35

Empathy and Altruism

C. Daniel Batson, Nadia Ahmad, David A. Lishner,

Altruism refers to a specific form of motivation way to help a stranded motorist change a flat
for one organism, usually human, benefiting tire.
another. Although some biologists and psy- Why do we humans help? Often, of course,
chologists speak of altruistic behavior, meaning the answer is easy. We help because we have
behavior that benefits another, we do not rec- no choice, because it is expected, or because it
ommend this use. Such use fails to consider the is in our own best interest. We may do a friend
motivation for the behavior, and motivation is a favor because we do not want to lose the
the central issue in discussions of altruism. If friendship or because we expect to see the favor
one’s ultimate goal in benefiting another is to reciprocated. But it is not for such easy answers
increase the other’s welfare, then the motiva- that we ask ourselves why we help; it is to press
tion is altruistic. If the ultimate goal is to in- the limits of these answers. We want to know
crease one’s own welfare, then the motivation whether our helping is always and exclusively
is egoistic. We shall use the term altruism to motivated by the prospect of some benefit for
refer to this specific form of motivation and the ourselves, however subtle. We want to know
term helping to refer to behavior that benefits whether anyone ever, in any degree, transcends
another. the bounds of self-interest and helps out of gen-
uine concern for the welfare of another. We
want to know whether altruism is within the
human repertoire.
A Basic Question: Is Altruism Part of Proponents of universal egoism claim that
Human Nature? everything we do, no matter how noble and
beneficial to others, is really directed toward the
Clearly, we humans devote much time and ultimate goal of self-benefit. Proponents of al-
energy to helping others. We send money to truism do not deny that the motivation for
rescue famine victims halfway around the much of what we do, including much that we
world—or to save whales. We stay up all night do for others, is egoistic. But they claim more.
to comfort a friend who has just suffered a They claim that at least some of us, to some
broken relationship. We stop on a busy high- degree, under some circumstances, are capable

485
486 PART VI. INTERPERSONAL APPROACHES

of a qualitatively different form of motivation, grenade or the man who dies after relinquishing
motivation with an ultimate goal of benefiting his place in a rescue craft. These persons may
someone else. have acted to escape anticipated guilt and shame
Those arguing for universal egoism have el- for letting others die. They may have acted to
egance and parsimony on their side in this de- gain the admiration and praise of those left be-
bate. It is simpler to explain all human behavior hind—or benefits in an afterlife. Perhaps they
in terms of self-benefit than to postulate a mo- simply misjudged the situation, not thinking
tivational pluralism in which both self-benefit that their actions would cost them their lives.
and another’s benefit can serve as ultimate To suggest that heroes’ noble acts could be mo-
goals. Elegance and parsimony are important tivated by self-benefit may seem cynical, but
criteria in developing scientific explanations, yet the possibility must be faced if we are to re-
they are not the most important criterion. The sponsibly address the question of whether al-
most important task is to explain adequately truism exists.
and accurately the phenomena in question. We
need to know if altruistic motivation exists,
even if this knowledge plays havoc with our as- Empathic Emotion: A Possible Source of
sumptions about human nature. If altruistic Altruistic Motivation
motivation is within the human repertoire, then
both who we are as a species and what we are In both earlier philosophical writings and more
capable of doing are quite different than if it is recent psychological works, the most frequently
not. Altruism, if it exists, provides an important mentioned possible source of altruistic motiva-
cornerstone for positive psychology. tion is an other-oriented emotional reaction to
Whether altruism exists is not a new ques- seeing another person in need. This reaction has
tion. This question has been central in Western variously been called “empathy” (Batson, 1987;
thought for centuries, from Aristotle (384–322 Krebs, 1975; Stotland, 1969); “sympathy” (Ei-
b.c.) and St. Thomas Aquinas (1225–1274), senberg & Strayer, 1987; Heider, 1958; Wispé,
through Thomas Hobbes (1588–1679), the Duke 1986, 1991); “sympathetic distress” (Hoffman,
de la Rochefoucauld (1613–1680), David Hume 1981); “tenderness” (McDougall, 1908); and
(1711–1776), Adam Smith (1723–1790), and “pity” or “compassion” (Hume, 1740/1896;
Jeremy Bentham (1748–1832), to Friedrich Smith, 1759/1853). We shall call this other-
Nietzsche (1844–1900) and Sigmund Freud oriented emotion empathy. Empathy has been
(1856–1939). The majority view among Renais- named as a source—if not the source—of altru-
sance and post-Renaissance philosophers, and ism by philosophers ranging from Aquinas to
more recently among biologists and psycholo- Rousseau to Hume to Adam Smith, and by psy-
gists, is that we are, at heart, purely egoistic— chologists ranging from William McDougall to
we care for others only to the extent that their contemporary researchers such as Hoffman
welfare affects ours (see Mansbridge, 1990, and (1981), Krebs (1975), and Batson (1987).
Wallach & Wallach, 1983, for reviews). Formally, we define empathy as an other-
The many forms of self-benefit that can be oriented emotional response elicited by and
derived from helping make the case for univer- congruent with the perceived welfare of some-
sal egoism seem very persuasive. Some forms one else. If the other is perceived to be in need,
of self-benefit are obvious, as when we get ma- then empathic emotions include sympathy,
terial rewards and public praise or when we es- compassion, softheartedness, tenderness, and
cape public censure. But even when we help in the like. It is important to distinguish this
the absence of external rewards, we still may other-oriented emotional response from a num-
benefit. Seeing someone in distress may cause ber of related psychological phenomena, each of
us to feel distress, and we may act to relieve which also has at one time or another been
that person’s distress as an instrumental means called empathy. We have identified seven re-
to relieve our own. Alternatively, we may gain lated concepts from which empathic emotion
self-benefit by feeling good about ourselves for should be distinguished.
being kind and caring, or by escaping the guilt
and shame we might feel if we did not help.
Seven Related Concepts
Even heroes and martyrs can benefit from
their acts of apparent selflessness. Consider the (1) Knowing another person’s internal state, in-
soldier who saves his comrades by diving on a cluding thoughts and feelings. Some clinicians
 CHAPTER 35. EMPATHY AND ALTRUISM 487

and researchers have called knowing another 1902; Darwin, 1871; McDougall, 1908; Mead,
person’s internal state “empathy” (e.g., Broth- 1934; Spencer, 1870; Wundt, 1897). Feeling the
ers, 1989; de Waal, 1996; Dymond, 1950; Koh- same emotion as another also has been called
ler, 1929; Wispé, 1986). Others have called this “fellow feeling” (Hume, 1740/1896; Smith,
knowledge “being empathic” (Rogers, 1975), 1759/1853); “emotional identification” (Freud,
“accurate empathy” (Truax & Carkuff, 1967), 1922), “emotional contagion” (Becker, 1931; de
or “empathic accuracy” (Ickes, 1993). Still oth- Waal, 1996; Hatfield, Cacioppo, & Rapson,
ers speak of “understanding” (Becker, 1931) or 1992; Heider, 1958); “affective reverberation”
“perceiving accurately” (Levenson & Ruef, (Davis, 1985), and “empathic distress” (Hoff-
1992). It might appear that such knowledge is a man, 1981). Although feeling as the other feels
necessary condition for the other-oriented emo- may be an important stepping-stone to the
tional response claimed to evoke altruistic mo- other-oriented feeling that has been claimed to
tivation, but it is not. Empathic emotion re- be a source of altruism, it is neither a necessary
quires that one think one knows the other’s nor a sufficient precondition (Batson, Early, &
state because empathic emotion is based on a Salvarani, 1997). Feeling as the other feels may
perception of the other’s welfare. It does not, actually inhibit feeling for the other if it leads
however, require that this perception be accu- one to become focused on one’s own emotional
rate, or even that it match the other’s percep- state. For example, sensing the nervousness of
tion, which is often the standard used to define other passengers on an airplane in rough
empathic accuracy (Ickes, 1993). An attempt to weather, one may become nervous, too, and fo-
help motivated by empathic feeling is, of course, cused on one’s own nervousness.
more likely to be beneficial if the feeling is (4) Intuiting or projecting oneself into an-
based on an accurate perception of the other’s other’s situation. Projecting oneself into an-
needs. Thus, it is not surprising that clinicians, other’s situation is the psychological state re-
whose primary concern is to help the client, ferred to by Lipps (1903) as Einfülung and for
tend to emphasize accurate perception of the cli- which Titchener (1909) originally coined the
ent’s feelings more than feeling for the client. term “empathy.” This state also has been called
(2) Assuming the posture of an observed “projective empathy” (Becker, 1931). Origi-
other. Assuming the physical posture or atti- nally, these terms were intended to describe an
tude of an observed other is a definition of em- artist’s act of imagining what it would be like
pathy in many dictionaries. Among psycholo- to be some person or, more often, some inani-
gists, however, assuming another’s posture is mate object—such as a gnarled, dead tree on a
more likely to be called “motor mimicry” (Bav- windswept hillside. This original definition of
elas, Black, Lemeray, & Mullett, 1987; Hoff- empathy as aesthetic projection often appears in
man, 1981; Murphy, 1947; Dimberg, Thunberg, dictionaries, but it is rarely what is meant by
& Elmehed, 2000); “physiological sympathy” the term in contemporary psychology (although
(Ribot, 1911); or “imitation” (Becker, 1931; Wispé, 1968, has called this state “aesthetic”
Lipps, 1903; Titchener, 1909). Feeling empathic empathy).
emotion may be facilitated by assuming an- (5) Imagining how another is feeling. Wispé
other’s posture, but assuming the other’s pos- (1968) called imagining how another is feeling
ture is neither necessary nor sufficient to pro- “psychological” empathy in order to differen-
duce empathy as we are using the term. tiate it from the aesthetic empathy just de-
(3) Coming to feel as another person feels. scribed. Stotland (1969) spoke of this as a par-
Feeling the same emotion that another person ticular form of perspective taking—an “imagine
feels also is a common dictionary definition of him” (or, more generally, an “imagine other”)
empathy, and it is a definition used by some perspective. Experimental instructions to adopt
psychologists (Berger, 1962; Eisenberg & this imagine-other perspective often have been
Strayer, 1987; Englis, Vaughan, & Lanzetta, used to induce empathic emotion in participants
1982; Freud, 1922; Stotland, 1969). Among phi- in laboratory research (see Batson, 1991, and
losophers, coming to feel as the other feels is Davis, 1994, for reviews).
more likely to be called “sympathy” (Hume, (6) Imagining how one would think and feel
1740/1896; Smith, 1759/1853). Scientists—in- in the other’s place. Adam Smith (1759/1853)
cluding psychologists—who have been influ- prosaically referred to this act of imagination as
enced by philosophy also typically refer to this “changing places in fancy.” Mead (1934) some-
state as “sympathy” (Allport, 1924; Cooley, times called it “role taking” and sometimes
488 PART VI. INTERPERSONAL APPROACHES

“empathy”; Becker (1931) coined the term feelings. Feeling personal distress is not likely
“mimpathizing.” In the Piagetian tradition, to be a stepping-stone to altruism. Instead, it is
imagining how one would think in the other’s likely to evoke an egoistic motive to relieve
place has been called either “perspective taking” one’s own distress (Batson, Fultz, & Schoen-
or “decentering” (Piaget, 1932/1965; Steins & rade, 1987; Piliavin et al., 1981).
Wicklund, 1996). Stotland (1969) called this an Although distinctions among the eight con-
“imagine-self” perspective, distinguishing it cepts in the empathy cluster are sometimes sub-
from the imagine-other perspective described tle, there seems little doubt that each of these
previously. These imagine-self and imagine- states exists. Indeed, most are familiar experi-
other forms of perspective taking often have ences. Their familiarity, however, should not
been confused or equated in spite of research lead us to ignore their psychological signifi-
evidence suggesting that they should not. When cance. The processes whereby one person can
attending to another person in distress, an sense another’s cares and wishes are truly re-
imagine-other perspective stimulates the other- markable, as are the range of emotions that
oriented emotional response that we are calling these processes can arouse. Some great thinkers
empathy, whereas an imagine-self perspective (e.g., David Hume) have suggested that these
may stimulate empathy but is also likely to processes are the basis for all social perception
elicit more self-oriented feelings of personal dis- and interaction. They are certainly key—and
tress (Batson, Early, & Salvarani, 1997). underappreciated—elements of our social na-
(7) Being upset by another person’s suffer- ture.
ing. The state of personal distress evoked by
seeing another in distress to which we just re-
Empathic Emotion as Situational, Not
ferred has been given a variety of names. It has
Dispositional
been called “sympathetic pain” (McDougall,
1908); “promotive tension” (Hornstein, 1982); Note that all eight of the empathy concepts we
“unpleasant arousal occasioned by observation” have considered are situation specific. None re-
(Piliavin, Dovidio, Gaertner, & Clark, 1981); fers to a general disposition or personality trait.
and “empathy” (Krebs, 1975). Here, one does There may well be individual differences in the
not feel distressed for the other nor distressed ability and inclination to experience these var-
as the other but feels distressed by the state of ious states (see Davis, 1994, for a suggestive dis-
the other. cussion), but attempts to measure these differ-
We have listed these seven other empathy ences by standard retrospective self-report
concepts for three reasons. First, we wish to questionnaires seem suspect at best. Such ques-
point out the range of psychological states to tionnaires are more likely to reveal the degree
which the term empathy has been applied, hop- of desire to see oneself and to be seen by others
ing both to reduce confusion and to discourage as empathic rather than to provide a valid mea-
imperialist attempts to identify it with only one sure of one’s proclivity to be empathic.
of these phenomena. Second, we wish to distin-
guish each of the seven other empathy concepts
from the other-oriented emotional response Testing the Empathy-Altruism
that has been claimed to be a source of altruistic Hypothesis
motivation. Third, we wish to suggest how each
of the other seven concepts relates to this em- The claim that feeling empathic emotion for
pathic emotional response. Most of the other someone in need evokes altruistic motivation to
empathy concepts describe cognitive or percep- relieve that need has been called the empathy-
tual states that are potential precursors to and altruism hypothesis (Batson, 1987, 1991). Ac-
facilitators of empathic emotion (Concepts 1, 2, cording to this hypothesis, the greater the
4, 5, and 6). Two describe alternative emotional empathic emotion, the greater the altruistic mo-
states: feeling as the other feels (Concept 3) and tivation.
feeling personal distress (upset) as a result of Considerable evidence supports the idea that
witnessing the other’s suffering (Concept 7). feeling empathy for a person in need leads to
Feeling as the other feels may serve as a increased helping of that person (Coke, Batson,
stepping-stone to empathic feelings and, hence, & McDavis, 1978; Dovidio, Allen, & Schroeder,
to altruistic motivation, but it also may lead to 1990; Krebs, 1975; see Batson, 1991, and Eisen-
self-focused attention and inhibit other-oriented berg & Miller, 1987, for reviews). To observe
 CHAPTER 35. EMPATHY AND ALTRUISM 489

an empathy-helping relationship, however, tells pothesis does not. Results of experiments test-
us nothing about the nature of the motivation ing these competing predictions have consis-
that underlies this relationship. Increasing the tently supported the empathy-altruism
other person’s welfare could be an ultimate hypothesis, not the aversive-arousal reduction
goal, an instrumental goal sought as a means to explanation. These results cast serious doubt on
the ultimate goal of gaining one or more self- this popular egoistic explanation (see Batson,
benefits, or both. That is, the motivation could 1991, for a review of these experiments).
be altruistic, egoistic, or both.
Three general classes of self-benefits can re-
Empathy-Specific Punishment
sult from helping a person for whom one feels
empathy. Helping enables one to (a) reduce A second egoistic explanation claims that people
one’s empathic arousal, which may be experi- learn through socialization that additional ob-
enced as aversive; (b) avoid possible social and ligation to help, and so additional shame and
self-punishments for failing to help; and (c) gain guilt for failure to help, is attendant on feeling
social and self-rewards for doing what is good empathy for someone in need. As a result, when
and right. The empathy-altruism hypothesis people feel empathy, they are faced with im-
does not deny that these self-benefits of pending social or self-censure beyond any gen-
empathy-induced helping exist. It claims, how- eral punishment associated with not helping.
ever, that with regard to the motivation evoked They say to themselves, “What will others
by empathy, these self-benefits are unintended think—or what will I think of myself—if I
consequences of reaching the ultimate goal of don’t help when I feel like this?” and then they
reducing the other’s need. Advocates of egoistic help out of an egoistic desire to avoid these
alternatives to the empathy-altruism hypothesis empathy-specific punishments. Once again, ex-
disagree; they claim that one or more of these periments designed to test this explanation have
self-benefits is the ultimate goal of empathy- consistently failed to support it; instead, results
induced helping. In the past two decades, more have consistently supported the empathy-
than 25 experiments have tested these three altruism hypothesis (again, see Batson, 1991).
egoistic alternatives to the empathy-altruism
hypothesis.
Empathy-Specific Reward
The third major egoistic explanation claims that
Aversive-Arousal Reduction
people learn through socialization that special
The most frequently proposed egoistic expla- rewards in the form of praise, honor, and pride
nation of the empathy-helping relationship is are attendant on helping a person for whom
aversive-arousal reduction. According to this they feel empathy. As a result, when people feel
explanation, feeling empathy for someone who empathy, they think of these rewards and help
is suffering is unpleasant, and empathically out of an egoistic desire to gain them.
aroused individuals help in order to eliminate The general form of this explanation has been
their empathic feelings. Benefiting the person tested in several experiments and received no
for whom empathy is felt is simply a means to support (Batson et al., 1988, Studies 1 and 5;
this self-serving end. Batson & Weeks, 1996), but two variations have
Researchers have tested the aversive-arousal been proposed for which at least some support
reduction explanation against the empathy- has been claimed. Best known is the negative-
altruism hypothesis by varying the ease of es- state relief explanation proposed by Cialdini et
cape from further exposure to a person in need al. (1987), who suggested that the empathy ex-
without helping. Because empathic arousal is a perienced when witnessing another person’s
result of witnessing the person’s suffering, ei- suffering is a negative affective state—a state of
ther terminating this suffering by helping or temporary sadness or sorrow—and the person
terminating exposure to it by escaping should feeling empathy helps in order to relieve this
reduce one’s own aversive arousal. Escape does negative state.
not, however, enable one to reach the altruistic At first glance, this negative-state relief ex-
goal of relieving the other’s distress. Therefore, planation may appear to be the same as the
the aversive-arousal explanation predicts elimi- aversive-arousal reduction explanation. In fact,
nation of the empathy-helping relationship it is not. Although both explanations begin with
when escape is easy; the empathy-altruism hy- the proposition that feeling empathy for some-
490 PART VI. INTERPERSONAL APPROACHES

one in need involves a negative affective state, now being advanced are more compatible
from this common starting point they diverge. with the view that true altruism—acting
The aversive-arousal reduction explanation with the goal of benefiting another—does
claims that the goal of helping is to eliminate exist and is a part of human nature. (p. 27)
the negative state; the negative-state relief ex-
planation claims that the goal of helping is to Pending new evidence or a plausible new ego-
gain mood-enhancing self-rewards that one has istic explanation of the existing evidence, this
learned are associated with helping. observation seems correct. It appears that the
Although the negative-state relief explana- empathy-altruism hypothesis should—tenta-
tion received some initial support (Cialdini et tively—be accepted as true.
al., 1987; Schaller & Cialdini, 1988), subsequent
researchers have found that this support was
likely due to procedural artifacts. Experiments
Other Possible Sources of Altruistic
avoiding these artifacts have consistently sup-
Motivation
ported the empathy-altruism hypothesis (Bat-
son et al., 1989; Dovidio et al., 1990; Schroeder,
Might there be sources of altruistic motivation
Dovidio, Sibicky, Matthews, & Allen, 1988). It
other than empathic emotion? Several have
now seems clear, therefore, that the motivation
been proposed, including an “altruistic person-
to help evoked by empathy is not directed to-
ality” (Oliner & Oliner, 1988), principled moral
ward the egoistic goal of negative-state relief.
reasoning (Kohlberg, 1976), and internalized
A second variation on an empathy-specific re-
prosocial values (Staub, 1974). There is some
ward explanation was proposed by Smith, Keat-
evidence that each of these potential sources is
ing, and Stotland (1989). They proposed that,
associated with increased motivation to help,
rather than helping to gain the rewards of see-
but as yet it is not clear that this motivation is
ing oneself or being seen by others as a helpful
altruistic. It may be, or it may be an instru-
person, empathically aroused individuals help in
mental means to the egoistic ultimate goals of
order to feel joy at the needy individual’s relief:
maintaining one’s positive self-concept or
“It is proposed that the prospect of empathic
avoiding guilt (Batson, 1991; Batson, Bolen,
joy, conveyed by feedback from the help recip-
Cross, & Neuringer-Benefiel, 1986; Carlo, Ei-
ient, is essential to the special tendency of em-
senberg, Troyer, Switzer, & Speer, 1991; Eisen-
pathic witnesses to help. . . . The empathically
berg et al., 1989). More and better research ex-
concerned witness . . . helps in order to be
ploring these possibilities is needed.
happy” (Smith et al., 1989, p. 641).
Some early self-report data were supportive,
but more rigorous experimental evidence has
failed to support this empathic-joy hypothesis. Two Other Possible Prosocial Motives
Instead, experimental results consistently have
supported the empathy-altruism hypothesis Thinking more broadly, beyond the egoism-
(Batson et al., 1991; Smith et al., 1989). The altruism debate that has been a focus of atten-
empathic-joy hypothesis, like other versions of tion and contention for the past two decades,
the empathy-specific reward explanation, seems might there be other forms of prosocial moti-
unable to account for the empathy-helping re- vation, forms in which the ultimate goal is nei-
lationship. ther to benefit self nor to benefit another indi-
vidual? Two seem worthy of consideration,
collectivism and principlism.
A Tentative Conclusion
Reviewing the empathy-altruism research, as
Collectivism
well as recent literature in sociology, economics,
political science, and biology, Piliavin and Collectivism is motivation to benefit a particular
Charng (1990) observed: group as a whole. The ultimate goal is not to
increase one’s own welfare or the welfare of the
There appears to be a “paradigm shift” specific others who are benefited; the ultimate
away from the earlier position that behavior goal is to increase the welfare of the group. Ro-
that appears to be altruistic must, under byn Dawes and his colleagues put it succinctly:
closer scrutiny, be revealed as reflecting “Not me or thee but we” (Dawes, van de Kragt,
egoistic motives. Rather, theory and data & Orbell, 1988). They suggested that collectivist
 CHAPTER 35. EMPATHY AND ALTRUISM 491

motivation is a product of group identity (Taj- collectivism as well. Philosophers reject appeals
fel, 1981; Turner, 1987). to altruism, especially empathy-induced altru-
As with altruism, what looks like collectivism ism, because feelings of empathy, sympathy,
may actually be a subtle form of egoism. Perhaps and compassion are judged to be too fickle and
attention to group welfare is simply an expres- too circumscribed. Empathy is not felt for
sion of enlightened self-interest. After all, if one everyone in need, at least not in the same de-
recognizes that ignoring group needs and the gree. They reject appeals to collectivism because
public good in headlong pursuit of self-benefit group interest is bounded by the limits of the
will lead to less self-benefit in the long run, then group. Collectivism not only permits but may
one may decide to benefit the group as a means even encourage doing harm to those outside the
to maximize overall self-benefit. Certainly, ap- group. Given these problems with altruism and
peals to enlightened self-interest are commonly collectivism, moral philosophers typically ad-
used by politicians and social activists to encour- vocate prosocial motivation with an ultimate
age response to societal needs: They warn of the goal of upholding a universal and impartial
long-term consequences for oneself and one’s moral principle, such as justice (Rawls, 1971).
children of pollution and squandering natural re- This moral motivation has been called princi-
sources; they remind that if the plight of the plism (Batson, 1994).
poor becomes too severe, the well-off may face Is acting with an ultimate goal of upholding
revolution. Such appeals seem to assume that a moral principle really possible? When Kant
collectivism is simply a form of egoism. (1785/1898, pp. 23–24) briefly shifted from his
The most direct evidence that collectivism is analysis of what ought to be to what is, he ad-
independent of egoism comes from research by mitted that concern we show for others that ap-
Dawes, van de Kragt, and Orbell (1990). They pears to be prompted by duty to principle may
examined the responses of individuals who had actually be prompted by self-love. The goal of
been given a choice between allocating money to upholding a moral principle may only be an in-
themselves or to a group. Allocation to oneself strumental means to reach the ultimate goal of
maximized individual but not group profit; allo- self-benefit. If this is true, then principle-based
cation to the group maximized collective but not motivation is actually egoistic.
individual profit. Dawes et al. found that if indi- The self-benefits of upholding a moral prin-
viduals faced with this dilemma made their allo- ciple are conspicuous. One can gain the social
cation after discussing it with other members of and self-rewards of being seen and seeing one-
the group, they gave more to the group than if self as a good person. One also can avoid the
they had no prior discussion. Moreover, this ef- social and self-punishments of shame and guilt
fect was specific to the in-group with whom the for failing to do the right thing. As Freud (1930)
discussion occurred; allocation to an out-group suggested, society may inculcate such principles
was not enhanced. Based on this research, Dawes in the young in order to bridle their antisocial
et al. (1990) claimed evidence for collectivist mo- impulses by making it in their best personal in-
tivation independent of egoism, arguing that terest to act morally (also see Campbell, 1975).
their procedure ruled out the two most plausible Alternatively, through internalization (Staub,
egoistic explanations—enlightened self-interest 1989) or development of moral reasoning
and socially instilled conscience. There is reason (Kohlberg, 1976; Gilligan, 1982), principles may
to doubt, however, that their procedure effec- come to be valued in their own right and not
tively ruled out self-rewards and self- simply as instrumental means to self-serving
punishments associated with conscience. We ends.
may have a standard or norm that says “share The issue here is the same one faced with
with your buddies” rather than one that simply altruism and collectivism. Once again, we need
says “share.” So, although this research is im- to know the nature of a prosocial motive. Is the
portant and suggestive, more and better evidence desire to uphold justice (or some other moral
is needed to justify the conclusion that collectiv- principle) an instrumental goal on the way to
ist motivation is not reducible to egoism. the ultimate goal of self-benefit? If so, then this
desire is a subtle and sophisticated form of ego-
ism. Alternatively, is upholding the principle an
Principlism
ultimate goal, with the ensuing self-benefits un-
Most moral philosophers argue for the impor- intended consequences? If so, then principlism
tance of a prosocial motive other than egoism. is a fourth type of prosocial motivation, inde-
Most since Kant (1724–1804) shun altruism and pendent of egoism, altruism, and collectivism.
492 PART VI. INTERPERSONAL APPROACHES

Results of recent research suggest that people Prosocial values usually are assumed to be
often act so as to appear moral while, if possible, mutually supportive and cooperative; concern
avoiding the cost of actually being moral; this for the welfare of others and concern for the
sham morality has been called moral hypocrisy welfare of the society are assumed to be moral
(Batson, Kobrynowicz, Dinnerstein, Kampf, & (Hoffman, 1989; Staub, 1989). If, however, the
Wilson, 1997; Batson, Thompson, Seuferling, different values evoke different ultimate goals
Whitney, & Strongman, 1999). Results of this and therefore different motives, they may at
research also suggest that if moral motivation times conflict rather than cooperate. For exam-
exists, it is easily overpowered by self-interest. ple, concern for the welfare of a specific other
Many of us are, it seems, quite adept at moral person (altruism) may conflict not only with
rationalization. We are good at justifying to self-interest but also with concern for the wel-
ourselves—if not to others—why a situation fare of the group as a whole (collectivism) or
that benefits us or those we care about does not concern to uphold a moral principle (princi-
violate our moral principles: why, for example, plism). Evidence of such conflicts has been
storing our nuclear waste in someone else’s found (Batson, Ahmad, et al., 1999; Batson, Bat-
backyard is fair; why terrorist attacks by our son, et al., 1995; Batson, Klein, Highberger, &
side are regrettable but necessary evils, whereas Shaw, 1995).
terrorist attacks by the other side are atrocities; To entertain the possibility of multiple pro-
why we must obey orders, even if it means kill- social motives (egoism, altruism, collectivism,
ing innocent people. The abstractness of most and principlism) based on multiple prosocial
moral principles, and their multiplicity, makes values (self, other, group, principle) begs for a
such rationalization easy. better understanding of cognitive representation
But this may be only part of the story. Per- of the self-other relationship. Several represen-
haps upholding a moral principle can serve as tations have been proposed. Concern for an-
an ultimate goal, defining a form of motivation other’s welfare may be a product of: (a) a sense
independent of egoism. If so, then perhaps these of we-ness based on cognitive unit formation or
principles can provide a rational basis for re- identification with the other’s situation (Horn-
sponding to the needs of others that transcends stein, 1982; Lerner, 1982); (b) the self expand-
reliance on self-interest or on vested interest in ing to incorporate the other (Aron & Aron,
and feeling for the welfare of certain other in- 1986); (c) empathic feeling for the other, who
dividuals or groups. This is quite an “if,” but it remains distinct from self (Batson & Shaw,
seems well worth conducting research to find 1991; Jarymowicz, 1992); (d) the self being re-
out. defined at a group level, where me and thee be-
come interchangeable parts of a self that is we
(Dawes et al., 1988; Turner, 1987); or (e) the
Toward a General Model of self dissolving in devotion to something outside
Prosocial Motivation itself, whether another person, a group, or a
principle (James, 1910/1982).
Staub (1989) and Schwartz (1992) have for Most of these proposals seem plausible, some
many years emphasized the importance of val- even profound. Yet not all can be true, at least
ues as determinants of prosocial behavior. Bat- not at the same time. Based on research to date,
son (1994) has proposed a general model that it appears that empathic feelings are not a prod-
links prosocial values and motives: The value uct of self-other merging (Batson, Sager, et al.,
underlying egoism is enhanced personal wel- 1997; Cialdini, Brown, Lewis, Luce, & Neuberg,
fare; the value underlying altruism is the en- 1997), but the effect on one’s self-concept of
hanced welfare of one or more individuals as caring for people, groups, and principles is not,
individuals; the value underlying collectivism is as yet, well understood.
enhanced group welfare; and the value under-
lying principlism is upholding a moral principle.
Four experiments have provided evidence for Theoretical Implications of the Empathy-
the predicted link between empathic emotion— Altruism Relationship
a source of altruistic motivation—and valuing
another individual’s welfare (Batson, Turk, Returning to the empathy-altruism relation-
Shaw, & Klein, 1995); the other value-motive ship, it is clear that this relationship has broad
links await test. theoretical implications. Universal egoism—the
 CHAPTER 35. EMPATHY AND ALTRUISM 493

assumption that all human behavior is ulti- tightly tied to the welfare even of those who
mately directed toward self-benefit—has long were not close kin (Hoffman, 1981).
dominated not only psychology but also other William McDougall (1908) long ago described
social and behavioral sciences (Campbell, 1975; these links in his depiction of the “parental in-
Mansbridge, 1990; Wallach & Wallach, 1983). stinct.” As with all of McDougall’s theorized in-
If individuals feeling empathy act, at least in stincts, the parental instinct involved cognitive,
part, with an ultimate goal of increasing the affective, and conative (motivational) compo-
welfare of another, then the assumption of uni- nents: Cues of distress from one’s offspring, in-
versal egoism must be replaced by a more com- cluding cognitively adopted offspring (e.g., a
plex view of motivation that allows for altruism pet), evoke what McDougall called “the tender
as well as egoism. Such a shift in our view of emotion” (our “empathy”), which in turn pro-
motivation requires, in turn, a revision of our duces altruistic motivation. Although few psy-
underlying assumptions about human nature chologists would wish to return to McDougall’s
and human potential. It implies that we humans emphasis on instincts, his attempt to integrate
may be more social than we have thought: (a) valuing based on cognitive generalization of
Other people can be more to us than sources of the perception of offspring in distress, (b) em-
information, stimulation, and reward as we each pathic (sympathetic, compassionate, tender)
seek our own welfare. We have the potential to emotional response, and (c) goal-directed altru-
care about their welfare as well. istic motivation seems at least as much a blue-
The empathy-altruism relationship forces print for the future as a curio from the past.
us to face the question of why empathic feel-
ings exist. What evolutionary function do they
serve? Admittedly speculative, the most plau- Practical Implications of the Empathy-
sible answer relates empathic feelings to Altruism Relationship
parenting among higher mammals, in which
offspring live for some time in a very vulner- The empathy-altruism relationship also has
able state (de Waal, 1996; Hoffman, 1981; Mc- broad practical implications. Given the power of
Dougall, 1908; Zahn-Waxler & Radke-Yarrow, empathic feelings to evoke altruistic motivation,
1990). Were parents not intensely interested in people may sometimes suppress or avoid these
the welfare of their progeny, these species feelings. Loss of the capacity to feel empathy
would quickly die out. Empathic feelings for for clients may be a factor, possibly a central
offspring—and the resulting altruistic mo- one, in the experience of burnout among case
tivation—may promote one’s reproductive po- workers in the helping professions (Maslach,
tential not by increasing the number of 1982). Aware of the extreme effort involved in
offspring but by increasing the chance of their helping or the impossibility of helping effec-
survival. tively, these case workers—or nurses caring for
Of course, empathic feelings extend well be- terminal patients, or even pedestrians con-
yond one’s own children. People can feel em- fronted by the homeless—may try to avoid
pathy for a wide range of targets (including feeling empathy in order to avoid the resulting
nonhumans), as long as there is no preexisting altruistic motivation (Shaw, Batson, & Todd,
antipathy (Batson, 1991; Krebs, 1975; Shelton 1994; Stotland, Mathews, Sherman, Hansson, &
& Rogers, 1981). From an evolutionary per- Richardson, 1978).
spective, this extension is usually attributed to More positively, the empathy-altruism rela-
cognitive generalization whereby one “adopts” tionship suggests the use of empathy-based so-
others, making it possible to evoke the primitive cialization practices to enhance prosocial behav-
and fundamental impulse to care for progeny ior, practices that are very different from the
when these adopted others are in need (Batson, currently dominant practices involving inhibi-
1987; Hoffman, 1981; MacLean, 1973). Such tion of egoistic impulses through shaping, mod-
cognitive generalization may be facilitated by eling, and internalized guilt (see Batson, 1991,
human cognitive capacity, including symbolic for some suggestions). Further, therapeutic pro-
thought, and the lack of evolutionary advantage grams built around facilitating altruistic im-
for sharp discrimination of empathic feelings in pulses by encouraging perspective taking and
early human small hunter-gatherer bands. In empathic feelings might enable individuals to
these bands, those in need were often one’s chil- develop more satisfactory interpersonal rela-
dren or close kin, and one’s own welfare was tions, especially those that are long term. There
494 PART VI. INTERPERSONAL APPROACHES

may be personal health benefits as well (Luks, is no compelling research evidence to support
1988; Williams, 1989). these proposals.
At a societal level, experiments have indicated Thinking beyond the egoism-altruism debate,
that empathy-induced altruism can be used to two additional forms of prosocial motivation
improve attitudes toward stigmatized out- seem especially worthy of consideration: collec-
groups. Empathy inductions have been used to tivism and principlism. Collectivism—motiva-
improve racial attitudes, as well as attitudes to- tion with the ultimate goal of benefiting some
ward people with AIDS, the homeless, and even group or collective as a whole—has been
convicted murderers (Batson, Polycarpou, et al., claimed to result from group identity. Princi-
1997; Dovidio, Gaertner, & Johnson, 1999). plism—motivation with the ultimate goal of
Empathy-induced altruism also has been found upholding some moral principle—has long been
to increase cooperation in a competitive situa- advocated by religious teachers and moral phi-
tion (a Prisoner’s Dilemma)—even when one losophers. Whether either is a separate form of
knows that the person for whom one feels em- motivation, independent of and irreducible to
pathy has acted competitively (Batson & Ah- egoism, is not yet clear. Research done to test
mad, 2001; Batson & Moran, 1999). the independent status of empathy-induced al-
truism may serve as a useful model for future
research assessing the independent status of col-
lectivism and principlism.
Conclusions We know more now than we did a few years
ago about why people help. As a result, we
Why do people help others, even at considerable know more about human motivation, and even
cost to themselves? What does this behavior tell about human nature. These are substantial
us about the human capacity to care, about the gains. Still, many questions remain about the
degree of interconnectedness among us, about emotional and motivational resources that could
how social an animal we humans really are? be tapped to build a more caring, humane so-
These classic philosophical questions have re- ciety. Providing answers to these questions is,
surfaced in the behavioral and social sciences in we believe, an important agenda item for posi-
the past several decades. Psychological research tive psychology.
has focused on the claim that empathic emotion
evokes altruistic motivation—motivation with
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