ALVIN PATRIMONIO, Petitioner, vs.
NAPOLEON GUTIERREZ and OCTAVIO
MARASIGAN III, Respondents.
G.R. No. 187769, SECOND DIVISION, June 4, 2014, BRION, J.
FACTS:
The petitioner and the respondent Gutierrez entered into a business venture under the name
of Slam Dunk Corporation, a production outfit that produced mini-concerts and shows related
to basketball.
Patrimonio pre-signed several checks to answer for the expenses of Slam Dunk. Although
signed, these checks had no payee’s name, date or amount. The blank checks were
entrusted to Gutierrez with the specific instruction not to fill them out without previous
notification to and approval by the petitioner.
Without the petitioner’s knowledge and consent, Gutierrez went to Marasigan to secure a
loan in the amount of P200,000.00 on the excuse that the petitioner needed the money for
the construction of his house. In addition to the payment of the principal, Gutierrez assured
Marasigan that he would be paid an interest of 5% per month.
Marasigan acceded to Gutierrez’ request and gave him P200,000.00. Gutierrez
simultaneously delivered to Marasigan one of the blank checks the petitioner pre-signed with
Pilipinas Bank with the blank portions filled out with the words “Cash” “Two Hundred
Thousand Pesos Only”, and the amount of “P200,000.00.”
Marasigan deposited the check but it was dishonored for the reason “ACCOUNT CLOSED.”
It was later revealed that petitioner’s account with the bank had been closed.
Marasigan sought recovery from Gutierrez, to no avail. He thereafter sent several demand
letters to the petitioner asking for the payment of P200,000.00, but his demands likewise
went unheeded. Consequently, he filed a criminal case for violation of B.P. 22 against the
petitioner.
RTC— in favor of Marasigan. It found that the petitioner, in issuing the pre-signed blank
checks, had the intention of issuing a negotiable instrument, albeit with specific instructions
to Gutierrez not to negotiate or issue the check without his approval. RTC declared
Marasigan as a holder in due course and accordingly dismissed the petitioner’s complaint for
declaration of nullity of the loan. It ordered the petitioner to pay Marasigan the face value of
the check with a right to claim reimbursement from Gutierrez. CA— affirmed the RTC ruling.
ISSUE:
Whether the contract of loan in the amount of ₱200,000.00 granted by respondent
Marasigan to petitioner, through respondent Gutierrez, may be nullified for being
void;
Whether the Patrimonio authorized the borrowing and Gutierrez completely filled out
the subject check strictly under the Patrimonio’s authority
Decision:
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Yes. The petitioner seeks to nullify the contract of loan on the ground that he never
authorized the
borrowing of money. He points to Article 1878, paragraph 7 of the Civil Code, which explicitly
requires a written authority when the loan is contracted through an agent. The petitioner
contends that absent such authority in writing, he should not be held liable for the face value
of the check because he was not a party or privy to the agreement.
Article 1878 paragraph 7 of the Civil Code expressly requires a special power of authority
before an
agent can loan or borrow money in behalf of the principal, to wit:
Art. 1878. Special powers of attorney are necessary in the following cases:
xxxx
(7) To loan or borrow money, unless the latter act be urgent and indispensable for the
preservation
of the things which are under administration.
Article 1878 does not state that the authority be in writing. As long as the mandate is
express, such
authority may be either oral or written.
The court unequivocally declared in one case that the requirement under Article 1878 of the
Civil Code refers to the nature of the authorization and not to its form. Be that as it may, the
authority must be duly established by competent and convincing evidence other than the
self-serving assertion of the party claiming that such authority was verbally given. And more
recently,
The court stated that, if the special authority is not written, then it must be duly established
by evidence. Here, the contract of loan entered into by Gutierrez in behalf of the Petitioner
should be nullified for being void; petitioner is not bound by the Contract of Loan.
A review of the records reveals that Gutierrez did not have any authority to borrow money in
behalf
of the petitioner. Records do not show that the petitioner executed any special power of
attorney
(SPA) in favor of Gutierrez. In fact, the petitioner’s testimony confirmed that he never
authorized Gutierrez (or anyone for that matter), whether verbally or in writing, to borrow
money in his
behalf, nor was he aware of any such transaction:
Marasigan however submits that the petitioner’s acts of pre-signing the blank checks and
releasing
them to Gutierrez suffice to establish that the petitioner had authorized Gutierrez to fill them
out
and contract the loan in his behalf. Marasigan’s submission fails to persuade us. In the
absence of any authorization, Gutierrez could not enter into a contract of loan in behalf of
the petitioner.
In the absence of any showing of any agency relations or special authority to act for and in
behalf of
the petitioner, the loan agreement Gutierrez entered into with Marasigan is null and void.
Thus, the
petitioner is not bound by the parties’ loan agreement. Furthermore, that the petitioner
entrusted the blank pre-signed checks to Gutierrez is not legally sufficient because the
authority to enter into a loan can never be presumed. The contract of agency and the special
fiduciary relationship inherent in this contract must exist as a matter of fact. The person
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alleging it has the burden of proof to show, not only the fact of agency, but also its nature
and extent.
The records show that Marasigan merely relied on the words of Gutierrez without securing a
copy of the SPA in favor of the latter and without verifying from the petitioner whether he had
authorized the borrowing of money or release of the check. He was thus bound by the risk
accompanying his trust on the mere assurances of Gutierrez.
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