The U.S.

Army: Tanks and the Korean War See Page 7

PB 17-00-5 September-October 2000

 Saddle Up... Tonight We Ride

“Civilians may think it’s a little juvenile to worry about rib- The awarding of commander and CSM coins has also
bons, but a civilian has a house and bankroll to show what spurred controversy. The Army Times noted that the Army is
he’s done for the past four years.” — Bill Mauldin preparing a service-wide policy that will govern who can
issue coins and how much they can spend coining deserving
Want to start a good argument? Introduce the topic of
soldiers. The article led soldiers to write angry rebuttals,
awards into a conversation with military folks. Just about
pointing out many soldiers value a coin more than an award,
everyone, past and present military, can furnish a tale of
and questioning the wisdom of fixing something that was not
some gross injustice involving the awards system. Look to
broke.
recent events, specifically the controversy over the Air Force
and Navy’s awarding of Bronze Stars to colonels who waged I side with the letter writers and vote against any policy that
the battle that was Kosovo from hot spots like: Whiteman Air would impede a commander’s or CSM’s ability to award a
Force Base, Mo.; Ramstein Air Base, Germany; and Naples, coin on the spot to a worthy soldier — I suspect those coins
Italy. Let’s not enter into that fray: the Army did not award become quite special to the awardees.
any Bronze Stars. But take note of one disturbing trend from
Which brings us to my reason for raising this topic — the
that affair — of the 185 Bronze Stars awarded by the Air
U.S. Armor Association’s Saint George Award program.
Force since the conflict in Kosovo stabilized, eight out of
There are few excuses for failing to plan or forecast an
every nine medals have gone to officers, mostly lieutenant
award to allow its presentation before the awardee departs,
colonels and above. Kinda makes you go hmmm...
yet this happens all the time. Offenders recoil in horror at the
In the litany of gripes lodged against the award system, one association’s inability to process the award immediately,
complaint resonates, and that is the appearance of varying “This is a great soldier and we need to get him the award!”
standards, not only between different organizations, but of- Suddenly, the Association and the good ladies who process
ten within the same organization. A previous company the award become the Great Satan and are blamed if the
commander of mine aggressively awarded medals, arguing award is not presented on time. No one should get their
that if he were a civilian employer he could reward his sub- award in the mail or at their next duty station. Of course, this
ordinates with raises or cash bonuses. Since these tools means taking care of soldiers and insuring that the award is
were not available to him, he utilized awards to recognize prepared, processed, and bestowed properly. I also object to
deserving soldiers. But many commanders view this practice soldiers paying for and writing their own award, a practice
differently, toeing the line with a tough stance on awarding that tells a lot about a soldier’s unit and chain of command.
medals, fearing a diluted awards system. (In 1998, the Army Unfortunately, we see this all too often.
recognized one in every 2.2 soldiers for distinguished
Finally, the criteria for the Saint George awards are clear.
achievement or service, awarding either the Legion of Merit,
Please do not ask us to make an exception. We view our
Meritorious Service Medal, Army Commendation Medal, or
role as guardians at the gate, protecting the award for those
the Army Achievement Medal.) However, when soldiers of a
who wear it. Bending or violating the criteria to gain the St.
like rank gather at schools, they often find a disparity in med-
George Award does a disservice to all those who have
als earned for similar achievements. Commanders have a
earned it.
tough task in striking a balance while preserving the worth of
an award. — D2

By Order of the Secretary of the Army: Official:

ERIC K. SHINSEKI
JOEL B. HUDSON
General, United States Army
Administrative Assistant to the
Chief of Staff
Secretary of the Army
0021601
 The Professional Development Bulletin of the Armor Branch PB 17-00-5

Editor-in-Chief Features
MAJ DAVE DAIGLE
7 Tanks and the Korean War: A Case Study in Unpreparedness
by George F. Hofmann, Ph.D.
Managing Editor
13 The Army and Society: Some Perspectives for the 21st Century
JON T. CLEMENS by Colonel (Ret.) Michael D. Mahler

Commandant 16 Mobs, Refugees, and Armor: Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures

by Major Robert G. Ivy
MG B. B. BELL
18 Gulf War Story in ARMOR Cited for Distinguished Writing
19 “Fight Your Tank, Sergeant” by Master Sergeant Dennis White
ARMOR (ISSN 0004-2420) is published bi- 20 Before There Was Digitization: How MG J.S. Wood’s 4th AD
monthly by the U.S. Army Armor Center, 4401
Stormed Across France Without Written Orders
Vine Grove Road, Fort Knox, KY 40121.
by Major Donald E. Vandergriff
Disclaimer: The information contained in AR-
MOR represents the professional opinions of 28 Force XXI Planning Using the Maneuver Control System
the authors and does not necessarily reflect by Captain Michael Dane Acord
the official Army or TRADOC position, nor 30 What Were We Thinking? A Collection of “Interesting” Ideas from ARMOR
does it change or supersede any information
presented in other official Army publications. 34 The Battle of Cambrai by Captain Kristafer Ailslieger
Official distribution is limited to one copy for 37 Leadership in the XXI Century — Digital Age
each armored brigade headquarters, armored by Major James K. Morningstar
cavalry regiment headquarters, armor battalion
headquarters, armored cavalry squadron head- 40 Scheduled Services: A “Pay Me Now or Pay Me Later” Proposition
quarters, reconnaissance squadron headquar- by CW3 Kevin L. Cox, Sergeant First Class Joseph N. Pishner Jr.,
ters, armored cavalry troop, armor company, and Lieutenant Colonel Peter D. Utley
and motorized brigade headquarters of the
United States Army. In addition, Army libraries, 46 Victory in the Red Zone by Captain Bill A. Papanastasiou
Army and DOD schools, HQ DA and MACOM 51 Platoon Leadership in the Offense by Captain Celestino Perez
staff agencies with responsibility for armored,
direct fire, ground combat systems, organiza- 54 Army Officers Operate Web Site For Company Commanders
tions, and the training of personnel for such
organizations may request two copies by 55 HistoryChannel.com Launches Veterans.com
sending a request to the editor-in-chief. 55 Bradley Exhibit Opens This Fall at the National Infantry Museum
Authorized Content: ARMOR will print only by Diane L. Urbina
those materials for which the U.S. Army Armor
56 Digital Courseware Offers New Opportunities
Center has proponency. That proponency
includes: all armored, direct-fire ground com- For Training and Self-Development by Captain Dan Dwyer
bat systems that do not serve primarily as 61 T-90 Russian Main Battle Tank Poster
infantry carriers; all weapons used exclusively Threat Branch, Directorate of Force Developments
in these systems or by CMF 19-series enlisted
soldiers; any miscellaneous items of equip- Back Patton Museum Vehicles Roar Again in WWII Reenactment
ment which armor and armored cavalry or- Cover Photos by Robert Stevenson
ganizations use exclusively; training for all SC
12A, 12B, and 12C officers and for all CMF-
19-series enlisted soldiers; and information Departments
concerning the training, logistics, history, and
leadership of armor and armored cavalry units 2 Contacts
at the brigade/regiment level and below, to 3 Letters
include Threat units at those levels. 5 Commander’s Hatch
6 Driver’s Seat
Material may be reprinted, provided credit is
57 Reviews
given to ARMOR and to the author, except
where copyright is indicated.
Periodicals Postage paid at Fort Knox, KY, and additional mailing offices. Postmaster: Send address changes to Editor, ARMOR,
ATTN: ATZK-TDM, Fort Knox, KY 40121-5210.
Distribution Restriction: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
September-October 2000, Vol. CIX, No. 5 USPS 467-970
 Directory — Points of Contact
DSN prefix – 464-
Commercial prefix– (502) 624-

ARMOR Editorial Offices U.S. Army Armor Center

Editor-in-Chief Commanding General (ATZK-CG)
MAJ Dave Daigle 2249 MG B. B. Bell 2121
E-Mail: [email protected] E-Mail: [email protected]
Managing Editor Deputy Commanding General (ATZK-DCG)
Jon T. Clemens 2249 BG Terry Tucker 7555
E-Mail: [email protected] E-Mail: [email protected]
Editor Chief of Staff (ATZK-CS)
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COL Matthew L. Smith 8247
U.S. Army Armor School E-Mail: [email protected]
TRADOC System Manager for Force XXI (ATZK-XXI)
Director, Armor School (ATSB-DAS) COL Brett H. Weaver 4009
COL Robert T. Gahagan 1050 E-Mail: [email protected]
E-Mail: [email protected]
TRADOC System Manager for Abrams (ATZK-TS)
Armor School Sergeant Major (ATSB-CSM) COL James H. Nunn 7955
CSM Terry McWilliams 7091 E-Mail: [email protected]
E-Mail: [email protected]
Mounted Maneuver Battlespace Battle Lab (ATZK-MW)
NCO Academy (ATSB-NC) COL Dennis J. Szydloski 7809
CSM James E. Dale 5150 E-Mail: [email protected]
E-Mail: [email protected]
Office, Chief of Armor (ATZK-AR)
16th Cavalry Regiment (ATSB-SBZ) COL John L. Ballantyne 1272
COL John Antal 7848 E-Mail: [email protected]
E-Mail: [email protected] FAX 7585
1st Armor Training Brigade (ATSB-BAZ) Special Assistant to the CG (ARNG) (ATZK-SA)
COL William J. Blankmeyer 6843 COL D. Allen Youngman 1315
E-Mail: [email protected] E-Mail: [email protected]

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2 ARMOR — September-October 2000

Mech Commander Adds Detail of our night laager and returned without find- In 1970, on my second tour, I flew over
About Suoi Tre Account ing a crossing on the Soui Mat. (Little did we Suoi Tre. The rectangle where we buried the
know, but at that point the Soui Mat was a 647 Viet Cong could be clearly seen at 1,000
dry bed with firm, fairly level ground that feet. The weather was clear with no clouds in
Dear Sir: could not be seen from the air and not read- the sky, unlike that day in March.
I enjoyed the article on “The Battle of Suoi ily identified on the ground due to the dense
growth.) It was planned that after stand-to COLONEL A. J. FERREA
Tre,” written by First Sergeant Christopher P. U.S. Army, Retired
Worick in your May-June 2000 issue of the next morning, to go east from where the
recon element stopped the previous night via email
ARMOR. I know it is difficult to gather first-
hand detailed information on an action after and look for another crossing site. as the
30+ years. The author has done a fine job, jungle was so dense we could not see the Clarifying British and Canadian Use
all things considered. There are a few items I meandering of the stream nor any place to Of Converted Armor as APCs
would like to furnish that might be of impor- cross by following its path from the air.
tance from my first-hand point of view as When the attack on FSB Gold started on Dear Sir:
commander of the 2/22 Inf (Mech) during this the morning of March 21, I established the
operation. order of march from the laager with TF 2/22 I just got the July-August ARMOR, a good
elements leading. They were to establish a issue with a wide range of articles. Some-
The 2/22 Inf (Mech) joined up with the 2/34 thing to please everyone, if that is ever pos-
Armor (-) on March 18 to cross the Bach trail from the recon platoon’s northern pene-
tration and go due east towards FSB Gold. sible.
Sohn Doi near its junction with the Soui Mat
stream. The Armor battalion had 18 tanks In my command helicopter, I was able to One small point caught my eye. In CPT
and a tank retriever (M-88), plus their head- orbit the lead vehicle and direct its travel Leaf’s article on “MOUT and the 1982 Leba-
quarters vehicles. To facilitate operations, through the least dense areas and shortest non Campaign,” his note 14, describing the
we cross-attached elements to establish the line (it was approximately 2,500 meters) to use of armored self-propelled gun carriers
task forces as follows: FSB Gold. All vehicles traveled in column, for troop transport in British service in Nor-
with the M113s widening the trail to facilitate mandy, ends with the sentence, “The idea
2/22 Inf (M) (-) the tanks’ movement through the trees. At did not take hold, due mainly to a lack of
Co B, 2/22 Inf (M) the same time we were moving east, the desire by the artillery to ferry troops around.”
2/12 Inf was recalled from an area northwest This may seem strange to some readers,
Co C, 2/22 Inf (M)
of FSB Gold where it had gone on an opera- and I hope the following will clear the matter
Co A, 2/34 Armor tion on March 20. On entering the clearing in up.
the southwest corner of FSB Gold, the com-
2/34 Armor (-) The vehicles used were at one time SP
bined elements of 2/22 Inf (M) and 2/34 Ar-
Co C, 2/34 Armor mor TF moved in column in a counterclock- guns, in fact the U.S. M7 105mm HMC,
Co A, 2/22 Inf (M) wise direction around the base to secure the known as “Priests” in British service. These
SW, SE & NE sectors with the 2/12 Inf the were based on the M3-series medium tank,
with further internal cross attachments. with the fighting compartment replaced with
NW sector. Once the perimeter was closed
The crossing site was just north of a fire and secured, close-in operations continued, an open-topped, protected box with the
support base at Xa Loc Ninh occupied by B to include the retrieval of the FAC team from standard M2A1 105mm howitzer mounted to
Btry, 2/35th Arty (155 SP) and B Btry, 2/32 the airplane, about 1,000 meters south of fire with limited traverse through the front
Arty (8 in. and 175 mm) that provided sup- FSB Gold, by the 2/22 Inf (M) recon platoon. plate. First used at El Alamein in 1942, they
port for our operation and FSB Gold. After equipped several British and Canadian artil-
Many people have written about this opera- lery units in the assault waves on D Day,
crossing the rivers, both task forces moved tion, and there have been many variations to
north on the west side of Soui Mat stream in firing from landing craft during the landing
sort out. I hope that my comments above will approaches and then employed as mobile
column to ease passage through the dense aid in visualizing the operation from my
trees with the 2/22 TF leading. We were artillery. As the 105mm was not a standard
viewpoint. There were many problems using caliber in Commonwealth service, their stan-
looking for another crossing site to get on the tanks in the heavy jungle, as stated by 1LT
east side of the Soui Mat as it generally ran dard towed and SP field gun being the
Danny Hollister in the article. It was bad 25pdr, the vehicles were soon taken out of
to the northwest, away from FSB Gold. The enough for the M113s, but the terrain dic-
lower end was very boggy and the AVLBs service. For use as troop carriers, Canadian
tated where you could and could not go with mechanics removed the guns and plated
could not span this area after their initial heavy armored vehicles vs. the M113s.
employment. At the end of March 18, we had over the aperture as a quick-fix measure, the
moved about 2,000 meters north, paralleling conversion being designed to be reversible.
the Soui Mat without finding a suitable cross- COL RALPH W. JULIAN (Ret.) Used during the Normandy bridgehead Op-
ing site. The AVLBs used to cross the river Highlands Ranch, Colo. eration TOTALISE, these vehicles, dubbed
and the lower part of Soui Mat were returned “Unfrocked Priests” but commonly known as
to their base as their size would pose many “Kangaroos,” were thought to have been
problems going through the heavy under- More Detail Added sufficiently successful to lead to more per-
By Another Suoi Tre Leader manent employment.
growth in the jungle and there were no
identifiable sites for their immediate use. What resulted was another Canadian effort,
On March 19, we continued moving north Dear Sir: but more so. The carrier vehicle used was
parallel to the Soui Mat and again moved the Canadian Ram, a medium tank — a
about 2,000 meters conducting operations in As an author of an advanced course mono- “Cruiser” in Commonwealth parlance — with
zone and seeking a crossing site to the east graph on the battle of Suoi Tre and a platoon the turret removed. The Ram was also de-
without success. leader in A Company, 2-34 Armor (my pla- rived from the U.S. M3 series, but unlike that
toon was OPCON to 2-22 INF) during the vehicle’s trademark side-mounted 75mm
March 20th saw a continuation of the move fight, I want to say that First Sergeant Chris- main gun and small gun in the turret, the
north, approximately 2,000 meters, with topher P. Worick has done a superb job on Ram was in many ways like the M4 Sherman
some skirmishes, but no success with a his account of the battle. I would add that in that it was a conventional design. Re-
crossing site. The recon platoon of the 2/22 the commander of the 2nd Bn, 77th Arty was garded in mid-1944 as obsolescent as a gun
Inf (M), which had been in the lead at this LTC John W. Vessey, who distinguished tank due to its small, 57mm 6pdr gun, and
time, had stopped about 1,000 meters north himself in the four-hour battle. superseded in Canadian armored units by

ARMOR — September-October 2000 3

Shermans, there were enough in England for ing for transportation. For the most part, the upon for every small conflict occurring in a
conversions to be made, and a new unit, 1st Abrams and Bradley vehicles cannot operate Third World country, but we must be pre-
Canadian Armoured Carrier Regiment, was in Third World countries due in part to inade- pared for the next major conflict that breaks
formed to crew them. After more successful quate roads, bridges, and railroads. There- out. The light force will be the one that must
use, a British unit — 49th Armoured Person- fore, we need a light force that can be de- fit its vehicles and crews into C-130 aircraft,
nel Carrier Regiment — was formed from ployed by air and at a moment’s notice. This fly in, close with and destroy the enemy,
49th Royal Tank Regiment. Both units were force must be able to defend itself and our whenever and wherever it may be.
part of the British 79th Armoured Division, interests until — if needed — our heavy
the home formation for specialist armor such forces can arrive. KARLEN P. MORRIS
as flail mine clearers, armored engineer SSG, 2/123 AR
vehicles, and flame throwers. As stated in his letter, LTC Kojro is con- KYARNG
cerned about crew survivability. The U.S. did
In Italy, the same idea was also employed not field a crew-survivable tank until the M1
in the later stages of the campaign using was developed. The Armor force that cru- Kudos, and Comments On
converted Priests and war-wary Sherman saded through Europe in WWII did not fight Fort Knox’s New MOUT City
gun tanks with guns or turrets respectively in crew-survivable tanks, let alone the fact
removed. Postwar, the British army contin- that they were out-gunned, out-armored, and Dear Sir:
ued to use Ram Kangaroos for some years, thin-skinned. The M48- and M60-series I am consistently impressed with ARMOR
while the Canadians went on to convert tanks were not crew-survivable, with ex- Magazine. Please pass to your staff the
some of the late-model Sherman M4A2 posed hydraulic lines and open ammunition great job they do. You guys bring more
tanks they purchased from the USA. storage. The M1 is crew-survivable and that meaningful “stuff” to the field than any other
is the main reason it is now too heavy for pub. I appreciate the way you always include
An account of the wartime Canadian unit,
quick deployment. Why is the M1 70 tons of historical vignettes to reinforce learning
written and published by a veteran of the
rolling steel? So that it can survive heavy points, the way you allow even the most
unit, “The Canadian Kangaroos in World War
tank-to-tank fighting with an enemy that has junior Armor soldier to sound off in letters to
II — The Story of 1st Canadian Armoured
greater massed armor. Is crew survivability a the editor, the way you present tactical TTPs
Carrier Regiment, Canada’s Foreign-born
risk we can afford? As bad as it sounds, that will, I assure you, one day save lives.
Secret Regiment” by Kenneth R Ramsden,
YES! Is it something we have done before? The highlight of Gen. Starry, and the article
was reviewed by this author for ARMOR in YES.
the March-April 1999 issue. An historical about armor defending the firebase, were
account of the unit and modeling details also Before the letters start to pour in, let me super (May-June 2000). Seems like the rest
appear in the British magazine MILITARY explain. Will this light force be facing a of the Army wants to dump lessons learned
MODELLING, Vol. 30, No. 8, July-August massed armor enemy? NO. The light force from Vietnam. I’m glad you continue to high-
2000. Online, accounts can be seen linked will not be designed to go against an enemy light them.
from the “Maple Leaf Up” site http://www. with a heavy tank capability. What can light
One minor thing: In the May-June 2000 is-
mapleleafup.org and “Canadian Tracks” forces be expected to go up against? Some
sue, you show a pic of the MOUT city at
http://www.magma.ca/~tracks/. of these countries have had some armor
Knox. Whoever designed it did a super job,
capabilities, but not all. There has been
I hope this will interest ARMOR readers but I’ve yet to go to a European or Asian city
plenty of light armor and regular military
and add a little more to the varied history of that allowed such easy trafficability for ar-
vehicles, but there is a good chance [the
armor. mor. Suggest they add on someday, with a
enemy] will be militia in pick-up trucks with
PETER BROWN cluster of buildings that replicate such tight
20mm cannons mounted in the bed.
Poole, Dorset conditions.
So, what are the light forces going to be Keep up the excellent work!
defending themselves against? RPGs, mor-
Swallowing a Bitter Pill: tars, mines, 20 and 30mm cannon, and GEORGE W. WHEELOCK
Armor Must Lighten Up maybe the occasional T-54/55 or T-62. Can MAJ, Infantry
the LAV and HMMWV survive engagements Battalion Commander, Army ROTC
with the above mentioned? If so, then that is Michigan Technological University
Dear Sir: what we are looking for. What about fire-
power? If you look in the Janes book on
In response to the letter “Armored Cars armor vehicles, you will see many types of Book Review Was a Rare Critique
Squander Research Money” in the July- vehicles with many different firepower capa- Of a Sensitive Personnel Issue
August issue, there is a problem. The Armor bilities. The LAV has several, and several
community must accept and swallow a bitter countries, including some of our Allies, field Dear Sir:
pill. The M1A1/A2 Abrams and the M2/3 many variations.
Bradley vehicles are the weapons of choice I was surprised, but interested, to read the
in a major conflict should U.S. forces fight The Army shouldn’t have to spend money review of Stephanie Gutmann’s book about
another heavy force, but they will not be the on research and development for light force women in the military. Surprised, as I believe
weapons used to fight small regional con- vehicles when this has already been done by there is a concentrated effort on the part of
flicts. These vehicles are, as stated, main our allies. The Army should explore up- top generals to suppress any criticism of the
battle vehicles. Not since Desert Storm has grades or improvements to our current fleet feminization of the U.S. Army. I am still wait-
the United States been put up against a and the existing available light vehicles used ing for any top flag officer to tell the truth
force that has massed armor capabilities. by others around the world. Have we ex- about what this is doing to morale, stan-
Nor have we been called on against a force hausted the realm of weapons that can be dards, discipline, and combat readiness. I
that outnumbers us 15 or 20 to one, vehicle transported on the HMMWV? What about have waited in vain to read a factual refuta-
to vehicle. the punch a Javelin team can add to a light tion with hard, pertinent evidence by any flag
force? Is a sabot-capable 90mm gun avail- officer of Mitchell’s book, Women in the Mili-
Look at the last 20 years. Where have we able for the LAV? These are the kinds of tary: Flirting With Disaster. It is this refusal
deployed? Grenada, Panama, Somalia, Haiti, questions that should be explored.
Bosnia and Kosovo. Our heavy forces were
only deployed to two of these small conflicts I think the Armor/Cavalry community must
and that was after several months of prepar- accept the fact that we may not be called Continued on Page 55

4 ARMOR — September-October 2000

 Major General B. B. Bell
Commanding General
U.S. Army Armor Center

A Chief of Armor Update:

The Combat Armor Badge
In this update, I’d like to address the tough, challenging, full spectrum mis- a cavalry scout in Kosovo, an armor
potential for establishing a Combat sions. These range from lethal direct crewman in Bosnia or Korea, a drill
Armor Badge. During General Shin- fire combat, to peace enforcement, to sergeant at Fort Knox, or an AC/RC
seki’s Armor Conference briefing, one peacekeeping, to presence, to recruit- NCO at Fort McCoy, Wisconsin, be-
of the great scout NCOs here at the ing, training, and preparing future war- cause that is where the Army asked
Armor Center asked him when he, the riors for their place in the force. The them to contribute to the Nation’s na-
CSA, was going to approve a Combat reality is that all Armor warriors stand tional security effort? I for one don’t
Armor Badge. Up front, this was a ready to serve, and each serves as his think we should separate the two with a
valid question from an Armor SFC who Nation calls. Following Desert Storm, badge, a badge that would address ser-
looks at his Infantry brethren and sees a we all looked each other in the eye and vice only, and not necessarily valor or
Combat Infantry Badge and wonders reflected on the great training and mis- courage in combat. It would create the
why he too didn’t receive a recognition sion readiness of the force. We stood haves and have nots by inspection of
badge for his service in Desert Storm. by the principle that our entire Armor the BDU uniform only. I believe deeply
As you may know, this issue has come force was trained and ready to win the that we should separate the haves from
up from time to time over the years. first battle of the next war, and the De- the have nots by reviewing their per-
There is no single best answer and all sert Storm force did just that. We rec- formance in whatever job the Army
sides have sound, defensible argu- ognized that those who were not called sends them to do — not by just inspect-
ments. On the surface, the establish- forward were also trained and ready ing their BDUs.
ment of a CAB would seem to have and would have served with distinction
great value to our force, and would had their units been sent into the com- The second reason I can’t champion a
CAB is the impact on the Army overall.
certainly recognize the Armor warriors bat zone. We all vowed not to penalize I don’t think the proposal would pro-
who have served with distinction in those who did not serve in that war —
combat when our nation called. How- just because they were not called on. I mote unit cohesion or unity of the
combined arms team. Our goal is to
ever, upon further consideration and as stand by that promise today — not just forge a cohesive combat team that
Chief of Armor, I cannot support the regarding the Desert Storm force, but
establishment of a Combat Armor regarding the full range of Armor as- fights and wins collectively. The CAB
proposal would contribute to overriding
Badge. Here’s why. signments. unit cohesion with personal attributes,
There are two overriding arguments I believe that soldiers should stand out and tend to fragment the “have” Armor
that tell me the CAB is not right for our and be recognized for their selfless soldiers from the quality combat sup-
force. First is the potentially divisive service and performance, not just for port personnel who fight alongside
nature of such an award, and second is the location of their service. Our Army them in war. When we put a recce pla-
its impact on the overall Army. Let me recognizes conduct in combat with a toon on the ground in a combat zone,
discuss each of these points. range of appropriate and time-honored do we recognize the 19D scout with a
medals for valor. We recognize partici- CAB, then disregard the contribution of
In my view, the establishment of the pation in a designated combat operation the 97B counter-intelligence soldier at
CAB could be divisive in the Armor by authorizing every participant to his side who is assigned to that same
force and create an impression and cul- wear his or her unit’s patch on the right scout squad by TO&E?
ture of “haves and have nots.” We rou- shoulder. Should we authorize a CAB
tinely call on our great Armor and Cav- for service with a unit in combat, while
alry warriors to perform a variety of at the same time minimizing the role of Continued on Page 54

ARMOR — September-October 2000 5

 CSM Carl E. Christian
Command Sergeant Major
U.S. Army Armor Center

Branch-Qualifying Time Requirement

Provides More Opportunities for Armor NCOs
Time and time again, I am asked grade is Qualified, and an NCO who it continues to change to meet the needs
about the 18-month requirement for has not met the 18-month time re- of an ever-changing world environ-
certification of position as section ser- quirement in a leadership branch- ment. I have heard it said that soldiers
geant or tank commander, platoon ser- qualified position at the current grade are being asked to do more then they
geant, and first sergeant. There are level is Least Qualified. So, it is defi- used to have to do. That is true, partly
many who ask, why do we have the nitely important that NCOs seek and because the equipment allows the sol-
time requirement? Is it really such a big fulfill the 18-month requirement of dier to do more, and also because tacti-
deal if I do not serve the 18 months leadership branch-qualifying positions. cal situations require it. But just be-
before I do something else? Some oth- cause, 10 or 15 years ago, a platoon
The 18-month time period was se-
ers say it is too short a time for a leader lected because this appeared to be the sergeant may have been in position for
to truly become proficient in his job 6 to 8 years does not mean that we need
level; they say leaders should perform normal cycle of time for a unit to go to do this today. We must constantly
through several key events that are
their duties longer in these leadership critical in the development of leaders. measure what we need of our leaders
positions. Still others ask about the and assess their ability to meet that
challenges of getting into branch-qual- Some of these events are: FTX, gun- need. It cannot be argued that the more
nery, CI, monthly counseling of sol-
ifying positions, compared to TDA diers, mentoring soldiers for promotion times someone has to do a certain task,
positions that are vital to our Army. the better they normally become at the
Whichever side you’re on, the fact is and ARTEP, to name a few. I do admit task. Once a leader has proven exper-
that there are units who may do the
that we will continue to have such a training events faster or slower then 18 tise of a certain task at his current job
requirement in the Armor Force. level, senior leaders must note this and
months. However, in most cases, 18 assist the NCO in mastering the other
Each promotion board gets some months is the minimal time a leader
guidance, sent to the president of the will get to see everything one time and skills that are required of him at this
grade. Only after he has mastered all
board, for selecting the best Armor even that may not be enough to make the tasks required of a qualified leader
NCOs for promotion. This board guid- that NCO proficient in leading with
ance is always available for anyone to enough technical and tactical expertise in his current grade should leaders al-
low the NCO to progress onto the next
review by going to the Fort Knox at that current grade level. Senior lead- level of leadership responsibility.
Home Page. Board guidance always ership must counsel the NCO and tell
states that an NCO who has served 18 them how they are doing, or not doing, Having NCOs perform duties in TDA
months in the leadership branch-quali- as it pertains to branch qualification. It assignments is crucial to the success of
fying position at current grade and has is key for soldiers to receive counseling our Army. There are many positions
served in a leadership position of the if they are to be successful in promo- that fall into this category, such as AC/
next higher grade is regarded as Best tion, at all levels. RC duty, drill sergeant duty, recruiter
Qualified. An NCO who has served at
least 18 months in the leadership The Army and the Armor Force is dif-
branch-qualifying position of current ferent then it was several years ago, and Continued on Page 18

6 ARMOR — September-October 2000

Tanks and the Korean War:
A Case Study in Unpreparedness
by George F. Hofmann, Ph.D., University of Cincinnati

“I believe we need to read the lessons

closely lest we repeat, at inestimable
cost, the mistakes for which we paid so
dear a price.”
General Matthew B. Ridgway
The Korean War (1967)

As the U.S. Army went to war in Ko-

rea in June 1950, it once again found
itself unprepared to fight and win the
first and succeeding battles.1 In order to
understand why the Army was unpre-
pared, we must examine the postwar
development of doctrine regarding
mechanized warfare with tanks as the
main maneuver element.
On the eve of the Korean War, the na- Although the U.S. had developed more modern tanks, the WWII-era Sherman M4A3E8s
tion’s defense establishment had set carried the burden of much of the fighting early in the Korean War.
aside much of what had been learned
about the conventional combined arms
armor doctrine so successfully demon-
strated in Western Europe in World War Department Equipment Board,” achieved by occupying the enemy’s
War II, and instead had begun to de- the Stilwell Board, which was named territory.3
pend on nuclear weapons delivered by after its president, the respected Gen- Based on another recommendation of
air power. As this was happening, the eral Joseph W. Stilwell. Based on im-
mediate postwar reports from Europe the Stilwell Board, the commander of
Army was digesting the war’s lessons, the Army Ground Forces, General
attempting significant changes in or- on tactical employment of armored and Jacob L. Devers, disbanded the tank
ganizations, weapons systems devel- infantry divisions, one of its many rec-
ommendations called for establishment destroyer branch. Tank destroyer doc-
opment, and doctrine, based on the trine was no more than an early World
success of the combined arms approach of a combined arms force to conduct War II defensive response to the threat
developed during the war. extended service tests of new weapons
and equipment. The board suggested of mechanized warfare and its main
It was quite evident that the tank had ground maneuver element, the tank.
that this proposed combined arms force But as the war progressed, tanks im-
revolutionized battlefield dynamics. formulate a doctrine for its employ-
The armored force that swept across ment, specifically aimed at providing a proved and accounted for most of the
Europe had learned some important tank-on-tank combat. By the end of the
ready force quickly available for any war, the M26 Pershing tank offered
lessons, chiefly that it was essential for military contingency.
ground forces and tactical air to fight in better armor protection than the open-
combination, and that tanks could not The report proposed three types of turreted tank destroyers and mounted a
operate independently in battle. An- tanks: a light tank for reconnaissance 90mm gun as good or better than the
4
other lesson was that it was important and security; a medium tank capable of guns on the TDs.
to have tank units organic to infantry assault action, exploitation, and pursuit;
divisions, and consequently, a tank and a heavy tank capable of assault As the Army was steeply down-sizing,
battalion was made organic to each action and breakthrough. The board it would be difficult, if not impossible,
infantry division to assist in the as- also recognized the importance of de- to implement the Stilwell Board’s rec-
sault.2 Armor was expected to exploit veloping components specifically for ommendations. The cuts were so dras-
the breakthrough, then strike out to tanks rather than relying, as in the past, tic that during his tour as Army Chief
pursue the enemy. In short, the Army on standard automotive components. It of Staff, between November 1945 and
believed that the combined arms team, was now accepted that the tank was a February 1948, General of the Army
built around the tank, could make op- special vehicle. Finally, the board Dwight D. Eisenhower remarked that
erational level exploitation possible. based its recommendations on the idea implementing the rapid demobilization
that the next war would again be total, of the wartime army was more unpleas-
One doctrinal milestone emerged in with the use of air power and atomic ant than being head of the occupation
January 1946, with the “Report of the weapons, and that victory could only be forces in Germany. His tenure as Chief

ARMOR — September-October 2000 7

of Staff, Eisenhower noted, was full of outgoing Army Chief of Staff stated
frustrations. The wartime Army was that the Army had in essence purchased
falling apart, rather than demobilizing, no new equipment, including tanks,
while he was struggling with Congress “The Army suffered the most under since World War II. Therefore the
over budgetary problems and the public the fiscal restraints of the legislative Army, he warned, was in no situation
outcry to “bring the boys home.” Add- branch, having its appropriations, to train and arm its troops adequately to
ing to this dilemma, troop discontent especially for research and devel- meet demands of emerging interna-
over inequities in demobilization al- opment, cut each year until the war tional threats. Consequently, the ground
most turned into a mutiny. Eisenhower broke out in Korea....” forces reported state of readiness to
struggled with the need to redeploy the deal with contingencies and defensive
Army for occupation duties in Ger- plans were nothing but “mere scraps of
many, Austria, Japan, and Korea, and paper,” Eisenhower concluded.11
there was an ongoing debate over the Army’s future became even more
unification of the military services.5 vague. Senator Robert A. Taft, an in- Military manpower continued to de-
fluential Republican isolationist, chal- cline, not for a lack of volunteers, but
Speaking on national security at the lenged the country’s postwar role in due to Army budget cuts. Despite an
Nebraska Fair in Lincoln on August 31, internationalism, and was a proponent increasingly turbulent new world order,
1947, General Devers observed that of limited government. The Ohio sena- the home front was more preoccupied
during the two years after the end of tor was not enthusiastic about commit- with its move to suburbia, concern over
hostilities in Europe and the Pacific, the ting U.S. ground forces in Europe. In- rising prices and inflation, labor unrest,
United States demobilized the Army stead he supported the Navy and a pol- a crisis in education, housing shortages,
and Navy, “until it became evident that, icy of reliance on air power and nuclear and tax disputes. Meanwhile, the Na-
with every reduction in the power at weapons for national defense.9 tional Defense Act of 1947 had sepa-
our disposal, there was a corresponding rated the Air Force from the Army,
deterioration in the international situa- Adding to the Army’s predicament giving it equal status with the Army
tion.”6 Even before the war had ended was the influence of atomic bomb sci- and Navy. The new Defense Depart-
in Europe, the Secretary of State ad- entist and author Vannevar Bush, who ment establishment, under a civilian
vised the War Department of serious was head of the Office of Scientific head with cabinet status, was intended
deterioration of relations with the So- Research and Development during to improve wartime operations of the
viet Union. A year later, Secretary of World War II, and beginning in Sep- services, but instead politicized the
State James Byrnes had painted a very tember 1947, the director of the Joint process, making it difficult to establish
pessimistic picture regarding Soviet Research and Development Board, cre- centralized planning due to multiser-
aggressive tendencies in Eastern Eur- ated to resolve technological differ- vice bickering and squabbling amongst
ope.7 These developments made the in- ences between the several departments the service chiefs. This increased the
ternational situation more unstable, yet and agencies in the military establish- competition for military technology
the President was implementing a de- ment. Earlier he had suggested to Con- funding during a period of budget con-
fense policy based on deep cuts in con- gress that the military limit its work to straints.
ventional military expenditures in favor improvements in existing equipment
rather than perusing technological de- With the technologically driven air
of reliance on nuclear power delivered
by air. velopment. Shortly before the war power proponents striving to achieve a
started in Korea, Bush wrote the Army greater nuclear delivery capability and
General Devers reacted with criticism Chief of Staff, General Omar N. Brad- the Navy, traditionally the most expen-
of the nation’s policy makers. He ley, that the day of the tank’s domi- sive of the military services, fighting
claimed they had missed opportunities nance was fading. He argued that for for its share, there were virtually no
to educate the public about world prob- the cost of one tank, 100 antitank guns funds for armor research and develop-
lems. Regarding the future Army, he could be built, using new ammunition ment. This weakened the Army’s po-
said he was disappointed that Congress to fight and hold defensive lines in litical situation, depriving the ground
was resisting the President’s and War Europe against a preponderance of So- forces of the means to develop a proper
Department’s plan for universal mili- viet tanks.10 relationship between the doctrine and
tary training, which was necessary to technology required for mechanized
fill the ranks of the National Guard and Throughout this period Congress te- warfighting as envisioned by the Stil-
Organized Reserves. Devers argued naciously held to its illusion of insular well Board.
that since the bulk of the Regular Army security despite growing Soviet intran-
was on occupation duty and garrisoning sigence and aggressiveness. By control- The Truman Administration, continu-
ling the purse, Congress was able to ally driven by domestic policies that
United States territories, there would be focused more on the postwar economy
a major manpower problem if a war influence a national strategic policy,
occurred.8 Two years later, the Army limiting military force levels and weap- and social programs, remained adamant
on systems development programs. The about defense cuts. In 1948, the Army
would be stretched even further by the had to impose an 80 percent reduction
need to assign ground troops to the Army suffered the most under the fiscal
North Atlantic Treaty Organization, restraints of the legislative branch, hav- in equipment requirements, thus defer-
ing its appropriations, especially for ring any equipment modernization. In
which — along with the Truman Doc- 1948, when the Joint Chiefs of Staff
trine and Marshall Plan — were part of research and development, cut each
the nation’s new policy of containing year until the war broke out in Korea. submitted a $30 billion defense budget
Before he left office in February 1948, based on their perceptions of national
Soviet expansionism. security needs, Truman capped their
General Eisenhower warned that the
When the economy-minded Republi- unbalanced budget situation had ren- budget at the $14.4 billion set in 1947
cans gained control of both houses in dered the Army increasingly unable to and progressively reduced in succeed-
Congress in the 1946 elections, the mobilize in a national emergency. The ing fiscal years until January 1950,

8 ARMOR — September-October 2000

when it was reduced again to $13.5 bil- support a major ground war for a least were deficient in authorized tank
lion. Congress also reduced the author- two and a half years after the beginning strength. Rather than having a standard
ized Army end-strength from 677,000 of hostilities. One solution suggested complement of one heavy tank battal-
to 630,000. When North Korea invaded was to take advantage of America’s ion of M26s and three regimental me-
South Korea, the U.S. Army’s actual great industrial capabilities and the dium tank companies of M4s, each di-
strength was only about 591,000 men. mechanical aptitudes of its people.17 vision had only one company of M24
And only 6,000 serviceable tanks re- Chaffee light tanks, no match for the
mained in 1950 of the more than A 1949 field manual emphasized the Soviet-built T34/85 tanks that the North
importance of the offensive role of ar-
28,000 tanks the country had at the end mor, noting that the faster armor moves Koreans Peoples’ Army used to spear-
of World War II.12 head their invasion of South Korea.
and the quicker it accomplishes its of-
Although President Truman blamed fensive mission of penetration and en- On the eve of the Korean War, the
rapid post-World War II demobilization velopment, the fewer the losses and Army had approximately 3,400 M24
of America’s mighty military force on more effective the gains. Exploitation light tanks in the inventory, most of
the people, the press, and Congress, he was considered a continuation of pene- them unserviceable. In addition, there
also went to great lengths to hold down tration and envelopment. Tankers were were available approximately 3,200
defense spending.13 Truman’s ambi- expected to plan boldly and execute M4A3E8 Sherman medium tanks of
tious Secretary of Defense, Louis John- their missions with aggressiveness and World War II vintage, of which only a
son, whose economy drive on the eve violence, employing firepower, mobil- few more than half were serviceable.21
of the Korean War again fell heavily on ity, and speed.18 The M4 mediums were the workhorse
the Army, best illustrated this. Johnson of U.S. ground troops during World
believed that the best national defense In March 1950, the Hodge Report — War II. They were not tactically capa-
named after Lieutenant General John R.
policy rested on nuclear air power. Hodge, the post-World War II Army ble of head-to-head engagement with
Unlike Johnson, Secretary of State German tanks. Their battlefield success
Dean Acheson favored a more flexible corps commander in Korea — stated was due more to superior numbers and
that armor was more effective when
policy based on deployable military employed as part of the combined arms the ability of U.S. tankers to maneuver
power that would enhance American to a position where a penetrating round
diplomacy. This policy found support team of tank, infantry, artillery, combat could find a weak spot.22 To engage
engineers, and tactical air power. Ar-
in a recommendation made shortly be- mor’s mission with the combined arms superior German tanks, the Army in-
fore the invasion of South Korea in a troduced, late in the war, the heavier
secret National Security Council study team was destruction of enemy forces armed and armored M26 Pershing.
with firepower, mobility, and shock
(NSC-68), which called for a stronger action. The report added that attacking However, the first three M26s that were
ground force to deal with increasing rushed to Korea from the Tokyo Ord-
challenges caused by the spread of towards deep objectives in pursuit and nance Depot had chronic problems,
exploitation over considerable dis-
communism worldwide.14 tances was the role for armor at the especially overheating engines and
defective fan belts.23
Secretary Acheson, however, defined operational level. In the design of
the country’s strategic defensive pe- tanks, the report stated, firepower, ma- Also introduced to Korea was the
rimeter along a line that included Japan neuverability, and mobility were more M46 Patton. Fielded in 1949, the M46
and Taiwan but did not include Korea, important than armor protection, al- was an M26 upgraded in engine reli-
a country where the Joint Chiefs of though armor remained important. Like ability and cooling. Accordingly, tank-
Staff had earlier advised the President the Stilwell Board, it recommended ers went to war in Korea with equip-
that the United States had little strategic tanks be organic to infantry regiments ment mostly left over from World War
interest. They argued that military re- and divisions, and that three types of II. In addition, many tankers were ill-
trenchment and budget cuts forced functional tanks be developed. Dis- trained and ill-prepared, receiving
them to take U.S. military forces out of heartened, the Hodge Report noted that equipment just days before engaging
Korea.15 At the same time, there was Army research and development had the T34/85s.24
disagreement between the Central Intel- been curtailed and would likely be fur-
In the beginning, the Korean War was
ligence Agency and Army Intelligence ther reduced.19 a war of movement. U.S. tank units
over the possible outcome. The CIA
advised that withdrawal of U.S. ground By 1950, Army doctrine had been re- were assigned to various infantry divi-
vised in many ways; however, it was sions, regimental combat teams, and
troops from South Korea in the spring basically a refinement of World War II task forces for mobile fire support and
of 1949 would in time be followed by
an invasion from the North. The Ar- experience. It was Eurocentric, de- antitank capabilities. No large armor
signed to fight a total war, rather than units — regiments, brigades or divi-
my’s Intelligence Division disagreed, contingency operations in present and sions — saw service in Korea. After the
claiming troop withdrawal would not
encourage a North Korean move.16 future less-than-total war situations counter-invasion by the Chinese Com-
around the world.20 Congressional and munist forces and what was left of the
Meanwhile, early in 1949, an advisory White House actions had reduced nine North Korean People’s Army, the con-
panel on armor reported that the U.S. of 10 Army divisions into ineffective flict became a defensive war of attrition
Army had no tanks in production or in skeletons, impacting training. This was and increased firepower to support in-
development capable of defeating the especially true of the four occupation fantry forces. Despite mountainous
types possessed by the country’s poten- divisions stationed in Japan. That con- terrain and restricted trafficability,
tial enemies. The panel considered this gested country and its road conditions tanks proved to be potent adjuncts in
situation critical. Unless the Army’s did not permit extensive training exer- support of infantry. Often they were
tank development situation was im- cises, especially for medium and heavy used for indirect fire missions or de-
proved, the panel reported, the United tanks. Moreover, because of the mili- ployed in fixed defensive positions.
States would not have enough tanks to tary austerity program, these divisions Though most armor action was infan-

ARMOR — September-October 2000 9

 At top of page, M46 tanks of the 64th Tank Battalion undergo final inspection
before an operation supporting the 3rd ID in July, 1951. At left, an M46 rolls
down one of country’s few high-speed roads. The M-46 at lower right slowly
moves into a village. The knocked-out North Korean vehicle at center, above,
is a 76mm self-propelled field gun.

try- and artillery-driven, Korea demon- limited war changed the relationship for warfighting at the operational level
strated the value of tanks as infantry- between maneuver and firepower, em- that characterized Allied operations
accompanying weapons, and on occa- phasizing increased use of air power during the Gulf War.30
sion, achieved spectacular results in and artillery. Concluding, there are a number of his-
executing fairly deep mechanized task
force operations despite mountainous At the 1954 Armor Conference, the torical observations to consider. First
are the country’s political objectives.
terrain and trafficability restrictions.25 question of armor mobility was posi- Until the war in Korea, Congress and
tioned within the national strategy of
A 1954 Johns Hopkins study, “Tank- nuclear air power. It rationalized that the President were more prone to po-
vs-Tank Combat in Korea,” recorded litical and economic containment of the
that U.S. tanks were approximately mobility and flexibility would become Soviet Union and collective security
more decisive on a nuclear battlefield.
three times as effective as enemy tanks. The conference concluded that armor through the United Nations rather than
It noted that American tanks destroyed promoting a combat-ready ground force
about 25 percent of the enemy tank was more capable of attaining rela- to deal with contingencies, as suggested
tively superior mobility that could pro-
force, largely due to higher first-round vide a decisive advantage in a Euro- by the Stilwell board.
engagements and hits.26 As a result of
early experiences in Korea, a 1951 pol- pean-style battle. The conference ac- This situation again demonstrated that
cepted the concept of firepower and
icy conference on armor revived the attrition but suggested it be integrated the country’s leadership failed to adopt
Stilwell Board’s recommendations for a national defense policy that took ad-
three types of functional tanks: a light with the freedom of action that armor vantage of technological changes
provided.29 Naturally, mobility de-
gun tank distinguished by its mobility; pended upon equipment characteristics, brought about as a result of World War
a medium tank characterized by its II. Congress and the President also
ability to sustain itself in all types of which required a trade-off between lacked the vision to fully understand
mobility and survivability. Summariz-
combat action; and a heavy tank to de- ing, the conference noted that firepower the importance of the conventional
feat any enemy on the battlefield.27 component of a national military pol-
Conversely, the British, who consid- was the decisive factor, and that armor icy. The outcome was that traditional
doctrine be based on the fundamental
ered the Patton tank “all too pansy,” concept that power coupled with an military heritage once again came in
had indicated that, unlike the U.S. conflict with postwar domestic and
Army, one all-purpose tank, like their unexcelled ability to maneuver fire- political demands, causing a serious
power at the decisive time to the deci-
Centurion, was more suitable for armor sive place. Yet for the decades follow- gap between foreign policy and a suit-
operations.28 able military policy.
ing the Korean War, firepower systems
In spite of various armor policy rec- and attrition warfare doctrine domi- The second observation deals with the
ommendations following the Stilwell nated. This doctrine finally gave way to issue of military strategy, which is how
Board Report, battlefield dynamics in a the visionary AirLand Battle doctrine to win the next war. The post-World

10 ARMOR — September-October 2000

The Sherman “Easy-8” was outclassed in tank-to-tank combat by the early ’50s, but was still formidable in its main Korean War role,
supporting infantry. This scene shows an M4 accompanying U.S. and Korean infantrymen through a rubbled street.

War II military austerity invoked by the Third, when the U.S. Army entered experience was a clear example of the
White House and Congress had a ripple the Korean War, an innovative tank importance of readiness and the need to
effect, stifling Army research and de- program and a visionary mobile com- modernize organization, training, and
velopment necessary for innovation bined arms doctrine — suggested by equipment to deal with the ever-chang-
with a mobile strike force trained and the Stilwell Board and endorsed by the ing threats and technical advances of
equipped to fight and win the first and Hodge Report — were all but forgot- warfighting.
succeeding battles. ten. Unfortunately, funds that did trickle
The Army’s post-war doctrine on how As revolutionary as the tank was in down for armor research and develop-
to organize and fight its next war was ment degraded the health of the armor
not in agreement with required modern World War II, its future full potential force, a legacy that continued long after
was not to be realized with a ground
equipment assets necessary to execute force whose mission began to change the “Forgotten War” in spite of the
its mission. Consequently, the strategic, changes in warfighting from a World
operational, and tactical links for win- as a result of America’s expanding in- War II concept of total war to the dy-
ternational commitments to contain
ning the first battle never materialized. communism. As a result of the Army’s namics of a limited war.
This was due to a national strategy that
did not take into consideration the rela- lack of preparedness, North Korean
forces, led by their T-34/85s, pushed
tionship between threats and the need the allies back to the Pusan Perimeter, a This paper was presented as part of a
for technological advances. As a result, panel session entitled, “The Korean
the Army had a force structure and tiny sliver of the peninsula, before it War ‘Tank Crisis’ of 1950,” chaired by
could accumulate sufficient strength to
equipment that did not fit its future stop the North Koreans and launch a BG Jack Mountcastle, USA (Ret.) at the
warfighting doctrine that became out- Society for Military History annual
moded in spite of the Stilwell Board’s counteroffensive. meeting at the Marine Corps Univer-
recommendations. Instead the national The neglect of armor research and de- sity. The commentator at the session
defense strategy of the country relied velopment and a makeshift organiza- was GEN Donn A. Starry. The author
on nuclear weapons and intercontinen- tion led to many frustrations for tankers would like to express thanks to GEN
tal airpower capabilities and the exer- in Korea, who fought and died there Starry and Charles Lemons, Curator of
cise of coercion called deterrence, while employing, in most cases, worn- the Patton Museum, for their assistance
America’s Maginot Line. out, World War II equipment. This while he was researching the article.

ARMOR — September-October 2000 11

Notes 1950: National Security Affairs; Foreign Eco- 2d Armored Division, A Report on United States
nomic Policy, Vol. I (Washington, D.C.: Gov- vs. German Armor to General Dwight D. Eisen-
1Eric C. Ludvigsen, “The Failed Bluff of Task ernment Printing Office, 1977), pp. 231-33. Also hower, Headquarters 2d Armored Division, 20
Force Smith: An ‘Arrogant Display of Strength’,” see Nathan Reingold, “Vannevar Bush,” in John March 1945, Patton Museum, p. 1.
ARMY, February 1992, pp. 36-45, and William G. A. Garraty and Mark C. Carnes, eds., American 23R. P. Hunnicutt, Pershing: A History of the
Robertson, “Economy of Force: Repulsing the National Biography, Vol. 4 (New York: Oxford Medium Tank T20 Series (Berkeley, Calif.: Feist
North Koreans Along the Naktong, 1950,” in University Press, 1999), p. 80. Publications, 1971), pp. 178-9.
Roger J. Spiller, gen. ed., Combined Arms in 11Louis Galambos, ed., The Papers of Dwight
24For two superb studies on armor’s calamity
Battle Since 1939 (Fort Leavenworth, Kan: U.S. David Eisenhower: The Chief of Staff, Vol. IX
Army Command and General Staff College and the excellent adjustments made by tankers
(Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press,
Press, 1992), pp. 97-103. during the war, see Bolté, “Post-World War II
1978), pp. 2254-6. For an excellent study on
2Christopher R. Gabel, “World War II Armor and Korea: Paying for Unpreparedness,” pp. 217-
Congress and its ability to influence the military
58, and Arthur W. Connor, Jr., “The Armor De-
Operations in Europe,” in George F. Hofmann through power of the purse, see Edward A. Ko-
bacle in Korea, 1950: Implications for Today,”
and Donn A. Starry, eds., Camp Colt to Desert lodzeij, The Uncommon Defense and Congress,
Parameters, Spring 1992, pp. 66-76.
Storm: The History of U.S. Armored Forces 1945-1963 (Columbus: Ohio State University
(Lexington, Ky.: University Press of Kentucky, Press, 1966). 25Leadership Branch, Armor in Battle, (Fort
1999), pp. 179-80. 12William W. Epley, America’s First Cold War Knox: Leadership and Training Division, Com-
3Report of War Department Equipment Board, Army 1945-1950 (Arlington, Va.: The Institute of mand and Staff Department, U.S. Army Armor
19 January 1946, Falkovich Collection, Patton Land Warfare, Association of the United States School, March 1986), pp. 3-1 to 3-27. For addi-
Museum of Cavalry and Armor, Fort Knox, Ky., Army, 1999), pp. 6, 11. tional details, see John F. Antal, “Tanks at
pp. 8-9, 42-4. Hereinafter cited as Falkovich 13Memoirs by Harry A. Truman: Years of Trial
Chipyong-Ni,” ARMY, March 1998, pp. 24-32,
Collection, Patton Museum. Also see Jonathan Scott D. Aiken, “The 72d Tank Battalion in Op-
and Hope 1946-1952 (Garden City, N.Y.: Dou- eration TOUCHDOWN,” ARMOR September-
M. House, Toward Combined Arms Warfare: A bleday & Company, Inc., 1956), p. 345.
Survey of 20th Century Tactics, Doctrine, and October 1992, pp. 44-8, and Sam Friedman,
14Steven L. Rearden, History of the Office of the “Tankers at Heartbreak,” ARMOR, September-
Organization, Research Survey No. 2 (Fort
Leavenworth: Combat Studies Institute, U.S. Secretary of Defense: The Formative Years 1947- October 1952, pp. 24-7.
Army Command and General Staff College, 1950 (Washington: Historical Office, Office of 26Vincent V. McRae and Alvin D. Coox,
August 1984), pp. 146-9, and Philip L. Bolté, the Secretary of Defense, 1984), pp. 406-10. For “Tank-vs-Tank Combat in Korea,” Operations
“Post-World War II and Korea: Paying for Un- brief discussions of NSC-68, see Maurice A. Research Office (Chevy Chase, Md.: The Johns
preparedness,” in Camp Colt to Desert Storm, pp. Mallin, Tanks, Fighters, & Ships: U.S. Conven- Hopkins University, 8 September 1954), Falk-
218-20. tional Force Planning Since WWII (Washington: ovich Collection, Patton Museum, pp. 2-3.
4Report of War Department Equipment Board, Brassey’s, Inc., 1990), pp. 41-62, and John Ed-
27Report of U.S. Army Policy Conference on
ward Wilz, “Korea and the United States, 1945-
Falkovich Collection, Patton Museum, p. 42. For 1950,” in Stanley Sandler, ed., The Korean War: Armor, Fort Monroe, 16-20 October 1951, Falk-
an excellent study on the too-specialized TD An Encyclopedia (New York: Garland Publish- ovich Collection, Patton Museum, pp. 1-2.
doctrine, see Christopher R. Gabel, Seek, Strike, ing, Inc., 1995), pp. 176-7. 28“Tanks: How Do They Rate?” 24 March
and Destroy: U.S. Army Tank Destroyer Doctrine
in World War II (Fort Leavenworth: Combat 15Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation: My 1952, Newsweek, pp. 30-1.
Studies Institute, U.S. Army Command and Gen- Years in the State Department (New York: W.W. 29“Effect of Atomic Weapons on the Employ-
eral Staff College, September 1985). Norton & Co., 1969), pp. 349-53, and Eisen- ment of Armor,” in Final Report of United States
5Dwight D. Eisenhower, At Ease: Stories I Tell hower, At Ease, pp. 319-20. Army Policy Conference, 15-19 November 1954,
to Friends (New York: Doubleday & Company, 16“Consequences of a U.S. Troop Withdrawal Fort Knox, Falkovich Collection, Patton Mu-
Inc., 1967), pp. 316-20, and R. Alton Lee, “The from Korea in Spring, 1949,” and “Appendix,” seum, 1-3.
Army ‘Mutiny’ of 1946,” Journal of American 28 February 1949, in Michael Warner, ed., The 30On this issue, see Robert H. Scales, “From
History, December 1966, pp. 555-71. For a pro- CIA under Harry Truman (Washington: Center Korea to Kosovo: America’s Army Learns to
vocative account of mobilization and military for the Study of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Fight Limited Wars in the Age of Precision
unpreparedness, see Michael Kendall, “An In- Agency, 1994), ORE 3-49. Strikes,” Armed Forces Journal International,
flexible Response: United States Army Man- 17Report of Army Field Forces Advisory Panel December 1999, pp. 36-41.
power Mobilization Polices, 1945-1950” (Ph.D. on Armor, Vol. 1, 18 February 1949, Falkovich
dissertation, Duke University, 1982). Collection, Patton Museum, pp. 5-7.
6Address by General Jacob L. Devers at Veter-
18Department of the Army, FM 17-100 Ar- Dr. George F. Hofmann is a history
ans’ Day Observance, Lieutenant General George professor at the University of Cin-
mored Division and Combat Command, Decem-
W. Read, Jr. Files in possession of author, p. 2.
7Samuel P. Huntington, “The Interim Years:
ber 1949, Patton Museum, pp. 85-7. cinnati, who served in the U.S.
World War II to January, 1950,” in Raymond G.
19Report of the Army Equipment Board 1950, Army (Armor). He is the author of
O’Connor, ed., American Defense Policy in Per- Fort Monroe, Va., 8 March 1950, Falkovich The Super Sixth: A History of the
spective: From Colonial Times to the Present Collection, Patton Museum, pp. 27-9. Sixth Armored Division, Cold War
(London: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1965), p. 298, 20Robert A. Doughty, The Evolution of U.S.
Casualty: The Court Martial of Ma-
and James F. Byrnes, Speaking Friendly (New Army Tactical Doctrine, 1946-76, Leavenworth jor General Robert W. Grow, and
York: Harper & Brothers Publishers, 1947), pp. Papers (Fort Leavenworth: Combat Studies Insti-
277-97. tute, U.S. Army Command and General Staff
edited with Donn A. Starry Camp
8Address by General Jacob L. Devers, pp. 2, 4. College, August 1979), p.1. Colt to Desert Storm: The History of
9Thomas D. Boettcher, First Call: The Making 21Bolté, “Post-World War II and Korea: Paying U.S. Armored Forces. He is a con-
of the Modern U.S. Military, 1945-1953 (Boston: for Unpreparedness,” p. 204. tributor to History in Dispute, World
Little, Brown and Company, 1992), pp. 116-7. 22S. R. Hinds, “Comparison of United States War II, and a frequent contributor to
10S. Everett Gleason and Fredrick Aandahl, gen. Equipment with Similar German Equipment,” in ARMOR and The Journal of Military
eds., Foreign Relations of the United States Major General I. D. White, Commanding General History.

12 ARMOR — September-October 2000

The Army and Society:
Some Perspectives for the 21st Century
by Colonel (Ret.) Michael D. Mahler

As our Army enters the 21st century, achieve the same or greater outputs wonder that there is a sense of unease
there appears to be a distinct sense of with less. As outputs became more in our ranks.
unease within its ranks. Recent surveys critical to survival of the organization,
depict a corps of officers and noncom- it became more demanding of its man- But maintaining an Army that is too
small for its missions and not as well
missioned officers who have low mo- agers. And as managers became more paid as the private sector of our society
rale, who do not believe that their units pressured, they became insensitive to
are well prepared, and who do not in- the needs of their subordinates. is not new. The 31 December 1899
New York Times carried a small article
tend to stay in the Army until retire- In the midst of all this, the reduction noting that the Democratic Senator
ment — in fact, the survey found a
third of the officers and noncommis- in the middle-management ranks meant from Missouri opposed a Republican
that promotions were hard to come by plan to raise the regular army strength
sioned officers intend to leave at the because there were not as many posi- from 26,000 to 65,000 because, with
end of their current obligation. Added
to that alarming report is a perception tions available. Eventually, the private some slight adjustments for seacoast
sector came to understand that there is fortifications, the 26,000 would be “all
that the “warriors” are getting out first a limit to being lean and mean that is this country will need after the present
and that career success comes from
avoiding risks in training, doctrine, and not reflected in the balance sheet alone. conditions in the Philippines have been
Many companies have been working at overcome.” And pay has always been
leadership. redressing the damage done in the years an issue. In the late 1800s, the Con-
As unsettling as this picture is, it of self-inflicted reorganization and many gress simply did not appropriate any
might be well to put a little perspective of the gurus of that era are out of work, pay for the Army for a period of time.
on what we are reading and hearing in but the sense of betrayal lingers and So, the Army has had similar issues
the hope that we can better find our employees remain skeptical. with American society for at least a
way through this seeming morass and century, but the sense of unease that is
recover some of our good feeling for a Our Army has been through much the with us today seems not to have been
same thing over the last eight or nine
profession that our nation still needs — years, though the downsizing resulted present in the past. What makes the
though sometimes it does seem that the difference?
nation doesn’t know it. If it is true that from directives and budget reductions.
It should not, therefore, be surprising at One difference now is that the mission
the Army is, in many ways, a reflection this stage to find that the same reac- of the Army is more ambiguous than
of the society from which it springs, it
may be well to start by looking at some tions have set in among our officers ever before. That is partially due to the
and noncommissioned officers. end of the Cold War, which was the
unsettling trends in that society. last easily articulated threat to national
The recent Army survey found that
A few years ago, a well-known man- the major issues motivating members to security, and partially due to the num-
agement consulting firm did a very ber of administration-directed deploy-
large national employee survey. The leave the service were family separa- ments whose relationship to core Army
tion, pay, quality of life, and job satis-
general trends were disquieting and faction, though the order differed missions is not easily articulated. For-
may sound familiar. They found that tunately and unfortunately, these de-
company credibility was at a 10-year slightly between officers and noncom- ployments have not resulted in high
missioned officers. Compare this to that
low, that manager/professional skepti- national survey of a few years ago costs in casualties or equipment — or
cism was up five percentage points, at least not since Somalia. It is fortu-
that “company” approval was down 20 where the top four reasons for leaving a nate for the deployed Army members,
company were advancement potential,
percentage points, that less than 50 boredom/more challenge, inept man- but it is unfortunate because it enables
percent of management believed they the deployments to continue without
were “in touch” with employees, and agement, and pay. It takes very little much public notice or discussion. In the
imagination to see the parallels, nor to
that advancement opportunities were understand the terrible price an organi- absence of full public discussion on the
perceived to not be there. national security rationale for these
zation pays when it reduces size be- deployments, it becomes very difficult
Much of this feeling probably resulted yond the point where responsibilities
from the downsizing and reengineering can reasonably be fulfilled. If you take to relate them to the Army’s traditional
core missions.
that had been taking place. As good into consideration that our Army mem-
people were let go, remaining employ- bers have always had more family In order to feel pride in performance,
ees worried about their future. As or- separation than any private-sector em- most Army members need to feel that
ganizations reduced size, the work bur- ployee, have always had less control they are doing something important
den grew greater for the remaining em- over their earning power, and have al- that is related to what they have been
ployees. As resources became more ways had much less ability to do some- trained to do and what they joined up
constrained, managers were pushed to thing about their quality of life, it is no for. While you can train them to do

ARMOR — September-October 2000 13

 “Take, for instance, the omnipresent e-mail... The recipient gets the message in-
stantly, though the responsibility for getting the word out has subtly changed
from the sender to the recipient who must open his e-mail — but the message no
longer conveys the angry voice of a boss, the frustrated gesture of a subordinate,
the compassionate look of a colleague, or the friendly pat of reassurance, all of
which often deliver the message more effectively than the most eloquent e-mail.”

many different tasks, you can’t legislate when there is no need because “warri- explain. That takes a lot of security in
how they perceive the difference be- ors” don’t like to waste training time on who you are and where you’re going —
tween the assigned task and what they activities they perceive to be marginal and a stronger interest in what is right
signed up to do. For them to believe to their mission, and they don’t take for the organization than what is right
that an activity is worthwhile, they kindly to the kind of careerist who is for advancement in that organization,
must see some significant mission- willing to sacrifice risk-taking in train- which are hard qualities to legislate
related reason for the family separation, ing and thought in order to make it ap- given the human instinct for survival
high operational tempo, and general pear that all is well with the world dur- and the natural competitiveness of
discomfort incurred. You cannot use ing their “watch,” which is endemic many Army members. We will also
the Army for what many perceive to be among senior managers in the private have to do better in this respect than
repetitive whimsical deployments, not sector of society as well. our private sector counterparts, with
clearly related to core missions, and whom being a “team player” has be-
expect the ranks to feel good about it. If you look at one of the manage- come the major qualification for suc-
rial-style constructs popular in society
The traditional senior leadership role today — the one that uses quadrants cess in big organizations.
of trying to rationalize the burden sim- labeled “analytical,” “driver,” “amia- There is an added dimension to this
ply emphasizes the different perspec- ble,” and “expressive” — it appears scenario that comes from our society’s
tives under these circumstances and that the Army has always wanted its fascination with high technology and
leads to the allegation that they are out small unit leaders to be “drivers” (high its current tendency to believe optimum
of touch with the organization. No risk taker, results-oriented, task-ori- effectiveness comes from functional
amount of thanks for a job well done, ented), but its senior leaders to be “ana- specialization. Technology has pro-
or preaching about the importance of a lytical” (always wants more informa- vided the ability to retrieve and sort
mission, will convince soldiers that tion, hates to be wrong). Extended pe- endless amounts of data, and the natu-
they are involved in something signifi- riods of peace aggravate that divide ral extension of that is that we some-
cant if the issue is not generally ac- because the “drivers” who want to real- times have trouble differentiating be-
cepted as one that they signed on to istically prepare for war and the “ana- tween data and useful information.
perform. Desert Storm felt significant; lytical” types want to be sure they don’t Simply because the capability exists,
nothing since then has quite made the make a mistake — and most peacetime society seems to be impelled to use it.
grade with soldiers despite all the talk. goals will always appear to be artificial We must resist that societal trend be-
Desert Storm was about what armies when compared to taking a hill. It is cause it may be fatal to Army opera-
do. simply harder to quantify success in the tions. My memories of trying to move a
military in peacetime, so careerists fo- tank company forward while buttoned
That doesn’t mean that our Army has cus on “zero defects” instead of maxi- up make we wonder how much digiti-
not turned in a fine performance in
these nontraditional missions; it does mum effectiveness. zation I could have digested — and
reading about trying to do the same
mean, however, that it has been a fine Warriors have always left the service thing these days with “auto-masking”
performance that a majority may not during long periods of peace, and if
believe they should be doing. Over- they stayed, their advancement was in effect makes me think that not much
has changed.
coming that is going to require some slow. Many of our World War II lead-
inspired leadership, not just talk about ers would have retired as colonels had
missions other than war. Unfortunately, it not been for that conflict. My genera- Technology and functionality also
tend to distort what is important and
the most difficult part of that inspired tion of soldiers (after Korea and during what is not. A recent article in ARMY
leadership may require doing the politi- the Cold War and Vietnam) were more
cally unpopular: educating society on fortunate than many because most of Magazine lauded the advent of the new
Strategic Plans and Policy specialty.
the trade-offs involved in multiple our senior leaders had made their repu- While the new specialty appears to be
doubtful deployments versus current tations in World War II or Korea, when
resources so that all the costs of the “warrior spirit” counted, and had that simply a refinement of the old Opera-
tions, Plans, and Training specialty, the
choices are clear to both our civilian momentum to carry them up through authors tried unsuccessfully to make
leadership and their constituents. The the ranks in the ensuing periods of
effort, alone, would dispel some current “peace” — though what with the Cold the case that this new specialty would
provide a unique advantage for the
perceptions. War and Vietnam, there was never Army of the future. After a historical
quite the intolerance for these “drivers”
The problem of “warriors” leaving the that may be prevalent now. review of past great military strategists
Army is also not new. If you look at the (which actually showed rather convinc-
“warriors” in the Civil War, you find The challenge then is to make room ingly that the great strategists were
that many of them had left the Army for the “warriors” when a careerist’s really the result of personality and
only to come back in when the conflict instincts are to eliminate the risks of place rather than any training model or
started. It is hard to be a “ warrior” having such stormy petrels around to specialty track) the authors asserted

14 ARMOR — September-October 2000

that the new specialty would release the tempt what technology tells us will not issues discussed to this point would
selected officers “from the needless work. A wise professor at the U.S. make it reasonable to accept that per-
burden of becoming tactical and opera- Military Academy once responded to a ception as fact. I’m not sure that many
tional masters en route to becoming question about the utility of teaching of us would characterize our own peri-
strategists.” literature to future Army officers by ods of Army service as “fun,” but I am
Apparently they saw nothing wrong in pointing out that the purpose was to very sure that there were a lot of very
develop their imagination and creativity satisfying high points along the way
asserting that an officer could become a so that they might be able to find a so- that seem to be missing today. And, I
strategist without mastering the founda-
tions — and neither did the readers. lution on some future battlefield when do think that there was more of a sense
the computer — and everything ra- of making a real contribution to some-
More than six months after the appear- tional — told them that they could not thing really big in other years — a
ance of the assertion, I have read only
one criticism — in another professional hold. After all, technology or not, smart sense that your unit might be the only
munitions or not, isn’t that what our available force for your country at a
journal and from another retired officer. profession is about? critical moment in a critical place and
What’s wrong with this picture? Have
we become so inured to unrealistic There is not much that we can do that you had better be ready for the
eventuality, no matter how remote it
concepts that nobody objects to two about decreasing budgets, frittering might appear.
academics demeaning the core skills of away scarce resources on doubtful mis-
a successful Army leader? Does that sions, or reduced strengths, other than
One of my bosses in a pretty routine
mean that Courtney Massengale has to make an honest case for what is right staff assignment once remarked that
become the hero of Myrer’s Once an and what is needed in the appropriate
Eagle to this new generation of read- public forum. There is much that we what kept his combat arms staff offi-
cers going was that they all had white
ers? Or are our readers just too busy can do to avoid the pitfalls that the pri- horses tethered out in the hall in case
and too tired to care? Intellectual apa- vate sector of society has encountered
thy is not normally the hallmark of a in its dash to downsize and reengineer the need arose for them to gallop off.
As absurd as that may sound for a digi-
healthy organization in our society. and employ technology. Technology tized army, maybe we need to make
was initially touted as being a way to
Finally, with regard to technology in all reduce personnel needs, but it has never sure that there is still a place for those
its wonder, it would be well to remem- horses as we start the 21st century.
ber that it is a tool, albeit a very power- produced any real personnel savings. It
has merely changed the skills needed
ful tool, for humans. It is not a substitute without reducing the numbers. A case
for initiative or intelligence, and it re- COL Michael D. Mahler was com-
quires a deal more sophistication to use may be made for the private sector that
the end result is improved output de- missioned in armor from the U.S.
it properly than most folks seem to real- spite the absence of savings in person- Military Academy in 1958. He com-
ize. Take, for instance, the omnipresent
e-mail. It is a quick and efficient means nel costs, but that would be a dangerous manded armored cavalry and tank
pattern for an army to try to replicate units in the U.S. and Europe be-
of communication, but is it effective or since its output is overwhelming force
is it “efficiently deceptive”? fore returning to the U.S. Military
at the needed place at the needed time. Academy as an instructor and as-
The recipient gets the message in- sistant professor of English. Sub-
stantly, though the responsibility for Society in general today is mesmer-
ized by high technology and prosperity sequently, he served in Vietnam
getting the word out has subtly changed and early retirement with a minimum of
from the sender to the recipient who as the brigade adjutant, 1st Bri-
must open his e-mail — but the mes- effort. The temptation to clone an gade, 1st ID, and as the executive
Army with those qualities is great, and officer, 3d Sqdn, 5th Cav, 9th ID.
sage no longer conveys the angry voice the possibility of totally avoiding them
of a boss, the frustrated gesture of a He commanded the 3d Sqdn, 12th
subordinate, the compassionate look of really remote. It may be that it is a time
to be reinforcing the tried and true Cav, 3d AD for two years and
a colleague, or the friendly pat of reas- Army leadership principles, while re- served as the deputy chief of staff
surance, all of which often deliver the for personnel and administration
message more effectively than the most maining cognizant of what is going on
in society at large — and adopting only for the First U.S. Army at Fort
eloquent e-mail. Senior leaders need to that which really fits those principles. George G. Meade. He is a gradu-
consider that aspect lest they inadver-
tently distance themselves even more Increasingly, that society is one that has ate of the U.S. Army Command
no familiarity with the realities of and General Staff College and the
from those they lead in ways they have Army service; that needs to be continu-
never even thought about. And make Industrial College of the Armed
no mistake: this issue is not, as I re- ously educated in terms that they can Forces. After leaving the service,
understand about what we do and what Colonel Mahler joined an architec-
cently read, about learning to use new our limits are. That does not mean,
technology; it is about being sensitive tural engineering firm in Chicago,
to the effect of new technology. The however, that we need to become like
them in ways that may counter our ef- Illinois, where he was the vice
private sector of society is just now fectiveness when it will be most president for human resources
starting to understand these complica- and services for 10 years. He cur-
tions, but we’re the ones whose busi- needed. Reliance on technology and
politically easy solutions may earn you rently writes and is a lecturer in
ness is supposed to be leadership. stock options, but it may not make you management at Montana State
Current high technology is the latest successful on some future battlefield. University’s College of Business.
tool, but probably not the last new de- Finally, it is apparently not fun to be He is the author of Ringed in Steel
velopment. And even if it is, we are in in the Army these days. That is what — Armored Cavalry, Vietnam
a profession that may require us to at- you read and what you hear. All of the 1967-1968.

ARMOR — September-October 2000 15

Mobs, Refugees, and Armor:
Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures
by Major Robert G. Ivy

Bosnia, August 1996. 1-4 Cavalry to a plan, and many times has commu- IEBL. The Serbs reacted by deploying
was operating in sector supporting nications contact with a higher level their special police forces into the town,
various missions, including the occupa- element. A crowd is usually a sponta- initiating a conflict. The two sides faced
tion of platoon-sized observation posts, neous reaction to an event, whereas a each other and threw various items at
treaty verification, and security support mob is a planned and controlled unit. each other, including hand grenades.
for the International Criminal Tribunal Mobs occur during planned events. Attempts by our troops to stop the inci-
for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY). Examples of planned events are various dent resulted in soldiers quickly finding
Mahala, a former Muslim village on the domestic protests, political rallies, and themselves between the two parties and
Serb side of the Inter-Entity Boundary confrontations between entities. In con- unable to affect the situation.
Line (IEBL) had recently been reoccu- trast, crowds are caused by unplanned One of the unique aspects of the Bos-
pied by Muslim refugees. These refu- or spontaneous events. Examples of
gees, supported by the Muslim gov- unplanned spontaneous events are nia refugee situation is their forced
removal from their homes, either by
ernment, stood accused by the Serbs of crowds gathered for food and water; opposing forces or their own friendly
carrying arms and endangering Serb distribution of limited resources, such
civilians. A group of Serb policemen as refugee supplies; and gatherings forces. In addition, most refugees carry
all of their possessions in or on a single
were dispatched to clear the town of the after religious or sporting events. vehicle, either motorized or animal-
Muslims and were reported to the
squadron headquarters by a patrol that Before 1-4 Cavalry deployed to Bos- drawn. Typically, every group of refu-
nia in 1996, the squadron trained at the gees has a leader or leaders. Usually the
supported the ICTY mission. Combat Maneuver Training Center refugees have a plan on where they
Squadron elements responded by send- (CMTC) and was certified for the Bos- want to displace to, even if it is just
ing a tank and Bradley scout section to nia deployment. The squadron had following another group. Typically,
Mahala to observe. Meanwhile, Serb trained on handling crowds and was refugee groups are built around some-
police clashed with the Muslim refu- prepared to execute an array of civil- one’s family unit and usually have fam-
gees. Separating the two factions, the military missions. However, it encoun- ily members of all ages, to include
squadron guarded each until representa- tered several incidents that were not children and elderly. These groups then
tives from the two governments could be anticipated during training — in par- attract former neighbors or people that
brought to Mahala to negotiate an end ticular, how to deal with mobs and have lost their families. They have, on
state. The Serb government responded refugees. Through the experience of the average, little food and are almost al-
by broadcasting on local radio stations squadron as a whole, we identified sev- ways short of water.
that NATO had arrested the Serb police. eral characteristics of mobs and refu-
Serb mobs appeared throughout the gees and then developed actions that Like refugees, mobs also have leaders.
If the mob is planned, the mob leaders
squadron sector shortly thereafter, would enable the squadron to move may have communication with their
blocking most of the key road intersec- from a reactive condition to one that
tions. The Serbs began transporting put the local commander back in con- “headquarters.” During events in Bos-
nia, this was usually done via a person
hundreds of people to an intersection trol. First, I’ll discuss the characteris- following the leader with a concealed
close to Mahala. Soon, a massive Ser- tics that we identified in both mob and
bian mob moved toward Mahala to take refugee movements, especially in Bos- pocket radio. Runners using residential
phones were also used. Leaders control
control of the Serb policemen. The bri- nia, then address the tactics, techniques the mobs by moving the participating
gade commander, wanting to maintain and procedures we developed to gain
control, instructed the squadron to stop control of the situation. I’ll conclude people to a designated area by vehicle,
then forming and moving to the tar-
the mob. with Standard Operating Procedures geted area. Upon completion of the
(SOPs) and Contingency Plans (CON-
There have been several incidents PLANs) that can be applied to com- demonstration, the people in the mob
similar to the one at Mahala. In most of are then moved to a pick-up area to
these situations, U.S. armored forces pany teams or even platoons. meet their transportation.
were present in some form. Therefore, In April 1996, the squadron encoun- The key to dealing with both refugees
it is important for Armor leaders to
understand that mob situations can be tered its first mob activity. The incident and mobs is preparation. Shaping the
was sparked when the Moslems gath- area of operation is still the first part of
controlled. ered a group of people to cross the In- any operation, including peacekeeping.
For the purpose of this paper, a crowd ter-Entity Boundary Line into Serb- Therefore, Intelligence Preparation of
is a large gathering of people that is not held territory. Our first indication of the Battlefield (IPB) is paramount.
mobile and does not possess any kind movement was when our observation Both mobs and refugees use avenues of
of command and control. A mob also is posts started to report unusually large approach, are affected by terrain, and
made up of a large number of people, groups of people crossing the IEBL. typically are characterized as moving
but a mob possesses command and The group moved into a former Muslim units. Therefore, Named Areas of In-
control, is mobile, operates according village on the Serb side, close to the terest (NAIs) should be determined,

16 ARMOR — September-October 2000

Decision Points selected, and a Deci- mander to thin the flow of groups en- In review, mobs and refugees typi-
sion Matrix developed. The key to con- tering an area of operation. cally follow a plan. Both mobs and
trol of refugees and mobs is controlling In general, any plan would be to limit refugees have leaders and a command
their mobility. Choosing the routes they and control system. Likewise, mobs
can use and restricting their mass and the maneuverability of any group by have a means of communication with
using TAIs. Both mobs and refugees
speed helps control their mobility. usually stay on roads which are also their “controlling headquarters.” Armor
Therefore, Targeted Areas of Interest units can successfully manage mob or
(TAIs) still play an important part in avenues of approach. Therefore TAIs refugee activity if they prepare. Intelli-
can be very useful. Refugees require
shaping any area. In this case, TAIs are channeling. They tend to be passive gence preparation of the battlefield,
made up of obstacles, checkpoints, and decision points, and a decision matrix
holding areas. and are easily guided. However, if they focused on controlling mob or refugee
do not receive guidance, they will
A mob or refugee scenario would gather wherever they can obtain food, movements are the keys to dealing with
mobs and refugees.
have preplanned TAIs that have pre- water, or shelter. The lack of a plan
pared obstacles linked with the terrain. could result in potential logistical or The August 1996 incident ended suc-
These obstacles in the preplanned stage humanitarian problems. cessfully as squadron elements enacted
are just engineer stakes and wire laid at Mobs, on the other hand, require con- their plan and slowed the mob by using
a TAI so that a tank or scout section several scout sections along the mob’s
can close the obstacle in minutes. tainment. In addition, within planned route. These sections acted as a sifter,
crowds there will be people designed to
Every vehicle in the unit, therefore, will attract press coverage. Elderly, chil- causing the mob to thin as mob mem-
carry the necessary wire and other class bers were stopped at the different sec-
IV needed to complete and close any dren, and pregnant women all have tions. Able to go no further, mob mem-
been forced to the front of mobs to be
TAI obstacle. beaten by the Serbs, thereby increasing bers could only yell or talk to the sol-
diers present. By the time the mob
Early detection of refugee or mob ac- press coverage. Efforts should be made reached the final TAI prior to Mahala,
tivity is important. This will give the to safely separate these people from the
commander and the operations group mob. For example, a restriction of no it had been reduced from several hun-
dred to a few dozen people. This en-
time to start the orders process and ac- vehicles in an area will cause the mob abled the squadron soldiers to negotiate
tivate the unit’s plan. Likewise, the to walk further and the elderly, chil-
destination of the groups needs to be dren, and pregnant women to drift to the withdrawal of the mob back to their
intersection start point. A key point of
known quickly. Contact must be made the rear of the mob, where they are less this negotiation was the promise of
with the group and maintained. Using effective.
available Civil Affairs (CA) or Counter information on the current situation to
A tank or scout section can man a be relayed to the mob leaders via the
Intelligence (CI) assets is best. The bot- typical TAI. It is important to tie the senior squadron officer present. Even-
tomline is to get someone to find the
mob’s or refugee’s leadership and try to TAI into other support and overwatch tually the Serb police were allowed to
so that the section is not isolated. Con- return to their station and the mob
extract information while providing secutive TAIs could also be used to boarded their buses and returned home.
location and situational updates. Com-
manders can then slow, channel, or support one another. It is important that
once the TAI is established, the sec-
divert the groups as needed, using the tions both man their vehicles and pro-
network of TAIs. MAJ Robert G. Ivy, a 1989 grad-
vide themselves local security on the uate of the Virginia Military Insti-
The general principle towards refu- ground. This security should be in the tute, served with Task Force 1-32
gees is to keep them moving towards form of two-man teams. The security Armor as a tank platoon leader
food and shelter without crowding teams also provide the important func- during the Gulf War and later as a
routes or blocking key terrain. The tion of giving the members of the mobs
general principle in dealing with mobs or refugees someone to talk to. Avoid scout platoon leader. After AOAC,
is to slow or prevent the gathering. using the TAIs as blocking obstacles. he joined the 3rd Infantry G3 staff,
Once a mob or refugee movement is Rather TAIs should act as delaying Wuerzburg, Germany, and worked
detected, it is important to act quickly points that thin out the crowds, gather as the assistant S3 for 3-4 Cav-
in order to maintain the initiative. intelligence from passers-by, and ob- alry, 3d ID, Schweinfurt, Germany
Clearly, the commander needs to iden- serve situational conditions. (now 1-4 Cavalry). He command-
tify and refine his intelligence require- ed B Troop, 3-4 Cavalry from Oc-
CONPLANs and SOPs are critical to
ments in a timely fashion. The soldiers success when dealing with mobs and tober 1995 to March 1997, when
manning the OPs, checkpoints, and his troop deployed for a year to
even in convoys can help provide the refugees. Units should develop an exe-
cution matrix of the tasks required for Bosnia as part of Task Force Ea-
commander needed information. dealing with mobs and refugees. This gle. He was later assigned to the
In addition to TAIs, holding areas are matrix needs to be updated daily so as Defense Language Institute, Mon-
important to shaping any area. The idea to properly match sections and platoons terey, California, for language stud-
of a holding area is to receive incoming operating in respective areas with their ies and to the Monterey Institute of
groups and then break them down into required CONPLAN tasks. For exam- International Studies, where he
manageable sizes. Holding areas can be ple, patrols should be briefed on NAIs,
used to supply refugees with water, in TAIs, and key terrain for each CON- earned a MA in International Pol-
addition to breaking up masses of peo- PLAN and be prepared to execute. In icy Studies, with distinction. He is
ple. Holding areas are ideal for coordi- addition, patrols should have, as a SOP, currently serving as the Deputy
nation or processing points for local the required equipment and barrier ma- OIC of the Defense Threat Reduc-
authorities and NGOs, such as the terial needed to execute CONPLANs tion Agency Operations Center,
UNHCR. This will allow the com- included in their vehicle loadplans. Washington, D.C.
ARMOR — September-October 2000 17
 Gulf War Story in ARMOR
Cited for Distinguished Writing
Historian Stephen A. Bourque’s
account of the capture of Safwan,
site of the surrender talks that ended
the Gulf War, was one of only two
articles recognized as outstanding
achievements in writing on U.S.
Army history by the Army Histori-
cal Foundation.
“Incident at Safwan” appeared in
the January-February 1999 issue of
ARMOR and recounted the frantic
efforts to capture the Iraqi airfield
where General Norman Schwartz-
kopf wanted to hold the talks. When
the location was selected, General The Foundation’s award program viewed in this issue of ARMOR.)
Schwartzkopf had been under the recognizes significant contributions Three frequent ARMOR contributors
impression that it was already in to the preservation and promotion of won the other two book awards:
Allied hands, but this turned out to the history and heritage of the Peter Mansoor, for The GI Offensive
be incorrect. Bourque’s story de- American soldier. Awards were in Europe: The Triumph of Ameri-
scribed how LTC Bob Wilson’s 1-4 given in two categories, books and can Infantry Divisions, and Profes-
Cav was tasked to move to the air- articles. Bourque’s entry was cited sor George F. Hofmann and General
field at Safwan and secure it for the in the Professional Army Journals Donn A. Starry, who edited Camp
talks, although the location was then category. Colt to Desert Storm: The History of
still in enemy hands. U.S. Armored Forces.
Three books were also cited, in-
(The article is currently accessible cluding The Eyes of Orion: Five Professor Hofmann’s article on
at the ARMOR web site, knox-www. Lieutenants in the Persian Gulf War, tanks in the Korean War is the cover
army.mil/dtdd/armormag.) by Alex Vernon. (This book is re- story in this edition of ARMOR.

DRIVER’S SEAT
from Page 6
duty, and instructor duty here at Fort units, the NCOs, and the Army. Rota- titive for promotion, it is essential that
Knox, to name several. As the Army tion cycles of assignments and special these NCOs rotate as they become
changes, there will be a continuing duties do not always meet the NCO’s branch-qualified at their current grade.
need to support such positions. As an needs in getting into, or sometimes out
example: in Fiscal Year 99, for the of, the branch-qualifying positions as The Office of the Chief of Armor,
MOS 19K, there were 1,082 SFCs soon as they are eligible. When coun- along with Armor Branch and myself,
competing for 418 platoon sergeant seling the NCO, senior leaders should are constantly working to improve the
positions. For the MOS 19D, there be advising the NCO in what TDA as- capabilities and opportunities of the
were 537 SFCs competing for 182 pla- signment he would best serve the Army Armor Force. Having an 18-month
toon sergeant positions. Compare this after he branch-qualifies. Or, if he is in branch-qualifying requirement for NCO
to projections for FY 02, when in MOS a TDA assignment, when and how best leadership positions is currently the
19K, 1,044 SFCs will compete for 315 to get into a qualifying position that best way for us to ensure that we can
platoon sergeant positions and, for best meets the needs of the NCO, the care for the Armor NCO Corps. It also
MOS 19D, 592 SFCs will compete for unit, and the Armor Force. The senior assists in providing to commanders,
201 platoon sergeant positions. leaders also should be working closely now and in the future, great noncom-
with the Armor Branch assignments missioned officers prepared and certi-
Today, in quite a few units, staff ser- office to have the NCO rotate out of the fied to execute their tasks on the future
geants are serving as platoon sergeants. leadership job and into other beneficial battlefields.
Senior leaders must be aware of the duty positions once he has met the re-
needs of the total force so that we can quirements of branch certification. If “TODAY IS THE BEST DAY
work together to meet the needs of the we are to keep the Armor NCO compe- TO BE A SOLDIER.”

18 ARMOR — September-October 2000

“Fight Your Tank, Sergeant”
by Master Sergeant Dennis White

This article was MSG White’s entry in for a tank crew was to be able to fight tanks. The “Designate” capability en-
the Draper Leadership Essay Contest. your tank, regardless of the circum- ables the crew to engage targets much
Although it did not place in the top three stances. faster by allowing the TC to acquire
entries, we believe it deserves to be pub- targets while the gunner engages another
In May of 1990 at the National Train-
lished in ARMOR. ing Center, it was the last rotation fought target simultaneously. But, the rest, to
me, was “Jedi Tanking,” for lack of a
“Bravo, one five, this is Charlie niner by BLUFOR using the M60A3 main better term. We went through new
battle tank. As a newly assigned TC, I
two,” announced the tower at range 118. was fortunate to have an outstanding and equipment training on our new panzers
“Clear and elevate all weapon systems with great zeal and enthusiasm. We
and proceed to the base of the tower. A loyal tank crew that I will always think learned how to operate all of the digital
of with fondness. My platoon was at-
maintenance team will be on site to tached to an infantry company that systems of the tank. But, something
troubleshoot your tank.” wasn’t right. We were being told to get
called themselves “The Hell Raisers.” down inside to fight the tank. I heard
I was a young corporal at the time, the
gunner on tank B-15 in B Troop, 3-12 During a movement to contact in the new terms like “Check your mail box!”!
central corridor, our crew luckily sur- I just may be an old DAT stuck in his
Cavalry in the fall of 1986. My tank vived the initial wave of OPFOR. But, ways, but this felt strange.
commander (TC) was SFC Thomas
“Pappy” La Fontaine, a man I would true to Murphy’s Law, something went I am quite sure you are wondering how
wrong with our beloved panzer. The
grow to do my best to emulate. Our stabilization in the fire control system all of this relates to “Leadership in the
problem was that the tank thermal sight Digital Age.” It is quite simple. Leader-
(TTS) was out and our laser range finder went out. The timing couldn’t have been ship is about people! My concern with
worse as the AGMB was headed our
(LRF) was flashing triple niner five. way. So, we went to ground north of the the eye in the sky technology is we will
lose sight of the real weapon we have in
Most TCs would follow the tower’s Racetrack. My driver, PFC Robert our inventory, that being the American
instructions. Pappy, however, was not “Bull” Van Slyke, found a great defen-
your average tank commander. He re- sive position in a narrow cut at the base soldier.
plied, “Negative! We will complete the of the ridge along the north wall. The new technologies such as IVIS,
last two engagements using degraded Pluggers, e-mail, and PowerPoint, to
mode.” The next thing I hear him say In our struggle to survive the ensuing name a few, are only tools designed to
OPFOR attack, we didn’t realize that
was “Index one two hundred, battle our position would provide us superb enhance our capabilities. We must re-
carry sabot, crew report!” I was now member and continue to teach our sol-
concerned that our gunner score would concealment and keyhole shots into the diers the basics — to estimate range
flank of the enemy. Enemy vehicles
not be as high as I had hoped due to our passed our position and, my gunner, with the naked eye, read a map, walk
systems failure. Our wing tank reported, across the street to speak to a colleague,
“Targets up, TRP two.” The TC over- SGT Roland “Sporty” McEachin stead- stick your head out the hatch and assess
ily picked them off, one by one, using
rides my power control handles and lays degraded gunnery techniques. Again, we the surrounding environment. These
the gun on. He screams, “Gunner, battle technologies can take us, as leaders,
sight tank.” Our crew responds with, were “Fighting the Tank!” After the dust away from our troops if we allow them
settled, we learned that we had de-
“Up, Identified. Fire. On the way.” stroyed over 40 enemy vehicles before a to. Interacting with our comrades instead
“BOOM.” Our tank rocks back from the of sending them a “digital burst” should
recoil. Our wing man yells, “Over BMP finally located our position and always remain the preferred method.
shot us in the grille doors. It was a won-
Line!” Pappy responds with, “Over, derful day to be a tanker! In closing, I understand that many peo-
drop one half form. Fire.” I squeezed the
trigger again. “BOOM,” it seemed like Five years later, I was assigned as a ple in the Armor Community will throw
stones at me for these random thoughts
an eternity before Pappy yelled, “TAR- platoon sergeant in 3-8 Cavalry at Fort on the Digital Age, but I will always say,
GET, cease-fire, crew report!” Hood, Texas. We were the first unit to
draw the latest main battle tank in the “FIGHT YOUR TANK, SERGEANT!”
We all had a sense of relief as we made
our way to the tank crew evaluation Army’s inventory, the M1A2. On draw
day, I anxiously climbed into the turret
(TCE) tent. We bypassed the grill where of my new panzer and sat in the TC’s
LTC J. W. Thurman was cooking “Bolo MSG Dennis White is currently as-
Burgers” for those crews that didn’t seat. I could not believe my eyes. I signed to CMTC Hohenfels, Ger-
looked around and was overwhelmed by many. He has served as tank pla-
shoot so well. We had done as we had the technological advances. I asked my-
trained at the tank crew proficiency toon O/C, tank company O/C team
course (TCPC) at home station. We had self, “Is this a tank or a cubicle in some- NCOIC, and is currently the BRT
one’s office?” Some of the advances
done as Pappy had always said, “Fight were far beyond anything that I could Mustang 20 Team NCOIC. Prior as-
the Tank!” signments include PSG, A Co, 3-68
imagine. The addition of a commander’s
Though this was only my first gunnery, independent thermal viewer (CITV) is, Armor and B Co, 3-8 Cav, 1st Cav,
I soon realized that technology was only in my opinion, the most significant im- which was the first battalion to field
a tool, and that the most important thing provement made to the M1 family of the M1A2. Email: denniswhite surfl.de

ARMOR — September-October 2000 19

General Wood, at right, discusses plans for the breakout with Lieutenant General Omar Bradley, center, and Major General Manton Eddy.

Before There Was Digitization:

How MG J.S. Wood’s 4th Armored Division

Stormed Across France Without Written Orders
by Major Donald E. Vandergriff
 “Burn Em! That’s the last written evolving doctrine. Employing the fun- with more hitting power and longer
field order this division prepares! damentals of maneuver warfare, the 4th ranges. Many of 4AD’s battles in
Every order I give will be verbal, either AD exploited, pursued the Germans France in 1944 would pit its smaller,
eye-to-eye or by radio.”1 across France, and then carried out a yet well equipped forces against deter-
mobile defense against a determined, mined German units, some of high
After viewing his division’s first writ-
ten order in combat, MG John S. well-trained, well-equipped, and well- quality, such as the Panzer divisions,
led enemy in forested terrain inhabited and some of inferior quality, such as
Wood, commander of the 4th Armored by an unfriendly population. the Volksgrenadier divisions. In many
Division, told his G3 (operations offi-
cer) not to issue any more. Wood be- By the time the division entered com- cases, the division operated its combat
commands over vast distances, yet the
lieved the formatted, five-paragraph bat, with none of its units bloodied, it long experience operating as a team
order taught to U.S. Army officers at was ready to fight. Wood had reason to
the Command and General Staff Col- feel that his division was ready to take bonded them as they fought. They had
trained and grown to think as a team,
lege at Fort Leavenworth would only the fight to the enemy because it had with a single mind.6
slow down his division’s decision cycle been preparing for more than three
in combat. years, in snow, mountains, sand, and It was the long period of training and
The fact that MG Wood could dis- hard scrabble plains. Probably no other building cohesion that enabled the divi-
outfit in our military history had trained sion to perform at such a high level.
pense with written orders while leading together longer, more intensively, or in The soldiers themselves were as confi-
his division across France highlights
the level of training, cohesion, and edu-
cation that a unit would need to achieve
in order to execute verbal mission or- “The 4th AD adapted many tenets of German maneuver war-
ders.
fare. The objective of maneuver warfare is to exploit fire-
The 4th Armored Division’s “daring, power, mobility, and shock action through aggressive, auda-
hard-riding, fast-shooting style” was
made possible through the execution of cious tactics and techniques. It optimizes the capacity to move,
mission orders. But only by “throwing shoot, and communicate more effectively than the enemy.”
away the book,” ironically, did the di-
vision accomplish the armored warfare
envisioned by the writers of FM 17- more varied terrain and weather than dent as they should have been. One of
100, Armored Command Field Manual, the 4th Armored Division. It was ready their noted members, retired Brigadier
The Armored Division.2 to a fare-thee-well.4 General Albin F. Irzyk, remarked that,
The division was activated on April “We felt that we were destined for
And as it fought, it got better because greatness, much the same feeling that a
15, 1941, at Pine Camp, New York, its officers and soldiers could easily
and stayed together and trained in the assimilate new lessons learned from the college football team must have when it
United States for 32 months before senses the national championship.”7
battlefield. This was the key to suc-
shipping out to England in December cess. Flexibility became the division’s The entire division did not stay to-
1943. By that time, the division had watchword, and accepted way of doing gether as a team through its three years.
trained in New York, Tennessee, the business. The Army’s poor policies stripped the
Desert Training Center in California, 4th AD of many of its trained members
and Camp Bowie, Texas. In July 1944, Though the division was divided ac- to form the cadres of other divisions. In
the division entered combat for the cording to its Table of Organization
and Equipment (TO&E) into three sub- fairness, there was no choice: there
first time during Operation Cobra, the were not enough trained personnel in
breakout from the Normandy beach- ordinate brigade-size commands, let- the Regular Army at the beginning of
head, and from that point on led the rest tered Combat Command A, B, and Re-
serve, the actions of Combat Command the war to train the new divisions. In
of the Army across France and into 1942, many members of the 4th AD
Germany. The division offers valuable A (CCA) merit specific study, provid- were reassigned, yet a cadre of key
lessons in developing the leadership ing many examples of rapid and deci-
sive decision-making, from the indi- leaders remained, allowing the division
and cohesion that allowed it to become to remain effective. General Bautz de-
one of World War II’s premier armored vidual tank crew to the combat com- scribes how the division overcame this:
divisions, and its commander, Major mand commander. The 4AD’s offen-
sive in Lorraine demonstrated speed, “Though many soldiers were taken
General John Shirley Wood, the away in 1942, many leaders and staff
“American Heinz Guderian.”3 “not just speed of movement, which is officers stayed. This cadre of individu-
important, but speed in everything.”5
The 4th AD adapted many tenets of als, particularly men like [Bruce] Clark
German maneuver warfare. The objec- In several battles, the principles of and [Creighton] Abrams, allowed the
tive of maneuver warfare is to exploit leadership and cohesion held firm division to retain its lessons learned.
firepower, mobility, and shock action against the best the Germans had to The learning and innovating did not
through aggressive, audacious tactics throw at the U.S. Army at the time. The stop as a large body of lower ranking
and techniques. It optimizes the capac- division had to employ maneuver war- men were pulled away to create other
ity to move, shoot, and communicate fare to succeed because it faced longer- divisions.”8
more effectively than the enemy. The range weapons, manned by veteran
4th AD could do this because its com- German soldiers with some of the best There were key reasons that allowed
mander and his subordinates modified technology of the day. The Germans the 4AD to remain effective despite the
or defied existing officer and unit per- had better tank sights and range-finding loss of several thousand personnel.
sonnel policies as they implemented an equipment, and larger main tank guns First, the division retained its key offi-

ARMOR — September-October 2000 21

cers. Another reason was the command and recommendations, and the demon- • Never fear what “they” will or do
atmosphere: Wood fought hard to cre- stration of the power of Blitzkrieg as (“they” being the same old bogie
ate and sustain an atmosphere of trust German forces overran Poland and — high officialdom or general
during his tenure as division com- France in 1939 and 1940, there was still opinion)
mander. He began training his division resistance to an American armor force.
in a situation that was no different than It would fall on the shoulders of Wood
• Trusting people in rear to do their
part, a trust sometimes misplaced,
any other division. His new officers, to prove the value of his words with
the men who would train the division actions. but not generally.14
for combat, and lead its men against the At the beginning of World War II, the “He would try anything once; he en-
famed German Army, were no more couraged initiative.”15 With this fun-
than amateurs.9 Regular Army had 14,000 officers and damental outlook toward training, it
120,000 enlisted men. Almost over-
night, the officer corps expanded about was not surprising that many officers,
J.S. Wood and His Officers such as Major Creighton Abrams (later
60-fold. The war exposed Regular offi- Army Chief of Staff), and Lieutenant
cers to responsibilities far beyond any-
From the time of his youth, Wood was thing they had experienced, and forced Bruce C. Clarke (later NATO com-
an individual of strong character and a mander) became brilliant officers.16
naturally strong leader. A graduate of them to rely on subordinates who were
essentially commissioned amateurs. The 4th AD did a lot of experiment-
the University of Arkansas, he then at- Most division commanders and their ing, and “Wood had ideas and was will-
tended West Point, which had a strong
interest in him due his football reputa- regimental commanders, who were ing to give them without reserve.” One
largely pre-war regulars, turned toward of these inventions was the use of the
tion and his academic record. At the authoritarian, top-down methods of task force. At Pine Camp, the 4th Ar-
Academy, he excelled in both academ-
ics and athletics, particularly football, command. They issued detailed orders, mored Division established the task
insisted on unquestioned obedience, force principle.... One key derivative
graduating in 1912. He became known and used their staff officers to check on was that the building blocks of such
as the professor, or “P,” for taking the
lead in helping tutor other students. compliance. Reposing trust and confi- task forces — especially the tank and
dence in a subordinate entailed the pos- armored infantry battalions — would
As a Regular Army officer, Wood sibility that he might fail, and embar- not be permanently assigned to any
constantly showed his desire for inde- rass his ambitious superiors with their higher headquarters (a combat com-
pendence and responsibility. In 1936, eyes on one of the many commands mand in an armored division), but
already a known advocate of maneuver being formed.13 rather tasked out to one or another such
warfare and a student of the writings of Wood was the exception to this trend, headquarters depending on the tactical
Charles de Gaulle, B.H. Liddell-Hart, situation.17
and J.F.C. Fuller; Wood sought as- taking the pain of creating autonomy
that would allow his officers to learn Wood speeded up decisions by using
signments that would give him experi- from their mistakes. He won their loy- this ability to change task organizations
ence. Despite the advice of friends,
Wood turned down attendance at the alty, and developed subordinate leaders to solve a particular tactical problem.
not afraid to take risks in the face of From the first day of his command,
Army War College and instead took German actions. Wood did his utmost to ensure that his
command of the Army’s only inde-
pendent truck-drawn howitzer brigade, Wood got the opportunity to combine commanders and their staffs were not
focused on processes or formulas.
stationed in Des Moines, Iowa.10 It was the theories of maneuver warfare advo- Wood understood that over time,
during this assignment that Wood ex- cates such as J.F.C. Fuller and Heinz
perimented with mechanization and Guderian with his own experiences through constant training, officers
memorized and verbalized a seemingly
mobility. In numerous exercises, Wood when he was offered an armored divi- complex decision-making process He
would use his initiative to move his sion in 1942. Wood took over the divi-
howitzer brigade thousands of miles to sion in June, 1942, at Camp Pine, N.Y. was against these tidy methods of con-
trol and written prescriptions for ensur-
separate firing points. He tested his He immediately brought with him sim- ing control. He wrote, “Contrary to the
unit’s abilities, as well as demonstrat- ple, yet time-proven philosophies such
ing its mobility, a trait unknown for as, practice in many other armored divi-
sions, we had no separation into fixed
artillery at the time. Despite Wood’s • Audacity (de l’audace) or rigid combat commands. To me, the
noble efforts, he continued to be criti-
cized by senior officers, even as he was • The indirect approach division was a reservoir of force to be
applied in different combinations as
reporting to become Patton’s artillery • Direct oral orders. No details, only circumstances indicated, and which
chief in the newly formed 2nd Armored missions
Division.11 could be changed as needed in the
• Movement in depth always. This course of combat by a commander in
Upon assuming direction of Patton’s allows flexibility and security of close contact with the situation at the
artillery in September 1939, his charac- flanks front. There is not time or place for
ter was once again called into question detailed orders, limiting lines or zones,
by senior officers because of his advo- • Disregard old ideas of flank secu- phase lines, limited objectives or other
cacy of maneuver warfare. Wood now rity restraints.18
attacked, verbally and in writing, the • Organization of supply (taking ra-
traditionalist views that advocated lin- tions, gas, and ammunition in roll- In order to create such flexibility,
ear — or attrition — warfare. In nu- ing reserve) Wood stressed hard, realistic training.
merous reports and articles, he stressed The division truly exemplified the
a familiar theme: “The motor offers one • Personal communication with com- phrase, “Train as you fight.” Constant
manders
of the few hopes of securing surprise in maneuver training, in all conditions,
modern war.”12 Despite his warnings • Never taking counsel of your fears enabled the commanders of companies,

22 ARMOR — September-October 2000

A column of 4th AD tanks pass a destroyed German vehicle in the French town of Auvencheil-Aubac in September 1944.

battalions, and the combat commands From physical fitness to collective against guidance not to conduct move-
of the division to know each other as training, there was never a break in ment at night. He seized the bridge
officers seldom do. The division trained training. In force-on-force battles, op- after a surprise night march. The Sec-
on how to task organize for a particular posing forces fought with live .30 cali- ond Army commander, Lieutenant Gen-
mission, and then, on Wood’s orders, ber ammunition slapping against “but- eral Ben Lear, criticized the officers of
reform the task forces while on the toned up” turrets. Maneuver, speed and the 2nd Armored Division for being too
move to meet a new threat. Wood did competence — the basic military skills aggressive and going beyond estab-
this with no fancy briefings or lengthy — were taught and practiced over and lished boundaries. At that time, most
rehearsals. He used the radio, and face- over in varying situations.19 officers adhered to the methods they
to-face oral instructions to train his Wood exemplified the best in a senior had learned from the French Army —
division to operate without written di- rigid adherence to staying within des-
rectives. Speed was always on Wood’s officer. With a foundation established ignated boundaries, reporting locations,
in the basics of soldiering and disci-
mind as he trained, not just speed of pline, Wood created a command cli- and being on time. To leave the boun-
motion, but speed in everything the daries, even to outsmart the enemy
division executed. The training enabled mate that was open to innovation. He through maneuver, was breaking the
believed loyalty was a two-way street,
the division’s officers to do away with and continually stood up for his subor- rules of the game in the mind of Gen-
many standardized procedures that eral Lear.
would slow down their actions, such as dinates, especially when they followed
his evolving armor doctrine. He had an Wood bore the brunt of the verbal at-
abiding by strict radio procedures. intense — indeed fierce — sense of tack, by jumping between Lear and the
For example, Wood’s battalion com- loyalty down; he was ready to act as a division’s officers, then said to Lear,
manders and the division command shock absorber for all who served un- “You do not know what you are talking
learned to recognize each other by der him. But he had little toleration for about, either as to the employment of
voice — authentication by familiariza- rigidity, inflexibility, or stupidity and armor or of the quality of people in my
tion. This increased flexibility, and he could not condone it, even in his division!”20 Such moral courage can be
translated into the ability of command- superiors; he felt his highest loyalty up traced to Wood’s background, which
ers to change directions more quickly, was to his country and the Army he fostered independence and commitment
without worrying that the orders re- served, not to any single individual, to excellence.
ceived were false. Rapid decision- even one of superior rank.
Finally, it must be highlighted that
making increased with operating pro- In the fall of 1942, 4th AD executed while Wood enforced high standards in
cedures that eased the ability of com-
manders to make decisions. This trans- maneuvers in central Tennessee as part both competence and performance, he
of LTG Leslie McNair’s methodical was not a “martinet or a ‘spit-and-
lated into fluid tactics. When the divi- training plan to prepare divisions for polish’ general.”21 He enforced main-
sion or its subordinate commands at-
tacked, it was by flanking movements. combat. It was an opportunity for taining the proper uniform — keeping
Wood to see what his subordinates sleeves and shirts buttoned — and sa-
The division practiced moving and at- could do with his premise of “I will let luting, not merely to a higher rank, but
tacking behind enemy lines. The spirit
of such aggressive tactics infected the you decide what to do on the spot.” It as an informal “soldier’s greeting.” To
also allowed Wood to shield them from Wood, discipline brought about pride,
entire division. his conservative superiors. An example so essential in a good unit. While Wood
Wood never let his standards drop, of the fierce loyalty inherent in Wood’s knew discipline was important, he did
knowing that the Germans would never command style occurred after the divi- not, as some leaders did, believe in
give the division a second chance. He sion seized a bridge over the Columbia “imposing your will... even by the mar-
kept his training intense and realistic. River in central Tennessee. Wood went tinet method.”22 He refused to transfer

ARMOR — September-October 2000 23

poor soldiers to other units, instead to create ad hoc units to overcome the province of Lorraine in eastern
expecting his officers to train them. German resistance and to adapt to the France.
And as always, Wood exemplified the extensive road network. These factors From the time the division rumbled
high standards he set by leading by increased the speed of its advance. The
example. He lived with his soldiers 4th AD advanced on parallel routes in through German lines at 9:45 on 29
July in the breakout from Normandy, it
constantly, from the onset of his com- order to reduce the number of vehicles continually improvised with a different
mand until his departure in November, on a single route, thus preventing traf-
1944. fic jams, and hitting the Germans from solution for every problem it encoun-
tered. On 30 July, after refueling their
many directions. It was an agility that vehicles, the 4th Armored was in-
Organized for Speed the division had maintained in training
that “kept the advance moving.”26 structed by Patton to seize all four
By the time the 4th Armored Division bridges over the Selune River at the
entered combat in July 1944 in Opera- A Doctrine of Improvisation town of Avranches.27 It is important to
tion Cobra, it was not only well trained, note that Wood sent the orders to con-
but capable of speed under the revised The division’s fighting from July duct this critical mission over radio.
organization for armored divisions that 1944 to October 1944 epitomized de- CCB would attack the town from the
followed lessons learned in early com- centralized combat while fighting to- north, and CCA would seize the
bat in North Africa. Lieutenant General ward a common goal. After their bridges. CCA formed its task forces,
Leslie McNair, commander, Army breakout from Normandy, 4th AD had also by radio orders, and CCA’s com-
Ground Forces, and Major General to advance westward into Brittany to mander, Colonel Bruce Clarke, had
(later General) Jacob Devers, then chief capture the peninsula’s ports, as four separate task forces moving within
of the Armored Force, created an in- planned prior to D-Day. Wood
credibly flexible organization, styled saw the situation had dictated
the “Type U.S. Armored Division, new plans, as did Patton, and they
Sept. 1943.” The earlier division con- recommended moving east after
cept of 1942 had established two com- breaking out of Normandy and
bat commands, lettered A and B (CCA encircling German forces at-
& CCB), which allowed commanders tempting to counterattack into the
to improvise task organizations to meet flank of the 3rd Army. Planners
likely situations. The problem with the at Lieutenant General Omar
1942 design was that “it was too tank- Bradley’s 12th Army Group and
heavy and lacked infantry and mecha- at Eisenhower’s Supreme Allied
nized artillery.”23 Later studies forced Forces headquarters saw no
the Army to create a well-balanced all- change in the situation. Orders
arms division, and added a third bri- came down from higher: Execute
gade-size headquarters, Combat Com- as planned. The 4th AD assisted
mand Reserve (CCR).24 follow-on infantry forces in clear-
Based on General McNair’s goal, new ing Germans from the Channel
ports in western France, but at the
divisions like the 4th AD were lean and price of losing precious time in
simple, offensive in orientation, with
attachments developed as necessary. cutting off and destroying Ger-
man forces which were fleeing
Under the doctrine that had developed east to the German border. Dur-
from the Louisiana Maneuvers and
training throughout the growing Army, ing this delay in August and early
September — and also because 4th AD troopers keep their weapons at the
the corps was to be a tactical headquar- fuel priorities were going to the
ters to handle a mix of infantry and ready during a break in the fighting in France in
armor divisions. It was the field army British attempting to break out in July, 1944. Note carbine in the guitarist’s lap
the northern part of the beach- and the M3 “Grease Gun” at the fiddler’s feet.
that allocated divisions to the corps, head — German forces had a
with combat service and service sup-
port assets when needed. Once combat chance to consolidate and rein-
force, offering new resistance to the 4th the hour.28 Two of the bridges fell dur-
began, units found it necessary to keep AD. In a reversal of what had occurred ing the first assault, while the remain-
attached units at the division level. ing two had to be seized after a pro-
While other divisions kept attachments during the previous five years of the
war — where well-led, cohesive Ger- longed battle with German SS troopers.
and task forces constant, the 4th Ar- man units outfought Allied units — the
mored continued to change its mix of This first encounter demonstrated how
separate arms such as tanks, infantry, 4th AD fought hastily thrown together valuable the 4th AD’s strenuous train-
German units, over-controlled by a ing had been at moving decisively, ex-
engineers, and artillery units through- centralized headquarters (Hitler). In
out the 1944-45 campaign.25 ploiting the enemy’s confusion, and
this scenario, the U.S. forces were bet- saving lives.
When 4th AD arrived in Europe, it ter led, trained, more cohesive, and had
had three tank, three infantry, and three higher morale due to the teamwork The move westward into Brittany to
artillery battalions, along with attached developed over the previous three years clear German holdouts in the Channel
engineer, antitank, and tank destroyer and the months of recent fighting in ports diverted U.S. armor from pursu-
units. It had a total of 11,000 officers France. Despite the 4th AD’s advan- ing the main German force that was
and men. As the division broke out of tages, the Germans could still fight and retreating eastward. Wood had the fore-
Normandy in August 1944, it found intended to counterattack the stalled sight to point parts of the division east
that its training had given it the ability 3rd Army forces, including 4th AD, in in anticipation of orders that would

24 ARMOR — September-October 2000

allow him to continue the pursuit. tanks or overhead in airplanes (Piper AD possessed few advantages. The Nor-
When he received approval from his Cubs) calling for suppressive fires, mandy breakout had cost the Germans
corps commander to move, the division pinning German units down, and hence some of their best units, and other
quickly caught retreating German col- assisting with rapid maneuver.31 strong units were sent north to fight the
umns. British and U.S. First Army. The Ger-
The 4th AD had also worked out in-
As the 4th Armored Division began its credible cooperation with the Army Air man advantages were their superior
equipment, such as the Panther and
march toward Germany, it demon- Corps, especially the P-47 fighter- Tiger tanks, their knowledge of the
strated more flexibility, ingenuity, and bombers of the XIX Tactical Air
mobile firepower. The division’s com- Command (TAC) attached to the 3rd terrain, and their posture on the de-
fense. On the other hand, they were
bat commands and task forces fre- Army. The airplanes, acting as light handicapped by poorly trained soldiers,
quently changed configuration, based cavalry did in the past, screened ahead
on changing tactical conditions. Wood to attack targets marked by air control- units thrown together just prior to bat-
tle, and officers new to their units. Al-
made many of these adjustments by lers riding with the tanks or by artillery though combat experienced and well-
verbal FRAGO. He would observe the observers in their light aircraft. The
situation from the air in his small Piper commanders of Wood’s task forces educated in the art of war, from the
tactical to the operational level of
Cub airplane, then land alongside a would use the “flying artillery” of the command, turbulence handicapped the
column using either a road or a field. XIX TAC to fill the gaps when artillery
Wood would pull the map out of his was not available for immediate sup- officer corps in Fifth Panzer Army and
Army Group G. “One significant prob-
shirt, spread it, and point: “There’s pression. The ground and air units also lem with German command and control
your boundaries, the units left, right had developed teamwork and standard
and following us and the first, second operating procedures that kept friendly was the constant rotation of leadership
at higher levels.”34
and third objectives — let’s get at it fire or fratricide incidents to a mini-
right now!” After brief details of enemy mum. The success of the fighter- Despite lack of gasoline, Wood’s divi-
information, air and artillery support, bomber to the combined arms teams of sion continued to defeat and repel fresh
Wood flew to the other combat com- the 4th AD was an obvious payoff after German forces and their counterattacks
mands, artillery headquarters, and to long months of practice. Training had in mid-September. Ordered to encircle
his division headquarters to brief his led to confidence and mutual under- the town of Nancy and seize the high
staff and put his concise attack order on standing by imaginative and highly ground to the east of Arracourt, Wood
a map and a few message-blanks. By competent leaders at all echelons, was forced to divide the division into
the time the Army corps order arrived working with the driving spirit of their two thrusts, north and south of Nancy.
at Wood’s headquarters, at least one — commanding general.32 During these operations, the division,
and sometimes all the 4th Armored particularly Clarke’s CCA, provide ex-
Division objectives — had been taken Despite the division’s glaring success, amples of agility, initiative and depth.
Eisenhower decided to make them the
and Wood’s combat commands were secondary effort. By mid-September, CCA conducted a river crossing, a for-
mopping up.29 ward passage of lines, a counterattack,
Eisenhower’s broad front policy — then an exploitation and pursuit against
The benefit of bottom-up decision which diverted scarce resources to the
making and cohesion paid handsome British army’s advance into Belgium reinforced German units defending in
channelized terrain. These operations
dividends in the pursuit across France. and Holland — had given German came to a climax when the division
With tanks usually in the lead, Wood’s forces the opportunity to regroup. Pat-
columns moved along secondary roads ton had also ordered attacks across the reunited at Arracourt and fought a mo-
bile defense against better equipped
catching fleeing enemy units on the entire front of the 3rd Army throughout and more numerous German troops.35
main road, bypassing road blocks, and September, which also took away lim-
moving on. Logistical units — includ- ited resources and slowed the 4th AD
ing maintenance teams, medics, and rapid advance. Insights Into the Future
supplies — were mixed in with the
division combat columns. It was not Dwindling resources was not the only Oddly, there was a reversal of accepted
cause of stalling the division. Its imme- historical roles during this period. While
uncommon for logistical units to en- diate headquarters, the XII Corps, had Wood and his subordinates sped up their
gage German units missed or left be-
hind by the advancing combat units. become concerned about its flanks, actions, moving quickly on verbal mis-
which helped bring the division’s ad- sion orders, the Germans commanders
During their three years of training, vance to a standstill. The XII Corps operated under an extremely centralized
Wood had also ensured that the first
responsibility of his logistical units was Commander, Major General Manton S. system. The German military culture in
Eddy, felt he needed to eliminate Ger- 1944 turned into one where, “Generally,
the ability to defend themselves against mans bypassed by the 4th AD, so he commanders lacked flexibility to make
attack.
ordered his infantry divisions to stop changes and were subject to court mar-
Artillery also moved with the lead supporting the division and concentrate tial if they did so without first checking
columns, and was expected to keep up. on destroying German pockets of resis- with Berlin. Orders were spelled out in
Wood avoided the habit that most other tance. In early September, despite be- great detail and subordinates had to fol-
division and corps commanders had ing within reach of the German border, low them to the letter.”36 Hitler and his
developed during World War I — these factors, plus growing German headquarters in Berlin and the Ober-
slowing their advance in order to wait resistance, brought the division to a kommando Wehrmacht (OKW), at-
for their artillery. In the 4th AD, when- standstill.33 tempted to control the actions of units
ever the lead elements needed fire sup- down to and even below division level,
port, the artillerymen would pull off the By September 1944, the Germans employing the most modern communi-
road and “hip-shoot” the fire mission.30 were eager to return to the offense. The cations devices to keep in constant con-
Forward observers were in front in German forces arrayed against the 4th tact with the front, army groups, and

ARMOR — September-October 2000 25

army commanders. While Hitler at- AD and used them as examples on how • The division never massed its com-
tempted to manage two major warfight- to employ the Army’s new AirLand bat power up front. Using aircraft and
ing fronts, his commanders wasted pre- Battle doctrine. A great effort had been autonomous reconnaissance units, it
cious time waiting for permission to act. made in the Army’s education system was able to maintain uncommitted units
Hitler became so fanatical about making to ensure all officers knew and under- as a large tactical reserve. In effect, it
decisions that commanders risked court stood the Army’s first maneuver doc- was “reconnaissance pull,” allowing
martial if they used initiative. trine, outlined in the 1982 and 1986 Wood and the CCA and CCB com-
versions of FM 100-5, Operations.40 manders to shift to routes of least resis-
This climate of fear filtered down to
regimental and even battalion com- Lieutenants, in their first exposure to tance in order to maintain initiative and
formal Army education at their officer momentum.42
manders. Orders, once easily transmit- basic course, were inundated with the
ted verbally, became detailed written
tenets of AirLand Battle doctrine —
• The incorporation of assisting Army
transmission of actions. Subordinates Air Corps fighter bombers used as “fly-
Agility, Initiative, Depth, and Synchro-
were then expected to follow these or- nization. Later, these officers would ing artillery.” The planes attacked Ger-
ders to the letter. Gone were the days of man tactical reserves, and enhanced the
Auftragstaktik, or mission orders; com- serve as battalion executive and opera- movement of the ground element.
tions officers, and company command-
manders now copied the orders of high- ers leading units in the Gulf War. The 4th AD was a maneuver-oriented
er headquarters, making no adjustments
to them. Only a few commanders, like The operations of 4th AD exemplified division. It did its utmost to avoid use-
less casualties in frontal assaults. It
Erwin Rommel, Hermann Balck, and how officers should practice these ten- sought to collapse the enemy from
Eric Manstein, still possessed the moral ets. The division’s relentless pursuit of
courage and character to argue with an offensive upheld Agility, both physi- within, by attacking his headquarters
and support assets.43 Future units might
Hitler over “bad” decisions.37 cally and mentally. It takes physical find themselves fighting the same way
stamina for officers and men to stay
Another problem with the German focused and to sustain tempo for days. — widely dispersed, coming together
shift toward centralized command and to fight or raid enemy weaknesses, and
control was the constant rotation of They must be mentally agile to evaluate then dispersing to avoid strikes by nu-
the battle and to exploit enemy gaps as
commanders, not due to death in com- they discover them. The division dem- clear or chemical weapons. They must
bat but the assumptions of new duties. be agile, with commanders possessing
Changes occurred at the theater, army onstrated Initiative throughout its train- the initiative, to destroy high value en-
ing and in actual combat operations,
group, army corps and division level. from Wood down to the lowest ranking emy targets pinpointed by intelligence-
Commanders also assumed new forma- gathering systems and relayed by digi-
tions just prior to executing difficult tanker, infantryman, artilleryman, and tal technology, or moving quickly to
logistician. Wood’s ability to control a
missions. For example, both the com- division with only verbal, short orders exploit enemy weaknesses. In these
manders of the newly formed 111th and rapidly changing environments and
113th Panzer brigades had to expose consisting of a few lines, or what the threats, commanders will also have to
Army calls FRAGOs, is an extraordi-
themselves, in combat vehicles with nary accomplishment that should be make rapid decisions. Units will have
attacking units, to motivate and ensure to be trained in encountering different
their orders were carried by lesser- emulated by today’s Army, with its enemies in the spectrum of conflict
computer-generated orders. In applying
trained subordinates. As a result, both Depth, the 4th AD fought non-linear from low-intensity in urban environ-
commanders were killed around Arra- ments to high intensity in desert terrain
court as the battle was being fought to a warfare, attacking enemy weaknesses employing different tactics, and coun-
miles behind German lines. These
decision. Their places were filled by fights, while mentally and physically tering them with a combination of drills
commanders also new to the position and tactics that will rapidly destroy or
and situation.38 stressful, placed demoralizing pressure neutralize an enemy’s units or his will
on the enemy.41
As the battles around Arracourt came to fight. In the future, time will not
The 4th AD was able to practice this allow the U.S. Army three years to pre-
to an end, the 4th Armored Division style of warfare for a number of rea- pare. It must possess a culture whose
had destroyed 241 German tanks and
inflicted high casualties. After the vic- sons that we can emulate today: foundation rests on its personnel sys-
tem, which creates leaders who can
tory at Nancy and Arracourt, the divi- • Logistics were forced forward, trav- command units of excellence that are
sion, combat commands, and task force eling with combat formations. Also,
commanders looked east toward Ger- units lived off German supplies left by both ready to go to combat on a mo-
ment’s notice.
many and proposed the seizure of Saar- fleeing troops. Unit commanders did
bucken. They continued to focus on not fear for the security of their logisti-
how to defeat and destroy the enemy. cal units because they knew how to The author would like to thank MG Ed
The Germans had feared this, since no fight, and were soldiers first and tech- Bautz, Chuck Spinney, John Tilson,
reserves were present to shore up the nicians second. Pierre Sprey, William Lind, and Bruce
front. This exploitation was halted only Gudmundsson for their insights.
by bad weather and the caution of sen-
• The division maintained small
staffs. Competence and experience
ior U.S. commanders at levels above
the 4th Armored.39 eliminated the need for most paper- Notes
work.
1Discussions with Major General Edward
What We Can Learn
From the 4th Armored Division
• Command, control, communications Bautz, USA, (Ret.) from Dec 1996-September
and intelligence were not deterministic. 1997. General Bautz served as General Creighton
In the 1980s, the Army was recover- There was no separate chart or process Abrams’ S3 (operations officer) and XO (execu-
ing from Vietnam and senior officers to ensure they occurred. Constant prac- tive officer) in 1-37 AR, 4th Armored Division,
took lessons from the actions of the 4th tice ensured unity of effort. during the training of the division from 1942

26 ARMOR — September-October 2000

through 1944, and in its critical campaigns in 12Hanson W. Baldwin, “ ‘P’ Wood of the 4th 1944. In the early 1960s, he was supreme com-
France and Germany, 1944-1945. Shortly after Armored,” in Army (Arlington, Va.: Association mander of NATO.
relieving Bastogne, General Bautz was moved up of the United States Army, January 1968), pp. 29Baldwin, Tiger Jack, pp. 41-42.
to be S3 for Combat Command A (brigade), 4th 50-51. 30“Hip-shoot” means firing artillery missions
Armored Division. 13Russell F. Weigley, History of the United
2U.S. War Department, FM 17-100, Armored
off a compass bearing using quick mathematical
States Army (Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana Univer- calculations to determine range and azimuth.
Command Field Manual, The Armored Division sity Press, 1984), pp. 598-600. Given more time (30-45 minutes) a battery could
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing 14Sorley, Thunderbolt, pp. 36-37; these were “survey” and stake out its new firing position,
Office, 1944), p. 2-4. This manual was written enabling it to use more precise calculations to
based on the experiments and training conducted not Wood’s exact words, but Dr. Sorley’s inter-
pretation of several prominent officers’ insights deliver more accurate fire missions.
by the 4th Armored Division from 1942 through 31Richard H. Barnes, Arracourt-September
1943. into Wood’s methods. General Bautz reinforced
3Discussions with Brigadier General Mike
these approaches during a discussion with the 1944 (Fort Knox, Ky.: U.S. Army Armor Center,
author about General Wood’s leadership style. 1982), pp. 39-40.
Lynch, USA (Ret.), 24 May 1998; John Wood 15Baldwin, Tiger Jack, p. 113. 32After-Action Reports of the 4th Armored Di-
and Heinz Guderian suffered the same fate. Both
were relieved for having out-thought their sen- 16Baldwin Thunderbolt, Tiger Jack, p. 50 and vision, 29 July-30 September 1944, provided by
iors, thus gaining credit that deflated the image of 113. Major General (Ret.) Bautz to the author, No-
their superiors. 17Sorley, pp. 36-37. This concept was based on
vember 1995.
33Dr. Christopher Gabel, The 4th Armored Divi-
4Lewis Sorley, Thunderbolt, From the Battle of Adna Chaffee’s concept of armor.
the Bulge to Vietnam and Beyond: General 18Baldwin, Tiger Jack, p. 52.
sion in the Encirclement of Nancy (Fort Leaven-
Creighton Abrams and the Army of His Times worth, Kan.: Combat Studies Institute, April
19Balwin, Tiger Jack, pp. 144-147. 1986), p. 33.
(New York, N.Y.: Simon & Schuster, 1992), p.
46. 20Discussions with Major General Bautz, USA 34Richard H. Barnes, p. 35-36.

5William S. Lind, “The Theory and Practice of (Ret.), 27 July 1997; see also Baldwin, Tiger 35Commanders and Staff of Combat Command
Maneuver Warfare,” in Maneuver Warfare: An Jack, pp. 124-126. A, 4th Armored Division, U.S. Army, The Estab-
Anthology, edited by Major Richard D. Hooker, 21Allan R. Millett, The General: Robert L. Bul- lishment and Defense of the Nancy Bridgehead
(Novato, Calif.: Presidio Press, 1993), p. 7. This lard and Officership in the United States Army (Fort Leavenworth, Kan.: Military History-Battle
is a compressed APEX, i.e., the steps involving 1881-1925, pp. 100-106 and 140-49; Millet dis- Analysis, Combat Studies Institute, 1994), p. Lsn
analysis, planning and execution. This reflects the cusses Pershing’s use of fear in order to impress 3-2-19.
true meaning of maneuver warfare based on the the British and French generals in WWI, which 36Richard H. Barnes, p. 35.
ability to exploit favorable operational and tacti- influenced the leadership style of the entire 37For examples of this evolution, from decen-
cal options as they arise, while overcoming unfa- American Expeditionary Force (AEF), and in
vorable situations and circumstances that could effect stifled decentralized leadership. This began tralized to centralized command and control, see
cause failure. the American tradition of authoritarian leadership Mellenthin, Panzer Battles, pp. 312-318. Also see
6Major Dean A. Nowowiejski, “Achieving style. Manstein, Lost Victories, pp. 538-543.
38Richard H. Barnes, pp. 36-37.
Digital Destruction: Challenges for the M1A2 22U.S. Army, The Officer’s Guide (Washington,
Task Force,” in ARMOR, January-February 1995, D.C.: National Service Publishing Co., 1947), p. 39Donald E. Vandergriff, “The Exploitation
p. 21. Situational awareness is the thorough 247. from the Dieulouard Bridgehead: An Example of
knowledge of both friendly and enemy elements. 23Discussions with Major General Bautz, USA Maneuver Warfare that Applies Today,” in AR-
In a technological sense, this is translated to a (Ret.) 12 August 1997. MOR, September-October 1995, pp. 6-9.
small screen in the M1A2 for commanders to 24Jonathan M. House, Toward Combined Arms 40Discussions with General Donn Starry, USA
view their place in the larger formation and unit. (Ret.), 7 November 1997. General Starry was
This will hopefully decrease fratricide (friendly Warfare: A Survey of 20th-Century Tactics, Doc-
trine, and Organization (Fort Leavenworth, Kan.: commander of Training and Doctrine Command,
fire) incidents. 1979-1982. General Starry was involved in the
7Brigadier General Albin F. Irzyk, (Ret.), “The
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College,
Combat Studies Institute, August 1984), p. 108. creation of AirLand Battle Doctrine, as well as
Name Enough Division,” in ARMOR, July-Au- 25Dr. Christopher R. Gabel, The Lorraine Cam-
writing more than 50 articles for various military
gust 1987, pp. 8-12; General Irzyk served as journals on leadership, cohesion, and doctrine.
operations officer (S3), executive officer (XO), paign: An Overview, September-October, 1944 General Starry also commanded the 11th Ar-
and commander of 8th Tank Battalion during the (Fort Leavenworth, Kan.: U.S. Army Command mored Cavalry Regiment in Vietnam, the U.S.
4th Armored Division’s fighting in Europe. and General Staff College, Combat Studies Insti- Army Armor Center, U.S. Army V Corps, and
8Discussions with Major General Bautz, USA
tute, February, 1985), p. 14. U.S. Readiness Command.
26After-action reports of the 4th Armored Divi-
(Ret.) 12 August 1997. 41Gabel, Encirclement of Nancy, pp. 23-24; an

9Author interviews with Army officers March-

sion, 29 July-30 September 1944, provided by analogy of the actions of the division with those
Major General Bautz in November 1995. of AirLand Battle.
August 1997. Officers’ complaints centered 27Major General Bautz made an appearance on
around the turnover of personnel as soon as a unit 42Reconnaissance pull is where reconnaissance
returned from a productive and infrequent CTC the television show, Modern War, hosted by units find gaps in enemy defenses, or surfaces,
rotation. William Lind in January 17, 1997, discussing the and “pull” follow-on units through toward enemy
10At the time, there was no rigid management of
actions of 4th Armored Division and maneuver weaknesses.
warfare. Afterward, a group of U.S. Marine 43Baldwin, Tiger Jack, p. 26.
officers. Successful career patterns varied, but Corps lieutenants asked General Bautz how long
those of successful peacetime officers at the time did it take his battalion [Task Force 1-37 Armor,
relied more on political connections or working or Task Force Abrams] to move from an assem-
in positions that were under the view of senior bly area to conduct an attack. General Bautz MAJ Donald E. Vandergriff is a fre-
officers than on competence in the field. George remarked that it took 30 minutes to conduct a quent contributor to ARMOR and
C. Marshall, Dwight D. Eisenhower, and George hasty attack from the time they received the order
S. Patton Jr. all thought they had come to the end
currently instructs at Georgetown
to “getting on the road.” The lieutenants replied University ROTC. An author of over
of their careers by the mid ’30s due to the as- they were being taught to plan a platoon deliber-
signments they were serving in. ate attack in six hours. 20 articles on maneuver warfare
11Hanson W. Baldwin, Tiger Jack (Fort Collins, 28Colonel Bruce Clark would later become and military effectiveness, he is ex-
Colo.: Old Army Press, 1979), pp. 104-106; “The General Bruce Clark, hero of the defense of St. pecting publication of his first book
prophets of the future form of war were without Vith during the Battle of the Bulge in December in the Spring-Summer of 2001.
honor in their own country.”

ARMOR — September-October 2000 27

Force XXI Planning
Using the Maneuver Control System
by Captain Michael Dane Acord

The Maneuver Control System (MCS) ability to collect, coordinate, and act on units can now rapidly transfer informa-
and the Army Tactical Command and near-real-time battlefield information tion, orders, and graphics among other
Control System (ATCCS) are integral and to graphically visualize the battle- ATCCS units in a matter of seconds.
parts of Force XXI initiatives. As a field. The All Source Analysis System
A TTP we used to enhance parallel
member of the 4th Infantry Division, I (ASAS) provides battle commanders planning was to “pull” division prod-
have tested these systems and their with analyzed intelligence and unana-
effects on our current doctrine and tac- lyzed combat information. The Ad- ucts during their MDMP. During the
course of their process, they would
tics, techniques and procedures (TTPs). vanced Field Artillery Tactical Data produce WARNOs and products as
I am writing this article for two rea- System (AFATDS) provides command,
sons. First, I want to inform others in control, and communications for the outlined in FM 101-5. For example,
our division conducted PowerPoint
the Army that MCS works. There are U.S. Army and Marine Corps cannon, briefings to the commanding general
marked advantages, with respect to rocket, missile, mortar, close air sup-
planning, that the MCS and ATCCS port, and naval surface weapons sys- for mission analysis, COA develop-
ment and decision, and the OPORD.
brings to the fight. I will provide some tems. The Air & Missile Defense Work- They also produced their synch matrix
TTPs using MCS that will enhance the station (AMDW/S) provides the com-
brigade battle staff’s planning process. mander with the ability to electroni- during the wargame. As soon as these
briefings, events, and graphics were
Second, I want to raise awareness of cally generate and display weapon and complete and saved to an MCS com-
sensor locations, manipulate map
specific challenges MCS and ATCCS graphics, conduct terrain analysis, and puter, my operators would “pull” that
have to overcome before fielding in the briefing, using the file transfer protocol
21st century. I am writing this article analyze and monitor missions in near embedded in the MCS software. This
real time. The Combat Service Support
from the perspective of the brigade Control System (CSSCS) provides the allowed me to utilize the same informa-
staff for current and future brigade staff tion (and slides) to inform the com-
members. commander with battlefield decision mander of ensuing operations. As we
support and situational awareness for
My opinion is based on my experience planning and controlling logistical sup- honed our TTPs, we were able to stay
so close to the division that we once
as a brigade plans officer in 2nd Bri- port of combat operations. Addition- produced a full brigade order and is-
gade, 4th Infantry Division, from ally, there are several other comple-
March 1998 to June 1999. This experi- mentary systems that perform specific sued it only one hour after the division
released the division order. Conversely,
ence included the Maneuver Control functions that support ATCCS — e.g., as the BCT explored branches and se-
System’s initial operational testing and Digital Topographic Support System
evaluation (IOT&E) and a corps-level (DTSS). All the systems in the brigade quels, I could share them (which in-
cluded proposed graphics and sketches)
Warfighter exercise, which fully inte- architecture communicate internally with the division plans team in order to
grated all our ATCCS systems. In addi- using a local area network (LAN) and
tion to MCS training, I’ve attended externally using a router connected to make recommendations involving the
brigade’s future missions. This does
many sessions of battle staff users our existing mobile subscriber equip- not, however, replace the need for liai-
training at our local training facility, ment (MSE).1
and also have a working knowledge of son officers (LNO). The human ability
to relate the commander’s intent cannot
other systems in the ATCCS suite. I am Although not originally designed as a be replaced, but by using the FTP,
a user and have spent an inordinate planning tool, the MCS brings some
amount of time exploring and testing marked advantages to the planning LNOs can rapidly exchange informa-
tion higher, lower, and to adjacent units
all the functions on the MCS. Hence, I process. Its most significant effect on without traveling extended distances
am one of perhaps 25 officers in the the process is the increased ability to
U.S. Army with direct experience op- share information horizontally and ver- over the battlefield.
erating MCS in a field environment tically on the digital battlefield (com- The MCS also has the ability to over-
planning combat operations. Unfortu- monly called, but not limited to, paral- lay some analysis products, allowing
nately, I have had no exposure to Force lel planning). Prior to the introduction the commander to better visualize the
XXI Battle Command Brigade and Be- of MCS and the digital network, infor- battlefield. One such product, although
low (FBCB2) or applique (during our mation sharing was limited to the use still underdeveloped, is the terrain
testing the lower units were fed from a of MSE and the TACFAX, and use of analysis tool. A TTP I used with the
simulation). liaison officers (LNOs). These tech- commander was to overlay a function
niques could not convey concepts and called elevation bands onto our area of
ATCCS is a tactical computer net- graphics in a timely manner because operations. Then I would zoom in to
work designed to facilitate command the TACFAX is slow and indistinct, key terrain on the battlefield. The
and control from corps through battal- and LNOs had to travel sometimes 10- commander would use a laser pointer to
ion. The Maneuver Control System 30 kms between their parent headquar- issue guidance based on the picture I
(MCS) provides corps through battalion ters and the adjacent or higher unit. presented to him, and from there I
force level commanders and staffs the With MCS and the digital network, could plan branches and sequels.

28 ARMOR — September-October 2000

 ATCCS Suite enough for all to see. The medium
must also be “comfortable” for the
commander to use for issuing guidance.
We evolved to proximas and screens
AMDWS ASAS RWS covered with Plexiglas. This allowed
DISPLAY WEAPON PROVIDES ENEMY the commander to draw COAs directly
AND SENSOR SITUATIONAL onto a blowup of the area of operations.
LOCATION AWARENESS
ANALYZE AND We also invested heavily in laser point-
MONITOR MISSION ers. We should develop an interactive
screen to allow the command to see,
MCS touch, and interact with the digital map,
INTEGRATE much the way he does with a paper
INFORMATION TO map or whiteboard.
PROVIDE A COMMON
PICTURE The MCS software is somewhat un-
derdeveloped. The analysis tools are
CSSCS AFATDS immature and need to provide more
RESOURCE STATUS C3 FOR FA SYSTEMS detail to the brigade and below. Some
SUMMARIES WEAPON TARGET PAIRING tools are also clumsy and not indicative
AUTOMATIC DATA DISTRO of today’s technology. The MCS is
currently not as user-friendly as most
home computers. An intuitive, user
In fielding the MCS, the Army still keeping copiers and diazos on the S3’s friendly, soldier-system interface would
faces many challenges. The most sig- authorized property. ease the burden. We need to keep up, as
nificant is that MCS units still have a much as possible, with today’s technol-
MCS and ATCCS face other chal- ogy. This will allow new soldiers
need for analog products (paper order
and plastic overlay). It is unrealistic to lenges that must be overcome before familiar with home computers to rap-
fielding. One such challenge involves idly learn the Army’s systems.
say that all units on the modern battle- the map. The mapping software that
field will be equipped digitally. Multi- In conclusion, when the entire
national forces, National Guard units, MCS uses is not the same software the
other ATCCS systems use, so overlays ATCCS is operating, the system works
and other non-digital units will likely cannot be shared among all the ATCCS well. The potential is still much greater
be a part of our task organization. Ad- that the performance, but we are at the
ditionally, commanders are reluctant to systems. The Army needs to agree on
one map. I recommend that one map (a point where potential is starting to meet
give up the “redundancy” of the paper common database) be adopted, and all performance. With respect to the mili-
map. Before the introduction of MCS tary decision-making process, the MCS
and digital networks, staffs only had to ATCCS use that map.
doesn’t alter doctrine. The process has
focus on the production of one product. Another challenge crops up when op- not, and probably will not change. But
Even with only one product to produce, erating with units that don’t have MSE it does greatly increase the speed at
our staff struggled with time manage- capabilities (i.e., maneuver battalions). which information can be passed. With
ment during training and at the NTC. The MCS’s ability to rapidly transfer ATCCS and the MDMP, I recommend
Imagine how long it would take to type information is greatly hampered be- units take “baby steps.” Altering the
every OPORD and Annex and make a cause non-MSE units use a combat net commanders decision-making involves
digital drawing of the graphics, in addi- radio limited to a 14,400-baud modem changing the way he thinks, so take it
tion to the analog product. to transfer and receive orders from slow. In current operations, the ATCCS
higher. Our orders were normally about is an excellent way to have a common
Currently, the brigade staff has to
produce both products. For graphics, 40 pages and contained pictures using operational picture from corps to battal-
the embedded PowerPoint software. ion, but if the conditions are not set
every graphic drawn on either our plas- Microsoft Word documents transferred,
tic overlay or on the MCS must be during the planning process, the Ma-
transferred manually (meaning grid by but PowerPoint documents took an neuver Controls System’s ability to
inordinate amount of time. The result provide the commander a common op-
grid). Additionally, our division only was that information flow from brigade
provides MCS graphics, so the brigade erational picture will be limited.
is the “clearing house” for converting to battalion, with respect to operations
orders, remained consistent with cur-
digital graphics to analog graphics. For rent techniques, the use of LNOs and
orders, every product has to be typed. Notes
This prevents units from using matrix- runners. A better communications sys-
tem must be developed so that maneu-
type “fill in the blank” orders. With ver battalions have equal capabilities to
1Executive Overview briefing for the Army
multiple products to produce, quality Battle Command and Control System given by
control becomes difficult. The MCS that of brigades and divisions to send Force XXI Training at Ft. Hood, Texas, dated
and receive data. The Army should January 1998.
software must account for the seamless develop a “mini-SEN” housed in a sin-
linkage of analog and digital products. I
should be able to press a button and gle vehicle that would give the battal-
ions the same capabilities the division CPT Michael Dane Acord served
provide all products to non-ATCCS has.
units. Software developers need to add as the Chief of Plans for 2nd Bde,
functions to the MCS that give us the Also, the video monitor that comes 4th ID. Formerly, he was assigned
ability to print overlays at the scale of with an MCS system is too small for to 4th Battalion, 31st Infantry at Ft.
our choice. Our MTOE should continue integrated planning or execution. Units Drum. He is a 1993 ROTC graduate
to account for the analog requirement, must use a video medium that is large of North Georgia College.

ARMOR — September-October 2000 29

From the 1916 Fighting Vehicle Concepts Department:

Contemporary “artist’s conception” of the world’s new-

est weapon, the tank. Note the personnel claw for situa-
tions when ROE prohibits use of deadly force.
-- July-August 1986

What were we thinking?

A Collection of “Interesting” Ideas from ARMOR Magazine
We remember futurists like H. G. Wells, whose turn-of-the-century novels predicted rockets traveling to the
moon and submarines 20,000 leagues under the sea, but we conveniently forget the predictions that didn’t quite
work out. Alas, ARMOR carried its share of them over the years, As we muddle into a new millennium, perhaps
it’s time to look back in the spirit of humility and explore some of the more humorous ideas. Remember, you
never know, the future could still bring the world’s first, “solar-powered, flying submarine-tank, fully equipped
with a 60-ton phonograph transmitter and personnel sniffer.”

From the 60-ton Phonograph Department:

From the 1986 Fighting Vehicle Concepts
Department:

“Ideally, what is needed is an ‘Armored Individual

Vehicle’ (AIV).... This will be a small wheeled ve-
hicle, probably with a set of six hydrostatically-
powered wheels. However, to enable this vehicle to
be a true cross-country vehicle, it will be equipped
with two or three pairs of legs. [Italics added] While
this sounds like something out of ‘Star Wars,’ we
suggest that this is not a new idea, but was origi-
nally tried back in the fifties, but proved to be
somewhat uncontrollable. The main reason for the
problems encountered at that time was very simple:
it takes about two years to learn to walk, using only
two legs. The human operator, using mechanicals
controls and with practically no feedback, had no
chance of mastering those mechanical legs and the
This experimental vehicle allegedly provides a “listening” capability project was dropped. With the emergence of com-
for the tank company. According to the “designer,” it can also be puters and microprocessors as powerful tools, the
utilized in the anti-personnel role and has been known to spit huge idea was revived and there are now several experi-
balls of fire. mental vehicles using this kind of locomotion.”
-- November-December 1973 -- November-December 1986

30 ARMOR — September-October 2000

 From the M16 Replacement Department:
From the Weapons Procurement
Department:
Stechkin APS 9mm with
FUTURE TANK REQUIREMENT shoulder stock attached.
We know exactly what we want. Take
the single item of the tank: our re-
quirements are simple. We want a fast,
highly mobile, fully armored, light-
weight vehicle. It must be able to -- January-February 1966
swim, cross any terrain, and climb 30-
degree hills. It must be air-transport-
able. It must have a simple but power-
ful engine, requiring little or no main-
tenance. The operating range should
be several hundred miles. We would From the Ideas for the Marines Department:
also like it to be invisible.
General Bruce C. Clarke UNDERSEA TANK
-- September-October 1960
Technical engineers have designed an undersea
tank of the future for amphibious operations. Still in
the blueprint state, it is designed to overcome un-
derwater obstacles and carry the punch against
shore strong points in the critical initial phases of a
From the Bad Headlines Department: landing. The illustrations below are from Mechanix
Illustrated Magazine, and show the steps in landing
the tank from the point offshore to arrival at beach.
When an atomic weapon hits your battalion,
round up the men who can still function.
Take tactical action. Sympathize with your medics.
It is time for worry and for action, but it is
No Time for Despair!
--May-June 1956 The underwater tank blows off its plastic bubble top on reaching land.

From the Town and Country Department:

The M48 can move with gracious deliberation through any society.

Unloading offshore for the underwater approach, a submarine on tracks.

Arms are 105mm recoilless, flame thrower and machine guns, turret mounted.
-- January-February 1967
-- January-February 1951

ARMOR — September-October 2000 31

From the “I’d Rather Be Fishing” Department:
From the Italian Confidence Course
Department:

NEW TRIPLE THREAT VEHICLE

Lockheed’s TerraStar amphibious vehicle is shown following successful
mud, water, and hard surface operation tests. Developed by Lockheed Air-
craft Service Company, TerraStar’s outstanding feature is its capability to
perform well in all three of these principal environments. An advanced loco-
motion concept permits TerraStar to move easily through mud and swamp- This Bersagliere somersaulting through a ring of fire
land, paddle through water, and operate as a conventional wheeled vehicle shows the result of rigorous training and self-confidence.
on roads and other hard surfaces. Commercial applications include oil and
mineral exploration, remote site construction, rescue and salvage opera- -- March-April 1961
tions, mapping and survey work, and fire-fighting operations.
In an advanced stage of training, a Bersagliere trooper
-- May-June 1967 leaps to a somersault over the bare bayoneted rifles.

From the”War in 1974” Predictions

Department:

From the “Kill Me”

Platform Department:

(Drawing by Lieutenant Colonel Rigg)

The Sky-Cavalrymen can be saved by their emergency

rocket-ejected parachutes that lower them to safety from -- May-June 1958
their flying platforms and aerial assault jeeps.
-- May-June 1958 This is the Army’s experimental one-man helicopter, known as the Aerocycle.

32 ARMOR — September-October 2000

 From the Soldier Sniffer Department: From the Night Operations Department:

The Sun-Powered Helmet Radio.

Front view of the Man Pack Prototype -- July-August 1957
Chemical Personnel Detector with M16 Rifle.

Finally, from the Fixin’ What Ain’t Broke Department:

“The purpose of this article is to discuss the way we shoot.

Don’t get me wrong — I believe in fire commands whole-
heartedly. I just don’t think we are using the right ones...
Let’s start with the alert. Why say, GUNNER!?
I don’t know. Why not say, TANK!? That will get my at-
tention real quickly and it combines the alert and description
elements all in one.
The next element is ammunition. Once again, why? Let’s
scrap it....
ON THE WAY would be replaced with FIRE!, because it is
quicker and not as difficult for soldiers whose native language
is not English.
A standard fire command would now sound like this:
Commander: TANK!
Gunner: OK!
Loader: UP!
Internal view of the Man Pack Personnel Commander: FIRE!
Detector revealing the simplicity of design.
Gunner: FIRING!
....To sum up, I believe that we need to drastically change
-- September-October 1966 the way we shoot. To continue doing it the way we are be-
cause we have always done it this way is not a viable reason.
Tanks work differently and more quickly now. With the
UCOFT, our crews are getting much faster and need a usable
system like I have outlined here.
More from the Bad Headlines Department: I’m not asking for permission to use abbreviated fire com-
mands more often. I am recommending a new system, a quan-
tum leap in efficiency. All it will take is for the Chief of Ar-
When in Doubt — Fire!!! mor to read this article and say to the Weapons Department,
“You know, this sergeant is right. Let’s shorten up our fire
-- March-April 1988 commands and quit this Stone Age gunnery. I want this to be
in effect in one year.” Then we will quit this longwinded gun-
nery and have fire commands that keep up with the most so-
phisticated fire control system our Army has ever had.”
From the Advice I Want To Hear Department:
-- May-June 1988
“The first and most obvious countermeasure [to sleep depri-
vation] is napping. Soldiers should take naps at every oppor-
tunity... Leaders must nap, setting the example for their The preceding photomontage was compiled by 2LTs
troops. Keep in mind that individuals need more sleep if Jackson Eaton, William DelBagno, and Scott Hausauer,
they get it by napping than if the sleep is uninterrupted.” graduates of Princeton University, West Point, and Buf-
-- September-October 1994 falo State College of New York, respectively.

ARMOR — September-October 2000 33

The Battle of Cambrai
by Captain Kristafer Ailslieger

Just after dawn on the morning of 20 weaknesses, and developing methods The location of the attack, the area be-
November 1917, without any prepara- for maximizing the former and minimiz- tween the towns of Cambrai and St.
tory bombardment, nearly 400 British ing the latter. However, they couldn’t Quentin, had been carefully chosen by
tanks concentrated on a six-mile front, get the field commanders to follow Fuller because it had seen little fight-
crossed the line into no-man’s land, their advice. Both men believed that ing. The open, rolling ground had not
advancing towards the French town of mass and surprise were the key ele- been churned up by artillery fire and
Cambrai. This innovative attack, de- ments to achieving decisive results with attacking troops, and was relatively
signed to break the stalemate that char- the tank. They felt that if given the op- firm and solid. This would give the
acterized the Western Front during the portunity to deploy the tanks in massed tanks their first chance to operate over
First World War, was the first attack by formations as the primary attacking unbroken ground.
massed tank formations in history. It force, over relatively unbroken ground,
was the first time since their invention with little or no preparatory bombard- There were two key terrain features
which dominated the avenues of ap-
that tanks were employed as their de- ment, they could prove the validity of proach to Cambrai, the Flesquieres
velopers originally envisioned, and it this doctrine. Then Fuller hit on the
marked the birth of modern tank doc- idea of staging a raid on Cambrai. ridge and Bourlon Hill. The Flesquieres
ridge was located roughly in the center
trine. The idea was originally a small scale of the planned advance, while Bourlon
The attack was the inspiration of Lieu- raid — a surprise attack over good was in the north. The plan was to cap-
tenant Colonel J.F.C. Fuller, the Chief ground to prove what the tanks could ture these two key terrain features with
of Staff of the British Tank Corps.1 For do when properly employed. However, the tanks and infantry in order to allow
the entire year since the tank’s debut at as the higher commands became in- the cavalry to pass between them and
the Somme in 1916, he and the Tank volved, the plan was transformed into a take Cambrai. The town itself was of
Corps commander, General Hugh Elles, large scale offensive. By the time the only minor importance, being a center
had chafed at the piecemeal manner in attack began, it involved six infantry of textile production before the war.
which the tanks were being employed divisions, five cavalry divisions (in However, four main railways passed
on the battlefield. Fuller and Ellis spent reserve), and a spearhead of three tank through it, providing a major supply
a great deal of time studying the tank’s brigades supported by over 1,000 artil- conduit for the German front line ar-
performance, noting the strengths and lery guns and 14 air squadrons.2 mies. Capturing it would break the Ger-

34 ARMOR — September-October 2000

man’s supply line and put the British in
position to exploit the breakthrough in
several directions.
Between the British lines and Cambrai
lay a German defensive belt that was
five and a half miles deep. It consisted
of three defensive lines — the Hinden-
burg Main Line, the Hindenburg Sup-
port Line, and the Beaurevoir-Mas-
nieres-Marcoing line. These trench sys-
tems had been constructed to take
maximum advantage of the rolling ter-
rain, using the ridges and spurs to hide
portions of the defensive lines. The
trenches had been built much wider
than usual — up to 16 feet — and each
trench system was preceded by dense
barbed wire obstacles at least 50 yards into three sections as well; one to mark “The immediate onset of the tanks was
deep. Concrete dugouts with massed the path cleared by the tanks, one to overwhelming. The German outposts,
machine gun batteries covered the ave- clear the trenches, and one to garrison dazed or annihilated by the sudden
nues of approach.3 the trenches. deluge of shells, were overrun in an
Manning these defenses were the sol- instant. The triple belts of wire were
With this plan approved, a date was crossed as if they had been beds of net-
diers of the German Second Army. set and the forces were moved into po-
These troops were of generally good sition. Because surprise was an essen- tles, and 350 pathways were sheared
quality and included some who had through them for the infantry. The de-
tial element of Fuller’s plan, the tanks fenders of the front trench, scrambling
recently arrived from the Russian were moved in secrecy, mostly at night,
Front. However, this area of the front to concealed positions near their start out of the dug-outs and shelters to meet
was regarded by the Germans as a rest the crash and flame of the barrage, saw
points. Also, in sharp contrast with the leading tanks almost upon them,
zone for battle-weary troops because of previous attacks, there would be no
the strong defensive structure.4 preparatory artillery bombardment. their appearance made the more gro-
tesque and terrifying by the huge black
To break through these formidable de- The attack began as planned at 6:20 bundles they carried on their cabs. As
fensive lines, Fuller devised a special a.m. on 20 November. A thousand artil- these tanks swung left-handed and fired
method of attack.5 Because the trenches lery guns opened fire, raining high ex- down into the trench, others, also sur-
were too wide for the tanks to cross, plosives and shrapnel on the German mounted by these appalling objects,
each tank was outfitted with a fascine, a positions and shrouding the battlefield appeared in multitudes behind them out
bundle of wood that could be dropped with smoke.6 Simultaneously, the tanks of the mist. It is small wonder that the
into the trenches to make a bridge. moved out. The historic battle was un- front Hindenburg Line, that fabulous
Fuller dictated that the tanks would be derway. excavation which was to be the bulwark
organized into sections of three ma- of Germany, gave little trouble. The
chines that would work together. The The tanks’ initial advance was quite great fascines were loosed and rolled
lead tank was to advance through the successful. According to Trevor Wil-
son, “In the opening stages the progress over the parapet to the trench floor;
enemy’s wire, flattening it for the in- and down the whole line, tanks were
fantry, and then, upon reaching the first of the attack proved irresistible.”7 He dipping and rearing up and clawing
trench, turn left and fire into it to sup- goes on to describe the advance:
their way across into the almost unrav-
press the defenders. The following two “Followed by their columns of infan- aged country beyond. The defenders of
tanks would then advance and one try, the tanks rolled ponderously on- the line were running panic stricken,
would drop its fascine into the trench ward through what the enemy had as- casting away arms and equipment.”9
and both would cross over. The one sumed was impregnable barbed wire.
that had dropped its fascine would then Then they reached trenches supposedly All along the front, the attack met
turn left and work down the trench with success. By 8 a.m., the tanks and
too deep and broad to allow their tran- infantry had overrun the Hindenburg
from the back side, while the other sit, unloaded their fascines, “dipped
would advance to the next trench line, their noses in, and came up and over.” Main Line, and by 11:30 a.m. they had
drop its fascine, turn left and suppress taken the Hindenburg Support Line in
While their enfilading fire harried the most places.10 The attack was proceed-
the defenders in that trench. The first trench dwellers, the British infantry
tank would then cross over both moved in to complete the conquest.”8 ing extremely well in all aspects, with
trenches, and go on to the third trench one notable exception: Flesquieres.
line with its own fascine to use as a One of the tank commanders, Captain The ridge near the village of
bridge there. The tanks were to be D.G. Browne, gave the following ac- Flesquieres, with its commanding view
closely followed by infantry organized count of the opening stages: of the countryside, was the most impor-

ARMOR — September-October 2000 35

tant objective of the center of the at- ish Army had advanced nearly five Unfortunately, though, the British
tack. It dominated the approaches to miles, something months of infantry counted their successes too early, and
Cambrai and hid part of the Hinden- fighting had failed to accomplish. Dur- were unprepared for the German coun-
burg Support Line behind it. The re- ing the night, the Germans abandoned terattack which came on November
sponsibility for taking this objective Flesquieres, and when the second day 30th. Using high-speed infiltration tac-
was given to the 51st Highland Divi- of the offensive dawned, the British tics, with little artillery preparation, the
sion, an experienced and well respected were still advancing. However, the new Germans quickly penetrated the British
unit. Its commander, General Harper, day would not prove so fruitful for lines and recaptured much of the
however, did not have much faith in the them. ground they had lost. Within a few
tanks.11 days, the German counterattack had
To begin with, they had 179 fewer basically nullified the gains made by
Contrary to Fuller’s instructions, he tanks on the second day — the casual-
ordered his infantry to keep well behind ties of both enemy fire and mechanical the British, although the lines shifted
somewhat, with the British gaining
the tanks.12 Furthermore, because the breakdown.17 Also, it had begun raining some ground in the north, the Germans
initial advance went faster than ex- during the night and the continuous
pected, he ordered a one-hour delay drizzle kept most of their air support gaining some in the south.
before continuing on to the Hindenburg grounded. Finally, they were hampered Despite this later reversal, the Battle
Support Line in order to remain on by their own success on the previous of Cambrai has gone down in history as
schedule.13 This gave the Germans time day. Many of the commanders in the a great success for the tank as a
to move their field batteries to more rear had not expected such spectacular weapon. It proved the effectiveness of
mobile positions on the reverse slope of results and they were slow to respond massed tanks supported by infantry in
the ridge. From that position, they were with additional orders. Communica- penetrating enemy defenses. With its
able to engage the tanks of the British tions with the troops and tanks at the combination of mobility, protection,
elements advancing on both the north front proved more difficult than ex- and firepower, the tank proved itself to
and south, knocking out 11 of them pected and there were significant de- be an effective and powerful weapon,
before they moved out of range.14 This, lays in getting troops moving. and it soon became a mainstay of mod-
however, was not the worst of it for the ern armies. While it was not immedi-
British. Once underway, the British found the ately grasped by many military leaders
German resistance to be getting
When Harper ordered his forces to stronger and stronger. Their advance at the time, Cambrai was a demonstra-
tion of the future of warfare.
continue the advance, they were com- progressed much more slowly, but by
pletely unaware of the German field mid-afternoon, they had captured the
batteries on the other side of the ridge. town of Fontaine, only two miles from
Keeping with his instructions, the in- Cambrai. But this marked the high Notes
fantry let the tanks advance well ahead point of their advance. Strong German
1Bryan Cooper, The Battle of Cambrai, (New
of them. The tanks advanced up the resistance slowly ground the advance to
slope, cutting their way through the a halt all across the front, and the espe- York: Stein & Day, 1968) 64-65.
wire obstacles, with the infantry some cially determined defense of Bourlon 2Ibid., 68.
four hundred yards behind. As they Hill and Bourlon Wood defeated every 3The foregoing description of the terrain and
crested the top of the ridge, they came British attack. With Bourlon Hill still in defenses was drawn primarily from Cooper, 68-
face to face with the German batteries. German hands, the British were unable 70.
Silhouetted against the skyline, the to reinforce the handful of troops at 4Trevor Wilson, The Myriad Faces of War,
tanks made perfect targets for the Ger- Fontaine or continue the advance to (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1986) 488.
man gunners. With no infantry support, Cambrai. At the end of the day, Sir 5Cooper, 78-79. See also Philip J. Haythorn-
the tanks were sitting ducks, and 16 Douglas Haig, commander of the Brit-
were destroyed before the German guns ish Expeditionary Force, decided to halt thwaite, The World War I Source Book, (London:
Arms and Armour Press, 1992) 97.
were themselves put out of action. This the advance and concentrate on con-
6Wilson, 489.
single event delayed the entire advance solidating their gains and capturing
and caused the loss of 27 tanks to four Bourlon Hill. 7Ibid., 490.
German field guns.15 8Ibid. (Quoting “Cambrai”, Part 4, Royal Tank
On the 22nd, after a full day of fight-
Moreover, the German resistance was ing, the British did manage to capture Corps Journal, July 1936: 69).
stiffening. After the initial shock of the Bourlon Hill and the village of Bour- 9Cooper, 100. See also Martin Gilbert, The First

attack, the Germans regrouped and lon, but they could advance no further. World War: A Complete History, (New York:
rushed all available forces to meet the The three days of fighting had worn out Henry Holt and Company, 1994) 379. Neither
onslaught. The infantrymen facing the the tank crews and their machines. The Cooper nor Gilbert provide a pinpoint cite for the
tanks soon learned methods to disable men were all in need of rest and most quote, but its original source is apparently The
Tank in Action by Captain D.G. Browne (Lon-
them. By shooting through the lookout of the tanks needed repairs. The infan- don: William Blackwood, 1920).
slits, they could injure or kill the crew- try soldiers were tired as well, and there 10Wilson, 490.
men, and by bundling grenades to- were no reserves to continue the attack.
11Cooper, 113. General Harper’s dim view of
gether and throwing them under the Haig called an end to the offensive.
tracks, they could render a tank immo- tanks, and subsequent mishandling of them is
Although they had not reached their confirmed in John Keegan, The First World War
bile.16 These tactics, born of despera- objectives, the British commanders (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1999) 370-
tion, proved to be effective in slowing
the British advance. were pleased with the operation. The 371.
tanks had achieved successes that were
Still, the tank attack had, in the first unprecedented in the two years of
day, achieved great success. The Brit- trench warfare on the Western Front. Continued on Page 39

36 ARMOR — September-October 2000

Editor’s Note: This essay won the third prize in the Draper
Essay Contest, sponsored by the Draper Armor Leadership
Award Fund to mark the 75th anniversary of the program.
Contestants were asked to write on the subject: “Leadership
in the XXI Century — Digital Age.”

Leadership in the XXI Century — Digital Age

by Major James K. Morningstar

“Leadership …is the thing that wins leadership remains unchanged, but the sound and timely decisions.” Doctrine
battles.”1 dawning century will reveal shining adds, “You must be able to rapidly as-
- GEN George S. Patton, Jr. opportunities and shadowy challenges sess situations and make sound deci-
to leadership new to battle. sions. If you delay or try to avoid mak-
ing a decision, you may cause unneces-
Victory in the digital age, more than The Army foresees “…future informa- sary casualties and fail to accomplish
ever before, requires leaders who can tion technology will greatly increase
make bold and quick decisions. New the volume, accuracy, and speed of the mission. Indecisive leaders create
hesitancy, loss of confidence, and con-
technology delivers unprecedented vol- battlefield information available to fusion. You must be able to anticipate
umes of information to front line com- commanders.”4 This technology allows
manders, burdening them with a rapid greater fidelity in addressing the true and reason under the most trying condi-
tions and quickly decide what actions
operational tempo. Only leaders who nature of combat. Battle is not a pre- to take.”6 The revelation is in under-
quickly convert information into deci- dictable unfolding of events along lines
sive action can fully realize the poten- in time and space. Battle is not linear, standing that future technology actually
increases the importance and difficulty
tial of this applied science. These lead- but rather plays itself out in sequences of decision-making and leadership.
ers, however, will find that digital tech- of decision points immune to predeter-
nology makes unique demands on the mined direction. Historic command and Digital technology places unsuspected
human dimensions of leadership. To control systems could not hope to redi- challenges on leadership. In his analy-
meet future needs for bold and decisive rect combat power faster than condi- sis of U.S. Army operations in Somalia,
leaders, the Army must change its cur- tions changed in this chaotic system. Mark Bowden found “Men in battle
rent methods of leader development Leaders were forced to decide direction drink up information like water.”7 With
and begin to seek out and reward junior in advance and apply combat power in digital technology, those men drink
leaders who take risks. a linear fashion against conditions as from a fire hose. A flood of information
Army doctrine defines leadership as: they hoped to find them (with frequent can drown some leaders’ ability to
pauses to adjust to reality). Digital make decisions. Bowden continued,
“…the process of influencing others to technology will provide the leaders at “…Soldiers fought better when things
accomplish the mission by providing
purpose, direction, and motivation.”2 the decision points with the information were going their way. Once things
and means necessary to address condi- turned, it was harder to reassert con-
This process begins with decision- tions as and when they find them. This trol.”8 Perfect situational knowledge
making. Leaders identify what must be
done and then provide others with the does not, in and of itself, equate to leads to perfect frustration when events
greater combat effectiveness, for knowl- go awry. Leadership, not technology,
reason and motivation to do it. They edge does not equal action. Rather, as changes the direction of events. As
inspire others through time-honored
traits such as experience, physical en- Robert Leonhard observed, “Informa- S.L.A. Marshall observed more than
tion breeds decisions.”5 It is leaders thirty years, “There are no computers in
durance, judgment, “uprightness and who translate information into combat the jungle. And if there were, they
cleanliness of character.”3 They build
cohesive and efficient teams by estab- power — they make decisions. wouldn’t help.”9
lishing standards, enforcing discipline, The importance of decision-making is Digital technology can, perversely,
and conducting challenging training. more of a remembrance then a revela- isolate leaders from the fight. In Moga-
Above all else, leaders are counted on tion. Among the fifty-year-old princi- dishu, the commander “…and his staff
to know what to do. The essence of ples of Army leadership is “Make probably had more instant information

ARMOR — September-October 2000 37

about this unfolding battle than any leads that gains victory.” When opera- one young officer prone to avoid risk
commander in history, but there wasn’t tions follow computer guidance, sol- refused to enter unexplored areas of
much they could do but watch and lis- diers will only follow leaders. Soldiers wilderness despite his mission to sur-
ten.”10 During a “digital rotation” at the know computers don’t care. Only lead- vey territory in the Pacific northwest.17
National Training Center, I witnessed a ers, as General Dennis Reimer says, This refusal did not harm George
battalion employing a digital mobile “… know their soldiers’ strengths and McClellan’s rise to the top of the
command post in the defense. While weaknesses. This is the key to suc- Army. When later confronted with the
the commander watched his bank of cess.”15 unexpected on campaign in Virginia in
monitors inside the command post, his The digital battlefield challenges lead- 1862, McClellan lost his nerve, his
sergeant major stood outside and battles, his campaign, and many men’s
watched enemy tanks skirt the battal- ers to motivate soldiers in a torrent of lives. He proved over-dependent on
information. General Marshall illus-
ion’s forward positions. When asked trated how leaders motivate soldiers in (faulty) intelligence and lacked the
what his commander knew of the en- ability to make decisions when faced
emy’s maneuver, the sergeant major a confused, rapidly moving battle, rife with uncertainty. In peacetime, that
with information on the situation, in
said, “If he’d get off that damn Nin- recalling Patton at Strausburg in 1945. liability wasn’t as important to promo-
tendo and come out here, he’d see!” As tion as other, more aesthetic, character-
General Sherman said many years be- Marshall said, “He [Patton] interviewed istics.
several commanders. In each case they,
fore, “No man can properly command in accordance with their training, began
an army from the rear, he must be ‘at Talk with today’s junior leaders and
its front’.”11 The telegraph, telephone, to tell him about enemy movements. you will find suspicions that the Army
They were doing what they were
and radio did not alter this rule, and taught. But this was a great emergency. is again promoting “lack of failure”
neither will digital connections. It is old over bold decision-making. They feel
doctrine: “Decision-making must ulti- Everything was in confusion. In each the same systemic constraints noted by
case, Patton would interrupt and say, ‘I
mately rely upon the commander’s don’t want to know a goddam thing Roger H. Nye a decade ago:
judgment based upon his personal ob-
servation of the battlefield.”12 about the enemy. What are you doing?’ “… the power of the company com-
This changed their psychology. It was a mander has been denigrated by modern
In assessing future operations, the perfect example of leadership.”16 Find- communications, by theories of man-
U.S. Army’s Training and Doctrine ing his soldiers searching for accurate agement that have moved much of the
Command acknowledges the limits of information, Patton sought action. Dig- company administration to higher head-
technology and the importance of deci- its will not transmit this will to win. quarters, and by centralized systems of
sion-making: “Despite advances in That is the leadership required in to- pay, promotion, training, maintenance,
information technology, commanders, morrow’s battles. and supply that bypass the command-
leaders, and soldiers will never have er’s authority and impact directly on
Today, the Army’s challenge is to
perfect knowledge of the operational produce tomorrow’s leaders. The “digi- the soldier below him. It is possible for
situation surrounding them. Yet, due to a captain of average ability to be quite
the pace and complexity of future bat- tal age” demands quick decisions by successful in the eyes of higher authori-
leaders at the front who can see into the
tle, commanders, more so than in the souls of soldiers and inspire them in the ties if he faithfully obeys, enforces
past, must accept uncertainty and not standards set by others, and does not
hesitate to act instead of waiting for face of danger and uncertainty. Some violate some cardinal rules of leader-
of these traits can, as the Army be-
more analysis or information.”13 The lieves, “… be learned through self- ship and management. This is good
best technology will not motivate men followership, but it is not command.”18
forward in dangerous and uncertain study, education, training, and experi-
ence.” Some can only be revealed.
circumstances. Only leadership, that In the 1990s, LTG Stroup added,
ability to make a decision and move To make quick decisions in ambigu- “…studies and surveys confirm that
out, can cut the fog of war. As General ous circumstances, a leader must take something in the Army environment is
George C. Marshall noted, “The great risks. Unfortunately, the Army has little changing. We hear anecdotal accounts
difficulty is observing the execution, toleration for such leaders. Because of careerism, stifled initiative, lack of
and pushing it at the weak point and tight training budgets often limit lead- trust of subordinates and a growing
getting it ahead.”14 ers to a single maneuver or gunnery zero defects mentality … the shift has
exercise during a rating period, only been subtle and unconscious.”19
Ironically, the more prominent com- those who avoid mistakes get high rat-
puters become in battle, the more im- In such an environment, it is virtually
portant becomes the human bond be- ings. A bad rating will haunt even the impossible to groom and assess the
newest lieutenant for the rest of his
tween leaders and their soldiers. J.F.C. career. Command goes to those who, decision-making abilities of junior
Fuller wrote, “The more mechanical leaders. So instead we promote photo-
become the weapons with which we through choice or nature, avoid mis- graphs, PT scores, and “lack of failure”
takes by avoiding risks. While the fu-
fight, the less mechanical must be the ture demands decisive leaders, the pre- in one’s record. We reward only those
spirit which controls them.” In the slavishly faithful to the rules, but as
midst of the great mechanical revolu- sent environment produces passive General Grant said, “If men make war
types.
tion of World War II, General George in slavish observance of rules, they will
S. Patton Jr. eloquently observed, This climate is cyclic in Army history. fail.”20 Any officers ambitious for
“Wars may be fought by weapons, but During the 1840s and 1850s, men who higher command seem to make “a ca-
they are won by men. It is the spirit of sought safe duty enjoyed meteoric reer out of their own careers rather than
the men who follow and the man who Army careers. In 1853, for example, a career out of leading their units.”21

38 ARMOR — September-October 2000

 Cambrai
from Page 36
There is little doubt that today’s Army 8Ibid.
would promote McClellan and send 9S.L.A. Marshall, in a speech, “Problems in
Grant and Sherman back to civilian Combat Leadership,” to CGSC Class at Ft. 12Ibid., 114.
life. Leavenworth, 3 Dec 62. 13Ibid.
10Bowden, p. 20.
Our Army has historically waited until 14Ibid., 116.
the fighting starts to replace passive 11FM 22-103, Leadership and Command at 15Ibid., 117.
peacetime leaders with bolder decision- Senior Levels, (Headquarters, Department of the 16Ibid., 120.
makers. Famous first defeats, like Kas- Army, Washington, D.C.; June 1987) p. 15.
17Wilson, 490.
serine Pass, served as wake-up calls. 12FM 25-4, How To Conduct Training Exer-
We should not wait to apply Major cises (Headquarters, Department of the Army
General Ernest Harmon’s after-action Washington, D.C.; 10 Sep 1984).
observation from Kasserine, “Up to the 13TRADOC
Bibliographical Note
Pamphlet 525-5, Force XXI Opera-
time of battle itself, we are inclined to tions (Headquarters Department of the Army Most of the information for this article
stress administration, paperwork, and Washington, D.C.; 1 Aug 1994) p. 3-4. came from Bryan Cooper’s book The
tactical knowledge above the flair for 14George C. Marshall, Interviews and Reminis- Battle of Cambrai, (New York: Stein &
leadership. In this we are wrong….”22 cences for Forrest C. Pogue, Larry I. Bland, ed. Day, 1968). Most general texts on
The precision, lethality, and tempo of (George C. Marshall Research Foundation, Lex- World War I give the Battle of Cambrai
the next first battle could make the con- ington, Va., 1991) p. 450. only a few pages of coverage. I tried to
sequence of poor leadership unimag- 15GEN Dennis J. Reimer, “Leadership for the confirm information drawn from Coo-
inably disastrous. We must have bold, 21st Century: Empowerment, Environment, and per, at least generally, with one or more
decision-making leaders in place when the Golden Rule” in Military Review, (Jan-Feb other sources. Below is a list of addi-
the first shot is fired. 96), pp. 4-9. tional sources I consulted which pro-
Today, we often hear the mantra of 16Marshall, pp. 547-548. vide general information about the bat-
digitization echoing like a chant to 17See “McClellan’s Life before 1860” in The
tle:
ward off the specter of future defeat. Peninsula Campaign by David G. Martin (Com- Martin Gilbert, The First World War: A Com-
While technological developments in bined Books Inc., Conshohocken; Pa. 1992) pp. plete History, (New York: Henry Holt and
rapid shared communications and pre- 24-26. Company, 1994) 378-383.
cision weapons are tremendous combat 18Roger H. Nye, The Challenge of Command
Philip J. Haythornthwaite, The World War I
multipliers, they are not a warranty for (Avery Publishing Group Inc., Wayne N.J., 1986) Source Book, (London: Arms and Armour
victory. To succeed on the future bat- p. 26. Press, 1992) 97.
tlefield, the Army must develop deci- 19LTG Theodore Stroup, “Leadership and Or-
John Keegan, The First World War, (New York:
sive leaders today. Tomorrow’s battles ganizational Culture: Actions Speak Louder than Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1999) 369-371.
will be characterized by rapidly flow- Words” in Military Review, Jan-Feb 96, p. 44.
S.L.A. Marshall, World War I, (Boston: Hough-
ing information in a fast-paced, uncer- 20Quoted by Nye, p. 28. ton Mifflin Company, 1964) 316-319.
tain, and lethal environment. Today’s 21Douglas Kinnard’s observation of the officers Trevor Wilson, The Myriad Faces of War, (Cam-
Army must encourage and reward lead- bridge: Polity Press, 1986) 485-492.
during the Viet Nam War from his book, The
ers who can take risks and make quick, War Managers (Avery Publishing Group Inc.,
bold decisions in fast-paced and am- Wayne N.J., 1985) p. 112.
biguous circumstances. It is this leader- 22Quoted by Douglas MacGregor in Breaking
ship that continues to be “the thing that Captain Kristafer Ailslieger enlisted
the Phalanx (Center for Strategic and Interna-
wins battles.” tional Studies, Washington D.C.; 1997) p. 159.
in the Kansas Army National Guard
in 1987 and served as a flight op-
erations specialist. He was com-
Notes MAJ James K. Morningstar is a missioned in 1990 through OCS.
1983 graduate of the U.S. Military He has served in 1st Battalion,
1GEN George S. Patton, Jr., in a letter to his
Academy. His assignments include 635th Armor, KSARNG, as a tank
son, 16 Jan 1945. platoon leader (on both M60A3 and
2FM 22-100, Military Leadership (Headquar-
tank platoon leader and company
XO in 3d AD in Germany; REFOR- M1-series tanks), scout platoon
ters, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C.;
31 July 1990) p. 1. GER 88 Planning Group; S4, 1/4 leader, HHC XO, battalion S3 (air),
3These are the four traits Theodore Roosevelt Cav, Ft. Riley, Kan.; commander, D and tank company commander. A
used to describe General Leonard Wood when he Co, 3-37 AR in the Gulf War; ob- graduate of AOBC, AOAC (resi-
asked him to lead the Rough Riders. See “Raising server/controller with the Brigade dent), the Joint Firepower Control
the Regiment” from The Essential Theodore Staff Trainer Team at the NTC; Course, and CAS3, he holds both a
Roosevelt, ed. John Gabrielle Hunt, (Gramercy Army Liaison Officer and J51 Plans BA and MA in political science from
Books, N.Y., 1994) p. 48.
Officer for COMSECONDFLT/COM Wichita State University, and a JD
4TRADOC Pamphlet 525-5, Force XXI Opera-
STRIKFLTLANT/CJTF 120; and S3, from Washburn University School of
tions, 1 Aug 1994, p. 1-5.
5Robert Leonhard, The Art of Maneuver (Presi- 1-8 Cav, Ft. Hood, Texas, including Law. He is currently a member of
deployment to Bosnia for peace- the 418 Civil Affairs Battalion,
dio Press, Novato, Calif., 1991) p. 119.
6See FM 22-100, Military Leadership. keeping operations. Currently, he is USAR. In the civilian sector, he is
7Mark Bowden, Blackhawk Down, (Grove At- the XO, Department of Military Sci- employed as a research attorney
lantic, Inc., 1999) p. 55. ence, University of Virginia. for the Kansas Court of Appeals.

ARMOR — September-October 2000 39

Scheduled Services:
A “Pay Me Now or Pay Me Later” Proposition
by CW3 Kevin L. Cox, Sergeant First Class Joseph N. Pishner Jr., and Lieutenant Colonel Peter D. Utley

Editor’s Note: Space considerations forced us to greatly Commander’s Guidance

reduce the size of the illustrations accompanying this story.
But you can download full-size versions in Excel spreadsheet In designing the 13-day service program, the maintenance
leaders of the Lion Battalion applied their commander’s guid-
form on the ARMOR Magazine website at www.knox.army. ance. The battalion’s scheduled service program for tanks
mil/armormag/so00indx.htm).
will:
A successful maintenance program within a battalion and
its companies has many components. These range from • Be comprehensive.
command involvement, to trained operators, to an effective • Provide time for crewmembers and mechanics to “pay
and efficient maintenance management system. The one attention to detail.”
critical component this article will address is the scheduled
service program. Without a first-class, dedicated, scheduled
• Be a living document.
service program, a unit will become consumed with un- • Be the first category of training event applied to the bat-
scheduled maintenance and the attitude “that it just doesn’t talion’s training calendar after the higher headquarters’
matter, because it will break anyway.” The result is putting a requirements are applied.
Band-Aid on a problem requiring major surgery. For this
reason alone, it is essential for commanders at the battalion • Provide an opportunity for first-line leaders to train their
soldiers.
and company level to commit the resources to make sched-
uled services a planned training event, rather than an after- • Maximize the precious resource of time.
thought or just another requirement to be met.
• Involve key members (master gunners and the mainte-
The program described is built around an M1A1 armor bat- nance technician) who are often consumed doing other
talion, but it has application in any armored unit, even units tasks.
with a wheeled vehicle fleet. The 2nd Battalion, 63rd Armor
(“Lions”) do not take full credit for the program described in • Be preventive in nature by anticipating problems and
looking for trends.
this article. The 1st Infantry Division Master Gunner re-
ceived it from the USAREUR Master Gunner in the summer • It will have a system where quality control and quality
of 1999 and provided it to all battalions in the division as a assurance (QA/QC) exist.
sample. The battalion took the format of the 8-day program,
extracted portions of it to include the format, and applied its Before describing the unique aspects of the program as they
13-day service program model (Figure 1). relate to the commander’s guidance, it is important to pro-
vide some background information on the
fleet and the program. The 44 tanks in the
Service Schedule battalion are 10+ years in age. The average
tank has between 5,500-6,000 miles on it.
VEHICLE 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 The battalion instituted its 13-day service
program in July 1998 and has been using it
____6 D0 H1 H2 H3 H4 H5 CO T1 T2 T3 T4 T5 DF to date. No tank in the battalion has missed
____7 D0 H1 H2 H3 H4 H5 CO T1 T2 T3 T4 T5 DF a scheduled service since this program was
instituted. A company has one platoon, and
____8 D0 T1 T2 T3 T4 T5 CO H1 H2 H3 H4 H5 DF possibly a headquarters tank, in service at
one time.
____9 D0 T1 T2 T3 T4 T5 CO H1 H2 H3 H4 H5 DF
Company maintenance teams are kept at
____ D0 T1 T2 T3 T4 T5 CO H1 H2 H3 H4 H5 DF full strength within the battalion. Other
COORDINATION NOTES:
sections of the battalion maintenance pla-
toon will go short personnel before a com-
* COMPLETE OPERATOR PMCS AND DISPATCHING OF THE TANK DURING THE LAST MAINTENANCE
PERIOD BEFORE THE SCHEDULED SERVICE START DATE. THIS WILL FACILITATE THE pany maintenance team does. Mechanics
ACCOMPLISHMENT OF DAY 0 TASKS. are excused from the duty roster for the
* ENSURE SUSPENSION SYSTEMS ARE CLEANED AFTER THE ROAD TEST AND BEFORE RETURNING published service period shown on the bat-
THE TANK TO THE MOTORPOOL FOR THE DAY 0 TECHNICAL INSPECTION (TI). RUN THE TANK
THROUGH THE WASHRACK TO CLEAN THE SUSPENSION SYSTEM.
talion training calendar. A tank platoon
crewmember’s place of duty is the service
* THE GOAL FOR DAY 0 TECHNICAL INSPECTIONS IS ALL TANKS COMPLETING HULL TI AND TURRET
TI ON TANKS GOING INTO HULL SERVICE. TANKS SCHEDULED FOR TURRET SERVICE WILL
line. The only training events in which they
COMPLETE TURRET TI ON DAY 1 OF TURRET SERVICE. are allowed to participate are physical
training and gunnery training in UCOFT.
Figure 1 The service program as described in this

40 ARMOR — September-October 2000

 VEHICLE
DAY 0 ___6 ___7 ___8 ___9 QA/QC
1 SAFETY BRIEFING PL OR PSG
2 B, D, A, W & M PMCS IAW TM-10 and 5988-E are Completed TC
3 Dispatch Vehicle TC
4 Road Test Vehicle TC AND MECHANIC
5 Mechanics Start Technical Inspection IAW TM-20 Service
article has undergone three revisions, but the Section to Include Identification of New Welding/Tapping
13-day model has remained consistent. Requirements and Update Vehicle Welding Matrix SERV TM CHIEF
6 Check Specific Gravity of Each Cell in Each Battery and Record
Readings on Enclosed BATTERY CELL READING MATRIX SERV TM CHIEF
Applying the Commander’s Guidance 7 Required Job Orders Prepared SERV TM CHIEF
8 Coordinate with BMO for Welder Support Schedule CO MNT TM CHIEF
The service program is comprehensive in na- 9 Identified Parts Annotated, NMC Parts Ordered SERV TM CHIEF
ture because it services everything from the 10 Install New Parts TC
11 Tag Parts Awaiting Other Parts and Return to PLL TC
individual soldier to the tank. Major areas 12 Clean Work Environment, Dispose of Waste/HAZMAT Materials CO MNT TM CHIEF
serviced include individual and crew-served 13 Conduct Nightly Service Huddle, Prepare for Next Day CO XO
weapons, NBC equipment, ancillary equip- Figure 2
ment, communications equipment, mine
plows, mine rollers, and the tank’s hull and
VEHICLE
turret. A unique aspect of the program is the TURRET DAY 1 ___6 ___7 ___8 ___9 QA/QC
dedication of a full day to each of the follow- 1 SAFETY BRIEFING PL OR PSG
ing areas: weapons, NBC equipment and an- 2 Complete TM-20 Level Technical Inspection to Include
Identification of New Welding/Tapping Requirements and
cillary equipment, and the individual soldier. Update Vehicle Welding Matrix SERV TM CHIEF
This precludes the possibility that critical 3 Change Hydraulic Reservoir Filter
nodes, like the NBC room and arms room, are USE HULL SEMI-ANNUAL KIT (HYDRAULIC FILTER
MANIFOLD: PN5705135) SERV TM CHIEF
not overloaded at any one time. If a company 4 Inspect and Service Elevation Mechanism
headquarters tank is being serviced with a USE HULL SEMI-ANNUAL KIT (KIT, FILTER ELEMENT:

platoon, a maximum of three crews will be PN5911304) SERV TM CHIEF

5 Inspect and Service Traverse Mechanism
servicing their equipment at one of the two USE HULL SEMI-ANNUAL KIT (KIT, FILTER ELEMENT:
critical nodes on identified days in the sched- PN5911304) SERV TM CHIEF
ule. Individual soldier readiness for the sol- 6 Change Turret Distribution Filters
USE HULL ANNUAL KIT (DAMPENER-FLUID: PN12273464) SERV TM CHIEF
diers of the platoon in service is performed on 7 Inspect All Turret Wiring Harnesses/Assemblies SERV TM CHIEF
Day 7 (Changeover Day) (See Figure 8) under 8 Clean Work Environment, Dispose of Waste/HAZMAT Materials CO MNT TM CHIEF
9 Conduct Nightly Service Huddle, Prepare for Next Day CO XO
the control of the company first sergeant, as-
sisted by the company medic and a represen- Figure 3
tative from the battalion S1 section.
The –20 Technical Manual for the tank pro- TURRET DAY 2
VEHICLE
___6 ___7 ___8 ___9 QA/QC
vides the requirements for an M1A1 to be 1 SAFETY BRIEFING PL OR PSG
serviced annually and semiannually. From 2 Inspect Hull and Turret Ammunition Doors/Safety Switch/
SERV TM CHIEF
these requirements, most units allocate 5-7 Hardware
3 Clean All Ammo Wells and Storage Racks SERV TM CHIEF
working days for this task. Our battalion’s 4 Inspect and Service Turret Lock Assembly SERV TM CHIEF
experience and vehicle performance will 5 Inspect and Service Turret Race Assembly SERV TM CHIEF
6 Drop Breech Block SERV TM CHIEF
show this is completely inadequate. Crew- 7 Clean and Service Breech Block Assembly SERV TM CHIEF
members and mechanics need the time to 8 Clean and Service Collimator
work the “attention to detail” shortcomings on USE HULL SEMI-ANNUAL KIT (SERVICE KIT M.R.S.:
PN12961043) SERV TM CHIEF
a tank. Taking this approach will save many 9 Punch Gun Tube and Replace Seals
hours of unscheduled maintenance because USE HULL SEMI-ANNUAL KIT (CUSHION: PN9377334)

the little things often lead to big problems. USE HULL SEMI-ANNUAL KIT (O-RING: PN12312058,
MS9021-371) SERV TM CHIEF
How many times do you see vehicles come 10 Inspect and Service Bore Evacuator SERV TM CHIEF
into service with deferred shortcomings and 11 Crew Services Recoil Mechanism IAW page 2-369, TM-10 SERV TM CHIEF
12 Perform Recoil Exercise IAW Appendix I, TM-20 SERV TM CHIEF
depart the service with the same and even 13 Clean Work Environment, Dispose of Waste/HAZMAT Materials CO MNT TM CHIEF
more shortcomings being deferred? Give the 14 Conduct Nightly Service Huddle, Prepare for Next Day CO XO
welder time to tap bolts and weld. Give the Figure 4
crew time to steam clean, scrub, and spot
paint the engine compartment. Give the me-
chanics time to secure loose cables, tape bare
wires, and execute each step of the service. Give the service battalion executive officer and company commander attend.
team chief time to inspect and perform quality control over The focus of the service huddle is to determine what has
the service. Give the battalion maintenance technician (BMT) been accomplished to date and what is programmed to be
and battalion motor sergeant (BMS) time to look for unusual performed during the next 1-2 days of the service. You could
wear or trends. Pride in your equipment and a little tender refer to it as a “synch meeting.” It is a very important daily
loving care goes a long way towards maintenance success. meeting, because it prevents surprises, maximizes resources,
and enables critical maintenance decisions relative to service
Assessments and feedback are important aspects of training to be made. It gives the leaders the ability to set the condi-
and leadership. They are also essential to an effective service tions and prepare for the next day’s activities with respect to
program. Each day of the service ends with a nightly service resources (tools, diagnostic equipment, supplies, parts, per-
huddle involving the key maintenance leaders. This includes sonnel, etc.). At the completion of the service, the battalion
the BMT or battalion motor officer (BMO), company execu- commander chairs a service after-action review (AAR) with
tive officer, company maintenance team chief, service team the same key maintenance leaders who attend all or selected
chief, platoon leader, and platoon sergeant. Periodically, the nightly service huddles.

ARMOR — September-October 2000 41

 VEHICLE
TURRET DAY 3 ___6 ___7 ___8 ___9 QA/QC
1 SAFETY BRIEFING PL OR PSG
2 Inspect and Service Commander's Weapon Station Hatch SERV TM CHIEF
3 Inspect and Test Smoke Grenade Launchers SERV TM CHIEF
4 Purge and Charge All Sights (GPS, GPSE, CWS, Unity
Periscope) and LRUs
DESICCANT GPS: PN9377106
KIT LRF: PN5705155 SERV TM CHIEF The intent of the AAR is to provide feedback
5 Purge, Charge, and Leak Check LRF SERV TM CHIEF on any maintenance trends (positive and nega-
6 Purge, Charge, and Leak Check ICU SERV TM CHIEF
7 Inspect and Sensor Crosswind Sensor SERV TM CHIEF
tive) observed during the service and to solicit
8 Inspect Thermal System SERV TM CHIEF recommendations on any required adjustments
SERV TM CHIEF
9
10
Inspect 120mm Cannon Assembly
Inspect Breech Contact Group and Replace Spring
to the service program. Making your subordi-
USE HULL SEMI-ANNUAL KIT (SPRING: PN12529740) SERV TM CHIEF nates a part of the process gives them a sense of
11
12
Inspect and Service Breechring Contact Group
Perform Prep-To-Fire Checks and AACs Record on
SERV TM CHIEF ownership. Every battalion has smart soldiers;
Enclosed AAC WORKSHEET CO MG give them the opportunity to express them-
13 Inspect and Service NBC System. If Date Stenciled on the selves and share their ideas.
Canisters (Primary and Secondary) is Older Than 2 Years,
Replace the Filters. Update the Date Stencil on the Adding scheduled services to the Battalion
Canisters if Filters are Replaced.
USE NBC FILTERS (PRIMARY): 4240-01-161-3710 Training Plan at the end of the annual training
USE NBC FILTERS (BACK-UP): 4240-00-828-3952 plan development process is a recipe for disas-
USE NBC FILTER (SQUARE): 4240-00-866-1825 SERV TM CHIEF
14 Clean NBC System Particle Separator with Compressed Air from
ter. Instead, build your training plan around the
the Inside to the Outside, Wipeout Standing Water and Dirt from scheduled services. The most efficient way to
the NBC Sponson Box SERV TM CHIEF
15 Check Air Pressure at Crew Stations with Air Flow Tester,
accomplish this is by scheduling the services on
Should Read 18 CMFS. SERV TM CHIEF the calendar after the higher directed events
16 Replace NBC Sponson Box Seals, 4 Each, Cut to Fit
USE SEAL: PN 12345800-1 SERV TM CHIEF
have been posted. Using the 10 percent vari-
17 Clean Work Environment, Dispose of Waste/HAZMAT Materials CO MNT TM CHIEF ance (18 days), the services can then be slid left
18 Conduct Nightly Service Huddle, Prepare for Next Day CO XO or right to accommodate the desired battalion-
Figure 5 level field training events. When you examine
the amount of available training time, when
TURRET DAY 4 ___6
VEHICLE
___7 ___8 ___9 QA/QC
balanced against the 13-day model, company-
1 SAFETY BRIEFING PL OR PSG level field training opportunities are limited.
2 Clean, Service, and Inventory Crew Served Weapons Platoon-level field training is not a problem
Crew Served Weapon Cleaning Kits CO ARMORER
M2 and Spare Barrel CO ARMORER from the resource perspective of time. In
Loader's M240 and Spare Barrel CO ARMORER USAREUR, company-level field training is
CO ARMORER
3
Gunner's M240 and Spare Barrel
Clean, Service, and Inventory Individual Weapons
normally associated with a CMTC rotation (a
Individual Weapon Cleaning Kits CO ARMORER higher directed event) due to training area
Driver's M9 and Magazines
Loader's M9 and Magazines
CO ARMORER
CO ARMORER
availability and suitability. The 13-day model
Gunner's M9 and Magazines CO ARMORER requires a significant investment of time and
Tank Commander's M9 and Magazines CO ARMORER detailed training management (planning), but it
Crew M16A2 and Magazine CO ARMORER
Crew M16A2 and Magazine CO ARMORER is most definitely worth the investment.
4 Clean and Service NVDs and Ancillary Equipment
Loader's AN/PVS-7B CO ARMORER We can all agree maintenance is training. A
Tank Commander's AN/PVS-7B CO ARMORER few examples of how training is embedded into
Driver's AN/VVS-2 CO ARMORER
PLGR CO ARMORER the model include Armament and Accuracy
Loader's Binos CO ARMORER Checks (AAC), weapon services, and Preven-
Tank Commander's Binos CO ARMORER
MBD CO MG
tive Maintenance Checks and Services (PMCS)
Anderson Device CO MG before the two road tests. Having the crews
CO MEDIC
Vehicle First Aid Kits
Combat Lifesaver Bag CO MEDIC
perform the AAC during the service requires
5 Update Weapon Responsibility Statements and Cards CO 1SG them to conduct prep-to-fire checks and bore-
6
7
Clean Work Environment, Dispose of Waste/HAZMAT Materials
Conduct Nightly Service Huddle, Prepare for Next Day
CO MNT TM CHIEF
CO XO
sight the tanks — great tasks to sustain as a part
of gunnery training and proficiency. After a
Figure 6 crewmember completes the service on a
VEHICLE weapon, have him perform the TCGST tasks
___6 ___7 ___8 ___9 QA/QC
1 SAFETY BRIEFING
TURRET DAY 5
PL OR PSG
for the M240 and the M2, more great sustain-
2 Clean and Service NBC Equipment ment tasks for gunnery. In the 1st Infantry Di-
Driver's M42A2 CO NBC NCO vision, crewmembers (operators) receive an
Loader's M42A2 CO NBC NCO
Gunner's M42A2 CO NBC NCO annual certification by their first-line leader on
Tank Commander's M42A2 CO NBC NCO their ability to perform a proper PMCS. The
M13 DAP CO NBC NCO
AN/VDR-2 CO NBC NCO
service program allows this certification to oc-
M256 Kit CO NBC NCO cur either during the Day 0 or Day 13 PMCS
M274 Marking Kit
IM-93
CO NBC NCO
CO NBC NCO
prior to the respective road test. Make sure your
M8 and M9 Paper CO NBC NCO leaders record the performance of these tasks in
M8A1 CO NBC NCO their Leader Books, so they can accurately track
3 Clean, Service, and Inspect BII and Update Handreceipt CO SUPPLY SGT
4 Inspect, Clean, and Service Vehicle Communications proficiency and frequency of training. These
System to Include the ANCD and Vehicle Battery Bag CO COMMO SGT are but a few representative examples of how
5 Inspect, Clean, and Service Ground Communications
Equipment CO COMMO SGT
maintenance is truly training.
6 Inspect, Clean, and Service CVCs CO COMMO SGT
7 Inspect and Service Mine Plow or Mine Roller SERV TM CHIEF Time is the one resource we always seem to
8 Dispatch Vehicle for Road Test TC lack. Time is a precious commodity, but it is
9 Clean Work Environment, Dispose of Waste/HAZMAT Materials CO MNT TM CHIEF
10 Conduct Nightly Service Huddle, Prepare for Next Day CO XO
often wasted. By using a “batch and stack” or
Figure 7 “leveraging” approach to our activities, we are
better able to accomplish more tasks in a given

42 ARMOR — September-October 2000

 VEHICLE
DAY CHANGEOVER ___6 ___7 ___8 ___9 QA/QC
1 CTA-50 Inventory CO SUPPLY SGT
2 CTA-50 Direct Exchange (DX) TC
3 Initial Inventory Issue CO SUPPLY SGT
period of time. Many of our requirements are 4 Phone Roster Updated PSG
periodic or cyclic in nature. By aligning re- 5 Shot Records Updated CO MEDIC
quirements or tasks in time and space, you can 6 HIV Test Verified CO MEDIC
7 Solider Physical Verified CO MEDIC
potentially accomplish more with the available 8 Soldier Pay Verified PSG
resources at hand. You are also saving time in 9 BAQ/VHA Verified PSG
terms of overhead, set-up and tear-down time, 10 SGLI Verified BN PAC NCO
11 Personal Data Sheet Updated PSG
for each task. Some examples include the per- 12 Power of Attorney Verified/Completed PSG
formance of the recoil exercise during the ser- 13 Will Verified/Completed PSG
vice, which meets the semiannual requirement, 14 Inspect and Verify PDP Packet for Completeness CO 1SG
15 Key Control Update CO 1SG
or screening the soldiers’ pre-deployment 16 Confirm Individual Weapon Qualification Status CO 1SG
packets (PDP), getting shots, and completing 17 Conduct Nightly Service Huddle, Prepare for Next Day CO XO
personnel and administrative actions as they Figure 8
relate to soldier readiness, which meets other
semiannual requirements. You can argue that
you will still have to do these things because
you are not doing every soldier or tank in the company or the know what right looks like. They have the ability to visualize
battalion. But you are saving time. Instead of blocking out an a train wreck before it happens. They greatly assist the com-
entire day to perform recoil exercises on your company, or mander in making sure the proper standard is being applied.
spending a day sending 63 soldiers to PDP, you are doing it They have the ability to train as they apply their expertise.
by exception or by unit/element; therefore, other units/ele- The BMT and BMS can work with the mechanics and the
ments have the ability to perform other tasks. An asymmetri- master gunner can work with the crewmembers on gaining a
cal approach, versus a symmetrical approach to planning deeper understanding of the tank. Again, maintenance is
your companies’ activities, will allow you to accomplish truly training! The feedback they provide is critical to the
more with the available resources. During services, you, as overall readiness of the unit. Our Army has spent a great deal
leaders, have a very attentive audience. Account for your of money training them; we need to maximize their knowl-
soldiers and keep them on task. edge by involving them in the scheduled service process.
Frequently, we use our most experienced and knowledge- Anticipating maintenance problems sounds very difficult,
able maintenance professionals to perform tasks that could but by listening to what other units are saying as well as
be handled by someone less specialized. How often is the what your maintenance professionals are saying, the task
BMT or BMS chasing parts? How often is your company becomes more manageable. Understanding what caused the
master gunner at the Training Support Center (TSC) schedul- maintenance failure, rather than just fixing the problem with
ing or obtaining training aids, devices, simulations, and a part, will allow you to see if you have a bigger problem.
simulators (TADSS) or executing administrative require- During the scheduled service, close attention is paid to com-
ments for the first sergeant? These are maintenance-smart ponents or parts and how they wear or why they failed. From
soldiers, and their minds are a terrible thing to waste. They this, the BMT and the company maintenance team chief are
able to identify possible trends within the bat-
talion’s fleet. Other great sources of informa-
tion concerning trends and solutions to the
HULL DAY 1
VEHICLE
___6 ___7 ___8 ___9 QA/QC
problems are the PS Magazine, maintenance
1 SAFETY BRIEFING PL OR PSG messages, and the Field Problem Review
2 Prep for Hull Services SERV TM CHIEF Board (FPRB) Report. Taking this informa-
SERV TM CHIEF
3 Pull Rear Deck
4 Remove Power Pack SERV TM CHIEF
tion, the battalion confirms or denies if it has
5 Remove and Service Batteries, Load Test Batteries SERV TM CHIEF the identified trend. All trends are treated the
6 Drain and Change Final Drive Oil SERV TM CHIEF same in terms of fixing the problem. If a trend
7 Inspect Engine Compartment and Powerpack for Damage
and Any Leaks SERV TM CHIEF
exists within the fleet, the corrective action is
8 Complete TM-20 Level Technical Inspection to Include applied. A determination is made to apply the
Identification of New Welding/Tapping Requirements and
corrective action during a command mainte-
Update Vehicle Welding Matrix SERV TM CHIEF
9 Inspect Engine and Transmission Cooling System SERV TM CHIEF nance period, if it requires no major mainte-
10 Inspect All Exhaust Seals and Oil Cooler Seals SERV TM CHIEF nance activity (i.e., pulling a pack), or wait
SERV TM CHIEF
11 Inspect Oil Lines
12 Clean Exhaust Duct Elbow SERV TM CHIEF
until the next scheduled service. Regardless,
13 Inspect Exhaust Duct and Exhaust Duct Gasket SERV TM CHIEF each tank is tracked to ensure no vehicle is
14 Inspect Generator Access Cover Gasket SERV TM CHIEF missed. Frequently, the trend is then translated
15 Inspect Exhaust Duct Exhaust Seal, Rotate 180 Degrees if Worn,
If Seal is Completely Unserviceable, Replace Seal and Screws
into a step in the service and, if required, parts
USE SEAL NONMETALLIC: NSN 5330-01-320-3692 are added as additional battalion required
USE SCREW CAP: NSN 5305-00-988-7794 SERV TM CHIEF parts. The current service program’s addi-
16 Replace Grille Door Bolts (Annual Requirement, Check Last
Service Packet to Determine if Replacement is Required) tional parts are listed on the Day Final Check-
USE GRILLE DOOR BOLTS: NSN 5305-01-130-1665 SERV TM CHIEF list (See Figure 14). Many of the additional
SERV TM CHIEF
17 Inspect Both Right Angle Drives
18 Inspect Propeller Shafts SERV TM CHIEF
parts are seals and bolts associated with the
19 Inspect PTO Seals and Housings SERV TM CHIEF high heat areas of the engine and the exhaust.
20 Inspect and Service Trans/Axial Fan Assembly SERV TM CHIEF The battalion also uses both the semi and an-
21 Clean Work Environment, Dispose of Waste/HAZMAT Materials CO MNT TM CHIEF
22 Conduct Nightly Service Huddle, Prepare for Next Day CO XO
nual service kits during each semiannual ser-
vice. This has reduced the number of engine
Figure 9 failures, because the air induction system in
the tank is serviced every six months. Tailor-

ARMOR — September-October 2000 43

 VEHICLE
HULL DAY 2 ___6 ___7 ___8 ___9 QA/QC
1 SAFETY BRIEFING PL OR PSG
2 Change Engine Oil Filter
ing the service program to meet the unique USE OIL FILTER KIT: NSN 4330-01-118-2868 SERV TM CHIEF
needs of your fleet, without sacrificing the 3 Change Transmission Oil Filter
basic service outlined in the TM –20, will USE OIL FILTER KIT: NSN 2520-01-204-2585 SERV TM CHIEF
4 Change Primary, Secondary, and Last Chance Filters
keep you ahead of the unscheduled mainte- USE HULL SEMI-ANNUAL KIT (FUEL FILTER SERVICE KIT:
nance power curve. PN5705134) SERV TM CHIEF
5 Clean and Service Fuel Nozzles
As you look at your battalion’s MTO&E, USE HULL SEMI-ANNUAL KIT (SERVICE KIT: PN12312058,
you probably won’t find any positions iden- PN12284708, PNM83248/1-241) SERV TM CHIEF
6 Steam Clean Engine Compartment SERV TM CHIEF
tified as quality control supervisor or qual- 7 Clean and Service Battery Compartment SERV TM CHIEF
ity assurance inspector, but we all know 8 Steam Clean Powerpack Assembly to Include Oil Coolers SERV TM CHIEF
these are essential functions. How do you 9 Service Left and Right Oil Coolers SERV TM CHIEF
organize your company service team to 10 Replace Left and Right Oil Cooler Seals
USE OIL COOLER SEAL R/S: NSN 2930-01-102-3491
accommodate or resource these require- USE OIL COOLER SEAL L/S: NSN 5330-01-393-2605 SERV TM CHIEF
ments? In the Lion Battalion, a company 11 Replace Exhaust Duct Gasket (Annual Requirement, Check

maintenance team takes the shop foreman Last Service Packet to Determine if Replacement Required)
USE GASKET: NSN 5342-01-317-1446
and makes him the service team chief. He USE SHORT BOLT: NSN 5305-00-727-6804
performs quality assurance for the service. USE LONG BOLT: NSN 5340-01-171-4736

Each tank in hull service gets a hull me- USE WASHERS: 5310-00-281-6347 SERV TM CHIEF
12 Replace Generator Access Cover Gasket (Annual
chanic and each tank in turret service gets a Requirement, Check Last Service Packet to Determine if
turret mechanic assigned to it. In addition, Replacement is Required)
the tanks in hull service have the senior hull USE GASKET: NSN 5330-01-101-5065
USE BOLT: NSN 5306-00-637-8723
mechanic supervising the hull mechanics USE WASHER: 5310-01-369-5648 SERV TM CHIEF
and the same responsibilities are given to 13 Inspect All Quick Release Pins; i.e., Brake, Steering, Parking
the senior turret mechanic for the service of Brake SERV TM CHIEF
14 Service Cooling and Scavenger Fan Shafts and U-Joint
the turrets. These two noncommissioned Assemblies SERV TM CHIEF
officers perform quality control of their 15 Clean Work Environment, Dispose of Waste/HAZMAT Materials CO MNT TM CHIEF
respective portions of the service. This or- 16 Conduct Nightly Service Huddle, Prepare for Next Day CO XO
ganization for the service requires 7, possi- Figure 10
bly 8, personnel from the authorized 10 in a
company maintenance team. The BMT and
BMS perform quality assurance of the en- VEHICLE
HULL DAY 3 ___6 ___7 ___8 ___9 QA/QC
tire service with particular emphasis on the 1 SAFETY BRIEFING PL OR PSG
conduct and the results of the technical in- 2 Clean and Service V-Packs and Precleaner Assembly
spections on Day 0 and Day Final. The USE HULL ANNUAL KIT (SEAL: PN12287512) SERV TM CHIEF
same concept of quality control and quality 3 Clean Plenum Box SERV TM CHIEF
4 Pull V-Packs, Blow V-Packs, Weigh V-Packs, and Record
assurance is applied by the platoon sergeant Readings on Enclosed V-PACK WEIGHT MATRIX. Replace
(quality control) and the company NBC V-Packs if They do not Meet the Criteria in the TM-20. SERV TM CHIEF
NCO, company armorer, and company first 5 Service Personnel Heater
USE HULL SEMI-ANNUAL KIT (PERSONNEL HEATER
sergeant (quality assurance) for the other FUEL FILTER KIT: PN57052)
areas of the service. You can have the USE HULL SEMI-ANNUAL KIT (PERSONNEL HEATER
greatest plan in the world, but success still FUEL PUMP SERVICE KIT: PN5705207)
USE HULL ANNUAL KIT (WATER SEPARATOR KIT:
revolves around the execution. Dedicating PN5705484) SERV TM CHIEF
personnel to perform quality control and 6 Install Batteries
quality assurance will ensure you are exe- USE HULL SEMI-ANNUAL KIT (KIT, BATTERY: PN5705143) SERV TM CHIEF
cuting to standard. 7 Replace Fuel Cap Vents, 4 Each
USE HULL SEMI-ANNUAL KIT (SERVICE KIT, FUEL CAP:
PN10582) SERV TM CHIEF
The Details 8 Perform Fire Extinguisher Test SERV TM CHIEF
9 Test PPI System SERV TM CHIEF
Taking the commander’s guidance, the 10 Clean Work Environment, Dispose of Waste/HAZMAT Materials CO MNT TM CHIEF
checklists shown in Figures 2-14 were de- 11 Conduct Nightly Service Huddle, Prepare for Next Day CO XO
veloped, and they describe the 13 days of Figure 11
the program. These same checklists are
used by maintenance leaders and mechanics
during the service. VEHICLE
HULL DAY 4 ___6 ___7 ___8 ___9 QA/QC
The checklists for each day of the service 1 SAFETY BRIEFING PL OR PSG
contain standard tasks to be accomplished 2 Ground Hop Powerpack SERV TM CHIEF
during most of the service days. These in- 3 Perform Engine Test Using and Record Readings on
clude safety briefs, work area cleaning, and Enclosed ECU J1/BOB CONVERSION CHART SERV TM CHIEF
4 Lube Vehicle IAW LO-9-2350-264-LO TC
the nightly service huddle. Selected tasks in 5 Inspect and Service the EAPU
the service have the parts kits from the an- USE SEMI/ANNUAL SERVICE KIT: NSN 2815-01-383-7316 SERV TM CHIEF
nual or semi-annual service kits or the addi- 6 Clean Work Environment, Dispose of Waste/HAZMAT Materials CO MNT TM CHIEF
tional battalion service parts associated with 7 Conduct Nightly Service Huddle, Prepare for Next Day CO XO

the particular step of the service. This pre- Figure 12

vents the situation when parts are not ap-
plied because a mechanic may not know

44 ARMOR — September-October 2000

 VEHICLE
HULL DAY 5 ___6 ___7 ___8 ___9 QA/QC
1 SAFETY BRIEFING PL OR PSG
2 Set Powerpack SERV TM CHIEF
3 Inspect, Torque, and Mark Sprocket, Roadwheel, and Track increasing in age and require the best mainte-
Assembly Bolts/Nuts SERV TM CHIEF
4 Drain Road Wheel and Compensating Idler Arm Hub Oil,
nance possible for them to effectively operate.
Replace Oil, and Replace Plug (Annual Requirement, Check This fact makes the performance of scheduled
Last Service Packet to Determine if Replacement is
Required)
services even more imperative if our equip-
USE PLUG PROTECTIVE: NSN 5340-01-128-9554 SERV TM CHIEF ment is going to last and carry us to the final
5 Clean Work Environment, Dispose of Waste/HAZMAT Materials CO MNT TM CHIEF objective.
6 Conduct Nightly Service Huddle, Prepare for Next Day CO XO
Note: If you are interested in obtaining the
Figure 13 complete service program contact the Battal-
ion Motor Officer or Battalion Maintenance
VEHICLE
DAY FINAL ___6 ___7 ___8 ___9 QA/QC
Technician at the following address: Com-
1 SAFETY BRIEFING PL OR PSG mander, ATTN: BMO, HQ, 2-63 AR, Unit
2 Validate Crew Members Ability to PMCS Vehicle TC 28014, APO AE 09112 or phone DSN 476-
3 Road Test Vehicle TC
4 Final Technical Inspection SERV TM CHIEF
2786.
5 Close-out Dispatches TC
6 Clean Work Environment, Dispose of Waste/HAZMAT Materials CO MNT TM CHIEF
7 Complete Service Packets, Verify Service Checklists, Order
Parts, Verify Job Orders, File All Paperwork: Verify 2408-4,
5988-E CO XO
CW3 Kevin L. Cox enlisted in February
8 Service AAR BN XO 1979 as a 63C/63N and worked on the
9 Reorder Service Kit and Additional Battalion Required Parts CO MNT TM CHIEF M60-series tank until 1982 when the field-
SEMI HULL SEMI-ANNUAL KIT (NSN 2540-01-255-3347) 1 EACH PER TANK
SEMI HULL ANNUAL KIT (NSN 4330-01-117-7943) 1 EACH PER TANK ing of the M1 began. He has served with
SEMI ENGINE OIL FILTER KIT (NSN 4330-01-118-2868) 1 EACH PER TANK several armor units and the U.S. Army
SEMI TRANSMISSION OIL FILTER KIT (NSN 2520-01-204-2585) 1 EACH PER TANK
SEMI OIL COOLER SEAL R/S (NSN 2930-01-102-3491) 1 EACH PER TANK Armor Center and School. In 1988, he
SEMI OIL COOLER SEAL L/S (NSN 5330-01-393-2605) 1 EACH PER TANK was selected to attend Warrant Officer
SEMI GRILLE DOOR BOLTS (NSN 5305-01-130-1665) 2 EACH PER TANK
SEMI NBC SYSTEM SPONSON BOX SEAL (PN 12345800-1) 20 FT PER TANK School. Upon completion of this school,
SEMI EAPU SEMI/ANNUAL SERVICE KIT (NSN 2815-01-383-7316) 1 EACH PER TANK
he was assigned to M109 and MLRS bat-
ANN GASKET HEAT DUCT (NSN 5342-01-317-1446) 1 EACH PER TANK
ANN BOLT (SHORT) (NSN 5305-00-727-6804) 11 EACH PER TANK talions until selected for promotion to
ANN BOLT (LONG) (NSN 5340-01-171-4736)
ANN WASHER (NSN 5310-00-281-6347)
6 EACH PER TANK
17 EACH PER TANK
CW3 and attendance at the advanced
ANN GENERATOR ACCESS PLATE GASKET (5330-01-101-5065) 1 EACH PER TANK course. His professional experience with
ANN BOLT (NSN 5306-00-637-8723)
ANN WASHER (NSN 5310-01-369-5648)
12 EACH PER TANK
12 EACH PER TANK
the M1-series tank spans more than 17
ANN PLUG PROTECTIVE (5340-01-128-9554) 16 EACH PER TANK years. Upon completion of the advanced
AS REQ

AS REQ
SEAL NONMETALLIC (NSN 5330-01-320-3692)
SCREW CAP (NSN 5305-00-988-7794)
1 EACH PER TANK
6 EACH PER TANK
course, he was assigned to 2-63 Armor
BIEN NBC FILTER (PRIMARY) (4240-01-161-3710) 2 EACH PER TANK as the BMT in the Fall of 1997.
BIEN NBC FILTER (BACK-UP) (4240-00-828-3952) 2 EACH PER TANK
BIEN NBC FILTER (SQUARE) (4240-00-866-1825) 1 EACH PER TANK
SFC Joseph N. Pishner Jr. enlisted in
Figure 14
January 1984 as a 45N and worked on
the M60-series tank until October 1985
when he was reclassified as a 45E. He
what they are or where they go. One could argue that many has served with several armor battalions and the 27th
of the steps in the checklists are redundant and are included MSB as a team chief, ORF maintenance manager, and
in the TM –20, but experience shows that some of these division recovery OIC. He has over 15 years experi-
tasks don’t get accomplished. Why is this the case? Selected
tasks listed in the TM –20 can realistically be performed by ence on the M1-series tank. He participated in the field-
crewmembers, but frequently the crewmembers won’t know. ing of the M1A2 at Fort Hood with 1-8 Cav. He also
The mechanic, who is using the TM –20, assumes the crew- participated in the fielding of the M88A2 at Fort Hood
members know and they don’t; therefore, the task doesn’t get and the LMTV, which was all part of Force Package
performed. If the QA/QC inspectors miss it, we have a prob- 2000. SFC Pishner has attended numerous Army
lem. Adding detail to the checklist enhances situational maintenance schools and has always graduated in the
awareness and ensures all personnel know the tasks to be top 5% of his class. He currently serves as the team
accomplished. Making sure all personnel involved in the chief for B/2-63 Armor.
service have a clear task and purpose will lead to mission
accomplishment. LTC Peter D. Utley was commissioned in 1982 as an
The scheduled service is only one of the many components armor officer through ROTC after graduating from The
of an effective unit maintenance program, but it serves as the Citadel, the Military College of South Carolina. During
foundation for success. An effective scheduled service pro- his career, he has served with numerous cavalry
gram requires a significant investment of resources, and it squadrons of the 2nd, 4th, 9th and 11th Regiments in
must be treated as a training event worthy of protecting. If it various command and staff positions. In 1990, he de-
is treated as an afterthought, you will not reap the benefits of
your labor. Avoid paying high labor costs (in terms of lost ployed to Southwest Asia with the 2nd Squadron, 4th
training hours and training dollars) by paying a reasonable Cavalry, 24th Infantry Division (Mech) as the squadron
price through a comprehensive scheduled service program. S3 air and squadron S3. Most recently, he served as
The Army has given us the most modern weapon systems the commander of 2-63 Armor from 4 February 1998 to
found in the world, but some of these technical systems are 28 February 2000.

ARMOR — September-October 2000 45

Victory in the Red Zone
by Captain Bill A. Papanastasiou

Alpha Company, a mechanized infantry company team, advanced westward at less

than moderate speed. Not more than a few hours short of LD, Alpha Company had as-
sumed the advance guard for the task force. The team commander decided there was
little time for a proper intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) or rehearsals.
However, he did remember that the battalion staff reported that a reinforced enemy
combat security outpost (CSOP) lay less than four kilometers away. Meanwhile, the task
force commander barked into the team commander’s ear to slow down so he would not
separate from the obscured main body. The tremendous dust clouds kicked up by the
advancing Alpha Company had blinded the rest of the task force traveling in the dia-
mond formation.
Suddenly, two of 3rd platoon’s Bradley Infantry Fighting Vehicles (BIFVs) catastro-
phically exploded in balls of flame due to enemy direct fire. At the same time, heavy ar-
tillery landed all around the advancing team, causing great confusion. Friendly vehicles
were firing in every direction and moving every which way. A tank from 1st platoon
accidentally fired on and destroyed a 3rd platoon BIFV. On the left flank, 2nd platoon,
with four BIFVs and mounted infantry, tried to advance along a tree line, which ran
parallel to the team’s axis of advance. In a shower of anti-tank guided missiles
(ATGMs), originating from inside the tree line, the platoon lost three vehicles and their
mounted infantry in seconds. The platoon leader failed to clear the tree line before ad-
vancing. Watching in horror, the team commander realized he had lost total control of
the situation. He also regretted not conducting his own, thorough IPB prior to LD. As it
turned out, the CSOP was actually one kilometer closer than intelligence had reported.
Clearly, the entire team fell right into the enemy kill sack. In less than five minutes, Al-
pha Company lost seven BIFVs and two tanks to direct and flanking ATGM fire and
mines. The fact that the enemy destroyed nine of Alpha Company’s 14 combat vehicles
made it combat ineffective. To make matters worse, the entire CSOP withdrew within
the defending motorized rifle battalion’s defensive line without any losses.

As alarming as this example may be, to reverse this trend, our tank and actions on contact. The final area will
one is more shocked to learn that such mechanized infantry company teams concern maneuvering in the enemy’s
failures occur repeatedly to company must aggressively and effectively exe- battlespace, and this will explain the
teams deploying to the combat training cute maneuver when in contact with the Red Zone, the application of combined
centers, especially the National Train- enemy. They must close with and de- arms, and fire and movement.
ing Center (NTC) at Fort Irwin, Cali- stroy the enemy with massed lethal
fornia.1 Company teams are failing to fires from all combined arms assets, Knowing the Enemy
show proficiency in critical collective while at the same time securing and
Therefore, I say: Know the enemy and
tasks, such as direct fire planning and preserving their own combat power and know yourself; in a hundred battles you
execution, killing with lethal direct successfully accomplishing the team’s
fires, executing effective actions on mission. will never be in peril. When you are
ignorant of the enemy but know your-
contact, using proper movement forma- This article attempts to shed some self, your chances of winning or losing
tions and techniques based on terrain
and enemy situation, and exploiting the light on certain key aspects of offensive are equal. If ignorant of your enemy
maneuver planning that our company and of yourself, you are certain in
effects of combined arms. Concerning teams should consider. The tactical every battle to be in peril.3
the latter, the unplanned use or the mis-
use of dismounted infantry is most suggestions presented are not meant to To put it in contemporary terms, Sun
be approved solutions but simply ap-
common. Thus our company teams proaches to increasing the company Tzu, in his writings on war over 2,000
seldom achieve the degree of tactical years ago, intended that commanders at
initiative needed to force the enemy to team’s chances of success in offensive all levels conduct what we call an intel-
maneuver execution.
conform to our commander’s opera- ligence preparation of the battlefield
tional purposes and tempo, while re- This analysis will focus on three ma- (IPB). This is the crucial second step in
taining freedom of action.2 This inabil- jor topics: The first, knowing the en- the mission analysis phase in the mili-
ity to impose our will on the enemy emy, will cover IPB and reconnais- tary decision-making process (MDMP).
results in our reacting to his terms of sance. The second, transitioning from A negative trend observed at the NTC
battle, giving him the advantage of dic- movement to maneuver, will include is that IPB at the company team level is
tating when and where to fight. In order discussion of the approach march and either not done to the necessary level of

46 ARMOR — September-October 2000

detail, or simply not done at all. Com- team to gain early contact with the en- friendly forces as they attempt to ma-
pany team commanders usually do not emy using the minimum amount of neuver. Furthermore, it gives the com-
template the enemy positions down to force, thus, giving the commander time mander time to develop and evaluate
individual vehicle and dismounted to analyze the situation and maneuver the situation, and decide on and execute
fighting positions. Often ignored is the the mass of his force against the enemy a viable course of action. General
potentially lethal hand-held anti-tank with the greatest possible advantage. George S. Patton addressed the same
threat. Moreover, company team com- matter in his March 6, 1944, “Letters of
manders generally do not analyze the Transitioning From Instruction”:
Movement To Maneuver
terrain for intervisibility lines, dead In battle, casualties vary directly with
space, choke points, and trafficability. With a clear vision of the terrain and
Perhaps more importantly, they often enemy based on his IPB and the com- the time you are exposed to effective
fire. Your own fire reduces the effec-
fail to consider the enemy’s use of ter- bat information provided by his com- tiveness and volume of the enemy’s fire,
rain with respect to specific weapon bined arms patrol, the team commander
systems and obstacle emplacements. can make sound decisions with respect while rapidity of attack shortens the
time of exposure.9
The result is that units haphazardly to the type of movement formation to
move into enemy engagement areas use during the approach march and
Maneuvering in the Enemy’s
and suffer heavy losses. which movement technique to use in
Direct Fire Battle Space
The company team commander must conjunction with the movement forma-
tion. At the NTC, company teams con-
conduct a thorough terrain and weather sistently do not plan and rehearse the The last line in the above quote brings
analysis by way of a map reconnais- us to the next matter, effectively ma-
sance and, if possible, from dominating movement technique they will use with neuvering in the “Red Zone” to bring
the movement formations, and often
terrain overlooking the axis of advance make contact while traveling or in col- about the enemy’s destruction. The
before the start of the attack. In light of “Red Zone” is a non-doctrinal term
this analysis, the commander must then umn. Commanders have difficulty tran- referring to the enemy’s direct fire bat-
sitioning from less secure movement
seek to understand the enemy situ- formations and techniques to more se- tle space.
ational template provided by the task
force staff.4 Given this information and cure ones, like the wedge and bounding It is a dynamic, physical area that ex-
overwatch, respectively. The solution is pands or contracts in relation to the
his own conclusions, the commander that commanders must plan and re- ability of the enemy to acquire and en-
should attempt to visualize the enemy’s
dispositions, especially dismounted, hearse these transitions, essential in a gage with direct weapons fire. It is
movement to contact, based on the graphically characterized, in a BLUE-
and possible enemy courses of action. likelihood of enemy contact.7 FOR deliberate attack, as the area be-
From this estimate, the commander will
be able to develop a flexible scheme of tween the probable line of contact and
The transition from movement — the limit of advance, within enemy di-
maneuver that will ensure the company when units bound forward supported by rect fire range.10
team secures the position of tactical
advantage from which effective massed an overwatch element — to tactical
maneuver, when an active base of fire As observed at the NTC, many com-
lethal fires and further maneuver covers forward progress, should occur pany teams lose cohesion short of the
against enemy weaknesses can occur.
before entering into the enemy’s direct objective and are unable to mass
Quite often though, the company team fire battle space. Quite often, observer/ against a defending enemy or a coun-
commander may not have adequate controllers (OCs) observe company terattacking combined arms reserve.
intelligence on the enemy, and thus will teams moving, while in traveling over- Maneuver has two components — fire
have difficulty visualizing how the en- watch, into the enemy’s fire sack, and movement. Fire neutralizes, sup-
emy will fight. Therefore, the com- where it is rapidly destroyed. Further- presses, demoralizes, and destroys en-
mander may need to gather, by way of more, once joined in battle, company emy forces. Movement brings this fire-
reconnaissance, his own combat infor- teams fail to execute effective actions power into positions of advantage from
mation — what our doctrine calls on contact. The typical reaction to en- which it extends and completes the
“those facts obtained on the battle- emy contact is a complete halt and an destruction.11 The solution to the above
field.”5 However, reconnaissance can attempt to return fire at targets often problem is the synchronization of fire
result in combat power losses and much beyond maximum effective ranges. and movement, which will enable com-
time expended. Hence, the commander Instead, the company team should pany teams to effectively close with
must balance the need for specific in- and destroy the enemy.
formation against potential losses in the execute a well-rehearsed battle drill
that establishes a base of fire, not an Fire from the rear is more deadly and
combat power that he will need during overwatch, by one element while the three times more effective than fire
actions at his decisive point.6
remaining elements seek covered and from the front, but to get fire behind the
A non-doctrinal technique that resem- concealed positions. Unlike an over- enemy, you must hold him by frontal
bles the Russian use of “combat recon- watch, which suppresses when the en- fire and move rapidly around his flank.
naissance patrols,” or “forward pa- emy is visible, a base of fire actively Frontal attacks against prepared posi-
trols,” is the use of a combined arms suppresses an objective whether the tions should be avoided if possible.
patrol consisting of one tank, two enemy is visible or not.8 The net effect “Catch the enemy by the nose with fire
BFVs, and a dismount infantry squad. is that the enemy’s “heads” are down, and kick him in the pants with fire em-
This patrol will allow the company seeking cover, rather than engaging placed through movement.”12

ARMOR — September-October 2000 47

 Figure 1: Company Team Maneuver through the Enemy’s Battle Space16

In order to avoid unnecessary losses, a To accomplish this maneuver of clos- refers to coordinating units of different
commander must develop the situation ing with and destroying the enemy, a arms or capabilities.... Complementary
and allow conditions for success to build tank and mechanized infantry company combined arms should pose a dilemma
before executing maneuver. He must team commander has at his disposal a for the enemy. As he evades the effects
possess combat patience, which allows combined mix of assets. In a combined of one weapon or arm, he places him-
him to control the pace of actions — arms team, each type of system — self in jeopardy of attack by another
tempo. It may take some time for the tank, BIFV, and mechanized infantry weapon.13
company team to regain the advantage — has an important role. The combined
after initial contact. This can be strengths of all these systems negate the A negative trend observed at the NTC
achieved by establishing suppressive weaknesses of individual systems. is that company teams are not planning
fires and exploiting an enemy flank for the use of dismounted infantry in
through the use of masking terrain. The term combined arms refers to two the attack. The result is that either the
Moreover, it is critical to maintain all- or more arms in mutual support to pro- infantry become Red Zone casualties as
around security throughout the fight in duce complementary and reinforcing their vehicles are destroyed, or they
the Red Zone, especially to counter en- effects that neither can obtain sepa- become possible fratricide casualties if
emy anti-tank and dismounted threats. rately.... Tactically, combined arms they are dismounted, due to the unco-

48 ARMOR — September-October 2000

Figure 1a: Company Team Maneuver through the Enemy’s Battle Space

ordinated nature of their employment. these dangerous areas. Infantry can also infantry in their unit organizations.
Based on a detailed terrain and enemy attack an assailable flank, forcing the Many Israeli armored brigades suffered
analysis, the company team com- enemy to commit in another direction. heavy losses due to Egyptian tank killer
mander must realize the value his dis- They are greatly beneficial in a recon- ambushes. They lacked infantry to pro-
mounts have in ensuring mission ac- naissance role, getting eyes on the ob- vide close-in security against hard-to-
complishment. The commander must jective and guiding fighting vehicles to detect enemy dismounts.14
fully integrate his dismounts in the advantageous ground where they can The tank is closed and to a large ex-
scheme of maneuver. bring effective fire to bear. An infantry
squad can direct many sets of eyes in a tent it is “blind.” Its gun and coaxial
There are many techniques for em- machine guns can fire only in the direc-
ploying dismounted mechanized infan- 360-degree surveillance with a far bet- tion that the turret is facing. On the
ter view of the situation than mounted
try. For instance, they are perfectly soldiers who may be “buttoned up.” other hand, the soldiers on the armored
suited to operate in restrictive terrain, personnel carrier can make use of sev-
such as forests, rocky ground, and ur- During the Yom Kippur War of Octo- eral pairs of eyes to scan the area in all
ban areas. They can clear passes and ber 1973, the Israelis learned the painful directions, and they can quickly fire
defiles for vehicles moving through lesson of not having enough mechanized many weapons in a flexible manner.15

ARMOR — September-October 2000 49

 The following is a possible offensive pany team to effectively close with and accordingly, commanders can aggres-
technique in the use of combined arms. destroy the enemy in the offense. Suc- sively and effectively maneuver their
The company team commander can di- cessfully maneuvering a combined units and close with and destroy the
rect a base of fire force consisting of — arms team against a determined enemy enemy with massed lethal fires, while
two BIFVs and two tanks. The BIFVs is certainly part art and part science. at the same time securing and preserv-
suppress enemy dismounts and vehicle With instinct and intuition, a com- ing their own combat power.
positions while the tanks engage the mander must execute quick and sound
enemy vehicles as they move into their tactical decisions based on his own
firing positions. As the base of fire force capabilities and the little information he
suppresses the enemy causing him to may have on the enemy and terrain. CPT Bill Papanastasiou is a 1994
seek cover, the dismounted infantry, Such intuitive and instinctual capacity graduate of the U.S. Military Acad-
acting as guides and scouts, move ahead is developed by repeatedly placing the emy, where he received his Armor
of the flanking force that is seeking the commander under difficult and realistic commission and a B.S. in Interna-
enemy’s rear. This technique sets the conditions — whether actual field ex- tional and Strategic History. He
conditions for success by attacking the ercises or computer simulations — and has served at Ft. Riley, Kan., with
enemy from multiple directions. It also in as many different and stressful situa-
ensures that undetected enemy vehicles tions as possible to train his tactical 1-34 Armor, 1st Bde, 1st ID (M) as
and infantry do not surprise the flanking decision-making faculties. Further- a tank platoon leader, tank com-
force. For a graphical example of the more, the commander must expose his pany XO, and HHC XO. Upon ar-
effective execution of combined arms subordinates to the same intensive riving at his current duty station,
maneuver at the company team level see training to develop their ability to act Ft. Stewart, Ga., he was assigned
Figures 1 and 1a. quickly and decisively in any situation. as the garrison S3. His military
In short, successful closure with and schooling includes Armor Officer
Home station is where this develop- Basic Course, Air Defense Artillery
destruction of the enemy hinges on the ment must occur. Company team com-
skillful use of the effects of combined Officer Advanced Course, Air As-
arms and attacks from multiple direc- manders must know our doctrine and sault School, and Airborne School.
understand that it is merely a founda-
tions.17 tion on which to build flexible tactical Currently, he commands A/3-69
In some detail, we explored a few ma- execution. By also possessing the abil- Armor, 1st Bde, 3d ID (M) at Ft.
jor reasons for the failure of the com- ity to visualize the battlefield and act Stewart.

Notes
1Center for Army Lessons Learned, A Collec- 9George S. Patton, Jr., War As I Knew It (Bos- ---. A Collection of Trends, with Techniques and
tion of Trends, with Techniques and Procedures ton: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1947) 379. Procedures that Work. NTC Trends Compen-
that Work, NTC Trends Compendium No. 97-17 10CTC Quarterly Bulletin No. 96-10, 17. dium No. 97-17. Fort Leavenworth, KS: U.S.
(Fort Leavenworth, Kan.: U.S. Army Training 11FM 71-1, 3-23.
Army Training and Doctrine Command [TRA-
and Doctrine Command [TRADOC], September DOC], September 1997.
1997) N24-40. 12Patton, 380.
FM 17-95, Cavalry Operations. Washington,
2FM 100-5, Operations (Washington, D.C.: 13FM 100-40, Tactics, Initial Draft (Washing- D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army,
Headquarters, Department of the Army, 14 June ton, D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the 19 September 1991.
1993) 2-6. Army, March 1995). FM 71-1, Tank and Mechanized Infantry Com-
3Sun Tzu, The Art of War, trans. Samuel B. 14RB 100-2, Vol. 1, “Selected Readings in Tac- pany Team. Washington, D.C.: Headquarters,
Griffith (London: Oxford University Press, 1963) tics, The 1973 Middle East War,” (Fort Leaven- Department of the Army, 22 November 1988.
84. worth, Kan.: U.S. Army Command and General FM 100-5, Operations. Washington, D.C.: Head-
4Center for Army Lessons Learned, Closing Staff College, 1980) 40. quarters, Department of the Army, 14 June
15Avraham Adan, On the Banks of the Suez (Je- 1993.
with the Enemy: Company Team Maneuver,
Special Study (Fort Leavenworth, Kan.: U.S. rusalem, Israel: Edanim Publishers, 1979) 211. FM 100-40, Tactics. Initial Draft. Washington,
Army Training and Doctrine Command [TRA- 16Special Study, 63-64. D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army,
DOC], March 1998) 11. 17Ibid., 79. March 1995.
5FM 101-5-1, Operational Terms and Graphics
FM 101-5-1, Operational Terms and Graphics.
(Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Department of Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Department
the Army, 30 September 1997) 1-130; FM 17-95, of the Army, 30 September 1997.
Cavalry Operations (Washington, D.C.: Head- Bibliography Patton, George S., Jr. War As I Knew It. Boston:
quarters, Department of the Army, 19 September Houghton Mifflin Company, 1947.
1991) 3-1. Adan, Avraham. On the Banks of the Suez. Jeru-
6Special salem, Israel: Edanim Publishers, 1979. Tzu, Sun. The Art of War. trans. Samuel B. Grif-
Study, 16. fith. London: Oxford University Press, 1963.
7Ibid.,
Center for Army Lessons Learned. Closing with
N30. the Enemy: Company Team Maneuver. Special RB 100-2, Vol. 1. “Selected Readings in Tactics,
8FM 71-1, Tank and Mechanized Infantry Com- Study. Fort Leavenworth, Kan.: U.S. Army The 1973 Middle East War.” Fort Leaven-
pany Team (Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Training and Doctrine Command [TRADOC], worth, Kan: U.S. Army Command and General
Department of the Army, 22 Nov 1988) 2-34. March 1998. Staff College, 1980.

50 ARMOR — September-October 2000

Platoon Leadership in the Offense
Recognizing the Line Between Actions on Contact and Maneuver

by Captain Celestino Perez

In preparing platoons for mounted

field training, trainers usually place
importance on a platoon’s ability to
approach battlefield problems in terms
of the seven forms of contact. Platoon
leaders have learned that for each form
of contact there exists a platoon battle
drill. But there is danger in assuming
that battle drills can always provide a
sufficient response to enemy contact,
particularly direct-fire contact.
My argument is that the defining re-
sponsibility of the tank platoon is not
the battle drill, but instead closing with
and destroying the enemy through ma-
neuver. Furthermore, the relations be- Photo by Greg Stewart
tween battle drills, actions on contact,
and maneuver can benefit from some 1-MTP, Final Draft 1998) grants a cen- toon leaders have capably conducted
study. One way to reach clarity about tral role to maneuver in the offense, as their intelligence preparation and de-
these matters is to train companies and does the latest edition of FM 17-15 termined that no direct-fire contact
platoons to establish a phase line (or a (April 1996). should be expected until the unit
probable line of deployment) that, reaches the PLD. Since our business
when crossed, will cause leaders to A summary of CALL’s approach to does not entail ideal conditions, contact
think no longer in terms of movement maneuver is in order. To know maneu-
ver is to understand that, in order to and action drills, along with tactical
formations and battle drills (namely formations, do serve their purpose. A
action and contact drills), but maneu- close with and destroy the enemy, formation is meant to enable the fastest
ver. forces must enter the enemy’s battle-
space not in formations, but using the movement possible toward the PLD, all
Some discussion of maneuver is nec- the while recognizing the minimal
bounding overwatch technique. Upon threat of direct-fire contact. Indeed, if a
essary. The recent material on maneu- receiving fire, the overwatch element
ver is illuminating. My first exposure to shifts into the suppression mode. The platoon encounters direct-fire contact,
the topic was a videotaped presentation e.g., a single AT system in the hills,
transition from bounding overwatch to then all soldiers in the unit — from the
entitled “Red Zone Brief,” given by suppression marks the transition from
then-COL James Grazioplene, former movement to maneuver. loader on D22 to the task force com-
chief of the Operations Group at the mander — should be properly sur-
National Training Center. This tape In the offense, this applies not only to prised. After all, the unit is receiving
was followed by an article from the the destruction of the enemy’s main direct-fire contact earlier than expected.
Center for Army Lessons Learned effort, but it applies (arguably more so) A properly chosen formation enables a
(CALL), entitled “Black 6, this is Red to the destruction of such elements as unit to respond satisfactorily to such
6...Contact...” The article, written in single anti-tank positions arrayed in surprises with an established weapons
two parts, can be found in CTC QB No. depth. The aim is not to run into the orientation. And, depending on the situ-
96-10. This article was followed by a enemy’s force, even a single anti-tank ation, a battle drill might be in order,
CALL Special Study entitled “Closing position, without proper overwatch and which would fulfill the first step of
with the Enemy — Company Team suppression, so that entire companies actions on contact, i.e., return fire.
Maneuver” (March 1998). Any armor and task forces are not destroyed by
The battle drill deserves closer atten-
or mechanized-infantry leader who has what should be a negligible force. tion. Battle drills enable a platoon to
not become familiar with these materi- react “when contact is made with small
als owes it to his unit to do so. Contact and Action Drills arms fire or when the platoon sights the
Prior to the PLD enemy without being engaged and does
In fact, Army doctrine has been a
Johnny Come Lately to the importance It is my contention that those in- not want to stop or slow its movement”
of maneuver, at least in its publications. stances when the use of contact and (FM 17-15, p. 3-33). I contend this
COL Grazioplene explained during his action drills are necessary are fewer enemy situation — and hence the need
briefing that even the Army’s doctrinal than commonly thought. Prior to cross- for the contact drill — will seldom
material was sorely deficient on the ing a probable line of deployment, no arise prior to the PLD. No rational, lone
subject. I have found that since his lec- direct-fire contact is expected. That is machine-gunner would engage even
ture, the revised company-level doc- because the combined efforts of the one tank with small-arms fire. Further-
trine (FM 71-1, 1998, and ARTEP 71- task force S2, commanders, and pla- more, the enemy holding the machine

ARMOR — September-October 2000 51

gun, after observing an approaching eyes (that is, those of every TC, gunner, Maneuver
formation of tanks, would most likely loader, and driver in the company) will
Once units cross the PLD, formations
remain hidden and call for indirect fire. be on the supposed location of the anti- cease and set-move drills begin in the
Since the contact drill allows the pla- tank system. With all eyes on the men-
toon to “engage the enemy without acing system, a second antitank system form of bounding overwatch. To begin
with, if task force commanders heed
changing its direction or speed of will undoubtedly exploit the company’s the Red Zone Brief, they will never
movement along an axis of advance,” failure to maintain 360-degree security
the platoon would best be advised to and will commence the slaughter. The order company teams to execute
bounding overwatch with another com-
either destroy the machine-gunner by upshot is that if the action drill is nec- pany (i.e., Alpha Team set, Bravo
using maneuver or maintain contact essary prior to the PLD, we are in bad
until handing off the target to another shape. So, our objective must be to Company bound) because from such a
scheme it is geometrically impossible
unit. In either case, the platoon leader minimize the instances when action for one company to provide effective
who continues to move without altering drills prior to the PLD are necessary
direction or speed should be fired. and focus on those things (IPB, secu- overwatch for another. Since our com-
pany commander is not doing a set-
The action drill, as distinguished from rity, sector discipline) that will negate move drill with another company, he
the chance of a pre-PLD slaughter.
the contact drill, is more useful, but it is has options. He can array his platoons
seldom employed effectively. Upon so all are conducting set-move drills
enemy contact, the action drill is meant Contact and Action Drills within the platoon (Alpha section set,
After the PLD
to “orient the...platoon’s frontal armor Bravo bound), or he may elect to have
toward the antitank fire while moving The use of a contact drill after the two platoons conducting set-move
to cover and concealment. If the pla- PLD is unlikely for the same reasons as drills with each other (Red set, Blue
toon cannot reach a covered and con- prior to crossing the PLD. That is, few bound) while one platoon is kept back
cealed position or achieve weapon rational machine-gunners would take to respond to contact as an enveloping
standoff, the platoon leader directs the on a tank, and no rational platoon force. Furthermore, the commander can
platoon to assault the enemy” (FM 17- leader would bypass even an unarmed give or withhold from his platoon lead-
15, p. 3-36). For this condition to arise, enemy without orders, for even this ers whether to bound by sections. Re-
the IPB of the S2, the commander, and enemy has the ability to report or call gardless of the levels at which bound-
the platoon leader must have failed, for indirect fire. In most instances, the ing overwatch is occurring, all over-
since it did not correctly depict the en- use of the action drill after the PLD is watch elements must realize that they
emy’s main or forward-deployed bat- both unnecessary and inadvisable be- are their partner’s keeper. That is, a
tlespace. Sadly, this scenario occurs cause the platoon will be conducting section or platoon that is providing
fairly regularly at the National Training either bounding overwatch or maneu- overwatch must not allow the bounding
Center. To make matters worse, the ver, both of which require the element element to take direct fire and suffer
action drill, which should have worked, to provide 360-degree security for a loss. The Grazioplene approach was to
fails for two reasons. Either the platoon moving element with the ability to fire assign a grade to the overwatching
leader failed, in his map reconnaissance upon every single area from which an element’s performance. An “A” goes to
or while on the move, to orient sectors antitank system might fire. The proper the overwatch element whose partner
of observation towards danger areas response to enemy contact, which is proceeds unscathed. An “F” goes to the
where an antitank system might lurk, or now expected since the platoon has overwatch element whose partner loses
a crewman failed to observe his sector. crossed the PLD, is to issue a fire two vehicles.
The antitank gunner will be able to fire command and recommend a course of
off two or three rounds without being action, all the while maintaining 360- The platoon leader and commander at
this point should no longer be thinking
detected, inevitably finding grille degree security to avoid a successful L- in terms of contact and action drills to
doors. And the antitank gunner’s work shaped ambush or main defense. The
is just beginning, because the possibil- platoon leader who proceeds after react to surprise conditions (which is
the case prior to the PLD), but of over-
ity of his destroying an entire company crossing the PLD must expect contact watch. His section or platoon will be
team or task force is likely. at every minute and perhaps be a little
disappointed when it has not yet ap- either the beneficiary of an overwatch
For this reason, it is critical that the or will be the element overwatching.
PLD be accurate and a soldier’s con- peared. During the overwatch, the platoon
cern for 360-degree security become One instance, however, that might re- leader must think about the next phase
instinctive. I stated earlier that the ac- quire an action drill is if a platoon is of the offensive engagement, which is
tion drill is seldom employed because, engaged from an area that is covered the transitional event that will trigger
in order for the drill to occur, someone only by visual scanning. In this in- actions on contact and, as soon as a
must locate the antitank system in order stance, it might be advisable to conduct course of action is set, maneuver. This
to orient his platoon’s frontal armor in an action drill to orient the platoon’s transitional event is the first (and ex-
its direction. But few platoons seem frontal slopes toward the enemy. How- pected) direct-fire enemy contact.
able to determine the general direction ever, a better trained platoon might
from which the fires come. Also, as- instead suppress the offending enemy Stated differently, once an overwatch
suming the enemy system is found, one with one or two tanks. This course of element fires a round in order to main-
also has to assume it is not alone. Just action would decrease the possibility of tain its “A” average in relation to the
as we try to establish a tactical “L” to an L-shaped ambush by not requiring bounding element, actions on contact
force the enemy to fight in two direc- all four tanks to re-orient frontal armor have begun. We are now in an adven-
tions, so does the enemy. If a platoon or in unison, thus leaving the maneuver ture that will at some point lead to the
— what is more likely — an entire element holding the bag without over- execution of a course of action. Once
company conducts an action drill, all watch or suppression. actions on contact lead to a course of

52 ARMOR — September-October 2000

action, all lessons on maneuver will maneuver. Depending on the mission, a livery of his operations order, during
have ensured that the foremost thought platoon may be asked: which he can expect to get as much
in leaders’ heads should be the race to
establish the “L,” i.e., a course of ac-
• To destroy the enemy by maneuver communication and control as he is
ever going to get.
(as described above) through set-
tion that will cause the enemy to fight move drills by section or crew One method that facilitates simple
in two directions. This concept is noth-
ing new. A familiar quotation from • Conduct a support by fire (SBF) plans is the company SOP, which de-
Patton’s War As I Knew It states: with all four tanks for another ma- termines the spatial relations between
neuver element the platoons, and company “plays” that
Whenever possible, beginning with establish those platoons that will set,
the squad, use a base of fire and ma- • Assault (on line) as part of the those platoons that will envelop, and
neuvering element. The maneuvering company assault or by itself (with the spatial relations between these ac-
element should be the larger of the or without overwatch/SBF) tions.
two forces, and should start its attack • Conduct an assault in column (non-
well back from the point of contact of doctrinal, but useful) to penetrate
the base of fire. The attacking force Support By Fire
the enemy’s defense or bypass en-
must proceed sufficiently far beyond emy contact The task of support by fire deserves
the hostile flank to attack from the
rear. As soon as the enveloping attack, • Conduct an attack by fire. some attention. The Red Zone Brief did
everyone a service by teaching that the
or better the rear attack, has pro- A good discussion awaits those lead- SBF force, prior to the friendly maneu-
gressed sufficiently to cause the enemy ers who sit down to determine those
to react, the base of fire transforms conditions that merit one of the five vering element’s getting into the pic-
ture, must have some enemy force as a
itself into a direct attack along the options more than the others. Neverthe- partner. In other words, an element
original axis of advance. less, it is the company team com-
mander’s responsibility to assign his cannot be in a support by fire until en-
In summary, prior to the PLD, forma- emy vehicles are in a gunner’s reticle.
tions are the proper approach, along platoons their tasks (hence the empha- Otherwise, the platoon or company
sis on the use of doctrinally correct
with the necessity of thinking in terms terms), while recognizing the need to given the support-by-fire mission, de-
of contact and action drills (although spite the mission statement, remains in
those are unlikely if good IPB and 360- maintain flexibility and perspective in a de facto movement to contact.
the planning and execution phase of the
degree security occur). After crossing engagement. Just as COL Grazioplene A couple of implications arise. First, a
the PLD, the unit shifts from forma-
tions to bounding overwatch, during described that the ideal graphic for a company team commander or platoon
company team in the offense is the leader given the task of establishing a
which time platoon leaders must ea- simple axis of advance (i.e., not a series support by fire must ask the following:
gerly anticipate that first contact which
will initiate actions on contact. The of SBF graphics), so should the com- Sir, suppose I get to the general loca-
pany team commander structure his tion of the SBF intent graphic and I
ideal result of actions on contact should plan to accommodate simple fragmen- find it an adequate place from which to
be a course of action that uses maneu-
ver, i.e., set-move drills, to establish an tary orders and flexibility. support, but there is no enemy — do I
have permission to continue until I en-
“L”. His plan must be simple. There is a counter enemy, even if I must move
notion that the loss of communication
two, or five, or ten kilometers farther?
What Might a Platoon Leader equates to a loss of control, and a loss
The answer will certainly depend upon,
Be Asked To Do? of control equates to the loss of com- among other things, whether the objec-
mand. I do not know whether I agree. I
Sometime during the race to develop shall posit, albeit not insistently, that a tive relates to an enemy- or terrain-
an L, the platoon leader and com- based mission. For example, it may be
mander will have to close with and commander must make his plan with determined that the objective in ques-
the assumption that communication
destroy the enemy. Ask a platoon will diminish as a mission continues. In tion is a good place from which to pro-
leader to imagine his role in the de- vide the task force with security during
struction of the enemy. Chances are he fact, there are some who write, and refueling operations, a necessity that
experience confirms, that in many in-
probably envisions an assault, whereby stances once an engagement is joined, a may or may not have been determined
his or his buddy’s platoon, with tanks prior to crossing the line of departure.
on line, charges across the objective commander will be able to affect the Since the element given the SBF task
battle not by constant decisions based
with guns blazing in an attempt to run on near-perfect or good information, determines that the maneuvering force
over the enemy. I believe the literature is not necessary to secure the objective,
on maneuver should do much to dispel but at only a few points with partial the SBF task transitions to an over-
information. For instance, with train-
this notion. Indeed, not only should ing, he may be able to order effectively watch task while the original maneuver
most offensive engagements not end force occupies the objective to protect
with a platoon-level assault, very few the shifting of his main effort (perhaps the refueling operation.
by moving his tank to the front of a
should. The reason is that maneuver platoon, which has become the new Another option is that the original
enables us to find, fix, and destroy the
enemy by attacking him from two di- main effort) or a change to the com- SBF element occupy the objective and
pany team’s mission (shouted repeat- provide the requisite security while the
rections without having to run him edly, to be sure, in bits and pieces into original maneuver force does some-
over.
his helmet until all acknowledge). The thing else. The point is not to issue or
I should like to emphasize the options commander’s job is most important accept the SBF task without putting to
available to the platoon during an of- during the designation and shifting of rest any lingering doubts in the precise
fensive engagement while conducting the main effort and the writing and de- meaning of the leader’s intent.

ARMOR — September-October 2000 53

 COMMANDER’S HATCH from Page 5
In this regard, the establishment of the Staff of the Army in the eye and ask
The second implication that arises is Armor Badge would likely result in a him a very poignant and relevant ques-
whether the SBF element is allowed to proliferation of badge proposals from tion, and I fully understand his reasons
establish an “L” during the execution of the other branches. If an Armor badge for feeling that a badge is warranted.
the SBF task. The company team were approved, what about the engi- As Chief of Armor, I think it’s my re-
commander may ask: Sir, if my platoon neers who are breaching obstacles in sponsibility to answer the force on this
gets to the general location of the SBF conjunction with the scouts — in front issue straight up. This subject is con-
intent graphic and I find it an adequate of the Armor force and exposed to di- troversial and will continue to be so.
place from which to support, and I en- rect and indirect fire? This initiative All arguments and points in this debate
counter enemy — do I have permission could result in a landslide of badge are meritorious and deserve considera-
to maneuver (remember, set-move requests, everyone of which would tion. I would appreciate hearing from
drills to establish an “L”) in the general state. “Look what I have above my anyone and will certainly take all views
location of my SBF position until the BDU pocket and what you don’t have.” aboard for further assessment. For the
maneuvering force arrives? Further- Is that really what we want in building time being, however, I do not support
more, may I recommend that I destroy cohesive warfighting teams? I hope not. the establishment of a Combat Armor
the enemy with company-level maneu- Badge.
ver if I discover the enemy is not as I believe the environment that led to
robust as we think it is now? The point the establishment of the Combat Infan- The staff here at the Armor Center
here is to envision units executing sup- try Badge in 1943, during World War continues to look at the potential for a
port by fire while not in a straight line. II, was very different than today. The competency-based evaluation akin to
Leaders in SBF must be able to take the Army required a larger influx of infan- the Expert Infantry Badge. This effort
initiative and recommend limited ma- trymen to offset a critical shortage and has merit, as it could provide a formal
neuver to better support the maneuver wanted to provide recognition for the capstone exercise focused on individ-
force or, perhaps, to proceed with clos- branch that was suffering the largest ual skills qualification that has been
ing with and destroying the enemy on number of casualties under the worst missing with the loss of the SQT.
his own, thereby relieving the original conditions. I respect the CIB and those Given the intensity of our current mis-
maneuver force of its mission. who have earned it. The appropriate- sion sets, I don’t think this is the right
ness of the CIB is not in my lane. How- time to put an Expert Armor Badge on
Conclusion ever, today we train and fight in com- the table. Nonetheless, the notion of
bined arms formations with mutually an EAB is something worth serious
The preceding comments are meant to supportive missions. The reach of en- consideration.
raise interest in the employment of emy weapons systems leaves no one
company teams in the offense. Al- As always, I look forward to hearing
protected and puts most of the brigade from the force on this or any other issue
though I have written nothing that is combat team’s members into a direct
above argument, I do insist that discus- fire engagement area. relevant to the branch.
sions on such topics as battle drills,
actions on contact, and maneuver will I honor the warrior NCO who dis- FORGE THE THUNDERBOLT
be fruitful and will help clarify ques- played the courage to look the Chief of AND STRIKE FIRST!
tions and stir imagination, particularly
in the methods by which we train pla-
toons and companies. I also contend
that those training techniques that bring
to the forefront the criticality of intelli-
Army Officers Operate Web Site
gence preparation and maneuver will
pay enormous dividends. To be sure,
For Company Commanders
dismounted training enables leaders to
Eight Army officers have founded a web site dedicated to improving com-
complete their brain-work and soldiers
pany-level leadership in the Army. Their web site — CompanyCommand.com
to hone proper habits prior to the first
— serves as a clearinghouse of good ideas for company, troop, and battery
mounting of a tank.
commanders.
The web site is a user-driven forum in which former and current company
CPT Celestino Perez Jr. graduated commanders share their best ideas, products, and lessons learned to benefit
from the U.S. Military Academy in current and future company commanders. The goal of the web site is to im-
1992 with a B.S. degree in Political prove institutional knowledge at the company level of Army leadership by im-
proving the lateral flow of information.
Science. His previous assignments
include: tank platoon leader, mortar Founded in February, the web site has been received enthusiastically by of-
platoon leader, and company ex- ficers in the field. The number of “hits” on CompanyCommand.com has in-
ecutive officer, 3-66 Armor, Ft. creased steadily, from 11,114 hits in February to 44,831 hits in April and
Hood, Texas; G3 asst. operations 78,451 hits in June.
officer; 1st Brigade, 1st ID asst. op- The eight officers, all of whom are assigned to the staff and faculty at the
erations officer; and company U.S. Military Academy, run the web site during their off-duty hours without
commander, D/2-34 Armor, Ft. Ri- remuneration. “Our sole focus is on helping leaders to grow great units and
ley, Kansas. He is an AOAC gradu- soldiers,” said Majors Nate Allen and Tony Burgess, infantry officers who are
the site’s co-founders.
ate. Currently, he commands HHC/
2-34 Armor at Ft. Riley.

54 ARMOR — September-October 2000

 HistoryChannel.com Launches Veterans.com
LETTERS Using the power of the Internet to bring Additionally, Veterans.com features war-
from Page 4 together veterans, their friends and fami- related discussion forums, information on
lies, HistoryChannel.com has launched veterans-related topics, and links to a vast
by the top to level with us that is the Veterans.com (http://www.veterans.com), range of military services and veterans
primary cause for young officers and an online portal for the veteran community organizations.
NCOs leaving the service in record dedicated to preserving the experiences of
numbers. If you cannot trust the top, men and women who served in the mili- “The veteran community is one of our na-
there is nothing left. tary. tion’s most crucial educational resources,
and we wanted to ensure that veterans’
Good for you to publish this review. To celebrate the launch, HistoryChan- individual memories and experiences were
Now, what may come next? I expect nel.com is donating computers and cable preserved in a forum accessible by every-
the Navy is looking for good looking modem Internet access to Vet Centers one,” said Todd Tarpley, Vice President of
blondes to staff their submarines, the around the country. The donations, which AETN Interactive.
Air Force for more Kelly Flynns. The began on Memorial Day, will continue
Marines seem to be the only service “The active, dedicated veteran discussion
throughout the summer and are in partner- group on HistoryChannel.com showed us
that is trying to deal with this issue ship with local cable affiliates.
with some honesty... Women as tank that veterans and their friends and families
commanders? As long as the Navy is needed a place online exclusively for them,
A hallmark feature of Veterans.com is the where they can share resources and dis-
intent on putting women on their “veterans locator” database that allows
boats, how can Armor long resist cuss issues. Veterans.com aims to live up
visitors to search for veterans by name, to this demand,” he added.
women in tanks? Are they not, boats nickname, hometown, or service back-
and tanks, both enclosed structures?... ground. To mark the launch, Senator John McCain
GEORGE G. EDDY participated in a live online chat on May 25,
COL, USA-Ret. The not-for-profit site also boasts eyewit- 2000 on Veterans.com. McCain discussed
Austin, Texas ness service accounts and a profile of a his experiences as a Vietnam prisoner of
“veteran of the month” nominated by site war, and offered his thoughts on veterans’
visitors. current concerns.

Bradley Exhibit Opens This Fall

At the National Infantry Museum
by Diane L. Urbina

The National Infantry Museum (NIM) at Ft. with supporting documentation. It will explain M242 25mm Bushmaster cannon, M257
Benning, Ga., is developing a new Bradley to visitors the Bradley mission, doctrine, smoke grenade launcher, M240C coaxial
Fighting Vehicle (BFV) exhibit (outdoor and training, and organization. More importantly, 7.62mm machine gun, M321 5.56mm firing
indoor) scheduled to open in November. The the display will include accounts by former port weapon, training ammunition, infantry
museum is in Building 396, Baltzell Avenue, and current program participants, including squad equipment, TOW missile, M47 Drag-
on Ft. Benning’s main post. It is one of the combat developers, materiel developers, and on, and SINCGARS radio system.
largest military museums in the country, industry representatives, of how the Bradley
The Museum continues to seek Bradley
housing a collection of more than 25,000 was developed, tested, fielded, and up-
items in 30,000 square feet of exhibit space. graded over the last 20 years. documentation (photos, videotape, signifi-
cant program documents, newspaper arti-
Visitors to the museum will have a first- The Bradley, as one of the “Big Five” post- cles) for donation to the exhibit. We are par-
hand opportunity to see a Bradley Infantry Vietnam weapon systems, has had some ticularly interested in information regarding
Fighting Vehicle (IFV) up-close, in an out- interesting and unique twists and turns in its development of the MICV by Pacific Car and
door exhibit, featuring the M2A1 and an development. Following the Vietnam War, Foundry; the three Task Force Reports (Ca-
engineering prototype of the M2A3. The the U.S. Army was undergoing radical reor- sey, Crizer, and Larkin); the cannon “shoot-
Bradley was developed to accommodate ganization and significant changes in doc- off” between Hughes Helicopter Company
“block” improvements, with the M2A1 incor- trine, training and tactics. During these criti- and Ford Aeroneutronic Corporation; live fire
porating the first of these, an improved TOW cal changes, and despite a massive Soviet testing and test reports; and first-hand ac-
antitank missile system and a better chemi- build-up of its armored force, the Army counts of the Bradley’s performance during
cal protection system. The M2A3 features struggled to justify the greatly increased cost Desert Storm. If you have documentation for
numerous improvements in lethality and of replacing its infantry armored personnel donation (which will not be returned), or
survivability. carrier with a much more expensive true stories you would like to share regarding
infantry fighting vehicle. It was against this development of the Bradley, please forward
The indoor BFV exhibit, “Lethal Beyond All setting that the Bradley was designed, de- to:
Expectations,” will be the single largest ex- veloped, and produced. Visitors will gain rare
hibit in the museum. This exhibit marks the insight regarding the Bradley project’s cost, U.S. Army Tank-automotive and
first time a major weapon system and the schedule, and performance trade-offs. Armaments Command
story of its development will be featured in a Bldg 229
U.S. military museum. In addition to equip- The exhibit will feature newspaper articles, SFAE-GCSS-W-BV (Attn: Diane Urbina)
ment and displays, the exhibit will provide a photographs, videos and displays grouped Warren, MI 48397-5000
comprehensive overview of how the system by events in the program life-cycle. Some of
was developed from 1968 to the present, the equipment displayed will include the Email: [email protected]

ARMOR — September-October 2000 55

SHARPENING THE SPEARHEAD:

Digital Courseware Offers New Opportunities

For Training and Self-Development
by Captain Dan Dwyer

Major John Doe served with distinc- work has been done for him and is tionary approach towards delivering its
tion as a foreign area officer in a remote available anytime, anywhere. courseware. Its distance learning (DL)
country for two years and was recently program utilizes customized, web-
assigned as the XO of an armor battal- Your unit is preparing for a Combat enabled software platforms that are
Training Center (CTC) rotation or real
ion. Having been away from troops for a world deployment and is being chal- available to be incorporated into a unit’s
while, he recognized a need to develop training program or your own profes-
or fine-tune his doctrinal skills. He also lenged with finding enough time to train sional development. The principal DL
its staff well. How can a brigade/battal-
aspires to implement an effective Battle ion XO or S3 use existing technology to course being delivered from Fort Knox
Staff training program in his organiza- is the Armor Captains Career Course-
tion that uses innovative techniques and train highly proficient battle staffs and Distance Learning (AC³-DL). This
battle captains?
leverages today’s technology. How can course delivers complex cognitive in-
MAJ Doe get up to speed fast? By using Internet-delivered, perform- struction to geographically dispersed
ance-oriented training that focuses spe- students in a way that has never before
By accessing the Internet, MAJ Doe
can explore cutting-edge, distance-learn- cifically on training battle captains — a been possible.
topic that has been given cursory men-
ing courseware, offered by the Armor tion, at best, in our doctrinal publica- The Armor School is committed to
School, which uses a full range of mul- sharing its distance learning courses
timedia technology, including streaming tions. The Armor School has Internet- with other TRADOC schools, Active
based instruction that addresses a scope
audio and video, that dramatically illus- of different learning styles (visual, kin- Component units, individual soldiers,
trates the key concepts of the military and allied International Military Offi-
decision-making process (MDMP), Ar- esthetic, and auditory) and a wide vari- cers. Our vision is that in the near future,
ety of subject matter (for example, intel-
my operations, and other staff actions. ligence preparation of the battlefield active duty soldiers and units with .mil
addresses will have access to this
Captain Jones, a recent Armor Cap- (IPB), combat support (CS), and combat courseware much like accessing the
tains Career Course (AC³) graduate, service support (CSS) integration).
serving as an S3 Air or company com- Reimer Army Digital Training Library
An Allied international military student (ADTL) and other military educational
mander, has been tasked by his battalion finds out that he has been hand-picked sites.
commander to give an officer profes-
sional development (OPD) session on to attend AC³ during the next year at For more information on AC³-DL or
Fort Knox, and he wants to show up at
direct fire planning to the other officers the course well prepared. How can he the Armor School’s Distance Learning
in his battalion. How can CPT Jones Program, contact:
deliver this OPD using materials found prepare himself for the unknown?
CPT Dan Dwyer, Subject Matter Ex-
in the FM 71-series doctrinal publica- In the foreseeable future, international pert, (502) 624-7699/DSN 464-7699 or
tions and other references that have officers from countries who routinely
broached this topic in the past? send their best officers to Fort Knox for [email protected]

Available to CPT Jones is web-based, world-class training may have access to CPT Chet Guyer, AGR Course Advi-
our distance-learning courseware to gain sor, (502) 624-7601/DSN 464-7601, or
visually animated courseware that dem- a familiarization with our doctrine and [email protected]
onstrates tactics, techniques and proce-
dures of such fundamentals with greater staff processes prior to arriving at Fort Mr. George Paschetto, Technical Advi-
Knox.
fidelity and effectiveness than a white- sor, (502) 624-4708/DSN 464-4708, or
board could. By using Fort Knox-based The U.S. Army Armor School has [email protected]
instruction, CPT Jones can prepare his made groundbreaking advancements in
Dr. Connie Wardell, Educational Advi-
brief in less time than it would take to information technology by pairing prov- sor, (502) 624-5591/DSN 464-5591, or
create a PowerPoint presentation. The en educational techniques with a revolu-
[email protected]

Captain Daniel Dwyer has served

The More Things Change... as a tank platoon leader, tank com-
pany XO, scout platoon leader, and
“A recent survey of a tank battalion at Fort Hood showed that only 17 percent of battalion maintenance officer with
the crews had been together more than six months. That fact is not unusual. Per- 2nd Battalion, 35th Armor, 4ID (M);
sonnel turbulence is so bad we don’t really have crew training — it’s more like as S4, 3rd Brigade, 1ID, and com-
individual training with hasty assembly for the gunnery season. For years, we pany commander of both A Com-
blamed this on the Vietnam War. We are now three years into a peacetime Army, pany and HHC, 1st Battalion, 63rd
yet the problem still exists — it’s time to correct the problem...” Armor, Vilseck, Germany. He re-
-LTC (later BG) John C. Bahnsen, ARMOR Jan-Feb 1976 cently served as a Small Group In-
structor in 3rd Squadron, 16th Cav-
alry at Fort Knox, Ky.
56 ARMOR — September-October 2000
When Close Air Support Grew Distant
Contributions in Military History Number
25: A Hollow Threat: Strategic Air
Power and Containment Before Korea
by Harry R. Borowski; Greenwood Press,
Westport, Conn.; 1982; 242 pages;
$53.40 (CAC Book Store, Ft. Leaven-
worth, Kan.).
Officers in Flight Suits: The Story of
American Air Force Fighter Pilots in
the Korean War by John Darrell Sher-
wood; New York University Press; 1996;
239 pages; $22.90 (CAC Book Store, Ft.
Leavenworth, Kan.).
Crimson Sky: The Air Battle for Korea
(Unfortunately, the latter book is in Russian Navy jet fighters could intercept even the
by John R. Bruning, Brassey’s; Dulles,
and there is not much hope of seeing it trans- then-new B-36 very heavy bomber far out at
Va.; 1999; 232 pages; $24.95 (Barnes lated into English.) sea and shoot it down. This challenge was
and Noble). quietly turned aside by the Air Force, and with
When the USAF was created as a separate
Natovskiye Yastreby v Pritselye Sta- the resulting discovery of the Navy twisting the
service in 1947, it was ill-prepared to meet its
facts in the “Revolt of the Admirals” was con-
linskikh Sokolov: Sovetskiye Letchiki new tasks as the strategic bombing arm of the signed to the back shelf of history.
na Zashchitye Neba Kitaya i Korei new Department of Defense. Most of its WWII
(1950-1951) (NATO’s Hawks in the personnel had mustered out, and many of its While the Navy tended to look to highly edu-
Sights of Stalin’s Falcons: Soviet Fliers new recruits were mentally substandard. An cated officers to train as pilots, the Air Force
in the Protection of the Skies of China official policy which stated that all personnel was still preferring the “good old boy” from the
will be pilots, and no special staff officers were country, as he was more likely to be trained to
and Korea 1950-1951) by Vitaliy P.
to be trained and fielded to units, resulted in a take the type of risks the Air Force saw as
Naboka, Soviet Kuban Publishing, Kras- force in chaos and at very low standards of
nodar, Russia; 1999; 238 pages, $26.95 necessary. As a result, in 1950 the Air Force
readiness. Only two bombardment groups had the least well educated officer corps of
(East View Publications) (In Russian). were capable of delivering nuclear weapons, any of the services. The Air Force pressed
While doing research on the 32nd Armored and not all of those personnel were up to greater stress on piloting skills and aggressive
Regiment’s combat trail during WWII, I was speed. behavior than it did on intellectual skills, and
amazed to see how close the cooperation had Politically, however, the USAF was pushing as a result anyone who did not fly as aggres-
been between the 3rd Armored Division’s the doctrine of strategic daylight bombardment sively as generals such as LeMay thought
units and fighter-bombers from the 9th Air with nuclear weapons as the only military they should wound up being forced out for
Force. It appears that each combat command strategy needed by the United States. This did “FOF” — fear of flying. Pilots thus tended to
had at least four P-47s up on station and on not play well with the USAF in such disarray, do what they were told, and thought little
call during daylight hours for most of their and it was only after the replacement of key about the consequences.
drive across France, and that the P-47s were general officers with people like Hoyt Vanden-
very good at nailing the ground targets picked berg as CSAF and Curtis LeMay as com- When the Korean War broke out in June
out by the 3AD forward observers and relayed mander, SAC, that things began to change. 1950, the USAF and the Navy both responded
back to the aircraft. But when looking through But at the same time, the Air Force began to the challenge at once. But too many USAF
the war in Korea, and then Vietnam and the really pressing for new aircraft and more planners had made too many assumptions,
Gulf War, this cooperation seems to slowly money, manpower, and a premiere place in and while the USAF basically wiped out three-
disappear and eventually turn up totally miss- determining U.S. military strategy. quarters of the North Koreans’ propeller-
ing. The turning point seems to have been in driven air force in less than three months, they
Korea, where the USAF went from performing There is an old “Inside the Beltway” saying were totally unprepared for what happened in
pinpoint strikes to simply carrying out either that the three major services follow the rule of November 1950 when the Soviet Union cov-
area missions — Battlefield Air Interdiction — the three Ds: the Air Force is devious, the ertly began flying air defense over the rem-
or strikes on strategic targets in support of Navy is deceitful, and the Army is dumb. In nants of the Democratic Peoples’ Republic of
combat. Only the Navy and USMC air ele- 1948-49, this was quite true, and as a result, Korea. The MiG-15 was a nasty surprise, far
ments showed that they could carry out preci- the Air Force was able to present sufficient superior to anything then in the air in Asia. Six
sion close air support missions. material to Congress and the lackluster Secre- weeks later, the USAF placed its own best
tary of Defense, Louis Johnson, to get the fighter, the F-86 Sabre, up against the MiG-
Reading these four books in sequence gives funding and assets they needed. The Navy 15.
a good reason to understand the change balked at this, and eventually began what
which took place in USAF thinking, and why. became known as the “Revolt of the Admirals” The true results of the air war in Korea have
The third one gives a balanced view of what over vesting so much money and so many unfortunately transcended into myth, created
took place in Korea, and the desire and skills assets with the USAF. The Navy felt confident by flacks and other pro-USAF writers who
of the Naval air crews in carrying out the pre- that they could carry out the nuclear delivery loudly proclaimed that the Air Force had es-
cision missions needed to provide direct sup- mission from carriers, particularly the new tablished air superiority over Korea. The real-
port. The last one presents a Soviet (now USS United States supercarrier, and that the ity of what happened does not match those
Russian) view of what happened in Korea USAF was misleading the public with its ex- claims, and the seeds of decline in the close
between June 1950 and July 1951, and clears travagant claims. One admiral challenged the air support business grew from that war and
up many of the myths of the Korean Air War. Air Force to “bomb” Hawaii, as he boasted his its results.

ARMOR — September-October 2000 57

 First of all, the USAF did not bring its pre- ing jet fighter. The USAF claims 27 MiGs were and 308 “operational non-combat” losses. A
miere close support aircraft to Korea. The shot down by B-29s and dozens more dam- total of 218 Sabres were lost due to all
propeller-driven P-47s were left behind, and aged, but the Russian archives indicate only causes, including accidents.
were being phased out of service. The plane one which may have succumbed to bomber
they did send, the F-51D Mustang, had defensive fires. Both sides began to count claims rather than
proven itself as a good fighter in Europe, but validated kills toward the end of the war. Any
was not as effective as the P-47. Still, in the Reporting tended to get more inventive, fo- MiG which was shot up and seen to be leav-
early days of the conflict, F-51s carried the cusing nearly exclusively on the air-to-air ing gray smoke or vapor trails from its engine
bulk of the USAF close air support and BAI battle rather than the air-to-ground results. For was counted as a kill, even though the Soviets
missions, and did good work, but they were example, claims for the first year of the air war indicated that the engine was very durable
more vulnerable to ground fire than the P-47. indicate “over 200 MiGs” were shot down by and would get the pilot back with an amazing
And once the MiGs were introduced, the F- USAF pilots. Russian archives indicate 33 amount of damage. Likewise, Soviet pilots
51s could do little but try and get out to the MiGs lost in air-to-air combat and two more in who fired at Sabres and saw a long streak of
Yellow Sea/Gulf of Korea before the MiGs accidents. They claim 233 U.S. aircraft shot black smoke come from the tailpipe also
could catch them. In contrast, the Navy and down, but there is no accurate version of what counted them as kills. The Soviets did not
was actually lost to refute that number. realize that this was normal for a Sabre’s GE
USMC brought their WWII-era F4U Corsairs
and AD Skyraiders with them, and they engine at full throttle, which is where it was
What is also overlooked is how the MiGs when the pilot found himself under attack!
proved excellent at the job, causing most of were deployed and fought. MiG priorities
the close air support damage. One Chinese were: strategic bombers, fighter-bombers, and The bottom line from Korea, reflected in the
commander (who was retired shortly after then fighters, in that order. Very snide com- results of ground combat, were that the USAF
making this comment) indicated that the PLA ments by USAF pilots of MiGs running away could effectively prosecute none of the mis-
took 300,000 KIA and nearly one million WIA ignore the fact that the MiGs were focusing on sions it had touted as its field of excellence.
in Korea, most of which he attributed to the fighter-bombers and B-29s. The combat re- Strategic bombing was a bust; air superiority
“blue” aircraft. ports of the MiG pilots indicate a very clear only possible for a short period of time over
concept of mission and desire to prosecute the target, if at all; and mediocre results from
A second factor was that the USAF insisted
attacks on USAF aircraft, forcing many mis- its CAS and BAI missions. The Navy and
on using early jet fighter-bombers in Korea,
sions to dump their bombs and run for the Marines came away from Korea as skilled
and they were not well-suited to CAS or BAI.
water. Due to Stalin’s paranoia that the par- practitioners of the art, and with an eye to-
A key reason was their range: they flew from
ticipation of his units in Korea would be un- wards the future. But the USAF myth caught
bases in Japan and as a result could carry
covered, MiGs were ordered to fly no further on, and to this day many Air Force writers
only a tiny amount of ordnance to place on
south than Pyongyang (when it was in Com- solemnly believe that the USAF was the
target. Pilots were also loathe to “gut it out”
munist hands) nor over the water on either dominant power in Korea.
and get down within range of the high concen-
coast of Korea. U.S. air crews figured this out,
tration of ground AA defenses. Navy and The reality of the war would tend to support
and until the Chinese began to put reasonably
Marine pilots did so far more often, and took more like a 1:1 loss ratio in actual aerial com-
qualified formations of MiG pilots into the air in
the losses. (Crimson Skies also has one of the bat. Pesky items like a list of U.S. POW/MIA
late 1951, this remained a “time out” area for
best accounts of the tragic death of Ensign personnel shows a number of F-84 and F-86
crews under attack.
Jesse L. Brown, the first African-American pilots shot down in aerial combat on days
Naval aviator, who died when his F4U Corsair Finally, losses on both sides were “adjusted” when the USAF officially admitted no losses.
crashed after being hit by rifle fire. Why no and changed to suit the views of specific au- The USAF came out of Korea with its “fighter
one has made a film of this incident is beyond diences at home. The USAF has long claimed jock” mentality in the ascendant, and a total
me.) a 13:1 kill ratio in Korea. The way this was whitewash of the failure of both its strategic
A third factor was that the USAF concept of figured was like this: the USAF admitted to and tactical bombing policy. After Korea, the
strategic daylight bombing failed. The MiG-15 only 58 F-86E losses in air-to-air combat as USAF worked hard at cultivating its image as
showed it could easily penetrate fighter opposed to 792 claims against MiGs, which aerial superiority via fighter dominance, while
screens and attack propeller-driven bombers. results in a ratio of 13.6:1. However, these CAS and BAI took a back seat, and even in
The Soviets claimed 69 B-29 bombers during admitted F-86E losses were limited to those Vietnam were not pressed as capabilities.
the course of the war (the USAF admits 17, which met USAF criteria: They had to take The Air Force was more effective at CAS in
and then claims most of them were lost to flak; place (a) in aerial combat (b) over the target Vietnam than in Korea, primarily due to the
but one needs to realize that the air crews area and (c) result in a clear-cut shoot-down adoption of the Navy-designed F-4 Phantom,
referred to the cannon fire from the MiG-15 as of the aircraft by an enemy aircraft. Anything which was a true multi-role aircraft. The de-
“Horizontal Flak” due to its size and amount of else would be considered either a non-combat velopment of the A-10 “Warthog” held promise
damage inflicted). This successively forced operational loss, non-combat loss, or aircraft that the USAF was going to seriously get back
the USAF to night bombing with radar, then loss due to unknown reasons. These included into the WWII role it did so well. But both be-
night bombing in heavy cloud cover. As a aircraft which were shot down due to antiair- fore and after the Gulf War — where the lowly
result, the strategic bombing campaign proved craft fire or which were so badly shot up in A-10 shone as the USAF’s only true tank killer
little and accounted for only what minuscule combat that they crashed in the Gulf of Ko- — the USAF was again touting its fighters as
industries the North Koreans had developed. rea/Yellow Sea area or on their way back to fighter-bombers and conducting CAS from 12-
their bases. When the numbers for all of these 15,000 feet. The results from Kosovo show
A fourth factor, due to the problems with “other” losses are examined — and there is that the USAF is still adhering to its beliefs,
fighter-bombers and with strategic bombing, no way to separate out many actual air-to-air even when the reality of “CAS from 15,000
and a constant pressure from the American losses from the other three — the numbers feet” shows errant bombing of civilian targets
press on USAF failures in Korea, there was a change drastically. The Soviets admitted 334 and only three confirmed tank kills. Until the
change in the approach to how the USAF air-to-air losses and the Chinese a further USAF realizes its erroneous thinking, the
dealt with the press and its image. Recent 231, for a total admitted air-to-air loss of 565. image frozen in time from Korea will remain its
accounts from USAF personnel indicate that, (Korean numbers are not known, partially elusive, and unobtainable, goal.
at the time, no one wanted to tell General because of ridiculous KPAF claims of no
LeMay that his strategic fighter escort for his losses versus 8,000 aircraft shot down in air- CW2 (Ret.) Stephen “Cookie” Sewell en-
bombers — the Republic F-84 Thunderjet — to-air combat.) The Soviets claimed 1,097 tered the Army in 1968 as an Army Security
could neither fight with nor repulse a deter- aircraft in air-to-air combat and the Chinese a Agency Linguist, retiring in 1990. He is cur-
mined attack by the MiGs. They also did not further 271, or 1,367 total air-to-air claims. The rently an analyst for the National Ground Intel-
know how to point out that the defensive fire USAF admits to only 137 air-to-air losses, but ligence Agency. He holds a BA in English
control onboard the B-29s and other bombers the other admissions include 447 due to Literature from the Regents College, Univer-
could not compensate for nor track an incom- “ground fire,” 68 “unknown” combat losses, sity of the State of New York.

58 ARMOR — September-October 2000

Chechnya’s Grim Sequel:
David and Goliath Square Off in Round Two
The War in Chechnya by Stasys Knezys Terror as a method of war, clearing popula- Wall] had prolonged World War II in the west
and Romanas Sedlickas, Texas A&M tion zones to prevent the enemy from using by half a year, and the cost in Allied dead had
University Press, College Station, Texas; the people, war carried into cyberspace to been greater than the U.S. Army alone suf-
sustain the morale of the home front and to fered in ten years of war in Korea and Viet-
1999; 359 pages; $32.95 (hardcover).
demonize the enemy, all of this is unsettling to nam.” The elaborate defensive line incorpo-
a conventional soldier raised in the Cold War. rated the best of France’s Maginot Line (a
I found myself paging back and forth through This book really made me think about future linear defense design with supporting fires)
this book, about the first war in Chechnya, as I conflicts we may face as the little wars on the but avoided the weaknesses (single line of
watched the second — and still ongoing — fringes of old empires boil over into regions defense with zero air defense capability). It
war in Chechnya on CNN. The book was that directly affect our vital national interests. was a fortified defense-in-depth which was
written by Stasys Knezys, a retired colonel of tied in with natural obstacles. These charac-
the Soviet Union’s Air Defense Forces, and The final chapters, which detail lessons
teristics made it impossible to flank (thereby
Mr. Sedlickas, a former major in the U.S. Air learned through analysis of both sides, are
avoiding the Maginot Line outcome) and, most
Force, and it is an amazingly impartial analy- extremely disturbing. While slow to open, this
importantly, made it feasible to man with sec-
sis of what went on in Chechnya between book must be studied by serious students of
ond- or third-rate troops, thus freeing crack
October 1994 and November 1997. My reac- war. Buy it, read it, think, and read it again. I
troops for employment in other, more critical,
tion to the book, reading it while watching was constantly reminded of what General Lee areas.
Chechnya War 2, was that the Federal Rus- said at Fredericksburg: it is good that war is
sian Army was using this book as a guide on so terrible lest we grow too fond of it. This The book strikes me as falling into an area of
what would work and what would not. book describes a new type of warfare that we “military history” between dry reference mate-
must learn how to deter, because if we fight it, rial and historical novel (the author manages
The book portrays a very ugly war. There is we may have to become as savage as our to combine historical accounts with battle
no standoff, precision-guided, clean combat enemies in order to set the conditions for our descriptions, excessive references to Ernest
detailed here; rather, it is a conflict more like victory. And we will have to figure out how to Hemingway, and even a Grimm Brothers fairy
World War II, our fathers’ or grandfathers’ war. justify to the world the means we employed to tale.) It shouldn’t be confused with purist mili-
I got a real feel for the conditions both sides reach our ends. tary history (the “footnotes” which appear at
faced. The authors very convincingly show us the conclusion of each chapter are anecdotal
that the Russian Goliath was not as clumsy as KEVIN C.M. BENSON
in nature and not citations in the Turabian
we thought, and that the Chechen David was LTC, Cavalry
format.) The reader is asked to take as his-
not nearly as noble as we thought. 3-8 Cavalry
torical truth too many uncited references to
Fort Hood, Texas
The book develops a neo-Clausewitzian alleged facts; for example, at one point the
view of war in this postmodern age. The trinity author, attempting to emphasize the success
of the state, the people, and the army is rele- WEST WALL: The Battle For Hitler’s of the defense of the West Wall in delaying
vant, but is also supplemented by a new trinity Siegfried Line September 1944-March advancing Allied units, claims that Eisenhower
of politics, the military, and terror. This is a not only would have welcomed a German
1945 by Charles Whiting; Combined Pub-
very disturbing idea, but an accepted form of attack into the Ardennes as a means of not
lishing, Conshohocken, Pa.; 2000; 199 having to deal with the West Wall, but that he
war used by the Chechens — terror as a
means to an end. The end, which led to the
pages; $27.95. knew it was coming. And this without the
hiatus in the war in 1997, justified the means Charles Whiting has written the first in a se- benefit of a footnote.
of terror, which made the conditions for victory ries of nine volumes of WWII military history to That observation having been made, Mr.
so costly that the Russians made terms. Poli- be published by Combined Publishing be- Whiting has succeeded in putting a dog-tired
tics clearly drove the objectives of the war. tween now and Autumn 2002. He implies that GI face on this horrific battle, and I look for-
Terror, in Chechnya War 1, was judiciously this may be the first look at what until now ward to subsequent additions to this series. In
applied, in the eyes of the Chechens. Terror in military historians have considered to have sum, I recommend this book as an addition to
Chechnya War 2 appears to be overused and been little more than “…a series of separate a military historian’s collection of WWII refer-
made the conditions for victory more palatable engagements, only tenuously linked.” His ences as a human interest work, and not a
to the Russian government and people. work describes the construction of, and battle citable reference work.
over, the German Siegfried Line. Whiting
Information operations are analyzed. The DAVID P. CAVALERI
informs the reader of his thesis early in the
Chechens capitalized on their perceived role LTC, Armor
foreword: “…the battle [“The Battle for Hitler’s
of underdog, fighting a tough battle for free- Ft. Leavenworth, Kan.
Siegfried Line”] [was not only] the most impor-
dom against a tottering imperialistic giant bent
tant of the 1944-5 campaign against Ger-
on retaining a vestige of empire. They used
many, but …it was the key battle of the entire The Eyes of Orion: Five Tank Lieuten-
web sites, faxes, media access, and the brutal
war in the west.” One could reasonably expect ants in the Persian Gulf War by Alex
nature of the war as reinforcing fire against
that, after a statement such as that, the author
the Russians. The Russians never really had
would provide documentation to back such a
Vernon with Rob Holmes, Greg Downey,
a chance in this supporting operation to the Neal Creighton and Dave Trybula; Fore-
claim. That is, unfortunately, not the case. But
campaign. Clearly, in War 2, the Russians are word by Barry R. McCaffrey; Kent State
if the reader understands this up front, then
doing a much better job. I visited a Russian the book is a remarkably enjoyable read. University Press; 1999; 360 pages, hard-
web site on the war which portrayed the Che- cover; $35.00.
chens as criminals and terrorists. The series Whiting describes the West Wall (aka the
of bomb attacks in Moscow and other Russian “Siegfried Line”) as the German equivalent to Most officers eventually begin a professional
cities certainly assisted this effort of making the French Maginot Line, but with fundamen- library. It may start accidentally with random
the enemy look like criminals. tally different results: “The battle [for the West purchases at the Post Exchange or with

ARMOR — September-October 2000 59

books left over from college. With time and quote from General Stilwell at the beginning of West Point classmates of the class of 1877
experience, the choices become more refined. Once an Eagle in mind, if an officer doubts his were assigned to black regiments and posted
Certain books form the foundation of many of abilities, is he then automatically unfit to lead to the frontier, where they lived, worked,
these professional libraries. The Killer Angels, soldiers? With Vernon, this does not seem to trained, scouted and fought against Indians
Platoon Leader, Company Commander are be accurate. His self-doubts seemed more the and other marauders of the then-untamed and
early additions. Later, titles like We Were natural response of a young man facing one not so glorious West. Kinevan captures a
Soldiers Once and Young… and Once an of life’s most daunting responsibilities: leading basic body of history and experience, from the
Eagle are added and, in the case of the latter, soldiers into battle. Whether this is an in- education of a young officer through his trials,
read and reread. These thoughts come to stance of excessive criticism or a matter of tribulations, and ever-broadening awareness
mind when one reads the recently published, competence is for the reader to ponder. as an Army officer stationed in Texas. Bigelow
The Eyes of Orion: Five Tank Lieutenants in is challenged by the demands of the Indian
the Persian Gulf War. Not only is it a fine per- Officer retention is another topic, relevant to Wars, leading and training black soldiers and
sonal memoir, but it is as worthy an addition to today’s Army, that is featured in Eyes of Orion. living in a very Victorian society. Although this
a professional library as the titles listed above. Four of the five authors have left the Army, book is set over 120 years ago, Bigelow’s
some very soon after the war. In their descrip- thoughts, opinions and basic experiences
Eyes of Orion recounts the experiences of tions of how and why they left the Army, one parallel those of many junior leaders through-
five armor lieutenants serving in the 24th In- detects a glimmer of regret and self-justi- out history.
fantry Division (M) during Operation Desert fication. They expressed regret in leaving the
Shield/Desert Storm. The book is a blending institution that gave their lives meaning and Frontier Cavalryman is a comprehensive
of their experiences leading armor and scout the formative experience of their lifetime. In look at the Army of the 1870s. It reveals the
platoons in the same brigade. From pre- defending their decisions to leave, the authors unpopular and demanding operations that
deployment to post war and post army, the seem to need to justify, to themselves as took place in Texas during this period, while
fears, frustrations and very candid observa- much as to others, why they left. The Army, providing a glimpse of the genesis of deseg-
tions of these five young officers are told in a like the war, was part of their youth. They regation and equity for all races in the Army
style that is both easy to read and insightful. grew because of their experience and in doing and American society as a whole. In the
so outgrew the youthful reasons for serving. 10th U.S. Cavalry, the Buffalo Soldiers lived,
What makes Eyes of Orion so valuable is
worked and fought side by side. Through their
that it captures the experience of youth at war. This is a valuable perspective for those still
efforts, hardships, and customs, many military
Written less than a decade after the war, while serving. Read these accounts to understand
and cultural changes were brought about on a
the authors were still young, their work is a better the reality, good and bad, of leaving the wider scale throughout the United States.
valuable insight into the most destructive of service. Life will change in ways unforeseen.
youthful experiences: combat. The intangibles offered by military service are Kinevan is brilliant in his portrayal of Lieu-
not always readily noticed. Being in corporate tenant Bigelow’s experiences, but misses with
Perspective is an important element in a middle management, or attending grad his overindulgence in exploring the Victorian
memoir, and certainly in a war memoir. Desert school, as some of the authors did, is not the culture of that era. These digressions provide
Storm lacked the carnage and high casualties same as serving as an Army officer. Knowing a glimpse into the society of the time, focusing
of other wars. However, the perspective on this is useful before one actually hangs up his on the Army, Texas, and the city of San Anto-
the ground in Desert Storm, like in any other green suit. nio. Kinevan spends perhaps too much time
conflict, was radically different from those of discussing Bigelow’s relationships with girls
the home front or of hindsight. The five pla- Eyes of Orion is a valuable addition to a pro- and their parents, and with walking around
toon leaders of Eyes of Orion did not know at fessional’s bookshelf. Like the classic We San Antonio. Perhaps his purpose is to pro-
the time that their war would end with little Were Soldier’s Once and Young…, The Eyes vide a sense of the boredom that made up a
bloodshed. They expected the worst. This ex- of Orion immerses the reader in the life of a great deal of Bigelow’s life as a young officer
pectation permeates the book and makes it unit as it trains, deploys, and ultimately fights. in Texas. A further exploration of other issues,
stand out from previous Gulf War books that Armor lieutenants would do well to read this such as training, actual operations against the
dealt with the larger picture. outstanding book and learn from their prede- Indians, or the relationships among the sol-
cessors.
This narrow view makes the Eyes of Orion diers of the 10th U.S. Cavalry, might have
a valuable contribution to the history of the CPT DAN LEAF better served his wider purpose.
Gulf War and to one’s professional library. Fayette, N.C. Frontier Cavalryman is exhaustively re-
After reading this book, one can better un- searched and documented by the author. He
derstand the experiences of a young, un- provides an excellent set of appendices that
tested leader, as he trains, deploys with, and Frontier Cavalryman: Lieutenant John further detail the Army of this era. The end-
ultimately leads into battle equally untested Bigelow with the Buffalo Soldiers in notes and bibliography are well laid out and
soldiers. The authors make plain how the Texas by BG (Ret.) Marcus E. Kinevan, extensive. Frontier Cavalryman contains only
hopes, fears, and survival of the soldiers a limited number of maps, photos, and draw-
rested upon their actions and how they each
Texas Western Press, The University of
Texas at El Paso, El Paso, Texas; 1998; ings. This does not distract from the work, as
met this responsibility. there are photos of Bigelow, his soldiers, fel-
338 pages, maps, pictures, sketches, ap-
The five authors were obviously good at their low officers and the locations where he lived,
pendices, endnotes, bibliography, index; worked, and fought.
jobs: dedicated, professional, earnest, and $25.00, hardback.
eager. However, Eyes of Orion is not an exer- Bigelow’s epitaph for a colleague perhaps
cise in self-adulation or a retelling of “war Frontier Cavalryman is a first-rate account of best illustrates the principal feeling and mes-
stories” of questionable veracity. The authors a young cavalry officer’s experiences at the sage of this book: “Long and faithful perform-
give praise where it is due. The soldiers, turn of the century in the 10th U.S. Cavalry. ance of duty, sometimes arduous and dan-
NCOs, senior leaders, equipment, and the Brigadier General (Ret.) Marcus Kinevan gerous, generally monotonous, and rarely, if
Army in general all receive much deserved delivers a well-documented and thorough ever, glorious or thrilling, has become a com-
praise. Equally, their criticism is often scathing history of the Army and the U.S. Cavalry of mon thing in the traditions of the Army.” Their
for those who do fail in their duties. However, the late nineteenth century. efforts have led to the society and Army that
as in any honest accounting, the authors often we know today. Frontier Cavalryman is a
save the harshest analysis for themselves. Kinevan’s work is centered on Lieutenant worthy addition to any professional’s library.
One of the authors, Alex Vernon, portrays John Bigelow’s personal journal, which chron-
himself as ultimately being unfit to serve as an icles his experiences, observations, opinions ANDRÉ HALL
officer. The accuracy of this depiction would and tribulations as a young cavalry officer in MAJ, Armor, (USAR)
be a good topic for an OPD session. With the Texas. Bigelow and so many of his other Heidelberg, Germany

60 ARMOR — September-October 2000

 Threa t Bra nch

~;'lIt
'l "
~~ ~1-
V
'

FOli Knox, Kentuc ky

T-90
Fort Kno:\. Kentucky

Russian Main Battle Tank

Characteristics

Crew Size 3 Max Road Range 5S0km

Combat Weight 46,SOOkg Max Road Speed 60kmlh
Height (without machinegun) 2.226m Armament (main gun) 12Smm
Length (hull) 6.86m Armament (coaxial) 7.62mm
Length (gun forward) 9.53m Armament (anti-aircraft) 12.7mm
Width (over skirts) 3.78111 Armament (ATGM) Refleks (AT-ll )
Using countries: India, Russia

PostCl" produced hy Threat Branch. USAARIVlC. Fun Knox. Kentuck y ~0 1 2 1 6 lU ll' 2(J(JO

A color version of this poster appears on the Threat Branch website at: knox-www.army.mil/centerithreatiintel.htm.
 Patton Museum Vehicles Roar
Again in WWII Reenactment
Photos by Robert Stevenson

Soldiers, military families, and

the general public crowded
Keyes Park, Fort Knox, to see
the annual July 4 living histo-
ry program mounted by the
Patton Museum. Reenactment
groups staged a World War II-
style skirmish using original
restored vehicles.

ARMOR
The Professional Development Bulletin Periodicals Postage
of the Armor Branch Paid at Louisville, KY
U.S. Army Armor Center
ATTN: ATZK-TDM
Fort Knox, KY 40121-5210

PIN: 078381-000