Tradecraft

Primer
A Framework
for
Aspiring
Interrogators

Paul Charles Topalian

Tradecraft
Primer
A Framework
for
Aspiring
Interrogators
Tradecraft
Primer
A Framework
for
Aspiring
Interrogators

Paul Charles Topalian

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Contents

Preface xi
Author xv

1 Getting Our Terms Straight 1

The Need to Seek Common Ground 2
Redefining the Term Interrogation 3
Comparing Law Enforcement and Intelligence Interrogations 4
Other Associative Terms 5
Law Enforcement Custodial Interrogations 5
Law Enforcement Noncustodial Interviews 6
Elicitation 6
Strategic Debriefings 7
Tactical Questioning 7
Confessions 7
Admissions 7

2 Interrogation’s Tortuous Past 9

Snapshots from Distant History 10
The Qin Dynasty 10
The Roman Empire 10
The Dark Ages 11
Salem Witch Trials 12
Napoleon Speaks Out! 12
The Wickersham Commission 13
Evolving Case Law 14
Brown versus Mississippi (1936)
and Chambers versus Florida (1940) 14
Rochin versus California (1952) 15
Miranda versus Arizona (1966) 15
Lessons from World War II 17
The Cold War Era 19
The U.S. Experience in the Korean War 19
On the Heels of the Vietnam Conflict 20
The U.S. Experience in the Vietnam Conflict 21

v
vi Contents

Enter the Global War on Terror 22

Renditions 23
Black Sites 24
Enhanced Interrogation Techniques 24
The Evolving Army Field Manual 26
A Major Force for Change 28

3 Rights of Persons in Custody 29

Constitutional Provisions 29
Fifth Amendment 29
Sixth Amendment 30
Eighth Amendment 30
Fourteenth Amendment 31
International Treaties 31
Universal Declaration of Human Rights 32
Geneva Conventions and Common Article 3 32
UN Convention against Torture 35
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) 35
Istanbul Protocol 36
U.S. Laws, Statutes, and Executive Orders 36
Torture Victims Protection Act (TVPA) 36
War Crimes Act (WCA)—18 U.S.C. § 2441 37
Federal Torture Statute—18 U.S.C. § 2340–2340B 38
Detainee Treatment Act (DTA) 39
Military Commissions Act (MCA) 40
Executive Order 13491 41
Challenges Yet Ahead 43

4 On Being Human 45
Understanding Memory 45
Other Factors Influencing Memory 46
Gisting 46
Reality Mapping 46
Stress 47
Passage of Time 47
Suggestibility and Memory Distortion 48
Situational Dynamics 48
Physical and Emotional Isolation 48
Fear 48
Contents vii

Guilt, Shame, and Humiliation 49

Physiological Factors 49
Perceptions 50
Physical Setting 50
Bias 51
Infliction of Pain and Threats 52
Interpersonal and Intrapersonal Dynamics 53
The Science of Rapport 53
Choose Your Words, Demeanor, and Tenor Wisely 54
Six Key Elements of Interpersonal Dynamics 55
Five Core Needs of Intrapersonal Dynamics 57
Put These Concepts into Action 59

5 The Interrogation Cycle 61

The Law Enforcement Interrogation Cycle 62
Collect Relevant Background Information 62
Frame Initial Questions 65
Noncustodial Interview and Assessment 68
Decision to Release or Detain in Custody, Mirandize,
and Isolate 69
Develop Your Interrogation Strategy 70
Seek the Miranda Waiver 73
The Custodial Interrogation 73
Corroborate Outcomes 88
Decision to Refer to a Prosecutor, Release, or Detain
and Repeat Cycle 89
The Intelligence Interrogation Cycle 89
Identify Threats and Priority Intelligence Gaps 90
Screen Detainees 90
Frame Initial Questions 90
Perform Pre-Interrogation Interview 90
Build and Execute Your Interrogation Strategy 91
Corroborate Responses, Release, or Retain and Repeat Cycle 91

6 About Confessions 93
Three Major Factors Influencing Outcomes 93
Strength of Evidence 93
Time 94
Number of Tactics 94
viii Contents

Other Influential Variables 95

Age 95
Gender 96
Race and Ethnicity 96
Mental State and Psychological Factors 97
Previous Convictions 97
Type of Offense 97
Access to Legal Advice 97
Miranda Rights 98
Other Considerations 98
Wrongful Convictions 98
Interrogation-Induced False Confessions 100
Eyewitness Misidentification 103
Jailhouse Informants 104
Owning Up to the Problem 105
Minimizing False Confessions 106
Eyewitness Reforms 107

7 Unmasking Deception 109

Offset the Liar’s Advantage 110
Integrity Is Not a Stable Trait 110
People Make Poor Lie Detectors 111
Content Analysis 112
Statement Analysis 112
Verbal Markers 113
Avoid Focusing on the Wrong Nonverbal Cues 114
For Different People, Look for Different Cues 115
More Reliable Ways to Uncover Deceit 116
The Information-Gathering Interview Style 116
Imposing a Cognitive Load 117
Evaluating Inconsistencies in Facial Expressions 118
Uncovering Deception in Tandem Conspirators 119
Other Ways to Outsmart Liars 120
Time Well Spent 120
Being a Good Listener 120
Draw Me a Picture 121
Strategic Use of Evidence 121
Contents ix

8 Calling for a Code of Ethics 123

The Need for a Code of Ethics 123
Leading the Change 124
Final Thoughts 125
Key References and Suggested Readings 127
Preface

Whether at home or overseas, organized crime groups, enemy spies, and terror-
ists follow the same modus operandi. They operate in the shadows and rely on
deception to evade capture and surprise to achieve their goals. Among the tools
available to counter these groups is information. And often the best source of
that information comes from the criminals, spies, and terrorists themselves—
those captured, detained or held in lawful custody, and questioned. Yet experi-
ence tells us that such suspects and detainees do not just give up their secrets
simply over tea and cookies. Sometimes, tougher measures are needed to obtain
the information they possess. After all, getting the information they know
allows us to take apart their networks and, quite possibly, save many thousands
of lives and, most certainly, save multibillions of U.S. taxpayer dollars.
Among the arsenal of weapons at our nation’s disposal to help thwart
groups that endanger public safety and seek to harm our nation are our
military, our law enforcement agencies, and the intelligence community—
all working together as part of our country’s national security team. And
within these large institutions is a small subset of talented men and women
who practice a secretive tradecraft few understand and even fewer have
ever performed. They are called interrogators.
Much of what we know about the interrogation tradecraft has been passed
down through the years primarily by word of mouth—in some cases over
hundreds or even thousands of years—from one interrogator to the next. In
more recent decades, though, the daily experiences of those engaged in law
enforcement and intelligence provide valuable contributions. Meanwhile,
most of the storied how-to manuals marketed by methodologists engaged in
interrogation tradecraft are principally derived from a law enforcement con-
text and often based on methodologies developed half a century or more ago.
With the attacks of 9/11 came the early rush to establish strategic inter-
rogation centers for the many thousands of enemy combatants and terrorists
captured on the battlefields of Afghanistan, Iraq, and other conflict zones,
where an unfortunate pattern of harsh, coercive interrogations was initially
commonplace. Among the many thousands of detainees captured over the
past decade or more, an unspecified number were subjected to what a reason-
able person may characterize as brutal, degrading treatment at the hands of a
few military and intelligence interrogators. The public and political backlash
was inevitable and palpable. Critics and human rights advocates equated the

xi
xii Preface

harsh treatment to torture and claimed that such practices violated the U.S.
Constitution, our laws, and international obligations and treaties.
Domestic law enforcement has not been immune to the use of such tac-
tics either. Frequent stories of police misconduct seem to originate from New
York, Los Angeles, Chicago, Miami, and other major American cities, captur-
ing headline news. Some of these recount shocking tales of psychologically­—
and, in some cases, physically—abusive interrogations of juveniles and adults
who were subjected to unrelenting and coercive questioning.
Such realities within the interrogation profession have opened the door
to a new era of research by a new crop of reformers who challenge past beliefs,
the validity of previous research, and the tactics and techniques of previous
generations of interrogators. This contemporary community of behavioral
scientists and methodologists—both in the United States and abroad—is
providing us with fresh insight into the dynamics of human motivation,
deception, and truth-telling, and more effective human influence strategies
and tactics. What was once thought to be valid is giving way to new findings,
demonstrating that, in many cases, professed experts did not actually know
what they thought they knew.
Putting the science aside, the practice of interrogation tradecraft still
relies heavily on the creative talents of a single person—the interrogator—in
a one-on-one highly personalized interaction with an often less than fully
cooperative suspect or detainee. From that unique ­perspective, the trade­craft
demonstrates that a successful interrogation depends on the finesse and art-
ful skill of the interrogator, certainly assisted by behavioral science, but not
entirely dependent upon it.
To succeed, the interrogator must connect on an interpersonal level and
persuasively convince an uncooperative subject to disclose a valuable com-
modity—what the subject knows—often in opposition to the subject’s own
interests. To do this effectively, the interrogator must do so lawfully and ethi-
cally, in keeping with U.S. Constitutional values. No easy task.
Despite recent advances in national policy guidance, the profession con-
tinues to be the target of derision by a vocal segment of scholars, politicians,
newscasters, and other pundits concerned with human rights, government
transparency, and the law. Such discussions are divided over the moral, legal,
and ethical arguments over many of the legacy techniques in practice, which
many claim still amount to forceful coercion or worse.
Understanding what is permissible and not permissible and where to
draw the line are the major reasons behind this primer. While a number of
former government officials may continue to face criticism for permitting
harsh treatment of those in their custody or control, the larger issue of pre-
venting future abuse requires a sea change within the profession and in the
way our interrogation programs are run and managed.
Preface xiii

The lessons of the past several decades are clear. Effective interrogation
programs require three essential elements to function properly: (1) trained,
vetted, and self-disciplined interrogators; (2) unambiguous behavior or per-
formance standards—for the do and don’ts inside the interrogation room;
and (3) engaged managers or leaders who exercise oversight over their inter-
rogators. In each case where violations occurred—whether in the military,
law enforcement, or the intelligence community—one or more of these three
elements were absent.
Whether interrogators serve in the military, in law enforcement, or in
the intelligence community, they share an important goal when performing
their duties. That goal is gathering useful and reliable information from an
often reticent or uncooperative suspect or detainee. And based on the experi-
ences of successful master interrogators, this is achieved most effectively by

• forging a constructive, rapport-based relationship that induces trust

and cooperation between the interrogator and subject;
• preparing beforehand and asking questions in ways that help the
suspect or detainee with memory recall and in ways that elicit accu-
rate information; and
• undermining resistance and deception by effective use of approved
tactics and techniques that are lawful and ethical.

Keep in mind, too, the other aims of this primer. They are to give an
aspiring interrogator a leg up before entering formal training and encourage
their participation in the evolving future of the profession by

• providing a baseline of where law enforcement, the military, and

intelligence community stand in the art and science of interrogation
tradecraft;
• identifying the most commonly authorized interrogation techniques
which experts claim to yield the best chances of success;
• pointing out the many variables that influence why suspects confess
or do not confess to crimes and the empirical findings associated
with admissions and denials;
• advocating for a community-wide code of ethics for the profession
that promotes high ethical standards for interrogators based on our
nation’s values, the U.S. Constitution, our laws and statutes, interna-
tional agreements, and the policies of our nation’s leaders; and
• inspiring interrogators to further pursue independent research and
study to improve their skills.

Have a great career.

Author

Paul Charles Topalian possesses nearly 30 years of expe-

rience as an intelligence professional with extensive over-
seas experience in Asia and Europe. His foundational
expertise on the topic in this primer is built on assign-
ments with the U.S. military, the intelligence community,
and law enforcement. His academic credentials include an
undergraduate degree from Norwich University and two
graduate degrees—a master of science from Salve Regina
University and a master of arts from the U.S. Naval War
College. Find Paul at [email protected] or at home with family and
friends on the beach in Kailua, Hawaii. Aloha.

xv
Getting Our
Terms Straight
1
In its battle against transnational and domestic organized crime groups,
enemy spies, and terrorists, our nation turns to its law enforcement officers,
the military, and the intelligence community and conceptualizes a uni-
fied strategy against these continuously mutating and dangerous threats
to our national security and our worldwide interests. One manifestation
of this strategy is the cooperation that frequently takes place among them
and where sharing a detainee or suspect inside the interrogation room may
provide critical information to support either an ongoing law enforcement
investigation or an ongoing intelligence operation, or both. As pointed out in
a comprehensive Intelligence Science Board study, Intelligence Interviewing,
(2009): “For the foreseeable future, then, the United States will need infor-
mation from persons in custody who may know about matters critical to our
national security.”
Yet, findings to the 2008 Senate Armed Services Committee report,
Inquiry into Treatment of Detainees in U.S. Custody, and to the 2014 follow-on
partially released report from the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence,
Central Intelligence Agency’s Detention and Interrogation Program, indicate
that this collaboration between law enforcement and the intelligence com-
munity had room for improvement. These Senate reports make clear that
the two sides frequently disagreed over the treatment of captured terrorists
and enemy alien detainees held in their custody or in their control and over
interrogation practices used in overseas U.S. government detention facilities.
Over a decade of investigative reporting by U.S. and foreign news
media attests to this stormy relationship, frequently pitting former officials
of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) on one side of the debate and
former officials of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) on the other side.
Meanwhile, our nation’s military found itself in the middle, with senior lead-
ers of two presidential administrations—those of George W. Bush and of
Barack Obama—leaning to one side or the other in these divisive discussions.
To end the acrimony, the incumbent U.S. president at that moment in his-
tory, Barack Obama, personally intervened by using his executive authority.
Many saw Executive Order 13491, Ensuring Lawful Interrogations, which
President Obama signed almost immediately after taking office in 2009, as
a major step to resolve the acrimony over how our nation’s interrogation

1
2 Tradecraft Primer

programs are to be run. Others saw the executive order as a political expedient­
solution that only touched the surface of a very complex issue. Apparently, the
intelligence community, the military, and law enforcement were operating
from different frames of reference when it came to interrogation tradecraft.

The Need to Seek Common Ground

Some assert that the term interrogation has different technical meanings in
intelligence and law enforcement, among which the military is an integral
part of both, and so the two could never agree to a common standard. The
assertion is false. Such a belief fails to grasp that the aims of intelligence and
law enforcement interrogation methodologies are the same—to gather reli-
able and useful information.
For the Department of Defense, the Army Field Manual 2–22.3 (2006),
Human Intelligence Collector Operations, carries within it the operative
definition of interrogation, now equally relied on by the entire intelligence
community: “the systematic effort to procure information to answer specific
collection requirements by direct and indirect questioning techniques of a
person who is in the custody of the forces conducting the questioning.”
Law enforcement faces a larger challenge when it comes to defining the
term interrogation. With so many activities and agencies, including federal,
state, local, tribal, and territorial entities, the closest definition that receives
general acceptance among them is that found in Inbau, Reid, Buckley et al.’s
Criminal Interrogation and Confessions which, since 1962, largely serves as
the standard reference manual for investigative interviews and interroga-
tions among the general law enforcement community. Captured from its
pages, the term interrogation is interpreted to mean “. . . the accusatory
questioning of a subject . . . involving active persuasion . . . that occurs in
a controlled environment . . . when an investigator is reasonably certain of
a suspect’s guilt . . . for the purpose of learning the truth” (Inbau, Reid,
Buckley et al. 2013).
Both definitions reflect the interests of their target audience. The 2006
Army Field Manual’s definition focuses on the collection of “information”
principally for intelligence requirements. Meanwhile, Inbau, Reid, Buckley
et al.’s definition asserts a search for the “truth” through its “accusatory”
approach to questioning, a traditional approach that presumes knowledge,
guilt, and deception in the subject.
Both definitions try to explain their respective approaches to interroga-
tions in other ways, as well. The Department of Defense’s definition makes
reference to vague “direct and indirect” questioning techniques. Inbau, Reid,
Getting Our Terms Straight 3

Buckley et al.’s definition makes reference to cryptic “active persuasion”­

tactics. By doing so, both rely on ambiguous terms which fail to recognize
the evolving nature of the interrogation tradecraft, with ever increasing
demands for greater transparency and fairness and a growing public chorus
who oppose the questionable interrogation practices of previous years.
Coincidentally, both definitions fail to capture an important aim of an
interrogation—transforming an uncooperative or reticent subject to one who
is cooperative; one that voluntarily accommodates answering the interroga-
tor’s questions with reliable and useful responses. After all, absent a recalci-
trant subject, little need exists for an interrogation. Rather, for cooperative
detainees and suspects basic elicitation, debriefing, or interview techniques
may suffice.
In principle, then, a major step toward achieving a unified interrogation
strategy and improving cooperation among law enforcement, the military,
and the intelligence community, in the context of interrogations, would be to
seek common ground for what is meant by the term interrogation.

Redefining the Term Interrogation

In recognition of the multiple dynamics at play, to include oversight com-

mittees and ameliorate public concerns, a suggested definition of interroga-
tion for the profession might better read: “the systematic use of authorized
techniques that influence the transition of an uncooperative subject held in
custody, or detained in a controlled setting, into a cooperative source will-
ing to respond voluntarily to questions that seek reliable and useful infor-
mation in support of either a law enforcement investigation or intelligence
requirements” (also see Meissner, Evans, Brandon et al. 2010).
The term systematic implies a methodical or deliberate approach tai-
lored to the subject, the situational setting, and the information sought.
The term authorized is interpreted to mean lawful, ethical, and permitted
by current government policy. The term custody principally speaks to law
enforcement–managed interrogations, while a controlled setting is common
to most military- and intelligence-focused interrogations when outside of
a custodial setting. The term voluntarily denotes the absence of coercion.
The term reliable is interpreted to mean truthful and accurate. Useful is
interpreted to mean relevant to an ongoing investigation or to intelligence
requirements.
Keep in mind that, whether the interrogation takes place in an intel-
ligence, military, or law enforcement context, three common features are
desirable in all effective interrogations:
4 Tradecraft Primer

• First, the suspect or detainee voluntarily answers questions within

his or her sphere of knowledge.
• Second, the tactics and techniques used are lawful, approved for use,
and ethical.
• Third, the interrogator gains reliable information that is useful.

Comparing Law Enforcement

and Intelligence Interrogations

As we just discussed, a common denominator between law enforcement

and intelligence interrogations is getting reliable and useful information.
For law enforcement, this typically means eliciting from a person of inter-
est or a suspect an incriminating statement, a partial admission, or a full
confession about a past criminal act of sufficient credibility and validity
that it can be referred as evidence to a prosecutor. For intelligence, this
often means gaining from a detainee strategic insight and knowledge or
time-sensitive information—termed actionable intelligence (see the fol-
lowing figure)—­about persons, places, organizations, and their associated
plans; and useful to assist in future choices whether supporting our home-
land defense, our deployed forces in overseas conflict zones, or our national
decision-makers. In either instance, whether in a law enforcement or intel-
ligence context, responsible interrogators also elicit statements which
exonerate innocent persons held in custody; encourage leads to identify
others responsible for the act or event under investigation or point to those
engaged in hatching future plots; and collect additional insights which con-
tribute to a broader understanding of the events, people, and organizations
under investigation.

Actionable Intelligence

Information that is used to deter, disrupt, and

defeat the ability of our enemies to endanger
our nation, its citizens, our allies, and U.S.
interests around the globe.

Another important factor that often distinguishes law enforcement

from intelligence interrogations is the degree of public safety concern and
the degree of urgency. It’s what’s at stake that matters. For instance, inter-
rogating a probable serial killer or child molester for crimes that are clearly
unconscionable pales in significance to interrogating a likely terrorist who
may know of a ticking time-bomb plot that could kill many thousands of
Getting Our Terms Straight 5

innocent citizens. As a nation of laws, however, the exigency of the cir-

cumstances and the immediate danger to society does not provide an open
mandate, or the right, for an interrogator to violate the law. Under such a
hypothetical scenario, the best an interrogator could hope is for the court
to judge his or her liability and punishment by the totality of the facts and
circumstances.
The following figure highlights many of these points.

Similarities and Differences

Law Enforcement Interrogations Intelligence Interrogations
• Gathering of information: essential for a criminal • Gathering of information: essential for
case—evidence and leads assessments, actionable intelligence, and leads
• Confessions: a significant achievement in the law • Confessions: of secondary interest to the
enforcement world intelligence community
• Degree of detail: sufficient to prove guilt • Degree of detail: the more details, the better
• Responsibility: primary importance—seek sufficient • Responsibility: secondary importance—
information for a conviction knowledge is primary
• Tactics and techniques: stringent • Tactics and techniques: flexible
• Focus: on the past • Focus: on the future
• Degree of urgency: low to moderate • Degree of urgency: moderate to high

Other Associative Terms

When we speak of gathering information from people, something common

to both law enforcement and intelligence, a number of associative terms
related to these professions are frequently used and often misunderstood.
In researching them, no single source satisfactorily defined many of them.
What I captured below is a synthesis of the terms.

Law Enforcement Custodial Interrogations

Within law enforcement, the terms interrogation, custodial interview, and
custodial interrogation are frequently used interchangeably. Similar to an
intelligence-focused interrogation, the aim is to influence the transition of an
uncooperative suspect or detainee to a cooperative frame of mind, a mindset
in which the subject cooperates to the questioning. And, under such a set-
ting, the person’s freedom to leave the interrogation is controlled by the gov-
ernment. An important point, too, law enforcement custodial interrogations
require a “waiver” of Miranda rights to proceed, a topic further explored later
in this primer. The Miranda warning is generally not required in intelligence
interrogations of alien detainees captured on foreign battlefields.
6 Tradecraft Primer

Law Enforcement Noncustodial Interviews

A law enforcement noncustodial interview, sometimes called an investigative
interview, is used to explain the systematic screening and non-accusatory
questioning of persons of interest and likely suspects to obtain relevant infor-
mation using basic question-and-answer or elicitation techniques. During
such interviews, a law enforcement officer initially evaluates the subject for
potential guilt or knowledge, relevant background information, resistance,
rapport-building potential, and interpersonal and intrapersonal dynamics
as a stepping stone to a tailored custodial interrogation strategy. Without a
reading of the Miranda rights, the person in a noncustodial interview retains
the right to leave at any time.
In an intelligence context, a noncustodial interview is called a pre-inter-
rogation interview. However, unlike a law enforcement noncustodial inter-
view, the person’s right to leave a pre-interrogation interview or screening is
situational dependent. As we will learn later in this primer, a far less intrusive
methodology is used to interview witnesses and victims.
The following figure captures the similarities and differences between a
typical law enforcement interview and a law enforcement interrogation.

Similarities and Differences

Law Enforcement Interviews Law Enforcement Interrogations
• Aims: seek reliable and useful information • Aims: seek reliable and useful information
• Goal: simply collect information • Goal: a confession, admission, or incriminating statement
• Process: typically nonjudgmental; elicitation • Process: typically judgmental; accusatory
• Source: witnesses, victims, and persons of interest • Source: suspects of crimes
• Initial expectation: truthfulness presumed • Initial expectation: deceit presumed
• Structure: reasonable start and end times • Structure: no set time limits
• Tone: casual; polite; even tempered; empathetic • Tone: formal; persuasive; confident; assertive
• Freedom to depart: retained by subject • Freedom to depart: retained by government
• Setting: noncustodial; voluntary • Setting: custodial; controlled
• Version of events: respondent’s side of the story • Version of events: investigator’s hypothesis
• Miranda warning: waiver not required • Miranda warning: waiver required

Elicitation
An elicitation is a subtle and sophisticated question-and-answer technique
commonly used to uncover additional information that is not otherwise
known and shielded by the respondent. The communication exchange can be
face-to-face during a casual conversation, but may also be over the phone, or
in writing (e.g., text, tweet, or e-mail). Often integrated into the interrogation
process once an uncooperative suspect transitions to a cooperative mind-
set, it calls for a softer, less confrontational demeanor and measured tone of
Getting Our Terms Straight 7

voice. Moreover, it serves as a dominant question-and-answer technique dur-

ing the interview process when working with victims and witnesses. In most
cases, the respondent is witting to the purpose of the questioning. In other
instances, the respondent may be unwitting to the underlying and indirect
fact-finding aims of the question.

Strategic Debriefings
Debriefing is a term that is frequently heard in intelligence circles and is inter-
preted to mean the systematic questioning of a responsive and cooperative
individual by intelligence officers whether outside or inside a custodial or con-
trolled setting. Its aim is to elicit information volunteered in a direct, noncon-
frontational, and business-like manner in response to intelligence collection
requirements. In some cases, incentives or inducements may be used to
achieve and reward cooperation. In other cases, disincentives may be used.
Similarly as in elicitation, the respondent may be witting to the aims of the
underlying questions or, in other instances, may be unwitting to the true
aims of the person asking the question.

Tactical Questioning
Tactical questioning is the field-expedient initial questioning of a captured
or detained person at or near the point of capture by the military for infor-
mation of immediate tactical value and before the individual is placed in a
detention facility. According to the Department of Defense doctrine, tactical
questioning is limited to direct questioning and is an unstated exception to
the rule that only officially trained personnel may perform interrogations
and debriefings.

Confessions
A confession is a self-incriminating statement by a suspect admitting or
acknowledging guilt and direct participation in a crime. Among police offi-
cers, it is often loosely interpreted to mean any statements which tie a suspect
to a crime.

Admissions
An admission is far less specific than a criminal confession. It might include
acknowledgment by a suspect to some facts implying some degree of guilt
or involvement in the crime under investigation but falls short of a full
confession.
8 Tradecraft Primer

For more explanations of other associated legal terms, I suggest you explore
Black’s Law Dictionary, which serves as the most comprehensive and authori-
tative source of such terminology. For the most relevant military and intelli-
gence terms, the Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated
Terms (Joint Publication 1-02) and its companion glossary Joint Intelligence
(Joint Publication 2-0) are available online at http://www.dtic​.mil/doctrine.
Interrogation’s
Tortuous Past
2
Interrogation and torture have been linked since antiquity and, in a histori-
cal context, commonly practiced by those exercising absolute power over
those they ruled or held in captivity. Despite the passage of thousands of
years, the two remain synonymous in the eyes of many people, even though
torture and interrogations are distinctly dissimilar.
Torture, along with other forms of cruel, inhumane, and abusive treat-
ment or punishment, is illegal by the U.S. Constitution, our laws, and rec-
ognized as an international human rights crime. On the other hand, the
practice of interrogation tradecraft remains a legitimate and essential law
enforcement, military, and intelligence skill.
Where interrogation and torture are still practiced together by lawless
state and nonstate actors, the threads that commonly link them are severe
physical or mental pain or suffering for the victim. This disturbing legacy
demonstrates that torture serves as an expedient tool of interrogators for the
following major reasons:

• Breaking free will, such as getting the person to say or do something

he or she would otherwise not say or do; make a confession, admit
guilt, or agree to support a propaganda campaign.
• Punishing and intimidating others and, in the process, exerting
authority, exacting revenge, deterring revolt, or serving as a warning.
• Enforcing submission or conversion to a new religion or ideology.

Today, we know through a number of landmark studies that exerting

mental or physical coercion during an interrogation produces unreliable
results. As pointed out in the 2008 Senate Armed Services Committee report
on the treatment of detainees by the U.S. military, put a person under enough
discomfort or pain and he or she will eventually say whatever it takes to stop
it. And, sure, harsh treatment may increase the amount of information the
person will tell the interrogator but it does not mean that the information
is accurate. In fact, harsh treatment usually decreases the reliability of the
information. Of course, there are exceptions, like with all generalizations,
but they are not common. Rather, the likelihood that harsh mistreatment
during an interrogation will increase accurate information from a detainee

9
10 Tradecraft Primer

or suspect is very low. And, as we will learn later in this primer, there is also
the likelihood that the use of excessive physical pain and extreme mental
suffering may further harden defensive resistance in uncooperative subjects
(U.S. Congress 2008).

Snapshots from Distant History

The Qin Dynasty

The first documented government to rely on torture as a political tool was the
Qin (pronounced “chin”) Dynasty, the empire which unified China under a sin-
gle emperor. A time of extreme cruelty and violence, the dynasty came to power
under the leadership of Emperor Qin Shi Huang Di (260–210 BCE).
To forge his nation, the emperor ruled under a tyrannical form of
government called legalism—a practice in which everyone was terrified
and informants were everywhere. Death, maiming, and torture were used
as punishments for the slightest infractions—foreshadowing the Cultural
Revolution two millennia later. Along with his political critics and mili-
tary opponents, the emperor singled out intellectuals, in particular, for
special persecution along with their books, especially the followers of
Confucius.

The Roman Empire

Two hundred years later, the West experienced its own form of tyr-
anny under the Roman Empire, most vividly represented by the reign
of Caligula (AD 37–41), who relied on torture to punish anyone he mis-
trusted. Other cruel rulers soon followed in near succession, such as Nero
(AD 54–68) and Commodus (AD 180–192), whose reigns likewise relied
on torture and persecutions against those they considered enemies of the
Roman state—especially Christians, political opponents, and criminals
alike.
Crucifixions, stoning, floggings, and death in the arena were the most pub-
licly recognized form of punishment and torture. Yet an infinite variety of other
forms were also practiced under Roman rulers, limited only by their imagi-
nation. We know some of them today by such strange-sounding Latin-based
names as flagellation, decimation, and precipitation.
Still, other forms of torture were adopted from their Greek predecessors,
such as the Sicilian bull. Here, victims were placed inside a closed chamber
made of bronze and basically baked to death over a fire. Their screams accentu-
ated by specially designed honed baffles.
Interrogation’s Tortuous Past 11

The Dark Ages

The collapse of the Roman Empire coincided with the rise of the Dark Ages,
roughly from the 6th to the 13th century. It was a period in medieval Europe
in which the art of interrogation and torture reached a heightened level of
sophistication under the union of the church and the state. Under the Grand
Inquisition, heretics were nearly always subjected to coercive physical and
psychological abuse, and, in many cases, pain by the Catholic Church, and,
if found guilty, were then turned over to the state for final punishment
(Educing Information 2006).
The first how-to interrogation manuals appeared at this time. Prominent
among them was Practica inquisitionis heretice pravitatis, translated as
“Conduct of the inquisition into heretical depravity.” Written in 1323 by
Dominican priest Bernard Gui, inquisitor of Toulouse in southern France,
his manual covers the nature and types of heresy an inquisitor might encoun-
ter and it provides advice on everything from conducting an interrogation
to pronouncing a death sentence. A prodigious writer, the portfolio demon-
strates that Gui was methodical, learned, clever, patient, and persistent—the
ideal qualities for an interrogator even today.
A generation after Gui, another Dominican priest, Nicholas Eymerich,
produced the Directorium Inquisitorum, which became the definitive hand-
book of the Spanish Inquisition. Eymerich served as inquisitor general of
Aragon in the 1350s. Built on the work of his French predecessor, Eymerich’s
detailed treatise achieved even greater popularity and served inquisitors well
into the 17th century.
Eymerich makes a point to warn inquisitors to expect deception from
those being questioned and lays out the ways heretics will employ resistance.
They include equivocation, redirecting the question, feigning astonishment,
twisting the meaning of words, changing the subject, feigning illness, and
feigning stupidity. To counter such ruses, Eymerich writes, the well-prepared
inquisitor has tricks of his or her own. For example, to confront a resistant or
deceptive prisoner, the inquisitor might sit with a large stack of bogus docu-
ments in front of him or her, which he or she would pretend to consult as he
or she asks questions or listens to answers, periodically looking up from the
pages as if they contradicted the testimony and saying, “It is clear to me that
you are hiding the truth.” This same technique survives today in a number
of training manuals. Another technique suggested by Eymerich is for the
inquisitor to suddenly shift tactics away from a harsh demeanor and feign
empathy and understanding, perhaps even offering food or a drink. Today,
we call this the good cop/bad cop technique.
Other such techniques included threatening heretics with death or
injury, playing on the prisoner’s feelings of utter despair and futility, and
12 Tradecraft Primer

reminding the detainee that only cooperation with the interrogator offers
the heretic a path to something better. Not surprisingly, inquisitors also
believed that extended solitary confinement was one of the most influential
interrogation techniques for breaking a person. We saw many of these same
techniques—noncoercive and coercive—reappearing nearly 600  years
later in the war against terrorism, some labeled “enhanced interrogation
techniques.”

Salem Witch Trials

Not unique to the Inquisition, some of the same practices were later
adopted by the Puritans during the Salem witch trials, which, once again,
reaffirmed the unity of religious and secular authorities for the colony. We
also see, in a number of cases, the use of fire and water to purify the defen-
dants and uncover the “truth.” Accused citizens of Salem were offered two
options: they could plead guilty or innocent. The majority of the people
under questioning admitted guilt and usually ended with the least punitive
forms of colonial punishment: the wearing of letters such as T for thief,
A for adulterers, and D for drunkards; whippings; or time in the stocks
and pillory. However, should a defendant assert innocence, that was when
things really got serious.
Some of the more common methods of interrogation and torture
included the dunking stool. With a setup similar to a seesaw, the accused
was on one end which would hang above the local pond, while on the other
end stood the accusers. They would repeatedly dunk their victim under the
water. If the victims floated, they were a witch under the assumption that
they used magic to stay afloat. Ironically, if they sank and nearly drowned,
they were innocent.
Although the legend of Salem witch trials claims victims burning at the
stake, in reality, most met their fate by hanging on Gallows Hill. Between
1692 and 1693, more than two hundred people were accused of practicing
the “devil’s magic,” or witchcraft, and 19 were executed by hanging; one was
crushed to death.

Napoleon Speaks Out!

More than a century after the Puritans, one of history’s most famous mili-
tary leaders stands tall for condemning the practice of torture. By this time,
torture is clearly used on the battlefield to exact intelligence. In a blunt let-
ter, Napoleon Bonaparte chastised Major General Louis-Alexandre Berthier
for mistreating his prisoners during the 1798 French military campaign in
Egypt:
Interrogation’s Tortuous Past 13

[The] barbarous custom of whipping men suspected of having impor-

tant secrets to reveal must be abolished. It has always been recognized that
this method of interrogation, by putting men to the torture, is useless. The
wretches say whatever comes into their heads and whatever they think one
wants to believe. Consequently, the Commander-in-Chief forbids the use of a
method which is contrary to reason and humanity. (Plon 1861)

The Wickersham Commission

Throughout the 19th and the early 20th century, coercive interrogation prac-
tices, called the third degree, were common in police stations throughout
America. Beginning in the early 1920s, however, the public’s concern over law-
less police practices in the country steadily grew to the point where President
Hoover appointed former Attorney General George Wickersham to chair the
1929 National Commission on Law Observance and Law Enforcement.
In 1931, this body, commonly known as the Wickersham Commission,
issued the Report on Lawlessness in Law Enforcement, among its 14-volume
report  on criminal justice in America. The report became a catalyst for
modern police reform. Documenting various abuses, the Wickersham
Commission concluded that the police use of brutal physical force, threats,
intimidation, and protracted incommunicado detention during interroga-
tions was widespread. In short, the third degree was a common practice in
most of America’s police departments.
What is the third degree? This term is a euphemism for a variety of harsh,
even brutal, interrogation tactics used by police to extract information from
a suspect. It relied on physical force to inflict injury and pain and on psycho-
logical threats to cause duress to extract confessions from vulnerable sus-
pects. The significance of the third degree was more than just a representation
of abusive police practices that violated constitutionally protected civil liber-
ties of persons taken under police custody. Equally as well, it represented an
off-the-record system of dispensing extrajudicial punishment by the police
on victims (Leo 1992).
The Wickersham reports made their intended impact. Physically coercive
interrogation methods gradually began to decline in use by police depart-
ments starting in the mid-1930s. In place of the third degree, the police began
to adopt methodologies that relied on ever subtle and increasingly sophisti-
cated manipulation, persuasion, and deception techniques to induce confes-
sions and admissions from subjects in custodial interrogations (Leo 1992).
By the mid-1970s, such tactics became the standard police practice across the
country. Although we still hear about police abuses during custodial ques-
tioning, the reported use of the third degree during interrogations is far less
frequent than in the past. Its use today is considered an aberration.
14 Tradecraft Primer

Such an anomaly popped up in 2010 during the trial of a senior Chicago

police officer, Lieutenant Jon Burge, who commanded the Violent Crime
Unit of Chicago’s Area Two Headquarters. For decades, city prosecutors dis-
missed complaints about his command where suspects were being coerced
into making false confessions—at gunpoint, with shocks to the genitals,
or with plastic bags over their heads. In 2011, Officer Burge was sentenced
to jail for deceptively lying about his penchant for the cruel use of torture
on suspects. Dozens of cases are now under review along with $5.5 million
in reparations expected for his victims (Chicago Tribune, Online Editions:
Jan 22, 2011 and Apr 14, 2015, Search: Jon Burge).

Evolving Case Law

Court-driven legal rulings continue to play an important role in influencing

police interrogation practices. In the past century, in particular, a number
of watershed rulings elaborated and enforced constitutional rights and due
process norms and sought to restrain police abuse. The use of force, threats of
harm, denial of food or sleep, prolonged isolation, and badgering by multiple
interrogators over extended hours or even days are no longer condoned by
legal authorities. By excluding confessions that are the by-product of physi-
cally or psychologically coercive methods, the courts sought to stamp out
third degree interrogation practices in America.

Brown versus Mississippi (1936)

and Chambers versus Florida (1940)
Despite the Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution,
state courts were slow to recognize that coercive interrogation-induced con-
fessions were inadmissible. In Brown versus Mississippi (1936), the Supreme
Court held, in the first series of state cases, that physically coerced confessions
were not admissible but had to be voluntary to be admitted into evidence. In
other words, the due process clause of the 14th Amendment prevents the
prosecution from using information in a confession that resulted from the
use of physical force by law enforcement officers. A follow-on ruling in 1940
by the Supreme Court in Chambers versus Florida (1940) held that some
forms of psychological pressure could be interpreted as equally coercive. In
this case, the suspect was first threatened by mob violence and then grilled by
four interrogators over five consecutive days until he relented and confessed.
Since then, police practices, such as threats of harm or punishment, exces-
sively lengthy interrogations, promises of leniency, and denial of sleep and
food, are considered presumptively coercive.
Interrogation’s Tortuous Past 15

Rochin versus California (1952)

In Rochin versus California (1952), the U.S. Supreme Court established the “shock-
the-conscience” test. Through its interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment,
the Court ruling in Rochin prohibits depriving any person of “life, liberty, or
property without the due process of law” and prohibits shocking actions by
agents of the government that fall outside the standards of civilized decency.
In Rochin, three California law enforcement officers busted into the room
of Antonio Rochin under suspicion that he was selling narcotics. Fearing
arrest, Rochin quickly swallowed two morphine capsules on a nightstand
next to his bed. Wrestled to the ground, Rochin was next taken to a hospital
where he was forcedly induced to vomit the pills. Charged and convicted of
narcotics charges, Rochin tried to get the evidence of the capsules suppressed.
On an appeal, Supreme Court Justice Felix Frankfurter held that the con-
duct by the California law enforcement officers “shocks the conscience” and the
“canons of decency and fairness.” Their actions offended even those with “hard-
ened sensibilities.” They were representative of “methods too close to the rack and
screw.” The Court also emphasized that the same prohibition extends to federal
government officials under the due process provisions of the Fifth Amendment.

Miranda versus Arizona (1966)

Nearly 30 years after Chambers, the Supreme Court’s landmark ruling in
Miranda versus Arizona (1966) held that the police have a responsibility to
protect a suspect’s Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights during a custodial
interrogation. The Court’s decision in Miranda addressed four different cases
involving custodial interrogations. In each of these cases, the unrepresented
defendant was questioned by police officers, detectives, or a prosecuting attor-
ney in a room in which he was cut off from the outside world. In none of these
cases was the defendant given a full and effective warning of his rights at the
outset of the interrogation process. In all the cases, the questioning elicited
admissions and, in three of them, signed statements were admitted at trial.
The Miranda ruling served as a stepping-stone to a new era in law enforce-
ment doctrine. In taking the Miranda case, the Supreme Court determined
the future role that the police have in protecting the rights of the accused
guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination and
the Sixth Amendment right to an attorney. The Supreme Court ruled 5–4 in
favor of Miranda. This pivotal decision gave rise to what has become known
as the Miranda rights warning.
While many jurisdictions have their own regulations as to the precise
rights warning given to a person interrogated in police custody, the typical
rights warning has four basic elements reflected in the following figure, and
16 Tradecraft Primer

should conclude with the statement “Do you understand these rights as they
have been read to you?”

Standard Miranda Rights Warning

1. You have the right to remain silent.

2. Anything you say can and will be used

against you in a court of law.

3. You have the right to an attorney.

4. If you cannot afford an attorney, one will

be appointed for you.
Based on Miranda versus Arizona, 384 U.S.
436, 1966.

As part of the Miranda ruling, Chief Justice Earl Warren condemned what
he saw as the trend toward increasingly manipulative, deceptive, and psycholog-
ically coercive tactics relied on by the police to elicit confessions from defendants
during custodial interrogations. The following figure captures some of the major
concerns expressed by Chief Justice Warren as part of the Miranda ruling.

Criticized Deceptive Police Tactics

• Persistent, lengthy, and aggressively hostile questioning

• Undermining the relevance of the Fifth and Sixth

Amendment rights

• Offering the subject legal and moral excuses for the

act by casting blame on others or society

• Manipulating the subject’s psychological vulnerabilities

• Implying promises that cannot be met

• Fabricating false evidence by false witnesses

• Using empathy to misrepresent a police officer’s true

intentions
Modified from Miranda versus Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 1966.

To offset these manipulative tactics, the Miranda ruling also requires the
police seek a “waiver” from the subject before a custodial interrogation can
legally begin. Additionally, such waivers must be granted “voluntarily” and
“knowingly.” The two requirements are exacerbated when the English lan-
guage is not the suspect’s primary spoken language, there is no interpreter on
the scene, and when cultural dynamics come into play. Unless such a waiver is
Interrogation’s Tortuous Past 17

obtained and understood by the subject, an interrogation is presumed coercive

and the statements made during the interrogation are inadmissible.
As to the waiver, all the police officer needs to do after reading the
Miranda warning is state, “I would like to talk to you about matter XYZ.
Is this OK?” If the subject expresses a willingness to talk, the interrogation
may proceed. If, however, the subject refuses to talk or asks for an attorney,
the interrogation must terminate. Moreover, it is not permissible to pressure
subjects into waiving their Miranda rights. And, if after beginning the inter-
rogation a subject decides to change his or her mind and invokes Miranda,
the interrogation must terminate immediately.
Despite Chief Justice Warren’s concerns, once a suspect waives his or her
rights, a multitude of tactics open up to law enforcement, many of which may
appear unethical but legal. For instance, police interrogators may tell the sus-
pect that the murder victim is still alive; exaggerate or downplay the serious-
ness of the offense; tell the suspect that they have convincing evidence of his
or her guilt; tell the suspect that they are investigating one crime when, in fact,
they are investigating another; tell the suspect that a polygraph test indicates
guilt when it does not; or fake compassion, empathy, and friendship to elicit
confessions from the suspect.
Of course, there are limits to police deception. For instance, a police
interrogator or investigator cannot trick a criminal suspect into waiving his
or her Miranda rights; fabricate tangible false evidence, such as a forensics
report claiming the suspect’s fingerprints were on a weapon; or lie in the
courtroom in front of a judge. Beyond this, police deception and persuasive
ploys aimed at getting a confession are governed by the due process clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment and only when it violates fundamental c­ oncepts
of “fairness or egregious police misconduct” (Skolnick & Leo 1992).

Lessons from World War II

The Second World War elevated the importance of the interrogation trade­
craft. In support of both theaters of war—the Pacific and Europe—and even
stateside, the U.S. military established a number of strategic interrogation
centers where high-value enemy prisoners of war (POWs) underwent system-
atic questioning by skilled interrogators.
In the Pacific, we found ourselves at war against the Japanese—a people,
a culture, and a psychology profoundly different from our own. Fewer yet
understood their language. From a military perspective, the Japanese were
seen as fanatics, true believers ready to die for their emperor and in their
total commitment to the bushido code—one that emphasized a no-surrender
warrior mind-set epitomized by the myth of the samurai.
18 Tradecraft Primer

In the face of these challenges, the U.S. military implemented a success-

ful interrogation strategy—one for the army and another for the navy—which
was initially built on the limited cultural and linguistic skills available. The U.S.
Army largely capitalized on the native language skills of nisei—second-generation
American citizens of Japanese descent fluent in their parents’ native language and
born here. They largely served as enlisted members. Meanwhile, the U.S. Navy
initially relied on a cadre of formally trained officers; those who previously trained
as attachés and former American missionaries who served previously in Japan.
Meanwhile, as German troops entered Paris in 1940, plans were drawn
up to surge interrogators against Germany. Formal training of interroga-
tors destined for Europe began in 1942 at Fort Ritchie, Maryland. Basically
a “Dale Carnegie” approach to interrogation, the course emphasized that a
cigarette or a cup of coffee would frequently elicit more accurate and usable
information than threats. Like the United States’ effort to capitalize on nisei
in the Pacific, the strategic interrogation plans against Germany called for
recruiting recent immigrants from Europe in the United States or their chil-
dren who were fluent in their parents’ native language. Significant numbers
were Jews who fled Germany in the past several decades or less. Nicknamed
the Ritchie Boys, after their training center, most of them welcomed the
opportunity to return to Europe in the war against Hitler and the Nazi army.
While many interrogators on all sides of the war most certainly relied on
brutal and coercive tactics to get the information sought, anecdotal evidence
demonstrates that the most consistently successful among them, such as U.S.
Marine Major Sherwood Moran in the Pacific and even the respected German
Luftwaffe and Nazi master interrogator Hanns Scharff (Interrogation: World
War II, Vietnam, and Iraq 2008), recognized the inherent value of the following:

• Treating the enemy prisoners as human beings.

• Offering empathy and understanding.
• Ensuring their prisoners had access to food, clothing, and medical care.
• Relying on the power of psychology as a tool in interrogations.
• Avoiding humiliation, excessive coercion, and torture.

Unfortunately, the historical legacy and valuable lessons learned from our
nation’s successful military interrogation strategy of World War II were lost on a
new generation of American recruits who were largely unprepared for our upcom-
ing battles against Communism, the Iron Curtain, and the Cold War. By 1950,
for example, the army had fallen from over eight million men and women at its
height in the war to less than 600,000 soldiers. In the near frantic demobiliza-
tion of our military after the war, most of our experienced interrogators returned
home to assimilate back to civilian life. This loss in talent had profound implica-
tions on training future generations of interrogators for many decades ahead.
Interrogation’s Tortuous Past 19

The Cold War Era

The U.S. Experience in the Korean War

The Communist show trials of captured U.S. aviators during the Korean War
opened a national debate: How could U.S. service members confess to drop-
ping bombs filled with germs on civilian populations when these events did
not occur? Were they brainwashed—a term first popularized by psycholo-
gist Edward Hunter in 1951—or were they traitors? Researchers Hinkle and
Wolff (1957) concluded that there was no evidence that drugs, hypnosis,
or special devices had any significance in the interrogations—such as that
depicted in the movie The Manchurian Candidate. The overwhelming con-
clusion of their studies was that the Soviets and the Chinese were using tra-
ditional police interrogation tactics.
About the same time Hinkle and Wolff released their research, Farber,
Harlow, and West (1957) released a book that described what American POWs
experienced during their confinement at the hands of the North Koreans and
Chinese. Farber, Harlow, and West creatively coined the phrase “debility,
dependency, and dread” to explain what American military prisoners expe-
rienced at the hands of their captors. Debility was induced by conditions such
as semistarvation, fatigue, and disease. Control of their basic needs created
dependency. Dread was marked by intense fear and anxiety.
Today, psychologists and doctors engaged in treating those in recovery
from traumatic life events, typical of extreme coercive physical and psycho-
logical interrogation tactics when experienced over a prolonged period, rely
on other terms—captured in the following figure—to describe their impact
on at-risk or vulnerable persons.

Consequences of Physical
and Psychological Trauma
• Posttraumatic stress disorder manifested by prolonged,
recurring flashbacks and nightmares; significant
impairment and instability in life functions; suicidal
tendencies; and weakened physical health

• Depressive disorders manifested in self-destructive

and suicidal thoughts and behavior

• Psychosis, in the form of delusions, bizarre ideations

and behaviors, perceptual distortions, and paranoia

Adapted from Leave No Marks: Enhanced Interrogation

Techniques and the Risk of Criminality, Physicians for
Human Rights and Human Rights First, Washington,
DC, 2007.
20 Tradecraft Primer

However, not everyone exposed to brutal interrogations or mistreatment

will experience the anxiety of posttraumatic stress disorder or descend into
psychosis or related mental illnesses. People vary and so do their psychologi-
cal risk factors or vulnerabilities and their tolerance to stress, pain or terror,
and to extreme fear brought about by threats of death, mutilation, or rape.

On the Heels of the Vietnam Conflict

In response to the experiences of captured aviators in the Korean War, the
U.S. government started research on defensive techniques under an early
1960s Air Force contract to help with survival, evasion, resistance, and escape
(SERE) training for downed pilots.
Almost simultaneously, while the Air Force-sponsored research into
defensive techniques, the CIA took an alternate path. The Agency began
exploring offensive interrogation techniques. Among the research, it probed
the use of chemicals and drugs, sensory deprivation, hypnosis, and a multi-
tude of other unconventional methods to enhance interrogation outcomes.
This secretive program, codenamed MKULTRA, failed to achieve main-
stream acceptance and, upon its discovery, the U.S. Congress shut it down.
Some of MKULTRA’s major findings were captured in the infamous
KUBARK Counterintelligence Interrogation Manual (1963), whose publica-
tion happened to coincide near the start of the Vietnam conflict. Declassified
in 1997, the KUBARK Manual served as the intelligence community’s inter-
rogation primer for its time.
Despite the continuing criticism heaped on it, the KUBARK Manual
contains some valuable guidance among its pages for today’s interrogators:

• Develop rapport with the detainee.

• Treat each detainee as a unique individual.
• Tailor interrogations to a detainee’s personality.

Importantly, too, the KUBARK Manual encouraged interrogators to

ask themselves, “How can I make the subject want to tell me what he or she
knows?” rather than, “How can I trap him or her into disclosing what he or
she knows?” And it also offers this advice to interrogators: “[T]he KUBARK
questioner should aim not for a personal triumph but for his true goal—the
acquisition of all needed information by any authorized means.”
Ultimately, the KUBARK Manual lost standing within the intelligence
community and the military. Operating on limited research in offensive
interrogation strategies, the writers adopted harsh SERE training tactics to
meet many of its operational requirements. In doing so, the authors failed to
fully appreciate the artificiality of SERE-derived training scenarios, which
Interrogation’s Tortuous Past 21

sought to train our aviators in resistance techniques in opposition to coercive

Communist Chinese, North Korean, and Soviet interrogation tactics—tactics
that clearly conflicted with American values, our Constitution, and the
Geneva Conventions. Importantly, too, the KUBARK Manual’s character-
ization of human personality types lacked a sound basis in empirical-based
psychology.
Reflecting on why SERE training techniques make poor role models for
interrogations, the Senate Armed Forces Committee in its Inquiry into the
Treatment of Detainees Held in U.S. Custody (2008), echoed nearly the same
shortcomings identified as a weakness in the KUBARK Manual decades earlier:

• First, SERE lesson plans and techniques routinely employ a wide

range of coercive methods that often fall well outside of U.S. laws, the
Geneva Conventions, and other international treaties and human
rights guidelines.
• Second, although questioning is an important element of role play
exercises, this activity during SERE training does not reach the
depth required for either law enforcement investigations or for
intelligence-focused operations.
• Third, SERE instructors, although talented, lack the expertise
expected of fully trained interrogators or investigators.

Most importantly, though, the Communist interrogation techniques,

which served as a model for SERE training and adopted by the intelligence
community, were never intended to elicit reliable and useful information
from American prisoners. Rather, their goal was to beat down American
POWs to the point where they reluctantly participated in Communist propa-
ganda campaigns against our nation.

The U.S. Experience in the Vietnam Conflict

Like our recent experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Vietnam conflict
was characterized by a widespread insurgency and asymmetrical warfare.
A defining characteristic of an insurgency is the ability of insurgents to
transition quickly between the roles of combatant and civilian, making it
extremely difficult to identify the innocent from the enemy (Interrogation:
World War II, Vietnam, and Iraq 2008).
Unable to easily identify discrete targets—dressed largely like the general
population—U.S. military forces were limited in their ability to successfully
capitalize on their massive firepower. As in Iraq and Afghanistan, interroga-
tors were urgently needed to assist in identifying insurgents as well as their
bases, plans, targets, tactics, and supply routes.
22 Tradecraft Primer

Historians typically identify the Vietnam conflict in terms of a failed

counterinsurgency strategy. So, too, was the overall interrogation strategy that
supported forces in the field. Among its failures, the interrogation strategy

• Alienated the local Vietnamese population through its harsh meth-

ods on innocent civilians and legitimate captives alike; and
• Lacked sufficient preparatory training for the interrogators. Many were
unfamiliar with the culture, laws, customs, and language of Vietnam.

While there were certainly exceptions among the interrogators and their
methodologies—for one, Army Warrant Officer Sedgwick Tourison, who
authored Talking with Victor Charlie: An Interrogator’s Story (1991)—the
Cold War interrogation techniques in Korea and Vietnam largely failed to
offer future generations of interrogators a valuable legacy. As a consequence,
America was little prepared for what was about to emerge in the upcoming
conflicts in the Middle East.

Enter the Global War on Terror

The Gulf War (1990 to 1991) and the Bosnian conflict (1992 to 1995) saw little
advancements in the interrogation tradecraft. Direct military engagements
in these conflicts proved too short to sustain a surge in interrogator recruit-
ment, training, and operations.
The 2001 attacks of September 11, or 9/11, and their aftermath were a dif-
ferent matter. The horror of watching television footage of innocent men and
women jumping out of New York City’s World Trade Towers and their collapse,
followed by news footage of the Pentagon attack, and then learning of United
Flight 93’s crash in a remote cornfield in Shanksville, Pennsylvania, made a
lasting imprint on America’s psyche. Together, the three events represented
the largest ever foreign attack against the U.S. homeland. The fear of further
attacks was pervasive, as was the need to seek answers to urgent questions.
Who attacked us? Why? What did they want? What else were they planning?
The response was clear. We were at war with an enemy unlike any other.
With the encouragement of the American public and the U.S. Congress—and
bolstered by the Joint Resolution of September 18, 2001, which authorized
the use of “all necessary force”—our nation’s leaders used their mandate to
unleash every available tool in our national security arsenal to gather intel-
ligence and respond militarily to the terrorists—to do whatever it took to pre-
vent the next attack. The gloves came off and the Department of Defense and
the CIA responded. Just a day prior to the Congressional Joint Resolution,
on September 17, 2001, President George W. Bush had signed a covert action
Interrogation’s Tortuous Past 23

Memorandum of Notification. Under its authority, the CIA started putting in

place plans to capture, detain, and interrogate high-value terrorist members
of al-Qaeda who may possess critical, actionable intelligence needed to stop
further attacks against our homeland, our allies, and our interests worldwide
(U.S. Congress 2014).
Military internment facilities in Afghanistan, Cuba, Iraq, and elsewhere
soon exploded with battlefield detainees awaiting interrogation. Operating
with limited resources, many of these facilities were largely staffed by military
members, law enforcement officers, contractors, psychologists, SERE advisors,
linguists, analysts, and intelligence personnel inexperienced with managing
large-scale, long-term prisoner holding facilities. Many lacked substantive
interrogation skill sets, target familiarity, cultural awareness, and necessary
linguistic skills. All were working under intense pressure to uncover actionable
intelligence useful to protect our nation from further attacks and helpful to
field commanders in the conflict zones—Afghanistan and Iraq.
Both programs—within the military and within the CIA—were sup-
ported by a February 7, 2002, presidential memo entitled Humane Treatment
of al-Qaeda and Taliban Detainees, which denied al-Qaeda detainees for-
mal protections of the Geneva Conventions and Common Article 3 based
on their non-state actor status. On the other hand, the Taliban, while offered
some of the protections of the Geneva Conventions because of their former
association with the government of Afghanistan, were denied traditional
enemy POW status because, like al-Qaeda, they wore no uniforms, attacked
civilians and military alike, and failed to comply with traditional laws of war.

Renditions
Extradition is a process in which persons suspected of criminal activity are
involuntarily transferred from one country to another—to those which pos-
sessed legitimate arrest warrants for their detention and trial. It is typically
preceded by a formal legal process established by a bilateral treaty between
countries. Other related but dissimilar terms include deportation, in which
aliens residing in the United States are removed after an administrative hear-
ing for violations of immigration laws; and repatriation or resettlement, in
which persons voluntarily agree to relocate to their nation of origin or to a
host country willing to offer asylum. Far less common, though, is the U.S.
government’s involuntary transfer of individuals through a process known
as rendition. Unlike traditional extradition, persons subjected to rendition
typically have no access to the judicial system of the sending country through
which they may challenge their transfers. And, during President George W.
Bush’s administration, involuntary renditions took a prominent place within
our nation’s counterterrorism strategy. Human rights advocates and critics
24 Tradecraft Primer

of the administration claimed that the transfers were often to countries that
permitted harsh interrogation techniques prohibited in the United States,
including torture. In response, the administration did not deny that rendi-
tions took place—a practice that had been in effect since 1986—but denied
allegations that renditions were for purposes of torture (Garcia 2009).

Black Sites
Complementing the rendition program were efforts to remove prominent
al-Qaeda and Taliban operational planners and associates—about 119 high-
value terrorists in total—from their spheres of influence or power, whether
on or off the battlefield, and ship them to remote, covert holding facilities,
nicknamed black sites, where they were held incommunicado by the CIA for
follow-up questioning. In other instances, some were held in Department
of Defense–managed detention facilities; and, in other cases, some were
transferred to liaison partners willing to accept them for questioning (U.S.
Congress 2014).

Enhanced Interrogation Techniques

Among those held at black sites, a handful of hardened, uncooperative ter-
rorist detainees assessed with knowledge of time-sensitive and actionable
intelligence or knowledge of Usama bin Laden’s location were subjected to
enhanced interrogation techniques (see the following figure)—a program
managed by the CIA with the approval of the president, the National Security
Council, and the U.S. Department of Justice, and with the knowledge of key
members of the U.S. Congress. The underlying aim of the program was to
serve as a softening-up tool for the most recalcitrant among the captured
senior terrorist leaders in an effort to overcome their resistance and transi-
tion them from an uncooperative to a cooperative frame of mind in prepara-
tion for debriefings and follow-up questioning (U.S. Congress 2014).

Examples of Former CIA “Standard” and “Enhanced” Interrogation Techniques

• Attention grasp • Sleep deprivation
• Facial hold and slap • Waterboarding
• Sensory deprivationdarkness • Use of diapers and nudity
• Cramped confinement • Extended isolation
• Stress positions • Sensory bombardmentlight and
sound
Extracted from Guidelines on Medical and Psychological Support to Rendition,
Interrogation, and Detention, CIA Office of Medical Services, 2004, released
and declassified in 2005.
Interrogation’s Tortuous Past 25

Initially lacking in basic interrogation competencies and adequately

equipped internment facilities, detainee abuses and mistreatment among
some of those held were a predictable outcome—even several deaths.
Moreover, at least as controversial as some of the interrogation tactics or
techniques, detainees held incommunicado in undisclosed black sites were
outside of the visible protection of the International Committee of the Red
Cross—a recognized responsibility given it by international treaties such as
the Geneva Conventions.
Predictably, the Bush administration soon found itself under challenge. In
the 2006 case of Hamdan versus Rumsfeld, the U.S. Supreme Court rejected the
Bush administration’s February 2002 position that the Geneva Conventions
and Common Article 3 were not applicable to the present armed conflict with
al-Qaeda. The Hamdan ruling also denied the right of the president to convene
military commissions or tribunals to prosecute select terrorists imprisoned at
Guantanamo without U.S. Congressional legislation.
As a result of the Hamdan case, policy debates also surfaced among some
Congressional lawmakers over criminal liabilities that CIA officers could pos-
sibly face for the harsh interrogation tactics approved for their use at that time.
To mitigate such challenges, George W. Bush officially asserted his presidential
authority in July 2007 and signed Executive Order 13440, Interpretation of the
Geneva Conventions Common Article 3 as Applied to a Program of Detention
and Interrogation Operated by the Central Intelligence Agency.
The executive order formally declared al-Qaeda and Taliban unlawful
enemy and non-state actors, and, therefore, not entitled to protections as
state-sponsored prisoners of war under the Third Geneva Convention. On
the other hand, the President acceded to apply Common Article 3 standards
to detention and interrogation programs managed by the CIA in keeping
with the Supreme Court’s Hamdan ruling.
Critics of the Bush administration often fail to recall the national secu-
rity context in which the CIA operated its rendition, detention, and interro-
gation program on behalf of our nation. For the most part, these high-value
detainees served as second or third tier terrorist operatives and facilitators
within al-Qaeda and the Taliban, whose organizations posed a serious threat
of violence or death to our citizens, our military, and, in the case of al-Qaeda,
our nation. In other cases, some detainees served as principal planners for
secondary attacks or knew of others who were doing the planning, while oth-
ers knew of supporting logistical and financial networks. The security of our
nation depended on our ability to learn what these people knew (CIA 2014).
In the frantic rush to stop these terrorists and go after timely intel-
ligence, legal advisors in the Department of Justice and the White House
blurred and stretched interpretations of fundamental rights given to all
persons—­terrorists included—embedded in our nation’s Constitution,
26 Tradecraft Primer

our laws, and international treaties. We needed to put away the gloves—at
least partially—and we did.
Recognizing the need to modify its operations, CIA had already set in
motion a number of internal reforms for its rendition, interrogation, and
detainee program. Waterboarding stopped in 2003. And the last detainee to
experience an enhanced interrogation was in 2007. Meanwhile, largely as a
consequence of international pressure, a number of black sites had begun
to close. Some detainees were released; others were transferred to countries
willing to accept them or to countries who claimed legal jurisdiction; and, for
the most dangerous, transferred to the Department of Defense’s control and
its detention center at Guantanamo Naval Base, Cuba.

The Evolving Army Field Manual

The 1992 version of the Army Field Manual 34–52, Intelligence Interrogation
(1992), clearly recognized the need to restrain military interrogators from
engaging in torture. Prohibited were such things as mock executions; electric
shock; infliction of pain; chemically induced psychosis; forcing an individual
to stand, sit, or kneel in abnormal stressful positions for prolonged periods of
time; food and sleep deprivation; and beatings.
Following the 9/11 attacks, attitudes about interrogations within the
Department of Defense shifted. By December 2001, the Pentagon planned
the use of several new interrogation techniques with suspected al-Qaeda
and Taliban fighters in anticipation of the February 2002 presidential memo,
which denied al-Qaeda and the Taliban the protections of the Geneva
Conventions and its Common Article 3 and denied them traditional POW
status as terrorists. Labeling them stateless unlawful enemy combatants per-
mitted the military to use far more aggressive interrogation techniques than
those authorized for use against lawful, state-sponsored enemy combatants.
Included among the coercive techniques were sensory deprivation, use of
stress positions, forced standing for four or more hours, nudity, and using
dogs for intimidation. It did not last. By late 2003 to early 2004, and largely
in response to internal and external criticism and the shocking images of
leaked photos of detainees held in overseas military detention facilities
in Iraq—images that shocked America’s conscience—the Department of
Defense rescinded most of its most controversial techniques.
Within the U.S. Congress, the momentum against the use of harsh
coercive techniques against captured terrorist fighters gained traction. In
response, the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 was signed. In turn, the mili-
tary updated its principal field manual to comply with the act. In September
2006 the Army issued FM 2–22.3, Human Intelligence Collector Operations.
Interrogation’s Tortuous Past 27

This updated Army Field Manual restricted the Department of Defense

to “18 techniques plus 1,” several of which require general officer or higher
approval—for example, prolonged isolation or separation. They are shown in
the following figure.

Current Army Field Manual Interrogation Techniques

(1) The direct approach (10) We all know
(2) Incentive approach (11) File and Dossier approach
(3) Emotional love approach (12) Establish your identity
(4) Emotional hate response (13) Repetition
(5) Emotional fear-up approach (14) Rapid fire
(6) Emotional fear-down approach (15) Silent treatment
(7) Emotional-pride and ego up approach (16) Change of scenery
(8) Emotional-pride and ego down approach (17) Mutt and Jeff
(9) Emotional futility (18) False flag
(Plus 1) Separation [considered coercive]
Extracted from Army Field Manual 2–22.3, Human Intelligence Collector Operations,
Washington, DC, 2006.

Aside from directly questioning a detainee and the use of incentives,

permissible psychological ploys include appealing to the detainee’s emotions
and ego, leading the detainee to believe the interrogator knows more than he
or she, and confronting the detainee with false information. A more aggres-
sive tactic includes rapid-fire questioning. Still, others require general officer
authorization: “Mutt and Jeff,” a phrase adopted from British intelligence and
law enforcement, otherwise known as good cop/bad cop technique; false flag,
where a detainee is made to believe that he or she is being held by another
country known by the detainee for its harsh interrogations with the aim
to instill fear and gain cooperation; and separation, where the detainee is
socially isolated for extensive periods of time away from colleagues.
Specifically prohibited are any sort of physically coercive contact; threats
of force; nudity, sexual acts or posing detainees in sexual positions; hood-
ing except while in transit; beatings, electric shock, burning detainees, or
inducing other forms of physical pain; waterboarding; using military dogs to
intimidate detainees; mock executions; causing hypothermia; and depriving
the detainee of food, water, and needed medical care.
Despite the fanfare that accompanied the publication of the most recent
Army Field Manual and its endorsement by members of Congress, a 2010
article in The Journal of Psychiatry & Law (Evans, Meissner, Brandon et
al. 2010) and a follow-on 2012 article in the Journal of Applied Research in
Memory and Cognition (Evans, Houston, Meissner 2012) suggest that there
28 Tradecraft Primer

is little in the way of empirical science to back many of the military’s inter-
rogation or interview tactics and techniques. Still, others imply that several
of the techniques described in the Army Field Manual are likely ineffective,
coercive in some instances, and even counterproductive. Most experts agree
that further empirical-based research is needed to validate the interrogation
techniques or tactics captured within it.

A Major Force for Change

As a lead-up to the need for a sea of change in interrogation doctrine and

procedure within the military and intelligence community, Senator John
McCain, himself a former POW (1967 to 1973) and the target of harsh inter-
rogations while in custody of the North Vietnamese, voiced his objections in
2005 on the Senate floor against the use of torture by our military and the
intelligence community in the battle against terrorism:

[Although] the enemy we fight has no respect for human life or human rights
. . . this isn’t about who they are. This is about who we are. These are the val-
ues that distinguish us from our enemies, and we can never, never allow our
enemies to take those values away. (McCain 2005)

Nine years later, Senator McCain reiterated his concerns over the rev-
elations and findings now tied to the 2014 Senate Select Committee on
Intelligence report:

[T]he so-called “enhanced interrogation techniques” . . . actually damaged

our security interests, as well as our reputation as a force for good in the world.
. . . I know from personal experience that the abuse of prisoners will pro-
duce more bad than good intelligence. I know that victims of torture will offer
intentionally misleading information if they think their captors will believe it.
I know they will say whatever they think their torturers want them to say if
they believe it will stop their suffering. Our enemies act without conscience.
We must not. . . . (McCain 2014)

Presidential Executive Order 13491 reflected many of the same views

when it was signed by President Barack Obama on January 22, 2009. It will
be discussed in the next chapter.
Rights of Persons
in Custody
3
At least four amendments in our Constitution, along with several statutes and a
number of international treaties signed by the United States, protect persons in
custody or detention from mistreatment, including torture, at the hands of abu-
sive interrogators. Quite simply, their aims are to protect a person’s human dig-
nity and fundamental human rights—something all interrogators need to keep
in mind. More importantly, these collective documents serve as a vital reminder
that sticking to our nation’s core values is important—on or off the battlefield—
and when engaged in law enforcement, military, or intelligence interrogations.
At what point do interrogations violate human dignity? The U.S. Supreme
Court has long considered interrogations to violate human dignity if “cruel
and unusual” mistreatment “shocks the conscience.” Federal courts have also
held that, in some cases, such violations of human dignity—“cruel, inhu-
man, and degrading treatment”—can be implied even absent evidence of
any pain or physical injury to the subject. To a far more limited degree, the
Courts have also found that foreign terror detainees held overseas in U.S.
government detention facilities may receive some protections under the U.S.
Constitution, even when located offshore or in foreign territories, if such
facilities the U.S. wholly managed by the U.S. military.

Constitutional Provisions

Fifth Amendment

Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution

No person shall be held to answer for a capital,
or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment
or indictment of a grand jury, except in cases arising in
the land or naval forces, or in the militia, when in actual
service in time of war or public danger; nor shall any
person be subject for the same offense to be twice put
in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in
any criminal case to be a witness against himself,
nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law; nor shall private property be taken
for public use, without just compensation.

29
30 Tradecraft Primer

The Fifth Amendment creates a number of rights relevant to both criminal and
civil legal proceedings. In criminal cases, the Fifth Amendment guarantees the
right to a grand jury, forbids double jeopardy, and protects against self-incrimi-
nation. The right against self-incrimination serves as an important foundation in
the Miranda ruling. It also requires that due process, commonly interpreted as
fairness, be part of any proceeding that denies a citizen life, liberty, or property.
The “due process clause” prohibits intentional acts by federal officials
done in the course of their government duties, i.e., under color of law, that are
so maliciously offensive to human dignity that they “shock the conscience”
and cause unjustifiable harm to a person.

Sixth Amendment

Sixth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution

In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall

enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an
impartial jury of the state and district wherein
the crime shall have been committed, which
district shall have been previously ascertained by
law, and to be informed of the nature and cause
of the accusation; to be confronted with the
witnesses against him; to have compulsory
process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and
to have the assistance of counsel for his defense.

The Sixth Amendment guarantees the right to a public trial without unneces-
sary delay, the right to a lawyer, the right to an impartial jury, and the right to
know your accusers and the nature of the charges and evidence against you. It
has been most recently tested in a series of cases involving terrorism, but much
more often plays a part, for example, in cases that involve jury selection or the
protection of witnesses, including victims of sex crimes as well as witnesses
in need of protection from retaliation. Along with the Fifth Amendment, the
Sixth Amendment right to an attorney took center stage in the Miranda ruling.

Eighth Amendment

Eighth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution

Excessive bail shall not be required, nor

excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual
punishments inflicted.

Certainly the shortest among the amendments in the Constitution and often
discussed in the context of the death penalty, the Eighth Amendment prohibits
Rights of Persons in Custody 31

government officials associated with the criminal processes from intentionally

resorting to or inflicting “cruel and unusual punishment” that fails to meet “evolv­
ing standards of decency” to a convicted criminal or someone held as a pre-trial
detainee. The excessive fines clause surfaces, among other places, in cases of crim-
inal forfeiture, for example, when property is seized during a drug raid.

Fourteenth Amendment

Fourteenth Amendment
(excerpt) of the U.S. Constitution
Section 1.

All persons born or naturalized in the United

States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof,
are citizens of the United States and of the state
wherein they reside. No state shall make or
enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United
States; nor shall any state deprive any person of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law; nor deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws . . . .

The rulings under the Fourteenth Amendment apply to the states and not the
federal government. The Fourteenth Amendment offers state residents safe-
guards against arbitrary denial of life, liberty, or property by their state govern-
ment. It carries the “equal protection clause” and provides that no state shall
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. At the
time of its introduction, residents among several states, in some circumstances,
had different levels of protections from those offered by the federal government.
Another right found in the Fourteenth Amendment, the “due process clause” is
the only right stated twice in the Constitution, signaling its importance.
While the Fifth Amendment imposes the due process requirement on
the federal government, the Fourteenth Amendment does the same for the
states. In this Amendment, the phrase “equality before the law” interprets
the “due process clause” to prohibit acts by state government officials in the
course of their duties which “shock the conscience;” a ruling we discussed in
Chapter 2 under Rochin versus California (1952).

International Treaties

Like the system of checks and balances in the U.S. Constitution, the United
States has elected to subject itself to international laws and protocols that
32 Tradecraft Primer

offer checks on the use of power in times of war and international conflict.
Such recognition stemmed in part from the belief that only by binding itself
to a system of domestic and international laws that oppose abusive use of
power, such as torture, could the United States hope to avoid becoming what
it most opposes—a totalitarian regime.

Universal Declaration of Human Rights

The United Nations (UN) General Assembly adopted the Universal Declara­
tion of Human Rights to clarify the rights and fundamental freedoms that
member nations were obliged to protect. The Universal Declaration prohibits
such things as arbitrary arrest, detention, or exile of persons, as well as torture
and cruel or inhuman or degrading treatment. The Universal Declaration is
not a treaty and technically not binding on the United States, although a
number of its provisions are understood to reflect customary international
law. The Universal Declaration does not include an enforcement provision.

Geneva Conventions and Common Article 3

Four Major Treaties of the

Geneva Conventions

• The First Geneva Convention protects

wounded and sick soldiers on land during war.

• The Second Geneva Convention protects

wounded, sick, and shipwrecked military
personnel at sea during war.

• The Third Geneva Convention applies to

POWs.

• The Fourth Geneva Convention affords

protection to civilians, including those in
occupied territories.
Rights of Persons in Custody 33

The Geneva Conventions of 1949 and its four separate treaties, reflected
in the above figure, are at the core of international humanitarian law, the
body of law that seeks to regulate the conduct of war. Through it, responsible
nations seek to protect innocent persons from harm who do not, or no lon-
ger, take part in fighting, such as noncombatant civilians, aid workers, chil-
dren, women, medical personnel, and shipwrecked and wounded soldiers.
As of the year 2000, 194 nations agreed to the Conventions, making it largely
accepted throughout the globe.
Respect and protection of human life are at the root of the Geneva
Conventions. To accomplish it, the Conventions call for punitive criminal
trials against nations and leaders who violate its treaties. Such violations are
formally called “grave breaches.” Those responsible for “grave breaches” are
liable for extradition and trial to the International Criminal Court in the
The Hague, no matter what nationality they may hold. Among other duties
of the signatories to the Conventions are the obligations, vis-a-vis the civil-
ian population, to provide humanitarian relief in territories where they serve
as occupying powers; and the duty to permit access to detainees and POWs
under their custody or control to the International Committee of the Red
Cross.

Common Article 3
Common Article 3 marks a breakthrough in the agreements since it cov-
ers, for the first time, situations of noninternational armed conflict or, in
other words, conflicts short of general war. According to the International
Committee of the Red Cross, 80% of the victims of conflicts since 1945 have
been victims of noninternational armed conflict and, typically, such con-
flicts are often even more cruel and lethal than general international wars.
Types of noninternational armed conflicts vary greatly. They include tradi-
tional civil wars, internal armed conflicts that spill over into other nations, or
internal conflicts in which a third-party government or a multinational force
intervenes alongside a legitimate government under attack. These include
our experiences in Korea and Vietnam and contemporary conflicts such as
present-day Syria, Iraq and Afghanistan.
34 Tradecraft Primer

Common Article 3 for Conflicts Short of International War

In the case of armed conflict not of an international character occurring in the territory
of one of the High Contracting Parties, each party to the conflict shall be bound to apply,
as a minimum, the following provisions:

(1) Persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including members of armed forces
who have laid down their arms and those placed “hors de combat” by sickness, wounds,
detention, or any other cause, shall in all circumstances be treated humanely, without
any adverse distinction founded on race, colour, religion or faith, sex, birth or wealth,
or any other similar criteria.

To this end, the following acts are and shall remain prohibited at any time and in any
place whatsoever with respect to the above-mentioned persons:

(a) violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds, mutilation, cruel
treatment and torture;

(b) taking of hostages;

(c) outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment;

(d) the passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions without previous
judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court, affording all the judicial
guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples.

(2) The wounded and sick shall be collected and cared for.

An impartial humanitarian body, such as the International Committee of the Red Cross,
may offer its services to the parties to the conflict. The parties to the conflict should
further endeavour to bring into force, by means of special agreements, all or part
of the other provisions of the present Convention.
The application of the preceding provisions shall not affect the legal status of the
parties to the conflict.

In many ways, Common Article 3 is like a miniconvention within the

Conventions since it contains the essential rules of the Geneva Conventions
in a condensed format and makes them applicable to conflicts not of an inter-
national character. Among its key provisions, Common Article 3 states that
all persons taking place in hostilities “shall in all circumstances be treated
humanely” and bans all “violence to life and person,” including “cruel
treatment and torture” . . . and “outrages upon personal dignity, in par-
ticular, humiliating and degrading treatment” at any time and in any place
whatsoever.
In instances of both the Geneva Conventions and Common Article 3,
the International Committee of the Red Cross is given the right to offer its
services to the parties in conflict and may request access to POW internees
and protected persons held in detention centers to ensure their humanitar-
ian needs are met. Such humanitarian needs include food, shelter, clothing,
medical treatment, personal mail, and recreation.
Rights of Persons in Custody 35

UN Convention against Torture

The most well known among international agreements prohibiting torture is
the UN Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment, sometimes referred to in some circles as the
Convention or CAT in others. It has more than 140 nations as its signatories
and was adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1984. It went into effect on
June 26, 1987. The core provisions of the Convention establish a regime for
international cooperation in the criminal prosecution of torturers. Each state
party to the Convention is required to either prosecute torturers who are found
in their territory or permit their extradition to other countries for prosecution.
While a number of prior international agreements and declarations con-
demned and prohibited torture, the Convention appears to be the first inter-
national agreement to actually attempt to define the term. Article 1 of the
Convention specifies that torture is understood to mean
any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intention-
ally inflicted . . . for such purposes as obtaining . . . information or a confession,
punishing . . . intimidating or coercing . . . for any reason . . . when such pain or
suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation . . . consent or acquiescence of a public
official or other person acting in an official capacity. It does not include pain or
suffering arising only from, inherent in, or incidental to lawful sanctions.

Importantly, this definition clearly specifies that both physical and men-
tal suffering can constitute torture, and that for such suffering to constitute
torture, it must be purposefully inflicted. Additionally, acts of torture covered
under the Convention must be committed by someone acting under the “color
of law.” So, for example, if a private individual is the cause of intense suffering
of another, absent the “instigation, consent, or acquiescence” of a public offi-
cial, such action does not constitute torture for purposes of the Convention.
The Convention also requires governments to take effective measures to pre-
vent torture within their borders, and forbids governments from transporting
people to any country where there is reason to believe that they will be tortured.
The United States ratified the Convention in 1994. But, it did so with a
Senate reservation that (1) the act specifically intended to inflict severe physi-
cal or mental pain or suffering; and that (2) the U.S. considers itself bound
to prevent cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment only to the
extent that such treatment or punishment is prohibited by the Fifth, Eighth,
and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution.

International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)

Article VII of the ICCPR, ratified by the United States in 1992, prohibits
states from subjecting persons “to torture or to cruel, inhuman, or degrading
36 Tradecraft Primer

treatment or punishment.” The Human Rights Committee, the monitoring

body of the ICCPR, has interpreted this prohibition to prevent governments
from exposing “individuals to the danger of torture or cruel, inhuman or
degrading treatment or punishment upon return to another country by way
of their extradition, expulsion or refoulement.” (Refoulement, by the way, is
the forcible return of refugees or asylum seekers to a country where they are
liable to be subjected to persecution.)
Although the Human Rights Committee is charged with monitoring the
compliance of parties with the ICCPR, its opinions are not binding law. The
U.S. ratification of the ICCPR was contingent upon the inclusion of a reser-
vation that the treaty’s substantive obligations were not self-executing (i.e.,
they require domestic-implementing legislation in order for courts to enforce
them). The United States also declared that it considered Article VII binding
to the extent that “cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment”
(prohibited by ICCPR Article VII) means the cruel and unusual treatment or
punishment prohibited by the Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to
the Constitution of the United States. The United States has not yet enacted
laws or regulations to comply with the Human Rights Committee’s position
that ICCPR Article VII prohibits the transfer of persons to countries where
they would likely face torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment.

Istanbul Protocol
The 1999 Istanbul Protocol, also called The Manual on the Effective Investigation
and Documentation of Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment, is a nonbinding set of international guidelines which
encourage governments to document incidents of torture and other forms of ill-
treatment and to punish those responsible in a prompt and impartial manner.
Among its provisions, the Istanbul Protocol warns governments, physicians,
and lawyers investigating incidences that “the absence of physical evidence
should not be construed to suggest that torture did not occur, since such acts of
violence against persons frequently leave no marks or permanent scars.”

U.S. Laws, Statutes, and Executive Orders

Torture Victims Protection Act (TVPA)

The TVPA is a statute that allows for the filing of civil suits in the United
States against individuals who, acting in an official capacity of a foreign gov-
ernment, committed torture or extrajudicial killings. The statute requires
Rights of Persons in Custody 37

the plaintiff to show that he or she exhausted attempts to petition the courts
where the event took place, if possible, before seeking the help of U.S. courts.
In 1992, Sister Dianna Ortiz was the first to file a case under the act, in
a civil action against former general and Defense Minister Héctor Gramajo
of Guatemala, contending that he was responsible for her abduction, rape,
and torture by military forces in Guatemala in November 1989. A federal
court in Massachusetts ruled in her favor, awarding her $5 million in dam-
ages in 1995. And, the TVPA has also been used by both foreign national and
U.S. victims of terrorism to sue foreign states that had been designated by
the United States as sponsors of terrorism, such as Iran, if the plaintiff can
show that his or her injuries were caused by the state’s support of a terrorist
organization.

War Crimes Act (WCA)—18 U.S.C. § 2441

Federal law 18 United States Code (U.S.C.) § 2441 is known as the War Crimes
Act. Fully in effect from 1997 to 2006, the WCA broadly criminalized all vio-
lations of Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions. The WCA applies
to acts committed “inside or outside the United States” in any circumstance
“where the person committing such war crime or the victim of such war crime
is a member of the Armed Forces of the United States or a national of the
United States.”
In 2006, the Military Commissions Act (MCA) narrowed the definition
of what are “war crimes” by asserting only “grave breaches” of Common
Article 3 would constitute war crimes and citing the nine specified acts listed
in the WCA. They are

Torture. The act of a person who commits, or conspires or attempts

1.
to commit, an act specifically intended to inflict severe physical or
mental pain or suffering (other than pain or suffering incidental to
lawful sanctions) upon another person within his custody or physi-
cal control for the purpose of obtaining information or a confession,
punishment, intimidation, coercion, or any reason based on dis-
crimination of any kind.
Cruel or inhuman treatment. The act of a person who commits, or
2.
conspires or attempts to commit, an act intended to inflict severe
or serious physical or mental pain or suffering (other than pain or
suffering incidental to lawful sanctions), including serious physical
abuse, upon another within his custody or control.
Performing biological experiments. The act of a person who subjects,
3.
or conspires or attempts to subject, one or more persons within his
38 Tradecraft Primer

custody or physical control to biological experiments without a legit-

imate medical or dental purpose and in so doing endangers the body
or health of such person or persons.
Murder. The act of a person who intentionally kills, or conspires or
4.
attempts to kill, or kills whether intentionally or unintentionally in
the course of committing any other offense under this subsection,
one or more persons taking no active part in the hostilities, includ-
ing those placed out of combat by sickness, wounds, detention, or
any other cause.
Mutilation or maiming. The act of a person who intentionally injures, or
5.
conspires or attempts to injure, or injures whether intentionally or unin-
tentionally in the course of committing any other offense under this
subsection, one or more persons taking no active part in the hostilities,
including those placed out of combat by sickness, wounds, detention, or
any other cause, by disfiguring the person or persons by any mutilation
thereof or by permanently disabling any member, limb, or organ of his
body, without any legitimate medical or dental purpose.
Intentionally causing serious bodily injury. The act of a person who
6.
intentionally causes, or conspires or attempts to cause, serious bodily
injury to one or more persons, including lawful combatants, in viola-
tion of the law of war.
Rape. The act of a person who forcibly or with coercion or threat
7.
of force wrongfully invades, or conspires or attempts to invade, the
body of a person by penetrating, however slightly, the anal or genital
opening of the victim with any part of the body of the accused, or
with any foreign object.
Sexual assault or abuse. The act of a person who forcibly or with coer-
8.
cion or threat of force engages, or conspires or attempts to engage, in
sexual contact with one or more persons, or causes, or conspires or
attempts to cause, one or more persons to engage in sexual contact.
Taking hostages. The act of a person who, having knowingly seized or
9.
detained one or more persons, threatens to kill, injure, or continue
to detain such person or persons with the intent of compelling any
nation, person other than the hostage, or group of persons to act or
refrain from acting as an explicit or implicit condition for the safety
or release of such person or persons.

Federal Torture Statute—18 U.S.C. § 2340–2340B

In response to the 1987 UN Convention Against Torture, Congress did not
enact new domestic laws to criminalize acts of torture committed within the
Rights of Persons in Custody 39

jurisdiction of the United States. It was presumed that such acts would be
covered by existing applicable federal and state statutes. However, it did add
Chapter 113C to the United States Criminal Code (Federal Torture Statute,
18 U.S.C. § 2340–2340B), which criminalizes acts of torture that occur outside
the United States to implement its treaty obligations under the Convention.
The Torture Act criminalizes acts of torture committed by a government
official or representative acting “under color of law” and specifically intend-
ing to inflict severe physical or mental pain or suffering upon a person within
his custody or control under the following four elements of proof:

1. The act took place outside of the United States.

2. The act was performed under color of law.
3. The victim was under the defendant’s custody or physical control.
4. The act was intended to inflict severe physical or mental pain or suffering.

The statute defines “severe mental pain or suffering” as prolonged men-

tal harm caused by or resulting from (1) the intentional infliction or threat-
ened infliction of severe physical pain or suffering; (2) the administration
or threatened administration of mind-altering substances; (3) the threat of
imminent death; or (4) the threat that another will be imminently subjected
to any of the above three acts to coerce and influence the principal subject.

Detainee Treatment Act (DTA)

Popularly called the McCain Amendment, the DTA, which Congress passed
in 2005, asserts that “no person in the custody or under the physical control
of the United States government, regardless of nationality or physical location,
shall be subject to torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or pun-
ishment.” Among other things, the DTA contains provisions that

• Requires all members of the U.S. military to employ United States

Army Field Manual guidelines while interrogating detainees;
• Prohibits the “cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or punish-
ment” of persons held in detention, custody, or control of Department
of Defense and in its holding facilities;
• Removed the federal courts’ jurisdiction over detainees wishing to
challenge the legality of their detention, stating that “no court, jus-
tice or judge shall have jurisdiction to hear or consider” applications
on behalf of Guantanamo detainees; and
• Provides legal defense to U.S. personnel in any civil or criminal action
brought against them on account of their “good-faith” participation
in the authorized interrogation of suspected foreign terrorists.
40 Tradecraft Primer

Within the DTA, prohibitions against “cruel, inhuman or degrading

treatment or punishment” is the same as in the UN Convention Against
Torture and is interpreted to mean “the cruel, unusual and inhumane
treatment or punishment” prohibited by the Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth
Amendments to the U.S. Constitution.

Military Commissions Act (MCA)

In response to the restrictive provisions of the 1996 WCA and the 2005 DTA,
which the Bush administration claimed impeded U.S. government interro-
gations in its war against terrorism, and the Hamdan ruling, which applied
Common Article 3 to the war with al-Qaeda and held that military tribu-
nals or commissions to try terrorists needed Congressional legislation, the
White House encouraged Congress to pass the MCA. It did in 2006. This act
narrows interpretations of the DTA and violations of Common Article 3 to
the nine specified “grave breaches” listed in the WCA, previously discussed.
Within the MCA, torture is defined as “an act specifically intended
to inflict severe physical or mental pain or suffering (other than pain or
suffering incidental to lawful sanctions) upon another person within his
custody or physical control for the purpose of obtaining information or
a confession, punishment, intimidation, coercion, or any reason based on
discrimination of any kind.” Cruel or inhuman treatment is defined in the
MCA as “an act intended to inflict severe or serious physical or mental
pain or suffering including serious physical abuse, upon another within his
custody or control.”
The MCA also reestablished military tribunals or commissions, sus-
pended under the Hamdan ruling, to prosecute select terror defendants
held in Guantanamo rather than offer them access to U.S. courts. The
MCA was highly controversial at the time of its passage. Civil rights advo-
cates claimed that it suspended detainee rights of habeas corpus and due
process, violated the U.S. Constitution, and ignored still other provisions
in the Geneva Conventions.
In 2008, and on review of the MCA, the U.S. Supreme Court held
in Boumediene versus Bush (2008) that a terrorist detainee held in
Guantanamo had the right to petition federal courts under writ of habeas
corpus, but that such challenges do not guarantee release and upheld con-
tinuing detention even if the petitioner is no longer a threat. Moreover, the
Court reaffirmed the use of military tribunals or commissions to prose-
cute Guantanamo defendants, at the government’s discretion, for their war
crimes. In response to the Court’s rulings, and an accommodation to the
judicial challenge, the MCA was amended in 2009 to offer some additional
Constitutional protections for defendants (see https://www.aclu.org/).
Rights of Persons in Custody 41

Executive Order 13491

Two days after taking office on January 20, 2009, President Obama issued
Executive Order 13491 under the title Ensuring Lawful Interrogations.
In its opening paragraph, the new Presidential order revoked former
President Bush’s Executive Order 13440 of July 20, 2007, which had offered
al-Qaeda and Taliban captives only limited protections of the Geneva
Conventions and Common Article 3. Instead, this new executive order
affirmed Common Article 3 of the Geneva Convention, the Federal Torture
Statute, and the Detainee Treatment Act as the standards for the humane
treatment of detainees held in U.S. government detention facilities.
Next, in a direct rebuke of the enhanced interrogation program,
President  Obama’s order revoked “all directives, orders, and regulations
inconsistent with this order and issued to or by the Central Intelligence
Agency from September 11, 2001 to January 20, 2009 concerning detention
or the interrogation of detained individuals.” Black sites were ordered closed.
Additionally, with publication of the President’s executive order, the CIA
officially terminated its rendition, interrogation, and detention program.
The executive order then set other compliance standards for our nation’s
interrogation program. It declared Army Field Manual 2–22.3 (2006), Human
Intelligence Collector Operations, as the operative interrogation directive for the
Department of Defense and the entire intelligence community. In doing so, the
executive order now restricts the intelligence community and any others per-
forming interrogations inside Department of Defense internment or holding
facilities to techniques and tactics contained within the Army Field Manual.
In sharp contrast to the restrictions placed on the general intelligence
community, the Federal Bureau of Investigations and other federal law
enforcement agencies received an exemption when performing interroga-
tions outside of Department of Defense internment facilities to existing
“authorized, non-coercive techniques of interrogation that are designed to
elicit voluntary statements and do not involve the use of force, threats, or
promises.” The “techniques” were never specified.
As a matter of emphasis, the executive order reiterated the prohibition against

• Torture, as defined under Federal Torture Statute (18 U.S.C. § 2340);

• Cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment, as defined under the
DTA and MCA;
• Any activities subject to criminal penalties under the WCA, such as
murder, rape, and mutilation;
• Willful and outrageous acts of personal abuse done for the purpose
of humiliating or degrading the individual in a manner so serious
that any reasonable person would deem them beyond the bounds of
42 Tradecraft Primer

human decency—sexually indecent acts, threatening the person with

sexual mutilation, or using the individual as a human shield; and
• Acts intended to denigrate the religion, religious practices, or reli-
gious objects of the individual.

Further, the executive order directed the U.S. Attorney General to cre-
ate a Special Interagency Task Force on Interrogation and Transfer Policies.
Among its responsibilities, the Special Interagency Task Force was tasked to

• Evaluate the adequacy of Army Field Manual and its interrogation

techniques for use by agencies outside of the Department of Defense
and to recommend any other additional or different guidance for
such agencies;
• Establish a scientific research program for interrogation in order to
“study the comparative effectiveness of interrogation approaches and
techniques with the goal of identifying existing techniques that are
the most effective and developing new lawful techniques to improve
intelligence interrogations”; and
• Review the practices of transferring individuals to other nations
under the rendition program.

On August 24, 2009, the Special Interagency Task Force released its find-
ings and concluded

• That the Army Field Manual “provides appropriate guidance for mil-
itary interrogators and that no additional or different guidance was
necessary for other agencies” (DOJ 2009). It did not further amplify.
• That with regard to the rendition program, the Task Force mandated
U.S. transfer practices included injecting the U.S. State Department
to monitor the treatment of transferred persons to nations receiving
detainees.

For our nation’s most dangerous terror captives, the Attorney General
approved the creation of the High-Value Detainee Interrogation Group (HIG).
By design, the HIG is to bring together the most effective and experienced
interrogators from across the intelligence community, the Department of
Defense, and law enforcement; and its main role would be intelligence gather-
ing. Yet the Special Interagency Task Force guidance also provides the option
of preserving information to be used in potential criminal investigations and
prosecutions. Interrogations of high-value terrorists would be performed by
mobile teams of experienced interrogators, analysts, subject matter experts,
Rights of Persons in Custody 43

and linguists. Among its roles, the HIG would also develop and publish a set
of best practices for conducting interrogations.
In a follow-up to his executive order and in a White House press release
on April 16, 2009, President Obama stated that his administration was not
interested in prosecuting current and former intelligence officers who car-
ried out interrogations based on the Department of Justice’s legal reasoning
prior to the issuance of his 2009 executive order:

This is a time for reflection, not retribution. I respect the strong views and
emotions that these issues evoke. We have been through a dark and painful
chapter in our history. But at a time of great challenges and disturbing dis-
unity, nothing will be gained by spending our time and energy laying blame
for the past. Our national greatness is embedded in America’s ability to right
its course in concert with our core values, and to move forward with confi-
dence. That is why we must resist the forces that divide us, and instead come
together on behalf of our common future. (White House 2009)

Challenges Yet Ahead

The case law rulings and interpretations of the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and
Fourteenth Amendments are continuously evolving for both criminal sus-
pects held in custody by police within the United States and for foreign terror
suspects and enemy combatants held by our military in overseas U.S. govern-
ment detention facilities. All are open to evolving legal interpretations and
policy debates.
In general, the courts have determined the following types of acts are
prohibited under these Amendments:

• Handcuffing an individual to a post or wall in a standing or stressful

position for an excessive period of time.
• Maintaining temperatures and ventilation systems in detention
facilities that fail to meet reasonable levels of comfort.
• Prolonged interrogations over an extended period, including interro-
gations of a duration that might not seem unreasonable but becomes
such when evaluated in the totality of the circumstances.
• Intentionally causing serious bodily harm, maiming, and injury
involving a substantial risk of death; or causing extreme physical
pain, disfigurement, or the loss or impairment of the function of a
body member, organ, or mental faculty.
• Beatings, sexual assaults, and rape.
44 Tradecraft Primer

While it might seem obvious to most of us that the methods highlighted

above amount to “cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment,” a
leading number of congressional lawmakers—led by Senators John McCain
of Arizona and Dianne Feinstein of California—wanted to avoid any ambi-
guity when it came to interrogations in conflict or war zones. Together, the
two Senators rallied bipartisan support in 2015 to add an amendment to
the 2016 Defense Appropriations Act. Titled Limitations on Interrogation
Techniques, and short-named the McCain–Feinstein Amendment, it cements
into law key features of President Obama’s Executive Order 13491. The aims
were clear: to close any misinterpretations of the laws against torture and
deny the opportunity for future presidents to loosen the reins.
This amendment now broadens the mandate found in the DTA of 2005.
Now, “all” government agencies must rely on the Army Field Manual when
engaged in detainee interrogations, further solidifying the aims of President
Obama’s Executive Order. The amendment stipulates that any person in cus-
tody or under control of the United States or detained in a U.S. facility in any
armed conflict can be interrogated using only the techniques in the Army
Field Manual. Federal law enforcement, as an exception, would continue to
use previously approved, noncoercive techniques.
Also tied to the amendment is the requirement for the Department of
Defense to review and update the Army Field Manual, no later than one year
of the amendment’s enactment and at least once every three years thereafter,
capturing relevant “evidence-based, best practices” that do not rely on physi-
cal violence or threats of force and which elicit “reliable” and “voluntary”
statements. In support of transparency, the amendment mandates that the
Army Field Manual continue as an openly available and accessible unclas-
sified publication. Moreover, the amendment asserts that all agencies of the
government engaged in overseas operations must provide the International
Red Cross with access to detainees held in their custody or control.
On Being Human
4
An infinite number of variables are at play inside the interrogation room that
impact the subject and the interrogator. The most impactful among them
are the dynamics of being human. Your understanding of how being human
influences the suspect or detainee gives you a powerful vantage point to bet-
ter understand the person sitting before you—on a human level—and what
it may take to influence the subject to cooperate with questioning and, ulti-
mately, steer the interrogation to a satisfactory outcome.

Understanding Memory

As pointed out in a government-sponsored Intelligence Science Board study,

interrogators need a sound understanding of how memory works and how
it sometimes fails us—how it perceives, stores, and retrieves information
(Intelligence Interviewing 2009). Without this basic knowledge, interroga-
tors may misinterpret or even contaminate the information inside the sub-
ject’s memory, fail to help the subject with memory recall, or fail to discern
truth from lies. And, while the human brain still largely remains a great mys-
tery, recent breakthroughs in cognitive science are teaching us more than we
have ever known about the human mind and memory.
Many people believe that the human mind acts like a video recorder, cap-
turing all experiences exactly as they occur and storing them in a database—­
our memory—until retrieved. Such a model overestimates the capacity of
the human brain. Consequently, when a suspect or detainee fails to provide
a full picture or claims to have no memory of the topic, the tendency is to
interpret the faulty memory to an uncooperative, evasive, or deceptive sub-
ject. Typically, the common response of interrogators is to ratchet up the
psychological pressure on the subject with tactics that further elevate stress
and tension, which may further exacerbate memory recall abilities (Educing
Information 2006). Knowing what we now know about stress on memory
recall, a better alternative strategy might be to try working calmly with the
subject to help the person remember the information sought. But to do so
requires a shift in existing interrogation paradigms.

45
46 Tradecraft Primer

Shown in the following figure are examples of some factors that may neg-
atively influence or alter memory recall and the ability of a person to accu-
rately perceive, store, and retrieve information.

Major Influence on Memory Recall

• Fragility of memory recall over time

• Contaminated or compromised knowledge
based on unconscious influence of the
questioner
• A false confession based on psychological
vulnerability to police or interrogator
inducement
• No knowledge of events or persons
• Effects of stress on an individual’s behavior
and memory recall
• Deliberate acts of lying, deceit, and omission
or obfuscation

Other Factors Influencing Memory

An infinite number of other factors also influence memory and outcomes

inside the interrogation room. Here are some obvious ones.

Gisting
Our memories favor gisting (broad concepts) over details. So while the capac-
ity of human memory for gist is quite good, our memory for associative details
may fail us, particularly over time or in high-stress situations, and is vulnerable
to suggestion. It seems that in a highly charged life-altering event, we also expe-
rience a sort of tunnel vision retaining the most vivid memories of the central
or core event while often discarding peripheral information. Such implications
about our memories are important, especially when an interrogator is trying to
help someone recall details for court testimony in a criminal case or when we
are debriefing a victim or witness after a terror attack.

Reality Mapping
Errors in reality mapping mean that a person may retain a memory, but
forget or misattribute the origin of that memory. For example, a mem-
ory may have originated in a daydream, a conversation with a friend, a
story read or seen in a movie. In trying to recall the memory, the per-
son may misattribute the original source to the wrong one. This explains
why the memory may be real in the mind’s eye, but a real memory is not
On Being Human 47

necessarily accurate. Too often, as we previously just discussed in the sec-

tion “Gisting,” it seems that we are poor judges of the accuracy of our own
memories. For example, an individual may remember the overall content
of a conversation at a meeting, but at the same time may make several
errors with regard to who said what and the order in which people spoke.

Stress
Stress, even at moderate levels, may impair memory recall in subjects—
especially during interrogations—or in eyewitnesses (Loftus 2011). A text-
book example of this comes from the annals of Northwestern University’s
School of Law near Chicago where Professor Fred Inbau—the respected
lifelong associate of John E. Reid—taught criminal justice for 32 years.
During one of his classes, an armed robber burst in and mugged Inbau in
the middle of a lecture on policing. After the robber fled with his briefcase,
Inbau asked the class to describe his attacker. An abbreviated synopsis of
student observations is captured below. The results were startling.
Some said the robber was fat; others said thin. Some said the robber wore
glasses; others said he didn’t. Some said he was short about 5 feet 6 inches;
others as tall as 6 feet 6 inches tall. Some said the robber’s hair was jet black;
others said bleached blond or it just might have been mousy brown. Some
said the robber wore a denim shirt and blue jeans; others a leather jacket and
brown corduroys. (The Economist, June 11, 1998)

By the way, the entire event was staged. Inbau, the professor, was a skep-
tic on the reliability of eyewitnesses and sought to persuade his students to
put their faith in hard forensic evidence over witness statements.

Passage of Time
We know memories decay over time without use, but not all memories
decay at the same rate. Additionally, once recovered, information apparently
becomes easier to retrieve the second time around, thus slowing the decay.
Once remembered, the repetition of a story or event may have an impact on
the retrieval of other ancillary information to the point where the story will
slightly change with each retelling, as new details are recalled and retrieved.
Along these same lines, the more meaningful and personally relevant an
event is to the person, the more easily the person will retrieve the core infor-
mation. If carefully done, providing cues or prompting with partial detail
may help the person recall information. But be careful. Priming memory
with hints and cues may also corrupt the accuracy of that information, even
in fully cooperative subjects.
48 Tradecraft Primer

Suggestibility and Memory Distortion

The study of suggestibility is to understand that, under certain conditions,
“leading” questions are likely to have a powerful influence on memory recall
in witnesses or victims. Consequently, interrogators need to keep in mind
the form, the content, and the manner in which their questions are asked
and framed. Inadvertently, a questioner may influence vulnerable persons
to suggestion and, therefore, to false recollections. And, once a person has
recalled information falsely, it may be difficult for that person to let go of the
false memory and distinguish it from a real one.
Along the same lines of suggestibility, memory distortion occurs when
postevent information contaminates the recall of events, say a crime or an
accident. Again, subjects may unconsciously simply repeat what they have
learned from a neighbor, friend, or from the news media. As with sug-
gestibility, once inaccurate postevent information is recalled during an
earlier retrieval attempt, it increases the likelihood that the same incor-
rect information will be recalled in a subsequent retrieval opportunity
(Loftus 2011).

Situational Dynamics
Such factors may include the circumstances and the time of day of the arrest
and the interrogation. More often than not, for example, executing an arrest
early in the morning and suddenly waking someone up from sleep is disori-
enting and may weaken a subject’s ability to resist and cope with the subse-
quent questioning. Or, simply the shock of capture might influence a subject
to cooperate.

Physical and Emotional Isolation

Abject feelings of loneliness and separation from family and friends are com-
monly the first emotions anyone behind bars experiences. Moreover, many
interrogation manuals emphasize isolating the subject from external influ-
ences that might obstruct his or her willingness to confess, tell the truth, or
answer questions.

Fear
Fear involves the desire to avoid harm and uncertainty and, in either
instance, can be a powerful motivator. Going through an arrest and being
confined behind bars are clearly stressful events, especially for the first-
time offender. With rare exceptions, people change when they enter the
On Being Human 49

interrogation room and are brought under custody and placed in detention.
They frequently lose their identity and confidence. Loyalties change; pri-
orities change (Interview with Michael Koubi: Israeli Interrogator 2004). A
person’s imagination may go wild as well. Such uncertainty frequently raises
fear levels: fear of being locked up with strangers; fear of the consequences
for lying to the interrogator; and, if guilty, fear tied to the consequences of
a confession. Such emotions may serve as powerful precursors for either
truth-telling or deceit.

Guilt, Shame, and Humiliation

Guilt, shame, and humiliation serve as three emotions that frequently
influence an interrogation. Shame is often perceived by a subject as a
degrading, humiliating experience. It often accompanies a sense of expo-
sure. In contrast, guilt is associated with some real or imagined past
wrongdoing that is inconsistent with the person’s values and standards.
While feelings of guilt may serve to motivate some to confess, feelings
of shame and humiliation have the opposite effect, often hardening the
person against confession.
As an example of this, read what Marine Sergeant Andrew Tahmooressi
said in an abridged excerpt from a television interview shortly after his release
from a Mexican prison. He spent over 200 days behind bars in 2014 under
suspicion of gunrunning charges to which he was never tried. Tahmooressi
spoke in vivid detail about his experience and “exposure” in the aftermath of
an escape attempt and how his prison guards reacted:

I was very afraid. I felt like it would be the last night of my life right there. That
these guys were going to kill me. That these guys were going to brutally kill
me. . . . They [the guards] began hitting me and I thought to myself “bring it
on.” I expected it. Then they stripped me of my clothes; forced me to stand in
the dark naked and cold and tied me to a pole for 8 or 9 hours overnight. Then
they brought me into a small dark cell, partially clothed me and had me lie on
a bed facing upright, restrained with one arm and leg on opposite bed posts;
and left me that way in full view of hardened prisoners walking past my cell. . . .
So, I’m like some kind of animal in a cage here . . . like I don’t even have life in
me. . . . I was totally exposed, humiliated, and felt completely vulnerable. (Fox
News Interview with Andrew Tahmooressi 2014)

Physiological Factors
Upon initial arrest, subjects commonly experience heightened physiological
arousal, which includes increased heart rate and blood pressure, irregular
50 Tradecraft Primer

respiration, and above normal perspiration. These physiological changes

occur because subjects are typically apprehensive, worried, and frightened.
Such elevated physiological factors may affect a subject’s health in general
and, more importantly, memory and recall abilities. Typically, once a sub-
ject confesses, there are sharp reductions in physiological arousal because
of greater short-term certainty about the immediate future. Arousal and
fear may then return to heightened levels just before trial or a preliminary
hearing because of uncertainties tied to the pending prosecution.

Perceptions
A subject’s behavior during an interrogation is often influenced more by per-
sonal perceptions about what is happening rather than by the actual behavior
of the interrogator or actual events. For instance, a guilty subject’s percep-
tions about the strength of evidence in possession of the police often serve as
a strong motivator either to confess or to continue deceptive lies. For most
people, a guilty subject is far more likely to confess if he or she perceives
that the incriminating evidence is strong. Or, if the subject perceives that the
interrogator is experienced and doggedly persistent, the person may simply
confess to avoid even tougher questioning. On the other hand, if a guilty sub-
ject believes that the investigator lacks sufficient evidence or lacks adequate
experience, a hardened suspect or detainee may simply continue to lie or
deceive rather than self-incriminate and open up about the information in
his or her possession.

Physical Setting
The physical setting of the interrogation room and the detention cen-
ter also play an important role in the success or failure of influencing a
subject to talk. For an interrogator, it is worth considering how to create
an environment that facilitates effective communication exchanges and
getting to the truth rather than establishing physical barriers or distrac-
tions that may inhibit effective communication. The research suggests
that it is easier to persuasively influence people who find themselves in a
conducive environment that resonates in positive ways. Keep extraneous
people, noise, and voices to a minimum. Make sure the room’s tempera-
ture is set at a comfortable level. And pay attention to strange odors that
may serve as a distraction. Other suggestions for setting up the interroga-
tion room are reflected in the following figure.
On Being Human 51

Suggestions for Interrogation Rooms

• Make it conducive to eliciting responses. • Remove logos or pictures from walls.

• Select plain, simple decor, neutral off-white • Use unobtrusive A/V recording devices and
wall paint with good lighting. hidden cameras that do not distract—these
are preferred to one-way windows.
• Keep noise to a minimum, providing privacy
without any distractions. • The interrogator and the subject should be
separated by about 4 to 5 ft and should directly
face each other without any other object
• Interrogators should dress conservatively, between them to avoid any sort of physical
preferably in business attire; most guidelines barrier.
suggest no uniforms.

Bias
Important to the interrogation process is the need to understand our biases
and their impact on us. Our biases wield a tremendous influence not only
on the interrogator but, equally as well, on the suspect or detainee and the
evolving interpersonal dynamics between the two. And, this influence is
not always negative. Biases can exert both positive and negative influences
among people—on our attitudes, our perceptions and beliefs, and treatment
of each other. Whether in a law enforcement or intelligence context, the
important thing to remember is that our biases can skew objectivity in an
interview or interrogation, the direction an investigation takes, the ability
to establish rapport, the tone and types of questions asked, and the outcome
of an interrogation or even an entire investigation.
By the time most interrogators enter the interrogation room, they are
fully formed adults with a history of family baggage, decades of group
and cultural influences, and a lifetime of professional and personal expe-
riences behind them. Most law enforcement officers have climbed the
ranks from patrol officer to detective before conducting interrogations
as part of their investigative duties. Similarly, most intelligence profes-
sionals managed a successful career before leading them to a midcareer
decision to train as interrogators and debriefers. Among their counter-
parts, only military interrogators possess a full-time career track and are
trained as interrogators upon entry to the armed forces. And, don’t forget,
suspects and detainees are likewise influenced by their childhood and life
experiences. Over the course of all their lives, these people—interroga-
tors and suspects or detainees—have collected millions of memories and
such thoughts wield powerful conscious and unconscious influences.
52 Tradecraft Primer

Some of our memories are fairly obvious but most are stored in the recesses
of our brains. The circumstances we encounter can trigger those memories,
often in ways that we are not fully aware. Some we readily acknowledge and
are called conscious biases; others may not be as obvious and are hidden away
from our conscious thoughts but just as influential. We call these uncon-
scious biases. During the interrogation process, conscious and unconscious
biases may lead us down the wrong path, prejudicing our judgments of prob-
able guilt or innocence in others and the value of any information we elicit
from them simply based on biased stereotypes. In psychology, this is referred
to as “confirmation bias.”
Can we eliminate the hold that conscious and unconscious biases
have over us? Perhaps not as much as we might hope, especially that of
unconscious bias. But, by exercising self-awareness and acknowledg-
ing the existence of bias and the influence it may have over our lives,
especially inside the interrogation room, are big steps in mitigating and
marginalizing their influence. In the process, acknowledging bias may
prompt us to take greater steps to see the suspect or detainee on a human
level (Ross 2014).

Infliction of Pain and Threats

Keep in mind that deliberately inflicting pain or even the threat of pain
or death against a subject is unlawful by our laws, the U.S. Constitution,
and several international treaties. Importantly, too, any information
gained through such actions is generally inadmissible in a court of law
and may prove unreliable from an intelligence context. Reports about
physical abuse of POWs in China during the Second World War and
the Korean War demonstrated that such tactics were often ineffective in
gaining consistently reliable, accurate information. Subjects were known
to say just about anything, including falsely incriminating themselves,
just to make the pain stop. Moreover, pain can negatively affect the tenor
of the relationship—rapport—between the interrogator and the subject
and certainly decreases the likelihood of voluntary cooperation. In most
cases, those interrogators who revert to such tactics will certainly be seen
as bullies.
In a bizarre twist, and in other wartime observations, some POWs actu-
ally became accustomed to pain during interrogations to the point that
it served no useful purpose. Rather than getting the detainee to talk and
become submissive, excessively harsh coercive tactics over an extended
period actually influenced the resolve of some detainees to resist the brutal-
ity of their handlers and interrogators. Such was one of the themes in the
movie and in the book Unbroken (2010) by Laura Hillenbrand, which tells
On Being Human 53

the inspirational story of former Olympian and World War II POW survivor
Louie Zamperini, who served as a bombardier in the Army Air Corps in the
Pacific theater. Here is a stylized account from the movie that emphasizes
this point:

On May 27, 1943, while on a search mission for a downed aircrew, mechani-
cal problems caused Zamperini’s plane to crash into the Pacific Ocean 850
miles south of Oahu, Hawaii. Adrift in a rubber raft nearly 50 days, the
three surviving airmen subsisted on what little rainwater and fish they
could catch until the Japanese Navy discovered him, and his only surviv-
ing companion, near the Marshall Islands. Separated from his compan-
ion, Zamperini was initially held at Kwajalein Atoll for several weeks in a
small, confined cage-like cell. Fearful, isolated, and absent human interac-
tion, Zamperini acted out in bizarre ways, often screaming and slamming
his body against the sides of his cage. Forty days later, he was transferred
to Ofuna Interrogation Center near Yokohama, an undeclared internment
facility for high-value detainees. Later, he is transferred yet again to Tokyo’s
Omori POW camp and eventually to Naoetsu POW camp, where he stayed
until August 1945 and the war’s end. At both of these last two internment
camps, Zamperini encountered the brutal and sadistic Japanese Corporal
Mutsuhiro Watanabe, who took on the role of Zamperini’s tormentor, sub-
jecting the airman to almost daily inhuman treatment and abusive beat-
ings, yet reinforcing the unyielding resolve within Zamperini to survive.
In a major scene near the end of the movie we see Zamperini struggling to
stand tall holding a wooden beam over his head. Recognizing his inability
to defeat him, Watanabe fell to his knees in tears. Zamperini survived his
mistreatment and the war, unbowed and unbroken through sheer determi-
nation and courage.

Interpersonal and Intrapersonal Dynamics

Whether in a law enforcement or intelligence context, the interrogation

process can be effectively distilled to its underlying dynamics: “a controlled
exchange of information on both an interpersonal and an intrapersonal
level” (Educing Information 2006).

The Science of Rapport

At the start of an interrogation, it is hard to know what is motivating the
person sitting across from you. Is he or she willing to cooperate with you or
not? Will he or she be truthful? One proven way to help achieve your aims in
an interrogation is by establishing rapport with the subject.
54 Tradecraft Primer

The word rapport comes from the French raport, meaning “to report.”
The earliest use of the term referred to the act of bringing back information
and connecting one party to another. A rapporter was one who connected or
formed a relationship between two parties through the act of reporting some
type of information. Reporter, the occupational identifier of a person tied to
the news media, is a derivative of the word. The term rapport has evolved to
mean a “special bond” between two persons, in this case between the inter-
rogator and the subject.
Building rapport is an important factor in almost all successful inter-
rogations and starts the moment you make eye contact with the subject and
continues throughout all your interactions. It involves the interrogator creat-
ing the perception of a constructive experience for the subject on an interper-
sonal or psychological level (Tickle-Degnen & Rosenthal 1990).

The dynamic is intensely interpersonal; it is therefore all the more necessary

to strike a counter-balance by an attitude which the subject clearly recognizes
as essentially fair and objective. (KUBARK Manual 1963)

If the subject perceives that he or she will be treated fairly and learns
to trust and respect the interrogator, then, perhaps, he or she may be more
responsive to the interrogator’s questions. Anecdotal evidence suggests that a
failure to build rapport early in the interrogation process is one of the leading
causes of unsuccessful interrogations (Walsh & Bull 2012).
One way to help in the process of rapport-building is to create in the sub-
ject’s mind a “perception of similarity” between the interrogator and the sub-
ject. According to a 2014 Harvard Business Review article by Northeastern
University Professor David DeSteno, “The Simplest Way to Build Trust,” there
is nothing complicated about it. All that is required to increase a person’s
willingness to cooperate is to find and emphasize something—anything—
that will cause the subject to see a common link or special bond with the
interrogator. It could be as small as an article of clothing, pendant, or wrist-
band that both share; or the ability to leverage common cultural or linguis-
tic identities; or a shared meal, snack, or beverage. Or it might be simply a
lighthearted discussion about a favorite sport or athlete before beginning the
serious questioning.

Choose Your Words, Demeanor, and Tenor Wisely

Ever wonder why some people are better interrogators than others? Perhaps,
it is because they are just more effective and strategic at communicating and
interacting with their targets. They think through what they say before they
say it. Their interrogation successes are likely high because they have a better
On Being Human 55

read of the subject and develop the ability to construct a more persuasive
message that resonates on a human level.
Research shows that interrogators who think through what they say,
understand the power of their words, and speak in a calm, steady, and clear
tone of voice have a greater chance of achieving their desired outcomes.
Such interrogators possess the ability to deliver persuasive and influential
messages that may ultimately move an uncooperative subject to the goal of
responding to questions with useful and reliable information in support of
either intelligence requirements or an open police investigation (Heuback
2009).
Research suggests that those who are verbally aggressive or abusive
lower their chances of persuasively influencing the listener. Sure, there are
times when raising one’s voice might be effective. Yet no one enjoys being put
down and called names. No one enjoys being made to feel inferior and less
than human. No one enjoys being humiliated. Such interrogators and their
abusive language are more frequently perceived as less effective in achiev-
ing successful interrogation outcomes. Verbally abusive interrogators make
people feel uncomfortable and rely on character attacks, competence attacks,
insults, teasing, ridicule, profanity, etc. The targets of their abuse not only
will resent them, but also will likely resist their efforts of persuasion and
influence (Delia 2008).
On another point, it is important that the interrogator be respected by
the subject and one of the most effective ways of accomplishing that is by
controlling your demeanor, the tone of your voice, and the words you use.
The selection of words you use and how you deliver them do matter. Those
interrogators who understand this have an advantage over other interroga-
tors. Moreover, as you will read next, gaining perceived credibility, trust, and
respect in the eyes of the subject further supports your efforts at rapport-
building and persuasion.

Six Key Elements of Interpersonal Dynamics

Why are we attracted to some people over others? Robert Cialdini explains
it in his book Influence: The Psychology of Persuasion, first published in
1984 in support of the advertising and marketing industry. His insights
into interpersonal dynamics and the power behind influence and persua-
sion focus our attention on six key elements. All of us should familiar-
ize ourselves with them, not only to help explain their influence over
interpersonal dynamics inside the interrogation room, but also as a tool
to help managers and leaders as well. Let us now explore these six key ele-
ments (see the following figure)—slightly modified to accommodate the
interrogation process.
56 Tradecraft Primer

Major Influencers on Interpersonal Dynamics

1. Trust/respect 4. Commitment/consistency

2. Authority 5. Social validation

3. Reciprocity 6. Scarcity
Adapted from Cialdini, R. B., Influence—The Psychology
of Persuasion, William Morrow, New York, NY, 1984.

Trust and Respect

People prefer to say yes to those they trust, respect, and perceive in positive
ways. Remember, the suspect or detainee need not like you, but they should
believe they can trust and respect you. In general, people feel comfortable
with those they trust and respect, those that behave in a positive manner, and
those they believe are objective and fair.

Authority
Most cultures respect requests from authority figures. We are also more likely
to be influenced by messages from a person whom we perceive in respectful
terms—those that use titles such as “detective,” “senior sergeant,” or “doc-
tor.” Such titles and personas elevate the status of the interrogator in the eyes
of the subject and may help contribute to influencing a subject’s willingness
to talk. So, select your persona carefully.

Reciprocity
There is a powerful—often unspoken—social norm of reciprocity, variously
known as “give and take,” or a “two-way street.” The philosophy behind this
theory is that most people are more likely to respond positively to requests
for information from someone who has first provided a benefit, incentive, or
favor to them—whether tangible or intangible—rather than from someone
who has not. Such a benefit might mean a warm meal or the ability to call
their loved ones. When a person begins to feel the pull to reciprocate, a sus-
pect or detainee may have often little to offer the interrogator other than the
information he holds.

Commitment and Consistency

People want to see themselves—and be seen by others—as fulfilling their
promises and commitments. People are more likely to cooperate or be influ-
enced in a particular direction if a request is consistent with a previous mes-
sage or is for the better good. Another example of this is for an interrogator
On Being Human 57

to discuss with the subject that a particular request for information does not
violate his or her prior commitments to others and that, perhaps, responding
to the request would serve to help family or friends.

Social Validation
Social validation is especially influential when these two elements are pres-
ent: (1) uncertainty—a person who is unsure of his or her surroundings
and in an ambiguous situation is more likely to seek social validation—and
(2) similarity—people are more inclined to follow the lead of others in social
settings who seem similar to themselves. Using this principle, a detainee or a
suspect is more likely to provide information if he or she believes “others” in
his or her cohort, such as a criminal gang, have already done so. This works
most powerfully when the others are similar in various ways (e.g., age, race,
interests, and socioeconomic status) to the subject.

Scarcity
Under the scarcity principle, something that is easily attainable is not nearly
as desirable as something scarce or rare—such as a phone call to loved ones.
An interrogator might offer a conditional incentive for information that is
available only if the subject decides within a specified time frame, after which
“all deals are off.” To a subject in confinement, the diminishing availability of
the incentive serves as a potent motivating force.

Five Core Needs of Intrapersonal Dynamics

Every one of us has emotional needs and these needs possess a powerful intra­
personal influence over the way we think and behave. According to Roger
Fisher and Daniel Shapiro’s 2005 book Beyond Reason: Using Emotions as
You Negotiate, these needs are distilled into five major influences highlighted
in the following figure.

Major Influencers on
Intrapersonal Dynamics

Appreciation
Affiliation
Autonomy
Status
Role
Adapted from Fisher, R., and D. Shapiro,
Beyond Reason: Using Emotions as You
Negotiate, Penguin Books, Westminster,
London, 2005.
58 Tradecraft Primer

The degree of influence these five core needs have over people varies
from person to person. In other words, people have stronger needs in some
areas than others. For instance, one subject may have a stronger desire to feel
respected, while another may have a stronger need to feel a sense of compan-
ionship. Moreover, all five core concerns are in constant flux and must be
continuously evaluated for the person or target group you are trying to influ-
ence; their degree of influence changing over time. From an interrogator’s
vantage point, understanding these five core concerns provides an insightful
opportunity to understand the subject on an intrapersonal level. By doing so,
you will have another valuable tool toward rapport-building, influencing the
subject, and achieving a successful outcome in the interrogation.

Appreciation
People often feel appreciated when they believe someone seeks to understand
their point of view. Appreciation may be communicated verbally, such as by
the use of a respectful language, or by the action of offering something spe-
cial to the subject, perhaps as simple as a cup of coffee (which may also lead to
some reciprocity). By doing so, an interrogator shows the detainee or suspect
that he or she empathizes with many of the subject’s experiences, thoughts,
and feelings.

Affiliation
Feeling connected to others can be emotionally comforting. Rapport can
result more easily and quickly when people believe in the perception that they
have something in common. Here, the interrogator might seek to uncover
common links with the subject, perhaps by discussing family, work expe-
riences, religious backgrounds, sports, or hobbies. Emphasizing the shared
nature of their common experiences increases the subject’s relationship to
the interrogator in positive ways, which the interrogator can then leverage as
a tool during questioning.

Autonomy
The need for autonomy varies across cultures and among individuals.
However, almost all people wish to feel they possess at least some control
over their lives. A person who has a strong need for autonomy is likely to find
detention particularly tough, and might likely become even more resentful
if constantly told what to think, what to talk about, and how to behave—
in addition to being told what to wear and when to eat and sleep. Since con-
trol is built into a detention setting, the interrogator may be able to mitigate
resistance by creating the perception that the subject is being offered some
small area of control over their lives—to stand or to sit, whether to eat alone
privately or with a group—in exchange for cooperation. At times, it might
On Being Human 59

even be helpful to permit the detainee or suspect to control the direction of a

conversation. As one master interrogator observed: “From my point of view,
the subject who seeks to take control by asking questions can be quite useful
to a savvy interviewer—one can learn a great deal from the questions that are
asked” (Intelligence Interviewing 2009).

Status
Almost all individuals enjoy the feeling that they are respected and viewed
as important. Regardless of the interrogator’s private opinion of the subject,
acknowledging a subject’s former status—as a professional person, a leader,
a  parent, etc.—may provide another way for an interrogator to gain some
persuasive leverage. Such recognition elevates the subject’s sense of self-
importance while elevating positive perceptions of the interrogator.

Role
People play many roles in life and may find it hard to give up these roles, par-
ticularly while detained behind bars. If a subject is viewed and treated only
as a radical jihadist or a hardened criminal, he or she will likely persist in
such behaviors and belief systems. An interrogator might reduce the subject’s
resistance by drawing out other roles that the subject has played—perhaps as
an educator, a student, a father, a husband, a theologian, or a member of a
sports team.

Put These Concepts into Action

Taken as a collective group, and put into action during an interrogation,

these conceptual theories potentially provide us with powerful and exploit-
able points of leverage and influence. They explain the interpersonal and
intrapersonal dynamics that influence interrogations.
Quite simply, positive words and actions, objectivity and fairness, and
perceptions of empathy are more quickly associated with people we feel
comfortable with and want to communicate with, while those who we per-
ceive in negative terms by their harsh language or abusive actions turn us
off. These same perceptions—good or bad—are experienced among those we
interrogate.
So keep these concepts in mind as we enter Chapter 5 and learn to develop
tailored interrogation strategies.
The Interrogation Cycle
5
The crime:
Collect relevant
background
information
Decision to refer to
prosecutor for charges, Begin framing
release, or detain and initial questions
repeat cycle

Corroborate Throughout the cycle,

outcomes; if Noncustodial
appropriate, get continuously evaluate
interview and
signed confession
responses for assessment

reliability and usefulness,

truthfulness or deceit, and

Custodial Decision to release
guilt or innocence
interrogation or detain in custody,
Mirandize, and isolate

Seek Miranda
waiver; if none, Develop the
terminate interrogation
interrogation strategy

A Framework for Law Enforcement Interrogations

The law enforcement interrogation cycle portrayed above captures the major
steps and decision points in a baseline interrogation of a criminal suspect.
Each step around the circle dependent on the step preceding it. The inner cir-
cle emphasizes that throughout the cycle, the interrogators are continuously
evaluating the suspect’s responses for reliability and usefulness, truthfulness or
deceit, and cues to guilt or innocence. A conceptual framework for an intelli-
gence-related interrogation will also be addressed later in this chapter. In most
cases, however, the framework for law enforcement interrogations provides an

61
62 Tradecraft Primer

insightful tool for the intelligence community as well, less the need to Mirandize
an alien enemy combatant captured outside the United States and its territories.
Unlike classic legacy methodologies, this contemporary model advo-
cates spending extra time and energy in four steps often overlooked and
not routinely emphasized: (1) researching, collecting, and analyzing relevant
background information on the crime and suspect; (2) framing initial ques-
tions leading up to the noncustodial interview and custodial interroga-
tion; (3) crafting a flexible interrogation strategy tailored to the subject; and
(4) corroborating postinterrogation outcomes—particularly a confession or
an admission—with the oversight of senior managers. Investing sufficient
time and energy in corroborating and evaluating postinterrogation out-
comes aims to limit the influence of confirmation bias on the part of the
interrogator, limits false confessions from entering the judicial system, and
injects stronger accountability into the overall process.

The Law Enforcement Interrogation Cycle

Collect Relevant Background Information

All authorities agree that a solid analysis of relevant background information
and research about the crime are essential to a successful interrogation. Such
analysis helps set the overall direction of the investigation and may offer insights
into the motives behind the event and the persons of interest or the suspect.
Relevant background information includes such baseline reporting as
crime scene photos or video; medical investigator’s and examiner’s results;
forensics and DNA testing; ballistic analysis; and statements from victims,
witnesses, informants, and co-conspirators. Do not forget, as well, to evalu-
ate possible cultural dynamics at play which may have influenced the sub-
ject. Also, as part of this preparatory stage in a criminal investigation, your
research into the major statutory elements of proof for the crime under inves-
tigation may help you develop initial questions when the time comes for the
noncustodial interview and custodial interrogation.
Knowing how to ask the right type of questions is perhaps one of the
most important, but often overlooked, skill sets of an investigator. According
to Fisher and Geiselman (1992), the recognized experts of cognitive inter-
views, eliciting as much information as possible from victims and witnesses
is considered one of the best predictors of solving a crime. Yet their research
demonstrates that most law enforcement officers lack effective interviewing
skills and, consequently, overlook key pieces of information.
As explained in Fisher and Geiselman’s paper, The Cognitive Interview
Method of Conducting Police Interviews: Eliciting Extensive Information and
Promoting Therapeutic Jurisprudence (2010), most investigative interviews of
The Interrogation Cycle 63

victims and witnesses follow a similar pattern. They open with a series of ques-
tions aimed at collecting demographics from the witness or victim and then
move on to the perfunctory open-ended “What happened?” In a matter of a
few seconds into the respondent’s narrative explanation, the interviewer typi-
cally cuts off the person and unleashes a barrage of close-ended, short-answer
questions: “How old was the robber?” “Was he white or black?” “Was he tall or
short?” “Did he have a weapon?” “How much money was stolen?” This line of
questions continues until the investigator exhausts his or her arsenal of crime-
relevant questions. At the end, the interview terminates with the pro forma “Is
there anything else?”
Fisher and Geiselman (2010) assert that the typical background inter-
view is too heavily dominated by the investigative interviewer asking far too
many questions; forcing the witness or victim to play an ancillary or subor-
dinate role. They claim that too many witnesses or victims merely “help out”
in the process—giving short answers to questions that are far too specific,
close-ended, or leading. Additionally, most victims and witnesses are often
discouraged by investigators from volunteering details that do not relate to
the immediate question; in the process, chains of thought are frequently
interrupted and disrupted. Emoting emotions are typically discouraged,
too, despite the fact that in many instances the person just experienced a
traumatic life event. Instead, the sequencing of the interview and the ques-
tions too often follow a perfunctory written checklist and, quite often, are
designed to confirm the interviewer’s hypothesis. Under such frameworks,
typical police questioning practices limit the amount of information wit-
nesses provide and increase chances of inaccurate responses. In summary,
classic questioning methodologies encourage people to withhold unsolicited,
yet important, information; emphasize abbreviated answers to close-ended
questions; depersonalize the question-and-answer process; emotionally
handcuff the victim and witnesses; and, in the end, make them feel more like
a suspect than as part of the investigative process and a team member to the
investigation.
Instead, Fisher and Geiselman (2010) suggest that investigators need to
be better listeners and refrain from asking too many questions—so many
questions, in fact, that investigators typically overwhelm the respondent.
Broad open-ended questions are far more effective. Investigators can fur-
ther help witnesses and victims by enhancing their memory recall of a crime
event by considering the following suggestions:

• Invest sufficient time and effort at the outset of an interview to

develop meaningful rapport and trust with the victim and the
witness. Remember, in most instances, these people just experi-
enced a life-changing event and may have to talk about potentially
64 Tradecraft Primer

embarrassing circumstances to an investigator who, in most cases, is

a complete stranger to them.
• Permit the victim and witnesses to fully explore, describe, and recall
their emotions and feelings at the time of the original crime event.
• Capitalize on broad open-ended questions, not inject a barrage of
close-ended questions, or cutoff explanations while witnesses or vic-
tims are searching their memories.
• Suggest that respondents close their eyes to enhance concentration
and memory recall—provided, of course, sufficient rapport and trust
are established.
• Tailor questions to the respondent’s most vivid experiences or mental
images, e.g., the weapon, the suspect’s clothes, or the facial descrip-
tion, about the crime event instead of relying on a fixed checklist of
questions.
• Avoid confusing the respondent by cutting off the narration and ask-
ing questions about the color of the suspect’s hair at the moment he
or she is talking about the weapon.
• Defer control of the interview to the victim or witness since it is their
thoughts and memories that should direct the course of the ques-
tioning rather than subordinate them to the interviewer’s needs or
assumptions. “I’m interested in what you have to say. What you saw?
What you experienced?”
• Enhance recollection by asking the respondents to describe the event
or crime scene several times within the interview and arrange to
interview the victim or witness on more than one occasion to capi-
talize on the recall of new details, which is common days after the
first interview terminated.
• Instruct the victim or witness to refrain from guessing, and tell them
that it is okay to say, “I don’t know.”
• Permit the victim or witness to narrate using nonverbal language,
such as drawing or sketch, using model figurines, or even acting out
the event just as he or she experienced and observed it.
• Arrange for non-English-speaking victims or witnesses to record
their narratives in their native language with a reliable and vetted
interpreter to assist with follow-up questioning.

A Cognitive-Based Interview Methodology

Within the field of interviewing, the cognitive interview reflects a multi-
disciplinary approach backed up by empirical research from cognitive psy-
chology. The protocol has been extensively examined in laboratory and field
studies in a number of countries and has employed the use of empirically
The Interrogation Cycle 65

driven techniques shown to increase the elicitation and retrieval of accurate

information, especially by victims and witnesses. Quite simply, the cog-
nitive interview leads to better memory recall of events, whether for law
enforcement or intelligence, compared to traditional interview methods
(McLeod 2010). As an example, the cognitive interview commonly includes
the following steps.
Step One: Recreate Feelings or Perceptions of the Event  Here, the inter-
viewer might ask the victim or witness to recall the dominant memory of the
event under investigation and then follow up with questions that elicit sen-
sory experiences of the incident: “What did you feel?” “What did you hear?”
“What were you touching or holding?” Such questions are designed to stimu-
late memories from among different neural pathways—emotional, auditory,
kinesthetic, etc.
Step Two: Recollect Event in Sequence  During this point in the cognitive
interview, the victim or witness is asked to recall the event in chronological
sequence in a free flow of memory without any interruption on the part of
the interviewer. Following the retelling of the event, the interviewer would
then frame follow-up questions relying on key words or phrases from the
subject’s own words: “OK, Sammy, you told me that you were in the store
standing at the counter. What did you observe about the person in front of
you?” “What did the person look like?” Such questions are designed to stimu-
late secondary memories based on the subject’s recall of his or her primary
memory at the crime scene.
Step Three: Reverse the Order of the Recall of Events  Here, the subject
is asked to recall events in reverse order. The aims of such a process seek to
validate the previous retelling and sequence of events at the crime scene or,
quite possibly, uncover deception on the part of the subject.
Step Four: Recall from Another Person’s Perspective  Ask the subject to
describe the incident from another person’s perspective, such as that of the
victim, further stimulating memories in the subject.
Step Five: Recall the Event by Sketching a Map  This technique aims to
validate what the victim or witness tells the interviewer against actual recol-
lections of the crime scene, validating or disproving storylines of the event
while stimulating alternative memory pathways.

Frame Initial Questions

As with victims and witnesses, the quality of the answers you get from a sus-
pect or detainee depends on the quality of the question asked. To create and
66 Tradecraft Primer

ask the right questions, you need to know something behind framing ques-
tions. This is especially true for the noncustodial interview, which hinges
on the ability of an interrogator to ask meaningful questions of the subject.
So avoid suggestive questions that can lead people to incorporate inaccura-
cies in their responses. The subsequent recall of incorrect information can be
partially offset by not introducing misinformation or contamination through
the use of poorly framed questions.
Think through, too, what your questions may reveal to the subject in the
way of expectations and perceptions. Whether intentional or not, a question
may provide the recipient insights about what you may expect him or her to
know or not know and what you, the interrogator, may know or not know.
Perceptive subjects may likely use these insights to their advantage.
To avoid poorly framed suggestive and contaminated questions, brain-
storm your proposed questions ahead of time with the assistance of another
interrogator. Together, you should explore the range of the information
gaps you need filled and explore the range of possible assumptions under-
lying the suspected person’s involvement or knowledge of the act or event.
Importantly, too, by participating in such creative thinking processes before
you enter the room, you will limit the influence of bias in your questioning.
Remember, too, that knowing the specific elements of proof for the particu-
lar category of crime under investigation will help you focus and frame your
questions to the crime.
In planning your interrogatives or questions for the noncustodial or
pre-interrogation interview, rely on open-ended questions, which require
the subject to amplify answers in narrative-type responses, rather than on
close-ended questions, which typically produce short yes/no responses. And
remember these six key questions: “who?” “what?” “when?” “where?” “how?”
and “why?” These six questions provide you the basic building blocks to use
in asking your questions whether in a criminal or intelligence context.
By the way, here are some general suggestions from experts, such as the
authors Robert Royal and Steven Schutt in their seminal book The Gentle Art
of Interviewing and Interrogation (1976), on the fundamentals of good ques-
tion design:

• Make the questions short and confined to one topic—avoid com-

pound questions combining more than one question in a question.
• Make the questions clear and easily understood.
• Avoid the use of frightening or superrealistic words, such as confes-
sion, murder, forger, dope addict, terrorist, and embezzler. Use milder
terms.
The Interrogation Cycle 67

• Use precise questions. A precise question is one that calls for a spe-
cific or an exact answer. It limits the requested answer to a definite
item of information.
• Use discerning questions. Discerning questions are questions de­­signed
to produce information directly bearing on the matter under discussion.
• Design your questions to accommodate the cognitive intellect, the edu-
cation level, and the linguistic ability of the person under questioning.
• Rehearse your questions in advance especially if using an interpreter.

In further context to open-ended questions, here is the type of open-

ended question to avoid: “Why did you use gasoline to destroy the victim’s
body?” Here, the interrogator runs the risk of undermining objectivity and
accuracy of the information received. The question is leading and offers the
subject too much insight into the investigation. In contrast, a solid open-
ended question might ask, “What happened to the body?” Here, the subject
is asked to answer based on his or her knowledge and memory, without the
benefit of clues contained in the question. Along the same lines, avoid nega-
tive questions such as “Did you go to the gym or not?” The response here may
not only confuse you but also the subject. Whether the subject responds with
“yes” or “no,” it is unclear what you are asking the subject.
And make sure to exercise self-discipline and self-awareness inside the
interrogation room. Listen to the subject’s responses without overt reactions
and constant interruptions. By allowing the subject to tell his or her story
without interruption, an interrogator aims to achieve basic objectivity and
help in the process of rapport-building.

Dillon’s Five-Question Methodology

A technique worth knowing is Dillon’s (1990) five-question technique.
Originally designed for schoolteachers and academic counselors, Dillon’s
methodology ­proposes five separate types of question to ask in sequential
order.
Initial Opening Questions  Initial opening questions are used at the start
of the interview and designed to get the subject talking. These should be sim-
ple yes/no questions that are easy to answer and are not about the crime or
event.
Free Narrative Questions  Here, the interviewer names a topic tied to the
investigation and asks the subject to tell what he or she knows about it, giv-
ing the subject sufficient time to describe a topic in his own words while the
interviewer listens without interrupting.
68 Tradecraft Primer

Direct Questions  A direct question is a follow-up on the narrative-type

responses by asking about specific items while avoiding value-laden terms
such as murder, explosion, and rape. The interrogator should rank his ques-
tions (a)  from the general to the specific and (b) from the known to the
unknown.
Cross-Questions  These questions are designed to check and verify one
answer against another, delving into problematic (i.e., contradictory or
ambiguous) answers. The subject is asked to repeat his or her statements to
questions asked in different ways and in no special order.
Review Questions  These questions are used to confirm previous answers,
repeating the information and asking, “Is that correct?” and “What else?”
At the closing of any interview or interrogation, most experts suggest simply
casually chatting with the subject. Such small talk may lead to an unguarded
statement from the suspect or detainee that contains new information
because the subject perceives that the questioning is over and reverts to a
more relaxed state. Regardless of the questioning technique you use, always
remember to repetitively ask for clarification such as “Tell me more to make
sure I understand.” And do not forget to use this as the final question during
all your interviews or interrogations: “Do you have any information relevant
to this investigation that we have not discussed?”

Noncustodial Interview and Assessment

The noncustodial interview is normally the first sit-down meeting between
the interrogator and the subject. This important step in the interrogation
cycle provides the opportunity to assess the likelihood of knowledge or cul-
pability and guilt of the subject to the event under investigation, to validate
holding the subject as a legitimate suspect or detainee, and to understand
the subject as a person and get a handle on what makes him or her tick. This
includes the subject’s motivations, psyche, and emotional vulnerabilities; an
opportunity to evaluate the subject’s willingness to cooperate and his or her
degree of resistance; and to uncover short- and long-term interpersonal and
intrapersonal motivational influences.
Underlying this step in the interrogation cycle are these important
points: (1) find out what the subject is willing to talk about; (2) find out what
the subject is hesitant to disclose; and (3) find out what the subject is uncom-
fortable talking about.
Typically, noncustodial interviews are structured around a two-part
process. In the first part of the interview, the interrogator or investigator is
using the opportunity to gather personal or demographic information with
The Interrogation Cycle 69

relevance to the investigation from the subject. In the process of collecting

this neutral data, the interrogator is able to evaluate and determine the sub-
ject’s normative behavior patterns and general anxiety level. Simultaneously,
during this early stage of the interview, the interrogator is also establishing
rapport and assessing the subject’s cognitive skills, communication and lan-
guage abilities, anxiety levels, and physical and mental health.
In the second part of the interview, the investigator or interrogator
commonly asks preliminary investigative-type questions. Remember that
in a law enforcement noncustodial interview, the suspect is not yet under
arrest or formally charged with a crime. Consequently, the police are per-
mitted to question the subjects in a noncustodial setting absent the reading
of Miranda rights.
Provided there is no spontaneous confession or admission at this stage,
the results of the noncustodial interview logically feed into the next step in
the interrogation cycle.

Decision to Release or Detain in Custody, Mirandize, and Isolate

Based on the outcome of the noncustodial interview, subjects may be released
or further detained and placed in custody. If detained and placed in cus-
tody, U.S. citizens and residents are always read the Miranda warning and
informed of their rights to an attorney.
There is one important exception to the reading of the Miranda warn-
ing. It is labeled the public safety exception and it was admittedly exer-
cised by the police and the Federal Bureau of Investigation in 2013 with
the surviving Boston bomber Dzhokhar Tsarnaev, a naturalized U.S. citi-
zen. Under the public safety exception, law enforcement officers making an
arrest need not read suspects their Miranda rights upon capture if doing
so impedes law enforcement efforts to uncover imminent threats to pub-
lic safety or identify future terrorist plans. The exception is necessitated
by the belief that should such a suspect receive the Miranda warning too
early after capture, the suspect might simply invoke the right against self-
incrimination and stop t­alking, crippling further intelligence collection
efforts (Wright 2013).
The decision to detain in custody and Mirandize is sometimes accom-
panied by the act to isolate the subject before starting the custodial interro-
gation. Isolation has two basic aims. First, emotional and physical isolation
helps to elevate additional anxiety, insecurity, fear, and self-doubt in the
subject caused by the uncertainty of what will happen next. Indirectly, it is
a routine form of psychologically softening up the subject for the custodial
interrogation. Second, although the suspect may exercise his or her right
to an attorney at this point, the isolation helps to shut off the subject from
70 Tradecraft Primer

other outside influences, such as co-conspirators or family members, who

may influence the subject’s storyline. Provided that it is not excessive, such
as over many days, and deliberately done to punish the subject—­isolation
is an accepted practice in a law enforcement context. Additionally, the time
spent in isolation provides the interrogator the opportunity to prepare
for the next step in the interrogation cycle—developing the interrogation
strategy.

Develop Your Interrogation Strategy

Once you are convinced that an individual should be questioned in a custo-
dial setting, you need to develop a flexible interrogation strategy tailored to
the suspect or detainee before stepping foot inside the interrogation room.
While crafting it, keep in mind that your goal is to get an unwilling person
suspected of guilt to cooperate and confess to a crime in a law enforcement
context or reveal what he or she knows—the extent of their knowledge—in
an intelligence context. So how do we tailor a strategy to the individual?
Such a strategy requires some tough decisions and thinking about

• the success or failure at the initial rapport-building and the like-

lihood of the suspect’s cooperation or resistance and, if in a law
enforcement context, agreeing to a Miranda waiver;
• relevant reevaluation and identification of knowledge and gaps about
the crime or event;
• review of previous personality-based assessments about the suspect,
which may have identified exploitable vulnerabilities—feelings,
beliefs, or perceptions about his or her circumstances and interper-
sonal and intrapersonal dynamics at play;
• relevant topics which were deliberately avoided by the subject in pre-
vious discussions; or the need to seek additional clarity;
• the severity of the crime and, if any, the urgency of the present cir-
cumstances; and
• the authorized tactics and techniques available to you as tools to
achieve cooperation.

As a preparatory step in developing the strategy, you should also identify

the right team members to assist in the interrogation. Such team members
may include an assisting investigator or interrogator, a forensic psycholo-
gist, a linguist-interpreter, a technical subject-matter expert, and, if needed,
The Interrogation Cycle 71

a person familiar with the subject’s cultural nuances. Other variables to

inject into this planning step may include the need to decide on the time
and place for the interrogation, the review of unresolved information gaps,
and getting someone to help with audiovisual recording equipment for the
interrogation.
No one strategy or technique will prove effective with all subjects. While
selective tactics and techniques are important, keep in mind that they are not
ends in themselves. They are tools used by the interrogator to mitigate resis-
tance and persuasively influence cooperation during questioning. More impor-
tantly, it is the strength of the interpersonal relationship between the subject
and the interrogator—­the rapport—that largely determines the outcome of an
interrogation and the willingness of the subject to cooperate with questioning.
Understanding the concept of acceptable rationalization (see the following fig-
ure) in your planning process may also help.

Acceptable Rationalization

One technique to help you match the right

approach to a subject is to keep in mind the
concept of acceptable rationalization. By doing so,
you are helping the subject save face by crafting
the right rationalization or acceptable excuse to
cooperate. This concept theorizes that many
uncooperative subjects in custodial interrogations
feel the growing internal stress that results from
wanting simultaneously to divulge and conceal,
called the compliance–resistance dilemma. To
escape from this tension, the subject may grasp at
any face-saving reason to cooperate. Your job as
the interrogator is to help the subject find the
right one.

Modified from Intelligence Science Board, Educing

Information: Interrogation: Science and Art
(Phase I), National Defense Intelligence College
Press, Washington, DC, 2006.

Another aspect of strategy planning is to identify alternative tactics

and line of questioning you intend to use with the suspect should your first
approach fail. Whatever the tactics you adopt, build flexibility into your
strategy and be prepared to respond with agility inside the interrogation
room. Understanding the concept of sensory acuity (see the following figure)
enables you to plan for both—­flexibility and agility—during the execution
phase of your strategy.
72 Tradecraft Primer

Sensory Acuity

For the interrogator, sensory acuity implies

maintaining situational and interpersonal awareness
to what is happening inside the interrogation room
with the subject. Specifically, it is the ability to make
rapid and accurate adjustments to your approach or
strategy during the investigative interview or
interrogation.

This might take the form of noticing a rise in

anxiety or stress-induced behavior and intense
emotions when you ask the subject questions about
certain topics and an absence of those same
behaviors and emotions when asked questions
about other matters.

Modified from Intelligence Science Board, Educing

Information: Interrogation: Science and Art
(Phase I), National Defense Intelligence College
Press, Washington, DC, 2006.

When Three’s Not a Crowd

Existing interrogation models emphasize the need to establish a sense of
complete privacy in the interrogation room between the subject and the
interrogator. The same logic is echoed by the Department of Defense in its
current guidance to interrogators which states that relying on tandem inter-
rogators may have negative consequences and make it “more difficult to
establish rapport” (Army Field Manual 2–22.3 2006). Supporting that under-
lying assumption is the fact that the predominant research on interrogations
has been done largely from an individual interrogator’s perspective, not from
the perspective of a two-person interrogation team (Driskell, Blickensderfer
and Salas 2013). In other words, “three’s a crowd” inside the interrogation
room. Yet, as we will discuss and demonstrate below, such legacy beliefs may
not reflect what really goes on inside today’s interrogation room.
So is it better to have two interrogators in the room or a single interroga-
tor? Which is the better choice? Research scientist Tripp Driskell, formerly
with the University of Central Florida, and his associates examined the pos-
sible negative effects of a third person inside the interrogation room (Driskell
and Driskell 2013). The study compared law enforcement interrogations in
which one interrogator was present to interrogations in which two inter-
rogators were present and evaluated the impact on rapport and outcomes.
Results showed no significant difference by having an additional interrogator
present. More so, Driskell’s research suggests that a two-person interroga-
tion team is preferable and able to capitalize better on group dynamics and
The Interrogation Cycle 73

teamwork which may, in turn, enhance the outcomes of an interrogation.

Additionally, the gains achieved from “harnessing the power of the team”
may lead to new strategies and approaches to enhance the information gath-
ering aims of interrogations.

Seek the Miranda Waiver

Since 1966, U.S. law enforcement investigators have been required to read
criminal suspects their Miranda rights and seek a voluntary waiver from
them before proceeding with the custodial interview or interrogation
phase. Should the suspect decide to waive Miranda, the investigator may
then move forward with the custodial interrogation. Without the waiver,
the court may consider the interrogation coerced and the information
inadmissible.

The Custodial Interrogation

Despite the large number of interrogation manuals and methodologies on
the market, common police interrogation practices within the interrogation
room still largely remain a mystery to the general public. What emerges from
the 2007 survey of 631 law enforcement officers by Kassin, Leo, Meissner et
al. (2007) is a reliable baseline in contemporary police practices—the first
self-reported survey ever conducted involving such a large number of law
enforcement officers.
The survey depicts that the typical interrogation almost always begins
with (1) isolating the suspect away from family and friends, (2) placing him
or her in a small private room, (3) identifying contradictions or holes in the
suspect’s account, and (4) establishing rapport with the suspect in order to
gain his or her trust. Should the interrogation intensify, tactics may include
(5) confronting the suspect with evidence of his or her guilt and (6) appealing
to the suspect’s ego and self-interest. Somewhat less frequently, interrogations
sometimes include (7)  offering the suspect sympathy, moral justifications,
and excuses, (8) interrupting the suspect’s denials and objections, (9) imply-
ing and/or pretending to have independent evidence of guilt, (10) minimiz-
ing the moral seriousness of the offense, and (11) appealing to the suspect’s
religion or personal conscience. On rare occasions, interrogations may
include (12) showing the suspect photographs of the crime scene and victim.
An underlying presumption of guilt drives the entire process (Kassin, Leo,
Meissner et al. 2007). The following figure summarizes and highlights the
top 12 techniques relied on by the 631 law enforcement respondents to the
2007 survey.
74 Tradecraft Primer

Commonly Practiced Police Interrogation Tactics

(with the % of respondents who claimed to use the tactic routinely)

• Isolating suspect from family and friends (66%) • Offering the suspect sympathy, moral justifications,
and excuses (13%)
• Conducting the interrogation in a small, private • Interrupting the suspect’s denials and objections
room (42%) (13%)
• Identifying contradictions in the suspect’s story • Implying or pretending to have independent
(41%) evidence of guilt (7%)
• Establishing rapport and gaining the suspect’s trust • Minimizing the moral seriousness of the offense
(32%) (29%)
• Confronting the suspect with evidence of his guilt • Appealing to the suspect’s religion or conscience (5%)
(22%)
• Appealing to the suspect’s self-interests (11%) • Showing the suspect photographs of the crime
scene and the victim (3%)
Based on Kassin, S. M., R. A. Leo, C. A. Meissner, K. D. Richman, L. H. Colwell, A. M. Leach,
and D. La Fon, Police Interviewing and Interrogation: A Self-Report Survey of Police Practices
and Beliefs, American Psychology–Law Society/Division 41 of the American Psychological
Association, 2007.

Legacy Interrogation Tactics and Techniques

In both law enforcement and intelligence, the widely recognized doctrine
for interrogators is to rely on the least intrusive, least coercive technique or
tactic during an interrogation. Yet, in practice, most legacy interrogation
models or methodologies are just the opposite, typically hostile and con-
frontational. Such strategies reflect a presumptive and confident belief in the
subject’s guilt in a criminal case or knowledge, in an intelligence context,
as an unquestionable fact. Moreover, relying on such logic, many interroga-
tors still believe that innocent persons quite simply would not find them-
selves inside an interrogation room. Consequently, the traditional focus of
law enforcement questioning is often on why the subject committed the act
instead of if he or she did it, and dismiss narratives from the subject that
amount to claims of innocence.
Additionally, short of physical abuse and torture, the issue of which leg-
acy tactics are coercive and noncoercive remains a matter of debate among
U.S. courts and their jurisdictions. However, the trends increasingly con-
sider many of the classic tactics as unethical, coercive in some instances, and
highly manipulative or exploitive. In general, the tactics in the following fig-
ure have been frequently interpreted as coercive by judges and the courts
in criminal cases.
The Interrogation Cycle 75

Police Tactics Judged Coercive

• Failing to read the Miranda warning or offering the

waiver

• Causing pain by aggressive physical manhandling of

the suspect

• Failure to offer medical assistance to a subject in

physical or psychological pain

• Threats of physical or psychological harm

• Explicit promises of leniency in exchange for an

admission of guilt

• Denying the subject essential necessities—food,

water, or toilet access

• Unrelenting and hostile questioning over an

excessively extended period of time

Adapted from Leo, R. A., From Coercion to Deception:

The Changing Nature of Police Interrogation in America,
University of California, 1992, also published in Crime,
Law and Social Change, 18, 1–2, 35–59, September 1992.

Classic legacy tactics and techniques taught to police include direct con-
frontation, theme development, developing details, alternative questioning
technique, falsifying evidence, invoking guilt and responsibility, manipu-
lative role-playing, and implying promises. By relying on these aggressive
influence strategies and tactics, investigators and interrogators are taught to
deceptively manipulate the way a subject feels, thinks, and behaves in ways
he or she might otherwise not and in ways that advance the interrogator’s
underlying assumptions about the subject’s guilt or knowledge.
The Direct Confrontation  Direct confrontation normally occurs right
up front in most traditional interrogation models and basically says to a
suspect—“I know you did it, you know you did it, just admit it, and we
can move on.” Clearly, this approach is accusatory in tone, emotionally
charged, and based on the assumption that the subject is guilty. If this fails
and the suspect resists, an interrogator’s next option is commonly to rely on
what is termed the tactic of theme development.
76 Tradecraft Primer

Theme Development  Theme development is generally the second technique

or tactic used by law enforcement officers following a direct confrontation.
Theme development occurs in one of three ways—through rationalization,
projection of blame, and minimization or maximization. Rationalization is
where the interrogator makes the crime seem socially acceptable and even
reasonable given the circumstance. For example, investigators may rational-
ize a bank robbery by telling the suspect that given the state of the economy,
other people are making the same decision because of their financial situa-
tions. The second kind of theme development is projection of blame which
aims to transfer blame to someone or something else entirely—such as the
victim or society. For example, in a rape case the interrogator might sug-
gest that perhaps the suspect would not have raped the woman had the vic-
tim dressed more conservatively. Some argue that leading subjects to project
blame on external factors and escape moral culpability for their criminal
actions is deceptive since they create the implication that the subject is not
responsible for their actions. The third way a theme is developed is through
the use of minimization or maximization. The police may exercise minimi-
zation or maximization by either withholding (minimizing) or exaggerat-
ing (maximizing) the evidentiary evidence in their possession. They may,
for example, tell a suspect that a murder victim is still alive, hoping that this
knowledge will compel the subject to talk. Or the police may exaggerate the
seriousness of the crime—overstating the amount of money stolen—so that
the subject feels compelled to confess to a smaller role in the crime. Or a
police officer may tell the subject that they are investigating a minor crime
when, in fact, they are really investigating a more serious one. Theme devel-
opment can be an effective communication strategy because it utilizes justi-
fications for the crimes in hope that the suspect will process and accept them
and, in doing so, confess.
Developing Details  A follow-on tactic to theme development is develop-
ing details, which arises immediately after the suspect makes the first verbal
signs of an incriminating statement or admission of guilt—the “OK! I did it”
statement. Now, the interrogator withdraws a bit from the intensity of the
interrogation and begins to modify his or her communication style to a more
empathetic tone. Instead of dominating the conversation, the interrogator
now starts to ask nonleading, more open-ended questions. For example, the
interrogator may begin asking the suspect to clarify his or her response and
then ask why he or she committed the crime and let the suspect tell his or her
version of events. This allows the suspect to give a detailed explanation for
the crime, ideally leading to a full confession.
The Interrogation Cycle 77

Alternative Questioning Technique  Another tactic in the law enforce-

ment inventory is the alternative questioning technique. The key here is to
present the suspect with a choice between two possible explanations for why
the crime was committed—one choice more socially or morally attractive or
justifiable than the other. For example, in a case involving theft, the suspect is
asked, “Did you take the money because you needed it for bills or for drugs?”
In logic, this is also referred to as a false dilemma and it is an effective tactic
because one (or more) of these reasons may account for the rationale behind
the crime. If the suspect accepts either one of these explanations, he or she
is admitting his or her guilt. In some cases, a suspect may voluntarily offer a
third possibility, which, again, serves as an admittance of guilt.
Falsifying Evidence  Courts have routinely permitted police to confront
a suspect with false evidence of guilt. Basically, this strategy has five sepa-
rate possible tactics. One is to falsely inform the subject that an accomplice
has identified him or her. Another is to falsely state that existing physical
evidence—such as fingerprints, bloodstains, or hair samples—confirms the
subject’s guilt. Yet another is to falsely assert that an eyewitness or the victim
identified the subject as the perpetrator. One other ploy is to have a coached
witness falsely identify the subject in a police lineup. Finally, we have the
subject taking a polygraph and regardless of the outcome inform the subject
that the results confirms guilt. All such tactics are permissible provided such
assertions are made verbally and the false statements are not made under
oath in front of a judge and in the courtroom.
Invoking Guilt and Responsibility  As previously discussed, guilt often leads
to defensiveness, anxiety, and shame, a belief by some that they abandoned
society’s values. Or, still in others, guilt may result in a desire for retaliation—
blaming others for their actions. Still in others, a guilt-ridden suspect may feel
powerless and stymied in the ability to adequately respond to the situation,
leading some to deliberately lie about their participation in the act under inves-
tigation to avoid facing the consequences. The reality is, however, few confes-
sions are inspired solely by remorse and guilt (Educing Information 2006).
Manipulative Role-Playing  Police are taught that an effective psycho-
logically oriented interrogation often demands the ability to feign different
personality traits or to act in a variety of roles. This may include projecting
sympathy, understanding, and compassion while shielding one’s personal
judgments about the subject. The most well known among such strategies is
the good cop/bad cop technique, which may be played with either one or two
investigators or interrogators (Rafaeli 1991).
78 Tradecraft Primer

Implied False Promises and Incentives  Although promises of leniency

have been ruled presumptively coercive since 1897 under the ruling Bram
versus United States (1897), the courts continue to permit vague and indefi-
nite promises. Specificity seems to be a key factor. For example, in one case,
the suspect was repeatedly told that he had mental problems and needed
psychological help rather than punishment and would get it provided that
he confess. Although this approach by the interrogator implied leniency, the
court upheld the conviction based on the confession (Miller versus Fenton
1986). The courts also permit interrogators or investigators to tell subjects
that they will inform the court of the subject’s cooperation, that showing
of remorse will be a mitigating factor, or that they will help out every way
they can if the subject confesses. Such assurances, while deceptive, are legal
(Skolnick and Leo 1992).
The use of incentives, disincentives, and inducements—money, favors,
gifts, special privileges (or their removal)—is commonly used within the
intelligence community. However, in the law enforcement community, plea
agreements are often used and may encourage testimony from those seeking
lighter sentences.
These classic legacy techniques are still commonly taught and practiced
despite the fact that far more creative, far less confrontational, and equally
effective approaches are now available.

Multifaceted Social Influence and Persuasion Techniques

Newer techniques offer fresh, creative ways to influence cooperation from
suspects or detainees, possess empirical research behind them—something
largely lacking in former classic legacy interrogation techniques—and offer a
noncoercive approach to gather reliable and useful information whether in a
criminal or an intelligence context.
Largely rapport-based influence techniques, these multifaceted ap­​pro-
aches come to us from experts who study the art and science behind persua-
sion, influence, and overcoming resistance from such fields as advertising,
communications, negotiations, medicine, and behavioral science or psychol-
ogy. By selectively choosing from among the menu of options laid out in this
primer and tailored to a subject, law enforcement and intelligence interrogators
may expand their options beyond those limited to classic legacy interrogation
tactics—which can lead to greater opportunities for success.

First among Many: The Direct Approach  Whether in law enforcement or

intelligence, all interrogations should routinely begin with this approach—it
is a direct, unambiguous questioning of the subject (see the following figure).
The Interrogation Cycle 79

The direct approach permits the interrogator to lessen the intensity so com-
mon in former interrogation models, and relies more on elicitation skills.

Statistical Benefits of the Direct Approach

Statistics from interrogation operations in

World War II show that the direct approach was
effective 90% of the time. In Vietnam and other
operations, such as Grenada in 1983, Panama in
1989, and the first Gulf Wars in Kuwait and Iraq
in 1991, the direct approach was 95% effective.

The effectiveness of the direct approach in the

early operations in Afghanistan, 2001 to 2002, and in
Iraq in 2003 is still under study. However, unofficial
statistics indicate that in these operations, the direct
approach has been dramatically less successful.

From Army Field Manual 2–22.3, Human Intelligence

Collector Operations, Washington, DC, 2006.

For some suspects or detainees, the direct approach capitalizes on the

shock of capture phenomenon—a brief psychological window of opportunity
to exploit the confusion, the uncertainty, and the negative expectations going
through the subject’s mind immediately after arrest or capture. Despair
typically sets in, as do feelings of confusion and fright. Consequently, the
straightforward direct approach comes as a welcome relief to the subject. So
plan to use this technique as long as the subject is answering the questions in
a non-evasive, useful, and reliable manner.
Remember, too, that it is psychologically easier for a subject to tell the
truth to someone who demonstrates an interest in him or her as a person,
and who is seeking to understand why the subject committed the crime or
act. While doing so, however, also keep in mind the need to avoid any emo-
tional attachments to the subject through transference (see the following
figure).
Use the direct approach as long as you believe the subject is answer-
ing your questions truthfully. Once the subject refuses to answer, falsely
answers questions, or recants previous statements, your next move is to
turn to more convincingly persuasive influence and counterresistance
techniques.
80 Tradecraft Primer

Warning: Avoid Transference

One common psychological danger during

interrogations is to develop an emotional attachment
on the part of the interrogator to the subject,
something that may happen especially during lengthy
interrogations of a suspect or detainee.

Recognize, too, that transference may likewise

operate in the opposite direction from the subject to
the interrogator, called countertransference. That is,
the subject may develop an attachment to the
interrogator and may unconsciously influence the
subjectsomething which reinforces the need to
strive to maintain situational awareness and
objectivity on the part of the interrogator inside the
interrogation room.

From Army Field Manual 2–22.3, Human Intelligence

Collector Operations, Washington, DC, 2006.

Understanding Resistance and Persuasion  Resistance and persuasion

represent the “yin and yang” of human interaction. Within interrogation
tradecraft, an understanding of both is fundamental to achieving success-
ful outcomes, especially when dealing with uncooperative subjects. So how
may we promote change in a subject and gain his or her cooperation? For
our purposes, there are two ways to do it. One way is to increase the motiva-
tion to cooperate and this is commonly represented by persuasive messaging.
The second way to promote change is to decrease resistance through a num-
ber of alternative approaches. As emphasized by Knowles and Linn (2004)
in their book Resistance and Persuasion, we may succeed in either of these
approaches by generally increasing the positive forces for persuasion or by
decreasing resistance by techniques that permit the receipt of the persuasive
messages and convinces the subject to cooperate.
The Influence of Persuasive Messaging  Among the persuasive influence
approaches, the most successful approaches focus their time and energy on
attempts to win over an uncooperative subject rather than on negative inter-
actions which are common in classic legacy tactics. These successful, persua-
sive, rapport-based approaches involve making the offer to cooperate more
socially attractive through reasoning, trust, and credibility. Some of these
approaches have been touched on in Chapter 4 but are worth repeating here
to emphasize their selective value as part of an integrated interrogation strat-
egy in the custodial phase of the interrogation.
The Interrogation Cycle 81

Repetition and Message Relevance  A factor to weigh in any persuasive mes-

saging is its degree of high or low personal relevance to the target recipient.
The higher the personal relevance, the more effective the delivery and the
attitudinal change. So in attempting to move an uncooperative suspect or
detainee to a cooperative state, make sure that the message is relevant to him
or her and their unique situation. And, of course, relevant arguments repeat-
edly heard are more persuasive than arguments heard only once. Just think
of the repetitive advertising we are bombarded with every single day on the
radio, television, and the Internet. It is the same idea.
Respect, Credibility, Trust, and Similarity  Respect and credibility weigh
heavily on changing attitudes. The higher the credibility, respect, and trust
the subject has in the persona of the interrogator, the more likely the desired
interrogation outcomes will be achieved. As discussed in Chapter 3 of this
primer, other characteristics that influence persuasion are forces of similarity
and qualities aligned with rapport-building.
Consistency and Commitment  Commitment and consistency are power-
ful glues influencing the subject to a course of action. Inconsistency in your
messaging threatens cooperation and compliance. So make sure you are con-
sistent with your prior actions, statements, and requests. Getting people to
commit to an action or a request is easier if the statements are compatible
with prior requests. The greater the similarity of the content between the
recent requests and the previous requests, the more persuasive is the foot-in-
the-door effect.
Strong Positive Messaging  Rely on positive messaging to influence the sub-
ject’s cooperation and set the stage for greater receptivity by the subject.
Typically, too, rely on facts and strong arguments. The implication is that
strong arguments are more effective than weak arguments. Accordingly,
weak arguments are not merely unpersuasive but can actually be antipersua-
sive. In other words, weak messaging may sometimes move the recipient fur-
ther away from the desired message position. So remember, in your contact
with a suspect or detainee, formulate strong messages that suggest or imply
positive consequences for the recipient.
Predicting the Future  Forcibly asking an uncooperative suspect or detainee
to do something is generally ineffective in gaining compliance. This ineffec-
tiveness is in large part due to the natural resistance most people experience
when someone is asserting their will over them in a controlled setting. A bet-
ter alternative may be simply to ask the subject “to predict what they would
do if someone were to ask them to do XYZ and to weigh its advantages down
the road.” By focusing the subject on the future and the short- and long-term
82 Tradecraft Primer

consequences of their decisions, an interrogator can help erode resistance in

context to present circumstances. Predicting the future and imagining hypo-
thetical future events focuses the subject away from the immediate unat-
tractiveness of their present situation. It forces them to think about future
implications where compliance seems more reasonable and easier to accept.
Those interrogators who are savvy with these effects will find that making
subtle suggestions to the subject to reflect on the future and to think more
deeply about down-the-road consequences may help influence constructive
choices in the present.
Appealing Narratives  In or out of the interrogation room, experienced leaders
know the powerful influence narratives or stories have on people. When people
are willing and able to listen to a message, strong arguments are more persua-
sive. And narratives are more persuasive when they appeal to the listener and
when phrased in ways that allow easy understanding. Some qualities inher-
ent in effective narratives are their wide audience appeal, vivid storylines, and
use of humor. Such qualities are commonly found in parables, novels, songs,
fantasy comics, television dramas and documentaries, and big-screen movies.
While the stories or narratives might be about external or inconsequential
people and events (e.g., “I once knew someone who . . .”), the content and reso-
lution of each story should mirror the subject’s situation and identify a path out
of a predicament. Because the story is ostensibly not about the subject, it does
not engage resistance that would be sparked by an explicit rhetorical discussion
about the subject’s dilemma. Some researchers suggest that the use of narra-
tives, in fact, may be one of the only strategies available for influencing the
beliefs of those who are solidly predisposed to oppose outreach efforts and the
most resistant to change—recalcitrant terrorist and true believers, for instance.
Influence by Self-Affirmation  Research shows that when selectively used,
assisting the subject with self-affirmation—validating someone’s self-worth
or stroking someone’s ego—may help to undermine resistance and leave
individuals more open to persuasion. Provided that it is done with tact and
discretion, this subtle form of manipulation could be used to get someone to
do something he or she would not otherwise do. Or it could be used to get
someone to divulge information.
To successfully use self-affirmation, you need to remember two important
rules. First, the self-affirmation must be positive. Second, the self-affirma-
tion must be somewhat compatible with your persuasive message, although
not-in-your-face obvious. Whether or not self-affirmation creates a greater
vulnerability to persuasion depends on the relationship between the topic
of the self-affirmation and the gist of the persuasive message. If the topic of
the self-affirmation is incompatible with the persuasive message, then self-
affirmation may not lead to greater persuasion. Rather, they would result in
The Interrogation Cycle 83

resistance. For instance, you cannot say on the one hand, “I respect you for
your honesty and integrity,” and then turn around and say, “Now will you tell
me a secret about your organization.” You have to be a bit more sophisticated
than that. Of course, in some cultures this idea of stroking someone’s ego
may yield a different outcome than in Western societies.

Norm of Reciprocity  Reciprocity possesses a powerful influence over peo-

ple. This strategy involves the interrogator doing a small favor or providing
the subject a gift before making a request to that person. In turn, the small
favor creates a relationship that, in turn, engages a norm of reciprocity, an
obligation to return the favor. As previously discussed, quite often, the only
reciprocal favor a suspect or a detainee possesses is the information in his or
her possession.
Influence of Intersecting Goals  Closely related to the norm of reciprocity is
the ability to influence through intersecting goals. If it is carefully orches-
trated by the interrogator, the subject comes to recognize—through implicit
or explicit language—that the subject’s actions can achieve some of his per-
sonal goals, such as release or better treatment. In an interrogation, the line
between the subject’s goal (e.g., early release or favorable treatment) runs
directly through the interrogator’s objective (i.e., gaining actionable intel-
ligence, reliable evidence, or a confession).
Principle of Social Proof  Previously touched upon in Chapter 4, this persua-
sive strategy relies on the fact that most people follow the crowd and often use
other people’s actions as reference for what is appropriate and desirable. Thus,
one strategy is for the interrogator to let the subject know that the choice
offered to him or her to cooperate is the same one that others have accepted.
Of course, the strategy can backfire on the interrogator, with some subjects
offering counterarguments against cooperating. So the best approach is to
use such an approach with caution.
Managing Anticipated Regret  Whenever an interrogator is trying to per-
suade a subject, one technique is to offer the subject a choice between two
options—Alternative A and Alternative B—and lean the messaging in the
direction of the preferred choice. As part of this messaging technique, the
interrogator may ask the subject to anticipate the future regret that he or she
might feel for selecting the less preferred option. “Before making your deci-
sion, just think a moment how you might feel in three years for not selecting
Alternative A?” So remember the power of anticipated regret as an effective
persuasion technique to help overcome resistance.

Capitalizing on Scarcity  Again, scarcity possesses a powerful motivating

influence over people and was one of the primary principles of influence
84 Tradecraft Primer

identified by Cialdini in his seminal 1984 book Influence: The Psychology

of Persuasion and touched on in Chapter 4. He proposed that objects and
opportunities appear more valuable when they are less available, even if
those objects and opportunities have little intrinsic value. “If it is scarce, it
must be valuable.” Cialdini also offered a second interpretation of the power
of scarcity that is much closer to our focus on interrogations and the previ-
ously discussed topic of anticipated regret. He suggests that as things become
less and less available, subjects may perceive the loss of not getting them. “If
you don’t get it now, this offer might not come around a second time and you
may regret not having it.” Again, in this case, scarcity works by weakening
the forces of resistance through the anticipation of future regret.
Avoid Attacks on Someone’s Traditional Beliefs  Avoid threatening a person’s
deep-seated beliefs, such as a religion or culture. Negative messages, which
vilify such beliefs, are not successful persuasion strategies. Long-standing atti-
tudinal views in the subject—especially those steeped in history—tend to be
particularly resistant to change. Expect a near insurmountable challenge if try-
ing to convince someone otherwise. Your time and energy may be better spent
avoiding such an approach and relying on the power of the persuasive social
influence techniques we just discussed in this section.
Dealing with Resistance  What do we mean by the term resistance?  It
is basically refusing to make a change whether in behavior (refusing to
answer questions truthfully) or in thinking (refusing to accept new view-
points) in response to a request from the interrogator; and we know people
resist or oppose persuasive attempts for a variety of reasons. Typically, it
is a by-product of a preexisting belief, which the person insists on keeping
(Intelligence Interviewing 2009). And like truthfulness and deceit, there are
plenty of shades of gray in the degrees of resistance a subject may employ.
While suicide, physical outbursts, and debilitating hunger strikes repre-
sent the most extreme forms of resistance an interrogator may face, the fol-
lowing figure tries to capture other common resistance techniques you may
encounter with a suspect or detainee.

Resistance Tactics Practiced by Uncooperative Subjects

• Denying knowledge • Claiming memory lapses

• Feigning illness • Injecting lies within statements
• Recanting previous statements • Claiming innocence
• Pacing selective release of information • Shifting blame or knowledge to others
• Keeping completely silent • Showing contempt
• Omitting statements deliberately
The Interrogation Cycle 85

What reinforces resistance in people? Basically, it is threat driven. When

a person senses a threat from someone, resistance typically follows. Inside the
interrogation room, this is reflected by the subject’s unwillingness to cooperate.
The greater the nature of the perceived threat—arbitrary, blatant, direct, and
demanding—the greater the likelihood a detainee may resist. Without the threat,
there is no resistance. Among the many other reasons not to cooperate could
be distrust of the interrogator and weakness in argumentation of the persua-
sive message. Still, other reasons, according to Knowles and Linn (2004), may
include the desire to avoid the punitive consequences of a previous act, conflict-
ing biases, a cultural aversion to the change attempt, or any number of others.
In terms of the interrogation cycle, most conventional approaches to
interrogation assume that once resistance surfaces, our options are limited;
we either give up or ratchet up the pressure through increasingly confronta-
tional coercive techniques. However, that is now up to challenge.
The moment resistance first happens might be a good starting point to shift
strategies from a focus on persuasion tactics to acknowledging the resistance fol-
lowed by reliance on techniques and tactics designed to defuse it. These alterna-
tive approaches work by decreasing the motivation, reasons, or incentives not to
engage in resistant or uncooperative behavior (Knowles and Linn 2004).
Sidestepping Resistance  Successful interrogators focus their finite resources
(e.g., time and energy) on subjects that present the most attractive risk-to-
gain ratio. One way to do that is simply to ignore or avoid the need for the
subject to revert to resistance in the first place. For an interrogator, you
might sidestep resistance a number of ways. One way is to refrain from
direct in-your-face or tell-me-everything demands by beginning with small,
indirect, and less-threatening requests. Another way is simply “going next
door.” Occasionally, the information needed from a recalcitrant subject is
obtainable from a willing subject or co-conspirator located in an adjoining
cell.
Minimizing Requests  Another way to sidestep resistance is to minimize
the initial request. The idea behind minimizing requests is that an initial
small request may receive relatively little resistance.
Addressing Resistance Directly  Another approach seeks to reduce resistance
by directly addressing its causes. One way is by offering some guarantee that
the most feared outcome will not occur. If a subject is worried about feel-
ing trapped, an interrogator might advise the subject, “Anytime you need a
break, just let me know.”
Distracting Resistance  Psychologists know that resistance requires atten-
tion and energy on the part of the subject to be optimally effective. Here,
86 Tradecraft Primer

a mild distraction, such as engaging music or videos, or television, might

occupy the subject’s attention, thereby limiting the capacity to counterar-
gue or resist. These considerations assume that the distraction is sufficient
to interfere with resistance, yet weak enough not to obscure the message.
Distractions can boomerang, of course, and lead to no persuasion. If a dis-
traction is too intense, then it may become the focus of attention and your
message may fail to even register with the subject.
Using Resistance to Promote Change  One of the most intriguing approaches
to getting past resistance is to acknowledge it and use it. In a manner of speak-
ing, this is the use of reverse psychology by interrogators. Reverse psychology
is telling people not to do what you really want them to do. Here, an interro-
gator might precede a persuasive message by saying something like “I know
you’re determined not to listen to anything I say, but …” When this works,
the subject resists the acknowledgment or suggestion of resistance. Reverse
psychology is a dangerous strategy if used recklessly because the interroga-
tor is advocating something against his or her own interests. The targets of
the influence—the subject—may take the suggestion at face value and act in
accordance with the stated wishes, thereby thwarting the interrogator’s aims.
To be effective, reverse psychology requires that the interrogator has a real
certainty that the subject will, in fact, oppose the suggestion and do exactly
the opposite of what is requested in the messaging.
The Double-Bind Alternative Choice  This approach uses resistance to
promote attitudinal or behavioral change by offering the subject a choice
between two alternatives—Alternative A and Alternative B. Offering the
subject a choice between two alternatives that achieve the same aims regard-
less of which alternative is chosen allows the subject to exhaust his or her
resistance while still achieving the interrogator’s aims. In psychology, this
tactic of the alternative choice is labeled double-bind and commonly used
by parents on children who are resistant to bedtime. In this case, the parent
asks, “Do you want to brush your teeth first or do you want to put on your
pajamas first?” It is a double-bind in the sense that both alternatives lead to
the same outcome, in this case, going to bed. In the case of an interrogation,
the interrogator can ask, “Which do you want to discuss first, A or B?” The
outcome will be the same, but the subject feels he or she had control over the
outcome by choosing which topic to address first.
Redefining Relationships  In redefining the interaction between the interroga-
tor and the subject, a savvy interrogator might transform the situation away
from an interrogation to something more benign or collaborative. Transforming
the role of the suspect or detainee into the role of teacher or consultant implies
that the interrogator takes on the role of learner; or transforming the role of
The Interrogation Cycle 87

suspect or detainee into that of an expert implies that the interrogator takes
on the role of novice. In either case, the roles can indirectly disable a target’s
resistance. Such role transformations have many implications particularly
for those who are long-term detainees of the intelligence community. First, it
implies that both the interrogator and the subject are now working coopera-
tively on a mutual goal. For instance, the interrogator might ask the subject to
instruct, educate, and mentor on the beliefs of the subject’s former cohort unit.
By implication, the subject now has less need to feel threatened and is being
respected for his or her knowledge. Second, such role transformations imply a
longer-term relationship with more opportunities for interaction than a tradi-
tional interrogator/subject relationship. Third, a long-term relationship implies
that there will be future opportunities to reciprocate that may result from this
interaction.
An Alternative Option to Defeat Resistance: Fear Appeals  Fear appeals
(messages) are powerful strategies that attempt to change attitudes by relying
on the negative emotion of fright to gain cooperation from a resistant subject.
As a future-oriented negative emotion, it is closely tied to anticipated regret,
scarcity, and perception management (Stephenson and Witte 1997).
Initially developed to promote healthy lifestyle changes and choices
among medical patients—such as the increased risk of melanoma without
routine, daily use of skin creams with sun-block protection—fear appeals
generally contain two parts: (1) a fear component and (2) a desired response.
Typically, the subject first evaluates the fear component, which is defined
by the message’s severity. If the message initiates perceptions of fear that
reach a certain threshold, then the subject next evaluates the effectuality
of the desired response and the consequences for noncompliance. It is the
combination of the perceived fear component coupled with the ability of the
subject to comply with the desired response and the weighing of the conse-
quences for noncompliance that determine successful outcomes.
Traditional research believed that moderate fear appeals were most effec-
tive; low fear appeals did not portray sufficient degrees of negative conse-
quences to influence subjects; and high fear appeals may have frightened
subjects too much and increased resistance and defensive avoidance.
More recent research has changed views about high fear appeals. Such
research demonstrates that properly communicated, strong or high fear
appeals that are coupled with realistic recommendations that are easily and
effectively executed by the subject, and avoids the perceived negative con-
sequences, result in the highest degree of positive motivational influence.
Alternatively, strong fear appeals that are coupled with ineffectual recom-
mendations (too difficult, too time consuming, unrealistic), possess the
lowest degree of influence on the subject. In the latter instance, subjects
88 Tradecraft Primer

commonly engage in denial (e.g., “I’m not going to do it; no one else I know
has done it”); defensive avoidance (e.g., “I’m just not going to think about
the consequences”); or message manipulation (e.g., “They are just trying to
scare me” or “What’s the use? I’m screwed whether I do it or not”). So, where
high fear messaging is coupled with effectual recommendations that are rea-
sonably executed by the subject is where researchers saw the greatest suc-
cess with the desired behavior change, patient compliance, and cooperation
(Stephenson and Witte 1997).

Corroborate Outcomes
Too many interrogators treat a suspect’s “I did it” statement as if it is auto-
matically self-validating—even if it fails to be supported by logic or the evi-
dence. Why? Because it too often validates the interrogator’s assumption of
the suspect’s guilt—a kind of confirmation bias. Rather, interrogators and
investigators need to learn to fact-check and evaluate the outcomes of their
interrogations in a postmortem review. While doing so, they should treat
admissions or confessions as neutral hypotheses to be tested against the
evidence.
This process of corroborating outcomes is nothing new to the intelligence
community and is easily adoptable to law enforcement interrogations as well.
In the process of corroborating an interrogation, the interrogator is making
a logical judgment. Typically, valid confessions will be supported by the evi-
dence, the quality of the subject’s responses, previous insights, forensics and,
if available, witness statements. In the process, a guilty subject’s admission
or confession may reveal insights known only by the true perpetrator, lead
to new evidence, explain anomalies at the crime scene, and be supported by
forensics. False ones will not (Drizin and Leo 2004).
Too often, missing from this equation, at least in a law enforcement set-
ting, is the need to inject an evaluation by the interrogator of confidence
levels in the judgment of interrogation outcomes and in terms of guilt or
innocence. Ascribing confidence levels in terms of high, moderate, or low
confidence will ultimately help prosecutors in the decision to bring a case to
trial. With so much at stake in terms of law enforcement credibility and soci-
ety’s concerns over prosecuting an innocent person, this step in the interro-
gation cycle should also call on the supervisor of the interrogator to actively
participate in the evaluation process. By serving in a third-party review of
the audiovisual recording and participating in the final determination of
confidence levels, police supervisors inject accountability into the overall
step of corroborating outcomes.
The Interrogation Cycle 89

Decision to Refer to a Prosecutor, Release,

or Detain and Repeat Cycle
This step represents the final stage of the law enforcement interrogation cycle.
At this point, it should be fairly obvious if the facts warrant: referring the
case to a prosecutor; releasing the suspect for lack of evidence; or whether,
such as in the case of a detainee held on terror charges, requesting the subject
be held for further questioning in a repeat of the entire cycle. Once referred,
the case is now in the hands of the prosecutor.

The Intelligence Interrogation Cycle

The threat:
What do we know, do not
know, and want to know?
Identify and prioritize the
critical intelligence gaps
Corroborate responses; Identify and screen who among
if appropriate, release, or retain
the detainees would, should, or
and repeat cycle
could know what you seek

Throughout the cycle,

continuously evaluate
Review relevant
Execute the interrogation responses for background information
and frame initial questions
reliability and usefulness
and truthfulness or deceit

Build an interrogation plan: Pre-interrogation interview

Select from among authorized (1) Begin rapport-building
tactics or techniques likely to
(2) Assess degree of
induce cooperation, mitigate
resistance and cooperation
resistance to questioning, and (3) Uncover interpersonal
exploit motivational and intrapersonal
influences motivational influences

A Framework for Intelligence Interrogations

Similarities between the previous law enforcement interrogation cycle and

this cycle for intelligence interrogations are apparent. In this case, however,
we are talking about someone normally without U.S. Constitutional standing
and interned outside of the United States so there is no need for the Miranda
warning or waiver.
90 Tradecraft Primer

Identify Threats and Priority Intelligence Gaps

Starting at the top and working in a clockwise direction, notice that we begin
the cycle with the threat and associated intelligence gaps—which are com-
mon to intelligence problem sets: What do we know about the threat? What
do we not know relative to intelligence gaps? Which intelligence gaps are the
most critical and time-sensitive and possess the highest priority to get filled
first?

Screen Detainees
Next in sequential order, we need to screen and identify who among the
detainee population might possess the information we seek. One suggested
approach to identify an appropriate prisoner for interrogation or question-
ing is to make an initial determination of “who would know, could know,
or should know” the information sought—a technique attributed to former
U.S. Army master interrogator Tourison and practiced during his tours in
Vietnam. For instance, a person claiming to be a local villager would know
the names of those living near him, should know the location of the nearest
medical clinic, and could know who among the villagers joined forces with
local terrorist insurgents (Interrogation: World War II, Vietnam, and Iraq
2008).

Frame Initial Questions

Once a potential source is identified, the next step would be to review all
relevant background information on the detainee; to refine your knowledge
of the information gaps needed filling; and to start the process of framing
initial questions in preparation for the pre-interrogation interview that, in
most cases, may be the first face-to-face meeting between the interrogator
and the detainee.

Perform Pre-Interrogation Interview

As with the noncustodial interrogation, one of the main goals of the pre-
interrogation interview is to begin the initial efforts at rapport-­building.
Simultaneously, it also serves as an opportunity to evaluate the detainee’s
scope of knowledge, resistance posture, duplicity, willingness to cooperate in
questioning, cognitive skills and intellect, and motivational influences. These
factors may serve as valuable points of leverage if a formal interrogation is
warranted.
The Interrogation Cycle 91

Build and Execute Your Interrogation Strategy

Using all this relevant information as background, the interrogator
next begins to develop an appropriate interrogation strategy tailored to
the  detainee. Such a plan requires the interrogator to select from among
the authorized tactics and techniques likely to induce cooperation from the
detainee, mitigate resistance, and help facilitate the greatest chances of suc-
cess by persuasively influencing the detainee to provide useful and reliable
answers to key questions.
The plan should also include identifying and issuing guidance to your
team members; obtaining needed props, such as maps or photos, if needed;
and rehearsing your questions in advance with your supporting linguist-
interpreter; and consulting with any other interrogators who may have previ-
ously spoken with the detainee. Once completed, schedule the appropriate
time and place for the interrogation and execute your strategy.

Corroborate Responses, Release, or Retain and Repeat Cycle

Once accomplished, the information received from the detainee must be vet-
ted and corroborated. Once satisfied, the interrogation may terminate just
as in the law enforcement cycle. In some cases, the detainee may be eligible
for release. If, on the other hand, additional information is needed and the
detainee appears to possess it, the interrogator may then repeat the cycle once
again. Keep in mind, too, that throughout the intelligence interrogation cycle
the detainee’s responses are constantly evaluated for reliability and useful-
ness, truthfulness and deceit.
About Confessions
6
An interrogation is generally deemed successful in a law enforcement con-
text when a suspect makes some sort of incriminating statement, voices
an admission, or makes a full confession. Or, in an intelligence context, a
detainee provides information needed to fill a critical information gap, pro-
vides time-critical or actionable intelligence about an imminent threat, or
adds to our basic knowledge about the target group. So, too, is getting cred-
ible and reliable leads in either of these contexts.
What should a criminal interrogator expect in the way of confessions
inside the interrogation room? In the United States, survey results over the
past decade or more suggest that the rate of self-incriminating statements,
admissions, or confessions range from 46% to 68% (Kassin, Leo, Meissner
et al. 2007). British research shows a similar success pattern—in the range of
approximately 50% to 55% of those interrogated (Educing Information 2006).

Three Major Factors Influencing Outcomes

From an interrogator’s perspective, three factors influence confession out-

comes. First is the strength of evidence believed to exist—real or imagined—
by the suspect against himself or herself. Second is the amount of time spent
by the interrogator inside the interrogation room with the suspect. Third is
the number of tactics used on the suspect.

Strength of Evidence
The strength of the evidence—real or imagined—against a suspect is one of
the best predictors of the likelihood of a confession. Additionally, suspects
were significantly more likely to provide incriminating information dur-
ing an interrogation in which strong evidence existed against them prior to
questioning. In fact, the stronger these perceptions of evidence are, the more
likely the suspect will confess, often resulting in some sort of admission in
slightly more than 50% of cases. In cases where evidence was weak, confes-
sions were rare—less than 10% of cases—and denials common—77% of cases
(Educing Information 2006; Kassin, Leo, Meissner et al. 2007).

93
94 Tradecraft Primer

How do police, investigators, or interrogators create such perceptions?

Possessing solid evidence helps—DNA or other forensics, security camera
video, reliable witness statements, or victim testimony. But in the absence of
tangible evidence or forensics, police sometimes bluff about the existence of
evidence and make false claims such as “We’ve got your fingerprints.” As pre-
viously discussed, the criminal courts do not forbid it. The only basic rules
that seem to apply are that police cannot lie in front of a judge or in the court-
room and that they are prohibited from creating falsified tangible evidence.
Apparently, the courts seem to draw a line between false verbal assertions
made to the suspect and false tangible physical evidence manufactured to
deceive the suspect, such as a hard copy forensic report. Inadvertently, such
physical evidence could end up into the courtroom, so such acts are prohib-
ited (Skolnick & Leo 1992).

Time
Longer interrogations commonly result in greater numbers of confessions
over those that are far shorter. In 2004, the Federal Bureau of Investigation
interrogation training literature claimed that “the chances of obtaining a
confession increase 25 percent for every hour (up to 4 hours) of an inter-
rogation” (Educing Information 2006). Experiences from law enforcement
officers show that a custodial interrogation can vary in length from a few
seconds—in cases when the suspect either immediately confesses or invokes
Miranda rights and the interrogation is terminated—to about 5 hours for
the longer ones. And, the 2007 survey of 631 law enforcement officers sug-
gests that most criminal interrogation sessions are relatively brief with more
than 90% of routine law enforcement interrogation sessions lasting about
1.50 hours. Yet the police survey did indicate that many suspects are often
interrogated more than once over several days or weeks. The survey also
demonstrated that the more serious the crime—murder or rape—the longer
interrogators spend attempting to elicit incriminating information from a
suspect (Kassin, Leo, Meissner et al. 2007). For the most part, time is a distin-
guishable difference in a military or intelligence setting where a knowledge-
able terrorist or enemy combatant could be held for years and repetitively
questioned—at least until interrogators are convinced that the detainee has
exhausted his or her knowledge, no longer poses a threat, the conflict ends,
or the need to intern the detainee no longer exists.

Number of Tactics
In general, the larger the number of tactics used inside the interrogation
room, the more likely one of them will resonate with the subject and result in
About Confessions 95

a confession, an admission, or an incriminating statement. In a field observa-

tional study of nearly 200 interrogations, Leo (1996) observed the number of
tactics a detective employed per interrogation ranged from zero (e.g., the sus-
pect spontaneously confessed or the detective did not genuinely try to elicit a
confession) to 15 for the longest one. However, the average was approximately
five. The higher numbers of tactics seemed dependent on three variables:
(1) seriousness of the crime—the more serious the crime, the higher the num-
ber of interrogation tactics used in a custodial setting; (2) race and ethnicity—­
minorities were subjected to far more tactics over their white counterparts;
and (3) strength of evidence—the stronger the evidence, the fewer tactics used
since there was less need for incriminating evidence (Leo 1996).
As highlighted at the beginning of this chapter, statistically expect about
50% of the suspects to make some sort of incriminating statement to the
interrogator. Of that number, increasing concerns are being raised by judicial
watch groups over the validity of these success rates in light of recent empiri-
cal studies, demonstrating that false confessions do occur. False confessions
most notably occur when heavy-handed, manipulative, and deceptive tech-
niques are employed by relentless and unethical interrogators.

There is a common belief that people do not make unreliable or false state-
ments unless they’re tortured or mentally ill. And I would explain . . . that’s
not the case, sometimes people do make false statements, even if they’re not
physically tortured or mentally ill, that there . . . is psychological research
that explains how certain [interrogation] techniques can lead people to make
the decision to confess whether they’re guilty or innocent. (Vent versus State
of Alaska 2003)

Other Influential Variables

Age
Older suspects and detainees, generally those older than 26 years, seem to
cope better with the unfamiliarity and demands of police interrogation than
younger ones. A possible explanation may be that older suspects are often
better equipped psychologically to cope with the demands of an interro-
gation. Another possible explanation is that older suspects are more likely
to understand and assert their legal rights during an interrogation. There
is also case law that demonstrates that younger suspects are more likely to
confess than older suspects. One possible explanation for this phenomenon
is that younger people, especially juveniles, do not think through the long-
term implications of their confession and are commonly influenced by fam-
ily members to come clean. In a survey of nearly 25,000 juveniles—with an
96 Tradecraft Primer

average age of 15.5 years—from seven European countries, 14% reported giv-
ing a false confession (Redlich, Summers & Hoover 2009). In other instances,
the National Registry of Exonerations statistics suggest that young people in
particular are more prone to admitting guilt for crimes they did not commit.
Nearly 40% of exonerations for crimes allegedly committed by youths under
18 years old in the last quarter of the century involved false confessions com-
pared with 11% for adults.

Gender
As of 2013, nearly 93% of persons arrested and imprisoned for serious
crimes were male. Females, despite comprising slightly more than half of the
U.S. population, make up about 7% of the prison population in the United
States (DOJ 2014). In terms of violent crimes, such as homicides, males
in 80% of the cases killed a stranger or a nonfamily member. Females, on
the other hand, in about 60% of the cases killed their spouse, an intimate
acquaintance, or a family member. It also seems that for their crimes, females
generally receive lighter sentences by the courts. In general, men are nearly
16 times more likely to be incarcerated than women for a crime. In terms of
confession rates, a comprehensive study conducted in Britain in a survey of
4250 arrests among 10 police stations in England and Wales concluded that
females confess at higher rates than males, a 73% admission rate for females
versus 52% for males (Phillips & Brown 1998).

Race and Ethnicity

For context and background for what we are about to discuss next, it is
important to know that blacks (non-Hispanics) make up about 13.2% of the
U.S. population; whites (non-Hispanics) about 62%; Hispanics about 17.4%;
and Asians about 5%, according to U.S. Census statistics for 2014.
According to 2013 Department of Justice crime statistics, black men
represented the largest proportion of sentenced male inmates at year-end
at nearly 37%; white males made up about 32%. Meanwhile, Hispanic men
made up 22% of the prison population. Among females, whites comprised
49% of the female prison population in 2013, while black females 22%.
In terms of incarceration rates for males, the statistics show that black
men were two times more likely to be incarcerated than Hispanics and seven
times more likely to receive prison sentences than white criminals. Among
women, the imprisonment rates for black females, as a percentage to their
population, is twice that of white females (DOJ 2014). Overall, the numbers
show nearly 3% of the black male population in prison. Among the many
About Confessions 97

factors to account for larger conviction rates among black males and females
is an assessment that whites are getting better plea bargains than blacks
(Bureau of Justice Assistance 2011).

Mental State and Psychological Factors

Research from self-reported surveys of previously incarcerated false confes-
sors were significantly different on a number of measures relating to nega-
tive life events, particularly being bullied or expelled from school, substance
abuse, self-harming behaviors, cognitive skill deficits, and mental health
issues. Overall, the general picture that emerges is that false confessors have
more mental health-related issues than those who do not make false confes-
sions. Additionally, such survey results are consistent with mental illness as a
recognized risk factor for false confessors (Redlich, Summers & Hoover 2009).

Previous Convictions
With regard to prior prison experience, the likelihood of a denial of guilt was
twice as great in cases where the suspect had already been to prison. Such
suspects who have had several previous convictions are more likely to know
and assert their legal rights, more familiar with the probable consequences
of making self-incriminating admissions and confessions, and more familiar
with the police environment and interrogations. Consistent with expecta-
tions, suspects with previous felony records were four times more likely to
invoke their Miranda rights than suspects without previous convictions and
suspects with previous convictions were less likely to confess to the alleged
offense than first-time offenders (Educing Information 2006).

Type of Offense
The more serious the offense and the greater the stakes in terms of perceived
and real punishment, the less likely a suspect would confess. In general, sus-
pects interrogated for property offenses confessed more often than suspects
of violent offenses (Mitchell 1983; Neubauer 1974).

Access to Legal Advice

Contrary to expectations, access to an attorney does not appear to reduce
the overall confession rate in major ways. In other words, even with a high
proportion of suspects being provided legal advice, suspects still confessed in
slightly more than half of all cases (Gudjonsson & Hilton 1998).
98 Tradecraft Primer

Miranda Rights
Even though invoking Miranda is a potentially powerful tool for suspects
to avoid interrogation, multiple law enforcement surveys since 1996 dem-
onstrate that roughly four out of five criminal suspects typically waive their
rights and agree to enter questioning. In percentage terms, that is approxi-
mately an 80% waiver rate (Leo 1996).
Among the 574 U.S. police officers who participated in the 2007 self-
reported survey of law enforcement officers, respondents estimated that about
68% of suspects fully waived their rights, while an additional 13% initially
waived their rights but then reversed themselves and invoked them (Kassin,
Leo, Meissner et al. 2007). This generally tracks with previous survey results
that claim that about 20% of suspects choose to terminate questioning and
invoke their Miranda rights from the start (Kassin, Leo, Meissner et al. 2007).

Other Considerations
As we have just discussed, many variables influence confessions. The follow-
ing figure tries to summarize other factors that may impede a confession or
lead some to deny knowing something important.

Factors Inhibiting Confessions

1. Fear of legal consequences—financial

liberty, death
2. Professional reputational concerns—the
higher the social standing, the greater
reluctance to confess
3. Personal shame—desire to keep family and
friends ignorant of activities
4. Fear of retaliation—against his or her person
or family
5. Ideological or societal beliefs and
commitments
6. Response to coercively unfair techniques or
perceptions of ill-treatment
7. Initial success with lies, which reinforces
further deception and denials

Wrongful Convictions

No one really knows the extent of the problem within the criminal justice
system. Yet the reality that greater numbers of formerly convicted subjects
About Confessions 99

are being exonerated by the courts, many of whom have served decades
behind bars, suggests some sort of breakdown in our criminal justice system.
Prominent among the advocacy groups probing the causes of wrong-
ful convictions and evaluating why so many innocent persons have served
time in prison are the National Registry of Exonerations, a project of the
University of Michigan Law School, and the Innocence Project at the
Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law at Yeshiva University. Founded in 2012,
the National Registry provides detailed information about every known
exoneration in the United States since 1989—cases in which a person was
wrongly convicted of a crime and later cleared of all the charges based on
new evidence that ascertain innocence. Predating the registry by 20 years,
the Innocence Project was established in 1992 to help prove the innocence of
convicts through DNA testing.
As of mid-March 2015, the National Registry database held over 1,564
exonerated persons, some of whom spent decades behind bars. As of mid-
2015, the Innocence Project held over 325 former defendants exonerated by
DNA testing, including 18 internees who were formerly on death row. In
total, these 1,564 former internees spent nearly 14,000 years in prison—on
average, about 9 years each. Almost all were imprisoned for years; 41% for
10 years or more; 62% for at least 5 years.
As demonstrated by the Innocence Project and the National Registry,
wrongful convictions are far too common within the criminal justice system.
Among the 1,564 internees previously discussed, nearly 46% were falsely
convicted of homicide, nearly 30% were falsely convicted of sexual assault
including child sex abuse, and nearly 15% falsely convicted for other violent
crimes. Major contributing factors to their wrongful convictions included
the following:

• False confessions: 13%

• Misleading or false evidence: 22%
• Eyewitness misidentification: 34%
• Official (police or prosecutorial) misconduct: 46%
• Perjury or false accusations: 55%

Among the most serious of violent crimes—homicides, sexual assaults,

and child abuse cases—wrongful conviction statistics are even more dra-
matic according to the National Registry. In specific crime categories:

• Perjury or false accusations are highest in child sex abuse cases (81%)
and homicide cases (67%).
• Official misconduct is highest in homicide cases (59%) and child sex
abuse cases (46%).
100 Tradecraft Primer

• Mistaken eyewitness identifications are highest in robbery cases

(83%) and adult sexual assault cases (72%).
• False or misleading evidence are highest in adult sexual assault cases
(33%) and child sex abuse cases (23%).
• False confessions are highest in homicide cases (21%).

Interrogation-Induced False Confessions

Within the context of wrongful convictions, a false confession is an admission
of an act the confessor did not commit. Research suggests that false confessions
are powerfully persuasive and that many false confessions contain detailed nar-
ratives and accurate facts that appear to betray guilty knowledge (Kassin 2012).
The idea of false confessions is a foreign concept to most people. Many
have difficulty comprehending the situational factors which would lead an
innocent person to confess to an act they did not commit—particularly to
an act which is criminal in nature and could result in a long incarceration
in prison or even the death penalty. Yet false confessions show up in nearly
15% of all cases in the National Registry and nearly 30% of DNA exonera-
tion cases according to the Innocence Project. In fact, false confessions are
counterintuitive in part because these false statements come from the defen-
dant themselves and, in part, because they often contain facts that were not
publicly known. In some circumstances, false confessions may include state-
ments of motive, even apologies and remorse. Such detailed admissions indi-
cate that the innocent confessor may have obtained the information from
either “leading” questions inside the interrogation room or other second-
ary sources of external influence (American Psychological Association 2014).
The following figure captures the most vulnerable among the population to
interrogation-induced false confessions and to external influences.

Demographics of Common
False Confessors
1. Naively trusting juveniles

2. Cognitively and intellectually disabled

3. Persons with psychotic and personality

disorders

4. Targets of excessively physical or

psychologically coercive interrogators

As previously discussed, researchers recognize that interrogation-

induced false confessions tend also to correlate with excessively lengthy
About Confessions 101

interrogations. In support of such findings, Drizin and Leo (2004) documented

125 cases of proven false confessions in conjunction with the Northwestern
University School of Law and its Center on Wrongful Convictions. Of those
in the sample who went to trial attempting to reclaim their innocence, over
80% were wrongly convicted based on interrogation-induced confessions. In
the study, the average length of the interrogation was 16.3 hours, far exceed-
ing the norms of most police interrogations.
The major causes of interrogation-induced false confessions are the
interrogator’s use of psychologically relentless tactics and contamination
error reflected through the following:

• Repetitive and suggestive questioning that exposes the subject to

new information not previously discussed or known to the subject
which is then adopted by the subject in future retelling of events.
• Deceptively telling the subject that others have already provided the
details and, to escape the interrogation, all the subject needs to do is
confirm what everyone already knows.
• The use of positive feedback, incentives, or encouragement when the
information confirms or is consistent with the interrogator’s per-
ceived assumptions or biases.
• The use of negative feedback, disincentives, or discouragement when
the information refutes or is inconsistent with the interrogator’s per-
ceived assumptions or biases.
• Coercively repeating a question, intimidating, badgering or brow-
beating the subject until the interrogator got the response sought.
• Telling the suspect or detainee that he or she may have had a mem-
ory lapse and then convincing the subject to accept the interrogator’s
version of events to fill the void.
• Retelling a distorted version of previously elicited testimony by the
investigator or interrogator to confuse the subject and in an effort
to have a false narrative adopted and recited by the subject in sub­
sequent testimony.

In response to these manipulative interrogation tactics, Professor

Richard Leo (2009) from the University of San Francisco’s School of Law
identifies three major types of interrogation-induced false confessions:

• Voluntary false confession: A false confession voluntarily and know-

ingly given in response to little or no police pressure and for a vari-
ety of reasons, including a pathological desire for notoriety, need
for self-punishment, mental impairment, or a desire to protect the
actual perpetrator.
102 Tradecraft Primer

• Compliant false confession: A confession knowingly given to put an

end to a harsh interrogation. Many adults with mental disabilities,
younger adolescents, and even normal adults who respond badly to
stress often succumb to compliant false confessions. In other cases,
an innocent person gives way to social pressure during interroga-
tion, especially juveniles or children influenced by their parents.
They are led to believe that the short-term benefits of a false con-
fession outweigh the long-term costs of prolonged interrogation. A
famous example of a compliant false confession took place in the
1989 Central Park Jogger Case, in which five young suspects were
told that they could end their lengthy and coercive interrogations
in connection with the rape and murder of a female victim if they
provided statements placing themselves at the scene of the crime and
incriminated each other.
• Persuaded false confession: A false confession knowingly given by
an innocent suspect who comes to doubt the reliability of his or her
memory and thus comes to believe that he or she may have com-
mitted the crime despite no actual memory of having done so. Also
called internalized false confession, this type of confession is admit-
tedly rare and yet persuasive when entered into evidence.

Regardless of the age, mental capacity, or a host of other extenuating

factors, what all false confessors seem to have in common is the decision, at
some point during the interrogation process, that confessing will be more
beneficial to them than maintaining their innocence and enduring harsh
treatment at the hands of an aggressive interrogator. And, as we now know,
repeated and suggestive questioning at the hands of an aggressive interroga-
tor may implant false memories, elicit false information, and coerce a vulner-
able subject into giving false testimony.
In an ironic twist, the one case that catapulted John E. Reid and his meth-
odology to national prominence in the 1950s speaks to these points directly.
The case involved the murder of Nancy Parker and husband-defendant
Darrel Parker, who was wrongly charged with her murder. It took nearly
40 years to overturn his conviction and 57 years to officially pronounce him
innocent. The account is drawn from the National Registry of Exonerations
with its permission. The registry’s summary of the case was written by Senior
Researcher Maurice Possley (2012).

In 1956 Darrel Parker, a forester in Lincoln, Nebraska, was convicted of mur-

dering his wife solely by a confession—recanted almost immediately after—and
given under coercive circumstances after 12 hours of intense interrogation by
John E. Reid who served as his interrogator. At the end of his interrogation, Reid
About Confessions 103

said Parker confessed. Parker recanted the confession almost immediately, but
it was rejected. Parker went on trial in the Lancaster County Court of Common
Pleas in May, 1956. The evidence against him consisted almost solely of his con-
fession. He was convicted by a jury on June 2, 1956. Parker was sentenced to
life in prison. After his initial appeal was denied, Parker filed a federal peti-
tion for a writ of habeas corpus. In February 1969, the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Eighth Circuit ruled that the confession had been coerced and ordered
Parker retried or released. The state of Nebraska appealed and the U.S. Supreme
Court reversed and sent the case back to the trial court for a hearing on whether
the confession was voluntary. Parker was released on his own recognizance in
December 1969. After the Supreme Court ruling, Parker agreed to waive the
hearing, the confession was found to be voluntary, and his conviction was rein-
stated. Days later, the Nebraska Board of Pardons commuted his sentence to 25
from 45 years in prison. Parker was then paroled. He moved to Illinois.
Five years later, in 1975, Wesley Peery was convicted of murdering a woman
in Havelock, Nebraska, and was sentenced to death. While on death row, he told
his lawyers about 13 other murders he had committed—but refused to allow his
attorney to tell anyone about them until after he died. One of those murders was
Nancy Parker. Peery had a meticulous memory of the murder and provided a
multitude of details that coincided with the evidence in the crime. After Peery
died in 1988, his confession to killing Nancy Parker was revealed. Based on
Peery’s confession, Parker sought a pardon. In 1991, he was granted a full par-
don by the Nebraska Board of Pardons. In 2011, attorneys for Parker filed a claim
for $500,000 under the Nebraska Wrongful Conviction and Imprisonment
Act. In August 2012, the state of Nebraska issued a declaration of innocence to
Parker and agreed to pay him $500,000. Attorney General Jon Bruning publicly
declared that Parker was wrongly convicted based on a false confession and offi-
cial misconduct and apologized on behalf of the State of Nebraska.

Eyewitness Misidentification
Eyewitness misidentification is one of the major causes of wrongful con-
viction nationwide, playing a role in nearly 35% of convictions that were
subsequently exonerated. As far back as the late 1800s, experts knew that
eyewitness identification is all too susceptible to error. In 1932, Yale law pro-
fessor Edwin Borchard formally identified eyewitness error as an important
factor that contributed to the erroneous conviction of innocent people. Now,
more than 80 years later, his findings are repeatedly echoed in many of the
wrongful convictions in the National Registry of Exonerations. Despite the
fact that empirical research has demonstrated for decades that witnesses can
be rather unreliable, there is still much to learn. According to the Innocence
Project, witness memory is like any other evidence at a crime scene. It must
be carefully preserved and retrieved methodically.
104 Tradecraft Primer

Scientific research demonstrates that when it comes to eyewitness testi-

mony there is no relationship between confidence and accuracy. This is par-
ticularly true of highly emotionally charged events in our lives; and certainly
seeing a violent crime as a witness fits into that category. To help illustrate
this point, here is an abbreviated snapshot of events surrounding the 2014
killing of Michael Brown in Ferguson, Missouri. The accounts below empha-
size the vulnerability of eyewitness testimony to contamination error and
memory distortion.

On August 9, 2014, black teenager Michael Brown was shot and killed by white
police officer Darren Wilson in Ferguson, Missouri. Wilson tried to stop the
teenager in the middle of a street for a possible theft of some cigarillos from
a convenience store. Upon confronting Brown, Wilson claimed the teen, who
was 18 years old, attacked him and struggled to grab his police pistol. A com-
panion of Brown claimed that, to the contrary, the teenager was compliant
to the police officer’s demands and had his hands in the air and screamed,
“Don’t shoot!” The incident ignited months of violent rioting and racial ten-
sions by hundreds, perhaps thousands, of Missourians and other out-of-state
civil rights advocates who took to the streets chanting, “Hands up, don’t
shoot!” Many residents claimed Brown’s civil rights were violated. For con-
text, Ferguson is a city of 21,000 residents, two-thirds black, yet its police force
had only three black officers. Many young black men in the city felt targeted
by the police and resented it.
A grand jury convened. The U.S. Attorney General personally provided
oversight in the case along with an army of FBI investigators who sought out
witnesses and their testimony. Over 60 eyewitnesses came forward claiming
first-hand, yet conflicting, memories of what happened on the day of the shoot-
ing. On cross-examination, many changed their stories under questioning; oth-
ers could not be believed at all, including one woman who claimed she might
have dreamed about seeing the confrontation between the officer and Brown.
Some admitted lying. Other versions were largely inconsistent with forensic evi-
dence. And in some cases, witnesses admitted they were afraid to come forward
because they feared reprisals from the enraged community if their stories sup-
ported Wilson’s account of the events. In the end, the testimony of about 6 eye-
witnesses was accepted as credible by the grand jury over the testimony of over
50 others. Officer Darren Wilson was exonerated of any guilt in November 2014
and the mantra “Hands up, don’t shoot!” false. Months later, in March 2015, a
federal civil rights investigation of Wilson did the same.

Jailhouse Informants
According to the Innocence Project, jailhouse informants are responsible
for nearly 20% of wrongful conviction cases overturned through DNA test-
ing. Such statistics and exonerations show that informants commonly lie and
About Confessions 105

their testimony often unreliable. Why? Because falsely testifying in exchange

of an incentive—typically a sentence reduction—is often the last resort of a
desperate inmate. For someone not yet in prison, providing false testimony
may be a desperate move to avoid going to jail (Innocence Project 2015).
Too often, law enforcement officials who seek out informants share exten-
sive background information on cases—inadvertently feeding informants
with what they need in the way of information to provide the false testimony.
In other cases, statements from people with incentives to testify—particu-
larly incentives that are not disclosed to the jury—serve as core evidence in
convicting an innocent person. Unfortunately, incentivized informants con-
tinue to testify in courtrooms around the country today. Why? In cases with-
out any forensic DNA evidence, the incentivized testimony from informants
is often the only evidence a prosecutor has of a suspect’s guilt (Innocence
Project 2015).

Owning Up to the Problem

Recent research suggests that confessions, eyewitnesses, and informants—

especially in the absence of other evidence—are persuasively convincing
among police, prosecutors, and juries. For investigators, gaining a confes-
sion from a criminal suspect often results in overlooking other exculpatory
evidence or leads—even in cases in which the confession is internally incon-
sistent and contradicted by external evidence or a by-product of an exces-
sively long and coercive interrogation. When such false confessions or false
testimony is injected into the judicial system, the results can be severe and
dramatic for all sides in the criminal justice system:

• Frequently resulting in innocent persons going to prison.

• Corrupting other evidence from lay witnesses and forensic experts—
producing an illusion of false support for a conviction.
• Undermining public confidence in law enforcement and the justice
system.
• Causing long-term resentment by subjects coerced into false confes-
sions and found guilty.
• Serving as a challenge for police, judges, and juries who cannot easily
distinguish between uncorroborated true and false confessions.

Moreover, recognizing that we got it wrong after the fact is a tragic

lesson,­especially as evidenced by the large numbers of innocent defen-
dants whose convictions are overturned thanks to modern DNA testing and
other improvements in forensics. These lessons should force us to review the
106 Tradecraft Primer

interrogation process and ask ourselves what we might do differently to help

mitigate wrongful convictions.

Minimizing False Confessions

Here are some suggestions that find broad consensus among our nation’s law
enforcement and criminal justice experts.

Electronically Record Interrogations

False confessions could be greatly reduced if the police were required to
electronically record the entirety of all custodial interrogations of suspects.
Videotapes create the opportunity for various criminal justice officials to
more closely monitor both the quality of police interrogation and the reliabil-
ity of confession statements. Unlike some potential reforms, the recording
of police interrogations favors neither the defense nor the prosecution, but
only the pursuit of reliable and accurate fact-finding. In fact, the 2007 survey
among the 631 law enforcement officers revealed that 81% of the respondents
favored recording interrogations from start to finish (Kassin, Leo, Meissner
et al. 2007).

Educate in False Confessions

According to Drizin and Leo (2004), police investigators and interrogators­—and
for that matter intelligence officers too—need better training in the psychology
of interrogations, decision-making by suspects, and confessions. In support of
such aims, experts suggest these four areas for continued emphasis in profes-
sional education programs for interrogators and police investigators:

Impact of select legacy tactics on innocent suspects: Interrogators

1.
need to be taught that psychologically manipulative legacy interro-
gation techniques can and do cause innocent suspects (who are cog-
nitively normal) to falsely confess. More importantly, interrogators
need to be shown why such interrogation methods may lead to the
decision to confess from the guilty as well as the innocent.
The need to corroborate confessions: Police interrogators need
2.
to be trained better to recognize their own biases, to initially treat
an admission or confession as a neutral hypothesis to be tested
against objective case facts, and to systematically validate their con-
fidence levels of a suspect’s postadmission narrative or confession.
Additionally, detectives need to be taught that the proper way to
assess the reliability of a suspect’s confession is by analyzing the fit
of the suspect’s postadmission narrative or confession against the
About Confessions 107

underlying crime facts to determine whether it reveals guilty knowl-

edge and whether it is corroborated by existing evidence. Assuming
that there is no contamination, a guilty suspect’s postadmission nar-
rative will reveal knowledge known only to the true perpetrator, the
police, or both; lead to new or derivative evidence; explain seeming
anomalies or otherwise inexplicable crime facts; and are able to be
corroborated by existing physical and medical evidence. An inno-
cent suspect’s postadmission narrative will typically reveal just the
opposite.
Understanding special category persons: Interrogators need to
3.
receive specialized training in how to interrogate persons with devel-
opmental disabilities and young juveniles, two subgroups of suspects
who appear to be particularly vulnerable to falsely confessions or
making false statements. Because juvenile suspects share many of
the same characteristics as the developmentally disabled—notably
their eagerness to comply with adult authority figures, impulsivity,
immature judgment, and inability to recognize and weigh risks in
decision-making—they are at risk of falsely confessing when exposed
to manipulative, psychological interrogation techniques.
Limiting reliance on nonverbal body language: Police interroga-
4.
tors need to be retrained to understand that they are not human
lie detectors, and that they endanger the innocent when they guess
the meanings behind the many hundreds of possible combinations
of eye, hand, and body movements. Yet based on legacy interroga-
tion methodologies and instruction, that is exactly what our nation’s
police interrogators have come to rely on—a psychology of human
lie detection that is empirically proven to be unreliable and flawed.
Such judgments are highly prone to error and have misled inter-
rogators and investigators to believe in their inordinate abilities to
discern truth from lies. Rather, quite typically the opposite is true.
Remember, confidence in someone’s abilities at lie detecting does not
necessarily lead to greater accuracy.

Eyewitness Reforms
Additionally, the Innocence Project suggests a range of reforms to improve eye-
witness identification accuracy, particularly for live person and photo lineups.
These reforms have received endorsement by the National Institute of Justice,
the American Bar Association, and the National Academy of Sciences. The
benefits of these reforms are corroborated by over 30 years of peer-reviewed
comprehensive research (Innocence Project 2015).
108 Tradecraft Primer

Double-Blind Procedure/Blind Administrator

A double-blind lineup is one in which neither the administrator nor the eye-
witness knows for certain whether the likely suspect will be present among
those in the live person or photo lineup. This prevents the administrator of
the lineup from providing inadvertent or intentional verbal or nonverbal
cues that may influence the eyewitness’ selection and prevents the adminis-
trator from affirming the accuracy of any selection.

Sequential Presentation of Lineups

When combined with a “blind” administrator, presenting lineup members one
by one (sequentially), rather than all at once (simultaneously), has been proven
to significantly increase the overall accuracy of eyewitness identifications.

“I Don’t Know” Instructions

Instructions are a series of statements issued by the lineup administrator to
the eyewitness that deter the eyewitness from feeling compelled to make a
selection. They also prevent the eyewitness from looking to the lineup admin-
istrator for feedback during the identification procedure. One of the recom-
mended instructions includes the directive that the suspect may or may not
be present in the lineup.

Composing the Lineup

The photographs or the persons in the live lineup should be selected to avoid
bringing unreasonable attention to the suspect. Nonsuspect photographs
and/or live lineup members (fillers) should be selected based on their resem-
blance to the description provided by the eyewitness—as opposed to their
resemblance to the most likely police suspect.

Postselection Confidence Statements

Immediately following the lineup procedure, the eyewitness should provide
a statement, in his or her own words, that expresses the level of confidence he
or she has in the identification made. This could be as simple as stating high,
medium, or low confidence.

Recording or Documenting Lineups

Ideally, the lineup procedure should be electronically recorded. If this is
impracticable, an audio or written record should be made. Such recordings
will help to demonstrate the existence or absence of external influences on
the witness and affirm the fairness of the lineup process.
Unmasking Deception
7
A lie is an intentional act to conceal, fabricate, or distort information with
the aim of creating a belief in another person’s mind that the deceiver knows
is untrue. For an interrogator, uncovering deception and lies can be of high-
stake relevance with serious consequences for both the interrogator and the
deceiver. At stake could be the public’s safety, the lives of our military and
police officers, and even the security of our nation. For the deceiver, it could
mean the difference between going free or spending many years in a prison
or a POW-holding facility. In lying and deceiving, a suspect or detainee may
do the following:

• Provide false descriptions of events, persons, or things to mislead.

• Offer false denials to shield knowledgeability, culpability, and guilt.
• Manipulate or omit facts (called half-truths) to confuse the
investigator.
• Hedge or equivocate to shield true thoughts, beliefs, feelings, and
knowledge.

Why do deceivers typically lie? For most crime suspects or detainees, the
common motivations for deceit are these four major factors:

1. Fear: Avoiding retaliation or legal sanctions, such as financial penal-

ties, loss of liberty, or even death; the greater the penalty, the greater
the motivation to deceive.
2. Shame: Reputational concerns and social standing; the higher the
social standing, the greater the reluctance to confess.
3. Desire to get something: Tangible or intangible, personal or for a
group.
4. Desire to protect someone or something: On a personal or group
level.

Intelligence and law enforcement professionals know that all inconsisten-

cies in the source’s words do not necessarily indicate a lie, just as consistency
is not necessarily a guarantee of the truth. For instance, a falsehood based on
self-delusion or a mistaken belief does not qualify as a deceptive lie. Know, too,

109
110 Tradecraft Primer

that interrogators who are overtly biased in their beliefs or assumptions as they
enter the interrogation room make themselves vulnerable to deception and
manipulation by a perceptive suspect or detainee who is quick thinking enough
to respond to questions in anticipation of the interrogator’s expectations.

Offset the Liar’s Advantage

Detecting deception is not easy, and it is compounded by the fact that

deceiver may have a clear advantage over the investigator or interrogator who
is engaged in trying to unravel truths from lies. In fact, practiced liars have
a very good chance of succeeding in their deception and not getting caught.
Recent research in deception at the Northwestern University suggests that
the more frequently a person lies, the better a person gets at it. In short,
rehearsals and practice seem to help (Hu, Chen & Fu 2012). Additionally,
successful deception serves as its own form of reinforcement and, for some, a
thrill that further increases chances of even more lies. The research also sug-
gests that the faster a person’s ability to lie, the more difficult it is to detect
the lie—evidently, the ability to think fast on your feet helps (Anyaso 2012).
To help offset this advantage, researchers suggest that investigators and
interrogators inject unanticipated filler questions into their interrogation
strategy that liars might not anticipate (Vrij, Granhag, Mann et al. 2011).
Such filler questions should be designed to require repeated honest responses
that are common knowledge to both the respondent and the questioner. The
technique is based on the premise that increasing the predominance of honest
responses to filler questions makes competing deceptive responses—lying—
more difficult when substantive investigative questions are asked. The higher
the number of irrelevant filler questions that require honest responses, the
more difficult it is to reverse course when asked relevant investigative ques-
tions (Hu, Chen & Fu 2012).

Integrity Is Not a Stable Trait

Trustworthiness and deception are not pure black-and-white issues. There

are plenty of shades of gray or gradations between the two. Consequently,
you should expect that most narratives or storylines from subjects will con-
tain intentional half-lies and half-truths; others are unintentional, perhaps
attributable to flawed memories.
Honesty and deception are also situation dependent. In other words,
someone who has been honest in the past will not necessarily be honest in the
Unmasking Deception 111

future, and vice versa. Along these lines of thought, Northeastern University
professor and psychologist David DeSteno (2014a) suggests that many people
who identify themselves as morally upstanding will act dishonestly to benefit
themselves if they believe that they will not get caught. So remember that a
reputation for trustworthiness earned under one set of circumstances cannot
be relied on to hold up when circumstances, trade-offs, and accountability
change.
To understand why, we need to abandon the notion that most people
wrestle with good and evil impulses, which serves as a fundamental theory
for many of the traditional legacy interrogation methodologies. Rather, focus
on the two types of gains: short-term and long-term for the topic under dis-
cussion. It is the situational trade-off and the degree of risk versus gain that
a person is willing to take when deciding to lie and deceive or tell the truth
(DeSteno 2014a).
Such insights raise important red flags. If everyone is capable of lies, a
good question for an investigator or interrogator to ask himself or herself
during a debriefing, interrogation, or custodial interview is this: “Is this
criminal suspect, detainee, or captured spy lying about something we care
about at this given moment and on this critical topic of interest?”

People Make Poor Lie Detectors

People are generally not very good at spotting liars via behavioral cues. A num-
ber of studies, over many decades, have demonstrated that individuals per-
form no better than chance at detecting deception and that detection training
tends to produce only small and inconsistent increments of improvement in
performance. Empirical research by Bond and DePaulo (2006) demonstrate
that people exhibit on average an overall 54% accuracy rate (47% for lies; 61%
for truths) under the best of circumstances. Such findings challenge the uncor-
roborated claims that training in the detection of complex nonverbal indica-
tors or cues, common in legacy interrogation manuals, can increase accuracy
rates to 80% to 85% or better. In fact, any improvements have been typically
very small. In one of the more successful studies, the untrained control group
achieved a baseline success rate of 53.4% with detecting lies and truths, while
the trained observers attained a success rate of 57.66%. Other studies demon-
strated far worse results (Kassin & Fong 1999).
Trained experts, such as the police, perform only slightly better than
ordinary people, if at all. Law enforcement professionals, like all people, are
apparently no better at discriminating between truth and deception in others
even with training (Kassin, Leo, Meissner et al. 2007).
112 Tradecraft Primer

Yet law enforcement officers consistently rate themselves above average

when it comes to assessing their abilities to detect deception and lies. This
confidence in their abilities does not translate into greater accuracy than
that of the average person at distinguishing between truth-tellers and liars
according to a number of respected research studies. For example, when par-
ticipants in a 2007 survey of 631 law enforcement officers were asked to rate
their own deception detection skills, they estimated a 77% level of accuracy,
an unproven figure that indicates that faith in their abilities and their train-
ing is significantly skewed (Kassin, Leo, Meissner et al. 2007).

Content Analysis

One way to evaluate truthfulness and deceit in a subject is to focus on state-

ment analysis and linguistic markers that may appear in oral and written
statements or transcripts of audio recordings of interviews and interroga-
tions. The analysis of statements from witnesses, victims, informants, persons
of interest, or suspects involves evaluating first what these subjects choose
to include or exclude from their storyline accounts; second, the manner in
which they choose to express the information, including the sequence they
select to recall the event; and, third, the use of what are termed as moderating
linguistic or verbal markers (Sandoval, Matsumoto, Hwang et al. 2015).

Statement Analysis
Statement analysis is based on the theory that truthful statements or accounts
of events based on actual memories differ from those based on fabricated
accounts (Undeutsch 1989). From that perspective alone, deceivers face a
number of challenges. They must decide what to reveal, what to omit, what to
fabricate, and what they want to protect.
In general, truthful narrative accounts commonly possess four major
elements. The first is an introductory statement, where the subject sets the
stage for the main incident under investigation. Second is the main event,
which also identifies victims, witnesses, and serves as the baseline primary
memory. The third element is a concluding wrap-up to the narrative, which
helps to further amplify activities or feelings of the subject after the main
event took place. The final element is out-of-sequence information, which
frequently happens when primary memories stimulate secondary memories
at the scene of a crime or major event. The inclusion of secondary memories
of an account validates the primary memory.
Unmasking Deception 113

In contrast, deceptive narratives purposely omit information and are

less detailed or sketchy than truthful ones. And deceivers typically deflect
answering questions by injecting irrelevant or extraneous information into
discussions that has nothing to do with the particular question asked. Why
do liars limit the amount of their falsehood or omissions? Because no liar
lies unnecessarily. Lying requires the liar to fabricate information, and if
someone fabricates a storyline or deliberately omits information, it requires
the person to recall the lie or omission accurately in subsequent questioning.
Moreover, there is limited out-of-sequence information because most of the
time, the lie is rehearsed in sequential, chronological order; recalling out-of-
sequence events may further confuse the liar and muddle his or her storyline.
Creating unnecessary filler information requires the liar to tell even more
lies to recall later.
Another differentiating quality to look for between truthful and decep-
tive narratives or testimony is the inclusion or exclusion of thoughts and
emotions at the time of the event and the recalling of these later. Most of us
cannot recall a traumatic event in our lives without recalling feelings and
emotions. They are part of the human experience. Liars have their hands
full trying to recall the action side of their storyline, never mind the feelings
and emotions that accompany their fabricated story. This emphasis on action
over feelings and emotions is common to deceptive subjects.

Verbal Markers
Aside from the sequencing of the storyline and what a deceiver may decide to
omit or fabricate in a narrative, the appearance of certain words, particularly
certain adverbs, and the frequent use of nonprompted negation in narratives
serve, in many cases, as representative indicators of deception according to an
article by Sandoval, Matsumoto, Hwang et al. (2015). The article “Exploiting
Verbal Markers of Deception across Ethnic Lines: An Investigative Tool for
Cross-Cultural Interviewing” explains that:

• Words such as maybe, kind of, sort of, and perhaps are most associated
with equivocation and are intentionally used by deceivers to distance
themselves from the act of lying by tempering their responses.
• Words such as no, did not, never, could not, and would not in response
to a simple open-ended question such as “Tell me what you did last
Thursday?” imply deceit by avoiding a direct response to the ques-
tion and by defensively focusing on what a person did not do rather
than explaining what the person did do.
114 Tradecraft Primer

• Words such as very, really, truthfully, and honestly in narratives

are used by writers and speakers to convince another person of
something.
• Words such as only, just, simply, and merely are used to downplay or
minimize the role of the speaker or writer.
• Words such as then, after, next, while, so, and when suggest an
attempt to intentionally omit information that may be critical to the
investigation.

A key finding of the article is that linguistic or verbal markers transcend

ethnic or cultural differences among speakers of English as a second lan-
guage, an important point to consider as our nation continues to grow in its
cultural and ethnic diversity.
When examining narratives, interrogators or investigators are looking
for inconsistency in the storyline. This process is facilitated when the inves-
tigator or interrogator possesses sufficient factual background knowledge of
the case, possesses evidence, and has available statements from other persons
familiar with the event under investigation. Additionally, such investigators
or interrogators may rely on linguistic markers if they are sufficiently dis-
tinctive. When the investigator or interrogator possesses no factual informa-
tion, when he or she has no alternative statements for comparison, and when
the linguistic markers are not remarkable, nonverbal cues can become more
important.

Avoid Focusing on the Wrong Nonverbal Cues

Researchers in behavioral science, the military, law enforcement, intelligence,

and business communities have spent decades and multimillions, perhaps bil-
lions, of dollars searching for reliable and relevant nonverbal cues for detecting
deception and lies in people. Despite their best efforts, they continue to come
up short. More than 130 well-known empirically based studies conclude that
there is no single nonverbal cue uniquely related to deception. In other words,
there are no reliable universal cues such as Pinocchio’s nose, which grows each
time the subject lies (Vrij, Granhag & Porter 2010).

All those books and videos promising to teach you how to spot liars through
body language? None have empirical support. (DeSteno 2014a)

Yet law enforcement continues to retain an overreliance on nonverbal cues

in its effort to detect lies and deception through observation of emotion-
driven responses in subjects during an interrogation or custodial interview.
Unmasking Deception 115

In this approach, liars were assumed to fear being caught and fear is associ-
ated with obvious physiological changes in the deceiver’s body that do not
appear in truth-tellers. Most police investigation manuals have several chap-
ters devoted to nonverbal cues, often accompanied by photographs, which
continue to postulate that liars are far more nervous than truth-tellers and
will reveal their nervousness through telltale signs such as eye aversion, fidg-
eting, heightened anxiety, despair, increased perspiration, rapid heart rate,
and defensive or submissive postural reflex responses or even anger (Inbau,
Reid, Buckley et al. 2013).
The flaw in this emotion-driven theory is the continuing myth that
deceivers or liars demonstrate far more nervous behaviors than innocent sub-
jects or truth-tellers. As a further step in this approach, follow-on questions
are strategically injected by interrogators to further heighten the emotional
response and elicit verbal responses that affirm the interrogator’s underlying
assumptions of deceit and guilt in the subject.
The emotion-based approach has its limitations. First, experiencing emo-
tion is not exclusive to liars. Truth-tellers also experience the same emotions,
especially if they sense that their storyline or claims of innocence are not
believed by the interrogator. Second, the follow-on investigative questions
that are deliberately introduced are commonly framed in ways that further
elevate the emotional responses in liars, but are theorized not to influence
truth-tellers. Yet according to the National Research Council, no such differ-
entiating question technique exists to date and it is doubtful that such ques-
tions can ever be developed (National Research Council 2003). Third, while
there may exist behavioral indicators differentiating truth-tellers from liars,
such cues are unreliable and too faint. Moreover, practiced deceivers may try
to control their behaviors, emphasizing verbal and nonverbal cues that make
them appear credible. Rather than trying to focus on universal nonverbal
cues, another suggested approach is to identify nonverbal cues unique to the
individual (DePaulo, Lindsay, Malone et al. 2003).

For Different People, Look for Different Cues

Recent research shows that people demonstrate deception cues unique to
themselves and that the same person may show different deception cues
under different occasions. So avoid using universal fixed models of body
movements to detect deception in people. One more thing: tied to this
approach is the understanding that verbal and nonverbal indicators may sig-
nificantly change for each person, under different settings, and under differ-
ent circumstances.
So how do we go about identifying the subject’s baseline nonverbal cues
and speech patterns to differentiate lies from truth? Current legacy training
116 Tradecraft Primer

manuals suggest that the interrogator and investigator rely on small talk dur-
ing the pre-interrogation or noncustodial interview and while in the process
of trying to establish rapport. Yet responding to questions during a casual
conversation is very different from responding to questions during an inter-
rogation or custodial interview about a crime or terrorist plot. To overcome
this challenge, one suggestion is to frame a series of questions purposely
designed to generate baseline “truthful” responses under comparable stress
conditions and in the same physical setting that the subject may experience
during the interrogation (Vrij, Granhag & Porter 2010). Such baseline posi-
tive response behaviors may then help to discern truth from lies when the
subject is deceitful.
Another point to keep in mind is to recognize that people may react dif-
ferently to different investigators or interrogators, which implies that they
may be truthful to one and lie to another. Additionally, people respond dif-
ferently to different topics, depending on how personal the topic relates to
them. Keep in mind, too, that a subject’s nonverbal and verbal responses may
change over time and, if interviewed on more than one occasion, may change
over repeated interviews (Vrij, Granhag & Porter 2010).
The bottom line is that all nonverbal and verbal responses or behaviors
are specific to the individual. Each person has his or her set of behaviors
that occur when he or she is lying or telling the truth. And to identify base-
line behaviors that differentiate between falsehoods and truth, focus first on
identifying the subject’s baseline truthful responses under the same sort of
setting as the anticipated custodial interview or interrogation. To do this,
though, you will need to spend enough time to get to know the subject before
the start of the formal interrogation.

More Reliable Ways to Uncover Deceit

Based largely on work of Professor Aldert Vrij, of the University of Portsmouth

in England, and his colleagues, the next two approaches have proven them-
selves in both research and field tests. The first is the information-gathering
interview, and the second approach we will discuss is imposing a cognitive
load (Vrij, Granhag & Porter 2010).

The Information-Gathering Interview Style

Most traditional or legacy police training manuals emphasize the “accusa-
tory approach” to investigative interviewing or interrogations. In the accu-
satory approach, the interrogator or investigator confronts the subject with
accusations, such as “You know that you did it. I know you did it. Now, let’s
Unmasking Deception 117

get on with you telling me the truth.” Typically, such an approach leads the
criminal subject to respond defensively and in fairly short expressions, such
as “I didn’t do anything.”
During a typical information-gathering interview, the interviewer asks
broad open-ended questions that require detailed statements from the sub-
ject, such as “What did you do yesterday between 3:00 and 4:00 PM?” Like
the cognitive interview technique, discussed in Chapter 5, the information-
gathering interview approach commonly leads to the gathering of far more
useful information and longer engaged responses from the subject than the
former accusatory approach.
According to Vrij, Granhag & Porter (2010), the information-gathering
response is also far more responsive to uncovering lies. First, it permits greater
opportunities to check inconsistencies in the subject’s storyline against the
available evidence because of the detailed responses required of the subject.
Second, it permits an opportunity to gather more nonverbal cues than the
accusatory model because the typical interview is simply longer. Third, lon-
ger stories also afford opportunities to gather more verbal cues associated
with deceit. Fourth, the absence of an accusatory, judgmental tone by the
interviewer lessens duress in the subject and helps to serve as a safeguard
against false confessions (Vrij, Granhag & Porter 2010). Yet, in its basic form,
multiple studies have shown that aims of the information-gathering meth-
odology are best accomplished when coupled with techniques that impose
cognitive loads on the subject during questioning.

Imposing a Cognitive Load

A necessary complement to the information-gathering methodology is
the need to impose a “cognitive load” in the subject. Here, the underlying
assumption is that lying is more difficult than truth-telling. By increasing the
cognitive load in suspected deceitful subjects, they will have fewer cognitive
resources available to them to craft or sustain the lies. Two suggested ways
for accomplishing this are: first, by asking the subjects to tell their stories in
reverse order and, second, by insisting that the subjects maintain eye contact
with the interviewer.
Requiring subjects to tell their stories in reverse order runs counter to
the natural forward sequencing of events. Because liars already have depleted
cognitive resources and energies by lying and deceit, they should find this
unfamiliar mental exercise even more taxing than truth-tellers do. And
insisting that subjects maintain continuous eye contact while telling their
stories is distracting and makes a false narrative even more difficult to recall
(Vrij, Granhag & Porter 2010). Another advantage is that maintaining eye
contact with the subject facilitates the reading of facial expressions.
118 Tradecraft Primer

Evaluating Inconsistencies in Facial Expressions

All people express emotions on their faces in similar ways. Facial expres-
sions are universal and independent of race, culture, ethnicity, nationality,
gender, age, religion, or any other demographic variable. Moreover, unless
deliberately planned to deceive, they are often immediate, automatic, and
unconscious reactions. Advocates believe that learning to read such facial
expressions means having a window into the soul of almost anyone. It is
a powerful tool for investigators because facial expressions of emotion,
among which there are seven, are the closest thing humans have to a uni-
versal language (see the following figure) (Matsumoto, Hwang, Skinner
et al. 2011).
Surprise Anger

Happiness Sadness Fear

Contempt Disgust

The seven basic emotions and their universal expressions. (From Matsumoto, D.,
H. S. Hwang, L. Skinner, and M. Frank, “Evaluating truthfulness and detection decep-
tion,” FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin, June 2011, http://www.fbi.gov/stats-services​
/publications/law-enforcement-bulletin/june_2011/june-2011-leb.pdf.)

Those focused on facial expressions look for inconsistency between facial

expressions and verbal expressions. For example, if while interviewing a sub-
ject, investigators or interrogators see an expression inconsistent with the
words spoken or the emotions described, they should follow up until they
can achieve reconciliation or get a more complete answer. This might include
a subject showing disgust when talking about another person. What does
that mean? It depends on the context. A subject giving a statement such as
“He’s a great guy” while his facial expression says otherwise may suggest that
the subject is possibly lying. Regardless of the reason, something about the
other person has produced an involuntary reaction in the subject. If interro-
gators can isolate and identify disconnects between the narrative and facial
expressions, they can leverage them to clarify what really happened.
Unmasking Deception 119

Uncovering Deception in Tandem Conspirators

One significant limitation in most deception research is that it examines

deception as an exclusively individual-level phenomenon tied to a single
deceiver. Yet encounters among intelligence collectors and law enforcement
investigators frequently take place in field settings where an initial screen-
ing may likely include the opportunity to question two tandem witnesses
or co-conspirators together. Such an opportunity presents a unique window
for two suspects or witnesses to be interviewed in a group setting instead of
separating them.
Typically, interviewing tandem conspirators has its risks, and isolat-
ing two or more companions is carried out ostensibly to remove them from
the ability to collaborate on a storyline. Yet research studies by Driskell,
Blickensderfer, and Salas (2012) and Driskell and Driskell (2013) suggest that
there may be advantages to performing field interviews of two conspirators or
witnesses simultaneously—particularly in an effort to uncover deception. The
research studies suggest unique nonverbal and verbal cues to deception exist
between accomplices that may not exist when interviewing them individually.
For example, do you recall seeing on television the video surveillance clips
of the Boston bombers, the Tsarnaev brothers, strolling through a cheering
downtown marathon crowd on April 15, 2013, carrying their pressure cooker
bombs in backpacks shortly before they ignited their explosives? What if a
law enforcement official had stopped to question them at that point? Would
red flags have surfaced in their responses to questions that would have led the
police to detain them for further questioning? Said another way, if you jointly
questioned these two persons regarding their activities, with the bombs still
concealed in their backpacks, would they have exhibited speech and behavior
cues between themselves that might have indicated deception?
The preliminary research of Driskell, Blickensderfer, and Salas (2012) sug-
gests that the looks and sounds of deceit existing between tandem conspirators
at a group level that may not be apparent when these persons are interviewed or
observed individually. For example, interactive behaviors—such as acknowl-
edgments, back-channel responses, and corrections—may serve as cues to
deception during their interactions when questioned together. Such cues are
simply not observable on an individual level. The findings also suggest that
two people typically describe an event differently when they actually experi-
enced an event together versus when they did not and try to fabricate a story.
Truth-tellers are able to draw on their shared memory of the actual event
that they experienced and would be able to describe this event in an inter-
active and collaborative manner. In other words, if you and I share some
experience, say that we go on a fishing trip together, we encode memories
120 Tradecraft Primer

of that event between ourselves. That is, you store in memory some parts of
the event, and I store some parts. When we are questioned about the event,
we recall it also in a joint manner—you recall some information, and I recall
some information. Our style of interaction when recalling this jointly expe-
rienced event is collaborative—we elaborate on each other’s sentences and fill
in stories for one another. Collaboration and interaction are not as evident
when two people recall a fabricated story that did not take place. Deceivers
are more likely to describe the fabricated event from an individual perspec-
tive. In contrast to those that are truth-tellers, deceivers were also less likely
to conduct back-and-forth exchanges, less likely to look at one another, and
less likely to exhibit synchrony in communication (the degree to which one
member of the twosome exhibits similar behaviors and uses similar linguis-
tic styles as the other member).

Other Ways to Outsmart Liars

Time Well Spent

One proven principle involves the element of time spent with the detainee or
suspect and the opening up of an ongoing dialogue. Quite simply, the more
time the investigator or interrogator spends talking to a subject, the more
information will be learned and the stronger the rapport between the two.
Such chats may have nothing to do with the event or crime under investi-
gation and could just easily focus on a casual chat over a beverage, meal,
sporting event, or television show. As generally understood, once a suspect
or detainee begins talking to an investigator or intelligence officer, the flow of
words, in many instances, will eventually lead to the truth.

Being a Good Listener

Practice good listening skills. Be open minded to the person sitting before
you, and seek to learn and understand from not only what the person is say-
ing but also how it is being said. As a reminder, too, when asking questions,
the investigator or interrogator should just listen and avoid any attempt to
influence the recall of events. Again, empirical studies and research continue
to emphasize the value of opening an investigative interview or interrogation
with broad, open-ended questions followed by closed-ended clarifying or
probing questions. The selective use of clarifying or closed-ended questions
seeks to draw out further information about the event or act and should be
reserved and held back until the subject concludes his or her response to the
broad open-ended question.
Unmasking Deception 121

Draw Me a Picture
Ask subjects to draw a picture of the event. Putting pencil to paper forces
people to give spatial information—something that most liars are not pre-
pared to do. Again, along with their lies, drawing pictures can overtax their
mental resources. In general, drawings from liars are much less detailed than
those of the truth-tellers—and are frequently at odds with their verbal testi-
mony and the evidence (Vrij, Granhag, Mann et al. 2011). The use of draw-
ings has other obvious benefits. First, it does not involve speech so that it can
be used in interviews with interviewees who are not fluent in the language of
the interviewer. Second, a drawing can be assessed immediately and does not
require transcribing audiotapes (often necessary in speech analyses) or ana-
lyzing videotapes (often necessary in behavioral analyses). Third, a drawing
can easily be checked for factual accuracy. Fourth, a drawing can be sketched
in a relatively short period of time, which saves an interviewer’s time.

Strategic Use of Evidence

Many legacy police methodologies fail to recognize the relevance of strategic
use of evidence as an effective deception detection tool. For instance, many
training manuals suggest officers confront suspects early on during an inter-
rogation with the evidence in their possession to demonstrate the futility of
remaining silent and not disclosing what they know. By doing so, however,
they have handed a deceiver an unintended advantage.
One of the challenges liars face is uncertainty about the knowledge held
by the investigator or interrogator. This makes it tough for a deceiver to know
what they can say without the risk of offering statements in conflict with the
evidence and known facts. If police officers disclose what they know too early
during an interrogation, they reduce this uncertainty and make it easier for
guilty suspects to change their stories and give alternative explanations for
their ties to the evidence.
Recent research by Maria Hartwig and her colleagues reveals that early
release in the interrogation process actually hampers lie detection. The results
demonstrate that strategically timed release of evidence after the suspect
has had ample opportunity to tell his or her side of the story dramatically
improves opportunities for an interrogator or investigator to show incon-
sistency between the liar’s storyline and the known facts or evidence and
serves as valid cues to deception. And, initial research results are promising,­
with success rates as high as 67.6% for the interviewers’ abilities to discern
truth-tellers from liars by pinpointing duplicity and deception between the
suspect’s storyline and what the evidence reveals (Hartwig 2005).
Calling for a Code
of Ethics
8
The continuing public debate over law enforcement, military, and intelligence
interrogation programs demonstrates a number of shortcomings within the
profession on a number of fronts. Let’s face it; it is difficult to mention the word
interrogation without conjuring up preconceived notions and disturbing men-
tal images. Some issues are being addressed by the government through the
legislative process and by sponsoring additional empirical-based research to
identify improvements in current techniques and practices. Other initiatives
may include establishing a basic core curriculum with certification, creden-
tials, and oversight provided by the Special Task Force on Interrogations or the
High-Value Interrogation Group. Then, too, is the need to formally profession-
alize the profession by requiring those who practice the tradecraft—whether
on a full-time or a part-time basis—to comply with a common code of ethics.

The Need for a Code of Ethics

Most dictionaries and related professional manuals define profession as an

occupation or trade requiring “specialized knowledge” typically after inten-
sive study, leading to a shared understanding among practitioners. Such
references further define a professional as someone who complies with “tech-
nical and ethical standards of a profession.”
The term ethics is generally used to describe someone’s conscience or moral
fiber. One who possesses ethics is said to know right from wrong and can be
trusted to make the right decision in unfamiliar and unsupervised circum-
stances in which there are no easy answers. Anecdotal evidence seems to suggest
that those who lack ethics face a host of personal and professional challenges.
For a profession, a code of ethics operates much the same way as a person’s
conscience. Professionals in many occupations are guided by them—a set of
principles by which they practice their professions on behalf of those who entrust
to them an important duty or responsibility. For instance, the legal and medical
professions are two examples that come to mind. Doctors swear a commitment
to the Hippocratic Oath, which requires physicians to uphold certain standards
of their profession. Likewise, lawyers are expected to comply with the rules of
professional conduct issued by the American Bar Association. Encouraging the

123
124 Tradecraft Primer

establishment of a common ethical code shared among interrogators—regard-

less of whether he or she is in law enforcement, the military, or the intelligence
community—would serve as an important step toward remedying some of the
major shortcomings identified by critics over the past several decades.
A common code of ethics will forge a unifying bond among all interrogators;
instill a sense of pride in the profession; serve as a moral compass in those unique
moments when there is not sufficient guidance or precedent; and, for those who
fall short and violate the public trust, permit the profession to revoke credentials.
In other words, a code of ethics will serve as the profession’s ethos. It will keep
the profession in check by reminding those within it of their duty to the nation,
to the U.S. Constitution, and to our laws and related international agreements.

Leading the Change

The Department of Justice, the Department of Defense, and the Office of the
Director of National Intelligence ought to share responsibility as principal stake-
holders to drive the formulation of a code of ethics for our nation’s interrogation
program on behalf of the American people. Each possesses a vested interest in
it. In taking on this overdue initiative, the three institutions would help close an
apparent void within the profession. And, in this case, a code of ethics would
not just help to distinguish between right and wrong but, in a wider sense of the
word, would be used to describe the underlying guideposts and distinctive cul-
ture of the profession. The following figure is offered to assist in its formulation.

A Framework for Development of a Code of Ethics for Interrogators

Leads to continuous Influenced by underlying

improvement in tradecraft principles and values from
professionalism interpretations of the U.S.
Constitution, court rulings,
laws, treaties, and executive
policy

Apply to career profes- Code of

sional development and Ethics Captured from existing reg-
training programs ulations, guideline standards,
and practices for interrogators

Underpin every decision

and action inside the Embedded in interrogation
interrogation room—how strategies, plans, and tactics
to think and behave for suspects and detainees
Calling for a Code of Ethics 125

Importantly, too, a code of ethics is needed to help guide the profession

for the road yet ahead and for a public safety and national security envi-
ronment at home and abroad that remains uncertain and demanding; and
anticipates continuing challenges for the profession in the future. Whatever
the final version might look like, a suggested framework for a code of ethics
would help:

• Define the basic principles that help guide practitioners in uncertain

times and circumstances—now and into the future.
• Embrace an operational climate of high expectations and standards
among practitioners and require humane treatment of suspects and
detainees.
• Provide the shared profession a shared professional identity which
encompasses a sacred trust among practitioners.
• Put practitioners on notice that those who violate the code of ethics
would bring dishonor to themselves, to their cohorts, and to their
profession, and likely result in the loss of their credentials and pos-
sibly expose them to civil and criminal liability.
• Recognize that the code of ethics would likely need periodic updates
in faces of new legislation, judicial rulings, and executive policy deci-
sions by our nation’s leaders.
• Advance the profession by encouraging lifelong learning and con-
tinuous professional improvement among practitioners.

Final Thoughts

Before wrapping up our discussions on ethics, permit me to drive home an

important point which, coincidentally, serves as a fitting end for this primer.
That is, no matter where an interrogator serves—law enforcement, the mili-
tary, or intelligence—and no matter the degree of expertise—entry-level
trainee or a fully professionalized master interrogator, all share a responsi-
bility to advance the profession and the tradecraft. And, this shared pledge to
the profession and tradecraft is best exemplified by six simple words: Do No
Harm—Respect Human Rights. A credo all interrogators should adopt and
help promote throughout their careers.
Key References
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127
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CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION

Tradecraft
A Framework for
Primer Aspiring Interrogators
Tradecraft Primer: A Framework for Aspiring Interrogators is a timely and relevant reference
manual for a new generation of professionals as we enter a new era in our nation’s interrogation
programs. A must-read for anyone thinking of entering the interrogation profession, whether in
law enforcement, the military, or intelligence, it provides fresh insights from the latest empirical-
based studies that will enhance your results and contribute to best practices. It challenges past
beliefs and legacy interrogation practices of previous generations by capturing novel approaches
that no longer rely on physical and psychological coercion, unethical or questionable ruses, or
abusive mistreatment.

Importantly, this primer also opens the door to valuable lessons from contemporary experts in
human motivation and more effective social influence methodologies and tactics while you learn
of the art and science behind rapport-building, effective communication constructs, and the
influence of interpersonal and intrapersonal dynamics for use inside the interrogation room. In
addition, it captures the “interrogation cycle” as a handy reference graphic. By reading this primer,
you will learn how to reduce incidences of false confessions, mitigate eyewitness misidentification,
and gain simple contemporary insights to outsmart liars and discern truth-tellers from deceivers.

As an advocate for a sea change in the way our nation’s interrogation programs are run and
managed, this primer encourages a team approach to interrogations and emphasizes active
engagement and oversight by supervisors in efforts to corroborate interrogation outcomes. It also
asserts the need for the adoption of a common code of ethics shared among all practitioners—an
ethical code created in deference to our nation’s Constitution, statutes, international treaties, and
the policies of our nation’s leaders. One that encompasses the pledge and built on two underlying
principles: Do no harm and respect human rights.

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