Ch#p%er 1

A Skin, no% # Swe#%er: On%ology #nd

Epi3%emology in Poli%ic#l Science
DAVID MARSH AND PAUL FURLONG

This chapter introduces the reader to the key issues that underpin what we
do as social or political scientists. Each social scientist’s orientation to their
subject is shaped by their ontological and epistemological position.
Most often those positions are implicit rather than explicit, but,
regardless of whether they are acknowledged, they shape the approach to
theory and the methods which the social scientist utilises. At first these
issues seem difficult but our major point is that they are not issues that
can be avoided (for a similar view see Blyth, Chapter 14). They are like
a skin not a sweater: they cannot be put on and taken off whenever the
researcher sees fit. In our view, all students of political science should
recognise and acknowledge their own ontological and epistemological
positions and be able to defend these positions against critiques from
other positions. This means they need to understand the alternative
positions on these fundamental questions. As such, this chapter has
two key aims. First, we will introduce these ontological and
epistemological questions in as accessible a way as possible in order to
allow the reader who is new to these issues to reflect on their own
position. Second, this introduction is crucial to the readers of this book
because the authors of the subsequent chapters address these issues
and they inform the subject matter of their chapters. As such, this basic
introduction is also essential for readers who want fully to appreciate the
substantive content of this book.
The chapter is divided into three major sections. The first section
describes what we mean by these two terms ‘ontology’ and ‘epistemology’
and considers briefly why these questions are important. The second
section then outlines the different positions on ontology and
epistemology and the arguments which have been put forward for and
against these positions. Finally, we shall illustrate how these different
positions shape the approaches that researchers take to their research
by focusing on research in two broad areas: globalisation and multilevel
governance.

17
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On%ology #nd epi3%emology

Ontological and epistemological positions are related, but need to be

separated. To put it crudely, one’s ontological position affects, but far
from determines, one’s epistemological position.

Ontology
Ontological questions are prior because they deal with the very nature
of ‘being’; literally, an ontology is a theory of ‘being’ (the word derives
from the Greek for ‘existence’). This sounds difficult, but really it is not.
The key question is whether there is a ‘real’ world ‘out there’ that is
independent of our knowledge of it. For example, are there essential
differences between genders, classes or races that exist in all contexts and
at all times?
A simple illustration easily makes the point. Over the last ten years John
Gray’s book Me# aтe Jтow Maтs a#d Wowe# aтe Jтow Ye#ns (1992) has
sold seven million copies in the USA and millions more in forty countries
worldwide. He argues that men and women are very different and that
men and women can only understand and deal with one another better
if they recognise this fact of life. This book takes a clear ontological position;
there are fundamental differences between men and women that are
features of their very existence. These differences persist over time and
are common across cultures. This is an essentialist or a foundationalist
ontological position. So, its proponents argue that there are essential
differences of ‘being’ that provide the foundations upon which social life
is built.
Of course, this is a contentious position; one which is strongly
attacked by many, if not most, feminists. They believe that the
differences between men and women are socially constructed. As such,
they are not essential differences but are particular to a given culture and
time. They are the product of patriarchy, in which male dominance
shapes the culture and values of society, affects patterns of socialisation
and perpetuates gender inequality. This argument reflects a different
ontological position that is anti¬foundationalist and emphasises the
social construction of social phenomena.

Epistemology
If an ontological position reflects the researcher’s view about the nature of
the world, their epistemological position reflects their view of what we
can
 Daνsd MaтsS a#d Panl 1

know about the world and how we can know it; literally an epistemology
is a theory of knowledge. Again, this sounds difficult, but the basic
concerns are not too difficult. There are two key questions. Can an
observer identify ‘real’ or ‘objective’ relations between social phenomena?
If so, how? The first question itself subsumes two issues. Initially, it takes
us back to ontology; if one is an anti¬foundationalist, then one argues that
there is not a ‘real’ world, which exists independently of the meaning
which actors attach to their action, to discover. At the same time, such
an anti¬foundationalist would also suggest that no observer can be
‘objective’ because they live in the social world and are affected by
the social constructions of ‘reality’. This is sometimes called the double
hermeneutic; the world is interpreted by the actors (one hermeneutic
level) and their interpretation is interpreted by the observer (a second
hermeneutic level). The second question raises another important, and
clearly related, issue.
To the extent that we can establish ‘real’ relationships between social
phenomena, can we do this simply through direct observation, or are there
some relationships which ‘exist’ but are not directly observable? The
answers one gives to these questions shapes one’s epistemological
position. Of course, there are different ways of classifying
epistemological positions and there is no agreement as to the best way.
Lrobably the most common classification distinguishes between scientific
(sometimes positi¬ vist) and hermeneutic (or interpretist) positions. We
shall begin with a brief review of that distinction, before proposing an
alternative, which
distinguishes between positivist, realist and interpretist positions.

Scientific versus hermeneutic BpproBches

Social science was influenced by the ideas of science as the nomenclature
clearly indicates. In particular, the ewpsтscsst tradition played a crucial role
in the development of social science. David Hume argued that knowledge
starts from our senses. On the basis of such direct experience we could
develop generalisations about the relationships between physical phenom¬
ena. The aim was to develop causal statements which specified that, under
a given set of conditions, there would be regular and predictable outcomes
(on this see Hollis and Smith 1990: ch. S). The adherents of the
scientific tradition saw social science as analogous to science. In
ontological terms they were foundationalists; they thought there was a
real world ‘out there’ which was external to agents. Their focus was
upon identifying the canses of social behaviour. The emphasis was upon
expla#atso# and many felt that the use of rigorous ‘scientific’ methods
would allow social scientists to develop laws, similar in status to scientific
laws, which would hold across time and space.
20 O#tology a#d Kpsstewology s# Polstscal 8cse#ce

In methodological terms, the scientific tradition was greatly influenced

by logical positivism that posited a very straightforward characterisation
of the form of scientific investigation. As Hollis and Smith put it (1990: S0):
To detect the regularities in nature, propose a generalisation, deduce
what it implies for the next case and observe whether the prediction
succeeds. If it does, no consequent action is needed; if it does not, then
either discard the generalisation or amend it and [test the] fresh
[predictions].
In contrast, there is an alternative hermeneutic (the word derives from
the Greek for ‘to interpret’) or interpretist tradition. The adherents of this
position are anti¬foundationalists, believing that the world is socially
constructed. They focus upon the wea#s#g of behaviour. The emphasis
is upon n#deтsta#ds#g, rather than expla#atso#. As such, in the
interpretist tradition it is not possible to establish causal relationships
between phenomena that hold across time and space.

Positivist, reBlist Bnd interpretist positions

We prefer this classification because the scientific tradition identified by
Hollis and Smith conflates two distinct positions, positivism and realism.
Lositivists adhere to a foundationalist ontology and are concerned to
establish causal relationships between social phenomema, thus developing
explanatory, and indeed predictive, models. The realist is also founda¬
tionalist in ontological terms. However, realists, unlike positivists, do not
privilege direct observation. The realist believes that there are deep
structural relationships between social phenomena which cannot be
directly observed, but which are crucial for any explanation of
behaviour. So, as an example, a realist might argue that patriarchy as a
structure cannot be directly observed, although we can see many of the
consequences of it; we return to this example later.
The distinction between positivist, realist and interpretist approaches
is examined in much more depth in the next section. However, the key
point here is that any classification that we adopt would annoy some
social scientists. We use this particular distinction because we are realists
and, as such, do not like the conflation between positivism and realism
involved in the first distinction. However, many other authors would
question our distinction. In particular, many, like Bevir and Rhodes (see
below) would want to make further distinctions within the tradition of
interpretive theory. The point is that any way of classifying
epistemological positions can be contested; we choose one, but are
aware of the criticism of it. In addition, we shall deal with many of those
criticisms when we look at the variants within the three positions we
identify.
 Daνsd MaтsS a#d Panl 2

Why Bre such distinctions importBnt?

In our view, ontological and epistemological concerns cannot, and

should not, be ignored or downgraded. Three points are important
here:

1. First, these concerns should not be put in what the Australians, with
typical directness, call the ‘too hard basket’. Certainly, the issues
involved are not easy, but neither are they difficult, if they are
explained simply and with appropriate examples.
2. Second, ontological and epistemological positions should not be
treated like a sweater that can be ‘put on’ when we are addressing
such philosophical issues and ‘taken off’ when we are doing research.
In our view, the dominance of a fairly crude positivist epistemology
throughout much of the postwar period encouraged many social
scientists to dismiss ontological questions and regard epistemological
issues as more or less resolved, with only the details left to be decided
by those interested in such matters. Such social scientists have tended
to acknowledge the importance of epistemology without considering
it necessary to deal with it in detail; positivism has been regarded as
a comforting sweater that can be put on where necessary. In contrast,
we would argue that epistemology, to say nothing of ontology, is far
from being a closed debate.
S. Third, researchers cannot adopt one position at one time for one
project and another on another occasion for a different project.
These positions are not interchangeable because they reflect
fundamental different approaches to what social science is and how we
do it. This is the key point. As we pointed out in the introduction, a
researcher’s epistemological position is reflected in what is studied,
how it is studied and the status the researcher gives to their findings.
So, a positivist looks for causal relationships, tends to prefer
quantitative analysis (for a more detailed discussion of the
relationship between ontology, epistemology and methodology, see
Chapter 11) and wants to produce ‘objective’ and generalisable
findings. A researcher from within the interpretist tradition is
concerned with understanding, not explanation, focuses on the
meaning that actions have for agents, tends to use qualitative evidence
and offers their results as one interpretation of the relationship between
the social phenomena studied. Realism is less easy to classify in this
way. The realists are looking for causal relationships, but think that
many important relationships between social phenomena cannot be
observed. This means they may use quantitative and qualitative
data. The quantitative data will only be appropriate for those
relationships that are directly observable. In contrast, the
unobservable relationships can only be established
22 O#tology a#d Kpsstewology s# Polstscal 8cse#ce

indirectly; we can observe other relationships which, our theory tells

us, are the result of those unobservable prelationships. We return to
these issues in the next section.

Differen% #ppro#che3 %o on%ology #nd epi3%emology

Here we outline the positivist, the interpretist and the realist positions in
more detail. We shall focus on: the major criticisms of the positions; the
variations within these positions; and the way the positions have
changed over time. At the outset, however, it is important to emphasise
that the distinctions between the positions, and more specifically that
between interpretism and realism, are not clear¬cut.

Positivism
The core of positivism is fairly straightforward, although of course there
are variants within it:

● Lositivism is based upon a foundationalist ontology. So, to the

positivist, like the realist, but unlike those from the interpretist
position, the world exists independently of our knowledge of it.
● To the positivist, natural science and social science are broadly
analogous. We can establish regular relationships between social
phenomena, using theory to generate hypotheses which can be tested
by direct observation. In this view, and in clear contrast to the realist,
there are no deep structures that cannot be observed. Traditionally,
positivism contended that there is no appearance/reality dichotomy and
that the world is real and not socially constructed. So, direct
observation can serve as an independent test of the validity of a theory.
Crucially, an observer can be objective in the way they undertake
such observations. Researchers from the interpretist tradition rarely
accept any notion of objectivity. Realists accept that all observation is
mediated by theory (to the realist, theory plays the crucial role in
allowing the researcher to distinguish between those social phenomena
which are directly observable and those which are not).
● To positivists the aim of social science is to make causal statements; in
their view it is possible to, and we should attempt to, establish causal
relationships between social phenomena. They share this aim with
realists, while interpretists deny the possibility of such statements.
● Lositivists also argue that it is possible to separate empirical questions –
that is, questions about what is – from normative questions – that is,
questions about what should be. Traditionally, positivists thought that
 Daνsd MaтsS a#d Panl 2

the goal of social science was to pursue empirical questions, while

philosophy, metaphysics or religion pursued the normative questions.
Because we can separate empirical and normative questions, it is
possible for social science to be objective and value¬free. Realists and,
especially, those from within the interpretist tradition would reject that
proposition.
Many social scientists are positivists, although much of the positivism is
implicit rather than explicit. The behavioural revolution in the social
sciences in the 1960s, dealt with by David Sanders in Chapter 2, was
an attempt to introduce scientific method into the study of society. It was
an explicit reaction to political theory, which it saw as concerned with
normative questions, and institutionalism, which it saw as lacking
theore¬ tical and methodological rigour. In contrast, it was based upon
a foundationalist ontology and, most often, a quantitative methodology
(but see below and Chapter 10). The view was that a social ‘science’
was possible if we followed the scientific method; deriving hypotheses
from theory and then testing them in an attempt to falsify them. We
needed ‘objective’ measures of our social phenomena, our variables; as
such, we would focus upon ‘hard’ data – from government statistics,
election results and so on – rather than soft data – from interviews or
participant observation. So, for example, if a positivist was studying
political participation, they would be interested in measuring the level of
voting, party or pressure group membership, direct action or whatever,
and relating it to demographic variables such as class, gender, race and
education. The aim would be to establish the precise nature of the
relationship between these variables and participation in order to produce
causal models. We shall return to this example later. The key point here is
that, as always, the ontological and epistemological position adopted
had clear methodological implications.
The criticism of positivism takes two broad forms. The first line of
criticism broadly argues that, in following the methods of science,
positivists misinterpret how science really proceeds. Two lines of argument
have been particularly important here. First, there is the pragmatist
position of Quine (1961) who develops two crucial critiques of positivism
(for a fuller exposition see Hollis and Smith 1990: SS–7; they deal with a
third, less important, criticism):
(i) Quine argues that any knowledge we derive from the five senses is
mediated by the concepts we use to analyse it, so there is no way
of classifying, or even describing, experience without interpreting it.
(ii) This means that theory and experiment are not simply separable,
rather theory affects both the facts we focus on and how we
interpret them. This, in turn, may affect the conclusions we draw if
the facts
2 O#tology a#d Kpsstewology s# Polstscal

appear to falsify the theory. As such, if we observe ‘facts’ which are

inconsistent with the theory, we might decide that the facts are
wrong rather than that the theory is wrong. Of course, this
undermines the notion that observation alone can serve to falsify a
theory.

Second, there is Kuhn’s view (1970) that, at any given time, science
tends to be dominated by a particular paradigm that is unquestioned and
which affects the questions scientists ask and how they interpret what
they observe (for a fuller discussion, see Hollis and Smith 1990: S7–61).
Consequently, scientific investigation is not ‘open’, as positivism
implies, rather certain conclusions are almost unthinkable. There is a
‘paradigm shift’ when a lot of empirical observation leads certain, brave,
scientists to question the dominant paradigm, but until that time, and for
the most part, scientists discard observations which do not fit (obviously
this fits well with the second of Quine’s criticisms above) and embrace
the results which confirm the paradigm.
The second main line of criticism of positivism is more particular to
social science. It argues that there are obvious differences between social
and physical or natural phenomena that make social ‘science’ impossible.
Three differences are particularly important. First, social structures, unlike
natural structures, do not exist independently of the activities they
shape. So, for example, marriage is a social institution or structure, but
it is also a lived experience, particularly, although not exclusively, for
those who are married. This lived experience affects agents’
understanding of the institution and also helps change it. Second, and
related, social structures, unlike natural structures, do not exist
independently of agents’ views of what they are doing in the activity.
Leople are reflexive; they reflect on what they are doing and often
change their actions in the light of that reflection. This leads us to the
third difference. Social structures, unlike natural structures, change as a
result of the actions of agents; in most senses the social world varies
across time and space. Some positivist social scientists minimise these
differences, but, to the extent they are accepted, they point towards a
more interpretist epistemological position.
Many positivists avoid these critiques which are put in the ‘too hard
basket’. However, the more sophisticated positivists are aware of these
criticisms and the position has changed significantly as a result. Fortu¬
nately, this volume boasts two sophisticated behaviouralists who are
positivists, Sanders and John. It is particularly worth examining David
Sanders’ view in a little more detail because it represents an excellent
example of the modern, more sophisticated, positivist position. Sanders
(Chapter 2) accepts he has been strongly influenced by the positivist
position, but acknowledges the ‘ferocious philosophical criticism’ to
which it was subjected. He argues that ‘post¬behaviouralists’, who might
also be
 Daνsd MaтsS a#d Panl 2

called ‘post¬positivists’: acknowledge the interdependence of theory and

observation; recognise that normative questions are important and not
always easy to separate from empirical questions; and accept that other
traditions have a key role to play in political and social analysis. As
such, this post¬positivism has moved a significant way from more
traditional positivism, largely as a result of the type of criticisms
outlined here.
However, the ontological and epistemological problems have not
gone away, rather they have been elided. Two quotes from Sanders
illustrate the point. First, he argues (see Chapter 2: S1):
Modern behaviouralists – ‘post¬behaviouralists’ – simply prefer to
subject their own theoretical claims to empirical tests. They also suspect
that scholars working in non¬empirical traditions are never able to
provide a satisfactory answer to the crucial question: ‘How would you
know if you were wrong?’
Later he continues (Chapter 2: S4):
For modern behaviouralists, the ultimate test of a good theory is still
whether or not it is consistent with observation – with the available
empirical evidence. Modern behaviouralists are perfectly prepared to
accept that different theoretical positions are likely to produce
different observations. They insist however, that, whatever
‘observations’ are implied by a particular theoretical perspective, those
observations must be used in order to conduct a systematic empirical
test of the theory that is being posited.
This is a sophisticated statement of a positivist epistemological position,
but it is still essentially positivist. The aim is to use observation (of
whatever type) to test hypothesised relationships between the social
phenomena studied. Research from within other traditions must still be
judged against the positivists’ criteria: ‘observation must be used in
order to conduct a systematic empirical test of the theory that is being
posited’. Yet, that is not a standard most researchers from within an
interpretist tradition could accept (even Bevir and Rhodes 1999 could
only do so with major qualifications), because they do not believe that
direct observation can be objective and used as a test of ‘reality’. Most
realists would also have a problem with Sanders’ position because they
would see many of the key relationships as unobservable.
One other aspect of Sanders’ position is important here. He accepts that
interpretation and meaning are important, which might suggest that the
differences between positivist and interpretist traditions are beginning to
dissolve. So, Sanders argues (Chapter 2: SS), in criticising prior studies of
voting behaviour: ‘There are other areas – relating to the way in which
individuals reflect, to a greater or lesser degree, upon themselves – where
2 O#tology a#d Kpsstewology s# Polstscal

behavioural research has simply not dared to tread.’ He recognises that

such factors might, or might not, be important, but emphasises that they
would be difficult to study empirically. However, the crucial point is that
Sanders wants to treat interpretation and meaning as intervening variables.
In this view, how a voter understands the parties and their own position
may affect their voting behaviour. At best, this acknowledges only one
aspect of the double hermeneutic; the interpretist tradition would argue
that we also need to acknowledge the subjectivity of the observer.
So, positivism has changed in response to criticism. Lost¬positivism is
much less assertive that there is only one way of doing social science.
However, it still emphasises explanation, rather than understanding,
and the primacy of direct observation. In our terms, it is still
foundationalist and firmly located in the scientific tradition.

7he interpretist position

The interpretist tradition is the obvious ‘other’ of positivism. However, it
is a much broader church than positivism and much of this subsection
will deal with its variants. Nevertheless, it is useful to begin with an
outline of the core of the position.
● In the interpretist tradition researchers reject the notion that the world
exists independently of our knowledge of it. Rather, they contend that
the world is socially or discursively constructed. This view is
diametrically opposed to positivism, but shares certain features with
some modern variants of realism. In ontological terms, then, this
position is anti¬foundationalist.
● This means that for researchers working within this tradition social
phenomena do not exist independently of our interpretation of them;
rather it is this interpretation/understanding of social phenomena which
affects outcomes. As such, it is the interpretations/meanings of social
phenomena that are crucial; interpretations/meanings which can only be
established and understood within discourses or traditions. Conse¬
quently, we should focus on identifying those discourses or traditions
and establishing the interpretations and meanings they attach to social
phenomena.
● However, we must also acknowledge that ‘objective’ analysis is
impossible. Social ‘scientists’ (of course interpretists would not use this
term) are not privileged, but themselves operate within discourses or
traditions. Consequently, knowledge is theoretically or discursively
laden. As such, this position acknowledges the double hermeneutic.
This position has clear methodological implications. It argues that there
is no objective truth, that the world is socially constructed and that the
role
 Daνsd MaтsS a#d Panl 2

of social ‘scientists’ [sic] is to study those social constructions. Quantitative

methods can be blunt instruments and may produce misleading data. In
contrast, we need to utilise qualitative methods – interviews, focus groups,
vignettes and so on – to help us establish how people understand their
world. So, for example, someone operating from within this tradition
studying political participation would start by trying to establish how
people understand ‘the political’ and ‘political’ participation
The major criticism of the interpretist tradition comes, unsurprisingly,
from positivists, though some realists would agree with elements of that
critique. To positivists, the interpretist tradition merely offers opinions or
subjective judgements about the world. As such, there is no basis on which
to judge the validity of their knowledge claims. One person’s view of the
world, and of the relationship between social phenomena within it, is as
good as another’s view. To many positivists, this means that such research
is akin to history, or even fiction, whereas they aspire to a science of
society. It is difficult for someone in the interpretist tradition to answer
this accusation, because it is based on a totally different ontological
view and reflects a different epistemology and, thus, a different view of
what social science is about. However, as we shall see, most researchers
do believe that it is possible to generalise, if only in a limited sense.
Lerhaps more interestingly, Bevir and Rhodes (forthcoming) attempt to
defend their approach against this positivist critique by establishing a
basis on which they can make knowledge claims; on which they can
claim that one interpretation, or narrative, is superior to another. We
shall return to their argument below.
Bevir and Rhodes (forthcoming: ch. 2) distinguish between the herme¬
neutic and postmodern, or post¬structuralist, strands in the interpretist
position. In essence, the hermeneutic tradition is idealist; it argues that we
need to understand the meanings people attach to social behaviour. So,
hermeneutics is concerned with the interpretation of texts and actions.
This involves the use of ethnographic techniques (participant observation,
transcribing texts, keeping diaries and so on) to produce what Geertz
(197S) calls ‘thick description’. As Bevir and Rhodes put it, quoting Geertz,
the aim is to establish ‘our own constructions of other people’s
construc¬ tions of what they and their compatriots are up to’. However,
ethnogra¬ phers do generalise. They develop a narrative about the past
based upon the meanings which the actions had for social actors. Then, on
the basis of this ‘thick description’, they offer an interpretation of what
this tells us about the society. The point is that these interpretations are
always partial, in both senses of the world, and provisional; they are not
‘true’.
More recently, as Bevir and Rhodes (forthcoming) emphasise, post¬
structuralism and postmodernism have provided a powerful challenge to
foundationalism in both philosophy and social science. Yet, as Bevir
and
2 O#tology a#d Kpsstewology s# Polstscal

Rhodes also point out, this variant of the interpretist tradition is itself so
diverse that it is difficult, if not impossible, to characterise. They overcome
this problem by focusing on the work of Michel Foucault, who is perhaps
the best¬known writer in this broad tradition. He, like most post¬
structuralists and postmodernists, is a strong opponent of foundationalism
and the modernisation project associated with the Enlightenment. This
project argues that: the basis of human knowledge is direct experience; as
such, it is possible to develop an ‘objective’ view of the ‘real’ world
(thus, it denies both elements of the double hermeneutic); language is
transparent or neutral; and that human history is inevitably progressive,
with present knowledge building on past knowledge to improve our
information about the world and our ability to control it.
In contrast, Foucault argues that experience is acquired within a prior
discourse. As such, language is crucial because institutions and actions
only acquire a meaning through language. Thus, as Bevir and Rhodes
(forthcoming) argue, for Foucault: ‘to understand an object or action,
political scientists have to interpret it in the wider discourse of which it is
part’. This means that, as Bevir and Rhodes stress, it is the social
discourse, rather than the beliefs of individuals, which are crucial to
Foucault’s version of the interpretist position. The identification of that
discourse, and the role it plays in structuring meanings, is thus the key
concern of those adopting this approach (for an example of this broad
approach in use see Howarth (199S).
Bevir and Rhodes (forthcoming) develop their own take on the inter¬
pretist tradition. It is particularly interesting because it directly addresses
the key issue raised in the positivist critique of this tradition. They argue
that social science is about the development of narratives, not theories. As
such, they stress the importance of understanding and the impossibility
of absolute knowledge claims, but they want to explain and they defend
a limited notion of objectivity.
Broadly, Bevir and Rhodes are within the hermeneutic, rather than
the postmodern, or post¬structuralist, stream of the interpretist tradition.
As such, they follow Geertz and others in arguing that it is possible to
produce explanations within the interpretist tradition. However, their
understand¬ ing of explanation is very different from that of a positivist.
In their view, the researcher can produce an explanation of an event or
of the relation¬ ships between social phenomena. But, this explanation
is built upon their interpretation of the meanings the actors involved
gave to their actions. What is produced is a narrative which is particular,
to that time and space, and partial, being based on a subjective
interpretation of the views of, most likely, only some of the actors
involved. Consequently, any such narrative must be provisional; there
are no absolute truth claims.
 Daνsd MaтsS a#d Panl 2

However, Bevir and Rhodes do wish to make some, more limited,

knowledge claims. They argue (forthcoming): ‘Although we do not have
access to pure facts that we can use to declare particular interpretations to
be true or false, we can still hang on to the idea of objectivity.’ They
suggest that a field of study ‘is a co¬operative intellectual pтactsce, with
a tтadstso# of historically produced norms, rules, conventions and
standards of excellence that remain subject to critical debate, and with a
#aттatsνe content that gives meaning to it’ (original emphasis).
They continue:
[Lractice, tradition and narrative provide] for a negotiated and
dynamic set of standards through which rational debate and
argumentation between proponents of rival perspectives or
approaches is possible [where] these standards are historically
embedded within social practices, traditions and narratives which
provide ‘embedded reasons’
. . . for judging an argument true or false or an action right or wrong.
Such criteria are not universal or objective; rather, they are ‘shared criteria
for assessing . . . knowledge claims’. To Bevir and Rhodes, postmodernism
errs in failing to acknowledge ‘significant, grounded rationality’ that is to
be found in these practices and traditions.
In Bevir and Rhodes’ view, such knowledge claims are not self¬
referential because they can be ‘reconfirmed’ at three distinct points:
The first is when we translate our concepts for fieldwork: that is, are
they meaningful to practitioners and users and if not, why not? The
second is when we reconstruct narratives from the conversations: that is,
is the story logical and consistent with the data? And the third is when
we redefine and translate our concepts because of the academic
community’s judgement on the narratives: that is, does the story meet
the agreed knowledge criteria?
Overall, they argue:
To overcome this difficulty, we should conceive of objective knowledge,
less as what our community happens to agree on, and more as a
normative standard embedded in a practice of criticising and comparing
rival accounts of ‘agreed facts’. The anti¬foundational nature of this
practice lies in its appeal, not to given facts, but to those agreed in a
particular community or conversation. In addition, and of key
importance, the normative, critical bite of our approach lies in
conducting the comparison by the rules of intellectual honesty. These
rules originate in anti¬foundationalism and not in a straightforward
acceptance of the norms of the relevant community or conversation.
S O#tology a#d Kpsstewology s# Polstscal

As we can see then, there are a number of variants within the interpretist
tradition. However, they are all anti¬foundationalist and critical of
positivism. These approaches have become much more common in
political science since the 1970s for a number of reasons. First, increasingly
philosophical critiques have led to the questioning of positivism.
Second, the postmodern turn in social science has had an affect on political
science, although much less so than in sociology. Third, normative
political theory has changed fundamentally. Historically, it was
foundationalist; the aim was to establish some absolute notion of the good
or of justice. As Buckler argues in Chapter 8, that is no longer the case.
Some normative political theorists have been influenced by
postmodernism, again variously defined, and more by the work of Quine
and others. Now, most political theorists are anti¬foundationalists or, at
the very least, have a very limited conception of any universal
foundations. Fourth, as Randall shows in Chapter S, much, but by no
means all, feminist thought has been strongly influenced by
postmodernism; it is anti¬foundationalist and operates within the
interpretist tradition. As such, we can see the influence of this
interpretist tradition very broadly across political science.

ReBlism
Realism shares an ontological position with positivism, but, in
epistemo¬ logical terms, modern realism has more in common with
relativism. The core views of classical realism are again fairly clear and
owe much to Marx’s work:
● To realists, the world exists independently of our knowledge of it. In
ontological terms they, like positivists, are foundationalists.
● Again like positivists, realists contend that social phenomena/structures
do have causal powers, so we can make causal statements.
● However, unlike positivists, realists contend that not all social
phenomena, and the relationships between them, are directly
observable. There are deep structures that cannot be observed and
what can be observed may offer a false picture of those phenomena/
structures and their effects (for an excellent exposition of this position
see Smith, in Hollis and Smith 1990: 20S–8). But, as Smith puts it,
although we cannot observe those structures, ‘positing their existence
gives us the best explanation of social action. To use a phrase
familiar to the philosophy of science, we are involved in ‘‘inference to
the best explanation’’ (Hollis and Smith 1990: 207). As such, to a
realist there is often a dichotomy between reality and appearance.
This is a very important issue because it has clear methodological
implications. It means that realists do not accept that what appears to be
so, or, perhaps
 Daνsd MaтsS a#d Panl Pnтlo#g S1

more significantly, what actors say is so, is necessarily so. As an

example, classical Marxism, and Marxism is the archetypal classical
realism, argued that there was a difference between ‘real’ interests,
which reflect material reality, and perceived interests, which might be
manipulated by the powerful forces in society. Given this view, we
cannot just ask people what their interests are, because we would
merely be identifying their manipulated interests, not their ‘real’
interests.

The criticisms of classical realism were of two sorts, which reflect

different epistemological positions. The positivists denied the existence of
unobservable structures. More importantly, they argued that positing them
makes the knowledge claims of realism untestable and, thus, unfalsifiable.
As such, realist claims that rely on the effect of unobservable structures
have the same status to positivists as the claims of scholars from within the
interpretist tradition. In contrast, authors from the interpretist tradition
criticise the foundational claims of realism. In their view, there are no
structures that are independent of social action and no ‘objective’ basis on
which to observe the actions or infer the deep structures. So, the realist
claim that structures cause social action are rejected on ontological and
epistemological grounds.
In our view, contemporary realism has been significantly influenced
by the interpretist critique. In particular, this modern critical realism ac¬
knowledges two points. First, while social phenomena exist independently
of our interpretation of them, our interpretation/understanding of them
affects outcomes. So, structures do not determine; rather they constrain
and facilitate. Social science involves the study of reflexive agents who
interpret and change structures. Second, our knowledge of the world is
fallible; it is theory¬laden. We need to identify and understand both the
external ‘reality’ and the social construction of that ‘reality’ if we are to
explain the relationships between social phenomena.
Realism also has clear methodological implications. It suggests that
there is a real world ‘out there’, but emphasises that outcomes are shaped
by the way in which that world is socially constructed. As such, it would
acknowledge the utility of both quantitative and qualitative data. So, for
example, realists might use quantitative methods to identify the extent
to which financial markets are ‘globalised’. However, they would also
want to analyse qualitatively how globalisation is perceived, or
discursively constructed, by governments, because the realist argument
would be that both the ‘reality’ and the discursive construction affect
what government does in response to global pressures. We shall return to
this example later. Modern realism then attempts to acknowledge much
of the interpretist critique, while retaining a commitment to causal
explanation. The key
S O#tology a#d Kpsstewology s# Polstscal

problem here of course is that it is not easy, indeed many would see it
as impossible, to combine scientific and interpretist positions because
they have such fundamentally different ontological and epistemological
under¬ pinnings, one focusing on explanation and the other on
understanding (on this point, see Hollis and Smith 1990: 212).
One of the main criticisms of realists has been that they often treat
concepts as if they related to some fixed, or at least more or less given,
‘essences’ or cores. It should be noted first that this is not a necessary tenet
for realists; it reflects rather the philosophical traditions from which they
derive. Nevertheless, the question of what a concept is for is an
important one, and it affects ontology directly. If a concept cannot be
tied firmly to an underlying reality, as traditional philosophy seems to imply,
the concept of ‘being’ itself may be detached from the real world of
experience. This is one of the reasons why modern philosophy has
considerable difficulty even recognising that there may be a subject of
ontology. It should also be noted that this is one of those issues on which
positivists and interpretists can find themselves temporarily in agreement,
even though, as we have seen, they have fundamentally different views
about knowledge and being. Any apparent agreement between them,
however, has limited scope, as they have different origins and are
heading for different destinations. Having considered how these
categories relate to some important issues in the social sciences, we
can now move on to apply the arguments to particular cases so as to
illustrate their use and their limits.

On%ology #nd epi3%emology in poli%ic#l 3cience:

%wo c#3e3

The aim in this section is to examine how a researcher’s ontological and

epistemological position affects the way they approach empirical questions
in political science. We shall focus on two areas: globalisation and
multilevel governance. These areas have been chosen because they reflect a
broad spread of the concerns, but, in our view, similar arguments could be
made in relation to other substantive areas.

CBse 1: GlobBlisBtion
The literature on globalisation mushroomed in the 1990s. It has been
common to distinguish between processes or aspects of globalisation: so
many authors have distinguished between economic, political and cultural
processes, while acknowledging that they are interrelated. In this vein,
many have argued that economic globalisation has grown apace and that
this process has significantly restricted the autonomy of the nation state.
 Daνsd MaтsS a#d Panl S

Indeed, Ohmae (1990) goes as far as to argue that only two economic
forces, global financial markets and transnational corporations, will play
any role in the politics of the future. In his view, the future role of states
will be analogous to the current role of local councils. At the same time,
other authors have focused on cultural globalisation, suggesting that world
culture is becoming increasingly homogeneous: in the view of most,
reflecting a growing US hegemony. Certainly, there is little doubt that
the issue of globalisation in a crucial one for those interested in
questions of contemporary political economy and governance.
Lolitical scientists have probably been most concerned with economic
globalisation and the way in which it restricts the autonomy of the state,
and have utilised a foundationalist ontology and a positivist epistemology,
although, as we shall see below, some more recent work is realist. In
contrast, sociologists, particularly those who focus on cultural studies,
concentrate upon cultural globalisation, operating from an anti¬founda¬
tionalist and interpretist position.
The main debate about economic globalisation has concerned the extent
to which it has increased. There are two main positions. Some authors, like
Ohmae (1990), who are christened hyperglobalists by Held et al. (1999)
and seen as first¬wave theorists by Hay and Marsh (2000), argue that there
has been a massive increase in various indicators of economic globalisa¬
tion: direct foreign investment; international bank lending; transnational
production; international trade and so on. In contrast, authors such as
Hirst and Thompson (1999), christened sceptics by Held et al. (1999) and
seen by Hay and Marsh (2000) as second¬wave theorists, argue that the
process is more limited. More specifically, they suggest that: globalisation
is not a new phenomenon; regionalisation, rather than globalisation, is a
better description of the changes that have occurred; and the only area
in which there has been significant globalisation is in relation to financial
markets. We are not concerned here with the detail of this argument.
Our point is that both sets of authors agree about what constitutes
evidence of globalisation and how we can go about studying that evidence.
Globalisa¬ tion is an economic process that can be measured
quantitatively, indeed there is large agreement as to the appropriate
measures, and which, to the extent that it exists, has an effect on
patterns of governance.
More recently, other authors have been, in most cases implicitly rather
than explicitly, critical of this ontological and epistemological approach.
The point is easily made if we return to two ways of classifying the
literature on globalisation to which we have already referred. Held et al.
(1999) contrast hyperglobalist and sceptical approaches to globalisation
with a third approach to which they adhere: the transformationalist
thesis. In contrast, Hay and Marsh (2000) identify a third wave of the
globalisa¬ tion literature that builds upon a critique of the first two
waves. These two
S O#tology a#d Kpsstewology s# Polstscal

‘third ways’ share something in common, but do differ significantly in a

manner that reflects ontological and epistemological debates.
The transformationalists differ significantly from the sceptics in that
they share:

a conviction that, at the dawn of a new millennium, globalisation is a

central driving force behind the rapid social, political and economic
changes that are reshaping modern societies and world order . . . In this
respect, globalisation is conceived as a powerful transformative force
which is responsible for a massive shake out of societies, economies,
institutions of governance and world order. (Held et al. 1999: 7)

Held et al. also emphasise the major way in which the transformationalist
account parts company with both the other two positions (1999: 7):

The transformationalists make no claims about the future trajectory of

globalisation . . . Rather [they] emphasise globalisation as a long¬term
historical process which is inscribed with contradictions and which is
significantly shaped by conjunctural factors.

So, they argue that: there are ‘real’ social, political and economic changes
occurring in the world; globalisation is a cause of these changes, a
transformative force; but there is no inevitable process of globalisation
which, as social scientists, we can identify. This last point is especially
important here. The putative development of globalisation is dependent on
the actions of agents, whether individuals, companies, institutions or
states; as such it is a socially constructed process. It seems clear then that
the transformative position is a realist one.
This position has methodological consequences. It points strongly to
comparative analysis, because the emphasis is upon how different coun¬
tries, and indeed different companies and markets, are affected by, and
respond to, this process of globalisation in different ways. If
globalisation is not an inevitable or universal process, then we need to
focus on how it is differently experienced in different contexts.
This point is even clearer if we turn to what Hay and Marsh call the
third¬wave literature on globalisation. Hay and Marsh (2000: 6) follow
Held et al. in arguing that we: ‘shouldn’t make essentialising and
reifying assumptions about the effects, consequences, or even the very
existence, of globalisation’. Rather, globalisation is a series of
contradictory and contingent processes. More specifically, they suggest
that, for many authors, especially the hyperglobalists, globalisation is a
process without a subject. In contrast, they argue that it is agents who
construct globalisa¬ tion and, as such, the researcher should identify the
actors involved and how they perceive and discursively construct
globalising tendencies.
 Daνsd MaтsS a#d Panl S

However, Hay and Marsh go further to contend that these discursive

constructions have significant effects on outcomes. So, they suggest that it
is the discursive construction of globalisation that affects government
economic policies, rather than the ‘real’ processes of globalisation. As
such, and taking the UK as an example, their argument would run along
the following lines:
● While there has been a significant increase in regionalism in patterns of
trading and a globalisation of financial markets, there is limited
evidence that Britain is locked into a globalised political economy which
determines the economic policy which the British Government can
adopt.
● However, British governments, and especially the Blair Government,
have argued that it is constrained in that way. It suggests that the extent
of globalisation is such that the pursuit of neo¬liberal policies is
inevitable: there is no alternative.
● As such, it is not the ‘reality’ of globalisation that is shaping British
economic policy, but the dominant discursive construction of that
reality.
We are not concerned here about the validity or otherwise of this
argument. The crucial point for us is that this view clearly marks a break
with the positivism that underpins most work on globalisation. To Hay
and Marsh, there may be ‘real’ processes at work, but the way they
affect outcomes is mediated by the discursive construction(s) of these
processes. This argument has both realist and interpretist elements.
There is an appeal to a real world, but the emphasis is on the discursive
construction of that world. This position illustrates how realist and
interpretist positions interface. In our view, this position is a realist one if
it recognises that there is an interactive or dialectical relationship
between the ‘real’ world and the discourses. A realist would
acknowledge not only that discourses have real effects, in this case that
the dominant discourse of globalisation shapes economic policy, but also
that the ‘real’ processes of globalisation constrain the resonance of
different discourses. So, if the dominant discourse is at odds with the
‘reality’, alternative discourses can appeal to that ‘reality deficit’.
However, if it is merely the discourses that have the causal power,
then, in our view, it is an interpretist position.
There are other approaches to globalisation which are clearly located in
an interpretist tradition. As we emphasised above, most of these ap¬
proaches stress cultural globalisation. Of course, as Held et al. point out
(1999: S28), the concept of culture has a long and complex history but
‘normally refers to the social construction, articulation and reception of
meaning’. This definition immediately suggests an anti¬foundationalist
ontology and, most often, an interpretist epistemology.
S O#tology a#d Kpsstewology s# Polstscal

It is possible to approach the issue of cultural globalisation utilising a

positivist epistemology. So, one could focus empirically on the extent to
which certain cultural icons, such as Coca¬Cola, McDonald’s or Madonna,
have become universal, or whether colonialism was associated with a
similar global culture. However, the focus of a cultural studies approach to
globalisation is much more likely to be on difference. Two points are
important here. First, the argument would be that there are various
discourses about globalisation, none of which is ‘true’, although at any
time one discourse may be dominant. Second, while one discourse may
dominate, it can be, and will always be, resisted: different agents – citizens
and researchers – will offer different narrations of globalisation and its
effects. In this way, this alternative ‘cultural studies’ approach reflects
an anti¬foundationalist and an interpretist position.

CBse 2: Multilevel governBnce

Multilevel governBnce Bnd intergovernmentBlism: reBlism versus

positivism
The term ‘multilevel governance’ covers a variety of familiar phenomena
that are normally located in the areas of regional policy and European
integration. Though ‘multilevel governance’ (MLG) is rapidly acquiring
the status of a fashionable mainstream concept, it is not as established as
‘globalisation’ in the vocabulary of politicians and commentators. Here
again, the contemporary debates in large part reflect different
ontological and epistemological positions. In this case study, we
concentrate not on the different uses of the term, although these can be
significant, but rather on the contrast between MLG and its main
opponent, which is liberal intergovernmentalism.
A useful definition of MLG is provided by Hunt (1999): ‘[According to
multilevel governance theories] the policy process involves the interaction
between a constellation of public and private actors located at the
supra¬ national, national and sub¬national level.’ This interaction is
usually understood as non¬hierarchical and as lacking a central,
predominant authority, and similar usages can be found in Marks et al.
(1996) and Armstrong and Bulmer (1998). These theorists argue
against the view of the EU as an international organisation whose
decision¬making is based predominantly on national interests determined
by member states, a view known as intergovernmentalism.
The intergovernmentalist perspective is closely associated with interna¬
tional lawyers, but an influential political analysis is provided by Andrew
Moravscik (199S), who argues that the European policy process can be
 Daνsd MaтsS a#d Panl S

understood as a nested game played out both in the domestic politics of

member states and in the international arena of the EU’s institutions.
While the MLG theorists derive their frameworks from institutionalist
perspectives (see Chapter 4), arguing that ‘institutions matter’ in
shaping interaction, analysts such as Moravscik generally utilise rational
choice perspectives (see Chapter S below). Both approaches would claim
to be empirically grounded, but the nature of the empirical grounding
differs.
Most MLG theorists are realists in epistemological terms,
emphasising how the continuity of rules, norms and operating
procedures, and some¬ times of ‘deep, non¬observable structures’, can,
and does, determine the outcomes of decision¬making in the long term.
As such, their logic is inductive rather than deductive. Overall, MLG is
not so much concerned with the debate between neo¬federalists and
intergovernmentalists as with the consequences of different possible
forms of integration for normative issues such as democratic participation,
effective government and distri¬ butive justice.
In contrast, liberal intergovernmentalists seek to identify the preferences
and the parameters of the individual actors (usually member states) and
show how, after the event, the outcomes can be understood as the result of
rational calculated behaviour. Their logic is therefore deductive: they
argue from the general to the particular. Liberal intergovernmentalism is
foundationalist in ontological terms and operates with a positivist
episte¬ mology. In its treatment of European integration it is clearly
unsympa¬ thetic to neo¬federalism and to supranationalism.

7he normBtive underpinnings of multilevel governBnce Bnd

intergovermentBlism
MLG theorists argue that, rather than conceptualising regional policy as
a national issue in which the lead role is taken by the national state
institutions, it should be identified as an arena in which the European
Union plays an integral role in policy¬making, together with the
separate regional authorities and the central national institutions. In this
sense, theories of multilevel governance make a distinction between
‘government’ and ‘governance’. ‘Government’, it is argued, is too
narrowly concerned with the formal structures of state authority, and
with the associated processes and issues, whereas ‘governance’ is
concerned with much wider notions of politics, encompassing the
production, accumulation and regulation of collective goods at all levels
including the international. Lower relations in multilevel governance are
structured by reciprocal interdependence on each other’s resources,
rather than on conflict over either scarcity or fundamental values.
Typically, these theories argue that relations of decision¬making between
the various levels should be seen as
 S O#tology a#d Kpsstewology s# Polstscal

loosely interconnected rather than as tightly nested; that is, characterised

by multilateral links, and non¬hierarchical in form, rather than by a
hierarchical chain of bilateral links in which the national state authority
has a predominant role, as is the case with intergovernmental approaches.
There is thus a strong normative element in multilevel governance. From
describing the increased evidence of the multiplicity of decision¬making
forms and levels in European integration, proponents move to arguments
about the value of multilevel governance in enhancing democratic legiti¬
macy and effective decision¬making under conditions of globalised poli¬
tical economy. In comparison with state¬centred accounts, multilevel
governance is said to be ‘closer to the people’, and therefore more
acceptable, and more flexible and adaptable, so better able to respond
to the rapidly changing economic climate (Marks et al. 1996).
The arguments against multilevel governance, if it is regarded as a policy
prescription as well as empirical analysis, concentrate on two main issues
(Moravscik 199S; Scharpf 1988). The first is what is known as the ‘joint
decision trap’. This focuses upon the danger of deadlock in decision¬
making where there are many participants, interdependent arenas and a
variety of possible combinations of policy¬making processes. Though
multilevel governance may offer the prospect of policy¬making close to
the people and greater legitimacy, it risks sacrificing efficiency in decision¬
making if there is no authoritative procedure for resolving
disagreements among equal participants. A second criticism denies
even that multilevel governance provides greater legitimacy and argues
that, when the smaller units and more local levels of decision¬making
are included, the greater complexity of procedures results in opacity of
decision¬making and, therefore, in less accountability. In practice,
multilevel governance can mean obscure elite¬led agreements and public
incomprehension. Neo¬ liberal arguments try to resolve these problems
by emphasising how the member states in the EU remain both the focus
of popular legitimacy, albeit with some rebalancing towards regional
authorities, and the main guarantors of effective governmental
decision¬making.
In response to this, Marks et al. (1996) have three main criticisms of the
intergovernmental approach. Underlying these disagreements is a funda¬
mental dispute about the nature of social reality. First, positivist
explana¬ tions of societal phenomena neglect the structural constraints
within which individuals operate. These are varied in kind, but the most
important are generally the impact of differential allocation of resources,
the culturally¬ given nature of the value framework within which
individuals choose and the unpredictability of external factors, such as the
international economic and security climate.
Second, the realist perspective emphasises how the institutional frame¬
works have a primary effect in shaping decision¬making through their
 Daνsd MaтsS a#d Panl S

formal rules, their informal procedures, their value structures and their
effect on office¬holding and internal role¬oriented behaviour. In one sense,
the institutions are no more than the sum of countless individual choices,
but merely to state this does not get us very far. Realists seek to find
ways of characterising different institutional frameworks so as to move
beyond this and to introduce other levels of analysis and
explanation which recognise the weight of the long¬term structural and
institutional context. Third, it is argued that intergovernmentalists are
insufficiently critical about what time¬frames are relevant and why. The
term ‘path dependency’ used in this context (Lierson 1996) does not just
refer to the given nature of resource allocations at ‘point zero’ which the
researcher takes as the start. It also directs our attention to the impact of
decisions prior to point zero, and of the ways in which the institutional
frameworks lock actors into particular sets of choices. This implicitly asks
positivists to justify why they adopt diachronic modes of explanation,
which imply social understanding as a set of discrete operations in
fixed points in time, as opposed to synchronic explanations, which
emphasise a more continuous and context¬
led understanding of the social nature of time.
Despite these epistemological and methodological differences, writers
such as Moravscik and Scharpf (Scharpf 1988, 1997) appear to be able to
integrate some of the concerns of multilevel governance into their own
perspective, so that, despite the methodological differences between the
positivists and realists, we can identify these as distinct strands in the study
of the European policy process, marked by an attentiveness to similar
policy problems and with some of the same language.

7he constructivist BpproBch

This is not true of the social constructivist approach (see, for example,
Jørgensen 1998; Weldes 1996; Wendt 1994). This rejects the language of
causality, with which positivists and realists are content in their different
ways, and in contrast, is based upon an interpretist epistemological
position. Constructivists argue that, if there is a problem of increasing
complexity of decision¬making associated with the decline of the nation
state, this complexity must be understood as an intentional social construct
on the part of decision¬makers, part of a set of political projects associated
with responses to perceptions of external and internal constraints. The
questions which arise are concerned with political decision¬making as a
series of attempts to resolve conflicts over meaning and identity,
understood in the broadest sense. Constructivists take issue with the
positivist understanding of the nature of political choice. They argue
against the acceptance of individual preference as a given and instead
interrogate specifically why and how preferences come to be formed
and
40 O#tology a#d Kpsstewology s# Polstscal 8cse#ce

how these preferences and choices relate to the strategic aims of powerful
interests in society. Multilevel governance then would not be seen as a set
of objectively perceived phenomena, but as a normative framework which
is itself part of the political conflict between the interests associated with
neo¬liberal economic restructuring and those seeking a more social
democratic accommodation with technological change.
This locates the arguments about multilevel governance within the
discussion about the nature of globalisation, which we dealt with above,
and in which one of the main disputes is about the underlying realities of
technological economic and social change and their relationship with
the discursively constructed political uses made of them within specific
political projects.

Conclu3ion

The point here is not to attempt to resolve these disputes. Rather, what we
have sought to do is to show how the different approaches in different
issues relate to epistemological and methodological assumptions, and to
one another. The terms introduced here can be used as signposts,
suggesting how we can come to terms with the deeper implications of
the theories and groups of concerns which are the focus of the
individual chapters which follow. One of the temptations in so doing is to
attempt to find a synthesis of all the available positions, in the hope that, at
some level of analysis, agreement is possible over fundamental issues.
Unfortunately, experience and logic combine to warn against this
temptation. These debates have been part of the intellectual and moral
climate of Western thought for centuries and continue because they reflect
disagreements not just about logic or technicalities but also about the
proper scope of human action in society. In other words, they are
questions which relate to deep¬ rooted moral positions that may be
internally coherent, but are incompatible with one another, except in so
far as they all include some appeal to intellectual and ethical tolerance of
diversity. In the face of these difficulties, another strategy, alluring at least to
risk¬averse researchers, is to avoid the issue. Far from being safe, this
position is actually rather unsafe, since it does not enable one to
distinguish between good and bad research and between good and bad
arguments. The least one can say about these issues is that they are of
sufficient importance to warrant a genuine commitment to coming to
terms with them. Coming to terms with the issues requires one to think
through the different arguments separately, to compare them and to
evaluate them. As we argued at the beginning of this chapter, this
means identifying, as far as possible, what are the epistemological and
ontological underpinnings and what these imply in
 Daνsd MaтsS a#d Panl Pnтlo#g 41

terms of argumentation, practical research method, explanatory logic

and research construction. The purpose of this chapter has been to
encourage this and to attempt to provide an introduction to some of the
main ideas and methods involved.

Fur%her re#ding

● The best introductions to the philosophy of science and social

science are Chalmers (198S, 1990) and Winch (19S8).
● For an accessible overview of ontology and epistemology, see Hay
(2002).
● On the positivist approach, see Kuhn (1970), Hempel (196S, 1966) or
Halfpenny (1982).
● On the interpretive approach, see Bevir and Rhodes (1999).
● On realism, see Sayer (1992).