PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellant, vs. ANUNCIACION VDA.

DE
GOLEZ, defendant-appellee.

1960-06-30 | G.R. No. L-14160

DECISION

REYES, J.B.L., J.:

On October 2, 1957, the provincial fiscal of Negros Occidental filed an information in the Court of First
Instance of that province charging Anunciacion Vda. de Golez with the crime of homicide through
reckless imprudence, as follows:
"That on or about the period comprised from December 12, 1956 to December 24, 1956, in the
municipality of San Carlos, province of Negros Occidental, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the herein accused, without being duly licensed to practice medicine and with reckless
negligence and without taking due precaution, did, then and there, wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously
diagnose, prescribe, and treat one Susana Tam, who had been suffering for sometime with bodily
ailment, knowing fully well that she is incompetent and not possessing the necessary technical or
scientific knowledge or skill, and as a consequence of such negligence and carelessness and lack of
medical skill, said Susana Tam died thereafter."
The accused pleaded not guilty to the information.
When the case was called for trial, the assistant fiscal made a manifestation that the accused had also
been charged with the crime of illegal practice of medicine before another sala of the same court. In view
of this manifestation, the trial court motu proprio dismissed the information for being fatally defective,
without prejudice to the filing of the proper information against the same accused. The grounds given for
the dismissal were the following:
"In view of the foregoing manifestation of the Fiscal, the Court finds that the information is fatally
defective and, therefore, should be dismissed under Par. (a), Sec. 2 of Rule 113 of the Rules of Court
inasmuch as the facts charged do not constitute the offense of homicide thru reckless imprudence
because illegal practice of medicine is malicious per se, and when the accused practiced medicine
without academical preparation and without a license to do so, then she is per se committing a criminal
act for which the criminal intent is presumed. Although the crime of homicide thru reckless imprudence
can be committed by a duly licensed physician when in the practice of his profession he fails to exercise
due care and diligence from which the criminal act arises, this crime cannot be imputed to a person who
has no authority to practice this profession, which act is malicious per se. The crime described in Article
365 of the Revised Penal Code results from the performance of a lawful act which was done without
exercising the care and diligence that is required by the circumstances, and not from the performance of
an unlawful act which is the subject of the information in this case because a quack doctor who practices
medicine does so against the law, and, therefore, his act is necessarily malicious and criminal."
From the above order, the provincial fiscal appealed to this Court, and, through the Solicitor General,
urges that the court below erred in dismissing the information for being fatally defective because the
facts charged therein allegedly do not constitute the crime of homicide thru reckless imprudence.
We agree with appellant that the order of dismissal is erroneous, in that the crime of illegal practice of
medicine is a statutory offense wherein criminal intent is taken for granted, so that a person may be
convicted thereof irrespective of his intention and in spite of his having acted in good faith and without
malice; i.e., even if he was not motivated by an evil desire to injure or hurt another, but by an honest
desire to cure or alleviate the pain of a patient. In fact, as defined by Section 2678 of the Revised
Administrative Code (the law then in force), the offense consists in the mere act of practicing medicine in
violation of the Medical Law, even if no injury to another, much less death, results from such malpractice.
When, therefore, the patient dies, the illegal practitioner should be equally responsible for the death of
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his patient, an offense independent of and distinct from the illegal practice of medicine.
The allegations in the information in this case that the accused acted with reckless negligence in
diagnosing, prescribing for, and treating the deceased Susana Tam, knowing that she did not possess
the necessary technical knowledge or skill to do so, thus causing her death, sufficiently charge the crime
of homicide through reckless imprudence, since ordinary diligence counsels one not to tamper with
human life by trying to treat a sick man when he knows that he does not have the special skill,
knowledge, and competence to attempt such treatment and cure, and may consequently reasonably
foresee harm or injury to the latter. In a similar case wherein the accused, not being a regular practitioner,
undertook to render medical assistance to another, causing physical injuries to the latter, said accused
was found guilty and convicted by this Court of physical injuries through imprudence under the old Penal
Code (U.S. vs. Feliciano Divino, 12 Phil., 175).
However, in view of the error of the lower court in dismissing the information, we cannot sustain this
appeal for the reason that it would place the accused in double jeopardy. The present information being
valid and sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction, the dismissal thereof by the court after
the accused had pleaded not guilty to the charge and without his consent constitutes jeopardy as to bar
further proceedings upon the case (U.S. vs. Yam Tung Way, 21 Phil., 67; People vs. Hernandez, 94
Phil., 49; 49 Off. Gaz. No. 12, 5342; People vs. Ferrer, 100 Phil., 124; 55 Off. Gaz. [4] 620). The failure
of the accused to file a brief and raise the question of double jeopardy in this appeal does not mean that
section 2, Rule 118, providing that the People can not appeal if the defendant would be placed in double
jeopardy would no longer apply (People vs. Bao, 106 Phil., 243; 56 Off. Gaz. [51] 7768).
The unfortunate result in this case could have been avoided if the trial court had proceeded more
deliberately, without allowing its judgment to be influenced by preconceived notions or undue haste in
dispatching cases.
The appeal is, therefore, dismissed, with costs de oficio.
Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Barrera and
Gutierrez David, JJ., concur.

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