COMMON GROUND

Norbert R. Morgenstern1

ABSTRACT

This Keynote Address highlights the unifying elements in geotechnical theory and practice. Unifying
concepts, history, achievements and challenges are reviewed. It is emphasized that major value added
contributions arise from an integrated or holistic approach to geotechnical engineering. The current
organization of the geotechnical community is not adequate to foster this approach. The formation of an
International Geotechnical Union is advocated in order to better meet the challenges of the new millennium.

1.0 INTRODUCTION

This singular event, Geo Eng 2000, supported by all the main members of the geotechnical family,
provides an opportunity to ask a number of questions and reflect on the nature of our profession early in the
new millenium:

• Who are we?

• What do we do?
• How did we come into being?
• What have been our accomplishments?
• How do we add value now in engineering practice?
• What special problems confront us?
• Do we need change or is it business as usual?

Each of these questions will be addressed in the following. The perspective is necessarily personal. It
will be argued that, notwithstanding the achievements of the past and the exciting new developments
provoking change in geotechnical engineering in recent years, the way in which geotechnical engineering
adds value is not adequately understood, recognized and rewarded. Examples will be given to illustrate that
the way forward to resolve this issue requires emphasis on unification, as opposed to specialization, in
geotechnical engineering. This emphasis, "Common Ground", must be highlighted not only in geotechnical
practice but also in educational and research programs. A new organizational structure, an International
Geotechnical Union, is necessary to promote this vision.

2.0 WHO ARE WE?

Recent efforts in the United Kingdom to create a unified body to provide a technical, professional focus
for geotechnical matters have contributed a definition of geotechnical engineering that is comprehensive
(Anon, 1999):

"Geotechnical engineering is the application of the sciences of soil mechanics

and rock mechanics, engineering geology and other related disciplines to civil
engineering construction, the extractive industries and the preservation and
enhancement of the environment.
Geotechnical engineering plays a key role in all civil engineering projects, since
all construction is built on or in the ground. In addition it forms an important part
of extractive industries, such as open cast and underground mining and

1
Norbert R. Morgenstern, University of Alberta, Edmonton, canada, T6G2G7
 hydrocarbon extraction and is essential in evaluating natural hazards such as
earthquakes and landslides.
The use of natural soil or rock makes geotechnical engineering different from many
other branches of engineering: whereas most engineers specify the materials they
use, the geotechnical engineer must use the material existing in the ground and in
general cannot control its properties."

3.0 WHAT DO WE DO?

Anon (1999) also discussed the practice of geotechnical engineering and noted that it often encompasses a
wide variety of skills involving many types of professionals concerned with the ground; e.g. civil and
structural engineers, tunnelling engineers, mining engineers, geotechnical engineers, engineering geologists,
geologists, hydrogeologists, geophysicists, geochemists, etc.
Figure 1, modified from Anon (1999), suggests that the main deliverables of geotechnical engineering
are: i) structural support systems, ii) fluid control systems, iii) underground geo-structures, iv) surface
geo-structures and v) ground improvement. As indicated, geotechnical engineering draws not only on
relevant scientific and engineering fundamentals, but also on public policy restraints, construction practice,
and risk management.

Rock Mechanics
Geology deformation Soil Mechanics
composition failure deformation
genesis seepage failure
applications seepage Public Policy
processes codes
Hydrology applications
hydrology standard
surface fluid flow
Fluid Control laws + compliance
Systems
Structural Mechanics Contract Law
e.g., dams
deformation Structural Underground specifications
failure Support Systems Geo-structures
member design e.g., foundations e.g., tunnels Risk Management
observational method
Continuum Mechanics risk assessment
elasticity Geotechnical Engineering instrumentation
plasticity
idealisation
Surface Geo-structures Mechanical Engineering
Ground Improvement
e.g., embankments, drilling
Numerical Analysis e.g., densification,
landfills instruments
finite elements remediation
excavation
finite differences
Construction
Materials practice
types experience
properties Geochemistry
Site Exploration Ground
geosynthetics waste
reconnaissance Movements
leachates
drilling earthquakes
durability
in-situ testing
geophysics

Figure 1. The practice of geotechnical engineering encompasses a wide variety of skills; modified from
(Anon, 1999).

Morgenstern (2000) recently emphasized that uncertainty is chronic in geotechnical practice and therefore
risk must be managed. An essential component of assuring geotechnical performance, over the wide range
of deliverables, requires that the geotechnical engineer maintain an on-going awareness of factors that
contribute to unsuccessful performance and introduce this awareness into comprehensive risk management
tools.
The geotechnical method is not serial, but instead involves feedback between data acquisition, material
and model idealization, technical evaluation, judgement and risk management. While performance codes
and methods standards are useful, more penetrative standardization of geotechnical design is
counter-productive. The interactive aspects of the geotechnical method are illustrated in Figure 2, also
adapted from Anon (1999). The dominance of particular linkages and feedback loops will vary from project
to project.

Genesis/geology

Ground Site investigation

profile ground description

Precedent,
empiricism,
experience,
risk-management

Ground Appropriate
behaviour model

Lab/field testing Idealisation followed by

Observation/ evaluation. Conceptual or
measurement physical modelling
Analytical modelling

Figure 2. The geotechnical triangle. Each aspect is distinct but interlinked.

The geotechnical method also recognizes several unifying concepts. They can be illustrated by reference
to the origin-consistency matrix of geo-materials shown in Figure 3 that demonstrates the wide range of
materials considered by geotechnical engineers. The distinction between soil and rock is based on whether
or not the material disintegrates when submerged in water and the boundary between weak and strong rock is
taken at the compressive strength of common concrete. Neither boundary is razor-sharp. Clay-shales are
transitional materials between soils and rock that are difficult to classify with precision. The distinction of
strong rock is intended to imply that the strength of the intact rock is generally too high to be of geotechnical
significance. However, while often true for many geotechnical problems, important exceptions exist.
Studies by Martin and his co-workers (Martin, 1997) on the behaviour of deep openings in highly stressed
granite have shown that progressive failure affects the boundary and the shape of the excavated opening.
This has an important bearing on the integrity of nuclear waste repositories planned for such host media.
Referring to the range of materials illustrated by Figure 3, a geotechnical engineer may be called to
evaluate liquefaction in a recent alluvial sand or design a tunnel in a Cretaceous marine clay-shale or advise
on a deep excavation through a weathered granite profile. The unifying concepts that facilitate this breadth
of endeavour are:

i) All of the materials are porous (to varying degrees) and the concept of effective stress
provides the fundamental basis for quantitative characterization.
ii) All of the material (to varying degrees) are normal stress dependent; strength increases with
normal stress, stiffness increases with normal stress and permeability generally decreases with
normal stress.
iii) All of the materials (to varying degrees) are structure-dependent; for some, like homogeneous
uniform clays, the structure is at a scale that can be characterized by the process of sampling
and testing; for others, like a jointed, hard rock mass, the discontinuity fabric dominates
behaviour and scale effects limit the role of sampling and testing.

4.0 WHERE HAVE WE COME FROM?

4.1 Soil Mechanics

The emergence of soil mechanics has been well chronicled (Terzaghi, 1957; Goodman, 1999). While
important contributions to earth pressure theory had been made in the 18th century and to slope stability
analysis in the 19th century, the subject remained incoherent until Terzaghi recognized "that engineering
geology cannot possibly become a reliable tool in the hands of earthwork engineers unless and until we
acquire the capacity to assign to each material of the earth numerical values which make it impossible to
mistake it for another one with significantly different engineering properties".
Armed with this conviction and working in isolation at Robert College in Turkey, Terzaghi realized in
1918 the need for systematic experimentation and within a few years he had made brilliant progress,
culminating in his recognition of the concept of effective stress. The publication of Erdbaumechanik auf
Bodenphysikalischer Grundlage (Terzaghi, 1925) marks the emergence of soil mechanics as a discipline in
its own right. This volume integrated soil description and classification, fundamental frictional properties,
deformation and strength, and the theory of consolidation together with various applications in foundation
engineering.
In 1929 Terzaghi returned to his more geological interests and published his classic "Effect of minor
geological details on the safety of dams". Notwithstanding the scientific advances that he had initiated, this
contribution highlighted the uncertainties that are an essential part of geotechnical practice and , as noted by
Terzaghi (1961), led to the articulation of the observational method. He had not only laid the scientific basis
for much of soil mechanics but had also provided the risk management procedures for its successful
application in practice.
The first International Conference on Soil Mechanics and Foundation Engineering in 1936 marked the
start of the period of widespread recognition and acceptance of soil mechanics in engineering practice.

4.2 Rock Mechanics

The first Congress of the International Society of Rock Mechanics was convened in Lisbon in 1967 with
about 800 participants and 300 accompanying persons. As summarized by Rocha (1967), President of the
Organizing Committee, 42 countries were represented and the interest in rock mechanics was shared by a
diverse group of specialists including mineralogists, petrologists, geologists, tectnophysicists, geophysicists,
mining engineers, civil engineers, petroleum engineers and others. Although there was much overlap in both
technical content and audience with the soil mechanics community, it is unlikely that the identification and
support of such wide interest in rock mechanics would have been achievable without the formation of a new,
identifiable, international society with such clear interests and mandate.
 Origin and Sedimentary Igneous and
Composition Clastic Chemical Organic Metamorphic

Consistency Arenaceous Argillaceous Carbonates Evapourites

Cohesionless Alluvial Rock Flour Calcareous Gypsiferous Topsoil Talus

Sand and Sands Sands
SOIL

Gravel

Cohesive Oil Sand Clay Ooozes Peat Laterite

Clay Shale Marl

Slaking and
Softening

Soft Friable Mudstone Chalk Gypsum Lignite Weathered

ROCK

Compressive
Sandstone Granite
Strength
500 kPa

Hard Sandstone Shale Limestone Potash Coal Granite

Figure 3. The Range of Geotechnical Materials by Origin, Composition and Consistency

 While 1967 marks the coming of age of rock mechanics there had been a number of symposia and
organizational structures in various countries prior to that time. In the United States there had been eight
symposia on rock mechanics since 1956. Other countries followed with national meetings in the 1960's. The
mining community had convened meetings on Strata Control and Rock Mechanics. Meetings on specialist
topics had been held prior to 1967 and aspects of rock mechanics appeared on the technical programs of the
International Commission on Large Dams, the International Society of Soil Mechanics and Foundation
Engineering and the Internationales Büro für Gebirgsmechanik. However the dominant pioneering effort
that crystallized in the formation of International Society of Rock Mechanics was made by Leopold Müller.
Müller (1967), in his closing address to the first Congress, describes how in 1951 sixteen men gathered at
his house to try and arrive at a synthesis of geology, geophysics, science of construction materials, mining
and construction engineering, to be called "geomechanics". This group in Salzburg became known as the
Austrian School and their journal, originally Geologie und Bauwesen, and then Rock Mechanics, was the
vehicle for promoting interest in rock mechanics. This culminated in the formation of the International
Society of Rock Mechanics.
While Müller deserves enormous credit for bringing the ISRM to fruition, he himself recognized the
scientific influence of Stini (Müller, 1979). Stini, who was Professor of Technical Geology in Vienna from
the 1920's to the 1940's, was among the first to introduce statistical joint measurements and originated the
concept of "Kluftkorper" or joint body. He also made major contributions to slope stability and other aspects
of engineering geology.
If there is one major distinction between soil mechanics and rock mechanics, it is the emphasis in rock
mechanics on discontinuity behaviour and the properties of jointed media. This paradigm has influenced
much of rock mechanics theory and rock engineering practice. It has resulted in powerful numerical
methods that we enjoy today for analysing all aspects of the behaviour of discontinuous media and it has
focussed our attention in the field on the critical elements controlling the engineering behaviour of both rock
and many soil masses.
It is of interest to note that in 1961 Terzaghi's attention was almost entirely concentrated on rock
mechanics (Terzaghi and Voight, 1979). He became convinced that the variability of rock masses, combined
with the great expense of available testing procedures, precluded the possibility of obtaining sufficient
information for a reliable computation of slope stability (and, by inference, other aspects of the behaviour of
jointed media). His statements in 1963, at the end of his life, comparing the capacity of soil and rock
mechanics to solve geotechnical problems is worthy of review as a benchmark in the evolution of
geotechnical engineering. Was his prognosis correct?

4.3 Engineering Geology

The first Congress of the International Association of Engineering Geology was held in Paris in 1970.
Professor Q. Zaruba was the first President of IAEG and Professor J. Goguel was President of the Congress.
About 400 members from 40 different countries gathered to discuss 119 papers and to plan the future growth
of the IAEG. Arnould (1970) has described the history of the establishment of the IAEG which goes back to
the 22nd International Geological Congress held at New Delhi in 1964. Following the initiative of a group of
experts who felt that engineering geology was being neglected, the International Union for Geological
Sciences established a Committee on Engineering Geology in 1964 to advise on its future. IUGS took no
action on the subject in 1966 and the experts decided to create IAEG with Dr. A. Shadmon as the first
President. Formative meetings were held in 1967 under the patronage of UNESCO and scientific activities
emerged in 1968, particularly associated with the 23rd International Geological Congress in Prague, where
the first General Assembly of IAEG convened. Therefore, although 1970 marked the recognition of
Engineering Geology in terms of international institutions, and the Bulletin of IAEG was started in that year,
concerted organizational efforts had preceded this since 1964.
While the international organization of engineering geology can be fixed at 1970, the practice of
engineering geology has a proud tradition that precedes this by a considerable length of time. The
monumental history by Kiersch (1991) documents this history in detail. Legget (1962) also provides a
comprehensive history.
Many examples of dam, tunnel, railroad and canal construction can be cited to show that interest in
geology as applied to engineering works grew steadily throughout Europe in the late 1800's. By the early
1900's geological counsel was commonly accepted for the planning of industrial expansion, as the
progressively larger engineering structures usually meant a proportionately greater number of complex
geological problems for engineering practitioners.
The same can also be said of the United States. Kiersch cites Professor W.O. Crosby (1850-1925) as the
"Father of Engineering Geology in America" both as a result of his consulting practice and his academic
work at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. In Europe the influential work of Stini has already been
cited and the publication by Redlich et al. (1929) was an important event in the subject. Pioneers can be
identified in every country undergoing industrial development at the time (e.g., Lapworth, 1911; Lugeon,
1933; McDonald, 1915; Zaruba and Mencl, 1963).
While the special scientific principles underpinning soil and rock mechanics are readily discerned, those
of engineering geology are more elusive. Berkey (Paige, 1950) was undoubtedly the most influential
engineering geologist of his time in North America and as a result of his efforts geologists found
employment in most large civil engineering organizations engaged in locating, planning and constructing
large civil engineering projects. In their discussion of the influence of Berkey and the role of the geologist in
such organizations, Burwell and Roberts (1950) isolated the requirements of the engineering geologist as
follows:

1) "Obviously, the first requirement of the engineering geologist is that he shall be a competent
geologist. ……Against this background of knowledge, he will discover the major geologic factors
in advance of construction and recognize the more obscure minor details that so often exert a
major influence on location, design and construction problems."
2) "The second requirement is that he shall be able to translate his discoveries and deductions into
terms of practical application. This qualification is not obtained as a result of better knowledge of
geology, but of better knowledge of engineering."
3) "The third requirement is dual in character. It is the ability to render sound judgements and make
important decisions. …..Sound judgment is a priceless faculty of the geologist who is frequently
called on to make decisions without all the factual data necessary to guarantee the results. It is not
always economically practicable to eliminate the element of uncertainty and not infrequently his
advice has to be based on few and scattered evidences in the field."
4) The fourth requirement relates to the temperamental make-up or personal qualities of the
engineering geologist. "He should not be an alarmist. Neither faults, nor earthquakes, nor
cavernous limestones, nor pervious basalts, nor low water tables should deter him from
rationalizing the field evidences and proceeding to logical conclusions based on due consideration
of both facts and influences."

This early description of the modus operandi of an engineering geologist finds some resonance in
Zaruba's (1970) summary of his 50 years of practice where he advises: "the engineering geologist should be
very sober in his conclusions, to keep painstakingly to the objective facts and avoid even the most ingenious
inferences".
It is of interest to assess whether or not this classical inductive approach limits the role of the engineering
geologist. In a now obscure paper, Morgenstern and Cruden (1977) analyzed the nature of geotechnically
complexity at a given site and indicated how complexity arises from three kinds of processes acting either
singly or in consort:

i) genetic processes
ii) epigenetic processes
iii) weathering processes

They discussed how process models can contribute to the unravelling of complexity on sites by clarifying
the understanding of the distribution of geotechnical properties within a site. This is similar to the more
comprehensive arguments in favour of geological model-making put forward by Fookes (1997):

"The strength of the geological model is in providing an understanding of the geological processes
which made the site. This enables predictions to be made or situations anticipated for which
explorations need to be sought in the geological materials, geological structure and the ancient and
active geological processes of the area. It provides a rational basis for interpretation of the geology
 from understanding and correlation of observed geological features and exposures. Also it can
provide an indication of the potential variation in the properties of the soil or rock mass and hence
possible errors in calculations or assumptions, especially those assuming homogeneity."

As stressed by Morgenstern (2000), in geotechnical practice, risk must be managed to overcome

limitations of site characterization, knowledge of material properties, other unknowns and the vagaries of
construction practice. This emphasis on geological model-making applied to geotechnical engineering
elevates the role of the engineering geologist as a risk manager. The value of geological model-making is
already well-recognized in petroleum engineering.

5.0 WHAT HAVE WE ACCOMPLISHED?

Terzaghi's Erdbaumechanik was published in 1925. Stini's Technische Geologie appeared in 1922 and the
journal that he initiated Geologie und Bauwesen, was started in 1929. Redlich, Terzaghi and Kampe's
Ingenieurgeologie was published in 1929.
In North America, the benchmark volume produced by the American Institute of Mining and Metallurgy,
Geology and Engineering for Dams and Reservoirs, also came out in 1929. Many other classics followed
shortly thereafter. Modern geotechnical engineering emerged between 1920 and 1930 and it is convenient to
adopt 1925, the date of publication of Erdbaumechanik as the pivotal year. Much has been achieved by the
geotechnical community in the subsequent seventy-five years.
Engineering News Record (1999) lists 125 top construction projects over the past 125 years and, starting
with 1925, it is possible to select a number of examples that are geotechnically intensive:

• Tunnels (Holland Tunnel, 1927; Cascade Tunnel, 1928; Channel Tunnel, 1994/ Seikan Rail
Tunnel, 1988)
• Dams (Hoover Dam, 1935; Guri Dam, 1968; Aswan Dam, 1970; Snowy Mountains Project, 1974;
Nurek Dam, 1977, James Bay Project, 1985; Itaipu Project, 1991).
• Highways (Alaskan Highway, 1942)
• Navigation Projects (Mississippi River Locks and Dams, 1940; St. Lawrence Seaway, 1959).
• Bridges (Humber Bridge, 1981; Northumberland Straits Bridge, 1996).
• Pipelines (Trans Alaska Pipeline, 1977)
• Offshore structures (Statford B. Platform, 1981; Hibernia Platform, 1997)
• Subways (Washington, D.C., 1976)
• Airports (Chek Lap Kok, 1998)

To those civil engineering monuments could be added a comparable list of geotechnical contributions to
mining and hydrocarbon extraction as well as to environmental improvement through ground remediation.
Less visible, but equally important, are the geotechnical contributions to building infrastructure in
virtually every country in the world.

6.0 WHAT ARE THE AGENTS OF CHANGE?

Geotechnical engineering is continually being transformed by the push of new technology and the pull of
new problems. Change is particularly evident over the past twenty years.
Everyone will have a different list of the major technical advances affecting geotechnical practice and
research over the past twenty years. Mine includes the following (in no particular order):

• Advances in numerical modelling

• Advances in instrumentation and data processing
• Soil reinforcing, including soil nailing
• Advances in ground improvement techniques (grouting, compaction, etc.)
• Applications of geosynthetics
• Advances in in-situ testing
• Application of geophysics
 New or greatly intensified applications of geotechnical engineering have developed in the following
areas:

• Emergence of environmental geotechnics

• Cold-regions geotechnical engineering (permafrost, ice, frost)
• High-temperature geotechnical engineering (nuclear waste expositories, in-situ hydrocarbon
production).
• Application to mining (tailings dams, heap-leach, dumps)
• Applications to petroleum recovery (well-bore stability, reservoir compaction).

The processes driving change in the future, that intimately affect the profession, can be best understood
by reference to Knill's (1997) insightful paper. While written in the context of challenges to engineering
geology, it can be read as relevant to the whole of geotechnical engineering.
Knill stated that environmental change is taking place primarily as a result of two factors: population
growth and climatic changes, issues that are inevitably closely associated. He points out that the most likely
projections for population growth peak at 11 billion in the final decades of this century (from the current 5.8
billion), about 90% of the increase will be located in developing countries and at least 60% of this increased
population will be living in megacities. Some estimates indicate the need to build the equivalent of 400 huge
cities over the next 50 years. This increased population will require housing, food, clean water and effective
waste disposal for a basic level of subsistence. It will require, at a minimum, an enhanced infrastructure of
agriculture, transport, water and energy supply, waste disposal and pollution control. The population and its
supporting infrastructure will need to be provided with stability through adequate protection against the
consequences of environmental and manmade disasters, or institutional change. This growing demand for
life-support systems coincides with increasing climate change, itself influenced, if not dominated, by human
activity. As a result we have entered a period of intense global environmental change and the associated
management problems will influence the geotechnical agenda of the future. Sustaining megacities, waste
containment and protection from natural extreme events are three easily recognized examples.
Recognizing the need to focus more on sustainable development, Knill has identified eight aspects of the
professional practice of engineering geology (read geotechnical engineering) that deserve greater attention:

• Work professionally and live in a manner which has a minimal influence on the environment,
recognizing and mitigating impacts where they occur.
• Make use of environmentally friendly techniques using low cost and low quality materials, and
"soft engineering".
• Give greater weight to the quantitative assessment of uncertainty and variability in assessing
geological processes, and the properties of geological materials.
• Recognize the importance of geological processes within the context of time, and in relation to
causation through other environmental mechanisms.
• Increase the extent to which modelling is used as a predictive and verifying tool.
• Accept that engineering geology (read geotechnical engineering) works for the benefit of people,
and so needs to be related closely to the population affected by, or benefiting from, development.
• Give parallel recognition to the role of other disciplines in the assessment of the environmental
issues.
• Understand the role of environmental legislation, regulation and policy formulation.

The geotechnical agenda of the future will be dominated by finding engineering solutions to problems
which are responsive to environmental needs.

7.0 WHAT ARE THE CHALLENGES?

It would be satisfying to be able to state with confidence that the geotechnical community will evolve
from its considerable record of achievement in the past and will deal effectively with the problems of the
future. However, I do not believe that we can take comfort in this optimistic perspective. A number of
issues must be recognized and dealt with before we can, as a professional community, look forward with
confidence.

7.1 Inadequate Performance

In geotechnical engineering, as in other aspects of engineering, the overriding obligation requires that the
constructed entity or process fulfill its intended function. It should normally do so in a safe, economic and
environmentally acceptable manner. Successful performance requires meeting criteria of safety,
serviceability, environmental acceptability and affordability. While the geotechnical engineer has a long
tradition of success in meeting these requirements under conditions that differ from many other types of
technological endeavours, there are some areas of application where inadequate performance remains
distressingly frequent.
Unsuccessful performance might involve failure, excessive leakage or deformation, non-compliance with
environmental requirements or other regulatory restrictions and excessive cost. In some instances
unsuccessful performance might be judged in a broader social and environmental context. There are too
many examples of unsuccessful performance in geotechnical engineering.
Morgenstern (1998) listed eleven serious incidents over the period 1995-1998 associated with mine
tailings and waste overburden management. Others have occurred since then. All were involved with
modern structures and were not part of the historical legacy of poorly engineered waste containment
structures that characterized parts of the mining industry in the past. The consequences of these incidents
were variable. There were a few fatalities and typically substantial environmental and economic penalties.
There was no common element geographically or socio-economically. However each case involved
geotechnical input from consultants well-known by either national or international standards. He concluded
that "…..a well-intentioned corporation employing well-qualified consultants is not adequate insurance
against serious incidents".
Hoek and Palmieri (1998) have provided valuable insight into the impact of geotechnical risk on large
civil engineering projects. Unforeseen geological conditions and the associated geotechnical problems are a
major contributor to cost and schedule overruns on large civil engineering projects. They cite a study of 71
hydroelectric projects financed by international agencies where estimated costs and schedules were
compared with actual (World Bank, 1996). The study concluded that construction costs for hydropower
projects were on average 27% higher than estimated. Experience indicates that less than 1% of the total
project cost is spent on pre-engineering studies, which is remarkably low. Hoek and Palmeiri (1998)
observed that a number of projects have actually been abandoned or have encountered costs and schedules
that have escalated to several times the original estimate. They note that unforeseen geological conditions
cannot be blamed for all of these costs and schedule overruns. However, many of these instances of
unsuccessful performance are the result of inadequate geological data, inappropriate interpretation of
available data and incompetence in dealing with the problems once they have arisen.
An excessive number of projects exhibiting unsuccessful performance, as defined above, is not restricted
to the hydropower industry. Geotechnical engineering, as a whole, must strive to improve its record in this
regard.
The ten year international programme of the International Decade for Natural Disaster Reduction
(IDNDR) came to an end on December 31, 1999. During the decade important activities were conducted
worldwide in order to implement the specific objectives of United Nations General Assembly Resolution
44/236, adopted in December, 1989. These activities involved agencies both within and outside of the UN
system. While successor arrangements to IDNDR are being put in place at the international level, the decade
ended with cruel reminders of ongoing challenges associated with preparedness and mitigation of natural
disasters.
Between December 1-16, 1999 rainfall in Venezuela was eight times the usual amount for that time of
year. As a result, in many areas of the Cerro Avila (the mountains that surround Caracas and its
neighbouring states) landslides caused severe mud and debris flows that buried entire villages and affected a
total of eight states, including Caracas. The 1999 Venezuelan disaster was not only the worst tragedy in
Venezuela's history, but also one of the most severe disasters in the Americas in this century. The decade
also ended with severely damaging earthquakes in Taiwan and Turkey, to remind us of the concerted effort
needed to mitigate the consequences of seismic hazards.
 It will be necessary for the geotechnical community to be more pro-active in multi-disciplinary
undertakings in the future if the technical advances made in recent years are to have appropriate social and
economic impact.

7.2 Inadequate Compensation

The ability to attract talented new people into our profession and retain those already contributing to it is
closely linked to remuneration. There are no international statistics to guide a comparison between
geotechnical engineers and others to assess this issue and therefore we must make use of national studies,
where available.
The information presented in Figure 4 is disquieting (Davis, 2000). This is a plot of median income by
major branch of engineering for 1998 according to the U.S. National Society of Professional Engineers
(NSPE) "1999 Professional Engineer Income and Salary Survey". The figures for median annual income
represents salaries, fees, cash bonuses and commissions received from respondent's primary jobs as reported
on January 1, 1999, excluding any overtime pay. Of the 7,966 MSPE member respondents to the 1999
survey, 74.1% had supervisory or management responsibility and about 82.1% were registered engineers.
Additional information on the survey may be found at the NSPE web site (www.nspe.org/em1-ssal.asp).

120000

100000

80000
$(US)
Control Systems/Structural $70,000

60000
Aerospace/Aeronautical $78,700

Environmental $68,000

Manufacturing $67,000
40000

Geotechnical $62,950
Petroleum $102,500

Mechanical $72,000

Agricultural $65,873
Electronics $79,500

Computer $68,750
Chemical $80,000

Electrical $75,372
Industrial $76,692
Sanitary $84,900
Nuclear $88,050

Mining $83,600

Civil $66,816

20000

Figure 4. Median income by major branch of engineering.

This information reflects remuneration in the USA. Both absolute and relative remuneration levels will
vary from nation to nation. It is the relative position of geotechnical engineers on the figure that is troubling.
We are the lowest!
The factors affecting remuneration level are complex. Certainly supply and demand of professionally
qualified manpower is one important consideration. Is there an over-supply? Remuneration tends to
correlate with the real or perceived value added by the engineer. Does the fee structure in geotechnical
engineering, which ultimately controls remuneration, reflect a perception of low value-added contributions?
Has the bulk of geotechnical practice become routine, amenable to control by standards and gone the way of
conventional materials testing?
7.3 Inadequate Recognition?
The natural materials that the geotechnical engineer must deal with are complex and do not afford the
luxury of replication. Geotechnical undertakings, either in-situ or associated with unit construction processes
themselves, are performed under circumstances very different from the controlled environment of a
manufacturing plant. The implications of uncertainty, with examples of unsuccessful behaviour in
geotechnical practice, are discussed at length by Morgenstern (2000).
The value-added component of geotechnical engineering is closely linked to performance assurance.
When it goes wrong the penalties are severe for all involved. The complexity of performance assurance in
geotechnical engineering has been underestimated and this requires greater recognition. To assure
performance, comprehensive risk management tools must be applied and appropriate rewards are deserved
when they are applied correctly.
Risk management can only be successful if critical sources of uncertainty are understood. This aspect of
geotechnical engineering cannot be made routine. As emphasized by many commentators, judgment is
essential to assure geotechnical performance. The need to apply the observational method is
well-recognized, but its limitations are sometimes underestimated. Morgenstern (2000) has advocated the
systematic application of qualitative and consequential risk analysis to the design and control of geotechnical
projects. This application provides structure to the judgment process, makes it more transparent and
facilitates risk management. This part of a project development requires the highest level of experience. It
should be recognized as adding the highest value and rewarded accordingly.

8.0 ADDING VALUE THROUGH GEOTECHNICAL ENGINEERING

8.1 Introduction
The following examples, taken from personal experiences, are intended to illustrate how geotechnical
engineering adds value to both industrial and social institutions. Other commentators will have comparable
examples.

8.2 Adding Value in Synthetic Crude Oil Production

Synthetic crude oil is the product of the Alberta oil sands industry. The Alberta oil sands, located
primarily in north eastern Alberta, comprise a vast resource of hydrocarbons. Of the 270 billion m3 (1,700
billion bbls) contained in these Cretaceous deposits, less than about 10% are within the surface-mineable
region, in the vicinity of Fort McMurray, Alberta. Estimates suggest that about 60% of the surface-mineable
deposits are recoverable with current technology. While small as a percentage of the total resource, this
nevertheless represents a huge recoverable reserve.
Commercial mining and processing of oil sands was pioneered by Suncor Ltd. (originally Great Canadian
Oil Sands). The original mining scheme required removal of overburden, followed by mining with
bucket-wheel excavation operating on a three-bench mining configuration. Suncor began operations in the
mid-1960's. Bucket-wheel excavation has now been abandoned in favour of a high capacity truck and shovel
operation.
Slightly more than a decade later, in 1977, Syncrude Canada Ltd. came on stream. At Syncrude, annual
production is currently targeted at about 14.5 million m3 (90 million bbls) of synthetic crude oil and, together
with Suncor's production, represents in excess of 20% of Canada's petroleum needs. The industry is
profitable and in the midst of aggressive expansion involving an investment of many billions of dollars.
Geotechnical engineering has contributed to the emergence of this successful industry in a number of
ways, primarily related to safe mining practice involving slope stability concerns in a complex geological
setting and to safe waste management systems involving enormous volumes of waste overburden, tailings
and water. Morgenstern, Fair and McRoberts (1988) and Morgenstern (1996) provide technical details.
Reference to the Syncrude Canada operation provides some insight into the geotechnical contributions.
This mine presently moves about 1,000,000 tonnes of material per day. The geology is complex and
includes a large number of geotechnically challenging materials. The clay shale overburden has numerous
weak presheared layers which cause foundation and slope instabilities. The oil sands straddle the boundary
between hard soils and weak rocks, and contain many weak dipping clay layers that govern geotechnical
performance. Some of the largest structures in the world have been created in order to store the tailings.
Multiple mining and tailings management methods are used in an environment of continuous improvement.
 McKenna (1998) recently reviewed the role of Syncrude's Geotechnical Review Board and summarized
many of the geotechnical issues confronted by Syncrude and their consultants. The list illuminates the role
of geotechnical engineering in this industry. It includes the following:

• dam construction on muskeg foundation

• spillway design and maintenance on weak valley slopes
• heavy foundation on gassy and temperature-sensitive soils
• coring and testing of gassy/expansive oil sands
• haul roads and trafficability for large mining equipment on oil sands
• depressurization of gassy watersand aquifers
• failure of starter dykes and movement of tailings dykes on clay shale foundations
• highwall design utilizing locked sands
• winter construction of large fluid retaining embankments
• design of landfills and sewage treatment plants
• frost effects on foundations and stockpiles
• short and long-term excavations into clay shale slopes
• cold-weather construction of tailings storage
• blockslides along inclined clay layers
• progressive failure in sands and clays
• empirical highwall monitoring for draglines
• highwall failures due to gas-exsolution and bulging
• pit floor heave
• concerns of static liquefaction of loose tailings sands
• use of lean oil sand as a construction material
• ore stockpile failures on weak clay layers
• characterization and management of fluid fine tailings
• failure of in-pit dumps due to collapse of clay shale fills
• movement and failure of out-of-pit dumps on clay shale
• long-term physical stability of reclaimed landscape

The successful application of geotechnical engineering to the oil sands industry has relied on a number
of contributions including: 1) basic property studies, 2) advanced analytical studies, 3) geophysics, 4)
instrumentation. But above all, there has been an intimate interaction between the analysis of the geological
environment and geotechnical behaviour, with on-going application of the observational method.
Value has been added not by the separate application of soil mechanics or rock mechanics or
engineering geology but by their integration, needed to bring a comprehensive geotechnical perspective to
problem-solving.

8.3 8.3 Adding Value by Saving Lives

On 25 August, 1976, soon after 10:00 a.m., the fill slope immediately behind Block 9 of the Sau Mau
Ping Estate in Hong Kong failed. The resulting mud avalanche buried the ground floor of the block killing
eighteen people. This disaster had wider implications because 71 persons were killed in a slope failure, also
in fill and also at Sau Mau Ping in 1972. The Final Report of the Commission of Inquiry concluded, with
regard to the 1972 failure, that no fault was found "with the manner in which the design and construction of
the embankment was carried out". Since the 1976 failure made this conclusion suspect, the Government of
Hong Kong appointed an Independent Review Panel on Fill Slopes to advise on the cause and implications
of the 1976 Sau Mau Ping failure. In retrospect, this proved to be a major turning point in the evolution of
geotechnical engineering in Hong Kong.
The Panel was tasked to report on the following:
a) the cause of the recent failure
b) assessment of risk of further failure on the recently failed slopes and in other fill slopes which may
affect public housing estates
 c) feasibility of temporary and permanent remedial works for the recently-failed slopes
d) assessment of risk of failure in fill slopes elsewhere taking account of past design and construction
practice in Hong Kong
e) recommendation on design of future fill slopes.

The Panel, with the assistance of others, recognized that the 1976 slope failure was the result of
infiltration during intense rainfall in end-tipped loose fill, followed by loss of strength and consequent
conversion of the upper few metres of the fill into a destructive mud avalanche. Loose fill was found in
many other slopes in Hong Kong, and a program of re-compaction of the surface layer of fills was
recommended. Improved specifications were to be adopted for the design and construction of future fill
slopes. Finally, the Panel recommended "that a control organization be established within the Government
to provide continuity throughout the whole process of investigations, design, construction, monitoring and
maintenance of slopes in Hong Kong".
The Government of Hong Kong accepted the recommendations. Compaction of old fill slopes has been
an on-going remediation programme. A recent review by the Hong Kong Geotechnical Engineering Office
has confirmed its effectiveness while observing that other methods of mitigation may be attractive under
special circumstances.
The Government also established the Geotechnical Control Office (GCO) which later became the
Geotechnical Engineering Office (GEO). This organization has generally worked under the remit suggested
by the Review Panel, but at a scale much greater than originally envisaged. Under the leadership of a series
of distinguished Directors, it has grown to be an internationally recognized centre of excellence.
The Mission Statement of the GEO is as follows:

"We will meet Hong Kong's needs for the highest standard of slope safety and engineering
development through:

• excellence in geotechnical practice

• partnership with the community and the profession
• the dedicated teamwork of all of our staff".

The basic mandate of GEO resides in enhancing public safety. This is recognized in Government policy
statements that sets out targets for overall landslide risk reduction. Current policy estimates that by 2010 the
overall landslide risk associated with man-made slopes will be below 25% of the level in 1977.
Hong Kong has a population of some 7 million within a land area of only 1,097 square kilometers. The
terrain is hilly, with steep slopes, mantled by residual soils. The rainfall averages 2.225 m annually and
more than 80% of this falls during the period May to September. Intensities can be high, with 50 mm/hour
and 200 mm in 24 hours being not uncommon. Landslides are frequent during or immediately after periods
of intense rainfall.
Figure 5 (Chan, 2000) summarizes data on known landslip fatalities in Hong Kong. Notwithstanding the
extraordinary growth in Hong Kong since 1976, the improved record is indisputable. Not only has public
safety been improved by the slope management team, but property values have also been enhanced, although
data in this regard is not readily available.
There is an extensive technical literature describing ground characteristics and geotechnical evaluation
applied to slope engineering in Hong Kong (e.g., Brand, 1985; Li, Kay and Ho, 1998). There is no need to
repeat any of this material here. Instead, the following summarizes some of the main concepts, integrated
over the years, that underpin the slope management system in Hong Kong.
At the outset, GEO began the creation of a slope catalogue. Airphoto interpretation was employed and
has remained a dominant technique in catalogue development. Site inspections assisted the establishment of
priorities for slope up-grading. Relative risk considerations were applied early in the development of the
up-grading priorities. Studies into rainfall-landslide correlations formed the basis of a landslide warning
system and the beginning of a substantial effect on rainfall monitoring. This was a major advance in risk
communication. It is one thing to discuss warning systems theoretically; it is another to implement them
successfully with the general public.
 160

140 Open Spaces

Roads
No. of Fatalities each year

120
Squatter Areas
100
Buildings

80

60

40

20

0
1949 1953 1957 1961 1965 1969 1973 1977 1981 1985 1989 1993 1997

Figure 5. Known Landslip Fatalities in Hong Kong (Chan, 2000)

Through the early 1980's, GEO sponsored a number of terrain evaluation studies integrating terrain
analysis, engineering geological assessment and geotechnical evaluation as background for land use
considerations. Early programs were also directed at improved understanding of unsaturated soil behaviour
in both the laboratories and the field. The significance of relict joints and clay seams were detected, blurring
the boundaries between soil and rock mechanics. The Mid-levels Study of 1982, a major study influencing
development in an important part of Hong Kong, shows clearly that geology, geomorphology, hydrogeology
and geotechnical characterization were being integrated, at least at the level of major studies.
As illustrated by Figure 5, a large number of fatalities were due to slope stability problems in areas of
illegal squatters. The hazard had been recognized earlier, but there had been administrative reluctance to
face up to the issue of forced re-settlement. Enhancing public safety is not achieved by technical
considerations alone. After 1982, there was increased efforts to remove illegal squatters from dangerous
areas.
Through much of the 1980's the emphasis at GEO was on engineering and regulations. Figure 5
illustrates that following 1982 there were few, if any, events to elicit public concern. In retrospect, this may
have coincided with a period of below-average rainfall.
In 1992 a fatal landslide occurred at Baguio Villas that was attributed to lack of maintenance of drainage
systems. This created a heightened awareness of the need to give guidance on and promote slope
maintenance as an integral part of the slope safety system.
Heavy rain in 1993 created a number of debris flows in Lantau Island highlighting the need to devote
more resources to natural slope hazards. Risk analysis considerations began to be explored.
The Kwun Lung Lau landslide in 1994 resulted in five fatalities and more injuries. This landslide
provoked considerable public concern in Hong Kong and resulted in technical detailed inquiries by the GEO
(Hong Kong Government, 1994; Morgenstern, 1994). The Kwun Lung Lau landslide involved a slope and
retaining wall that had been catalogued, a configuration that had been subjected to a preliminary study and
assessed as adequate, a site that had been inspected periodically by qualified consultants, even shortly before
the unfortunate occurrence and had occurred when the landslide warning was in effect. Hence questions
were raised with regard to the effectiveness of the whole risk management system. Detailed studies revealed
that the landslide occurred as a result of sub-surface infiltration from defective buried drainage systems.
Inaccurate historical documents describing the retaining wall at the site were misleading and likely resulted
in inadequate appreciation of the potential risk at this site. Human uncertainty dominated the failure as
opposed to more traditional geotechnical consideration Hong Kong has implemented programs to avoid these
specific causes in the future.
GEO is charged with up-grading many existing man-made slopes over the next decade while encouraging
measures to enhance stability of existing slopes. This has required a considerable investment into
information technology (slope information systems), enhanced design and construction productivity, use of
risk analysis and increased emphasis on community preparedness and response. There is also increased
public pressure to enhance aesthetics of slopes. The move to "social engineering" is particularly illustrative
of the range of activities required to develop an effective slope safety system. Details are given by Yim, Lau
and Massey (1999).
Table 1 (Malone, 1998) summarizes the components of the Hong Kong slope safety system. Are they soil
mechanics or rock mechanics or engineering geology? They are all and more. GEO adds value in meeting
its objectives, consistent with its mission statement, by integrating all aspects of geotechnical engineering
together with additional non-technical tools required for effective risk management in a public setting.

Table 1. The slope safety system (Malone, 1998)

Contribution by Each Component

Slope Safety System Components To Reduce Landslip Risk To Address

Public Attitudes
Hazard Vulnerability

Policing
Cataloguing, safety screening, and statutory √
repair orders for slopes
Checking new works √ √
Maintenance audit √
Inspecting squatter areas and recommending √
safety clearance
Input to land use planning √ √

Safety standards and research √ √ √

Specialist works projects

Upgrading old Government slopes √
Preventive works for old tunnels √

Education and Information

Maintenance campaign √ √
Personal precautions campaign √ √
Awareness Programme √ √ √
Information Services √ √ √
Landslip Warning and emergency services √ √ √
8.4 Adding Value in Hydro-electric Production
The Sainte-Marguerite-3 (SM3) hydroelectric project, currently under construction, is located 90 km
north west of Sept-Isles, in the north-eastern part of the Province of Québec. The site develops a total head
of 330 m over the eight km separating the powerhouse from the reservoir. The development involves
construction of the following works:
• a 171 m high earth and rock fill dam that required construction of a 978 m long diversion
tunnel and the construction of a 20 m high upstream cofferdam.
• an 8 km headrace tunnel
• a three unit underground powerhouse with an installed 2 unit capacity of 882 MW
• a three gate spillway
The main civil works are essentially complete and the power station is expected to come into service in
2001. Impounding began in 1998. A number of technical papers have been published (Rattue et al., 2000;
de Courval et al., 1998).
The region in which the SM-3 project is situated is generally rugged terrain with narrow valleys. It forms
part of the Canadian Shield. The rock is primarily gneisses, intruded locally by anorthosite, granite and
pegmatite. The majority of the works at SM3 are in an anorthosite batholith, a high quality rock. Seismicity
is only moderate. The dam site is characterized by a narrow, steep-sided valley. Bedrock outcrops
principally at the cliffs at the top of the left abutment and sporadically on the right abutment.
Site investigation was undertaken over several years, involving seismic refraction surveys, overburden
and bedrock drilling, terrain analysis and geological synthesis. Major features identified by the investigation
program were the deep alluvial deposits in the river and the generally steep form of the bedrock at the
abutments beneath the talus.
In order to accommodate the optimal location of the dam, it was necessary to construct a 20 m high
upstream cofferdam in the v-shaped canyon filled with 20 m of loose sand underlain by 40 m of coarse
alluvium. Seepage calculations indicated the need for a positive cutoff wall. The wall was formed by a
primary row of columns through both formations and a secondary row of columns through the coarse
alluvium. The cutoff wall reached a maximum depth of 65 m, a world record, and performed well under a
head of over 40 m. Elsewhere beneath the cofferdam blast densification of the sand was utilized to enhance
stability.
The dam is a central earth core rock-fill structure with external slopes of 1.75:1 upstream and 1.65:1
downstream. Due to the steep valley slopes and roughness of the rock profile, foundation preparation and
grouting were challenging.
The materials for the dam incorporate till for the core, natural sand filters obtained from the foundation
sand excavation and crushed rock for the transitions and shells. All are within precedent at Hydro-Québec.
Instrumentation has been installed both for routine monitoring and to observe special features such as the
downstream crowding of equipotential lines, observed in a number of dams all over the world. Advanced
analyses were used to assist in the decision to incorporate a large slide mass in the downstream shell of the
dam.
Rock conditions for the underground works were generally excellent. In-situ stress measurements, stress
analysis, rock reinforcement, geological mapping and rock monitoring were all incorporated in the design
and construction of the underground works. It should be noted that the headrace tunnel and approach to the
underground powerhouse are unlined and will operate under a peak pressure of 3-6 Mpa which stretches
experience in Canada.
While details at SM-3 are unique, it is characteristic of many large hydroelectric projects in illustrating
the value added by geotechnical engineering. Many decisions are taken both during design and construction
that involve risk. While specialist skills are important inputs, the geotechnical contribution to risk
management requires an integration and overview in order to be constructive.

8.5 Commentary
The examples presented here illustrate that geotechnical engineering goes beyond its building blocks,
illustrated in Figure 1, in order to add value. The extra value arises from the synergy associated with
understanding earth materials and earth processes regardless of consistency and origin. This maybe
self-evident to many, but it is not reflected adequately in most academic programs and the structure of many
industrial and research organizations. Perhaps most important of all, it is not reflected in the organizational
structure that our profession presents to the rest of the scientific and technological world.

9.0 TOWARD AN INTERNATIONAL GEOTECHNICAL UNION

Geotechnical engineering has much to contribute to both current and future industrial and environmental
needs, particularly within a context of sustainable development. The strength of geotechnical engineering
resides in its integrated and holistic approach to the engineering of earth materials and processes in the face
of considerable uncertainty. Experience has led to comprehensive risk management procedures and they
continue to evolve. Geotechnical engineering is synergistic in that the whole is greater than the sum of its
parts.
The capabilities of geotechnical engineering will be under-utilized, under-valued and under-rewarded
unless an organizational structure emerges to promote the integrated prespective espoused here. The current
structure of separate societies, (ISSMGE, ISRM, IAEG) is incapable of assuming this role. They have their
own mandates and are fully occupied in fulfilling them. Nevertheless the existing societies would have
supporting roles in any new organization.
This inquiry into "Common Ground" leads me to the conclusion that a new organization is needed, an
International Geotechnical Union (IGU). An international union is not only a union of other international
societies, but also a union of nation societies or committees. In many countries a single geotechnical society
already exists and for the IGU to be formed merely requires agreement of these national societies. Where no
single representing body exists, an effort would have to be made to form one. The existing international
associations would act as affiliated or supporting organizations. IAEG, ISRM and ISSMGE are already
affiliated with the IUGS.
The International Union of Geodesy and Geophysics (IUGG) or the International Union of Geological
Sciences (IUGS) present equivalent models. At the IUGG 22nd General Assembly in 1999 there were Union
lectures and Union Symposia, Inter-Association Symposia and Workshops and Association Sessions. Seven
International Associations affiliate with IUGG such as the International Association of Hydrological
Sciences (IAHS) and the International Association of Seismology and Physics of the Earth's Interior
(IASPEI).
The IGU would promote the integrated perspective of geotechnical engineering in education, research,
and practice. Participation in the International Council for Science (ICSU) may be of value.
Building on the success of Geo Eng 2000, the proposed Union would convene Geo Eng 2004.

To form the IGU, the following will be necessary:

1) national societies should study the concept and support the formation of the Union
2) international societies should agree to support the Union and affiliate with it
3) a national society should propose the hosting and organization of Geo Eng 2004
4) the formal creation of the IGU should take place at Geo Eng 2004.

10.0 CONCLUSIONS

Geotechnical Engineering has a proud record of application of the sciences of soil mechanics, rock
mechanics, engineering geology and other related disciplines to the resolution of numerous development and
environmental problems. Value-added contributions arise more from the integrated perspective of
geotechnical engineering than from one of its specialized components alone. A new organizational structure
is needed to promote this perspective. The formation of the International Geotechnical Union is proposed to
meet this objective.

11.0 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I appreciate the stimulating discussions with David Cruden on several of the themes within this
presentation.
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