Nuclear Deterrence in South 

Asia

This book explores evolving patterns of nuclear deterrence, the impact of new
technologies, and changing deterrent force postures in the South Asian region to
assess future challenges for sustainable peace and stability.
Under the core principles of the security dilemma, this book analyzes the pre-
vailing security environment in South Asia and offers unilateral, bilateral, and
multilateral frameworks to stabilize peace and ensure deterrence stability in the
South Asian region. Moreover, contending patterns of deterrence dynamics in
the South Asian region are further elaborated as becoming inextricably inter-
linked with the broader security dynamics of the Asia-­Pacific region and the
interactions with the United States and China’s Belt and Road Initiative. As
India and Pakistan are increasingly becoming part of the competing strategies
exercised by the United States and China, the authors analyze how strategic
uncertainty and fear faced by these rival states cause the introduction of new
technologies which could gradually drift these competing states into more
serious crises and military conflicts.
Presenting innovative solutions to emerging South Asian challenges and
offering new security mechanisms for sustainable peace and stability, this book
will be of interest to academics and policymakers working on Asian Security
studies, Nuclear Strategy, and International Relations.

Rizwana Abbasi is an Associate Professor in the Department of Humanities and

Social Sciences at Bahria University, Pakistan and a fellow of East West Insti-
tute, New York, USA. She is the author of Pakistan and the New Nuclear
Taboo: Regional Deterrence and the International Arms Control Regime (2012).

Zafar Khan is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Strategic Studies at

National Defence University, Pakistan. He is the author of Pakistan’s Nuclear
Policy: A Minimum Credible Deterrence published by Routledge in 2014.
Routledge Security in Asia Series

  6 China’s Rise – Threat or Opportunity?

Edited by Herbert S. Yee

  7 India and the South Asian Strategic Triangle

Ashok Kapur

  8 Southeast Asia and the Rise of China

The Search for Security
Ian Storey

  9 China’s Strategic Competition with the United States

Russell Ong

10 The Origins of U.S. Policy in the East China Sea Islands Dispute
Okinawa’s Reversion and the Senkaku Islands
Robert D. Eldridge

11 Arming Asia
Technonationalism and its Impact on Local Defense Industries
Richard A. Bitzinger

12 The China–Japan Conflict over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands

Useful Rivalry
Anna Costa

13 Vietnam, Territoriality and the South China Sea

Paracel and Spratly Islands
Hãn Nguyên Nguyễn Nhã, edited by Vinh-­The Lam

14 Nuclear Deterrence in South Asia

New Technologies and Challenges to Sustainable Peace
Rizwana Abbasi and Zafar Khan
Nuclear Deterrence in
South Asia
New Technologies and Challenges to
Sustainable Peace

Rizwana Abbasi and Zafar Khan

First published 2020
by Routledge
2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN
and by Routledge
52 Vanderbilt Avenue, New York, NY 10017
Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business
© 2020 Rizwana Abbasi and Zafar Khan
The right of Rizwana Abbasi and Zafar Khan to be identified as authors of
this work has been asserted by them in accordance with sections 77 and 78
of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988.
All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or
utilized in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now
known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in
any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing
from the publishers.
Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or
registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation
without intent to infringe.
British Library Cataloguing-­in-Publication Data
A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library
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A catalog record has been requested for this book

ISBN: 978-0-367-21969-7 (hbk)

ISBN: 978-0-429-26908-0 (ebk)
Typeset in Times New Roman
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Contents

List of abbreviations vi

Introduction 1

1 New technologies and the systemic security dilemma:

US–China–India–Pakistan 20

2 The Indo-­US increasing strategic partnership and regional

stability 48

3 India’s evolving nuclear strategy under the essentials of

its minimum deterrence: limitations and challenges 70

4 Pakistan’s evolving nuclear policy: the pursuit of balance

sans parity 96

5 Crises dynamics and the escalation dominance strategy in

South Asia 115

6 Balancing and stabilizing South Asia: challenges and

opportunities for sustainable peace and stability 149

Conclusion 179

Bibliography 195
Index 212
Abbreviations

A2/AD Area Access, Area Denial

AAD Advanced Air Defense
ABM Anti-­Ballistic Missile Treaty
ALCMs Airfield Lighting Control and Monitoring System
APEC Asia-­Pacific Economic Cooperation
ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations
ASW Anti-­Submarine Warfare
ATV Advanced Technology Vessel
BJP Bharatiya Janata Party
BMD Ballistic Missile Defence
BRI Belt and Road Initiative
C&C Command and Control
CBMs Confidence-­Building Measures
CENTO Central Treaty Organization
CFE Conventional Forces in Europe
CIRUS Canada-India-Reactor, US
COMCASA Communications Compatibility and Security Agreement
CPGS Prompt Global Strikes
CSD Cold Start Doctrine
CTBT Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
DCLs Direct Communication Links
DF Dong Feng
DGMOs Director General Military Operations
DND Draft Nuclear Doctrine
DOD Department of Defense
DRDO Defence Research and Development Organisation
DTTI Defence Trade Treaty Initiative
EAS East Asia Summit
EMALS Electromagnetic aircraft launch system
EW Electronic Warfare
FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation
FMCT Fissile Missile Cut-­Off Treaty
G8 Group of Eight
 Abbreviations   vii
GBSD Ground Based Strategic Deterrent
GDP Gross Domestic Product
IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency
IBGs Integrated Battle Groups
ICBMs Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles
IOR Indian Ocean Region
JeM Jaish-­e-Muhammad
LEMOA Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement
LeT Lashkar-­e-Taiyyaba
LoC Line of Control
LRSO Long Range Standoff Missile
MAD Mutual Assured Destruction
MIRVs Multiple Independent Reentry Vehicles
MRBM Medium Range Ballistic Missiles
MWe Megawatt Electrical
NAVCENT Naval Forces Central Command
NCA National Command Authority
NCBMs Nuclear Confidence-­Building Measure
NFU No-­First Use
NNPA Nuclear Non-­Proliferation Act
NNWS Non-­Nuclear Weapon States
NPR Nuclear Posture Review
NPT Non-­Proliferation Treaty
NRRCs Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers
NSG Nuclear Suppliers Group
NWS Nuclear Weapon States
PAD Prithvi Air Defense
PAEC Pakistan’s Atomic Energy Commission
PAO Pro-­Active Operations
PHWRs Pressurized Heavy-­Water Reactor
PLA People’s Liberation Army
PLAAF People’s Liberation Army Air Force
PNEs Peaceful Nuclear Explosions
PPP Purchasing Power Parity
QDR Quadrennial Defense Review
RAW Research and Analysis Wing
RSS Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sang
SAC Strategic Air Command
SEATO Southeast Asian Treaty Organization
SIOP Single Integrated Operational Plan
SLBMs Submarine-­Launched Ballistic Missile
SLCM Submarine-­Launched Cruise Missile
SLOCs Sea Lines of Communications
SPD Strategic Plans Division
SRR Strategic Restraint Regime
viii   Abbreviations
SSBNs Nuclear-­Powered Ballistic Missile Submarines
TAC Amity and Cooperation
TFW Two-­Front War
THAAD Terminal High Altitude Area Defense
TNW Tactical Nuclear Weapons
TPP Trans-­Pacific Partnership
TTP Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan
UAVs Unmanned Aerial Vehicle
UNGA United Nations General Assembly
UNSC United Nations Security Council
Introduction

The fundamental rationale of this book is to investigate the prevailing security

environment in South Asia under the core principles of the security dilemma –
‘a situation in which one state’s efforts to increase its own security reduces the
security of others.’1 This study explains and analyzes the evolving dynamics of
nuclear deterrence underpinned by the introduction of new technologies and its
related challenges to peace and stability between India and Pakistan. More
broadly, this volume carefully conceptualizes how rapidly the South Asian
region is pulled by the competing strategies played out between the US and
China in the broader Asia-­Pacific region where India is considered the strategic
partner to the perceived US offshore-­balancing/Pivot to Asia strategy and Paki-
stan is becoming one of the essential components of the evolving broader
Chinese Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). As India and Pakistan become part of
these broader competing strategies in Asia, this volume attempts to find out how
these rival states, wrought by an increasing vicious circle of security dilemma,
would fall in more strategic uncertainty and fear against each other thereby
facing more insecurity that in turn would push them toward the introduction of
advanced conventional technologies and modernized nuclear deterrent forces.
It is apparent that the contemporary evolving patterns of South Asian nuclear
deterrence are heading in the same direction. In doing so, the rapid introduction
of newer technologies by one state in terms of both conventional and nuclear
deterrent forces affects the strategic policies of another state that, in turn, gradu-
ally affect the broader strategic stability of Asia-­Pacific in general and the South
Asian region in particular. More importantly, this volume conceptualizes how
contemporary scholarship can best explain the evolving South Asian security
dilemma paradox from a broader perspective that is systemic in nature.
Centrally, this book presupposes that the evolving nature of deterrence
dynamics under the rubric of the security dilemma between India and Pakistan is
increasingly important to the world that justifies, and aspires for, the timely pro-
duction of this volume. South Asia is an extremely important case with reference
to new technologies in terms of deterrent forces and shifting doctrinal postures,
states’ realignment with external leading powers, their outstanding territorial dis-
putes, cross-­border terrorism, and high probability of war, particularly when the
inter-­state rivalry between India and Pakistan continues to persist despite the
2   Introduction
i­ntroduction of nuclear weapons.2 Most of these key variables are interlinked with
the essentials of the security dilemma debate conceptualized throughout the study.
Against the backdrop of these challenges, security experts failed to discern the
evolving patterns of South Asian deterrence dynamics with the broader changing
security matrix of the Asia-­Pacific region that is becoming fraught with the evolv-
ing competing strategies between the contending regional powers such as China
and India, and the sole power US. Arguably, in this context the competing strat-
egies between the US (the dominant player), China (the regional rising power),
and India (the regional aspirant power) could gradually affect the cooperation level
between these competing states in general and the South Asian deterrence stability
between India and Pakistan in particular. Because of the introduction of new
cutting-­edge but complicated technologies in terms of the expansion of deterrent
forces in South Asia, it tends to refresh the imperatives of the classic security
dilemma when South Asian nuclear states locate themselves in the broader vicious
circle of leading powers’ competing strategies in the Asian region, which ostens-
ibly remains the primary focus of twenty-­first century international politics. In
doing so, this book attempts to locate itself in the existing literature and explore
how various contending patterns of deterrence dynamics related to the nuclear
South Asian region is becoming inextricably interlinked with the broader security
dynamics of the Asia-­Pacific region. Therefore, it is important to note that China’s
regional rise, the US offshore-­balancing/Pivot to Asia strategy, India’s strategic
alignment with the US, combined with its perceived hedging strategy against
China and Pakistan, give this volume an exceptional impetus and academic rigor
to further expand the debate in the existing literature.
Contemporary scholarship carefully monitors how competing strategies by
contending powers such as the US–China, China–India, and India–Pakistan
within the realm of the security dilemma pull the South Asian region into the
classic vicious circle of the security dilemma. To put more simply, this volume
conceptualizes the contemporary debate on a US–China relationship fraught
with several competing strategies, the most significant of any in Asia, which
defines the broader regional security order and correlates to changing dynamics
between India and Pakistan. From the defensive realism perspective,3 this is a
complex interconnectedness of a strategic quadrilateral relationship where
China, from the defensive realism perspective, appears to be assertive in safe-
guarding its interests in the Asia-­Pacific, which are important for its economic
and security imperatives, without necessarily having expansionist designs in
pushing out the US from the entire Asia-­Pacific region. The US, in turn, fears
that China may have aggressive expansionist designs, which would threaten the
US’s close Asian allies and its predominance in the Asia-­Pacific region. India, in
being a part of this complex quadrilateral relationship, enhances its conventional
and nuclear force posture in order to become a prominent regional and global
player, thereby advancing the broader interests of the US in containing China’s
growing political and economic influences. This consequently makes Pakistan
less secure and threatens its security interests when it comes to the essentials of
the systemic security dilemma. That being noted, it is significant to conceptualize
 Introduction   3
further the evolving debate surrounding the security dilemma in a broader
picture underpinned by its core essentials before understanding the evolving pat-
terns of nuclear deterrence and its related challenges in South Asia.

Conceptualizing the evolving patterns of nuclear deterrence

in South Asia under the imperatives of the security dilemma
Before tracing out the core ingredients of the security dilemma while understanding
these core essentials in the evolving patterns of nuclear deterrence and its related
challenges for South Asian nuclear states, it is important to conceptualize what the
security dilemma is and how key scholarly contributors agree and disagree on the
various essentials of the security dilemma. It is also important to find out how these
core ingredients develop our understanding of the broader competing strategies
between the US and China, and the subsequent effects and compulsions of the two
South Asian key players that possess nuclear weapons, India and Pakistan, into the
vicious circle of the classic security dilemma that, in turn, provides them with
incentives to fall into their own security dilemma. In doing so, both India and Paki-
stan become trapped in a spiral of arms competition because of fear, mistrust, and
uncertainty that one could significantly outpace the other, thus risking its survival
and territorial integrity. That said, this creates more complex challenges to South
Asian deterrence stability that, in turn, could produce more crises, further risks of
escalation to a nuclear level, and a situation where cooperation becomes complex
and war more likely under the persistent security dilemma.
When it comes to the security dilemma, it is important to acknowledge the
pioneering contributions and expansion of the concept of the security dilemma
by Herbert Butterfield, John H. Herz, and Robert Jervis. The term ‘security
dilemma’ was first coined by John H. Herz in his seminal work published in the
leading academic journal World Politics in 1950. While pioneering this under-
standing on security, Herz stated that:

Wherever such anarchic society has existed – and it has existed in most
periods of known history on some level – there has arisen what may be
called the ‘security dilemma’ of men, or groups, or their leaders … con-
cerned about their security from being attacked, subjected, dominated, or
annihilated … striving to attain security from such attack, they are driven to
acquire more and more power in order to escape the impact of the power of
others. This, in turn, renders the others more insecure and compels them to
prepare for the worst. Since none can even feel entirely secure in such a
world of competing units, power competition ensues, and the vicious circle
of security and power accumulation is on.4

Herz further elaborated,

Whether man is by nature peaceful and cooperative, or domineering and

aggressive, is not the question.… It is his uncertainty and anxiety as to his
4   Introduction
neighbors’ intentions that places man in this basic security dilemma, and
makes the ‘homo homimi lupus’ a primary fact of the social life of man.
Basically it is the mere instinct of self-­preservation which, in the vicious
circle [of the security dilemma] leads to competition for even more power.5

Although Butterfield has not specifically mentioned the term ‘security dilemma’
in his key seminal work, what he attempted to elaborate reflects how, essentially,
the security dilemma drives two rival states to war even though they may not ini-
tially want to become involved. That is,

the greatest war in history can be produced without the intervention of any
great criminals who might be out there to do deliberate harm in the world. It
could be produced between two powers, both of which were desperately
anxious to avoid a conflict of any sort.6

Later, Robert Jervis modified and expanded the concept of the security dilemma
in his seminal work ‘cooperation under the security dilemma’ in 1978 when it
stated: ‘many of the means by which a state tries to increase its security decrease
the security of others.’7 And ‘one state’s gain in security often inadvertently
threaten others.’8 Earlier, Jervis stated in a similar context that, ‘these unintended
and undesired consequences of actions are meant to be defensive.’9 Jervis con-
tinues to persist on a similar concept regarding the security dilemma in his sub-
sequent scholarly works that, ‘… the attempts by one state to increase its security
have the effect of decreasing the security of others.’10 For many, the security
dilemma does not arise from misperception and human nature, but it is poten-
tially because of the international system which remains anarchic, fearful, and
uncertain. The pervasiveness of anarchy between states is the basic assumption
of realism11 – a prominent school of thought in international relations theory.
Nevertheless, despite certain overlaps between the conceptual analyses when it
comes to the their elaboration of the security dilemma, these key contributors,
such as Herz, Jarvis, and Butterfield, would at least agree on the plausible essen-
tials of the security dilemma – that is, anarchy, fear, and uncertainty between
rival states which, in turn, create the risk of conflict, miscalculation, and military
confrontation, even potentially leading to the nuclear level, particularly if these
rival states are in possession of nuclear weapons and sophisticated technologies.
The security dilemma existing in such a scenario entails that these rival states
outpace and undermine each other’s deterrent force capability, thereby, falling
into an unending arms race, thus making each other less secure.
While closely and critically reading these key contributors on the security
dilemma, Shiping Tang broadly defines the security dilemma: ‘Under a con-
dition of anarchy, two states are defensive realist states. The two states, however,
cannot be sure of each other’s present or future intentions (because they live
under anarchy).’ When this happens, Tang asserts that this results in a fear
against the other that ‘may be or may become predator.’ Tang remains persistent
that since, ‘both believe that power is a means towards security, both seek to
 Introduction   5
accumulate more and more power’ and ‘many of the measures adopted by one
side for its own security can often threaten, or be perceived as threatening, the
security of the other side, even if both sides merely want to maximize their
security.’ Furthermore, Tang, while trying to broaden the term, asserts that in
doing so, ‘consequently, the other side is likely to take countermeasures against
those defensive measures … to reinforce their fears and uncertainty about each
other’s intentions, leading to a vicious cycle …’ which Tang, like many of his
predecessors on the security dilemma conceptualization, confirms that, ‘this
vicious cycle can also lead to unnecessary conflicts – threats of war or war.’12
While conceiving the broad definitional conceptualization, Tang dedicated his
seminal contribution on the security dilemma to his pioneers, stating that ‘the
security dilemma is arguably the theoretical linchpin of defensive realism.’13
However, some of the key elements of the security dilemma are also acknow-
ledged by classic realism. For example, for Hans J. Morgenthau, the anarchic
nature of the international system drives states into a classic security dilemma.14
It is important to note that amongst many elements of the security dilemma, the
three essential elements such as anarchy, fear, and uncertainty remain the core
elements this volume attempts to conceptualize in order to underpin its central
argument. The main argument is that evolving technologies and competing strat-
egies in South Asia make peace fragile and war more likely, which in turn lead
to challenging deterrence stability. That said, while borrowing from Tang’s
broader but core conceptualization on the security dilemma,15 the South Asian
strategic environment remains anarchic, not only because it has a number of
unresolved issues including the core issue of Kashmir, but it is also gradually
getting wrought by competing strategies between the US and China, which
eventually pull both India and Pakistan (arch-­rivals) into their alliance system
(not substantially elaborated by Tang and his pioneers on the linchpin logic of
the security dilemma). The South Asian anarchic situation generates uncertainty
between India and Pakistan. While uncertainty creates fear, fear leads to com-
peting strategies in the form of an arms race, the transformation of doctrinal pos-
tures, the introduction of newer technologies, and the suspension of dialogue and
the peace process. Moreover, these competing strategies trigger the security
dilemma which, in turn, could produce a number of crises between India and
Pakistan risking the escalation of military conflicts to a nuclear level in the
absence of de-­escalation or war-­termination strategies. However, in fact this
tragic pattern of the security dilemma can best be examined through the lens of a
broader systemic dilemma emanating from competing strategies between the US
and China in the Asian region.

US–China competing strategies: gluing others in the vicious circle of

the security dilemma
It may not be wrong to argue that the contemporary US–China competing strat-
egies in the broader Asia-­Pacific region expand the security dilemma while at
the same time gluing others such as India and Pakistan in this persistent circle of
6   Introduction
the security dilemma. For example, India’s and Pakistan’s deterrent force pos-
tures gradually become affected by what is largely played out in the broader
Asia-­Pacific region. This scenario may fall in a systemic security dilemma. The
South Asian rivals are directly or indirectly affected by the evolving competing
strategies of the US and China. In this context, Adam Liff and John Ikenberry
help us to understand this type of scenario by elaborating two types of security
dilemma, as the combination of these two strands somewhat appears to be
applicable to the central argument of this volume. Liff and Ikenberry assert that,

A type-­1 strategic setting is characterized by a traditional security dilemma

– that is, a situation in which security relations between potential rivals are
unstable and defined by mutual suspicions of each other’s intentions but
where both sides are status-­quo, defensive oriented states.

Liff and Ikenberry conceptualize that ‘despite having aligned interests, they
nevertheless are engaged in a destabilizing action-­reaction cycle whereby moves
to enhance one’s own security for defensive reasons are seen by the other side as
evincing potentially offensive intentions.’ Therefore, ‘… the other side judges it
has no choice but to employ countermeasures.’16 In this type, the two states can
strike a bargain to regulate/control military competition. While elaborating the
type-­2 security dilemma dynamics, Liff and Ikenberry assert that,

type-­2 dynamics are those in which one or more states seek changes to the
status quo in a fundamentally zero-­sum manner. Although one or both sides
may wish to avoid war, the core driver of military competition is a direct
conflict of interest.17

More so, ‘the two sides’ interests are not aligned and efforts to enhance military
capabilities are a means to a de facto revisionist end.’18 Although both types of
security dilemma dynamics could overlap and help explain what is happening
between China and the US, and India and Pakistan, when it comes to their com-
peting strategies against each other, the second type could best apply in the
South Asian dynamics of the security dilemma emanating from a direct conflict
of interest between India and Pakistan that is much more complex, and that
could become even more challenging for contemporary scholarship to help find
out a direct and easy way forward. The first type of security dilemma helps us
understand the competing strategies between the US and China, where suspi-
cions of actions of one against the other exist and where one state’s defensive
deterrent forces development is considered to be offensive by the other.
More conceptually, on the one hand, as China’s rise is becoming a reality for
many in the twenty-­first century of international politics, China is perceived to
be a potential threat for the US and its Asian allies and partners. However, the
contemporary international economic and political order that tends to favor
China, in turn seems to accommodate China’s rise as a rising regional power.
Nevertheless, contemporary scholarship critically observes China’s rise as
 Introduction   7
fraught with both opportunities and challenges. First, China’s economic rise
could potentially empower the developing states economically as China brings
with its rise huge investments on mega projects into these countries as part of its
BRI. Second, with its potential rise, China would acquire advanced deterrent
forces and effective countermeasures in order not only to prevent the offensive
measures China perceives largely from the US and its close Asian allies particu-
larly in the South China Sea, but also China would aim to protect its rudimentary
Sea Lines of Communications (SLOCs). However, this will simultaneously have
two plausible challenges for China: (1) as China tends to heavily invest in the
Asian region – though most Chinese allies are least developing states compared
to US allies, which are rich and stronger – other countries would feel as if China
is gradually expanding and they would perceive that China might one day station
its deterrent forces in those countries that are particularly under Chinese eco-
nomic and political influence because of their geopolitical essence, in order to
keep an eye on its adversaries. (2) When it comes to the Chinese production of
effective countermeasures, the US and its potential Asian allies would feel
threatened – that is, the more the China develops its countermeasure capabilities,
the more it tends to make its potential adversaries’ command and control vulner-
able and the more it is perceived as escalatory when it comes to the competing
strategies of China and the US, which are fraught with the possibilities of escala-
tion toward dangerous entanglement.19
On the other hand, since the US perceives the rise of China as a potential
threat to its predominance and its allies in the Asia-­Pacific region, the US
appears to be developing its offensive and defensive deterrent forces, although it
becomes hard to distinguish between the defensive and offensive deterrent forces
within the realm of a severe security dilemma. That is, the perceived defensive
deterrent forces as exhibited by one state may likely be considered offensive by
other states. Similarly, it becomes hard to distinguish between malign and benign
state deterrent force postures, especially when states are under severe competing
strategies affected by the security dilemma. First, it is becoming a challenge for
the US to convince China, with regard to the development and gradual deploy-
ment of its Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) system in the Asian region, that
these defensive forces are not against China but rather to intercept the incoming
missiles from provocative states. Also, preparing the military muscle of others
states, for example India, as part of the US offshore/Pivot to Asia strategy may
remain unacceptable both to China and the US’s potential Asian allies, as China
would like to prevent confrontation or war in the first place because of the evolv-
ing Chinese strategy of economic integration. Second, the US would want to
advance conventional forces and, at the same time, would want to retain essen-
tial nuclear forces to complement its conventional force as part of its broader
‘damage-­limitation strategy.’ Charles Glaser and Steve Fetter conceptualize the
US damage-­limitation strategy in the Chinese context by arguing that,

A damage-­limitation strategy is designed to protect against an adversary’s

nuclear attack: the United States attempts to destroy China’s nuclear forces
8   Introduction
before they reach the United States. To achieve damage limitation, the
United States would attack China’s nuclear forces on land and at sea, as
well as the command and control capabilities that China relies on to launch
these forces. It would also employ BMD to intercept the warheads that
China would launch after they have survived the US attack.20

However, because of the evolving prospects of the security dilemma in the Asia-­
Pacific region, Glaser and Fetter argue that the US damage-­limitation strategy
could generate arms competition, invite inadvertent escalation, and fuel more
crises escalating to a bigger military confrontation.21 Liff and Ikenberry also
assert that, ‘… mistrust and uncertainty about intentions lead one side to inter-
pret the other’s defensive measures as offensive and therefore threatening. The
other side responds in kind.’22 This interface inadvertently stimulates a tragic
action–reaction spiral of military competition that leaves both states in the posi-
tion of an arms race, thereby making both less secure.23 That being noted, if the
US consistently pursues its offshore-­balancing competing strategy by increasing
its strategic partnership with the rising potential Asian states, in this case India,
then China could fall under severe strategic pressure. While becoming an
unavoidable part of the vicious circle of the security dilemma, China is follow-
ing three major options: (1) it is increasing its strategic partnership with its Asian
allies by bolstering their economic and military imperatives, (2) China would try
to integrate the majority of the Asian states, including potential US allies, as part
of its economic integration strategy, and (3) it would develop more counter-­
effective deterrent forces specially naval forces that in turn could undermine and
challenge the command and control mechanism of the US for its deterrent forces
in Asia. Summing up the argument, the US–China competing strategies would
not only strain the relationship between these competing states, but also these
strategies would gradually pull the potential Asian states such as India and Paki-
stan into a vicious circle of a broader systemic security dilemma, particularly
when the inter-­state rivalry between Asian states endures.

The China–India competing strategy: who is hedging against whom?

As competing strategies between China and India are played out in the Asia-­
Pacific region, competition, cooperation, and containment have become the
common practices between these regional powers. Although, as a continental
power of this region, China has effectively managed its border conflicts with
regional states with India, it continues to have strategic rivalry in the Southern
Asian region. However, the burgeoning economies of the two states and their
growing interdependence cannot be easily ignored. Having said that, China
has the ability and potential to accommodate India and moderate the security
dilemma with India that, in turn, may lead to reducing the chances of conflict
or confrontation between the two. However, the possibility of conflict, which
may not be in the interest of any regional or extra-­regional powers, cannot be
completely ruled out. In this context, it needs to be observed closely just what
 Introduction   9
s­ trategic approaches are prioritized and played out by these rising competing
powers. If both China and India tend to keep their deterrent forces (i.e., con-
ventional and nuclear forces) limited and stay within their legitimate contin-
ental and maritime domains without necessarily hedging or decreasing the
security of other states – that is, to stay defensive rather than aggressive and
escalatory – the prospect for conflict diminishes. However, if both India and
China strategically pose more assertions and expand their strategic impera-
tives, then this could have certain strategic repercussions that might invite
conflict in the region. As a result, this broadly affects the Southern Asian
region when both India and Pakistan are linked with these competing powers
in one way or the other.
As the tectonic plates of international politics gradually shift away from
Europe to Asia, many key players strategize how and where to project power in
order to influence the continental and maritime frontiers. Both China and India,
as emerging regional powers in the maritime sphere of the Asia-­Pacific, not only
desire to enhance their force capability to protect their legitimate economic inter-
ests, but also demonstrate some power projection in the maritime domain where
their economic legitimacy would matter much. Sustaining economic legitimacy
and demonstrating power projection would require both of these competing
players to develop not only their advanced deterrent force, but also to craft strat-
egies to integrate with each other through an institutional mechanism in order to
enhance cooperation and reduce the possibility of conflict in the Asia-­Pacific. In
other words, it is to prevent the adversaries’ forward-­deployed naval forces in
both the South and East China Seas. China’s policy paper, ‘White Paper 2015,’
speaks of ‘active defense’ to ‘safeguard national territorial sovereignty and mari-
time rights and interests, and maintain security and stability along China’s peri-
phery.’24 India, on the other hand, considers largely the Indo-­Pacific Ocean as
India’s ocean.25 Inspired by the classic strategic thoughts of Indian naval strate-
gist K.M. Panikkar, India rises up and shows some power projection, which in
turn requires India to expand its naval forces that are stationed at important stra-
tegic locations: the Andaman and Nicobar Islands close to the Strait of
Malacca.26 These important sea routes support the life engines of the Chinese
and US economies, which in turn affect the economies and security of many
other countries.
In this context, fraught with US–China competing strategies as discussed in
the preceding section because of the evolving patterns of the security dilemma,
both India’s and China’s increasing geo-­economic and geo-­strategic interests in
the Asia–Pacific region would require their strategic force modernization. With
this strategic force modernization, both China and India would increase their
deterrence capabilities and their strategic influence in the Asia-­Pacific region.
They would also attract many countries located strategically at important
SLOCs. This would be an opportunity for both states to show power projection,
hedging strategies, and improve the strategic and economic conditions of the
other countries that China and India would like to engage with. However, at the
same time, increasing competing strategies between China and India could
10   Introduction
increase the prospects of escalation, which in turn could lead them to a possible
conflict as discussed in Chapter 1. First, the strategic rivalry between India and
China makes them appear more assertive and escalatory; and second, this may
increase their deterrence force capability, which could strategically assist them
to deter each other from any sort of aggression against each other. However, to
recall the classic conceptual framework on the security dilemma, this strategic
approach decreases the security of conventionally weaker states in the Asia-­
Pacific region.
In summary, China’s and India’s competing strategies, fraught with the
similar logic of the security dilemma because of the strategic rivalry that con-
tinues to persist between these two contending states, would help develop esca-
lation dominance and hedging strategies against each other that, in turn, affect
India’s and Pakistan’s deterrent force postures in South Asia. These are dis-
cussed in the subsequent sections of this introduction.

Persistent security dilemma and India’s changing deterrent

force posture
Since the competing strategies between China and India, and India’s hedge
against China continues to endure, it would have implications for India’s deter-
rent force posture in general and Pakistan’s nuclear strategy in particular. While
Pakistan’s case is discussed briefly here, but in more detail in Chapters 2, 4, and
5, to find out whether or not it is wrought by the vicious cycle of the security
dilemma, it is important to analyze first the changing patterns of India’s deterrent
forces under the rubric of the security dilemma. Over the past two decades, India
has changed its deterrent force posture, such as the principle of no first use in
2003, from what it earlier conceptualized in the 1999 Draft Nuclear Doctrine
(DND).27 These changes broadly relate to the Indian doctrinal posture when it
comes to the use of India’s deterrent forces perceptively or employing nuclear
weapons in time of war.28 On the one hand, India appears to bring modifications
within its DND as part of its broader nuclear policy, but on the other hand,
India’s military also attempts to develop a limited war-­fighting strategy as a
broader part of the Cold Start Doctrine (CSD) – rooted in the Sunderji military
doctrine of the late 1980s – but formally initiated since 2004 after the frustrating
Indian military force deployment at the common borders between India and
Pakistan stemming from the Twin Peaks incidents in 2001–2002. But, this deter-
rent force posture is posing challenges for India in general and the broader stra-
tegic stability of South Asia in particular.29
One challenge, for example, is when India declares that it would trigger a
massive retaliation as part of its 2003 modified DND when the adversary would
use either chemical or biological weapons against India, or Indian military forces
are killed anywhere in the region; contemporary scholarship would need to care-
fully analyze whether or not this is a rational approach and whether the Indian
security leadership would indeed trigger such a massive retaliation, say, for
perceived minor attacks at the tactical level. This appears to be directionless and
 Introduction   11
less convincing, as with the US nuclear strategy of Massive Retaliation proposed
by Foster Dulles in the 1950s, which was critiqued in the subsequent years.
Another challenge is when the Indian military leadership announces that it has
actually been working on CSD development and on waging the possible deploy-
ment of limited strikes against unknown parts of Pakistan without provoking
Pakistan to use its nuclear forces; through a careful and critical lens, it can be
questioned how the Pakistani security leadership could be convinced on this
position when the latter relies on nuclear forces for its ultimate survival because
of the growing conventional asymmetry between the two South Asian rivals.
Also, it would be debatable just how correct India would be to believe that it
would not provoke Pakistan to use its battlefield nuclear forces in the event of
CSD deployment.
This moves India away from the classic principles of the No-­First Use
(NFU) option because the CSD could include the use of India’s short-­range
tactical nuclear weapons supporting India to strike first before it itself is hit.
The Prahaar, Nirbhay, and BrahMos short-­range missile variants are ideal and
could be used to carry tactical nuclear warheads if and when the Defence
Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) expands to miniaturize its
nuclear warheads.30 This becomes escalatory which, in turn, immensely
increases the chances of miscalculation and inadvertent war in South Asia.
With an increasing number of nuclear forces, and the acquisition of advanced
conventional forces bolstered by the shift in the NFU option, India becomes
more assertive in South Asia. India’s nuclear strategy for the development of
the BMD system, Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs), Multiple Inde-
pendent Reentry Vehicles (MIRVs), nuclear-­powered submarines, aircraft
carriers, and hi-­tech cutting-­edge new technologies and deployment of new
surveillance means, continue to create fear and anxiety for Pakistan, thereby
making it less secure against India.
In summary, many in the strategic circles of Pakistan would perceive the
modernization of India’s deterrent forces as increased insecurity for Pakistan.
This book attempts to explain the puzzle of how India’s introduction of
cutting-­edge new technologies and how its attempts to bring bigger shifts in
its deterrent force postures for preemptive/punitive strikes against parts of
Pakistan could undermine the credibility of Pakistan’s nuclear deterrent forces
and how this could expand the vicious circle of the security dilemma in South
Asia when the latter would feel more insecure by the changing patterns of the
former’s deterrent force posture. Eventually, given these policy implications,
Pakistan may have two policy options for escaping the fraught cycle of the
security dilemma in South Asia. (1) It could opt for a weapon-­to-weapon
policy. (2) It could develop a strategy to retain a deterrence balance rather
than parity. Of course, each of these policy options could have policy implica-
tions that are discussed in greater detail in Chapters 4 and 5. A brief conceptu-
alization is developed here.
12   Introduction
The puzzle persists: is Pakistan in search of parity or retaining
balance?
Since India plans, as it carries a potential to do so, to develop more nuclear
deterrent forces bolstered with sophisticated delivery systems, these questions,
therefore, arise: will Pakistan need to build up its armaments for parity or retain
a balance against India and will its nuclear deterrent force development remain
consistent with the essentials of minimum deterrence conceived here? This book
answers the question through the prism of the offense–defense realm as a rudi-
mentary part of the broader security dilemma that if Pakistan opts for a parity
level against its adversary by means of increasing its deterrent forces (both con-
ventional and nuclear), developing sophisticated delivery systems, and demon-
strating its deterrent force assertion by weapon-­to-weapon combat against its
potential adversary in South Asia, then Pakistan’s nuclear policy may go beyond
the minimum deterrence it adopted earlier. In this scenario, others may perceive
Pakistan as an offensive realist state that tries to maximize its security endeav-
ors. However, if Pakistan opts for retaining a credible balance vis-­à-vis its adver-
sary when it comes to essential deterrent force posture without necessarily opting
for a weapon-­to-weapon strategy, then Pakistan’s nuclear policy remains con-
sistent with the minimum deterrence conceived here. Pakistan may thus fall best
into the category of a defensive realist state that attempts only to defend its vital
interest by focusing on its primary security.31
The chapters of this volume unpack varying analyses by further illustrating
that either Pakistan would need to expand its deterrent forces – that is, to opt for
parity – or it would remain consistent with its defensive deterrent force posture,
which is to retain balance against its adversary. However, it is important to note
that if Pakistan, in being a defensive realist state, retains a balance by avoiding
the unnecessary expansion of its deterrent forces while preferring to plug
the deterrence gaps, then it will become easier for other states to understand the
intentions of Pakistan’s security policy which will in turn help mitigate the
paradox of the security dilemma in South Asia. But, if Pakistan expands its
deterrent force program, which it might do so in response to what its adversary
does, and since it could become difficult for Pakistan to convince others about
the Pakistani intention on defensive deterrent forces, then the security dilemma
as an unresolved puzzle will continue to persist between India and Pakistan. It
will become hard to mitigate the perceived arms competition, multiple crises,
and the risk of bigger military confrontation to a nuclear level in South Asia. In
such a scenario, cooperation will become hard and each contending party will
perceive that the costs might be less by entering into conflict against the rival.
Nevertheless, if the intentions of both India and Pakistan are clear and less
ambiguous towards each other, and both the rival states perceive to be playing
on their defensive realism, cooperation in a persistent security dilemma can be
possible, despite their differences. Both the Soviet Union (Russia) and the US
were successful by keeping the mutual level of cooperation high through
different channels in order to prevent escalation for dangerous entanglement.
 Introduction   13
Both sides realized the high costs involved in becoming malign rather than
benign states. In a similar context, India and Pakistan had a number of Confi-
dence Building Measures (CBMs) and Nuclear Confidence Building Measures
(NCBMs) despite the acquisition of new technologies, a consistent arms race,
competing strategies, and multiple crises between India and Pakistan. Defensive
rather than offensive realism provides food for thought for South Asian rivals
when weighing the cost–benefit analysis of cooperation under the security
dilemma.

Cooperation under the security dilemma: toward sustainable peace

and stability in South Asia
Since the security dilemma remains central to defensive realism, if this is prac-
ticed as conceptualized in the preceding sections, then cooperation between
states may be possible because the intention of the states becomes obvious and
states do not perceive major ambiguities against each other. More importantly,
they try to avoid cheating and deliberate seriously to prevent war-­fighting strat-
egies that lead to war. Trust gradually builds up as they begin to show a greater
interest in agreement on multiple arrangements, moderate security dilemma, and
strike bargains to mitigate risks of war. With clear intentions and less ambiguity,
it gradually becomes easier for states to develop various mechanisms for
cooperation, though states are wrought with severe rivalry underpinned by the
security dilemma. In this context, as conceptualized in the preceding sections,
Shiping Tang argues in his seminal work that, ‘the security dilemma is arguably
the theoretical linchpin of defensive realism because for defensive realists it is
the security dilemma that makes possible genuine cooperation between states.’32
Also, Robert Jervis who is responsible for expanding and further modifying the
concept of the security dilemma agrees that cooperation in the security dilemma
may be possible despite the anarchic world where it becomes hard for one state
to completely understand the intention of another.33 Jervis foresees the possib-
ility of cooperation between the rival states in the context of cost and benefit
analysis. Jervis argues that, ‘for a state to stress how much it gains from
cooperation may be to imply that it is gaining much more than the other and to
suggest that the benefits should be distributed more equitably.’34 Jervis provides
key empirical evidence derived from the 1962 Cuban missile crisis during the
peak of the Cold War between the Soviet Union and the US when the Soviet
leader Khrushchev expressed mutual cooperation to mitigate the persistent
security dilemma between the two superpowers of the Cold War period:

we are of sound mind and understand perfectly well that Russia could not
launch a successful attack against the US, and therefore that there was a no
reason for the US to contemplate a defensive, preemptive strike of its own.35

That being said, it depends on the level of cooperation between the two rival
states within the realm of the vicious circle of the security dilemma. If one rival
14   Introduction
state expresses its willingness or signals to the other side that it would like to
discuss issues on various cooperative measures that could be mutually decided
and agreed upon, then it is important to observe whether or not the other side
agrees on the arrangements proposed. Simply put, cooperation under the security
dilemma is not one-­way traffic, especially when the two contending states are
rivals to each other and Tang’s core elements of the security dilemma, such as
anarchy, fear, and self-­help, persist.36 It requires two or more states to mutually
agree upon certain cooperative imperatives under the security dilemma. If this
persists, there are chances that state leadership might help to mitigate the security
dilemma. However, if one side tries to cooperate, but the other does not substan-
tially respond to cooperative signals, then there is a danger that the core elements
of the security dilemma would continue to endure between the two or more
rivals, thus making war likely. When it comes to cooperative arrangements under
security dilemma between India and Pakistan, it is important to closely observe a
number of existing CBMs/NCBMs that were mutually agreed upon, and the
similar cooperative measures and imperatives that are practiced today. That
being noted, these numbers of cooperative arrangements mitigate the security
dilemma, therefore reducing the chances of major conflicts erupting in South
Asia. However, because of the existence of core ingredients, the security
dilemma persists in South Asia, which could trigger these major conflicts into
becoming serious military crises. Contemporary scholarship can monitor closely
that multiple crises between India and Pakistan continue to persist despite the
introduction of nuclear deterrent forces and these crises eventually undermine
the credibility of the existing valuable CBMs/NCBMs between the two rivals,
particularly when both sides do not agree to recommence the sustainable polit-
ical dialogue process.
In summary, the level of cooperation under the security dilemma differs from
one security arrangement to another between the South Asian rivals. If they suc-
cessfully and mutually agree upon cooperative arrangements by weighing up the
cost and benefit analysis, then cooperation persists and both sides successfully
reduce the intensity of the security dilemma, thereby preventing the chances of
bigger conflicts. However, if both India and Pakistan fail to mutually agree upon
well-­intentioned cooperative arrangements for multiple complex reasons, then
the security dilemma becomes intensified which, in turn, creates fearful scen-
arios and a warlike situation in South Asia. In this context, when it comes to the
core essentials of the security dilemma in the absence of cooperation under the
security dilemma, Tang is correct to argue that, ‘anarchy generates uncertainty;
uncertainty leads to fear; fear then leads to power competition; power competi-
tion activates a (dormant) security dilemma; and the activated security dilemma
leads to war through a spiral.’37

Significance of the study
When it comes to the essential significance of this book, it is different and innov-
ative in multiple ways. That is, most of the work and literature covered on the
 Introduction   15
South Asian issues is part of the history. The existing literature merely covers
the historical narrative of various issues limited to India and Pakistan. The
present volume goes beyond the South Asian historical narrative by attempting
to avoid the reproduction of the existing literature that has largely been covered,
instead substantially and systematically analyzing the emerging and future
security architecture of South Asia in light of key literature on the subject which
in turn reflects how India and Pakistan may become the central focus of global
nuclear politics. Based on contemporary developments, this book offers a future
security mechanism/cooperation amidst the vicious circle of the security
dilemma for India and Pakistan, to stabilize deterrence and promote peace which
in turn makes this volume interesting and innovative.
More interestingly, this work is innovative in that it not only widely covers
the challenges that arise in the rapidly transforming security environment of
South Asia under the persistent core rubric of the security dilemma (anarchy,
fear, self-­help), but also proposes various prospects as how to approach these
challenges, which are interlinked with one another or with an evolving security
dynamic between the US and China in the Asia-­Pacific region. This volume is
purely innovative and offers a unique and fresh scholarly perspective for under-
standing the evolving broader regional security dynamics of South Asia.
This book is timely, rigorous, and futuristic in terms of exploring the inter-
connected nuclear affairs in South Asia, defined largely by the systematic
security dilemma. It offers a new voice and a diversity of opinions to the plural-
ity of existing viewpoints based on an exploratory research method. Thus, in
addition to the large amount of secondary and tertiary sources consulted for this
work, it is also based on key interviews/fieldwork and personal observations. By
virtue of this book’s methodological rigor under the conceptual framework of
the evolving dynamics of the security dilemma, empirical detail, and policy ana-
lysis, this volume offers a fresh perspective and rich addition to the existing
body of knowledge on South Asian affairs. It is an interesting, innovative, and
enriched volume in its approach and research orientation, and covers challenges
in the changing/changed geo-­strategic architecture of South Asia in which India
and Pakistan become the central focus of global politics. The book has a target
market and is highly useful for students of International Relations, Strategic
Studies, Security Studies, Contemporary Global Issues, and policymakers. This
book is a valuable addition to the existing literature and would substantially
cover in-­depth analysis of a wide variety of contemporary issues that the South
Asian region confronts.

The organization of the book

Chapter 1 of this study is the most important part of the volume, which builds a
broader debate on emerging geo-­economic and geopolitical trends in the Asia-­
Pacific region and the US–China technological evolution that in turn determines
Indo-­Pakistan inter-­state security relations. This chapter covers the holistic
ground on evolving technologies and shifting doctrines and the deterrent forces
16   Introduction
of the US–China, and India–Pakistan. It identifies how the complex quadrilateral
relationship among these states leads to the creation of a systemic security
dilemma, driving the region into an aggravated arms race and conflict-­driven-
like scenarios. This chapter carefully determines the extent to which the strategic
behavior of these four states is geopolitically and geo-­economically interlinked,
in order to explain the varying dynamics that in turn intensify the security
dilemma-­driven military and technological competition in the region. This
chapter confirms the existence of a chain reaction between these four states and
its adverse strategic effects on the security setting of South Asia.
Chapter 2 deals with the dynamics of Indo-­US security relations and the con-
temporary nature of their strategic partnership. It investigates how changing
global dynamics have led to the transformation of Indo-­US relations and how
Asia’s rise has redefined their strategic priorities. The chapter investigates the
kinds of technologies that India is procuring from the US and other leading US
allies and partners against the backdrop of the Indo-­US nuclear deal that was
signed in 2008. Similarly, the chapter links the growing Indo-­US partnership to
the instability of the broader nuclear non-­proliferation regime and the regional
strategic balance between India and Pakistan. It finds how the Indo-­US strategic
partnership leads the way to promoting the spiral of arms competition as part of
the enduring and unresolvable security dilemma between India and Pakistan,
thus challenging regional stability.
Chapter 3 assesses India’s deterrent force modernization that reflects a shift in
India’s evolving nuclear strategy, asking the question of whether or not the doc-
trinal shifts remain consistent with the minimum deterrence that India conceptu-
alized in its previous DNDs. It builds on the argument that India’s nuclear
strategy is evolving, which in turn shapes India’s ‘conceptual road map’38 for
achieving a great power status and security maximization in the Southern Asian
region as part of its grand strategy. This chapter investigates how India’s
­strategic shift makes India more assertive in its policy direction against its
adversaries, thereby creating fear as one of the essential components of the
security dilemma in South Asia. It carefully conceptualizes why India gradually
brings modifications to its DND and how this emerging shift in its DND affects
its broader nuclear policy of minimum deterrence in general and South Asian
deterrence stability in particular. It illustrates how this creates more challenges
for India and affects the strategic policies of its adversaries in the Southern Asian
region.
Linked with the previous chapter, Chapter 4 focuses on understanding the
essential pillars of Pakistan’s nuclear strategy, potentially shaped in accordance
with the changed South Asian strategic environment. This chapter examines the
debate around whether Pakistan is racing for a balance or parity against India, or
whether its nuclear deterrent force development remains consistent with the
essentials of its minimum deterrence policy that it adopted earlier. The chapter
builds on the essentials of minimum deterrence in order to understand the ration-
ale of Pakistan’s evolving nuclear policy, especially after two decades of nucle-
 Introduction   17
arization of South Asia, and whether or not this remains consistent with its
policy of credible minimum deterrence.
Chapter 5 builds the debate on the nature and dynamics of crisis that seem to
be transforming in frequency and scale. Crises will continue to occur, which in
turn could lead to a further deteriorated peace process between the South Asian
nuclear states, thus making war more likely because of the South Asian conflict-
ing environment as one of the key components of the security dilemma. To
understand key crises and their prospects for key lessons learned by India and
Pakistan, this chapter first begins to understand briefly the origin of the enduring
rivalry between India and Pakistan and then explains the changing nature of the
crisis. However, the second section of this chapter is focused on investigating
India’s quest to preserve escalation dominance thereby causing security chal-
lenges for Pakistan and making war more likely.
Chapter 6 is a key part of this book in that it offers innovative solutions to stabi-
lizing deterrence and securing sustainable peace in South Asia. While carefully
stemming from a severe security dilemma paradox in South Asia, this chapter
entails that cooperation between the South Asian rivals is possible amidst the
vicious circle of the security dilemma. It offers unilateral, bilateral, and multilateral
frameworks to stabilize peace in the broader Southern Asian region. The book
covers comprehensive ground on the states’ unilateral, bilateral, and multilateral
efforts to prevent war-­fighting strategies, reduce over-­reliance on nuclear weapons,
and avoid accidental nuclear war, thereby adopting a policy of accommodation to
promote peace and achieve deterrence stability in South Asia.
The Conclusion of this book extracts the salient features of the main debate,
thereby confirming that the essential core elements of the security dilemma that
exists in South Asia are systemic in nature. This section confirms that the quadri-
lateral relationship that exists between the US and China, China and India, and
India and Pakistan is so complex that it creates an unresolvable security dilemma
and the problem of an unresolvable arms race. It considers the puzzle (persistent
core essentials of the security dilemma) of how far the South Asian deterrent
dynamics correlate to the evolving security dynamics of the Asia-­Pacific region,
and concludes that the risk of conflict exists, but states have the potential to
moderate the security dilemma to prevent war, since cooperation is possible
amidst the security dilemma particularly when the two contending parties mutu-
ally agree on imperatives for cooperation. Finally, this section sums up the major
conclusions and recommendations, thus offering the key policy options for states
within and outside of South Asia.

Notes
  1 Charles Glaser, ‘Will China’s Rise Lead to War? Why Realism Does Not Mean Pess-
imism,’ Foreign Affairs, Vol. 90, No. 2 (March/April 2011), p. 82.
  2 For interesting analysis, see T.V. Paul, The India–Pakistan Conflict: An Enduring
Rivalry (London and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005).
  3 Kenneth N. Waltz, ‘Structural Realism after the Cold War,’ International Security,
Vol. 25, No. 1 (Summer 2000), pp. 5–41.
18   Introduction
  4 John H. Herz, ‘Idealist Internationalism and the Security Dilemma,’ World Politics,
Vol. 2, No. 2 (January 1950), pp. 157–180, 157.
  5 John H. Herz, Political Realism and Political Idealism: A Study in Theories and Real-
ities (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1951), pp. 3–4.
  6 Herbert Butterfield, History and Human Relations (London: Collins, 1951),
pp. 19–20.
  7 Robert Jervis, ‘Cooperation under the Security Dilemma,’ World Politics, Vol.  30,
No. 2 (January 1978), pp. 167–214, 169.
  8 Ibid., p. 170.
  9 Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press, 1976), p. 66.
10 Robert Jervis, ‘Realism, Neoliberalism, and Cooperation: Understanding the Debate,’
International Security, Vol. 24, No. 1 (1999), pp. 42–63, 49. For a somewhat similar
stance on the security dilemma, see Robert Jervis, ‘Security Regimes,’ International
Security, Vol.  36, No.  2. (1982), pp.  357–378, 358; Robert Jervis, ‘Realism, Game
Theory, and Cooperation,’ World Politics, Vol.  40, No.  4, pp.  317–349, 317; and
Robert Jervis, ‘Was the Cold War a Security Dilemma?’ Journal of Cold War Studies,
Vol. 3, No. 1 (2001), pp. 36–60, 36.
11 See Niccolò Machiavelli, The Prince (London: Penguin Books Limited, 2009); also
see Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics among Nations (3rd edn) (New York: Alfred A.
Knopf, 1965).
12 For an interesting analysis and expanded elaboration on the security dilemma, see
Shiping Tang, A Theory of Security Strategy for our Time: Defensive Realism
(London & New York: Palgrave, 2010), p. 39.
13 Ibid., p. 33.
14 See Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace
(New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1948).
15 Tang, A Theory of Security Strategy for our Time: Defensive Realism, pp. 31–42.
16 Adam P. Liff and G. John Ikenberry, ‘Racing Towards Tragedy? China’s Rise,
Military Competition in the Asia Pacific, and the Security Dilemma,’ International
Security, Vol. 39, No. 2 (Fall 2014), pp. 52–91, 63.
17 Ibid., p. 64.
18 Ibid., pp. 63–64.
19 James M. Acton, ‘Escalation through Entanglement: How the Vulnerability of
Command-­and-Control Systems Raises the Risks of an Inadvertent Nuclear War,’
International Security, Vol. 43, No. 1 (Summer 2018), pp. 56–99.
20 Charles L. Glaser and Steve Fetter, ‘Should the United States Reject MAD? Damage
Limitation and US Nuclear Strategy toward China,’ International Security, Vol. 41,
No. 1 (Summer 2016), pp. 49–98, 50.
21 Ibid., pp. 51–53.
22 Liff and Ikenberry, ‘Racing Towards Tragedy? China’s Rise, Military Competition in
the Asia Pacific, and the Security Dilemma,’ p. 63.
23 Ibid., p. 63.
24 Ministry of National Defense of the People’s Republic of China, ‘China’s Military
Strategy,’ (May 26, 2015): http://eng.mod.gov.cn/DefenseNews/2015-05/26/content_
4586748.htm.
25 James R. Holmes and Toshi Yoshihara, ‘Strongman, Constable, or Free-­Rider? India’s
“Monroe Doctrine” and Indian Naval Strategy,’ Comparative Strategy, Vol. 28, No. 4
(2009), pp. 332–348.
26 For an interesting analysis on this perspective, see Baldev R. Nayar and T.V. Paul,
India in the World Order: Searching for Major Power Status (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2003); C. Raja Mohan, Crossing the Rubicon (New York: Palgrave
Macmillan, 2003); Manjeet S. Pardesi, Deducing India’s Grand Strategy of Regional
Hegemony from Historical and Conceptual Perspectives (Singapore: IDSS, 2005);
 Introduction   19
Indian Navy Integrated Headquarters, Indian Maritime Doctrine (New Delhi: Minis-
try of Defense, April, 2004).
27 Rajesh Rajagopalan, India’s Nuclear Doctrine Debate (Washington, DC: Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace, June 30, 2016).
28 Shivshankar Menon, Choices: Inside the Making of Indian Foreign Policy (London:
Penguin, 2016).
29 Walter C. Ladwig III, ‘A Cold Start for Hot Wars? The Indian Army’s New Limited
War Doctrine,’ International Security, Vol.  32. No.  3 (Winter 2007/2008),
pp. 158–190.
30 Dinshaw Mistry, ‘South Asia’s Missile Expansion,’ The Nonproliferation Review,
Vol. 22, No. 3–4 (2015), pp. 361–377, 366.
31 For interesting analysis on and distinction between the offensive realist states and
defensive realist states, see Shiping Tang, A Theory of Security Strategy for our Time:
Defensive Realism (London & New York: Palgrave, 2010).
32 Tang, A Theory of Security Strategy for our Time: Defensive Realism, p. 33.
33 Robert Jervis, ‘Cooperation under the Security Dilemma,’ World Politics, Vol.  30,
No. 2 (January 1978), pp. 167–214, 170–186.
34 Ibid., p. 181.
35 Ibid., p. 180.
36 Tang, A Theory of Security Strategy for our Time: Defensive Realism, p. 41.
37 Ibid., pp. 40–41.
38 Peter Layton, ‘The Idea of Grand Strategy,’ The RUSI Journal, Vol.  157, No.  4
(2012), pp. 56–61, 60.
1 New technologies and the systemic
security dilemma
US–China–India–Pakistan

Introduction
The international system has undergone a significant transformation against the
backdrop of the global distribution of power1 that is in flux. For example, the
global distribution of power is shifting to Asia and changes between actors
within the region are also taking place. China’s economy is gradually rising and
its Gross Domestic Product (GDP) has exceeded that of the US at purchasing-­
power parity (PPP) in contemporary times. A number of other Asian emerging
economies are maintaining relatively steady growth rates. Therefore, it is
important to note that Asia has become the global economic powerhouse of the
twenty-­first century’s international political economy. Moreover, Asia has
become prominent in global political affairs due to increased interaction between
great and small powers. States such as the US, China, India, and Pakistan seem
to make the strategic environment of this region more dynamic, complex, and
somewhat unpredictable. The strategic quadrilateral relationship – described
here as a growing systemic security dilemma – among these states is fairly com-
plicated and provides them with the incentive to play out various combinations
of strategies based on cooperation, competition, and containment that, in turn,
may raise the possibility of conflict amongst them. Also, interaction between
these four states suggests significant challenges to strategic stability in the
broader Southern Asian region. Questions here arise: given the anarchic nature
of the security dilemma, what are the persuasive reasons that lead to form com-
peting trends between/among these states? To what extent is the strategic behav-
ior of these four states interlinked? What are the compelling reasons that lead to
generate the spiral of military competition among these states? How closely are
US–China evolving technologies linked to the vicious cycle of the security and
power competition between India and Pakistan? How does the chain reaction of
these states lead to create conflicting or stable strategic effects? The sections
below build answers to these questions, discussing these states’ force structure,
their military modernizations, and future advancements in order to determine
how the systemic interaction of these states shapes the regional order and
security environment of the broader Southern Asian region.
 New technologies and the security dilemma   21
US evolving technologies: conflicts and power balance in the
Asia-­Pacific
The speedy growth and dynamism of Asia has elevated the geopolitical signifi-
cance of this region. This, in turn, has compelled US attention and focus from
the Middle East and Europe to Asia. Therefore, the US has initiated its
‘re­balancing strategy’ – a ‘Pivot to Asia’2 that means it had to rebalance eco-
nomic, political, and security commitments to Asia.3 The Asia-­Pacific spans
from the Pacific to the Indian Ocean; it drives global politics and runs the engine
of the future global economy. The US’s economic shift toward the Pacific has
been motivated by three factors:4 (1) promoting growth, (2) maintaining the
balance against China’s growing strength, and (3) sustaining the US’s long-­term
presence in the region. Within this shift, the US aims to promote the interests of
its allies and partners, managing regional conflicts, and mitigating threats.
It is important to understand that the US has remained the militarily dominant
player in the blue waters and skies of the Asia-­Pacific for nearly 70 years.
­Furthermore, the US has remained a prominent maritime power in the Indian
Ocean (the world’s third largest body of water, which has 48 of its 63 ports in
Asia) after providing strategic space to the US through the British Indian Ocean
Territory in 1966 for 50 years until 2016. The same is extended for another two
decades until 2036.5 The US maintained its supremacy in the Indian Ocean during
the Cold War in order to contain the spread of the Soviet Union (Russia), thereby
creating a broader influence in the region and protect SLOCs for oil and trade
routes from the Middle East. Consequently, the US built a naval facility at Diego
Garcia – an atoll leased6 from the British, which was strategically midpoint of the
Indian Ocean. After the Cold War, the US became the major guarantor of SLOCs
in the entire India Ocean region. The US, therefore, enjoys freedom of movement
with the propensity to deny such space of freedom to its challengers. Thus, the US
wants to protect all SLOCs that are pivotal to the US economy, from the Western
Pacific to the Indian Ocean. More so, the western border of the US stretches across
the Pacific Ocean, where the US and its allies have shared economic interests, to
East and Southeast Asia.7 For example, Japan, South Korea, Australia, Singapore,
Thailand, Philippines, India, Indonesia, and Vietnam are included in this alliance
system. The US aspires to secure its own exports across the Pacific, while import-
ing quality Asian goods at a sustainable level. The US is making significant
attempts to foster economic relations with the smaller economies of East and
Southeast Asia while maintaining traditional methods of bilateralism and multilat-
eralism across the region. It cannot be denied that the US, as an established unipo-
lar power, has maintained economic hegemony worldwide for decades. But, the
US is losing its economic control in the Asia-­Pacific region, with China at the
center in recent times. Thus, the US wants to maintain the balance by promoting its
own growth rate and exports across the Pacific.
On the other hand, China’s size, its continental power potential8 (a state that
enjoys secure land borders in the absence of serious local enemies), and growing
wealth, gradually turns the geo-­economic and geopolitical environment in its
22   New technologies and the security dilemma
favor for its growth, defense, and deterrent force modernization. The US per-
ceives China’s rise as a threat to its presence and broader interests in the region.
The US, as a settled maritime power of Asia, yet faces hurdles to contain the
growing influence of continental power (in this case China). In addition to the
above, territorial disputes between regional states, such as Northern Territories/
Southern Kuriles (Japan and Russia); Senkakus/Diaoyutai/Diaoyu Dao (Japan,
China, and Taiwan); Dok-­do/Takeshima (Korea and Japan); Paracels/Xisha
Islands (Vietnam and China); Nansha/Spratlys (China, Taiwan, Vietnam, Brunei,
Malaysia, and the Philippines); and the Preah Vihear temple complex (Cambodia
and Thailand) provide the US with the geopolitical opportunity to ensure the
security and legitimacy of inhabitation concerning its allies and partners against
the rise of its potential adversaries in the Asia-­Pacific region. Security compul-
sions, such as the threat from nuclear North Korea, the presence of undemocratic
governments, ethnic issues, drug trafficking, security of navigation on trade
lines/naval routes, and the rising geopolitical significance of the choke points,
such as Strait of Hormuz and especially the Malacca Strait, determine US assert-
iveness in that region. China’s claim on the South and East China Seas, potential
and unsettled key issues between China and other Asian countries, are also com-
pelling aspects for US dominance in this region. For example, for the US, the
instability in the region caused by China’s presence, such as its artificial islands
building campaign in the South China Sea, and the stationing of batteries of
long-­range surface to air missiles on Woody Island in the Paracel Island chain,
are some of the strategic concerns for the US and its Asian allies and partners.9
Chinese construction of ports such as Gwadar in Pakistan, Hambontata in Sri
Lanka, Sittwe in Burma and Chittagong in Bangladesh, which are part of China’s
transport corridor for its trade, create geopolitical discomfort in India and the US
that, in turn, lead to the creation of the classic security dilemma situation.
Therefore, the US at present is pursuing a policy of selective/deep engagement10
to project its own interests and closer allies’11 and/or partners’ interests. This is fol-
lowed by establishing deep security and military alliances with countries such as
Japan and South Korea, deploying its forces, and maintaining its bases to preserve
its predominance in the entire Asia-­Pacific region. Beyond bilateral alliances, the
US enhances its strategic position in the region through regional organizations.12
To achieve these goals, the US assertively supports institutions and forums such as
the East Asia Summit (EAS), the Association of Southeast Asian Nations
(ASEAN), the Asia-­Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum and the Trans-­
Pacific Partnership (TPP), though the US under the Donald Trump administration
has got reservations about the TPP and withdrew from this arrangement. However,
the US believes that Asian multilateral institutions can strengthen US alliances in
order to achieve their shared political goals. For example, former Defense Sec-
retary Ash Carter highlighted that the ‘Asia-­Pacific security network [is] a web of
bilateral, trilateral and multilateral connections in which the US alliances are pur-
posefully enmeshed.’13 In 2009, the US signed the ASEAN treaty of Amity and
Cooperation (TAC) resulting in the US–ASEAN summit, held in November 2009.
The US reinvigorated APEC and initially joined in the negotiations of the TPP – a
 New technologies and the security dilemma   23
trade agreement between Australia, Brunei, Chile, Malaysia, New Zealand, Peru,
Singapore, and Vietnam.
In order to further ensure its presence and political influence in the region, the
US sustains its resilience in the Asia-­Pacific through maintaining a consistent
military force in the region to maintaining balance in Asia. In this process, the
US has introduced military reforms and modernization plans, adapting new
operational concepts and capabilities to the changing character of warfare and
the new geopolitical environment. This, in turn, leads to rendering the security
dilemma severe, thereby compelling China to build its own deterrent by produc-
ing effective countermeasures, which then could undermine the US command
and control mechanism for a broader Asian region.

US military modernization plans
The US secures a stockpile of 4500 nuclear warheads, 1930 of which are
retained in deployed form (1750 are strategic whereas 180 are non-­strategic war-
heads). Around 2570 are reported to be held in reserves, whereas 2570 warheads
are said to be scheduled for dismantlement for a total inventory of 7070 war-
heads.14 The Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments reports that it
would cost the United States US$700 billion to maintain the current nuclear
deterrence posture with necessary modernization and improvement over the next
25 years.15 The US aims at capitalizing $350 billion16 on its nuclear force and
weapon modernization in order to deal with renewed threats in the twenty-­first
century. The latest version of the nuclear-­capable SSBN, the newest long-­range
nuclear-­powered bombers, ALCMs, ICBMs, the modern class of nuclear-­capable
tactical fighter aircraft, the production of new nuclear warheads,17 the improve-
ment of command and control (C2) systems, and the expansion of nuclear pro-
duction and simulation facilities are all part of these objectives.

Air inventories
Currently, the US possesses 18 B-­2s and 88 B-­52Hs, out of which 16 B-­2s and
44 B-­52Hs are thought to be specified for a nuclear role.18 The US deploys
between 200 and 300 weapons at the bombers’ bases in peace time. The remain-
ing 550–650 weapons are reported to be in central storage at Kirtland and New
Mexico.19 The US air force will continue to modernize its bomber inventories
such as next-­generation long-­range nuclear bombers20 (B-­21 bombers) between
the 2030s and 2040s.21 Further plans involve building new guided nuclear
gravity bombs such as the B61-12 to arm its existing B-­21 and the B-­2 at a cost
of nearly US$10 billion for an estimated delivery of 480 bombs,22 which is
scheduled for 2022. The development of new smarter nuclear-­armed cruise mis-
siles with exalted accuracy23 and range is underway. A new class of missiles,
known as the Long-­Range Standoff Missiles (LRSOs), which are capable of
integration in B-­2, B-­52H and B-­21 aircraft, are being procured at a cost of
US$25 billion for 1000 missiles.
24   New technologies and the security dilemma
Land-­based ballistic missiles
The US retains 441 deployed operational Minuteman III ICBMs whereas an
additional 249 are kept in storage.24 The US Air Force aims at developing a new
generation of the ICBM called the Ground Based Strategic Deterrent (GBSD),
which would replace Minuteman III by 2028.

Ballistic missile submarines

The US navy possesses overall 14 Ohio-­class SSBNs, eight of which are based in
the Pacific and six in the Atlantic, carrying Trident II (D5) SLBMs. Twelve of
these SSBNs are reportedly operational at present. The submarines carry a total of
approximately 1000 warheads. The US in the past had planned to reduce the
number of SLBMs to 240 by 2017. Work on the latest generation of SSBN is
underway. Twelve new SSBNs are almost ready to replace the 14 Ohio-­class
SSBNs due to their better efficiency in the refueling process. The navy is modern-
izing the Trident II D5 missiles, which are expected to last till 2042.25 The latest
SSBNX will be operationalized by 2031. A total of 12 SSBNs are planned, worth
US$98–103 billion, which includes US$10–15 billion dedicated to research and
development.26 The newest SSBN will be armed with the Trident II SLBM, called
the D5LE, designed with improved accuracy and guidance systems.

Non-­strategic weapons
The US possesses 500 tactical B61 bombs in its stockpile,27 180 of which are
deployed at six locations in European Union countries, with power delegated to
US field commanders. The US will replace these tactical B61 bombs with the
B61-12 guided nuclear gravity bombs. The fresh version uses the nuclear explo-
sive package of B61-4 with the ability to lessen collateral damage.

Deployment of US inventories in the Asia-­Pacific

The US national security policy in the post-­Cold War era meant that the role of
nuclear weapons was reduced, unlike the potential war-­fighting role these
weapons played during the peak of the Cold War. In his Prague speech, Presi-
dent Obama announced the intention to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in
the national security policy of the US.28 However, in recent years, the security
dynamics have changed, in turn creating new threats for the US globally. For
example, the US believes that the Russian invasion of Ukraine and its growing
influence in Syria,29 the challenges in East Asia, and North Korea’s growing
nuclear capability, have become challenges for the US mainland. Against the
backdrop of US–China competition, the apprehension between these two states
has intensified. The US feels more militarily prepared and ready in order to
contain China’s assertiveness in the East and South China Sea and its threat to
Japan. For example,
 New technologies and the security dilemma   25
China’s heartland faces the sea … United States has deployed strong forces
in the Western Pacific and has formed a system of military bases [in] the
First and Second Island Chains with a strategic posture involving Japan and
South Korea as the northern anchors, Australia and Philippines as the
Southern anchors, and with Guam positioned as the forward base.30

Some maritime powers may employ long-­range strike weapons to attack

into the depth of China beyond the first island chain – [and] threaten
important political, economic, and military targets.31

The US has a massive deployment of its troops in the Asia-­Pacific. In total,

377,000 civilian and military personnel are working across the Asia-­Pacific.32
The US navy has stationed nuclear submarines to a secret location in the region.
The US military has more than 5000 troops deployed in Guam.33 The US has an
air base in Guam where it has stationed bombers that include the B-­1 (carry only
conventional mission), B-­2 and B-­52. US missiles defense consists of a ground-­
based midcourse defense element deployed in Alaska and California, which was
designed to defend against a limited ballistic missile attack by Iran or North
Korea; the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) – an anti-­missile
system that is capable of intercepting medium-­range ballistic missiles; and the
Aegis BMD systems and the Patriot PAC-­3, both of which are intended to
counter short- to intermediate-­range ballistic missiles.
Japan and Taiwan already possess PAC-­3 missiles defense batteries; South
Korea has contracted Lockheed Martin to supply PAC-­3 interceptors and
launchers for its air and missile defense forces. The US and South Korea are
working on the successful deployment of THAAD on South Korean territory
against the North Koreans. The US at present has 28,500 troops from the Air
Force, Army, Marine Corps, and Navy, all stationed in South Korea.34 Addition-
ally, it has multiple squadrons of F-­16 fighters and A-­10 ground attack jets
placed in South Korea.35 The US and South Korean militaries routinely conduct
shared drills. Japan aims at purchasing THAAD systems, and is seeking to
acquire the Aegis Ashore BMD system for deployment in its territory. The US
has about 50,000 troops deployed in Japan. The US Navy has a carrier strike
group based at Yokosuka, led by the US Ronald Reagan aircraft carrier. Japan
and the US control the near seas of China, line the shores with military bases and
ban neighboring states from building independent navies.36 The US Conven-
tional Prompt Global Strikes (CPGS) could be used to destroy or disable an
adversary’s anti-­satellite capabilities or for defense suppression, such as counter-
ing Area Access, Area Denial (A2/AD) capabilities. The US is advancing its
space and Anti-­Satellite capabilities. The US and Japan are jointly developing
Aegis BMD and SM-­3 Block IIA interceptors. These will be deployed to defeat
medium- and intermediate-­range missiles. The US is also purchasing cyber
weapons for deterrent effect and offensive cyber war capabilities.
The Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) 2014, issued by the DoD, high-
lighted that ‘the department’s investment in combat aircraft, including fighters
26   New technologies and the security dilemma
and long-­range strike, survivable persistent surveillance, resilient architecture,
and undersea warfare will increase the joint force ability to counter the chal-
lenges relating to A2/AD.’37 The US is also expanding the locations to which it
deploys aircraft. The QDR highlights how the platforms are a part of general
modernization efforts, but are likely to be prioritized due to the China factor: the
multi-­role, fifth-­generation F-­35 fighter, which would provide improved surviva-
bility; a new, stealth, long-­range strike aircraft, which would maintain the ability
to operate from long ranges, carry substantial payloads, and operate in and
around contested airspace; and the KC-­46A next-­generation tankers/cargo air-
craft, which would enable efficient, and rapid long-­range deployments.38 The Air
Sea Battle is an operational concept designed in 2010 to ensure access and to
maintain freedom of action in the global commons due to adversaries’ A2/AD
capabilities. Due to its expanded joint nature, it is called a joint concept for
access for maneuver in the Global Commons, or JAM-­GC.39 The US has started
to inflate its bases, disperse land base forces to other bases and/or operational
locations, and has the ability to operate and maintain frontline combat aircraft
from austere bases with a small number of logistical and support personnel and
equipment.
President Trump believes that the US needs more weapons and more low-­
yield nuclear arsenals.40 The President in the 2018 US Nuclear Posture Review
(NPR)41 promoted that the US needs more nuclear capabilities at his disposal to
close the imagined credibility gap.42 What the posture review makes clear,
however, is that the Trump administration wants to produce a considerable
number of new nuclear weapons, particularly the deployment of non-­strategic
weapons for counterforce targeting purposes. This would represent a break from
precedents established even by the previous administration on reducing arsenals;
it would compel the revisiting of its nuclear policy. It appears that the US will
continue to retain and maintain a safe, secure, and effective arsenal to deter
threats and safeguard its national interests. It will continue to modernize all three
legs of its strategic nuclear triad along with the maintenance of non-­strategic
nuclear weapons. The US will increase its reliance on the missile defense system
and global prompt strike capabilities to project its power in the Asia-­Pacific
region. All these evolving trends suggest the growing assertiveness of the US
military and its preparedness in the Asia-­Pacific region, meaning that it would
continue to keep its footprints as the dominant player in this region for years to
come, thereby ensuring the protection of its high level of security and interests.
As a consequence there would be challenges to China’s position and its own
national security. The section below discusses China’s rise and the military mod-
ernization plans that it adopts in order to become an assertive player in the
region.

China’s rise and its military modernization

China’s growing wealth and power make it an important player in the Asia-­
Pacific region. Its economic growth rate in Asia, evolving military forces,43
 New technologies and the security dilemma   27
growing political influence, and conflicts with its Asian neighbors create discom-
fort for the US. Since the 1990s, China and the US have shared bilateral rela-
tions to promote their common economic and commercial interests such as trade,
maintenance of the global financial system, and the stability of the global
economy. However, distinct ideological, cultural, political, and historic factors
have modified their view and understanding of each other on various political
and security matters. China has achieved the status of the second largest global
economy thereby reducing the power equation with the US. This power trans-
ition creates a climate of tough competition between the two. Beijing believes
that the US is trying to contain its emerging political and economic profile.
China believes that the US military presence in Asia creates a great threat to
Chinese security.44 For China, the US is exacerbating the tension between
Taiwan and China.45
More so, China’s socio-­economic growth is increasingly dependent on sea
trade – especially for energy imports. Almost ‘89 per cent of [China’s] hydrocar-
bons are transported through [blue waters].’46 Maritime transport in the Indian
Ocean is restricted to a number of small choke points such as the Strait of
Hormuz in the Persian Gulf, and the Strait of Malacca between the Malay Pen-
insula and Sumatra. China is sternly reliant on these choke points. An additional
stake for China is the ‘first island chain’ that runs from South Korea through
Japan and the Philippines to Malaysia and Indonesia. This ‘first island chain’ is
hampering Chinese mobility in the blue waters. For the Chinese, the US and its
allies are using the ‘first island chain’ to obstruct China’s legitimacy. China
believes that the construction of its ports is purely defensive and commercial
based on its economic connectivity under its BRI project.47
However, it goes without saying that China aspires to become the dominant
regional power in Asia and a balancer to the US presence in this region. China
appears to be expanding its national power potential to safeguard its core national
interests. China has adopted a mix of soft and hard power strategies to achieve its
foreign policy goals and mitigate the security threats. The People’s Liberation
Army has adopted a series of contingency plans in order to contain the potential
military intervention in the region by the US. China sees the ‘US military pres-
ence as a destabilizing factor in the region that threatens China’s ability to return
to its rightful place of regional preeminence.’48 China sees the US policy on the
South China Sea as a ‘Cold War mentality,’49 ‘a threat to China’s security,’ and
an effort to ‘intimidate and contain China.’50 Many observers51 are not clear
whether the US and China are major competitors and/or would maintain a large
disparity in terms of the distribution of power leading to increased probability of
conflict, or whether they would reduce disparity in order to minimize the likeli-
hood of war and increase declining states’ security. The US in turn enhances its
military alliances and presence in the region as part of its rebalancing strategy in
the Asia-­Pacific region, thereby maintaining constant close-­in air and sea surveil-
lance and reconnaissance activities, all of which negatively impact China’s per-
ceived security.52 Moreover, since the beginning of the current century,
Sino-­Japanese relations have experienced a downward trajectory. The two states’
28   New technologies and the security dilemma
history is constructed on major problems such as territorial disputes – for
example, the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea. China challenges
Japanese de facto control over the islands by deploying coastguards ships and air-
planes to conduct regular patrols in nearby water and airspace. The Chinese estab-
lishment of an air defense identification zone over part of the East China Sea in
2013 was strongly condemned by Japan and the US. Moreover, Japan is getting
more assertive in terms of its increased military development. China is deeply
concerned about the deployment of Washington and Tokyo’s joint military forces,
which leads to the obstruction of China’s mobility in the East and South China
Seas and in the region.
China believes that Japan and the US jointly threaten its own nuclear deter-
rent. ‘Japan has been conducting anti-­submarine warfare operations with the US
in the Asia-­Pacific.’53 The US–Japanese collaboration to track China’s SSBN is
a major concern for China. Japan is a close partner of the US in the deployment
of its anti-­ballistic missile system in the Asia-­Pacific. Japan is contributing to the
development of the US SM-­3 missiles system, the latest version of which will
be  deployed on Japan’s Aegis-­capable vessels. Japan has also deployed two
AN/TPY-­2 radars on its territory while expressing interest in deploying other
advanced missile defense systems, such as THAAD or the Aegis Ashore system
in Japan in the near future. China also believes that South Korea promotes a
hedging strategy by seeking to possess the capability to develop nuclear
weapons. South Korea is working with the US to deploy its THAAD system on
its territory; this in turn would create security concerns for China that could
further deteriorate relations between South Korea and China.
The US deployment of THAAD technologies in South Korea against North
Korea are also driving China uncomfortable. China is concerned about the
growing North Korean nuclear capability, the warlike situation on the peninsula,
and the growing tension and instability of the region. This certainly poses a
danger to China’s long-­term assertiveness, its economic development, and
peaceful rise. Beijing considers the US to be a spoiler, that it is behind any
regional confrontation all over the world.54 China has long been considering the
US’s growing power profile, and its military deployment and bases in the Asia-­
Pacific, as a threat to its own national security. The US has the policy of a
nuclear First Use doctrinal posture that could create apprehensions in Beijing.
Non-­nuclear technologies and sophisticated missile defense systems such as
THAAD, advanced conventional capabilities such as Global Prompt strikes, and
the possibility of offensive cyber-­attacks are of primary concern to China. With
these potential threats in the background, China is compelled to modernize its
technologies and safeguard its economic and security goals in the region. This is
discussed in the following section.

The assessment of China’s evolving technologies

China maintains a comprehensive and small arsenal, adhering to the policy of
minimum deterrence and the policy of NFU55 based on a defensive posture.
 New technologies and the security dilemma   29
China announces that it will not be the first country to use nuclear weapons in a
warlike situation but that nuclear weapons will only be employed in retaliation
or response to a nuclear attack. However, China is presently modernizing its
deterrent forces in order to safeguard its vital interests against the developments
outlined above. The current assessment of the number of warheads that can be
delivered via land-­based ballistic missiles, aircraft, and nuclear-­powered sub-
marines that China possesses is 260. Land and airbase platforms are reported to
be operational with the possession of 190 warheads56 while others are stored in
non-­operational form. China retains its arsenal at a low level of alert in peace-
time, de-­mated and stored separately from warheads. China’s 2015 defense
paper suggests that it will ‘optimize its nuclear force structure,’57 while improv-
ing strategic early warning systems, command and control capabilities, missile
preparation, rapid reaction, and survivability and protection capability. China
possesses a small stockpile of HEU and Plu among P5 countries.58 It has ceased
production of HEU between 1987 and 1989 and the production of military pluto-
nium was ceased in 1991.59 The cessation of production suggests that China
cannot produce an extensive arsenal. Therefore, instead of increasing in size,
China is modernizing its forces qualitatively. The subsequent part of this study
shows China’s existing force structure and developments in the direction of
future modernizations.

Land-­based missiles
China fields a range of Dong Feng (DF ) series land-­based ballistic missiles,
which make up approximately two-­thirds of its total arsenal. China possesses
150 missiles of seven different types. However, China is gradually modernizing
its arsenal by replacing silos-­based, liquid-­fueled missiles with more survivable
mobile solid-­fueled models. It is improving the communication capabilities of its
nuclear forces, ensuring the effectiveness of C2 systems for a large and dispersed
mobile missile force. China reportedly has 50 to 60 ICBMs. Silos-­based, liquid-­
fueled, two-­stage Dong Feng (DF 5A) and road mobile solid-­fueled, three-­stage
(SDF-­31A) are currently China’s longest-­range operational ICBMs. The shorter
range DF-­31 ICBMs have replaced the aging two-­staged DF-­4 ballistic missiles.
China may also be focused on developing a new version of missiles, the DF31B
with improved, range accuracy and payload capability. Of the DF series mis-
siles, only the DF-­5 can carry more than one warhead, via MIRVs. Its long-­range
and ICBMs, the DF-­4, DF-­5 and DF-­31 have ranges of 5500 km to 1300+ km.
The DF-­3A has a range of 3000 km, and its DF-­15 and DF-­21 short- and
medium-­range ballistic missiles have ranges of 600 and 2150 km respectively.
At least 44 of China’s long-­range missiles, which can carry a total of 64 war-
heads, can reach targets on the US mainland. In December 2015, PLAN
deployed a nuclear ballistic missile submarine on a deterrent patrol.
China is developing a new road mobile ICBM, the DF-­41, which may be
capable of carrying multiple warheads. In one of the recent tests, in December
2015, a canisterized DF-­41 was launched from a rail car in western China. China
30   New technologies and the security dilemma
is replacing ICBMs, including the liquid-­fueled silos-­based DF-­5A missiles,
with a newer mobile, solid-­fueled missile, such as the DF-­31A.60 China has
deployed advanced road mobile ICBMs and is reportedly developing more
powerful road mobile ICBMs with a longer range. China has recently deployed
MIRVed silo-­based intercontinental ballistic missiles, which could improve
China’s capability to penetrate the US missile defense system. China is also
working on its MIRV technologies in response to the US BMD systems for its
assured retaliation. In 2015, China confirmed the deployment of the DF-­5B
MIRVed nuclear missile which was displayed for the first time in the annual
military parade. Reports suggest that DF-­41 road mobile ICBM is also possibly
capable of carrying MIRVs.

Ballistic missile submarines

China is busy attaining maritime power potential. It is building aircraft carriers
and nuclear-­powered attack submarines, while including more destroyers to its
existing inventory.61 China is modernizing its air, naval, and missile forces. It is
focusing and investing in A2/AD systems. Due to a lesser threat to its land
border,62 China’s major focus is on aerospace and naval modernization.63 The
South China Sea, through which more than US$5.3 trillion of maritime trade
passes each year, is now a major point of confrontation. Creating a sea-­based
deterrent has been a daunting task for China. It has built a relatively modern stra-
tegic SSBN fleet, which is armed with submarine-­launched ballistic missiles.64
China’s 094 Class SSBN has reportedly conducted its first patrol this year, and
China’s engineers are constantly working to mitigate noise and improve surviva-
bility. The PLA has developed a successful SSBN, the type 094. China reportedly
operationalizes four 094 type SSBNs and one boat is under construction. Fol-
lowing the type 094 Jin-­class SSBN, China is now adjudged to possess an opera-
tional at sea second strike capability. By 2015, China had three Jin-­class
Submarines, each of which can carry 12 submarine-­launched ballistic missiles,
and may field a total of five to eight by 2020. China has two types of SLBMs,
the JL-­1 and the JL-­2 with ranges of 1000+ km and 7000+ km respectively. JL-­2
is a sea-­based variant of the DF-­31 ICBM. China continues to upgrade its sur-
vivable second strike force. China is working on its latest SSBN, called the type
096. The new longer range Tang-­Class submarine, still in the design stage, may
carry up to 24 SLBMs.

Aircraft and cruise missiles

The PLAAF maintains a small number of nuclear gravity bombs to be delivered
by the Hongza-­6 (H-­6) medium-­range bomber and also a short-­range combat air-
craft. China has two cruise missiles that may be nuclear-­capable – the CJ-­10 and
the CJ-­20. CJ-­10 is a land attack cruise missile with an estimated range of
1500 km and the CJ-­20 air-­launched cruise missile is still under development.
China is modernizing its air defense capabilities to contribute to offensive and
 New technologies and the security dilemma   31
defensive operations, through providing strategic warnings such as air attacks,
anti-­air missile defense, airborne operations and strategic air lift.65 The com-
mander of the PLAAF has highlighted China’s need to leverage innovation and
technological advancement in order to win future wars.66 Military aviation is the
center pillar of ISR systems’ rapid global mobility, global strikes, and C2
systems. China is also pursuing Missile defense capabilities,67 and in 2018 it pur-
chased several Russian S-­400 systems. These interceptors can engage threat at a
range of up to 400 km, including aircraft, cruise missiles and short and medium-­
range ballistic missiles. China has not yet decided to deploy BMD systems,
though it has the capability to trace and engage them. China has tested two
direct-­ascent, anti-­satellite missiles: the SC-­19 and the larger DN-­2 against sun
orbital targets. It has tested a hypersonic missile delivery vehicle that is capable
of carrying a nuclear or conventional warhead. China possesses extensive
modern offensive cyber capabilities.

China’s deployment of inventories in the Asia-­Pacific

At present, China sees US military power – and air power in particular – as the
principle threat to China’s ability to achieve its goals, which compels China to
modernize its own defense, such as the modernization process of its armed
forces and the construction of military aviation and new force employment con-
cepts. War over the status of Taiwan involving US military intervention is a
possibility. There is also a growing risk of a conflict over one of China’s mari-
time territorial disputes because of US intervention. Changing dynamics in the
region has generated internal debate within China around the need for a revised
future nuclear posture. ‘Some scholars argue that China should add conditions to
its NFU policy, or adopt a launch on warning or launch under attack posture.’ It
goes without saying that Chinese doctrinal and strategic thinking is influenced
by the US doctrines, forces, and military initiatives in that region. Thus ‘China’s
nuclear posture could deviate from its traditional practice in the future.’68
Against the backdrop of recent developments and like other nuclear weapons
states, China is trying to achieve nuclear efficiency, and sufficiency. The focus
remains on mastering the technology to prove excellence instead of actually
thinking of deploying or employing them. A major focus is the maximization of
the power equation to raise high its profile in global affairs. In addition to its
perceived kinetic A2/AD capabilities, Beijing also appears to be pursuing
preemptive options well before a conflict, with the intention of eroding the
United States’ strategic position, freedom of action, and operations in the region.
Many believe that China, with its effective countermeasures, has the ability to
destroy US ships, aircraft, and bases within 500 miles of China’s territory and
disrupt the satellite and computer networks that underpin US military power
throughout East Asia.69 Many observers assume that ‘China could use these A2/
AD capabilities to hold the US military at bay while enforcing its expansive ter-
ritorial claims, which include most of the East and South China Seas.’70 The con-
tention is that to maintain regional hegemony, China needs to improve its
32   New technologies and the security dilemma
maritime power and military presence on the coast surrounding the East and
South China Sea. For Michael Beckley, ‘China is nowhere [yet] close to achiev-
ing either of those objectives.’71 China today has no prospects of regulating and
dominating the coast of East Asia.72 It lacks the potential or military power to
initiate a surprise attack, a naval block, or strategic bombing against Taiwan due
to its extremely sophisticated weapons systems, early warning systems and plat-
forms provided by the US. Geographical and technological indicators suggest
that Japan has an enduring A2/AD capability that can deny China sea and air
control in the East China Sea.73 China claims the South China Sea, but the sea is
potentially a disputed zone, with five other countries laying shared claims to it.74
More so, US dominance in the East Asian region, its potential military bases,
and military superiority along with military preparation of other regional states
can repudiate China’s sea and air control in the western and southern portions of
the South China Sea. China experiences formidable constraints and is unable to
command major portions of its nearby seas.75
Summing up, many of the measures adopted by the US are perceived by
China to be a threat to its own security when it comes to the vicious circle of the
security dilemma. That China is gradually modernizing its defense forces and
improving its maritime strength, there is no doubt. It is fielding a series of inter-
national missiles, sensors, guidance, and other technologies designed to deny
freedom of movement to hostile powers in the air and waters off its coast.76
However, China has its own limitations in outweighing US maritime power and
influence in the entire Asia-­Pacific region. Therefore, it is expected that China
will continue to modernize its platforms in order to achieve its political, eco-
nomic, and security goals.

The classic systemic security dilemma becomes prominent

Both the US and China are behaving under anarchy as defensive realist states
without aiming at harming each other. Although the US and China are aware of
each other’s intentions at present, they are effectively moderating the security
dilemma that has yet resulted in the spiral of action–reaction arms build-­up. Both
are working together on a range of regional and global issues to make sure that
rivalry does not gain warlike space between them. For example, both are
working on issues such as dealing with North Korean and Iranian nuclear ambi-
tions, non-­proliferation, climate change and global economic growth. Bilateral
US–China negotiations and communication aims at building trust to mitigate
misunderstandings or risks of any confrontation. Both hold regular meetings and
communication at the presentational level to share their thoughts on global gov-
ernance, and promote military to military relations in an effort to mitigate mis-
trust and misperceptions. Despite this, the argument confirms that the US–China
relationship has evolved into one of the most complex and consequential, leading
to intensify bilateral competition. This reflects the existence of the classic
security dilemma between the US and China, and the possibility of increased
friction on deep-­rooted divergences. However, the security competition has
 New technologies and the security dilemma   33
driven the two states into a spiral of action–reaction that may drive them into a
situation that was conceptualized by Butterfield.77 Anarchy leads to create fear
and fear in turn generates uncertainty between the two. Both the states do not
necessarily threaten each other, but they are not sure about their future moves
given the rising economic influence of China over Asia.
The US cannot neglect the possibility of China becoming more assertive in
the future; neither is it completely sure whether China’s rise would be entirely
peaceful or threatening. If China’s assertiveness aggravates, this may slide the
two states into an irreversible tragic end. To procure their economic gains, both
lead to accumulate more and more power. This power competition, such as the
US’s measures and China’s countermeasures as highlighted above, will lead to
reinforce their fears and uncertainties about each other. Each accumulates power,
thereby enhancing the other’s insecurity without institutionalizing any construc-
tive mechanism to address their severe security dilemma or strategies to
moderate or alter it. The power gap seems to continue to sustain, leading to the
escalation of tension between the two major rivals, though many US experts
have rejected the notion of the ‘Thucydides Trap’78 type of interaction between
the US and China.79 Thus, John Mearsheimer’s proposition that conflict is inevit-
able between a rising and established power80 cannot be completely ruled out.
In this process, power competition between the US and China creates an
opportunity for India to bolster its economy and military power to attain its polit-
ical profile and status. India, due to its geopolitical location has become a critical
actor to the US defense strategy in rebalancing toward Asia. This is why New
Delhi has deepened its strategic alliance with the US, so that it can procure tech-
nology by signing the Indo-­US nuclear deal without being a signatory to the
Non-­Proliferation Treaty (NPT)81 (see further details in Chapter 2 of this
volume). The US alliance with India and India’s hedging policy against China
has created a vicious cycle of a severe security dilemma between India and Paki-
stan. The severity of which can lead to a tragic end, thus making war more
likely. The section below develops a debate on how India’s modernization plans
– a chain reaction created by the US and China – become one of the crucial parts
of the systemic security dilemma conceptualized in this chapter.

India’s capability-­based modernization and hedge

against China
China and India have had a historic rivalry that dates back to the Sino-­Indian
war of 1962. Despite this rivalry, the two states’ economic volume is rising
incredibly.82 Although China has resolved many of its border conflicts with its
neighboring countries, it continues to have strategic rivalry with India in the
Southern Asian. Beijing lays claim to the northeast Indian state of Arunachal
Pradesh, while India does not recognize Beijing’s jurisdiction over Aksai Chin
in Southwest China. Both have also laid claim to a small portion of Kashmir that
was ceded to China by Pakistan in the early 1960s.83 These differences have
remained dormant and unresolved for many years. In recent years, India’s Act
34   New technologies and the security dilemma
East policy has revived some of the issues. At present, China’s economy and
defense budget are four to five times bigger than India’s.84 India is in serious
competition with China in order to match its capability in the region. As a result,
the territorial rivalries of China and India are regaining space against the back-
drop of the Indo-­US growing partnership. India identifies ‘the arc from the
Persian Gulf to the Strait of Malacca as its legitimate area of interest,’ and the
Red Sea, South China Sea and Southern Indian Ocean as ‘secondary areas’ of
maritime interest.85
India expands its influence and attempts to elevate its power status. This is
why India is working actively on its Act East policy and has undertaken various
initiatives to enhance its economic and strategic ties with Southeast Asian coun-
tries. This includes India’s improved relations with all the regional countries and
regional organizations such as the ASEAN. This suggests, India’s strategic
ambitions are beyond the Indian Ocean and could lead New Delhi to threaten
China’s interests in other regions, including the East China Sea. China tries to
protect significant routes in blue seas that are vital to its economy and growth.
Due to its strategic location, India dominates the Ocean’s trade routes. A major
concern for India is the need to outweigh China’s growing influence in the mari-
time domain. China heavily relies on the Arabian Sea, the Indian Ocean, and the
Indonesian archipelago for its trade and economy, and energy resources.86 India
has the potential to exploit its geographic position and overseas territories. Both
the US and India share their interests in the maritime domain. The US believes
that India can play the so-­called ‘stabilizing role in Asia.’87 It goes without
saying that ‘India is pursuing relations with the US to support its own global
ambitions and, more specifically, to gain access to advanced and sensitive tech-
nologies to fuel its economic growth and military prowess.’88 As the Sino-­US
security competition increases, India appears more prominent in hedging against
China. To contain China, India has developed far-­reaching relations with the US,
Japan, and many other countries in the region. India’s relationship with the US
has developed exponentially more than it ever has before. The US has modified
the rules against the global nuclear commerce in favor of India by initiating the
Indo-­US nuclear deal (discussed in Chapter 2). The US is one of the largest arms
suppliers to India and India conducts more military exercises with the US than
with any other partner.89 The US and India share interests on maritime security,
freedom of navigation, and overflight in the Asia-­Pacific. The section below
shows how India hedges against China through extensive modernization of its
land and naval forces, which in turn puts pressure on Pakistan’s national security
and regional balance.

India’s evolving technologies

It is estimated that India possesses 100–120 nuclear warheads of which 56 are
housed in land-­based ballistic missiles, nearly 48 in gravity bombs and 14 in sea-
­based ballistic missiles.90
 New technologies and the security dilemma   35
Land-­based missiles
India’s operational land-­based ballistic missiles are: short-­range Prithvi-­II and
Agni-­1; the medium-­range Agni-­II; and the intermediate-­range Agni-­III. The
nuclear or conventionally armed Prithvi-­2 has a range of 250–350 km. The Agni
ballistic missile has possibly Prithvi’s nuclear delivery role. Agni (700 km),
Agni-­II (1000 km) Agni-­III (3000 km) have all had successful test launches. The
road mobile Agni-­1 is also conventional or nuclear-­capable, with a range of
700 km. The short-­range of Agni variants is deployed in western parts of India
mainly targeting Pakistan. Agni-­II has a range of 2000 km; fewer than ten
launchers are stationed in northern India to hit Western, Central, and Southern
China. The Agni-­III, nuclear-­capable at 3200 km, is capable of hitting Shanghai
and is possible to be deployed in the extreme Northern part of India.
The DRDO is developing rail mobile Agni-­IV and Agni-­V missiles with a
maximum range of 3500–5000 km, respectively, against China. The Agni-­IV
underwent a launch in 2015 and would be undergoing further testing before
entering into service. Agni-­II, redesigned as Agni-­IV, incorporates advanced
technological features, including composite rocket engines, improved stage
­separation and a state of the art navigation system. The long-­range Agni-­V has
also been developed. Agni-­V was successfully launched in January 2015. The
Agni-­V, commonly known as an ICBM, allows India to target major Chinese
cities including Beijing. It incorporates a number of new propulsion and naviga-
tion system technologies. It is stored at the launch site from a new mobile canis-
ter system, which reduces the time required to place the missiles on alert in a
crisis. The launching of Agni-­V has put India in the ranks of the other major
missile power countries with the ability to power, such as the US, China, Britain,
France, and Israel. India now focuses on developing Agni-VI, MIRVs and more
maneuverable warheads.

Air inventories
Indian Air capability is potentially effective. The Indian Air Force has reportedly
certified the Mirage 2000H multi-­role combat aircraft for delivery of nuclear
gravity bombs. India is modernizing its sea and land-­based forces and delivery
platforms for its nuclear weapons, its two–three squadrons of Mirage 2000H and
Jaguar IS/IB fighter bombers remain at the core of its nuclear strike force, with a
range that extends deep into Pakistan and China. India’s two Mirage 2000 squad-
rons, one of which is likely assigned a second strike nuclear mission, are based
at Maharajpur Air Force station at Gwalior.

Sea-­based missiles91
India is working on the accuracy of its second strike capability. It is building its
sea-­based capability such as SSBNs and ship-­launch ballistic missiles. The first
SSBN, the Arihant, embarked on a sea trial in 2014 and in February 2016, it
36   New technologies and the security dilemma
underwent its final tests in the Bay of Bengal before entering service. A second
Arihant-­class nuclear submarine is under construction, and the development of
the third submarine is also underway. In parallel to Arihant, India is working on
another ballistic missile submarine, the Aridhaman, and plans to have four
SSBNs in service by 2020. The Arihant will carry the K-­15 SLBM which has a
range of 700 km. The K-­15 combined aspects of both cruise and ballistic mis-
siles. The second class of SLBMs is the K-­4, which has a range of up to 3500 km
with the ability to hit targets in Pakistan, China, and the Indian Ocean. The K-­4
would eventually replace the K-­15 in arming the Arihant-­class submarines. India
is also working on the K-­5, an SLBM with a range of 5000 km. More so, the
350 km Dhanush missile is also a naval version of Prithvi-­II, which, in turn,
gives India a rudimentary sea-­based nuclear strike capability.

Cruise missiles/BMDs/air defenses

India is also working on the Nirbhay subsonic ground-­launched cruise missile,
with a range of 700–1000 km and is designed for launch from land, air, and sea.
India is furthering the sea-­launched Nirbhay for the Arihant Submarine. India
might also be working on an Air-­launched version for delivery by the Su-­30MK1
combat aircraft.92 India’s DRDO has also currently begun to test indigenous
endo- and exo-­atmospheric missile defense system-­designated Advanced Air
Defense (AAD) and Prithvi Air Defense (PAD) systems, respectively. The oper-
ationalization is expected to take a decade. India has purchased a Russian S-­400
air defense system, which is capable of intercepting short- and medium-­range
ballistic missiles and cruise missiles. India is upgrading and extending the
service life of Mirage and Jaguar fighter bombers. It is searching for new
bombers to replace its aging fleet and has confirmed the purchase of 36 Rafale
aircraft from France to take forward the role.

Hedging policy and deployment of new technologies

Indian maritime aspirations are revealed in its Kiev-­class aircraft carriers – INS
Vikramaditya from Russia, which entered service in 2013, and two Vikrant-­class
aircraft carriers expected to enter service in 2018 and 2025.93 India advocates
that in the event of a conflict with China, India would use sea denial strategies
such as a naval blockade to scuttle China’s energy supply line, and disrupt its oil
and trade lanes in the Indian Ocean.94 India established the Andaman and
Nicobar Command bases in Port Blair aiming at the sea line of Malacca and
plays a dominant part in the Malacca Strait, obstructing the Chinese infiltration
of the Indian Ocean. This important command has the ability to rapidly deploy
its military assets in the region so as to safeguard its interests.95 This raises ques-
tions for both Pakistan and China when it comes to India’s introduction of new
and sophisticated technologies in its broader deterrent forces. India has become
assertive against the South China Sea problem and the threat from China to
freedom of navigation in the region. India deploys a dozen light mountain
 New technologies and the security dilemma   37
d­ ivisions at the Chinese border while some of these forces are multiplied for
counterinsurgency. India aims at raising a new strike corps at the China border –
the 17th Corps, which will be India’s first mountain strike corps awaiting to be
functional by 2021.96 It is important to note that India now seeks Amer­ican eco-
nomic and technological assistance to give momentum to its rise as a major
power and its new role in maintaining maritime preeminence over the Indian
Ocean region. Most of the US$14 billion worth of weapons and technology
(C-­130 Js, C-­17s, light Howitzer artillery, UAVs, P-­8 maritime surveillance air-
craft, jet engines, and aircraft carrier technologies) that India has purchased from
the United States over the last decade directly augments its capabilities vis-­à-vis
China on the Himalayan border and in the Indian Ocean.97
India plans on acquiring six Scorpene-­class diesel-­electric submarines from
France and is building new destroyers, frigates, and corvettes.98 The Indo-­US
DTTI and logistics Support Agreement would enhance operational capability
and interoperability, allowing aircraft and ships to land and refuel. India decep-
tively claims that it perceives its threat from China and Pakistan. Ambassador
Tasneem Aslam stated that, ‘India’s batteries are stationed towards Pakistan and
China, but its projection is global. China is certainly a factor in Indian military’s
calculations but it is more about prestige and power projection than maximiza-
tion of security against China.’99 A high profile military elite also commented,
‘India is focusing on building global power state status. Accumulation of their
material power and modernization of their deterrent force and missile ranges
clearly suggest that their ambitions go beyond this region.’100 The above asser-
tions suggest that against the backdrop of the power competition between the US
and China, India is being encouraged by the US to project its military power
beyond the Indian Ocean and the entire Asia-­Pacific region.
India may not have a substantial existential threat from China given its
growing trade volume with China, although both have unresolved border issues
that in turn create a minor possibility for future confrontation between the two
states. A senior Pakistani former diplomat, however, assesses that there is no
possibility of war between India and China. He argues that India is very fright-
ened of any type of confrontation with China due to lessons they had learned in
1962. He also said,

Dokhlam is an issue between Bhutan and China not China and India. India
is displaying brinkmanship to maximize its relevance, but clearly both the
states do not want to go down to the path of war or any confrontation as it
would impact their economies.101

Ambassador Tasneem holds a similar view that, ‘China has been accommodating
India, as China does not want to be bogged down on its economy.’102 For Zafar
Nawaz Jaspal, ‘there is a dim possibility of war between China and India.’ He
confirms that ‘India is competing with China without having any threat on the
ground. India is not a military challenge to China as both have their own reasons.
Although China will continue to maintain its strategic dominance.’103
38   New technologies and the security dilemma
The possibility of war between China and India may seem less acute but the
Indo-­China power competition has led to the creation of a severe security
dilemma between India and Pakistan. Indo-­Pakistan rivalry is historically so
complex that, against the backdrop of India’s unchecked qualitative and quant-
itative defense modernization, it has become much more complicated than ever
before. The US defense partnership with India (see Chapter 2), India’s forward
military presence, and its militarization of the Indian Ocean enhances its power-­
projection capabilities that in turn widen the trust deficit between China and the
US and threatens Pakistan’s interests. The trends highlighted above determine
Pakistan’s security environment (discussed in the next section) when it comes to
the systemic security dilemma affecting Pakistan’s geo-­economic and security
interests in the Southern Asian region. To reiterate Herz, it is not that states are
either ‘peaceful and cooperative, or aggressive and domineering,’ it is the
‘uncertainty, fear and anxiety’ about the intentions that drive states into
the security dilemma-­driven arms competition.104 The section below shows how
the above-­mentioned Indian developments drive Pakistan into fear, anxiety, and
a spiral of the security dilemma-­driven arms race.

Pakistan’s evolving technologies and security environment

Historically, India and Pakistan are arch-­rivals. Pakistan perceives an existential
threat from India. India’s unchecked capability-­based defense modernization,
with the help of major powers including the US, increases Pakistan’s insecurity
and destabilizes the regional strategic environment in South Asia. Resultantly,
Pakistan produces effective countermeasures in order to create deterrence and
prevent war in the South Asian region. On the other hand, emerging realities in
the Asia-­Pacific and competition between the US and China, and China and
India has made the regional strategic environment enormously complex. The
global and regional dynamics and triangular relationship of the US–China–India
has a direct impact on the South Asian security environment. A growing Indo-
­US strategic partnership, India’s rapid growth of its defense arsenals and plat-
forms, the revision of its doctrines, and its assertive, offensive, and hard power
posture (see Chapters 3 and 4) all create stress on the regional stability, which
compels Pakistan toward modernization of its own technologies.

The assessment of Pakistan’s technologies

It is globally but through unverified sources estimated that Pakistan possesses 140
to 150 warheads.105 It has a small number of nuclear-­capable delivery vehicles –
many of which have dual capability and are thus assigned to conventional missions.

The assessment of land-­based missiles

Pakistan possesses six ballistic missiles that are land-­based. It has developed
nuclear-­capable short-­range missiles that appear to be intended for a nuclear role
 New technologies and the security dilemma   39
and mission – Hatf-­IX (Nasr, 60–70 km). Nasr is designed to offset Indian, CSD
under which India can carry out rapid and limited conventional attacks on Paki-
stani territory under the nuclear overhang. The latest version of Nasr was test-­fired
in January this year in order to ensure its ‘extreme in-­flight manoeuvrability.’106
The road mobile Hatf-­II, Hatf-­III, and Hatf-­IV short-­range ballistic missiles have
maximum ranges of 180 km, 290 km, and 750 km respectively. Pakistan possesses
the liquid-­fueled, road mobile Hatf-­V (Ghauri) with a range of 1250 km and the
two-­stage, road mobile Hatf-­VI (Shaheen-­2) with a range of 1500 km. Pakistan has
developed a medium-­range Shaheen-­III ballistic missile variant capable of carrying
nuclear and conventional warheads, that was tested in the Arabian Sea in 2015. In
response to Agni-­V, Pakistan fired Shaheen-­III. This missile has a range of
2750 km107 and is capable of reaching targets throughout India including locations
such as Nicorbar Island.

Aircraft
Pakistan possesses the F-­16 A/B (purchased from the US in the mid-­1980s and
later in 2006 and 2008) with a range of 1600 km. They are capable of carrying
one nuclear gravity bomb each. Later, the Mirage-­5 combat aircraft was also
assigned the nuclear role. The Mirage-­3 has been used for test flights of nuclear-­
capable Ra’ad air-­launched cruise missiles. ‘The Pakistani Air Force is adding
aerial refueling capability to the Mirage [in order to enhance] a nuclear strike
mission.’108 Pakistan is developing JF–17 fighters to replace the aging Mirage-­3
and Mirage-­5 aircraft. Pakistan’s nuclear-­capable aircraft include F-­16 A/B
fighter bombers and Mirage-­3 and Mirage-­5s. Pakistan might integrate the Ra’ad
air-­launched cruise missile on to the JF thunder.

The assessment of sea-­based missiles

Pakistan is working on completing its survivable and assured second strike capa-
bility. Pakistan has established a Naval Strategic Forces Command to oversee
the second strike force. It is assumed that the sea-­based force consists of nuclear-
­armed SLCMs, deployed on ‘Agosta-­class’ submarines or on surface ships.

Cruise missiles and MIRV technologies

Pakistan continues to develop cruise missiles. There are two types of cruise mis-
siles in Pakistan’s inventory: the ground-­launched Babur (Hatf-­7)109 and Air-­
launched Ra’ad (Hatf-­8). It is believed that Babur is also a Naval variant.

The severity of the security dilemma between India and

Pakistan
Pakistan’s evolving security posture is affected by plausible strategic changes
occurring in the Southern Asian region. First, the growing Indo-­US strategic
40   New technologies and the security dilemma
partnership has strengthened Pakistan’s anxiety and security concerns (see dis-
cussion in Chapter 2). Second, the suspension of communication (see further
details in Chapter 6) between India and Pakistan generates doubt and fear,
which, in turn, lead the rivals into a negative arms competition. For example,
India is accumulating power to create a balance in the broader Asia-­Pacific
region. Pakistan perceives this as the creation of a power imbalance in South
Asia, heightening its own insecurity. This perception pushes Pakistan to intro-
duce countermeasures to guarantee its own security. A lack of negotiations or an
arms restraint arrangement makes it more difficult for states to moderate the
security dilemma as the likelihood and number of conflict scenarios have
increased while avenues for cooperation have decreased. Additionally, the emer-
gence of new technologies and weapons systems, such as BMD systems and
MIRVs, sea-­based systems, and short-­range missiles, have made deterrence
stability in South Asia increasingly fragile.
India’s recent procurement of the S-­400 – a long-­range multichannel air
defense missile system (ADMS) – seems to have a destabilizing impact in the
region. India has purchased its five regiments (each regiment carries two battal-
ions) out of which three regiments will be deployed against Pakistan, whereas
two will be stationed at the border with China, one each on the western and
eastern sectors of the Line of Actual Control (LoAC).110 Timings of the deal for
India are important as India enjoys a strategically advantageous position in con-
temporary times. It thus aims at both maximizing its gains in order to purchase
hi-­tech smarter technologies, and also indigenizing the technological base by
empowering the national military–industrial complex. In October 2018, Paki-
stan’s Foreign Office announced, ‘Russian S-­400 missile system to India could
destabilize the region,’ but at the same time, the ministry commented that ‘Paki-
stan had developed capabilities that could defeat India’s planned BMD
systems.’111 The authors approached a former D.G. Strategic Plans Division
(SPD), General Mazar Jamil for comments on this development. He responded,
‘we are cognizant of all developments and will ensure deterrence stability at all
costs.’ He did not mention clearly what sort of measures would be effective
against the S-­400 but he said, ‘we understand capabilities and specifications of
the S-­400 system and our spectrum of response measures will effectively ensure
the deterrence stability and that Pakistan will never compromise on stability of
deterrence at any cost.’112 Recently, Lt. Gen. Khalid Kidwai (retd), a seasoned
former D.G. SPD, commented that Pakistan possesses adequate countermeasures
to the S-­400, therefore, the S-­400 cannot be a game changer.113 It seems this
development may push Pakistan for the production of more missile systems in
their search for deterrence stability.
Thus, it is safe to argue that the systemic security dilemma which has arisen
due to the acquisition of sophisticated technology, is currently shaping the stra-
tegic environment of the broader Southern Asian region, which, in turn, increases
the prospects for conflict between India and Pakistan. A lack of negotiations
makes it more difficult for states to moderate the likely security dilemma as a
probability of crisis has increased while avenues for negotiations and dialogue
 New technologies and the security dilemma   41
have decreased. Ambassador Tasneem stated that ‘India is highly aggressive.
They are trying to create war while we are consistently working on avoiding
such an eventuality.’114
Therefore, decades-­old conflicts and divergence of political interests (see
further details in Chapter 5) drive the security dilemma spiral between India and
Pakistan. The above-­mentioned introduction of new technologies and the con-
sistent force modernization of the two states, along with the discussions in
Chapter 2, show how these two states are actively engaged in competing war-­
fighting strategies that stimulate military competition, thus making war more
likely. India is on a quest for maximization of power that makes it a revisionist
and greedy actor in this spiral dynamics, which, in turn, drives Pakistan into a
warlike situation. Pakistan a defensive realist – a status quo- or security-­seeking
state – which, despite its efforts, receives no credible commitments of status quo/
defensive intentions from India. India’s introduction of new cutting-­edge tech-
nologies shows its revisionist and offensive intensions of seeking domination or
conquest, thus making a regional strategic environment further uncertain. Paki-
stan considers India’s intensions offensive, and this in turn forces Pakistan to
introduce countermeasures to guarantee its own survival. This is the consequence
of its power-­projection ambitions and its strategic alliance with the US and/or
hedging policy against China. These two dimensions make the security dilemma
relatively complex between the two South Asian states. Glaser confirms that the
‘security dilemma is compatible even in this situation with both greedy and non-­
greedy states and that the security dilemma is universal rather than condi-
tional.’115 Presumably, India’s offensive behavior and its power maximizing
motive and Pakistan’s security-­seeking quest make the security dilemma virtu-
ally unresolvable.

Conclusion
This chapter draws some plausible findings: First, the US and China have com-
peting political, strategic, economic, and security interests in the Asia-­Pacific
region. Both the US and China are heavily reliant on maritime trade routes for
their socio-­economic growth and they will continue to exert their assertiveness
in the blue seas of the Asia-Pacific in order to preserve their SLOCs. Second,
China’s conflicts with Asian states and its claims on the South and East China
Seas are not going to resolve in the near future which in turn would lead to
escalate tension between both the states. More so, China cannot invade or block-
ade any of its neighbors due to US presence and the preparation of neighboring
states’ military assertiveness. The US still remains the maritime power of Asia
and holds supremacy in the blue seas of the Asia-­Pacific, whereas China will
continue to modernize its naval platforms to maintain balance and mitigate
threats. If China’s assertiveness aggravates, this may slide the two states into an
irreversible tragic end. This reflects the existence of the classic security dilemma
between the US and China, and the possibility of increased confrontation and
friction on deep-rooted divergences. Resultantly, competition will lead to having
42   New technologies and the security dilemma
serious stability implications. This is why John Ikenberry suggests that this shift-
ing distribution of power ‘creates worries, insecurity, and new possibilities for
miscalculations.’116 For him, ‘There is more competition – either bipolar com-
petition between the United States and China, or a wider multipolar balance of
power dynamic. In a competitive balancing of power system, the “problems of
anarchy” threaten to return.’ He further confirms that ‘there are problems of arms
racing, security dilemma-­driven conflict, risk-­taking, and the possibility of
war.’117 Third, considering the Sino-­Indian trade volume, it seems that India is
working, not on threat-­centric, but on capability-­based defense modernization to
project its power in the Asia-­Pacific as one of the rising regional powers. This is
why there are rare chances of an escalation of conflict between China and India
because of the high volume of economic growth between the two sides. Never-
theless, India will continue to achieve everything that China wants to achieve in
the broader region. Despite intense competition both India and China will con-
tinue to moderate security dilemma and accommodate each other in order to
maximize their shared gains. Four, the strategic rivalry and severe security
dilemma will continue to exist between India and Pakistan. India’s power accu-
mulation would continue to increase widely. India’s capability-­based defense
modernization increases Pakistan’s insecurities and this, in turn, would have an
enormous destabilizing impact on South Asia.
The growing trends suggest that the systemic security dilemma, driven by
military competition in the Asia-­Pacific between the US-China, China-India, and
India-Pakistan exists. This vicious cycle of arms race competition would worsen
in the near future if not amicably controlled. Indeed, the four states’ power asser-
tion is becoming more prominent in the Asia-­Pacific and the interrelationship
between the US-China, and India-Pakistan is becoming visibly more complex
and interlinked. The strategic chain of these states could have destabilizing and
irreversible effects. For example, the states’ expansion of military deployments
and expansion of threats would increase the risks of miscalculations or unin-
tended escalations. Militarization of the blue seas has complicated the threat
spectrum and increased challenges related to the C2 systems of the states. The
states’ growing development of long-­range missiles, the development of MIRVs,
BMDs, and submarine-­based nuclear weapons and outer space platforms, create
strategic implications in the Southern Asian region. Evolving technologies and
the increasing gap between these states could further create imbalance and
instability. Because of insecurity and uncertainty about others, each player may
conclude that it has no plausible alternatives. The resulting outcomes are the
vicious cycles of expanding action–reaction arming. Thus, shifting distribution
of material power – which exists owing to China’s growing influence in Asia,
the growing economic rise of Asia, surging military spending, and military mod-
ernization – has introduced an unending arms race leading to broader regional
instabilities. Indeed, ‘the development of the US’s strategic posture, such as
missile defense and conventional prompt global strikes, could lead to a reaction
in China, which could produce a corresponding reaction in India,’118 and that in
turn could impact Pakistan’s strategic choices. A vicious unavoidable cycle of
 New technologies and the security dilemma   43
action–reaction, which is systemic in nature, is born. This level of transforma-
tion has certainly created puzzling questions related to regional insecurities. This
chapter finds that competition and the systemic security dilemma would not
foster a stable environment; rather, it would introduce negative repercussions for
the stability of the wider Southern Asian region.

Notes
   1 Xenia Wickett, John Nilsson-­Wright, and Tim Summers, ‘The Asia-­Pacific Power
Balance: Beyond the US–China Narrative,’ Chatham House (September 2015):
www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/publications/research/20150924As
iaPacificWickettNilssonWrightSummersFinal.pdf.
   2 See Oliver Turner, ‘China, India and the US Rebalance to the Asia Pacific: The Geo-
politics of Rising Identities,’ Geopolitics, Vol. 21, No. 4 (2016).
   3 Phillip C. Saunders, ‘The Rebalance to Asia: US–China Relations and Regional
Security,’ National Defense University, INSS (August 2013).
   4 Quoted in Jonathan Hoogendoorn, ‘Trade Liberalization in the Asia-­Pacific: US
Interests and Challenges,’ Geopolitical Monitor (June 3, 2016): www.geopolitical
monitor.com/trade-­liberalization-in-­the-asia-­pacific-us-­interests-and-­challenges/.
   5 For interesting analysis on this, see Peter H. Sand, United States and Britain in
Diego Garcia – the Future of a Controversial Base (New York: Palgrave Macmillan,
2009).
   6 See Prologue in Robert David Johnson, Congress and the Cold War (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2006).
   7 Michael Beckley, ‘The Emerging Military Balance in East Asia,’ International
Security, Vol. 42, No. 2 (Fall 2017), p. 78.
   8 Evan Braden Montgomery, ‘Competitive Strategies against Continental Power: The
Geopolitics of Sino-­Indian–Amer­ican Relations,’ Journal of Strategic Studies,
Vol. 36, No. 1 (2013), p. 81.
   9 Quoted in Kristien Bergerson, ‘China’s Efforts to Counter US Forward Presence in
the Asia-­Pacific,’ US–China Economic and Security Review Commission, p.  4:
www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Research/USCC%20Staff%20Report%20on%20
China%20Countering%20US%20Military%20Presence%20in%20Asia.pdf.
  10 Charles Glaser,’ A US–China Grand Bargain,’ International Security, Vol. 39, No. 4
(Spring 2015), p. 54.
  11 See Victor D. Cha, Powerplay: The Origins of the Amer­ican Alliance System in Asia
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2016).
  12 Elsina Wainwright, ‘The Evolving US–Asia Alliance Network,’ Center on Inter-
national Cooperation (October 26, 2016): http://cic.nyu.edu/news_commentary/
evolving-­us-asia-­alliance-network.
  13 Ibid.
  14 Hans M. Kristensen, ‘US Nuclear Forces,’ in SIPRI Yearbook 2017: Armaments,
Disarmament and International Security (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017),
pp. 616–618.
  15 Quoted in Brian Kalman, Edwin Watson, and South Front, ‘The US Nuclear Deterrent
Triad. Can the US Afford to Modernize it?’ Centre for Research on Globalization
(March 16, 2016): www.globalresearch.ca/the-­u-s-­nuclear-deterrent-­triad-can-­the-u-­s-
afford-­to-modernize-­it/5516253.
  16 Hans M. Kristensen, ‘US Nuclear Forces,’ SIPRI Yearbook 2017, p. 611.
  17 Ibid.
  18 Ibid., p. 614.
  19 Ibid.
44   New technologies and the security dilemma
  20 Ibid.
  21 Ibid.
  22 Ibid.
  23 Ibid.
  24 Ibid., p. 615.
  25 Hans M. Kristensen and Robert S. Norris, ‘United States Nuclear Forces, 2017,’
Journal of Bulletin of the Atomic Scientist, Vol. 73, No. 1 (2017).
  26 See, ‘The US Nuclear Arsenal: A Dangerous Vestige of the Cold War,’ Union of
Concerned Scientists (February 2014): www.ucsusa.org/sites/default/files/legacy/
assets/documents/nwgs/nuclear-­arsenal-vestige-­cold-war.pdf.
  27 Ibid., p. 3.
  28 See ‘Remarks by President Barack Obama in Prague as Delivered,’ The White
House Office of the Press Secretary (April 5, 2009): https://obamawhitehouse.
archives.gov/the-­press-office/remarks-­president-barack-­obama-prague-­delivered.
  29 Fiona Hill, ‘Understanding and Deterring Russia: US Policies and Strategies,’ The
Brookings Institute: www.brookings.edu/testimonies/understanding-­and-deterring-­
russia-u-­s-policies-­and-strategies/.
  30 Xu Qi, ‘Maritime Geo-­strategy and the Development of the Chinese Navy in the
21st Century,’ translated by Andrew E. Erickson and Lyle J. Goldstein, Naval War
College Review (Autumn 2006), pp. 56–57.
  31 Ibid.
  32 France-­Presse, Agence, ‘The US has a massive military presence in the Asia Pacific,’
Public Radio International, p. 2 (August 11, 2017): www.pri.org/stories/2017–08–11/
us-­has-massive-­military-presence-­asia-pacific-­heres-what-­you-need-­know-about-­it.
  33 Dakota, L. Wood (ed.), ‘2016 Index of US Military Strength: Assessing Amer­ican’s
Ability to Provide for the Common Defense,’ The Heritage Foundation, pp. 1–335:
https://s3.amazonaws.com/ims-­2016/PDF/2016_Index_of_US_Military_Strength_
FULL.pdf.
  34 ‘The US has a massive military presence in the Asia Pacific,’ p. 2.
  35 Ibid., also see Kyodo News, ‘Japan mulls regulations to keep drones away from US
military bases,’ The Japan Times (December 28, 2017): www.japantimes.co.jp/
news/2017/12/28/national/politics-­diplomacy/japan-­mulls-regulations-­keep-drones-­
away-u-­s-military-­bases/#.WoWCotwaa2c.
  36 Michael Beckley, ‘The Emerging Military Balance in East Asia,’ p. 81.
  37 Department of Homeland Security, ‘The 2014 Quadrennial Homeland Security
Review,’ US Department of Homeland Security, pp.  1–104 (March, 2014): www.
dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/2014-qhsr-­final-508.pdf.
  38 Ibid., p. 28.
  39 Ibid.
  40 ‘Nuclear Posture Review,’ US Department of Defense (February 2018): https://media.
defense.gov/2018/Feb/02/2001872886/-1/-1/1/2018-NUCLEAR-­POSTURE-REVIEW-­
FINAL-REPORT.PDF?source=GovDelivery.
  41 Ibid.
  42 Ashley Feinberg, ‘Exclusive: Here is a draft of Trump’s Nuclear Review,’ Huffpost
(January 11, 2018): www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/trump-­nuclear-posture-­review-2018
_us_5a4d4773e4b06d1621bce4c5.
  43 See Ashley J. Tellis, Alison Szalwinski, and Michael Wills, Strategic Asia 2017–18:
Power, Ideas and Military Strategy in the Asia-­Pacific (Washington, DC: National
Bureau of Asian Research, 2017).
  44 Zhao Tong, ‘China’s Strategic Environment and Doctrine,’ in Robert Einhorn and
W.P.S. Sidhu (eds.), The Strategic: Linking Pakistan, India, China and US, Brook-
ings Arms Control and Non-­Proliferation, Series Paper No. 14 (March 2017), p. 17.
  45 See Michael D. Swaine, ‎Andrew N.D. Yang, and ‎Evan S. Medeiros, Assessing the
Threat: The Chinese Military and Taiwan’s Security (Washington, DC: Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace, 2007).
 New technologies and the security dilemma   45
  46 Quoted in Jan Hornat, ‘The Power Triangle in the Indian Ocean: China, India and
the United States,’ Cambridge Review of International Affairs, Vol.  29, No.  2
(2016), p. 5.
  47 Alek Chance, ‘The Belt and Road Initiative and the Future of Globalization,’ The
Diplomat (October 31, 2017): https://thediplomat.com/2017/10/the-­belt-and-­road-
initiative-­and-the-­future-of-­globalization/.
  48 Quoted in Kristien Bergerson, ‘China’s Efforts to Counter US Forward Presence in
the Asia Pacific,’ p. 4.
  49 Justyna Szczudlik, ‘China’s Response to United States’ Asia-­Pacific Strategy,’ PISM
Policy Paper, No. 41 (October 2012), p. 5: www.scribd.com/document/165049932/
China-­Response-to-­US-Strategy.
  50 Ibid.
  51 See Michael D.  Swaine, Nicholas Eberstadt, M. Taylor Fravel, Mikkal Herberg,
Albert Keidel, Evans J.R. Revere, Alan D. Romberg, Eleanor Freund, Rachel Esplin
Odell, and Audrye Wong, Conflict and Cooperation in the Asia-­Pacific Region: A
Strategic Net Assessment (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International
Peace, 2015).
  52 Quoted in Kristien Bergerson, ‘China’s Efforts to Counter US Forward Presence in
the Asia Pacific,’ p. 4.
  53 Zhao Tong, ‘China’s Strategic Environment and Doctrine,’ p. 21.
  54 Michelle Jamrisko, ‘US lurks as spoiler threat at Asia-­Pacific trade talk,’ Bloomberg
(October 20, 2017): www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017–10–20/u-­s-lurks-­as-
spoiler-­threat-at-­asia-pacific-­trade-talks.
  55 For interesting analysis on Chinese nuclear policy, see Jeffrey Lewis, The Minimum
Means of Reprisal: China’s Search for Security in the Nuclear Age (Cambridge,
MA: MIT Press, 2007).
  56 Hans M. Kristensen and Robert S. Norris, ‘Chinese Nuclear Forces, 2016,’ Bulletin
of the Atomic Scientists (July 2016): https://thebulletin.org/2016/july/chinese-­
nuclear-forces-­20169627.
  57 Shannon N. Kile and Hans M. Kristensen, ‘Chinese Nuclear Forces,’ in SIPRI Year-
book (2017), p. 637.
  58 Ibid.
  59 Ibid.
  60 See Eric Gomez, ‘Meet the DF-­31AG and the DF-­26: The big ballistic missiles at
China’s military anniversary parade,’ The Diplomat (August 8, 2017): https://the
diplomat.com/2017/08/meet-­the-df-­31ag-and-­the-df-­26-the-­big-ballistic-­missiles-at-­
chinas-military-­anniversary-parade/.
  61 Ronald O’Rourke, ‘China Naval Modernization: Implications for US Capabilities –
Background and Issues for Congress,’ Congressional Research Service (February 3,
2011), pp. 24–29.
  62 Robert D. Kaplan, Monsoon: The Indian Ocean and the Future of Amer­ican Power
(New York: Random House 2010), p. 282.
  63 Evan Braden Montgomery, ‘Competitive Strategies against Continental Power,’
p. 84.
  64 Robert Einhorn and W.P.S. Sidhu (eds.), The Strategic: Linking Pakistan, India,
China and US, p. 4.
  65 Oriana Skylar and Michael S. Chase, ‘Long-­Term Competition between the
United States and China in Military Aviation,’ SITC Research Briefs, Series 9,
(2017) p. 2: https://cloudfront.escholarship.org/dist/prd/content/qt00p6c0v8/qt00
p6c0v8.pdf.
  66 Ibid.
  67 Doug Tsuruoka, ‘China pursuing missiles defenses,’ Asia Times (January 19, 2018).
  68 Robert Einhorn and W.P.S. Sidhu (eds.), The Strategic: Linking Pakistan, India,
China and US, p. 5.
46   New technologies and the security dilemma
  69 See Andrew S. Erickson, Anti-­Ship Ballistic Missiles Development, Trajectories,
and Strategic Implications (Washington, DC: Brookings Institute Press, 2016).
  70 Michael Beckley, ‘The Emerging Military Balance in East Asia,’ p. 78.
  71 Ibid., p. 81.
  72 Andrew J. Nathan and Andrew Scobell, ‘China’s Overstretched Military,’ Washing-
ton Quarterly, Vol. 35, No. 4 (Fall 2012).
  73 Michael Beckley, ‘The Emerging Military Balance in East Asia,’ p. 98.
  74 Toshi Yoshihara and James R. Holmes, ‘Can China Defend a “Core Interest” in the
South China Sea?’ Washington Quarterly, Vol. 34, No. 2 (Spring 2011) pp. 45–59.
  75 See more in Michael Beckley, ‘The Emerging Military Balance in East Asia,’
pp. 104–108.
  76 Stephen Biddle and Ivan Oelrich, ‘Future Warfare in the Western Pacific,’ Inter-
national Security, Vol. 41, No. 1 (Summer 2016), p. 7.
  77 Butterfield, History and Human Relations, pp. 19–22.
  78 Graham Allison, ‘The Thucydides Trap,’ Foreign Policy (June 9, 2017).
  79 Face-­to-face conversation by one of the authors with the US officials in Washington
(July 2018).
  80 See John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: W.W.
Norton, 2001).
  81 See Teresita Schaffer, India and the United States in the 21st Century: Reinventing
Partnership (Washington, DC: CSIS, 2009).
  82 For an interesting analysis on increasing trade volume between India and China,
see Rong Wang and Cuiping Zhu (eds.), Annual Report on the Development of
International Relations in the Indian Ocean Region (Berlin: Springer, 2016),
pp. 53–77.
  83 See Francine R. Frankel, ‘The Breakout of China–India Strategic Rivalry and the
Indian Ocean,’ Journal of International Affairs, Vol.  64, No.  2 (Spring/Summer,
2011), pp. 1–17.
  84 Mohan Malik, ‘Balancing Act: ‘The China–India–US Triangle,’ World Affairs
(Spring 2016), p. 2.
  85 Andrew S. Erickson, Walter C. Ladwig, III, and Justin Mikolay, ‘Diego Garcia and
the United States’ Emerging Indian Ocean Strategy,’ Asian Security, Vol. 6, No. 3.
(September 2010), p. 230.
  86 Shishir Gupta ‘Caught between Pakistan’s claim on Kashmir and China’s OBOR,
India must stand on its own,’ Hindustan Times (May 20, 2017): www.hindustan
times.com/opinion/caught-­between-pakistan-­s-claim-­on-kashmir-­and-china-­s-obor-­
india-must-­stand-on-­its-own/story-­ZJ8Lq8Nq2bNd19seD7le9M.html.
  87 Lisa Curtis, ‘The Triangle Dynamic in Asia: The US, India, and China,’ The
Heritage Foundation, Paper No. 1017 (Washington, DC, 2007), www.heritage.org/
asia/report/the-­triangular-dynamic-­asia-the-­us-india-­and-china.
  88 Ibid., pp. 1–4.
  89 Rajat Pandit, ‘US pips Russia as top arms supplier to India,’ The Times of India
(August 13, 2014): https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/US-­pips-Russia-­as-top-­
arms-supplier-­to-India/articleshow/40142455.cms.
  90 Shannon N. Kile and Hans M. Kristensen, ‘Chinese Nuclear Forces,’ in SIPRI Year-
book 2017 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), pp. 641–646.
  91 Yogesh Joshi and Frank O’Donnell, ‘India’s Evolving Nuclear Force and its
Implications for US Strategy in the Asia-­Pacific,’ Strategic Studies Institute, US
Army War College (June 2016), pp. 3–11.
  92 Ibid.
  93 Jan Hornat, ‘The Power Triangle in the Indian Ocean,’ p. 8.
  94 Shashank Joshi, ‘Why India is becoming warier of China,’ Current History, p. 735,
pp. 156–161.
  95 Quoted in Jan Hornat, ‘The Power Triangle in the Indian Ocean,’ p. 5.
 New technologies and the security dilemma   47
  96 Rajesh Rajagopalan, ‘India’s Nuclear Security,’ in Robert Einhorn and W.P.S. Sidhu
(eds.), The Strategic: Linking Pakistan, India, China and US, p. 32.
  97 Mohan Malik, ‘Balancing Act: The China–India–US Triangle,’ p. 3.
  98 Siddharth Srivastava, ‘India’s nuclear submarine plan surfaces,’ Asia Times (Febru-
ary 20, 2009).
  99 Authors’ interview with Pakistani Ambassador, Tasneem Aslam, who was a career
diplomat and formerly served as the spokesperson for the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, Islamabad, February 2019.
100 Authors’ interview with a high profile military officer who wished to remain
anonymous, Rawalpindi, February 2019.
101 Authors’ interview with Zamir Akram who is a former Ambassador of Pakistan and
currently advisor to the Strategic Plans Division, Islamabad, February 2019.
102 Authors’ interview with Tasneem Aslam.
103 Authors’ interview with Zafar Nawaz Jaspal who is Professor at Quaid-­i-Azam
University, Islamabad, February 2019.
104 Herz, International Politics in the Atomic Age, p. 241.
105 Hans M. Kristensen, Robert S. Norris, and Julia Diamond, ‘Pakistani Nuclear Forces,
2018,’ Bulletin of Atomic Scientists (2018), Vol. 74, No. 5, pp. 348–358, 348.
106 ‘Pakistan conducts another successful test launch of ballistic missile Nasr,’ Dawn
(January 31, 2019): www.dawn.com/news/1461016.
107 ISPR Press Release, No. PR-­61/2015-ISPR (March 9, 2015): www.ispr.gov.pk/
press-­release-detail.php?id=2804.
108 Ibid., p. 349.
109 Pakistan’s ISPR Press Release: No. PR-­10/2017-ISPR, Rawalpindi (January 9,
2017): www.ispr.gov.pk/press-­release-detail.php?id=3672.
110 Pranab Dhal Samanta, ‘Russian S-­400 Triumf gives India an edge against Pakistan,
China,’ The Economic Times (July 13, 2018): https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/
news/defence/russian-­s-400-gives-­india-an-­edge-against-­pakistan-china/articleshow/
54893457.cms.
111 ‘Russia’s sale of S-­400 missiles to India may destabilize Region,’ Dawn (October
20, 2018).
112 Authors’ interview with Gen. Mazar Jamil (retd) who is Former Director General of
the SPD, Islamabad, 2018.
113 Pakistan to maintain strategic balance with India, says NCA Adviser,’ Dawn
(November 7, 2018).
114 Authors’ interview with Tasneem Aslam.
115 Glaser, ‘The Security Dilemma Revisited,’ p. 174 and pp. 190–191.
116 G. John Ikenberry, ‘From Hegemony to the Balance of Power: The Rise of China
and the Amer­ican Grand Strategy in East Asia,’ International Journal of Korean
Unification Studies, Vol. 23, No. 2 (2014), pp. 41–63, 53.
117 Ibid.
118 See Robert Einhorn and W.P.S. Sidhu, The Strategic: Linking Pakistan, India, China
and US.
2 The Indo-­US increasing strategic
partnership and regional stability

Introduction
Indo-­US relations have entered a new phase since the beginning of the twenty-­
first century. The past divergent priorities, guided by shared doubts and animos-
ities between the two states, have converted into new strategic realities. The
Indo-­US strategic trust has transformed into a strategic partnership in the present
century and both states are transitioning to new roles in the changing world
order. For John Ikenberry, the coming phase of the world order will be ‘the post-­
Western order.’1 This partnership in the changing international order can be con-
ceptualized clearly on the following parameters: (1) geographically, India shares
its contested territory with a rising power – China – that is in the center of the
emerging world order. Geopolitical and geo-­economic competition between the
US and China, and between China and India, has led to the creation of space for
greater US–India strategic cooperation.2 Ashley Tellis argues, Indo-­US
cooperation/partnership is ‘intended to strengthen Indian power as a means of
constraining China’s capacity to undermine those interests shared by Washing-
ton and New Delhi.’3 Thus, India becomes the most reliable partner for the US
to hedge against China while exercising joint patrolling and navigation with the
US from the Indian Ocean to the blue seas of the Asia-­Pacific. Ikenberry claims
that ‘the United States seeks a regional order that is open and organized around
widely shared rules and principles of politics and economics.’4 He further says,
‘the Amer­ican goal is not to prevent this growth in Chinese power and leader-
ship, but to make sure it is not used to turn the region into a closed, illiberal
Chinese sphere of influence.’5 For the US, India’s rise is important as a counter-
weight to China, which stabilizes the broader Asian region that is favorable to
the US. (2) India’s economic integration in the global system has compelled the
US to accommodate India’s interests in the cooperative global order. Economic-
ally, India has grown at an average of 7.6 percent in real terms between 2000
and 2010. Estimates suggest that the Indian economy will expand at an average
rate of 8.4 percent through 2020.6 Trade between the United States and India has
doubled in the first decade of the twenty-­first century.7 As the Indian economy
grows it will invest trillions of dollars in infrastructure, transportation, energy
production and distribution, and defense hardware.8 In short, over the next two
 Indo-US increasing strategic partnership   49
decades India is on the path to becoming a global economic powerhouse, with
all that implies for the US and world economies. (3) India has positioned itself
as a major US ally in order to benefit from US military and diplomatic assistance
and to use this relationship to put additional pressure on Pakistan. This is why,
since 9/11, anti-­terrorism cooperation has found solidarity between the two
states, against the backdrop of the US fight against the ‘war on terror.’ India
wholeheartedly supported the US intervention in Afghanistan and it has actively
engaged in the process of reconstruction of that country in order to maximize its
physical influence in Afghanistan while promoting a proxy war and instability
inside Pakistan.9 Thus, based on geo-­strategic compulsions, India is gradually
achieving a more prominent status in the US strategic calculus. The US has
started considering India to be a formidable, natural, and trustworthy ally due to
its geo-­strategic location and economic credentials. India, in turn, has built its
rapprochement with the US in order to maximize its role in the broader Asian
region and to accumulate material power without compromising on its ‘strategic
autonomy’10 and/or independent foreign policy. In this context, Alexander
Wendt argues that autonomy refers to ‘the ability of a state-­society complex to
exercise control over its allocation of resources and choices of government not
only to survive, but also to retain its liberty.’11 India’s growing relations with the
US is mostly perceived as an opportunity to acquire power projection and retain
its escalation dominance in the Southern Asia region.12
Both the US and India have identified shared mutual strategic interests that in
turn successfully convinced the US to sign a civil-­nuclear deal with India in
2008. This legitimizes India’s footprints to the global market to procure nuclear
fuel and technologies. This deal, in turn, has enabled India to project its power
and economic status broadly in the region, offsetting China’s rising influence. In
this way, India can become an important player to balance military power
against China in the naval and strategic domain. The US devolution of power to
India and its force modernization has led to an increase Pakistan’s insecurity,
thus aggravating deterrent force asymmetry between India and Pakistan based on
the security dilemma-­driven action–reaction spiral. That being noted, this
chapter deals with the deepening strategic partnership between India and the
United States, their growing mutual trust and its impact on Pakistan–India rela-
tions and the broader regional stability. The chapter shows that the Indo-­US stra-
tegic partnership leads to the promotion of an unresolvable spiral in the arms
competition between India and Pakistan.

A frosty relationship in the absence of shared priorities

Indo-­US relations during the Cold War period remained frosty due to a lack of
US strategic priorities in India and the non-­aligned policy of the Indian Premier,
Jawaharlal Nehru. For instance, Nehru laid down the vision to pursue India’s
national goals, autonomously independent of Cold War competition between the
US and the former Soviet Union (Russia). Indeed, India’s alignment policy and
its cordial relations with the Soviet Union kept both the US and India away from
50   Indo-US increasing strategic partnership
each other. India’s inclination toward the Soviet Union was based on their shared
strategic interests as the Soviet Union endorsed India’s foreign policy and its
stance on the issue of Kashmir, while India considered the Soviet military
advancement as defensive.13 Nehru, conversely, tried to manage a balancing role
with the US in order to secure assistance and aid. After partition in 1947, the US
became the first country to establish a defense trade with India by offering India
200 Sherman tanks worth US$19 million14 along with 54 C-­119 Fairchild
military transport aircraft.15 Nehru visited the US in 1949, 1956, and later in
1961, receiving US$10 billion in assistance from the US.16 India’s peaceful
nuclear program was first supported by the US in the 1950s under its Atom for
Peace program. Subsequently, the US trained Indian scientists at its institutions,
thereafter building India’s nuclear infrastructure at Tarapur by providing heavy
water for that facility.17
The 1963 US–India agreement for peaceful nuclear cooperation helped India
establish two Tarapur nuclear power plants at Maharastra in the 1960s, built by
General Electric, which is an Amer­ican multinational conglomerate incorporated
in New York City. Later, Canadian assistance in the 1970s resulted in the con-
struction of the 300 MWe twin PHWRs at Rawatbhatta, Rajasthan. Furthermore,
the two Light Water Reactors were built at Kodankulam and Tamil Nadu with
the help of the Soviet Union. It is undeniable that India used US-­supplied heavy
water in their Canadian-­built CIRUS reactor to produce fuel for the so-­called
peaceful nuclear explosions (PNEs) in 1974.18 This nuclear program had civil as
well as military components attached. At the enforcement of the NPT in 1968,
India criticized the treaty for not constraining vertical proliferation and imposing
one-­sided obligations on states without nuclear weapons.19 At the same time,
India received US$4.2 billion of US economic assistance during 1965–1971.
However, in 1971, the Soviet Union became the major arms supplier to India
thereby creating dent in the Indo-­US relations. These relations became tense
after its PNEs in 1974, as this event set a bad precedent for the stability of the
non-­proliferation regime and the regional environment, thus later compelling
Pakistan to follow suit. Subsequently, the NSG was created in 1975 against the
backdrop of India’s nuclear proliferation event, as a safeguard to regulate the
transfer of nuclear technology and related material in order to constrain further
proliferation at a global level. Later, in 1978, the NSG introduced a regulatory
mechanism to strengthen export control in order to avoid the diversion of the
peaceful transfer of technology for military means. The US also introduced strin-
gent rules to govern nuclear exports to non-­nuclear states by introducing the
Nuclear Non-­proliferation Act (NNPA) in 1978.20 It is noted that ‘in 1980 Presi-
dent Carter approved a temporary waiver of nearly 32 tons of uranium for
India’s Tarapur reactor, and in 1982, an agreement allowed France to supply
Tarapur in return for India’s accepting safeguard on the facility.’21
It was only in the mid-­1990s that the trajectory of relations between India and
the US improved. India’s economic reforms altered the Indo-­US political rela-
tionship. It was during Bill Clinton’s second tenure as US president that the
Indo-­US relationship grappled with the opportunity to improve political ties.
 Indo-US increasing strategic partnership   51
Indeed, three significant developments laid down the foundation for strengthen-
ing US–India relations at that time: first, the end of the Cold War prevented
­US–Soviet competition and US policy shifted from India’s non-­alignment
policy. Second, against the backdrop of globalization, India’s historic economic
reforms of the early 1990s, led by Manmohan Singh, then finance minister (later
Premier from 2004 to 2014) opened India for global economic connectivity.
After the liberalization of India’s economy, President Clinton initiated a new era
of commerce and investment between the two countries.22 This created extra-
ordinary gateways for the US and India to connect private sector trade and
investment that continue to persist in present times. Third, India’s strong demo-
cratic credentials laid the foundation for the convergence of Indo-­US shared
interests. The Indian premiers, Atal Bihari Vajpayee (1998–2004) and Manmo-
han Sing (2004–2014) worked diligently for over a decade, strengthening the
foundation for improving relations with the US.
However, relations between the two states yet remained of low impetus and a
missed opportunity. It was due to the fact that the US assumed India’s adherence
to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) that New Delhi did not consider
a rational policy option. India’s nuclear tests in 1998 presented a further setback
to this relationship, the result of which was the imposition of economic and
military sanctions – the Glenn amendments on India and Pakistan – led by the
US along with 14 other countries.23 The UNSC passed resolution 1172 in June
1998 condemning the tests and ruling out the possibility of recognizing India
and Pakistan as nuclear weapons states (NWS).24 The India–Pakistan nuclear
tests were denounced by the UNSC, calling on the two states to halt and roll
back their nuclear program, sign the CTBT, and participate in negotiations
toward the FMCT.25 Due to US sanctions, India’s stock market and Pakistan’s
foreign exchange suffered. The US Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbot tried
to convince India to sign the CTBT, freeze the production of fissile material and
work toward the FMCT, develop no new missiles, improve export controls, and
engage Pakistan on Kashmir. India stated that it would only consider signing the
CTBT if the nuclear weapons states agree to nuclear disarmament on a particular
timetable. The 14 rounds of talks did not yield substantial results, but the busi-
ness community lobbied inside the US, leading to the removal of all sanctions in
1999 that were imposed on India under the NPPA.
Later, in March 2000, President Clinton paid a visit to India (the first visit of
a President in over 22 years), which, in turn, improved the trajectory of Indo-­US
relations. The Vision Document, signed by Clinton and Vajpayee, highlighted
their ‘resolve to create a closer and qualitatively new relationship between the
US and India on the basis of common interests and complementary responsib-
ility for ensuring regional and international security.’26 Some remaining sanc-
tions enacted in 1998 were lifted from India. Later in that year, Vajpayee also
visited the US, thereby signing additional export–import bank financing. In turn,
US companies signed agreements to install large civil power projects in India,
worth US$6 billion. US Deputy Secretary of State, Strobe Talbott maintained
the interaction with the Indian Foreign Minister, Jaswant Sing in frequent
52   Indo-US increasing strategic partnership
s­ trategic rounds of talks for improved engagement. Nevertheless, despite all the
joint statements and agreements, relations between the two states could not reach
the highest level of momentum, in spite of India’s expectations.
President Clinton was given the authority to waive off the Symington and
Pressler amendments for both India and Pakistan. The authority was exercised by
Clinton in the following month of the subsequent year. India and Pakistan were
able to procure loans and credit from international financial institutions and Paki-
stan was also able to secure military assistance from the US. However, embargoes
associated with nuclear and other advanced technologies persisted. But it can be
argued that Clinton laid the foundation for an Indo-­US renewed relationship at the
beginning of the twenty-­first century. Both the states under Clinton’s administra-
tion agreed to forge a relationship in a diversified area across the whole range of
issues/areas and both the countries reiterated their intentions to work for stability
in Asia and beyond.27 Indo-­US relations converted into a strategic partnership
under the President George W. Bush administration.

A redefined relationship: shared strategic priorities

President G.W. Bush took the trajectory of the two states’ relations to a whole
new level. President Bush extraordinarily supported India during his election
campaign in order to secure votes from the Indian diaspora. For example, he said
in one of his speeches, India is ‘emerging as one of the great democracies of the
twenty-­first century.’28 He also announced the removal of the Glenn Amendment
sanctions against India. He was against the CTBT and Anti-­Ballistic Missile
Treaty during his election rhetoric. In response to this, Indian analysts assessed
that President Bush’s administration would bring a ‘greater political sensibility
to bear upon its nuclear dialogue with India that had been dominated for too long
by non-­proliferation fundamentalists in Washington.’29 There were speculations
that Bush would improve strategic convergence between the two states thereby
viewing India as a useful counterweight to China.30
Indo-­US bilateral official visits began. In parallel, the US sought to strengthen
defense ties and subsequently the two states initiated military to military
exchanges.31 Observers in India then evaluated that ‘the Bush administration
[had] viewed India as a major strategic [partner], a key security interlocutor, and
a nation whose opinion mattered, even on issues not directly related to South
Asia.’32 Therefore, India became a valuable friend of the US in Asia under the
Bush presidency and an important player on strategic matters. Between April
and July that year, significant exchange of visits between the two countries
occurred. Strategic rapprochement between India and the US reached a fresh
impetus. Then US Secretary of State, Mr. Armitage’s, and later the US Joint
Chief of Staff ’s, visits to India transformed the ties between the two states. Ana-
lysts then suggested that ‘the shifting international balance of power will, there-
fore, give India a unique status and [position] that no other ally has enjoyed in
the past.’33 The US offered India a privileged position and presidential favor
against China in that region.
 Indo-US increasing strategic partnership   53
Against the backdrop of the September 11 attacks in the US and the sub-
sequent announcement of the war on terror, Indo-­US collaboration became even
further self-­assured and robust. New Delhi’s immediate offer of military and
intelligence support created more admiration for India in Washington. Against
this background, the US lifted nuclear-­related sanctions that were imposed in the
wake of the 1998 tests. After 9/11, extensive and frequent high profile exchanges
of visits took place. Colin Powell (then US Secretary of State) and Donald
Rumsfeld (then Secretary of Defense) visited India for close coordination and
consultation, whereas India’s Jaswant Sing and Brajesh Misra (national security
advisor) also paid visits to Washington. President Bush called Premier Vajpayee
and informed him about the bombing campaign against Afghanistan that was
about to commence. In November that year, Vajpayee visited the US for detailed
meetings with President Bush and his senior administration and congressional
officials. The two countries reached the highest level of understanding against
the backdrop of the 9/11 event, which otherwise would not have been possible.
In parallel to Delhi, Islamabad also became an important capital for Washington.
Pakistan became a frontline partner in the war against terrorism. Thus, the US
lifted all sanctions against Pakistan and pledged to renegotiate its balance of debt
crisis. By the end of the same year, the Indo-­US defense policy group interacted
to discuss shared military training and exercises. Both built cooperation in search
of exercise and rescue, peacekeeping and disaster relief efforts, and in missile
defense exercises.34
The US sold arms and weapons systems to India that were never permitted
before due to non-­proliferation sanctions.35 Against the backdrop of the terrorist
attack36 at the Parliament of India in New Delhi on December 13, 2001, the two
states initiated intelligence and information sharing thereby making India a more
reliable partner against terrorism. Colin Powell pronounced in a press conference
that India and the US were ‘natural allies’ and two great democracies that
believe in a common set of values.37 A few weeks later, President Bush pro-
nounced, ‘[m]y administration is committed to developing a fundamentally
different relationship with India.’38 This meant the US aimed at offering India a
larger role in the entire region and a deeper role in Afghanistan. This partnership
later transformed and became more constructive in the field of civil-­nuclear
energy, collaboration on scientific technologies, and burgeoning trade and com-
mercial links. The US found this to be an opportunity to build the relationship
and improve its ability to regulate the security affairs of the entire Asia-­Pacific.
Therefore, India became a ‘strategic partner of the highest caliber for the US.’39
In April 2002, India and the US initiated the first major weapons deal in more
than ten years and the US agreed to extend eight Raytheon Co. long-­range
weapon locating radars worth US$146 million. This system is designed to
engage adversaries’ long-­range mortars, artillery, and rocket launches.40 In May
2003, the US endorsed the sale to India of Israel’s Phalcon airborne early
warning systems, worth US$1.2 billion.41 The Bush Administration confirmed
that ‘India’s influence clearly goes far beyond South Asia.’42 It is estimated that
in 2004, India received military hardware and devices from the US worth US$10
54   Indo-US increasing strategic partnership
billion. This transfer of technology included the P-­8, maritime surveillance
means, anti-­submarine warfare aircraft, Apache attack helicopters, CH-­47 Chi-
nooks, transport helicopters, C-­17s, C-­30s, transport airplanes, and so on.43
Ashley Tellis presented a report44 to the House Committee on International
Relations in June 2005 recommending a set of policy options: (1) The US should
help uplift Indian material power (military and economy) to outweigh China’s
influence in Asia. (2) Very strangely, he presented the idea that the question of
military balance between India and Pakistan holds no relevance in this context.
(3) India’s membership in the UNSC, the Group of Eight (G8; refers to the group
of eight highly industrialized nations), Asia-­Pacific Economic Cooperation
(APEC), and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) should be recog-
nized. (4) The US’s objection to the Iran–India gas pipeline be lifted. (5) The US
should extend the sale of dual-­use technologies, including nuclear safety equipment,
to India. Later, in March 2005, Condoleezza Rice visited India as US Secretary of
State and argued, ‘we would effectively de-­hyphenate our South Asia policy by
seeking highly individual relations with both India and Pakistan.’45 This is why,
in March 2005, Condoleezza Rice announced the Bush Administration’s desire
to prepare India as a ‘global power.’46 She broke long-­standing non-­proliferation
constraint policy measures by undertaking full civil–nuclear cooperation with
India. In the beginning of President Bush’s second tenure, the partnership
between the two became more ambitious. The US decided to mainstream India
into the nuclear order by offering India the benefits of full civil-­nuclear energy
cooperation. The US decided to help India in building, and subsequently
running, the nuclear power plants.
The July 18, 2005 Agreement on full civil-­nuclear energy cooperation and
trade with India, made the US modify its own laws and policies in order to
transfer nuclear technology and modify international controls on the supply of
nuclear fuel and technology. In March 2006, President Bush and Indian Premier
Manmohan Singh announced this vision through the Indo-­US nuclear
cooperation initiative.47 This allowed India to trade with the US on ‘nuclear
material, including fuel and information.’48 In December 2006, a strong biparti-
san majority in Congress passed the Hyde Act, which approved the initiative,
thereby allowing US investment in India’s civil-­nuclear power industry. The US
Hyde Act 2006 was introduced in order to allow the proposed cooperation agree-
ment with India and implement the 2005 joint statement between the two states.
Former Republican member of the US House of Representatives, Henry J. Hyde,
modified the US Atomic Energy Act to formalize this joint statement.49 The US
carved out an exception to the US Atomic Energy Act of 1954, authorizing the
US President to conclude 123 agreements with India despite its nuclear status
outside the NPT. The 123 agreement states the terms of the deal, subject to the
approval from the IAEA, the NSG and the US Congress. The US assured India
of its commitment to the reliable supply of fuel, including by working with allies
and the NSG, along with negotiations with the IAEA.50 George Perkovich high-
lighted clearly in 2005 that the foundation of this deal was to dissuade or prevent
China from competing harmfully and that the US aimed at empowering states in
 Indo-US increasing strategic partnership   55
the periphery of China to balance China’s power.51 For the US, a ‘more powerful
and collegial India will balance China’s power in Asia.’52 The Bush–Singh joint
statement specified its ‘readiness to assume the responsibilities and practices and
acquire the same benefits and advantages as other leading countries with
advanced nuclear technologies, such as the United States.’53 Also, Perkovich
further confirmed through some sources that the US administration ‘want India
to build a bigger strategic arsenal to balance China’s power.’54 The deal without
any defined regional framework has solidified the Indo-­US trust and partnership
in order to promote the US Pivot to Asia policy that in turn has undermined
Pakistan’s security and has led to the creation of the spiraling arms race between
India and Pakistan.

Indo-­US joint pivoting

The US strategic partnership with India reaffirmed against the backdrop of
Obama’s Pivot to Asia policy.55 Building upon the Bush Administration’s policy,
President Obama, in 2009, called India a natural ally. China’s increasing and
assertive role compelled the US and India toward forging a further deeper rela-
tionship. Soon after his inauguration, President Obama announced that India
would be a priority for his administration. He said, ‘Our rapidly growing and
deepening friendship with India offers benefits to all the world citizens.’56 Presi-
dent Obama took forward the agreements that were initiated during the Bush
administration. The US and India initiated renewed military cooperation based
on the New Framework in the India–US defense relationship. This included a
range of yearly joint exercises with the US military more than with any other
country. The Indo-­US agreement was formally signed in 2008, which was a
major step forward in the cultivation of relations between the two states, in dis-
regard of the non-­proliferation norms. On October 8, 2008, the US Congress
passed the United States–India Nuclear Cooperation Approval and Non-­
proliferation Enhancement Act,57 approving the agreement and strengthening
cooperation between the US and India. Later in November 2009, President
Obama called the US and India natural allies for the ‘core goal of achieving
peace and security for all poles in the Asian region.’58
The agreement allows India access to the international uranium market for
India to use to fuel those reactors that it chooses to place under the IAEA’s safe-
guards. This, in turn, would free up its local uranium for its nuclear weapons
modernization leading to the rapid expansion in its nuclear stockpile and
arsenal.59 Indian modernization plans mean the production of larger quantities of
fissile material for nuclear weapons production. India could choose ‘to build a
larger plutonium-­production reactor to add a CIRUS and Dhruva, its two
weapons-­grade plutonium-­production reactors at the Bhaba Atomic Research
Centre in Bombay.’60 Presumably, it would be another way that India could
increase its fissile material stockpile to expand its small-­scale centrifuge enrich-
ment program and make highly enriched uranium for nuclear weapons.61 That
being noted, the deal overlooks how India uses the weapons-­usable materials
56   Indo-US increasing strategic partnership
produced so far. Mansoor Ahmed confirms that the ‘primary source of India’s
increasing capabilities emanates from weapons-­grade plutonium and HEU being
produced in its steadily expanding fissile material infrastructure – its centrifuge,
plutonium production, and reprocessing and breeder programs.’62 He further
argues that ‘India’s large and growing stockpiles of unsafeguarded spent fuel
containing reactor-­grade plutonium, coupled with its increasingly efficient and
expanding reprocessing capacity, also offer potential for future expansion in
India’s arsenal.’63 The United States is also investing in a long-­term strategic
partnership with India to support its ability to be a regional economic anchor and
provider of security in the broader Indian Ocean.’64 India indeed became an
important strategic pillar for US rebalancing toward Asia.65 The DoD considered
India’s position in the US Strategic Guidance document of 2012, highlighting
that,66

US–India economic and security interests are inextricably linked to devel-

opment in the arc extending from the Western Pacific and East Asia to the
Indian Ocean region and South Asia.… The United States is also investing
in a long-­term strategic partnership with India to support its ability to be a
regional economic anchor and provider of security in the broader Indian
Ocean.

In 2012, the two states initiated the DTTI, in order to promote co-­development
and co-­production. The DTTI redefines bilateral collaboration in different areas
such as: shared establishment of a chemical-­biological protective ensemble of
troops; development of mobile electric hybrid power stations; a next-­generation
small unmanned aircraft; an intelligence and surveillance module for transport
aircraft; digital helmet-­mounted displays; and joint biological tactical detection
systems along with two joint working groups, one on aircraft carriers’ techno-
logy development, and the other on jet engine technology.
In 2014, Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) came out with the slogan of ‘stronger
India’ to reassert its hedging role. India’s quest for power maximization was
forcing the country toward this kind of partnership. Under the BJP government,
the US–India partnership has progressed considerably. The two states had
addressed the nuclear liability change; they have fostered the DTTI and initiated
co-­production and co-­development industrial growth. The co-­production of the
Raven unmanned aerial vehicle, reconnaissance modules for the C-­130 J, and
other low-­end weapons is underway. Both have a mutual strategic vision for the
IOR and Asia-­Pacific region that shares a roadmap for dealing with China’s
growing political and economic influence and its claims on the South and East
China seas. India took a tough line against China and Pakistan in order to culti-
vate relations with the US. India is modernizing its forces and augmenting
military and technological capabilities. It has an enormous domestic industry,
but still continues to develop a strategic partnership with countries such as
France, Russia, the US, and Israel, for buying hi-­tech and state of the art tech-
nologies. This strategic shift included selective military resources, capacity-­
 Indo-US increasing strategic partnership   57
building, and the priority development of platforms and capabilities that have
direct applicability in the Asian region, such as the procurement of new types of
submarines, stealth bombers and joint strike fighters, and P8 maritime patrol air-
craft.67 Ashton Carter recently said, ‘We have demonstrated repeatedly that we
can release sensitive technology to India.’68 India has purchased C-­130 J and
C-­17 transport aircraft, which offer the Indian air force the heavy lift capability
and support high altitude operations in the Himalayas. India is the first foreign
country to get the P8-1 Poseidon maritime surveillance aircraft, adding to the
defensive capability of India’s eastern naval fleet and protecting Indian interests
in the Bay of Bengal and the Andaman Sea.69 The US defense sales joint
research and development for the co-­development of the next-­generation of anti-­
tank weapons can be shared and used by both armies.70 Both states have
exchanged information on homeland security and law enforcement, peace-­
keeping cooperation involving global non-­proliferation, and arms control. India
has enjoyed US support on its entry into the MTCR and Wassenaar Arrange-
ments. Both have regular discussions on shared security and navigation in the
Indian Ocean region. Both states are working together on strengthening the
manufacturing sector, while mitigating barriers for investors. During Indian PM
Modi’s visit to the US in 2016, both President Obama and Modi agreed on initi-
ating agreements on energy, defense, and trade as they sought convergence on
the Asia-­Pacific, Afghanistan, and Africa.
India’s navy will be essential in order to promote the US rebalance to Asia
and secure the IOR. India’s navy is capable of offering support to the US in
order to help provide security with anti-­piracy, anti-­submarine patrols, especially
in the sea lanes from the Gulf of Aden to the Strait of Malacca. US rebalancing
is augmented by India’s Act East Policy. The US and India both have a partner-
ship with Vietnam and both will initiate a future partnership for promoting joint
ventures. More than half of India’s shipping passes through the Strait of
Malacca. Unmanned and unarmed aerial surveillance vehicles based in Andaman
and Nicobar, India, could help the US patrol the Straits. India has participated in
an exercise to promote shared goals in the South China Sea but the capacity of
India’s navy’s is not yet effective for patrols and navigation. Thus, India’s stra-
tegic partnership with Japan and South Korea complement the US rebalance in
Asia. More so, India builds and modernizes its deterrent forces to contain
China’s naval power. Therefore, the US’s and India’s navy have formed an exer-
cise partnership.71 Indian’s growing naval modernization will allow the US to
shift its attention eastward from the IOR in the coming decade. To counter
China’s A2/AD, India is aiming at developing its own ‘air-­sea battle’ operational
concept by getting assistance from the US. India is already purchasing military
hardware from the US and it looks to the US for further technology transfer and
co-­production of defense platforms in India that in turn would empower India’s
military–industrial complex.72 More so, India is rapidly modernizing its naval
leg of the nuclear triad. That being noted, all these developments and the nucle-
arization of the Indian Ocean certainly puts considerable pressure on Pakistan’s
deterrent stability.
58   Indo-US increasing strategic partnership
Strategic partnership: a leap forward
The US would like to assign India an offshore-­balancing role in the Indo-­Pacific
affairs. President Donald Trump hosted Prime Minister Narendra Modi at the
White House on June 26, 2017 for an official visit to Washington, DC. The two
leaders committed to expanding and deepening the strategic partnership between
the two countries. The shared objectives they highlighted include combating ter-
rorist threats, promoting stability across the Indo-­Pacific region, increasing free
and fair trade, and strengthening energy linkages.73 Defense trade was a major
theme of the meeting. Both the leaders further committed to enhance defense
and security ties, against the backdrop of the United States’ recognition of India
as a Major Defense Partner.74 They pledged to work on advanced defense equip-
ment and technology at a level commensurate with that of the closest allies and
partners of the United States. The US has committed to the sale of Sea Guardian
Unmanned Aerial Systems,75 which would enhance India’s capabilities and
promote shared security interests. They further discussed the implementation of
their ‘White Shipping’ data-­sharing arrangement, and deep engagements on their
shared maritime objectives, thereby initiating new naval exercises. President
Trump expressed full support for India’s early membership of the NSG.76 Presi-
dent Trump ensured US support for India’s permanent membership on a
reformed United Nations Security Council.77 For the US, India is no longer an
ordinary South Asian country, but its role goes beyond the subcontinent to the
broader Asia-­Pacific region. The equation for India has been made in Washing-
ton’s policy circles to use India as a gateway through which to legitimize their
mobility in the broader region. Bilateral, economic, defense, and political rela-
tionships are expanding exponentially in order to prepare Indian military muscle
against China in the region.
Speaking in June 2018, Nikki Haley, a former US Ambassador to the United
Nations, said that the Trump Administration ‘seeks to take the U.S.–India rela-
tionship to the next level; to build a strategic partnership rooted in our common
values and directed toward our common interests.’78 She further stated that allies
will stand ‘shoulder-­to-shoulder in confronting regional and global challenges.’79
She confirmed that the US–India military partnership is deepening, and that the
US has ‘significantly upgraded its security cooperation with India, which was
now Washington’s major defense partner.’80 US Defense Secretary Ashton
Carter, with his Indian counterpart Manohar Parrikain, agreed in July 2018 to
initiate81 a further project within the parameters of the DTTI. They called for the
finalization of four government-­to-government agreements in the area of science
and technology cooperation, Atmospheric Sciences for High Energy Lasers,
Cognitive Tools for Target Detection, Small Intelligent Unmanned Aerial
Systems, and Blast and Blunt Traumatic Brain Injury. The two states also agreed
to promote bilateral naval interaction in order to promote submarine safety and
anti-­submarine warfare. They also agreed to initiate a shared Maritime Security
Dialogue. The Amer­icans have also pushed for the joint production of fighter
aircraft by Lockheed Martin and Boeing. The two states also agreed a deal on
 Indo-US increasing strategic partnership   59
military logistics exchange, known as the Logistics Exchange Memorandum of
Agreement (LEMOA).82 The LEMOA promotes the militaries of the US and
India sharing facilities for refueling, spare parts, and supplies, largely assisted by
modernized and advanced deterrent forces. In September 2018, the two states
announced the signing of the Communications Compatibility and Security
Agreement (COMCASA)83 between the two nations under two-­plus-two talks.
The COMCASA will allow India to procure critical defense technologies from
the US and get access to a critical communication network to ensure interopera-
bility among the US and Indian armed forces. India and the US agreed to initiate
exchanges between US Naval Forces Central Command (NAVCENT) and the
Indian Navy as part of deepening maritime cooperation in the western Indian
Ocean. These agreements would allow India better freedom of navigation and
mobility in the entire IOR and blue water of the Asia-­Pacific.

Strategic partnership: challenges to the broader stability of

the non-­proliferation regime
The Indo-­US nuclear deal is the major pillar of this strategic partnership. This
nuclear deal has transformed the nuclear order in many ways: (1) It has violated
the long-­held spirit of the NPT.84 In order to make relations resilient with India,
the US had to modify the national and international laws and rules that
obstructed trade with India. This deal offered India the full benefits of the NPT
NWS without asking India to sign the accord. This formation in the regime took
place for the first time in the last 30 years. (2) It transformed India from a target
of the international non-­proliferation regime to a stakeholder in it, allowing India
to secure international assistance for its civilian nuclear reactors and also retain
nuclear weapons in parallel. (3) The US Atomic Energy Act required a formal
agreement to lay down the legal foundation for this bilateral initiative. The Indo-
­US nuclear cooperation agreement of July 2007 constitutes the legally binding
instrument and establishes the necessary legal framework following the political
commitments of the 2005 Joint statement. The US entered into the 123 agree-
ment in accordance with Section 123 of the US Atomic Energy Act.85 This
agreement left eight out of the existing 22 nuclear reactors outside the inspection
of the IAEA’s safeguard system, while violating the non-­proliferation rules laid
down in the statute of the IAEA and the articles of the NPT. (4) The US pro-
vided incentives to India for the reprocessing of spent fuel. India was not asked
to cease producing material for nuclear weapons or to cease structuring addi-
tional weapons. (5) It supported India’s nuclear weapons development and
endorsed supply of nuclear fuel for Indian nuclear power plants by making
adjustments in the international rules.
That being noted, US expectations from India were along the following lines:
(a) to segregate military and civilian nuclear facilities by placing all the civilian
facilities under the IAEA’s safeguard system; (b) to extend its moratorium on
non-­testing and sign the CTBT; (c) to work toward the conclusion of the FMCT;
(d) to refrain from the transfer of enrichment and reprocessing technologies to
60   Indo-US increasing strategic partnership
states that do not have them and to support international efforts to limit their
spread and progress toward regional non-­proliferation;86 (e) to make progress
toward the conclusion of the Additional Protocol with the IAEA; (f ) to commit
to the US that under US law they would reverse this deal and seek the return of
the nuclear fuel and technology shipped to India under this deal if India tests
again in the future; and finally (g) India would commit to ensure the necessary
steps were taken to secure nuclear material and technologies through compre-
hensive export control legislations in line with the Wassenaar Arrangements.
However, India refused to agree upon the permanent testing moratorium. More-
over, the idea of the separation of facilities made India uncomfortable and has
not yet been implemented. India has safeguarded only 14 out of 22 nuclear facil-
ities and diverts unchecked material for military purposes from these reactors.
The IAEA does not have any checks on crossovers between military and civilian
facilities. It is important to ask: what if India tests its hydrogen bomb in the near
future? The 123 agreement is silent about this issue. India has been offered a
blank check in order to cash in on everything that the NWS do as a non-­NPT
state without signing the NPT. The deal does not bind India to sign the CTBT,
the FMCT, or initiate an arms restraint arrangement in the region. Ambassador
Zamir Akram stated,87

[the] U.S. has improved India’s ability to increase production of nuclear

warheads based on domestic uranium. India is producing [an] extensive
amount of enriched uranium for naval propulsion that goes beyond their
needs. India’s separation plan on civil-­nuclear facilities is doubtful. We are
not unconvinced that India is accumulating stock for future testing.

Mansoor Ahmed further asserts,88

India has maintained its civil nuclear energy program as the linchpin of its
entire nuclear enterprise, through which it has developed its strategic
program and is aiming at inclusion in the NSG, which has already granted it
an India-­specific waiver. India will seek to consolidate its gains by main-
taining the same trajectory of civilian and military overlapping streams of
fuel cycle activities, unless the NSG demands safeguards on all its civilian
plutonium as a pre-­condition for embracing India.

The deal serves a fatal blow to the NPT’s non-­proliferation norms, thereby
making the anarchic world system favorable to the US interests that preferred
the geopolitical and economic imperatives to international non-­proliferation
while competing in many countries, including India, against other developed
states for developing lucrative nuclear deals. However, the US special conces-
sion to India has rotted the spirit of the NPT. This deal has violated the NPT
treaty article-­I that stipulates that a nuclear weapons state cannot, either inten-
tionally or unintentionally, assist a non-­nuclear weapons state to develop a
nuclear weapons program – the deal must not violate the clear prohibition.89 The
 Indo-US increasing strategic partnership   61
deal may undermine the provisions and credibility of international law dealing
with non-­nuclear proliferation. This deal would increase proliferation trends, and
the security dilemma-­driven mistrust, fear, and uncertainty between India and
Pakistan. Furthermore, many states may be encouraged to build nuclear weapons
or drop their NPT pledges on nuclear programs in the expectation that they will
be rewarded despite their profligacy. This deal may cause Iran, Japan, and South
Korea to build their nuclear program. The deal will also create a moral divide
between NPT non-­member states and will create more problems for global gov-
ernance in the nuclear field between NPT nuclear and non-­nuclear members.
India’s nuclear weapons program would no longer obstruct its ability to
approach the global commerce for high-­technology goods, including advanced
weapons systems and space-­based technologies from the US. The dual-­use tech-
nologies, which prevent cutting-­edge dual-­use enrichment and reprocessing tech-
nologies, would become helpful to India’s nuclear program. India’s receipt of
nuclear fuel from the international partners would be freeing-­up its domestic
manufactured fissile material for weapons purposes. Indeed, in ‘importing
nuclear fuel for its civilian reactors, India will be able to use all its indigenous
uranium resources for weapon producton.’90 After getting fissile material suffi-
ciency, India can decide to terminate the safeguard agreements, resume nuclear
testing, test a hydrogen bomb, and expand its nuclear weapon program, being a
non-­NPT member state. There are no reports suggesting whether the US or the
IAEA directly monitor India’s uranium production, or the amount of uranium
that India shifts to its military program. Nowhere in the agreement is it stated
that there is a cap on the growth and modernization of India’s nuclear weapons
program. In addition, with the ‘continued operation of its plutonium production
reactors Dhruva and CIRUS, India has about two tons of plutonium in the spent
fuel from its unsafeguarded power reactors that could be used for weapons.’91
Under the separation agreement, India retains the sole authority to determine
whether any new facility will be civilian or military. And when its fast breeder
reactors (FBRs) program becomes fully operational, then India will have an
ability to produce an even larger amount of weapons materials. This is with the
US objective of wanting to support India through its offshore-­balancing strategy
to counter China. Opponents to the Indo-­US civil nuclear deal inside the US
Congress also raised concerns, even during the congressional hearing, that
selling nuclear fuel to India for its civilian reactors would allow India to spare an
amount of indigenous uranium, which would in turn enable India to devote those
resources to weapons purposes.92
More so, India’s growing economic prowess, wealth, and power requires
more energy resources and fuel for its force modernization such as nuclear sub-
marines propulsion and achieving efficiency to meet renewable energy demands
for its socio-­economic growth. This deal would help India in indigenizing its
energy production capability to achieve sustainable development. It would facil-
itate US investment inside India, which would boost the Indian economy and
legitimize its indigenous defense production. India’s diversion of uranium and
the modernization of its technologies would have a broader impact on regional
62   Indo-US increasing strategic partnership
strategic stability. This deal has created a major setback to Indo-­Pakistan rela-
tions, enhancing irregularities and impacting the strategic balance and peace
between the two South Asian states. The deal would destabilize the South Asian
nuclear dynamics that ‘India and Pakistan have, over the last two decades, settled
into a more stable nuclear-­deterrent balance,’ rather than a ‘delicate form of
deterrence that remains vulnerable to breakdown.’93 This deal has created path-
ways for India to secure its NSG membership that, in turn, has created a new
debate on the non-­NPT states’ criteria for adherence to the NSG.

India’s lopsided NSG membership case

The NSG member states clearly laid down the admission criteria for new states
in the 2001 Aspen Plenary: the new aspirant states should be party to the NPT
and agree to enforce full-­scope safeguards with the IAEA.94 The NPT’s member-
ship condition for states’ adherence to the NSG was removed in its guidelines in
2012.95 India has been consistently struggling to secure NSG membership since
2013. Pakistan in parallel also aspires to the similar position in order to acquire
civil-­nuclear technology to fulfill its domestic energy needs. The NSG annual
plenary session that was held in Seoul in June 2016 did not reach any consensus
on the inclusion of India and Pakistan in the NSG. Several key NSG states, such
as Australia, Ireland, New Zealand, and Switzerland, maintained principled
opposition, thereby questioning these states’ non-­NPT status. Other states, like
Brazil and Turkey, called for a criteria-­based process to be put in place. Six
years ago, then US President Barack Obama pledged his support for India’s
entry and, consequently, the US supported India’s single admittance in the
club.96 China, however, has strongly resisted the Indian application, arguing that
it would enhance nuclear competition in South Asia by isolating Pakistan. Later,
in November that year, China proposed that the solution to new aspirants’ acces-
sion to the NSG should be non-­discriminatory, applicable to all non-­NPT
members and must not damage the strength and spirit of the NSG and the NPT.
The NSG joint statement highlighted Technical, Legal, and Political aspects of
the Participants of non-­NPT States in the NSG, thereby deciding to continue dis-
cussions.97 Thus, Rafael Mariano Grossi, a former chairman of the NSG, was
assigned the task of preparing a procedure on the inclusion of non-­NPT states in
the cartel. The Grossi six-­point formula98 seems to put India in an advantageous
position over Pakistan questioning the latter’s credentials. If cumulatively ana-
lyzed, Pakistan already adheres99 to all of Grossi’s six-­point formula except the
signing of the IAEA’s additional protocol that Pakistan can consider signing any
time with the IAEA.100
Pakistan protests101 over the India-­specific membership in the NSG. As the
Indian separation plan on civil-­nuclear facilities is not fully implemented, eight
of its civilian power reactors, Fast Breeders Reactors, fuel cycle, and other facili-
ties reside outside the IAEA’s safeguards. India’s Additional Protocol102 agree-
ment with the IAEA applies only to its nuclear exports. It does not apply to
Indian nuclear material, facilities, or associated equipment. India has already
 Indo-US increasing strategic partnership   63
refused to sign the CTBT and has remained muted on Pakistan’s proposal103 to
sign the bilateral moratorium on non-­testing. It has not ceased the production of
fissile material for military purposes and its export control guidelines do not spe-
cifically outlaw the transfer of ENR technologies. India does not have an inde-
pendent nuclear regulatory authority that could oversee nuclear material security
and safety aspects and it is keen to join the cartel to achieve global support for
its civil-­nuclear deals. It aims to achieve a recognized nuclear state status. India
also wants to create a platform from which to secure a permanent seat in the
UNSC. Against this backdrop, India attempts to implement a sustained military
build-­up involving the use of modern state of the art weapons systems, ballistic
missiles, nuclear-­powered submarines capable of launching ICBMs, large air-
craft carriers capable of operating fixed-­wing combat aircraft, substantial surface
warfare and submarine fleet, and sophisticated air platforms. However, all these
developments between the US and India are not free of cost and independent of
regional implications, and lead to Pakistan being dragged into the complex spiral
of security dilemma-­driven fear that ultimately is forcing Pakistan to introduce
countermeasures that may guarantee its own security.

Strategic partnership: the security dilemma intensified and

regional balance challenged
As the growing Indo-­US strategic partnership deepens, and mistrust between
India and Pakistan further widens, this could challenge the strategic stability and
peace of the region. Ambassador Zamir Akram confirmed that, ‘this deal has led
to the creation of arms-­racing trends between India and Pakistan. All agreements
between the U.S. and India have an impact on the national security of Paki-
stan.’104 Ambassador Tasneem also stated that Indo-­US convergence has led to
increased divergences between the US and Pakistan and has enhanced India’s
military capabilities.105 First, the growing partnership would enhance India’s
strategic and conventional capabilities as India is seriously marching towards
strategic force modernization. India is emerging as one of the key players in the
Indo-­Pacific region and conceptualizes the Indian Ocean as India’s ocean and
the Indo-­Pacific as India’s Pacific. It is considered that, after the US and China,
India with its emerging economic and strategic force posture would expand its
political, diplomatic, economic, and strategic influences in the Indo-­Pacific
region with an eye on China and offensive/war-­fighting intensions against Paki-
stan. Against the backdrop of these developments, India has taken drastic meas-
ures in transforming its strategic force posture in recent years (see Chapter 3),
which Pakistan considers offensive and based on malign interests such as pulling
Pakistan into a deliberate warlike scenario. Second, the growing strategic part-
nership would increase India’s security, and enhancing its strategic and conven-
tional capabilities would provide India with the extra confidence to show its
power projection in the region, which in turn could make others, such as Paki-
stan, feel threatened and less secure. The Cold War classic security dilemma
maxim suggests that the consistent increase of one state’s security (in this case,
64   Indo-US increasing strategic partnership
India) would decrease the security of the other state (in this case, Pakistan). Inter-­
state rivalry between Pakistan and India is still enduring as many outstanding
issues, including the core issue of Kashmir, are yet to be politically resolved
between the two states. Due to these issues, the two countries have fought in the
past and confronted many border skirmishes. Given this rivalry and given the
increase in India’s conventional military capabilities, India could put Pakistan
under enormous strategic pressure in a complex and unrecoverable security
dilemma, thereby making war a prominent and more likely proposition. This
would cause a never-­ending spiral in arms-­racing in the region, making both India
and Pakistan less secure. Third, India’s growing strategic partnership, as well as its
force modernization plan, challenge India’s policy of minimum deterrence that it
had earlier conceptualized against both China and Pakistan. Considering India’s
contemporary force modernization against the backdrop of the India–US strategic
deal, India’s conceptualization of a minimum deterrent seems no longer convinc-
ing and relevant. India accumulates power, either unintentionally or deliberately,
but in doing so creates a strategic scenario driven by power maximization ambi-
tions while putting confidence-­building measure to the back burner. India’s leader-
ship has to resolve this growing strategic dilemma without necessarily pulling one
or the other adversary into vicious cycle of an arms race. The US cannot turn a
blind eye to the growing power imbalance and arms competition in this region.
Last but not least, the strategic partnership creates a competitive strategic triangle
between the US, China, and India as each desires to project its power and compete
with the other adversary. This, in turn, deepens the systemic security dilemma and
mistrust between India and Pakistan. Although conflict between these powers is
unlikely, the risk does not vanish away.

Conclusion
The US has initiated a strategic partnership with India in order to promote its
own strategic, political, and economic interests in the broader Asia-­Pacific
region. The US has decided to prepare India as a hedger state against China by
helping it to accumulate its material power position. Indeed, India’s democratic
credentials and emerging economic market, its geo-­strategic location, and will-
ingness to hedge against China, have all swayed the US to consider India a
natural ally. Thus, the US is working on transforming India into a greater power
state. India’s force modernization and power projection through joint patrolling
and navigation will obstruct China’s rise and legitimize the US’s growing influ-
ence in the region. This is why the US has altered the global nuclear rules in
India’s favor by offering it a civil-­nuclear deal while mainstreaming and con-
necting it to global nuclear commerce. The Indo-­US nuclear deal is a major
pillar of the Indo-­US strategic partnership that, in itself, is a setback for the
stability of the broader non-­proliferation regime and for regional peace. It has
rewarded a non-­NPT state the rights and privileges of an NPT–nuclear weapons
state without any pressure on it to sign the NPT, the CTBT, reduce its current
stockpile, or cease fissile material production.
 Indo-US increasing strategic partnership   65
The Indo-­US strategic partnership has led to making the South Asian security
dilemma one that is complex and unresolvable. This partnership promotes the
advancement of India’s strategic and conventional capabilities and India is
­seriously striving for strategic force modernization. India’s force modernization
and power accumulation have increased Pakistan’s insecurities, undermined the
regional balance, and aggravated the asymmetry between India and Pakistan.
This partnership has led to increased mistrust, fear, and uncertainty between
India and Pakistan against the backdrop of acute inter-­state rivalry and unre-
solved territorial disputes, such as the core issue of Kashmir. The Indo-­US
­strategic partnership has bolstered the Indian revisionist mindset, which, in turn,
has led to the destabilization of the regional centric deterrence, a reduced possib-
ility of the resumption of dialogue around the peace process, and an increased
probability of war in South Asia. Against the backdrop of its growing technolo-
gical pace, India can put Pakistan under immense strategic stress and into an
unresolvable classic security dilemma.

Notes
   1 See G. John Ikenberry, ‘The Rise of China and the Future of Liberal World Order,’
Lecture at Chatham House (May 7, 2014): www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/
files/field/field_document/20140507RiseofChina.pdf.
   2 Mohan Malik, ‘Balancing Act: The China–India–US Triangle,’ World Affairs
(Spring 2016).
   3 Ashley J. Tellis, ‘Narendra Modi and US–India Relations,’ Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace (November 1, 2018): https://carnegieendowment.org/2018/11/01/
narendra-­modi-and-­US-india-­relations-pub-­77861.
   4 G. John Ikenberry, ‘From Hegemony to the Balance of Power,’ p. 41.
   5 Ibid.
   6 See Council on Foreign Relations, ‘The United States and India: A Shared Strategic
Future,’ Joint Study Group Report, p.  5 (September 2011): file:///C:/Users/HP/
Downloads/USIndia_jointstudygroup_IIGG%20(1).pdf.
   7 Ibid., p. 6.
   8 Ibid., p. 6.
   9 One such example is the Jadhav case. See ‘Who is Kulbhushan Jadhav?’ Dawn
(April 7, 2017): www.dawn.com/news/1326117.
  10 See Guillem Monsonis, ‘India’s Strategic Autonym and Rapprochement with the
US,’ Strategic Analysis, Vol. 34, No. 4 (July 2010), pp. 611–624.
  11 Alexander Wendt, A Social Theory of International Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1999), p. 235.
  12 Guillem Monsonis, ‘India’s Strategic Autonym and Rapprochement with the US,’
p. 614.
  13 See Stephen P. Cohen, ‘India and America: An Emerging Relationship,’ Conference
Paper (Kyoto, Japan, December 8–10, 2000), pp. 2–10.
  14 See Dinseh Kumar, ‘Defense in Indo-­US Relations,’ Strategic Analysis, Vol.  20,
No. 5 (August 1997), p. 751.
  15 Shahid Latif Bajwa, US Security Cooperation with India and Pakistan: A Com-
parative Study, Master’s thesis (Monterey: Naval Postgraduate School 2013), p. 21.
  16 Arthur Rubinoff, ‘Incompatible Objectives and Short Sighted Policies,’ in Sumit
Ganguly, Brian Shoup, and Andrew Scobell (eds.), US–Indian Strategic Cooperation
into the 21st Century, More than Words (1st edn) (London: Routledge, 2006), p. 43.
66   Indo-US increasing strategic partnership
  17 Shahif Latif Bajwa, US Security Cooperation with India and Pakistan: p. 30.
  18 Feroz Hassan Khan, Eating Grass: The Making of Pakistani Bomb I (Stanford, CA:
Stanford University Press, 2012), p. 120.
  19 Statement by the Indian Representative (Hussain) to the Eighteen Nation Disarma-
ment Committee.
  20 Sharon Squassoni, ‘Looking Back: The 1978 Nuclear Non-­proliferation Act,’ Arms
Control Today (December 2008).
  21 Stephen P. Cohen, ‘India and America: An Emerging Relationship,’ Conference
Paper (Kyoto, Japan, December 8–10, 2000), p. 10.
  22 Nicholas Burns, ‘America’s Strategic Opportunity with India: The New US–India
Partnership, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 86, No. 6 (November 2007), p. 134.
  23 Kate Heinzelman, ‘Towards Common Interests and Responsibilities: The US–India
Civil Nuclear Deal and the International Nonproliferation Regime, Yale Journal of
International Law, Vol. 33, No. 2 (2008), p. 454.
  24 S.C. Res. 1172, 11, UN Doc. S/RES/1172 (June 6, 1998).
  25 Leonard Weiss, ‘US–India Nuclear Cooperation, The Nonproliferation Review,
Vol. 14, No. 3 (November 2007), pp. 432–445.
  26 US Department of State, ‘India–US Relations: Vision for the 21st Century,’ Joint US–
India Statement, Press Release, The White House (March 21, 2000): https://1997-
2001.state.gov/global/human_rights/democracy/fs_000321_us_india.html.
  27 Joint statement by US President Bill Clinton and PM Vajpayee (September 15,
2000).
  28 Quoted in Robert Hathaway, ‘The US–India Courtship: From Clinton to Bush,’
Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 25, No. 4, (2002; online version June 4, 2010), p. 10.
  29 Ibid.
  30 Ibid.
  31 Ibid., p. 11.
  32 Ibid., p. 12.
  33 See quoted in Muhammad Isaque Fani, ‘The Indo-­US Strategic Partnership Post
9/11: Implications for Pakistan,’ Journal Pakistan Vision, Vol.  10, No.  2 (2009),
pp. 132–136.
  34 See Ravi Tomar, ‘India–US Relations in a Changing Strategic Environment,’
Research Paper No. 20 2001–02, Published by the Department of the Parliamentary
Library (2002): www.aph.gov.au/binaries/library/pubs/rp/2001-02/02rp20.pdf.
  35 Ravi Tomar, ‘India–US Relations in a Changing Strategic Environment.’
  36 See Polly Nayak and Michael Krepon, ‘US Crisis Management in South Asia’s
Twin Peaks Crisis,’ Report 57 (2nd edn), (Washington, DC: Stimson Centre, Sep-
tember 2014).
  37 Chinmaya R. Gharekhan, ‘Colin Powell’s Visit,’ The Hindu (October 10, 2001):
www.thehindu.com/thehindu/2001/10/10/stories/05102523.htm.
  38 See Indrani Bagchi, ‘India, US Reaffirm Strategic Partnership,’ Times of India (April
19, 2017): https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/us-­reaffirms-major-­defense-
partner-­status-for-­india/articleshow/58242327.cms.
  39 Victor M. Gobarev, ‘India as a World Power: Changing Washington’s Myopic
Policy,’ CATO Institute Policy Analysis, Vol. 381 (September 11, 2000).
  40 See Fani, ‘The Indo-­US Strategic Partnership Post 9/11.’
  41 Ibid.
  42 Jane Perlez, ‘US ready to end sanctions on India to build alliance,’ New York Times
(August 27, 2001): www.nytimes.com/2001/08/27/world/us-­ready-to-­end-sanctions-­
on-india-­to-build-­alliance.html.
  43 US–India Security Cooperation, Progress and Promise for the Next Administration,
CSIS (October 12, 2016): www.csis.org/events/us-­india-security-­cooperation-
promise-­and-progress-­next-administration.
 Indo-US increasing strategic partnership   67
  44 Ashley Tellis, ‘The US–India Global Partnership: How Significant for Amer­ican
Interests?’ Carnegie Endowment for Peace (November 17, 2005): https://carnegie
endowment.org/2005/11/17/US-­india-global-­partnership-how-­significant-for-­Amer­ican-
interests-­pub-17693.
  45 Nicholas Burns, America’s Strategic Opportunity with India, Foreign Affairs
(November/December 2007), p. 135.
  46 Chidanand Rajghatta, ‘India a Global Power,’ Times of India, May 29, 2005.
  47 Burns, ‘America’s Strategic Opportunity with India,’ p. 136.
  48 Ibid.
  49 See Henry J. Hyde, Unites States–India Peaceful Energy Cooperation Act of 2006,
Pub. L. No. 109–401, tit. I, 120 Stat. 2726.
  50 ‘Agreement Concerning Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy (123 Agreement),
US–India,’ Art. 4, No. 1 (August 3, 2007): www.state.gov/documents/organization/
90157.pdf.
  51 George Perkovich, ‘Faulty Promises,’ Policy Outlook, Carnegie Endowment for
Peace (September 2005), p. 1.
  52 Ibid., p. 2.
  53 Ibid., p. 8.
  54 Ibid.
  55 Hillary Clinton, ‘America’s Pacific Century,’ Foreign Policy (November 2001).
  56 ‘Indian Express,’ (January 26, 2009).
  57 See, for example, Howard Berman, ‘H.R. 7081 (110th): United States–India Nuclear
Cooperation Approval and Nonproliferation Enhancement Act,’ (September 25,
2008): www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/110/hr7081.
  58 Kevin Whitelaw, ‘Obama: US–India “Natural Allies” in the 21st Century,’ National
Public Radio 204 (November 2009).
  59 Zia Mian and M.V. Ramana, ‘Wrong Ends, Means and Needs: Behind the US
Nuclear Deal with India,’ Arms Control Today (January 2006), p. 15.
  60 Ibid.
  61 Ibid.
  62 Mansoor Ahmed, ‘India’s Nuclear Exceptionalism: Fissile Materials, Fuel Cycles
and Safeguards,’ Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard
Kennedy School (May 2017), p. 43.
  63 Ibid.
  64 Department of Defense, Sustaining US Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st
Century Defense (Washington, DC: US Department of Defense, 2012).
  65 See Stephen Burgess, ‘The US Pivot to Asia and Renewal of the US–India Strategic
Partnership,’ Comparative Strategy, pp. 367–379 (see p. 368).
  66 Sustaining US Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense, p. 2.
  67 Jaskara Teja, ‘United States–India: Enhancing a Strategic Partnership,’ Amer­ican
Foreign Policy, Vol. 36, No. 3 (2014), p. 190.
  68 Ibid.
  69 Ibid.
  70 Andrea Shalal-­Esa, ‘US eyes co-­development of anti-­tank missile with India,’
Reuters (September 19, 2013).
  71 ‘Indian, US navy ships conduct joint exercise,’ The Times of India (March 27,
2018): https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/indian-­us-navy-­ships-conduct-­joint-
exercise/articleshow/63476670.cms.
  72 Lalit K. Jha. ‘US Working on Giving India Access for Defense Technology: Carter,’
Press Trust of India (September 16, 2013).
  73 ‘Modi–Trump White House meeting: Full text of joint statement issued by India and
US,’ The Indian Express (June 2017): http://indianexpress.com/article/india/pm-­
narendra-modi-­donald-trump-­white-house-­meeting-full-­text-of-­joint-statement-­
issued-by-­india-and-­us-4723844/.
68   Indo-US increasing strategic partnership
  74 Ibid.
  75 Joshua White, ‘What’s next for US–India defense ties?’ Business Line (August 1,
2017): www.thehindubusinessline.com/opinion/whats-­next-for-­usindia-defense-­ties/
article9797379.ece.
  76 The Times of India, ‘Trump Supports India’s Permanent Membership,’ (June 27,
2017): https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/trump-­supports-indias-­permanent-
membership-­of-unsc/articleshow/59335826.cms.
  77 ‘Remarks by President Trump and Prime Minister Modi of India in Joint Press State-
ment,’ The White House (June 26, 2017): www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-­statements/
remarks-­president-trump-­prime-minister-­modi-india-­joint-press-­statement/.
  78 The Economic Times, ‘Trump administration wants to take Indo-­US ties to next
level: Nikki Haley,’ (June 28, 2018): https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/
politics-­and-nation/trump-­administration-wants-­to-take-­indo-us-­ties-to-­next-level-­
nikki-haley/articleshow/64783081.cms.
  79 Ibid.
  80 Ibid.
  81 Ashton Carter, ‘India–US defense relationship “strategic handshake,” ’ The Eco-
nomic Times (July 12, 2018).
  82 Ankit Panda, ‘India, US Sign Logistics Exchange Agreement: What You Need to
Know,’ The Diplomat (August 30, 2016): https://thediplomat.com/2016/08/india-­us-
sign-­logistics-exchange-­agreement-what-­you-need-­to-know/.
  83 ‘India & US sign COMCASA, Pompeo says no decision on S400,’ The Economic
Times (September 6, 2018): https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/
india-­and-us-­sign-military-­communication-pact/articleshow/65700604.cms.
  84 Rizwana Abbasi, ‘Emerging Security Trends and Legitimacy of the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Regime,’ Strategic Studies, Vol.  34, No.  2&3 (Summer & Autumn
2014): http://issi.org.pk/wp-­content/uploads/2015/12/4-Rizwana_Abbasi__34_SS_23_
2014.pdf.
  85 See Daryl Kimball and Kingston Reif, ‘The US Atomic Energy Act Session 123 at a
Glance,’ Arms Control Today, updated (July 25, 2018): www.armscontrol.org/
factsheets/AEASection123.
  86 Annual report on progress toward regional non-­proliferation under section 601 (a) of
the Foreign Assistance Act.
  87 Zamir Akram is a Former Ambassador of Pakistan and Advisor to the Strategic
Plans Division.
  88 Mansoor Ahmed, ‘India’s Nuclear Exceptionalism,’ p. 44.
  89 ‘The Treaty on the Non-­Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT),’ Department for
Disarmament Affairs, United Nations (2000): http://disarmament.un.org/wmd/npt/
npttext.html.
  90 Quoted in Leonard Weiss, ‘US–India Nuclear Cooperation,’ p. 438.
  91 Ibid.
  92 Ibid., p. 440.
  93 Sumit Ganguly and Devin T. Hagerty, Fearful Symmetry: India and Pakistan Crises
in the Shadow of Nuclear Weapons (Washington, DC: University of Washington
Press, new edition (June 27, 2006), p. 197.
  94 See Andrea Viski, ‘The Revised Nuclear Suppliers Group Guidelines: A European
Union Perspective,’ EU–Non-­Proliferation Consortium: Non-­Proliferation Papers,
No. 15 (May 2012).
  95 Ibid.
  96 See ‘US to support India’s full membership in NSG,’ Times of India (November 26,
2010).
  97 Public Statement: Plenary Meeting of the Nuclear Suppliers Group, Seoul, Republic
of Korea (June 23–24, 2016): www.nsg-­online.org/images/2016_Public_Statement_
Final.pdf.
 Indo-US increasing strategic partnership   69
  98 Daryl G. Kimball, ‘NSG membership proposal would undermine nonproliferation,’
Arms Control Today (December 21, 2016): www.armscontrol.org/blog/ArmsControl-
Now/2016–12–21/NSG-­Membership-Proposal-­Would-Undermine-­Nonproliferation.
  99 See further details here: Rizwana Abbasi, ‘Addressing Nuclear Non-­Proliferation
and Disarmament Challenges in South Asia,’ E-­IR (January 6, 2018): www.e-­ir.
info/2018/01/06/addressing-­nuclear-non-­proliferation-and-­disarmament-challenges-­
in-south-­asia/.
100 Ibid.
101 Anwar Iqbal, ‘Formula for new NSG members leaves Pakistan out: US Group,’
Dawn (December 28, 2016).
102 IAEA, ‘India’s Additional Protocol Enters into Force,’ (July 25, 2014): www.iaea.
org/newscenter/news/indias-­additional-protocol-­enters-force.
103 Express Tribune, ‘Pakistan offers India moratorium on nuclear tests,’ (August 17, 2016):
https://tribune.com.pk/story/1164259/pakistan-­offers-india-­moratorium-nuclear-­tests/.
104 Authors’ interview with Zamir Akram.
105 Authors’ interview with Tasneem Aslam.
3 India’s evolving nuclear strategy
under the essentials of its
minimum deterrence
Limitations and challenges

Introduction
The evolving dynamics of the security dilemma entail that, like India, every state
possessing nuclear weapons practices certain types of nuclear strategies to ensure
its security, though ambiguous these nuclear strategies could be. Arguably, the
element of ambiguity exists in every nuclear weapons state’s nuclear strategy,
whether or not it is officially declared. It is a strategy, small or grand, that assists
the state ‘to coordinate and direct all the resources of a nation toward the attain-
ment of the political objective of the war.’1 After nearly two decades of nucleari-
zation in South Asia since the May 1998 nuclear tests, India’s nuclear strategy
appears to be evolving and becoming dynamic compared to what India concep-
tualized in its earlier 1999 and 2003 DND. Similarly, India’s existing DND
remains open for interpretation and more modifications as the Indian internal
debate on restructuring India’s nuclear strategy begins to influence and tempt
Indian security leadership into carrying out the first preemptive strike on Paki-
stani nuclear forces without even provoking Pakistan into using its nuclear
weapons first.2 Therefore, such modifications may include changes in its core
nuclear doctrinal elements, such as (a) the possible modifications from an NFU
to a First Use (FU) nuclear option, (b) the reconsideration of credible minimum
deterrence, and (c) massive retaliation.3 That said, one senior Pakistani military
official mentioned that, ‘India’s broader nuclear strategy may aim for displaying
its power projection, acquiring a bigger number of nuclear forces, and competing
with its adversaries in the Southern Asian region.’4 Similarly, India has been
developing its deterrent forces and increasing the ranges of their delivery
systems. A Pakistani diplomat, Tasneem Aslam, argues that this is for at least
two major reasons: (1) its aspiration for the status of a global power, and (2) its
struggle for power maximization not to be bogged down by the smaller powers
in the broader Southern Asian region.5
It seems apparent that India plans for a counterforce preemptive strike
strategy against Pakistani nuclear forces before they are used against India as
part of its growing flexible response nuclear strategy.6 This could be a dramatic
shift in its DND, affecting the development of India’s nuclear forces in general
and the nuclear strategy of its adversary in particular. For example, when it
 India’s evolving nuclear strategy   71
comes to India’s conventional and nuclear forces advancement, Devin T.
Hagerty, on the evolving nature of India’s nuclear strategy, argues that,

the Indian strategic-­scientific community has ambitious plans for a robust

triad of nuclear forces, consisting of land-­based ballistic missiles, fighter-­
bomber aircraft, and SLBMs, as well as a sufficiently effective command
and control system to ensure the safety and security, and responsiveness of
the weapons.7

In addition to this, India’s nuclear strategy potentially aims for the development
of the BMD system, ICBMs, MIRVs, nuclear-­powered submarines, aircraft
carriers, and a number of nuclear reactors to be able to produce more fissile
materials. India may require to use these materials for both peaceful and military
purposes. Also, it attempts to secure the NSG membership that was created after
India’s nuclear test in 1974. India attempts to acquire nuclear legitimacy without
losing or compromising on its nuclear deterrent forces. Apparently, these initi-
atives are ambitious and largely shrouded in an element of ambiguity that ‘casts
New Delhi’s trajectory as analogous to the ruinous one followed by the super-
powers during the Cold War.’8 This doctrinal reassessment is ‘regional centric,
seemingly planned to gain regional influence with the intention of acquiring a
great power status.’9 Furthermore, the evolving modification takes India in ‘a
more assertive direction.’10 Vipin Narang also dispelled at least five elements of
India’s evolving nuclear strategy as myth and concluded that ‘despite the atten-
tion paid to Pakistan, it may actually be India that triggers a South Asian arms
race.’11 That being said, it illustrates that India’s deterrent force posture, as part
of its evolving nuclear strategy, makes India a greedy state that is more assertive,
aspiring for a great power status and security maximization, thereby hedging
against both China and Pakistan. India’s status-­driven ambitions lead to the cre-
ation of an unresolvable security dilemma in the South Asian region, thereby
making it less secure and creating an unintended complexity for India.
Therefore, the questions arise: does India’s ambitious nuclear force posture
reflect a shift in India’s evolving nuclear strategy? Do the doctrinal shifts remain
consistent with the minimum deterrence India conceptualized in its previous
DNDs? How could this trigger the vicious circle of the security dilemma in
South Asia? Arguably, India’s evolving nuclear strategy shapes India’s ‘concep-
tual road map’12 for achieving a great power status and security maximization in
the Southern Asian region as part of its grand strategy, and more importantly for
a counterforce targeting strategy that is currently debated both in the West and in
India.13 For example, after carefully surveying the available evidence in the
existing literature, Clary and Narang argued that, ‘India may be developing
options towards Pakistan that would permit it to engage in hard nuclear counter-
force targeting, providing India a limited ability to disarm Pakistan of strategic
nuclear weapons.’14 In doing so, if India really opts for a decapitating first strike
against Pakistani nuclear forces, as the debate continues to be in and out of India,
then this in turn makes India more assertive in its policy direction against its
72   India’s evolving nuclear strategy
potential adversaries without learning credible lessons from the Cold War when
neither the Soviet Union nor the US materialized their first strike capabilities
against each other, despite both possessing the capabilities. This was because of
the fact that it was not guaranteed whether or not the Cold War superpowers
possessing thousands of nuclear weapons could kill all the targets at a place and
time of their choosing. Even the US could not go for the first strike during both
its nuclear monopoly years and the classic Cuban Missiles crisis because of the
similar guarantee issue and, more importantly, the logic of mutual vulnerabilities
emanating from the nuclear revolution.15 Therefore, it is extremely speculative
and highly questionable how India, with its ‘counterforce temptation,’ could
really preempt all of the Pakistani nuclear forces in one go without even risking
a full-­fledged nuclear war that could endanger India’s vulnerabilities with its
BMD and see its sophisticated air defense defeated. There are several seminal
readings in the existing literature that discuss India’s evolving nuclear policy.16
These key readings convey the argument on India’s nuclear development
program and add to the existing vocabulary of the nuclear politics of South Asia.
Nevertheless, many of them do not substantially conceptualize why India gradu-
ally brings modifications to its DND and how this emerging shift in its DND
affects its broader nuclear policy of minimum deterrence in general and South
Asian deterrence stability in particular. That being noted, this chapter conceptu-
alizes the rationale of India’s evolving nuclear strategy under the conceptual ele-
ments of minimum deterrence. It illustrates how this creates more challenges for
India and affects the strategic policies of its adversaries in the Southern Asian
region under the rubric of an increasing security dilemma.

The rationale of India’s evolving nuclear strategy

With India’s bigger investment in acquiring advanced conventional forces, one
might presume that eventually India could reduce its reliance on nuclear
weapons. This nuclear learning can partially be deduced from the 2010 US NPR
when the US State Department indicated to reduce the Cold War-­type reliance
on nuclear weapons despite the strong pledges to continue to keep nuclear
weapons ‘as long as nuclear weapons exist.’17 The similar stance on nuclear
weapons reliance, however this time with much more focus on both strategic and
non-­strategic nuclear forces, makes the 2018 US NPR more ambitious and while
affecting the policies of other nuclear weapons states, which could include India
with whom it is likely to further develop its strategic partnership.18 However,
one is not completely sure if the 2018 US NPR would bolster US President
Obama’s legacy on reducing the role of nuclear weapons in US defense and
foreign policy. It seems unlikely. However, this learning may not be practiced
by the Indian security leadership, at least not at this juncture, when the Indian
security leadership desires to achieve nuclear effectiveness and efficiency in its
deterrence force posture, which includes the long-­range missiles ICBMs,
MIRVs, BMD, short-­range non-­strategic weapons, aircraft carriers, and a
number of credible SSBN. This can be a path towards its grand nuclear strategy,
 India’s evolving nuclear strategy   73
embarking upon sufficiency while further undermining the essentials of
minimum deterrence that India conceptualized earlier, since its nuclear weapons
tests in 1998.19 To develop a framework for its evolving nuclear strategy, India
would continue to retain a flexible response by maintaining advanced nuclear
and conventional forces. In this context, Zafar Iqbal Jaspal, on the immense
transformation with regard to India’s doctrinal posture, argues that, ‘India
appears to be striving for a flexible response nuclear strategy, like the US prac-
ticed during the Cold War period against the Soviet Union.’20 India may also
assert in its policy paper and DND that India could retain nuclear weapons as
long as nuclear weapons exist and while others continue to retain nuclear
weapons. Also, India may not substantially join the broader non-­proliferation
initiatives unless India sees the process become non-­discriminatory and univer-
sally accepted, which, in turn, could allow India to become part of, say, the NPT
without compromising on losing the credibility of its nuclear forces. India no
longer openly views the NPT as a discriminatory treaty. This is due to the fact
that India has already been offered incentives by the NPT states through the
NSG waiver packages as discussed in the previous chapter. This could be India’s
greater assertion for major shifts in its evolving nuclear strategy. Conceptually,
such a restructuring of India’s nuclear strategy could have the following essen-
tial elements, but each of these elements may have its own limitations, which
could undermine India’s broader nuclear policy of minimum deterrence that it
earlier conceived.

Shaping India’s draft nuclear doctrine: a counterforce strategy

The rationale for India’s DND, which it conceptualized in 1999, can be (1) India
is a democracy; (2) India desires to reassure its public and international audience
about its nuclear doctrine; (3) it is a rational state that likes to strengthen its insti-
tutions; and (4) it would like to establish its role as a responsible nuclear state
that would pursue confidence-­building measures in the South Asian region.21
The DND in 1999 mentioned three major ingredients that depicted India’s essen-
tials of its nuclear doctrinal posture. The first, India will pursue the policy of
‘credible minimum deterrence.’ Second, any nuclear attack on India and its
forces shall result in ‘punitive retaliation’ with nuclear weapons to inflict unac-
ceptable damage to the aggressor. And third, India will not be the first to initiate
a nuclear strike (No-­First Use).22 In 2003, India modified its DND by adding
some changes, more particularly to its retaliatory strategy where it added the
word ‘massive,’ which could have a different interpretation and contextualiza-
tion for its adversaries. The modifications dramatically brought changes when it
comes to the use of nuclear force. That is, India would use its nuclear weapons if
Indian forces are attacked ‘anywhere with chemical and biological weapons.’23
How India would actually use its nuclear force could be perceived differently on
different strategic contexts, especially when Indian forces are attacked anywhere
in the world. This needs more elaboration in India’s modified DND. The dra-
matic changes in 2003 and the possible modifications on its draft policy make
74   India’s evolving nuclear strategy
India’s official document more ambiguous and open for interpretation.24 Does
this reflect India’s motivation for crafting a grand strategy for a flexible response
strategy that could primarily focus on a counterforce strategy? This could be
declared official nuclear documentation, yet limitations and challenges would
continue to be part of India’s evolving nuclear strategy. In order to understand
this further, it is unpacked in the subsequent sections.
First, it is not clear when it comes to credible minimum deterrence. Indian
official statements on minimum deterrence depict that minimum deterrence is a
dynamic rather than a static term that cannot be fully defined. It could change in
accordance with a changed strategic environment.25 The intentional ambiguity in
DND with regard to its minimum deterrence policy gradually drags India away
from defining how many nuclear forces, along with their delivery systems, India
would require. According to Lt. General Naeem Khalid Lodhi (retd),

it is largely presumed that what is the minimum against China cannot be the
minimum against Pakistan. India has already crossed the perceived bar of
minimum deterrence, though minimum in real terms cannot be quantified,
as Indian security leadership still continues to maintain.26

This intentional and calculated ambiguity could best serve India’s evolving nuclear
strategy as it could develop the ability to produce more fissile material that can
provide India with an opportunity to increase the number of its nuclear forces it
potentially desires to build, which could include a number of nuclear-­powered sub-
marines and ICBMs with increased ranges and multiple warheads. Arguably, these
deterrent forces would require India to produce more fissile material through build-
ing many unsafeguarded nuclear reactors that, in turn, may violate the principles of
the IAEA.27 These credible sources elaborate that India gradually drifts away from
the minimum deterrence it earlier conceptualized in the 1999 and 2003 policy
drafts. Will India officially shift away from its declared undefined nuclear policy
of minimum deterrence when it comes to its evolving nuclear strategy?
Second, India’s NFU nuclear option also remains ambiguous; Pakistan has
already rejected the offer India proposed more than a decade ago. There has been
a long debate in India whether or not India continues to sustain its official stance
on the NFU. Until recently, there has been no official declaratory statement to
the effect that India will eventually be departing from such a nuclear-­use option.
On the one hand, Pakistan’s Ambassador Riaz Muhammad Khan confirms this
by arguing:

I have not seen a formal shift but only suggestions in innuendoes. This is
part of a bluster and blame game which must be avoided by every nuclear
weapons state. In my view older/mature nuclear weapons states do not
indulge in such irresponsible rhetoric, which does not mean that they do not
improvise their nuclear arsenals or show restraint in the development of
their nuclear programs. This is evident in the scuttling of the INF. China is
also modernizing its arsenals, but quietly.28
 India’s evolving nuclear strategy   75
But, on the other hand, Pakistani diplomat Tasneem Aslam presumes that,

When it comes to India’s nuclear doctrinal posture of NFU, it appears that

they are not serious about to strictly follow what they declare. It is not a
blanket term. There has been a consistent debate that India is rather moving
away from this traditional doctrinal stance for a more aggressive preemptive
strike posture – that is, it would not allow Pakistan to use its nuclear
weapons first against India.29

Nevertheless, Indian civilian leadership still remains committed to the option of

NFU that remains consistent with its policy of minimum deterrence, crafted
earlier. However, two plausible accounts may contradict what the Indian civilian
leadership could continue to insist. First, India’s CSD prepares India to wage a
limited war and conduct surgical strikes against parts of Pakistan in the shortest
possible time.30 This takes India away from the principles of the NFU option
because the CSD could include the use of India’s short-­range tactical nuclear
weapons supporting India to strike first before it itself is hit. Prahaar, Nirbhay,
and BrahMos are ideal short-­range missile variants that could be used for
carrying tactical nuclear warheads if and when DRDO expands to miniaturize its
nuclear warheads.31 Zafar Iqbal Cheema confirms this by stating that, ‘given the
internal debate regarding considerable changes with regard to India’s doctrinal
posture, India might integrate the use of its tactical nuclear weapons and coun-
terforce preemptive strikes against its potential adversaries in its modified
DND.’32 This becomes escalatory, which, in turn, immensely increases the
chances of miscalculation and inadvertent war in South Asia.
Second, Shivshankar Menon, who served as a National Security Adviser to
the Indian Prime Minister from 2010–2014, revealed the insider account of the
Indian leadership, which could develop the thinking to drift away from India’s
draft policy on the NFU toward a preemptive strike against Pakistani nuclear
forces while urging India to use its nuclear weapons first.33 An increasing
number of nuclear forces, and the acquisition of advanced conventional forces
bolstered by the shift in the NFU option, make India more assertive in South
Asia. If Indian civilian leadership actually declares and shifts for the counter-
force preemptive strike capability, it may trigger a major arms race in South
Asia. In doing this, it may not remain consistent with what India conceptualized
in its previous nuclear policy drafts. This inconsistency could add more ambigu-
ity in India’s evolving nuclear strategy.
Third, the shift from a ‘punitive’ to a ‘massive’ retaliation strategy in its DND
makes India assertive in the making of its nuclear strategy. Although massive
retaliation may presumably be different from the classic Cold War US nuclear
strategy during Eisenhower’s leadership, India appears to follow what the US
initially practiced when it comes to initial nuclear choices before the US nuclear
leadership. The question is whether India’s nuclear strategy of massive retali-
ation is realistic when it comes to the evolving South Asian strategic environ-
ment. Pakistan former Ambassador Zamir Akram argues that, ‘India’s nuclear
76   India’s evolving nuclear strategy
strategy of massive retaliation remains irrational and therefore challenging for
India in general and deterrence stability of South Asia in particular.’ He further
points out that, ‘it remains nonsensical if India says that it would retaliate mas-
sively, say, if Pakistan uses its battlefield weapons in the wake of the deploy-
ment and use of CSD against Pakistan.’ While comparing the massive retaliation
with India’s nuclear policy of minimum deterrence, Zamir Akram concurs that,
‘massive retaliation remains inconsistent with the minimum deterrence India
declared earlier because it would require India to develop many nuclear war-
heads and delivery systems.’34
Concurrently, India’s nuclear strategy, based on massive retaliation, can draw
two plausible assessments. The first, India’s nuclear strategy pursuing massive
retaliation contradicts India’s earlier conceptualized principles of minimum deter-
rence. This, in turn, may not become consistent with the minimum deterrence India
still officially declares because of its ambitious evolving nuclear strategy. The
second, a massive retaliatory strategy depicts that India would absorb and survive
the first strike before it could strike back massively. To strike back with massive
retaliation, India would require a bigger number of nuclear forces supported by the
sophisticated delivery systems that India currently aims to acquire since it could
face a lot of limitations when it comes to its conventional force posture vis-­à-vis
Pakistan.35 Potentially, India could continue to keep its quest for modernized and
advanced deterrent forces in South Asia in order to gain greater power state status
and play a bigger role in the broader Asia-­Pacific region.

The quest for modernized and advanced deterrent forces

India’s modified DND may provide a foundation for a perceived shift in its
evolving nuclear strategy in such a way that, in turn, could best serve India not
only to adopt a flexible approach to shaping its nuclear strategy, but also enable
India to acquire advanced deterrent forces. One of the rationales of India’s
evolving nuclear strategy includes India’s desire to acquire modernized and
advanced deterrent forces to meet robustly its political and military objectives in
South Asia while offsetting the strategic frustration it confronted in a number of
India–Pakistan crises.36 First, it is important to assess how India’s quest for mod-
ernized and advanced deterrent forces shapes its nuclear strategy for more modi-
fications and keeps its DND open for interpretation. As India’s DND becomes
open for debate and prone to consistent changes, this could provide India with an
opportunity to acquire advanced deterrent forces and sophisticated delivery
systems. In doing so, India is gradually drifting away from the essentials of
minimum deterrence that the Indian civilian leadership earlier conceptualized in
their earlier DNDs.

The BMD system: sword and shield

India has long been trying to acquire its BMD system, inspired by the US Stra-
tegic Defense Initiative (SDI).37 The growing strategic partnership with the
 India’s evolving nuclear strategy   77
developed states, such as the US and Israel, that accounts for billions of US
dollars could enable India to develop measures for the ‘comprehensive defense
system’ it desires as part of its broader plans for developing new technologies
comprising both nuclear and conventional deterrent forces. Presently, India, with
its two renowned BMD systems (i.e., the Prithvi Air Defense and the Ashwin
Advanced Air Defense) aim to protect only two major cities: New Delhi where
the Indian civilian leadership sits, and Mumbai which is considered one of the
potential and significant hubs for India’s economic development. Once India
completes these two types of BMD systems, it intends to broaden the deployed
defenses, aiming at ‘enhanced air defense capability’ that could cover a wider
part of its territory, population centers, and strategic assets.38
India could make plausible inroads for developing the BMD system. (1) India’s
security leadership, largely guided by India’s Defense Research and Develop-
ment Program, could make a conceivable rationale for its BMD system in that
this system remains deployed and capable of intercepting incoming missiles.
(2) India may perceive that this system is defensive in nature and that it would
encourage its adversaries to engage in arms control initiatives in South Asia.
One of the proponents of India’s BMD system, Ashley Tellis, presumed that the
Indian deployed defense system could produce incentives for strategic stability
and the counter-­proliferation of the ballistic missile race in South Asia.39
(3) Others may think that it could offset Pakistan’s asymmetric strategy, that is,
the option to use nuclear weapons first.40 (4) This could reduce if not completely
eliminate, the eventuality of terrorist attacks on India.41 However, the develop-
ment and deployment of India’s BMD system could have far-­reaching intended
and unintended strategic consequences. It may increase demand for Pakistan’s
nuclear warheads and delivery systems. For example, it could trigger a new arms
race and this, in turn, could make Pakistan produce effective countermeasures in
order to defeat the deployed system. This makes the BMD system in South Asia
expensive and ineffective, bolstered with a false sense of security particularly
against the production of effective countermeasures in the new era of technolo-
gical shift,42 thereby making war more likely and intensifying the severity of the
security dilemma in South Asia. Ambassador Zamir Akram confirms this with
what we argue in this volume by saying:

India believes that it can eliminate Pakistani deterrence forces with its so-­
called preemptive strikes and later can protect India with its BMD system.
However, it will be irrational for India to carry out such attacks given the
credible, better mobilized, dispersed, and survivable Pakistani deterrent forces.
Since it is not guaranteed for India to eliminate all of Pakistan’s deterrent
forces, India would unnecessarily risk a nuclear war in South Asia.43

MIRVing: the shift for a sophisticated delivery system

In addition to the BMD system, India is also embarking on yet another technolo-
gical shift, that is, MIRVing as part of its quest for a modernized deterrent force
78   India’s evolving nuclear strategy
capability. MIRV technology provides India with the incentive for acquiring a
sophisticated delivery system to strike multiple targets in one credible shot.
MIRVing is different from MRVs in terms of hitting the targets. Technically,
MRVs can be used against soft targets and aim to hit the targets at in concen-
trated forms. While MIRVs are much more sophisticated and are used for coun-
terforce multiple hard targeting. These have the capability to hit various targets
independently.44 The rationale for India to develop MIRV technology could
consist of multiple elements, which could include both external and internal
factors. External factors may include China’s development of the MIRV and its
anti-­ballistic missile system. Also, India enhances its counterforce targeting
strategy whereby India may preempt the adversaries’ targets before they are even
used against India. The internal factors may include technological and organiza-
tional importance against the civilian government.45 The new technologies, such
as the BMD and MIRVing sophisticated technological systems, take India away
from the minimum deterrence depicted in its earlier DNDs. This, in turn, brings
a major shift in India’s nuclear strategy for punitive action, which provides India
with a strategic incentive to strike first.
As part of its nuclear strategy, there are clear evidences in the form of Indian
official public statements that India is striving hard for MIRV technology devel-
opment. India has been developing the capability to MIRV both SLBMs and
long-­range ballistic missiles of the Agni series. For instance, Avinash Chander,
former Director General DRDO, stated in 2007 that the, ‘[Agni variant] would
be a multiple warhead missile with a capacity to carry four to 12 warheads.’46 A
few months later, V.K. Saraswat, who also held a similar position, emphasized
the similar need for MIRV technology and that India is working on it. While
presenting a rationale for MIRV development, Saraswat stated, ‘Adversaries will
… acquire missile defense, so our future missile should counter the threat of
interception.’47 As India progresses in its Agni series of long-­range missile
development in terms of their payloads and ranges, India certainly looks for sup-
plying the MIRV technology into these long-­range missiles such that they are
capable of hitting distant counterforce targets located in Pakistan and China.48
Technological advancement matters much for India, which, in turn, pushes the
strategic balance and escalation dominance in its favor. In 2017, the Indian
Space Research Organization (ISRO) successfully launched more than 100 satel-
lites into space in one go.49 This demonstrates India’s capability to develop and
deploy MIRV technology for most of its medium- and long-­range ballistic mis-
siles in the near future. Along with the land-­based Agni variant for long range
ballistic missiles, India plans to develop the payload ranges and multiplicity of
its SLBM K-­series missiles for its nuclear submarines.50 These strategies, based
on power accumulation and modernization plans, reflect India’s offensive and
ambitious designs that have driven this region into intense fear, uncertainty, and
warlike situations, thereby making both India and Pakistan less secure in a new
era of counterforce targeting technology.
 India’s evolving nuclear strategy   79
Nuclear-­powered submarine – capability-­based modernization
As part of new technology introduction in South Asia, the nuclear submarine in
the murky waters of the Indian Ocean becomes yet another landmark strategic
endeavor by India, aimed at increasing its deterrence credibility both for maxi-
mizing its security and for power-­projection purposes in the South Asian region
and beyond.51 Other aims for this type of technological deterrent development,
according to India’s maritime strategy of 1999, could include the safety and
security of Indian maritime interests against a surprise attack, to deter Pakistan
from escalating the conflict into a full-­scale war and to win the war convinc-
ingly.52 Very recently, Larry Pressler, who represented South Dakota in the
Senate from 1979 to 1996, recommended building the Indian nuclear submarine
against the rise of China. In his book, Pressler stated ambitiously,

we can send China a devastating message by strengthening the Indian Navy.

An Indian Navy that has the capability of delivering nuclear weapons would
cause China great concern. In fact, if we actually outfitted the Indian Navy
with nuclear weapons, China might back down from its antagonistic stance
in the region.53

The development of the nuclear triad remains a part of India’s DND of 1999,
though the history for developing the nuclear submarine goes back to the late
1980s with the help of Russia.54 Three years after the launch of India’s first indi-
genous nuclear-­powered submarine in 2009, Pakistan followed suit to inaugurate
the headquarters of the Naval Strategic Force Command in 2012, vowing to
build its own nuclear submarine to offset such a technological imbalance
between India and Pakistan.55 Similarly, Khalid Banuri also argues regarding the
implications of India’s increasing attempts for the nuclearization of the Indian
Ocean:

The presence of a blue water navy in the Indian Ocean and beyond would
imply India’s ready potential for a naval blockade in the times of crisis. On
the other hand, the increasing attention to the sea leg of the Indian triad
would tend to affect the Pakistan–India nuclear threshold negatively. Paki-
stan would be forced to take the Indian naval capability, its enhancing
variety of nuclear weapons and delivery systems etc. into its strategic
calculus to ensure the credibility of its nuclear deterrent.56

After many years, involving several trials and accidents that occurred in the
process of the development of a nuclear submarine, India has recently commis-
sioned its first indigenous INS Arihant nuclear-­powered submarine under the
Advanced Technology Vessel (ATV). The introduction of new technology,
including that of a nuclear-­powered submarine, further nuclearizes the Indian
Ocean region. Moreover, it accelerates a security dilemma between India and
Pakistan in South Asia.57 Open sources indicate that India could develop from
80   India’s evolving nuclear strategy
three to six nuclear-­powered submarines.58 It has become the first South Asian
nuclear state to join the established club of five nuclear weapons states that have
already developed and deployed their nuclear submarines. In the new era of
counterforce targeting technology, the intention for developing more nuclear
submarines with increased ranges of SLBMs could be India’s aspiration for great
power projection and security maximization against Pakistan in general and
China in particular. In doing so, this becomes inconsistent with the minimum
deterrence India earlier declared. However, when it comes to India’s maritime
strategy, it is not clear what command and control structure India will pursue for
its deployed nuclear submarines with a number of warheads in them.

The next-­generation aircraft carrier: marching toward innovative

technology acquisition
India plans to develop an aircraft carrier based on cutting-­edge technology in the
wake of its growing strategic partnership with the US. Since the 2005 US–Indian
Civilian Nuclear Cooperation agreement, Ashley Tellis proposes that the US and
India will have the next big idea, that is, the joint construction of a next genera-
tion of aircraft carrier for India.59 Tellis convincingly proposes that,

No country today possesses the technical capacity to design and build air-
craft carriers like the United States. And no country today would profit as
much from collaborating with the United States in carrier design and con-
struction as India at a time when its local dominance in the Indian Ocean is
on the cusp of challenges from China … that commissioned its first aircraft
carrier in 2012.60

This reflects the urge for India to enhance its strategic partnership with the US,
in terms of co-­development and co-­production, which could also include the
construction of India’s next-­generation aircraft carrier, expected to be much
higher and more efficient than its counterpart China’s aircraft carrier. Current
international conditions enable India to maximize its larger interests by acquir-
ing and inducting new technologies, as part of its broader deterrence force
framework, in disregard of how other states perceive or react.
The growing strategic partnership with the US in building a next-­generation
aircraft carrier could include (a) the flight function more particularly equipping
India’s carrier with the electromagnetic aircraft launch system (EMALS) and
providing access to various advanced aviation systems such as the US Navy’s
E-­2C/D Hawkeye for airborne early warning and battle management. Also, this
could include the lighter fifth-­generation F-­35C strike fighter; (b) the move func-
tion could allow the US to provide India with nuclear propulsion technology to
make EMALS a viable option for India’s next-­generation aircraft carrier. To be
sure, this innovative EMALS technology for the Indian aircraft carrier could
boost up its efficiency and flexibility by successfully carrying out its mission
in  the Indian Ocean; and (c) the integrate function includes co-­production and
 India’s evolving nuclear strategy   81
co-­design for India’s next-­generation aircraft carrier. Also, this would include
the facilitation of US shipyard companies/industries to impart and incorporate
advanced construction techniques in helping India build its own large deck
carriers.61
The construction of a next-­generation aircraft carrier makes a couple of
rationales for India. First, India would like to catch up with China in such a
superior shipping construction race. India wishes to excel China in making a
next aircraft carrier much more technically advanced and superior to what China
has recently launched its Liaoning aircraft carrier. India’s next-­generation air-
craft carrier could have the capacity to hold 50 aircraft, 35 strike fighters, three
airborne early warning platforms, eight ASW and utility helicopters and four
support aircraft, aerial tankers, or electronic warfare (EW) platforms.62 Second,
it would like to make a stronger case in its strategic favor against the rise of
China as part of the US Pivot to Asia strategy. India’s growing strategic partner-
ship with the US assists India in not only crafting a vibrant nuclear strategy, but
also assisting the US by balancing to contain the spread of China in the Indian
Ocean. In this context, with the development and deployment of nuclear sub-
marines and technologically advanced aircraft carriers, India could be able to
achieve its desired strategic goals. Khalid Banuri stated that,

The technological developments relating to Indian nuclear weapons and

delivery systems have led to a variety of weapons related options – various
types of missiles, increasing ranges, canisterization, sub-­surface weapons,
submarine-­launched weapons, etc. – such developments point at technology
driving the Indian nuclear doctrine, rather than the other way around.63

Third, the development of a next-­generation aircraft carrier enables India to

support its gunboat diplomacy and power projection. Also, this makes India realize
the strategic significance of the Indian Ocean. For example, Indian Prime Minister
Narendra Modi stated in his speech in Mauritius, ‘India is becoming more integ-
rated globally. We will be more dependent than before on the ocean and the sur-
rounding regions … so the Indian Ocean region is at the top of our policy
priorities.’64 Resultantly, all these significant new technological advancements by
India not only make India’s evolving nuclear strategy inconsistent with what it
earlier discussed in its 1999 and 2003 policy drafts, but also pull Pakistan into an
intensified security dilemma and arms race, almost to the point of exhaustion.

Exhausting Pakistan in the bigger arms race: the action–reaction

paradigm in practice
While closely conceptualizing India’s nuclear strategy and the introduction of
innovative technology in its deterrence forces, it becomes important to understand
India’s broader strategy for exhausting Pakistan in the vicious cycle of a security
dilemma, which Pakistan largely may perceive could become one of India’s evolv-
ing rationales of a nuclear strategy. Islamabad believes and considers in national
82   India’s evolving nuclear strategy
and international forums that it is India that tested nuclear weapons first in 1974
and later in May 1998, which compelled Pakistan to follow suit. Zafar Iqbal
Cheema argued, ‘had India not chosen to go nuclear, Pakistan would not neces-
sarily follow suit.’65 Therefore, based on the action–reaction strategic paradigm,
Pakistan’s nuclear development program becomes security oriented and India-­
centric. It may not have the ambition for power projection in South Asia. For many
in Pakistan, it is India’s progress for advancing and modernizing its deterrent
forces that pulls Pakistan into an arms race, which, in turn, makes Pakistan produce
cost-­effective countermeasures vis-­à-vis its adversary. India is good at crafting this
strategy and developing certain plausible initiatives to exhaust Pakistan and this
gradually could undermine the credibility of Pakistan’s deterrent forces. In this
context, Tasneem Aslam asserts that, ‘creating holes in Pakistan’s nuclear policy
has been part of India’s evolving nuclear strategy. What Pakistan needs to do is to
plug these deterrence gaps through both conventional and nuclear deterrent forces
development.’66 The fear, uncertainty, and space for war continues to exist between
India and Pakistan. Presumably, India appeared to have strategized on how to
effectively push the strategic balance in its favor in South Asia by embracing
offensive strategies based on new technologies that it is introducing for moderniz-
ing its conventional and nuclear forces.
First, India could justify strategically its case for its deterrent force develop-
ment and modernization, potentially against China and Pakistan. Therefore, it
might need more deterrent forces to effectively deter both. The strides for a
greater number of deterrent forces would become consistent with India’s modi-
fied nuclear strategy of massive retaliation, though ambiguous this could be.
This strategic approach enables India to craft strategies by enhancing its strategic
partnership with developed states by acquiring advanced and modernized deter-
rent forces technology and their related facilities. Nevertheless, the limitation to
this motivation is that it puts India into a strategic dilemma to further complicate
the strategic environment, that is, it will be hard for India to define whether or
not its minimum deterrence against China will still be minimum against Paki-
stan.67 In this context, Pakistan could opt for certain plausible options: (a) to
produce countermeasures for weapon-­to-weapon against those that India
develops and, therefore, gets pulled into a major arms race in South Asia.
However, it is not advisable that Pakistan follows this path because this could
become inconsistent with Pakistan’s declared policy of minimum deterrence, nor
would Pakistan’s current economy manage it. Also, it may become a commit-
ment trap for developing a number of advanced deterrent forces that Pakistan
may not be able to sustain; and (b) to only follow suit when it is absolutely
required for deterrence stability and retaining balance rather than parity, thereby
escaping the vicious trap of arms race exhaustion.
Second, India’s ambition for acquiring a bigger number of deterrent forces,
bolstered by the new technological shift, may also have an aspiration for power
projection in the South Asian region. India’s gradual shift for more advanced
and sophisticated deterrent forces in this new era of counterforce strategy could
possibly weaken the prospects of nuclear deterrence in South Asia. In addition to
 India’s evolving nuclear strategy   83
the security maximization factor, India aspires to power projection in South Asia
that pushes for bigger defense projects. However, even power projection ele-
ments such as coercive diplomacy, military modernization, and aspiration for
increasing India’s material power could become inconsistent when applied to
India’s minimum deterrence. To be sure, power projection conclusively may
require more than one element of national power: the stable state’s economy
with sustainable growth; the proper allocation of the annual budget; political
stability; foresighted leadership; a strong institution, free from corruption; innov-
ative; with cutting-­edge technologies; and better and result- oriented defense
spending.68 States that possess these strong indicators can produce an effective
strategic partnership with major powers and attract foreign investment. Unlike
Pakistan, India appears to be successful in most of these indicators, including
that of its growing strategic partnership with major powers, to enhance the cred-
ibility of its deterrent forces enriched with innovative technology.69 In this
context, Lieber and Press’s seminal work correctly draws on scholarship that
covers the new era of counterforce strategy, suggesting that an advanced techno-
logical shift could erode the prospects of nuclear deterrence in the future and that
those who lag behind would either suffer from their deterrent forces being under-
mined or could produce effective countermeasures against the emerging threats
that analysts and policymakers have often overlooked.70
Third, largely assisted by modernized and advanced deterrent forces bolstered
by the shift toward its DND, India appears to be developing flexibility in its
nuclear strategy. India is inclined to opt for a counterforce strategy that could
provide incentives to India for carrying out surgical strikes against parts of
Pakistan. This component of strategy supports India’s CSD in that it has declared
its intentions to fight a limited war against Pakistan after the 2001–2002 attacks
in India that resulted in a common border confrontation between the two nuclear
states, although the roots of such a strategy can be traced back to the Sunderji
military doctrine in the late 1980s.71 In the wake of Pathankot and Uri incidents,
the Indian leadership has recently claimed to have carried out this type of strike
across the Pakistani side of the border. Nevertheless, Pakistan categorically
denies this as baseless, with no evidence to it.72 India’s rationale for such a
strategy could be to test the resolve of Pakistani deterrent forces for counterforce
targeting, whether or not Pakistan would use its counterforce battlefield nuclear
forces (Nasr 70 km). In fact, India’s recent land-­based targeting strategy may
encourage Indian security planners to opt for limited preemptive strikes against
parts of Pakistan.73 However, this could be a risky approach and an unfortunate
policy direction and carry strategic implications if India strategizes for punitive
actions against Pakistan, and Pakistan in turn deploys its battlefield nuclear
weapons as part of its evolving battlefield nuclear policy.74 Presumably, India
may use its counterforce targeting strategy, which could probably also include
the attacks on Pakistani battlefield nuclear weapons before Pakistan could use
them, yet risky and challenging this counterforce war-­fighting strategy could be
in South Asia.75 That being said, each of these rationales, potentially based on
the introduction of new technologies in South Asia, may pose challenges and
84   India’s evolving nuclear strategy
limitations to India’s evolving nuclear strategy in general, and South Asian
deterrence stability in particular.

Challenges and limitations for India’s evolving

nuclear strategy
India’s gradual shift within its evolving nuclear strategy could create a number
of challenges and limitations to India and its perceived adversaries.

Challenges to minimum deterrence in South Asia

Since minimum deterrence remains flexible, in that it cannot fully be defined, it
can be debatable when it comes to the conceptualization of minimum deterrence
between the two nuclear weapons states, which may vary from one particular
region to another. Also, the changes could occur between various types of deter-
rent forces with their own particular assigned delivery systems.76 For example, the
short ranges of battlefield weapons that the US and Russia developed could not be
applicable using the same logic, because of varying ranges and payloads, to the
South Asian nuclear environment. The presumed minimum number of forces
between Russia and the US after their planned reduction of forces may not be con-
sidered to be minimum, say, for India and Pakistan.77 Until there is a dramatic shift
in South Asia’s nuclear strategy, minimum deterrence may become an undefined
entity. The debate on India’s DND may indicate that India could bring a shift in its
nuclear strategy that might include reconsideration of the minimum deterrence it
earlier conceptualized. In this context, minimum may not remain minimum in
South Asia.78 Pakistan could also have a reappraisal of its minimum deterrence in
South Asia.79 This is confirmed by Zafar Iqbal Cheema, saying that,

since India has already moved away from minimum deterrence, it will have
a greater military, economic, and strategic pressure on Pakistan to have a
reappraisal of its nuclear policy of minimum deterrence. This is to maintain
deterrence equilibrium in South Asia.80

Therefore, the minimum for one nuclear weapons state may not be the minimum
for other.
Such a dramatic shift after almost two decades of nuclear weapons test in South
Asia may be presumed on the following elements conceptualized here: (1) India’s
perception about what and how China modernizes its deterrent forces, including its
border disputes with both China and Pakistan may further trigger a security
dilemma in the broader Southern Asian region; (2) India may also consider a cred-
ible response to Pakistan’s battlefield nuclear forces that Pakistan developed in
response to India’s CSD; (3) considering the inter-­state rivalry between these
nuclear weapons states (i.e., India vs China) and (India vs Pakistan), India’s con-
sistent advancement for acquiring a bigger number of nuclear forces, bolstered
with assigned sophisticated delivery systems, makes a considerable case for India
 India’s evolving nuclear strategy   85
to revisit its nuclear policy of minimum deterrence; and (4)  India’s broader
security paradigm, which could potentially include China in its evolving nuclear
strategy, including that of its rising elements of power projection, could in turn
bring India into a position from which to stage such a nuclear strategy, where
minimum deterrence may have a minimum space in South Asia. What the future
of minimum deterrence could likely be in South Asia is yet to be determined,
depending much on the given prevailing Southern Asian strategic environment.
However, the prospects for a sustainable minimum deterrence remain dim because
of the changed strategic environment that could further intensify the vicious cycle
of the security dilemma in the South Asian region.

Continuity in the arms race: the challenge to South Asian

deterrence stability
India’s nuclear strategy evolves from the modifications within its DND that, in
turn, lay down the framework for both conventional and nuclear development
programs. The DND remains an open draft that could further frame India’s
nuclear force modernization. However, such a framework unpacks the security
dilemma between the two South Asian nuclear states. As a result, this increases
the arms race and decreases the prospects for a strategic restraint regime in South
Asia.81 India’s nuclear strategy based, on its changed DND, could include a
number of advanced conventional and nuclear forces. India may craft certain
provisions, though challenging they could be, that (a) it is not interested in an
arms race; (b) it follows minimum deterrence; (c) it pursues the principles of
strategic restraint; and (d) it remains a responsible nuclear weapons state.82 Also,
it could present its case to the international community that, since it confronts
two potential nuclear adversaries, that is, China and Pakistan, the security para-
digm guides India to develop conventional and nuclear forces to deter both of its
potential adversaries. Nevertheless, the continuity of an arms race between the
two nuclear states endangers the strategic stability of South Asia. Such an unend-
ing arms race can be at both the conventional and nuclear levels. The continuity
of the South Asian arms race can be appraised by the logic of the security
dilemma-­driven action–reaction syndrome. For example, the conventional force
power declaration of India’s CSD, and its gradual development that aims at
waging limited strikes against parts of Pakistan, force Pakistan to develop battle-
field nuclear weapons to plug the deterrence gap. This is largely perceived as a
shift from minimum deterrence to full-­spectrum deterrence as part of Pakistan’s
evolving nuclear policy,83 although full-­spectrum deterrence can be the offshoot
of the minimum deterrence, as Pakistani officials consistently declare it to be.84
It is largely presumed that the purpose of Pakistan’s development of battlefield
nuclear weapons against the CSD is to address conventional force asymmetry in
South Asia.85 Zafar Iqbal Cheema also argues that,

as India continues to develop its Cold Start Doctrine for punitive strikes
against Pakistan, Pakistan in turn develops an effective deterrent force, for
86   India’s evolving nuclear strategy
example, battlefield nuclear forces, to balance the increasing conventional
force disparity between India and Pakistan. Also, it is to plug deterrence
gaps by preventing India’s conventional forces advancing against
Pakistan.86

Similarly, Pakistan produces effective countermeasures (i.e., increasing the

lethality and accuracy of cruise missiles and the development of MIRV techno-
logy) against India’s development of the BMD system, because Pakistan con-
siders that India’s BMD undermines the strategic stability of South Asia.87 Also,
as India develops the nuclear triad and plans to develop more nuclear-­powered
submarines, Pakistan plans to develop its own nuclear submarine to follow suit.88
Nevertheless, it appears that Pakistan falls within the vicious cycle of the arms
race by producing countermeasures to whatever deterrent forces India develops.
The question is: does Pakistan really need to opt for a strategy that could suffice
for the perceived weapon-­to-weapon objective? This is discussed in the follow-
ing chapter. The continuity in the South Asian arms race indicates that it is likely
that there may not be an end to such a vicious cycle of the arms race at least in
the near future.89 It can be observed from a Pakistani perspective that India’s
development of modernized conventional forces may further create conventional
imbalances in South Asia that, in turn, compel Pakistan to rely on its nuclear
forces. It is significant to note that Pakistan may not desire to go weapon-­to-
weapon against India’s potential arsenal and at the same time may not, as Lieber
and Press have enunciated, desire to lag far behind in the new era of the counter-
force strategy where technological advancement would matter much more. The
continuity of the arms race in South Asia will eventually strain relations between
India and Pakistan as both fail to moderate the security dilemma by promoting
cooperation and communication. Both states, in turn, feel less secure against the
backdrop of evolving competing military strategies that may lead the region to
accidental war.

The risk of accidental war: danger that cannot be ruled out

As long as inter-­state rivalry between India and Pakistan continues to exist, there
will potentially be more crises. These potential crises between the two sides
could not only increase the prospects of an arms race, but also produce the risk
of accidental war leading to the nuclear level. This danger may not be ruled
out.90 That being said, the continuity of the arms race between India and Pakistan
emanating from their evolving nuclear strategies enhances the risk of accidental
nuclear war. For example, in considering the Pakistani perspective on the evalu-
ation of how the risk of accidental war between the two could occur, there is the
need to analyze India’s changing strategic posture to one of a counterforce
strategy that aims at preempting Pakistan despite Pakistan’s possession of cred-
ible nuclear forces along with delivery systems. However, Pakistan need not
deploy its battlefield nuclear weapons when its centralized command and control
mechanisms remain effective for these weapons for deterrence purposes.91 This
 India’s evolving nuclear strategy   87
is to avoid the risk of accidental war in South Asia while considering the issues of
pre-­delegation, the use-­or-lose dilemma, and the command and control structure
related to battlefield nuclear weapons.92 However, these issues were particularized
during the Cold War period where both the Soviet Union and the US had no direct
border contingency, thereby, these types of nuclear weapons could then be pre-­
delegated, but still under the direct command and control of the US as part of its
extended deterrence. Neither tactical nuclear weapons were used nor did one or the
other adversary preempt the TNWs as part of a counterforce targeting strategy.93
Despite the risk, India tends to develop such a counterforce strategy, which could
successfully preempt Pakistan’s battlefield deterrent forces before they are used
against India. That is, India would try to degrade the Pakistani deterrent force
capability and unplug the gap that Pakistan tries to plug in using it.94
In doing so, this will have the following implications for the South Asia region:
(1) India could carry out surgical strikes against parts of Pakistan, as India claimed
in 2016 that it had done, while Pakistan denied such a claim. The purpose of this
strategic tactic, as part of India’s counterforce strategy, is to convince Pakistan that
it has indeed carried out such strikes on a smaller scale at the Pakistani side of the
border, suggesting that the same could be carried out in the future. For example,
the recent Pulwama crisis in 2019 can be point of consideration here. This is
simply a deterrence signal by India, however blurred it might be, to gradually
erode the prospects of deterrence at the tactical level without letting Pakistan actu-
ally use its battlefield nuclear weapons. (2) India could try to provoke Pakistan to a
certain extent by threatening and convincing Pakistan that it could carry out
preemptive strikes against Pakistan, so that Pakistan would strategize to deploy
and mobilize its battlefield nuclear forces closer to the Indian border. (3) India, as
it has done previously in its major crises with Pakistan, would also try to convince
the major powers, particularly the US, that the terrorist attacks in parts of India are
supported by Pakistan95 and, therefore, India would be under immense public pres-
sure to uproot the terrorist camps across the Indian border by taking preemptive
strikes. Ambassador Riaz Muhammad Khan argues:

Waging a war, a nuclear war, is improbable, and escalation towards it must be

stopped by all diplomatic and political means. Skirmishes and tension under
the nuclear overhang are possible and we experienced these in the shape of
Kargil (1999) and Twin Peaks escalation (2002–2003).… There is absolutely
no space for fighting a nuclear war. These weapons are not for use. They
provide protection but do not facilitate adventure or admit brinksmanship.96

That being said, it is very interesting to note that India urges China to instigate a
process of dialogue to help resolve its border issue, but opts for a strategy to strike
parts of Pakistan when it comes to the issue of terrorism, which Pakistan claims
that it has been fighting against, sacrificing many of its men and much of its
materials in the process.97 Recently, Pakistan’s Director General Inter Services
Public Relations (DG ISPR) Major General Asif Ghafoor reiterated in the wake
of Pulwama incident in February 2019 that it is not Pakistan, but India that is
88   India’s evolving nuclear strategy
tempted to wage a war against Pakistan. He asserted that there were at least eight
significant events that took place either in Pakistan or involving Pakistan in the
period January–February 2019 when India tried to exploit the situation in its favor:
(1) the  Saudi Crown Prince’s visit and investment conference; (2) the discussion
on the United Nations Security Council terror listing; (3) the Afghan peace talks;
(4) the European Union’s discussion on occupied Kashmir; (5) the hearing of Indian
spy Kulbhushan Jadhav’s case at the International Court of Justice; (6) the discus-
sion on the FATF report; (7) the meeting between Pakistan and Indian officials on
the Kartarpur Corridor development; and (8) the Pakistan Super League cricket
matches to be played in Pakistan.98 The DG ISPR warned that ‘we have defended
our country against terrorism […] we are battle hardened.’ He argued, ‘It was diffi-
cult fighting an invisible enemy. India is a non-­threat.… We have studied you for 70
years, watched you, prepared our capability for you. Our response will also be for
you.’ While elaborating Pakistan’s defensive posture, the DG ISPR also stated that,

we do not wish to go into war, but please rest assured that should you
initiate any aggression – first, you will never be able to surprise us. Pakistan
armed forces will never be surprised by you. But let me assure you, we shall
surprise you.99

In the following days, the India civilian leadership claimed that they had under-
taken yet another surgical strike, eliminating the Jaish-­e-Muhammad camps in
operation. However, Pakistan denied this and stated that, although the Indian Air
Force crossed the Line of Control (LoC) thereby violating the agreed principles
of LoC, the Indian Air Force had not carried out any strikes. Considering this as
an ‘act of aggression,’ the DG ISPR once against asserted that, ‘today, the prime
minister has asked everyone to get ready for every eventuality. We are all ready.
Now it is time for India to wait for our response.’ He also stated that, ‘the
response will come at a point and time of our choosing where our civil military
leadership decides, and as a matter of fact, has decided.’100
On the following day, the Pakistan Air Force responded in self-­defense by
shooting down two Indian fighter aircraft, arresting its pilots. The DG ISPR
argued that,

in response to PAF strikes this morning as released by MoFA, IAF crossed

LOC. PAF shot down two Indian aircraft inside Pakistani airspace. One of
the aircraft fell inside Azad Jumma and Kashmir while the other fell inside
Indian Occupied Kashmir. One Indian pilot was arrested by troops on
ground.

The DG ISPR asserted that,

today’s action was in self defense; we don’t want to claim any victory. We
set our target by making sure that there was no collateral damage. The in-­
built message was that despite our capability, we look towards peace.
 India’s evolving nuclear strategy   89
While Pakistan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that the ‘sole purpose of this
action was to demonstrate our right, will, and capability for self-­defense. We do
not wish to escalate but are fully prepared if forced into that paradigm.’101
Finally, India could successfully shift the burden of responsibility onto Paki-
stan as part of India’s commitment trap strategy while waging a preemptive
counterforce strike and letting Pakistan use its battlefield nuclear forces. India
then could create a scenario, convincing the international community that it was
Pakistan that used its nuclear weapons first. Therefore, India would have two
options: (a) inform the major powers to do something seriously; or (b) unleash
its nuclear strategy of massive retaliation against Pakistan. Much depends on
how India would convince Pakistan about its perceived counterforce strategy
without letting Pakistan deploy its battlefield nuclear forces. This example
reminds us of the nuclear lesson learned from the classic Cold War period when
Robert McNamara, the US defense Secretary, failed to convince his counterpart
on avoiding the countervalue (city-­busting) targeting in favor of a counterforce
targeting option.102 India’s provocative tactics of keeping escalation dominance
in its favor may, at best, still not convince Pakistan, and similar provocative
measures could, at worst, risk war between the two sides, making the security
dilemma intensely complex and unresolvable.

Conclusion
Since India aspires to attain regional power status as it increases its strategic part-
nership with the world’s major players, such as the US, in order to acquire new
technologies, it tends to revisit its nuclear strategy by crafting its draft nuclear doc-
trine to achieve its political and military goals, both for security and power-­
projection purposes. India’s evolving nuclear strategy includes both advanced
conventional and nuclear forces, bolstered with sophisticated delivery systems.
The development of ICBMs, nuclear submarines, SLBMs, MIRVs, aircraft
carriers, and more nuclear reactors enabling India to produce more fissile material
are some of the key ingredients of its efforts for introducing new technologies in
its deterrent forces that reflect India’s nuclear strategy that, in turn, makes India
more assertive in Southern Asian nuclear politics. The Indian political and diplo-
matic leadership develops a framework by successfully deterring both China and
Pakistan. As India increases its security, it potentially enhances the security
dilemma between the two rivals in South Asia. This further increases fear and
creates uncertainty, thus intensifying the security dilemma. For many in Pakistan,
India’s growing material power and large survivable nuclear forces confirm India’s
revisionist designs that, in turn, threaten the vital security ­interests of Pakistan. The
timing for such a strategy correlates with the US Pivot to Asia strategy, where
balancing to contain China remains one of the priorities as part of the perceived
US offshore-­balancing strategy. This brings to India greater confidence in enhanc-
ing its deterrent force capability in both the conventional and nuclear domains. In
doing so, it eventually may not remain consistent with the minimum deterrence
that India conceptualized earlier in its 1999 and 2003 DND.
90   India’s evolving nuclear strategy
In addition, India plans to modify its DND in order to modify its nuclear
strategy. The changes in the existing DND, from the 1999 to the 2003 version,
appear to be discussed amongst the Indian strategic community, which could
reshape its DND while influencing its doctrinal use of nuclear forces, nuclear tar-
geting, minimum deterrence, deployment, survivability, ready to launch, and cred-
ibility of its deterrent forces. The rationale for its evolving nuclear strategy is to
reassess its existing DND, develop advanced deterrent forces supported by new
and sophisticated technologies, exhaust Pakistan in such a grand arms race, and
maximize its security and power projection in the Southern Asian region. Never-
theless, each of these elements could have their own weaknesses, limitations, and
challenges to a broader India’s deterrent force doctrinal posture in general, and to
South Asian deterrence stability in particular. If India potentially shifts away from
1999 and 2003 DND versions, marching for a bigger deterrent force posture devel-
opment, aimed for offensive counterforce strategy, then this can be perceived as a
broader reconsideration of India’s nuclear policy direction and it may not remain
consistent with the minimum deterrence India initially conceptualized. In doing so,
India provides an incentive to Pakistan to consider a reappraisal of its nuclear
policy of minimum deterrence. This consideration is further analyzed in Chapter 4.

Notes
   1 Basil H. Liddell Hart, The Decisive Wars of History: A Study in Strategy (London:
G. Bell & Sons, 1929), p. 150.
   2 For interesting analysis, see Toby Dalton and George Perkovich, ‘India’s Nuclear
Options and Escalation Dominance,’ (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace, May 2016). Also, see George Perkovich and Toby Dalton, Not
War, Not Peace: Motivating Pakistan to Prevent Cross-­Border Terrorism (New
Delhi: Oxford University Press 2016). For more recent and interesting analysis on
these imperatives, see Christopher Clary and Vipin Narang, ‘India’s Counterforce
Temptations: Strategic Dilemmas, Doctrine, and Capabilities,’ International
Security, Vol. 43, No. 3 (Winter 2018/2019), pp. 7–52.
   3 Rajesh Rajagopalan, India’s Nuclear Doctrine Debate (Washington, DC: Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace, June 30, 2016). Clary and Narang, ‘India’s Coun-
terforce Temptations: Strategic Dilemmas, Doctrine, and Capabilities,’ pp. 16–20.
   4 Authors’ interview with a Pakistan retired senior military official in Islamabad,
February 2019.
   5 Authors’ interview with Ambassador Tasneem Aslam, former Pakistan diplomat and
a spokesperson for the Foreign Ministry of Pakistan, February 2019.
   6 Shivshankar Menon, Choices: Inside the Making of Indian Foreign Policy (London:
Penguin 2016). Also, see Prakash Menon, The Strategy Trap: India and Pakistan
under the Nuclear Shadow (New Delhi: Wisdom Tree, 2018).
   7 Devin T. Hagerty, ‘India’s Evolving Nuclear Posture,’ The Nonproliferation Review,
Vol. 21, No. 3–4 (2014), pp. 295–315.
   8 Gaurav Kampani, ‘Is the Indian Nuclear Tiger Changing its Stripes?’ The Nonprolif-
eration Review, Vol. 21, No. 3–4 (2014), pp. 383–398, 384.
   9 For interesting analysis, see Zulfqar Khan and Ahmad Khan, ‘The Strategic
Impasses over India’s Doctrinal Restructuring,’ The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 39,
No. 1 (2016), pp. 139–157, 139.
  10 Shashank Joshi, ‘An Evolving Indian Nuclear Doctrine?’ in Michael Krepon, Joshua
T. White, Julia Thompson, and Shane Mason (eds.), Deterrence Instability and
 India’s evolving nuclear strategy   91
Nuclear Weapons in South Asia (Washington, DC: Stimson Center, 2015),
pp. 69–93, 69.
  11 Vipin Narang, ‘Five Myths about India’s Nuclear Posture,’ The Washington Quar-
terly, Vol. 36, No. 3 (2013), pp. 143–157, 155.
  12 Peter Layton, ‘The Idea of Grand Strategy,’ The RUSI Journal, Vol.  157, No.  4
(2012), pp. 56–61, 60.
  13 Ibid., p. 60.
  14 Clary and Narang, ‘India’s Counterforce Temptations: Strategic Dilemmas, Doc-
trine, and Capabilities,’ p. 8.
  15 See Michael Mandelbaum, The Nuclear Revolution: International Politics Before and
After Hiroshima (Cambridge & New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981);
Robert Jervis, The Illogic of Amer­ican Nuclear Strategy (Ithaca, NY: Cornell Univer-
sity Press, 1984); Robert Jervis, The Meaning of Nuclear Revolution: Statecraft and
the Prospects of Armageddon (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1989).
  16 See George Perkovich, India’s Nuclear Bomb: The Impact on Global Proliferation
(Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1999); Bharat Karnad, India’s
Nuclear Policy (London: Praeger, 2008); Ashley J. Tellis, India’s Emerging Nuclear
Posture: Between Recessed Deterrent and Ready Arsenal (Santa Monica, CA:
RAND, 2001); Rajesh M. Basrur, Minimum Deterrence and India’s Nuclear Security
(Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2006). Also, for an excellent piece on the
contemporary nuclear strategy, see Vipin Narang, Nuclear Strategy in the Modern
Era: Regional Powers and International Conflict (Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univer-
sity Press, 2014).
  17 ‘The United States Nuclear Posture Review 2010,’ The US Department of Defense:
www.defense.gov/Portals/1/features/defenseReviews/NPR/2010_Nuclear_Posture_
Review_Report.pdf.
  18 ‘The United States Nuclear Posture Review 2018,’ The US Department of Defense:
www.defense.gov/News/Special-­Reports/0218_npr/.
  19 Zafar Khan, ‘The Growing Indo-­US Strategic Partnership and its Impact on the
Regional Security,’ The Journal of Pakistan Army Green Book (2015), pp. 134–144.
  20 Authors’ interview with one of Pakistan’s leading strategic analysts Professor Zafar
Nawaz Jaspal, Department of International Relations Quaid-­e-Azam University,
Islamabad, February 2019.
  21 See Rakesh Sood, ‘Should India Review its Nuclear Doctrine?’ Center for Nuclear
Non-­Proliferation and Disarmament, Policy Brief No.  18 (December 2014),
pp. 1–12.
  22 National Security Advisory Board, ‘Draft Report of National Security Advisory
Board on Indian Nuclear Doctrine,’ Indian Ministry of External Affairs (August 17,
1999): http://mea.gov.in/in-­focus-article.htm?18916/Draft+Report+of+National+
Security+Advisory+Board+on+Indian+Nuclear+Doctrine.
  23 Prime Minister’s Office, ‘Cabinet Committee on Security Reviews Progress in Oper-
ationalizing India’s Nuclear Doctrine,’ Press Release (January 4, 2003): http://pib.
nic.in/archieve/lreleng/lyr2003/rjan2003/04012003/r040120033.html.
  24 Zafar Khan, ‘Emerging Shifts in India’s Nuclear Policy: Implications for Minimum
Deterrence in South Asia,’ Strategic Studies, Vol. 34, No. 1 (2014), pp. 94–112.
  25 For Indian official take on this, see K.S. Manjunath and Beryl Anand, ‘India’s Cred-
ible Minimum Deterrence: A Report,’ IPCS Special Report (February 13, 2006),
pp. 1–10.
  26 Authors’ interview with Lt. General Naeem Khalid Lodhi (retd) in Rawalpindi,
February 2019.
  27 For interesting and detailed analysis, see Mansoor Ahmed, ‘India’s Nuclear Exception-
alism: Fissile Materials, Fuel Cycle, and Safeguards,’ Project on Managing the Atom,
Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, 1–60. Also, see International Panel
on Fissile Materials, ‘Global Fissile Materials Report 2015,’ pp. 1–62; Ashley J. Tellis,
92   India’s evolving nuclear strategy
‘US–Indian Civilian Nuclear Cooperation and India’s Nuclear Arsenal,’ (Washington,
DC: Carnegie Endowment for international Peace, 2006), pp. 1–64.
  28 Authors’ interview with Pakistan former Foreign Secretary Riaz Muhammad Khan
in Islamabad, February 2019.
  29 Authors’ interview with Tasneem Aslam, former Pakistan diplomat and a spokes-
person of Foreign Ministry of Pakistan, February 2019.
  30 Walter C. Ladwig III, ‘A Cold Start for Hot Wars? The Indian Army’s New Limited
War Doctrine,’ International Security, Vol. 32, No. 3 (Winter 2007/08), pp. 158–190.
  31 Dinshaw Mistry, ‘South Asia’s Missile Expansion,’ The Nonproliferation Review,
Vol. 22, No. 3–4 (2015), pp. 361–377, 366.
  32 Authors’ interview with Professor Zafar Iqbal Cheema, President and Executive Dir-
ector of Strategic Vision Institute (SVI), Islamabad, February 2019.
  33 Menon, Choices: Inside the Making of Indian Foreign Policy, pp. 164–166.
  34 Authors’ interview with Pakistan former Ambassador Zamir Akram who has served
as a permanent member of the United Nations, February 2019.
  35 For an excellent analysis to India’s conventional forces against Pakistan, see Walter
C. Ladwig III, ‘Indian Military Modernization and Conventional Deterrence in
South Asia,’ Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 38, No. 5 (2015), pp. 729–772.
  36 For detailed analyses of these crises, see Peter R. Lavoy (ed.) Asymmetric Warfare
in South Asia: The Causes and Consequences of the Kargil Conflict (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2009); Sumit Ganguly and Michael R. Kraig, ‘The
2001–2002 Indo-­Pakistan Crisis: Explaining the Limits of Coercive Diplomacy,’
Security Studies, Vol.  14, No.  2 (2005), pp.  290–324; Michael Krepon and Julia
Thompson (eds.) Deterrence Stability and Escalation Control in South Asia (Wash-
ington, DC: The Stimson Center, 2013).
  37 Ashley J. Tellis, ‘The Evolution of US–Indian Ties: Missile Defense in an Emerging
Strategic Relationship,’ International Security, Vol.  30, No.  4 (Spring 2006),
pp. 113–151.
  38 Vinod Kumar, ‘A Phased Approach to India’s Missile Defense Planning,’ Strategic
Analysis, Vol. 32, No. 2 (2008), pp. 171–195, 185.
  39 Tellis, ‘The Evolution of US–Indian Ties: Missile Defense in an Emerging Strategic
Relationship,’ p. 138.
  40 Sumit Ganguly, ‘India’s Pursuit of Ballistic Missile Defense,’ Nonproliferation
Review, Vol.  21, No.  3–4 (2014), p.  377; Hash V. Pant, ‘India Debates Missile
Defense,’ Defense Studies, Vol. 5, No. 2 (2005), pp. 234–235.
  41 Rajesh M. Basrur, ‘Missile Defense and South Asia: An Indian Perspective,’
pp.  15–16 (May 2001): www.stimson.org/images/uploads/research-­pdfs/SABMD-
Basrur.pdf.
  42 Zafar Khan, ‘India’s Ballistic Missile Defense: Implications for South Asian Deter-
rence Stability,’ The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 40, No. 3 (2017), pp. 187–202.
  43 Authors’ interview with Pakistan former Ambassador Zamir Akram who has served
as a permanent member of the United Nations, February 2019.
  44 See Kartik Bommakanti, ‘Satellite Integration and Multiple Independently Re-­
targetable Reentry Vehicles Technology: Indian–United States Civilian Space
Cooperation,’ Astropolitics, Vol. 7, No. 1 (2009).
  45 For interesting analysis on these perspectives, see Joshua T. White and Kyle
Deming, ‘Dependent Trajectories: India’s MIRV Program and Deterrence
Stability in South Asia,’ in Michael Krepon, Joshua T. White, Julia Thompson,
and Shane Manson (eds.), Deterrence Stability and Nuclear Weapons in South
Asia (Washington, DC: Stimson Center, 2015), pp. 177–203; Rajesh Basrur and
Jaganath Sankaran, ‘India’s Slow and Unstoppable Move to MIRV,’ in Michael
Krepon, Travis Wheeler, and Shane Mason (eds.), The Lure and Pitfalls of
MIRVs: From the First to the Second Nuclear Age (Washington, DC: Stimson
Center, 2016).
 India’s evolving nuclear strategy   93
  46 Quoted in White and Deming, ‘Dependent Trajectories: India’s MIRV Program and
Deterrence Stability in South Asia,’ p. 180.
  47 Ibid.
  48 Rajat Pandit, ‘Agni-­V with China in range tested; next in line is Agni-­VI, with mul-
tiple warheads,’ India Times (December 27, 2016).
  49 Associated Press, ‘India launches more than 100 satellites into orbit,’ Telegraph
(February 15, 2017).
  50 White and Deming, ‘Dependent Trajectories: India’s MIRV Program and Deterrence
Stability in South Asia,’ pp. 180–182.
  51 Iskander Rehman, ‘Murky Waters: Naval Nuclear Dynamics in the Indian Ocean,’
(Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2015).
  52 Indian Navy Integrated Headquarters, Freedom to Use the Seas: India’s Maritime
Military Strategy (New Delhi: India’s Ministry of Defense, 2007), p. 23.
  53 See Larry Pressler, Neighbors in Arms: An Amer­ican Senator’s Quest for Disarma-
ment in a Nuclear Subcontinent (London: Penguin, 2017).
  54 Harsh V. Pant (ed.), The Rise of the Indian Navy: Internal Vulnerabilities, External
Challenges (Farnham: Ashgate 2012).
  55 Rehman, ‘Murky Waters: Naval Nuclear Dynamics in the Indian Ocean,’ p. 17.
  56 Authors’ interview with Khalid Banuri former Director General Arms Control and
Disarmament Affairs, SPD, Pakistan, February 22, 2019.
  57 Ankit Panda, ‘The Indian Ocean won’t be a “nuclear free zone” anytime soon,’ The
Diplomat (May 20, 2016).
  58 Franz Stefan Gady, ‘Sea trials of Indian Navy’s deadliest sub going “very well,” ’
The Diplomat (May 5, 2015). Also, see Gulshan Luthra, ‘After Arihant, Indian Navy
considering n-­propulsion for aircraft carriers,’ India Strategic (December 2015);
David Brewster, ‘Asia’s Coming Nuclear Nightmare,’ The National Interest (March
31, 2015).
  59 Ashley J. Tellis, ‘Making Waves: Aiding India’s Next-­Generation Aircraft Carrier,’
(Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2015), pp. 1–25.
  60 Ibid., p. 3.
  61 Ibid., pp. 12–21.
  62 Ibid., p. 9.
  63 Authors’ interview with Khalid Banuri former Director General Arms Control and
Disarmament Affairs, SPD, Pakistan, February 22, 2019.
  64 Dhruva Jaishankar, ‘Indian Ocean Region: A Pivot for India’s Growth,’ The Brook-
ings Institute (September 12, 2016): www.brookings.edu/opinions/indian-­ocean-
region-­a-pivot-­for-indias-­growth/.
  65 Authors’ interview with Pakistan’s leading nuclear strategist Professor Zafar Iqbal
Cheema and the President of Strategic Vision Institute, September 2012.
  66 Authors’ interview with Tasneem Aslam, former Pakistan diplomat and a spokes-
person of Foreign Ministry of Pakistan, February 2019.
  67 Khan, ‘Emerging Shifts in India’s Nuclear Policy: Implications for Minimum Deter-
rence in South Asia,’ pp. 94–98.
  68 For interesting analysis on this, see Ashley J. Tellis, Alison Szalwinski and Michael
Wills, Strategic Asia 2015–16: Foundation of National Power in the Asia-­Pacific
(Washington, DC: The National Bureau of Asian Research).
  69 Khan, ‘The Growing Indo-­US Strategic Partnership and its Impact on Regional
Security,’ pp. 134–140.
  70 Keir A. Lieber and Daryl G. Press, ‘The New Era of Counterforce: Technological
Change and the Future of Nuclear Deterrence,’ International Security, Vol. 41, No. 4
(Spring 2017), pp. 9–49.
  71 For a detailed analysis on this, see Zafar Iqbal Cheema, Indian Nuclear Deterrence:
Its Evolution, Development and Implications for South Asian Security (London:
Oxford University Press, 2010).
94   India’s evolving nuclear strategy
  72 Express News Service, ‘Pakistan denies surgical strikes, says only cross-­border
firing happened,’ The Indian Express (October 3, 2016).
  73 Joy Mitra, ‘India’s land warfare doctrine 2018: Hoping for the best, preparing for
the worst,’ The Diplomat (January 1, 2019): https://thediplomat.com/2019/01/indias-­
land-warfare-­doctrine-2018-hoping-­for-the-­best-preparing-­for-the-­worst/.
  74 Jaganath Sankaran, ‘Pakistan’s Battlefield Nuclear Policy: A Risky Solution to an
Exaggerated Threat,’ International Security, Vol.  39, No.  3 (Winter, 2015),
pp. 118–151.
  75 Ibid., pp. 148–151.
  76 Zafar Khan, Pakistan’s Nuclear Policy: A Minimum Credible Deterrence (London
& New York: Routledge, 2015).
  77 See New START Treaty, 2011, US Department of State: www.state.gov/t/avc/
newstart/.
  78 Zafar Khan, ‘Pakistan’s Policy of Minimum Deterrence: Why Minimum is not the
Minimum,’ Defense and Security Analysis, Vol. 29, No. 1 (2013), pp. 30–41.
  79 Zafar Iqbal Cheema, ‘Pakistan’s Posture of Credible Minimum Deterrence: Current
Challenges and Future Efficacy,’ in Zulfqar Khan (ed.), Nuclear Pakistan: Strategic
Dimensions (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2011), pp. 43–84.
  80 Authors’ interview with Professor Zafar Iqbal Cheema, President and Executive Dir-
ector of SVI, Islamabad, February 2019.
  81 Zafar Khan, ‘India’s Ballistic Missile Defense: Implications for South Asian Deter-
rence Stability,’ The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 40, No. 3 (2017), pp. 187–202.
  82 Debalina Ghoshal, ‘While no one was watching, India worked to position itself as a
responsible nuclear-­powered nation,’ Scroll.in (February 4, 2018): https://scroll.in/
article/867260/while-­no-one-­was-watching-­india-worked-­to-position-­itself-as-­a-
responsible-­nuclear-powered-­nation.
  83 Toby Dalton and Michael Krepon, ‘A Normal Nuclear Pakistan,’ Carnegie Endow-
ment for International Peace and Stimson Center (2015), pp. 1–48.
  84 See ISPR Press Release, No PR-­64/2016-ISPR, Rawalpindi (February 24, 2016):
www.ispr.gov.pk/press-­release-detail.php?id=3211. Also, see ‘A Conversation with
Gen. Khalid Kidwai, Carnegie International Nuclear Policy Conference 2015,’ (March
23, 2015): https://carnegieendowment.org/files/03–230315carnegieKIDWAI.pdf.
  85 Zafar Khan, ‘The Arrival of Tactical Nuclear Weapons in South Asia: Deterrence
Stability or Instability,’ Comparative Strategy, Vol. 32, No. 5 (2013), pp. 402–417.
  86 Authors’ interview with Professor Zafar Iqbal Cheema, President and Executive Dir-
ector of SVI, Islamabad, February 2019.
  87 Khan, ‘India’s Ballistic Missile Defense: Implications for South Asian Deterrence
Stability,’ pp. 199–200.
  88 Reporters, ‘India’s bid for “second strike capability” to put pressure on Pakistan,
says SPD Official,’ Dawn (May 15, 2016).
  89 Bhumitra Chakma, ‘Nuclear Arms Control Challenges in South Asia,’ Indian
Review, Vol. 9, No. 3 (2010), pp. 364–384.
  90 For latest interesting analysis on this perspective, see Moeed Yusuf, Brokering
Peace in Nuclear Environments: US Crisis Management in South Asia (Stanford,
CA: Stanford University Press, 2018); Sameer Lalwani and Hannah Haegeland
(eds.), Investigating Crises: South Asia’s Lessons, Evolving Dynamics, and Traject-
ories (Washington, DC: Stimson Center, 2018).
  91 Reuters, ‘Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons, Safe or Not?’ Dawn (May 23, 2011).
  92 For an excellent analysis on this, see Hans M. Kristensen, ‘Non-­Strategic Nuclear
Weapons,’ Federation of Amer­ican Scientists, Special Report No.  3 (May 2012),
pp. 1–86.
  93 Shaun R. Gregory, Nuclear Command and Control in NATO: Nuclear Weapons
Operations and the Strategy of Flexible Response (London: Palgrave Macmillan,
1996).
 India’s evolving nuclear strategy   95
  94 Baqir Sajjad Syed, ‘NCA stresses full-­spectrum deterrence,’ Dawn (September 6,
2013).
  95 For an interesting analysis, see Yusuf, Brokering Peace in Nuclear Environments
(chapters 3, 4, and 5, pp. 53–156).
  96 Authors’ interview with Pakistan former Foreign Secretary Riaz Muhammad Khan
in Islamabad, February 2019.
  97 News Desk, ‘China may initiate “limited war” with India,’ The Express Tribune
(August 6, 2017).
  98 See ‘DG ISPR reiterates “talks, not war” proposal to India, distances Pakistan from
Pulwama,’ Dawn (February 22, 2019): www.dawn.com/news/1465382/dg-­ispr-
reiterates-­talks-not-­war-proposal-­to-india-­distances-pakistan-­from-pulwama.
  99 Ibid.
100 See DG ISPR statement in the wake of India’s claim of carrying out surgical strikes
in the Pakistani side of Kashmir, ‘Time for India to wait for our response’: ISPR DG
debunks New Delhi’s claims on LoC violation,’ Dawn, (February 26, 2019): www.
dawn.com/news/1466161/time-­for-india-­to-wait-­for-our-­response-ispr-­dg-debunks-­
new-delhis-­claims-on-­loc-violation.
101 For detail, see ‘PAF shoots down two Indian aircraft inside Pakistani airspace; two
pilots arrested,’ Dawn (February 27, 2019): www.dawn.com/news/1466347/ispr-­dg-
press-­conference-two-­indian-pilots-­arrested.
102 Lawrence Freedman, The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy (New York: Palgrave 2003),
pp.  213–226. Also, see Scott D. Sagan, Moving Targets: Nuclear Strategy and
National Security (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1989), chapter 1,
pp. 10–57.
4 Pakistan’s evolving nuclear policy
The pursuit of balance sans parity

Introduction
Since the introduction of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons in May 1998, Pakistan’s
nuclear policy has potentially been evolving, albeit embedded with nuclear
ambiguity keeping the central aim to deter its adversary’s conventional and
nuclear attacks.1 Doing so reflects that Pakistan as a defensive state would
require a number of nuclear warheads and credible delivery systems to address
the perceived security threat, both in the conventional and nuclear domains,
while considering Pakistan’s declared nuclear policy of India-­specificity. Cur-
rently, Pakistan possesses nuclear dyads, such as the dual capable aircraft and
missile variants, to deliver nuclear warheads to their assigned targets. First, Paki-
stan has already procured JF-­17 Thunder and F-­16 aircraft to carry nuclear war-
heads for hitting the targets assigned to these warheads and delivery systems. It
is believed that Mirage III fighter aircraft may also be nuclear-­capable. Second,
Pakistan has already developed various short and medium ranges of ballistic
missile variants as a broader part of its delivery systems. The short ranges of
these missiles include Hatf (50 km), Nasr (70 km), Abdali (200 km), Ghaznavi
(300 km), and Shaheen-­I (750–900 km), while the medium range of ballistic vari-
ants include Ghauri-­I (1500 km), Ghauri-­II (1800 km), Ababeel (2200 km),
Shaheen-­II (2500 km), and Shaheen-­III (2750 km). The significance of the
Shaheen-­III ballistic missile variant is also perceived to be India-­specific when it
covers Indian military forces on the Andaman and Nicobar Islands while the
significance of Nasr (the battlefield nuclear weapon) attempts to plug the deter-
rence gap emanating from India’s CSD, which aims at waging a limited war
against Pakistan as part of India’s military policy of unified battle groups.
However, unlike India, Pakistan has not yet developed a long-­range ballistic
missile such as the ICBM. Pakistan may not need to develop an ICBM if its
medium and/or intermediate ranges of ballistic missile cover major parts of its
adversary. Also, it may not need to go for bigger ranges if it desires to retain
India-­specificity under the essentials of minimum deterrence conceived here.
Third, against India’s development of BMD, Pakistan has been producing coun-
termeasures such as the Babur-­III (450 km), the Submarine-­Launched Cruise
Missile (SLCM), and the Ababeel (2200 km), perceived to be an MIRV variant,
 Pakistan’s evolving nuclear policy   97
in order to defeat the Indian-­deployed BMD system. Pakistan could also con-
sider Shaheen-­II and Shaheen-­III ballistic missiles as one of the prime candid-
ates for MIRVing purposes. As India enhances its air defense capability by
planning to induct the proposed Russian S-­400 sophisticated air defense system
as part of India’s acquisition of new technology for protection of its conventional
and nuclear forces, Pakistan continues to find effective countermeasures to
defeat these deployed systems. Fourth, although Pakistan has not yet developed
a nuclear-­powered submarine (nuclear triad) in a more classic sense, for procur-
ing an assured second strike capability, it has vowed to develop this, especially
after India eventually commissioned its nuclear submarine Arihant in 2016 that
it recently deployed. India plans to develop more nuclear submarine variants.
The question, therefore, arises: is Pakistan racing for a balance or parity against
India, and does its nuclear deterrent force development remain consistent with
the essentials of minimum deterrence conceived here? First, it is important to
conceptualize the rationale of Pakistan’s evolving nuclear policy, especially after
two decades of nuclearization of South Asia, whether or not this remains con-
sistent with the minimum deterrence Pakistan practiced earlier. This chapter
argues that if Pakistan opts for parity against its adversary by means of increas-
ing its deterrent forces, developing sophisticated delivery systems, and demon-
strating its deterrent force assertion by a weapon-­to-weapon process against its
potential adversary in South Asia, then Pakistan’s nuclear policy may go beyond
the minimum deterrence it crafted earlier. However, if Pakistan as a defensive
state opts for retaining a credible balance vis-­à-vis its adversary when it comes
to essential deterrent force posture, without necessarily opting for a weapon-­to-
weapon strategy and introducing sophisticated new technologies for which India
aspires, then Pakistan’s nuclear policy remains consistent with the minimum
deterrence conceived here.

The essential pillars of Pakistan’s evolving nuclear policy

Since Pakistan has not yet produced an official nuclear draft document on its
nuclear policy, nuclear ambiguity may continue to play a central role in each
rationale of Pakistan’s evolving nuclear policy. Nevertheless, the available
declaratory policy statements in the existing literature with regard to Pakistan’s
nuclear weapons program can make some sort of sense of what Pakistan’s
nuclear policy is, how it strategizes its deterrent forces, and why certain doc-
trinal postures are necessary for deterrence credibility. In doing so, this gradual
openness remains consistent with the essentials of minimum deterrence
perceived here.

Ensuring a state’s security: does it remain consistent with minimum

deterrence?
Security remains the predominant and compelling factor amongst many other
rationales for states’ acquisition of nuclear weapons such as power projection,
98   Pakistan’s evolving nuclear policy
prestige, and organizational imperatives.2 It is important to mention that strength-
ening a state’s security becomes one of the primary pillars of Pakistan’s evolv-
ing nuclear policy, since perceiving the need to acquire nuclear weapons.
Pakistan’s nuclear policy of credible minimum deterrence aims at safeguarding
its security. Its nuclear policy could remain consistent with the essentials of
minimum deterrence conceived here if Pakistan considers using its deterrent
forces for defensive rather than offensive purposes. For example, Pakistan’s
Prime Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto stated in his address to the United Nations
General Assembly (UNGA) in 1965 in the wake of the India–Pakistan war,
‘Pakistan is a small country facing a great monster (India) … that is determined
to annihilate Pakistan.’3 With this perception, Bhutto realized the weaknesses of
Pakistan’s conventional forces and the significance of the deterrent factor of
nuclear weapons acquisition for the state’s security and territorial integrity for
defensive purposes. Recalling Bhutto’s strides for such a rationale, Munir
Ahmed Khan, who earlier served the IAEA and later became the head of Paki-
stan’s Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC) stated:

After the 1965 war, our vulnerabilities increased. Mr. Bhutto visited Vienna,
where I was working at the IAEA, and I briefed him about what I knew of
India’s nuclear program … I told him that a nuclear India would further
undermine and threaten our security, and for our survival, we needed a
nuclear deterrent.4

Bhutto and Khan reflected on Pakistan’s defensive deterrent force posture.

Therefore, Bhutto perceived the need for, and thus linked, nuclear deterrence
with Pakistan’s existence as a state. His commitment with, and obsession for, the
acquisition of the bomb, including its association with Pakistan’s national
security, can well be reflected in a number of his statements. One of his famous
and often quoted ‘eating grass’ statements again appears when he declared in
1966 that, ‘Pakistan will have always find it difficult to quantitatively keep pace
with India … I warned that nation sometime back if India acquires nuclear
status, Pakistan will have to follow suit even if it entails eating grass.’5 Argu-
ably, Bhutto’s above assertions clearly suggest Pakistan’s defensive intensions
behind the acquisition of nuclear weapons. After Pakistan’s nuclear tests in
1998, this became one of the essential pillars of Pakistan’s nuclear policy,
embedded within the essentials of minimum deterrence. For example, Major
General Mahmud Ali Durrani (retd), a Pakistani senior military official, argues
that, ‘Pakistan’s nuclear capability is solely for the purpose of deterrence and
defense of sovereignty.’6 When it comes to deterrence, its purpose it is to deter
‘all forms of external aggression, which can endanger Pakistan’s national
security.’7 However, this policy seems ambitious. First, it remains ambiguous as
to how Pakistan could use nuclear weapons against every adversary’s aggres-
sion, since all forms of external aggression could include both minor and major
conflicts. Pakistan may not need to use nuclear forces in each of these crises.
Second, deterring all forms of aggression may require Pakistan to get involved
 Pakistan’s evolving nuclear policy   99
in a bigger arms race, with an acceptance of risk that Pakistan may not desire.
This, in turn, could take Pakistan away from the minimum deterrence it concep-
tualized earlier.

Credible minimum deterrence: how consistent is this rationale with

the essentials of ‘minimum’?
Pakistan has carefully deliberated on and pursued the policy of credible
minimum deterrence.8 Although Pakistan declared after the 1998 nuclear tests
that it would follow a nuclear policy of minimum deterrence and that a few
nuclear weapons would suffice for deterrence purposes, the concept for nuclear
deterrence existed in the 1960s within the public statements and speeches by
Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto when he served as Foreign Minister and later as President
and Prime Minister of Pakistan. In a similar context, the concept of minimum
deterrence existed for Pakistan in the 1990s when General Aslam Beg stated in
an interview,

In the case of weapons of mass destruction it is not the number that matters,
but the destruction that can be caused by even a few … the fear of retali-
ation lessens the likelihood of full-­fledged war between India and Pakistan.9

This reflects the value of minimum deterrence for Pakistan’s nuclear weapons
development program, guiding the Pakistani nuclear leadership’s perception that
few could be better and few could eventually deter. Pakistan’s declaratory policy
of minimum deterrence has had a deterring effect to date. Nevertheless, few may
not stay static when it comes to an actual contextualization of minimum deter-
rence in South Asia against the backdrop of rapidly evolving technology and
strategies of the adversary, India. Few could increase, too, in accordance with
the changed South Asian strategic environment, but this could fairly be validated
within the set parameters of minimum deterrence. It is interesting to observe
from credible international sources that there is a gradual increase in the number
of warheads stockpiled by both India and Pakistan in South Asia,10 but both of
these nuclear weapons states continue to officially state that they practice
minimum deterrence, which would remain a credible and flexible policy guide-
line. Ambassador Riaz Muhammad Khan is succinct on this important by
saying that,

Minimum credible deterrence does not lay down any hard and fast para-
meters. It is partly a label and a posture which suggests reasonableness on
the part of the country that professes it. In reality, minimum is subjective
and determines sufficiency at a given point of time. Credible is the operative
word which relates to security environment, need and capacity.11

The dilemma with the evolving policy of minimum deterrence in South Asia is
that the term remains extremely innocuous with no fixity to the definition of
100   Pakistan’s evolving nuclear policy
what minimum could be and how this could truly be defined. Nuclear ambiguity
rules the evolutionary process of Pakistan’s nuclear policy. For example, today’s
minimum in terms of a numbers game may not be the same as, say, in ten years’
time. In an interview in 2012, Abdul Sattar, a former Pakistan Foreign Minister,
stated: ‘The concept of minimum deterrence is not static and fixed. It changes in
accordance with the changed strategic reality. The estimated number of nuclear
forces Pakistan possessed in 2000 would not be sufficient in 2012.’12 Logically,
Abdul Sattar’s perception on minimum deterrence was correct. Amidst nuclear
ambiguity, today’s minimum deterrence has become even more dynamic in
South Asia. For example, while broadly conceptualizing the term ‘minimum
deterrence’ for the broader South Asian region, Lt. General Naeem Khalid Lodhi
(retd) assumes that,

it is largely presumed that what is the minimum against China cannot be the
minimum against Pakistan. India has already crossed the perceived bar of
minimum deterrence, though minimum in real terms cannot be quantified as
Indian security leadership still continues to maintain.13

In response to what India practices with regard to its declared nuclear policy,
Ambassador Riaz Muhammad Khan is quite clear on this by stating that, ‘in my
view, Pakistan need not have changed its minimum credible deterrence doctrine
as it provided us all the freedom to pursue what we thought was necessary.’14
With regard to the association of credibility with the minimum deterrence, it
may often be assumed that the addition of this phenomenon with the minimum
could bear flexibility and tendency for the quest to acquire more nuclear forces
bolstered with the new technologies in the form of sophisticated delivery
systems.15 Khalid Banuri stated that, ‘the adjective of credibility suggests that
minimum would remain a dynamic notion.’16 However, it is important to note
that the term ‘credibility’ may not necessarily mean expansion of nuclear forces
because minimum deterrence itself needs to be very much credible in order to
prevent a scenario where deterrence could be undermined. First, when it comes
to deterrence and its essentials, credibility remains one of the significant ingredi-
ents of deterrence without which the very essence and spirit of minimum deter-
rence fades out. Second, the term credibility itself can be utilized with flexibility
into a consideration. Its contextualization could vary from one nuclear weapons
state to another. Third, simply, whether or not one uses and/or associates the
term credibility with minimum deterrence, deterrence stays an independent com-
ponent and should remain credible. Fourth, as long as one uses the term ‘deter-
rence,’ say, with minimum, credibility becomes a primary source for the
proposed minimum. In sum, minimum deterrence with a gradual increase in
number, though not in thousands, and the ambiguity it depicts for deterrence
purposes could become consistent with the essentials of minimum deterrence,
though the greater number of nuclear weapons, the introduction of new technol-
ogies for a broader deterrent force framework, and increased amount of ambigu-
ity could undermine the official stance on minimum deterrence in South Asia.
 Pakistan’s evolving nuclear policy   101
Minimum deterrence remains one of the essential ingredients of Pakistan’s
evolving nuclear policy, which, in turn, lays the foundation for Pakistan’s
­doctrinal posture of nuclear use, though ambiguous this could be.

The doctrinal posture of first use: does ambiguity exist at the

operational level?
Pakistan does not elaborate in any great detail as to when, where, and how
­Pakistan would use its nuclear weapons as part of its doctrinal posture of nuclear
use. Pakistan considers that nuclear ambiguity serves a deterring purpose in its
doctrinal posture. For example, the following statements on whether Pakistan
would use nuclear weapons first could not be logical and, therefore, become irra-
tional if (a) India attacks Pakistan and conquers a large part of its territory;
(b) India destroys a large part of Pakistani land and air forces; (c) India’s strategy
to strangle Pakistan’s economy; and (d) India pushes Pakistan into a political
destabilization or creates a large-­scale internal subversion.17 A statement claimed
by the Italian Research Group Landau Network (contributors Ramusino and
Maurizio Martellini) while interacting with and interviewing Lt. General Khalid
Kidwai (retd), a former Director General of the SPD, has recently been denied
by Kidwai himself by stating that he was misquoted.18 Apparently, ambiguity
rules over when it comes to the Pakistan doctrinal posture of nuclear use at the
operational level. Ambiguity to this level remains consistent with the essentials
of minimum deterrence conceived here. Arguably, no nuclear weapons state
declares openly its nuclear redlines. For example, the US declares in its 2010
NPR that the US could use nuclear weapons in an ‘extremis condition’ without
illustrating its doctrinal posture.19 A similar doctrinal assertion is emphasized in
its 2018 NPR.20 Russia would argue that it would have a nuclear strategy based
on a flexible option that would enable the Russian nuclear leadership to use
nuclear weapons first, though it still remains ambiguous.21 Other nuclear
weapons states, including Pakistan, would declare that these deadly weapons can
be used first, but as a ‘last resort.’ This, in turn, could have a different interpreta-
tion with various policy implications for a nuclear weapons state itself and the
region to which it belongs.22
Pakistan’s rationale for not subscribing to NFU as initially proposed by India
is to address the issue of growing nuclear asymmetry in South Asia since India
would have a greater strategic advantage in pursuing Pakistan to the NFU
posture while it keeps an effective hedge against Pakistan in the conventional
domain.23 That is, Pakistan believes that relying on nuclear weapons under the
banner of FU could offset this outstanding strategic issue, both at the strategic
and the tactical level. In other words, it is to deter adversary conventional and
nuclear attack, what Vipin Narang called ‘asymmetric nuclear posture.’ In order
to prevent both conventional and nuclear attacks, Pakistan could also utilize a
major power’s, say, the US’s role in South Asia, what Narang called a ‘catalytic
nuclear posture.’24 Nevertheless, the perception for such a rationale existed in the
early 1970s when Pakistan’s Prime Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto argued that
102   Pakistan’s evolving nuclear policy
Pakistan would need nuclear weapons to deter India’s conventional and nuclear
attacks.25 If this remains logical and purely for defense purposes, then this may
not violate the essentials of minimum deterrence that Pakistan officials continue
to declare. In the 1990s, Pakistan had already attained a delivery system (F-­16
aircraft) that could carry and deliver nuclear weapons if India had carried out air
strikes on Kashmir.26 In addition to the pre-­nuclear period, the perception con-
tinues to exist in the post-­nuclear period, too, that Pakistan could pursue an
asymmetric nuclear posture while using nuclear weapons first if absolutely
needed. For example, Pakistan’s Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif stated, after Paki-
stan had carried out nuclear weapons tests that, ‘these weapons are to deter
aggressions, whether nuclear or conventional.’27 These instances reflect that
Pakistan’s doctrinal posture of first use remains less ambiguous at the declara-
tory level, but more ambiguous at the operational level. However, Indian-­
centricity remains at large with an aim to prevent deterrence erosion in
South Asia.

Indian specificity: has the minimum deterred India?

Unlike India, which considers two adversaries (i.e., China and Pakistan) and sim-
ilarly the US, which protects its homeland and extends its nuclear deterrence in
order to ensure a security guarantee to its allies and partners, Pakistan’s nuclear
program is India-­specific only.28 Indian specificity continues to prevail as part of
Pakistan’s evolving nuclear policy. If Pakistan practices this policy option, it
remains consistent with the minimum deterrence that Pakistan officially declared
after its 1998 nuclear tests. Pakistan acquired a nuclear weapons program to follow
India’s suit. Many in Pakistan argue that if India had not acquired nuclear weapons
in the first place, Pakistan would not have gone nuclear.29 Although this statement
remains ambitious, it makes Pakistan’s deterrent force development reactive to
India’s nuclear weapons program. The security dilemma-­driven, action–reaction
theoretical paradigm predicts well that the arms race between India and Pakistan
will sustain as long as nuclear deterrence continues to play a role in these states’
national security policy. However, it is not clear whether Pakistan would opt for a
balance or a parity when it comes to Pakistan’s production of effective counter-
measures against India. It is important to conceptualize that if Pakistan goes for the
parity level, that is, adopting a weapon-­to-weapon strategy that mirrors what its
adversary develops, it may not remain consistent with the essentials of minimum
deterrence conceived here. Retaining balance sans parity, which is to avoid the
security dilemma-­based vicious cycle of the bigger arms race, may remain consist-
ent with the minimum deterrence. In this context, Ambassador Riaz Muhammad
Khan also confirmed that,

as for Pakistan, we need to keep our deterrence credible which does not
mean missile for missile, system for system, bullet for bullet. We may keep
in mind that nuclear weapons capacity is a great level, and also that we do
not have a blank check to pursue any programs.30
 Pakistan’s evolving nuclear policy   103
Nevertheless, Pakistan would at least increase the specific ranges, the accuracy
of the platforms’ survivability, and the penetrability of these deterrent forces in
order to plug the deterrence gaps against its adversary. However, apparently, as
plugging the deterrence gap becomes one of the emerging rationales of Paki-
stan’s evolving nuclear policy, it poses certain implications: First, Pakistan
declares full-­spectrum deterrence, but it is not clear whether this could be a cred-
ible part of the perceived minimum deterrence Pakistan declares, or whether
Pakistan considers a broader shift in its nuclear policy. When it comes to shifting
away from minimum deterrence to a full-­spectrum deterrence, Riaz Muhammad
Khan cautions that, ‘full-­spectrum deterrence gives us no advantage and is
unnecessarily provocative.’31 Second, in doing so, the perceived Indian-­centricity
increases an arms race in South Asia as Pakistan makes an interesting case for
plugging the deterrence gap that, in turn, may not remain consistent with what
Pakistan earlier conceptualized. Third, this eventually drives the South Asian
strategic environment to what, in the classic Cold War period, the US and the
Soviet Union largely practiced by acquiring and inducting new technologies in
their deterrent forces. Arguably, Pakistan’s credible minimum deterrence has
deterred India in the past and the essentials of minimum deterrence predict that it
could also deter its adversary from waging bigger wars in future. The question
is: why increase more when the minimum can deter?

Plugging deterrence gaps: does Pakistan aim to prevent

deterrence erosion?
Pakistan’s countermeasures against its adversary, both at the strategic and the tacti-
cal level, reflect that it would make every effort to plug the deterrence gap where
necessary even if it has to increase its deterrent forces. The strategy for plugging the
deterrence gap in South Asia becomes one of the essentials of Pakistan’s evolving
nuclear policy. Pakistan considers this a realistic approach toward sustaining deter-
rence stability. As the fear exists, Pakistan may presume that if these deterrence
gaps are not filled up in a timely manner, it could severely undermine the credibility
of South Asian deterrence stability in general, and its forces in particular. However,
it can be expected that Pakistan may desire to keep the deterrence balance, if not
parity, vis-­à-vis its adversary. That is, it could closely observe as to where, when,
and how effective countermeasures are needed in reaction to what and when India
develops. One of the Pakistani senior military officials mentioned that,

In response, Pakistan develops effective countermeasures in order to plug

the deterrence gaps. For example, Pakistan’s recent Nasr short range battle-
field nuclear weapons have increased its potential in terms of (a) maneuver-
ability and (b) increased ranges from 60 km to 70 km to deter India’s
evolving CSD that aims at waging limited war against Pakistan.32

Pakistan could buy time to articulate its strategic calculation in this regard
and  produce effective responses to both its adversary’s conventional force
104   Pakistan’s evolving nuclear policy
­ odernization and nuclear forces. But, in doing so, this could potentially put
m
major strategic pressure on Pakistan and increase the security dilemma in South
Asia. Therefore, the rationale of plugging the deterrence gap creates a plausible
debate in South Asia.
First, in the wake of Pakistan’s acquisition of battlefield nuclear weapons in
response to India’s CSD, many may consider filling this gap to be part of a pro-
posed full-­spectrum nuclear deterrence and consider this a shift in Pakistan’s
nuclear policy.33 They also consider this shift to infer that Pakistan could
increase its warheads and delivery systems.34 Nevertheless, if one is to contextu-
alize this under the essentials of Pakistan’s declaratory policy of minimum deter-
rence, then we can have different presumptions in Pakistan that may not
necessarily support the same connotations.35 This reflects a clear contradiction
between what is conceptualized in Pakistan and what is presumed outside.
Second, in Pakistan the assumption could be that plugging gaps may not
necessarily mean a policy shift and/or strides for increasing the number of
nuclear weapons along with their delivery systems, but to prevent deterrence
erosion in South Asia. For example, Pakistan has recently acquired the SLCM
Babur-­III ranging 450 km sea-­based capability to demonstrate its resolve toward
acquiring an assured second strike deterrent force.36 Pakistan could consider
increasing the ranges of existing SLCMs in the near future to enhance its deter-
rence credibility, though it has already demonstrated its commitment to acquir-
ing full-­fledged assured second strike capability by developing a nuclear-­powered
submarine in the near future. Also, Pakistan successfully tested its Ababeel
surface to surface ballistic missile, which could hit multiple targets at the same
time.37 If the ranges of these countermeasures, as part of Pakistan’s nuclear
policy, become only India-­specific to retain a balance, and therefore do not
threaten other states in the Southern Asian region, then it remains consistent with
the conceptual framework of minimum deterrence crafted here. When it comes
to Pakistan’s efforts for developing MIRV technology as part of its effective
countermeasures against what India develops, Ambassador Riaz Muhammad
Khan argues:

Yes, why not MIRV technology if we can afford it and if indeed needed,
and why not more and more precise missiles. My basic objection is to those
weapons systems where deployment leads to loss of centralized control. The
other issue is, of course, resources and priorities.38

Third, in an emerging technological era, Pakistan could develop more sophistic-

ated options in response to a changed South Asian strategic environment while
plugging the perceived deterrence gaps. It is recognized in Pakistan that some of
these existing options could be borrowed from China, whose effective counter-
measures against the US in the form of anti-­satellite missiles, jamming, dis-
rupting, chaffing, thermal shielding, and warheads with a very low infrared
signature could defeat the adversary’s deployed defense system.39 However, it is
not to suggest here that Pakistan must follow how China produces effective
 Pakistan’s evolving nuclear policy   105
countermeasures against the US. In this context, the capacity of China is much
greater and the same may not be applicable to the South Asian context when it
comes to a broader part of nuclear learning, introducing new technologies, and
plugging deterrence gaps. Also, China may have its own limitations in trans-
ferring these new and sophisticated deterrent force-­related technologies to Paki-
stan. Nevertheless, these essentials, embedded as they are with nuclear
ambiguity, pose challenges to Pakistan’s evolving nuclear policy.

Challenges and limitations to Pakistan’s evolving nuclear

policy under the essentials of minimum deterrence
Although the rudimentary pillars of Pakistan’s nuclear policy, which remain
consistent with minimum deterrence, elaborate why and how Pakistan manages
its nuclear deterrent forces along with its credible delivery systems, challenges
and limitations would continue to exist in terms of managing effective command
and control systems, crafting better concealment and dispersal strategies, and
maintaining a reasonable balance between its reliance on nuclear weapons and
conventional forces. Essentials of minimum deterrence entail that Pakistan
addresses these challenges and overcomes the limitations to its evolving nuclear
policy.

The command and control system: what do the essentials of minimum

predict?
One of the crucial challenges for Pakistan after it tested its nuclear weapon capa-
bility was to constitute an effective command and control (C&C) mechanism
significant for keeping the safety, security, and retaining the credibility of its
deterrent forces. Pakistan successfully created the National Command Authority
(NCA) and the SPD, which constituted the combination of both civilian and
military officials to set up a comprehensive command and control mechanism.40
The robustness and comprehensiveness of the command and control system for
Pakistan’s deterrent forces may require essential elements such as the centraliza-
tion, pre-­delegation, doctrinal posture of nuclear uses in addition to a process of
making a broader nuclear policy, and crafting a combination of various types of
nuclear strategies. It is important to conceptualize who controls Pakistan’s
nuclear weapons program. Hence, it may be wrong to presume that Pakistan’s
army has complete authority over Pakistan’s deterrence forces. The NCA,
chaired by civilian Prime Minister, and the SPD, which oversees nuclear
weapons development and employment policies and their related facilities, is the
permanent secretariat. SPD becomes extremely important and significant in this
context. However, without Pakistan’s civilian Prime Minister’s permission,
Pakistan may not use nuclear weapons. But, of course, the Prime Minister may
not be the sole individual who could exclusively undertake this critical decision
at the critical security juncture, where the survival and existence of Pakistan is at
stake. Such a crucial decision-­making process with regard to doctrinal uses of
106   Pakistan’s evolving nuclear policy
nuclear forces may require the consensus mechanism that ensures the civil–mili-
tary even-­handedness as to when, where, and how Pakistan could use nuclear
weapons, only when and if absolutely needed, to follow Peter Feaver’s always/
never conceptual dichotomy.41
In addition, Pakistan could face challenges in crafting and practicing a better
C&C for its nuclear-­powered submarine, which it has already committed as part
of Pakistan’s effective countermeasures against its adversary.42 Although
­Pakistan has developed an SLCM (450 km), it is yet to acquire a nuclear-­
powered submarine with an assured SLBM that could have enhanced survivabil-
ity, increased ranges, and multiplication of warheads to assigned targets.
Pakistan could ensure that its nuclear-­powered submarine travels big distances
when and if needed and stays in deep water long enough in order to avoid vul-
nerability. The nuclear sea-­based strategy with regard to nuclear submarines is
still evolving in South Asia. There is a need for more clarity in the level of threat
perception between India and Pakistan, and for the C&C system both India and
Pakistan would develop. In this context, Feroz Hassan Khan stated that, ‘the
absence of a robust command control mechanism on both sides, and a lack of
clarity in safeguards and doctrine generate uncertainty that could be detrimental
to regional stability.’43 Due to the presence of nuclear ambiguity, Pakistan has
not yet officially declared its naval doctrine. It is not clear what sea-­based
strategy Pakistan would opt for as Pakistan plans to acquire an assured second
strike capability (i.e., a nuclear triad). Nevertheless, Pakistan could have the
option of multiple sea-­based nuclear strategies. All these imperatives, which aim
to overcome these challenges, may remain consistent with the essentials of
minimum deterrence discussed here. The essentials of minimum deterrence
predict that Pakistan would overcome the emerging challenges to its command
and control structure.
First, it could adopt a continuous at-­sea patrol and sea-­based nuclear strategy
that would allow Pakistan to enable its nuclear-­powered submarine to travel
deep in water and cover long distances in order to avoid vulnerabilities and
enhance the credibility of its assured second capability. Also, this strategy could
help prevent the adversary’s surprise attack particularly when the nuclear sub-
marine is stealthy and stays deep in the sea. However, it is not clear whether or
not Pakistan would opt for the same, given the short geographical distance and
Indian specificity as part of its evolving nuclear policy. Second, Pakistan could
opt for a bastion strategy, that is, to keep its nuclear submarine close to its ports.
In doing so, the nuclear submarine can launch SLBM to the assigned targets
from within the periphery of the bastion/port without necessarily traveling deep
in the sea and, therefore, staying submerged for too long. Given the water con-
gestion and the short geographical distances between India and Pakistan, Paki-
stan may initially opt for the bastion strategy. Third, however, keeping a nuclear
submarine at the base for too long could also create vulnerabilities to an adver-
sary’s preemption. There may be a need for a more flexible and innovative
strategy to avoid this rising challenge. This could provide Pakistan with the flex-
ibility to retain various types of options with regard to its evolving sea-­based
 Pakistan’s evolving nuclear policy   107
strategy. However, the complexity of the C&C system related to a nuclear-­
powered submarine either to be centralized or pre-­delegated, Anti-­Submarine
Warfare (ASW), and personnel reliability are few of the important challenges
Pakistan’s nuclear leadership may need to consider in order to craft a better and
effective sea-­based command and control mechanism as a crucial part of its
nuclear policy of minimum deterrence.44 Moreover, it may also need to consider
the challenges it could confront when it comes to dispersal and concealment
strategies in the changed advanced technological era where precision, accuracy,
and penetration to destroy the deeply buried and dispersed targets would matter
greatly.45

Challenges to dispersal and concealment strategies

Since the Cold War period, every nuclear weapons state, including Pakistan, prac-
tices the strategy of dispersal and concealment. Dispersal and concealment strat-
egies become a crucial part of Pakistan’s nuclear policy and the same remains
consistent with the minimum deterrence conceptualized here. This can be for two
significant reasons: (1) nuclear weapons states would desire to keep their war-
heads, and the delivery systems concerned, concealed and dispersed on multiple
locations to prevent the adversary’s first strike capabilities;46 and (2) dispersal,
concealment, and even mobilization of these deterrent forces are designed to
increase their survivability in order to strike back after absorbing the first strike.
Essential elements such as dispersal, concealment, survivability, mobilization, and
penetrability enhance the prospects for achieving a second strike capability, though
a classic second strike capability comes from the development and deployment of
a credible nuclear-­powered submarine. During the peak of the Cold War, the
Soviet Union and the US successfully acquired the assured second strike capability
despite the challenges to their sea-­based command and control mechanism that
eventually could cause an accidental nuclear war.47
The South Asian nuclear environment confronts similar challenges and vul-
nerabilities to their deterrent forces and delivery systems at sea. One of the better
prospects with regard to invulnerabilities of deterrent forces in South Asia is that
India and Pakistan may continue to practice recessed deterrence while de-­mating
their warheads for many, if not all, of their delivery systems in order to prevent
accidental wars and crisis instability.48 In this context, two significant studies by
the SPD are worth quoting. First, for example, Zafar Ali, who has served in the
SPD, stated that,

the smaller size of Pakistan’s nuclear assets and facilities decrease the chal-
lenges of theft as these could be easily secured and guarded. In contrast, a
larger nuclear establishment and the possession of nuclear materials would
correspondingly present more targets and thus more vulnerability.49

Ali believes that ‘Pakistan’s arsenals are kept well dispersed, concealed, and dis-
sembled. Moreover, Pakistan does not ignore the technical improvement given
108   Pakistan’s evolving nuclear policy
the challenges to strategic stability.’50 Second, the primary study carried out by
Luongo and Salik regarding Pakistan’s nuclear safety and security argued that, 

The weapons are believed to be kept separate from the delivery system, with
nuclear cores removed from the detonators. Some estimates claim that the
weapons themselves be scattered at up to six separate locations … nuclear
weapons certainly would be dispersed at multiple sites.51

As Pakistan’s nuclear policy continues to evolve with the changed strategic

environment of South Asia, the dispersal and concealment strategy becomes
even more challenging for Pakistan, particularly in the new era of the counter-
force strategy where the introduction of modernized and sophisticated techno-
logy could become a game changer. This, in turn, could potentially threaten
Pakistan’s deterrent forces and their delivery systems, such as MIRV and low-­
yield nuclear weapons. The introduction of sophisticated technology in terms of
cyber technology, drones, satellites, spying aircraft, precision, and accuracy
make Pakistani deterrent forces vulnerable to an adversary’s preemptive strikes.
For example, the introduction of new technology via its strategic partnership
with technologically advanced countries encourages India to gradually bring
doctrinal modifications in its draft nuclear doctrine toward counterforce strike
capabilities with a confidence to strike first.52 It remains ambiguous as to how
Pakistan could opt for making its dispersal and concealment strategy more soph-
isticated by acquiring its own early warning capabilities from technologically
advanced countries that could include various combinations of drones, satellites,
and spying aircraft to reduce the vulnerabilities of its deterrent forces.53 The
essentials of minimum can predict that Pakistan would make its deterrent forces
invulnerable by crafting sophisticated dispersal and concealment strategies.
With the introduction of advanced technology in South Asia, the challenges
to the dispersal and concealment strategy could exist despite Pakistan’s
minimum number of deterrent forces. Although Pakistan’s small number of
deterrent forces suits the dispersal and concealment strategy, minimum deter-
rence may not be free from the challenges to vulnerabilities.54 Effective counter-
measures can be crafted to deal with such vulnerabilities. One way to avoid such
ambiguity and reliance on nuclear forces, is for Pakistan in the long run to think
of taking effective measures by revamping its nuclear policy and keep flexible
options for acquiring advanced conventional forces to address the vulnerabilities
and challenges to its nuclear deterrence.

The flexible option: can Pakistan strive for an alternative balance?

Although nuclear weapons may not have a strategic complement with conven-
tional forces because of their deterring value preventing major wars compared to
conventional deterrence, an alternative balance between the advanced conven-
tional forces and nuclear weapons can be created. Opting for an alternative
strategy for retaining a balance between the conventional and nuclear forces in
 Pakistan’s evolving nuclear policy   109
order to avoid an increasing reliance on nuclear weapons could remain consist-
ent with minimum deterrence. The flexible option in keeping a balance between
the value of nuclear deterrent forces (i.e., comprising both countervalue and
counterforce targeting strategies) and advanced conventional forces may exist
for Pakistan for a couple of plausible reasons: first, Pakistan may keep the option
to improve its conventional force capabilities rather than merely relying on
nuclear deterrence to address the growing conventional asymmetry in South
Asia. Of course, nuclear weapons deter both bigger and limited nuclear wars and
Pakistan’s nuclear policy of credible minimum deterrence has deterred a large
scale of adversaries’ direct military attacks. But, nuclear weapons cannot be the
panacea for all existing South Asian issues. Second, nuclear weapons confront
challenges and pose certain limitations to the given value of deterrence when it
comes to growing multiple crises, outstanding issues, terrorism, possible cyber-­
attacks, and non-­state actors between India and Pakistan that, in turn, could
escalate to bigger military confrontations, including the possible use of nuclear
weapons in South Asia.55 Third, the acquisition of advanced conventional forces
can also produce effective results for Pakistan in order to quickly achieve its
military goals where the role of nuclear weapons is for deterrence purposes,
deterring bigger wars in South Asia. However, nuclear weapons have not
deterred a number of border skirmishes and serious crises between India and
Pakistan.
It is not to suggest that Pakistan halts producing effective countermeasures
for deterrence purposes when and where it is required to plug the deterrence
gaps as part of its evolving nuclear policy. We now know that during the early
years of the Cold War and later at the peak of a similar era, the US heavily relied
on nuclear weapons as conventional forces.56 Nevertheless, when it comes to
inter-­state rivalry and growing conventional asymmetry between India and Paki-
stan, it can be expected that Pakistan may continue to keep its nuclear deterrence
credible to help deter both conventional and nuclear wars in South Asia. For
example, Ambassador Zamir Akram elaborates,

When it comes to war-­fighting strategy, it is India that has been assertive

trying to find a space for waging a limited war through its evolving strategies
and introduction of new technologies such as CSD, BMD, MIRV, and assured
second strike capability. Pakistan’s policy has been to deter and prevent
India’s option for waging a limited war. Therefore, Pakistan opts for effective
countermeasures against all such Indian deterrent force development.57

There cannot be a significant match between the conventional and nuclear deter-
rence because the latter has confronted lots of failure in the past, more so than
the former.58 However, striking a balance can be significant at the same time
since most of the major powers, including the US, have attempted to achieve
their military and political goals through their advanced conventional force cap-
abilities, though these major powers, especially countries possessing nuclear
weapons, have not compromised on the credibility of their nuclear deterrence.
110   Pakistan’s evolving nuclear policy
Therefore, these major powers, in possessing nuclear deterrence, have kept both
the essence of nuclear deterrence and the acquisition of advanced conventional
forces to use and achieve their military goals especially against the non-­nuclear
weapons states in most of the military warfare confrontations. Regarding the
inter-­state rivalry, it remains ambiguous whether or not Pakistan may continue to
rely on nuclear weapons as long as conventional asymmetry exists between India
and Pakistan. However, Pakistan may have two options to address this issue.
Both of these options may remain consistent with the essentials of minimum per-
ceived here. First, it may successfully contribute to creating a Strategic Restraint
Regime (SRR) that could address the issue of conventional imbalances in South
Asia that, in turn, could reduce the strategic pressure on Pakistan. A unilateral or
bilateral creation of an SRR could become complex and challenging. Other
nuclear weapons states, say, China at the trilateral level and the US at the quadri-
lateral level, could help support the creation of an SRR in South Asia.59 Second,
Pakistan could also take initiatives in terms of acquiring advanced conventional
forces at some point, in order to keep a balance with its nuclear forces. In doing
so, it could reduce the reliance on its nuclear deterrent forces. Nevertheless, this
could require a bigger economy and effective financial management. Relying
less on nuclear forces and striving for conventional force advancement reflects
that Pakistan could get ready to play an assertive role not only to ease off on
international pressure, but also to strive for a nuclear legitimacy in South Asia
under the severe security dilemma-­driven conditions of fear, uncertainty, and the
threat of war.

Conclusion
This chapter aims at analyzing whether Pakistan is racing toward a nuclear
force balance sans parity under the essentials of minimum deterrence while
conceptualizing Pakistan’s evolving nuclear policy after completing nearly two
decades of nuclearization, which still remains absent from their official draft
nuclear doctrine. The chapter concludes that if Pakistan tries to achieve a parity
level, that is, a bigger number of deterrent forces, sophisticated delivery systems
such as heavy bombers, aircraft carriers, a BMD system, and ICBMs, which
may go beyond Indian specificity, then it may not remain consistent with the
minimum deterrence Pakistan conceptualized earlier. However, if Pakistan
merely looks for a balance as part of its strategic compulsion, such as producing
effective countermeasures where absolutely required in order to prevent the
total erosion of deterrence in South Asia, then its nuclear policy could remain
consistent with the minimum deterrence conceived here. Essentially, minimum
deterrence entails that Pakistan continues to consider its nuclear weapons for
deterrence purposes and associate nuclear weapons with its security and territo-
rial integrity. Also, Pakistan ensures to keep its deterrent forces credible under
the dynamics of minimum deterrence, though it becomes hard to define and
identify these principles, as minimum remains a non-­fixed entity in South Asia.
If Pakistan continues to add more nuclear warheads in response to Indian
 Pakistan’s evolving nuclear policy   111
d­ evelopments just to keep a balance, then it may remain consistent with the
minimum deterrence it conceptualized earlier. Nevertheless, nuclear ambiguity
reflects how Pakistan increases its nuclear forces whenever it requires, miti-
gating the security dilemma and maintaining strategic balance to prevent war.
Also, it may rely on these nuclear forces under the essentials of minimum deter-
rence. Pakistan considers that minimum deterrence embedded with nuclear
ambiguity would suit Pakistan’s evolving nuclear policy. In addition, under the
essentials of minimum deterrence, it is unlikely that Pakistan would define red
lines when it comes to its doctrinal posture of nuclear use because defining
nuclear red lines would become ambitious and could add more ambiguity
within Pakistan’s evolving nuclear policy.
That being said, as part of the policy implications for Pakistan in general, and
the South Asian region in particular, this chapter implies that on the one hand
nuclear ambiguity helps shape the essential pillars of Pakistan’s nuclear policy
but, on the other hand, too much nuclear ambiguity could force Pakistan to con-
front various challenges to its nuclear policy, doctrinal posture, and its efforts for
securing a legitimate space in the international non-­proliferation regime. This
strategic approach of practicing too much ambiguity might encourage Pakistan
to consider a bigger arms race that, in turn, drives Pakistan away from keeping a
deterrence balance. Eventually, this may not remain consistent with the
minimum deterrence conceptualized here. In the changed South Asian strategic
environment, Pakistan may need to elaborate in greater detail the broader pillars
of its nuclear policy, which, in turn, could (a) entail some transparency required
by the international non-­proliferation regime, particularly when Pakistan tries to
secure a space for nuclear legitimacy; (b) ease off the mounting international
pressure that is tagging Pakistan to be the fastest growing nuclear weapons state;
(c) help devise strategies to prevent major wars; and (d) strengthen deterrence
stability in South Asia.

Notes
  1 Mahmud Ali Durrani, ‘Pakistan’s Strategic Thinking and the Role of Nuclear
Weapons,’ pp.  1–53 (Albuquerque: Sandia National Laboratories, 2004): www.
sandia.gov/cooperative-­monitoring-center/_assets/documents/sand2004-3375p.pdf.
  2 William Epstein, ‘Why States Go and Don’t Go Nuclear,’ ANNALS of the Amer­ican
Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 430, No. 1 (1977), pp. 16–28; Peter R.
Lavoy, ‘Nuclear Myths and the Causes of Nuclear Proliferation,’ Security Studies,
Vol. 2, No. 3/4 (1993), pp. 192–212; Bradley A. Thayer, ‘The Causes of Nuclear Pro-
liferation and the Utility of the Nuclear Non-­Proliferation Regime,’ Security Studies,
Vol.  4, No.  3 (1995), pp.  463–519; Scott D. Sagan, ‘Why Do States Build Nuclear
Weapons? Three Models in Search of a Bomb,’ International Security, Vol. 21, No. 3
(1996), pp. 54–86.
  3 Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, ‘Bhutto’s Declaration to the UN General Assembly,’ in A. Jalal
and H. Khan (eds.), Reshaping Foreign Policy: Articles, Statements, and Speeches:
1948–1966, Vol. 1 (Karachi: Pakistan Publications, 1965), p. 221.
  4 Munir Ahmed Khan, ‘Speeches on Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons,’ (March 20, 1999):
www.nuclearfiles.org/menu/key-­issues/nuclear-­weapons/issues/policy/pakistani-­
nuclear-policy/munir%20ahmad%20khan%27s%20speech.html.
112   Pakistan’s evolving nuclear policy
  5 ‘Bhutto’s Larkana Declaration December 29, 1966 on Pakistan and Nuclear Prolifera-
tion,’ cited in S. Wolpert, Zulfi Bhutto of Pakistan His Life and Times (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1993), p. 113.
  6 Durrani, ‘Pakistan’s Strategic Thinking and the Role of Nuclear Weapons,’ p. 23.
  7 Ibid.
  8 Zafar Khan, Pakistan’s Nuclear Policy: A Minimum Credible Deterrence (London &
New York: Routledge, 2015).
  9 Quoted in George Perkovich, ‘A Nuclear Third Way in South Asia,’ Foreign Policy,
Vol. 91 (Summer, 1993), pp. 85–104, 88–89.
10 On India’s nuclear forces, see Hans M. Kristensen and Robert S. Norris, ‘Indian
Nuclear Forces, 2017,’ Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, Vol.  73, No.  4 (2017),
pp. 205–209. For Pakistan’s nuclear forces, see Hans M. Kristensen, Robert S. Norris,
and Julia Diamond, ‘Pakistani Nuclear Forces, 2018,’ Bulletin of Atomic Scientists,
Vol. 74, No. 5 (2018), pp. 348–358.
11 Authors’ interview with Pakistan former Foreign Secretary Riaz Muhammad Khan in
Islamabad, February 2019.
12 Authors’ interview with the former Pakistan Foreign Minister Abdul Sattar, Islama-
bad, September 18, 2012.
13 Authors’ interview with Lt. General (Retd) Naeem Khalid Lodhi in Rawalpindi in
February 2019.
14 Authors’ interview with Pakistan former Foreign Secretary Riaz Muhammad Khan in
Islamabad, February 2019.
15 Scott D. Sagan, ‘The Evolution of Pakistan and Indian Nuclear Doctrine,’ in Scott D.
Sagan (ed.), Inside Nuclear South Asia (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press,
2009), pp. 219–264, 219.
16 Authors’ interview with Khalid Banuri former Director General Arms Control and
Disarmament Affairs, SPD, Pakistan, February 22, 2019.
17 Khalid Kidwai, ‘An Interview with the Italian Research Group Landau Network,’ in
C.P. Ramusino and Maurizio Martellini (eds.), Nuclear Safety, Nuclear Stability and
Nuclear Strategy in Pakistan (Landau Network: London, January 21, 2002), p. 7.
18 This was confirmed to the second author of this volume during his interview at the
SPD, September 2012. It was also mentioned by General Kidwai in one of the recent
international conferences on South Asian Strategic Stability, in Islamabad.
19 ‘Nuclear Posture Review,’ The US Department of Defense (2010): www.defense.gov/
News/Special-­Reports/NPR/.
20 ‘Nuclear Posture Review,’ The US Department of Defense (2018): www.defense.gov/
News/Special-­Reports/0218_npr/.
21 For a detailed Russian nuclear strategy, see Stephen J. Blank, Russian Nuclear
Weapons: Past, Present, and Future, Strategic Studies Institute (2011): www.offnews.
info/downloads/pub1087.pdf.
22 For interesting analysis on this, see George Perkovich, Do Unto Others: Toward a
Defensible Nuclear Doctrine (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for Inter-
national Peace, 2013).
23 ‘India asks Pakistan to accept “no-­first use pact,” ’ The Independent Dhaka (July 9, 1998).
24 Vipin Narang, Nuclear Strategy in the Modern Era: Regional Powers and Inter-
national Conflict (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2014).
25 Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, The Myth of Independence (London: Oxford University Press,
1969).
26 Devin T. Hagerty, ‘Nuclear Deterrence in South Asia: The 1990 Indo-­Pakistani
Crisis,’ International Security, Vol. 20, No. 3 (1996), p. 102.
27 ‘Statement by Nawaz Sharif, May 28, 1998,’ Disarmament Diplomacy, No. 26 (May
1998).
28 Bhumitra Chakma, Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons (London & New York: Routledge,
2009).
 Pakistan’s evolving nuclear policy   113
29 Authors’ interview with Professor Zafar Iqbal Cheema, currently President SVI
Islamabad, September 2012.
30 Authors’ interview with Pakistan former Foreign Secretary Riaz Muhammad Khan in
Islamabad, February 2019.
31 Ibid.
32 Authors’ interview with a Pakistan retired senior military official in Islamabad,
February 2019.
33 Toby Dalton and Michael Krepon, ‘A Normal Nuclear Pakistan,’ Carnegie Endow-
ment for International Peace and Stimson Center (2015), pp. 1–48.
34 Ibid.
35 Zafar Khan and Rizwana Abbasi, ‘Pakistan and the International Nuclear Order,’
Islamabad Papers, Institute of Strategic Studies Islamabad, Nuclear Paper Series,
No. 1 (2016), pp. 1–80.
36 Staff Reporter, ‘Pakistan test-­fires nuclear-­capable submarine-­launched cruise
missile,’ Dawn (January 10, 2017): www.dawn.com/news/1307531.
37 Staff Reporter, ‘Pakistan conducts first flight test of surface to surface Ababeel
missile,’ Dawn (January 24, 2017): https://tribune.com.pk/story/1305179/pakistan-­
conducts-first-­flight-test-­surface-surface-­missile/.
38 Authors’ interview with Pakistan former Foreign Secretary Riaz Muhammad Khan in
Islamabad, February 2019.
39 Zafar Khan, ‘India’s Ballistic Missile Defense: Implications for South Asian
Deterrence Stability,’ The Washington Quarterly, Vol.  40, No.  3 (2017),
pp. 127–142.
40 Naeem Salik, Learning to Live with the Bomb: Pakistan 1998–2016 (London: Oxford
University Press, 2017).
41 Peter D. Feaver, Guarding the Guardians, Civilian Control of Nuclear Weapons in
the United States (Ithaca, NY and London: Cornell University Press, 1992).
42 Syed Sammer Abbas, ‘India developing atomic submarine: Tasneem Aslam,’ Dawn
(December 13, 2016).
43 Feroz Hassan Khan, ‘The India–Pakistan Nuclear Rivalry at Sea,’ Laps Dialogue, The
online magazine of the Institute of Asia and Pacific Studies, Nottingham (June 16,
2017): https://iapsdialogue.org/2017/06/16/india-­pakistan-nuclear-­rivalry-at-­sea/.
44 Khan, ‘The India–Pakistan Nuclear Rivalry at Sea.’
45 Colin S. Gray, Strategy for Chaos: Revolution in Military Affairs and the Evidence of
History (London: Frank Cass, 2002).
46 For interesting analysis on this, see Albert Wohlstetter, ‘The Delicate Balance of
Terror,’ Foreign Affairs, Vol. 37 (1959), pp. 211–233.
47 For a comparative analysis on the US and the Soviet Union Nuclear Submarine for an
assured second strike capability, see Thorn W. Ford, ‘Ballistic Missile Submarine of
the United States and the Soviet Union: A Comparison of Systems and Doctrine,’ US
Department of Defense (1982), pp. 1–67.
48 See Dean Wilkening, Kenneth Watman, Michael Kennedy, and Richard Darilek, Stra-
tegic Defense and Crisis Stability, Santa Monica, CA: Rand Cooperation, 1989.
49 Zafar Ali, ‘Pakistan’s nuclear assets and threats of nuclear terrorism,’ Washington,
DC: Stimson Center, 2007.
50 Authors’ interview with Zafar Ali in SPD, September 2012.
51 Kenneth N. Luongo and Naeem Salik, ‘Building Confidence in Pakistan’s Nuclear
Security,’ Arms Control Today (December 1, 2007), pp. 1–10.
52 For interesting analysis, see Christopher Clary and Vipin Narang, ‘India’s Counter-
force Temptations: Strategic Dilemmas, Doctrine, and Capabilities,’ International
Security, Vol. 43, No. 3 (Winter 2018/2019), pp. 7–52.
53 For interesting analysis, see Munir Akram, ‘The nuclear dimension,’ Dawn (October
1, 2017).
54 Khan, Pakistan’s Nuclear Policy: A Minimum Credible Deterrence, pp. 44–45.
114   Pakistan’s evolving nuclear policy
55 Andrew Phillips, ‘Horsemen of the Apocalypse? Jihadist Strategy and Nuclear Instab-
ility in South Asia’ International Politics, Vol. 49, No. 3 (2012), pp. 297–317.
56 Freedman, The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy, chapter 4, pp.  43–59 & chapter 5,
pp. 72–86.
57 Authors’ interview with Pakistan former Ambassador Zamir Akram who has served
as a permanent member of the United Nations, February 2019.
58 John J. Mearsheimer, Conventional Deterrence (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press,
1983).
59 Zafar Khan, ‘Prospects for an Arms Control Regime in South Asia,’ The Washington
Quarterly, Vol. 39, No. 1 (2016), pp. 171–189.
5 Crises dynamics and the
escalation dominance strategy
in South Asia

Introduction
The enduring rivalry between India and Pakistan is replete with perplexed under-
standing, fear, suspicion, uncertainty, and hostility. The two states have fought
many wars (1948, 1965, 1971, and 1999), witnessed a series of crises, and
battled routine border skirmishes since 1947. This study refers to T.V. Paul’s
categorization of enduring rivalry, where he opines that

enduring rivalry is characterized by a persistent, fundamental and long term

incompatibility of goals between the two states which manifests itself in the
basic attitudes of the parties towards each other as well as in recurring
violent or potentially violent clashes over a long period of time.1

Kenneth Waltz, a leading defensive realist and nuclear optimist, advocated2 that
nuclear arsenals guarantee peace and resolve countries’ complex security prob-
lems. Twenty years have now passed and nuclear India and Pakistan still con-
tinue to perceive threats from each other with an intense nuclear arms build-­up
driven by a severe security dilemma. Despite both following up on various com-
munication channels, and people’s aspiration to maintain peace and harmony,
the two states fail to achieve peace. The following plausible factors make
endemic rivalry enduring and peace unachievable: conflicting interests such as
the inability to agree on a distinct strategic direction and vision (religious and
political patterns), and the legacy of the Redcliff Award (demarcation of bound-
aries resulting in territorial disputes); a convoluted history (facts and realities
clouded by sentiments and politico-­religious and ideological narratives, blood-
shed as a consequence of Hindu–Muslim riots and partition); the two states’
inclination for alignments with extra-­regional power and subordinating their pol-
icies (external balancing) and their ‘nefarious designs’;3 and the security–insecu-
rity paradox4 – based on misplaced suspicion, fear, and competition to reduce
the power differential to maintain equilibrium and maximize security against
each other. Even the similarities, though just a few, in most indices (cultural,
similar history, language) have been mired with hostility, hate speeches, antago-
nism, and mistrust. Today, these attributes are embedded in the societies of these
116   Crises dynamics and escalation dominance
two countries as a never-­ending ‘vicious cycle’ of a security dilemma-­driven
action–reaction.
The Kargil episode (1999), the Twin Peaks incidents (2001–2002) with sub-
sequent frequent violations at the LoC, and the routine border skirmishes have
made this region more volatile than ever before, thus making trust building
between India and Pakistan difficult to achieve. An additional crisis took place
against the backdrop of the terrorist attack in Mumbai (2008) that further exacer-
bated mistrust and the communication gap between the two nuclear weapons
states. Recent events – such as the terrorist attack on the Indian military base in
Uri,5 India’s unverified claims of launching retaliatory surgical strikes6 inside
Pakistan, and Kulbhushan Yadav’s (an Indian military officer) arrest7 in Balo-
chistan, and renewed violence and uprising in Kashmir after the death of Burhan
Wani (commander of Hizbul Mujahedeen who was killed in an encounter by
Indian security forces) – have intensified the conflicting trends between India
and Pakistan. The crisis situation between India and Pakistan has further intensi-
fied in the wake of the latest suicide attack in Pulwama8 in the Indian-­occupied
Kashmir, killing at least 40 Indian paramilitary troops, which was claimed by the
proscribed organization, Jaish-­e-Mohammad. This is discussed in the subsequent
sections of this Chapter.
First, it is important to note that this chapter focuses on investigating the
dynamics of conflicts between India and Pakistan and their deepening complexi-
ties that, in turn, challenge regional stability and prosperity. Following the pre-
ceding chapters that explain the evolving nuclear strategies of nuclear India and
Pakistan, the argument of this chapter is that nuclear deterrence may remain
unstable and peace fragile in South Asia due to each state’s distinct strategic
interests and conflicting directions. Moreover, this chapter argues that although
the nature of the crisis has shifted in frequency and scale, crises will continue to
occur that could lead to a further deteriorating peace process between the South
Asian nuclear states. To understand key crises and their prospects for key lessons
learned by India and Pakistan, this chapter first begins to understand briefly the
origin of the enduring rivalry between India and Pakistan and the possibility of
future crises in South Asia. This chapter builds a section on India’s war-­fighting
or escalation-­dominance strategies, asking why India appears to be heading
toward these strategies and how their execution could be challenging for India in
general and South Asian strategic stability in particular.

What makes Indo-­Pakistan rivalry enduring?

Prior to 1947, there were two leading ethnic groups envisioning distinct ideolo-
gies with different religious practices under British rule: Hindu constituted the
majority and Muslims were in the minority. The Indian national congress under
the leadership and guidance of Mohandas Gandhi and Jawaharlal Nehru, with
Hindu majority membership, has envisioned the political vision of a ‘Greater
India’9 – based on a vision of secularism and liberalism, the slogan ‘the Greater
India Vision’ can be translated and interpreted through the prism of realism –
 Crises dynamics and escalation dominance   117
that means India ‘would play a greater-­power role in world affairs commensu-
rate with its size and power potential.’12 Cumulative Ghandian and Nehruvian
philosophy, ‘Greater India’ – (the rise of India as a great power – the maximiza-
tion of power and expansionism] – is a concept that derives its power from Kau-
tilya’s Arthashastra13 and Mahabharata philosophy,14 rooted in the power-­based
Machiavellian realist school.15 The manifestation and latent presence of Kautilyan
strategic thought cannot be discounted in Indian policy and this confirms India’s
power accumulation on its status-­driven ambitions.
On the other hand, the Muslim League headed by Muhammad Ali Jinnah, in
March 1940 expressed the merit of a two-­nation theory and desired the creation
of Pakistan as a separate state for Indian Muslims. This theory was the founda-
tion for partition in India in 1947, which declared that Muslims and Hindus were
by every definition two separate nations. Therefore, Muslims should have an
autonomous homeland – Jinnah sought self-­determination on the basis of the
‘two-­nation theory’ and fought for a separate land on religious lines. It is
important to note that the vision of the League and Congress was divided, even
in the disposition of the princely states, on strategic, military and economic
affairs.16 In addition to the above differences, during the mid-­1940s, Hindu–
Muslim riots emerged with acute intensity as a consequence of which British
rulers realized that partition may bring peace for them. However, when the last
British Viceroy Lord Louis Mountbatten failed to address the differences
between the two major parties because of their distinct vision (Hindu–Muslim
clashes emerged with intense escalatory potential at that time) in 1946, a Cabinet
Mission sent by the Great Britain proposed that a union between British India
and the Princely States be established and a constitution drafted.17 In August
1947, Britain implemented its earlier decision to partition the religiously and
ethnically diverse Indian Empire into two independent and sovereign states:
India and Pakistan in 1947. Subsequently, this partition gave rise to territorial
conflicts that have shaped the South Asian regional environment. Argument
proves, based on the above notion, that the most significant aspect of the split in
1947 was the conflict in ideology (Muslim-­majority identity versus Hindu-­
dominated India).
The primary question is: how was mistrust generated between the two states
in the first place? First, it is important to review here just a little, of what hap-
pened after the Indian Independence Act of 1947, which intensified Pakistan’s
fear and created irresolvable mistrust between the two states. During the parti-
tion process, 562 princely states had the option to join either India or Pakistan.
Out of these, three princely states decided to stay independent from both India
and Pakistan: Jammu and Kashmir in the North, Hyderabad in the South, and
Junagadh in the West. While the rulers of the latter two were Muslim, the
majority of their population was Hindu and their accession to India occurred
through, extensively, Indian military action. New Delhi, later legitimized these
accessions through subsequent ‘perverted’ referenda. Only Jammu and Kashmir
emerged as the most contentious, given its geographical proximity to Pakistan
and a majority Muslim population. The Hindu ruler of Kashmir, Maharaja Hari
118   Crises dynamics and escalation dominance
Singh, first chose to remain independent from both India and Pakistan. But in
October 1947, disturbances occurred inside Kashmir. India claimed that it was
the tribal forces from Pakistan’s Northwest Frontier Province that attacked
Kashmir, whereas Pakistan contended that it was the local revolt against Raja’s
intentions of acceding to India. Nevertheless, the Maharaja sought India’s help
and signed an agreement to accede to India, and then the Indian forces inter-
vened. This conflict turned into a short war between the two states, which
lasted until the end of 1948. Moreover, the ‘riots that followed in 1947–48 left
more than a million people dead in six months and displaced upwards of 15
million people.’18 Thus, territorial clashes and the overwhelming risk of war in
the region greatly affected the Pakistani nation’s psyche. Thereafter, Kashmir
became a major territorial dispute between India and Pakistan. This event had
set a serious precedent for enduring rivalry, antagonism, and animosity by
building the Pakistani strategic planners and elites’ perception and direction
against India.
Additionally, in 1948, India took the Kashmir dispute to the United Nations
Security Council and agreed to conduct a plebiscite on Kashmir in order to
address the issue according to the wishes of the people of Kashmir. Neverthe-
less, India never allowed this plebiscite to be held up to this date thus bypassing
global rules and norms and building claims that there were substantial interfer-
ences by the Pakistani military inside Kashmir to incite insurgency. This fact
further increased Pakistan’s concerns toward India’s exceptional lack of sincer-
ity on bilateral issues, thereby giving rise and strengthening the notion of expan-
sionist and hegemonic designs in the region based on realists’ guided offensive
political pattern. The question here arises as to why Kashmir became an
important issue for both India and Pakistan. Both the countries have distinct
understandings and views on the Kashmir issue, which has become the core
problem between nuclear India and nuclear Pakistan. For Ganguly and Hagerty,
the Indian view on Kashmir remained that ‘incorporating Kashmir was important
because Kashmir, a Muslim majority state, would demonstrate India’s funda-
mental commitment to civic, secular nationalism and that a Muslim-­majority
state could thrive within a secular polity.’19 This was also central to what Indians
believe is the cohesion and integrity of secular India; leaving Kashmir would
mean other states could ask for independence or accession to Pakistan. For Paki-
stan, the possession of Kashmir means ‘Pakistan’s identity would remain incom-
plete without the incorporation of Kashmir.’20 In the present authors’ view,
Kashmir became important for Pakistan for certain reasons: for example, cultural
and religious coherence; sources of water – rivers that flow from Kashmir; a
valued ecosystem; strategic location – a bridge between Pakistan and China; and
most importantly, for Pakistan it becomes a question of human rights and inter-
national law due to a pending plebiscite that did not take place up to this date.
The above key factors suggest that Pakistan’s inherited ‘strategic culture’
became central to the fear of Indian regional dominance. This study refers to
Jack Snyder’s interpretation of ‘strategic culture,’ which means the ‘sum total of
ideas, conditioned emotional responses, and patterns of habitual behavior that
 Crises dynamics and escalation dominance   119
members of a national strategic community have acquired through instruction or
imitation and share with each other.’21
Second, a distinct political vision also contributed in aggravating mistrust and
rivalry. For example, it is important to note that the Indian leaders such as Sardar
Vallabhbhai Patel and Nehru until 1947 were not in favor of Pakistan becoming
a separate state. For them, India and the Muslim majority provinces in the north-
west and northeast, which were to make up an independent Pakistan, would have
been a more powerful and successful country had they remained together
because of the geo-­strategic location and economic potential of these lands. This
validates the realists’ guided Greater Indian vision here. Then reluctantly in June
1947, they accepted the inevitable for two reasons: (1) Independent Pakistan
would not last long, and (2) in order to avoid the communal violence that could
ensue post British-­withdrawal. As Patel expressed it, ‘they had seventy-­five to
eighty per cent of India, which they could develop and make strong according to
their genius. The [Muslim] League could develop the rest of the country.’22 This
serves to undermine the argument that an undivided – but internally disunited –
India might have had a greater influence in the world.
Third, elites’ hate speeches, statements, and behavior have also substantially
contributed to fortifying this rivalry. For example, there was a widespread belief
among the Congress party politicians that Pakistan’s independence would be of
short duration and that bankruptcy and a lack of sufficient national assets for
statehood in terms of buildings and institutions would prompt a return to
‘Mother’ India and a corrective to the unwanted ‘vivisection’ of 1947. Nehru
stated their viewpoint succinctly: ‘we expected that partition would be tempo-
rary, that Pakistan was bound to come back to us. None of us guessed how much
the killing(s) and the crisis in Kashmir would embitter relations.’23 Historically
driven radical concepts, like Akhund Bharat, and Hindutva, populated with anti-­
Pakistan sentiments, have been extensively used by political parties and religious
extremists in India – apparently to remain relevant in their respective spheres of
domestic influence and power. Hindu fundamentalists generated an extreme anti-
­Pakistan drive, which intensified partition. Cohen confirms that

Veer Savarkar, then the leader of the militant Hindu revivalist group Rash-
triya Swayamsevak Sang (RSS), has opposed partition on the ground that
India was a cultural and religious entity with a Muslim minority that did not
merit the privileges of becoming a separate state.24

Leading political parties, the Indian Jana Sangh Party and the BJP, later adopted
the postulates of this group. Though the present study believes that the larger
Indian society is not truly radicalized by these extremists’ thoughts and radical
ideologues, Pakistan has always figured these as principles that have motivated
Indian foreign and military policies.
Fourth, consequences of partition and the distribution of assets also raised
fear in Pakistani minds. For example, the first consequence was the recurring
sense of Pakistan being discriminated against at the time of partition, which
120   Crises dynamics and escalation dominance
stems from the most basic perception: that the country had been treated
‘unfairly.’ Disputes followed the distribution of military and civil assets between
the two states, the precise demarcation of the geographically separated new
union of West and East Pakistan, the economic and social imbalance between
the two regions, and the poor infrastructure inherited from the Raj. Human rights
violations, at the hands of Indians, and the resulting resentment and suspicion
between different religious communities were other consequences. Partition left
hundreds of thousands of casualties. The precise figures are not known,25 but
perhaps more than a million migrants were slaughtered, while the remaining reli-
gious minorities experienced discrimination.26 A large number of civil servants
and military left their families trapped in communal riots and mass migration.27
It is important to note that ‘about 7.2 million Indian Muslims migrated to Paki-
stan, forming about one-­fourth of the population of West Pakistan [whereas] 5.5
million Hindus and Sikhs left Pakistan for India.’28 The additional phenomenon
was the lack of inherited institutional structures. Most of the developed institu-
tions abandoned by the British went to India. For example, India inherited the
state buildings in Delhi and the Parliament. Pakistan had to create alternatives
for itself in Karachi. Likewise, the training arrangements for the Indian civil ser-
vices were inherited by India, and Pakistan had to develop its own. The eco-
nomic heart of undivided India was Bombay, which of course went to India.
More importantly, the distribution of the natural resources of the Indus River
system between India and Pakistan was linked to the issue of Kashmir. Presum-
ably, had the water issue been resolved, the Kashmir question might not have
existed in such an acute form. Any solution to the Jammu and Kashmir question
is dependent on the fair distribution of river waters. Within this, Pakistan identi-
fied India from the outset as its principal threat and adversary. Right from the
start, India’s revisionist behavior had led to the creation of a severe and unre-
solvable security dilemma in the region.
The consequence of partition shifted intra-­state rivalry into inter-­state con-
flict between India and Pakistan. More so, the consequences of partition created
a set of harsh realities which helped shape the national psyche of Pakistan and
helped develop an India-­centric Pakistani strategic culture – a psyche of a new
nation toward the larger and powerful India – as an ‘antagonist,’ as never
friendly, and as an anti-­Muslim neighbor. The Indian hegemonic approach and
threat of the Indian army posed to Pakistan’s borders became the immediate
concern after independence in 1947. Pakistan professed India to be an arch-­rival
and a hegemonic player, focused on breaking and dismantling Pakistan that led
to create anti-­Indian sentiment in Pakistan thereby empowering this country’s
military and security apparatus against India. Pakistan’s strategic directions
have been guided by these factors, largely: survival as an independent state;
Kashmir to be ‘an integral part of Pakistan’ – that is, as Jinnah called it, a
jugular vein of Pakistan; looking outward for bridging the power disparity –
focusing on external balancing; and India – a clear, direct, and existential threat
to its security. Whereas in the Indian context, two strands (power maximization
and Hindu-­identity) and maximization of security against both China and India
 Crises dynamics and escalation dominance   121
help understand India’s strategic orientation and thinking. Built upon this
psyche, the two states fought a series of wars that led to making the rivalry
between the two states enduring and complex.

Crisis dynamics – pre 1998

The two states fought a major conventional war in 1965, over the status of
Jammu and Kashmir, resulting in heightened domestic unrest. The war left thou-
sands of casualties on both sides and had considerable implications for Paki-
stan’s defense policy. The question reopened Pakistan’s inferiority in
conventional weapons vis-­à-vis India. Instead of helping Pakistan, the US
banned the supply of weaponry and imposed arms embargoes on both states.29
Six years after the 1965 war, the Indo-­Pakistan war of 1971 began as a civil war
in the eastern wing of Pakistan, and ended up with India’s involvement and
resulting in the dismemberment of Pakistan (East Pakistan becoming Bangla-
desh). This war originated neither from inherited hatred and antagonism between
India and Pakistan, nor from dissatisfaction at the distribution of the territory of
Kashmir, but was instead triggered by open military intervention for reasons of
its own state interest. For Khan and Lavoy, the Indian intrusion – ‘blitzkrieg-­
type operations following a nine months’ long insurgency and civil war’30
resulted in the breaking up of Pakistan and the emergence of Bangladesh. Once
again Pakistan received no support from its western alliance system such as
Southeast Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO) and the Central Treaty Organiza-
tion (CENTO) during this war (as a result of which, Pakistan later withdrew
from CENTO in 1979). Ganguly and Hegerty confirmed that ‘India’s military
plans for an eventual war with Pakistan included the support, training, and
arming of the “MuktiBahini” (literally liberation force) composed of disaffected
officers from the Pakistani Army and other men of Bengali origin.’31 India pro-
vided substantial support to this organization, which wreaked havoc across East
Pakistan during the late summer of 1971, thus exploiting the Pakistani Army’s
ability to face an Indian military onslaught later that year.32 The study argues
that East Pakistan might have become a valuable strategic asset with which Paki-
stan could have sought to counterbalance India, but it has always proved difficult
to manage, given the distances involved and the lack of a land corridor between
the western and eastern parts of the federation. Richard Bonney argued that the
break-­up of the federation had positive implications for Pakistan’s security –
through which it emerged as a stronger and more stable state that could focus its
energies more effectively.33 Nevertheless, this partition of Pakistan in 1971 pro-
voked a profound crisis for the former West Pakistan. A Pakistani military
former official expressed his feelings thus:

ever since the creation of Pakistan we have been faced with an existential
threat from India and this threat came to the fore … with the event of 1971
when Pakistan was divided through an Indian invasion and Bangladesh was
created.34
122   Crises dynamics and escalation dominance
The disintegration of Pakistan was the consequence of the Indira Doctrine
(under the second longest-­serving Indian PM 1966–1977 and 1980–1984). The
Indira Doctrine was a manifestation of Indian expansionism, power maximiza-
tion, and the realists-­guided material-­based, ‘greater India’ philosophy. The
hatred and antagonism was embedded when Brasstacks – a large-­scale Indian
military exercise – began in November 1986 and was followed up to December
in the same year with an offensive operation in a mobile battleground environ-
ment. This served to heighten the fear and uncertainty in Pakistan that India was
planning to invade and destroy its nuclear facilities.

India used Brasstacks to provoke Pakistan into war. The real plan was to
attack Pakistan’s Punjab and cut off access to Sindh. The objective was to
pulverize Pakistan before its nuclear capability matured and made it nearly
impossible for India to wage a massive conventional battle without risking
an atomic war.35

This operation continued until mid-­1987. The largest Indian maneuvers took
place in the deserts of Rajasthan, 100 miles (160 km) from the Pakistani border,
in the sensitive regions of Kashmir, but this served only to heighten concerns in
Pakistan that India was planning to invade and destroy its nuclear facilities.
Indeed, Indian General Krishnaswami Sunderji (who initiated this exercise) had
a plan to provoke Pakistan into war.36 Sunderji himself stated that ‘the Brasstacks
crisis was the last all-­conventional crisis in which India could have used its con-
ventional superiority to destroy Pakistan’s conventional and nuclear weapons
capability.’37 By mid-­January, armies of the two states were facing each other on
the frontiers. Each states’ perception regarding the other’s intentions reached a
dangerous point – mistrust aggravated by grounded misperceptions about each
other. When the situation was heightened, Pakistani high-­profile elites trans-
mitted the message that ‘we shall use the bomb if our existence and sovereignty
is threatened.’38 It was the nuclear deterrence which helped the two states to
initiate negotiations on January 31, 1987 on a diplomatic level. On February 4,
the same year, the Indo-­Pakistan consultations agreed to pull out their forces that
were deployed on the border.39 This incident was another setback to the regional
complexities and peace that had been exploited miserably, driving Pakistan into
a severe security dilemma.
Within these realities, the Kashmir dispute re-­emerged not long after the
Brasstacks affair. Kashmir, a Muslim majority state was in open rebellion in
1989 against the state of India. India blamed Pakistan for waging an unconven-
tional or asymmetrical war with India by providing assistance to the Kashmiri
Muslims, which the Indians called provoking terrorism. In response, Islamabad
insisted that it gave only moral support to the Kashmiri ‘freedom fighters.’ India
did not consider the Pakistani account thus; these Pakistani freedom fighters
were perceived terrorists in India – which ushered in a new dimension to the
regional threat spectrum. This crisis and aggressive behavior by both states again
brought the region close to war, for the second time since 1971. The deployment
 Crises dynamics and escalation dominance   123
of forces on a large scale around the Line of Control – the demarcation line
between India and Pakistan in Kashmir – proves the above argument. This crisis
situation was very close to eruption and escalation from a low-­intensity to a
large-­scale war when the US played a decisive role as a crisis manager, sending
Robert Gates, Deputy Director of Intelligence Agency, on a mission to the region
to ease the tensions. Arguably, the introduction of a nuclear weapon in this
region compelled the US to play a constructive role during the crisis situation in
South Asia. Pakistan’s policy entered a new phase when the Hindu nationalist
party, the BJP, gained power in India in March 1998 with an overtly Hindutva
rather than a secular policy. ‘The social practices of BJP elites and the decision
to go nuclear in 1998 showed the importance of the “Hindutva” norm.’40 India
detonated its nuclear devices for the second time in 1998, this in turn changed
Pakistan’s cautious and restrained policy into one of weaponization. Pakistan
reciprocated by detonating its own nuclear devices in the same year. Nuclear
deterrence has altered the crisis dynamics between India and Pakistan by ruling
out the probability of war at the strategic level, thus making peace precarious
and fragile at the sub-­strategic level. The section below evaluates the changing
nature of the crisis between India and Pakistan since 1998 and their impact on
the two states’ relations.

Crisis dynamics – post 1998

The Kargil episode of 1999

Yet, the argument that nuclear weapons states do not fight war and that nuclear
deterrence minimizes the probability of war was severely challenged as the two
states slipped into a major post-­nuclear misadventure. This was the first and only
war being fought by the two states in a nuclearized environment. This short war
erupted in May–July 1999 – limited in its scale and goals – leaving more than
1000 casualties on each side.41 There are two propositions to this episode. One
group of observers considers that this limited war was associated with the Indian
intrusion over the LoC at the Siachen Glacier and that Pakistan intended to
secure a better bargaining position over this issue. Pakistan also wanted to inter-
dict a strategic road linkage between Srinagar and Siachen to counter repeated
Indian interdictions of the Neelam Valley.42 For this group, Kargil was inevit-
able, even in the absence of the introduction of nuclear weapons in the region.
Whereas the second proposition is that Pakistan has used nuclear deterrence as a
cover or bargaining chip to force India to resume substantive dialogue on
Kashmir,43 to internationalize the Kashmir cause, and reinvigorate the freedom
struggle.44 However, by any calculation, crafted hastily, this was the most dan-
gerous confrontation to erupt in the nuclearized environment – thus climbing the
road to a major misadventure with considerable escalatory potential attached.45
Again, it was the US intervention as a crisis manager46 (due to the presence of
nuclear weapons in this region) which helped ease the tempers of the two states
by pulling the forces back to barracks.
124   Crises dynamics and escalation dominance
The Kargil ushered in a new dimension in the paradigm of nuclear deterrence
– the notion of the stability–instability paradox47 and the emergence of the Indian
CSD,48 the strategy of Pro-­Active Operations (PAO), and the construct of the
Two-­Front War (TFW). The two states invalidated the notion and spirit of
nuclear deterrence theory, thus sliding into a crisis. This was something that had
not happened before. The Kargil episode changed the dynamics of the conflicts
in two ways: (1) the larger confrontation, and heavy employment of force and
conventional weapons, shifted into cross-­border terrorism; (2) both the states
introduced new war-­fighting strategies and contingency plans – India started
working on its CSD and Pakistan in turn developed low-­yield weapons.
The outcomes of the Kargil event suggest a set of factors that led to encour-
age both the states to behave rationally and exercise restraint to minimize viol-
ence and control the escalation of the conflict. Consequently, subsequent
conflicts appeared to be limited in scale and human loss. Nuclear deterrence
played a part in restraining policymakers from undertaking irrational moves, and
international mediation, such as the US role, was crucial in this crisis. Local
terrain, the military balance in Kashmir, and the domestic civil–military drift
also regulated Pakistan’s behavior across the LoC. However, the Kargil lessons
did not diminish the likelihood of crisis or their prospects for future escalation.
This conflict had a significant impact on setting renewed trends for future crises.
The two states not only introduced new technologies in their inventories, but
also the nature and scale of the conflicts shifted in terms of casualties, timings,
and goals.

The Twin Peaks crisis 2001–2002

On December 13, 2001, five militants entered the Indian Parliament house, start-
ing a fire that killed 14 people and left 22 injured. This event created a tense
situation between India and Pakistan, bringing their forces to an eyeball to
eyeball confrontation. Large-­scale war became a possibility within days. In the
meantime, subsequent attacks took place in the following year that is why the
crisis is known as Twin Peaks. For example, the militants entered an Indian
Army base, near the town of Kaluchak, in the capital of Jammu and Kashmir on
May 14, 2002, leaving 31 dead, including women and children. These six
months created a high probability of war between the two states. This crisis situ-
ation compelled high-­level US officials to seriously involve themselves as crisis
managers in order to restore peace and avoid war.49 India blamed Pakistan for
the involvement of Kashmiri militants, such as Lashkar-­e-Taiyyaba (LeT) and
Jaish-­e-Muhammad (JeM),50 and also pointed the blame at Pakistani intelligence
agencies for ‘sponsoring terrorism to pressure India to relinquish Kashmir.’51
Pakistan in return condemned the attacks and denied India’s accusations that the
attackers belonged to Pakistan or were backed by the Pakistani security appar-
atus. This event encouraged India to launch ‘Operation Parakram’ on December
18, 2001 by mobilizing its forces for another war. Pakistan, again in return,
mobilized its forces. Since the redeployment of Pakistan’s forces and the
 Crises dynamics and escalation dominance   125
d­ iversion of its focus from the western to the eastern border was absolutely not
in the interests of the US, as Pakistan was fighting a war with the US in Afghani-
stan as a frontline ally, the US played an important role once again as a crisis
manager, thereby cooling the tempers of the two states. Krepon maintained that
India restrained the escalation in order to avoid war.52
The contention is that it was possibly US-­backed channel diplomacy that
restrained India’s provocative response, in order to avoid Pakistan’s deviation
from the western to the eastern border. India’s then Premier, Atal Behari
Vajpaye wrote to the US president, George W. Bush that Washington should
pressurize Pakistan into cracking down on terrorist groups and declare JeM a
terrorist organization, otherwise India would take unilateral action.53 India
engaged the crisis management skills of Secretary of State Colin Powell and
Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage to seek an end to the standoff.
Pakistan’s then President Musharraf, in his address on January 12, promised to
crack down on the militants and would not tolerate any terrorist activity, even
if it is in support of Pakistan’s position on Kashmir.54 The US in return
­welcomed Musharraf ’s pledge. Against the backdrop of the Kaluchak attacks,
Powell and Armitage secured pledges from President Musharraf that he would
do his utmost in order to cease the permanent infiltration across the LoC.55 Had
the US not played a role as a crisis manager, the escalation would have turned
the region into a war.
However, the Twin Peak crisis did not escalate into a major conventional war
or threaten nuclear war. This time again, the two states adopted a restraint policy
at the bilateral level. International pressure restrained the two states against
further moves. For example, mediation remained a crucial factor to de-­escalate
the crisis situation. The US from the outset played a serious role in facilitating
negotiations and attempting to de-­escalate the conflict, as US forces were
extremely busy undertaking operations in Afghanistan against Al-­Qaeda and
Pakistan was then the frontline ally of the US. This is why the US wanted to
resolve the Pakistani conflict with India in order to gain more support on the
western border. During this time, the US had leverage over India and Pakistan in
order to defuse tension. Indo-­Pakistan war-­fighting strategies became more
complex as a result of this crisis. The lessons of Kargil and Twin Peaks resulted
in the introduction of the Indian Offensive Cold Start Doctrine. For Ladwig,

the goals of this limited war doctrine are to establish the capacity to launch
a retaliatory conventional strike against Pakistan that would inflict harm …
before the international community could intercede while pursuing narrow
enough aims to deny Islamabad a justification to escalate the clash to a
nuclear weapon.56

Cold Start is an offensive and conventionally superior and provocative doctrine.

This doctrine means reorganization of the Indian military away from the three
large strikes corps into eight smaller ‘integrated battle groups’ combined with
infantry, artillery, and armored vehicles. These two events proved that the space
126   Crises dynamics and escalation dominance
exists for proxy wars, low intensity conflicts, and limited war under the nuclear
overhang, thereby making the scale of crises limited and the nature of peace
more volatile and precarious.

Mumbai attacks – 2008

This crisis was sparked in November 2008 when a mass casualty assault took
place in Mumbai. This attack took 172 (including six US citizens) lives, with
300 left wounded, and nine of the ten assailants also died. India claimed that the
attackers were trained on Pakistani soil as these attacks were affiliated with the
non-­operational LeT group based in Pakistan. India’s then foreign minister,
Mukherjee, asserted that the attackers were affiliated to Pakistan. Later, India’s
state deputy Home Minister, R.R. Patil Maharashtra announced that the captured
assailant was a Pakistani national.57 India initiated a strong campaign asking the
international community to force Pakistan to take action against these groups.
India projected itself as a victim of cross-­border terrorism thereby pressurizing
Pakistan and maligning its image globally. Pakistan, in turn, largely condemned
the attacks in the first place and extended assurances to India for all-­out support
for the prosecution of the personnel involved in this attack. Pakistan’s then presi-
dent, Asif Zardari condemned the attacks and blamed non-­state actors and their
agendas that defy the state of Pakistan.58 Subsequently, Pakistan initiated an
investigation and detained the suspected individuals. The mastermind of this
event, Zakiur Rehmna Lakhvi was also part of this prosecution process. As part
of this investigation, Pakistan sought access to eyewitnesses based in India and
to the principle accused, who was arrested by India and later executed in 2012.
India refused access or information pertaining to these legal procedures, con-
sidering them insignificant. As a result, the trial remained incomplete and left
dialogue between India and Pakistan suspended. Non-­state actors gained space
by spoiling the peace process. This event widened mistrust while the distance
between the two countries increased considerably.
This crisis alarmed the US, which was heavily dependent on Pakistan for
legitimatizing its mobility in Afghanistan against terrorism. Since Amer­ican
citizens were killed in this event, heavy US involvement in this crisis convinced
India to deploy the services of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) for a
detailed investigation.59 It is claimed that ‘the captured attacker made revelations
to the FBI and Indian interrogators for his recruitment, training and guidance by
LeT operatives.’60 During this crisis extensive high-­level US visits took place to
Pakistan and India side by side in order to ensure de-­escalation. The US heavily
pressurized Pakistan to take action against the culprits and Hafiz Saeed, the
leader of JuD. The US then Ambassador Patterson had frequent meetings with
then Premier Yousaf Raza Gilani and Army Chief Gen. Ashfaq Pervez Kayani
to crack down on the leader of JuD. Pakistan continuously denied any affiliation.
Later, some of the Pakistani authorities acknowledged ‘that some [elements
based in Pakistan] took some actions on Pakistani soil … that had LeT Links.’61
Pakistan’s raid on major LeT camps in Azad Jammu and Kashmir and the
 Crises dynamics and escalation dominance   127
s­ ubsequent arrest of the LeT and JuD actors was lauded by the US on December
7. In turn the US consistently played a role in cooling the tempers of the two
states and de-­escalating the crisis. It would prove costly for the US to allow
Pakistan to shift its focus from the Afghan border to the eastern side. Thus, US
diplomatic intervention eased the tension in order to achieve its goals in Afghan-
istan with the help of Pakistan; as a result, the crisis could not erupt into a major
conflict as the two states’ behaved rationally because the US played an active
role in defusing this tension.
The outcome of this event was more or less similar to that of the Twin Peaks
crisis: symbolic promises followed by a demobilization of forces on both sides
and the temporary cessation of cross-­border infiltration. The US diplomats relied
on high-­level engagement with Indo-­Pakistan senior officials and worked on
information sharing between India and Pakistan on the attacks. Pakistan denied
any involvement, but took serious action against LeT and JuD. At the same time
that India was pushing Pakistan to take action against militants, Pakistan was
fighting a tough battle against these terrorists internally. The TTP and other
militant groups extended a campaign of terrorist attacks from the northwest, tar-
geting the populous region of Punjab. The bombing of the Marriott Hotel in
Islamabad on September 20, 2008 created a massive disturbance. In the winter
of 2009, an attack was initiated by the terrorists in Lahore on the visiting Sri
Lankan cricket team on March 3, leaving six policemen dead, and an attack on a
police training academy on March 30, leaving 12 dead. More worrisome still
was a TTP attack on a Peshawar primary school that killed over 120 children,
dealing a hammer blow to the Pakistani psyche. In turn, Pakistan dramatically
transformed its attitude against the TTP, from the public to the military and
political level. The Pakistani military initiated, a major operation – Zarb-­e-Azab
(sharp and cutting-­edge sword). This operation cleared the area by killing 3,400
militants in the battle. As a result of this operation, Pakistan’s security situation
improved and terrorist attacks were effectively controlled and gradually pre-
vented. Nevertheless, a crisis situation and cross-­border terrorist movements
between India and Pakistan yet remained a major stability challenge. These
trends led to another attack thereby intensely transforming the conflicting trends.

Crisis dynamics – post 2008

The attacks from Pathankot to Uri

The Indian air force base came under attack on January 2, 2016 leaving three
Indian military personnel and four militants dead. India claimed that these milit-
ants had associations with the defunct JeM based in Pakistan. India protested
and called for action by Pakistan against these militant groups. Pakistan, as a
result, prosecuted and detained some members of the JeM, arrested the group
leader and ensured cooperation with India on this deadly attack. India, in turn,
became inflexible to the idea of building any sort of cooperation while demand-
ing the prosecution of the Pathankot attack. The joint investigation started and
128   Crises dynamics and escalation dominance
later stalled when the Pakistani investigation team visited India and later they
revealed that the incident could have been staged by India in order to suspend
talks. Later, on September 18, 2016, another attack on the Uri military base near
the LoC took place during which 19 Indian soldiers lost their lives and four ter-
rorists were killed. Uri is a town that separates the Kashmir valley from the plains
of Punjab. The Indian government blamed Pakistan for the assault. Pakistan
immediately denied any involvement in the Uri attack. In response to Uri, without
verification of the facts, India misleadingly claimed to have initiated a surgical
strike along the LoC to kill terrorist camps. Pakistan in response denied any
responsibility for such attacks; second, it invalidated Indian claims for carrying
out surgical strikes. The Uri was another setback after the 2008 Mumbai attacks
that derailed the peace process and increased mistrust, uncertainty, and anxiety in
both countries against each other. Mistrust increased following the terrorist attack
and arrest of former Indian Naval officer, turned spy, Kulbhushan Jadhav who
was operating in Baluchistan under a false Iranian passport. Kulbhushan publicly
confessed62 on Pakistan television that he promoted sabotage in Karachi. Pakistan
initiated his trial (still in Pakistani custody), thereby denying access to Indian
authorities to meet him. In the aftermath of the Uri attack, Indian Premier Modi
launched a diplomatic offensive to isolate Pakistan globally.
In summary, the outcomes of this event prove that the dynamics of crises
have dramatically shifted in multiple ways:63 first, the nature of crises has
become smaller in terms of scale, causalities, objectives, and timings. Second,
the threshold for the role of the US as a crises manager has been minimized for a
number of reasons: (a) the US–Pakistan trust level has decreased as US interest
has shifted away from Pakistan to India; (b) the US degree of influence and
leverage over India has decreased as the US does not want to go against India’s
aspirations to be a key player in the Asia-­Pacific region and outweigh China’s
influence/rise; (c) the US has no economic or diplomatic aptitude to play a role
as a crisis manager as their interests have shifted from South Asia to the Asia-­
Pacific; finally, the crisis was new in a way that, in the absence of US mediation,
India claimed unilateral surgical strikes against militants to prove a new war-­
fighting strategy in order to generate possible deterrent effects. Pakistan in turn
denied India’s claims on surgical strikes such that many in the US believed it is
a ‘nice de-­escalation.’64 This strategy is risky in a way that Pakistan’s response
could be laced with battlefield nuclear weapons. Conflating trends have become
even more dangerous since then.
Zafar Nawaz Jaspal said,65

India is aware that they cannot conduct surgical strikes due to fear of Paki-
stan’s retaliation. India failed to prove surgical strikes in the first place. The
surgical strike is a politically driven phenomenon as the BJP government is
scoring political points. The BJP government is creating anti-­Pakistan senti-
ment domestically through annual celebrations of these strikes in order to
maximize their electoral gains. We must understand that these surgical
strikes are risky and any such future misadventure can invite escalation.
 Crises dynamics and escalation dominance   129
However, if Indian strikes remain limited to LOC, then chances of escala-
tion are limited; however, the situation may escalate rapidly if India violates
the LOC.66

Ambassador Zamir Akram67 said,

Through surgical strikes the BJP government is trying to project a robust

image of India and its political profile against Pakistan. PM Modi aims at
using Pakistan as a means to maximize his political gains. Indian claims on
surgical strikes are political rhetoric and bluff and that is why India failed to
make it public.

While Ambassador Tasneem Aslam asserted, ‘India is trying to create a psycho-

logical impact on Pakistan in order to test limitation in the latter’s nuclear deter-
rent capability,’68 similarly, Ambassador Riaz Muhammad Khan69 confirmed,

Debate on the launch of 2016 surgical strikes is divided and controversial

even within the strategic circles of India. It officially justifies these surgical
strikes as a response for ‘terrorist actions’ originated from the territory
under Pakistani control. The whole concept is flawed. How do you deter-
mine right away that an act of violence has links to Pakistan, and that it is
not an act of retaliation against the persistent human rights violations
reported on a daily basis in IOK or other parts of India? Even if we suppose
that non-­state actors were involved, will they congregate at one place to be
targeted? Just targeting any place to ‘punish’ would naturally cause reaction
from Pakistan – a recipe for escalation. Therefore, many advocate the need
for crisis management and de-­escalation. Although it is not a well-­publicized
aspect of policy … past crises amply demonstrate that both sides did resort
to de-­escalation and de-­fusion of crises in the past.

Thus, the Uri attacks and the Indian position on surgical strikes has led to a
deepening of the security dilemma between India and Pakistan, thereby strength-
ening mistrust and distrust. However, a smooth democratic transition in Pakistan
created a favorable environment for the resumption of dialogue with India. Paki-
stan’s Prime Minister Imran Khan’s genuine interest in building peace between
the two countries has led India and Pakistan to finally agree to establish the Kar-
tarpur corridor connecting the Sikh shrines of Gurdwara Dera Baba Nanak (the
Gurdaspur district of Punjab, India) to Gurdwara Darbar Sahib Kartarpur (the
Narowal district of Punjab, Pakistan).70 The Kartarpur corridor had unlocked
new avenues for cooperation, and meaningful and constructive dialogue for reso-
lution of contentious issues between India and Pakistan. Nevertheless, the com-
plexity of the issue of Kashmir and cross-­border terrorism continues to impede a
future peace process as, once again, the recent Pulwama Attacks have derailed
the future possibility of a peace process.
130   Crises dynamics and escalation dominance
The Pulwama attack: an intensified crisis situation
The crisis situation between India and Pakistan has abruptly intensified after the
Pulwama suicide bomb attack on a paramilitary convoy, which killed over 40
Indian military personnel in India-­held Kashmir. This time, again, India has
claimed that those who calibrated this attack had connections with the Pakistani
state. India also announced that it would launch a diplomatic offensive to isolate
Pakistan in the international community. Moreover, India expelled Pakistan from
its Most Favoured Nation status leading to the imposition of a 200 percent
customs duty on its goods.71 However, Pakistan, in turn, has taken a proactive
position on denying these charges and/or illogical allegations.72 In response to
India’s allegations, Prime Minister Khan announced the intention to conduct an
investigation if New Delhi provided ‘actionable evidence,’73 but also warned that
Pakistan will ‘retaliate’ if India launches any sort of attack/strikes. In parallel to
the civilian government, the Pakistan Army also called upon India to exercise
restraint and avoid ‘any misadventure.’
Within two weeks of the Pulwama attack, the crisis situation escalated quite
rapidly. India’s Foreign Secretary V.K. Gokhale announced that India’s air force
had ‘struck the biggest training camp of JeM in Balakot.’ He further asserted
that ‘a large number of JeM terrorists were killed [while] the strike avoided civil
casualties.’74 However, India in the first place failed to provide any evidence on
the Pulwama attacks to the international community and later failed to release
any footage on the claimed attacks on the camp of JeM in Balakot. In turn, Maj.
Gen. Asif Ghafoor, the DG of ISPR, held a press conference on the same day,
discrediting India’s claims. The DG ISPR announced that ‘Indian military planes
had violated the LoC, intruding from the Muzaffarabad sector, following which
“Pakistan Air Force immediately scrambled” ’75 and Indian aircraft withdrew. He
further said, ‘The response will come at a point and time of our choosing where
our civil–military leadership decides.’ Pakistan’s Foreign Minister, Shah
Mahmood Qureshi made repeated phone calls to the heads of all the prominent
states and also, in a letter to the then United Nations Secretary General António
Guterres, had informed him of the violation and said that the aggressive act by
India will have ‘severe repercussions for the regional peace and security.’76 The
foreign minister also maintained that Pakistan reserves the right to respond in
self-­defense.77 A special meeting of the National Security Committee (NSC) was
held by the Prime Minister of Pakistan which was attended by all top civil and
military brass. This meeting strongly rejected Indian claims of targeting an
alleged terrorist camp near Balakot and the claim of heavy casualties. The NSC
meeting concluded that India has conducted a False Flag Operation to cover
electoral mileage domestically while risking regional peace and stability.78 Paki-
stan announced that the area India claimed to have targeted is open for global
scrutiny and invited the media to visit the impact site. The NSC concluded that
Pakistan will respond at a place and time of its own choosing.79 The PAF a day
after India violated the LoC – undertook strikes across the LoC from Pakistani
airspace and shot down two Indian jets inside Pakistani airspace. One pilot,
 Crises dynamics and escalation dominance   131
Abhinandan Varthaman, was arrested and later returned to India as a gesture of
peace to de-­escalate the tensions. Footage of the arrest and subsequent release
were shown publicly,80 with the announcement that Pakistan gave measured
response in its self-­defense. DG ISPR stated, via a press conference,81

If that were the case [that Pakistan wanted to escalate], we could have easily
engaged the [military] targets, which our air force had locked. That would
have resulted in human casualties and collateral damage as well.

US Secretary of State Michael Pompeo has urged India and Pakistan to avoid
further escalation ‘at any cost’ and to ‘prioritize direct communication.’82 The
general secretariat of the Organization of Islamic Countries also condemned
India’s violation of the LoC and called upon both states to observe restraint.83
On the present prevailing situation, China has also asked both the countries to
exercise restraint.84 It is assumed that the US’s and China’s back-­channel diplo-
macy was involved in order to restrain Indo-­Pakistan behavior and prevent
further escalation in the wake of the Pulwama attacks.
To the question of how crucial China’s or the US’s role is in de-­escalating the
conflict between India and Pakistan, Ambassador Zamir Akram commented that
‘China can play a very strong role to prevent conflict between India and Pakistan
if it occurs. They have the capacity to terminate/prevent conflict.’85 Similarly,
Zafar Nawaz Jaspal argued,86

China has an important role to play and act as mediator between India and
Pakistan. It carries potential to de-­escalate war between India and Pakistan.
China’s role can be identical to the role the US had been playing in order to
defuse or de-­escalate the crises between India and Pakistan that had existed
since 1998. China has also conflict avoidance and management experience
in South China and East China Sea. China has good relations with all the
conflicting parties. China will be a bigger loser in case war erupts between
India and Pakistan.

While Ambassador Tasneem stated, ‘thinking of the use of nuclear weapons is

highly risky as the population on both sides will get affected.’87 Ambassador
Tasneem also states that

China will play a role convincing both India and Pakistan to resolve their
issues through dialogue. China can talk to India and Pakistan quietly for risk
avoidance. They are accommodating India which will preserve both the
states’ economic stakes. Obviously, if Pakistan comes under threat, then
China would take a public position.

In this context, Gen. Naeem Khalid Lodhi (retd) did not rule out the role of the
US as a crisis manager between India and Pakistan. He stated that the ‘US will
maintain a preeminent position and remain relevant in order to play a role to
132   Crises dynamics and escalation dominance
defuse tension between India and Pakistan.’88 Another high profile and eminent
military officer on the condition of anonymity told that the US is closely observ-
ing the evolving situation between India and Pakistan and their role is preemi-
nent to de-­escalate conflict between the two states. They will continue to play a
role, he said.89 That being noted, it is important to conceptualize further the
essential drivers that could create more crises between India and Pakistan under
the long shadow of nuclear weapons.

Growing strategic instability: the possibility of future conflict

in South Asia and escalation dominance
It will not be wrong to mention that nuclear South Asian region is fraught with
many challenges and outstanding issues more particularly after the introduction
of nuclear weapons. Crises dynamics between nuclear India and Pakistan, as
elaborated in the preceding sections of this chapter, pose challenges to the stra-
tegic stability of South Asia. It is important to note that, although the introduc-
tion of nuclear weapons induced fear of escalation and thereby prevented
large-­scale wars between India and Pakistan, these deterrent forces have cer-
tainly not diminished the prospects of limited or sub-­conventional crises. The
contemporary South Asian advanced conventional force development and con-
sistent relevance of, and increasing volume for, nuclear deterrence have rather
induced nuclear India and Pakistan to not only strengthen their deterrent forces,
but also these sophisticated deterrent forces have provided considerable incen-
tives for war-­fighting strategies for ‘escalation dominance’ and/or ‘competition
in risk-­taking’ – to quote best these phrases by the well-­respected Amer­ican
political scientist Robert Jervis.90 In doing so, this in turn could be escalatory for
major military confrontations in South Asia, leading to nuclear war. The follow-
ing sections further analyze South Asian war-­fighting strategies and the possib-
ility of conflict out of the multiple crises that India and Pakistan have confronted,
as analyzed in the preceding sections. First, it is important to focus on India’s
war-­fighting strategy in an attempt to discover why India appears to head toward
these strategies and how they could be challenging for India in general and South
Asian strategic stability in particular.

India’s quest for escalation dominance under the complexity of the

security dilemma
Ever since India has conducted nuclear tests, first in 1974 and later in 1998, it
has attempted to keep the escalation dominance in its favor in the South Asian
region, through its hedging strategy over Pakistan in both conventional and
nuclear forces development. Therefore, India’s quest for an escalation domi-
nance strategy would comprise plausible imperatives. Each of these related
quests for escalation dominance could be escalatory, thereby risking the possib-
ility of conflict in South Asia.
 Crises dynamics and escalation dominance   133
India’s nuclear strategy of massive retaliation: asserting escalation
dominance
It seems that India has borrowed the principles of the US’s nuclear strategy of
massive retaliation, which the US crafted during the initial years of the Cold War
to guard against the Soviet Union’s possible conventional and nuclear attacks on
the US and its allies and partners in Europe and Asia, though the strategy was
highly criticized for not meeting US security objectives the way US security
planners would expect.91 In order to follow similar principles, India attempts to
be assertive in keeping escalation dominance in South Asia. The nuclear strategy
of massive retaliation can be one of the essential components of India’s escala-
tion dominance strategy whereby the Indian security leadership would vow to
retaliate massively with nuclear weapons. Nevertheless, the illogic of India’s
massive retaliation strategy would have key policy implications in South Asia.
First, it is not a clear approach, and similarly does not appear to be a rational
approach, to retaliate massively with nuclear weapons against a state or non-­state
actor who could use chemical and/or biological weapons against Indian forces
anywhere. In this scenario, massive retaliation could become a flawed nuclear
strategy that could, in turn, become what Scott Sagan calls a ‘commitment trap’92
leading to further escalation and risking a major war from minor attacks on
Indian forces in South Asia. Second, massive retaliation would require India’s
security leadership to plan for deploying a massive number of deterrent forces
against a number of assigned targets. This would, in turn, assist India in increas-
ing its deterrent forces, which India would require as part of its existing retali-
atory strategy. The development of a number of warheads would mean that India
would need to hit as many targets as possible when it comes to its massive retali-
ation strategy against its adversaries. Although India’s nuclear strategy of
massive retaliation becomes directionless, as it was for the US during the Cold
War era, India’s commitments to achieve nuclear efficiency (effectiveness) and
sufficiency (modernization of deterrent forces and accumulation of power) leads
to more inconsistencies and ambiguities in its deterrent postures towards China
and India respectively. Third, since massive retaliation would help India increase
its deterrent forces, it induces its arms race for the Southern Asian region, which,
in turn, causes Pakistan and China to worry about their security plans for deter-
ring India. A massive retaliation policy seems meaningless or irrelevant in the
present century, as full-­scale wars have become socially and politically costly.
Neither the use of total force is feasible nor the concept of total victory is achiev-
able in the nuclear domain.

India’s quest for advanced deterrent forces

To keep the escalation dominance intact against its adversaries at all levels, India
would need to build up advanced conventional and nuclear forces. These deter-
rent forces, as discussed in the preceding chapters, would include India’s short-,
medium, and long-­ranges missile capability. Indeed, India is trying to make
134   Crises dynamics and escalation dominance
most, if not all, of its missiles nuclear-­capable. More conceptually, its short-­
range missiles could be designed for counterforce targeting strategies, the
medium ranges could have a mix of both counterforce (military installations)
and countervalue (city-­busting) targeting, and the longer ranges, up to the ICBM
level, could be used for mass destruction targeting when and if the Indian
security leadership chose to do as part of its escalation dominance. In addition to
this, India would build up more nuclear-­powered submarines. It has already
developed one, though that has confronted challenges and is still awaiting a
complete operationalization for deep blue sea patrolling. India has already
achieved MIRV technology capability, which would help India to MIRV many
of its medium and longer ranges of missiles that could include the ICBMs that
India has recently developed, while sending more than 100 satellites into space
in one launch day reflects India’s quest for advanced deterrent force capability
that, in turn, could boost up its escalation dominance strategy in the broader
Southern Asian region.93
Nevertheless, India’s quest for acquiring advanced deterrent force develop-
ment, potentially meant for escalation dominance in South Asia, would have a
couple of key implications for India. First, India’s quest for deterrent force
development could potentially increase the security dilemma, tempting its
potential adversaries to either balance or produce effective measures in the new
era of technological advancement. The sophisticated delivery systems sup-
ported by advanced technology could undermine the deterrent forces of its
adversaries, which, in turn, would induce the latter to produce certain measures
that may enable deterring India from using these advanced deterrent forces in
the first place. Absent effective countermeasures production, the security
dilemma could further intensify in South Asia which tends to undermine the
credibility of deterrent forces of one nuclear state against the other. Presum-
ably, no nuclear state wishes to see the credibility of its deterrent forces under-
mined because of what an adversary could develop. A nuclear state would
either attempt to make a similar deterrent force or produce an effective counter-
measure in order to convince the adversary that its deterrent forces could
become vulnerable to a possible preemptive strike amidst a serious crisis esca-
lation. Second, although India would desire to sustain its escalation dominance
at all levels by developing advanced deterrent forces, and a similar strategy
could provide the Indian security leadership with greater confidence on both
‘deterrence by denial’ (that is, to convey to its adversary that an attack could be
prevented and nuclear victory could be denied) and ‘deterrence by punishment’
(an attempt to convince its adversary that an attack on India is not sensible and
that in doing so the adversary could confront an unacceptable cost), the Indian
strategy of escalation dominance at all levels of its deterrent forces could also
provide greater confidence for the Indian security leadership to strike first to
achieve its perceived military and political goals. However, it is not clear how
the Indian security leadership would achieve these goals without paying the
greater cost of its escalatory strategy. Robert Jervis illustrates this scenario by
arguing that,
 Crises dynamics and escalation dominance   135
taking such action will involve using force. The aggressor must thus act in a
way which will greatly increase the chance of major violence … the
defender must be willing to run significant risks if it is not to be forced to
retreat. But the initial burden falls on the aggressor.94

The striking first option could have policy implications for India’s doctrinal
nuclear posture under the changed crisis environment in South Asia. For
example, it would provide India with an incentive to gradually shift away from
its traditional NFU to FU doctrinal use of nuclear forces that, in turn, could
entangle India in more escalatory approaches, risking the escalation of serious
future crises between India and Pakistan.

A plausible departure from the NFU to the FU nuclear option and

future crises
As part of an escalation dominance strategy to help India excel in both conven-
tional force modernization and nuclear deterrent force development in the future,
India may rely on the FU nuclear option. In this conceivable departure from its
doctrinal use posture, India could confront certain challenges and inconsistencies
with regard to its future nuclear strategy for a broader Southern Asian region.
First, the official declaration of the perceived FU nuclear option could impel
India to rely on its deterrent forces, turn many of its deterrent forces nuclear-­
capable, and deploy most, if not all, of the deterrent forces it has ready to be
launched and awaiting the order from India’s top echelons. Nevertheless, relying
on nuclear forces by retaining the FU nuclear option would be a clear signal to
its Southern Asian adversaries (China and Pakistan) that India could undertake
the risk by using nuclear forces in the early stages of war with both China and
Pakistan. In this context, the Indian security leadership has already argued that
India has achieved the capability for fighting a two-­front war, however challeng-
ing and questionable this approach could be.95 This appears to be extremely
escalatory, but the Indian security leadership must sensibly be aware of the
changed strategic environment, more particularly regarding the basic fact that we
are in a nuclear age, and that in turn creates a greater sense of mutual vulnerabil-
ities in the Southern Asian region where India’s proclivity toward first-­strike
emission out of the escalation dominance strategy could create greater risk and
also make India vulnerable to its adversaries.
In this context, Jervis is convincing in his argument on the nuclear revolution
in the existing nuclear age: ‘When crises are generators of risk, superior military
power no longer guarantees security. We could not escape from the nuclear
revolution even if we were able to reestablish the kind of military balance that
existed in the mid-­1960s.’96 In the event of a serious crisis escalation, using
nuclear forces first would make India appear assertive. Its attempt to turn most
of its deterrent forces nuclear-­capable could provide the incentive to its adversar-
ies to follow suit and the deployment of India’s deterrent forces, ready to be
launched at short notice, could create hysteria and the strategic dilemma of a
136   Crises dynamics and escalation dominance
use-­or-lose situation – that is, India would be under tremendous pressure to use
these ready-­to-be-­deployed forces or confront a dreadful situation where these
Indian deterrent forces could be preempted before they are actually used.
Presumably, ready-­to-be-­launched Indian deterrent forces could be more vulner-
able to the deterrent forces placed under the provisions of recessed deterrence,
where the warheads are kept separate from the delivery systems. While closely
monitoring India’s assertive approach emanating from its perceived FU nuclear
option, India would tend to opt for a number of surgical strikes, believing that it
could not provoke its adversaries into using their nuclear weapons.
Second, although inconsistent, India’s nuclear doctrinal posture could be
largely associated with its escalation dominance; it provides the opportunity and
presents the challenges for India to materialize its emerging nuclear strategy in
the changed nuclear age. That said, on the one hand, if India conceives that its
attempt in using first strike to gain maximum benefits would provide it with
more benefits than the costs India might expect, India may follow up the ‘com-
petition in risk-­taking’ strategy – that is, the Indian security leadership, in per-
ceiving its military and nuclear advantages over its adversary, may be willing to
run the risk of keeping its escalation dominance strategy intact. India will follow
such a policy posture in order to put greater strategic pressure on its adversary,
showing that Indian advanced conventional forces and greater nuclear warheads
and delivery systems are superior to those of its adversary, say, Pakistan. But, it
cannot escape the basic logic of a nuclear revolution that diminishes the pro-
spects of willingness to embark on a risk-­taking strategy irrespective of any
military and/or nuclear strategy. Jervis consistently remains thoughtful and con-
vincing in this context: ‘Indeed it is missed by those who stress the importance
of escalation dominance. If confrontations and [sub-­conventional] crises get out
of hand and lead to total war, advantages on the battlefield have little signifi-
cance.’97 However, on the other hand, if the Indian security leadership perceives
the high cost of its preemptive counterforce military strike strategy, while under-
standing the logic of the nuclear revolution, it is highly likely that it would
become self-­deterred from such a provocative strategy, one that could bring ruin
to all and victory to none. Yet, the Indian security leadership would still rather
be interested in finding gaps in which to wage limited strikes in a much more
controlled fashion without intimidating its adversary to cross the nuclear thresh-
old, however complex this could be. Since India would understand that an all-­
out nuclear war may not be in its best strategic interest, and that the same could
not be fought as states did in the pre-­nuclear age, India also understands that
massive retaliation is not a feasible option on humanitarian and normative
grounds. Moreover, it serves no purpose in the wake of cross-­border terrorism.
That said, geographical contiguity also makes a massive retaliation strategy vul-
nerable, as it will yield considerable fallout for India also. India would still be
interested in figuring out how, when, and where it could wage limited/or surgical
strikes so that it could outweigh the costs with the benefits – that is, translating
the challenges into opportunities. But, this could also pose a challenge to India’s
escalation dominance strategy, as conceived here.
 Crises dynamics and escalation dominance   137
The operationalization of India’s military doctrine of the CSD for
limited war
As India becomes more ambitious in its military and nuclear projects, the devel-
opment and possible deployment of the CSD for limited war could become one
of the fundamental imperatives for India’s escalation dominance strategy.
Although most parts of the CSD still remain classified for obvious reasons, the
Indian security leadership has recently acknowledged its existence since India
has undertaken a number of military exercises toward its development program.98
Therefore, it can be expected that India will soon be able to complete the devel-
opment process of the CSD and make it ready for operationalization and deploy-
ment when and if the Indian security leadership would require it. Many would
still argue, both in India and out of it, that India’s military CSD is a myth and
that it does not exist to be deployed.99 Presumably, this could be deduced further
because of a number of issues the Indian security leadership could confront with
regard to CSD development and deployment processes. One of the primary
objectives could be, though there is no substantial evidence to this, that any
denial of the CSD’s existence as a strategy for waging limited strikes/war against
Pakistan at a time of India’s own choosing is a broader reflection that the Paki-
stani security leadership need not worry so much about the CSD, and in doing so
Pakistan may not need to develop its battlefield nuclear forces in response to the
CSD. However, even before the Indian military leadership claim for CSD exist-
ence, there existed a strong perception in Pakistan that the Indian military had
been working on its development for many years. Also, there is a consistent fear
in Pakistan that India’s military could deploy its CSD for limited strikes for
some, if not all, parts of Pakistan. Against this backdrop, any development of the
CSD and its possible deployment could have severe policy implications for the
Indian doctrinal posture in general, and the overall South Asian strategic stability
in particular.
First, CSD development creates security dilemma-­driven fear, uncertainty and
anxiety in South Asia, given the traditional rivalry between India and Pakistan
when both sides have confronted a number of wars and lots of crises, some even
more serious, potentially producing risks of military confrontation under the
existing nuclear overhang. This fear further produces a security dilemma paradox
when the consistent increase of one’s security would potentially decrease the
security of the other’s. Despite the perceived weaknesses related to CSD devel-
opment, which India may have the potential to overcome, the Indian security
leadership appears to be serious about developing various options under the CSD
framework for waging limited strikes/wars. Hypothetically, if the Indian military
remains consistent with this war-­fighting strategy, then it must be confident to
undertake the risk of waging limited strikes, even though they could cause a
potential escalation. The theory of escalation dominance in India’s favor would
predict that India could undertake certain risks for waging limited strikes in
unknown parts of Pakistan, strongly believing that it could potentially control
this to a limited level and that India would not provoke Pakistan into deploying
138   Crises dynamics and escalation dominance
and using its battlefield nuclear weapons, which it developed to deter CSD
deployment in the first place. Nevertheless, while criticizing the Indian military
strategy for waging limited strikes through the deployment of the CSD, the
Indian civilian leadership would be extremely cautious when deploying the CSD
against Pakistan, and only consider this strategy if it was sure that Pakistan
would deploy its battlefield nuclear forces in response.
That being noted, the Indian civilian leadership could be self-­deterred from
deploying its CSD given the understanding of what Robert Jervis correctly pre-
sumed, that, ‘using military force is truly risky. History is filled with cases in
which small wars escalated, either because of accidents or because of explicit
decisions.’100 However, the Indian military leadership remains committed while
successfully convincing its civilian leadership that India can undertake limited/
surgical strikes through its military strategy of the CSD without provoking Paki-
stan to use its nuclear weapons first (in this case Pakistan’s battlefield nuclear
forces). It is unclear and, therefore, it remains uncertain how the control on
limited strikes could be sustained in South Asia and whether or not cooperation
and consistent communication between nuclear India and nuclear Pakistan could
be exercised. In this uncertain situation, it is highly likely that the Pakistani
security leadership would think of deploying (for quick employment if needs be)
its battlefield nuclear forces while closely considering and monitoring Indian
CSD deployment. The mutual deployment of these war-­fighting strategies for
risking mutual destruction could immediately undermine the strategic stability of
South Asia, leading to a possibly irreversible situation.
Second, the consistent development of the Indian military war-­fighting
strategy for waging limited strikes tempts India into revamping its existing
DND. This modified doctrinal posture, while bolstering the CSD, could include
the different types of ballistic missiles, including those of India’s battlefield
nuclear forces. The Integrated Battle Groups (IBGs), supported by advanced
conventional and sophisticated nuclear delivery systems, provides the Indian
military with a greater but flawed confidence that they may not be defeated in
such quick exchanges and that India could achieve its military and political
goals. This could make India more assertive in undertaking certain military risks
in South Asia, putting greater strategic pressure on its adversary (Pakistan),
pushing it toward the use of low-­yield weapons on the battlefield. What India
perceives is needed for achieving certain military goals while accepting risks
amidst its escalation dominance strategy may likely be perceived differently by
its adversary. The adversary (in this case Pakistan) may not be convinced about,
and therefore would not accept, the use of the Indian military strategy for waging
limited strikes against Pakistan, strongly believing that such a strategy is fraught
with risks that tensions could escalate to a bigger level. The US nuclear strategy
of flexible response followed by its countervailing nuclear strategy during the
peak of Cold War tried to find a space for waging a limited war against the
Soviet Union, but failed to successfully convince the latter on such an ambitious
nuclear strategy that could potentially risk scaling the ladder of military escala-
tion up to the nuclear rung.101 The US strategy for limited war was greatly
 Crises dynamics and escalation dominance   139
c­ riticized, even amidst proxy wars in Western Europe, that it could escalate to an
all-­out nuclear war resulting in mutual destruction and bringing victory to no one.
In this context, Thomas Schelling’s widely quoted concept of ‘the threat that
leaves something to chance’102 is important to note that tense war-­fighting strat-
egies could scare both sides into mutual vulnerabilities. Schelling argued that, 

any situation that scares one side will scare both sides with the danger of a
war that neither wants and both will have to pick their way carefully through
the crisis, never quite sure that the other knows how to avoid stumbling over
the brink.103

Similarly, while facing a greater threat of conventional force attacks against the US
allies and partners in Europe and Asia, the US nuclear strategy against the Soviet
Union made it clear that the United States ‘seeks to convince the Soviets that they
could not win … a limited war, and thus to deter them from starting one.’104
In summary, whatever strategy the Indian military crafts with regard to the
CSD for limited war, bolstered by innovative technologies in order to legitimize
its weapons development and deployment, will in turn lead to prompt aggres-
sion, thereby increasing the prospects of escalation to an undesirable level. Thus
the limited war may no longer stay limited between India and Pakistan. This, in
turn, could escalate to a higher level that both sides would not want in the first
place. In addition, such a strategy could bring considerable shifts in both India’s
doctrinal posture and its concept for waging limited strikes against parts of Paki-
stan, which could further undermine the strategic stability of South Asia. Faced
by this rising complex security dilemma, Pakistan could develop certain options,
which could include considerable options to deter the Indian military strategy for
a limited war. This is discussed in the next section.

Limited war and Pakistan’s quest for balancing escalation

dominance in South Asia
It is presumed that in response to India’s escalation dominance strategy, India could
expect Pakistan to produce effective countermeasures in order to counterbalance
India’s escalation dominance strategy, albeit that this action could not escape the
risk of escalation in South Asia too. Although each of these countermeasures may
be effective, more research work is required into how each of these effective coun-
termeasures could also create anxiety and confront challenges. Some of these plaus-
ible countermeasures, vis-­à-vis India’s escalation dominance strategies, require
further analyses since these counter policies remain open to interpretation.

Low-­yield weapons – Nasr: how can this be an effective

countermeasure?
Although the Pakistani security leadership also improves its conventional force
capability by increasing its strike forces closer to the common border, Pakistan
140   Crises dynamics and escalation dominance
primarily produces the Nasr (60–70 km) in response to the Indian military
strategy of the CSD. It is presumed that the Nasr is developed to keep the Cold
Start cold before the Indian military actually launches against the unknown loca-
tions of Pakistan.105 It is expected that Pakistan could increase the ranges of its
battlefield nuclear forces, as Pakistan has been criticized for short ranges that in
turn could also damage Pakistani armed forces when and if they are deployed
and used in the event of a serious warlike situation.106 India’s strategy of limited/
surgical strikes may prompt Pakistan to revisit its nuclear strategy along the fol-
lowing lines: (a) Pakistan may decide to abandon its recessed deterrence policy;
(b) Pakistan may delegate power to field commanders and decide to deploy Nasr
batteries; and (c) Pakistan may consider to improve the ranges of its battlefield
nuclear forces that, in turn, could enhance the credibility of Pakistani short-­range
deterrent forces. By all dimensions, low-­yield weapons/TNWs are fraught with
weaknesses and loopholes. For example, the use-­or-lose security dilemma is
largely associated with TNWs/low-­yield nuclear weapons.107 This, in turn, is
largely connected with the issue of pre-­delegation when the field commander
would enjoy the authority to use these forces only when they are absolutely
needed. However, it is not clear when, where, or how they may be used.
Pakistan faces a serious dilemma under the rubric of an evolving security
dilemma, that is, on the one hand, a nuclear state possessing and deploying short-­
range nuclear forces in the field does not want these forces to be preempted by
adversaries before they are actually used against the assigned targets. On the other
hand, the same nuclear state would like to effectively mobilize the battlefield
nuclear forces in the field and use them in the early stages of war. Both of these
plausible scenarios may face challenges: (a) If a nuclear state deploys and uses
these short-­range deterrent forces in the early stages of war, it may achieve its
short-­term military objectives without realizing how this could impact on the
overall strategic environment of South Asia, particularly since the adversary could
strike back with a massive retaliation. Therefore, Pakistan’s early use of these
short-­range nuclear forces could provoke India’s nuclear strategy of massive retali-
ation (this also does not make complete sense with lots of challenges India may
confront by utilizing its nuclear strategy of massive retaliation, as discussed in
detail in Chapter 3). (b) If Pakistan deploys its short-­range nuclear forces in the
early stages of a serious crisis, pulling up just short of a serious war, it would be
considered a too ambitious and too early tactical move forward. This would be
exerting more pressure on the field commander and that in turn could confront the
command and control issue, since the field commander may not be able to quickly
mobilize these forces to safer locations. There is a risk of adversaries’ preemptive
strikes before they are actually used, undermining the credibility of Pakistan’s
battlefield nuclear weapons because India’s advanced conventional forces, sup-
ported by modern technology, could successfully locate the whereabouts of
Pakistani-­deployed battlefield nuclear weapons. In an activated security dilemma,
such an evolving scenario becomes risky for an immediate escalation.
Pakistan may consider a couple of plausible options with regard to its battlefield
nuclear forces: (a) Pakistan can declare the existence and utility of these short-­range
 Crises dynamics and escalation dominance   141
battlefield nuclear weapons to its adversary, asserting that these deterrent forces
exist and have become a reality when it comes to the logic of ‘existential deter-
rence.’108 (b) Pakistan may need to increase the ranges of these battlefield deterrent
forces in order to enhance their credibility. Instead of relying on the deployment of
the Nasr batteries, Pakistan needs to rely much more on credible sources as to when,
where, and how India would deploy and/or launch its CSD for limited strikes
against parts of Pakistan. This will lead to the avoidance accidental war.

Pakistan’s obsession with the FU nuclear option

India initially offered Pakistan the option of NFU nuclear use, but Pakistan
rejected this offer because of a growing conventional force asymmetry in South
Asia. Therefore, Pakistan does not subscribe to the NFU nuclear option. This
reflects how Pakistan would rely on its nuclear weapons to deter India’s conven-
tional and nuclear attack.109 However, complete reliance on nuclear forces would
depend largely on the given changed strategic environment, the further increase
of conventional force modernization between India and Pakistan, and how India
would bring a considerable shift in its DND, which could enable India to deploy
and use its nuclear forces in the early stages of war. Despite the obsession with
the FU nuclear option, it is not clear when, where, or how Pakistan could use its
nuclear forces first in the event of a serious war against its adversary. There
exists a dichotomy between the first use and last resort of nuclear weapons. Also,
there can be lots of differences between the early first use, absolute first use, and
no-­early first use of both strategic and tactical nuclear weapons.110 Considering
these categories, the Pakistani security leadership may argue that it could use
these deterrent forces in ‘extremis conditions,’ like many other nuclear weapons
states declare so to do.111 However, each of these nuclear states would fail to
define what the extremis conditions for the use of these deterrent forces are.
These categories and ambiguities could have security implications. For
example, India would consider the early use of Pakistani battlefield deterrent
forces against India’s large-­scale conventional attacks as strategic attacks that
could trigger a massive retaliation.112 This could become escalatory for the South
Asian region. As Pakistan may consider India’s CSD to be offensive and a war-­
fighting strategy, India in turn could also perceive Pakistan’s reliance on low-­
yield weapons to be dangerous, with the potential to escalate to a nuclear level.
This, in turn, brings both adversaries under tremendous pressure in the event of a
serious crisis to try to prevent a greater escalation. Each side would try to keep
the escalation dominance in its favor, but each side would also consider how
they may become vulnerable to each other’s escalatory strategies. One may
derive key lessons from the critical time of Cold War nuclear history when the
US Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger stated:113

I believe … if we were to maintain continued communications with the Soviet

leaders during the war, if we were to describe precisely and meticulously the
limited nature of our actions, including the desire to avoid attacking their
142   Crises dynamics and escalation dominance
urban-­industrial base, that in spite of whatever one says historically in advance
that everything must go all out, when the existential circumstances arise, polit-
ical leaders on both sides will be under powerful pressure to continue to be
sensible.

Later, the US Defense Secretary Harold Brown also had an odd argument
regarding the risk of limited war escalating to an all-­out nuclear war. While con-
sidering the uncertain situation, Brown made it clear that:

I am not at all persuaded that what started as a demonstration, or even a

tightly controlled use of the strategic forces for larger purposes, could be
kept from escalating to a full-­scale thermonuclear exchange. But, all of us
have to recognize, equally, that … it should be in everyone’s interest to
minimize the probability of the most destructive escalation and halt the
exchange before it reached to catastrophic proportions.114

Also, for example, one of the Russian spokesmen stated that,

If the US uses these missiles (TNWs) in Europe against the Soviet Union, it
is not logical to believe we will retaliate only against targets in Europe. Let
me tell you, if some of your experts think this, then they are foolish.115

In a similar context, the Indian security leadership, while apparently deriving

key lessons from Cold War nuclear history, argue that if Pakistan deployed and
used nuclear forces, then India would trigger its nuclear strategy of massive
retaliation. Although India’s existing DND continues to follow a similar nuclear
strategy, India’s nuclear strategy of massive retaliation also becomes problem-
atic: (a) it becomes pointless why India would come up with massive retaliation
against strikes at the lower level; (b) massive retaliation would require India to
produce a number of nuclear weapons along with delivery systems; and (c) this
becomes escalatory since it could trigger a bigger arms race and military escala-
tion up to the nuclear level.

Conclusion
A careful analysis of this chapter reflects that the introduction of nuclear
weapons in South Asia has not protected India and Pakistan from the various
dynamics of crises fraught with the risk of escalation to a bigger military con-
frontation including the use of nuclear weapons. That being noted, although
nuclear weapons have successfully deterred both nuclear India and Pakistan
from waging bigger wars, they continue to face a high probability of limited
crises with escalation potential. The first section of this chapter shows the
dynamic nature of crises and how the arrival of nuclear weapons and subsequent
nuclear leaning has transformed the nature of crises. The crises are becoming
smaller, shorter, and briefer in terms of objectives and bearing collateral damage.
 Crises dynamics and escalation dominance   143
In the wake of the Kargil episode, India and Pakistan confronted a number of
serious crises, such as the common border military confrontation 2001–2002 and
the Mumbai crisis in 2008. These dynamics of crises have also greatly affected
the deterrent forces of the South Asian nuclear adversaries. It is greatly feared
that these serious crises could eventually lead to a military war between India
and Pakistan and since both adversaries have already fought many wars in the
past, and now have developed nuclear forces and various credible delivery
systems, there exists a nuclear danger in South Asia. Moreover, conflicting stra-
tegic dynamics, the evolving pattern of crises, and India’s and Pakistan’s trans-
formation of war-­fighting strategies, all combine to trigger the vicious circle of
the security dilemma in South Asia. This, in turn, increases the possibility of
nuclear weapon use.
That being noted, because of the number of issues, including the rising issue
of terrorism and the long-­standing issue of Kashmir, these crises in South Asia
have not only changed the dynamics of crises in the South Asian nuclear age,
but have also produced the possibility of serious conflict between India and Paki-
stan. Nevertheless, India and Pakistan need to realize and understand the arrival
of mutual assured destruction in South Asia when it comes to the meaning of the
nuclear revolution – that is, irrespective of war-­fighting strategies, the reap-
praisal in nuclear strategies, and the introduction of technology in both nuclear
and conventional force domains – a nuclear revolution that creates mutual vul-
nerabilities between two credible nuclear states makes these strategies less signi-
ficant. That said, it is then important to undertake effective and innovative
measures that could encourage the South Asian nuclear weapons states to engage
in a robust, consistent, and comprehensive dialogue process in order to sustain
peace and stabilize the South Asian region. This is discussed in Chapter 6.

Notes
   1 T.V. Paul, ‘Causes of India–Pakistan Enduring Rivalry,’ in T.V. Paul (ed.), The
India–Pakistan Conflict an Enduring Rivalry (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2006), pp. 3–6.
   2 See Scott D. Sagan and Kenneth N. Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons, 2nd
edn (New York: W.W. Norton, 2002).
   3 See for more detail: Stephen P. Cohen, Shooting for a Century: The India–Pakistan
Conundrum (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institute, 2013).
   4 See P.R. Chari, ‘Nuclear Restraint, Nuclear Risk Reduction, and the Security–­
Insecurity Paradox in South Asia’: www.stimson.org/images/uploads/research-­pdfs/
NRRMChari.pdf.
   5 Mukhtar Ahmad, Rich Phillips, and Joshua Berlinger, ‘Soldiers killed in army base
attack in Indian-­administered Kashmir,’ CNN (September 19, 2016): https://edition.
cnn.com/2016/09/18/asia/india-­kashmir-attack/index.html.
   6 ‘Army rubbishes Indian “surgical strikes” claim as two Pakistani soldiers killed at
LoC,’ Dawn (September 29, 2016): www.dawn.com/news/1286881.
   7 ‘Who is Kulbhushan Jadhav?’ Dawn (April 10, 2017): www.dawn.com/news/
1326117.
   8 ‘Pulwama Attack,’ Dawn (February 16, 2019): www.dawn.com/news/1464153.
144   Crises dynamics and escalation dominance
   9 For more details on Nehruvian strategic thinking see Zafar Iqbal Cheema, Indian
Nuclear Deterrence: Its Evolution, development and Implications for South Asian
Security (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2010), p. 498.
  10 Robert Jackson and Georg Sørensen, Introduction to International Relations: The-
ories and Approaches (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), pp.  37–40. Presi-
dent Wilson delivered an address to the US Congress in 1918 with a vision of
making the world a safer place, thereby instituting a new international order based
on liberals’ ideas. He promoted democratic values and self-­determination. His con-
viction was that through a rational and intelligently designed international institu-
tion, peace can be preserved. For him, international institutions and organizations
can promote peaceful cooperation among states and mitigate their differences.
  11 Ibid.
  12 Jawarlal Nehru, The Discovery of India (London: Meridian Books, 1945), 35–40.
Quoted in Zafar Iqbal Cheema, Indian Nuclear Deterrence, p. 498.
  13 See Kautilya, The Arthashastra (edited, rearranged and translated from the Sanskrit
by L.N. Rangrajan) (India: Penguin Books, 1992).
  14 See Joshua J. Mark, ‘India: Definition,’ An Ancient History Encyclopedia (Novem-
ber 12, 2012): www.ancient.eu/india/.
  15 See Niccolò Machiavelli, The Prince, translated by W.K. Marriot (Maryland, Manor
Publishers, 2007).
  16 Stephen P. Cohen, Shooting for a Century, p. 2.
  17 See T.V. Paul, ‘Causes of India–Pakistan Enduring Rivalry.’
  18 Radha Kumar, ‘The Troubled History of Partition, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 76, No. 1
(January–February 1997), 26.
  19 Quoted in Ganguly and Devin T. Hagerty (eds.) Fearful Symmetry (New Delhi:
Oxford University Press, 2005), p. 22.
  20 Ibid.
  21 The term ‘strategic culture’ was coined by Jack Snyder during the Cold War. See
Jack Snyder, The Soviet Strategic Culture Implications for Limited Nuclear Opera-
tions (Report R 2154-AF ) (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, September
1977).
  22 Quoted in Jaswant Singh, Jinnah: India–Partition–Independence (New Delhi: Rupa
and Co., 2009), p. 459.
  23 Ibid., 458.
  24 See Stephen P. Cohen, Shooting for a Century, p. 16.
  25 Bonney in Bonney, Malik, and Maini (eds.), Warriors after War (Oxford: Peter
Lang, 2011), p. 7.
  26 See Stanley A. Wolpert, A New History of India, 6th edn (New York: Oxford
University Press, 2000).
  27 Hasan Askari Rizvi, ‘Pakistan’s Strategic Culture,’ in Michael R. Chambers (ed.),
South Asia in 2020: Future Strategic Balance and Alliances (Carlisle, PA: Strategic
Studies Institute, 2002), pp. 309–310.
  28 Quoted in Stephen P. Cohen, Shooting for a Century, p. 3.
  29 Ibid., pp. 105–115.
  30 Feroz Hassan Khan and Peter R. Lavoy, ‘Pakistan: The Dilemma of Nuclear Deter-
rence,’ in Muthiah Alagappa (ed.), The Long Shadow: Nuclear Weapons and
Security in 21st Century Asia (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2008),
p. 218.
  31 Ganguly and Hagerty (eds.) Fearful Symmetry, p. 32.
  32 Ibid., pp. 32–33.
  33 Richard Bonney, Emeritus Professor of University of Leicester, one of the Authors’
Interview (April 15, 2010).
  34 General Ehsanul Haq, Former Director General Inter-­Services Intelligence and Chair-
man Joint Chief of Staff Committee, one of the Authors’ Interview (London, 2009).
 Crises dynamics and escalation dominance   145
  35 P.R. Chari, ‘Nuclear Crisis, Escalation Control and Deterrence in South Asia,’
Working Paper version 1.0 (Washington, DC: Henry L. Stimson Center, 2003),
p. 15.
  36 Quoted in Varun Shani, ‘A Dangerous Exercise: Brasstack as Non-­nuclear Near
War,’ in Sumit Ganguly and S. Paul Kapur, Nuclear Proliferation in South Asia:
Crisis Behaviour and the Bomb (Abingdon: Routledge, 2008), p. 25.
  37 Quoted in Waheguru Pal Singh Sidhu, ‘India’s Nuclear Use Doctrine,’ in Peter R.
Lavoy, Scott D. Sagan, and James J. Wirtz (eds.), Planning the Unthinkable: How
New Powers will use Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Weapons (Ithaca, NY and
London: Cornell University Press, 2000), p. 136.
  38 Kuldip Nayyar, ‘Pakistan has the Bomb,’ Tribune (March 1, 1987). Also, see P.R.
Chari, ‘Nuclear Crisis,’ p. 15.
  39 See Rizwana Abbasi, Pakistan and the New Nuclear Taboo (2012), pp. 143–147.
  40 Muhammad Shoaib Pervez, Security Community in South Asia (London: Routledge,
2015), p. 143.
  41 Ibid., p. 167.
  42 Authors’ personal discussions with experts in Pakistan.
  43 Zulfqar Khan and Rizwana Abbasi, ‘Regional Centric Deterrence: Reassessing its
Efficacy for South Asia,’ Korean Journal of Defense Analysis, pp. 491–492.
  44 Author’s interaction and discussions with Policy elites in Islamabad.
  45 See Khan and Abbasi, ‘Regional Centric Deterrence.’ Also see Herman Kahn, On
Escalation (New York: Praeger, 1965).
  46 For an in-­depth analysis, see Moeed Yusuf, Brokering Peace in Nuclear Environ-
ments: US Crisis Management in South Asia (Stanford, CA: Stanford University
Press, 2018).
  47 This concept postulates that the introduction of nuclear weapons has reduced the
likelihood of full-­scale war; nevertheless, the probability of limited war has been
increased, pursued by widespread local aggression. For more detail see: Michael
Krepon, ‘The Stability–Instability Paradox, Misperception, and Escalation Control
in South Asia,’ Stimson Centre (December 1, 2004): www.stimson.org/essays/the-­
stability-instability-­paradox-in-­south-asia/.
  48 The Indian Chief of the Army Staff announced the CSD – the active defense and
proactive strategy in 2004. This is the institution of a new concept for conventional
conflict premised on offensive orientations under the nuclear overhang.
  49 For further detailed analysis on this crisis see, Polly Nayak and Michael Krepon,
‘US Crisis Management in South Asia’s Twin Peaks Crisis,’ Report 57, 2nd edn
(Washington, DC: Stimson Center, September 2014).
  50 This is the largest Jihadi group based in South Asia. The organization is banned by
Pakistan, India, and the US.
  51 Nayak and Krepon, ‘US Crisis Management in South Asia’s Twin Peaks Crisis,’
p. 16.
  52 Ibid., p. 10.
  53 Ibid., p. 16.
  54 See Seth Mydnas, ‘Musharraf Treading Gently Against Pakistani Militants,’ New
York Times (April 28, 2002), pp. 1–8.
  55 In Nayak and Krepon, ‘US Crisis Management in South Asia’s Twin Peaks Crisis,’
p. 19.
  56 Christopher Ladwig, The Military Balance, 2006 (London: Taylor and Francis for
IISS, 2006), pp. 230–240.
  57 Krepon in Krepon and Nayak, ‘The Unfinished Crisis: US Crisis Management after
the 2008 Mumbai Attacks,’ Report, Stimson Center (February 7, 2012), p. 20.
  58 ‘Death toll climbs past 150 as city reels from terror attack,’ The Guardian, November
29, 2008: www.theguardian.com/world/2008/nov/29/mumbai-­terror-attacks-­terrorism2.
146   Crises dynamics and escalation dominance
  59 For more details, see Krepon and Nayak, ‘The Unfinished Crisis.’
  60 Ibid., p. 25.
  61 Ibid.
  62 ‘Kulbhushan Jadhav makes second “confession,” files mercy plea before Pakistan
army chief,’ The Wire (June 22, 2017): https://thewire.in/diplomacy/kulbhushan-­
jadhav-files-­mercy-petition-­before-pakistani-­army.
  63 Rizwana Abbasi and Joy Mitra, ‘US Crisis-­Management in South Asia: Post 2008,’
Presentation at Stimson Center (August 2018).
  64 One of the Author’s in-­depth interviews with the US-­based scholars and policy-
makers, Washington, DC, July 2018.
  65 Authors’ interview with Professor Zafar Nawaz Jaspal.
  66 Authors’ interview with Professor Zafar Nawaz Jaspal, Quaid-­I-Azam University,
Islamabad, February 2019.
  67 Authors’ interview with Ambassador Zamir Akram, February 2019.
  68 Authors’ interview with Ambassador Tasneem Aslam, February 2019.
  69 Authors’ interview with Ambassador Riaz Muhammad Khan, February 2019.
  70 Rizwana Abbasi, ‘Hot Talks: Kartarpur Corridor and India Pakistan Relations,’
South Asian Voices (December 3, 2018): https://southasianvoices.org/hot-­takes-
kartarpur-­corridor-and-­india-pakistan-­relations/.
  71 ‘Pulwama terror attack: India vows to isolate Pakistan, withdraws “Most Favoured
Nation” status,’ The Economic Times (February 15, 2019): https://economictimes.
indiatimes.com/news/politics-­and-nation/pulwama-­terror-attack-­india-vows-­to-isolate-­
pakistan-withdraws-­most-favoured-­nation-status/videoshow/68004390.cms.
  72 ‘Pakistan will address actionable evidence if shared by Delhi, PM Khan tells India
after Pulwama attack,’ Dawn (February 19, 2019): www.dawn.com/news/1464783.
  73 Ibid.
  74 ‘India claims to have struck “biggest training camp of JeM in Balakot,”’ Dawn (Febru-
ary 26, 2019): www.dawn.com/news/1466149/india-­claims-to-­have-struck-­biggest-
training-­camp-of-­jem-in-­balakot.
  75 ‘“Time for India to wait for our response”: ISPR DG debunks New Delhi’s claims on
LoC violation,’ Dawn (February 26, 2019): www.dawn.com/news/1466161/time-­for-
india-­to-wait-­for-our-­response-ispr-­dg-debunks-­new-delhis-­claims-on-­loc-violation.
  76 ‘Foreign minister’s letter to UN secretary general on India’s act of aggression circu-
lated in UNSC,’ Dawn (February 27, 2019): www.dawn.com/news/1466341/foreign-­
ministers-letter-­to-un-­secretary-general-­on-indias-­act-of-­aggression-circulated-­in-unsc.
  77 Ibid.
  78 ‘Pakistan will respond to uncalled-­for Indian aggression at time, place of its choos-
ing: NSC,’ Dawn (February 26, 2019): www.dawn.com/news/1466145.
  79 Ibid.
  80 ‘2 Indian aircraft violating Pakistani airspace shot down; 2 pilots arrested,’ Dawn
(February 27, 2019): www.dawn.com/news/1466347/2-indian-­aircraft-violating-­
pakistani-airspace-­shot-down-­2-pilots-­arrested.
  81 Ibid.
  82 ‘Mike Pompeo urges India, Pakistan to “avoid escalation at any cost,”’ Dawn (Feb-
ruary 27, 2019): www.dawn.com/news/1466345/mike-­pompeo-urges-­india-pakistan-
­to-avoid-­escalation-at-­any-cost.
  83 ‘OIC slams strikes, advises India and Pakistan restraint,’ Times of India, (February
27, 2019: https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/oic-­slams-strikes-­advises-india-­
and-pakistan-­restraint/articleshow/68177136.cms.
  84 ‘China urges India, Pakistan to “exercise restraint” after air strike,’ The Economic
Times (February 27, 2019): //economictimes.indiatimes.com/articleshow/68168069.
cms?utm_source=contentofinterest&utm_medium=text&utm_campaign=cppst.
  85 Authors’ interview with Ambassador Zamir Akram.
  86 Authors’ interview with Zafar Nawaz Jaspal.
 Crises dynamics and escalation dominance   147
  87 Authors’ interview with Ambassador Tasneem Aslam, February 2019.
  88 Authors’ interview with Lt. Gen. Naeem Khalid Lodhi (retd), February 2019.
  89 Authors’ interview with a Senior Military Officer, February 2019.
  90 For interesting analysis on these thoughtful phrases, see Robert Jervis, The Illogic of
Amer­ican Nuclear Strategy (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1984), pp. 126–146.
  91 Lawrence Freedman, The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy (3rd edn) (London: Pal-
grave Macmillan, 2003), see chapter 6, pp. 72–86.
  92 Scott D. Sagan, ‘The Commitment Trap: Why the United States Should Not Use
Nuclear Threats to Deter Biological and Chemical Weapon Attacks,’ International
Security, Vol. 24, No. 4 (Spring 2000), pp. 85–115.
  93 Michael Safi, ‘India launches record-­breaking 104 satellites from single rocket,’
Guardian (February 15, 2017).
  94 Jervis, The Illogic of Amer­ican Nuclear Strategy, p. 154.
  95 Rizwan Zeb, ‘Can India fight a two-­front war?’ The Nation (January 19, 2018).
  96 Jervis, The Illogic of Amer­ican Nuclear Strategy, p. 152.
  97 Ibid., p. 141.
  98 Quoted in Zafar Khan, ‘India’s Cold Start Doctrine: Not so ambiguous,’ South Asian
Voices (January 26, 2017): https://southasianvoices.org/indias-­cold-start-­doctrine-
not-­so-ambiguous/.
  99 Jaganath Sankaran, ‘Pakistan’s Battlefield Nuclear Policy: A Risky Solution to an
Exaggerated Threat,’ International Security, Vol.  39, No.  3 (Winter, 2015),
pp. 118–151.
100 Jervis, The Illogic of Amer­ican Nuclear Strategy, p. 13.
101 Ibid.
102 For detailed analysis on this perspective, see Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of
Conflict (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1960), pp. 187–204.
103 Thomas C. Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press,
1967), pp. 98–99.
104 DoD, Annual Report, F.Y. 1982 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office,
1981), p. 42.
105 Quoted in, David O. Smith, The US Experience with Tactical Nuclear Weapons:
Lessons for South Asia (Washington, DC: Henry L. Stimson Center, March 4, 2013),
p. 32.
106 Naeem Salik, ‘Tactical Nuclear Weapons and Deterrence Stability,’ pp.  1–4, 2:
www.hsdl.org/?view&did=709866; see also Feroz Hassan Khan, ‘Going Tactical:
Pakistan’s Nuclear Posture and Implications for Stability,’ Proliferation Papers,
No. 53 (September 2015), pp. 1–47, 31–32.
107 For these conceptual understandings with regard to the issues related to TNWs, see
Tom Nichols, Douglas Stuart, and Jeffrey D. McCausland (eds.), Tactical Nuclear
Weapons and NATO (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2012).
108 See McGeorge Bundy, Danger and Survival: Choices about the Bomb in the First
Fifty Years (New York: Random House, 1988).
109 Mahmud Ali Durrani, ‘Pakistan’s Strategic Thinking and the Role of Nuclear
Weapons’ (Albuquerque: Sandia National Laboratories, 2004), pp.  1–53: www.
sandia.gov/cooperative-­monitoring-center/_assets/documents/sand2004-3375p.pdf.
110 For these conceptual understandings, see Zafar Khan, ‘Pakistan’s Nuclear First Use
Doctrine: Obsessions and Obstacles,’ Contemporary Security Policy, Vol. 36, No. 1
(2015), pp. 149–170.
111 ‘Nuclear Posture Review 2010,’ US Department of Defense: www.defense.gov/
Portals/1/features/defenseReviews/NPR/2010_Nuclear_Posture_Review_Report.
pdf. Also, see ‘Nuclear Posture Review 2018,’ US Department of Defense: www.
defense.gov/News/Special-­Reports/0218_npr/.
112 Rajesh Rajagopalan, India’s Nuclear Doctrine Debate (Washington, DC: Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace, June 30, 2016).
148   Crises dynamics and escalation dominance
113 US Senate, Subcommittee on Arms Control, International Law and Organization of
the Committee of Foreign Relations, Hearing on US and Soviet Union Strategic
Doctrine and Military Policies, 93rd Cong., 2nd session, March 4 (Washington, DC:
Government Printing Press, 1974), p. 13.
114 DoD, Annual Report, F.Y. 1981, p. 67. Also, see Fred Kaplan, Wizard of Armaged-
don (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1991), pp. 385–386.
115 See Leslie Gelb, ‘Soviet marshal warns the US on its missile,’ New York Times,
March 17, 1983.
6 Balancing and stabilizing
South Asia
Challenges and opportunities for
sustainable peace and stability

Introduction: rational dynamics for balancing and stabilizing

South Asia
The South Asian region continues to be in a consistent search for balancing and
stabilizing the strategic environment amidst the persistent, decades-­old out-
standing issues of fear and mistrust. Stability through institutionalized peaceful
measures becomes essential for mitigating the growing security dilemma
between the two South Asian rivals. It can be presumed correctly that future pro-
spects of cross-­border terrorism-­related attacks between India and Pakistan
suggest the increased risk of military confrontation between the two rivals
heading towards the nuclear level. Therefore, under the vicious cycle of the
security dilemma, the crises between the South Asian rival states continue to
endure. The fact that both India and Pakistan possess nuclear weapons means it
is important to prevent war since the risk of escalation from a military conflict to
a nuclear level is not in the interests of either of the two rivals.1 In this context,
Pakistan’s Prime Minister Imran Khan has repeatedly stated that two nuclear
weapons states do not fight war. It will be mutually suicidal if they go to war
against each other.2 In doing such a thing, both sides may argue that there may
not be plausible defenses against nuclear attacks, therefore, these deadly
weapons should not be considered as conventional forces; conversely, both India
and Pakistan aspire to retain the value of nuclear weapons by developing more
warheads and delivery systems. A similar pattern of the security dilemma-­driven
arms race becomes the crucial part of South Asian nuclear politics,3 which was a
common practice during the Cold War between the Soviet Union and the US,
both of whom considered nuclear weapons as just another type of weapon, yet
contended to use them when absolutely needed.4 In Guarding the Guardians, the
Cold War practice is fairly conceptualized by Peter Feaver, who presents the
always/never dichotomy – that is, for the credibility of nuclear deterrence,
nuclear weapons should always be used when extremely needed in ‘extremis cir-
cumstances’ while they should never be used when absolutely not needed.5
Nuclear states may agree with this dichotomy as part of their declaratory policy.
However, no nuclear state would declare how, when, or where exactly it would
use nuclear weapons.6
150   Balancing and stabilizing South Asia
Nuclear weapons may prevent bigger wars, even limited wars, from risking
major escalation on many occasions, but they certainly cannot be considered a
panacea for all existing problems.7 Arguably, if nuclear weapons prevented
major wars, then these weapons failed to prevent several crises between India
and Pakistan. Today, the South Asian arch-­rivals still aspire for settling their
scores on account of many issues including the core issue of Kashmir. For
example, India has been emphasizing the issue of terrorism as the topmost
agenda item between India and Pakistan. Ambassador Tasneem Aslam
argues that:

At present, India does not feel any strict compulsion to seriously discuss
things with Pakistan bilaterally. India has already opposed what Pakistan
proposed earlier. The situation between India and Pakistan may remain
embroiled and complex given India’s arrogant attitudes by compelling Paki-
stan to discuss only terrorism while ignoring other serious outstanding
issues including the issue of Kashmir.8

Indeed, nuclear weapons have not resolved these outstanding issues. The chal-
lenges continue to exist and India and Pakistan may expect more crises under
the increasing long shadow of nuclear weapons.9 South Asian nuclear leader-
ship has a great potential and opportunity to learn from their nuclear prede-
cessors. Although it is commonly understood that the Cold War strategic
environment may not be the same, and most of its ingredients may not be
applicable, for the South Asian nuclearized environment, the South Asian
security leadership may follow the best and productive practices for stabilizing
deterrence and avoiding accidental nuclear war in South Asia. In addition to
sheer luck, best nuclear practices prevented nuclear war on many occasions
between the US and the Soviet Union during the Cold War period. If nuclear
states follow these patterns of best practices carefully and rationally, a similar
miscalculation in South Asia can also be prevented. The South Asian security
leadership needs to enhance its understanding while dealing with nuclear
weapons by unpacking their cognitive potential to conceptualize what Robert
Jervis termed ‘the meaning of nuclear revolution.’10 That being noted, nuclear
weapons have brought about a revolution in international politics between
nuclear states, which has created ‘mutual vulnerabilities’ between them. In fol-
lowing this pattern of deterrence associated largely with psychological factors,
major wars between nuclear states are prevented thereby enhancing deterrence
stability, though fragility to nuclear deterrence may continue to persist even in
a more advanced nuclear age, bolstered by the introduction of new technolo-
gies for enhancing the credibility of deterrent forces. Therefore, several plaus-
ible imperatives and their continuity with regard to (1) understanding the
prevailing dynamics of the nuclear revolution, (2) improving means of com-
munication, and (3) promoting deterrence stability and sustainable peace in
South Asia may be much more needed than ever before in the wake of the
arrival of nuclear weapons in the broader Southern Asian region.
 Balancing and stabilizing South Asia   151
Reducing risks to building sustainable peace and stability
Understanding the rational dynamics of the nuclear revolution in South Asia,
which introduced Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) between India and Paki-
stan after the two rivals went nuclear, has in turn made both sides vulnerable
to nuclear attacks the same way that the Soviet Union and the US became
involved in ‘mutual vulnerabilities.’11 But as the risk for military escalation to
a nuclear level exists in South Asia because of various challenges the South
Asian region confronts, this may not suffice to rely on MAD and ignore
considerable initiatives that could help the South Asian nuclear leadership to
prevent war-­fighting strategies, reduce the risk of accidental nuclear war, and
eventually mitigate the security dilemma to stabilize deterrence stability in
South Asia. Not all proposals could necessarily be agreed upon as they may
not be considered appropriate for the South Asian region, but these proposals
are well intentioned and, if considered, could produce positive results.
However, there is a need for consistent efforts in following some of the pro-
posed agenda items meant for stabilizing and balancing the South Asian deter-
rence stability.

Efforts to prevent war-­fighting strategies

Amidst the fast-­changing South Asian strategic environment, where both India
and Pakistan have developed various types of missiles to carry warheads to
assigned targets, including both countervalue and counterforce targeting, the
South Asian nuclear rivals are in flux for competing war-­fighting strategies even
though they may not opt for bigger wars including a limited war because of the
fear of nuclear use from both sides. This danger existed during the Cold War
period between the Soviet Union and the US when each side developed thou-
sands of nuclear weapons and their delivery systems. This, in turn, made them
develop a first strike capability with the ability to destroy as many targets as they
could. For example, the US crafted a massive scale nuclear targeting strategy
named the Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP) that helped the United
States to destroy targets in Russia, China, and Eastern Europe. Critical though
this large-­scale US nuclear targeting strategy was, the SIOP aimed that:

Everything would go at once – the handful of early missiles and several

thousand gravity bombs to be delivered by aircraft. Every major city in
Russia, Eastern Europe, and China would be attacked. A number of military
and economic targets, railroads marshalling yards, submarine bases, air-
fields, hydro-­electronic dams, oil fields, mines, and the like, would also be
hit [by what was called an] ‘optimum mix.’12

While considering US large-­scale preemptive nuclear strikes against its per-

ceived adversaries during the height of the Cold War, Lt. General Naeem Lodhi
(retd) mentioned that,
152   Balancing and stabilizing South Asia
like the US preemption strategy, India has also been preparing for preemp-
tive strike strategy directed against Pakistan rather than China. This in turn
will dilute India’s nuclear doctrinal posture of NFU as India appears to be
more aggressive in its strategy while finding space for war in South Asia.13

Although operationalization targeting plans in South Asia are kept deliberately

ambiguous and highly classified for obvious reasons, that does not mean that
India or Pakistan could not have crafted a number of countervalue and coun-
terforce targeting strategies. It is important to note that various types of devel-
opment of warheads and delivery systems for these deterrent forces are
considered for various assigned targets. Therefore, warheads and delivery
systems stand for some deterrence value. Under the security dilemma-­guided
action–reaction theoretical paradigm, South Asian nuclear rivals appear to be
engaged in competitive war-­fighting strategies at both the tactical and strategic
levels, though each side would not desire to escalate the crisis to a nuclear
level. In this context, India’s development of the CSD and its short-­range
battlefield nuclear weapons (Prahaar) for waging a limited/limited-­nuclear war
against Pakistan, and Pakistan’s development of its battlefield nuclear weapon
(Nasr) to counter and fill the deterrence gap, reflect the existence of competing
war-­fighting strategies in South Asia, the execution of which could make each
side vulnerable to strikes, which in turn undermines the deterrence stability of
South Asia.
War-­fighting strategies could have security implications for the South Asian
region. First, despite an Indian military declaration that the CSD exists and
that it continues to develop further by placing the Indian military brigade and
its facilities closer to the Pakistani side of the border, the CSD needs more
elaboration on whether or not the Indian civilian government, who are pre-
sumed to be the guardians of Indian deterrent forces when it comes to the top
echelons of India’s nuclear command and control structure, approves of it.14
Indian military assertiveness for undertaking future surgical strikes against
parts of Pakistan without securing the approval of the Indian civilian leader-
ship could create large-­scale civil–military tension in India. This could be con-
sidered provocative, invoking the other side to react. Second, it is not clear
how the Indian security leadership would convince the Pakistani side that
space for a limited war exists, and the Indian military strategy under the imper-
atives of its planned CSD could undertake a military venture against parts of
Pakistan without intimidating Pakistan into deploying and using its nuclear
weapons,15 though the Indian security leadership keeps a fair understanding of
the prevailing dynamics of deterrence in South Asia where Pakistan aspires to
rely more on nuclear weapons due to the growing conventional asymmetry
between the two sides. What the Indian security leadership perceives could
have an unreasonable turn-­out disfavoring India for what it conceptualizes to
undertake a limited war without provoking Pakistan to use its nuclear weapons.
If India takes the risk of a military surgical strike, there will be lots of pressure
on India to bear the burden of its unilateral initiative. India’s initiation of a
 Balancing and stabilizing South Asia   153
limited war could escalate to a major war, leading to the nuclear level; the
Indian civilian leadership may not want this to happen. This is confirmed by
Zafar Nawaz Jaspal in stating that,

if there is any real surgical strike against Pakistan, Pakistan may quickly
respond to it. However, Indian surgical strikes and Pakistani quick responses
for obvious reasons could produce a risk of escalation to a bigger military
confrontation between India and Pakistan.16

Third, if India develops and deploys its CSD, then it could intimidate Pakistan
into launching its battlefield fighting strategy involving short-­range nuclear-­
capable Nasr ballistic missiles to deny the advancement of the CSD. However,
this war-­fighting initiative, as part of Pakistan’s battlefield nuclear policy, could
confront certain challenges associated with battlefield nuclear weapons: (1) the
deployment of the CSD could provide the incentive to Pakistan to eventually
deploy Nasr to ensure the credibility of short-­range ballistic missiles. This would
require a pre-­delegation authority to the field commander who could come under
tremendous pressure in the real dynamics of warfare. Following the centralized
order, the field commander would have less time for the quick mobilization of
these forces from one location to another and/or use the tactics of dispersal
or  concealment in order to enhance the survivability of these weapons; and
(2)  failure to practice strict mobility of battlefield nuclear forces for ensuring
their survivability could place the pre-­delegation authority under extreme pres-
sure to either use these weapons against assigned targets or succumb to the
adversary’s possible preemptive strikes. That being noted, the dilemma con-
tinues. On the one hand, battlefield nuclear weapons deployment in the field
close to the adversary’s border enhances the vulnerabilities of these weapons,
but on the other hand the early use of these weapons against assigned targets on
the battlefield could also trigger India’s nuclear strategy of massive retaliation,
since the Indian security leadership considers large-­scale strategic responses to
Pakistan’s use of battlefield nuclear weapons.17 Also, India may deploy Prahaar
battlefield nuclear weapons in response to the Nasr that India has already suc-
cessfully produced in 2011.18 However, this is discussed less in the existing liter-
ature as if India does not even possess its battlefield nuclear weapons.
Therefore, the pre-­delegation authority and the use-­or-lose security dilemma
with regard to battlefield nuclear weapons remain problematic, as with the
deployment of the CSD for limited war in the first place.19 There is a need for
strategic imperatives between India and Pakistan in order to understand the
dynamics of war-­fighting strategies in South Asia emanating from the risk of
execution of the CSD followed by the possible deployment of battlefield nuclear
weapons. In order to prevent this from happening, India should not undertake the
considerable risk involved in executing and deploying its CSD, which is
designed for limited war. This could discourage Pakistan from deploying its
battlefield nuclear weapons, which are perceived to be developed against
the CSD.
154   Balancing and stabilizing South Asia
Reducing reliance on nuclear weapons
It is important to note that states possessing nuclear weapons amidst the absence
of nuclear disarmament across the board of international non-­proliferation reflect
the fact that reliance on nuclear weapons continues to exist, though this could
vary from one nuclear state to another depending much on the prevailing stra-
tegic environment that a particular nuclear state faces. For example, the US con-
fronted the enormous conventional forces of the Soviet Union at the onset of the
Cold War period due to which it relied on its nuclear monopoly and subse-
quently increased a number of nuclear warheads and delivery systems to deter
the Soviet Union’s conventional attacks against the US and its allies.20 Although,
since the end of the Cold War, the US has reduced its reliance on nuclear forces,
it still continues to keep a large number of nuclear forces along with the assigned
delivery systems.21 In South Asia, Pakistan relies on nuclear deterrent forces
because of the perceived growing conventional force imbalance between India
and Pakistan. For Pakistan, it becomes important to rely on nuclear weapons as
long as a conventional imbalance exists between Pakistan and India. Also, it is
not correct to argue that India, due to its conventional force superiority, would
not rely on nuclear weapons, and might, therefore, not increase its deterrent
forces. On the contrary, India increases its fissile material, which, in turn, boost
India’s capability to increase its warheads.22 India not only aspires to develop
sophisticated delivery systems for these warheads to the assigned targets India
prepares against Pakistan and China, but also ensures it has the capability to
engage targets beyond Southern Asia. Lt. General Naeem Lodhi (retd) argues:

When it comes to India’s evolving military strategy in general and nuclear

strategy in particular, India argues that it confronts two of its major adver-
saries (i.e. China and Pakistan) and that it can fight well wars on two fronts.
That being noted, India increases its nuclear warheads and develops sophist-
icated delivery systems. India does this because of its aspiration for power
projection and political influence in international affairs.23

However, South Asian nuclear states need to craft a strategy and/or undertake
certain plausible measures in order to reduce the over-­reliance on nuclear forces.
In this context, few key measures could be undertaken as part of confidence-­
building measures between the South Asian nuclear rivals, though they could be
difficult and complex. First, there is a need to address the issue of growing con-
ventional imbalances in South Asia in the form of a treaty for setting up the
parameters and identifying the areas that negatively cause the other side to
increase its reliance on its nuclear forces to offset the conventional force imbal-
ance. Second, the side that relies on nuclear weapons much more than the other
could enhance the incentives to develop its conventional force capability, though
this could be expensive. This may not be advisable for two reasons – (a) it
increases the conventional arms race and (b) it increases the probability of war
in South Asia.24 Third, decreasing the security threat produced by the advanced
 Balancing and stabilizing South Asia   155
conventional force capability designed for waging limited wars can help reduce
an over-­reliance on nuclear forces. Although it remains ambitious, South Asian
nuclear rivals may undertake measures to deploy their deterrent forces that
neither side would execute (e.g., both conventional and nuclear), targeting each
other for tactical objectives. Reducing the over-­reliance on nuclear forces could
have certain policy implications: (a) it could further discourage India and Paki-
stan from deploying either advanced conventional or nuclear forces as part of
their military/nuclear strategies against each other – for example, it can be pre-
sumed that if India does not strategize to deploy its advanced conventional
forces as part of its CSD against parts of Pakistan, Pakistan may not unnecess­
arily deploy its battlefield nuclear forces as part of its battlefield nuclear policy;
(b) this could provide incentives, particularly to the side relying on nuclear force
for strengthening its conventional force capability, to retain a conventional force
balance; and (c) reducing greater reliance on nuclear forces helps reduce the risk
of nuclear use which, in turn, promotes deterrence stability in South Asia.

Preventing accidental nuclear war

Although the probability of nuclear weapon use has significantly been reduced
between India and Pakistan because of improved nuclear knowledge surround-
ing nuclear use, that in doing so could trigger retaliation followed by an all-­out
nuclear war, the risk of accidental nuclear use continues to persist between the
two nuclear weapons states particularly during serious crisis situations in South
Asia. That said, on the one hand, the technological advancement, and complex
organizational procedures have made the chances of accidental use of nuclear
weapons greatly remote during peace time, but on the other hand, in a serious
crisis between nuclear states, especially when nuclear forces are on high alert
ready to be deployed in minutes, the risk of escalation to a major military con-
frontation leading to a high possibility of nuclear use is increased. Poorly
managed and ineffective early warning systems, and incomplete/incorrect and
false alarm messages are some of the important factors that increase the prob-
ability of accidental nuclear war if these messages are not thoroughly reviewed
by the concerned nuclear security-­related organizations. Even some of the very
complex technical and organizational mechanisms could become complex. For
example, the accidental detonation of one of the nuclear warheads could send a
false alarm to its adversary who could prepare for retaliation. The adversary’s
retaliatory move could in turn be considered an offensive first strike. This, in
turn, could cause further miscalculation. It is generally observed that during a
serious crisis situation, alerting activities and the prospects for reaction to the
other side’s action get enlarged.
It is important to note that the first atomic age was not free from the complex-
ities that could have caused accidental nuclear use between the Soviet Union and
the US.25 A nuclear South Asia cannot be estranged and indifferent to these chal-
lenges in the new technological era. Disinformation and reaction to false alarms
without properly reviewing procedure could cause chaotic conditions during a
156   Balancing and stabilizing South Asia
serious crisis between India and Pakistan. Emotional rhetoric by the security
leadership on any false alarm situation that is perceived to be real could cause
the nuclear alert level to be potentially high between India and Pakistan, espe-
cially when the South Asian region lacks an effective early warning system.26
The Cold War nuclear period, despite organizational practices and technological
advances with regard to the safety and security of nuclear forces, faced false
alarm-­related issues.27 Cold War nuclear security issues may provide some
lessons for nuclear South Asia. For example, two significant false alarm-­related
glitches in the US could have caused an accidental nuclear war between the
Soviet Union and the US during the peak of the Cold War period. First was the
Goldsboro incident, when a US B-­52 bomber carrying two hydrogen bombs
crashed in Goldsboro, North Carolina. Because of the safety devices attached to
these bombs, neither of these bombs detonated.28 However, even if just one of
the bombs had detonated, this could have been perceived to have been an offen-
sive strike by the Soviet Union which, in turn, could have caused a crisis leading
to accidental nuclear use. Second, the NORAND incident caused a tremendous
false alarm situation when a glitch in one of the computer chips set off a false
alarm, conveying a message to Strategic Air Command (SAC) that a number of
Soviet SLBMs had been launched targeting the United States.29 Although these
episodes occurred during peace time, they could easily have escalated to a major
crisis situation. It is important to question what would happen if the nuclear-­
related accidents had occurred amidst a serious crisis. Scott Sagan is correct to
argue that ‘no system to prevent accidents is perfect; incidents of some sort are
bound to happen. What if some of the rare accidents that have occurred in peace-
time, had instead happened in the middle of a serious crisis?’30 That being noted,
the South Asian nuclear leadership will need to consider these serious accidents
during peacetime and analyze their security implications for a serious South
Asian crisis. Although there is no single system that could completely avert the
possibility of an accident during peace and crisis time, South Asian nuclear
states can undertake stringent measures to reduce the possibility of nuclear-­
related accidents from escalating to a major military confrontation. Zafar Nawaz
Jaspal assumes that, ‘Although strategic restraint on deterrent forces and delivery
systems remains complex and difficult between India and Pakistan, they are
much more interested in developing a regime that will help prevent accidental
nuclear war in South Asia.’31

Sticking to the essentials of minimum deterrence

Although both India and Pakistan have declared that they would follow
minimum deterrence while opposing the acquisition of a larger number once was
acquired by the Soviet Union and the US during the peak of the Cold War, it
appears as if both India and Pakistan are drifting away from the minimum deter-
rence they conceptualized earlier. Initially, both India and Pakistan had few
nuclear weapons in their possession. According to some credible sources, the
number is increasing.32 It is important to note that if the number of nuclear
 Balancing and stabilizing South Asia   157
weapons increased, then increased warheads would also require delivery systems
to sustain the credibility of these deterrent forces. Nevertheless, the problem
associated with the concept of minimum deterrence is that although minimum
remains innocuous, the number fluctuates.33 From the security leadership in India
and Pakistan, it can be deduced that minimum cannot be quantified. It does not
remain static, rather, it changes in accordance with the changed strategic
environment of South Asia. Although both India and Pakistan have officially
declared their intentions to sustain minimum deterrence, it has been recently
observed that the Indian security leadership may no longer be interested in using
the modifier ‘minimum’ with ‘deterrence.’34 This reflects that India might aspire
to possessing more nuclear warheads and delivery systems for both security and
power-­projection purposes. Drifting away from minimum deterrence could have
the following security implications for the South Asian region: (1) The consist-
ent increase in the number of warheads bolstered by sophisticated delivery
systems by one nuclear state could increase the security dilemma for others in
South Asia, which, in turn, increases the arms race to a number of deterrent
forces not defined; (2) It would become murkier to define what minimum is and
how the security leadership in South Asia would further illustrate minimum
deterrence as being a part of the nuclear CBMs; (3) It is feared that both India
and Pakistan could gradually drift away from the minimum deterrence they
earlier conceptualized because of the changed strategic environment. This would
eventually take India and Pakistan into a Cold War scenario where minimum
was disregarded by both the US and its counterpart the Soviet Union.35 For
example, Lt. General Naeem Lodhi (retd) stipulates that,

India has already crossed the principles of minimum deterrence both in

spirit and in the letter, given its advanced conventional and modernized
nuclear deterrent forces, since it has developed its capacity to increase more
warheads. Apparently, India is no longer interested in using the term
‘minimum’ in its policy papers.36

That being noted, there is a dire need for the South Asian broader security
leadership to revisit the essentials of minimum deterrence while learning from
its Cold War nuclear predecessors. Although the US, in its arms race with the
Soviet Union, disregarded minimum deterrence on multiple fronts, the state-
ments by the US security leadership reflected the US’s modest approach toward
minimum deterrence. For example, McGeorge Bundy, the United States National
Security Advisor to Presidents John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson,
stated that:

Think-­tank analysts can set levels of ‘acceptable’ damage well up in the tens
of millions of lives. They can assume that the loss of dozens of great cities
is somehow a real choice for sane men. They are in an unreal world. In the
real world of real political leaders – whether here or in the Soviet Union – a
decision that would bring even one hydrogen bomb on one city of one’s
158   Balancing and stabilizing South Asia
own country would be recognized in advance as a catastrophic blunder; ten
bombs on ten cities would be a disaster beyond history; and a hundred
bombs on a hundred cities is unthinkable.37

Also, while realizing the deadly effects of nuclear weapons after issuing the
command to use these weapons, first in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, US President
Harry S. Truman advocated to David Lilienthal that: ‘You have got to under-
stand this is not a military weapon. It is used to wipe out women, children and
unarmed people, not for military use.’38 In addition to this, US President Dwight
D. Eisenhower, who surprisingly was initially inspired by his Defense Secretary
John Foster Dulles’ designed nuclear strategy of massive retaliation, later
stated that:

Gain such a victory and what would you do about it? I ask you, what would
the civilized world do about it? I repeat that there is no victory in any war
except through imagination, through our dedication and through our work to
avoid it.39

Although the United States eventually went for a larger number of deterrent
forces, the concept and reflection for the proposed policy of minimum deterrence
existed even during the peak of the Cold War. In a similar context, the South
Asian security leadership and leading analysts were not oblivious to the concept
of minimum deterrence for the South Asian region. For example, Pakistan’s then
Chief of Army Staff, General Aslam Beg stated in an interview,

In the case of weapons of mass destruction, it is not the numbers that matter,
but the destruction that can be caused by even a few … the fear of retali-
ation lessens the likelihood of full-­fledged war between India and
Pakistan.40

A renowned Indian nuclear strategist, K. Subrahmanyam, stated that ‘deterrence

is not to be measured in terms of any equation of damages that each side may
inflict on the other’ and even just ‘one bomb on one city is unacceptable.’41 Also,
Rajesh Basrur, while illustrating the essentials of minimum deterrence, advises
the South Asian nuclear leadership that, ‘the implication is clear. Minimum
deterrence does not require a calculation of the balance of capability in a nuclear
relationship. Whether one side has more and/or better weapons does not
matter.’42
Out of these reflections on the essentials of minimum deterrence, the South
Asian security leadership can sustain minimum deterrence without necessarily
emulating the adversaries of Cold War nuclear history. There is absolutely no
need to go for an ‘overkill strategy’ that would require thousands of nuclear
weapons and many sophisticated delivery systems, as the Soviet Union and the
US once followed.43 By revisiting the proposed essentials of minimum deter-
rence, both India and Pakistan (1) can avert replicating the Cold War nuclear
 Balancing and stabilizing South Asia   159
history of larger numbers of deterrent forces along with sophisticated delivery
systems; and (2) can be convinced that the minimum number of forces can work
to deter the other side. For example, despite the smaller number of nuclear
forces, China deterred the provocative measures of both the US and the Soviet
Union and prevented these major powers from attacking the mainland of China
during the Cold War period. China believes that its minimum deterrence con-
tinues to deter its adversaries. Therefore, China has not increased its deterrent
forces into the thousands, although it has slightly increased recently to 280
nuclear weapons in total.44 Chinese deterrent forces aim at the minimum means
of reprisal.45 By revisiting the essentials of minimum deterrence India and Paki-
stan can prevent the vicious cycle of an arms race, which will not only contribute
toward deterrence stability in South Asia, but also avert international pressure on
how India and Pakistan might otherwise increase their deterrent forces, thereby
endangering the risk of nuclear war.

An improved means of communication for risk reduction

An improved means of communication for reducing the risk of accidental
military escalations to the nuclear level is one of the first, but quite significant,
initiatives between the rival states. Improved communication, particularly
between the two nuclear states, becomes more important in order to prevent the
failure of nuclear deterrence. Rapid, secure, and reliable communication between
India and Pakistan has become much more important because of the consistent
arch-­rivalry and fear of nuclear weapons use in South Asia. The following sec-
tions explain some of the effective channels for communication that may further
be improved between India and Pakistan in order to protect the South Asian
region from the risk of accidental nuclear war.

Hotlines
Direct Communication Links (DCLs), particularly between the states’ top leader-
ship during the crisis that is conceptualized as The Hot Line, can play an
effective role in protecting states from the risk of accidental war if the DCLs are
reliable, improved, secure, and rapid between the states’ leadership. It is
important to note how significantly the need for such communication links
between the Soviet Union and the US during the peak of the Cold War was felt.
It can be observed that during the Cuban Missile crisis in 1962, communication
between the two superpowers was not rapid, secure, or reliable. Therefore, there
was a risk of miscommunication and that, in turn, could escalate the crisis into a
major military confrontation, including the use of a nuclear missile stored in
Cuba. For example, when Robert Kennedy delivered an oral message to the
Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin, stating that the United States could
invade Cuba if the Soviet Union would not remove the missiles, it took a great
deal of time and an official process before the message in Dobrynin’s words was
sent across to the Soviet security leadership.46 What exactly was quoted by
160   Balancing and stabilizing South Asia
Robert Kennedy could have been conveyed incorrectly by the other side, creat-
ing a tenser strategic environment between the two nuclear superpowers, par-
ticularly when the two were close to using their nuclear weapons. Learning
lessons from the classic Cold War Cuban Missile crisis, Kennedy and Khrush-
chev agreed to establish DCLs between the US and the Soviet Union, which
were made rapid, improved, reliable, and consistent throughout the Cold War
strategic rivalry. An improved ‘hotline’ communication was used on many occa-
sions between the Cold War superpowers that, in turn, helped prevent major
crises.47
The South Asian region also required the establishment of Cold War-­type
DCLs after the end of the 1971 war between India and Pakistan. Since then, both
sides have used hotline communication links on many occasions between both
sides. Hotline communication links are part of the CBMs between India and
Pakistan, when the two sides agreed to hold direct communication links during
the time of the crises in order to prevent the escalation of these crises to an
unnecessary military level.48 Although it is considered that the hotline communi-
cation links between India and Pakistan are made secure through involving
various procedures, these links could further be made rapid, improved, consist-
ent, and reliable, making sure that these hotline direct communication links are
not preempted and/or accidentally destroyed during a multiple crises escalation.
Similarly, the hotline improved communication links can be used not only at the
Director General Military Operations (DGMOs) level, but consistently made
effective at the Foreign Minister and even Prime Minister level during both
peace and crisis times. Pursuing an effective, reliable, and rapid DCLs hotline
between India and Pakistan could have certain security implications that, in turn,
could produce positive results benefiting India and Pakistan. First, the DCLs that
are to be rapid, consistent, and reliable are considered an asset in the bid for sus-
tainable peace and deterrence stability in South Asia. A correct and appropriate
means of hotline communication between India and Pakistan at all essential
leadership levels is necessary during both crises and peacetime. However, it is
important to note that direct communication at all levels of leadership may not
be carried out at the same time. This is to avoid confusion and miscommunica-
tion. Once talks fail to produce meaningful results at one particular level, then
other levels can be tried against the backdrop of what was discussed by the
former. Second, talks and direct communication links are always tried in the
wake of major crises and they often produce effective results. Learning from
past experience, when dialogue is the ultimate form of mechanism between the
two strategic rivals, it is in the interests of the rival states to discourage backing
off from using the peaceful dialogue mechanism. Productive and reliable com-
munications could always pave the way for restoring peace and stabilizing the
strategic environment. The absence of a DCL hotline amidst serious crises could
endanger the risk of military escalation to a nuclear level, especially when the
rivals possess nuclear weapons. Third, a third-­party role could also appropriately
be utilized in favor of DCLs, especially when the strategic environment becomes
complex and outstanding issues stand unresolved. Although the third-­party role
 Balancing and stabilizing South Asia   161
may not help resolve all of the outstanding issues between rival states, and it
could only play a balancing role in managing the crisis, it may still be considered
that the role of a third party could help encourage the strategic rivals toward
effective and resulted-­oriented dialogue. If the effective role of a third party
cannot help resolve outstanding issues, it can at least play a significant role in
preventing a major military escalation. The third-­party role has played a signi-
ficant part in managing several crises and stabilizing peace in South Asia in the
1990s and 2000s, though it failed to help resolve the outstanding issues between
India and Pakistan.49

Adopting measures for retaining a balance rather than parity

It is interesting to observe the changing behavior of both Pakistan and India
when it comes to their deterrence force posture in South Asia. Are these South
Asian nuclear states taking adequate measures for deterrence force balance and/
or parity? There appears to be a greater shift in the doctrinal deterrent force
posture of the changed South Asian strategic environment. First, India appears to
be in search of parity, vis-­à-vis the deterrent forces that China develops, as India
keeps its strategic rivalry alive against China despite the growing volume of eco-
nomic activity between the two strategic rivals. India’s DRDO has been working
on bigger deterrent force projects that include short-, intermediate-, and long-­
range ballistic missiles bolstered with sophisticated delivery systems. The ration-
ale for developing these missile variants, which India currently upgrades and
develops, could be used for a combination of both countervalue and counterforce
targeting strategies against both Pakistan and China. India has been striving hard
to develop the potential to produce much fissile material, especially when it has
increased the number of nuclear reactors after the India–US nuclear deal that, in
turn, enables India to develop more nuclear warheads.50 Second, since Pakistan
keeps Indian specificity as one of the significant rationales of its nuclear policy,
it tends to retain a balance rather than nuclear parity. Pakistan, as part of its
nuclear policy, may not be able to afford deterrence forces through parity for a
considerable number of reasons, as discussed in the preceding chapters. Argu-
ably, a weapon-­to-weapon deterrence force strategy was largely practiced by the
US and the Soviet Union at the peak of the Cold War when both sides developed
thousands of nuclear weapons. Only the major powers, and/or the rising regional
power in possession of nuclear capability, could afford the policy of deterrence
force by parity. To further conceptualize, parity could stand for a greater number
of nuclear forces including sophisticated delivery systems. Doing so, however,
may not remain consistent with minimum deterrence. In contrast to the deter-
rence force posture by parity, retaining a deterrence balance may remain consist-
ent with the minimum deterrence perceived here since retaining a policy based
on a deterrence balance discourages nuclear states to go for a bigger number of
deterrence forces. Striving for a deterrence force by parity could have certain
security implications for the South Asian region: (1) it increases the security
dilemma between India and Pakistan; (2) this then increases the arms race that
162   Balancing and stabilizing South Asia
both India and Pakistan might well wish to avoid in the first place; and (3) this
could further undermine South Asian deterrence stability.
Therefore, the following measures can be undertaken in order to address this
prevailing dilemma in South Asia. (1) There is a need for an extension of the
existing NCBMs between India and Pakistan that, in turn, could help these
nuclear states craft a strategy of how, and under what parameters, the balance in
both conventional and nuclear domains could be sustained. Because a consistent
increase in one’s deterrent force capability could undermine the imperatives of
deterrence balance in South Asia, this could increase the risk of more conflicts
and military confrontations. For example, the existence of conventional force
disparity and the increasing asymmetry in nuclear delivery systems between
India and Pakistan could enable the former to effectively use its shield (in this
case the BMD system) and sword (aspiration for preemptive strikes) against the
latter. The latter (Pakistan) would soon plunge into a bigger arms race while pro-
ducing effective countermeasures, the failure of which the Pakistani security
leadership may perceive that Pakistan could lag behind and suffer at the conven-
tional and nuclear deterrence force levels. (2) While retaining the agreed prin-
ciples of keeping the deterrence force balance rather than parity, South Asian
nuclear states could significantly prevent the Cold War practice of retaining
thousands of nuclear weapons on each side, the failure of which would be the
Cold War-­type of overkill strategy of MAD. Presumably, MAD, which has
already arrived in South Asia, is meant to create mutual vulnerabilities for both
India and Pakistan. (3) Preventing deterrence by parity could, in turn, discourage
India and Pakistan from getting involved in a bigger arms race. The recent exclu-
sive report printed in Dawn by Pakistani renowned former ambassadors
noted that,

in the nuclear age, it is axiomatic that an all-­out nuclear conflagration is

unthinkable. So it should also be unthinkable for the two nuclear neighbors
to initiate a conflict that has the potential of getting out of control. They
must learn to prevent and manage crises rather than spawn and fuel them.’51

In doing so, this may pave the ways for establishing an SRR and/or an arms
control regime that does not exist in South Asia. The South Asian region requires
one of these proposed agenda items for assisting both India and Pakistan not to
indulge in an never-­ending arms race.

The arms control regime

Despite the proposal regarding the establishment of an SRR in 1998 – one of the
reasonable forms of arms control regime – neither an SRR nor the so-­called arms
control regime exists between the South Asian nuclear states today. Although
there is a number of CBMs/NCBMs between India and Pakistan in both the pre-
and post-­nuclear period, in the wake of the India and Pakistan, May 1998 nuclear
tests, the Clinton Administration under its Deputy Secretary of State Ian Talbot
 Balancing and stabilizing South Asia   163
proposed a ‘four plus one’ strategic dialogue, commonly referred to as an ele-
phant with ‘four legs and a trunk’ or a ‘tail.’ This included: (1) unconditional
adherence to the CTBT; (2) entry into the proposed FMCT to stop the produc-
tion of fissile material; (3) the adoption of a minimum deterrent posture with
greater restraint on the production of nuclear weapons, their delivery systems
and a commitment on non-­deployment; (4) the adoption of international
norms and export control guidelines on nuclear-­related sensitive technology; and
(5) the resumption of direct dialogue between India and Pakistan to resolve their
outstanding issues, including the core issue of Kashmir.52
The agenda items proposed by the Clinton administration were encouraging
for South Asian deterrence stability. However, following a similar pattern, it is
important to note that Pakistan’s security establishment also proposed the non-­
paper proposal regarding an SRR that Pakistan proposed to India, and which
comprised these essential ingredients: (1) the need for the creation of a political
climate and a culture of conflict resolution to reduce tension; (2) while creating
the proposed SRR, there is a need for proportionate and balanced obligations on
all issues from both sides; (3) the need for recognizing that Pakistan’s nuclear
deterrent force posture is affected because of conventional and structural imbal-
ances in South Asia; (4) both India and Pakistan would need to establish an insti-
tutionalized mechanism to prevent an escalation in crises; and (5) the right of
withdrawal from the SRR arrangements on account of meeting the supreme
national security interests.53 Nevertheless, the proposed SRR was not material-
ized because of the following reasons: (a) Pakistan linked conflict resolution
with conventional and nuclear restraint, (b) the consideration of conventional
force restraint was not acceptable to India, and (c) in doing so, any nuclear
restraint in the absence of a conventional force restraint was not then acceptable
to Pakistan, and finally (d) considering this complex situation, Washington lost
interest in the so-­called proposed SRR.54 Also, a couple of serious crises – the
Kargil episode in 1999 and the Twin Peaks incidents in 2001–2002 – further
faded the interest of India and Pakistan, as well as the US, in working further on
these significant proposals, regarding putting restraints on their conventional and
nuclear deterrent forces. Khalid Banuri also pointed out that it was

Pakistan that proposed an SRR in South Asia which asked for getting onto
the table to determine what agenda points were mutually agreeable for
nuclear and missile restraints and conventional balance, so that a conflict
resolution mode could be evolved.55

Yet, in 2004 both India and Pakistan agreed on a number of CBMs/NCBMs,

such as the dedicated and secured hotline communications, pre-­notification of
the flight testing of missiles, the unilateral practice of a nuclear moratorium, and
a restoration of the Lahore Memorandum of Understanding of 1999 dialogue
process between India and Pakistan. In 2007, there was a cordial discussion on
the review of the existing number of CBMs/NCBMs between India and Paki-
stan.56 In the following year, the Mumbai crisis undermined the credibility of
164   Balancing and stabilizing South Asia
these existing dialogue processes. Since then, multiple crises have continued to
occur, such as Pathankot (2016), Uri (2016), Nagrota (2016) etc., in the recent
past between the two sides and it appears to be a standstill type of situation
between India and Pakistan when it comes to the dialogue process. There has
been an absence of a dialogue process on these proposed and/or existing CBMs/
NCBMs between India and Pakistan. For example, on the one hand, India con-
siders the spread of terrorism as top of the agenda, but on the other hand, Paki-
stan consistently emphasizes that terrorism is one of the imperatives of the
existing dialogue process and that outstanding issues, including the core issues
of Kashmir, are the root causes of all issues affecting South Asian stability.
When it comes to the establishment of the proposed SRR, Zafar Iqbal Cheema
argues that,

It is always India that has opposed and has not agreed to what Pakistan has
proposed because India considers that if it accepts what Pakistan proposes it
shows weakness. It would be India, rather than Pakistan, that would need to
agree to establishing SRR in South Asia.57

Many in Pakistan would agree that existing CBMs/NCBMs can further be

strengthened, although these measures cover most of the essentials. Considering
the changed South Asian strategic environment, many initiatives are still missing
from the existing CBMs/NCBMs that can form part of the proposed SRR:
(a)  there is a need for an agreement on the prohibition of cyber-­attacks on
nuclear command and control and other military/nuclear installations; (b) both
India and Pakistan need to develop negotiations for putting restraints on the
development and deployment of Anti-­Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM) systems in
South Asia; (c) the US needs to adopt a policy of discouraging India from pursu-
ing missile defense capabilities; (d) India needs to hold an agreement with Paki-
stan on non-­operationalization of the CSD, and Pakistan then will need to stop
production of further low-­yield weapons/TNWs; (e) there is a need for a par-
ticular mechanism for the restoration of the ceasefire along the Line of Control;
(f ) India and Pakistan need to have a declaration to refrain from war-­fighting
and/or provocative military doctrines; (g) the proposed SRR needs to include the
provisions of pre-­notification before India and Pakistan conduct missile tests;
(h) there is a need for an agreement on avoiding incidents at sea; (i) hotline com-
munications can further be expanded into Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers
(NRRCs); and (j) India and Pakistan can also work out the placement of loca-
tional restrictions on offensive forces in order to reduce the possibility of sur-
prise attacks, in line with the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) agreement.58
In addition to these proposed agenda items for the proposed SRR, the South
Asian region needs to have an arms control regime and the proposed SRR could
pave the way for SRR creation for the South Asian rival nuclear states. It is
important to understand that the establishment of an arms control regime/SRR is
significantly important for South Asian nuclear rivals – that is, (a) to avoid the
cost of war, (b) to prevent accidental nuclear war, and (c) to promote deterrence
 Balancing and stabilizing South Asia   165
stability in order to reduce the possibilities of war between India and Pakistan.
Nevertheless, the challenges for the establishment of an arms control regime
between India and Pakistan exist and, therefore, it becomes unlikely that the
South Asian nuclear rivals will be able to establish the so-­called arms control
regime in the immediate future. While speaking on a number of challenges with
regard to the creation of an SRR/arms control regime in South Asia, Ambassador
Zamir Akram mentioned that,

When it comes to SRR, India has always been opposed to its acceleration,
but it rather successfully developed most of its deterrent forces along with
their delivery systems, which Pakistan proposed as part of restraint regime
in South Asia. India is not likely to accept what Pakistan may propose. It
aspires for escalation dominance and power projection in the broader
Southern Asian region.59

Similarly, Khalid Banuri argued:

As Pakistan proposed CBMs, India did not appear inclined to discuss them,
even when the dialogue channels were open. With the composite dialogue
in a freeze for the last several years, the status quo continues to prevail.
With a consistently stubborn negation from the Indian side to resume the
dialogue, a CBM fatigue is gaining traction in Pakistan.60

That said, the key challenges toward the making of an arms control regime in
South Asia could be: (1) Both India and Pakistan are still in the early stages of
their deterrent force development. They have yet to make plans to develop many
delivery systems for their warheads. For example, India is developing MIRV
technology, a BMD system, aircraft carriers that could require dual capable air-
craft, many types of nuclear-­capable missile technology, and more nuclear sub-
marines, particularly when it perceives two adversaries, China and Pakistan.61
(2) Perhaps, the most important factor amidst the absence of an arms control
regime is the extra-­regional link factor under the rubric of a systemic security
dilemma conceptualized in this volume – that is, what is happening in terms of
deterrent force development between the United States and Russia affects
Chinese deterrence forces, Chinese force development is then perceived to be a
threat for Indian deterrence force credibility, and India then significantly affects
Pakistan’s deterrent force posture.62 Eventually, the existing force posture of
major nuclear states affects the nuclear policies of smaller nuclear states. (3) The
international non-­proliferation regime, particularly the NPT, does not recognize
India and Pakistan as nuclear weapons states. The NPT recognizes only five
nuclear states, commonly known as the established nuclear weapons states that
have already tested their nuclear power capabilities before January 1, 1967.
Therefore, other nuclear states, including India and Pakistan, are not granted
nuclear legitimacy. Exclusion of these states from the NPT’s umbrella makes the
situation severe, complex, and fearful.
166   Balancing and stabilizing South Asia
Improved confidence-­building measures
There have been a number of confidence-­building measures/nuclear confidence-­
building measures (CBMs/NCBMs) between India and Pakistan over the last
two decades. These CBMs aim to ease the growing tension, manage crises, and
prevent the possibility of military escalations to a nuclear level. Many of these
CBMs/NCBMs are still in existence and they have been productive between the
two South Asian nuclear states. However, it is important to observe that in the
past couple of decades these confidence-­building measures have failed to pro-
gress, especially after a number of crises unfolded between the two arch-­rivals
that could have risked military escalation, for example, the recent Pathankot,
Uri, and Nagrota events, though both India and Pakistan have demonstrated
restraint in avoiding quick military mobilization to the common border, unlike
what happened in the Kargil (1999) and the Twin Peaks (2001–2002) episodes.63
Primarily, this could be one of the key lessons about managing the crisis that
India and Pakistan have learned from previous crises in South Asia.64 Yet, both
sides still need to learn more on the security implications of these crises for the
South Asian region; if they are not properly and timely managed, the CBMs are
not institutionalized, and the dialogue often gets delayed and discouraged.65
These related issues might undermine the existence and future of CBMs/NCBMs
between India and Pakistan, and the confidence-­building measures on all fronts
might then be violated.
It is observed that many significant measures get delayed because of a number
of prevailing crises between India and Pakistan. That is, after every crisis the
credibility of CBMs/NCBMs becomes undermined. For example, after the 2007
judicial crisis in Pakistan, followed by the Mumbai episode in 2008, a number of
significant backchannel discussions on at least four agenda items, such as (a) the
concept of self-­governance within sub-­regions of the territory, (b) the softening
of the LoC for intra-­Kashmir travel and commerce, (c) de-­militarization, and
(d) a joint mechanism to safeguard essential interests for the two countries linked
to Kashmir, was cancelled. Both the parties have been unable to restore these
essential parts of backchannel CBMs.66
Pakistani Ambassador Riaz Muhammad Khan illustrates how CBMs between
India and Pakistan have been successful in the past, even though they have not
helped resolve a number of outstanding issues between the two countries. Khan
argues that a number of CBMs failed to grow successfully because of (a) the
domestic pressure and competing narrative and (b) the lack of institutionaliza-
tion of these confidence-­building initiatives and the lack of growth of CBMs/
NCBMs alongside the growing shift in India’s and Pakistan’s military doctrines
and capabilities.67 For example, when it comes to competitive narratives,
whereas India blames Pakistan for terrorism in India and/or India-­held Kashmir,
Pakistan would blame India for its growing spread of terrorism in parts of Paki-
stan. When India blames Pakistan Inter-­Services Intelligence (ISI) for its com-
plicity in acts of terrorism in India, Pakistan has equally held the Indian Research
and Analysis Wing (RAW) responsible for its acts of terrorism inside Pakistan
 Balancing and stabilizing South Asia   167
and its failure to contain terrorism inside India. Therefore, for India, terrorism
becomes the first and foremost agenda item when it comes to existing CBMs,
while, for Pakistan, terrorism is one of the important points, but considers
Kashmir the root cause of all issues between India and Pakistan. In doing so,
competing narratives continue to prevail between the two arch-­rivals in South
Asia. Khan is correct to argue that, ‘such divergences have clouded the mindset
of the two sides over the years, impeding the mutual accommodation needed for
progress in almost every area of prospective cooperation.’68 In an interview with
these authors, Ambassador Riaz Muhammad Khan argues:

Well for any progress towards reduction of tension and a degree of nor-
malcy, dialogue is necessary which was interrupted by India after the
Mumbai incident and then Uri and Pathan Kot incidents. In my view, India
should not have suspended the dialogue after Uri and Pathan Kot. In any
event Pakistan is right in maintaining its readiness to engage in dialogue
when India is ready, perhaps after the Indian elections. Meanwhile, human
rights violations in Kashmir continue and there is growing recognition that
the Kashmiri uprising is indigenous. So we have to wait and see how the
situation develops after the Indian elections.69

Most of the existing CBMs/NCBMs are very significant in that they cover most
of the essentials elements between India and Pakistan that help reduce the risk of
escalation. They include hotlines (diplomatic and military levels), formal agree-
ments for the exchange of advance information on missile and nuclear tests,
commander level flag staff meetings, the exchange of information related to
accidents at sea and land, and the annual exchange of information on the loca-
tion of nuclear sites and bearing a commitment not to target these sites. Also,
these CBMs/NCBMs include: a mutual agreement on preventing airspace viola-
tions; advance notice on military exercises, maneuvers, and troop movements;
and agreement on the release of many fishermen between India and Pakistan
Security Agency and the Indian Coast Guard.70 All these CBMs/NCBMs tend to
ensure strategic stability in South Asia in terms of producing the guiding prin-
ciples for de-­escalating tensions at the LoC and Working Boundary.71 Neverthe-
less, amidst growing competing war-­fighting strategies in South Asia, more
needs to be done to overcome the prevailing competing narratives. Also, there is
a need for a more regular and permanent political and diplomatic level of mech-
anism that would assist both sides to eventually institutionalize the existing
essentials of CBMs/NCBMs between India and Pakistan.
First, an official dialogue process between India and Pakistan should be
resumed to mitigate the nuclear risks that new technologies continue to pose.
Second, an effective mechanism for third-­party mediation is needed, otherwise
India and Pakistan will continue fighting until they find a lasting solution to the
Kashmir conflict, which is highly unlikely in the absence of US mediation.
Third, India and Pakistan should discuss the stability of nuclear deterrence in the
region, the status of Kashmir, and relations with Afghanistan. Against this
168   Balancing and stabilizing South Asia
b­ ackdrop, both countries need to immediately revive the Lahore Declaration
(1999) and resume all existing nuclear CBMs, thereby immediately opening up
suspended communication channels. The Declaration seeks to resolve issues,
including Jammu and Kashmir, take CBMs forward in the nuclear and conven-
tional military fields, and address the need to increase information technology
cooperation, ease visa regulations, and promote trade. Fourth, India and Pakistan
should promote transparency with each other on their nuclear doctrine, posture,
and modernization plans through budgetary constraints. Such transparency is
necessary for a substantive dialogue to build mutual understanding and pave the
way for future reductions. Fifth, discussing the consequences of using nuclear
weapons, building up the training centers to reduce the risks of nuclear escala-
tion, and empowering the academic community in both countries, are all neces-
sary steps to enhance escalation control strategies. Sixth, the two countries
should endeavor to find common ground on the settlement of bilateral disputes,
especially over Kashmir. Seventh, India and Pakistan need to introduce a shared
mechanism to address cross-­border terrorism.72 This dialogue should take place
between the highest levels of military and political leadership of both countries.
Eighth, India and Pakistan need to initiate economic dialogue at the earliest73
possible opportunity in order to connect the economies at a bilateral level, which
in turn would mitigate their mistrust and differences. Finally, existing CBMs/
NCBMs need to be further improved and made credible. They need to be made
regular and permanent at the political and diplomatic level. Decades-­old ten-
sions, such as a shared troubled history, mutual suspicion and hostility, territorial
disputes, and cross-­border terrorism, remain challenging to the future improve-
ment of Indo-­Pakistan bilateral relations. It goes without saying that in the
absence of dialogue at the state level, non-­state actors may gain more space to
steer narratives toward the negative, furthering a focal point of India–Pakistan
tensions. Another skirmish at the border has the potential to escalate to the
nuclear level, and this is unlikely to change if governments fail to revive the dia-
logue process during peacetime. Additionally, open communication, information
sharing, and routine connectivity will help build understanding between the two
states. These measures can assist India and Pakistan to continue to hold talks,
avoid misunderstanding, and improve their bilateral relations.
The continuity of these measures at all levels can further assist the two rival
states to show restraint during serious crises and if these measures are executed
in a timely fashion, then India and Pakistan can prevent major conflict leading to
a nuclear level. In doing so, the two rival states will effectively mitigate the
security dilemma while promoting peace and stability in South Asia. This
process will, in turn, mitigate the fear, uncertainty, and probability of wars.
Therefore, credible confidence-­building measures can prevent a major communi-
cation breakdown irrespective of the seriousness of each unfolding crisis in
South Asia. Eventually, these measures will provide a robust framework to not
only understand the existing dynamics of prevailing crises between India and
Pakistan, but also find solutions for preventing these serious crises in the future.
It is not incorrect to mention that South Asian deterrence stability largely
 Balancing and stabilizing South Asia   169
depends on these significant and credible CBMs/NCBMs at all levels. This, in
turn, forces the South Asian leadership to ensure the existence and credibility of
these measures by instituting the crisis management mechanism for preventing
serious escalation issuing from the prevailing crises between India and Pakistan.
This could require a bilateral (India and Pakistan), trilateral (India, Pakistan, and
the US) and even quadrilateral (India, Pakistan, China, and the US) level of
engagement for making the crisis management mechanism robust.

The US’s balancing role for the South Asian region

Since the onset of the Cold War between the two major powers, the US and the
Soviet Union (Russia), the US has remained active in the South Asian region.
Although India has tilted toward Russia more despite its non-­alignment move-
ment, Pakistan has opted to be in the US camp with its security mechanisms,
such as CENTO and SEATO, which it used to support Pakistan with economic
and defense packages.74 In the following decades of the Cold War, particularly
1960s, 1970s, and 1980s, the US attempted to sustain a balancing role. However,
the major powers, including the US, failed to provide Pakistan the kind of eco-
nomic and military assistance it provided in th Indo-­Pakistan war in 1965,
despite Pakistan’s security membership in those security mechanisms. Similarly,
the US was unable to prevent India from testing its nuclear capability in 1974,
which India continues to call a PNE. Similarly, in the wake of the Cold War, the
major powers could not prevent both India and Pakistan from successfully
carrying out nuclear tests. This reflects the diplomatic and political limitations of
the international community, including the US. In this context, Ambassador Riaz
Muhammad Khan also opined:

Outside powers can be supportive and are willing to play a supportive role.
But given the nature of Pakistan–India relations, CBMs and measures for
normalcy and dispute resolution will have to be primarily worked out by the
two countries themselves. Outsiders can play an important role in arresting
a conflict situation, but then it is incumbent on the two countries to prevent
such conflict getting precipitated.75

The United States crisis management important has changed the dynamics of the
fragile strategic environment in South Asia, which may consistently require a
third-­party role, say in this case, the US and perhaps China in the near future to
actively participate in managing the crises and helping prevent the uncontrolled
escalation of these crises to a much more dangerous level.76 It can be observed
that the US crisis management team has actively been involved in engaging both
the Indian and Pakistani security leadership by sending trained and skillful man-
agers who know about the dynamics of South Asia. In the wake of the nuclear
tests in May 1998, the US crisis management team began to closely monitor
South Asia’s changed strategic environment. For example, the US, as a third-­
party stakeholder, played a significant role in the wake of the 1999 Kargil
170   Balancing and stabilizing South Asia
episode, the 2001–2002 Twin Peaks incidents, and the 2008 Mumbai crisis. The
US continued to play a similar role in the existing prevailing crises between
India and Pakistan despite US diplomatic limitations. However, the Trump
administration is unclear about the US’s consistent crisis management role for
the South Asian region, but it cannot ignore the consequences of an uncontrolled
escalation leading to the nuclear level. Yet, it is important to understand why the
US crisis management ‘playbook’ failed to resolve outstanding issues, including
the core issue of Kashmir, despite its credibility. First, it appears to be correct
that, due to US diplomatic limitations, it only attempts to manage the crisis by
preventing an uncontrolled escalation. The US crisis management team has
never been able to resolve major issues between India and Pakistan. Second,
there are competing and contrasting narratives between India and Pakistan. That
is, Pakistan desires the third-­party role to help resolve major issues rather than
merely manage the crises. India largely prefers for these major issues to be bilat-
erally resolved between India and Pakistan, though India encourages the US
crisis management role for the South Asian region. Third, despite the existing
narrative promoting the US’s balancing role in South Asia, it appears that the tilt
of the United States balancing role would rather go in favor of India much more
than Pakistan, particularly during the administration of US presidents Obama
and Trump. For example, the US–India nuclear deal, and its consistent growing
strategic partnership with India as part of the US ‘re-­balancing strategy,’ demon-
strates that the US’s balancing role for the South Asian region could soon fade.
These, in turn, could have security implications for the South Asian region:
(a) this would greatly enhance India’s confidence to show its aggression against
Pakistan; (b) it would allow India to shift its military and nuclear posture to
preempt the Pakistani deterrent force capability; (c) India could chalk out its
regional aspirations for power projection; and (d) this could increase the possib-
ility of an arms race and uncontrolled escalation between India and Pakistan.
What, then, is required in order to prevent this unbalanced prevailing strategic
environment? Some plausible options could appropriately be considered: (1) The
US needs to retain a balancing role. Its civilian and military leadership need to
engage and support both India and Pakistan in their dialogue process. For
example, it will be highly encouraging if the US president visits both of the
South Asian nuclear states on equal terms without producing a sense of discrimi-
nation and frustration. (2) The US could encourage both India and Pakistan to
resolve their major issues with the possible help of US crisis management assist-
ance. (3) The US could even play a significant role by urging China to play an
active part in the South Asian region as China increases its economic and trade
volume with both India and Pakistan as part of Chinese BRI. However, in this
context, a senior Pakistani military official stated that,

China’s role in South Asia may still remain limited despite its trade and eco-
nomic imperatives with both India and Pakistan. It has not yet achieved the
level of maturity in managing serious conflicts that the US has been man-
aging for decades between India and Pakistan. Obviously, it will be in
 Balancing and stabilizing South Asia   171
neither China’s nor the US’s interest to let India and Pakistan become
embroiled in a major conflict that could then escalate to a nuclear level
because of the increasing Chinese, and the long-­standing US, geo-­economic
and geo-­political interest in the broader Southern Asian region.77

In sum, relations between India and Pakistan could be improved at the bilateral,
trilateral, and even quadrilateral levels when the US and China play their active
roles in promoting South Asian strategic stability because any possible uncon-
trolled military escalation could harm US and Chinese geopolitical and geo-­
economic interests in the region.

South Asian nuclear statuses and international non-­proliferation

Although there is less of a possibility that the international non-­proliferation
regime, particularly the NPT, would immediately recognize India and Pakistan
as nuclear weapons states, there could be some form of amendment to grant
nuclear legitimacy within the prevailing international non-­proliferation system.
This would encourage restraint and strategic stability in South Asia. This, in
turn, could strengthen the credibility of the international non-­proliferation
regime. However, this would require a greater role by the major nuclear weapons
states to encourage the inclusion of India and Pakistan in becoming greater parts
of the NPT. Any discrimination, say the inclusion of India and consistent ouster
of Pakistan from broader international non-­proliferation politics, could have
greater consequences for non-­proliferation in general and the strategic stability
of South Asia in particular. Therefore, the international non-­proliferation regime
will have two plausible options, either: (1) They accept the nuclear statuses of
both India and Pakistan as responsible nuclear states, since both India’s and
Pakistan’s nuclear weapons tests are considered to be for deterrence purposes.
That in turn may help revamp the NPT provisions to their security interest; or
(2) Members of the NPT could continue to keep both India and Pakistan outside
the NPT as a crucial part of the international non-­proliferation regime. Each of
these options could have certain implications and challenges to India and Paki-
stan in general, and the NPT in particular. First, by accepting India’s and Paki-
stan’s nuclear statuses as legitimate nuclear weapons states, the major nuclear
states could help strengthen international non-­proliferation. This will greatly
reduce the perceived discriminatory tag associated with the NPT, that is, the dis-
crimination between the haves and the have-­nots. Second, the international non-­
proliferation regime cannot keep India and Pakistan outside the NPT for too
long. The more they are out of the NPT, the more they engage in an arms race,
and greater are the risks for war between the South Asian nuclear rival states.
The earlier they are included within the NPT system, the more the NPT could
encourage India and Pakistan to put a restraint on their deterrent forces.
Nevertheless, revamping and keeping flexibility within the NPT, although it
is much needed now, may have unexpected implications for the non-­proliferation
regime, of what many states party to the NPT may perceive. First, for many
172   Balancing and stabilizing South Asia
States Parties to the NPT, this approach could open up a Pandora’s Box. The
existing States Parties to the NPT could also demand a similar type of treatment
as this could be awarded to South Asian nuclear states in terms of accepting their
nuclear statuses. Other nuclear states outliers to the NPT could also recognize
the member states for acknowledging their nuclear statuses. This could then
unleash the prospects for more nuclear states to exit the existing NPT. That
being noted, any new nuclear states that would acquire nuclear weapons and
would be party to the NPT, could have already planned to quit the NPT and test
its nuclear capability. This, in turn, could spread the arms race both at the ver-
tical and horizontal aspects between the member states party to the NPT, which,
already weakened, could unravel to a failure. Considering these implications,
which create a dilemma for the NPT, it appears to be extremely difficult and
complex for the member states party to the NPT to grant nuclear legitimacy to
India and Pakistan in the near future.

Addressing South Asian non-­proliferation and disarmament

challenges
One of the significant aspects for sustaining deterrence stability in South Asia is
that both India and Pakistan may continue to maintain their unilateral and volun-
tary non-­proliferation initiatives – that is, the continuity of a nuclear mora-
torium.78 If that was the case, then neither India nor Pakistan would need to carry
out more nuclear tests. At the present time, both India and Pakistan have not
conducted any more nuclear tests since they tested their nuclear capability in
May 1998. However, part of the problem is that this is a voluntary practice, not
legally binding, which in turn provides incentives to nuclear states to conduct
nuclear tests whenever they deem necessary for security and deterrence pur-
poses. In this context, if one nuclear state in South Asia decides to conduct more
nuclear tests, others would eventually follow suit. Since nuclear weapons exist
and there is no effective or unanimous agreement on nuclear disarmament in the
immediate future, the possibilities for conducting more nuclear tests remain
inevitable. Similarly, both India and Pakistan have never been part of the NPT
and the CTBT. It is unlikely that they would join these leading international non-
­proliferation regimes in the immediate future unless they are otherwise recog-
nized as nuclear weapons states. More so, contemporary realities have outdated
the NPT. For example, NPT clauses on non-­proliferation and peaceful use
require major changes if a better non-­proliferation regime is to emerge. The NSG
is under immense stress against the backdrop of globalization and the rising
demand for energy security in developing countries in Asia and shifting global
energy trends from fossil fuels to alternative energy sources.
A new criterion has to be devised for non-­NPT states to meet their energy
security demands. India’s integration without a criterion would undermine the
regime. A new criterion could be devised by the NSG members to accommodate
India and Pakistan on the basis underlined below.79 First, both should sign the
bilateral moratorium on non-­testing with Pakistan. Second, both should slow
 Balancing and stabilizing South Asia   173
down their fissile material production and sign a bilateral moratorium on fissile
material with Pakistan before the discussion on universal FMCT.80 Third, initiate
a bilateral agreement between India and Pakistan on a separation plan and open
up all peaceful facilities for IAEA’s verification and full-­scope safeguards.81
Fourth, the Indian NSG waiver of 2008 has become irrelevant and may not need
to be incorporated in the new criterion.82 Fifth, NSG membership can immedi-
ately lead to the institutionalization of meaningful arms control agreements
between India and Pakistan to reduce existing stockpiles and stop future growth.
Finally, the problem of the Indo-­Pakistan nuclear status outside the NPT can be
addressed through NSG membership. The NSG would benefit by extending its
membership to India and Pakistan.83

Conclusion
It is important to conclude that India and Pakistan are gradually learning to
live with the reality of nuclear deterrence after comprehensively analyzing the
India–Pakistan dialogue process: (1) understanding the prevailing dynamics of
the nuclear revolution, (2) improved means of communication, and (3) pro-
moting deterrence stability in South Asia. As these South Asian nuclear rivals
learn to live with each other – despite outstanding issues, including the core
issue of Kashmir – the international community, particularly member states to
the international non-­proliferation regime, also learn to live with nuclear
weapons in South Asia. The arrival of nuclear weapons in South Asia has
significantly reduced major wars and has perhaps also provided the incentive
for a third-­party role in terms of managing the issues between India and Paki-
stan because of the fear of a military escalation emanating from serious crises
to the nuclear level between the South Asian nuclear states. However, nuclear
deterrence is becoming undermined in South Asia because of the growing
number of crises between India and Pakistan in the recent past. Therefore,
nuclear weapons have not resolved outstanding issues, including the core issue
of Kashmir. The long-­standing issue of Kashmir between India and Pakistan is
not resolved, even with the involvement of key third-­party stakeholders, such
as the US crisis management imperative. One of the key lessons the South
Asian nuclear states have learned is that neither nuclear weapons nor the third-
­party role have significantly addressed prevailing long-­standing issues between
India and Pakistan. Apparently, there has been an emphasis on crisis manage-
ment rather than on conflict resolution. Therefore, the risk of escalation to the
nuclear level, out of serious crises between India and Pakistan, continues to
exist, but nuclear deterrent forces that have created a ‘nuclear stalemate’ and
‘mutual vulnerabilities’ in South Asia have provided a significant lesson for
India and Pakistan – that military escalation risking the use of nuclear forces
may not favor either side.
The growing arms race in terms of introduction of new deterrent force tech-
nologies, conventional force modernization, and increasing the number of
nuclear warheads and delivery systems are some of the challenges posing a
174   Balancing and stabilizing South Asia
d­ angerous threat to South Asian deterrence stability. Given these challenges,
nuclear leadership needs to demonstrate strong responsibility to avoid miscalcu-
lation and the risk of accidental nuclear war in South Asia. Nuclear South Asia
remains a dynamic region and there are a number of plausible imperatives men-
tioned in this chapter, and although not all of them could be applicable, some of
them are promising, which could, in turn, help India and Pakistan to resolve their
outstanding issues, including the prevention of nuclear war. While illustrating
these plausible dynamics under the essentials of a systemic security dilemma,
the South Asian security leadership can proceed with the consistent dialogue
process at the bilateral (India and Pakistan), trilateral (China, India, and Paki-
stan), and quadrilateral (China, the US, India, and Pakistan) levels, to simultan-
eously prevent the unthinkable in South Asia. South Asian nuclear rivals cannot
live for too long with these issues, nor can the international community ignore
India and Pakistan prevailing a serious crises environment. In order to have con-
sistency in the dialogue process between India and Pakistan, the South Asian
security leadership needs to learn from their past experiences in order to perform
more efficiently – that is, (1) to sustain the credibility of the existing CBMs/
NCBMs, (2) to institutionalize the crisis management mechanism in South Asia,
(3) to provide considerable room for a third-­party role to continue with man-
aging the crises, and (4) to eventually find a concrete mechanism for conflict
resolution of the long-­standing issues in South Asia. Upon learning something
out of these valuable lessons from their past experiences, India and Pakistan will
be able to secure and sustain deterrence stability in South Asia.

Notes
  1 Zafar Khan and Rizwana Abbasi, ‘Pakistan and the International Nuclear Order,’
Islamabad Papers, Institute of Strategic Studies Islamabad, Nuclear Paper Series,
No. 1 (2016), pp. 1–80.
  2 See, AAP News, ‘ “Two nuclear armed countries should not even think of a war,” says
Pakistani Prime Minster Imran Khan,’ AAP News PK (January 8, 2019): www.
youtube.com/watch?v=kzmCqG9geBE.
  3 Bhumitra Chakma (ed.), The Politics of Nuclear Weapons in South Asia (London and
New York: Routledge, 2011).
  4 Lawrence Freedman, The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy (New York: Palgrave, 2003).
  5 Peter D. Feaver, Guarding the Guardians: Civilian Control of Nuclear Weapons in
the United States (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1992).
  6 Although many nuclear states have written declaratory policies, it is still not clear as
to when, how, or where exactly they would use their nuclear forces. The red lines are
not fully defined. They are kept under calculated ambiguity. The least possible answer
one can get is that they could use their nuclear forces as a ‘last resort’ and/or in
‘extremis circumstances.’
  7 Ward Wilson, ‘The Myth of Nuclear Deterrence,’ The Nonproliferation Review,
Vol. 15, No. 3 (November 2008), pp. 421–439; Ira Helfand, ‘The Humanitarian Con-
sequences of Nuclear War,’ Arms Control Today, November 2013. Also, see Edward
Ifft, ‘A Challenge to Nuclear Deterrence,’ Arms Control Today (March 2017): www.
armscontrol.org/act/2017-03/features/challenge-­nuclear-deterrence.
  8 Authors’ interview with Tasneem Aslam, former Pakistan diplomat and a spokes-
person of Foreign Ministry of Pakistan, February 2019.
 Balancing and stabilizing South Asia   175
  9 For useful analysis, see Sameer Lalwani and Hannah Haegeland (eds.), Investigating
Crises: South Asia’s Lessons, Evolving Dynamics, and Trajectories (Washington,
DC: Stimson Center, 2018).
10 Robert Jervis, The Meaning of Nuclear Revolution: Statecraft and the Prospects of
Armageddon (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1989).
11 See Robert Jervis, ‘Mutual Assured Destruction,’ Foreign Policy, No. 133 (Novem-
ber–December 2002), pp. 40–42. For useful analysis on this, see Henry D. Sokolski
(ed.), Getting MAD: Nuclear Mutual Assured Destruction: Its Origins and Practice
(Washington, DC. Institute of Strategic Studies, 2004).
12 Thomas Powers, ‘Choosing a Strategy for World War III,’ Atlantic Monthly, (Novem-
ber 1982), pp. 82–110, 92.
13 Authors’ interview with Lt. General Naeem Khalid Lodhi (retd) in Rawalpindi,
February 2019.
14 Zafar Khan, ‘India’s Cold Start Doctrine: Not so ambiguous,’ South Asian Voices
(Washington, DC: The Stimson Center, January 26, 2017).
15 For a detailed analysis on this, see Walter C. Ladwig III, ‘A Cold Start for Hot Wars?
The Indian Army’s New Limited War Doctrine,’ International Security, Vol.  32,
No. 3 (Winter 2007/2008), pp. 158–190.
16 Authors’ interview with one of Pakistan’s leading strategic analysts Professor Zafar
Nawaz Jaspal, Department of International Relations Quaid-­e – Azam University,
Islamabad, February 2019.
17 Akra Biswas, ‘Pakistan’s Tactical Nuclear Weapons: De-­constructing India’s Doc-
trinal Response,’ Strategic Analysis, Vol. 39, No. 6 (2015), pp. 683–695.
18 Evan Braden Montgomery & Eric S. Edelman, ‘Rethinking Stability in South Asia:
India, Pakistan, and the Competition for Escalation Dominance,’ The Journal of Stra-
tegic Studies, Vol. 38, No. 1–2 (2015), pp. 159–182.
19 For interesting analysis on this, see Jaganath Sankaran, ‘Pakistan’s Battlefield Nuclear
Policy: A Risky Solution to an Exaggerated Threat,’ International Security, Vol. 39,
No.  3 (Winter 2014/2015), pp.  118–51. Also, see Mansoor Ahmed, ‘Pakistan’s
Tactical Nuclear Weapons and their Impact on Stability,’ Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace (June 30, 2016): http://carnegieendowment.org/2016/06/30/
pakistan-­s-tactical-­nuclear-weapons-­and-their-­impact-on-­stability-pub-­63911.
20 Lawrence Freedman, The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy (New York: Palgrave, 2003),
pp. 37–42.
21 See the United States Nuclear Posture Reviews of 2010 and 2018: for NPR 2010, see
www.defense.gov/Portals/1/features/defenseReviews/NPR/2010_Nuclear_Posture_
Review_Report.pdf; for NPR 2018, see https://media.defense.gov/2018/Feb/02/
2001872886/-1/-1/1/2018-NUCLEAR-­POSTURE-REVIEW-­FINAL-REPORT.PDF.
22 Mansoor Ahmed, ‘India’s Nuclear Exceptionalism: Fissile Materials, Fuel Cycles,
and Safeguards,’ May 2017, Belfer Center, pp.  1–66: www.belfercenter.org/sites/
default/files/files/publication/India%27s%20Nuclear%20Exceptionalism.pdf.
23 Authors’ interview with Lt. General (Retd) Naeem Khalid Lodhi in Rawalpindi in
February 2019.
24 This is derived from the seminal work of John J. Mearsheimer, Conventional Deter-
rence (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1983).
25 David Wright and Eryn MacDonald, ‘Reducing the Risk of Nuclear War,’ Union of
Concerned Scientists (February 2, 2016), pp.  1–16: www.ucsusa.org/sites/default/
files/attach/2016/02/Reducing-­Risk-Nuclear-­War-full-­report.pdf; Bradley A. Thayer,
‘The Risk of Nuclear Inadvertence: A Review Essay,’ Security Studies, Vol. 3, No. 3
(1994), pp. 428–493.
26 P.R. Chari, ‘Nuclear Crisis, Escalation Control, and Deterrence in South Asia,’
Working Paper (Washington, DC: Stimson Center, 2003), pp.  1–27: https://pdfs.
semanticscholar.org/b52d/2a2d54117826d94be58d12b6e2860cbcbd21.pdf. Also, see
176   Balancing and stabilizing South Asia
Lalwani and Haegeland, Investigating Crises: South Asia’s Lessons, Evolving
Dynamics, and Trajectories (2018), pp. 11–22 and pp. 251–264.
27 Scott D. Sagan, The Limits of Safety: Organizations, Accidents, and Nuclear Weapons
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993).
28 Quoted in, Scott D. Sagan, Moving Targets: Nuclear Strategy and National Security
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1989), p. 174.
29 Ibid., pp. 173–174.
30 Sagan, Moving Targets: Nuclear Strategy and National Security, p. 144.
31 Authors’ interview with one of Pakistan’s leading strategic analysts Professor Zafar
Nawaz Jaspal, Department of International Relations Quaid-­e – Azam University,
Islamabad, February 2019.
32 For Indian nuclear forces, see Hans M. Kristensen and Robert S. Norris, ‘Indian Nuclear
Forces, 2017,’ Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 73, No. 4 (2017), pp. 205–209. For
Pakistani nuclear forces, see Hans M. Kristensen and Robert S. Norris, ‘Pakistani Nuclear
Forces, 2016,’ Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 72, No. 6 (2016), pp. 368–376.
33 Zafar Khan, Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons: A Minimum Credible Deterrence (London
and New York: Routledge, 2015).
34 Manpreet Sethi, ‘India’s N-­Doctrine: Still credible, still minimum,’ The Tribune (May
16, 2017): www.tribuneindia.com/news/comment/india-­s-n-­doctrine-still-­credible-
still-­minimum/407524.html.
35 Keith B. Payne and Matthew Costlow, ‘Nuked: Destroying the myth of minimum
deterrence,’ The National Interest (December 12, 2014): http://nationalinterest.org/
feature/nuked-­destroying-the-­myth-minimum-­deterrence-11843.
36 Authors’ interview with Lt. General (Retd) Naeem Khalid Lodhi in Rawalpindi,
February 2019.
37 McGeorge Bundy, ‘To Cap the Volcano,’ Foreign Affairs, Vol.  48, No.  1 (October
1969), pp. 1–20, 10.
38 Quoted in Lawrence Freedman, The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy (New York:
­Palgrave, 2003), p. 49.
39 John L. Gaddis, Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Post-­War Amer­
ican National Security Policy (London: Oxford University Press, 1982), p. 135.
40 Quoted in George Perkovich, ‘A Nuclear Third Way in South Asia,’ Foreign Policy,
Vol. 91 (Summer 1993), pp. 84–104, 88–89.
41 K. Subrahmanyam, ‘Nuclear Force Design and Minimum Deterrence Strategy for
India,’ in Bharat Karnad (ed.), Future Imperiled: India’s Security in the 1990s and
Beyond (New Delhi: Viking, 1994). Also, see K. Subrahmanyam, ‘A credible deter-
rent: Logic of the nuclear doctrine,’ Times of India (1999).
42 Rajesh Basrur, Minimum Deterrence and India’s Nuclear Security (Stanford, CA:
Stanford University Press, 2006), p. 39.
43 David A. Rosenberg, ‘The Origins of Overkill: Nuclear Weapons and Amer­ican
Strategy, 1945–1960,’ International Security, Vol. 7, No. 4 (Spring 1983), pp. 3–71.
44 Hans M. Kristensen and Robert S. Norris, ‘Chinese Nuclear Forces, 2018,’ Bulletin of
the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 4, No. 4 (2018), pp. 289–295.
45 Jeffery Lewis, Minimum Means of Reprisal: China’s Search for Security in Nuclear
Age (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2007).
46 Quoted in Sagan, Moving Targets: Nuclear Strategy and National Security, p. 150.
47 Ibid., pp. 151–152.
48 For interesting analysis, see Moonis Ahmar, The Challenges of Confidence-­Building
in South Asia (New Delhi: Har Anand, 2001).
49 Lalwani and Haegeland, Investigating Crises: South Asia’s Lessons, Evolving
Dynamics, and Trajectories, pp. 143–162.
50 For interesting analysis, see Ashley J. Tellis, ‘Atoms for War? US–Indian Civilian
Nuclear Cooperation and India’s Nuclear Arsenal,’ Carnegie Endowment for Inter-
national Peace (2006): http://carnegieendowment.org/files/atomsforwarfinal4.pdf.
 Balancing and stabilizing South Asia   177
51 Riaz Hussain Khokhar, Riaz Muhammad Khan, and Inamul Haq, ‘Dawn Exclusive: A
Time for Restraint,’ Dawn (February 24, 2019): www.dawn.com/news/1465697/
dawn-­exclusive-a-­time-for-­restraint.
52 Feroz Hassan Khan, ‘Strategic Restraint Regime 2.0,’ in Michael Krepon and Julia
Thompson (eds.), Deterrence Stability and Escalation Control in South Asia (Wash-
ington, DC: Stimson Center, 2013), pp. 161–174, 163.
53 Ibid., p. 164.
54 Ibid., pp. 161–162.
55 Authors’ interview with Khalid Banuri, former Director General Arms Control and
Disarmament Affairs, SPD, Pakistan, February 22, 2019.
56 Ministry of External Affairs, ‘Joint Statement on India-­Pakistan expert-­level dialogue
on Nuclear Confidence Building Measures (CBMs),’ Government of India (October 19,
2007): http://mea.gov.in/bilateral-­documents.htm?dtl/5921/Joint+Statement+on+India
Pakistan+expertlevel+dialogue+on+Nuclear+Confidence+Building+Measures+CBMs.
57 Authors’ interview with Professor Zafar Iqbal Cheema, President and Executive Dir-
ector of SVI, Islamabad, February 2019.
58 Naeem Salik, ‘Strategic Stability in South Asia: Challenges and Prospects,’ (Islama-
bad: Institute of Strategic Studies, 2016), pp. 3–25, 13–14.
59 Authors’ interview with Pakistan former Ambassador Zamir Akram who has served
as a permanent member of the United Nations, February 2019.
60 Authors’ interview with Khalid Banuri former Director General Arms Control and
Disarmament Affairs, SPD, Pakistan, February 22, 2019.
61 Zafar Nawaz Jaspal, ‘Arms Control: Risk Reduction Measures between India and
Pakistan,’ (Islamabad: SASSU, 2005), pp. 1–28.
62 For interesting analysis on this, see Zafar Khan, ‘Prospects for an Arms Control
Regime in South Asia,’ Washington Quarterly, Vol. 39, No. 1 (2016), pp. 171–189;
Bhumitra Chakma, ‘Nuclear Arms Control Challenges in South Asia,’ India Review,
Vol. 9, No. 3, (2010), p. 377. Also see, Robert Ayson, ‘Arms Control in Asia: Yester-
day’s Concept for Today’s Region,’ Australian Journal of International Affairs,
Vol. 67, No. 1 (2013), pp. 1–17.
63 Ibid.
64 Ibid.
65 Ibid., p. 158.
66 See Riaz Muhammad Khan, ‘Conflict Resolution and Crisis Management: Challenges
in Pakistan–India Relations,’ in Sameer Lalwani and Hannah Haegeland (eds.), Inves-
tigating Crises: South Asia’s Lessons, Evolving Dynamics, and Trajectories (Wash-
ington, DC: Stimson Center, 2018), pp. 75–96, 83. 
67 Ibid., p. 87.
68 Ibid., p. 83.
69 Authors’ interview with Pakistan former Foreign Secretary Riaz Muhammad Khan in
Islamabad, February 2019.
70 Riaz Muhammad Khan, ‘Conflict Resolution and Crisis Management: Challenges in
Pakistan–India Relations,’ p. 84.
71 For a detailed information on these CBMs/NCBMs, see Michael Krepon, ‘South Asia
Confidence Building Measures (CBM) Timeline,’ Stimson Center, (April 14, 2017):
www.stimson.org/content/south-­asia-confidence-­building-measures-­cbm-timeline.
72 Rizwana Abbasi and Lubna Abid Ali, ‘Twenty Years into Nuclear South Asia:
Resuming Dialogue to Stabilize Deterrence,’ South Asian Voices (May 25, 2018):
https://southasianvoices.org/nuclear-­south-asia-­dialogue-stabilize-­deterrence/.
73 Ibid.
74 Feroz Hassan Khan, Eating Grass: The Making of the Pakistani Bomb (Stanford, CA:
Stanford University Press, 2012), pp. 68–94; Abdul Sattar, Pakistan’s Foreign Policy
1947–2009: A Concise History (2nd edn) (London: Oxford University Press, 2011),
pp. 8–21.
178   Balancing and stabilizing South Asia
75 Authors’ interview with Pakistan former Foreign Secretary Riaz Muhammad Khan in
Islamabad, February 2019.
76 Yun Sun and Hannah Haegeland, ‘China and Crisis Management in South Asia,’ in
Lalwani and Haegeland (eds.), Investigating Crises: South Asia’s Lessons, Evolving
Dynamics, and Trajectories (2018), pp. 165–186.
77 Authors’ interview with a Pakistan retired senior military official in Islamabad,
February 2019.
78 ‘Pakistan Offers India Moratorium on Nuclear Tests,’ The Express Tribune (August
17, 2016): https://tribune.com.pk/story/1164259/pakistan-­offers-india-­moratorium-
nuclear-­tests/.
79 Rizwana Abbasi, ‘Addressing Nuclear Non-­Proliferation and Disarmament Chal-
lenges in South Asia, I-­IR (January 6, 2018): www.e-­ir.info/2018/01/06/addressing-­
nuclear-non-­proliferation-and-­disarmament-challenges-­in-south-­asia/.
80 Ibid.
81 Ibid.
82 Ibid.
83 Ibid.
Conclusion

Revisiting the systemic security dilemma

This chapter draws on the findings that the US and China have political, stra-
tegic, economic, and security interests in the Asia-­Pacific region. Both the US
and China are heavily reliant on maritime trade routes for their socio-­economic
growth and they will continue to increase their influence and assertiveness in the
blue seas in order to preserve their SLOCs. Moreover, China’s conflicts with
Asian states and its claims on the South China Sea and the East China Sea are
not going to resolve any time soon. Although China cannot invade or blockade
any of its neighbors due to US presence and the preparation of neighboring
states’ military assertiveness, it has the ability to challenge US economic and
security interests in the region. The US is the predominant maritime power and
holds supremacy in the blue seas of the Asia-­Pacific whereas China will con-
tinue to modernize its naval platforms to maintain balance and mitigate threats.
These trends, in turn, drive these two states into serious security competition.
Although both the US and China are carefully moderating the security dilemma
in order to avoid confrontation, probability of conflict cannot be ruled out, given
their extensive arms build-­up and deployment of military platforms in the Asia-­
Pacific region. Thus, the US–China power balance, against the backdrop of
evolving technologies, could lead to the escalation of tension and conflict that, in
turn, could challenge the broader regional stability. Considering the Sino-­Indian
trade volume, it seems that India is working on capability-­based planning to
project its power in the Asia-­Pacific as one of the rising regional powers. There
are no acute chances of an escalation in the conflict between China and India
because of the recent economic growth between the two sides and China’s ability
to moderate the security dilemma with India. Nevertheless, probability of con-
flict between China and India cannot be completely ruled out, given India’s
hedging policy against China and its evolving deterrent forces and military mod-
ernization plans directed at China. Both US–China competition and India’s
hedge against China create a security dilemma. India’s modernization of its
military forces, its evolving technologies, transforming strategies, and contin-
gency plans all combine to threaten Pakistan, which, in turn, adopts counter-
measures to ensure its security. The growing trends in the Asia-­Pacific suggest
180   Conclusion
that the systemic security dilemma-­driven vicious cycle of the arms race might
become more prominent and interlinked between the US and China, China and
India, and India and Pakistan. These competing states’ expansion of military
deployments and expansion of threats would increase risks of miscalculation or
unintended escalation. Militarization of the blue seas has complicated the threat
spectrum and increased challenges related to the C2 systems of the states. States’
growing development of long-­range missiles, the development of MIRVs,
BMDs, and submarine-­based nuclear weapons, introduction of SLBMs, aircraft
carriers, and outer space platforms create strategic implications in the Southern
Asian region. Evolving technologies and increasing gaps among these states
could further create imbalance and instability.
Because of fear, insecurity, and uncertainty about others, each player con-
cludes that it has no alternative but to protect their vital security interests. The
resulting outcomes are the vicious cycles of an expanding action–reaction arms
competition. Thus, shifting the distribution of material power, owing to China’s
growing influence in Asia, the growing economic rise of Asia, surging military
spending, and military modernization has introduced an unending arms race
leading to broader regional instabilities. Indeed, development in the US strategic
posture, such as missiles defense, and conventional prompt global strikes, could
lead to reaction in China, which could produce a corresponding reaction in India1
that, in turn, could impact Pakistan’s strategic choices. A vicious unavoidable
cycle of action–reaction that is systemic in nature is produced. This level of
transformation certainly created puzzling questions attached to regional insecuri-
ties. This arms race can only be mitigated when and if all sides are able to
engage in the broader arms control institutional framework, respecting each
other’s security concerns. This volume finds that competition and the systemic
security dilemma would not foster a stable environment, but, on the contrary,
would introduce negative repercussions for the stability of the wider Southern
Asian region.
After two decades of South Asian nuclearization, the value of nuclear deter-
rence persists, ensuring that nuclear weapons will continue to exist in South
Asia. Nuclear South Asia has become one of the more important regions, whose
nuclear strategies are crafted at the expense of competing strategies played out
by major powers. This volume elaborated upon the competing strategies between
the states possessing nuclear weapons, bolstered by advanced delivery systems
under the conceptual systemic level framework, which, in turn, affects South
Asian deterrence stability. The overall strategic stability of South Asia largely
depends on what and how major nuclear powers interact and develop their stra-
tegic relationship with nuclear South Asia. If major powers, because of their
geopolitical and geo-­strategic interests, favor one state against the security inter-
ests of another, then this can undermine the deterrence stability of South Asia.
Also, if the established nuclear states would continue to retain a policy to keep
nuclear weapons as long as nuclear weapons exist, then this may reflect and
convey a message regarding the value to smaller nuclear states of nuclear deter-
rence. Major nuclear states’ conventional and nuclear force modernization may
 Conclusion   181
greatly affect the policy of other nuclear states, including that of India and Paki-
stan, given the imperatives of the systemic level elaborated upon in this volume.
However, given the inter-­state rivalry between India and Pakistan, it will be
interesting to see how major powers would observe the South Asian prevailing
complex strategic environment before they develop their strategic partnership
with South Asian nuclear states. Absent from any balancing role, major powers
possessing nuclear and advanced conventional force capability could greatly
affect the strategic stability of South Asia, shifting more to one than the other,
which in turn may not essentially benefit the prime interests of either of the
South Asian nuclear states. Therefore, despite the competing strategies between
these powers at the systemic level, while affecting the Southern Asian region’s
strategic stability, this volume primarily summarizes the major content of each
chapter by presenting pertinent suggestions, which, in turn, may have policy
implications for a broader Southern Asian region.

Systemic dynamics on the brink to affect South Asian

deterrence stability
The South Asian prevailing strategic environment remains in flux, given the
rising challenges to the nuclear deterrence particularly emanating from the many
unresolved issues, including the core issue of Kashmir, in general, and the
­dramatic shift occurring in the broader part of Southern Asian deterrent force
politics because of the changing deterrent force posture at the systemic level
(involving the US, China, and India), in particular. As the tectonic plates of
international politics shift away from Europe to the Asia-­Pacific region, we
observe various competing strategies between the US (as a predominant power),
China (the rising regional power), and India (the aspirant regional power) at the
broader systemic level that, in turn, gradually affects the evolving dynamics of
the Southern Asian region. It is perceived, as linked with the India-­specificity
factor, that Pakistan potentially gets attracted to what is being competed between
these states at the systemic level. As the strategic competition continues to
prevail between these states, Pakistan’s deterrent force posture can largely be
affected by how other competing powers affect their policies in the Southern
Asian region. This, in turn, presents more challenges to nuclear deterrence in
South Asia. It is significant to observe that although Pakistan cannot be ignored
– being one of the important states for the leading powers, including that of the
rising power China because of greater geo-­economic and geopolitical interest
despite the growing systemic level between the US, China, and India – plausible
reasons as part of systemic dynamics between these key states are worth
mentioning.
First, Pakistan would argue that its deterrent force posture is affected because
of its inter-­state rivalry with India on a number of unresolved issues, including
that of growing conventional force disparity. Because of growing conventional
force modernization and the potential for developing more nuclear forces bol-
stered by sophisticated delivery systems, it can be perceived that Pakistan’s
182   Conclusion
India-­specificity would further enlarge, which, in turn, forces Pakistan to produce
effective countermeasures in order to retain a deterrence balance – though how
long it could continue to retain this potential, when it comes to a greater arms
race between India and Pakistan, is becoming a challenge for Pakistan. This is
further elaborated later. Second, India would find a growing strategic dilemma
against the potential rise of China on the one hand and Pakistan on the other, and
would argue that it faces two adversaries. Therefore, it would require improving
its deterrent forces to deter both China and Pakistan. The empirical evidence
shows that India, through its acquisition of a number of nuclear forces, is becom-
ing involved in a bigger arms race in the broader Southern Asian region and con-
tinues to demonstrate its potential to develop and test more nuclear weapons if
and when it wishes to do so. Third, India is building its material power (both its
economy and military might) in order to secure greater power state status. In
doing so, India is potentially involved in a number of mega strategic force devel-
opments, such as the BMD including S-­400 the sophisticated air defense system
from Russia, MIRV, nuclear-­powered submarines, aircraft carriers, and many
other advanced conventional forces. All these imperatives provide India with a
power potential to shift its deterrent force posture, for what many in India would
claim, and many in Pakistan may perceive, is a readiness to fight a limited war
against both China and Pakistan. Indian military CSD development is one of the
imperatives in this direction, in order to wage limited strikes against parts of
Pakistan without provoking the Pakistani security leadership to use nuclear
weapons, although there are limitations and challenges the CSD may confront
since India continues to have structural issues when it comes to its Cold Start
Doctrinal development. Fourth, as the systemic dynamics prevail, China may
argue that it faces a threat from the US’s predominant position of trying to
contain China through its perceived ‘pivot to Asia’ and/or ‘offshore-­balancing’
strategy in the Asia-­Pacific region. Therefore, it becomes necessary for China to
produce effective countermeasures in order to show its assertion, at least in the
East Asian region, to retain its legitimacy, if not its intention to expand and push
the US from the Asia-­Pacific region. China has recently increased its deterrent
forces. At the same time, it modernizes its deterrent forces to counter its poten-
tial adversary’s further expansion and protect its vital interest within its pre-
scribed SLOCs. Fifth, when it comes to the predominant player, that is, the US,
it would argue that it and its closer allies and partners potentially face threats
emanating from the resurgence of Russia and its deterrence forces, China, North
Korea, and even Iran. The 2018 US NPR reflects a similar US contention. There-
fore, the US would continue to keep nuclear weapons ‘as long as nuclear
weapons exist.’ Similarly, it would continue to keep its extended deterrence to
its closer Asian and European allies and partners out of its deterrent force mod-
ernization. Nuclear disarmament becomes difficult for the US to agree on. The
evolving systemic power dynamics between these states will eventually affect
the South Asian deterrence stability, particularly when these competing states
face India–Pakistan inter-­state rivalry under the large nuclear shadow.
 Conclusion   183
The changing patterns of South Asian nuclear politics: who
exploits the most?
Since the Cold War period, South Asian nuclear rivals confronted on and off
support from the major nuclear states, particularly from the US, when their geo-
political and geo-­strategic interests outweighed their non-­proliferation initiatives
toward the South Asian region. Both India and Pakistan faced various patterns of
South Asian nuclear politics while successfully passing through time-­tested chal-
lenges and opportunities, which, in turn, enabled them to eventually test their
nuclear capabilities. It is important to mention a few plausible patterns of South
Asian nuclear politics: (1) The US–Pakistan geopolitical significance to contain
the spread of the Soviet Union (Russia) during the Cold War period that, in turn,
provided ease to the Pakistani security leadership to advance its nuclear develop-
ment program vis-­à-vis India. Presumably, Pakistan’s geopolitical importance
has not completely withered away. Pakistan is still considered one of the key
players in bringing peace and stability in Afghanistan, and who could eventually
serve best the US security interests in the Southern Asian region. (2) India has
exploited the opportunity to become part of the US grand strategy while pre-
paring itself to play an offshore-­balancing role vis-­à-vis the rise of regional
power China, even if the US would support Indian deterrent force development.
The US–India nuclear deal and its growing strategic partnership with India in
terms of its deterrent force development are some of the key reflections in this
context. These changing patterns would have key implications for the South
Asian region: (a) The US’s gradual tilt toward India undermines the credibility
of its long-­standing balancing role for the South Asian region. In doing so, it
provides India a greater confidence to increase its deterrent forces, challenge
Pakistan as a nuclear state, and create hurdles for China’s rise in the Southern
Asian region. The Indian security leadership’s recent argument on fighting a
two-­front war is a careful reflection of this perspective. (b) Given its growing
strategic partnership with major powers such as the US, India could further
exploit its position to expand its deterrent forces and modify its deterrent force
posture vis-­à-vis China and Pakistan. This, in turn, could cause India to appear
more assertive in South Asia. (c) The changing patterns of South Asian nuclear
politics could increase the arms race between India and Pakistan. As a result,
this could deprive India and Pakistan from establishing an arms control regime
that does not exist in South Asia, despite the proposal for establishing a Strategic
Restraint Regime. (d) Contemporary competing strategies in the Asia-­Pacific
region, in general, force India to contemplate its greater geopolitical influences
and power-­projection elements as part of a broader US offshore-­balancing
strategy against the potential rise of China, and its hedging strategy against Paki-
stan as part of its increasing deterrent force potential, could undermine the cred-
ibility of the Pakistani deterrent forces and eventually cause China to worry
about the potential rise of India in the Indian Ocean region.
Given the changing patterns of South Asian nuclear politics, each nuclear state
would attempt to gain much by exploiting opportunities emitted by interacting
184   Conclusion
with major powers. As major powers would expect to meet their goals by increas-
ing their relationship with states bearing geopolitical and geo-­strategic importance,
these smaller states would exploit their geopolitical significance in regional pol-
itics to gain maximum benefits out of a strategic environment that favors and bene-
fits them with more than they could otherwise lose. For example, India remains
adept at exploiting various opportunities across the board by interacting and
increasing its strategic partnership with major countries. This is carried out because
of a few plausible reasons: First, India claims to be the largest democracy in the
world; therefore, it attracts many countries to understand India’s aspiration for
democracy. Second, India has successfully improved its economic position. It is
considered to be one of the rising economic powers. A sound economic condition
becomes one of the major imperatives for a state to achieve, as a country that is
economically well off will attract many states wishing to do business with it.
Third, India, because of its strategic rivalry with rising China, and despite increas-
ing trade volume between China and India, exploits this potential opportunity to
increase its strategic partnership with major powers, especially with the US.
Apparently, as the major strategic imperatives tilt in favor of the power-­aspiring
India, it could create potential challenges for its rival Pakistan. Therefore, in order
to offset this rising dilemma, Pakistan would have a couple of options: (1) it can
still exploit its geopolitical position to restore or reset its strategic relations with
the US and potentially convince the US leadership to play a constructive balancing
role in South Asia that will not only benefit the US’s greater interest, but also help
Pakistan to sustain a balance, if not parity, when it comes to its deterrent force
development against its adversary India. (2) The Pakistan leadership needs to
sustain good relations with all of the countries in its neighborhood, including con-
vincing India to engage in more constructive and productive dialogue that may
include all issues as part of a composite dialogue process. (3) Pakistan can build
up its strategic partnership with other major powers, such as Russia, the UK,
France, and even the rising regional power China, to offset the perceived imbal-
ance created by the growing US–India strategic partnership that incentivizes India
to increase its deterrent force potential in South Asia against its potential adversar-
ies China and Pakistan.

India and its deterrent force potentials

This volume, by engaging both credible primary and secondary sources, has
argued that India continues to have the potential to increase its deterrent forces.
Currently, India has been working on multiple mega deterrent force projects
under its DRDO to enhance its power potentials in South Asia for at least three
plausible reasons: First, it likes to contain or balance rising China in the Indian
Ocean region. Second, it increases its preemptive/punitive strike strategy against
Pakistan. Third, it increases its power-­projection element in the Indian Ocean
region as it develops and modernizes its deterrent forces. Indian multiple mega
deterrent force projects may include the development and modernization of its
conventional and nuclear forces. For example, India has been working to turn
 Conclusion   185
most of its missile forces nuclear-­capable, targeting China and Pakistan. It has
developed a nuclear-­powered submarine. Despite the technical challenges that
India has currently faced with regard to its nuclear-­powered submarine, it remains
committed to developing more nuclear submarines in order to enhance its assured
second-­strike capability. In doing so, India will surely increase the ranges of its
SLBMs, which would prevent vulnerabilities to Indian sea-­based deterrent forces
and enable India to strike most of the areas of its adversaries (i.e., China and Paki-
stan) from the deep blue sea. Also, India potentially increases the ranges of most
of its ballistic missiles up to the ICBM level, covering not only major parts of
China, but also worrying many non-­nuclear states on other continents. In addition,
India plans to develop MIRV and BMD deterrent force systems to enhance its
power potentials. The recent strategic plan for inducting the Russian S-­400 is one
of the key steps forward as part of its evolving military and nuclear strategy for a
broader Southern Asian region.
That being noted, this volume has discovered that Indian deterrent force
development and the modernization process will not only affect the Indian deter-
rent force posture when it comes to India’s nuclear strategy and doctrinal posture
against its adversaries, but may also potentially increase the security dilemma in
the Southern Asian region. First, the Indian security leadership has already
brought about a shift in its 1999 draft nuclear doctrine. The draft doctrine of
2003 now suggests that India would retaliate massively if it is attacked by
nuclear forces. Also, India could use its nuclear forces against possible chemical
and biological attacks. Given this, it appears that the Indian draft nuclear doc-
trine remains a draft that can be modified over a period of time. According to
credible sources, the Indian security leadership plans for punitive/preemptive
strike options against Pakistan. Very recently, the Indian military leadership
argued that it has successfully carried out surgical strikes against parts of Paki-
stan as part of its evolving land warfare military strategy. The Pakistani security
leadership denies this, however. It is not completely clear whether or not this
could be part of the Indian military strategy of the CSD. Second, as India poten-
tially increases its security by modernizing its conventional and nuclear deterrent
forces, Pakistan would perceive of Indian deterrent force development as offen-
sive. In addition to the effects of the Indian deterrent forces on India’s doctrinal
posture, it will also have implications on the security dynamics of South Asia.
South Asian nuclear dynamics will continue to face the vicious cycle of the
security dilemma. This, in turn, would increase mistrust and enhance the arms
race between India and Pakistan. As long as nuclear weapons exist and the con-
ventional force disparity continues to mark the difference in South Asia, the
security dilemma will remain a part of the changing dynamics of the South Asian
security environment. The competing strategies in the Southern Asian region
will tend to make these nuclear states produce modernized and sophisticated
deterrent forces and in response to others, and due to the prevailing dynamics of
the security dilemma, will produce effective countermeasures.
Amidst this, technological advancement and a major power-­balancing role
would matter for Southern Asian nuclear states. Policymakers cannot overlook
186   Conclusion
the significance of technology and its appropriate utilization when it comes to
nuclear deterrence and its changing dynamics in the broader Southern Asian
region. Those who lag behind in technological advancement and its timely
exploitation could suffer in their inability to enhance the credibility of their
deterrence forces. In this context, and despite its limitations, India tends to
acquire and exploit the technological imperatives embedded within its deterrence
force development after striking up a strategic partnership with major powers.
This, in turn, creates challenges, not only for India’s draft nuclear doctrine as it
gradually shifts away from what it initially conceptualized with regard to its doc-
trinal posture, but also undermines the strategic stability of South Asia. Faced by
this vicious security dilemma, Pakistan would create options either to balance or
go for parity vis-­à-vis its adversary. Each policy option could have its own draw-
backs as Pakistan continues to retain its deterrent forces and produce effective
countermeasures, both for deterrence purposes and its ultimate survival.

Pakistan in search for balance sans parity

As the inter-­state rivalry between India and Pakistan continues to exist, many
observers of security studies would expect India and Pakistan to engage in a
bigger arms race. With its improved and managed economic imperatives, India’s
security leadership has developed mega projects against China and Pakistan.
This could appear as aggression against Pakistan and at the same time this could
ultimately create strategic worries for China. However, it is expected that the
Pakistani security leadership will develop its options as to when, where, and how
the deterrence gaps need to be filled. While weighing up the costs and benefits
analysis, Pakistan may have plausible options: First, it could develop its deter-
rent forces and produce countermeasures when absolutely required in order to
retain deterrence stability. It may not necessarily produce countermeasures that
are not required. That is to strive for keeping an appropriate balance rather than
opting for parity. For example, on a number of significant occasions, Pakistan
has remained steadfast by producing effective countermeasures. (1) It has suc-
cessfully produced battlefield nuclear forces in response to the Indian military
strategy of the CSD, aiming for waging limited strikes against unknown loca-
tions of Pakistan without provoking Pakistan to use its nuclear forces. (2) Paki-
stan has recently tested SLCM to counter India’s development of a
nuclear-­powered submarine. Nevertheless, it could increase SLCM ranges. Also,
Pakistan has already vowed to develop a nuclear submarine for an assured
second-­strike capability vis-­à-vis India. India intends to develop more nuclear-­
powered submarines that would impel India to produce more warheads/SLBMs.
In doing so, the Indian security leadership could convert most of its sea-­based
ballistic missiles into MIRV technology. This enhances the credibility of India’s
sea-­based deterrence and enables India to hit many targets with its sea-­based
multiple warheads. India’s recent single launch of more than 100 satellites is a
sheer reflection of Indian’s capability of MIRVing most of its intermediate and
long-­range ballistic missiles. (3) In response to the Indian BMD program,
 Conclusion   187
­ akistan has enhanced the speed, lethality, and accuracy factors of its missile
P
development variants. It continues to increase the deterrence capability of cruise
missiles and develop MIRV technology against India’s BMD system. Pakistan’s
recent test of the ballistic missile Ababeel is a step toward MIRV technology.
Unlike India, Pakistan may not go for longer ranges of ballistic missiles up to
the ICBM level. However, Pakistan develops Shaheen ballistic missile variants
in order to be able to neutralize India’s second-­strike capability from Nicobar
and Andaman Islands.
Second, Pakistan is expected to continue to maintain minimum deterrence
without making any major shifts. The fact of the matter is that Pakistan has
already deterred India with its minimum deterrence in the past and it will con-
tinue to deter India with its minimum deterrence force posture. Apparently, full-­
spectrum deterrence is a broader part of Pakistan’s policy of credible minimum
deterrence. It might have nothing to do with an immediate shift in nuclear policy.
Pakistan’s shift away from minimum deterrence could have dire implications for
Pakistan in general, and its relations with other countries in particular. (1) The
international community could consider Pakistan’s motives for increasing its
deterrent forces for war-­fighting purposes against its adversary, India, which
otherwise may not be the case in reality. (2) The international non-­proliferation
regime could put lots of pressure on Pakistan, ultimately considering Pakistan to
be assertive. (3) Many nuclear and non-­nuclear weapons states, including the
US, could try to impose economic sanctions while considering Pakistan to be the
fastest growing nuclear weapons state. (4) Shifting away from minimum deter-
rence, Pakistan could further find itself in the vicious cycle of an arms race to
which there appears to be no immediate end. Therefore, it is important to
mention that Pakistan needs to have a strategy for retaining a balance rather than
opting for a weapon-­to-weapon policy approach. If Pakistan can deter India with
minimum deterrence, it may not necessarily shift away from the policy approach
it earlier conceptualized. Reappraisal or revisiting minimum deterrence may not
mean bigger changes within the broader policy of minimum deterrence; rather,
this could be a strategy to produce effective countermeasures and plug the deter-
rence gaps where absolutely needed. Retaining a balance sans parity may be the
strategy that Pakistan can reflect upon. More interestingly, if India, China, the
UK, and France become the claimants of minimum deterrence that, in turn,
enable these nuclear states to not only increase in a timely fashion, but also mod-
ernize their deterrent forces, then Pakistan can also develop the potential to
follow suit within the framework of minimum deterrence it earlier conceptual-
ized. However, many observers may notice the consistent increases in, and mod-
ernization processes of, deterrent forces by Southern Asian nuclear states, that
could eventually make these nuclear states depart from the principle of minimum
deterrence that they earlier conceptualized. Nevertheless, in fact, compared with
many nuclear states that still possess more than 90 percent of the world’s deter-
rent forces, South Asian nuclear states still contend that they have a small
number. Until the deterrent forces of all nuclear states are lined up using a rough
equation, which appears to be unlikely in the foreseeable future, the disparity
188   Conclusion
between the minimum deterrence practiced by South Asian states and other
recognized nuclear states will persist. But, whatever the number of these deter-
rent forces is, nuclear India and Pakistan will continue to face inter-­state rivalry
that, in turn, poses challenges to deterrence stability in South Asia.

South Asian inter-­state rivalry and challenges to

deterrence stability
Despite introducing nuclear forces in South Asia, the inter-­state rivalry continues
to exist between India and Pakistan. This rivalry brings about more crises
between the two South Asian nuclear states. It is feared that any serious crisis
between India and Pakistan, because of inter-­state rivalry, could flare up a
military confrontation that could spiral out of control. India and Pakistan have
faced many crises since both states have acquired nuclear capabilities. Neverthe-
less, none of these crises have crossed the line to a nuclear level, though the risk
has existed on a number of occasions and a similar risk continues to persist
between them. After the introduction of nuclear weapons in South Asia, the
nuclear factor could have played a significant role in the Kargil episode (1999)
the Twin Peaks incidents (2001–2002), the Mumbai attack (2008), the Pathankot,
Uri, Nagrota attacks (2016), and more recently the Pulwama crisis (2019), in that
it prevented nuclear India and Pakistan from engaging in a major military escala-
tion. Both sides showed mutual restraint. Apparently, neither side showed any
interest in inflaming these crises to a bigger military level, although the Indian
security leadership vowed that India could intervene or opt for particular surgical
strikes against the Pakistani side if any serious Mumbai-­type crisis occurs in
future. However, it is observed that, since Mumbai, many incidents have taken
place, but the Indian security leadership has not undertaken bigger risks, say, for
example, the mobilization of its military forces closer to the Pakistani border,
unlike Kargil in 1999 and the Twin Peaks incidents in 2001–2002. There appear
to be some credible lessons learned from the previous crises. Although the recent
crises across the common border between India and Pakistan have created a
standstill situation in South Asia, the Indian leadership remain persistent in
holding the Pakistani side responsible for supporting terrorism across the Indian
border. However, Pakistan denies these allegations and would rather draw the
attention of the international community to the fact that India is involved in
fanning up acts of terrorism in Balochistan and other parts of the Pakistan border
between Afghanistan and Iran. For example, Kulbhushan Jadhav’s arrest in 2016
by the Pakistani security forces from Balochistan is a reflection of this concern.
Therefore, India brings forth terrorism as one of the top agenda items as part of
the composite dialogue process between the two sides, while the Pakistani side
would continue to insist that it is one of the essential elements of the dialogue
process, but it cannot undermine other core issues, including the issue of
Kashmir, which is a major cause of the inter-­state rivalry and why it still persists.
The inter-­state rivalry may continue to persist between the nuclear India and
Pakistan as long as the core issue of Kashmir and many outstanding issues,
 Conclusion   189
including the growing concerns of terrorism on both sides of the border, remain
unresolved despite the existing composite dialogue process at the political
leadership level. In resolving these issues, however, both India and Pakistan may
have a plausible way forward to help contain the growing sense of inter-­state
rivalry in South Asia. First, it is important to mention that India and Pakistan
need to learn key lessons from past crises. Revisiting these crises, they could
create more opportunities and incentives for themselves as to where they went
wrong and how and when they could get back to a point for a credible dialogue
process. The good news is that the composite dialogue process is now in place
between India and Pakistan. There are many CBMs and NCBMs that need to be
revisited and upgraded where necessary in order to push forward the dialogue
process. One of the proposed solutions to this composite dialogue process could
be that the Indian and Pakistani military leadership should consistently and regu-
larly interact with each other with a greater consideration for helping resolve all
outstanding issues, including the core issue of Kashmir, amicably. Second, India
and Pakistan have the potential to create opportunities at the bilateral, trilateral,
and even quadrilateral levels by exploiting these opportunities to the best of their
capacity that would eventually benefit both sides. Favorable conditions could be
created, such that neither side would get discouraged from backing off, there-
fore, undermining the credibility of the existing composite dialogue process.
Unless favorable conditions are created, the composite dialogue process will
continue to remain at a standstill. A dialogue process needs to be initiated at all
levels and discussing all agenda items, including the growing concerns of ter-
rorism on both sides of the border. The more the dialogue process is delayed, the
more the trust deficit increases, and the longer both India and Pakistan would
take to resolve their core issues. It is important to note that the postponement of
the composite dialogue process with no results may not be in the interests of
either side. Third, since the introduction of nuclear weapons in South Asia has
become a reality, both sides may not opt for bigger wars, or even a limited war,
because of the fear of escalation to a nuclear level. Nevertheless, there is a risk
of more crises because of the growing concern for acts of terrorism. For
example, many crises have occurred only in 2016. Any serious crisis between
the South Asian nuclear states could create more risks of a military confronta-
tion. Therefore, India and Pakistan can emphasize how they could mutually
tackle the growing menace of terrorism that has halted the dialogue process in
South Asia. One of the solutions to containing this issue could be the immediate
correction of India’s policy toward occupied Kashmir, while the other way
forward could be to increase the trade volume between India and Pakistan. Eco-
nomic interdependence potentially prevents states from indulging in bigger
crises. Although China and India are strategic rivals, the trade volume gradually
increases between them and this, in turn, discourages them from indulging in
bigger crises, as discussed in the preceding sections of this volume. The peaceful
workout on the recent Doklam crisis between India and China could be a reflec-
tion of this, indicating that neither India nor China is interested in escalating the
crisis that could outweigh costs over benefits.
190   Conclusion
Future dynamics of South Asian deterrence stability:
thinking about the unthinkable
Despite the better prospects for a composite dialogue process between India and
Pakistan, the strategic rivalry continues to persist, given that there are many
unresolved outstanding issues, including the core issue of Kashmir. The trust
deficit increases on account of multiple reasons, and because of the growing con-
cerns over terrorism on both sides of the border, the inter-­state rivalry between
India and Pakistan grows. In addition, deterrent force modernization and gradual
increases in the armed forces of both India and Pakistan create a severe security
dilemma that increases the risk of war between the two nuclear sides. Therefore,
if one side potentially increases its deterrent forces, thereby intensifying the
security dilemma, then the other side tries to produce effective countermeasures
in order to counterbalance the strategic environment. The prevailing strategic
environment between India and Pakistan is in flux. Both of the South Asian
nuclear states develop war-­fighting strategies under the shadow of a growing
nuclear threat. For example, the Indian security leadership has been crafting a
framework to mature its war-­fighting strategy – that is, the CSD – for waging a
limited war against unknown parts of Pakistan. The Indian military leadership
has recently expressed openly that India has been developing the CSD for
preemptive strikes against parts of Pakistan. The Indian security leadership con-
siders that it could wage limited/surgical strikes against unknown locations in
Pakistan without provoking Pakistan into using its nuclear weapons. Considering
the potential shift in India’s military strategy, Pakistan is developing short-­range
battlefield nuclear weapons. Many in Pakistan consider this to be one of the pos-
sible options for plugging the deterrence gap created by the Indian military
strategy of the CSD. That is, if the Indian military deploys the CSD, thus waging
limited strikes against parts of Pakistan, then Pakistan could possibly have an
option for the deployment of battlefield nuclear weapons. However, each side
could face key issues.
First, many things are still unclear with regard to the Indian military strategy of
the CSD, whether or not this will include Indian battlefield nuclear forces for coun-
terforce targeting. As the Indian military leadership confesses to develop and pos-
sibly deploy the CSD for limited strike purposes, CSD development still faces a
number of structural and technical issues. Any ambitious deployment of the CSD
could create the risk of misadventure and miscalculation between India and Paki-
stan that, in turn, could risk a military escalation to the unthinkable level. Indian
military strategists must have considered the severe implications of any deploy-
ment of the CSD, supported by the possible inclusion of Indian battlefield
weapons. Pakistan’s reliance on nuclear forces and its possible deployment of
battlefield nuclear forces against the deployment of the CSD could be a strategic
calculation of the Indian military strategy. Therefore, if the Indian military leader-
ship considers there are existing weaknesses and vulnerabilities of the CSD for
waging limited strikes against Pakistan, then it could possibly not undertake the
risk of escalation because of the fear of miscalculation and inadvertence between
 Conclusion   191
the two South Asian nuclear states. Conceptually, it is hard to consider that the
Indian military would successfully wage limited strikes under the banner of the
CSD against unknown parts of Pakistan without provoking Pakistan’s nuclear
option.
Second, as India confronts issues with regard to its deployment of the CSD,
Pakistan could also confront difficulties by deploying is battlefield nuclear
forces. It is not clear when, where, or how Pakistan would use its nuclear forces.
This is for obvious reasons. However, like many nuclear states with their written
and unwritten nuclear policy structures, Pakistan would argue that they would
use their nuclear forces as a last resort or in extremis circumstances. It would not
be surprising for Pakistan to argue that it would use nuclear forces when it is
absolutely necessary – that is, that Pakistan may consider using its nuclear forces
in extremis circumstances. In this particular context, nuclear ambiguity rules
over, and becomes one of the central pillars of, Pakistan’s nuclear policy. That
being noted, the Pakistani security leadership must have considered various
scenarios when it could deploy its battlefield nuclear forces, vis-­à-vis against its
adversary, in order to deter the Indian military strategy of the CSD, but it must
have calculated as to how such a possible deployment could create a number of
issues such as the dilemma of a decentralized command and control mechanism
under the basic principle of pre-­delegation and the use-­or-lose dilemma associ-
ated with battlefield/TNW forces. Any immediate deployment of Pakistan’s
battlefield nuclear forces amidst these relevant issues, without waiting for India
to deploy its military strategy of the CSD, could potentially undermine the cred-
ibility of Pakistan’s doctrinal use of nuclear forces. If the Pakistani security
leadership deploys its battlefield nuclear forces well in advance before CSD
deployment, while bypassing other related issues with regard to battlefield
nuclear forces, then Pakistan could also confront larger issues of miscalculation
and inadvertence. That being conceptualized, it is important to note that mutual
vulnerabilities and shortcomings in war-­fighting strategies in South Asia help
prevent both India and Pakistan from deploying their deterrent forces for limited
strikes and/or counterforce targeting. Given the action–reaction strategic
dynamics of South Asia, if one state does not deploy its war-­fighting deterrent
forces for waging limited strikes against the other, then the other state may not
need to deploy its deterrent forces. This is important to prevent risk and miscal-
culation for escalation while thinking about the unthinkable.

Two decades of South Asian nuclearization: what more can

be done to stabilize peace?
Although India and Pakistan have developed nuclear weapons and their delivery
systems to the assigned targets and they have consistently been improving the
quality of these deterrent forces, nuclear weapons have not completely prevented
a number of crises in South Asia. It is feared that any serious crisis between
India and Pakistan, absent a mature crisis management mechanism, could fetch
nuclear India and Pakistan into deep trouble, which, in turn, could escalate to a
192   Conclusion
nuclear level. Despite the introduction of nuclear forces in South Asia, India and
Pakistan faced a number of crises, and because of these crises nuclear India and
Pakistan have stopped formally talking to each other. There remains a standstill
situation between India and Pakistan. The trust deficit grows gradually between
the two South Asian nuclear states. Apparently, the existing CBMs/NCBMs
have lost their spirit and credibility despite their effectiveness. If nuclear
weapons are not considered a panacea for all the issues, then the South Asian
security leadership will need to consider many other useful options to help
prevent many serious crises that could escalate to a nuclear level. Nevertheless,
this does not mean that two decades of South Asian nuclearization has lost its
strategic significance. It is important to note that these deterrent forces will likely
remain in South Asia and both India and Pakistan may not get rid of their nuclear
forces as long as nuclear weapons exist across the board. Major nuclear weapons
states would argue that they would not disarm as long as nuclear weapons exist.
Plausible alternative strategies are required in order not only to reduce the reli-
ance on nuclear forces when it comes to doctrinal postures on these deterrent
forces, but also to produce a particular mechanism for managing robustly these
deterrent forces and preventing future crises escalating to a nuclear level.
First, there have been concerns surrounding the growing conventional force
asymmetry in South Asia since India spends much more than Pakistan on its
conventional force modernization after striking a significant strategic partnership
with major powers including that of the US. It is important to note that India has
potentially become one of the world’s largest buyers of advanced conventional
forces. This in turn increases the conventional force disparity between India and
Pakistan. India’s continuous conventional force modernization could potentially
increase the arms race, the security dilemma, and the war-­fighting strategies in
South Asia. In addition, the same disparity could provide an incentive for Paki-
stan to rely on its deterrent forces in order to offset the growing conventional
force disparity. This growing issue can mutually be addressed through the cre-
ation of the proposed strategic restraint regime Pakistan first proposed in
South Asia.
Second, South Asian nuclear states need to revisit the proposed restraint
regime that could restrain more nuclear tests, a bigger arms race, and growing
conventional force disparity. Also, by revisiting the proposed strategic restraint
regime, offensive doctrinal postures can be relaxed and war-­fighting strategies
can be prevented. The strategic restraint regime or the arms control regime are
not supposed to address the issues related to nuclear disarmament; rather, the
purpose is to basically control the increasing nuclear forces, including their
delivery systems, and more possibly find options for reducing the deterrent
forces mutually agreed between two or more nuclear states. The Soviet Union
(Russia) and the US did so during the peak of the Cold War period and they are
following similar imperatives in the post-­Cold War period. Pakistan and India at
some stage can also follow their own pattern of an arms control regime. The
potential aim for doing this is to reduce the possibility of war, contain a bigger
arms race, and reduce the cost of war. Nevertheless, there can be many factors
 Conclusion   193
that may prevent the establishment of a restraint regime at the bilateral, trilateral,
and even quadrilateral level. For example, India would not agree to the establish-
ment of a restraint regime unless China is included; China may not agree to this
proposal unless the US becomes a potential part of it; and the US might not
agree unless Russia, including many other nuclear states, would get on board.
The proposed arms control regime in South Asia faces the existing dilemma of
an extra-­regional link factor and India and Pakistan have become part of this
vicious cycle of the arms race.
Third, international non-­proliferation eventually needs to provide nuclear
­statuses to India and Pakistan to help encourage these nuclear states to be on the
mainstream, although India and Pakistan have been extremely active in terms of
their participation in the non-­proliferation and nuclear security-­related meetings
and summits. In doing so, international non-­proliferation will help (1) contribute
toward the credibility of non-­proliferation regimes by encouraging more states
into the non-­proliferation mechanism, and (2) this can potentially reduce the per-
ceived discrimination between the haves and have-­nots. Although India and
Pakistan are outliers to the NPT, member states, particularly the recognized
nuclear states, can undertake a key reforms agenda mutually agreed upon to
accommodate India and Pakistan in the NPT, with their nuclear statuses acknow-
ledged. Nevertheless, this important could face challenges when it comes to
international efforts for nuclear non-­proliferation and disarmament. Many coun-
tries that are States Parties to the NPT might consider this approach unjust when
the NPT eventually grants some form of recognition to India and Pakistan by
acknowledging their nuclear statuses. They could develop the perception that
some of these countries could also develop their own nuclear capability, quit the
NPT, and be recognized by the NPT while exploiting the modified provisions of
the NPT. This could provide incentives to others to proliferate from within the
NPT and the international non-­proliferation could then end up with many nuclear
states. Therefore, as the international non-­proliferation paves the way by
acknowledging India’s and Pakistan’s nuclear status while considering strength-
ening the NPT, a similar approach could also create an incentive for other
would-­be nuclear states to exploit. However, the international non-­proliferation
regime, potentially the NPT, could then produce stringent provisions to address
this dilemma and prevent many other States Parties to the NPT to exploit while
at the same time encourage India and Pakistan to become States Parties to
the NPT.
In sum, despite the introduction of nuclear forces and deterrence conceptuali-
zation in South Asia, the overall strategic stability between India and Pakistan
remains fragile as many crises continue to occur between these nuclear states.
Therefore, nuclear weapons have not successfully prevented crises in South
Asia. It is perceived that any serious crisis between nuclear India and Pakistan
could escalate to a bigger military confrontation and the same could then
produce a risk of nuclear escalation. Given the fear of military escalation to a
nuclear level in South Asia, India and Pakistan try hard to prevent bigger wars,
but many outstanding issues, including the core issue of Kashmir, continue to
194   Conclusion
remain unresolved between the two South Asian nuclear states. More impor-
tantly, the growing threat of terrorism on both sides of the border undermines the
credibility of existing CBMs/NCBMs between India and Pakistan. That said, as
the trust deficit grows between India and Pakistan because of the growing con-
cerns of terrorism, the talks in South Asia remain at a standstill. In addition to
this, the introduction of innovative technology in terms of the further moderniza-
tion of conventional and nuclear forces in South Asia also provides incentives to
nuclear states to devise effective war-­fighting strategies and win their military
goals by opting for preemptive limited/surgical strikes. It is perceived that those
who lag behind in acquiring modern technology to help improve the high-­quality
standard of their deterrent forces could suffer. The South Asian nuclear states
are affected by a systemic level that is conceptualized in this volume. That being
noted, the nuclear policies of major nuclear states affect the policies of other
nuclear states and India and Pakistan are no exception.
The conceptual framework of the systemic level conceived in this volume
would have implications for nuclear South Asia. As the risk associated with
nuclear weapons use in South Asia exists, given the growing fragility of the stra-
tegic stability because of a number of factors elaborated substantially in this
volume, India and Pakistan, including the international non-­proliferation regime,
particularly the established nuclear states, such as the US, Russia, the UK,
France and China, will need to play a balancing role and help India and Pakistan
to resolve their outstanding issues diplomatically and politically. Favoring one
side against the other can further undermine the credibility of the deterrent forces
in South Asia and that, in turn, may further increase the risks of serious crises
between India and Pakistan. Therefore, there is a need for more talks, both at the
political and the military levels, for enhancing the credibility of CBMs and
improving the chances for establishing the proposed strategic restraint regime,
including that of the crisis management team in South Asia. Currently, both of
these essential imperatives do not exist when it comes to the changing strategic
dynamics of South Asia. As mutual vulnerabilities still exist between India and
Pakistan, waging a limited or a bigger war may prove not to be in the best inter-
ests of either of these two South Asian nuclear states.

Note
1 See, for example, Robert Einhorn and W.P.S. Sidhu (eds.), The Strategic Chain linking
Pakistan, India, China, and the United States. Washington, D.C: the Brookings, 2017.
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Index

Ababeel 96, 104, 187, 208 advancement 31, 50, 65, 71, 78, 84, 86,
Abbas 113, 195 110, 134, 153, 155, 185, 186
ability 24, 26, 27, 31, 35, 41, 49, 53, 56, advancements 20, 81
60, 71, 74, 121, 151, 179, 211 advantageous 40, 62
above-mentioned 38, 41 adventure 87
abruptly 130 adversary 10, 12, 64, 70, 82, 87, 96, 97,
absence 5, 14, 21, 49, 106, 123, 128, 154, 99, 101–103, 106, 120, 134, 136, 138,
160, 163–165, 167, 168 140, 141, 155, 184, 186, 187, 191
absolutely 82, 87, 102, 106, 110, 125, 140, adverse 16, 20
149, 158, 186, 187, 191 advisable 82, 154
absorbing 107 advocate 129, 173
academic 2, 3, 168 Aegis-capable 28
acceptable 157, 163 affected 6, 7, 39, 118, 131, 143, 163, 181,
accepted 73, 119 194
accepting 50, 138, 171, 172 affiliated 126
accidental 17, 86, 87, 107, 141, 150, 151, aggravated 16, 65, 122
155, 156, 159, 164, 174 aggravating 49, 119
accidents 79, 138, 156, 167, 176, 207 Agni-V 35, 39, 93, 205
accommodating 37, 131 Agosta-class 39
accumulate 5, 33, 49, 64 agreeable 163
accuracy 23, 24, 29, 35, 86, 103, 107, 108, agreements 51, 52, 54, 55, 57–59, 61, 63,
187 167, 173
achieve 8, 17, 22, 27, 31, 32, 42, 61, 63, aircraft 11, 23, 25, 26, 29–31, 35–37, 39,
72, 81, 89, 109, 110, 115, 116, 127, 133, 50, 54, 56–58, 63, 71, 72, 80, 81, 88, 89,
134, 138, 140, 184 93, 95, 96, 102, 108, 110, 130, 146, 151,
acquiring 37, 70–72, 78, 80, 82, 84, 103, 165, 180, 182, 198, 204, 209
104, 108, 110, 134, 194 air-launched 30, 36, 39
action–reaction 8, 32, 33, 42, 49, 81, 82, airplanes 28, 54
85, 102, 116, 152, 180, 191 Aksai 33
actively 34, 41, 49, 169 alarmed 126
actually 11, 31, 71, 73, 75, 79, 87, 136, 140 alignment 2, 49
additionally 25, 40, 118, 168 allegations 130, 188
addressing 69, 172, 178, 195 alliances 22, 27, 144, 207
addressing-nuclear-non-proliferation 69 allocation 49, 83
adequate 40, 161 Ambassador 37, 41, 47, 58, 60, 63, 68, 74,
adherence 51, 62, 163 75, 77, 87, 90, 104, 109, 114, 131, 146,
administration 22, 26, 52, 53, 55, 58, 66, 147, 169, 177
68, 162, 163, 170, 197 ambiguity 13, 70, 71, 74, 75, 96, 97, 100,
admittance 49, 62 101, 105, 106, 108, 111, 174, 191
 Index   213
ambitions 32, 34, 37, 41, 64, 71, 117 134, 141, 143, 145, 146, 188, 195, 198,
amendment 52, 171 199, 209
America 65, 66, 197 attain 3, 33, 89
amicably 42, 189 attitudes 115, 150
anarchy 4, 5, 14, 15, 32, 33, 42 attributes 115
Andaman (island) 9, 36, 57, 96, 187 authorities 126, 128
annihilate 98 aviation 31, 45, 80, 208
announced 24, 40, 52, 54, 55, 59, 126, 130,
145 back-channel 131
antagonism 118, 121, 122 background 28, 45, 53
antagonistic 79 Balakot 130, 146, 198
anti-ballistic 28, 52, 78, 164 balance 11, 12, 23, 34, 49, 78, 96, 97,
anti-Indian 120 102–105, 108–111, 113, 124, 144, 145,
anti-missile 25 155, 179, 182, 184, 187, 196, 200, 203,
anti-Pakistan 128 207, 211
anti-satellite 25, 31, 104 balancing 42, 46, 50, 65, 81, 89, 115, 120,
apparatus 120, 124 151, 157, 159, 161, 167, 169–171, 177,
appeared 82, 124 181, 183, 194, 204
applicable 6, 62, 84, 105, 150, 174 ballistic 7, 11, 24, 25, 29–31, 34–36, 38,
approaches 9, 135, 144, 201 39, 45, 47, 63, 71, 77, 78, 92, 94, 96, 97,
approximately 24, 29 104, 113, 138, 153, 161, 185–187, 198,
aptitude 128 199, 202, 208
Arabian (sea) 34, 39 Balochistan 188
archipelago 34 Bangladesh 22, 121
architecture 15, 26 bankruptcy 119
archives 44, 210 bargain 6, 43, 199
Arihant-class 36 baseless 83
arms control 68, 69, 174, 200 basic 4, 104, 115, 120, 135, 136, 191
arms-racing 63, 64 Basrur, Rajesh 91, 92, 158, 176, 196
arms-supplier-to-India 46 battalions 40
arrangement 14, 40, 58, 60 battle 26, 57, 80, 88, 96, 122, 125, 127, 138
arrival 94, 142, 143, 150, 173, 202 battlefield 11, 76, 83–87, 89, 94, 96, 103,
arsenals 26, 38, 74, 107, 115 104, 128, 136–138, 140, 152, 155, 175,
Arthashastra 144, 202 186, 190, 191, 207
Asia-Pacific 1, 2, 5–7, 9, 15, 17, 21–28, behavior 16, 20, 41, 118–120, 122, 124,
31, 32, 34, 37, 38, 40–46, 48, 53, 54, 131, 161, 199
56–59, 64, 76, 93, 128, 179, 181–183, Beijing 27, 28, 31, 33, 35
196, 200, 201, 208, 209, 211 Bhutto, Ali Zulfiqar 98, 99, 101, 111, 112,
aspiration 70, 80, 82, 83, 115, 154, 162, 184 196, 211
aspirations 36, 128, 170 bilaterally 150, 170
assertiveness 22, 24, 26, 28, 33, 41, 152, bipartisan 54
179 blitzkrieg 121
assessments 23, 76 bloodshed 115
assistance 37, 49, 50, 52, 57, 59, 68, 122, bluster 74
169, 170 bomb 39, 60, 61, 66, 91, 98, 111, 113, 122,
assists 70, 81 130, 145, 147, 157, 158, 177, 199, 202,
assumed 39, 51, 100, 131 205–207
asymmetry 11, 49, 65, 85, 101, 109, 110, bombs 23, 24, 30, 34, 35, 151, 156, 158
141, 152, 162, 192 BrahMos 11, 75
Atlantic 24, 175, 206 Brasstack 145, 207
atomic 44, 45, 47, 54, 55, 59, 68, 98, 112, breakdown 62, 168
113, 122, 155, 176, 195, 200, 203 breakout 46, 199
attack 3, 7, 8, 13, 25, 29–32, 53, 54, 73, briefs 45, 208
79, 101, 106, 116, 122, 126–128, 130, brigade 152
214   Index
brinksmanship 87 coercive 83, 92, 199
British-withdrawal 119 cognitive 58, 150
budgetary 23, 168 coherence 118
buildings 119, 120 collaboration 28, 53, 56
build-up 32, 63, 115, 179 collateral 24, 88, 131, 142
burgeoning 8, 53 combat 12, 25, 26, 30, 35, 36, 39, 63
Bush–Singh 55 combination 6, 105, 161
Command-and-Control 18, 195
cabinet 91, 117, 206 commander 31, 116, 140, 153, 167
calculated 74, 174, 191 commensurate 58, 117
calculus 49, 79 commentary 43, 210
calibrated 130 commerce 34, 51, 61, 64, 166
Cambridge 17, 18, 43–45, 65, 91, 92, 143, commission 43, 98, 196
147, 176, 200, 201, 204–207, 211 commitments 21, 41, 59, 133
camp 130, 146, 169, 198 committee 54, 66, 91, 130, 144, 148, 206,
canisterization 81 210
capability-based 33, 38, 42, 79, 179 communications 7, 59, 141, 160, 163, 164
capacity-building 56 comparative 18, 65–67, 94, 113, 196, 200,
career 47 202
cartel 62, 63 compatibility 59
Carter 22, 50, 57, 58, 67, 68, 197, 201 compel 26, 86
casualties 120, 121, 123, 124, 130, 131 compelling 20, 22, 23, 50, 97, 150
catalytic 101 complement 7, 57, 108
catastrophic 142, 158 complexity 71, 107, 129, 132
categorization 115 components 1, 16, 17, 50, 133
causalities 128 composite 35, 165, 184, 188–190
ceased 29, 63 compromising 49, 71, 73
centric 65, 71, 82, 145, 202 computer 31, 156
centrifuge 55, 56 concealment 105, 107, 108, 153
certainly 28, 37, 42, 57, 78, 108, 132, 150, conceivable 77, 135
180 conceiving 5
chaffing 104 concepts 23, 31, 119
challenge-nuclear-deterrence 174, 200 conceptualization 5, 11, 64, 84, 193
challengers 21 conceptually 6, 73, 134, 191
chambers 144, 207 concerning 22, 67
change 32, 56, 74, 93, 168, 204 condemned 28, 124, 126, 131
channels 12, 115, 159, 165, 168 condition 4, 62, 101, 132, 184
chemical-biological 56 confidence-building 64, 73, 166, 168, 176,
Chicago 18, 200 195
China-Response-to-US-Strategy 45 conflicting 17, 40, 115, 116, 127, 131, 143
Chinese-nuclear-forces 203 confrontation 4, 7, 8, 12, 28, 30, 32, 37,
choice 6, 157, 199 41, 83, 123, 124, 137, 142, 143, 149,
choosing 72, 88, 130, 137, 146, 175, 198, 153, 155, 156, 159, 179, 188, 189, 193
206 congestion 106
circles 11, 58, 129 conglomerate 50
circumstances 142, 149, 174, 191 congressional 45, 53, 61, 205
city-busting 89, 134 connotations 104
civil–military 124, 130, 152 consensus 62, 106
claimants 187 consequently 2, 5, 21, 62, 124
clarity 106 considerable 26, 57, 75, 84, 121, 123, 132,
classified 137, 152 136, 139, 141, 151, 153, 161, 174
climate 27, 32, 163 consideration 90, 100, 163, 189
clouded 115, 167 consistently 8, 41, 62, 85, 127, 136, 160,
co-development 56, 57, 67, 80, 207 164, 165, 169, 189, 191
 Index   215
consolidate 60 dangerous 7, 12, 44, 122, 123, 128, 141,
constraining 48, 50 145, 169, 174, 207, 210
containment 8, 20, 176, 199 data-sharing 58
contention 31, 125, 182 daunting 30
contentious 117, 129 dealing 32, 56, 61, 127, 150
contextualization 73, 99, 100 debates 92, 206
continental 8, 9, 21, 22, 43, 45, 205 decade 36, 37, 48, 51, 57, 74
contingency 27, 87, 124, 179 decades-old 41, 149, 168
continuity 85, 86, 150, 168, 172 decapitating 71
contrasting 170 decision-making 105
contributors 3, 4, 101 decisive 90, 123, 204
controls 51, 54, 105 declaration 85, 111, 112, 135, 152, 164,
convergence 51, 52, 57, 63 168, 196
conversely 50, 149 de-constructing 175, 196
convinced 11, 49, 126, 138, 159 de-escalate 125, 131, 132
cooperate 14 defeat 25, 40, 77, 97, 104
cooperative 3, 14, 38, 48 defence 11, 47, 68, 197, 201, 202, 207,
co-production 56, 57, 80 209, 211
corps 25, 37, 125 defender 135
cost–benefit 13 defensible 112, 206
cost-effective 82 defensive 2, 4–9, 12, 13, 18, 19, 27, 28, 31,
costly 127, 133 32, 41, 50, 57, 77, 88, 96–98, 115, 208
counterbalance 121, 139, 190 deficit 38, 189, 190, 192, 194
counterforce 26, 70–75, 78, 82, 83, 89–91, definition 99, 117, 144, 204
93, 108, 113, 134, 136, 151, 161, 190, defusing 127
191, 197, 204
de-hyphenate 54
counterinsurgency 37
delegate 140
countermeasure 7, 134, 139
deliberate 4, 13, 63
counter-proliferation 77
delicate 62, 113, 211
countervalue 89, 109, 134, 151, 152, 161
delivery 12, 23, 36, 38, 89, 96, 97, 104,
counterweight 48, 52
crafting 74, 81, 82, 89, 105, 106, 108, 190 105, 107, 108, 110, 134, 136, 142, 143,
credentials 49, 51, 62, 64 149, 152, 161–163, 173, 191, 192
credible 12, 16, 41, 70, 78, 84, 86, 91, demarcation 115, 120, 123
96–100, 103, 105, 107, 109, 141, 143, de-militarization 166
156, 168, 169, 176, 187–189, 197, 202, demobilization 127
207, 208 democracy 66, 73, 184, 210
crisis 13, 17, 35, 53, 66, 72, 79, 92, 94, demonstrated 57, 104, 166
107, 116, 119, 121–131, 134, 135, denial 25, 36, 134, 137
139–141, 146, 152, 155, 156, 159–161, department 44, 66–68, 72, 91, 94, 112,
163, 166, 173–175, 188, 193–195, 197, 113, 147, 175, 176, 198, 199, 205, 210
199, 200, 203, 208, 211 deploying 22, 28, 31, 133, 137, 138, 140,
Crisis-Management 146 152, 153, 155, 191
criteria-based 62 deployments 26, 42, 180
cross-border 1, 90, 94, 124, 126, 127, 129, deputy 51, 123, 125, 126, 162
136, 149, 168, 198, 206 derailed 128, 129
crucial 33, 105, 107, 124, 125, 131, 149, 171 design 30, 80, 176, 208
Cuban 13, 72, 159, 160 designs 2, 78, 89, 115, 118
cumulative 117 destabilization 65, 101
cutting-edge 2, 11, 41, 61, 80, 83, 127 destroy 7, 25, 31, 107, 122, 151
cyber 25, 31, 108, 109 destruction 99, 134, 138, 139, 143, 151,
cyber-attacks 28, 164 158, 175, 201, 208
determine 20, 22, 38, 61, 129, 163
damage-limitation 7, 8 deterrence 1–218
216   Index
deterring 44, 89, 98, 99, 101, 108, 109, doctrine 10, 18, 19, 44, 45, 73, 81, 83, 85,
133, 134, 200 89–92, 94, 100, 106, 108, 110, 112, 113,
devastating 79 122, 125, 137, 145, 147, 148, 168, 175,
devices 53, 123, 156 176, 185, 186, 197, 199–203, 205–208,
devolution 49 210
dialogue 5, 14, 52, 58, 65, 87, 113, 123, document 45, 51, 56, 65, 74, 97, 208
126, 129, 131, 143, 160, 161, 163–168, Dokhlam 37
170, 173, 174, 177, 184, 188–190, 195, domain 9, 34, 49, 101, 133
202, 204 domestic 20, 56, 60–62, 119, 121, 124, 166
diaspora 52 dominant 2, 21, 26, 27, 36
dichotomy 106, 141, 149 dominated 3, 52, 117
differences 12, 33, 117, 141, 144, 168 dormant 14, 33
differently 73, 138 doubtful 60
digital 56 dramatic 70, 73, 84, 181
dilemma-driven 16, 38, 42, 49, 61, 63, 85, drawbacks 186
102, 110, 116, 137, 149, 180 dreadful 136
dilemmas 90, 91, 113, 197 dual-use 54, 61
dimension 113, 122, 124, 195 dynamic 15, 20, 42, 46, 70, 74, 100, 142,
diminishes 9, 136 174, 197
diplomacy 81, 83, 92, 112, 125, 131, 146, dynamism 21
199, 208, 210
diplomatic 49, 63, 87, 89, 122, 127, 128, eased 127
130, 167–170 easily 8, 107, 131, 156
direction 1, 16, 29, 71, 83, 90, 115, 118, eastward 57
182 eating 66, 98, 177, 202
disarmament 43, 51, 66, 68, 69, 91, 93, economically 7, 48, 184
112, 154, 172, 177, 178, 182, 192, 193, ecosystem 118
195, 198, 203, 206, 208 effectively 8, 32, 40, 54, 82, 121, 127, 140,
discourage 153, 155, 160, 162 162, 168
discourages 161, 189 efficacy 94, 145, 197, 202
discriminatory 73, 171 efficiency 24, 31, 61, 72, 80, 133
discussed 9–11, 28, 34, 38, 58, 73, 81, 86, efficient 26, 56, 80
90, 106, 116, 133, 139, 140, 143, 160, elaborate 4, 74, 101, 105, 111
161, 189 electoral 128, 130
discussions 41, 57, 62, 145, 166 electromagnetic 80
disintegration 122 elevated 21
dismantling 120 eliminating 88
disparity 27, 86, 120, 162, 181, 185, 187, emanating 5, 6, 72, 86, 96, 136, 153, 173,
192 181, 182
dispersed 29, 77, 107, 108 embargoes 52, 121
disposal 26 emergence 40, 121, 124
disputes 1, 22, 28, 31, 65, 84, 115, 120, emotional 118, 156
168 emphasized 78, 101
disregarded 157 empirical 13, 15, 182
dissatisfaction 121 encourage 77, 83, 111, 124, 143, 161, 170,
dissuade 54 171, 193
distinct 27, 115–119 encouraging 163, 170, 193
distribution 20, 27, 41, 42, 48, 119–121, endanger 72, 98, 160
180 endowment 19, 44, 45, 65, 67, 90, 92–94,
disturbances 118 112, 113, 147, 175, 176, 195, 197, 206,
divergences 32, 63, 167 208, 209
diversity 15 enforcement 50, 57
divided 117, 121, 129 engaged 6, 41, 49, 125, 131, 152
divisions 37 engagement 22, 52, 127, 169
 Index   217
engaging 169, 184, 188 failed 2, 89, 117, 128–130, 138, 150, 161,
enrichment 55, 59, 61 166, 169, 170
ensuring 26, 29, 51, 97, 153, 180 fair 58, 120, 152
entanglement 7, 12, 18, 195 fallout 136
entity 84, 110, 119 false 77, 128, 130, 155, 156
environment 1, 5, 15–17, 20, 22, 23, 38, far-reaching 34, 77
41, 43–45, 50, 66, 74, 75, 82, 99, 103, fast-changing 151
104, 108, 111, 117, 122, 123, 129, 135, fatal 60
149–151, 160, 161, 164, 174, 184, 185, fatigue 165
190, 210 favorable 48, 60, 129, 189
episode 116, 123, 124, 143, 163, 166, 170, fearful 4, 14, 68, 144, 165, 199
188 feasible 133, 136
equation 27, 31, 58, 158, 187 fields 29, 151, 168
equilibrium 84, 115 fifth-generation 26, 80
equipment 26, 54, 58, 62 financial 27, 52, 110
erosion 102–104, 110 first-strike 135
escalating 8, 79, 142, 156, 189, 192 fishermen 167
escalation-dominance 116 fissile 51, 56, 61, 64, 74, 89, 161, 163, 173,
escalatory 7, 9–11, 75, 117, 123, 132, 134, 175, 195
135, 141, 142 fixed-wing 63
escape 3, 135, 136, 139 flawed 129, 133, 138
establish 50, 73, 125, 129, 160, 163, 165 flexible 70, 73, 74, 76, 84, 94, 99, 101,
establishing 22, 162, 164, 183, 194 106, 108, 138, 199
evaluates 123 fluctuates 157
eventuality 41, 77, 88 flux 20, 151, 181, 190
evolution 15, 92, 93, 95, 112, 114, 144, force-related 105
147, 174–176, 197, 199, 207, 209 foreign 17, 27, 40, 49–51, 72, 83, 89, 99,
excellence 31 111, 126, 130, 160
exceptional 2, 118 formation 59
exclusive 44, 162, 177, 199, 202 formula 62, 69, 200
execution 116, 152, 153 forward-deployed 9
exist 6, 42, 72, 73, 82, 86, 101, 102, 105, foundation 44, 46, 51, 52, 54, 59, 76, 93,
108, 109, 137, 141, 150, 154, 162, 165, 101, 117, 197, 209, 211
172, 173, 180, 182, 183, 185, 186, 188, fragility 150, 194
192, 194 France-Presse 44, 199
existential 37, 38, 120, 121, 141, 142 Freedman, Lawrence 95, 114, 147,
exo-atmospheric 36 174–176, 199
expanding 7, 13, 26, 27, 42, 56, 58, 180 free-Rider 18, 200
expansionism 117, 122 friction 32
expansionist 2, 118 friendship 55
experiences 32, 174 frightened 37
expert-level 177, 204 Frontier 118
exploitation 186 frosty 49
exponentially 34, 58 frustrating 10
extended 21, 87, 126, 127, 182 full-fledged 72, 99, 104, 158
extensive 29, 31, 34, 53, 60, 126, 179 full-scale 79, 133, 142, 145
extra-regional 8, 115, 165, 193 full-scope 62, 173
extremely 1, 32, 72, 99, 105, 125, 135, full-spectrum 85, 95, 103, 104, 208
138, 149, 172, 193 fundamental 1, 115, 118, 137
futuristic 15
face-to-face 46
facilitate 61, 87 gained 123, 126
facilities 23, 59, 60, 62, 82, 105, 107, 122, Garcia, Diego 21, 43, 46, 198, 207
152, 173 generate 8, 20, 106, 128
218   Index
genius 119 Hindu 66, 116, 117, 119, 123, 199
genuine 13, 129 Hindu–Muslim 115, 117
geo-economic 9, 15, 22, 38, 48, 171, 181 Hiroshima 91, 158, 204
geopolitics 43, 205, 210 historic 27, 33, 51
geo-strategic 9, 15, 49, 64, 119, 180, 183, historical 15, 18, 206
184 hi-tech 11, 40, 56
geo-strategy 44, 206 hostility 115, 168
globalization 43, 45, 51, 172, 197, 201 hot-takes-Kartarpur 146, 195
goal 48, 55 humanitarian 136, 174, 200
governance 32, 61 hybrid 56
government-to-government 58 hydrocarbons 27
gradual 7, 82, 84, 85, 97, 99, 100, 183, 190 hydrogen 60, 61, 156, 157
gravity 23, 24, 30, 34, 35, 39, 151 hypersonic 31
greater-power 117
ground-launched 36, 39 idea 19, 54, 60, 80, 91, 127, 204
guarantee 40, 41, 63, 72, 102, 115 Idealism 18, 200
guarantor 21 identical 131
Guardian 58, 145, 147, 199, 207 identify 110
guidance 24, 32, 56, 116, 126 identity 117, 118
guideline 99 ideologies 116
gunboat 81 ideology 117
Gwadar 22 Ikenberry, John 6, 8, 18, 41, 47, 48, 65,
200, 204
habitual 118 illogic 91, 133, 147, 201
Hagerty, Devin 68, 71, 90, 112, 118, 144, images 68, 92, 143, 197, 206
199, 200 imbalances 86, 110, 154, 163
handshake 68, 197 imitation 119
hardened 88 immense 65, 73, 87, 172
harming 32 impact 3, 27, 37, 38, 40, 42, 49, 61, 63, 91,
harmony 115 93, 123, 124, 129, 130, 140, 175, 180,
Hatf-II 39 195, 202, 206
Hatf-III 39 imperatives 2, 3, 8, 9, 14, 17, 60, 90, 98,
Hatf-IV 39 106, 132, 137, 150, 152, 153, 162, 164,
Hatf-IX 39 170, 174, 181, 182, 184, 186, 192, 194
Hatf-V 39 impetus 2, 51, 52
Hatf-VI 39 implementation 58
have-nots 171, 193 implication 158
haves 171, 193 implies 49, 111
Hawkeye 80 importance 78, 123, 136, 183, 184
headquarters 18, 79, 93, 200 imposition 51, 130
hearing 61, 88, 148, 210 improvement 23, 107, 168
heartland 25 inadvertence 175, 190, 191, 209
hedge 10, 33, 48, 64, 101, 179 inclination 50, 115
hedging 2, 8–10, 28, 33, 34, 36, 41, 56, 71, incompatibility 115
132, 179, 183 inconsistencies 133, 135
hegemonic 118, 120 inconsistent 76, 80–83, 136
hegemony 18, 21, 31, 47, 65, 200, 206 incorporated 50, 173
heighten 122 incorrect 155, 168
helicopters 54, 81 increased 11, 20, 27, 28, 32, 40, 42, 63, 65,
helmet-mounted 56 74, 80, 98, 100, 118, 126, 128, 145, 149,
heritage 44, 46, 197, 211 154, 155, 157, 159, 161, 180, 182
high-profile 122 increasingly 1, 27, 40, 56
high-technology 61 independence 112, 117–120, 196
Himalayan 37 independently 78, 92, 196
 Index   219
in-depth 15, 145, 146 internal 31, 70, 75, 78, 93, 101, 206
India-centric 120 internally 119, 127
India-held Kashmir 130, 166 Internationalism 17, 200
Indian-centricity 103 interpreted 116
Indian-deployed 97 Inter-Services 144, 166
Indian-occupied 116 inter-state 1, 8, 15, 65, 84, 86, 109, 110,
Indian-ocean-region 93, 201 120, 181, 182, 186, 188–190
India-Pakistan 173, 177 intimidate 27, 153
India-specificity 96, 181, 182 intra-state 120
India–US 55, 64, 66, 68, 161, 197, 210 introducing 50, 82, 89, 97, 105, 188
Indo-China 38 invasion 24, 121
Indonesia 21, 27 inventory 23, 30, 39
Indo-Pakistan 15, 38, 62, 92, 116, 121, investigates 16
122, 125, 127, 131, 168, 169, 173, 199 investigating 17, 94, 116, 175–178, 202,
industrial 56, 134 204, 208
industrialized 54 invulnerabilities 107
ineffective 77, 155 Iran 25, 61, 182, 188
inferiority 121 Islamic 131
infiltration 36, 125, 127 islands 9, 22, 28, 96, 187
inflexible 127
influence 7, 9, 21–24, 27, 32–34, 41, 42, Jadhav 65, 128, 143, 146, 198, 210
48, 49, 53, 54, 56, 64, 70, 71, 119, 128, Jaguar 35, 36
147, 154, 179, 180, 207 Jaishankar 93, 201
influences 2, 63, 183 Jaish-e-Mohammad 116
infrastructure 48, 50, 56, 120 Jammu 117, 120, 121, 124, 126, 168
ingredients 3, 14, 73, 89, 100, 101, 150, Justice 88
163 justification 125
initiate 32, 57–60, 73, 88, 95, 122, 162,
168, 173, 205 Kargil 87, 92, 116, 123–125, 143, 163,
innovative 14, 15, 17, 80, 81, 83, 106, 139, 166, 169, 188, 204
143, 194 Kartarpur 88, 129, 146, 195
insecurity 1, 11, 33, 38, 40, 42, 49, 143, Kashmiri 122, 124, 167
180 Kautilya 144, 202
instability 16, 22, 28, 42, 49, 90, 94, 107, Kautilyan 117
114, 132, 180, 201, 202, 206 key-issues 111
instituting 144, 169 Khrushchev 13, 160
institutionalization 166, 173 kinetic 31
institutions 22, 50, 52, 73, 119, 120, 144 Korea 21, 22, 25, 27, 28, 57, 61, 68, 182,
insurgency 118, 121 206
integrate 8, 9, 39, 75, 80 Kulbhushan 65, 88, 116, 128, 143, 146,
integration 7, 8, 23, 48, 92, 172, 196 188, 198, 210
intelligence 53, 56, 123, 124, 144, 166 Kyoto 65, 66, 197
intended 25, 38, 48, 77, 123
intensely 89, 127 label 99
intentional 74 land-based 24, 29, 34, 35, 38, 71, 78, 83
interact 180, 189 Lashkar-e-Taiyyaba 124
interaction 20, 33, 51, 58, 145 launch 8, 13, 31, 35, 36, 47, 79, 80, 90,
interceptors 25, 31 106, 124, 125, 129, 130, 134, 141, 186,
interconnectedness 2 208
interdependence 8, 189 launchers 25, 35
interested 85, 136, 156, 157, 189 launching 35, 63, 116, 153
interlinked 2, 15, 16, 20, 42, 180 lays 33, 101
interlocutor 52 leaders 3, 58, 119, 141, 142, 157
intermediate-range 25, 35 leaning 142
220   Index
legal 59, 62, 126 maximum 35, 39, 136, 184
legitimacy 9, 22, 27, 68, 71, 110, 111, 165, meaning 26, 91, 143, 150, 175, 201
171, 172, 182, 195 mechanisms 13, 86, 155, 169
legitimate 9, 34, 111, 171 Memorandum 59, 163
letter 130, 146, 157, 198 menace 189
leverage 31, 125, 128 Menon, Shivshankar75
liability 56 Meridian 144, 205
liberalism 116 militarization 38, 42, 180
liberation 27, 121 mindset 65, 167
light 15, 36, 37, 50 miniaturize 11, 75
limitation 8, 18, 82, 129, 199 ministry 18, 40, 47, 89–93, 174, 177, 200,
limited 9–11, 15, 18, 19, 25, 39, 71, 75, 92, 204, 205
95, 96, 103, 109, 132, 136–142, 144, minor 10, 37, 98, 133
145, 150–153, 155, 170, 175, 182, 186, Mirage 35, 36, 39, 96
189–191, 194, 203–205, 208 MIRVing 77, 78, 97, 186
liquid-fueled 29, 30, 39 misadventure 123, 128, 130, 190
location 25, 33, 34, 49, 64, 118, 119, 153, miscalculation 4, 11, 75, 150, 155, 174,
167 180, 190, 191
logic 5, 10, 72, 84, 85, 136, 141, 176, 208 misperceptions 32, 122
logistics 37, 59, 68, 205 missile 7, 11, 13, 24–26, 28–31, 35–37, 39,
longest-range 29 40, 42, 52, 53, 75, 77, 78, 94, 96, 102,
longest-serving 122 104, 133, 159–161, 163–165, 167, 185,
long-held 59 187
long-ranges 133 mission 25, 35, 39, 80, 117, 123
looking 66, 120, 208 mitigate 12–14, 27, 30, 32, 41, 144, 151,
lopsided 62 167, 168, 179
loser 131 mobility 27, 28, 31, 58, 59, 126, 153
low 26, 29, 51, 104, 108, 126, 141 mobilization 107, 153, 166, 188
low-end 56 moderating 32, 179
low-intensity 123 modern 23, 30, 31, 63, 91, 112, 140, 194,
low-yield 124, 138–140, 164 205
luck 150 modernizations 20, 29
Modi 57, 58, 65, 68, 81, 128, 129, 209,
Machiavellian 117 211
mainland 24, 29, 159 modifications 10, 16, 70, 72, 73, 76, 85,
mainstream 54, 193 108
Malacca (strait) 9, 22, 27, 34, 36, 57 Modi–Trump 67, 209
Malaysia 22, 23, 27 momentum 37, 52
maligning 126 monopoly 72, 154
manager 123, 125, 128, 131 motivation 74, 82
maneuverability 103 mountain 36, 37
manufactured 61 movement 21, 32, 169
marching 63, 80, 90 multilateral 17, 22
maritime 9, 18, 21, 22, 25, 27, 30–32, 34, multiplication 106
36, 37, 41, 44, 54, 57–59, 79, 80, 93, multi-role 26, 35
179, 200, 206 murkier 157
massive 10, 11, 25, 44, 70, 73, 75, 76, 82, muscle 7, 58
89, 122, 127, 133, 136, 140–142, 151, muslim-majority 117, 118
153, 158, 199 myopic 66, 199
mastermind 126 myth 71, 137
material-based 122
materialized 72, 163 narrative 15, 43, 166, 170, 211
maximize 5, 12, 37, 49, 80, 90, 115, 128, Nasr 39, 47, 83, 96, 103, 139–141, 152,
129 153, 208
 Index   221
national 9, 18, 24, 26–28, 34, 40, 43, 44, officially 70, 74, 76, 99, 102, 106, 129,
49, 53, 59, 63, 67, 75, 81, 83, 91, 93, 95, 157
98, 102, 105, 111, 116, 119, 120, 126, offshoot 85
130, 147, 157, 163, 176, 196, 198, 199, offshore 7
203–207, 209, 211 offshore-balancing 1, 2, 8, 58, 61, 89, 182,
nationalism 118 183
navigation 22, 34–36, 48, 57, 59, 64 oil 21, 36, 151
necessary 23, 59, 60, 97, 100, 103, 160, openly 73, 101, 190
167, 168, 172, 182, 189, 191 operational 23, 24, 26, 29, 30, 35, 37, 57,
negative 40, 43, 168, 180 61, 101, 102, 151
negotiations 23, 32, 40, 51, 54, 122, 125, optimist 115
164 option 11, 51, 70, 74, 75, 77, 80, 89, 101,
Nehruvian 117, 144 102, 106, 108, 109, 117, 135, 136, 141,
neighboring 25, 33, 41, 179 186, 190, 191
Neoliberalism 18, 201 organizational 78, 98, 155, 156
neutralize 187 oriented 6, 82, 83
never-ending 64, 116, 162 origin 17, 116, 121
next-generation 23, 26, 56, 57, 80, 81, 93, outcomes 42, 124, 128, 180
209 outweigh 34, 54, 128, 136, 189
Nicobar (island) 9, 36, 57, 96, 187 overcome 106, 137, 167
Nightmare 93, 196 overkill 158, 162, 176, 207
no-first 11, 73, 112, 209 over-reliance 17, 154, 155
non-discriminatory 62, 73 overwhelming 118
non-nuclear 28, 50, 60, 61, 110, 145, 185,
187, 207
pact 112, 209
non-operationalization 164
Pakistan 1–3, 5, 6, 8–17, 20, 22, 33,
non-state 109, 126, 129, 133, 168
35–42, 44–47, 49–56, 61–66, 68–71,
non-strategic 23, 24, 26, 72, 94, 203
74–133, 135–146, 149–175, 177–211
non-testing 59, 63, 172
Pakistani-deployed 140
non-threat 88
Normal 94, 113, 197 Pakistan–India 49, 79, 169, 177, 202
normalcy 167, 169 panacea 109, 150, 192
notion 33, 100, 117, 118, 124 Pandit 46, 93, 205
nuclear-armed 23 Paracel (island) 22
nuclear-capable 23, 30, 35, 38, 39, 96, 113, paradigm 81, 82, 85, 89, 102, 124, 152
134, 135, 165, 185, 208 paradox 1, 12, 17, 137, 143, 145, 197, 203
nuclearfiles 111 parallel 36, 52, 53, 59, 62, 130
nuclear-policy 111 parameters 48, 58, 99, 154, 162
nuclear-powered 11, 23, 29, 30, 63, 71, 74, paramilitary 116, 130
79, 80, 86, 94, 97, 104, 106, 107, 134, parity 11, 12, 16, 20, 82, 96, 97, 102, 103,
182, 185, 186, 199 110, 161, 162, 184, 186, 187
nuclear-related 53, 163 Parliament 53, 120, 124
nuclear-use 74 partition 50, 115, 117, 119–121, 144, 203
numbers 14, 100, 158, 159 partner 1, 28, 34, 48, 52, 53, 58
Pathankot 127, 164, 166, 188
objection 54, 104 patrolling 48, 64, 134
obligations 50, 163 pattern 5, 118, 143, 149, 150, 163, 192
oblivious 158 peaceful 3, 28, 33, 38, 50, 67, 71, 144,
observations 15 149, 160, 172, 173, 189, 200
obstacles 147, 202 peacekeeping 53
occurred 52, 79, 117, 118, 156, 189 peacetime 29, 156, 160, 168
offense–defense 12 penetrability 103, 107
office 40, 44, 91, 147, 198, 206, 210 peninsula 27, 28
222   Index
perceive 7, 11–13, 77, 80, 81, 115, 141, Prague 24, 44, 210
162, 171, 182, 185 precarious 123, 126
perceives 7, 22, 37, 38, 40, 136, 138, 152, precedent 50, 118
165 preceding 9, 13, 116, 132, 133, 161, 189
perception 18, 40, 84, 98–102, 106, 118, precision 107, 108
120, 122, 137, 193, 201 pre-delegation 87, 105, 140, 153, 191
perhaps 120, 165, 167, 169, 173 predict 103, 105, 106, 108, 137
periphery 9, 55, 106 predominant 41, 97, 179, 181, 182
permission 105 preeminent 131, 132
Persian 27, 34 preemptive 11, 13, 31, 70, 75, 77, 83, 87,
phenomenon 100, 120, 128 89, 108, 134, 136, 140, 151–153, 162,
philosophy 117, 122 184, 185, 190, 194
physical 49 pre-notification 163, 164
pillar 31, 56, 59, 64 pre-nuclear 102, 136
pilot 88, 130 preparation 29, 32, 41, 179
pioneering 3 preserve 17, 22, 41, 131, 179
pipeline 54 prestige 37, 98
pivot 1, 2, 7, 21, 55, 67, 81, 89, 93, 182, prevail 102, 165, 167, 181, 182
196, 201 prevented 51, 127, 132, 134, 150, 159,
planned 24, 40, 71, 84, 152, 172 188, 191–193
planning 92, 97, 122, 145, 179, 203, 204, prevents 189
208 primarily 74, 140, 166, 169, 181
platforms 26, 29, 32, 35, 38, 41, 42, 57, 63, princely 117
81, 103, 179, 180 priorities 16, 48, 49, 52, 67, 81, 89, 104,
playbook 170 198
players 3, 9, 63, 89, 183 probability 1, 27, 65, 123, 124, 142, 145,
plea 146, 210 154, 155, 168, 179
plebiscite 118 problematic 142, 153
pledged 53, 58, 62 proclivity 135
plugging 103–105, 190 procure 33, 49, 52, 59
plunge 162 procurement 40, 57
plurality 15 producing 23, 59, 60, 86, 96, 109, 110,
plutonium 29, 56, 60, 61 137, 162, 167, 170, 186
pointed 124, 163 productive 150, 160, 166, 184
policy-makers 146 project 9, 22, 26, 27, 37, 42, 49, 58, 64, 91,
politico-religious 115 129, 179, 195
population 77, 117, 120, 131 projection 9, 37, 38, 49, 63, 64, 70, 80–83,
populous 127 85, 89, 90, 97, 154, 165, 170
portions 32 proliferate 193
positive 121, 151, 160 promises 67, 127, 206
possessed 100 promoted 26, 128, 144
possession 4, 29, 86, 107, 118, 156, 161 prompt 25, 26, 28, 42, 119, 139, 140, 180
possibilities 7, 42, 165, 172 propulsion 35, 60, 61, 80
possibly 30, 35, 82, 125, 138, 190, 192 prosecuted 127
postponement 189 protect 7, 9, 21, 34, 77, 159, 180, 182
postures 1, 5–7, 11, 97, 133, 192 protection 26, 29, 87, 97
potentials 184, 185 protocol 60, 62, 69, 200
power-aspiring 184 provisions 61, 85, 136, 164, 171, 193
power-balancing 185 provocative 7, 89, 103, 125, 136, 152, 159,
power-based 117 164
powered 106, 107, 185, 186 provoking 11, 70, 122, 138, 152, 182, 186,
powerful 30, 55, 119, 120, 142, 194 190, 191
powerhouse 20, 49 proximity 117
power-projection 41, 79, 157, 183, 184 proxy 49, 126, 139
 Index   223
psychological 129, 150 recruitment 126
publication 175, 211 Redcliff 115
publicly 128, 131 redefined 16, 52
Pulwama 87, 95, 116, 129–131, 143, 146, redlines 101
188, 198, 209 reduced 24, 65, 145, 154, 155, 173
punishment 134 reduction 84, 143, 159, 164, 167, 177, 197,
punitive 11, 73, 75, 78, 83, 85, 184, 185 201
purchased 31, 36, 37, 39, 40, 57 reestablish 135
pursue 49, 73, 80, 100, 102 reflected 98, 157
puzzle 11, 12, 17 reflection 137, 158, 183, 186, 188, 189
refueling 24, 39, 59
quadrilateral 2, 15, 17, 20, 110, 169, 171, regime 16, 50, 59, 64, 66, 68, 85, 110, 111,
174, 189, 193 114, 156, 162, 164, 165, 171–173, 177,
qualitative 38 183, 187, 192–195, 200, 202, 209
quality 21, 191 regiments 40
quantities 55 region 1, 2, 5–10, 15–17, 20–23, 25–28,
quest 17, 41, 56, 76, 77, 93, 100, 132–134, 31, 32, 34, 36–43, 45–49, 52, 53, 55–58,
139, 206 60, 63, 64, 70–73, 76, 78, 79, 81, 82,
questionable 72, 135 84–87, 90, 93, 100, 101, 104, 111, 116,
quests 132 118, 120, 122, 123, 125, 127, 128,
quickly 109, 140, 153 132–135, 141, 143, 149–152, 156–162,
164–167, 169–171, 174, 177, 179–186,
racing 16, 18, 42, 97, 110, 204 196, 201, 208, 210
radical 119 regulatory 50, 63
radicalized 119 reinforce 5, 33
Rafael 62 reinvigorate 123
railroads 151 reiterates 95, 198
raises 18, 36, 195 relating 26, 81
rapid 1, 26, 29, 31, 38, 39, 55, 159, 160 relationship 2, 8, 16, 17, 20, 32, 34, 38,
rapprochement 49, 52, 65, 205 49–53, 55, 58, 65, 66, 68, 92, 158, 180,
rational 10, 51, 73, 133, 144, 149, 151 184, 197, 209
rationale 1, 16, 72, 73, 77, 78, 83, 90, relevant 64, 119, 131, 191
97–99, 101, 104, 161 reliable 48, 53, 54, 159, 160
reaction 16, 20, 29, 33, 42, 103, 129, 155, reliance 26, 72, 105, 108–110, 141, 154,
180 155, 190, 192
reactor-grade 56 religious 115–120
reactors 50, 55, 59–62, 71, 74, 89, 161 reluctantly 119
ready-to-be-deployed 136 renegotiate 53
realist 4, 12, 19, 32, 41, 115, 117 renewable 61
realistic 75, 103 renewed 23, 52, 55, 116, 124
realists-guided 122 repercussions 9, 43, 130, 180
realm 2, 7, 12, 13 reprisal 45, 159, 176, 204
reappraisal 84, 90, 143, 187 reprocessing 56, 59, 61
rearranged 144, 202 Republican 54
rebalance 21, 43, 57, 207, 210 repudiate 32
rebalancing 21, 27, 33, 56, 57 requires 9, 14, 61, 111, 162
re-balancing 170 reserves 23, 130
received 50, 53, 121 resilient 26, 59
recent 21, 24, 29, 31, 33, 40, 42, 63, 83, resolve 41, 51, 64, 83, 87, 104, 115, 125,
90, 103, 112, 116, 129, 162, 164, 166, 131, 161, 163, 166, 168, 170, 174, 179,
173, 179, 183, 185–189 189, 194
recognition 58, 167, 193 resources 34, 49, 56, 61, 70, 104, 120
reconnaissance 27, 56 respond 14, 130, 146, 153, 198
record-breaking 147, 207 responses 103, 118, 153
224   Index
responsibilities 55, 66, 200 sea-based 30, 35, 36, 39, 40, 104, 106,
responsible 13, 73, 85, 94, 166, 171, 188, 107, 185, 186
199 sea-launched 36
restoration 163, 164 searching 18, 36, 205
restrained 123, 125 secondary 15, 34, 184
restraints 163, 164 second-strike 185–187
result 9, 34, 51, 73, 83, 85, 121, 125–127, secretariat 105, 131
183 secretary 22, 44, 51–54, 58, 89, 92, 95,
resume 61, 123, 165, 168 112, 113, 125, 130, 131, 141, 142, 146,
retains 12, 24, 29, 61 158, 162, 177, 178, 198, 210
retaliate 76, 130, 133, 142, 185 secularism 116
retaliation 10, 11, 29, 30, 70, 73, 75, 76, secure 2–4, 8, 11, 21, 26, 50, 52, 57, 59,
82, 89, 99, 128, 129, 133, 136, 140–142, 60, 62–64, 71, 78, 86, 111, 123, 159,
153, 155, 158 160, 174, 182
retaliatory 73, 76, 116, 125, 133, 155 security-related 155, 193
revealed 36, 75, 128 security-seeking 41
revised 31, 68, 210 self-assured 53
revisit 85, 89, 140, 157, 192 self-determination 117, 144
revisited 47, 189, 199 self-deterred 136, 138
rewarded 61, 64 self-governance 166
rhetoric 52, 74, 129, 156 self-preservation 4
rigorous 15 sensitive 34, 57, 122, 163
risking 3, 5, 72, 122, 130, 132, 133, 135, sentiment 120, 128
138, 150, 173 sentiments 115, 119
risk-taking 132, 136 separate 108, 117, 119, 136
rivals 6, 11, 13, 14, 17, 33, 40, 89, 149, separation 35, 60–62, 173
151, 152, 154, 155, 160, 161, 164, 165, seriously 13, 63, 65, 89, 124, 150
173, 174, 183, 189 services 87, 120, 126
roadmap 56 settlement 168
robust 53, 71, 106, 129, 143, 168, 169 Shaheen-I 96
rooted 10, 58, 117 Shaheen-II 96, 97
routine 115, 116, 168 Shaheen-III 39, 96, 97
rudimentary 7, 12, 36, 105 Shanghai 35
Russia 12, 13, 21, 22, 36, 44, 46, 49, 56, shield 76, 162
79, 84, 101, 151, 165, 169, 182–184, ship-launch 35
192–194, 200 shipping 57, 58, 81
shipyard 81
sabotage 128 shortcomings 191
sacrificing 87 shortest 75
safeguard 9, 26–29, 36, 50, 59, 61, 166 short-range 11, 30, 35, 38–40, 72, 75, 140,
safety 54, 58, 63, 71, 79, 105, 108, 112, 152, 153, 190
156, 176, 203, 206, 207 shoulder-to-shoulder 58
sanctions 51–53, 66, 187, 206 shrouded 71
satellite 31, 92, 196 Siachen 123
scale 17, 87, 109, 116, 123, 124, 126, 128, signal 87, 135
151 signals 13, 14
scare 139 significance 14, 21, 22, 81, 96, 98, 136,
scattered 108 183, 184, 186, 192
scenario 4, 6, 12, 63, 64, 89, 100, 133, 134, signing 33, 51, 59, 60, 62
140, 157 silo-based 30
scholarship 1, 2, 6, 10, 14, 83 similarities 115
scientific 53 simultaneously 7, 174
scrutiny 130 situations 78, 155
scuttling 74 skillful 169
 Index   225
skirmishes 64, 87, 109, 115, 116 structural 17, 163, 182, 190, 210
slaughtered 120 structure 20, 29, 80, 87, 106, 152
small-scale 55 sub-conventional 132, 136
socio-economic 27, 61, 179 submarine-based 42, 180
solidarity 49 submarine-launched 30, 81, 96, 113, 208
solid-fueled 29, 30 submerged 106
solution 62, 94, 120, 147, 167, 175, 207 subsonic 36
sophisticated 4, 12, 28, 32, 36, 40, 63, 72, substantially 5, 14, 15, 72, 73, 119, 194
76–78, 82, 84, 89, 90, 97, 100, 104, 105, sub-surface 81
108, 110, 132, 134, 138, 154, 157–159, succinct 99
161, 181, 182, 185 succinctly 119
sovereignty 9, 98, 122 suffer 83, 162, 186, 194
Soviets 139 sufficiency 31, 61, 73, 99, 133
spectrum 40, 42, 122, 180, 187 sufficiently 71
spending 42, 83, 180 suggestions 74, 181
spying 108 suicidal 149
Srinagar 123 suit 50, 79, 82, 86, 98, 102, 111, 135, 172,
stability–Instability 124, 145, 203 187
stabilize 15, 17, 143, 151, 177, 191, 195 summary 10, 11, 14, 128, 139
stabilizing 17, 34, 149–151, 153, 155, 157, superior 81, 125, 135, 136
159–161, 163, 165, 167, 169, 171, 173, superiority 32, 122, 154
175, 177 superpowers 13, 71, 72, 159, 160
stakeholder 59, 169 suppliers 34, 68, 206, 210
stalemate 173 supporting 11, 75, 188
standoff 23, 125 suppression 25
statecraft 91, 175, 201 surface 22, 39, 63, 104, 113, 208
statehood 119 surfaces 46, 208
statements 52, 74, 78, 97–99, 101, 111, surgical 75, 83, 87, 88, 94, 95, 116, 128,
119, 157, 196, 211 129, 136, 138, 140, 143, 152, 153, 185,
States–India 55, 67, 196, 200, 208 188, 190, 194, 197, 198
state-society 49 surging 42, 180
static 74, 99, 100, 157 surprise 32, 79, 88, 106, 164
stationed 9, 25, 35, 37, 40 surprising 191
status-driven 71, 117 surveillance 11, 26, 27, 37, 54, 56, 57
stealth 26, 57 survivability 26, 29, 30, 90, 103, 106, 107,
stemming 10, 17 153
stockpile 23, 24, 29, 55, 64 survivable 26, 29, 30, 39, 77, 89
storage 23, 24 survival 3, 11, 41, 98, 105, 120, 147, 186
strain 8, 86 suspected 126
strategically 9, 10, 21, 40, 82 suspicion 115, 120, 168
strategist 9, 93, 158 sustaining 9, 21, 67, 103, 172, 198
strategists 190 symbolic 127
strategize 9, 87, 155 systematic 15
strength 21, 32, 44, 62, 211
stretches 21 tactic 87
strides 82, 98, 104 tactical 10, 11, 23, 24, 56, 75, 87, 94, 101,
strikes 11, 25, 28, 31, 42, 75, 77, 83, 85, 103, 140, 141, 147, 152, 155, 175, 195,
87, 88, 94, 95, 102, 108, 116, 125, 196, 202, 205, 208
128–130, 136–143, 146, 151–153, 162, target 15, 35, 58, 59, 88, 167
180, 182, 185, 186, 188, 190, 191, 194, targeting 26, 35, 71, 78, 80, 83, 87, 89, 90,
197, 198, 210 109, 127, 129, 130, 134, 151, 152, 155,
stringent 50, 156, 193 156, 161, 185, 190, 191
strive 108, 110, 186 team 127, 128, 169, 170, 194
stronger 7, 56, 81, 121 technical 62, 80, 107, 155, 185, 190
226   Index
technological 15, 16, 31, 32, 35, 37, 40, unavoidable 8, 42, 180
56, 65, 77–79, 81–83, 86, 93, 104, 107, uncertain 4, 41, 138, 142
134, 155, 156, 185, 186, 204 unchecked 38, 60
tectonic 9, 181 unclear 138, 170, 190
temptations 90, 91, 113, 197 uncomfortable 28, 60
tension 27, 28, 33, 41, 87, 125, 127, 132, uncontrolled 169–171
152, 163, 166, 167, 179 undefined 74, 84
terminate 61, 131 undermined 55, 65, 83, 100, 134, 163, 166,
territorial 1, 3, 9, 22, 28, 31, 34, 65, 98, 173
110, 115, 117, 118, 168 understanding 3, 15, 16, 18, 27, 44, 53,
terrorism 1, 53, 87, 88, 90, 109, 113, 122, 115, 136, 138, 150–152, 163, 168, 173,
124, 126, 129, 136, 143, 150, 164, 200, 201
166–168, 188–190, 194, 196, 206 undertake 105, 135, 137, 138, 143,
terrorism-related 149 152–156, 190, 193
test-fired 39 underway 23, 24, 36, 56
test-fires 113, 208 unfinished 145, 146, 203
testing 35, 60, 61, 163, 169 unification 47, 200
THAAD 25, 28 unilateral 17, 110, 125, 128, 152, 163, 172
the-belt-and-road-initiative 45 unintended 4, 42, 71, 77, 180
thermal 104 unintentionally 60, 64
threat-centric 42 unipolar 21
threaten 2, 4, 5, 25, 28, 33, 34, 42, 89, 98, unique 15, 52
104, 108, 125, 179 universal 41, 173
three-stage 29 unjust 193
Thucydides 33, 46, 196 unknown 11, 137, 140, 186, 190, 191
timeline 177, 203 unleash 89, 172
time-tested 183 unless 60, 73, 172, 189, 193
tolerate 125 unlikely 64, 72, 111, 165, 167, 168, 172,
traditional 6, 21, 31, 75, 135, 137 187
trafficking 22 unmanned 56–58
tragedy 18, 46, 204 unnecessarily 77, 103, 155
tragic 5, 8, 33 unpredictable 20
trajectories 45, 92–94, 175–178, 198, 202, unreal 157
204, 208, 211 unsettled 22
transfer 50, 54, 57, 59, 63 upgrades 161
transformation 5, 16, 20, 42, 73, 143, 180 uranium 50, 55, 60, 61
transforming 15, 17, 63, 64, 127, 179 US-India 66, 200
transparency 111, 168 US–Japanese 28
treading 145, 205 US-strategy 208
treaty 22, 33, 50–52, 60, 68, 73, 94, 121, US-supplied 50
154, 164, 173, 198, 205 utilization 186
tremendous 136, 141, 153, 156 utilized 100, 160
trial 35, 126, 128
triangle 44, 46, 64, 65, 197, 200, 204 Vajpayee 51, 53, 66
Trident 24 validates 119
trilateral 22, 110, 169, 171, 174, 189, 193 valley 123, 128
twenty-first 2, 6, 20, 23, 48, 52 value 99, 108, 109, 149, 152, 180
two-plus-two 59 values 53, 58, 144
variables 2
ultimate 11, 160, 186 variant 30, 39, 78, 96
umbrella 165 variants 11, 35, 75, 96, 97, 161, 187
unacceptable 7, 73, 134, 158 variety 15, 79, 81
unanimous 172 varying 12, 16, 84
unarmed 57, 158 vehicle 31, 56
 Index   227
verification 128, 173 war-termination 5
versions 90 watched 88
vertical 50, 172 watching 94, 199
very 37, 54, 79, 87, 93, 100, 104, 123, 131, weakened 172
155, 167, 185, 199 weapon 23, 53, 61, 96, 105, 123, 125, 143,
viable 80 147, 149, 152, 155, 158, 207
victim 126 weapons-grade 55, 56
victor 43, 66, 197, 199 weapon-to-weapon 11, 12, 82, 86, 97, 102,
victory 88, 133, 134, 136, 139, 158 161, 187
Vienna 98 well-intentioned 14
Vietnam 21–23, 57 well-publicized 129
violated 59, 60, 130, 166 well-respected 132
violation 95, 130, 131, 146, 198 Wisdom 90, 204
violence 116, 119, 124, 129, 135 worries 41, 186
vital 12, 29, 34, 89, 180, 182 worrisome 127
volatile 116, 126 worry 133, 137, 183
vulnerability 18, 106, 107, 195 wounded 126
vulnerable 7, 62, 108, 134–136, 141, 151,
152 yards 151
Yearbook 43, 45, 46, 203
wage 75, 88, 122, 136, 182, 190, 191 yearly 55
wait 88, 95, 146, 167, 198 yield 26, 51, 108, 136, 141
waiting 191
waiver 50, 60, 73, 173 Zamir, A. Ambassador 47, 60, 63, 68, 69,
war-fighting 10, 13, 17, 24, 63, 83, 109, 75–77, 92, 109, 114, 129, 131, 146, 165,
116, 124, 125, 132, 137–139, 143, 177
151–153, 164, 167, 187, 190–192, 194 Zarb-e-Azab 127
warlike 14, 28, 29, 32, 41, 63, 78, 140 zero-sum 6
warned 88, 98, 130 zone 28, 32, 93, 205