INTRODUCTION

The doctrine of joint liability deals with the conditions under which more than one person incurs
responsibility before, during and after committing crimes. When one is accountable for another’s
conduct, it does not matter whether the defendant’s own conduct, the conduct of the other or
others or the conduct of all taken collectively or both together establish the elements of the crime
charged.

Normally and naturally the person who is liable for wrong is who does it. Yet both ancient and
modern laws admit instances of vicarious liability in which one man is made answerable for the
acts of another.

JOINT LIABILITY UNDER SECTION 34

The concept of Joint Liability is embodied under Section 34 of Indian Penal Code – “Acts done by
several persons in furtherance of common intention- each of such persons is liable for that act in the
same manner as if done by him alone.” Further Section 33 defines ‘Act’ and ‘Omission’ as the word
‘act’denotes as well a series of acts as a single act: the word ‘omission’ denotes as well a series of
omissions as a single omission. It is an exception to the general principle that a person is responsible for
his own act.

OBJECT :- The provision is intended to to meet a case in which it may be different to distinguish between
acts of individual member of a party who act in furtherance of the common intention of all or to prove
exactly what part was taken by each one of them.

When IPC was enacted in 1860, section 34 at that time did not include the words ‘in furtherance of
common intention’, then an amendment was made in year 1870. It happens that different persons
perform different acts in the commission of the act or non-commission of the act, even though when
section 34 applies, all the persons in group are jointly liable for the acts of another. Section 34 is not
the penal provision and hence does not create any specific offence
ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF S.34
(a)Criminal act is done by several persons;

(b)Such act is done in furtherance of the common intention of all; and

(c)Each of such persons is liable for that act in the same manner as if it were done by him alone.

Participation not always needed

the act mentioned in section 34 need not necessarily be an overt act. Even if it is a covert act, it is
enough to attract the provision, provided it is presumed to have been done by the co- accused in
furtherance of the common intention. In a situation even id he did not actually commit the crime, his
liability will be co-extensive with liability of other accused who actually committed the crime.
The essence of S-34 is simultaneous consensus of the minds of persons participating in the criminal
action to bring about a particular result. Such consensus can develop at the spot as well.
Common Intention

“Common intention” implies a pre-arranged plan and acting in concert pursuant to the plan. though it is
difficult in most cases to prove the intention of an individual, it has to be inferred from the act or
conduct or relative circumstances of the case.

Common Intention can be developed at the spur of the moment

The common intention may be developed on the spur of the moment It may be deduced from the
overt act or conduct of the accused or from other relevant circumstances. The common intention
to bring about a particular result may well develop on the spot as between a number of persons,
with referenceto the facts of the case and circumstances of the situation.1

Common and not similar intention

Common intention requires a pre-arranged plan because before a man can be vicariously
convicted for the criminal act of another, the act must have been done in furtherance of the
common intention of them all. Accordingly, there must have been a priormeeting of minds. When
two accused are convicted under section 302 read with this section and one of the accused is
acquitted in appeal, the other accused cannot be convicted under section 302 simpliciter in the
absence of proof of exact nature of injuries caused by each accused. It cannot be postulated in such
circumstances that the other accused alone caused all the injuries.2 In a case like this each will be
liable for whatever injury he caused but none could be vicariously convicted for the act of any of
the others.3
In furtherance of common intention In view of the phraseology of section 34, existence of
common intention is not enough, the criminal act impugned to attract section 34 must be
committed in furtherance of common intention. all participants in the joint act must either have the
common intention of committing the same offence or the common intention of producing the same
result by their joint act. Where the accused in furtherance of their common intention, struck the
deceased with lathies and a fracture of the skull resulting in death is caused by one of the blows,
the accused are guilty of an offence under section 304, even though it cannot be ascertained which
of the blows was fatal.4
CASE LAWS :- State of UP v. Iftekhaar khan, to attract S-34, there is no requirement in the
prosecution to prove that an overt act was committed by the said individual.
2- Shatrughan Pataar v. Emperor AIR 1990 Patna 111.
3- Barendra kumar Ghosh v. king emperor, Appellant charged and convicted of murder u/s 302
read with s. 34
App claimed – that he was standing outside the room while another man killed sub-postmaster
PC said that- u/s 34 regard must be given to the criminal act, not to the offence as a whole, but to
the totality of series of act which resulted in offence.
JOINT LIABILITY UNDER SECTION 149

Section 149 creates a specific, distinct and substantive offence. Section 149 of the IPC postulates
an assembly of 5 or more persons having a common object and then doing of the act as the
members of it in prosecution of that object. The basis of constructive guilt under section 149 is
mere membership of an unlawful assembly.

Section 149 makes it clear that if an offence is committed by any member of an unlawful
assembly in prosecution of the common object of that assembly, or such as the members of that
assembly knew to be likely to be committed in prosecution of that object, every person who, at the
time of the committing of that offence, is a member of the same assembly, is guilty of that
offence; and that emphatically brings out the principle that the punishment prescribed by section
149 is in a sense vicarious
ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF SECTION 149
For the application of this section, the following elements are necessary:

(i)there must have been an unlawful assembly;

(ii)an offence is committed by a member of that assembly;

(iii) (a)the offence is committed in prosecution of the common object of the assembly; or (b)the
person sought to be made liable knew that the offence was likely to be committed in prosecution of
that common object; and

(iv)such person was a member of the same unlawful assembly at the time of the commission of
the offence.
Unlawful Assembly
Section 141 defines ‘unlawful assembly’. A plain reading of s 141 reveals that the essence of
‘unlawful assembly’ is the combination of five or more persons for committing an offence. To
constitute an ‘unlawful assembly’, the following ingredients need to be established:
(1) That there was an assembly of five or more persons;
(2) They must have a common object; and
(3)The common object must be one of the five specified in the section:
Common Object of Unlawful Assembly
The emphasis of the offence of unlawful assembly is the common object of the members of the
assembly being unlawful. The court said:
What is important in each case is to find out if the offence was committed to accomplish the
common object of the assembly or was one which the members knew to be likely to be
committed. There must be a nexus between the common object and the offence committed and if it
is found that the same was committed to accomplish the common object, every member of the
assembly will become liable for the same. Therefore, any offence committed by a member of the
unlawful assembly in prosecution of any of the five objects mentioned in section 141, will render
his companions constituting the unlawful assembly liable for that offence with the aid of section
149.
It was clarified that since s 149 fastened vicarious responsibility on persons. Even if acts
incidental to the common object are committed to accomplish the common object, it must be
within the knowledge of other members as one likely to be committed in prosecution of the
common object.

CASE LAWS :- Bhim Rao v. State of Maharashtra 2003 CrLJ 1204, Common object of 5 is to
assault, 2 went inside and 3 were standing at the gate, these 3 were not liable because there was
no committee of murder but of assault only.
2. Umesh Singh v. State of Bihar, 2000 CrLJ 3167. , 20 assailants went to paddy field & all
were carrying weapons, one of them killed the child, as they said they would go to any extent,
held liable
3. Shivji v. State of Bihar, Mere presence or mere being part of unlawful assembly would not
make the accused liable until & unless he shares the common object of the group. The court
further says that with reference to 2nd part of 149, mere probability is not what the section talks
about it us positive knowledge which has to be served by the court to apply the section 149 part
 2.
4. Daya krishan v. State of Haryana, even if a person is a member of unlawful assembly until &
unless common object is proved, no liability will issue on such individual. It is necessary for the
application of the section for the prosecution to prove a meeting of minds or in some cases an
overt act which can be attributed to the said individual.
DISTINCTION BETWEEN SECTION 34 AND SECTION 149 IPC

Though both these sections relate to the doctrine of vicarious liability and sometimes overlapwith
each other there are substantial points of difference between the two. They are as under-

(i) Section 34 does not by itself create any specific offence whereas section 149 the Indian Penal
Code, 1860, does so.

(ii) Some active participation, especially in a crime involving physical violence is necessary
under section 34 but section 149 the Indian Penal Code, 1860, does not require it and the
liability arises by reason of mere membership of the unlawful assembly with a common object
and there may be no active participation at all in the preparation and commission of the crime.5

(iii) Section 34 speaks of common intention but section 149 the Indian Penal Code, 1860,
contemplates common object which is undoubtedly wider in its scope and amplitude than
intention. If the offence committed by a member of an unlawful assembly is in prosecution ofthe
common object of the unlawful assembly or members of that assembly knew to be likely to be
committed in prosecution of the common object, all other members of the unlawful assembly
would be guilty of that offence under section 149 IPC,

(iv) Section 34 requires at least two persons who must share the common intention whereas
section 149 the Indian Penal Code, 1860, requires that there must be at least five persons who
must have the same common object.

(v) Common object is different from common intention as it does not require prior and common
meeting of minds , but an unlawful object can develop after people assemble together.
CONCLUSION

The doctrine of joint liability deals with the conditions under which more than one person incurs
responsibility before, during and after committing crimes. When one is accountable for another’s
conduct, it does not matter whether the defendant’s own conduct, the conduct of the other or
others or the conduct of all taken collectively or both together establish the elements of the crime
charged.