HUME

Hume’s most important contributions to the philosophy of causation are found in A

Treatise of Human Nature, and An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding, the
latter generally viewed as a partial recasting of the former. Both works start with
Hume’s central empirical axiom known as the Copy Principle. Loosely, it states that
all constituents of our thoughts come from experience. By learning Hume’s
vocabulary, this can be restated more precisely. Hume calls the contents of the
mind perceptions, which he divides into impressions and ideas. Though Hume
himself is not strict about maintaining a concise distinction between the two, we may
think of impressions as having their genesis in the senses, whereas ideas are products
of the intellect. Impressions, which are either of sensation or reflection (memory),
are more vivid than ideas. Hume’s Copy Principle therefore states that all our ideas
are products of impressions. At first glance, the Copy Principle may seem too rigid.
To use Hume’s example, we can have an idea of a golden mountain without ever
having seen one. But to proffer such examples as counter to the Copy Principle is to
ignore the activities of the mind. The mind may combine ideas by relating them in
certain ways. If we have the idea of gold and the idea of a mountain, we can combine
them to arrive at the idea of a golden mountain. The Copy Principle only demands
that, at bottom, the simplest constituent ideas that we relate come from impressions.
This means that any complex idea can eventually be traced back to its constituent
impressions. In the Treatise, Hume identifies two ways that the mind associates
ideas, via natural relations and via philosophical relations. Natural relations have a
connecting principle such that the imagination naturally leads us from one idea to
another. The three natural relations are resemblance, contiguity, and cause and
effect. Of these, Hume tells us that causation is the most prevalent. But cause and
effect is also one of the philosophical relations, where the relata have no connecting
principle, instead being artificially juxtaposed by the mind. Of the philosophical
relations, some, such as resemblance and contrariety, can give us certitude. Some
cannot. Cause and effect is one of the three philosophical relations that afford us less
than certain knowledge, the other two being identity and situation. But of these,
causation is crucial. It alone allows us to go beyond what is immediately present to
the senses and, along with perception and memory, is responsible for all our
knowledge of the world. Hume therefore recognizes cause and effect as both a
philosophical relation and a natural relation, at least in the Treatise, the only work
where he draws this distinctionThe relation of cause and effect is pivotal in
reasoning, which Hume defines as the discovery of relations between objects of
comparison. But note that when Hume says “objects”, at least in the context of
reasoning, he is referring to the objects of the mind, that is, ideas and impressions,
since Hume adheres to the Early Modern “way of ideas”, the belief that sensation is a
mental event and therefore all objects of perception are mental. But causation itself
must be a relation rather than a quality of an object, as there is no one property
common to all causes or to all effects. By so placing causation within Hume’s system,
we arrive at a first approximation of cause and effect. Causation is a relation between
objects that we employ in our reasoning in order to yield less than demonstrative
knowledge of the world beyond our immediate impressions. However, this is only the
beginning of Hume’s insight. or Hume, the denial of a statement whose truth
condition is grounded in causality is not inconceivable (and hence, not impossible;
Hume holds that conceivability implies possibility). For instance, a horror movie may
show the conceivability of decapitation not causing the cessation of animation in a
human body. But if the denial of a causal statement is still conceivable, then its truth
must be a matter of fact, and must therefore be in some way dependent upon
experience. Though for Hume, this is true by definition for all matters of fact, he also
appeals to our own experience to convey the point. Hume challenges us to consider
any one event and meditate on it; for instance, a billiard ball striking another. He
holds that no matter how clever we are, the only way we can infer if and how the
second billiard ball will move is via past experience. There is nothing in the cause
that will ever imply the effect in an experiential vacuum. And here it is important to
remember that, in addition to cause and effect, the mind naturally associates ideas
via resemblance and contiguity. Hume does not hold that, having never seen a game
of billiards before, we cannot know what the effect of the collision will be. Rather, we
can use resemblance, for instance, to infer an analogous case from our past
experiences of transferred momentum, deflection, and so forth. We are still relying
on previous impressions to predict the effect and therefore do not violate the Copy
Principle. We simply use resemblance to form an analogous prediction. And we can
charitably make such resemblances as broad as we want. Thus, objections like: Under
a Humean account, the toddler who burned his hand would not fear the flame after only one
such occurrence because he has not experienced a constant conjunction, are unfair to
Hume, as the toddler would have had thousands of experiences of the principle that
like causes like, and could thus employ resemblance to reach the conclusion to fear
the flame.
If Hume is right that our awareness of causation (or power, force, efficacy, necessity,
and so forth – he holds all such terms to be equivalent) is a product of experience, we
must ask what this awareness consists in. What is meant when some event is judged
as cause and effect?  Strictly speaking, for Hume, our only external impression of
causation is a mere constant conjunction of phenomena, that B always follows A, and
Hume sometimes seems to imply that this is all that causation amounts to. (And this
notion of causation as constant conjunction is required for Hume to generate the
Problem of induction discussed below.)  Nevertheless, ‘causation’ carries a stronger
connotation than this, for constant conjunction can be accidental and therefore
doesn’t get us the necessary connection that gives the relation of cause and effect its
predictive ability. We may therefore now say that, on Hume’s account, to invoke
causality is to invoke a constant conjunction of relata whose conjunction carries with
it a necessary connection.

Hume points out that this second component of causation is far from clear. What is
this necessity that is implied by causation?  Clearly it is not a logical modality, as
there are possible worlds in which the standard laws of causation do not obtain. It
might be tempting to state that the necessity involved in causation is therefore a
physical or metaphysical necessity. However, Hume considers such elucidations
unhelpful, as they tell us nothing about the original impressions involved. At best,
they merely amount to the assertion that causation follows causal laws. But invoking
this common type of necessity is trivial or circular when it is this very efficacy that
Hume is attempting to discover.

We must therefore follow a different route in considering what our impression of

necessity amounts to. As causation, at base, involves only matters of fact, Hume once
again challenges us to consider what we can know of the constituent impressions of
causation. Once more, all we can come up with is an experienced constant
conjunction. Of the common understanding of causality, Hume points out that we
never have an impression of efficacy. Because of this, our notion of causal law seems
to be a mere presentiment that the constant conjunction will continue to be constant,
some certainty that this mysterious union will persist. Hume argues that
we cannot  conceive of any other connection between cause and effect, because there
simply is no other impression to which our idea may be traced. This certitude is all
that remains.
For Hume, the necessary connection invoked by causation is nothing more than this
certainty. Hume’s Copy Principle demands that an idea must have come from an
impression, but we have no impression of efficacy in the event itself. Instead, the
impression of efficacy is one produced in the mind. As we experience enough cases of a
particular constant conjunction, our minds begin to pass a natural determination
from cause to effect, adding a little more “oomph” to the prediction of the effect every
time, a growing certitude that the effect will follow again. It is the internal impression
of this “oomph” that gives rise to our idea of necessity, the mere feeling of certainty
that the conjunction will stay constant. Ergo, the idea of necessity that supplements
constant conjunction is a psychological projection. We cannot help but think that the
event will unfurl in this way.
Having approached Hume’s account of causality by this route, we are now in a
position to see where Hume’s two definitions of causation given in the Treatise come
from. (He gives similar but not identical definitions in the Enquiry.) He defines
“cause” in the following two ways:
(D1)      An object precedent and contiguous to another, and where all the objects
resembling the former are placed in like relations of precedency and contiguity to
those objects that resemble the latter.

(D2)      An object precedent and contiguous to another, and so united with it, that
the idea of the one determined the mind to form the idea of the other, and the
impression of the one to form a more lively idea of the other. (T 1.3.14.31; SBN 170)

There are reams of literature addressing whether these two definitions are the same
and, if not, to which of them Hume gives primacy. J.A. Robinson is perhaps the
staunchest proponent of the position that the two are nonequivalent, arguing that
there is an nonequivalence in meaning and that they fail to capture the same
extension. Two objects can be constantly conjoined without our mind determining
that one causes the other, and it seems possible that we can be determined that one
object causes another without their being constantly conjoined. But if the definitions
fail in this way, then it is problematic that Hume maintains that both are adequate
definitions of causation. Some scholars have argued for ways of squaring the two
definitions (Don Garrett, for instance, argues that the two are equivalent if they are
both read objectively or both read subjectively), while others have given reason to
think that seeking to fit or eliminate definitions may be a misguided project.

One alternative to fitting the definitions lies in the possibility that they are doing two
separate things, and it might therefore be inappropriate to reduce one to the other or
claim that one is more significant than the other. There are several interpretations
that allow us to meaningfully maintain the distinction (and therefore the
nonequivalence) between the two definitions unproblematically. For instance, D1 can
be seen as tracing the external impressions (that is, the constant conjunction)
requisite for our idea of causation while D2 traces the internal impressions, both of
which are important to Hume in providing a complete account. As Hume says, the
definitions are “presenting a different view of the same object.” (T 1.3.14.31; SBN
170)  Supporting this, Harold Noonan holds that D1 is “what is going on in the world”
and that D2 is “what goes on in the mind of the observer” and therefore, “the
problem of nonequivalent definitions poses no real problem for understanding
Hume.” (Noonan 1999: 150-151)  Simon Blackburn provides a similar interpretation
that the definitions are doing two different things, externally and internally.
However, Blackburn has the first as giving the “contribution of the world” and the
latter giving the “functional difference in the mind that apprehends the regularity.”
(Blackburn 2007: 107)  However, this is not the only way to grant an nonequivalence
without establishing the primacy of one over the other.
Another method is to cash out the two definitions in terms of the types of relation.
Some scholars have emphasized that, according to Hume’s claim in the Treatise, D1 is
defining the philosophical relation of cause and effect while D2 defines the natural
relation. Walter Ott argues that, if this is right, then the lack of equivalence is not a
problem, as philosophical and natural relations would not be expected to capture the
same extension. (Ott 2009: 239)  This way of dismissing the nonequivalence of the
two definitions becomes more problematic, however, when we realize that Hume
does not make the distinction between natural and philosophical relations in
the Enquiry, yet provides approximately the same two definitions. If the definitions
were meant to separately track the philosophical and natural relations, we might
expect Hume to have explained that distinction in the Enquiry rather than dropping it
while still maintaining two definitions. Perhaps for this reason, Jonathan Bennett
suggests that it is best to forget Hume’s comment of this correspondence. (Bennett
1971: 398)
Though this treatment of literature considering the definitions as meaningfully
nonequivalent has been brief, it does serve to show that the definitions need not be
forced together. In fact, later in the Treatise, Hume states that necessity is defined by
both, either as the constant conjunction or as the mental inference, that they are two
different senses of necessity, and Hume, at various points, identifies both as the
essence of connection or power. Whether or not Robinson is right in thinking Hume
is mistaken in holding this position, Hume himself does not seem to believe one
definition is superior to the other, or that they are nonequivalent.
Beyond Hume’s own usage, there is a second worry lingering. Attempting to establish
primacy between the definitions implies that they are somehow the bottom line for
Hume on causation. But Hume is at pains to point out that the definitions are
inadequate. In discussing the “narrow limits of human reason and capacity,” Hume
asks,

And what stronger instance can be produced of the surprizing ignorance and
weakness of the understanding than [the analysis of causation]?…so imperfect are
the ideas we form concerning it, that it is impossible to give any just definition
of cause, except what is drawn from something extraneous and foreign to it….But
though both these definitions be drawn from circumstances foreign to cause, we
cannot remedy this inconvenience, or attain any more perfect definition…. (EHU
7.29; SBN 77, emphasis his)
The tone this passage conveys is one of resigned dissatisfaction. Although Hume does
the best that can be expected on the subject, he is dissatisfied, but this dissatisfaction
is inevitable. This is because, as Hume maintains in Part VII of the Enquiry, a
definiens is nothing but an enumeration of the constituent simple ideas in the
definiendum. However, Hume has just given us reason to think that we have no such
satisfactory constituent ideas, hence the “inconvenience” requiring us to appeal to
the “extraneous.”  This is not to say that the definitions are incorrect. Note that he
still applies the appellation “just” to them despite their appeal to the extraneous, and
in the Treatise, he calls them “precise.”  Rather, they are unsatisfying. It is an
inconvenience that they appeal to something foreign, something we should like to
remedy. Unfortunately, such a remedy is impossible, so the definitions, while as
precise as they can be, still leave us wanting something further. But if this is right,
then Hume should be able to endorse both D1 and D2 as vital components of
causation without implying that he endorses either (or both) as necessary and
sufficient for causation. For these reasons, Hume’s discussion leading up to the two
definitions should be taken as primary in his account of causation rather than the
definitions themselves.
Today, philosophers recognize Hume as a thoroughgoing exponent of philosophical
naturalism, as a precursor of contemporary cognitive science, and as the inspiration for
several of the most significant types of ethical theory developed in contemporary moral
philosophy. In the Treatise, Hume qualifies his claim that our ideas are copies of our
impressions, making clear that it applies only to the relation between simple
ideas and simple impressions. He offers this “general proposition”, usually called
the Copy Principle, as his “first principle … in the science of human nature”:
All our simple ideas in their first appearance are deriv’d from simple impressions, which
are correspondent to them, and which they exactly represent. (T 1.1.1.7/4)
He presents the principle as something that everyone’s experience confirms, but he also
gives an argument to establish it.
He argues first that there is a one–to–one correspondence between simple ideas and
simple impressions. He can’t prove that this correspondence holds universally, since he
can’t examine every individual impression and idea. But he is so confident the
correspondence holds that he challenges anyone who doubts it to produce an example of a
simple impression without a corresponding simple idea, or a simple idea without a
corresponding simple impression. Since he is certain they will fail, he concludes that
there is a constant conjunction between simple impressions and simple ideas.
Next, he maintains that this constant conjunction is so universal that the correspondence
can’t be a matter of chance. There must be a causal connection between them, but do
ideas cause impressions or do impressions cause ideas?
Finally, he argues that experience tells us that simple impressions always precede and
thus cause their corresponding ideas. To support this claim, he appeals to two sorts of
cases. First, if you want to give a child an idea of the taste of pineapple, you give her a
piece of pineapple to eat. When you do, you are giving her an impression of the
pineapple’s taste. You never go the other way round. His other case involves a person
born blind, who won’t have ideas of color because he won’t have impressions of color.
The Copy Principle is an empirical thesis, which he emphasizes by offering “one
contradictory phenomenon” as an empirical counterexample to the principle. He imagines
someone who has had the same sorts of experiences of colors most of us have had, but
has never experienced a certain shade of blue. Hume thinks that if he orders all the shades
of blue he has experienced from the darkest to the lightest, he will see immediately that
there is a gap where the missing shade should be. Then he asks
Finally, he argues that experience tells us that simple impressions always precede and
thus cause their corresponding ideas. To support this claim, he appeals to two sorts of
cases. First, if you want to give a child an idea of the taste of pineapple, you give her a
piece of pineapple to eat. When you do, you are giving her an impression of the
pineapple’s taste. You never go the other way round. His other case involves a person
born blind, who won’t have ideas of color because he won’t have impressions of color.
The Copy Principle is an empirical thesis, which he emphasizes by offering “one
contradictory phenomenon” as an empirical counterexample to the principle. He imagines
someone who has had the same sorts of experiences of colors most of us have had, but
has never experienced a certain shade of blue. Hume thinks that if he orders all the shades
of blue he has experienced from the darkest to the lightest, he will see immediately that
there is a gap where the missing shade should be. Then he asksAlthough we are capable
of separating and combining our simple ideas as we please, there is, nevertheless, a
regular order to our thoughts. If ideas occurred to us completely randomly, so that all our
thoughts were “loose and unconnected”, we wouldn’t be able to think coherently (T
1.1.4.1/10). This suggests that
There is a secret tie or union among particular ideas, which causes the mind to conjoin
them more frequently, and makes the one, upon its appearance, introduce the other.
(Abstract 35)
Hume explains this “tie or union” in terms of the mind’s natural ability
to associate certain ideas. Association is not “an inseparable connexion”, but rather “a
gentle force, which commonly prevails”, by means of which one idea naturally introduces
another
In the first Enquiry, Hume says that even though it is obvious to everyone that our ideas
are connected in this way, he is the first philosopher who has “attempted to enumerate or
class all the principles of association” (EHU 3.2/24). He regards his use of these
“universal principles” as so distinctive that he advertises them as his most original
contribution—one that entitles him call himself an “inventor” (Abstract 35).
Hume identifies three principles of association: resemblance, contiguity in time and
place, and causation. When someone shows you a picture of your best friend, you
naturally think of her because the picture resembles her. When you’re reminded of
something that happened in the 1960s—miniskirts, for example—you may think of the
Vietnam War, because they are temporally contiguous. Thinking of Sausalito may lead
you to think of the Golden Gate Bridge, which may lead you to think of San Francisco,
since they are spatially contiguous. Causality works both from cause to effect and effect
to cause: meeting someone’s father may make you think of his son; encountering the son
may lead you to thoughts of his father.
Of the three associative principles, causation is the strongest, and the only one that takes
us “beyond our senses” (T 1.3.2.3/74). It establishes links between our present and past
experiences and our expectations about the future, so that “all reasonings concerning
matters of fact seem to be founded on the relation of Cause and Effect” (EHU 4.1.4/26).
Taking aspirin in the past has relieved my headaches, so I expect that the aspirin I just
took will soon relieve my present headache. Hume also makes clear that causation is the
least understood of the associative principles, but he tells us, “we shall have occasion
afterwards to examine it to the bottom” (T 1.1.4.2/11).
Like gravitational attraction, the associative principles are original, and so can’t be
explained further. Although the associative principles’ “effects are everywhere
conspicuous” their causes “are mostly unknown, and must be resolv’d
into original qualities of human nature, which I pretend not to explain”. Accordingly, we
should curb any “intemperate desire” to account further for them, for doing so would take
us illegitimately beyond the bounds of experience (T 1.1.4.6/12–13).
Hume doesn’t try to explain why we associate ideas as we do. He is interested only in
establishing that, as a matter of fact, we do associate ideas in these ways. Given that his
claim that the associative principles explain the important operations of the mind is an
empirical one, he must admit, as he does in the first Enquiry, that he cannot prove
conclusively that his list of associative principles is complete. Perhaps he has overlooked
some additional principle. We are free to examine our own thoughts to determine whether
resemblance, contiguity, and causation successfully explain them. The more instances the
associative principles explain, the more assurance we have that Hume has identified the
basic principles by which our minds work.
In the Abstract, Hume concludes that it should be “easy to conceive of what vast
consequences these principles must be in the science of human nature”. Since they “are
the only ties of our thoughts, they are really to us the cement of the universe, and all the
operations of the mind must, in great measure, depend on them” (Abstract 35). Just what
these “vast consequences” are will become clear when we examine Hume’s revolutionary
accounts of our causal inferences and moral judgments.
When Hume enters the debate, he translates the traditional distinction between knowledge
and belief into his own terms, dividing “all the objects of human reason or enquiry” into
two exclusive and exhaustive categories: relations of ideas and matters of fact.
Propositions concerning relations of ideas are intuitively or demonstratively certain. They
are known a priori—discoverable independently of experience by “the mere operation of
thought”, so their truth doesn’t depend on anything actually existing (EHU
4.1.1/25). That the interior angles of a Euclidean triangle sum to 180 degrees is true
whether or not there are any Euclidean triangles to be found in nature. Denying that
proposition is a contradiction, just as it is contradictory to say that 8×7=57. n sharp
contrast, the truth of propositions concerning matters of fact depends on the way the
world is. Their contraries are always possible, their denials never imply contradictions,
and they can’t be established by demonstration. Asserting that Miami is north of Boston is
false, but not contradictory. We can understand what someone who asserts this is saying,
even if we are puzzled about how he could have the facts so wrong.
The distinction between relations of ideas and matters of fact is often called “Hume’s
Fork”, generally with the negative implication that Hume may be illicitly ruling out
meaningful propositions that don’t fit into these two categories or fit into both of them.
To defuse this objection, however, it is important to bear in mind that Hume’s categories
are his translations of a traditional absolute categorical classificatory distinction, which
all his contemporaries and immediate predecessors accepted.
Hume’s method dictates his strategy in the causation debate. In the critical phase, he
argues that his predecessors were wrong: our causal inferences aren’t determined by
“reason or any other operation of the understanding” (EHU 5.1.2/41). In the constructive
phase, he supplies an alternative: the associative principles are their basis.
Hume’s contributions to the critical phase of the causation debate are contained
in Treatise 1.3.6 and Section 4 of the first Enquiry, appropriately titled “Sceptical doubts
concerning the operations of the understanding”. The constructive phase in
his Enquiry account is the following section, also appropriately titled “Sceptical solution
of these doubts”, while the corresponding sections of the Treatise stretch from 1.3.7
through 1.3.10.

5.1 Causal Inference: Critical Phase

Causal inferences are the only way we can go beyond the evidence of our senses and
memories. In making them, we suppose there is some connection between present facts
and what we infer from them. But what is this connection? How is it established?
If the connection is established by an operation of reason or the understanding, it must
concern either relations of ideas or matters of fact.
Hume argues that the connection can’t involve relations of ideas. Effects are different
events from their causes, so there is no contradiction in conceiving of a cause occurring,
and its usual effect not occurring. Ordinary causal judgments are so familiar that we tend
to overlook this; they seem immediate and intuitive. But suppose you were suddenly
brought into the world as an adult, armed with the intellectual firepower of an Einstein.
Could you, simply by examining an aspirin tablet, determine that it will relieve your
headache?
When we reason a priori, we consider the idea of the object we regard as a cause
independently of any observations we have made of it. It can’t include the idea of any
other distinct object, including the object we take to be its usual effect. But then it can’t
show us any “inseparable and inviolable connection”—any necessary connection—
between those ideas. Trying to reason a priori from your idea of an aspirin, without
including any information you have of its effects from your previous experience, yields
only your simple ideas of its “sensible qualities”—its size, shape, weight, color, smell,
and taste. It gives you no idea of what “secret powers” it might have to produce its usual
effects. Hume concludes that a priori reasoning can’t be the source of the connection
between our ideas of a cause and its effect. Contrary to what the majority of his
contemporaries and immediate predecessors thought, causal inferences do not concern
relations of ideas.
Hume now moves to the only remaining possibility. If causal inferences don’t involve a
priori reasoning about relations of ideas, they must concern matters of fact and
experience. When we’ve had many experiences of one kind of event constantly conjoined
with another, we begin to think of them as cause and effect and infer the one from the
other. But even after we’ve had many experiences of a cause conjoined with its effect, our
inferences aren’t determined by reason or any other operation of the understanding.
In the past, taking aspirin has relieved my headaches, so I believe that taking aspirin will
relieve the headache I’m having now. But my inference is based on the aspirin’s
superficial sensible qualities, which have nothing to do with headache relief. Even if I
assume that the aspirin has “secret powers” that are doing the heavy lifting in relieving
my headache, they can’t be the basis of my inference, since these “secret powers” are
unknown.
Nonetheless, Hume observes, “we always presume, when we see like sensible qualities,
that they have like secret powers, and expect that effects, similar to those we have
experienced, will follow from them” (EHU 4.2.16/33). Since we neither intuit nor infer a
priori that similar objects have similar secret powers, our presumption must be based in
some way on our experience.
But our past experience only gives us information about objects as they were when we
experienced them, and our present experience only tells us about objects we are
experiencing now. Causal inferences, however, do not just record our past and present
experiences. They extend or project what we have gathered from experience to other
objects in the future. Since it is not necessarily true that an object with the same sensible
qualities will have the same secret powers that past objects with those sensible qualities
had, how do we project those experiences into the future, to other objects that may only
appear similar to those we’ve previously experienced?
Hume thinks we can get a handle on this question by considering two clearly different
propositions:

 (1)I’ve found that headache relief has always followed my taking aspirin;
and

 (2)Taking aspirin similar to the ones I’ve taken in the past will relieve my present
headache.
There is no question that “the one proposition may be justly inferred from the other”, and
that “it is always inferred”. But since their connection obviously isn’t intuitive, Hume
challenges us to produce the “chain of reasoning” that takes us from propositions like (1)
to propositions like (2) (EHU 4.2.16/34).
(1) summarizes my past experience, while (2) predicts what will happen in the immediate
future. The chain of reasoning I need must show me how my past experience is relevant
to my future experience. I need some further proposition or propositions that will
establish an appropriate link or connection between past and future, and take me from (1)
to (2) using either demonstrative reasoning, concerning relations of ideas, or probable
reasoning, concerning matters of fact.
Hume thinks it is evident that demonstrative reasoning can’t bridge the gap between (1)
and (2). However unlikely it may be, we can always intelligibly conceive of a change in
the course of nature. Even though aspirin relieved my previous headaches, there’s no
contradiction in supposing that it won’t relieve the one I’m having now, so the
supposition of a change in the course of nature can’t be proven false by any reasoning
concerning relations of ideas.
That leaves probable reasoning. Hume argues that there is no probable reasoning that can
provide a just inference from past to future. Any attempt to infer (2) from (1) by a
probable inference will be viciously circular—it will involve supposing what we are
trying to prove.
Hume spells out the circularity this way. Any reasoning that takes us from (1) to (2) must
employ some connecting principle that connects the past with the future. Since one thing
that keeps us from moving directly from past to future is the possibility that the course of
nature might change, it seems plausible to think that the connecting principle we need
will be one that will assure us that nature is uniform—that the course of nature won’t
change—something like this uniformity principle:

 [UP]The future will be like the past.

Adopting [UP] will indeed allow us to go from (1) to (2). But before we can use it to
establish that our causal inferences are determined by reason, we need to determine our
basis for adopting it. [UP] is clearly not intuitive, nor is it demonstrable, as Hume has
already pointed out, so only probable arguments could establish it. But to attempt to
establish [UP] this way would be to try to establish probable arguments using probable
arguments, which will eventually include [UP] itself.
At this point, Hume has exhausted the ways reason might establish a connection between
cause and effect. He assures us that he offers his “sceptical doubts” not as a
“discouragement, but rather an incitement … to attempt something more full and
satisfactory”. Having cleared the way for his constructive account, Hume is ready to do
just that.

mind itself is not a substance, but a bundle of impressions there is nothing like a
13:37
substance as such, and we would see that David Hume in that sense is a skeptic
power
13:45
excellence. So, he would say that if you examine your perceptions you would find
only
13:51
your impressions and ideas and these are very important terms in Hume’s
philosophy
13:56
impressions and ideas they are not one and the same there is a certain difference
between impressions and ideas. I will explain that shortly these are the buildings
blocks of
14:05
all our knowledge. So, fundamentally identifying the building blocks of knowledge,
and the contents of
14:12
mind as I have already mentioned that impressions they have sensations and feeling
they are. So, direct sensations this direct sensations, which I get the feeling of
pleasure pain
14:22
all these things. So, which is very direct and immediate or strong and vivid because
14:28
they are? So, immediate they are very strong. And impressions of sensation derive
from our senses and impressions of reflection from
14:39
our experience of our mind feeling of emotions. So, as I mentioned they are vivid,
they
14:46
are very strong, they are so immediate, and direct, directly given to me and when you
14:53
talk about ideas; ideas are related to thinking when I think about say the kind of
emotion
14:59
or the kind of feeling I have. The sensation I get when I enter this rule there is
15:04
temperature difference in this room, because this room is air conditioned, suddenly I
feel
15:09
a deference in temperature it is a feeling it is so vivid and strong, I immediately felt it,
but when I think about this feeling. Now I
15:16
am thinking about it that what is the kind of feeling I had when I entered this room,
there is a sudden change in temperature which I
15:24
could feel, but I do not experience that feeling with all its intensity and (Refer Time:
15:30
15:33) right now and I think about it now I have only a kind of image of it. So, it is
related to concepts beliefs memories, mental images, etcetera, derived from and
15:40
are copies of impressions. So, my thinking about that temperature deference right
now,
15:47
gives a kind of idea in my mind idea about that temperature deference which is
nothing,
15:52
but a copy of the feeling of that temperature deference I experienced and I entered
this room. So, one is direct and vivid and strong the other one is a little, week
because it
16:02
is a copy a copy can never be like the original. They are faint and unclear to that
extent and ideas of sensations there are like
16:13
impressions of sensations and impressions of reflections. Similarly, you have ideas
of sensations and ideas of reflection like ideas
16:21
of sensations are color and ideas of reflection example a kind of an emotion I am
feeling
16:27
so happy, so satisfied for certain reason that is so direct.
16:32
But, when I think about it becomes an idea, again a little further a deference of
16:38
forcefulness and vivacity I have already explained, the difference between an idea
under impression is a deference between forcefulness and vivacity ideas are faint
copies of
16:49
impression, less forcible and lively. To listen to music and to imagine or remember
that
16:58
music, when I listen to a music I almost become a part of it, I experience that
harmony
17:04
with all its vivacity all its liveliness, but when I think about it after sometime,
17:10
the music which I heard, which I listened, how wonderful that experience was still I
experience it as a pleasant experience, but the intensity
17:19
is less. So, that is what makes an idea different from an impression, impressions are
our sensations
17:26
passions and emotions as they make their first appearance in the soul as they
17:31
make their first appearance the direct it so it is so intense in that sense, the most
lively thought is still inferior to the dullest sensations
17:42
this is what Hume says, the most lively thought is inferior to dullest sensations.
17:49
So, let us have this figure will explain again I would give a picture about Hume’s
17:56
program once again, to summarizes once again, it starts with the question of the
origin of knowledge, and when you try to understand
18:03
the origin of knowledge you would see that there are outward and inward
impressions,
18:09
impressions from senses and impressions from reflection, and they are more lively
perceptions in that sense and when we hear, or
18:16
see, or feel, or love, or hate, or desire, or will, you have impressions all our sensations
18:23
passions and emotions as they make their first appearance in the soul I have just
explain, actually understood that is a kind of a definition for an impression and
thoughts or ideas
18:33
are copies of impression. So, this is what we have seen now, again a little bit about
impressions the materials
18:39
furnished us by the senses and experience they are the basic materials, which we
receive
18:46
or which we have, which forms the foundation blocks, or the building blocks of all our
18:52
knowledge; however, complicated it is all knowledge is built up by compounding
19:00
transposing augmenting or diminishing impressions. So, we make these impression
put
19:07
together them try to see the relationship between each other and this is how the
entire
19:12
knowledge system which we have built, every idea we have is a copy of a similar
19:18
impression. So, I have an idea about the music which I listened sometime back
which is
19:23
nothing, but a copy of my experience my direct feeling when I actually listened it in
that
19:30
music room, where there is no impression there is no idea a blind man has no notion
of
19:38
color. So, what Hume was trying to argue is that every knowledge has its foundation
in
19:45
these impressions, if there are no impressions no ideas. So, let us think about many
19:50
things which we come across in our life, if you apply this humane idea there are
many
19:57
things in which we take for granted in our lives are problematic. For example, cause
of at relationship I say that there are two events are related in such
20:08
a way that one is the cause of other for example, when I clap my hand there is a
sound, my clapping is the cause of the sound, but Hume
20:16
would say that I can hear the clapping, or I can see the clapping and I hear the sound
there are two events, but where is that causal
20:26
connection, where there is no impression there is an impression of two hands
coming together and an impression of sound, but there is no impression of the
causal necessary
20:36
connection between the hands coming together and the sound produced. So, there
are
20:42
many such things say for example, god when I talk about god, god would save me
what
20:47
do you mean by god, where is this impression of god there is nothing like that. So,
you
20:52
can question it you can challenge the validity of several such beliefs, several such
20:57
assumptions, and several such concepts, which we employ in our day to day life.
21:02
Now, let us see a little bit more on the relation between impressions and ideas. So,
this
21:11
again is a figure which would give you an idea about this inters relationship. So, you
start with the impressions here, impressions of sensations and impressions of
reflection.
21:20
Which sensations are arises in the soul from unknown causes, we never know who
from
21:26
where do they come from and impressions of reflections are derived from the ideas
21:31
which we have. So, let us see the impressions of sensations like impressions of cold
accompanied by the pain, and this is being copied a copy of this
21:42
impression is retained in the mind then it becomes an idea, and then again
straightaway
21:48
let us come here this produces new impressions of aversion for example, which
21:55
we which are impressions of reflection which will again copied in the memory of
imagination
22:01
and become ideas, and it goes on and on and on. So, everything actually begins
22:07
with impression, then impressions are copied by ideas, and these ideas sometimes
are capable of producing further impressions and then again there will be an idea
produced
22:16
impressions, ideas impressions like that it goes on the entire human system of
knowledge develops in this passion according to
22:24
Hume. So, you have the process here once again impressions strikes the senses,
perception, heat
22:31
or cold pleasure or pain this will be retained as a copy which is an idea, idea of
pleasure
22:36
or pain which will create new impressions of reflection desire and aversion hope and
22:41
fear which will be copied in the mind memory and imagination and again it goes on.
22:47
Now, this passage from impressions to knowledge is very important part in Hume’s
22:55
epistemology, which is as we have already stated impressions are the basic building
23:01
blocks of all thought and impressions and to each impression there is a
corresponding
23:06
idea and simple ideas are combined in order to produce complex ideas. So, by this
causes
23:13
which he call the association of ideas Hume explains, how complex systems of
23:19
knowledge are formed out of this simple vivid impressions which we directly
received
23:27
Complex ideas are made up of materials provided by impressions, and when we talk
about the formation of complex idea, ideas or thoughts exhibit a regularity, we can
see
23:38
that one after another, they introduce one another with a certain degree of method
and
23:46
regularity, as I mentioned when I clap there is a sound there is a regularity in that or
23:52
when I am thirsty, when I drink some water my thirst will be quench that is another
23:58
regularity. So, everything around me there is a regularity and a wound calls up an
idea
24:05
of pain suggesting a causal relationship, that I now experience a pain or a wound
calls up the idea of pain suggesting a causal relationship
24:14
between these two things wound and pain ideas are associated with one another
24:19
in terms of the principles of resemblance contiguity in time and place and cause and
24:26
effect. This is what he says basically he would say that there are impressions and
ideas
24:31
and nothing else and this whole regularity which we experience if necessary
connection
24:38
which we think objects or ideas may have with each other. For example, wound and
pain it is nothing, but a produced in terms of certain principles
24:48
like resemblance contiguity in time and place and cause and effect and complex
ideas are
24:54
formed by the association of ideas according to these principles the process is
called association of ideas, which is a uniting principle among ideas. It is a very
interesting
25:05
aspect of Hume’s works, Hume’s philosophical theory where he talks about the how
ideas are associated with each other by means of a uniting
25:14
principle some associating quality by which one idea naturally introduces another.
25:20
So, the idea of hands coming together clapping and the idea of sound so some
25:26
associating quality by which one idea naturally introduces another there is a quality
25:32
associating quality between these two and what is it. So, again Hume is very careful
25:38
when he uses words to describe this you would later on by analyzing the very bases
the
25:44
very foundation the very logical foundation called causality or cause effect
relationship. So, here he says is that what he says is that it is a gentle force which
commonly prevails
25:55
that has unknown causes. A given innate force or impulse in man which
26:01
moves him to combine together certain types of ideas. So, there is something in the
human mind a kind of tendency in the human mind a kind of given innate force or a
gentle
26:12
force in the human mind which makes it to connect one idea with another.
26:18
Now, let us see a little more about relations, because this is as I mentioned, it is at
the
26:24
center of humane epistemology it says that all our reasoning concerns the relations
26:30
between things. So, everything we understand reasoning, knowledge everything we
26:36
understand in this world is based on relating things among each other all knowledge
all
26:43
understanding even life itself is possible, because the human mind has the capacity
to
26:49
relate one idea with another. So, when I go out of this room I know that it is raining.
26:56
So, I need an umbrella rain umbrella outside the room all these are ideas. So, my
mind is capable of creating all these things. So,
27:05
that I can live a practical life in this world otherwise it is impossible. So, all our
reasoning concerns the relation between things, they are the objects of human
27:15
reason or enquiry and when it comes to relations since relations occupy a central
role in
27:25
not only in philosophy, but also in human life human practical day to day life, this
27:31
idea of this whole notion of relations occupy a very central role. So, Hume dedicates
sometime to enquire about this relations and
27:41
he says that logically speaking there are two types of relations possible, and
philosophically we should try to understand them, what is
27:48
the nature because it is upon these types of these two types of relationships all our
27:54
reasoning is based on. So, what are these two types of basic forms of reasoning’s?
28:01
A number one relation of ideas and the other one is matters of fact. So, objects of
human
28:08
reasoning relations of ideas and matters of fact. What you mean by relations of
ideas? So, as the title itself indicates there are ideas
28:20
and certain relationship between them nothing else, one idea is related with another
in a
28:26
certain way and here what he says is that the sciences of geometry algebra and
arithmetic
28:33
are examples where we will find relations of ideas, where the relations asserted are
28:39
necessary. For example, when you say 3 plus 2 is equal to 5, when I say 3 plus 2
equal
28:46
to 5 I am establishing a relationship or I am asserting a relationship, between 3 and 2
28:54
and this is necessary nothing would make it different, it is always 3 plus 2 is equal to
5. The truth of these propositions of these sciences
29:07
are independent of questions about existence, I need not verify it see for example,
29:12
when I say that there are 20 chairs in this room statement needs to be verified,
someone
29:18
needs to come here and count whether there are 20 chairs and it might be true or
29:23
it might be false, it is a contingent proposition you are not certain about it, there is
nothing that makes this statement necessarily true I
29:32
can always add 1 chair or take out 1 chair from this room. So, that there is a
possibility
29:38
that whatever number at a given point of time is true may not be true later on, but in
the
29:45
case of 3 plus 2 equal to 5, it is never going to change at all. So, mathematical
propositions, arithmetic, geometry and algebra, are domains where you
29:57
have relations of ideas all reasoning happens by virtue of these relations of ideas
and
30:02
they are going to provide us absolute certainty in that way, because they are
independent of questions about existence and every affirmation, which is either
intuitively or
30:14
demonstratively certain you can demonstrate the certainty of these mathematical
30:20
statement and again the truth of these propositions depend on the relations between
ideas
30:26
or on the meanings of certain symbols, what is the meaning of 3? And what is the
meaning of plus? And what is the meaning of 2? What is the meaning of equal to,
would
30:34
explain 5. So, it is basically nothing to do with what is this case in the world, their
truth requires
30:43
no confirmation from experience the truth of the proposition depends simply on the
meaning of terms. I have already explained
30:49
it their truth is independent of any application though mathematical; find some
application in the world the truth of mathematical propositions are independent
30:58
of applicability. Their truth cannot be refuted by experience and they are formal
propositions not
31:07
empirical hypotheses, all about relations of ideas and here there is a classic example
31:14
given to relations of ideas the Pythagorean Theorem. So, here it talks about a
triangle
31:20
on a right triangle the square of the hypotenuse is so let us say a b c. So, the
hypotenuse is c
31:29
and the square of the hypotenuse is equal to the sum of the squares of the other two
31:34
sides, which means a square plus b square is equal to c square. So, this is the
Pythagorean Theorem which is a classical example for relations
31:43
of ideas, where the truth of this proposition or truth of this judgment depends
31:49
only on the meaning of the symbols used here and has nothing to do with what is the
case in the world. Now, when you concentrate on the relations of matters of
32:00
fact there is no a priori truth revealed here. When I say there are 20 chairs in this
room, when I say there are 2 human beings in this
32:08
room, when I say the temperature outside is 25 degree Celsius, all these are not a
priori
32:15
truths, they are not a priori judgments, they are not true by virtue of statement alone.
32:22
But they are a they are to be discovered by empirical verification, they cannot be
discover by thought alone like in
32:31
the case of Pythagorean theorem, they are discovered by means of sense experience
I
32:36
have to observe, I have to just come here and physically count whether there are 20
chairs or more or less, I have to verify it and
32:45
neither intuitively nor demonstratively certain. These propositions are and judgment
32:51
concerning matters of fact can be denied without contradiction, if someone says
that there are 20 chairs in this room, I can deny the fact I can say that no its not
correct,
33:02
there are no 20 chairs in this or it is not true that there are 20 chairs in this room,
without any
33:07
logical contradiction as I mentioned I can take away 1 chair or put another chair and
33:13
make the alter the number of chairs in this room, or to put it in other words there is
33:19
nothing that necessitates this room to contain only 20 chairs, 20 and only 20 chairs.
33:25
It there is no logical necessity, and it is based on the belief that there is a connection
33:31
between cause and effect, but at the same time Hume acknowledges that this is a
very
33:37
important relationship, and practical life demands that people take for granted the
33:43
relationship between matters of facts, that when I am swatting a lot if I go to a air
33:51
condition room I will get a relief, or when I am feeling thirsty if I drink water that
33:57
we quench by thirst, or if I am feeling hungry if I eat something that will satisfy my
hunger,
34:03
all these are matters of fact something which is very essential for practical day to
day
34:10
life. So, Hume never denies it he only says that if you try to argue that there is a
34:17
necessary connection between this event and that event that is philosophic re
34:24
problematic. So, he says that it is based on the belief that there is a connection
between cause and effect products of inductive inferences see
34:34
for example, how do you know that by drinking water your thirst will be quenched
34:39
or to put it to raise another question, how do you know that the sun will rise in the
east tomorrow? Your answer to this question is
34:50
that it has risen today morning in the east, yesterday morning also it as rise in the
east, day before yesterday morning also it has risen
34:58
in the east, and all these days I have seen that the sun rising in the east in the
morning. So, it will rise in the morning tomorrow as
35:07
well, Hume’s objections how can you say this you have observed certain events
happening in the past certain events that have happened
35:18
in the past have been observed, but from there how can you conclude that the sun
will rise tomorrow in the east there is no logical certainty in the sense 1 plus 2 equal
to 3.
35:29
So, so long as there is no logical certainty one cannot assert it without any doubt.
35:35
So, there is always an element of doubt, skepticism there is for skepticism,
according to Hume now there is no causal relationship from what impression
35:47
or impressions the idea of causation is derived, that is Hume’s famous question, no
35:53
quality of those things which we call causes can be the origin of the idea of
causation
35:59
we cannot discover any quality which is common to them all, what you mean by this
causation a caused b in what sense you can
36:09
say that there is a necessary connection between a and b. So, that one is the cause
of another, or one is effect of another, the idea of causation
36:17
must be derived from some relation among objects, and he says that the basis of
this belief is
36:23
experience a posteriori and not a priori. So, derivation of causal relationship will
36:30
invest a little more time on this very important relationship, which is important for
humane philosophy also. So, he says that the causality
36:39
the relation of causality can be understood in terms of three principles. The first one
is contiguity, which we have already mentioned very briefly, the second
36:47
one is temporal priority, we say that the effect will be followed by the cause, the
caused will come first and then the effect will turn
36:55
up, and the third one is necessary connection we understand causation as a
necessary connection
37:01
between two events or two things a and b for example. So, let us take contiguity and
temporal priority contiguity is whatever objects are
37:11
considered as causes or effects are either immediately or medially contiguous,
spatial
37:17
contiguity is not essential to the idea of causation see, here the thing is that there
37:23
is a kind of mediate or immediate contiguity between two objects we tend to assume
that they are causally related one follows the other, here
37:33
again when it comes to temporal priority experience confirms that cause must be
temporally
37:40
prior to the effect. So, there is an idea of temporal succession an effect cannot be
perfectly contemporary with its cause. So, as
37:47
the simple example, which I have sighted when I clap there is the sight of two hands
37:53
coming together and the sound produced. So, there is a temporal priority I do not
hear
37:58
the sound first and see the clap later it is always the other way round.
38:04
And necessary connection is the common belief, now let us come to this important
aspect
38:10
of causality contiguity and temporal succession are not really essential to the idea of
38:17
causation, because just because something is contiguous or just, because there is
temporal priority we cannot say that one is a cause of another, but to assert causal
38:26
relationship, we need to invent another important category which is called necessary
connection, a is a cause of b because a and b are necessarily connected.
38:37
The common belief that cause effect relationship is necessary and neither contiguity
nor
38:43
temporal priority is an essential element of causal relation I have already explained
38:48
this. So, you need something like a necessary relationship between cause and effect
from what impression or impressions is the idea
38:57
of necessary connection derived that is the humane problem, that is the humane
question
39:02
Hume challenges you are talking about necessary connection. Now show me the
impressions
39:08
from where you have derive this notion of necessary connection, and if there are no
impression there is no knowledge impressions are the building blocks of all
39:17
knowledge. So, if you can show me the impressions of this necessary connection, I
would accept your position otherwise I am sorry, I cannot.
39:25
So, necessity is there are certain important questions about necessity, which Hume
rises;
39:33
on what basis do we assert that it is necessary that everything whose existence has
a
39:38
beginning should also have a cause? So, the very foundation of the notion of
causation
39:45
is that there is a belief that everything that exist has a cause, and Hume says how
can its void what is your basis of such a belief,
39:55
on what basis do you content that everything that exist should have a cause, why do
we conclude that particular cause must necessarily has
40:06
a particularly effect? A particular cause must necessarily have a particular effect,
40:11
or what is the nature of the inference we draw from the one to the other?
40:17
And the idea that everything has a cause neither intuitively certain nor demonstrable,
that
40:25
is what he says and again, we conceive an object as nonexistent at one moment and
as
40:31
existent at the next moment without having any distinct idea of a cause or
productive
40:37
principle, we can always do that and again our belief in causation arises from mere
40:43
experience and observation, we experience two events coming together always. So,
since
40:49
that was our experience the example, which I have sighted sun rising in the east
every
40:54
day morning I see sun rising in the east. So, I assume that there is a connection
between
41:00
morning and suns rising in the east. So, there are two important views which would
assert that causation is a necessary
41:12
relationship. So, one is that if everything if anything began to exist without a cause,
41:21
it says that everything as a cause, if as Hume says anything began to exist without a
cause, it would cause itself, which is impossible
41:30
because in order to cause itself it should exist so there should be something which
has caused it.
41:38
The second one is a thing which came into being without a cause, would be caused
by
41:46
nothing and nothing cannot be the cause of anything nothing cannot be this is
something
41:52
which Locke has initiated and to which Hume’s criticism is they beg the question by
41:59
presupposing, the validity of the very principle which they are supposed to
demonstrate namely that anything which begins to exist must have a cause.
42:08
So, in that sense Hume shatters Hume actually shows that demonstrates at all these
42:16
conceptions about causation are inherently problematic, and he asserts that
causation
42:23
is not a logical relationship there is nothing logically necessary about the causal
relationship, knowledge about cause is not
42:31
the result of intuition. Never look beyond the objects and the ideas which we form of
them. So, we have the objects we have the ideas
42:41
never say that there is a relationship which we can establish between these two, no
object
42:47
implies the existence of any other object. So, when I say that the heat produces
warmth
42:56
there is a kind of causal relationship I am implying. Hume says that you have heat
you
43:02
have warmth never say that you have a relationship between them, because there are
no impressions which suggests such a relationship, all distinct ideas are separable
there is
43:12
no logical connection between them, there is no logical necessity between heat and
warmth.
43:18
And the basis of causality according to so here, Hume employs a psychological
method
43:26
that is what I mentioned in the beginning that the humane method is also
psychological or it is fundamentally psychological. So, he examines how do we form
the idea of
43:36
causality, the basis of causality? So, here we say that we infer the existence of one
43:42
object from another by experience. We frequently experience the conjunction of two
objects, frame and warmth fire and
43:53
warmth conjunction, clapping and sound again a conjunction. So, two objects are
joint
44:00
together and the frequent conjunction has been experienced by us and we see flame
and
44:05
the sensation heat. These objects have appeared in a regular recurrent order of
contiguity
44:11
and succession, one after another always conjoined in my experience whenever,
there is
44:18
an occurrence of fire there was an occurrence of warmth for heat whenever there
was an
44:23
occurrence of hands clapping there was an occurrence of sound. So, all my
experience have seen that you know there is a kind of constant conjunction
44:32
between these two events, and we call the one cause and the other effect and infer
the
44:39
existence of the one from that of the other and the questions are from what
impression
44:44
or impressions the idea of necessary connection is derived, where is that impression
you have the impression of clapping, and you have
44:53
the impression of sound, you have the impression of fire, you have the impression of
warmth. But where is the impression of necessary connection between these distinct
45:03
events that is something which we never see only the only thing we have said is that
in
45:08
our experience we have observed that they appear jointly, one after another they are
45:13
eternally or constantly conjoined, not from the experience of constant conjunction
then not from observation of regular sequences of
45:24
causal connection. We perceive only their constant conjunction no impressions
about causal relationship,
45:31
and there is no necessary relationship necessity is the effect of observation of
several
45:37
instances of constant conjunction and again this is only an internal impression of the
45:44
mind something, which the mind creates it is not objectively present, but the mind
45:49
attributes the mind super embosses on the world or on impressions the propensity.
So,
45:57
this is very carefully used words it is a propensity caused by custom or association,
46:03
it is a habit of mind according to Hume that since two objects are conjoined. We
have seen them coming one after another on several instances
46:15
there is a propensity or a tendency of the mind to see an internal connection
between
46:21
them that is a custom that is a habit of the mind, or association to pass from an
observed
46:27
thing to another that is constantly conjoined to that. So, when I see clouds I
46:33
would infer that it is going to rain because that is my experience, I have seen them
joint conjoint.
46:42
Again in psychological terms, Locke explains the process of a causality or causation
the
46:49
psychological effect of observation of instances of constant conjunction. So, it is a
habit
46:56
of mind it is trace back to a kind of propensity of the mind, its custom something
which
47:03
ultimately the mind brings in and imposes in the world tendency of the mind to pass
47:11
naturally from one idea to another to form or from an impression to another an idea,
47:17
propensity or custom we pass beyond experience and expect that every event will
have
47:22
some cause there are no uncaused events. And in this connection Hume also
introduces this problem of induction, because
47:32
basically the causal relationship is based on something what we understand as
induction
47:38
inductive relationship, where we observe several particular cases and conclude a
general
47:46
principle from that we have observed that all crows are black in color, I mean that
47:51
is my observation, and I would conclude that all crows are black which include past
present and future instances of close appearances.
48:00
So, this process of induction Hume found is problematic, because induction is the
48:07
drawing of inferences from past experience of constant conjunction of two objects
to present or future events the principle of induction cannot be logically deduced
from
48:17
experience. I can only say that things have been like that they were regularly
conjoined,
48:27
but from that experience I cannot deduce a kind of necessary connection between
events
48:37
induction involves a leap from observed cases to the unobserved which is uncertain.
So,
48:42
it always leaves a room for uncertainty according to Hume there is no logical
necessity
48:49
guaranteed, there is no certainty that the sun will rise tomorrow the famous humane
48:54
statement. And let us conclude before that let us see some of these issues which
will figure in
49:00
again when we discuss the next lecture, because again we are going to concentrates
on other aspects of Hume’s philosophy in the next
49:07
lecture and Hume’s influence is going to be visible in all the philosophers we are
going to discus here after. So, Hume’s impact
49:16
are I mean he has created a kind of or initiated a kind of skepticism about the world
self
49:21
and personal identity issues which will we will discuss in our next lecture. Then we
have already seen his refutation of
49:32
the principle of causality in this lecture and the problem of induction we have already
mentioned it. So, these issues and problems
49:40
have the tremendous influence on philosophy after Hume, particularly the concept of
49:47
causation the problem of induction, because modern science to a very great extent
realize
49:53
on two process of reasoning induction and deduction, and it is very important that
you
49:58
know most of modern science develops on the basis of observations and
experiments which are nothing. But based on inductive reasoning and Hume was
questioning the very
50:07
foundation, Hume is questioning the very basis of this process of making induction
the
50:14
validity of this inductive reasoning is being questioned. So, these issues which will
we will discuss in the next lecture. So, as I have already
50:25
mentioned we have just introduce you and one more lecture we dedicate to
understand some of us other teachings the very important philosopher he is no
doubt in that and here
50:36
after we can see that you know Kant have already mentioned and when it comes to
19th and 20th century philosophy, the influence and the impact of Hume is
tremendous and
50:46
phenomenal. So, let us wind up this lecture. Thank you.