There is no dispute that rules of procedure can be given retroactive effect.

This general rule,

"9.17. Procedural laws.

Procedural laws are adjective laws which prescribe rules and forms of procedure of enforcing
rights or obtaining redress for their invasion; they refer to rules of procedure by which courts
applying laws of all kinds can properly administer justice. They include rules of pleadings,
practice and evidence. As applied to criminal law, they provide or regulate the steps by which
one who commits a crime is to be punished.

The general rule that statutes are prospective and not retroactive does not ordinarily apply to
procedural laws. It has been held that "a retroactive law, in a legal sense, is one which takes
away or impairs vested rights acquired under laws, or creates a new obligation and imposes
a new duty, or attaches a new disability, in respect of transactions or considerations already
past. Hence, remedial statutes or statutes relating to remedies or modes of procedure, which
do not create new or take away vested rights, but only operate in furtherance of the remedy
or confirmation of rights already existing, do not come within the legal conception of a
retroactive law, or the general rule against the retroactive operation of statutes." The general
rule against giving statutes retroactive operation whose effect is to impair the obligations of
contract or to disturb vested rights does not prevent the application of statutes to
proceedings pending at the time of their enactment where they neither create new nor take
away vested rights. A new statute which deals with procedure only is presumptively
applicable to all actions - those which have accrued or are pending.

Statutes regulating the procedure of the courts will be construed as applicable to actions
pending and undetermined at the time of their passage. Procedural laws are retroactive in
that sense and to that extent. The fact that procedural statutes may somehow affect the
litigants' rights may not preclude their retroactive application to pending actions. The
retroactive application of procedural laws is not violative of any right of a person who may
feel that he is adversely affected. Nor is the retroactive application of procedural statutes
constitutionally objectionable. The reason is that as a general rule no vested right may attach
to, nor arise from, procedural laws. It has been held that "a person has no vested right in any
particular remedy, and a litigant cannot insist on the application to the trial of his case,
whether civil or criminal, of any other than the existing rules of procedure."

Thus, the provision of Batas Bilang 129 in Section 39 thereof prescribing that "no record on
appeal shall be required to take an appeal" is procedural in nature and should therefore be
applied retroactively to pending actions. Hence, the question as to whether an appeal from
an adverse judgment should be dismissed for failure of appellant to file a record on appeal
within thirty days as required under the old rules, which question is pending resolution at the
time Batas Bilang 129 took effect, became academic upon the effectivity of said law because
the law no longer requires the filing of a record on appeal and its retroactive application
removed the legal obstacle to giving due course to the appeal. A statute which transfers the
jurisdiction to try certain cases from a court to a quasi-judicial tribunal is a remedial statute
that is applicable to claims that accrued before its enactment but formulated and filed after it
took effect, for it does not create new nor take away vested rights. The court that has
jurisdiction over a claim at the time it accrued cannot validly try the claim where at the time
the claim is formulated and filed the jurisdiction to try it has been transferred by law to a
quasi-judicial tribunal, for even actions pending in one court may be validly taken away and
transferred to another and no litigant can acquire a vested right to be heard by one particular
court.
 9.18. Exceptions to the rule.

The rule that procedural laws are applicable to pending actions or proceedings admits
certain exceptions. The rule does not apply where the statute itself expressly or by
necessary implication provides that pending actions are excepted from its operation, or
where to apply it to pending proceedings would impair vested rights. Under appropriate
circumstances, courts may deny the retroactive application of procedural laws in the event
that to do so would not be feasible or would work injustice. Nor may procedural laws be
applied retroactively to pending actions if to do so would involve intricate problems of due
process or impair the independence of the courts."1

It is clear to us, therefore, that the NLRC had no appellate jurisdiction to review the decision of the
POEA in disciplinary cases involving overseas contract workers.

Petitioners’ position that Republic Act No. 8042 should not be applied retroactively to the review of
the POEA’s decision dismissing their complaint against respondents has no support in
jurisprudence. Although, as a rule, all laws are prospective in application unless the contrary is
expressly provided, or unless the law is procedural or curative in nature, there is no serious question
8  9 

about the retroactive applicability of Republic Act No. 8042 to the appeal of the POEA’s decision on
petitioners’ disciplinary action against respondents. In a way, Republic Act No. 8042 was a
procedural law due to its providing or omitting guidelines on appeal. A law is procedural, according
to De Los Santos v. Vda. De Mangubat, when it – 10 

Refers to the adjective law which prescribes rules and forms of procedure in order that courts may
be able to administer justice. Procedural laws do not come within the legal conception of a
retroactive law, or the general rule against the retroactive operation of statues ― they may be given
retroactive effect on actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage and this will not
violate any right of a person who may feel that he is adversely affected, insomuch as there are no
vested rights in rules of procedure. 2

1
Tan, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 136368, January 16, 2002
2
Eastern Meditterranean Maritime Ltd. et. al. vs. Est. Anislao Surio et al, G.R. 154213, August 23, 2012