MARXIST-LENINIST THEORY

A.P. Sheptulin

Marxist
Leninist
Philosophy
 This is a systematic presentation of
the basic aspects of the Marxist-
Leninist philosophy of dialectical and
historical materialism: the concepts of
matter and consciousness, the laws and
categories of dialectics, the mode of
production, social revolution, etc. The
book also examines the connection
between the philosophical concepts and
people's practical and cognitive activity.
The author draws on modern natural
and social sciences and practical expe­
rience. Special sections are devoted to
a critical analysis of modern idealistic
views of the basic problems and cate­
gories of philosophy and quasi-scientific
concepts of the nature of social phe­
nomena.
The book is for readers interested in
philosophy and the problems of
dialectical and historical materialism.
 Professor Alexander Petrovich Shep-
tulin, Dr. Phil., is an authority on
philosophy, author of studies of dia­
lectical materialism, including the
monographs, The System of Dialec­
tical Categories and The Laws of
Materialist Dialectics. In recent years,
he devoted himself to producing popu­
lar expositions and textbooks of the
philosophy of Marxism-Leninism.
A.P. Sheptulin

Marxist-
Leninist
Philosophy

Progress Publishers
Moscow
Translated from the Russian
by Stanislav Ponomarenko
and Alexander Timofeyev

Edited by ]ane Sayer

A. n. Ulenry^HH

OldJIOCCKMffl MAPKCM3MA-JIEHHHH3MA
Ha amauucKOM n3biKe

First printing 1978

© Translation into English. Progress Publishers 1978

Printed in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

10501—297
III 014(01)—78 87—78
 CONTENTS

Page
Foreword.................................................................. . 13
Chapter I. The Role of Philosophy in Society . . 15
1. Philosophy as a World Outlook.................. 15
a) The Concept of a World Outlook ... 15
b) The Fundamental Question of Philosophy.
Materialism and Idealism............................... 16
c) Dualism in Philosophy.................... 18
d) Searching for a Third Line in Philosophy 19
e) The Social and Epistemological Roots of
Idealism......................................................... 21
2. Philosophy as Methodology........................ 24
3. Philosophy and Man's Practical Activities . .26
4. The Subject-Matter of Philosophy................. 27
5. Philosophy and Special Sciences.................. 27
6. The Partisanship of Philosophy.................. 29
Chapter II. The Struggle of Materialism Against
Idealism in the Pre-Marxian Philosophy .... 31
1. The Emergence of Philosophy...................... 31
2. The Struggle Between Materialism and Ideal­
ism in Slave-Owning Society.......................... 33
3. The Struggle of Materialism Against Idealism
in Medieval Philosophy...................................... 41
4. The Materialism of the 17th and 18th Centu­
ries and Its Struggle Against Religion and
Idealism................................................................ 44
5. Classical German Philosophy at the End of the
18th and in the First Half of the 19th Centu­
ries .........................................................................58
6. The Philosophy of 19th-Century Russian Revolu­
tionary Democrats..............................................70
Chapter III. The Revolutionary Upheaval in Philo­
sophy Made by Marxism.............................................. 75
1. The Conditions for the Emergence of Marxist
Philosophy ............................................................ 75
a) Socio-Economic Conditions.................. 75
6 CONTENTS

b) Natural-Scientific Conditions.............. 76
c) Theoretical Conditions......................... 78
2. The Substance of the Revolutionary Upheaval
Made by Marx and Engels in Philosophy . . 79
3. The Development of Marxist Philosophy by
Lenin..................................................................... 85

DIALECTICAL MATERIALISM

Chapter IV. Matter and Consciousness....................... 95

1. A Critique of the Idealist and Metaphysical
Views of Matter...................................95
2. Lenin's Definition of Matter.............. 97
3. Material Entity. Types of Matter .... 98
4. Matter and the Material..................... 100
5. Matter as Substance............................ 100
6. Motion-a Universal Form of the Existence of
Matter.................................................. 102
a) Narrow Metaphysical Concepts of Motion.
The Marxist Concept of Motion .... 102
b) Basic Forms of the Motion of Matter . . 104
c) The Inherent Connection Between Motion
and Matter................................................. 105
d) Motion and Rest............................107
e) Motion and Development ......... 109
7. Space and Time......................................... Ill
a) The Concept of Space and Time... Ill
b) A Critique of Idealist and Metaphysical
Concepts of Space and Time.................... Ill
c) The Basic Characteristics of Space and Time 11
8. Reflection as a Universal Property ofMatter. 117
9. Development of the Forms of Reflection.. . 119
10. Peculiarities of the Psychological Form of
Reflection..........................................................121
11. Consciousness-the Highest Form of the Psychic
Reflection of Reality......................................... 123
a) The Emergence of Consciousness .... 123
b) The Essence of Consciousness........................126
c) The Correlation of Consciousness and Matter 129
d) The Material and the Ideal.............................. 130
e) The Subjectivity of Consciousness..................... 131
Chapter V. Knowledge .... .................. 133
 CONTENTS 7

1. The Essence of Knowledge...................... 133

2. Practice as the Basis of Knowledge .... 135
3. The Dialectical Way of Knowledge .... 138
a) Live Contemplation . ...... .................. 138
b) Abstract Thinking.............................141
c) The Interconnection Between Sense and
Rational Knowledge............................. 145
d) Empirical and TheoreticalKnowledge . .147
e) Practice as the Criterion ofTruth. . .148
f) Objective Truth. The Interconnection Be­
tween Absolute and Relative Truths .... 150
4. Forms and Methods of Scientific Knowledge
(Cognition) ................... 156
a) Observation ......... ......................... • 157
b) Experiment............ 157
c) Comparison................ . 158
d) Hypothesis........................... • • • 159
e) Analogy............................................ 161
f) Model-Building.................................162
g) Induction and Deduction.............. 164
h) The Method of Ascension from the Abstract
to the Concrete . . . . ............................ 166
i) The Historical and the Logical inKnowledge168
j) Analysis and Synthesis...................170
Chapter VI. Categories of MaterialistDialectics . 175
1. The Concept of Category.............................. 175
2. The Interconnection of Categories .... 177
3. The Interconnection of Phenomena .... 185
a) Connection and Relation as Concepts . . 185
b) A Critique of Idealist and Metaphysical
Views of Connection....................................... 187
c) The Universality of the Interconnection
Between Phenomena.................................. 190
4. The Individual, the Particular and the Uni­
versal ................................................................... 191
a) The Concept of the Individual and the
General...............................................................191
b) A Critique of Metaphysical and Idealist
Views of the Individual and the General . 192
c) Interconnection Between the Individual and
the General........................... 194
d) The General and the Particular . . . 196
8 CONTENTS

5. Cause and Effect............................................ 199

a) The Concept of Cause and Effect . . . 1
A Critique of Idealist and Metaphysical
b)
Views of Causalty......................................200
c) The Interconnection Between Cause and
Effect.............................................................. 206
6. Necessity andAccident(Chance)..................... 208
a) The Concept of Necessity and Accident
(Chance)....................................................... 208
b) A Critique of Idealist and Metaphysical
Views ofNecessity andAccident (Chance) . 209
c) The Interconnection Between Necessity and
Accident (Chance)............................................ 213
7. Law.................................................................. 215
a) The Concept of Law............................... 215
b) Dynamic and Statistical Laws............ 216
c) General and Particular Laws............ 218
d) The Interconnection Between General and
Particular Laws................................................ 220
8. Content and Form......................................... 223
a) The Concept of Content and Form . . . 22
b) A Critique of Idealist and Metaphysical
Views of Content and Form.................. 224
c) The Interconnection Between Content and
Form............................................................. 225
d) Part and Whole, Element and Structure . 22
9. Essence and Phenomenon................................. 231
a) The Concept of Essence and Phenomenon . 23
b) A Critique of Idealist and Metaphysical
Views of Essence and Phenomenon . . . 232
c) The Interconnection Between Essence and
Phenomenon................................................ 234
10. Possibility and Reality .... ... 237
a) The Concept of Possibility and Reality . . 23
b) A Critique of Idealist and Metaphysical
Views of Possibility and Reality .... 238
c) The Interconnection Between Possibility and
Reality. Types of Possibility........................ 241
Chapter VII. The Basic Laws of Dialectics . . . 246
1. The Law of the Transition of Quantitative to
Qualitative Changes.......................................... 247
a) The Concept of Quality and Quantity . . 24
 CONTENTS 9

b) The Essence of the Law of the Transition

of Quantitative to Qualitative Changes . . 250
c) A Critique of Metaphysical Views of the
Interconnection Between Quantity and
Quality......................................................... 252
d) A Leap as a Universal Form of Transition
from One Quality Into Another .... 254
e) Evolution and Revolution...................... 256
2. The Law of the Unity and "Struggle" of
Opposites............................................................ 259
a) The Concepts of Opposite and Contradiction 259
b) The Unity of Opposites....................... 260
c) The Relativity of the Unity and the Abso­
luteness of the "Struggle" of Opposites . 262
d) Contradiction and Difference............. 264
e) The Universality of Contradictions . . . 265
f) Contradiction-the Source of the Motion and
Development of Reality............................ 266
g) Types of Contradiction.......................... 268
h) Antagonistic and Non-antagonistic Contradic­
tions .............................................................. 271
3. The Law of the Negation of Negation . . . 273
a) The Concept of Dialectical Negation . . 273
b) The Correlation of Concepts "Dialectical
Negation", "Leap" and "Resolution of Con­
tradictions" .................................................. 275
c) The Essence of the Law of the Negation of
Negation....................................................... 277

HISTORICAL MATERIALISM

Chapter VIII. The Subject-Matter of Historical Mater­

ialism ..............................................................................• 285
1. Historical Materialism as a Part of Marxist
Philosophy................................................................285
2. Historical Materialism and the Other Social
Sciences................................................................ 287
3. The Limitations of Pre-Marxian Sociological
Views................................................................... 289
4. The Development of Sociology into a Science 298
5. Historical Necessity and People’s Conscious
Activity ...................................... 301
10 CONTENTS

Chapter IX. Society and Nature ...................................... 306

1. On the Unity of Society and Nature............ 306
2. On Nature's Impact on Society......................309
3. Society's Influence on Neiture......................... 314
4. The Role of Population Growth in the Life of
Society................................................................. 316
Chapter X. Material Production as the Basis of
Society's Existence and Development........................... 320
1. The Concept of Production........................... 320
2. The Productive Forces of Society................. 323
a) The Essence of Productive Forces .... 32
b) The Productive Forces of Society and
Science............................................................ 325
3. Relations of Production..................... . . . 329
4. Dialectics of the Development of Productive
Forces and Relations of Production................ 334
a) The Dependence of Production Relations on
the Level of Development of the Productive
Forces . ........................................................... 334
b) The Law of the Correspondence of Produc­
tion Relations to the Level of Development
of the Productive Forces................................... 338
c) The Influence of Production Relations on the
Development of the Productive Forces . . 344
Chapter XI. The Basis and Superstructure......................348
1. Specific Features of the Basis and Superstruc­
ture ....................................................................... 348
2. The Patterns of Development and Replacement
of the Basis and Superstructure...................... 353
3. Specific Features of the Basis and Superstruc­
ture under Socialism.......................................... 356
Chapter XII. Classes and Class Relations ..... . 359
1. Lenin’s Definition of Classes..........................361
2. The Origin of Classes...................................... 364
a) A Critique of Idealistic Theories......... 364
b) The Marxist Theory of the Origin of
Classes................................................................. 366
3. A Critique of the Theory of Stratification and
Social Mobility.................................................... 369
4. Society's Class Structure................................. 372
a) Basic and Non-Basic Classes.............. 372
b) The Intelligentsia.................... . .. 374
 CONTENTS 11

c) The Estates............................................. 374

d) The So-Called "Middle Classes"............ 376
5. The Class Struggle as a Motive Force in the
Development of Antagonistic Society .... 379
6. The Objective Conditions for the Abolition of
Classes.................................................................. 386
Chapter XIII. The Political Organisation of Society . 390
1. The Political Organisation of Society as a
Concept................................................................ 390
2. The Origin and Essence of the State: A Critique
of Non-Marxist Theories................................... 390
3. The Origin and Essence of the State............. 395
4. Types and Forms of the State...................... 398
5. Specific Features of the SocialistState......... 401
6. Objective Conditions for the Withering Away
of the State......................................................... 408
Chapter XIV. Social Revolution........................................ 411
1. Social Revolution as a Form of Transition from
One Socio-Economic Class Systemto Another . 411
2. The Objective and Subjective Preconditions for
a Social Revolution............................................. 413
3. The Character and Driving Forces of a Social
Revolution............................................................ 415
4. A Socialist Revolution............................................ 416
a) The Essence and Specific Features of a So­
cialist Revolution......................................... 416
b) The Theory of Socialist Revolution as De­
veloped by Lenin......................................... 420
c) The Multiple Forms of the Socialist Revolu­
tion ................................................................. 424
Chapter XV. Social Consciousness and Its Forms . . 428
1. The Essence of Social Being and Social Consci­
ousness ..................................................... 428
2. The Relative Independence of Social Con­
sciousness ................................................. 434
3. The Influence of Social Consciousness on Social
Being......................................................... 435
4. The Structure of Social Consciousness .... 437
a) Social and Individual Consciousness .... 437
b) Social Psychology and Ideology ..... . 438
c) Forms of Social Consciousness ....... 440
12 CONTENTS

5. Political Ideology............................................ 441

6. Legal Consciousness........................................ 445
7. Morality............................................................ 449
a) The Essence of Morality..................... 449
b) The Origins of Morality......................451
c) The Class Nature of Morality............ 453
d) Elements of the Universal in Morality . . 45
e) The Criterion of the Truth in Morality . . 45
8. The Arts........................................................... 462
a) The Specifics of Art as a Form of Social
Consciousness................................................ 462
b) The Social Functions ofArt.................. 465
9. Religion.............................................................. 470
a) Origins and Essence ofReligion.......... 470
b) The Class Nature of Religion............. 472
c) The Abolition of the Social Base of Religion
Under Socialism........................................... 474
10. Science................................................................. 475
a) The Essence of Science.......................... 475
b) The Connection Between Science and Produc­
tion ................................................................ 476
c) The Interrelationships Between Science, the
Basis and the Superstructure....................479
Chapter XVI. The Role of the Masses and the Individ­
ual in History. Society and the Individual .... 483
1. The Masses as a Decisive Force of Social Prog­
ress ....................................................................... 483
2. The Role of the Personality in History .... 489
3. Society and the Individual........................... 493
a) The Individual as a Product of Social Devel­
opment ............................................. . . 493
b) The Dialectics of the Interrelationship Be­
tween Society and the Individual................... 494
Chapter XVII. Social Progress.......................................... 499
1. The Concept of Social Progress.................... 499
2. The Objective Criterion of Social Progress . . 505
3. Socio-Economic Systems as Stages of Society's
Progress.................................................................... 508
4. The Specific Features of Progress in Exploiting
Society................................................................... 515
5. The Specific Features of Progress Under Social­
ism ......................................................................... 517
FOREWORD

Marxist-Leninist philosophy is a coherent scien­

tific theory that examines the interrelationship
between objective reality and consciousness, the
universal laws of nature, society and human
thought, as well as the laws governing the func­
tioning and development of man's practical and
cognitive activities. It is the world outlook of the
working class, whose historical mission is to elimi­
nate the exploitation of man by man and to build
a classless communist society, thus ensuring the
all-round development of every individual and the
complete satisfaction of his material and cultural
requirements. It is also a general method for the
cognition and revolutionary remaking of reality.
Thus to study Marxist-Leninist philosophy and
master its laws and principles is a task of primary
importance for the working people seeking to elim­
inate exploitation and to build a new classless
society. The Soviet Union and other socialist coun­
tries focus particular attention on educating people
in the spirit of Marxism-Leninism. The Report of
the CPSU Central Committee to the 25th Party Con­
gress noted: "Marxism-Leninism is the only reli­
able basis for formulating the right strategy and
14 A. P. SHEPTULIN

tactics. It gives us an understanding of the his­

torical perspective, helps us to determine the lines
of our socio-economic and political development
for years ahead, and correctly to find our orienta­
tion in international developments."1
The purpose of this book is to introduce the
reader to the philosophy of Marxism-Leninism. It
is a translation from the Russian of A. II. Ulen-
ryjiHH. <1>hjioco4)hh MapKCH3Ma-jieHHHii3Ma. M.,
nojiHTM3AaT, 1970. The author has revised and
supplemented the Russian edition.

1 L. I. Brezhnev, Report of the CPSU Central Committee

and the Immediate Tasks of the Party in Home and Foreign
Policy. XXVth Congress of the CPSU, Moscow, 1976, p. 86.
Chapter I

the role of philosophy

IN SOCIETY

Before expounding Marxist-Leninist philosophy

we must establish what philosophy means in gen­
eral, how it differs from other forms of social con­
sciousness, and what functions it performs.

1. Philosophy as a World Outlook

a) The Concept of a World Outlook

Philosophy is the sum total of views on the

world, but this definition does not specify its dis­
tinguishing feature. The fact is that other views
exist in society apart from philosophical ones. So
how do philosophical views differ from non-philo-
sophical, such as natural-scientific views?
Special natural and social sciences study the
laws inherent in certain areas of reality, or in cer­
tain processes. Physics, for example, studies phe­
nomena related to bodies travelling in space, the
movement of molecules, "elementary" particles,
and so forth; biology deals with problems related
to living nature; economic sciences cover the so­
cial relations that take shape during the produc­
tion, distribution and consumption of material val­
ues; pedagogy deals with upbringing and teaching,
16 A. P. SHEPTUL1N

and so on. Philosophy, on the other hand, embraces

the entire world and all its processes, rather than
confining itself to a certain area of reality or a
certain part of the world.
Thus, philosophy develops a system of views on
the world as a whole and gives a general interpre­
tation of processes occurring within it, i.e. it is the
people’s world outlook.

b) The Fundamental Question of Philosophy.

Materialism and Idealism

Philosophy studies the relationship of matter and

consciousness, nature and spirit, and determines
what is primary and what is secondary. The ques­
tion of the relation of matter to consciousness is
fundamental to philosophy. The answer to it influ­
ences the solution of all other philosophical prob­
lems.
This is where the major difference lies between
philosophy and the other sciences, which do not
analyse the relationship of matter and conscious­
ness. They confine themselves to studying only the
objective properties of phenomena. Even sciences
concerned with psychic phenomena do not contrast
the material and the ideal.
Philosophers are divided in two major camps-
materialists and idealists-depending on how they
answer the fundamental question of philosophy.
Materialists maintain that matter is primary in
relation to consciousness and underlies all being.
Consciousness is secondary, being a property of
matter that manifests itself under certain condi-
 THE ROLE OF PHILOSOPHY IN SOCIETY 17

tions. Materialists include, among many others,

the ancient Greek philosopher Democritus, who
held that atoms formed the basis of the world; the
17th-century Dutch philosopher Spinoza who re­
garded the human mind as an integral property
or attribute of matter; and the 18th-century French
philosopher Diderot, who maintained that nature
existed independently of the mind.
In contrast to materialist philosophers, idealists
maintain that it is the spiritual, i.e. consciousness,
thought, or idea, that is primary or basic. Matter,
they say, is a derivative of spirit or consciousness,
being just a form of the latter's existence.
Though the idealists all agree that spirit forms
the basis of the world, they give different inter­
pretations to this postulate. Some of them insist
that spirit, which underlies all phenomena in the
world, exists in the form of human consciousness,
sensations, perceptions, notions or ideas, i.e. in
the form of subjective human activity. These are
called subjective idealists. There are others, the so-
called objective idealists, who maintain that the
spiritual exists as the so-called Absolute Idea, pure
consciousness, and the like.
The 18th-century German philosopher Fichte,
for example, was a subjective idealist. He main­
tained that the surrounding world was derived
from the activity of the subject, from the self-con-
sciousness of an "Ego" or "I". The ancient Greek
philosopher Plato, on the other hand, represented
objective idealism. In his view, the real world
around us consisted of ideal substances, while
sensuous things were but imperfect copies of the
2—1557
18 A. P. SHEPTULIN

latter that emerged as a result of the blending of

an idea with amorphous matter existing merely
as a possibility.

c) Dualism in Philosophy

Materialism, which explains all phenomena on

the basis of matter, and idealism, which derives the
existing world from spirit or consciousness, are
both monistic (from the Greek monos, meaning
one) philosophies. They are based on one philo­
sophical principle and proceed from one premise.
Yet there are philosophers who seek to prove
that the world has two primary bases-material and
ideal. These, they say, are independent of each
other. One of them underlies the existence of ma­
terial things, the physical world, while the other
underlies the spiritual world. This doctrine is known
as dualism (from the Latin duo, meaning two).
The 17th-century French philosopher Descartes,
a dualist, held that reality was based on two sub-
stances-material, with extension as its attribute,
and ideal, with thought as its attribute. Inde­
pendent of each other, these two substances
merged in man and assumed the form of body
and soul. Though they existed side by side in
man, Descartes maintained, they still remained
quite independent and equal.
Dualists claim to follow their own, independent
line in philosophy, distinct from materialism and
idealism. They fail, however, to uphold this line
consistently. With respect to specific problems
they are compelled to take either a materialist or
 THE ROLE OF PHILOSOPHY IN SOCIETY 19

an idealist stand, thus making their position in­

consistent, contradictory and mechanistic, inso­
much as they try to reconcile incompatible prem­
ises and principles.

d) Searching for a Third Line in Philosophy

Other philosophers, too, who ultimately prove

to be idealists, seek to place themselves above
both materialism and idealism and find a third
line in philosophy.
Such attempts were especially frequent in the
period of developed capitalism, when the victo­
rious bourgeoisie came to realise the danger of
the materialist world outlook with its inherent
atheistic and revolutionary conclusions.
At the turn of the 20th century, Ernst Mach, the
Austrian physicist and philosopher, made an at­
tempt to define the “third" line in philosophy. He
lashed out against both materialist and idealist
views, branding them "one-sided". Mach affirmed
that neither matter nor consciousness formed
the basis of the world, but rather the "neutral
elements of the universe", which could be both
material and ideal. Intertwining, they make up
the material or physical world, while in relation­
ship with man's nervous system they produce the
ideal or psychic world. According to Mach, the
physical and psychic worlds are intrinsically inter­
connected. The physical world can thus be con­
structed from psychic phenomena, but the possi­
bility of constructing the psychic world out of
physical phenomena is excluded.
2*
20 A. P. SHEPTULIN

In actual fact, however, these assertions do not

constitute any "third" line in philosophy. If the
theory of "neutral elements" is reason to affirm
that the physical world can be constructed out of
psychic phenomena, but not vice versa, then this
line of reasoning fully conforms with idealism,
since the psychic or the consciousness are primary
in his case.
Karl Jaspers, a prominent existentialist like­
wise tries to find a "third" line in philosophy. He
agrees with Mach that neither matter nor con­
sciousness form the basis of the world, but rather
something else which includes both of these. Ac­
cording to Jaspers, this "else", or this third, is the
"universal" which manifests itself either as pure
"existence", or "supernatural", or "consciousness",
or the "universe", and so forth. If, however, the
"universal" proves able to manifest itself as the
universe, consciousness, the natural and the super­
natural, it in no way differs from the God declared
by theologians to be the source of all being. Thus,
Jaspers' views coincide with those shared by ob­
jective idealists, who believe that consciousness is
the maker of all that exists.
Apart from those philosophers who place them­
selves above both materialism and idealism by ig­
noring matter and consciousness and searching for
a "third" way, there are thinkers, and even schools
of thought, that strive for the same goal by neglect­
ing the fundamental question of philosophy and
declaring it a pseudo-problem devoid of any mean­
ing. This view is upheld by the neo-positivists
Bertrand Russel, Rudolf Carnap, and others.
 THE ROLE OF PHILOSOPHY IN SOCIETY 21

The neo-positivists argue that philosophy is

unable to determine what is primary-matter or
consciousness-and so should ignore the problem.
It should confine itself exclusively to logical anal­
ysis of scientific data, semantic analysis of words
and propositions. A meaningful analysis of scien­
tific data, of the semantics of words and proposi­
tions, however, is inconceivable without first
determining what is primary-matter or conscious­
ness-in so far as such an analysis makes it neces­
sary to establish whether scientific data reflect
definite aspects and relations in the existing world
or are products of the creative activity of con­
sciousness, thought. The neo-positivists opt for the
latter view. They derive the essence of sensuous
data and the meaning of words and propositions
from the creative activity of consciousness or
thought, rather than from the outside world, and
thus objectively assume an idealist position.
Thus all attempts to find a "third" line in phi­
losophy can only lead to idealism.

e) The Social and Epistemological Roots of Idealism

There are many reasons for the appearance of

the idealist view of the environment. Some of them
stem from the economic system of society, the
social position of its classes and their requirements,
while others take root in knowledge, in the cogni­
tive activity of man.
The factors of social life that are conducive to
the emergence and spread of the idealist view of
man’s environment constitute the social roots of
22 A. P. SHEPTULIN

idealism. They include, primarily, the separation

of mental from physical labour and their transfor­
mation into opposites. Marx and Engels wrote:
"Once the ruling ideas have been separated from
the ruling individuals and, above all, from the rela­
tionships which result from a given stage of the
mode of production, and in this way the conclusion
has been reached that history is always under the
sway of ideas, it is very easy to abstract from these
various ideas 'the idea', the thought, etc., as the
dominant force in history, and thus to consider all
these separate ideas and concepts as 'forms of self-
determination' of the Concept developing in his­
tory."1
The social roots of idealism also include the striv­
ings of the exploiting classes to provide an ideal­
ist answer to the fundamental question of philos­
ophy and to spread idealist views which provide
a theoretical justification of religion, and thus are
conducive to the spiritual enslavement of the work­
ing people and divert them from the revolutionary
struggle to transform the existing situation in the
world.
As for the epistemological roots of idealism,
they are to be found in the realm of knowledge.
Knowledge or cognition is a complex and con­
tradictory process by which reality is reflected in
the consciousness of man. Exaggerating any aspect
of knowledge, depriving it of bonds with its other
aspects and with matter, and absolutising it in­

1 K. Marx and F. Engels, The German Ideology, Moscow,

1976, p. 69.
 THE ROLE OF PHILOSOPHY IN SOCIETY 23

evitably lead to idealism. The epistemological roots

of idealism lie therefore in making an absolute of
some aspect or peculiarity of the process of cogni­
tion, which leads to one-sided interpretation and
distortion of it. "Rectilinearity and one-sidedness,"
Lenin wrote, "woodenness and petrification, sub­
jectivism and subjective blindness-imila the epis­
temological roots of idealism."1
Sensations and perceptions are the forms of
sense knowledge that depend on man, his nervous
system, psychic state, experience, and the like. If,
however, we exaggerate this dependence, forget
that sensations and perceptions depend not only
on man, but also on the objects influencing his
sense organs, that they reflect the corresponding
aspects of these objects, we come inevitably to
subjectivism, i.e. we shall affirm that the content
of sensations and perceptions is determined by the
subject (man), by his emotions, which will bring
us to idealism-the recognition of sensations and
perceptions as the basis of all being. This was how
idealists, such as Berkeley, Mach, Avenarius, rea­
soned.
By cognising the surrounding world, people pin­
point the general qualities of the objects and phe­
nomena they encounter in everyday life. On this
basis, they develop general notions and then con­
cepts of such qualities. These notions and concepts
pass from one generation to the next, while the
objects reflected by them are constantly changing.
This creates the impression that concepts are sta­

1 V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 38, p. 363.

24 A. P. SHEPTULIN

ble, constant, eternal, while objects, on the con­

trary, are unstable, transient, temporary. The con­
cept "man", for example, emerged in ancient times,
but since the process of its formation has long
been forgotten one is inclined to believe it eternal.
Individuals, however, are not eternal-they are
born and they die. So, exaggerating the relative
stability of concepts, depriving them of their bonds
with the external objects which they emerged to
reflect and turning them into something independ­
ent and basic, necessarily leads to idealism.
2. Philosophy as Methodology

Philosophy forms man's world outlook and ena­

bles him to develop an integral idea of world phe­
nomena, thus helping him to pattern his everyday
behaviour and practical activity. But this is not
the only role philosophy plays in society. It also
performs methodological functions by developing
a general method of cognition which is the totality
of interrelated principles or demands advanced on
the basis of general laws discovered in the sur­
rounding world and in knowledge, and constituting
a conclusion drawn on the basis of the historical
development of social knowledge.
The history of philosophy knows two opposing
philosophical methods of cognition-the metaphys­
ical and the dialectical.
The metaphysical method took shape in the nat­
ural sciences in the 16th-17th centuries. At that
time natural scientists, in view of the requirements
of developing production, set themselves the task
 THE ROLE OF PHILOSOPHY IN SOCIETY 25

of studying specific aspects and properties of the

surrounding world, the concrete forms of being.
They broke down the objects of their studies into
separate parts, snatched them out of their natural
or historical context, and studied "each one sepa­
rately, its nature, special causes, effects, etc.''.1
This resulted in a tendency to consider the objects
and phenomena of the external world in isolation
from their relationship and interdependence, in
isolation from their motion and development,
which in turn resulted in a general metaphysical
method of cognition. According to this method,
the objects and phenomena of the external world
are isolated, independent of each other, devoid
of contradictions and the capacity to develop, with
always the same qualitative features, i.e. un­
changed.
Characteristically, modern metaphysicists abso-
lutise separate aspects and forms of the motion
of matter and reduce the higher to the lower.
The principles of the dialectical method of cog­
nition began to emerge as natural science started to
investigate the processes inherent in objects rather
than the objects and their properties themselves.
This method postulates that, in reality, all objects
and phenomena are intrinsically interconnected and
interdependent, that all of them are inherently con­
tradictory and that due to the struggle of oppo­
sites they undergo constant changes and pass to a
higher qualitative state.
The dialectical method is drawn from the general

1 F. Engels, Anti-Duhring, Moscow, 1969, p. 30.

26 A. P. SHEPTULIN

laws of reality and knowledge. It is, therefore, the

only consistent scientific (philosophical) method
helping scientists in their cognitive activity.

3. Philosophy and Man’s Practical Activities

By studying the general laws of reality and
knowledge and developing man's world outlook
and general method of cognition on their basis,
philosophy influences human life substantially.
People's behaviour and the guiding principles
behind their practical activities depend, to a large
extent on their general views, on their philo­
sophical ideas.
Thus, people who are inclined to the idealist
world outlook often give prominence in their per­
sonal lives to God, or some other supernatural
forces. They are prone to rely on fate, rather than
on knowledge of the laws governing changes in
their environment. In contrast, people with a
Marxist world outlook rely in their activities on
knowledge of the objective laws of reality. Their
main objective is continuous transformation and
improvement of the conditions of life, rather than
adaptation to them, as is the goal of people sharing
a religious, idealistic world outlook.
Besides, philosophy, dialectical materialism in
particular, is linked with practical experience
through implementing the methodological func­
tion of dialectical materialism. The latter studies
the general laws of reality and, on this basis, for­
mulates certain principles or demands and require­
ments that must be observed in solving a particu­
 THE ROLE OF PHILOSOPHY IN SOCIETY 27

lar problem. In other words, dialectical materialism

develops the method of action, of revolutionary
transformation of reality.

4. The Subject-Matter of Philosophy

Having discussed the specific features of philos­
ophy and its functions, we may proceed to a
definition of its subject-matter.
Philosophy is a world outlook and a method oi
cognition developed on the basis oi a specific solu­
tion to the problem of the relationship between
matter and consciousness.
This definition applies to any philosophy, to any
philosophical view-materialist or idealist, dialec­
tical or metaphysical. But here we do not intend
to define the subject-matter of every philosophical
school, and will confine ourselves to that of the
Marxist-Leninist philosophy.
The Marxist-Leninist philosophy is a science
studying regularities in the relationship between
matter and consciousness, the universal laws of
nature, society, and thought, and developing a
world outlook and a method of cognising and
transforming reality.

5. Philosophy and Special Sciences

Some view philosophy as the "science of sci­
ences" that should incorporate all other sciences
and allot each one of them its place and the prin­
ciples underlying its scope and development. This
view was widespread in pre-Marxian philosophy.
28 A. P. SHEPTULIN

Some bourgeois philosophers, however, continued

to support this view even after the emergence of
dialectical materialism.
Positivists hold the opposite opinion. They
maintain that special sciences have no need of
philosophy. Moreover, they argue that philosophy
should be abolished, since it only harms and ham­
pers scientific cognition,- nothing in reality corre­
sponds to its principles; it studies nothing and
cannot study anything; it does not and cannot
possibly have a scientific method of cognition.
This is true, to a certain extent, of idealist phi­
losophy, which substitutes the construction of
various principles on the basis of pure thought
for the study of objective reality. Dialectical ma­
terialism is a totally different matter, for it has its
own subject-matter for study and its own method
of cognition.
As distinct from special sciences, which study
the specific laws characteristic of a certain field of
reality, dialectical materialism studies general laws
covering all fields of the objective world and all
phenomena. General laws, however, do not mani­
fest themselves independently of or alongside
specific laws-they do so through the latter. So in
order to discover a philosophical law, one has to
refer to special sciences, to analyse their specific
laws and single out that which recurs in all fields
of real life, and is thus universal. By this token
philosophy is inseparable from the special sciences
and the scientific data obtained by them,- it draws
on such data and can develop successfully only
through generalising scientific information.
 THE ROLE OF PHILOSOPHY IN SOCIETY 29

Special sciences, in their turn, are inseparable

from philosophy and the results of its studies. In­
deed, philosophy studies the general laws of reality
and the regularities governing the relationship
between matter and consciousness and on this basis
develops a theory of knowledge and logic, i.e.
laws and forms of thinking, and together with all
this a general method of cognition. Special sci­
ences, on the other hand, cannot exist and devel­
op without using logical forms and laws of think­
ing. Neither can they do without a general method
of cognition. They are unable to evolve all this by
themselves, insofar as they do not study the gen­
eral laws of reality governing the thinking process
and underlying the logical laws and principles of
the dialectical method of cognition.
Dialectical materialism and special sciences,
though they have their own fields of study, are
closely interconnected, interdependent, and cannot
develop one without the other.

6. The Partisanship of Philosophy

In any class society philosophy is always parti­
san. It evolves a system of views of the world as
a whole, of surrounding reality, and at the same
time expresses and defends the interests of certain
classes or social groups. Through philosophical
views, classes and social groups theoretically com­
prehend their position in society and their relation­
ship with the surrounding world and the processes
taking place within it. Philosophy is the basis of
the world view of a definite class, and as such it
30 A. P. SHEPTULIN

moulds the way of thought and behaviour of this

class, shaping its requirements and ideals. "Re­
cent philosophy," Lenin wrote, "is as partisan as
was philosophy two thousand years ago. The con­
tending parties are essentially-although this is
concealed by a pseudo-erudite quackery of new
terms or by a weak-minded non-partisanship-ma­
terialism and idealism."1
As a rule, materialism is associated with pro­
gressive classes and social groups interested in his­
torical advance, whereas idealism is associated
with reactionary classes struggling to perpetuate
the existing order. Materialism relies on science
and makes use of scientific data; idealism, in con­
trast, is often bound up with religion and, basing
itself on its dogmas, seeks to substantiate the need
for it. Lenin stressed the partisanship of bourgeois
philosophy and its ties with theology when he
wrote: "... Not a single one of these [bourgeois-
Author] professors, who are capable of making
very valuable contributions in the special fields of
chemistry, history or physics, can be trusted one
iota when it comes to philosophy. Why? For the
same reason that not a single professor of political
economy, who may be capable of very valuable
contributions in the field of factual and specialised
investigations, can be trusted one iota when it
comes to the general theory of political economy.
For in modern society the latter is as much a par­
tisan science as is epistemology."2

1 V. I. Lenin, Collected Works. Vol. 14, p. 358.

2 V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 14, p. 342.
Chapter II

THE STRUGGLE
OF MATERIALISM AGAINST IDEALISM
IN THE PRE-MARXIAN PHILOSOPHY

1. The Emergence of Philosophy

Philosophy, as a system of man's views of the
world, as a world outlook, has not been always
in existence. It emerged at a certain stage in the
development of society, when human thought had
attained a high level and there were favourable
social conditions for it to emerge. In the initial
stages of society's existence and development,
man's productive forces were extremely underde­
veloped, while man himself was totally dependent
on nature and the elements. Since man was una­
ware of the real causes of various phenomena, he
was naturally inclined to animate them and con­
sider them to be wrought by supernatural forces
and creatures. This is how belief in the existence
of God, religion and religious views emerged.
Thus, a religious world outlook engendered by
the savage's impotence vis-a-vis nature and his
fear of the mysterious elements affecting his life
was the first, initial form of a general view of the
world.
When society was divided into classes—slaves
and slave-owners-religious views came to be
engendered by still another cause, namely, the
dependence of man on spontaneous social forces
32 A. P. SHEPTULIN

that were just as harmful to him as were

nature’s elemental forces. Besides, for the
slave-owners religion in slave-owning society
becomes a moral means for justifying and per­
petuating the exploitation of slaves. The emer­
gence of classes led to the emergence of the class
struggle, which was inevitably reflected in people's
spiritual life and in the struggle of different world
outlooks corresponding to the different positions
of classes and other social groups in society. In
slave-owning society, mental work separated from
manual labour and became the monopoly of slave­
owners. The ideological or philosophical struggle
was therefore waged mainly between separate
groups of slave-owners occupying different places
in society, such as progressive artisan and mer­
chant strata of the slave-owning class and conser­
vative aristocratic groups of tribal origin. The
artisan and merchant section of slave-owners
sought to develop the productive forces and trade,
and to bring about democratic reforms within the
slave-owning state. The aristocratic strata, on the
other hand, opposed such reforms. The struggle
waged by the progressive social groups against the
reactionary aristocracy led to the emergence and
development of a materialist world outlook op­
posed to the latter group's religious views of the
world.
While opposing materialism, representatives of
the reactionary section of slave-owners began to
develop idealistic conceptions to substantiate reli­
gion and to combat the materialist view of various
phenomena. This was how idealism took shape.
 MATERIALISM VS IDEALISM 33

It was a reaction to the emerging materialist world

outlook. Once having taken shape, idealism and
materialism began to wage a constant, unremitt­
ing struggle. The entire subsequent history of
philosophy is nothing but the struggle between
the two trends in philosophy-materialism and
idealism.

2. The Struggle
Between Materialism and Idealism
in Slave-Owning Society
The materialist view of the world is rooted in
the distant past. It began to emerge in Egypt and
Babylonia at the end of the 3rd and the beginning
of the 2nd millennium B.C. It was at that time that
the idea was recorded that water was the prime
source of the world, giving birth to all things and
living creatures.
Only in the 1st millennium B.C., however, did
materialism become a more or less integral system
of views. This was particularly true of India and
China. In India, for instance, the philosophical
trend Lokayata (literally, the views of those who
recognise only this world-lo&n) gained currency
as a fully developed materialist system of world
views. The school was founded by Brihaspati.
Adherents of Lokayata harshly critisised the
religious beliefs that were then popular in India
and were contained in the Vedas (scriptures of
Hinduism). They resolutely opposed all forms of
magic and superstition and exposed as false the
priests' dogmas about the immortality of the soul.
■1-1557
34 A. P. SHEPTULIN

which allegedly remained alive in the other world

after death. According to their doctrine, there was
not nor could there possibly be any other life,
except in this world, so man's soul died together
with his body.
At about the same time a materialist view of
the world took shape in China. A school opposing
religion and asserting that the world was eternal
and consisted of fire, water, wood, soil and metal,
was widespread in China between the Sth and the
7th centuries B.C. All things, the first Chinese
materialists maintained, were various combina­
tions of the above five elements.
The materialist world outlook was developed in
the philosophical system of Taoism that emerged
in the 6th century B.C. and was ascribed to Lao-tze.
His followers considered that the world was eternal
and in a constant state of motion and change.
Taoists maintained that motion was directed and
governed by Tao-the path taken by natural events
(tao means path, law).
The materialist systems that emerged in India
and China in the 1st millennium B.C. at first fought
against religious beliefs and later against ideal-
ism-the theoretical basis of religion. These systems
developed and matured in the course of this con­
tention.
From the 6th century B.C. onwards, philosophy
began to develop spectacularly in ancient Greece.
There too, the materialist view of the world was
the outcome of the struggle against religion and
reflected the interests of the progressive strata of
the slave-owning class. Materialist philosophy in
 MATERIALISM VS IDEALISM 35

ancient Greece was founded by the so-called Mi­

lesian (Ionic) School: Thales (c. 624-c. 547 B.C.),
Anaximander (c. 610-c. 546 B.C.), and Anaxi­
menes (c. 585-c. 525 B.C.).
Thales considered water the basic element of
all things. Everything originated from water and
everything eventually turned into water.
Anaximander thought that the primary source of
all things was the "apeuron" (the unlimited, bound­
less), and inchoate mass, separated out to make
the physical world by rotary motion and educing
the opposites, such as "moist" and "dry", "cold"
and "warm". Things and entire worlds that had
emerged and lasted for a certain time, disinte­
grated for the same reasons (motion and education
of opposites), disappeared and then turned into the
"boundless" again. Thus, Anaximander held, the
world was in a constant state of motion, rotation,
which caused some things and phenomena to
emerge from the "boundless" and others to disap­
pear back into it. Holding a materialist view, Ana­
ximander clearly attempted to present the world
dialectically, in motion, attended, to a certain
extent, by the process of divarication of the whole
(the "boundless") into opposites (eduction of
opposite things and phenomena).
Anaximenes held a similar view of the origin
of sensuous things. He taught that air was the
basic universal substance and that the motion of
air caused some things to emerge and others to
disappear. Air, being in a constant state of motion,
either rarefied or condensed, thus turning from one
substance into another. When air rarefied, for
s»
36 A. P. SHEPTULIN

example, it turned into fire, whereas when it

condensed it became wind. Further condensa­
tion turned air into clouds, and still further
into soil and eventually rock. All other things,
God included, emerged from the above states of
matter.
The first Greek materialists who expressed and
defended the interests of the progressive groups
of slave-owners were initially confronted by reli­
gious dogmas concerning the origin and essence of
the surrounding world, and then with idealist phi­
losophy developed by reactionary aristocratic
groups of slave-owners.
Pythagoreanism, founded by the Greek philos­
opher and mathematician Pythagoras (c. 580-c.
500 B.C.), was the first form of idealism in ancient
Greece. The Pythagoreans believed that number
was the essence of all things and that all relations
could be expressed numerically. The whole world
depended on numbers and was, they maintained,
but a harmony of numbers.
The Pythagoreans developed their philosophy
and assailed the materialist views of the Milesian
School. Materialism, however, was rapidly gaining
popularity.
An appreciable contribution to the development
of the materialist world outlook was made by the
Greek philosopher Heraclitus of Ephesus (c. 530-c.
470 B.C.). He held that fire was the underlying
substance, the first principle of the world, and that
it caused things to emerge and disappear. Hera­
clitus believed that everything came from fire and
eventually turned into fire. Fire, he said, was like
 MATERIALISM VS IDEALISM 37

gold, which could be exchanged for everything,

just like everything could be exchanged for gold.
Heraclitus maintained that the world was not creat­
ed by anybody, but existed eternally and irrespec­
tive of any supernatural forces. The world, he
wrote, was one whole created by neither God nor
man. It was and would always be a living fire
bound to blaze up and die away.
Heraclitus reiterated the idea of the continuous
motion and change of the surrounding world, of
contradiction as a source of that motion, of the
possibility of one opposite transforming into an­
other. He thus formulated a number of dialectical
principles which to some extent reflected reality,
though they were not based on scientific data. He­
raclitus affirmed: "Upon those who step into the
same river different and ever different waters flow
down" (because when we step into water the second
time it will certainly change); "There is one and
the same in us-alive and dead, awake and sleeping,
young and old. Indeed, this, when changed, is that,
and conversely, that, when changed, is this";
"What is cold turns warm, while what is warm
turns cold; what is moist dries up, while what is
dry gets moist."
The further progress of materialism in Greek
philosophy is associated with the works of Democ­
ritus (5th century B.C.) who advanced an atomic
theory of matter. According to this theory, the
world was made up of an infinite number of atoms
and of the vacuum in which they moved. Moving
in the vacuum, atoms met and formed various
bodies. All that existed was made up of atoms.
38 A. P. SHEPTULIN

Even man's soul was nothing more than a combi­

nation of particular atoms. Democritus turned his
ideas of the soul against the Pythagoreans, who
maintained that the soul was immortal. Democri­
tus believed that the soul died together with the
body. The body's death signified the disintegration
of the atoms making it up, which meant that the
atoms making up the soul disintegrated as well.
The atomic theory was later developed by the
Greek philosopher Epicurus (4th-3rd century B.C.)
and the Roman philosopher Titus Lucretius Carus
(1st century B. C.).
The Greek philosopher Plato (427-347 B.C.),
who expressed the interests of the reactionary
slave-owning aristocracy, came out against the
atomic theory of Democritus and the materialist
views shared by other philosophers, Heraclitus in
particular.
Platonism is based on the division of all that
exists into the real world, consisting of general
ideas ("ideal essences"), and the unreal world,
made up of assorted sensuous things, being just a
reflection or a shadow of the real world (the world
of ideas). To illustrate the correlation between the
world of sensuous things (the unreal world) and
the world of ideas (the real world), Plato gives
the following example. Imagine a man chained
to a pole in a dark cave, his back always to the
entrance from where the sunlight comes, so that
he cannot see what is going on outside the cave.
When people pass the cave entrance their shad­
ows and the shadows of things they carry would
appear on the wall facing the entrance. The
 MATERIALISM VS IDEALISM 39

man would see these shadows and take them

for real, though they are but imperfect imprints
of the real world. Sensuous things, the world of
the senses, are similar imprints or, to be more pre­
cise, shadows of the world of ideas. According to
Plato, we are just like that prisoner in the cave-
we take this world of things as real, though it is
nothing but a shadow of the real world, the world
of ideas concealed from us.
Plato believes that the world of ideas is integral
thanks to the Idea of the Good, and is eternal,
whereas separate things and phenomena are tran­
sient and temporary. They emerge from the amor­
phous and vague being (matter) as a result of com­
bining with a certain idea, but as soon as the idea
abandons the thing it has created, the latter ceases
to exist. It follows then that real things and phe­
nomena are created by ideas, which ultimately take
their beginning in God.
Plato's theory of ideas was severely criticised by
Aristotle (384-322 B.C.), whose teaching is the
pinnacle of ancient Greek philosophy. Aristotle
summed up and further developed all the philo­
sophical systems advanced by his predecessors. His
works encompass all aspects of reality-nature,
human society and knowledge. Assailing Plato's
philosophy, particularly his belief that ideas were
primary to sensuous things and that they existed
independently, Aristotle proved that no general
ideas existed outside and independently of things.
All that is real manifests itself through separate
things. As for general ideas, they emerge in man's
consciousness in the process of cognition as he is
40 A. P. SHEPTULIN

confronted with repetition and becomes aware

of it.
Aristotle vacillated between materialism and
idealism.
He held that all things originated from primor­
dial matter characterised by vagueness and a lack
of form, i.e., in fact it was just the possibility of
existence. This possibility turned into a real sen­
suous thing only when matter combined with a
form (Aristotle's term), which gave it definiteness.
Although Aristotle's world view was basically
materialist, it also had idealistic overtones. First,
he divorced primordial matter from motion, pre­
senting the former as a vague and amorphous
mass. Motion was introduced into it from outside,
by form. Second, the active element that caused
changes in matter and its transformation from an
uncertain into a certain state, and then from one
state into another-i.e. form-originated, in the final
analysis, from God as the prime mover. All this
reveals the inconsistency of Artistotle's teaching.
There are metaphysical and idealist elements in
his views, alongside elements of dialectics and
materialism.
The crisis of slave-owning society caused a de­
cline in ancient Greek philosophy after Aristotle.
A trend emerged towards transition from materi­
alism to idealism and mysticism. The revival and
propagation of idealist views was especially mani­
fest during the fall of the Roman Empire, when
idealism became linked to religion, particularly to
emerging Christianity, which became the dominant
ideology in the period of European feudalism.
 MATERIALISM VS IDEALISM 41

3. The Struggle
of Materialism Against Idealism
in Medieval Philosophy

The Middle Ages, when religious ideology

reigned supreme, and permeated and subdued all
spheres of society's spiritual life, left an imprint
on the development of philosophy as well. During
that time philosophy served religion objectively
and officially. It was called upon to justify and
substantiate religious dogmas, and to prove their
validity and stability. All philosophical problems,
therefore, were inevitably tinged with religious
connotations.
The problem of the correlation between general
ideas-ther so-called universals-and separate things
of the sensuous world-the particulars-was of great
concern to medieval philosophers. It had been
fiercely debated throughout the Middle Ages. The
solution of the fundamental question of philosophy
and the struggle between materialism and idealism
at that time was intrinsically linked to the solution
of the problem of the correlation between the indi­
vidual and the general or universal, between gen­
eral ideas and isolated things or occurrences.
Idealists maintained that the universal existed
independently of particular things and prior to
them; it was associated with God. Moreover, God
himself was the universal essence of all that existed.
As regards particular things, they were eventually
created by God. The exponents of this theory were
called realists, insofar as they acknowledged and
substantiated the real existence of the universals.
VI A. P. SHEPTULIN

Materialists held the opposite view. They be­

lieved that the universal could not exist in reality,
let alone prior to the particular. Only particular
things really existed. The universal, they reasoned,
was but a name reflecting nothing and therefore
non-existent in reality. The supporters of this view
were called nominalists, because they rejected the
real existence of the universal and declared it but
a name.
The teaching of the medieval philosopher Saint
Anselm of Canterbury (1033-1109) may serve as
an example of the idealist school. He believed in
an eternal, single and immutable God who acted
as a universal substance existing in and for himself.
All that existed outside God was rooted in God.
The divine origin was eternal and immutable. The
emergence of things was linked with their creation
by God. At the moment of creation, God first con­
ceived of things, his thoughts being the first im­
ages of things that were later created according to
those images. Here God acted as an artist, creat­
ing his works according to his intention. The ideal
being of things in God's mind was eternal, where­
as their real being (being outside of God) was
temporary, transient. On the basis of this system
of being. Saint Anselm maintained that general
ideas (universals) should exist prior to particular
things. Particular material things were secondary,
insofar as they were begotten by ideas, and even­
tually God.
The medieval philosopher-nominalist Roscelin
(c. 1050-c. 1112) vigorously opposed this view. He
insisted that the universal was not prior to sen­
 MATERIALISM VS IDEALISM 43

suous things, did not underlie them. Moreover, it

did not exist at all. General ideas, said Roscelin,
were nothing but words, names given by man to
particular things. Only particular things existed in
reality.
Rejecting the existence of the general, of uni­
versal ideas, Roscelin tried to refute religious
beliefs in a single God and the Trinity. He believed
that God and the Trinity (the Father, the Son, and
the Holy Ghost), through which the former alle­
gedly expressed himself, could not possibly exist.
If those three persons existed, then there should be
three independent gods, rather than one. This dec­
laration angered the Church and was condemned
as contrary to the ecclesiastical doctrine.
Saint Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274), the Italian
theologian and philosopher, attempted to reconcile
the extreme judgements made by realists and
nominalists concerning the correlation between
the universal and the particular. He believed that
the prime cause of all that existed was God-the
absolute and perfect spiritual being. God con­
tained in himself, as general ideas, all that existed
in the world, and created material things according
to these ideas. Thus, Thomas Aquinas agreed with
the realists who maintained that general ideas
existed in God's mind prior to particular things.
At the same time, he tried to prove the nominalists
right too, when he said that, if we took general
ideas that existed in the human, rather than God's
mind, we could affirm that these ideas could not
exist prior to particular things, they could
not engender them, they were created by man
IA A. P. SHEPTULIN

himself in the process of cognising the outside

world.
Thomas Aquinas tried to substantiate theoreti­
cally the subservient role of philosophy in relation
to theology. In his view, philosophy served the
same purpose as theology, i.e., to substantiate
religious dogmas, though by other means. The­
ology came to these dogmas directly from God,
whereas philosophy did so from God's creations-
material things.
Thomas' teaching is being revived and propa­
gated in many Western countries now as neothom-
ism. Its main objective is to reconcile philosophy
and the special sciences with religion, with the­
ology and to make them serve the latter.

4. The Materialism
of the 17th and 18th Centuries
and Its Struggle
Against Religion and Idealism
A new age-the age of Renaissance -came to
replace the Middle Ages, which were over­
whelmingly dominated by sterile scholasticism
confined to narrow religious dogmas. The emer­
gence and development of capitalist relations of
production stimulated the development of indus­
try and commerce. This required concrete knowl­
edge of the laws governing the development and
functioning of the phenomena of the surrounding
world. A need arose for studying and understand­
ing the laws of nature. The human mind began
taking an interest in nature, in man's material
 MATERIALISM VS IDEALISM 45

activities. This tendency naturally affected the

development of philosophy which was declared a
science called upon to establish truths that would
help in practical activities and direct the efforts
to create material values.
The general propositions used by medieval phi­
losophy and its method were judged false and mis­
leading. New ways of investigation and new
methods of cognising the truth were advanced.
Francis Bacon (1561-1625) was the founder of this
trend.
First and foremost, Bacon severely criticised
idealist philosophy-from ancient times to the
Middle Ages. He attacked it on two fronts. First,
he blamed the idealists for confusing the holy
and the human, and for going as far as to base
their philosophical doctrines on the Holy Writ.
Bacon held that sciences and philosophy should
use a specific method in the experiments and
base themselves on experience, whereas theology
was based exclusively on belief. Hence the con­
clusion: theology and philosophy should not be
confused, they should not interfere with each
other.
Second, he criticised the idealists, especially
the scholastics, for their speculative arguments,
for the emptiness and sterility of their propositions
and for the fruitlessness of their teaching.
Bacon considered experiment to be the founda­
tion of knowledge. He set himself the task of re­
lieving men and their consciousness of the preju­
dice that misled and confused men and obstructed
the road to the knowledge of the truth.
46 A. P. SHEPTULIN

All things, according to Bacon, were based on

simple “natures" deduced from forms. The forms
were limited in number, but their numerous
combinations engendered the diverse phenomena
occurring in the world. The material world, Ba­
con said, had neither a beginning nor an end,
it had existed and would exist for ever. "Nothing
is produced from nothing," he wrote. "Nothing
is reduced to nothing. ..." All the quantity of
matter or its sum remains constant and neither
increases, nor decreases.1
Bacon considered motion to be one of the basic
properties of eternally existing matter, although
he confined motion to 19 forms. This was undoubt­
edly a defect in his teaching.
Bacon's method of cognition is also tinged with
metaphysics. He thought that, in the process of
acquiring knowledge, it was necessary to split an
object into separate aspects, qualities (natures)
and to further break each quality down into still
simpler qualities (natures), proceeding in this
manner until the simplest natures are singled out.
Then we should discover the laws or forms that
determine the essence of these simplest natures,
and see how these natures combine into a specific
thing. As a result. Bacon believed, we can cog­
nise any thing in the surrounding world.
Bacon did not understand that objects are not
just mechanical combinations of certain perma­

1 See Francis Bacon, Novum Organum, Book II, London,

n.d.. Ch. I, p. 150, Ch. V, p. 156, Ch. IV, p. 153 Ch. XL,
p. 262.
 MATERIALISM VS IDEALISM 47

nent qualities, but are integral wholes, in which

qualities or aspects are interconnected and change
into one another. Therefore an object cannot
be cognised through a mechanical combination of
knowledge about its separate aspects.
Notwithstanding the shortcomings inherent in
Bacon's philosophy, it was an appreciable step
forward in the development of philosophical
thought and marked the emergence of a new form
of philosophical materialism.
Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679), the English bour­
geois philosopher, developed Bacon's materialist
teaching. As Marx put it, Hobbes was the systema-
tiser of Bacon's philosophy. He lent Bacon's views
an explicit mechanistic shading. He stripped nature
(matter) of the variety of qualities (ascribed to it
by Bacon). Hobbes believed it to be a totality of
bodies possessing only two main properties-ex-
tension and figure. He held the same view of mo­
tion, reducing its multiformity to one form-me­
chanical. By motion he understood only the travel
of bodies in space.
In Hobbes' view, knowledge was an addition and
subtraction of separate thoughts. He believed that
a mathematical method based on addition and sub­
traction could be the sole scientific method of ac­
quiring knowledge.
Hobbes developed his materialist world outlook
fighting against religion and drawing atheistic
conclusions from his philosophy. He held that
religion was the outcome of people's ignorance
and their fear of the unknown future. It had
nothing to do with science, though he maintained
48 A. P. SHEPTULIN

that it was needed because it helped to keep peo­

ple in order.
Just like Bacon and Hobbes, representatives of
the 17th-century bourgeoisie in England, so Rene
Descartes (1596-1650) in France came out with
a substantiation of new methods of cognising real­
ity. He drew a materialist picture of the world.
Nature, he said, consisted of small material par­
ticles of different sizes, forms and directions of
motion. The entire necessary variety of objects
emerged without God's interference in a natural
manner from the three different types of primary
elements that initially made up the boundless
Universe-the fire-like, the air-like, and the soil-
like. All these elements were in motion and formed
whirlwinds. The whirlwind motion of the first type
of element caused the emergence of the Sun and
the stars; of the second type-the sky; and of the
third type-the Earth and the other planets.
This naive, but basically materialist view of the
origin of the solar system was directed against the
religious dogma about the creation of the world
by God in six days, and was thus progressive for
its time.
In developing his view of the world, Descartes,
in contrast to medieval scholasticism, attempted to
rely on science. But at that time only mechanics
and mathematics had been developed appreciably.
This inevitably left an imprint on Descartes' teach­
ing, making it rather mechanistic. Like Hobbes,
Descartes deprived matter of its qualitative variety
and, in fact, reduced it to bare numbers. Specifi­
cally, he did not see the qualitative difference be­
 MATERIALISM VS IDEALISM 49

tween living organisms and inanimate objects.

Animals, in his view, were simple machines, and
man was a similar machine, though more complex.
Like Hobbes, Descartes reduced all the variety of
the forms of matter's motion to one-the travel of
bodies in space.
Descartes was not a consistent materialist. He
only held materialist views on matters relating
to certain natural phenomena. But as soon as
he passed on to the basic principles of being and
knowledge, he turned away from materialism and
approached philosophical problems from the
premise that God was the only basis of being. He
said, for instance, that "God ... has in principle
created matter together with motion and rest''1 and
that there were two independent substances in
the world-spiritual and material. All this made
the philosophy of Descartes dualist, as distinct
from those of Bacon and Hobbes which were
monistic.
Contrary to the 17th-century English material­
ists, who developed the theory and method of
cognition on the basis of experience and sense per­
ceptions, Descartes always proceeded from pure
reason. He did not believe that experience had an
important part to play in the process of cognition,
and thought that, in cognising the world, one

1 "Et generalem quod attinet, manifestum, mihi vide-

tur illam non iliam esse, quam Deum ipsum, qui materiam
simul cum motu et quiete in principio creavit..." (Des­
cartes, Principia philosophiae, Paris, 1905, Part II,
P- 61).
4—1557
50 A. P. SHEPTULIN

should rely exclusively on one's mind and be guid­

ed by its principles and ideas, which were innate. II
The Dutch materialist philosopher Spinoza
(1632-1677) overcame some of the drawbacks
inherent in the Cartesian teachings, such as du­
alism. Spinoza believed that the world was one by
nature and that this nature was substance. As
regards thinking, it was only an attribute (intrin­
sic quality) of matter, alongside its other attrib­
utes, such as extension. Nature was eternal, it had
never been created by anybody. The reason for its
eternal and infinite existence was concealed in Na­
ture itself. Being eternal, Nature (substance) man­
ifested itself through its modi (qualities or states)
which were innumerable. One of those modi was
motion which, as distinct from the other modi, was
infinite, rather than finite, i.e. characteristic of all1
the states of substance (Nature).
By declaring the world the cause of itself (causa
sui), Spinoza removed God as its creator and dis­
solved him in Nature.
Spinoza held that people's ignorance and fear of'
the future had given rise to religion which, he
wrote, was nothing "but the fantasy and ravings of j
a timid soul".1
Like the materialist views advanced by his pre­
decessors, Spinoza's theory has some weak points
typical of metaphysical materialism. Spinoza re­
duced all forms of motion to one-the travel of
bodies in space-and even thought motion to be a

1 Spinoza, Oeuvres, Vol. II, Paris, 1861, p. 5 (Preface

au Traite theologico-politique).
 MATERIALISM VS IDEALISM 51

property of matter's finite states, rather than an

intrinsic attribute of it. Moreover, he was unable to
give a satisfactory answer to the question of the
correlation between sense and rational knowledge,
being unaware of the significance of experience or
practice. Lastly, he was a hylozoist-he believed
consciousness to be a universal property of Nature,
i.e. he thought that animals and even inanimate
objects also possessed consciousness, just as men
did.
The materialist theories outlined above ex­
pressed the interests of the historically progressive
17th-century bourgeoisie. 17th-century materialism
was the world outlook of the bourgeoisie, which
fought feudalism for political power. But as soon
as the bourgeoisie came to power and established
its dictatorship, it began to abandon materialism
and lean towards idealism-the theoretical basis of
religion. The bourgeoisie began to resort to reli­
gion as a means of ideologically suppressing the
working people and justifying its own rule.
The bourgeoisie took power in England at the
end of the 17th century. It was not by mere chance,
therefore, that idealist systems spearheaded against
materialism and defending religion began to
emerge in England at the beginning of the 18th
century. One of the first and most important was
the philosophy of subjective idealism developed
by Bishop George Berkeley (1684-1753).
Berkeley believed that man dealt only with par­
ticular things and phenomena perceived by him as
different totalities of various sensations-of a cer­
tain form, colour, taste, smell, etc. If we discard
4*
52 A. P. SHEPTULIN

these sensations, Berkeley reasoned, the object

would disappear together with them. It followed
therefore, he concluded, that only sensations ex­
isted in reality. There was not nor could there be
anything apart from or above them. He wrote: "I
see this cherry, I feel it, I taste it: and I am sure
nothing cannot be seen, or felt, or tasted: it is
therefore real. Take away the sensations of soft­
ness, moisture, redness, tartness, and you take
away the cherry. Since it is not a being distinct
from sensations; a cherry, I say, is nothing but a
congeries of sensible impressions, or ideas per­
ceived by various senses: which ideas are united
into one thing (or have one name given them) by
the mind; because they are observed to attend
each other."1 If this is so, if only particular things
exist, the things which are the totalities of man's
sensations, then, Berkeley continues, matter is
nothing but a pure invention of the materialists.
It does not exist in reality. It was invented, Ber­
keley argues, by materialists to enable them to
construct various atheistic systems and to oppose
religion. But if matter does not exist, if it is an
empty word, a pure invention, then materialism is
refuted since matter is the basic principle of the
materialist teaching and plays a major role in it.
This was how Berkeley tried to refute material­
ism and substantiate the idealist system of the
world proceeding exclusively from the reality of
sensations.

1 George Berkeley, The Works, Vol. I, London, 1908,

p. 383.
 MATERIALISM VS IDEALISM 53

If, however, only man's sensations exist, and all

that surrounds him is nothing but various com­
plexes of his sensations, then other people are also
mere complexes of sensations rather then real
beings, and the whole world is bound to disappear
when the subject dies. Yet no sensible person will
question the real existence of the people around
him or believe that the whole world disappears
after one man's death. Berkeley's reasoning con­
tradicts the common sense on which he tried to
rely. If Berkeley had been consistent in his argu­
ments, he would inevitably have arrived at the
above conclusion and contradiction. But he him­
self betrayed his own principle by saying that
when there was no one to perceive a particular
thing, the latter did not disappear because it was
perceived by God. Generally, he said, all sensa­
tions experienced by men were caused by God, by
His action on man's soul. Thus, Berkeley shifts
from subjective to objective idealism and comes
out in an open defence of religion and the existence
of God whom he regards-as did the earlier medie­
val idealists-as the creator of the world.
The attempts made by Berkeley and other ideal­
ists to check the development and propagation of
materialist views were not really successful. Mate­
rialism was advancing further, while its struggle
against idealism and religion was becoming ever
more acute. It was especially intense in France,
where materialism was still a spiritual weapon in
the hands of the ideologists of the revolutionary
bourgeoisie fighting against feudal relations and
the church.
54 A. P. SHEPTULIN

The French materialists criticised religion and

the clergy more harshly, vehemently and consis­
tently than their predecessors did. Their brilliant
atheistic works are still relevant today.
Materialism in France was represented by Paul
Holbach, Denis Diderot, Claude Helvetius, Julien
La Mettrie, and others.
The French materialist philosophers advanced
the 17th-century mechanistic materialism of Bacon,
Descartes, Hobbes, Locke, etc.
The French materialists gave a more consistent
and profound answer to the fundamental question
of philosophy and overcame the theological devia­
tions typical in varying degrees of their predeces­
sors. Specifically, there was no room in their phi­
losophical systems for God either as creator (even
if He gave only the first impetus) or as observer.
They declared openly and clearly that nature ex­
isted objectively and eternally and did not need
God at all. Nature, said the French materialists,
is the sum-total of various combinations of tiny
particles of matter-atoms and molecules-which
possess extension, weight, figure, motion and other
properties.
The interconnection between matter and motion
was studied by the French materialists more thor­
oughly than by the 17th-century materialists. Al­
though by motion they understood, primarily, the
travel of bodies in space, they considered it (mo­
tion) an attribute (fundamental property) of mat­
ter stemming from its inner nature. Holbach, for
instance, wrote: "... matter moves by its own
forces and does not need any external impulse to
 MATERIALISM VS IDEALISM 55

set it in motion...."1 He continued: "...without

motion we cannot conceive of nature.. .".2
Though they were quite correct in assuming that
motion was related to the inherent nature of mat­
ter, the French materialists were still unable to
establish the source and cause of motion. Neither
did they see the multiplicity of the forms of motion
nor the development of nature as a transition
from lower to higher stages, and did not believe
in the existence of leaps.
As regards the theory of knowledge, the French
materialists came out resolutely against the theory
of innate ideas and principles, advanced by Des­
cartes. They believed that all men's ideas and no­
tions formed in the process of cognition, on the
basis of experience. In contrast to Spinoza, they
attached priority to sense knowledge, sensations,
which they regarded as the only source of knowl­
edge. The French materialists were right in that
respect, but they assigned an inadequate role to
thought, though they held it necessary for cognis­
ing truth. In a word, the French materialists had
not yet overcome the one-sided approach to the
correlation between sense knowledge and thinking
that had been characteristic of their predecessors'
views.
A sizable contribution to the development of
18th-century materialist philosophy was made by
the Russian thinkers, notably Mikhail Lomonosov

1 P. H. Holbach, Systems de la nature, Londres, 1793,

Premiere Partie, p. 23.
2 Ibid., Seconde Partie, p. 156.
56 A. P. SHEPTULIN

(1711-1765) and Alexander Radishchev (1749-

1802).
Lomonosov approached the fundamental ques­
tion of philosophy from a materialist point of
view and thought all bodies and phenomena to be
material in their essence. Matter is composed of
atoms which combine into molecules ("corpus­
cles"), the latter making up all "sensuous things".
Lomonosov was the first to prove in a natural-
scientific way the eternity and indestructibility of
matter and motion, when he discovered the law of
the conservation of matter and motion. He formu­
lated it as follows: ".. .all changes in nature occur
in such a way that whatever is added to something
is at the same time subtracted from something
else. ... This law of nature is universal to such
an extent that it covers the rules of motion as
well."1
Lomonosov stressed that matter and motion
were inseparable and that matter was in a constant
state of motion. Like all the other representatives
of mechanistic materialism, he reduced motion to
the travel of bodies in space and divided motion
into types-external, when a body changes its posi­
tion in relation to another body, and internal,
when the particles making up a particular body
change their position.
Lomonosov believed that matter possessed an
infinite multitude of properties.
According to Lomonosov, the world is knowable

1 M. V. Lomonosov, Selected Philosophical Works, Mos­

cow, 1950, p. 160 (in Russian).
 MATERIALISM VS IDEALISM 57

through the direct perception of objects and phe­

nomena by the sense organs and the subsequent
treatment of the sense data in the course of theo­
retical thinking. Lomonosov attached equal impor­
tance both to experiment and to theoretical think­
ing, insisting that truth could be cognised only if
the two were closely interconnected. He wrote:
"To establish a theory from observations and to
correct the observations through the theory is the
best way of all to establish the truth."1
Lomonosov's materialist views have another
major merit-his philosophical propositions were
always closely linked with the evidence of natural
science and research into specific fields of nature.
Radishchev followed Lomonosov's materialist
line in Russian philosophy at the end of the 18th
century. He also proved that the world was ma­
terial and considered matter to be a totality of all
substances. Radishchev singled out motion among
other properties of eternally existing matter (such
as extension, for example) as one of its basic
attributes. True, in this respect Radishchev did not
go farther than his contemporaries-the French ma­
terialist philosophers.
Like Lomonosov, he believed that the world was
knowable and thought sensuous experience to be
the source of knowledge. At the same time, he
considered thought activity very important in cog­
nising the surrounding world and maintained that
genuine knowledge was possible only when sense
perception and thinking were combined.
i
Ibid., p. 330.
58 A. P. SHEPTULIN

Radishchev was a revolutionary nobleman who

actively opposed serfdom and autocracy and sup­
ported the revolutionary emancipation of the serfs.
Summing up the materialist views of the 17 th-
18th-century philosophers, it is easy to see that
they were all to some extent metaphysical, i.e.
they rejected development, qualitative distinctions,
and contradiction in nature, and supported mech­
anism by reducing the variety of the forms of
motion to a mechanical form (the travel of bodies
in space) and by explaining the multitude of quali­
tative distinctions by the laws of mechanics. Natu­
rally, this was largely the result of the level of
development of the natural sciences. At that time
only astronomy and physics (mainly mechanics)
were fairly well developed.

5. Classical German Philosophy

at the End of the ISth
and in the First Half of the 19th Centuries

In contrast to England, France and other coun­

tries where bourgeois revolutions destroyed or
greatly undermined feudal relations and paved the
way for the development of capitalism, in Ger­
many feudal relations were still predominant in
the period under discussion. Germany was a back­
ward country broken up into numerous separate
principalities. The bourgeoisie had not yet emerged
as a class and was weak economically and depend­
ent politically. Unable to wage an independent
struggle for power, it was afraid of revolution and
 MATERIALISM VS IDEALISM 59

willingly made compromises with feudal lords.

This uncertain and dependent position of the
German bourgeoisie inevitably influenced the phi­
losophical systems developed and propagated by
its ideologists. They concentrated mainly on var­
ious abstract problems, rather than on seeking
ways to solve practical matters, in which the bour­
geoisie was helpless. True, these philosophical sys­
tems were to a certain degree influenced by the
French bourgeois revolution and by the advances
of the natural sciences. As a result, a living and
fertile dialectics-a major achievement of the clas­
sical German idealist philosophy-could be dis­
cerned through abstract, artificial and contradic­
tory systems.
Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) was the founder of
the classical German philosophy. Initially Kant
studied natural science and sought solutions to its
problems from a materialist standpoint. For
instance, he developed a hypothesis that the solar
system had emerged from a gas nebula as a result
of the action of its inner natural forces.
This Kantian hypothesis was prominent in the
struggle against the metaphysical way of thinking,
which held sway at that time. As Engels put it, it
made the first breach in the building of metaphy­
sics.
In subsequent years, however, when Kant en­
gaged in purely philosophical problems, such as
the theory of knowledge, he switched from spon­
taneous materialism to idealism, though he was
not a thoroughly consistent idealist. The essence
of Kant's philosophy was as follows.
60 A. P. SHEPTULIN

Kant did not reject the objective existence of

matter, but considered it unknowable by nature,
calling it a "thing-in-itself". Alongside matter (ob­
jective reality), there exists, Kant believed, a world
of phenomena, which he called nature-the world
we perceive, in which we live and act. The world
of phenomena, or nature, does not exist independ­
ently of human consciousness, it emerges as a
result of the "thing-in-itself" acting upon the sense
organs and is nothing but the totality of men's
notions. "All bodies," Kant wrote, "together with
the space they occupy should be considered as
simple notions in ourselves and do not exist any­
where except in our thought."1
The world of phenomena created by man in no
way resembles, according to Kant, the world of
"things-in-themselves". Yet man deals only with
the world of phenomena. If this is so, the world
of "things-in-themselves" is absolutely inaccessi­
ble for him. Man does not and cannot know any­
thing about this world, because it is unknowable.
All that man knows, Kant concluded, is related to
the world of phenomena, i.e. to his own notions.
The world of phenomena, Kant maintained, is
orderless and chaotic; it is not regulated by any
law or necessity; it exists outside of space and
time. It is man who introduces, in the process of
cognition, a certain measure of order into this
chaos-he places all phenomena within space and
time limitations, lends them necessity, regularity,
and a cause-and-effect relationship. It follows then

1 Immanuel Kant, Prolegomena, 1888, S. 67.

 MATERIALISM VS IDEALISM 61

that man creates both the world of phenomena

(since the latter, Kant said, is only a totality of
man's sensations or notions) and the laws acting
in this world. This is a clearly idealistic solution
to the problem of the relationship between man's
consciousness and nature. Kant, however, is not
consistent in this view. By admitting that the ob­
jective reality ("thing-in-itself") exists independ­
ently of consciousness, he tries to combine mate­
rialist and idealist principles into one system and
to reconcile materialism with idealism. Lenin pin­
pointed this inconsistency in Kant's philosophy. He
wrote: "The principal feature of Kant's philosophy
is the reconciliation of materialism with idealism,
a compromise between the two, the combination
within one system of heterogeneous and contrary
philosophical trends. When Kant assumes that
something outside us, a thing-in-itself, corresponds
to our ideas, he is a materialist. When he declares
this thing-in-itself to be unknowable, transcenden­
tal, other-sided, he is an idealist."1
In Kant's dualistic philosophy, however, the ma­
terialist and idealist trends do not hold an equal
place, with idealism gaining the upper hand. It is
not a mere coincidence, therefore, that Kant's
teaching was subordinated to a rather limited and
reactionary objective-to justify religion. It was
for this reason, Kant conceded, that he had to nar­
row the field of knowledge.
Indeed, according to Kant, man deals exclusively
with the world of phenomena and is unable to

1 V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 14, p. 198.

62 A. P. SHEPTULIN

grasp the world of "things-in-themselves". The

latter, as Kant saw it, is the realm of God, soul,
free will, etc. So science is unable and has no right
to judge of God, soul, etc. (to prove, for instance,
that God does not exist, or that the soul is mortal),
since all this is inaccessible for it. It is only reli­
gion, Kant insists, that can penetrate the world of
"things-in-themselves", break away from the ob­
served world of phenomena and take a look at
the other world, since religion unites man with
God, grants him free will in the other world, and
liberates him from all the hardships he constantly
suffers in the sensuous world.
The idealist philosophy was further advanced
by Hegel (1770-1831), the great German idealist
philosopher, the founder of idealist dialectics.
According to Hegel, all that exists originated
from pure thought or the Absolute Idea. Initially,
it is "pure being", i.e. devoid of any content
and equivalent to "nothing" or non-being. Then,
"pure being" and "nothing" (non-being) engage
in a struggle with one another and produce
a new concept-"becoming". The latter leads to the
emergence of yet another concept-"being there",
and the process goes on. The Absolute Idea is
inherently contradictory, so it constantly develops,
giving rise to ever new concepts, which are fuller
in content. This will continue until the Absolute
Idea exhausts itself, revealing all its content. Hav­
ing revealed and fully expressed its content in
various concepts, the Absolute Idea begets nature,
assumes a material shell and henceforth exists as
material objects and phenomena, i.e. Nature.
 MATERIALISM VS IDEALISM 63

Here, the Absolute Idea initially takes the form

of mechanical forces, then of chemical compounds,
and, finally, begets life and then man and human
society. With the emergence of man, the Idea
breaks through the material shell which is "alien"
to it, and begins to exist in its own form, the form
of men's consciousness or thought. As human
consciousness develops, the Idea liberates itself
increasingly from the fetters of matter. Finally,
having realised all its past experience, the Idea
ends its development in Hegelian philosophy and
returns, as it were, to itself, to its original state, but
now not as pure being, but as the being which has
revealed and apprehended its content to the full.
As regards knowledge, the full content of the
Absolute Idea-or the Absolute Spirit, as Hegel
calls his Absolute Idea-should be represented at
this final stage of its development by the Hegelian
philosophical system. The process of cognition
ends with the formulation of this system, because
there remains nothing that is not cognised. Hege­
lian philosophy, according to Hegel, expresses the
absolute knowledge, knowledge consummated
once and for all, the absolute truth.
In practice, the Absolute Spirit should have been
represented by the Prussian limited monarchy
which, as Engels put it, Frederick William III so
vehemently and vainly promised his subjects.
All this shows Hegelian philosophy as a vivid
example of objective idealism arguing that con­
sciousness or spirit is primary, while nature is
secondary, being a derivative of consciousness. Be­
sides, this philosophy overtly justifies and theo­
64 A. P. SHEPTULIN

retically substantiates the eternity of the existing

order, monarchy, nobility, and the regime that
suppresses the working people.
Yet, there is another aspect to Hegelian philo-
sophy-the dialectical method, the fundamental
principles of which were set forth by Hegel with­
in his rather conservative and artificial system.
By developing his system and showing how the
Absolute Idea engenders its content, and then the
material world-nature and society-Hegel, first,
gave a picture of the developing world and, second,
offered a universal description of the content of
the fundamental laws of dialectics. He showed,
among other things, that the world developed
through the struggle of opposites and that, in the
course of that development, some concepts were
negated by others and repeated on a higher level.
In the dialectic of concepts and their intercon­
nection and mutual transitions, Hegel guessed at
and expressed the real dialectic-the dialectic of
things. True, as often as not Hegel was inconsis­
tent in pursuing a particular dialectical principle,
especially when dealing with reality, which he had
to justify because of his class affiliation. The in­
consistency of the Hegelian dialectic stemmed, to
a considerable extent, from the fact that it was
developed within the framework of an idealist
system and was tailored to its needs, which were
incompatible with the revolutionary spirit of gen­
uine dialectics and contrary to its principles. Seek­
ing to satisfy the needs of his system, Hegel was
therefore compelled to go against his own dialecti­
cal method.
 MATERIALISM VS IDEALISM 65

Let us consider some deviations from the prin­

ciples of dialectics, caused by the contradiction
between the method and the system in Hegelian
philosophy.
1. The dialectical method sees nature, society,
and knowledge in a constant state of motion and
development. The system, on the other hand, calls
for a limit in development. Hegel yields to the
system and says that development ceases as soon
as the Idea reaches its highest stage.
2. The dialectical method recognises that contra­
dictions are universal. The system requires that
all contradictions should be settled and an ideal,
conflict-free state be established. Hegel finds him­
self on the side of the system and gives up his
method when he declares that as soon as the Idea
reaches its highest stage (the Prussian limited
monarchy, on the one hand, and the Hegelian
idealist philosophy, on the other) all contradictions
are resolved and the absolutely true situation is
established.
3. The method requires that thought should de­
velop in conformity with real processes. The sys­
tem, on the other hand, assumes that relations are
constructed in the head if the existing relations
and connections do not correspond to some pro­
vision of the system. Here, too, Hegel gives pre­
ference to the system and constructs various arti­
ficial connections instead of coordinating his
philosophy with reality.
4. The method requires continuous changes in
reality and shows how and in what direction they
are to be made, whereas the system demands that
5—1557
66 A. P. SHEPTULIN

the existing order should be perpetuated. Hegel

falls victim to his own system and deprives his
method of any practical value by relating it only
to the past, and by making it a method of cogni­
tion of past things and phenomena.
Only materialism based on science and requiring
the world to be taken as it is, without any outside
additions, could serve as a spring-board for over­
coming the above deficiences in the Hegelian meth­
od and for developing it further. The subsequent
development of philosophy objectively demanded,
therefore, a shift to materialism and a critical ma­
terialist reassessment of the Hegelian idealist phi­
losophy.
The German philosopher Ludwig Feuerbach
(1804-1872) accomplished, though only partially,
this historic mission. True, he did not re-examine
Hegel's dialectical principles from the materialist
standpoint. He confined his mission to revolting
against Hegel's idealism, rejecting it, and reinstat­
ing materialism. It was Marx and Engels who
peeled the husk of Hegelian idealism off the
rational grain-dialectics-and developed it on the
basis of materialism.
Feuerbach showed that the Hegelian Absolute
Idea was but the human mind, separated from its
bearer-man-and transformed into an independent
being that created the world out of itself. He said
that the role played by the Absolute Idea in He­
gelian philosophy was played by God in theology.
So the Absolute Idea in no way differed from God,
while Hegelianism was but a variety of theology.
"He who does not reject the Hegelian philosophy,"
 MATERIALISM VS IDEALISM 67

Feuerbach wrote, "neither rejects theology. The

Hegelian teaching that nature, reality is posited by
the idea is merely a rational expression of the theo­
logical precept that nature has been created by
God... "l
According to Feuerbach, thinking cannot exist
outside or independently of man, being a property
of man's brain and its function that inherent­
ly links the spiritual and the material. Hence
thinking (the ideal, spiritual) is not primary,
as Hegel believed, but secondary to matter, to
nature.
In contrast to Hegel, who made abstract spirit
the subject of his philosophy, Feuerbach bases his
system on man and nature, regarding man as an
integral part of the nature that produced him. He
makes anthropology (from the Greek anthropos-
man) a guiding, basic principle in developing his
materialist views. "The new philosophy," he wrote
referring to his philosophical system, "makes man,
including nature as the basis of man, the only, uni­
versal and supreme subject of philosophy."2
While being guided by his anthropological prin­
ciple and correctly stressing (in contrast to Hegel)
that man is part of nature, while his consciousness
(thinking) is an attribute of it, Feuerbach over­
looked one important point. He did not realise
that man, being part of nature, was at the same time
a product of social life, and that his consciousness

1 Ludwig Feuerbach, Philosophische Kritiken und

Grundsatze (1839-1846), Leipzig, 1969, S. 185.
2 Ibid., S. 269.
5*
68 A. P. SHEPTULIN

was shaped not only by the physiological proces­

ses occurring in his body, particularly in his brain,
but also by the social environment within which
man lived and acted, and by the material condi­
tions of his life. So no matter how vigorously
Feuerbach insisted on man being “alive" and "sen­
suous", and inherently linked with nature, that
man was abstract and isolated from the concrete
conditions of life, and deprived of his social (hu­
man) essence.
Giving the materialist answer to the question
of what is primary-matter or consciousness-
Feuerbach also correctly treated the other aspect
of the fundamental question of philosophy. He
supported the view that the world is knowable
and castigated Kant's agnosticism.
Feuerbach believed sensations to be the point
of departure in the process of cognition, providing
man with all the data related to objective reality.
Yet man feels and thinks simultaneously. Think­
ing supplements man's sensations, and is always
present at the stage of sense knowledge, making
coherent that which the senses perceive separately.
This proves that Feuerbach realised the inher­
ent interconnection between sensations and think­
ing, between the sensuous and the rational.
It is to Feuerbach's credit that he unflaggingly
opposed religion and comprehensively criticised it.
He showed that God had nothing supernatural
about him and had been invented by men in their
own image. According to Feuerbach, men, who are
able to think and imagine in abstract terms, sepa­
rated themselves from their own essence which
 MATERIALISM VS IDEALISM 69

they began to imagine as a special independent

and supernatural being-God.
By demonstrating that all the features ascribed
to God are human and belong to individuals or
the human race as a whole, Feuerbach revealed the
earthly roots of religion and brought God from
heaven down to earth.
Although Feuerbach tore the supernatural mask
from God, he did not realise the class essence of
religion and did not expose the social causes of the
belief in God and life after death. It is not fortui­
tous, therefore, that he was unable to point out
any effective way of combatting religion. More­
over, he was not against all religion. He opposed
only the traditional religion that regarded God as
a supernatural creature. At the same time, he
laboriously proved the need for a new, earthly re­
ligion in which man himself would take God's
place and man's love of man would be the guiding
principle.
Irrespective of the many drawbacks inherent in
Feuerbach's philosophy, it undoubtedly deserves
praise for reinstating the principles of materialism
(though on the old metaphysical basis and without
dialectics, which he rejected together with Hege­
lian idealism) and for having greatly influenced
the subsequent development of philosophy. The
fact that Feuerbach's materialist teaching was one
of the theoretical sources of Marxism is in itself a
graphic illustration of the role it played in the ad­
vancement of philosophical thought.
70 A. P. SHEPTULIN

6. The Philosophy
of 19th-Century
Russian Revolutionary Democrats

As shown above, Feuerbach reinstated material­

ism, but his was a metaphysical materialism.
Many shortcomings of the metaphysical mate­
rialism were surmounted by the Russian revolu­
tionary democrats, who set forth their philosophi­
cal views in the early 1840s and developed them
for several decades.
This was the time when a peasant, bourgeois-
democratic revolution spearheaded against serf­
dom and tsarism was maturing in Russia. The re­
volutionary democrats Vissarion Belinsky (1811-
1848), Alexander Herzen (1812-1870), Nikolai
Chernyshevsky (1828-1889), Nikolai Dobrolyubov
(1836-1861), and others were the ideologists of
the forthcoming revolution.
Having realised the necessity of changing the
existing social order and the righteousness of the
demands put forward by the people, especially the
peasants, the Russian revolutionary democrats
sided decisively with the peasants, the common
people, and began to substantiate in their philo­
sophical theories the imperative need to liberate
the peasants from serfdom.
In developing their philosophical views, the
Russian revolutionary democrats proceeded both
from materialist philosophy of their predecessors
in Russia (Lomonosov and Radishchev) and from
Hegel's dialectic and Feuerbach's materialism. At
the same time, they generalised to a certain extent
 MATERIALISM VS IDEALISM 71

the advances made by natural sciences at the

time.
In contrast to Feuerbach, the Russian revolu­
tionary democrats did not discard Hegel's dialec-
tic-though they did criticise Hegelianism-but tried
to combine it with materialism and give it a mate­
rialist interpretation.
Herzen was one of the first Russian revolution­
ary democrats who attacked Hegel's philosophy.
Though Herzen highly appraised Hegel's dialectic,
which gave a general description of the laws gov­
erning the motion and development of nature and
thought, he criticised Hegel for abstracting him­
self from reality, and for his idealism. Hegel, Her­
zen wrote, "sacrifices all the temporary, all the
existing for the thought and the spirit; the idealism
which brought him up and which he imbibed
with his mother's milk carries him away to one­
sidedness. .., he tries to suppress nature by spirit,
logic; he is ready to consider any particular mani­
festation of it a ghost...The Hegelian "pure be­
ing is an abyss which has engulfed all the defini­
tions of real being. . .. One should not think, how­
ever, that real being emerges indeed from pure
being-does the existing individual arise from the
concept of genus?"1
Herzen believed that the material things that
together make up nature existed in reality, not
pure being. As regards spirit and thought, Herzen
wrote, they are the result of the development of

1 A. I. Herzen, Selected Philosophical Works, Vol. 1,

Moscow, 1948, pp. 120, 150 (in Russian).
72 A. P. SHEPTULIN

nature, a property of material entities that have

reached a certain stage in their development.
The Russian revolutionary democrats held that
reality possessed an infinite multitude of proper­
ties and was in a state of constant and ceaseless
motion and development. Herzen wrote: "The life
of nature is a ceaseless development. . . ."1 Belinsky
wrote in the same vein: "There is no limit to the
development of humanity. .. . Mankind will never
say to itself: 'Stop, enough, there is nowhere to
go: "2
The struggle of opposites and the transformation
of opposites into each other, the Russian revolu­
tionary democrats maintained, is the source of
development. This is the essence of life and truth,
they said. "All the living," Herzen wrote, "is alive
and true only as one whole, as the internal and
external, as the general and the individual, i.e.
the co-existing. Life binds these elements together;
life is a process of their eternal transformation
into each other."3 Belinsky expressed the same
idea: "...Living truth consists in the unity of
opposites."4
The Russian revolutionary democrats also rea­
lised that, in the course of the motion and deve­

1 A. I. Herzen, Selected Philosophical Works, vol. 1,

p. 127.
2 V. G. Belinsky, Selected Philosophical Works, Vol. II,
Moscow, 1948, p. 146 (in Russian).
3 A. I. Herzen, Selected Philosophical Works, Vol. 1,
p. 61.
'• V. G. Belinsky, Selected Philosophical Works, Vol. I,
p. 468.
 MATERIALISM VS IDEALISM 73

lopment of nature, quantity turns into quality

engendering something new, which differs from
that which existed before. To illustrate how
this law operates, Chernyshevsky, for instance,
wrote: "... the combination of a known propor­
tion of oxygen and hydrogen makes water, which
possesses a multitude of qualities that are not
discernible either in oxygen or in hydrogen."1
Finally, the Russian revolutionary democrats,
Chernyshevsky in particular, gave a thorough de­
scription of the operation in nature and society of
the law of the negation of negation, ensuring con­
tinuous change, a rejection of some forms by oth­
ers and repetition of old forms on a higher level.
Thus, the Russian revolutionary democrats large­
ly got rid of mechanism and metaphysics, and
made a step forward in combining dialectics and
materialism and in giving a materialist interpreta­
tion and substantiation to dialectics.
It was also to the credit of the Russian revolu­
tionary democrats that they vigorously opposed
agnosticism, which sought to raise an insurmount­
able wall between consciousness and reality and
declared reality to be unknowable.
Referring to the life of man and to his experien­
ce, Chernyshevsky refuted agnosticism and
proved that the world was knowable and that our
sense perceptions correctly reflected reality.
In comparison with Feuerbach and his prede­
cessors, the Russian revolutionary democrats were

' N. G. Chernyshevsky, Selected Philosophical Works,V

V°I Ill, Moscow, 1951, p. 190 (in Russian).
74 A. P. SHEPTULIN

a step closer to overcoming the contemplativeness

of philosophical theories. They aspired to the
transformation of the world. Herzen, for instance,
considered dialectics to be, as Lenin put it, "the
algebra of revolution".
As regards their views of society, the Russian
revolutionary democrats were idealists, just like
their West-European predecessors and contem­
poraries, although they did make some materialist
pronouncements on the subject.
Chapter 111

THE REVOLUTIONARY UPHEAVAL

IN PHILOSOPHY MADE BY MARXISM

1. The Conditions for the Emergence

of Marxist Philosophy
a) Socio-Economic Conditions

The emergence of Marxist philosophy was a

necessary outcome of the development of society
and science. The philosophy of Marxism expresses
the interests of the proletariat, and therefore
arises at a stage in social development when the
working people become an independent social
force struggling to change the conditions of life.
Initially, the proletariat's class struggle was
spontaneous, taking the form of isolated actions
against individual capitalists. Later, however, it
became more conscious and purposeful. As the
struggle gained momentum, the proletariat began
to organise and unite, to realise its general class
interests, and to take action against the bourgeoisie
as a class, against capitalism as a social system,
rather than against individual members of the
bourgeoisie. The 1830s and 1840s witnessed the
first mass actions by the working class, such as
the revolt of the Lyons weavers in France (1831),
the revolutionary actions of the Parisian workers
(1832), the uprising of Silesian weavers in Ger­
many (1844), and the Chartist movement in En­
gland (1830-1840).
76 A. P. SHEPTULIN

As the class struggle against the bourgeoisie

intensified, the need arose to substantiate theoreti­
cally the necessity and possibility of overthrowing
the existing social and political system and to
develop a theory indicating the social relations and
institutions to replace the existing ones. This histor­
ical need was behind the emergence of Marxist
philosophy-a unique world outlook guiding the
proletariat in its struggle for a new society and
constituting for it a method for the revolutionary
remaking of reality.

b) Natural-Scientific Conditions

Although the proletariat's need for dialectical

and historical materialism was a prerequisite for
its emergence, this alone could hardly provide a
sufficiently sound foundation for developing the
Marxist philosophy. The utopian views advanced
before Marxism and substantiating the necessity
of passing to a new, ideal society had also been
a response to the oppressed classes' need for chang­
ing their conditions of life. Yet they did not help
those classes to evolve a correct understanding of
the surrounding world and to find the ways of
transforming reality, but rather obstructed this.
The emergence of dialectical and historical mate­
rialism required a certain level of scientific knowl­
edge, insofar as its content was a generalisation
of scientific advances.
By the early 19th century, scientific knowledge
had reached a level making it possible to substan­
tiate the basic principles of dialectics theoretically
 MARXIST UPHEAVAL IN PHILOSOPHY 77

and to develop a scientific dialectico-materialist

world view. By that time natural scientists began
to study the inner processes of phenomena instead
of merely describing and classifying them. They
not only recorded the properties observed, but
singled out the laws governing changes in these
properties. New sciences developed, such as phy­
siology studying processes in living organisms;
embryology studying embryonic development;
geology dealing with changes in the earth's crust;
and others. A number of outstanding discoveries
were made, which showed that natural processes
were dialectical in character. The most important
were: the discovery of the cellular structure of
organisms (1838-1839), the substantiation of the
law of conservation and transformation of energy
(1842-1847), and Darwin's evolutionary theory of
organisms (1859).
The discovery of the cell as the basic structural
unit of the organism pointed to the unity of the or­
ganic world and to the general laws of develop­
ment inherent in it. The law of conservation and
transformation of energy revealed the inter-con­
nection and mutual transformation of the various
forms of the motion of matter. Darwin's evolution­
ary theory showed that the organic world cons­
tantly changes and develops and that existing spe­
cies of animals and plants are the result of a long
evolution.
The strides made by the natural sciences at the
beginning and especially in the middle of the 19th
century made it possible to formulate and sub­
stantiate the most important principles of dialectics
78 A. P. SHEPTULIN

and to develop a consistent scientific world out­

look, for the proletariat to use as a weapon for
transforming existing reality.

c) Theoretical Conditions

The emergence of the Marxist philosophy was

conditioned not only by social factors and the
development of natural sciences, but also by the
entire history of philosophical thought. Marxism
absorbed and developed the progressive ideas put
forward by earlier philosophers. This means that,
besides the social and natural-scientific conditions
for the development of Marxism, there were also
theoretical conditions. Primarily, these relate to
19th-century German philosophy, the philosophical
views advanced by Hegel and Feuerbach.
Hegel formulated the fundamental principles
of dialectics and elaborated the dialectical method
of cognition. Being an idealist, however, he visual­
ised dialectics as the laws of the self-development
of the pure idea existing outside and prior to the
material world. As for the development of the
material world-nature and society-it was for him
"only a copy [Abklatsch] of the self-movement of
the concept going on from eternity, no one knows
where, but at all events independently of any
thinking human brain. This ideological perversion
had to be done away with."1
While criticising Hegel, Feuerbach did not no­

1 K. Marx and F. Engels, Selected Works, in three vo­

lumes, Vol. 3, Moscow, 1973, p. 362.
 MARXIST UPHEAVAL IN PHILOSOPHY 79

tice the rational grain in Hegel's philosophy-the

dialectical method introduced and at the same
time mystified by him. Feuerbach did not rectify
Hegel's mistakes, "he simply threw him aside as
useless. .. J'1
What Feuerbach was unable to do was done by
the founders of dialectical and historical material­
ism. Proceeding from the materialist principles re­
instated by Feuerbach, Marx and Engels compre­
hensively criticised Hegelian idealist philosophy.
In the process, they singled out the major contri­
bution of German classical philosophy-dialectics,
separated it from mysticism and numerous artifi­
cial schemes and constructions, and developed it
on a scientific materialist basis into dialectical and
historical materialism, which is a consistently
scientific world outlook and a general method for
cognising and transforming the surrounding world.

2. The Substance
of the Revolutionary Upheaval
Made by Marx and Engels in Philosophy
Karl Marx (1818-1883) and Frederick Engels
(1820-1895) were the founders of the new, con­
sistently scientific philosophy-dialectical and his­
torical materialism.
Initially, Marx and Engels were the followers
of Hegel's idealist philosophy. But later, yielding
to the pressure of social practice, particularly that
of the class struggle of the working people against
--------- -
1 Ibid., p. 361.
80 A. P. SHEPTULIN

their exploiters (which they both witnessed when

Marx worked as editor of Rheinische Zeitung and
Engels as an employee in the enterprise of which
his father was a shareholder), they abandoned
their idealist views and took a materialist position.
Engels, for instance, wrote at this time: "While I
was in Manchester, it was tangibly brought home
to me that the economic facts, which have so far
played no role or only a contemptible one in the
writing of history, are, at least in the modern
world, a decisive historical force,- that they form
the basis of the origination of the present-day class
antagonisms... Z'1
Marx began to lean towards materialism in his
Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Law (1843). It
was here that he drew the conclusion that the key
to understanding the process of mankind's histor­
ical development should be sought in "civil so­
ciety", i.e. in the material, economic relations be­
tween people, rather than in a political field, or
the state, as Hegel thought.
This tendency is especially explicit in The Holy
Family, a work written jointly by Marx and En­
gels in 1845. It contains a thorough criticism of
Hegel's idealism and the views of the Young He­
gelians. The latter scorned the common people,
regarding them as an "inert mass" incapable of
creativeness and obstructing progress. They ad­
vanced critically-thinking personalities as the deci­
sive creative force in history. Marx and Engels
refuted these ideas and showed that the working

1 K. Marx and F. Engels, Selected Works, Vol. 3, p. 178.

 MARXIST UPHEAVAL IN PHILOSOPHY 81

people who create material wealth ensuring there­

by the existence and development of society, are
the decisive force behind historical progress. They
stressed especially that the proletariat could and
had to liberate itself by abolishing private owner­
ship of the means of production and its corollary,
the exploitation of man by man.
Marx and Engels developed the fundamental
principles of dialectical materialism still further
fn another of their joint works, The German Ideo­
logy, written in 1845 and 1846, and Marx in his
work. The Poverty of Philosophy (1847). A com­
prehensive account of the world outlook devel­
oped by Marx and Engels is given in the Manifesto
of the Communist Party written by them on the
instructions of the Communist League and pub­
lished in 1848. As Lenin put it, this work with the
clarity and brilliance of genius outlines consistent
materialism which embraces nature, society and
dialectics, as the most comprehensive and pro­
found doctrine of development.1
After 1848, too, Marx and Engels continued
their work on the philosophical aspects of the
scientific world outlook and the method of cognis­
ing and transforming the existing reality. Most
relevant in this respect are Capital and A Con­
tribution to the Critique of Political Economy
by Marx, and Anti-Diihring, Dialectics of Na-
ture, and Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of
Classical German Philosophy by Engels.
By developing dialectical and historical material­

1 See V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 21, p. 48.

6—1557
82 A. P. SHEPTULIN

ism, Marx and Engels made a revolutionary up­

heaval in philosophy. Their teaching differs fun­
damentally from all the philosophy that existed
before them.
Indeed, the pre-Marxian materialist doctrines
were predominantly mechanical. This was not for­
tuitous, since in the 18th century mechanics was
the best developed of all the natural sciences. Che­
mistry, as Engels put it, existed only in its infan­
tile form-the phlogiston theory still reigned su­
preme. Biology was also still in its infancy-the
functioning of organisms was believed to be the
result of purely mechanical causes. Man himself
was seen through the prism of mechanical laws and
considered to be a complex machine.1 As the most
advanced field of knowledge, mechanics left an
imprint not only on other sciences, but on philos­
ophy, too. The materialist philosophers of the
time tried to explain the world, the reality sur­
rounding them, exclusively on the basis of mechan­
ical laws.
As distinct from pre-Marxian materialism, dia­
lectical materialism is free from mechanism. In
explaining the various phenomena taking place in
reality, it does not proceed from the laws of mech­
anics only, but rather from the totality of laws,
holding that mechanical laws make it possible to
understand only the mechanical form of the mo­
tion of matter. As regards the other forms of mo­
tion, their essence is determined by specific laws

1 See K. Marx and F. Engels, Selected Works, Vol. 3,

p. 349.
 MARXIST UPHEAVAL IN PHILOSOPHY 83

inherent in each of them, rather than by the laws

of mechanics.
Pre-Marxian materialism was metaphysical. It
was unable to conceive of the world as a process,
as developing historically. True, the philosophers
of the day did recognise motion in the surround­
ing world, but they believed motion to proceed
within a closed circle, repeating the same states.
In contrast, dialectical materialism views the world
as being in constant motion and development.
Pre-Marxian materialism was not consistent
and comprehensive. The materialist philosophers
of that time explained only natural phenomena
materialistically. As regards social phenomena,
they treated them idealistically and believed them
to be dependent upon a certain ideal basis-polit­
ical or legal consciousness, public opinion, ethics,
science, and so forth. The founders of dialectical
and historical materialism were the first to apply
materialist principles to society and to draw the
conclusion that the material conditions of life
were primary and decisive in society. Ideal or
spiritual phenomena, public consciousness, various
views, theories, and the like were secondary, and
stemmed from the material conditions of people's
life, from their social being.
Another major feature of the pre-Marxian mate­
rialists was contemplativeness and isolation from
People's revolutionary practical activities. They
merely explained the world, whereas it had to be
changed. Marxist philosophy is tied up with prac-
bce and its task is not merely to explain existing
reality, but also to transform it. It is, therefore, not
6»
84 A. P. SHEPTULIN

only a method of cognition, but also a method of

action, a method for the revolutionary transforma­
tion of reality.
Moreover, as distinct from pre-Marxian mate­
rialist and idealist doctrines which in varying de­
grees distorted the real state of affairs, dialectical
and historical materialism is deeply rooted in real­
ity, in the laws governing its functioning and
development. The partisanship of Marxist philos­
ophy includes the scientific approach as an indis­
pensable element.
At a certain stage in history, the interests of any
exploiting class inevitably clash with the require­
ments of social progress, and correspondingly with
the operation of particular objective laws. This
makes it impossible consistently and scientifically
to substantiate the interests of such classes and
necessitates the rejection of scientific principles
that contradict them and the advancement of prin­
ciples corresponding to and expressing the inter­
ests of the exploiting class, though these princi­
ples may not reflect reality and objective laws.
The interests of the proletariat, on the other hand,
are always in line with the objective trends in his­
tory, so the working class has a stake in knowing
reality and the laws governing the objective pro­
cess of development. Without this, the proletariat
will be unable to interfere actively in the objec­
tive process and purposefully transform the sur­
rounding world. It follows, then, that dialectical
and historical materialism can serve as the pro­
letariat's world outlook and method for the revo­
lutionary remaking of reality only if it is
 MARXIST UPHEAVAL IN PHILOSOPHY 85

founded on knowledge of the objective laws of

motion and development and if its principles are
scientific.
All this proves that dialectical and historical
materialism constitutes a fundamentally new phi­
losophy radically different from all the preced­
ing philosophical systems, and that its emergence
was a true revolution in philosophy.

3. The Development of Marxist Philosophy

by Lenin
Being a creative science, Marxist philosophy
does not stand still—it is continually developing
and improving. Every new major step in the de­
velopment of science and social practice makes
an inevitable impact on philosophy, causing a
change (enrichment, specification, or addition) in
its particular principles or tenets. Vladimir Ilyich
Lenin (1870-1924) made an incalculable contri­
bution to the development of dialectical and his­
torical materialism after the death of Marx and
Engels.
Lenin thoroughly developed the Marxist theory
of matter and consciousness as the reflection of
objective reality. He substantiated the decisive
role of practice in cognising reality and revealed,
on that basis, the actively creative character of
consciousness, stressing that "man's conscious­
ness not only reflects the objective world, but
creates it".1 Moreover, he defined the major

1 V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 38, p. 212.

86 A. P. SHEPTULIN

stages of cognition and its dialectical development

towards the truth.
Elaborating on dialectics as a teaching of de­
velopment, Lenin revealed the essence of the dia­
lectical understanding of development as a repe­
tition of the past stages, but on a higher basis, as
a leap-like revolutionary changing of reality caused
by inner contradictions, by the clash between
different and opposite forces and tendencies.1
Lenin analysed on a scientific and materialist
basis Hegel's dialectic and its development by
Marx in Capital and formulated the principle of
the identity of dialectics, logic, and the theory of
knowledge. He studied the general aspects and
connections of reality and universal dialectical
laws in the light of this principle and showed,
first, that philosophical categories were not only
the forms in which the general aspects and con­
nections of reality were reflected but also stages
or nodal points in the development of social con­
sciousness and practice, and, second, that the
laws of dialectics were not only the universal laws
of reality, but also the laws of thinking-the meth­
odological principles guiding people in their
practical and cognitive activities. In other words,
following Marx and Engels, Lenin developed dia­
lectical materialism not only as a world outlook,
but also as a theory of knowledge, a method of
thinking and of the practical transformation of
reality. "Lenin's further elaboration of material­
istic dialectics, his study of the dialectical mate­

1 See V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 21, pp. 54-55.

 MARXIST UPHEAVAL IN PHILOSOPHY 87

rialist theory of knowledge ... are of everlast­

ing importance. Lenin was the first thinker of our
century who saw in the achievements of natural
science of his time the beginning of a tremen­
dous scientific revolution, who was able to dis­
close and generalise philosophically the revolu­
tionary meaning of the fundamental discoveries
made by the great explorers of nature. He gave
a brilliant philosophical interpretation of new
scientific data in the period of the drastic 'break­
ing of principles' in the leading fields of natural
science. His idea of the inexhaustibility of mat­
ter has become the general principle of natural
science."1
Lenin laid special emphasis on the development
of the theory of historical materialism. He gave a
comprehensive analysis of the laws governing the
interconnection between social being and social
consciousness, material and ideological relations,
objective and subjective factors, the spontaneous
and the conscious. Lenin underlined the decisive
importance of the objective circumstances under
which people live, and showed the immense role
played by revolutionary theory, the revolutionary
party guided by this theory, by the revolutionary
class, and by historical personalities in transform­
ing the life of society, in replacing historically ob­
solete social forms by new ones corresponding to
the current level of development of the productive
forces.
■----------
1 "On the Centenary of the Birth of V. I. Lenin, Theses
°f the Central Committee, Communist Party of the Soviet
Union, Moscow, 1970.
88 A. P. SHEPTULIN

Lenin demonstrated the importance of revolu­

tionary ideas in orientating the spontaneous move­
ment of the masses to one objective-the revolu­
tionary transformation of the existing social and
political system. Lenin emphasised that the de­
velopment of a socialist ideology and its dissem­
ination among the working people, the prole­
tariat, was a task of paramount importance for a
proletarian party.
His studies of the imperialist stage of capital­
ism enabled Lenin to conclude that it was the last
stage, that it represented the eve of the socialist
revolution, that it was a stage from which society
can pass only to socialism. Lenin discovered the
law of the uneven economic and political devel­
opment of capitalist countries under imperialism.
This gave him grounds to conclude that the so­
cialist revolution could triumph first in several,
or even in one country.
Moreover, Lenin developed the Marxist teach­
ing on the character and motive forces of the
bourgeois-democratic revolution and its connec­
tion with the socialist revolution, enriching this
teaching with important conclusions. He proved
that the proletariat, not the bourgeoisie, should
lead the bourgeois-democratic revolution at a time
when capitalism in the advanced countries had
entered its imperialist stage. He also established
that the peasantry was an ally of the proletariat
and that a victorious bourgeois-democratic revo­
lution should establish the dictatorship of the rev­
olutionary people, of the workers and peasants,
not the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie. The es­
 MARXIST UPHEAVAL IN PHILOSOPHY 89

tablishment of the dictatorship of the workers

and peasants does not complete such a revolution.
Gradually, it develops into a socialist revolution,
in the course of which the proletariat in alliance
with the poorest peasants and all the exploited
classes transforms the life of society along social­
ist lines. Developing the theory of socialist revo­
lution, Lenin advanced the idea that the class
struggle of the proletariat against the bourgeoisie
and for socialism should be tied up with the na­
tional-liberation struggle of the oppressed peo­
ples.
It was also Lenin who proved that some coun­
tries and peoples might embark on a non-capital-
ist path of development and advance to social­
ism by-passing the capitalist stage of develop­
ment. He believed that victory of the socialist rev­
olution in the advanced countries and their all-
out assistance to backward nations was a major
condition for such a transition.
The theory of the dictatorship of the proletariat
occupies a prominent place in Lenin's theoretical
legacy. Drawing on the experience of the three
Russian revolutions, he developed the idea of the
proletarian dictatorship, set forth by Marx and
Engels, and demonstrated the necessity of estab­
lishing the dictatorship of the proletariat in the
period of transition from capitalism to socialism;
he revealed its essence and specific features as
constituting a fundamentally new democracy, laid
down the tasks confronting it, described its mech­
anism and mapped out its ways of develop­
ment. Lenin's discovery of Soviets as a form of
90 A. P. SHEPTULIN

proletarian dictatorship that emerged in Russia

as a result of the creative activities of the revolu­
tionary masses, and his substantiation of their
role in ensuring the victory of the Great October
Socialist Revolution, were of great significance.
After the triumph of the October Revolution,
Lenin concentrated his attention on developing
the theory of building socialism in Russia and
on evaluating the prospects for a world-wide rev­
olution. Lenin proved scientifically that social­
ism could be built under conditions of capitalist
encirclement. He showed that Russia had every­
thing necessary for building socialism and indi­
cated concrete ways for transforming the various
aspects of the life of society along socialist lines.
Lenin regarded the conversion of capitalist en­
terprises into socialist property belonging to the
whole people as a way of remaking large-scale
capitalist into socialist production. As regards the
socialist transformation of small-commodity pro­
duction, Lenin recommended that the various
forms of co-operation be used to turn small-scale
private ownership of the means of production in­
to co-operative public ownership.
Lenin advanced the idea that socialism and
communism can only be built under the guidance
of a Marxist-Leninist party, which enjoys the
support and confidence of the working people
in all its undertakings and which maps out prac­
tical ways for developing society along socialist
and communist lines, basing itself on the knowl­
edge of the laws governing the functioning and
development of society. This ideas has been borne
 MARXIST UPHEAVAL IN PHILOSOPHY 91

out by the experience of building socialism in the

Soviet Union and other countries.
Guided by Lenin's theoretical legacy and de­
veloping it by generalising the advances of mo­
dern science and social experience, the Communist
Party of the Soviet Union, the communist and
workers' parties of other socialist countries, and
Communists all over the world resolutely oppose
today's bourgeois ideology, and right and "left"
revisionism, which distort Lenin's revolutionary
teaching.
Dialectical
materialism
 Insofar as the fundamental question of any phi­
losophy is essentially the correlation between mat­
ter and consciousness, a presentation of dialectical
materialism should start with a description of mat­
ter and the basic forms of its existence, the laws
governing the emergence of consciousness and its
relation to matter. Then we should proceed to an
analysis of the laws governing the functioning and
development of knowledge as the reflection of
reality in man's consciousness. This will be followed
by a study of the categories and laws of dia­
lectics as the forms of reflection of the universal
aspects and connections of objective reality and
knowledge. The order in which categories and laws
are discussed is determined by the order in which
the universal properties and laws of reality re­
flected in them are cognised.
Chapter IV

MATTER AND CONSCIOUSNESS

1. A Critique
of the Idealist and Metaphysical Views
of Matter
As a rule, idealists reject the objective existence
of matter. Some hold that it does not exist at all,
but was invented by materialists to prove their
atheistic conclusions (Berkeley). Others declare it
to be a totality of sensations (Mach). Still others
represent it as a result of the development of
consciousness, as something dependent on or de­
rived from it (Hegel).
All the materialists, however, recognise the
real, objective existence of matter. In the course
of history, materialist views on the substance of
matter have differed considerably. Ancient philos­
ophers were inclined to identify matter with the
most widely spread substances or phenomena,
such as water (Thales), air (Anaximenes), or fire
(Heraclitus). Later, matter was believed to be an
infinite multitude of various invariable elements,
such, for instance, as the so-called "seeds of
things" (Anaxagoras), or atoms (Democritus). The
18th-century French materialists, Feuerbach, and
other thinkers considered matter to be the totality
of immutable atoms that made up all objects exist­
ing in the world.
96 A. P. SHEPTULIN

To view matter as a totality of atoms or sub­

stances is both narrow and false. This way of
thinking is associated with definite forms of the
existence of matter, and raises their inherent prop­
erties and states to an absolute. It is unable, |
therefore, to embrace the entire totality of phe­
nomena occurring in the world and the endless
variety of the forms of being.
The inadequacy of the above conception of mat­
ter was revealed strikingly during the crisis that
gripped natural science at the turn of the 20th
century, following the discovery of the electron
and radioactivity. The discovery of the electron
showed, in particular, that the atom is not immu­
table and eternal as previously believed, but con­
sists of smaller particles-electrons. Moreover, it
was discovered that the mass of an electron is not
invariable, but is a direct function of its velocity.
Yet it had been believed that the mass of an atom
was constant. This notion gave rise to the idea
that atoms, and consequently matter, were eter- ;
nal and indestructible.
The collapse of the notions that atoms were
indivisible and eternal and that the mass of bo­
dies was constant and indestructible evoked
doubts as regards the objective existence of mat­
ter and led to the conclusion that it was disap­
pearing. The logic was as follows: if an atom is
divisible, if it disintegrates into electrons whose ’
mass depends on motion, then matter, as some­
thing basic underlying all being, disappears and
turns into motion. Similar conclusions followed
from the discovery of radioactivity. The radioac-
 MATTER AND CONSCIOUSNESS 97

tive decay of uranium, and later of radium, was

taken to mean the transformation of matter into
motion, or pure energy. Idealists were quick to
take this up. They began to assert that the latest
advances of natural science refuted materialism,
having shown that matter did not exist and had
been invented by materialists.
It was necessary to generalise the above scien­
tific discoveries, to bring them in the line with
dialectical materialism and refute those idealists
who caught at these discoveries. Lenin undertook
to solve this problem.

2. Lenin’s Definition of Matter

Lenin analysed the above crisis in his book
Materialism and Empirio-criticism and showed
that it had arisen because natural scientists shared
the views of the metaphysical materialists and
explained the newest discoveries in physics ac­
cordingly. Indeed, the notion of matter as a to­
tality of immutable atoms was upheld by meta­
physical, not dialectical, materialism. The latter
has never reduced matter to atoms, and never
considered nor could consider them invariable
and eternal. According to dialectical materialism,
no concrete form of the existence of matter-atom,
molecule or electron-is eternal and invariable.
On the contrary, it is constantly in motion and
change, under certain conditions turning into
other concrete forms, which themselves turn into
others, and so on ad infinitum. Engels wrote:
"For it [dialectical philosophy] nothing is final,
7—1557
98 A. P. SHEPTULIN

absolute, sacred. It reveals the transitory charac­

ter of everything and in everything; nothing can
endure before it except the uninterrupted process
of becoming and of passing away.. ."J
The discovery of the disintegration of the atom
into other, smaller particles, as well as the trans­
formation of matter into light, does not, therefore,
refute dialectical materialism. On the contrary, it
reaffirms the truth of its principles, such as that
stating that everything existing in the world is in
constant motion and changes from one thing into
another.
What, then, is matter as seen by dialectical ma­
terialism? The concept of matter is tied up with
all that exists outside and independently of the
human mind, with the whole of objective reality.
So, matter includes not only atoms, but also the
"elementary" particles into which they disinte­
grate; not only substances, but also the light waves
they emit under relevant conditions.
"Matter," Lenin wrote, "is a philosophical cate­
gory denoting the objective reality which is given
to man by his sensations, and which is copied,
photographed and reflected by our sensations,
while existing independently of them."12

3. Material Entity. Types of Matter

Matter exists as a multitude of various bodies,
or material formations, existencies or entities con­

1 K. Marx and F. Engels, Selected Works, Vol. 3, p. 339.

2 V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 14, p. 130.
 MATTER AND CONSCIOUSNESS 99

nected with one another in a certain way. “The

whole of nature accessible to us," Engels wrote,
"forms a system, an interconnected totality of bo­
dies, and by bodies we understand here all mate­
rial existences extending from stars to
atoms... ."1
A material entity or body is only a part of
matter, so it does not possess all the properties
inherent in matter. Specifically, it is not eternal
and infinite, it emerges only under absolutely de­
finite conditions, it occupies a limited place in
space, it exists for a certain period and then dis­
appears, turning into other material entities. All
the same, matter is eternal and spatially bound­
less. This testifies to the fact that the concept of
matter is associated with the universe in general
and with the entire totality of its constituent ma­
terial entities.
Material entities make up corresponding groups
which form certain levels or stages in the devel­
opment of matter. These stages have their specif­
ic qualitative characteristics. Engels wrote that
“the discrete parts at various stages (ether atoms,
chemical atoms, masses, heavenly bodies) are
various nodal points which determine the various
qualitative modes of existence of matter in gen­
eral. .. ."2
Material entities that have a common origin and
represent a stage in the development of matter
from a lower to a higher level, make up a type
—
1 F. Engels, Dialectics of Nature, Moscow, 1974, p. 70.
2 F. Engels, Dialectics of Nature, pp. 293-94.
100 A. P. SHEPTULIN

of matter. These are, for instance, electromagne­

tic and gravitational fields, electrons, protons,
neutrons, atoms, molecules, living organisms, and
human society.

4. Matter and the Material

As already noted, the concept of matter in the
strict sense of the word is applicable to the world
in general, to the totality of material entities. As
regards particular material entities, each of them
is but a part of matter, a certain stage in its de­
velopment. However, material entities have one
thing in common-they all exist outside and inde­
pendently of consciousness. The concept of the ma­
terial was developed to reflect this common trait
inherent in material entities. It can be applied
both to the world in general and to the material
entities making up this world, to types of matter,
to objective properties and relations that exist
outside and independently of the human mind.
Thus, the material embraces everything that re­
lates to matter and characterises it as distinct
from consciousness.

5. Matter as Substance
When we defined matter we contrasted it to
consciousness. Yet, as already pointed out, it dif­
fers not only from consciousness, but also from
its own entities, states and properties. In this
sense matter is what underlies all its manifesta-
tions-specific states and properties. As substance,
 MATTER AND CONSCIOUSNESS 101

matter is the basis of all that exists. The var­

ious phenomena observed in the world are but
manifestations of the single material nature, the
various forms of its existence, its various states
and properties. In this respect consciousness as
a specific property of matter does not oppose mat­
ter's other properties, but occupies an equal place
among them. Like any other property of matter,
it has a reason for its existence in matter, in its
certain organisation.
As distinct from metaphysical materialism,
which sees matter's substantiality in its unchange­
ability, dialectical materialism ties up the sub­
stantiality of matter with its continuous motion
and change, during which matter transforms from
one qualitative state into another and "remains
eternally the same in all its transformations".1
This is expressed, above all, in the constancy of
its quantity, which remains the same under any
change. As regards the qualitative aspect of mat­
ter, its substantiality is expressed in the preser­
vation of its basic properties or attributes.
".. .None of its [matter's-Author] attributes can
ever be lost... ."2 If it is lost in one place, in one
material entity, it will inevitably manifest itself
elsewhere, in another material entity.
Moreover, the substantiality of matter is also
expressed in the ability of each of its entities to
be transformed under certain conditions into any
other entity. Any "elementary" particle, for ex­

1 F. Engels, Dialectics ot Nature, p. 39.

2 Ibid,
102 A. P. SHEPTULIN

ample, can change under certain conditions into

another "elementary" particle. This means that
every material entity possesses in itself, in its na­
ture, all the properties of matter.
The material unity of the world is expressed
in the substantiality of matter. The infinite mul­
titude of various phenomena that make up real­
ity has one material origin, constituting the var­
ious forms, states or properties of matter.

6. Motion—a Universal Form of the Existence

of Matter
a) Narrow Metaphysical Concepts of Motion.
The Marxist Concept of Motion

The concept of motion emerged together with

philosophy. Initially, it was thought to be the
appearance of one and the disappearance of an­
other. This view of motion was held by the first
Greek philosophers, such as Thales, Anaximenes,
and Anaximander.
The first Greek philosophers stressed motion
and change, neglecting, however, stability. Other
thinkers, particularly Xenophanes, Parmenides,
and Zenon of the Eleatic school, saw the impor­
tance of stability. As distinct from the first phi­
losophers, they made stability their point of de­
parture and, having absolutised it, arrived at the
negation of motion. Empedocles reinstated the
teaching of motion and attempted to coordinate
it with the recognition of stability. He held that
the four "roots"-water, air, fire, and earth-made
 MATTER AND CONSCIOUSNESS 103

up all things and were eternal and unchangeable.

Motion, he believed, was the movement of the
above unchangeable “roots", their integration and
division, rather than the destruction of one and
the appearance of another.
Aristotle developed the teaching of motion. He
revived the view that motion was the inception of
one thing and destruction of another. But he also
included in his doctrine-though in a sublimated
form-the views of motion held by other phi­
losophers, particularly Empedocles. Aristotle
thought of motion not only as destruction and in­
ception, but also as growth, decrease, qualitative
changes, as well as the movement of bodies in
space.
The tendency to absolutise the mechanistic
form of motion appeared during the subsequent
development of materialist philosophy. It predom­
inated in the 17th and 18th centuries, when mo­
tion was believed to be the movement of bodies
in space. Specifically, this view was shared by
Descartes and Holbach. "Motion," Holbach wrote,
"is a force helping a body to change or to seek
to change its position."1
The view of motion as the movement of bodies
in space is narrow. It does not embrace the entire
multitude of changes inherent in matter. For
instance, changes occurring in an atomic nucleus,
in a living organism, or in society are not simple
movements.
Only the founders of dialectical materialism

1 P. H. Holbach, Systeme de la Nature, p. 10.

104 A. P. SHEPTULIN

gave the first consistently scientific definition of

motion. Engels, for instance, wrote: "Motion, as
applied to matter, is change in general."1 It "com­
prehends all changes and processes occurring in
the universe, from mere change of place right up
to thinking".2
To sum up, motion is a philosophical concept
denoting all changes occurring in objective reality.

b) Basic Forms of the Motion of Matter

There is an infinite multitude of various forms

of the motion of matter. The basic ones are: the
physical form which includes the movement of
elementary particles and fields, the movement of
nuclear particles and molecules; the chemical form
related to the movement of atoms: the biological
form connected with the functioning and develop­
ment of living organisms; the social form embrac­
ing changes occurring in society; and the mechan­
ical form of motion, which is the movement of
bodies in space.
The basic forms of the motion of matter are
always interconnected and interdependent. One
form of motion is a prerequisite for the appear­
ance of another form. The movement of element­
ary particles, for example, is a prerequisite for the
emergence of atoms and their motion. The latter
is the basis for the formation of molecules and
their movement. Under certain conditions, this in

1 F. Engels, Dialectics of Nature, p. 247.

2 F. Engels, Dialectics of Nature, p. 69.
 MATTER AND CONSCIOUSNESS 105

turn leads to the emergence of life and thus to the

organic form of the motion of matter, which
creates prerequisites for the appearance of the
social form of the motion of matter.
All the basic forms of motion are stages in the
development of matter; they are related to the
corresponding types of matter and correlate to
each other as lower to higher forms. A lower
form is present, in its sublated shape, in a higher
form. The physical form of motion is present,
though transformed, in the chemical form, the
latter-in the biological form, and this-in the social
form. A lower form, while being present in a
higher form, is not decisive and occupies a subor­
dinate place in it. A higher form of motion plays
a decisive role and determines the essence of
phenomena representing the given form of the
motion of matter.

c) The Inherent Connection

Between Motion and Matter

Motion is an attribute of matter, its fundamen­

tal property. There has never been nor can there
be motion without matter or matter without
motion.
The law of the correspondence of mass and
energy testifies to the inalienable link between
matter and motion. According to this law, an
absolutely definite amount of energy corresponds
to a definite amount of mass. Any change in the
mass engenders a corresponding change in the
energy, and vice versa.
106 A. P. SHEPTULIN

Some bourgeois philosophers and physicists do

not recognise the inherent link between motion
and matter and are trying to prove that matter
can be reduced to motion. On this basis, they
declare energy to be primary, determining, while
matter, they say, is but a form of energy. To prove
their point, they refer to cases of matter changing
into light, such as the conversion of an electron
and a positron into a pair or a trinity of photons,
regarding this as the transformation of matter into
pure energy.
The American scientist Roy Marshall writes,
for example: "One form of energy is matter. The
conversion of matter to pure energy or of pure
energy to matter is possible, under certain cir­
cumstances."1
The exponents of this point of view proceed
from the metaphysical notion of matter as chemical
substance and, by this token, distort the actual
situation. The conversion of electrons and posi­
trons into photons-particles of light-is not the
conversion of matter into energy (pure motion),
but rather the conversion of one type of matter
into another, for the entire objective reality is
matter. It includes not only substance, but also
light and an infinite number of other known and
yet unknown forms of being.
Since matter is the objective reality existing
outside and independently of human conscious­

1 Roy K. Marshall, The Nature ot Things, N.Y., 1951,

p. 47.
 MATTER AND CONSCIOUSNESS 107

ness, neither the whole nor a part of matter can

disappear or turn into something immaterial.
Matter exists eternally and continually changes
from one qualitative state or type into another.
The same holds true for motion. Being inherently
linked with matter, motion cannot disappear nor
change into something else. Its quantity always
remains the same. Engels stressed that matter and
motion are eternal and inherently linked. He
wrote: "Matter without motion is just as in­
conceivable as motion without matter. Motion is
therefore as uncreatable and indestructible as
matter itself. ..." And later: "... the quantity of
motion existing in the world is always the
same."1

d) Motion and Rest

The assertion that matter is inherently linked

with motion and that the latter is a mode of its
existence may give rise to the opinion that there
is no stability or constancy in the world. This
view was advanced, for instance, by the Greek
philosopher Kratylos. But this is far from the
truth. Stability or rest is another property of mat­
ter, apart from motion.
As distinct from motion which is a continuous
change, rest signifies stability, constancy. Though
the opposite of motion, rest is not isolated from
motion. It is inherently linked with motion, being
an aspect and particular case of it. Rest is a re­

1 F. Engels, Anti-Diihring, p. 73.

108 A. P. SHEPTULIN

latively stable system oi motion-balanced motion.

The solar system, for example, viewed as a ma­
terial formation at rest, is made up of the planets
moving in strict cycles-it is balanced motion. Any
body, such as a material entity in inanimate nature,
a living organism, or human society, is a relatively
stable system of motion. Once you do away with
the changes inherent in these bodies, they disap­
pear as given, relatively stable (resting) material
entities.
Besides balanced motion, every material entity
includes an infinite multitude of other changes
which, for the time being, are inherent in the given
relatively stable system of motion and do not
upset the equilibrium of its constituent parts.
Having reached a definite level, however, these
changes destroy the given relatively stable system
of motion and lead to the formation of a new
stable system. The latter, after existing for a cer­
tain time, is also destroyed by changes occurring
within it and gives rise to yet other relatively
stable (resting) systems, which in turn engender
still other systems, and so on. This eternal process
of matter changing from one stable system into
another clearly shows that motion is absolute. It
exists always-at the inception of a relatively stable
system (since any new system emerges as a result
of changes occurring within the previous systems);
through a relatively stable system (since it con­
stitutes balanced motion); within such a system,
and at the moment of its destruction and the
emergence of a new relatively stable system. As
for rest, it is relative. It emerges together with a
 MATTER AND CONSCIOUSNESS 109

relatively stable system and disappears when the

system is destroyed. Then it re-emerges and, hav­
ing lasted for a certain time, disappears, this pro­
cess going on ad infinitum.

e) Motion and Development

We have noted that matter is in constant motion

and change and eternally passes from one stable
state to another, destroying some material entities
and creating others. But what is the trend in such
transformations? What replaces the destroyed ma­
terial entities?
Some philosophers believe that the motion of
matter is circular, that it eternally repeats the
same cycles. Others maintain that, in the course
of continuous changes in matter, there occurs a
movement from higher to lower stages, i.e. re­
gression. Yet others think that all the changes
observed in the universe are movement from
lower to higher stages.
In reality the first, second, and third take place
together, yet the dominant trend is the movement
from the lower to the higher.
The movement from the lower to the higher,
from the simple to the complex is called develop­
ment.
Examples of development are the formation of
atoms from "elementary" particles and molecules
from atoms; the emergence of living organisms
from inanimate substances; the conversion of the
simplest, non-cellular organisms into single-cell
and then to multi-cell organisms; transition from
110 A. t>. SMEPTULIN

organisms capable of reflecting the environment

through irritability to organisms possessing sensa­
tions and a psyche; the conversion of an ape herd
into human society; the transition of society from
the primitive-communal system to the slave­
owning system, feudalism, capitalism, and social­
ism.
While development is the dominant trend in the
universe, not every specific form of the existence
of matter undergoes development. Besides ma­
terial entities that undergo changes from the lower
to the higher, there are also those that are either
in a state of circular movement or undergoing
regressive changes. What is most significant and
universal in development is the fact that all ma­
terial entities possess the ability to become more
complex and to pass from the lower to the higher,
rather than to develop in general. This ability,
inherent in all matter and in every material entity,
manifests itself, like any other property, only
under relevant conditions. Wherever such condi­
tions exist, a change from the lower to the higher,
from the simple to the complex, will invariably
occur. If such conditions are absent, a circular
movement or regressive changes take place. Those
material entities that are involved in a circular
movement or undergo regressive changes do not
lose their ability to pass from the lower to the
higher. This ability is preserved whatever the
changes or transformations; it manifests itself as
soon as propitious conditions begin to emerge.
 MATTER AND CONSCIOUSNESS 111

7. Space and Time

a) The Concept of Space and Time

We have noted that every single material entity

is part of matter. Being one of the infinite number
of matter's connections it occupies a definite place,
possesses extension and correlates with the other
material entities that surround it.
The extension of material entities and the cor­
relation of each of them with surrounding material
entities is called space.
Moreover, as has already been noted, every
material entity is not eternal; it emerges as a
result of changes in certain preceding material
entities, passes through stages of development and
then disappears by turning into other material
entities.
The duration of the existence of material
entities and the correlation of each of them with
the preceding and subsequent material entities is
called time.

b) A Critique of Idealist and Metaphysical Concepts

of Space and Time

As a rule, idealists reject the objectivity of space

and time and their independence from conscious­
ness. Berkeley, for instance, believed that any
Place or extension existed in the spirit alone, like
time which he regarded as a consecutive manifes­
tation of ideas in our consciousness. Kant also
rejected the objective existence of space and time,
^e regarded them as a form of inner sensation,
112 A. P. SHEPTULIN

rather than a characteristic feature of things.

Many modern bourgeois naturalists and philos­
ophers do not accept the existence of space and
time in the microworld either. They include, among
others, James Jeans and A. Eddington, the latter
saying that, for low-numbered states, "space and
time do not exist, at least I can see no reason to
believe that they do".1
Some philosophers recognise the existence of
space and time, but they reject their connection
with matter and take them as forms of being that
are completely independent from matter. This
concept of space and time dates back to antiquity,
specifically to the Pythagoreans. For them, space
was a huge box filled with various things and
numbers. It was absolutely independent of the
latter and could exist without them. Democritus
believed space to be a vacuum, while Aristotle
regarded it as a place occupied consecutively by
various things.
The idea that space and time are independent
of matter was developed in the classical form by
Newton. He thought space to be absolute. It is
eternal, constant and stable, and does not depend
on objects. Objects, on the other hand, depend on
space, exist in it, and move in relation to it. Time
is treated by Newton in a similar way. It is also
absolute, exists by itself, independently of partic­
ular events, flows evenly and always in the same
manner.

1 A. S. Eddington, The Nature of the Physical World,

Cambridge, 1931, p. 198.
 MATTER AND CONSCIOUSNESS 113

Descartes made an attempt to bridge the me­

taphysical gap between space and matter. By
declaring extension to be the only and most im­
portant property of matter he, in fact, equated
space with matter. Spinoza made one step further
in the same direction. He regarded space as an
attribute of matter. Locke, too, connected space
with matter, regarding the former as the magni­
tude of bodies.
Though pre-Marxian philosophers tied up space
with matter, they stopped short of understanding
the dependence of spatial characteristics upon the
nature of material entities. Moreover, they be­
lieved that space was the same for all bodies and
that it possessed the same properties.

c) The Basic Characteristics of Space and Time

Dialectical materialism provided a scientific

solution to this problem. According to dialectical
materialism, space and time are the necessary
objective properties of any material entity and the
objectively real forms of existence of matter. The
extension and duration of being are not solely the
properties of stars, planets, and things (i.e. mac­
robodies), but also the properties of microbodies
(i.e. "elementary" particles). Lenin wrote: "There
is nothing in the world but matter in motion, and
matter in motion cannot move otherwise than in
space and time."1
Space and time are not only connected with

1 V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 14, p. 175.

8—1557
114 A. P. SHEPTULIN

matter, but are also dependent upon it; they are

determined by the nature of material entities and
the form of motion inherent in them. This propo­
sition of dialectical materialism is fully borne out
by modern scientific data showing that spatial
and temporal characteristics depend on the motion
and distribution of gravitational masses. The
greater is the force of gravitation, the more curved
space is and the slower the flow of time.
Moreover, the theory of relativity shows that
spatial correlations in a moving system shift as
compared to a static system, a body flattens out
in the direction of its movement, and the flow of
time slackens.
Space is three-dimensional, which is its major
characteristic. It has three directions-right and
left, up and down, and back and forth. All these
directions are graphically shown by three mutually
perpendicular lines. By moving parallel to them,
one may locate any body in space.
True, the physical theories of four-dimensional
and multidimensional space have been developed
recently. When scientists speak of a four-dimen­
sional world, they take time as the fourth dimen­
sion. So arguments about four dimensions do not
contradict reality but, at the same time, they do
not disprove the proposition that space is three-
dimensional. On the contrary, these arguments
stem from the above proposition. The same is true
of multidimensional space. Saying that dimensions
are multiple, physicists or mathematicians do not
refer to the spatial characteristics of a body or, to
be more precise, not only to spatial characteristics.
 MATTER AND CONSCIOUSNESS 115

They have in mind the measurement of various

properties of that body (a material entity), of
which it has an infinite multitude. It follows then
that an infinite multitude of dimensions is also
possible. But does this disprove the theory of
space as being three-dimensional? Of course not.
It only proves that the concepts “four-dimensional
space" and "multidimensional space" are used to
characterise the various aspects and states of a
material entity, rather than in their proper sense,
i.e. to denote the properties of space.
If space has three dimensions, time has only
one. It always flows in one direction-forwards.
The present becomes the past, and the future be­
comes the present. This direction cannot be
changed-time is irreversible.
Infinity is another major characteristic of space
and time. Superficially, one may think that space
and time are finite, since they exist as the proper­
ties and relations of finite material entities. Actual­
ly, this is far from the truth. Though space and
time exist in the form of finite things, they are
infinite. The fact is that every thing is tied up
with an infinite multitude of other things. Its
spatial relations turn into the spatial relations of
the other things that surround it, the spatial rela­
tions of the latter turn into the spatial relations
of the things that surround them, and so on ad
infinitum. Thus, being a sum of finite magnitudes
alone, space unfolds into infinity.
The same holds true for time. Every particular
thing has a beginning and an end of its existence.
But it was preceded by an infinite number of other
8*
116 A. P. SHEPTULIN

things which will be followed by others, this pro­

cess going on ad infinitum. The process of chang­
ing from some things or qualitative states to others
has neither a beginning nor an end. Time will go
on for ever.
The infinity of space and time, it should be
noted, is recognised by far from all philosophical
schools. As a rule, theologians tie up the finity of
the material world in time with God's will, and
idealists with the creative activity of consciousness
which, while existing outside of space and time,
gives birth to sensuous things that are spatially
limited and finite in time.
Some modern bourgeois scientists and philos­
ophers refer to the theory of relativity when they
try to prove that the world is limited in space.
According to the relativity theory, the observed
density of substance and the corresponding force
of gravitation must lead to the existence of matter
in the form of a closed sphere. This conclusion is
made on the basis of the equations of the general
theory of relativity, which presumes that matter
is distributed evenly in space. The latest findings
of astronomy, however, show that matter is dis­
tributed extremely unevenly in space.
Attempts are also made to use the so-called
"red shift" to prove that the world is finite in
space and time. It has been established that a
displacement of the spectral lines toward the red
colour is observed in light coming from the stars.
This fact indicates that the observable part of the
Universe is expanding and that galaxies are mov­
ing away from each other at the speed of 120,000-
 MATTER AND CONSCIOUSNESS 117

170,000 km/sec. Knowing this speed, one may

calculate the time when this dispersing matter
made up one whole. All this gave rise to theories
arguing that the world has originated from a
Father-Atom created by God, that it is limited in
space, and so on.
This way of reasoning is based on the assump­
tion that all the regularities observed in one part
of the Universe must necessarily be observed in
other parts of it. Actually, however, not all the
regularities observed in one field of reality at a
certain time are observed in its other fields. It is
only the general laws studied by philosophy that
are universal. As regards other laws and regulari­
ties, they manifest themselves in one particular
field or part of the Universe at a given time, but
this does not mean that they would necessarily be
observed in another field. So the expansion of the
observed part of the Universe in no way means
that its other parts are also expanding at this mo­
ment. They may expand, or they may contract. It is
more likely that processes of expansion and con­
traction are taking place in the Universe in equal
measure, that one tendency is predominant in one
part for a certain period of time and another ten­
dency in another part. Then they change places.

8. Reflection
as a Universal Property of Matter
We have already noted that matter exists
through separate material entities finite in space
and time, which do not simply exist, but influence
118 A. P. SHEPTULIN

each other. By interacting, they cause correspond­

ing changes in each other. These changes are con­
ditioned by both the nature of the material entity
in which they occur and by the peculiarities of
the body acting upon this entity. The peculiarities
of the affecting body leave an impact on these
changes and are expressed in them. This is the es­
sence of the property of reflection inherent in all
material entities.
Thus, reflection, as a universal property of mat­
ter, is the ability of a material entity to reproduce,
in the corresponding changes of its properties or
states, the peculiarities of other bodies that affect
it.
The most common examples of reflection are
the deformation of a body under the action of
another body; the heating of a conductor under
the effect of an electric current passing through it;
the expansion of a body's volume caused by heat­
ing; and so on.
Any material entity affected by other bodies is
active rather than passive. It has a reverse effect
on those bodies and causes corresponding changes
in them, which are a form of the reflection of its
own peculiarities. Therefore, any interacting ma­
terial entity is both reflecting and reflected. It
reflects in a certain form the peculiarities of
the objects affecting it, and is itself reproduced
in the corresponding changes occurring in those
objects.
This proves the universality of the property
of reflection, which is inherent in all material
entities,
 MATTER AND CONSCIOUSNESS 119

9. Development
of the Forms of Reflection
The form in which material entities reproduce
the peculiarities of bodies affecting them depends
on the nature of these entities. Qualitatively dif­
ferent material entities therefore reflect one and
the same action in different ways. The difference
in the forms of reflection is especially evident
when matter passes from one qualitative stage to
another.
In inanimate nature, reflection constitutes a
corresponding change of the physical properties
or chemical reactions reproducing in one way or
another the peculiarities of the interacting bodies
or phenomena. In the simplest animal or vegetable
organisms, reflection is manifested in the form of
irritability, which is a response to an outside
action, the response having a certain direction of
actions,1 a certain selectivity. For example, a plant
reacts to the action of sunlight by changing the
position of its leaves-it turns them in such a way
that they become perpendicular to the falling rays.
This position helps the plant to absorb a greater
quantity of solar energy which is essential for its
functioning and development.
The emergence of more complex and developed
living organisms, particularly those with a ner­
vous system, has made reflection more complex.
Now it assumes the form of excitability, a distinc­
tive feature of which is that a special organ-the

1 See F. Engels, Dialectics of Nature, p. 179,

120 A. P. SHEPTULIN

nervous system-begins to perform a reflecting

function. This system controls the interaction of
the organism with the outside world. Its separate
tissues or cells perceive outside actions, while
others transmit the resultant irritation to the cor­
responding parts of the organism, thereby ensur­
ing the performance of the necessary responsive
action.
Originally, the nervous system existed in the
form of nerve tissues and cells scattered all over
the animal's body. Later it underwent substantial
changes during the organism's subsequent devel­
opment. Separate nerve cells inosculated and
formed nerve ganglia connected by the nerve
trunk. Then nerve ganglia combined, thus causing
the development of special centres-the brain and
spinal cord-and forming the central nervous sys­
tem. The latter's appearance caused substantial
changes in the reflecting activity of an organism.
Previously, living organisms reacted only to irri- j
tants connected with their vital activities, whereas
now that the central nervous system has evolved,
they begin to react to irritants which of them­
selves have no importance for the organism, but
are linked to phenomena vital for it. In other
words, the interconnection of an organism with
the surrounding world was previously maintained
on the basis of unconditioned reflexes, whereas
now the latter have been supplemented with con­
ditioned reflexes. These allow the organism to
reflect connections between various phenomena
that are not vital for it and those that are. Thanks
to this, animals have become able to react sen­
 MATTER AND CONSCIOUSNESS 121

sitively to environmental changes and to adapt

themselves accordingly.
The form of reflecting reality through condi­
tioned reflexes differs greatly from the preceding
forms, such as irritability and excitability. The
latter were biological forms of reflection, while
conditioned reflexes are a form of psychological
reflection of reality.

10. Peculiarities
of the Psychological Form of Reflection
The psyche as a special form of reflecting
reality emerges together with the central nervous
system, which develops the ability to evolve con­
ditioned reflexes. The emergence of the psyche
gives rise to a signal, image reflection of reality.
The psychic is the form of an image of the phenom­
ena affecting an organism, arising in the brain
due to the development of a conditioned reflex.
A specific feature of a conditioned reflex is the
reflection of phenomena of the outside world that
are of themselves unimportant to the organism,
but prove to be connected with phenomena vital
for it. When a conditioned reflex is developed, the
latter phenomena play the role of signals of other
phenomena that are connected with the vital
activities of the organism and are biologically
important for it. Their impact on the organism is
equivalent to the impact of the biologically im­
portant phenomena, of which they are signals. At
the moment of this impact, images of the corres­
ponding biologically important phenomena emerge
122 A. P. SHEPTULIN

on the basis of temporal connections formed

in the brain.
For instance, the sound of a bell ringing has of
itself no importance for a dog. He does not react
to it. If, however, the bell rings and food appears
simultaneously, the dog will start reacting to it
as he reacts to the appearance of food-salivation
will start. By using the temporal connection
formed in his brain between the nidi of excitation
caused by the impact of the bell ringing and food,
the dog will reflect the dependence established
between the latter, where the bell ringing is play­
ing the role of the signal portending the ap­
pearance of food. This is why the dog reacts by
secreting saliva.
Thus, a conditioned reflex presupposes the estab­
lishment of a connection with a biologically im­
portant phenomenon at the moment the signal is
perceived. Being an essential aspect or moment of
a conditioned reflex, which is a physiological phe­
nomenon, the psychic is therefore closely linked
with the physiological-it emerges and exists on
the basis of the latter. The psychic is the result
of the physiological activity of the brain, which is
the brain's response to the impact on the organ­
ism of various phenomena of the outside world.
The psychic develops on the basis of certain
physiological connections formed in the brain and
is secondary to these connections and the brain,
i.e. it depends on them,
 MATTER AND CONSCIOUSNESS 123

11. Consciousness—the Highest Form

of the Psychic Reflection of Reality
a) The Emergence of Consciousness

The psychic form of the reflection of reality

evolved at a certain stage in the development of
animal organisms, particularly their nervous sys­
tem. It does not remain unchanged, but is con­
stantly improving and developing, turning, under
certain conditions, into a qualitatively different
form of reflection-consciousness.
Labour is the condition for transforming the
psyche of animals into human consciousness. It
is rooted in the reflex activities of animals who
used natural objects to achieve corresponding
objectives connected with the satisfaction of cer­
tain needs of the organism. Scientists believe that
certain species of anthropoid apes began to use
natural objects in order to satisfy their needs,
such as a stick to knock down fruit or a stone to
defend themselves. At first, these actions were
occasional. But since, as a rule, they yielded posi­
tive results and helped satisfy a particular need,
they became the basis for developing a conditioned
reflex and with it the habit of using natural
objects as "tools" under appropriate circumstances.
This habit resulted in substantial changes in
animal behaviour. Their connection with the en­
vironment was now maintained through natural
objects. Indeed, previously they reacted directly
to the impact of external reality, whereas now
they themselves affect the surrounding W’orld
through natural objects that they use as "tool?",
124 A. P. SHEPTULIN

This more complex connection of the organism

with the environment had a positive impact on the
development of the nervous system, the brain in
particular. It began forming more and more con­
nections and performing ever more complicated
functions, thereby developing and perfecting
itself. In turn, this exerted a positive influence on
the "tool activity" of animals, which also devel­
oped and became more complex. At a certain stage
in the development of this activity, animals,
seeing no "tool" to help them perform a particu­
lar action, began to seek ways of adapting other
objects for this purpose. A trend developed for
making the necessary "tool" by processing certain
objects. The development of this trend among
man's animal ancestors conditioned a gradual
transformation of reflex activity into conscious
actions aimed at changing the environment by
specially made implements.
This activity became the necessary form of con­
tact between creatures developing from the animal
world and between them and surrounding reality.
Certain relations developed between them that
were independent of their will, thus uniting them
in a single, welded entity-society. A certain degree
of co-ordination in the actions of the individuals
that made up this entity was required for it to
emerge, function and develop. This, however,
presupposed an understanding of a common goal
and the tasks, distribution of functions in attain­
ing this goal, and exchange of ideas among in­
dividuals acting in concert. "In short," Engels
wrote, "mep in th? making arrived at the point
 MATTER AND CONSCIOUSNESS 125

where they had something to say to each other."1

This emerging necessity conditioned the develop­
ment of a means to satisfy it: language, in which
consciousness acquired a material form of exis­
tence corresponding to its social nature. Being a
system of symbols ensuring the storing, processing
and transmitting of information, language is a
means of expressing thoughts and a means of in­
tercourse among people.
Men in the making began to designate partic­
ular phenomena, their properties and actions by
suitable sounds or symbols, using them to trans­
mit their thoughts to each other. The names given
by them to particular phenomena acted as sub­
stitutes for them. People reacted to them in the
same way as to the phenomena designated by
them. Words became the signals of particular phe­
nomena. By using them, people reflected surround­
ing reality, exchanged information and used it in
their everyday life and activities.
The reflection of reality through a system of
words is a specifically human form of reflection.
Animals reflect surrounding reality through the
signals of reality itself. It has been noted above
that the role of these signals is played by phenom­
ena or properties that, by themselves, are not
significant for the vital activity of an organism,
but that are in a certain relationship with other
biologically important phenomena or properties.
The Russian physiologist Ivan Pavlov called this
system of signals, common to animal and man,

1 F. Engels, Dialectics of Nature, p. 173.

126 A. P. SHEPTULIN

the first signalling system. The specifically human

signalling system, the system of words that play
the role of signals of particular phenomena of the
surrounding world, he called the second signal­
ling system.
The development of language introduced subs­
tantial changes in man's reflective activity. Lan­
guage liberated man from his blind dependence
on actual circumstances, created the conditions
necessary for broad generalisations and intercourse
with other people, greatly contributing thereby to
the formation and development of man's conscious'
ness.

b) The Essence of Consciousness

Consciousness is connected with labour and

society that developed on the basis of labour. It
is therefore an essential aspect of the social form
of the motion of matter, although it exists through
the consciousness of the individuals making up
human society. Each individual uses an existing
language, the means of labour and modes of
activity to assimilate the experience accumulated
by society and to transmit to society his personal
experience in the form of cultural and material
values created by him.
Having developed as an essential aspect of the
life of society that began to emerge on the basis
of labour, consciousness manifested itself among
man's ancestors primarily through an awareness of
their being, of their existence, through their dif­
ferentiating themselves from the surrounding
 MATTER AND CONSCIOUSNESS 12?

world, and through their definite attitude towards

it. An animal does not distinguish itself from the
environment. It merges completely with its vital
activities. A savage who has acquired conscious­
ness notices for the first time that he exists, that
various objects surround him, and that he is some­
how related to them and they to each other. By
becoming aware of his instincts and habits, he
gradually begins to understand what is going on
around him. Thus, consciousness is awareness of
what is happening in the surrounding world, which
is nothing other than knowledge.
The outside world is present in the conscious­
ness in the form of images taking shape in man's
brain as a result of his interaction with it. The
sum total of these images reflecting reality makes
up man's knowledge. By using these images and
the information they contain concerning the par­
ticular properties and connections of the objects
and phenomena of the surroundnig world, man
comes to understand what is happening around
him.
This understanding is a necessary condition for
man to take his bearings in the world. Guided by
a correct perception of reality and a knowledge of
its particular aspects and connections, man antic­
ipates the future and reproduces, in the form of
ideal images, that which does not yet exist, but
must occur following certain actions upon existing
reality.
Proceeding from this anticipatory reflection of
reality, man sets himself corresponding tasks and
subordinates his behaviour and actions to them.
128 A. P. SHEPTULIN

Thus, purposefulness is a major attribute of human

consciousness. The fulfilment of this function
distinguishes human behaviour from that of
animals, and sensible human activity from the
instinctive actions of animals. "A spider," Marx
wrote, "conducts operations that resemble those
of a weaver, and a bee puts to shame many an
architect in the construction of her cells. But what
distinguishes the worst architect from the best of
bees is this, that the architect raises his structure
in imagination before he erects it in reality. At
the end of every labour-process, we get a result
that already existed in the imagination of the
labourer at its commencement."1
The anticipatory reflection of reality underlies
not only goal-setting activities, but also the con­
structive, transformative activity of consciousness,
which is a major aspect of the latter's essence.
Having emerged under the direct impact of labour,
which presupposes the transformation of the world
in accordance with man's needs, consciousness
creates something new, that did not exist before,
on the basis of the knowledge it possesses. This
new thing, expressed in a system of ideal images,
becomes a real plan translating a particular pos­
sibility of matter into reality. Thus, being a reflec­
tion of the world, consciousness is also construc-
tive-it actively influences the surrounding world
and transforms it in keeping with the requirements
of society.

1 Karl Marx, Capital, Vol. I, p. 174.

 MATTER AND CONSCIOUSNESS 129

To sum up, consciousness is the reflection of

reality in the human brain, accompanied by an
understanding of what is happening in the outside
world, and goal-setting and thinking activity
based on this understanding, which ensures a cor­
responding orientation in the surrounding world
and its constructive transformation in the interests
of society.

c) The Correlation
of Consciousness and Matter

It follows from the above that consciousness is

secondary in relation to matter. This is expressed,
above all, in the fact that it does not exist always
and everywhere, but emerges at a specific stage
in the development of matter only in highly orga­
nised material entities. As such, consciousness is
necessarily tied up with matter and cannot exist
without it. Matter, on the other hand, is not de­
pendent on consciousness, having existed before
it emerged.
Moreover, consciousness is also secondary be­
cause it is a reflection of the outside world, a
picture of objectively existing things, their prop­
erties and relations. As such consciousness cannot
exist independently of material objects, inasmuch
as a reflection cannot exist independently of the
reflected object, whereas the latter can exist in­
dependently of its reflection.

9—1557
130 A. P. SHEPTULIN

d) The Material and the Ideal

Being a specific psychic phenomenon, con­

sciousness emerges in the brain as a result of
certain physiological processes occurring within
it. However, in its relation to the outside world,
with reality reflected in it, we find that conscious­
ness is ideal.
The ideal in consciousness is expressed in that
the images that form it possess neither the prop­
erties of the real objects reflected in it, nor those
of the nervous physiological processes under­
lying their emergence. The images do not con­
tain a grain of matter characteristic of reflected
reality and the brain. They are devoid of weight,
space dimensions, or any other physical prop­
erty.
Though the ideal is different from the material,
it is inherently linked to it, developing and exist­
ing only in that which is material-the human
brain. It is a result of the influence exerted by
material phenomena on the sense organs. Its con­
tent is determined by these phenomena, being a
reflection of them. Marx underlined the intrinsic
connection between the ideal and the material and
the former's dependence on the latter. He wrote:
"... the ideal is nothing else than the material
world reflected by the human mind, and translated
into forms of thought."1

1 Karl Marx, Capital, Vol. I, p. 29.

 MATTER AND CONSCIOUSNESS 131

e) The Subjectivity of Consciousness

The emergence of consciousness presupposes

that man separates himself from surrounding
reality, understands what is happening there, and
takes account of it in his activities. All this makes
man a subject, a being endowed with the ability
to understand what is happening around him,
setting himself definite goals and performing
actions to achieve these goals. By his very nature,
the subject is active. His relative independence
is the result of his influence upon the environment
in order to cognise and transform it. As distinct
from the subject, the reality cognised and trans­
formed by him is the object.
Since man emerges and exists as a member of
a particular group of necessarily interconnected
and interdependent individuals, i.e. a member of
society, the latter should be treated as the univer­
sal subject. It is society that cognises and trans­
forms the surrounding world. As for the individ­
ual, he is the subject only in as far as he ex­
presses the essence of society.
The subject possesses an intrinsically specific
inner world which is an ideal reflection of the
outside world, of objective reality. This inner
spiritual world constitutes the realm of the sub­
jective. Thus, all that relates to man's (society's)
spiritual world, that is included in the sphere of
consciousness and is realised by the subject, makes
up the subjective.
As the spiritual world of the subject, the sub­
jective depends on the latter, on his peculiarities,
9’
132 A. P. SHEPTULIN

specific features and state. But not everything in

the subject's spiritual world is dependent on him.
In man's subjective world, there are aspects stem­
ming from objective reality that are independent
of the subject-man and society. These aspects are
the objective within the subjective; they are a
specific form of existence of the outside world
within the inner world of the subject. This means
that consciousness, while being a subjective,
aware reflection of reality, is a unity of the sub­
jective and the objective. It includes aspects that
reflect properties of the object and do not depend
on the subject, and aspects that depend on the
subject, on the condition of his nervous system,
his personal experience, social status, conditions
of life, and so forth.
The activeness of consciousness, realised
through the purposeful actions of the subject, is
a major form in which his subjectivity is ex­
pressed. Before taking any action, the subject sets
himself a certain goal, specifies the ways and
means of achieving it, makes a decision to un­
dertake a certain course of action, and so forth. In
a word, all his actions pass through the sphere of
consciousness and are manifestations of his will.
Being a manifestation of subjectivity, the ac­
tiveness of consciousness enhances rather than
excludes the objectivity of its content. By taking
a certain pursposeful course of action, the subject
intervenes in objective processes, changes them in
a certain way, thereby transforming the subjective
that existed in his consciousness into the objective
that exists outside and independently of him.
Chapter V

KNOWLEDGE

1. The Essence of Knowledge

Knowledge is the reflection oi reality in mans
consciousness, the conscious reproduction of the
object under study, its properties and relations, in
the form of ideal images.
Idealist philosophers oppose the proposition
that knowledge (cognition) is the reflection of
reality; Thus, subjective idealists reduce it to the
study of the relationship between sensations and
notions, regarding them as the basis of all being.
On the other hand, objective idealists present
knowledge as the self-development of the idea (the
mind), irrespective of the material world. The
German philosopher Gottfried Wilhelm Leibnitz,
for instance, wrote: "Our thoughts come from our
own Self without any direct influence of all other
creatures on the Soul."1
Though exponents of the above concept recognise
that the world is cognisable, they divorce knowl­
edge from reality, from its practical transforma­
tion, and thereby in fact hamper the attainment of
true knowledge.

1 G. W. Leibnitz, Neuen Abhandlungen fiber den

wenschlichen Verstand, Berlin, 1874, S. 429,
134 A. P. SHEPTULIN

As distinct from philosophers who recognise the

knowability of the surrounding world, but distort
the essence of cognition, agnostics (a is the Greek
for "no", and gnosis for knowledge) reject any
possibility of cognising the outside world. Agnos­
tic views were held by Immanuel Kant, David
Hume, and others. Hume, for instance, reasoned
that only images or sense-perceptions were within
the reach of our mind. We do not know the source
or causes of these images. They may result from
the influence of objects on our sense organs, or
from the energy of the mind itself, or from the
action of some invisible and unknown spirit, or
from something else. Experience, he continued,
should have told us all about this, but at this point
it is silent and cannot be otherwise, since the mind,
having to do only with sense-perceptions, is unable
to compare sense-perceptions with the object. In
this case, any experience will be reduced to a
comparison of some sense-perception with
others.
Hume's proposition that experience attests to
the unknowability of objective reality is absolutely
unfounded. Experience, if treated materialistically
as the practical activities of men, shows, on the
contrary, that man is capable of cognising the
outside world and that knowledge is the reflection
of objective reality in man's consciousness in the
form of ideal images.
This reflection, however, is neither passive nor
mechanical. It is a constructive and creative ac­
tivity. The subject does not reflect everything he
sees, but only that which is necessary for his
 KNOWLEDGE 135

vital activities, which is connected in some way

with his requirements and can be used to satisfy
them.
In cognising reality, people set themselves
particular objectives that determine the range of
objects chosen for study, the main avenues of
knowledge, its forms, and so on. The content of
these objectives is determined by the level of the
development of society, particularly that of the
productive forces and the corresponding relations
of production among people, as well as by that
of knowledge itself. Today, for instance, man sets
himself such objectives as to learn the laws
governing the interaction of the "elementary"
particles that go to make up the nucleus of an
atom, to study the structure of the molecules that
underlie the vital processes in an organism and
to understand the mechanics of storing and re­
trieving information. In the not-so-distant past,
however, his goals in natural science were con­
fined to pinpointing the chemical and physical
properties of substances (revealed through their
interaction), describing and classifying living
organisms.

2. Practice as the Basis of Knowledge

Knowledge is active not only because it has a
purpose, but also because it is effected by man's
transformatoin of reality, by his practical action
on the surrounding world. In cognising his environ­
ment, man cannot and must not remain a mere
observer of what is happening around him. If he
136 A. P. SHEPTULIN

confines himself simply to observing or contem­

plating the object of his study, he will learn only
some of its outward properties, which will tell him
nothing of the object's essence. To reveal the
essence of an object, it must be acted upon, placed
in a system of relations and connections different
from those characteristic of its natural state. By
changing the natural state of the object of his
study, man gradually penetrates its secrets, ex­
poses its essence and expresses it in relevant ideal
images. The practical transformation of reality is,
therefore, a necessary condition for cognising
it. Cognition may function and develop on the
basis of practice alone, playing a decisive role
in it.
Being the basis of knowledge, a necessary con­
dition for the human mind to penetrate the essence
of the objects and phenomena of the outside world,
practice is the final goal and motive force of
knowledge. Indeed, in order to function and devel­
op production needs knowledge of the necessary
aspects and connections of the fields of reality
that are involved in people's practical activities
and are subject to change in the interests of so­
ciety. This knowledge, however, is acquired
through cognising reality, chiefly through science.
The latter's main objective is to provide society,
especially production, with the knowledge they
require in order to function and develop. Social
practice sets science definite tasks. By solving
them, science delves deeper and deeper into the
world of phenomena, discovers ever new proper­
ties and connections, and thus develops, Engels
 KNOWLEDGE 137

wrote: "If society has a technical need, that helps

science forward more than ten universities."1
The history of science proves that the develop­
ment of knowledge depends on practice, on the
problems posed by practical necessity. Fields of
scientific knowledge such as mechanics, hydro­
statics and hydrodynamics developed rapidly in
the period when practice raised the problem of
devising suitable mechanical methods of pumping
water from mines and lifting weights. Moreover,
the study of electrical phenomena gained momen­
tum only after it had been discovered that they
could be used in practice. The same is true of
nuclear research. The tremendous development of
this field was caused by the discovery of practical
uses for atomic energy.
Thus, practice exerts a decisive influence on
knowledge and is the basis for its functioning and
development.
Some pre-Marxian philosophers, including
Hegel, recognised the decisive role of practice in
cognition. In Hegel's view, the process of cognition
runs through creative activity. For him, however,
practice was but the thinking, creative activity of
the idea that created particular concepts, and then
the sensuous world, in the process of self-con­
sciousness.
In reality, however, practice is the material
activity oi people aimed at changing and trans­
forming the surrounding world. It includes, pri­
marily, production activity which changes natural

1 K. Marx and F. Engels, Selected Works, Vol. 3, p. 502,

138 A. P. SHEPTULIN

objects in order that they might satisfy the needs

of society. But man changes not only nature. He
also changes the life of society, the relations among
people, various public institutions, and so forth.
So, practice also includes the social activity of
people, particularly the class struggle which ulti­
mately alters the relations of production, and thus
the entire life of society.

3. The Dialectical Way of Knowledge

Basing itself on practice, cognition is constantly
moving from live contemplation to abstract think­
ing, and from there back to practice, as a criterion
for the truth of the knowledge obtained.1

a) Live Contemplation

Live contemplation is a sensuous reflection of

reality. It is effected through a direct perception
by man's sense organs of the things and phenom­
ena of the outside world. As distinct from pas­
sive contemplation, live contemplation presup­
poses active action on the object of knowledge, its
purposeful transformation during this process.
Live contemplation is connected with sensation
and perception as forms of the reflection of reality.
Sensation is a visual image of an object directly
acting upon the sense organs. The action of an
object on a sense organ irritates some nerve cells,
this irritation being transmitted through centripetal

* See V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 38, pp. 170-172.

 KNOWLEDGE 139

nerves to the cortex, some area of which is excited

by it. The resultant centre of excitation underlies
the realisation of the above action and the reflec­
tion of a certain property of the acting object as
a corresponding image-colour, smell, sound, taste,
shape, softness, hardness, and so on. Sensation is
thus "a result of the action of matter on our sense­
organs".1 It is "a transformation of the energy
of external excitation into the fact of conscious­
ness''.2
A sensation reflects only particular aspects or
properties of an object, rather than the object as
a whole. Since an object usually acts on the sense­
organs through its many aspects, several different
and inherently interconnected sensations emerge,
rather than a single one, and add up to a more or
less integral image of the acting object. This in­
tegral image is perception. So, perception is an
integral image that is formed in the human brain
as a result of the action of an object on our sense­
organs.
As soon as an object ceases to act, perception
disappears. The nerve connections underlying the
perception do not disappear, however, and last for
a certain time. As a result, later on man can re­
produce in his consciousness the image of the
object that acted on his sense-organs in the past.
This image is called notion or representation.
Notion is not so rich and clear in content as
perception-it reproduces only some of the prop­

1 See V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 14, p. 57.

2 Ibid., p. 51.
140 A. P. SHEPTULIN

erties inherent in the object that acted on the

sense-organs. Nevertheless, it has some advantages
over perception. The latter is always tied up with
a particular object, it limits the cognitive activities
of consciousness to the narrow confines of a given
concrete case. In contrast, notion does not entail
such a direct connection with the object; it makes
it possible to cognise the latter in its absence,
expanding thereby the scope of the cognitive
activities of consciousness. Moreover, being the
image of a concrete object or phenomenon, per­
ception is always individual, single. Notion, on the
other hand, may also be general. It may retain
only what is repeated in a number of similar
objects or phenomena. For example, besides the
notion of a specific tree or man, we may have the
notion of tree or man in general. Thus, as distinct
from perception which binds consciousness to the
single, the individual, notion breaks these narrow
confines and allows consciousness to single out
the general and use it in the relevant thinking
processes.
The reflection of reality through notions
extends beyond live contemplation confined to
sensations and perceptions. The reflection of
objective reality through sensations, perceptions
and notions is known as sense knowledge. Live
contemplation is not, therefore, identical to, but
narrower than, sense knowledge.
Having discussed the main forms of sense
knowledge we can define its specific features, the
main one being that it links us directly to the
outside world. Sensations and perceptions are the
 KNOWLEDGE 141

result of a direct action by the objects of the out­

side world on the sense-organs. Besides, sense
knowledge is visual, the surrounding world being
reflected through visual images. Lastly, sense
knowledge reflects only what is on the surface of
phenomena, only the outward aspects of objects,
which are, as a rule, changeable and fortuitous.
Man, however, is interested in the stable and
necessary aspects and connections and in the laws
governing the action and development of material
entities, for his practical activity is based on that
which is inevitably repeated under relevant con­
ditions and is necessary. These laws and that
which is necessary are, however, concealed from
direct perception, making up the inner content of
phenomena. All this points to the inadequacy of
sense knowledge and to the necessity of advancing
to some new, more perfect forms, capable of
reflecting the internal, the necessary, the laws
manifesting themselves in the surrounding world.
The forms of abstract thinking are such new forms
of cognising objective reality.

b) Abstract Thinking

Before discussing the specific features of

abstract thinking, we should define thinking in
general and show what it is as a special social
phenomenon.
Thinking is the isolation in consciousness of
certain aspects or properties of the object under
study, and their combination in specific groups in
order to obtain new knowledge.
142 A. P. SHEPTULIN

The solution of any mathematical problem may

serve as an elementary example of thinking ac­
tivity. Let us assume that we have to find out the
number of pairs of shoes to be produced in a
country in the next year, given a population of
200 million and the fact that every person wears
out three pairs of shoes annually. Besides, the
average annual population growth is 15 per
thousand. When solving this problem, we single
out certain thoughts, place them within the rele­
vant system of connections (relations) and obtain
new knowledge. Thus, we focus our attention on
the total number of people living in the country
(200 million), then on the annual growth rate. By
connecting these two factors, we figure out the
number of people that would live in the country
in the following year (203 million). We tie up this
new knowledge with the known annual per capita
requirement of footwear and obtain a figure
indicating the total footwear requirement for the
entire population in the coming year. Thus, by
isolating separate thoughts and tying them up in
relevant combinations to obtain the knowledge we
lack, we are thinking, and in the process we solve
the problem.
Thinking emerged together with consciousness
on the basis of man's labour activity. It was visual,
and even object-oriented, in the initial stages in
the development of the human race. In effecting
certain thinking operations, the people of that
time isolated and combined into new groups visual
images, such as sensations, perceptions, notions
that emerged in the course of the practical trans­
 KNOWLEDGE 143

formation of the surrounding world, as well as

the objects and phenomena encountered in every­
day life. Later on, as production developed, man
began to abstract from the sensuous, concrete and
visual, and to isolate the general from the individ­
ual. On this basis he developed, first, general
notions, and then concepts-the ideal non-visual
images reflecting the general, essential properties
and connections of the objects and phenomena of
the surrounding world.
The emergence of concepts gave rise to abstract
thinking. The latter is the isolation and combina­
tion of concepts in order to obtain new knowl­
edge.
Concept is a qualitatively new form of the
reflection of reality, differing markedly from the
forms of sense knowledge discussed above. As
distinct from the latter, concept is devoid of
visuality. It is impossible to visualise, for instance,
a chemical element, valency, patriotism, courage,
democracy, etc. All these ideal images are thoughts
expressing the understanding of a particular
phenomenon. Moreover, sense images-sensation,
perception, notion-reflect the external properties
and connections of the objects and phenomena of
the surrounding world, whereas concepts reflect
the inner, essential properties inherent in them.
Concepts interact with each other in the think­
ing process and make up other forms of the re­
flection of reality, such as judgements and in­
ferences.
Judgement is the simplest form of thinking. It
reflects, through a definite interconnection be­
144 A. P. SHEPTULIN

tween concepts or notions, the presence or absence

of connections between objects and their proper­
ties. The following thoughts, for instance, are
judgements: "man is a social being", "capitalism
begets unemployment", "the proletariat in capital­
ist society is not the owner of the means of pro­
duction". The first thought states that man and
society are interconnected; the second states the
connection between capitalism and unemployment;
the third thought states that there is no connec­
tion between the proletariat and the ownership
of the means of production in capitalist society.
Inference is a form of thinking representing a
connection between judgements and engendering
a new judgement that contains a new thought.
The following reasoning may serve as an example
of inference: "All the citizens of the Soviet Union
enjoy the right to work and rest. Ivanov is a
citizen of the Soviet Union. Ivanov enjoys the
right to work and rest". The first two judge­
ments are connected in such a way that a new
judgement, containing a new thought, may be
inferred.
By combining relevant concepts into judgements,
and these into inferences, man is thinking, thus
reproducing in his consciousness the necessary
aspects and connections of reality and the essence
of the object under study through a system of
ideal images. The ability to penetrate the essence
of a certain field of reality under study and the
isolation of its inherent aspects and connections is
a major feature of abstract thinking, distinguish­
ing it from sense knowledge.
 KNOWLEDGE 145

Another specific feature is the indirectness of

reflection. Abstract thinking involves concepts,
judgements and inferences, and is not directly
linked with the object under study. It deals with
sense data about this object, obtained at the sense
stage of cognition. It is these data that serve as
a mediating link separating abstract thinking
from reality and at the same time connecting
them.

c) The Interconnection
Between Sense and Rational Knowledge

Man cognises the surrounding world by way of

live contemplation and abstract thinking, but what
is the role played by each of these ways? Sen­
sualists believed that sense experience was most
important in cognition. Abstract thinking, they
maintained, is subsidiary, adding virtually nothing
to the knowledge obtained in the process of sense
cognition. In their view, the human mind does not
contain anything new to add to sense data. Ra­
tionalists (from the Latin ratio-reason) held the
opposite view. They believed that abstract think­
ing, reason, rather than the senses were para­
mount. The senses, they said, distort reality, mis­
lead us, therefore they should not be relied upon
in the process of cognising the truth. Reason is
the only unbiased judge and the sole way of
cognising the truth.
But what is a true answer to this problem?
Which of the two ways of cognition is decisive?
Neither sense knowledge, nor abstract thinking, if
10—1557
146 A. P. SHEPTULIN

taken separately, are capable of ensuring cogni­

tion of the essence of an object. Sense knowledge
is confined to noting that which lies on the sur­
face of phenomena, but is unable to fathom their
essence. Abstract thinking, on the other hand, can
penetrate the essence of phenomena, but it does
not possess the data about the object necessary
for reproducing its essence in the mind. These data
are provided by sense knowledge. It is obvious,
therefore, that sense knowledge and abstract think­
ing should not be counterposed. The essence of
phenomena can be cognised only by their joint
efforts.
The interconnection between the sensuous and
the rational in knowledge is expressed not only in
that they supplement and presuppose one another,
but also in that they interpenetrate one another.
Live contemplation involves thinking activity in
the process of which concrete visual images, no­
tions in particular, are being used.
By perceiving certain properties of the object
under study, man brings them within the scope
of his concepts and thus becomes aware of them.
But to bring a particular case within the range of
a general concept and, on this basis, draw a con­
clusion that contains new knowledge concerning
the object of thought, is merely to make a deduc­
tion, which is a form of thought. Moreover, by
making a point of the object's properties thus re- I
vealed, man compares it with other objects known |
to him and establishes the extent to which it is |
similar to or different from them. This process I
also takes the form of inference.
 KNOWLEDGE 147

Thus sense knowledge that reflects the object

under study through sensations, perceptions and
notions, is intrinsically tied up with thinking, in­
cluding it as one of its necessary aspects.
Abstract thinking is not absolutely free of
visual images either. Although it deals with
abstract concepts, it must keep within its range the
concrete object whose essence it has to reveal and
express in a system of abstract concepts.
To sum up, sense knowledge and abstract think­
ing are intrinsically interconnected and interde­
pendent, penetrating and changing into one
another as they function and develop.

d) Empirical and Theoretical Knowledge

When the process of cognition is viewed as the

inter-penetration of the sensuous and the rational,
of live contemplation and abstract thinking, the
necessity arises for distinguishing between empir­
ical and theoretical levels of knowledge.
Empirical knowledge deals with phenomena,
with that which lies on the surface of an object,
i.e. with its external aspects and connections. The
sensuous forms of reflecting reality-sensations,
perceptions, notions-play a major role here. The
concepts, judgements and inferences used at this
level of knowledge are closely linked with sense
data, their processing in the mind: fixation, analy­
sis, grouping, and the establishment of the general
and specific properties of the objects under study.
Empirical knowledge describes the behaviour
of the object under study, takes note of the
io*
148 A. P. SHEPTULIN

changes it undergoes, and makes general state­

ments on the basis of the data thus obtained. True,
these statements are of little value for science and
practical experience, inasmuch as they merely state
what is observed experimentally, being unable to
explain why it happens and whether it necessarily
happens under given conditions. The latter can be
established only by theoretical knowledge.
Although theoretical knowledge develops on the
basis of empirical knowledge, it does not confine
itself to the superficial study of phenomena but
penetrates their nature, exposing the causes behind
these phenomena. Basing itself on empirical data,
it seeks to reveal the necessary aspects and con­
nections of the object under study and the laws
governing its functioning and development, thus
providing an explanation for the phenomena ob­
served. So the task facing theoretical knowledge
is "to resolve the visible, merely external move­
ment into the true intrinsic movement.. .".1
Theoretical knowledge uses concepts, judge­
ments and inierences to reproduce in the mind the
essence of the object under study through their
interconnection.

e) Practice as the Criterion of Truth

Different philosophers gave different solutions

to the problem of a criterion of truth. Some de­
clared clarity of thought to be such a criterion
(Descartes), others-sensuousness, the direct per­

1 K. Marx, Capital, Vol. 3, p. 313.

 KNOWLEDGE 149

ception of a particular phenomenon (Feuerbach),

yet others-universality (the Machist Bogdanov) or
utility (Dewey). None of these factors, however,
can break the confines of our subjective judgement,
and they are therefore unable to distinguish be­
tween truth and falsity. Indeed, clarity of thought,
for instance, shows that the subject understands
a certain phenomenon, but it does not necessarily
mean that the latter corresponds to reality. An
erroneous view can also be clear. A direct percep­
tion of a particular phenomenon may also be
erroneous, distorted. An object, for instance, seen
at a great distance seems to be smaller than at
close quarters. In reality, however, it is the same.
Moreover, recognition of the truth of a certain
proposition by many people does not exclude the
possibility of it being false either, in so far as
many people may be mistaken. Many people, for
instance, believe in the existence of the devil, hell,
and paradise. The use of utility or belief as a
means of verifying truth will lead us to the same
conclusions. A false statement may be useful for
certain people. The idea, for instance, that the
capitalist state expresses the interests of all clas­
ses is useful for the bourgeoisie. This, however,
contradicts reality, inasmuch as the bourgeois state
expresses the interests of the exploiting classes,
the bourgeoisie in particular, and is spearheaded
against the working people.
How, then, is it possible to establish whether
an idea is true or false? The truth of our knowl­
edge must be established through practice. Practice
alone can give a final answer to the question of
150 A. P. SHEPTULIN

what is false and what is true. Marxists were the

first to advance and develop the idea that practice
is the criterion of truth. Marx wrote: "The ques­
tion whether objective (gegenstandliche) truth can
be attributed to human thinking is not a question
of theory but is a practical question. In practice
man must prove the truth, that is, the reality and
power... of his thinking."1
Indeed, in order to establish the truth of an idea
it is necessary to perform certain practical actions
based on this idea. If the results are as expected,
the idea is true, otherwise it is false. To estab­
lish, for instance, the truth of the statement that
heat may be converted into mechanical motion,
we build a steam engine which operates on the
principle of conversion of thermal into mechanical
energy. The operation of the engine shows that the
above statement is true and corresponds to reality.

f) Objective Truth. The Interconnection

Between Absolute and Relative Truths

Knowledge obtained in the process of empirical

and theoretical cognition becomes true only after
it has been confirmed in practice. But what is true
knowledge? How does it differ from false knowl­
edge?
The knowledge that corresponds to reality and
reflects it is true knowledge.
True knowledge that corresponds to reality
"does not depend either on a human being or on

1 K. Marx and F. Engels, Selected Works, Vol. 1, p. 13.

 KNOWLEDGE 151

humanity.. ."A People cannot arbitrarily, at their

will, change the content of true propositions. The
proposition, for instance, that electric energy may
be converted into heat and mechanical motion,
while the latter two may be converted into elec­
tricity, cannot be changed by people, because this
proposition is true, and reflects reality.
For this reason, objective truth may be defined
as follows. Objective truth is the content of our
knowledge, which reflects reality and therefore
does not depend either on a human being or on
humanity.
This definition does not imply, however, that
truth cannot change at all, that it is external, as
the metaphysicists maintained.
Although people cannot change the content of
truth at will, this content invariably undergoes
changes in the process of the development of
social knowledge and practice. These changes
stem primarily from the fact that the process of
cognition does not stand still—it is continuously
developing on the basis of social experience.
During this process people penetrate ever deeper
into the surrounding world, discover ever new
aspects and connections of it, thereby clarifying,
supplementing and enriching their knowledge and
making it correspond more fully to reality.
In 1858 the German physicist Julius Pliicker,
for instance, passed electric current through a tube
containing a rarefied gas and discovered so-called
cathode rays. Some time later (1869), Johann Hit-

1 V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 14, p. 122.

152 A. P. SHEPTULIN

torf established that these rays travelled in a

straight line, deflected in a magnetic field, could
be absorbed by solid bodies, etc. Still later (1879),
the British physicist William Crookes put forward
the idea that cathode rays were a flux of tiny par­
ticles detached from the cathode and travelling at
immense speed. According to Crookes, these par­
ticles had a negative charge and were part of all
atoms. John Thompson experimentally confirmed
the idea advanced by Crookes (1897). The Irish
physicist George Johnstone Stoney suggested that
the particles be called electrons.
The above example shows how our knowledge
of the electron continuously changed and became
more accurate and fuller in the process of the
development of knowledge. This is a rather vivid
demonstration that objective truth is relative, and
that its content depends on the level of develop­
ment of social knowledge and practice.
Objective truth cannot remain unchanged also
because the reality reflected by it does not stand
still, but is changing and developing all the time.
But if the object of reflection changes and passes
from one qualitative state into another, if some of
its properties and connections disappear and new
ones emerge, our knowledge of this object cannot
remain unchanged. In order to be true, this knowl­
edge must necessarily change, it must be sup­
plemented by new knowledge and brought in line
with changed reality. Our knowledge of the Rus­
sian proletariat, for instance, could not remain
unchanged after it had carried out a socialist
revolution, established its dictatorship and built
 KNOWLEDGE 153

socialism. To make it correspond to reality we

have to supplement this knowledge by new data
pertaining to the social position of the working
class and its place and role in socialist society.
Moreover, objective truth remains such only
within certain limits and under definite conditions.
Any extrapolation of or changes in the specific
conditions result in true knowledge turning into
false. Thus, the proposition that socialist revolu­
tion may be made victorious by peaceful means
is not true always and for every country. It is only
true for those countries where corresponding con­
ditions have matured, such as: the proletariat has
a real possibility to win over the majority of the
population, win elections to the country's legisla­
tive bodies, form its government, and begin the
socialist transformation of social relations peace­
fully, provided the bourgeoisie does not put up
an armed resistance. This indicates that truth is
always concrete.
To sum up, objective truth is relative; it neces­
sarily changes along with the development of
social knowledge and changes in reflected reality
and the conditions of its existence.
The fact that truth is not permanent or external
and that it necessarily changes, depending on the
level of development of social knowledge, does
not, however, exclude its objectivity and indepen­
dence of a human being and humanity. On the
contrary, the changeability of truth is a condition
for ensuring its objectivity, inasmuch as it con­
tributes to making our knowledge conform more
fully to reality.
154 A. P. SHEPTULIN

The development of our knowledge of thermal

radiation is a good example, showing how changes
in the truth contribute to greater objectivity.
In ancient times people noticed that a flame emits
heat rays. At first they thought that thermal ra­
diation was connected with the process of burning
alone. Later, however, it was also discovered in
incandescent bodies, and still later (the end of the
17th century) it was found in heated bodies. In
the 18th century, some scientists (Pierre Prevost,
for instance, in 1791) came to the conclusion that
thermal radiation is a characteristic feature of all
bodies, irrespective of their temperature. It was
also established (by Johann H. Lambert in 1779)
that heat rays travel and are reflected in the same
way as light rays, and that the amount of heat rays
emitted by a body is proportional to the increase
in its temperature (John Leslie). It was further
observed that bodies radiating heat extensively,
also absorb it to a greater extent, and vice versa.
Lastly, Herschel established in 1800 that heat is
distributed unevenly in the different parts of the
spectrum-the heat effect is especially pronounced
in the part that corresponds to the red colour and
diminishes towards the violet colour. This shows
that our knowledge of heat radiation changed as
social cognition developed. But this, of course, did
not make it less objective, nor did it refute the
truth of the belief shared by the ancients that
a flame emits heat rays. Changes in our knowl­
edge of thermal radiation made it increasingly
true, an increasingly objective reflection of rea-
 KNOWLEDGE 155

Lastly, if our knowledge is always relative and

invariably changes during the development of
social cognition and practice, does this not prove
that absolute truth does not and cannot exist?
Relativists draw exactly this conclusion. Dialec­
tical materialists, however, do not believe that the
relativity of our knowledge indicates that absolute
truth is non-existent. In the relative they see an
element of the absolute. According to dialectical
materialism, objective truth is relative and abso­
lute simultaneously. Inasmuch as it correctly re­
flects the particular aspects and connections of
reality, it is absolute; inasmuch, however, as this
reflection is always incomplete and does not and
cannot embrace the whole content of an object
(which is inexhaustible), it is relative.
Thus, although our knowledge is always rela­
tive, this does not mean that it is not objective and
absolute. The existence of absolute truth is neces­
sarily connected with the objectivity of our knowl­
edge. "To acknowledge objective truth," Lenin
wrote, "i.e. truth not dependent upon man and
mankind, is, in one way or another, to recognise
absolute truth."1
Absolute truth exists through relative truths,
through the aspects of relative truth that reflect
reality. As cognition and social practice develop,
the number of these aspects increases. At the same
time absolute truth, being a continuously growing
sum of relative truths, is becoming ever fuller. But
it can never be complete, because the world is

1 V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 14, p. 133.

156 A. P. SHEPTULIN

infinite in its diversity and therefore inexhaustible.

The chain making up absolute truth will be sup­
plemented with new links of relative truths, which
will bring us closer to an increasingly full (and in
this sense absolute) reflection of reality, but
without making it possible to exhaust it.

4. Forms and Methods

of Scientific Knowledge (Cognition)
By cognising the surrounding world, man
develops and uses the relevant forms and methods
of reflecting reality. He resorts to various types
of judgements, inferences and concepts and is
guided by the norms and principles of cognitive
activity. The forms and methods of cognition used
by man reflect the aspects and connections of
reality and the laws governing the development
of social knowledge and practice.
A method of cognition is a totality of the re­
quirements and principles man should follow in
studying a certain sphere of reality. These require­
ments are based on certain universal aspects
and connections of reality and the laws govern­
ing the development and functioning of cogni­
tion.
Some of these requirements are applicable to any
stage in the development of cognition, to all
spheres of scientific analysis, while others are
applicable to one stage in the development of
cognition, to one field of science. For this reason
there are general and particular methods of scien­
tific cognition.
 KNOWLEDGE 157

a) Observation

Observation is the purposeful, deliberate percep­

tion of phenomena related to the object under
study. It presupposes the preliminary setting of
an objective, definition of ways of achieving it,
availability of a plan for watching the object, use
of apparatus to extend the possibility of perceiv­
ing the object's qualities and recording them. The
extent to which observation is successful and
fruitful also depends on how well the observer is
versed in the given field of phenomena and on
how well he is prepared and organised.

b) Experiment

Experiment is a research method presupposing

a corresponding change in an object or its repro­
duction under conditions specially created for this
purpose.
In contrast to observation, where the subject
does not interfere with the phenomenon under
study, but confines himself to recording its natural
state, experiment involves the subject's active in­
terference in the field of phenomena under study,
disruption of the natural state of things, and the
placing of an object under different, specially
created conditions. The researcher thus compels
the object to react to the new conditions and to
reveal new properties not observed in its natural
state. Moreover, by changing these conditions,
he traces how these and other properties of the
object change and thus obtains plentiful data on
158 A. P. SHEPTULIN

the object's behaviour under different circum­

stances.
By making an experiment, the researcher pro­
ceeds from the information he has on the given
field of phenomena, and on this basis choses the
ways and means of conducting the experiment.
Besides, he is guided by certain assumptions that
are to be either confirmed or refuted by the ex­
periment. In other words, although experiment
involves new concrete data about the object
under study, it entails not only the sensuous forms
of cognition, but also abstract thinking.

c) Comparison

Comparison is the way of revealing the likeness

to or difference from other phenomena of the
phenomenon under study. It is a necessary method
of research widely used at different stages in the
development of cognition. Scientific knowledge is
inconceivable without it.
Indeed, the aim of science is to reveal what is
common and recurrent in phenomena, thus pen­
etrating their essence. By comparing the object
under study with other objects, and data obtained
under certain conditions at a certain time with
data obtained under other conditions at another
time, we establish what is common. Comparison
helps in revealing that which is recurrent in phe­
nomena and in formulating on this basis some
common propositions as regards the object under
study.
 KNOWLEDGE 159

d) Hypothesis

Hypothesis is a major form of thinking linking

theoretical with empirical knowledge and ensur­
ing a transition from reflecting the external aspects
of phenomena to reflecting their internal aspects.
Hypothesis is an assumption, based on estab­
lished tacts, of the cause underlying certain phe­
nomena
A hypothesis is advanced in the following way.
First, all phenomena relating to the object under
study are thoroughly examined. Through observa­
tion and experiment, data are collected on the
object's perceivable properties, their changes and
connections with other phenomena. Analysis of
these data makes it possible to assume a likely
cause behind the properties observed. A number
of conclusions are made on the basis of the as­
sumption, which are then verified. If a certain
assumed conclusion does not bring about the anti­
cipated result under the corresponding circum­
stances, the hypothesis is proved false. If, however,
all the anticipated consequences are observed, the
hypothesis is recognised as scientifically sound.
Later on, as it is further substantiated and con­
firmed by experience, the hypothesis becomes a
scientific theory and authentic knowledge.
The process of building up a hypothesis and
transforming it into authentic knowledge may be
easily traced from the explanation of the fact that
the radioactivity of a substance exposed to neu­
trons increases in the presence of some light
substances.
160 A. P. SHEPTULIN

Bruno Pontecorvo and Edoardo Amaldi noticed

in their experiments that the amount of radio­
activity acquired by a substance exposed to radia­
tion depends on surrounding objects. For example,
when a silver cylinder was exposed to radiation
in a lead box its radioactivity was negligible;
when, however, it was exposed on a wooden sup­
port, its radioactivity increased significantly. When
analysing the circumstances of this phenomenon,
Enrico Fermi made the following assumption as
regards the reason for the greater radioactivity of
a substance when exposed to radiation in the
vicinity of light bodies.
Inside a substance, a neutron collides with a
nucleus and loses part of its energy. The amount
of energy it loses in every particular case depends,
however, on what nucleus-heavy or light-it col­
lides with. If it collides with a heavy nucleus,
such as the nucleus of the lead atom, it bounces
off at virtually the same speed, i.e. it loses very
little energy. If, however, it collides with a light
nucleus, such as that of the hydrogen atom, it
bounces off, having transmitted to it part of its
energy, at a slower speed. It follows that the
lighter the nucleus, the more energy is lost by the
neutron upon colliding with it. But a change in
the neutron's speed increases its chances of being
captured by the nuclei of the atoms of the sub­
stance through which it passes, since, when travel­
ling at a slower speed, it interects with nuclei for
a longer time. So, when light bodies, such as wood
containing a great amount of hydrogen, are close
to a substance exposed to radiation, neutrons
 KNOWLEDGE 161

passing through them slow down and are captured

by atomic nuclei more frequently, which results
in increased radioactivity.
Having disclosed the assumed reason for the
greater radioactivity of a substance exposed to
neutron radiation, Fermi made a corresponding
conclusion-the radioactivity of substances exposed
to neutron radiation must increase in the presence
of any light body.
In order to verify this conclusion, Fermi decided
to expose silver to neutron radiation in paraffin,
which contains far more hydrogen atoms than
wood that increases its radioactivity in the pre­
sence of silver. The silver exposed to radiation in
paraffin acquired still more radioactivity than
when it was exposed on a wooden support. This
fact showed that Fermi's assumption was true.
Hypothesis plays an exceptionally important
part in the development of scientific knowledge.
This is not fortuitous, because it is a form of
transition from description to explanation of the
object under study, from recording its external
manifestations to reproducing their inner causes.

e) Analogy

Analogy is another form of thinking that makes

possible the transition from empirical to theoret­
ical knowledge.
Analogy is an inference making it possible to
draw conclusions about the similarity of objects
in certain of their properties on the basis of the
similarity of their other properties.
11—1557
162 A. P. SHEPTULIN

Analogy is normally used as a form of thinking

in dealing with a phenomenon that is more or less
studied and resembles other phenomena not yet
studied. Given this resemblance, one can assume
that a phenomenon not yet studied is governed by
laws inherent in the first phenomenon. This as­
sumption is based on the fact that properties and
relations inherent in objects are connected and
interdependent, so the presence of some properties
and relations presupposes the existence of other
properties and relations.
Inference by analogy plays an important part in
scientific progress. Many major scientific discov­
eries were made by transferring laws intrinsic
to one sphere of phenomena to another. The Dutch
physicist Christian Huygens, for example, conclud­
ed that light had a wave form on the basis of its
resemblance, in many ways, to sound. Kronig
compared the motion of gas molecules with the
motion of resilient balls, established some features
common to both processes and on this basis cal­
culated gas pressure. A similarity between the
flow of fluid in a pipe and of electrons in a con­
ductor helped in developing the theory of electric
current. Lastly, the discovery of a certain resem­
blance between reflective processes in a living
organism and some physical processes was con­
ducive to the development of cybernetic devices.

f) Model-building

The close connection between empirical and

theoretical knowledge and the transition from the
 KNOWLEDGE 163

first to the second are also effected through an­

other method of scientific analysis-model-building.
Model-building is reproduction of certain prop­
erties and connections of the object under study
in another specially created object-a model-in
order to study them more closely.
A geographical map which reproduces certain
properties and connections of the Earth's surface
is an ideal example of a model. Cybernetic ma­
chines imitating the properties of the human brain,
and structural formulae reproducing the proper­
ties and connections of the molecules or atoms of
a certain substance, are also models.
Model-building is very similar to analogy. Here,
too, the discovery of certain properties inherent
in one object-the model-provides grounds for
concluding that the same properties are intrinsic
to another object-the object of cognition.
The advantage of model-building is that it
makes it possible to single out certain properties
of the object under study, conceive them in their
pure form and study them in the absence of the
original. This is vitally important whenever access
to the object or action upon it are hampered by
certain circumstances or are not possible at all.
There are material and ideal (logical) models.
Material models are objects specially made or
selected by man to physically reproduce certain
properties, connections and processes inherent in
the object under study. Material models exist in
reality, function and develop according to some
objective laws that exist outside and independent­
ly of the human mind. A model of a house,
u»
164 A. P. SHEPTULIN

a bridge or a dam, for example, is a material

model.
Ideal models are mental constructions, images,
theoretical schemes that reproduce in an ideal
form the properties and connections of the object
under study. These models are formed with the
help of particular symbols, figures and other ma­
terial means. As distinct from material models,
ideal models do not reproduce the physical state
and properties of the object under study-they
merely copy or reflect them in the corresponding
mental constructions.
The role of model-building in knowledge and
practice has especially increased now that cyber­
netics and mathematical logic have developed.

g) Induction and Deduction

Another form of thinking-induction-is widely

used at the empirical stage of knowledge.
Induction is inference in the process of which
a general conclusion is made on the basis of knowl­
edge of particular cases in relation to all phenom­
ena of the given class.
As a rule, knowledge obtained through induction
is only a probability and is problematic, because a
general conclusion is drawn here on the basis of
a simple repetition of a particular property in all
the phenomena under study. The presence of a
property in these cases certainly does not mean
that it will necessarily be observed in other phe­
nomena not yet studied. It may or may not be.
It will necessarily be observed if it is law-gov­
 KNOWLEDGE 165

erned; it may not be if it is not connected with the

nature of the phenomena of a given class and
stems from external circumstances. Induction,
however, cannot establish whether this property
is necessary or accidental. Other methods of
scientific cognition are required for this, such as
deduction which is connected with the theoretical
level of knowledge.
Deduction is interence in which a new thought
is logically developed irom certain propositions
that are a general rule tor all phenomena ot a
given class. The following inference may serve as
an example of deduction. "The state is an instru­
ment used by the ruling class in society to sup­
press its class enemies. The bourgeoisie is the rul­
ing class in capitalist society. It follows that, in
capitalist society, the state is an instrument used
by the bourgeoisie to suppress its class enemies."
Deduction is very important in a scientific
substantiation of propositions reflecting various
aspects and connections of the objects under study
that cannot be perceived directly.
Although induction and deduction are two in­
dependent forms of thinking, they are intrinsical­
ly connected, presuppose one another and cannot
ensure the development of knowledge in isolation
from each other. By generalising accumulated
empirical knowledge, induction paves the way for
various assumptions to be made concerning the
causes of the phenomena under study and the
existence of a certain necessary connection, and
for these assumptions to be verified. Deduction,
on the other hand, by theoretically substantiating
166 A. P. SHEPTULIN

the conclusions drawn through induction, sublates

their problematic nature and makes them authentic
knowledge. "Induction and deduction," Engels
wrote, "belong together as necessarily as synthesis
and analysis. Instead of one-sidedly lauding one
to the skies at the expense of the other, we should
seek to apply each of them in its place, and that
can only be done by bearing in mind that they
belong together, that they supplement each other."1

h) The Method of Ascension

from the Abstract to the Concrete

The abstract is a one-sided reflection in men's

consciousness of the object under study. The con­
crete is an integral reproduction of the object (1)
as a system of abstract concepts or (2) in a sen­
suously visual form. The first reproduces the object
as a unity of its inner, necessary aspects and ex­
presses its essence; the second reproduces the
object's external aspects and is a superficial notion
of the whole.
Ascension from the abstract to the concrete is
an important form of theoretical knowledge. It
can lead to the reproduction in man's conscious­
ness of the essence of the object under study
through abstract concepts.
Hegel was the first to develop this method and
use it in constructing his philosophical system.
The Hegelian method of ascension from the
abstract to the concrete, however, was not scien­
tifically grounded, inasmuch as it expressed the
1 F. Engels, Dialectics of Nature, p. 228.
 KNOWLEDGE 167

development of pure thought that existed prior to

nature and man, i.e. was idealist in its essence.
Marx developed this method on a materialist and
scientific basis in his Capital. According to this
method, cognition should start from the abstract,
rather than the concrete whole, with analysis of
the concepts reflecting particular, very simple
aspects and connections of the object under study.
Not any very simple abstract concept, however,
can serve as a point of departure for studying the
whole. This can only be done by the concept that
reflects the main aspect or relation of the whole
under study. The main aspect (relation) directly
affects all other aspects of the whole. For this
reason, by taking the main aspect as the point of
departure and by viewing it in its development,
we can explain the emergence and peculiarities of
the other aspects of the whole, and deduce them
from changes in the main aspect (relation). By
tracing these changes one by one, and explaining
one aspect of the whole after another, we shall
reproduce in our mind, through a system of con­
cepts, the necessary interconnection and inter­
dependence of all these aspects, thereby arriving at
concrete knowledge of the essence of the object
under study.
Marx's analysis of the capitalist socio-economic
system in his Capital may serve as an example of
cognition through ascension from the abstract to
the concrete. Marx took commodity as the initial,
main aspect and explained, on the basis of the
development of commodity relations, the formation
of all other aspects and connections of the capitalist
168 A. P. SHEPTULIN

system. He mentally reproduced the essence of

capitalist society through a system of abstract con­
cepts reflecting these aspects and connections.
The method of ascension from the abstract to
the concrete is applicable at that stage of knowl­
edge when the whole under study has to a certain
extent been examined, when its general aspects
and connections have been isolated and expressed
in the relevant abstract concepts and definitions.
This, however, can be achieved at the stage of
knowledge developing from the sensuously con­
crete to the abstract. For this reason the above
form of knowledge should precede the develop­
ment from the abstract to the concrete.

i) The Historical and the Logical in Knowledge

The concept "historical'' means objective reali­

ty in a state oi motion and development. The con­
cept "logical means the necessary connection oi
thoughts reflecting surrounding reality in mans
consciousness.
The historical is primary to the logical, which
reflects the former. As such, the logical may or
may not correspond to the historical. It does so
when the interrelation of thoughts reproduces the
actual historical process. It does not correspond
to the historical when the interrelation of thoughts
does not reflect the history of an object, when, for
example, the train of thought proceeds in the op­
posite direction to the development of history.
Saying that the logical corresponds to the histor­
ical does not mean that this correspondence is
 KNOWLEDGE 169

complete. The logical does not fully coincide with

the historical. "History often proceeds by leaps
and zigzags... ."1 The logical must not and cannot
reproduce all these zigzags of history. Its sole
objective is to reflect the necessary changes, the
necessary tendency to pass from one qualitative
state to another.
The correspondence of the logical to the histor­
ical is an essential aspect of the dialectical meth­
od of cognition, particularly the method of
ascension from the abstract to the concrete. We
have already noted that, according to the method
of ascension from the abstract to the concrete, a
study begins by finding the general, main aspect
or relation. The study traces changes in the given
aspect or relation, making it possible to explain
the formation and transformation of the other
aspects of the whole. The thinking process repro­
duces connections and relations that somehow
reflect the actual formation of the essence of the
object under study. As a result, the logical devel­
opment of thought corresponds to the historical
development of the object. True, this correspon­
dence relates only to necessary connections. The
logical thus reproduces the historical that is free
of fortuity. Engels stressed the agreement between
the logical and the historical when proceeding
from the abstract to the concrete. He wrote: "The
chain of thought must begin with the same thing
with which this history begins, and its further
course will be nothing else but the reflection of

1 K. Marx and F. Engels, Selected Works, Vol. I, p. 513.

170 A. P. SHEPTULIN

the historical course in abstract and theoretically

consistent form; a corrected reflection but cor­
rected according to laws furnished by the real
course of history itself. .. Z'1

j) Analysis and Synthesis

In the process of cognising the surrounding

world, man constantly singles out in his mind
certain aspects of the object he studies and syn­
thesises them into combinations in order to obtain
new knowledge. The mental division of the object
of cognition into its separate parts (properties) is
analysis; the mental combination of the separated
parts (properties) into one tvhole is synthesis.
The forms and methods of research change as
knowledge develops and passes from one stage
to another. This holds true for both analysis and
synthesis. They do not always remain the same-
they change as cognition develops.
So-called direct analysis and synthesis take
place during the initial stages in the development
of cognition. They are characterised by a direct,
purely mechanical breakdown of the whole under
study into separate aspects or parts and a direct,
mechanical union of the separate aspects or parts
into particular combinations. Here, analysis is
effected irrespective of synthesis, and vice versa.
There is no intrinsic link between the two. This
type of analysis and synthesis ensures initial famil­
iarisation with the object, but goes no further.
A change in cognition from recording the prop­
1 K. Marx and F. Engels, Selected Works, Vol. I, p. 514.
 KNOWLEDGE 171

erties and connections observed on the surface

of phenomena to revealing the causes underlying
them, gives rise to a new, reflexive type of analy­
sis and synthesis.
Reflexive analysis is not confined to a mechani­
cal breakdown of a whole into its component parts,
but rather involves breaking it up into cause and
effect. Reflexive synthesis is not a mechanical com­
bination of separated parts-it is a combination
reflecting a cause-and-effect connection. This con­
nection is a pivot for the analytical and synthetical
activity of the brain. It directs and unites this
activity.
The above type of analysis and synthesis helps
explain separate parts of the whole under study
and reveal their nature and causes. It is unable,
however, to reproduce all its aspects and connec­
tions in their natural interdependence, i.e. repro­
duce its essence in the mind. A need for a new type
of analysis and synthesis arises at the stage of
cognising the essence of objects. This new type is
called progressive or system-structural analysis
and synthesis.
A characteristic feature of system-structural
analysis and synthesis is that the break-up of the
whole into separate parts and the combining of
the parts into one whole corresponds to the actual
breakdown of a material entity into separate
phenomena, qualitatively definite aspects and prop­
erties and to the actual, natural interconnection
of these aspects and properties. In this case, anal­
ysis and synthesis form a natural unity and are
effected at one and the same time. An analytical
172 A. P. SHEPTULIN

action here is also a synthetical one. For example,

the deduction of such phenomena of bourgeois
society as money, surplus value, labour force, and
capital from the development of commodity rela­
tions is not only analysis, but also synthesis, not
only a breakdown of the object under study into
its separate manifestations, but also a reproduc­
tion of the whole system of connections arising
between these phenomena.
Lenin's study of the imperialist stage of capital­
ism may serve as an example of the use of the
above types of analysis and synthesis in scientific
knowledge. In the course of this study Lenin ana­
lysed primarily available material on imperialism
and singled out the separate aspects distinguish­
ing it from the pre-monopoly stage. He found the
following characteristic features of imperialism:
the concentration of capital and the formation of
monopolies, a change in the role of banks, the
emergence of finance capital, the export of capital,
the division of the world among capitalist coun­
tries. At this stage of his study Lenin combined
the characteristic features of imperialism he had
singled out into one whole, not in the sequence
reflecting their natural necessary interdependence,
but in that in which they had been treated in the
economic studies he analysed. In this case Lenin
used direct analysis and synthesis.
Lenin used reflexive analysis and synthesis to
expose the cause of a certain feature of the im­
perialist stage of development and to define its
nature. This type of analysis and synthesis enabled
him to establish, for instance, that monopoly arises
 KNOWLEDGE 173

as a result of excessive concentration of produc­

tion.
After explaining the specific properties of im­
perialism he had singled out, Lenin found the
main determining aspect underlying all the other
properties of imperialism: the emergence and
domination of monopolies. This is the basis under­
lying the development of the imperialist essence
of capitalism. It is, as Lenin put it, the general
and main law of the given stage of capitalism.1
Lenin took monopoly as his point of departure,
traced its development and reproduced the essence
of imperialism in a system of economic concepts.
He pointed out that the appearance of monopoly
in production resulted in the elimination of the
predominance of free competition and made it
possible to ensure approximate accounting of pro­
duction, markets, raw material sources and their
division among monopoly associations. The emer­
gence of banking monopolies turned the banks
from modest intermediaries into almighty man­
agers of "almost the whole of the money capital
of all the capitalists and small businessmen.. .".2
This led to the merger of banks and industry and
the rise of finance capital, the domination of the
financial oligarchy, the formation of surplus capital
in some countries and the consequent export of
capital to other countries, which has virtually
resulted in the division of the world into spheres
of influence among the largest capitalist countries.

1 See V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 22, pp. 200-01.

2 V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 22, p. 210.
174 A. P. SHEPTULIN

Taking monopoly as a basis for deducing the

features of the imperialist stage in the develop­
ment of capitalism, Lenin singled out certain par­
ticular aspects of the whole under study and put
them within the context of their necessary inter­
connection and interdependence that express the
actual essence of imperialism. Any train of thought
here is both analytic and synthetic, i.e. both the
breakdown of the whole into separate aspects and
the combination of the separate aspects into one
comprehensive whole. All this indicates that, at this
stage of his research, Lenin used system-structural
analysis and synthesis.
The above example shows that each of the types
of analysis and synthesis discussed is connected
with a particular stage in the development of
knowledge and has its own essential sphere of
use.
Chapter VI

CATEGORIES
OF MATERIALIST DIALECTICS

1. The Concept of Category

In the process of cognising objective reality,
people form concepts, through which they express
and record the reflected properties and connections
of the objects and phenomena of the surrounding
world and which are ideal images of these objects
and phenomena. Concepts reflecting the most
essential and fundamental aspects and connections
in a field of phenomena are called categories.
Each science has its own categories. The catego­
ries of political economy, for instance, are: com­
modity, money, value, surplus value, labour force,
profit, etc.; the categories of biology are: organ­
ism, medium, assimilation, dissimilation, heredity,
species, genus, etc.; the categories of juridical
science are: law, legal norm, act, legal relation,
legal offence, etc. Philosophy, too, has its catego­
ries. As distinct from the categories of special
sciences, philosophical categories reflect not mere­
ly the most essential properties and connections,
but universal properties and connections, i.e. those
inherent in all the phenomena of reality and
knowledge. Philosophical categories are universal
concepts applicable to any field of reality. They
include, for instance, such concepts as the indi­
176 A. P. SHEPTULIN

vidual and the general, quantity and quality, cause

and effect, content and form, necessity and acci­
dent (chance), law, essence and phenomenon, and
contradiction.
Categories did not all appear simultaneously
in the course of history. Each of them is connected
with an absolutely definite stage in the develop­
ment of knowledge. Categories record the univer­
sal aspects and relations revealed at a certain
stage of development, and reflect the peculiarities
of this stage, being support points that enabled
man to rise above nature. In other words, cate­
gories that reflect the universal aspects and con­
nections of the outside world are, at the same time,
stages in the development of knowledge, moments
marking the passage of knowledge from one stage
to another. Lenin wrote: "Man is confronted with
a web of natural phenomena. Instinctive man, the
savage, does not distinguish himself from nature.
Conscious man does distinguish, categories are
stages of distinguishing, i.e. of congnising the
world... Z'1
Besides, the categories of dialectics are also
forms of thinking. They serve as a medium for
comprehending the actual material obtained in
the course of scientific research and the practical
transformation of reality. The most essential
characteristics of an object are revealed during
the mental processing of scientific data. Specific­
ally, when we examine data in the light of the
categories of the general and the particular, we

1 V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 38, p. 93.

 CATEGORIES OF MATERIALIST DIALECTICS 177

establish the identity and distinctions of the object

we are studying in comparison to other objects;
when we view them in the light of the categories
of causality and necessity, we establish the object's
causal dependence and its necessary and acciden­
tal aspects and connections; and when we analyse
them from the standpoint of the categories of
quantity and quality, we discover the object's
quantitative and qualitative characteristics and
under certain conditions also their interrelation­
ship.
Since categories reflect and record the universal
aspects and connections of reality, i.e. the univer­
sal forms of being, they make up the content of
dialectics; since they are also the points of depar­
ture or stages in the process of cognition, they
are part of the theory of knowledge; moreover,
since they are forms of thinking, they are objects
of study for dialectical logic.

2. The Interconnection of Categories

According to the theory of dialectical material­
ism, material entities (things, objects) are univer­
sally interconnected and interdependent. They
constantly interact with one another, interpene­
trate and, under certain conditions, pass into one
another. For this reason the concepts through
which man cognises the surrounding world must
be interconnected in a law-governed way. They
must be flexible to the point where they can
change into one another. Without this they cannot
reflect reality. This is why we must study cate-
12-1557
178 A. P. SHEPTULIN

gories not separately, not alongside one another,

but in their natural interconnection and interde­
pendence, as the necessary links of one logical
system in which each category has its own definite
place.
The problem of categories was thoroughly
studied by Hegel. As distinct from his predeces­
sors, Hegel put categories on an historical footing,
presented them in motion and development, in
their dialectical interconnection and interdepen­
dence. True, Hegel did this within the confines of
idealism, applying his theory to the development
of pure thought, the Absolute Idea, that existed
somewhere outside and independently of man and
the material world. The fallacy of the point of
departure in developing the system of categories
inevitably influenced the result. Hegel's idealistic
approach to categories gave rise to a multitude
of artificial constructions that distorted reality.
Even so, Hegel succeeded in developing a system
of categories reproducing quite a number of deep
universal laws and connections and the essence of
dialectics.
It was Marxist philosophy, however, that
supplied a consistently materialist and scientific
solution to the problem of the interconnection
of categories. Marx thoroughly developed it
for political economy in his Capital and Lenin
applied it to philosophy in his Philosophical Note­
books.
Lenin viewed categories as the universal forms
for reflecting reality and stages in the development
of social knowledge and practice. He deduced
 CATEGORIES OF MATERIALIST DIALECTICS 179

their interconnection from the laws governing

being and knowledge and considered that their
relationship reflected the relationship of the uni­
versal aspects and connections of reality, expres­
sing thereby the necessary development of knowl­
edge from lower to higher stages.
The appearance of every new category is con­
ditioned by development of knowledge. It emerges
because knowledge penetrates ever deeper into
the world of phenomena, thus exposing new
universal aspects and connections which no longer
correspond to existing categories and require new
categories in which to be expressed and recorded.
Once it has emerged, a new category enters into
necessary relations or connections with existing
categories, and thus takes its specific place in the
totality of knowledge, the place provided by the
continuous course of cognition. If categories are
arranged in sequence of emergence in the process
of the development of knowledge and social prac­
tice, we can determine their necessary interrela­
tionship and interconnection.
Let us briefly consider the sequence by which
man comprehended the universal aspects and con­
nections of his environment, and also the passage
of cognition from one category to another.
In contrast to animals, man begins to distin­
guish himself from his environment and to com­
prehend his specific being, which differs from that
of the outside world. Having comprehended his
being and the being of the outside world, man also
comprehends his separateness, his certain isola­
tion, just like the separateness and isolation of
ir
180 A. P. SHEPTULIN

the objects of the outside world. People developed

the concept separate (a separate object, phenom­
enon or thing) to express this separateness of
being.
Alongside comprehension of his isolation and
certain degree of independence, man becomes
aware of his connection with the outside world
and the interconnection of objects in his environ­
ment. As a living creature, man needs food, drink,
shelter, means of defence, and so on. The satisfac­
tion of these and other needs presupposes man's
intrinsic connection with the outside world and
the use of certain natural objects.
The interconnection of objects, however, presup­
poses their interaction and, consequently, a cer­
tain change in them, i.e. motion. Since intercon­
nection is inherently tied up with motion, man,
having comprehended the interconnection of
objects, had to comprehend that these objects
change, i.e. they are in motion.
As cognition passed from the separate to the
interconnection, interaction and motion of separ­
ate objects and bodies, man comprehended other
universal aspects and connections of reality, spe­
cifically the individual and the general.
Man perceived each separate object he encoun­
tered for the first time in his practical activities
as the only one of its kind, as something he had
not seen before, i.e. the individual. As he discov­
ered other objects that satisfied his particular
need, he passed over (both practically and mental­
ly) from one (single) object to several objects, to
"the many". Comparison of these many objects
 CATEGORIES OF MATERIALIST DIALECTICS 181

with one another, both practically and mentally,

revealed their identity (similarity) which under­
lay the formation of general notions and then
general concepts.
Quality and quantity are cognised at the same
stage. When man perceives a separate object as
the single and the only one of its kind, and seeks
to comprehend what it is like, he reflects it from
the point of view of quality. Inasmuch as the
object in this case is considered as such, in itself,
irrespective of other objects, its quantitative
characteristic is indiscernible and, in fact, merges
with quality. However, as cognition passes from
one object to many and as their identity (similar­
ity) and differences are established by compari­
son, the quantitative aspect begins to emerge.
Each property of an object bifurcates, as it were,
i.e. alongside what it really is, it reveals its mag­
nitude, the extent to which it manifests itself
and spreads-in short, it reveals its quantity.
The qualitative and quantitative characteristics
thus revealed do not at first show their interde­
pendence. They seem to be neutral with respect to
each other. As the knowledge of various phenom­
ena becomes deeper, however, people learn that
separate qualitative aspects are interconnected,
just like separate quantitative characteristics.
Simultaneously, they reveal an intrinsic connec­
tion between quality and quantity. They notice
that a strictly definite quality corresponds to a
definite quantity, and vice versa.
The knowledge of interconnection between the
categories of quality and quantity enables people
182 A. P. SHEPTULIN

to comprehend that changes in one phenomenon

cause certain changes in another. That which en­
genders something else and underlies its emer­
gence is a cause; that which is engendered and
emerges is an effect. People's cognition of the
interconnection between separate qualitative and
quantitative aspects thus brings them to the re­
velation of causality and also to the need for
forming the categories of cause and effect.
People find that cause and effect are so con­
nected that the appearance of a cause inevitably
leads to the appearance of an effect, while the
absence of a cause results in the absence of an
effect. To put it differently, people discover that
the connection between a cause and its effect is
of a necessary nature. Necessity is taken first as
a property of the cause-and-effect connection. As
knowledge develops, however, the content of the
concept of necessity becomes more specific and
extensive. People begin to consider as necessary
not only causal connections, but also any con­
nections inevitably occurring under certain con­
ditions, and not only connections, but also aspects
and properties that are necessarily inherent in the
material entity being studied.
Necessary connections discovered in the course
of the development of knowledge are often formed
in science as laws, i.e. they are comprehended
through the category of law, which expresses and
reflects general, stable and necessary connections
and relations.
The transition to the categories of content and
form proceeds in parallel with the development
 CATEGORIES OF MATERIALIST DIALECTICS 183

of knowledge from causality to necessity and law.

This is because cognition does not confine itself
to exposing one separate cause-and-effect connec­
tion. Practice which calls for ever deeper and
more complete knowledge of the objects of the
outside world, causes cognition to proceed from
one cause-and-effect connection to another and
from explanation of one property of the material
entity to another. This necessitates a new category,
namely that of content, which constitutes the total­
ity of all interactions and consequent changes in
the given material entity. But by cognising interac­
tions and consequent changes in a material entity,
we realise and gradually reproduce in our minds
first the external, and then the internal ways of
combining the elements of content, a relatively
stable structure within which all the interactions
and changes inherent in the material entity take
place, i.e. iotm.
The separation of the necessary and the acci­
dental during the development of knowledge and
the discovery of separate laws that manifest them­
selves in the whole under study, do not constitute
adequate knowledge, for they relate to separate
aspects and connections. However many aspects
and connections of the object under study have
been cognised and explained, their sum total can­
not supply us with a truly complete knowledge of
it, because it is merely a mechanical sum of sepa­
rate aspects. A material entity, however, is not
simply a sum total of its inherent properties, but
rather their integral whole, their dialectical unity.
This makes it necessary to unite connections in
184 A. P. SHEPTULIN

one integral whole and to deduce them from one

principle.
The reproduction of all the necessary aspects
and laws of the whole under study in their natural
interconnection and interdependence constitutes
the knowledge of essence.
The comprehension of essence begins from
finding the basis-the basic (most essential) aspects
and relations. These underlie the formation, func­
tioning and direction of the changes and develop­
ment of all other aspects of a particular material
entity. For this reason, taking them as a point of
departure, we can gradually reproduce in our
minds the interconnection existing between its
other aspects, too, and find out the place, role and
importance of each.
True, in order to achieve this the basic aspects
(relations) and the material entity itself must be
studied as they emerge and develop. This, in its
turn, makes it necessary to find the source of
development, the motive force driving the ma­
terial entity forward and underlying its transi­
tion from one stage of development to another.
This source of development is contradiction, the
unity and "struggle" oi opposite aspects and
trends.
Having revealed the contradictions inherent in
the basis and traced their development and the
consequent change in the other aspects of the
whole under study, we inevitably note that devel­
opment is effected through the negation of certain
qualitative states by others, the retention of all
the positive in the negated states, and the
 CATEGORIES OF MATERIALIST DIALECTICS 185

repetition of past experience on a new, higher

basis.
Thus, the essence of phenomena is cognised
through discovering their basis, revealing its con­
tradictory aspects, tracing their struggle and the
consequent development of the given phenomenon
through the negation of one qualitative character­
istic by another.
The above pattern in the development of knowl­
edge from one category to another can be traced
in the development of science. Inasmuch as cate­
gories are necessary stages in the development of
social cognition, the transition from one category
to another is inevitably observed in any field of
knowledge.

3. The Interconnection of Phenomena

a) Connection and Relation as Concepts

Connection is a relation between phenomena or

the aspects of one and the same phenomenon. Not
any relation, however, is a connection. Only a
relation that presupposes the dependence oi the
changes in one phenomenon or aspect on changes
in other phenomena or aspects is called a connec­
tion. People's social awareness, for instance, is
directly connected with the material conditions of
their life, a change in which inevitably causes a
corresponding change in their consciousness. Liv­
ing organisms and the environment they live in
are also to a certain extent connected. A change
in the environment has a definite effect on living
186 A. P. SHEPTULIN

organisms. Conversely, changes in the animal and

vegetable world cause corresponding changes in
the environment.
Besides connections, relation includes isolation
(separateness) which is a relation between phenom­
ena or the aspects of one and the same phenom­
enon, when changes in some of them do not
involve changes in others. A book-cover and the
book's content, for instance, are in a state of isola­
tion. A change of the book-cover does not involve
a change of its content, and vice versa.
Although connection and isolation are different
types of relations, they exist together, in union,
rather than separately. The existence of connection
involves the existence of isolation, and vice versa.
Any material entity (phenomenon or property),
although relatively independent, qualitatively iso­
lated, and existing separately from other material
entities (phenomena or properties), is also con­
nected with them. It depends on them with respect
to some relations and is independent with respect
to others. It undergoes changes that both cause
and do not cause corresponding changes in other
material entities (phenomena or aspects).
Social production, for instance, is connected
with geography. The former's level and develop­
ment trends depend on the fertility of the land,
natural resources (including water), climatic con­
ditions, and so on. When these change correspond­
ing changes occur in production. At the same time,
production is independent of the geographical en­
vironment and develops in accordance with its
own laws, rather than geographical ones. Its
 CATEGORIES OF MATERIALIST DIALECTICS 187

characteristic features and forms depend on the

level of development of the productive forces,
rather than on environmental changes.
Or take another example. An animal or veget­
able organism is connected with the environment,
being at the same time isolated, separated from it.
Some changes in the environment, particularly
those involving aspects connected with the organ­
ism's vital activity, result in corresponding
changes, while others do not.
To sum up, connection and isolation (separate­
ness) exist in unity. True, they do not always
manifest themselves equally. In some cases (rela­
tions), connection plays a leading part, while in
others-isolation. This factor has become the basis
for distinguishing in practice and knowledge
whether phenomena are interconnected or not.
In reality, however, all phenomena are both in­
terconnected and isolated, i.e. they are in a state
of separateness or isolation.

b) A Critique
of Idealist and Metaphysical Views of Connection

Certain notions of the separate, isolated existence

of phenomena and their interconnection appeared
together with the emergence of philosophy. Thus,
the first Greek philosophers took interconnection
as the basic principle for explaining various
phenomena. By taking a substance or natural
phenomenon (air, water, fire) as the original
source, Greek philosophers showed that all phenom­
ena had appeared as a result of certain changes
188 A. P. SHEPTULIN

in that substance (phenomenon) and that, being

but different states of one and the same nature,
they were intrinsically interconnected, passing
from one into another and into the original source.
Heraclitus was especially explicit in advancing
the idea that the phenomena of reality were uni­
versally interconnected. He thought fire to be
the original source of everything and the basis of
all connection and separateness.
The first Greek philosophers regarded intercon­
nection as the interpassage of phenomena into
each other. Later, however, this view was succeed­
ed by another one, according to which intercon­
nection was a mechanical joining and unjoining
of the same immutable elements. This view was
held by Empedocles and Anaxagoras, among
others. Aristotle overcame the limitations of this
view. He understood interconnection as the inter­
dependence of things. Aristotle wrote: "All rela­
tives have correlatives... "l He was the first to
declare the concept "relation" as a category, thus
lending it the necessary generality.
Kant developed the category "relations" and
showed that it included both connection and sepa­
rateness. Studying this problem as applied to the
correlation of concepts in a judgement, he noted
that they were both interconnected and isolated,
that any judgement recorded both the presence of
connection and its absence. The judgement "a wolf
is an animal", Kant said, expresses the fact that

1 Aristotle, Categories (Logic), Vol. 1, Chicago, 1952,

p. 11.
 CATEGORIES OF MATERIALIST DIALECTICS 189

the wolf is connected with animals and also that

it is separated from all the other animals, except
its kin, i.e. the wolves. Kant advanced and devel­
oped a correct point of view, yet he made one
retrogressive step. He rejected the interconnection
of phenomena in objective reality, believing that
this interconnection was introduced into the realm
of phenomena by the thinking subject. Hegel
objected to this. In his opinion, interconnection,
relations are inherent in things. It is through rela­
tions that they reveal their essence. Hegel wrote:
"All that exists is in relation and this relation is
what is true in any existence."1 Advancing this
idea, however, Hegel was far from materialist in
his views. He thought that relations were ideal
by nature and were moments or stages in the
development of the Absolute Idea that had existed
outside of and prior to the material world and
sensuous objects.
Alongside the dialectical conception of relations,
the history of philosophy records a metaphysical
view whose adherents absolutised isolation and
separateness and virtually denied the interconnec­
tion of phenomena.
Bacon and Locke developed this view in various
ways and it is still shared by some modern bour­
geois philosophers who adhere to the pluralist
theory that each object is something self-contained,
and therefore there can be no connection between
objects.

1 Ceorg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel's Werke, Berlin, 1840,

Sechster Band, S. 267.
190 A. P. SHEPTULIN

c) The Universality
of the Interconnection Between Phenomena

As distinct from metaphysicists, who deny the

interconnection of phenomena in the surrounding
world, and idealists, who deduce this interconnec­
tion from man's consciousness, dialectical mate­
rialists believe that interconnection is a universal
form of being inherent in all phenomena of reality.
All the existing in the world are links of one mat­
ter, "an interconnected totality of bodies".1
The Earth, for instance, is connected in a certain
way with the Sun and other planets of the solar
system. The Sun is a link in the Galaxy, which
includes a multitude of other stars that are inter­
connected. The Galaxy, in its turn, is part of a
still greater system and is connected within it
with quite a number of other star systems, and
thus ad infinitum. The situation is similar when
we penetrate into the depths of matter. Any
celestial body is a totality of different substances,
interconnected in one way or another; any
substance is a totality of interconnected molecules;
any molecule is a totality of interconnected atoms;
any atom is a totality of interconnected "element­
ary" particles. Celestial bodies are connected
through gravitational fields. The substances that
make up a particular body, as well as the atoms
that form a molecule, and electron shells and
atomic nuclei are connected through gravitational
and electromagnetic fields.
Animate and inanimate nature, the animal and
1 F. Engels, Dialectics oi Nature, p. 70.
 CATEGORIES OF MATERIALIST DIALECTICS 191

vegetable world, nature and society, various

aspects of society's life, and the phenomena of
consciousness and knowledge are also connected
in a certain way.
To put it shortly, everything is interconnected
in reality, "each thing (phenomenon, process, etc.)
is connected with every other".1

4. The Individual, the Particular

and the Universal
a) The Concept of the Individual and the General

Each phenomenon is connected in one way or

another with an infinite number of other phenom­
ena, which interact with it and thus introduce
corresponding changes into it. These changes are
different in each phenomenon, inasmuch as every
phenomenon has its own, special environment
which differs in some way from others and in­
asmuch as it has its own, special sequence of
preceding phenomena (its own history), which
differs in some way from other sequences. The
uniqueness of the changes occurring in any sep­
arate phenomenon at any given moment derives
from the uniqueness of its characteristic features.
Everything that is unique in a phenomenon, that
is inherent only in this phenomenon and is absent
in others, constitutes the individual.
The papillary patterns of the surface of the
fingertips, for instance, are individual because they

1 V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 38, p. 222.

192 A. P. SHEPTULIN

are unique to each person. It is not fortuitous that

law-enforcement agencies use fingerprints to
identify criminals. The unique features of culture,
psychology, language, traditions and customs are
specific for each nation.
Each separate phenomenon, while possessing
unique features (properties, aspects), is part of
integral matter, a link in the endless chain of its
development. Each phenomenon must therefore
possess, besides its unique features, something
that is repeated and inherent in other phenomena,
too. That which is repeated in phenomena, which
is inherent not in one, but in many phenomena, is
called the general.
The fact that production relations condition the
essence of every individual, the fact that he is a
reasonable creature, that his consciousness reflects
his social being, etc. constitute the general for this
individual, for all this is inherent not only in him,
but also in other people. A common territory and
a common language make up, among other things,
the general for a nation, for these features are
characteristic of all nations.

b) A Critique of Metaphysical and Idealist Views

of the Individual and the General

Two trends-realist and nominalist-are clearly

distinguishable in the history of philosophy with
respect to the question of the interconnection be­
tween the individual and the general.
Realists maintained that the general existed
independently of the individual, while the indi-
 CATEGORIES OF MATERIALIST DIALECTICS 193

vidual depended on the general, was engendered

by it and was secondary, temporary and transient.
Alfred Whitehead, a modern bourgeois philos­
opher, provides a similar solution to the problem
of the interconnection between the individual and
the general. He declares general ideal essences to
be eternal objects existing somewhere beyond
space and time. Individual objects, he says, appear
due to the transition of the corresponding ideal
essences into the world of space and time and
disappear as soon as these essences abandon the
sensuous world and return to the other, ideal
world.
Nominalists did not believe that the general
existed in objective reality. Only the individual,
they asserted, exists in reality, whereas the general
exists exclusively in people's minds, in their con­
sciousness. The general is no more than a name
for a number of individual objects.
The nominalist viewpoint is developed by some
modern bourgeois philosophers, such as Stuart
Chase and Cassius Keyser. Chase, for instance,
declares the concept of the general to be a symbol
that has nothing to do with reality. “We are con­
tinually confusing," he writes, "the label with the
nonverbal object, and so giving a spurious validi­
ty to the word, as something alive... ,"1 This, he
reasons, makes people believe that abstract gene­
ral concepts, such as freedom, justice, democracy,
capitalism, really exist, while there is not, nor can
be, anything of the kind in the surrounding world,

1 Stuart Chase, The Tyranny of Words, N.Y., 1938, p. 9.

•3—1557
194 A. P. SHEPTULIN

for only individual objects and phenomena exist

in reality.1
The history of philosophy has recorded attempts
to overcome the onesidedness of the realist and
nominalist solutions to the problem of the inter­
connection between the individual and the general.
Such attempts were made by Duns Scotus in the
Middle Ages and by Bacon, Locke, and Feuerbach
in the New Age. But these philosophers, too,
could not supply a consistently scientific solution.
They believed that only the individual really
existed, whereas the general existed only as an
aspect or moment of the individual.

c) Interconnection
Between the Individual and the General

Dialectical materialism succeeded in overcom­

ing the weak points inherent in the realist and
nominalist theories on this problem. According to
dialectical materialism, neither the general nor the
individual exists independently, "as such". Only
separate objects, phenomena and processes that
are a unity of the individual and the general, the
recurrent and the unique, exist independently. The
general and the individual exist only in separate
objects or phenomena as aspects or moments of
them. Interconnection between the separate
(object, process) and the general manifests itself
as the interconnection between the whole and a
part, where the separate is the whole and the

1 Stuart Chase, The Tyranny of Words, N. Y„ 1938, p. 9.

 CATEGORIES OF MATERIALIST DIALECTICS 195

general is the part. Hence, "every general only

approximately embraces all the individual objects"
and "every individual enters incompletely into the
general",1 inasmuch as, besides the general, sepa­
rate objects possess the individual, and alongside
their recurrent properties they possess unique
qualities.
Moreover, every separate object is not external
-it emerges, exists for a certain time and then
turns into another separate object, which turns
into a third one, and so on ad infinitum. Every
chemical element, for instance, can turn into
another chemical element under certain conditions;
every "elementary" particle can turn into another
"elementary" particle; a substance-into a field;
a field-into a substance, and so on. It follows that
"every individual is connected by thousands of
transitions with other kinds of individuals (things,
phenomena, processes)" and that "the individual
exists only in the connection that leads to the
general".2 Possessing the ability to turn, under
relevant conditions, into another separate thing,
it contains in itself (in its nature) the possible
properties of all these other separate things (ma­
terial entities, phenomena, processes) and for this
reason can be regarded as identical to them, i.e.
the general.
Existing in separate objects (processes, phenom­
ena), the individual and the general are intrin­
sically interconnected and pass into one another

1 V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 38, p. 361.

2 Ibid.
13*
196 A. P. SHEPTULIN

under certain conditions-the individual becomes

the general, and vice versa. This can be easily
observed from analysis of the appearance and
disappearance of certain properties in the material
entities of the animate world. When they settle
in different places, for instance, individual organ­
isms find themselves under different environmen­
tal conditions and acquire certain adapted features
which, under the impact of specific conditions,
turn unto general features characterising first a
variety, and then the species as a whole. If we
take individual animals of the same species from
different localities with either distinct environ­
mental features or a different degree of manifes­
tation, we may observe all the stages in the devel­
opment of a particular feature from an individual
deviation to a general feature of the species, and
vice versa-from the general to the individual.

d) The General and the Particular

To reveal the individual, the object under study

should be compared with all the other objects, but
in practice this is impossible. For this reason, an
object is normally compared only with some def­
inite objects. This makes it necessary to compare
the general with the particular, rather than with
the individual.
Indeed, by comparing one object with another
we establish their similarity and difference. But
that which distinguishes the objects from one
another constitutes their particular, while that
•ti
 CATEGORIES OF MATERIALIST DIALECTICS 197

which indicates their similarity constitutes the

general.
By comparing the individual with the particu­
lar, it is easy to see that the individual always
plays the role of the particular. Being a totality
of the properties inherent only in the given object,
it will always distinguish this object from all other
objects with which it is compared.
While the individual always plays the part of
the particular, the role of the general as regards
the particular is somewhat different. In some cases
it plays the role of the particular, while in others
it plays its own role. When it indicates the com­
pared object's difference from other objects, it
acts as the particular; when, however, it indicates
the similarity of the compared objects, it acts as
the general. For example, the fact that the trans­
formation of privately owned industry (enterp­
rises belonging to the national bourgeoisie) in the
Socialist Republic of Vietnam (SRV) was effected
gradually, by setting up mixed state-capitalist
enterprises, is the general, since this also hap­
pened in other countries, such as the German
Democratic Republic (GDR). This fact, however,
becomes the particular if we compare the SRV
with the Soviet Union. Moreover, the fact that the
dictatorship of the proletariat in the SRV has
taken the form of a people's democracy is also a
general moment, for this form of proletarian dic­
tatorship exists in a number of other socialist
countries, such as Bulgaria and Rumania. But this
aspect will constitute the particular if we com­
pare the SRV not with Bulgaria and Rumania, but
198 A. P. SHEPTULIN

with the USSR, where the dictatorship of the pro­

letariat has assumed the form of a republic of
Soviets.
Not everything general, however, may play two
roles-its own and that of the particular. There is
a type of the general that excludes the role of the
particular: this is the universal. Since it is inher­
ent in all the objects and phenomena of the real
world, it cannot be used to distinguish one object
or phenomenon from another. It will always point
out the similarity or identity of the objects com­
pared. Such characteristic features of a thing, for
instance, as the presence of necessary and acciden­
tal properties, content and form, the individual
and the general, cannot play the role of the par­
ticular. They do not make it possible to differen­
tiate the compared object from other objects,
because all the objects possess these features.
Thus, the individual always plays the role of
the particular, whereas the general plays it de­
pending on circumstances. When the general in­
dicates a difference between compared phenomena,
it takes on the role of the particular; when, how­
ever, it points out their similarity, it plays its own
role, i.e. the role of the general. The universal
cannot play the role of the particular-it always
indicates the similarity or identity of the phenom­
ena compared.
A correct use of laws governing the intercon­
nections between the general and the particular is
very important for implementing social transfor­
mations, especially building socialism. "In their
struggle," Leonid Brezhnev said at the 25th CPSU
 CATEGORIES OF MATERIALIST DIALECTICS 199

Congress, "Communists proceed from the general

laws governing the development of the revolu­
tion and the building of socialism and commu­
nism. ... A deep understanding of these general
laws, and reliance on them, in combination with
a creative approach and with consideration for
the concrete conditions in each separate country,
have been and remain the inalienable and distinc­
tive feature of a Marxist-Leninist."1

5. Cause and Effect

a) The Concept of Cause and Effect

In contrast to mechanistic materialists, who

looked for the cause of changes in a phenomenon
outside of it, in another phenomenon, dialectical
materialists believe that the cause of any change
and development in a phenomenon lies primarily
within the phenomenon itself, being the interac­
tion of its aspects or elements. Engels wrote that
"reciprocal action is the true causa finalis of
things".2
For example, the cause of the emergence, exis­
tence and development of a state is the interac­
tion (struggle) of antagonistic classes, whereas
the cause of a social revolution is the interaction
of advanced productive forces and backward rela­

1 L. I. Brezhnev, Report of the CPSU Central Commit­

tee and the Immediate Tasks of the Party in Home and
Foreign Policy. XXVth Congress of the CPSU, p. 37.
2 F. Engels, Dialectics of Nature, p. 231.
200 A. P. SHEPTULIN

tions of production. The cause of metal corrosion

is the chemical interaction of metals with gases
in the atmosphere and water and with substances
dissolved in it.
Thus, cause is the interaction of phenomena or
the aspects ot one and the same phenomenon un­
derlying corresponding changes. Effect is the
changes occurring in phenomena or the aspects
of a phenomenon as a result of their interaction.

b) A Critique of Idealist and Metaphysical Views

of Causality

The notion of cause appeared during the ini­

tial stages of the development of philosophy.
The views of the ancient philosophers were, how­
ever, vague and uncertain. They did not distin­
guish between cause and the first principle, mat­
ter constituting the basis of existing things and
phenomena. Thus, for instance, ancient Greek
philosophers first believed water (Thales), then
air (Anaximenes) and fire (Heraclitus) to be
cause. Later, however, cause was thought to be
eternal, immutable atoms with a different form,
position and order which produced different bo­
dies upon collision. Still later, all factors under­
lying the emergence of separate things were con­
sidered to be cause. Plato listed them as formless
matter, a definite idea, a mathematical relation,
and the idea of "supreme good" which he believed
to be a motive force. Aristotle saw four reasons
(causes) behind the emergence of things: mate­
rial, productive, formal, and purposive.
 CATEGORIES OF MATERIALIST DIALECTICS 201

Aristotle's understanding of causality was not

developed upon for a long time. Medieval phi­
losophy did not add anything to Aristotle's defi­
nition of these categories. Using his ideas of
formal and purposive causes, medieval philosophy
was preoccupied in substantiating the existence
of God and his creation of the sensuous world.
Bacon made one step forward in studying cau­
sality. Although he recognised Aristotle's four
causes, he thought one cause to be decisive-the
formal cause which, he believed, was inside a
thing, rather than outside it, as Aristotle had
maintained. This cause was the law governing the
existence of things.
In contrast to Bacon, Hobbes rejected formal
and purposive causes and recognised only two
causes in reality-productive (acting) and mate­
rial. The productive cause, he held, was the
totality of the properties of an active body causing
corresponding changes in a passive body, while
the material cause was the totality of the proper­
ties of a passive body. Defining cause, Bacon
emphasised that it belonged to the realm of the
internal, to the nature of a thing, whereas Hobbes
placed cause within the context of the external
and connected it with accidents-fickle and ines­
sential properties. He reduced it, in fact, to the
action of one body upon another.
Spinoza understood the limitations of this view
of causality and attempted to go further. He con­
sidered it necessary to look for the causes of the
existence and development of things within the
things themselves, which prompted him to ad­
202 A. P. SHEPTULIN

vance the concept causa sui (the cause of itself).

True, Spinoza believed that only the world as a
whole, infinite and absolute nature could con­
tain the cause of its existence in itself. As to
finite things, the causes of their existence lay not
inside but outside them in other finite things.
The idea that nature contained the cause of its
existence in itself and had no need of any exter­
nal force lying beyond it, was rather progressive
and played a substantial role in fighting against
idealism and religion. It was, however, inadequate
for overcoming the metaphysical concept of cau­
sality, which reduced the cause-and-effect con­
nection to the action of one body on another.
So it was not by chance that Spinoza's causa sui
did not change the concept of cause that existed
at the time. Natural scientists and philosophers
alike continued to believe cause to be the action
of some external force on a particular thing.
Newton, the 18th-century French materialist, and
some other thinkers adhered to this definition of
cause.
Reducing the cause of the existence and devel­
opment of a thing to the action of another thing
engenders a number of difficulties in knowledge.
Indeed, to cognise a thing means to cognise its
cause. If, however, the cause of the given thing
is concealed in another thing, in order to cognise
the former we have to cognise the latter. But cog­
nising this second thing presupposes revealing
its cause, which is hidden in a third thing. It fol­
lows that we have first to cognise the third thing.
But the same will happen again in this case, too.
 CATEGORIES OF MATERIALIST DIALECTICS 203

Thus, cognising any given thing on the basis of

the above definition of cause will inevitably lead
us to infinity and we shall have to cognise an in­
finite multitude of other things, which is, of course,
impossible. Spinoza understood this, and con­
cluded that single things could not be adequately
cognised.
True, the 18th-century philosophers and natur­
al scientists who advanced this metaphysical
principle of causality did not notice its inherent
contradiction. Guided by this method, they had
no doubt that it was possible to cognise the thing
under study. Moreover, they thought it to be ade­
quate for obtaining an exhaustive knowledge of
the Universe, for explaining any phenomenon
that had taken place in the past, and for fore­
casting any event in the future. The level of
development physics had reached at that time al­
lowed scientists to calculate the body's coordi­
nates and velocity at any moment of time in the
future on the basis of the known force acting upon
it, its coordinates and the velocity of its motion
at a given moment in time. Though this under­
standing of the cause-and-effect connection is
more or less acceptable for explaining a simple
mechanical movement, where changes in the state
of an isolated system are not connected with
changes in its quality, it is absolutely unaccept­
able for explaining other, more complex forms of
motion, the emergence of which is connected
with certain qualitative factors caused not so
much by the action of external forces, as by the
inner interactions in an object.
204 A. P. SHEPTULIN

Hegel was the first to see the limitations and

contradictory nature of the metaphysical view of
causality. Showing that the metaphysical ap­
proach to the cause-and-effect connection of
phenomena inevitably leads to bad infinity (i.e.
a mechanical repetition of one and the same pro­
perties without any progress in their develop­
ment), Hegel rejected the above concept of cau­
sality and offered a new solution. In his opinion,
cause and effect were in dialectical interaction. A
cause, being an active substance, acts upon a pas­
sive substance, thus giving rise to changes in it,
which makes it the effect. The latter, however,
exerts a known counteraction and thus turns from
the passive substance into an active one which
begins to act as a cause in relation to the first
substance.
Thus, owing to their interaction, cause and
effect turn into each other, exchange places and
act in relation to each other as cause and effect
simultaneously. By taking the interaction of cause
and effect as his point of departure, Hegel was
one of the first to discover their dialectical in­
terconnection.
Some bourgeois philosophers and scientists
still hold a mechanistic view of causality, which
explains their mistakes. There are modern physic­
ists who attempt to explain certain phenomena in
the behaviour of "elementary" particles on the
basis of this view. As a result, they arrive at the
conclusion that the principle of causality cannot
be applied to phenomena occurring in the mi­
croworld. This view is shared, for instance, by
 CATEGORIES OF MATERIALIST DIALECTICS 205

the US physicist Percy W. Bridgman. The law of

cause and effect, he says, does not operate in the
realm of elementary particles. Such assertions
are based on the fact that, in quantum mechanics,
it is impossible to simultaneously determine both
the position and the velocity of a microparticle
and to predict its behaviour. But the possibility
of an unambiguous prediction of an object's be­
haviour and the principle of causality are not one
and the same thing. The content of the principle
of causality is recognition of the fact that cause
underlies every phenomenon. Prediction of the
behaviour of an object, on the other hand, is the
result of knowledge of the cause-and-effect con­
nection, of a sufficiently exact fixation of the ini­
tial state of the object and the nature of its inter­
action with the environment. Quantum mechanics,
however, does not produce either the first or the
second result at the present stage of its develop­
ment. For this reason it expresses causality in
the microworld in the form of probability.
This does not imply, however, that there is no
causality in the microworld at all. It is there,
although it manifests itself in a form different
from that of mechanical motion. Causality mani­
fests itself in different ways depending on the field
of reality. For living matter, for instance, one
form is characteristic, for society's life-another,
for cognitive activity-yet another. The mechanist­
ic view of causality does not take account of this
multitude of forms and deals with only one-mecha­
nical. It is, therefore, unsuitable for expressing the
causality of phenomena in other forms of motion.
206 A. P. SHEPTULIN

c) The Interconnection Between Cause and Effect

As distinct from metaphysical materialism,

which rejects the interpassage of cause and effect,
dialectical materialism holds that they can change
places. That which at one time and in one rela­
tion is a cause, is an effect at another time and in
another relation, and vice versa. The struggle
between antagonistic classes, for example, is the
cause of the emergence of a state. Once estab­
lished, however, the state itself begins to exert an
influence on the class struggle. It defends some
classes and suppresses others, thereby causing
changes in this struggle. The state now acts as a
cause in relation to these changes, while the lat­
ter act as an effect in relation to the state.
Different causes may underlie one and the
same effect. For example, a higher productivity
of labour may be caused by improved means of
labour, higher skills of workers, a better organisa­
tion of labour, and so on.
As a rule, joint action by a plurality of causes,
instead of one, is behind every effect. This is
because no interaction is isolated from other in-
teractions-it is intrinsically connected with them,
affects and is affected by them. As a result, the
emergence of a phenomenon is affected not by
one but by a plurality of interactions. It is the
effect of a multitude of different causes.
Although every phenomenon is engendered by
several causes, their roles differ. Some causes are
necessary, and the phenomenon cannot come
about without them, while others, though they are
 CATEGORIES OF MATERIALIST DIALECTICS 207

involved in the phenomenon's appearance, are

not so important-the effect would come about
even in their absence.
Those causes without which the effect cannot
materialise are called basic, whereas those whose
absence does not exclude the appearance of the
effect are called non-basic.
For example, the basic cause of the economic
crises inherent in capitalist society is the contra­
diction between the social nature of production
and the private form of appropriation. An eco­
nomic crisis cannot develop without this cause.
On the other hand, non-basic causes may include
phenomena, such as currency devaluation, the
bankruptcy of a certain enterprise or a bank, or a
lower demand for a certain category of goods. An
economic crisis may develop without any of these
phenomena.
Besides basic and non-basic causes, there are
internal and external ones. The interaction of the
aspects of one and the same object causing cer­
tain changes is called an internal cause. The in­
teraction of different objects underlying cor­
responding changes in them is called an external
cause. The interaction of people in producing ma­
terial goods, for instance, is the internal cause
of the development of production, whereas the
impact of the geographical environment on pro­
duction is its external cause.
Internal causes are decisive for the emergence
and development of a material entity. External
causes affect its development only through inter­
nal causes.
208 A. P. SHEPTULIN

6. Necessity and Accident (Chance)

a) The Concept of Necessity and Accident (Chance)

The concept of necessity is developed on the

basis of a further study of causality, particularly
on the basis of understanding the necessary cha­
racter of the cause-and-effect connection. It is not
for nothing that some philosophers and natural
scientists equate necessity with causality, though
they are different concepts. Indeed, the concept
of causality reflects the dependence of some forms
of being upon others, their genetic connection.
The concept of necessity, on the other hand,
reflects the inevitability with which certain connec­
tions and properties appear under suitable condi­
tions.
Properties and connections are called necessary
if they have the cause of their existence in them­
selves and are conditioned by the inner nature of
the elements making up a phenomenon. Properties
and connections for which the cause is to be
found in other objects or phenomena, i.e. that are
conditioned by external circumstances, are called
accidental. Necessary aspects and connections
inevitably materialise under corresponding condi­
tions, whereas accidental properties and connec­
tions are not inevitable-they may or may not
occur.
The confrontation between the capitalist and
the worker on the labour market, for instance, is
a necessary phenomenon. It has been conditioned
by the class essence of both, by their social stand­
ing. The worker cannot survive without selling
 CATEGORIES OF MATERIALIST DIALECTICS 209

his labour to the capitalist, who cannot remain

what he is without hiring workers, without ex­
ploiting them.
The hiring of workers by capitalists is neces­
sary, while the turning of a worker, for instance,
into a capitalist is accidental, as this does not
follow from the essence of the worker, but is due
to some external circumstances.
Indeed, it does not follow from the workers'
social essence that they should turn into capital­
ists. On the contrary, according to this essence
workers should always remain workers. If one of
them becomes a capitalist, this is due to an acci­
dental concurrence of circumstances.

b) A Critique
of Idealist and Metaphysical Views
of Necessity and Accident (Chance)

Subjective idealists do not recognise the ob­

jective existence of necessity. It is, they say, a
characteristic feature of consciousness, of think­
ing.
Kant, for instance, sought to prove the absence
of necessity in nature. In his view, necessity is a
form of thinking introduced by man into nature
and the world of phenomena. Mach thought nec­
essity to be a logical connection. According to
Karl Pearson, an English philosopher and mathe­
matician, necessity exists only in the realm of
concepts. The modern German bourgeois philos­
opher Gunther Jacoby deduces necessity from
the logical connection of concepts. His reason­
ing is as follows: systems and their constituent
14-1557
210 A. P. SHEPTULIN

elements existing in the outside world are in a

state of repulsion. They are devoid of any binding
identity and necessary interconnection. The latter
exists in the identity of a system of concepts,
through which we are trying to reflect a partic­
ular system of the world. Essentially, Jacoby's
way of reasoning as regards necessity is a repeti­
tion of the Kantian viewpoint.
Some philosophers declare necessity to be a
conventional postulate accepted by people as a
reference point to facilitate explanation of the
world. There is nothing in nature, they maintain,
to correspond to this postulate; nature does not
have to behave to suit us.
If there were nothing in reality corresponding
to the reference points man uses in the process of
cognition, he would not be able to explain, let
alone change, a single phenomenon. His practi­
cal activities, however, show that man's notions
of the necessity of certain connections in things
correctly reflect reality and are, for this reason,
reference points for cognising and transforming
reality.
As distinct from idealists, materialists recog­
nise the objective existence of necessity and regard
it as one of the universal properties of material
entities and their connections. As regards logical
necessity, it is, materialists say, a picture, a copy,
a reflection of the relevant aspects and connec­
tions of the outside world.
While all materialists recognise the objective
existence of necessity, not all of them recognise
the objectivity of accident. Some of them believe
 CATEGORIES OF MATERIALIST DIALECTICS 211

it to have been invented by people to conceal their

ignorance of certain matters. When a man, they
say, does not know the cause of a certain phenom­
enon and cannot explain it, he declares it acci­
dental. This was the view held by Democritus,
Spinoza and Holbach, among others. Some think­
ers persist to this day in upholding a similar view.
As we cannot foresee some phenomena, they ar­
gue, we are inclined to consider them accidental.
For a person who knew everything, accident
would not exist as something unforeseen. Within
the confines of human knowledge, these philos­
ophers assert, the category of accident is a brief,
minimised expression of the fundamental insuf­
ficiency of the explanation of phenomena.
As a rule, rejecting the objectivity of accident
is connected with the universality of the cause-
and-effect connection and its necessary character.
If every phenomenon, the exponents of this view­
point say, has its cause necessarily bringing it to
life, all the phenomena that exist in the world
are necessary. There are no accidents and can be
none.
The idea of the universality of causality and
the necessary nature of the cause-and-effect con­
nection is correct. This, however, does not mean
that all phenomena existing in the world are
necessary, and that there is no chance. It is true
that every phenomenon is connected with the cause
that engenders it, but it is not this connection
that makes it necessary. The ruin of a harvest by
hail is a necessary result of the impact of ice on
plants, but this phenomenon is not considered
14’
212 A. P. SHEPTULIN

necessary. Neither is the death of a man overrun

by a car, although it is the inevitable result of the
blow of a certain force the man received upon
collision with the car. The necessity of a phenom­
enon stems from the necessity of the cause itself,
not from the necessary character of the cause-and-
effect connection, nor from the fact that it neces­
sarily follows from its cause.
Causes may be necessary or accidental. As noted
above, the interaction of phenomena or of the
elements making up one and the same phenomenon
is the cause of these phenomena. But these phe­
nomena or elements may encounter each other
and begin to interact owing to their inner nature,
as happens, for instance, when the proletariat and
the bourgeoisie meet on the labour market, or they
may hit upon each other and begin to interact by
accident, due to some circumstance. The hail or the
traffic accident referred to above are such ex­
amples. It does not follow from the inner nature
of plants that they should be exposed to ice dur­
ing their blossoming or ripening periods, nor
does it follow from the inner nature of man that
he should necessarily be hit by a car. Both phe­
nomena have been caused by the concurrence of
external circumstances.
Thus, the necessary character of the cause-and-
effect connection does not exclude the objective
existence of chance. The latter is a universal
form of being, just as necessity is.
 CATEGORIES OF MATERIALIST DIALECTICS 213

c) The Interconnection
Between Necessity and Accident (Chance)
Necessity and accident are a universal form of
being; they do not exist separately, but form an
intrinsic unity and are the moments or aspects
of one and the same thing. The one-to-one ra­
tio, for instance, of sodium and chlorine atoms in
a molecule of sodium chloride is necessary, inas­
much as it is determined by the inner nature of
this substance. But the fact that a given atom of
sodium interacted with a particular atom of chlo­
rine and formed this very molecule is accidental,
the result of certain external circumstances. Or
take another example: the growth of a plant from
a grain in a spot of fertile soil is necessary, but
the fact that the grain was planted in this very
spot is accidental. Other circumstances, such as
which plants grow nearby and which pests threat­
en it, are also accidental.
Being intrinsically connected with necessity,
accident (chance) is a form through which neces­
sity manifests itself and is supplemented. Neces­
sity finds its way through a maze of accidental
deviations which, although expressing it as a
tendency, introduce into a concrete process or
phenomenon many new aspects which do not fol­
low from necessity, but are conditioned by exter­
nal circumstances. Take, for instance, a necessary
connection, such as the dependence of a commod­
ity's price on its value-the amount of socially
necessary labour expended on its production. This
connection manifests itself in exchange operations
only in the form of a tendency, through constant
214 A. P. SHEPTULIN

deviations in one direction or another. These de- :

viations, however, being an expression of the
dependence of a commodity's price on its value, j
supplement the above necessary connection. In
particular, they also express the dependence of
the commodity's price on the supply-and-demand
ratio established on the market, i.e. on the con­
crete conditions of the sale and purchase of com­
modities.
As a phenomenon moves and develops, the ac­
cidental may turn into the necessary, and vice
versa. Take this example: subsistence economy
was dominant in primitive communal society.
Each community produced its own means of sub­
sistence and distributed them equally among its
members. All this was the necessary effect of a
low level of development of the productive forces,
which excluded any chance for producing a sur­
plus of material goods over and above the pro-7
ducers’ direct requirements. Under such condi­
tions, an exchange of one product for another
was exceptionally rare, an accident conditioned
by external circumstances, rather than by the in­
herent nature of the social system of the time.
Later, however, as the productive forces devel­
oped, the possibility arose of producing a greater
quantity of goods than was required for the direct
producer. This led to a growing exchange of one
type of product for another. As private ownership
of the means of production emerged, this ex­
change became a necessary aspect of a new eco­
nomic system arising from the ruins of primitive
society. As for subsistence economy, at a cer­
 CATEGORIES OF MATERIALIST DIALECTICS 215

tain stage in history it became totally extinct and

accidental. Thus, in the development process the
accidental becomes the necessary, and vice versa.

7. Law
a) The Concept of Law

Necessity exists in the form of the properties

and connections of phenomena. Definite necessary
connections or relations are called laws. Thus, a
law is that which cannot fail to take place under
given conditions. The law of value, for instance,
which expresses the dependence of a commodity's
price on the amount of socially necessary labour
expended on its production, operates inevitably
wherever there is commodity production. Or take
another example: the known chemical law of
constant proportions, that every substance has a
strictly definite and constant qualitative and quan­
titative composition, invariably manifests itself
in every substance, since the relations it expresses
stem from the very nature of the atoms that make
up the molecules of the given substance.
In saying that a law is a necessary connection,
we are not yet revealing all its specific features.
The fact is that not all necessary connections are
laws. Single (individual) connections, for instance,
cannot be laws. Only a general necessary connec­
tion, i.e. the one inherent in many phenomena,
is a law.
The law of half-decay, for example, according
to which over a certain period of time (specific
216 A. P. SHEPTULIN

for each substance) only half the substance de­

cays, whatever the amount, applies not for one
specific radioactive process, but for all similar
processes and all radioactive substances, i.e. it is
a general connection. This is true of any law of
nature, society or human thinking.
Being a general, repeated connection, law is
also a stable connection. It exists as long as the
corresponding form of the motion of matter (or
of a definite stage in its development) or thought
exists; it exists as long as the phenomena repre­
senting the given form of motion or thought exist.
For example, the law of dependence of people's
consciousness on their social being originated
together with the emergence of human society,
and will exist as long as society exists. Or take
another example: the law of value arose during
the decay of primitive communal society, it was
operative in slave and feudal societies, and is oper­
ative under capitalism and socialism. It will
cease to exist only after communism has been
built and the need for commodity production has
completely disappeared.
To sum up, a law is a necessary, general, and
stable connection of phenomena or of their as­
pects.

b) Dynamic and Statistical Laws

Being general connections (relations), laws

manifest themselves in many phenomena. This
manifestation, however, takes different forms.
Some laws apply to every phenomenon or mate­
 CATEGORIES OF MATERIALIST DIALECTICS 217

rial entity representing a certain form of motion

or field of reality, while others manifest themselves
only in a mass of phenomena. The first type are
usually called dynamic laws, the second-statistic­
al laws.
Ohm's Law, expressing the dependence of a
conductor's resistance on its composition, cross­
section area and length, is an example of a dynam­
ic law. This law embraces a great many different
conductors, and is true for each separate conductor
among them. Another example is Michael Fara­
day's discovery of the connection between the de­
position of a substance on electrodes and the
electric current passing through the electrolyte.
This connection expresses a proportional depen­
dence of the mass of the substance deposited on
the electrode on the amount of electricity passing
through the electrolyte, which is characteristic of
all cases when electricity passes through solutions,
and manifests itself in every case.
The interconnection discovered by Boyle and
Mariotte between changes in the pressure of a gas
and in its volume at a constant temperature is
statistical. This occurs only in a mass of chaotic­
ally moving molecules making up a certain volume
of gas. A separate molecule, however, is not sub­
ject to the law. Colliding with other molecules,
each molecule constantly changes its direction and
speed. As a result, the force of the impact of each
molecule on the walls of the vessel is accidental
and depends on a multitude of circumstances. A
certain regularity, however, finds its way through
this maze of changes in speeds of motion and.
218 A. P. SHEPTULIN

correspondingly, in the forces of impact produced

on the vessel walls by the various molecules mak­
ing up the given volume. This regularity is that
the pressure of a gas is inversely proportional to
its volume.
The laws of quantum mechanics pertaining to
the motion of microparticles are also statistical,
inasmuch as they are unable to determine the mo­
tion of every single particle, but only of a group
or multitude of particles.
Characteristically, dynamic laws make it pos­
sible to foresee fairly accurately the inception of
a certain phenomenon and changes in its proper­
ties or states. For example, the law of propor­
tional dependence of the mass of a substance
deposited on an electrode on the amount of elec­
tricity passing through the electrolyte makes it
possible to predict accurately the amount of sub­
stance deposited in any particular case.
As distinct from dynamic laws, statistical laws
do not allow scientists to make accurate predictions
of the occurrence or non-occurrence of a particu­
lar phenomenon, or the direction and nature of
changes in its properties. Statistical laws allow
them to determine only the probability of the
emergence or change of a certain phenomenon.

c) General and Particular Laws

Although all the laws are general connections

(relations), they apply to different groups of
phenomena. Some of them embrace a bigger
group, some-a smaller.
 CATEGORIES OF MATERIALIST DIALECTICS 219

The laws applying to a larger group of phenom­

ena are general laws in relation to those apply­
ing to the smaller, which are called particular
or specific laws.
The law of conformity of the relations of pro­
duction to the level of development of the pro­
ductive forces, for instance, is a general law in
relation to the law of average profit, inasmuch
as it operates in all socio-economic systems. The
law of average profit, on the other hand, is a par­
ticular law in relation to the former, because it
operates only within the framework of bourgeois
society.
The concepts of a general and a particular law
are relative. One and the same law may be both
general and particular, depending on the relation.
It will be particular in relation to a law embrac­
ing a wider range of phenomena and general
as regards a law operating in a narrower field.
The law of value, for instance, is particular as
regards the law of conformity of the relations of
production to the level of development of the pro­
ductive forces, since it does not operate in all so­
cieties (as the latter does), but only in those where
there is commodity production. It is, however,
general in relation to the law of surplus value,
inasmuch as the latter manifests itself in a nar­
rower field of phenomena, operating only in capi­
talist production and not extending to all com­
modity production.
Besides those laws that can act either as gen­
eral or as particular laws depending on concrete
relations, there are also laws that are general in
220 A. P. SHEPTULIN

all relations. These are called universal laws. They

apply to any field of reality. All other laws are
particular in relation to them, in so far as they
only pertain to some specific fields of reality.
Universal laws are studied by philosophy,
whereas laws connected with a specific form of the
motion of matter are dealt with by the special
sciences.

d) The Interconnection Between

General and Particnlar Laws

General laws may operate independently or

through particular laws, in which case both re­
late to one and the same connection. When, how­
ever, a general and a particular law relate to
different connections, they co-exist and co-operate
separately from each other.
For instance, the general chemical law of con­
stant proportions and particular laws indicating
which chemical elements in what proportion make
up certain compounds concern the same relation-
the composition of chemical elements. It is not
accidental that in our example the general law
manifests itself through particular, specific laws.
The situation is quite different as regards the
correlation of the law of conformity of the re­
lations of production to the level of development of
the productive forces (a general law) and the
basic economic law of socialism, which is aimed
at ensuring the fullest satisfaction of the material
and cultural requirements of people through de­
veloping socialist production on the basis of ad­
 CATEGORIES OF MATERIALIST DIALECTICS 221

vanced technology (a particular law). The first

law characterises the connection between the level
of development of the productive forces and of
production relations, while the second applies to
the connection between continuous growth of pro­
duction and the requirements of people. The con­
tent of the first law shows the necessity of chang­
ing the relations of production as the produc­
tive forces develop, whereas the content of the
second law indicates the aim of production and
the ways and means of attaining it. These laws
concern different connections and relations and
cannot operate one through the other; they oper­
ate quite independently, alongside each other.
Though they exist independently, they are closely
linked, not isolated from each other. This inter­
connection, however, differs radically from the
interconnection where one law manifests itself
through another.
The independent existence of general laws is
an inevitable effect of the development of reality.
Indeed, the transition from one phenomenon to
another in the development process involves both
the retention of all that is positive in the preced­
ing stages, and the emergence of new properties
and connections. In the passage from atom to mol­
ecule, for instance, many properties and connec­
tions inherent in the atom are retained. The atom
is contained, in its sublated, i.e. transformed
shape, in the molecule. In addition, however,
the molecule acquires a number of new properties
conditioned by a new type of interaction, namely,
that of atoms. The retention of the positive con­
222 A. P. SHEPTULIN

tent of the stages passed and the emergence of

new properties and connections can be easily
traced in the development of a living organism,
as well as human society.
The retention of certain properties and connec­
tions characteristic of past stages in a new stage of
development of a higher order reveals old laws in
new phenomena. The inception of new properties
and connections, on the other hand, causes new
laws to appear, which are particular in relation to
the old laws that have passed into the new phenom­
ena together with the retained connections. They
operate only in phenomena representing a new
stage of development, whereas the old laws operate
both here and in phenomena representing a lower
stage of development. Being particular, specific
to the new stage of development, these laws can­
not be the form through which the old laws mani­
fest themselves, inasmuch as they are connected
with different interactions and express different
relations. Laws specific to a molecule, for instance,
are connected with the interaction of atoms, while
the old laws relate to the interaction of the "ele­
mentary" particles making up the atoms.
We have discussed here the correlation between
the general and specific laws studied by the
special sciences. But what is the relationship be­
tween the laws of dialectics and those of the
special sciences? The former express the universal
connections and relations of reality. But these
connections and relations do not exist indepen-
dently-they take on the form of the concrete con­
nections and relations that make up the content
 CATEGORIES OF MATERIALIST DIALECTICS 223

of the corresponding concrete (general and

specific) laws which are the object of study for
the special sciences. Universal connections and
relations constitute certain repeated aspects of the
content of all similar concrete connections and
relations. As a result, the laws of dialectics can­
not operate in a pure form-they exist and mani­
fest themselves only through the other general
and specific laws studied by the special sciences.

8. Content and Form

a) The Concept of Content and Form

Content is a category oi materialist dialectics

denoting a totality oi all interactions and resul­
tant changes occurring in a phenomenon. The
content of a society, for instance, includes all
interactions between the people who make it up,
particularly the interactions that appear in the
process of producing, distributing and consum­
ing material goods, the interaction between po­
litical parties, the state and its citizens.
The content of a phenomenon includes both in­
ternal and external interactions, i.e. the interactions
between the elements of a phenomenon and the
phenomenon's interactions with other phenomena
surrounding it. The content of a living organism,
for instance, includes, besides the processes that
take place inside it, all the organism's actions that
are its responses to the actions of the correspond­
ing factors in its environment.
224 A. P. SHEPTULIN

The interactions and changes of a phenomenon

are not haphazard-they take place within cer­
tain limits that lend them a certain stability and
a qualitative definiteness, and have a certain rela­
tively stable system of connections, a certain
structure. The relatively stable system of connec­
tions of the content's aspects and its structure make
up the form of a phenomenon. The form of a liv­
ing organism, for instance, is its morphology, the
structure of its body; the form of a mode of pro­
duction is the relatively stable system of social
relations among people established during the
production and distribution of material goods.

b) A Critique of Idealist and Metaphysical Views

of Content and Form

Being the structure of content, form is in­

trinsically connected with it and cannot exist
without it. There have been attempts in the history
of philosophy, however, to prove that form exists
outside and independently of content. Aristotle,
for example, believed that content and form could
exist separately and that they merged into one
thing only under strictly definite conditions. Many
modern bourgeois philosophers and natural
scientists believe that form exists independently
of matter. Thus, Erwin Schrodinger, a prominent
physicist, declares "elementary” particles to be
pure forms devoid of any material content.
. .When you come to the ultimate particles con­
stituting matter,” he writes, "there seems to be no
point in thinking of them again as consisting of
 CATEGORIES OF MATERIALIST DIALECTICS 225

material. They are, as it were, pure shape, nothing

but shape.. .."i
If, however, "elementary" particles were nothing
that would constitute matter, if they were nothing
but forms constructed by people according to
known mathematical and geometrical laws, while
virtually everything in objective reality consisted
of "elementary" particles, matter would disappear
as objective reality and only the pure, ideal
form-i.e. consciousness-would remain.
The idealist nature of this reasoning is evident.
In reality, however, there is and can be no pure
form devoid of matter. Any form is the structure
of a particular material entity. As regards the
ideal forms created by people in the course of
extending of social knowledge, they are not pure
forms either, but have a content reflecting the
aspects and connections of the outside world.

c) The Interconnection Between Content and Form

Content and form are intrinsically intercon­

nected and constitute a dialectical unity, but they
play different parts in this unity. Content is deci­
sive, while form appears under its direct influence.
Emerging under the direct impact of content,
form is not passive-it also exerts an influence on
content. This influence is twofold: form either
facilitates the development of content or hampers
it, depending on whether it corresponds to the
latter or not. When it does, it is conducive to the
1 E. Schrodinger, Science and Humanism. Physics in
Our Times, Cambridge, 1952, p. 21.
15—1557
226 A. P. SHEPTULIN

content's development, when it does not, it hin­

ders its development.
Why does form correspond to content in some
cases, while in others it does not? The fact is that
form is, by its very nature, stable, whereas con­
tent is fluid, open to change, being the totality
of the processes occurring in a phenomenon. Ini­
tially, form corresponds to the content that gave
rise to it and provides great scope for the content's
development. As time passes, the content reaches
a level at which the confines of the given system
of connections become too narrow. The form be­
gins to hamper the development of the content,
which results in their incompatibility. This incom­
patibility grows ever stronger and, sooner or later,
results in the destruction of the old form-a relati­
vely stable system of connections-and the shaping
of a new system of connections, a new form that
at first corresponds to the content that has given
rise to it, but later becomes obsolete, too, and is
replaced by a new form, and so on ad infinitum.
The destruction of the old form and the emer­
gence of a new form is a process of fundamental
qualitative change of the content. Some interac­
tions or processes are destroyed, others emerge
and yet others undergo changes.
For example, during the transition from one
economic pattern of mode of production to
another as a result of the resolution of the contra­
diction between advanced productive forces
(content) and obsolete relations of production
(form), not only the form, but also the content
undergo changes. Thus, during the transition from
 CATEGORIES OF MATERIALIST DIALECTICS 227

artisan, handicraft production to capitalist manu­

facture, the transformation of the relations of
production occurred together with a drastic change
in the productive forces, which resulted in the
emergence of a new’ productive force connected
with a new distribution of people in the process
of production and with a new organisation of
labour. The productive forces also change during
the transformation of capitalist into socialist pro­
duction relations-they are substantially recon­
structed. Owing to the fact that under socialism
production is aimed at the fullest possible satis­
faction of people's requirements, not at securing
the maximum profit, the orientation of a great
number of enterprises inevitably changes, a new
relationship is established between separate in­
dustries, and quite new industries are set up.
To sum up, the transformation of the old form,
which does not correspond to the developed con­
tent, into a new one is also a process by which
the content is drastically changed. Lenin said on
this score: ". . .the struggle of content with form
and conversely. The throwing off of the form, the
transformation of the content."1

d) Part and Whole, Element and Structure

When we consider a phenomenon from the point

of view of its content it appears as a whole, as a
totality of all the elements and aspects that make
it up and of all their interactions. It is through
this totality that content relates to form. The sum­
1 V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 38, p. 222.
15*
228 A. P. SHEPTULIN

mary characteristic of content, however, becomes

inadequate as the object is further cognised and
a need arises for a closer study of the content's
separate aspects, elements, processes, and rela­
tions. The content is broken up into its component
parts, analysis of which necessitates the discovery
of regularities in their interaction with each other
and with the whole. Regularities governing the
interaction of separate parts with the whole are
reflected in the categories “whole" and "part",
while those governing the interaction of the com­
ponent parts of the whole are reflected in the
categories "element" and "structure".
An object (process, phenomenon, relation) that
makes up another object (process, phenomenon,
relation) and represents an aspect of its content,
constituting the part. An object (process, phenom­
enon, relation) including other integrally inter­
connected objects (phenomena, processes, rela­
tions) as its component parts and possessing such
other properties that are not the properties of its
component parts, constitutes the whole.
Each object is a whole made up of definite
parts. A molecule of water, for instance, makes
a whole consisting of one atom of oxygen and two
atoms of hydrogen. Each atom that is part of a
molecule of water constitutes part of a whole. It
is not dissolved in the whole, it does not merge
with its quality, but rather retains its qualitative
distinction and possesses a certain degree of in­
dependence enabling it to occupy a strictly definite
place in the whole and play a strictly definite
role. The molecule thus represents a discrete whole
 CATEGORIES OF MATERIALIST DIALECTICS 229

including parts that have their own specific con­

tent. Their content, however, is conditioned not
only by their specific nature, but also by the gen­
eral nature of the whole. For this reason they play
their specific roles not by themselves but as parts
of the whole. On the other hand, the general
nature of the whole (the molecule in our example)
depends on the specific nature of the parts that
make it up, particularly the atoms.
The interconnection of the whole and part, ex­
pressed in the dependence of the quality of the
whole on the specific nature of its component
parts, on the one hand, and the qualities of the
parts on the specific nature of the whole, on the
other, results from the interconnection between
the parts within the whole, this interconnection
constituting the structure of the whole. It is the
interconnection of the elements that underlies the
inception of the whole and the transformation of
the elements into component parts of the whole.
There is no whole without structure, which is
the main condition for the existence of the whole.
The concept structure represents the manner of
the combination and interconnection of the whole's
elements. The concept elements signifies the com­
ponents of a whole, which are interconnected and
interdependent in one way or another.
“Element” and "part" are not identical con­
cepts. Elements reveal their specific content
through their correlation with structure, with the
system of connections established between them.
Being independent and qualitatively isolated, ele­
ments differ essentially from the connection estab­
230 A. P. SHEPTULIN

lished between them. The specific content of

parts, on the other hand, is revealed through their
correlation with the whole, rather than through
the correlation with the connections established be­
tween them. For this reason they cannot be op­
posed to the connections making up the structure
of the whole, inasmuch as these connections are
themselves parts of the whole. Hence the concept
of part is broader than that of element. Parts of
the whole are not only interconnected elements,
but also the interconnections between the elements,
i.e. the structure.
By noting that structure is the manner of the
connection of elements in an integral system, we
in fact equate the concepts of structure and form.
This is, however, inevitable and natural because
the former emerged on the basis of the latter and
constitutes its concrete expression. Moreover, the
concept of structure expresses, when it comes
together with that of content, not only the regular­
ities governing the interconnection of content
and form, but also those governing the intercon­
nection of the content's elements, when it comes
together with the concept of element. The latter
interconnection is characterised in particular by
the fact that each element, while being qualitative­
ly isolated and relatively independent within
the whole, depends greatly on the other elements
making up the given whole and upon the nature
of its connection with them. These connections
largely determine its place, role and significance
in the whole, together with its qualitative and
quantitative characteristics. On the other hand.
 CATEGORIES OF MATERIALIST DIALECTICS 231

the connection between the elements itself depends

on their nature and on their qualitative and quan­
titative characteristics.
For example, relations established between a
husband and wife, and between parents and chil­
dren in a family, depend greatly on the qualita­
tive characteristics of the people involved. On the
other hand, the qualitative features of these people
depend to a large extent on the relations existing
in the family.
To sum up, the properties of the elements de­
pend on the structure of the whole they make up,
whereas the structure of this whole depends on
its constituent elements, their nature and quantity.
In other words, the elements of an object and the
structure of this object (the manner of connection
of the elements) are necessarily interdependent
and constitute a dialectical unity.

9. Essence and Phenomenon

a) The Concept of Essence and Phenomenon
As noted above, content includes the totality
of interactions and changes inherent in a thing,
whereas form embraces the totality of stable con­
nections and relations making up its structure.
Some of the interactions and changes making up
content are necessary, while others are acciden­
tal. The same is true of form. Some of the connec­
tions and relations making it up are necessary,
others are accidental. That which is necessary in
a thing's content and form constitutes its essence,
whereas that which, is accidental is a phenomenon.
232 A. P. SHEPTULIN

We should not, however, think that essence

is composed of a mechanical totality of necessary
aspects and connections. Essence is the totality of
a thing's necessary aspects and connections, in
which they are naturally interdependent and dia­
lectically united.
Thus, essence is the totality of all the necessary
aspects and connections of a thing, taken in their
natural interdependence; phenomenon is the man­
ifestation of these aspects and connections on
the surface through the entire mass of accidental
deviations.
The essence of a society, for example, is the to­
tality of all its necessary aspects and connections,
including all the laws governing its functioning
and development. The realm of phenomena inclu­
des manifestations of all these aspects and con­
nections (laws) through interactions among peo­
ple in their everyday life, through the activities
of public institutions and organisations, and so
on. The atoms making up a molecule and the
laws governing their interaction constitute the
molecule's essence. The totality of properties
through which the laws governing the interaction
and interdependence of these atoms appear on the
surface, constitutes a phenomenon.

b) A Critique of Idealist and Metaphysical Views

of Essence and Phenomenon

Idealists either reject the existence of essence

or deny its materiality. Berkeley, for instance, did
not recognise the existence of essence. This is
 CATEGORIES OF MATERIALIST DIALECTICS 233

also true of Mach and Avenarius. Some modern

bourgeois philosophers, too, like Russel and
Schiller, deny the existence of essence.
Russel, for instance, reasons as follows about
whether or not man has an essence. What is Mr.
Smith?-he asks, and answers: When we look at
him we see a number of colours, when we listen
to him we hear a series of sounds and think that
he, just like us, has thoughts and feelings. But
what is Mr. Smith besides these phenomena? He
is simply an imaginary hook on which supposedly
phenomena are hung. Actually, however, the phe­
nomena do not need this hook.
A similar view is held by Schiller. He tries to
prove that phenomena have no essence by arguing
that people understand the essence of an object
differently. Religion, he reasons, takes man's soul
as his essence, a physician thinks that it is his
body, a laundress sees the essence of a man in
the fact that he wears underwear, yet others see it
in his ability to earn money. What, then, is the
real essence of man?-Schiller asks and answers:
there is no such thing. It is created by people at
will.
Different people really do see the essence of a
thing differently. It does not follow, however, that
no such essence exists. This only shows that peo­
ple proceed in their understanding of a thing's
essence from its various aspects and connections,
which are infinite in number. People make an ab­
solute of them and thereby distort reality. Essence,
however, being the totality of the necessary
aspects and connections of the given thing, exists
234 A. P. SHEPTULIN

regardless of whether or not it is understood cor­

rectly and whether all or only one of its aspects
are reflected.
Some idealists, such as Plato, Hegel, Santayana,
and Whitehead, recognise the objective and real
existence of essences, though they consider them
as ideal. Plato and Santayana, for instance, held
that essences formed a special world, the true
reality comprising the supreme being. Hegel
thought essence to be the concept of an object,
retained irrespective of all changes in the object.
Dialectical materialists hold that essences ex­
pressed in an ideal form exist in man's conscious­
ness, not in the surrounding world. Being in man's
consciousness, they do not constitute a supreme
being in relation to the outside world; on the
contrary, they are dependent on this world, inas­
much as their content is derived from this world
and is its picture, a copy of some of the aspects
and connections of objective reality.

c) The Interconnection
Between Essence and Phenomenon

According to dialectical materialists, the es­

sence of material things is material. It is the to­
tality of the necessary aspects and connections ex­
isting independently of man's consciousness. Es­
sence is intrinsically linked with phenomenon,
revealing its content exclusively in and through
the phenomenon. Phenomenon, on the other hand,
is also inalienably linked with essence, and cannot
exist without it. Lenin stressed this interconnec­
 CATEGORIES OF MATERIALIST DIALECTICS 235

tion between essence and phenomenon. He wrote:

"The essence appears. The appearance is essen­
tial."1
Being a form through which essence manifests
itself, a phenomenon differs from it in that it ex­
presses essence in a distorted way. In capitalist
society, for example, phenomena indicate that
people's destinies and their material well-being
depend on the relations of things, on the play of
commodity prices on the market. Actually, how­
ever, all this depends on the relations among peo­
ple, which are formed in the process of producing,
distributing, and consuming material goods.
A phenomenon expresses essence and at the
same time adds new features and aspects to it
that stem not from the essence, but from the ex­
ternal circumstances surrounding a thing, from
its interaction with the environment. For this
reason, a phenomenon is always richer than es­
sence. This is easily seen in comparing the value
of commodities with their prices. The prices of a
particular commodity are always more varied (and
in this sense richer) than its value, since, in ad­
dition to the dependence on the amount of social
labour required to produce a unit of this commod­
ity, they express the dependence on many external
factors, such as the supply-and-demand ratio for
this commodity on the market.
Moreover, if a phenomenon's content is deter­
mined not only by the essence (the totality of the
internal necessary aspects and connections of a

1 V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 38, p. 253.

236 A. P. SHEPTULIN

thing), but also by its environment and its inter­

action with other things (which are continuously
changing), the content of this phenomenon must
be fluid and changeable, whereas the essence is
something stable, surviving all these changes. The
prices of a particular commodity, for instance,
fluctuate continuously, whereas its value remains
stable for a certain time. Similarly, the material
well-being of the population, especially of the
workers, in a capitalist country changes from one
period (or phase) in the development of produc­
tion to another, particularly from a revival to
boom, and then to crisis and depression. But the
totality of people's production relations (their es­
sence), which determines their material well­
being, remains relatively stable.
Lenin expressed this pattern in the correlation
of essence and phenomenon in the following
way: ".. .The unessential, seeming, superficial,
vanishes more often, does not hold so 'tightly',
does not 'sit so firmly' as 'Essence'."1
Being stable in relation to a phenomenon, es­
sence is not absolutely immutable. It changes,
but not so fast as a phenomenon. This is because,
as a phenomenon develops, certain necessary as­
pects and connections are enhanced and begin to
play a more important role, while others recede
or disappear totally. The transition of capital­
ism from the pre-monopoly stage to that of impe­
rialism is an example. At the pre-monopoly pe­
riod in the development of capitalism, when free

1 V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 38, p. 130,

 CATEGORIES OF MATERIALIST DIALECTICS 237

competition and commodity export reigned

supreme, monopolies did not play any significant
role, whereas at the imperialist stage free competi­
tion, though continuing to exist, is drastically redu­
ced by monopoly, which becomes a universal phe­
nomenon and begins to play a dominant role in
society. Moreover, the export of commodities is
pushed into the background, giving way to the
export of capital. This shows that one and the
same essence undergoes certain changes within
its limits.

10. Possibility and Reality

a) The Concept of Possibility and Reality

When exploring the essence of the object under

study, cognition goes back to the past and traces
the history of its inception and development.
Once the essence is revealed, cognition may anti­
cipate the future and find out, in addition to what
the object was in the past and what it is now,
what it will be in the future. In other words, once
a phenomenon's essence i.e. the totality of its
necessary aspects and connections (laws) is estab­
lished we may draw conclusions as to its real
and possible states.
Reality is that which actually exists, whereas
possibility is that which may occur under rele­
vant circumstances.
One may argue that if reality is that which
actually exists, it cannot be distinguished from
possibility, inasmuch as possibility, too, actually
238 A. P. SHEPTULIN

exists. Indeed, possibility exists actually, but only

as a capacity of matter to change, under certain
conditions, from one thing or qualitative state
into another. In this sense, i.e. when it is able to
change into something else, possibility constitu­
tes an aspect of reality and, naturally, possesses
an intrinsic quality, such as real existence.
When, on the other hand, we treat possibility
as something not yet existent, we mean qualita­
tive states or characteristics into which the given
phenomenon must change under relevant condi­
tions, not the ability of one phenomenon to change
into another. These characteristics do not possess
the property of real being, they are as yet non­
existent in reality, but they may appear.
Thus, by possibility we mean properties, states,
processes and things that are non-existent, but
which may appear owing to the fact that reality
possesses the intrinsic ability to change from one
thing into another.
Having materialised, possibility becomes real­
ity, so reality may be defined as materialised pos­
sibility, whereas possibility may be defined as
potential reality.

b) A Critique of Idealist and Metaphysical Views

of Possibility and Reality

The question of possibility and reality has been

attracting philosophers' attention since ancient
times. Plato's solution, for instance, was to dis­
tinguish possible from actual or real existence.
He held that the world of ideas and ideal essences
 CATEGORIES OF MATERIALIST DIALECTICS 239

possessed the property of real being, whereas the

world of things possessed possible being. Since it
is in a state of possibility, the world of things
could not change into reality and acquire real
existence. There was, Plato believed, a necessary
division between real and possible being.
In contrast to Plato, Aristotle rejected the exis­
tence of an insurmountable wall between possib­
ility and reality, although he acknowledged the
separate, independent existence of these two ca­
tegories. He believed that the possible can turn
into the real, and vice versa. He considered pri­
mordial matter to be pure possibility, while the
form that ultimately merged with God, who was
the form of forms, was in his view pure reality.
The blending of form with matter resulted in the
appearance of qualitatively definite things posses­
sing possible and real existence and changing
when one opposite (possibility) changed into
another (reality).
According to Aristotle, the transition of possi­
bility into reality did not occur as a result of
forces and tendencies inherent in a thing-it was
connected with the action of external factors, of
outside force, i.e. of a certain really existing thing.
From a thing existing as a possibility, he believed,
there always emerged a thing existing in reality,
as a result of the action of another thing, also
existing in reality.
Proceeding from Aristotle's proposition, Tho­
mas Aquinas substantiated the necessary existence
of pure reality acting in such a way that a
particular possibility turns into reality. Only
240 A. P. SHEPTULIN

God, he said, can perform the role of this (pure)

reality.
The metaphysical separation of possibility from
reality and their absolutisation inevitably lead to
idealism, to a search for a doer who can blend
possibility and reality and thereby create the
multitude of things and phenomena we observe in
the surrounding world.
Giordano Bruno resolutely opposed attempts to
divorce possibility from reality. In his view, pos­
sibility cannot exist outside and independently of
reality-it is inherent in it.
Hobbes developed this idea. He proved that
possibility and reality are closely interconnected
and stressed that they have one and the same ori­
gin.
Kant, however, was of another opinion. Pos­
sibility and reality, he said, are not inherent in
things or the outside world-they are just the cha­
racteristic features of the human mind, of its cog­
nitive faculties. . .The difference of possible from
real things," he wrote, "is one that counts only
subjectively for the human understanding."1
Hegel thoroughly criticised Kant's subjectivist
view of possibility and reality. He showed that as
applied to the development of thought possibility
stems from reality. He demonstrated the dialectics
of the transformation of one into the other.
Dialectical materialism gave a materialist ex­

1 Immanuel Kant, Kritik der Urtheilskraft, Leipzig,

1878, S. 288.
 CATEGORIES OF MATERIALIST DIALECTICS 241

planation and scientific substantiation to the laws

governing the interconnection of possibility and
reality, which Hegel had guessed.

c) The Interconnection Between Possibility and Reali.y.

Types of Possibility

A possibility turns into reality only under cer­

tain conditions. The possibility of a socialist rev­
olution in capitalist countries, for instance, may
only turn into reality if a general crisis breaks
out in a particular country, if the lower strata no
longer wish to live as before and the upper layers
can no longer govern as before, when the poverty
and hardships of the oppressed classes are more
intense than usual and their activity rises, and,
lastly, when the revolutionary class becomes ab’e
“to take revolutionary mass action strong enough
to break (or dislocate) the old government".1
Conditions are the totality of factors necessary
for translating possibility into reality.
The transformation of certain possibilities into
reality does not mean that the number of possibil­
ities is reduced. The realisation of some possi­
bilities brings about the emergence of others. They
are engendered by a new reality. Reality cannot
exhaust its possibilities by changing from one
qualitative state into another, because they are
limitless.
Any phenomenon constitutes the unity of a mul­
titude of different and opposing aspects and ten­

1 V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 21, p. 214.

16—1557
242 A. P. SHEPTULIN

dencies, each of which possesses the ability of

change, under certain conditions, into another or
into its opposite. Every phenomenon therefore has
many different possibilities. Taking into account
their characteristic features, these possibilities
may be divided into the following types: real and
formal, abstract and concrete, reversible and ir­
reversible, co-existing and excluding, pertaining to
essence and to phenomenon.
Possibilities stemming from the necessary as­
pects and connections ot an object and from the
laws governing its functioning and development
are called real; possibilities stemming from acci­
dental connections and relations are called for­
mal.
The possibility of organising the economies of
socialist countries on a planned basis is an ex­
ample of a real possibility. It stems from the dom­
inant position of public ownership of the means
of production-a necessary factor in socialist coun­
tries. The possibility of a worker becoming a cap­
italist is an example of a formal possibility. It is
not based on necessity, nor does it follow from the
laws governing the functioning of the capitalist
mode of production-it stems from external factors
and an accidental concurrence of circumstances.
The laws of capitalism presuppose, in fact, quite
the opposite-a worker in capitalist society must
always remain a worker.
Being engendered by the necessary aspects and
connections of reality, real possibilities differ as
regards their connection with the conditions neces­
sary for their materialisation. Depending on this
 CATEGORIES OF MATERIALIST DIALECTICS 243

connection, they are divided into abstract and con­

crete possibilities.
A possibility is called concrete when the rele­
vant conditions for its materialisation have ap­
peared or may appear, and abstract when such con­
ditions are absent. For an abstract possibility
to materialise, a phenomenon that possesses it
must pass through a number of stages of develop­
ment.
The possibility of economic crises under capital­
ism is a graphic illustration of a concrete possi­
bility. Relevant conditions may and do form-as
reality proves-in developed capitalist countries
for this possibility to materialise. While it is con­
crete with respect to a mature capitalist society,
it is abstract if applied to simple commodity pro­
duction. The conditions necessary for translating
this possibility into reality were absent in the
framework of simple commodity production which
had to pass through a number of development
stages for these conditions to form. Simple com­
modity production had to change into capitalist
commodity production, and the latter, in turn, had
to reach a certain level of development. It is not
accidental, therefore, that the first economic crisis
of capitalism broke out as late as 1825.
All possibilities may be divided up into rever­
sible and irreversible, depending on the specific
features of the process by which they become
reality.
A possibility whose transformation into reality
means that the initial reality becomes a possibil-
^y in relation to itself is called reversible. A pos­
16*
244 A. P. SHEPTULIN

sibility whose materialisation brings about the

conversion of the initial reality into an impossi­
bility is called irreversible.
The possibility of mechanical motion being con­
verted into heat is an example of a reversible
possibility, in so far as, once it has materialised,
that which was reality before (mechanical motion)
becomes a possibility. Indeed, heat contains the
possibility of being converted into mechanical
motion. The possibility of the chemical energy
of coal being converted into electricity is irrever­
sible, since, once it has been so converted, the
initial reality becomes an impossibility-electricity
cannot be reconverted into coal.
Being inherent in one and the same phenome­
non, different possibilities are interconnected and
interdependent. Depending on the nature of their
interconnection, possibilities may be divided into
co-existing and exclusive.
A possibility whose materialisation does not
entail the disappearance of another possibility is
called co-existing (in relation to the latter). A pos­
sibility whose materialisation brings about the
disappearance of another possibility is called ex­
clusive.
The possibility of a peasant becoming a kulak,
for example, is co-existing in relation to that of
his becoming a farm-hand. Having turned into a
kulak exploiter, the peasant may not stand the
competition and be ruined, thus becoming a hired
farm labourer. The possibility of private capitalist
ownership becoming public socialist property, on
the other hand, is exclusive in relation to the pos­
 CATEGORIES OF MATERIALIST DIALECTICS 245

sibility of one man exploiting another. The mate­

rialisation of the former brings about the disap­
pearance of the latter-the establishment of so­
cialist property rules out the possibility of exploi­
tation in the given country.
The materialisation of the different possibili­
ties inherent in an object has different effects
on its essence. The realisation of some of them
does not change the essence, while the realisa­
tion of others has the opposite effect-it entails
the transformation of the object into another
object.
A possibility whose materialisation does not
change the essence of an object is called the pos­
sibility of a phenomenon. A possibility whose re­
alisation entails a change in the essence of an ob­
ject and its transformation into another object is
called the possibility of the essence.
For example, the possibility for the workers in
a certain industry to secure a wage rise as a result
of their struggle with the capitalists is the possi­
bility of a phenomenon, inasmuch as its realisa­
tion does not change the social essence of the
given social groups. The workers remain what they
have been before-people deprived of ownership
of the means of production, removed from power,
and exploited by the bourgeoisie. On the other
hand, the possibility of a socialist revolution in a
capitalist country is the possibility of the essence.
Its realisation results in a change in the essence
of the social system-capitalist society turns into
socialist society.
Chapter VII

THE BASIC LAWS OF DIALECTICS

As noted, a law is a general, stable and neces­

sary connection or relation within a phenomenon
or among phenomena.
Each object has many different general, stable
and necessary connections (relations) and is sub­
ject to different laws. Not all of these general,
stable and necessary connections, however, play
one and the same role. Some of them are of major
importance, exerting an influence on all the other
laws and aspects of a phenomenon, and determine
to a greater or lesser degree the functioning and
development of this phenomenon as a whole;
others are of secondary importance and determine
the functioning and development of a few par­
ticular aspects of a phenomenon. The first group
constitutes basic laws, while the second-non-basic
laws.
The division of laws into basic and non-basic is
characteristic of both special sciences and phil­
osophy. Philosophical laws, the laws of dialectics
in particular, are not of equal value either. Some
of them influence all laws and characterise the
process of development as a whole, whereas others
play a subordinate role and characterise only se­
parate aspects of this process. The first group
 THE BASIC LAWS OF DIALECTICS 247

makes up the basic laws of dialectics, while the

second-the non-basic laws.
The basic laws of dialectics include that of the
transition of quantitative into qualitative changes,
that of the unity and “struggle" of opposites and
that of the negation of negation.
The non-basic laws of dialectics include the law
of causality, the law of form being determined
by content and of form's active influence upon con­
tent, the law of the existence or manifestation of
the necessary through the accidental, of the inter­
connection between the general and the particular,
between a part and the whole, etc.
Many non-basic laws have been covered in our
analysis of the basic categories of dialectics. The
basic laws of dialectics will be discussed below.

1. The Law of the Transition

of Quantitative to Qualitative Changes
a) The Concept of Quality and Quantity

As we noted in the preceding chapter, each

thing (object or process) constitutes a totality of
the general and the particular, i.e. that which in­
dicates its similarity with other things and that
which distinguishes it from them. But that which
distinguishes one thing from another or indicates
its similarity to another is property. A thing is
therefore characterised by an infinite number of
different properties some of them showing what
it is, others indicating its dimensions or magni­
tude.
248 A. P. SHEPTULIN

Thus, some properties of chlorine, such as the

fact that it is a gas under normal conditions, that
it is yellowish-green in colour, poisonous, chem­
ically active and combines directly with most
metals and non-metals, indicate what it is. Its
other properties, such as the fact that it is 2.5 times
heavier than air, that at normal pressure it weighs
3.214 g at 0°C, that 17 protons make up the
charge of its atom's nucleus, and that 17 electrons
rotate around its nucleus, characterise its quantity.
The totality of properties that make a particular
thing what it is, is called its quality. The totality
of properties indicating a thing’s dimensions or
magnitude is called its quantity.
The basic qualities of the thing under study
must be distinguished from its non-basic qualities.
Since the interconnection of each thing with other
real phenomena varies, at one time and in one re­
lation the thing in question manifests certain of
its properties, while at another time and in other
relations it reveals others. For this reason, under
certain conditions a thing will show one con­
crete non-basic quality, but under other condi­
tions another quality. The totality of the properties
that the thing revealed under the given conditions
and relations will constitute a concrete quality in
every particular case. For example, by perform­
ing certain labour operations, a man reveals prop­
erties indicating what he is as a labourer, and
constituting his quality as a labourer under the
given conditions. In this case he may be a manual
labourer, a fitter, an engineer or an office worker.
In other relations the man will reveal his other
 THE BASIC LAWS OF DIALECTICS 249

properties, in still others-still other properties,

and so on. In each case he will reveal a new
concrete quality. A man marries, for example,
and thus becomes a husband in this relation; he
begets children and becomes a father in rela­
tion to them; he is elected to parliament, which
reveals his new quality in this relation-he be­
comes a deputy.
Besides properties that reveal themselves in cer­
tain relations and under certain conditions, only
to disappear in others, a thing possesses prop­
erties that it has always, in any relation and under
any conditions. The totality of these properties
constitutes the basic quality of the thing. In
contrast to non-basic qualities which character­
ise a thing only in definite relations, its basic quali­
ty characterises the thing in all relations. It is in­
separable from the thing, emerges together with
it and changes only when the thing changes into
another thing.
Man's basic quality is made up, for instance,
of properties, such as his consciousness, ability
deliberately to transform his environment and
create the material wealth necessary for his vital
activities, capacity to live in society only, i.e. to­
gether with other people. The fact that water is a
substance made up of two atoms of hydrogen and
one atom of oxygen constitutes its basic quality,
whereas its non-basic qualities include, among
other things, the fact that it may be either a liquid,
a solid body, or a gas, depending on concrete
conditions.
250 A. P. SHEPTULIN

b) The Essence of the Law of the Transition

of Quantitative to Qualitative Changes
Qualitative changes in a thing are a result of
accumulated quantitative changes in it, which, hav­
ing reached a certain limit, inevitably turn into
qualitative changes, while the latter exert their
own reverse influence on the quantity and, in turn,
cause changes in its characteristics.
Indeed, whatever qualitative difference we take, I
we shall always find that its emergence is neces­
sarily connected with some quantitative differ­
ences. The qualitative differences between oxygen
and ozone, for instance, are a direct result of the
different quantities of atoms that make up the
molecules of the given substances. The molecule
of oxygen consists of two atoms, while that of
ozone-three. Moreover, two substances such as
laughing gas (N2O) and nitrogen pentoxide (N2O5)
differ greatly as regards their quality-the former
is a gas, whereas the latter is a solid. As to their
chemical composition, however, the only differ­
ence is that the molecule of nitrogen pentoxide
contains five times as much oxygen as that of
laughing gas. Or take Mendeleyev's periodic sys­
tem of chemical elements. It shows that a purely
quantitative difference of protons in an atom's |
nucleus causes corresponding changes in the qual- 1
ity of chemical elements.
Quality and quantity, however, possess relative
independence, so a quantitative change does not I
always entail a qualitative one. The quality of I
water, for instance, would not change if its quan- I
tity were increased or reduced. Water is water
 THE BASIC LAWS OF DIALECTICS 251

whether its quantity is one glassfull or a big basin,

or is but one drop. Similarly, a table will remain
a table whether we make it smaller or larger.
But all this applies within certain limits. Qual­
ity is not immune to quantitative changes. Sooner
or later an increase or decrease in a certain quan­
titative aspect will inevitably cause a qualitative
change. Thus, we cannot change the quantity of
water ad infinitum-a drop of water can be redu­
ced up to a certain limit below which its quality
instantly changes. For common water, the weight
of one of its molecules constitutes this limit below
which water becomes qualitatively different sub-
stances-hydrogen and oxygen. Moreover, we can­
not keep on making the table infinitely smaller
or larger and retain its quality-should we make
the table considerably larger or smaller, in one
case it will become a shed or a support, while in
the other it will turn into a toy or a model.
To sum up, quantitative changes do not entail
qualitative ones only up to a certain limit. The
limit within which quantitative changes do not
entail qualitative changes is called measure.
Thus, qualitative changes occur only when quan­
titative changes go beyond the limit of a cer­
tain measure. This being so, if qualitative chan­
ges do not occur always, but only when quanti­
tative changes reach a certain limit, beyond the
confines of the relevant measure, it becomes evi­
dent that qualitative changes are the result of
quantitative ones, that qualitative characteristics
are caused by quantitative ones, and qualitative
differences by quantitative ones.
252 A. P. SHEPTULIN

Qualitative differences that emerge as a result

of certain quantitative changes are not passive in
relation to them. They exert a reverse influence and
cause corresponding changes in the quantitative
characteristics. Socialism (as a new quality) has
replaced capitalism (as an old quality) and has
given rise to new quantitative characteristics, such
as different production growth rates, a different
degree to which the material and cultural needs
of the working people are satisfied.
This law-governed interconnection and inter­
dependence of quality and quantity, of qualita­
tive and quantitative changes constitutes the es­
sence of the law of the transition of quantitative
changes into qualitative ones, and vice versa.

c) A Critique of Metaphysical Views

of the Interconnection Between Quantity and Quality

Although the above proposition is obvious,

metaphysicists reject it, maintaining that quality
and quantity are not interconnected and cannot
pass into one another. The contemporary US phi­
losopher Sydney Hook, for instance, declares it
to be absurd. He writes: . .Although quantities
may vary and qualities may vary and the relation­
ship between the variations of both may be des­
cribed by continuous or discontinuous func­
tions ... it is absurd to say that quantity ever
becomes quality or that quality becomes quan­
tity."1 According to him, quantity cannot become
1 Sydney Hook, Dialectical Materialism and Scientific
Method, Manchester, 1955, p. 20.
 THE BASIC LAWS OF DIALECTICS 253

quality because the latter "is logically prior to

quantity" and can, in general, exist without it.
The statement that quality is logically prior to
quantity is true. In cognising the world, man pro­
ceeded historically from cognising quality to
comprehending (revealing) quantity. This in no
way means, however, that qualitative changes are
not the result of quantitative ones. In knowledge,
we are sometimes compelled to go in the direction
opposite to the actual one. What we observe in the
process of cognition, however, cannot serve as
sufficient grounds for drawing conclusions as
regards reality. The objective world should be jud­
ged on the basis of the laws governing reality itself,
not the laws of knowledge.
James Feibleman, a contemporary British phi­
losopher, also rejects the interconnection between
quality and quantity. He says that quality and
quantity cannot be interconnected, for one of them
(quality) is revealed through sensation, while the
other (quantity)-through the thinking process.
This is far from true-both quality and quantity
are cognised not only through sensations, but also
through thought. If this were true, however, it
would not follow at all that quantity and qual­
ity are isolated, since that which we sometimes
isolate in the process of cognition would not ne­
cessarily exist separately or isolate itself in ob­
jective reality.
In contrast to metaphysicists, dialectical mate­
rialists, proceeding from the data provided by
the natural sciences, recognise the interconnection
between quality and quantity, between qualita­
254 A. P. SHEPTULIN

tive and quantitative changes. Moreover, they con­

sider this to be a major law governing the motion
and development of matter.
d) A Leap as a Universal Form of Transition
from One Quality Into Another

While they are interconnected and interdepen­

dent, quantitative and qualitative changes are
fundamentally different from one another. Quan­
titative changes occur slowly, latently, gradually,
continuously, while qualitative changes occur
abruptly, openly, in a leap-like manner, as a break
in continuity.
A leap is the process by which the quality ot a
thing is transformed, a transition from one state
into another.
As a break in the continuous quantitative
changes of a thing, a leap is dependent on the
latter's nature, on its specific essence. Phenomena
that differ by their nature involve different forms
of leaps. For example, in one form an electron and
a positron change into a pair or a threesome of
photons, in another a substance changes from a
liquid into a gaseous state, in yet another one
species of animal changes into another. The
nature and form of the leap also depend on the
concrete conditions under which it occurs. Phe­
nomena that are similar in nature will make the
transformation into a new qualitative state in dif­
ferent ways under different concrete conditions.
In the USSR, for example, where land was na­
tionalised immediately following the triumph of
the Great October Socialist Revolution, it became
 THE BASIC LAWS OF DIALECTICS 255

possible in the course of the socialist transfor­

mation of agriculture largely to bypass the lowest
and medium forms of cooperative production so­
ciety, and introduce its higher form at once, i.e.
the collective farm, which combines collective la­
bour on publicly owned land with social ownership
of the basic means of production and distribution
of produce according to the quality and quantity of
labour contributed by the collective farmer. In the
other socialist countries this process develops in
a different way. Here the socialist transformation
of small-commodity farm production was carried
through under conditions of private ownership of
land. This had an effect on the form of the transfor­
mation. It was due to this, in particular, that var­
ious semi-socialist forms of production were
widely applied in these countries, combining social­
ist ownership of some means of production with
private ownership of land. Moreover, distribution
based on the quality and quantity of labour inputs
co-existed with that based on the quality and quan­
tity of the land and other means of labour given
over to the social economy.
For all their various forms, leaps can be sub­
divided into the following two types: 1) leaps
taking the form of an explosion; and 2) leaps oc­
curring comparatively slowly, by way of gradual­
ly accumulating the elements of a new quality and
discarding those of the old.
An explosive-type leap occurs rapidly, abruptly,
often as a single blow. The entire quality under­
goes changes in the process. In contrast, a leap
occurring through the gradual accumulation of the
256 A. P. SHEPTULIN

elements of a new quality and the disappearance

of those of the old quality, takes place slowly.
Only certain parts of the quality-not all of it-
undergo changes. One qualitative characteristic
is changed first, then another, then yet another,
and so on, until the entire quality is transformed.
The explosion of dynamite is an example of an
explosive-type leap: all the aspects of the initial
quality are involved in the abrupt transformation
of one substance into another. As applied to so­
ciety, an explosive-type leap can be exemplified
by a social revolution in the form of an armed
uprising.
The development of new species of plant and
animal is an example of a leap occurring by way
of the relatively gradual accumulation of the ele­
ments of a new quality and the disappearance of
those of the old quality. The transformation of
one species of plant or animal into another under
natural conditions occurs, as a rule, through the
gradual appearance of one new quality after an­
other that correspond to the changed environment,
and through the gradual disappearance of the
properties that do not correspond to such changes.
A peaceful take-over of political power by the
proletariat is an example of this type of leap, as
applied to society.

e) Evolution and Revolution

The nature of a leap and the way it proceeds

serve as the basis for subdividing all leaps into
leaps that take the form of an explosion and others
 THE BASIC LAWS OF DIALECTICS 257

that occur through the gradual accumulation of

the elements of a new quality and the disappear­
ance of those of the old quality.
Leaps may, however, be classified on the basis
of another feature, viz. the nature of qualitative
changes, that which changes in a thing, its qual­
ity. Since a thing has basic and non-basic quali­
ties, changes in the basic quality differ essential­
ly from those in non-basic qualities. Changes in
the basic quality of a thing presuppose a change
of its essence and its transformation into another
thing, whereas changes in non-basic qualities oc­
cur within the bounds of one and the same essence
and do not entail the transformation of the
thing into another thing. Bearing this in mind,
leaps can be divided into revolutionary and evo­
lutionary.
Revolution is a leap bringing about a radical
break in the old qualitative basis and a change
in the essence of a thing.
Evolution is a leap entailing transition to a new
quality within the given essence of a thing, with­
out a radical break in the existing qualitative basis.
A transition from one socio-economic system to
another, such as that from capitalism to socialism,
is an example of revolution. The transition from
pre-monopoly to monopoly capitalism and from
socialism to communism are examples of evolu­
tion.
In this particular sense the concepts "revolu­
tion" and "evolution" are applicable to all spheres
°f reality. They take a somewhat different mean­
ing, however, when used to express the laws
n—1557
258 A. P. SHEPTULIN

governing the transition from one qualitative state

to another in certain particular fields in the life
of society. As applied to society, not every leap
accompanied by a radical break of the existing
qualitative basis and a change in the essence of
the given material entity is a revolution, but only
one resulting in the emergence of more developed
qualitative states, i.e. a transition from a lower to
a higher phase. A transition from a higher to a
lower phase is called counter-revolution. The tran­
sition of political power from the bourgeoisie to
the proletariat, for instance, which represents the
socialist mode of production called upon to re­
place the historically outdated capitalist mode of
production, is revolution. The temporary resto­
ration of power by the bourgeoisie overthrown in
the course of revolution, is counter-revolution.
As regards evolution, if applied to historical
development, it is a reform which is a type of
transformation presupposing that the qualitative
basis of the existing economic and political sys­
tem, i.e. its essence, is preserved.
Today, the bourgeoisie spares no efforts to pro­
long the existence of the capitalist social system
and frequently resorts to reforms which, though
introducing certain insignificant changes in par­
ticular spheres of society, leave intact the exist­
ing mode of production and the exploitation of
man by man engendered by it. Addressing the 25th
CPSU Congress, Leonid Brezhnev said: "Capital­
ism did its utmost, so to speak, to keep in step
with the times, to apply various methods of ec­
onomic regulation. This made it possible to sti­
 THE BASIC LAWS OF DIALECTICS 259

mulate economic growth but, as the Communists

foresaw, it could not remove the contradictions of
capitalism."1

2. The Law of the Unity and “Struggle” of

Opposites
a) The Concepts of Opposite and Contradiction
Each thing has an infinite multitude of aspects
which interact and cause changes in one another.
These changes move in similar, different or op­
posite directions; they may reflect one and the
same or different trends.
Aspects in which changes move in opposite di­
rections and which have opposite trends ot func-
tioning and development are called opposites,
while the interaction of these aspects constitutes
a contradiction.
The processes of assimilation and dissimilation
in a living organism, for example, are opposites.
Assimilation constitutes a trend towards creating
certain component parts of an organism out of
substances in the environment, while dissimila­
tion is a trend towards decay or decomposition.
Antagonistic classes, such as the proletariat and
the bourgeoisie under capitalism, constitute an­
other example. These classes have directly opposite
interests and patterns of action. Indeed, the pro­
letariat is waging a continuous struggle for wage
increases, whereas the bourgeoisie is always seek­
1 L. I. Brezhnev, Report ot the CPSU Central Com­
mittee and the Immediate Tasks of the Party in Home
and Foreign Policy. XXVth Congress ot the CPSU, p. 33.
260 A. P. SHEPTULIN

ing wage cuts. The proletariat wants its represen­

tatives to be elected to legislative bodies, while
the bourgeoisie does its best to prevent this.

b) The Unity of Opposites

Though opposites have different trends of func­

tioning and development and different directions of
change, thereby excluding each other, they do not
eliminate each other, but co-exist in an unbreak­
able unity and interdependence. Assimilation and
dissimilation in a living organism are interconnect­
ed and presuppose each other. The proletariat and
the bourgeoisie in capitalist society are intrinsically
interconnected, too. The bourgeoisie cannot exist
as a class without the proletariat and, vice versa,
the proletariat disappears as an exploited class
together with the elimination of the bourgeoisie,
and turns into the working class of socialist so­
ciety.
The way in which opposites presuppose each
other and are inseparably interconnected is a ma­
jor form through which their unity manifests
itself.
A certain degree of coincidence between some
of their aspects and the presence of common prop­
erties constitute another form through which the
unity of opposites is revealed. Since opposites
are aspects of one and the same thing and charac­
terise one and the same essence, they must have
something in common and a number of their prop­
erties must coincide. The north and south poles
of a magnet, for instance, are aspects of one and
 THE BASIC LAWS OF DIALECTICS 261

the same physical phenomenon, of one and the

same essence.
Being different aspects of one and the same
thing, opposites not only exclude, but also inter­
penetrate each other; they not only express the
difference between the inseparably interconnected
aspects, but also their identity.
The identity of the quantitative characteristics
of opposites is expressed, in particular, in the form
of the equilibrium or balance of forces. The bal­
ance of opposites manifests itself at a certain stage
in the development of a contradiction, when an
equilibrium of opposite forces and trends sets in.
The correlation of revolutionary and counter-revo­
lutionary forces in Russia in October 1905 is an
example of the balance of opposites. Tsarism at
that time was, as Lenin put it, "no longer strong
enough", while "the revolution [was] not yet
strong enough to win".1 The balance of forces
does not mean that the "struggle" of opposites
fades away or becomes weaker. On the contrary,
at that stage in the development of contradictions
the "struggle" of opposites becomes especially
acute.
The transition of opposites into each other when
they exchange places is the supreme manifesta­
tion of the identity of opposites. The transforma­
tion of the proletariat into the dominant class and
the bourgeoisie into the suppressed class is a rel­
evant example with respect to the class struggle
between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie.

1 V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 9, p. 414.

262 A. P. SHEPTULIN

The moment at which opposites pass into each

other is the culmination in the development of op­
posites. At this stage, the contradiction is solved
and the thing passes from one qualitative state
into another. Taking account of the special im­
portance of this moment in the development of a
contradiction, of this manifestation of the identity
of opposites, Lenin defined dialectics as the study
of the identity of opposites, of the laws governing
their passing into one another. "Dialectics," he
wrote, "is the teaching which shows how opposites
can be and how they happen to be (how they be­
come) identical,-under what conditions they are
identical, becoming transformed into one another,
—why the human mind should grasp these oppo­
sites not as dead, rigid, but as living, conditional,
mobile, becoming transformed into one another."1

c) The Relativity of the Unity

and the Absoluteness of the “Struggle”
of Opposites

Contradiction, being the interaction of opposites,

includes both their "struggle" and their unity.
These two aspects of the essence of contradiction,
however, are not equal: the "struggle" plays the
leading role. It is absolute, just as the motion it
causes. The unity, on the other hand, is relative.
The absoluteness of the "struggle" of opposites
is expressed in the fact that struggle is involved
at every stage in the existence of a thing and its
transformation into something else. It takes place

1 V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 38, p. 109.

 THE BASIC LAWS OF DIALECTICS 263

at the emergence of any concrete unity resulting

from the "struggle" of opposite forces or trends.
It exists within the unity, causing its emergence
and development. It is present and is especially
pronounced when this unity breaks down and a
new one appears. It is the "struggle" of opposites
that causes the disintegration of the old unity and
its replacement by a new one, corresponding more
closely to the new environment.
In contrast to the "struggle", the unity of op­
posites is temporary. After emerging as a result
of this "struggle", it exists for a certain time,
until the relevant contradiction matures and is
resolved. Then the unity disappears, giving way
to a new one. The latter, having existed for a
certain period, also breaks down and is replaced
by another as a result of the "struggle" of the op­
posites inherent in it. This process goes on ad
infinitum. Unity, therefore, changes, while the
"struggle" remains. Existing within each one of
the consecutively changing unities, the "struggle"
is also a link connecting one unity with another
and ensuring historical continuity in the develop­
ment process.
The relativity of the unity, therefore, is expressed
through its temporary existence, through its
transient nature. But there are other forms in
which the unity's relativity is manifested, such as
the incomplete coincidence of opposites, the in­
complete coordination in their functioning and
development, and, lastly, the transient nature of
their balance.
264 A. P. SHEPTULIN

d) Contradiction and Difference

We defined contradiction as the interaction of

opposites, by which we mean a mature contra­
diction. As a rule, however, a contradiction does
not appear in a ready-made form. It first emerges
and exists in an immature form. Difference is
the universal form of being that gives rise to con­
tradiction. Difference is the first, immature form
through which contradiction manifests itself.
Not any difference, however, is a contradiction.
There are differences everywhere, between all phe­
nomena and all the aspects of one and the same
phenomenon. If all differences were contradic­
tions, it would be impossible to isolate any other
connections and relations apart from contradic­
tions, which would be the only form of intercon­
nection between objects and their aspects. Mean­
while, other forms of relations and connections,
besides contradictions, such as harmony, coordi­
nation, correspondence, and so on, exist in objec­
tive reality.
Only a difference that involves a divergence of
trends or directions of change, in particular in­
teracting aspects or phenomena, is called a con­
tradiction. In other words, only aspects that have
different trends, different directions of change and
development form a contradiction. There are es­
sential differences, for instance, between separate
branches of socialist production, but there may be
no contradiction between them if there is the ne­
cessary correspondence in their functioning and
development. A contradiction arises only when
 THE BASIC LAWS OF DIALECTICS 265

different trends or a certain discord begin to ap­

pear in the course of development of these bran­
ches due to the inefficiency of planning or eco­
nomic organisations.

e) The Universality of Contradictions

Metaphysicists deny the universality of con­

tradictions. Some, including the German philos­
opher Nicolai Hartmann, believe that all being is
not contradictory in nature and that "neither what
exists in itself, nor the mind in itself is contra­
dictory, but the requirement that the mind should
embrace all that exists, without exception".1
Others, such as Sydney Hook, recognise the exis­
tence of contradictions in the mind only, reject­
ing their existence in the outside world.
As distinct from metaphysicists, dialectical ma­
terialists hold that contradictions are universal.
They exist in any field of reality and in any ma­
terial entity as testified by scientific data and so­
cial experience. In mechanics, for instance, there
is action and counter-action, in electricity-neg­
ative and positive charges, in magnetism-the South
and North poles, in mathematics-plus and minus.
Modern physics has shown that the nature of "ele­
mentary" particles is contradictory. An electron
and a photon, for instance, constitute the unity
of a wave and a corpuscle. An atom, too, is a
unity of opposites, with electrons, protons, and

1 Quoted in Max Hartmann, Die philosophischen

Grundlagen der Naturwissenschaften, Jena, 1948, S. 36.
266 A. P. SHEPTULIN

other particles interacting within it. Contradicto­

riness is a necessary condition for the existence
of living organisms as well. Any living organism
functions and develops on the basis of the inter­
action of such opposite processes as assimilation
and dissimilation. Contradictions between con­
sumption and production, and between the produc­
tive forces and production relations, are inherent
in society. In knowledge, too, there are contradic­
tions between analysis and synthesis, the objective
and the subjective, the abstract and the concrete,
etc.
Thus, contradictions are present in any field of
reality. Contradictoriness is universal. It is intrinsic
in all that exists in reality and consciousness.

f) Contradiction—the Source of the Motion

and Development of Reality

The source of the motion and development of

matter and knowledge constitutes an exceptionally
complex problem over which many philosophers
have racked their brains in the past. They did not
recognise the contradictoriness of being and were
compelled, therefore, either to reject motion, or
turn to God, declaring Him the final cause of all
changes in the world. Heraclitus was the first to
propose that contradiction is the source of mo­
tion. Hegel, however, developed this idea on an
idealistic basis, with respect to pure thought, but
only dialectical materialism substantiated this
proposition on a truly scientific basis. Engels for­
mulated it in the following way: motion . .by
 THE BASIC LAWS OF DIALECTICS 267

the continual conflict of opposites and their final

passage into one another, or into higher forms,
determines the life of nature".1
How does contradiction act as a source of mo­
tion and development? Contradiction, as we have
already noted, is the interaction of opposites. The
action of one opposite force on another, however,
invariably involves relevant changes in the inter­
acting aspects of a thing, and also in the thing
itself. This means that the very existence of con­
tradictions presupposes the motion and also the
development, under relevant conditions, of the
corresponding phenomena.
The interaction of such opposite aspects oi so­
ciety's life as production and consumption, for
instance, inevitably causes changes in each of them,
and then in society as a whole. In this way peo­
ple's requirements influence and change produc­
tion, which takes account of these requirements
and develops in the required direction. As pro­
duction develops, however, so do requirements-
some are replaced by new ones, which set pro­
duction new objectives. Attaining them, produc­
tion develops further and becomes more advanced,
and so do requirements. The changed require­
ments set production yet new objectives, so pro­
duction changes again, and this goes on ad infini­
tum. The interaction of production and consump­
tion thus underlies the continual change in pro­
duction and requirements. At a certain stage in
the development of society, a need arises for im-

F. Engels, Dialectics of Nature, p. 211.

268 A. P. SHEPTULIN

proving the production relations within which

production functioned, and for abolishing one
form of ownership of the means of production in
favour of another. Changes in the relations of
production correspondingly reshape the entire
social organism and bring society to a new, higher
stage of development. In this way the interaction
of opposites causes phenomena to change and
pass into a new qualitative state. All this is a
graphic illustration of how contradiction acts as a
source of the motion and development of matter
and consciousness.

g) Types of Contradiction

Every phenomenon has a multitude of different

contradictions. Their roles in its existence and
development are far from equal, so the need arises
to classify contradictions.
The following types of contradiction are usual­
ly distinguished: internal and external, essential
and non-essential, basic and non-basic.
The interaction oi the opposite aspects inherent
in one and the same phenomenon is called an in­
ternal contradiction, whereas that oi the opposite
aspects inherent in different phenomena is called
an external contradiction.
The interaction of electrons and protons in an
atom, assimilation and dissimilation in a living
organism, the productive forces and production
relations in society, are all examples of internal
contradictions. Contradictions between society and
nature, between individual animals of different
 THE BASIC LAWS OF DIALECTICS 269

species, and so on, are external contradictions.

Internal and external contradictions play diffe­
rent roles in the development of a phenomenon.
Internal contradictions play a decisive role, for
their development and resolution cause a thing to
pass into a new qualitative state, a new stage of
development. External contradictions also exert a
pronounced influence on the development of a
thing, but this influence materialises through in­
ternal contradictions-it may be positive or neg­
ative, it may speed up or slow down the develop­
ment. The interaction of a particular living organ­
ism with the environment may either enhance its
development or cause its death, depending on the
actual conditions under which this organism lives.
The interaction oi opposite aspects of the es­
sence of an object is called an essential contradic­
tion, whereas that of the opposite aspects of ac­
cidental connections and relations is a non-es­
sential contradiction.
The contradiction between the social nature of
production and the private form of appropriation
in capitalist society is an example of an essential
contradiction, since it characterises the essence of
the capitalist mode of production. Contradictions
between bourgeois parties battling for votes dur­
ing an election campaign or contradictions between
various sectors of socialist production are non-
essential contradictions, for they do not concern
the essence of the phenomena in question nor
characterise this essence.
Essential contradictions play a decisive role in
the development of things. Their resolution alone
270 A. P. SHEPTULIN

leads to a change in the essence of an object and

to its transformation into a new object. As re­
gards non-essential contradictions, their resolution
does not change the prevalent situation. The elim­
ination of contradictions between certain bour­
geois parties, for instance, does not affect the
essence of capitalist society, which remains the
same. As regards the contradiction between the
proletariat and the bourgeoisie, however, its re­
solution changes the essence of the social system
and causes the transformation of capitalism into
socialism.
Essential contradictions are subdivided into bas­
ic and non-basic. Contradictions that determine
all the more or less essential aspects of a phenom­
enon, playing this role at every stage of its
development, are called basic. Contradictions that
characterise one particular aspect of a phenomenon
are non-basic. The contradiction between the so­
cial nature of production and the private form of
appropriation in capitalist society, for example,
and that between "dying capitalism and nascent
communism"1 during the transition from capital­
ism to socialism, are basic contradictions. The
contradictions between town and countryside, be­
tween mental and physical labour inherent in
capitalist society and characterising only separate
aspects of society's life, rather than society as a
whole, are non-basic contradictions.
The above types of contradiction are intrinsic
to all fields of reality. Emerging in a certain

1 V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 30, p. 107.

 THE BASIC LAWS OF DIALECTICS 271

concrete field or form of motion, contradictions

take on specific features that distinguish them
from contradictions in other fields or forms of the
motion of matter. Thus, the contradictions in in­
animate nature possess some features, while those
in the animal world possess others, and those of
the realm of knowledge yet others. The contra­
dictions in the life of society also have specific
features. Taking this into account, the founders
of dialectical and historical materialism singled
out antagonistic and non-antagonistic contradic­
tions in society.

h) Antagonistic and Non-antagonistic Contradictions

Contradictions between classes or other social

groups that have opposite interests are antagonist­
ic, while contradictions between classes or other
social groups that have common interests as re­
gards vital problems are non-antagonistic.
Contradictions between slaves and slave­
owners, peasants and landlords, the proletariat
and the bourgeoisie are antagonistic, while con­
tradictions between the working class and the
peasantry, and between various socialist coun­
tries, are non-antagonistic.
Antagonistic contradictions are characterised
by the fact that when they are resolved the unity
within which they existed is eliminated. Thus, the
resolution of the contradiction between the prole­
tariat and the bourgeoisie brings about the trans­
formation of capitalism, in which this contradic­
tion was inherent, into socialist society.
272 A. P. SHEPTULIN

The situation is quite different with non-antag-

onistic contradictions. Their resolution does not
eliminate the unity within which they existed, but
rather strengthens and consolidates it. When the
essential differences between the working class
and the peasantry, for instance, are overcome, so­
cialist society is not eliminated but becomes more
monolithic, mature and perfect.
Since irreconcilable class interests underlie an­
tagonistic contradictions, the latter, as a rule, have
a tendency to intensify. It does not follow, how­
ever, that this tendency manifests itself in all
cases, under all circumstances. Conditions may ob­
tain which paralyse this tendency and the antago­
nistic contradiction, resolved step by step, will
ease off, rather than intensify. The development
and resolution of the antagonistic contradictions
between the national bourgeoisie and the work­
ing class in the Socialist Republic of Vietnam is a
relevant example. The above contradictions ease
off as they are gradually resolved.
In contrast to antagonistic contradictions, non-
antagonistic ones do not tend to intensify. On the
contrary, since the social groups representing the
aspects of these contradictions are interested in
ensuring society's further progress, the contradic­
tions tend to ease off, smooth out and become
resolved, without reaching extreme forms.
Antagonistic contradictions are resolved through
an acute class struggle, whereas non-antagonistic
contradictions are overcome by persuasion, criti­
cism and self-criticism. This in no way means that
such methods cannot be employed under certain
 THE BASIC LAWS OF DIALECTICS 273

conditions to resolve antagonistic contradictions.

When the bourgeoisie realises the senselessness
and futility of resisting the advance of society
towards socialism, the antagonistic contradic­
tions between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat
may be resolved by peaceful means, by resorting
to persuasion and re-education on a wide scale of
that section of the bourgeoisie that accepts social­
ist transformations and cooperates on a voluntary
basis with the proletariat and other groups of the
working people. The experience of transforming
private capitalist enterprises in the German Dem­
ocratic Republic and the Socialist Republic of
Vietnam are examples of the widespread use of
persuasion and re-education in overcoming anta­
gonistic contradictions.

3. The Law of the Negation of Negation

a) The Concept of Dialectical Negation

A specific feature of dialectical negation is that

it is connected with development. This does not,
of course, mean that negations inherent in regres­
sive changes or circular movements do not follow
the laws of dialectics. The latter are universal,
they manifest themselves in any process of change,
and are intrinsic to any motion. The name
"dialectical negation", in the course of which a
passage from the lower to the higher occurs, is
conventional. It stems from the specific features
of dialectics as a science. As distinct from meta­
physics, which rejects development, dialectics is
18—1557
274 A. P. SHEPTULIN

the theory of development. Teachings on the laws

and forms of development constitute the main
content of dialectics, for which reason the nega­
tion inherent in development was called dialectic­
al, in contrast to all the other negations accepted
by metaphysicists in some form or other.
Dialectical negation is objective. It is the nega­
tion of one qualitative state and the formation of
a new one. It stems from the development of the
internal contradictions of a phenomenon and re­
sults from the "struggle" between internal opposite
forces and tendencies; it is a connecting link be­
tween the lower and the higher. It performs this
function because it is not simply the destruction
of a certain qualitative entity, but also the creation
of something new. It is a negation in the course
of which only that which has outlived itself,
which contradicts the new conditions of existence,
is destroyed. That which is positive in it is retained
and develops further within a new pheno­
menon that is taking shape in the process of nega­
tion.
Lenin stressed this specific feature of dialectical
negation when he wrote: "Not empty negation,
not futile negation, not sceptical negation, vacil­
lation and doubt is characteristic and essential in
dialectics,-which undoubtedly contains the ele­
ment of negation and indeed as its most impor­
tant element-no, but negation as a moment of
connection, as a moment of development, retain­
ing the positive... Z'1

1 V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 38, p. 226.

 THE BASIC LAWS OF DIALECTICS 275

In the process of negation-the disappearance of

some living organisms, for instance, and their re­
placement by other, more developed ones-every-
thing positive that has been accumulated during
the preceding historical development is retained
and developed further. Thus, the first living crea­
tures' ability to renew chemical components within
themselves and to organise and coordinate to a
certain extent all chemical reactions did not dis­
appear even when the creatures themselves did.
This ability was enhanced in the new organisms
that replaced them. The cellular composition of a
living organism is a similar case. Having first
been developed by the simplest unicellular or­
ganisms, it dit not disappear following transition
to more complex organisms, but has been retained
and became a necessary element of their structure.
Moreover, the productive forces created by preced­
ing generations are not destroyed during the nega­
tion or overthrow of one socio-economic system
and the emergence, on its basis, of another one.
On the contrary, being the basis for the emergence
of a new, more advanced economic system, they
receive wider scope for further development within
the bounds of the new socio-economic system.
To sum up, a specific feature of dialectical nega­
tion is that it is a universal form of connection
between the lower and the higher.
b) The Correlation of Concepts “Dialectical Negation”,
“Leap” and “Resolution of Contradictions”
A student of the basic laws of dialectics usually
encounters some difficulty in comprehending the
18*
276 A. P. SHEPTULIN

difference between a leap, dialectical negation, and

the process of resolving contradictions. This is not
surprising, for these three concepts deal with one
and the same process-the transformation of one
object into another. But they reflect its different
aspects. The concept "resolution of contradictions"
signifies that the transformation of one thing into
another occurs as a result of the "struggle" of
opposites, their transition into one another and
the elimination of the given contradictory unity.
The concept "leap" expresses the law according
to which this process takes place through the tran­
sition of quantitative into qualitative changes,
through the transformation of the given qualita­
tive state and the break-off of its further being.
The concept "dialectical negation" reflects the
fact that the transformation of one thing into
another occurs both through the destruction of
that within it that does not correspond to the
changed state and conditions of its being and
through the retention and further development
in a new phenomenon (emerging as a result of the
negation of the old one) of all that is positive and
corresponds to the new conditions and trends of
development.
In contrast to the concept "resolution of contra­
dictions", which marks the elimination of a cer­
tain contradictory unity, pointing to the finite
nature of being, the concept "dialectical nega­
tion" marks the elimination of a certain object
or qualitative state, pointing to the infinite nature
of being. Moreover, as distinct from the concept
"leap", which marks the moment of discrete ex­
 THE BASIC LAWS OF DIALECTICS 277

istence of a certain object or qualitative state, the

concept "dialectical negation" marks the moment
of the continuous nature of being, the moment
of connection between the negated and the negat­
or, and continuity of development.
c) The Essence of the Law
of the Negation of Negation
In the course of dialectical negation of some
phenomena or qualitative states by others, a mo­
ment comes when the newly-emerging phenomena
or qualitative states repeat a certain stage that has
already been passed. This repetition is partial,
rather than full, and formal, rather than essen­
tial. What happens is not an actual turn-back, but,
as Lenin put it, a would-be turn-back. The newly
emerging phenomenon or qualitative state repeats
the stage that has already been passed, but on
a new, higher basis.
The establishment of socialist public ownership
in the course of a proletarian revolution, for ex­
ample, is the repetition of what already existed
under the primitive communal system, in which
public ownership also prevailed. But, though a
repetition of what had existed at the initial stages
of society's development, socialist ownership has
certain specific features. Primitive communal
ownership was the consequence of a low level of
development of society's productive forces, which
excluded the possibility of procuring on one's own
the material wealth necessary for survival, where­
as socialist ownership is the outcome of an ex­
tremely high level of development of the produc­
278 A. P. SHEPTULIN

tive forces. It is established when the productive

forces outgrow the confines of private ownership I
and in order to develop further require the latter
to give way to public ownership.
Or take another example: the worker under
simple commodity production performed all la- I
bour operations related to the making of a certain ;
commodity. Following the appearance of capi­
talist manufactories, he turned into the partial, as
Marx put it, or detail, according to Lenin, worker
and began to perform only some of the opera­
tions, or even just one of them. Today, automation
of production compels the worker once again to
start performing a multitude of various opera­
tions. The repetition of what has already been and
has come back is evident here, but in this case,
too, it has occurred on a new, higher plane. In the
past, the simple commodity production worker
performed all labour operations himself, with his
own hands. Now all these operations are perfor­
med by machines. His role is to operate them.
Here is another example from the history of
knowledge. It is an established fact that, in the
Middle Ages, alchemists advanced the idea that
chemical elements could be transformed into
others. Later (in the 17th to 19th centuries), when
the atomistic theory substantiating the immutab-:
ility of atoms reigned supreme, the first idea was
replaced by another one, according to which che­
mical elements could not be transformed into j
others. Today scientists have come to the conclu­
sion that, given the right conditions, some chemical
elements can be transformed into others. A turn-j
 THE BASIC LAWS OF DIALECTICS 279

back to the past is evident here, too, but it has oc-

cured on a new basis. Alchemists drew their con­
clusions from sheer fantasy, while modern scien­
tists proceed from the knowledge of the objective
laws of natural and artificial radioactivity of cer­
tain substances.
The repetition of the past in the course of nega­
tion of some objects or qualitative states by others
is not an accidental phenomenon, but a universal
law of development. It is a necessary consequence
of the fact that the process of development en­
tails the transition of certain particular phenom­
ena (aspects, properties) into their opposites.
Having done so, a phenomenon (aspect, property)
again turns into its opposite in the course of its
development, thus returning, as it were, to its
initial state, repeating what has already been pas­
sed, but it does so on a necessarily new and higher
basis. This is because a phenomenon (aspect,
property) that has returned to its initial stage re­
tains in a sublated form the positive content that
has emerged during its subsequent development.
Thus, in the course of negation of some objects
or qualitative states by others, the repetition of
what has already been passed occurs on a new,
higher basis.
This inevitably raises the question: "How many
negations are needed for a developing phenome­
non to repeat the path already covered?"
In simple cases a turn-back, a repetition of the
initial qualitative state occurs after two negations.
In the development of a seed, for example, the
initial state is repeated after two negations: the
280 A. P. SHEPTULIN

seed is negated by the plant and the plant by the

seed.
A turn-back or repetition of what has already
been passed after two negations is not the only
form through which the law of the negation of
negation manifests itself. The repetition of the
stages passed may occur after a greater number
of negations, e.g. 4, 8, and so on. This is because
the transformation of a developing phenomenon
(aspect, property) into its opposite does not occur
in every negation. Frequently, in the course of
negation a thing does not turn into its opposite-it
passes into some other qualitative state which
differs from the initial one, but is not its opposite.
Transformation into its opposite is only the ulti­
mate result. The transformation of private proper­
ty, for instance, into socialist public ownership
occurs, as the history of human society proves,
through three negations: 1) slave ownership is
negated by feudal property, 2) feudal property
is negated by bourgeois ownership, and 3) bour­
geois (and all private property in general) is neg­
ated by socialist public ownership, which is the
opposite of private property.
Thus, the number of negations for repeating the
passed on a new basis in the development of a
certain field of reality may vary greatly. It depends
on the nature of a developing phenomenon and
on the concrete conditions of the development pro­
cess.
A specific feature of the law of the negation of
negation is thus the repetition of the passed on a
new basis, a return, as it were, to the old.
 THE BASIC LAWS OF DIALECTICS 281

It was this regularity that Lenin noted when he

defined the essence of this law. The negation of
negation, he wrote, is "a development that repeats,
as it were, stages that have already been passed,
but repeats them in a different way, on a higher
basis.. ."L
But if a return to the past, the repetition of the
passed stages on a new basis is a universal law
of development, the latter cannot proceed straight-
forwardly-it takes on a spiral form.

* * *

We have discussed the basic laws governing the

interconnection of matter and consciousness, and
also the universal properties and relations of
reality and the universal laws of dialectics. The
latter, however, do not exist independently of
particular laws which operate in the specific fields
of reality, but rather alongside and through them.
These particular laws which are specific for
a certain field of reality, affect the universal laws
and underlie their specific manifestations in every
field of reality. The specific manifestations of the
laws governing the interconnection between mat­
ter and consciousness and of the universal laws
of dialectics in society's life are studied by histor­
ical materialism which constitutes a major part
of the philosophy of Marxism-Leninism. The se­
cond half of this book deals with the topical
questions of historical materialism.

1 V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 21, p. 54.

Historical
materialism
Chapter Vlll

THE SUBJECT-MATTER
OF HISTORICAL MATERIALISM

1. Historical Materialism
as a Part of Marxist Philosophy
Historical materialism studies the laws govern­
ing the interrelation between matter and consci­
ousness and the universal laws of being with re­
spect to life in society.
This does not mean, of course, that dialectical
materialism does not study manifestations of the
universal laws of the motion and development
of matter in society. Dialectical materialism,
faced with the task of studying the laws inherent
in all the spheres of being, cannot avoid tracing
how the latter function in social life. While
studying the manifestations of these laws in so­
ciety, however, dialectical materialism focusses
its attention on only those elements, aspects and
relationships that are common to all the other
spheres of being. Historical materialism studies
the functioning of the universal laws in social
life in order to reveal their specific content, con­
ditioned by the peculiarities of the social form
of the motion of matter.
By establishing the specific nature of the laws
(studied by dialectical materialism) in social life,
historical materialism discovers the general
286 A. P. SHEPTULIN

laws which govern the functioning and develop­

ment of human society.
So, whereas dialectical materialism establishes
the laws of interconnection of consciousness and
matter in general by offering a solution to the
basic question of philosophy, historical material­
ism, while dealing wifh this problem as applied
to society, reveals the laws of the interconnection
between social being and social consciousness, the
material and spiritual life of society. These law-
governed patterns, though they are a manifesta­
tion of the general laws applying to the whole of
reality, have their own specific content and hence
are independent laws governing the operation of
the social organism.
In the context of historical materialism, such a
general law as the law of the unity and "struggle”
of opposites, for example, takes the form of that
of class struggle in an antagonistic society, of that
of the interconnection of production and consump­
tion and of other laws of social development. The
law of the transformation of quantitative into
qualitative changes, when applied to society, takes
the form of the law of social revolution and of
other laws of qualitative transformation of vari­
ous aspects of social life; the law of the negation of
negation takes the form of the law of the replace­
ment of socio-economic formations in the process
of historical development and recurrence of
past events at a higher stage taking place in all
spheres of social life, and so on.
Thus, historical materialism studies the laws ot
interrelationship between matter and consciousness
 THE SUBJECT OF HISTORICAL MATERIALISM 287

and the general laws of being in their specific ma­

nifestations in social life, and discovers, on this
basis, the general laws governing the functioning
and development of society as a specific form of
the motion of matter. Hence, the subject-matter
of historical materialism is the general laws
governing the functioning and development of
society.

2. Historical Materialism
and the Other Social Sciences
Besides historical materialism, many general
laws of social life are studied by specific social
sciences such as linguistics, the legal sciences,
ethics, aesthetics, political economy and the his­
torical science. So the question inevitably arises as
to what distinguishes the subject-matter of histor­
ical materialism from that of specific social
sciences and how it interrelates with them.
As a rule, specific social sciences study certain
individual aspects of society, the laws governing
the functioning and development of various
spheres of social life. Linguistics, for example,
studies the laws governing the functioning and
development of language, the legal sciences deal
with the law, ethics studies the laws of the rise
and development of moral norms and views, po­
litical economy investigates the laws of society's
economic life at various stages of development,
etc. Unlike these sciences, historical materialism
studies not separate spheres of social life but
288 A. P. SHEPTULIN

society as an integral organism, as a special,

relatively stable system of the motion of matter,
in which all aspects of social life are organically
interrelated and interdependent. Thus, it is the
laws of the interrelationship and interdependence
of all aspects and links of a social organism that
are studied by historical materialism.
Besides the specific social sciences already men­
tioned, there is another social science that studies
society as historical materialism does, as a whole,
not as individual aspects of its social life. This is
general history. So, how to differentiate between
the subject-matter of historical materialism and
that of historical science?
Historical materialism studies specific historic­
al events with a view to discovering, on their
basis, the general laws governing the functioning
and development of society, while historical sci­
ence aims at explaining specific events, proceed­
ing from the relevant laws of social development.
In other words, historical materialism, by study­
ing specific social phenomena, strives to reveal
the general, inherent in any society at a given
stage of development, while historical science,
looking at the same events, strives to detect the
particular and explain it proceeding from the
relevant general laws of historical material­
ism.
Thus, though historical materalism and histor­
ical science deal with the same subject-society as
a whole-their subject-matter differs.
 THE SUBJECT OF HISTORICAL MATERIALISM 289

3. The Limitations
of Pre-Marxian Sociological Views

Definite views of society, of its motive forces

and the laws of its development had already ap­
peared in ancient times. They emerged together
with philosophy which initially was the only
science not just studying the general forms of
being, but mainly explaining specific social and
natural phenomena. Once they had emerged, so­
ciological views did not remain intact, but were
constantly changing, especially as society pass­
ed from one stage of development to another.
For all the diversity of pre-Marxian sociological
views, they were all idealist in character. The
essence of social life, its changes and develop­
ment were deduced from some spiritual origin­
divine reason, the absolute idea, the development
of science, religion or public opinion, etc. Thus,
many philosophers in Ancient Greece held that
social life was guided by the gods, who directly
intervened in it and determined the destiny
of individuals and nations. In the Middle Ages,
theologians and philosophers deduced the essence
of social life from the divine nature. For example,
according to Thomas Aquinas, freedom, slavery,
class distinctions and state power were all of
divine origin. He held that God had created man
free, but had sent him slavery as a punishment for
his sins. Besides, according to Thomas Aquinas,
God created "dirty people"-peasants, townsmen
and artisans to do the "dirty" work of society. As
far as state power is concerned, Thomas Aquinas
19—1557
290 A. P. SHEPTULIN

held that it is a unifying principle in the state,

interrelated with the latter as God is with the
Universe, or the soul with the body. The 18th-
century French materialists Helvetius and Holbach
explained the changes within the state and in
people's living conditions by the changes in pub­
lic opinion. Hegel deduced the essence and laws
of development from the development of the abso­
lute idea. Ludwig Feuerbach related society's tran­
sition from one stage of development to another to
the change of religions.
While revealing the idealism of pre-Marxian so­
ciological views, we must not presume that
there was nothing rational or scientific about
them. Some pre-Marxian philosophers and sociolog­
ists also suggested certain correct ideas, that were
materialistic in essence. No matter what brilliant
conjectures they represented, however, these pro­
positions could not play a major role in the so­
ciological theories developed by these thinkers,
which were basically idealistic.
Thus, for example, the ancient Greek philosoph­
er Democritus, while opposing Pythagorean views
on the intervention of the gods into human social
life, put forward the idea of the importance of
material needs for society's development. Demo­
critus believed that "the need itself served as mis­
tress in all matters". At the same time, he consid­
ered production as the outcome of free creativ­
ity.
The ancient Greek philosopher Protagoras as­
signed an important place in social life to the dev­
elopment of material culture. He demonstrated
 THE SUBJECT OF HISTORICAL MATERIALISM 291

that, with the development of culture, in partic­

ular with the mastering of fire and the emergence
of crafts, people began to live in organised com­
munities, such as towns. At the same time Prota­
goras remarked that, for the people to pass to
this new form of social life, they should learn
to determine what is just and what is unjust. He
claimed that only the gods imparted that ability
to human beings.
The 18th-century French enlightener Charles
Montesquieu expressed the profound idea that law
depends on the mode of production. “The laws,"
he pointed out, “are very closely connected with
the way different nations procure their subsist­
ence."1 At the same time, he deduced the content
of laws from the form of government, i.e. from a
political factor that, according to his theory,
played a decisive role.
A number of rational ideas on the origin of
private property, classes and the state were ex­
pressed by Jean-Jacques Rousseau. Private prop­
erty, he asserted, emerges due to the fact that
people, with their inherent capacity for self­
improvement, devise new instruments of labour
and start cultivating the land. Advanced instru­
ments allow cultivation to be improved and, in
the long run, they cause the emergence of pri­
vate property, which, in turn, brings about the
division of society into the rich and the poor
and causes conflicts between them. The in­

1 Oeuvres completes de Montesquieu, Tome I, Paris,

1950, p. 384.
19«
292 A. P. SHEPTULIN

tensifying class struggle, according to Rousseau,

determines the need for the formation of a state
to guard private property and consolidate the
domination of the rich. Rousseau succeeded in
providing a general, rather realistic, description
of the social processes that caused the emergence
of classes and the state, but he failed to maintain a
consistently materialistic approach and follow this
principle throughout. Ultimately he departed from
the materialistic approach to the question of the
origin of the state, and took an idealistic stand,
claiming that it was the rich who invented the
state and deceived the poor as to the necessity of
establishing state power. According to Rous­
seau's interpretation, the state is, therefore, the
outcome of people's conscious creativity.
The proposition put forward by the 18th-century
French materialists (Helvetius, Holbach and
others) to the effect that man, with all his desires,
views and feelings was a product of education
and the environment in which he lived, was in
general a materialistic and correct point of view.
"People...," Helvetius wrote on this score, "are
born either with no disposition, or with disposi­
tions to all opposite vices and virtues. They are,
therefore, just a product of their education."1
But alongside this proposition, the French ma­
terialists developed the idea of the dependence of
the social milieu on legislation and the political
structure, which are formed under the influence of

1 Oeuvres completes de Mr. Helvetius, Tome 3, Londres,

1777, p. 297.
 THE SUBJECT OF HISTORICAL MATERIALISM 293

public opinion. "Experience," Helvetius wrote,

"proves that the character and spirit of peoples
change together with the form of their govern­
ment and that different forms of government im­
part to one and the same nation a high or low, a
constant or unstable, a courageous or timid
character."1 Social life and its development were
thus, in the final analysis, determined neither by
material factors nor by economic relations, but
by legislation, politics and public opinion.
The French historians of the Restoration (Guizot,
Thierry and Mignet) went somewhat further than
the 18th-century French materialists in compre­
hending the essence of social life. They established
that political institutions are determined by social
relations, which depend on the property status.
"It would be wiser," Guizot wrote, for example,
"to begin with the study of society, in order to
learn and understand its political institutions.
Before becoming a cause, institutions are a conse­
quence; society creates them before it begins to
change under their influence; and instead of judg­
ing the condition of a people from the system
or the forms of its government, we must first
of all investigate the condition of the people, in
order to judge what should be and what could
be its government."2 And he continued: "In ord­
er to understand political institutions, we must
study the various strata existing in society and

1 Ibid.
2 Georgi Plekhanov, Selected Philosophical Works,
Vol. 1, Moscow, 1974, p. 497.
294 A. P. SHEPTULIN

their mutual relationships. In order to understand

these various strata, we must know the nature
and the relations of landed property." Having
expressed the idea of the dependence of political
institutions on social relations, and that of the
latter on the property relations, the French his­
torians could not, however, reveal the actual
reasons behind the "property relations". A ref­
erence to human nature as a factor influencing
the property relations explained nothing, but
merely proved that they failed to go beyond the
ideas put forward by the Enlighteners, who
tried to link all social problems to "human na­
ture".1
The Utopian socialists (Owen, Saint-Simon and
Fourier) made definite strides towards revealing
the driving forces behind social progress. Though
similar to the 18th-century French materialists
and historians of the Restoration, the Utopians
based their social views on the supposed existence
of man's unchanging and true nature, but they
did not confine themselves to asserting that
property relations are the basis of the social
system, as the French historians had done at the
beginning of the 19th century. They tried to ex­
plain why these relations played such an impor­
tant part. Saint-Simon, in particular, saw the needs
of production and industry as the reason be­
hind the major role of property relations in the
development of society. He explained the transfer

1 Georgi Plekhanov, Selected Philosophical Works,

Vol. 1, p. 498.
 THE SUBJECT OF HISTORICAL MATERIALISM 295

of property from the feudal lords into the

hands of the bourgeoisie and the political changes
accompanying this process in France by the
needs of industrial development. Saint-Simon
was right in singling out production as a deter­
mining factor in social life, but he referred the
development of industry to changes in the public
consciousness and considered it the result solely
of the mental improvement of mankind. Thus,
here again, consciousness, as the spirit, represen­
ted the ultimate cause of society's existence and
development.
Finally, the Russian revolutionary democrats
Belinsky and Chernyshevsky pointed to the peo­
ple's "material conditions of existence" and their
material requirements as factors playing the major
part in human life. But they also acknowledged
the decisive role of science and education in his­
torical progress.
Thus, all pre-Marxian philosophers, both ideal­
ists and materialists, proceeded, in the final
analysis, from the spirit in trying to explain the
essence of social life and the motive forces of
history, i.e. they were, in fact, idealists.
How can one account for this? Why was ideal­
ism so predominant in the sociological views of
pre-Marxian philosophers and sociologists?
Interactions between material substances in
nature are effected without the interference of any
conscious creature and it is here that, in Engels’
words, "nothing of all that happens-whether in
the innumerable apparent accidents observable
upon the surface, or in the ultimate results which
296 A. P. SHEPTULIN

confirm the regularity inherent in these accidents

-happens as a consciously desired aim."1
It is people-creatures possessing consciousness
who set definite aims and try to fulfil them-who
act in society. There, wrote Engels, "nothing hap­
pens without a conscious purpose, without an in­
tended aim."2
It is this very circumstance that confused the
pre-Marxian materialist philosophers and made
them abandon the materialist basic principle in
explaining natural phenomena, in favour of an
idealistic approach to the phenomena of social
life. This is what determined the fact that they
(the pre-Marxian materialists) considered the ideal
driving forces in society to be the ultimate causes
of events and did not seek more deep-seated
motive forces which determined these driving
forces. Furthermore, due to this very exaggeration
of the role of the spirit in social life-the activities
of the masses escaped the attention of the pre­
Marxian sociologists, and it was great personali­
ties, enlightened monarchs and law-makers who
were regarded as the creators of history.
Pre-Marxian materialists, while proceeding from
ideological motives in explaining social phenome­
na and their causes spurring people to historical
activity, failed to unveil the reasons behind these
motives. As a result, they abandoned their ma­
terialist principles in favour of idealist views.

1 K. Marx and F. Engels, Selected Works, Vol. 3,

p. 365.
2 Ibid., p. 366.
 THE SUBJECT OF HISTORICAL MATERIALISM 297

Hegel tried to correct the mistake of the mate­

rialists in defining the ultimate causes of historical
development. He stated that the historical activi­
ties of people depended neither on their will nor
wish, but were guided by the "world spirit" which
assumed the form of historical necessity implicit
in individual events. Though people act in the
pursuit of their aims, Hegel pointed out, they ef­
fect something which is beyond their intentions
and objectives and which they themselves do not
realise. The realisation of what is beyond people's
immediate goals or consciousness, becomes the
historical mission of particular nations which, be­
ing themselves pawns in the hands of the "world
spirit", are called upon to implement relevant
ideas determining this or that stage of historical
development, and represent, in effect, the devel­
opment stages of the "world spirit". For example,
according to Hegel, the history of ancient Greece
was nothing but an elaboration of "forms of beau­
tiful individuality", or the realisation of the con­
cept of a "work of art" as such.1
While showing the 18th-century materialists'
narrow understanding of the ultimate causes of
peoples' historical activity, and being correct in
that the direct motivations of historical personaliti­
es were not the ultimate causes of historical events,
and that here are other driving forces behind
them, Hegel, nevertheless, failed to provide a
scientifically backed solution to this problem. He

1 K. Marx and F. Engels, Selected Works, Vol. 3.

P- 367.
298 A. P. SHEPTULIN

looked for the ultimate causes of historical devel­

opment not in history itself but outside, not
in the material sphere of social life but in the
spirit, in the logical laws of development of the
absolute idea existing somewhere outside and in­
dependently of human society and history.

4. The Development of Sociology into a Science

In contrast to Hegel, Marx saw the cause of

peoples' ideal motive forces not in the "world spir­
it", but in the activities of the people making
up the society. He discovered the simple fact, hid­
den however under ideological cover, that
"mankind must first of all eat, drink, have shelter
and clothing, before it can pursue politics, science,
art, religion, etc.; that therefore the production
of the immediate material means of subsistence
and consequently the degree of economic devel­
opment attained by a given people or during a
given epoch form the foundation upon which the
state institutions, the legal conceptions, art, and
even the ideas on religion, of the people concer­
ned have been evolved, and in the light of which
they must, therefore, be explained, instead of vice
versa, as had hitherto been the case."1 Marx ap­
plied the materialistic principle ot the primacy
of matter and of the secondary nature of con­
sciousness to society and found that, in society,

1 K. Marx and F. Engels, Selected Works, Vol, 3.

p. 1%
 THE SUBJECT OF HISTORICAL MATERIALISM 299

it is the material conditions oi people's life, the

production of material wealth and the resultant
economic relations that are the decisive factors,
not spiritual activity or consciousness.
Having revealed the decisive role of material
production in human life, Marx naturally came
to the conclusion that the decisive role in social
development is played by the producers of ma­
terial wealth-the masses of the people-and to
recognition of the class struggle as the driving
force behind historical development.
Pre-Marxian sociologists, while advancing a spe­
cific aspect of consciousness as the determining
factor in the functioning and development of so­
ciety or explaining the essence of social life on
this basis, were unable to notice the recurring and
regular nature of social phenomena typical of
different countries, and to differentiate between
important and secondary events in the complex
intermingling of social phenomena. The outcome
was, at best, a description of these phenomena,
or a compilation of facts, or untreated data, in­
capable of revealing the laws of history. And
without a knowledge of these laws, there could
not be any genuine social science. Marx’s identi­
fication of production relations as the key factor,
allowed him to notice recurrences in the life of
different nations, to single out the most common
patterns in their social structure and to express
these common features through the general concept
of socio-economic formation. According to Marx,
a socio-economic formation is characterised by
definite production relations, which come into
300 A. P. SHEPTULIN

being on the basis of the given level of develop­

ment of the productive forces, by the relevant polit­
ical and legal superstructure corresponding to pro­
duction relations, and by the forms of social con­
sciousness, the family, the way of life, etc. This
generalisation made it possible to pass from a
description and arbitrary appraisal of social
phenomena, from the point of view of the ideas
favoured by this or that author, to strict scientific
analysis of them.
Finally, in contrast to earlier sociologists who,
basing themselves on man's definite ideas and
aims and unable to see that they were dependent
on material social relations, linked such ideas
and aims to a spiritual factor, Marx by reducing
all social relations to relations of production, and
the latter to the level of development of the pro­
ductive forces, was able to present the develop­
ment ot socio-economic formations as a process
of natural history proceeding on the basis of ob­
jective laws independent ot the will or wishes of
people.
By making this discovery Marx was the first
to turn sociology into a science1. "Just as Dar­
win," wrote Lenin on this score, "put an end to
the view of animal and plant species being uncon­
nected, fortuitous, 'created by God' and immu­
table, and was the first to put biology on an ab­
solutely scientific basis by establishing the muta­
bility and the succession of species, so Marx put
an end to the view of society being a mechanical

1 See V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 1, pp. 140-42.

 THE SUBJECT OF HISTORICAL MATERIALISM 301

aggregation of individuals which allows of all

sorts of modification at the will of the authorities
(or, if you like, at the will of society and the gov­
ernment) and which emerges and changes casu­
ally, and was the first to put sociology on a scien­
tific basis by establishing the concept of the eco­
nomic formation of society as the sum-total of
given production relations, by establishing the fact
that the development of such formations is a pro­
cess of natural history."1

5. Historical Necessity
and People’s Conscious Activity
The major feature distinguishing social life from
living and non-living nature is the fact that the
protagonists here are conscious beings who set
definite goals and try to reach them. Nothing si­
milar is met in nature, where changes do not
result from the fulfilment of conscious aims, but
are due to the interplay of material bodies or the
collision of an infinite number of diverse sponta­
neous forces and trends.
Bearing this in mind, many pre-Marxian socio­
logists, while conceding the existence of an
objective necessity or a definite regularity in the
development of natural phenomena, nevertheless
rejected it on the historical plane, in social life.
According to them, society is not governed by any
laws or necessity, since it develops on the basis
of people's free will, or their free creative activity.

1 Ibid., p. 142.
302 A. P. SHEPTULIN

Marx and Engels proved that these ideas do

not reflect the real state of affairs. Though there
are acting, conscious beings in society, who are
trying to reach definite aims, this does not exclude
historical necessity or regularity which are brought
about by these actions, determining the inevita­
bility of results occurring independently of peo­
ple's consciousness or will.
Indeed, although every person acts consciously
and according to his will, the aims people set
conflict with each other, and prove unattainable
either in substance or due to a lack of means for
realising them. On the other hand, even if these
aims are to some extent attained, they do not
ultimately lead to the desired results. For ex­
ample, when people worked to create the steam
engine, their only concern was to raise productiv­
ity in some industries. They had no idea that
they were creating the instrument which more
than any other was to revolutionise social rela­
tions throughout he world. They had no idea that
this would, by concentrating wealth in the hands
of the minority and turning the overwhelming
majority of the population into proletarians, give
the bourgeoisie social and political domination at
first, and then cause a class struggle between
the bourgeoisie and the proletariat, which must
inevitably result in the overthrow of the bour­
geoisie and the abolition of all class antagonisms.1
Take another example. When people interact
with each other by selling or buying goods, em­

1 See F. Engels, Dialectics ot Nature, p. 181.

 THE SUBJECT OF HISTORICAL MATERIALISM 303

ploying or hiring, they are pursuing some definite

aims, giving little thought to what relations form
as a result and what the social changes are caused
by these relations. When a peasant, for instance,
sells his grain and thus comes into contact
with world grain producers on the world market,
he is not conscious of this nor is he conscious of
the kind of social relations that are formed on the
basis of exchange.1
Furthermore, the wealthy citizens of ancient
Rome, while buying up plots of land from poorer
landowners, simply wanted to increase their
wealth, and could not possibly have foreseen let
alone wished that the latifundia would destroy the
republic.
Thus, an individual in society pursues his own
deliberately set aims, while the total outcome of
a host of individual actions, undertaken with di­
verse aims in mind, does not depend on the will
and consciousness of individuals, but merely ex­
presses some necessary trend, determined by these
individuals' material living conditions and activ­
ities.
Clashes of innumerable intentions and actions
lead, in history, to a state similar to that in nature,
which is deprived of any consciousness: intrinsic
necessity and regularity manage to find their way
through the mass of diverse accidental interac­
tions, links and relations, and the objective laws
of motion come to the surface.
Thus, despite the highly specific nature of so­

1 See V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 14, p. 323.

304 A. P. SHEPTULIN

ciety, its functioning and development are subject

to objective laws expressing the necessity of de­
finite historical events and of the law-governed
pattern of the historical process.
But how can the inevitability of some events
be combined with man's freedom of action?
Some critics of Marxism hold that historical
necessity contradicts the freedom of human be­
haviour and that the inevitability of the historical
process excludes any freedom. In fact, people's
uninhibited activity, far from contradicting ob­
jective necessity, is based on it.
True, man can act freely only when he has cog­
nised the objective laws, necessary linkages and
interrelations inherent in a particular sphere and
takes them into acount in his actions. If, on the
other hand, he does not know these laws and ne­
cessary linkages, he cannot be free in taking his
decisions relating to the given sphere. Then he
acts at random and, naturally, is carried away by
spontaneous forces based on intrinsic laws, which
deprive his behaviour of any genuine freedom.
Thus, freedom lies not in independence from any
necessity and the laws of reality, but rather in
their cognition and "in the possibility ... of sys­
tematically making them [the laws of nature-
A. S.] work towards definite ends". Freedom is
nothing but "the capacity to make decisions with
knowledge of the subject".1
This applies not only to man's actions relating
to changes in natural phenomena, but also to those

1 F. Engels, Anti-Diihring, pp. 136-37.

 THE SUBJECT OF HISTORICAL MATERIALISM 305

aimed at changing social phenomena, i.e. not

only to his control over the processes of nature,
but also to his regulation of processes in social
life. Freedom of action in the social sphere, how­
ever, is attained only when society makes the tran­
sition to socialism and then to communism, since
only socialism creates the objective conditions for
the conscious application of the laws of social ac­
tivity and for the conscious use of historical ne­
cessity. It is only from this moment on that peo­
ple start to create history consciously, in accor­
dance with its objective laws and its intrinsic ne­
cessity. As for antagonistic systems, due to the do­
mination of private ownership over the means of
production and the exploitation of man by man,
the necessary conditions do not exist for the ba­
lanced and conscious utilisation of the laws of so­
cial development, and this results in these laws
opposing man "as laws of nature foreign to, and
dominating him"1 and excluding genuine freedom
of man's historical creativity.

1 F. Engels, Anti-Diihring, p. 336.

20—1557
Chapter IX

SOCIETY AND NATURE

1. On the Unity of Society and Nature

Society, being a special form of the motion of
matter, emerges on the basis of the further devel­
opment of the material forms of the motion of
matter that constitute nature, particularly its biolo­
gical form. Its immediate ancestor is the animal
herd, a biological group based on food, sex, defence
and other instincts.
The animal herd was transformed into human
society under the direct influence of labour and
the "instrumental" activity of man's animal an­
cestors to meet their needs. While looking for
food or defending themselves from enemies, high­
ly developed animals began using natural objects
(sticks, stones, etc.) in order to reach for a fruit,
to crack the hard shell of a nut, to hit an attack­
ing beast, and so forth. These actions often had
positive results, which conditioned the emergence
of a corresponding reflex and the habit of using
natural objects as "instruments" in undertaking
certain actions associated with meeting the body's
needs. At first such use of natural objects was a
casual and temporary phenomenon, but later, the
obvious efficacy of such uses lent them increasing
importance for the life of the given species of
animal.
 SOCIETY AND NATURE 307

While systematically applying natural objects

to achieve a predetermined result, attempts were
made to create the necessary "instruments" by
processing certain natural objects. As this ten­
dency developed it conditioned a gradual trans­
formation of reflex and instinctive actions into
conscious and purposeful activity.
By creating the instruments required to influence
nature, man's ancestors became less and less
dependent on it, since man then waged a struggle
for his existence not by changing his biological
qualities and functions, but by improving the in­
struments with which he affected nature and pur­
posely changed it.
Corresponding ties and relationships were
established between individuals acting jointly in
the creation and use of instruments. These ties
grew stronger with the development of this activ­
ity and gradually overtook in importance the bio­
logical ties underlying this association. As these
relationships became more and more important for
the existence of a tribe, formed by individuals,
this herd developed into a human society-a high­
er form of matter's being, qualitatively different
from previous forms of living nature.
As we can see, labour-the process taking place
between man and nature, "in which man of his
own accord starts, regulates, and controls the ma­
terial re-actions between himself and Nature"1-
represented the basis of the existence and develop­
ment of this new form of the motion of matter.

1 K. Marx, Capital, Vol. I, p. 173.

20*
308 A. P. SHEPTULIN

Labour is the prime and basic condition for hu­

man life, and its existence, above all, distinguishes
human society from an animal herd. Thanks to
labour man becomes separate from nature and
"makes it serve his ends, masters it."1
Society, which took shape as a particular form
of motion of matter, did not sever its ties with
the forms that preceded it and constituted a
sphere of animated and unanimated nature, but
incorporated them in a transformed way. In fact,
society was formed through the interaction and
interrelation of intricate material systems, viz., by
people with physical, chemical and biological pro­
cesses, subject to corresponding physical, chemi­
cal and biological laws. While all these laws ex­
press the organic linkage and unity of society
and nature, they are not determining in society,
do not constitute its essence or express its qualita­
tive features. Subject to definite physical, chemical
and biological laws, man's functioning and devel­
opment are part of a definite system of social
relations with their specific laws which deter­
mine the specific features of society and the
people that make it up.
Moreover, society's organic ties with nature are
also expressed by the fact that the former cannot
exist without its interaction with the latter. As
mentioned earlier, labour, which provides the
means of subsistence, is the basis of society's
emergence and existence. At the same time it re­
presents that interaction of man and nature, in

1 F. Engels, Dialectics of Nature, p. 179.

 SOCIETY AND NATURE 309

the course of which man purposely changes some

natural objects and phenomena, adapting them to
people's specific needs.
The interaction of society and nature is thus a
prime condition for the functioning and develop­
ment of society. In the course of this interaction,
nature produces a definite impact on society,
while the latter influences nature. Let us see how
this mechanism works.

2. On Nature’s Impact on Society

The part of nature that comes into contact with
society is conventionally called the geographical
environment.
The geographical environment consists of sur­
rounding lands and bodies of water, the climate,
flora and fauna, minerals, and so on. Society's
existence and development undoubtedly depend
on all these factors. Nature is a handy store of
foodstuffs and means of labour. While utilising na­
ture's wealth and the properties of its component
material forms (objects, bodies and processes),
people create the necessary conditions for existence
and produce the goods needed for their lives.
Nature or, more precisely, the geographical envi­
ronment thus produces a considerable impact on
people's life in society and on society's current
state and development.
For example, "the greater the natural fertility
of the soil and the favourableness of the climate,
so much less is the labour-time necessary for the
maintenance and reproduction of the producer. So
310 A. P. SHEPTULIN

much greater therefore can be the excess of his

labour"1 and the accumulation of social wealth. The
greater amount of minerals a country possesses,
the greater possibilities it has for development of
production. And the more varied is its wealth and
other natural conditions, the more diverse are
people's activities. Man's diverse activities are
inevitably conducive to "multiplication of his
wants, his capabilities, his means and modes of
labour."2
The influence of the geographical environment
on society's development was especially pro­
nounced in the early stages of mankind's existence.
During this period, the emergence and devel­
opment of any specific type of production or ac­
tivity was directly dependent on the geographical
environment and its specific features. Thus, for
example, fertile land was conducive to the emer­
gence of land cultivation, rivers and lake condi­
tioned the appearance of fishing, large forest
areas stimulated the development of hunting, while
steppe and hilly areas provided favourable
conditions for taming wild animals and raising
stock.
The geographical environment thus makes a
considerable impact on society's development, but
how important is it?
The proponents of so-called geographical de­
terminism hold that the influence of the geogra­
phical environment on society is determining, and

1 K. Marx, Capital, Vol. I, p. 480.

2 Ibid., p. 481.
 SOCIETY AND NATURE 311

that society's nature and its development depend

entirely on environmental factors. The ideas in­
volved here are in no way new. Even in the an­
cient times some historians, such as Strabo (Stra-
bon), referred to the geographical environment
when describing the life and mores of different
peoples. Geographical determinism has become
widespread, however, in the period of the devel­
opment of capitalism-when various "theories"
have emerged explaining the nature and develop­
ment of society by temperature conditions, ter­
rain, the presence and location of water, and so
forth.
The 18th-century French philosopher Montes­
quieu, for instance, held that society's moral prin­
ciples, the forms of state power and legislation
were all determined by the climate. In particular,
a hot climate, according to Montesquieu, engen­
ders laziness, cowardice and inevitably leads to
the emergence of slavery, while a cold climate,
on the contrary, imparts a certain strength to
people's minds and bodies, enabling them to
perform prolonged, strenuous, great and courage­
ous acts, as a result of which northerners are free
people. He wrote : "The pusillanimity of peoples
of hot climates almost always led them to slavery,
while the courage of peoples of cold climates
maintained them free."1
The Russian sociologist L. I. Mechnikov held
that water resources play the determining role

1 Oeuvres completes de Montesquieu, Tome 1, pp. 368-

69.
312 A. P. SHEPTULIN

in society. “Water," he wrote, "proves not only

to be a vitalising element in nature, but also a
genuine driving force in history." It represents a
"power" that encourages the development of cul­
tures, progression from the river systems towards
inland seas, and thence to the oceans.1
The 19th-century British ideologist Henry Tho­
mas Buckle advocated a whole host of geogra­
phical agents, such as the climate, soil, relief,
and so on, as determining factors in social devel­
opment.2
In the initial period of capitalism's existence,
geographical theories played a progressive role,
since they were spear-headed against theological
doctrines of society and provided secular expla­
nations of social changes. Later on, however, they
became increasingly reactionary in character, for
they diverted the attention of the working people,
notably the proletariat, from the actual reasons
behind their oppression and misery, and laid the
whole "responsibility" for this state of affairs on
the geographical environment-climate, soil ferti­
lity, etc.
In the 20th century, geographical determinism,
under the title of Geopolitik, became the theoreti­
cal basis for the imperialist bourgeoisie's mili­
taristic views, thus vindicating aggressive wars
and the enslavement of one nation by another.

* See Historical Materialism, Moscow, 1950, p. 61 (in

Russian).
2 See H. T. Buckle, History of Civilization in England,
London, 1891, Vol. I, p. 39.
 SOCIETY AND NATURE 313

Such views appeared for the first time in Ger­

many. Their authors claimed that Lebensraum
(living space), in particular a certain area of land,
plays the determining role in society's develop­
ment. They asserted that accordingly each nation
strove to obtain living space for its people, and
seize the requisite territory, thus explaining the
necessity of struggle for living space between
various nations and, consequently, that of wars.
The ideas were well suited to the policies of
fascism and so Geopolitik was proclaimed the of­
ficial ideology by the nazis. It was taught as a
special subject in all universities of nazi Germany.
Geopolitik lost its former significance when fa­
scism was defeated in World War II.
The geographical theory of society's develop­
ment obviously includes the possibility for bour­
geois ideologists to draw reactionary conclusions.
Its utter insolvency is proved by the fact that it
is unscientific and does not correspond to the ac­
tual state of affairs. The geographical position is
not, in fact, a determining factor in society's de­
velopment.
If this were the case it would be impossible to
explain why nations living under the most diverse
climatic and natural conditions and managing
their economies both on fertile and poor soils, on
hills and plains, on river banks, the shores of
seas and oceans, and far away from them, usually
pass similar stages of social development. They
begin with a primitive classless society based
on common ownership of the means of produc­
tion, then pass to a class society based on private
314 A. P. SHEPTULIN

property, and then through a socialist revolution

and the building of socialism to a classless com­
munist society. Furthermore, if the geogra­
phical position determined social development,
how could it happen that in relatively similar en­
vironments. for examole, in Europe, the majority
of nations have gone through three socio-economic
formations (the primitive-communal system, sla­
very and feudalism), while nations that have ta­
ken the road of socialist transformation are al­
ready in the fourth socio-economic system.
All this shows that the geographical environ­
ment is not a determining factor in social develop­
ment, which means that it cannot determine state
policy either. The policies pursued by a state
depend entirely on the ruling class. When reac­
tionary imperialist circles are in power, then ir­
respective of the country's geographical position
the policies pursued by its government would be
antipopular and would endanger peace.

3. Society’s Influence on Nature

Society, though itself influenced by nature,
affects the surrounding nature and brings about
corresponding changes in it, thus forming, in one
way or another, a new geographical environment.
Man, while producing the material goods needed
for his life, transports various species of animal
and plant from one place to another, thus chang­
ing the flora and fauna of the corresponding re­
gions, and even continents. For example, such
plants as potatoes, tomatoes corn, tobacco and
 SOCIETY AND NATURE 315

some others were brought to Europe from Ame­

rica.
Even plants and animals that spread in any par­
ticular area of the world without man's interferen­
ce, are subject to man's influence. Man is able to
change some species of animal and plant by his
purposeful activities. Besides, he breeds new
species, thus changing the flora and fauna of the
given region.
Not only animate but also inanimate nature
undergoes changes under the influence of human
society. Large amounts of burnt fuel result in a
concentration of carbonic acid in the atmosphere,
which affects plant growth. By extracting large
quantities of minerals from the earth and ship­
ping them as raw materials or manufactured goods
to other corners of the world, man changes the
qualities of the geographical environment.
Human society's impact on the geographical en­
vironment is not, however, always uniform. It
changes as society develops, as the means of la­
bour at its disposal improve and the social system
changes. As society develops, however, this im­
pact steadily grows. By inventing increasingly
sophisticated means of labour, man draws new
domains of nature into the sphere of his practical
activities and purposely changes them, thus estab­
lishing his supremacy over nature.
316 A. P. SHEPTULIN

4. The Role of Population Growth

in the Life of Society

As already mentioned, society is an aggregation

of people maintaining definite relationships, which
are determined by the production and distribu­
tion of material wealth. A certain minimum num­
ber of people and a certain population density are
evidently required for society to function and de­
velop normally. This minimum cannot be con­
stant, since it must change as society passes from
one stage of development to another. Changes in
the minimum number of people required for so­
ciety to function normally are necessitated by the
fact that, as society progresses, peoples' require­
ments grow, as do the means of production of
material and cultural values needed to satisfy
these requirements. The level of development of
the means of production at each stage in society's
evolution and the relationships of people in the
course of the production and distribution of ma­
terial wealth, determine the number of people
needed for production and the other functions of
a social organism. The number of people in so­
ciety is, however, determined by the laws of po­
pulation growth which, though dependent on the
mode of production prevailing in society, do pos­
sess a certain independence. The result is that
the growth of the population does not always cor­
respond to society's requirements. Thus, in slave­
owning society, for example, the population
growth lagged significantly behind its require­
ments, since it was impossible for slaves to have
 SOCIETY AND NATURE 317

a family. In capitalist society, on the contrary po­

pulation growth outstrips the demand in addition­
al human labour, which results in a "surplus"
population. This is an inevitable consequence of
the spontaneous operation of bourgeois society's
economic laws. Striving to increase his profits
rather than to satisfy the population's require­
ments to the maximum, the capitalist extends pro­
duction until there is an effective demand for
manufactured output. The subordination of pro­
duction development to the interests of capital
and its constant growth are the factor that pre­
vents all the workers from being drawn into pro­
duction, thus causing a relative surplus working
population, i.e. excess in comparison with the
average requirements of capital.1
In socialist society, this obstacle has been eli­
minated and the aim of production is the maximum
satisfaction of the requirements of all people.
Since production has unlimited possibilities for
development, it provides jobs for all able-bodied
members of society, and though improvements in
the means of production under socialism also
bring about a growth of labour productivity and
consequently a smaller input of labour power per
unit of output, there is no surplus population.
The higher labour productivity brought about by
technical progress serves as the material basis for
shorter working hours and more spare time,
which every member of society requires for his
comprehensive development.

1 See K. Marx, Capital, Vol. I, p. 590.

318 A. P. SHEPTULIN

So, the emergence of a relative surplus popu­

lation is the result of capitalist production, and it
becomes a law only under this socio-economic for­
mation. As for other social systems, each "has its
own special laws of population, historically valid
within its limits alone".1
Many bourgeois sociologists, however, associate
surplus population not with the historical laws
of capitalism, but with definite laws of nature,
which supposedly operate irrespective of the so­
cial system or mode of production. The first so-
called absolute "law" of population was formu­
lated by Thomas Malthus in 1798. According to
his theory, the population on our planet is grow­
ing much faster than the production of the means
of subsistence, so there would always be a de­
finite number of people in society whom it could
not maintain and who were consequently redun­
dant.
In recent years Malthusians have begun re­
ferring to the situation in those countries that have
recently gained their liberation from colonial op­
pression, and where the development of produc­
tion is lagging behind population growth owing
to the underdeveloped material and technical ba­
sis. But this in no way proves that the Malthusians
were right. In these countries production lags be­
hind population growth not because of any Mal­
thusian "law", but due to the fact that, for
many centuries, these countries were plundered
by foreign capitalists. This resulted in the almost

1 K. Marx, Capital, Vol. I, p. 592.

 SOCIETY AND NATURE 319

complete stagnation of the material basis of their

economies, while their populations continued to
grow. All this has brought about a sharp discre­
pancy between the size of the population and the
level of development of national economies. No­
wadays, these countries are making considerable
efforts to get rid of this discrepancy and there is
no doubt whatsoever that, given assistance by the
socialist countries, they will sooner or later suc­
ceed.
At the same time, the question arises as to
whether the earth's population can grow infinitely.
Will not this growth cause overpopulation of the
planet? Of course, such a possibility does exist
for the distant future, but it is an abstract one, and
no doubt people in the future communist society
will take timely notice of this trend and take due
measures to check it. It will not be difficult for
them to introduce a balanced regulation of popu­
lation growth.
Chapter X

MATERIAL PRODUCTION
AS THE BASIS
OF
SOCIETY’S EXISTENCE
AND DEVELOPMENT

1. The Concept of Production

As already mentioned, a society, in contrast to
a herd of animals, exists not by adapting to na­
ture and consuming the means of subsistence
created by it, but by adapting the natural means
of subsistence to its needs, by changing the prop­
erties of material bodies created by nature, and
turning them into the means of subsistence re­
quired for people's survival. The transformation of
natural objects into people's means of subsistence
and material wealth is carried out by acting on
nature with specially created implements-the
means of labour. This purposeful influence on na­
ture and alteration of its properties in the inte­
rests of society is called production. The main ele­
ments of production are: (I) purposeful activity,
(2) objects of labour and (3) means of labour.
In the labour process, human activity is carried
out consciously and is subject to a strictly defined
objective. Demonstrating the difference between
production activity and instinctive acts of the ani­
mal, Marx pointed out this very feature-the
conscious and purposeful character of labour op­
erations. "Man," Marx wrote, "not only effects a
 MATERIAL PRODUCTION 321

change of form in the material on which he works,

but he also realises a purpose of his own that gi­
ves the law to his modus operandi, and to which
he must subordinate his will."1
An object of labour is the part of nature that
man influences in the process of production and
that he changes into an object capable of meeting
some of society's needs. For example, ore, coal
and oil, which are extracted from the earth and
undergo special treatment, are objects of labour.
Both objects existing in their natural form (mi­
nerals in the earth, fish in natural bodies of water,
virgin forests and lands, etc.) and objects which
underwent primary processing through the appli­
cation of labour (ore in a foundry, cotton in a
spinning mill, grain in a mill, flour in a bakery,
etc.) may be considered objects of labour. An
object of labour which underwent some previous
treatment and which embodies a certain amount
of human labour is known as a raw material. Any
raw material is thus "the subject of labour, but
not every subject of labour is raw material: it
can only become so, after it has undergone some
alteration by means of labour."2
The thing or complex of things that man places
between himself and the object of labour and that
serve as the conductor for his influence upon that
object are called the means of labour.3
Machine-tools, machinery, diverse equipment,

1 K. Marx, Capital, Vol. I, p. 174.

2 Ibid.
3 See Ibid.
21—1557
322 A. P. SHEPTULIN

production buildings, means of transport needed

for servicing industrial enterprises and the like,
are all means of labour in industry. For agricul­
ture they are agricultural machines and imple­
ments used for land cultivation and harvest­
ing, the land under cultivation, inasmuch as it
is a part of a complex of conditions required for
seeds to germinate, as well as for plants to grow
and ripen, transport vehicles used to carry seeds
and harvested crops, barns and stores for stor­
ing the harvest, and so forth. In livestock-breed­
ing the means of labour include animals raised for
their wool, milk, butter and other produce, the
stalls in which the animals are kept, machines
used for the upkeep and exploitation of animals,
etc.
Instruments of labour are a separate category
of the means of labour. Instruments oi labour are
those means of labour that are used as direct con­
ductors of man's influence upon the object of la­
bour and that cause a corresponding alteration in
the latter through their properties (mechanical,
-physical or chemical). All sorts of machines and
gears, such as lathes, metal-working machines,
textile machines, and so forth, as well as the
plough, the harrow, the sowing-machine and com­
bine harvester may serve as examples of instru­
ments of labour. The simplest instruments of la­
bour, created by man in the early stages of human
society's evolution, were the knife, axe, hammer,
hoe, etc.
The objects and means of labour consitute the
means of production.
 MATERIAL PRODUCTION 323

The means of labour play an important role in

the production of material wealth. The level of
their development determines the character of so­
ciety's economic system and the degree of man's
domination over nature. "It is not the articles
made," Marx pointed out, "but how they are
made, and by what instruments, that enables us
to distinguish different economic epochs."1

2. The Productive Forces of Society

a) The Essence of the Productive Forces

The means of labour and the people who put

them into operation and produce material wealth
thanks to a definite production experience and
labour skills, form the productive forces of so­
ciety.
The production of material wealth is carried out
by people. It is human beings who affect nature
and transform its substances into means of
subsistence. It is therefore obvious that people
who participate in production should be included
in the productive forces. Moreover, people are
the main productive force of society. They repre­
sent the creative mainspring, a vital aspect of pro­
ductive activities.
People affect nature not with their bare hands,
not directly, but through the means of labour.
The degree to which nature is transformed and
the quantity of material wealth produced depend

1 K. Marx, Capital, Vol. I, p. 175.

21*
324 A. P. SHEPTULIN

essentially on the means and instruments of labour

used. So, the means of labour, too, must constitute
part of the productive forces of society.
While the means of labour are an essential ele­
ment of the productive forces, it should be stressed
that they are a productive force not by
themselves, but only in organic unity with man.
Isolated from people, who put the machine into
operation, the latter is no more than a heap of
metal. It is only in the hands of man that an instru­
ment becomes a productive force. The means of
labour, being the outcome of people's creative
activity, are thus able to fulfil their social function
and act as a productive force only within the
limits and exclusively as a vital aspect of this
activity and its development.
The use of even the simplest means of labour
in the creative process presupposes a knowledge
of how these means may be applied, and definite
skill and experience in using the given means of
labour. The greater is the experience in using any
means of labour, the better and more efficient are
people's actions and the greater is their produc­
tive force.
Thus the productive force of society depends
not only on the people who participate in the pro­
duction of material wealth and the means of la­
bour that they use, but also on the experience in
using these means and the workers' skill.
The technical organisation of labour, the loca­
tion of people in the course of production and the
division of functions between them, are factors
influencing society's productive force. The more
 MATERIAL PRODUCTION 325

advanced is the organisation of labour and the

more rationally are the means of labour and the
work force utilised, the greater is society's produc­
tive force. While analysing the specific features
of simple co-operation and manufacture, Marx spe­
cially emphasised the dependence of society's pro­
ductive force on the organisation of labour. "By
decomposition of handicrafts, by specialisation of
the instruments of labour, by the formation of de­
tail labourers, and by grouping and combining the
latter into a single mechanism, division of labour
in manufacture creates ... a quantitative propor­
tion in the social process of production; it con­
sequently creates a definite organisation of the la­
bour of society, and thereby develops at the same
time new productive forces in the society."1 He
amplified: "Not only have we here an increase in
the productive power of the individual, by means
of co-operation, but the creation of a new po­
wer."2
It follows that the productive forces represent
concrete and objective opportunities available for
society to influence nature and the ability that
exists in society to produce a definite quantity of
material wealth.

b) The Productive Forces of Society and Science

In the early stages of society's evolution, when

science was still in its cradle and the instruments
of labour were small-scale, primitive and designed
1 K. Marx, Capital, Vol. I, p. 344.
2 Ibid. p. 309.
326 A. P. SHEPTULIN

for manual labour, people were satisfied, as

the production of material wealth was concerned,
with the empirical knowledge gathered by pre­
vious generations in their struggle against nature
and accumulated in the means of labour produced
and the production experience handed down from
generation to generation. With the gradual tran­
sition from manual labour to machine production,
not only the knowledge acquired by the direct
producers in the process of work and training,
but also scientific discoveries began to be embo­
died in the means of labour produced and in the
methods of their use. The designing and appli­
cation of machines was based on systematic use
of the laws of nature discovered by science. This
made it possible to put the elements of nature in­
to the service of production and replace human
labour with them.
In the initial stages, however, the use of science
in production was somewhat limited. Scientific
laws were only taken into account when creating
mechanical means of labour, while production
techniques still escaped the attention of science.
However, the industrial revolution which began
at the turn of the 19th century, soon affected one
industry after another. Science began to play an
increasingly great role in production. Apart from
improving production techniques, it also paved the
way for the emergence of new industries. Where­
as, in the past, it had been primarily theoretical
mechanics that had been directly linked with pro­
duction, now it was the turn of physics and che­
mistry, which began to penetrate actively into
 MATERIAL PRODUCTION 327

the sphere of production. Such discoveries in

electricity as, for example, electromagnetic in­
duction, cathode ray and the electromagnetic
theory of light gave rise to a new industry­
electrical engineering-which was the basis for the
invention of the telegraph and telephone, the devel­
opment of the dynamo and of electric motors, etc.,
which were destined to play a big part in the
technical restructuring of production. The greatest
discoveries in chemistry led to the emergence of
the chemical industry and to the artificial synthe­
sising of a number of substances needed for pro­
duction.
The rapid development of machine production
provided the necessary base for the development
of the experimental equipment that allowed scien­
tists to take a deeper look into nature's secrets.
The turn of this century saw great discoveries
in physics. The electron theory of matter was de­
veloped and the radioactive decay of certain sub­
stances (uranium, radium and others) was disco­
vered. Study of the atom and its nucleus, the
discovery of ever now elementary particles, and
the formulation of the laws of their interaction
and inter-transformation gave rise to nuclear phy­
sics, quantum mechanics and other branches of
science. It became possible to use nuclear
power in production and for military purposes.
Together with physics and other sciences, ma­
thematics also showed a spectacular development
and its methods began to be employed on a wide
scale in all sciences. The use of mathematical me­
thods in various sciences gave rise to new comput­
328 A. P. SHEPTULIN

ing devices, the electronic computers, which can

perform thousands upon thousands or even mil­
lions of operations per second. Cybernetics, the in­
formation theory, mathematical modelling, etc.,
were born. All the necessary conditions for com­
plete automation of production processes and man­
agement were being created. Automation pre­
supposes the use, in the technical devices and pro­
duction techniques applied, of the most diverse
sciences, in particular, physics, chemistry, electro­
nics, mathematics and cybernetics.
All this testifies to the fact that the means of
labour and the technology utilised in present-day
production become, as Marx put it, an "embodied
power of knowledge", materialised science. In the
light of this, people who participate in such pro­
duction can no longer seek support from their
own experience and skills, but have to be guided
in their practical activities by scientific knowl­
edge related to the given line of production.
The growing ties between science and produc­
tion necessitate the greater involvement of research
establishments. By designing ever better machines
and installations, by developing the production
techniques for new materials and by defining the
ways of making more efficient use of the means
of labour, researchers participate, to varying
degrees, in the creation of material values.
Hence, science is increasingly turning into a di­
rect productive force, while the productive forces
are increasingly becoming a "technological applica­
tion of science".1
1 K. Marx, Capital, Vol. I, p. 584.
 MATERIAL PRODUCTION 329

The transformation of science into a productive

force is thus effected, on the one hand, by creat­
ing, on the basis of relevant scientific knowledge,
better machinery and by developing new produc­
tion techniques which better conform to the in­
creased requirements. On the other hand, the
people who take part in the production process
master the achievements of modern science, and
thus facilitate more rational organisation of pro­
duction and more efficient use of machinery.

3. Relations of Production
The productive forces of people express their
relation to nature, and the level of their develop­
ment shows the degree to which nature is subju­
gated to the interests of society, the extent to
which man dominates over its elements. However,
in the process of production people enter into def­
inite relations not only with nature, but also with
each other. It is these relations and their definite
interconnection which represent the major con­
dition for the functioning and development of
production. The transformation of nature in the
interests of society may only proceed within the
bounds of these relations, thanks to the social
ties existing between people. These ties and rela­
tions are a social form under which man influences
nature and effects its transformation and ap­
propriation. "All production," Marx wrote in this
connection, "is appropriation of nature on the
Part of individuals within and by means of a
330 A. P. SHEPTULIN

particular form of society."1 In order to produce,

men "enter into definite connections and relations
with one another and only within these social
connections and relations does their action on
nature, does production, take place."2
The relations which take shape among people
in the process of production, distribution and con­
sumption of material goods are production rela­
tions.
Since production implies none other than
man's influence on the object of labour with the
help of definite means of labour, production re­
lations include, in the first place, people's rela­
tions to the object and means of labour, i.e. to the
means of production. The means of production
may or may not belong totally or partially to the
producers. Definite relations with the material
wealth produced and the relations associated with
their distribution are formed on the basis of re­
lations with the means of production. If the
means of production belong to the producers,
then the material wealth produced also belongs to
them, and is later distributed either equally (un­
der the communal form of ownership of the means
of production), or according to the labour expend­
ed for society's benefit (under the socialist form
of ownership of the means of production), or ac­
cording to the needs (under the communist form

1 Karl Marx, Grundrisse der Kritik det politischen

Okonomie (Rohentwuri) 1857-1858, Moskau, 1939, S. 9.
2 Karl Marx, Wage Labour and Capital, Moscow, 1976,
p. 28.
 MATERIAL PRODUCTION 331

of ownership of the means of production). If, on

the other hand, the means of production are the
property of a group of people who make their
living by exploiting the working people, then the
goods produced belong to the exploiters and the
distribution of goods takes the form which suits
the exploiters' interests.
The relations that are formed in the process of
the exchange of various activities among members
of society are also production relations. Such, in
particular, are money and commodity-money re­
lations.
Depending on whether the means of production
are public or private property, relations of either
co-operation and mutual assistance, or of domi­
nation and subordination are established. Besides
these two basic types of production relations, in
some stages of historical development certain
transitional production relations appear, which are
based simultaneously both on private and public
property, and include elements of co-operation and
mutual assistance, on the one hand, and of dom­
ination and subjugation, on the other.
There are three types of production relations
which typify domination and subordination and
which correspond to the three forms of private
property-slave-owning, feudal and capitalist-
that appear and become dominant in definite pe­
riods of society's development. These are slave­
owning, feudal and capitalist production rela­
tions. Slave-owning production relations presup­
pose that all the means of production are the pri­
vate property of a definite group of people (the
332 A. P. SHEPTULIN

slave-owners), while the slaves who put these

means of labour into operation and carry out pro­
duction in the interests of the proprietor, are de­
prived of them. Feudal production relations are
based on the feudal lord's ownership of the land
and other means of labour, as well as on partial
ownership of the worker (who has his own means
of labour and a plot of land at his disposal),
whom the feudal lord can compel to work for
him or can sell but whom he no longer has the
right to kill, as was the case in slave-owning so­
ciety. Capitalist production relations are associat­
ed with individual ownership of the means of pro­
duction and the "free" hire of a formally (de jure)
free worker, deprived of any means of production
and, consequently, of any means of subsistence,
who is compelled to sell his labour power to the
owner of the means of production (the capitalist).
Production relations that imply co-operation
and mutual assistance exist in two forms: primi­
tive-communal and socialist. The first type was
brought into being by a low level of development
of the means of labour, which precluded the pos­
sibility of doing work alone, while the latter is
associated with highly developed forces of pro­
duction requiring social ownership of the means
of production in order to function normally and
develop unimpeded.
Transitional production relations were also of
two types: one assumed the form of a transition
from public to private property, while the se­
cond of a transition from private to socialist
property. The first type was characteristic of the
 MATERIAL PRODUCTION 333

period of decay of the primitive-communal system

and the ensuing emergence of a class society. An
example is patriarchal slavery, when some fam-
iles, who were breaking loose from the community,
began to employ, in addition to the labour of
the family members, the labour of slaves who were
the lowest on the social scale both in the family
and in the community. The second type of transi­
tional production relations emerges when capitalist
production relations are being transformed into
socialist relations. For example, there are var­
ious forms of semi-socialist co-operation, based
simultaneously on private and social ownership
of the means of production, as well as various
forms of state capitalism.
Since production relations are the social form
in which production functions and develops
they neither exist in isolation from the productive
forces, nor outside and independently of the
means of labour and the people who put these
means into operation. The productive forces and
production relations are two different, though
organically linked aspects of production, together
constituting a mode of production of material
goods.
A mode of production is nothing other than a
pattern of people's activity which, while trans­
forming various natural substances into the means
of subsistence, in effect, reproduces man's physi­
cal existence. But the influence of a pattern of
activity on people's life is not confined to this.
It determines their way of life. Marx and Engels
pointed out that “as individuals express their life,
334 A. P. SHEPTULIN

so they are".1 What individuals are depends on

what and how they produce.
A mode of production of material goods is the
basis of all social life, since it determines the
structure of the social organism, and the social,
political and spiritual processes of life, as well
as social and state relationships. Society's division
into classes, the relations among classes, the form
of the family, the morals predominant in society,
the legal relations and the religious and aesthetic
views of people, etc.-all depend on the mode of
production. Whenever the mode of production
changes, changes also ensue in all social relations
and the structure of the whole social organism.
Changes in the mode of production begin
with changes in the productive forces of society.
"In acquiring new productive forces men change
their mode of production; and in changing their
mode of production, in changing the way of earn­
ing their living, they change all their social rela­
tions."2

4. Dialectics of the Development

of Productive Forces
and Relations of Production
a) The Dependence of Production Relations
on the Level of Development of the Productive Forces
The productive forces constitute the content of
production, while the relations of production are its
1 K. Marx and F. Engels, Collected Works, Vol. 5,
p. 31.
2 K. Marx, The Poverty of Philosophy, Moscow,
1962, p. 105.
 MATERIAL PRODUCTION 335

social form. Since the productive forces are the

content of production, they are in constant, contin­
uous movement, in a state of change and de­
velopment. This is because production, while
being the basis and condition of human society's
existence, functions uninterruptedly. People can­
not survive without consuming the material goods
created in the process of production. To replenish
the consumed means of subsistence, new ones
must constantly be created. Since, moreover, the
population grows from generation to generation,
so do its requirements. Social production should
not, therefore, simply reproduce the consumed
means of subsistence, but rather create greater
quantities of them.
The necessity of extended reproduction of the
means of subsistence compels society constantly
to improve its productive forces.
The development of the productive forces occurs
during the production process. By influencing na­
ture with the means of labour, people accumulate
production experience, develop working skills
and acquire a knowledge of the phenomena they
encounter. On this basis, they constantly intro­
duce relevant changes into the means of labour,
i.e. improve them and create new ones. The ap­
plication of these new means of labour enriches
the available production experience and helps to
develop new methods for performing certain oper­
ations, thus raising the productivity of labour.
This, in turn, brings about a further improvement
in the means of labour, and so on and so forth.
In the course of this continuous improvement in
336 A. P. SHEPTULIN

the means of labour, in people's production expe­

rience and their work skills, the productive forces
grow and develop, thus paving the way for histor­
ical progress.
When the productive forces reach a definite level
of development, they bring about a change in pro­
duction relations. The replacement of one form
of production relations with another signifies a
transition to a higher stage of historical progress,
to a new socio-economic formation. Thus, the
slave-owning system replaced the primitive-com­
munal, feudalism replaced slavery, capitalism
replaced feudal relations, and socialism replaces
capitalist production relations.
Each new generation inherits the productive
forces created by its ancestors, utilises the achieve­
ments of practice and knowledge, and then de­
velops them still further, thus creating a new link
in the chain of historical progress. While inherit­
ing the productive forces from the previous genera­
tion, each new generation is compelled to adapt
to the conditions of labour that took shape on the
basis of these productive forces and enter into
relations within the bounds of which the given
production relations are functioning. For this is
the only way in which it can ensure both the fur­
ther development of production and, at the same
time, social progress. By further developing the
productive forces inherited from the previous gene­
ration, each new generation realises, in effect, the
opportunities offered by the level of development
of practice and knowledge, and fosters those
trends that are inevitably brought into existence
 MATERIAL PRODUCTION 337

by this level. This means that society's develop­

ment and historical progress are realised objecti­
vely, irrespective of people's will and wish,
though they are the result of their creative activ­
ity.
"Men," Marx wrote, "are not free to choose
their productive forces-which are the basis of all
their history-for every productive force is an ac­
quired force, the product of former activity. The
productive forces are therefore the result of prac­
tically applied human energy; but this energy is
itself conditioned by the circumstances in which
men find themselves, by the productive forces al­
ready acquired, by the social form which exists
before they exist, which they do not create, which is
the product of the preceding generation. Because
of the simple fact that every succeeding gener­
ation finds itself in possession of the productive
forces acquired by the previous generation, and
that they serve it as the raw material for new
production, a coherence arises in human history,
a history of humanity takes shape.... Hence it
necessarily follows that the social history of men
is always the history of their individual develop­
ment, whether they are conscious of it or not.
Their material relations are the basis of all their
relations. These material relations are only the
necessary forms in which their material and in­
dividual activity is realised."1
While being a form of men's productive activi­

1 K. Marx and F. Engels, Selected Correspondence,

Moscow, 1975, pp. 30-31.
22—1557
338 A. P. SHEPTULIN

ty, production relations depend on the productive

forces and change in keeping with the latter. The
dependence of production relations on the pro­
ductive forces finds its expression in the law of the
correspondence of production relations to the
level of development of the productive forces.
b) The Law of the Correspondence of Production
Relations to the Level of Development of the Productive
Forces
The essence of this law is that definite produc­
tive forces require strictly specific production re­
lations corresponding to their level of develop­
ment, and that changes in the productive forces
ultimately bring about relevant changes in produc­
tion relations.
The correspondence of production relations to
the productive forces is an essential condition for
the functioning and development of social produc­
tion.
We have noted previously that all specific pro­
duction relations took shape on the basis of a
strictly definite level of development of the pro­
ductive forces and under its direct influence. This
being the case, how is it that production relations
may sometimes not correspond to the productive
forces?
Since the productive forces, which represent the
content of production, are in a state of constant
change, and production relations, being a social
form of production, represent a relatively stable
system of men's interrelationships, within the
bounds of which both the exchange of substances
between society and nature and the exchange of
 MATERIAL PRODUCTION 339

activity among people (who form society) occur,

then at a definite stage of development of the pro­
ductive forces a disparity inevitably emerges be­
tween them and production relations, which lag
behind in their development. Though production
relations were the form of and condition for the
development of the productive forces in the first
stage, when they corresponded to the latter, in
the second stage, when a discrepancy emerges
between production relations and the productive
forces and these two come into conflict, produc­
tion relations become a brake on the develop­
ment of production.
In the course of the further development of
production, this contradiction is exacerbated and
becomes a conflict determining the historical ne­
cessity of replacing obsolete forms of production
relations and men's activity with new ones cor­
responding to the level of development of the pro­
ductive forces.
The types of production relations that gra­
dually replace each other "form in the whole evo­
lution of history a coherent series of forms of
intercourse, the coherence of which consists in
this: in the place of an earlier form of intercourse,
which has become a fetter, a new one is put, cor­
responding to the more developed productive
forces and, hence, to the advanced mode of the
self-activity of individuals-a form which in its turn
becomes a fetter and is then replaced by an­
other".1

1 K. Marx and F. Engels, The German Ideology, p. 90.

22’
340 A. P. SHEPTULIN

The dialectics of the transition from correspon­

dence of production relations to the productive
forces to a disparity between them in the course
of historical development which is accompanied
by the production relations turning from a form
of development of the productive forces into a
brake on development, can be easily traced by
reviewing the history of human society. Let us
discuss briefly the replacement, in the process of
historical development, of one form of produc­
tion relations by another.
It the initial stages of human society's forma­
tion, when the productive forces excluded any pos­
sibility for men of fighting nature alone, people
obtained their means of subsistence through col­
lective efforts. Collective labour determined com­
mon ownership of the means of production, as
well as the relations of co-operation and mutual
assistance among people.
The primitive means of labour typical of prim­
itive society gradually improved and developed:
metal instruments of labour replaced primitive
stone ones. An opportunity arose for the means
of labour to be applied on an individual basis
and for the private production of material goods
to be organised. Since private production was con­
ducive to a greater social division of labour and
specialisation of production, which, in turn,
brought about higher labour productivity and
further improvements in the instruments of pro­
duction, it appeared at that stage to be more use­
ful than production in common. Communal
ownership of the means of production and
 MATERIAL PRODUCTION 341

equal distribution did not offer an opportunity

for displaying one's initiative and deprived the
worker of personal interest in raising the pro­
ductivity of labour and in further developing the
productive forces. There arose the historical
necessity of replacing common ownership of the
means of production, which no longer corres­
ponded to the given level of development of the
productive forces, with private property which,
under the given circumstances, better suited the
level of development of the productive forces.
"Every change in the social order, every revolu­
tion in property relations, has been the necessary
result of the creation of new productive forces
which would no longer conform to the old prop­
erty relations. Private property itself arose in
this way."1 Thus, with the appearance of private
property, slavery came into being and slave-own­
ing production relations set in.
For some period of time slave-owning produc­
tion relations were the dominant form in which
the productive forces functioned and developed. La­
ter on, however, they came into conflict with the
productive forces and became fetters on their fur­
ther development. The point is that the slave, who
was considered property, i.e. was in the com­
plete possession of the slave-owner, who could
kill him without being punished, was not at all
interested in his labour, in raising its productiv­
ity or improving the instruments of labour. Mo­

1 K. Marx and F. Engels, Collected Works, Vol. 6,

P- 348.
342 A. P. SHEPTULIN

reover, brutally and inhumanly exploited, he

hated his work for the benefit of the slave-owner
and deliberately damaged the instruments of la­
bour given to him. This forced the slave-owners
to give to the slaves only instruments of labour
that they could not damage. All this held back
improvements in the instruments of labour and
checked the growth of labour productivity. Hence,
slave-owning production relations came into
conflict with the further development of the produc­
tive forces and were replaced by more developed
production relations-feudal production relations.
The latter did create a certain material interest
in work on the part of the worker-the serf. The
direct producer possessed a plot of land, as
well as certain instruments of labour necessary
for production, along with some free time which
the serf could use working for himself (over
and above the time he worked for the land­
lord).
The further development of feudal society's
productive forces gave rise to the capitalist ma­
nufacture and other enterprises, based on hired
labour. Compared to the serf, the wage worker
was more interested in raising labour productiv­
ity, since the payment he received for his work
was now dependent on the quantity of output he
produced or on the time spent. All this encouraged
the development of the productive forces and, in
particular, of the instruments of labour, which
were continuously improved. First simple machines
and then more complicated ones appeared.
Their application and development brought about
 MATERIAL PRODUCTION 343

a revolution in the productivity of labour, which

made a big leap forward.
Developing production based on hired labour,
i.e. capitalist production, required free and more
or less cultivated workers, capable of mastering
complex technological processes and able to op­
erate machinery. The labour force, however, was
in the feudal lords' hands. The peasants were at­
tached to the feudal lords' land and had no civil
rights. Moreover, feudal relations held back
the freedom of trade, which was part and parcel
of the emerging capitalist productive forces. All
this testified to the fact that feudal production
relations had become a hindrance to the develop­
ment of the productive forces, and so they gave
way to capitalist production relations.
The development of capitalist production was
accompanied by the constant introduction of new,
improved and increasingly complex machines,
and by the further social division of labour, which
conditioned the growing socialisation of produc­
tion. Individual industries entered among them­
selves into essential, increasing contacts and in­
terdependence, thus forming an organic whole in
which each element required smooth functioning
and development of all other components in or­
der to operate normally itself. As a result, the
social product appeared as the outcome of the ac­
tivities of a huge number of people engaged in
different industries, and thus became more and
more social in nature. But in so far as the means
of labour remained the property of individual capi­
talists, the production and distribution of output
344 A. P. SHEPTULIN

was suited to their interests. This is how the

contradiction between the social character of
production and the private capitalist form of ap­
propriation emerged and developed.
The aggravation of this contradiction brings
about periodically recurrent economic crises of
overproduction accompanied by the destruction
of the productive forces and means of subsistence
created, chronic undercapacity of production,
mass unemployment, and so forth. All this shows
that capitalist production relations have come into
conflict with the level of development attained by
the productive forces and have begun acting
as a brake on their further development. The
historic necessity arises of replacing capitalist
production relations with new, socialist relations,
based on social ownership of the means of pro­
duction, and presupposing the social form of
distribution of the material goods produced.
While corresponding to the modern level of deve­
lopment of the productive forces, socialist produc­
tion relations create unlimited possibilities for the
growth of production.
This is a concrete manifestation of the law of
the correspondence of production relations to the
level of development of the productive forces in
society's historical development.

c) The Influence of Production Relations

on the Development of the Productive Forces

It follows from the above that production rela­

tions depend on the productive forces.
 MATERIAL PRODUCTION 345

While changing under the influence of the pro­

ductive forces, which have gone ahead in their de­
velopment, production relations do not remain
passive, but respond actively and influence the
productive forces that have brought them into
existence. This influence reveals itself, above all,
in the fact that production relations provide an
impetus for the development of production and
society's productive forces. For example, in slave­
owning society the stimuli for the development
of production were satisfaction of the slave-own­
ers' needs and creation of the material wealth
they required to lead their idle lives. As for the
slaves, the dominating production relations pro­
vided no stimulus and no interest for them to de­
velop production.
Feudal production relations, though no diffe­
rent from slavery as regards the stimuli for pro­
duction development typical of the ruling exploit­
er class (since the feudal lords also wanted a life
of leisure), nevertheless advanced one step by
creating a stimulus for the exploited class, the
peasantry, to work. The latter acquired a certain
interest in developing production and the pro­
ductive forces, but only when they worked on
their own plot of land for their own benefit. While
working off the quit-rent or corvee (that is
when working for the feudal lords or the land­
owner), the peasant was not interested in raising
labour productivity.
Capitalist production relations created a new and
more powerful stimulus for production develop­
ment, both among the exploiters and the exploit­
346 A. P. SHEPTULIN

ed. The major goal of capitalist production is the

appropriation by the bourgeoisie of an increas­
ingly large quantity of the surplus product. Hence
the unrestrained desire to accumulate wealth
and expand production-a feature which did not
exist in either feudal or slave-owning society.
The major goal of feudal lords and slave-owners
was to consume the product. It was no accident
that in feudal and slave-owning society the rate
of extended reproduction was rather insignificant.
The worker is more interested in raising the
productivity of labour than the serf was. The
worker's labour for his own benefit cannot be
separated from his work for the capitalist's be­
nefit in time or in space, since every hour and
every minute of his work brings benefit both to
himself and to the capitalist. So when working
on piece rate, the worker is interested in
raising labour productivity. The degree of this
interest is probably not high, since the worker
realises that he is working for the capitalist's be­
nefit and enriching him.
It is only socialist production relations that
create, for the first time, an overall interest
on the part of the working people in developing
production. Under socialism, the workers are
aware that they are working entirely for their own
benefit and for their society. This fosters a desire
among them tc raise labour productivity, improve
technology, and develop production. It is no
accident that production grows in the socialist
countries at a higher rate than in the capitalist
world.
 MATERIAL PRODUCTION 347

To sum up, the influence of production rela­

tions on the development of the productive forces
finds its expression in the fact that production
relations create stimuli for the development of
production.
Chapter XI

THE BASIS AND SUPERSTRUCTURE

As already shown, production relations exert

a reverse effect on the productive forces. This
chapter deals with the influence of production re­
lations on the other aspects of social life, and
their place, role and importance in society.

1. Specific Features
of the Basis and Superstructure
While determined by the productive forces, pro­
duction relations themselves produce a determin­
ing impact on all other aspects of society. Polit­
ical, juridical, ethic, aesthetic, religious and other
views, as well as corresponding institutions,
arise and develop on their basis and under their
influence. In the light of this, production relations
are considered the economic basis oi society,
while the views and the corresponding institutions
determined by them are considered society's su­
perstructure.
The relations of production and exchange, "the
economic structure of society," as Engels wrote,
"always furnishes the real basis, starting from
 THE BASIS AND SUPERSTRUCTURE 349

which we can alone work out the ultimate expla­

nation of the whole superstructure of juridical and
political institutions as well as of the religious,
philosophical, and other ideas of a given histori­
cal period".1
The basis consists not only of the production
relations that are dominant in the given period,
but also of a mass of other production relations,
in particular those left as survivals of the old
mode of production, as well as those associated
with the new economic structures developing
within the given social system.
Though the basis represents the sum-total of
all the production relations at a given stage of
society's development, it is nevertheless connect­
ed with the dominating mode of production. The
production relations conditioned by the dominant
mode of production determine the nature of the
economic basis and its essence, as well as that of
the entire socio-economic formation.
The most important feature of the economic
basis is the fact that its essence is represented
by the material relations that take shape irrespec­
tive of men's conscience, in contrast to superstruc-
tural relations, which are ideological and originate
in the human mind, and hence depend on people's
will.
The basis relations are general for the given
society, since all its citizens become involved in
them. Indeed, by living in society every person
in one way or another receives a definite portion

1 F. Engels, Anti-Diihring, p. 37.

350 A. P. SHEPTULIN

of the means of subsistence, and thus participates

in the distribution of the material benefits pro­
duced in the society. Distribution is, of course, one
element of the production relations. Besides, from
the moment of his birth every person belongs to
some social group or class, and thus becomes in­
volved in definite relationships with other social
groups or classes.
In an antagonistic society the basis has a class
character. Since the basis is the sum-total of all
production relations based on private ownership
of the means of production and on the principle
of domination and subjugation, it ensures that
one group of people appropriates the labour done
by the other, and that some classes exploit others.
This, in particular, distinguishes production rela­
tions from the productive forces. The productive
forces are above class, since they serve both the
old and the new classes equally, both bourgeois
and socialist society. "The machine," Marx wrote,
"is no more an economic category than the ox
which draws the plough.... But the way in which
machinery is utilised is totally distinct from the
machinery itself. Powder is powder whether used
to wound a man or to dress his wounds."1
Being determined by the level of development
of the productive forces, the basis represents a
kind of intermediate link between the productive
forces and the superstructure. Neither the produc­
tive forces nor changes in them have a direct

1 K. Marx and F. Engels, Selected Correspondence,

p. 33.
 THE BASIS AND SUPERSTRUCTURE 351

influence on the superstructure or the political,

juridical and other social ideas and correspond­
ing institutions; this influence is indirect, through
the basis. Hence, with the same level of develop­
ment of the productive forces, different and
sometimes even diametrically opposite superstruc­
tures may exist, for the productive forces that are
equal in terms of their level of development may
exist for a certain period of time in quite differ­
ent social forms, and under different and some­
times even opposite production relations. For
example, the productive forces in the Soviet Union
and those in the USA are developed to approxi­
mately the same level, though in the USSR there
are socialist production relations, while capitalist
production relations reign in the United States.
There is a corresponding socialist superstruc­
ture in the Soviet Union and a capitalist one in the
United States.
Consequently, the superstructure cannot be
explained by the state of the productive forces.
If, on the other hand, the economic basis, the sum­
total of the production relations within which the
current state of the productive forces is realised,
is taken as the ground cause, superstructural phe­
nomena can be correctly explained.
The above features of production relations indi­
cate their dominating role in the entire system of
social linkages and relations.
Having clarified the specific features of the eco­
nomic basis, it is not difficult to determine those
of the superstructure. The superstructure aris­
ing through definite production relations, i.e. the
352 A. P. SHEPTULIN

basis, and representing the sum-total of the po­

litical, juridical, moral, aesthetic, religious and
other ideas current in society, and the corres­
ponding institutions, is not passive towards the
basis which gave birth to it, but exerts an active
influence on it.
"Political, juridical, philosophical, religious, li­
terary, artistic, etc., development is based on eco­
nomic development," Engels wrote. "But all these
react upon one another and also upon the econom­
ic basis. It is not that the economic situation is
cause, solely active, while everything else is only
passive effect. There is, rather, interaction on the
basis of economic necessity, which ultimately
always asserts itself."1
Since the superstructure is the sum-total of all
ideas and corresponding institutions arising on
the given basis, i.e. it incorporates the ideas and
institutions of both the ruling and the oppressed
classes, its influence upon the basis is not uni­
form, and may take not one but different and
sometimes diametrically opposite directions. In­
deed, the views and corresponding institutions of
the ruling class, i.e. the class which dominates
the given mode of production, are aimed at sub­
stantiating, consolidating and defending this ba­
sis. On the other hand, the ideas and correspond­
ing institutions of the exploited class are aimed
at undermining and demolishing the given eco­
nomic structure of society and replacing it with a

1 K. Marx and F. Engels, Selected Works, Vol. 3,

p. 502. IIt
r------------------------
THE BASIS AND SUPERSTRUCTURE 353

new and more progressive system, as well as theo­

retically substantiating such a change. So in a
class society the superstructure has a class char­
acter and becomes a battleground for a fierce
class struggle reflecting the opposite economic in­
terests that is determined and consolidated by the
antagonistic basis.
Though the superstructure of antagonistic so­
ciety does contain the ideas and corresponding
institutions of both the ruling and oppressed clas­
ses, it is nevertheless only the ideas and institu­
tions of the ruling class that play the leading part
in it. So while referring to the role of the super­
structure in any antagonistic society we must bear
in mind these ideas and institutions of the ruling
class.
In society the main role of the superstructure
is to safeguard and consolidate the dominating ba­
sis, the dominating economic relations.

2. The Patterns of Development and Replacement

of the Basis and Superstructure
The development of the productive forces inev­
itably leads to a change in the old production re­
lations, the formation of new ones and to a
change in society's economic system. "The changes
in the economic foundation lead sooner or later to
the transformation of the whole immense super­
structure."1

1 K. Marx, A Contribution to the Critique of Political

Economy, Moscow, 1971, p. 21.
25-1557

L
354 A. P. SHEPTULIN

A change in the superstructure does not, how­

ever, immediately follow a change in the basis, in
the society's economy. Changes take place in
the basis prior to changes in the superstructure.
The new mode of production that represents an
antagonistic system of a higher order takes shape
within the old basis. Once it has emerged, it is
compelled to exist for some time under the do­
mination of the old superstructure with which it
conflicts. The aggravation of this contradiction
usually gives rise to a clash between the classes
that defend the old superstructure and those that
represent the new basis, i.e. to a revolution, in
the course of which the old superstructure is
destroyed and a new one, corresponding to the
new socio-economic system, is established.
Thus, for example, the new, capitalist mode of
production began to take shape spontaneously at
some point within feudal society and then spread
to one economic sphere after another. The deve­
lopment of capitalist production was soon opposed
by the old feudal superstructure, which came into
conflct with the new basis that was taking shape.
As the bourgeoisie gradually acquired a domi­
nant position in the economy, it naturally sought
to gain a corresponding status in politics, to
take control of the organs of power and use them
to clear the way for their economic activities. New
political, juridical, moral, philosophical and other
theories emerged which criticised the morals and
institutions of feudal society. The bourgeois ideo­
logists put forward the principles of national
sovereignty, equality of all before the law, the
 THE BASIS AND SUPERSTRUCTURE 355

abolition of privileges for the nobility, and so

forth. Eventually the old, feudal superstructure
was demolished and the new, bourgeois super­
structure established as a result of a bourgeois
revolution.
Not all the component elements of a super­
structure and not all its aspects undergo changes
in the reconstruction of the old superstructure.
Much of what was formerly the content of the
old superstructure remains and develops further
within the new superstructure. This is due, above
all, to the fact that, in its development, the super­
structure is subject not only to the requirements
of the basis, but to its intrinsic laws. The basis
determines the direction of changes in the super­
structure. Though developing under the persistent
influence of the basis, the superstructure uses the
available material, which ensures continuity in
this field.
Any thinker has at his disposal the material
"which has formed itself independently out of
the thought of previous generations and has gone
through its own independent course of develop­
ment in the brains of these successive genera­
tions".1
Continuity in the development of the super­
structure may also be traced to the continuity in
the development of the successive bases. For
example, continuity of private property and the
ensuing exploitation of the working people may

1 K. Marx and F. Engels, Selected Works, Vol. 3,

P. 496.
23*
356 A. P. SHEPTULIN

be traced in the development of the antagonistic

production relations. Both these factors remain
when the transition is made from one antagonistic
basis to another. Only the form changes. This inev­
itably ensures continuity in the political, juridi­
cal and other institutions and in the ideology. So,
when it takes power, each new exploiting class
improves and adapts the state apparatus to its
needs, rather than destroy it. Religion, as a rule,
is not discarded, since in all exploiters' societies
it serves the ruling class and helps it keep the
oppressed classes under control.

3. Specific Features
of the Basis and Superstructure
Under Socialism
The socialist basis differs radically from the
previous, antagonistic bases. In contrast to the an­
tagonistic bases, which reposed on private owner­
ship of the means of production and the exploita­
tion of man by man, the socialist basis reposes
on social ownership of the means of production,
which excludes appropriation of the labour of
another.
The specific features of the socialist basis ine­
vitably condition the qualitative difference of the
socialist superstructure from those of the exploit­
er formations. The socialist superstructure ex­
presses and safeguards not the exploiters' inter­
ests but those of all the working people.
The socialist basis, which is diametrically op­
posite in nature to the previous antagonistic ba­
ses, cannot arise within the old, capitalist so-
ns;
 THE BASIS AND SUPERSTRUCTURE 357

ciety. It only begins to form during a socialist rev­

olution that wrests power from the exploiting
class and transforms private ownership of the
means of production into social property. During
the transition from the capitalist to the socialist
system, a socialist transformation of the basis
does not, therefore, precede a political revolution
but rather, on the contrary, the latter must pre­
cede the economy's transformation. The proleta­
riat should begin to transform society once it
gains political power and then proceed, in the
course of the revolution, using this power for the
economic transformation of society's basis.
On what, however, does the political power of
the proletariat, gained through revolution, rest
during the period preceding the creation of the
socialist basis? It rests on socialist production
relations, which are formed immediately after
the seizure of power, as well as on the process of
destroying and transforming the old basis. After
the working class has seized power, it immedia­
tely starts transforming private capitalist enter­
prises into socialist ones and thus gradually dep­
rives the bourgeoisie of its economic basis. No
revolutionary workers' government is able to
stay in power for long if it does not immediately
decide to start the socialist transformation of
industry. This means that the dictatorship of the
proletariat may only be established once capitalist
production relations have been destroyed and the
socialist basis created.
Another specific feature of the socialist super­
structure is that the old state apparatus, the chief
358 A. P. SHEPTULIN

element of the superstructure, is not merely

improved, as was the case when previous economic
formations emerged, but is completely destroyed
and replaced by a new, proletarian state apparatus,
designed not to oppress the working people but
to safeguard and satisfy to the maximum the
latter's interests and re-educate them in the social­
ist spirit.
The role of the socialist superstructure is not
confined to its participation in transforming the
capitalist basis into a socialist one. In contrast
to the superstructure of capitalist society, whose
involvement in the economic sphere is strictly
limited, the socialist superstructure actively inter­
venes in all the areas of the society's economy.
Socialist ownership of the means of production
makes the socialist superstructure, through the
socialist state, the main distributor of the means
of production and the nation-wide manager of
production processes. This means that, apart from
its political functions, the socialist superstructure
performs administrative and economic functions
as well.
Chapter XII

CLASSES AND CLASS RELATIONS

As was shown in the previous chapter, histori­

cal progress is achieved on the basis of the de­
velopment of the productive forces, which bring
about corresponding changes in production rela­
tions and a transition from one mode of produc­
tion to another.
At a certain stage in the development of the
productive forces society becomes divided into
antagonistic classes-definite social groups of peo­
ple with opposite economic interests. This is how
the exploiter class and the class of the exploited
comes into being. The slave-owners and the slaves
were the first classes. Class relations, being in
effect production relations, began to exert the
decisive influence on all aspects of human life
and on all social phenomena.
From this moment in society's historical devel­
opment, not a single social phenomenon or change
can be comprehended out of the context of clas­
ses, and the interrelations and struggle between
them. The class approach is therefore the funda­
mental methodological principle of any social stu­
dy in historical materialism, and an essential con­
dition for probing into any social event.
360 A. P. SHEPTULIN

The problem of classes and class relations had

attracted the attention of bourgeois scholars long
before Marx's time, and they came up with quite
a few rational ideas. In particular, it was the
classics of English political economy (Adam Smith
and David Ricardo) who described capitalist so­
ciety's class structure. The French historians of
the Restoration (Thierry, Guizot and Mignet)
proved that the class struggle is the reason be­
hind changes in society's political system, etc.
The pre-Marxist sociologists failed, however, to
create a scientific theory of classes and class
struggle. Since they were ideologists of the ex­
ploiting classes and idealists in their comprehen­
sion of the life of society, as a rule they did not
associate the existence of classes with a specific
level of development of material production, and
failed to detect in the class struggle of the pro­
letariat against the bourgeoisie the seeds of the
inevitable collapse of capitalist society and its
replacement by the new, socialist society. Neither
did they believe in the disappearance of classes
and the emergence of a classless society. These
questions were first scientifically dealt with by
Marx and Engels, who discovered and scientifi­
cally substantiated the law-governed patterns of
the emergence, development and disappearance
of classes, and revealed the determining role of
the class struggle in society's transition from one
socio-economic formation to the next, and even­
tually to the classless communist society.
"And now as to myself, no credit is due to me
for discovering the existence of classes in modern
 CLASSES AND CLASS RELATIONS 361

society or the struggle between them. Long be­

fore me bourgeois historians had described the
historical development of this class struggle and
bourgeois economists the economic anatomy of
the classes. What I did that was new was to prove:
1) that the existence oi classes is only bound
up with particular historical phases in the devel­
opment oi production, 2) that the class struggle
necessarily leads to the dictatorship oi the prole­
tariat, 3) that this dictatorship itself only consti­
tutes the transition to the abolition oi all classes
and to a classless society.. Z'1 wrote Marx to
Weydemeyer on March 5, 1852.

1. Lenin’s Definition of Classes

’.-rr

Lenin gave the classical definition of classes.

"Classes," he wrote, "are large groups of people
differing from each other by the place they oc­
cupy in a historically determined system of social
production, by their relation (in most cases fixed
and formulated in law) to the means of produc­
tion, by their role in the social organisation of
labour, and, consequently, by the dimensions of
the share of social wealth of which they dispose
and the mode of acquiring it. Classes are groups
of people one of which can appropriate the la­
bour of another owing to the different places they
occupy in a definite system of social economy."2

* K. Marx and F. Engels, Selected Correspondence,

P- 64.
? V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 29, p. 421,
362 A. P. SHEPTULIN

The fundamental trait of classes, specified by

Lenin, is people's relation to the means of pro­
duction; the other features are determined by it.
In fact, people's place in the system of social
production hinges on whether or not they are
owners of the means of production. If they own
the means of production, then it is their require­
ments that determine the objective of production,
its size and the direction of development. If, on
the other hand, they are deprived of the means
of production, then they represent just a produc­
tive force, utilised by the owners of the means
of labour for their own purposes. People's role
in the organisation of labour also depends on
this: those who own the means of production are
the masters and organisers of production, and,
vice versa, those who are deprived of the means
of production execute the will of others and play
a subordinate role.
The dependence of the form of appropriation
and quantity of the material wealth produced on
people's relation to the means of production is
no less evident. The owners of the means of pro­
duction hold the lion's share of the social wealth
and give only a tiny portion of the goods pro­
duced to the direct producers-the working
people.
The possibility for one part of society to live at
the expense of the other's labour, is also condi­
tioned by the relation to the means of produc­
tion. By appropriating the means of production
without which it is impossible to transform natu­
ral objects and phenomena into means of sub­
 CLASSES AND CLASS RELATIONS 363

sistence, a specific group of individuals acquires

the possibility of using these means to exploit
those who have been deprived of them and
become economically dependent on the former.
This definition of classes applies primarily to
the classes of antagonistic formations, but this
does not mean that it cannot be the basis for ana­
lysis of classes in socialist society. On the contra­
ry, this definition helps us better to understand
the qualitative changes through which the clas­
ses in socialist society have passed on their way
to extinction as classes. The classes of socialist
society-the working class and the collective-farm
peasantry-do not posses some of the qualities
specified by Lenin in his definition of classes. In
particular, the classes of socialist society do not
differ from each other by their relation to the
means of production, since they both own them.
The only difference is that the working class is
related to state property or the property of the
whole people, while the collective-farm peas-
antry-to collective or group property in the
means of production. However, both types of
property are socialist. The working class and the
collective-farm peasantry do not substantially dif­
fer from each other in the role they play in or­
ganising social production. In socialist society
production is managed by representatives of
both classes. Finally, the classes of socialist so­
ciety do not greatly differ in either the amount of,
or ways of acquiring, social wealth. The two clas­
ses receive their wages in amounts determined by
the quality and quantity of social labour expend­
364 A. P. SHEPTULIN ’*.n

ed. This shows that classes in a socialist society

are not antagonistic. While having common in­
terests in the vital issues of life and a common
goal-the building of communist society-they main­
tain relations of comradely co-operation and
mutual assistance. As they progress towards com­
munism, the differences between them will be
gradually eradicated till they vanish entirely.

2. The Origin of Classes

a) A Critique of Idealistic Theories

The problem of the origin of classes is of great

theoretical and practical importance. In the ab­
sence of a correct solution to it, no scientifically-
based theory of the law-governed pattern of class
relations or the development of the class struggle
can be created, the conditions under which classes
disappear cannot be defined and, moreover, no
transition to a classless communist society can
be achieved.
Many theories exist on the origin of classes.
Some authors hold that class distinctions among
people are a result of biological factors and are,
in particular, determined by race. Fascist ide­
ologists advocated this theory. Its proponents ap­
ply biological laws to social phenomena, while the
latter are subject in their development not to the
biological laws of matter's motion, but rather to
the laws of social life. The historical and practi­
cal experience of building socialism and commu­
nism in different countries shows that it is social
 CLASSES AND CLASS RELATIONS 365

factors that govern the relations among classes,

and not racial or national distinctions.
Another view is that the division of people into
classes is due to the appearance of multiple pro­
fessions and trades in society. All people belong­
ing to the same profession, the supporters of this
theory assert, form a definite class. Professional
distinctions cannot, of course, serve as a basis for
dividing people into classes. People belong to
different classes not because they practise differ­
ent trades, but rather the other way round-they
practise different trades because they belong to
different classes. j

Some sociologists base their theories on the

form of income people receive. They hold that
class distinctions appeared among people when
they began appropriating the surplus product in
different forms. Those who received their income
in the form of profit made up the capitalist class,
those who received it in the form of rent, made
up the class of landowners, and those who received
it in the form of wages became workers, and
so on.
This so-called theory of distribution mistook
the effect for the cause, and hence distorted the
actual state of affairs. In fact, the form of distri­
bution of the material wealth produced is in no
way determining; on the contrary, it is totally
dependent on the mode of production and the
form of ownership of the means of production.1
Along with these theories of the origin of clas­

1 See V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 6, p. 264.

366 A. P. SHEPTULIN

ses, one of the most widespread is the force

theory, in accordance with which classes were
formed by one people subjugating another. The
conquerors, so the theory runs, seized the prop­
erty of the conquered by force and started ex­
ploiting them. That was the theory propagated
by E. Duhring.
The theory of force does not stand up to scien­
tific scrutiny. Sheer force cannot create classes.
What the exploiting classes need for their existence
are material goods which, since they are not
absolutely essential for the survival of their direct
producers, can be systematically appropriated
by the exploiters. Force cannot create these goods.
It can only seize them once they have been pro­
duced. In other words, violence "may be able
to change the possession of, but cannot create,
private property as such".1 The appearance of
classes is not brought about by violence, but by
the economic causes determining the creation of
additional means of subsistence not essential for
the direct producer, and the possibility of their
appropriation by certain individuals and social
groups.

b) The Marxist Theory of the Origin of Classes

Marxism was the first theory to reveal the

interconnection between the development of pro­
duction and society's class structure. This inter­
connection consists, above all, in the fact that a

1 F. Engels, Anti-Duhring, p. 195.

 CLASSES AND CLASS RELATIONS 367

definite level of development of labour productiv­

ity is essential before there is a real opportunity
for man to exploit man. For, indeed, when man
produces only the minimum of products required
to maintain his physical existence and reproduc­
tion, any systematic appropriation of someone
else's labour is out of the question. The opportu­
nity to appropriate someone else's labour appears
only when productive forces have developed to
the level at which the quantity of goods produced
somewhat exceeds the minimum required to main­
tain the direct producer's life.
The social division of labour has played a great
role in the appearance of classes. The first major
social division of labour was, of course, the sep­
aration of stock-raising tribes. This resulted in
a higher labour productivity and in the produc­
tion of certain new products. These tribes began
producing not only meat and dairy products, but
also hides, wool, goat hair and, at the same time,
yarn and fabrics. This made it possible, for the
first time, to start a regular exchange with other,
notably farming, tribes. The new opportunity to
exchange certain products for others encouraged
the development of farming and the handicrafts.
The latter still further increased the amount of
labour expended by every member of the clan. The
need arose for more labour power. War offered a
solution: prisoners of war were turned into slaves.
In the initial stages, slave labour was still used
sporadically, since the slave was utilised as a
helping hand. He worked together with the other
free members of the clan and his way of life dif­
368 A. P. SHEPTULIN

fered little from theirs. As production developed

further, however, particularly when the second
major social division of labour occurred, i.e. when
handicrafts became separated from farming, and
later on with the appearance of mental and man­
ual labour, the slaves ceased to be mere assis­
tants. They were driven in dozens to work in the
fields or workshops. Since they began to perform
all major labour operations associated with the
production of material goods, they were looked
upon as objects or speaking implements, and no
longer as members of the clan. Slavery became
the basic form of economy." The division of
labour," Marx wrote, "implies the possibility,
nay the fact that intellectual and material activ­
ity-enjoyment and labour, production and con-
sumption-devolve on different individuals.. ."1
The developing productive forces gave people
an opportunity to work in separate families, in
isolation from the others. Collective labour began
to give way to individual labour. With the changes
in the nature of labour, the ways in which the
output was distributed also underwent changes.
Whereas previously the output had belonged
to the community, it now remained under the
control of the heads of the family and became
their property. In this way private property,
which better corresponded to the requirements of
production, replaced the spontaneously formed
primitive-communal property.
According to Engels, the property distinctions
______ .,.1
1 K. Marx and F. Engels, The German Ideology,
 CLASSES AND CLASS RELATIONS 369

between individual members of society undermin­

ed the old communist commune. The tribal system
had had its day and was replaced by a society
based on private property and exploitation of
one party of society by another, of one class by
another.

3. A Critique of the Theory of Stratification

and Social Mobility
Lenin's definition of the classes is constantly
attacked by modern bourgeois sociologists, who
endeavour to prove that both the definition and
the Marxist theory of the classes in general are
obsolete and that some other characteristics rather
than people's social relation to the means of pro­
duction, should be used to group them in social
divisions.
Bourgeois sociologists propose quite different
criteria, such as the line of business, place of resi­
dence, educational standard, having a house te­
lephone, means of transport, outward appearance,
etc. for substantiating the division of people into
social groups.
Some authors take several traits, which they ar­
range as an "index", as the criterion of belonging
to one or another social group. Thus, for example,
in the opinion of the American sociologist Lloyd
Warner an "index" of the class or stratum is
made up of such traits as the occupation, sources
of income, place and type of residence. Other auth­
ors list cultural standard, participation in so­
cial life, religious denomination, moral virtues
24-1557
370 A. P. SHEPTULIN

and even pronunciation among the attributes typi­

fying a stratum. The majority of these attributes
are not associated with any class distinctions, but
may be typical of people belonging to quite
different classes. For instance, neither occupation
and source of income, nor the cultural level can
characterise the essence of social classes or indi­
cate their place in society, or their historical role,
though they may identify a person as belonging
to a certain class. None of them in isolation or
jointly can, however, characterise the essence of
social classes.
It is easy to see that, while proposing diverse
criteria for dividing people into social groups,
bourgeois sociologists turn a blind eye to the at­
tributes that really do determine society's class
structure. This is how they try to conceal the class
contradictions in capitalist society and reduce
them to petty professional and commonplace
distinctions among people, thus distracting the
working people's attention from the causes of their
being exploited by the owners of the means of
production.
The theory of "social mobility", widely publi­
cised by bourgeois sociologists, serves the
same ends. "Social mobility" means the opportu­
nity for some individuals and groups of people
to move from one social status to another. Two
types of mobility-horizontal and vertical-are
distinguished. The first is associated with changes
in people's social status within the same social
stratum, and the second with the individual's
movement up or down the "social ladder". The
 CLASSES AND CLASS RELATIONS 371

worker's changing a job in one plant for the same

job in another is an example of horizontal mobil­
ity, while the promotion of a worker to an engi­
neer or an office employee to manager are exam­
ples of vertical mobility.
According to bourgeois sociologists, social mo­
bility, particularly vertical mobility, makes the
class structure of society flexible and mobile, thus
precluding the class struggle. The latter, they
claim, is becoming superfluous since every indi­
vidual dissatisfied with his social status may
change it and move to a higher social category.
In contemporary Britain, writes Lord Beaver­
brook, for example, "no bar now prevents poverty
rising to the heights of wealth and power".1 "In
an open society," says Joyce Hertzler, "the posi­
tion of the members of a given stratum or class
may be moved up or down during their own
lifetimes by their achievement of class role essen­
tials or lack of them. Such a system does not place
categorical limitations on the person with res­
pect to his class position. Vertical mobility is not
merely permissive; it is a right, and may be quite
general."2
It is true that the individual in capitalist society
does have the formal right to move from one class
to another, from one social group to another,
since there is no law to stop him. In reality,
however, the worker cannot become a capitalist
1 Lord William Beaverbrook, Don't Trust to Luck,
London, 1953, p. 18.
2 Joyce O. Hertzler, Society in Action. A Study of Ba­
sic Social Processes, New York, 1954, p. 238.
24*
372 A. P. SHEPTULIN

(no matter how hard he works and what he may

achieve), since the wage he gets is nothing but
the value of his labour power sold to the capi­
talist. No matter how the wage may vary in
amount, it is always supposed to reproduce this
power and can never turn into capital.
The rare instances when individual proletarians
do become bourgeois occur not as a consequence
of tendencies typical of the social status of the
working class, or as a consequence of objective
laws governing the functioning and development
of capitalist society, but due to some exceptional
circumstances. The social status of the working
class and the laws of the capitalist mode of pro­
duction determine the continuous and extended
reproduction of the proletariat, and, at the same
time, the aggravation of its contradictions with
the bourgeoisie, expressed in the intensification
of the class struggle.

4. Society’s Class Structure

a) Basic and Non-Basic Classes

Those classes that are engendered by society's

dominant mode of production are its basic clas­
ses. Thus, the slave-owning mode of production
conditioned the existence of slaves and slave­
owners, the feudal one that of peasants and land­
lords, and the capitalist system that of the pro­
letariat and the bourgeoisie. The relations between
the basic classes determine the essence of the so­
ciety's socio-economic system and the forms of
 CLASSES AND CLASS RELATIONS 373

exploitation. When a society makes the transition

from one formation to another, relations between
the basic classes undergo radical changes. For
the slave-owning system the typical relation be­
tween the basic classes was that the exploited
(the slaves) were the property of the exploiters
(the slave-owners). In feudal society, the landlord
was no longer the peasants' owner, but "was only
entitled to their labour, to the obligatory perform­
ance of certain services"1. With the transition
to capitalism, non-economic coercion in relations
between the classes had finally gone for good.
The worker is legally free and independent of the
capitalist, but having been deprived of the means
of production he sells the capitalist his labour pow­
er and in this way becomes dependent on him.
There are no more than two basic classes in any
class society, but there are, besides, other non-
basic classes. Their existence is determined by
different socio-economic structures existing along
with the dominant mode of production. For exam­
ple, in slave-owning society, along with produc­
tion based on slave labour, there were also handi­
crafts and small-scale farming. This gave rise to
the non-basic classes of artisans and free peas­
ants. Similarly, artisans, the emerging bourgeoisie
and the proletariat associated with it, existed
alongside the landlords and serfs under feudalism,
and a class of petty urban and rural bourgeoisie
exists along with the bourgeoisie and the pro­
letariat under capitalism.

1 V. I, Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 29, p. 476.

374 A. P. SHEPTULIN

b) The Intelligentsia
In capitalist society, besides the basic and non-
basic classes, there is another social stratum-the
intelligentsia. Intellectuals, who are neither own­
ers of the means of production nor direct produc­
ers of material goods, make up the intelligentsia,
which includes researchers, engineers, writers,
teachers, doctors, artists and some sections of
white-collar workers.
In capitalist society intellectuals and profes­
sionals come from various classes. Some of them
serve capital by servicing capitalist production,
and by elaborating and propagating the ideology
which suits the bourgeoisie's intersts. The other
part of the intelligentsia in capitalist society throw
in their lot with the working people: voice the
latter's interests and fight against the existing
social system.
In socialist society the social nature of the in­
telligentsia changes. The overwhelming majority
of the intellectuals take the side of the working
class and join in building the new society. With
society's progress towards socialism, the ranks
of the intelligentisia are replenished by represen­
tatives of the toiling classes, who help establish
increasingly stronger links between the intelligen­
tsia and the people, and centre the interests of the
intelligentsia on building communist society.
c) The Estates
Estates are social groups whose position in so­
ciety is defined by a law specifying the rights
and responsiblities of each of these groups. Since
 CLASSES AND CLASS RELATIONS 375

estates are a form of class distinction, they pre­

suppose the division of society into classes. In a
society with several estates, the classes are re­
lated, as a rule, to different estates: the upper
estates constitute the exploiting classes, while the
lower estates make up the class of the exploited.
At definite stages of historical development, how­
ever, a certain discrepancy emerges between
class and estate divisions. For example, the bour­
geoisie, which was quickly growing rich when
feudalism was decaying, was a class of exploiters,
yet it was not part of the upper estate. A divi­
sion of society into estates was typical of the
slave-owning and feudal socio-economic forma­
tions.
Each estate has strictly defined rights and res­
ponsibilities, laid down and safeguarded by the
state power. Thus, in tsarist Russia the nobility,
considered as a "genteel” estate, was relieved of
taxes and corporal punishment, and had the right
to possess land and serfs, etc. The clergy also had
special privileges: for instance, it was exempt
from state duties and taxes.
In contrast to the so-called upper estates, the
lower estates (artisans, traders, peasants) had no
privileges, but many duties. In particular, they
paid various taxes and performed corvees. The
right to belong to a particular estate was inherit­
ed.
Society's division into estates disappears as it
makes the transition to capitalism, since all ci­
tizens are then equal before the law. In fact, how­
ever, different classes occupy different positions
376 A. P. SHEPTULIN

in society. Some of them (the bourgeoisie) hold

power and use it to their own ends, while others
(the proletariat and the peasantry) are deprived,
as a rule, of the opportunity to express their will
in the form of a law and are subjected to constant
oppression on the part of the exploiting class and
its state.

d) The So-Called “Middle Classes”

While analysing the class structure of antago­

nistic society, the classics of Marxism-Leninism
developed the notion of the middle classes, by
which they meant the classes that hold an inter­
mediate position between the basic classes. In feu­
dal society it was the bourgeoisie that held an
intermediate position between the feudal lords
(or the aristocracy) and the working people. In
bourgeois society, the middle class is represented
by the urban and rural petty bourgeoisie, which
is somewhere between the proletariat and the big
capitalists. This class is made up of peasants, ar­
tisans and small traders. It is a specific feature of
the middle classes that they lack a stable position
in society and vacillate between the basic classes,
alternately taking different sides.
Describing the class of petty artisans and trad­
ers, Engels wrote, among other things: "Its in­
termediate position between the class of larger
capitalists, traders and manufacturers, the bour­
geoisie, properly so called, and the proletarian or
industrial class, determines its character. Aspiring
to the position of the first, the least adverse turn
 CLASSES AND CLASS RELATIONS 377

of fortune hurls the individuals of this class

down into the ranks of the second. ... Thus,
eternally tossed about between the hope of en­
tering the ranks of the wealthier class, and the fear
of being reduced to the state of proletarians or
even paupers; between the hope of promoting their
interests by conquering a share in the direction
of public affairs, and the dread of rousing, by ill-
timed opposition, the ire of a Government which
disposes of their very existence, because it has
the power of removing their best customers; pos­
sessed of small means, the insecurity of the pos­
session of which is in the inverse ratio of the
amount; this class is extremely vacillating in its
views."1
In recent years the problem of the middle
classes has attracted the attention of bourgeois
sociologists, who saw it as a factor supposedly
refuting the Marxist-Leninist thesis of the class
struggle and the revolution.
By arbitrarily interpreting the concept "middle
class", bourgeois sociologists are trying to prove
that capitalists and proletarians disappear in mod­
ern capitalist society, and that both these clas­
ses turn into one "middle class" which becomes
the decisive force of modern society. Accordingly,
they claim, capitalist society is changing into a
society of the "middle class" with no class strug­
gle and no dictatorship of the proletariat. "The
history of industrialised societies," writes Jessie

1 K. Marx and F. Engels, Selected Works, Vol. 1,

p. 304.
378 A. P. SHEPTULIN

Bernard, "does seem to be in the direction of a

'classless' society, but not by way of the route
predicted by Marx.... The 'classless' society,
then, is coming not through a transitional dicta­
torship of a proletariat, but by the enormous ex­
pansion of the middle class which tends to ab­
sorb those below it.''1
To define the middle class, bourgeois sociolo­
gists take various points of departure rather than
the place people occupy in the system of social
production or their relation to the means of pro­
duction. The annual family income is often given
as a criterion for placing people in the middle­
class category. Moreover, the brackets of this in­
come are so vaguely defined that both the capi­
talist and the worker may be included within the
same middle class. Thus, for example, the US De­
partment of the Treasury places all families with an
annual income of between $3,200 and $100,000 in
the middle class. As a result, this class covers, on
the one hand, artisans, shopkeepers, white-collar
office and commercial workers, wealthy farmers,
skilled workers and, on the other, corporation
executives, businessmen, landowners and other
representatives of the big and middle bourgeoisie.
A similar situation results when some other
factor of the same kind is taken as the criterion

1 Jessie Bernard, "Class Organisation in an Era of

Abundance: A New Principle of Class Organisation". In:
Transactions ot the Third World Congress of Sociology,
Vol. Ill, Changes in Class Structure, London, 1956,
pp. 26-27.
 CLASSES AND CLASS RELATIONS 379

of the middle class. Some scholars, for instance,

define the middle class on the basis of occupation,
including in it technicians, shop assistants, teach­
ers and small businessmen.
All these notions obviously have very little
to do with science. The antithesis between the
exploiters and the exploited, between the own­
ers of the means of production and the people
deprived of them, does not disappear, regardless
of whether or not the businessmen who earn
their living by exploiting the working people, and
the workers who are exploited by capital, are
included in one class. This being so, the talk
about the disappearance of antagonistic classes
under capitalism as they merge into a "middle
class" is but another attempt at concealing the
exploitative essence of capitalism and distracting
the workers' attention from the revolutionary
struggle for changing the existing state of affairs.

5. The Class Struggle as a Motive Force

in the Development of Antagonistic Society
Since different classes occupy different eco­
nomic positions in society and live under dissi­
milar conditions, their interests cannot be the
same. For example, the bourgeoisie has a vested
interest in cutting the workers' wages, as this
would bring them bigger profits, while the work­
ers want quite the opposite; during general elec­
tions to legislative organs, both the capitalists
and the proletariat are anxious to get their own
representatives elected; the bourgeoisie is inter­
380 A. P. SHEPTULIN

ested in consolidating private property, since it

is the economic basis for its domination, while
the proletariat wants private property to be abo­
lished; the bourgeoisie does its best to perpetu­
ate the exploitation of man by man, while the pro­
letariat is anxious to abolish it and create condi­
tions precluding the possibility of anyone mak­
ing a living at the expense of other people's
labour, etc.
Pursuing opposite interests, the antagonistic
classes wage a continuous, never ending, struggle
which at a definite stage results in the restructur­
ing of the entire social organism and society's
transition from one stage of its development to
the next. "The history of all hitherto existing so­
ciety is the history of class struggles."1
In the first place, the class struggle affects the
development of the productive forces. In partic­
ular, it speeds up the improvement of the means
of labour. For instance, the workers' struggle for
shorter working hours compelled the capitalists
to introduce improved technology enabling them
to produce a larger surplus value. Marx empha­
sised that the workers' strikes in many instances
gave an impetus to the design and introduction of
new machines.
The influence of the class struggle on the de­
velopment of the productive forces can also be
traced, in a somewhat different form, in other
socio-economic formations. In feudal society, in

1 K. Marx and Engels, Collected Works, Vol. 6, Mos­

cow, 1975 p. 482.
 CLASSES AND CLASS RELATIONS 381

particular, the class struggle of serfs promoted

the replacement of corvee by a quit-rent, and
later on a transition from the quit-rent in kind to
a quit-rent in cash.
Apart from influencing the development of the
productive forces, the class struggle also affects
that of production relations. Obsolete production
relations are not automatically changed under the
impact of the productive forces that have devel­
oped within their framework, for the historically
doomed but still ruling class, which is bent on
staving off impending changes, supports the old
production relations. So a force powerful enough
to overcome this resistance is required. It is the
activities of progressive classes, aimed at chang­
ing the existing state of affairs, reflected in the
class struggle, that represent this force.
Only the struggle of society's progressive
forces against the historically outdated ruling class
can culminate in the establishment of new pro­
duction relations corresponding to the level of
development attained by the productive forces.
This is why the class struggle is a motive force
for progress in antagonistic society.
The class struggle has a long history. Its forms,
aims and nature have changed from one period
of history to another. Thus, in slave-owning so­
ciety, for instance, the class struggle of the ex­
ploited against the exploiters was not spearheaded
against the existing mode of production. By
fighting the slave-owners, the slaves tried to li­
berate themselves from slavery, rather than to
abolish it altogether. Even so, their uprisings un­
382 A. P. SHEPTULIN

dermined the slave-owning social system and

finally compelled the slave-owners to bind the
slaves to the land and undertake certain other
measures facilitating the economic transformation
of the slave-owning system and its replacement
by feudalism.
In feudal society the exploited peasants started
to connect their struggle with changes in social
relations, in particular, serfdom, private property
in land, and so on.
While fighting oppression, the peasants usually
became politically dominated by the bourgeoisie
and obeyed it. The scope of the peasants' struggle
was, therefore, usually limited by the interests
of the bourgeoisie. Even so, the peasants' struggle
against exploitation played a positive role, since
it promoted the abolition of feudal production
relations and brought nearer the victory of the
capitalist mode of production.
Although they fought exploitation and oppres­
sion, the working masses of feudal society could
not achieve this goal, for they themselves were
property-owners and could not objectively oppose
private property. They opposed feudal ownership
of the means of production but supported capital­
ist property and capitalist production relations.
As a result their struggle led in practice to the re­
placement of one form of exploitation by another.
The situation changed radically when the in­
dustrial proletariat became an independent polit­
ical force. It is the proletariat's economic posi­
tion that impels it to press consistently for the
abolition of private property and exploitation
 CLASSES AND CLASS RELATIONS 383

of man by man. In the very course of the de­

velopment of capitalist production, the proleta­
rians unite, become organised and turn into a
migthy force confronting the exploiters.
The proletariat started its class struggle with
spontaneous attacks by isolated groups of the
working class against individual capitalists who
were the most notorious oppressors of workers.
This struggle centred strictly on economic issues
and was directed against intolerable exploitation
and oppression, the causes of which were initially
seen in some individual capitalists' brutality and
lack of human feeling.
Economic struggle is the first historical form
of the proletariat's class struggle. It grows spon­
taneously out of the economic plight of the
working class and is waged mainly for improve­
ments in the terms for selling labour power, rath­
er than for the complete abolition of such condi­
tions. The importance of the economic struggle
is, however, great, since it gave rise to the first
class organs of the proletariat-the trade unions.
Later on the working class becomes convinced
that the economic struggle can neither radically
improve its position nor abolish exploitation. It
begins to realise the relation between the bour­
geoisie's economic domination and state power,
as well as the fact that the latter safeguards the
exploitative system. As soin as the working class
realises that both its economic and political in­
terests are diametrically opposed to those of the
bourgeoisie, the proletariat's class struggle be­
comes conscious and purposeful.
384 A. P. SHEPTULIN

Socialist ideology and its alliance with the

workers' movement has a great role to play in
developing the class struggle from a spontaneous,
economic movement into a conscious and political
one. The communist party performs the task of
disseminating the socialist ideology in the
working-class movement. It is Communists who
wage the ideological struggle against bourgeois
and petty-bourgeois views. While expressing the
fundamental interests of the working class, the
communist party theoretically substantiates the
goals of the proletariat's struggle and defines the
ways and means of attaining them.
The class struggle of the proletariat thus de­
velops in three directions: economic, political and
ideological, with the political struggle playing the
decisive role, since only political domination of
the working class can ensure a radical transfor­
mation of the economy and the building of the
classless communist society.
A major feature of the proletariat's class strug­
gle against the bourgeoisie today is the fact that
it is intensifying. This is associated with the ag­
gravation of all social conflicts in the epoch of
imperialism and with the emergence and success­
ful development of the socialist world system
which graphically demonstrates the ways for abo­
lishing the exploitation of man by man.
Another important feature of the present-day
struggle of the proletariat is the stronger link
between the economic and political struggle.
Workers' strikes increasingly acquire a political
nature and are accompanied by political de-
 CLASSES AND CLASS RELATIONS 385

mands and all kinds of political demonstrations.

In view of the growing heterogeneity of the
working class (under the conditions of monopoly
rule its ranks are rapidly being replenished by
members of the petty bourgeoisie who have failed
to withstand competition) and the systematic cor­
ruption by the bourgeoisie of the upper strata
of workers (the so-called workers' aristocracy),
the working class movement is lacking in unity.
Some of its sections follow Communists, while
the others support opportunists who, in effect,
voice the interests of the bourgeoisie. One of the
most important tasks of the present-day revolu­
tionary working-class movement is thus the strug­
gle for unity of action.
Another specific feature of the class struggle of
the proletariat in modern conditions is its close
alliance with various democratic movements
fighting against monopoly domination and for
peace, national independence and sovereignty.
Though the participants in these movements do
not pursue the aim of transforming the capitalist
system into a socialist one, their struggle, never­
theless, greatly contributes to the proletariat's
struggle for socialism. "General democratic
struggles against the monopolies," says the Pro­
gramme of the CPSU, "do not delay the socialist
revolution but bring it nearer. The struggle for
democracy is a component of the struggle for so­
cialism". 1
Speaking of the connection between the class
struggle of the proletariat and the present-day
1 The Road to Communism, Moscow, 1962, p. 484.
25—1557
386 A. P. SHEPTULIN

democratic movements, we must take into ac­

count that today these movements have somewhat
different goals than in the pre-monopoly pe­
riod of capitalism. Whereas in the past they were
mainly directed against the vestiges of feudalism,
today these movements in the industrialised capi­
talist countries are directed against the domina­
tion of the monopolies that express, in the most
concentrated form, the essence of modern capi­
talism. In the industrialised capitalist countries
the present-day democratic movements are there­
fore linked in one way or another with the strug­
gle against capitalism, against some of its most
reactionary aspects. As for the developing coun­
tries, the democratic movements there are still
spearheaded against feudalism, which hampers
their progress, and against the foreign capital
that has taken root in these countries and is
doing its utmost to retain its position. In these
countries, too, there is a possibility of setting up
an alliance of the working class led by the com­
munist party with the peasantry, the urban petty
bourgeoisie and the revolutionary-minded nation­
al bourgeoisie-an alliance which would form a
basis for the transition to socialism by-passing
the capitalist system.

6. The Objective Conditions

for the Abolition of Classes
Many bourgeois sociologists claim that, in mod­
ern capitalist society, classes and class distinc­
tions have disappeared, and that, nowadays, one
 CLASSES AND CLASS RELATIONS 387

should talk not of class distinctions, but of dis­

tinctions between people. They assert that social
differences are gradually disappearing and only
individual distinctions remain. In particular, they
draw this conclusion by alleging that, since many
workers have bought shares, they have become co­
owners of industrial enterprises with the result
that the workers' interests completely coincide
with those of the capitalists, while capitalism it­
self has become people's capitalism.
The hard facts show, however, that capitalism
has always been and still is anti-popular, and
that the interests of the monopolies and of the
working masses can never coincide, because they
are diametrically opposite. The fact that some
workers buy shares does not change the overall
picture. According to statistics, some 98 to 99
per cent of all workers have no shares at all,
while even those who have a few shares, are na­
turally in no position to exert any influence on
the company's affairs. The ones who control the
means of production and the output are the capi­
talists who own the bulk of shares.
There is no doubt that in the industrialised ca­
pitalist countries the objective conditions are ripe
for the abolition of antagonistic classes, but they
cannot wither away under capitalism, where pri­
vate ownership of the means of production holds
sway.
What are the conditions necessary for classes to
disappeear and what form should this process take?
Society will be divided into classes as long as
social labour yields output that barely exceeds
25*
388 A. P. SHEPTULIN

the most basic means o£ subsistence and until this

labour consumes all, or almost all, the time of
the bulk of the members of society. Besides the
nation's majority, totally occupied with the
production of material values, there emerges a
class which is free from direct productive labour
and is engaged in politics, law, science, arts, and
the like.
With the attainment of a higher level of devel­
opment of the productive forces, when they can
produce sufficient material goods to meet the re­
quirements of all members of society, the existence
of classes is no longer a necessity, since it not
only discourages social progress, but even retards
it. Under such conditions, the division of people
into classes can be eliminated. The abolition of
classes "presupposes, therefore, the development
of production carried out to a degree at which
appropriation of the means of production and of
the products, and, with this, of political domi­
nation, of the monopoly of culture, and of intel­
lectual leadership by a particular class of society,
has become not only superfluous but economi­
cally, politically, intellectually, a hindrance to de­
velopment. This point is now reached."1
Thus, one of the conditions for the disappear­
ance of classes is a high level of development
of the productive forces, but one such condition
is not enough in itself. The existence of classes
is associated not only with a definite level of de­

1 K. Marx and F. Engels, Selected Works, Vol. 3,

p. 148.
♦IS
 CLASSES AND CLASS RELATIONS 389

velopment of the productive force, but also with

definite production relations determined by this
level, in particular with production relations based
on the private ownership of the means of pro­
duction. In order to do away with antagonistic
classes, private property must be abolished. "The
abolition of classes," Lenin wrote, "means placing
all citizens on an equal footing with regard to the
means of production belonging to society as a
whole. It means giving all citizens equal oppor­
tunities of working on the publicly-owned means
of production, on the publicly-owned land, at the
publicly-owned factories, and so forth."1
Certain other conditions are also required for
the complete abolition of classes. Quite substan­
tial differences took shape, accumulated and con­
solidated on the basis of the economic and polit­
ical distinctions between classes over many cen­
turies. They concern, in particular, differences in
education, morals, aesthetics, and so forth. It is
the triumph of communism that is needed for
these differences to be wiped out. To sum up, the
abolition of classes is linked with socialist revo­
lution and the building of communist society.

1 V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 20, p. 146.

Chapter XIII
■ 4 -.-■.r,. ;C.1TZ

THE POLITICAL ORGANISATION

OF SOCIETY

1. The Political Organisation of Society

as a Concept
With the division of society into classes and
the establishment of the domination of one class,
a special mechanism arises by which the ruling
classes govern society and regulate the relations
between classes, between separate individuals,
between the individual and society, and between
the country and other countries.
This mechanism includes the state with its ra­
mified network of institutions and organisations,
political parties, trade unions, various youth so­
cieties, and other unions and associations.
The state represents the pivot of the political
organisation of society. It is the main instrument
by which the ruling class implements its policies
and regulates class relations in society, and
society's relations with other countries.

2. The Origin and Essence of the State:

A Critique of Non-Marxist Theories
The question of the essence of the state is a
complex one, and has been the centre of a fierce
ideological struggle. This is because it affects the
interests of classes more than any other.
 THE POLITICAL ORGANISATION OF SOCIETY 391

To give a clearer picture of the confusion of

views on the state, we shall briefly discuss some
pertinent bourgeois theories or, rather, view­
points.
The neo-Thomists, for example, advocate the so-
called theological theory of the state, the main
provisions of which were formulated by the 13th-
century scholastic Thomas Aquinas. According to
this theory, the state is of divine origin. Since the
state represents the Deity on Earth, they claim, it
stands above social classes, uniting them into a
single whole and administering its powers over
this entirety, sanctioned by the Lord. Since state
power originates in God, assert the advocates of
this theory, it must be revered.
The reactionary nature of this theory is evident.
Its exponents are trying to make the working
people believe that a bourgeois state is non-class,
that it expresses and protects the interests of all
members of society, and that, taking account of
its divine origin, it should therefore be treated
with special respect, and all its demands obe­
diently fulfilled.
The supporters of another-the patriarchal-
theory allege that the state emerged as a result
of the development of the family, which first
turned into a clan, then into a tribe, and later
into a state. State power, they claim, is thus
none other than the transformed power of fathers,
since the father, of course, treats all members of
the family in an equal manner.
In Lenin's words, the patriarchal theory of the
origin and essence of the state is "childish non­
392 A. P. SHEPTULIN

sense".1 It is patently contrary to the actual

state of affairs. The family is not at all the origi­
nal unit of human society, but appeared at a later
stage in society's development. Originally people
lived in clans and even tribes, and it was much
later that families separated off from these as a
result of economic development and, in particu­
lar, of the invention of instruments of labour
making it possible to work alone. The state is
based not on blood relationships between people,
but on the territorial principle. All the people who
live on the territory of the state, irrespective of
the place of their birth, are considered its citizens.
The theory according to which the state arose
as a result of a social compact concluded by peo­
ple in the remote past, is also rather popular. Its
champions (Spinoza, Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau and
others) claimed that the emergence of the state
was conditioned by people's desire to prevent
mutual hostilities and regulate existing relations.
After setting up the state, people, acting in accor­
dance with the compact, vested in it some of their
rights and entrusted it to protect their freedom.
In the period of its rise (the 17th to 18th cen­
turies), this theory played a progressive, role since
it advocated the temporal origin of the state and
acknowledged the right to change it if it ceased
to perform its function of protecting the freedom
of all citizens. On the whole, however, this theory
is not scientific. Nobody concluded any compact
to form a state. Though many supporters of this

1 V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 1, p. 154.

 THE POLITICAL ORGANISATION OF SOCIETY 393

theory admitted that, in reality, there was no so­

cial compact and that the thesis was advanced
only to explain theoretically the essence of state
power and people's sovereignty. The compact itself
could not serve as such a basis either, since it rep­
resented a phenomenon dependent on the con­
sciousness of the people who concluded it. The
reasons for the emergence of the state lie not in
the realm of consciousness, but in the people's
material condition which takes shape irrespective
of their consciousness.
Many bourgeois sociologists trace the emer­
gence of the state to force. According to them,
the state arose as a result of the subjugation of
one tribe or people by another. The conquerors
seized the property of the subdued and began
administering them with the help of an apparatus
especially set up for the purpose. This is, for
example, how one of the protagonists of the
theory of force, Karl Kautsky, explains the rise
of the state: "A victorious tribe subjugates
the subdued tribe, appropriates all their land and
then forces the subdued tribe to regularly work
for the victor, to pay him tributes or taxes....
The repressive apparatus which the victors set up
for the subdued, becomes the state."1
This theory of the origin of the state does not
reveal what actually happens. Sheer violence
cannot engender the state. In order for a special

1 Karl Kautsky, Die Materialistische Geschichtsauf-

tassung, Bd. 2, "Der Staat und die Entwicklung der
Menschheit", Berlin, 1929, S. 82.

»
394 A. P. SHEPTULIN

group of armed men, called upon systematically

to suppress the population, to exist, there must
be certain material goods supplied to them re­
gularly. But violence alone cannot create them.
There must be the necessary economic conditions,
in particular the means of labour, making it pos­
sible to produce more means of subsistence than
are required to sustain the physical existence of
the producers. Force has nothing to do with the
emergence of these conditions.
Some bourgeois sociologists attempt to relate
the necessity for the emergence of the state with
the psyche. They claim that, in psychological
terms, people are divided into two directly op­
posite groups: strong-willed, active and energetic
people, and weak-willed, passive people who are
ill adjusted to life. The former are in need of
people whom they can organise and force to act,
while the latter desperately need leaders and men­
tors, without whom they can neither function nor
survive. These two groups of people, according
to the supporters of this theory, join ranks and
form a state, in which the former take power and
force the latter to perform definite functions.
This so-called psychological theory at present
enjoys wide currency among some bourgeois so­
ciologists who try to substantiate and justify the
rule of capitalist tycoons. The ideologists of the
imperialist bourgeoisie constantly emphasise that,
without strong personalities to guide the state po­
licy, organise and develop production, the nation
could not survive and would starve to death due
to lack of initiative, passiveness and helplessness.
 THE POLITICAL ORGANISATION OF SOCIETY 395

History, however, refutes these conjectures. In

socialist countries the rule of capitalist tycoons
has been abolished, but the working people have
achieved a level of production development over
only a few decades that would have taken much
more time for the capitalist countries to reach.
The psychological theory of the state is essen­
tially idealistic, since it considers psychic factors
to be the ultimate cause for the rise of the state,
while these are, of course, neither determining
in society as a whole nor in any individual's life.
Thus, there is one general shortcoming in the
above theories of the origin of the state-they
search for it not in the economic realm of the life
of society but in the other world, or in subjective
and psychic human acts.
It was historical materialism that, for the first
time, provided a scientific explanation of the ori­
gin and essence of the state.

3. The Origin and Essence of the State

According to historical materialism, the state
did not always exist, but emerged at a definite stage
in the development of society or, to be more
precise, when society was divided into exploiting
and exploited classes. In primordial society, where
collective labour, common ownership of the
means of production and relations of co-operation
and mutual assistance predominated, there were
neither classes nor a state. Human relationships,
labour duties and all other aspects of social life
were regulated by customs and traditions, passed
396 A. P. SHEPTULIN

down from one generation to another. Communal

officials were elected and those who were chosen
for public employment relied in their activities
exclusively on the authority and respect they
enjoyed among members of the commune or the
clan.
When classes emerged the situation underwent
considerable changes. Society began to disinte­
grate increasingly into groups with opposite in­
terests, with one group beginning to make its
living by appropriating the labour of the other.
Society became threatened by a fierce and irrecon­
cilable class struggle between the exploiters and
the exploited. This meant that a certain apparatus
of coercion was required systematically to crush
the resistance of the exploited, and thus place the
class struggle within certain bounds of the "order"
needed for society to function and develop. The
state was this apparatus which became separated
from society and stood above it. The state became
a machine protecting the order preferred by and
advantageous to the class that dominated the econ­
omy. With its help, this class also became the
politically dominant class and acquired a new
means for the suppression and exploitation of the
oppressed class.1
The state is thus an instrument in the hands oi
the ruling class for suppressing and oppressing
the working people, the exploited masses.
The territorial principle of dividing up the po­
pulation is one of the main features of the state.
1 See K. Marx and F. Engels, Selected Works, Vol. 3,
p. 328.
 THE POLITICAL ORGANISATION OF SOCIETY 397

In tribal society its members were united into a

single whole by blood relationships. It was only
after the appearance of private property and com­
modity exchange that clans and tribes intermin­
gled, thus paving the way for the unification of
people on the territorial, residential principle.
Another distinguishing feature of the state is
the presence of public authority in society. In
the case of tribal organisation of society, it was
the people who had the authority. It was the peo­
ple themselves who, for many centuries, main­
tained the established order, punished the guilty
and forced them to observe the existing norms
of behaviour. In the state, however, authority se­
parates from the people, rises above them and
becomes opposed to the population in the form of
special groups of people with an armed force,
prisons and other similar institutions at their dis­
posal.
Finally, the state is characterised by the col­
lection of taxes levied on the population. These
represent the material base the state needs to
maintain the people who exercise the power.
Since the exploiting state is, by nature, an in­
strument for oppressing and suppressing the
exploited and for protecting relations between
people, such as are to the liking and advantage
of the exploiters, its main function is to stamp
out resistance among the exploited. Its entire me­
chanism and all its organs are geared to check
the actions of the exploited classes against the
exploiters, either at the very outset or at the point
where they become dangerous for the latter.
398 A. P. SHEPTULIN

While oppressing the working people physi­

cally, the exploiting state also oppresses them
morally. It has a ramified network of ideological
institutions, including the church, to propagate
ideas, views and moral principles expressing the
interests of the ruling class. Besides, the state in­
terferes in the economy whenever and as far as
is advantageous to the ruling class, and influences
the course of its development. This becomes
especially pronounced in the period of imperial­
ism, when the state interferes in economic mat­
ters in the interests of the big monopolies, whom
it obediently serves.
The state also performs an external function,
which is not the main one of its activities, but
is still necessary in order for the ruling class's
interests to be realised. It protects the country
from encroachment on its sovereignty by other
states, wages wars to seize new territory and
spheres of influence, and pursues the interests of
the ruling class in solving international political
and economic issues.
The external function of the state is intimately
linked with its internal functions, its purpose
being to protect the interests of the ruling class
both domestically and in relations with other
countries.
•, ft li .1 •' . u -. -isii'.Jqxu r<.u 1©
4. Types and Forms of the State
^11J j
Once the state had emerged, it did not remain
unchanged, but evolved in step with the develop­
ment of the productive forces and production re­
 THE POLITICAL ORGANISATION OF SOCIETY 399

lations. In the course of history the state's struc­

ture and essence underwent considerable changes.
Historical materialism takes these changes into
account and distinguishes some types and forms
of the state.
The type oi the state is determined by which
class holds power and which production relations
the state protects and consolidates.
Historical materialism distinguishes three types
of exploiting state and one type of socialist state.
The types of exploiting state are: the slave-own­
ing state which represents the dictatorship of the
slave-owners designed to protect the slave-owners'
private property and suppress the slaves; the feu­
dal state which is an instrument of the feudal
lords for suppressing the peasants; and the ca­
pitalist state which expresses the interests of the
bourgeoisie, and suppresses the proletariat and
other sections of the working people.
The iorm of the state indicates how the state
power is exercised. By a form of the state we
mean, first of all, the form of government. There
are, thus, monarchies and republics, with a fur­
ther subdivision into aristocratic and democratic
republics.
"A monarchy," Lenin wrote, defining forms of
the state, "is the power of a single person, a re­
public is the absence of any non-elected author­
ity; an aristocracy is the power of a relatively
small minority, a democracy is the power of the
people (democracy in Greek literally means the
power of the people)."1
1 V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 29, p. 479.
400 A. P. SHEPTULIN

One and the same type of the state may exist

in the most diverse forms. Thus, for example, the
slave-owning state existed both in the form of
a monarchy and in that of a republic. Moreover,
it took the forms of both aristocratic and demo­
cratic republics. Republics and monarchies existed
under feudalism and they still do under capi­
talism.
A form of the state is of particular importance
for describing a certain state power, but it does
not characterise the essence of the state. This is
determined by the type of state, i.e. by which
class's dictatorship is embodied in the state pow­
er. For example, in spite of differences in form,
all slave-owning societies had the same essence.
Their basic feature was that the slaves, far from
being considered citizens, were not even treated
as human beings. Roman Law treated them as
objects and the law prescribing punishment for
murder, to say nothing of the other laws protect­
ing human dignity, did not apply to them. It pro­
tected only the slave-owners, since only they were
recognised as full-fledged citizens.1
This pattern holds for both bourgeois and so­
cialist societies. Despite a great variety of forms
of bourgeois states, their essence is the same:
they represent the dictatorship of the bour­
geoisie. As for the socialist state, a form of the
dictatorship of the proletariat, it may exist in the
form of the Paris Commune, a republic of Soviets,
or a people's democracy, etc.
1 See V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 29, pp. 479-
80.
 THE POLITICAL ORGANISATION OF SOCIETY 401

The differentiation of types and forms of the

state helps to assess any state correctly and ex­
pose its class nature.

5. Specific Features of the Socialist State

Every type of state is related to a definite so­
cio-economic system and represents a definite
stage in the development of society's political or­
ganisation. In the process of social development,
the state machinery, while passing from the con­
trol of one exploiting class to another, remains a
means of suppressing and oppressing the working
people. This situation continued unchanged un­
til the proletariat emerged-the class interested in
the abolition of exploitation of man by man and,
due to its economic position, capable of leading
all the working people.
In contrast to the exploiting classes, the pro­
letariat, once it has seized state power in the
course of a socialist revolution, cannot accommo­
date and utilise the old state machinery for this
was geared to suppressing the working people and
protecting the exploiters' interests, whereas the
task of the proletariat is to abolish exploitation and
protect the interests of the working people. So the
proletariat destroys the old state machinery and
creates a new one which exercises its dictatorship
and represents the interests of the working people.
The proletariat needs the state in order to solve
the tasks involved in the transformation of cap­
italist into socialist society. These include sup­
pressing the exploiters who, even after they are
26—1557
402 A. P. SHEPTULIN

overthrown, continue their struggle against the

proletariat and the social transformations intro­
duced by it; they have capital, are organised and
possess knowledge and have long-established
links with the international bourgeoisie and the
petty-bourgeois elements at home.
So, while suppressing the bourgeoisie, the pro­
letariat must unite all the working people and
petty-bourgeois elements around itself, organise
and draw them into the struggle for socialism,
for the transformation of all social life along so­
cialist lines, for the organisation of large-scale so­
cialist production and for the establishment, on this
basis, of conditions for the abolition of classes.
"In order to achieve victory, in order to build
and consolidate socialism, the proletariat must
fulfill a twofold or dual task: first, it must, by
its supreme heroism in the revolutionary struggle
against capital, win over the entire mass of the
working and exploited people; it must win them
over, ogranise them and lead them in the strug­
gle to overthrow the bourgeoisie and utterly sup­
press their resistance. Secondly, it must lead the
whole mass of the working and exploited people,
as well as all the petty-bourgeois groups, on to
the road of new economic development, towards
the creation of a new social bond, a new labour
discipline, a new organisation of labour, which
will combine the last word in science and capi­
talist technology with the mass association of
class-conscious workers creating large-scale so­
cialist industry."1
1 V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 29, p. 423.
 THE POLITICAL ORGANISATION OF SOCIETY 403

Without the state, however, without establish­

ing its dictatorship, the proletariat cannot resolve
these tasks and cannot make a transition from
capitalism to socialism. While emphasising the
need for a dictatorship of the proletariat during
that period, Marx pointed out that "between cap­
italist and communist society lies the period of
the revolutionary transformation of the one into
the other. Corresponding to this is also a political
transition period in which the state can be noth­
ing but the revolutionary dictatorship oi the pro­
letariat".1
The state of the dictatorship of the proletariat
radically differs from exploiting states, which
express the interests of the minority-the exploit-
ers-and are used by them to suppress the ma-
jority-the working people. The proletarian state
expresses the interests of all working people, i.e.
of the overwhelming majority of the country's
population, and is directed against the minority-
the exploiters.
Furthermore, the exploiting state is an organ
of coercion. The dictatorship of the proletariat
is more an instrument of non-coercion than of
coercion. It is an organisation through which the
working class guides the peasantry and other
working sections of society and encourages their
voluntary transition to socialism. The dictator­
ship of the proletariat is thus directed against the
exploiters and is a friend of the working people.

1 K. Marx and F. Engels, Selected Works, Vol. 3, p.

26.
26*
404 A. P. SHEPTULIN

in particular of the peasantry, and a helper in the

struggle for liberation from exploitation and for
higher living standards. "The workers' state," Le­
nin wrote, "is an implacable enemy of the land­
owner and capitalist" and "the only loyal friend
and helper the working people and the peasantry
have."1
Since the dictatorship of the proletariat differs
radically in nature from any other dictatorship,
it embodies a new and higher type of democracy.
In contrast to bourgeois democracy, which, in all
capitalist countries, is in fact a democracy for the
exploiters, socialist democracy is for the work­
ing people, for the overwhelming majority of the
nation. Under the dictatorship of the proletariat
the emphasis is shifted from formal recognition
of freedoms (as is the case in the capitalist world)
to their practical exercise on the part of the
working people.
It is only after the dictatorship of the proleta­
riat is established that the freedom of the press
proclaimed by bourgeois constitutions becomes a
reality for the working people, because it means
that newspapers, magazines, publishing houses
and printing presses become state property,
which is tantamount to their being in the control
of the working people. The situation is quite differ­
ent in the capitalist countries, where the press
is controlled by capital. "The first thing to do to
win real equality and genuine democracy for the
working people, for the workers and peasants, is

1 V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 29, p. 559.

 THE POLITICAL ORGANISATION OF SOCIETY 405

to deprive capital of the possibility of hiring writ­

ers, buying up publishing houses and bribing
newspapers,"1 Lenin wrote.
As distinct from exploiting states, where the
working masses are by all manner of means
kept out of political life, the socialist state is
based on increasingly broad participation of the
masses in the administration of state affairs.
"We know... from long years of practice
that ... genuine democracy is impossible without
socialism, and that socialism is impossible with­
out a steady development of democracy."2
A state of the dictatorship of the proletariat,
which arises as a result of a victorious socialist
revolution with the aim of suppressing the exploit­
ers and guiding the building of socialism, under­
goes changes in the course of socialist transfor­
mations and, having fulfilled its historic mission,
becomes a state of the whole people after the
completion of the building of socialist society and
its entry into the stage of building communism.
As distinct from the dictatorship of the prole­
tariat, which retains the function of suppressing
the overthrown exploiting classes, a state of the
whole people does not practise class coercion any
longer. With the victory of socialism, the exploit­
ing classes are abolished and this removes the
need to suppress them. The dictatorship of the
proletariat expressed the interests of the working
1 Ibid., Vol. 28, p. 461.
2 L. I. Brezhnev, Report of the CPSU Central Com­
mittee and the Immediate Tasks of the Party in Home
and Foreign Policy. XXVth Congress of the CPSU, p. 103.
406 A. P. SHEPTULIN

class and the working masses, but the state of

the whole people, the embodiment of the peo­
ple's unity, reflects the interests of the entire so­
ciety, which are determined by the supremacy of
socialist ownership of the means of production
and the single, socialist, mode of production.
Though the state of the whole people differs
greatly from that of the dictatorship of the pro­
letariat, they are closely interlinked and have
much in common. The state of the whole people
grows out of the dictatorship of the proletariat
and develops on the basis of a consistent evo­
lution of its principles. Yet those features that
embody the essence of the state of the whole
people-the expression and protection of the inter­
ests of the working people and their leadership
in the building of a new, classless society-are also
typical of the state of the dictatorship of the pro­
letariat. With the gradual abolition of the exploit­
ing classes and the conditions engendering the ex­
ploitation of man by man, the coercive and dicta­
torial functions of the proletarian state begin to
wither away, while its functions associated with
the expression and protection of public interests
expand and become dominant. From an instru­
ment of class domination, the state turns into an
instrument of the public will.
With the development of the dictatorship of the
proletariat into a state of the whole people, the
leading role of the working class does not drsap­
pear. In the period of the all-round building of
communism and in the developed socialist society,
the working class remains the most advanced, or­
 THE POLITICAL ORGANISATION OF SOCIETY 407

ganised and conscious class and the most consis­

tent bearer of communist ideals. It is linked with
machine industry and with the form of socialist
property that has the highest level of socialisation,
so it retains its leading role until the building
of communism is completed and class distinctions
have been finally eradicated. At previous stages
of development, the alliance of the working class
and the peasantry, and the leading role of the
working class in this alliance took the form of
the dictatorship of the proletariat. The alliance
of the working class and the peasantry is not,
however, identical to the dictatorship of the pro­
letariat and does not, by itself, constitute this
dictatorship. It assumes the form of the dictator­
ship of the proletariat only in the period when
the exploiters are being suppressed and when the
life of society is being transformed along social­
ist lines. The alliance of the working class and the
peasantry nd longer, however, needs the dictator­
ship of the proletariat in the period of the complete
and final victory of socialism, when the exploit­
ing classes have been abolished and when a
complete identity of the fundamental interests of
the two classes and their social, political and ideo­
logical unity have been achieved. This alliance
may successfully develop in a state of the whole
people as well.
The transformation of the dictatorship of the
proletariat into a state of the whole people leads
not to the weakening of the socialist state, but to
its consolidation, since nowadays it firmly rests
on a more solid social base and on more power­
408 A. P. SHEPTULIN

ful productive forces embodied in the complete

sway of the socialist economy and the unity of
the Soviet people.
While representing a new and higher stage of
development of socialist society, the state of the
whole people is not the terminal point of this
development. As it advances further, it will gra­
dually turn into public communist self-administra-
tion-a state-free organisation for running socie­
ty's affairs-and then will wither away.

6. Objective Conditions for the Withering Away

of the State
Some revisionists link the withering away of
the state with the socialist phase in the develop­
ment of society and with the victory of the so­
cialist revolution. Socialism does not, however,
create the objective conditions for the withering
away of the state, since under socialism it is not
yet possible to do without state interference in
the life of society or without state coercion.
The necessity of state administration of society
under socialism is determined, first of all, by eco­
nomic factors and, in particular, by the insuffi­
ciently high level of production development,
which presupposes state control over the measure
of labour and consumption.
Without state administration, socialist society
cannot solve the great tasks arising in the course
of communist construction, requiring strict dis­
cipline, centralised planning and subordination to
a single centre. Under socialism not all members
 THE POLITICAL ORGANISATION OF SOCIETY 409

of society have acquired the habit of observing the

established rules of behaviour of their own free
will, so state power is required to safeguard these
norms. Besides, the state must protect socialist
gains against external enemies.
The state can wither away only under commu­
nism, and this calls for classes to be completely
abolished and all class differences to be over­
come. "The abrogation of the state," Marx and
Engels wrote, "has only one meaning for Com-
munists-it is the necessary outcome of the aboli­
tion of classes, which involves the natural disap­
pearance of the need for the organisational power
of one class to retain its domination over the other
classes."1
It is the development of the production of ma­
terial goods to help satisfy all people's require­
ments and realise the principle "From each ac­
cording to his ability, to each according to his
needs", that is essential for the complete aboli­
tion of the state.
Finally, a major precondition for withering
away of the state is the high cultural standards
and consciousness of society's members, implying
that work for society's benefit will become the
prime necessity of every healthy person, that peo­
ple would observe the rules of communal beha­
viour of their own free will and there would be
no need for any coercion.
Besides these internal conditions for the aboli­
tion of the state, there are certain external ones:

1 Marx/Engels, Werke, Bd. 7, S. 888.

410 A. P. SHEPTULIN

the elimination of capitalism in all countries and

the triumph of socialism and communism on a
world scale. Only then would the danger of mili­
tary attack disappear, the danger that necessitates
the maintenance of an army, state security
organs and other state institutions related to the
exercise of the external function.
The withering away of a socialist state will
proceed gradually as the role of public bodies
grows and the working people participate on an
increasingly broad scale in administering society's
affairs, as public control is extended and the func­
tions of state organisations are taken over by
public bodies. During this process, the socialist
state is transformed into a non-state administra­
tive organisation-into communist public self-ad­
ministration.
Chapter XIV

SOCIAL REVOLUTION

1. Social Revolution as a Form of Transition

From One Socio-Economic Class System
to Another
A social revolution is an upheaval in the course
of which a transition is effected from one histori­
cally outdated socio-economic formation to
another, more progressive one.
A social revolution is not something accidental
in social development; it is an inevitable con­
sequence of the aggravation of the contradictions
that developed within the dominant mode of pro­
duction. A conflict between the new productive
forces and obsolete production relations is resolved
in the course of a revolution. Progressive forces
seek to change the obsolete production rela­
tions, but the latter are the backbone of the domi­
nation of the reactionary class, which opposes
any changes in these relations, relying, primarily,
on the state power which has the means of sup­
pression at its disposal. In order, therefore, to al­
ter the obsolete production relations, power has
to be wrested from the class related to these pro­
duction relations, i.e. a revolution has to be car­
ried out.
The passing of state power from one class to
another is the principal, the basic sign of a revolu­
tion.1 This is the feature by which a social revo­
1 See V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 24, p. 44.
412 A. P. SHEPTULIN

lution differs from a putsch or coup d'etat which,

without affecting the foundations of the domina­
tion of a particular class, just lead to a change
in the government of the ruling class.
This is how Lenin defined the political aspect
of a revolution: "The revolution itself is nothing
but the break-up of old superstructures and the
independent action of the various classes, each
striving to erect the new superstructure in its own
way."1
The revolutionary transformation does not,
however, end with the take-over of power by the
progressive class. A social revolution presupposes
radical changes not only in politics, but also
in all other realms of social life, in particular, in
the economy, ideology, social psychology and so
forth. The whole social organism and the entire
system of social relations and institutions change
and are renewed during a social revolution.
While emphasising the decisive role of a revo­
lution in the transition from one socio-economic
formation to another, historical materialism does
not deny the existence of evolutionary processes
in the social development, resulting in definite
progressive changes within the same socio-econom­
ic formation. In contrast to the reformists, how­
ever, who consider evolution to be the basic form
of social progress and the way of transition from
one socio-economic formation to a more advanced
one, historical materialism views the evolution­
ary form as a secondary one, capable of bring­

1 V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 8, p.218.

 SOCIAL REVOLUTION 413

ing about certain qualitative changes within the

same substance but unable to ensure transi­
tion to a new social system. It is a revolution that
is required for a change-over from a historically
outdated social system to another, more advanced
one, since only revolution can effect a radical
break-up of existing social forms and a transfor­
mation of the life of society. It is not by chance
that Communists advocate revolution as a way
of passing from capitalism to socialism. This, of
course, does not mean that Communists are
against evolutionary forms, in particular, reforms.
They deny neither reforms nor the necessity of
fighting for them.

2. The Objective and Subjective Preconditions

for a Social Revolution
A conflict between the new productive forces
and the obsolete production relations which have
become an obstacle to further development of
the productive forces and, at the same time, to
social progress, is the economic basis of social
revolution. It is this conflict that, in the final
analysis, drives the progressive forces of society
into a fight for the transformation of the social
system and production relations which develops
into a revolution at a definite stage. This con­
flict alone is not, however, sufficient for a re­
volution to be accomplished, since the contradic­
tion between the productive forces and produc­
tion relations does not automatically generate
a revolution. For a social revolution to begin it
414 A. P. SHEPTULIN

is necessary for this contradiction to create a rev­

olutionary situation, which is an objective pre­
condition for a social revolution.
Lenin considered the following factors as attri­
butes of a revolutionary situation: (1) a state of
affairs when not only the lower classes are un­
willing to live in the old way, but also when the
upper classes are unable to live as before; (2) a
more than usually acute aggravation of the suffer­
ing and want of the oppressed classes,- (3) a con­
siderable increase in the activity of the masses
who allowed themselves to be robbed in peace­
time, but who resolutely voice their demands in
turbulent times.1
The situation which developed in Russia prior
to the Revolution of 1905 may serve as a case in
point. A country-wide crisis preceded this revo­
lution. The tsarist government was entangled in
contradictions and proved incapable of solving
the tasks necessitated by the development of cap­
italist relations in the country. It well realised,
however, that the situation could no longer re­
main unchanged and that something had to be
done. The lower classes, suffering from hardships,
did not want to live in the old way either.
Thus, a revolutionary situation is needed for a
revolution to occur, but this alone is not yet suf­
ficient for a revolution to unfold, and not every
revolutionary situation engenders a revolution. A
revolution can only begin when, in addition, the

1 See V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 21, pp. 213-

14.
 SOCIAL REVOLUTION 415

objective preconditions listed above merge with

a definite subjective factor, namely, the ability of
a revolutionary class to undertake mass-scale and
sufficiently powertul revolutionary actions, in or­
der to crush (or undermine) the old government
which would never, even during crises, "fall"
without being "toppled", and the presence of
a revolutionary political party, capable of taking
the leadership over these actions.
Though a revolutionary situation develops
spontaneously, it is always a result of the in­
tensifying class struggle and an interplay of the
various factors that come to the surface during
a crisis in a given social formation.

3. The Character and Driving Forces

of a Social Revolution
The character of a social revolution is deter­
mined by the concrete tasks it is called upon to
resolve, and by the results achieved. If the revo­
lution is supposed to replace feudal with capi­
talist production relations and ensure the
sway of the bourgeoisie, it is a bourgeois revolu­
tion. If the main goal of the revolution is to
abolish capitalist private property and transform
the means of production into public socialist
property, and if it is aimed at establishing the dic­
tatorship of the proletariat and effecting a tran­
sition to socialism, then such a revolution is a so­
cialist one.
The classes which carry out a social revolution
are its driving forces. For example, in the revo­
416 A. t>. SHEPTULIN

lutions directed against the feudal social system,

the bourgeoisie, the peasantry, the urban petty
bourgeoisie (artisans, small traders) and even the
proletariat took part. All these classes, depend­
ing on the circumstances, may be the driving
forces of a bourgeois revolution.
The active participation of the working classes
in a bourgeois revolution, accompanied by the ad­
vancement of specific demands, leaves an im­
print on the entire course of the revolution and
turns these revolutions into popular or bourgeois-
democratic ones, which are marked by a more
determinate revolutionary action and greater
consistency in implementing revolutionary trans­
formations.

4. A Socialist Revolution
a) The Essence and Specific Features
of a Socialist Revolution

A socialist revolution is a qualitative leap

which results in the transition from the capitalist
socio-economic formation to a socialist one.
The contradiction between the level of devel­
opment of the productive forces achieved within
the capitalist mode of production and the capita­
list production relations that have become fetters
on further progress in production, is the econom­
ic basis of a socialist revolution. This contradic­
tion manifests itself in a growing discrepancy be­
tween private capitalist appropriation and the so­
cial character of production, which is a necessary
 SOCIAL REVOLUTION 417

outcome of the application of machines and me­

chanisation of production processes. This discre­
pancy leads to recurrent economic crises, chronic
underloading of production, a growing army of
unemployed, wars for the redivision of the
world and spheres of influence, seizure of new
markets and sources of raw materials, etc.
All this intensifies the conflict between the
bourgeoisie and the proletariat and encourages
the rallying of all the working people and the ex­
ploited masses around the proletariat, which fights
for society's transformation along socialist lines.
The proletariat and the non-proletarian work­
ing masses exploited by capital constitute the
driving forces of the socialist revolution. It is the
proletariat, however, that plays the leading role.
It is the proletariat that is called upon to fulfil
the historic mission of the grave-digger of the
bourgeoisie, execute the verdict passed by history
on capitalist private property, turn it into a pub­
lic socialist property and, in this way, resolve cap­
italist society's contradiction between the pro­
ductive forces and production relations. Since the
proletariat is deprived of ownership of the means
of production, and united and organised by the
very conditions of its labour, it represents a con­
sistent revolutionary class capable of carrying
along the non-proletarian mass of the working
people and the petty-bourgeois sections and lead­
ing them during the socialist revolution.
The goals of the socialist revolution-seizure of
political power, establishment of the dictatorship
of the proletariat and its utilisation to crush the
27—1557
418 A. P. SHEPTULIN

exploiters; replacement of capitalist small-com­

modity production relations with socialist ones
and, at the same time, abolition of any grounds
for exploitation of man by man; organisation of
highly-mechanised large-scale socialist produc­
tion capable of meeting the growing requirements
of the working masses; a rise in the cultural level
of the population and its increasingly broader in­
volvement in the administration of the state and
active participation in public affairs-all of which
result in the building of a socialist society.
The socialist revolution radically differs from
all previous social revolutions. Whereas all pre­
vious revolutions replaced one exploiting class
at the helm of power with another, a socialist re­
volution establishes the domination of a class
whose mission is to end the exploitation of man by
man.
While opposing some specific form of private
property, all previous revolutions established an­
other such form. A socialist revolution sweeps
away all private property and replaces it with
public property.
In the course of previous social revolutions the
classes that were coming to power sought to con­
solidate their acquired position by subjecting the
entire society to conditions ensuring their own
mode of appropriation and to the economic rela­
tions which had taken shape prior to the revolu­
tion. The proletariat, which comes to power as a
result of the socialist revolution, gains control of
the social productive forces only by changing its
social position and ridding itself of the prevailing
 SOCIAL REVOLUTION 419

mode of appropriation. “The proletarians have no­

thing of their own to secure and to fortify; their
mission is to destroy all previous securities for,
and insurances of, individual property".1
While consolidating and sanctifying the eco­
nomic relations that have taken shape within the
old social system, all previous revolutions con­
fined themselves to destroying whatever prevent­
ed these relations from developing. A socialist
revolution does not limit itself to the destruction
of the old, historically outdated order; its mission
is to create new forms of property and new pro­
duction relations that could not arise within the
old society based on private property.2
All previous revolutions, while expressing the
interests of the exploiters, i.e. of the minority,
were reduced to replacing the rule of one class
by that of another and could not activate the work­
ing masses. The socialist revolution is carried out
in the interests of the overwhelming majority
and it therefore inspires wide sections of the po-
pulation-the mass of the working and exploited
people-to creative deeds.
Finally, while just changing the form of exploi­
tation of the working people, all previous revolu­
tions could not ensure a cohesive society, since
after the revolution's victory the interests of the
class that had come to power always conflicted
with those of the overwhelming majority of the
1 K. Marx and F. Engels, Selected Works, Vol. 1, p.
118.
2 See V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 31, pp. 416-
18.
27*
420 A. P. SHEPTULIN

population. All this testified to the inevitability of

new social conflicts and new social revolutions. A
socialist revolution which sets itself the goal of
abolishing all forms of the exploitation of man
by man and any kind of oppression, can and
does unite the overwhelming majority of the po-
pulation-the working classes-among whom, in
the course of the revolution, there develops an
alliance based on common interests and a unity
of objectives.

b) The Theory of Socialist Revolution

as Developed by Lenin

The theory of socialist revolution was conceived

by Marx and Engels. Lenin developed it fur­
ther and applied it to the new historical condi­
tions of the epoch of imperialism. He also ad­
vanced and substantiated the idea of a successful
socialist revolution in one country, developed the
theory concerning the growing of a bourgeois-dem­
ocratic revolution into a socialist one, proved
the necessity of an alliance between the proleta­
riat and the peasantry during the socialist revo­
lution, and discovered the Soviets as a form of the
dictatorship of the proletariat resulting from the
victorious revolution, and so forth.
Marx and Engels lived when capitalism was in
its prime-it was vigorously spreading throughout
the world. It was the bourgeoisie that led the bour­
geois-democratic revolutions that were breaking
out at that time. The peasantry and the proleta­
riat acted as allies of the bourgeoisie. As a result
 SOCIAL REVOLUTION 421

of these victorious revolutions, the bourgeoisie

usually seized power, established its rule and
could peacefully exploit the working people for
a more or less prolonged period of time, until the
corresponding objective and subjective precondi­
tions emerged for a proletarian revolution. It
is only natural that, under these conditions, Marx
and Engels were unable to see that a bourgeois-
democratic revolution might develop directly into
a socialist one.
In Lenin's time, however, capitalism entered
its highest and final stage. By that time the prole­
tariat had firmly established and consolidated it­
self as a class and acquired a great deal of expe­
rience in class struggles, had set up its political
party and proved itself as a force capable of de­
cisive actions. On the other hand, the bourgeoisie
had by that time lost its former revolutionary
zeal. Now it considered not the feudal lords or
monarchy but the proletariat its main enemy,
and it was therefore ready to make any conces­
sions to the feudal lords and the nobility, in order
to prevent the bourgeois-democratic revolution
from developing at full speed and carrying out
the pertinent democratic reforms. Under these
new conditions, the bourgeoisie proved to be less
interested in breaking up the old feudal produc­
tion relations than was the proletariat, who
needed elementary democratic freedoms and
guarantees to secure for itself freer and wider
organisation in its struggle for socialism. The
bourgeoisie could not, therefore, retain its hege­
mony in the bourgeois-democratic revolution, and
422 A. P. SHEPTULIN

this role was taken over by the proletariat,

which acquired a firm ally in the peasantry. Under
these circumstances the state power must go over,
as a result of the victorious bourgeois-democratic
revolution, not to the bourgeoisie, but to the pro­
letariat and the peasantry, who establish their dic­
tatorship, later using it to crush counter-revo­
lutionary resistance, completely abolish survivals
of feudalism and establish the conditions under
which the working people could widely en­
joy democratic freedoms and, finally, consider­
ably improve the material condition of the work­
ing class and all the working masses.
Having exposed the specific features of the
bourgeois-democratic revolution under imperial­
ism, Lenin developed the theory of the immediate
development of the bourgeois-democratic into the
socialist revolution.
According to this theory, while attaining the
goals of the bourgeois-democratic revolution, the
revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the pro­
letariat and the peasantry, embodying the power
based on the alliance of these classes under the
leadership of the proletariat, is utilised to pre­
pare for the overthrow of capitalism and, in par­
ticular, for the concentration and rearrangement
of forces, centering around the proletariat and ca­
pable of carrying out a transition to a socialist
revolution.
Lenin's idea of the development of the bour­
geois-democratic into socialist revolution was
based on a profound understanding of the unity
of democratic and socialist movements in the
 SOCIAL REVOLUTION 423

epoch of imperialism. This unity gives rise to a

situation when the growth of a democratic move­
ment in all its forms encourages, to a certain
degree, the expansion of the social base of the
proletarian revolution, especially in those coun­
tries where feudal or semi-feudal relations still
survive. Well-known popular fronts in some now
socialist countries have become reflections of this
new tendency. It was the communist parties that
led the national liberation movement in these
countries, ensured a smooth transition from the
democratic to socialist transformations and then
to the victory of the dictatorship of the proleta­
riat.
While working out the theory of the develop­
ment of the bourgeois-democratic into social­
ist revolutions, Lenin gave all-round consideration
to the issue of the proletariat’s allies in the socialist
revolution. The proletariat does not perform the
socialist revolution alone. It has allies who partici­
pate in the socialist revolution. Among its allies
are the non-proletarian working masses, the pea­
santry in the first place.
In the epoch of imperialism the peasants are
turned increasingly into the slaves of capital. Ca­
pital penetrates all the spheres of agriculture, thus
increasing the numbers of hired labourers, which,
in turn, gives rise to the peasants' increasing dis­
possession of the land. As a result of this process,
the working peasants become proletarians, taking
an ever more hostile attitude towards the bourgeoi­
sie. As a result, the non-proletarian working po­
pulation may become a reliable ally of the pro­
424 A. P. SHEPTULIN

letariat in its struggle for the victory of the so­

cialist revolution.
Furthermore, Marx and Engels believed that the
socialist revolution would simultaneously triumph
in all or, at least, in the major capitalist countries,
but it was Lenin who drew attention to the gra­
phic manifestation of the law of the unevenness
of economic and political development of the cap­
italist countries in the epoch of imperialism. The
unevenness of the economic and political develop­
ment is responsible for the fact that in different
countries the conditions for the proletarian revolu­
tion mature unevenly. Hence the conclusion
that revolution cannot simultaneously take place
in these countries and that it can triumph in one
or, at best, in several countries at once, these being
the weakest links in the imperialist chain.

c) The Multiple Forms of the Socialist Revolution

The socialist revolution, being effected in differ*

ent countries at different times and under differ­
ent conditions, may take different forms. In par­
ticular, it may assume the form of an armed up­
rising or be carried out by peaceful means.
For example, in the Soviet Union, when the
working class in alliance with the peasantry came
out against the bourgeoisie, capitalism was do­
minant in all other major countries. Counting on
the support of these countries, the Russian bour­
geoisie did not intend to relinquish its power
peacefully, so the socialist revolution in Russia
took the form of an armed uprising, which later
 SOCIAL REVOLUTION 425

developed into a civil war unleashed by the bour­

geoisie. On the other hand, in other countries (in
particular in Poland, Rumania, Hungary and some
others), the socialist revolutions took place under
different conditions, affected by the existence of
the Soviet Union, and the socialist revolution de­
veloped from a democratic, anti-imperialist rev­
olution, directed against nazi invaders, feudal
lords and the monopoly bourgeoisie, and so so­
cialist transformations proceeded peacefully.
The specific features of the socialist revolution
in one or another country concern not only the
way the power is taken, but also the multifari­
ous transformations of the political, economic,
ideological and other aspects of society's life. For
example, after the revolution of 1917, the Russian
bourgeoisie did not wish to co-operate with the
workers and peasants, since it believed that their
power would not last long, and so began its strug­
gle against the working people's power, making
every effort to overthrow it. As a consequence,
the Soviet Government was compelled to isolate
the bourgeoisie from participation in the coun­
try's economic and political life. It was disfran­
chised, while the means of production belonging
to it were nationalised and turned into public prop­
erty.
As distinct from the Soviet Union, in some other
countries, such as the Socialist Republic of Viet­
nam, the transformation of enterprises belonging
to the national bourgeoisie proceeded in a some­
what different way-not through nationalisation
but through the establishment of mixed state-cap­
426 A. P. SHEPTULIN

italist undertakings that were gradually trans­

formed into socialist enterprises. These features
stem from the fact that, for a long period of time,
this and other such nations were semi-colonial,
semi-feudal, economically backward countries
with a relatively weakly developed national bour­
geoisie who took part in the struggle against im­
perialism, monopolies and the feudal lords. Re­
maining economically and politically weak, and
sensing the futility of opposing the socialist trans­
formations of the economy, the national bour­
geoisie in these countries chooses to co-operate
with the power of the working people and not to
struggle against the transformation of capitalist
industry along socialist lines.
There are many specific features related to the
transformation of agriculture and other areas of
social life in various countries that affect the
socialist revolution there.
While stressing the inevitability of differences
in the way the socialist revolution develops in in­
dividual countries, Marxism-Leninism opposes the
views of revisionists who absolutise these differ­
ences and peculiarities, and who claim that every
country is heading towards socialism in a way
drastically differing from those taken by other
countries or from that once passed by the Soviet
Union. It. should be remembered that each spe­
cific feature is inevitably linked with that which is
common, that each difference presupposes
identity and that the general laws of transition
from capitalism to socialism, which should be
always borne in mind if the desired goal of so­
 SOCIAL REVOLUTION 427

cialism and communism is to be reached along

the shortest road, do inevitably make their way
through the host of specific features of the social­
ist revolution in individual countries. Below are
some of these general laws, formulated in the De­
claration of the 1957 Meeting of Representatives
of the Communist and Workers' Parties: 1) guid­
ance of the working masses by the working class,
the core of which is the Marxist-Leninist party,
in effecting a proletarian revolution and establish­
ing the dictatorship of the proletariat; 2) the al­
liance of the working class and the bulk of the
peasantry and other sections of the working peo­
ple; 3) the abolition of capitalist ownership and
the establishment of public ownership of the basic
means of production; 4) planned development of
the national economy; 5) gradual socialist recon­
struction of agriculture; 6) the carrying out of
the socialist revolution in the sphere of ideology
and culture and the creation of a numerous intel­
ligentsia devoted to the working class, the work­
ing people and the cause of socialism; 7) the abo­
lition of national oppression and the establish­
ment of equality and fraternal friendship among
peoples; 8) defence of the achievements of so­
cialism against attacks by external and internal
enemies; 9) solidarity of the working class of the
country concerned with the working class of other
countries, that is, proletarian internationalism.

, ;o ehruzl
Chapter XV

SOCIAL CONSCIOUSNESS
AND ITS FORMS

1. The Essence
of Social Being and Social Consciousness
Before applying to the life of society dialecti­
cal materialism's principle of the primacy of mat­
ter over consciousness we must distinguish be­
tween material and spiritual phenomena in so­
ciety and determine the law-governed patterns of
their interrelationship. Marxist sociology custo­
marily uses the term "social being" to denote ma­
terial phenomena in society and "social conscious­
ness" to describe spiritual phenomena.
Social being includes the activity of people aimed
at creating the objects and material goods that
are essential for their life-food, clothing, housing,
means of transport and so forth. This activity is
performed with the utilisation of the means of
labour created by society, acting upon nature
with the aim of adapting it to society's needs.
During this labour activity people establish cer­
tain relations between one another, on the one
hand, and between themselves and nature, on the
other. The relations between people and nature
manifest themselves and are embodied in definite
kinds of means of labour, while those between
people themselves are expressed in the form of
ownership of the means of production and in the
 SOCIAL CONSCIOUSNESS AND ITS FORMS 429

corresponding forms of distribution of the means

of labour and the material goods produced.
Social being thus consists primarily of the re­
lations among people which arise in the process
of the production and distribution of material
goods, i.e. production relations.
Even though people's production relations re­
present the major aspect of social being, the latter
also includes certain other aspects, such as the
material relations arising between spouses within
the family, the relations between parents and
children, as well as certain (material) cultural and
every-day relations.
The totality oi material relations within which
the real process of human life proceeds, as well
as that of the material conditions of human exis­
tence, constitute social being.
Whereas the concept "social being" is associat­
ed with the material life of people and the con­
ditions for creating material goods, "social con­
sciousness" is related to their spiritual life and
the specific features of society's spiritual creativ­
ity.
Social consciousness is the totality of ideas,
theories, views, outlooks, feelings, customs and
traditions existing in society and reflecting the
social being of people and the material conditions
of their life.
Social consciousness reflects social being to the
extent that consciousness generally reflects the
reality existing outside and irrespective of the
former. A concrete expression of the general
philosophical principle that consciousness reflects
430 A. P. SHEPTULIN

the reality existing outside and irrespective of

it, this thesis, when applied to social cons­
ciousness, includes a number of specific features
that make it an independent sociological principle
related to a specific aspect of the interrelationship
between consciousness and being. Indeed, applied
to general philosophical (i.e. dialectical material­
ist) principles consciousness reflects reality as an
image or copy of it, while in the sociological con­
text (i.e. historical materialist), the consciousness
(of society) reflects social being not by making
copies of the latter and not in the form of images
or pictures of its component parts, but rather
in the form of dependence on it and the deter­
mining nature of the contents of social ideas, out­
looks, feelings, strivings and other economic con­
ditions of human life.
For example, the recognition of a marriage of
convenience as being moral in capitalist society
undoubtedly reflects the economic conditions and
social being of the bourgeoisie, based on the do­
mination of private capitalist property and com­
modity-money relations. But it is not an image
of this being or this economic position,- it is con­
ditioned and brought to life by the latter. Or take
another example: the teaching of the ancient
Greek philosopher Aristotle that some people, by
their natural qualities, were destined to become
slave-owners, while the others to be slaves, re­
flected the social being of the slave-owners and
their striving to theoretically substantiate and
justify the slave-owning mode of production. This
teaching was not, however, an exact reproduction
 SOCIAL CONSCIOUSNESS AND ITS FORMS 431

of the actual situation and social being concerned

though it was undoubtedly brought into exis­
tence by this social being.
We must not think that since social conscious­
ness reflects social being in the form in which the
content of the former is conditioned by the latter,
this type of reflection cannot be a copy of social
being and cannot assume the form of objective
truth. Under definite historical conditions the con­
tent of social consciousness may represent objec­
tive truth. This may be so when verification of
the actual situation corresponds to the interests
of some ruling class, or when its interests con­
form to the requirements of the objective mate­
rial development of society's life and to the trends
of change in social being. For example, the social
consciousness of the progressive classes who op­
pose historically obsolete forms of social being
does, as a rule, contain the objective truth that
to one or other degree reflects the actual situa­
tion. Thus, when the bourgeoisie was fighting
feudalism, which had become historically obsolete
and acted as a brake on the further progressive
development of society, its social consciousness
to some extent reflected the actual situation, i.e.
it contained elements of the objective truth. Later
on, when capitalist private property became an ob­
stacle to the further development of the produc­
tive forces and when a historical need arose for
replacing it with socialist property, the social
consciousness of the bourgeoisie and, in particu­
lar, the theories produced by its sociologists, could
no longer originate from the actual situation. On
432 A. P. SHEPTULIN

the contrary, they sought to prove the continuous

nature of capitalism and the necessity of its eter­
nal existence and began, either intentionally or
unintentionally, to distort its social conscious­
ness.
Social theories and diverse sociological views do
not become genuinely scientific and do not start
to reflect the objective truth until the time when
the capitalist socio-economic formation begins to
decay and the proletariat, interested in knowing
the actual laws of social development in order to
fulfil its historical mission-the abolition of pri­
vate property and of the exploitation of man by
man, as well as the building of a classless com­
munist society-comes on the historical scene.
The Marxist thesis of the decisive influence of
social being on social consciousness helps to re­
veal the reflection of material contradictions, the
class struggle, through the prism of ideological
struggle. Indeed, whereas certain social ideas and
theories arise as a reflection of social being and
are determined by people's economic conditions,
consciousness cannot be uniform and above clas­
ses in a class society. Each class forms its own
consciousness and understanding of the surround­
ing world in conformity with the economic con­
ditions of its being. In antagonistic society, the
social being of different classes is not the same
and may even be diametrically opposite. The an­
tagonistic polarity of social being inevitably leads
to antagonisms in the realm of consciousness and
to clashes of diverse ideas and views. In order to
keep one's bearings in social life and to be able
 SOCIAL CONSCIOUSNESS AND ITS FORMS 433

to sort out the diverse opinions, social ideas and

theories, it is essential to bear in mind the class
nature of social ideas and theories.
"People," Lenin wrote, "always have been the
foolish victims of deception and self-deception in
politics, and they always will be until they have
learnt to seek out the interests of some class or
other behind all moral, religious, political and so­
cial phrases, declarations and promises."1
It should be remembered that in society the
ruling class seeks at any price to impose its
views on the broad sections of the working peo­
ple and to make these views dominant. It suc­
ceeds to one or another degree since it has the ma­
terial means and controls the entire propaganda
apparatus-the press, radio, cinema, theatre and
so forth.
"The ideas of ruling classes," Marx and Engels
wrote, "are in every epoch the ruling ideas: i.e.,
the class which is the ruling material force of so­
ciety, is at the same time its ruling intellectual
force. The class which has the means of material
production at its disposal, has control at the same
time over the means of mental production, so that
thereby, generally speaking, the ideas of those
who lack the means of mental production are sub­
ject to it. The ruling ideas are nothing more than
the ideal expression of the dominant material re­
lationships. , ."2
. ;,oo krtoLun oaf lo jut iud
1 V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 19, p. 28.
2 K. Marx and F. Engels, The German Ideology, p.
J2OIQ9UO* Joi.. -J 04
28—1557
434 A. P. SHEPTULIN

2. The Relative Independence

of Social Consciousness
While stressing the dependence of social con­
sciousness on social being, historical materialism
certainly does not reject the relative independence
of social consciousness and the existence of in­
trinsic laws governing its development.
Social being cannot explain the entire wealth
of ideas and theories within a society. Entering
each new stage of development, social conscious­
ness takes with it certain ideas and theories from
the previous stage. These become independent of
the new developing social being and exist, as it
were, on their own. For example, the emergence
of socialist production in the Soviet Union radi­
cally changed the social being and social con­
sciousness of the Soviet people. In Soviet society
there are also, however, ideas dating to the re­
mote past, which are not only out of keeping
with socialist social being, but even contradict it.
This applies in particular to religious ideas, which
exist as vestiges of the past in the consciousness
of certain individuals in Soviet society.
This, however, does not mean that certain as­
pects in social consciousness are absolutely inde­
pendent of social being. The independence of so­
cial consciousness is always relative. Individual
ideas and outlooks may be independent of only
the currently dominant historical conditions and
historical being, but not of the material conditions
of life in general.
The relative independence of social conscious­
ness is conditioned, first and foremost, by the fact
 SOCIAL CONSCIOUSNESS AND ITS FORMS 435

that ideas may survive the social being that di­

rectly engendered them, for social consciousness
lags behind social being.
The relative independence of social conscious­
ness is also the outcome of the interplay between
the various forms of social consciousness which
determines the presence of certain traits in a par­
ticular form of social consciousness and cannot
be explained by the material conditions concerned.
But even here the independence of the spiri­
tual aspect of social life is only relative, for the
interrelationship between different forms of so­
cial consciousness is also, in the final analysis,
dependent on objective material factors.

3. The Influence of Social Consciousness

on Social Being
While arising under the influence of people's
definite social being and reflecting the material
conditions of their life, social consciousness does
not, however, behave passively. Social conscious­
ness exerts a reverse influence on the social be­
ing that engendered it. This influence, too, de­
pends on the character of social consciousness
and on the nature of its component ideas, theories
and outlooks. All ideas, different social theories
and outlooks may be grouped according to their
content into old reactionary and new progressive.
The old ideas and theories reflect and express the
interests of the obsolete classes and thus their in­
fluence on the life and development of society is
negative. They hamper society's advance. On the
28*
436 A. P. SHEPTULIN

other hand, the new progressive ideas and theories

reflect the interests of the progressive classes and
progressively-minded sections of society and con­
form to the needs for developing the people's ma­
terial condition. As a result, their influence on so­
ciety's life and on social being is positive, for
they contribute to society's progress.
Taken to their essential and deepest source, new
progressive ideas arise from the development of
production and the aggravation of the contradic­
tions between the new productive forces and the
obsolete relations of production. After arising on
the basis of definite contradictions in people's
material life, these new progressive ideas become
a weapon in the hands of society's progressive
forces, which is used for resolving these contra­
dictions. These new progressive ideas mobilise
people for solving the tasks facing society.
The influence of advanced ideas on social de­
velopment is exercised through the practical rev­
olutionary activity of the masses. New ideas can
only lead people beyond the influence of the old
ideas, but not beyond the bounds of the old sys­
tem. In order to exert a material influence, they
must become a material force. "The weapon of
criticism," Marx wrote, "cannot, of course, re­
place criticism by weapons, material force must
be overthrown by material force; but theory also
becomes a material force as soon as it has
gripped the masses."1 r
One of the distinctive features of a progressive
1 K. Marx and F. Engels, Collected Works, Vol. 3,
p; 182. .Ojfl!
*«
 SOCIAL CONSCIOUSNESS AND ITS FORMS 437

ideology is its ability to grip the working mas­

ses, since it expresses their genuine interests. But
it does not do so automatically. This occurs in a
bitter struggle between the new and the old ideas
that have taken root over many generations. The
struggle is for the minds of the masses and for
the spread of a definite ideology, and is waged as
a rule, by political parties.
, ?. • r .। . •........................ ... r • . •
■ . ' J J

4. The Structure of Social Consciousness

iistk
a) Social and Individual Consciousness

Social consciousness does not exist in isola­

tion from concrete individuals. It exists in their
minds in the form of definite ideas, outlooks, feel­
ings and wishes, characteristic of individual peo­
ple. This in no way implies that everything cha­
racteristic of the consciousness of any individual
represents a component part of social conscious­
ness. The latter encompasses only those ideas, out­
looks, feelings and strivings that express the com­
mon interests of people in a class society, i.e.
the common interests of a class or any other so­
cial group, collective, and so on.
The need thus arises for drawing a demarca­
tion line between social and individual conscious­
ness. Individual consciousness is the individual’s
spiritual world. It represents the thoughts, feel­
ings, emotions, customs and strivings of a partic­
ular person. It takes shape during his lifetime
and practical activities and reflects the material
conditions of his existence. Since individual con­
438 A. P. SHEPTULIN

sciousness expresses the practical experience and

conditions of life of a particular person, all its
features are unique for the individual. Even so,
it includes ideas, feelings and strivings that are
also typical of other people, in particular, of all
members of the given class or society as a whole
(under socialism). In this respect, therefore, it is
richer than social consciousness. But an individual
possesses, as a rule, only some, rather than all,
the ideas current in society, which means that in
other respects individual consciousness is more
limited than social consciousness.
Individual and social consciousness are interre­
lated and dialectically united: they interpenetrate
and mutually enrich each other.

b) Social Psychology and Ideology

The social consciousness of people is not ho­

mogeneous. It includes the most diverse spiritual
phenomena, ranging from human feelings, expe­
riences and moods to theories explaining the es­
sence of society's life, the direction of its devel­
opment, and so forth. Some of these phenomena
reflect human social being vaguely, while others
do it precisely and clearly; some phenomena
spontaneously arise in people's every-day life,
while others are deliberately created by a group
of people.
Taking account of this heterogeneity of the spi­
ritual phenomena making up the social conscious­
ness of people, historical materialism singles out
two different realms and, at the same time, two
 SOCIAL CONSCIOUSNESS AND ITS FORMS 439

tiers of social consciousness. These are social psy­

chology and ideology.
The totality oi ieelings, strivings, experiences,
customs, thoughts and moods that arise during
people's every-day life and reflect their social be­
ing, constitute social psychology.
An ideology represents the totality of ideas and
outlooks reflecting the material conditions of peo­
ple's life and their social being in a systematised,
logical form.
The distinguishing feature of social psychology
is that it directly reflects the conditions of peo­
ple's life and that this reflection is spontaneous
and accidental, recording only the outward aspect
of people's being. Social psychology cannot ex­
press the essence of people's material relations or
the causes behind these relations and the direc­
tion in which they change. This is why it does not
enable people to take their bearings in complex
life situations and comprehend surrounding
events.
Social psychology is the first stage in people's
understanding of their social being.
As distinct from social psychology, ideology re­
presents a higher stage of social consciousness
and a more profound understanding by people of
the material conditions of their life. Its mission
is to expose the essence of human relations and
to substantiate from the viewpoint of a particular
social class the need for maintaining or changing
these relations. Ideology is the understanding of
social being and all aspects of social life in a
theoretical form. In contrast to psychology, which
440 A. P. SHEPTULIN

is spontaneously formed, it is developed by a spe­

cial group oi people, known as ideologists.
Ideology is closely linked with psychology and
expresses the same aspects and trends of social
being as psychology does, but in a more precise
and logical form. It is not, however, created as a
result of the further development of social psy­
chology. It grows out of already existing theories
and views on the basis of the spiritual material
that has accumulated over previous development.
For example, socialist ideology resulted from
the further elaboration of the economic, philoso­
phical and sociological doctrines that preceded
Marxism and from the generalisation of the de­
velopment of science and the class struggle of
the proletariat.
Once it has taken shape, the ideology exerts an
active influence on human psychology and is thus
instrumental in transforming spontaneous move­
ments of particular social classes and social groups
into conscious actions. ■ '?
In a class society, the social psychology and
ideology have a distinctly class nature. Each class
has its own psychology and ideology reflecting its
economic position in society and its place in the
system of social production, as well as its require­
ments and interests.
•' - ' ?: - ’If' ’ 7 OT ‘i nJ Kt
c) Forms of Social Consciousness
The structure and composition of social con­
sciousness has its own specific forms of existence
and development, different from those of knowl­
edge. , J . ; '/.a .j . .
 SOCIAL CONSCIOUSNESS AND ITS FORMS 441

It has already been mentioned that social con­

sciousness, which is a reflection of social being,
does not remain passive, but exerts an active in­
fluence on the latter. Reflecting the different as­
pects of social being and influencing the most di­
verse sides of social life, social consciousness un­
dergoes a process of differentiation. Some of its
spheres begin to specialise in reflecting strictly
circumscribed aspects of social being and in per­
forming strictly prescribed social functions. This
leads to the emergence of separate and independ­
ent forms of social consciousness possessing spe­
cific features and performing strictly defined so­
cial functions.
The major forms of social consciousness are:
political ideology, legal consciousness, morals, the
[arts, religion, science and philosophy.

5. Political Ideology
A political ideology is a system of views which

I
theoretically substantiate the policy pursued by
some class or social group. Politics is a special
type of relations between classes1, nations2 and
parties; politics also specifies the content and
forms of government and the involvement in it of
classes and social groups.3
By affecting the relations between classes and
determining the structure of the state and the
[ '
1 See V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 32, p. 228.
2 Ibid., Vol. 35, pp. 272-73.
3 Ibid., Vol. 41, pp. 381-82.
442 A. P. SHEPTULIN

content of the activities of state bodies and insti­

tutions, a political ideology exercises a direct in­
fluence on the life of people and on society at
large. By reflecting the genuine interests of a class
in theoretically substantiated and systematised
forms, a political ideology determines the pro­
gramme of its activity, as well as the goals and
forms of the class struggle, and introduces in it
elements of organisation and co-ordination.
Being one of the ideological forms that is most
closely related to the economy and that reflects it
in the most concentrated form, political ideology
is the intermediate link connecting the economic
basis with the entire ideological superstructure.
As a result, a political ideology inevitably leaves
its imprint on other elements of the superstruc­
ture and on the forms of social consciousness.
Political ideology permeates them, as it were, thus
giving them a general ideological direction.
Take the history of capitalist society. In the first
period of capitalist development, when the bour­
geois political ideology was directed against the
decaying feudal system and its political institu­
tions, it demanded the abolition of society's divi­
sion into estates and the equality of all social
groups before the law, as well as the replacement
of absolute monarchy by a democratic republic.
Since the church protected society's division into
estates and the existing state power, the fight
against feudalism inevitably involved a fight
against the church and the replacement of the
idealistic outlook advocated by the church with an
atheistic and materialistic world outlook tracing
 SOCIAL CONSCIOUSNESS AND ITS FORMS 443

the origin of political institutions to mundane

causes, and stripping them of their former sanc­
tity. Furthermore, since radical changes in the
historically obsolete feudal society required the
active participation of the working masses in the
bourgeois revolution, this forced the bourgeoisie,
whenever it was interested in the radical trans­
formation of feudal relations-as it was, for ex­
ample, in France-to advance a theory substan­
tiating the participation of the mass of the peo­
ple in the country's political life.
Thus, the emergence of a new ideology deter­
mined changes in the existing outlook, the attitude
towards religion, the arrival of new sociological
views, and so forth. There was one reason for all
this-the bourgeoisie needed new ideas to theore­
tically substantiate its political programme and
its right to remake society politically in order
to consolidate its rule.
Once the bourgeoisie seizes state power, how­
ever, and the contradictions between it and the
proletariat begin to intensify, its political ideolo­
gy undergoes a drastic overhaul and becomes re­
actionary in nature. The bourgeoisie seeks to
prove that the capitalist social system is the ul­
timate goal of historical progress, that it repre­
sents the most perfect social system ever created,
and that the socialist-oriented class struggle is un­
lawful and unnatural, distorting the normal func­
tioning of society's life, etc. The reactionary na­
ture of the political ideology of the bourgeoisie
immediately left its stamp on the other forms of
social consciousness and, in particular, on philo­
444 A. P. SHEPTULIN

sophy, which provided a convenient breeding

ground for idealism, on morals, which began cul­
tivating vile and racist principles and on the arts,
which broke away from the realistic trends and
became captive to formalistic and abstractionist
schools, and so forth.
The political ideology of the exploiter classes
plays a positive role only in the peroid of social
development when the class whose interests it ex­
presses is fighting to remake the historically ob­
solete production relations and heralds the ad­
vance of new production relations corresponding
to the existing level of development of the produc­
tive forces. As soon as production relations, the
economic foundation of the rule of the class con­
cerned, come into conflict with the developing pro­
ductive forces, its political ideology begins to
play a negative and reactionary role. By defend­
ing historically obsolete social forms, it retards
historical progress and becomes a brake on de­
velopment.
As distinct from the political ideology of the
exploiter classes, that of the proletariat is con­
sistently progressive. History has assigned to the
proletariat the mission of ending all exploitation,
which absolutely precludes the replacement of
one form of exploitation with another, as has hap­
pened in the past. To fulfil this mission the pro­
letariat relies on the actual laws governing the
functioning and development of society and on
the objective trends in historical development,
which demand the abolition of private ownership
of the means of production and the establishment
 SOCIAL CONSCIOUSNESS AND ITS FORMS 445

of socialist ownership. The political ideology of

the proletariat is thus consistently scientific. It
expresses the needs of society's further develop­
ment and strives to reflect the actual situation.
At the same time, the political ideology of the
proletariat is profoundly partisan and class-con­
scious, It expresses its class interests and resolves
issues bearing on the interrelationship of classes
and nations, and on the forms and direction of
state policy from the same class viewpoint. The
partisan nature of the political ideology of the
proletariat does not contradict its scientific char­
acter, since the class interests of the proletariat
fully coincide with the requirements of social de­
velopment.
Since this ideology is consistently scientific, it
plays an exceptionally big part in the life of so­
ciety. It activates the working people in their
fight to remake society along socialist lines, and
is a programme for their revolutionary activity,
showing how to replace and drastically improve
the obsolete social relations and institutions.
bns bsi.’Ln- ri v oaorfw
6. Legal Consciousness
Being a form of social consciousness typical of
a class society, legal consciousness is the totality
of people's convictions concerning the justified or
unjustified nature of acts, rights and duties of so­
ciety's members and concerning the justice or in­
justice of laws.
Legal views are class-conscious by nature. Every
class has its own legal views and legal conscious­
446 A. P. SHEPTULIN

ness. For example, the exploitation of the work­

ing people and mass unemployment are quite
justified from the point of view of the bourgeoisie,
but a crime from that of the proletariat. On the
other hand, the struggle for the interests of the
working people, for the abolition of exploitation
and for the establishment of the new socialist so­
ciety is just from the point of view of the prole­
tariat, while the bourgeoisie considers it a crime.
It is the legal views of the ruling class that dom­
inate in society. These views are entirely per­
meated by class interests and express attempts
to establish a legal order to the liking and advan­
tage of the ruling class. A legal order is nothing
more than an order of human relationships in so­
ciety, expressed and consolidated in laws and re­
gulations, whose totality constitutes the law of the
given society.
Though in a class society each class has its own
legal views, the law in a society is one and bind­
ing for all classes and for all members of society.
For the law to be observed by all, both those in
whose interests it is enacted and those against
whom it is aimed-it is enforced by the state and
the state power. "For law," Lenin wrote, "is no­
thing without an apparatus capable of enforcing
the observance of the standards of law."1 This
shows that the state and law are inseparable-
they emerged at the same time and always exist
together.
As distinct from customs and moral rules, which

1 V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 25, p. 471.

 SOCIAL CONSCIOUSNESS AND ITS FORMS 447

come into existence spontaneously, without any

state form of codification or endorsement, legal
rules must be endorsed by the will of the state
and by the conscious activity of government.
These rules are established or sanctioned by the
state and are expressed in a special form-in the
form of a law.
Taking all this into account, law may be de­
fined as the totality ot rules for people's beha­
viour in society which express the will of the rul­
ing class and which are established or sanctioned
by the state with the aim of safeguarding, conso­
lidating and developing the social relations and
public order advantageous to the ruling class.
The exploiting classes have always endeavoured
to prove the non-class nature of law and legal
order. In feudal society, the legend of the divine
origin of law and of the sanctity and immutability
of the existing legal order was widely circulated.
Bourgeois ideologists stripped law of its divine
halo and produced mundane reasons for its ori­
gin, but both they and their revisionist henchmen
allege that law is above class and that it equally
expresses and protects the interests of all classes,
i.e. of the working people and the bourgeoisie
alike. Reality, however, testifies to the contrary­
bourgeois law serves the exploiters by expressing
their interests and will, and is directed against
the working people. Bourgeois law safeguards, in
particular, private ownership of the means of
production and legalises the exploitation of man
by man, as well as the oppression and plunder of
the workers.
448 A. P. SHEPTULIN

As a reflection of surrounding reality and under

the influence of Marxist ideology, the proletariat
and the non-proletarian working masses form
their own legal consciousness, which radically
differs from that of the bourgeoisie. The working
people begin to realise that the legality existing
in bourgeois society protects the interests of the
bourgeoisie and is directed against them.
Since the bourgeois legal system is geared to
establish a public order to the liking and advan­
tage of the ruling class, i.e. the bourgeoisie, and,
in the first place, to safeguard private property,
it is demolished in the course of the socialist rev­
olution. "The era of utilising the legality creat­
ed by the bourgeoisie," Lenin wrote, "is giving
way to an era of tremendous revolutionary bat­
tles, and these battles, in effect, will be the destruc­
tion of all bourgeois legality, the whole bourgeois
system.. ."*
The proletarian state which comes into being
as the result of the socialist revolution replaces
the demolished bourgeois legality and law with
its own socialist legal order and socialist law cor­
responding to the legal consciousness of the work­
ing people.
Will socialist legality survive under commu­
nism? The future of socialist legality is intimately
linked with that of the socialist state, for law ii
nothing without an apparatus to enforce it, fee*
without a state. As for the state, it will, of course,
wither away when society develops into a full
. . J.:. Zo-’ - .r.jmx IJ ,
1 V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 16, p.
 SOCIAL CONSCIOUSNESS AND ITS FORMS 449

communist system (provided there are no capita­

list states left by that time). It will be replaced by
organs of public self-government which will
have no machinery of coercion at their disposal
and which will rely entirely on moral public
authority.
The abolition of the state will bring in the era
of the abolition of law and legal consciousness,
but this does not mean that, in communist society,
there will be no social rules of human behaviour
or views for explaining and evaluating these
rules. Certain social rules will remain to regulate
the relations among the members of society who
are sure to observe them consciously and of their
own free will. All these rules will, however, lose
their legal character, since they will not require any
protection from a special apparatus of coercion.
The sole guarantee of their enforcement will be
public opinion. This being so, they will not be
treated as legal rules but rather as moral rules
or customs, and will therefore, be associated not
with legal but with moral consciousness.

7. Morality
a) The Essence of Morality

Man cannot exist outside society and the human

collective which always places certain obligations
on the behaviour of its members, so his actions
should conform to the interests of society, which
reserves judgement as to whether they are good
or bad, justified or not.
29—1557
450 A. P. SHEPTULIN

The views current in society oi people's actions,

evaluating them as their being either good or bad,
justified or unjustified, honest or dishonest, are
known as moral views.
Moral views are codified and embodied in cer­
tain rules and standards of human behaviour
which people observe in their relations. The to­
tality of moral standards constitutes the morality
of a society.
Thus, morality is a collection of standards and
rules of human behaviour in society at a given
stage of its development, expressing society's
views (or those of some class) concerning human
actions from the point of view of good or evil,
justice or injustice, honesty or dishonesty.
In addition to moral standards, there are, of
course, certain legal rules operating in society
which, like the former, regulate human behaviour.
Moral standards, however, differ drastically from
legal ones, notably in that legal rules rest on state
coercion. If some member of society refuses to
observe a certain legal rule, the organs of power
will force him to do so. Moral standards, how­
ever, do not have such a binding force. They are
only backed by the force of public opinion and
collective disapproval. Furthermore, while legal
rules are established by the state and assume the
form of a law, moral standards are established
by society or a class by generalising the practice
of human relations as well as people's notions of
good, evil, justice, injustice and the moral ideal,
which arise under the direct influence of the ma­
terial conditions of life.
 SOCIAL CONSCIOUSNESS AND ITS FORMS 451

b) The Origins of Morality

Idealists hold that morality originated from con­

sciousness, from a spiritual source. The ancient
Greek philosopher Plato associated morality with
the “idea of good", which is beyond human con­
sciousness, while Kant related it to the outside
world. There are also numerous attempts to trace
morality from man's biological nature and, in par­
ticular, from instincts-a mother's protection of
her offspring, the tribal instinct and that of mu­
tual assistance. "Morality is not typical of man­
kind only, it exists among animals also and only
expresses the social instinct."1
Some sociologists trace the origin of morality
to the so-called eternal and unchanging qualities
of man's nature-pugnacity or disposition towards
good, etc.
Marxism has been the first to provide a truly
scientific explanation of the origins and essence
of morality based on the materialistic understand­
ing of history.
Morality is a social phenomenon. It arises and
exists only in society on the basis of joint produc­
tion activity in the course of which the need emer­
ges for regulating the relations between the indi­
vidual and the collective, for defining the obliga­
tions of each member of the collective and the
measure of punishment for shirking. It was peo­
ple's joint labour activity that necessitated the co-

1 Karl Kautsky, Die materialistische Geschichtsauft-

assung, Erster Band, 1929, Brl., S. 440.
29*
452 A. P. SHEPTULIN

ordination of the actions of the individual with

those of the collective, and of personal with com­
mon interests. It also helped formulate definite
notions concerning everyone's responsibilities to
the collective and judgements of people's beha­
viour.
Initially people's notions of good and bad, just
and unjust, and the corresponding standards of be­
haviour constituted the only regulators of social
intercourse. Later customs and legal rules appeared
in addition to moral standards.
Stressing the link between morality and peo­
ple's production activity, Engels wrote: . .men,
consciously or unconsciously, derive their ethical
ideas in the last resort from the practical relations
on which their class position is based-from the
economic relations in which they carry on produc­
tion and exchange."1
But if morality is brought into being by peo­
ple's material conditions and their economic rela­
tions and also reflects these relations, it cannot be
eternal and should change along with the changes
in these conditions and economic relations.
For example, in the initial stages of human so­
ciety, when the level of development of the pro­
ductive forces was extremely low and man was
still unable to produce enough for his own sub­
sistence, it was considered moral to slay old peo­
ple who could not maintain themselves. Later on,
however, when the material conditions of life
changed and the productive forces developed.

1 F. Engels, Anti-Diihring, p. 114.

 SOCIAL CONSCIOUSNESS AND ITS FORMS 453

enabling people to produce a surplus product not

vitally essential for the direct producer's existence
people began to consider such actions immo­
ral. Concern and respect for old people were now
considered moral.

c) The Class Nature of Morality

When society became divided into classes dras­

tic changes took place in morality. In the past
morality had been the same for all members of
society, but now this uniformity disappeared. Each
class developed its own moral standards, its own
morality. This is not accidental, since morality de­
pends on the people's material conditions of life,
and since the antagonistic classes have diametri­
cally opposite conditions of life in a class society
it is only natural that these classes should have
differing ideas of good and bad, justice and injus­
tice, and that they should be guided by quite dif­
ferent social principles.
It is always the moral views and the corres­
ponding morality expressing the interests of the
ruling class that hold sway in society. The ruling
class seeks to make its moral views and corres­
ponding standards binding for the entire society,
but since moral standards are not backed by the
force of state coercion, as is the case with law,
the working people's public opinion neither re­
cognizes these standards as moral, nor observes
them; it disregards the public opinion of the ex­
ploiters. With their growing class consciousness,
the working people acquire their own moral views
454 A. P. SHEPTULIN

and moral principles, which are directly opposite

to those of the ruling bourgeois class.
In capitalist society, for example, the morality
of the capitalists, the bourgeois morality, predo­
minates. Private ownership of the means of pro­
duction serves as the economic foundation of this
morality. Yet in the view of the Russian proleta­
rian writer Maxim Gorky, private ownership dis­
unites people, arms them against one another,
creates an irreconcilable clash of interests, lies to
conceal or justify this clash and corrupts every?
body with a torrent of slander, hypocrisy and ma­
lice.
The principle of sale and purchase dominates
in bourgeois society. Everything is a commodity.
Not only consumer goods can be bought, but also
people, their blood and conscience. Money becomes
the main criterion of human relations. Those who
have money, no matter how they acquired it, are
considered honest and enjoy respect. In his pur?
suit of profit, the bourgeois would flout moral
standards and would commit crime.
Bourgeois morality fosters egoism and in?
dividualism. “Man unto man is a wolf", "self
comes first", "charity begins at home", "every­
body for himself", "only God cares for every?
body"-such are the principles of bourgeois mo?
rality.
But apart from bourgeois morality, a new higher
morality emerges in bourgeois society, the
morality of the progressive class called upon to
liberate mankind from poverty and exploitation.
This is the morality of the proletariat. J
 SOCIAL CONSCIOUSNESS AND ITS FORMS 455

It takes shape as the proletariat joins battle

against the exploiters and as soon as it develops
a class consciousness. Mikhail Kalinin, a promi­
nent Soviet public and political figure, wrote that
proletarian morality took shape in work-in fac­
tories and workshops.
The principles of the proletarian morality are
directly opposite to those of the bourgeoisie.
Whereas bourgeois morality rests on individual­
ism, egoism and a disregard for society and the
collective, proletarian ethics is based on collec­
tivism and comradely mutual assistance.
Characterising the revolutionary workers, Marx
wrote: ".. .Brotherhood among people is not an
empty phrase for them—it is the truth; and the
whole beauty of humanity looks at us from their
work-roughened faces."1
In capitalist society the word "comrade" sounds
as a call for unity in the struggle against the op­
pressors, and is a symbol of proletarian power,
the organisation and unity of its ranks.
The sense of comradeship becomes especially
pronounced after the overthrow of the exploiters,
the establishment of the dictatorship of the prole­
tariat and of socialist ownership of the means of
production which, in contrast to private owner­
ship that rouses hatred among people, unites peo­
ple, and stirs and develops this sense of comrade­
ship.
Proletarian morality, being the morality of a

1 K. Marx, and F. Engels, Selected Works, Vol. 3,

Moscow, 1930, p. 661 (in Russian).
456 A. P. SHEPTULIN

class, is, at the same time, the morality of all

working people. This is because in its struggle
against the exploiters the proletariat defends not
only its own interests, but also those of the en­
tire nation, inasmuch as it wages a struggle not
only for its own liberation from the capitalist
yoke, but also for that of all working people. So
during the building of communism, the morality
of the working class becomes gradually trans­
formed into a communist morality, which expresses
the interests of all working people.
By communist morality we mean everything
that "serves to destroy the old exploiting society
and to unite all the working people around the
proletariat, which is building up a new, a com­
munist society."1
Communist morality is thus subordinated to
"the interests of the proletariat's class strug­
gle."2 "Communist morality is based on the strug­
gle for the consolidation and completion of com­
munism."3
Communist morality, besides the principles of
collectivism and comradeship already mentioned
includes certain other principles and rules. These
are loyalty to the cause of communism; affection
for the socialist motherland; honest labour for
the sake of society; protection and accumulation
of socialist wealth; awareness of social duty and
intolerance of infringements on social interests;

1 V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol, 31, p. 293.

2 Ibid., p. 291.
3 Ibid., p. 295.
 SOCIAL CONSCIOUSNESS AND ITS FORMS 457

humane relations and mutual respect; honesty and

truthfulness, simplicity and modesty in public and
private life; mutual respect in the family and con­
cern for the upbringing of children; intolerance
of national and racial hostility; irreconcilable atti­
tude towards enemies of communism, of peace
and the freedom of nations; fraternal solidarity
with the working people af all countries, with
all nations of the world.
Communist morality takes shape and consoli­
dates itself in the fight against bourgeois morali­
ty, against the vestiges of the past in people's
consciousness and actions. "The higher the level
of our society in its development," it was stated
at the 25th CPSU Congress, "the more intolerable
are the still occurring departures from the social­
ist rules of morality."1

d) Elements of the Universal in Morality

Despite its class nature, morality includes

standards of behaviour that are common to dif­
ferent classes and different epochs, and are of a uni­
versal human nature. The presence of such stan­
dards is explained by the fact that any people's
collective requires that all members of society
should observe certain elementary rules of be­
haviour without which the existence of human so­
ciety is inconceivable. Among such standards are

1 L. I. Brezhnev, Report of the CPSU Central Com­

mittee and the Immediate Tasks of the Party in Home
and Foreign Policy. XXVth Congress of the CPSU, p. 94.
458 A. P. SHEPTULIN

the parents' concern for children and the chil­

dren's affection for their parents, respect for old
people, politeness, modesty, keeping one's word,
and standards condemning hooliganism, rape, and
so forth.
These universal moral standards should not be
considered in isolation from their historical con­
text. Like the principles that express the interests
of a particular class, iniversal ethical norms are
also an outcome of social development. Having
arisen in the remote past, they are passed down
from generation to generation, taking on a richer
form. Different epochs create different conditions
for the universal moral standards. Though in ori­
gin they are not associated with classes, the rela­
tions dominating in a class society leave a defi­
nite imprint on them, and in this way change them
in one direction or another. For example, the lust
of enrichment, a permanent feature of the exploit­
ers, and the constant want of the working people,
have often led to distortions and violations of the
elementary rules of human behaviour. ".. .The
fundamental social cause of excesses, which con­
sist in the violation of the rules of social inter­
course, is the exploitation of the people, their
want and their poverty", Lenin wrote.1
Only in a classless society, with new comrade­
ly relations among all its members, can there be
conditions for the observance of these rules of
behaviour. And though in contemporary socialist
society an apparatus of coercion is required to

1 V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 25, p. 464.

 SOCIAL CONSCIOUSNESS AND ITS FORMS 459

ensure their observance, with the transition to

communism the basic rules of social behaviour
will be observed by all people without any coer­
cion: their observance will become a habit. Thus,
with the establishment of socialist and, later, of
communist society, the sphere of universal as­
pects in morality widens.

e) The Criterion of the Truth in Morality

Since in society classes have different views

concerning good, evil, justice and injustice, i.e.
different and even directly opposite moral stan­
dards, the question naturally arises as to which of
these views and moral standards are true and
what is the criterion for the moral truth.
There are many points of view on this problem,
but for bourgeois sociologists the one common
feature is that all of them, as a rule, reject ob­
jective criteria of morality.
The moral relativists claim that it is impossible
to establish any reliable criteria for drawing a de­
marcation line between moral and immoral. "To
define the correctness of actions," Hellmuth Stofer
writes, "one last and decisive argument is mis­
sing. ... The obligation . .. rests empirically bn
multifarious commandments and prohibitions,
whereas the correctness of the ideals, taken as
a criterion, represents no more than a supposi­
tion."1

1 Hellmuth Stofer, Uber das ethische Werturteil, 1955,

Basel, S. 25, 157.
460 A. P. SHEPTULIN

The positivists also reject objective criteria for

the evaluation of ethical views. In their opinion,
the notions of good, evil, better and worse are
simply designed to express the fact that a cer­
tain individual considers the given action to be
such. The opinion of that individual is not, how­
ever, binding for other people who may have
their own and differing opinions on this score. It
is thus simply impossible to establish which of
these opinions is true.
Cassius Keyser's viewpoint is a relevant exam­
ple. He writes: "Ethics has its roots in certain
sentiments. What the sentiments are is indicated
by such terms as right, wrong, good, bad, better,
worse, evil, duty, obligation, ought, ought not.
Like everything else, the ethical sentiments are
what they are. Wherever they occur, whenever
they occur, they occur as facts, as facts of na­
ture. . .",l i.e. as strictly individual phenomena.
They are erratic and fragmentary. They differ
with various individuals and at different times,
they depend on the circumstances and time. Be­
cause of this, he continues, the rules engendered
by ethical opinions and the views associated
with these rules are also different and subject to
change.
Keyser holds that all moral principles and views
must be grouped so that each group includes only
those that do not contradict each other. There will
then be as many moral systems as there are groups.

1 Cassius Jackson Keyser, The Collected Works, Vol. II,

N. Y., 1952, p. 242.
 SOCIAL CONSCIOUSNESS AND ITS FORMS 461

According to Keyser, as many moral systems can

be built as there are different opinions among
people, but since their number is infinitely large,
so is that of morals.
Each of these systems, Keyser claims, will re­
flect the ethical opinion of some man and on this
strength it is true, since it records an actual fact
of reality.
Keyser fully ignores the fact that, despite dif­
ferences in moral judgements between some peo­
ple, there is something common in them, which
is determined by the position these people occu­
py in society and in the production of material
goods. This common element in evaluating a phe­
nomenon assumes the form of a system of moral
principles recognised by all members of the group,
say, the representatives of one class, though some
members of the group will certainly evaluate this
phenomenon differently. Individual ethical views
will also occur, but neither these variations nor
the individual approach in evaluating phenomena
in the least preclude the existence of an ethical sy­
stem common for the representatives of the class.
This system will exist and hew its way forward as
a general trend through all these many variations.
Thus, we see that idealist philosophy, while
speculating on the individual nature of people's
ethical views, rejects the common nature of mo­
ral standards for social groups and, at the same
time, the objective criterion of morality.
So how is the question concerning the crite­
rion of morality and the truth of moral stan­
dards solved?
462 A. P. SHEPTULIN

The morality of each epoch and of each class

reflects the material conditions of life and the
economic situation of people. It is this that de­
termines the historically relatively changing na­
ture of moral views and standards. Similar to
the development of the material conditions of hu­
man life, objective progress may also be ob­
served in the realm of morality. Marxism solves
the question concerning the truth of morality with
respect to this progressive development of so­
ciety. A morality that to the maximum extent con­
forms to the progressive advancement of society,
while safeguarding the future and reflecting the
tasks of society's progressive development, is the
truer morality. And only the proletarian commit
nist morality can be such a morality. On the issue
of which form of morality in capitalist society is
the true one, Engels writes: ".. .The maximum ele­
ments promising permanence which, in the pre­
sent, represents the overthrow of the present,
represents the future, and that is proletarian mo­
rality."1

8. The Arts
a) The Specifics of Art
as a Form of Social Consciousness

Art, which represents one of the major forms

of social consciousness, plays a big part in the
spiritual development of society.
Some contemporary bourgeois aestheticians
1 F. Engels, Anti-Diihring, pp. 113-14.
 SOCIAL CONSCIOUSNESS AND ITS FORMS 463

claim that art is a means of people's self-improve­

ment. According to this theory, anyone who prac­
tices art improves himself to the extent of his ca­
pacities, which are manifested outside his self in
the works of art he has created. There arises, as it
were, a competition between people in spiritual
self-improvement which, in the end, leads to the
development of people's spiritual life. As we see,
works of art are said to be created not to meet a
specific social requirement, but to take a step for­
ward in self-improvement.
There is little doubt that in creating a work of
art the artist improves himself and his artistic
skill, thus developing and enriching his spiritual
life. But is this really the essence of art as a so­
cial phenomenon? Of course not. Art, being a so­
cial phenomenon, emerged and developed in res­
ponse to the requirement that had arisen among
people to derive aesthetic pleasure. Artists, there­
fore, create their works not for themselves or their
own self-improvement, but for other people. The
fact of self-improvement while creating works
of art is not at all decisive, since self-improvement
also takes place in the course of scientific research,
during the process of teaching and in the course
of many other social functions.
Some bourgeois students of aesthetics maintain
that the specific features of art are that art, being
subjective in nature, presupposes "concrete and
direct acquaintance with the values of experi­
ence", while science, which reflects precisely
measurable aspects and relations may be treated as
"objective."
464 A. P. SHEPTULIN

The fallacy of this is evident: the difference

between art and science lies not in that the latter
reflects the objective truth while the former does
not, but rather in the different way in which they
reflect it. To create a work of art a "concrete and
direct acquaintance with the values of experience"
alone is not at all sufficient. For this one needs
a logical understanding of this experience, an in­
sight into the nature of perceived objects and
events and a knowledge of their essence.
The specific features of art as a form of social
consciousness are determined by its subject-mat­
ter and the artistic form of reflection of reality and
the functions performed by it in society.
The subject-matter of art is extensive. It covers
all the areas of people's life and activity. Reflect­
ing some side of reality, art, in contrast to science
where cognition is aimed at reflecting the objective
characteristics of an object or reality, reflects the
object in terms of its relation to the subject. Besi­
des, art reproduces not only the qualities of the
object, but also the subject's emotional response to
these qualities.
The specifics of an object reflected in art deter­
mine the specifics of the form of reflection, i.e. of
an artistic image whose content represents a reflec­
tion of reality and its assessment by the artist, in­
cluding information about the world at large, about
the artist himself who is cognising the world, and
about his feelings, thoughts, desires, and so forth.
In contrast to science, where reflection takes the
form of concepts, i.e. general ideal notions rep­
roducing in people's consciousness the requisite as­
 SOCIAL CONSCIOUSNESS AND ITS FORMS 465

pects and relationships of the object under study,

in art these are reflected in a concrete-emotional
and visual-imaginative form, i.e. in the form of a
unique and non-reproducible phenomenon. While
focusing attention on certain aspects of the depict­
ed phenomenon, the artist expresses its essence,
intrinsic regularities and development trends, as
well as assesses it in conformity with his world
outlook.
Art is peculiar in that it incorporates the unity
of reflection of reality and the practical creation
of the aesthetic values that embody the aesthetic
ideals of society. The unity of these aspects is gra­
phically reflected in an artistic image, which consti­
tutes both a form of artistic cognition and an embo­
died outcome of creative activity-artistic practice.
An artistic image is created through its embodi­
ment in the material means available to a partic­
ular kind of art (form, colour, line, sound, move­
ment, and the like.) An artistic image thus acquires
a concrete and imaginative objectivity and be­
comes knowable.
But it is the ideological and emotional content
that is of paramount importance for a work of art.
Art primarily represents the realm of the produc­
tion of spiritual values.

b) The Social Functions of Art

Art is an ancient form of social consciousness.

It has its history and its logic of development,
determined by the general laws of society's devel­
opment. Like any other form of social being, it
30—1557
466 A. P. SHEPTULIN

reflects the trends in people's changing material

conditions of life and the requirements of histori­
cal progress.
Representing both the aesthetic apprehension of
reality and its creative transformation, art was in
its earliest stage directly linked with the labour
and everyday life of primitive man and his com­
munity.
What compelled primitive man, who "was ab­
solutely crushed by the burden of existence, by the
difficulties of the struggle against Nature,"1 to prac­
tice art? The social impulse that engendered the
aesthetic reproduction of reality and aesthetic ac­
tivity was related to man's wish of knowing the
world, comprehending his place in it and trans­
forming it. It was a human need to influence and
transform nature in conformity with society's re­
quirements, which acted as the impelling force of
cognition. For his normal functioning and the de­
velopment of his productive activity, man needed
knowledge of many objects and phenomena: the
habits of animals, the structure of their bodies, the
properties of trees, rocks and the soil, as well
as of the recurrent natural phenomena-the seasons
for hunting, fishing and farming. Due to the fact
that the intellectual activity of primitive man was
united with his labour activity through actions in­
volving emotions and concrete objects and phe­
nomena, knowledge assumed an artistic and imagi­
native form presupposing a definite unity of the
subject and object. The accumulated emotional ex­

1 V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 5, p. 111.

 SOCIAL CONSCIOUSNESS AND ITS FORMS 467

perience of primitive man was embodied and un­

derstood in artistic images. The graffiti usually de­
picting animals, testify to our ancestors' keen pow­
er of observation and ability accurately to depict
the postures, movements and powers of wild ani­
mals. They prove that primitive man knew his
"models" well.
At these initial stages of social development
artistic and imaginative comprehension of the
world permeated all aspects of labour. The prepa­
rations for a labour process (hunting or sowing)
or a military attack gave rise to creative activity.
The latter was very effective since it included the
elements of rehearsal for the main event (songs,
dances and sketches of hunting, farming and other
scenes), as well as psychological training of the
members of the tribe.
As production developed further and the social
division of labour increased, art became separated
from practical material activities and grew into
a specific field of creative activity. At the same
time, a small group of people appeared who
began specialising in this field. The other part of
society was entirely preoccupied with the produc­
tion of material goods for those who, enjoying a
dominant position in society, acquired the right to
practice art.
Even after art separated from production activ­
ities and became an independent form of spiritual
creativity, it did not lose its links with people's
material life, and in its contents and development
trends reflected the changes taking place in eco­
nomic relations.
30*
468 A. P. SHEPTULIN

"Sancho," Marx and Engels wrote, "imagines

that Raphael produced his pictures independently
of the division of labour that existed in Rome at
the time. .. Raphael as much as any other artist
was determined by the technical advances in art
made before him, by the organisation of society
and the division of labour in his locality, and,
finally, by the division of labour in all the
countries with which his locality had inter­
course."1
As dictinct from such forms of social conscious­
ness as politics or law, art is not directly connect­
ed with the economic basis. Its links with the eco­
nomy are mediated by many factors, including po­
litics, law and morality.
Not the economic basis alone influences the de­
velopment of art. There are other contributing fac­
tors, including the level of development of socie­
ty's political and spiritual life and the peculiari­
ties of the class struggle in the respective histori­
cal stage. This is the main reason why a peak in
the development of art does not always coincide
with economic growth, but may occur at a time of
acute economic depression. A case in point is
nineteenth-century Russian art, which exemplifies
the relative independence typical of social consci­
ousness in general.
Art performs a number of functions in society,
the main one being to meet society's aesthetic re­
quirements. Art's ability to do so constitutes its aes­

1 K. Marx and F. Engels, The German Ideology,

pp. 441-42.
•O'.
 SOCIAL CONSCIOUSNESS AND ITS FORMS 469

thetic nature-an important feature which sets art

apart from other social phenomena.
While noting the ability to meet people's aes­
thetic requirements as a specific function of art, we
should remember that this is not its sole function.
Art also performs a number of other important
functions, such as being a means or a form of
knowing reality. Besides, it helps to educate
people and foster definite moral, political, philo­
sophical and other principles.
Works of art express the complexity of people's
feelings and ideals relative to a definite epoch and
embody the main trends of the social ideology and
psychology of the given historical period. They
reflect society's most burning problems. This, in
fact, is one of the manifestations of the social char­
acter of art. It always serves the society concerned
and reflects life from the viewpoint of the
ideals and interests of specific social groups and
classes, which is why art is always partisan in a
class society. While formulating the principle of
the partisanship of art, Lenin stressed that prole­
tarian art should serve the cause of emancipating
the working people from exploitation and of build­
ing a classless communist society. The writing of
fiction, he pointed out, "cannot, in fact, be an indi­
vidual undertaking, independent of the common
cause of the proletariat."1 Discussing the specific
features of art, Lenin stressed that it does not yield
to mechanical pressure and egalitarianism. Here,
he wrote, "there is no question, either, that in this

1 V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol, 10, p. 45.

470 A. P. SHEPTULIN

field greater scope must undoubtedly be allowed

for personal initiative, individual inclination,
thought and fantasy, form and content.”1
Art is one of the effective means designed by
society to promote the realisation of its tasks.
It is not by chance that the CPSU and the Soviet
Government attach so much importance to art in
the communist education of Soviet people. Basing
itself on the principle of socialist realism, which,
besides a true reflection of reality from a critical
point of view, presupposes the promotion of the
best ways for change (which is a characteristic
feature of this principle), Soviet art brings to light
the contradictions that develop in the course of
building communism and promotes their speedy
resolution. By depicting the future, Soviet art cul­
tivates among Soviet people the traits that man
will have in communist society.
Works of art depict people by demonstrating
their way of life and exposing their characters and
their inner world. Through his characters, the artist
teaches people how to treat certain social pheno­
mena, what people to imitate and what people to
oppose, how to behave under specific circumstan­
ces and which causes to espouse.9

9. Religion
a) Origins and Essence of Religion

Religion is a iantastic and illusory reflection in

people's consciousness of the outside forces domi-
1 V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 10, p. 46.
 SOCIAL CONSCIOUSNESS AND ITS FORMS 471

nating them in everyday life. In this reflection,

earthly forces assume the form of supernatural
ones. Religion is associated with belief in deities
and the performance of rites.
Religion emerged in the first stages of the for­
mation of human society, when, due to the low
level of development of the productive forces, man
was helpless in his struggle against the sponta­
neous forces of nature. The dependence on spon­
taneous forces and the lack of knowledge of their
causes conditioned man's deification of these
forces and the appearance of the belief that dei­
ties engender and control these forces.
Later on, when society became divided into
classes and some sections of society began to
exploit others, people came under the spell of the
spontaneous forces of society which began causing
the working people ".. .the most horrible suffering
and the most savage torment, a thousand times
more severe than those inflicted by extraordinary
events. . Z'1 This was a second, additional cause of
religion and an object of religious reflection. "In
the beginnings of history", Engels wrote, "it was
the forces of nature which were first so [religi-
ously-Ed] reflected.. .. But it is not long before,
side by side with the forces of nature, social forces
begin to be active-forces which confront man
as equally alien and at first equally inexplicable,
dominating him with the same apparent natural
necessity as the forces of nature themselves. The
fantastic figures, which at first only reflected the

1 V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 15, p. 406.

472 A. P. SHEPTULIN

mysterious forces of nature, at this point acquire

social attributes, become representatives of the
forces of history."1
In bourgeois society, capital is this additional
spontaneous force, opposed to man and dominat­
ing him; it constantly threatens the worker and
petty trader with "sudden", "unexpected" and
"accidental" ruin, which would turn him into a
pauper. In capitalist society the fear of losing his
job and hence all means of subsistence never
leaves the worker.
Apprehensions concerning the future and a
feeling of insecurity brought about by people's
helplessness vis-a-vis the spontaneous forces of
capital inevitably lead people to religion, reinforce
and develop their religious feelings.

b) The Class Nature o£ Religion

In antagonistic societies religion serves the ex­

ploiters. Besides the state which establishes the
order conforming to the interests of the exploiters
and suppresses any resistance on the part of the
exploited, the exploiters need means for spiri­
tually enslaving the working people in order to
retain supremacy. It is this function which religion
is called upon to fulfil. "All oppressing classes,"
Lenin wrote, "stand in need of two social functions
to safeguard their rule: the function of the hang­
man and the function of the priest. The hangman
is required to quell the protests and the indigna­

1 F. Engels, Anti-Duhring, pp. 374-75.

 SOCIAL CONSCIOUSNESS AND ITS FORMS 473

tion of the oppressed; the priest is required to con­

sole the oppressed, to depict to them the prospects
of their sufferings and sacrifices being mitigat­
ed .. . while preserving class rule, and thereby to
reconcile them to class rule, win them away from
revolutionary action, undermine their revolutio­
nary spirit and destroy their revolutionary de­
termination."1
Religion justifies exploitation and the existence
of the classes of oppressors and oppressed; it
pleads for obedience to the authority by stressing
that every kind of authority originates in God; it
teaches people humility and calls on them to bear
the earthly burden patiently, no matter how heavy
it is, since it is sent by the Almighty to redeem
their sins.
Exposing the reactionary essence of Christiani­
ty, Marx wrote: "The social principles of Chris­
tianity justified the slavery of antiquity, glorified
the serfdom of the Middle Ages and are capable,
in case of need, of defending the oppression of
the proletariat. . ."2
To compensate for people's sufferings and
privations, religion promises them the divine
reward of eternal bliss in "the other world", i.e.
after death. It alleges that in "the other world", the
exploiters and exploited would change places;
the former would be eternally tormented while
the latter would live in paradise.

1 V. I. Lenin, Collected. Works, Vol. 21, pp. 231-32.

2 K. Marx and F. Engels, Collected Works, Vol. 6,
p. 231.
474 A. P. SHEPTULIN

Religion distracts the working people from

the pressing problems of reality, from the strug­
gle for emancipation and for conditions worthy
of man.

c) The Abolition of the Social Base

of Religion Under Socialism

By sweeping out capitalist production relations

and the corresponding bourgeois superstructure in
the course of the socialist revolution, the proletar­
iat also rejects religion and wins for itself a
better life on earth.1
A radical improvement in the people's social
life is brought about by the abolition of the private
ownership of the means of production and by
the elimination of the economic and political do­
mination of the last exploiting class (the bourge­
oisie) and with it the elimination of exploitation of
man by man. A radical change occurs in the life of
society. With the establishment of socialist owner­
ship of the means of production, the conditions of
life which dominated people in the past come
under their power and control.
The laws governing their social actions, which
opposed them as alien, objective and spontaneous
in the past, are presently used by them with
knowledge and skill. From this moment on, people
begin to create their history consciously.2 All
this undermines the social roots of religion and
creates the conditions necessary for it to disappear.
1 See V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 10, p. 84.
2 See F. Engels, Anti-Duhring, pp. 337-38.
 SOCIAL CONSCIOUSNESS AND ITS FORMS 475

Religion does not, however, disappear immedi­

ately once socialist society has been built. It con­
tinues to exist for quite a long time under social­
ism. In contrast to the exploiting society, how­
ever, where religion is an inevitable product of
the contradictions in people's social being and
the material conditions of their life, religion in
socialist society mainly represents a vestige of the
past, for the changes in people's social being are
not immediately matched by changes in their con­
sciousness. Old ideas and views survive for some
time in the form of traditions and customs, even
under conditions of the changed social being. This
is why religious views survive in socialist so­
ciety.
The survival of these views is undoubtedly en­
couraged by the influence of capitalist countries,
where religion and the church occupy a dominant
position, as well as by all sorts of natural calami­
ties and personal tragedies.

10. Science
a) The Essence of Science

Science is a major form of social consiousness,

representing the aggregate or system oi people's
knowledge of nature, society and thinking. Its main
objective and social function lies in cognising real­
ity and in discovering the laws governing its func­
tioning and development.
Science reflects the world and records phenome­
na cognised in the form of notions, judgements.
476 A. P. SHEPTULIN

opinions, theories and so forth. Besides notions,

judgements and theories that have been proved
in practice and have acquired the meaning of the
objective truth constituting the main content of
science, it also includes certain factual data and
scientific information as well as scientific hypothe­
ses.
Science reflects nature and the life of society.
In this connection all the concrete sciences are
grouped into natural and social sciences. Natural
sciences deal with the law-governed properties and
connections (laws) of animate and inanimate na­
ture. Social sciences study various aspects of the
life of society, as well as the laws governing the
functioning and development of the social organ­
ism.
The social sciences that study society and so­
cial relations are closely connected with classes
and the class struggle. For this reason, they merge
with the ideology that reflects the social being of
people through the prism of the interests of a
specific class.
The natural sciences are not directly connected
with relations among social groups or with the class
struggle. They are linked with classes through
production, which they serve and on whose basis
they develop.

b) The Connection Between Science and Production

By discovering the laws governing the interrela­

tionship and development of the objects and phe­
 SOCIAL CONSCIOUSNESS AND ITS FORMS 477

nomena of the external world, science provides

production with the data it requires to purposefully
change some aspects of nature and create the
material wealth needed by man. This proves that
science exerts a strong influence on the develop­
ment of production, but the inverse influence, that
of production on science, is much stronger.
This influence is effected along the following
lines:
(1) Production sets science the task of investi­
gating certain phenomena that are required for its
development. It is production's need for certain
information on the external world, in order for
it to function and develop normally, that gave rise
to the sciences and helped them to progress.
For example, arithmetic and geometry appeared
in the remote past in response to people's need to
measure areas of land more or less accurately.
Mechanics emerged in order to create devices for
hoisting heavy objects and for pumping water out
of pits. Electrical engineering began to develop
rapidly when people discovered the possibility of
using electricity in production. Physiology, biology
and other sciences dealing with the laws govern­
ing the functioning and development of animals
and plants came into being in response to the
requirements of farming, and so on.
(2) Production provides science with the instru­
ments, tools and technical equipment required for
scientific research and experiments. Nowadays, the
interrelationship between science and technology,
and the former's dependence on the latter are es­
pecially pronounced. Today science cannot develop
478 A. P. SHEPTULIN

successfully without, for example, a charged par­

ticle accelerator designed for studying the struc­
ture of nuclei, without electronic ultramicroscopes,
computers, etc.
(3) Another way in which production exerts
influence upon science is that it provides conside­
rable factual data which science studies theoreti­
cally, generalises and on whose basis (plus, of
course, the findings received by scientists in the
course of their research) it creates scientific theo­
ries and discovers new laws.
The dependence of science on production is not
absolute. Science, like any other form of social
consciousness, possesses a certain independence
which, in particular, manifests itself in science's
reposing not only on the state of production,
but also on previous achievements in some field
of knowledge, i.e. on the stage that science has
reached in its development, and on the concrete
resolution of its intrinsic problems. For instance,
the nuclear theory emerged not while production
problems were being solved, but rather as a solu­
tion so specific problems of physics. Radar and
television originated in the same way.
For this reason, the level of development of
science does not always correspond to that of pro­
duction. Science may develop faster than the re­
quirement of some industry or may lag behind
them.
This proves that, besides the law that the devel­
opment of science depends on production, science
has its own laws of development, in particular that
of succession, which stipulates that scientific pro­
 SOCIAL CONSCIOUSNESS AND ITS FORMS 479

gress always directly depends on the mass of

knowledge inherited from the previous genera­
tions.
c) The Interrelationships Between Science,
the Basis and the Superstructure

Being one of the major forms of social con­

sciousness, science occupies a position of its own
and differs radically from other forms of social
consciousness. This difference is mainly manifest­
ed in its relations with the superstructure. All other
forms of social consciousness, such as political
ideology, juridical, moral, aesthetic and religious
views, constitute a part of superstructural phenom­
ena. The situation is different as far as the rela­
tions between science and the superstructure are
concerned. This, admittedly, is still a controversial
issue. Some scholars consider science part of the
superstructure, while many others do not. There
are also some who refer only social sciences and
the fundamental conclusions of natural sciences to
the superstructure.
In our opinion, the theory that science does not
relate to the superstructure seems more convinc­
ing. The point is that all sorts of objective truths,
manifested in relevant theories, laws and notions,
constitute the basic content of science. And the
objective truth is a state of human knowledge
that depends on neither man nor mankind but
rather reflects the objective situation. This being
so, science cannot be part of the superstructure,
since its dependence on the economic basis and on
the classes that arise from it is its major feature.
480 A. P. SHEPTULIN

It may appear at first glance that the social

sciences depend on the basis, reflect and safeguard
the interests of one class or another. This is why
some scholars refer them to the superstructure.
Indeed, the content of the social sciences may form
part of the superstructure if they conform to the
interests of the ruling class. When scientific pre­
cepts or theories contradict the interests of the
ruling class, however, the latter discards them,
proves them false and relies on precepts and
theories that, no matter how erroneous they may
be, do conform to its interests. True propositions
and theories, however, neither disappear nor lose
their scientific force simply because the ruling
class disregards them, but continue to exist and
develop in accordance with their intrinsic scientific
laws which differ from those of the super­
structure.
Economic, social, historical and other social
views are, as a rule, related to the superstructure.
They express the interests of definite classes. Since
the social sciences reflect the objective truth, which
depends neither on man nor on mankind, they do
not possess the traits typical of the superstructure.
Social views related to the ideological superstruc­
ture may coincide with the social sciences and rely
on them, thus providing a scientific background
for the ideology. This is the case in socialist so­
ciety, where the Marxist-Leninist doctrine on so­
ciety is both a science and an ideological super­
structure at the same time. Social views, how­
ever, may not coincide with the genuine social
science. It will exist alongside or despite such
 SOCIAL CONSCIOUSNESS AND ITS FORMS 481

views. This is how matters stand, in particular,

in capitalist society, where bourgeois views on so­
ciety are not scientific and the social sciences that
exist alongside them hew their way forward in
constant conflict with these views.
The fact that science in itself is not a super­
structure on the economic basis does not mean
that the basis exerts no influence on science. The
basis does affect science. It is the basis that deter­
mines the directions in which science will deve­
lop, as well as the problems and issues it studies
and the rate of scientific progress.
Thus, in capitalist society the economic basis de­
termines the fact that scientific research and the
way its findings are utilised are devoted to the
objectives of producing surplus value. The fact
that, in capitalist society, the main scientific efforts
nowadays are concentrated on research, which in
one way or another is related to military produc­
tion, is merely further proof that the economic
basis determines the direction of scientific pro­
gress.
Science develops in a quite different fashion in
socialist society. Here the achievements of science
are directed to developing the productive forces
and raising the material well-being of the work­
ing people. In the socialist countries, science
is the bearer of progress, creative activity and the
instrument for subordinating the forces of nature
and society to the needs of building socialism and
communism. It underlies not only the organisation
of production and its management, but also that
of society's life, the regulation of social processes
31—1557
482 A. P. SHEPTULIN

and the transformation of social relations, i.e. all

the practical activities of the people. By extending
the sphere in which science is applied, socialist
production relations create all the requisite con­
ditions for it to progress rapidly.
Chapter XVI

THE ROLE
OF THE MASSES AND THE INDIVIDUAL
IN HISTORY.
SOCIETY AND THE INDIVIDUAL

1. The Masses
as a Decisive Force
of Social Progress
Pre-Marxian sociologists considered that the
spiritual principle played the determining part in
historical development. So they presented great
personalities-enlightened monarchs, kings, law­
makers, scientists, philosophers and other indivi­
duals engaged in science, politics and art-instead
of the masses who produced the essential means of
subsistence, as subjects of historical progress. As
for the masses, they were proclaimed a blind inert
force, representing an obstacle to historical pro­
gress and able to take positive initiative under
the leadership of great personalities.
Marxism has refuted these anti-scientific theo­
ries which downgraded the role of the masses in
social development, thus distorting the actual si­
tuation for the sake of the exploiting classes. Marx
and Engels, who established the determining role
of production in society's life, came to the conclu­
sion that it is not great personalities, no matter
how brilliant they may be, that represent the ma­
jor force of social progress, but the masses.
81’
484 A. P. SHEPTULIN

Referring to the latter as the decisive force of

historical progress, we should have a clear idea
of their composition, i.e. which social groups and
classes they include.
The masses are mainly made up of those classes
and social groups whose labour ensures society's
existence and development. These are, in the first
place, the working people who create the material
goods, the scientific and technological intelligent­
sia related to the production process, the workers
in the service industries, scientists, those working
in the fields of culture and art and those who are
engaged in the upbringing and training of the
rising generation.
The composition of the masses does not remain
constant: it changes as society makes the transi­
tion from one stage of development to another,
in particular, that from one socio-economic system
to another. In slave-owning society the masses
were the slaves, the artisans and the indigent sec­
tions of the free population; under feudalism-the
peasantry, the artisans and the emergent bour­
geoisie ; under capitalism-the proletariat, the peas­
antry, the petty and middle bourgeoisie who are
interested in society's development, as well as the
progressive intelligentsia; in socialist society-the
working class, the peasantry and the intelligentsia,
and once the exploiting classes are finally elimi-
nated-the entire nation.
The determining role of the masses in society's
development manifests itself, above all, in the fact
that the masses, representing the major productive
force, set the means of labour in motion and
 SOCIETY AND THE INDIVIDUAL 485

effect the production of material wealth required

for the existence and development of society.
While constantly improving the means of labour
and their labour skills, the masses develop the pro­
ductive forces of society and make it imperative
for the old production relations, which begin to
inhibit development, to be replaced by new ones
corresponding to the level of the productive forces.
But this is not all that the role of the
masses in social progress amounts to. By deve­
loping the productive forces, the masses take a
most active part in supplanting one type of produc­
tion relations with another and in the struggle to
change the social and political system. Any new
class which represents a more progressive mode
of production works for victory by gaining the
support of the masses, who are the main motive
force of any social revolution. By participating in
a social revolution, the masses pursue their own
immediate goal of improving their living stan­
dard. However, by destroying the old produc­
tion relations, they contribute to the development
of production relations corresponding to the new
productive forces, and thus ensure historical pro­
gress.
In periods of social revolution, the creative abil­
ities and the initiative of the masses manifest
themselves in a more pronounced form than in
periods when society is developing peacefully.
. .The organising abilities of the people. ..,"
Lenin wrote, "are revealed a million times more
strongly, fully and productively in periods of rev­
olutionary whirlwind than in periods of so-called
486 A. P. SHEPTULIN

calm (dray-horse) historical progress."1 "Rev­

olutions," he wrote on the same score, "are fes­
tivals of the oppressed and the exploited. At no
other time are the mass of the people in a posi­
tion to come forward so actively as creators of a
new social order, as at a time of revolution. At
such times the people are capable of performing
miracles... ."2
It is not only in periods of social revolution,
however, that the masses influence the political
aspect of the life of society: the same happens in
periods of peaceful development. By their active
opposition, the working masses prevent the real­
isation of reactionary schemes worked out by
the ruling classes and directed against the work­
ing people, national independence, peace and de­
mocracy.
Since the masses represent the determining force
of economic and political development, they
make a sizable contribution to the advancement
of culture-science and art. These arose and deve­
loped on the basis of people's labour activities
and, at the initial stages, formed a component part
of them. By transforming reality and by creat­
ing new material goods that do not exist in a
natural form, the masses developed their cons­
ciousness, mental abilities and capacity to create
spiritual values, which are a materialised generali­
sation of people's transforming activities. Later on,
when manual labour separated from intellectual

1 V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 10, p. 259.

a Ibid., Vol. 9, p. 113.
 SOCIETY AND THE INDIVIDUAL 487

work, spiritual activity became a monopoly of spe­

cial social groups-classes. Even then, the role of
the masses in the development of culture did not
diminish, for the latter has its roots deep among
the people and draws its inspiration from the
ideas, feelings and strivings cherished by the
masses. Maxim Gorky wrote that the people con­
stitute not only the force that creates material
wealth, but also the only eternal source of spirit­
ual values. They are philosopher and poet,
unsurpassed from the point of view of the to­
picality, beauty and brilliance of their works,
who write all the great poems and tragedies,
including the greatest of them all-the history
of world culture.
It is no accident that culture and art flourish
in those periods of historical development when
art comes to grips with obsolete social forms and
battles for the realisation of progressive trends
which arise in the masses and thus expresses the
ideas, thoughts and aspirations of the overwhelm­
ing majority in society. Such, for instance, was the
situation in France prior to the great bourgeois
Revolution of 1789 and in 19th-century Russia dur­
ing the struggle against serfdom and the monarchy.
In describing the role of the masses in the de­
velopment of culture, one should not forget that
by their labour the masses create the material
goods required by the intellectuals.
By tracing the influence of the masses on the
development of various aspects of social life, Marx
and Engels discovered that the role of the
masses in historical progress inevitably increases.
488 A. P. SHEPTULIN

This pattern is a necessary consequence of the

history-making process which grows in scope as
the transition is made from one socio-economic
system to another: in society's consistent advance
the transformations of the social organism become
more profound and all-embracing. Thus, the tran­
sition from the slave-owning system to feudalism
saw changes in the forms of ownership, the state,
the law and social consciousness. These changes
did not, however, effect any radical alterations in
the working people's condition or their economic
and political status. They continued, as before,
to work for the owners of the means of produc­
tion, thus making up the labour force, which the
exploiters used to their advantage. Like the
slaves, they had neither political rights nor
civil liberties, but the transition to capitalism
brought about more radical and sizable changes.
Capitalism offered civil liberties to the working
people (though without proper guarantees), as
well as certain political rights. The law for­
mally proclaimed the equality of the exploiters
and the exploited, but since private ownership
of the means of production remained, the social
position of the working people did not change.
For the first time social transformations become
all-round and profound only with the transition
from capitalism to socialism. In the course of
the socialist revolution radical changes take
place in the economic, political and cultural
spheres of the life of society: private ownership
of the means of production is eradicated, antago­
nistic classes and the exploitation of man by man
 SOCIETY AND THE INDIVIDUAL 489

are abolished; the domination is established of

the working class-the proletariat-who uses state
power to carry out gradual social transformations
along socialist lines and to build communist soci­
ety; considerable changes occur in public ideology
-it becomes scientifically grounded for the first
time and begins to express the interests of the
proletariat and the working people in general.
The expanded scope of social transformations
and their profound nature makes it imperative
for a growing number of people to become in­
volved in history-making. "As man's history­
making activity grows broader and deeper,"
Lenin wrote, "the size of that mass of the popu­
lation which is the conscious maker of history is
bound to increase."1
It is, therefore, no accident that the masses are
much more active in capitalist society than in feu­
dal or slave-owning societies. Under socialism, this
activity becomes all-embracing, since the whole
society joins in the conscious making of history.

2. The Role of the Personality in History

While stressing the determining role of the
masses in historical progress, Marxism does not
disregard the influence of certain distinguished
personalities on the course of history and on so­
cial development. On the contrary, such personal­
ities are assigned a big role and their activities
are considered essential for social progress, pro­
ducing a certain impact on it.
1 V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 2, p. 524.
490 A. P. SHEPTULIN

The fact is that no group of people or society

can do without leadership or without persons to
lead it. These persons are called upon to work out
a programme of action for the members of so­
ciety (the class, party, state) and organise them
to implement it. "Not a single class in history has
achieved power without producing its political
leaders, its prominent representatives able to or­
ganise a movement and lead it."1
What influence, however, do great personali­
ties exert on historical progress? Their impact on
society depends on the extent to which they real­
ise the actual needs of society and on how far
they express the requisite trends of the time and
promote their implementation. Great personali­
ties advance the tasks that have already been
posed by the objective course of historical develop­
ment, and organise people towards their realisa­
tion. The importance of the great personality thus
lies not in the fact that he, in Plekhanov's words,
"can halt or change the natural course of things,
but in the sense that his activities are the con­
scious and free expression of that necessary and
unconscious course".2 It is this that sets the great
personality apart from the mass of other people
and assigns him a special historical role in social
development.
Indeed, it was a historical necessity in France,
for example, that the obsolete feudal political in­
stitutions be replaced with new ones that corres­
1 V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 4, p. 370.
2 G. V. Plekhanov, Selected Philosophical Works, Vol.
II, Moscow, 1976, p. 314.
 SOCIETY AND THE INDIVIDUAL 491

ponded better to the capitalist production rela­

tions developing within feudal society in the lat­
ter half of the 18th century. It was thus those peo­
ple who best realised this necessity and contribut­
ed to its realisation that became great personali­
ties of the period. The transition to socialism has
become a historical necessity in the 19th and the
20th centuries. Correspondingly, it is those peo­
ple who realised the necessity of and became lead­
ers in the struggle of the proletariat and of all
working people to remake society along socialist
lines, that are regarded as great personalities.
These personalities emerge whenever society is
in need of them. In other words, they appear on
the historical scene when great tasks requiring
the unified efforts of many people emerge with­
in society. The activities of personalities are thus
in no way accidental, but rather necessitated by
objective causes that take shape irrespective of
people's will or wish and are conditioned by the
course of historical progress. It is only the spe­
cific choice of the personality entrusted with the
task of solving the outstanding social problems
and of meeting one social requirement or an­
other, that is a matter of chance. "That such and
such a man and precisely that man arises at a
particular time," Engels wrote, "is, of course, pure
chance. But cut him out and there will be a de­
mand for a substitute, and this substitute will be
found, good or bad, but in the long run he will
be found. That Napoleon, just that particular Cor­
sican, should have been the military dictator
whom the French Republic, exhausted by its own
492 A. P. SHEPTULIN

warfare, had rendered necessary, was chance; but

that, if a Napoleon had been lacking, another
would have filled the place, is proved by the fact
that the man was always found as soon as he be­
came necessary: Caesar, Augustus, Cromwell, etc.
While Marx discovered the materialist conception
of history, Thierry, Mignet, Guizot and all the
English historians up to 1850 are evidence it was
being striven for, and the discovery of the same
conception by Morgan proves that the time was
ripe for it and that it simply had to be discov­
ered."1
Being moved by circumstances to positions of
command and resolving the tasks posed by histori­
cal development, the great personality exerts a
definite influence on the course of social progress
and on certain events: he may accelerate or re­
tard them, but he cannot change the direction of
historical progress, for this is determined not by
the will or wish of great personalities, but by the
objective laws of social development.
When defining the role of a great personality in
society's development, account must be taken of
the class he represents and whose interests he ex­
presses. If he represents the class which has be­
come historically obsolete, then his activities re­
tard social progress, whereas, if he expresses the
interests of the emerging class, then he contributes
to and accelerates social progress. It follows
that the role of great personalities should be as­
sessed in its historical context, by taking ac­
1 K. Marx and F. Engels, Selected Works, Vol. 3,
p. 503.
 SOCIETY AND THE INDIVIDUAL 493

count of circumstances and the surrounding objec­

tive conditions. Thus, great personalities connect­
ed with the bourgeoisie as a class played directly
opposite roles in different periods of historical
development: they were progressive when they
fought feudalism, but reactionary when they op­
posed socialist transformations. Great personali­
ties who represent the interests of the proletariat
always play a progressive role, since the interests
of that class coincide completely with the re­
quirements of historical progress.
? ' . io ' . : ' '-rJ a t ;

3. Society and the Individual

a) The Individual as a Product of Social Development

Pre-Marxian sociologist^ failed to resolve the

problem of the inter-relationships between society
and the individual correctly: they either opposed
one to the other or equated them. Modern sub­
jective-idealist philosophy proclaims the individ­
ual to be the only social reality. As far as so­
ciety is concerned, it is asserted to be a mechanic­
al aggregate of separate individuals. Thus, for ex­
ample, the modern US philosopher and sociologist
Warner Fite asserts that only individuals are real
and that only they have any importance, mean­
ing that the individual denotes the type and direc­
tion of what is real, and that the only cognisable
thing-in-itself is the individual.
The idealist interpretation of society's life
makes it impossible to define man's essence. All
pre-Marxian and modem idealist philosophers
494 A. P. SHEPTULIN

tried to resolve it on the basis of the abstract "ideal

man" devoid of any class identity and provided
by nature with certain eternal and unchanging
humanitarian qualities. There is no such thing,
however, as the "ideal man" in isolation from
society. The individual cannot be separated from
society, for he grows, develops and is moulded
within society which cannot but leave its imprint
on him. "One cannot live in society and be free
from society," Lenin wrote.1 Society exerts a de­
finite influence on the formation of the individ­
ual, but the type of society changes, of course,
from one epoch to another, which means that the
individual also changes and is characterised by
the specific features of each epoch.

b) The Dialectics of the Interrelationship

Between Society and the Individual

People in primitive society had their own spe­

cific features. The domination of collective labour
on the basis of common ownership of the instru­
ments of production brought about a situation
when the objective and the intention of each mem­
ber of the collective coincided with the interests
of society as a whole. This unity of society and
the individual is, however, primitive in nature, a
result of the low level of development of the pro­
ductive forces. This unity conditions the domina­
tion of the principle of collectivism in the con­
sciousness of people in primitive society .These spe­
cific features bring about specific relations among
* V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 10, p. 48.
 SOCIETY AND THE INDIVIDUAL 495

people that are typical of this society, as well as

a definite organisation of the family and definite
moral, religious and aesthetic views, together with
other aspects characterising the individual in the
society concerned.
The emergence of antagonistic society with its
division into irreconcilable classes contradicting
each other in their relationship to the means of
production and in their interests, leads to a situa­
tion where the interests of the individual clash
with those of society as a whole. The opposing of
the individual to society, which is typical of all
antagonistic social systems, cannot however be
presented-as some bourgeois scholars do-in the
form of the individual's freedom from society's
influence. It is conditioned by the specific featu­
res of a class society, which gives rise to a growth
of individualism to replace the collectivism of
the primitive communal system.
The influence of a class society on the formation
and development of the individual manifests it­
self above all in the form of the influence exert­
ed by the class to which he belongs, for since the
economic and political position of the antagonis­
tic classes is directly opposite, these influences
are different.
"Every individual," Plekhanov wrote, "walks
his own gait along the road of protest. However,
where this road leads depends on the social en­
vironment of the protesting individual."1
Due to the difference in the position of anta­
1 G. V. Plekhanov, Art and Literature, Moscow, 1948,
p. 786 (in Russian).
496 A. P. SHEPTULIN

gonistic classes, the influence of society on

members of different classes differs too. Never­
theless, people from the same socio-economic
system have certain common features associated
with their culture, customs and traditions. This
is because people of one socio-economic system
and epoch are united by the existing production
relations; they mutually influence each other
in one way or another, live in one society, in
the same country with definite geographical and
national features-a fact that cannot but affect
the formation and development of the individual.
The emergence of the new socialist order with
socialist ownership of the means of production, the
order characterised by relations of comradely co­
operation and mutual assistance, leads to funda­
mentally different conditions for the formation
of the individual and to new interrelationships
between society and the individual. Socialist own­
ership of the means of production abolishes all
grounds for social enmity, unifies the economic
interests of people and consolidates their socio­
political and ideological unity. The common goal
of each individual and society as a whole-the
building of communism-leads to a genuine unity
of the individual and society.
This interrelationship between society and the
individual differs radically not only from the re­
lations of enmity typical of antagonistic systems,
but also from the unity of social and personal in­
terests that is a characteristic feature of the pri­
mitive-communal system. The latter, as we have
seen, is an inevitable result of the extremely low
 SOCIETY AND THE INDIVIDUAL 497

level of development of the productive forces,

whereas the unity of society and the individual
attained by socialism becomes a reality only as a
result of a very high level of development of the
productive forces.
Socialism also signifies a new stage in the de­
velopment of the individual himself. For the first
time, society becomes interested in the har­
monious and all-round development of all its
members and seeks to create all the conditions re­
quired for this. Naturally, this could not happen
under the primitive-communal system, where the
level of development of the productive forces was
so low that it left no chance for the other sides
of the individual besides his physique to develop.
Neither can they develop under antagonistic
systems where the opportunities for the individual
to develop culturally, mentally and in other ways,
exist only for a small privileged part of society,
acquired through exploitation of the overwhelming
majority of the population.
The unity of society and the individual under
socialism does not, however, exclude contradic­
tions between them. These are brought about by
the difficulties arising during the building of so­
cialism and communism, and by the lag of peo­
ple's consciousness behind social being. This ex­
plains the anti-social behaviour on the part of
some members of socialist society, and by other
factors. But these contradictions, first, concern
only a few members of socialist society and, sec­
ond, are successfully overcome in the course of
building communism.
32—1557
498 A. P. SHEPTULIN

No matter how great the socialist gains are in

the field of social equality, socialism cannot yet
eradicate elements of inequality in different
spheres of society's life. Class distinctions still
survive, of course, and they are revealed in the
differences existing in socio-economic and cultural
conditions, as well as in the disparate life-styles of
town and country. Socialism, as Marx and Lenin
pointed out, does not create complete equality in
the distribution of consumer goods, and this results
in the unequal material condition of members of
socialist society and unequal opportunities for the
cultural development of the individual.
Communism overcomes this deficiency of the
socialist stage of development. A true social
equality between people will be established in so­
ciety as a result of the fusion of the two forms
of socialist ownership into a single communist
one, when the essential differences between the
working class, the peasantry and the intelligent­
sia are overcome, and the communist principle of
distribution in accordance with individual needs
is put into effect. "Under communism," the
CPSU Programme says, "all people will have
equal status in society, will stand in the same re­
lation to the means of production, will enjoy
equal conditions of work and distribution, and
will actively participate in the management of pub­
lic affairs. Harmonious relations will be established
between the individual and society on the basis
of the unity of public and personal interests."1

1 The Road to Communism, p. 510.

Chapter XVII

SOCIAL PROGRESS

1. The Concept of Social Progress

The idea of social progress was put forward
by bourgeois ideologists at the dawn of capital­
ism, when the capitalist mode of production that
arose in the heart of feudalism was ready to re­
place the historically obsolete economic form
based on the individual employment of small-scale
means of labour and on the system of serfdom.
Ideologists of the young bourgeoisie, while op­
posing the theological substantiation of the divine
origin and the invariability of the social and state
system, argued that feudalism was historically
transitory in nature and that it would inevitably
be supplanted by a new and more advanced sys­
tem. At that time the bourgeoisie believed that
there was unlimited scope for improving human
society on the basis of science and reason.
The views of Johann Herder (1744-1803), an
ideologist of the German Enlighteners, are an ex­
ample of how such theories were substantiated.
According to him, history represents an unbroken
chain of developments where each link is con­
nected with those before and after it. Each link
is a consequence of previous development and
of necessity passes to a new and more progres­
sive stage.
32*
500 A. P. SHEPTULIN

While advancing a correct idea concerning so­

ciety's transition from lower to higher stages. Her­
der failed to give it a scientific substantiation, for
he himself held idealistic views of society's life.
He held that it was the level of cultural develop­
ment, incorporating science, art, religion, the state,
etc., as its main components, that played the de­
termining role in social development.
French bourgeois ideologists, such as Anne Ro­
bert Jacques Turgot (1727-1781) and Jean Con­
dorset (1743-1794) also developed a theory of so­
cial progress. Turgot said, among other things,
that mankind was marching on towards ever
greater perfection. Both he and his follower
Condorset associated this perfection, however,
with unlimited development of the human intel­
lect, science and art, i.e. they were, in fact, ideal­
ists.
Hegel also recognised historical progress, view­
ing it as a consequence of developing the knowl­
edge of freedom.
While they subscribed to the idea of social pro­
gress at a time when the capitalist mode of pro­
duction was fighting to assert itself and when the
bourgeoisie was engaged in a struggle for power,
bourgeois sociologists began to depart from this
idea as soon as the capitalist mode of production
became dominant in society. Then it became ne­
cessary for the bourgeoisie to substantiate the
eternal nature of the capitalist social system, the
capitalist state and the capitalist way of life. In
response to this necessity theories emerged
which made bourgeois society the limit of pro-
 SOCIAL PROGRESS 501

gress, proclaiming capitalism the highest form of

social development. Among such views were the
theories of the French bourgeois sociologist and
philosopher Auguste Comte (1798-1857) and those
of the British sociologist and philosopher Herbert
Spencer (1820-1903).
At the time when capitalist society was enter­
ing the imperialist stage and the contradictions
of capitalism were manifesting themselves more
and more acutely, concepts emerged rejecting
historical progress and propagating the idea of
regressive motion and repetition in society's life.
It was, in particular, the German philosopher
Friedrich Nietzsche (1844-1900) who advanced
these views. He held that the motion of society
and the surrounding world is not progressive or
in a forward direction, but an eternal recurrence of
the forms and stages of development that had al­
ready been passed.
Modern bourgeois ideologists who argue the
absence of progress in society's life, include, for
instance, the contemporary French philosopher
Emile Brehier. His line of reasoning is that
there are no phases in society's development
forming stages of progress. There are only differ­
ent and quite independent social structures that
are not connected into a single chain of progres­
sion from the lower to the higher. Each of these
stages arises, exists and perishes in complete iso­
lation.
These views, however, definitely conflict with
reality. The history of human society is evidence
that social structures do not appear out of no­
502 A. P. SHEPTULIN

where, but arise on the basis of a previous struc­

ture due to certain specific changes in the latter.
Social structures do not disappear without a
trace after becoming historically obsolete. They
develop into new and more advanced social struc­
tures. In other words, between the past social
structure and the existing one there is a historical
(genetic) link which conditions the uninterrupted
development of human society.
The well-known US psychologist Edward Lee
Thorndike uses other arguments to prove the ab­
sence of progress in society. He claims that each
historical epoch has specific features of its own
and that the standards of one epoch are quite dif­
ferent from those of another. If this is so, he con­
tinues, how can it be decided which epoch is better
and more progressive? In order to compare them
one needs a specific criterion, but no such criterion
exists. By changing one social state or another,
Thorndike reasons, people intend to obtain some­
thing better, but, as a rule, this does not happen,
for an improvement in one thing is inevitably ac­
companied by a deterioration in another. We have
aviation but we do not have a Shakespeare. The
iconoclasts who used to destroy statues, break
stained-glass windows and smear religious paint­
ings, set out to deprive the church of idolatry and
cared least of all about the irreparable damage
they inflicted on art, archaeology and history.
Those who advocated laws forbidding the exploit­
ation of child labour had no idea that these laws
would encourage idleness and become a cause of
juvenile delinquency. ".. .The more we study the
 SOCIAL PROGRESS 503

past, the more we find that it was right, not

wrong. .writes Thorndike1 and concludes that
no attempts should be made to change the exist­
ing reality since it is fair and correct in itself. If
we still are uncertain, our hesitations will disap­
pear with time. If capitalist production relations
seem abnormal to some people, and if they do
not like private property, exploitation, unemploy­
ment and crises, they should not, according to
Thorndike, wish to eradicate these phenomena,
for the result is bound to be something even worse.
They would then realise that everything (private
property, exploitation, etc.) is not so bad after
all, and even fair.
The link between Thorndike's views and the
class interests of the bourgeoisie, as well as their
reactionary essence, are as evident as is their
anti-scientific nature and irrelevance to the true
situation.
Capitalist relations, private ownership of the
means of production, exploitation, unemployment,
crises and the bourgeoisie itself as a class, to­
gether with its sociologists, have all been eradicat­
ed in socialist society and no one, save for the
bourgeoisie, is sorry that this has happened.
During the revolutionary destruction of the old
and obsolete, there were, of course, cases when
something was destroyed by mistake (some works
of art, architectural and historical monuments,
etc.). These instances are not, however, the main
and determining features typifying the nature
1 The American Historical Review, Vol. LXI, No. 2, Ja­
nuary, 1956, pp. 282-83.
504 A. P. SHEPTULIN

and significance of these changes. They are de­

finitely outweighed by the huge torrent of posi­
tive change bringing about a new and more pro­
gressive social system and a more advanced way
of life.
It was Marx and Engels who, for the first time,
scientifically substantiated social progress on the
basis of the dialectico-materialist interpretation
of history.
According to Marx and Engels, history repre­
sents a consecutive supplanting of separate gen­
erations, each of which utilises the productive
forces inherited from the previous generations.
In view of this, the new generation both continues
the inherent activity under the totally different
conditions and changes it in accordance with the
new conditions.1 For this reason, there is a linkage
in human history consisting in the movement
from one stage of social development to another,
from one social system to a more advanced one.
All the social systems that replace one another in
the course of history represent, according to Marx
and Engels, mere stages in the infinite develop­
ment of human society from the lower to the high­
er. "Each stage is necessary, and therefore justi­
fied for the time and conditions to which it owes
its origin. But in the face of new, higher conditions
which gradually develop in its womb, it loses its
validity and justification. It must give way to a

1 See K. Marx and F. Engels, The German Ideology,

pp. 60-61.
 SOCIAL PROGRESS 505

higher stage which will also in its turn decay and

perish."1
Thus, society does not mark time, nor does
it repeat the forms already passed, but is
constantly on the move and changing from the
lower to the higher, from the worse to the better.
It is with this forward movement based on the
development of the productive forces that histo­
rical materialism associates the essence of social
progress.

2. The Objective Criterion of Social Progress

As already mentioned, society, while changing
from the lower to the higher, passes through
strictly definite stages of development. In the
course of historical analysis, the task arises of
singling out these stages and defining the specific
features of each of them. The singling out of stages
of development passed through by peoples and
mankind as a whole presupposes the choice of an
objective criterion of progress and the establish­
ment of a determining aspect of society's life,
whose changes are associated with society's de­
velopment from the lower to the higher and con­
dition this development.
It is the productive forces that Marxism takes
as the determining aspect in the life of society.
These represent a factor which ultimately deter­
mines all other aspects of the social organism.

1 K. Marx and F. Engels, Selected Works, Vol. 3,

p. 339.
33—1557
506 A. P. SHEPTULIN

Their state and level of development determine

the production relations of people in society, which
directly influence the entire system of superstruc-
tural phenomena and relations. The level of de­
velopment of the productive forces characterises
the degree of man's domination over nature and
its spontaneous forces. This level is vital to the
total amount of material wealth produced in so­
ciety and, at the same time, to the quantity of
labour expended by society to develop the means
of production, science, art and other spheres of
life. "A surplus of the product of labour over and
above the costs of maintenance of the labour,"
Engels wrote, "and the formation and enlarge­
ment, out of this surplus, of a social production
and reserve fund, was and is the basis of all so­
cial, political and intellectual progress."1
The level of development oi the productive
iorces is thus the main indicator of the progress
achieved by a nation.
This factor alone is not, however, sufficient in
itself to determine the stage of progress attained
by a nation. The level of development of the pro­
ductive forces determines the essence of the so­
cial organism only in the final count. It is produc­
tion relations that exert a direct influence on the
life of society.
If, in determining the stage of social develop­
ment of a nation, only the level of the productive
forces is taken into consideration, societies repre­
senting different stages of development may be

1 F. Engels, Anti-Diihring, p. 231.

 SOCIAL PROGRESS 507

erroneously classified as belonging to one group.

The same productive forces, however, may ac­
company different kinds of production relations,
because obsolete production relations are not au­
tomatically replaced by new ones corresponding
to the attained level of the productive forces, and
not in all countries at once, but gradually, as soon
as the necessary conditions are ripe. It may hap­
pen, therefore, that in some countries a certain
level of development of the productive forces coex­
ists with obsolete production relations, while in
others it may combine with the new production
relations corresponding to this level. If this fac­
tor is ignored, one can make mistakes similar to
that committed by the advocates of the "indust­
rial society" theory (Raymond Aron, Jean Fouras-
tie, Robert Angell, Jessie Bernard and others).
By taking as their point of departure the fact that
essentially the same technology and an approxi­
mately equal level of the productive forces exist
both in the Soviet Union and in the industrial­
ised capitalist countries like Britain, France, and
the USA, these ideologists assert that these coun­
tries belong to one and the same stage of social
development and that they are in a state of tran­
sition to the "industrial society".
The rise of this theory should not, however,
be totally attributed to the above mistake, but
rather to a desire to prove that there is virtually
no difference between capitalism and socialism,
that these systems have a similar social nature
and thus there is no need for a socialist revolu­
tion. Their views clearly tend to disregard the
33*
508 A. P. SHEPTULIN

nature of the production relations associated with

the relevant productive forces.
Hence, the level oi development oi the produc­
tive iorces and the production relations within
whose bounds the productive iorces iunction and
develop, represents an objective criterion oi so­
ciety's progress. The productive forces determine
the degree of man's domination over nature and
its spontaneous forces, while production relations
determine that of man's domination over the
spontaneous forces of society and of man's eman­
cipation from the sway of these forces.

3. Socio-Economic Systems
as Stages of Society’s Progress
The study of the productive forces in conjunc­
tion with production relations allowed Marx to
notice the recurrent features in the life of differ­
ent countries and nations, single out the basic
stages of society's progress and work out, on this
basis, the notion of a socio-economic system.
Stressing the determining role of the level of
development of the productive forces and, in
particular, of the means of labour, for separating
the stages of social progress, Marx wrote: "Re­
lics of bygone instruments of labour possess the
same importance for the investigation of extinct
economic forms of society, as do fossil bones for
the determination of extinct species of animals.
It is not the articles made, but how they are made,
and by what instruments, that enables us to dis­
tinguish different economic epochs. Instruments
 SOCIAL PROGRESS 509

of labour not only supply a standard of the de­

gree of development to which human labour has
attained, but they are also indicators of the social
conditions under which that labour is carried on."1
Pointing to the means of labour as a factor be­
hind the level of society's development and distin­
guishing the stages of this development, Marx as­
signs the main role to the way people combine
with the means of labour, i.e. to production rela­
tions. It is the nature of production relations and
the specific way in which people are connected
with the means of labour or, to put it more pre­
cisely, with the means of production that, in
Marx's words, "distinguishes the different eco­
nomic epochs.. .".2
Taking the level of development of the pro­
ductive forces and of the corresponding produc­
tion relations as the criterion for social progress.
Marx distinguished five socio-economic systems:
the primitive-communal, slave-owning, feudal, cap­
italist and communist.
Each of these systems represents a society at a
definite stage of historical development, which is
characterised by a definite level of the productive
forces and the corresponding production relations,
by the resultant system of diverse ideas and insti­
tutions, and by a definite type of family and other
relations.
The primitive-communal (or tribal) system rep­
resents the initial stage in the existence of human

1 K. Marx, Capital, Vol. I, pp. 175-76.

2 K. Marx, Capital, Vol. II, p. 36.
510 A. P. SHEPTULIN

society. It is characterised by poorly developed

productive forces. The means of labour utilised at
that time did not allow man to fight the forces of
nature on his own or to procure the essential
means of subsistence. All this necessitated collec­
tive labour, which laid the foundations for commu­
nal ownership of the means of production, equal
distribution and relations of co-operation and mu­
tual assistance among people. There was no state,
no classes, no law. Social functions were performed
by people elected by all the members of the com­
munity, who entirely relied on their authority,
trust and respect in performing their activities.
Social intercourse was based entirely on moral
norms and customs.
With the emergence of improved instruments of
production, the possibility arose of working alone
or in families. This eradicated the need for collec­
tive labour and a communal economy. People be­
gan switching over to privately-managed econo­
mies which, under those historical conditions,
were more productive. Private property appeared
on the basis of individual labour. With the institu­
tion of private property, the development of the
productive forces resulted in differences in the
property status of society's members and then
among the antagonistic classes-the slaves and the
slave-owners. The inception of classes and the
class struggle was followed by the rise of the
state, together with politics and law.
In this way society passed to a new and higher
stage in its development, which became known
as the slave-owning socio-economic system.
 SOCIAL PROGRESS 511

The possibility of obtaining more material

wealth than was required to sustain the direct pro­
ducer's existence, was a specific feature of the pro­
ductive forces under this system. Its production
relations were based on the slave-owner's com­
plete ownership of the means of production and
of the labourer, who was treated as a "talking
instrument of labour". Society's affairs were ma­
naged by the state, used by the slave-owners to
suppress the slaves.
The next stage in society's development was
feudalism. Feudal production relations were based
on the feudal lord's ownership of the land and
on his partial ownership of the serf, whom he no
longer had the right to kill, but could still sell,
punish or force to work for his own benefit. In
feudal society, apart from the feudal lord's prop­
erty, the serfs had means of labour of their
own, and there was also a personal economic
sector, based on personal labour. The peasant
received from the landlord a plot of land, on
which he organised his individual household and
created the necessary means of subsistence for
himself and his family. The peasant returned a
part of the means of subsistence created by him,
either in cash or in kind, to the feudal lord, or
had to work the feudal lord's land with his means
of labour.
The feudal social system was more progressive
than the previous, slave society. Under feudalism
the direct producer had a certain interest in in­
creasing the productivity of his labour.
Yet the feudal mode of production became his­
512 A. P. SHEPTULIN

torically obsolete with the further development of

the productive forces and with the spread of com­
modity-money relations and division of labour. It
was replaced by the capitalist socio-economic sys­
tem, based on capitalist private ownership of the
means of production and hired labour. Among the
specific features of capitalism are the socialisation
of labour and machine production, which sharply
enhanced the productive forces of society, and the
concentration of wealth and poverty at society's
opposite poles. Under capitalism the worker is
formally free, but he is virtually dependent in
economic terms, for he is deprived of the means
of subsistence and is compelled to sell his labour­
power to the capitalist who appropriates the sur­
plus value, created by the worker, in the form of
profit.
Though the capitalist mode of production was
progressive at a definite stage in the development
of human society, it later became a brake on so­
cial progress due to the intensification of the built-
in contradiction between the productive forces
and production relations. This was revealed, in
particular, in the conflict between the social na­
ture of production and the private form of appro­
priation. During the socialist revolution effected
by the proletariat in alliance with the peasantry
and other sections of the working people, capital­
ism is supplanted by the new, socialist mode of
production, which represents the economic basis
of the new, communist socio-economic system.
The communist socio-economic system is marked
by an unprecedentedly high level of develop­
 SOCIAL PROGRESS 513

ment of the productive forces, capable of ensur­

ing the production of the abundant material
wealth required to meet all society's demands.
Here, production relations are associated with the
domination of the single communist ownership of
the means of production, the absence of classes
and class distinctions and the operation of the
principle from each according to his abilities, to
each according to his needs. The state will wither
away and be replaced by communist self-admini­
stration. Law will disappear together with the
state. Social intercourse will be regulated by mor­
al norms, resting on the force of public opinion.
Such are some of the features of the basic
stages in society's historical progress, which as­
sume the form of five socio-economic systems
through which mankind passes.
Marx viewed society's transition from one sys­
tem to another as an intrinsic law of human his­
tory in general. Humanity consecutively passes
through all of them. Each of them is essential at
a definite stage in society's progress and acts as
a spring-board for the emergence of a new and
higher one. “No social order," Marx wrote, "ever
perishes before all the productive forces for which
there is room in it have developed; and new, hi­
gher relations of production never appear before
the material conditions of their existence have
matured in the womb of the society itself."1
Bourgeois sociologists advance concepts in an

1 K. Marx and F. Engels, Selected Works, Vol. 1,

p. 504.
514 A. P. SHEPTULIN

attempt to refute the Marxist theory of socio-eco­

nomic systems, which associates society's transi­
tion from one stage of development to another
higher one with the replacement of production re­
lations, representing the outcome of the develop­
ment of the productive forces. They disregard the
link between society's development and the change
in production relations. Among them is the theory
of "stages of economic growth" advocated by the
US sociologist Walter Rostow.
Rostow takes the degree of utilisation of scientif­
ic and technical achievements in production, as
well as the level of consumption, as criteria of
social progress. Proceeding from these criteria, he
divides the history of human society into five con­
secutive stages: (1) the pre-Newtonian stage of
science and technology; (2) the transformative
stage of traditional society and the creation of
conditions for utilising the achievements of modern
science; (3) the sharp upswing in the level of
technical development; (4) the movement-towards-
maturity period, when society begins to effectively
utilise modern scientific and technological achieve­
ments; (5) the high mass consumption period,
when the main industries switch over to manufac­
turing consumer goods.
Rostow's concept is characterised by an artificial
manner of phasing human history into the above
stages of development and by the absence of clear­
cut definitions of each stage. Not by chance does
Rostow disregard production relations which alone
can express the essence of any stage in the de­
velopment of the social organism. Such an ap­
 SOCIAL PROGRESS 515

proach allows him to escape analysis of the class

structure of society, of the forms of ownership
that supplant one another in history and the cor­
responding forms of exploitation and, what is
more, to present the evolution of antagonistic so­
ciety as a process by which science is increasing­
ly subordinated to production.
This theory undoubtedly serves the interests of
the bourgeoisie, since it distracts the working peo­
ple's attention from the class contradictions in­
herent in capitalist society and proves the possi­
bility of improving the position of the masses
within capitalist production relations on the basis
of technical progress alone.

4. The Specific Features

of Progress
in Exploiting Society

There are two clear-cut types of progress in the

history of human society. One of them is typical
of the antagonistic formation, while the other
takes place in socialist and communist society.
In antagonistic societies progress is attained on
the basis of the exploitation of one class by an­
other, so progressive development of some classes
goes hand-in-hand with regression of others.
"Since the exploitation of one class by another,"
Engels wrote, "is the basis of civilisation, its whole
development moves in a continuous contradiction.
Every advance in production is at the same time
a retrogression in the condition of the oppress­
516 A. P. SHEPTULIN

ed class, that is, of the great majority. What is

a boon for the one is necessarily a bane for
the other; each new emancipation of one class
always means a new oppression of another
class."1
This trend manifests itself both within a single
country and internationally. Having gone forward
in their development, some nations conquer others
and begin to develop more rapidly by exploiting
them. The oppressed nations are often not only
deprived of a chance to develop further, but are
thrown back. A relevant example is the develop­
ment of industrialised capitalist countries (Brit­
ain, France, etc.) through the plunder of numerous
Asian, African and Latin American countries. Des­
cribing the progress of the bourgeoisie in some
spheres of society's life, Marx wrote: "Has it ever
effected a progress without dragging individuals
and peoples through blood and dirt, through mi­
sery and degradation?"2
The main feature of an antagonistic society is
that progress does not extend to all spheres of life.
The development of some aspects often proceeds
simultaneously with retrogression of others. For
example, the supplanting of slave-owning produc­
tion relations by feudal ones resulted in consider­
able progress in production, but the establish­
ment of the religious ideology that accompanied
it led to a regression in culture. Or take another
1 K. Marx and F. Engels, Selected Works, Vol. 3,
p. 333.
2 K. Marx and F. Engels, On Britain, Moscow, 1962,
p. 404.
 SOCIAL PROGRESS 517

example, under capitalism considerable progress

in technology is accompanied by a regression in
art, philosophy, etc.

5. The Specific Features of Progress

Under Socialism
The abolition of private ownership of the means
of production and of the conditions for the ex­
ploitation of man by man greatly affects the na­
ture of society's progress, which becomes quali­
tatively different.
As distinct from exploiting society, under so­
cialism the progressive development affects all
the working sections of the country, all classes
and social groups. Moreover, socialism, for the
first time, gives rise to conditions making it pos­
sible to bridge the gap that arose under the pre­
vious systems between the level of development
of the various classes and strata in society. Under
socialism, in particular, the considerable differ­
ences between town and country, between mental
and manual labour are being gradually over­
come.
Socialist society creates, for the first time,
the conditions necessary for closing the gap in
the development level of different nationalities.
Thanks to all-round assistance from the techni­
cally developed nations, the formerly backward
countries that were still at the stage of feudalism
or even of the primitive-communal system bypass
capitalism and start building socialism. They are
mastering modern science, engineering and other
518 A. P. SHEPTULIN

achievements of human culture, thus joining the

ranks of the industrialised nations.
Harmonious development is a major feature of
progress in socialist society, which being all-em­
bracing in nature, more or less evenly affects
all the spheres of society's life.
In contrast to class-antagonistic society, where
booms alternate with recessions and regressive
changes, progress in socialist society is continuous
and unlimited. The domination of socialist own­
ership of the means of production creates vir­
tually unlimited possibilities for improving all as­
pects of society's life.
Furthermore, since in socialist society progres­
sive development corresponds to the interests of
all of its members, the masses take a most active
part in it. This, in particular, explains the grow­
ing tempo of social development and the accele­
rated movement forward. "... Only socialism,"
Lenin wrote, "will be the beginning of a rapid,
genuine, truly mass forward movement, embrac­
ing first the majority and then the whole of the
population, in all spheres of public and private
life."1
Planning is another specific feature of progress
under socialism. Under previous economic sys­
tems there were no objective conditions for cog­
nising and consciously applying social laws, which
operated spontaneously and destructively, in the
interests of progressive development. It is only

1 V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 25, p. 477.

 SOCIAL PROGRESS 519

socialist society that provides such an opportuni­

ty. Under socialism, Engels noted, "the extrane­
ous objective forces that have hitherto governed
history pass under the control of man himself.
Only from that time will man himself, with full
consciousness, make his own history.. ."d
Such are the specific features of progress under
socialism and communism, showing that this is
progress of a new type.

1 F. Engels, Anti-Duhting, p. 336.

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