Pat Cipollone Transcript
Pat Cipollone Transcript
7 WASHINGTON, D.C.
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17 Washington, D.C.
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20 The interview in the above matter was held in Room 5480, O'Neill House Office
2 Appearances:
9 SENIOR COUNSEL
13 CONTRACTOR
14 INVESTIGATIVE COUNSEL
16 CHIEF CLERK
17 CONTRACTOR
18 PARLIAMENTARIAN
19 INVESTIGATIVE COUNSEL
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25 -COUNSEL
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2 Good morning.
5 Pasquale Cipollone conducted by the House Select Committee to Investigate the January
6 6th Attack on the United States Capitol pursuant to House Resolution 503.
7 Mr. Cipollone, could you please state your full name, spell your last name for the
8 record?
10 Counsel for Mr. Cipollone, could you please identify yourself and
12 Mr. Purpura. Yes. Michael Purpura from the law firm of Hueston Hennigan.
19 committee.
21 chief c o u n s e l ; - who is the senior counsel and counsel to the vice chair;-
25 think the vice chair, Ms. Cheney, is present. Ms. Luria and Ms. Lofgren are also present
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3 participate and may choose to ask questions. While the interview is taking place in
4 person, we have established a link for the virtual participation via Webex. I'll try my
5 best, Mr. Cipollone, to indicate when members of the committee join remotely.
8 interview. Please wait until each question is complete before you begin your response,
9 and we will try to wait until your response is complete before we ask the next question.
10 The stenographer cannot record nonverbal responses, such as shaking your head,
11 so it's important that you answer each question with an audible verbal response. I'm
12 sure your experienced counsel has given you the same direction.
14 [Laughter.]
15 Exactly.
17 Thank you.
18 We ask that you provide complete answers based on your best recollection. If
19 the question isn't clear, then please just ask for clarification. If you don't know the
2 appearance here is voluntary, that the select committee did issue originally a subpoena
3 for your testimony, though we are now withdrawing the subpoena given your willingness
5 I also want to make clear that the select committee has had discussions with the
6 White House Counsel's Office about your testimony, specifically to ascertain the current
7 White House position with respect to the possible application of an executive privilege.
8 We understand that you and your counsel have also had discussions with the White
9 House counsel.
10 Based on those discussions, the White House has indicated that given the
12 into the January 6th attack on the Capitol, an assertion of executive privilege would not in
15 Mr. Cipollone, we understand that you might have -- you and your counsel might
16 have a few opening remarks. We want to give you a chance to proceed with those at
17 this point.
18 Mr. Purpura. Yes. Thank you, - And thank you for the courtesies
19 you've shown to Mr. Cipollone throughout this process along with every member of your
20 committee, - n ~ in particular.
22 compulsion. I also appreciate your acknowledgment of the discussions that each side
23 has had with the current White House counsel. We've also had discussions with counsel
25 The topics that Mr. Cipollone has been permitted to speak about are ones that
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1 you well know and we've had multiple discussions about those. And we've gotten the
2 recent correspondence from the current White House as well. We understand that the
4 We also acknowledge of course and hopefully you'll acknowledge for us that Mr.
5 Cipollone has been fully cooperative throughout the several months of discussions that
6 we've had with your staff, including an April informal interview which he provided to you
8 You also understand from our many discussions that Mr. Cipollone will not speak
10 that's of course important to the rule of law, important to the institutional separation of
13 understands that these events occurred 18-plus months ago. You also understand the
14 pressures and stresses and activities that occur in a job as significant as counsel to the
15 President of the United States. Mr. Cipollone's recollections will be his very best, but
16 there may be areas where his recollections have diminished or he simply doesn't
17 remember.
18 But of course, as always, given who he is, the character he has, he will do his best
19 to speak truthfully and answer your questions to the best of his ability within those
20 bounds.
21 I appreciate that.
22 Let me just repeat what you said, Mr. Purpura, about the previous cooperation
23 Mr. Cipollone has engaged with the select committee. Over time we did have an
24 informal interview. I think it was in April. And we've actually used a bit of that
25 information thus far in our public hearings, which we appreciate. We see this as a sort
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2 And with respect to privilege, I understand the line that you have indicated in
3 advance you'll draw. Our intention today is to frame questions, complete record of
5 Given the line that you have indicated, I will not force repetitious assertions.
6 understand that the line that you will draw with respect to privilege is direct Presidential
7 communications. But we need a record to make sure that we understand exactly which
9 I think we also have now Mr. Schiff and Mr. Kinzinger, who have joined as
10 members of the select committee. You are drawing almost the entire committee at this
12 We will march through the topics today. And, again, I appreciate the preview of
13 that, and I think that will make the interview more expeditious, knowing that in advance.
14 Mr. Cipollone, do you have anything yourself that you wanted to say?
15 Mr. Cipollone. I don't have much to say. To start out with, I agree with
16 everything my counsel said obviously. I also would like to thank you, and
20 executive branch, to the effective functioning of the Presidency, and also to my role as a
22 And so, I appreciate your understanding that you -- they are not my privileges to
23 waive, they do not belong to me. And I also want to make that clear.
24 But with that said, I'm here to testify truthfully, consistent with those privileges,
25 and to continuing cooperation with the committee to the best of my recollection and
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1 ability.
3 Mr. Cipollone. And also good morning to the members of the committee who
4 are on by Webex.
5 EXAMINATION
7 Q All right. Let's jump right into it then. I want to start with the election.
8 The select committee has developed evidence from numerous lawyers and other
9 experts regarding the results of the 2020 Presidential election. These witnesses have
10 indicated that over the course of the post-election period they evaluated claims and
13 In our public hearings thus far we have put on evidence from eight lawyers and
14 one former Federal judge: Matt Morgan, Bill Barr, Jeff Rosen, Rich Donoghue, Greg
15 Jacob, Ben Ginsberg, Eric Herschmann, Alex Cannon, and Judge Michael Luttig.
16 The evidence about these investigations of election fraud has come from the
17 President's campaign staff, including its general counsel, who looked closely at allegations
18 of fraud and irregularities in election processes, determined that there was insufficient
19 evidence of fraud to put any State's results into question. Matt Morgan in particular
20 indicated that it was everyone's assessment in the room that it was not -- none of that
22 This evidence has also come from the President's own appointees at the
24 Attorney General Barr has said, "Before I left, I made it clear publicly that I did not believe
25 the outcome of the election or I could find no evidence indicating the outcome of the
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1 election was caused by voting fraud. And I repeatedly told the President in no uncertain
3 I want to start by asking you if you agree, Mr. Cipollone, with the conclusions of
4 Matt Morgan, of Bill Barr, of all of the individuals who evaluated those claims that there
5 was no evidence of election fraud sufficient to undermine the outcome in any particular
6 State.
9 A Yes.
10 Q When did you determine -- when after the election did you sort of reach that
13 Q No.
15 the White House counsel. Obviously I became aware of them, these various allegations.
16 And clearly candidates have a right to litigate issues related to elections. That happens
17 every election season, before elections, after the elections. That's their right, to go to
18 court.
19 That wasn't my role, obviously. But to the extent that I was there and heard
21 But I really was relied on for the most part and supported to the best of my ability
22 the Department of Justice. Attorney General Barr is a man of character. I think the
23 country was lucky to have Attorney General Barr in that role. I came to Washington as a
24 young man, as a young lawyer, to work for Attorney General Barr, and I've had a long
1 But the investigation obviously was done at the Department of Justice. The
2 President's own counsel, outside counsel for the campaign, you know, various lawyers
5 got along the time continuum and things were happening in terms of certification and
6 things like that then obviously, I would say -- the point is I don't remember when I
8 But I agree wholeheartedly with the conclusion of Attorney General Barr and I also
9 agree wholeheartedly with conclusions of the very good lawyers that you referenced.
11 1st, less than a month after the election, that he had seen no systemic fraud sufficient to
12 undermine the outcome. Is it fair to say that by December 1st you had reached the
13 same conclusion?
14 A It's fair to say that I agreed with Attorney General Barr's conclusion on
16 Q Okay. I see Ms. Murphy has now also joined us, another member of the
17 committee.
19 Did you tell the President that he had lost the election?
21 BY
22 Q Is it fair to say -- -
24 Q Go ahead.
1 understanding of our agreement, I'm not going to discuss any communications that I had
2 with the President or conversations that might reflect those communications. And
4 And consistent with that, I'll answer your questions as best I can. To the extent
5 my opinions reflect what I told the President, I will, you know, I will give you my opinion
6 in the best way that I can consistent with my view of the privileges that have been
7 asserted.
8 Q I understand.
10 Q Okay. Is it fair to say that the President knew of your belief that the
13 BY
14 Q Did you believe, Mr. Cipollone, that the President should concede, once you
15 made a determination based on the investigations that you credited DOJ did, that the
16 campaign did, did you in your mind form a belief that the President should concede the
18 A Well, again, I was the White House counsel. Some of those decisions are
19 political. So to the extent that -- but if your question is did I believe he should concede
22 A Again, looking back on it, I don't remember exactly when I reached the
23 conclusion. And my conclusion was kind of regardless of his personal beliefs in terms of,
25 Q Yeah. I see.
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1 A -- action.
3 meeting that he participated in with the President in which he and Leader McCarthy
4 represented to the President that he should encourage rather than discourage his
5 supporters to vote by mail in 2020. Mr. Stepien testified that the President's mind was
6 made up and the President continued to undermine public confidence in mail-in voting
8 Did you have any discussions with Leader McCarthy or others about mail-in voting,
9 the reliability of mail-in voting, and what the President should say about that?
10 A Again, this was an issue that was primarily for the campaign and not for the
11 White House counsel. I probably did have conversations -- without getting into what I
12 talked to the President or who I talked about -- I probably did have conversations related
13 to that issue.
14 I think there were some issues, without regard to those conversations, obviously
15 one issue, one legal issue that was looked at I believe and litigated prior to the campaign
16 and I believe after the campaign. Of course I wasn't in charge of that litigation, but was
18 You know, one issue is who decides at the State level, you know, whether mail-in
19 voting can be used, is it the legislature, is it the executive, is it election officials? Those
24 A But I had a view. But my view -- I would just rely on the political advisers
25 on that.
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1 Q Yes.
2 A Did I express a view? Yes, I did. But that view is irrelevant. I think it's
4 Q Yeah. You have told us before in the informal interviews that the President
5 after the election began to rely on a number of outside voices, lawyers and others.
6 Did you have frustration with the fact that the President was relying on lawyers
9 election-related issues. The President would typically -- in other words, that were
12 But those issues were handled by outside campaign lawyers. I thought that Matt
13 Morgan was a very able and good lawyer. I had worked with him when he was counsel
14 to the Vice President. He actually worked closely with the White House Counsel's Office
15 and the team that we had put together in the White House Counsel's Office. I had
16 confidence in Matt.
17 Justin Clark as well was counsel to the campaign. And I think there were other
18 lawyers involved with them. And then as time went on, other voices became involved
19 as outside lawyers and were litigating those cases, and I think that is publicly known.
20 Q Yeah, it is. And my question is, did you have concerns about those outside
21 lawyers that came in to litigate the cases and were providing the President advice?
22 A Yes.
24 A Well, again, I don't think the President, you know, particularly over time, was
2 A And, again, without getting into naming, you know, all the names, and I may
3 forget some of the names because I'm looking back and thinking, obviously there were
4 lawyers like Sidney Powell, who I did not believe particularly over time in some of the
5 meetings I was involved in was serving the President well. And there were a number of
7 Q Yeah. Mr. Giuliani, was he in that category that was not serving the
8 President well?
9 A Again, with respect to Mr. Giuliani, you know, I had had a lot of respect for
10 Mr. Giuliani as mayor of New York and as a very capable lawyer. I think some of the
11 things he was doing with that team of lawyers I did not agree with.
12 There were times where Mr. Giuliani did play a positive role, and I'm
13 thinking -- and while I don't think this is one of the topics that I'm approved to talk about,
15 Q Yes.
16 A -- I think on some of the issues that were being raised by others, Mr. Giuliani
18 Q Yeah.
19 A There were other lawyers, like Jenna Ellis, who were involved.
20 But, look, I'm not here to be uncharitable or to besmirch other people in any way.
21 But, no, I did not agree whatsoever with the way they were conducting themselves.
22 And then with respect to the whole election fraud issue, okay, to me it's sort of if
23 you're going to make those kind of claims -- and people were open to them early on
24 because people were making all sorts of claims. And the real question is show the
25 evidence. Okay.
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1 And over time people were making -- as time went on into December, into late
2 December, for example that meeting on December 18th, there was a real question in my
3 mind and a real concern, you know, particularly after the Attorney General had reached a
4 conclusion that there wasn't sufficient election fraud to change the outcome of the
5 election when other people kept suggesting that there was, the answer is, what is it?
6 And at some point you have to put up or shut up. That was my view.
8 beyond, all the way up to the morning of January 6th, were specific claims the
9 Department of Justice had looked into and had rebutted. Did that cause you frustration
12 concern. And, again, without suggesting or reflecting any conversations with the
14 Q Yes.
16 extremely good and talented people. I had throughout my tenure worked as hard as I
17 can to support the Department of Justice, to protect their prerogatives as the counsel.
18 They obviously had a different role than the White House counsel. I had worked
19 very closely obviously with Bill Barr. Jeff Rosen I've known for a long time. We were
21 Rich Donoghue, again, had a very good relationship with Mr. Donoghue. Mr.
23 Steve Engel I had worked with in the past as a lawyer again. And he was the
24 head of OLC, so he obviously was involved in working with us and working with Mike
25 when we needed legal advice and legal opinions, many of which are published. He is an
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2 These are -- I'm leaving people out -- but these are all people of character. In my
3 own staff at that point Mike had gone on to a new job, but the lawyers on my staff same
4 thing.
5 Pat Philbin in particular who, you know, handled a lot of the legal questions sat
6 right next to me, very, very positive force in all this. Relied on him to look at legal issues
8 So, yes, I trusted those people. I believed those people. I believe they looked
9 at claims to the extent they needed to be looked at claims -- they needed to look at them.
10 In fact, Attorney General Barr got criticized early on by saying -- because he said
12 So he got -- and this is the one thing about Attorney General Barr. I mean he
13 gets criticized and he got criticized in his tenure from various -- and by the way, I'm not a
14 politician. Obviously, I'm a lawyer and I don't -- but from people on all sides of political
15 issues. Okay. And Bill Barr did the right thing time after time.
16 I think he did the right thing here. I think he looked at the issues. He had the
17 Department look at credible issues of fraud. And he made a determination that there
18 wasn't sufficient evidence of fraud. He told the American people that. I supported
19 that.
20 Q Okay. Bill Stepien, who was the campaign manager, testified before the
21 select committee that there were effectively two teams of lawyers. There was what he
22 called "team normal," and then that included Matt Morgan and Justin Clark and the
23 lawyers you mentioned before that were on the campaign team prior to the election; and
24 then there was another team, and that that other team sort of stepped in and took over
1 Is that a fair characterization of how you sort of saw the differential quality of
4 particular teams, there was a group of people, and I think a lot of people in the White
5 House agreed with this, that were not serving the President well. They were not serving
6 the President well. They were promoting ideas that were wrong. And, yes, there was
8 Q Yeah. And we're going to get into some of those specific ideas.
9 Last question on this. You mentioned Mr. Philbin, who was your deputy, your
10 principal deputy.
11 A He was deputy White House counsel. I mean, one thing that, you know,
12 when I was honored to have this job, you know, and I was very, very lucky to have people
13 like Mike Purpura, Pat Philbin, Kate Todd, just incredible lawyers, Tara Helfman, a large
15 And so, yes, Pat Philbin was one of them. I think he was the first one who sent
16 me an email when he heard publicly that I was being considered for the job.
17 As I told you in the interview, I recommended someone else for the job who was
18 already in the White House. But ultimately when the President asked me do the job, I
19 was honored to take it. And I was honored to work in the Trump administration with
20 the President and with a lot of talented people that I believe did a lot of good for
21 America. So I was honored do that. And Pat Philbin emailed me and he ended up
22 coming in.
23 Q Yeah.
24 A Pat Philbin is a very, very talented lawyer, clerked on the Supreme Court,
25 had worked in the Department of Justice, had been my partner at Kirkland & Ellis. So he
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1 was there. And particularly through the end of the administration in those days he was
2 right there with me and he was very important to the process of the transition.
3 Q Pat Philbin, when we interviewed him informally, told the select committee
4 that he felt that the outside lawyers, including Rudy Giuliani, Sidney Powell, Jenna Ellis,
5 and John Eastman, were giving bad advice to the President and that had ramifications for
7 A Yes.
8 Q Attorney General Barr, who has also interviewed with the select committee,
9 described the outside lawyers advising the President as a clown car. Do you agree with
10 that assessment?
11 A Again, without getting into pejorative statements, I don't disagree with that
13 Q Yeah. Mr. Barr told us that the President -- when he confronted the
14 President with his opinion of the fact that these lawyers were a clown car, the President
15 indicated that "at least Rudy fights for me," and he referenced the willingness to fight as
17 Did you sense anything with respect to the willingness to fight or the ability to
18 continue to press on with these claims as the reason why the President listened to that
19 advice?
20 A Again, I am not going to talk about conversations I had with the President or
22 Q All right. Let me ask you a little bit more about Attorney General Barr and
24 There were a lot of meetings that Attorney General Barr told us about where he
25 and other officials at the Department of Justice were explaining to the President that they
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1 had looked into these election fraud issues and were not finding them to be meritorious.
2 Is it fair to say that you sort of supported and reinforced to everyone in the White
3 House faith in the Department of Justice, faith in Attorney General Barr, faith in the
5 A Yes. And not just at this point in time, but throughout my tenure.
6 reinforced faith in the Department of Justice and the importance of the work of the
8 best I could.
9 Q Okay. And, Mr. Cipollone, were you vocal about that? Did you express
10 that faith, that belief, and essentially vouch for the process and the conclusions that
11 Attorney General Barr and Justice were reaching with respect to those investigations?
12 A Was I vocal?
13 Q Yes.
15 Q And, again, I understand you will not share with us your direct
16 communications with the President. But fair to say that the President and everyone
18 A Again, without talking about what I said to the President -- and let me put it
20 Q Yeah.
22 I felt that what the President wanted from me was my best advice and my
24 Then he made decisions. And that's what I felt I owed him. And I owed him the best
25 opinion I could give him. I tried to give it directly for the most part, not in large groups
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1 of people, but I gave it to him. And I think he appreciated it. And that was my job, and
3 Q Yeah. Attorney General Barr told us that on November the 23rd, you
4 actually suggested that he come to the White House, that he hadn't met with the
5 President since the election, and that there was a meeting with him in the White House
7 A Can you give me --you know, because there were so many meetings, and
8 Bill, Attorney General Barr, would come to my -- we had a weekly lunch. We were in
9 very regular communication. And so, I'm trying to remember. There were so many
10 meetings that have been talked about. Tell me what happened at this meeting and so I
12 Q Sure. Let me just tell you -- read you what Attorney General Barr told the
13 select committee.
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14 "So on November 23rd, I hadn't spoken to the President since the election. And
15 in fact I said since the middle of October roughly and it was a little -- it was getting
16 awkward, because obviously he had lost the election and I hadn't said anything to him.
17 And so Cipollone said, 'You know, I think it's time you come over here.' So I came over
18 to meet with the President in the Oval Office and Meadows and Cipollone were there."
19 He went on to describe the discussion about various theories of election fraud and
22 A Yes.
23 Q Tell us what you recall about the meeting with Attorney General --
24 A Again, that's a meeting that was with the President, so that's not something
25 that I'm going talk about, because I haven't been authorized to talk about that.
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1 Q Okay.
3 was very supportive of the Department of Justice in general and Attorney General Barr in
4 particular. I would say our thinking was quite aligned. We had reached conclusions
5 separately on many things, but certainly I was informed by the work that they were doing
7 Q Yeah.
8 A And, again, I think even Attorney General Barr would say that while there
9 may have been specific instances of fraud, there wasn't sufficient fraud to change the
12 was discussion about the President possibly conceding the election. And specifically, we
13 understand that Mark Meadows assured both you and Attorney General Barr that the
17 getting into that meeting, I would say that that is a statement and a sentiment that I
19 Q I see. And, again, do you know if it was on November 23rd or some point?
21 Q Yeah.
23 statement.
24 Q Tell me more about that, of your discussions with Mark Meadows, separate
25 from the meeting with the President, about his views that it was time for the President to
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2 A Again, and I can only discuss, you know, my interaction with Mr. Meadows.
3 Q Yeah.
4 A My general interaction with Mr. Meadows prior to the election had been
5 very good. He had been supportive of the White House Counsel's Office. We had
7 And so, I had a -- what I thought to be a good relationship with Mr. Meadows.
8 could be candid with him. And I think that sentiment was expressed to me by
9 Mr. Meadows, the President would ultimately concede the election or at least recognize
10 that the election was over and that Joe Biden was going to be the President and leave
11 gracefully.
12 Q Okay. And did Mr. Meadows maintain that view at least in conversations
13 with you all the way through the end of the administration or did that evolve over time?
14 A Look, I don't remember all of the conversations, that Mr. Meadows, you
15 know, was having conversations with a lot of people, you know, some of which I'm finding
17 So, you know, again. But whenever -- you know, and obviously sentiments can
18 change over time. But I think as a general matter, without getting into specifics because
19 I can't recall a lot of the specifics, but directionally if what you're saying, was Mr.
20 Meadows hopeful that at the end of the day, after all of the challenges were adjudicated
21 appropriately after the election was certified that things -- that there would be a graceful
23 Q Okay. And, again, I understand you can only talk about the conversations
25 A Now, was he, you know, supportive of looking into claims of election fraud?
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1 Yes, he was.
3 eventually concede and agree to a graceful exit change over time or did you hear him
5 A That he should?
6 Q Yes.
7 A Or that he --
9 A 1 don't think again -- and I'm trying to think back because we have had lots of
12 Did he think that -- did his hope -- was his hope that that would happen
13 consistent? Yes. Did he think he should ultimately do that? Yes. And I think he
14 thought, although there was a lot of activity that I assume you're going to get into, but I
15 think -- I think he thought -- and, again, you're asking me what I thought he -- was in his
18 A My general sense was that he thought that at the end of the day there
19 would be a transition.
20 Q Okay. The next time that you met with Attorney General Barr was
21 December 1st. That was the day on which he made the public statement to AP about
23 Do you remember seeing Attorney General Barr, meeting with him in the White
25 A I'm not sure if that was the next time I met with Attorney General Barr.
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1 may have met with him between those times. I certainly spoke to him.
2 Q Okay.
4 meet with me and we were going to talk, you know. We may have been meeting with
2 BY
3 Q Tell us what you remember, Mr. Cipollone, about your interactions with
5 A Well, he had made the public statement. It had gotten -- you know, it was
6 public.
7 Q Yeah.
10 little time in Mark's office as I recall. And I remember we got a call or one of -- I think
11 my assistant or someone, you know, they had heard that Attorney General Barr was
12 meeting with me and that they said the President wanted to see him.
13 Q Okay.
15 came with us. I don't know if we got that indication again in Mark's office or on the way
17 Somehow it became known that Attorney General Barr was in the White House
18 meeting with me. And that was the day that he had made the public statement and the
20 Q Yeah. Attorney General Barr has told us about that meeting, about the
21 discussion with the President where the President was angry at him about his public
23 A I recall that meeting. I believe that's a meeting that falls within the
24 category that I'm not -- I've not been directed or, again, that the privilege has been
1 Q Yes.
2 A So, you know, to the extent that you're asking me questions about what the
3 President said or did during that meeting, I'm not in a position to talk about that at this
4 time.
5 Q I understand that. I guess I'm just asking you whether or not the President
6 was angry.
9 I think maybe, certainly Mr. Barr's talked about that meeting and
10 there may be ways to ask Mr. Cipollone questions about his statements and recollection
12 Okay.
14 BY
15 Q Please.
16 A I cannot -- and, again, I feel it's a matter of conscience, I feel it's the effective
17 functioning of the government. I believe a President should have the ability to have
18 senior advisers, the counsel, the chief of staff, you know, the National Security Advisor
19 certainty and others give him frank advice. That's something that's been recognized and
20 supported by Presidents of both parties throughout our history. So I feel like that's
21 important.
22 Q Yeah.
24 not my choice about what I can say consistent with my beliefs to the fact that as an
1 Having said that, do I generally agree with what I know about Attorney General
3 Q Attorney General Barr told us that during the meeting the President was
4 supremely unhappy with his interview and decision to announce that there was no
5 widespread election fraud and specifically was said to have pushed back during the
6 meeting on the President's baseless election allegations, telling him that they were
7 bullshit and that his legal team was a clown show. That no self-respecting lawyer is
8 going anywhere near it. It's just a joke. That's why are you are where you are.
9 And that at one point the President -- Attorney General Barr offered to resign, and
10 the President slammed his hand on the table and said, "accepted."
12 A Again, without getting into who said what during that meeting or what I may
13 have said, I think those are the kinds of meetings that people typically give candid advice
14 and direct advice. And that's the kind of meeting that I would have given my candid
16 And without getting into every detail, again, I don't have any reason to question
18 Q When the meeting ended, was it your understanding that Attorney General
19 Barr had resigned, that that was left open at the end of the meeting, his status as
20 Attorney General?
21 A Again, Attorney General Barr continued in his position after that meeting.
22 Q Yeah. Well, we understand that you and Mr. Herschmann may have
23 intervened to essentially keep him on or talked to him after the meeting about staying on
24 as Attorney General.
25 A I can tell you this. It's my opinion, without reflecting again. And I don't
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2 Q Uh-huh.
3 A I didn't think it was good for the President or for the country or, frankly, for
5 Q Yeah.
6 A And so he didn't. And how that came about, I think he has talked about
7 that. But I certainly was not of the view that it would be a good thing for the President
8 for Attorney General Barr to leave office. Sometimes tempers flare and sometimes
9 people say things maybe they don't mean. And sometimes with a little bit of time, those
11 Q Yeah. Attorney General Barr and Eric Herschmann told us that you and
12 Mr. Herschmann actually went out to Mr. Barr's vehicle, it was on West Exec. He was
13 getting ready to leave and you essentially convinced him to stay on as Attorney General.
14 Is that accurate?
16 somebody -- I can't remember how, you know, I said, "Call Bill, tell him not to leave."
17 went to his vehicle. I got in next to him. And we had a discussion and he didn't leave.
19 A That was -- you know, again, like, people made his own -- people make their
20 own decisions and Bill made his. And I gave him my opinion. I don't want to suggest
21 anything beyond that. I think he respects my opinion. I think, you know, we have
22 known each other for a long time. And I think he made a determination to stay. But
23 actually, you know, at the end of the day it's the President's decision.
24 Q Understood. So the bottom line was at the end of the December 1st
25 interaction he didn't resign, he stayed for a little while longer as Attorney General?
30
1 A Yeah. And the President didn't ask for his resignation after that, in terms of
3 Q Yeah. You mentioned in your prior answer tempers flare. Did you
5 A I'm not going to get into tempers flaring or anything like that. I don't -- I
6 have my own views about things like that. People have different perceptions of that.
7 Okay.
8 I mean, this is not relevant to what we're talking about here, but, you know, I'm an
9 Italian-American. I come from a big family. We do not suffer in silence. We say our
10 opinions. Sometimes we disagree. We get mad sometimes, then we hug each other
11 and we eat.
12 So my view about tempers flaring may be different than what others' perceptions
13 are. But people obviously have strong opinions. Sometimes they express those
14 opinions strongly. They feel passionately about that. That was never anything that I
15 took personally or certainly anything that would stop me from giving my opinion,
18 certainly prior to the election, I viewed to be a good one. I believe that I was proud to
19 be working in the administration. I was proud to be working with the many, many
20 talented people that worked in the Trump administration. I was proud to be working
23 And so I felt and I continue to feel that when I wanted to express myself to the
24 President, he welcomed that. Didn't always -- you know, again, without getting
25 into -- these are general points. Didn't always agree. He's the President. I didn't get
31
1 elected to anything. Okay. I was there to serve as his lawyer and I was honored do
2 that.
3 Q Yeah.
5 the Presidency.
6 I see, Ms. Cheney, you've come off -- your camera is on. Please go
10 I just wanted to ask if you take issue with Attorney General Barr's characterization
11 of these events or the President's response on December 1st to the Attorney General's
12 comments.
14 Again, as a general matter, without -- you know, a lot has been said about that
15 meeting in various news outlets and Attorney General Barr has spoken about it. I think I
16 already said I do not take issue, you know, without going through each and every fact or
17 what other people might say, I do not take issue with Attorney General Barr's
18 characterizations of things as a general matter. I may have my own views and additions
19 that I might add, but, no, as a general matter, I agree with Attorney General Barr.
20 Ms. Cheney. So you don't take issue with Attorney General Barr's
22 Attorney General?
23 Mr. Cipollone. Again, when you say take issue, do I disagree with how Attorney
24 General Barr in his view described that? I don't take issue with that. Again, I may have
25 my own views, which I'm not here to express. But, no, I don't take issue with Attorney
32
1 General Barr.
3 BY-
4 Q Yeah. And, Mr. Cipollone -- does anyone else -- this is a good place to
6 If not, Mr. Cipollone, I just wanted just to stay on this just for a minute. We have
7 had a lot of testimony about the President's temper, the President's outbursts. And I'm
8 just, without -- I'm not asking you for specific communications, I'm asking you if you
11 A Again, I'm not going to get into those kinds of questions, because I believe
12 they might reflect my communications with the President. You know, people get angry,
14 In my case, if that ever happened in a meeting that I was in, I did not take it
15 personally. Okay. And it certainly did not dissuade me from giving my opinion.
16 think he knew that about me and I think he respected that about me.
17 Q Yeah.
18 A So that's what I'm going to say about that. Lots of people have different
19 characterizations of how he acted, you know. I have my own. Okay. I never took
20 anything like that personally. And I believed as a general matter, while there were,
21 certainly after the election, there were times where, let's say, were a little choppy in
23 Q Yeah.
24 A It didn't impact me and my ability to do my job. And that's what I'm going
25 say about that. Is that okay? I mean, I'm not quite sure, and I want to
33
1 answer your questions, what you're trying to get with this question and why.
6 BY
7 Q Yeah. Let's take a look at exhibit 1. - I don't know if you can pull it
9 But exhibit 1 is a handwritten note that we received I believe from the Archives
10 that we have received information was crafted right after or on December 1st after this
14 information. I don't know what this -- I'm not sure I've seen this.
16 General Barr's statements that there was no systemic fraud in the election.
19 recall it at all.
21 Q Okay. Do you know whether you received this from Ms. Hutchinson or Mr.
23 A I don't know. The counsel's office received all sorts of documents that
24 people would send up, and I don't know if this is one of them.
2 I just wanted to ask, Mr. Cipollone, do you recognize Mark Meadows' handwriting.
3 Mr. Cipollone. Not really. I don't. I'm not a handwriting -- sometimes I don't
8 said that Mr. Meadows handed her this handwritten note after the meeting in the Oval
9 Office on December 1st, after the President had learned of AG Barr's statement.
10 Mr. Cipollone. I don't think -- oh, I'm sorry. As I've told you many times,. in
11 our interaction, where I come from it's not rude to interrupt. So I apologize and I'll try
12 to stop interrupting.
13 It's really more for the court reporter. You have to be careful of
14 that.
16 BY
17 Q Well, let me just finish. She indicated that at Meadows' direction she
18 brought the note to your office, handed it to you, and asked if it was okay for Dan Scavino
20 A Okay.
23 A I don't have any reason to -- I don't have any recollection of that. So I don't
24 have as I sit here today a reason to dispute that characterization. Did something like this
2 A I notice the second sentence, "Anybody that thinks there wasn't massive
6 But I don't have any recollection of this. And by the way, I wasn't fired.
7 Q Right.
8 A And so --
11 he wanted. I served at the pleasure of the President. And he never did that.
12 Q Okay. Attorney General Barr just a couple weeks later did resign,
13 December the 14th. Did you have any discussions with him about his decision ultimately
17 A Well, look, what do I recall? I didn't want Bill to resign. We had had,
18 because we were -- we had worked together, we had had -- and I think he sort of -- my
19 understanding is he's talked about this. But we had had sort of an understanding that if
20 he was going to go, I was going to go with him. Not for any other reason that, you know,
21 we had worked together and there were people in my office who were quite capable of
22 doing my job.
23 And so -- and when we had talked about -- I think I don't know that I saw his
24 resignation letter, he may have talked about it. I don't remember. But I remember he
25 wrote a resignation letter that I then saw when he came to the White House. Actually, I
36
1 think it's one of the best and most concise recitation of the many accomplishments of
2 President Trump.
3 And, again, I didn't want Bill to go. I understood he wanted to move on.
4 Obviously Jeff Rosen was very capable and Rich Donoghue and all those people. So --
5 Q Did you have concerns, Mr. Cipollone, that Attorney General Barr's
6 resignation would make it harder for you to keep the President on track or keep him away
7 from the bad advice that he was getting from outside lawyers?
8 A I mean, I would put it this way. You know, Attorney General Barr is a force
9 of nature and he obviously was very, very helpful to me and to everybody in terms of
10 giving frank, candid advice. And so I didn't want him to leave. But I felt confident,
11 because I knew Jeff Rosen, that if Bill wanted to move on right before the holidays, that
12 Jeff would be a good acting Attorney General and that his team over there would remain
15 effect on the 23rd of December. And then Jeff Rosen, as you indicated, becomes acting
16 Attorney General.
18 at the White House with the new DOJ leadership, with Mr. Rosen and Mr. Donoghue and
19 Steve Engel. And there are, again, discussions at that meeting about election fraud.
22 Q Uh-huh.
23 A Yeah. I don't recall anything specific about that meeting. And that's the
24 kind of meeting again with the President that I think falls outside what I'm authorized to
25 talk about.
37
1 Q Yeah. Let me ask you about a couple of things that we believe were
2 discussed at the meeting and ask about your view on those topics.
3 First was something called "ltalygate" or the allegation that there were some
4 people in Italy that had information about satellites that may have impacted Dominion
7 Q Yes.
8 A -- in the embassy, and there may have been somebody in a jail somewhere
12 Q Yeah.
18 Q Do you remember whether anything was actually done to look into that
20 A I think -- I don't -- I don't remember specifically, but I'm sure, as with every
21 claim, if it was sent over, you know, some were more credible than others obviously.
22 And I think it was, at least as far as I know, was looked at in an appropriate way.
23 Q Okay.
25 Q I see.
38
2 Q Yes.
3 - Could I just clarify one thing, Mr. Cipollone, that may jog your
7 in Mr. Meadows' office with leadership from DOJ. I believe there was at least a portion
9 Mr. Cipollone. Okay. Yeah, again, I don't quite remember that. I would
10 certainly defer to the recollections of Rich Donoghue or Jeff Rosen if he was -- they were
13 - Yeah.
14 Mr. Cipollone. Look, again, there were these theories that would come up, all
15 right, on an ongoing basis. I don't know where they were coming from. Some people
16 took them seriously, okay, as far as I can tell and then would want them looked at.
17 From my view, if DOJ was looking at any claims of election fraud and was making a
18 determination -- again, it's not my determination, that was their call -- they could look at
19 it, determine from its face what investigation, if any, needed to be done with such claims.
20 But I don't know -- I can't recall much more about this. There were other things
21 like this that kept coming up, like beaming through thermostats and things like this, you
22 know.
39
2 [10:06 a.m.]
4 Q Do you remember any of these other specific claims that, in your view, were
5 ridiculous or meritless that came up for discussion over the course of this post-election --
7 think -- again, some people presented them as if they, you know, ought to be looked into
8 or were -- and you would -- it wasn't my job to sort through, you know, to actually
9 investigate these claims. My view would be, again, they're outside lawyers working for
10 the campaign, working for the President. If they had evidence, then let's have it, okay?
11 And if people thought that the claim was serious, they should refer to the Department of
12 Justice. I remember with some of this, I think Jeff's view was like bring it to the regional
13 FBI office, or bring it to the FBI, if you have something that you want to say.
15 correct, the President, I do not believe, was a participant in this meeting, it was in
16 Mr. Meadows' office -- that the subject of an original -- the Department of Justice filing a
23 A Well, I can't remember who was promoting that. You know -- and look,
24 lawyers were looking at all sorts of, kind of, options. And I mentioned some of the ones
25 that I thought -- you know, there were some legal issues that ought to be looked into, but
40
1 not by me, but by others representing the President. Go to court if you want to, and
2 they did.
3 You know, on this one -- I will say this, I generally support the Department of
4 Justice on these kinds of things. My sense was this is not something that they thought
5 was a thing that they could or should do. My recollection from the time or maybe things
6 like -- things I've heard since then in terms of testimony that you all have gotten, I think
7 Engel might have looked at this. I think Steve looked at this. Let me tell you, Steve is
8 gold standard, okay? Steve is an amazing lawyer. Very, very smart, but -- yeah. So I
9 would on these kind of things, if they wanted to look at it, that's their prerogative.
11 Q I understand.
12 Mr. Engel provided information about this meeting to the Select Committee. He
13 said that the group -- and this is Rosen, Donoghue, you, Pat Philbin, and Mark Meadows,
14 not the President, discussed the President's wish to file an original jurisdiction lawsuit and
15 proposed that Cipollone reach out to John Eastman to help persuade the President that
17 Do you remember the discussion, either with Engel or a subsequent call to John
23 Q Yes.
24 A Maybe that happened -- look, I didn't think it was a good idea, and primarily
25 because the Department of Justice didn't think it was a good idea. I think people were
41
1 looking at all sorts of creative things. This was December 29th. You know, this is the
3 Q It did not.
4 A No.
6 A I don't really recall detailed discussions about this with Professor Eastman.
7 Q Anything else about the prospect of this original jurisdiction case that you do
8 recall?
9 A Not as I sit here. If you have specific questions -- it wasn't filed. And look,
12 A These are not ideas -- I think these are ideas that were coming from other
13 people that were raised with the President. I mean, I don't think that -- in my sense,
14 okay, from some of the people, maybe not serving him well.
15 Q Yeah.
16 A I mean, there was other original jurisdiction cases, you know? I mean, a
18 Q Right.
20 campaign lawyer. I was defending the Department of Justice on this, you know, and on
21 everything.
22 Q Yeah. Another idea that came up is exhibit 4, if you could turn to that in
23 your binder.
2 Q This, for the record, is a December 16th, 2020 draft executive order that's
3 stamped President has seen, and it's titled, "Presidential findings to preserve, collect and
4 analyze national security information regarding the 2020 general election," and it would
6 Do you recall this draft executive order and any involvement in discussion of its
7 issuance?
8 A Well, I don't have a recollection right now of seeing this order at the time.
9 may have. I mean, things like this would -- this is not -- this is something that came from
11 mean, we drafted executive orders, you know, for the President on many, many things.
13 Do you know where --1 have a sense. I have an idea where it might come from.
14 You showed this to me at my interview. I know the idea contained in it. I mean, I can
16 Q Well, no. Just look at the last page, the very last page. There's a -- when
19 Q Yeah. There's a -- if you turn all the way to the back, there's a note that
22 Q Do you recall your assessment of whether there was factual basis for the
24 A Again, without getting into my conversations with the President -- no, I think
25 this was a horrible idea. I don't think there was a legal basis for this, and without going
43
3 A First of all, there is no legal basis, okay? Is this the one -- let me just take a
4 minute here.
5 Q Yeah.
7 Q Yeah.
8 A Yeah. No. That's not something that can be done. That's not something
9 the President ultimately did. So, no. My view of this was very clear, very strongly
11 don't think there was any doubt what I thought of this on anybody's part. And I think
12 some of it may already be public because I think -- was this the one that was -- I think this
13 was an idea that was discussed at the December 18th meeting, the 6-hour deal?
14 Q Yes.
15 A Yeah. I remember that. And then there's also something here -- and
16 again, I'm happy to take time and go through each and every point. I'm sure I didn't
17 read this with care when I got it, and I just looked at what it was. I'm sure Philbin looked
18 at it. I'm not, you know -- and there's something in here about appointment of a special
19 counsel --
20 Q Yes.
21 A -- to investigate --
22 Q Well, there's discussion of that at the 18th meeting. It is in here, the very
23 last --
2 A No. I was not in favor of that. I thought that was not a good thing. In
3 particular, the person who was being suggested for that role would have been a disaster.
6 And without getting into details about conversations with the President, you
7 know, there are regulations about who can appoint a special counsel, and then there
8 was -- I think there was some confusion even on the people who put this stuff together
9 on, was it a special counsel at the Department of Justice? There was some suggestion
10 that there would be a special counsel to investigate this in the White House.
11 remember somebody, you know, suggesting this, or me, maybe even in my office, and
13 Q So let me just finish with the executive order. It sounds like this was not
15 A Absolutely not.
16 Q Yeah. If you actually look at exhibit 31, all the way towards the back, this is
17 one of the new things that we sent over to you. Yeah. It's the same thing, but there's
19 A Okay.
21 "I reviewed, fixed a spelling error in the title, ensure it gets legal review, but this is
22 ready to go from my standpoint. Thanks for getting the key points in."
23 Do you have any idea where General Flynn was involved in drafting or proposing
25 A I don't know who drafted this, or whether General Flynn drafted it. Was he
45
3 A Yes, he was.
5 A 1 don't --you have to remind who is that is. Who is Phil Waldron?
6 Q He was a former military officer who was involved in working with the
8 A I didn't have a lot of insight into who was working on that team. This is the
9 Kraken?
10 Q It's --
11 A Yeah.
13 A Okay.
14 Q If you turn the next page to page six of the exhibit, the same email chain that
15 forwards this draft order, this is sent from, we believe, Phil Waldron to Bernie Kerik.
16 Do you know whether or not Mr. Kerik or Mr. Giuliani were involved?
17 A I'm not the person to ask these questions. I don't know who was involved
18 in this. I was at the December 18th meeting. Just to be clear, the President ultimately
20 Q But it sounds clear that your office had nothing to do with the crafting of and
22 A No. Pat Philbin would draft executive orders. This is not something that
1 Mr. Purpura. Heyllll before we move there, why don't we take a break.
3 minutes.
5 BY
6 Q So Mr. Cipollone, before the break we were talking a little bit about
7 December the 18th, and there was a big series of conversations in the White House that
9 First of all, did you participate in discussions with Sidney Powell, General Flynn
11 A Yes.
12 Q How did you first become aware that they were even present in the White
13 House?
14 A I was actually leaving to go home to dinner -- I forget what time it was, but it
15 was later on in the evening. And then I got a call, either from Molly or from Eric
16 Herschmann that I need to get to the Oval Office. I remember I had my overcoat on,
17 and so I went to the Oval Office. I opened the door, and I walked in. I saw General
18 Flynn. I saw Sidney Powell sitting there. I saw someone I didn't know, and Eric was
19 there. Derek Lyons was also there. That was that Derek's last day in the White House,
20 so he was staying around after his last day. He had gotten a job and was moving on.
21 And I walked in. I was not happy to see the people who were in the Oval Office.
22 Q Explain why.
23 A Well, again, I don't think they were providing -- well, first of all, the
24 Overstock person, I never knew who this guy was. Actually, the first thing I did, I walked
25 in, I looked at him and I said, Who are you? And he told me. I don't think any of these
47
2 And so, I didn't understand how they had gotten in. I didn't understand why the
4 Q Yes.
5 A Patrick Byrne, I didn't understand why he was there. I had never seen him
9 Eric Herschmann, who was playing a very positive role generally, in my view.
10 Derek Lyons also -- you know, he was staff secretary, but he is a very talented lawyer,
12 Then, I think there were other people on the phone. I think Mark Meadows was
13 on the phone at that point. And again, if you know -- I'm going by the best of my
14 recollection.
15 B~
17 A I think at some point -- I think Rudy Giuliani got on the phone at some point.
18 He later showed up for the second half of the meeting. So did Mark. I think Robert
19 O'Brien may have been on. I don't know who else was on the phone.
21 Committee, and she indicated, "Somebody had notified the world that we were there,
22 which caused massive consternation among the staff of the White House Counsel's Office,
23 and probably Mr. Meadows and Mr. Giuliani, too, to know that I had access to the
25 Is that generally accurate, that you were notified that Ms. Powell was already
48
1 present in a meeting with the President, and you came to sort of intervene and/or join
2 that discussion?
3 A I didn't know what was going on when they called me. They just told me
4 get to the White House. I didn't come running. But I did come -- I'm sorry, get to the
5 Oval Office. And I walked into the Oval Office, and then I saw who was in there.
6 Q All right. You testified, I believe before the break, that this executive order
7 that we had discussed previously, that that was one of the subjects discussed during the
9 A As I recall, yes. That was something that was being raised by General Flynn,
10 by, I think, Sidney. And they were just addressing the general view -- you know, they
11 were expressing the general view that there had been fraud in the election, and
12 something needed to be done. I don't think they were happy to see me, and it sounds
14 Q Fair to say that you pushed back strongly -- you, Mr. Herschmann, and
15 Mr. Lyons pushed back strongly against the idea of the issuance and this order and the
17 A Yes.
19 Insurrection Act?
20 A I don't remember that discussion. Was that something that could have
21 been discussed? Yes. But I don't recall whether or not that specific thing was
22 discussed. I can think about it. I mean, if you have information where someone says it
23 was, then I wouldn't contradict that. I remember that was something that I had heard
24 that General Flynn had suggested, but I did not -- I don't have a clear recollection of
1 Q Separate from the meeting, what was your view about things that General
2 Flynn had said, rerunning the election, the declaration of martial law as a possibility of
3 election-related remedy?
5 Q Did you -- do you know whether or not at that meeting the possibility of a
8 Q All right. January 6th, the joint session, do you recall any discussion of that
9 at that meeting?
10 A If people said that was discussed, I don't -- as I sit here today, I wouldn't
11 contradict that. But I don't have a clear recollection if that was a topic. The topics that
12 I have a clear recollection about -- and again, I'm not going to talk about my discussions
14 Q I understand.
15 A -- or what the President said, but the topics that I recall generally are this
16 idea of this executive order, the idea of election fraud generally. I remember the three
17 of them were really sort of forcefully attacking me, verbally, Eric, Derek. And we were
18 pushing back. And we were asking one simple question as a general matter: Where is
19 the evidence?
20 Q What response did you get when you asked Ms. Powell and her colleagues
23 know, I can't believe you would say something like -- you know, things like this like, what
24 do you mean where's the evidence, you know should now -- things like that, or you know,
25 a disregard I would say, a general disregard for the importance of actually backing up
50
2 Q And what was the basis of their criticism of you? You said they were
4 On what basis?
5 A They didn't think that we were, you know -- they didn't think we believed
6 this, you know, that there had been massive fraud in the election, and the reason they
9 A I did, yeah. I had seen no evidence of massive fraud in the election. Did
11 Q Yeah.
12 A Okay? Did they believe there had been? Seemed to be, that they really
13 believed it. And people are entitled to their opinion, but at some point, when you make
14 those kinds of claims, particularly if you're a lawyer, like Sidney Powell, you -- she
15 understands. And actually, she -- you know, early on my sense -- I didn't ever work with
16 her, but, you know, she was a skilled lawyer. At some point, you have to deliver with
17 the evidence.
18 And I -- again, I just go back to what Phil said, he had not seen and I was not aware
19 of any evidence of fraud to the extent that it would change the results of the election.
20 That was made clear to them, okay, over and over again. The meeting convened at one
21 point, or there was a -- and then it moved up to the residence, to the Yellow Oval. At
23 Q So they had been on the phone early, and then they showed up in person?
24 A Correct.
2 Q Yeah.
5 A As far as I recall --
7 A Yeah. He didn't this was -- no. Or that there was a legal basis for any of
8 this.
10 A You know, my sense is that Mark also -- again, I'm going directionally, not
11 with every word that was said or who might interpret, you know -- no. I think Mark also
12 was sort of, you know, on this issue, my recollection is he was very direct, particularly
13 with -- I remember him getting up and walking towards the General. And so he was very
15 Yeah. And, of course, you know, my view was clear, expressed repeatedly. Eric
16 Herschmann's view was clear and stated repeatedly. Derek's view, Derek Lyons,
17 forcefully and repeatedly. Again, he's a lawyer in addition, but he is serving as staff
18 secretary.
19 I remember at the break, because I had been there a while, when Mark came in,
20 he said, you know you can go -- you can leave if you want. I said, no, I'm not leaving.
21 So we all went up to the -- I can't remember the time of all this, but it was a long -- it was
22 a long haul at those two meetings. But again, at the end of the day, the President did
24 Q Yeah. And it sounds like from what you're describing, everyone in the
25 room or the rooms -- there were two different conversations -- was against the idea of
52
1 seizing voting machines or appointing a special counsel, but for Sidney Powell, Patrick
5 Q Yeah.
6 A With the appointment of a special counsel, I mean that came up. There
7 was some issue of -- there was an issue of, you know, do you need a security clearance in
8 order to work for the government and things like this. And there was some discussion
9 of that.
11 A 1don't believe -- well, no. She did not become the special counsel. So the
13 Q Yeah.
14 Ms. Powell told us, "Well, the President asked Pat Cipollone if he had the authority
15 to name me special counsel. He said yes, then he asked him if he had the authority to
16 give me whatever security clearance I needed, and Pat Cipollone said yes. And then the
17 President said Okay, I'm naming her that. I'm giving her security clearance. Shortly
18 after that, we left, and it totally blew up. Cipollone and Herschmann or whomever the
19 other young man was said, you can name her whatever you name her, and no one's going
21 A Again, without getting into -- that doesn't seem to be the whole story there.
22 I mean, in terms of the President's ability to grant a security clearance, the President has
23 that ability. Did I think that was a good idea, and did I express that very clearly, again, in
24 the room? Yeah, of course, I did. I don't think Sidney Powell would say I thought it was
25 a good idea to appoint her special counsel. I was vehemently opposed -- I didn't think
53
3 A She did not. And again, that was the President's decision.
6 Was there discussion about, sort of, who's fighting and who's weak that you
7 recall?
8 A I don't know. Well, that I recall -- let me put it to you this way: Did the
9 three of those people when I first walked in kind of attack me on the point that I wasn't
10 doing enough, I wasn't the person to do this, et cetera, et cetera, I can't remember
11 exactly what they were saying? Yeah. Did it have any impact on me whatsoever?
12 No.
13 Mr. Raskin, I see you've come off of -- you camera's on. Do you
15 Mr. Raskin. Thank you very much. Yes. I just wanted to ask Mr. Cipollone
18 seen is it was the craziest White House meeting in the Trump Presidency.
20 Mr. Cipollone. Well, Representative Raskin, again, I'm not gonna -- as a general
21 matter, people have their own views and will characterize things the way they want.
22 If you want my view of the meeting is, the people that were in that meeting, the
23 three people who I discussed -- no. I mean, they weren't behaving in an inappropriate
24 manner in my view. I think they later went up -- you know, I tend to keep meetings with
1 And that one, I think they all went out and started talking about it. They started
2 talking about me. They started, you know, saying that I was disrespectful because I was
3 speaking a lot. I don't know. Everybody has their own characterizations. It was not a
4 normal meeting --
6 Mr. Cipollone. In the sense of my, you know -- my time in the Trump
7 administration, and I don't know how they got into the White House even.
9 Mr. Cipollone. Sorry. If I could just say one more thing. I did not think that
11 Mr. Raskin. Good. And when you were offered the opportunity to go, but you
12 said no, you would continue to stay -- although, I think you had probably determined to
13 go home maybe a couple hours before that, why did you decide to stay?
14 Mr. Cipollone. Well, because I wanted to do my job, and I didn't want to leave.
15 And I wanted to be there to support. I don't leave, okay, in a situation like that. Yeah.
16 I was determined to go home. I was going home. Not that it's relevant here, my
17 daughter was having my family over, my parents. I was trying -- it was the holidays.
18 was leaving for that. And then I was like, Okay, I got called to the Oval Office. I'm not
19 going anywhere until it's done because I wanted to be supportive of my other colleagues.
20 And frankly, I wanted to be supportive of the President in giving him the best advice I
21 could.
23 Ms. Cheney, did you have something? I saw you also. Your
24 camera's on.
25 Ms. Cheney. I did. Thank you very much,1111 Thank you, Pat.
55
1 Pat, I just wanted to ask, you mentioned a few minutes ago -- Sidney Powell told
2 us that it was her view that she had, in fact, been appointed as special counsel, and I think
4 I wonder if you could tell us what the rest of that story is?
5 Mr. Cipollone. Well, I just meant that she answered -- I was speaking,
6 Representative Cheney, of the questions t h a t - was asking. She said did I say
7 that the President had authority to grant a security clearance. Well, the obvious answer
8 to that is yes. Did I think it was a good idea? No. And so, that's what I was talking
9 about in terms of her story that she's telling about that meeting.
10 I don't know what her understanding of whether she had been appointed, what
11 she had been appointed to, okay? In my view, she hadn't been appointed to anything.
12 And ultimately wasn't appointed to anything, because there had to be other steps taken.
13 So that was my view when I left the meeting. But she may have a different view
14 and others may have a different view and the President may have a different view. But
15 that was my -- when I left, I left with Eric Herschmann at the end of the meeting. And
16 when I left there, I left with the impression that certainly she hadn't been appointed at
17 that point. Did she want to be appointed? Yes. Were others thinking that she might
18 be appointed? I don't know. And that's -- was she ultimately appointed? No.
19 That's it.
20 Ms. Cheney. You mentioned that there were additional steps that would have
21 had to be taken.
22 So was there an initial step or a serious of initial steps taken to appoint her?
23 Mr. Cipollone. After that meeting? No. I remember afterwards Mark-- I don't
24 think this was something Mark wanted to do either. And so, I think it was
1 Ms. Cheney. Sorry, Pat. I didn't mean to interrupt you. It's okay in Wyoming.
2 I meant during the meeting. You know, she clearly had the impression she had
3 been appointed.
4 Were any steps taken, including the President himself telling her she'd been
5 appointed?
6 Mr. Cipollone. Again, I'm not going to get into the what the President said in the
7 meeting, you know? My recollection is you're not appointed -- you're not appointed
8 until steps are taken to, you know, get the paperwork done, get -- and when I left the
9 meeting, okay, did -- I guess what I'm trying to say is, I'm not going to get into what the
10 President said or said he wanted, okay? Was it my impression that that had been done
11 when I left the meeting? No. I didn't think it would get done. I didn't think it
12 was -- you know, it was like 2:30 -- I don't know, what time was that? Might have been
13 2, 3 o'clock.
14 After midnight.
15 Mr. Cipollone. It was late at night. And you know, I was, like, okay, we're done.
16 Eric and I left. And I didn't leave thinking that, you know, Sidney Powell was the special
17 counsel, let's put it that way, or ever would be. I didn't think that was going to happen.
18 What was said in the meeting by people, you have to ask them. Did people say
19 things along those lines? They may have, but I didn't think it was a real thing that had
20 happened, or, you know, no. Did she want to be that? Yeah. Did other people want
21 her to be a special counsel? Yes, but it didn't happen. I didn't think it was a good idea.
23 Ms. Cheney. And who were some of the other people who contemplated that
25 Mr. Cipollone. I mean, I think General Flynn did. I think Patrick Byrne did.
57
3 Mr. Cipollone. I'm not gonna get -- again, I understand the question, but that's
4 an area that I think I have to honor the privilege as I've been directed.
5 Ms. Cheney. Do you know, Pat, did this group meet with the President before
7 Mr. Cipollone. I don't know the answer to that question because when I got
8 there, they were already in there. Could be. I don't know. People were on the
9 phone. And look, you know, in terms of was it something -- people -- things get said
10 sometimes and then they're not really done. And things get said, you know, for reasons
11 that, you know, are unrelated to whether or not it was actually sort of going to get done.
12 So when I left -- it was a 6-hour meeting, something along those lines. It was late in the
13 morning. I didn't have the view that we had -- Sidney Powell had been appointed
18 - Yeah.
19
21 Mr. Cipollone, did Sidney Powell make assertions in this meeting about foreign
23 A Probably. Yeah. I don't have a specific -- I'm sure. I mean, there were a
24 lot of -- all of those kind of things were raised by the three of the people who were at the
25 meeting.
58
1 Q Okay. And you mentioned earlier some of Mr. Lyons' efforts to push back
3 Do you recall whether he raised to Ms. Powell the fact that she and the campaign
4 had lost all of the 60 cases that they had brought in litigation?
7 A I don't remember what she said. I don't think it was a good response.
9 A If you can tell me what others have said about that response, I can tell you if
10 that's my recollection, but -- yeah. I mean, people were saying -- the point was you had
11 your chance, okay, and in terms of, you know, losing or whatever -- some of that was
12 procedural, some -- you know, but at the end of the day -- and again, it's fully within the
13 right of candidates to challenge things in court in appropriate ways. But I think what
14 Derek was thinking and certainly I was thinking and certainly Eric was thinking, was like,
15 Hey, you were the lawyers doing this on the outside, you did it, and here we are. So I
16 think Derek did say that, and I thought it was a good point.
18 earlier. One of the distinctions in the versions that we've seen is a change in the
19 relevant Federal agencies that they purport to direct to take some actions. Some
20 versions we've seen involve the Department of Homeland Security, and others involve the
21 Department of Defense.
22 Do you remember discussion in this lengthy meeting at any point about a role for
24 A I'm sure there was such a discussion in terms of -- I think the general topic of
25 seizing voting machines was discussed in terms of the agency that actually did that.
59
1 think there was some discussion of Homeland Security. I think there was some
3 that's not a good thing to do, obviously. And it was a terrible idea. So did General
4 Flynn talk about that? Probably. But I don't have a specific recollection of that.
5 Q And I think you mentioned at the outset that you recalled that Robert
7 Do you remember when he -- what portion of the meeting, when he was added,
9 A He was on the phone, I believe, during the early portion of the meeting in
10 the Oval Office because people were being patched into the phone. I don't know how
12 Ms. Cheney. One other question on the executive orders; are you aware if the
14 Mr. Cipollone. I'm not aware of that. I don't believe that's the case, at least as
17 Mr. Cipollone. No. If you have some information that could refresh my
18 recollection, let me know what it is. But, no, this didn't get done. I also remember -- I
19 can't remember where in time, but there was another conversation where Ken Cuccinelli
20 was brought in, and he also said, you know, there's no authority for this.
22 Mr. Cipollone. Yeah, I think so. Yeah. And no. I mean, this was not -- no
23 one that I'm aware of, in terms of government lawyers who were asked about this,
24 thought that this was a legal sort of option that had any legal authority or that it was a
25 good idea. It was a bad idea. It was being brought to the President by people who I
60
1 don't believe had his best interest in mind. And part of the reason I was angry at these
2 meetings, and I tried to, you know, be respectful as best I could was because I thought
3 they were doing the country and the President, both in his capacity as President and his
4 personal capacity, a disservice. And they were giving him very bad advice. He
5 ultimately did not take that advice, but they were giving him very bad advice.
6 Ms. Cheney. Pat, did the President have the authority to appoint Sidney Powell
7 as special counsel?
8 Mr. Cipollone. Again, we've -- I don't know that we ever really carefully
9 considered that. I mean, in terms of the Justice Department, I think the Attorney
10 General has an authority to appoint special counsel. I think this idea that you would put
11 investigative special counsel in the White House, that was not something that, you know,
12 I thought was either a good idea, or, you know, the best approach to a special counsel.
13 Look, the President is the President, and ultimately, there's executive authority, but I
14 think under the regulations at the Department of Justice, I would think that, you know, a
15 direct appointment of a special counsel I think normally would go through the Attorney
17 Ms. Cheney. But would the President have authority to appoint counsel at the
19 Mr. Cipollone. Well, does the President have authority to appoint counsel at the
20 White House? Yes. A counsel at the White House that would, you know -- with
21 subpoena power or ability to do this kind of investigation? I don't believe so. I think it
23 Ms. Cheney. But the question of the President's authority to make the
24 appointment in the same way that I think you told -- the President had the authority to
25 grant her security clearance, there doesn't seem to be a question about that?
61
1 Mr. Cipollone. I think it's a more complicated question. The security clearance
2 is very clear.
4 Mr. Cipollone. I'm not going to talk about people may have said in the meeting.
5 Did Sidney Powell ultimately have a security clearance or work in any capacity for
6 the government? No, as far as I understand. Whether she has a security clearance,
7 you know, as an individual on the outside, I don't know. But I don't think so.
8 Ms. Cheney. And Pat, just one last question on this. Are you aware whether
9 the President signed this document during the period of time he was meeting with these
11 Mr. Cipollone. I have no awareness of that as I sit here today, no. I mean,
12 based on my recollection.
13 Did he sign this document? I don't -- this document never was enacted by the
16 Mr. Cipollone. If you have information that you'd like to give me, let me know
17 what it is, but based on my recollection, Representative Cheney, of that meeting, no.
18 don't think this was something signed. But if you have one that's signed, let me know
22 Mr. Raskin. Yes. Just to follow up on Ms. Cheney's question. Did the
23 proponents of this idea of appointing Sidney Powell as special counsel offer any clarity
24 about whether they were talking about making her special counsel in the Department of
1 Mr. Cipollone. I think they were unclear about that. I think they wanted her to
2 be special counsel. But part of my understanding of what they were proposing is that
3 she be a special counsel or be a counsel in the White House to look at this, at least that's
4 my recollection. I don't think they were thinking through the procedure in any real way
5 of how this would get done if you were doing it in a normal way.
6 Mr. Raskin. I see. I don't know exactly where you are on the question of the
7 unitary executive, but did you feel the need in any way to countermand the assumption
8 after the meeting that she had been appointed special counsel?
9 Mr. Cipollone. To countermand -- I don't understand the use of that word. I'm
10 the White House counsel. The President is in charge of -- you know, obviously so I give
11 advice.
13 Mr. Cipollone. Was there -- do I recall, sort of, an ongoing effort or question by
14 her to get herself appointed or get this thing done? Yeah. Did I work on that with
18 Mr. Raskin. Forgive me. I think there's a delay in audio. That's why we keep
19 interrupting by accident.
20 Mr. Cipollone. I'll try to be -- that's my fault. I'll try to be better about that.
21 Mr. Raskin. How long you needed to pursue the question, how long did that go
22 on for?
24 about the length of time. Like anything else in those days, these are things that you
25 thought were done, and then would come back around. And so, I don't remember on
63
2 Mr. Raskin. But in other words, it was something that you had to contend with
3 or push back on for several days, even after the meeting on the 18th?
4 Mr. Cipollone. I think that's correct, yeah. I think that's correct. I'm -- I
5 believe it kept coming back. I think Mark, you know, was dealing with it as well, Mark
6 Meadows. And so, based on what he was saying to me, it didn't seem like something he
7 was in favor of either. But that's what he was saying to me, and I had no reason to
8 doubt that. But then it -- at some point, it went away, you know.
9 Mr. Raskin. And did she -- did you ever see her again in that period? Did she
11 Mr. Cipollone. I don't know if she showed up again at the White House. I don't
12 have any recollection of seeing her again. It's possible, but I don't have a recollection of
16 BY
20 Ms. Cheney. First of all to say to Pat, we appreciate very much your role in this.
21 And when you talk about -- first of all, this issue that it kept coming back up again,
23 Mr. Cipollone. Well, Sidney Powell kept bringing it back up again. That would
24 be one person I recall. Mark was, you know, dealing with it. I can't remember whether
1 primarily -- again, with the caveat that I'm not talking about conversations with the
2 President, I think the key proponent, as I remember it, the chief vocal proponent of -- one
6 Ms. Cheney. So when you would hear that it kept coming back up again, how
9 Ms. Cheney. And then, just back on the meeting itself for just a minute, can you
11 Mr. Cipollone. Well, I think Eric Herschmann and I had expressed our opinion
12 over and over again, and I think at some point in the meeting, towards the end of it, we
13 left. I don't remember -- I think the meeting was essentially over. It was breaking up,
14 is my recollection. But Eric and I left, we left the residence is my recollection of things.
15 I think Derek stayed a little bit later, but I think that's what happened. And my sense is
17 Ms. Cheney. Did you stay -- did you see the other people leave?
18 Mr. Cipollone. I don't remember if I saw the other people leave. I don't -- we
19 left -- my recollection, Representative Cheney, is that Eric and I left, okay, but I didn't -- I
20 think we might have been -- I think there were other people there still when we left.
23 Sure. Yes.
24 Mr. Raskin. Mr. Cipollone, when the matter continued to flare up over the next
25 several days, was it your understanding that Sidney Powell was still seeking an
65
1 appointment, or that she was asserting that she had been appointed by the President at
3 Mr. Cipollone. You know, now that you mention it, probably both. You know,
4 in terms of like -- I think she was -- I think she may have been of the view that she had
5 been appointed and was seeking to, you know, get that done, and that she should be
6 appointed. In other words, she was taking the view, Hey, I have been, this is what I've
7 been told, and we need to get this done, because there's a formal process obviously of
9 Mr. Raskin. Is there anyone in the White House who has that title of special
10 counsel?
11 Mr. Cipollone. Well, I mean, there may be -- not in the sense of what she was
12 talking about. But yeah, Emmet Flood who -- when I joined, who's an excellent lawyer
13 and a good friend of mine, he was special counsel in the White House dealing with the
14 Mueller investigation on the part of the President. I believe President Biden has
15 appointed -- that's a title within the White House. You can be special counsel for an
16 activity. I believe President Biden has appointed special counsel to deal with
17 congressional oversight I read recently. But the idea that you appoint a special counsel
18 in the same way that the Justice Department, the Attorney General can appoint special
19 counsel to do an investigation, that's not something that I'm familiar with happening at
20 the White House. That's not what I think about when I think of a special counsel in the
21 White House.
22 Mr. Raskin. And they were contemplating she would be special counsel to
24 Mr. Cipollone. That's my understanding, but you'll have to ask her what she was
25 contemplating.
66
3 BY
4 Q Last thing on this, I just want to go back to something you said a couple
5 minutes ago, Mr. Cipollone, that this is not only a bad idea on the merits, on the facts in
6 the law, but would be bad for the country and be bad for the President personally.
7 Talk more about that. Why was this on a broader scale a bad idea for the
8 country?
9 A To have the Federal Government seize voting machines, that's a terrible idea
10 for the country, you know? That's not how we do things in the United States. There's
11 no legal authority to do that. And there is a way to contest elections. You know, that
12 happens all the time. But the idea that the Federal Government could come in and seize
13 election machines, no. That's -- I don't understand why I would even have to tell you
14 why that's a bad idea for the country. That's a terrible idea.
19 A I don't recall having a lot of involvement in that. I think that was being
20 done -- obviously, again, that's something that would be done by outside campaign
21 lawyers. You know, that's something that -- I think there's a precertification, you know,
22 and post-certification and analysis that would need to be done there. But no, I don't
24 Q Let me point you to exhibit 24 in your binder. This is an email that was
25 sent, I believe --
67
2 Yes.
3 Ms. Cheney. Sorry about that. Just before we go to fake electors, if we're
4 completely leaving the 18th, I just wanted to ask: Pat, was there any discussion before
5 you and Eric left of the tweet that went out at 1 a.m. that morning of the 19th?
7 Ms. Cheney. Yeah. This was the tweet the President ended with, you know,
10 Ms. Cheney. So did you become aware of the tweet that evening, or, I guess, it
12 Mr. Cipollone. I don't know when I became aware of that tweet. I don't have
13 Twitter. I don't have social media. So if it was discussed in that meeting, I'm not
16 Mr. Cipollone. If other people say it was -- I don't have a reason -- that's one
17 point I've made before, is I'm giving you the best recollection that I have of events that
18 took place a year and a half ago. Other people have their own recollections. I'm not
19 here to, you know, question anybody else's recollection. I'm just giving you the best.
20 And if you can give me something that refreshes, I'll talk more about it.
23 BY
24 Q Let me just point you again, Mr. Cipollone, to exhibit 24, this is an email that
25 came from Speaker Gingrich very early, November the 12th, to Meadows and to you,
68
1 about alternate slates of electors, indicates "Is someone in charge of coordinating all the
2 electors? Evans makes the point that all the contested electors have to meet on
3 December 14th, send in ballots to force contests, which the house would then have to
4 settle. Newt?"
5 First of all, do you recall receiving this message from Newt Gingrich back as early
8 Q Yeah. What do you recall about the prospect of the needing these slates of
13 thought was a good lawyer who could help -- and by the way, early on, you know, there
14 was kind of a notion, let's get some, you know, good lawyers who can actually think about
15 these things and effectively go about them to represent the President on the outside and
16 by people in the White House, people in the campaign. He had Justin Clark and Matt
17 Morgan. And so, I think Mr. Evans was somebody who Mr. Gingrich, Speaker Gingrich
18 thought was a very effective lawyer. I don't recall this, but if I had to -- I mean, I guess
19 there was -- there was some suggestion -- I take it from this, that, you know, alternate
20 slates of electors for consideration by State houses that were considering this, and maybe
22 Q Yeah. I guess, my question is exactly that, whether you and your office, the
23 White House Counsel, got involved in any way in assessing whether or not these alternate
24 slates were lawful, had a basis in fact or law, or if this was something being done by folks
25 on the outside?
69
1 A I think this was done primarily by people on the outside that we have
2 any -- like, there was a lot going on during that time period.
3 Q Yeah.
4 A People were, you know, coming in from the outside. There were lots of
6 probably. But no. In terms of the principal people who were looking at this, this was
10 A I don't. I don't. As I sit here, I don't have any recollection. Could that
12 Q How about Rudy Giuliani or any other lawyers representing the campaign?
13 A I don't have a specific recollection. But did I have discussions with people,
14 you know, with lawyers at the campaign? Yeah, I did on occasion, or when they were in
17 A 1don't remember about this subject. I'm not saying I didn't, but I just don't
19 Q This email from Newt Gingrich went to both Meadows and you.
23 A Again, all of these things -- I viewed my role to be, I'm the counsel to the
24 President at the White House. I was a government lawyer. Obviously, you know,
1 Q Sure.
2 A There's whole protocol for that, and there's a whole -- actually, the ethics
3 lawyers in my office, Scott Gast and his team had put out many, many emails how that
4 was supposed to work and all that. So, yeah, I mean -- but things like this, you know,
5 pursuing litigation and all that stuff, that was run by people on the outside.
7 White House Counsel's Office provided a legal opinion on or other assessment of the
10 involved in that.
15 A Okay. I'm not going to discuss anything that may have -- particularly legal
16 advice.
Q I understand.
A But to the extent that I would be looking at anything like this, this is
19 something that Pat Philbin would look at, you know, so obviously you had a discussion
20 with him.
22 Ms. Cheney. I want to just clarify, legal opinion has a particular meaning, and we
23 need to be careful about how we're asking the question. I'm not sure that we're asking
25 Mr. Cipollone. Okay. And you're right, Representative Cheney. If I'm asked
71
1 for a written legal opinion, what the normal process that would be done normally, we'd
2 go to OLC, we'd talk to Steve Engel, we'd get his advice. I'd talk to Pat Philbin. If there
3 was an agency involved, then we would talk to the agency's general counsel, and we
5 If President wanted to issue an executive order, for example, that was a very
6 detailed process. It went through all sorts of clearance at an agency, in my office, and at
7 OLC before it was issued. So we rendered legal clearance and legal opinions in that way.
8 BY
9 Q That's a good point. I'm not talking about a formal opinion that was vetted
11 Let me just read you the testimony that we got. This is from Cassidy Hutchinson:
12 "To be clear, did you hear the White House Counsel's Office say that this plan to have
13 alternate electors meet and cast votes for Donald Trump in states that he had lost was
17 Answer, "Not sure. Not trying to be overly broad right now. I can recall at the
18 time, perhaps early to mid-December, could have been the end of November."
19 But the general testimony was that there -- the view of the White House Counsel's
20 Office, that it was not legally sound. Is that consistent with your recollection?
21 A Again, I'm not going to get into either my legal advice on matters, and the
22 other thing I don't want to do is, again, other witnesses have their own recollections of
24 And in this case, do I recall rendering a formal legal opinion? I don't. I don't.
25 Did I often make -- I don't know about the Cassidy Hutchinson, but did I often say things
72
1 like, you know, this is not a good idea, and because I'm a lawyer, people took things
2 that -- well, the lawyers are saying nothing -- they might have. But as I sit here today, I
3 don't remember focusing on this issue that much. Maybe Pat Philbin focused on it a lot.
4 And as I sit here today, I'm not going to render a legal opinion now.
73
2 [11:12 a.m.]
4 Q Yeah.
7 Maybe we could ask it this way, Pat. Did you think it was a good idea to send
9 Mr. Cipollone. Well, again, without getting into the terminology, I thought it was
10 a good idea to, once things were certified and once the process was done, was to follow
13 Mr. Cipollone. I believe Leader McConnell went onto the floor of the Senate, I
14 believe in mid-December, and basically said, you know, the process is done. You know,
17 Yeah.
20 I would like to go back to a comment that Mr. Cipollone said a couple minutes ago
22 Mr. Cipollone, is it your impression that the President understood there was a
23 lengthy process that required all of this review in order to issue an executive order,
24 irregardless of the topic, and just if that process was necessary [inaudible]?
25 Mr. Cipollone. I believe the President understood, you know, the general
74
1 process. And, you know, it can be done quickly, and was, on certain occasions, but I
2 think he understood that there was a process and then the executive order would be
3 brought to him. We would come sometimes, but a lot of the times this was done when
4 the final product was completed through Derek Lyons, the staff secretary, and he would
5 sign it.
6 Mrs. Luria. So he would expect that to come from certain people within his own
8 Mr. Cipollone. Oh, no, if something -- well, I'm just talking about the normal
10 Often it started with, you know, the policy shop or with the President himself or
11 with others who wanted to do something by executive order. Counsel's Office would be
12 involved in that. If it impacted a particular agency, the agency policy people, the
13 Cabinet Secretary sometimes, and certainly their lawyers, the general counsel, would be
14 involved in that.
15 It would be sent through a process where everyone could chime in and give
16 comments, and it would get cleared through OLC, and then the President would sign that.
17 How much, you know, sort of -- I mean, the President understood that there was a
18 lot of work being done on these things. Whether he knew exactly who was doing it
19 or -- he knew the Counsel's Office was involved, he knew Steve Engel was involved. So I
21 Mrs. Luria. So, in the case of this executive order that we've been discussing at
22 length in this meeting, is it your impression that he would've viewed this as something
23 that had gone through that extensive process, in the way it was presented to him?
24 Mr. Cipollone. I don't know how he viewed this. And I don't want to speculate
2 BY
3 Q All right, Mr. Cipollone, let me go back. You mentioned Mr. Philbin
4 would've been asked to look at this. We interviewed Mr. Philbin. He described the
5 effort to convene Trump electors in States that he lost as one of the bad theories that
6 were like, he'd used the term "whack-a-mole," in the White House during this period.
9 And, again, Pat and I were, you know, very closely aligned on these issues.
10 relied on Pat, to the extent we had to look at something, you know, to look at it in more
11 detail.
12 I would come at things, you know -- and I had a lot of things going on, but, you
13 know, if something needed a deep dive, sometimes I would get involved, but Philbin
14 would look at it and other people would look at it. Then we'd have a meeting, and I'd,
16 Q Yeah.
18 Q Yeah.
21 - I'll take that opportunity. Can I just ask one point of clarification?
22 BY-
23 Q Mr. Cipollone, earlier you said, when we first introduced this topic of fake
24 electors or electors being sent from States that Trump lost, as a distinction between
1 Can you explain to us more what you meant by "certification" and what the
3 A Well, for example, when a State meets and certifies the election results, I
4 think there was a thinking before that happened by some people that, you know, if there
5 was going to be proof of fraud and if there was going to be evidence of fraud -- and,
6 again, this is in part speculation, because I did not do a deep analysis of any of this. And
7 maybe I shouldn't even speculate about this. But I think there was an idea that, if that
8 happened and if they did find fraud, there had to be, you know, an alternate slate. But I
9 don't know.
10 But then once certification -- so you're using terms like "fake electors." I don't
11 know what you mean when you're saying that. Are you saying early in the process?
13 Q Well, is it fair to say that, after the States had certified the election results,
14 you felt or it was your opinion that it was not appropriate for anyone to convene and
15 send slates of Trump electors from States in which Trump had lost?
16 A I don't know that I looked at that question in any detail specifically. Again, I
17 would rely on Mr. Phil bin's testimony on that, to the extent he would certainly represent
18 the views of our office. And Pat Philbin and I were in agreement, you know, on these
20 We would have discussions about -- but, again, this was not something that I have
21 a recollection of our office looking at in any detail. I was more looking at the general
22 issue from a positive view. I was like, okay, there's a process; the process -- there are
23 certain deadlines, and at some point that process is completed, as it normally is, litigation
25 BY
77
2 conversations --
7 Sure.
9 [Recess.]
11
12 Q I want to move now, if I can, Mr. Cipollone, to the issue of the Vice
13 President's authority at the joint session and, first, just ask sort of generally if you recall
14 this being an issue that you and your team at the White House Counsel's Office looked
15 into, the authority of the Vice President with respect to the counting of the electoral
17 A We looked into it. Pat Philbin looked at it. But primarily I think Greg
18 Jacob in the Vice President's office was looking, doing a detailed analysis of this for the
19 Vice President.
20 Q Uh-huh.
21 A I think also there was an issue of this would be in his capacity as president of
23 Q Right.
24 A -- he -- Greg is a very, very talented and skilled lawyer. I worked with him
1 So he was looking at it closely. Pat was also looking at it. And I was looking at
4 A I don't know when it began. I remember when it sort of got, you know,
5 fully on my radar screen. And, as I recall it -- and I'm sure people were looking at it
6 before this time. But, as I recall it, it kind of came up to me, I think it was, right after
8 Q Uh-huh.
10 Q It was.
11 A And so I'm sure I was aware of it before that, I'm sure people were looking at
12 it before that, but when it became really sort of a pronounced issue in my mind, in terms
14 I mean, we were dealing with the whole Jeff Clark situation, you know, through
15 the new year, you know, into the first couple days of January, and I was primarily focused
16 on that.
17 Q Right. Right. It was exactly around that time -- I won't show you these,
18 but I think we sent you in advance a series of exhibits -- 8, 9, 10, and 11. These were
19 emails that Greg Jacob sent to you that had some Law Review articles and some
21 A Right.
22 Q Do you recall receiving those and passing them along to Mr. Philbin?
23 A I'm sure I received them. I'm sure that if anybody read the Law Review
24 articles, that would've been Pat Philbin. I may have skimmed them, but I don't have a
25 recollection of going into detail about this myself. But Pat certainly looked at it. I had
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1 discussions about it --
2 Q Yeah.
3 A -- with Pat Philbin, with Greg Jacob, with Marc Short and people like that.
4 Q And tell us your view, Mr. Cipollone, upon those discussions with Mr. Philbin,
5 with Greg Jacob, what was your assessment as to what the Vice President could or could
8 Q Yes.
11 A My view was that the Vice President didn't have the legal authority to do
13 Q Yeah.
15 Q Okay.
16 Mr. Philbin, who looked at this closely, told the select committee that you asked
17 him to look into the theory of the Vice President's unilateral power at the joint session.
18 He looked into it. He discussed with you his conclusions that any such theory -- that the
19 Vice President had authority to reject slates of electors -- was wrong and that he
22 A Yes.
23 Q Okay.
24 And I know you will not share with us direct communications with the President,
25 but is it fair to say the President understood your and the White House Counsel's position
80
1 on --
3 Q Do you remember discussing this with any of the outside lawyers that we've
7 any --
9 with generally. You know, I -- and Senator Lee, you know, who I know, who was also a
10 great lawyer, and so, yeah, I'm sure I might've had discussions with him.
11 But I can't remember specific -- I mean, again, just going back to it, there was sort
12 of, kind of, as I look at it chronologically, as I think back on it, you know, we got through
13 that December 18th meeting. You know, then we had the holidays, but around
14 the hol- -- I mean, the new year and the end of -- and, obviously, we were working
15 through that entire period, because we were also starting to, you know -- Pat and I were
16 working with Chris Liddell -- and I can't remember exactly when this started -- to have the
17 transition. Like, you know, there was a lot of work that needed to be done, and we
19 Q Uh-huh.
20 A And then we had -- and we had Jeff Clark. And then this happens.
21 So, over that time, was I having discussions with people on the Hill about -- I
24 Senator Lee or others your view that the Vice President did not have the authority to
1 A Again, I'm sure I was conveying to people that that was my view, you know,
3 It was primarily a question that I was thinking about with the Vice President's
4 team --
5 Q Right.
7 Q Yeah. And it sounds like your views were aligned with theirs, that you
8 shared --
10 Q Yeah.
11 Let's talk about John Eastman. Were you familiar with Mr. Eastman,
12 Dr. Eastman, before the 2020 election? Did you have any relationship with him or
14 A I was familiar with John Eastman. I met him a long time ago when I was
15 working at Kirkland & Ellis, and he was, I believe, working in the Washington office there
16 at the time. So I met him back then. I think he went out to California; he became a law
17 professor.
18 Q Uh-huh.
19 A You know, I had a generally good opinion of John Eastman. You know, he
21 Q Uh-huh.
23 before this time with John Eastman were related primarily to the whole issue of birthright
24 citizenship and whether or not there could be an executive order on birthright citizenship.
25 And John had done, I was told, a lot of work on this issue, had written scholarly opinions
82
1 about it, et cetera, et cetera. So I interacted with him on that, because I was asked to.
2 And he talked to Pat Philbin, he may have talked to people over at DOJ about that issue
4 Q Do you have any idea, Mr. Cipollone, how the President came to rely on his
5 advice with respect to the 2020 election, the Vice President's authority, all of the issues
7 A I don't know precisely how, but I know that the President had a generally
8 positive view of John Eastman and his, you know, legal analysis, primarily as a result of
10 Q Yeah.
11 A -- was my understanding.
12 Q Okay.
13 A I think that was sort of how he got to know John Eastman. I don't know
14 who introduced him to John Eastman. And that's how I had interacted with John prior
15 to this time.
16 Q Okay.
17 A There was some idea that there would be an executive order on -- you know,
18 we looked at it closely, and it turned out -- well, there was never an executive order on
19 that.
22 Q Yeah.
24 Q Okay.
25 I want to talk about the post-election period and your interaction with
83
2 A Uh-huh.
3 Q -- and they reflect that there were three telephone conversations between
4 Eastman and you on December the 4th, relatively early in the post-election period.
5 Do you have any recollection about the subject matter of those conversations?
6 A I don't have a specific recollection of the subject matter. I would think the
7 general subject matter would be related to the election, but I don't have a specific
8 recollection.
9 Q Yeah. There was a 30-minute call, a 26-minute call. And this was just
10 before the filing of the Texas v. Pennsylvania Supreme Court case. Does that refresh
12 A That might've been what we talked about. I don't know if it was just me or
13 if I had my phone with, you know, Pat or who -- I don't -- I don't remember that call
14 specifically.
15 Q Okay.
16 A But if that's the timing of it, then maybe that's what it was about.
17 Q All right.
18 Did you at some point after that become aware of Dr. Eastman's view of what the
19 Vice President could do at the joint session and form an opinion of that view?
21 Q Okay.
23 think it was the time -- was I aware of it before the early part of January? Yes, I probably
24 was. Did I focus on it or think about it a lot prior to that? Well, there were other
25 things that were coming sort of one after the other that I was more focused on.
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1 But I'm sure Pat Philbin -- and I don't know what he told you -- but I'm sure Pat
2 Philbin may have been looking at it. I know Greg was looking at it. I know Greg did a
3 lot of work on it --
4 Q Yeah.
5 A -- was my sense, and, you know, looked at it very seriously and analyzed it.
6 That's my sense.
7 Q And that's exactly right. They have both told us, Mr. Philbin and Mr. Jacob,
8 that they looked very closely at the Eastman memos, the Eastman theory, and thought
9 that it had no basis, that it was not a strategy that the President should pursue.
12 Q Yeah.
13 A But my impression also is, again, I -- you know, I definitely look at all that and
14 talk about it, but I also come to things, like, with a commonsense perspective of, okay,
15 what are you saying can happen here, and then just thinking about it and saying --
16 Q Yeah.
19 A And, obviously, other lawyers, I think John and others, had a different view --
20 Q Yeah.
21 A -- and I understand that, and I understand that they were talking to the
23 Q Okay.
24 I want to talk about direct communications you had with Mr. Eastman,
1 We believe that there was a meeting on January the 4th, the day after the Jeff
2 Clark meeting that we'll get to later, in Meadows' office where you had a direct
5 was set up well in advance. I remember hearing that he was down there. Maybe Mark
7 Q Yeah. Do you remember talking with Dr. Eastman about his theory and
11 A I don't have a very clear recollection about the specific conversation, but,
12 directionally, my view was, you know, this is not something that is consistent with the
14 Q Uh-huh.
16 I think that -- there was -- was that the day --1 think there was a day that he was
18 Q Yes.
19 A -- and with the Vice President and with Greg Jacob, I believe Marc Short, and
20 Mark Meadows.
21 Q Exactly. It sounds -- we have learned that the meeting that you had with
24 Q You didn't go to the meeting in the Oval Office where Eastman met with the
25 President and with the Vice President. Do you remember why you didn't personally
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1 attend?
2 A I did walk to that meeting and I did go into the Oval Office with the idea of
3 attending that meeting, and then I ultimately did not attend that meeting.
6 Q Okay. Were you asked to not attend the meeting, or did you make a
10 BY
11 Q Yeah. Okay.
12 After the meeting, did you remain -- or as the meeting was going on, did you
13 remain in the outer Oval Office and have another conversation with Eastman after?
15 recollection is, once I left the Oval, I believe I went back to my office, but, again --
16 Q There's been reporting that you had sort of an angry confrontation with
17 Dr. Eastman, either before or after this meeting in the Oval Office. Do you remember
18 that?
20 Q Tell us what --
23 Q Uh-huh.
24 We have received testimony from various people about this. One was Jason
25 Miller, who was on the campaign. He said, "The way it was communicated to me was
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1 that Pat Cipollone thought the idea was nutty and at one point confronted Eastman,
3 Does that --
5 Q Okay.
7 Q Okay.
8 Did Dr. Eastman ever acknowledge to you that his theory was on uncertain legal
11 lawyers have different views of, you know, this is a legal theory, and then there's a
12 separate question of, you know, what is the likelihood of success even if some lawyer
14 So I don't know if -- I can't -- could we have had a discussion like that? Yeah, we
15 could have. But I don't recall the specifics of my discussion with John Eastman on that
17 Q There's been some reporting that, when you asked Dr. Eastman whether his
18 theory that the Vice President could reject electors could actually happen, he responded,
20 Your response: "You just told the President of the United States this is a doable
21 thing."
24 A I don't have a specific recollection of that exchange. Again, that sounds like
25 somebody who's doing an analysis of is this a reading of the law that he was proposing
88
1 versus a likelihood of success, and, you know, sometimes those are different things.
3 Q Yeah.
4 A -- people -- John, the Vice President's lawyer, who'd be Marc Short, the Vice
6 Q Yeah.
7 A Okay? I thought that the Vice President did not have the authority to do
8 what was being suggested under a proper reading of the law. I conveyed that, okay?
9 think I actually told somebody, you know, in the Vice President's -- "Just blame me."
10 You know, this is -- I'm not a politician, you know. I don't -- but, you know, I just said,
12 But let me tell you this. Can I say a word about the Vice President?
13 Q Please.
14 A I think the Vice President did the right thing. I think he did the courageous
15 thing. I have a great deal of respect for Vice President Pence. I worked with him very
17 afterwards as well. I think he did a great service to this country. And I think I -- I
18 suggested to somebody that he should be given the Presidential Medal of Freedom for his
19 actions.
20 Q Yeah.
21 Greg Jacob has shared with us an email that he sent to Dr. Eastman in which he
22 called him -- "You're the serpent in the ear of the President," essentially saying that he
24 knew was -- knew was unlawful, consistent with what I just asked you about.
25 Did he ever concede to you or did you get the sense that he knew that this advice
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2 A I don't have a recollection of that. And, again, everybody has their own
3 views of what's in somebody's mind or their motives. I'm not here to express any of
4 that.
5 Q Yeah.
6 Were you aware at all, Mr. Cipollone, of any discussions directly between the
7 President and the Vice President about this issue, the Vice President's authority?
8 A Well, I was aware of the meeting on the 4th, so that was a discussion. But
9 there were -- I believe there was another meeting with just the Vice President and the
11 Q Yeah.
12 A And then I remember hearing reports of a phone call with the Vice President
13 on January 6th.
14 Q That's all --
16 Q Okay. Do you have any information about what was discussed, about the
18 A Again, I'm certainly not going to discuss matters that I may have learned, you
19 know, secondhand about conversations between the President and the Vice President of
20 the United States. That is at the heart of the privilege. I view that as sacrosanct. So
22 Q Okay.
23 Beyond Dr. Eastman's memos, there were some other materials prepared.
24 Johnny McEntee prepared -- I think you sent you this in advance -- a one-page document
25 about Thomas Jefferson using his position as Vice President to win the election.
90
3 Q Yeah.
4 A -- about this, I don't have a recollection of looking through that, reading, you
5 know, Johnny McEntee's views about this. I don't have a recollection. Did I know
6 about them at the time? Probably I did. Maybe I did. But, no, I don't have an
8 Q Do you have any idea why it is that Johnny McEntee, the director of, you
9 know, Presidential personnel, would be drafting things for the President about legal
12 Q Yeah.
13 A No.
14 Q Is that unusual?
15 A But do I -- well, Johnny McEntee had some people working for him who were
16 lawyers, who were not part of the White House Counsel's Office, who sometimes had
17 ideas about legal things. And sometimes that got to the President through Johnny
18 McEntee, is my recollection.
19 Q Yeah.
20 Did you have concerns, Mr. Cipollone, about the flow of information on legal
21 issues going to the President that you and your White House Counsel's Office were not
22 involved in?
23 A Yes.
25 A Although, you know, obviously, if the President's having interaction with his
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1 personal counsel or with his campaign counsel, I didn't have a concern about that, you
3 Q Yeah.
4 A So, no.
5 Were documents being sent to the President, sent to Molly to give to the
7 You know, part of that, you know, prior to the election, is just part of the way
8 things worked, in the sense of, the President wanted to hear a lot of opinions and he
10 matters. I think that's one of his strengths. I think he wants to hear different opinions,
12 He will push back and give his own views of things, and then he is the ultimate
13 decision-maker. And I think, as I've said before, I think he made a lot of great policy
14 decisions for the United States that worked well and came out of that process, okay?
15 Was it as formal as, you know, some other people who are President would've run
17 Q Uh-huh.
19 Q Well -- I see Ms. Cheney has come off of -- put her camera on.
22 Pat, I just wanted to go back for a second, and in the context of what you're
23 describing now about how the President operates, were there other occasions where you
24 intended to attend a meeting in the Oval Office and then didn't, for privileged reasons?
2 you know, had nothing to do with me. I had an open invitation from the President to
3 attend any meeting I want to, as a general matter. And I didn't go to every meeting.
5 But, again, I think that's a very broad question over a long period of time, so I
6 don't --
8 In the specific case of this meeting, though, you wanted to attend and, in fact, did
10 Mr. Cipollone. I did go to the Oval Office, yeah, with the intention of attending.
13 Mr. Cipollone. I can't remember if I did, but I might have. It sounds like
14 someone told you that I did after that meeting, but -- and I don't have an independent
19 Ms. Cheney. In terms of the confrontation with Mr. Eastman, was the President
21 Mr. Cipollone. Again, I think that falls within the privilege. I'm not here to
22 discuss any conversations about the President or that I may have had or, you know, in a
23 manner that would reflect advice given or his views or anything like that. I view that as
1 So, in terms of the President's policy about having an open door, and recognizing
2 where you're drawing privilege lines, were there other instances where you went to a
3 meeting with the intention of attending the meeting and then were asked not to attend
4 the meeting?
5 Mr. Cipollone. I'm sure there were other instances where I went to a
6 meeting -- you know, I don't have one in particular in mind. I'm sure there were other
7 instances where I went to a meeting and I was told, you're really not needed at this
8 meeting, or, we're good, you know, you can -- and so I'm sure that happened sometimes,
9 you know, if it was something that didn't fall squarely within what I needed to be talking
10 about.
11 But I was invited to attend any meeting I wanted to, is my sense. But, in the
12 normal give-and-take, would I sometimes go to meetings, be there for a while, and realize
13 that, you know, my time -- you know, that he didn't really need me in that meeting, and
14 leave? Yeah, I'm sure there were instances like that. Were there meetings where I
15 didn't think I was needed and he called me into the meeting, asked Molly to call me
17 Ms. Cheney. And in the case of this particular meeting, could you tell us what
18 happened?
19 Mr. Cipollone. I think I've said what I can say with respect to this particular
20 meeting.
21 Ms. Cheney. In the case of this meeting, did you make a determination that you
23 Mr. Cipollone. Again, with -- I think I've said what I'm going to say about this
24 meeting.
2 disrespectful at all. But you understand, you know, my views of the privilege and --
6 BY
7 Q With your patience, Mr. Cipollone, one more question about this meeting.
8 I know you're not going to -- you've told us that you can't tell us the reason why
9 you didn't attend the meeting, but my question is just: Was the reason that you didn't
10 attend the meeting apparent to the Vice President and his staff?
11 A Actually, my recollection of this was that they hadn't arrived yet. That's my
12 recollection, that they hadn't arrived yet, but that John was there, I believe Mark was
13 there, and I was there. That's my recollection. I think they arrived shortly -- so that's
14 my recollection.
17 Q Okay.
19 Q No worries.
20 BY
21 Q But, in summary, it sounds clear that everyone involved in that meeting was
23 A Again -- and I appreciate the questions, and I have a lot of respect for you as
24 a lawyer -- I've said what I'm going to say about that meeting.
25 Q Okay.
95
1 Let me just finish what I was asking before about the flow of paper into the Oval
2 Office. Did you and Mr. Herschmann at some point try to create some sort of rigor or
3 discipline about legal issues, paper going to the President needing to be seen by you or
5 A Well, the rigor that is already in the White House is: Pieces of paper come
6 through, for the most part, the staff secretary, okay? And Derek has a -- now, for lots of
7 different reasons, a lot of them fully appropriate reasons, a lot of them stylistic reasons,
9 Q Yeah.
10 A And I think the President welcomed that, and I actually think, as a general
12 Now, there were people in the outer Oval, you know, who were all very, very
13 good, talented people who worked for the President, who would get things, and,
14 particularly as time went on, after the election, you know, with some of the people who I
15 have already told you were giving bad advice to the President, I think both Eric and I and
16 probably others told them that if something comes to the President that we need to be
17 aware of, to let us know before, if possible, that's provided to the President, if it has to do
18 with a legal issue. But, obviously, we didn't get in the way of the flow of information,
20 And they were doing that anyway. So, you know, Molly Michael, who's, again,
21 a -- there were many, many good people who worked in the Trump White House --
22 Q Uh-huh.
23 A -- and Molly was one of them. And Molly was a very skilled professional.
24 Good judgment. Good person. She would call my office if something came that she
25 thought I needed to be aware of. She would call one of my assistants, she'd call Philbin,
96
1 she'd call me. And so -- and others there would do the same thing.
2 Q Yeah.
3 You told us in the informal interview, together with Eric Herschmann, you made
4 efforts to understand if materials were going into the Oval Office outside of the regular
5 process and enlisted outer Oval staff, Molly Michael and Nick Luna, to assist in the effort
6 to ensure that anything legal went through Counsel's Office first. Ultimately, you did
7 your best to make sure incorrect or inappropriate materials were intercepted before
8 getting to the President, but that was ultimately -- and these are your words -- "a losing
9 battle."
10 Is that accurate?
11 A Well, what I would say is that we tried, particularly at that time, because
13 Q Yeah.
14 A -- you know, people were sending things directly to the President, and we
15 wanted to make sure we had an awareness of it and could weigh in. Yes.
16 But, yeah, obviously, the President has a right to whatever information he wants.
18 Q Yeah.
19 A But Eric and I and others wanted to make sure that if it's something like an
20 executive order or these type of things, that somebody from the outside was giving him
21 extremely bad advice, was putting it in front of him, that we were aware of it so that we
23 Q Yeah.
24 And it sounds like, Mr. Cipollone, not to put words in your mouth, but that that
25 happened with some frequency in the post-election period. People were putting things
97
1 in front of the President that, in your view, were just bad advice. Is that right?
2 A Yes.
3 Q Okay.
4 I want to stop and see if anyone has any questions on the Vice President's
5 authority or any of the, sort of, post-election legal issues. I'm ready to move to
6 January 6th, but I want to stop here and see if any members have questions on these
10 I wanted to go back to some testimony that came from General Milley. And I
11 didn't know if you had frequently sat in on meetings that included General Milley,
13 Mr. Cipollone. Is that a -- okay. Is that the end of the -- yes, I did. I was
14 involved in that. I worked closely with Robert O'Brien, obviously others, including all of
16 So --
17 Mr. Cipollone. -- Robert were primarily responsible, but I sat in on a lot of those
18 meetings, not all of them. I sat in on the daily briefing. Typically I was invited to that.
19 And, you know, the President, I think, wanted me involved in those things.
20 Mrs. Luria. So, in General Milley's testimony, he references two meetings that
23 down which of those two it was -- but there was a discussion about a
24 national-security-related issue that he doesn't go into because of the nature and the
25 classification of it.
98
1 But he says: "So we're in the Oval Office. There's a discussion going on. And
3 Pompeo -- "words to the effect, 'Yeah, we lost. We need to let the issue go to the next
5 Do you have any recollection of this meeting, and were you present?
6 Mr. Cipollone. I don't --1 don't recall being President -- sorry, present at that
7 meeting. I don't want to discuss anything where the President was -- well, let me take a
8 step back.
9 Anything that even -- and we talked about this. I'm not here to talk about
10 anything related to national security, anything related to anything that could remotely be
11 classified.
12 I don't have a recollection of being at that meeting. I may or may not have been
14 Mrs. Luria. Okay. Did you discuss the content of this particular meeting with
16 Mr. Cipollone. I don't recall that. I think as time went on and I think, in
17 particular, you know -- I can talk about the Jeff Clark meeting because there was a waiver
20 Mr. Cipollone. And I think -- well, I just mean, I wanted to tell the
21 Representative, I think the issue you're getting at I can probably talk about in the context
24 Mr. Cipollone. Not this specific issue, but the general issue.
1 And then, you know, another characterization that General Milley gives about
2 these two meetings and contrasts them to subsequent meetings, you know, he says that
3 this was a relatively normal meeting during the timeframe -- and this was getting up to
4 early December. And he says, but then in subsequent meetings -- he didn't know how to
5 characterize it -- there was a distinct change. He said it's anger, it's denial, that there
6 was sort of not this normal tone that he had experienced during all his previous
9 Mr. Cipollone. Again, these are the kinds of questions I -- I worked with General
10 Milley. I respect General Milley. He has his own views and characterizations, and I
14 Ms. Cheney. Thanks, Tim. Mr. Cipollone mentioned the Jeff Clark meeting,
20 All right. Any other questions before we leave the, sort of, legal
21 issues post-election?
23 Mr. Raskin. Yes. Thank you, ■ I just have one question about how the
24 former White House Counsel viewed all of these activities that were taking place.
25 Presumably you didn't get involved in [inaudible] legal issues. Did you
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1 see -- about the succession of questions related to State legislatures, electoral slates, and
2 the authority of the Vice President to nullify electors, did you see all of these as an
3 extension of campaign activity or something that was also reasonably within your
5 Mr. Cipollone. Well, again, it would depend on the issue. And, you know, as I
6 looked at my role and what I was being asked to do, you know, sometimes I would give
7 general advice that, you know, had nothing to do with legal issues but just kind of general
8 advice.
9 I think that to the extent that these issues had an institutional component, I would
10 think that that -- I believe that that was where we needed to clearly weigh in on things, as
11 a general matter.
12 And then, with respect to the rest, I mean, I was aware of things, I talked about
13 things, but I tried as best I could to maintain my role as, you know, the White House
15 But I was involved in some of these things. And, you know, I worked with a lot of
16 these people, and some of the people who were in the White House and outside the
21 Let's talk just briefly about schedule, and we can go off the record for a minute.
24 [Recess.]
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2 [12:31 p.m.]
5 BY
6 Q Let's talk now, if we can, Mr. Cipollone, about the Department of Justice and,
10 Q How?
11 A I've known him for a long time. I mean, we worked at the same law firm
12 for many years. He clerked for the same Court of Appeals judge that I clerked for.
13 knew him in the context of, obviously, he was working over at the Department of Justice.
16 A I have no idea.
17 Q All right. And do you know how Jeff Clark first got involved in discussions
22 President, and then there were meetings at the White House, is my understanding -- or a
23 meeting.
24 Q Okay.
25 Let's talk about that. When you learned that Mr. Clark had met with the
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3 Q Why?
4 A Well, I mean, he's a Department of Justice lawyer -- and just let me say that
5 all of my experience with Mr. Clark up to that point had been positive.
6 Q Yeah.
8 administrative lawyer. He had been promoted to acting head of the Civil Division, I
10 Q That's right.
13 I believe I learned about this -- I'm trying to remember how I found out about this,
14 that he had been over in the White House meeting with the President. I believe I found
15 out about it from Jeff Rosen, who had found out about it, and he called me about it.
16 I was surprised to hear that. That was something that I wouldn't expect of Jeff.
17 That is not something that's normal. When a lawyer from the Department of Justice
18 comes to the White House, whether that be the Attorney General himself, he would
19 notify me.
20 And so, no, that was not a good thing, that Jeff Clark was meeting -- you know,
21 from my perspective --
22 Q Yeah.
23 A -- was meeting with the President. I don't think the leaders of the
24 Department of Justice at that time thought that was a good thing. I was surprised by it.
1 Justice personnel and a White House policy that sort of carefully circumscribes the people
7 Q Yeah.
8 Was this of particular concern to you, Mr. Cipollone, during this time period,
9 because of the, sort of, bad ideas that you referenced before that were being discussed
11 A I don't know if that -- because, to be honest with you, I didn't expect bad
12 ideas to come from Jeff Clark at this point in my life, okay? But when I found out, I was
13 confused. It wasn't reflective of the person that I had known. I mean, look, I didn't
14 know him extremely well, but I knew him and I had worked with him and I had respect for
15 him.
16 Q Yeah.
17 One of the first things that comes up in the discussion with Jeff Clark is a letter
18 that he was putting forth that he thought should be sent to the State legislatures. It's
20 A Okay.
21 Q Let me ask you just to take a quick --1 don't need you to read the whole
22 thing, but take a quick look and tell me if you recognize this as the letter that Mr. Clark
23 was putting forth, something that the Department of Justice, under his maybe potential
1 Q Did you have a view as to whether or not it made sense for the Department
6 Q Yeah. Why?
7 A Well, for a number of reasons. First of all, I think I learned about the
8 existence of this letter from somebody at DOJ -- I think it was Jeff Rosen; it might've been
10 Obviously, you know, I was in regular communication with Jeff Rosen, and
11 so -- and I wanted to make sure, obviously, as a general matter, that the Justice
12 Department -- you know, the prerogatives of the Justice Department were protected.
13 This didn't seem like something, based on when I first heard about it, that the Justice
14 Department should even or could even be involved in. Obviously I would rely on them
15 on those conclusions.
16 They were firmly of the view that this letter was not something that the Justice
17 Department could or should be involved in. I believe they've all testified to that fact,
19 So, yeah --
20 Q Yeah.
22 Q The Department of Justice officials that you just referenced indicated that
23 both the letter had no factual basis -- it cites existence of DOJ investigations that were
24 finding irregularities, which was not accurate -- and that, procedurally, it was
25 inappropriate for the Department of Justice to suggest to a State legislative body that it
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1 should take some action. Again, consistent with your response to this letter.
3 Q All right.
4 Pat Philbin told the select committee that he reviewed this letter that Clark
5 wanted to send to senior officials in Georgia, considered it part of the crisis around the
7 Did this come up in the context that Jeff Clark would send this if he were
8 appointed?
9 A I think that's part of what he was intending to do, as I understood it, was to
10 get this letter sent out, or send this letter out, at the Department of Justice.
11 It appears from the letter, and my understanding is, that he presented it to Jeff
13 Q Yeah.
14 A -- and then -- and had his own name on it. Obviously, they reacted very
16 Q Exactly.
17 All right. Were you also aware that Mr. Clark had requested a briefing from the
22 that -- I think even, I believe, at DOJ that, fine, let him have a briefing. We thought it
23 would be a positive kind of step, given what -- and so I can't give the briefing, but I believe
1 because the briefing would essentially tell Mr. Clark that there was no evidence of fraud --
3 Q Okay.
4 A -- or would talk about that briefing or what may or may not have been
5 contained in that.
6 Q Did you first speak to Mr. Clark on December the 31st and express your
7 displeasure with his direct communications with the President without your knowledge?
8 A Yes.
10 A I remember it was New Year's Eve or the afternoon of New Year's Eve.
11 can't remember if I called him or he called -- like, I reached out to him. I don't
12 remember all of the specifics of that conversation, but, directionally, you know, I
13 expressed my unhappiness about the fact that he had been over at the White House
14 without my knowledge, without the knowledge of anybody in the White House Counsel's
16 And then -- and then I'm sure we discussed other matters related to some of his
17 theories, as I think through -- but I'm trying to remember all of the topics and thinking of
20 to President Trump?
22 some things that indicated that he understood that that was not -- that he should've --
23 Q Yeah.
24 A -- told us.
1 A Yes. No, he was firmly -- he was firmly of the view, okay, as far as I could
2 determine, that there had been election fraud and that this letter was part of the
3 response that the Justice Department should take to election fraud. That was my
4 understanding.
5 Q So, despite the fact that Attorney General Barr and others in the Justice
6 Department had rebutted a lot of those theories, Mr. Clark, it was your impression,
10 Q Yeah.
12 Q Did you also ask Mr. Philbin to reach out to Clark directly?
13 A Well, that was the day -- you know, that was the day of January 3rd, I believe
14 is when that conversation took place. I mean, we were involved in, you know, the
16 I'm trying to remember exactly the point in time that the idea that Jeff Clark
17 would become Acting Attorney General kind of got on my radar screen. I don't -- and I
18 would have to -- you know, I'm sure it was -- whenever Jeff Rosen found out about it, I'm
20 Q Yeah. Yeah. On January 3rd, we're going to get to, is the meeting at
21 which that is clearly in mind. It's the meeting where you're at liberty to talk about it
23 A Yes.
24 Q -- how far before that did the idea of maybe Mr. Clark being appointed as
1 A It must have been a couple days before that, but I don't remember the exact
2 chronology. I would think whenever the DOJ people found out about it, found out about
3 that, is around the same time I found out about it. I believe I found out about it from
4 them. I may have also heard it from Mark Meadows. But I don't have a specific
5 recollection about when I found out or who I found out from. My best -- my best
8 It looks like, from the DOJ officials that we've talked to, that there was a meeting
9 with the President on December the 31st, the same day that you had that conversation
10 with Clark, that Donoghue and Rosen, Meadows, you, and Mr. Philbin all attended, and
15 A No.
20 Okay.
21
22 Q Well, just to -- Mr. Donoghue indicated that the President was a little bit
23 more agitated than he had been previously and continued to put forth these theories of
24 election fraud.
25 Again, not asking you about the communications, but is that a fair characterization
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2 A Again, I'm not going to characterize the President's demeanor. I will say
3 that Rich Donoghue is a man of integrity and, you know, a friend of mine and a great
4 public servant, and I don't have any reason to question his recollection of things.
5 Q Okay.
6 All right. Well, then, after that meeting, the idea of Jeff Clark serving as Acting
7 Attorney General is brought forth. And before the actual meeting on the 3rd, it looks
10 A I remember talking to Pat, and I remember -- Pat had also worked with Jeff
11 at Kirkland, knew Jeff, you know, I think had generally the same opinion as I had.
12 This didn't seem like Jeff, which -- you know, it was like, well, where is this coming
14 Q Yeah.
16 And, you know, I had spoken to him, as you said, on the 31st, and I said, Pat, call
18 Q Right.
19 A Figure out what's going on, see if you can talk to him, you know, and -- on
20 two points, I think, on that day, both the idea that he would become the Acting Attorney
21 General of the United States and also, my recollection, on sort of the issues generally
23 Q Yeah. Exactly what Mr. Philbin told us. He said that, upon your request,
24 he called Mr. Clark. He was unable to convince Clark that his theories of election fraud
25 were without merit. Clark's response was to claim that there's enough out there that
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1 smells rotten and rings true enough of being rotten that the election would be stolen if
5 didn't get it done with -- despite the lack of valiant efforts with Mr. Clark.
6 And, in my mind, because I knew Mr. Clark and I had a respect for him as a lawyer
7 and as a person before this, I wanted to make sure that we were talking to him. And
8 Pat, in particular, and I tried and Jeff had tried to give him every opportunity to sort of
9 understand, like, this is not good, this is not a good thing, it's not good for you, it's not
10 good for the President, it's not good for the Department of Justice --
11 Q Right.
14 A 1didn't think it was good for him to have a meeting with -- you know, I didn't
15 think that meeting would be productive for Jeff, certainly not for the President.
16 Q Yeah.
18 Q Uh-huh. So, upon hearing of the prospect of him being installed as Acting
19 Attorney General, your first thought is, "Let's just talk him out of it," "him" being Jeff
20 Clark.
21 A Let's figure out -- well, my first thought was, this is a terrible idea. Jeff Clark
22 cannot be installed as Acting Attorney General of the United States. I must be missing
23 something here, given what I know about Jeff Clark, so let's talk to him.
24 Jeff had talked to him. He had -- Jeff Rosen -- and he had relayed to me some of
25 those conversations, and I was confused by some of the conversations, in terms of how
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2 [12:46 p.m.]
3 B~
4 Q Unsuccessfully.
6 Q Yeah. Okay. Let's talk about the meeting. So before the meeting
7 occurred, did you give some advice to Mr. Rosen or Mr. Donoghue about the things they
10 Q Yeah.
11 A I think we were all on the same page anyway. So I don't know if I could
12 classify it as advice or whatever. I told them Jeff called me or I called Jeff, or Jeff and I
15 A Sorry, Jeff Rosen. Right there were right there were two Jeffs here. Jeff
16 Rosen called me. I may have spoken to other people from there. I may have spoken to
17 Steve Engel, I may have spoken to Rich. I can't remember who I spoke -- but here are
18 the things that I would have conveyed, two things: Number one, we need to have
19 people beyond, you know, it should be other people from the Justice Department coming
20 to this meeting in my view. They were in agreement with that. I thought it was
21 important that Steve Engel be at the meeting. I thought it was important that Rich
23 Q Why?
24 A Why? A, those two people are -- you know, they had the respect of the
25 President in my view, as did Jeff Rosen, as a general matter. You know, based on my
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1 interaction. And I respected them. And I wanted the -- you know, I wanted to make
2 sure, you know, in providing advice to the President, because, again, this was another
3 idea -- I don't think the President, you know -- I don't even know if he knew Jeff Clark,
4 okay? So I don't think the President in my sense without revealing any privileges on his
5 own came to the conclusion, Hey, there is this guy Jeff Clark at the Justice Department,
6 wouldn't be make a nice acting Attorney General. I think this was another idea that was
7 put in front of him, okay? Jeff unfortunately participated in that. And that is where we
8 got where we got, but I wanted to make sure in doing my job for the President that he
9 was aware, A, of all the facts, and B of the views of people he respected and had worked
10 closely with, and who, you know, thought a lot of him, thought a lot of the President.
12 Q Yeah.
14 at the meeting, Philbin was going to be at the meeting, Eric Herschmann was going to be
15 at the meeting. So I thought it was important that the meeting be broadened end to
17 Q Okay.
18 A There was firm agreement, you know. And again, who thought -- but that
19 was my view.
20 Secondly, I thought it was important that the President know how people at the
21 Department of Justice would react to this and how strongly they felt about it. I think -- I
22 don't think that was information that had been provided to the President, okay, by either
24 or whoever. I don't think the President fully understood at that point. Again, I can't
25 talk about privilege, but it was my personal assessment that if he really knew how people
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1 felt about this and what this would mean, I think he would think differently about it and I
3 Q Uh-huh.
4 A So, I said to Jeff, or I think it was Jeff on that call, but again, I may have said it
5 to a couple of people. Philbin also kind of did the same thing. It was like you need to
6 figure out who is going to leave if this happens. I think there was already some thinking
7 going on at the Department of Justice about that, but you know, Jeff Clark is trying to
8 become the acting Attorney General. And the President has right to know, he deserves
9 to know what that going to mean for people who he trusts and who have done a good job
10 for him, in terms of how they are going to react to it. So I said, you know, You need to
11 bring that, you need to bring whoever the resignations are bring them to this meeting.
12 Q Before we get into to the meeting, I see Ms. Cheney and Mr. Raskin had their
13 cameras on.
16 Pat, the President had been meeting with Jeff Clark prior to January 3rd, and you
17 mentioned someone put Jeff Clark in front of them. Can you tell us specifically who you
20 Perry.
23 Okay. And how did you form that view that it was Perry?
24 Mr. Cipollone. I was told by Rosen, and I think it was told ultimately by
25 Meadows, too.
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1 Okay.
3 Ms. Cheney. And did you understand Mr. Meadows to be facilitating those
4 meetings?
5 Mr. Cipollone. I don't know what Mark was doing vis-a-vis those meetings.
6 don't know if he, you know, facilitated them. I don't -- I don't know. I don't remember,
7 you know. If someone comes into the White House, typically the Chief of Staff would
8 know about that or be informed about that. But there had been some instances where
9 people -- like the December 18th meeting, I don't know who knew or how those people
10 got into the White House, but somebody WAVEd them in. So I don't have an answer on
11 that.
14
15 Q Let's talk about the meeting. Why don't I start with an open-ended
16 question about what you recall about the discussion in the Oval Office. First of all, who
17 was present?
18 A Okay, who was present. You know, obviously Jeff Clark was present. Jeff
19 Rosen was present, I was present, Pat Philbin was present. Steve Engel was present.
20 Q Eric Herschmann?
21 A Of course, Eric Herschmann was present. I don't think Rich -- Rich came
22 and he was not -- in his view, like, I was why isn't Rich in this meeting? He is outside,
23 you know. Rich is a former military guy. He is, you know, very much into protocol,
24 which he should be, obviously it is the Oval Office, but he was sitting outside. And then I
25 can't remember how he ultimately -- someone said the President found out, Hey, Rich is
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1 outside. The President likes Rich Donoghue and respects him, and then Rich came in.
3 Q Okay, tell us what you recall about who was on what side when it came to
5 A Who was on what side? Everybody in that room, the lawyers in that room
6 were on one side. And Jeff Clark was the man alone.
9 Q Tell us about the conversation. What were the specific arguments that you
10 and others put forth to the President that this was not a good idea?
11 A Well, and again a lot has been said about this and people have testified.
12 And I know Jeff Rosen and Rich Donoghue and Steve Engel have all testified. So I think
13 you have a pretty thorough understanding of what happened at that meeting. I came in.
14 I was -- I was seated at, you know, the chairs were like this. I was seated all the way on
15 to the President's left on the right-hand side, kind of in that chair where I kind of was
18 A I took that seat because I would sit in that seat a lot of times. And, you
19 know -- I think the President sometimes would, you know, turn and look at me during the
21 Q Yeah, yeah. This was a meeting where you, I think, are at liberty to talk
22 about what the President said. I am curious if you recall specific questions he asked and
24 A Again, I think that has been thoroughly testified to by others. I can tell you
25 what I remember --
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1 Q Yes.
2 A Okay. So, I was very unhappy with Jeff Clark when I came into this meeting,
3 okay? And I think the meeting began -- I think this might have been before Rich got into
4 the meeting, but I just started, you know, and others did too. There was definitely a
5 very active questioning and participation of Jeff Clark by several of the attorneys in that
6 room. I was one of them. I kind of started out with just by pushing Jeff on some of the
7 theories that he was propounding on, or looking into, or suggesting might have some
8 merit on election fraud. In particular, as I recall, I had in my mind, you know, and again,
9 without getting into things, he had had briefings, so, you know, I was -- I was questioning
10 him related to these theories and, you know, basically you get -- he had gotten what he
11 had asked for, and we started talking along those lines. And Rich came in at some point.
12 I think the -- Jeff talked, Jeff Rosen talked initially, and so did Jeff Clark. And then I -- I
13 did a lot of talking, Rich Donoghue did a lot of talking, Eric Herschmann, Pat Philbin all
15 Q Yeah.
17 because Steve had, you know -- the President had a very, very positive view of Steve as he
18 should.
19 Q Right.
20 A And Steve, you know, I worked closely with Steve and the President on a
21 number of very important and key and good policies that the administration put into
22 effect, that the President put into effect. He was familiar with Steve's work.
23 Q Uh-huh.
24 A He was a fabulous lawyer. I wanted him to hear what Steve had to say.
25 Q Yeah. You told us in the informal interview that the President, during this
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1 meeting, repeated a litany of election fraud allegations and concerns about DOJ
2 investigations that you told him that were without merit, that you and others continually
4 A He raised and as you know, others jumped in, too. I, you know I didn't -- I
5 kind of -- two generic things. I supported the Department of Justice's views, fully backed
6 them up them, and then presented my own opinion as to that, but you know, these
7 things have been looked at, they did not have merit.
8 Q Yeah.
9 A And there was no -- let me put it to you this way: Some of them just were
10 wholly without merit, some of them, there was not sufficient evidence to suggest that
11 there was, you know, significant fraud so that it would impact the result in the election.
12 Q Uh-huh. And did the President ever acknowledge that any such claims had
15 matter is, he believed that he won the election, okay? Based on what -- again, this is my
16 determine --
17 Q Okay.
18 A -- can't get inside of head, that he believed that there had been massive
19 fraud in the election. You know, obviously he said that before that time, after that time
20 and since then. And that is what I think he -- my impression was he believed that.
21 Q Despite Attorney General Barr, his own campaign staff, numerous people
24 Q Uh-huh.
1 Q Yeah.
3 somebody else or Philbin would kind of give the facts of that, you know, and Rich
4 obviously walked through a lot of those. And then he would just move, Well, what
5 about this?
6 Q Yeah.
7 A And --
9 would just move onto the next allegation or the next argument?
10 A Well, I think again, this is my recollection. He wanted to talk about this and
11 Jeff Clark, you know -- I mean, Jeff Clark was there, kind of, also in my recollection,
13 Q You ultimately told us that you described this meeting as a -- not this
14 meeting, the Georgia letter that was proposed as an F'ing murder suicide pact. Do you
16 A Yes.
18 A Well, what I meant was, the letter, the whole thing the Jeff Clark becoming
19 attorney -- this letter, it was bad for the President. It was bad for the country. But it
20 was bad for the President himself personally. So I thought it was -- that was how
21 I -- that was the shorthand version that just came to me, and, you know, without
22 repeating the salty language, I said this is -- yeah, this is a murder suicide pact.
23 Q Yeah. You told us this letter is a murder suicide pact. It is going to kill
24 you, Clark, and you, President Trump with him. This thing is going to damage anyone
1 A And I think what I was trying to say is Jeff Clark is doing something bad to
3 Q Yeah.
4 A Okay. I cared about the President. I went to work with him and I was
5 honored to work with him in that administration as I have said several times. So when
6 people like that were telling him things that were not only wrong, okay, for whatever
7 their own personal reasons might be, and I can't -- I don't want to speculate in Jeff's case.
8 I got upset about that too. I got upset about that, because I didn't think he was properly
12 A Yes.
13 Q Did you tell the President that you, Mr. Cipollone, would resign if he did this?
15 understood that would be it for me and that would be it for Pat Philbin.
16 Q And were you prepared to follow that through, if the President had
17 appointed Jeff Clark as Acting Attorney General, were you prepared to resign?
19 would do it. I think once he saw what this really was, okay, and once he understood
20 that here are people that have worked hard for this administration, you know, that have
21 supported your policies, that have been honored to work in this administration and the
22 many people, the Cabinet Secretaries who we were able to work with, we think this is
23 bad. And I think -- I thought, my hope was, when he heard that, he would make the
25 Q Did he say why he ultimately decided not to appoint Mr. Clark? Did he give
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1 a reason?
2 A I -- I can't remember all the reasons. I mean, one of the reasons, you know,
3 he -- I don't if this was his reason, but be he definitely said that these guys are, you know,
4 not having this, and I forget the word, the exact words. And you know, you can't -- they
7 A I don't remember that word. I mean, I -- I don't remember that, you know,
9 But I didn't think he would think at the end of the day, he thought it would be a good
10 decision.
11 Q And --
13 Q My question is, what were those reasons to the extent you could tell during
14 the meeting? It was the resignations, what's it the merits -- the lack of merit of the
17 based on conversations and a conversation that took place after that meeting, he
19 Q All right. After the meeting, Mr. -- in our informal discussion with
20 Mr. Philbin, he told us that the President said something along the lines of, you have to
21 understand there is a coup going on and you are complicit in it. Talking to both you and
22 Mr. Philbin. Do you recall the President talking about a coup going on?
23 A He said that. My recollection is he said that toward the end of the meeting.
24 I think he was -- I think he was expressing the fact that I said that he believed that there
25 was fraud in the election, that, you know. And he viewed that, I guess, as, you know, he
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1 used the word "coup," and he pointed at us and said, And you are complicit and you are
2 complicit, and he said the same to Eric. I don't if he really, you know, I mean, meant
4 Q And he said that you were complicit in this coup or that you how had
6 A No, no. I think what he meant was, you know, I think he understood what I
7 felt about the claims of election fraud in that meeting. I think he -- and we just
9 Q I see.
12 Pat, did you ever hear the President cite any genuine evidence that the election
14 Mr. Cipollone. I can't go into my conversations with the President. I think a lot
15 of people were providing the President with instances of what they believed to be fraud.
16 And I think the President, you know, was considering that. Some of that, a lot of that
17 went over to the Department of Justice. There were all sorts of claims early on,
18 because, you know, I think there have been some issues as I mentioned before some legal
19 issues about how mail-in ballots, you know, were authorized in certain States, how they
20 may have been used, all of these things. I think after we got through that, I think people
21 were, you know, there were various theories of dead people voting, and you have heard
22 many of them that people were putting in front of them -- in front him, Rich Donoghue
23 and Jeff Rosen talked about that in the public testimony, some of those issues. I don't
25 Ms. Cheney. Well, I am actually asking you about in that meeting, Pat. In that
123
1 meeting, did you hear the President cite any genuine evidence that the election was
3 Mr. Cipollone. I think he cited a number of things that he believed that he had
4 been told, based on my observations, he -- he believed were true, but I didn't -- it wasn't
6 Ms. Cheney. And as you told us earlier today, the Attorney General, the acting
7 Attorney General, the previous Attorney General, his own campaign lawyers all had told
8 him that there was no basis for these allegations, that there was sufficient fraud to
9 change the outcome of the election. And I think you said you agreed with that.
10 Mr. Cipollone. I did agree with that. Yes, when Bill Barr told him that, I agreed
11 with it.
14 Ms. Cheney. And so, again, I ask you, did the President cite any genuine
15 evidence in this meeting of fraud sufficient to steal the election from him?
16 Mr. Cipollone. And again, you know, I will give you the same answer, in my view,
17 he was raising issues that had been raised. It wasn't a debate about specific evidence.
18 He would say, Well, what about this? And then Jeff or Jeff or Rich Donoghue would
20 Ms. Cheney. And these were all claims that Jeff and Rich Donoghue had told you
22 Mr. Cipollone. For the most part, yes. And that we assessed on our -- you
23 know, it wasn't our job to drill down on each one of these claims, but to the extent we
24 could and Pat Philbin and I also chimed in at this meeting in terms of our views of these
25 things. We supported DOJ, we gave our independent view, this was January 3rd at this
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3 Mr. Cipollone. To the extent -- but I did leave the meeting thinking that he -- he
4 believed this.
5 Ms. Cheney. Can we --1 don't know if we're done with this meeting, but this is
6 about the same period of time as the Raffensperger call, so I would like to move to that,
8 We are about to. Let me see if Mr. Raskin, if you have any
9 questions about the January 3rd meeting. If you do, please go ahead. No? Okay.
10 BY
11 Q Just quickly to follow up before we leave the January 3rd meeting, on the
12 very question that Ms. Cheney was asking, we talked to Mr. Philbin this, and he indicated
13 in this meeting, President Trump would go on and on about the fraud that was taking
14 place and how no one was willing to drill down and find out about it, that he returned to
15 some of the same theories that had been brought up repeatedly, brought up and
16 rebutted by DOJ. And that Mr. Philbin assessed the lawyers had adequately rebutted
17 and responded to the President's claim, and that there could not be any confusion as to
18 the collective view that each of these things the President brought up, had been looked at
22 mentioned, just the day before this on January 2nd, President Trump has a phone call
23 with Georgia Secretary of State, Brad Raffensperger. First of all, are you familiar with
24 that call?
25 A At the time, I don't have any recollection of knowing about that call until I
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6 A No.
7 Q No? Okay.
10 A I think as I recall, look, those days there were a lot of things going on, and I
11 understood he was doing various things that I didn't have some insight into -- a lot of
12 insight into with the campaign team or with others and some of these lawyers. But my
13 recollection is, I was actually -- I can't remember when the story broke, but it was right
15 Q It was.
16 A I remember being out on a walk in, like, in the Cabin John trail and hearing
17 about this.
18 Q Would --
19 A That is my recollection of how I found out about the details of that call. But
20 that is -- again, this was a time period where a lot was going on. I think that
22 Q The call itself took place on the 2nd, which was the day before the Jeff Clark
25 Q Okay. When you heard about the call, and it was actually leaked, did you
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1 have concerns about the words that were used on the call?
2 A I am not going to go into that, into my opinions about the call or, you know,
5 when you heard that call, you had legal concerns about the words that were used during
6 the conversation.
7 A Again, I would say that I didn't. At that point, I was focused on Jeff Clark,
8 you know. Did I -- did I think that call was a positive thing? No. Was it my role to do
9 a kind of -- sort of legal analysis of what had happened? I didn't do that, but Pat did, so
11 Q Yeah. I understand that you didn't do a formal legal analysis. But when
12 you heard the President asking the Georgia Secretary of State to find 11,000-plus votes or
13 whatever it is, did you have concern about that sounding like a pressure campaign or
15 A Again, without getting into questions of legal -- he had other lawyers on the
16 outside involved in, I assume, assessing that and looking at that no, in terms of those
17 activities. But I didn't -- I didn't have a positive view of call generally once I heard about
18 it.
19 Q Okay. Did you talk to Mark Meadows about that? He was a participant in
20 the call.
21 A I may have. I prob -- I probably did. But I don't -- I don't recall specific
23 about kind of the overall some of activities that were going on at that point with it. And
24 more in view of, like, okay, we are at -- you know, this is January 3rd now.
25 Q Yeah. Did you express your displeasure of the fact of the call to
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3 Okay. Ms. Cheney, anything else about the January 2nd meeting?
5 Okay.
8 Q
BY-
- g o ahead.
Just to clarify, Mr. Cipollone, did anyone from the White House Counsel's
11 - All right. I want to move now to January 6th unless anyone else
15 Sure.
18 [Recess.]
20 Ms. Cheney. Tim, I am sorry please hold on for at least one second.
22 Ms. Cheney. Thank you. Pat, I assume that you saw, and maybe you didn't, I
23 am happy to read it to you. Eric Herschmann's testimony before this committee that on
24 Jan 7th he told John Eastman he was going to need a good F'ing criminal defense
25 attorney.
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5 Ms. Cheney. Let me go back to the chronology just for a minute. So we were
6 talking about the January 3rd meeting in the Oval Office. By that time on December
7 14th, the electoral college had met and voted. And also by that time, the President or
8 his associates had brought -- had lost 60 out of 61 cases they had brought to challenge
9 different aspects of the election in a number of States. They lost 60 out of 61 of those
10 cases. So by the time we get to January 3rd, that has been clear. I assume, Pat, that
11 you would agree the President obligated to abide by the rulings of the courts?
15 Ms. Cheney. And I assume you also would agree the President has a particular
18 Ms. Cheney. Okay. So by the January 3rd meeting, the electoral college had
23 BY
24 Q Okay. Let's talk if we can, Mr. Cipollone, about your expectation of the day.
25 Did you have any intelligence, law enforcement or otherwise, regarding the possibility of
129
6 A We had conversation, I think Pat Philbin and I had conversations with Jeff
7 and others at the Justice Department about what their assessments were.
8 Q Yes.
9 A And I believe Pat may have talked to you about that. I told you I didn't -- I
10 think they thought that if they had matters in hand, can set the date, we are going to be
11 involved in anything. And no, I did not -- I did not expect what happened.
12 Q Yeah. You told us actually that you expected large crowds, but that the
16 Q Yeah.
17 A And I -- actually, my recollection is that Jeff was of the view that the crowds
18 might be smaller than maybe anticipated. But, again, the bottom line is, we had a
19 couple conversations with them. I did not expect what happened on January 6th.
20 had no indication that that would happen based on what I knew at the time.
21 Q Yeah. Did you also understand at the start of the day on January 6th that
22 the Vice President had made clear to the President that he would not exercise any
23 purported authority to affect the outcome of the election at the joint session.
25 Q All right. In other words, the President had informed, at least the evening
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1 of January 5th, if not earlier, that the Vice President would count the electoral votes and
2 would certify President Biden's victory in the election. Was that you expectation?
4 issued a letter publicly. I don't recall the exact timing of that letter, but that also went
7 Let's talk about the morning of the 6th. Did you hear any discussion that
9 A I got in a little later than normal on January 6th. I might have been there
10 late the night before. And so I am trying to remember the exact time I got in. I think it
11 might have been I don't know 10-ish or something, something like that. Anyway, do I
12 remember hearing -- I don't have a specific recollection, but I remember that there was
13 some talk of that. And I don't remember who I heard that from. But, yeah, the idea
14 that the President wanted to also go to the Capitol, I remember hearing that at some
16 Q You heard it that day. But did you also hear discussions then the days
18 A I might have. I don't -- look, I was not involved in obviously any of the
19 planning or the preparation for that rally. I am not charge of Presidential movements,
20 so I don't --
21 Q What did --
22 A To the extent that I heard that anyone wanted the President to go to Capitol
23 Hill, my view is that was a bad idea. And, you know, I don't remember when I heard that
25 Q Tell us more --
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3 A Well, I mean, in my view, and again, people can -- people have a right to, you
4 know -- let me put it to you this way, okay? I didn't think any of this was a good idea.
5 didn't think the rally at the Capitol on that day was a good idea, just from, you know, not
6 as a legal analysis but just as a person. And so, to the extent that there would also be a
7 movement to the Capitol, no, I wouldn't think that was a good idea.
8 Q Was that because the practical security reasons, legal concerns? Tell us
10 A I don't recall having sort of a legal analysis about that. That just struck me
11 as, that is not a good idea. I am sure Tony Ornate would be involved in security
12 concerns, Chiefs of Staff's office, and things like that. I just didn't think it would be, you
15 A I am sure I did.
17 A He didn't go.
18 Q What did you understand the purpose of that movement to be when it was
19 discussed?
21 Q Do you have any sense of what the President intended to do once he arrived
22 at the Capitol?
2 Q All right. And again, did you have any concerns about the legal implications
4 A Again, when we were going into January 6th, and even the morning of
5 January 6th, what ended up happening was not something that I thought would happen,
6 anticipated happen, have any sense of that. I don't -- I didn't do -- I didn't think about it
7 in terms of legal at that point. I just didn't think it was good for the President to be
9 Q Were you aware, Mr. Cipollone, that the President persisted in his desire to
11 A I -- I wasn't -- I didn't -- I wasn't there obviously. I don't --1 don't have any
12 information about whether he persisted in his desire or what. I know he came back to
14 Q Yeah. My question was sort of, was this, like, the Jeff Clark idea that kept
15 coming up, despite the fact that you and others had argued against it?
16 A Again, this is not one that would be kind of in my lane, you know, whether
17 the President goes -- I don't remember when it first came up to my attention. I don't
18 know how often it came up. It certainly wasn't something that, you know, I was
19 involved in for any significant amount of time or consideration. I am sure I heard about
21 Q All right. During the speech, he actually talks about going to the Capitol, I
22 will go to the Capitol. I will be there with you. First of all, you didn't go to the speech,
23 correct?
2 office. And I may have -- we had a television kind of in the outer portion of the office.
3 And sometimes, you know, we would watch TV out there. I may have been watching
4 some of it, but I don't recall that specific part of it, no.
5 Q And do you know whether or not upon the President's return that those
8 should then go to the Capitol, no, I don't have a recollection of those discussions.
12 Q Yes.
13 A Not that I can recall, you know. But a lot of things were happening that
14 day. But based on my current recollection, that is not something that sticks out as
16 Okay.
18 Ms. Cheney. Thank you. Pat, the committee has evidence which is not yet
19 public from a source who was in the President's motorcade about an altercation in the
20 presidential vehicle. I take it from your testimony that you are not aware of such an
21 altercation?
22 Mr. Cipollone. I am not, no. I don't recall being aware of it at the time. I was
23 surprised to hear it when I heard about it publicly. I don't -- there was -- I have heard
24 what people have said, or some witnesses have said happened, but I don't -- I don't have
25 any information about that. I don't -- I don't remember in the course of the day. That
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1 wasn't something I was focused on. Again, a lot was going on that day. I mean, and
2 no, but I don't remember hearing about an altercation as I sit here today.
3 Ms. Cheney. And Kayleigh McEnany testified to the committee that the
4 President was determined to go to the Capitol after he returned from the Ellipse. Did
6 Mr. Cipollone. I don't -- I don't recall having a conversations with Kayleigh about
8 Ms. Cheney. And were you aware of anybody else who had, or any other
9 discussions, did you have any other discussions about the President's determination to go
11 Mr. Cipollone. Not that I can recall as I sit here, no. I mean, I -- my recollection,
12 sort of, you know, begin once, you know, it became clear that people were entering the
13 Capitol and starting to enter the Capitol, and some violence was occurring. That is when
14 I -- that is when I sort of remember, you know -- I remember that clearly, that part clearly.
15 Ms. Cheney. And do you know if Pat Philbin was involved in any of these
17 Mr. Cipollone. I don't. But Pat Philbin and I were sort of joined at the help that
18 day. I mean we did a lot of this together to the extent we went to the Oval Office, I
19 think, all, or almost all of that we did together. We got on various phone calls with DOJ,
20 with the Pentagon, with Homeland Security during the course of that day. And I would
21 say, for the most part, Pat Philbin and I were together.
23
24 Q Just to summarize this, Mr. Cipollone, is it fair to say that whenever this idea
25 came up, the idea of the President going to the Capitol, you expressed your view, your
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2 A I am sure I did, yeah. I didn't think it was a good idea. But I don't
3 remember -- and I don't think I did start using legal terms or legal jargon to discuss it or
5 Q Did it come up repeatedly over the course of the lead up to and the day of
6 January 6th?
7 A I have told you what I recall about that. Again not an area that I would be,
10 A 1 don't remember the exact time I got in. I remember I started late in that
11 morning. I went to the church in the morning, and then went home for a little while.
12 And then I just had -- at that point, you know, I was -- well, anyway, then I went in. And I
13 don't -- I don't remember exactly the time. But it was -- normally I would get in a little
14 bit on the earlier side, but this was a little bit later than my normal day.
15 Q You told us that you had been at the White House late the evening before,
16 that you came in to work a little bit later than usual. After first going to your office, you
17 went down to the Oval Office to see what was going on, and you saw that the President
18 was meeting with some members of his family. Do you remember that?
19 A I do. I remember, and again, I don't remember what time I left the night
20 before, you know, but I got -- when I got to work, I went to my office, I dropped -- you
21 know, I checked in at my office, and then I walked down to the Oval Office. And I
22 walked into the outer Oval, and I walked into kind of the door of the Oval Office.
23 looked in. I don't remember everybody who was in there. But I remember members
24 of his family being in there, primarily members of his family. I think Mark Meadows may
25 have been in there. I believe General Kellogg may have been in there, but I don't know.
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1 And then I remember Eric Herschmann was standing there and came and my recollection
2 is he came to me as I was standing in the door and said, this is -- this is family -- just kind
3 of -- you don't need to be here. And I said, fine. And I believe I went back to my office
4 at that point.
6 A Not in my recollection -- I mean, I may have walked in a little bit but yeah,
7 that is my recollection.
9 angry or heated call between the President and the Vice President that took place that
11 A No, no.
15 A I didn't remember when I heard about it, I think there were news reports
16 about it at some point. And you know I remember -- I don't remember -- I don't any if
17 Eric was present for it or not, but I may have heard about it from Eric. I heard it was a
18 heated call. I don't -- I don't have any details and witnesses who were there for the call
20 Q And I appreciate that. And I want to clarify with all these questions. I am
21 not looking for things you read about in the news, but things to the extent you can
22 untangle this that you heard from the people, your personal knowledge directly of people
23 in the White House. Did anybody describe for you who was present for this call, the
24 conversation?
25 A Not on that level of detail, no. I mean, maybe Eric told me about the call.
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1 I think it was Eric, but I don't know. And I remember hearing about the call. I wouldn't
2 talk about a call between the President and the Vice President anyway, under, sort of, our
3 privilege analysis; but no, I remember hearing separately that the call took place that it
4 was heated.
8 Q Okay.
9 A You know, I have heard about that call. And I have read about that call in
10 the resources.
11 Q You said a little while ago that you thought the whole thing was a bad idea,
12 meaning the President's -- the rally, the President's speech that he proposed to give at
13 the Ellipse. Tell us more why you thought that whole thing was a bad idea?
14 A Well, again, you know, and that was sort of, in my view, sort of a campaign
15 kind of event so it is not -- other people may have different views of that. I just thought
16 at that point, the best thing to do would be, you know, start the transition, or continue
17 the transition. And having rallies like that at that point, I didn't view as, you know, the
19 Q Did you see a draft of the President's Ellipse speech sometime before it
20 occurred?
21 A I remember -- and I think it was the day of, I think the day of, you know,
22 speeches, even campaign speeches would sometimes get circulated through the process.
23 And I was not the one reviewing those speeches. I think Pat Philbin would normally
24 review those speeches. I don't know if it was when I got in, or on the way in, but maybe
25 when I got in I heard that they had circulated the speech to Pat. I believe they would
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1 copy me on those things normally. I may have a copy of it in my email. I don't have a
2 recollection of doing a close review of the speech. I think Pat did some of that, but I
3 think my immediate reaction was, you know -- I think I told Pat that, to the extent there
4 are recitations of facts, you know, we are not -- it is not our role to review or sign off on
5 that. And I think I suggested he send some email to that effect. I know Eric sent an
6 email, at least I was told he did to that effect. But that is what I know about that.
7 Q They did. You are exactly right. Pat Philbin and Mr. Herschmann
8 expressed concern about factual statements the speech that were some of the very same
10 A And I told Pat, like, you know, make sure there is a -- a record of that, and he
11 did.
12 Q Why--
13 A And he agreed.
15 A Well, I mean, this thing just dropped in our in box, you know. I don't
16 remember how many -- maybe Pat saw a copy of it the night before, I don't know when.
17 But I remember the morning of thinking okay, what are we going -- it is not our role to
18 review this for factual accuracy, it would normally be, and I just told them make sure that
20 Q Okay. Were you concerned, Mr. Cipollone, about the inclusion of these
21 false assertions regarding the power of the Vice President or election fraud in the joint --
22 A I didn't have enough detail about the speech to suggest to me, you know, in
23 particular, things I would be concerned about, but I just wanted to make sure Pat aware
24 make sure that, you know, he told me -- we may have talked about particular concerns on
25 that day. I don't remember that. But I just wanted to make sure that to the extent
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1 that there were factual assertions in that speech, that there wouldn't be some indication
2 that somehow they sent it to us and we signed off on that, because everybody
3 understood our view at the time. And I don't even know if they were sending us that for
4 that reason. But I just said, Pat, make sure you email something. But I don't
7 A 1am not a big emailer. Pat would generally, you know, do the -- he would
9 Q Tell us more about your decision not to attend the rally on the Ellipse. Why
12 past obviously as part of the campaign, you know, even during the administration. But
13 that day, it just didn't even occur to me that that would be something that I would go to.
14 Q Did you discuss with Mr. Herschmann or Mr. Philbin their potential
15 attendance at the --
16 A My recollection of that is that -- I don't think Pat Philbin had any, you know,
17 any inclination that he would be going to that rally. And I remember Eric ended up
18 going. I can't remember whether he might have asked Pat or not, you know.
19 Q Yeah.
20 A I don't know why Eric went. I don't know. I am sure he told you in his
21 testimony.
23 because he thought Philbin could be helpful, and that Philbin chose not to attend because
24 he knew that the rally would be about election fraud theories that he knew were false,
25 and which he knew the President had been told were false. And that is why he didn't
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1 want to go.
3 Q Yes.
4 A Okay.
6 A I shared the view that -- I share that view generally, yes. I didn't -- I don't
7 know sort of -- I didn't want to go to that rally. I didn't think it would be -- it would be
8 odd for the White House counsel show up at that rally. That is not something I would
9 do. I also agree with Pat Philbin that I didn't want to go there because theories that
10 were being propounded. And again, I didn't know exactly what was going to be said, but
14 office. And maybe at some point, I came in and out, watched the speech, you know.
15 think I had a TV in my office, but I don't think I ever turned it on once, but I had a TV
16 outside. And I may have gone in and out or stood at my door and watched some of it.
17 Q Do you remember any specific reaction to any of the words the President
19 A No.
20 Ms. Luria first, and Ms. Cheney, you have come off the camera.
21 Ms. Cheney, why don't you go first, if you have a question and Ms. Luria we will come to
22 you.
24 Pat, I didn't know if you saw in one of other hearings we presented some of the
25 radio traffic from some of the law enforcement sources on the morning of the 6th, it
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1 included reports of weapons in the crowd, including AR-15s. Did you see that tape we
4 Ms. Cheney. Are you aware of the police reports that there were weapons in the
6 Mr. Cipollone. I don't believe I was aware of those things at the time. Of
7 course, that would be a law enforcement function and not my function. But I don't -- I
8 was not aware of that at the time. Am I aware now what you are saying that there were
9 weapons and things like this? Yeah. I am aware just from subsequent events.
10 Ms. Cheney. So did you hear on January 6th, or in the days before that, concerns
12 Mr. Cipollone. No, not that I can recall. My primary conversation and I think
13 Pat Philbin's too, were with DOJ and making sure that, you know -- just finding out from
14 them where are you on this and -- but no, I did not -- I don't recall people telling me that
16 Ms. Cheney. And did you hear reports on the 6th that Secret Service was
17 confiscating weapons?
18 Mr. Cipollone. I can't remember when I started hearing reports like that, you
19 know, about what was going on in the crowd. If I would have heard such a thing, I
20 would have heard it from Tony Ornate. I remember clearly, at one point in the
21 afternoon, hearing that someone had been shot in the Capitol and reacting to that.
22 think I heard that from Tony. But I don't have a recollection of, you know, particularly
23 prior to the speeches. I said I was, you know, being aware that there were weapons in
24 the crowd, but somebody may have said that at some point, but I don't think so, not to
25 me.
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3 Mrs. Luria.
4 Mrs. Luria. Yes. So I want to go back to the review of the draft of the remarks
5 and your previous comments as well where you had alluded to the fact that there were
6 things that were being planned that were not factual, you were aware they were not
7 factual. I get the impression you voiced that opinion repeated times. And rather than
8 focusing on that particular set of remarks, that particular event, can you talk more
9 broadly as to what is the role of the White House counsel in this review process, the
10 speeches that are going to be given by the President to cite document, and then report
11 back directly to the President and people who are drafting the speech that there are
12 actually inaccuracies in the text of that document that she is about to go deliver --
13 Mr. Cipollone. Well, there is a process talking about a policy speech, for
14 example, where the policy people, the speech-writing team obviously put together a
15 speech and it typically goes through a number of different reviews, people comment on
16 it. It typically goes through -- you know, it gets reviewed by the counsel's office, you
17 know, sometimes for factual accuracy on things like that, if we have a question, or if
18 somebody else who maybe is a policy person with more detailed knowledge of facts, they
19 would get involved. But I, personally, in terms of my role, you know, I would not be the
20 person doing the detailed review of these speeches. You know, typically, Pat would do
21 it or somebody else in the counsel's office would do it, depending on what agency it
22 impacted. We have a large team -- well, I mean, 30-ish, 35 lawyers. Each agency had a
23 lawyer assigned to it for a policy perspective, also for an oversight, if oversight issues
24 came up. And so -- but if there were particular speeches or particular questions that Pat
25 would raise with me or I was involved in, then, yeah, I would review things, but that
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2 Mrs. Luria. So going back to this particular speech the one that the President
3 was to deliver the morning of January 6th at the Ellipse. What review process did it go
5 Mr. Cipollone. The only thing I can recall, I don't know who else was looking at it
6 who on the campaign. I am sure people, you know, not in the White House and maybe
7 associated with the campaign of the event, I would expect that they would have looked at
8 it, but I don't know. I think that my only recollection is the speech came in, I found out
9 that the speech had come in, it had been copied in my mailbox. And I think I talked to
10 Philbin. And I said what is -- like, why are -- you know. And then I said, just make sure,
11 you know, we are not doing a review for facts. And we are not signing off on things that
12 are in there in terms of the facts. I mean, I remember saying that and I remember
13 Philbin documenting it. But it wasn't -- I didn't spend a lot of time on that. I just
14 remember seeing it and talking to Pat. I remember hearing Eric had done the same
16 Mrs. Luria. Thank you. Maybe in my context is obviously a little bit different in
17 my professional experience than the White House Counsel to the President, but thinking
18 as somebody who served 20 years in the Navy and having worked directly for flag officers
19 and their JAG [inaudible.] That is given, you know, relative to all aspects of their job.
20 And maybe this will be hard as we get more into the January 6th of what actions were
21 taken at the White House. But it seems as though throughout the day, and we are
22 looking really close at an 185-minute period, that there are a lot of actions that one
24 We heard from multiple people that calls were not made, Defense Department,
25 Justice, Mayor of Washington, D.C., all of these types of things. You know, am I off base
144
1 in saying is that, you know, as the legal adviser, that I would have anticipated you to have
2 been by his side in this kind of scenario advising on the legality of all kinds of decisions
3 that needed to be made, but that, in fact, didn't happen because of something such as
4 [inaudible.] conversations, decisions were not being litigated by the President during that
5 time.
6 Mr. Cipollone. Let me -- I can tell you what I did and what we did. And I think,
7 you know, there is the time period before the speech, during the speech, after the
8 speech, once kind of the protests and the start and then once people breached the
9 Capitol, what I did. And without, you know, getting into what would normally be done
10 in normal circumstances. Number one, I was very concerned about the safety of people,
11 the fact that we had enough -- make sure we had enough law enforcement resources up
12 there.
14 not getting into what I said or didn't say to the President. I am telling about my personal
15 views. My personal view was that there once people were -- once things started
16 developing in a way near the Capitol, at the Capitol, and certainly once it was breached,
17 my very strong view was there needed to be an immediate strong direct call to people to
19 And we are going to march through a little bit of that once we keep
22 Please.
23 Mr. Cipollone. Yeah. With respect to other issues, and I think probably other
24 people have testified to this, with respect to law enforcement issues, obviously other
25 people are responsible for the law enforcement aspects of it, but I was in communication
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1 over that period of time with the people at the Pentagon. I was in communication, as
2 were others, you know. There was a group of people dealing with it, Justice
3 Department; Jeff Rosen; Rich Donoghue was involved, I believe he was at the command
4 center; Mr. Bowdich was from the FBI was there; Chris Miller at the Pentagon; the acting
5 Secretary of Defense, he was involved; General Milley was involved. DHS was involved.
6 And I was on a variety of calls, I don't remember how many, but a number of calls through
7 that process, you know, just sort of do whatever it was I could do to make sure that there
2 [1:58 p.m.]
4 And I do want to come back for a little bit of your responses to Ms. Luria's
7 the speech.
9 Ms. Lofgren. I understand that you wanted to make clear it was not the
10 counsel's office to ascertain the validity of factual associations -- assertions -- and that
12 But what about legal assertions? Would it be the role of the counsel to correct
15 Mr. Cipollone. Well, it would depend on the type of speech. Obviously, if it's a
16 government policy speech there was a little bit of a different review, but still a review on
18 But, yeah, I mean, if there were misstatements of law in a policy speech, then
20 Ms. Lofgren. You had reached the conclusion, as I think all -- even Mr. Eastman
21 admitted that his proposal violated the Electoral Count Act -- that the idea that the Vice
22 President could simply choose the next President was not well grounded.
23 Did your office see evidence in the proposed speech about directing the Vice
24 President to do that, that he had the authority? Did your lawyers correct that?
25 Mr. Cipollone. Again, I did not -- I think that's a better question for Pat Philbin.
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1 I don't know, you know -- here's what I thought about that. I thought that was done in
2 the sense that people understood our views. The Vice President was not going do that,
4 So that's kind of my thinking of that, and that was clear certainly by the morning
6 Ms. Lofgren. Just quickly. It seems that the role of the counsel is to help the
7 President from making mistakes that you're aware of and looking out for him and his
9 Mr. Cipollone. I would say, Representative, that Pat Philbin and I and our entire
10 team worked extremely hard over the course of our tenure to achieve that goal.
11 Ms. Lofgren. Let me make clear, I don't dispute that. I was just inquiring as to
12 the speech review and the unfortunate comments made during the speech about the
13 Vice President.
17 Ms. Cheney. Thank you,. I'd like to take a five-minute break, if we could.
18 Sure we can.
20 [Recess.]
21 All right. Ms. Cheney, you were in the middle before we stopped.
25 BY
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2 returned to the White House and came sort of straight to the counsel's suite. You told
5 A No, I don't remember whether he came back. I think he left during the
6 speech.
7 Q Yeah.
8 A And then he came back, and he came into our office. And, I mean,
9 whatever he said, he's testified to, I don't have any reason to disagree with.
11 A Well, I don't think he liked the event either. And I think, having been there,
13 Q All right. When did you first realize that people from the Ellipse were
14 moving towards the Capitol? Do you have any recollection of how and when you knew
15 that?
16 A No.
17 Q When did you first realize that there was actual violence or rioting at the
18 Capitol?
19 A I first realized -- and it may have been on television or it may have been Tony
20 or it may have been Philbin -- but I found out that people were -- they weren't in the
21 Capitol yet, but they were -- and then I started watching it, and then I was aware of it.
1 Q All right. When you first realized that there was actual violence at the
3 A Well, I went -- I got -- well, I first -- I think the first time -- I may have gone
4 down before this, but the first time I remember going downstairs was when people had
5 breached the Capitol, they had gotten into the Capitol, you know? And I may have gone
7 But I went down with Pat, and I remember we were both very upset about what
8 was happening. And we both wanted, you know, action to be taken related to that.
9 Q When you say you went downstairs, are you talking about to the Oval Office
10 or to --
11 A I'm sure I may have stopped by Mark's office first. I normally would do
12 that. Sometimes I wouldn't. But we went down to the Oval Office, we went through
13 the Oval Office, and we went to the back where the President was.
15 A And I believe Meadows was already there at that point or he came -- but I
17 Q All right. You and Mr. Philbin indicated that you first -- the two of you went
18 downstairs, first, to Mark Meadows' office, either found him in his office or then found
20 A That's correct. Yeah. Yeah. I think he was already in the dining room.
21 I think we went to his office. He wasn't there. We both went into the dining room.
22 Q And what was your intention? I think you said something needed to be
23 done.
2 Mr. Cipollone. I can't talk about conversations. I think I was pretty clear there
6 room?
10 BY
11 Q Okay. At some point, did you leave the dining room and go back to the Mr.
12 Meadows' office?
13 A I'm sure I did. I remember at one point the mil aide came and somebody
14 from -- I believe, Chris Miller or somebody from the Pentagon wanted to talk to someone.
15 And I think -- and I went with the mil aide. And I believe Mark came to the -- to Mark's
16 office and had a call with Chris Miller. I don't know if General Milley was on that call.
18 You know, just to -- while I'm talking, I don't -- I want -- and I'm sure you know this
19 from talking to a lot of people. There were a lot of people in the White House that day.
20 Q Yep.
21 A Senior people who, you know, felt the same way that I did and who were
22 working very hard to achieve that result. There were -- I think lvanka was one of them.
23 And Eric Herschmann was there, Pat Philbin was there, and a number of other people.
24 Q Yeah.
1 Q Okay. Do you remember any discussion with Mark Meadows with respect
2 to his view that the President didn't want to do anything or was somehow resistant to
5 Q Yeah.
7 I'm sure I had conversations with Mark about this during the course of the day and
9 In the meantime, I was also going up with Pat and getting on these phone calls
12 my way up -- my office was on the next floor up in the West Wing from where the Oval
13 Office is, and when I was going up there -- and I told -- I'm sure I told Mark this, I mean,
14 we need to get every available Federal resource, Federal law enforcement resource to the
15 Capitol now.
16 Now, that's not my job. There were lots of people working on that. But I
18 I got on the phone call. I don't know who had called. That was already
20 I think Donoghue at some point left the command center and went up to the
21 Capitol. I remember there was one phone call where he wasn't on, and I believe I called
22 him on his cell, and I said, "Rich what's going on?" And then I relayed -- it may have
23 been one of the initial phone calls. And that may have been one where he went up to
25 So I was on a few phone calls that day in that respect. And I was in
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2 Q Before the phone calls start, at the onset of the violence when you first
3 notice on television or wherever that rioters have actually breached the Capitol, did you
4 have a conversation with Mark Meadows in which Meadows indicated he doesn't want to
6 A I don't -- I had a conversation I'm sure with Mark Meadows, I'm sure with
7 other people, of what I thought should be done. Did Mark say that to me? I don't have
8 a recollection of him saying that to me, but he may have said something along the lines.
12 Pat, you said that you expressed your opinion forcefully. Could you tell us
15 Mr. Purpura. Talking about the conversation with the President, same thing with
16 Meadows or others.
17 Mr. Cipollone. Yeah. I can't -- I don't have -- you know, I have to -- on the
18 privilege issue, I can't talk about conversations with the President, but I can generically
19 say that I said people need to be told, there needs to be a public announcement fast that
21 Ms. Cheney. And, Pat, could you let us know approximately when you said that?
23 people were getting into the Capitol or approaching the Capitol in a way that was violent.
2 Mr. Cipollone. I think Mark was doing the best he could, you know, to -- under
3 the circumstances, was my view, you know. And others were. And I think Mark also
4 wanted to -- got -- I remember him getting lvanka involved, because he's like get lvanka
6 I don't think Jared was there in the morning, but I think he came later.
8 And, of course, Pat Philbin was expressing the same things. I mean, Pat Philbin
9 was very -- as I said, I don't think there was one of these meetings where -- there might
10 have been -- but for the most part I remember the both of us going down together, going
11 back, getting on phone calls. He was also very clearly expressing this view.
13 Ms. Cheney. And so, Pat, at this point, you said you began almost immediately
19 Mr. Cipollone. I remember at one point, and I can't remember when, when I
20 continued to express -- and this is not something -- I think this was outside of the -- I know
24 I expressed very clearly to Mark Meadows and others -- and it wasn't just me,
25 again, with this sentiment -- that something needed to be done, that this was not good,
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1 that this was a violation of -- well, let me put it to you this way.
2 I thought what happened on January 6th was a national tragedy. And I did
3 everything I could do during that time to express my opinion that things needed to be
5 I wasn't the only one. There were a lot of people who were doing it forcefully.
7 But, no, that was a terrible, terrible day for the United States and certainly for the
8 people who lost their lives and who were victims of violence.
9 At one point, I remember in one of these calls telling Jeff Rosen these people who
10 are doing this up there, who are engaging in these acts of violence, they need to be
11 arrested and they need to be prosecuted to the fullest extent of the law.
12 That was my view. Now, that's obviously up to the Department of Justice. But I
14 I was also, I remember, in terms of the Vice President -- and I believe Pat may
15 have communicated with Greg on that, I believe, you know, but we were also obviously
19 Pat, is it fair to say that you were concerned about what the consequences could
24 Mr. Cipollone. Yeah. Yeah. In terms of people's safety. I mean, that's how a
1 And, again, I was the White House counsel. I was doing what I could do. There
2 were very brave law enforcement officers and the Capitol Police and Federal law
4 And I just wanted to do everything that I could do from my position to make sure
5 that the response was swift and immediate, and I did everything I could do in that regard.
6 Ms. Cheney. And just to follow up on that, Pat, is it you view that the tweets
8 Mr. Cipollone. Again, I'm trying to give my answer consistent with privileges and
9 consistent with things that might have reflected my advice at the time. And you're
11 I think the question is, did you believe that the tweets were not
13 Mr. Cipollone. No, I believed more needed to be done. Okay. I believed that
16 this?
18 Mr. Cipollone, did you have a conversation that day at all with Mr. Meadows in
19 which you indicated that you were trying to persuade the President to do more, but the
22 general matter, let me put it to you this way. I think all of us wanted more to be done as
23 quickly as possible. And did I have a conversation with Mr. Meadows about that? I'm
24 sure I did.
25 With respect to -- what I'm trying to -- I'm trying to answer your question as
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1 directly and clearly as I possibly can without at the same time providing information that
2 might reflect what I may have heard or reflect statements by the President.
3 And I understand your -- the committee's view of that privilege, and all I'm doing is
4 trying to follow the direction that I've been given in terms of what I can say.
5 So I don't want to be unclear. I think I've been clear about what I thought and
7 Mr. Schiff. I appreciate that. I just want to see if I can get further clarity there.
8 Do you recall any conversation you had with Mr. Meadows where he indicated
9 that he's trying to follow your recommendation and trying to get the President to urge
10 people to leave the Capitol, but that the President wasn't willing to do what he was being
11 asked?
14 It does not reflect a communication that Mr. Cipollone had with the
16 I think Mr. Schiff's question is, did you have a conversation with Meadows in
17 which Meadows indicated he was trying to essentially follow your advice, provide similar
19 Mr. Cipollone. And again, it wasn't just my advice. I don't want to give the
21 I understand.
23 Yeah, I think Mark Meadows was doing what he could to get things to move
24 quickly.
25 Mr. Schiff. Well, Mr. Cipollone, what is the basis of that conclusion that you
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2 Did Mr. Meadows convey to you that he was trying to get the President to urge
4 Mr. Purpura. I think it's the same -- I think we're at the same answer here,.
5 I mean, he's answered it. He's tried to come up as close to the line as we can on this.
6 I think the confusion, or at least mine, I can't speak for Mr. Schiff, is
7 I understand the direct communications with the President, Mr. Cipollone, you have
8 asserted privilege.
9 Mr. Cipollone. Or --
11 President.
13 anything, a fact or opinion, I don't see how that's covered by executive privilege.
14 Mr. Purpura. Well, I think we're putting words in the President's mouth. If it
15 was phrased in a way that talks about Mr. Meadows' opinion that doesn't reflect a direct
16 conversation of what Mr. Meadows believed, then maybe he could answer the question.
18 this -- my understanding of what the instructions that I've received on the privilege is that
19 I'm not to discuss -- and this is our understanding -- direct communications with the
20 President or other communications that might reflect direct communications with the
21 President. And I'm trying to answer your question as best that I can, and I'm trying to do
23 Mr. Schiff. And, again, - i s reflecting exactly what I was asking. Let
25 You said that you believe that Mr. Meadows was doing the best he can. And by
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1 that I take it you mean he was doing the best he could to get the President to issue a
3 What is the basis for your saying you believe Meadows was trying?
4 Mr. Cipollone. Well, my own observations of what Mark was trying to do, both
5 inside, you know -- to the extent that I had observations of Mark. I mean, that was my
6 observation.
8 Mr. Purpura. If you saw him with the President, that's a Presidential
9 communication.
10 Mr. Cipollone. Again, I'm trying to remember. Let me take a step back and
11 think about --you're asking a general question about every encounter that --
13 Mr. Cipollone, you said that Mr. Meadows was doing the best he could, and that's
15 That I assume would be on the basis of either you observing him interacting with
16 the President or him telling you about his interaction with the President.
17 So I'm asking you which was it, and if you can give us any clarity.
19 Mr. Schiff. In terms of outside of the presence of the President, can you be any
20 more specific about what he related to you what he was trying to do?
22 out or a public statement. And I think at one point I said to Mr. Meadows -- I'm trying to
25 Mr. Purpura. Let's go off the record for maybe two minutes.
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6 outside the presence of the President. It was outside -- that something needed to be
7 done, that somebody needed to go make a public statement immediately, and that if the
8 President didn't do it, then Mr. Meadows should go out and do that, whoever. But that
10 Okay.
11 Mr. Schiff. One other question, if I could. In your conversations with Mr.
12 Meadows, did you discuss the threats on the Vice President's life and that something
14 Mr. Cipollone. I'm sure I discussed the Vice President at some point in the day,
15 probably early on with Mr. Meadows and others, and certainly on the calls that I was
16 having with law enforcement and people who -- Federal law enforcement. Obviously,
17 there were other law enforcement officials, including the Capitol Police, who were
19 Mr. Schiff. In your conversations with Mr. Meadows about the Vice President,
20 did he ever indicate his views or the views of others as to whether the Vice President
23 Look, on the Vice President my view was very clear that something needed to be
24 done for the Vice President, but for everybody at the Capitol who was threatened by the
25 violence. But, obviously, I was concerned about the Vice President. I indicated that.
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1 I think Pat Philbin also took steps to at least get information. And I understand,
2 obviously, the Secret Service was involved, but I didn't have communication with the
3 Secret Service.
4 Mr. Schiff. With respect to your conversations with Mr. Meadows, though, did
5 you specifically raise a concern about the Vice President with him, and how did he
6 respond?
7 Mr. Cipollone. I believe I raised a concern about the Vice President. And
8 I -- again, the nature of his response, without recalling exactly, was people were doing all
10 Mr. Schiff. And what about the President, did he indicate whether or not the
11 President was doing what needed to be done to protect the Vice President?
16 I see.
19 Ms. Cheney. Pat, what was your reaction to the 2:24 tweet about the Vice
20 President?
21 That's the one that says, "Mike Pence didn't have the courage to do
22 what should have been done to protect our country and our Constitution."
23 Mr. Cipollone. I don't remember when exactly I heard about that tweet, but my
24 reaction to it is that's a terrible tweet, and I disagreed with the sentiment. And I
1 Ms. Cheney. And when you talk about others on the staff thinking more should
2 be done or thinking that the President needed to tell people to go home, who would you
4 Mr. Cipollone. Well, I would put --1 think I went through them all or a large
5 number of them. I would put in that category -- not in terms of precisely what they said,
6 but in terms of a positive push to get -- a positive effort to get more done faster, Pat
7 Philbin, Eric Herschmann. Overall, Mark Meadows, lvanka. Once Jared got there,
8 Jared, General Kellogg. I'm probably missing some, but those are -- Kayleigh I think was
10 Ms. Cheney. And who on the staff did not want people to leave the Capitol?
13 Mr. Cipollone. I can't think of anybody on that day who didn't want people to
14 get out of the Capitol once the -- particularly once the violence started. No. I mean --
19 Mr. Cipollone. Oh, I'm sorry. I apologize. I thought you said who else on the
20 staff.
21 Yeah. I can't reveal communications. But obviously I think, you know -- yeah.
23 Ms. Cheney. Well, I would like to understand how we got to the 4:17 video.
24 Yeah.
25 BY
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1 Q My question's exactly that, that it sounds like you from the very onset of
2 violence at the Capitol right around 2 o'clock were pushing for a strong statement that
4 Is that right?
7 Capitol until 4:17 p.m. So there's a couple of hours in which your strong advice had not
8 been taken.
9 Is that right?
10 A I don't want to characterize in that way. I want to say that -- I know there
11 were tweets that were sent out, and in my view of the world and I think others more
13 Q Yeah. So your advice was tell people to leave the Capitol, and that took
14 over 2 hours when there were subsequent statements made, tweets put forth, that in
16 Did you continue, Mr. Cipollone, throughout the period of time, up until 4:17,
18 A Yes.
20 A Yes.
21 Q By Eric Herschmann?
22 A Yes.
23 Q By Mark Meadows?
24 A Yes.
25 Q Okay. And was it necessary for you to continue to push for a stronger
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1 statement between 2 o'clock all the way until the statement was issued at 4:17?
4 people to leave all the way through that period of time until it was ultimately issued after
5 4 --
6 A I felt it was my obligation to continue to push for that, and others felt it was
8 Q Why was it necessary to continue to push for a statement over that period of
9 time?
10 Was it because one had not been issued, because your advice had been resisted?
11 A I mean, factually, what I can say is that there had been some statements
12 made, and that I continued to push because I thought more needed to be done.
13 Q Would it have been possible at any moment for the President to walk down
14 to the podium in the briefing room and talk to the nation at any time between when you
15 first gave him that advice at 2 o'clock and 4:17 when the video statement went out?
18 Q Yes.
20 Q Is it fair to say, Mr. Cipollone, that it took you and all the people you
22 ultimately happen?
24 Q Was it necessary for all of you that you've named, all of the people that were
25 pushing for a stronger statement, did it take repeated pushing, repeated efforts of
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1 persuasion to finally achieve the goal that you suggested back at 2 o'clock, a statement
3 A I think, again, what I would say is that a lot of people, including myself, were
4 pushing for more to be done. Some statements were issued. Some tweets were
5 issued. And my view was that we should do as much as we possibly can as quickly as
6 possible.
7 Q Yeah. You told the President or you advised at 2 o'clock that you should
8 tell people to go home. The first tweet says stay, stay peaceful.
10 A Again, I'm not going to get -- I'm not going to get into interpretations of
11 particular tweets.
15 Q Yeah.
16 A And then, as I said, I was in and out of -- and others were there. I think
17 lvanka was very effective in and positive in her advice. I think others were too.
18 But, again, I'm not going to get into the privileged communications or direct
19 communications. I was going back and forth to my office to get on these phone calls.
20 And I don't, as I said, I don't remember how many times I went down there.
21 remember being down there when the statement was being recorded outside.
22 Q Yeah. Did you continue to push for that result, that tell people to go home,
23 all the way through the period until the statement was issued?
24 A Yes.
25 Q Okay.
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1 Ms. Cheney.
2 Ms. Cheney. Can you -- Pat, are you aware of an argument, a disagreement,
5 Mr. Cipollone. Yeah. I can't -- I was trying to place the people you're
11 Can you tell us who contacted you that day? You said that you were back in your
13 Mr. Cipollone. Well, I got on call -- I remember the mil aide wanted me to talk to
14 Chris Miller at one point. And then Chris wanted to -- we got on a bunch -- I got on a
15 couple of -- at least two, maybe three conference calls with DOD, Homeland Security,
16 DOJ, people from the FBI. And so that -- I just got -- I dialed in or maybe the Sit Room
18 Ms. Cheney. Did you talk to anybody outside the executive branch?
21 Mr. Cipollone. Oh, I'm sorry. Oh, I'm sorry. Outside the executive branch.
23 During the course of the day, I can't remember. I'm sure -- I would -- one thing
24 that would be helpful, I don't have my call logs. I haven't seen my call logs. And if you
25 have them and I could look at them then I could tell you.
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1 Did I talk to people on the Hill at some point during the course of the day?
2 probably did. But I don't recall specific conversations as I sit here. But I'm sure it's
3 all -- if we just look at the call logs of my office or my phone or whatever, my White House
5 Ms. Cheney. Pat, did you use text messaging on your official phone?
6 Mr. Cipollone. I didn't have that activated on my phone. I'm not a big texter.
7 But I'm sure people from the Hill were communicating with me. I think -- I saw reports
8 that Lindsay Graham said he talked to me at some point, Senator Graham. That seems
11 Mr. Cipollone. I mean, people -- everybody was calling. People were trying to
12 call. I was kind of -- I kind of knew what people would have to say, and I was just sort of
14 I remember Chris Christie called my office, but I didn't have the time to talk to him
16 I remember now seeing a lot of the texts that you have with various people
17 outside of government, including people who are media people making comments and
18 texts and things like that. Did I get a text like that? I don't know. Maybe I did.
19 I don't know if I was aware at the time that all of that was going on, but it didn't
21 Ms. Cheney. Did you talk to -- and we've seen the texts. We've seen texts from
22 Sean Hannity to Mark Meadows, for example. Did you hear from Sean that day?
23 Mr. Cipollone. I don't recall hearing from Sean that day. I might have heard
24 from Laura. I actually saw her -- I saw her in the morning because she was dropping her
25 kids off at school, and I was at home with Becky, my wife, and she had stopped by to have
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1 coffee with Becky. So I saw her when I got back from church is my recollection.
2 And who else called me that day? I mean, obviously, as time -- as the Capitol
3 was secured, I probably got additional calls at that point from people, and I had the time
4 to take them. But, again, no one comes immediately to mind as someone who called
5 me.
7 checked in with him. Probably talked to Rich Donoghue. I may have talked to Chris
8 Miller. I was talking to him throughout the day. General Milley, I talked to a couple
10 Ms. Cheney. Did you talk to Sean Hannity in the days leading up to the 6th?
12 Ms. Cheney. One of the texts that you may have seen is from Sean to Mark on
13 January 5th where he says, "Pence pressure, White House counsel will leave."
14 Mr. Cipollone. Yeah. I may have talked to -- I may have. I don't remember if I
15 talked directly to Sean. I probably talked during that time with Jay Sekulow. Jay had
16 functioned -- you know, had been the President's outside lawyer, and Jay and I were
17 involved in trying the first impeachment case together. I knew him before that. I've
18 worked with him. I have a lot of respect for Jay. And so I'm sure I talked to him.
20 Bill Barr. Again, I'm just naming names of people who I would regularly talk to. I don't
22 Ms. Cheney. No. I appreciate that. I guess I'm specifically wondering about
23 discussions you might have had with Sean Hannity, with Jay Sekulow, with Laura
24 Ingraham on this issue of the plans for the 6th might be causing you to leave.
25 Mr. Cipollone. Well, again, are you asking me about whether I considered
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3 Mr. Cipollone. Okay. So I'll give you my best recollection of that and my
5 First of all, I'm not a resigning type of person, okay? And I certainly don't -- I kind
6 of hang in, and I don't -- I don't threaten, go around threatening to resign. I might
7 inform people that if certain things would come to pass that I don't know -- I don't know if
8 I could stay. I think there might have been a couple instances of that.
9 I think it's fair to say that after Bill left -- and I said earlier that my plan had been to
10 stay on -- to sort of leave when Bill left under the circumstances, and having
12 And then just various things that had occurred, I did consider leaving. Was I
13 considering leaving in -- during that week? Yes. I talked to Meadows about it.
14 But, again, I didn't have a lot of conversations about it. I talked to others. I got
16 I had a couple of concerns generally with respect to my doing that. First of all, I
17 could never ask people who worked for me if I'm leaving over a particular situation that I
18 feel like I need to leave over, I'm not the kind of person that would leave and then the
19 people, the good people working with me, no, expect them to stay.
21 certainly among the younger lawyers, I wouldn't feel right about that, that if I had done
24 So there was some of that before January 6th related to various things and the
1 And then after that some people were resigning, obviously, over January 6th.
2 We know who they were. Did I consider it? Yes. Did I do it? No. And the reason
3 that I didn't do it was people contacted me -- and others too -- people were concerned
6 And, again, I'm just one person. So I'm not trying to self-aggrandize or anything
7 like that. A lot of people were getting these types of messages. Robert O'Brien, who
9 And I didn't think it would serve the President for me to leave. One thing I was
10 concerned about is if people in the counsel's office left, who would replace me? And I
11 had some concerns that it might be somebody who had been giving bad advice and might
13 But I sort of didn't think about it that much after that. I may have had
14 conversations with some people on the Hill about it, some people in the Cabinet. But I
15 was more focused -- on the day of the 7th, there was the other speech that the President
16 gave.
17 Ms. Cheney. Pat, but let me just stop you before we go beyond the 6th.
18 When you're talking about the period before the 6th, what are the things that
20 Mr. Cipollone. Well, I didn't like what was going on with the Vice President and
21 the way that was working. You know, again, I told you, I didn't like the continued the
22 event and the continued notion that we weren't at a point at that point that we were
23 going to have a transition of power. You know, there were probably other things.
24 But ultimately I didn't -- I ultimately concluded that I was going to stay. But I
25 don't want to give the impression that it was an ongoing -- there was a time during that
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1 week, and, frankly, in the weeks earlier, that the thought occurred to me. Didn't talk to
2 a lot of about it, just people who I would typically get advice about -- or from. But I did
3 my job, and that's what I was more focused on during those days.
7 I just wanted to take you back. You said that on the 6th you were trying to do
8 everything you could to get a response, and you included in that you were trying to get a
9 statement to be made.
10 Would you also include in there that you were trying to get responders to respond
12 Mr. Cipollone. Well, let me put it to you this way. They were responding. It's
13 not that I have to tell them to respond. I just wanted to make sure that -- I got on these
14 calls, they asked us to get on these calls, and I wanted to make sure that people
15 understood that our view was get every available Federal resource up there.
16 I think that was already underway. Again, the people who actually do those
17 things were doing them. That was being run by that group of people. So I don't want
18 to suggest that anything other than I just added my voice to that. I think it was
19 underway.
20 I think there were some issues with, you know, issues around the National Guard
22 So, again, there were others involved. Certainly others mainly outside the White
23 House that were doing everything they can do in my view, acting very bravely, the first
25 I just was asked to get on phone calls, I wanted to get on phone calls when people
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1 were asking.
2 Mrs. Murphy. So when you say "our view," who are you representing when you
3 say "our"? The White House counsel? Your view as an individual? Or the White
5 Mr. Cipollone. I think all of the above in my mind. I mean, that's all the -- yeah.
6 My personal view, certainly the view of -- but they don't -- they act on their own,
9 Mr. Cipollone. Well, yeah, if you're talking about -- but I'm talking about, sort of,
10 Federal resources. I just wanted to do what I could do. And there are different Federal
11 resources. I think they had FBI, I think they had some Homeland, and just making sure
12 that we --
13 Mrs. Murphy. So you just represented to us that you considered "our view" to
14 be inclusive of the President's view that DOD assets and DHS assets be sent to the Capitol
15 to defend it?
16 Mr. Cipollone. That was my -- again, let me put it to you this way. My
18 communications, that I got on these calls and I communicated what I thought to be the
20 Mrs. Murphy. So --
22 Mrs. Murphy. Well, just to be precise here, we don't deploy DOD assets
23 domestically without -- well, you tell me, who is the authorizer for deploying DOD
24 assets --
25 Mr. Cipollone. Well, again, it's not -- no. No. What I was --
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3 Mrs. Murphy. Who has the authority to deploy DOD assets domestically
4 [inaudible]?
5 Mr. Cipollone. Again, I can give you my understanding of what happened that
6 day. I think there was -- there was -- there was some issue that I was called about,
7 about the National Guard and getting the National Guard. And I wasn't, obviously, the
8 one who was -- had been involved in that. But I remember getting a call.
10 confused by any confusion that we would want DOD to do everything being with respect
12 Again, there was -- there are various different scenarios for that, as you know, in
14 But primarily what I was focused on at that time was just getting on calls with Pat
15 Philbin and talking about what we had as available Federal resources and what people
16 were doing, just for informational purpose to make sure we were communicating.
17 That's all.
18 Mrs. Murphy. So did you represent yourself on these calls as representing the
20 Mr. Cipollone. I didn't. I didn't get into -- I didn't -- I got on the call. And in
22 Mrs. Murphy. Did you have indications from the President that he was
23 deputizing you or anybody else from the White House to have -- to exercise that
24 authority?
25 I'm just trying to figure whether or not when you say "our view," and you included
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1 the President and the White House, whether you were actually representing the
3 Mr. Cipollone. I think the answer to that is, I got specific direction because there
4 were some questions. Again, I wasn't -- and that's a DOD, and DOD I believe had the
6 And, again, I remember there was a question raised about that. And I remember
8 remember Meadows being a little bit agitated that that there was still some
9 misunderstanding or confusion about whether or not they had that authority, I guess,
10 that that authority had been granted. And so that was my understanding.
13 Are you aware whether or not the chief of staff to the White House is in the chain
14 of command?
16 Ms. Cheney. No. Is the chief of staff in the White House in the chain of
17 command?
18 Mr. Cipollone. I took the chief of staff acting on that day was giving me direction
22 Ms. Cheney. So you're aware, I'm sure, that the chain of command for
23 deployment of forces for the defense of the Capitol, for example, runs from the President
1 Ms. Cheney. So the chief of staff to the President is not in the chain of
2 command?
3 Mr. Cipollone. I understand that. But often the chief of staff would
7 Ms. Cheney. So are you aware of any phone call by the President of the United
10 Ms. Cheney. Are you aware of any phone call by the President of United States
13 Ms. Cheney. Are you aware of any phone call by the President of the United
21 You mentioned the circumstance of the Vice President as being part of that
22 consideration.
23 Could you give us any other things that caused you to consider resigning?
25 I could tell you one of the things that -- and I'm just trying to think about sort of
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1 privilege issues here. But one of the things that I would consider in that regard would
2 be some pardons that were being proposed, some types of pardons that were being
3 proposed.
5 Mr. Cipollone. How about we take a, if you don't mind, take a five-minute break.
6 I can consult with my counsel. We can talk about how much I can say in that regard.
9 [Recess.]
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2 [3:17 p.m.]
4 Mrs. Luria, I see your hand is raised. Did you have -- or, I'm sorry, when we left
5 off, did --1 don't know, Ms. Lofgren, if you had more to go?
6 Ms. Lofgren. Well, you know, I guess the question is, what are the pardons that
7 specifically were troubling? And then we'll see if there's a followup question.
9 So, publicly, it had been reported that a number of different types of pardons
11 privilege -- pardons relating to -- you know, broad pardons for people involved in
12 January 6th, pardons for Members of Congress, et cetera, pardons -- there was a public
14 And these things had -- some of these things, you know, were discussed before
15 and then also after, but primarily after January 6th. Pardons had been an ongoing
16 process, you know, toward the end of the administration, pardons and commutations.
17 And so, to the extent that any of that type of thing would've happened, that
18 would be something that I would not be around for. Not that there's not, you know -- it
19 wasn't about an analysis of technical legal authority. The pardon power is broad. But
20 that was not something that I felt was a good idea, for lots of reasons. And none of that
22 Ms. Lofgren. Understanding that none of that happened, what was the basis of
24 Mr. Cipollone. Well, I mean, the basis of my view --you know, there were
25 numerous, sort of, legal and prudential reasons, you know, that would've gone into that,
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1 and it would reflect communications with the President, but I didn't think any of that
2 should be done.
3 Ms. Lofgren. Would it be your view -- I'm not asking what you told the President,
4 but would it be your view that pardons offered to individuals in advance of the
6 Mr. Cipollone. I don't -- I don't have a view on that. I don't have a view on that.
9 Ms. Lofgren. I'm just referencing public statements made and the reliance on
10 those statements.
17 that were given on January 6th and then more broadly about the role of the White House
18 Counsel's Office.
19 So, you know, can you confirm that I'm correct in saying that the White House
23 And can you describe, you know, broadly how you view your role in essentially
24 ensuring that statements the President makes are not just complete lies?
25 You know, it's been stated over and over again in testimony from multiple people
178
1 who worked with you in the White House that the President had been told over and over
2 again that these allegations of election fraud were incorrect, they had no basis. It had
3 been through court, and 60 of 61 cases had shown that they had no merit. Vet he was
4 planning to give remarks on January 6th to the American people that again stated things
5 that were known to be false. And your reaction to that was to have that noted and
6 documented.
8 that something the committee has, this document showing opposition to the content of
9 those remarks?
11 Mr. Cipollone. Yeah. Again, with respect to those particular remarks and
12 remarks like that -- and there's a difference in the process with official remarks, you
13 know, policy remarks and things like that and then remarks that, let's say, are campaign
14 or political remarks.
15 What happened with that in particular is, those remarks are typically circulated by
16 the staff secretary, okay? And I am not typically, as I said, personally involved in
17 reviewing remarks. You know, there are lots of lawyers in the White House who do that.
19 But with respect to this particular set of remarks, I found out that these remarks
20 had been sent through the staff secretary I believe on the day of January 6th. Pat
21 Philbin told me that we had gotten those remarks. And I think it was, you know -- I don't
22 remember the -- and, again, maybe they had been circulated the night before. I don't
23 know that. I remember learning about the circulation the day of, and I remember it
25 And, you know, Pat Philbin -- and, again, you have, I know, discussed that with Pat
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1 Philbin, who did the review. I've told you already what I did.
2 Yeah. And, Mrs. Luria, I'm happy to share with you more about
3 documents when we get another opportunity. I just want to make sure you get a
4 chance, in the limited time we have, to ask any more questions of Mr. Cipollone.
6 So, I mean, we know publicly that this is not the only time, around this time of
7 January 6th or even after that, while he was still the sitting President, it's not the only
8 time that the President made these false allegations publicly through official remarks.
9 Was it your common practice that every time you were made aware of these
10 remarks in advance or even after the fact that you somehow documented and recorded
21 Mr. Cipollone. Well, it's the normal process of things that's established in the
24 Mrs. Luria. So, when a lawyer who worked for you in the White House Counsel's
25 Office objected to something, was there a process that would elevate it up, perhaps
180
1 totally to you, if it was, you know, something that was a statement being made by the
2 President that had an objection? It would seem like that would need to be within your
3 visibility.
4 Mr. Cipollone. Yeah. Sometimes that would get elevated, or sometimes there's
5 a policy dispute, or sometimes there was an issue, and that would get elevated through
11 Mrs. Luria. -- were known to be lies, the President was saying things that were
13 Mr. Cipollone. Again, I've testified throughout today about what I was doing in
15 speeches, that was a process that was different for campaign speeches. As I said, my
16 observation was, the President believed these things. But I think everyone understood
18 Mrs. Luria. So maybe I didn't hear all of the remarks you made today, but this is
19 the first time I recall you saying that the President believed these things. So you're
20 saying, in your assessment, the President believed that he had won the election?
21 Mr. Cipollone. In my assessment, again -- and I spoke about that in the context
22 of the Jeff Clark meeting -- that he believed, at least based on -- again, I can't get inside
23 his head, but based on my observation, I think he believed these allegations of fraud.
24 And he believed that -- yes, I mean, I think he -- again, without testifying as to what his
25 actual belief is, because I'm just reporting my observation in that meeting.
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1 Ms. Cheney. So, just to be clear there, Pat, so you're saying he acted as if he
6 I yield back.
11 Yeah, I'm sorry, Mr. Raskin, I can see you talking, but I can't hear you. Maybe if
14
15 Q All right, Mr. Cipollone, I don't want to spend a lot more time on the
17 When you were in the dining room where the television -- was there a television
18 on?
19 A Yes.
21 A I didn't know.
22 Q When you were in the dining room, in these discussions, was the violence at
24 A Yes.
25 Q All right.
182
1 Do you remember any discussion at any point during the day about rioters at the
4 Q Yeah. And --
6 Q I'm just curious, I understand the privilege line you've drawn, but do you
7 remember what you can share with us about the discussion about those chants, the
10 Q Yeah. Please.
12 Q Uh-huh.
13 A And for anyone to suggest such a thing as the Vice President of the United
14 States, for people in that crowd to be chanting that I thought was terrible. I thought it
15 was outrageous and wrong. And I expressed that very clearly to people.
16 Q Did anyone with whom you spoke that afternoon express a contrary view?
17 A Not that I can recall -- "a contrary view"? -- again, without getting into
18 privilege issues.
19 Q Well, is there anybody who expressed a contrary view that you can't share
23 Q Okay.
24 The New York Times reported that you hammered at Mr. Trump to understand
25 that he had potential legal exposure for what was taking place. Do you remember
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1 discussion about the possible legal exposure as to what was taking place at the Capitol?
4 Q Again, I'm just asking whether or not you had concerns yourself,
6 A Again, in my own mind, looking back on it, I was more -- I was mainly
7 concerned about doing everything I can do to stop the situation. You know, assessing
8 legal -- it was more, sort of, what can I do as part of the overall team to make sure I was
13 Q I see.
14 You mentioned lvanka Trump being involved. Did she have any unique role or
15 unique ability to, sort of, get through to the President or a relationship with him as a
16 family member that, sort of, was valuable or you thought was useful over the course of
17 that day?
18 A Yes.
19 Q Tell me more --
20 A 1mean, not just the course of that day; throughout, you know, the time in
21 the administration. lvanka is very effective, very intelligent. She's the President's
22 daughter.
23 Q Yeah.
24 A Obviously, I think he really respects and considers her opinion. And I think
1 Q Uh-huh.
2 A And I viewed her as a -- I was very proud to be working with her. I think
4 And, in particular, on that day, as I said earlier, Mark Meadows wanted to, you
5 know, make sure that lvanka was involved in the situation. And she was, and she was
6 very effective.
8 relationship, was she, sort of, elicited or brought in to these discussions because she had
11 Q All right. And she shared your view that more needed to be said, that we
15 Q Yeah.
17 Q All right.
18 Ms. Cheney asked you some questions about the President not calling various
19 people. Was there any discussion about the President reaching out to the Vice
23 Q Yeah. The President didn't call the Vice President that afternoon. Is that
24 right?
1 Q Yeah. Okay.
2 Ms. Cheney?
3 Ms. Cheney. Pat, are you aware that the Vice President gave an order to
4 Mr. Miller?
5 Mr. Cipollone. Am I aware of that? I remember hearing about that, and I can't
7 In terms of what I was talking about before, okay -- and I understand the chain of
8 command, and certainly clearly understand my role, as Counsel, I'm not in the chain of
9 command -- when Pat Philbin and I were being asked questions, you know, on some
10 issues related to the whole issue of the National Guard, we went, and Mark Meadows,
11 you know, made clear that the authority had been granted.
12 Now, the chief of staff, you know, saying that the President, you know -- I
13 understand who has the authority, but we were told that the authorities have already
14 been granted. The chief of staff, you know, while not formally being the chain of
15 command, as you well know, can communicate the directives of the President. And
16 what I was thinking is, we heard that from Mark, and then we can go back and relay that.
17 I believe they got that directly -- it sounds like, and it makes sense, that they got it
19 Ms. Cheney. They certainly got it from the Vice President that -- and I want it to
20 be clear, I was not suggesting that you had given an illegal order or that you had
21 stepped --
22 Mr. Cipollone. Okay, yeah. I didn't think you were suggesting that, but I was
23 trying to understand exactly. I understand I'm not in the chain of command. All I was
24 trying to do was what I could do from my position and, you know, frankly, sometimes at
25 the request of people at DOD who are in the chain of command, what I could do to make
186
3 I think that it's just important, as we discussed earlier, to be clear that the
4 President of the United States is the one responsible for defending all three branches of
5 our government. And, as you confirmed before, as has every witness who's been asked
6 this question in front of the committee, the President of the United States made no
7 phone calls to any of the people who actually were in the chain of command that day to
8 deploy forces to the Capitol and issued no order that day or prior to that day to deploy
10 Mr. Cipollone. Well, again, on who he talked to that day, I'm going by what I
11 understand. You've gotten a lot of testimony from various people. I don't have any
13 In terms of prior orders by the President, I think -- and I don't want to wade into
14 this myself at this point, but I understand that there may be a difference of opinion on
16 Ms. Cheney. No, I -- well, as Secretary Miller has testified publicly, that he
21 Ms. Lofgren -- I'm sorry, Mr. Cipollone. Did you have something else you wanted
23 Mr. Cipollone. No. We can talk about it at some point. You know, there
24 obviously is the National Guard, and then there are forces. But we don't need to go into
1 Ms. Lofgren?
3 Ms. Cheney. Sorry, Zoe, just to -- I don't mean to interrupt you, but I just want to
4 be clear: With respect to the National Guard, with respect to regular military forces,
5 there was no order given, and Secretary Miller has testified to that. So I don't want us
8 Representative Cheney.
10 Mr. Cipollone. And I don't want to characterize anybody else's testimony. I can
11 only --
12 Ms. Cheney. No, I actually didn't think that you were. Thank you very much,
13 Pat.
16 All right.
17 Mr. Raskin, are you back on? Did you have something?
19 Yes.
21 Mr. Cipollone, you said that you don't like being threatened to resign, which I
22 appreciate, but you were seriously considering resigning because, you said, you didn't like
24 Can you be more specific about what it was that you didn't like about what was
1 Mr. Cipollone. Well, the first time, just to be clear, that I've testified -- and then
2 I'll answer your question about that issue, Representative Raskin -- number one, the
3 whole Jeff Clark scenario, that's something that I testified to, that if that had happened,
4 that would've caused me and lots of people to leave. That didn't happen.
5 Second, during, you know, the weeks, you know, leading up, you know, I didn't -- I
6 didn't -- on that issue of the Vice President, you know, and the ultimate -- you know, the
7 ultimate resolution of that by the Vice President, in my view, was the correct one. And
8 so I just -- part of my thinking was, I assumed that would be the outcome, knowing the
9 Vice President, knowing his counsel. But during the course of that week, I did consider,
10 you know, whether it was time for me to move on. But that didn't happen.
12 Mr. Cipollone. And then, after January 6th, after the violence, many people
13 were, I'm sure, considering such a step, and I chose not to, for the reasons I've discussed.
14 Mr. Raskin. In the pre-January-6th period, when you were forced to consider it, I
15 want to be clear about why. Was that because of the pressure that was being brought
17 Mr. Cipollone. Again, I wasn't forced to consider it. I was considering it, okay?
18 Number one.
19 Number two, there were a number of things in my mind, including things that had
20 built up with some of the events that we've discussed, and then, you know, again,
21 depending -- depending on, not so much pressure, but, you know, depending on outcome
22 in terms of that issue, that was weighing on my mind. But there were -- it wasn't one
24 But during that week I definitely thought about it and talked to people, and it
25 didn't happen.
189
2 I had one other question. You said that you had expressed concern about Vice
3 President Pence. I think this was in connection with Mark Meadows, that you expressed
5 Mr. Cipollone. Well, again, I was -- as I think I said, I had concerns about
6 everybody who was, you know, up at the Capitol at that point. I was obviously
7 concerned about Vice President Pence. I don't have a recollection of spending a long
8 period of time talking to various people. I think that was being -- that was obviously
9 being handled by the Secret Service and by other people. But I just wanted to -- one
10 thing on my mind -- and Pat Philbin, I think, also looked into it -- was that Vice President
13 And did you mention also specifically in passing Members of Congress or Capitol
16 obviously, you know, I was worried about what was going on inside the Capitol and the
17 threat to people and the threat to law enforcement and some of the activity. And then,
18 in particular, when I heard from Tony Ornate that someone had been shot, I would say
20 So, yeah, I had a general -- obviously, you know, as a human being, I had a lot of
21 concern about what was happening at the Capitol, as I told you, you know, and I felt very
22 strongly that what happened on that day in terms of, you know, violence, you know,
23 approaching and in the Capitol was wrong and it was a tragic thing and it was a tragedy.
24 It's not who we are in this country; it doesn't reflect that. And I was feeling that in the
2 I yield back,.
4 BY
5 Q I want to talk a little bit, Mr. Cipollone, about the 4:17, the video statement
6 that ultimately was put out. Tell us about your role, if any, in drafting the words that
9 I don't remember who the primary drafter was. I remember looking at it and giving
10 comments.
11 I remember, you know, Pat -- I believe Pat Philbin was also around, that other
13 And I don't remember the primary drafter, but I think -- I think, you know, I
15 Q Were the remarks that ultimately the President made on video from a
16 written draft, or were they more extemporaneous, or some combination of the two?
17 A I don't have both in front of me, but basically I remember that there were
18 some differences from the written draft and what was added in the remarks.
19 Q Yeah.
20 Mr. Nick Luna testified before the select committee. He said, "Mr. Cipollone was
22 was interested in having a forceful statement that put an end to the day's events."
24 A That is true. And I would also add that Nick Luna is another person who,
25 you know, is a, you know, very -- was a very, very positive force on that day and generally.
191
1 Q Yeah.
2 Were you present when the statement in the Rose Garden was actually filmed?
3 A As my recollection was, I was inside the outer Oval, and I was present for,
4 yeah, the -- I wasn't outside, is my recollection, but I was in the outer Oval with some
5 other people in that office there. And, you know, I saw some of the filming.
6 Q All right. So you were involved in discussions about what it should be, but
7 didn't go outside with the President and others to film the statement?
8 A No. I mean, that wouldn't be -- but I could see through the windows --
9 Q Yeah.
10 A -- outside of the --
11 Q 1see.
12 So I won't read the whole statement to you, but at 4:17 the President does issue a
13 videotaped statement where he talks about, "I know your pain. I know you're hurt.
14 We had an election that was stolen from us. Go home. We love you. You're very
18 peace. You know, some of the extemporaneous comments I don't remember having a
19 strong reaction to. I was happy that something was said at that point in time. You
20 know, some of those extemporaneous remarks didn't reflect what I thought, obviously,
22 Q You testified earlier that you thought some of the earlier tweets -- and I
23 won't go over them again -- didn't go far enough. Did you have a similar reaction to the
25 A I remember having a reaction that it was a good thing that that was done at
192
1 that point in time. And I think subsequent statements were made the next day that I
2 had a role in --
3 Q Yeah.
5 violence, et cetera. But, again, I don't want to get into my thinking and how I provided
7 Q And I understand that, and I'll get to the January 7th speech. I'm just
8 wondering again, on a gut level, when you heard the 4:17 statement finally telling people
9 to go home but with all of that other language, did you think it was positive or not?
10 Constructive? Destructive? What was your personal, not communications with the
13 home, is my recollection of it. But, you know, referencing some of the other things at
15 Q I understand.
16 At 6:01 p.m., almost 2 hours after that, there's another tweet that the President
17 issues. Similarly, "These are the things and events that happen when a sacred landslide
18 election victory is so unceremoniously & viciously stripped away from great patriots who
19 have been badly & unfairly treated for so long. Go home with love & in peace.
21 Did you have any involvement in crafting or issuing that message at 6:01 p.m.?
25 A I'm trying to remember my reaction when I learned about that. Again, I'm
193
1 sure my reaction was consistent with my beliefs about what was stated in there. So I
3 But, again, as I said, based on my observations of the President's actions, that that
4 was something -- those sentiments about the election was something that he believed
7 constructive or helpful for the President, even after the violence of the afternoon of
8 January 6th, to talk about a sacred landslide election victory being unceremoniously
12 Ms. Cheney. Hey,.before you go to that, I wanted to talk more about the
13 tweet and also just, again, to confirm -- Mr. Cipollone, I think you just said that the
14 President believed it, after you told us you couldn't get into his mind.
15 Mr. Cipollone. I think what I tried to say -- and maybe they can read it back.
16 said, based on my observations of his actions, you know, my conclusion at the time was
18 I don't know how -- I don't know the best way to say that, but you said it earlier,
19 you know, in a way that I think was acceptable. And I don't need to keep saying that.
22 And I just -- on that tweet, the first sentence of it is, "These are the things and
1 Mr. Cipollone. Of course not. I thought it was a terrible thing. It's not
5 characterizing your view of that statement and whether it does that, my view is, no,
6 that -- what happened at the Capitol cannot be justified in any form or fashion. It was
7 wrong, and it was tragic. And a lot -- and it was a terrible day. It was a terrible day for
8 this country.
10 I was reading the President's words, that these are the things and events that happen
14 Mr. Cipollone. And I think I've been clear, that's not my view in any sense.
16
17 Q And just to go back to something Ms. Cheney said earlier, I think you
18 indicated that the President acted as if he believed these -- it was your observation, based
20 A Yeah. And I think I also said earlier that my sense, sort of, over time as
21 things, you know -- my observation is that that continued to solidify. In other words, I
22 think -- and without going into my conversations, you know, looking at things early on
23 and, you know, over time, it seemed to be getting more solidified in terms of at least, you
1 A Correct.
2 Q All right.
3 You had a call with him that evening. I believe the phone records reflect that
5 Ms. Cheney. I just want to -- I'm sorry. One more time. I just want to be clear
6 for the record,. and Pat: Mr. Cipollone, you're not saying to us, I mean, that you're
10 Mr. Cipollone. No, I cannot. No. No, I'm not saying that, nor could anyone
13 BY
14 Q Okay. Again, Mr. Cipollone, 7:01 to 7:07 p.m., the phone records reflect
16 A I did.
18 A Yes.
19 Q All right. And are you able to share with us anything about the call?
21 BY
22 Q I understand you can't share the communication, but even what prompted
25 Q Please.
196
3 Mr. Cipollone. And I can't remember the exact time, but that the Capitol was
4 secured again, and there was a period of time before everything went back into session.
6 BY
8 A It was, yeah.
9 And I remember -- and I don't want to get into the detail of this, but I remember
10 going to Mark Meadows -- and, again, this would reflect the communication that I
12 But I remember going to Mark and saying, I think that someone should tell the
13 President to take a certain action with respect to what was going to happen in the joint
14 session. And he said, if you think that, you know, then go right ahead and do that.
15 Q Uh-huh.
17 time, so I couldn't go --
18 Q Up to the residence?
19 A Up to the residence. And I called the White House operator at some point.
20 As I recall, I didn't get him. And then he called me back, I think. And I think that's -- as I
22 Q Yeah.
24 needed to express.
3 BY
4 Q And I appreciate it. Was the timing of that conversation, before the joint
5 session resumed, important and it had to do with something with respect to the joint
7 A Yes.
8 Q Okay.
14 Mr. Cipollone. -- the discussion. So I appreciate the question. I think I've said
16 BY
17 Q All right. I want to move now to what you just referenced a bit ago about
22 Ms. Cheney. Sorry. One more thing before we get to January 7th.
23 Pat, were you aware that even subsequent to that call that you made to the
24 President, Rudy Giuliani was calling Senators and urging them to continue to delay the
25 count?
198
1 Mr. Cipollone. I don't know what Rudy Giuliani was doing on that day. Did
2 someone tell me that was happening? It's possible. I don't have a recollection of that.
5 Mr. Cipollone. I actually may -- I may have heard something about that, but
7 Ms. Cheney. Did that inform your determination to talk with the President that
8 night?
9 Mr. Cipollone. I don't think that was the reason I wanted to talk to the President.
10 It was just my own determination that I wanted to talk to him about, in my view -- again,
11 because I felt like I owed him my best advice, that I wanted to give him that. And I did.
13 BY
14 Q All right. Let's talk about January 7th.
18 Q All right. Who took the first draft or the first crack at drafting what the
20 A Well, I remember -- I don't know who took the first craft at drafting the
21 larger speech that he did. I remember that both Pat Philbin and I felt that, you know,
22 something more should be done. And I remember Pat had drafted kind of a brief
23 statement, and I looked at it, and I said, yeah, this is -- generally, this is fine --
24 Q Yeah.
1 Q In your view, Mr. Cipollone, that morning, what were the general messages
2 that you thought it was important -- you thought was important for the President to
8 Q Yeah.
11 In my view, he needed to express very clearly that the people who committed
12 violent acts and went into the Capitol and did what they did should be prosecuted and
13 should be arrested.
14 And, number three, I think he needed to convey, in my view -- and, again, these
16 Q Yeah.
17 A -- they did not reflect, the people who did that, anything about the
18 movement that had brought President Trump into office, that those are things that did
19 not reflect on who we are as Americans. And that needed to be stated forcefully --
20 Q Okay.
21 A -- that they did not represent him or his political views in any form or
22 fashion.
23 And then I think he needed to express that we're moving on with a transition at
25 Q Uh-huh.
200
1 A So those are some of the themes that, you know -- I think some of that was
3 Q Yeah.
4 A So that's --
5 Q Yeah. I understand.
6 Let's turn to exhibit 23. This is an actual draft of the "Remarks on National
7 Healing." And this was something that was, you know, obviously provided in advance.
8 And,_ maybe you could call it up so that the members can take a look.
10 A This is not the one that -- this is not -- I don't think this is the one that Philbin
13 A No, there's a shorter version that -- okay. I'm sorry. Go ahead. You ask
14 the questions.
16 it may not have been the initial draft that Philbin did, but it was a draft?
17 A I can see that this document is a draft of the "Remarks on National Healing."
21 A But --
22 Q -- that typically --
1 Q Do you have any insight into why the President crossed off or added any
5 "Department of Justice to ensure all lawbreakers are prosecuted to the fullest extent of
6 the law. We must send a clear message, not with mercy, but with justice"? That is
7 X'ed out and did not make it into the ultimate remarks.
8 Do you remember any discussion about that message and whether it was or
9 wasn't appropriate?
10 A I'm sure there was a discussion about the types of remarks that should be
11 made. I don't recall a specific discussion at this moment about, you know, these edits.
12 But, as I said to you, it was my view that was expressed directly to Jeff Rosen on
13 that day -- because it was just my opinion, but it was a strong opinion, and Jeff's a
14 friend -- that the people who were involved in breaching the Capitol and committing acts
16 Q Yeah. I understand that was your view, and you expressed that before, but
17 it's crossed out of the speech and doesn't make it into the speech. Do you know why?
18 A Do I know why?
19 Q Yeah.
21 Q Okay.
22 Also crossed off: "I want to be very clear, you don't represent me. You don't
24 Do you remember any discussion about that language and why the President did
1 A Oh, I'm -- again, I'm trying to recall, like -- I'm sure Stephen Miller was also
2 involved in drafting this. Maybe you can tell -- I mean, again, I'm not the person to go
3 through line by line of this speech and give you answers as to my speculation about why
5 Q And I appreciate that, Mr. Cipollone. I'm not looking for your --
6 A Do you have a copy of the final version that I could look at?
7 Q I do not.
8 And I'm not looking for speculation. I'm just looking for your recollection as to
9 specific language, why it should or should not be included in the January 7th speech, to
12 manner that I think would -- I'm trying to remember if I spoke to other people outside of
13 the --
14 Q Right.
15 A -- you know, so --
16 Q Yeah.
18 Go ahead.
19
20 Q Did you have conversations -- and just to elicit a privilege objection, if there
21 is one -- did you have conversations with the President about these two topics in the
23 struck from --
24 A I think these --
25 Q -- this draft?
203
1 A I'm sorry. I think these topics were important to a lot of people. So,
2 again, there were various other people and there were people inside the White House
3 who felt strongly about this, outside of the Counsel's Office. And so I'm sure those
5 Mr. Purpura. You can't talk about conversations with the President.
6 BY
7 Q Yeah. The question, though, is, were there such conversations with the
9 A Again, I'm trying to have a clear recollection of the process for this.
10 Q Yeah.
11 A And was I around, you know, the President when he was thinking about this
12 and others were around? I may have been. You know, that wouldn't be outside of the
13 ordinary.
14 Q Uh-huh.
16 Q Okay.
17 We have developed information that this speech took multiple takes and that the
18 President had difficulty ultimately getting through this and creating a speech that could
20 A I was there when they did this in the East Wing. I think there were
22 Q Yeah.
24 you know, there are multiple takes of things like that, given, you know, how things are
2 A So I don't recall the specific reasons for the multiple takes. There were
3 multiple takes.
4 Q All right.
7 Q Sure.
8 A -- and giving a speech in those times -- but I think it was a speech at that
9 time that he was willing to make and wanted to make and made.
12 Q Okay.
14 Q Did you believe it was important for him to make the speech as potentially
15 cover for discussions that had started about the 25th Amendment or impeachment or any
17 A Again, that's not -- those were not the primary things in my mind at the time.
19 Q Yeah.
20 A -- and it's important for the country, and it's important that his supporters
21 hear that from him. He had a lot of supporters, obviously, out there.
22 And so I thought -- that's how I was thinking about it. Thinking about it in that
23 way certainly was not my primary thing. It wasn't at the forefront of my mind. I just
25 Q Were there discussions, though, as to the impact that this speech might have
205
2 A Not that I can recall. The next day, the time -- no, that's not -- again, if
6 Q -- what you --
7 A I don't have a recollection of that. And, certainly, for Pat Philbin and
8 myself, I remember we just thought this needed to be said because it was the right thing
9 to say.
11 Ms. Cheney. Pat, did you speak at all to Sean Hannity about this speech?
13 generally more speak to Jay Sekulow, so -- that's who I would speak to. And so I can't
18 It says: One, no more "stolen election" talk. Yes, impeachment and the 25th
19 Amendment are real and many people will quit. Three, he was intrigued by the pardon
20 idea, Hunter. Four, resistant but listened to Pence's thoughts to make it right. And,
22 So I'm wondering whether or not you had any discussions with Jay Sekulow, as
23 you said, or potentially Sean Hannity that would reflect what he was apparently talking
25 Mr. Cipollone. My answer to that would be, I don't have a recollection that
206
1 somehow I talked to someone and then that resulted in this text. No. I think these
2 were ideas, my sense, that came from Sean Hannity. I don't -- if that happened, if I
3 talked to somebody and said something and then -- I'm not aware of that.
4 Ms. Cheney. No, and I appreciate that. I was asking more, generally speaking, I
5 think that you can see that this text reflects that Sean's perspective was that potential for
6 impeachment and for the 25th Amendment being invoked were real and also many
8 It said, Sean is also the source of a number of texts before this about how the
9 White House Counsel's Office will leave. And I wondered to what extent you may have
10 had conversations with him, whether they led to this text or not.
11 Mr. Cipollone. I mean, I know Sean Hannity. I respect Sean Hannity. I can't
12 remember -- I had had conversations with him during my time in the White House.
13 can't remember if I had some around this time, or maybe I had conversations with
14 someone else who relayed to him what I was thinking. I don't know the answer to that.
16 Do you recall discussions with anybody at FOX News about impeachment or the
17 25th Amendment?
20 Mr. Cipollone. You mean once the idea was being publicly talked about?
21 mean, I --
22 Ms. Cheney. At any time between January 6th and January 20th.
24 like that. The only reason I'm hesitating is, obviously I said, you know, Laura Ingraham is
25 a friend of my family's and she's a friend of mine, and, you know, if I had a conversation
207
1 with -- I don't consider that in the context of FOX News. I consider that as the context
2 of, you know, Laura, a friend of my family's who sometimes comes over to dinner with
3 her kids.
4 But I don't remember me reaching out to personalities on FOX News and having
5 conversations with them. That wouldn't have been typical for me. I talked to
6 reporters a lot during the first impeachment, but -- but that wouldn't --
10 Mr. Cipollone. Not specifically, no. And that's not something -- my general way
12 closely. So, to the extent that I was thinking or hearing things that were part of my
13 work, I wouldn't typically share that. To the extent that things were in the news and
14 people would raise that, raise things, I would also be typically very circumspect in my
15 answers.
16 Ms. Cheney. Did you talk to anybody after the 20th about this time period with
19 Ms. Cheney. Yes, but if you want to limit it to the time period immediately after
20 the 20th, you could do that as well. How about we do: To reporters?
22 with reporters, you know, whenever I interacted with reporters, for the most part, it was,
23 you know, authorized. I did not -- I was very, very careful about discussing things were
25 Sometimes other people would talk about issues and things in this time period
208
1 and reporters would reach out to me, but I didn't normally talk directly. Sometimes I
2 did, but only in the context of, you know, not revealing privilege but giving guidance if I
3 thought something was -- they said you said this; did you do it, did you not? And I would
4 either give -- I would give guidance, typically, and say "I can't talk about that" or "doesn't
7 Mr. Cipollone. I don't -- a lot of reporters, you know, were reaching out. I'm
10 BY
12 being any discussion about whether the President in the "Remarks on National Healing"
15 Q Do you remember pushing back against the notion that he would mention
19 Q Yeah.
21 Q Yes.
23 that was being said in the speech. But, again, this was a long time ago, so -- I've
24 expressed my view --
25 Q Yeah.
209
4 I want to ask you a little bit about discussions with members of the Cabinet in the
5 wake of January 6th, specifically Secretary Scalia, who I know is a close friend of yours.
6 Do you recall any discussions with him about actions that the Cabinet would or
7 should take between January 6th and January 20th to ensure the peaceful, orderly
8 transition of power?
9 A Yes.
11 A Well, Gene Scalia is a longtime friend of mine and colleague, and I have a lot
12 of respect for him. And he was another person in the Trump administration who was
14 He called me -- I don't remember exactly when, but it was after January 6th -- and
15 expressed a number of things. The main thing he expressed was he thought there
18 necessary?
19 A I think part of the purpose was so that people could express themselves and
20 the President could hear from the Cabinet in light of the events of January 6th.
21 Q Uh-huh.
22 A I remember Gene ultimately felt like he wanted to write a memo about that.
25 Gene thought that there should be a Cabinet meeting. Probably others thought
210
5 A I don't know all the reasons why not. My sense was that Mark did not feel
9 view of how the President might react in that meeting -- you know, things like that.
10 But Gene, you know, got Mark's reactions to that directly. You've told me you
12 Q We have.
14 Q All right. Nothing else specifically about the Scalia idea of having a Cabinet
17 supported it.
18 Q Yeah.
21 Q Do you recall, Mr. Cipollone, any discussions with General Milley or others
22 about the need to reassure world leaders about the stability of American democracy, the
2 on -- you know. And I can't remember if I had a one-on-one call with him or he called
4 Q Uh-huh.
7 Q Yeah.
8 A -- from General --
9 Q Tell me more about that, what you heard about General Milley's or others'
11 A I heard that that was his desire, that he thought that that was a good thing
14 A Well, again, my view was, particularly in light of events of January 6th, that
15 we need to move forward and, you know, have the transition of power. Anything that
16 could be done, you know, to aid that and to assure people that, you know, that was
17 happening -- and I think this speech, I think, was part of that as well.
18 Q Yeah.
20 Q Some people, in the wake of January 6th, in the Cabinet did resign. Did you
21 talk, for example, to Secretary DeVos or Secretary Chao about their decisions to step
24 Secretary Chao, I believe I did speak to her at some point just to tell her that, you
1 Q Yeah.
2 A You know, I thought she was -- you know, she's been a Cabinet member
3 before. She was an effective Cabinet member. I had a good working relationship with
4 her, and I have a very high regard for her. So I wanted to express that to her directly.
5 believe I did that. I can't remember at what point in time I did that.
6 Q Did she articulate to you why she felt strongly enough to resign?
7 A I think that was obvious. I can't remember the details of what we talked
8 about.
9 Q Did you talk to others who didn't resign about whether they should, Cabinet
12 Q Who?
13 A I'm sure I had discussions with Robert O'Brien. Robert and I were very
15 Q Yeah.
16 A I think Robert also, as I said before, was getting calls that he needed to stay
17 there.
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2 [4:18 p.m.]
3 Is it fair to say that Mr. O'Brien thought about resigning but decided
4 not to?
7 Mr. Cipollone. Maybe would now be a good time to take a five-minute break?
9 We have, yeah.
15 [Recess.]
16 BY
18 I think when we took a break, Mr. Cipollone, we were talking about whether or
19 not you had discussions with anyone else about the prospect of resignation. I'm just
20 wondering if you recall beyond Mr. O'Brien whether there were any such discussions?
21 A I'm sure there were such discussions. The other ones that I recall were
22 with members of my own staff, with -- and also with the deputies, Pat Philbin, Kate Todd,
24 Q Yeah. Do you recall talking to former Attorney General Barr during this
2 Q You indicated that you stayed in your position as White House counsel even
3 after General Barr resigned because you believed you had an important role to play and
4 you were concerned about who might be chosen to fill your job. Is that sort of accurate
6 A Why I personally decided to stay was I thought that I could play a positive
7 role. I thought that I could serve the country and the President. I thought that -- I was
8 concerned about who might replace me. And those are the key reasons.
9 I felt like -- I didn't want to leave. I felt like I wanted to stay and I wanted to stay
10 with my team. I wanted to stay working with the President and making what -- the
11 contribution that I could make, along with many others, to the administration and to the
13 Q Yeah. You mentioned that you had conversations with your own team
14 about possible resignation. In his informal interview, Mr. Philbin told us that he
15 considered resigning every day from approximately November 15th to the end of the
16 administration. Does that comport with your understanding regarding Mr. Philbin and
18 A That's correct. I'm sure that Mr. Philbin felt that way. I think the reality
19 was, as I felt is, I don't know that I considered it every day. I went through each day and
20 then I came back the next day. But I talked to Pat Philbin and others on a daily basis
22 Q Yeah. Mr. Philbin said that he considered resigning every day, quote,
23 "because the whole thing was descending into a clown car. There were interlopers
24 coming in and giving bad advice. There was no way to control and no way to prevent
25 bad advice from being given to the President. Things were being done that were not
215
2 A I agree wholeheartedly with what Pat said. I agree that he had a very big
3 role in preventing that. I'm grateful to him. I think the country should be grateful to
4 him. I think the President is and should be grateful to him in the role that he played.
5 And, yeah, I mean there were things that happened after that time. I remember
6 there was one thing in particular that jumps to mind where Mike Lindell, the pillow man,
7 was I think in the White House. He was going into the Oval Office.
8 And, again, I don't think this is something that the President wanted or maybe
9 even knew about until these things would happen in some instances. I think this was
10 probably one of them, because I think what happened was Robert O'Brien went down or
11 saw him or was around the Oval, and he basically told the President. And I think the
13 But Robert said, "Look, we need to -- these are things you should talk to the White
14 House counsel about." I think he was just -- he didn't -- I think he was just doing that as
15 a way of getting him out of the Oval, and then they brought him up to my office.
16 Q Yeah, yeah. Were there other things like that, Mr. Cipollone, that between
17 January 6th and the end of the administration you felt like you needed to bat back, push
20 Q Okay.
21 A You know, we were focused on doing the pardons, doing the transition.
22 People were starting to off-board at that time and there was a whole schedule that had
23 been put into place where people were off-boarding. So as days went by, we were
24 working with a smaller and smaller legal staff. And we were working very, very hard,
1 And so were there instances like that? I didn't end up talking for very long to
2 Mike Lindell. There was a piece of paper that he had. I recall one of things on there, at
5 conversation with him, I confronted him about that. I said, "I understand you're here to
6 have me fired." And he said, "Well," and he got a little flustered and said it was actually
7 a lawyer who wanted that. And I said, "What? Which lawyer?" And he forgot their
9 And so I don't know, he ended up speaking to one of my colleagues for a little bit,
10 but that was that. Things like that might happen on occasion. I don't know who was
11 involved in causing those things to happen. I didn't get the sense that the President, at
13 Ms. Cheney, I see you have turned your camera on. Go ahead.
15 Pat, so the -- Mr. Lindell was in the Oval Office? Is that what I understand?
16 Mr. Cipollone. I think this has all been publicly reported, is my understanding.
17 didn't see him in the Oval Office, I wasn't there, I was told by Robert that he was --
18 Robert O'Brien.
19 Mr. Cipollone. Robert O'Brien, that he was in or outside or seeking to get into
20 the Oval Office, is my understanding. And then Robert O'Brien did what I just said he
22 I couldn't -- Robert came into my office. I couldn't see him, Mike Lindell, at that
23 point. Then he went downstairs into the waiting area of the White House, the reception
24 area.
25 And then my assistant, Kate, went down. I said, "You know, you need to tell him
217
1 I'm not going to" -- I had other meetings I had to go to and I wasn't able to see him. So
3 But he got agitated with her in a way that I didn't appreciate. And when she
4 ultimately brought him up, I asked him to apologize to her, and then I talked to him for a
5 few minutes.
6 Ms. Cheney. Do you know who cleared him into the White House?
10 seen, Mr. Cipollone, about Jared Kushner talking about the prospect of you resigning.
11 Specifically he was asked, "Are you aware of instances where Pat Cipollone
12 threatened to resign?"
13 He said, "I kind of, like I said, my interest at that time was on trying to get as many
14 pardons done. And I know that, you know, he was always -- him and his team were
15 always saying, 'Oh, we're going resign. We're not going to be here if this happens, if that
18 Mr. Purpura. Actually,. I do, because he's not going to say it. That's
19 nonsense. Okay. I'll tell you as someone -- I'm not testifying here, but I'm just giving a
20 perspective as someone who worked for him 2 years in a very high stress, impactful
21 environment.
22 He behaved with a cool head, level thinking -- levelheaded thinking at all times.
23 And he didn't threaten things lightly, as he's already testified to. And he most certainly
24 did not whine about anything in the White House. He handled a very difficult job in very
1 Yeah.
2 Mr. Purpura. And it is unfair for someone to cast that about Pat.
4 you --
6 Yeah. Go ahead.
8 Please.
9 Ms. Cheney. I not only appreciate that perspective, but I share it and am grateful
10 for the role that Pat played and for the job that Pat did. And his service deserves to be
13 BY
14 Q Anything at all, Mr. Cipollone, that you want to say about that?
18 Q Yeah.
19 A I didn't really pay too much attention to that comment, you know. And my
20 general view of Jared is that he's a friend of mine. He's a very, very capable person.
21 He played a positive role in the White House. I worked closely with him on a lot of
23 I think, as I said, I think highly of lvanka. I think they were great to work with.
24 They're incredibly talented. I consider them friends. I don't really think he meant that
25 at the time. But, again, that's what I have to say about that.
219
1 Q Yeah. Over the course -- I don't want to belabor what you answered in
2 response to earlier questions, but did you consider resigning after that -- during or after
3 that December 18th meeting where there were discussions of Sidney Powell as special
4 counsel and the seizure of voting machines? Was that one of the triggering incidents
5 that --
6 A I mean -- look, again, just to make the point hopefully one last time.
7 Considering and vocalizing, you know, are two different things. So did I vocalize to
8 anybody where it would matter in terms of, like, okay this is -- there were probably, you
11 Q You have.
13 Q Okay.
16 Q Yeah.
17 A Okay. And that's part I think that, you know, he wanted my advice. And I
18 continued. And he made the decisions, particularly during the pardon process. Okay.
19 At the end of the day, and I can say this publicly, it's the President's decision on who to
20 pardon.
21 Q Yes.
22 A He has broad pardon power. And he ultimately chose not to exercise this
23 broad pardon power in all -- in many of these instances that we've discussed. And that's
24 his decision.
25 Q Yeah.
220
1 A And I stayed till the last day. And, you know, actually on the night before
2 the last day, I expressed my thanks to the President. And he expressed to me his thanks.
4 Q Yeah. I want to ask you a couple things about pardons. But just to recap,
5 I think you testified today that you considered resigning over the Jeff Clark appointment,
6 over the pressure placed upon the Vice President about January 6th, and over the
7 prospect of some pardons that you thought were unwise. Is that all? Am I accurately
8 characterizing --
11 I think some of the things you said just in that recitation weren't exactly the way I
12 said that, particularly the word "pressure" and things like this.
13 But I said what I said. I think you understand at this point. I didn't resign.
15 You know, I was involved in the transition. I reached out to any successor, Dana
16 Remus. I had conversations with her. I told her to come to the White House, don't
17 wait till noon, come and get situated in the office. She did that. We had another good
19 Q Yeah.
21 Q In our informal discussion, moving to pardons, you said that you were
22 working on pardons, you were focused on pardons and commutations of, you said,
23 regular people who had been harmed in some way by the justice system, that you felt
24 very good about what the administration was able to do in that area. But there were
25 other requests for pardons that were reported on in the news about which you had
221
1 strong opinions.
2 If you could just sort of summarize for us what were those pardons about which
3 you had strong opinions, negative opinions, that they should not be --
4 A I believe I've already summarized those for you. Let me say with respect to
5 the first thing, yes, I mean the President, again, one of his accomplishments, great
6 accomplishments, was pardons and commutations for people who deserved them, for
7 regular people who had been in prison for a long time, had sentences that did not make
8 sense in my view. I believe that criminal justice reform that happened was a very good
9 thing.
10 So I was -- the pardon process in many ways, including my work with Jared in that
11 process, was very positive by and large and for the most part, and the President was very
13 So there were some pardons that were discussed publicly. And I'm not even
14 suggesting how often they were actually discussed privately. I'm not going to get into
15 that. Okay.
16 But some of the things that were -- or how seriously they were really taken
17 internally. Okay. I think sometimes what you read in the newspapers in terms of the
18 seriousness of consideration may not reflect the reality of how seriously certain things
19 were taken.
20 In my view, as I said, some of the pardons that were discussed in the media were
21 by some people outside the White House as well. Pardons related to January 6th, no
23 General pardons of people. I mean, in terms of broad pardons for large groups
2 Okay.
4 Pat, during the attack itself, during the violence, was the President making calls to
5 people on the Hill to urge that they continue to delay the count.
6 Mr. Cipollone. I don't -- I don't know -- I don't know. I don't have a recollection
7 of that. There were a lot -- for example, I looked at the call log that you put -- that-
8 showed me. I wasn't aware of some of those calls, a lot of those calls that were
10 Ms. Cheney. And are you aware whether or not during the violence the
11 President was in contact with Rudy Giuliani, who was in the war room at the Willard?
12 Mr. Cipollone. I didn't have a lot of insight into a war room at the Willard or any
13 of that. I've seen on the call log, I believe there is a call with Rudy Giuliani, but I'm not
14 the person to talk about what was happening over at the war room. And a lot of that
15 stuff I was not aware of or had any insight into as a general matter at the time.
16 Ms. Cheney. And beyond the meeting on the 18th, are you aware of other
18 Mr. Cipollone. I don't. If you have one in particular that you're asking about.
20 Ms. Cheney. Did you express concerns about the activities of Mike Flynn in
23 Flynn or what he was doing with respect to January 6th. I expect -- I expressed general
24 concern with Mike Flynn and some of the things he was saying, particularly at that
1 So, yes, I expressed my concern about ideas being promoted at that meeting and
5 And were you aware of discussions between the President and Roger Stone?
6 Mr. Cipollone. No, not that I can recall. I remember there were issues
7 surrounding pardons that Roger Stone had some involvement in. And I've subsequently
8 read in newspaper articles about that stuff. But I didn't really think about, you know,
9 the President communicating with Roger Stone or I wasn't really aware of that. Could it
10 have happened? Maybe it did. But the President talks to a lot of people, or did, you
13 Mr. Cipollone. Not recently, no. But I did have communications and
14 conversations with the President since that time, particularly in the context of Mike and I
15 and Pat were designated as -- and others -- were designated on dealing with requests to
17 But with respect to any -- I have not. Mike, obviously, my counsel, has had
19 privilege. I had a communication with the President that's reflected in the email that we
23 But basically what happened was when the committee was asking me to appear I
24 have -- again, as I said, the privilege is not mine. I would have to get the direction of the
1 And I think you were dealing, we were dealing with was it Justin Clark at the time
2 and Alex Cannon. And then there was --you were talking with Mike and we worked out
3 an agreement as to what I could say. Then I got approval of that from the President.
4 It first came from Justin Clark, but then I wanted to get on a call with the President
5 and with Mike and Pat Philbin and with his attorneys and just to raise these issues and
6 make sure that I was hearing it directly and then would later be reflected in a writing of
8 The privilege, as I said, lawyer privilege doesn't belong to me. And I wanted to
9 make sure that there was a clear record and understanding of what I was authorized to
11 Ms. Cheney. And so in -- and I appreciate that. In the context of any of those
12 discussions, has the President talked to you about the substance of your testimony?
16 Ms. Cheney. And has the President's lawyers talked to your counsel about the
20 And has anybody else from Trump world reached out to you, Pat? And I know I
21 mentioned yesterday that we were going to ask you about this and just to remind you
22 that the committee's got evidence of outreach of concern that's happened in other
23 circumstances.
24 Mr. Cipollone. Can I answer -- here's how I would answer that question. I'm
25 here testifying truthfully. Okay. I don't feel personally as if anybody has attempted in
225
3 Ms. Cheney. And I have no question about that. I appreciate that. And I
4 suppose the question is not whether you have been susceptible to any pressure but
6 Mr. Cipollone. I don't feel like any pressure has been exerted. Now, after it
7 became public that, you know, you wanted -- the committee wanted to hear more from
8 me, obviously it became a big public issue. And then I started getting emails from
9 people I don't know and all sorts of stuff along those lines.
10 But none of that -- did they say what I should do and did people give me advice?
11 Yeah. But, no, I don't feel like anything that rises to the level of what you're talking
14 Mr. Cipollone. Well, what I was just talking about was just people, strangers that
15 I don't know emailing me and sending me multiple emails about what I should do.
16 Ms. Cheney. What about people that you know contacting you from within
17 Trump world.
19 Again, I don't want to go through and -- there are people who I've talked to, my lawyers
21 But, no, I don't -- contacted me directly? I don't -- I'm trying to think. Not in
23 Ms. Cheney. How about at all? I'm asking you if anybody from The Trump
1 contacted Mike and we've discussed issues related to privilege and Mike had those
2 communications. And with respect to other people contacting parties like, you know,
3 who I know? Again, I don't think with respect to the substance of my testimony, that's
5 Ms. Cheney. And so, what has the contact been, beyond the privilege
6 discussions?
7 Mr. Cipollone. With me? There hasn't been a lot of direct contact about that
8 stuff. I mean, I think -- and, again, some of these people are my friends and I don't think
9 they were contacting me. I think Eric Herschmann probably contacted Mike or Jay or
10 something.
11 But other than that, you know, again, so much has happened in my life in the past
12 couple weeks in dealing with this. And all I can say is I think I've answered your
13 question. I'm not going to delineate all the contacts. I don't feel like I've been
17 Mr. Cipollone. I heard from Mark Meadows before all this. He sent me -- he
18 called and left a voicemail on my phone related to overturning Roe v. Wade. And so I
20 I listened to the message. I got Kate Todd on the phone and we called Mark
21 back. And it was just a minute or two. I don't remember how long the phone call, but
23 Ms. Cheney. But you didn't discuss with him your appearance in front of the
24 committee?
2 Mr. Cipollone. He was happy -- he was happy about the results in the Supreme
3 Court and that's what he was calling to express an opinion about with me.
5 Mr. Cipollone. Did I talk to George? No, not directly. I think George --
6 Mr. Purpura. I had a conversation with Mr. Terwilliger that was based solely on
8 Ms. Cheney. And what was Mr. Terwilliger's role with respect to privilege lines?
9 Mr. Purpura. Well, I think he asked -- I think they have a pending lawsuit. And
11 Ms. Cheney. Did you consult with him about where it should be drawn in
15 Mr. Purpura. Not in relation to this. I will say that Greg Jacobs' counsel
16 contacted me, again about privilege lines and where they go. And I had talked with him
17 previously.
18 Ms. Cheney. And what about Alex Cannon and Justin Clark?
20 Mr. Cipollone. I think in the context is my recollection of trying to get, you know,
23 Mr. Cipollone. We tried to reach out to them and they told you that somebody
25 Ms. Cheney. And after that, that individual's the person you spoke to?
228
4 Mr. Cipollone. Well, Pam Bondi is a friend of mine. Someone on my staff was
5 married recently in Ireland and I went to the wedding with my wife and Pam was there.
6 You know, Pam's a friend. I did not -- I haven't spoken directly with Pam Bondi and
9 Mr. Cipollone. No, I haven't talked to Matt Schlapp in a long time or Mercedes.
10 They are friends of mine. Mercedes worked -- Mercy worked in the White House.
11 Try and remember. I think I saw Matt last time at a Notre Dame event here in
12 Washington at a dinner, I saw him there. I saw Representative Kinzinger speak at that
17 allow you to share information with other counsel within the privilege?
21 assistance to pay the fees of your very able and experienced counsel?
23 [Laughter.]
1 Mr. Cipollone. That remains to be seen. Mike has been a great friend to me
2 and is helping.
3 BY
6 A For me?
9 Q Yeah. To put a finer point on Ms. Cheney's questions, it sounds like you
10 said no one has attempted to influence your testimony before the select committee in
12 A Again, without going over everything I said or characterizing it, in my view --1
13 don't know what's in somebody else's mind. I didn't have that sense. A lot of people
14 have attempted to tell me I should or shouldn't do, you know, but that's just the public
15 stuff.
16 Q Yeah. I understand. I'm not looking for the public stuff, I'm looking for
18 A Pressure?
19 Q -- influence your testimony in any way, tell you what you should or shouldn't
22 Q All right.
23 A I, you know, obviously thought through myself and I consult with advisers
24 and some of my lawyers and other people who I know whose opinion about what I should
25 do and kind of the issues that are at work in terms of me and some of my beliefs about
230
2 Q Yeah.
4 Q Let me just go back to the pardons issue and just a couple of other things.
7 A I think -- well, not with respect to discussions -- I'm not going to talk about
9 I remember that issue came up at some point. And I thought I heard from
11 Q Okay.
12 A But I don't -- again, I wasn't tracking exactly who was talking to who about a
14 Q You have testified that I think there were some sort of pardons that made
15 sense, pardons of -- I think you used the term "regular people" versus pardons that did
17 Would a possible pardon of Rudy Giuliani be on the latter side, a pardon that
19 A Again, I don't -- without going into -- I don't think this was -- it didn't happen,
21 Q Right.
22 A I told you what I thought I heard I think thirdhand from somebody that that
23 was Rudy's position, but I don't know. And I don't remember having any significant
24 consideration of such a thing through the formal -- I mean, we had a process, okay, where
25 people would submit petitions. Jared's team was working with our team. We were
231
1 working with DOJ pardon counsel to the extent that we needed. And we were working
2 with someone in Jeff Rosen's office. And there was a list and submissions, and I don't
5 A Again, I don't -- the only one that immediately comes to mind, because I
6 heard about it, was I think Pat and Eric had a conversation with Congressman Gaetz, I
8 Did I hear about others? That wasn't something that I thought was a good idea,
9 not something that I viewed as being actively considered in any serious way.
12 A I don't. Again, if you have a specific question, please. And, again, you
13 know I respect you. I'm getting to the point in the day where --
14 Q I know.
16 question about, I'll try. As I sit here, I'm not recalling. As a general matter I've said
19 A Now, there were some, I believe, former Members of Congress that had
20 been involved in being charged or something, but that's not what you're talking about.
21 Q No. I think you testified that you didn't think it made sense for the
22 President to pardon himself or his family members. That would have been a bad idea.
23 Is that right?
24 A That's my view and I -- and the President didn't do that. That was also the
1 You know, you have to be a little bit careful, because, you know, I've obviously -- I
3 Q I know.
4 A But when you say people and people's pardon -- consideration of people,
5 you just said family members and things like this. I mean, just because something is out
6 in the paper or people are talking about it in the media or whatever, that doesn't mean
7 that people -- certain people -- and I'm not going to go point by point -- wanted pardons
8 or were receiving pardons. I think you just need to be -- not you, but everyone needs to
10 Q I agree completely, Mr. Cipollone. And that's why I'm asking you whether
11 or not you remember discussions about certain pardons, not things that were reported,
13 A Again, on that one, I remember that that, you know, sort of like not just but
14 kind of more broadly. But those were discussed and the President ultimately, you know,
16 Q Yeah.
19 I just wanted to ask about Eric Herschmann has told the committee, as have two
20 other witnesses, that Mr. Gaetz -- I think you mentioned that Mr. Gaetz was seeking a
21 pardon, potentially Mr. Biggs as well. I wonder if you had discussions with Mr.
23 Mr. Cipollone. I'm sure I did. I know about -- definitely about Mr. Gaetz.
24 think he wanted to talk to them. I did not get on that phone call. And I have no reason
25 to dispute what Mr. Herschmann said about that or about anybody else who he says.
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1 He was involved in the pardon process. He was working with us in the pardon
2 process. He wasn't -- Eric wasn't technically in the White House Counsel's Office. He
3 was an adviser to the President, but he wasn't formerly part of the White House Counsel's
4 Office.
5 And with respect to Eric, I just remembered in terms of communications with him,
6 not related to your question, but just to put it out there, a while back before this
7 happened he invited me and some other people to a dinner at his house in New Jersey for
8 August and I called him and said, yeah, I would try my best to make it.
11 interviewed, as you know, Secretary Scalia and he had some recollection of a discussion
12 with you, Mr. Cipollone, on December the -- oh, sorry, on January 14th, when he went to
14 And he said that during the conversation he conveyed to you, Secretary Scalia
15 conveyed to you his understanding of President Trump was that we was not going to
17 You replied that you too believed that that was not the President's current
18 intention and that while it could change at the moment, you were hopeful that that's
20 Do you recall that conversation with Secretary Scalia about the prospect of these
21 family or widespread --
22 A Now that you say it, yeah, I do recall that, and I think that accurately reflects
23 the conversation. I didn't believe that the President was going to do that. And that's
24 because he was going make the decision not to do it. Again, ultimately his decision.
1 A n y t h i n g - from you?
-
3
6 Did you at the time leading up to January 6th or after, did you ever have occasion
7 to advise other White House staff that they shouldn't engage with the President about
8 any particular topics out of concern for their own legal liability?
10 January 6th? I don't know. But there were times where I, you know, there were times
11 where, you know, there were younger people around in sort of -- in terms of the staff.
12 And could I have said, hey, you know, don't go in there or something like that? Maybe.
14 - And I'm talking about specific issues that you thought would put
17 - Okay.
20 Well, Ms. Cheney, I see you've come off once again. Anything else that you --
22 Yeah.
23 Ms. Cheney. I just wanted to ask about there was another speech the President
24 gave on January 13th which was the day that he was impeached. And I wonder if you
25 had any discussions, Pat, with anybody on the Hill about that speech or the arrangements
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3 people on the Hill over this time period and generally. I don't recall conversations about
5 I was not going -- I was not going to be -- I was obviously counsel in the first
7 And so, did I have a conversation or put somebody in contact or talk to people
8 about, you know, our experiences and procedural issues? I'm sure I did. But I was
11 Mr. Cipollone. I mean, for a lawyer, one impeachment is probably enough. But
12 also it was not -- it was -- look, my view was you know my views that I've expressed here
13 and I didn't think I was the right person to be representing the President in the second
15 Ms. Cheney. Thank you, Pat. And do you know why the President decided to
17 Mr. Cipollone. I'm even trying to remember -- which -- can you give me a clue as
19 Ms. Cheney. It was a speech essentially right in the aftermath of the vote to
20 impeach in the House. And he gave a speech about that and about what had happened
21 on January 6th.
22 Mr. Cipollone. Again, I, you know, I probably knew at the time. I probably, you
23 know -- look, I was involved obviously in advising the President and giving
24 my -- continuing to give my frank advice on these types of things. But I don't remember
25 this speech in particular. It sounds like it was the one right -- it was after the vote of
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3 Mr. Cipollone. Yeah, I'm -- I wouldn't doubt that we were involved in at least
4 looking at that, but I don't have a specific recollection. If I got the speech and I looked at
8 Mr. Raskin, if you have something, I see you also came off of mute.
10 And, Mr. Cipollone, I'm sorry that you weren't at the second impeachment, I think
12 But I wanted to just ask you about one word that you used --
15 You called this a national tragedy, which in some sense it certainly was. But
16 would you also call the events of January 6th a political crime?
17 Mr. Cipollone. I'm not -- again, I'm not here to choose those or assent to those
21 Mr. Raskin. Because you used that word and it just -- it caught my attention.
22 I'm wondering, well, what kind of tragedy you think it was. I mean, was it like a natural
23 tragedy or was it tragedy in the sense that it flowed from one person's tragic flaws?
24 Mr. Cipollone. Again, I'm not here to answer those types of questions in my
25 view. I appreciate why you're asking them. I understand that. But particularly at this
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1 point in the day, Representative Raskin, I think it would be wise of me not to engage in
3 Mr. Raskin. Fair enough. I bid you farewell. And I thank you for your focus
4 today.
s I yield back.
7 All right. If not, then Mr. Cipollone I just want to echo the thanks. We
8 appreciate it. We could not do this work without people like you who were engaged in
9 the events that are the focus of the select committee's work coming forward.
10 And we appreciate your cooperation back in April through today. Very much
11 appreciate it. Thank you for your willingness to come and answer questions for
14 I think it has.
17 Mr. Cipollone. Thank you, and thank you again for your
1 Certificate of Deponent/Interviewee
4 I have read the foregoing _ _ pages, which contain the correct transcript of the
10 Witness Name
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14 Date
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