206 ICAO Circular 88-AN/74 No. 22 Aer Lingus International Airlines Ltd., Vickers Viscount 808, EI-AKK, accident_at Bristol (Lulsgate) Airport, England, on 21 September 1967. Civil Accident Report No. #4/C/0187, released by the ‘Board of Trade, United Kingdom, on 20 December 1968, GAP. 313 1.1 History of the €Light Before leaving Dublin no landing forecast for Lolsgate vas available but the forecast conditions for Filton, 10 miles north of Lulsgate, were well above the company minina of 260 ft critical height and 800 # RVR. About 25 minutes before commencing the approach to land and whilst the aircraft was on the airvay near Struble, the latest weather conditions for Lulsgate, obtained by radio from air traffic control, showed that there w: 3/8 cloud at 1 000 fe, visibility was 1 500 m with the sun tending to disperse cloud and nist. After leaving the airvay, the aircraft was positioned by Lulegate radar for an approach to runway 28 on a right-hand base leg. At 0752 hours GMI before the final approach was conmenced, the latest weather conditions were passed by the Lulsgate radar controller who vas‘also the approach controller; these conditions shoved a surface wind northerly 8 to 10 kt, QFE 979, QNH 1 O01, visibility in mist 1 800 m, During the final turn on to the approach at 6 miles, the aircraft drifted to the left of the extended centre line vhich was regained closing from left to right during the final descent. At five miles from touch- down, still to the left of the centre line, a descent from 1 500 ft (QFE) was commenced at fa rate of 300 ft per mile with advisory altitudes being passed every half mile, The air was cal and the commander was able to achieve a high degree of precision during the approach; heights were accurately flown during the descent and the aircraft's track, com verging on the centre line, was steady. When the aircraft was between 3 and 34 miles from touchdown, the controller informed it that visibility had deteriorated to 1 200m, At two miles, when steering 295°, the aircraft intercepted the approach centre line and its heading was corrected to 290°! at one and a half miles at 500 ft, a further heading cor~ rection was made on to 287, A drift to the right, avay from the centre line, became apparent when the aircraft was between 1 and 1! miles from touchdown and the controller gave further corrections to the left to 285° and 2800, At one mile from touchdown at 350 feet, a further left correction to 275° was given but the aircraft continued to track to the right of the centre line. At half a mile from touchdown, when the talk-domn was complete, the controller informed the aircraft it was well 0 the right of the centre line and that’s should overshoot if the runvay was not in sight. Shortly afterwards the air- craft was seen, by a controller, heading tovards the control tover before commencing its correct ive turn to the left. The commander, who was at the controls of the aircraft, said it was possible to refer to the ground and natural horizon until passing through about 650 ft when a thin layer of cloud followed by misty conditions required the remainder of the approach to be made on instruments. Whilst descending through 300 ft, the commander asked the co-pilot if he could see anything but just as he replied in the negative the commander saw the approach lights ahead and ro his left and he promptly commenced an 'S' turn to line upICAO Circular 88-AN/74 207 with Lem, As he did so he called for 40° of flap and less power in order to reduce the airspeed from :30 kt to about 112 kt. During this phaseshe lost contact with the Lights “for sone seconds" but he elected to continue the approach because the last reported visibility was 1 200 m and he was confident the runway Lights would shortly appear ahead. When they cane into view the aircraft was over the left-hand side of the runway and not properly aligned with it; the comander safi he attempted to turn on to the runway centre line as he flared out for the landing. During this manoeuvre, although he was not avare of it, the starboard wing tip and No. 4 propeller struck the runvay; the aireraft then touched down on all {ts wheels with considerable port drift, The connander took overshoot action, applying full power, calling for 200 of flap and the undercarriage to be raised; the aispeed had, ia the meanvhile, fallen below 100 kt. The commander realised that the aireraft was not accelerating normally and saw that it vas headed towards butldings on the northern perineter of the aerodrome; rather than risk flying into these obstructions, he flew the aircraft on to the ground with its undercarriage retracting. The aircraft touched down starboard wing first, ground-looped to the right as it slid along the remaining section of thé adjacent runvay, then crashed tail first through a fence. Ten of the occupants of the passenger cabin were injured, three of then seriously; fire did not break out; rescue and fire vehicles arrived promptly on the scene. The accident occurred at 0759 hours. 1.2. Injuries to persons Injuries Crew al Passengers Others, Patal Non-fatal 2 8 None 2 9 1,3 Damage to aircraft The aircraft was danaged beyond repair. 1.4 Other damage The surface of runway 34 and the boundary fence were damaged. 1.5 Grew information Conmander Captain Patrick Vincent Donoghue, aged 33, comnenced employment with Aer Lingus in May 1962, and was appointed captain on Viscount aircraft in April 1965, Captain Donoghue had a valid airline transport pilot's licence and instrument rating, Jesued by the Republic of Ireland; he was last medically examined on 14 September 1967 and was in good health. According to company records Captain Donoghue had a total flying experience of 5 005 hours at the time of the accident; 3 163 hours were in command, of which over 1 300 were on Viscounts. Captain Donoghue was considered by his company to be an above average Viscount pilot, an assessment he had consistently maintained since converting to type. His most recent line and competency checks had been in February and April 1967 respect ively,208 ICAO Circular 88AN/74 Compilot First Officer Niall O'Farrell, aged 26, conmenced employment with Aer Lingus in January 1965; he held a valid senior comercial pilot's licence and an instrument rating issued by the Republic of Ireland, Mr, O'Farrell was last medically examined on 27 June 1967 and was in good health. His total flying experience amounted to 2 200 hours, of which 592 were as co-pilot on Viscounts, Mr, O'Farrell satisfactorily completed line and com petency checks in March and April 1967" respectively and he w sed by his company as a high average co-pilot, 1.6 Aircraft information The aircraft was manufactured by Vickers Armstrongs (Aircraft) Lta., Weybridge, and was registered in the Republic of Ireland on 14 June 1958 in the nane of its present owner. Its certificate of afrvorthiness in the transport of passengers category was last renewed on 4 June 1967, and it had been maintained in accordance with an approved mainte nance schedule; it had flown 214 hours since its last periodic inspection and 18 375 hours since nev, Its weight at the time of the accident was approximately 23 505 kg; the balance chart shows it was loaded correctly with the centre of gravity in mid-range. The maximum certificated landing veight was 26 989 kg and there was no weight restriction for landing at Lulsgate, ‘There were no apparent defects in the aircraft, its instruments, engines, or systems before the accident. 1.7. Meteorological information Synoptic situation On the morning of the accident, @ depression over the North Sea was slow moving and with high pressure to the west of Ireland a mainly northerly airstrean was over the Irish Sea, Over the southern half of England pressure was slack and the airstrean slow-moving; winds at 2 000 ft were northerly, 15 to 20 kt in the west becoming 5 to 10 ke in the east, Weather Visibility was 30 km gradually reducing eastwards to 5 kn east of Cardiff; inland over England fog was widespread but clearing. In the west there was 2/8 to 5/8 cumulus cloud, base 1 200 to 1 500 ft with tops 10 000 to 12 000 fr with isolated showers, but towards Cardiff and eastwards cloud becoming 1/8 to 3/8 stratocumilus, base 3 000 to 4 000 ft. Freezing level was 6 000 fr. Loe: weather conditions ‘An appraisal of weather conditions in the Sonerset-Gloucester area, nade subsequent to the accident by the Meteorological Office, showed the following: "At 0600 hours, fog was patchy over the area with visibilities between 700 m and 2,8'km being reported, Wind was calm or light northerly with variable 1/8 to 5/8 cloud. By 0700 hours, fog had thickened and visibility was generally 300 to 900 m on low ground with sone thicker patches of 100 m. By 0800 hours, fo was clearing though thick patchesICAO Circular 88-AN/74 209 still persisted over low ground in Semerset; visibilities were improving towards 2 km and the wind picking up to 5 kt from the NNW, Some slight drifting of the thicker fog patches would be likely over ground exposed to the north and northwest, also as the fog lifted from the valleys to higher ground before clearing. Around Bristol Airport area at the time of the accident (0759 hours), reports indicate that visibility was mainly around 1 000 m but thicker patches were likely in nearby valleys and these patches were {n the process of clearing. The amount of wind shear on the approach was unlikely to be significant. The pressure gradient was slack with the wind at 2 000 ft around 350° 10 kt and a temperature of plus 7° centigrade. The vertical temperature distribution showed a maximum temperature of about plus 10° centigrade at about 700 ft AMSL with an inversion below that level. The fog vould have been maintained within the inversion and fog near the airport would have been shallow, The maximum temperature difference through the inversion would have been about 5° but at the time of the accident might have been les: Observations by Lulsgate ATC The following conditions were observed by air traffic control officers at Lulagate during the 34-minute period preceding the accident: Time Observations and remarks 0725 hours Visibility 1 500 m with the gun tending to disperse cloud and mist, cloud 3/8 at 1 000 ft, 3/8 at 3 000 ft, wind northerly at 5 to 6 kt, (Passed to aircraft at 0726 hours) 0740 hours Visibility 2 km, 2/8 cloud at 1 000 ft, surface wind 010/06 kt. 0745 to Visibility 1 800 m (passed to aircraft 0752 hours) 0752 hours 0755 hours. Visibility varying between 1 187 and 1 647 m, the lowest visibility of 1 097 m was also assessed at this time but was recorded at about 0757 hours for routine transmission £0 the parent meteorological office, (Visibility of 1 200 m with « deterioration warning was passed to aircraft at approxinately 0757 hours) 0759 hours According to air traffic control, visibility did not reduce aignificantly from the lowest assessment of 1 097 m; when the aircraft crashed its rudder could be clearly seen from the control tower, about 900 m distant, and visibility reference points at 950 and 1 000 m were both in view. Another ATC officer observed the aircraft during its final approach heading towards the control tower, at about 4+ @ mile range. .210 ICAO Circular 88-AN/74 Ground level eyewitnesses A witness located to the right of the approach centre line and about 400 m from the beginning of the runway said that, at the time of the accident, there was thick fog which reduced visibility in that position to less than 50 yd, Patches of fog were also observed on the main Bristol-Lulsgate road (A38) about 20 minutes before the accident. Two ground level eyewitnesses on the aerodrome assessed the visibility at less than 1 000 m across the aerodrome at approximately right angles to the aircraft's landing path, Me: rement of Runvay Visual Range (RVR) and viesbilie; Runway visual range is measured at Lulsgate when the visibility falls below 1100 m, According to air traffic control, Lulsgate, it takes approximately 10 minutes to position an observer on the aerodrome and obtain an RVR reading; in this instance, the deterioration from 1 800 m (0752) to 1 097 m (0755) was so rapid it was not possible to obtain an RVR reading before the sircraft landed; had the aircraft overshot, it would have been possible to do so before a second approach was nade. Visibilities above 1 100 m are assessed by reference to landmarks and buil- dings of known distances fron the control tower; these distances were agreed with the parent meteorological station (Glamorgan) and are checked annually. There is, however, some dif- ficulty in assessing visibilities between 1 000 and 1 500 m across the aerodrome because of an insufficiency of prominent features. On the aerodrone there are two hangars, one at 950 m and the other at 1 000 m; vistbilities greater than 1 000 m and less than 1 500'm can only be estimated. ‘The first two reference pointsbear roughly west and south-west from the con trol tower and are to the right and left of runway 28; a third point, 1 500 m distant, bears roughly north-east from the control tower, It is therefore difficult to decide precisely when an RVR reading becomes necessary. According to ATC Lulsgate, both the 950-metre and 1 000-netre points were clearly visible from the control tower whilst the aircraft vas approaching to land, 1.8 Aids to navigation Ground aid: ‘The ground navigational aid relevant to the aircraft's approach to runway 28 was a Plessey 424 radar with dual head presentation, one of which was avaiting modifica~ tion vas not in operation. Because there was no back-up capability, the installation was promulgated as unserviceable in a Class I NOTAM (Notices to Airmen) on 23 August 1967. This notification was received by Shannon Aeronautical Information Service (AIS) and, on 24 August, it was included in a bulletin of pre-flight navigational warnings which are issued, together with any daily amendnents, by the Department of Transport and Power AIS Briefing Unit at Dublin Airport, The unserviceable status of Bristol radar continued to be published in the daily amenduent sheet until 27 August, when it was withdrawn on the advice of Aer Lingus aircrew because they'gained the impression, through usage, that Bristol radar would in fact be available if required. Since Aer Lingus at Dublin were the only users of Bristol NOTAM information, the NOTAM entry on the bulletin was withdrawn in order to avoid confusion, Briefing officers were avare that the facility would be made available and it was customary for them to query the serviceability state of Bristol radar by tele~ phone or telex, when enquiring about the weather, before briefing the crews and despatching their aircraft.ICAO Circular 88-AN/74 as The equipment was flight checked shortly after the accident by the Civil Aviat. 4, ing Unit and their inspection revealed no gross error in azimuth for the approuci to runway 28, but the range error at one nautical mile from touchdown point on this runvay was 76 ft outside the tolerance of * 484 ft which is applied by the Board of Trade to ite own installations, Bristol radar is not subject to this ruling as it is privately owned and operated by the Municipal authority. Airborne The aircraft was equipped with: Collins Integrated Plight System ‘Twin VHF communication transmitter /receiver H/F transmitter /rece iver ‘Twin VAF navigation receivers and omnibearing selector Twin ADF receivers ‘win RMI Marker beacon receivers ‘Transponder Maps and charts The crew were in possession of the appropriate maps, radio navigation charts and airfield approach charts. Company weather minima for the various let-down and instru~ ment approach procedures are printed on the relevant approach charts. Operations manual An operations manual, issued on the authority of the Flight Operation Manager of Aer Lingus, was carried in the aircraft; it contained, inter alia, instructions and guidance with regard to approaching to land under instrument meteorological conditions. The following extracts from the manual are considered relevant: (a) "Critical Height: That height above aerodrome level at which the the captain must break off his approach, unless he is satisfied that he hae established his position and can continue the approach and landing solely by reference to the runway threshold, runway lighting or approach lighting, and without further reference to non-visual aids." (b) “Critical Height Related to ILS or Radar Approach: The aircraft will ‘not maintain critical height in an endeavour to pick up the lead-in Lights, or in an endeavour to line up subsequently with the runway. Tf an aircraft is not in a position to land after reachine critical height OVERSHOOT ACTION SHOULD BE TAKEN." (c) "General Policy: At an airport where the visibility or cloud base is reported to be less than the company minima, an approach shall not be continued below critical height unless, when reaching critical height, the captain is satisfied that the reported visibility or cloud is inaccurate and that he has adequate slant visibility to complete the approach and landing, visually, in safety. In this context, "adequate slant visibility" may be defined as a fisure at least equivalent to the minimum runvay visual range for the runway in question. Captains should212 ICAO Circular 88-AN/74 bear in mind that slant visibility under certain condit fons of ground fog may suddenly decrease close to the ground. An exception to this occurs when the visibility, passed to the aircraft, is in the form of an RVR. In this case, captains must not descend (except In an emergency) below critical height, unless the last RVR received is equal to or greater than the visibility minimum listed for the particular let-down, The manual also contained a temporary revision (No. 8/67) which deals with landing minima for French airfields and the procedure to be adopted if meteorological con— ditions, on arrival, are reported to be slightly below company minima, Ina table related to a situation where RVR or meteorological visibility deteriorate below company minima when below critical height, the stipulated action is "Break off approach procedure inmediately yaless it is considered that this manoeuvre is less safe than continuing the approach." There were no specific instructions in the Viscount Operations Manual to cater for a situation during an approach to any other airfield when visual contact is lost below critical height, except for that which could be applied in the foregoing sub- paragraph (b), but the meaning of its last sentence is not clear. 1.9 Communications Communication between tif aircraft and air traffic control was entirely satisfactory; speech recording equipment was in use and a transcript was compiled of all radio messages which passed between the aircraft, London airways and Bristol (Lulsgate) ATC, 1,10 Aerodrome and ground facilities Runway 28 is 1 600 m long and 46 m wide; it has a slight uphill gradient and its published elevation 1s 620 ft AMSL, The landing threshold is displaced approximately 100 m from the beginning of the paved surface. Seven centre line high intensity approach Lights, with one cross-bar, extending 410 m from the beginning of the runway are installed ‘on the approach and these were evitched on and serviceable. The runway threshold is marked by green omidirectional wing bar lights which were on and serviceable. Runway Lighting is elevated high intensity and was switched to a top setting at the time of the accident. A single system VASI (visual approach slope indicator) is installed and was switched on and serviceable. All Lighting inetallations were checked by the duty technician during the previous evening. Routine checks of VHF communication channels, Radar (Plessey 424), NDB and VDF installations were made during the early hours of the morning of the accident, all of which were serviceable, 1.11 Flight recorders No flight recorder fitted. 1.12 Wreckage Inspection at the scene of the accident showed the aircraft first struck the surface of runvay 28 with the starboard wing tip at a point 19 ft 6 in to the left of the runvay centre line, and 483 ft from the displaced threshold, At the sane tine, No. 4 pro peller made contact with the eround as evidenced by 44 blade slash marks equally spaced at 33-inch intervals; paint and marks on the runvay surface indicated progressive flattening of the blade contacts tovards the end of the slash mark sequence. The aircraft subsecuent ly touched down on the runway on all wheels 384 ft beyond the point where initial contact was nade by the wing tip. Examination of tire marks on the runway surface shoved the nose wheelICAO Circular 88-AN/74 213, tire contact to be 3 ft 6 in to the right of the starboard main gear tire marks, thus indicating considerable drift to port at touchdown, The tire marks continued for approxi- mately 400 ft veering to the right across the runway; they ceased as they neared the right- hand edge. The aircraft then becane airborne for about 600 ft and passed over the area of grass until the starboard wing tip dug into the ground just before the edge of the up- wind section of runway 34, The aircraft then slid along the surface of runway 34, ground- looping to the right; Nos, 3 and 4 propellers made heavy contact gouging the tarmac surface. The aircraft came to rest in a field 300 ft from che end of the runway, having crashed tail First ' wough the aerodrome boundary fence. In penetrating the fence, the starboard wing was severely damaged by impact with a tree stump and the starboard tip section was torn off. The starboard outer fuel bag had torn open and there was considerable spillage of kerosene, The fuselage was severely distorted and torn open on the starboard side between the wing root fillet and the rear entrance door, The passenger cabin floor was badly buckled but no seats were detached although parts of the floor, and the seats along- side the port windows, were pushed upwards, ‘The safety belts were undamaged. A removable bulkhead by the port side rear entrance door, on the aft face of which was a folding seat which had been occupied by an air hostess, had collapsed rearvards. The undercarriage main Rear was retracted and the nose gear was approximately three-cuarters retracted; the nose wheel doors had jammed due to structural distortion. Port and starboard wing flaps, with the exception of the starboard outer section, were almost completely destroyed during the collision with the fence; the flap selector lever was set at 20°, All flying controls and their associated circuits were serviceable except for damage caused by ground impact. The condition of all propeller units, as apparent on external inspection, was consistent with them being driven under a degree of power at the time of impact; No. 2 propeller complete with reduction gear, had torn off during the latter part of the ground slid Because of the reported sub-normal acceleration during the attempted over- shoot, Nos. 3 and 4 engines and propellers were subjected to detailed strip examination. Calculations based on an assumed forvard epeed of 107 kt (target threshold speed for weight) indicated that No, 4 propeller was functioning within ite normal range of pitch angle commensurate with an engine rpm of about 10 600 at the time of the first Ampact with runway 28, Strip inspection revealed that No. 4 propeller blades had almost achieved a feathered angle during the ground slide on runway 34; nothing untoward was found in No. 4 propeller control system which could have prevented normal operation, The change in pitch angle which apparently occurred between the initial and subsequent impacts cannot be fully explained but, as No. 4 propeller had no known defects and was operating normally before it struck runway 28, it would be reasonable to suppose that twisting and bending forces, together with the rapid opening of the throttles during the attempted overshoot, might well have resulted in spurious signals which caused the blade angle to coarsen. Detailed examination of both starboard engines revealed no evidence of pre- crash failure and, with the exception of No. 4 engine, all damage was consistent with impact. In No. 4 engine, one high pressure turbine blade had failed with very slight secondary damage to the nozzle box but the condition of the failed blade indicated that the engine had run for some hours since the failure. LS Fae There was no fire. No, 1 engine fire extinguisher did not discharge because its associated inertia switches had not operated, Nos, 2, 3 and 4 engine fire extinguishers had operated.214 ICAO Circular 88-AN/74 1.14 Survival aspects ALL passengers and cabin staff were strapped in for landing and injuries vere confined to passengers seated in the last four rows of seats and the cabin staff. The latter had occupied two rearvard-facing occasional seats attached to the aft side of two removable bulkheads, one of which was torn loose during the rearvards retardation. The Injuries sustained resulted from the apparently greater side forces generated in the after cabin than those which existed over the wing or in the forvard section of the fuselage ‘The majority of the injuries were due to sudden contact with seat arn rests, window frames and side structure as the aircraft struck the ground and ground-looped during its crash Yanding. Although the fuselage skin ruptured alongeide a row of seats, no one was injured through contact with the jagged edges of the exposed torn metal, Two pallet loads of freight, 59 and 565 ke respectively, which were stoved in the front compartment, remained securely lashed down. LAs snd_ research Wone. 2. Analysis and Conclusions 2.1 Analysis When the radar controller completed his talk-down the aircraft was half a mile from touchdown; he was aware that the aircraft was ill-positioned for a landing and he rightly advised it to overshoot if the runvay was not in sight. On seeing the approach Lights ahead and to hie left, the conmander attempted to regain the centre line by making an "S" turn side-step manoeuvre which, according to the evidence, was connenced from a lateral displacenent of between 60 and 150 m to the right of the approach centre line when the aircraft was less than 1 000 m from the runway threshold; such a manoeuvre is not easily completed when go close to the runway. Tests carried out on transport aircraft, which included the Viscount, at the RAE in 1955 and 1956 (Aeronautical Research Council R & M No, 3347, HMSO, 1964), showed that 12 to 18 seconds are required to complete this manoeuvre Af commenced 1.800 m from the runway, assuming the runway to be in sight throughout the manoeuvre, which was not so in this instance, It would, nonetheless, seem that on reaching critical height and observing the approach lights on his left, the commander was satisfied "chat he had eetablished his position and could continue his approach and landing solely by reference to the runway .... oF approach lighting" (Aer Lingus Operations Manual); but when he lost contact with the approach lights during this final phase, it would have been a prudent act of airmanship for hin to have discontinued the approach, ‘The Aer Lingus Qperations Manual dees not specify what action the connander should take when visual reference is lost below critical height. This 1s universally recognised as a difficult eituation, but due to the large number of factors involved it {s not practicable to provide specific instructions or positive guidance to meet every case, Hence, the aircraft commander, in the full knowledge of the manoeuvre to which he is already committed, has to assess any other factors pertinent to the particular situation and act accordingly. On this occasion, in retrospect, it is felt that the commander made a mistake in attempting to correct his lateral displacement when so close to the runway threshold without being able to see the runvay or its Lighting, Failure to overshoot at this juncture, or later, when the approach lights were obscured, did not, in itself, cause the accident but it led to a situation which could well have been avoided had the approach been discont inued.ICAO Circular 88-AN/74 215 The commander continued the approach, descending without proper visual guidance, in the belfef that the runway would shortly appear ahead because he had been very recently informed that visibility was 1 200 m, Visibility on the aerodrome was not in fact significantly less but there was an unobserved patch of shallow fog lying on the approach to runway 28 near the aerodrome boundary and there is reason to believe this obscured the approach lights, and probably the runway lights, as the aircraft approached the aerodrome boundary. When the runway came into view the aircraft was not in a position to lands it was at an angle to the runvay heading, passing over the left-hand side and at flare-out height, Whilst attempting to re=position to the centre of the runvay, the starboard wing tip and No. 4 propeller struck the surface ~ a situation which could have been avoided had overshoot action been taken, even at that late stage, instead of attempting a further cor~ rection at a height which was too low to permit the safe application of bank. Tt appears likely that when No. 4 propeller struck the runway, it was damaged to a degree which seriously reduced its propulsive capability; in overshooting at or below 100 kt and with full power séFected on the remaining engines, directional confeol of the aircraft vas probably ‘impaired as well as performance. As may be seen from the reconstructed path (Figures 1 and 2), after striking the runvay the aircraft was probabl¥ yawing and, banking gently to the right under the influence of asymfetric power or as the result of imbalance created by the initial impact with the runway. Had the decision to erash-Lahd been deferred for but a brief period, the consequences might, well have been disastrous, 2.2 Conclusions (a) Findings The aircraft was airworthy and correctly loaded. The crew were properly licensed, There were no vre-crash defects in the aircraft, its related equipment of propulsive systems. Flight inspection of the Plessey 424 radar installation at Lulagate revealed no significant errors in azimuth and only a small error in range at one mile from touchdown, ‘The commander continued the approach when visual guidance became obscured below critical height. JA crash landing became necessary diring an attempted overshoot after the aircraft had touched the ground and sustained damage during a turn at a low height, (>) Causes or Probable cause(s) The accident was caused by an attempt to align the Aircraft with the runway at too low a height following the commander's incorrect decision to continue the approach when visual guidance became obscured below critical height. Scheduled international Landing ~ go-around Wing tip landing ICAO Ref: AR/076/67 Pilot - continued IFR below minimaICAO Circular 88-AN/74 ‘AIRLINES LTD. AT BRISTOL (LULSGATE) AIRPORT (ON 21 SEPTEMBER 1967 ‘ACCIDENT TO VICKERS VISCOUNT 608, ET-AKK, OF AER LINGUS aml | T, ENGLAND. 5, 8