Hague Centre for Strategic Studies

Report Part Title: STATE AND NON-STATE ACTORS: BEYOND THE DICHOTOMY
Report Part Author(s): Peter Wijninga, Willem Theo Oosterveld, Jan Hendrik Galdiga and
Philipp Marten

Report Title: STRATEGIC MONITOR 2014

Report Subtitle: FOUR STRATEGIC CHALLENGES
Report Author(s): Eline Chivot, Jan Hendrik Galdiga, Maarten Gehem, Emily Knowles,
Matthijs Maas, Philipp Marten, Willem Theo Oosterveld, Menno Schellekens, João Silveira,
Peter Wijninga, Michelle Yuemin Yang and Olga Zelinska
Report Editor(s): Joris van Esch, Frank Bekkers, Stephan De Spiegeleire, Tim Sweijs
Published by: Hague Centre for Strategic Studies (2014)
Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep12608.8

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4 STATE AND NON-
STATE ACTORS:
BEYOND THE
DICHOTOMY
4.1 Introduction 141
4.2 What are State and Non-State Actors? 142
4.3 Non-State Actors in World Affairs 146
4.4 Examining Civil Society Actors in Depth 152
4.5 Conclusions & Security Implications 159

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4 STATE AND NON-STATE
ACTORS: BEYOND THE
DICHOTOMY

Peter Wijninga, Willem Theo Oosterveld, Jan Hendrik Galdiga, Philipp Marten

4.1 Introduction
In today’s globalized and multipolar world, Non-State Actors play a key role in national
and international security. Until the turn of the 21st century the world was very much
dominated by states. Nowadays, Non-State Actors such as The World Bank, Gazprom,
Al-Qaeda, Huawei Technologies and Transparency International command the
international headlines as much as states do, and are often able to decisively influence
state decision-making processes. However, the wide range of Non-State Actors also
indicates a variety of ways in which they influence international affairs. In fact, the
problem starts with the very fact that ‘Non-State Actors’ is a negatively posited catch-
all term that has no obvious delimitations. Non-state actors include non-governmental
organizations (NGOs), but equally so multinational corporations, private military
organizations, media outlets, terrorist groups, organized ethnic groups, academic
institutions, lobby groups, criminal organizations, labor unions or social movements,
and others. All wield different forms of power. Some contribute positively to security
and stability whereas others actively undermine it.

Last year’s HCSS Strategic Monitor concluded that “the state is back with a
vengeance, both at the international and the national level.” The steady rise of Non-
State Actors over the last few decades, and the associated diffusion of power, seems
in recent years to be matched by a greater profiling of state actors. Examples are the
large-scale economic interventions by governments in the aftermath of the financial
crisis, and the way in which states managed to reduce terrorist threats.1
Notwithstanding this assertion – which remains relevant – it is clear that Non-State
Actors have gained in importance in the foreign and security policy areas in significant
ways. This study aims to develop a clearer view on the roles and influence of Non-
State Actors. In particular, we elaborate on the interaction between State and Non-
State Actors, whilst acknowledging that the relative power and influence of State and
Non-State Actors cannot always be easily quantified.

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This study is organized as follows. Section 4.2 examines in some detail the distinction
between State and Non-State Actors, which is more complicated than a simple linear
dichotomy. Section 4.3 looks at the drivers of Non-State Actor activities, why these
Non-State Actors matter, and how they influence the security environment. In section
4.4 we elaborate on the particular case of cooperative Non-State Actors, generally
labelled as civil society actors that may support or leverage the security functions of
state actors. For the purpose of this study we will refer to these civil society actors as
non-governmental organizations (NGOs).2 Finally, section 4.5 concludes with the key
security implications from our analysis.

4.2 What are State and Non-State Actors?

Evolution of the Notion of ‘State’
To clearly understand the role of Non-State Actors, we first need to have more clarity
on what we mean by State versus Non-State Actors. Prima facie, the distinction does
not appear to be very problematic. In traditional political science discourse, states
were considered the only relevant players. Moreover, they were considered as
coherent actors.3 In recent decades, however, the idea of state actors and how they
operate has increasingly been unpacked, mostly due to globalization, the rise of
communication technology and the emergence of a multipolar world order.4 The nature
and extent of state authority and the ways in which a state exerts its authority have
dramatically changed.5 While the state’s core task used to be to ensure security and
protection for its citizens6, nowadays the state provides social security, healthcare,
transportation, education and many more services well beyond enforcement of the
law. For instance, the Dutch spending on defense currently is only about 5% compared
to the combined spending on healthcare and social security.7 While the post-World
War II period pointed towards an accumulation of tasks on the part of governments,
the last decades have witnessed some reverse trends in the shape of outsourcing and
privatization, creating more opportunities for Non-State Actors to jump into the fold. At
the same time, the model of the Westphalian State existing in an anarchical world has
changed radically in some parts of the world because of the rise of international
institutions–the EU institutions being the best example in this respect.8 The result is
that the influence of the state as an actor appears to have declined over the past three
decades, in particular to the benefit of Non-State Actors, such as NGOs.9

Of course, the extent of the state and its ability to provide security can differ
dramatically across the world. For instance, in developed countries, the state
monopoly on the use of force to provide security10 is usually not subject to discussion.

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0.55

0.50

0.45

0.40
0
1980 1990 2000 2010

FIGURE 4.1: DECLINING INVOLVEMENT OF STATE ACTORS IN GLOBAL EVENTS, MEASURED BY SHARE OF GLOBAL NEWS
COVERAGE (%), SINCE 2000 (SOURCE: GDELT).

In other parts of the world, the very opposite is not seldomly the case. Examples
include Somalia, Mali, Lebanon, Pakistan and DR Congo, and perhaps even Ukraine.
These are countries where ethnic, tribal or private groups sometimes amass so many
weapons and means to enforce their writ that they effectively constituted ‘a state
within a state’. Even so, the differences between state authority in developed and less
developed countries should not be drawn in absolute terms. After all, governments
everywhere are subject to global pressures of an economic or technological nature.
Their ability to exercise force for the sake of security has evolved in different ways,
whether as a result of state failure, of drastically increased costs, of privatization, or of
pooling of resources at the international level.

Evolution of the Notion of ‘Non-State Actor’

The more the idea of the state as a coherent actor is differentiated, the more the roles
of Non-State Actors and the impact they have on societal issues, including security
matters, stand out. The kinds of actors that we can classify as Non-State Actors
include NGOs, charities, political parties, lobby groups, the media and multinational
companies, super-empowered individuals such as ‘oligarchs’, but also terrorist groups
and international crime syndicates, as well as diasporas and organized ethnic
minorities. With such a variety of actors, many of which have ties to state authorities,
it becomes difficult to ascertain or even compare their impact on state authority. For
instance, in a country like Colombia, how is one to judge the impact of FARC rebels
compared with that of local human rights NGOs upon the functioning of Colombian
state authorities?

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In the literature there is a multitude of definitions for Non-State Actors, many so broad
or vague as to be of little methodological merit.11 One potentially fruitful way to define
them for our purposes may be by comparing Non-State Actors against the attributes
of a state.12 To begin with, a Non-State Actor does not exercise formal power over, or
on behalf of, a given population. However, this does not mean that it has no
constituency of its own. Many Non-State Actors have formal membership bases,
employees (in the case of large corporations and NGOs) and sympathizers. Sometimes
Non-State Actors act as official representatives of designated groups in a country (e.g.
an ethnically defined political party). As a result, a Non-State Actor can sometimes be
very influential, in some respects even more powerful than a state itself. Secondly, a
Non-State Actor does not formally control territory. This is true as a rule, but separatist
movements, large companies, or the Catholic Church can in fact be in effective control
of territory. Conversely, the state itself may not always be in control of all territory
under its jurisdiction, as in the tribal areas of Pakistan. Finally, the cornerstone rule
that international relations are built on formalized state-to-state relations is also
becoming questionable. Many NGOs now have standing in certain interstate bodies,
and are able to conclude agreements with state authorities. Also, states are now
entering more often in officially sanctioned contracts such as Public-Private
Partnerships (PPPs)13 with commercial enterprises. As a result, Non-State Actors are
assuming more responsibility under international law. The UN’s Global Compact
(2000), which brings together governments and multinationals to promote good
business practices is one well-known example amongst many.

What these observations point to is that “to be considered an actor in world politics,
the entity under consideration needs to possess a degree of autonomy and influence
rather than the legal and state-related status of sovereignty.”14 It is emblematic of
today’s world that power and influence are no longer only determined by legal status
and hard power attributes, but also by the extent of an organization’s network, by their
perceived or recognized legitimacy and by their power to mobilize resources.

Current Dutch Perspective on State and Non-State Actors

In the Eindrapport Verkenningen, the Dutch government introduced a ‘scenario
framework’ as a first-order conceptualization of possible future security environments.
Two ‘key uncertainties’ were introduced, one being “will global security mainly be
determined by States or by Non-State Actors?” This model presents some issues in
understanding the role of Non-State Actors. The issue here is that it suggests a zero-
sum perspective where the rise of the one represents an inevitable decline of the
other, even if the framework does not mean that states take preference to the
exclusion of other actors, or vice versa.15

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Another problem of the scenario framework is that, rather than focusing on whether
or not actors advance the causes of peace and stability or promote conflict and war,
the horizontal axis (the other key uncertainty) takes the cooperation between global
actors as the central dimension, even if the degree of cooperation says relatively little
about security implications.16

Finally, the developers of the framework take a cautious approach by suggesting that no
single scenario will prevail globally everywhere and at all times, but that in reality,
different scenarios will preponderate in different parts of the globe. 17 While this is not
unlikely, the present study suggests that in many respects the network scenario is in
fact becoming more dominant that the other scenarios,18 while at the same time the
security implications of all four scenarios remain possible. The Verkenningen report
notes that in the network scenario, national sovereignty, the state’s monopoly on the
use of force, and the international rule of law are all being challenged.19 Indeed, in a
networked society, various functions of the state–including security-related functions–
may be executed by Non-State Actors in some sort of public-private partnership. Power
and influence of Non-State Actors can augment that of state actors, and vice versa. As
the Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review of the US State Department put it
in 2010 in relation to US foreign policy: “The potential of civil society organizations
around the world to advance common interests with us is unprecedented. Non-state
actors bring considerable political and financial resources to bear on collective
challenges. They mobilize populations within and across states to promote growth,
fundamental human values, and effective democratic government. (...) They are
indispensable partners, force multipliers, and agents of positive change.”20 Therefore,
Non-State Actors should not always be considered as providing a challenge to state
authority, but also as an opportunity for governments to improve security and stability.

Another important point to underline is that the rise of Non-State Actors requires
governments to conduct diplomacy in a different fashion. Globalization and economic
development have not only spurred the rise of Non-State Actors, but also created new
ways for actors to interact, whether in informal fora (e.g. as part of transnational
coalitions); between non-traditional players (e.g. between businesses and advocacy
groups); or through new modes of communication (e.g. Twitter and Facebook). Several
constructive suggestions for modernizing modes of interaction were made in the
interim report published by the Dutch Advisory Commission on Modernising
Diplomacy (the “Commission-Docters van Leeuwen”), which, among other things,
noted that “[a] “world of networks” has emerged exhibiting a huge increase of and
synergies between state and Non-State Actors, as well as subject matters and

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channels through which these parties cooperate. This occurs ever more through
informal networks, and in varying levels.”21 In its response, the government
acknowledged this new reality,22 and is now in the process of reorganizing the
diplomatic service accordingly.

Multiple factors explain how this role of Non-State Actors in international relations and
global security has come about. In this study, we will elaborate on this and suggest
some ways for governments to engage with Non-State Actors, both cooperative and
non-cooperative ones.

4.3 Non-State Actors in World Affairs

Drivers of Non-State Actor Activity
There is nothing accidental about the rise of Non-State Actors. The first causal factor is
the emergence of a multipolar world order. Simply put, the presence of multiple
centers of power and influence creates more opportunities for Non-State Actors to
play an international or even global role. For instance, while during the Cold War large
companies often encountered obstacles when operating in countries that belonged to
the sphere of influence of the other superpower, such restrictions rarely exist today.
The same applies for NGOs, many of which today enjoy a global presence. This is not
a one-way-street, however, but rather a mutually reinforcing development. The global
rise of Non-State Actors has undoubtedly contributed to further increase the multipolar
character of the world order. What is more, since the relative power of single countries
has decreased, they are generally less able to control Non-State Actor activities.
Transnational terrorism and crime are only two examples in kind.

A second, closely related factor is globalization. The past two decades have been
dominated by free-market thinking. Many large corporations have benefited from the
multipolar world and the opportunities to amass capital and develop a global reach.
More specifically, globalization has also allowed companies from the ‘Global South’23
to become very prominent worldwide. India’s Tata and China’s Huawei are well known
examples. But globalization has also affected NGOs: they have enjoyed more funding
opportunities over the past decades, and only saw their prospects diminish during the
global economic recession starting in 2008. 24 A particular kind of NGO that benefited
from globalization is charities, enabling wealthy individuals to dominate the aid sector
with their foundations, examples being the Gates Foundation, the Clinton Foundation
and the Netherlands-based INGKA Foundation, established by IKEA founder Ingvar
Kamprad.

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Thirdly, the third wave of democratization has contributed to more Non-State Actor
activity, in particularly at the local level. In essence, when more people around the
world get a voice, they also have (and frequently take) the opportunity to organize
themselves, thus giving rise to an emergent civil society made up of countless civil
associations.

A fourth key development is the continuous improvement of information and

communication technology (ICT) and its rapid dissemination around the world. ICT is
instrumental in enabling groups to organize themselves, whether at the local, national
or global level, as well as for funding, procurement and dissemination purposes. As
one observer noted: “The development of communication technologies in particular,
allow[s] better organization of NGOs, their coordination worldwide, and more effective
advocacy.”25 But technology can also instigate social change. Some visible examples
have included the revolution driven by mobile texting in the Philippines in 2001 that
brought down President Estrada, and of course the revolution in Egypt in 2011 that
saw President Mubarak ousted, in which social online networks such as Facebook
played an instrumental role.26 In the same vein, ICT allows aggressive Non-State
Actors, such as transnational criminal and terrorist organizations, to similarly enjoy the
benefits of globalized communications as do recognized ideational NGOs.

Finally, changes at the normative level have helped to bring new Non-State Actors into
existence. Akin to what psychologist Steven Pinker calls the “Rights revolution”27, the
idea is a growing global awareness of the needs and concerns of people, coupled with
increasingly low tolerance for (perceived) injustice or suffering. This awareness has
become a catalyst for grassroots action channeled through civil society organizations.28

However, while many of these drivers have given impetus to the growth of Non-State
Actors, they have also presented some challenges. For instance, Non-State Actors can
be vehicles for enhancing the legitimacy of constituencies in civil society, but the fact
that Non-State Actors often lack a formal mandate puts their perceived legitimacy on
shaky ground.29 Also, funding and accountability imperatives can limit an Non-State
Actor’s ability to operate.30 Third, Non-State Actors often play an important role in
terms of collecting and disseminating information. However, the proliferation of Non-
State Actors combined with the ubiquity of means of communication may cause
information overload on the part of information recipients, whether they be
governments, citizens or other actors. The resulting competition for attention may
potentially lead to perverse or unintended consequences, like the fact that the
message that is heard is the one that is communicated best, not the one that is the

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most important. And last but certainly not least, states and international organizations
have only just begun to understand the impetus of globalization on transnationally
operating aggressive Non-State Actors.

How Non-State Actors Affect the International Environment

The rise of Non-State Actors and changes in the international order are closely
intertwined. While the emergence of Non-State Actors can to a significant extent be
attributed to changes in the international political arena, Non-State Actors have helped
to further change these structures in turn. Indeed, “[t]he real story is not the
proliferation of NGOs, but how these organizations have effectively networked and
mobilized their members to reshape world politics.”31 It is therefore very likely that in
the decades to come, Non-State Actors and states will jointly be setting the
parameters in the international arena.

Behind these developments is not just a reconfiguration of sovereignty, important

though that is.32 The most important factor is the acceleration of change and the
complexity of an increasingly connected world. The ability of states to anticipate and
respond to emerging global and local developments is necessarily limited, and willingly
or unwillingly leave room for other actors to arise and respond. In turn, the rise of Non-
State Actors leads to more complexity, creating more uncertainty in the process.33

More than ever, we see a multiple-level world emerging that in many respects
challenges the idea suggested by the Verkenningen report of scenarios dominated by
either states or by Non-State Actors. In contrast, the Dutch Scientific Council for
Government Policy (WRR) wrote in its report Attached to the World that “[t]oday’s
world can best be described as hybrid in nature. On the one hand, there is the familiar
world of geopolitics and nation states. That world is currently going through a shift in
the balance of power towards the East. On the other hand, there is the ‘network
world’, populated not only by states, but increasingly also by Non-State Actors. State
borders present virtually no obstacle to these networks.”34 The Council went on to say
that “[p]arallel to this situation, (...) we are witnessing the rise of a network-world of
international relations. This is characterized by an explosive increase in the number of
Non-State Actors, topics, and channels of cooperation; such channels may be old and
formal organizations, but increasingly they tend to be informal networks.”35

Of course, one should be careful not to draw too rigid dividing lines between an ‘old’
state-based order and a ‘new’ network-based order. Networks between all kinds of
stakeholders have existed for centuries – think of networks among international

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bankers or even trade networks stretching back to the days of the historic Silk Road to
China. States will not wither away but will adapt to new circumstances. What is new,
however, is that the pace at which networks develop, proliferate and overlap will only
increase, whereby formalization of linkages between actors will more likely be a
burden than an asset. The more nimbly one can operate, the better. For instance,
terrorist and criminal networks can develop very rapidly given the opportunity, as we
have seen in the Sahel countries but also in Central Asia, Iraq, and Syria.

Another misconception to avoid is to think of networks as a panacea to cure the ills

associated with international interactions conducted by states, such as lack of
transparency and lack of representation. As the historian Mazower recently wrote:
“Networks (...) sounds equalizing and youthful, [yet] networks exist in many forms,
and many of them are too opaque and unrepresentative to any collective body.”36
These problems can arise from the fact that many networks handle issues that are
very technical, making accountability less meaningful. The opacity of networks is also
an inherent advantage for aggressive Non-State Actors such as transnational criminal
networks. It allows them to engage in human trafficking, drug trading, illicit arms
trade, all of which could support and fuel instability and insurgency in fragile zones--
and therewith, facilitate terrorist activity.37 In recognition of the threat of transnational
crime and its links with terrorism, the UN adopted a convention calling upon countries
to combat such activity.38

In terms of exercising power, increasingly different modes of power will be applied in

different fashions. Next to hard military power, soft power on the basis of “reputation,
cultural attractiveness, legitimacy and lawfulness” will become a central attribute in
itself.39 In a world of networks, reputation becomes a highly prized asset. NGOs can play
an important role in gaining and applying ‘reputation’ as an instrument for advancing
national interests. Conversely, legitimacy is also a valuable asset, one that NGOs that
lack public accountability would like to benefit from when interacting with government
agencies. Furthermore, in a world where normative aspects are becoming more central,
lawfulness also provides states with a means of power, in particular if states continue to
define the rule-based order framed in the language of international law.

These same soft-power elements can also make a difference when it comes to
engaging aggressive Non-State Actors. For instance, they constitute the right
elements for a veritable “hearts and minds” strategy. What is more, it can also be the
basis for what the US Department of State calls community diplomacy, which entails
“building networks of contacts that can operate on their own to advance objectives

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 consistent with our interests; and second, showcasing through particular events
[American] commitment to common interests and universal values.”40

Analysts find it very difficult to measure the influence of Non-State Actors. The most
obvious way is to simply count their numbers.41 Even if size, reach or significance of
Non-State Actors are taken into account,42 such a count in itself does not say much
about the nature of the global order, i.e. whether it is networked or fragmented, and
whether Non-State Actors themselves may be fragmenting.43

The effect of their rise is visible when their participation in world events is gauged
compared with state actors. In Figure 4.2 we see a slow but steady decline of the
recorded activities of state actors as compared to those of Non-State Actors. Only in
recent years does state activity appear to be on the rise again, although it is too early
to tell whether this recovery will continue. Factors such as the decline of terrorist
violence and government intervention over the course of the financial crisis partly
account for the modest resurgence of state activity.

State Non State Actors

1.00
Share ot total events in the world

0.75

0.5

0.25

0
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2013

FIGURE 4.2: BALANCE BETWEEN STATE AND NON-STATE ACTORS IN THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM OVER TIME,
NORMALIZED (SOURCE: GDELT)

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Beyond the Zero-Sum Dichotomy
One of our main arguments is that the balance of influence on security issues
between State and Non-State Actors does not have to be zero-sum. In other words,
an increasing role of the one does not necessarily correspond to reduced influence of
the other. In aligning their efforts, State and Non-State Actors may strengthen their
respective influence on peace and order. NGOs can be positively involved in rule-
setting, decision-making, monitoring or regulatory roles, or consultation procedures. A
particular kind of engagement is public-private partnerships (PPPs).44 They can be
created for many reasons, for instance to draw on experience and expertise, or for
reasons of efficiency. In addition, PPPs can help bring legitimacy to projects through
inclusiveness that helps to foster trust.

In some instances, even the relationship between states and aggressive Non-State
Actors cannot be regarded as zero-sum. There are examples of states and aggressive
Non-State Actors benefiting from close cooperation. Terrorist groups like Hezbollah in
Lebanon, and Al Qaida in pre-9/11 Afghanistan might not have flourished without the
help of Iran and Syria, and the Taliban regime, respectively. Similarly, relations between
cooperative and aggressive Non-State Actors need not be zero-sum. Hezbollah and
Hamas engage in charitable or social welfare activities to broaden and consolidate
their base in their respective countries. According to one study, Hamas expends no
less than 95% of its total budget on welfare activities.45 Private (or state supported)
charities as such can also play a role in financing criminal or terrorist activities,
examples being Saudi Arabia’s al-Haramein Foundation (now banned), the Holy Land
Foundation (US) and Muslim Aid (UK). Many though not all of such charities have an
Islamic background, inviting suspicion from law enforcement and military agencies
that deal with aggressive Non-State Actor activity.

For states, a general concern is that Non-State Actors replace government functions
without the state’s consent; place themselves outside the law; or take the law into
their own hands. This is both an issue in developed and in developing countries. For
example, in recent years there was a debate in the Netherlands on whether Dutch
merchant vessels could employ private security personnel to provide for their safety
when crossing the waters of the Arabian Sea. The Dutch government maintained that
Dutch ships were an extension of Dutch national territory and that therefore the Dutch
state was the sole power allowed to bear arms and use violence on board those ships.
Consequently, the Royal Netherlands Navy deployed so-called Vessel Protection
Detachments (VPDs),46 made up of heavily-armed marines, on merchant vessels.
However, since there are limits to the number of ships the Navy can protect, and

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since the ship owners had to pay for the VPDs anyway, private security contractors
have increasingly become employed by Dutch ships in spite of this being a clear
violation of Dutch law. As a result of this situation, the rules covering the protection of
merchant shipping are currently being reviewed.

Such careful deliberation is not always the norm. In a number of developing countries,
both military and non-military Non-State Actors have been chipping away at state
power to the point where the very legitimacy of the authorities is questioned. This
may result from the fact that the state itself lacks legitimacy with the people(s) living
within its jurisdiction. In the era of decolonization, many states framed their legitimacy
in a formalist way, emphasizing aspects such as self-determination and territorial
integrity. However, tribal, ethnic, and religious loyalties have persisted, and with an
increased ability to mobilize such sentiments through ICT networks, traditional groups
are now seriously challenging state authorities in many countries. How such conflicting
loyalties can tear states apart at the seams has been amply demonstrated in places
such as Yugoslavia, Rwanda, DRC, Somalia, Cote d’Ivoire, Sudan, Afghanistan, Iraq,
Libya, Syria, Mali, CAR and Ukraine.

To conclude, Non-State Actors have had a profound influence on the international

order. They have helped push network diplomacy, as well as the notion that states are
to be judged by their reputation, legitimacy and accountability, rather than just their
military and economic capacities. Crucially, the key to maintaining power and influence
will then not depend on these hard assets, but on how and where authorities position
themselves in domestic and international networks, and how they mobilize their ‘soft
power’ assets so as to ensure the integrity of domestic societies. Finally, these
developments also warrant a reappraisal of relations between State and Non-State
Actors, moving beyond a simple zero-sum dichotomy to a more nuanced perspective.

4.4 Examining Civil Society Actors in Depth

Defining Non-Governmental Organizations
Given the purpose of our analysis, an examination of Non-State Actors should focus on
Non-State Actors that potentially affect Dutch security interests. From the vast array of
Non-State Actors categories that are active these days, we have picked civil society
organizations or NGOs to look at in more detail. These are particularly relevant because
they could support or leverage the security functions of the state to a mutual benefit.

As a distinct community of actors, NGOs really burst into the international arena in the
1990s, when their arrival was seen as amounting to a “global associational

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revolution.”47 Their influence on global public policy developed through successful
advocacy campaigns around issues such as the banning of land mines, the fight
against poverty, and environmental protection.48 And while in retrospect the 1990s
appear to have been the heyday of NGO activism, former UN Secretary-General Kofi
Annan in fact declared that “the 21st century will be the era of NGOs.”49

However, while many NGOs are very visible, it has proved surprisingly hard to define
what they really are. The term NGO as such originated in the UN Charter.50 The World
Bank crafted an authoritative definition calling them “organizations that have a
presence in public life, expressing the interests and values of their members or others,
based on ethical, cultural, political, scientific, religious or philanthropic considerations.”51
Dutch political scientist Paul Dekker stated that civil society is the domain in which
voluntary associations are dominant.52 Belonging to this group are local community
associations, non-profit groups and service organizations. Dekker sees civil society as
“the institutional domain of voluntary associations”.53 Based on Dekker’s analysis we
see NGOs as voluntary associations, with a non-profit objective and without
institutional links to state authorities.

In spite of the fact that it is not easy to assess the impact of NGOs on states and
governance because of the complexity of their mutual relations54, many statistics bear
out the rapid proliferation of NGOs over the past decades and the extent to which they
have become the backbone of civil society at all levels. Between 1994 and 2009, for
instance, the number of NGOs registered with the UN’s Economic and Social Council
(ECOSOC), increased from 41 to 3,172. Altogether, there are now well over 50,000
internationally active NGOs.55 At the domestic level, the numbers are even more
staggering. In a 1999 report, The Economist wrote that “the United States alone has
about 2 million NGOs, 70% of which are less than 30 years old. India has about 1
million grass-roots groups, while another estimate suggests that more than 100,000
sprang up in Eastern Europe between 1988 and 1995.”56

In terms of NGOs’ contributions to employment, one observer concluded that “NGOs

are a thriving part of Western market economies, making up 14.4 percent of the
workforce in the Netherlands, 11.1 percent in Canada, 9.8 percent in the United States,
6.3 percent in Australia, and 5.9 percent in Germany.”57 What is more, NGOs have also
become very important international players, in particular in the development, human
rights and humanitarian arenas. The same Economist report mentioned above also
noted that “[a]s a group, NGOs now deliver more aid than the whole United Nations
system.”58

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 Explaining the Rise of NGOs
What accounts for the rise of NGOs? The same factors that explain the rise of Non-
State Actors as a whole apply here as well. But other factors can be adduced. One is
that the rise of NGOs is related to the coming-of-age of the baby-boom generation and
their sense for social engagement.59 Hence, the normative, or rights-based angle, is
important here, as advocacy NGOs in particular have become primordial norm-setters
at the global level.60 Another important, and perhaps more obvious, reason is that
NGOs can fill a needs gap which the state is unable to fill. Thus, the kind of issues that
(international) NGOs can deal with are often too technically complex and extensive for
governments to handle. One interesting area is in conflict resolution, or mediation.
Once the preserve of states, NGOs are increasingly active in this field. Some of their
advantages include that “[t]hey lack the political baggage that diplomats carry, (…);
[t]hey are not bogged down by official caution and bureaucracy, [and a]bove all,
they can take bigger risks over whom they will talk to and in what
circumstances.”61Accordingly, private mediators have been involved in conflicts in
for instance Aceh, Sri Lanka and Colombia.

Other often-mentioned advantages of NGOs include their flexible way of operating;

their ability to access the people concerned; and their cost-effectiveness. Given these
comparative advantages, Kofi Annan concluded in his memoir Interventions that
“NGOs were ahead of the UN in what they could deliver.”62 Finally, NGO networks
also constitute a key asset: “International NGOs with a large international network
may in some cases be better placed than governments to influence important
international processes (e.g. to influence the agenda of the G20, by consulting with
crucial government negotiators in advance).”63

0.010
Share of global news coverage, %

0.008

0.006

0.004

0.002

0
1980 1990 2000 2010

FIGURE 4.3: RISE OF INGOS SINCE 1980 (SOURCE: GDELT)

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Hence, NGOs have several raisons d’être. But for such organizations to persist, they
require a measure of legitimacy, both in the eyes of the government and the citizens
they wish to serve. In absence of a formal democratic mandate, some NGOs may
claim to give a voice to constituencies that do not see themselves represented in
formal representative settings. Sometimes, they may even claim to be more legitimate
than the government, in particular if the latter’s democratic credentials are
questionable. However, it is not always clear whether NGOs truly speak on behalf of
existing constituencies, and whether or not they are in fact speaking on behalf of
corporate interests for instance. As a result, “government rationales for inviting NGOs
to the table vary just as much as NGOs’ reasons to sit down at it, [although] one
shared interest is to gain legitimacy by representing interested and affected publics.”64

NGOs are mostly well aware of these legitimacy shortcomings, and they therefore
seek to justify their existence through their professional credentials, the argument
being “that NGOs contribute invaluable expertise in policy arenas where governments
or business lack resources or specific ‘on the ground’ knowledge (...), claiming that
without their specialized knowledge entering decision-making processes, political
choices in democratic polities would be seriously limited.”65 However, the problem
with this kind of legitimacy is that NGOs become too technocratic, and lose touch
with their base and the communities where they operate. The inability to translate
technical expertise to the grassroots level can lead to situations whereby “[a]pplying
business methods to social problems, [NGOs] exaggerate what technology can do,
ignore the complexities of social and institutional constraints (...) and wreak havoc
with the existing fabric of society in places they know very little about.”66

Some NGOs do not wish to associate with states for fear of losing their freedom of
maneuver and their access to people in areas where guerrillas or terrorists are active.
Yet, this does not mean that they are completely unambiguous about neutrality. For
instance, Greenpeace and Sea Shepherd take to the seas with ships under a Dutch
flag, and appeal for help to the Dutch government if things go wrong.67 Others rely on
state operated military air transport to get their relief goods to a disaster stricken
country.68 In return, states might consider demanding from NGOs some form of
reciprocity when they are about to embark on stability operations.

Above all, legitimacy is a matter of trust. This is where we have witnessed some
interesting trends in recent years. The first is a growing role for developing-nations
(‘southern’) NGOs, which are now receiving more donor funding and whose role is
sometimes seen as complementary because they bring legitimacy to the development

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endeavors of civil society actors in local settings. The idea here is that the ‘northern’
NGOs can bring the needed capacity (and sometimes the funding too).69

The Role of Faith-Based NGOs

Within the context of the general upward trend in the number of NGOs, there is a
“dramatic increase” of faith-based NGOs.70 For instance, “[i]n Sub-Saharan Africa, (...)
the World Bank estimates that as much as 50% of all health and education services
are provided by Faith-Based Organizations (FBOs).”71 This trend is surprising given that
the drivers of NGO activity have largely been ‘secular’ factors such as technology, the
rights revolution and globalization. However, the technocratic approach of many
secular NGOs gives faith-based NGOs an advantage when entering the arena. This is
because faith-based NGOs – which often operate at the grassroots level – are usually
seen as more representative, legitimate, and more in tune with and understanding of
people’s beliefs.72 In that sense, their engagement helps to create and sustain social
capital as the glue that holds communities together.73 Governments have picked up on
this quality of FBOs, and are now “extending new forms of participatory governance
to include faith communities, engaging them strategically in the development of more
legitimate and effective decision- and policy-making.”74

The story about FBOs is particularly interesting from the point of view of the worldwide
fight against terrorism, from which two different but complementary pictures emerge.
On the one hand, in the United States, almost 20% of foreign aid is now going to
faith-based groups, against 10% before 9/11 took place. Part of the reason why much
more money has gone to NGOs as a whole is because of the fact that, over the course
of the war on terror, more development issues where NGOs have built up a strong
track record have become ‘securitized’ and therefore become more of a priority for
governments.75 US-based FBOs, mostly if not all of Christian denomination, have
particularly benefited from this development.

On the other hand, there is the rise of Islamic faith-based organizations. As a UN news
agency noted, “With many Western donors cutting budgets amid fears of another
recession, [the Middle East] has gained influence in aid, especially in countries with
large Muslim populations. Both in terms of funds and action on the ground, the effort
in [for instance] Somalia has put Muslim and Arab donors and organizations onto
center stage.”76 Other factors that account for their rise is the increase in NGOs
worldwide in general since the 1970s, but also the surge in pan-Arabism after the
1967 war with Israel.77 Some Islamic charities, such as UK-based Islamic Relief, Saudi-
based International Islamic Relief Organization and other such charities from Turkey,
Qatar, Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates now have budgets exceeding 30 million

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US$,78 while the potential for Islamic philanthropy worldwide through waqf and zakat
runs into the hundreds of billions of US$.79

However, these charities face some serious issues. Some have been put on
international sanctions lists in connection with terrorist financing due to alleged links
to al-Qaeda.80 This situation, and the fact that there exists much mutual mistrust
between Islamic charities and the rest of the development community, has made
relations between these actors often frosty and complicated. For instance, while
Islamic organizations tend not to engage in proselytizing – if only because they operate
almost exclusively in Muslim countries – Christian NGOs operating in Muslim countries
are suspected of doing so, in particular Evangelical NGOs.81 What is more, Islamic
NGOs tend to get a lot of financial support from their respective governments (in that
respect following global trends).

Towards a New Equilibrium Between the State, IGOs and NGOs

Since the 1970s, the share of government funding for humanitarian NGOs has been
rising steadily from a mere 2% to over 40% in the mid-1990s, with some NGOs
receiving over 90% of their funding from government sources. This trend, says one
observer, “raises questions about the extent to which NGOs are really non-
governmental.”82 The result is that nowadays, “[m]ore government aid funding is
flowing bilaterally through NGOs, or more precisely through the handful of largest
NGOs, than ever before. (...) This trend towards more bilateral grant-making coincided
with a doubling of official humanitarian assistance (...) resulting in closer relations
between donors and NGOs.”83 The same issue of donor-dependence exists at the
international level. Here, large amounts of aid were initially provided by (Western)
governments, the result being that “funding can become a form of co-optation, and
many NGOs now worry about how to prevent the funders dictating their mission so as
to preserve their legitimacy.”84

Since a perceived lack of legitimacy had always been a key issue with intergovernmental
organizations, it is mildly ironic that today NGOs might come to suffer the same fate,
being seen as agents made up of “faceless bureaucrats.” In the 1990s it was said that
“the real losers in this power shift [from states towards civil society] are international
organizations.”85 Today, however, when it comes to providing global public goods,
“well-run multilateral international institutions can deal with [this] more systematically
and openly [than many private initiatives].”86 Trends in terms of influence exercised by
IGOs over the past decades show that they enjoyed their heydays in the era of the
“Washington consensus”, when the IMF, World Bank and the WTO were dominant
players, but that their power declined relatively after 2000.

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0.100

0.075

0.050

0.025

0
1980 1990 2000 2010

FIGURE 4.4: RISE AND FALL OF MULTILATERAL ORGANIZATIONS, MEASURED BY SHARE OF GLOBAL NEWS COVERAGE (%),
SINCE 1980 (SOURCE: GDELT).

Now, however, multilateral organizations might come to enjoy a new upsurge, partly
driven in fact by NGO activism. The reason for this is that “[i]n terms of common
goals, NGOs, leading states, and IGOs often broadly share the same general goal of
promoting new forms of transnational governance to solve global problems. This
common goal has led them to frequently work with one another to create and maintain
international institutions and interventionist foreign policies meant to aid nations
suffering from a wide variety of social, economic, and political problems.”87 Hence, we
may be moving towards a new equilibrium whereby both NGOs and IGOs can draw on
their respective strengths, that is, combining the former’s ability to operate at the
grassroots level, and the latter’s capacities to coordinate support.

Thus, it becomes clear that NGOs are a typical offspring of their era, and in many
respects in tune with contemporary political, social and economic developments.
However, some important questions remain: one concerns the paradox between the
need to be transparent and accountable on the one hand, and on the other, to avoid
becoming too much driven by performance targets on the basis of log frames or other
management tools, which make NGOs risk losing touch with their constituents on the
ground. Another issue of concern is on whose behalf NGOs speak or act. What is the
basis for their legitimacy? It appears that in this respect, faith-based NGOs are gaining
ground vis-á-vis secular NGOs, thus bucking a global trend among NGOs that are
driven by secular objectives (human rights for instance) and riding a secular wave of
democratization and globalization.

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These questions also have ramifications for how NGOs impact on the security
environment, whether at the local or the international levels. To begin with, working
with NGOs that are seen as legitimate is not just important for the sake of perceptions,
but also because such NGOs are more likely to convey critical and more accurate
information. In turn, this helps governments to better engage with governments and
societies abroad, in particular where zones of conflict are concerned, or to better deal
with transnational criminals trafficking illegal goods, humans and money through
places of flows (nodal or intersection points) in transportation and communications
networks. What is more, legitimate NGOs are key companions in any endeavor that
seeks to reach people’s hearts and minds, and to build trust so as to improve mutual
relations. However, given the fluidity in how the NGO scene evolves sometimes, it is
important to make sure to pick the right partners at the right time, and to know how to
engage them. Concretely speaking, this could mean for instance trying to work more
with faith-based NGOs – including those with an Islamic orientation – where possible,
and not to impose onerous accountability burdens upon NGOs in general.

4.5 Conclusions & Security Implications

The role and influence of State versus Non-State Actors in the international system is
not a zero-sum game. The scenario framework as used in the 2010 Verkenningen does
not adequately represent this notion. Although we have seen that in recent years the
activities of State Actors have increased as compared to those of Non-State Actors,
this does not mean that the role of Non-State Actors has diminished. On the contrary,
the influence of civil society Non-State Actors is still growing and holds consequences
for how State and Non-State Actors interact in the international system.

The impact of Non-State Actors on the international environment has some key
implications for Dutch security policy. At the most general level, Non-State Actors are
drivers in shaping not just a multipolar, but a networked world order. This was
acknowledged in the Docters van Leeuwen report. Secondly, influence in the
international arena is no longer measured by military and economic power only, but
also by the legitimacy and reputation of actors – as applied to both states and Non-
State Actors. As a result, soft power will become more important for a state to ensure
social stability, or to attract a wider range of people and companies to contribute to its
economy. Thirdly, the evolution towards a networked world order is accompanied by
legalization and judicialization, meaning that accountability for the implementation of
decisions is shifted into the hands of impartial third parties (principally courts).
Simultaneously, international law as ‘hard law’ will become relatively less important
compared to ‘soft law instruments’, which are more suitable for Non-State Actors.

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Fourthly, NGOs – among them increasingly faith-based organizations – are proving to
be key drivers in promoting normative change. Finally, states will experience that their
monopoly on the use of force to provide security is being challenged. This could be
because of cutbacks in defense budgets, because of increasing supranational pooling
or because of the wider and cheaper availability of private security capabilities.

Concretely speaking, in a world of network diplomacy, the distinction between ‘state’

and ‘non-state‘ becomes increasingly blurred. Making common cause will become
easier, resulting in a gain for both state and Non-State Actors. The functioning of state
authorities will also evolve, and they become more administrators and regulators,
rather than an implementer of policy. In the same vein, diplomats will come to function
more as liaison officers and coordinators, from which their influence will flow. In turn,
this will enable them to better mobilize and take advantage of what Non-State Actors
have to offer, whether it concerns NGOs, charities, faith-based organizations or other
network-like organizations.

These developments have several implications for how civil society organizations (or
NGOs) operate. One is that they become more important as direct recipients of donor
support, rather than that such support is channeled through multilateral agencies. At
the same time, ‘southern’ NGOs are becoming relatively more important vis-à-vis
‘northern’ NGOs, also as a result of receiving increasingly more direct support.
Another trend is that among donors themselves, Non-State Actors are becoming more
important. NGOs are also becoming more important where peace-making is
concerned–another area where the prerogative of states is challenged. Because of
their growing dominance in (international) civil society and their interaction with many
groups – including aggressive Non-State Actors – that are active in global networks,
NGOs have access to information that is hard to come by for governments or
international organizations. On top of that, they can also promote values and mobilize
public opinion to impact the public policy agenda in a given country.

Security Implications
The security implications stemming from the above analysis all have to do with the
way states can continue to exercise their core task of providing security to their
citizens. They run the risk of losing relevance because today’s complex environment
makes it more and more difficult to exercise security functions in a stand-alone
fashion. Hence, rather than simply maintaining the monopoly on the use of force,
states will become more like administrators of power – whether physical or
otherwise.88 The result would be, in the words of Anne-Marie Slaughter, that

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“government becomes governance precisely because of the absence of any
centralized authority to exercise command and control power.”89 One consequence is
that the state will come to operate in a ‘disaggregated’ fashion – that is, different
parts of a government administration will be active in different kinds of networks,
many of which are cross-border. “As a consequence [of these developments]”, the
Dutch WRR concluded, “the traditional distinction between ‘domestic’ and ‘foreign’ is
becoming increasingly blurred.”90

The most concrete consequence of this development is that states, like Non-State
Actors, need to be able to operate in a global network environment.91 The Dutch
Foreign Minister wrote in this regard recently that “[o]ur diplomats need to be at home
in a hybrid world of states and other kinds of players, in which the classic interstate
relations and modern societal and business networks intersect. This requires
substantive expertise and excellent network management skills, which will give the
Netherlands an opportunity to punch above its weight.”92 Indeed, this echoes the
finding of the WRR, which wrote that ”[t]raditionally, a state’s power used to be
determined by its GDP, army, and/or population size, and this is often still the case in
state-dominated arenas. Meanwhile, however, such indicators have ceased to be
crucial ones. In non-state arenas and in networks, centrality and a position as a broker
or node in the network are at least as important, and this is precisely where the
Netherlands should be able to excel.”93 The Docters Van Leeuwen commission also
underlined this view.94

When it comes to identifying the right kinds of partners in the various networks, the
United States government suggests a community diplomacy approach. This entails
“identifying and developing networks of contacts through specific on-the-ground
projects, programs, or events and then helping those networks evolve into consistent
centers of action on areas of common interest – from non-proliferation to climate
change to expanding opportunities for women and girls”95 The WRR said in this regard
that: “[d]ealing with NGOs and transnational corporations (multinational and
international companies) requires another approach than a state-based focus. In its
joint activities with Non-State Actors, the Dutch government does not play the role of
gatekeeper but rather that of liaison. A liaison not only establishes connections but
also selects what connections are interesting and which of them may help promote
strategic choices. The aim here is, while keeping an eye on domestic self-interest
across territorial and immaterial borders, to help connect actors and networks and to
exchange goods and ideas in a way that will benefit the Netherlands and the Dutch.” 96

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In addition, and to concretize this approach, a more systematic and structural
cooperation with Non-State Actors is called for.97 Indeed, this would help to consolidate
networks that serve the purpose of exchanging information among partners, which is
of great value to counter security threats for instance. The Dutch Foreign Minister
wrote on this point that “[i]n order to secure a strong position on gathering information
and to be able to operate effectively, we need a wide network of contacts. [For
instance,] to counter crime, drug problems, terrorism and new (cyber) threats so as to
protect domestic security imperatives, specialized Dutch liaison officers representing
the police, the intelligence service and the Ministry of Justice are stationed in
countries from which threats emanate or where information is collected.”98 This
requires a flexible approach whereby diplomats and liaison officers can quickly be
relocated depending on need, and constant monitoring of new actors emerging in civil
society or in the realms of criminal or terrorist groups. This emphasizes once again the
need to monitor and control the nodal points where the various networks intersect,
enabling policy officers more flexibility to consider threats and opportunities that are
being faced, and the actors that drives these.

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