STATUTORY INTERPRETATION, LAW REFORM AND

SAMPFORD'S THEORY OF THE DISORDER OF LAW-

PART ONE

Jeffrey W Barnes•

[I]n order to begin to understand public law we must first try to make it strange. 1

INTRODUCI'ION

Main themes
The law of statutory interpretation is often wrongly thought of as a "quiet backwater".2
The myth that it is a dry, formal subject3 containing simple rules persists despite high-
level seminars devoted to it,4 law reform reports,s sweeping statutory reforms,6
mammoth texts,7 sophisticated judicial descriptions,8 and, in the last decade,
numerous scholarly articles and works emanating particularly from North America.9
.. B Juris LLB (NSW) M Pub Law (ANU); Lecturer in Law and Legal Studies, La Trobe
University. I am very grateful to the following persons for their comments and suggestions
on drafts of this paper: Francis Bennion, Enid Campbell, Bruce Dyer, Andrew Goldsmith,
Justice Michael Kirby and William Twining. I would also like to acknowledge the
assistance of the Faculty of Law, Monash University, in the preparation of this paper.
1 M Loughlin, Public lAw and Political Theory (1992) at 39.
2 Mr Justice Bryson, "Statutory Interpretation" (1992) 8 Aust Bar Rev 185.
3 D N MacCormick and R S Summers, "Interpretation and Justification" in D N MacCormick
and R S Summers (eds}, Interpreting Statutes: A Comparative Study (1991) 511 at 538.
4 Another Look at Statutory Interpretation (1982). An edited record of the Symposium on
Statutory Interpretation conducted by the Attorney-General's Department in Canberra in
March 1981.
5 The Law Commission and the Scottish Law Commission, The Interpretation of Statutes
(1969) (hereafter, Law Commissions); Northern Territory Law Reform Committee, Report
on Statutory Interpretation (1987); Law Commission (NZ}, A New Interpretation Act to Avoid
"Prolixity and Tautology" (1990).
6 Eg, ss 15AA and 15AB of the Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth).
7 F A R Bennion, Statutory Interpretation: A Code (2nd ed 1992), is almost a thousand pages.
8 Black-Clawson International Ltd v Papierwerke Waldhof-Aschaffenburg AG [1975] AC 591 at
629-630 per Lord Wilberforce.
9 In the United States of America discussions have "erupted both on the bench and in the
academy": F H Easterbrook, "What Does Legislative History Tell Us?" (1990) 66 Chi-Kent L
Rev 441. See also on this point W D Popkin (ed}, "Symposium on Statutory Interpretation"
(1990) 66(2} Chi-Kent L Rev; P P Frickey, "From the Big Sleep to the Big Heat: The Revival of
Theory in Statutory Interpretation" (1992) 77 Minn L Rev 241. For an English perspective,
 1994 Statutory Interpretation, Law Reform and Sampford's Theory 117

r
:~ This two-part article focuses on the sweeping reform found in s 15AA of the Acts
Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth) and in other State and Territory legislation, called here
"the purpose rule".lO This rule was applied to Commonwealth legislation in the early
1980s and is now found in most jurisdictions in Australia, but is not replicated in the
same form elsewhere. The Commonwealth rule is as follows:
In the interpretation of a provision of an Act, a construction that would promote the
purpose or object underlying the Act (whether that purpose or object is expressly stated
in the Act or not) shall be preferred to a construction that would not promote that
purpose or object.
With respect to the purpose rule (as with statutory interpretation generally), text
writers have understandably looked for an inherent structure or system in the
principles of statutory interpretation. For instance, Bennion begins his general work by
stating that "[t]he search is for order ... It is the self-imposed task of the commentator to
reconcile [the principles].'' 11 Moreover, several claim to have found a form of order.
Bennion presents the law as a system (a code). Gifford's overall view emphasises the
way lawyers are constrained by the community within which they work:
[T]he existence of the basic rules of statutory interpretation allows lawyers, in advising
their clients or in preparing arguments to put before a court, to firmly ground themselves

see J Bell and G Engle, Cross on Statutory Interpretation (2nd ed 1987) at 194-195; and J Bell,
"Studying Statute Law" (1993) 13 OJLS 130. For an Australian perspective, see J Gava,
"Review: Statutory Interpretation in Australia" (1993) 9 Aust J of L & Soc 118. A
comprehensive critical overview appears in W N Eskridge and P P Frickey, "Statutory
Interpretation as Practical Reasoning" (1990) 42 Stan L Rev 321 at 324-345. Interdisciplinary
works include K S Abraham, "Statutory Interpretation and Literary Theory: Some
Concerns of an Unlikely Pair" (1979) 32 Rutgers L Rev 676; P Goodrich, Reading the Law: A
Critical Introduction to Legal Method and Techniques (1986); R A Posner, Law and Literature: A
Misunderstood Relation (1988) at ch 5; J Evans, Statutory Interpretation: Problems of
Communication (1988); S Fish, Doing What Comes Naturally: Change, Rhetoric, and the Practice
of Theory in Literary and Legal Studies (1989); G Airo-Farulla, "'Dirty Deeds Done Dirt
Cheap': Deconstruction, Derrida, Discrimination and Difference/ance in (the High) Court"
(1991) 9(2) L in Con 102; A Glass, "Interpretive Practices in Law and Literary Criticism"
(1991) 7 Aust J of L & Soc 16; PC Schanck, "Understanding Postmodem Thought and its
Implications for Statutory Interpretation" (1992) 65 S CalL Rev 2505; J A Ferejohn and B R
Weingast, "A Positive Theory of Statutory Interpretation" (1992) 12 International Review of
Law and Economics 263; J P Stevens, "The Shakespeare Canon of Statutory Construction"
(1992) 140 U PaL Rev 1373; and P Campos, "That Obscure Object of Desire: Hermeneutics
and the Autonomous Legal Text" (1993) 77 Minn L Rev 1065.
10 See generally DC Pearce and R S Geddes, Statutory Interpretation in Australia (3rd ed 1988)
at paras 2.22-2.25; G Morris et al, Laying Down the Law (3rd ed 1992) at 157-161; C Enright,
Legal Research and Interpretation (1988) at 229-231; C Corns, "Purposive Construction of
Legislation and Judicial Autonomy" (1984) 58 LIJ 391; I Cameron, "'Now Yoq See Me, Now
You-' Section SA and the Interpretation of the Legislation to which it Relates" (1985) 3
C&SLJ 46; R East, "The Lawmaking Role of the Appellate Judiciary: Some Lessons from
Australia" (1990) 11 Stat LR 48; Mr Justice Bryson, above n 2; D Gifford, Statutory
Interpretation (1990) at ch 4.
11 FAR Bennion, above n 7 at 1 and 2. To be fair, Bennion does qualify this statement by
saying that criticism is also essential (at 3); a fask he carries out at length.
118 Federal Law Review Volume22

upon shared principle and a common heritage. To abandon these rules would be to replace
statutory interpretation as we know it with the arbitrary whim of individual judges. 12
Writing extra-curially, the Chief Justice of the High Court of Australia appears to
assume an order preserved by social consensus:
It is unrealistic to interpret any instrument, whether it be a constitution, a statute, or a
contract, by reference to words alone, without any regard to fundamental values. By
values I mean those that are accepted by the community rather than those personal to the
judge.l3
The various studies of statutory interpretation have been undertaken despite
obvious and acknowledged difficulties. Bennion writes that, "[w]hen dealing with
statutory interpretation, the jurist of today writes about a vital subject in disarray." 14
Cross has noted the "paucity of rules and confusion of principles". 15 Many
commentators writing in academic journals have been even less circumspect in their
criticism of statutory interpretation. Here are three examples:
The result is chaos. It is impossible to predict what approach any Court will make to any
case. The field of statutory interpretation has become a judicial jungle.l 6
[It is a] morass of contradictory rules, presumptions, and practices [and] the loss of faith
in our ability to ascertain the "true" meaning of statutory language [is] deep ... 17
The judicial interpretation of statutes has traditionally been characterised by a high
degree of tolerated indeterminacy as to what amounts to acceptable practice. IS
Rather than search for order in the time-honoured way, the aim of this article is to
study the disarray in statutory interpretation caused by the purpose rule. The analytical
tool principally em~loyed is Charles Sampford's theory of the disorder of law
(introduced below). 1 Three aspects of the disarray caused by the purpose rule need to
be studied: its origins, nature, and effects. The origins lie in the disordering qualities of
the common law and in the process of making the purpose rule. The nature of the
disarray in the purpose rule, and purposive interpretation generally, is reflected in the
large number of additional interpretive issues and problems which the rule has
generated. The effects of the disarray have added to the pre-existing disorder in
statutory interpretation. I will argue further that the rule has been instrumental in
producing certain tendencies in the general approaches to statutory interpretation as
they are applied in the courts and quasi-judicial tribunals. These tendencies include:
added conflict, decanonisation, fragmentation, pluralism, a greater level of
indeterminacy and a deeper contingency in the relations between the rule and its
premises.

12 D Gifford, above n 10 at 56. Emphasis added. On "interpretive communities", see below

n 172.
13 Sir Anthony Mason, "Future Directions in Australian Law" (1987) 13 Man U L Rev 149 at
158-159.
14 F A R Bennion, above n 7 at 3.
15 J Bell and G Engle, above n 9 at 36.
16 D A SWard, "A Criticism of the Interpretation of Statutes in the New Zealand Courts"
[1963] NZLJ 293 at 296.
17 E Tucker, "The Gospel of Statutory Rules Requiring Liberal Interpretation According to St
Peter's" (1985) 35 UTLJ 113.
18 D Miers, "Legal Theory and the Interpretation of Statutes" in W Twining (ed), Legal Theory
and the Common Law (1986) 115 at 117.
19 C Sampford, The Disorder of Law: A Critique of Legal Theory (1989): see below at 120.
 1994 Statutory Interpretation, Law Reform and Sampford's Theory 119

The aim of studying the disarray or disorder is two-fold. The immediate aim is to
illuminate statutory interpretation by focusing on an ignored aspect: its disarray. It
may seem paradoxical to focus on a well recognised aspect for this purpose, but, as
Wittgenstein pointed out years ago:
The aspects of things that are most important for us are hidden because of their
simplicity and familiarity. (One is unable to notice something- because it is always
before one's eyes.)20
The analysis contained in this article may be linked, in a broad way, to the school of
thought called "deconstruction". It has been said that "[t]o deconstruct a text is to ...
subvert the text's own assumptions".21 Another writer has summed it up as follows:
Deconstruction, as a methodology, is not primarily concerned to give an interpretation
- identify the meaning - of a text. Rather it seeks to identify the conditions in a text
that make meaning possible. 22
Using Sampford's theory of the disorder of law, this article subverts the assumption
that statutory interpretation is essentially ordered, rather than disordered. This is not an
empty academic exercise. The assumption that law engenders order was behind the
enactment of the purpose rule. A leading commentator has observed that:
[The purpose rule] was an attempt by the Executive to impose some constraints on the
courts by requiring them to take into account matters that the Executive saw as relevant
to the interpretation of the legislation.23
More precisely then, it is the aim of this article to call into question the assumption that
the purpose rule would further constrain statutory interpretation.
A wider aim of this study, which the theory of the disorder of law is also well fitted
to assist, is to evaluate the well known claim by Lord Wilberforce, that statutory
interpretation is an unsuitable subject for statutory law reform:
I come to the general question of legislation and statutory interpretation. I have always
doubted whether statutory interpretation is a genuine subject for the Law Commission at
all. I suspect it is what is nowadays popularly called a non-subject. I do not think that
law reform can really grapple with it. It is a matter for educating the Judges and
practitioners and hoping that the work is better done.24
Lord Wilberforce made this comment in 1966, before the purpose rule had first been
suggested, but the message he delivered to an audience of law lords has a special
pertinence for the present study. During subsequent debates about the proposed rule
conducted in England25 and Australia,26 would-be reformers found themselves
irresistibly drawn to it, as if the words stood guard over the common law.

20 L Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations (3rd ed 1967) at para 129, cited in M Krygier,

"Law as Tradition" (1986) 5 L & Phil237 at 238.
21 R Young (ed) Untying the Text- A Poststructuralist Reader (1981) at 18, cited in G Airo-
Farulla, above n 9 at 104.
22 Ibid at 102. These conditions, he adds, "are not inherent in the text, are not in the collection
of signs which constitute the text; but in the role that the text plays in discursive practices,
and specifically in the exercise of power": ibid at 103.
23 DC Pearce, "Executive Versus Judiciary" (1991) 2 PLR 179 at 186. Emphasis added.
24 H Lords Deb 1966, Vol277 at 1294.
25 Below at 153-154.
26 Below at 155-157.
120 Federal Law Review Volume22

Theoretical framework
It has been said that those "who disliked theory, or claimed to get along better without
it, were simply in the grip of an older theory".27 The argument in this article has been
generally informed by certain theories of law and society. The principal theory from
which I draw is Charles Sampford's sociological theory of law and society - a theory
of social and legal "disorder", or "melee" theory.
Before detailing his theory it may be helpful to give some background to it because
his theory begins as a rejoinder. In recent years iurisprudence has come alive with a
plethora of debates about the nature of law. 2 Sampford's theory is a deliberate
attempt, as I read it, to address a number of important questions and assumptions
which are being debated or which the debate assumes. His main concern is with the
orthodox assumption that law forms a system:
The contention of this book becomes that much of what is wrong with legal theory is that
too many of its answers see law as a system and that the solution lies in a nonsystematic
theory of legal disorder.29
The characteristics of a system, for Sampford, are that "[t]hey are wholes, they have
elements and those elements have relations which form a structure".30 Many system
theories or theories of law which assume a legal system are examined in the first half of
the book. The theories are divided into three types: (1) positivist theories such as Hart's
The Concept of Law (1961); (2) "content theories" such as that of Dworkin which may go
so far as imagining law as a "closed system of definitions, rules of operation and
substantive major premises such that any specific legal problem can be solved by
deductive reasoning from the propositional system so established";31 and (3)
sociological theories including Parsonian, Luhmann and Marxist systems.
In developing a nonsystematic theory, two other debates should be mentioned. One
concerns the autonomy of law. It has been thought by some that Critical Legal Studies
and related intellectual movements have led or may lead to the "death" of the law.32
The theory of disorder is explicitly a critical theory. Although he disagrees with
sections of the CLS movement~3 Sampford thinks that the theory of disorder could be
"congenial to many CLS scholars".34 Sampford's view of the autonomy of law is shaped
from the basic position that "the 'legal' web is only a part of the larger web of society";
there are no natural boundaries between the two.35 Law is not therefore above conflict
in society or unaffected by it. He therefore rejects the view that law ought to be viewed
as an autonomous discipline. But this does not mean that he rejects some autonomy for
the law. The law is "relatively autonomous"36 in operation, in part because "conflict

27 J M Keynes, cited in T Eagleton, Literary Theory: An Introduction (1983) at vii.

28 W Twining and D Miers, How to Do Things With Rules (3rd ed 1991) at 379. For a lucid
exposition, seeS Berns, Concise Jurisprudence (1993).
29 C Sampford, above n 19 at 13.
30 Ibid at 16. Emphasis in original.
31 G Sawer, Law in Society (1965) at 17, cited inC Sampford, above n 19 at 75.
32 See, eg, 0 Piss, "The Death of the Law?" (1986) 72 Cornell L Rev 1; D Miers, above n 18 at
116-118.
33 C Sampford, above n 19 at 143-148.
34 Ibid at 145.
35 Ibid at 224.
36 Ibid at 247.
 1994 Statutory Interpretation, Law Reform and Sampford's Theory 121

over the action of legal officials must be fought on a particular battleground within
legal institutions". 37 ·
A third debate which is a major concern of the book is whether there are such
things as commonly held values, and the extent to which the law-creation process
reflects consensus or conflict.38 Sampford's response here is a complex one and
essentially he finds the consensus/conflict paradigm too crude. True, consensus and
conflict are part of the theor~ of disorder, the possibility of commonly held values
being asserted is not denied, 9 and the theory of disorder highlights conflict. But,
importantly, it is not a theory of "pure conflict". From a law-creation perspective, it may
be seen as a version of conflict theory where conflict is muted not by consensus as
commonly understood, but by disordering influences.
What, more precisely, is this disorder? Sampford's thesis, elaborated in the second
half of the book, is both grand in scope (being a theory of law and society) 40 and
sophisticated in attention to detail. It attempts to challenge the orthodox view, held by
both "radicals" and "conservatives", that "law is, in some or other sense, a system". 41 In
its place he argues for a nonsystematic theory of social and legal disorder. He
acknowledges, and frequently draws on, other nonsystematic traditions, such as
deconstruction, post-structuralism and some parts of Critical Legal Studies. 42 The
author's fundamental premise appears to be that writers on society and the law have
vastly underestimated the extent of human variability. 43 In this respect Sampford is
drawing on a rich tradition of postmodem scholarship; as Hassan has said in a succinct
review of postmodernism, "the age demands differences".44 Sampford's perspective is
that of the "social observer"; his goal is to present us with a combined macro/micro
view of society and law (the two are intertwined) without the mythical element of
systematic order. In its place he finds society to be a "melee", or "a fluid, constantly
,• changing set of interactions in a complex struggle between a large number of groups
and institutions".45
He provides a summary of the differences - which he calls "disordering
influences"- that produce the melee.46 They include:

• The indeterminacy of language .

• The "variety and mixture of social relations [in society] and the asymmetric
perception of the mix".
• The different social environments which exist for those at either end of social
relations.

37 Ibid at 247.
38 See generally, S Bottomley, N Cunningham and SParker, Law in Context (1991} at ch 12.
39 C Sampford, above n 19 at 207.
40 See generally Q Skinner (ed), The Return of Grand Theory in the Human Sciences (1985).
41 C Sampford, above n 19 at 6 and 11.
42 Ibid at 150.
43 Ibid at 151. For example, he holds that values are "entirely internal mental phenomena":
ibid at 173.
44 I Hassan, "Pluralism in Postmodem Perspective" (1986) 12 Critical Inquiry 503 at 505.
45 C Sampford, above n 19 at 203.
46 Ibid at 219-220. Emphasis added.
122 Federal Law Review Volume 22

• The different values, ideals and subjective interests which are generated by the
different environments and practices found at either end of relations of
production.
• The "irreducibly individual" nature of personal value judgements ("norms") .
• The "set[s] of people at one end of a type of social relation" ("groups"). They are
"likely to share certain characteristics on which could be founded common
subjective interests and other values [but] different groups are likely to have
subjective interests that are antagonistic to those of other groups, ideas and
values".
• The centripetal tendencies within social institutions caused by the above social
relations. These tendencies "leave members with different interests and frequently
the resources to pursue them".
• Social conflict and social change, the latter being a gradual process which changes the
balance of forces within the social melee.
SamJ?ford gives many illustrations of how the disorderincf influences affect
society'l' and law,48 for law is both disordered and disordering. 4 Of course, conflict
theories of society are far from new5° and writers have previously acknowledged that
laws create problems. 51 The importance of Sampford's theory is in explaining how and
why society and law are "essentially" disordered.52 It is not merely because the
disordering influences referred to tend to produce the melee or conflict described
above. It is because the disordering influences that produce conflict also operate,
paradoxically, to frustrate and mute it,53 and so avoid a Hobbesian war of all against
all. 54 He illustrates this important point by reference to the differences and conflicts
within institutions:
[T]here is not all-out "war" [and] the nature of institutions would make it very difficult
for them to take part in one. First, there are all the difficulties of directing the activity of
institutions toward singular purposes. The basic problem for any institution is that,
being a web of mixed relations between different persons with different environments
and values, there is rarely a consensus or unity of purpose within that institution.
Second, though the total resources held by a group's members may be quite massive,
these resources are rarely, if ever, fully mobilised [because individuals] may not realise
that there are many like-minded individuals to mobilise ... Mobilisation of one side's
resources is pointless if it provokes the other side to mobilise even more ... 55
Disorder also affords a general explanation of the lack of change in society and the law:
[T]he intractability of our society and its law to either reform or revolution is precisely
due to its lack of systematic organisation, so that when the revolutionary strikes or the
reformer moves there is no one system to attack, no one key institution to change. Lack

47 Ibid at ch 7.
48 Ibid at ch8.
49 Ibid at 223.
50 S Bottomley, N Cunningham and SParker, above n 38 at ch 12.
51 W Twining and D Miers, above n 28 at 125 and 243. The relevance of that work to the
theoretical framework adopted here is explained below at 124-125.
52 C Sampford, above n 19 at 149. Emphasis added.
53 Ibid at 209.
54 Ibid at 152-153 and 203.
55 Ibid at 203-204.
 1994 Statutory Interpretation, Law Reform and Sampford's Theory 123

of change is the result of legal and social disorder producing social and legal inertia
rather than, as is more usually supposed, social and legal order providing social and
legal stability.56
Because of the tendency to inertia as well as to conflict, the effects of law, then, tend to
be relatively crude, conflicting, incomplete and nonuniform. 57
His theory is therefore not a one-sided conflict theory, but is also a theory of "social
peace" or relative social inertia. It is vital to note this feature, for the outcome is not, as
the title may imply, a theory of total disorder, in the sense of unmitigated conflict.
Further, although there are strong similarities with postmodernism,58 it is difficult to
see how the theory can be ranked with "anarchic" postmodem theories59 which in
effect preach the "death" of law.60 Apart from the general tendency for disorderin&
forces to frustrate or mute conflict, institutions inject some organisation into social life,
while the law is "relatively autonomous". 62 He recognises many of the insights of
positivist, "content" and sociological theories of law. 63 But "meta-narratives" of
consensus are eschewed,64 although the possibility of persons holding similar values is
not.65
The perspective which Sampford takes leads him to emphasise the aspects of law
which tend to be unconsciously suppressed.66 Although at first sight it may appear to
be a bleak view of law, there is room for altruism, for ideals, and for everything except
a system, as he makes clear in the following colourful analogy:
[Law] is a great drama, perhaps the greatest drama in which we are involved. Even if it
does not have a plot, a start or a finish and even if the direction is appalling, like the
quintessential Hollywood movie "it has got everything".67
In summary, Sampford's theory provides a perspective in which law is seen as a
"complex disordered entity",68 the role of disordering influences accordingly being
"highlighted".69 The admission that the theory highlights the disordering influences in
the law - the theory's principal strength- is also its principal limitation. It inevitably
cuts off other perspectives (some deliberately, of course). But this "problem" arises with
any theory or model, which cannot claim complete neutrality or the provision of
complete answers to complex questions involving interpretation and personal
judgement, such as those examined here?O

56 Ibid at 6. Emphasis in original.

57 Ibid at 252.
58 See above n 44.
59 J McGowan, Postmodernism and its Critics (1991) at 16.
60 0 Fiss, above n 32.
61 C Sampford, above n 19 at 200.
62 Ibid at 247.
63 Ibid at 159.
64 Ibid at 166-167 and 206-207.
65 Ibid at 173 and 195.
66 Ibid at 2-3.
67 Ibid at 263.
68 Ibid at 262.
69 Ibid at 149.
70 A Hunt, "The Role and Place of Theory in Legal Education: Reflections on
Foundationalism" (1989) 9 LS 146 at 163; P Cheah, "The Law of/as Rape
124 Federal Law Review Volume22

For our present purposes the theory is an appropriate one because of the close
conceptual identity between a state of disarray and a theory of disorder. It can provide a
rigorous theoretical framework for inquiries into the disarray in statutory
interpretation, the part played in this by the purpose rule, and the general question of
law reform in this area.
Although indebted to Sampford's theory, it is appropriate to spell out the limited
application which is being made of the theory here. The article does not seek to
critically examine all the implications of the theory in so far as the purpose rule or
purposive interpretation is concerned. This would be a very large project indeed. Only
part of "the law" in the Sampfordian sense is being studied.71 This article concentrates
on the process of making the purpose rule and on the judicial interpretation of it. 72 Some
attention is also paid to the process of the courts as revealed in court transcripts.
Sampford's theo~ can and will be contrasted with more systematic theories of the
legislative process,7 particularly theories based on the alleged existence of a social
consensus which judges and others can "tap into". Such theories are supported by
leading members of the judiciary in Australia and the United Kingdom.74 For example,
the existence of a fundamental consensus has been seen as a basis of legal reasoning in
the statement, quoted above, of the current Chief Justice of Australia.75 Another
member of the High Court has espoused a similar view:
[The judicial branch of government] gives effect to, and sometimes expresses the basic
norms of society. For the most part, these basic norms do not find expression in positive
law. They are drawn from the values which a society commonly respects- perhaps
intuitively respects. Notions of justice, dignity, fair dealing, respect for others, mercy -
these are notions not often found in the statute books, though they affect statutory
interpretation?6 ·
Sampford's theory of the disorder of law has echoes in other theoretical writings. Of
particular note is Twining and Miers's detailed and original study of rules (legal and
non-legal), a microcosm of a theory of disorder.77 The heart of their book is a model for
diagnosing the problems in interpretation of rules?B It consists of 35 "conditions of
doubt" (such as lack of clear policy objectives) which may arise in three chronological
stages: prior to the creation of the rule; during the rule-making stage; and after the
creation of the rule. In addition, there may be special features of the particular case.
They stress .that their model overcomes the deficiencies of standard legal texts which:

Poststructuralism and the Framing of the Legal Text" (1991) 9(2) Lin Con 117 at 118-119;
R Cranston, Law, Government and Public Policy (1987) at 6.
71 C Sampford, above n 19 at 259-260.
72 Courts and tribunals are included. See generally D Miers, above n 18 at 125-126 for a
critique of studies which fail to acknowledge the limited scope of their inquiry.
73 S Bottomley, N Gunningham and S Parker, above n 38 at 310-314 ("'pure' consensus",
"consensus pluralism").
74 P Devlin, The Judge (1979) at 5 and 9-10.
75 Above at 118.
76
Mr Justice Brennan, "Ministers of the Third Branch of Government", an address to a
luncheon organised by the Young Lawyers' Section of the Law Society of NSW, Sydney, 29
May 1981.
77 W Twining and D Miers, above n 28.
78 Ibid at ch6.
 1994 Statutory Interpretation, Law Reform and Sampford's Theory 125

tend either to concentrate on identifying remedies for problems in interpretation without

first identifying their causes, or, where they do pursue this task, to present such
problems as being primarily attributable to the structural characteristics of the English
language.79
This latter argument is a particularly relevant one for it provides further justification (if
one is needed) for analysing the disarray caused by the purpose rule "from the ground
up", that is, with detailed attention to the pre-existing common law and the process by
which the rule came to be made by Parliament, as well as to the interpretation and
application of the rule in the courts and tribunals. Their identification of conditions of
doubt is also generally useful for providing a detailed list of points where the rule-
making process can fracture and be a source of future interpretive conflict.

Outline
Part One examines the pre-enactment phase of the purpose rule. It demonstrates that,
far from being a model of consensus, close analysis of the law-making process reveals
the rule to be shot through with disorder - with simultaneous tendencies towards
conflict and inertia. The thesis is that the rule could not bring added order to statutory
interpretation, at least initially, because it was not the product of consensus on a wide
range of issues, despite some appearances to that effect.
The above introduction sketched the main themes of the article and introduced the
theoretical framework: Charles Sampford's theory of the disorder of law. Below, the
common law position prior to the statutory reform is analysed. This section articulates
the disordering influences in the law and in society which constituted its disarray. It
also details how those influences operated to frustrate or mute conflict over the rules
and over interpretation in individual cases. The main point made in this section is that
the disordering influences created a situation of such complexity that order would be
difficult or impossible to achieve by means of rules, let alone a single rule.
Next, the disorderly rise of the purpose rule is traced, beginning with its origins in
the 1969 joint report of the Law Commission for England and Wales and the Scottish
Law Commission. The report was eventually debated in the United Kingdom
Parliament (though never implemented in that country). However, its
recommendations were strongly promoted in Australia at a high-level seminar
following a period of infamous judicial interpretation called by one commentator "the
new literalism".8° The article then turns to the reforms themselves: to the hunt for
Parliament's intention and to influential juristic views of the provision.
The changes to the common law made by the High Court of Australia in the case of
Cooper Brookes (Wollongong) Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation of the Commonwealth of
Australia,81 the judgments in which were handed down after the rule's introduction
into Parliament but before its enactment and commencement, are then critically
examined. The case noticeably moved the common law in the direction of the purpose
rule; paradoxically, however, this liberalisation could be a problem for interpreters of
the purposive rule. The rule had been created on the assumption that the common law
had certain deficiencies, such as that it was over-literal and had erected artificial

79 Ibid at 236-237.
80 R Krever, "Murphy on Taxation" in JA Scutt (ed), Lionel Murphy: A Radical Judge (1987) 128
at 130.
81 (1981) 147 CLR 297.
126 Federal Law Review Volume22

barriers to taking account of the purposive approach. In addition, there were

significant differences of opinion amongst members of the Court and certain other
features of the judgments which were disordering.
The final section in Part One reviews the disorder in the common law and its
aggregation during the process of making the purpose rule. The main point made in
this section is that, immediately after its enactment, when the rule was unused and
apparently "green", it was already disordered. This state of affairs would be likely to
lead to further disarray in the law of statutory interpretation rather than, as had been
supposed, to the imposition of some constraints.
Part Two examines the post-enactment phase of the rule and draws general
conclusions from both parts. First, the operation of the rule in the courts and quasi-
judicial tribunals is subjected to close scrutiny. This section demonstrates that, instead
of imposing some constraints, the purpose rule has added to the disarray in the
common law by giving rise to a multiplicity of issues which in most respects defy
simple answers. The disordering effects of the purpose rule, flowing from its
disorderly rise and its interpretation in the courts and tribunals, are then synthesised.
The purpose rule is seen to have been a catalyst for certain tendencies in the law of
statutory interpretation: added conflict, decanonisation, fragmentation, pluralism, a
greater level of indeterminacy and a deeper contingency.
The article concludes by reflecting on the benefits of a theoretical perspective of
statutory interpretation. Specifically, it considers the warning given by Lord
Wilberforce shortly before the purpose rule was first suggested - that statutory
interpretation was a "non-subject" as far as Parliament was concerned. With some
qualifications, the question as to whether it is such a non-subject is seen to depend on
the criterion one selects. If the criterion selected is the achievement of a particular
result and no more (that is, a determinate set of results), then it is submitted that this
study generally supports Lord Wilberforce's view. In the case of the purpose rule,
reform by way of statute of the general approaches has surely proved to be an
unpredictable exercise not without dangers. The dangers range from failure to have
any effects, to a whole range of unintended effects. As it happened, the latter occurred,
and the general effects were mixed. If, however, the criterion selected is not the
capacity to deliver a determinate set of results, but simply the capacity to bring about
some non-specific improvements (such as, in this case, to give "a nudge in the direction
of the purpose rule"), then we may take a different view. We may conclude that, with
the benefit of hindsight, Lord Wilberforce was too pessimistic. For it cannot be denied
that legislating has had several beneficial effects.

THE DISORDER OF THE COMMON LAW82

Although Sampford's theory of legal disorder may seem at first sight a debatable claim
to make of law generally, we have seen that it embodies an uncontroversial claim in
respect of the common law of statutory interpretation prior to the enactment of the
purpose rule. This section examines this state of affairs. 83 It first explores the "internal"

82 In this section I have been generally assisted by the analysis in J Bell and G Engle, above
n 9 at chs 1 and 2.
83 On the causes of interpretive problems generally, see W Twining and D Miers, above n 28
at ch 6. For a drafter's perspective, seeD Ward, above n 16 at 293-294.-
 1994 Statutory Interpretation, Law Reform and Sampford's Theory 127

conflicts in the common law: the problems with the "principles" themselves. But the
disorder in the common law cannot be understood in a vacuum, so it is then necessary
to consider how the legal and social context in which the general approaches operated
added to that disorder. Finally, it is essential to consider how the disorder of the
common law was muted, for, despite the multiple tendencies to conflict, the law was
not one unmitigated conflict before the intervention of the Australian Parliaments by
way of the purpose rule.

Internal view
The disorder was comprehensive, but the principal influences fell into two groups. On
the one hand, there was a relative indeterminacy in the law, manifested by a lack of
rules, a fictional basis, an oversimplified understanding and ample individual judicial
freedom. On the other hand, the limited guidance which the law offered was, in
important respects, contradictory and in any case subject to change. The conflicts
concerned the general structure of the law and the underlying values which were to be
preferred, and were also reflected in various contradictions, ambiguities and
indeterminacies in the particular approaches. Change was endemic because the
doctrine was historically contingent. These various factors are briefly considered in
tum.

Lack of rules at common law

The common law regulating statutory interpretation existed in notoriously loose,
imprecise form- even for the common law. The lack of substance, which can be
amply documented, hindered the development of an orderly body of law. In the Sussex
Peerage case, Tindal CJ pointed out a salient fact:
[T]he only rule for the construction of Acts of Parliament is that they should be construed
according to the intent of the Parliament which passed the Act.84
Cross laments this situation, whereby there was a "paucity of rules" to resolve the
"confusion of principles".85 All that there is, he says, is "a welter of judicial dicta".86 He
prefers to describe the principal features of the law as "canons", in other words,
"statements not so much of hard-and-fast rules of law, as of a general judicial approach
to the task of interpreting statutes in particular contexts". 87 A former Chief Justice of
Australia admitted they were merely "frail guidelines".88 Bennion lists the types of
"interpretative criteria" which are used "to discover what the legislator intended" and
in so doing emphasises the extent to which those criteria do not exist in the form of
binding rules. As well as rules of construction, they mainly consist of principles of legal
or public policy, presumptions of legislative intention and linguistic canons of
construction. 89

84 (1844) 11 Cl & Fin 85 at 143; 8 ER 1034 at 1057. Emphasis added.

85 J Bell and G Engle, above n 9 at 36.
86 Ibid at46.
87 Ibid at 4.
88 G Barwick, Foreword to the First Edition, DC Pearce and R S Geddes, above n 10 at vii.
89 F A R Bennion, above n 7 at 378 and 380.
128 Federal Law Review Volume 22

The general approaches to interpretation have been said (mistakenly) to be

composed of three rules, the so-called literal, golden and mischief "rules". 90 Authorities
on statutory interpretation more properly accord them a lesser status. Pearce and
Geddes describe them as "approaches and presumptions".9 1 Bennion too classifies each
of the dominant approaches as a presumption.92 But in what sense was there a lack of
rules in statutory interpretation beyond the fact that the approaches are technically
presumptions? Twining and Miers suggest three criteria for distinguishing between
rules: "the level of generality or particularity of a prescription; their precision or
vagueness; and their status or force in dictating, guiding or influencing a result...93 The
literal presumption and the mischief rule are high in generality because they apply to
statutes and other legislation across the board. They are low in precision because of the
vagueness of what is meant by the literal and the mischief approaches. 94 Most
importantly, they have little force in terms of dictating a result. In no sense do they
ever dictate the result in a case. The force of the literal presumption or the mischief rule
will depend on the strength of the argument based upon the presumption or the rule,
and the relative strength of the arguments, based upon a consideration of other
interpretive criteria, which favour a different construction.95 Nevertheless, the literal
presumption "weighs heavily".96
What of the so-called rule that a court must ascertain and give effect to the intention
of Parliament? It is discussed in some detail below. While it cannot be denied that the
presumed intention of Parliament is "often perfectly clear and obvious",97 the limited
guidance the rule offers in cases of dispute is notorious. More often it expresses simply
the court's conclusion about the meaning of a word or words after the various
interpretive criteria have been weighed, particularly as at common law until very
recently a court could generally not refer to parliamentary material as an aid to
construction. 98

90 M Zander, The Law-Making Process (2nd ed 1985) at 75 refers to this tradition.

Inadvertently, he perhaps perpetuates it.
91 DC Pearce and R S Geddes, above n 10 at para 1.4.
92 FAR Bennion, above n 7 at 7.
93 W Twining and D Miers, above n 28 at 133.
94 On the ambiguities in the literal approach, see below at 137-140. On the purposive
approach, see below at 140-141 and Part Two. See also W Twining and D Miers, above n 28
at 365.
95 See generally FAR Bennion, above n 7 at 387-389.
96 Ibid at 389.
97 W Twining and D Miers, above n 28 at 209. See also H MeN Henderson, cited in I Maclean,
"Responsibility and the Act of Interpretation: the Case of Law" in I Maclean et al (eds), The
Political Responsibility of Intellectuals (1990) at 161. Lord Reid once observed that: "One may
say what one likes about the way in which Acts of Parliament are interpreted in the courts
at the moment, but the proof of the pudding is in the eating, and in ninety-nine cases out
of a hundred counsel can advise in advance what the court is likely to say a particular
section means, because the court acts on the words of the section which are plain for
everybody to see.": H Lords Deb 1966, Vol277 at 1278.
98 Pepper (Inspector of Taxes) v Hart [1993] AC 593 [HL]; South Australian Commissioner for
Prices and Consumer Affairs v Charles Moore (Aust) Ltd (1977) 139 CLR 449 at 461 (HC);
DC Pearce and R S Geddes, above n 10 at para 3.3. In Australia the rule was more liberal
in operation at the State level in that reference to the mischief and other historical
 1994 Statutory Interpretation, Law Reform and Sampford's Theory 129

Fictional basis
The rule that the courts must give effect to the intention of Parliament - said to be the
only rule of statutory interpretation - was, however, productive of disorder because it
rested on a fiction, although debate continued, and still continues, about what it meant
to describe the concept in such terms.99 In general, fictions produce disorder because
they are an "instrument for producing change",100 and because they are illusory in
nature, concealing unavoidable creative choices. 101 Fuller is said to have observed that,
in the case of a fiction, the judge is usually "acting under an unarticulated philosophy
... which seems to him to justify the change if it takes place under the apparent sanction
of old formulas, when it would not be justified otherwise".102
The difficulties with the concept start with the assumption that any body, such as
Parliament, can have a single intention at all. 103 As MacCallum points out, critics
themselves assumed one or both of the following: (1) that two or more persons cannot
have the same intention, and (2) a group of persons is incapable of having an
intention. 104 In any case, there was usually a lack of direct evidence of the group
intention outside of the actual words, 105 promoted by the general rule prohibiting
courts from referring to parliamentary material as an aid to construction.106
The difficulties were compounded when attention was focused on how the courts
said they carried out their interpretive functions. For various reasons, as Gifford points
out, the courts must "divine or impute" the relevant intention:
Parliament's intention ... is not the intention that Parliament would have had had its
attention only been directed to the problem currently before the courts nor is it "the
actual intention of the draftsman" nor "the subjective intention of the members of
Parliament". 107
Because the subjective intent may not have been realised in the words chosen, the
courts have denied that their role is one of ascertaining the actual intention of
Parliament:
We often say that we are looking for the intention of Parliament, but that is not quite
accurate. We are seeking the meaning of the words which Parliament used. We are
seeking not what Parliament meant but the true meaning of what they said.108
The concept of the intention of Parliament also seems fictional in those cases where it
was clearly apparent that no intention could be ascertained since the legislative drafter
was said not to have anticipated the situation which gave rise to the interpretive

background was frequently permitted: D C Pearce and R S Geddes, above n 10 at paras

3.2-3.6.
99 G C MacCallum Jr, "Legislative Intent" (1966) 75 Yale LJ 754.
100 J Stone, Social Dimensions of Law and Justice (1966) at 130.
101 J Stone, Legal System and Lawyers' Reasonings (1964) at 32 and 292.
102 L L Fuller, cited in J Stone, above n 101 at 292.
103 M Zander, above n 90 at 139.
104 G C MacCallum, above n 99 at 764.
105 M Zander, above n 90 at 139.
106 See above n 98.
107 D Gifford, above n 10 at 52.
108 Black-Clawson International Ltd v Papierwerke Waldhof-Aschaffenburg AG [1975] AC 591 at 613
per Lord Reid. His Lordship made this comment in the context of discussing the use of
extrinsic material.
130 Federal Law Review Volume22

problem.109 The freedom which the courts accordingly sometimes have in the
interpretive task is another reason for scepticism as to the reality of the legislative
intent. The courts' power in this respect has been frankly acknowledged extra-curially:
[W]henever the Court decides [a taxation appeal], it legislates about taxation. It makes a
law taxing all gains of the same kind and all documents of the same kind. Do not let us
deceive ourselves with the legal fiction that the court is only ascertaining and giving
effect to what Parliament meant ... The court may describe what it is doing in tax appeals
as interpretation. So did the priestess of the Delphic oracle. 11 0
Though "widely discredited",111 the concept of the intention of Parliament can be
defended on certain grounds.112 But these grounds paradoxically serve to strengthen its
fictional quality, because they demonstrate why it cannot be dismissed as a concept
without substance and significance. Words in particular contexts must be taken to have
limits - otherwise communication would not be possible. (These limits are linguistic
conventions set by "the relevant linguistic community".) 113 The intention of Parliament
can therefore be viewed as an umbrella concept signalling that interpretation cannot be
a purely subjective matter. In the many cases where there is no dispute as to the
meaning of particular words it is fair to say also (in the absence of any overriding
explanation) that the intention of Parliament has meaning. 114 In other words, the
concept imposes some general, though manipulable, limitation- "the subordination of
the judiciary to Parliament".ns

Over-simplification116
The disorder was magnified by oversimplified statements of the law. A distinguished
judge once said:
We are always told that construing Acts of Parliament is a mystery, and books have been
written about the subject. I always advise young men "Don't read them", because the
rules are extremely simple.117
It is submitted that this view is a gross oversimplification. Any doubts about the
richness and the complexities of statutory interpretation have been removed by the
publication of mammoth scholarly treatises,118 analyses of the gamut of causes of

109 M Zander, above n 90 at 139-140; Lord Diplock, "The Courts as Legislators", Holdsworth
Club Lecture, 1965, cited in M Zander, above n 90 at 156. G C MacCallum, however,
discusses the possibility that the courts may be agents of Parliament under an "agency
model" of legislative intent: above n 99 at 780-784.
110 Lord Diplock, "The Courts as Legislators", Holdsworth Club Lecture, 1965, cited in
M Zander, above n 90 at 156.
111 M Zander, above n 90 at 140.
112 The Law Commissions were sympathetic to criticism of the concept of the intention of
Parliament (above n 5 at paras 54-55), but defended it by drawing a distinction between a
"particular legislative intention" and a "general legislative intention", the latter being "the
purpose which the legislature intended to achieve": Law Commissions, above n 5 at
para 55, drawing on G C MacCallum Jr, above n 99. But to align the purpose with overall
meaning is to confuse the two: G C MacCallum, above n 99 at 757; and see Part Two.
113 G C MacCallum, above n 99 at 761, 762 and 767.
114 W Twining and D Miers, above n 28 at 209-210.
115 J Bell and G Engle, above n 9 at 28.
116 See generally S D Smith, "Reductionism in Legal Thought" (1991) 91 Colum L Rev 68.
117 H Lords Deb 1966, Vol277 at 1278 (Lord Reid).
118 F A R Bennion, above n 7.
 1994 Statutory Interpretation, Law Reform and Sampford's Theory 131

interpretive crroblems,119 as well as exploration of the connections with other

disciplines. 12 There is also implicit judicial recognition of the complexities:
[T]he important element of judicial construction [is] not confined to a mechanical
analysis of today's words, but, if this task is to be properly done, [it is to be] related to
such matters as intelligibility to the citizen, constitutional propriety, considerations of
history, comity of nations..~ reasonable and non-retroactive effect and, no doubt, in some
contexts, to social needs.1L1
The problem of over-simplification is one which has pervaded both courtroom and
academia. Of the former, Bennion has neatly revealed the ingrained habits which are
the cause, and the complications which result:
Acts of Parliament are prepared unscientifically and in haste ... Acts so faultily
engendered pass in rapid succession before busy judges, assisted by busier advocates.
Few of these have the time, or are equipped, for cool and deep analysis. Yet judges lean
to the delivery of impromptu and pithy (and therefore doubly inaccurate) descriptions of
the nature of statutes and the principles governing their interpretation. Often quotable,
these get quoted. Not being based, as a rule, either on profound research or blinding
insight, they tend to agree neither with each other nor with the real nature of the subject
matter. 122
In academia, Cross observed that the dearth of learning on statutory interpretation was
unwittingly promoted in an influential article published in 1938 by Professor J Willis.
(Wishing to correct the impression that there was but one rule of interpretation, Willis
had stated that there were in fact three approaches -literal, golden and mischief.) For
many years afterwards, until the recent "upsurge"123 of interest in statutory
interpretation, these approaches formed the main diet of generations of Anglo-
Australian students of statutory interpretation,1 24 so much so that Cross reports that
any question about statutory interpretation directed to students was answered "as of
yore" with the "three rules of interpretation". This left him (Cross) as much "in the
dark" as he had been in his student days about statutory interpretation.1 25 Some texts
unfortunately still refer to the approaches as the "three basic rules". 126
The pragmatic nature of English law practice1 27 and the problems raised by
Bennion mean that it is only a few judges who attempt to systematise judicial
approaches to interpretation in the case law.I28 Twining and Miers elaborate:

119 W Twining and D Miers, above n 28.

120 See above n 9.
121 Black-Clawson International Ltd v Papierwerke Waldhof-Aschaffenburg AG [1975] AC 591 at
629-630 per Lord Wilberforce. See also H Gibbs, Foreword in D Gifford, above n 10 at viii.
122 FAR Bennion, above n 7 at 2.
123 J Bell and G Engle, above n 9 at 194. For examples of theoretical approaches, see now J Bell
and G Engle, above n 9 at ch 2; D Miers, above n 18. For interdisciplinary studies, see
aboven 9.
124 JBell and G Engle, above n 9 at 194.
125 R Cross, Statutory Interpretation (1st ed 1976) at v. ,
126 For instance, M Zander, above n 90 at 75 perpetuates the tradition that "there are said to be
three basic rules" though, in fairness to him, he does later state (at 129) that it is a
misnomer to call them rules, and refers generally to the many other guides to
interpretation.
127 W Twining and D Miers, above n 28 at 152 and 368.
128 Ibid at 366.
132 Federal Law Review Volume 22

References to the "intention of parliament" and "the purpose of the statute" are
reasonably frequent, though used in various senses, and there are occasional references
to presumptions or canons of interpretation. On the other hand there are usually very
few explicit references to what are or what ought to be the methodological principles
guiding interpretation; nor is it easy to discern whether the judges are implicitly
following some procedure.129

Judicial freedom of choice

With little clear guidance in the common law, the inescapable element of judicial
freedom of choice looms large in this area. Judicial discretion is not excluded merely 1

because a particular interpretation can be supported by a particular approach.

Although certain values inhere in the various approaches (discussed below), we I

should not assume, for instance, that a literal interpretation in a particular case is a 1

conscious effort to give effect to the values of a literal approach (and the same applies to 1

purposivism).130 The notion that judges have "leeways of choice" in decision-making

and that the leeways extend to finding the best justification is old hat now.l31 Hence, 1

"[f]or some interpreters, the method of interpretation is as good as the results it

achieves" .132 One only has to look, Twining and Miers add, to the judgments of
"creative", "liberal" judges, such as Lord Atkin and Lord Denning, to see that a literal
interpretation may be prompted by reasons other than those which inhere in a literal
approach, such as the desire to do justice in a particular case or to reveal the absurdity 1

of a particular rule.133 In addition, there is an apparent freedom not to refer to the

canons of statutory interpretation at all. It is true that some of the cases in which no 1

canon is mentioned may be consistent with a tacit acceptance of the canons.

Nevertheless, "the area of 'justifiable solutions' will be a wide one".134

Conflicting traditions
The factors mentioned so far demonstrate that the common law lacked substance in 1

terms of legal principle, a state of affairs which would be productive of conflict. In 1

addition, the limited guidance which was offered was, to a great degree, also 1

productive of conflict. Importantly, there were two different traditions as to the I

"structure" of the law. One maintained that the general approaches were separate and I
distinct and that they stood in a clear hierarchy. This tradition was well supported in 1

the law reports. In 1844 Tindal CJ emphasised the literal approach in these terms:
The only rule for the construction of Acts of Parliament is, that they should be construed
according to the intent of the Parliament which passed the Act. If the words of the statute
are in themselves precise and unambiguous, then no more can be necessary than to
expound those words in that natural and ordinary sense.135

129 Ibid.
130 The distinction between a literal approach and a literal interpretation is well made by
M Zander, above n 90 at 93; see also below at 135-136.
131 J Stone, The Province and Function of Law (1946) at 172.
132 W Twining and D Miers, above n 28 at 365.
133 Ibid at 196.
134 A A Farrar, "Judicial Approaches to Meaning in the Interpretation of Statutes", LLM thesis,
University of Canterbury, NZ (1982) at 246.
135 Sussex Peerage (1844) 11 Cl & Fin 85 at 143; 8 ER 1034 at 1057. Emphasis added.
 1994 Statutory Interpretation, Law Reform and Sampford's Theory 133

A frequently quoted Australian authority described the literal approach in similar

terms:
The fundamental rule of interpretation, to which all others are subordinate, is that a
statute is to be expounded according to the intent of the Parliament that made it; and that
intention has to be found by an examination of the language used in the statute as a
whole. The question is, what does the language mean; and when we find what the
language means, in its ordinary and natural sense, it is our duty to obey that meaning,
even if we think the result to be inconvenient or impolitic or improbable.T36
Commonly cited as a general approach, but in effect a qualification of the literal
approach, was the "golden rule". An oft-cited description of the circumstances in which
it may be invoked was put forward by Lord Wensleydale in Grey v Pearson:
I have been long and deeply impressed with the wisdom of the rule, now, I believe,
universally adopted, at least in the Courts of Law in Westminster Hall, that in construing
wills and indeed statutes, and all written instruments, the grammatical and ordinary
sense of the words is to be adhered to, unless that would lead to some absurdity, or some
repugnance or inconsistency with the rest of the instrument, in which case the
grammatical and ordinary sense of the words may be modified, so as to avoid the
absurdity and inconsistency, but no farther.137
Although often accorded the status of a general approach, the "golden rule" was not as
important as the literal or mischief approaches because it dealt with truly exceptional
cases and was infrequently referred to.
The third specific general approach in the common law was the mischief or
purposive approach. The classic statement of the mischief approach was, of course,
Heydon's Case, in which the Barons of the Exchequer resolved as follows:
And it was resolved by them, that for the sure and true interpretation of all statutes in
general (be they penal or beneficial, restrictive or enlarging of the common law), four
things are to be discerned and considered:
1st. What was the common law before the making of the Act,
2nd. What was the mischief and defect for which the common law did not
provide,
3rd. What remedy the Parliament hath resolved and appointed to cure the
disease of the commonwealth.
And, 4th. The true reason of the remedy;
and then the office of all the Judges is always to make such construction as shall
suppress the mischief, and advance the remedy, and to suppress subtle inventions and
evasions for continuance of the mischief, and pro privata commodo, and to add force and
life to the cure and remedy, according to the true intent of the makers of the Act, pro bono
publico.l 38
A modem description of the purposive approach is given by Cross who, after referring
to a House of Lords case in which their Lordships based their interpretation on the
policy which the relevant Act was designed to serve, commented:
Unlike the approach of the golden rule, there was no reliance on an absurdity manifest
from the statute read as a whole, but rather the policy was derived from the legislative
history and from the social background against which the Act was passed. Under the

136 Amalgamated Society of Engineers v Adelaide Steamship Co Ltd (1920) 28 CLR 129 at 161-162.
137 (1857) 6 HLC 61 at 106; 10 ER 1216 at 1234.
138 (1584) 3 Co Rep 7a at 7b; 76 ER 637 at 638.
134 Federal Law Review Volume22

purposive approach, the judge may look beyond the four comers of the statute to find a
reason for giving a wider or narrower interpretation to its words, and his role is one of
active co-operation with the policy of the statute.139
An alternative tradition in the structure of the common law as to how the general
approaches were to be treated laid less emphasis on them individually and more on
the task at hand: to ascertain the meaning of the words. This "global" or "amalgamated"
approach has been expressed in different ways over the years. The concept of the
intention of Parliament has long been a way to rationalise interpretations based on
diverse sources, as is evident from this extract from Plowden (1560). After referring to
various authorities he wrote of these expositions:
[They] have always been founded upon the intent of the Legislature, which they have
collected sometimes by considering the cause and necessity of making the Act,
sometimes by comparing one part of the Act with another, and sometimes by foreign
circumstances. So that they have ever been guided by the intent of the Legislature, which
they have always taken according to the necessitv of the matter, and according to that
which is consonant to reason and good discretion. 140
Many jurists,141 including Driedger, have gone further in advocating an approach to
statutory interpretation which replaces "the traditional three fold statement of the
canons of statutory interpretation" with a "unitary approach". 142 Instead of the
intention of Parliament, Driedger prefers an interpretive approach called "literal in
total context". His main point is that, contrary to Willis and his academic successors,
there are not three seEarate approaches, but one, which encapsulates the three main
approaches, and more.143 He writes:
Today there is only one principle or approach, namely, the words of an Act are to be
read in their entire context and in their grammatical and ordinary sense harmoniously
with the scheme of the Act, the object of the Act, and the intention of Parliament. 144
Driedger draws on judicial dicta such as the following:
For words, and particularly general words, cannot be read in isolation: their colour and
content are derived from their context. So it is that I conceive it to be my right and duty
to examine every word of a statute in its context, and I use "context" in its widest sense ...
as including not only other enacting provisions of the same statute, but its preamble, the
existing state of the law, other statutes in pari materia, and the mischief which I can, by
those and other legitimate means, discern the statute was intended to remedy. 145

139 J Bell and G Engle, above n 9 at 18.

140 Stradling v Morgan (1560) 1 Plowd 199 at 205; 75 ER 305 at 315.
141 FAR Bennion, above n 7 at 378; DR Miers and A C Page, Legislation (1st ed 1982) at 187-
188 referring to Lloyd, Cross and Driedger.
142 A and J Farrar, "Legislation" in J F Corkery (ed), A Career in Law (2nd ed 1989) 54 at 66 and
67.
143 See E Driedger, Construction of Statutes (2nd ed 1983) at 87, 89-91 and 107, who cites
various English authorities, all pre-1973, for a method of construction which he calls
"literal in total context" (at 2).
144 Ibid at 87.
145 Attorney-General v Prince Ernest Augustus of Hanover [1957] AC 436 at 461. However, it has
been argued that a wholesale shift to the approach claimed by Driedger had not been
worked out by the courts immediately before the enactment of the purpose rule:
A A Farrar, above n 134 at 248.
 1994 Statutory Interpretation, Law Reform and Sampford's Theory 135

There is also distinguished Australian authority for this more truly contextual
approach.146 In R v Wilson: ex parte Kisch, 147 Dixon J said:
The rules of interpretation require us to take expressions in their context, and to construe
them with proper regard to the subject matter with which the instrument deals and the
objects it seeks to achieve, so as to arrive at the meaning attached to them by those who
must use them.l 48

Differing value preferences

Another fundamental conflict arose because of the differing values underlying each
approach. In preferring particular approaches as a matter of course (as distinct from
adopting a literal or purposive interpretation in a particular case),149 it can be argued
that the courts consciously or unconsciously gave effect to the positive values of one
approach over the positive values of others. Further, to the extent that each approach
also entails negative values, those negative values must have been deemed less
significant than those attaching to other approaches. Let us now look at the underlying
values of literalism and purposivism in tum. Half a century ago, a commentator
defended the "literal canon" on the basis that in our constitutional system:
[T]he process of interpretation must be divorced as far as may be from that of legislation.
What must be sought for bi the courts are criteria of meaning as objectivised and
impersonal as can be found ... 50
Similarly, Eskridge and Frickey see the continuing appeal of "textualism" (roughly
equivalent to literalism) in the following terms:
[T]extualism appeals to the rule-of-law value that citizens ought to be able to read the
statute books and know their rights and duties. By emphasising the statutory words
chosen by the legislature, rather than (what seem to be) more abstract and judicially
malleable interpretive sources, textualism also appeals to the values of legislative
supremacy and judicial restraint.151
The literal approach is also said to promote certainty and better and more precise
draftsmanship.152
These values are disputed by several writers. Zander153 concedes that a literal
interpretation in a particular case may be the best course, but argues that a literal

146 Northern Territory Law Reform Committee, above n 5 at 8-9 cites the following for what it
calls the purpose approach: Bradley v Commonwealth of Australia (1973) 128 CLR 557 at 565
("subject matter and object"); MP Metals Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation of Commonwealth
of Australia (1967) 117 CLR 631 at 633 ("policy" of an enactment); and Moreton Central Sugar
Mill Co Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation of Commonwealth of Australia (1967) 116 CLR 151 at
157 ("apparent general purpose").
147 {1934) 52 CLR 234.
148 Ibid at244.
149 See M Zander, above n 90.
150 E R Hopkins, "The Literal Canon and the Golden Rule" (1937) 15 Can Bar Rev 689 at 696.
151 Above n 9 at 340. A recent illustration is Re Secretary of Department of Social Security and
Diepenbroeck (1992) 15 AAR 411 at 414 {Cth AAT, per O'Connor n. See also Black-Clawson
International Ltd v Papierwerke Waldhof-Aschaffenburg AG [1975] AC 591 at 638 per Lord
Diplock; P S Atiyah and R S Summers, Form and Substance in Anglo-American Law (1987) at
108.
152 M Zander, above n 90 at 89-91.
153 Ibid at 92-93.
136 Federal Law Review Volume 22

approach on its own is always wrong. First, by g1vmg excessive weight to the
importance of words it may be a form of primitive tradition which regards the written
instrument with "mystical awe". Secondly, the literal approach can reflect a punitive or
disciplinarian school of judicial interpretation because "[t]he draftsman is in effect '
punished for failing to do his job properly". Thirdly, rather than being based on the
courts' deference to the sovereignty of Parliament, this posture conceals another
tradition which holds that the common law is a superior form of creation to statutes.
Fourthly, the literal approach is the "intellectual equivalent of deciding the case by
tossing a coin" because it is defeatist and lazy. Another authoritative work on statutory '
interpretation, by Atiyah and Summers, disputes the neutrality assumed by the
association of the rule of law with literalism. They record the criticism, made by
American lawyers, that the literal approach "may be merely a covert way of importing
values without discussion or analysis".154
Purposivism is also said to be "faithful to the principle of legislative supremacy",155
for the purposive meaning must be found in the Act or be found to be consistent with
it. But it offers a different route to democracy, that is, it entails a different methodology 1

and set of values from textualism. By focusing on the end sought to be achieved, 156""it
provides a general sense of direction.157 It has an overtly evaluative element, in the
sense that it provides "a ground for evaluating one interpretation as better than 1

another". 158 It is premised on members of Parliament acting rationally,159 that is, that
"the legislature is filled with reasonable people who will reach reasonable purposive
results by followinS established procedures".l60 The results must be ones which are
publicly directed.1 1 The purposive approach permits the interpreter to deal with 1

unforeseen events under a cloak of legitimacy.162 Thus, purposive interpretation 1

ultimately entails different constitutional values as well:

What is implicit in purposive interpretation is a shift in the conception of the judiciary's
role ... some realignment of the relationship between the judiciary and the legislature,
and so of the permissible limits of judicial action.163
More precisely, Kirby P has testified that purposivism gives vent to the "modern self 1

conception of the judiciary as having a legitimate, but limited, function of 1

lawmaking".164
In the same way that the practice of literalism may arguably reflect undesirable
values, so too can purposivism- or at least interpretation which goes by that name. A .

154 P S Atiyah and R S Summers, above n 151 at 107.

155 W N Eskridge and P P Frickey, above n 9 at 332.
156 D N MacCormick and R S Summers, above n 3 at 519.
157 W Twining and D Miers, above n 28 at 215.
158 D N MacCormick and R S Summers, above n 3 at 514.
159 Ibid at 520.
160 W N Eskridge and P P Frickey, above n 9 at 334, drawing on H M Hart Jr and A M Sacks,
The Legal Process: Basic Problems in the Making and Application of Law (Tentative ed 1958) at 1

1415.
161 D N MacCormick and R S Summers, above n 3 at 519.
162 Kingston v Keprose Pty Ltd (1987) 11 NSWLR 404 at 423.
163 DR Miers and A C Page, above n 141 at 205.
164 The Honourable Justice Michael Kirby, "Statutory Interpretation and the Rule of Law -
Whose Rule, What Law?" in D St L Kelly (ed), Essays on Legislative Drafting (1988) 84 at 92.
 1994 Statutory Interpretation, Law Reform and Sampford's Theory 137

New Zealand judge had the purposive approach in mind when he compared "Enjlish"
interpretation to the more purposive practice of interpretation in American courts: 65
English law prefers certainty of interpretation, based on what Parliament has said, to the
uncertain approach which prevails in the United States of America, based on one Judge's
feeling as to what Parliament meant.166
Atiyah and Summers also record that English lawyers are shocked by the "free-
wheeling and sometimes 'substantivistic' methods" associated with American
purposivism. 167 In addition, much more than literalism, purposive approaches depend
on extrinsic material. This can lead to trouble in practice because the material may seem
authoritative, but may be evidence only of the government's intention and not
necessarily that of the Parliament. This facet of purposivism has recently arisen in the
United Kingdom following the ruling by the House of Lords168 that a court may refer
to a clear statement of the Minister or other promoter of the relevant Bill made in
Parliament, in certain circumstances. Oliver has perceptively discussed the
implications of the judgment:
The decision represents approval of a "purposive" approach to statutory interpretation ...
An implication of the decision which was not discussed in the speeches of the Law
Lords, nor indeed in argument, is the effect it will have on (rebuttable) judicial
presumptions about the intentions of Parliament. The courts presume, for example, that
Parliament cannot have intended to oust the jurisdiction of the courts, that Parliament
intends not to breach Treaty obligations and so on. These presumptions enable the courts
to uphold what they see as certain fundamental constitutional principles- the rule of
law and principles of good administration. Reference to Hansard may well make it
impossible for the courts to continue this role if Hansard discloses, as it may well do, that
Parliament and the government did not intend such principles to operate. This point,
taken with the likelihood that ministers will only make statements that are favourable to
government, may well reinforce the dominance of government in the constitution and reduce the
power of the courts to operate as checks against the dominant executive. 169

Contradictions and ambiguities in the particular approaches

There are a number of contradictions within the literal approach. The first concerns its
claim to objectivity, which has been challenged by some literary theorists. Statutory
interpretation is an obvious meeting place for law and literature because of the
similarities between literary and legal interpretation.1 70
Stanley Fish, whose background is in literature and literary theory, has written at
length on the subject of legal interpretation.171 On statutory interpretation, he has
forcibly argued that the courts hugely understate the extent of interpretation involved in
165 For a comparison of English and American approaches to statutory interpretation, see
P S Atiyah and R S Summers, above n 151 at 100-101.
166 Arthur Yates & Co Ltd v Minister for Agriculture & Fisheries [1979] 1 NZLR 469 at 472 per
ChilwellJ.
167 P S Atiyah and R S Summers, above n 151 at 104.
168 Pepper (Inspector of Taxes) v Hart [1993] AC 593. ,
169 D Oliver, "Pepper v Hart: A Suitable Case for Reference to Hansard?" [1993] PL 5 at 9 and 12-
13; footnotes omitted; emphasis added. See further Part Two (determining purposive
meaning).
170 K S Abraham, above n 9.
171 S Fish, above n 9, which largely consists of previously published writings on law and
literature.
138 Federal Law Review Volume 22

the literal approach, and falsely assume that it may be applied objectively. His
argument is a particularly relevant one because that approach presumes to seek out
nothing more than the ordinary, that is, non-technical, meaning. Fish's assumption is
that the source of interpretive authority and meaning is neither the text nor entirely the
individual reader, but is reflected in the idea of an "interpretive community."172 Thus,
"meanings are not embedded in words but emerge and are perspicuous in the light of
background conditions of intelligibility" (specifically, "rules of thumb", "beliefs" and
"tacit knowledge"). 173 In the passage below he challenges the conventional view of the
literal meaning, promoted by H LA Hart in his The Concept of Law, that it is objective
and non-interpretive at least in many cases:
Hart's argument is that a rule framed in the appropriately general terms (eg, "vehicles
are prevented from entering the park") will pick out "standard instances" of its
application and that these instances will constitute a set of "central" or "plain cases" in
relation to which other, less clear, cases can be classified. Thus someone "faced with the
question whether the rule prohibiting the use of vehicles in the park is applicable to
some combination of circumstances in which it appears indeterminate" can proceed by
considering "as one does who makes use of a precedent," "whether the present case
resembles the plain case 'sufficiently' in 'relevant' respects" [reference omitted]. The
words "sufficiently" and "relevant" indicate Hart's awareness that the agent's discretion
remains wide, but still it is a bounded area, marked off by a plain case that at once gives
interpretation a direction and holds it in check.
As an account of what people do (line up present cases with clear, paradigm cases),
this is impeccable, but as I read it, it is an account not of interpretation subdued, but of
interpretation triumphant. The question is not whether there are in fact plain cases -
there surely are- but, rather, of what is their plainness a condition and a property?
Hart's answer must be that a plain case is inherently plain, plain in and of itself, plain
independently of the interpretive activities it can then be said to direct. But it takes only a
little reflection to see that the truth is exactly the reverse. 174
A plain case is described by the author in the following passage:
In those cases in which meanings seem immediately available without recourse to
anything but the words themselves, it is because the intentional structure - the
conditions of intelligibility that limit the meanings words can have before they are
produced -is so deeply in place that we are not aware of it and seem to experience its
effects directly, without mediation.175

172 Explained in S Fish, above n 9 at 141: "The notion of 'interpretive communities' was
originally introduced as an answer to a question that had long seemed crucial to literary
studies. What is the source of interpretive authority: the text or the reader? Those who
answered 'the text' were embarrassed by the fact of disagreement ... Those who answered
'the reader' were embarrassed by the fact of agreement ... What was required was an
explanation that could account for both agreement and disagreement, and that explanation
was found in the idea of an interpretive community, not so much a group of individuals
who shared a point of view, but a point of view or way of organising experience that
shared individuals in the sense that its assumed distinctions, categories of understanding,
and stipulations of relevance and irrelevance were the content of the consciousness of
community members ... " The notion was not, however, invented by Fish: see R Posner, The
Problems of Jurisprudence (1990) at 436.
173 S Fish, above n 9 at 295. I am grateful to Dr A Goldsmith for clarifying the background
conditions or constituting notions.
174 Ibid at 512-513.
175 Ibid at 295.
1994 Statutory Interpretation, Law Reform and Sampford's Theory 139

In summary:
[R]ather than being independent of perspective [the literal meaning] is a product of
perspective (it is the meaning that, given a perspective, will immediately emerge); it is
itself an interpretation and cannot therefore be the indisputable ground on which
subsequent interpretations securely rest.176
Eskridge and Frickey also find a serious gap between the theory and the practice of the
literal approach. On the one hand, they say, textualism pres~posed the text could be a
"complete and reasonably determinate source of meaning". 1 Yet it failed "to consider
that meaning is strongly influenced by context",1 78 and is undercut by the importance
of "the interpreter's own context, including current values".179
A second problem with the literal approach was the conflict over whether context
was relevant and, if so, over identifying the relevant context. It might be thought to be
beyond dispute that consideration of the particular context was essential to
ascertaining meaning in a particular case. However, as Farrar has pointed out, "it is not
difficult to find cases adopting an excessively narrow and isolationist approach to
meaning".180 These cases are consistent with an understanding of literal meaning
accepted by several writers. 181 They define a literal meaning as "its dictionary sense
unaffected by considerations of the particular context", or as "the meaning which
results from giving to each word an ordinary meaning without much reference to the
context or the statutory object".182
Assuming it was necessary to consider the context, there were different views also
as to the extent of the proper context. There was first the question of which parts of the
Act were relevant. The joint inquiry of the Law Commission for England and Wales
and the Scottish Law Commission found there were two schools of thought on the use
of punctuation, long titles, preambles, headings and marginal notes. A wide view was
supported by Lord Somervell and Viscount Simonds in Attornfr-General v Prince Ernest
Augustus of Hanover, who required the "whole ... of the Act"18 and the "context in its
widest sense" 184 to be considered, including the title 185 and preamble. 186 A narrower
view was taken in many other cases, which required an apparent uncertainty before
these elements could be referred to, if at aH.187 There was also conflict over whether the
literal approach extended beyond the Act in question. As Farrar noted:

176 Ibid at 185.

177 W N Eskridge and P P Frickey, above n 9 at 341.
178 Ibid at 342.
179 Ibid at 343.
180 A A Farrar, above n 134 at 130. She cites Whiteley v Chappell (1869) 4 LRQB 147; Fisher v Bell
[1961]1 QB 394; Bourne v Norwich Crematorium Ltd [1967] 2 AllER 576.
181 A A Farrar, above n 134 at 130.
182 Ibid at 117-119.
183 [1957] AC 436 at 473 per Lord Somervell.
184 Ibid at 461 per Viscount Simonds.
185 Ibid at 473 per Lord Somervell.
186 Ibid at 461 and 473.
187 Law Commissions, above n 5 at paras 42-44; G Morris et al, above n 10 at 184-187.
140 Federal Law Review Volume 22

[O]n the whole, modern cases ... stop at a consideration of the Act as a whole. A few go
further and consider "all the surrounding circumstances", including the statutory
object. 188
A third difficulty for the literal approach arose where the ordinary meaning of a
word or phrase in dispute and its technical meaning are different. The ordinary
assumption that the literal meaning equates with the ordinary meaning is not applied
in this case. The courts will prefer the technical meaning to the meaning it might have
to the ordinary person in the street.189 However, this exception conflicts with the
supposed fundamental value of the literal approach in facilitating the understanding of
statutes by ordinary citizens.190
Aside from problems in defining the literal approach, it also entailed ambiguities in
its application in a particular case, which are clearly productive of conflict. It is a trite
observation that words frequently have more than one ordinary meaning. 191 While in
most cases the particular meaning will be obvious, in some cases resort to a dictionary
will give rise to controversial choices rather than a definitive answer.192 The literal
meaning also can be difficult to determine when different audiences would ascribe
different meanings to a word in doubt.l93 ,
Alternatives to the literal approach are beset with similar problems. The threshold
tests for the mischief approach and the golden rule were very oren-ended and the
relationship between the alternative approaches was ill-defined.19 At the time of the
introduction of the purpose rule it was generally held that the literal approach was to
be taken to be the rule of construction except in some circumstances. In the Sussex
Peerage case, Tindal CJ said the ordinary meaning would apply if "the words of the
statute are in themselves precise and unambiguous". Only if "doubt arises from the
terms employed by the legislature" could a court call in aid "the ground and cause of
making the statute, and ... have recourse to the preamble, which ... is 'a key to open the
minds of the makers of the Act, and the mischiefs which they intended to redress"'.195
The same relationshif. between the literal and mischief approaches is assumed by
Pearce and Geddes. 96 Yet it is obvious that the criterion of doubt is itself
problematical197 and a potential source of disagreement.

188 Above n 134 at 133. In the Hanover case Viscount Simonds included the mischief within the
necessary context of the Act: [1957] AC 436 at 461.
189 See, eg, Fisher v Bell [1961] 1 QB 394.
190 Re Secretary of Department of Social Security and Diepenbroeck (1992) 15 AAR 411 at 414 (AAT
per O'Connor J).
191 A A Farrar, above n 134 at 123.
192 For instance, Harris v Sumner [1979] VR 343. J Bell and G Engle, above n 9 at 37 note the
case of Newbury DC v Secretary of State for the Environment [1981] AC 578 "where the House
of Lords adopted an interpretation of the word 'repository' which Lawton LJ in the Court
of Appeal had described as one which 'no literate person' would adopt: see [1979] 1 AllER
243,252".
193 A A Farrar, above n 134 at 125-128.
194 Ibid at 249.
195 (1844) 11 Cl & Fin 85 at 143; 8 ER 1034 at 1057, citing Dyer CJ in Stowel v Lord Zouch (1569)
1 Plowd 353 at 369; 75 ER 536 at 560.
196 Above n 10 at para 2.21.
197 FAR Bennion, above n 7 at 13-14.
 1994 Statutory Interpretation, Law Reform and Sampford's Theory 141

Applying the mischief or purposive approach also creates problems which are
sources of potential conflict. Eskridge and Frickey argue that purposivism
unrealistically assumes that "the legislature is filled with reasonable people who will
reach reasonable, purposive results by following established procedures".198 They
point to the compromises and .deals which are an everyday reality of the legislative
process. 199 In short, their argument is that in many statutes there is no coherent
purpose. Alternatively, the "complex compromises ... suggest that legislation is
frequently a congeries of different and sometimes conflicting purposes". 200
Even if the purpose can be identified, frequently it can only be stated rather
broadly. Twining and Miers give the example of "a taxing statute the overall purpose
of which may be to raise revenue, but the instruments for achieving this often are
extremely complex, technical and precise".201 Clearly, if such broad purposes are to
apply to particular cases, they need defining and that interpretation process may be
productive of further conflict.

Historical contingency
A further and final reason for the disorder of the common law was the factor of
change. The common law has emphasised and preferred one or other of the general
approaches at different periods. In an illuminating article, Tucker suggests that
competing constitutional visions which are "deeply embedded in our legal traditions
and judicial practices" explain these shifts. One vision "posits the primary lawmaking
function in an elected legislature and sees the courts as playing a subordinate role of
law interpretation and application". The other "envisages a larger role for the courts in
confining legislative encroachments into individual rights which are considered
fundamental". 202 The central issue in this,.he says, is:
the extent to which the legislature is sovereign, or whether there is a higher authority
such as a written or unwritten constitution or a set of broad legal principles to which the
courts owe their ultimate allegiance and from which they derive powers independent of,
and superior to, those of the legislature.203
Tucker gives a concise analysis of the changes.204 He points out that, prior to the
fourteenth century, there was a tradition of free interpretation. A tendency towards
strict literalism emerged in the fourteenth century. By the sixteenth century a new
doctrine of "the equity of the statute" prevailed, Heydon's case being a famous example.
That case had required the mischief approach to be taken without the more modem
qualifications to which we have grown accustomed.ZOS However, even in this period
jurists were not unanimous. A formal shift towards literalism took place towards the
end of the eighteenth century. The latest shift, to purposivism, was noted by Lord
Dip lock in 1975 as having occurred over the previous thirty years. 206

198 Above n 9 at 334.

199 Ibid at 334-335.
200 Ibid at 335.
201 W Twining and D Miers, above n 28 at 214.
202 Above n 17 at 148.
203 Ibid at 116.
204 Ibid at 117-123.
205 F A R Bennion, above n 7 at 654-658.
206 Carter v Bradbeer [1975] 1 WLR 1204 at 1206-1207.
142 Federal Law Review Volume22

Contextual influences
The disorder of the general approaches at common law can be amplified when regard
is had to the multiple disordering influences which operated upon them, and for the !

most part continue to do so, in the wider law and especially in society. At a general
level, two types of influence can be identified. The first is the changing legal and social
environment in which the approaches were applied. These included the form of
statutes, other interpretive rules, the subject matter to which the presumptions applied,
and the general movement to a "postliberal" form of society. The second broad
disordering influence on the general approaches was the individual interpreter. With !
respect to judges these included the conflict between the judiciary and what can be !

thought to have been the intention of Parliament on certain issues of importance; the
changing self conception of the judiciary in respect to their interpretive function; and
the general factor of subjective assessment. Other interpreters affected the application
of the general approaches through their different standpoints. The limited influence of
the general public also needs to be considered.

Changing form of statutes

The presumptions have been materially affected by the form of the statutes to which 1

they have been applied. From the sixteenth century, statutes "contained lengthy 1

preambles reciting the particular mischief or defect in the common law that the '
enacting words were designed to remedy".207 However, as is well known, the use of
preambles eventually declined so that they are rare today. This severely hindered the !

mischief approach, which had been based on there being a ready indication of the !
mischief within the printed version of the Act.
Of greater signficance has been the general style of drafting, which has been 1

intimately connected with the approaches, particularly the literal approach of late.
From the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, a "detailed style" was adopted
which:
... sought to ensure that the courts took account of every situation contemplated by the
policy. [It] involved very detailed specification of the factual circumstances and their
legal consequences.208
According to Lord Diplock, this style was prompted in part by a "narrowly semantic ·
approach to statutory construction".209 Though "widely criticised",210 the style is still
generally employed today.
The form of statutes continues to evolve. Clear or plain English drafting ~romises to 1

give much more information on which to mount a purposive interpretation. 11 Though

207 Black-Clawson International Ltd v Papierwerke Waldhof-A.schaffenburg AG [1975] AC 591 at 638.

208 W Twining and D Miers, above n 28 at 342.
209 Fothergill v Monarch Airlines Ltd [1980] 3 WLR 209 at 222 per Lord Diplock.
210 Ibid. A leading critic in Australia is R Eagleson, "Efficiency in Legal Drafting" in
D St L Kelly (ed), Essays on Legislative Drafting (1988) 13.
211 I Turnbull, "Clear Legislative Drafting: New Approaches in Australia" (1990) 11(3) Stat LR
161.
 1994 Statutory Interpretation, Law Reform and Sampford's Theory 143

that style is still evolving, 212 hopes of simple statutes across the board which are
accessible to all seem far-fetched.213

Effect of other interpretive rules

The development of other interpretive rules indirectly affected the presumptions. For
instance, in the latter half of the eighteenth century there emerged a rule that material
extrinsic to the Act could not be referred to.2 14 This was of course well after Heydon's
case had established the mischief rule. The restrictions on the materials which could be
referred to severely limited purposive arguments, which are aided by extrinsic
material to a much greater extent than arguments relying on the literal approach. The
restrictions were themselves disordered in that the applicable law was "obscure"215
and inconsistently applied. According to Pearce and Geddes, the rule referred to came
to have a somewhat relaxed application in lower courts, which permitted recourse to
parliamentary proceedings to discover the mischief. 216 In addition, there was general
agreement to allow
... reports of commissioners including law commissioners, and white papers to be looked
at for the purpose solely of ascertaining the mischief which the statute is intended to cure
but not for the .r.urpose of discovering the meaning of the words used by parliament to
effect such cure.217
This distinction was of course an artificial one218 and did not stop some judges from
having regard to the remedy as well as the mischie£.219

Movement to postliberal form of society

It is well known that the situations to which the general approaches potentially apply
are large and varied.220 As a result, the approaches are necessarily broad and lack
definition. Since the end of the Second World War, certain tendencies in the social life

212 Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, House of Representatives Standing

Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs, Clearer Commonwealth Law (1993) at para
8.4.
213 C Sampford, above n 19 at 232. The re-written clear English Social Security Act 1991 (Cth)
contains almost 1400 sections. In Re Blunn v Cleaver (1993) 119 ALR 65 at 81-83 the full
Federal Court strongly criticised the redrafting of this Act. It stated that "an Act that is two
or three times as long is not necessarily easier to read because some technical expressions
(which once understood were succinct) have been replaced by wordier ones" (at 82). It
noted that "[t]he professed aim of the drafting of the Act is to make it more accessible to
persons without legal training" (at 81); yet, it found that "no one seriously believes the
layman can master the Act unaided" (at 81-82).
214 Pepper (Inspector of Taxes) v Hart [1993] AC 593 at 630.
215 Law Commissions, above n 5.
216 Aboven 98.
217 Pepper (Inspector of Taxes) v Hart [1993] AC 593 at 630. The Australian authorities are set out
in DC Pearce and R S Geddes, above n 10 at para 3.9.
218 Pepper (Inspector of Taxes) v Hart [1993] AC 593 at 635; H Lords Deb 1980i Vol 405 at 281;
H Lords Deb 1981, Vol 418 at 67; see also D C Pearce and R S Geddes, above n 10 at
para 3.2.
219 Sagnata Investments v Norwich Corporation Tl971] 2 QB 614 at 624, discussed in
FAR Bennion, Statutory Interpretation, Second Edition, Supplement (1993) at A64-A65.
220 C Sampford, above n 19 at 230; W Twining and D Miers, above n 28 at 323-324 give useful
illustrations.
144 Federal Law Review Volume22

of Western democracies have been observed which have brought further pressures to
bear on the work which the approaches are called upon to do, especially the purposive
approach. The classic exposition is that of Unger, whose landmark study Law in Modern
Society included a discussion of the impact of these societal changes on statutory
interpretation. 221 He described contemporary Western democracies as postliberal
societies, one feature of which was the now familiar welfare tendency marked by "the
overt intervention of government in areas previously regarded as beyond the proper
reach of state action". In his view, "[a]s the state becomes involved in the tasks of overt
redistribution, regulation, and planning, it changes into a welfare state". 222 The impact
of the welfare state on statutory interpretation is directly felt:
As government assumes managerial responsibilities, it must work in areas in which the
complexity and variability of relevant factors of decision seem too great to allow for
general rules, whence the recourse to vague standards. These standards need to be made
concrete and individualised by persons charged with their administrative or judicial
execution.223
Unger also notes other contemporaneous changes in society as reasons for greater
emphasis on purposive reasoning, including changes in the theoretical understanding
of language:
Language is no longer credited with the fixity of categories and the transparent
representation of the world that would make formalism plausible in legal reasoning or in
ideas about justice. 224

Conflict between judiciary and the intention of Parliament on certain issues

It is now generally accepted that judges have certain freedom of choice in
interpretation. Some academics controversially argue that a good proportion of the
judiciary,225 or individual judges at least,226 may in some cases be guided by particular
values that are in conflict with the goals of the legislation and hence at odds with the
approaches they purport to be applying and with their constitutional role. 227 The
disorder in this respect lies in the conflict between the policies being effectively
pursued by the interpreter and the policies of the law-maker.

221 Other writers have pointed out the different traditions which have arisen within Western
democracies, eg P S Atiyah and R S Summers, above n 151 at 103-104.
222 R MUnger, Law in Modern Society (1976) at 193.
223 Ibid at 196.
224 Ibid.
225 H W Arthurs, "Rethinking Administrative Law: A Slightly Dicey Business" (1979) 17
Osgoode Hall LJ 1 at 20-22 offers several reasons why judges may be unconsciously at odds
with the legislature or even consciously "conceive that their mandate entitles them to
revise legislation through interpretation" (at 21). P McAuslan, "Administrative Law,
Collective Consumption and Judicial Policy" (1983) 46 MLR 1 argues that the judiciary is
"antipathetic to collective consumption" (at 19) and have a general "ideological preference
... for the individual as opposed to the collective" (at 11).
226 S Rice, "Judicial 'Habits' and other Curious Tales" (1993) 18 Alt LJ 244; S Berns, above n 28
at 77-81, discussing the writings of Duncan Kennedy.
227
E Tucker, above n 17 at 143-147. The question of values in particular cases involving the
purposive approach is taken up in Part Two.
 1994 Statutory Interpretation, Law Reform and Sampford's Theory 145

Changing self conception of the judiciary in respect to law-making function

Less controversially, the judiciary has acknowledged that its law-making function
affects approaches to interpretation. The Chief Justice of the High Court of Australia
has noted that in recent years the Court has been less inclined to pursue formal legal
reasoning, of which the literal approach is a "hallmark". Purposivism is more attractive
because it emphasises "substance instead of form". 228 Dissatisfaction with the tradition
of legal formalism arises in part because it is incom~atible to a degree with the modem
self conception of the judiciary as law-makers.2 9 Many commentators, including
members of the judiciary,230 have observed the, increasing tendency for judges to take
an active law-making role. In Australia this tendency has been occurring since the
1970s as a new generation of appellate judges has made its mark on the common
law. 231 Kirby P has identified the link between this movement and changing attitudes
to statutory interpretation. The need for law-making arises, in his Honour's view,
because law has "necessarily been expressed in brief and general language that cannot
' foresee all of the circumstances to which that language will have to apply". Nor is
limited law-making by the judiciary excluded because the judiciary is unelected: "It is
not as if every word has received more than the formal stamp of approval of the
parliamentary institution". Purposivism as a technique is suitable because, unlike
literalism, it can fill "at least the minor gaps in the statutory language in a way which
achieves, and does not frustrate, the apparent overall policy of the legislation".232

Subjective assessment by judges233

There is a substantial body of literature on judges which emphasises their collective
identity and the inevitable effect this has on interpretation. 234 It is true that judges have
similar social backgrounds, which are reinforced by the relatively homogenous and
narrow education they receive in law schools and the traditions of legal practice. But
no one suggests that judges do not deal with matters to some extent by reason of their
individual make-up, although the differences amongst judges will no doubt not be as
great as those between judges and members of the wider community. The reason for
differences amongst the judicial community is the same as for persons generally: their
uniqueness and individuality which is partly determined by genetic factors, but also by
their social context or, more precisely, by the interaction between the self and
society. 235
These differences manifest themselves in different value preferences - "world
views" - which inform their reasoning.236 Particularly important will be how they
view the judicial function. Twining and Miers instance the case of a rule which has
been overtaken by social change, technological innovation or a shift in public opinion.

228 Sir Anthony Mason, above n 13 at 157-158 and 160-161; see also R Unger, above n 222 at
194-200.
229 The Honourable Justice Michael Kirby, above n 164 at 92.
230 Sir Anthony Mason, "Book Review" (1983) 6 UNSWLJ 234 at 235-236.
231 A Blackshield, "Judicial Innovation as a Democratic Process" in Futurt: Directions in
Australian Politics (1979) 35.
232 The Honourable Justice Michael Kirby, above n 164 at 92.
233 See generally, FAR Bennion, above n 7 at 389-390.
234 See also G Bird, The Process of Law in Australia (2nd ed 1993) at 198-201.
235 C Sampford, above n 19 at 188-190.
236 D N MacCormick, Legal Reasoning and Legal Theory (1978) at 105-106.
146 Federal Law Review Volume 22

In their view some judges might try to mitigate the situation (using the golden rule or a
purposive approach); some might see their role as being to interpret and apply the
legislation without regard to the supervening events (using the literal approach); while
others may go further and seek to provoke legislative action by underlining the
absurdity of the existing provision (literal approach again).237
Some judges may proclaim a general preference for a particular approach because
of their philosophical beliefs.238 However, it is not suggested that all or even most
judges are of a type when it comes to applying the general approaches to
interpretation. The need to do justice in a particular case and to reach the "right
result"239 means almost inevitably that no one approach will meet these ends in all
cases. 240

Other interpreters: effect of individual standpoint

Twining and Miers strongly argue that traditional accounts of interpretation unduly
focus on the standpoint of the judge:
Civil servants, the police, businessmen, accountants, insurance claim adjustors,
practising lawyers and ordinary citizens may all be concerned to predict or to speculate
about likely judicial interpretations of particular rules - and past or potential future,
authoritative rulings have special significance from the internal point of view of anyone
who wishes to adhere to a rule- but in the course of conducting their affairs such people
inevitably take many other factors into account, some of which are intimately tied up with their
respective standpoints and roles. 241
They illustrate the different results which apply when the same problem is looked
at by three different participants: a cautious solicitor, an adventurous barrister and an
"unhappy interpreter". It is not merely that one participant will see a doubt where
another may not, but that the adoption of such roles may even require the interpreter
to "engineer doubts in order to achieve his objective". 242 Alternatively, a participant
such as a public servant may "treat cases about which others have raised doubts as
clear ... because there are good ~stemic reasons against allowing the argument that it
is a hard case to prevail".24 Their point is that labelling such activities as
"manipulative" or "legalistic" should not lead us to conclude such actors are villains -
merely individuals playing out their respective roles and situations. 244
As Twining and Miers acknowledge, the ordinary citizen cannot be ignored,
although he or she is not an interpreter in the usual sense. Legislation is not drafted
with the general public in mind and few of them ever read legislation. The public get
their knowledge of the law indirectly from a variety of sources. 245 In the same vein,

237 W Twining and D Miers, above n 28 at 194.

238 Mr Justice F C Hutley, "The Legal Traditions of Australia as Contrasted with those of the
United States" (1981) 55 ALJ 63.
239 M Coper, "Interpreting the Constitution: A Handbook for Judges and Commentators" in
A R Blackshield (ed), Legal Change: Essays in Honour oflulius Stone (1983) 52 at 53-54.
240 W Twining and D Miers, above n 28 at 196-197.
241 Ibid at 189. Emphasis added.
242 Ibid at 192.
243 Ibid at 240. Emphasis in original.
244 Ibid at 190-191.
245 C Sampford, above n 19 at 232.
 1994 Statutory Interpretation, Law Reform and Sampford's Theory 147

they would be mostly unaware of the technical law of statutory interpretation. 246 In
these circumstances it is not surprising that they may form different views about the
scope and operation of the law in particular instances.

Muting the conflict

It is a crucial part of the theory of disorder that differences which are productive of
conflict (disordering influences) also operate to frustrate or mute conflict about the law
and to prevent change from occurring. It is not possible to examine the negative
influence of each of the disordering influences noted above, but several examples
should suffice. First, the lack of rules in the common law, which was seen to be
productive of conflict, also meant that there was a lack of law to challenge. The
frequently made observation that statutory interpretation is all in the practice rather
than in the books indicates the difficulties. It was not possible to focus on any precise
aspect of the law which was inadequate, because no "clear-cut defects" were
apparent. 247 Even if they could be identified, what use would there be in changing the
law? To the extent that the law could be identified, its ambiguities would also have
created uncertainty over what to challenge. There would be too many ambiguities and
no single obvious flaw. As Cross said, there would be a "confusion of principles".248 In
other words, the task of reform was difficult because it was unmanageably large.
The ambiguities in the law also muted conflict over the law because of the
perception that they permitted interpreters a wide choice anyway. For some time an
influential view amongst academics has been Willis's dictum that a court invokes
"whichever of the rules provides a result which satisfies its sense of justice in the case
before it". 249 More recently, Tucker has persuasively argued that:
[I]f the initial assertion of this paper is correct - that the law of statutory interpretation
is a morass of contradictory rules, presumptions, and practices - then it will seldom be
necessary for a judge to depart from the accepted conventions of interpretation to defend
a particular reading of a statute as a legitimate exercise of judicial power. 25°
The underlying values of the literal approach which created tensions with the
values of purposivism also ensured a measure of stability. The judiciary's self
justificatory linking of the literal approach with the intention of Parliament added a
political dimension to any debate over the traditional law. A challenge to the literal
approach could have been seen as an attack on judicial independence. Challenging the
entrenched values of the existing law would thus have been productive of wider
conflict.
The artificial aspects of the law, such as its fictions and its close association with the
tradition of legal formalism, suited the law-making style of the day in any case.251
Leading judges have acknowledged that the formalism of the literal approach - for
instance, its lack of regard to the consequences of interpretation - enabled the

246 P Bridgman, "New Ways with Old Acts - Queensland's Innovative Acts Interpretation
Act" (1991) 21 Queensland Law Society Journal333.
247 Law Commissions, above n 5 at para 6.
248 Above at 118.
249 J Willis, "Statute Interpretation in a Nutshell" (1938) 16 Can Bar Rev 1 at 16.
250 E Tucker, above n 17 at 114.
251 For a strong judicial statement of the benefits of the literal approach to the judicial role in
law-making, see Mr Justice F C Hutley, above n 238.
148 Federal Law Review Volume 22

judicia~ to adopt a more restrained approach to law-making than is accepted

today. 2 2 The former style of law-making was frequently associated with the "strict and
complete legalism" made famous by Dixon CJ in the early 1950s.253
The gulf between the views of the legal community and those of the general public
on the subject of statutory interpretation, which could be so productive of conflict, also '
served to partition the law of statutory interpretation from critical questioning. Thus,
the seminar which examined the law of statutory interpretation in Australia in the
early 1980s was dominated by the legal profession and the legally qualified.254 Because
the rules were seen to be "esoteric", "'black letter' law",255 that is, technical rules fully
known only to members of the legal community,256 the concerns of the general public
were seldom addressed. Until the notorious tax avoidance era and the controversial
interpretive practices of the High Court257 the public's ignorance of the problems in the '
law ensured the common law a measure of freedom from intervention.
The independent reasoning processes of individuals which are productive of i
conflict are, in the end, also responsible for similar readings and lack of conflict. 258 As
Sampford explains, regularity of behaviour nevertheless comes about through
individual decisions at lower levels of consciousness:
Much regularity of behaviour results from"'iower levels of interaction between rrund and
environment and at lower levels of consciousness. We are constantly making decisions
about what action to perform next; crossing the road, watching television, buying goods.
These mobilise little of our conscious brain or bring into play few of our attitudes, ideas
and values.259 ·
Such practices are not maintained, in his view, by commonly agreed rules. They act '
"not as internal constraints on social action so much as weapons that can be used
against someone who can be accused of breaching them".260 Therefore, we should not 1

assume that the lack of disagreement which occurs on many issues is the result of
shared beliefs; rather, in Sampford's view, differences still rule:
[It] is quite unnecessary to postulate common perception, common meaning, shared
norms or shared reasons for action to explain and understand how behaviour is regular
and hence predictable ... we should delve inside the minds of the social actors, but we
should not presume to find the same ideas and processes just because the same
movements are being performed.261

Conclusion
Before the enactment of the purpose rule, the common law of statutory interpretation
did accommodate the purposive approach in its calculations, but that approach was 1

frequently subordinated to the literal approach. But the law and practice of statutory

252 Sir Anthony Mason, above n 13 at 154-155; M Kirby, P, above n 164 at 92.
253 Dixon CJ, Address on being sworn in as Chief Justice, (1952) 85 CLR xi at xiii-xiv.
254 See further below, discussion of seminar at 155.
255 P Bridgman, above n 246 at 333.
256 D Gifford, above n 10 at 56. See also S Fish and his discussion of "interpretive '
communities": above n 9 at 125-128.
257 See further, discussion of tax avoidance era below at 154.
258 See n 97 above.
259 C Sampford, above n 19 at 182.
260 Ibid at 207.
261 Ibid at 182.
 1994 Statutory Interpretation, Law Reform and Sampford's Theory 149

interpretation were far more complicated than this; one indication being the existence
of an alternative tradition in the common law which gave less emphasis to the
individual approaches and more emphasis to the attainment of a just outcome through
a consideration of multiple factors. The existence of this alternative methodology was
just one of a multitude of influences which disordered the law both within the
doctrinal law and outside it. At least some of the differences which were productive of
conflict and disorder also frustrated or muted the conflict, tending to maintain a state
of inertia. In sum, the disordering influences created a situation of such complexity that
creating order would be difficult or impossible to achieve by means of rules/62 let
:, alone a single rule.

THE DISORDERLY RISE OF THE PURPOSE RULE

British origins
1 In 1965 the Law Commission for England and Wales and the Scottish Law Commission
became concerned about the state of the law of statutory interpretation. They
considered that, although the rules were "individually reasonably clear [they] are often
difficult to apply, particularly where they appear to conflict with one another and
when their hierarchy of importance is not clearly established." Their other main
concern was the "present limitations on the means, other than reference to the actual
text of the statute, for ascertaining the intention of the legislature". 263 The Commissions
subsequently commenced a joint inquiry into the rules for the interpretation of statutes
to examine these and other related issues.
The joint report of the Commissions264 criticised a number of features of the
common law which were seen above to contribute to its disarray.265 They were critical
of each of the literal, golden and mischief rules, principally because they were
contradictory and ambiguous. They were dissatisfied with the traditional structure of
the law which emphasised the individual approaches at the expense of a more
pluralistic methodology. Although the Commissions were not inclined to criticise the
rules referred to if those rules were used as "convenient headings", they were "less
satisfactory [when] used to justify the meaning given to a proviSion." The Commissions
clearly preferred the "alternative tradition" because:
[T]he ultimate function of a court in the interpretative process is not simply to decide
whether it is J;lound to follow a literal interpretation on the one hand or to adopt on the
other an interpretation reached in the light of the golden or mischief rules. It is rather to
decide the meaning of the provision, taking into account, among other matters, the light
which the actual language used, and the broader aspects of legislative policy arrived at
by the golden and rnis_chief rules, throw on that meaning. 266
They also found the individual approaches to be contradictory and ambiguous. The
literal approach was singled out for special criticism. The rules had "tended excessively
262 W Twining and D Miers, above n 28 at 230.
263 Above n 5 at para 1.
264 Aboven5.
265 Already mentioned above were its criticisms with respect to the concept of legislative
intention (n 112) and the obscurity of the rules limiting the materials which could be
considered (n 215).
266 Above n 5 at para 29.
150 Federal Law Review Volume22

to emphasise the literal meaning of statutory provisions without giving due weight to
their meaning in wider contexts".267 The literal approach also led in some cases to
debate which appeared to be conducted on a plane of "sterile verbalism" over the
ordinary (literal) meaning.268 The golden rule's requirements of absurdity,
inconsistency and inconvenience were also productive of uncertainty.269
While the mischief approach was a "somewhat more satisfactory approach",
changes in society had made it "somewhat outdated". Its language was archaic. It
"reflected a very different constitutional balance between the Executive, Parliament
and the public than would now be acceptable", particularly in not making clear "the
extent to which the judge should consider the actual language ... contained in the
statute". It assumed "the statute was subsidiary or supplemental to the common law".
It was pronounced at a time before the current rules on exclusion of material which
might bear on the mischief were developed. As a consequence, if a court "has
inadequate means of discovering the policy behind a statute, a mere exhortation to
consider that policy may not be very effective".270
To remedy these deficiencies in the law the Commissions recommended a "limited
degree of statutory intervention".211 Of special significance for the present study was
the Commissions' recommendation that statutory intervention was needed "to
emphasise the importance in the interpretation of a provision of ... the general ;
legislative purpose underlying it".212 In Appendix A at clause 2(a) it set out its
recommendation as to the appropriate provision to be included in legislation:
That a construction which would promote the general legislative purpose underlying the
provision in question is to be preferred to a construction which would not.
Upon analysis, the Commissions' recommendation involves three separate conclusions.
First, that there should be a greater emphasis on the purpose of the provision in
question. Secondly, that legislation should be used to make such emphasis known.
Thirdly, that the legislation should elevate a purposive construction to a higher place
than some other differing construction. To varying degrees, each of these conclusions is
symptomatic of disorder and would contribute to disorder if implemented.
Although the Commissions did circulate a working paper to a number of persons
and organisations before completing their report, their conclusion that there ought to
be a greater emphasis on the purpose was based on anecdotal evidence, rather than
any wide-ranging empirical research of judicial and lawyerly practice. The report
identified the problem - the excessive tendency to emphasise the literal approach -
as evidenced in certain judgments, but the extent of the problem was not clear. It was
conceded that some recent cases had in effect repudiated "literalism".273
The second conclusion, that statutory intervention was needed, was not well
supported. In fact the Commissions went to some lengths to express the contrary view.
They acknowledged that "[u]nder our constitutional arrangements it is the function of
an independent judiciary to interpret the law and no proposals which we may make
267 Ibid at para 8.
268 Ibid at para 9.
269 Ibid at para 32.
270 Ibid at para 33.
271 Ibid at para 81.
272 Ibid.
273 Ibid at para 8.
 Statutory Interpretation, Law Reform and Sampford's Theory 151

'' can or should undermine the freedom which this function requires". 274 They also noted
the doubt expressed by Lord Wilberforce, before the project had been commenced, as
to "whether statutory interpretation is a genuine subject for the Law Commission at
all".275 At paragraph 81 the Commissions stated that the constitutional perspective
militated against "any comprehensive enumeration of the factors to be taken into
account by the courts in the interpretation of legislation", but did not advance any case
why a more limited statutory intervention was appropriate and would in any case
work Earlier in the report they noted that a New Zealand provision requiring, among
other things, an interpretation which would best attain the object of the Act had failed
to attract the courts' attention. That provision read:
Every Act, and every provision or enactment thereof, shall be deemed remedial, whether
its immediate purport is to direct the doing of anything Parliament deems to be for the
public good, or to prevent or punish the doing of anything it deems contrary to the
public good, and shall accordingly receive such fair, large and liberal construction and
interpretation as will best ensure the attainment of the object CJh the Act and of such provision or
enactment according to its true intent, meaning, and spirit. 76
The Commissions unconvincingly attempted to distinguish the New Zealand case and
a Canadian counterpart277 from their proposal. They criticised the New Zealand
provision on the ground that its exhortation to the courts to adopt "large and liberal"
interpretations "begs the question as to what is the real intention of the legislature,
which may require in the circumstances either a broad or ,narrow construction of
language".278 This point was well made: the Commissions' purpose rule was not so
confused. But the New Zealand provision was recognised by the Commissions as also
expressing the mischief approach in more modern language, which must have been a
reference to the italicised purpose rule in the quotation above. The Commissions'
response to this aspect of the provision was to note that "it makes no contribution to
the problem of how the mischief and the remedy envisaged by the legislature are to be
ascertained". However, the same criticism could be levelled to some extent at the
Commissions. In Chapter V of their report they considered and made
recommendations upon the rules which ought to determine the proper context of a
provision. Although they agreed in principle that "the courts should be able to consider
any material which 'must be assumed to be in the contemplation of the legislature"',279
and made some recommendations in favour of relaxing the then common law rules, in
the end they did not favour the consideration of reports of proceedings in
Parliament.280 Even though it could not be denied that such reports might be relevant

274 Ibid at para 79.

275 H Lords Deb 1966, Vol277 at 1294.
276 Acts Interpretation Act 1924 (NZ) at s SQ); emphasis added. See generally D AS Ward,
above n 16 whose view was that it was a "modem restatement" of the rule in Heydon's case
(at 294).
277 Above n 5 at para 33 and n 79: Interpretation Act 1967 (Canada), s 11; see generally
E Tucker, above n 17. The Canadian provision stated that: "Every enactment shall be
deemed remedial, and shall be given such fair, large and liberal construction and
interpretation as best ensures the attainment of its objects".
278 Ibid at para 33.
279 Ibid at para 52, citing Govindan Sellappah Nayar Kodakan Pillai v Punchi Banda Mudanayake
[1953] AC 514 at 528 (PC).
280 Law Commissions, above n 5 at para 61.
152 Federal Law Review Volume22

to ascertaining the intention of Parliament,281 on largely practical grounds they were

opposed to liberalising the rules covering recourse to parliamentary materials.
The third conclusion, that the legislation should be enacted in certain specified
terms, was equally problematic. In hindsight, the report failed to explain its
assumptions, such as how a purposive construction may be different from another (for
example, literal) construction, and why a purposive construction ought always to
prevail. The report was ambiguous on the question whether a purposive construction
ought to be sought in all cases or, if not, on the question of the circumstances when it
ought to be sought. No examples were given of how the proposed provision might .1

work.
The third conclusion was also suspect at a deeper level. The Commissions approved
of the view that the difficulties with the concept of the intention of Parliament could
perhaps be clarified if "a distinction is drawn between a particular legislative intent in 1

the sense of the meaning in which the legislature intended particular words to be '
understood, and a general legislative intent in the sense of the purpose which the !
legislature intended to achieve".282 This led the Commissions to see force in the ,
statement that:
If [legislative intent] is looked upon as a common agreement on the purpose of an
enactment and a general understanding of the kind of situation at which it is aimed, to
deny the existence of a legislative intention is to deny the existence of a legislative
function. 283 .
But the linking of purposive action with the conventional values of "the legislative '
function" is rhetorical. As one cannot question the legislative function, we are asked to 1

accept without question the reality and benefits of purposive reasoning. This is ironic,
because the authors from whom the Commissions drew substantially qualified the !
quoted views. The author who linked purposive action with the legislative function ,
acknowledged that purposive reasoning would fail in a group of cases "where no 1

meaning, aim or purpose of the legislature is at all capable of apperception". 284

Furthermore, the author who was lauded for equating purposive reasoning with a
general legislative intent did not accept that the problems with legislative intent could
be solved by simple formulas, warning that "[w]e too often continue to demand clear-
cut and decisive answers in the face of facts that simply will not support such
answers". 28S In short, because the consequences of the proposed purpose rule had not
been thought through, or were not at least evident in the report, the Commissions
appeared to fall into the trap of "throwing texts at problems".286 Users of the rule
would be operating in the dark and unintended effects were likely.

281 Ibid at para 54.

282 Ibid at para 55. Emphasis in original. The Commissions drew on G C MacCallum Jr, above
n99.
283 Law Commissions, above n 5 at para 55. The Commissions drew on an unnamed author,
"A Re-evaluation of the Use of Legislative History in the Federal Courts" (1952) 52 Colum L
Rev 125 at 126.
284 "A Re-evaluation of the Use of Legislative History in the Federal Courts", above n 283 at
n16.
285 G C MacCallum Jr, above n 99 at 786.
286 C Sampford, above n 19 at 256.
 1994 Statutory Interpretation, Law Reform and Sampford's Theory 153

Fate of the Law Commissions' report

The Commissions' report was presented to the United Kingdom Parliament but its
recommendations were not implemented immediately. In 1975 the report was
reviewed by the Renton Committee on the Preparation of Legislation.287 That
Committee noted several criticisms which had been put to it. The Committee raised
doubts about whether the correct purpose had been identified, whether it was
desirable that the purpose should overrule all other "principles" (presumptions), and
whether it was little more than a rephrasing of the old mischief rule.288 It concluded in
favour of the enactment of the purpose rule, though its reasons were not fully
explained:
[The proposed purpose rule] is, as we understand it, in part a codification of modem
practice in the application by the courts of the so-called "mischief rule" of statutory
interpretation. 289'
The purpose rule was eventually included in the Interpretation of Legislation Bill
1979 and introduced into the House of Lords by Lord Scarman in 1980. The Bill was
heavily criticised in that House on second reading and withdrawn. The Bill was
reintroduced in 1981, again with the purpose rule included,290 was passed by the
House of Lords, but was objected to on the motion for second reading in the House of
Commons. To date, the purpose rule has not been implemented in the United
Kingdom.
Despite its lack of success, the purpose rule was not specifically opposed at any
time in its passage through the House of Lords. The support for the purpose rule in
that House was significant because it was later used to demonstrate the stren~ of the
rule when it was eventually introduced into the federal Parliament in Australia. 291 The
support the proposed rule garnered in the House of Lords must have lulled Australian
onlookers into a false sense of security. In promoting the Bill, Lord Scarman referred to
it as "such a slight thing",292 and as having been "drafted ... in perfectly clear terms".293
His Lordship responded to Lord Wilberforce's warning that statutory interpretation
was a "non-subject" and rather a matter for "educating the judges and practitioners"
with the unconvincing retort that the Bill was "little more than an educational exercise
for the judges".294 As Viscount Dilhome remarked during the 1980 debate on the Bill,
there was a gap in Lord Scarman's promotion of the Bill, "in his failure to demonstrate
that the provisions of the Bill would really assist in the task of interpretation". 295 There
was confusion as to whether it would be a simple rule of priority, or whether it was the
harbinger of a much larger reorientation in interpretive methods. On the one hand,
Lord Scarman claimed that the purpose rule did not "purport to alter, or amend, or

287 The Renton Committee, The Preparation of Legislation, Cmnd 6053 (1975).
288 Ibid at para 19.27.
289 Ibid at para 19.28.
290 Interpretation of Legislation Bill 1981 (HL Bill No 67), set out in D R Miers and A C Page,
above n 141 at 245-246.
291 Sen Deb 1981, Vol90 at 2166 ("The British proposals, I should add, have been initiated and
supported by very distinguished law lords, including Lord Scarman and Lord
Wilberforce": Senator Durack, Attorney-General.)
292 H Lords Deb 1980, Vol405 at 306.
293 H Lords Deb 1981, Vol418 at 83.
294 H Lords Deb 1980, Vol405 at 277.
295 Ibid at295.
154 Federal Law Review Volume22

restrict the common law";296 and it provided an "indication as to the priorities in

interpreting statute [sic] laid down by parliament" in the direction already taken by the
courts. 297 Consistently with this objective, Lord Wilberforce applauded. the purpose
rule for being "moderately expressed".298 On the other hand, it was admitted that "the
whole field is obscured ... almost overgrown, by judicial doubts and anxieties". 299 Lord
Scarman thought that it would "exterminate" "[t]he old habit of sticking to the literal
meaning of the words used and refusing to depart from them even when they produce
a result which is clearly inconsistent with the intention of parliament ... [which] is still
lurking in the back corridors of the legal system".300 Lord Renton equated the
provision with an obligation to "have regard to the general legislative purpose" which
"would remove once and for all the long conflict between the literal and the purposive
methods of construction".301

The "new literalism" in the common Iaw302

The promotion in Australia of the recommendations of the Law Commissions was
accelerated by a notorious era of interpretation of legislation in Australia, a time
generally known as the tax avoidance era. Its emergence has been described by !<rever
as follows:
High rates of inflation put new pressures on the [tax] system in the 1970s as taxpayers
found themselves pushed into higher tax brackets while their real purchasing power
remained the same or decreased. Increasingly, efforts were devoted towards the goal of
tax minimisation. At the same time, the essential co-operation of the High Court was
quickly dissipating. Following the appointment of Garfield Barwick as Chief Justice of
Australia in 1964, the High Court slowly began to dismantle the pillars of judicial
construction that upheld the Australian income tax system. Under the leadership of
Barwick the High Court began to narrow the application of crucial provisions in the
income tax Act, [sic] including the important general anti-avoidance provision. The
reversal of long standing doctrines by the Court signalled to tax planners an opportunity
to shift into high gear and a host of new [tax avoidance] schemes quickly emerged.303
The approach that the High Court took in a series of taxation cases,304 which !<rever
labels as the "new literalism",305 is described as follows:

296 Ibid at 278. See also at 287 and 289; H Lords Deb 1981, Vol418 at 77, 78 and 81.
297 H Lords Deb 1980, Vol405 at 279.
298 H Lords Deb 1981, Vol418 at 74.
299 Ibid at 66.
300 H Lords Deb 1980, Vol405 at 279.
301 H Lords Deb 1981, Vol418 at 72.
302 For this background 1 am indebted to R Krever, above n 80.
303 Ibid at 129-130.
304 Slutzkin v Commissioner of Taxation of Commonwealth of Australia (1977) 140 CLR 314;
Commissioner of Taxation of Commonwealth of Australia v South Australian Battery Makers Pty
Ltd (1978) 140 CLR 645; Commissioner of Taxation of Commonwealth of Australia v Everett
(1980) 143 CLR 440; Commissioner of Taxation of Commonwealth of Australia v Westraders Pty
Ltd {1980) 144 CLR 55; Commissioner of Taxation of Commonwealth of Australia v
Commonwealth Aluminium Corporation Ltd (1980) 143 CLR 646. _
305 R Krever, above n 80 at 130.
 1994 Statutory Interpretation, Law Reform and Sampford's Theory 155

Time and again the Court turned to a doctrine of strict literalism - reading down the
words of the statute without consideration for the purpose of the sections or act in which
they appeared- to find in favour of tax avoiders.306
In Krever's view the approach was "absurd"307 and "pedantic"308 because it could lead
to "tax results completely divorced from economic reality".309
The extent to which cases such as Westraders illustrated either a general trend to
literalism or an application of a particularly strong presumption in favour of taxpayers
was nevertheless open to question. Sampford, following Weber, uses the term
"asymmetrical" to describe the different f:erceptions that two persons involved in a
power relation may have of that relation. 10 The reaction by the current Chief Justice
(Mason CJ) to the tax avoidance cases has been to see them as merely taxation cases
and not as symptomatic of any error in statutory interpretation generally. 311 His
Honour's view finds support in the Westraders case in which the then Chief Justice
(Barwick CJ) had defended his approach in terms of the specific rights of taxpayers:
[T]he citizen has every right to mould the transaction into which he is about to enter into
a form which satisfies the requirements of the statute ... the freedom to choose the form
of transaction into which he shall enter is basic to the maintenance of a free society.312
However, rightly or wrongly, cases such as these were not viewed by persons outside
the Court as raising a purely taxation issue. The High Court itself had become the
focus, as evidenced in the following extract from a national magazine of the day:
By adopting this attitude, the [High] court has effectively usurped a large part of
Parliament's powers on taxation. It has made a simple and non-legalistic method of
collecting income tax from wealthy individuals extremely difficult.31 3
As we shall see, commentators at the seminar (discussed below), and key members of
Parliament (the Attorney-General and the Opposition spokesman on legal matters)
began supporting reform of the general approaches to statutory interpretation. In
short, the controversy over the interpretation of taxation legislation, itself a product of
social disorder, had caused a general reaction against the courts' interpretive methods.
The extraordinary stimulus to reform, stemming from the tax avoidance era and the
High Court's handling of avoidance schemes, recalls the insight of Foucault (another
disorder theorist) concerning the foundations of knowledge in the human sciences. In
his view that knowledge was "rooted in non-rational, contingent and frequently
unsavoury origins".314

306 Ibid.
307 Ibid at 134.
308 Ibid at 141.
309 Ibid at 132.
310 C Sampford, above n 19 at 166.
311 Sir Anthony Mason, above n 13 at 161.
312 Westraders v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1975) 144 CLR 55 at 60 and 61.
313 P P McGuiness, quoted by G McGregor, "The High Court: Backwards into the Future",
National Times, 17-23 February 1980, p 14, cited in R Krever, above n 80 at 133.
314 M Philp, "Michel Foucault" in Q Skinner (ed), The Return of Grand Theory in the Human
Sciences (1985) 65 at 70.
156 Federal Law Review Volume22

Promotion of the purpose rule in Australia

Legal and public pressures on the common law caused the Commonwealth Attorney-
General's Department to organise a high level seminar devoted to the question of
reform of statutory interpretation. Held in March 1981, its participants included the
Commonwealth Attorney-General, senior advisers in his department, leading members
of the legal profession and noted academics. The seminar is important as a source of
the rationale for the purpose rule. However, even among that predominantly legal
group, complete agreement about the suggested rule is not apparent. The proceedings
reveal that little detailed attention was given to the rule, apart from a paper delivered
by the Deputy Secretary of the Attorney-General's Department, discussed below. 315
It is convenient if we consider what the seminar participants had to say about the
three relevant conclusions in the Law Commissions' report. On the first conclusion-
the need for greater emphasis on the purposive approach, the impression of three
(uncontradicted) speakers was that there was a problem with the way the courts had
been interpreting legislation. The clearest statement came from Mr Kolts (First
Parliamentary Counsel):
Unfortunately, in Australia, the High Court's approach seems to me to be to read the
words in too literal a sense without having regard to the other basic ingredients ...31 6
Mr Kolts was generally supported by Professor Pearce on this point,317 and Mr Brazil
(Depu~ Secretary, Attorney-General's Department) was prepared to accept the view
also. 31 Their views were echoed later by another prominent member of the legal
community, the editor of the Australian Law Journal, who singled out for concern the
interpretation of income tax legislation.319 However, each of these participants had
distinct standpoints (drafter; academic; Ministerial adviser); it is likely that if closer
examination of their views were possible, differences would emerge. Furthermore, in
his closing remarks the Attorney-General differed greatly from the previous speakers.
He saw the problem not so much as one of interpretation but as one of drafting. The
traditional drafting style was "forbidding" to members of Parliament and ways were
needed to help reduce "the volume of material that has now become part and parcel of
modern government". For this reason, it is difficult to see the seminar as a co-ordinated
effort to solve mutually agreed problems. In any case the participants at the seminar
were at the most an unco-ordinated group, not as powerful as institutions such as the
government. 320
The second conclusion, the need to legislate, was the subject of the opening remarks
by Mr Brazil. Like Lord Scarman, who had promoted the rule vigorously in England,
the Australian reformer found himself drawn to the warning of Lord Wilberforce that
statutory interpretation was a "non-subject" for law reform. This warning, he said,
"represent[s] pessimism in relation to statutory interpretation". 321 The need to legislate

315 Another Look at Statutory Interpretation, above n 4.

316 Ibid at 6.
317 Ibid at 7.
318 P Brazil, "Purposive Versus Literal Approach" in Another Look at Statutory Interpretation
(1982) 16 at 18.
319 J G Starke, "Statutory Guidelines for Interpreting Commonwealth Statutes" (1981) 55 ALJ
711.
320 C Sampford, above n 19 at 201.
321 P Brazil, "Opening of Seminar", in Another Look at Statutory Interpretation (1982) 1.
 1994 Statutory Interpretation, Law Reform and Sampford's Theory 157

was endorsed by Mr Kolts and Professor Pearce without discussion. It received a very
brief word from Mr Brazil who thought that the objection in England - that it was
unnecessary - did not apply so much in Australia. Once again, therefore, as reported
in the proceedings of the seminar, there was negligible debate on the need to
legislate. 322 Apart from the great issue of principle involved Gudicial independence)
the fact that a related attempt had failed in New Zealand and had been tried elsewhere
seemed to call for investigation at this stage. The remarks about the Law Commissions'
report on this matter apply equally here.
The third conclusion - the precise terms to be employed - received rather more
attention in the paper by Mr Brazil, yet some internal disorder is apparent.323 His
support of the purpose rule proposed by the Law Commissions324 was somewhat
inconsistent with his own view that there was only one rule of construction:
[Y]ou ascertain the ordinary grammatical meaning of the words by looking at them in
the light of the mischief the Act as a whole is meant to deal with.325
No discussion occurred on the question why a purposive construction should prevail.
Mr Brazil did, however, address the matter of the stage at which the purposive
meaning was to be considered. He prefaced the comment immediately above with the
following:
The other thing I want to say is to take issue with the statement that you can only use the
mischief rule if the words aren't clear on their face. The approach I would take is that the
mischief rule is something to be taken into account, in the appropriate cases, at what I
call first level or stage of interpretation.326
However, the rule he proposed did not address the situation of when the purposive
meaning must be sought. Despite Mr Brazil's reliance on Cross for his "one rule of
construction" theory, another speaker drew attention, in critical terms, to the power of
courts to decline to take account of the mischief if there was no ambiguity on the face
of the legislation. Professor Pearce referred to the conflict which arises when a court
maintains that there is no ambiguity, even though counsel believes there is one.327
Lastly, there was only a vague indication given of how the rule would work. Mr Brazil
said that:
[The] approach does not involve trying to restate a fundamental comprehensive rule of
statutory interpretation. It involves, rather, an intervention in the process of statutory
interpretation that gives a nudge in the direction of the purposive approach and having
done that it does no more.328

322 It was noted in the Preface that the publication contained selections of the discussion of the
main papers. The need to legislate was an issue which concerned commentators after
enactment of the purpose rule: C Corns, above n 10 at 392; J G Starke, above n 319 at 712-
713.
323 See generally, C Sampford, above n 19 at 175.
324 Above n 318 at 19-20.
325 Another Look at Statutory Interpretation, above n 4 at 4.
326 Ibid.
327 Ibid at 7.
328 Above n 318 at 20. In view of the several noted differences and tensions between
Mr Brazil's own view and the proposed purpose rule, it is worth noting the disordering
nature of bureaucratic policy-making. The literature suggests that policy-making is
generally "confined to a series of well-rehearsed options familiar to all the participants",
rather than being a highly rational process in which the consequences of the policy chosen
158 Federal Law Review Volume22

On the books: the intentions of Parliament

It has occasionally been suggested that the courts adjusted the common law prior to the
enactment of the purpose rule. For example, Kirby P has written:
To stimulate [the purposive] approach in Australia, legislatures, Federal and State, have
enacted statutory provisions. However, to a very large extent, these simply reinforce
developments which were already occurring by the common law.329
It is true that in the common law, as it had developed in England, purposive
interpretation had already become "fashionable" by 1978.330 A trend had been
observed as early as 1975.331 However, the case generally acknowledged to have
adjusted the common law in Australia332 was handed down after the purpose provision
had been introduced into Parliament, and just one week before the provision's formal
enactment and commencement.333
The purpose rule was introduced into the Commonwealth Parliament in omnibus
legislation, the Statute Law Revision Bill1981. As proposed and enacted, s 15AA of the
Acts Interpretation Act 1901 read:
In the interpretation of a provision of an Act, a construction that would promote the
purpose or object underlying the Act (whether that purpose or object is expressly stated
in the Act or not) shall be preferred to a construction that would not promote that
purpose or object.334
As can be seen, the provision closely follows the Law Commissions' proposal.335 The
reform was later adopted in most jurisdictions of Australia. 336 It applies to the

most closely match the goals to be secured: W Twining and D Miers, above n 28 at 325. Of
course, one of the options which the Australian promoters did consider was the report of
the Law Commissions.
329 Director-General of the Department of Corrective Services v Mitchelson (1992) 26 NSWLR 648 at
654.
330 Stock v Frank Jones (Tipton) Ltd [1978] 1 AllER 948 at 951 per Viscount Dilhome.
331 Carter v Bradbeer [1975] 1 WLR 1204 at 1206-1207 per Lord Diplock. See further, Part Two.
The following year, Unger published a landmark jurisprudential work in which similar
trends were observed: R MUnger, above n 222 at 195.
332 Cooper Brookes (Wollongong) Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation of the Commonwealth of
Australia (1981) 147 CLR 297; Mr Justice Bryson, above n 2 at 191: "the judgments in Cooper
Brookes, and particularly [the judgment of Mason and Wilson JJ) constitute a new
beginning for ascertaining the state of opinion in the High Court on statutory
interpretation".
333 See n 367 for further details.
334 Section 15AA of the Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth) was inserted by the Statute Law
Revision Act 1981 (Cth), s 115.
335 Compare above at 150.
336 The State and Territory counterparts of s 15AA are the Interpretation Act 1967 (ACT),
s llA; Interpretation Act 1987 (NSW), s 33; Acts Interpretation Act 1915 (SA), s 22; Acts
Interpretation Act 1931 (Tas), s SA; Interpretation of Legislation Act 1984 (Vic), s 35(a);
Acts Interpretation Act 1954 (Qld), s 14A; and Interpretation Act 1984 (WA), s 18. The
South Australian version is a weaker version on paper: G Morris et al, above n 10 at 158-
159. The Queensland version is a stronger version on paper: P Bridgman, above n 246 at
335-337. Both the South Australian and Queensland versions are discussed in Part Two.
There is a further Commonwealth/State and Territory purpose rule in s 109H of the
Corporations Law which was enacted in 1990. See commentary by A J Black,
"Interpretation" in Australian Corporation Law, Principles and Practice, Vol1 at paras 1.2.0020
1: 1994
J''~-:1'
'.·
_')'-
Statutory Interpretation, Law Reform and Samp_ford's Theory 159

interpretation of Acts and delegated legislation337 whether enacted or made before or

after the commencement of each provision.338 A related reform, s lSAB of the Acts
Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth),339 and State equivalents,340 permitted wider use of
extrinsic materials in the interpretation of Acts and delegated legislation,341 again
whether enacted or made before or after the commencement of each provision. 342
The inclusion of the reform in a Statute Law Revision Bill indicates some conflict at
the outset in relation to the proposed s 15AA. Was it a purely technical device as the
Bill indicated or was it a major policy measure as some of the later parliamentary
speakers claimed? If the latter, was there consensus- or lack of it (disorder)- about
the rationale and intended effects of the proposed rule? When we attempt to ascertain
the intentions of Parliament to the extent possible from Hansard, we find a very
complex amalgam of differing intentions. Potentially the most significant for later
interpretation and application of the rule was the view of Senator Durack who, as the
Attorney-General, introduced the provision into Parliament. His idiosyncratic view
reminds us that who defines the problem is a necessary dimension for understanding
the problem at hand.343 In his prepared Second Reading Speech, he said:
I am not among those who would say that the general approach of our courts is at
present overly legalistic ... 344
However, this was contradicted in the debates where he remarked:

and 1.2.0025. It replaced a similar rule which applied under the previous co-operative
scheme of corporations legislation: Companies and Securities (Interpretation and
Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1980 (Cth), s SA, and respective State Codes- see, eg, Re
Guardian Investments Pty Ltd (1984) 2 ACLC 165. That section is discussed in I Cameron,
aboven 10.
337 Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth), s 46; Interpretation Act 1987 (NSW), s 33; Interpretation
of Legislation Act 1984 (Vic), s 35; Interpretation Act 1984 (WA}, s 18; Interpretation Act
1967 (ACT}, s 49; Statutory Instruments Act 1992 (Qld}, s 14(1); Acts Interpretation Act
1931 (Tas), s 4; Acts Interpretation Act 1915 (SA), s 3; D C Pearce and R S Geddes, above
n 10 at paras 2.23 and 2.24.
338 Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth), s 2(1); D C Pearce and R S Geddes, above n 10 at
para 2.23; Interpretation Act 1987 (NSW), s 5(1); Interpretation of Legislation Act 1984
(Vic}, s 4{1); Interpretation Act 1984 (WA), s 3(1); Interpretation Act 1967 (ACT}, ss 6, 49;
Acts Interpretation Act 1954 (Qld), s 2(1); Acts Interpretation Act 1931 {Tas), s 4; Acts
Interpretation Act 1915 (SA), s 3.
339 Section 15A8 of the Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth) was inserted by the Acts
Interpretation Amendment Act 1984 (Cth). Its relationship with s 15AA will be explored in
Part Two.
340 Interpretation Act 1967 (ACT), s 118; Interpretation Act 1987 (NSW), s 34; Acts
Interpretation Act 1954 (Qld), s 148; Interpretation Act 1984 (Vic), s 35(b); Interpretation
Act 1984 (WA), s 19; Acts Interpretation Act 1931 {Tas), s 88.
341 Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth), s 46; Interpretation Act 1987 (NSW), s 34; Interpretation
Act 1984 (WA), s 19; Interpretation Act (ACT), s 49; Interpretation of Legislation Act 1984
(Vic), s 35; Acts Interpretation Act 1931 {Tas), s 4; Statutory Instruments Act 1992 (Qld),
ss 14(1), 15. \
342 Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth), s 2(1); Interpretation Act 1987 (NSW), s 5(1);
Interpretation Act 1984 (WA), s 3(1); Interpretation Act 1967 (ACT), ss 6, 49; Interpretation
of Legislation Act 1984 (Vic), s 4(1); Acts Interpretation Act 1954 (Qld}, s 2(1); Acts
Interpretation Act 1931 (Tas), s 4.
343 W Twining and D Miers, above n 28 at 119.
344 Sen Deb 1981, Vol 90 at 2166.
160 Federal Law Review Volume 22

Many judges have said that they are obliged to interpret legislation literally and may not
look beyond that. That approach, if taken to its logical conclusion, as unfortunately occurs
quite often, obliges Parliament to produce legislation which will cover every conceivable
situation that may arise.345
As suggested in this last sentence, it is not that the Attorney-General was unconcerned
with the rules of interpretation; but they were part of a wider problem of the
"imbalance which has developed between the courts and the Parliament in relation to
the details of law making".346 This had arisen in the following way:
The courts' approach and contribution to the development of law historically has been of
enormous importance. It is perhaps only in the more recent years of the development of
the law, and I am speaking not of decades but of centuries and in particular this country,
that the courts have retreated very considerably in their role of developing the law -
certainly this has occurred in an overt way - and have left it to parliament.
Parliament has very much asserted its role to the extent where the courts have
almost, in theory, at least, retreated to the point where they ostensibly claim that any
development of the law is not for them but for parliament. That is a most unfortunate
trend, which has resulted in Parliament being overwhelmed by legislation of enormous
proportions and growing technicality, to an extent that, as honourable senators will
agree, it is beyond our capacity as parliamentarians to handle it. Therefore, it is time to
take corrective measures and the proposal before us represents a first and very important
step to that end. I hope that it will prove to be a catalyst in correcting the imbalance that
has developed.347
In the Senate, only the "shadow" Attorney-General, Senator Evans, joined Senator
Durack in making a substantial contribution to the debate on the rule. Senator Evans
did not share the same concerns as the Attorney-General. His concern about judicial
law-making was not with the lack of it, but with the results the courts reach,
particularly in the taxation area:348
[The proposed rule] should serve to concentrate wonderfully the minds of those
remaining Australian judges who have been unwilling to exercise their judicial
responsibility in the national and community interest and to produce interpretations of
legislation which are in conformity with what not only the parliaments but also right
thinking members of the community wish to achieve. 349'
He also had a real concern with the rules themselves and how, by failing to set a clear
hierarchy, they permitted seemingly arbitrary decisions to be made:
Judges traditionally ... have had to turn for guidance to one or other of two more or less
equally time-honoured but nonetheless basically irreconcilable approaches to statutory
interpretation. One of those two chosen approaches seems, on the face of it, to depend, as
much as on anything else, on the taste, temperament, conscious or subconscious, political
prejudice or even the state of the judge's liver on the day. Those two approaches are
literalism on the one hand and what can be loosely described as liberalism on the other....
These two approaches are on the face of it more or less flatly contradictory... 350

345 Ibid at 2314-2315. Emphasis added.

346 Ibid at 2315.
347 Ibid at 2314.
348 Ibid at 2310. See also similar concerns in the lower House: H Rep Deb 1981, Vol123 at 3437
and 3439. Mr Jacobi MP called it a "disaster" (at 3439).
349 Sen Deb 1981, Vol90 at 2312.
350 Ibid at 2310 and 2311.
 1994 Statutory Interpretation, Law Reform and Sampford's Theory 161

Senator Evans was full of praise for the proposal, declaring it to be a "splendid
innovation" of "very real importance". But he too was vague about its effect:
It is clear that if this new approach is adopted ... we can expect much more explicit
attention being paid by the courts in the future to these purposive problems.351
Parliamentarians might have wondered how the rule could fulfil the multiple
objectives sought for it with concessions such as this from Senator Evans:
The object of the exercise is really to reinforce the traditional principle that has been
always understood to apply as the basis of statutory interpretation, and that is that
Parliament's intention should prevail. This provision is just a machinery way of
improving the probability that that will be the case.352
In the lower House no speaker demonstrated how the provision was meant to
work. One speaker (Mr Jacobi) assumed that Parliament was making its intent clear.353
Another, Mr Duffy, perceptively argued how the rule would not work. He took the
purposes of the proposed new section to be contained in the following extract from the
second reading speech of Senator Durack:
The effect of the provision to be inserted in the Acts Interpretation Act will be to confirm
that in interpreting provisions regard is to be had to the object or purpose underlying the
Act in question.
Mr Duffy argued that a literal interpretation of the section would not give effect to this
apparent purpose: the section would not require an interpretation which "better
promotes the object of the Act in question" and would have no application unless a
court regarded one of the alternative interpretations as not promoting the purpose or
object of the Act.354
These extracts from the parliamentary proceedings further confuse the picture as to
the aims of the legislation. We saw above that officials and others at the seminar saw
the legislation as necessary to correct inappropriate, over-literal, interpretive practice.
The view of a key officer advising the Minister was that the provision would alter "first
level" interpretive practice. On the other hand, the Attorney-General's prime concern
was with the reluctance of courts to make law, not with over-literalism. The Minister
wished nothing less than to cause a shift in the constitutional roles of Parliament and
the courts. The Opposition speakers had a variety of different and conflicting concerns,
including the immediate significance of the Bill in relation to the interpretation of
taxation law. Senator Evans's claim that there was a lack of hierarchy (in that the rules
were flatly contradictory and gave rise to arbitrary results) was somewhat at odds with
the view of several speakers at the seminar, which saw the problem in the current bias
towards a literal approach.
The question whether Parliament ought to intervene received some attention. Both
Senator Durack355 and Senator Evans35b viewed legislation as appropriate to laying
down general rules of interpretation such as those contemplated, although they failed
to point out that never before had Parliament legislated on such a topic in Australia.

351 Ibid at 2310.

352 Ibid at 2313.
353 H Rep Deb 1981, Vol123 at 3437. Mr Brown MP ironically noted that the courts would not
be able to have the benefit of the member's remarks: ibid at 3440.
354 Ibid at 3439.
355 Sen Deb 1981, Vol90 at 2166 and 2314.
356 Ibid at 2313.
162 Federal Law Review Volume 22

Neither Senator Durack, nor Senator Evans, was specific as to how the rule would
work, and the impression from Senator Durack's speech is that no precise method had
been contemplated. One member who considered its operation (Mr Duffy) thought it
would "fail". Senator Evans's assumption that the rule would impose a hierarchy which
did not currently exist assumed that one could sensibly distinguish between the literal
and purposive approaches. His justification of the purpose rule by linking it with the
intention of Parliament raises further difficult theoretical questions.35 7 What is meant
by the intention of Parliament in this context? Why should a non-purposive approach
be assumed to be inconsistent with Parliament's intention, and a purposive
construction be assumed to be consistent?
To sum up, it is impossible in this instance to obtain from Hansard a clear idea of
Parliament's intent with respect to the purpose rule, and in many respects the
participants' intentions conflicted or contained questionable assumptions. Any court
wishing to find authoritative guidance as to the meaning of the purpose rule from the
political background would be frustrated. Because of this, later interpretation of the
rule would be disordered for lack of a clear rationale and set of objectives, and
Parliament would lack a sound basis from which to evaluate the reform. The rationale
and aims of the purpose rule are further complicated when one examines the views of
expert observers.

Expectations of jurists
Academic views of the purpose rule, published at varying times after the provision
became law, but before the High Court gave its view, were far from uniform. The most
liberal view appeared in the standard Australian text on statutory interpretation by
Pearce and Geddes, who stated that the rule makes a purposive construction
mandatory:
Under s 15AA, however, the purpose or object must be taken into account even if the
meaning of the words, interpreted in the context of the rest of the Act, is clear. When the
purpose or object is brought into account, an alternative interpretation of the words may
become apparent. And if one interpretation does not promote the purpose or object of an
Act and another interpretation does so, the latter interpretation must be adopted.3 58
Other writers saw the effect of the rule in purely permissive terms. In a brief
commentary on an Administrative Appeals Tribunal decision, Hanks wrote that
"s lSAA ... is a general direction to give effect to the purpose of legislation when
inteiWreting that legislation, and does not depend on ambiguity for its invocation
... ". 3 A similar view Was expressed in the text Legal Research: Materials and Methods. It
was noted that in the States (other than South Australia), including Victoria, "[t]he
requirement that an ambiguity must first exist before the purpose approach is
employed does not exist".360

357 See generally W N Eskridge and P P Frickey, above n 9 at 325-339.

358 D C Pearce and R S Geddes, above n 10 at para 2.23; emphasis in original. See also
G Morris et al, above n 10 at 151.
359 (1990) 57 Aust Admin Law Bull at para 1996. Of course, those favouring a "mandatory"
construction (such as Pearce and Geddes) would agree that no ambiguity is necessary for
its invocation.
360 E Campbell and others, Legal Research: Materials and Methods (3rd ed 1988) at 105.
,
~ 1994 Statutory Interpretation, Law Reform an'd Sampford's Theory 163
'f. ~-------------------

A more conservative opinion was also put forward. In the view of Gifford, the
provision sanctioned "emphasis" on the purposive over the literal approach;361
nevertheless, the rule implied "at least some degree of ambiguity existing in the
Act".362 Enright took a similar view, adding that it was a "statutory expression of the
common law mischief rule".363 Corns also doubted whether the terms of the Victorian
equivalent "confer a mandatory duty on the judiciary to construe legislation in the
preferred manner".3 64 In summary, although there was support for Brazil's mandatory
purposive interpretation (Pearce and Geddes}, some opposed it (Gifford; IEnright;
query Corns}, and others suggested middling viewpoints which could be taken
(Hanks; authors of Legal Research).
Any academic enthusiasm for the purpose rule was not matched by the reaction of
the profession;36S in particular, one senior member of the judiciary issued a warning
shortly after the Commonwealth purpose provision was enacted. Sir Laurence Street,
then Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of New South Wales, expressed doubts as to
whether the provision would succeed in altering the law or practice of statutory
interpretation:
The history of similar, but not quite such far-reaching, provisions elsewhere indicates
that courts have, in effect, read them out of the law. They have been treated as going
little, if at all, beyond established rules of statutory interpretation. Whether that
approach is taken in Australia remains to be seen.366
The significance of his Honour's remark is that it illustrates yet another view which
could possibly be taken in relation to the rule: that the rule changed nothing, or even
that the rule could be effectively ignore<:~.
Before the courts could examine the proposed rule, the High Court, with
remarkable timing, reformed the general common law just one week before the
purpose rule was formally enacted and commenced to operate.367 Before examining
the operation of the rule in the courts and quasi-judicial tribunals, it is therefore
necessary to refer to the almost contemporaneous change in the general common law.

ASSUMPTIONS UNDERMINED: ELEVENTH HOUR CHANGES TO THE

COMMON LAW
Krever notes that following the resignation of Barwick CJ in February 1981, there were
two cases in which the High Court took a purposive interpretation of the taxation
l!iw.368 But the case which is generally acknowledged to have effected a landmark shift
in the common law was Cooper Brookes (Wollongong) Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation
361 D Gifford, above n 10 at 6.
362 Ibid at 57.
363 C Enright, above n 10 at 230.
364 C Corns, above n 10 at 392.
365 J G Starke, above n 319 at 712. In Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Trustees of the Lisa Marie
Walsh Trust (1983) 14 ATR 399 at 420 Fitzgerald J thought the opportunity to discern the
object from extrinsic material was "worth little".
366 L Street, "Judicial Law-Making- Some Reflections" (1982) 9 Syd LR 535 at 53~.
367 It was passed by the Houses of Parliament on 10 June. The rule was enacted and
commenced to operate on 12 June 1981: Statute Law Revision Act 1981 (Cth), s 2(1). The
High Court's decision was delivered on 5 June-1981.
368 R Krever, above n 80 at 140-141.
164 Federal Law Review Volume22

of the Commonwealth of Australia. 369 In this case the appellant subsidiary company
challenged a disallowance by the Commissioner of a claim for a deduction from its
assessable income. Prima facie, the appellant was entitled to the deduction. The Income
Tax Assessment Act 1936 (Cth) provided that a taxpayer could deduct from his income
in a given year so much of the losses he had incurred in any of the preceding years as
had not been allowed as a deduction in any of those years. This entitlement was
qualified by subsequent provisions (ss 80B,80C):
[The] broad effect was that losses of subsequent years sustained by a company could not
be deducted unless there was a substantial continuity of the beneficial ownerl:Jhip of the
share capital of the company in the year of loss and the year of income.370
The taxpayer satisfied the continuity provisions if references to "the company" did not
refer to a subsidiary company. Prima facie, this was the case, for s 80C(3) provided:
For the purposes of the application of either of the last two preceding sub-sections, the
provisions of sub-sections (3) to (8) inclusive, of the last preceding section apply in
relation to the holding company and in relation to every company that was at any
relevant time interposed between the holding company and the subsidiary company as if
references in those sub-sections to the company were references to the holding company
or to the interposed company, as the case may be.
Literally construed, this sub-section required all references to the company in the
specified provisions to mean the holding company, which would have the effect that
the potential exclusion did not apply to the taxpayer (a subsidiary company).
By majority the High Court ruled in the Commissioner's favour. It found that
s 80C(3) was a drafting mistake and it had not been Parliament's intention to leave out
a subsidiary company from the scope of the exclusionary provision. Upon analysis, the
judgments can be seen to have rested on several statements of principle or
assumptions. However, rather than promote order in the law of statutory
interpretation, it is argued that each of these statements or assumptions is evidence of
disorder, or would create disorder.
The Court took the intention of Parliament to be the main consideration. 371 For
example, in the judgment of Mason and Wilson JJ it was stated that:
[T]he fundamental object of statutory construction in every case is to ascertain the
legislative intention by reference to the language of the instrument viewed as a whole. 372
As noted above in the discussion of the common law, the concept of the intention of
Parliament is fictional. Fictions disorder by maintaining the appearance of unity and
continuity of a legal order,373 while permitting underlying change to occur. As detailed
below, use of the fiction of the intention of Parliament enabled some members of the
Court to alter the status of the literal approach without appearing to change the law.
The reliance on the intention of Parliament was therefore superficially stabilising, but
its ability to accommodate shifts in interpretation indicates its fluid, disordering
nature.

369 (1981) 147 CLR 297.

370 Ibid at 315-316.
371 Ibid at 304, 310 and 320.
372 Ibid at 320.
373 J Stone, above n 101 at 22.
 1994 Statutory Interpretation, Law Reform and Sampford's Theory 165

More specificall;;, members assumed the literal approach to be a distinct and

separate approach. 74 For instance, Mason and Wilson JJ saw the literal approach as
still having meaning in the following passage:
[D]eparture from the ordinary grammatical sense cannot be restricted to cases of
absurdity and inconsistency ... [T]he propriety of departing from the literal interpretation
is not confined to situations described by these labels.375
The assumption was underlined in the judgments of Mason and Wilson JJ and of
Stephen J. Their judgments were traditional in maintaining a distinction between
ordinary meaning and some other alternative construction. Only Gibbs CJ adopted the
"alternative tradition", which attempts to consider multiple approaches at the one time.
His Honour's view was that "no part of a statute can be considered in isolation from its
context" and that "a full view of the Act" included the scheme, machinery and
"manifest purpose" of the Act.3 76 Each of these ways of thinking was disordering. The
assumption that the literal approach was distinct and should be separately treated
begged questions which defy simple answers, such as how can the literal meaning be
divorced from other meanings? If meaning is contextual, what context is relevant for
the literal approach? The use of the alternative tradition did not make new law, but the
disorder of the law permitted the court to take this approach.
The literal approach continued to be emphasised by all members, but, in the
judgment of Mason and Wilson JJ, this emphasis was fictional for, in substance, they
greatly reduced its status. Their Honours were concerned by some disorder in the
common law regarding the literal and golden rules, observing that "[i]n some cases in
the past these rules of construction have been applied too rigidly".3 77 The basic cause,
they thought, was that courts had been unduly sensitive to their position in a
democracy and that this had led them to make incorrect statements on statutory
interpretation.378 In several obiter dicta,379 their Honours gave their view as to the true
status of the literal approach:
(i) The literal rule and the related golden rule of construction were not rules of law,
merely "rules of common sense".'380
(ii) An alternative construction to the literal construction could be preferred having
regard to the operation of the statute in the following circumstances:
Generally speaking, mere inconvenience of result in itself is not a ground for departing
from the natural and ordinary sense of the language read in its context. But there are
cases in which inconvenience of result or improbability of result assists the court in
concluding that an alternative construction which is reasonably open is to be preferred to

374 (1981) 147 CLR 297 at 307, 310 and 320.

375 Ibid at 320 and 321.
376 Ibid at 304 and 306.
377 Ibid at 320.
378 Ibid at 319. W N Eskridge and P P Frickey call it "counter-majoritarian anxiety": above n 9
at 324. ,
379 On the facts their Honours decided the case in favour of the Commissioner on traditional
grounds: (1) "the literal interpretation ... results in an operation ... which in our opinion is
capricious and irrational": (1981) 147 CLR 297 at 321. (2) The preferred interpretation was a
"necessary implication to be deduced from the legislative scheme as a whole": ibid at 322.
(3) It "may also be justified as an application of the 'mischief rule"': ibid.
380 (1981) 147 CLR 297 at 320.
166 Federal Law Review Volume 22

the literal meaning because the alternative construction more closely conforms to the
legislative intent discernible from other provisions in the statute.381

(iii) The cases when a court could depart from the literal meaning were not restricted to
traditional statements of the golden rule:
There are similar problems with the related so-called "golden rule" of construction ... For
the reason already given in the discussion of the literal rule, departure from the ordinary
grammatical sense cannot be restricted to cases of absurdity and inconsistency.38Z

(iv) The cases when the literal rule may be departed from were not limited:
[W]hen the judge labels the operation of the statute as "absurd", "extraordinary",
"capricious", "irrational" or "obscure" he assigns a ground for concluding that the
legislature could not have intended such an operation and that an alternative
interpretation must be preferred. But the propriety of departing from the literal
interpretation is not confined to situations described by these labels. It extends to any
situation in which for good reason the operation of the statute on a literal reading does not
conform to the legislative intent as ascertained from the provisions of the statute,
including the policy which may be discerned from those provisions. 383

(v) The literal approach could be departed from even where, in theory, it was quite
persuasive:
If ... one interpretation has a powerful advantage in ordinary meaning and jifammatical
sense, it will only be displaced if its operation is perceived to be unintended. 4
The other members of the majority were less liberal in referring to the status of the ~
literal approach. Gibbs CJ maintained that:
[I]f the language of a statutory provision is clear and unambiguous, and is consistent and
harmonious with the other provisions of the enactment, and can be intelligibly applied to
the subject matter with which it deals, it must be given its ordinary and grammatical
meaning, even if it leads to a result that may seem inconvenient or unjust.385
The Chief Justice thus tended to suggest that the operation of the statute was of 1

marginal importance, something Mason and Wilson JJ were at pains to reject. True, it
was appropriate to consider whether the plain meaning could be "intelligibly applied",
but inconvenience and injustice would not be enough to suggest another meaning ·
might have been intended. True also, his Honour was speaking of a situation where the '
language was "clear and unambiguous", but this appears to have been a reference to
the face of the statute only, and not to a situation where there was only one possible ·
construction. Stephen J briefly put the conditions for departing from the literal '
approach in a manner which tended to support the heavy emphasis which the Chief
Justice still placed upon it. The view of Stephen J appears in the following passage:
[I]f literal meaning is to be departed from, it must be clear beyond question both that
literal meaning does not give effect to the intention of the legislature and that some
departure from literal meaning will fulfil that intent.386

381 Ibid.
382 Ibid.
383 Ibid at 321. Emphasis added.
384 Ibid.
385 Ibid at 305.
386 Ibid at 310.
 1994 Statutory Interpretation, Law Reform and Sampford's Theory 167

The status of the literal approach was therefore contested - it was reduced only in
the judgment of Mason and Wilson JJ. Because it did not have the clear support of a
majority of the Court, it would compete in future with the more conservative statement
of the Chief Justice. Differences of view as to principle in multi-member courts are of
course hardly new, but they are cogent evidence of the natural disorder in the law,387 a
factor recognised by scholars investigating the tradition of the law.388
Along with the decline in the status of the literal approach in some of the
judgments, increased prominence was given to the purposive approach. Members
assumed that a purposive approach could be considered either at the "first level" or
stage of interpretation, or, at least, without requiring there to be any ambiguity in the
literal meaning. Gibbs CJ entertained a purposive construction at the first level, as
evident above. Similarly, Stephen J found the meaning of the words on the face of the
statute to be "clear",389 yet still felt entitled to decide the case on purposive grounds:
That sub-section now stands as an anachronism; the failure to amend it to accord with
those provisions upon which it operates and have themselves long since been amended,
ensures that to give it its literal application will, in the words of Fry LJ, be to construe
"the Act in order to defeat its object rather than with a view to carry its object into
effect" ... 390
Mason and Wilson JJ essentially took the same approach as Stephen J on this point.
However, rather than talk affirmatively of the necessity to take account of the purpose,
their Honours directed most of their dicta to the circumstances when it would be
appropriate to depart from the literal meaning. As noted above, they implied that there
was no barrier to ascertaining the purpose and taking it into account, provided only
that such a construction amounted to a "good reason".
The loosening up of the rules of statutory interpretation was accompanied by open
acknowledgment of the individual freedom of the judge in the task of interpretation.
However, little indication was given as to the factors which would determine that
choice other than an "objective" weighing up of the various factors. According to
Mason and Wilson JJ:
If the judge applies the literal rule it is because it gives emphasis to the factor which in
the particular case he thinks is decisive ... Quite obviously questions of degree arise. If
the choice is between two strongly competing interpretations, as we have said, the
advantage may lie with that which produces the fairer and more convenient operation so
long as it conforms to the legislative intention.391
Stephen J also referred expressly to the law-making function of the judge when
interpreting legislation.392 That judges do play an individual role is evident from the
Cooper Brookes case itself. Counsel for the appellant assumed that the law was "well
settled",393 and neither counsel argued for any new interpretations of law. Hence, the
development in the law was mostly due to judicial initiative.
387 C Sampford, above n 19 at 277.
388 M Krygier, above n 20 at 251-254, discussing the relationship between tradition and
change in the law.
389 (1981) 147 CLR 297 at 310.
390 Ibid at 311, citing Curtis v Stovin (1889) 22 QBD 513 at 519.
391 Ibid at 320 and 321.
392 Ibid at 310.
393 Transcript of Proceedings, High Court of Australia, 4 June 1980, p 8 (L J Priestley QC,
counsel for the appellant).
168 Federal Law Review Volume22

On the facts of the case a majority found that the literal meaning should not be
adopted. (Aickin Jdissented.) From the point of view of legal principle, the importance
of the judgments of the High Court Justices in Cooper Brookes was that they brought the
common law closer to the purpose rule, without actually mandating a purposive
approach. They revived the "alternative tradition" that the purposive approach could
be considered either at the "first level", or without requiring there to be any ambiguity
in the literal meaning. In the judgment of Mason and Wilson JJ, which has
subsequently been much referred to in texts394 and cases,395 the status of the literal
approach as it ought to flln:ction in practice was greatly reduced. If their judgment
were taken literally, the golden rule would be abolished and the other general
approaches could freely be considered and applied provided only there was good
reason to do so.
Paradoxically, however, this liberalisation could be a source of difficulty for
interpreters of the purposive rule. When the judgments were handed down, the rule
had already been put before the Parliament, although it had not yet been implemented.
As the rule had been created on the assumption that the common law had certain
deficiencies, such as that it was over-literal and had erected artificial barriers to the
taking into account of the purposive approach, these assumptions could now be
seriously questioned.
In addition, Cooper Brookes did not settle the common law position. In form it rested
on fictional foundations - the intention of Parliament and the dominance of the literal
approach. A majority of the Court had not agreed about the status of the literal or
purposive approaches. In making their individual choices about these matters, the
judgments reveal both the choices possible in the pre-existing law and the ability of the
judiciary to free themselves to some extent from previous authoritative statements.

DISORDER IN THE MAKING: REVIEW

The purpose nile was enacted to remedy at least some of the disarray in the common
law of statutory interpretation. But, immediately after its enactment, in its unused and
apparently "green" state, this account demonstrates that the purpose rule was already
disordered. Notwithstanding some tendencies in the disordering influences to maintain
a state of inertia, the rule would be likely to add to the disarray rather than impose
some constraints.
The disorder was aggregated in stages.396 Before the rule came into existence the
common law lacked substance, as evidenced by a lack of rules, a fictional basis, an
oversimplified understanding and ample individual judicial freedom. Further, the
limited guidance which the law offered was in important respects contradictory and in
any case subject to change. The conflicts concerned the general structure of the law and
the underlying values which were to be preferred, and were also reflected in various
contradictions and ambiguities in the particular approaches. Change was endemic
because the doctrine was historically contingent. The disorder of the general
approaches at common law was further increased by the multiple disordering
influences which operated upon them, and for the most part continue to do so, in the
394 See Part Two.
395 See Part Two.
396 W Twining and D Miers, above n 28 at ch 6.
 1994 Statutory Interpretation, Law Reform and Sampford's Theory 169

· wider law and especially in society. At a general level, two types of influence were
identified. The first was the changing legal and social environment in which the
approaches were applied. These included the form of statutes, other interpretive rules,
the subject matter to which the presumptions applied and the general movement to a
"postliberal" form of society. The second broad disordering influence on the general
approaches was the individual interpreter. With respect to judges, these included the
conflict between the judiciary and what can be thought to have been the intention of
Parliament on certain issues of importance; the changing self conception of the
judiciary in respect to their interpretive function; and the general factor of subjective
assessment. Other interpreters, with different standpoints, could give differing
interpretations. The public exercised little influence in Australia until the literal
approach to taxation legislation taken by the courts in the tax avoidance era of the
1970s came to public notice. This malady prompted a general review of the approaches
to statutory interpretation which some questioned as unnecessary. Paradoxically,
however, the differences which were productive of conflict (disordering influences)
also operated to frustrate or mute conilict about statutory interpretation. For example,
the lack of substance in the law meant that there was a lack of law to challenge.
The process of making the rule did not add firm foundations for an ordered future,
instead adding the basis for conflict. The initial proposal paid little or no attention to
the likely consequences of enacting such a rule: a recipe for unintended effects. When
the proposal was considered in Australia, confusion was generated by the different
views which were espoused as to the problem which the rule was addressing. The
policy objectives of the promoters of the rule were unclear and the views of one key
promoter appeared to be contradictory to some extent. Various participants in the law-
making process had raised problems, but these were apparently ignored. The scope of
the proposed rule was unclear as was the extent to which it changed the common law.
In the Australian Parliament the purpose rule was based upon alleged British support
for the rule, but this soon evaporated. Finally, at the eleventh hour, after the
introduction of the rule into the Australian Parliament, but before the rule had been
passed by the Parliament, the assumptions of the rule were undermined to some extent
by reforms to the common law made by the High Court in the Cooper Brookes case.
Upon analysis, the judgments in this case were also evidence of disorder or contained
the potential for future conflict.
Immediately after the rule came into force, but before the opportunity for
interpretation in the higher courts, other events added to doubts about the rule.
Experienced observers contemplated that the rule might not change anything. The
intervention of Parliament into what was formerly the courts' domain blurred the law
because of the common law presumption that statute law does not change the common
law unless the intention to do so was clearly manifested. Nevertheless, the rule could
not easily be dismissed altogether. However, the rule clearly did not codify much of
the vast body of learning that constitutes statutory interpretation; at the most it was
likely that, if it did have an impact on the common law, it would do so at the margins.
The problems with the rule increased once it began to be interpreted. It was soon
apparent that jurists could not agree among themselves about the effect of the rule and
that these views also diverged from the views of the promoters of the rule. Differences
emerged about whether the rule merely declared the common law or whether it
effected a change and there were divergent opinions about the extent of that change.
170 Federal Law Review Volume 22

However, it would be an exaggeration to say that the enactment of the purpose rule
had unleashed forces which would create an unmitigated conflict over statutory
interpretation. The theory of disorder does not suggest such an unrealistic and bleak
picture of attempted law reform in Australia. On the contrary, it maintains that the
influences which are productive of conflict - differences associated with human
variability - also tend to exert a stabilising influence and to frustrate or mute the
conflict. Thus, an interpreter could find plenty of indications in the origins of the rule
to support a restrictive interpretation, such as that the rule merely declared the
common law. For instance, potential interpretive issues, on which the report and the
rule were apparently silent, could simply be ignored. The contradictions in the views
of promoters, together with the common law presumption that the common law is not
altered by statute law, could be used to "read down" the rule. The fact that reports of
law reformers expressed conflicting views over the scope of the rule would militate
against later reference to them as extrinsic aids. The eleventh hour change to the
common law, which occurred after the rule was put before the Parliament, could be
used to support the case that change was not now necessary; in other words, that the
rule was now merely declaratory of the common law. Previous, largely unsuccessful
attempts in overseas jurisdictions to reform the common law could also be used as
"precedents".
Rather than offer the courts and the wider community a clean slate, it is submitted
that the future of the rule was already determined immediately after its enactment and
that the rule was likely to add to the disarray of the common law. It is true that,
superficially, there was some basis for the view that the rule would bring added order,
or would hardly disturb the existing state of affairs. The reform could be viewed as a
technical reform; the bipartisan vote in the Australian Parliament and the general
absence of concerted opposition suggested a consensus about the rule. It is submitted
that the rule was much more likely to engender a degree of conflict, at least initially,
because of the lack of consensus on a wide range of issues and other in-built tendencies
to cause conflict. Once the rule was operational, many of the unresolved matters would
crystallise as interpretational issues -issues rooted not merely in semantic ambiguity,
but, as we have seen, in the origins of the rule.
[Part Two of this article will appear in a later issue of the Review.]