PCA Ruling
PCA Ruling
Arbitration Ruling
Permanent
In the Matter Court
of South of Arbitration Rulin
China
Sea Arbitration
VS
In response, by a diplomatic note dated 19 February 2013 addressed to the Philippines, China
expressed its rejection of the arbitration.In China’s view, the Arbitral Tribunal did not have
jurisdiction in the case because China’s acceptance of dispute settlement under the UN
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) – the basis put forward by the Philippines – was
limited and excluded sea boundary delimitations and the determination of historic titles. Since
then, China has continuously refused either to accept or to participate in the arbitral
proceedings initiated by the Philippines. The tribunal, however, did not see this as an obstacle.
On 29 October 2015, it delivered its first award finding that it had jurisdiction, and, on 12 July 2016,
its award deciding on the merits of the dispute.
South China Sea vis a vis West Philippine Sea
The South China Sea is a marginal sea of the Western Pacific Ocean. It is bounded in the north by the
shores of South China (hence the name), in the west by the Indochinese Peninsula, in the east by the
islands of Taiwan and northwestern Philippines (mainly Luzon, Mindoro and Palawan), and in the south
by Borneo, eastern Sumatra and the Bangka Belitung Islands, encompassing an area of around
3,500,000 km2 (1,400,000 sq mi). It communicates with the East China Sea via the Taiwan Strait, the
Philippine Sea via the Luzon Strait, the Sulu Sea via the straits around Palawan (e.g. the Mindoro and
Balabac Strait), the Strait of Malacca via the Strait of Singapore, and the Java Sea via the Karimata and
Bangka Strait. The Gulf of Thailand and the Gulf of Tonkin are also part of the South China Sea. The
shallow waters south of the Riau Islands are also known as the Natuna Sea.
The South China Sea is a region of tremendous economic and geostrategic importance. One-third of
the world's maritime shipping passes through it, carrying over US$3 trillion in trade each year. Huge oil
and natural gas reserves are believed to lie beneath its seabed. It also contains lucrative fisheries,
which are crucial for the food security of millions in Southeast Asia.
The South China Sea Islands, collectively comprising several archipelago clusters of mostly small
uninhabited islands, islets (cays and shoals), reefs/atolls and seamounts numbering in the hundreds,
are subject to competing claims of sovereignty by several countries. These claims are also reflected in
the variety of names used for the islands and the sea.
UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON
THE LAW OF THE SEA (UNCLOS)
An international treaty which Established to define Defines Territorial sea as the
was adopted and signed in coastal and maritime 12-nautical mile zone from
1982, replacing the four boundaries, to regulate the baseline or low-water
Geneva Conventions of April, seabed exploration not line along the coast. The
1958, respectively concerned within territorial claims, coastal state’s sovereignty
the territorial sea and the and to distribute revenue extends to the territorial sea,
contiguous zone, the from regulated exploration. including its seabed, subsoil
continental shelf, the high and airspace, above it.
seas, fishing and conservation
of living resources on the high Created three new institutions on the international scene :
seas.
The (1) International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea; (2)the
International Seabed Authority; (3) the Commission on the
Limits of the Continental Shelf.
UNCLOS ANNEX VII
ARBITRATION
Institution of proceedings
Beijing stakes claim to most of the region and at the heart of this
claim is the U-shaped ‘nine-dash line’ that includes as much as 90
per cent of these waters. This dotted line was adopted from Chinese
maps in the 1940s, and represents Beijing’s claim over the sea and
all the land features that are contained within the line.
NINE DASH LINE
China’s ‘historical’ claims over the South China Sea
For long, China has argued that its claim over the South China Sea is historical in nature. Several Chinese
analysts and academics contend that the islands of the South China Sea were first discovered by China’s Han
dynasty more than two millennia ago. According to Kaplan, these scholars have further argued that a Chinese
mission in the third century A.D. to Cambodia “made accounts of the Paracels and Spratlys”. Then between the
10th and the 14th century, during the period of Song and Yuan dynasties, many official and unofficial Chinese
accounts show the South China Sea to be within China’s national boundaries. However, this ‘historical rights’
argument has been challenged on several fronts.
First, there is scant proof that China has controlled the South China Sea after the mid-17th century.“Indeed, after
a burst of seafaring exploration during the Ming dynasty (1368-1644), China’s emperors largely shut their
empire off from the seas,” said Wang Ying, a Chinese marine geographer and a student of Yang, to Time. She
argued that as a consequence, there is scarce cartographic proof of China’s rights over the South China Sea.
Second, as argued by Kaplan, most of the land features and islands within the South China Sea are just
“microscopic bits of earth with little history behind them and basically no civilians living on them”.
This complete lack of history and culture made it easy for China and even other Southeast Asian countries to
turn them into “symbols of patriotism and nationhood”, he added.
Illustration of
the Parties’
claims on the
disputed
Islands
Source: Case Brief on the South China Sea Arbitration between the Republic of the Philippines and the People’s Republic of China by the Permanent Court of Arbitration. https://rsilpak.org/2017/case-brief-on-the-south-china-sea-arbitration/
INITIATION OF ARBITRATION
Pursuant to Articles 286
and 287 and in ● Certain of the maritime
features claimed by the
accordance to Article 1 of
parties are islands, low
Annex VII of the UNCLOS,
tide elevations or
by a Notification and
submerged banks, and if
statement,the Philippines
capable of generating
initiated the arbitration entitlement to maritime
proceedings to zones greater than 12NM;
International Tribunal for
the Law of the Sea (ITLOS)
Seeks an award:
● declaring the Parties’ ● Philippines to exercise
respective rights and and enjoy the rights
22 January 2013 obligations in regard to within and beyond its
the waters, seabed and exclusive economic
-Parties signed and
maritime features of the zone and continental
ratified the UNCLOS 8
May 1984 (PH), and on 7 South China Sea shelf that are
June 1996 (China). ● Inconsistency of established in the
- PH’s lack of military 9-dashline w/ the Convention
power UNCLOS
DETAILS OF PH SUBMISSION TO THE ARBITRATION
1
China’s maritime entitlements in the South China Sea, like those of the Philippines, may
not extend beyond those expressly permitted by the United Nations Convention on the
Law of the Sea (“UNCLOS” or the “Convention”)
China’s claims to sovereign rights jurisdiction, and to “historic rights”, with respect to the maritime
areas of the South China Sea encompassed by the so-called “nine-dash line” are contrary to the
Convention and without lawful effect to the extent that they exceed the geographic and
substantive limits of China’s maritime entitlements expressly permitted by UNCLOS;
2
4
Mischief Reef, Second Thomas Shoal and Subi Reef are low-tide elevations that do not generate
entitlement to a territorial sea, exclusive economic zone or continental shelf, and are not features that
are capable of appropriation by occupation or otherwise;
DETAILS OF SUBMISSION TO THE ARBITRATION
5 Mischief Reef and Second Thomas Shoal are part of the exclusive economic zone
and continental shelf of the Philippines;
6
Gaven Reef and McKennan Reef (including Hughes Reef) are low-tide elevations that do not
generate entitlement to a territorial sea, exclusive economic zone or continental shelf, but their
low-water line may be used to determine the baseline from which the breadth of the territorial sea
of Namyit and Sin Cowe, respectively, is measured;
7
Johnson Reef, Cuarteron Reef and Fiery Cross Reef generate no entitlement to an exclusive
economic zone or continental shelf;
8
China has unlawfully interfered with the enjoyment and exercise of the sovereign rights of the
Philippines with respect to the living and non-living resources of its exclusive economic zone and
continental shelf;
9
China has unlawfully failed to prevent its nationals and vessels from exploiting the living resources in the exclusive
economic zone of the Philippines;
DETAILS OF SUBMISSION TO THE ARBITRATION
10 China has unlawfully prevented Philippine fishermen from pursuing their livelihoods by interfering
with traditional fishing activities at Scarborough Shoal;
China has violated its obligations under the Convention to protect and preserve the marine
environment at Scarborough Shoal, Second Thomas Shoal, Cuarteron Reef, Fiery Cross Reef, Gaven
Reef, Johnson Reef, Hughes Reef and Subi Reef;
11
(a) violate the provisions of the Convention concerning artificial islands, installations and
12 structures;
(b) violate China’s duties to protect and preserve the marine environment under the Convention;
and
The Philippines expressly requested that these proceedings continue. The Tribunal has
continued the proceedings, confirming that despite its non-appearance, China remains
a party to the arbitration, with the ensuing rights and obligations, including that it will be
bound under international law by any decision of the Tribunal.
STEPS TAKEN TO ENSURE PROCEDURAL FAIRNESS TO
BOTH PARTIES
Article 9 of Annex VII seeks to balance the risks of prejudice that could be suffered by
either party in a situation of non-participation. First, it protects the participating party by
ensuring that proceedings will not be frustrated by the decision of the other party not to
participate. Second, it protects the rights of the non-participating party by ensuring that
a tribunal will not simply accept the evidence and claims of the participating party by
default.
The respective procedural rights of the parties are further articulated in Article 5 of
Annex VII, which provides that “the arbitral tribunal shall determine its own procedure,
assuring to each party a full opportunity to be heard and to present its case.”34
Measures to Safeguard the Procedural Rights of China
Ensured that all communications and materials in the arbitration have been promptly delivered,
both electronically and physically, to the Ambassador of China to the Kingdom of the Netherlands
in The Hague;
Granted China adequate and equal time to submit written responses to the pleadings submitted
by the Philippines;
Invited China (as with the Philippines) to comment on procedural steps taken throughout the
proceedings;
Provided China (as with the Philippines) with adequate notice of hearings and multiple
opportunities to comment on the setting and scheduling of both the Hearing on Jurisdiction and
Hearing on the Merits, as described at paragraphs 47 to 53, 54 to 59 and 61 to 76 above;
Promptly provided to China (as with the Philippines) copies of transcripts of the Hearing on
Jurisdiction and Hearing on the Merits;
Invited China (as with the Philippines) to comment on the proposed candidates and terms
of reference for independent experts appointed by the Tribunal;
Measures to Safeguard the Procedural Rights of China
Invited China (as with the Philippines) to comment on certain materials in the public domain, but
not already in the case record;
Made the Registry staff available to Chinese Embassy personnel to answer informal questions of an
administrative or procedural nature;
Had the Registry convey written communications from the Chinese Embassy to the individual
members of the Tribunal; and
Reiterated that it remains open to China to participate in the proceedings at any stage.
The Tribunal has also taken measures to safeguard the Philippines’ procedural rights. As
noted by the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea in Arctic Sunrise, a participating
party “should not be put at a disadvantage because of the non-appearance of the
[non-participating party] in the proceedings.”
● Whether China’s historic right claims to waters, seabed, and subsoil in the South
China Sea based in the 9 Dash Line merits?
● Whether certain land features in the Spratly Islands claimed by both China
and the Philippines are properly characterized as islands, rocks, low tide
elevations (LTEs), or submerged banks?
● Whether the Philippines’ request to declare China’s interference with the
Philippines’ rights and freedoms within its EEZs violated the UNCLOS
● Whether China’s recent actions, specifically its land reclamation and
construction of artificial islands in the Spratly Islands after the arbitration was
commenced, violated the UNCLOS obligations
SOVEREIGNTY VS. SOVEREIGN RIGHTS
Sovereignty Sovereign Rights
Absolute ownership of an independent Represents the rights that a coastal state
state over its territory. Sovereignty of a enjoys basing on its sovereignty over all kinds
coastal state is the ultimate right which is of resources in its economic exclusive zone and
continental shelf, as well as the exploring,
exercised within the limit of its internal
exploiting in its economic exclusive zone and
waters and territorial sea.
continental shelf for economic purpose,
including the production of energy from water,
ocean currents and wind, etc.
Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) up to 200NM (sovereign rights only, exploitation, exploration
of natural resources)
ARBITRATION
RULING
“in this game of shark and minnow, the latter proved that might isn’t always right…”
Ruling 01
1. The Philippines sought a declaration that the countries’ respective rights and obligations
regarding the waters, seabed, and maritime features of the South China Sea are governed by
UNCLOS. As such, China’s claims based on any “historic rights” to waters, seabed, and subsoil
within the nine-dash line are contrary to UNCLOS and invalid.
Holding: UNCLOS “comprehensively” governs the parties’ respective rights to maritime areas in
the South China Sea. Therefore, to the extent China’s nine-dash line is a claim of “historic
rights” to the waters of the South China Sea, it is invalid.
Reasoning: Whatever historic rights China may have had were extinguished when UNCLOS was
adopted, to the extent those rights were incompatible with UNCLOS.
Ruling 02
2. The Philippines sought a determination as to whether certain land features in the Spratly Islands
claimed by both China and the Philippines are properly characterized as islands, rocks, low tide
elevations (LTEs), or submerged banks. Under UNCLOS, an “island” generates both a territorial sea
of 12 nautical miles and an exclusive economic zone (EEZ) of up to 200 nautical miles, subject to
delimitation of a maritime boundary with any other countries’ overlapping territorial seas or EEZs.
Holding: None of the features in the Spratly Islands generates an EEZ, nor can the Spratly Islands
generate an EEZ collectively as a unit. As such, the Tribunal declared certain areas are within the
Philippines’ EEZ and not overlapped by any possible Chinese entitlement.
Reasoning: The baseline of analysis is what the features can sustain in their “natural condition”
(i.e., not after construction of artificial islands, installation of desalination plants, etc.). Based on
historical evidence, none of the features in the Spratly Islands can sustain either a stable
community of people or economic activity that is not dependent on outside resources or purely
extractive in nature.
Ruling 03
3. The Philippines sought a declaration that China violated UNCLOS by interfering with the
Philippines’ rights and freedoms within its EEZs. This includes preventing Philippine fishing around
Scarborough Shoal, violating UNCLOS’s environmental protection provisions through construction
and fishing activities that have harmed the marine environment (including at Scarborough Shoal,
Second Thomas Shoal, and Mischief Reef), and by dangerously operating law enforcement vessels
around Scarborough Shoal.
Ruling 03
Holding: China violated the Philippines’ sovereign rights in its EEZ. It did so by interfering with
Philippine fishing and hydrocarbon exploration; constructing artificial islands; and failing to
prevent Chinese fishermen from fishing in the Philippines’ EEZ. China also interfered with Philippine
fishermen’s traditional fishing rights near Scarborough Shoal (without prejudice to the question of
sovereignty over Scarborough Shoal). China’s construction of artificial islands at seven features in
the Spratly Islands, as well as illegal fishing and harvesting by Chinese nationals, violate UNCLOS
obligations to protect the marine environment. Finally, Chinese law enforcement vessels unlawfully
created a serious risk of collision by physically obstructing Philippine vessels at Scarborough Shoal
in 2012.
Ruling 03
Reasoning: This set of holdings depended on the Tribunal finding that certain areas are within the
Philippines’ EEZ and not subject to possible overlapping Chinese entitlements. It also depended on
finding that activities such as island construction are, in accordance with China’s own public
statements, not “military activities” and therefore not excluded from jurisdiction under UNCLOS.
Once this was established, the Tribunal considered Chinese activities in the relevant areas and
found that China had (a) interfered with Philippine petroleum exploration at Reed Bank, (b)
purported to prohibit fishing by Philippine vessels within the Philippine EEZ, (c) protected and failed
to prevent Chinese fishermen from fishing within the Philippine EEZ at Mischief Reef and Second
Thomas Shoal, and (d) constructed artificial islands/installations at Mischief Reef without the
Philippines’ authorization.
Ruling 04
4. The Philippines sought a declaration that China’s recent actions, specifically its land
reclamation and construction of artificial islands in the Spratly Islands after the arbitration was
commenced, violated the obligations UNCLOS places on states to refrain from conduct that
“aggravates and extends” a dispute while dispute resolution proceedings are pending.
Holding: China has aggravated and extended the disputes through its dredging, artificial
island-building, and construction activities.
Reasoning: While these proceedings were pending, China has built a large island on Mischief Reef,
an LTE within the Philippines’ EEZ; caused irreparable harm to the marine ecosystem; and
permanently destroyed evidence of the natural condition of the features at issue.
Mischief Reef
https://amti.csis.org/the-long-patrol-staredown-at-thitu-island-enters-its-sixteenth-month/
TIMELINE OF PCA RULING
● 22 January 2013 – Philippines served China with notification and Statement of Claim
● 19 February 2013 – China rejected the Philippines' Notification
● 11 July 2013 – First meeting of the arbitral tribunal at The Hague
● 31 July 2013 – Philippines commented on draft Rules of Procedure for the Tribunal
● 1 August 2013 – China indicated that "it does not accept the arbitration initiated by the Philippines"
● 27 August 2013 – Procedural Order No 1 issued via PCA Press Release on behalf of the arbitral tribunal
● 30 March 2014 – Submission of the Philippines Memorial
● 14–15 May 2014 – Second meeting of the arbitral tribunal at The Hague
● 21 May 2014 – China comments on draft Procedural Order No 2 and observes that "it does not accept
the arbitration initiated by the Philippines".
● 29 May 2014 – Philippines comments on draft Procedural Order No 2
● 3 June 2014 – Procedural Order No 2 issued via PCA Press Release on behalf of the arbitral tribunal
● 15 December 2014 – China had not filed a Counter-Memorial
● 17 December 2014 – Procedural Order No 3 issued via PCA Press Release on behalf of the arbitral
tribunal
● 16 March 2015 – The Philippines made a Supplemental Written Submission to the Arbitral Tribunal
● 20–21 April 2015 – Third meeting of the arbitral tribunal at The Hague
● 22 April 2015 – Procedural Order No 4 issued via PCA Press Release on behalf of the arbitral tribunal
● 7–13 July 2015 – Hearing of the arbitral tribunal at The Hague
● 29 October 2015 – PCA issued the Award on jurisdiction and admissibility
● 12 July 2016 – The tribunal of PCA gave a verdict claiming that China has no legal basis or historic
claim on the Nine-dash line. China rejected the ruling.
Summary of Philippine Claims and Tribunal
Rulings
2 China’s “nine-dash line” (Deferred to merits Yes: There is no legal basis for China to
claim is invalid to the
stage) claim historic rights to waters in the South
extent it exceeds the limits
established by UNCLOS China Sea (so, to the extent that is what
Jurisdiction granted
the nine-dash line means, it is invalid)
PH wins
https://www.lawfareblog.com/tribunal-issues-landmark-ruling-south-china-sea-arbitration?fbclid=IwAR2CUHHG2UYuu5CQyS2lADl2hZGPx
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No Philippines’ Claim Jurisdictional Merits Ruling
Ruling
PH wins
4 Mischief Reef, Second Jurisdiction granted Yes: Mischief Reef, Second Thomas Shoal,
Thomas Shoal, and Subi Reef
and Subi Reef are LTEs
are all LTEs that do not
generate territorial seas or
EEZs, and are not subject to PH wins
appropriation
5 Mischief Reef and Second (Deferred to merits Yes: Mischief Reef and Second Thomas
Thomas Shoal are part of the
stage) Shoal are part of the EEZ and continental
Philippines’ EEZ and
continental shelf shelf of the Philippines
Jurisdiction granted
PH wins
https://www.lawfareblog.com/tribunal-issues-landmark-ruling-south-china-sea-arbitration?fbclid=IwAR2CUHHG2UYuu5CQyS2lADl2hZGPx
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No Philippines’ Claim Jurisdictional Merits Ruling
Ruling
6 Gaven Reef and McKennan Reef Jurisdiction No: Both Gaven and McKennan Reef are above
(including Hughes Reef) are LTEs granted
water at high tide; they are rocks that generate
that generate no maritime
entitlements, but may be used to territorial seas but no EEZ or continental shelf
determine baselines to measure
territorial sea PH loses
7 Johnson Reef, Cuarterton Reef, Jurisdiction Yes: Johnson Reef, Cuarterton Reef, and Fiery Cross
and Fiery Cross Reef generate no
granted Reef are rocks that generate no EEZ or continental
entitlements to EEZ or continental
shelf shelf
PH wins
8 China has interfered with the (Deferred to Yes: China has interfered with Philippine sovereign
Philippines’ exercise of sovereign
merits stage) rights to fishing and hydrocarbon exploration
rights over living and non-living
resources within its EEZ and within its EEZ
continental shelf Jurisdiction
granted PH wins
https://www.lawfareblog.com/tribunal-issues-landmark-ruling-south-china-sea-arbitration?fbclid=IwAR2CUHHG2UYuu5CQyS2lADl2hZGPx
PKnAUgChv0daxQxbUcSgIw7rV8LM6g
No Philippines’ Claim Jurisdictional Merits Ruling
Ruling
9 China has failed to prevent its (Reserved to merits Yes: China failed to prevent Chinese fishermen
nationals and vessels from
stage) from fishing within the Philippine EEZ
exploiting the living resources in
the Philippines’ EEZ
Jurisdiction granted PH wins
10 China has prevented Philippine Jurisdiction granted Yes: China violated the Philippines’ “traditional
fishermen from pursuing their
fishing rights” at Scarborough Shoal
livelihoods through traditional
fishing activities around
Scarborough Shoal PH wins
11 China has violated UNCLOS’s Jurisdiction granted Yes: China engaged in environmentally harmful
environmental protection
fishing/harvesting practices at Scarborough
obligations at Scarborough Shoal
and Second Thomas Shoal Shoal and Second Thomas Shoal
PH wins
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No Philippines’ Claim Jurisdictional Merits Ruling
Ruling
12 China’s occupation and (Deferred to merits Yes: Environmental protection provisions
construction on Mischief Reef
stage) were violated at Mischief Reef; artificial
violate UNCLOS provisions on
artificial islands and island construction violated Philippine
environmental protection, and Jurisdiction granted
sovereign rights within its EEZ; the
are unlawful acts of attempted
appropriation “appropriation” claim is moot because
Mischief Reef is an LTE not capable of
appropriation
PH wins
13 China has violated UNCLOS by Jurisdiction granted Yes: China violated UNCLOS and other
dangerously operating law
treaty provisions on maritime safety
enforcement vessels creating
serious risk of collision near
Scarborough Shoal PH wins
https://www.lawfareblog.com/tribunal-issues-landmark-ruling-south-china-sea-arbitration?fbclid=IwAR2CUHHG2UYuu5CQyS2lADl2hZGPx
PKnAUgChv0daxQxbUcSgIw7rV8LM6g
No Philippines’ Claim Jurisdictional Merits Ruling
Ruling
14 China has unlawfully (Deferred to merits Yes: Although there is no jurisdiction over
aggravated and extended the
stage) disputes involving military activities such
dispute by interfering with the
Philippines’ rights of navigation as the Second Thomas Shoal standoff,
near Scarborough Shoal, Jurisdiction
China has aggravated/extended the
preventing the rotation and granted in part,
resupply of Philippine personnel disputes through recent large-scale land
stationed at Second Thomas denied in part
reclamation and artificial island
Shoal, and endangering the
health of the personnel there construction in the Philippine EEZ
PH wins
15 Going forward China shall (Deferred to merits Qualified yes: This claim simply asks China
respect the rights and freedoms stage) to do what it is required to do under
of the Philippines under UNCLOS UNCLOS; therefore, no further statement is
Jurisdiction
and comply with its duties under necessary
granted
UNCLOS
https://www.lawfareblog.com/tribunal-issues-landmark-ruling-south-china-sea-arbitration?fbclid=IwAR2CUHHG2UYuu5CQyS2lADl2hZGPx
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Where does this leave us?
Did it matter?
Could it still matter?
ENFORCEMENT
The award shall be final and without appeal, unless the parties to the dispute have agreed in advance to an
appellate procedure. It shall be complied with by the parties to the dispute.
States Parties shall fulfill in good faith the obligations assumed under this Convention and shall exercise the
rights, jurisdiction and freedoms recognized in this Convention in a manner which would not constitute an
abuse of right.
https://onedrive.live.com/?authkey=%21AI9KnHTaAo%5FVQxQ&cid=6BB4350FF31A82E8&id=6BB4350FF31A82E8%
21270&parId=6BB4350FF31A82E8%21104&o=OneUp
Sandy Cay in Thitu Island
https://amti.csis.org/the-long-patrol-staredown-at-thitu-island-enters-its-sixteenth-month/
Sandy Cay in Thitu Island
https://amti.csis.org/the-long-patrol-staredown-at-thitu-island-enters-its-sixteenth-month/
Sandy Cay in Thitu Island (2020)
https://amti.csis.org/the-long-patrol-staredown-at-thitu-island-enters-its-sixteenth-month/
https://www.lawfareblog.com/tribunal-issues-landmark-ruling-south-china-sea-arbitration?fbclid=IwAR2CUHHG2UYuu5CQyS2lADl2hZGPx
PKnAUgChv0daxQxbUcSgIw7rV8LM6g
WHAT SHOULD WE DO NOW?