Open Society Foundations

Africa Regional Strategy

2022-2026
 Open Society Foundations │ Africa Regional Strategy 2022-2026

A. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ........................................................................................................................................ 3

B. CONTEXT AND FIELD ANALYSIS: Africa’s political economy ........................................................................ 4
C. A NEW OSF IN AFRICA: our role, vision, mission and principles ................................................................... 7
D. HOW CHANGE HAPPENS: theory of change and approaches ...................................................................... 10
E. PROGRAMME PRIORITIES, GEOGRAPHIES AND TIMELINES ...................................................................... 13
1. EXPRESSION AND PARTICIPATION ............................................................................................................ 14
1.1. Resisting the capture of democratic processes and institutions to defend against rising
authoritarianism ......................................................................................................................................... 14
1.2. Resisting the capture of electoral processes and institutions .............................................................. 15
1.3. Promoting access to information, digital rights and independent media ............................................ 15
1.4. Promoting arts and culture for expression and participation ............................................................... 16
1.5. Supporting HRDs in advancing rights and challenging the abuse of power by state and non-state
actors ........................................................................................................................................................... 16
2. SECURITY AND RIGHTS ................................................................................................................................ 17
2.1. Supporting civilian oversight of and an accountable security sector .................................................. 17
2.2. Supporting narrative change around insecurity and terrorism ............................................................. 17
2.3. Security and safety for women and girls in conflict areas and sexual and gender minority groups
advanced ..................................................................................................................................................... 18
3. ACCOUNTABILITY AND JUSTICE ................................................................................................................. 18
3.1. Promoting institutional transformation and renewal for accountability and justice .......................... 19
3.2. Strengthening national, regional and continental human rights and legal accountability
mechanisms towards better human rights protection and access to justice ...................................... 19
3.3. Challenging corporate power to ensure public institutions function without the influence of
capture ......................................................................................................................................................... 19
3.4. Supporting and strengthening broad-based intersectional movements to advance human rights
and accountability agenda at the national, regional and international levels ..................................... 19
4. OPPORTUNITY AND EQUITY......................................................................................................................... 20
4.1. Access to justice and the rights of the marginalised ............................................................................. 21
4.2. Addressing inequality by supporting transformative policies and practice ........................................ 21
4.3. Supporting enablers and catalytic economic reforms towards people-centred, inclusive and
sustainable economies .............................................................................................................................. 21
4.4. Fair global climate governance and justice, anchored in human rights .............................................. 23
5. WOMEN’S RIGHTS .......................................................................................................................................... 24
5.1. Positioning African women’s rights globally .......................................................................................... 24
5.2. Strengthening the field to anchor the work of the other pillars ............................................................ 24
5.3. Supporting intersectional feminist movements ...................................................................................... 24
5.4. Strengthening intersectional feminist knowledge-production and uptake .......................................... 25
6. SPECIAL INITIATIVES .................................................................................................................................... 25
6.1. Re-invigorating pan-African civil society: decolonising academia and more impactful research
and policy influence ................................................................................................................................... 25
6.2. Advancing African influence in the globe ............................................................................................... 26

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ACRONYMS

ACHPR African Commission on Human and People’s Rights

AfCFTA African Continental Free Trade Area agreement

AfDB African Development Bank

AfRO Africa Regional Office

AIRI Africa International Relations Institute

AU African Union

BRICS Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa

COVID-19 Coronavirus 2019

CSOs Civil Society Organisations

EPRDF Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front

FPIC Free, Prior and Informed Consent

HRDs Human Rights Defenders

ICT Information and Communication Technology

IFIs International Finance Institutions

LGBTQI+ Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender, Queer and Intersex plus

MEL Monitoring, Evaluation and Learning

NGOs Non-Governmental Organisations

OSF Open Society Foundations

OSF-Africa Open Society Foundations Africa

OSF-SA Open Society Foundation for South Africa

OSIEA Open Society Initiative for Eastern Africa

OSISA Open Society Initiative for Southern Africa

OSIWA Open Society Initiative for West Africa

OSUN Open Society University Network

RECs Regional Economic Communities

SAPS Structural Adjustment Programs

SEDF Soros Economic Development Fund

SMEs Small and Medium-sized Enterprises

SRHR Sexual and Reproductive Health and Rights

WHRD Women Human Rights Defenders

WTO World Trade Organisation

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 Open Society Foundations │ Africa Regional Strategy 2022-2026

A. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
This One Africa strategy (2022-6) was developed over an intensive eight-month period in a process
involving staff from across our five entities (AfRO, OSF-SA, OSISA, OSIEA and OSIWA). It sets
out the overall direction for OSF in Africa in the next five years. It is flexible given our complexity
and diversity, to allow for adaptation as needed across contexts and over time.
We have developed this integrated One Africa strategy to better maximise our resources and impact.
Our work and those we support face additional strain due to COVID-19. We need to more
strategically deploy the resources we are entrusted to manage. This means changed thinking, ways of
working and partnerships. Our strategy development process also took place in a changed internal
and external environment, providing the opportunity to break geographic silos, while recognising the
national level remains the primary space where decisions influencing open society issues are made.
The strategy assumes the global political, economic and social fallout due to COVID-19 will worsen
insecurity, injustice and inequity, and disproportionately affect the most vulnerable. But today’s
challenges (rising authoritarianism, disinformation, human rights violations, lack of/unequal access
to social services and inequality) are not only due to COVID-19. They reflect structural problems
festering for many years. Political and economic power remains captured by political and corporate
elites (often working together). They exercise this power in their own interests, not those of the
people, with little/no accountability. Due to discriminatory and repressive policies, laws, practices
and processes, the people, especially the most vulnerable, remain excluded from political, economic,
and social opportunities and human rights protection. Women are in the majority, yet the translation
of their numbers into access to and control over decision-making as well as key resources, public
goods and services, remains limited. Women continue to suffer gender-based discrimination and
gender inequality is a major contributor to domestic and sexual violence.
We will work with and in support of the people and communities who experience autocracy,
injustice, impunity, poverty, exclusion and inequality across countries and regions. We will prioritise
diversity, equity and inclusion, with a particular focus on women and youth. Our work will be
organised around four pillars reflecting OSF’s global ambitions—Expression and Participation;
Security and Rights; Accountability and Justice; and Opportunity and Equity.
Under those four pillars, we will pursue the following strategic goals:
1. Expression and participation: Amplify people’s voices, through conscious organising to
express themselves and participate in public life, challenge and disrupt the exercise of
unchecked power and hold public and private bodies to account;
2. Security and Rights: Promote a rights-based approach to security sector governance and
accountability and respond to existing and emerging security challenges;
3. Accountability and Justice: Promote accountable, just and inclusive democracies governed by
law in which rights are promoted and protected;
4. Opportunity and Equity: Support progressive economic and social norms, policies and
practices that create opportunity and promote equality and rights.
This strategy represents both continuity and change. While many gains have been made by African
activists over the last two decades, there is now a sustained assault by enemies of open society

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against the laws, policies and movements for which our colleagues in civil society have fought.
Audacity in the face of opponents and our insistence on funding a diverse and unusual set of voices
have been defining elements of our strategies over the last 20+ years. This will continue. However,
our new strategy provides opportunity to close avenues that have not led us where we had hoped they
might and chart new territory where necessary, especially on intersectional justice. This strategy will
not be uniformly applied across the continent as country and regional circumstances will determine
how best to implement it in different geographies.
Finally, we are mindful of the tensions created by the ongoing OSF transformation. Our promise is to
be transparent and guided by values that include a feminist ethos, inclusivity, pan-African solidarity
and accountability.

B. CONTEXT AND FIELD ANALYSIS: Africa’s political economy

OSF began its work in Africa during the decades of hope for the continent. OSF-SA began its work
in 1993, as South Africa was preparing for its first democratic elections. In Southern Africa, the first
regional foundation opened as the end of Apartheid and the decolonisation of Namibia accompanied
the end of civil wars in Angola and Mozambique. OSF opened its second regional foundation in
West Africa, where most Francophone countries were undergoing democratic transition, initiated
during by a wave of national conferences. The end of military regimes in Ghana and Nigeria gave
rise to the first pluralist elections in those countries. OSIWA set up its offices in Dakar the year
Senegal had its first democratic transition from the ruling party to the opposition. OSIEA started
during the euphoria of the first democratic transition in Kenya, while governments resulting from
armed revolutions in Ethiopia, Eritrea, Rwanda and Uganda promised to project East Africa towards
unprecedented developmental democracy.
The wind of change and hope then sweeping the continent saw the emergence of civil society
determined to ensure public policies consolidated promised transformations. Groups intensified civic
education and improved election monitoring and protection techniques. Organisations strove to
ensure greater access to justice. Activists analysed the impact of budget choices on people’s quality
of life and monitored public spending. Governments and state institutions made progress making
decision-making procedures transparent and open to greater public participation.
The end of the Cold War led to predictions of the loss of geostrategic interest in Africa. As if to
disprove these predictions, a double revolution flourished. The democratic revolution—also referred
to as the Second Revolution after the Independence movement of the 1960s—started at the beginning
of the 1990s. And the ‘African Renaissance’ ushered in by the transformation of the OAU into the
AU. The democratic revolution was characterised by an unprecedented wave of norm-setting and
institution-building towards constitutionalism, laws and practices for better governance and greater
respect for human rights. National human rights institutions and anti-corruption bodies were set up,
the judiciary strengthened together with oversight institutions such as parliamentary committees or
public auditors. The AU and regional blocs also adopted norms and standards to promote democratic
principles and institutions, combat unconstitutional changes of government and promote popular
participation and human rights. Foundational documents included: the AU’s Constitutive Act (2000);
the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD, 2001); the African Peer Review
Mechanism (APRM, 2002); the AU Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption (2003);
and the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance (2007).

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It is a paradox that interest in Africa as a frontier market and a theatre for ideological geopolitical and
security battles is resurfacing today as the two revolutions described above are experiencing
exhaustion. From the start of the 2010s, there has been an erosion of the democratic gains of the past
three decades. Although Afrobarometer, the pan-African polling and research organisation, continues
to record popular attachment to democracy, the euphoria of the 1990s has evaporated.
Constitutionalism has come to a halt as constitutional advances, such as presidential term limits, are
being dismantled. Popular participation has been reduced to formalities, with pluralist elections
producing authoritarian governments. National human rights and anti-corruption institutions are
failing, while the judiciary has been weakened, by co-option, intimidation and financial asphyxiation.
Progress turned out to be more fragile than anticipated. These transitions took place at the height of
the neoliberal wave, whose good governance agenda carried a narrow definition of democracy as
multi-party, free and fair elections, constitutionalism and rule of law. This formal approach resulted
from the conception of democratic transition as divorced from an economic and social agenda, which
compelled African states to liberalise, open their fledgling markets to foreign competition and
disinvest from structural transformation and the provision of public goods such as education and
health.
A notable tendency is to isolate economic problems from political and social problems and insist on
addressing them as a priority. The first generation of post-independence political leaders were
community and trade union leaders who owed their credentials as mass organisers and their
participation in the post-World War II struggle for political emancipation. From the 1980s, Africa
saw the emergence of a new class of political leaders who base their reputation on their economic
expertise. Some came straight from IFIs and have little or no experience in community or trade union
organising. State agencies are invaded by technical experts. Pursuing economic growth and
maintaining a good business climate now come before addressing inequality and the people’s low
purchasing power. Reforms are assessed based on their technical soundness rather than their political
and social impacts. Throughout the design and implementation of these reforms, IFIs’ and rating
agencies’ opinions outweigh those of parliaments and national interest groups. Forms of political
consultation, such as elections and parliamentary debates seen as a nuisance if they threaten
efficiency.
Attempts to isolate the economy from political interference have proven illusory and
counterproductive. The prevailing neoliberal economic orthodoxy has led to atrophy of African
states, an erosion of investments in public goods and services and a disinterest in the impacts of
climate change. This thinking has not only emerged from outside, it is also pervasive amongst the
continent’s political and economic elites, together with self-destructive internal politics.
We see this in, for example, the consequences of the neoliberal wave of liberalisation and
privatisation in Africa. Both were promoted to introduce market discipline in the way the state
functions by reducing its grip on the economy. This, in turn, was meant to give birth to a local
business class which would prosper free from the interventionist state—a thesis inspired by 19th
century Europe, where the rise of an economic bourgeoisie favoured the birth of political freedoms.
In Africa, however, the opposite happened. In some cases, where the economic elite was weak or yet
to be built up, liberalisation and privatisation allowed the political elite to capture public resources
for its own benefit. In other cases, they created dependence on public resources by the economic
elite, preventing it from acting as a counterweight to the political elite. The complicity between the

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economic and political elites and the state plays out in a vicious way. To prosper, the economic elite
tends to seize control of—capture—the state. For its part, the political elite is too embedded in the
economy for the state to properly function as a guarantor of the public interest and regulator of the
economic elite. Governments thus resort to coercive and unpopular policies that undermine
transparency and close civic space.
The erosion of the social contract between a captured state and an impoverished populace is why the
nation-building gains of previous decades are unravelling. The erosion has given rise to its
fundamentalism and violent extremism on the part of non-state actors. With all West Africa now
within reach of fundamentalists, for example, violence is no longer the prerogative of failed states,
nor confined to territories or segments of society abandoned by the state. In Mali, violent extremism
emerged even as the government was applauded for its ‘consensual democracy’ that sought to bypass
electoral contests. Violent extremism in the Sahel and elsewhere feeds on the inability or
unwillingness to engage in public debate to confront divisions of affected societies―between
farmers and pastoralists, between descendants of different castes and between practitioners of
different forms of Islam
Regimes that come to power—by coup d’état—on the vow to ‘clean house’ and impose political
legitimacy also weaken the state. Military dictatorships are systematic in their weakening of political
culture and institutions through the institutionalisation of rents and co-optation. Modern versions
propose an alternative to neoliberalism in the form of a ‘developmental state’ based on the
proposition the primary task of the state is to provide security and public services and that political
freedoms and rights are permissible so long as their exercise does not interfere with this task.
However, the fragility of development achieved under this premise is evident in Ethiopia post-
EPRDF or post-crisis Cote d’Ivoire, with the risk of losing both developmental benefits and rule of
law and respect for freedoms.
In other words, the fragility of formal democratic transitions is increasingly apparent. Africa’s
longstanding challenges, such as patriarchal control over gender and sexuality, violence against
women and gender diverse people, poor management of difference and diversity, inequality, corrupt
and weak leadership, poverty and economic volatility remain rooted in the colonial, Apartheid and
Cold War eras. External actors continue to erode Africans’ voice and agency. These challenges
persist due to the failure of most African states to transform gendered power relations and the
colonial state. Africa faces the dual challenge of addressing its internal injustices, while also
addressing a global hierarchy of power that continues to systematically undermine it.
The AU reform process that began in 2016 was an admission the African Renaissance had hit a dead-
end and a recognition of the need to inject new momentum by refocusing the organisation’s priorities
and make it more efficient. A renewed African Renaissance will have to confront: gender inequality;
poor management of ethnic, religious and other forms of diversity; the threat of climate change; and
other threats best addressed collectively.
If change begins with a mental predisposition, the continent is in a better starting position thanks to
the discrediting of fatalistic theories about Africa. For a long time, it was fashionable to believe there
was something uniquely African about Africa’s structural weaknesses. But the 2008 global financial
crisis showed that continents outside of Africa suffer from the same pathologies and require the same
types of therapies. No one now believes attacks on democracy only happen in Africa.

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Authoritarianism and populism in Western Europe and North America refute the notion that
democracy’s fragility uniquely African. Likewise, during the COVID-19 crisis, the predictions for
Africa turned out to be false.
Once the doom has been deconstructed, it is important to gamble on Africa’s strengths. One of these
is the resurrection of African feminism. African feminists were part of anti-colonial liberation
movements. During the 20th century, African feminist movements continued to demand freedom,
equality and rights. However, feminist movements contend with misrepresentation of feminism as
‘un-African’ and Western by conservative women and men who wish to maintain pre-colonial
patriarchal orders. The same heteronormative rhetoric is used to describe homosexuality as un-
African’ and use colonial laws to threaten and violate the rights of LGBTQI+ people on the
continent. African feminism is a political framework identifying patriarchal power, sexism and
misogyny as a fundamental source of injustice and inequality and calling for the freedom of all
African women.
Public or civil society institutions to monitor democratic transitions seem depleted. But the vacuum
created gives rise to new and younger social movements proposing new types of civic engagement.
The youth are another asset. Not only does Africa have the youngest population, its young people are
among the most politically engaged. Showing imagination, including through innovative mastery of
new information and communication technologies, African youth are now the forefront of the fight
against authoritarianism, injustice and inequality.
One of the lessons of COVID-19 is that restoring state agency is not just desirable—it is a necessity.
Just as inaction by the State enabled the most disastrous health consequences of the pandemic, the
economic and social effects of the pandemic can only be mitigated by the State.
The continent is also renewing the drive for renewed and fairer multilateralism. Agreeing to the
AfCFTA amidst the wave of nationalist retrenchments from multilateralism globally sends a signal.
The Global South-led push for vaccine justice, anchored in a unified common African position at the
WTO, is another such signal. We therefore anchor our work in change to restore Africa’s voice and
agency, that is owned by people domestically and connected to multilateral mechanisms and
processes. Achieving better economic and societal outcomes for Africans requires us to
conceptualise our work in a framing of a global Africa: one that seeks to maximise its impacts on
global policy, politics and practice, for domestic and continental change.

C. A NEW OSF IN AFRICA: our role, vision, mission and principles

Role: To respond to the changing context presented in the field analysis (Section B), OSF is seeking
to intensify its engagement in Africa in the coming five years. To do so effectively, OSF is
integrating its five African entities into a One Africa structure and team, optimised to deliver a
single, coherent One Africa strategy that is locally rooted, regionally relevant, continentally critical
and globally assertive. The One Africa Strategy (2022-6) comes when OSF overall is becoming a
more global organisation by re-affirming our proximity to local challenges, becoming more
regionally-driven, focusing our global efforts on fewer priorities and adhering to a more integrated
approach across the network—all aimed at achieving significant, long-lasting external impacts.
OSF’s work globally is committed to Expression, Justice and Equity, with cross-cutting work around
climate and intersectional justice. The One Africa strategy seeks to advance similar priorities on the

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continent, rooted in and framed from an African perspective to meet present-day, interconnected
challenges to open society.
Building on three decades of work in Africa, 1 we are restructuring our work with a pan-African
approach to present-day challenges and opportunities on the continent. In so doing, OSF will become
the largest political philanthropy in Africa, uniquely poised to have impact at scale and able to
contribute to tangible open society victories. This aspiration demands a robust approach to our
framing, tracking and assessment of results as well as learning to realise our impact goals.
As a political philanthropy, our efforts will focus on supporting structural change and necessarily
taking a long-term view of our work and partnerships. We will be open and willing to take risks,
experiment and innovative in pursuit of impact at scale, including through work on important issues
no one else is willing to engage on and learning from our efforts as we create pathways for others.
This has implications for the monitoring and evaluation as well as learning approaches and practices
we need to adopt going forward. We will seek to learn from our grantees, our own efforts and
experiences to feed back into our long-, medium- and short-term choices and decisions. As we
deliberately adopt a feminist, intersectional approach, we will employ feminist approaches and
practices to our grantmaking, partnership building and learning.
We will enhance advocacy in our own name on issues and situations that would benefit from OSF’s
voice, networks, tools and resources for progress on causes we share with our partners. However, we
are aware our ability to achieve transformative change at scale depends on how we partner
meaningfully with others (activists, institutions, movements, civil society and governments) to re-
energise a fit for purpose and vibrant ecosystem of social justice championing. Conscious of our own
power as a grantmaking institution and limitations as a global brand, we understand our place in the
African landscape being to play a catalytic, collaborative and supportive role in contributing to the
vision below.
Vision: An integrated, vibrant, self-respecting and globally-respected Africa, characterised by
democratic governance, sustainable development and economic systems that deliver more just,
inclusive and accountable outcomes with and for the people and the environment in Africa.
Mission: To advance gender justice and women’s rights, deepen democracy, accountable governance
and inclusive development in Africa through participatory and strategic grantmaking and advocacy.
We will give pre-eminence to and be guided by the ideas, voices and agency of African women,
youth, organisations and movements in pursuit of our vision and mission.
To achieve this, we will grow:
More equal and impactful partnerships: We remain dedicated to an inclusive partnership practice,
engaging with grantees and other stakeholders with mutuality and sensitivity to contextual realities
and requirements. We will assess our current portfolio to ensure the diversity of partners necessary
for our pan-African mandate, appropriate levels of engagement (from local to global) and scale to
achieve this strategy’s intended results. We will give larger grants to key anchor institutions for
longer periods while continuing to invest in emerging change-makers. We will connect our partners

1
OSF’s current reach is in four African regions (East, Central, Southern and West Africa), with 3,800 partners in 33
countries (ranging from community organisations to governments) and a budget of over USD120 million.

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working at different levels and scale to build coalitions. We will continue to invest all our funding in
African individuals and institutions on the continent and in Diaspora. To strengthen intersectional
gender justice, we will prioritise funding women-led and feminist organisations and strengthen
investments in younger feminist organising. To advance Africa’s place in the world and strengthen
African and Global South voices in global policy spaces, we will forge stronger South-South as well
as South-North alliances, together with and via our partners. Our partnerships, including with
governments, will be driven by our commitment to supporting peoples’ voice and agency as the
central force for change.
Advocacy: For the past three decades, OSF has supported the advocacy of partners and engaged in
direct advocacy. In step with OSF’s scaled-up investment in advocacy and campaigning, we will
intensify both tracks and ensure greater integration and coordination of the same. We will design a
joined-up, Africa-wide advocacy strategy to advance the objectives in this strategy. We will do so in
consultation with partners and key stakeholders, as the purpose of our pan-African advocacy is
supporting peoples’ initiatives for change.
Learning: We will increase our focus on monitoring, evaluating and learning to adapt our course
towards impact as we go, given the non-linearity of change and the uncertainty of our times. All our
work will be knowledge-based, to enable continuous improvement. We aim to be a thought leader in
select areas and will strategically share and use knowledge generated with relevant partners and
stakeholders. We will seek to overcome and rebalance patriarchal, white supremacist, elitist, neo-
colonial and neo-liberal tendencies in our knowledge production and uptake.
Strategic footprint: OSF current conducts work in 33 countries through 11 offices. We will
recalibrate our physical presence and continental reach through the One Africa strategy and structure.
In so doing, we will strike a balance between proximity to local realities and appropriate coverage of
the continent, leveraging the most politically strategic spaces and ensuring we are in places most
conducive for or in need of open society work.
People and culture: As we transform into the One Africa structure, we renew our commitment to
build a cutting-edge pan-African team that is curious, bold, collaborative, committed to the highest
standards of integrity and impact-oriented. We will build a work environment in which we treat each
other with empathy and respect, in which diversity of thought and equality is fostered and
organisational values are lived and practiced.
Principles: We will be guided by the following principles in all our engagements―internally as well
as externally:
● Pan-African solidarity: While recognising Africa’s diversity, we will join hands, support and
collaborate across boundaries to deepen and model Africans’ aspirations for greater integration
and unity based on shared values;
● Equality: Everyone has the right to be treated fairly and to have the same rights and
opportunities;
● Inclusivity: We embrace diversity and draw inspiration from the different perspectives and
contributions of all people and communities in their respective and interconnected struggles
against poverty and injustice. We espouse the same values internally and our recruitment, staffing
and interventions will adhere to diversity;

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● Humility: We will value others and lifting their stories, admit mistakes and acknowledge the
power dynamics inherent to philanthropy;
● Courage: Our work is grounded in our commitment to the universality and indivisibility of
human rights. We will speak truth to power and not be beholden to any sectarian, political or
corporate interests. We will act with conviction in the justice of our causes;
● Accountability: We will take responsibility for our actions and hold ourselves accountable to the
people we work with and for;
● Knowledge-driven innovation: We believe in the power of African culture, knowledge, narratives
and lived experiences to generate solutions for both African and global open society challenges.
We will invest in the Africa’s cultural, intellectual, people and institutional power to advance our
causes in innovative ways;
● Transformation orientation: Our work is centred on African peoples’ own initiatives for change
and we will acknowledge and seek to expand people’s voice and agency over their own lives and
the decisions that impact them. We will seek to add value towards tangible results for the lives of
the people, communities and constituencies we serve.

D. HOW CHANGE HAPPENS: theory of change and approaches

Theory of change: Our ambition is to contribute to transformative change at the national, regional,
continental and global levels. We are guided by the African proverb: ‘If you want to go fast, go alone
and if you want to go far, go with others.’ We will therefore achieve impact by being part of a pan-
African ecosystem towards political and socio-economic transformation driven by values of
economic and social justice. We will seek change at scale by acting in solidarity with and amplifying
the voices and agency of people most directly affected by autocracy, exclusion, human rights
violations, injustice and poverty.
This work is consolidated in areas where OSF has traction and value-add vis-à-vis other
philanthropies. Our work rests on the principle that we must support processes of re-balancing power
in political life, how the economy interfaces with society and how people’s dignity is upheld through
their rights. Failed political and economic governance and unsustainable policy frameworks have
given rise to challenges manifest in religious fundamentalism, a culture of repression and violence,
including violence against women, poor healthcare and poor and non-inclusive education systems.
Our aspiration is to support the voice and agency of the most marginalised and the progressive
pursuit of Expression and Participation, Security and Rights, Accountability and Justice and
Opportunity and Equity. Our work centres democratic practice, respect for human rights and
principles of economic and social justice.
Power dynamics have become more complex—shifting from formal state institutions and people as
major interlocutors to multiple and invisible webs of players. OSF has to consistently and effectively
support strategies that seek to visibilise, challenge and transform these power dynamics. Some
problems manifest at the local level but have global roots. Such problems may require collective,
pan-African and global responses, such as COVID-19 and climate change. Political and economic
elites in Africa are also connected from the local to the global levels, and addressing challenges
caused by elite collusion requires global solidarity within and beyond OSF.

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Our understanding is that change comes from multiple angles of influence. Dismantling patriarchal
and heteronormative power structures and addressing fragility, inequality and poverty requires an
understanding of visible, hidden and invisible power which oppresses and profits from the
marginalised. Power dynamics are always shifting in ways that we cannot always predict, and our
approach will therefore be open to adjustments. Our efforts will be focused where our impacts will
be most significant--where people are most affected by injustice, discrimination, exclusion,
inequality and poverty or where our influence on people, institutions and decision-making has the
potential to transform lives. To meet this complex and unpredictable future, we need to improve our
ability to adapt rapidly to changing contexts. Our menu of approaches and tools will enable us to
achieve distinctive and measurable impact. The following constitutes our theory of change and will
inform everything we do.
People power: We will amplify the voices and actions of African artists, activists, academics, civil
society, social movements, private sector and state actors as well as any other stakeholders working
to combat discrimination, inequality, injustice, impunity and poverty. We will offer financial and
other forms of support where needed and advocate for and act with them to transform their lives.
This includes supporting offline and online mobilisation and organisation to shift narratives, change
opinions and engage decisionmakers at national, regional, continental and international levels
through strategic communications.
Gender justice: We will adopt a gender justice approach across all our work. We will prioritise
approaches and solutions that seek to end discrimination, rights violations and injustice suffered by
women and gender non-conforming people. We will adopt inclusive approaches that focus on better
understanding and dismantling hierarchy and subordination, as well as how power relations drive
inequality, injustice and poverty (including religious fundamentalism, oppressive masculinities and
systemic racism). We will also support LGBTQI+ and gender non-binary people to affirm the right
of all persons to freedom of gender identity and sexual orientation and challenge the regulation and
control of people’s bodies, choice and gender and sexual identities.
Cross-issue and cross-movement organising: We will build coalitions within, across and between
countries, regions and continents across disciplines, issues and themes from the local to the global
levels. We will leverage the power of collective knowledge to understand and respond to inequality,
injustice, impunity and poverty from local, regional, continental, Northern and Southern causes. We
will raise awareness about how norms and institutions (public and private) that cause inequality,
injustice, impunity and poverty are interrelated across geographies, issues and themes by supporting
and connecting communities, civil society and social movements across countries and regions within
and beyond Africa. We will build on their knowledge and campaign together to influence decision-
making and achieve solutions.
Building South-South and South-North power: We will engage with relevant Global North and South
powers, including BRICS, as well as key multilateral processes addressing development, security,
development financing, debt and climate. When relevant, we will engage and/or partner with the
RECs and AU as well as regional development banks, the UN and IFIs and other multilateral
initiatives and institutions. We will work to ensure the impact of Africa within OSF and the broader
world. Africa and Africans have solutions both for African and global governance and development
challenges and common challenges of different continents require common solutions and greater
collaboration.

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Our theory of change supports working with partners to implement catalytic, context-specific and
strategic interventions to achieve positive change in the attitudes and behaviour of peoples, the
private sector, governments and regional bodies. Our ambition is to invest in both high impact, short-
term opportunities as well as long-term structural transformation. IF we invest in strengthening
broad-based movements, including new youth and women’s movements, intersectional and pan-
African approaches, as well as progressive state and private actors, THEN we will build critical mass
towards transformative change in communities, national spaces and on the continent. The key is to
make the private sectors, regional and international bodies more responsive and accountable to
peoples’ needs, the marginalised in particular.
How we will work for change: This strategy will further require context-specific readings to better
determine how to implement it in our different sub-regions. Tactical and operational choices will be
made. We will not sacrifice nuance and specificity in pursuit of a continental approach. We will
incentivise curiosity and dynamism by reducing bureaucratic, administrative and financial barriers
inhibiting pan-African funding and advocacy. We will use a range of approaches and tools as
follows:
Grantmaking: With a focus on leadership development and community engagement to elevate the
voices and experiences of the marginalised. Grants will support mobilising and organising by those
fighting exclusion, injustice, impunity and poverty. We will provide direct assistance and collaborate
with them to drive positive change. To advance gender justice, we will fund women-led and feminist
and intersectional organisations and movements, including those of LGBTQI+ individuals. We will
provide flexible, core support and longer-term grants and use feminist tracking, assessment and
measuring approaches and tools.
Arts and culture: We will support artists and cultural producers to disrupt the causes of crisis and
fragility, including storytelling by those drowned out, suppressed or ignored and expanding the
intersections between entertainment and democracy, rights and economic and social justice
promotion.
Knowledge-generation and research: To improve the evidence base for advocacy and policy
engagement. We believe in the leadership, agency and power of African knowledge and research
institutions to provide solutions to African and global challenges. We will invest in strengthening
evidence-based African narratives and knowledge. We will seek to generate new insights into
solutions to problems. We will support inter-generational exchange and learnings to build and
transfer skills.
Convenings, collaborations and partnerships: We will expand our convening role nationally and
continentally by strategically collaborating with others to expand our knowledge and collective
influence. We will find egalitarian and flexible ways of engaging, adapt to their ways of working and
hold ourselves accountable to them. We will adapt our approaches, processes and systems to ensure
greater agility, innovation, responsiveness and mutual respect in our collaborations.
Advocacy and campaigns: As we increase our own advocacy and campaigns, we will not supplant
African voices and agency with our own. We act with and for our grantees. Our advocacy will be
pan-African focused and led, but we will always determine the best entry point (national, regional or
continental) to advance a particular advocacy goal based on our analysis of context and actors, as
well as on our own and our partners’ capabilities.

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Strategic litigation: This is one change pathway as, in the era of growing political intolerance, the
courts are one of the few spaces where authority can be questioned, dissent expressed and
independent scrutiny applied. We will, where appropriate, work with JI on this.
African philanthropy and impact investment: Africa has a fast-growing philanthropic sector made up
of foundations, impact investment funds and various forms of community savings and investment
tools. Notwithstanding its dynamism, capital flows to, on and across the continent are mired in
gender and racial bias. We want to see a more just philanthropic and investment field in Africa,
serving the ambitions of Africans, disrupting power dynamics in decision-making and anchored in a
self-determined agenda for change. We will: a) support deepening and strengthening African
philanthropy and research on giving in Africa; b) accelerate our partnership with SEDF and African
investment funds to address bias, co-define social impact and ensure more tailored capital flows to
African businesses; and c) proactively identify potential opportunities to support women and younger
people in accessing financial capital for socially impact investments.
Learning: A key principle is learning from what we do and how we do it to maximise our impact and
that of our partners in a context characterised by increased needs and limited resources. We will
adopt an integrated learning approach―encouraging individual learning, team learning,
organisational learning and inter-organizational learning with effective feedback loops and
mechanisms. Key will be learning from the field—our grantees and communities, who are the
custodians of knowledge as to what works best for them.

E. PROGRAMME PRIORITIES, GEOGRAPHIES AND TIMELINES

We will apply the above theory of change to advance progress on our four pillars of work (that
mirrors OSF’s global pillars: Expression and Participation; Security and Rights; Accountability and
Justice; and Opportunity and Equity. The pillars are big picture lens through which we understand
our work and our value-add―across thematic and geographic specificities―and from which we
derive our four strategic goals:
1. Expression and participation: Amplify people’s voices, through conscious organising to express
themselves and participate in public life, challenge and disrupt the exercise of unchecked power
and hold public and private bodies to account;
2. Security and Rights: Promote a rights-based approach to security sector governance and
accountability and respond to existing and emerging security challenges;
3. Accountability and Justice: Promote accountable, just and inclusive democracies governed by
law in which rights are promoted and protected;
4. Opportunity and Equity: Support progressive economic and social norms, policies and practices
that create opportunity and promote equality and rights.
Shifting power in favour of women and young people is central to our work. We will commit that at
least 30% of our grantmaking, advocacy, campaigning and overall programming budget to women-
led and feminist organisations. Overall, a minimum of 50% of our budget will be committed to both
women-led as well as youth-led and focused organisations.
To achieve the strategic goals, several objectives are conceived as critical and concrete enablers,
utilising the approaches and tools outlined in Section D. While themes (framed at present as: political

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governance; human rights; and economic justice) remain one way to organise our work, this
strategy—through the four pillars—seeks to break unhelpful thematic silos and inspire cross-
thematic thinking and collaborative action to respond in a joined-up fashion to Africa’s open society
challenges. Similarly, on geography, this strategy seeks to break artificial geographic silos in the way
we understand the continent and how we approach our work. As such, this strategy and the section
below elaborates an Africa-wide roadmap for more concerted and cohesive progress towards our
mission for the continent. Underpinning our collective pan-African ambition will necessarily be
specific interventions in key countries and regions with tactical choices about investments and tools
to bring to bear, based on contextual and intersectional analysis. We will invest in African
knowledge-generation and horizon scanning (in-house and externally) to determine our best entry
points to move the needle on a particular issue or situation. In this section, broad geographic
implications are laid out under each pillar as guides to be further fleshed out during implementation.
Finally, while this is a five-year strategy, we will improve our agility to respond to our dynamic
continent and adapt as needed across contexts and over time—especially given that it is OSF’s first
Africa-wide strategy, to be implemented by a brand-new, One Africa structure. Living our values of
being knowledge-driven, transformation-oriented and accountable, we will use the 2022-6 period to
further refine and strengthen OSF’s strategic path in an iterative fashion and therefore will strengthen
our MEL. We are committed to the collective, pan-African vision and ambition but remain flexible—
and teachable—in our thinking and approaches to getting there.

1. EXPRESSION AND PARTICIPATION

Goal 1: Amplify people’s voices, through conscious organising to express themselves and
participate in public life, challenge and disrupt the exercise of unchecked power and hold
public and private bodies to account.
Inclusive and vibrant democracies require engaged peoples, free to express themselves and
participate in democratic processes. Expression and participation are limited in most African
countries, where civic and political space is closed or closing due to the enactment of laws that
restrict political freedoms and the economic marginalisation of most Africans, particularly women
and the youth. To promote expression and participation, we will support disrupting and resisting the
capture of democratic processes and institutions to defend against rising authoritarianism.
Investments will also go to building an ecosystem supportive of people’s organising by: promoting
access to information and digital rights; supporting protections for HRDs, particularly WHRDs;
reclaiming civic space using tools such as strategic litigation; building strong solidarity networks and
movements; using arts and new age technology; and deepening actors’ understanding of state
capture.
Geography: Investments under this pillar will prioritise countries in which gains have been made and
need sustaining and/or countries in need of democratic consolidation. The work on HRD protection
will be implemented across the continent.
1.1. Resisting the capture of democratic processes and institutions to defend against rising
authoritarianism
We will support the generation of knowledge and deepening of understanding about the capture of
democratic institutions and processes (investigations, research, publication and education on the
manifestations and impacts of capture, including by corporations and technology, in select countries).

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We will support people’s organising and mobilising to push back against capture and rising
authoritarianism: artists, community organisations, feminist and youth social movements challenging
existing narratives and demanding accountability. This will include: catalysing dialogues and debates
linking African thinkers with people’s engagement; building regional collaborations; and supporting
those exposing and challenging corporate overreach and excessive profiteering. We will also support
civic actors and social movements in ungovernable spaces. We will strengthen access to information,
investigative journalism and narrative-shaping to expose and highlight capture and authoritarianism
and use the media to amplify voices of resistance. We will support the review, adoption and
implementation of AU mechanisms against capture.
1.2. Resisting the capture of electoral processes and institutions
The capture of electoral institutions and processes means most African elections are inordinately
expensive and violent in instances of disputed electoral outcomes. We will support initiatives aimed
at improving and upholding the integrity of electoral processes and institutions, including organising
and advocacy to delegitimise fraudulent elections. Investments will build peoples’ capacity to
advance electoral reform and disrupt capture through documentation, investigative journalism,
strategic communications and strategic litigation. We will support the transparent and effective
deployment of ICT in electoral management. We will seize electoral moments to advance other key
demands. We will also support women and young people’s participation in the electoral process and
strengthen civic capabilities to analyse electoral processes quantitatively and qualitatively. A
political analysis of each country where elections work is proposed will be undertaken to guide
specific investments.
1.3. Promoting access to information, digital rights and independent media
To promote access to information, digital rights and independent media, we will support content-
creation and diffusion of credible information through community-based platforms and digital tools
to provide counter-narratives to attempts by governments and the private sector to misinform the
populace. We will support media literacy and strengthen civic capacities to detect and expose dis-
and misinformation.
We will support independent investigative journalism and alternative media channels, including
specialised reportage on the economy and climate change. We will support narrative change work,
elevating African content creation and storytelling, and build regional solidarity and networks for
cross-border reporting. Finally, we will support greater affordable Internet access and invest in the
protection of journalists against reprisals.
Strengthening digital rights: Developments in digital technology present increased opportunities to
enable people to access and use information to hold governments and other duty bearers accountable.
At the same time, increased use of digital surveillance is a threat to democratisation, as is the use of
Internet shutdowns to curtail people’s expression and protest. These shutdowns also restrict
commerce, threatening livelihoods.
We will invest in building capacity for data collection and engagement in the development of laws
related to privacy, data protection and access to information. This includes supporting: the fair
regulation of digital technology in a way that expands access to the Internet and curtails surveillance
and algorithmic bias; accountability of big tech on the use of technology in surveillance and the use
of algorithms to feed populist or narratives and electoral manipulation advancing authoritarianism.

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We will support those advancing human rights in non-traditional ways through the creative use of
social media as an alternative civic space and strengthening the skills of frontline individuals and
organisations.
1.4. Promoting arts and culture for expression and participation
We recognise arts and culture as both rights and tools for promoting expression and participation.
Arts and culture are pivotal to expanding civic space, providing avenues for building consciousness
and enabling expression in closing spaces and voicing of the liberation demands of the marginalised.
Arts and culture also enable diverse narratives, contributing to tolerant, plural and democratic
societies. We will support artists and cultural producers, including: skills-building in marginalised
communities; and the construction and promotion of platforms that integrate and strengthen the
collective voice of artists and cultural actors.
1.5. Supporting HRDs in advancing rights and challenging the abuse of power by state and
non-state actors
Advancing expression and participation will be resisted by many African states, creating risks for
HRDs, WHRDs and pro-democracy champions. We will support and stand in solidarity with those
who seek justice, accountability and equitable access to resources. As WHRDs are more at risk,
facing double stigmatisation and the risk of sexual violence, they will receive special attention under
this pillar.
We will support interventions that provide resources and capacity for timely and effective emergency
response and protection as well as HRD platforms across Africa. To address digital surveillance, we
will explore new partnerships to enhance digital security. We will contribute to donor platforms with
the capacity to engage governments and intergovernmental institutions to build in a greater focus on
prevention. Tools to advance this portfolio will include: grantmaking, strategic communications and
advocacy as well as strategic litigation.
EXPECTED RESULTS

● Bold, innovative and effective movements resisting autocracy and capture and demanding their
rights;
● Strong, broad-based women’s and LGBTQI+ movements resisting patriarchy and other forms of
oppression and pressuring governments and corporations to respect women’s rights;
● Increased civic participation and public accountability for the distribution of resources and
delivery of quality public services;
● Legislation that protects people’s privacy, data and digital rights;
● Increased diversity and pluralism in information producers and distributors;
● Increased surfacing of abuse of power and corruption through investigative journalism, with
cases brought to the courts and justice being served;
● Increased use of strategic litigation to challenge arbitrary state actions and corporate actions that
violate human rights;
● Strong frameworks and platforms to support HRDs and WHRDs.

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2. SECURITY AND RIGHTS

Goal 2: Promote a rights-based approach to security sector governance and accountability
and respond to existing and emerging security challenges.
Stabilising and advancing African democracy require concerted efforts to address the continent’s
pervasive insecurity. Africa is plagued by security challenges giving rise to gross and systemic
human rights violations and grave crimes. Africa’s protracted insecurity has its roots in failed
political governance, economic policies and global injustice resulting in joblessness, vulnerability to
shocks such as COVID-19 and climate change, exposing Africa’s woman and youth in particular
religious and other identity fundamentalist and extremist violence. Protracted conflicts have
devolved into criminal enterprises with deep-seated interests making resolution difficult. Ungoverned
territories under control of insurgents and terrorist groups are expanding and the adverse effects of
disrupted trade, climate change and food (in)security is impoverishing people and fuelling further
violence. Geopolitics in the Sahel, Gulf of Guinea, Lake Chad Basin and the Horn of Africa and their
intersection with various elites in the private sector (foreign corporate interests) and the State has
enabled capture of the state and democratic processes by militaristic interests. Many countries
struggling to transit to democracy are governed by militaristic regimes, making militarism a key
factor hindering democratic transformation. Chad, Ethiopia, Nigeria, Rwanda, South Sudan, the
Sudan, Uganda and Zimbabwe are a few examples. We will support the growth of an accountable
security sector and promote civilian oversight of security agencies. We will also invest in changing
dominant narratives about terrorism while advancing accountability for the human rights violations
characteristic of state responses to violent extremism. While our overall framing is that of human
security, beyond responding to crises, we will focus on the nexus between insecurity, crisis and
rights.
2.1. Supporting civilian oversight of and an accountable security sector
We will support efforts to hold military power accountable to civilian authorities and security sector
reforms to address the role of military in democratic processes and systems, including demands for
accountability.
We will build an understanding of militarism through comparative research, mapping securitisation
in selected countries. We will be working with the AU and RECs to develop and monitor norms and
standards on the role of the security sector, including Agenda 2063 [Free Movement, Malabo
Protocols (Court of Justice and Human Rights)] and develop reporting systems with the AU and the
ACHPR. We will support efforts to hold military power accountable to civilian authorities and
security sector reforms to reshape the role of the military in democratic processes, including
providing demands for accountability. We will also support advocacy to inform and build alliances
with organisations with niche expertise in security and challenge the influence of foreign actors in
African militaries in so far as it contributes to increased militarisation of democratic processes.
2.2. Supporting narrative change around insecurity and terrorism
We will seek to change dominant narratives on terrorism while also advancing accountability for
human rights violations characteristic of state responses to violent extremism. We will support
evidence-based analysis on violent extremism and the provision of said analysis for engagement.
This will include strengthening: research foregrounding voices from affected communities on
continental insurgencies in the continent; and research on foreign actors involved to advance more

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nuanced geopolitical framing. We will support: narrative change as concerns terrorism, focused on
governance gaps and community agency; and public demands for legal and institutional transparency
related to security and military funding and cooperation agreements.
2.3. Security and safety for women and girls in conflict areas and sexual and gender
minority groups advanced
During conflict, sexual violence, unwanted pregnancies and STIs, including HIV/AIDS, and trauma
increase. Women and sexual and gender minorities tend to suffer disproportionately. Access to
services, especially SRHR and psychosocial services and access to PEP, critical for recovery, is
limited.
We will invest in feminist analysis of securitisation of political and economic governance and
support peace-building efforts that build stakeholder capacity to prevent, stop and hold perpetrators
of sexual violence accountable.
EXPECTED RESULTS

● In select countries experiencing militarism or undergoing violent extremism, voices of those

impacted amplified towards sustainable solutions;
● An understanding of militarism and violent extremism’s impacts on those affected informs state
responses;
● Those affected using regional norms and mechanisms state, non-state and external actors
accountable for human rights violations and grave crimes;
● Accountability and justice for women in militarised contexts or contexts of violent extremism.

3. ACCOUNTABILITY AND JUSTICE

Goal 3: Promote accountable, just and inclusive democracies governed by law in which rights
are promoted and protected
Accountability and justice require that the state and its institutions have the capacity to both
effectively perform and function within the constraints of the law. In many African countries, the
rule of law and accountability institutions are captured or weak. Accountability institutions are also
patriarchal and have not transformed from their colonial roots. Classist and racist colonial laws
remain, which criminalising many people. Although such laws were recently successfully challenged
before the ACHPR, they remain the basis of policing. The existence of multiple legal regimes
(traditional, religious and statutory) deny women their rights. This legal and institutional set-up
underpins today’s rising authoritarianism and complicate demands for accountability in cases of
human rights violations and grave crimes.
We will support efforts aimed at promoting the rule of law and challenging the abuse of power by
states, non-state, private sector and foreign actors towards legal and institutional reform,
accountability and justice.
Geography: This work will be anchored in countries where legal and institutional strengthening is
possible and those experiencing human rights violations, grave crimes and impunity.

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3.1. Promoting institutional transformation and renewal for accountability and justice
To advance accountability and justice (including gender justice), we will support the reform and
strengthening of independent oversight mechanisms and institutions in select countries to promote
transparency and accountability (parliament, the judiciary, election management bodies, human
rights, public procurement, public resource management and anti-corruption agencies as well as
other public watchdogs such as Ombudspeople’s office).
We will support the policing reforms and the strengthening of prosecutorial capacities to enhancing
state capacities to deliver justice and address corruption. To improve the broader political
environment defining the character and performance of these institutions, we will also support civil
society’s proactive engagement in the design and implementation of these reforms through: training,
civic engagement platforms and social movements; South-South experience-sharing and learning;
campaigning and litigation). We will support efforts towards a pluralistic media ecosystem to
investigate and expose abuses of power.
3.2. Strengthening national, regional and continental human rights and legal accountability
mechanisms towards better human rights protection and access to justice
At the core of accountability is the right to an effective remedy for survivors and victims in the form
of norms, institutions and processes. We will support interventions to advance judicial independence
and adherence to procedural safeguards in criminal proceedings. We will support legal and policy
reform to enhance human rights and accountability institutions (national human rights institutions
and policing oversight agencies). We will support historically marginalised groups (women,
LBTQTI+ communities and PWDs) in addressing the systemic discrimination that denies them
access to justice from these institutions.
In addition, we will support efforts aimed at building capacity for investigations, transitional and
international criminal justice proceedings, including with: national and sub-regional justice
mechanisms. We will support civic actors’ documentation, reporting on and advocacy towards
accountability for gross and systemic human rights violations and grave crimes, including sexual
violence, at national, regional and international levels.
3.3. Challenging corporate power to ensure public institutions function without the influence
of capture
We will support work on business and human rights, challenging state and non-state actors violating
community rights through profiteering without community benefit, environmental damage and
pillage through: knowledge generation and research; investigative journalism; campaigns to expose
state and corporate capture and demand accountability; domestic and extraterritorial litigation; and
reform efforts on related laws, policy, laws and regulations. We will support voices demanding FPIC
and ensuring affected communities are involved in decision-making about benefit-sharing. We will
also support the review, adoption and implementation of AU mechanisms to mitigate against the
capture of accountability mechanisms.
3.4. Supporting and strengthening broad-based intersectional movements to advance human
rights and accountability agenda at the national, regional and international levels
To entrench human rights and accountability, it is essential to protect the individuals and movements
at the forefront of these struggles. The continent is in need of reinvigorated and robust human rights

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and accountability intersectional movements employing new tactics and tools to effectively respond
to the needs of the time.
In recognition of the potential of African youth to drive change, we will support youth-led human
rights and accountability movements in developing new organising and mobilising strategies,
engaging new allies and re-energising their support base. We will support efforts to develop and
advance youth leadership in civil society, politics and the economy, including through: cross-border
learning; digital activism; as well as content development and narrative change.
We will also support African solidarity movement-building to respond to human rights and
accountability challenges around the continent including through protection institutions and
platforms.
EXPECTED RESULTS

● More transparent and accountable governance evidenced through enhanced independence and
strengthening of select democratic, human rights and rule of law institutions;
● Improved laws and policies to protect human rights;
● Improved mechanisms to challenge undue corporate power and influence;
● More citizen organising and mobilising into effective movements against autocracy and capture,
demanding rights, challenging injustice and demanding accountability;
● Sustainable solutions to protracted conflicts and recurring crisis generated by those most
impacted;
● Improved culture of human rights and the rule of law.

4. OPPORTUNITY AND EQUITY

Goal 4: Support progressive economic and social norms, policies and practices that create
opportunity and promote equality and rights.
Building and sustaining open societies means restoring the hope and trust that a continent of 1.3
billion people, with a median age of 18, has in the social contract, political life and economic
prospects. The continent’s future depends on whether young women and men, LGBTQI+ people and
other marginalised groups feel safe, like they belonging and can participate towards the of their and
their communities’ conditions. Space for public engagement is closing off. We need to re-catalyse
dynamism towards inter-generational dialogue, better representation and participation, access to
resources and services and transformation. Patriarchal prejudice, discrimination and other
inequalities rooted in culture and religion and colonialism continue to criminalise, exclude and
violate large segments of African populations. African economies continue to be based on
extractivist development patterns generating jobless growth and be fraught by cronyism and rent-
seeking, limited to only few, often a politically connected circle. We want to ensure political,
economic and social norms and practices create opportunity and promote equity, safety and rights,
particularly for women and young people. This work will focus on policies and regulation but we are
cognizant of the need for diffused ownership and greater service to the public interest. While the
mid-term goal is policies and regulation, the long-term goal is changing power dynamics in public
life towards economic justice.

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4.1. Access to justice and the rights of the marginalised

To counter discrimination, enhance equality and create a more inclusive Africa, we will support legal
and policy reform as well as organising and mobilising to challenge systemic barriers faced by
marginalised persons. We will support challenges (including legal challenges) to the weaponisation
of laws and policies against identity and support the enactment of laws and policies to protect the
rights of the marginalised. Structurally, we will support approaches and tools aimed at improving the
administration of criminal justice. Women, LGBTQI+ and sex worker communities in particular face
legal, economic and social discrimination.
4.2. Addressing inequality by supporting transformative policies and practice
Years of underinvestment, together with the undermining and destruction of public institutions due to
internal governance failures and external pressures make it challenging to rebuild the social contract.
Our goal is to enhance the ability of fragmented civil society to demanding more viable, well-
resourced and accountable states that prioritise well-being through progressive social policies.
Health and education as essential public goods: Many Africans have to contend with non-existent or
dysfunctional public services while remaining unable to pursue their right to these essential public
good, exacerbated by systemic discrimination on class, gender, racial, ethnic and other grounds.
COVID-19 provides the opportunity to reclaim essential public goods (health and education). We
will support organising and mobilising towards agency and accountability, focused on universal
healthcare and insurance as well as education. We will focus on rights, governance and financing of
these essential public goods. We will invest in institutions responsible for guaranteeing access to
health and education and support processes towards greater domestic financing on the same. We will
seek to ensure African perspectives and ambitions also shape global health and education governance
and financing. This work will take place in select countries, connecting civil society across
specialties and geographies in support of uptake of policy commitments on health and education
from the RECs and continental institutions.
Engagement in support of social policy, led by women and young people: We will support
movements in favour of social protection and invest in generating policy options on the same,
including through: enhancing the bargaining power of (women) workers in the informal sector; and
working with states, RECs and the AU on the harmonisation, piloting and implementation of cross-
country frameworks. This is a space few philanthropies are willing to invest in, where we think
scalable change can emerge. Finally, we will support work towards the continental recognition of the
care economy as an economic building block, including by currently underfunded, pan-African,
feminist alternatives. While this work is cross-country, we will identify a limited set of countries
with political opportunities to advance scalable and replicable frameworks.
4.3. Supporting enablers and catalytic economic reforms towards people-centred, inclusive
and sustainable economies
Africa needs to both address internal economic deficiencies and, externally, leverage South-South
cooperation towards transformation of the international financial architecture. Both require sustained
political will and African integration, allowing the continent to speak and act as a unified bloc.
Support tax justice domestically and globally, to finance development: Taxation remains a potent
tool to address local and global inequalities. We will build on the global momentum towards tax,

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spearheaded by persistent demands from the Global South, to overhaul global tax rules and foster a
continent that is more self-reliant and independently driving its economic development. This work
will strengthen African and global momentum towards stemming illicit financial flows by supporting
synergies between research, civil society and movements to build political pressure for action, in
select countries where needs are most pressing and political openings exist. Nationally, we will
invest in addressing corruption in the management of public resources. At the continental level, we
will support institutions under African financial architecture (the African Central Bank, African
financial regulatory authorities, African tax institutions and African rating agencies) and calls for the
reform of the international financial architecture (fiscal and monetary policies driving Africa’s
cyclical debt crises as well as the regulation of private sector actors). In addressing sovereign debt,
we will also support domestic accountability mechanisms.
Making trade and investment work for Africans: The AfCFTA has the potential to break from
existing trade agreements and be a progressive force for change. It could be a rallying point for
peoples, civil society, formal and informal (women) workers and policymakers to engage around the
rules and regulations shaping our economies and economic activity. The AfCFTA is yet to finalize
phase II protocols on investment, intellectual property (IP) rights and competition policy. These all
affect the ability of states to maintain policy independence, uphold rights, create opportunity and
advance sustainable development and managing climate. To advance an agenda that centres rights
and opportunity, we will: support the representation and power of civil society and local enterprise in
shaping and monitoring implementation of the AfCFTA; advance a gendered approach as concerns
formal and informal labour and local enterprise; and support multidisciplinary spaces for African
expertise and activism advancing reform proposals towards gender and climate justice. This work
will have a sub-regional and continental outlook and will be led by anchor organisations with access
to bilateral and multilateral trade and investment spaces.
Reforming the management of natural resources: The continent remains economically dependent due
to an extractive development model. Natural resource management (beyond the mining and gas
sectors to Africa's forests, rivers and seas) needs transformation as concerns domestic ownership and
value chains. Beyond the accountability agenda (transparency and community rights), we will
support demands for transformation and transitions away from extractive industries and towards
more diversified, people-centred and climate-sensitive industries. This work will happen
continentally by supporting implementation of regional and continental natural resource management
frameworks, such as the AU’s African Mining Vision.
Supporting African and Global South proposals on new economic development models: We
recognise the violence of an unregulated and unchecked neoliberal and financialised view of
development that de-emphasises the well-being of people and communities. We will support spaces
and processes for African thinkers, activists and policymakers to challenge economic orthodoxies in
ways that reflect African contexts and priorities and go beyond critique to new imaginations. We will
support reform of economics teaching in African institutions and support African feminist
economists. We will support communications and engagement to incentivise popular support for new
economic models.
Technology, governance and opportunity: The fourth industrial revolution holds promise as concerns
public engagement, job-creation, new ways to cure disease, tackling climate change and more. But it
may also concentrate wealth and power and accelerate inequalities. Technology will also shape

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geopolitical dynamics, with potentially adverse effects on Africa, as a site for proxy wars.
Technology is central to people building power and increasing access to opportunity. Yet it is
uncertain African countries, civil society, businesses and people are positioning themselves for
conversations and actions on digital rights, cyber-security, net neutrality, corporate control and
capture, intellectual property, ethical standards and so on. We will support the growth of an
ecosystem of African academics, artists, activists and policymakers equipped to engage on how
digital technologies can advance transformation. We will support:
People-focused, inclusive and accountable digital transitions: Advancements in the automation of
the mining industry, financial and service sectors, trade and climate technology will have impacts on
labour, fiscal and competition policy and practice as well as the economy as a whole, including
opportunity and equity. We will work with regulators and civil society to: support policy engagement
on the future of labour and taxation; address collusion between digital platforms and governments on
policy; and support dialogue on green technologies and natural resources management.
Incentivise African visioning on the intersection of technology and society: Africans need to more
intently consider how rapid technological progress will shape political, economic, social and cultural
life. We will support more robust platforms to deconstruct and reconstruct visions of change given
technological changes. This work will support existing or new reflection spaces, think tanks or other
research spaces, unorthodox ideation initiative, and thinkers towards co-creation of African visions
about the digital future.
4.4. Fair global climate governance and justice, anchored in human rights
Strengthen African agency on and mechanisms for climate change governance, financing and
justice: Climate change will continue to be an existential threat to human life and progress. As the
struggle to find technological, political, economic and social solutions advances, African states and
people must not only be engaged, but reinforce principles of equitable and shared responsibility.
There is need to build domestic (regional and continental) political capital in support of more
progressive leadership and alignment of climate policies and regulations against the window of
opportunity for new economic activities, employment and environmental justice. Critical sectors for
the continent include: energy, agriculture together with land and water and carbon markets. Our goal
is to grow political and social capital for climate action, engage on global governance of climate and
address environmental crimes. We will support expanding stakeholder organising and mobilising,
accelerating the development and implementation of national strategies on climate adaptation and
mitigation and advancing African biodiversity.
We will: nurture a groundswell of women- and youth-led coalitions of peoples, movements making
use of African-centred climate research to engage with domestic and global climate negotiations;
support advocacy on African climate change agendas; support advocacy towards more transparent,
just and accountable climate financing; and d) support organising and mobilising to address
environmental crimes in selected geographies.
EXPECTED RESULTS

• Strengthened and connected civic communities (environmental activists and movements) across
countries and sub-regions towards solidarity and action on decision-making and policy;
• Better civic coordination on demands transparency and accountability as concerns climate action;

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• New thinking and alternative economic development models on just transitions;

• More strategic African and African-centred participation (state and non-state) in global responses
to climate change.

5. WOMEN’S RIGHTS
We recognise the threats to women’s bodily autonomy (SRHR and sexual violence); women’s
political autonomy (closing space for organising and mobilising; conflict and insecurity); and
economic autonomy (corruption taking away much-needed economic and social security, as well as
the impacts of COVID-19 on socioeconomic rights), A Women’s Rights pillar is proposed to
advance feminist perspectives and women’s rights. We will support the field in agenda-setting
towards gender justice and women’s rights. We will ensure all our work advances gender justice and
women’s rights across the other four pillars. We will technically backstop the executive team to
enable them to ensure we deliver for women.
Feminist work has contributed to the growth of the SRHR and LGBTQI movements, as well as
younger feminist and sex worker movements. These have been robust at times and stagnant during
others―often affected by under-resourcing. Concepts of gender and sexuality are dynamic and,
working within a binary, some interventions have proven exclusionary. The inclusion of trans,
intersex and non-conforming as genders has been limited, pointing to gender justice being more
layered and our understanding of it requiring broadening to ensure no genders are marginalised or
excluded.
In movements both established and nascent, marginalised women have had to contend with cultural
and religious intolerance, exploitation and sexual violence. Movements cannot operate in isolation
and must show solidarity across different forms of marginalisation and inequality. The struggle for
gender justice is connected to queer struggles, young women’s struggles, labour and economic
struggles, climate justice struggles and racial justice struggles. Intersectional feminist movement
building is an imperative.
5.1. Positioning African women’s rights globally
We will connect with other OSF entities as well as other global players to advance the visibility and
voice of African women globally through creating and supporting platforms and spaces of diverse
African women, their communities, organisations, networks and movements to engage internally and
externally.
5.2. Strengthening the field to anchor the work of the other pillars
We will support the field in setting the agenda for gender justice and women’s rights across our other
four pillars. The governance crises in several countries (resulting in closing civic space and depleting
funding), the a rise in anti-gender movements and COVID-19 have resulted in women’s rights
organisations scaling down or closing shop. We need to assist in reviving the field including through
connecting different struggles. But there have also been positive shifts, presenting us with an
opportunity to influence and rebuild the field in a positive way.
5.3. Supporting intersectional feminist movements
Interlocking forms of oppression and increased complex challenges are shaping global politics,
calling for intersectional movements that are inclusive in their form and approaches. We will connect

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movements not usually connected and exploring, designing and leveraging models of care and
healing frameworks.
5.4. Strengthening intersectional feminist knowledge-production and uptake
We will prioritise intersectional, feminist knowledge-production and uptake to inform how we
interpret the world and improve the quality of our work and partnerships. Feminist knowledge and
narratives will enable us to go beyond the binaries of Global North and Global South to gendered
power dynamics globally.
EXPECTED RESULTS

• OSF prioritises gender justice and women’s rights across its work;
• OSF is a key contributor to and supporter of gender justice and women’s rights with at least 30%
of our budgets going towards the same across all pillars;
• Strong and well-resourced intersectional and intergenerational feminist movements;
• Alternative ideas about the African women’s political, economic and social realities of women;
• African feminist knowledge and practices shape gender justice and women’s rights strategies,
programmes and initiatives;
• African women assert their rights through increased advocacy formations, organisations,
networks and movements.

6. SPECIAL INITIATIVES
Three special initiatives will support our strategic ambitions, each serving distinct purposes and
cutting across all pillar. These are not parallel to our work, they are central and foundational enablers
linking the pillars.
6.1. Re-invigorating pan-African civil society: decolonising academia and more impactful
research and policy influence
More substantial, flexible, longer-term and predicable funding and support for African
changemakers (the Sunrise Initiative): African civil society operating across countries and engaging
continental institutions face acute and longstanding challenges. They lack adequate funding, leading
to failures of governance, leadership and strategy. They are unable to sustain rigorous testing of their
ideas at the levels required. We will dedicate an initial injection of at least half our budget to core,
flexible and predictable funding for an ecosystem of anchor organisations at the continental, regional,
national and local levels (including the 30% allocation to women-led and youth-led organisations).
Our support will go beyond funding to ensuring our changemakers develop better pathways towards
sustainability by integrating organisational development into our grantmaking. This initiative will
require at least two dedicated staff, whose primary focus will be to ensure clarity of purpose,
evaluation and learning, supported by a representative group of all programmatic staff. The initiative
is not standalone (outside our regular grantmaking). It a clear commitment about how we will
allocate our budget under this strategy. Following the lifecycle of this strategy and upon evaluation,
the possibility exists to further this work through an endowment with a focused mandate.
A continental policy centre: We will set up a policy centre as a platform for African civil society to
engage the AU in Addis Ababa more robustly on a sustained basis. The goal is to advance

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implementation—and challenge regression—of continental norms related to our pillars by supporting

a new crop of pan-African organisations pushing for the people-centred AU we want. The policy
centre will also serve as a focal space for OSF’s own policy engagement with the AU, to OSF’s
policy centres in Brussels and DC. Increasing OSF’s advocacy capital in the Global South is part of
OSF’s transformation into a more global organisation with a strategic geographic footprint, in step
with our multi-polar geopolitical context.
More resourced and connected African academic, research and higher education initiatives: A
history of underinvestment, politicisation the legacy of colonial and structural adjustment has
deepened the divide between well-endowed research spaces globally and those on the continent. The
quality of research from the continent will be an asset in shaping our societies in a globalised world.
The decolonisation of higher education is a priority. We will support academic, research and higher
education initiatives and networks.
6.2. Advancing African influence in the globe
Given the intensified interest of external players in Africa, current geopolitics with new opportunities
and challenges for Africa to assert itself globally and the fragmentation of Africa’s foreign policy
stances, seeding an Africa International Relations Institute to address these issues is critical. The
Institute will serve as an independent, Africa-owned and led resource for African academics, civil
society, private sector, policymakers and AU Member States, to produce quality Afrocentric, foreign
policy-oriented data analysis articulating long-term and strategic pan-African interests that centre
African peoples and bolster Africa’s relations with the rest of the world. There is no such Institute at
present. Attention will be given to African women in international relations, creating
intergenerational opportunities for upcoming African researchers and policymakers to interact with
our seasoned former diplomats, mediators, force commanders, go beyond state-centric international
relations and encourage non-state actors as key influencers and determinants of international
relations. Our role is to catalyse and seed this initiative by piloting several ideas designed to
ultimately converge in the Institute.
EXPECTED RESULTS

● Sustained civil society engagement with the AU;

● An African International Relations Institute that addresses the structural fragmentation of African
foreign policy;
● African researchers, civil society organisations and current policymakers engaging former
diplomats, mediators, force commanders and continental institutions.

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