for inter- of material properties of steel and concrete shall be taken into
mediate and final stages of the accident. Thermal loads, hydro- account.
static pressure and eventual overpressure due to excessive Partial safety factors shall allow for uncertainties in modelling
evaporation shall be combined with relevant operational loads of the loading, in adopted material properties and response cal-
(dead weight). culations. The detailed design shall be in accordance with Sec-
tions 5, 6 and 7 of this standard.
609 Classification of industrial explosions Industrial explo-
sions can be classified into: A 900 Earthquakes
1) physical explosions 901 Seismic loads
Data on seismic activity of a particular site shall be obtained
— exploding steam boilers from local records. If no reliable records are available, data (re-
— Rapid Face Transformation (e.g. Nuclear Power sponse spectra) shall be determined either probabilistically or,
plants) - exploding pressure vessels (BLEVE) if statistic data are insufficient to expect reliable results from a
2) chemical explosions probabilistic approach, deterministically.
Both horizontal and vertical ground accelerations shall be con-
— explosive charges (incl. sabotage) sidered.
— gas cloud explosions Two classes of design earth quakes shall be considered:
For each individual project in inventory shall be made up of the a) Strength Level Earthquake (SLE)
blast potentials. Blast potentials which stem from adjacent
plants shall be considered as well. See Sec.3 A303 for definition.
b) Ductility Level Earthquake (DLE)
A 700 Analysis See Sec.3 A303 for definition.
701 Thermal analysis 902 Seismic Analysis
Thermal analysis shall be carried out making allowance for A full dynamic analysis shall be carried out (see Sec.5), mak-
temperature dependency of thermal material properties. Due ing allowance for:
attention shall be given to the transient state; non-linear tem-
perature fields give rise to eigen-stresses, which stresses sig- — material damping
nificantly influence the crack pattern (crack distance and crack
width). For further details, see Sec.5. — soil characteristics
Soil characteristics (stiffness, damping, susceptibility to
702 Structural analysis liquefaction) significantly affect the dynamic response of
The outer tank shall be designed to contain maximum liquid the structure. A parametric sensitivity study is recom-
content of the inner tank at the minimum design temperature mended to investigate the effect of scatter in soil charac-
specified. teristics. This particularly in view of the intensity of
Structural analysis shall be carried out accounting for temper- liquid-structure interaction (sloshing)
ature dependency of mechanical and rheological material — sloshing of the liquid
properties. Adopted material properties shall be based on tests
or applicable literature data. The effect of cracking on the dis- Sloshing effect shall be dealt with according to up-to-date
tribution of forces shall be considered. Local plasticity is ac- calculation procedures. Eventual damage to roof insula-
ceptable as long as overall stability is assured and provided that tion (suspended roof), the possibility and consequences of
crack width and leakage requirements remain fulfilled. For fur- overfill and suction forces a non-load bearing membrane
ther details, see Sec.5. might be subjected to, shall be duely considered.
Due attention shall be given to the modelling of the interaction
A 800 Design criteria between inner and outer tank, i.e. to the dynamic properties of
801 Crack width criteria shall ensure that possible leakage of the load bearing bottom insulation. Anchoring of the inner tank
gas or liquid through cracks shall neither give rise to an esca- in order to ensure horizontal and vertical stability of the inner
lation of a calamity nor constitute an additional hazard for life tank shall thoroughly be investigated.
and property beyond what is considered to be acceptable. See A dynamic response obtained with a model analysis will gen-
Sec.6 D504. For gas tightness and prevention of mitigation of erally yield sufficiently accurate results. For higher accuracy
moisture into the insulation, a steel membrane will normally be direct integration technics are more suitable. In the early stage
required in the secondary barrier. of the project a quasi static analysis may be helpful for a pre-
802 In case of storage of poisonous material full tightness liminary estimation of the seismic behaviour of the structure
shall be required, to be ensured by a minimum height of the and of the soil~ structure interaction. Design values for struc-
concrete compressive zone hx ≥ 100 mm. In view of high con- tural forces (moments, shear forces, etc.) to be used for dimen-
sequences leakage of poisonous material through through- sioning of cross sections, amounts of reinforcement etc. shall
cracks might have, even narrow through~cracks may not be be obtained from the full dynamic analysis.
considered to be tight for the duration of the calamity and shall, In the dynamic analysis the adopted materials properties shall
therefore, either be avoided or be sealed off by an internal lin- refer to temperatures under operational conditions.
er. The functioning of the liner shall be checked for all relevant If the concrete protective structure is required to withstand the
cryogenic load cases. The tightness criteria shall be in accord- hydrostatic and thermal loading resulting from a possible fail-
ance with Sec.5. ure of the inner tank in an earthquake, a consistent scenario
803 Crack width calculations shall be carried out accounting shall demonstrate whether an additional dynamic loading asso-
for temperature dependency of tensile and bond strength of the ciated with the failure of the inner tank has to be considered or
concrete. not.

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 Offshore Standard DNV-OS-C503, October 2004
App.D – Page 55

A 1000 Action combinations for design of containment those indicated in the tables below, taking into account load
tanks coefficients. It shall be noted that the accidental actions are as-
sumed not to be simultaneous.
1001 The actions listed above shall be combined to create
normal actions and augmented actions at least as severe as

Table A1 Normal actions

Permanent, variable and accidental actions to be combined
Normal actions Permanent Construct. Overloads [Q2] LNG [Q3] Thermal Stresses Climatic loading and SLE [E2]
actions [G] Loading [Q1] [Q4] environmental loading
[E1] and [E3]
Building x x
Testing (1) (2) -
Operation x - x x x -
Earthquake x - x x x
(1) Taking into account the pressure test of 1,0 times the maximum operating gauge pressure.
(2) Taking into account hydrostatic pressure test at a minimum pressure of 1,0 times the operating gauge pressure under normal filling con-
ditions.

Table A2 Accidental Action Combinations

Augmented actions Permanent, variable and accidental actions to be combined
Thermal stresses

Over pressure

Leak action

Overfilling
Permanent

Radiation
Negative
Pressure

Impact
action

LNG

Blast
DLE
[G] [Q3] [Q4] [A1] [A2] [A3] [A4] [A5] [A6] [A7] [A8]
Over pressure x x x x
depressurisation x x x x
primary container leak x x x x
Overfilling x x x x
Earthquake x x x x
Missile impact x x x x
Adjacent tank on fire or relief valve on fire x x x x
(on the same tank)
External explosion x x x x

A 1100 Specific methods to determine the actions 1102 Effect of fire radiation on prestressed concrete
1101 Hydrostatic action of fluid The thickness of the concrete shall be sufficient to ensure that,
in the event of an external fire, the temperature of the prestress
The hydrostatic action shall be calculated taking into account cables is kept low enough to maintain the integrity of the LNG
the weight of the highest of the following values: tank and its enclosure with full contents and at maximum de-
— the weight of LNG which completely fills the primary sign pressure. If no water deluge system is installed, the integ-
container (action [Q3]) rity of the design of the tank shall be guaranteed during the
time needed to provide fire water in sufficient quantities from
— the weight of the hydrostatic test fluid (action [Q2]) an external Source.
— any sloshing effect from liquid in the tank
— any pressure variation or sloshing effect from hull move- To determine this minimum concrete thickness recognised
ments. methods and appropriate models which have been validated
shall be used.
The hydrostatic test is usually carried out with water, the den- 1103 Deformable projectile impacts
sity of which is approximately twice as high as that of LNG.
Therefore, according to the height of the water during the test, Deformable projectiles are non rigid objects which are as-
the hydrostatic action can be up to twice that encountered un- sumed to be incapable of deforming a harder surface on im-
der normal operating conditions. The nature of the fluid, which pact. The impact of planes or helicopters on a prestressed
will be used for the hydrostatic test, and the level of fluid concrete wall, if required in the hazard assessment, shall be
which will be required shall be known at the design stage. Min- taken into account on this basis except for the impact of the en-
imum test conditions are described in Sec.6, but the owner can gine which is considered to be an indeformable projectile.
have particular requirements.
The resulting effect is the application of a force on a portion of
In a tank with a self-supporting primary container, by defini- the surface, that is, of a pressure, whose value varies over time.
tion the primary container shall take up forces generated by the By retaining the maximum value of this pressure, the calcula-
hydrostatic action of the fluid. tion of the required resistance to impact may be reduced to one
based on a statically applied pressure.
The secondary container (including impounding area if re-
quired) wall shall also be able to withstand that action in the The calculation of this pressure can be carried out from the fol-
event of internal tank leakage. lowing elements

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Offshore Standard DNV-OS-C503, October 2004
Page 56 – App.D

— it may be assumed that a mass that impacts the hard sur- minimum longitudinal reinforcement in both directions and, if
face, instantly reaches a nil velocity; splinters shall also necessary, by reinforcing the wall in the areas base slab/wall
have a nil velocity and dome/wall with stirrups sufficient to prevent brittle shear
— knowing the distribution of mass within the projectile, the fracture.
application of dynamics allows the calculation of the in- If the cross-section dimensions are sufficient to exclude brittle
stantaneous value of the resulting force on the wall fracture resulting from failure of the concrete pressure zone, an
— the resulting pressure is obtained by dividing the force increase in reinforcement is preferable to an increase in the
thus obtained by the area of the instantaneous contact sur- concrete cross-section, taking all factors into consideration.
face area of the projectile with the wall.
Ductility of reinforced concrete sections are provided by ap-
1104 lndeformable projectile impacts propriate inclusion of confining reinforcement in the concrete
lndeformable projectiles (for example aircraft engines) are section.
those assumed to be harder than the surface encountered. The For ductility requirement of structural members in in-plane
absorption of their momentum is through deformation and shear, special considerations may be required. If ductility de-
breaking of the wall. sign in form of plastic hinges becomes unrealistic, an over-
Actions shall be calculated using recognised models. strength design may be appropriate also for DLE. Special con-
sideration will be required in each case as this will be structural
1105 Explosions geometry dependent.
If flammable products stored or transported near the tank, were 1202 Fire Resistance, External Fire
accidentally released into the atmosphere, they could create an
explosion generating an over pressure wave to which the tank If the sprinkler system fails the shielding tank has to resist the
would be submitted. thermal radiation of an adjacent burning tank or of a burning
spill for a limited time. Structural integrity and serviceability
Recognised methods and models which have been validated of a concrete container are maintained if the prestressing ten-
shall be used to calculate the over pressure. In this case it will dons in the wall are covered sufficiently with concrete, consid-
be assumed that: ering the march of temperature and the critical temperature of
the prestressing steel, and if the reinforcement on the inside of
— a detonating or deflagrating explosion near the tank cre- the wall is sufficient for crack distribution.
ates an over pressure wave that is to be applied, as a worst
case assumption, to half the perimeter of the tank Examination of the system as a whole for non-uniform temper-
— the effects on the structure are reduced to a static calcula- ature distribution can result in decisive bending moments and
tion. forces..
1203 Cold Resistance, Cold Spot Resistance
The method, widely used because of its simplicity, of the TNT
equivalent which assimilates the gas explosion to a TNT deto- With regard to the risk of cracking and penetration of liquid to
nating explosion is considered too conservative when applied the surface of the concrete wall, an insulation liner is efficient
to unconfined natural gas clouds. only for the reduction of the boil off rate and for cold spot re-
sistance.
1106 Earthquakes
If the safety theory of the outer tank requires a cryogenic wall
The reactions of the fluid mass and the mass of the tank as such
or bottom slab, the material properties shall be chosen consid-
shall be studied separately dynamically. ering the temperature of the stored liquid.
Critical dampening percentages shall be covered by the soil re-
port. For the design of a cryogenic liner the effects of thermal shock
on anchors, shear studs and the like shall be investigated. If the
Study of the fluid mass shall enable the following to be deter- liner for operating conditions is not cryogenic the concrete
mined for tanks: structure must be resistant to liquid leakage.
— pressure distribution on the walls 1204 Liquid and Gas Tightness
— the height of the wave at the surface of the fluid If complete liquid tightness for protection of the insulation or
— tangential shearing stresses within the tank gas tightness is necessary for double wall systems, a steel liner
— vertical tensile stresses at the base of the tank (sizing of an- is required.
chorage within the raft)
— vertical compressive stresses at the base of the tank (resist- 1205 Membranes
ance to buckling) The membrane is an impervious barrier which is separated
— overturning moment, which includes the effects of dynam- from the concrete by the insulation. The insulation must be se-
ic pressures on the bottom. lected in such a manner that it can transfer the liquid pressure
to the concrete as a permanent load. The flexibility of the ap-
A 1200 Structural detailing prox. 1 mm thick metal membrane, which must be ductile at
1201 Toughness service temperature, is assured by profiling in the horizontal
and vertical direction.
The assumed magnitude and distribution of the loads as well as
the calculations of the cross section forces are approximations A 1300 Liners
only with a considerable range of variation for hazard load cas-
es. A sufficient toughness for the reduction of elastic stress 1301 Liners are in dispensable in the design of concrete com-
peaks and a sufficient capacity for the redistribution to less ponents as an impervious barrier to make the components liq-
stressed areas and therefore prevention of a brittle fracture are uid tight on the long run or gas tight and to prevent the
the most important requirements in the design of the outer penetration of water into the insulation.
tank. For dynamic hazards like earthquake, vapour cloud ex- 1302 Liners are in contact with and act usually compositely
plosion, external impact, internal fluid impact, a sufficient en- with the concrete. The standard design is a lining located at the
ergy dissipation is required to absorb the introduced energy. inner surface of the outer concrete wall.
A measure for the compliance with all these requirements is 1303 The liner must resist buckling during and after pre-
the toughness of a cross-section and of a structure, Toughness stressing (including the effects of creep and shrinkage of the
is required to limit the damages after hazards. For a concrete concrete wall). In the case of leakage of the inner tank the liner
secondary barrier, this requirement is fulfilled with a sufficient may experience contraction and thermal shock which is suffi-

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 Offshore Standard DNV-OS-C503, October 2004
App.D – Page 57

cient to overcome the prestress. Consideration should also be tank, to prevent the pressure of the perlite powder from build-
given to the rate of strain under these conditions. The effects of ing up following consolidation and thermal cycles, since such
thermal shock on any anchors, shear studs, and the like con- pressure increases could lead to buckling of the tank.
necting the liner with the concrete must also be considered. Foamed glass and polyurethane blocks are commonly attached
1304 A flexible zone is required at the junction wall/floor. to the wall by means of a suitable adhesive. They must be fully
1305 Whether a cryogenic liner is required for the outer tank protected from the ingress of moisture, which can disrupt the
depends upon the design philosophy. Under operating condi- adhesive and cause a loss of insulation,-and from ultraviolet at-
tions the liner is protected by the insulation so that the gas tack.
tightness can be assured by a non-cryogenic liner. In the event There are also insulations of sprayed polyurethane foam which
of failure of the inner tank the cryogenic liner is only necessary are used both as insulation and as temporary membranes for
when it has to assure the liquid tightness. the reduction of the boil off rate and for cold spot resistance,
because of their impervious nature. A resin bonded fibre glass
A 1400 Insulation reinforcing layer may be incorporated near the exposed face of
1401 Tank floors: Foamed glass blocks are commonly em- the foam, to prevent cracks temporarily from penetrating to the
ployed, stacked in layers with filled and staggered vertical liner. Systems employing sprayed insulation must be applied
joints and interleaved with bitumenous or felt layers. The ma- in carefully controlled environmental conditions.
terial is brittle, and its strength is limited. 1403 Tank roofs: These are usually insulated by means of
Other types of insulant used in tank floor construction include perlite, fibre glass blankets, mineral wool, or polyurethane,
pvc and polyurethane, though the long term creep characteris- placed on top of a suspended inner roof.
tics of the latter should be taken into account in determining its
suitability and limiting compressive stress. A 1500 Membrane storage vessels
The insulation immediately below the wall of the inner tank 1501 The insulation of a membrane storage is in charge of
may be subjected to load intensifies in excess of the safe work- two additional functions which are:
ing capacity of foamed glass; in this zone, it is therefore usual
to install a ring beam of perlite concrete which may be cast in — tightness in the case of a damaged membrane
place but more usually is of precast oven dried and sealed — transmitting the load bearing forces to the supporting
blocks. structure
Other lightweight concretes including cellular concrete and an 1502 For these purposes the two following systems may be
insulating concrete incorporating polystprene beads have also employed:
been used, as have blocks of laminated balsa wood. The width
of this ring beam should extend at least 100 mm beyond the in- — panels made of polyvinyl chloride (PVC) bonded together,
ner edge of the annular plate of the inner tank bottom. and covered with a plywood sheet which provides ade-
quate support for the membrane. The joints between the
1402 Tank walls: The most widely used forms of insulation insulation panels are staggered and filled with glass-wool.
are powdered perlite in double wall systems, and either foamed In case of a liquid penetration behind the primary barrier,
glass or polyurethane slabs in single wall designs. Perlite is the tightness of this insulation system protects the concrete
provided as a loose powder which is subject to settlement and from being submitted to any thermal shock.
consolidation, and therefore required to be contained. This is — bonded planks of polyurethane foam reinforced in three
usually done by filling the space between the inner and outer orthogonal directions with fiber-glass yarns. The system is
walls, and a nylon or similar seal is often provided at the wall tight (totally bonded) which eliminates any free flow path.
to roof junction to prevent the perlite from being carried over In addition, LNG gradually penetrating into the insulation
into the stored liquid. because of a damaged membrane is stopped from reaching
For metallic inner tanks a resilient layer in the form of a fibre the outer tank by a gas barrier formed within the insula-
glass blanket, about 100 mm thick, is placed around the inner tion.

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Offshore Standard DNV-OS-C503, October 2004
Page 58 – App.D

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