Advanced Drafting
Advanced Drafting
INDICAN UNION
INDICAN SHISHLAMIC
UNION SHISHLAMICLLEAGUE
EAGUEL EADER SSIYARAM
LEADER IYARAM U THE PERSON/PE RSONS
V.
UPON SUBMISSIONS TO THE HON’BLE CHIEF JUSTICE AND HIS COMPANIONN JUSTICES OF THE
SUPREME COURT OF INDICA.
TABLE OF CONTENT
Table of contents obviously lists the contents in your memorial.
ISSUE 1: WHETHER THE CITIZENS HIP ACT IS CONSTITUTIONALLY VALID OR NOT? ...................... 14
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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
Table of abbreviations lists all the abbreviations used throughout your memorial
including in your footnotes. For example, para stands for paragraph, ed. stands
for editor, so on and so forth.
Anr. ANOTHER
Art. ARTICLE
Bom BOMBAY
Del DELHI
Ors. OTHERS
S. SECTION
SC SUPREME COURT
V VERSUS
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INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
Index of authorities is like the bibliography where you list all the cases you cited, the books, the reports, the
statutes you’ve used and any other material that you have used to prepare your memorial.
I. CASES
1. AJAY HASIA V. KHALID MUJIB, AIR 1981 SC 487
2. AMIT SAHNI V. COMMISSIONER OF POLICE AND ORS W.P.(C) 429/2020
3. ANANTA KATHOD PAWAR V STATE OF MAHARASHTRA (1997) 11SCC 564
4. ANUJ GARG V. HOTEL ASSOCIATION OF INDIA (2008) 3 SCC 1
5. ANURADHA BHASIN V. UNION OF INDIA FREE 1031 OF 2019
6. ARUNA ROY AND OTHERS VS UNION OF INDIA 98 OF 2002
7. ASHA RANJAN VS. STATE OF BIHAR & ORS 2017 (4) SCC 397
8. ASHOK KUMAR GUPTA V. STATE OF U.P, (1997) 5 SCC 201;
9. ASHOKA KUMAR THAKUR V. UNION OF INDIA 2008) 6 SCC 1
10. ASHUTOSH GUPTA V. STATE OF RAJASTHAN, (2002) 4 SCC 34
11. BABULAL PARATE V. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA 1961 AIR 884, 1961 SCR (3) 423
12. BACHANSINGH V. STATE OF PUNJAB, AIR 1982 SC 1336;
13. BAL PATIL AND ANR. V. UNION OF INDIA 4730 OF 1999
14. BASHESHAR NATH V. COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX, RAJASTHAN, [1959] SUPP 1 SCR 528
15. BENNET COLEMEN CO V. U.O.I (1972)2 SCC 788: AIR 1973 SC 106
16. BHANWAR SINGH V. STATE OF M.P (2008) 16 SCC 657
17. BISHAMBHAR DAYAL CHANDRA MOHAN V. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH, (1982) 1 SCC 39
18. BUDHAN CHOUDHARY V STATE OF BIHAR AIR 1955 SC 191
19. CHINTAMANRAO V. STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH, AIR 1951 SC 118
20. CHIRANJIT LAL CHOUDHARY V UNION OF INDIA 1951 AIR 41, 1950 SCR 869
21. DEEPAK SIBAL & ORS VS PUNJAB UNIVERSITY AND ANR 1989 AIR 903, 1989 SCR (1) 689
22. DISTRICT REGISTRAR AND COLLECTOR V. CANARA BANK, AIR 2005 SC 186
23. DR. M. ISMAIL FARUQUI MOHD V UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS AIR 1995 SC 605
24. DR.SUBRAMANIAN SWAMY V. CBI OI) AND ANR 2014 8 SCC 682
25. DS NAKARA & OTHERS V UNION OF INDIA 1983 AIR 130, 1983 SCR (2) 165
26. EP ROYAPPA V. STATE OF TAMIL NADU, AIR 1974 SC 555;
27. EXPRESS NEWSPAPER P. LTD. V. UNION OF INDIA, AIR 1958 SC 578;
28. FAHEEMA SHIRIN.R.K V. STATE OF KERALA 19716/2019-L
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29. FEDCO (P) LTD. BILGRAMI,S.N., AIR 1960 SC 415
30. FEDERATION OF ALL INDIA CUSTOMS AND CENTRAL EXCISE STENOGRAPHERS V. UNION OF
INDIA, AIR 1988 SC 1291;
31. GANGA RAM MOOLCHANDANI VS STATE OF RAJASTHAN AND ORS 6469 OF 1998
32. GLASS CHATONS IMPORTERS AND USERS ASSOCIATION V. UNION OF INDIA, AIR 1961 SC
1514.
33. GNANAPRAKASAM V. GOVERNM ENT OF TAMIL NADU, W.P.NO.18373 OF 2008
34. GOLKNATH V STATE OF PUNJAB AIR 1967 SC 1643: (1967) 2SCR 726
35. HIMAT LAL K. SHAH VS. COMMISSIONER OF POLICE AHMEDABAD AND ANOTHER REPORTED
48. KERALA BAR HOTELS ASSOCIATION V. STATE OF KERALA (2015) 16 SCC 421
49. KESHAVA NANDA BHARATHI V. STATE OF KERALA (1973) 4 SCC 225: AIR 1973 SC 146
50. KHAJAH NOORUL HOOSEIN V C FABRE TONNER E (1875) 24 WR (CR) 26
51. KULDEEP NAYAR V. UNION OF INDIA (2006) 7 SCC 1, 67 AND
52. LACHHMAN DAS VS STATE OF PUNJAB AND OTHERS 1963 AIR 222, 1963 SCR (2) 353
53. MAHBOOB SHAH V. EMPEROR, AIR 1945 PC 118
54. MANEKA GANDHI V. UNION OF INDIA AIR 1978 SC 597;
55. MARIADASAN AND ORS V. STATE OF TAMIL NADU AIR 1980 (SC) 573
56. MAZDOOR KISAN SHAKTI SANGHATAN VS UNION OF INDIA 1153 OF 2017
57. MINERVA MILLS LTD. VS. UNION OF INDIA, AIR 1980 SC 1789
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58. MINISTRY OF INFORMATION & BROADCASTING GOVERNMENT OF INDIA V. CRICKET
ASSOCIATION OF BENGAL, (1995) 2 SCC
59. MODERN DENTAL COLLEGE & RESEARCH CENTRE V. STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH ,
(2016) 7 SCC 353 &
60. MOHAMMED FARUK V. STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH (1969) 1 SCC 85,
61. MOHAN KUMAR SINGHANIA V. UNION OF INDIA, AIR 1992 SC 1;
62. MOHANLAL CHHAGANLAL MITHAIWALA VS VIPANCHANDRA R. GANDHI AND ANR AIR 1962
GUJ 44, (1961) GLR 735
63. MOHD. ARIF @ ASHFAQ V. THE REG. SUPREME COURT OF INDIA (2014) 9 SCC 737
64. MOHD.HANIF QUARESHI V. STATE OF BIHAR , AIR 1958 SC 731
65. MOREY V. DOUD, (1956) 118 U.S. 356
66. MOTOR GENERAL TRADERS V. STATE OF AP, (1984)1 SCC 222, 229: AIR1984 SC 121,
67. MUNICIPAL CORPORATION V. JAN. MD. USMANBHAI, AIR 1986 SC 1205
68. NAGPUR IMPROVEMENT TRUST AND VS VITHAL RAO AND OTHERS 1973 AIR 689, 1973 SCR
(3) 39
69. NARENDRA KUMAR V. UNION OF INDIA, AIR 1960 SC 430
70. NATURAL RESOURCE ALLOCATION, RE SPECIAL REFERENCE NUMBER 1 OF 2012, (2012) 10
SCC 1 (77)
71. NAVTEJ SINGH JOHAR V UNION OF INDIA (2018)10 SCC 1
72. OM KUMAR V. UNION OF INDIA, (2001) 2 SCC 386,
73. P.P ENTERPRISES V. UOI, (1982) 2 SCC 33
74. PARADISE PRINTERS V. UNION TERRITORY, CHANDIGARH, AIR 1985 SC 354;
75. PRABHAT VERMA V. STATE OF YOU U.P, (1984)4 SCC 251: AIR 1985 SC 167,
76. PUCL V. UOI, (2003) 4 SCC 399
77. PURAN V. STATE OF RAJASTHAN AIR 1976 (SC) 912
78. R.C. COOPER V. UNION OF INDIA, AIR 1970 SC 564
79. RAJ PAL SHARMA V. STATE OF HARYANA, 1985 SUPP. SCC 72, 75: AIR 1985 SC 1263.
80. RAJ PAL SHARMA V. STATE OF HARYANA, AIR 1985 SC 1263;
81. RAMACHANDRAN V. STATE OF KERALA (AIR 2011 SC 3581)
82. RAMANA DAYARAM SHETTY V. INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AUTHORITY OF INDIA AIR 1979
SC 1628
83. RAMDHANDAS V. STATE OF PUNJAB, AIR 1961 SC 1559
84. RAMESHWAR PRASAD AND ORS VS. UNION OF INDIA (2006) 2 SCC 1)
85. RATNAPOORVA DEVI V. STATE OF ORISSA, AIR 1964 SC 1195
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86. RE-RAMLILA MAIDAN INCIDENT DT. V. HOME SECRETARY AND ORS. (2012) 5 SCC 1.
87. S.R. BOMMAI VS UNION OF INDIA 1994 AIR 1918, 1994 SCC (3) 1
88. SAKHAWANT ALI V. STATE OF ORISSA, AIR 1955 SC 166, 169;
89. SANTOSH KUMAR AND OTHERS V. SECRETARY, MINISTRY OF HUMAN RESOURCES
DEVELOPM ENT AND ANOTHER (1994) 6 SCC 579
90. SAURABH CHAUDRI V. UNION OF INDIA (2003) 11 SCC 146
91. SHAYARA BANO V UNION OF INDIA (2017)9 SCC 1)
92. ST. STEPHENS COLLEGE V. UNIVERSITY OF DELHI, (1992) 1SCC 588: AIR 1992 SC 1630,
1662,
93. STATE OF BIHAR V. KAMLA KANT MISRA, (1969) 3 SCC 337
94. STATE OF BOMBAY V. ANWAR ALI SARKAR, AIR 1952 SC 75;
95. STATE OF BOMBAY V. S.N. BALSARA, AIR 1951 SC 318;
96. STATE OF KARNATAKA V. ASSOCIATED MANAGEMENT OF (GOVT. RECOGNIZED – UNAIDED –
ENGLISH MEDIUM) PRIMARY AND SECONDARY SCHOOLS, (2014) 9 SCC 485
97. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA & ANR VS INDIAN HOTEL & RETAURANTS ASSN 2705 OF 2006
98. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA V. HIMMATBHAI NARBHERAM RAO, AIR 1970 SC 1157
99. STATE OF MYSORE V. P. NARASINGA RAO, AIR 1968 SC 349;
100. STATE OF U.P. V. DR. DINA NATH SHUKLA, (1997) 9 SCC 662
101. STATE OF U.P. V. JODHA SINGH AIR 1989 (SC) 1829
102. STATE OF VICTORIA V THE COMMONWEALTH, 45 ALJ 251
103. STATE OF WEST BENGAL V. ANWAR ALI SARKAR, AIR 1952 SC 75:1952 SCR 284
104. STYLE (DRESS LAND) V. UNION TERRITORY, CHANDIGARH, (1999) 7 SCC 89.
105. SUBHASH CHANDRA V. DELHI SUBORDINATE SERVICES SELECTION BOARD (2009) 15 SCC 448.
106. SUNEEL JATLEY ETC V. STATE OF HARYHANA 1984 AIR 1534, 1985 SCR (1) 272
107. THE GOVERNM ENT OF TAMIL NADU V P.AYYAKANNU
108. THE STATE OF GUJARAT AND ANOTHER V. SHRI AMBICA MILLS 1974 AIR 1300, 1974 SCR (3)
760.
109. TRUAX V. CORRIGAN, (1921) 257 U.S. 312
110. UNION OF INDIA V. INDIAN CHARGE CHROME, (1999) 7 SCC 314;
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II. STATUTES
1. INDICAN CONSTITUTION, 1949
2. THE CITIZENSHIP ACT, 1955.
3. THE FOREIGNER’S ACT 1946.
4. INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY ACT, 2000
5. INDIAN TELEGRAPH ACT, 1885
6. THE PASSPORTS ACT, 1920
7. A.B. KAFALTIYA, INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES 214 (2008)
8. CITIZENSHIP ACT IN 1955
9. CITIZENSHIP (AMENDMENT) ACT, 2003
10. CITIZENSHIP (AMENDMENT) ACT, 2015
11. THE INDICAN PENAL CODE, 1860
12. THE CONSTITUTION OF SRI LANKA, 1978.
13. THE CONSTITUTION OF PAKISTAN, 1973.
14. THE CONSTITUTION OF AFGHANISTAN, 2004.
15. THE CONSTITUTION OF BANGLADESH, 1972.
III. INTERNATIONAL CONVENTIONS AND LEGISLATIONS
1. U.N. HUMAN RIGHTS COMMITTEE, GENERAL COMMENT NO 35, ARTICLE 9 (LIBERTY AND
SECURITY OF PERSON) (DEC. 16, 2014) UN DOC. CCPR/C/GC/35
2. HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL 30TH JUNE 2016 32/5
3. INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS, DECEMBER 19, 1966, 999
U.N.T.S 171
4. UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS, DECEMBER 10, 1948, 217 A (III).
5. OHCHR | FACT SHEET 26, OHCHR.ORG (2020),
HTTPS://WWW.OHCHR.ORG/EN /PUBLICATIONSRESOURCES/PAGES/FACTSHEETS.ASPX (LAST
VISITED FEB27, 2020).
6. CONCLUSIONS ADOPTED BY THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE ON THE INTERNATIONAL
2. LEXISNEXIS.COM
3. SSCONLINE.COM
5. BAREACTLIVES.COM
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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Statement of jurisdiction is a proclamation of the jurisdiction of the court where the petitioners have filed the
case. It is important that this is included and is correct for maintainability of the case filed
THE JURISDICTION OF THIS HONOURABLE COURT IS INVOKED UNDER ‘ARTICLE 32’ OF THE
CONSTITUTION ISSUING THE WRIT OF ‘MANDAMUS’ TO FILE PUBLIC INTEREST LITIGATION
UNDER JUDICIAL ACTIVISM CONCERNING PUBLIC AT LARGE1
1
Remedies for enforcement of rights conferred by this Part
(1) The right to move the Supreme Court by appropriate proceedings for the enforcement of the rights conferred
by this Part is guaranteed
(2) The Supreme Court shall have power to issue directions or orders or writs, including writs in the nature of
habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari, whichever may be appropriate, for the
enforcement of any of the rights conferred by this Part
(3) Without prejudice to the powers conferred on the Supreme Court by clause ( 1 ) and ( 2 ), Parliament may by
law empower any other court to exercise within the local limits of its jurisdiction all or any of the powers
exercisable by the Supreme Court under clause ( 2 )
(4) The right guaranteed by this article shall not be suspended except as otherwise provided for by this
Constitution
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
Statement of facts are the facts of the proposition but include those which are important for and relevant to
your case. The facts of the proposition you wish to include will change with whether you are a plaintiff or a
defendant
~FACTUAL BACKGROUND~
1. Indica being the largest democracy in the world has the lengthiest written Constitution. The Preamble
to the Constitution of Indica declares Indica as a Sovereign Socialist Secular Democratic Republic.
In a democracy, the right and duties of the citizen are broadly specified. The State owes certain
responsibilities towards all its citizens. Indica boasts of having the second largest population of the
world.
2. The term Secular was added to the Preamble of the Constitution as part of the basic structure vide
the 42nd amendment to the Indican Constitution in 1973. As per one of the most landmark case of
Indica, decided by the largest bench of 13 judges, it was made a principle that the ‘Basic Structure to
the Constitution of Indica’, cannot be amended to remove any word whatsoever. However, additions
can be made to them if the situation demands. The preamble was held to be a part of the basic
structure vide this case and owing to the fact that Indica is Home to multiple religious denominations, the
idea of Secularism found its place in the Constitution.
3. Indica has a neighboring nation, Zakistan, which is not a secular nation, but an Shislamik Republic.
The term secular means that Indica does not favor any specific religion, but rather gives equal
status and respect to all religions. Sindhuism being the religion that is followed by majority of Indicans,
i.e. 79.8%, followed by Shislam (14.23%) and other religions including Chrismanity and Siddhism is
being 2.3 and 1.72 percent, respectively.
~PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND~
4. The worst affected state of Indica, i.e. Nassam was alleged to have, as many as 50% of its population,
being such immigrants. Owing to this reason, the Central and State government in collaboration, launched
the National Register of Citizens for Nassam, which contained entries of the people being original
inhabitants of the state and as the government claims, excluded all the illegal immigrants.
5. Meanwhile, to tackle the issue of illegal immigrants at National Level, the Central Government came
up with a bill called Citizenship Amendment Bill, which was alleged to have some provisions being
grossly against secularism, and being discriminatory against Shislamians.
6. The controversial provision that spiked this disruption was a Proviso being added to Section 2
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of the Citizenship Amendment Act 1955 by the Citizenship Amendment Bill 2019.
~CURRENT SCENARIO~
7. This led to widespread protests around the Nation. Amidst the protests, the bill even received the
President’s assent and converted into a full-fledged Act on 12th October, 2019. The constitutional
validity of the Citizenship Amendment Act was challenged into various High Courts and Supreme
Court, by the Shislamians, claiming that the bill arbitrarily discriminates against Shislamians and the
government having a long term agenda of combining it with PAN NRC, and declaring Shislamians
as illegal immigrants, putting them either in Detention Camps or sending them to Major Shislamik
Countries. On the other hand, the Central Government denied any such claim and argued that the
Act is constitutionally valid and in no way challenges the Fundamental Rights of any Religious
Community and also the citizenship status of the community. Nor does the bill has any agenda to
sweep off the Shislamians as Indica being a secular country gives equal respect to all religions.
Even the Home Minister of Indica claimed that Shislamians are in no way the religiously persecuted
minorities and nor does the bill has any agenda to sweep them off.
8. The protests soon turned violent and led to mass bloodshed between the two religious groups. It majorly
involved students from certain universities and political groups like PMI and KNU, leading to large
scale loss of lives. In response to the legislation, several sit off protests were organized by the member
of Shislamik community. This was morally supported by the opposition members through their
statements and visit.
9. One such site of protest being Rahim Baugh witnessed a sit in protest. However, soon after a few
days a complaint of road blockage and Public Nuisance to started finding their place in media
reports. The ruling party started widespread discouragement towards the protest, highlighting major
public inconvenience and affixing their stand of not standing the Act back. Various state governments
took cognizance of the situation asking the protestors to hault their actions. However, continuous denial
and an explicit incident of making a call through loudspeaker from a local mosque, which called the
members of the Shislamik community to continue their fight for justice, invited prompt action by the
government. Some of the state governments in turn ordered an Internet ban in various cities.
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~ ISSUE I ~
~ ISSUE II ~
~ ISSUE III ~
It is humbly submitted that even though no two human beings are similar in all respects, there are similar
in one respect, namely they all are human beings. Therefore, as human beings they require the same
treatment, i.e. they must all be treated as human beings. Any classification or absence of it that ignores
this aspect, violates equality and cannot be justified under article 14
~ ISSUE IV ~
WHETHER THE INTERNET BAN HAS VIOLATED ANY FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS TO THE
INDICAN CONSTITUTION OR NOT?
It is humbly submitted before this Hon’ble Court that, arbitrary and unreasonable Internet shutdowns
by the government is a violation of the fundamental rights to information, education and free speech
protected by the Constitution. Access to Internet is merged with manifold fundamental rights like
education, information, communication, free speech and expression, health among others.
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WRITTEN PLEADINGS
Arguments advanced are detailed explanations of each of your issue raised⎯ explaining and supporting your
issue with extensive cases, reports, statutes, facts, etc. The more legal cases you use, the stronger will be
your argument.
This is the heart and soul of the memorial. Every part of the argument must be supported by legal authority.
Arguments should be well-organized and convincing. Each point the team wants the court to consider in
deciding the case must be described, the reasons explained with appropriate references to research materials
used, and text citations should be inserted as frequently as needed. Arguments should address legal precedent
and policy issues. Each part of the argument first addresses the issues supporting one’s own case.
Then, address contentions anticipated to be brought up by the opposing party. The argument should be written
in forceful, active, positive language. It is best to avoid the passive tense. Headings and subheadings are used
to help in clearly organizing the arguments. The same structure of headings and subheadings should be
summarized in the Table of Contents. The idea is to do everything in terms of both form and substance to help
the court understand the reasonableness and logic of the argument, and thus decide in one’s favor.
1. It is most respectfully submitted that the Preamble delineates the contours in accordance with which
our Constitutional machinery has to function.2 It enlists the goals which our Constitution intends
to achieve. This fact can be appreciated only by looking into the history of the framing of our
Preamble.3 Not only was the Constitution framed in light of the Preamble but the Preamble was
finally adjusted so as to bring it in conformity with the Constitution.
2. Citizenship Amendment Act seeks to amend the definition of ‘il egal migrant’ provided in section
2(1) (b) of the Act by means of a provision. It creates an exception in favor of Categories4 of
Hindus, Sikhs, Buddhists, Jain, Parsis and Christians from Afghanistan, Bangladesh and Pakistan,
thereby making them eligible for applying for Indian citizenship. 5 The Act further seeks to expedite
the naturalization of the said class of persons by relaxing the qualification for the same.6 The
Amendment Act undermines the very basis of equality in that it increases the gap of opportunity
between the six religious persecution groups and the other persecution groups of the country. By
providing citizenship to certain religious persecution communities while doing away with the twin
requirements7 of proving efficiency and inadequacy, the Act aims to give excessive benefit without
any rational basis, which is against the fundamental tenets of democracy and equality as foreseen
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and engraved in the Preamble of the Constitution.
3. It is most respectfully submitted that the CAA shows that it makes three separate classifications.
First, it distinguishes migrants from Pakistan, Bangladesh and Afghanistan from migrants from
all other countries. Second, it makes a sub-classification separating those belonging to the Hindu, Jain,
Sikh, Buddhist or Christian faiths from all other persons,
2
State of Victoria v the Commonwealth, 45 ALJ 251
3
Basheshar Nath v. Commissioner of Income Tax, Rajasthan, [1959] Supp 1 SCR 528
4
Passport (Entry into India) Rules, 1950, rule 4(1) (ha) and The Foreigners Order, para. 3A.
5
Citizenship (Amendment) Bill, 2019, clause 2
6
Id., cl. 4
7
The State Of Gujarat And Another vs Shri Ambica Mills 1974 AIR 1300, 1974 SCR (3) 760, Lachhman Das vs State Of
Punjab And Others 1963 AIR 222, 1963 SCR (2) 353, Deepak Sibal & Ors vs Punjab University And Another 1989 AIR
903, 1989 SCR (1) 689
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including, significantly, Muslims. And third, it confers privileges to those migrants fulfilling the
above criteria only if they have entered India on or before December 31, 2014.
4. It is most respectfully submitted that the statute itself doesn’t clearly lay out an aim. The Statement
of Objects and Purposes [SOA] which accompanied the bill, as introduced in the two Houses of
Parliament, contains the assertion8:
5. It is humbly submitted that if we were to take this SOA at its word, as representing the stated objective
of the law, it is clear, that it will violate Article 149, because it treats people equally situated in an
unlike manner. Under this SOA, if one were to assume that the objective is to protect only minorities
from neighboring countries with a state religion, the exclusion of Bhutan and Sri Lanka is stark.
After all, the constitutions of both these countries emphasize a special place for Buddhism. Therefore,
the State is entitled to offer special protection to persons persecuted from neighboring countries
with a state religion to the exclusion of all other persecuted migrants, the omission of Bhutan and Sri
Lanka undoes any nexus between the object of the law and the classifications it makes.
6. It is most respectfully submitted that if, on the other hand, based on the SOA, the State were to argue
that its objective is to offer the law’s protection only to migrants from neighboring countries where
Islam is a state religion, then the classification made is still invalid because the law leaves out not
only certain communities of Muslims from these countries, who would also ordinarily qualify as
minorities—notably the Ahmadiyya sect from Pakistan and the Hazaras from Afghanistan—but
also excludes other people persecuted on the basis of religion, including Jews, agnostics and
atheists.
7. It is humbly submitted that if we take an altogether different explanation for the law, which, once
again, the SOA hints at, that is that the objective of the CAA is to protect migrants from countries that
were originally a part of pre-partition India, the classification will still be unconstitutional. If this were
the prevailing logic, the inclusion of Afghanistan and the exclusion of Myanmar (which as Burma
was governed as a part of the British Indian
8
It is a historical fact that trans-border migration of population has been happening continuously between the territories
of India and the areas presently comprised in Pakistan, Afghanistan and Bangladesh. Millions of citizens of undivided
India belonging to various faiths were staying in the said areas of Pakistan and Bangladesh when India was partitioned in
1947. The constitutions of Pakistan, Afghanistan and Bangladesh provide for a specific state religion. As a result, many
persons belonging to Hindu, Sikh, Buddhist, Jain, Parsi and Christian communities have faced persecution on grounds of
religion in those countries. Some of them also have fears about such persecution in their day -to-day life where right to
practice, profess and propagate their religion has been obstructed and restricted. Many such persons have fled to India to
seek shelter and continued to stay in India even if their travel documents have expired or they have incomplete or no
documents.
9
Equality before law and equal protection of law.
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administration until 1937) means that the classification that the CAA makes can have no rational
relation to its objective.
8. It is humbly submitted that there are various other reasons why the classifications that the CAA makes
is unequal. The law, segregates apparent religious persecution from other forms of persecution ignoring
the fact that can there be anything to suggest that a Tibetan subjected to persecution on political grounds
is somehow in a better position than a Christian or Buddhist subjected to persecution in Pakistan or
Bangladesh on the basis of their faith? The law also proceeds by making an assumption that it is
only persons from countries with a state religion who can be subjected to religious persecution. But
as the example of the Rohingya Muslims in Myanmar shows us, this assumption is not only incorrect but
also invidious.
[1.1] CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE CAA
9. The primary ground for challenge against the CAA is that it is arbitrary, discriminatory and denies
equality before law and equal protection of laws in violation of Article 14 of the Constitution in so
far as it excludes Muslims from the Specified Countries and persons of other neighboring
countries who may have faced religious persecution ("Excluded Persons") from the benefit of
eligibility for citizenship. Another ground for challenge is that it deprives these Excluded Persons
of a meaningful right to life and personal liberty in violation of Article 2110 of the Constitution.
The constitutionality of this particular grounds can be challenged on the following grounds:
(I) It leaves out other religious communities in the subject countries (e.g., Jews, atheists,
agnostics, Shias, Ahmadiyas)
(II) It ignores other countries in India’s neighborhood (e.g., Sri Lanka, Bhutan, Myanmar);
(III) The cut-off date of 31 December 2014 is arbitrary
(IV) It ignores non-religious persecution (e.g., persecution on grounds of race or sexual orientation)
(V) The relaxation of the residence requirement from 11 years to 5 years is palpably arbitrary (why
should a Parsi fleeing religious persecution from Iran have to reside in India for 11 years to
seek citizenship by naturalization, while a Parsi fleeing religious persecution from Afghanistan
has to wait only 5 years?)
(VI) It fails to provide the modus operandi /, method or way of execution of such an act
10
Protection of life and Personal liberty
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(VII) It is the responsibility of every government to anticipate the consequences of any legislation
so that it does not create any disturbance in the society and the government has miserably
failed to do so.
(VIII) It fails to calculate the approximate number of persons who would be eligible for citizenship and
also fails to calculate the consequence of the same in terms of economic burden.
(IX) It has misused its powers under the provision of competent legislature to implement the act
by using the terminology of ‘Narrow piece of legislation’ which is so narrow that it could of
satisfy the basic provisions of law and is arbitrary and not reasonable as it has unreasonably under
included and over included features as per their own convivence.
(X) It is in contravention with part III of the constitution and is also violates the principle of basic
structure.11
10. In State of West Bengal v Anwar Ali Sarkar12, it was also held that the application of Article 14
cannot be precluded on the basis of whether there was clear evidence of the Legislature’s intention to
discriminate, and held that the application of Article 14 is premised on whether discrimination is a
necessary consequence of the statute.
[1.2] THE OBJECT ITSELF IS PRIMA FACIE DISCRIMINATORY
11. It is most respectfully submitted that the Union Government may refer to the Statement of Objects
and Reasons to contend that the classification is applicable only to those countries that have Islam as
the specific state religion, and that the communities covered are only those communities in these three
countries who do not believe in Islam. This may also be used to justify the exclusion of Ahmadi
Muslims, to state that they are persecuted on sectarian grounds, as they do not subscribe to a
certain version of Islam in Pakistan. However, such a classification is not based on an ‘intelligible
differentia’13 for three reasons, which shall be outlined below.
12. First, the classification is based on the premise that religious persecution takes place only in those
neighbouring countries that have Islam as the specific state religion. But, as discussed above,
religious persecution also takes place in Sri Lanka14 and Bhutan, which have Buddhism
11 Keshava Nanda Bharathi v. State of Kerala (1973) 4 SCC 225: AIR 1973 SC 146,Golknath v State of Punjab AIR 1967
SC 1643: (1967) 2SCR 726 ,Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Raj Narain 1975 Supp SCC 1: AIR 1975 SCC 299 ,Indra
Sawhney(2) v. Union of India (2000) 1 SCC 168: AIR 2000 SC 498,Kuldeep Nayar v. Union of India (2006) 7 SCC 1, 67
and Ashoka Kumar Thakur v. Union of India 2008) 6 SCC 1
12
1952 AIR 75, 1952 SCR 284
13
Suneel Jatley Etc vs State of Haryhana 1984 AIR 1534, 1985 SCR (1) 272, Mohanlal Chhaganlal Mithaiwala vs
Vipanchandra R. Gandhi And Anr AIR 1962 Guj 44, (1961) GLR 735, Ganga Ram Moolchan dani vs State Of Rajasthan
And Ors 6469 of 1998, State Of Maharashtra & Anr vs Indian Hotel & Retaurants Assn 2705 OF 2006
14
Article 9 of Sri Lanka Constitution
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as the State religion, and not Islam. The case of Tamils in Sri Lanka and Christians in Bhutan highlights
that persecution takes place even in two other neighbouring countries that do not subscribe to Islam.
13. Second, the classification is based on the presumption that only communities who are non- believers
in the state religion are persecuted, and that only minority communities are persecuted in an Islamic
country. The persecution of Ahmadi Muslims in Pakistan for not subscribing to a certain version of
Islam rebuts this presumption. As Ahmadis are persecuted for not subscribing to a certain version
of Islam, their persecution does have a ‘religious’ angle to it. This renders the distinction between
‘religious’ and ‘sectarian’ persecution a matter of mere semantics, which cannot be used to argue
that the classification is based on an intelligible differentia. In any case, the distinction between
religious and sectarian persecution is applicable only to Ahmadis, and is inapplicable to the exclusion
of Sri Lankan Tamils and Bhutanese Christians.
14. Third, the religion and country-based classification takes into account only religion-based persecution,
and does not take into account certain other forms of persecutions, such as persecution that is
political in nature. For instance, Tibetans are persecuted in China for political reasons, and even
they stand excluded from the protective umbrella of the CAA. For these reasons, the religion and
country-based classification is not just and sound, and cannot be said to be based on an ‘inte igible’
differentia. In Nagpur Improvement Trust and vs Vithal Rao and Others15, the Court emphasized
that, “if the object itself should be lawful and it cannot be discriminatory. If the object is to
discriminate against one section of the minority, the discrimination cannot be justified on the
ground that there is a reasonable classification because it has rational relation to the object
sought to be achieved”.
15. All communities mentioned above have been excluded from the ambit of the CAA. Hence, the object
of the religion and country-based classification created by Section 2 of the CAA is in itself
discriminatory.
16. Furthermore, instead of viewing this classification as a case of ‘under-inclusion’ by the Legislature,
it is better understood as one that leads to discrimination as a necessary consequence. This is a
case of unequal treatment of individual human beings within the territory of India, who are placed
in a similar situation, and is not akin to other classic cases of ‘under- inclusion’ such as Chiranjit Lal
Choudhary v Union of India16, it was argued that other similarly placed companies were ‘under-
included’ by the Legislature. The CAA accordingly leads to discrimination as a ‘necessary
consequence’, as certain communities already in India as
15
1973 AIR 689, 1973 SCR (3) 39
16
1951 AIR 41, 1950 SCR 869
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“i egal immigrants” from three neighbouring countries are granted a different eligibility criterion
for citizenship, to the exclusion of others (such as Sri Lankan Tamils) who are similarly placed.
This also goes against the basic tenet of Article 14, which is that ‘equals should be treated equa y’.
[1.3] THE PRINCIPLES CONUNDRUM AND UNDER-INCLUSIVENESS
17. PRINCIPLE 1: Pakistan and Bangladesh were part of British India. Illegal immigrants from there
could still generically be considered of Indian origin. However, with the inclusion of Afghanistan, it is
evident that the classification is not based on the principle of divided India and undivided India.
18. PRINCIPLE 2: Afghanistan, Pakistan and Bangladesh have a State religion. However, the
classification cannot be on the basis of a State religion, as Sri Lanka prescribes Buddhism as the State
religion.
19. PRINCIPLE 3: Degrees of harm. In Chiranjit Lal Chowdhury it was held that the legislature is free
to recognize the degrees of harm and confine the classification to where harm is the clearest.
However, if the CAA is based on the degrees of harm then the Rohingyas of Myanmar ought to be
included as the 2013 UN report states that the Rohingyas are the most persecuted in the world.17
20. PRINCIPLE 4: The classification might be limited to singling out persecuted religious minorities.
However, on this logic, Sri Lankan Eelam Tamils must also be included, as the Tamilians are
persecuted based on religion (Hinduism) and ethnicity.”
It is most humbly submitted that the classic problem of “inadequate principle” is at issue here. The
above four principles, if applied, result in the law leaving out some group who ought to qualify. In
Anwar Ali Sarkar, it was explained that intelligible differentia means that there must be a yardstick
to differentiate between those included in, and excluded from the group.
[1.4] CONSTITUTIONALISM AS AN IMPLIED LIMITATION
21. Constitutionalism recognizes the need of government but insists upon limitation being placed upon governmental
powers. Limited government is the central point of constitutionalism.18 It is the anti-thesis of arbitrary
powers.19 The underlying difference between the ‘Constitutionalism’ and ‘Constitution’ is that a Constitution
ought not merely to confer powers on the various organs of the Government but also seek to restrain those
powers. A good and virtuous constitutionalism having moral foundation protects not only fundamental
freedoms but also creates a bridge between conflicting interests and becomes a
17
https://www.unrefugees.org/emergencies/rohingya/ and
https://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=22491&LangID=E
18
Russell Hardin, Constitutionalism, in the Oxford Handbook of Political Economy 289.
19
Giovanni Sartori, Constitutionalism: A Preliminary Discussion, 56 AM. POL. SC REV. 853 (1962).
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harbinger to the social needs and produced good legislators and good citizens.20 Thus, the concept of
constitutionalism which is inherent in our constitution provides for an implied limitation on the powers of
the legislature. In I.R. Coelho (Dead) By LRs. vs. State of Tamil Nadu and Ors21 and Rameshwar Prasad
and Ors vs. Union of India (UOI) and Anr22 view taken by the Supreme Court - The principle of
constitutionalism is now a legal principle which requires control over the exercise of Governmental power to
ensure that it does not destroy the democratic principles upon which it is based. These democratic principles
include the protection of fundamental rights
22. It is most respectfully submitted that the government cannot do away or cannot wash off its hands
when it comes to the consequences of an act which is discriminatory in nature and cannot rely upon
the aims and objectives as a defense for not being violative of any of the constitutional principles.
It is most respectfully submitted that the government cannot rely upon the aims and objectives of an
act which in itself is discriminatory and is not good in the eyes of law nor does it pass the test of
reasonable classification. It is most respectfully submitted that it is the responsibility of the government
to anticipate or foresee the consequences of such an act so that it does not disturb the public
order. The Union Government cannot successfully argue that the requirements of Article 14 are satisfied
by defining the purpose of the CAA in terms of the selection of the beneficiaries i.e. in terms of
illegal immigrants of non-Islamic communities, who have come to India from three neighboring
Islamic nations. To illustrate further, a law which confers red-haired businessmen with a tax exemption
cannot be defended on the ground that the object of the law is in itself to provide a benefit to
solely red-haired individuals, as such an object would by itself be discriminatory. In Subramanian
Swamy v. CBI23a Constitution bench of the court anonymously held that “if the object itself is
discriminatory then explanation that classification is reasonable having a rational relation to the object
sought to be achieved, I is immaterial.
20
1 Dr. L.M. Singhvi, Constitution of India 24 (2nd ed.).
21
AIR 1999 SC 3197 and Minerva Mills Ltd. vs. Union of India, AIR 1980 SC 1789.
22
(2006) 2 SCC 1)
23
2014 8 SCC 682
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23. It is most respectfully submitted that, Article 1924 (1) (B) of the Constitution of India 1949, lay down
that ‘Al citizens shal have right to assemble peaceably and without arms. That means citizens of
India have been given freedom to assemble and organize a public gathering or even processions on their
own will.
24. Recently, parliament passed the Citizenship Amendment Act (CAA) which gave rise to the massive
protests by the people across states and students across universities. Public protests are the hallmark
of a free, democratic society, whose logic demands that the voice of the people should be heard by
those in power and decisions be reached after proper discussion and consultation. In order to
participate in public protest, the right to freedom of speech & expression, association and peaceful
assembly are necessary.
➢ The Right to free speech and expression25 transforms into the right to freely express an opinion
on the conduct of the government.
➢ The Right to association26 is required to form associations for political purposes — for instance,
to collectively challenge government decisions and to even aim, peacefully and legally, to displace
the government, to not merely check abuse of power but to wrest power.
➢ The Right to peaceably assemble27 allows political parties and citizenship bodies such as university-
based student groups to question and object to acts of the government by demonstrations, agitations
and public meetings, to launch sustained protest movements.
25. In the case of Ramlila Maidan Incident v. Home Secretary, Union of India & Ors28 &
Jawaharlal Nehru University V. Geeta Kumari, President Jnusu & Ors29 the Supreme Court had
stated, “Citizens have a fundamental right to assembly and peaceful protest which cannot be taken
away by an arbitrary executive or legislative action.”
26. If democracy means government of the people by the people, it is obvious that every citizen must
be entitled to participate in the democratic process and in order to enable him to
24
(b) to assemble peaceably and without arms
25
(a) to freedom of speech and expression;
26
(b) to assemble peaceably and without arms
27
(c) to form associations or unions
28
Ors (CRL.) NO. 122 OF 2011
29
Cont.Cas(C) 110/2018
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intelligently exercise his rights of making a choice, free & general discussion of public matters
is absolutely essential.30
[2.1] LAWFUL ASSEMBLY
27. Section 14131 in The Indican Penal Code defines “unlawful assembly.” The following are the ingredients
for an assembly to be labeled as an “unlawful assembly”:
1. There must be an assembly of five persons.
2. The assembly must have a common object and
3. The common object must be to commit one of the five illegal objects specified in the section.
The common object of the assembly should qualify for at least one of the five that are
mentioned in section 141:
1. To overawe by criminal force32
2. To resist the execution of law or any legal process33
3. To commit any mischief or criminal trespass or other offences34
4. By means of criminal force or show of criminal force35
5. To compel any person by means of criminal force or show of criminal force36
28. It is humbly submitted that, for an assembly to be labeled as unlawful assembly it needs to satisfy
the above-mentioned ingredients. In the present case, it can be said that there was an assembly of five
or more students of PMI & KNU universities but it cannot be said that the object of the assembly
was to resist the execution of law/any legal process or to commit any mischief or any other offences.
It is pertinent to note that, the students from PMI & KNU universities were from two different
religious and political groups. Both, the groups were having their own political and religious
ideologies. But the intention of both the groups was to express their resentment over the actions of
the Government on Citizenship Amendment Act, 2019. What section 141 of Indican Penal Code
attracts is that the object should be common
30
Maneka Gandhi vs. Union of India 1978 AIR 597, 1978 SCR (2) 621
31
Unlawful assembly —An assembly of five or more persons is designated an “unlawful assembly”, if the common
object of the persons composing that assembly is
32
To overawe by criminal force, or show of criminal force, 1[the Central or any State Government or Parliament or the
Legislature of any State], or any public servant in the exercise of the lawful power of such public servant
33
To resist the execution of any law, or of any legal process; or
34
To commit any mischief or criminal trespass, or other offence; or
35
By means of criminal force, or show of criminal force, to any person, to take or obtain possession of any property, or
to deprive any person of the enjoyment of a right of way, or of the use of water or ot her incorporeal right of which he
is in possession or enjoyment, or to enforce any right or supposed right; or
36
By means of criminal force, or show of criminal force, to compel any person to do what he is not legally bound to do,
or to omit to do what he is legally entitled to do.
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amongst all the member of the assembly, which should fall under the five illegal objects under the
section. But in the current scenario the students were having common intention not the common
object, which does not fall under the five illegal objects. Common object & Common intention distinct
from each other
COMMON OBJECT
29. The object of the assembly must be common to the person composing assembly. They all should
be aware of it. A common object does not require a prior meeting of minds or prior concert like
common intention37.
COMMON INTENTION
30. The expression ‘common intention’ means unity of purpose or a pre-arranged plan, prior meeting
of minds, prior consultation in between all the persons constituting the group38 It is humbly submitted
that, the common object required by section 141 is different from the common intention. Common
object should not be the product of prior concert but may spur of the moment.39 Therefore, in the
present case, the assembly could not be held as an unlawful assembly.
[2.2] NOT AMOUNT TO RIOT
31. The offence of rioting is defined under section 14640 of the penal code. When a group of people
come together unlawfully and perform anything (in order to achieve a common goal) using
force and violence, every member of that group is guilty for committing the offence of rioting.
To hold a person liable for the offence of rioting essentials ingredients must be present:
1. The accused person must be five or more in number and form an unlawful assembly.
2. The accused must be animated by a common object
3. The force or violence must be used by the unlawful assembly or any member thereof in the
prosecution of the common object.
32. It is humbly submitted that, protest could not be held as a riot on the following grounds:
1. The ingredients which are required for a riot does not meet in the present case, as already
been justified that the assembly could not be held as an unlawful assembly only on the basis
37
Ramachandran v. State of Kerala (AIR 2011 SC 3581)
38
Mahboob Shah v. Emperor, AIR 1945 PC 118
39
Bhanwar Singh v. State of M.P (2008) 16 SCC 657
40
Whenever force or violence is used by an unlawful assembly, or by any member thereof, in prosecution of the
common object of such assembly, every member of such assembly is guilty of the offence of riotin g.
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that it was constituted of more in number. None of the protestors were having any common object,
which is laid down in section 141.
2. Merely the use of force by a group of people does not render them liable for rioting. If the common
purpose is not illegal, then the use of force by the assembly will not amount to rioting. And if
force was being used by the assembly for a lawful purpose but a sudden quarrel broke out
without any pre-planned manner and eventually led to violence, it would not amount to rioting.
3. The students from two different universities i.e. PMI & KNU having different political and religious
ideologies, which led to the sudden quarrel/fight between the groups and turned the protest
into violence, led to mass bloodshed, which falls under the exception of section 146 of Indican
Penal Code. To support the above mentioned contention, we could also rely on the judgment of
khajah Noorul Hoosein v C Fabre Tonner41e & Ananta Kathod Pawar v State of
Maharashtra42 the hon’ble court held that, if a number of persons assembled for a lawful purpose
suddenly quarrels without any previous intention or design they would not be liable for rioting.
41
(1875) 24 WR (Cr) 26
42
(1997) 11SCC 564
43
Asha Ranjan vs. State of Bihar & Ors 2017 (4) SCC 397, The Government of Tamil Nadu vs P.Ayyakannu
44
1961 AIR 884, 1961 SCR (3) 423
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dharnas, protests, agitations and rallies of the present kind45. On the one hand, citizens are guaranteed
fundamental right of speech and the right to assemble for the purpose of carrying peaceful
protest/processions, on the other hand, reasonable restrictions on such rights can be placed by law.
Provisions of the Indican Penal code and Code of Criminal Procedure are in the nature of such
reasonable restrictions, which are statutory provisions giving powers to the State to ensure that such
public assemblies, protests, dharnas or marches are peaceful and they do not become unlawful46.
36. It is humbly submitted that, as per the facts of the case, when the bill was passed in both the houses
a widespread protest took place around the nation. At that time, government did not took the
cognizance of the matter, which resulted into the second incident between the students from two
universities, led to mass bloodshed and losses of lives. Where government again failed to take the
precautionary measures to protect the life of the protestors and general public, the other Police
authorities have also miserably failed to maintain public order in and around Rahim Bagh and in
various state. They have further neglected and failed to ensure peaceful and comfortable living for the
residents of the locality.
37. The people of a democratic country like ours have a right to raise their voice against the decisions
and actions of the Government or even to express their resentment over the actions of the Government
on any subject of social or national importance. The Government has to respect and, in fact, encourage
exercise of such rights. It is the abundant duty of the State to aid the exercise of the right to freedom
of speech as understood in its comprehensive sense and not to throttle or frustrate exercise of such
rights by exercising its executive or legislative powers and passing orders or taking action in that
direction in the name of reasonable restrictions.
38. It ought to be kept in mind that whenever any agitation or protest is going on, situation is like fluid
- keep on changing looking to the temperament of the protesters and resistances by other people.
Simultaneously, police have to maintain the law and order. Hence, the government has all power,
jurisdiction and authority to control the traffic, wherever protests or agitations are going on47
45
Himat Lal K. Shah vs. Commissioner of Police Ahmedabad and another reported in 1973 (1) SCC 227, Re - Ramlila
Maidan Incident Dt ... vs Home Secretary and Ors (CRL.) NO. 122 OF 2011
46
Mazdoor Kisan Shakti Sanghatan vs Union Of India 1153 OF 2017
47
Amit Sahni v. Commissioner Of Police And Ors W.P.(C) 429/2020
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ISSUE 3: WHETHER OR NOT THE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS OF ANY SECTIONS ARE BEING
VIOLATED BY THE ACT AND WHETHER OR NOT THE GOVERNMENT FAILED TO FULFILL
ANY CONSTITUTIONAL DIRECTIVES?
It is most respectfully submitted that there has been absolutely a gross violation of fundamental
rights and that the government has failed to fulfill the constitutional directives.
• This is the heart and soul of the memorial. Every part of the argument must be supported by legal
authority. Arguments should be well-organized and convincing. Each point the team wants the court to
consider in deciding the case must be described, the reasons explained with appropriate references to
research materials used, and text citations should be inserted as frequently as needed. Arguments should
address legal precedent and policy issues. Each part of the argument first addresses the issues supporting
one’s own case.
• Then, address contentions anticipated to be brought up by the opposing party. The argument should be
written in forceful, active, positive language. It is best to avoid the passive tense. Headings and
subheadings are used to help in clearly organizing the arguments. The same structure of headings and
subheadings should be summarized in the Table of Contents. The idea is to do everything in terms of
both form and substance to help the court understand the reasonableness and logic of the argument, and
thus decide in one’s favor
[3.1] ARTICLE 14- EQUALITY BEFORE LAW AND EQUAL PROTECTION OF LAW
{3.1.1} UNDERLYING PRINCIPLE
39. It is humbly submitted that even though no two human beings are similar in all respects, there are
similar in one respect, namely they all are human beings. Therefore, as human beings they require the
same treatment, i.e. they must all be treated as human beings. Any classification or absence of it that
ignores this aspect violates equality and cannot be justified under article 14. It is a humble
submission that equality not only prohibits unequal treatment (negative equality) but it also demands
equal treatment (positive equality). The state must not only to treat people unequally but it must also take
26
MEMORANDUM ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER
positive steps to remove existing inequalities, especially those inequalities which treat human beings less
than human beings. It is summitted that common humanity, which is also formulated as human
dignity, remands distributive justice both of which dignity and distributive justice are essential to
equality.48
40. Similarly, the expression “equal protection of laws “is now being read as a positive obligation on
the state to ensure equal protection of the laws by bringing in necessary social and economic changes, so
that everyone may enjoy equal protection of the laws and nobody is denied such protection. If the state
leaves the existing inequalities untouched by its laws, it fails in its duties of providing equal protection
of its loss to all persons. ST. Stephens College v. University of Delhi.49 It was also held in the case
of Indra Sawhney (2) v. Union of India that the right to equality is also recognized as one of the basic
features of the Constitution50
48
The role of equality under the human rights act, 1998 “20006122LQR53, when the author states:
Equality can be seen to further at least five different, but overlapping purposes one consistency or treating like a like,
second rationality and proportionality third democracy fourth dignity and fifth distributive justice.
While the other find the first three less effective in substantive matters, she finds the last two being developed in different
jurisdictions. The US application of equality clause on the basis of “rational classification “, “strict strict scrutiny “and
“intermediate scrutiny “and the developments in South Africa are also relevant in this context
49
AIR 1992 SC 1630, 1662, AIR 2000 SC 498 Also, Austin, working or democratic Constitution: the Indian experience
1999 669: Austin, inverted, the Supreme Court and the struggle for custody of the Con stitution” In B.N. Kirpal Et al (
Eds.), Supreme but not infallible 2000 13
50
(2000) 1 SCC 168: AIR 2000 SC 498
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51
(1972)2 SCC 788: AIR 1973 SC 106
52
(1978)1 SCC 248: AIR 1978 SC 597
53
(1985) 4 SCC 146
54
(1998) 3 SCC 732: AIR 1998 SC 1064
55
1973 1 SCC 500: AIR 1973 SC 689
56
19892 SCC 145 ,151: AIR1989 SC 903
57
AIR 1952 Cal 150
58
1956 AIR 479, 1956 SCR 267
59
(2003) 6 SCC 611: AIR 2003 SC 2902
60
2014 8 SCC 682
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Constitution bench of the court anonymously held that “if the object itself is discriminatory then
explanation that classification is reasonable having a rational relation to the object sought to be
achieved same material.
45. It is humbly submitted that a basic well-established principle is that Article 14 does not mandate
absolute equality. Classification is permitted so long as such classification is reasonable i.e. it is
based on intelligible differentia and has a rational nexus to the objective sought to be achieved.
This is the classic twin test of reasonableness expounded in several decisions of the Supreme Court
Navtej Singh Johar v Union of India61
46. It is most humbly submitted that legislative and executive action may accordingly be sustained if
it satisfies the twin tests of reasonable classification and the rational principle correlated to the
object sought to be achieved. The State, therefore, would have to affirmatively satisfy the Court that
the twin tests have been satisfied. It can only be satisfied if the State establishes not only the rational
principle on which classification is founded but correlate it to the objects sought to be achieved.
This approach is noticed in Ramana Dayaram Shetty v. International Airport Authority of
India62
47. The Court's ruling in DS Nakara & others v Union Of India63 relying on In Re Special Courts
Bill, 1978 lays down two very important propositions: a) Article 14 applies even when Parliament
is extending benefits or privileges as is the case with the CAA; b) the burden lies on the State to
justify that the classification drawn in such cases is reasonable.
{3.1.4} TWIN TEST OF CLASSIFICATION
48. Article 14 forbids class legislation but does not forbid reasonable classification for the purpose of
legislation.64 The correct position will be that class legislation is permissible if the classification on
which it is based is rational and has a nexus with the object sought to be achieved.65 Mere classification
is not enough to get over the inhibition of this Article. The classification must be rational. The differentia
which is the basis of classification and the object of the Act are distinct things and what is necessary
is that there must be a nexus between them.
61
(2018)10 SCC 1
62
[(1979) 3 SCC 489, 506 : AIR 1979 SC 1628 : (1979) 3 SCR 1014, 1034 : (1979) 2 LLJ 217]
63
1983 AIR 130, 1983 SCR (2) 165
64
Sakhawant Ali v. State of Orissa, AIR 1955 SC 166, 169; See also Union of India v. Indian Charge Chrome, (1999) 7
SCC 314; Mohan Kumar Singhania v. Union of India, AIR 1992 SC 1; Federation of All India Customs and Central
Excise Stenographers v. Union of India, AIR 1988 SC 1291; Paradise Printers v. Union Territory, Chandigarh, AIR 1985
SC 354; Raj Pal Sharma v. State of Haryana, AIR 1985 SC 1263; State of Mysore v. P. Narasinga Rao, AIR 1968 SC 349;
Express Newspaper P. Ltd. v. Union of India, AIR 1958 SC 578; State of Bombay v. S.N. Balsara, AIR 1951 SC 318; State
of Bombay v. Anwar Ali Sarkar, AIR 1952 SC 75; Javed v. State of Haryana, (2003) 8 SCC 369, 380; Joshi D.D. v. Union
of India, AIR 1983 SC 420.
65
Ratnapoorva Devi v. State of Orissa, AIR 1964 SC 1195
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The legislation is given the utmost latitude in making the classification and it is only when there
is a palpable abuse of power and the differences made have no rational relation to the objectives that
judicial interference becomes necessary.66 Every State action must be informed by reason and it
follows that an act uninformed by reason is per se arbitrary. None should be favored67and none should
be placed under any disadvantage in circumstances that do not admit of any reasonable
justification68 for a different treatment.69
49. The objective of the CAA is to make eligible for citizenship, persons who have faced persecution
on grounds of religion. In doing so, the CAA carves out a class based on religion and nationality
i.e. it specifies persons from certain communities in certain countries. Creation of a class based
on religion prima facie raises concerns of the law conflicting with secularism, a principle recognized
by the Supreme Court to form part of the basic structure of the Constitution SR Bommai v Union
of India70
50. It is most respectfully submitted that the Ahmadis are a Muslim sect who follow Mirza Ghulam
Ahmad who claimed to have been divinely appointed as both the promised Mahdi (Guided One)
and Messiah expected by Muslims. Due to this belief that Mirza Ghulam Ahmad was the Messiah,
the Ahmadis are considered non-Muslims by many mainstream Muslims and face significant
persecution and oppression. In Pakistan, by way of the Constitution71Order, 1985, the Constitution
of Pakistan was amended to define a "non-Muslim" as a person who is not a Muslim and includes
a person belonging to the Christian, Hindu, Sikh, Buddhist or Parsi community, a person of the
Quadiani group or the Lahori group (who call themselves 'Ahmadis' or by any other name), or a
Bahai, and a person belonging to any of the scheduled castes.
51. It is most respectfully submitted that another prime example is the Rohingya Muslims living in Myanmar.
In 2013, the UN declared the Rohingyas as "the most persecuted minority in the world". In direct
contravention of international human rights law, the Rohingya Muslims have been denied citizenship
under the 1982 Myanmar nationality law, rendering them stateless since then. Hundreds of
thousands of Rohingya Muslims were forced to flee their homes in August 2017 when violence
broke out including the burning of entire Rohingya villages. Some
66
Kathi Ranging Rawat v. State of Saurashtra, AIR 1952 SC 123, 131.
67
Morey v. Doud, (1956) 118 U.S. 356.
68
John Vallamettom v. Union of India, AIR 2003 SC 2902.
69
Truax v. Corrigan, (1921) 257 U.S. 312.
70
1994)3 SCC 1, paragraph 3045
71 rd
3 constitutional amendment
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of these Rohingya Muslims have also fled to India and their numbers according to press reports are
approximately 40,000. The Rohingya Muslims will also not get the benefit extended under the
CAA. It is indeed ironic that a law that seeks to protect and make eligible for citizenship communities
who have faced religious persecution in neighboring countries does not protect the most persecuted
community in the world.
52. Yet another example is the Sri Lankan Tamils (mostly Hindu) who have fled Sri Lanka since the
end of the civil war and are living in refugee camps in Tamil Nadu. According to press reports, the
persecution of Tamils continued even as late as in 2016 despite the civil war ending in 2009.
approximately 59,000 Sri Lankan Tamil refugees are living in refugee camps in Tamil Nadu. These
Sri Lankan Tamils would not get the benefit under the CAA as they are not from the Specified
Countries. The above examples make it amply clear that the religions and nationalities specified
under the CAA are not the only persons facing persecution on religious grounds in countries
neighboring India.
53. It is most respectfully submitted that Another intelligible differentia that the Statement of Objects
and Reasons of the CAA hints at is that the constitutions of the Specified Countries provide for a
specific state religion. However, on this count as well, the CAA suffers from under inclusion as
the Constitution Of Sri Lanka, also a neighboring country provides for a specific state religion.
Article 9 of the Constitution of Sri Lanka provides that the Republic of Sri Lanka shall give to
Buddhism the foremost place and accordingly it shall be the duty of the State to protect and foster
the Buddha Sasana.
54. It is most respectfully submitted that yet another intelligible differentia that supporters of the CAA
have canvassed is that the CAA is only seeking to protect persecuted communities belonging to
the territory of erstwhile undivided India. However, on this count, the CAA suffers from over-
inclusion as Afghanistan was historically not a part of undivided India and yet it is included in the
list of Specified Countries.1
55. It is most respectfully submitted that therefore, on any of the plausible intelligible differentia, the
CAA suffers from either under inclusion or over inclusion and treats equally situated persons
unequally. This unequal treatment to equals manifests itself at two levels. First, a person belonging
to a specified persecuted community from one of the Specified Countries is eligible for citizenship
whereas a person belonging to a non-specified persecuted community from the same country is
not eligible for citizenship. E.g. a Hindu from Pakistan becomes eligible for citizenship whereas an
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Ahmadi from Pakistan, despite also being persecuted on grounds of religion does not become eligible
for citizenship. Second, a person belonging to a
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specified persecuted community from one of the Specified Counties is eligible for citizenship whereas
a person belonging to the same community and who is persecuted on religious grounds in a non-
specified country is not eligible for citizenship. E.g. a Hindu from Pakistan becomes eligible for
citizenship whereas a Hindu (Tamil) from Sri Lanka despite also being persecuted on grounds of religion
does not become eligible for citizenship.
56. It is most humbly submitted that the CAA does not satisfy the twin test of reasonableness i.e. it
is not based on any intelligible differentia which can be said to have a rational nexus to the objective
sought to be achieved. If the objective sought to be achieved was to provide refuge to communities
persecuted on grounds of religion, then all persecuted communities from all neighboring countries
being equally placed persons ought to have been conferred the benefit under the CAA.
{3.1.5}MANIFEST ARBITRARINES
57. Apart from the conventional twin test of classification, a law can also be struck down as
violating Article 14 if it is manifestly arbitrary. In Shayara Bano v Union of India72, the
Supreme Court elucidated the concept of manifest arbitrariness in the following words:
“Manifest arbitrariness, therefore, must be something done by the legislature capriciously,
irrationally and/or without adequate determining principle. Also, when something is done
which is excessive and disproportionate, such legislation would be manifestly arbitrary."
58. It is most respectfully submitted that a bare perusal of the above instances of over inclusion and under
inclusion in the CAA would show that it is not based on an adequate determining principle. The
selected class has no rational nexus to the objective sought to be achieved and cannot be distinguished
from other equally placed persons.
59. It is most respectfully submitted that one cannot also ignore the possibility that the law has been
framed with a sinister intent to discriminate against and exclude one particular religion. The popular
argument advanced to exclude Muslims from the scope of the CAA is that the Specified Countries
are Islamic majority countries whose constitutions specify Islam as the state religion. Therefore,
there is no question of Muslims being persecuted in these countries. As discussed above, this is
factually inaccurate as sects of Muslims such as the Ahmadiyas are persecuted in a Muslim majority
country such as Pakistan.
72
(2017)9 SCC 1)
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73
Indra Swahney v. Union of India, AIR 1993 SC 477
74
Ashok Kumar Gupta v. State of U.P, (1997) 5 SCC 201; Jagdish Lal v. State of Haryana, (1997) 6 SCC 538; State of
U.P. v. Dr. Dina Nath Shukla, (1997) 9 SCC 662
75
John W. Johnson and Robert P. Green, Affirmative Action: Historical Guides to Controversial issues in America (1st
ed., 2009).
76
Durga Das Basu, Commentary on the Constitution of India, 3838 (8 th ed. 2008)
77
Ronald Dworkin, A Matter of Principle,302.
78
T.K. Tope, Constitutional Law of India, 731 (3rd ed. 2010).
79
H.M. Seervai , Constitutional Law of India (4th ed. 1993).
80
Bidi Supply Co. v. State of Gujarat, AIR 1956 SC 479; Nagpur Improvement Trust v. Vithal Rao (1973) 1 SCC 500;
Deepak Sibal v. Punjab University (1989) 2 SCC 145 and Subramanian Swamy v. Director, CBI (2014) 8 SCC 682
81
R.C. Cooper v. Union of India, AIR 1970 SC 564
82
Justice K.S. Puttaswamy (Retd.) v. Union of India, Writ Petition (Civil) No. 494 of 2012.
83
Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, (1978) 1 SCC 248
84
Gnanaprakasam v. Government of Tamil Nadu, W.P.No.18373 of 2008
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expel foreigners is absolute and unlimited and there is no provision in the Constitution fettering
this discretion.85 However, insofar as imprisonment is a potential penal consequence directed at non-
exempted categories of refugees, it is submitted that deprivation of personal liberty is immediately
in issue and article 21 is squarely attracted.
63. It has been judicially recognized that “the quality of reasonableness does not attach only to the content
of the procedure which the law prescribes with reference to article 21 but to the content of the
law itself.”86 The ‘reasonableness’ of the law under article 21 is generally examined with reference
to articles 14 and 19 of the Constitution of India.87 The ‘strict scrutiny’ test has the effect of
reversal of the presumption in favor of the constitutionality of an enactment and the burden is
on the State to justify the impugned State action.88 Additional y, it requires a more searching
judicial scrutiny into ‘compel ing State ends’; (most pressing circumstances); ‘narrow tailoring’ (the
law must not overreach the compel ing ends) and if the same corresponds with ‘least restrictive
alternative available to pursue those ends’.89 Thus, in a ‘strict scrutiny’ analysis, the Government [or
the State] must be asked to provide a rigorous, detailed explanation in respect of this classification.90
64. Applying the above tests to the impugned provisions identified above, we find that there was neither
any compelling State interest justifying discrimination between and among refugee sub-populations and
even if that requirement is somehow satisfied, the ‘law’ in question is most certainly not narrowly
tailored or least restrictive in its evidently omnibus and indiscriminate criminalization of non-
exempted subsets of refugees.
85
Hans Muller of Nuremburg v. Superintendent, Presidency Jail, Calcutta, AIR 1955 SC 367
86
Justice K.S. Puttaswamy (Retd.) v. Union of India, Writ Petition (Civil) No. 494 of 2012.
87
Mohd. Arif @ Ashfaq v. The Reg. Supreme Court of India (2014) 9 SCC 737
88
Anuj Garg v. Hotel Association of India (2008) 3 SCC 1
89
Subhash Chandra v. Delhi Subordinate Services Selection Board (2009) 15 SCC 448, Saurabh Chaudri v. Union of
India (2003) 11 SCC 146
90
Kerala Bar Hotels Association v. State of Kerala (2015) 16 SCC 421
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ISSUE 4: WHETHER THE INTERNET BAN HAS VIOLATED ANY FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS TO
THE INDICAN CONSTITUTION OR NOT?
65. It is humbly submitted before this Hon’ble Court that, arbitrary and unreasonable Internet shutdowns
by the government is a violation of the fundamental rights to information, education and free speech
protected by the Constitution. Access to Internet is merged with manifold fundamental rights like
education, information, communication, free speech and expression, health among others.
[4.1] VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 1491
66. Equality is one of the magnificent corner-stones of Indian democracy.92 The doctrine of equality
before law is a necessary corollary of Rule of Law which pervades the Indican Constitution.93 The
underlying object of Art.14 is to secure to all persons, citizens or non- citizens, the equality of
status and opportunity referred to in the preamble to our Constitution.94Art. 14 bars discrimination
and prohibit discriminatory laws. It is humbly submitted that Article 14 provides for equality before
the law and equal protection of the law. For upholding the classification under Article 14 two tests
must be satisfied. In the case of Budhan Choudhry v. State of Bihar95, it was held, to pass the
test of permissible classification two conditions must be fulfilled, namely, (i) That the classification must
be founded on an intelligible differentia which distinguishes persons or things that are grouped
together from others left out of the group, and (ii) That the differentia must have a rational relation
to the object sought to be achieved by the statute in question96.”
91
Equality before the law and equal protection of the law
92
Thommen J, in Indira Sawhney v. UOI, AIR 1993 SC 477.
93
Ashutosh Gupta v. State of Rajasthan, (2002) 4 SCC 34
94
Natural resource allocation, Re Special Reference Number 1 of 2012, (2012) 10 SCC 1 (77)
95
AIR 1955 SC 191
96
The test was clearly expressed by Justice dash in the state of West Bengal v. Anwar Ali Sarkar, AIR 1952 SC 75:1952
SCR 284 and has been repeated in many cases. For its continuing assertion see, Motor General traders v . State of AP,
(1984)1 SCC 222, 229: AIR1984 SC 121, Prabhat Verma v. State of you U.P, (1984)4 SCC 251: AIR 1985 SC 167, Raj
Pal Sharma v. State of Haryana, 1985 supp. SCC 72, 75: AIR 1985 SC 1263. Kallakurichi Taluk Retired officers Assn.
v. State of Tamil Nadu (2013) 2 SCC 772, 794, emphasis supplied.
97
M.P. Jain, Indian Constitutional Law, 876 (7th ed., Lexis -Ne xis Butterworth Wadhwa Publications, Nagpur, 2016)
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The order passed by the government, cannot be passed to the public generally, and must be specifically
against the people or the group which is apprehended to disturb the peace. It is necessary for the State
to identify the persons causing the problem, and an entire State cannot be brought to a halt. Therefore, it
is on the part of the Government, before making a complete ban on the Internet in the Indican, to
bring a prudent differentia of its actions. Complete ban on Internet and unreasonable restrictions on
movement cannot be a solution for the problems which arose in the state and moreover it all added to
the further plight of the common people.
{4.1.2} REASONABLE NEXUS BETWEEN CLASSIFICATION AND THE OBJECT
SOUGHT:
68. The order passed by the government on banning the internet was to stop the severe unrest rising among
the locals. Not only this but also it imposed restrictions on the trade, movement, speech, access to
health facilities, education etc. This particular action of government cannot be justified on the
grounds that stopping the common people from using internet or putting restrictions on the trade or
movement can curb the unrest in the Indican. Complete ban is no solution. It should be classified
according to a reasonable nexus to seek the desired objective. The exercise proved to be absolutely
this proportionate to the purpose sought to be achieved. The reasonable Nexus between stringency
of the provision and the purpose sought to be achieved must exist.98
{4.1.3} ARBITRARINESS:
69. Any state action, legislative or judicial or executive, is void if it contravenes Article 14. The word
‘State’ thus includes al ‘instrumentalities or agencies’ of the government, whether they are
departments of the government or not, whether a statutory corporation or other private body. It is
the duty of state to allay fears of citizens regarding discrimination and arbitrariness.99 If the classification
is not reasonable and does not satisfy the aforementioned two conditions, the impugned legislation or
executive execution would plainly be arbitrary and the guarantee of equality under Art. 14 would be
breached.100 It is held that the expression "reasonable" connotes that the limitation imposed on a
person in the enjoyment of the right should not be arbitrary or of an excessive nature beyond what
is required in the interests of public101. Thus in the instant matter, the restrictions imposed by the Union
of Indican on internet, trade, movement and other
98
District Registrar and Collector v. Canara bank, AIR 2005 SC 186
99
Style (Dress Land) v. Union Territory, Chandigarh,(1999) 7 SCC 89.
100
Durga Das Basu Commentary on the Constitution of India, 8th Edition of 2007, Volume 2
101
P.P Enterprises v. UOI, (1982) 2 SCC 33
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rights cannot be justified and are unreasonable. “Every state action must be non- arbitrary and
reasonable. Otherwise, the court would strike it down as invalid".102
[4.2] VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 19103
70. It is humbly submitted before this Hon‘ble SC that, the word ‘freedom’ in Art. 19 of The Constitution
mean absence of control by the state. In all matters specified in Art. 19(1), the citizen has the liberty
to choose, subject only to restriction in Art. 19(2) to (6).104 We are confining ourselves to declaring
that the right to freedom of speech and expression Under Article 19(1) (a), and the right to carry
on any trade or business under 19(1) (g), using the medium of internet is constitutionally protected.
Which has been upheld in the case of Anuradha Bhasin v. Union of India free 1031 of 2019105
freedom of speech and expression and the freedom to practice any profession or carry on
any trade, business or occupation over the medium of internet enjoys constitutional protection under
Article 19(1) (a) and Article 19(1) (g) Freedom of speech and expression is the bulwark of democratic
Govt. it is therefore truly said that it is the mother of all other liberties106. Freedom of speech plays
a crucial role in the formation of public opinion on social, political and economic matters as it would
help formation of one’s opinion and view point and debates on matters of public concern107.
71. The word "reasonable" implies intelligent care and deliberation, legislation which arbitrarily or excessively
invades the right cannot be said to contain the quality of reasonableness and unless it strikes a
proper balance between the freedom guaranteed in Article 19(1) (g) and the social control permitted
by Clause (6) of Article 19, it must be held to be wanting in that quality.108. The larger public
interest sought to be ensured in the light of the object sought to be achieved,
102
Bachansingh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1982 SC 1336; EP Royappa v. State of Tamil Nadu, AIR 1974 SC 555; Maneka
Gandhi v. Union of India AIR 1978 SC 597; Ajay Hasia v. Khalid Mujib, AIR 1981 SC 487.
103
Protection of certain rights regarding freedom of speech etc
(1) All citizens shall have the right
(a) to freedom of speech and expression;
(b) to assemble peaceably and without arms;
(c) to form associations or unions;
(d) to move freely throughout the territory of India;
(e) to reside and settle in any part of the territory of India; and
(f) omitted
(g) to practise any profession, or to carry on any occupation, trade or business
104
State of Karnataka v. associated management of (Govt. Recognized – Unaided – English Medium) Primary and
Secondary Schools, (2014) 9 SCC 485
105
1031 of 2019
106
Report of the Second Press Comm., Vol I, 34-35.
107
Maneka Gandhi v. UOI, AIR 1978 SC 597
108
Chintamanrao v. state of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1951 SC 118
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the necessity to restrict the citizen's freedom the possibility of achieving the object by imposing a
less drastic restraint or that a less drastic restriction may ensure the object intended to be achieved.109.
The Hon’ble Supreme Court dealt with the aspect of the freedom elaborately. The right of the citizens
to obtain information on matters relating to public acts flows from the Fundamental Rights enshrined in
the Art. 19(1) (a)110
72. The State can impose restrictions; we should focus on the question of the "least restrictive measure"
& “Unavoidable Circumstances” that can be passed111. It is submitted that while imposing restrictions,
the rights of individuals need to be balanced against the duty of the State to ensure security. The
State must ensure that measures are in place that allows people to continue with their life, such as
public transportation for work and schools, to facilitate business, etc. In Mohd.Hanif Quareshi
v. State of Bihar112, AIR 1958 SC 731 it was held that, restriction has to be determined in an
objective manner and from the standpoint of the interests of the general public and not from the
point of view of the persons upon whom the restrictions are imposed or upon abstract considerations
73. The term "reasonable", as used in Article 19(2) of the Constitution need to be tested on the anvil of
the test of proportionality. Which is also been upheld in the case of Modern Dental College &
Research Centre v. State of Madhya Pradesh113, (2016) 7 SCC 353 & Justice K.S. Puttaswamy
v. Union of India114, (2019) 1 SCC 1 limitation of a constitutional right will be constitutionally
permissible if: (a) backing of a law', (b) legitimacy of purpose, (c) rational connection of the act and
object, (d) necessity of the action, and (e) when the above four are established, then the test of
proportionality is permissible.
74. Internet shutdowns, on a prima facie level, fail the test of proportionality. This is because they are
indiscriminate, in both whom they target (that is, everyone within a defined area, whether potential
disruptors of law and order, or the entirely innocent), and the manner in which they do so (cutting-
off access to the entire internet, which includes a vast majority of entirely bona fide and legal uses
of the internet).There is a need for procedural justice in cases relating to restrictions which impact
individuals’ fundamental rights as was recognized by this Court in the
109
Mohammed Faruk v. State of Madhya Pradesh (1969) 1 SCC 85, Om Kumar v. Union of India, (2001) 2 SCC 386,
State of Bihar v. Kamla Kant Misra, (1969) 3 SCC 337 & Bishambhar Dayal Chandra Mohan v. State of Uttar
Pradesh, (1982) 1 SCC 39
110
PUCL v. UOI, (2003) 4 SCC 399
111
Re-Ramlila Maidan Incident Dt. v. Home Secretary And Ors., (2012) 5 SCC 1.
112
AIR 1958 SC 731
113
(2016) 7 SCC 353
114
(2019) 1 SCC 1
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115
case of Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India and the Justice K. S. Puttaswamy v Union of
India116. The procedure that is to be followed for restricting Internet services is provided under the
Temporary Suspension of Telecom Services (Public Emergency or Public Service) Rules117, 2017
[hereinafter “Suspension Rules”], which were notified under the Section 5 of Telegraph Act118 read
with Section 69 of Information Technology Act119. The Suspension Rules indicate that the restriction
imposed was contemplated to be of a temporary nature. The aim of the Section is not to
restrict/block the internet as a whole, but only to block access to particular websites on the internet,
etc. It is humbly submitted that, the orders were not in compliance with the procedure prescribed
under the Suspension Rules. Further, the orders did not provide any reasoning as to the necessity of the
restrictions, as is required under the Suspension Rules
75. We need to distinguish between the internet as a tool and the freedom of expression through the
internet. The wider range of circulation of information or its greater impact cannot restrict the content
of the right nor can it justify its denial120. All these rights combined have a wider expression and
would comprise within its ambit the interests of public health and morals121, economic stability122 of
the country, equitable distribution of essential commodities at fair prices123, maintenance of purify
in public life, prevention of fraud124; amelioration of the conditions of farmers125 or workman126;
implementation of the Directive Principles in Part IV127
[4.3] VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 21128
76. The nature of fundamental rights under Part III of the Constitution is well settled. The fundamental
rights are prescribed as a negative list, so that "no person could be denied such right until the
Constitution itself prescribes such limitations". The only exception to the
115
(1978) 1 SCC 248
116
(2019) 1 SCC 1
117
2.(1) Directions to suspend the telecom services shall not be issued except by an order made by the Secretary to the
Government of India in the Ministry of Home Affairs in the case of Government of India or by the Secretary to the
State Government
118
5. Power for Government to take possession of licensed telegraphs and to order interception of messages
119
69 Power to issue directions for interception or monitoring or decryption of any information through any computer
resource.
120
Ministry of Information & Broadcasting Government of India v. Cricket Association of Bengal, (1995) 2 SCC
121
State of Maharashtra v. Himmatbhai Narbheram Rao, AIR 1970 SC 1157
122
Glass Chatons Importers and Users Association v. Union of India, AIR 1961 SC 1514.
123
Narendra Kumar v. Union of India, AIR 1960 SC 430
124
Fedco (P) Ltd. Bilgrami,S.N., AIR 1960 SC 415
125
Jan Md., Noor Mohammad Begam v. State of Gujarat, AIR 1966 SC 385.
126
Ramdhandas v. State of Punjab, AIR 1961 SC 1559
127
Municipal Corporation v. Jan. Md. Usmanbhai, AIR 1986 SC 1205
128
Protection of life and personal liberty
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aforesaid formulation is Article 21(A)129 of the Constitution, which is a positive right that requires
an active effort by the concerned government to ensure that the right to education is provided to all
children up to the age of 16 years but in this case because of the internet ban various children suffered
losses and their fundamental right of education got hampered130.
77. Also, in the case of Faheema Shirin.R.K vs State Of Kerala131 it was held that, right to have access
to Internet becomes the part of right to education as well as right to privacy under Article 21 of the
Constitution of India. While there can be some restrictions, there can be no blanket orders, as it would
amount to a complete ban. Instead, a distinction should be drawn while imposing restrictions on
social media/mass communication and the general internet. The least restrictive option must
be put in place, and the State should have taken preventive or protective measures. Ultimately, the State
needs to balance the safety of the people with their lawful exercise of their fundamental rights.
129
Right to Education
130
Anuradha Bhasin v. UOI, 2020 1 MLJ 574
131
19716/2019-L
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PRAYERS
Prayer is one of the most important parts of a memorial as well as during oral rounds. It consists of what you
are seeking from the Court, of what you want the decision of the Court to be.
Always stand up when the prayer is being said.
Wherefore in light of the issues raised, arguments advanced and authorities cited, this Hon’ble
Supreme Court may be pleased to:
• To declare, that the internet ban was not under the preview of the Indican constitution
And/ or any other order, direction or relief that this Hon’ble Court may be deem fit in the
interest of Equity, Justice and Good Conscience.
It is the relief claimed by the parties which should be clearly mentioned. More than one relief can be claimed
in one cause of action. Following the prayer signature of the council must be stated.
This acts as the ending of the Memorial. This clearly declares what an individual be it a petitioner or the
defendant actually wants from the Court in his favour. This is the relief mentioning sentence, and in it the
basic motive of filing the suit is mentioned through reliefs claimed.
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Thus, always read the rules and regulations of a moot problem very carefully. Not following the prescribed
font, font size, line spacing, etc. make you lose marks allotted to a memorial.
The citation used should be as per the guidelines. If it mentions ‘Bluebook’, a lot of marks will be deducted
if you use any citation style other than Bluebook.
• Beauty in uniformity
Formatting your memorial also means making it look beautiful. That does not mean you will attach pictures
to it. Beauty in a memorial refers to uniformity. It lies in the equal line spacing after every heading; proper
border for the pages; usage of large caps and small caps wherever required. Do not use rich text everywhere.
For example,
This is the pattern you may use for a the headings respective to its numbering. Don’t use bold for the
heading under 1.1 or underline the heading under 1.1.
Avoid:
• Cover page
Coming to cover pages, it is blue for petitioners/plaintiffs and red for respondents/defendants. This is
very important to be followed while submitting your memorials both online and offline.
Research well before making your cover page as the format changes with the kind of moot problem.
For example, a writ petition should have a “WRIT PETITION /2018” written on it
with the correct year of the filing of the petition while any other Constitutional Law memorial has no
need for it.
It needs to be auto-generated.
If you go to ‘References’ in Word and click on ‘Table of Contents’, under ‘Manual Table’, you can see
‘Level 1’, ‘Level 2’, etc. written beside them. That is how your Table of Contents needs to look like.
To achieve that format of Table of Contents, you need to place the headings of your memorial
under different levels.
2. . Go to ‘Paragraph…’
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1. Block the authority you have cited (case name, book name, etc.) in your footnotes.
2. Click on ‘Mark Citation’ under ‘References’.
3. Select the category from the dropdown list.
4. After you are done doing the same for all the citations, go to the page where you will insert the list
of authorities and click on “Insert Table of Authorities”.
Be careful while doing this because it gets very messy when all the citations will be marked. Also, usage
of ibid and supra will make it complicated because they need to be marked as well.
• Miscellaneous
• Take note of margins while using bu lets and numbering. They get rea ly messy if they are shifted.
• Learn how to properly use page breaks and section breaks as section breaks wi l be required to
change the style of page numbers.
• Do not use very fancy forms of page numbers. Simplicity stands out more and in a good way.
• The above written memorial must be in well versed English. It does not mean a typical type of
English; by reading one should understand and writing should contain legal quality. After
preparing memorial it is very necessary to go through the memorial at least 3-4 times and it is
necessary to write in a correct format no grammatical mistakes, otherwise it will not bring out the
true essence of the memorial.
• Memorial writing is an art of writing. For writing a proper memorial one has to be thorough not
only with the facts but also with the laws that have to be applied. It is a tedious task and mooting
altogether involves many of such tedious tasks. If an individual knows the facts very well but does
not know what all laws have to be applied, the facts known will act as null and void. Before
making the memorial or start up with his work one should get well versed with the particular area
of law which is going to be applied because a single memorial does not contain a single law but a
series of laws from various sources. A proper knowledge as well as patience is needed in making
a good or even the best memorial. A person cannot complete his memorial in one or two weeks
but need a months’ time to draft his memorial.
43
MEMORANDUM ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER