A German infantryman participates in a Combined Georgian special operations force exercise for Noble Partner 18, the

fourth iteration of the Georgian Armed Forces and U.S. Army Europe cooperatively-led exercise. “Strength through
partnership” was the theme for this year’s exercise, which also emphasized joint, combined planning for complex operations.
(U.S. Army/ Kris Bonet)

30 | FE ATURE S PRISM 7, NO. 4

Examining Complex Forms
of Conflict
Gray Zone and Hybrid Challenges
By Frank G. Hoffman

T
he Joint Force, and the national security community as a whole, must be ready and able to respond
to numerous challenges across the full spectrum of conflict including complex operations during
peacetime and war. However, this presupposes a general acceptance of a well-understood taxonomy
describing the elements that constitute the “continuum of conflict.” The U.S. security community lacks this
taxonomy, despite its engagement in a spate of diverse conflicts around the globe from the South China Sea, to
Ukraine, Syria, Iraq, and beyond. Partially as a result of this conceptual challenge, we are falling behind in our
readiness for the future. As the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Joseph Dunford has admitted
“We’re already behind in adapting to the changed character of war today in so many ways.”1 The U.S. national
security establishment must devote greater attention to the range of challenges and adversaries it faces. The
first step is recognizing the diversity of potential conflicts and understanding the relative risks of each.
American strategic culture is sometimes criticized for its emphasis on conventional, interstate war. This
was acknowledged in a major 2012 lessons learned project produced by the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff that
observed how a “big war” paradigm clouded our understanding and delayed the adaptation required for U.S.
forces to succeed in Iraq and Afghanistan.2 The tendency to ignore certain types of threats or forms of conflict
has impeded U.S. strategic performance in the past, and will continue to do so until we grasp the full range of
conflict types.3 Without explicit recognition of diverse conflict types in U.S. strategy and doctrine, the armed
services are likely to remain in a perpetual state of costly and reactive adaptation when called upon to address
various threats.4
As should be expected in any attempt to describe something as complex as war, there is much debate over
characterizations and definitions. The lexicon of national security and defense analysis has been strained lately,
struggling to describe the emerging and ambiguous complex threats we face, most of which fall well short of con-
ventional war. Indeed, some threats do not meet the current threshold of what we think of as war at all.
Embracing a narrow conventional conception of conflict does not prepare future leaders for the range of
emerging threats we face, nor is it conducive to developing doctrine and training. A myopic focus on con-
ventional threats obscures the complexity of the phenomena and oversimplifies the challenges. It may also
be a way of overemphasizing a preferred mission set or a conventional, big war paradigm, which narrows our

Dr. Frank G. Hoffman is a Distinguished Research Fellow at National Defense University.

PRISM 7, NO. 4 FE ATURE S | 31

HOFFM AN

cognitive understanding of conflict.5 That is a risk scholars have rejected such parsing and argue for a
we have been bearing and for which we have paid a unitary vision of war, war can take many forms.8
dear price for far too long.
As the Prussian theorist of war, Carl von Back to the Future
Clausewitz argued, war is an ever-evolving, inter- The Joint Staff’s projected security environment
active phenomena.6 Understanding the complexity forecasts a future of contested norms in which
and distinctions of various modes of warfare con- adversaries will employ stratagems to gain influ-
ducted across the continuum of conflict is critical, ence and undermine U.S. interests with techniques
as is understanding our adversaries, their methods, well short of traditional armed conflict.9 This is not
and conceptions of victory. To navigate through the unprecedented. During the Cold War, the United
fog of complexity, a heuristic construct for conflict is States faced persistent efforts to undermine order,
presented in Figure 1. weaken our alliances, and undercut our interests
Rather than perpetuate the binary peace/war by activities well short of military violence. The
distinction, this continuum of conflict depicts a former Soviet Union had well-established direc-
range of different modes of conflict arrayed by torates in their intelligence organizations designed
increasing levels of violence, from measures short to sow discord, de-legitimize political opponents,
of armed conflict, to large-scale conventional wars, and weaken the resolve of the North Atlantic Treaty
utilizing modality and scale of violence as distin- Organization NATO alliance.10
guishing factors. A continuum is not a rigid tool, Cold War and recent experience with Russia
but rather an intellectual construct that opens our suggests that the mixture of political, economic,
cognitive lens to the full-range of challenges we and subversive activity is a consistent element of
must understand, and will bring analytic coher- their operational art.11 Russia uses these tactics
ence to both the complex array of contemporary in Ukraine and elsewhere, a form of “simmering
security problems as well as the range of the mil- borscht” that seeks to extend Moscow’s sphere of
itary professional’s domain within the national influence without triggering an armed response.
security arena. The former Soviet Union frequently employed
Well-defined elements within the continuum of what it called “active measures” in the informa-
conflict facilitate our thinking about future and cur- tion domain, including forgery, propaganda, and
rent opponents and their ways of war.7 Though some false stories or “fake news.”12 Russia’s interest in and

FIGURE 1: A HEURISTIC CONSTRUCT FOR CONFLICT.

Continuum of Conflict

Conventional Warfare
Measures Short of Irregular Warfare/
Hybrid Warfare (limited to theater-
Armed Conflict Terrorism
wide objectives)

Special Warfare

32 | FE ATURE S PRISM 7, NO. 4

 GR AY ZONE AN D H Y BRID CHALLENGE S

application of active measures does not seem to have More recently, China’s use of diplomatic
abated, and has perhaps even intensified via social assertions, deliberate use of fishery/maritime law
media and proliferating fake news outlets in the last enforcement forces, and aggressive seizures of dis-
several years.13 This includes the development of puted islands in the Pacific offer another modern
“social bots”—computer-generated online accounts case study.23 China’s assertiveness in the South China
implanted into sites like Facebook that masquerade Sea appears designed to erode the existing interna-
as real users—to communicate and amplify narra- tional order and change the norms of international
tives or disinformation streams. These can dominate behavior by acts of latent coercion. Maritime militia
or manipulate group pages and disseminate political forces have allowed China not only to disrupt foreign
advertisements. Facebook representatives testified to survey, energy development, and commercial fishing
Congress that prior to the U.S. Presidential election operations, but to extend and consolidate areas it
in 2016 a Russian “troll farm” with ties to the Russian views as Chinese territory with low escalatory risks.24
Government paid $100,000 for advertisements that China strikes with all instruments of national power,
produced thousands of Facebook and Instagram and has particularly intensified its use of military
posts, to which more than 125 million users could diplomacy since 2009.25 China has also learned to
have been exposed. The same Russian firm, the wield influence using funding to both incentivize and
Internet Research Agency, has made widespread use coerce academic and media voices.26
of bots in its attempts to manipulate public opinion China is well-organized to conduct operations
through the use of social media.14 This is the 21st cen- short of military conflict.27 As the scholar Stefan
tury version of classical Soviet dezinformatsiya.15 Halper perceptively noted in a study from 2014 for
Russia’s current leaders emerged from Soviet the Pentagon, China “employs diplomatic pressure,
intelligence entities and seem experienced in the use rumor, false narratives, and harassment to express
of covert approaches and the use of distortion, dis- displeasure, assert hegemony and convey threats.”28
information, subversion, and propaganda.16 Russian Guided by the doctrinal principle of “disintegrating
meddling in U.S. electoral campaigns has received enemies,” political warfare promotes the suppression
much attention lately, but such influence efforts have of perceived threats to China by using psychologi-
been a routine part of their arsenal of trade tricks.17 cal operations as a means of leading international
Russia has also directed its cyber mischief activi- discourse and influencing policies of friends and foes.
ties at Estonia, Georgia, and Ukraine.18 Moscow’s Propaganda, carried out during both peacetime and
interference in European political parties, and its in armed conflict, amplifies or attenuates the political
development of soft power “false front” organiza- effects of the military instrument of national power.29
tions is also noteworthy.19 Recent reports that China is operating deep inside
Russia’s toolkit has always included the Australia to destabilize the Australian government
exploitation of non-military aggression.20 Experts and turn it toward Chinese aims suggest that Beijing’s
have identified the extent to which Russia appears doctrine is more than merely academic.30
willing to go to project influence and sow confusion Some analysts from the Chinese People’s
within U.S. and European democracies.21 While Liberation Army (PLA) argue that future wars
Russia’s cyber and propaganda intrusions are inten- will be marked by the “three non” warfares:
sifying, the U. S. Government is neither effectively non-contact (fei jierong), non-linear (fei xianshi),
organized nor conceptually prepared to address and non-symmetric (fei duicheng). In non-con-
Russia’s information weapons.22 tact warfare the more advanced adversary exploits

PRISM 7, NO. 4 FE ATURE S | 33

HOFFM AN

its advantage by staying outside the reach of the By failing to understand that the space
other side’s weapons, while retaining the ability to between war and peace is not an empty
directly target and strike its rival.31 Chinese con- one—but a landscape churning with polit-
ceptions of “quasi-war” and “three warfares,” as ical, economic, and security competitions
depicted in Figure 2, embrace legal, psychological, that require constant attention—American
and information activities short of war.32 China’s foreign policy risks being reduced to a reac-
growing conventional military power suggests that tive and tactical emphasis on the military
it is employing these techniques as it builds up its instrument by default.35
national power and extends its military reach. To
This suggests that the U.S. security or policy
what degree will it retain an interest in non-contact
community does not recognize the importance of
and indirect methods when it has obtained regional
competing in this arena. However, an examination
parity? Recent research suggests that a convergence
of any regional or theater commander’s engage-
of China and Russian tactics is occurring, emanat-
ment plans would suggest this view is somewhat
ing from Chinese interpretations of Russia’s actions
exaggerated. Theater security cooperation plans,
in the Crimea and in the cyber domain. This is not
military-to-military engagement, military aid or
authoritative but we should also expect Russia (and
support, exercises and various forms of engage-
others) to absorb lessons from the South China Sea.33
ment are routinely employed by our regional
commands to compete for influence and signal
Clarity and Unclarity in the Gray Zone
U.S. commitment.36 The United States has recently
The need to compete with greater agility at lower been heavily engaged in many failing states and
levels short of war, against multi-functional or regions employing what might be best described
multi-dimensional threats is belatedly recognized as the constructive and stabilizing instruments
today. The gap has existed for some time and was of traditional statecraft. We may need to bet-
deemed decades ago to be a shortfall in U.S. strategic ter understand and execute these missions, and
culture.34 More recently, a security scholar noted, scholars have recently noted that our assistance

FIGURE 2: WAR, QUASI-WAR, AND NON-WAR, AS EXPRESSED IN A PLA TEXT FROM 2009.

Chinese Conception of Military Operations

Wartime Military Operations Quasi-War Non-Wartime Military Operations

Military Operations

Source: Liu Xiaoli, Military Response to Significant Sudden Incidents and Crises: Research on Military Operations Other
than War, 8. Adapted from Alison A. Kaufman and Daniel M. Hartnett, Managing Conflict: Examining Recent PLA Writings
on Escalation Control (Arlington, VA: CNA, 2016), 26.

34 | FE ATURE S PRISM 7, NO. 4

 GR AY ZONE AN D H Y BRID CHALLENGE S

TABLE 1: FORMS OF STATECRAFT AND INFLUENCE.

Traditional/Legitimate Non-traditional/Illegitimate
Security cooperation and foreign military sales Political subversion by penetration or false-front
organizations
Economic sanctions Economic corruption

Public diplomacy and support for IGO/NGO Propaganda/psychological operations/disinformation

Military presence/engagements/exercises Cyber intrusions/cyber corruption/disruption

Foreign internal defense Sponsored criminal activity

Freedom of navigation exercise (maritime or aerospace Electoral interference

domains)

programs can be improved.37 It is the character of lectures on “Measures Short of War” during the 1950s
tools used that distinguishes us from other powers. at the National War College.41
Some of the tools used by others are more ambig- The conflict mode which Kennan originally
uous and nontraditional instruments of statecraft, referred to as political warfare has recently been
and may be of nefarious or of questionable legiti- re-anointed as “gray zone conflict.” Actors in the
macy. The salient questions are: “are we doing the gray zone are,
right things? are we doing enough? and, are the
employing sequences of gradual steps to
right agencies doing it?” Table 1 presents a sample
secure strategic leverage. The efforts remain
list contrasting these two sets of tools.
below thresholds that would generate a
Scholars and practitioners within the
powerful U.S. or international response, but
Department of Defense, and the U.S. Special
nonetheless are forceful and deliberate, calcu-
Operations community in particular, have examined
lated to gain measurable traction over time.42
various case studies to better understand how to con-
ceptualize the problem set and respond accordingly. As noted this is not unprecedented; in fact, it
Some recall U.S. diplomat George Kennan urging rather resembles classical “salami-slicing” strat-
the use of political warfare to counter adversary egies, fortified with a range of unconventional
activities.38 Kennan defined political warfare as “the techniques—from cyberattacks to information
employment of all the means at a nation’s command, campaigns to energy diplomacy. One scholar lists
short of war.”39 His understanding of the problem was numerous current relevant examples, including the
informed by a deep understanding of Russian stra- ongoing crisis in eastern Ukraine. But Ukraine—
tegic culture and its preference for indirect methods. particularly the fighting in Donbas—has blown past
But his definition was too expansive (“all means”) being an ambiguous “no-man’s land” or gray zone,
and mislabeled as a form of warfare despite its focus given the violent scope of the conflict (10,000 dead)
on activities “short of war.” The term was used during and the overt use of advanced conventional power
the Cold War with a general understanding, though (armor, rockets, missiles).
eventually displaced by covert action (or activities). Others argue that,
It has generally been dropped from governmen-
the gray zone is characterized by intense
tal usage.40 Kennan himself recognized this in his
political, economic, informational, and

PRISM 7, NO. 4 FE ATURE S | 35

HOFFM AN

military competition more fervent in nature at the Naval Postgraduate School, has convincingly
than normal steady-state diplomacy, yet argued, instead of creating an imaginary zone,
short of conventional war.43 we should understand that all of this activity is an
essential part of the realm of human conflict.45
Yet others note that gray zone conflicts,
The importance of the measures addressed by
involve some aggression or use of force, but in these scholars is valid even as they struggle to define it.
many aspects their defining characteristic is This area has been consistently highlighted by strategic
ambiguity—about the ultimate objectives, the assessments of the U.S. Intelligence Community and
participants, whether international treaties cannot be ignored.46 The only issue is whether the use
and norms have been violated, and the role of these tactics will dissipate or increase in the future.
that military forces should play in response.44 Conceptual progress requires clear and distinct
definitions, and vague terms like political warfare or
They list Russia’s annexation of Crimea, its sup-
gray zone are of limited help.47 This is not war in the
port of separatists in eastern Ukraine; the Islamic
classic sense, but we should not misconstrue the fun-
State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) advances; Boko
damental element of conflict inherent to this part of
Haram’s insurgency in Nigeria, among others, as
the security environment.
gray zone conflicts. That range includes very dis-
A formal definition of gray zone tactics is offered:
tinct conflicts and asks a lot of the concept. Russia’s
war inside Ukraine is hardly covert or ambigu- Those covert or illegal activities of non-
ous. Similarly, ISIL is responsible for an estimated traditional statecraft that are below the
20,000 fatalities, and an estimated 10,000 casualties threshold of armed organized violence;
in Nigeria have been attributed to Boko Haram. including disruption of order, political sub-
These belligerents appear to worry little about version of government or non-governmental
crossing lines or facing escalation from the inter- organizations, psychological operations,
national community. Clearly these are not gray or abuse of legal processes, and financial cor-
ambiguous acts. ruption as part of an integrated design to
The definition of gray zone conflicts remains achieve strategic advantage.
both expansive and elusive. Definitions found in
This definition emphasizes the actual activ-
recent literature are applied very inconsistently and
ities over intent. Placing this to the far left of the
do not contribute to analytic coherence as they cover
proposed continuum of conflict, short of violent
such a vast portion of the conflict spectrum, over-
military force or war, represented by the thick red
looking different historical contexts, methods, and
line, positions it clearly along the continuum of chal-
best practices. These over-wide definitions rob gray
lenges that our security policy must address.
zone conflict of analytical utility, as they mask more
than they reveal. Indeed, this new term captures
Defining Hybrid Warfare
more a failure in U.S. military and security culture
than it characterizes any new method or form of Nearly 15 years ago, analysts in the Department of
conflict. The real gray zone is “between our ears,” in Defense and at the Marine Corps’ Warfighting Lab
our faulty models and education about what conflict identified trends and evidence of deliberate efforts
entails. Enshrining our intellectual fault line as an to blur and blend methods of war. Their fore-
opponent’s method is not enlightening. As John cast suggested that the prevailing technological
Arquilla, a professor and Chair of Defense Analysis advantage of the American-dominated Revolution

36 | FE ATURE S PRISM 7, NO. 4

 GR AY ZONE AN D H Y BRID CHALLENGE S

in Military Affairs would produce a counter-rev- that current categories do not match contemporary
olution that would exploit the convergence of conflict.51 Hybrid threats are frequently referred to in
different modes of conflict. This threat hypothe- the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review, national-level
sis evolved into a theory of hybrid threats.48 The intelligence reports on the future character of war,
projection was affirmed in the summer of 2006 and in various top-level documents of other coun-
in Southern Lebanon by the actions of Hezbollah, tries.52 The Futures Study Group at NATO–Allied
and appears to be relevant to other conflicts as Command Transformation (ACT) also anticipated
well.49 Three U.S. Secretaries of Defense, includ- this threat in 2007.53 Numerous policymakers and
ing the incumbent, have found the hybrid warfare military leaders have agreed, as shown in Figure 3.
concept useful and have warned of the emergence A hybrid threat transcends a blend of reg-
of hybrid adversaries.50 ular and irregular tactics. More than a decade
Military leaders as well, including Chiefs of Staff ago, it was defined as an adversary that “simul-
of the Army and several Joint leaders, have recognized taneously and adaptively employs a fused mix

FIGURE 3: HYBRID WARFARE, AS MENTIONED BY SELECT U.S. DEFENSE AND POLICY OFFICIALS.
Hybrid warfare will be a defining feature of the future security environment.
—the Honorable Michele Flournoy, then U.S. Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, along with Special Advisor Shawn Brimley, in
their article on “The Defense Inheritance: Challenges and Choices for the Next Pentagon Team,” The Washington Quarterly 30
(Autumn 2008).

In reality, as [academic] Colin Gray has noted, the categories of warfare are blurring and do not fit into tidy
boxes. We can expect to see more tools and tactics of destruction—from the sophisticated to the simple—being
employed simultaneously in hybrid and more complex forms of warfare.
—the Honorable Robert Gates, then U.S. Secretary of Defense, in his article “The National Defense Strategy: Striking the Right
Balance,” Joint Force Quarterly 52, no.1 (2009).

Rarely are such conflicts decided on conventional battlefields by traditional armies. They become
hybrid wars—‘a fused mix of conventional weapons, irregular tactics, terrorism and criminal behavior in
the battlespace.’
—the Honorable Joseph S. Nye, Jr., former Undersecretary of State and Chairman of the National Intelligence Council, in The Future of
Power: Its Changing Nature and Use in the Twenty-First Century published by PublicAffairs (©2011).

. . . one of the most costly lessons . . . learned over the last decade: how to deal with the challenge of hybrid
warfare. It will be increasingly common for the army to operate in environments with both regular military and
irregular paramilitary or civilian adversaries, with the potential for terrorism, criminality and other complications.
—General Raymond T. Odierno, then Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army, in his article on “The U.S. Army in a Time of Transition:
Building a Flexible Force,” Foreign Affairs 90, no.3 (May–June 2012).

But if the streets of Baghdad and the valleys of Afghanistan were a laboratory for irregular warfare, I believe that
ground force will increasingly need to prepare for future hybrid warfare.
—the Honorable Robert O. Work, then U.S. Deputy Secretary of Defense, in a speech delivered at a U.S. Army War College Strat-
egy Conference in April, 2015.

Future wars could have conventional forces, Special Forces, guerrillas, terrorists, criminals all mixed together in a
highly complex terrain environment, with potentially high densities of civilians.
—General Mark A. Milley, 39 th Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army as quoted by journalist Helen Cooper in “The War of the Future?
Picture Big Armies and Many Fronts,” New York Times, June 10, 2016.

PRISM 7, NO. 4 FE ATURE S | 37

HOFFM AN

of conventional weapons, irregular tactics, cata- Hybrid threats can also be created by a state
strophic terrorism, and criminal behavior in the actor using a proxy force. A proxy force sponsored
battlespace to obtain desired political objectives.”54 by a major power can generate hybrid threats readily
The criminal, or more broadly “socially disruptive using advanced military capabilities provided by the
behavior,” and mass terrorism aspects should not sponsor. Proxy wars, appealing to some as “warfare
be overlooked, but the fusion of advanced mili- on the cheap” are historically ubiquitous but chron-
tary capabilities with irregular forces and tactics is ically understudied.58
key, and has appeared repeatedly during the past The hybrid threat concept captures the ongo-
decade from Hezbollah to the Russian campaigns ing implications of globalization, the diffusion of
in Georgia and Ukraine.55 Hezbollah’s method of military-related technologies, and the information
fighting Israel as is described by its leader Hassan revolution. Hybrid threats are qualitatively different
Nasrallah, is an organic response to its security from less complex irregular or militia forces. They,
dilemma and “not a conventional army and not a by and large, cannot be defeated simply by Western
guerrilla force, it is something in between.”56 As counterterrorism tactics or protracted counterin-
lethal as Hezbollah has been in the past decade, we surgency techniques. Hybrid threats are more lethal
should be concerned about the lessons it is learning than irregular forces conducting simple ambushes
in Syria from the Russians.57 using crude improvised explosive devices, but they

A cyber warfare operations officer reviews visualization data as analysts review log files and provide a cyber threat update.
(U.S. Air Force/ J.M. Eddins, Jr.)

38 | FE ATURE S PRISM 7, NO. 4

 GR AY ZONE AN D H Y BRID CHALLENGE S

are not unfamiliar to Western forces and can be about all wars, which tend to contain combinations
defeated with sufficient combat power.59 of military and non-military activity in an integrated
Events in the Crimea and eastern Ukraine have plan. The NATO definition reflects a combination of
led European security officials to pay greater atten- methods, and clearly emphasizes a purposeful design
tion to Russia’s assertive behavior and its ways of war. to achieve desired outcomes, but it does not necessar-
For this reason, hybrid warfare is now an explicit ily include kinetic applications of violent force.
discussion point among NATO military and civilian A historical case study illuminates the distinc-
leaders.60 In the Crimea, Russia demonstrated that it tions between the original, American view of hybrid
had learned from its performance in Georgia in 2008 threats and its more recent NATO interpretation.
and employed inherently conventional methods, but While Russia’s efforts to influence Ukraine’s efforts
with better agility and illegal methods.61 This was to reach out to the EU constitute an example of a
hardly new or ambiguous but it was effective under gray zone conflict, clearly competing well short of
circumstances that are not easily replicated. traditional armed conflict, the ongoing violence in
Numerous foreign sources describe President eastern Ukraine is a classical form of hybrid war-
Vladimir Putin’s preferred method as “hybrid war- fare within an integrated design that has produced a
fare,” a blend of hard and soft power. A combination costly conflict with more than 10,000 fatalities.67 The
of instruments, some military and some non-mili- fusion of the various forces or means employed in
tary, choreographed to surprise, confuse and wear the Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts (combinations of
down an opponent, hybrid warfare is ambiguous in separatists, Spestnaz special forces, Russian regulars
both source and intent, making it hard for multi- with advanced military capabilities, electronic war-
national bodies such as NATO and the EU to craft fare, drones, large volume rocket launchers, and some
a response.62 This is not novel, especially in Russia. armor) is distinctly representative of hybrid warfare.68
These are actually time-tested methods with which The employment of political repression, influence
the U.S. security community has experience, albeit over food supplies to control the local population,
not for several decades.63 and the accidental catastrophic act of killing of 217
European military analysts, prompted by passengers aboard MH–17 suggest a less conven-
Russia’s behavior, have also embraced the hybrid tional character closer to the middle of the conflict
phenomenon as a feature of contemporary con- spectrum, and all are elements consistent with hybrid
flict.64 However the NATO interpretation of hybrid threat methods. The evidence of rampant corrup-
warfare is much broader, depicting it as a mixture tion and suppression of employment and economic
of military means with non-military tools including security evince all the elements of a hybrid opera-
propaganda and cyber activity. This differs from the tional context which appear to be part of a deliberate
earlier American definition, and is much closer to design.69 Those who have repeatedly visited Ukraine
the so-called gray zone conflicts described earlier. and Donbas confirm the conflict as inherently hybrid
The distinction between indirect and less violent in accordance with the original definition.70
gray zone conflicts and the more violent methods of As a recent RAND Corporation report noted,
hybrid threats has been noted by several scholars.65 Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of
Key NATO leaders define hybrid threats as “a wide Russia Valery Gerasimov’s article described the
range of overt and covert military, paramilitary, and current character of warfare, rather than outlining
civilian measures are employed in a highly integrated a particular doctrine or institutional approach.71
design.”66 This broad definition could describe just The Russian understanding of conflict constitutes

PRISM 7, NO. 4 FE ATURE S | 39

HOFFM AN

a full spectrum approach, which means it can capabilities with irregular tactics, with
include measures short of war or more violent terrorism and criminal activities, or com-
hybrid approaches as appropriate to the situation.72 bination of regular and irregular forces,
Historically, Russia’s approach has appreciated operating as part of a common design in the
the value of indirect approaches and non-military same battlespace.
instruments. We would do well to better re-learn
The major distinction here is the addition of
Russia’s strategic culture and history.73
“violent” to the definition to clarify its placement in
The NATO Defense College has been at the fore-
the continuum, and to further distinguish it from
front of thinking on this topic, and other European
activities short of violent conflict.
analysts are carefully examining the implications.74
These analyses are primarily focused on the intelli-
Looking Forward—So What?
gence agencies that make routine use of the criminal
All elements of the U.S. national security commu-
underworld for “services” including cyberattacks and
nity must assess and prepare for the complete array
violence. As U.K scholar Mark Galeotti has noted,
of challenges they face in today’s dynamic envi-
“one of Russia’s tactics for waging war is using orga-
ronment. As Clausewitz said in probably his most
nized crime as an instrument of statecraft abroad.”75
oft-quoted passage,
The malign influence of criminal activity and the
corrupting nature of illicit networks in the battlespace . . . the first, the supreme, the most far reaching
is growing and merits greater study.76 It should be act of judgment that the statesman and com-
made clear that Russia would employ these criminal mander have to make is to establish . . . the
networks in both measures short of armed conflict kind of war on which they are embarking.78
and in more violent contingencies.
We should also be concerned about Hezbollah One cannot make this supreme judgment
and the lessons it may be absorbing from its stint in without a deep understanding of history, of war and
Syria.77 Hezbollah has always been more than a well- the various ways in which it is waged. Lacking that
understanding increases the risk of mistaking the
armed guerilla movement and constituted a more
essential nature of the conflict being considered or
classical hybrid threat. Now, though it has suffered
those we must adapt to as a result of the ever-evolv-
significant combat losses, it has also been exposed to
ing character of warfare.79 The continuum concept
an extensive learning cycle from the Russian special
operations advisors supporting the Assad regime. and hybrid threats remain controversial since they
Hezbollah’s own special forces may have mastered distract from the efforts of “big wars” and great
the integration of cyber, combined arms, and intelli- power competition advocates.80
gence operations at an even higher level than before. The new U.S. National Defense Strategy (NDS)
Thus, even if ISIL is defeated and Syria is stabi- identifies China and Russia as our primary competi-
lized into a stalemate, our allies in Israel may face a tors and threats.81 Some analysts misread the NDS as
greater threat than before. embracing great power wars of a conventional type.
To update our understanding and better dis- This misinterpretation of the strategy reflects a lack of
tinguish hybrid conflict from irregular warfare, a appreciation for both Chinese and Russian strate-
revised definition of the former is offered: gic culture, which both recognize unconventional
methods and non-military conflict. The Secretary
The purposeful and tailored violent appli- of Defense and his NDS explicitly recognize a full
cation of advanced conventional military

40 | FE ATURE S PRISM 7, NO. 4

 GR AY ZONE AN D H Y BRID CHALLENGE S

spectrum of conflict and warn against over-investing ingenuity of our adversaries and their evolving
in a single and preclusive form of warfare, a mistake ways of warfare.85 We should also remain cogni-
an adversary will surely exploit.82 We face an array of zant of the reality that major adversaries now have
different threats and require a comprehensive suite of the means to directly attack our political will and
options to address the full range of conflict we may the resilience of our societies and will attempt to do
face. Joint doctrine recognizes a conflict continuum, so in any form of conflict, well to the left of armed
yet fails to define it in detail.83 Doctrinal efforts to conflict or during high-intensity conflict.86
address that are in progress. Countering measures short of armed con-
flict is the subject of various new studies, and the
U.S. defense policy community and military are
The Secretary of Defense and belatedly devoting significant intellectual capital to
this issue. 87 But countering this method of conflict
his NDS explicitly recognize a full will require more than traditional military strategy
spectrum of conflict and warn responses and must incorporate more than special
operations forces. We must establish a broader
against over-investing in a single and framework for conflict short of violent warfare
preclusive form of warfare, a mistake that incorporates a wider range of tools than the
traditional set, and special forces, or paramili-
an adversary will surely exploit. 82
tary operations.88 For example, how do we counter
manipulation of elections and efforts to sow
We face an array of different threats
discord via cyber intrusions and the deliberate dis-
and require a comprehensive suite of tribution of false information?89 How do we ensure
that forms of subversion or disinformation, at
options to address the full range of home and abroad, are neutralized? Getting beyond
conflict we may face. Joint doctrine the operational or tactical perspective is surely
warranted as suggested by the U.K. scholar, Dr.
recognizes a conflict continuum, yet Robert Johnson of Oxford’s Changing Character of
fails to define it in detail. Doctrinal
83 War Programme.90

efforts to address that are in progress. Political Aims

A particularly valid point is the need to consider
the political dynamics of conflict, not just its meth-
Yes, we are facing an era of great power ods or modes. This is not simply a statement of the
competition, but that competition is not inher- obvious.91 It addresses a longstanding deficiency in
ently limited to one point in the continuum. The the American way of war. “Too often governments
first step in generating an effective response to miss critical components of their adversary’s strat-
the challenge our adversaries may present along egy, typically because of a near-exclusive focus on
the continuum is defining what that continuum its use of violence. Partial responses such as these
consists of, with some granularity. 84 Until we do can be counterproductive.”92 This is the largest
so we will continue to be outplayed at influence deficiency in hybrid threat theory; its emphasis on
competitions and will remain surprised at the “how” the adversary applies violence overlooks the

PRISM 7, NO. 4 FE ATURE S | 41

HOFFM AN

“why,” which is ultimately more critical to counter– of intelligence, law enforcement, development,
strategies and conflict resolution. information activity, and military security will
vary depending on the contingency, but there is
Intelligence no doubt that complex conflicts require more than
U.S. analysts should continue to explore past and sheer conventional military might.96 Both field
current doctrine of our major competitors. Ongoing experience and scholarship on networked and
changes in the Russian way of war, and how their multi-dimensional problems demonstrate that we
mental model is adjusting under Putin’s leadership, will require equally inventive solutions.97
are worthy of detailed assessment.93 But this work Understanding our future security challenges
should go beyond military articles and speeches that demands that we reflect and interpret the past, under-
will offer little insight into a decisionmaking circle stand the present, and think rigorously about what
that is centered on President Putin and a clique lies over the horizon in order to adapt to the chang-
largely comprised of former KGB officers. A broader ing character of conflict.98 This requires keeping an
evaluation of Russian history and nonconventional open and informed mind about the breadth of the
methods is more appropriate to compete with various modes of conflict that exist. The wars of the
Moscow’s propensity to target seams and institu- 21st century may take many forms. As conflict reflects
tional gaps with its active measures. a greater degree of convergence and complexity, so
must our mental models and frameworks. PRISM
Organization
Once we ascertain the relative scope of the prob- Notes
1
General Joseph Dunford, USMC, remarks at
lem, structural issues must be addressed, along
National Defense University Graduation Ceremony, Ft.
with authorities. How should we organize our- McNair, DC, June 10, 2016. Available at <http://www.jcs.
selves to address this challenge?94 Is this a function mil/Media/Speeches/Article/797847/gen-dunfords-re-
for the State Department, or is an interagency marks-at-the-national-defense-university-graduation/>.
2
U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Decade of War: Vol. 1:
model similar to the National Counterterrorism Enduring Lessons from the Last Decade of Operations,
Center needed to better integrate activities in Suffolk, VA: Joint and Coalition Operational Analysis,
intelligence, campaign design, and assessment in June 15, 2012.
3
counter–influence activities? This may be another Frank G. Hoffman, “Small Wars Revisited: The
United States and Nontraditional War,” Journal of
place where the Special Operations community Strategic Studies, Vol. 28, no. 6 (December 2005); David
can apply its unique skill sets in the post–counter- Johnson, Doing What You Know: The United States and
terrorism world.95 250 Years of Irregular War, Washington DC: Center for
Strategic and Budgetary Assessment, August 2017.
4
Jan K. Gleiman, “The American Counterculture of
Multi-Dimensional Partnerships War: Supporting Foreign Insurgencies and the American
What is evident is the changing character of con- Discourse of War,” Special Operations Journal, Vol. 1, no.
1 (2015), 19–36.
flict today, which demands both a mindset and 5
For an argument for a general unitary concep-
an organizational approach that is creative and tion of warfare see Dr. Al Palazzo, “Forging Australian
multi-dimensional. The capacity to generate and Land Power: A Primer,” Directorate of Future Land
execute effective strategies across government Warfare, Australian Army, Army Research Papers no. 7,
(December 2015), 8–9.
lines, including private sector and international 6
Christopher Mewett, “Understanding War’s
organizational contributions, is especially salient Enduring Nature,” War on the Rocks, January 21,
in complex contingencies. The relative weight 2014, available at <http://warontherocks.com/2014/01/

42 | FE ATURE S PRISM 7, NO. 4

 GR AY ZONE AN D H Y BRID CHALLENGE S

understanding-wars-enduring-nature-along- View, Warsaw: Centre for Eastern Studies, May 2014.

17
side-its-changing-character/>. Mark Kramer, “The Soviet Roots of Meddling
7
See the arguments against categories from a stra- in U.S. Politics,” PONARS Eurasia Policy Memo
tegic theorist, Colin Gray, “Categorical Confusion, The # 452, Washington, DC, January, 2017, avail-
Strategic Implications of Recognizing Challenges Either able at <http://www.ponarseurasia.org/memo/
as Irregular or Traditional,” Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies soviet-roots-meddling-us-politics>.
18
Institute, February 2012. Michael Birnbaum, “Russian’s Tactics Roil
8
On an argument in favor of a unitary perspective Europe,” The Washington Post, August 14, 2016, 1; and
see Hew Strachan, The Direction of War: Contemporary the joint statement from the Department of Homeland
Strategy in Historical Perspective (New York: Cambridge Security and Director of National Intelligence,
University Press, 2012), 112. Washington, DC, October 7, 2016 available at <https://
9
VADM Kevin Scott, USN, Joint Operating www.dhs.gov/news/2016/10/07/joint-statement-depart-
Environment 2035, Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff/ ment-homeland-security-and-office-director-national>.
19
J7, July 14, 2016, ii. Orysia Lutsevych, Agents of the Russian World
10
Christopher Andrew and Vasili Mitrokhin, The (Proxy Groups) (London: Royal United Services Institute,
Sword and the Shield: The Mitrokhin Archive and the April 2016).
20
Secret History of the KGB, 1999; Christopher Andrew Timothy Thomas, “Russia’s Information Warfare
and Oleg Gordievsky, Comrade Kryuchkov’s Instructions, Strategy: Can the Nation Cope in Future Conflicts?” Vol.
Top Secret Files on KGB Foreign Operations, 1975-1985, 27, no. 1, Journal of Slavic Military Studies, 2014, online at
Stanford, CA: Stanford UP, 2005. <http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/1351804
11
Victor Madeira, “Russian Subversion: Haven’t We 6.2014.874845>; Kier Giles et al, The Russian Challenge,
Been Here Before?,” July 30, 2014, available at <http:// London: Royal Institute of International Affairs,
www.statecraft.org.uk/research/russian-subversion- Chatham House Report, June 2015; Rod Thornton, “The
havent-we-been-here>; David Maxwell, “Taking a Spoon Changing Nature of Modern Warfare: Responding to
to a Gunfight,” War on the Rocks, April 2, 2014. Russian Information Warfare,” Vol. 160, no. 4 RUSI
12
Vasily Mitrokhin, KGB Lexicon: The Soviet Journal (Fall 2015), 40–48.
21
Intelligence Officer Handbook (London: Frank Cass, For assessment on Russian mastery of informa-
1992), 13. On Russian historical cases see Richard H. tion distortion in multiple mediums see: Clint Watts,
Shultz and Roy Godson, Dezinformatsia: Active Measures “Disinformation: A Primer in Russian Active Measures
in Soviet Strategy, McLean, VA: Pergamon-Brassey’s, and Influence Campaigns.” Statement prepared for the
1984; U.S. Information Agency, Soviet Active Measures Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, March 30,
in the “Post-Cold War” Era 1988-1991, Washington DC: 2017. Available at <https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/
USIA, June 1992. Events in the fall of 2016 suggest that sites/default/files/documents/os-cwatts-033017.pdf>;
the Russians have continued their practices, see Craig Clint Watts. “Cyber-enabled Information Operations.”
Timberg, “Research ties ‘fake news’ to Russia,” The Statement prepared for the Senate Committee on the
Washington Post, November 25, 2016, A1, A15. Armed Services, Subcommittee on Cybersecurity, April
13
Martin Kragh and Sebastian Asberg, “Russia’s 27, 2017, available at <https://www.armed-services.senate.
Strategy for Influence through Public Diplomacy and gov/download/watts_04-27-17>; Clint Watts, “Extremist
Active Measures: The Swedish Case,” Journal of Strategic Content and Russian Disinformation Online: Working
Studies, January 5, 2017, available at <http://dx.doi.org/10. with Tech to Find Solutions,” Statement prepared for the
1080/01402390.2016.1273830>. Senate Judiciary Committee, Subcommittee on Crime
14
Craig Timberg and Elizabeth Dwoskin, and Terrorism, October 31, 2017, available at <https://
“Russian content on Facebook, Google and Twitter www.fpri.org/article/2017/10/extremist-content-russian-
reached far more users than companies first disclosed,” disinformation-online-working-tech-find-solutions/>.
22
The Washington Post, October 30, 2017, available Mike Rogers, “America Is Ill-Prepared to Counter
at <https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/ Russia’s Information Warfare,” Wall Street Journal, March
technology/2017/10/30/4509587e-bd84-11e7-97d9- 28, 2017, A17.
23
bdab5a0ab381_story.html?utm_term=.08451ccd09c6>. Andrew S. Erickson, Connor M. Kennedy, “Beware
15
Adam Taylor, “Before ‘fake news,’ there was Soviet of China’s “Little Blue Men” in the South China Sea,” The
‘disinformation’,” The Washington Post, November 26, 2016. National Interest, September 15, 2015, available at <http://
16
Jolanta Darczewska, “The Anatomy of Russian nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/beware-chinas-little-
Information Warfare, The Crimean Operation,” Point of blue-men-the-south-china-sea-13846>.

PRISM 7, NO. 4 FE ATURE S | 43

HOFFM AN

24
See Andrew S. Erickson and Connor M. Kennedy, “Winning Without Fighting: Chinese Public Opinion
“Countering China’s Third Sea Force: Unmask Maritime Warfare and the Need for a Robust American Response,”
Militia before They’re Used Again,” The National Interest, Washington DC: Heritage Foundation, Backgrounder No.
July 6, 2016, available at <http://nationalinterest.org/ 2745, November 26, 2012.
32
feature/countering-chinas-third-sea-force-unmask- Stephan Halper, “China: The Three
maritime-militia-16860?page=show>. Warfares,” May 2013, available at <http://
25
Kenneth Allen, Phillip C. Saunders, and John images.smh.com.au/file/2014/04/11/5343124/
Chen “Chinese Military Diplomacy, 2003–2016: Trends China_%2520The%2520three%2520warfares.
and Implications.” Washington, DC: Center for the pdf?rand=1397212645609>. Sangkuk Lee, “China’s Three
Study of Chinese Military Affairs, China Strategic Warfares, Origins, Applications, and Organizations,” Journal
Perspectives 11, 2017. of Strategic Studies, Vol. 37, no. 2 (April 2014), 198–220.
26 33
“China’s Foreign Influence Operations Are Lora Sallman, “Little Grey Men: China and the
Causing Alarm in Washington,” Washington Post Ukraine Crisis,”, Vol. 58, Issue 6 Survival (2016), 135–156.
34
December 11, 2107, at <https://www.washingtonpost.com/ See David Tucker and Christopher J. Lamb,
opinions/global-opinions/chinas-foreign-influencers- “Peacetime Engagement” in Sam Sarkesian and
are-causing-alarm-in-washington/2017/12/10/98227264- Robert Connor, America’s Armed Forces, A Handbook
dc58-11e7-b859-fb0995360725_story.html?utm_term=. of Current and Future Capabilities (Westport, CT:
c0b74b7e2aff>; Juan Pablo Cardenal, Jacek Kucharczyk, Greenwood Press, 1996).
35
Grigorij Mesežnikov, and Gabriela Pleschová, “Sharp Nadia Schadlow, “Peace and War, the Space
Power, Rising Authoritarian Influence,” National Between,” War on the Rock, August 18, 2014, avail-
Endowment for Democracy, December 2017, available able at <http://warontherocks.com/2014/08/
at <https://www.ned.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/ peace-and-war-the-space-between/>.
36
Sharp-Power-Rising-Authoritarian-Influence-Full- On the role and complexity of signaling through
Report.pdf>. exercises see Beatrice Heuser, Tormod Heier, and
27
Mark Stokes and Russell Hsiao, The People’s Guillaume Lasconjarias, eds., Military Exercises: Political
Liberation Army General Political Department Political Messaging and Strategic Impact (Rome: NATO Defence
Warfare with Chinese Characteristics, Washington, College, 2018).
37
DC: Project 2049 Institute, October 14, 2013. For Marla E. Karlin, Building Militaries in Fragile
an earlier study see J. Michael Waller, “Chinese States Challenges for the United States (Philadelphia:
Political Warfare Strategy Against the US,” Institute University of Pennsylvania Press 2018).
38
of World Politics Insight, April 23, 2001, available Max Boot and Michael Doran, “Political Warfare:
at <http://www.iwp.edu/news_publications/detail/ Changing America’s Approach to the Middle East,”
chinese-political-warfare-strategy-against-the-us>. Brookings, June 28, 2013, available at http://www.
28
Quoted in Peter Navarro, “China’s Non-kinetic brookings.edu/research/opinions/2013/06/28-political-
Three Warfares Against America,” Center for National warfare-us-middle-east-counterterrorism-doran-boot. On
Interest’s The Buzz (blog), January 5, 2016, available at the application of Political Warfare in the 21st Century,
<http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/chinas-non- see the White Paper, SOF Support to Political Warfare, U.S.
kinetic-three-warfares-against-america-14808>. Army Special Operations Commander, Ft. Bragg, NC,
29
Li Yan, “Implementing ‘Four Transformations’ March 10, 2015.
39
in Peacetime Political Mobilization,” China Military For Kennan’s policy memo promoting this ini-
Online, May 7, 2012, available at <http://chn.chinamil. tiative under the auspices of the State Department, see:
com.cn/yby/2012-05/07/content_4854257.htm>; Timothy <http://academic.brooklyn.cuny.edu/history/johnson/
L. Thomas, “New Developments in Chinese Strategic 65ciafounding3.htm>.
40
Psychological Warfare,” Special Warfare, April 2003. For an unsuccessful attempt to defend the term see
30
Irene Luo, “Former Chinese Diplomat On China’s Jeffrey V. Dickey, Thomas B. Everett, Zane M. Galvach,
Infiltration of Australia,” Epoch Times, July 7, 2017; Harry Matthew J. Mesko and Anton V. Soltis, Russian Political
Krejsa, Under Pressure: The Growing Reach of Chinese Warfare: Origins, Evolution and Application, Monterrey,
Influence Campaigns in Democratic Societies (Washington, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, unpublished M.A. thesis,
DC: Center for a New American Security, April 2018). June 2015.
31 41
Dean Cheng, “Winning Without Fighting: Chinese Giles D. Harlow and George C. Maerz, eds.,
Legal Warfare,” Washington DC: Heritage Foundation, Measures Short of War: The George F. Kennan Lectures
Backgrounder No.2692, May 21, 2012; Dean Cheng, at the National War College, 1946-47 (Washington, DC:

4 4 | FE ATURE S PRISM 7, NO. 4

 GR AY ZONE AN D H Y BRID CHALLENGE S

52
NDU Press, 1990), 6–8. He noted that “The varieties of National Intelligence Council, Global Trends
skullduggery which make up the repertoire of the totali- 2030: Alternative Worlds (Washington, DC: Director of
tarian government are just about as unlimited as human National Intelligence, April 2012), 65.
53
ingenuity itself, and just about as unpleasant.” NATO Multiple Futures Report, (Norfolk, VA:
42
Michael Mazarr, “Mastering the Gray Zone,” Allied Command Transformation, 2007).
54
Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2015. Frank G. Hoffman, Conflict in the 21st Century:
43
General Joseph L. Votel, statement before the The Rise of Hybrid Wars (Arlington, VA: Potomac
House Armed Services Committee Subcommittee Institute for Policy Studies, 2007), 14, 58.
55
on Emerging Threats and Capabilities, March 18, Anders Fogh Rasmussen quoted in Mark Landler
2015; Captain Philip Kapusta, U.S. Special Operations and Michael Gordon, “NATO Chief Warns of Duplicity
Command (USSOCOM) white paper, “Defining Gray by Putin on Ukraine,” The New York Times, July 8, 2014.
56
Zone Challenges,” April 2015. Quoted in Matt Mathews, We Were Caught
44
David Barno and Nora Bensahel, “Fighting and Unprepared, the 2006 Hezbollah-Israeli War, Ft.
Winning in the ‘Gray Zone,’” War on the Rocks, May 19, 2015. Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2008.
45 57
John Arguilla, “Perils of the Gray Zone, Paradigms Dima Adamsky, “Russia’s Intervention in Syria—
Lost, Paradoxes Regained,” Vol. 7 no. 2, PRISM, 2018, 124. Strategic Implications and Warfare Lessons.” Ma’arakhot,
46
Office of the Director of National Intelligence, November 1, 2016.
58
Global Trends: Paradox of Progress (Washington, DC: Andrew Mumford “Proxy Warfare and the Future
National Intelligence Council, 2017). of Conflict,” The RUSI Journal, Vol. 158, no. 2 (2013),
47
Paul W. Blackstock, The Strategy of Subversion: 40–46, published online April 28, 2013.
59
Manipulating the Politics of Other Nations (Chicago, David E. Johnson, Hard Fighting: Israel in
IL: Quadrangle, 1964), 41–77;William Roseau, Lebanon and Gaza (Santa Monica, CA: RAND
Subversion and Insurgency, Santa Monica, CA: RAND, Corporation, 2011), 148–149, available <http://www.
Counterinsurgency Study Occasional Paper, 2007, 4. rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2011/
48
William. J. Nemeth, USMC, Future War and RAND_MG1085.sum.pdf>; David E. Johnson, “An
Chechnya: A Case for Hybrid Warfare, Monterrey, CA: Naval Overview of Land Warfare” in Dakota Wood, ed.,
Postgraduate School, Master’s Thesis, June 2002; James N. 2018 Index of U.S. Military Strength, Washington, DC:
Mattis and Frank Hoffman, “Hybrid Threats and the Four Heritage Foundation, October 2017.
60
Block War,” Proceedings, September 2005; Frank Hoffman, Anders Fogh Rasmussen quoted in Mark
“Hybrid Threats: Reconceptualizing the Evolving Character Landler and Michael Gordon, “NATO Chief Warns of
of Modern Conflict,” Strategic Forum 240, Washington, DC: Duplicity by Putin on Ukraine,” The New York Times,
Institute for National Strategic Studies, April 2009. July 8, 2014, A1.
49 61
David Johnson, Military Capabilities for Hybrid Sam Jones, “Ukraine: Russia’s new art of war,”
War: Insights from the Israel Defense Forces in Lebanon FT.Com, August 28, 2014, accessed at <http://www.
and Gaza (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2010). ft.com/cms/s/2/ea5e82fa-2e0c-11e4-b760-00144fe-
50
Robert M. Gates “The National Defense Strategy: abdc0.html#ixzz3O01r9qjy>; Yuri Drazdow “Modern
Striking the Right Balance,” Joint Force Quarterly (1st hybrid war, by Russia’s rules,” Minsk Herald, Nov. 3,
Quarter 2009), 2–7; Leon Panetta, Remarks at the 2014, available at <http://minskherald.com/2014/11/
Woodrow Wilson Center, Washington, DC, October 11, russian-new-military-doctrine/>.
62
2011, available at <at http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/ “What Russia Wants: From Cold War to Hot
transcript.aspx?transcriptid=4903>. War,” Economist, Feb. 14, 2015, available at <http://www.
51
General James T. Conway, USMC, Admiral Gary economist.com/news/briefing/21643220-russias-aggression-
Roughead, USN and Admiral Thad W. Allen, USCG, A ukraine-part-broader-and-more-dangerous-confrontation>.
63
Cooperative Strategy For Maritime Security, Washington, Ben Connable, Jason H. Campbell, and Dan
DC, October 2007; James Conway, Marine Corps Vision Madden, Stretching and Exploiting Thresholds for High-
and Strategy 2025, Washington DC: Headquarters, U.S. Order War (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2016).
64
Marine Corps, June 2008; General Martin Dempsey, Strategic Survey 2014, The Annual Review of World
“Versatility as an Institutional Imperative,” Small Wars Affairs, London: Institute for International Strategic
Journal, March 10, 2009; General James Amos, USMC, Studies, 2014, 53–64; “Hybrid Warfare: Challenge and
Commandant’s Planning Guidance, November 2010; Response,” Military Balance, London: Institute for
Raymond T. Odierno, “The U.S. Army in a Time of International Strategic Studies, 2015, 17–20.
65
Transition,” Foreign Affairs, May/June 2012, 10. Mazarr, “Mastering the Gray Zone, 44–46;

PRISM 7, NO. 4 FE ATURE S | 45

HOFFM AN

Michael Kofman and Matthew Rojansky. “A Closer Look Beyond Convergence: World Without Order, (Washington,
at Russia’s Hybrid War,” Kennan Cable No. 7, Washington, DC: National Defense University, Center for Complex
DC: Woodrow Wilson Center, April, 2015. Operations, 2016).
66 77
Wales NATO Summit Communique, North Brig. Gen. Muni Katz, IDF and Nadav Pollak,
Atlantic Treaty Organization, September 4, 2014, “Hezbollah’s Russian Military Education in Syria,”
accessed at <http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_ Washington, DC: Washington Institute, Policy Watch
texts_112964.htm?selectedLocale=en>. 2541, December 24, 2015; Barbara Opall-Rome, “Russian
67
For analysis drawn from field research and direct Influence on Hezbollah Raises Red Flag in Israel, Defense
observations, see Dr. Philip A. Karber, “Lessons Learned News, November 6, 2016, available at <https://www.
from the Russo-Ukrainian War,” paper delivered at the defensenews.com/global/mideast-africa/2016/11/07/
Historical Lessons Learned Workshop conducted at russian-influence-on-hezbollah-raises-red-flag-in-israel/>.
78
Johns Hopkins Applied Physics Laboratory, July 2015. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, Peter Paret
UN statistics cited available at <http://euromaidanpress. and Michael Howard, eds. and trans. (Princeton, NJ:
com/2016/09/21/real-human-costs-of-russian-aggression- Princeton University Press, 1986), 88–89.
79
in-ukraine-still-uncounted-un-says/>. H. R. McMaster, “Change and Continuity, The
68
Phillip A. Karber, “Russian Style Hybrid Warfare,” Army Operating Concept and Clear Thinking About
McLean, VA: The Potomac Foundation, 2015. Future War,” Military Review (March/April, 2015), 6–18.
69 80
Vladimir Peshkov, “The Donbas: Back in the Elizabeth Young, “Decade of War: Enduring
USSR,” European Council on Foreign Relations, 2014. Lessons from a Decade of Operations,” Vol. 4, no. 2,
Valentin Torba,“The great tragedy of little Luhansk,” PRISM, 2015, 126–27.
81
European Council on Foreign Relations, January 15, 2016, James N. Mattis, Synopsis of the National Defense
available at <http://www.ecfr.eu/article/commentary_ Strategy, Sharpening the U.S. Military’s Competitive Edge,
the_great_tragedy_of_little_luhansk>. In Ukraine, the Washington, DC: Department of Defense, January 2018.
82
net effect of the criminal activity is to control the popula- “The paradox of war is that an enemy will attack a
tion through access to food. perceived weakness, so we cannot adopt a single pre-
70
Wes Clark and Jack Keane, “Ukraine’s Hybrid clusive form of warfare.” James N. Mattis, transcript,
War,” The Washington Times, March 6, 2018. Roll Out Speech for National Defense Strategy, School
71
Michael Kofman, et al in Lessons from Russia’s of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins
Operations in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine (Santa University, Washington, DC, January 19, 2018.
83
Monica, CA: RAND 2017), 77. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Operations,
72
Oscar Jonsson and Robert Seely, “Russian Full- (Washington, DC: Joint Staff, August 11, 2011), I-5.
84
Spectrum Conflict: An Appraisal after Ukraine,” Vol. 28, Alan Dupont, Full-Spectrum Defense: Re-thinking
Journal of Slavic Military Studies, 2015. the Fundamentals of Australian Defense Strategy
73
Ofer Fridman, Russian ‘Hybrid’ Warfare, London: (Sidney, Australia: Lowy Institute, March 2015), avail-
Hurst, 2018 (forthcoming). able at <http://www.lowyinstitute.org/publications/
74
Guillaume Lasconjarias and Jeffrey A. Larsen, eds. full-spectrum-defence-re-thinking-fundamentals-austra-
NATO’s Response to Hybrid Threats (Rome: NATO Defense lian-defence-strategy>.
85
College, 2015). For a superb assessment, see András Rácz, Nathan Freier, et al, Outplayed: Regaining Strategic
“Russia’s Hybrid War in Ukraine: Breaking the Enemy’s Initiative in the Gray Zone (Carlisle, PA: Army War
Ability to Resist,” FIIA Report 43 (Helsinki, Finland: The College, Strategic Studies Institute, May 2016).
86
Finnish Institute of International Affairs, 2015). Linton Wells, “Cognitive-Emotional Conflict,
75
For an excellent look at Russian-based organized Adversary Will and Social Resilience,” Vol. 7, no. 2,
crime see Mark Galeotti, “CRIMINTERN: How the PRISM, 2017, 4–17.
87
Kremlin Uses Russia’s Criminal Networks in Europe,” For ideas on countering coercive activities by
Policy Brief, European Council on Foreign Relations, China in Asia, see Patrick Cronin and Andrew Sullivan,
London, April 2017. See also the insights by Claire Bigg, Preserving the Rules: Countering Coercion in Maritime Asia
“Vostok Battalion, A Powerful New Player in Eastern (Washington, DC: Center for a New American Century,
Ukraine,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, October March 2015). US. Army Special Operations Command,
27, 2015. Accessed at <http://www.rferl.org/content/ “Counter-Unconventional Warfare,” White Paper, Fort
vostok-battalion-a-powerful-new-player-in-easter- Bragg, NC, September 26, 2014. See also Joseph L Votel,
nukraine/25404785.html>. Charles, T. Cleveland, Charles T. Connett, and Will Irwin,
76
Hilary Matfess and Michael Miklaucic, eds., “Unconventional Warfare in the Gray Zone,” Joint Force

46 | FE ATURE S PRISM 7, NO. 4

 GR AY ZONE AN D H Y BRID CHALLENGE S

Quarterly, Issue 80 (1st Quarter 2016), 101–110.

88
Dickey et al, 256.
89
As noted in a claim by the U.S. Government,
available at <https://www.dhs.gov/news/2016/10/07/
joint-statement-department-homeland-security-and-of-
fice-director-national>.
90
The various uses of some terminology is evident in
the literature, for example see Robert Johnson, “Hybrid
Warfare and its Countermeasures, A Critique of the
Literature,” Small Wars and Insurgencies, Vol. 29, no. 1
(2018), 141–163.
91
See the valuable insights of David Ucko and
Thomas Marks, “Violence in Context: Mapping the
Strategies and Operational Art of Irregular Warfare,”
Contemporary Security Policy, Vol. 39, no. 2 (2018),
206–233.
92
Ibid, 224.
93
For an excellent example see Timothy L. Thomas,
“The Evolving Nature of Russia’s Way of War,” Military
Review (July/August, 2017), 34–40.
94
Robert R. Bowie and Richard H. Immerman,
Waging Peace: How Eisenhower Shaped an Enduring
Cold War Strategy (New York: Oxford University Press,
1998). On the Eisenhower era see James M. Ludes, A
Consistency of Purpose: Political Warfare and the National
Security Strategy of the Eisenhower Administration, Ph.D
dissertation, Georgetown University, 2003. See also
Fletcher Schoen and Christopher J. Lamb, Deception,
Disinformation, and Strategic Communications: How One
Interagency Group Made a Major Difference (Washington,
DC: NDU Press, June 2012).
95
David Ellis, Charles Black and Mary Ann Nobles,
“Thinking Dangerously, Imagining SOCOM in the
Post-CT World,” Vol. 6, no. 3, PRISM, 2016, 110–29.
96
For a recent assessment of how the United States
might adapt better see Linda Robinson et al Modern
Political Warfare: Current Practices and Possible Responses
(Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2018). For ideas on how the
United States should begin to conceive of more compre-
hensive campaigning below the threshold of conventional
war, see Joint Concept, Integrated Campaigning
(Washington, DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff (J7) 2018).
97
For key lessons about the need for and types of
organizational innovation used recently see Christopher
Fussell and D. W. Lee, “Networks at War: Organizational
Innovation and Adaptation in the 21st Century,” in
Hilary Matfess and Michael Miklaucic, eds., Beyond
Convergence: World Without Order (Washington,
DC: National Defense University, Center for Complex
Operations, 2016).
98
Brian McAllister Linn, “The U.S. Armed Forces’
View of War,” Vol. 140, no. 3, Daedalus (Summer 2011), 34.

PRISM 7, NO. 4 FE ATURE S | 47