0% found this document useful (0 votes)
59 views20 pages

BMJ 03 01 07

This document discusses geographical chokepoints and their strategic significance. It defines chokepoints as narrow passages in oceans that constrict shipping. Major chokepoints include the Strait of Hormuz, Strait of Malacca, Panama Canal, and Suez Canal. Chokepoints are vulnerable locations that control vital global shipping lanes and oil transit routes. The document outlines various nations' political and economic interests relating to control over chokepoints and how this influences international geopolitics and maritime security.

Uploaded by

akun bebaz
Copyright
© © All Rights Reserved
We take content rights seriously. If you suspect this is your content, claim it here.
Available Formats
Download as PDF, TXT or read online on Scribd
0% found this document useful (0 votes)
59 views20 pages

BMJ 03 01 07

This document discusses geographical chokepoints and their strategic significance. It defines chokepoints as narrow passages in oceans that constrict shipping. Major chokepoints include the Strait of Hormuz, Strait of Malacca, Panama Canal, and Suez Canal. Chokepoints are vulnerable locations that control vital global shipping lanes and oil transit routes. The document outlines various nations' political and economic interests relating to control over chokepoints and how this influences international geopolitics and maritime security.

Uploaded by

akun bebaz
Copyright
© © All Rights Reserved
We take content rights seriously. If you suspect this is your content, claim it here.
Available Formats
Download as PDF, TXT or read online on Scribd
You are on page 1/ 20

BMJ Vol 3 Issue 1 ISSN 2519-5972 109

Control over Maritime


Chokepoints an Assurance of Secure Lifeline
Md. Mehadi Amin Miah1,
S. M. Saief Uddin Ahmed2 and Kazi Shaila Sultana3

Abstract
From ancient time explorers and military people travelled different lands for a living. In course of
time, this natural need institutionalised through trade and commerce. Complementary interest
rose through exchange mode of trade but contradictory condition developed with coercive
military might in pursuit of wealth. Explorers tried to look for a geographical shortest way to save
time and energy. Thereby the major geographical choke points of the world have become
significant both from geopolitical and geostrategic perspective. There are approximately 200
straits or canals around the world but only a handful are known as chokepoints. Chokepoints are
the strategic strait or canal which could be closed or blockaded to restrict energy flow or lifelines
of governing states. This type of geopolitical aggression could surely cause international
discontent. In 1982 Law of the Sea Convention further protected the international access for
nations to sail through straits or canals and ensured these passageways are available as aviation
routes for all nations. Hence the control over such geographical choke points and canals can
assure politico-economic relief for nations whose main energy flow or lifeline exclusively depends
on safe passage through geographical choke points.

Keywords: Shipping, Chokepoints, Energy Flow, Lifeline, Economic Sanction, Geopolitics,


UNCLOS.

Introduction
“…. for whosoever commands the sea, commands the trade, whosoever commands the trade of
the world commands the reaches of the world and consequently the world itself”
A 15th century English soldier, a qualified intelligence agent and later became British
politician Sir Walter Raleigh mentioned those lines on his autobiography published 200 years
after his death (Raleigh, 1829). Though Sun Tzu was the pioneer on the art of war strategy on
the battlefield, Sir Walter Raleigh was the pioneer to shift the focus of war more on economic
control through the sea. Later on, 18th century US Admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan
supplements the concept of sea power of a nation with few credentials like; Geographical

1
MPhil Researcher, CHSR, Bangladesh University of Professionals
2
Assistant Professor, Business Faculty, Sylhet International University
3
Assistant Professor, Law Faculty, Uttara University
110 Control Over Maritime Chokepoints an Assurance of Secure Lifeline

position, physical conformation, number of population, national character, the character of


government and most importantly extent of territory (Mahan, 1660). In 21st Century Geoffrey
Till, Eric Groove and Milan Vego further simplify the intent of superpowers at sea on
developing sea power.
They clearly signify the aspect of Critical requirement (CR) and critical vulnerability (CV) of
any achievable Centre of Gravity (CG) (Vego, 2009). Last decade Strategist Collin S Grey
and Charles Hadfield mentioned about the control over geographical choke points and
significant canals of the world are the CV to gain control over the trade of the world (Grey,
1999). In today’s world, economic security assures the stability of the government.
In this paper, the major geographical choke points of the world along with few canals will be
briefly presented with their controlling authority. An assessment specified on power playing
nation’s politico-economic interest of geographical choke points and canals including their
brief history. Finally, a glimpse of thought is expressed on Bangladesh perspective to extract
complimentary strategic benefit from power playing nations on the aspect of Geographical
choke points.

Conceptual Framework
This paper is a geostrategic meta-analytic research where the concept of geographical
chokepoints was described in brief. major geographical chokepoints and man-made
chokepoints were also described with geographic maps along with strategic significance. The
power politics by the influential nation-state concentrated through geographical choke points
were also mentioned in the paper. The growing interest of influential nation state’s investment
on future manmade choke points and endeavour to dominate in international geopolitics were
figured out as an outcome of this paper. Finally, the impact on Bangladesh over maritime
politics of geographical choke points were discussed in brief as the future scope of study from
this paper. In this exploratory form of research methodology meta-analysis process was
adopted as it combines fact from multiple studies for a common outcome. Here multiple
geographical chokepoints both natural and man-made were discussed considering the

Major shipping routes Maritime chokepoints Coastal Inland

US Gulf of Mexico ports Strait of Black Sea Ports


inland waterways and Dover and rail network
rail network
Turkish Straits
Suez Strait of Hormuz
Canal
Panama Strait of
canal Gibraltar
Strait of Bab Strait of Malacca
al-Mandab
Brazil’s southern ports
and inland road network

Guardian graphic | Source: Chatham House

Figure-1: Global Maritime Chokepoints (http://www.bbc.com/news/world-40415756)


BMJ Vol 3 Issue 1 ISSN 2519-5972 111

international maritime geopolitics evolving around them. Thereby global maritime choke
points were discussed briefly with future endeavour by power playing nations over choke
point, nation states and third-party State interest like Bangladesh were discussed in this paper.

Geographical Chokepoints
The world’s oceans account for nearly 90% of all international commerce. Straits are
geographical areas littered across the oceans near land masses that constrict the passage of

Figure-2: Global Oil production and Consumption flow: million barrel/day-2015


(http://energyfuse.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/crude-oil-balance-of-trade

Figure-3: Global Oil transit Chokepoints and energy flow: million barrel/day-2016
(https://www.eia.gov/beta/international/regions-topics.php?RegionTopicID=WOTC )
112 Control Over Maritime Chokepoints an Assurance of Secure Lifeline

shipping to narrow passages. These geographical narrow passages are called chokepoints.
In 1982 UNCLOS II protected the international access for nations to safe passage through
straits and canals and even ensured that these passageways are available as the innocent
passage for aviation (Collins, 1998). These straits often serve as strategic chokepoints those
offer potential control of the world’s sea lanes of communication. As international shipping
lanes are forced to go through these specific vulnerable locations, they are often referred to as
the ‘Geographical Achilles heels of the global economy’. Many straits are in close proximity
to politically unstable nations, which increases navigation risks and compromises access and
use. These strategic passages can be mined, blocked by sinking ships or interdicted by naval
forces, artillery or missile systems (Jong, 2014).

Major Geographical Chokepoints


There are few geo-strategic oil chokepoints throughout the world. Disruption to any one of
these chokepoints could cause unpredictable price fluctuations. Fortunately, these locations
are generally safe and are kept
clear by the international Bandar-e
Abbas
community, whose economies
and standards of living depend on IRAN
these chokepoints. Uncertainty shm
Qe
over maritime security can lead to Bandar-e ire h -ye Strait of
Jaz
a global shift in oil prices. If one Lengeh

Ho
Jazireh-ye

rmuz
of these chokepoints were Tonb-e Kuchek
(Lesser Tunb) Jazireh-ye
disrupted, ships would need to Tonb-e Bozorg
(Greater Tunb)
travel additional thousands of SEA LAN
E
Persian Gulf
miles to reach an alternate route. Abu
Oman

The major choke points are Musa


(Abu Musa) Gulf of Oman
appended below in the order of oil
flow: U.A.E

Strait of Hormuz
The Strait of Hormuz is the
world's primary oil chokepoint.
According to the US Energy
Information Administration (EIA),
19 million barrels of oil,
representing 30% of all maritime-
traded petroleum passed through
the strait per day in 2015. Oil
from Saudi Arabia, the UAE,
Qatar, Iran and Iraq all pass
through the strait. These oil flow Figure-4: Global Oil flow in Hormuz Strait
head mostly towards Asia and (https://www.google.com/search?hl=en&authuser)
BMJ Vol 3 Issue 1 ISSN 2519-5972 113

tankers head west towards Suez Canal and the Red Sea.
The Strait of Hormuz is able to accommodate the largest oil tankers in the world. The mercury
of tension rising centring this strait as the US and its allied domination is often challenged by
Iran, China and Russia. Recent Qatar issue further tightened the situation of flow at Hormuz.
This is a 47 km strait between Bandar Abbas port of Iran and Kumzar island of Oman. British
SOLAS (Safety of Life At Sea) station at Al Jeer port of UAE and Safe energy traffic station
of US coalition forces established on Khasab port of Oman (Ramazani, 1979) raised the
mercury of tension much
higher than predicted. US
and UK maintain strong
military ties with Saudi
Arabia, Oman and UAE for
active control on the Strait of
Hormuz.

Strait of Malacca
The Strait of Malacca is the
shortest waterway which
connects the Indian Ocean to
the South China Sea and the
Pacific Ocean. In 2015, the
US Energy Information
Administration, EIA estimated
that 15.2 million barrels of
oil a day passed through the
strait, with the fuel from the
Middle East primarily
heading towards Indonesia,
China, and Japan. The Strait
of Malacca is also one of the
narrowest chokepoints in the
world. The narrowest point in
the strait is only 1.7 miles
wide, which creates a natural
Figure-5: Crude Oil flow through Malacca Strait
bottleneck for shipping. The (https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=10671)
Strait is 805 km (500 miles)
stretched between Peninsular Malaysia (West Malaysia) and the Indonesian island of
Sumatra. At Phillips Channel close to the south of Singapore, the Strait of Malacca narrows
to 2.8 km (1.5 nautical miles) wide, creating one of the world’s most significant traffic choke
point (Freeman, 2003).
It is named after the Empire of Melaka who ruled over the archipelago between 1414 to 1511.
From an economic and strategic perspective, the Strait of Malacca is one of the most
114 Control Over Maritime Chokepoints an Assurance of Secure Lifeline

important shipping lanes in the world. The


strait is the main shipping channel between
the Indian Ocean and the Pacific Ocean,
linking major Asian economies such as
India, China, Japan and South Korea. Over
50,000 vessels pass through the strait per
year carrying one-quarter of the world's
traded goods including oil, Chinese
manufactures and Indonesian coffee.
About a quarter of all oil carried by sea
passes through this strait (Nordin, 2007).
The narrowest point of this channel is
about 22 km between Malaysia’s Port
Dickson and Indonesian Island of Pulut
Rupat.

Cape of Good Hope


The Cape of Good Hope, the crossing at
the southernmost tip of Africa, is not
technically a chokepoint since it's open on
one side but considered as a critical trade
route. In 2013, the route around the Cape
saw 4.9 million barrels of oil a day,
approximately 9% of the total maritime oil
trade. In 2013, total 3.6 M/bd of crude oil
around the world moved eastbound,
originating mostly from Africa (2.1 M/bd)
and from South America and the
Caribbean (1.3 M/bd). Eastbound crude oil
flows were nearly all destined for Asian
markets (3.5 M/bd). In the opposite
direction, nearly all westbound flows
originated from the Middle East (1.3
M/bd), mostly destined for the United
States (Mulder, 2015).
There is a very common misconception
that the Cape of Good Hope is the southern
tip of Africa because it was once believed
to be the dividing point between the
Atlantic and Indian Oceans. In fact, the
southernmost point is Cape Agulhas, about
150 kilometres (90 miles) to the Figure-6: Oil flow through Cape of Good Hope
east-southeast. The Atlantic and Indian (https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=10671)
BMJ Vol 3 Issue 1 ISSN 2519-5972 115

oceans meet at the point where the warm-water current meets the cold-water current and turns
back on itself – a point that fluctuates between Cape Agulhas and Cape Point, about one
kilometre east of the Cape of Good Hope. When following the African coastline from the
equator, the Cape of Good Hope marks the psychologically important point where one begins
to travel more eastward than southward. Thus the first rounding of the cape in 1488 by
Portuguese explorer Bartolommeo Dias was a major milestone in the attempts by the
Portuguese to establish direct trade relations with the Far East (McKinnon, 2015).
The Cape of Good Hope
also functions as the
SUDAN SAUDI ARABIA
secondary route for oil if
the primary chokepoints
Al Ghaydah
of the Suez Canal or the ERITREA Massawa Sanaa YEMEN
Bab el-Mandab were Asmara
closed. According to the Al
Hudaydah Al Mukalla
US Energy Information
Administration, EIA ETHIOPIA
rerouting oil around the Gulf of Aden

cape would increase oil DJIBOUTIBab el Mandeb


Djibouti
cost considerably as it Dese

would add an additional Berbera


2,700 miles of transit Ababa Hargeysa SOMALIA
from Saudi Arabia to the
US. Figure-7: Traffic lane through Bab-el-Mandeb chokepoint
(http://susris.com/2015/04/14/the-bab-el-mandeb-maritime-chokepoint)
Bab el-Mandab
Only 18 miles wide at its narrowest point, the Bab el-Mandab connects the Red Sea to the
Gulf of Aden and ultimately to the Indian Ocean. Instability or closure of the waterway could
force tankers to have to travel around the southern tip of Africa. Crucially, the EIA notes, the
vast majority of southbound traffic through the Suez Canal must also pass through the Bab
el-Mandab, so the closure of the waterway could have a cascade effect (Anderson, 2014).
In 2015, 3.8 million barrels of oil passed through the waterway per day. Oil prices took a
recent jolt after the Yemeni government collapsed, raising the possibility of a security crisis
in the Bab el-Mandab. The narrowest passage of the choke point is 12 km between former
French colony Djibouti and Perim island of Yemen where 2012 UK invested on hotel tourism
and maritime safety observer station for passive control (Blazev, 2016).

Danish Straits
The Danish Straits formed out of a series of channels passing around the Danish Islands is
among the most secure oil chokepoints in the world. The chokepoint connects the Baltic Sea
in the east to the North Sea in the west. Approximately 3.3 million barrels of oil a day flowed
through the region in 2013. Despite rising tensions with Russia in Europe and particularly the
Baltics, shipping is unlikely to be affected by regional security issues. The EIA estimates that
116 Control Over Maritime Chokepoints an Assurance of Secure Lifeline

Skagen Key routes


Hirtshals 1 Via Great Belt max draft: 15m BW
Frederlkshavn 2 Via Sound max draft: 7,7m BW
KATTEGAT
Hanstholm Aalborg
1 2 SWEDEN

Grend
Helslngor
Aarthus Hersholm
DENMARK Copenhagen
Holbcek (GAC Denmark Main Office)
Kalundborg Kege Renne
Frederlcla Odense Korsor
Stigsnces BALTIC SEA
Esbjerg Nyborg
Svendborg
Aabend Nokskov
Redby Gedser

Figure- 8: Traffic lane through Danish Strait


(https://www.trafficlist.net/lyngby-radio-oxz)

42% of all oil shipped through the Danish Straits originated from the Russian port of
Primorsk in 2013 to the West. A small amount of Norwegian and British oil also went through
the straits to the Baltics (Paul, 2010). If Russia ever blockaded the Strait, it would mostly just
be blockading its own oil trade as well.

Strait of Gibraltar
The name Gibraltar is the Spanish derivation of the Arabic name Jabaal Tariq, meaning
‘Mountain of Tariq’. It refers to the Rock of Gibraltar, which was named after the Umayyad
general Tariq ibn-Ziyad. An Anglo-Dutch force captured Gibraltar from Spain in 1704 during
the War of the Spanish Successor on behalf of the Habsburg pretender to the Spanish throne.
The territory was subsequently ceded to Britain in perpetuity under the ‘Treaty of Utrecht’ in
BMJ Vol 3 Issue 1 ISSN 2519-5972 117

1713. The sovereignty of Gibraltar is a Gibraltar


major point of contention in (U.K.) SPAIN

Anglo-Spanish relations as Spain


asserts a claim to the territory. 360100 N

Gibraltarians overwhelmingly rejected 0 Mile


Neutral
proposals for Spanish sovereignty in a 0 Kilometer Bay of Gibraltar Zone
North
1967 referendum and again in 2002.
Eastern
Mole Beach

The
Under the Gibraltar constitution of
Gibraltar Harbour
Detached Mole Gibraltar
Governor’s Residence Catalan Bay

R o c k
2006, Gibraltar governs its own affairs South
Sandy Bay
360080 N
Mole
such as defence and foreign relations St. Michael’s Caves Highest Point
1,394 ft (425m)
SPAIN Rosala Bay Fortress
remaining under the responsibility of Headquarters

the UK Government.
Little Bay

Europa Point
5 24 W
0 0
5 22 W
0 0
50200 W

The Strait of Gibraltar is a narrow body


of water between Spain and Britain that
connects the Mediterranean Sea with
the Atlantic Ocean. Though the strait
having a continuous coast of Morocco,
Britain shares the critical entry point of
Spanish land and Spain holds the
south-eastern part of Morocco. Around
300 cargo vessels pass through the
Strait every day. In spite of the heavy
concentration of shipping traffic and
the noise caused by it, there is still an
abundance of whales and dolphins in
these waters. The Rock is the Crown
property of the United Kingdom and Figure-9: Strait of Gibraltar
borders Spain (Brown, 2012). The (http://attyreycdar.blogspot.com/2014/08/rock-of-gibraltar.html)
sovereignty of Gibraltar was
transferred from Spain to the Kingdom of Great Britain by the Treaty of Utrecht in 1713 after
the War of the Spanish Succession.

Bosporus Strait
A strait of Bosporus/Turkish Straits is a 17-mile-long waterway with only 1 km wide, which
connects the Black Sea with the Mediterranean Sea and supplies Western and Southern
Europe with oil from the Caspian Sea. The strait is made up of the Bosporus and Dardanelles
and divides Asia and Europe. The Bosporus joins the Black Sea with the Sea of Marmara and
the Dardanelles connects the Sea of Marmara and the Mediterranean Sea. Straits of Bosporus
is the world's narrowest strait used for international navigation. The Straits are governed
under the Montreux Convention, which gives Turkey control over the Bosporus and the
Dardanelles. While Turkish maritime authorities have the right to levy tolls on the passing
tankers and are also responsible to check ships for sanitary conditions and safety (Cogliati,
2014), the Bosporus and Dardanelles Straits are considered international waterways and
118 Control Over Maritime Chokepoints an Assurance of Secure Lifeline

Figure-10: Strait of Bosporus


(http://www.bosphorustour.com/Currents-Bosphorus-Water.html)

Turkey is prohibited from restricting their use during peacetime.


The Bosporus is a narrow stretch of water that divides both Asia from Europe and splits
Istanbul's European and Asian halves. The chokepoint connects the Black Sea to the
Mediterranean. In 2013, approximately 2.9 million barrels of oil a day flowed through the
Bosporus, with the petroleum coming from Russia, Azerbaijan, and Kazakhstan. According
to the EIA, Russia has slowly been shifting its exports to the Baltics while Azerbaijan and
Kazakhstan have further increased shipping through the chokepoint. The Bosporus is only a
half mile wide at its narrowest point and around 48,000 vessels travel through the waterway
a year (Bender, 2015).

Major Manmade Canals as a Chokepoint


There are few manmade-strategic chokepoints throughout the world. Since these choke points
are manmade, they represent strong economic and political intention of state government
with regional influence. Closure or disruption to any one of them could cause unpredictable
price fluctuations of commodities and energy. Therefore, these choke points became the vital
regional lifelines exhibiting supreme strategic importance. Economic superpowers also
influencing states to have more manmade canals to dominate regional economic growth and
establish own interest. Military movement and positioning along the canals further secure the
interest of influencing nation and disrupt the interest of other States. Uncertainty over
maritime security can lead to a global shift in oil prices. If one of these chokepoints were
disrupted, ships would need to travel additional thousands of miles to reach an alternate route.
The major manmade canals are appended below in the order of shipping flow:

Suez Canal
Suez Canal is an artificial sea-level waterway in Egypt, connecting the Mediterranean Sea to
the Red Sea through the Isthmus of Suez. Constructed by the Suez Canal Company between
BMJ Vol 3 Issue 1 ISSN 2519-5972 119

Figure-11: Suez Canal


(http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2017/06/14/532960178)

1859 and 1869, it was officially opened on November 17, 1869. The canal offers watercraft a
shorter journey between the North Atlantic and northern Indian Oceans via the Mediterranean
and Red seas by avoiding the
South Atlantic and southern M
ED
Indian oceans, in turn ALARABIYA IT
ER
NEWS Port Said RA
reducing the journey by NEA
N SEA
approximately 7,000km
(4,300 miles). It extends The “New Suez Canal” is the name of the
from the northern terminus project in which a new lane was created to
run alongside part of the existing Suez
of Port Said to the southern Canal

terminus of Port Tewfik at


the city of Suez. Its length is It also aims to reduce the
waiting times for transiting
193.30km (120.11 miles), ships

including its northern and


southern access channels The army took about 11 months to complete
the construction of the new waterway
(Lesseps, 1876).
The costs of the “national project”
In 2013, a record 3.2 million were entirely covered by the
Egyptian people
barrels of oil a day passed
through the canal, mostly to New Suez Canal
markets in Europe and North The new 72-kilometre waterway will

America. According to the facilitate traffic in both directions and can


accommodate larger vessels
EIA, the Suez Canal was
expanded in 2010 to allow
60% of all tankers in the
world to effectively pass
through. The fall of dictator Figure-12: Suez Canal Development
Hosni Mubarak in Egypt in (http://english.alarabiya.net/en/perspective/2015-Egypt-s-Suez-Canal)
120 Control Over Maritime Chokepoints an Assurance of Secure Lifeline

2011 and the resulting unrest did San Francisco


United States
New York City

little to deter shipping through the North


Atlantic
canal. But security remains a Ocean
PANAMA CANAL
primary concern and in 5.200 Miles
September 2013 terrorists Equator 8.370 Km
South
planned a failed rocket attack on America
cargo ships passing through the South
region. In 2012 total 17,225 Pacific
Ocean 13.000 Miles
vessels traversed the canal which 20.900 Km

means 47 vessels per day. In


August 2014, construction was
How the Panama Canal Works
launched to expand the speed of
the canal's transit time to double Lock-type Canal Gate
Higher
Sea Lavel
the capacity of the Suez Canal Lock Gate
from 49 to 97 ships a day. The Lower
Sea level
‘New Suez Canal’, as the
expansion opened with great
fanfare in a ceremony on 6
August 2015 (Waterfield, 2016). Ship sails into
Closed chamber
fills with water to
Additional locks
raise water level
open lock raise toraise ship to to height of higher
level of next lock sea level
Panama Canal
The United States commenced Sea-level Canal
building a canal across a 50-mile
stretch of the Panama isthmus in Contlnuous
Sea level
Carving through uneven
terrain unites the two
1904. Chief engineer John bodies of water allowing for
Stevens devised innovative equal sea-level passage

techniques and spurred the crucial


redesign from a sea-level to a lock
canal. His successor, Lt. Col.
George Washington Goethals,
stepped up excavation efforts of a
stubborn mountain range and
oversaw the building of the dams
and locks. The Canal opened in
1914, oversight of the
world-famous Panama Canal was
transferred from the U.S. to
Panama in 1999. The Panama
Canal is strategically important to
the United States because it is a
rapid link between the east and
west coast, saving approximately
13,000km (from 21,000km to Fig 13: Panama Canal Operation.
8000km). It is comprised of three (http://marinersgalaxy.com/2015/06/panama-canal-history)
BMJ Vol 3 Issue 1 ISSN 2519-5972 121

Figure-14: Economic benefit of the Panama Canal.


( http://marinersgalaxy.com/2015/06/panama-canal-history)

main elements, the Gatun Locks (Atlantic Ocean access) the Gaillard Cut (continental divide)
and the Miraflores Locks (Pacific Ocean access). The Panama Canal connects the Pacific
Ocean to the Caribbean and ultimately to the Atlantic (McCullough, 2001). According to the
US Energy Information Administration EIA, the Panama Canal transported 1.4% of all oil and
petroleum products globally in 2013. This amounted to approximately 0.85 million barrels of
oil a day in 2013. The utility of the canal has waned in the years since it was built.
Today, the narrowest point of the Panama Canal is only 110 feet wide forcing larger
super-tankers to avoid the canal. The canal is undergoing an expansion project which should
enable larger tankers to pass through the region more easily. The USA will fund the expansion
project of the Panama Canal to ensure the safe passage of her Supertankers and Aircraft
Carriers. Political negotiation is underway to attain more benefit from Panama and early
completion of the development project by 2022 (Friar, 2016).

Kiel Canal
The Kiel canal built between 1887 and 1895, initially served German military needs by
eliminating the necessity for ships to travel northward around the Danish peninsula. It was
enlarged between 1907 and 1914 to accommodate large naval ships. Prior to World War I the
122 Control Over Maritime Chokepoints an Assurance of Secure Lifeline

Fig 15: German Kiel Canal.


(https://www.britannica.com/topic/Kiel-Canal)

canal (former Kaiser-Wilhelm Canal) was owned by the German government. The Treaty of
Versailles (June 28, 1919) laid down regulations, internationalised the canal and leaving it
under German administration. Traffic on the canal was subject only to general police,
shipping, sanitary and customs regulations. These provisions were rejected by Adolf Hitler in
1936. Since World War II the conditions of the Treaty of Versailles guaranteeing freedom of
navigation to be practised (Gollasch Stephan, 2006). The canal remains an important route for
Baltic shipping.
The canal has been enlarged twice and is today 160 metres (526 feet) wide and 11 metres (37
feet) deep and is spanned by seven high-level bridges that have about 43 metres (140 feet) of
clearance for ships beneath them. The locks are 45 metres (146 feet) wide by 327 metres
(1,072 feet) long. The canal constitutes the safest, most convenient, shortest and cheapest
shipping route between the North Sea and Baltic Sea (Sheffield, 2016). This canal gives the
quickest access route to all the rim nations of Baltic Sea like Poland, Lithuania, Latvia,
Estonia, Finland and Moscow.
BMJ Vol 3 Issue 1 ISSN 2519-5972 123

WEST
Mediterranean Sea BANK
GAZA
STRIP

Port Said
ISRAEL

Suez JORDAN
Canal
Cairo Port
Sinai
Suez Peninsula Eilat
(EGYPT)
er

f
Gulf
Riv

qaba
o z SAUDI
EGYPT S e
u
Nile

of A

ARABIA
Gulf

Sharm al
Shaikh

= Location of UNEF
(United Nations Straits
Emergency Forces) of
Tiran Red Sea

Figure-16: Israeli Lifeline Strait of Tiran


(https://earthobservatory.nasa.gov/IOTD/view.php?id=81772)

Future Exertion on the Canal as the Chokepoint


There are few natural chokepoints new world order will ponder out. Complementary and
conflicting interest will open the avenue to think for the execution of new manmade canals.
Few future planning of economic giants trying to secure their interest through Geographic
and manmade canal development are given below:

Strait of Tiran
The Straits of Tiran are the narrow sea passages between the Sinai and Arabian peninsulas
which separate the Gulf of Aqaba from the Red Sea. The distance between the two peninsulas
is about 13 km. After the 1956 war, Egypt agreed to reopen the Straits of Tiran for Israeli
shipping, whose closure had been a significant catalyst in advancing the Suez Crisis. It has
two passages deep enough to be navigable by larger ships. The Enterprise passage, 290
metres (950 feet) deep, is adjacent to the Egyptian side, while the 73 metres (240 feet) deep
Grafton passage, surrounded by shallows, is to the east, nearer to the island of Tiran
(Lapidoth, 1982). To the east of Tiran and Saudi Arabia, the other strait has reefs and shallows
with a single channel has 16 metres (52 feet) depth.
Access to Jordan's only seaport of Aqaba and to Israel's only Red Sea seaport of Eilat is
through the Gulf of Aqaba, which gives the Straits of Tiran strategic importance. In 1967,
90% of Israeli oil passed through the Straits of Tiran, making it a target of Egyptian blockade
during the Arab League boycott of Israel. In May 1967, Israeli Prime Minister Levi Eshkol
repeated declarations that Israel had made in 1957, saying that closure of the Straits of Tiran
would be an act of war. Spiritually the route of Exodus gives this strait an added value to Jews
(Fritz, 2016), yet Israeli lifeline Strait of Tiran will be protected by her allies in the name of
Maritime security.
124 Control Over Maritime Chokepoints an Assurance of Secure Lifeline

Nicaragua Canal
GUATEMALA
This canal is the extended HONDURAS
reach of China’s string of
pearls which negotiates EL SALVADOR
Caribbean
Sea
with Nicaraguan govern- NICARAGUA
ment to have an
alternative manmade canal Managua Lake NICARGAUA CANAL
Nicaragua
other than the Panama Brito Punta Gorda
Canal. On 26 September
PANAMA CANAL
2012, the Nicaraguan PACIFIC COSTA
OCEAN RICA
Government and the Colon
newly formed Hong Kong Panama City
PANAMA
Nicaragua Canal COLOMBIA

Development Group
0 75 150
(HKND) signed a
MILES
memorandum of underst-
anding that committed
HKND to finance and The Nicaragua Canal and Maritime Routes
building the ‘Nicaraguan 100 km Length: 278km Length: 193-3km
Canal and Development NICARAGUA Width: 230-5200m Width: 280-345m
Depth: 22.5m
Project’. HKND Group is Managua Artificial lake
Depth: 27.6m-30m 16,600 ships in 2013
5,100 ships per year No locks
a private enterprise (Ellis, Lake Construction of a new
Nicaragua Construction period:
2016). The Nicaraguan Brito Punta
Dec-2014-2019
canal to double the waterway’s
capacity started on Aug 5
Gorda
Government subsequently NICARGAUA CANAL (PLAN) SUEZ CANAL
approved the Master
Main competing inter-ocean routes between Asia and the US
Concession Agreement By market share
with HKND on 13 June
2013 thereby granting 1%
‘The sole rights to the 61% Suez
Nicaragua
HKND Group to plan,
design, construct and US Intermodal System 38%
Panama

thereafter to operate and Panama Canal


manage the Nicaragua Suez Canal Graphics, AFP/GT

Grand Canal and other Figure-17: Panam’s Alternative Nicaragua Canal


related projects, including (http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/898353.shtml)
ports, a free trade zone, an
international airport and other infrastructure development projects’. The construction work is
due to start by the end of 2022.
The country has been waiting for the project’s completion and a chance to compete with the
Panama Canal. This Special Law for the Development of Nicaraguan Infrastructure and
Transport to the Canal and Free Trade Zones allow for the construction of the project, which
is estimated at USD 50 billion. The agreement establishes that the Canal will have its own
special operation team with immunity to Nicaraguan law and HKND descendants will be the
BMJ Vol 3 Issue 1 ISSN 2519-5972 125

MYANMAR THAILAND CAMBODIA


000000

Kra Isthmus Railway VIETNAM

(2nd Thai-Burma Railway)


THAILAND
Andaman Chumphon 00000

Sea Station

M
al
(Chumphon Port)

ac
ca
St
ra
M ALAYSIA

it
Khao Fa Chi Station
Kawthaung
Canal
Ranong Port
Kraburi River Gulf of Thailand I N D O N E S I A

Figure-18: Ranong-Chumphon Canal


(https://books.google.co.uk/books?%Thailand%20Ranong%20Canal)

owners of the Canal until the year 2129 (Ellis, 2016).

Ranong Canal
Ranong is located 586 kilometres south of Bangkok and is the first southern province that is
located on the Andaman Sea. The narrowest part Ranong province of Thailand is only 44
kilometres which give explicit chance for any country to invest in manmade canals. China
showed interest in this project which may challenge and incapacitate the shipping flow of
Malacca Strait. If this canal is established after the hydrographic assessment, it will definitely
transform the economic posture of Thailand.
Thailand is seeking investments to build a Canal Zone through the provinces of Ranong and
Chumphon. This will shorten the trip from the Middle East by a couple of days by skipping
the strait of Malacca. International energy flow duration will be reduced by a day with
distance reduction of 2300 km toward China and East Asia (Graham, 2005). Japan is
interested but China is ready to invest and start the project by 2022 after political clearance
from China’s policy-making level.

Bangladesh Perspective on Global Chokepoints


Bangladesh, a littoral state in the Bay of Bengal (BoB), is becoming more and more
strategically significant for many countries. Since the BoB leads to the Malacca Strait, that
opens up to the South China Sea (SCS), these routes are crucial to economies in the SCS
(China, Japan) which explains the growing interest and involvement of extra-littoral players
in the Bay. Protection of SLOCs has added to the importance of increasing maritime power
projection capabilities in the BoB. Even though relatively manageable in terms of
confrontations between nations, the intentions of the major powers are increasingly being
126 Control Over Maritime Chokepoints an Assurance of Secure Lifeline

questioned. In terms of foreign policy strategy, China is clearly adopting a ‘Look South’
policy, reflected through its heavy infrastructure investments in the countries around the Bay.
India is opting for a ‘Look East’ policy, to intensify connectivity to Southeast Asia and the US
with its Asia ‘Rebalancing’ strategy which shifts its focus from the Middle East to this
dynamic region (M H Kabir, 2015).
Geographically Bangladesh residing among world economic superpower’s like China and
India where politico-economic calculation seems tedious on conflicting and contradictory
interest. Considering Bangladesh under the ‘String of Pearls’ policy of China with their deep
sea port investment gave huge importance to Bangladesh in the global arena. Chinese interest
lies in the investment on Bangladesh’s plain fertile land and transit point to develop her
southern Sichuan province. On the other hand, India’s political influence on Bangladesh
assures transit facilities towards her eastern regional development at Tripura, Assam and
Mizoram. Internationally as a Muslim state and vibrant UN member state Bangladesh
maintains healthy foreign relation with global powers and middle east for safer and smooth
flow of petroleum through geographical choke points.

Conclusion
At the dawn of the 15th century, Sir Walter Raleigh recognised the strategic importance of
oceanic chokepoints for commercial trading vessels in times of peace and have enhanced the
military power of their occupiers in times of war. However, in course of time, structural
changes in the shipping industry have had significant consequences for strategic chokepoints,
especially the two great canals. Over the last 25 years, the real cost of sea transportation fell
by 80% because larger ships generated economies of scale, containerisation reduced labour
costs and information technology improved resource allocation. The rise of super tankers and
post-Panamax container ships has significantly diverted traffic from the Panama Canal and
has motivated the Egyptian government to approve a 10-year 441 million-dollar project to
widen and deepen the Suez Canal. The development of railway trans-shipment in Suez and
Panama and competition from rail and truck transportation in North America and Europe may
further undermine the commercial value of strategic waterways. Moreover, most products of
information industries cost very little to transport, even by aeroplane and sometimes can be
‘exported’ abroad via the internet.
Growing demand and squeezed supplies are unavoidable consequences of the geography of
petroleum production, distribution and consumption. The global economy is beginning to
realise the full extent of a growing shortage of oil and its inherent economic and geopolitical
costs. Current estimates place the peak of global oil production at around 2008-2010. In the
meantime, oil consumers are struggling to diversify their oil supplies, but most of the
remaining oil reserves are predominantly in the Middle East, a region which will remain the
focal point of global oil shipments. Although there is a current energy shift towards renewable
and environmentally-friendly resources, such as natural gas and eventually hydrogen, the
move from petroleum is likely decades away. Even a transition to natural gas, the reserves of
which are substantial, would be very costly since entirely new distribution infrastructures
would be required, including additional LNG carriers, terminals and processing facilities.
BMJ Vol 3 Issue 1 ISSN 2519-5972 127

Meanwhile, an era of insecurity and vulnerability is likely to prevail as petroleum circulation


increases with strategic chokepoints bearing the brunt of the tension. Like the limited
additional petroleum production capacity, the circulation capacity, which is mainly dictated
by the chokepoints of oil circulation, leaves little room for additional growth. These
geographical constraints cannot be bypassed easily and will be a significant factor in global
insecurity of oil supplies in terms of who will get preferential access to these limited
resources. The situation is likely to become very tense among large consumers, such as the
United States and China during the second decade of the 21st century. As they compete, the
outlets of the Middle East handle the last large volume supply routes of the petroleum era.
Since additional economies of scale in maritime shipping are difficult to achieve and
alternative routes, including pipelines are limited and insecure so, world economic power
seeks alternative ways and routes through new manmade canals to secure their energy flow.
Thereby, solutions for petroleum distribution, namely the use of geographical chokepoints
will demand rationalised use for the wellbeing of world peace.

References
Anderson, E. W. Global Geopolitical Flashpoints: An Atlas of Conflict. NY, USA: Routledge
publishers, (2014): 24-26.
Bender, J. These 8 narrow chokepoints are critical to the world's oil trade. Business Insider, April
2015.
Blazev, A. S. Global Energy Market Trends (I. 9780881737554, Trans.) Lilburn, Georgia, USA, USA:
The Fairmont Press, Inc, 2016: 751.
Brown, J. Crossing The Strait: Morocco, Gibraltar and Great Britain in the 18th and 19th Centuries
(Vol. 2). (S. i. Maghrib, Ed.) Laiden, Boston, USA: Brill Publishers, 2012.
Cogliati, C. H. The Legal Regime of Straits: Contemporary Challenges and Solutions. Cambridge,
UK: Cambridge University Press, (2014): 77-79.
Collins, J. M. Military Geography for Professionals and the Public. Washington DC: NDU Press,
Washington, 1998: 278.
Ellis, E. China on the Ground in Latin America: Challenges for the Chinese and Impacts on the
RegionThe Political Economy of East Asia. NY, USA: Springer Publications, (2016): 74-75
Freeman, D. B. Straits of Malacca: Gateway Or Gauntlet? Maquill, London, UK: McGill-Queen's
Press, (2003): 190-195.
Friar, W. Portrait of the Panama Canal: Celebrating Its History and Expansion. (p. 87, Ed.) London,
UK: Graphic Arts Books Publishers, 2016.
Fritz, G. A. Lost Sea of the Exodus: A Modern Geographical Analysis. San Antonio, Texas, USA:
GeoTech Publishers, (2016): 192-194.
Gollasch Stephan, S. G. Bridging Divides: Maritime Canals as Invasion Corridor (Vol. 83). (M.
Biologicae, Ed.) Berlin, Germany: Springer Science & Business Media publications, 2006.
128 Control Over Maritime Chokepoints an Assurance of Secure Lifeline

Graham, E. Japan's Sea Lane Security: A Matter of Life and Death? NY, USA, Nissan Institute, USA:
Routledge Publications/ Routledge Japanese Studies, (2005): 161-166.
Grey, C. S. Modern Strategy (Vol. 2). NY: Oxford University Press, 1999.Jong, S. d. No Blood for
Oil?: Economic Security, & Energy Security. Dutches Strategic Studies Journal , 107, 2014.
Lapidoth, R. The Read Sea and the Gulf of Aden - International Straits of the World (Vol. 5). Boston,
USA: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, (1982): 172-174.
Lesseps, F. D. The Suez Canal: Letters and Documents Descriptive of Its Rise and Progress in
1854-1856 . Michigan, USA: University Press of Michigan, (1876): 53-54.
M H Kabir, A. A. The Bay of Bengal: Next theatre for. (I. 1848-5782, Ed.) Croatian International
Relations Review (CIRR), 2015: 199-239.DOI 10.1515/cirr-2015-0007
Mahan, A. T. The Influence of Sea Power Upon History 1660-1783 (Vol. ISBN 9783861951780). (P. N.
27, Ed.) Bremen, Germany, Bremen, Germany: BOD - Books on Demand Publishin, 2010.
McCullough, D. The Path Between the Seas: The Creation of the Panama Canal, 1870-1914. NY:
Simon and Schuster Press, (2001): 112-117.
McKinnon, J. Wine, Women and Good Hope: A history of scandalous behaviour in the Cape. (p. 168,
Ed.) Capetown, South Africa: Penguin Random House, 2015.
Mulder, G. Oil transportation through South Africa. global security.org , 31, 2015.
Nordin, H. Trade and Society in the Straits of Melaka: Dutch Melaka and English Penang, 1780-1830.
Singapore, Singapore, Singapore: National University Press, (2007): 47-56.
Paul, E. M. The Danish Straits and German Naval Power, 1905-1918 (Vol.13). (P. S. Militärgeschichte,
Ed.) Berlin, Germany: Forchungsamt publishers, 2010.
Raleigh, W. The Works of Sir Walter Raleigh. California, USA: university Press, 1829.
Ramazani, R. K. The Persian Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz - International Straits of the World.
Tehran, Iran: Brill Archive Publishers, 1979.
Sheffield, B. Inland Water Ways of Germany (Vol. ISBN 9781846234637). (i.r.2, Ed.) Berlin, Germany:
Imray, Laurie, Norie & Wilson Limited, 2016.
Vego, M. N. Joint Operational Warfare: Theory and Practice (Vol. ISBN 9781884733628). NY:
Government Printing Office, Naval War College (NWC), 2009.
Waterfield, O. C. The New Suez Canal: Considerations Addressed to the Committee of Shipowners. (p.
12, Ed.) Cairo, Egypt: Fb&C Press, 2016.

You might also like