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Lhuillier vs. British Airways, G.R. No. 171092, March 15, 2010 DIGEST

1. The petitioner, a frequent traveler, complained about rude treatment by flight attendants on a British Airways flight from London to Rome. She filed a damages case against British Airways in the Philippines. 2. British Airways argued the case must be dismissed because under the Warsaw Convention, jurisdiction is only proper in the courts of London or Rome. The trial court agreed. 3. On appeal, the Supreme Court upheld the dismissal, finding that the Warsaw Convention applies since this was international air travel between two Convention signatories. Under the Convention, jurisdiction is limited to the locations specified in Article 28(1), not Philippine courts.

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187 views4 pages

Lhuillier vs. British Airways, G.R. No. 171092, March 15, 2010 DIGEST

1. The petitioner, a frequent traveler, complained about rude treatment by flight attendants on a British Airways flight from London to Rome. She filed a damages case against British Airways in the Philippines. 2. British Airways argued the case must be dismissed because under the Warsaw Convention, jurisdiction is only proper in the courts of London or Rome. The trial court agreed. 3. On appeal, the Supreme Court upheld the dismissal, finding that the Warsaw Convention applies since this was international air travel between two Convention signatories. Under the Convention, jurisdiction is limited to the locations specified in Article 28(1), not Philippine courts.

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4. Lhuillier vs.

British Airway
G.R. No. 171092. March 15, 2010.*
EDNA DIAGO LHUILLIER, petitioner, vs. BRITISH AIRWAYS, respondent.

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

FACTS:

On February 28, 2005, petitioner Edna Diago Lhuillier took British Airways’ (herein respondent) flight
548 from London, United Kingdom to Rome, Italy. On board, she requested Julian Halliday, one of the
respondent’s flight attendants, to assist her in placing her hand-carried luggage in the overhead bin,
but Halliday allegedly refused to help and assist her, and even sarcastically remarked that “If I were to
help all 300 passengers in this flight, I would have a broken back!”

In addition, when the plane was about to land in Rome, Italy, another flight attendant, Nickolas
Kerrigan, singled her out from among all the passengers in the business class section to lecture on
plane safety, making her appear to the other passengers to be ignorant, uneducated, stupid, and in
need of lecturing on the safety rules and regulations of the plane. Affronted, petitioner told Kerrigan
that she was a frequent traveler and hence, knew the plane’s safety regulations. In turn, Kerrigan
thrust his face a mere few centimeters away from that of the petitioner and menacingly told her that
“We don’t like your attitude.” Upon arrival in Rome, petitioner complained to respondent’s ground
manager and demanded an apology. However, the latter declared that the flight stewards were “only
doing their job.”

Thereafter, she filed a Complaint for damages against respondent before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Makati City praying that respondent be ordered to pay P5 million as moral damages, P2
million as nominal damages, P1 million as exemplary damages, P300,000.00 as attorney’s fees,
P200,000.00 as litigation expenses, and cost of the suit.

Summons, together with the copy of the complaint, was served on the respondent through Violeta
Echevarria, General Manager of Euro-Philippine Airline Services, Inc. Respondent, by way of special
appearance through counsel, filed a Motion to Dismiss on grounds of lack of jurisdiction over the
case and over the person of the respondent. Respondent alleged that only the courts of London,
United Kingdom or Rome, Italy, have jurisdiction over the complaint for damages pursuant to the
Warsaw Convention, Article 28(1) of which provides:

“An action for damages must be brought at the option of the plaintiff, either before the court of
domicile of the carrier or his principal place of business, or where he has a place of business
through which the contract has been made, or before the court of the place of destination.”

Thus, since a) respondent is domiciled in London; b) respondent’s principal place of business is in


London; c) petitioner bought her ticket in Italy (through Jeepney Travel S.A.S, in Rome); and d) Rome,
Italy is petitioner’s place of destination, then it follows that the complaint should only be filed in the
proper courts of London, United Kingdom or Rome, Italy.

Likewise, respondent contended that the case must be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction over the
person of the respondent because the summons was erroneously served on Euro-Philippine Airline
Services, Inc. which is not its resident agent in the Philippines.

The RTC ruled in favor of respondent, ruling that it has no jurisdiction by virtue of the provisions in the
Warsaw Convention. Hence, this Petition for Review on Certiorari on pure questions of law was filed
by petitioner.

In this petition, petitioner argues that her cause of action arose not from the contract of carriage, but
from the tortious conduct committed by airline personnel of respondent in violation of the provisions
of the Civil Code on Human Relations. Hence, she has the option to pursue this case in this
jurisdiction pursuant to Philippine laws. On the other hand, respondent asserted that that petitioner’s
claim for damages fell within the ambit of Article 28(1) of the Warsaw Convention. As such, the same
can only be filed before the courts of London, United Kingdom or Rome, Italy.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner’s claim for damages fell within the ambit of Article 28(1) of the
Warsaw Convention and hence, Philippine Courts have no jurisdiction over the case - YES

HELD:

1. It is settled that the Warsaw Convention has the force and effect of law in this country as such is a
treaty commitment voluntarily assumed by the Philippine government and, as such, has the force and
effect of law in this country.

In Santos III v. Northwest Orient Airlines, the SC held that the Republic of the Philippines is a party to
the Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Transportation by Air or
the Warsaw Convention which took effect on February 13, 1933. The Convention was concurred in by
the Senate, through its Resolution No. 19, on May 16, 1950. The Philippine instrument of accession
was signed by President Elpidio Quirino on October 13, 1950, and was deposited with the Polish
government on November 9, 1950. The Convention became applicable to the Philippines on February
9, 1951. On September 23, 1955, President Ramon Magsaysay issued Proclamation No. 201,
declaring our formal adherence thereto.

2. Well-settled in our jurisprudence that tortious conduct as ground for the


petitioner’s complaint is within the purview of the Warsaw Convention.
The Warsaw Convention applies because the air travel, where the alleged tortious conduct occurred,
was between the United Kingdom and Italy, which are both signatories to the Warsaw Convention.
For the purposes of the application of this Convention, the expression “international carriage” means
any carriage in which, according to the contract made by the parties, the place of departure and the
place of destination, whether or not there be a break in the carriage or a transshipment, are situated
either within the territories of two High Contracting Parties, or within the territory of a single High
Contracting Party, if there is an agreed stopping place within a territory subject to the sovereignty,
suzerainty, mandate or authority of another Power, even though that Power is not a party to this
Convention. A carriage without such an agreed stopping place between territories subject to the
sovereignty, suzerainty, mandate or authority of the same High Contracting Party is not deemed to be
international for the purposes of this Convention.

3. By virtue of the said Convention, the place where petitioner may bring the action for damages,
under its Article 28(1) is either to the following courts: where the carrier is domiciled; where the
carrier has its principal place of business; where the carrier has an establishment by which the
contract has been made; or of the place of destination.

This particular provision is jurisdictional in character and not a venue provision. First, the wording of
Article 32, which indicates the places where the action for damages “must” be brought, underscores
the mandatory nature of Article 28(1). Second, this characterization is consistent with one of the
objectives of the Convention, which is to “regulate in a uniform manner the conditions of international
transportation by air.” Third, the Convention does not contain any provision prescribing rules of
jurisdiction other than Article 28(1), which means that the phrase “rules as to jurisdiction” used in
Article 32 must refer only to Article 28(1). In fact, the last sentence of Article 32 specifically deals with
the exclusive enumeration in Article 28(1) as “jurisdictions,” which, as such, cannot be left to the will
of the parties regardless of the time when the damage occurred.

4. Moreover, there was no voluntary appearance on the part of the respondent in this case which will
vest jurisdiction to RTC over tis person. Respondent, in seeking remedies from the trial court through
special appearance of counsel, is not deemed to have voluntarily submitted itself to the jurisdiction of
the trial court. In this case, the special appearance of the counsel of respondent in filing the Motion to
Dismiss and other pleadings before the trial court cannot be deemed to be voluntary submission to
the jurisdiction of the said trial court.

The second sentence of Sec. 20, Rule 14 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure clearly provides:

Sec. 20. Voluntary appearance.—The defendant’s voluntary appearance in the action shall be


equivalent to service of summons.

The inclusion in a motion to dismiss of other grounds aside from lack of jurisdiction over the person
of the defendant shall not be deemed a voluntary appearance. Thus, a defendant who files a motion
to dismiss, assailing the jurisdiction of the court over his person, together with other grounds raised
therein, is not deemed to have appeared voluntarily before the court. What the rule on voluntary
appearance means is that the voluntary appearance of the defendant in court is without qualification,
in which case he is deemed to have waived his defense of lack of jurisdiction over his person due to
improper service of summons.

Petition denied.

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