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Module 5: Responsibility

Learning Outcomes

At the end of this module, the students should be able to:

1. Define the levels of Intention;

2. Determine the modifiers of Responsibility
3. Apply the principles of double effect/indirect voluntary

This module discusses the Levels of Intention, Levels of Willing and Not Willing, Modifiers
of Responsibility, Ignorance, Intellectual fear, Force, Habit and Fear

PROBLEM

From the acts humans perform we have separated out those over which a person has
control or mastery. We have fixed the point of control in the consent of the will, prepared
for by the deliberation of the intellect on the basis of the value perceived. If the consent can
be given to any available alternative, the individual person is the cause of his or her own
choice and is therefore responsible for the act chosen. The only reason why this act was
done rather than not done or why this act was done rather than some other possible act is
that the person, by a personal choice under the guiding light of his or her own intellect,
made the act to be. The act is that per: son's own act precisely because and insofar as that
person did it

Is a person equally responsible for all the acts over which he or she has control, that is to
say, for all his or her human acts? Not all knowledge is equally clear, nor does the will
always consent with total decisiveness. In addition, what proceeds from the will may be
closely or remotely connected with the willed act itself and may share in its voluntariness
in varying degrees. We must now examine the factors that enhance or limit a person's
responsibility by increasing or diminishing his or her control, making the act more or less
human, more or less than persons. The following questions will guide us in understanding
these factors:

1. What are the main kinds of voluntariness?

2. What precludes or weakens our responsibility?
3. Are unwanted but foreseen consequences voluntary?
4. When may one permit foreseen evil con sequences?
5. Must we avoid contributing to others' moral harm?
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LEVELS OF WILLING AND NOT WILLING

There is a difference between not willing to do something and willing not to do something
in the first case there is no act of the will and therefore no voluntariness. In the second case
there is an act of the will, an act of deliberate omission or refusal, and this is quite
voluntary. Hence voluntariness can be positive or negative, according as we will to do
something or to omit something, and both of these kinds of voluntariness are different
from a state of non- voluntariness, which is an alliance of willing. Some writers reserve the
word involuntary for what happens against our will and use non voluntary for what we
have no attitude toward, but this usage is not consistently observed.

The state of not willing is often psychologically impossible to maintain. We do not will so
long as the doing of an act does not even cross our mind. Once we think of it, and especially
after we have reflected on it and deliberated about it, we must do one of two things: either
take it or leave it, either will to do it or will not to do it. One course is as volunteer as the
other. Thus negative voluntariness is not the same as no voluntariness, much as a negative
number is not the same as zero.

For my act to be voluntary I must will it knowingly. But must my mind be focused on the
act at the very moment I am doing it? Can I be responsible for an act done in a state of
complete distraction? For any responsibility to remain, must a previous decision to act still
influence my behaviour, or may it have entirely ceased its influence? Can I be responsible
for something that I never did will but presumably would have willed if I ever thought of
it?

To answer such questions it is customary to distinguish four levels of intention with which
an act is performed, representing a progressive diminution of voluntariness.

1. An actual or active intention is one that a person is conscious of at the moment he or

she performs the intended action. The person pays attention not merely to what he or she
is doing but also to the fact of here and now willing it.

2. A virtual intention is one that was once made and continues to influence the act now
being done, but it is not present in the person's consciousness at the moment of
performing the act. Thus a woman walks to a definite destination; her intention was actual
on starting out but soon becomes virtual as her mind drifts onto other subjects while she
takes the right turns and ar. rives at where she wanted to go. What she willed was the
whole series of acts that would bring her there, but she need not be thinking of her
destination every step of the way. After her first decision the subsequent acts could be
carried out while her mind is completely distracted from its original purpose.

3. An unrevoked intention is one that was once made and not retracted, but it does not
influence the performance of the act intended at present. For example, a man fully resolves
to kill his enemy but is prevented by circumstances from carrying out his intent, though he
never revokes it; later, while hunting, he shoots at what he thinks is an animal but finds
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that he has accidentally shot his enemy. He is responsible for intending to kill an animal,
not for killing his enemy. In this instance he had no intention of killing his enemy

4. An interpretative or presumed intention is one that has not been made but
presumably would have been made if the person were aware of the circumstances. If, for
example, the literal application of a law would cause more harm than good, one might
interpret the intention of the lawgiver and relax the law in this particular case. For an act
to be voluntary an actual intention is not necessary; a virtual intention suffices. The
unrevoked and interpretative intentions have much less importance. They indicate that the
person's will (either once actually had or merely presumed) is objectively carried out, but
not by the person's own voluntary act.

MODIFIERS OF RESPONSIBILITY

Voluntariness is said to be complete or perfect if the agent has full knowledge and full
consent. It is diminished or imperfect if there is something wanting in the agent's
knowledge or consent or both, provided he or she has both in some significant degree. If
either the knowledge were wholly lacking or the consent were wholly lacking, there could
be no voluntariness at all. The question now arises: What sorts of things render
voluntariness imperfect, reducing the specifically human character of the act and making
the agent less responsible? Since we are not interested here in the psychological strength
of the act but in the degree of the agent's self-control, we shall call them modifiers of
responsibility. There are five

Main modifiers:

1. Ignorance, affecting the knowledge

2. Strong emotion, affecting the consent of the will

3. Intellectual fear, opposing to the will a contrary wish

4. Force, actual use of physical compulsion.

5. Habit, a tendency acquired by repetition

Ignorance

We are interested in ignorance only to the degree that lack of knowledge affects the
voluntariness of a human act so as to make the act less a human act. Since voluntariness is
the measure of the degree of responsibility, the less voluntary the act, the less responsible
the agent is for that act. The only ignorance that has ethical import is ignorance an agent
ought not to have, an ignorance that ought not to exist. There are three kinds of such
ignorance:
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1. Ignorance that can be overcome by acquiring the requisite knowledge is called vincible
ignorance.

2. Ignorance that cannot be overcome because the requisite knowledge cannot be acquired
is called invincible ignorance.

3. Ignorance deliberately cultivated in order to avoid knowing what ought to be known is

called affected or studied ignorance. These three kinds of ignorance can be looked atlas
three degrees of lack of knowledge thereby affecting the agent's voluntariness and his or
her responsibility.

1. Invincible ignorance precludes responsibility. Knowledge is requisite for

voluntariness, and in the case of invincible ignorance this knowledge is simply
unobtainable. A person can be invincibly ignorant for one of two reasons: (1), being
unaware of his or her ignorance, the person does not know there is any knowledge to be
acquired or (2) being aware of his or her ignorance, the person's efforts to obtain the
knowledge are of no avail. Since in either case the knowledge is unobtainable and since no
one can be held to do the impossible, what is done in invincible ignorance is not voluntary,
and so the agent is not responsible. A woman, for example, who pays for something with
counterfeit money, not even suspecting that the money is counterfeit, does no wrong. The
act of paying is voluntary, but not her paying in counterfeit money.

2. Vincible ignorance does not preclude re responsibility, but lessens it. The person
knows that he or she is ignorant and that the knowledge is obtainable. If such a person
deliberately fails to make sufficient effort to overcome the ignorance and so allows the
ignorance to remain, the effects that follow from such ignorance are indirectly voluntary.
By willing to remain in ignorance, the person is responsible for the consequences that he
or she foresees will or may follow from that ignorance. If a surgeon, knowing that he or she
does not have sufficient knowledge for a difficult operation that can be postponed,
performs the operation anyway and the patient dies as a result, then even though the
surgeon did not want the patient to die, we must say that he or she deliberately exposed
the patient to serious and un necessary danger and is therefore responsible for the death.
Still, though the surgeon is aware of being ignorant, he or she is not sure of the effects of
such ignorance. Consequently we can say that the surgeon is less responsible than one who
would deliberately plan to kill a patient in this way.
The blameworthiness of vincible ignorance depends on the amount of effort put
forth to overcome it, and the amount of effort called for depends on the importance of the
matter and the obligation of the agent to possess such knowledge. The person who makes
a little effort, but not enough, shows some goodwill but insufficient perseverance. One may
know that the knowledge can be obtained but is too lazy or careless to search for it.
Another may doubt whether the knowledge can be obtained and, after a little effort, may
hastily but wrongly judge that the knowledge is unobtainable. Still another may make no
effort at all, either with full knowledge that the ignorance is vincible or not caring whether
it is or not.
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3. Affected ignorance in a way lessens, in a way increases, responsibility. Such ignorance

lessens responsibility, as does all lack of knowledge, since the person does not see clearly
the full import of what he or she is doing. The ignorance, deliberately cultivated, increases
the re responsibility if the person intends to use the ignorance as an excuse, for example, to
lessen the risk of punishment or to avoid having to carry out a known duty. Here the
person is not only willing the act but also willing the ignorance as a means of facilitating
the act. The increase of voluntariness and therefore of responsibility in this latter respect
is usually more important than the lessening of voluntariness in the former respect.

Strong Emotion

Emotion, if felt very strongly, may make us will something more intensely than we
otherwise would and will it with less self-control than we would have when our emotions
were more calm. Strong emotion increases the force of the willed act, but to the degree
such emotion lessens voluntariness it also lessens responsibility, and so the act is to that
degree less a human act.

Our emotions may arise quite spontaneously before the will has acted. Remember that our
emotions mix and mingle with our senses constantly. When an object is sensed, our
emotions are operating along with the senses and pick up the beauty or ugliness, for
example, in what we are sensing. We stir emotionally in the very pro cess of sensing
something and respond almost automatically with a sudden feeling of joy or dis gust. We
are simply responding with our emotions to what we have come in contact with in the
sensed object. Sudden feelings of Joy, anger, hatred, grief, shame, pity, disgust, and the like
are the emotions we are talking about. If they are very strong or violent, they can modify
the responsibility we have for what we will when we generate such strong emotions. And,
when such emotion is generated before the will can act, we call emotion of this kind
antecedent emotion.

We can also deliberately choose to generate very strong emotions, for example, by
brooding or focusing on the objects that arouse them. We can actually make ourselves
angry by rehearsing insults in our imagination or frightened by re calling the details of a
particularly frightening experience from the past. This kind of deliver lately aroused
emotion is called consequent because we generate it after and as a result of our own
choice. Antecedent emotion is involuntary, whereas consequent emotion is voluntary and
so is a human act. Antecedent emotion becomes consequent when it is recognized for what
it is and then deliberately retained or fostered.

1. Very strong or violent antecedent emotion may preclude responsibility. If the emotion is
so sudden or violent as wholly to block the use of our intelligence, it makes deliberation
impossible, and the act performed under the influence of such emotion is then neither free
nor voluntary. If the act is not voluntary at all, then the person is not responsible for the
act. Such complete loss of control happens rarely.
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2. Very strong or violent antecedent emotion usually lessens responsibility. In most cases
even when moved strongly by emotion, we remain in control of our acts. Enough
knowledge and con sent remain for the act to be both voluntary and free, and so the person
is held responsible for his or her act. Calm, intellectual deliberation becomes more difficult,
the motives on each side, cannot be weighed with careful impartiality, the will is
predisposed more strongly toward one side rather than the other, and thus the person's
freedom of action is pampered. As a consequence an act done under the influence of strong
or violent emotion, when free, is less free than one done knowingly and with no disturbing
emotions. Without calm judgment on the part of the intellect the choice of the will cannot
be as voluntary and free. Responsibility is therefore lessened to the degree that
voluntariness is lessened.

3. Strong or violent consequent emotion does no lessen responsibility but may increase it.
When the strong or violent emotion is deliberately aroused or fostered, we voluntarily put
ourselves in that emotional state. The acts we perform under the influence of such
deliberately aroused or fostered emotion are either directly voluntary or voluntary only
indirectly voluntary acts will be examined and explained later in this chapter). For
example, a person intentionally (deliberately) broods over an insult in order to work up to
an act of revenge; the person is using the emotion as a means to accomplish the goal of
revenge, and so both the emotion deliberately worked up and the revenge taken are
directly voluntary. An indirectly voluntary act, however, is quite different. Take a man, for
example, who does not want to kill but foresees that his continual brooding over supposed
wrongs done to him will get himself into such a frenzy that he will very likely kill; yet he
deliberately continues to nurse his anger and, as a result, becomes in sane with rage and
kills his enemy. His emotional state is directly voluntary, for he deliberately put himself
into that very state by brooding on the supposed wrongs; his act of killing is indirectly
voluntary, because he foresaw what very likely would happen and did nothing to keep
from falling into the insane rage. He is responsible for the death of the person, and the
rage, having been deliberately fostered, increases his responsibility for the killing.
Obviously we do not mean to give emotion a bad name by what we have said above.
Our emotions are very important because they are the basic powers we have to get in
contact with what is valuable or worthwhile in ourselves and in our world. Human
consciousness is an emotional consciousness as well as being a consciousness that senses,
conceptualizes, deliberates, and wills. Reflective deliberation does not have to be emo
tionless intellect aloofly observing the whirl of our emotions, nor does it have to govern
those emotions as a tyrant who is afraid of being over thrown. Reflection is a conscious act
that we as persons perform. Our emotions are intimately involved in the reflection along
with the intellect. Our intellectual powers share in the activity of our emotions, which
constitute the importances (values) in our lives, by giving our emotions ad vice and
direction that they often would not have on their own just because of their immediacy and
impatience. Since whatever emotions we do have are our emotions, we must acknowledge
them as ours and take responsibility for the way we choose to integrate them into our self-
image and attitude toward the world, ourselves, and other persons.
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Fear

Fear is the emotion that apprehends impending evil and manifests itself in the desire to
get away, avoid, or escape as far as possible from the impending threat. The aim of fear is
to protect the self from the anticipated evil. We can also have an intellectual fear,
comprising an understanding of a threatened evil and a movement of the will to avoid this
evil by rationally devised means. This intellectual kind of fear may have no easily
discernible emotional component. Someone may coldly decide to steal, for example,
because of fear of living in poverty, to lie because of being afraid to be disgraced, to murder
because of fear of being blackmailed. This kind of fear deserves attention as a separate
modifier of responsibility.
To estimate its effect on responsibility, we must consider intellectual fear relatively
to the person and his or her circumstances. What would produce a slight fear in one person
may produce grave fear in another; some people are naturally cautious, whereas others
are bold; some have little aversion to a condition that others would find intolerable. A
lesser evil threatening us now may produce more fear than a greater evil still far off.

What we are calling intellectual fear is a modifier of responsibility only when we act
from fear as a motive for acting and not merely with fear as an accompaniment of our act.
A soldier deserting his post in battle because of cowardice is motivated by fear and acts
from fear; if he stays this post despite the danger, he may have just as much fear, but even
though he acts with fear, he does not let that fear influence his conduct.

1. Intellectual fear does not preclude responsibility. This kind of fear does not produce
panic and loss of self-control. The person calmly looks about for an escape from the
threatening evil and makes a deliberate choice. He or she could choose to face the evil but
chooses instead to yield to the fear rather than resist it and therefore wills what he or she
does. Fear of this sort thus does not necessarily preclude responsibility.

2. Intellectual fear lessens responsibility. An act motivated by intellectual fear is one that
we deliberately will; however, we would not will it except for the fear we experience. This
reluctance weakens the consent of the will, leaving us with a divided mind and a hankering
after alternatives the situation does not have. This reluctance and hankering lessen our
self-control. If my choice is clear-cut and straightforward so that I act without regret or
reluctance, my act is voluntary and I am responsible. But when I act regretfully and
reluctantly, when I choose something I would rather not be obliged to do, there is a
conflict, so to speak, between my will and my wish. My will is what I deliberately choose;
my wish is what I would like if circumstances permitted. A time-honored example is that of
the sea captain who throws his cargo overboard to save his ship in a storm. The act
contains both a voluntary and an involuntary aspect: voluntary in the sense that he
jettisons his cargo deliberately and intentionally with sufficient knowledge and consent,
for he could refuse to do so and try to weather the storm or even let the ship sink;
involuntary in the sense that he would rather not have to this and, if there were no storm,
certainly would not do it. He wills to jettison his cargo, wishing that he did not need to do
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so. Despite the contrary wish the captain is held responsible for this act of jettisoning the
cargo but not as responsible as he would be were there no contrary wish present.
Acts done under duress and intimidation have what we are calling intellectual fear as a
motive. These acts are extorted under threat of evil to be inflicted by another human will.
Unless the person becomes so upset as to become temporarily unable to control his or her
acts, acts done under duress and intimidation are responsible acts, for the person could
have refused and taken the consequences. Contracts unjustly extorted through fear can be
nullified by positive law, not because the parties are never responsible but because the
common good requires that extortion be made unprofitable. These points can be looked at
more carefully if we examine the relation of force to responsibility.

Force

Force, violence, or compulsion is physical power used to make someone do something

against his or her will. In common language, one who yields to a threat of violence is said
to be forced, yet this is not really force but fear, and the person's voluntariness and
therefore responsibility is to be judged by the criteria for fear. Now we must consider force
in its strictest sense as not merely a threat but as the actual use of physical might If I hand
over my money to a thug because he thrusts a gun at me, that is fear; if he physically
overpowers me and rifles my pockets, that is force.

Force in this physical sense cannot reach the will directly, for physical action cannot touch
the act of the will. We can continue to will the op positive, no matter how violently we are
forced to do the act. Hence the act we are forced to do is involuntary, so long as we do not
will it. Someone may have the physical strength to make us do something, but he cannot
make us will it.
The act a violent aggressor is trying to make us do may or may not be evil in itself. If
it is not, we may yield to it and comply with the aggressor's demands; our rights are
outraged and injustice is done against us, but we ourselves are not doing wrong, only
saving ourselves further harm. One who is kidnapped, for example, need not struggle (and
this is true of acting from fear as well as force), for there is no moral wrong in merely going
off to another place. But in a case such as rape, where consent would involve moral wrong,
resistance is required.
What counts as resistance and how much is required? At least internal resistance,
withholding the consent of the will, and passive external resistance, non-cooperation with
the aggressor, is required. Active external resistance, consisting in positively fighting the
aggressor, is also necessary when without it the withholding of consent world be too
difficult to maintain. This is not required when it would be useless or when there is no
danger of consent

The victim of force has no responsibility if he or she does not consent. If the victim
consents reluctantly, he or she has reduced responsibility because of the contrary wish. If a
person actually wants to do what he or she is being forced to do and, for example, pretends
to resist, he or she is not truly a victim of force and has complete responsibility, or if he or
she would not have done the act without being forced, nearly complete responsibility.
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Habit

The nature and kinds of habit will be discussed later in the chapter on habit; here we are
interested only in the way habit may affect our responsibility for an act. For our present
purpose we may define a habit as a constant way of acting acquired by repetition of the
same act. When a habit has been acquired, the actions follow from it spontaneously, almost
automatically, so that de liberate guidance becomes unnecessary and, in a sense, even
difficult.

1. We may set out deliberately to acquire a habit, as when we try to learn how to play a
game or how to pick pockets. Then the habit is directly voluntary, and the acts resulting
from it are either directly voluntary if performed with the intention of acquiring the habit
or at least indirectly voluntary if they are the unintended but foreseen consequences of the
habit. We are completely responsible for the habit and the acts resulting from it

2. We may not intend to acquire a habit for its own sake but voluntarily perform acts that
we know are habit forming, as when a person takes up smoking or drugs. Here the acts
done are directly voluntary, and the forming of the habit is indirectly voluntary, since we
know that we cannot do habit-forming acts without getting the habit. After the habit has
been acquired, acts unintentionally following from it are also indirectly voluntary. We are
completely responsible for the habit and the acts resulting from it.

3. We may discover that we have unintentional ally acquired a habit, either because we did
not realize that we had done the same thing in the same way so often, or because it did not
occur to us that such actions were habit-forming. Most of our habits of speech and gesture
are of this type. In this case we are not responsible for the existence of the habit or for the
acts that unintentionally follow from it, so long as we remain ignorant that we have the
habit. A rather gross lack of reflectiveness may cause this condition to remain about a great
many patterns of action even over a long time

In whatever way we may have acquired the habit, as soon as we fully recognize that we
have it, we face the choice of either keeping the habit or trying to get rid of it. In either case
a new act of the will is called for; the act of getting a habit and the act of keeping it are two
distinct acts, and each may be voluntary.

If we decide to let the habit remain, our possession of the habit now becomes directly vol
unitary, and the acts that unintentionally follow from the habit are indirectly voluntary.
The habit, however acquired, is now deliberately kept, and we are completely responsible
both for the habit itself and for its effects.

If we decide to get rid of the habit, we are now the victim of two opposite pulls, the
voluntary decision of our will to suppress or get rid of the habit and the involuntary
persistence of the habit itself. Long-standing habits of some types are not overcome in a
day or by a few days' effort and when our vigilance is relaxed, will inadvertently reappear
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in the corresponding act. Success in this struggle is bought only by constant watchfulness
and effort. If we let down our guard, we shall soon find ourselves drifting back to the old
familiar way. Our responsibility for these particular acts depends on the amount of
advertence at the moment when the act is performed and also on the amount of effort
expended to get rid of the habit. Here, just as in the dispelling of vincible ignorance, we are
obliged to put in an amount of effort proportional to importance of the matter. Depending
on these factors and on our sincerity in the particular instance, we may have complete
responsibility for acts done from habit, or only some, or even none at all.

Additional Modifiers

To these five modifiers of responsibility it is possible to add others, such as sleeping,

sickness, pain, alcohol, drugs, and other conditions that reduce awareness and self-control.
They are very important, but since they produce their effect on voluntariness by involving
one or more of the five modifiers already discussed, no new principles need be added to
those explained above.

Abnormal mental states will, of course, seriously affect the capacity of a person to perform
human acts. The lighter neuroses will probably only lessen voluntariness, whereas the
deeper psychoses may preclude it entirely. The mentally disturbed may have complete
self-control at times or along certain lines and little or none at other times or in other
forms of behavior. A klepto maniac may be a very rational person except when under the
spell of this particular compulsion; these acts are involuntary but not the other acts the
person performs. Each case is different and must be judged by itself. In order to make a
judgment in a particular case we have to know how the individual abnormal state affects
voluntariness, because the degree of voluntariness is the measure of the degree of
responsibility.

The same principles seem applicable also to the refined methods of physical, mental, and
social torture used for political purposes, beginning with "brainwashing" and aiming at
total "thought control." It is said that in such a long, drawn-out process everyone has his or
her breaking point. If so, the victim has full responsibility at the start, suffers a gradual
diminution of it as the inhuman routine continues, and after the breaking point, if there
really is one, the victim ceases to be a responsible person. A person need not be reduced to
insanity, It is sufficient that one cannot control one's moral judgments or the actions
resulting from them. Whether any moral responsibility is left only the victim really knows,
though a psychologist might be able to make a good inference.

Nothing has been said about the unconscious, about the drives, complexes, and
motivations sunk beneath the threshold of our awareness, which are such powerful
influences affecting our behavior. They are indeed of the greatest importance in the
development of our personality and have much to do with our ethical life, especially with
our moral principles and attitudes. They may explain why some have such a keen, and
others such a blunted, sense of moral values. Since such urges are unconscious, however,
they exist in us involuntarily and do not make the act human by what they contribute. They
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are much like habits inadvertently developed. We cannot be responsible for them until we
recognize them, and by that time they have been dredged up from the unconscious to a
condition of conscious awareness. Then we are faced with the problem of what we shall
choose to do about them. They may supply the real motivation of acts that we attribute to
other motives, but since at the time we choose the act as we see it, we are responsible for
the act as seen and chosen, and not in terms of the hidden motives from which it may
actually stem.

Neither Freud nor the psychoanalytic movement has strengthened the force of traditional
morality. By showing the weakness of conscious ness before the unconscious, the
psychoanalytic movement has left is less able to believe in our moral freedom. We find
ourselves perhaps talking more in terms of neuroses and complexes than in terms of
virtues and vices. But we still go about our everyday lives guided by moral will, and we
make judgments in its terms. We do distinguish among people we know in terms of their
virtues and vices; for example, we speak of the almost scrupulous honesty of one, of
another as well nigh incapable of telling the truth, and of another as being the very
embodiment of kindness and understanding. And we deal with people in these terms. We
forgive people for occasional failings, but almost never do we find ourselves excusing them
because they are neurotic about something or have such and such a complex over which
they have no control. If we do discover some neurosis or complex in ourselves, we have
become conscious of it and can begin to understand how it affects our behavior. The point
is that the neurosis or complex is no longer unconscious but is now a part of our conscious
awareness. Now we are responsible for what we do about it, for how we integrate it into
our lives, for the impact we let it have on our behavior. As long as we do not know
something, we cannot be responsible in regard to it.
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Module 6: Indirect Voluntary

Learning Outcomes

At the end of this module, the students should be able to:

1. Define the principle of Double Effect;

2. Determine the Additional Modifiers of Responsibility
3. Apply the principles of double effect/indirect voluntary

This module discusses the principle of double effect, the occasion of evil, the cooperation
of evil and additional modifiers of responsibility

INDIRECT VOLUNTARY

There is a difference between the way in which the act itself is voluntary and the way in
which its consequences are voluntary. Something is directly voluntary when it is the thing
willed, whether it be willed as an end or as means to an end. Something is indirectly
voluntary when it is the unintended but foreseen consequence of something else that is
directly voluntary; the agent does not will this consequence either as end or as means but
sees that he cannot get something else without getting it. The agent wills the cause of which
this is a necessary effect. Thus one who throws a bomb at a king to assassinate him,
knowing that he will kill the king's attend ants also, directly wills the throwing of the bomb
(as means), also directly wills the death of the king (as end), and indirectly wills the death
of the attendants (as consequence) though their death gives him no profit. A consequence,
however, that is neither intended nor foreseen is involuntary, such as the death of one who
unexpectedly rushes up to the king after the bomb has left the thrower's hand.

Note that what we are concerned with here are physical actions that we directly will to do
and that have physical consequences or effects that we do not directly will but foresee and
accept or permit because of the physical effect we want to achieve with our action. Now
there seems to be some significant difference between a per son's directly intending
something and that per son's foreseeing and accepting something else that will happen
along with the effect directly willed. In our example we have been dealing with several
physical evils that result from the assassin's physical action. Of these we must say that as a
killer he is more willing to have the king die than he is to have the attendants die and even
less willing to have innocent bystanders die. Note further that insofar as there is moral evil
in the situation, the moral evil lies in the assassin's will, for he intends (directly wills) to kill
the king, foresees and accepts the deaths of the attendants (indirectly wills these deaths),
and accepts, though he does not necessarily foresee, the deaths of possible innocent
bystanders (indirectly wills these deaths)
2

Having examined the voluntariness of the assassin's action with regard to the deaths of the
king, the attendants, and the possible innocent bystanders, we are now in a position to
assess his responsibility for these various deaths. Note once again that the voluntariness of
one's action is the measure of the degree of responsibility that the person has for that
action. The distinction between the directly and the indirectly voluntary acts helps us to
articulate what is happening psychologically, namely, that the assassin by his act directly
intends the death of the king and is willing to accept the foreseen deaths of the attendants
and possibly those of innocent bystanders. All the other deaths apart from the king's are
indirectly willed and so are indirectly voluntary, and these deaths are willingly accepted
precisely because the death of the king is sufficiently important to the assassin to justify, in
his own mind, his acceptance. The assassin must be assigned complete responsibility for
the king's death, but how much responsibility does he have for all the other deaths? Even if
he is reluctant to accept the other deaths, must he accept complete responsibility for them?
He is completely responsible because he is perfectly willing to accept any other deaths as
long as he succeeds in killing the king. Those deaths may be an unfortunate side effect of
the killing of the king, but his foreseeing them was not sufficient to deter him from killing
the king and so he has complete responsibility for them.

Good or indifferent actions also may have evil physical consequences that can be foreseen.
How responsible are we for these physical evils? Must we always refuse to do a good act if
we foresee that it will or can have some physical evil as one of its effects? While we have
not yet established the existence or nature of moral good and evil, much less separated out
the particular factors from which these moral qualities arise, for our present purpose we
can take them on the common sense level on which we began our study: that humans judge
some actions to be good, others bad (evil), and still others indifferent. Our business here is
to determine how responsible one is for the physical consequences of one's actions,
whatever their moral quality, and our examples are mere common sense illustrations.

If we were obliged to avoid every action that will result in physical evil, life in this world
would soon become unlivable, impossible to bear Human beings are limited beings,
Physical evil at tends our life in this world. True, some of it merely happens to us as when
we are beset with violent disruptions of nature such as hurricanes, earthquakes, floods, and
the like, but some are also caused by us. The human situation is such that it gives rise to
value conflicts and to particular situations in which we have to act to achieve some
important good but in so doing we bring about some sort of evil as well. Our situation is
also permeated with human limitations that are not mercy physical but psychological,
sociological, pedagogical, and aesthetic as well. In addition, most situations are very
complex. Nevertheless we must try to do the right thing in spite of the complexities. One
who accepts a job when jobs are scarce cuts someone else out of a livelihood; a doctor who
tends the sick during a plague exposes himself to catching the disease; a lawyer who must
present this bit of evidence to win her case may put an Innocent person under suspicion; or
a teacher who gives a competent examination knows that some will probably fail. The
world in which we live is a mixture of good and evil that affects each of us as we try to live
an upright moral life. We seem to be caught on the horns of a dilemma: either human life
cannot be lived as it actually is, or we are compelled to do evil and to do it voluntarily.
3

There is a solution to the dilemma in the principle of the indirect voluntary, commonly
known as the principle of the double effect. This principle has a long history and helps
resolve some of the moral complexity of our lives. The first part of this principle is that no
evil must ever be willed simply for its own sake either as end (goal) or as means, for if the
evil were willed in either of these ways, it would be the direct object in tended by our
willing and would necessarily render our entire action evil, even if there were good,
morally correct consequences that flow from the act. Briefly stated, evil must never be
directly willed, for such an act is directly voluntary. The second part of the principle is that
evil may be willed indirectly, that is to say, as a foreseen but unwanted consequence, such
an act is indirectly voluntary and may be willed only if it can somehow be reduced to an
incidental and unavoidable by-product or side effect in the achievement of some good the
person is rightly seeking.

Though I am never allowed to will evil directly, I am not always bound to prevent the
existence of evil. Just as I may tolerate the existence of evils in the world at large, since I
could not cure them all without bringing other evils on myself or my neighbour, so may
sometimes tolerate evil con sequences from my own actions if to abstain from such actions
would bring a proportionate evil on myself or others. Sometimes I cannot will a good
without at the same time permitting the existence of an evil that in the very nature of
things is inseparably bound up with the god I will. But I must not do so indiscriminately.
Sometimes I am bound to prevent evil, and in these cases it would be wrong for me to
permit it. How can we determine these cases? The principle of double effect says that it is
morally allowable to perform an act that has an evil effect under the following conditions:

1. The act to be done must be good in itself or at least indifferent. This is evident, for if
the act is evil of itself, evil would be chosen directly, either as an end or as a means to an
end, and there could be no question of merely permitting or tolerating it.

2. The good intended must not be obtained by means of the evil effect. The evil must
be only an incidental by-product and not an actual factor in the accomplishment of the
good. If the act has two effects, one good and the other bad, the good effect must not be
accomplished by means of the bad, for then the evil would be directly voluntary as a means.
We may never do evil in order that good may come of it. A good end does not justify the use
of bad means. Hence the good effect must follow at least as immediately and directly from
the original act as the evil effect. It is sometimes said that the evil must not come before the
good, but this may be misunderstood. It is not a question of time but of causality: the good
must not come through or by means of the evil.

3. The evil effect must not be intended for itself but only permitted. The bad effect may
be of its own nature merely a by-product of the act per formed, but if the agent wants this
bad effect, he or she makes it directly voluntary by willing it.
4. There must be a proportionately grave reason for permitting the evil effect.
Though we are not always obliged to prevent evil, we are obliged to prevent a serious evil
by a small sacrifice of our own good. Hence some proportion between the good and evil is
4

required. How to estimate the proportion may be difficult in practice. For the present we
can say that the good and the evil should be at least nearly equivalent. If the good is slight
and the evil great, the evil could be called incidental only in a technical sense, and the
obligation to avoid it would be overwhelming Also, if there is any other way of getting the
good effect without the bad effect, this other way must be taken, otherwise there is no
proportionate reason for permitting the evil.

Does the principle of the double effect do away with responsibility for the evil effect that is
merely permitted but not directly intended? Responsibility is measured by voluntariness.
The evil effect is, according to the principle of double effect, indirectly voluntary, that is to
say, not directly willed but foreseen as a consequence of something else that is directly
willed. I get the evil effect and cannot avoid getting it because I want the good that 1 rightly
intend. I am therefore completely responsible for the good as well as for the evil. The
principle of the double effect neither does away with responsibility nor was it intended to
do away with it. Its purpose is, in some conflict situations, to do away with moral blame for
permitting the existence of an evil that cannot be avoided if the good is to be obtained.

The act is not morally allowable unless all four conditions are fulfilled. If any one of them is
not satisfied, even though the other three are, the act is morally wrong. There is no
question here of telling people that in the conditions specified they can go ahead and do
wrong. Rather, it is a way of showing that the action in question is not wrong. The bad
effect spoken of is a physical evil of some kind. The double-effect principle ex presses the
conditions under which one is not morally blameworthy for permitting a physical evil to
happen.

An example will help to illustrate the application of the principle. A man passing by a
burning building dashes in to save a child trapped there, though he may be severely burned
and even lose his life. We recognize his deed as heroic, but its justification is found in the
principle of double effect:

1. The act itself apart from its consequences is merely an act of entering a building. It is
surely an indifferent act and morally allowable.

2. This act has two effects: one good (saving the child) and the other bad (being burned or
even death for the rescuer). However, he does not save the child by means of dying or being
burned but by means of reaching the child and carrying it or throwing it to safety. If he can
do so without harm to himself, so much the better. The good effect is accomplished in spite
of, rather than by means of the bad effect, which is thus made only an incidental
accompaniment in the rescue of the child.

3. If the rescuer were using this chance as an excuse for suicide, he would intend the evil for
itself rather than merely permit it.

4. There is a sufficient proportion: at a minimum, a life for a life. To enter a burning

building merely to rescue some trifling possession could not be morally justified.
5

A few more cases will show how one or another of these four conditions can be violated:

1. An employee of a bank embezzled money to pay for the care of his sick child, hoping to
pay it back later. Here the act itself of embezzlement (taking money belonging to another
and falsifying the accounts) is neither good nor in different but wrong, and it cannot be
justified by any good intentions or good effects that might follow. He must try to raise the
money in some other way, and for the purposes of this example we stipulate that it is
possible for him to do so. The first condition is violated, and the evil is directly voluntary.

2. A man living with an alcoholic rich uncle stocks the house with liquor, knowing that he
will inherit a fortune when the uncle has drunk himself to death. For purposes of this
example we stipulate that the uncle simply has no control over himself in the presence of
alcohol. The act of stocking the house with liquor is indifferent in itself. It has two effects,
bad for the uncle by occasioning his death, and good for the heir by bringing him his
inheritance sooner. But the money cannot be inherited except through the uncle's death.
The good effect (obtaining the money sooner) is accomplished by means of the bad effect
(the uncle's death), and thus the sec one condition is violated.

3. A political boss distributes money to poor people to get them to vote for an unworthy
candidate. Here the giving of money to the poor is a good act. The good effect (relieving
poverty) is not accomplished by means of the bad effect (electing an unworthy candidate)
but rather the other way round, the bad effect through the good, But here the third
condition is violated because the evil effect, the election of the unworthy candidate; is
directly intended as the end,

4. The owner of a private plane has his pilot fly him through exceedingly dangerous
weather to complete a business deal that will net him a small profit. To fly a plane is an
indifferent act; the danger has to do with the possible effect rather than with the act itself.
The good effect (completing the business deal) is not obtained by means of the bad effect
(possible loss of life). The bad effect is not intended for its own sake, for neither wants to
die. But the fourth condition can easily be violated here, for there does not seem to be a
sufficient proportion between the risk to their lives and the rather slight financial
advantage to be gained. There is always a risk in flying, of course, and financial advantage
can be great enough to justify it, but for the sake of an example we presuppose an excessive
risk.

Though the foregoing examples show how the principle of double effect can be violated,
many of the ordinary actions of life find their justified action in a correct application of the
principle. Thus people may take dangerous occupations to earn a livelihood, firemen and
policemen can risk their lives to save others, a surgeon can operate even though he may
cause pain, a man can vindicate his honor or rectify past wrongs even though other
people's reputations suffer from his disclosures, or the people may be subjected to great
sacrifices to defend their country. If a per. son were obliged to avoid every deed to which
evil could be incidental, we could do so little that we might as well stop living.
6

RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE ACTS

OF OTHERS

Only the person who knowingly and willingly does an act can be responsible for it. In this
sense no one can be responsible for the acts of another person. But we are responsible each
for our own acts insofar as we knowingly and willingly intend to permit them to affect
another person as in incentives to good or evil. The ways in which we can help our
neighbor to god or ill are so numerous that it would be impossible to list them. It will be
useful here, since we have just discussed the double-effect principle, to consider two ways
in which we must try to avoid doing moral harm to other people, and how far this
avoidance is possible.

Occasion of Evil

The word scandal originally meant a stumbling block, and metaphorically something we
trip on and fall over in our moral career. Now the word has lost its force and means only
shocking conduct and juicy gossip. To regain the old meaning we shall call it occasion of
evil. It is any word or deed tending to lead, entice, or allure another person into
wrongdoing. It may be only given, or only taken, or both given and taken, so that the
question of responsibility may arise on either side or on both.

We give occasion of evil to another directly if we intend his or her evil act either as an end
or as a means. To intend it as an end would signify a truly diabolical hatred, for such an
intention looks to the moral destruction of the other per son. The usual motive for inducing
others to evil, however, is to use the other's evil doing as a means to one's own profit, as do
those who make their living by selling addictive drugs. The direct voluntariness of this
direct giving of occasion of evil makes for complete responsibility for the evil on the part of
the giver. The taker's responsibility is also complete if the evil is done knowingly and
willingly; his or her responsibility may be diminished by any of the modifiers of
responsibility discussed above.

We give occasion of evil to another indirectly if we do not intend the other person's evil act
either as end or as means but foresee it as a consequence of something else we do. Care for
our neighbor's moral welfare obliges us to avoid even this as far as possible, but life would
be intolerably difficult if we had to avoid all actions in which others might find an occasion
to do evil. Here the principle of double effect applies: the act we do must not be wrong in
itself though we foresee it will be a temptation to another; the good effect we intend must
not be accomplished by means of the other's evil act; we must not want but only permit the
other's temptation; and there must be a proportionate reason for permitting it.

Occasion of evil is taken but not given when someone with peculiar subjective dispositions
is led to evil by another person's innocent words or deeds. It may be due to the taker's
malice, and then is wholly the taker's responsibility. Or it may be due to the taker's
weakness, to his ignorance, youth, inexperience, prejudices, violent emotions, or
unconquered habits. Love of other human beings requires us to avoid words and actions,
7

otherwise harmless, that might be a source of moral danger to the innocent or the weak.
But sometimes such situations cannot be avoided, and it is here that the principle of double
effect comes into play.

Cooperation in Evil

Cooperation in another's evil deed may occur by joining that person in the actual
performance of the act or by supplying him or her with the mean's for performing it. If two
men plan a robbery, one may hold the gun while the other relieves the victim of his
valuables, or one may lend the other a gun to enable him to carry out the robbery alone. In
either case one not only helps another to do evil but also knowingly and willingly joins in
his evil intention. This is known as formal cooperation and all the cooperators share
completely in the responsibility for the act.

A lesser variety of cooperation occurs when without approving another's wrongdoing one
helps him perform his evil act by an action of one's own that is not of its nature evil. Thus
an employee is forced by robbers to open the safe, or the driver of a car is compelled by
gangsters to drive them to the scene of intended murder. This is known as material
cooperation. There is nothing wrong in what I do or in what I intend, but there is the bad
circumstance that my otherwise innocent act aids others in their wrong doing.
Consequently, if there is a proportionately grave reason for permitting this evil
circumstance, material cooperation can be justified by the principle of double effect. Since
the act I do is not wrong in itself, since I do not use the other's evil deed as a means to any
end of my own, and since I have no wrong intention and so no moral responsibility for the
other's evil act, the only remaining difficulty is that of the proportion. This proportion must
be estimated by the following:

1. The amount of evil my cooperation helps others to do

2. The amount of evil that will happen to me if I refuse to cooperate

3. The closeness of my cooperative act to the others evil act

The first two points are only common sense and are formally justified in a later chapter by
the principles bearing on a conflict of rights. My duty to my fellow man does not oblige me
to suffer an injury greater than or equal to that which I am trying to ward off from him, but
it does oblige me to suffer a small loss to prevent a great loss from happening to another,
and it may even oblige me to sacrifice my life to prevent a huge public calamity. The third
point, however, needs some further explanation.

Cooperation may be proximate or remote, de pending on how close it comes to the actual
evil deed of the principal agent. The more proximate the cooperation, the greater the
proportionate reason needed to allow material cooperation.
8

If no one else could be substituted to help in the evil act, I have a greater obligation because
I can actually prevent the act from happening, and I should have a proportionately greater
reason. Also, greater reason is required to justify material cooperation by persons who
have an explicit duty to prevent that particular kind of evil from happening. This would
occur if a soldier were forced to cooperate with the enemy, a policeman with criminals, a
watchman with burglars, a customs officer with smugglers. The forms that cooperation can
take are too numerous to mention, for it is possible to cooperate with almost any act, at
least by encouragement and support. Hired workers, because they engage their services to
a company whose policy they do not determine, are particularly open to the danger of
material cooperation. One should not keep a job with a company that continually and
habitually does a morally objectionable business. If it does so only occasionally, employees
need not be disturbed so long as their material cooperation is kept remote but if they find
that proximate material cooperation is demanded of them fairly frequently, they should
have a grave reason for continuing in their job and should meanwhile make an earnest
effort to obtain other work.
Tig 5 na langg
1 TRUE OR FALSE true
A certain but erroneous conscience must also be
followed because the agent cannot distinguish it
from a correct conscience and has no other guide.

2 IDENTIFICATION correct conscience

Judges as good what is really good, and as evil
what is really evil.

3 IDENTIFICATION Strong emotion, affecting the

consent of the will
Modifier of responsibility affecting the consent of
the will. capital?

Small lang, ganyan lng

nakalagay sa module

Thank you po

4 TRUE OR FALSE false

One of the chief acts of conscience is convincing.

5 TRUE OR FALSE false

Vincible ignorance removes responsibility and not
lessen it.

6 IDENTIFICATION moral
Used at times as a general term covering both
good and bad qualities or values.

7 IDENTIFICATION voluntariness
Said to be complete or perfect if the agent has full
 knowledge and full consent.

8 TRUE OR FALSE False?

Vincibly ignorant, a woman who pays for
something with counterfeit money, does no wrong.

9 IDENTIFICATION ignorance
Absence or lack of knowledge affecting the
voluntariness of a human act so as to make the act
less a human act.

10 TRUE OR FALSE False

All moral knowledge has an intellectual dimension,
and our emotions draw the values we experience
into the interior of our personality.

11 TRUE OR FALSE False

The judgement about voluntariness is a factual
judgement about the degree of responsibility.

12 TRUE OR FALSE True

There would be no judgement of conscience if
emotion was not at all involved in the first place.

13 IDENTIFICATION occasion of evil

Any word or deed tending to lead, entice, or allure
another person.

14 TRUE OR FALSE True

Not willing to do something has no act of the will
and therefore no voluntariness.
15 IDENTIFICATION intellectual fear
Consist of an understanding of an impending evil
and a movement of the will to avoid this evil by
rationally devised means.

16 IDENTIFICATION morality
The quality or value human acts have by which we
call them right or wrong, good or evil.

17 TRUE OR FALSE False (unintended)

Something is indirectly voluntary when it is the
intended but foreseen consequence of something
else that is directly voluntary.

18 TRUE OR FALSE False

( act from fear as a motive for

An act from fear is something done accompanying acting and not merely with
fear. fear as accompaniment of our
act. )
Thank you

19 IDENTIFICATION morality
The judgment on the nature of the act done.

20 TRUE OR FALSE false

For an act to be voluntary an actual intention is
necessary; a virtual intention suffices.

21 TRUE OR FALSE True ( ang nasa module ay

doubtful conscience)
A person who acts with uncertain conscience is
willing to do an act whether it is right or wrong.
22 TRUE OR FALSE true
The ignorance, deliberately cultivated, increases
the responsibility if the person intends to use the
ignorance as an excuse.

23 TRUE OR FALSE true?

Any act done from habit will always be voluntary.

24 IDENTIFICATION virtual intention…. Sadyang

capital start?
Intention not present in the person's
consciousness at the moment of performing an Small po hehe
act.

25 TRUE OR FALSE false

Morality in its completeness includes only the
objective aspects.

26

27

28

29

30
STEF
1 TRUE OR FALSE true
Always obey a certain conscience even when it is
unknowingly wrong.

2 TRUE OR FALSE true

An emotion is always subjective and objective
aspect.

3 IDENTIFICATION ethics of religion or religion?

Sa tingin niyo?
A set of beliefs and practices by which people
relate their lives to supernatural beings.

4 IDENTIFICATION prudential certainty

The degree of certainty that would be sufficient to
call the judgment certain.

5 TRUE OR FALSE False

Objectivism holds that moral judgments are
subjective and that there are no objective moral
truths.

6 FILLING IN THE BLANKS

AN ACT (dito start) (di ko

mahanap sunod huhuhu)
Intellectual fear
7

9 IDENTIFICATION cooperation
The joining of the person in the actual
performance of the evil act or by supplying him or
her with the means for performing it.

10 TRUE OR FALSE true

Moving away from what one is afraid of is an act
done with fear.

11

12

AVE
13

14 TRUE OR FALSE (The subject matter of ethics

is human conduct, those
Actions which a man performs consciously and actions which a man
willfully is the subject matter of ethics. performs consciously and
willfully, and for which he is
held accountable.)

15 TRUE OR FALSE true

Civil Law deals only with external facts/acts and
positive legality.
16 TRUE OR FALSE false
For an act to be voluntary an actual intention is
necessary; a virtual intention suffices.

17 IDENTIFICATION doubtful?
That which one either hesitates to make any doubful conscience
judgement at all or makes a judgement but with
misgivings that the opposite may be true.

18 Fill in the blank

19 Fill in the blank

20 TRUE OR FALSE true

Not willing to do something has no act of the will
and therefore no voluntariness.

21 The study of the nature of things, of what is real metaphysics

and apparent.

22 Fill in the blank

23 Fill in the blank

24 TRUE OR FALSE false

Voluntary acts consist conduct.

MIRKO

25 TRUE OR FALSE True? False to immoral dapat

ay moral
Ethics is a branch of philosophy concerned with
what is immoral. Yan napansin ko ty
Baka kasi what is immoral
and moral sorna

26 IDENTIFICATION correct conscience

Judges as good what is really good, and as evil
 what is really evil.

27 TRUE OR FALSE False (law)

Morality is the study or field that is closely related
to ethics because of its oughtness

28 IDENTIFICATION subjectivism
It holds that moral judgments are subjective and
that there are no objective moral truths.

29 IDENTIFICATION responsibility
It looks to the agent who is responsible,
answerable, and accountable for the act.

30 Fill in the blank to mamaya na

31 IDENTIFICATION attributability
It looks to the act as it relates to the agent, who is
chargeable or gets the credit for the act.

32 IDENTIFICATION morality
The quality or value human acts have by which we
call them right or wrong, good or evil

33 TRUE OR FALSE False (sensitive dapat)

The person who is morally good is one who loves
the good and is insensitive to its presence.

34 TRUE OR FALSE True (system of beliefs)

Religion is a set of beliefs and practices by which
people relate their lives to supernatural
beings.

35 TRUE OR FALSE False (emotional dimension)

All moral knowledge has an intellectual
 dimension, and our emotions draw the values we
experience into the interior of our personality.

36 Fill in the blank

MARIONE
37 IDENTIFICATION certain conscience
Judgment without fear that the opposite may be
true in fact.

38 IDENTIFICATION reflex principle?

Indirect method used in forming one’s
conscience.

39 IDENTIFICATION mood
Generalized emotion; it also an immediate
appreciation of the value, but a mood tends to
focus on the world/ rather than on a particular
person, thing or situation.

40 TRUE OR FALSE true

The study of ethics generally stresses subjective
morality.

41 IDENTIFICATION conscience
The evaluative judgement about the moral value
or disvalue of an act and of a person.

42 IDENTIFICATION emotion
An immediate appreciation of the value and its
significance. It is an activity that we do.
43 IDENTIFICATION habit
Constant way of acting and is acquired by the
repetition of the same act.

44 TRUE OR FALSE True

Something is indirectly voluntary when it is the
intended but foreseen consequence of something
else that is directly voluntary.

45 Fill in blank mamaya na

46 IDENTIFICATION voluntariness
Said to be complete or perfect if the agent has full
knowledge and full consent.

47 Fill in the blank

48 Fill in the blank din

THEA
49 Fill in the blank huhu

50 TRUE OR FALSE true

Formal object is the point of view of ethics, the
ethical judgment of reason.

51 TRUE OR FALSE false

Invincible ignorance does not remove
responsibility.

52 Fill in the blank

53 Fill in the blank

54 Fill the blank huhu

55 IDENTIFICATION desire
Is something wanting, striving for someone or
 something valuable to me. It is not always
based on our emotions.

56 IDENTIFICATION choice
Taken comparatively, as a preference for one
alternative over the other.

57 TRUE OR FALSE true

Any act done from habit will always be voluntary.

58 TRUE OR FALSE False (Greeks)

The Germans are responsible for integrating
primitive speculations/beliefs into one general
Body of Wisdom.

59 IDENTIFICATION consent
Taken absolutely, as the yielding to the attraction
of the object.

60 Fill in the blank huhu

1 Has the right of capital punishment and could state
appoint a man condemned to death.

2 TF True
Murder is unjust killing, done without legitimate
authority.

3 TF False
Mercy killing if administered by another without the
victim's consent is both suicide and murder. If
administered to oneself,
euthanasia is suicide. If
administered by another
without the victim’s
consent, it is murder

Awan di ko alam huhu

4 Term used in arguments opposing suicide as a cowardice daw

refusal to face life courageously.

5 A person who commits suicide and invades God's rebel

exclusive right is called
Answer
(one word).

6 Incident where a person has the right to destroy self-defense

other human lives for his own safety.

7 TF False
State has the supreme dominion over human life
and could order anybody to kill himself/herself.

8 The giving of an easy, painless death to one Mercy killing daw ang tama
suffering from an incurable or agonizing ailment.

9 Direct killing of an innocent person. murder

10 TF True
The uselessness of a person to the society and to
himself is one of the contentions favoring suicide.

11 TF False
Induced abortion is not a direct killing. about induced abortion,
which is voluntarily. the death
of the fetus is intended as
end or as means, it is direct
killing.
12 TF True
Killing is not suicide unless it is done by one's own
authority.

13 TF False
Medical science is unintelligent use and
development of the remedies nature provides to Medical science is an
preserve life. intelligent use and
development of the remedies
nature provides to preserve
life.

14 On whose authority when a soldier kills an enemy in state

a just war and the executioner putting criminals to —-------- state nga daw
death? I guess

The soldier killing the enemy

in a just war and the
executioner putting criminals
to death are acting on the
states authority, presuming
the state has the authority.

15 TF true
A person is not allowed to take even his or her own
life, much less would a person be allowed to take
the life of another.

16 Expulsion of the fetus from the womb before it can abortion

live outside the mother.

17 TF true
In times of war and capital punishment God does
give the person direct ownership over human lives.

18 The greatest gift of God. freedom

19 Difference between human life and other life. personhood???

Page 10 pdf
“Human life is not on the
same level as other life;
personhood makes the
difference”

20 Direct killing of oneself on one's own authority. suicide

21 One who has not forfeited his or her right to life. innocent person

22 In self-defense the defender kills the attacker not on true

his or her own authority.
23 Arises when the mother has serious illness while indirect abortion
bearing the child.

24 TF false
The state authority may be used in any way the
state please.

25 Has always been recognized as one of the worst murder

crimes and as the most glaring example of a morally
evil act.
1 IDENTIFICATION bipolar
The positive and negative poles of values.

2 TRUE OR FALSE false

Values are homogeneous.

3 IDENTIFICATION intrinsic good

The befitting good, the upright and honorable, the
noble and righteous good.

4 TRUE OR FALSE false

Objective goodness is attained through
subjectivism.

5 IDENTIFICATION nonmoral ought??? Di ko sure

kasi
Sense of ought where good is optional. Here we see two different
senses of the ought, which the
good always implies, the
nonmoral and the moral ought.
Every good except the moral
good is optional,

6 TRUE OR FALSE TRUE

That we cannot define yellow but can only point to
yellow objects is a proof that not all knowledge is
by definition.

7 IDENTIFICATION relatively perfect

It is completely satisfying to a creature (human
person), according to that creatures finite capacity

8 IDENTIFICATION Aristotle
For him "The good is that at which all things aim."
9 TRUE OR FALSE True
Hedonists would limit people to sense the
pleasures alone.

10 IDENTIFICATION Hedonism
Pleasure as the first good innate in us, and from
pleasure we begin every act of choice and
avoidance, and to pleasure we return again, using
the feeling as the standard by which we judge
every good.

11 TRUE OR FALSE False

For Bentham, the moral goodness of an act is to by its utility
be judged by the pleasure in promoting the
common welfare of all as well as the personal “The moral goodness of an act
advantage of each. is to be judged by its utility in
promoting the common welfare
of all as well as the personal
advantage of each.”

12 IDENTIFICATION obligation
Moral value implies
Answer

13 TRUE OR FALSE FALSE

What is good for one thing may be good for “What is good for one thing may
another. not be good for another

14 TRUE OR FALSE false

Every being is good for something but it does not

follow that every being is good for everything
means there are no differences when it comes to
goodness.

15 IDENTIFICATION John Dewey’s Instrumentalism?

Ito ang sagot talaga?
Humans exists except in a definite situation with a ???? THANK YOU
definite history and culture and with some definite
 desires, strivings and ideals.”

16 IDENTIFICATION Aristippus
Identified happiness as pleasure. We find hedonism first proposed
by Aristippus, leader of the
Cyrenaic school, who identified
happiness with pleasure.

17 TRUE OR FALSE false

It is not human's nature to seek the good as their
end.

18 TRUE OR FALSE false

A moral value can be compared only with another
value.

19 TRUE OR FALSE False

Moral good is the pleasant good.

20 TRUE OR FALSE True

It can be inferred from everything is relative that
no supreme purpose for man has yet identified
with certainty.

21 TRUE OR FALSE False

According to Aristippus, NO individual human
being and no society of humans exists except in a
definite situation with a definite history and culture
and with some definite desires, strivings and
ideals.
22 TRUE OR FALSE True
No activity is possible except for the attainment of
some end, for the sake of some good.

23 TRUE OR FALSE True

No activity is possible except for the attainment of
some end, for the sake of some good.

24 IDENTIFICATION happiness
The fulfillment of desire by the possession of the (What do you call the fulfillment
good. of desire by the possession of
the good? Happiness) from ppt

25 TRUE OR FALSE False

Moral value is not universal in the sense that what
holds for one does not hold for all in the same
conditions.
1-12 STEF
13- 24 AVE
25- 36 MIRKO
37- 48 MARIONE
49-60 THEA

LAST NA TO MAKAKAPAHINGA NA!!!!!

1 Which is not a utilitarian belief/position?

None of the above?

Utilitarianism seeks a happiness,
sabagay sige

Ari kasi nakalagayyy huhu

tenchuuu

2 What is a person? A person is a subject?

3 Incident where a person has the right to self-defense

destroy other human lives for his own safety.

4 How about killing in self-defense? Is it No, the defender acts by authority

murder? of his or her natural right to life
5 Deliberately induced expulsion of a living fetus Therapeutic
in order to save the mother from the danger of
death brought on by pregnancy.

6 One who has not forfeited his or her right to innocent person
life.

7 On whose authority when a soldier kills an state

enemy in a just war and the executioner
putting criminals to death?

8 He thinks that nothing but itself is good or evil, Thomas Hobbes

but these are the names we give to what we
desire or detest.
9 TF False
An act of omission is the deliberate and direct - It is an act of commission
termination of a terminally ill-patient’s life whenever a terminally-ill patien will
by employing painless method be deliberately and directly
terminate his life by employing
painless method;

10 Unconditional readiness and willingness of the

Japanese soldiers to die.
harakiri? sige

11 Who defines Self-defense as merely an Thomas Aquinas

application of the principle of double effect.

12 How about war and killing criminals? Do they No, the enemy in a just war and the
fall under murder? executioner putting criminals to
death are acting on the states
authority, presuming the state has
the authority.

13 What is hara-kiri? ALL OF THE ABOVE

14 TF True? True
Euthanasia is murder.

15 Suicide is taken in the strict sense as the direct killing

________________ on one’s own
authority.

16 TF False
Murder is a just killing, done without legitimate
authority.

17 TF False
That we cannot define yellow but can only
point to yellow objects is a proof that all
knowledge is by definition.

18 TF False
Eugenic abortion is also known as
spontaneous or accidental abortion.

19 TF True
To try to define good in terms of something
else that is also good is the proper way to
define it.

20 TF False
The uselessness of a person to the society
and to himself is one of the contentions
favoring murder.

21 TF True
 No action will ever take place, unless a being Page 8
with potentiality or ability for acting is
determined and stirred to act, and points its
action in one certain direction.

22 Which is not a cause of suicide: F

23 Also known as selective abortion, is Eugenic

recommended on a case-by-case basis.

24 The giving of an easy, painless death to one mercy killing

suffering from an incurable or agonizing
ailment.

25 The essential element of a lie as a human act falsity of the statement

is the willful disconformity between one’s
thought and one’s speech, so that it is
“speech contrary to one’s mind.”

26 Which claim is not part of the group/claim? the moment of conception all the
way to adulthood the person is
intrinsically unique in its own right

Anti arbornist kasi to

27 What are the means can one use to keep a All of the above
secret when directly questioned about it?
Page 86

28 This is the usual motive to lying and indicates The intention to deceive
its normal effect on the one lied to. The intent
need not be efficacious, as when a liar knows
that he or she will not be believed.

29 How is it possible to attain objective Letter f?

goodness?
Yesss ah oki oki tnx

"Objective goodness vs
subjectivism” ● We can attain
universal moral standards/truth
through the use of forms and
concepts

30 Death in Greek. thanatos

31 In cultural religious causes of suicide, it is best Kamikaze pilots

exemplified by______________
The cultural and religious causes
are best exemplified by the
Kamikaze pilots during World War

32 TF False
By implication killing oneself is a theory which
affirms an individual’s right to die. Thus, by implication euthanasia is
a theory which affirms an
individual’s right to die in a painless
and peaceful manner whenever
he/she is confronted with a
 horrible disease and the quality of
his life deteriorates

33 Everything natural seeks its own

being and tends to keep itself in
being as long as possible.
Intelligence is meant to promote,
not counteract, that natural urge.

Sa opposing kasi to

What claim/s does not belong to the group?

34 Painless death may be either an act of self-administered

commission (active) or an act of omission
(passive).

35 The direct killing of an innocent person: It is murder

direct killing, directly voluntary, so that death is
intended as ends or as means.

36 This provide the material for a lie for it is not a falsity condition
lie to say what is actually false while thinking it Page 23
true, though it is a lie to say something is
actually true while knowing it to be false.

37 The giving of an easy, painless death to one Solenn

suffering from an incurable or agonizing
ailment. mercy killing

38 WHAT is true to “female to male” sex Surgeons, hindi ga lahat?

change operations? All beh may ans key ako nung final
exam ng last sem
Di ko lang agad nasabi kasi late na
ako nakapagstart hahahaha sinooo
tooo HAHAHAHH
Perks ng may jowang higher year
charot HAHAHAHAHA
Hhahahaha tama daw yonn??

Female to male daw, balaka kung

sino ka man HAHAHHA surgeons
isasagot ko

AHHH GETSSS HAHAHAHAH

 GEGE SURGEONS

ALL NA LANG

39 A person who commits suicide and invades rebel

God’s exclusive right is called
Answer
(one word).

40 TF false
Induced abortion is not a direct killing.

41 Which is not an element of relativism? every being is good for something

but it does not follow that every
being is good for everything

Under to nung good as end

42 What is expulsion of the fetus from the womb abortion

before it is viable?

43 It is completely satisfying to a creature (human relatively perfect

person), according to that creatures finite
capacity.

44 It must be presumed that anyone to whom we Told to one who has a right to the
speak has the right to be spoken to truthfully if truth
we speak to him or her seriously on any matter
 at all. Respect for the person as a person
requires that we speak truthfully.

45 The conscious state of satisfaction which happiness

person feels on the fulfillment of his desire by
the
possession of the good.

46 Which is not a Pragmatist belief/position?

None of the above,

47 Arises when the mother has serious illness indirect abortion

while bearing the child

48 TF Solenn
In times of war and capital punishment God does
give the person direct ownership over human true
lives.

49 MORAL EVIL

What claim/s does not belong to the group?

50 TF FALSE
Mercy killing if administered by another without
the victim’s consent is both suicide and
murder.

51 TF FALSE
 Medical science is unintelligent use and
development of the remedies nature provides
to preserve life.

52 TF FALSE
State has the supreme dominion over human
life and could order anybody to kill
himself/herself.

53 Direct killing of a person who has not forfeited murder

his or her right to life.

54 TF FALSE
In self-defense the defender kills the attacker
on his or her own authority.

55 It seeks happiness in which all will be happy UTILITARIANISM

rather than only the fortunate few. The
individual sacrifice required for this contribution
to the general good is small enough price to pay
for the happiness of so many.

56 Term used in arguments opposing suicide as a cowardice

refusal to face life courageously.

57 Relativism that judges the moral value of acts by pragmatism

their consequences, not limiting itself, as
utilitarian does, to pleasurable ones.

58 What is true about homosexual orientation? ALL OF THE above

59 Which of the following is not the characteristic

of moral value?

Values go beyond the limits of

facts and our expectations.

Ito lang ung wala

60 Accordingly the act of self –defense may ONE IS SAVING OF ONE’S OWN
have two effects: LIFE AND THE OTHER IS THE
SLAYING OF THE AGGRESOR
Greeks (same)

culture, with the Greeks. By the sixth century

before Christ they had reduced primitive
speculations to some sort of order or system,
and integrated them into the general body of
wisdom called philosophy

True

Every emotion involves a judgement about

me and my world

Ethos

law

True
A mood is a generalized emotion;it too is an
immediate appreciation of value, butmood
tends to focus on the world as whole rather
than on a particular person, thing or situation.

Conduct-
consists of voluntary or human acts. In
contrast to involuntary acts, human acts are
those of which a person is master by
consciously controlling and deliberately
willing them.
deliberating,

Metaethics

Decision making ????

Di lo alam

true

Good life ?

Religion? Not sure hahahah. Based on

google lang

(Ethics of Religion akin)

true
Ethics
Sure to. Nasa pdf

Philosophy

False

Voluntariness- is the most important

characteristic of human act.I

study of civil law

Subjectivism holds that moral judgments are

subjective and that there are no objective
moral truths.

(same)

Bebe ethics lang

Nasa ans key hehe
Ah ggee hahahahahahah

TRUE
FALSE.
Responsibility dapat.

FALSE.
Consent dapat, hindi choice.

Philosophy

Logic

Epistemology