Republic of the Philippines

Supreme Court
Manila

EN BANC

ATTY. HOWARD M. CALLEJA,

ATTY. JOSEPH PETER J.
CALLEJA, ATTY.
CHRISTOPHER JOHN P. LAO,
DE LA SALLE BROTHERS, INC.,
as represented by Br. Armin
A. Luistro, FSC, DR.
REYNALDO J. ECHAVEZ,
NAPOLEON L. SIONGCO, and
RAEYAN M. REPOSAR,
Petitioners,
G.R. No. 252578
- versus - Petition for Certiorari
and Prohibition with
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, prayer for TRO
NATIONAL SECURITY
ADVISER, SECRETARY OF
FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
SECRETARY OF NATIONAL
DEFENSE, SECRETARY OF
INTERIOR AND LOCAL
GOVERNMENT, SECRETARY
OF FINANCE, SECRETARY OF
JUSTICE, SECRETARY OF
INFORMATION AND
COMMUNICATIONS
TECHNOLOGY, and
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR OF THE
ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING
COUNCIL (AMLC),

Respondents.
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

REP. EDCEL C. LAGMAN

Petitioner, G.R. No. 252579
Petition for Certiorari
- versus - and Prohibition with
prayer for TRO
CONSOLIDATED COMMENT
Calleja, et a. v. Executive Secretary, et al.
GR. Nos. 252578-80, 252585, 252613, 252623-24 and 252646
x-------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
SALVADOR C. MEDIALDEA,
ANTI-TERRORISM COUNCIL
(ATC), ANTI-MONEY
LAUNDERING COUNCIL
(AMLC), SENATE OF THE
REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, represented by
SENATE PRESIDENT VICENTE
C. SOTTO III, and THE HOUSE
OF REPRESENTATIVES,
represented by SPEAKER
ALAN PETER S. CAYETANO,
Respondents.
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x

MELENCIO S. STA. MARIA,

EIRENE JHONE E. AGUILA,
GIDEON V. PEÑA, MICHAEL T.
TIU, JR., FRANCIS EUSTON R.
ACERO, PAUL CORNELIUS T.
CASTILLO, and EUGENE T.
KAW,
Petitioners,
G.R. No. 252580
- versus - Petition for Certiorari
and Prohibition with
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY prayer for TRO
SALVADOR C. MEDIALDEA,
SECRETARY OF JUSTICE
MENARDO I. GUEVARRA, THE
ANTI-TERRORISM COUNCIL,
ARMED FORCES OF THE
PHILIPPINES CHIEF OF STAFF
FILEMON SANTOS, JR.,
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL
POLICE CHIEF ARCHIE
FRANCISCO F. GAMBOA,
NATIONAL SECURITY
ADVISER HERMOGENES C.
ESPERON, JR., SECRETARY OF
FOREIGN AFFAIRS TEODORO

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L. LOCSIN, JR., SECRETARY OF

THE INTERIOR AND LOCAL
GOVERNMENT EDUARDO M.
AÑO, SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
DELFIN N. LORENZANA,
SECRETARY OF FINANCE
CARLOS G. DOMINGUEZ III,
SECRETARY OF INFORMATION
AND COMMUNICATIONS
TECHNOLOGY GREGORIO
HONASAN II, and ANTI-
MONEY LAUNDERING
COUNCIL EXECUTIVE
DIRECTOR MEL GEORGIE B.
RACELA,
Respondents.
x-------------------x

BAYAN MUNA PARTY-LIST

REPRESENTATIVES CARLO
ISAGANI T. ZARATE,
FERDINAND GAITE AND
EUFEMIA CULLAMAT;
GABRIELA WOMEN’S PARTY
REPRESENTATIVE ARLENE D.
BROSAS; ACT-TEACHERS
PARTY-LIST
REPRESENTATIVE FRANCE L.
CASTRO; KABATAAN
PARTYLIST REPRESENTATIVE
SARAH JANE I. ELAGO;
BAYAN MUNA PARTY-LIST
PRESIDENT, SATURNINO
OCAMPO; MAKABAYAN CO-
CHAIRPERSON LIZA
LARGOZA MAZA; BAYAN
MUNA PARTY-LIST
CHAIRPERSON NERI J.
COLMENARES; ACT-
TEACHERS PARTY-LIST
PRESIDENT ANTONIO TINIO,
AND ANAKPAWIS PARTY-
LIST VICE-PRESIDENT ARIEL

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CASILAO, and MAKABAYAN

SECRETARY GENERAL,
NATHANAEL SANTIAGO,
Petitioners,

- versus - G.R. No. 252585

Petition for Certiorari
PRESIDENT RODRIGO and Prohibition with
DUTERTE, EXECUTIVE prayer for TRO
SECRETARY SALVADOR
MEDIALDEA, AND THE ANTI-
TERRORISM COUNCIL,
REPRESENTED BY ITS
CHAIRMAN SALVADOR
MEDIALDEA,
Respondents.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

RUDOLF PHILIP B. JURADO,

Petitioner,

- versus - G.R. No. 252613

Petition for Certiorari
THE ANTI-TERRORISM and Prohibition with
COUNCIL, THE EXECUTIVE prayer for TRO
SECRETARY, SECRETARY OF
JUSTICE, SECRETARY OF
FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
SECRETARY OF NATIONAL
DEFENSE, THE SECRETARY OF
THE INTERIOR AND LOCAL
GOVERNMENT, SECRETARY
OF FINANCE, THE NATIONAL
SECURITY ADVISER, CHIEF
OF STAFF OF THE ARMED
FORCES OF THE
PHILIPPINES, DIRECTOR
GENERAL OF THE PHILIPPINE
NATIONAL POLICE, THE
SENATE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, AND THE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
OF THE PHILIPPINES,

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Respondents.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

CENTER FOR TRADE UNION

AND HUMAN RIGHTS
(CTUHR), REPRESENTED BY
DAISY ARAGO, PRO-LABOR
LEGAL ASSISTANCE CENTER
(PLACE), REPRESENTED BY
ATTY. NOEL V. NERI,
ARMANDO TEODORO, JR.,
VIOLETA ESPIRITU, and
VIRGINIA FLORES,
Petitioners,

- versus - G.R. No. 252623

Petition for Certiorari
HON. RODRIGO R. DUTERTE, and Prohibition with
IN HIS CAPACITY AS prayer for TRO
PRESIDENT AND
COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF OF
THE REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, HON.
SALVADOR MEDIALDEA, AS
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY,
ANTI-TERRORISM COUNCIL
(ATC), ARMED FORCES OF
THE PHILIPPINE (AFP),
REPRESENTED BY LT. GEN.
FELIMON SANTOS JR. and the
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL
POLICE (PNP), REPRESENTED
BY LT. GEN. ARCHIE GAMBOA,
Respondents.
x - - - - - - -- - - - - - - - - - - - -x

CHRISTIAN S. MONSOD,
FELICITAS A. ARROYO, RAY
PAOLO J. SANTIAGO,
AMPARITA STA. MARIA,
MARIA ILSEA W. SALVADOR,
MARIANNE CARMEL B.
AGUNOY, XAMANTHA XOFIA

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A. SANTOS, MARIA PAULA S.

VILLARIN, PAULA SOPHIA
ESTRELLA, IGNATIUS
MICHAEL D. INGLES,
ERNESTO B. NERI, FR.
ALBERT E. ALEJO, S.J., PAULA
ZAYCO ABERASTURI,
WYANET AISHA ELIORA M.
ALCIBAR, SENTRONG MGA
NAGKAKAISA AT
PROGRESIBONG
MANGGAGAWA (SENTRO),
represented by its Secretary-
General JOSUA T. MATA,
Petitioners,

- versus - G.R. No. 252624

Petition for Certiorari
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY and Prohibition with
SALVADOR C. MEDIALDEA, prayer for TRO
NATIONAL SECURITY
ADVISER HERMOGENES C.
ESPERON, JR., DEPARTMENT
OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
SECRETARY TEODORO L.
LOCSIN, JR., DEPARTMENT OF
NATIONAL DEFENSE
SECRETARY DELFIN N.
LORENZANA, DEPARTMENT
OF INTERIOR AND LOCAL
GOVERNMENT SECRETARY
EDUARDO M. AÑO,
DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE
SECRETARY CARLOS G.
DOMINGUEZ III,
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
SECRETARY MENARDO I.
GUEVARRA, DEPARTMENT OF
INFORMATION AND
COMMUNICATIONS
TECHNOLOGY GREGORIO B.
HONASAN II, ANTI-MONEY-
LAUNDERING COUNCIL

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EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR MEL

GEORGIE B. RACELA, ALL
MEMBERS OF THE ANTI-
TERRORISM COUNCIL,
ARMED FORCES OF THE
PHILIPPINES CHIEF OF
STAFF GENERAL FILEMON
SANTOS, JR., PHILIPPINE
NATIONAL POLICE CHIEF
GENERAL ARCHIE FRANCISCO
F. GAMBOA,
Respondents.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

SANLAKAS, represented by
Marie Marguerite M. Lopez,
Petitioner,

- versus - G.R. No. 252646

Petition for Certiorari
RODRIGO R. DUTERTE, as and Prohibition with
President and Commander- prayer for TRO
in-Chief of All the Armed
Forces, SENATE, and HOUSE
OF REPRESENTATIVES,
Respondents.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

CONSOLIDATED COMMENT

Respondents President Rodrigo Roa Duterte, Executive

Secretary Salvador C. Medialdea, National Security Adviser
Hermogenes C. Esperon, Secretary of Foreign Affairs Teodoro
L. Locsin, Jr., Secretary of National Defense Delfin N.
Lorenzana, Secretary of the Interior and Local Government
Eduardo M. Año, Secretary of Finance Carlos G. Dominguez
III, Secretary of Justice Menardo I. Guevarra, Secretary of
Information and Communications Technology Gregorio
Honasan II, Anti-Money Laundering Council Executive
Director Mel Georgie B. Racela, Senate of the Philippines,

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represented by Senate President Vicente C. Sotto III, House

of Representatives, represented by Speaker Alan Peter
Cayetano, The Anti-Terrorism Council, Armed Forces of the
Philippines Chief of Staff Filemon Santos, Jr., and Philippine
National Police Chief Archie Francisco F. Gamboa, through the
OFFICE OF THE SOLICITOR GENERAL (OSG), respectfully
submit this Consolidated Comment.

PREFATORY STATEMENT

The sovereign Filipino people ordained and promulgated

the 1987 Philippine Constitution not only to build a just and
humane society but to establish, as well, a Government that
shall secure for all and posterity the “blessings of
independence and democracy under the rule of law and a
regime of truth, justice, freedom, love, equality, and peace.”1

In fulfilling its duty to preserve peace and national

security, the Government has been balancing upon its broad
shoulders the yoke of private interests and individual rights
vis-à-vis public interests and the common good. To this end,
the Government has done its part to enlist patriotic men and
women in the frontlines against international and domestic
security challenges.

These security challenges, however, have never been

daunting and difficult as they are now. Due to advances in
technology, unscrupulous individuals who have nothing but
hatred in their hearts, and blood in their hands have extended
their doctrinal reach and influence, and the dark days of
terrorism have dawned.

As aptly put by the National Security Council:

The terrorist threat posed by local

communist terrorist groups continue to threaten
the lives, properties, and freedoms of the
Filipino people. They hamper the country's
potential economic gains and progress.

1
Preamble of the 1987 Philippine Constitution

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The threat from ISIS-affiliated groups

remains despite their resounding defeat in
Marawi, which is now undergoing reconstruction
and rehabilitation.

Elsewhere, in areas where there are local

terrorist groups such as the Abu Sayyaf, Maute
and the BIFF, the operations will be relentless.
More security forces will be deployed, as
necessary.

In addition, the country also faces continuous and

aggressive security threats from the New People’s Army (NPA)
of the Communist Party of the Philippines, National
Democratic Front (CPP-NDF), which is listed as a terrorist
organization by the United States of America (USA), the
European Union (EU), the United Kingdom (UK), Australia,
Canada, and New Zealand. Also, foreign security threats
posed by extremist networks like the Islamic State in Iraq and
Syria (ISIS) and the Jemaah Islamiyah cannot be discounted. 2

Now, more than ever, the response of the Government

against terrorism is critical. And respond, it did.

On July 3, 2020, President Rodrigo Roa Duterte signed

into law Republic Act No. 11479, otherwise known as the Anti-
Terrorism Act of 2020 (“Anti-Terrorism Act” for brevity).

The Anti-Terrorism Act is the embodiment of the State’s

policy “to protect life, liberty, and property from terrorism, to
condemn terrorism as inimical and dangerous to national
security of the country and to the welfare of the people, and
to make terrorism a crime against the Filipino people, against
humanity, and against the Law of Nations.”3

But like any other law that has implications on individual

rights, the Anti-Terrorism Act has been unfairly stigmatized as
a mere legal ruse to quell oppositions against the current
administration. Moreover, it has also been claimed that the

2
https://theaseanpost.com/article/why-philippines-needs-anti-terror-bill, last accessed on July 14, 2020.
3
Section 2, Anti-Terrorism Act.

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law is susceptible to governmental abuse by the military and

law enforcement agencies.

It is in the foregoing context that the respondents view

this Consolidated Comment as an opportunity to allay the
fears of the Filipino nation and to remind it that the
Government should not be perceived as the enemy. As
ordained in the Constitution, the Government remains
dedicated to its avowed duty to maintain a regime of truth,
justice, freedom, love, equality, and peace for this generation
and for the generations to come.

THE SUBSTANTIVE AND PROCEDURAL FACTS

1. On March 6, 2007, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9372 or

the Human Security Act of 2007 (“Human Security Act” for
short) was signed into law. Said Act defined the crime of
terrorism.4 In the same year, various groups challenged its
constitutionality before this Honorable Court. On October 5,
2010, this Honorable Court, in Southern Hemisphere
Engagement Network, Inc., et al. v. Anti-Terrorism Council, et
al.,5 dismissed the petitions on procedural grounds.

2. Years after the implementation of the Human

Security Act, terrorism in the country had become more

4
SEC. 3. Terrorism. — Any person who commits an act punishable under any of the following provisions
of the Revised Penal Code:
a. Article 122 (Piracy in General and Mutiny in the High Seas or in the Philippine Waters);
b. Article 134 (Rebellion or Insurrection);
c. Article 134-a (Coup d’Etat), including acts committed by private persons;
d. Article 248 (Murder);
e. Article 267 (Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention);
f. Article 324 (Crimes Involving Destruction), or under
(1) Presidential Decree No. 1613 (The Law on Arson);
(2) Republic Act No. 6969 (Toxic Substances and Hazardous and Nuclear Waste Control Act of
1990);
(3) Republic Act No. 5207, (Atomic Energy Regulatory and Liability Act of 1968);
(4) Republic Act No. 6235 (Anti-Hijacking Law);
(5) Presidential Decree No. 532 (Anti-Piracy and Anti-Highway Robbery Law of 1974); and,
(6) Presidential Decree No. 1866, as amended (Decree Codifying the Laws on Illegal and Unlawful
Possession, Manufacture, Dealing in, Acquisition or Disposition of Firearms, Ammunitions or
Explosives)
thereby sowing and creating a condition of widespread and extraordinary fear and panic among the
populace, in order to coerce the government to give in to an unlawful demand shall be guilty of the crime
of terrorism and shall suffer the penalty of forty (40) years of imprisonment, without the benefit of parole
as provided for under Act No. 4103, otherwise known as the Indeterminate Sentence Law, as amended.
5
G.R. Nos. 178552, 178554, 178581, 178890, 179157, and 179461, October 5, 2010.

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complex and malevolent. For instance, when the ISIS terror

group continued to lose ground in Iraq and Syria, its members
and sympathizers brought the fight here in Southeast Asia.
Eventually, the notoriety of the ISIS in the Middle East
attracted the attention of extremist groups in the Philippines.
Based on the 2018 Global Terrorism Index released by the
Institute for Economics and Peace (IEP), the Philippines ranked
tenth worldwide, making it worse affected by terrorism than
South Sudan, Democratic Republic of Congo and Libya.6 In
fact, the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) has obtained
an ISIS’ propaganda material, Dabiq, which reports that as
early as November 2014, a number of groups in the Philippines
had already pledged their allegiance to the caliphate.7

3. Recently, local terrorist groups perpetrated

bombing attacks which resulted in a number of casualties,
such as: the January 27, 2019 Jolo Cathedral suicide bombing, 8
the April 3, 20199 and September 7, 201910 Isulan bombings,
and the June 28, 201911 Indanan suicide bombing perpretrated
by the first known Filipino suicide bomber, and the September
8, 201912 bombing also in Indanan, Sulu. All these incidents
proved that the Human Security Act has failed in terms of its
efficacy as a counter-terrorism measure, despite the real and
present threats presented by terrorists.13

4. To eliminate this evident difficulty in curbing

terrorism and to strengthen the law enforcement aspect of the
counter-terrorism measures, the members of the Senate and
the House of Representatives filed several bills, viz.:

6
Explanatory Note of Senate Bill No.6 authored by Senator Vicente Sotto III; citations omitted.
7
Dabiq: Remaining and Expanding (Muharram 1436 or November 2014) ; Annex “1
8
20 Dead After Bombing of Cathedral in Southern Philippines, https://thediplomat.com/2019/01/20-dead-
after-bombing-of-cathedral-in-southern-philippines/, last accessed on July 11, 2020.
9
At least 18 injured in Sultan Kudarat explosion, https://www.rappler.com/nation/227333-isulan-sultan-
kudarat-explosion-april-2019, last accessed on July 11, 2020.
10
At least 7 hurt in Isulan IED explosion, https://newsinfo.inquirer.net/1161960/at-least-7-hurt-in-isulan-ied-
explosion, last accessed on July 11, 2020.
11
Philippines: 1st known Filipino suicide attacker identified,
https://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory/philippines-1st-filipino-suicide-attacker-identified-
64078506, last accessed on July 11, 2020.
12
Indanan, Sulu suicide bomber a Female: PNP, https://www.pna.gov.ph/articles/1080653, last accessed on
July 11, 2020.
13
Panfilo M. Lacson, Sponsorship Speech for the Anti-Terrorism Act of 2019 (18th Congress),
https://pinglacson.net/2019/10/02/sponsorship-speech-for-the-anti-terrorism-act-of-2019-18th-congress/,
last accessed on July 16, 2020.

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Bills filed in the Senate

a. Senate Bill No. 6, introduced by Senator

Vicente Sotto III, entitled “An Act Amending
R.A. 9372, otherwise known as The Act to
Secure the State and Protect our People from
Terrorism or The Human Security Act (HSA) of
2007, Appropriating Funds therefor and for
Other Purposes”;

b. Senate Bill No. 21, introduced by Senator

Panfilo Lacson, entitled “An Act Amending
Certain Provisions of Republic Act No. 9372,
otherwise known as ‘An Act to Secure the
State and Protect Our People from Terrorism’”;
and

c. Senate Bill No. 630, introduced by Senator

Imee Marcos, entitled “An Act to Combat
Terrorism and Secure the Nation, Amending
for this Purpose Certain Provisions of Republic
Act No. 9372, Otherwise known as ‘Human
Security Act of 2007’ and Other Laws’”.

Bills filed in the House of Representatives:

a. House Bill No. 551 authored by Rep. Rozzano

Rufino Biazon, entitled “An Act Amending
Certain Provisions of Republic Act No. 9372
entitled: An Act to Secure the State and
Protect our People from Terrorism, Otherwise
known as “The Human Security Act of 2007”;

b. House Bill No. 2082 authored by Rep. Jericho

Jonas Nograles, entitled “An Act Amending
certain provisions of Republic Act No. 9372,
Otherwise known as “An Act to Secure the
State and Protect our People from Terrorism”

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c. House Bill No. 2847 authored by Rep. Luis

Raymund “LRay” Villafuerte, entitled “An Act
Amending Certain Provisions of Republic Act
No. 9372, Otherwise Known as “An Act to
Secure and Protect our People from
Terrorism”;

d. House Bill No. 3103 authored by Rep. Michael

Odylon Romero, entitled “An Act Amending
Republic Act No. 9372, Providing for Stiffer
Penalties and Sanctions, and for Other
Purposes”;

e. House Bill No. 3413 authored by Reps. Jocelyn

Tulfo, Eric Yap and Rowena Niña Taduran,
entitled “An Act Amending Certain Provisions
of Republic Act No. 9372 otherwise known as
an Act to Secure the State and Our People
from Terrorism”; and

f. House Bill No. 5710 authored by Rep. Lianda

Bolilia, entitled “An Amending Republic Act No.
9372 Othewise Known as Act to Secure the
State and Our People from Terrorism or the
Human Security Act of 2007, Appropriating
Funds therefor and for Other Purposes.”

5. These bills recognized the pressing need to amend

the Human Security Act, as the circumstances under which
said law was enacted had significantly altered. Terrorist acts,
or the threat of such acts, have become more serious, violent
and are being undertaken in a more complicated and
systematic manner.14

6. The decision point for the Philippine Congress

appeared to be the Marawi siege in 2017, as it took five long
months for the government to terminate all combat
operations in Marawi. The armed confrontation between the
government and the pro-ISIS militants in Marawi caused the
massive deaths of civilians and military alike, the devastation
of the groundwork and the displacement of the people and

14
Explanatory Note of House Bill No. 551, authored by Rep. Rozanno Biazon.

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their livelihood.15 This siege of Marawi City uncovered the

gaps in the Human Security Act.16

7. Moreover, a stronger anti-terrorism law is also

necessary for the Philippines to comply with its international
obligations, particularly those under United Nations Security
Council Resolution (UNSC) Resolution No. 1373,17 and those
under UNSC Resolutions Nos. 1456,18 1566,19 and 1624.20 In
particular, UNSC Resolution No. 1373 directs member States,
such as the Philippines, to prohibit their nationals from
making funds, financial services, or economic resources
available to those who commit terrorist acts, among others.

8. In addition, the enactment of the Anti-Terrorism

Act is absolutely necessary to avoid the risk of having the
Philippines included in the Financial Action Task Force’s
(FATF’s) grey list of countries (and territories) with strategic
deficiencies in its anti-money laundering/counter-terrorism
financing (AML/CTF) framework. Grey-listing will have a
negative impact on the reputation of the economy, and on the
cost of doing business by our Filipino citizens abroad, both as
an individual and a juridical entity. 21

9. On August 13, 2019, the Senate Committees on

National Defense and Security, Peace, Unification and
Reconciliation and Finance jointly conducted a hearing on SB
Nos. 6, 21 and 630. Thereafter, on September 30, 2019, the
said Senate Committees submitted Committee Report No. 9
which recommended that Senate Bill (SB) No. 1083 entitled
“An Act to Prevent, Prohibit and Penalize Terrorism, thereby
Repealing Republic Act No. 9372, otherwise known as the
‘Human Security Act of 2007’” or “The Anti-Terrorism Act of
2020”, substitute SB Nos. 6, 21, and 630.

15
Explanatory Note of Senate Bill No. 6 authored by Senator Vicente Sotto III.
16
Explanatory Note of Senate Bill No. 21 authored by Senator Panfilo Lacson.
17
Threats to International Peace and Security Caused by Terrorist Acts, Annex “11”.
18
High-level Meeting of the Security Council: Combating Terrorism, Annex “12”.
19
Threats to International Peace and Security Caused by Terrorist Acts, Annex “13”.
20
Threats to International Peace and Security (Security Council Summit 2005), Annex “14”.
21
Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering (APG), Anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing
measures in the Philippines, http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/mer-fsrb/APG-
Mutual-Evaluation-Report-Philippines.pdf, last accessed on July 16, 2020.

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10. On October 2, 2019 and November 5, 2019, SB

No. 1083 was sponsored in the plenary. On December 17,
2019, January 21 and 27, 2020, the Senate extensively
discussed and deliberated upon said bill on the floor. During
the deliberations on February 12, 18 and 19, 2020, the bill
underwent several amendments. On February 26, 2020, the
Senate approved it on third and final reading.

11. On May 30, 2020, the House of Representatives

Joint Committees, particularly House Committees on Public
Order and Safety, and on National Defense and Security,
submitted Committee Report No. 340 which reported House
Bill (HB) No. 6875 entitled “An Act to Prevent, Prohibit and
Penalize Terrorism, Thereby Repealing Republic Act No. 9372
Otherwise Known as the ‘Human Security Act of 2007’” in
substitution of the previous HB Nos. 551, 2082, 2847, 3103,
3413, and 5710.

12. On June 1, 2020, President Rodrigo Roa Duterte

certified HB No. 6875 as urgent.

13. On June 2, 2020, House Committee on Public

Order and Safety Chair Narciso Bravo, Jr., Committee on
National Defense and Security Chair Raul Tupas,
Representatives Biazon and Nograles (J), sponsored HB No.
6875 at the plenary. HB No. 6875 was thereafter approved on
second reading on even date.

14. On June 3, 2020, the House of Representatives

approved HB No. 6875 on third and final reading.

15. On June 5, 2020, before its adjournment sine

die, the House of Representatives adopted SB No. 1032 as an
amendment to HB No. 6875.

16. Accordingly, on June 9, 2020, the Senate and the

House of Representatives transmitted the enrolled Anti-
Terrorism Bill to the Office of the President.

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17. On July 3, 2020, the President signed the enrolled

bill into law i.e. Republic Act No. 11479 or the Anti-Terrorism
Act.

18. On the same day, July 3, 2020, the first two

Petitions for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the
Revised Rules of Court to assail the Anti-Terrorism Act were
filed. Petitioners Atty. Howard Calleja, et al. filed the first
petition as concerned citizens and members of the Philippine
Bar, while petitioner Edcel C. Lagman filed the second petition
as a Filipino citizen and Representative of the First District of
Albay.

19. On July 5, 2020, petitioners Bayan Muna Party List

Representative Carlos Isagani T. Zarate, et al. filed the third
petition as legislators and concerned Filipino citizens.

20. On the following day, July 6, 2020, petitioners

Atty. Melencio Sta. Maria, et al. filed the fourth petition as
taxpayers and members of the Philippine Bar.

21. Acting on these petitions, this Honorable Court

sitting En Banc issued a Resolution consolidating the four
Petitions and directing the respondents to file their respective
comments.

22. Later, four more Petitions were filed before this

Honorable Court, namely: (a) The Center for Trade Union and
Human Rights (CTUHR) Petition filed on July 8, 2020; (b) the
Jurado Petition filed on July 8 2020; (c) the Constitution
Framers and Ateneo Lawyers Petition filed on July 8, 2020;
and (d) the partylist Sanlakas petition filed on July 13, 2020.

23. On July 14, 2020, this Honorable Court issued

another Resolution directing the consolidation of the four
additional Petitions with that of the earlier four Petitions.

24. Hence, this Consolidated Comment.

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ATTACHED DOCUMENTS

25. The documents relied upon in support of and

attached to this Consolidated Comment are the following:

Annex Description
1 Dabiq: Remaining and Expanding
(Muharram 1436 or November 2014)
Senate Deliberations
2 TSN dated December 17, 2019
3 TSN dated January 21, 2020
4 TSN dated January 22, 2020
5 TSN dated January 27, 2020
6 TSN dated January 28, 2020
7 TSN dated February 3, 2020
8 TSN dated February 19, 2020
House Deliberations
9 TSN dated June 2, 2020, 6:35 p.m.
10 TSN dated June 2, 2020, 8:10 p.m.
United Nations Security Council
Resolutions
11 UNSC 1373, Threats to International
Peace and Security Caused by Terrorist
Acts
12 UNSC 1456, High-level Meeting of the
Security Council: Combating Terrorism
13 UNSC 1566, Threats to International
Peace and Security Caused by Terrorist
Acts
14 UNSC 1624, Threats to International
Peace and Security (Security Council
Summit 2005

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ARGUMENTS

Procedural Arguments

I. Petitioners have no locus standi to

file the subject Petitions.

i. Cases involving the

constitutionality of a penal
legislation necessitate a closer
judicial scrutiny of the rule on
locus standi.

II. The doctrine of transcendental

importance is not a magic wand that
can be waved effortlessly to ward
off the duty of petitioners to
establish a justiciable case that
merits the time and attention of this
Honorable Court.

III. There exists no actual justiciable

controversy in this case. Thus, the
Petitions failed to meet the
requirements of judicial review.

IV. A penal statute is not susceptible to

a facial challenge.

V. Certiorari and prohibition will not lie

against respondents.

i. Petitioners could not

successfully invoke this
Honorable Court’s expanded
certiorari jurisdiction absent
any allegation of grave abuse
of discretion on the part of
respondent members of the
Anti-Terrorism Council.

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ii. Respondent members of the

legislature committed no
grave abuse of discretion in
enacting the Anti-Terrorism
Act.

VI. The House of Representatives

complied with the mandatory
requirements set by the
Constitution in enacting the Anti-
Terrorism Act.

i. Section 29 of the Anti-

Terrorism Act is not a rider.

ii. The House of Representatives

did not violate Section 26(2),
Article VI of the Constitution.

VII. The wisdom and necessity behind

the enactment of the Anti-Terrorism
Act are political questions which,
pursuant to the doctrine of
separation of powers, are beyond
the ambit of judicial scrutiny.

i. The issuance of the President’s

Certification of House Bill No.
6875 as urgent is a political
question as it involves the
President’s authority and
discretion.

VIII. The President is immune from suit.

IX. The Sta. Maria, Lagman Zarate,

Jurado, CTUHR, Monsod and
Sanlakas Petitions suffer from
formal defects and procedural
infirmities which merit their outright
dismissal by this Honorable Court.

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Substantive Arguments

X. The enactment of Anti-Terrorism

Act is a legitimate exercice of the
police power by the State which has
general welfare as its object.

i. The State has a compelling

interest in the protection of its
citizens from terrorism.

ii. The Anti-Terrorism Act adopts

the least restrictive means in
its implementation.

iii. The Anti-Terrorism Act cannot

be nullified based on
conjectural or anticipatory fear
that it will be abused by the
law enforcement agents of the
State.

XI. The Anti-Terrorism Act does not

violate the due process clause of the
Constitution.

i. Section 4 of the Anti-Terrorism

Act is neither intrinsically
vague nor impermissibly
overbroad.

XII. The Anti-Terrorism Act does not

violate the constitutional right
against unreasonable searches and
seizure.

i. Section 17 of the Anti-

Terrorism Act does not violate
the requirement that a search
warrant shall only issue upon a

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finding of probable cause

determined personally by a
judge.

ii. Section 17 of the Anti-

Terrorism Act does not prohibit
the quashal of a warrant
issued under the same
Section.

XIII. The Anti-Terrorism Act does not

violate the constitutional right to
privacy.

i. A secret tap of
communications under Section
16 can only be done after a
determination of probable
cause by the Court of Appeals
and therefore does not violate
the right to privacy.

ii. The production of customer

information and records under
Section 16 does not intrude
upon the private sphere of an
individual.

iii. A surveillance order issued by

the Court of Appeals under
Section 16 does not vest upon
the Executive a perpetual
authority to probe into a
person or organization’s
communications.

iv. The Anti-Terrorism Act does

not prohibit making
surveillance data available to
the aggrieved party should he
or she be absolved of
suspicion.

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XIV. The Anti-Terrorism Act does not

violate the constitutional freedoms
of speech, and expression, of the
press, and of association, as well as
the rights to peaceably assemble
and petition the government for
redress of grievances.

i. Section 4 regulates conduct

and not speech.

ii. Sections 5, 9, 10, 25 and 26 of

the Anti-Terrorism Act pass
the clear and present danger
test.

XV. The Anti-Terrorism Act does not

violate the freedom of religion and
belief.

XVI. The Anti-Terrorism Act does not

violate the constitutional right to
association.

XVII. Under the Anti-Terrorism Act,

the ATC’s powers, duties and
responsibilities are purely executive
in nature. Hence, it does not violate
the separation of powers.

i. The determination of probable

cause in designation is
consistent with international
practice and is grounded on
legal standards.

ii. There are three kinds of

designation under Section 25.

iii. Designation is an executive

function.

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iv. Designation, being an

administrative process under
the Anti-Terrorism Council, is
distinct from proscription,
which is a judicial function of
the Court of Appeals.

v. Proscription is a judicial
process.

XVIII. The Anti-Terrorism Act

provides for measures against
persons validly arrested. It is also
not a license to arrest any person
based on mere suspicion.

i. The fourteen-day detention

period under Section 29 of the
Anti-Terrorism Act is neither
arbitrary nor unjustified.

ii. Section 29 of the Anti-

Terrorism Act does not
authorize the ATC to issue
warrants of arrest.

XIX. The Anti-Terrorism Act recognizes

the constitutional right to bail and
does not alter any rules on the grant
thereof.

XX. The Anti-Terrorism Act imposes a

valid restriction on the right to
travel of an accused.

XXI. The Anti-Terrorism Act does not

infringe the academic freedom of
institutions of higher learning, teachers
and students.

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i. There is nothing in the law

which prohibits the free
exercise of academic freedom.

XXII. Petitioners are not entitled to a

temporary restraining order (TRO),
writ of preliminary injunction and/or
other injunctive remedies.

i. Petitioners do not possess a

clear and unmistakable right
which will be violated by
thepassage of the Anti-
Terrorism Act.

ii. Petitioner also failed to prove

that they will sustain grave
and irreparable injury resulting
from the implementation of
the Anti-Terrorism Act.

iii. The issuance of a TRO or a writ

of preliminary injunction would
operate as a prejudgment of
the case.

DISCUSSION

Petitioners have no locus

standi to file the subject
Petitions.

26. Any party may only come to court if he or she has

legal standing. Legal standing or locus standi refers to a
party’s personal and substantial interest in a case, arising
from the direct injury he or she has sustained or will sustain
as a result of the challenged governmental action.22

22
Chamber of Real Estate and Builder’s Associations Inc. (CREBA) v. Energy Regulatory Commission
(ERC), et al., G.R. No. 174697, July 8, 2010.

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27. For cases assailing the constitutionality of a

statute, the rule on locus standi requires that a party must
have a direct and personal interest. Petitioners must
demonstrate that they have been, or are about to be, denied
some right or privilege to which they are lawfully entitled, or
that they are about to be subjected to some burdens or
penalties by reason of the statute or act complained of.23

28. Admittedly, this Honorable Court has allowed non-

traditional plaintiffs, such as concerned citizens, taxpayers,
voters or legislators, to sue in the public interest, albeit they
may not have been directly injured by the operation of a law
or any other government act.24

29. However, in the present case, petitioners

erroneously claim that as concerned citizens, taxpayers,
members of the Philippine Bar, legislators, and human rights
advocates they possess the required standing to file the
instant Petitions.

30. Petitioners failed to specifically allege the injury

they have sustained or will sustain by the enactment and
enforcement of the Anti-Terrorism Act.

31. Locus standi calls for more than just a generalized

grievance. The term “interest” means a material interest, an
interest in issue affected by the decree, as distinguished from
mere interest in the question involved, or a mere incidental
interest. There must be a present substantial interest and not
a mere expectancy or a future, contingent, subordinate, or
consequential interest.25 As held in Galicto v. H.E. President
Aquino III:26

It has been held that as to the element of

injury, such aspect is not something that just
anybody with some grievance or pain may
assert. It has to be direct and substantial to
23
Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network, Inc. v. Anti-Terrorism Council, et al., supra.
24
Spouses Imbong et al. v. Ochoa, Jr., G.R. No. 204819, April 8, 2014.
25
Zabal, et al. v. Duterte, et. al. G.R. No. 238467, February 12, 2019.
26
G.R. No. 193978, February 28, 2012.

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make it worth the court’s time, as well as the

effort of inquiry into the constitutionality of the
acts of another department of government. If
the asserted injury is more imagined than real,
or is merely superficial and insubstantial, then
the courts may end up being importuned to
decide a matter that does not really justify such
an excursion into constitutional adjudication.27

32. A party will be allowed to litigate only when he or

she can demonstrate that (a) he or she has personally
suffered some actual or threatened injury because of the
allegedly illegal conduct of the government; (b) the injury is
fairly traceable to the challenged action; and (c) the injury is
likely to be redressed by the remedy being sought.28

33. Petitioners Calleja, et al., Lagman, Sta. Maria, et

al., CTUHR, et al., Monsod, et al., and Jurado are suing as
concerned citizens and taxpayers. When suing as a citizen,
the interest of the petitioner assailing the constitutionality of
a statute must be direct and personal.29 He or she must be
able to show, not only that the law or any government act is
invalid, but also that he sustained or is in imminent danger of
sustaining some direct injury as a result of its enforcement,
and not merely that he or she suffers thereby in some
indefinite way.30

34. Petitioners Calleja, et al., Lagman, and Sta. Maria,

et al. only made general statements on their alleged
standing—that they are in imminent danger of sustaining
direct injury once the law is enforced. Since the Petitions
merely raise hypothetical scenarios of the possible abuses to
be committed by the implementors of the law, and it is clear
that petitioners’ slights are merely imagined. Evidently,
petitioners have not alleged any injury sustained but merely
speculate on a possibility that they would be prosecuted as
perpetrators or purveyors of terrorist acts or ideas.

27
Emphasis supplied.
28
Lozano v. Nograles, G.R. Nos. 187883 and 187910, June 16, 2009.
29
Francisco v. House of Representatives, et al., G.R. No. 160261, November 10, 2003.
30
Ibid.

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35. On the other hand, petitioners Zarate, et al. allege

that, as victims of “terrorist-tagging” by the government
forces, they are in real and immediate danger of sustaining
injury as a result of the implementation of the law.31 However,
they failed to substantiate their claim of “terrorist-tagging”
through any government-issued official document or judicial
order.

36. Petitioners also claim legal standing on the basis

of their being taxpayers. A taxpayer suit, however, is proper
only when there is an exercise of the spending or taxing power
of Congress. The Anti-Terrorism Act is a penal statute and
does not provide for any appropriation from Congress for its
implementation.32

37. Petitioners Calleja, et al. and Sta. Maria, et al.,

who also come to this Honorable Court as members of the
Philippine Bar and supposedly have an interest in ensuring
that laws and orders of the Philippine government are legally
and validly issued. However, they cannot not also successfully
claim legal standing. This supposed interest has been branded
by this Honorable Court in Integrated Bar of the Philippines v.
Hon. Zamora,33 “as too general an interest which is shared by
other groups and by the whole citizenry.”

38. Petitioners Lagman and Zarate, et al. seek refuge

on the fact that they are legislators and former lawmakers.
However, they failed to pinpoint any concrete injury suffered
or to be suffered from the passage or enforcement of the Anti-
Terrorism Act. They also failed to establish that its passage
would affect their official functions and prerogatives as
legislators.34

39. Petitioners Monsod, et al. and members of

petitioner Sanlakas also assert their being staunch advocates
of human rights who resort to mass actions and protests in

31
Makabayan Petition, pp. 4-6, 8-11.
32
Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network, Inc. v. Anti-Terrorism Council, et al., supra.
33
G.R. No. 141284, August 15, 2000.
34
Biraogo v. The Philippine Truth Commission, G.R. No. 192935, December 7, 2010.

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the exercise of their rights to express and peaceably

assemble. However, mere invocation of human rights
advocacy has nowhere been held sufficient to clothe litigants
with locus standi. Petitioners must show an actual, or
immediate danger of sustaining, direct injury as a result of
the law’s enforcement.35

Cases involving the

constitutionality of penal
legislation necessitate a closer
judicial scrutiny of the rule on
locus standi.

40. The Anti-Terrorism Act is a penal statute. Cases

involving the constitutionality of penal legislation belong to an
altogether different genus of constitutional litigation.
Compelling State and societal interests in the proscription of
harmful conduct necessitate a closer judicial scrutiny of the
rule on locus standi.36

41. In Republic v. Roque,37 this Honorable Court made

the following pronouncement:

It is well to note that private respondents

also lack the required locus standi to mount
their constitutional challenge against the
implementation of the above-stated provisions
of RA 9372 since they have not shown any direct
and personal interest in the case. While it has
been previously held that transcendental public
importance dispenses with the requirement that
the petitioner has experienced or is in actual
danger of suffering direct and personal injury, it
must be stressed that cases involving the
constitutionality of penal legislation belong to an
altogether different genus of constitutional
litigation. Towards this end, compelling State
and societal interests in the proscription of
harmful conduct necessitate a closer judicial
scrutiny of locus standi, as in this case. To rule
otherwise, would be to corrupt the settled

35
Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network, Inc. v. Anti-Terrorism Council, et al., supra.
36
Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network, Inc. v. Anti-Terrorism Council, et al., supra.
37
G.R. No. 204603, September 24, 2013.

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doctrine of locus standi, as every worthy cause

is an interest shared by the general public.

42. Here, petitioners’ mere invocation of imminent

danger or serious threat of violation of constitutionally
guaranteed rights without evidence of direct injury and
personal stake is not sufficient to clothe them with locus
standi. The invocation of constitutional rights that may be
violated, without evidence of being actually charged or
imminence of being charged, is not enough. Again, they must
show an actual or immediate danger of sustaining direct injury
as a result of the enforcement of the law. To rule otherwise
would be to corrupt the settled doctrine of locus standi, as
every worthy cause is an interest shared by the general
public.

43. The rule on locus standi is not a plain procedural

rule but a constitutional requirement derived from Section 1,
Article VIII of the Constitution, which mandates courts of
justice to settle only “actual controversies involving rights
which are legally demandable and enforceable.”38 As aptly
ruled in Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Teofisto Guingona, Jr.,39 viz.:

Courts are neither free to decide all kinds

of cases dumped into their laps nor are they free
to open their doors to all parties or entities
claiming a grievance. The rationale for this
constitutional requirement of locus standi is by
no means trifle. It is intended “to assure a
vigorous adversary presentation of the case,
and, perhaps more importantly to warrant the
judiciary’s overruling the determination of a
coordinate, democratically elected organ of
government.” It thus goes to the very essence
of representative democracies.

44. To broadly allow petitioners who lack the legal

standing to pursue the instant proceedings would run counter
to the constitutional mandate that this Honorable Court can
settle only actual cases or controversies.

38
Biraogo v. Nograles, supra.
39
G.R. No. 113375, May 5, 1994.

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45. While this Honorable Court has taken an

increasingly liberal approach to the rule of locus standi,
evolving from the stringent requirements of “personal injury”
to the broader “transcendental importance” doctrine, such
liberality is not to be abused. It is not an open invitation for
the ignorant and the ignoble to file petitions that prove
nothing but their cerebral deficit.40

The doctrine of
transcendental importance
is not a magic wand that
can be waved effortlessly
to ward off the duty of
petitioners to establish a
justiciable case that merits
the time and attention of
this Honorable Court.

46. As held in a number of cases of the same class,

there being no doctrinal definition of transcendental
importance, the following instructive determinants formulated
by former Supreme Court Justice Florentino P. Feliciano are
instructive: (a) the character of the funds or other assets
involved in the case; (b) the presence of a clear case of
disregard of a constitutional or statutory prohibition by the
public respondent agency or instrumentality of the
government; and (c) the lack of any other party with a more
direct and specific interest in raising the questions being
raised.41

47. In Anak Mindanao Party-List Group v. The Executive

Secretary,42 this Honorable Court is explicit in its
pronouncement that the rule on standing will not be waived
where these determinants are not established. A mere
invocation of transcendental importance in the pleading is not

40
Biraogo v. Nograles, supra; citing Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Guingona, Jr, supra; Francisco v. House of
Representatives, G.R. No. 160261, November 10, 2003; Senate v. Ermita, G.R. No. 169777, April 20, 2006;
CREBA v. ERC and Meralco, G.R. No. G.R. No. 174697, July 8, 2010.
41
Francisco v. House of Representatives, G.R. No. 160261, November 10, 2003.
42
G.R. No. 166052, August 29, 2007.

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enough for this Honorable Court to set aside procedural

rules.43 This ruling highlights the nature of the doctrine of
transcendental importance as more of an exception rather
than the general rule. In fact, it was originally used to relax
the rules on locus standi or legal standing.44 Hence, this
doctrine must be strictly construed against petitioners, who
must establish the occurrence of all the above-stated
determinants with certitude.

48. In this case, a cursory reading of the Petitions

would show the lack of requirements for the waiver of
procedural rules via the transcendental importance doctrine.

49. Petitioners claim that the Anti-Terrorism Act

allegedly violated some provisions of the Constitution but did
not care to elaborate, much less establish, all the required
determinants. As far as petitioners are concerned, the
application of the liberality of transcendental importance
hinges on what they believe as sufficient discussion on the
constitutional or national issues presented, which however fall
short of a clear showing of the presence of the determinants
as required in Anak Mindanao Party-List Group.45 Notably, it
is quite apparent from all the petitions that petitioners put
forth so much effort in portraying a grim picture of the Anti-
Terrorism Act, but they took lightly their duty to establish the
presence of the required determinants of the transcendental
importance doctrine.

50. Petitioner Jurado attempts to demonstrate that his

petition merits the application of the transcendental
importance doctrine. However, a punctilious scrutiny of his
Petition reveals that they are mere general averments that
could best qualify as motherhood statements anchored on
assumed common interests of the public, unsubstantiated
allegations of deprivation of constitutional rights, and
sweeping conclusions about the overhauling effect of the Anti-

43
In The Matter Of: Save The Supreme Court Judicial Independence And Fiscal Autonomy Movement Vs.
Abolition Of Judiciary Development Fund (Jdf) And Reduction Of Fiscal Autonomy, UDK-15143, January
21, 2015.
44
Gios Samar, Inc. v. Department of Transportation and Communications and Civil Aviation Authority of
the hilippines, G.R. No. 217158, March 12, 2019.
45
Supra.

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Terrorism Act on the basic principles of criminal law. 46 On this

score, the judicious observation of former Supreme Court
Justice Florentino P. Feliciano, the formulator of the above-
mentioned determinants, in his concurring opinion in
Kilosbayan v. Guingona,47 is instructive:

I submit, with respect, that it is not

enough for the Court simply to invoke
"public interest" or even "paramount
considerations of national interest," and to
say that the specific requirements of such public
interest can only be ascertained on a "case to
case" basis. For one thing, such an approach is
not intellectually satisfying. For another, such
an answer appears to come too close to saying
that locus standi exists whenever at least a
majority of the Members of this Honorable
Court participating in a case feel that an
appropriate case for judicial intervention has
arisen.48

51. From the foregoing, it is clear that a strict stance

should be adopted in evaluating the appropriateness of the
transcendental importance doctrine. Laid back attempts to
justify the application of this doctrine, as petitioners clearly
demonstrated in these petitions, must not be countenanced.
This doctrine must be insulated from unwarranted
expectations of petitioners that this Honorable Court would
accept it hook, line and sinker, by expediently harping
hackneyed phrases such as “paramount importance,”
“overarching significance,” “national interest,” and the like.
Already settled is the rule that a cursory incantation of the
transcendental importance doctrine will not automatically
justify the brushing aside of the strict observance of the
requisites for this Honorable Court's power of judicial review.
Verily, an indiscriminate disregard of the requisites every time
this doctrine is invoked would result in an unacceptable
corruption of the settled doctrine of locus standi, as every
worthy cause is an interest shared by the general public. 49

46
Jurado Petition, pars. 103, 110, 118, and 121, pp. 25-28.
47
Supra.
48
Emphasis supplied.
49
Roy v. Herbosa, G.R. No. 207246, 22 November 2016.

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52. Viewed against the above discussion, the Petitions

clearly fail the test in qualifying for the liberal application of
procedural rules based on the transcendental importance
doctrine. Therefore, these actions must be dismissed on the
ground of petitioners’ lack of legal standing.

There exists no actual

justiciable controversy in
this case. Thus, the
Petitions failed to meet the
requirements of judicial
review.

53. The power of the courts is derived from the

Constitution. Section 1, Article VIII defines and delineates
judicial power, thus:

SECTION 1. The judicial power shall be

vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower
courts as may be established by law.

54. Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of

justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are
legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any
branch or instrumentality of the Government.50

55. The power of judicial review is the power of the

courts to test the validity of executive and legislative acts for
their conformity with the Constitution. Through such power,
the judiciary enforces and upholds the supremacy of the
Constitution.51

56. Like almost all powers conferred by the

Constitution, the power of judicial review is subject to
limitations, to wit: (a) there must be an actual case or

50
Art. VIII, Sec. 1, 2nd par. of the Constitution.
51 Garcia vs. The Executive Secretary, et al., G.R. No. 157584, April 2, 2009.

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controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (b) the

person challenging the act must have the standing to question
the validity of the subject act or issuance; otherwise stated,
he or she must have a personal and substantial interest in the
case such that he or she has sustained, or will sustain, direct
injury as a result of its enforcement; (c) the question of
constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity;
and (d) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota
of the case.

57. The first element of actual case or controversy is

well established. As early as Angara v. Electoral
Commission,52 this Honorable Court has held:

[T]his power of judicial review is limited to

actual cases and controversies to be exercised
after full opportunity of argument by the
parties, and limited further to the constitutional
question raised or the very lis mota presented.
Any attempt at abstraction could only lead to
dialectics and barren legal questions and to
sterile conclusions unrelated to actualities.
Narrowed as its function is in this manner, the
judiciary does not pass upon questions of
wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation.
More than that, courts accord the presumption
of constitutionality to legislative enactments,
not only because the legislature is presumed to
abide by the Constitution but also because the
judiciary in the determination of actual cases
and controversies must reflect the wisdom and
justice of the people as expressed through their
representatives in the executive and legislative
departments of the governments.

58. The rule is that “the constitutionality of a statute

will be passed on only if, and to the extent that, it is directly
and necessarily involved in a justiciable controversy and is
essential to the protection of the rights of the parties
concerned.”53 Stated simply—the exercise of judicial power
requires an actual case or controversy.

52
G.R. No. L-45081, July 15, 1936.
53
The Provincial Bus Operators Association of the Philippines v. DOLE, G.R. No. 202275, July 17, 2018;
citing Philippine Association of Colleges and Universities v. Secretary of Education, G.R. No. L-5279,
October 31, 1955.

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59. The meaning of “an actual case or controversy” is

also widely known:

An actual case or controversy is one which

involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of
opposite legal claims, susceptible of judicial
resolution as distinguished from a hypothetical
or abstract difference or dispute since the courts
will decline to pass upon constitutional issues
through advisory opinions, bereft as they are of
authority to resolve hypothetical or moot
questions. Related to the requirement of an
actual case or controversy is the requirement of
“ripeness,” and a question is ripe when the act
being challenged has a direct effect on the
individual challenging it. For a case to be
considered ripe for adjudication, it is a
prerequisite that an act had been accomplished
or performed by either branch of government
before a court may interfere, and the petitioner
must allege the existence of an immediate or
threatened injury to himself as a result of the
challenged action.54

60. In Spouses Imbong v. Ochoa, Jr.,55 this Honorable

Court held that an actual case or controversy existed in the
challenge against the Reproductive Health Law.56 The
challenge was considered ripe for adjudication because “its
implementing rules have already taken effect and that
budgetary measures to carry out the law have already been
passed.”

61. In contrast to Spouses Imbong v. Ochoa, Jr.,57 the

implementing rules of the Anti-Terrorism Act have not yet
been drafted. Moreover, the Act is not yet in force as the
fifteen-day period from its first publication on July 3, 2020 has
not lapsed. It is, therefore, clear that any challenge to the
Anti-Terrorism Act is not yet ripe for adjudication.

54
Council of Teachers v. Secretary of Education, G.R. Nos. 216930, 217451, 217752, 218045, 218098, 218123,
and 218465, October 9, 2018.
55
Supra.
56
Council of Teachers v. Secretary of Education, supra.
57
Supra.

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62. In Southern Hemisphere, this Honorable Court

declared the challenge against the Human Security Act as
without any justiciable controversy. In arriving at this
conclusion, this Honorable Court noted that “(t)he possibility
of abuse in the implementation of Republic Act No.9372 does
not avail to take the present petitions out of the realm of the
surreal and merely imagined.”58

63. Similarly, petitioners’ obscure allegations of future

and contingent surveillance, future and contingent detention
and red tagging,59 among others, are not credible threats of
prosecution that would make their Petitions as actual
justiciable cases or controversies. In Southern Hemisphere 60
this Honorable Court ruled:

Unlike the plaintiffs in Holder, however,

herein petitioners have failed to show that the
challenged provisions of RA 9372 forbid
constitutionally protected conduct or activity
that they seek to do. No demonstrable threat
has been established, much less a real and
existing one.

Petitioners’ obscure allegations of

sporadic “surveillance” and supposedly being
tagged as “communist fronts” in no way
approximate a credible threat of prosecution.
From these allegations, the Court is being lured
to render an advisory opinion, which is not its
function.

Without any justiciable controversy, the

petitions have become pleas for declaratory
relief, over which the Court has no original
jurisdiction. Then again, declaratory actions
characterized by “double contingency,” where
both the activity the petitioners intend to
undertake and the anticipated reaction to it of a
public official are merely theorized, lie beyond
judicial review for lack of ripeness.

58
Supra.
59
Zarate Petition, par. 79, p. 28.
60
Supra.

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The possibility of abuse in the

implementation of RA 9372 does not avail to
take the present petitions out of the realm of
the surreal and merely imagined. Such
possibility is not peculiar to RA 9372 since the
exercise of any power granted by law may be
abused. Allegations of abuse must be anchored
on real events before courts may step in to
settle actual controversies involving rights
which are legally demandable and
enforceable. 61

64. Petitioners’ theoretical and contingent worst case

scenarios occurring upon the future implementation of the
Anti-Terrorism Act necessarily take them out of the realm of
justiciability and the requirement of actual case and
controversy.

65. The Petitions are, therefore, more in the nature of

a declaratory relief which is the proper mode to bring a
question of construction or validity arising from a statute.
However, even for this remedy, the requirement of an actual
case or controversy remains. In Social Justice Society v.
Lina,62 this Honorable Court reminded the Bench and the Bar
that an action for declaratory relief also requires a justiciable
controversy, thus:

Indeed, an action for declaratory relief

should be filed by a person interested under a
deed, a will, a contract or other written
instrument, and whose rights are affected by a
statute, an executive order, a regulation or an
ordinance. The purpose of the remedy is to
interpret or to determine the validity of the
written instrument and to seek a judicial
declaration of the parties’ rights or duties
thereunder. For the action to prosper, it must
be shown that (1) there is a justiciable
controversy; (2) the controversy is between
persons whose interests are adverse; (3) the
party seeking the relief has a legal interest in

61
Emphasis in the original; citations omitted.
62
G.R. No. 160031, December 18, 2008.

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the controversy; and (4) the issue is ripe for

judicial determination.63

66. At any rate, under Section 1, Rule 63 of the Revised

Rules of Court64 and as declared in Southern Hemisphere,65
this Honorable Court has no original jurisdiction over petitions
for declaratory relief.

67. Furthermore, the requirement of the existence of

an actual controversy is not discarded when this Honorable
Court exercises its power of judicial review to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any
branch or instrumentality of the Government. As Justice
Marvic M.V.F. Leonen discussed in his Dissenting Opinion in
Disini v. Executive Secretary:66

Judicial review — the power to declare a

law, ordinance, or treaty as unconstitutional or
invalid—is inherent in judicial power. It includes
the power to “settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable”
and “to determine whether or not there has
been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction on any part of any
branch or instrumentality of Government.” The
second aspect of judicial review articulated
in the 1987 Constitution nuances the
political question doctrine. It is not
licensed to do away with the requirements
of justiciability.67

68. Clearly, the herein Petitions grossly failed to show

the existence of an actual case or controversy over which this
Honorable Court may exercise its judicial power.

63
Social Justice Society v. Lina, supra; citing Bayan Telecommunication, Inc. v. Republic, G.R. No. 161140,
January 31, 2007; citations omitted.
64
SECTION 1. Who may file petition. — Any person interested under a deed, will, contract or other written
instrument, or whose rights are affected by a statute, executive order or regulation, ordinance, or any other
governmental regulation may, before breach or violation thereof, bring an action in the appropriate
Regional Trial Court to determine any question of construction or validity arising, and for a declaration
of his rights or duties, thereunder.
…
65
Supra.
66
Disini v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 203335, February 18, 2014.
67
Emphasis supplied; citations omitted.

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A penal statute is not

susceptible to a facial
challenge.

69. A facial challenge is not allowed against penal

statutes like the Anti-Terrorism Act.

70. This Honorable Court explained in Estrada v.

Sandiganbayan68 that penal statutes have general in terrorem
effect resulting from its very existence. And if a facial
challenge is allowed for this reason alone, the State may well
be prevented from enacting laws to deter socially harmful
conduct. In Sps. Romualdez v. COMELEC,69 this Honorable
Court again emphasized that “on-its-face” invalidation of
penal statutes is not allowed in this jurisdiction.

71. In Southern Hemisphere,70 this Honorable Court

reiterated that a facial challenge against a criminal statute on
either vagueness or overbreadth grounds is impermissible.

72. In 2014, this Honorable Court carved out a narrow

exception to the above rule in Disini v. Executive Secretary:71

When a penal statute encroaches upon

the freedom of speech, a facial challenge
grounded on the void-for-vagueness doctrine is
acceptable. The inapplicability of the doctrine
must be carefully delineated. As Justice Antonio
T. Carpio explained in his dissent in Romualdez
v. Commission on Elections, “we must view
these statements of the Court on the
inapplicability of the overbreadth and
vagueness doctrines to penal statutes as
appropriate only insofar as these doctrines are
used to mount ‘facial’ challenges to penal
statutes not involving free speech.”

In an “as applied” challenge, the

petitioner who claims a violation of his
constitutional right can raise any constitutional

68
Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 148560, November 19, 2001.
69
G.R. No. 167011, April 30, 2008.
70
Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network, Inc. v. Anti-Terrorism Council, supra.
71
Disini v. Executive Secretary, supra.

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ground – absence of due process, lack of fair

notice, lack of ascertainable standards,
overbreadth, or vagueness. Here, one can
challenge the constitutionality of a statute only
if he asserts a violation of his own rights. It
prohibits one from assailing the constitutionality
of the statute based solely on the violation of
the rights of third persons not before the court.
This rule is also known as the prohibition against
third-party standing.

But this rule admits of exceptions. A

petitioner may for instance mount a “facial”
challenge to the constitutionality of a statute
even if he claims no violation of his own rights
under the assailed statute where it involves free
speech on grounds of overbreadth or vagueness
of the statute. The rationale for this exception is
to counter the “chilling effect” on protected
speech that comes from statutes violating free
speech. A person who does not know whether
his speech constitutes a crime under an
overbroad or vague law may simply restrain
himself from speaking in order to avoid being
charged of a crime. The overbroad or vague law
thus chills him into silence.

73. To be clear, Disini72 is an exception to the rule.

Petitioners’ invocation that the law would create a “chilling
effect” is insufficient to bring their claims under this narrow
exception. In Disini,73 this Honorable Court provided an
exception because the Cybercrime Prevention Act74 seeks to
regulate the novel and incomparable medium of cyberspace.
The present Petitions have not made a case that the Anti-
Terrorism Act is similar to the Cybercrime Prevention Act.
Thus, scrutinized under the high standard in Disini, the Anti-
Terrorism Act cannot be the subject of a facial challenge.

74. Thus, the facial challenge against Anti-Terrorism

Act, a penal statute, should fail.

72
Disini v. Executive Secretary, supra.
73
Ibid.
74
Republic Act No. 10175.

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Certiorari and prohibition

will not lie against
respondents.

75. Petitioners resorted to the remedies of certiorari

and prohibition under Sections 175 and 276 of Rule 65 of the
Revised Rules of Court in connection with this Honorable
Court’s expanded power of judicial review under the
aforecited Section 1 of Article VIII of the Constitution.

Petitioners could not

successfully invoke this
Honorable Court’s expanded
certiorari jurisdiction absent
any allegation of grave abuse
of discretion on the part of the
respondents.

76. Certiorari and prohibition are appropriate

remedies to raise constitutional issues and to review and/or
prohibit or nullify the acts of legislative and executive
officials.77 This is pursuant to this Honorable Court’s
“expanded certiorari jurisdiction” provided in the
Constitution.78

77. However, an indispensable key in unlocking this

Honorable Court’s expanded power of judicial review is the
allegation of “grave abuse of discretion”. After all, under the
75
Section 1. Petition for certiorari. — When any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial
functions has acted without or in excess its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper
court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the
proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer, and granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice may
require. … (Emphasis supplied.)
76
Section 2. Petition for prohibition. — When the proceedings of any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or
person, whether exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions, are without or in excess of its
or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and
there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person
aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and
praying that judgment be rendered commanding the respondent to desist from further proceedings in the
action or matter specified therein, or otherwise granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice may
require. … (Emphasis supplied.)
77
Ermita v. Aldecoa-Delorino et al., G.R. No. 177130, June 7, 2011.
78
See Francisco v. House of Representatives et al., supra.

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Constitution, such power is specifically designed “to

determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the
part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.”

78. A thorough reading of the Calleja, Sta. Maria, and

Monsod, Petitions reveals that the allegations of grave
abuse of discretion pertain, directly or indirectly, only to
respondent Anti-Terrorism Council (ATC). On the other
hand, the Zarate and CTUHR Petitions contain neither direct
nor indirect allegation of grave abuse of discretion either on
the part of respondent members of Congress or to
respondent members of the ATC.

79. Petitioners Calleja, et al. directed the blame to the

respondent lawmakers. They argue that the assailed
provisions must be invalidated because the legislature
committed grave abuse of discretion by passing a law that
is repugnant to the Constitution.79On the other hand,
petitioners Sta. Maria, et al., insist that the grave abuse of
discretion was committed at the time of enactment of the
subject law.80

80. Petitioners Monsod, et al., simply stated that a

“breach of due process of law, the rights against searches
and seizures without a judicial warrant, and the
fundamental right of expression is a grave abuse of
discretion.”81

81. For their part, petitioners Zarate, et al. merely

mentioned the words grave abuse of discretion in the
quoted decision which supposedly discussed the propriety
of their availment of the remedy of certiorari.82 On the other
hand, petitioners CTUHR, et al. merely cited Section 1,
Article VII of the Constitution. 83

79
Calleja Petition, page 7.
80
Sta. Maria Petition, page 9; Emphasis supplied.
81
Monsod Petition, p. 4.
82
Zarate Petition, p. 7.
83
CTUHR Petition, p. 3.

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82. It is worthy to note that only petitioners Lagman,

Jurado, and Sanlakas impleaded the Senate and the House
of Representatives as respondents in this case.

83. Hence, petitioners Calleja, et. al, Sta.Maria, et.al

and Zarate, et al.’s reliance on Araullo v. Aquino,84 Rappler
vs. Bautista,85 SPARK v. Quezon City,86 Ifurung v. Office of
the Ombudsman,87 Kilusang Mayo Uno v. Aquino,88
Demetria v. Alba,89 and Lazatin v. Kapunan90 are misplaced.
These rulings could not justify these petitioners’ invocation
of this Honorable Court’s expanded power of judicial review
absent any assertion that respondent members of the ATC
whom they impleaded, gravely abused their discretion in the
discharge of their functions under the Anti-Terrorism Act.

84. More importantly, respondent members of the ATC

could not have gravely abused their discretion as the
assailed law is not yet in effect. Consequently, as of this
time, the respondent members of the ATC have yet to act
in accordance with their mandates under said law.

85. To repeat, in certiorari proceedings under Rule 65

of the Revised Rules of Court, the Court’s inquiry is limited
to determining whether or not the public officer acted
without or in excess of his or her jurisdiction, or with grave
abuse of discretion.91 Thus, without any specific allegation
as to how the respondent members of the ATC committed
acts that are contrary to law, the Constitution or
jurisprudence, or how they executed their duties in a
whimsical or despotic manner, this Honorable Court’s
expanded certiorari jurisdiction could not be successfully
invoked.

84
G.R. No. 209287, July 1, 2014.
85
G.R. No. 222702, April 5, 2016.
86
G.R. No. 225442, August 8, 2017.
87
G.R. No. 232131, April 24, 2018.
88
G.R. No. 210500, April 22, 2019.
89
G.R. No. 71977, February 27, 1987.
90
G.R. No. L-29894, March 28, 1969.
91
Morales, Jr. v. Ombudsman, G.R. No. 208086, July 27, 2016.

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Respondent members of the

legislature committed no
grave abuse of discretion in
enacting the Anti-Terrorism
Act.

86. There is grave abuse of discretion when an act is

(a) done contrary to the Constitution, the law or jurisprudence
or (b) executed whimsically, capriciously or arbitrarily, out of
malice, ill will or personal bias.92

87. The abuse of discretion to be qualified as “grave”

must be so patent or gross as to constitute an evasion of a
positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform the duty or to act
at all in contemplation of law.93 In addition, it is “grave” when
it is a capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment that is so
patent and gross as to amount to a virtual refusal to perform
a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law,
as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic
manner by reason of passion or hostility.94

88. Mere allegation or invocation that constitutionally

protected rights will be violated by the Anti-Terrorism Act will
not automatically result to a finding of grave abuse of
discretion. Contrary to petitioners Lagman and Jurado’s
assertion, there is no such thing as a patently unconstitutional
law. In Aquino v. COMELEC,95 this Honorable Court ruled in no
uncertain terms that laws are presumed to be Constitutional,
viz.:

Any law duly enacted by Congress carries

with it the presumption of constitutionality.
Before a law may be declared unconstitutional
by this Court, there must be a clear showing
that a specific provision of the fundamental law
has been violated or transgressed. When there
is neither a violation of a specific provision of
the Constitution nor any proof showing that
there is such a violation, the presumption of

92
SPARK v. Quezon City, supra.
93
Republic v. Roque, supra.
94
Garcia v. Executive Secretary, et al., supra.
95
G.R. No. 189793, April 7, 2010.

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constitutionality will prevail and the law must be

upheld. To doubt is to sustain.

89. Indeed, every statute is presumed valid. 96 On the

party challenging its validity weighs heavily the onerous task
of rebutting this presumption. 97 Any reasonable doubt about
the validity of the law should be resolved in favor of its
constitutionality.98 To justify the nullification of a law, there
must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution,
and not one that is doubtful, speculative, or argumentative.99

90. Petitioner Lagman’s insistence that the grave

abuse of discretion is so obvious that it is res ipsa loquitor will
not excuse him from presenting proofs to substantiate his
allegations. On him lies the burden of demonstrating, plainly
and distinctly, all facts essential to establish his right to a writ
of certiorari. The burden of proof to show grave abuse of
discretion is on petitioner Lagman. As the one asking for the
issuance of writ of certiorari, he must discharge the burden of
proving grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
respondent members of Congress, in accordance with the
definition and standards set by law and jurisprudence.100

91. Also, it must be stressed that in Southern

Hemisphere,101 this Honorable Court dismissed the petition
assailing the constitutionality of the Human Security Act
because the petitioners therein did not even allege with any
modicum of particularity how respondents acted without or in
excess of their respective jurisdictions, or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

92. Anent petitioner Jurado’s allegations, there is no

truth that the respondent members of Congress transgressed
the requirements of the Constitution in the passage of the law.
As will be elaborated in the succeeding paragraphs.

96
Heirs of Ardona v. Reyes, G.R. Nos. L-60549, 60553 to 60555, October 26, 1983.
97
Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, supra.
98
Peralta v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. L-47771, March 11, 1978.
99
Betoy v. Board of Directors, G.R. Nos. 156556-57, October 4, 2011.
100
See Morales, Jr. v Ombudsman, et al., supra.
101
Supra.

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93. Also, contrary to petitioner Sanlakas’ claim, the

Anti-Terrorism Act is a penal statute that needs no
appropriation as above stated.

94. Moreover, as will be further discussed hereunder,

there was no hint of whimsicality, nor of gross and patent
abuse of discretion as would amount to an evasion of a
positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined
by law or to act at all in contemplation of law on the part of
respondent members of Congress in passing this important
piece of legislation. They are clothed with the authority to
enact a law that responds to the pressing need of our country
for a stricter law to address terrorism and for a law that is
consistent with our international obligations.

95. It is important to note that respondent lawmakers

saw the urgent necessity to fill the gaps of Human Security
Act and to make it more in keeping with the requirements of
UNSC Resolution No. 1373 adopted on September 28, 2001, to
wit:

1. Decides that all States shall:

(a) Prevent and suppress the

financing of terrorist acts;

(b) Criminalize the wilful provision or

collection, by any means, directly or indirectly,
of funds by their nationals or in their territories
with the intention that the funds should be used,
or in the knowledge that they are to be used, in
order to carry out terrorist acts;

(c) Freeze without delay funds and

other financial assets or economic
resources of persons who commit, or
attempt to commit, terrorist acts or
participate in or facilitate the commission
of terrorist acts; of entities owned or
controlled directly or indirectly by such
persons; and of persons and entities acting
on behalf of, or at the direction of such persons
and entities, including funds derived or
generated from property owned or controlled

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directly or indirectly by such persons and

associated persons and entities;

(d) Prohibit their nationals or any persons

and entities within their territories from making
any funds, financial assets or economic
resources or financial or other related services
available, directly or indirectly, for the benefit of
persons who commit or attempt to commit or
facilitate or participate in the commission of
terrorist acts, of entities owned or controlled,
directly or indirectly, by such persons and of
persons and entities acting on behalf of or at the
direction of such persons;

2. Decides also that all States shall:

(a) Refrain from providing any form of

support, active or passive, to entities or persons
involved in terrorist acts, including by
suppressing recruitment of members of
terrorist groups and eliminating the supply of
weapons to terrorists;

(b) Take the necessary steps to

prevent the commission of terrorist acts,
including by provision of early warning to other
States by exchange of information;

(c) Deny safe haven to those who

finance, plan, support, or commit terrorist
acts, or provide safe havens;

(d) Prevent those who finance, plan,

facilitate or commit terrorist acts from using
their respective territories for those purposes
against other States or their citizens;

(e) Ensure that any person who

participates in the financing, planning,
preparation or perpetration of terrorist
acts or in supporting terrorist acts is
brought to justice and ensure that, in
addition to any other measures against
them, such terrorist acts are established as
serious criminal offences in domestic laws
and regulations and that the punishment
duly reflects the seriousness of such
terrorist acts;

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(f) Afford one another the greatest

measure of assistance in connection with
criminal investigations or criminal proceedings
relating to the financing or support of terrorist
acts, including assistance in obtaining evidence
in their possession necessary for the
proceedings;

(g) Prevent the movement of terrorists or

terrorist groups by effective border controls and
controls on issuance of identity papers and
travel documents, and through measures for
preventing counterfeiting, forgery or fraudulent
use of identity papers and travel documents;102

96. Additionally, the Anti-Terrorism Act is consistent

with UNSC Resolution No. 1624 which was adopted on
September 14, 2005. Such Resolution provides, among
others:

Reaffirming also the imperative to

combat terrorism in all its forms and
manifestations by all means, in accordance
with the Charter of the United Nations, and
also stressing that States must ensure that any
measures taken to combat terrorism comply
with all their obligations under international law,
and should adopt such measures in accordance
with international law, in particular international
human rights law, refugee law, and
humanitarian law,

Condemning in the strongest terms all

acts of terrorism irrespective of their
motivation, whenever and by whomsoever
committed, as one of the most serious threats
to peace and security, and reaffirming the
primary responsibility of the Security Council for
the maintenance of international peace and
security under the Charter of the United
Nations,

Condemning also in the strongest terms

the incitement of terrorist acts and
repudiating attempts at the justification or

102
Emphasis supplied.

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glorification (apologie) of terrorist acts

that may incite further terrorist acts,

Recalling that all States must cooperate

fully in the fight against terrorism, in
accordance with their obligations under
international law, in order to find, deny
safe haven and bring to justice, on the basis
of the principle of extradite or prosecute, any
person who supports, facilitates,
participates or attempts to participate in
the financing, planning, preparation or
commission of terrorist acts or provides
safe havens,

1. Calls upon all States to adopt such

measures as may be necessary and appropriate
and in accordance with their obligations under
international law to:

(a) Prohibit by law incitement to

commit a terrorist act or acts;

(b) Prevent such conduct;

(c) Deny safe haven to any persons

with respect to whom there is credible and
relevant information giving serious
reasons for considering that they have
been guilty of such conduct.103

97. Furthermore, the Anti-Terrorism Act complies with

UNSC Resolution Nos. 1456 and 1566. UNSC Resolution No.
1456 adopted on January 20, 2003 enjoins member States to
“bring to justice those who finance, plan, support or commit
terrorist acts or provide safe havens.” On the other hand,
UNSC Resolution No. 1566 adopted on October 8, 2004 calls
upon member States “to cooperate fully in the fight against
terrorism and to deny safe haven and bring to justice, on the
basis of the principle to extradite or prosecute, any person
who supports, facilitates, participates or attempts to
participate in the financing, planning, preparation or
commission of terrorist acts or provides safe havens.”

103
Emphasis supplied.

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98. Therefore, respondent lawmakers could not have

committed a grave abuse of discretion that would justify the
issuance of writs of certiorari and prohibition. They were
motivated by neither passion nor hostility in making sure that
our anti-terrorism law is responsive to the call of the UNSC.
They did not also exercise their legislative authority in a
whimsical, capricious or despotic manner when they
envisioned and crafted an anti-terrorism law that could
effectively combat terrorism at its inception.

99. Considering the foregoing, there is no doubt that

the remedies of certiorari and prohibition will not lie against
herein respondents.

The House of Representatives

complied with the mandatory
requirements set by the
Constitution in enacting the
Anti-Terrorism Act.

100. Petitioner Jurado attacks the constitutionality of the

Anti-Terrorism Act on the ground, among others, that Section
29 thereof violates the “one-bill-one-subject” rule under
Section 26 (1), Article VI of the Constitution, and that the
House of Representatives transgressed the requirements set
by Section 26 (2), Article VI of the Constitution when it
enacted the assailed law. These contentionsdeserve scant
consideration.

Section 29 of the Anti-Terrorism Act

is not a rider.

101. In an attempt to challenge the constitutionality of

the Anti-Terrorism Act, petitioner Jurado assails Section 29 of
said law. He imputes grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of its jurisdiction on the part of Congress for
including Section 29 in the enactment of the Anti-Terrorism
Act. According to him, Section 29 is not germane to the
subject matter of the Anti-Terrorism Act. Hence, it is a rider.

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Furthermore, petitioner Jurado further contends that Section

29 repeals or overhauls Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code
and Section 7, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Court relative
to the extended period of detention of a person lawfully
arrested without a judicial warrant. Therefore, he claims that
Section 29 is violative of the constitutional provision requiring
that a bill, which may be enacted into law, cannot embrace
more than one subject, which shall be expressed in its title. 104

102. These arguments sink the ship of credence and

merit.

103. Truth be told, Section 26 (1), Article VI of the

Constitution requires that “(e)very bill passed by the Congress
shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in
the title thereof.” This proscription is aimed against the evils
of the so-called omnibus bills and log-rolling legislation as well
as surreptitious and/or unconsidered encroaches. The
provision merely calls for all parts of an act relating to its
subject finding expression in its title.105

104. Effectively, this requirement is mandatory and not

directory. Its compliance is essential to the validity of
legislation.106

105. Although the requirement is mandatory, it should

not be so construed as to cripple or impede proper legislation.
As this Honorable Court said in Sumulong v. Commission on
Elections,107 the requirement “should be given a practical
rather than a technical construction. It should be sufficient
compliance with such requirement if the title expresses the
general subject and all the provisions of the statute are
germane to that general subject.”

106. The Constitution does not require Congress to

employ in the title of an enactment a language of such
precision as to mirror, fully index or catalogue all the contents
104
Jurado Petition, pp. 17-19, 49-50.
105
Farinas, et al., v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 147387, December 10, 2003.
106
Central Capiz v. Ramirez, 40 Phil. 883 (1920).
107
73 Phil. 288 (1941).

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and the minute details therein.108 It suffices if the title should

serve the purpose of the constitutional demand that it informs
the legislators, the persons interested in the subject of the bill
and the public, of the nature, scope and consequences of the
proposed law and its operation.109

107. Petitioner Jurado correctly stated that a rider is a

provision that is not germane to the subject matter of the
bill.110 But he is purely mistaken in saying that Section 29 is a
rider.

108. On the contrary, Section 29 is ultimately germane

to the purpose of the Anti-Terrorism Act. Hence, it is not a
rider.

109. Section 29 is precisely placed in the Anti-Terrorism

Act to address the possible imputation of a crime to law
enforcement agents in their pursuit against terrorism, which
is the very purpose of the law. In fact, Section 29 is one of
the primary facets of the Anti-Terrorism Act in the
implementation of a much-needed stronger legal tool in
preventing terrorism and prosecuting those who are involved
in acts of terrorism.

110. It is essential to address the necessity to gather

intelligence and evidence against terrorists. Through Section
29, law enforcement agents may not only obviate potential
retaliation but also prevent other members of terrorist groups
from evading arrest or prosecution. Relatedly, a review of
Section 2, i.e. Declaration of Policy, of the Anti-Terrorism Act
reveals that the fight against terrorism requires a
comprehensive approach, which undeniably covers the ambit
of Section 29.

111. Likewise, it must be noted that Section 29 is not a

totally new provision. It is lifted from the Human Security Act,

108
Lidasan v. Commission on Elections, L028089 (1967); Insular Lumber v. CTA, 104 SCRA 710 (1981).
109
Ibid.
110
Jurado petition, p. 18.

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specifically Section 18 111 thereof, which also provides for a

period of detention without judicial warrant of arrest. Their
primary variation only pertains to the period of detention.
Importantly, this provision in the Human Security Act was not
declared unconstutitional.

112. Regarding petitioner Jurado’s allegation that Section

29 repeals or overhauls Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code
and Section 7, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Court, it is
more imagined than real.

113. Quite the opposite, Section 29 is well-within the

sphere of the subject matter of the Anti-Terrorism Act. Hence,
it need not be contained in a separate legislation.

114. Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code criminalizes

the delay in the delivery of detained persons to the proper
judicial authorities, viz:

Article 125. Delay in the delivery of

detained persons to the proper judicial
authorities. — The penalties provided in the

111
SEC. 18. Period of Detention Without Judicial Warrant of Arrest. — The provisions of Article 125 of the
Revised Penal Code to the contrary notwithstanding, any police or law enforcement personnel, who,
having been duly authorized in writing by the Anti-Terrorism Council has taken custody of a person
charged with or suspected of the crime of terrorism or the crime of conspiracy to commit terrorism shall,
without incurring any criminal liability for delay in the delivery of detained persons to the proper judicial
authorities, deliver said charged or suspected person to the proper judicial authority within a period of
three days counted from the moment the said charged or suspected person has been apprehended or
arrested, detained, and taken into custody by the said police, or law enforcement personnel: Provided,
That the arrest of those suspected of the crime of terrorism or conspiracy to commit terrorism must result
from the surveillance under Section 7 and examination of bank deposits under Section 27 of this Act.
The police or law enforcement personnel concerned shall, before detaining the person suspected of the
crime of terrorism, present him or her before any judge at the latter’s residence or office nearest the place
where the arrest took place at any time of the day or night. It shall be the duty of the judge, among other
things, to ascertain the identity of the police or law enforcement personnel and the person or persons they
have arrested and presented before him or her, to inquire of them the reasons why they have arrested the
person and determine by questioning and personal observation whether or not the suspect has been
subjected to any physical, moral or psychological torture by whom and why. The judge shall then submit
a written report of what he/she had observed when the subject was brought before him to the proper court
that has jurisdiction over the case of the person thus arrested. The judge shall forthwith submit his/her
report within three calendar days from the time the suspect was brought to his/her residence or office.
Immediately after taking custody of a person charged with or suspected of the crime of terrorism or
conspiracy to commit terrorism, the police or law enforcement personnel shall notify in writing the judge
of the court nearest the place of apprehension or arrest: Provided, That where the arrest is made during
Saturdays, Sundays, holidays or after office hours, the written notice shall be served at the residence of
the judge nearest the place where the accused was arrested.
The penalty of ten (10) years and one day to twelve (12) years of imprisonment shall be imposed upon the
police or law enforcement personnel who fails to notify and judge as provided in the preceding paragraph.

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next preceding article shall be imposed upon the

public officer or employee who shall detain any
person for some legal ground and shall fail to
deliver such person to the proper judicial
authorities within the period of; twelve (12)
hours, for crimes or offenses punishable by light
penalties, or their equivalent; eighteen (18)
hours, for crimes or offenses punishable by
correctional penalties, or their equivalent and
thirty-six (36) hours, for crimes, or offenses
punishable by afflictive or capital penalties, or
their equivalent.

115. Meanwhile, Section 7 of Rule 112 of the Revised

Rules OF Court tackles preliminary investigation and inquest
when an accused is lawfully be arrested without warrant:

Section 7. When accused lawfully arrested

without warrant. — When a person is lawfully
arrested without a warrant involving an offense
which requires a preliminary investigation, the
complaint or information may be filed by a
prosecutor without need of such investigation
provided an inquest has been conducted in
accordance with existing rules. In the absence
or unavailability of an inquest prosecutor, the
complaint may be filed by the offended party or
a peace office directly with the proper court on
the basis of the affidavit of the offended party
or arresting officer or person.

Before the complaint or information is

filed, the person arrested may ask for a
preliminary investigation in accordance with this
Rule, but he must sign a waiver of the provisions
of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended, in the presence of his counsel.
Notwithstanding the waiver, he may apply for
bail and the investigation must be terminated
within fifteen (15) days from its inception.

After the filing of the complaint or

information in court without a preliminary
investigation, the accused may, within five (5)
days from the time he learns of its filing, ask for
a preliminary investigation with the same right
to adduce evidence in his defense as provided
in this Rule.

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116. A cursory reading of these provisions would reveal

a very apparent thought — Section 29 is a distinct and specific
provision of the Anti-Terrorism Act which provides for a
detention period of fourteen days, extendible to another
period of ten days, to address the need of law enforcement
agencies for sufficient time to gather evidence that can
withstand judicial scrutiny. It does not in any way repeal
Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code as it exists to address
an exact and defined scenario of an authorized prolonged
detention. It provides for a specific situation where an
arresting officer is allowed to detain a person, who was
previously lawfully arrested without a judicial warrant, for a
period of fourteen days without incurring any criminal liability
for arbitrary detention under Article 125 of the Revised Penal
Code.

117. In the same vein, it does not overhaul Section 7,

Rule 112 as there is nothing in Section 29 which scraps the
process of preliminary investigation or inquest from the
procedural parlance involving a detainee who has been
lawfully arrested without a warrant.

118. Moreover, there is nothing in Section 29 which

categorically states that it is repealing Article 125 of the
Revised Penal Code and Section 7, Rule 112 of the Revised
Rules of Court. In fact, Section 29 recognizes Article 125 of
the Revised Penal Code in this wise: “The provisions of Article
125 of the Revised Penal Code to the contrary
notwithstanding, …”. Hence, what petitioner Jurado impresses
upon this Honorable Court is an implied repeal by Section 29.

119. But, petitioner Jurado obviously forgets the

elementary rule that a repeal by implication is frowned upon
in this jurisdiction. It is not favored unless it is manifest that
the legislative authority so intended or unless it is
convincingly and unambiguously demonstrated that the
subject laws or orders are clearly repugnant and patently
inconsistent that they cannot co-exist. This is because the
legislative authority is presumed to know the existing law so
that if repeal was intended, the proper step is to express it.112
112
The United Harbor Pilot’s Association of the Philippines, Inc. v. Association of International Shipping
Lines, Inc., G.R. No. 133763 (2002).

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120. Furthermore, in order to effect a repeal by

implication, the latter statute must be so irreconcilably
inconsistent and repugnant with the existing law that they
cannot be made to reconcile and stand together.

121. This is not the case here. As previously discussed,

Section 29 presses the need of preventing and prosecuting
terrorists in this jurisdiction, which makes it patently
consistent with and germane to the subject matter of the Anti-
Terrorism Act.

122. To recap, Section 29 is germane to the subject

matter of the Anti-Terrorism Act. It does not repeal nor
overhaul Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code and Section 7,
Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Court. In short, Section 29 is
absolutely not a rider.

The House of Representatives did

not violate Section 26 (2), Article VI
of the Constitution.

123. Petitioner Jurado further contends that the House of

Representatives purportedly bypassed the requirements set
by Section 26 (2), Article VI of the Constitution, which
allegedly deprived its members the opportunity to examine
HB No. 6875.

124. Petitioner’s contention is hollow.

125. Section 26 (2), Article VI of the Constitution

provides:

2. No bill passed by either House shall

become a law unless it has passed three
readings on separate days, and printed copies
thereof in its final form have been distributed to
its Members three days before its passage,
except when the President certifies to the
necessity of its immediate enactment to
meet a public calamity or emergency. Upon

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the last reading of a bill, no amendment thereto

shall be allowed, and the vote thereon shall be
taken immediately thereafter, and the yeas and
nays entered in the Journal.113

126. The import of the aforequoted provision is to

dispense with the above requirements – to conduct three
readings of the bill on separate days and to furnish members
of the House of Representatives copies of the bill’s final form
three days before its passage – when the President certifies a
bill as urgent. This is consistent with the rulings of this
Honorable Court in Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance 114 and
Abas Kida v. Senate of the Philippines. 115 Respondents thus
quote:

The petitioners in G.R. No. 197280 also

challenge the validity of RA No. 10153 for its
alleged failure to comply with Section 26 (2),
Article VI of the Constitution which provides
that before bills passed by either the House or
the Senate can become laws, they must pass
through three readings on separate days. The
exception is when the President certifies to the
necessity of the bill's immediate enactment.

The Court, in Tolentino v. Secretary of

Finance, explained the effect of the President's
certification of necessity in the following
manner:

The presidential
certification dispensed with the
requirement not only of printing
but also that of reading the bill
on separate days. The phrase
"except when the President certifies
to the necessity of its immediate
enactment, etc." in Art. VI, Section
26[2] qualifies the two stated
conditions before a bill can become
a law: [i] the bill has passed three
readings on separate days and [ii] it
has been printed in its final form

113
Emphasis supplied.
114
G.R. No. 115455, August 25, 1994.
115
G.R. Nos. 196271, 196305, 197221, 197280, 197282, 197392 & 197454, October 18, 2011.

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and distributed three days before it

is finally approved.

That upon the certification

of a bill by the President, the
requirement of three readings
on separate days and of printing
and distribution can be
dispensed with is supported by
the weight of legislative
practice. For example, the bill
defining the certiorari jurisdiction of
this Court which, in consolidation
with the Senate version, became
Republic Act No. 5440, was passed
on second and third readings in the
House of Representatives on the
same day [May 14, 1968] after the
bill had been certified by the
President as urgent.

In the present case, the records show that

the President wrote to the Speaker of the House
of Representatives to certify the necessity of the
immediate enactment of a law synchronizing the
ARMM elections with the national and local
elections. Following our Tolentino ruling, the
President's certification exempted both the
House and the Senate from having to comply
with the three separate readings
requirement.116

127. Clearly, by virtue of the President’s certification, the

House of Representative committed no constitutional violation
when it dispensed with the three-day rule.

128. Unconvinced, petitioner Jurado casts doubt on the

propriety of the President’s certification as urgent of HB No.
6875, the precursor of the Anti-Terrorism Act. He insists that
the swift enactment of the law deprived the members of the
House of Representatives the opportunity to study the subject
bill and even resulted to an erroneous counting of votes.

116
Emphasis supplied.

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129. Again, petitioner Jurado is clutching at straws.

130. Absent any showing of grave abuse of discretion,

the judicial department, in deference to a co-equal branch,
will not review the factual basis of the President’s certification
as urgent of HB No. 6875. Abas Kida117 is instructive:

On the follow-up contention that no

necessity existed for the immediate enactment
of these bills since there was no public calamity
or emergency that had to be met, again we hark
back to our ruling in Tolentino:

The sufficiency of the factual basis

of the suspension of the writ of habeas
corpus or declaration of martial law Art.
VII, Section 18, or the existence of a
national emergency justifying the
delegation of extraordinary powers to the
President under Art. VI, Section 23(2) is
subject to judicial review because basic
rights of individuals may be of
hazard. But the factual basis of
presidential certification of bills,
which involves doing away with
procedural requirements designed to
insure that bills are duly considered
by members of Congress, certainly
should elicit a different standard of
review. [Emphasis supplied.]

The House of Representatives and the

Senate — in the exercise of their legislative
discretion — gave full recognition to the
President's certification and promptly
enacted RA No. 10153. Under the
circumstances, nothing short of grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the two houses of
Congress can justify our intrusion under our
power of judicial review.

The petitioners, however, failed to

provide us with any cause or justification
for this course of action. Hence, while the
judicial department and this Court are not
bound by the acceptance of the President's
certification by both the House of
117
Supra.

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Representatives and the Senate, prudent

exercise of our powers and respect due our
co-equal branches of government in
matters committed to them by
the Constitution, caution a stay of the
judicial hand.

In any case, despite the President's

certification, the two-fold purpose that underlies
the requirement for three readings on separate
days of every bill must always be observed to
enable our legislators and other parties
interested in pending bills to intelligently
respond to them. Specifically, the purpose with
respect to Members of Congress is: (1) to
inform the legislators of the matters they shall
vote on and (2) to give them notice that a
measure is in progress through the enactment
process.

We find, based on the records of the

deliberations on the law, that both advocates
and the opponents of the proposed measure had
sufficient opportunities to present their views.
In this light, no reason exists to nullify RA No.
10153 on the cited ground.118

131. Here, petitioner Jurado failed to attribute any grave

abuse of discretion committed by the President when he
certified the HB No. 6985 as an urgent bill. The absence of
grave abuse of discretion became more evident when the
members of the House of Representatives fully recognized the
President’s certification and immediately deliberated on HB
No. 6875 and eventually passed the Anti-Terrorism Act. In
fact, Representatives Zarate and Lagman, both members of
the House of Representatives and also petitioners herein,
tacitly admitted the validity of the President’s certification
when they did not raise it as an issue in their respective
Petitions. Verily, petitioner Jurado’s reservation on the
President’s certification is untenable.

132. By the same token, petitioner Jurado’s insinuation

that, based on news articles, 119 the swift enactment of the
Anti-Terrorism Act deprived members of the House of

118
Emphasis supplied.
119
Jurado Petition, Annexes “C ” and “D.”

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Representatives an opportunity to study the law and resulted

to an erroneous counting of votes, should likewise be
rejected.

133. For one, these news articles do not salvage

petitioner Jurado’s plea since it would practically compel this
Honorable Court to rule on factual issues and, in turn,
circumvent the settled doctrine that this Honorable Court is
not a trier of facts.120 For another, these news articles should
not be accorded any probative value since they are “hearsay
evidence, twice removed" and, hence, inadmissible. 121

134. And more importantly, petitioner Jurado himself, the

Senate transmitted its SB No. 1083 to the House of
Representatives on February 27, 2020 for the latter’s
concurrence.122 Note that HB No. 6875 adopted in toto SB No.
1083.123 Petitioner Lagman, et al. even remarked that HB No.
6875 is a “copycat” of SB No. 1083.124 Hence, between
February 27, 2020 and July 3, 2020, the members of the House
of Representatives had more than three months, or
approximately ninety-seven days, to study the proposed
legislation before it was finally voted upon on July 3, 2020.

135. Ineluctably, sans any clear showing that some

members of the House of Representatives were deprived of
the opportunity to study the bill and that their votes were
erroneously counted, the deliberation and voting conducted in
the House of Representatives enjoy the presumption of
regularity125 and are, thus, valid.

136. In sum, the House of Representatives complied with

the mandatory requirements set by the Constitution when it
enacted the Anti-Terrorism Act.

120
Abogado v. Department of Environment and Natural Resources, G.R. No. 246209, September 3, 2019.
121
Feria y Pacquing v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 122954, February 15, 2000.
122
Jurado Petition, p. 11, par. 33.
123
Id., at p. 14, par. 42.
124
Lagman Petition, p. 13, par. 51.
125
Section 3, Rule 132, Revised Rules of Court.

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The wisdom and necessity

behind the enactment of
Anti-Terrorism Act are
political questions which,
pursuant to the doctrine of
separation of powers, are
beyond the ambit of judicial
scrutiny.

137. Petitioners bewail the crafting and eventual

passage of the Anti-Terrorism Act.

138. In particular, petitioners Calleja, et al., stated that

they do not assail the wisdom and necessity of the law.126
However, they did state that despite calls from various human
rights and church groups to reconsider and/or remove the
alleged unconstitutional provisions in the Anti-Terrorism Act,
said provisions remained.127 Petitioner CTUHR, et al. share
this same observation. 128

139. Meanwhile, petitioners Sta.Maria, et al. also

impliedly attack the wisdom of the enactment of the law and
harp that the Anti-Terrorism Act should not have seen the
light of day129 because it allegedly lowers the threshold in
imposing limitations on a person’s fundamental rights yet
gives the government and the ATC more powers.130

140. And petitioner Lagman he attacks the wisdom and

necessity of the law, brushing aside the apparent intent of
the lawmakers to provide the country with a stronger law
against terrorism similar to what other nations have
done.131 He also questions the necessity of the Anti-
Terrorism Act, claiming that there is no deficiency in the law
it replaced i.e. the Human Security Act. He further argues
that there are other statutes which are applicable and
already adequate to deter terrorism and prosecute
126
Calleja Petition, p. 3.
127
Calleja Petition, par. 13, p. 7.
128
Center for Trade Union Petition, p. 8.
129
Sta. Maria Petition, p. 5.
130
Sta. Maria Petition, p. 20.
131
Lagman Petition, par. 141, p. 52.

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terrorists. He claims that the Anti-Terrorism Act should not

have included the imposition of sanctions by the FATF.132 He
also laments the passage of the law at the time when the
country is facing the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic.133

141. Petitioners Zarate, et al., also impliedly attack the

wisdom of the Anti-Terrorism Act by alleging that public
opinion from various sectors and civil society is
overwhelmingly opposed to its enactment.134 They question
the necessity of the law on the ground that that the acts
sought to be defeated are already addressed by existing
penal laws.135

142. Questions on the propriety and timeliness of the

law’s enactment are political questions, hence, beyond the
ambit of judicial scrutiny.

143. The leading case of Tañada v. Cuenco136 held that

a political question “is a matter which is to be exercised by
the people in their primary political capacity, or that it has
been specifically delegated to some other department or
particular officer of the government, with discretionary
power to act.”

144. Indeed, the wisdom and necessity behind the

enactment of a law are matters of political question. Their
determination exclusively rests upon Congress and due
deference from the courts is expected. This must be so
because said discretion of Congress emanates from its
plenary mandate to enact laws. In Garcia v. Drilon,137 this
Honorable Court categorically stated that the exercise of
discretion with respect to what motivates Congress to enact
a law and how it wishes to accomplish its intentions, are
matters solely within its prerogative which the Judiciary
may not supersede. Moreover, in numerous cases, this

132
Lagman Petition, pars. 52-57, 61, pp. 16-17.
133
Lagman Petition, pars. 64-67, pp. 17-18.
134
Zarate Petition, par. 45, p. 18.
135
Zarate Petition, par. 144, p. 49.
136
G.R. No. L-10520, February 28, 1957.
137
G.R. No. 179267, June 25, 2013.

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Honorable Court afforded respect and gave a wide latitude

to the wisdom of Congress in the enactment of laws.138

145. As will be thoroughly discussed hereunder,

Congress acted within its legislative authority in enacting
the Anti-Terrorism Act. Hence, the subject matter of these
petitions is clearly beyond the ambit of this Honorable
Court’s power of judicial review.

The issue on the President’s

Certification of House Bill No.
6875 as urgent is a political
question as it involves the
President’s authority and
discretion.

146. Petitioner Jurado’s contention that the certification

by the President of HB No. 6875 as urgent is invalid or
improper for not being in conformity with Section 26 (2),
Article VI of the Constitution is futile.139

147. Indeed, to be certified as urgent, the proposed

legislation must pertain to a public calamity or emergency. In
this regard, the definition of the term “emergency” in the
Constitution is already settled. Emergency, as a generic term,
connotes the existence of conditions suddenly intensifying the
degree of existing danger to life or well-being beyond that
which is accepted as normal. The elements of intensity,
variety, and perception are implicit in this definition. As
explained in David v. Macapagal-Arroyo,140 this jurisdiction
has adopted the same concept of emergency as perceived by
the legislature or executive in the United States of America
since 1933, to that which have been occasioned by a wide
range of situations, classifiable under three principal
heads: (a) economic; (b) natural disaster; and (c) national
security.141 It may further include rebellion, economic crisis,
138
See Abakada Guro Party List v. Ermita, G.R. Nos. 168056, 168207, 168461, 168463, and 168730, September
3, 2005; People v. Tongko, G.R. No. 123567, June 5, 1998; Council of Teachers and Staff of Colleges and
Universities of the Philippines v. Secretary of Education, supra.
139
Jurado Petition, p 12.
140
G.R. Nos. 171396, 171409, 171485, 171483, 171400, 171489 & 171424, 3 May 2006.
141
Id., emphases in the original.

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pestilence or epidemic, typhoon, flood, or other similar

catastrophe of nationwide proportions or effect. 142

148. In the case of HB No. 6875, the emergency

addressed by the presidential certification is the menace
which terrorist acts may bring, such as the Marawi Siege in
2017, the Jolo Cathedral suicide bombing in 2019, and
separate bombings at Isulan and Indanan also in 2019, 143
which shook the peace and order situation and bore a large
hole in the core of the country’s state of national security, and
left litter of bodies of loved ones and rubble of what used to
be homes.

149. In this light, the exercise of the prerogative to

certify a legislation as urgent is basically a matter within the
discretion of the President; hence, it is a political question
beyond the reach of the judicial arm. As the Chief of the
executive branch of the government, the President heads both
the DND and the DILG. Not to be overlooked, the President is
also the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces. 144 Being
fully abreast with the current prevailing state of the country’s
national security, the President has the primary responsibility
to defend the country and its people. The President’s power
to act in the manner that would bring success in the
performance of this sacred duty is borne by the laws enacted
by Congress.

150. All information from all sources go to the President

and he has a full complement of public officers in different
fields of expertise who provide him with data and advise in
handling state matters involving defense and security issues.
Effectively, the whole executive branch of the government is
the President’s source in determining what bill he would
consider as urgent and why. Needless to say, every legislation
certified by the President as urgent has undergone the
scrutiny of the minds of specialized agencies equipped with
technical expertise on matters touching such legislation.

142
Id.
143
See Substantive and Procedural Facts of this Consolidated Comment.
144
Section 18, Article VI, 1987 Constitution,

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151. More importantly, it is already settled that

presidential certifications of a bill as urgent is not subject to
heightened scrutiny. 145 Whether to treat and certify a bill as
urgent to address an emergency, such as the alarming
emergence of terrorist acts, is best left to the sound discretion
of the executive department, whose judgment, absent any
good cause or justification may not be intruded by the courts
through its power of judicial review.

152. In Abas Kida v. Senate of the Philippines,146 this

Honorable Court refused to inquire into the wisdom of
certifying as urgent the passage of HB No. 4146 and SB No.
2756, thus:

On the follow-up contention that no

necessity existed for the immediate enactment
of these bills since there was no public
calamity or emergency that had to be met,
again we hark back to our ruling in Tolentino:

The sufficiency of the factual basis

of the suspension of the writ of habeas
corpus or declaration of martial law
Art. VII, Section 18, or the existence
of a national emergency justifying the
delegation of extraordinary powers to
the President under Art. VI, Section
23(2) is subject to judicial review
because basic rights of individuals
may be of hazard. But the factual
basis
of presidential certification of
bills, which involves doing away
with procedural requirements
designed to insure that bills are
duly considered by members of
Congress, certainly should elicit a
different standard of review.

The House of Representatives and the

Senate — in the exercise of their legislative
discretion — gave full recognition to the
President's certification and promptly

145
Abas Kida v. Senate of the Philippines, infra.
146
G.R. No. 196271, 18 October 2011.

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enacted R.A. No. 10153. Under the

circumstances, nothing short of grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the two houses of
Congress can justify our intrusion under our
power of judicial review.147

153. Verily, Abas Kida cautioned courts from being

baited into probing the wisdom of a presidential certification
under the guise of judicial review, by petitions crying
supposed violation of constitutional rights, so as to steer clear
of the possibility of encroaching on the powers of a co-equal
branch. This rule especially holds true in cases in which
Congress committed to the President’s certification, like in
Abas Kida and the present case.

154. Notably, petitioner Jurado did not proffer any valid

cause or justification that will trigger this Honorable Court’s
power of judicial review. Petitioner Jurado failed to show, and
there is nothing on record to show, that the members of the
House of Representatives were denied the opportunity to
examine HB No. 6875 because of the President’s
certification.148 Curiously, there is nothing on record that any
one member of the House of Representatives questioned the
reality of the factual basis of the certification. 149 Petitioner
Jurado’s bare allegations that the standing bills 150 were
overhauled when the House of Representatives adopted SB
No. 1083 as HB No. 6875, and that after the second reading
no other amendments from the members of the House were
entertained despite deep concerns as to the constitutionality
of SB No. 1083,151 without proof and which the records
dispute, may not serve as reasons enough to cross the
threshold of separation of powers and review the factual basis
of the presidential certification.

155. Thus, as this Honorable Court held, “while the

judicial department and this Honorable Court are not bound
by the acceptance of the President's certification by both the
House of Representatives and the Senate, prudent exercise of
147
Emphasis in the original.
148
Cf. Abas Kida v. Senate of the Philippines, supra.
149
Cf. Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance, supra.
150
H.B. Nos. 551, 2082, 2847, 3103, 3143, and 5710.
151
Jurado Petition, p. 14.

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our powers and respect due our co-equal branches of

government in matters committed to them by the
Constitution, caution a stay of judicial hand.”152

The President is immune

from suit.

156. Petitioners Zarate, et al., CTHUR, et al., and

Sanlakas impleaded the President, in his capacity as the Chief
Executive and Commander-in-Chief under the Constitution, as
respondent in the present case. The President, according to
petitioners, had already performed an act relevant to the Anti-
Terrorism Act when he signed said law on July 3, 2020, which
allegedly rendered the present case ripe for adjudication.

157. Petitioners are barking up the wrong tree.

158. The President’s immunity from suit is not a novel

issue. The seminal case of David v. Macapagal-Arroyo153
categorically held that an incumbent President is immune
from suit, albeit the absence of any express provision in the
Constitution granting the same, viz.:

Incidentally, it is not proper to implead

President Arroyo as respondent. Settled is the
doctrine that the President, during his
tenure of office or actual incumbency, may
not be sued in any civil or criminal case,
and there is no need to provide for it in the
Constitution or law. It will degrade the
dignity of the high office of the President,
the Head of State, if he can be dragged into
court litigations while serving as such.
Furthermore, it is important that he be freed
from any form of harassment, hindrance or
distraction to enable him to fully attend to the
performance of his official duties and functions.
Unlike the legislative and judicial branch, only
one constitutes the executive branch and
anything which impairs his usefulness in the
discharge of the many great and important

152
Cf. Abas Kida v. Senate of the Philippines, supra.
153
G.R. Nos. 171396, 171409, 171485, 171483, 171400, 171489, and 171424, May 3, 2006.

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duties imposed upon him by the Constitution

necessarily impairs the operation of the
Government. However, this does not mean that
the President is not accountable to anyone. Like
any other official, he remains accountable to the
people but he may be removed from office only
in the mode provided by law and that is by
impeachment.154

159. Relatedly, this Honorable Court has recently held

that presidential immunity admits no qualification or
restriction while the President is holding such office. De Lima
v. Duterte155 instructs:

While the concept of immunity from suit

originated elsewhere, the ratification of the 1981
constitutional amendments and the 1987
Constitution made our version of presidential
immunity unique. Section 15, Article VII of the
1973 Constitution, as amended, provided for
immunity at two distinct points in time: the first
sentence of the provision related to immunity
during the tenure of the President, and the
second provided for immunity thereafter. At this
juncture, we need only concern ourselves with
immunity during the President's tenure, as this
case involves the incumbent President. As the
framers of our Constitution understood it, which
view has been upheld by relevant jurisprudence,
the President is immune from suit during his
tenure.

Unlike its American counterpart, the

concept of presidential immunity under our
governmental and constitutional system does
not distinguish whether or not the suit pertains
to an official act of the President. Neither does
immunity hinge on the nature of the suit. The
lack of distinctions prevents us from making any
distinctions. We should still be guided by our
precedents.

Accordingly, the concept is clear and

allows no qualifications or restrictions that the
President cannot be sued while holding such
office.

154
Emphasis supplied.
155
G.R. No. 227635 (Resolution), October 15, 2019.

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160. Without, therefore, any legal justification to

depart from the doctrine of presidential immunity, petitioners
should not be allowed to conveniently implead the President
as a respondent in this case.

161. Nonetheless, assuming arguendo that the

President may still be sued, petitioners must allege the
specific act or omission, committed by the President pursuant
to the Anti-Terrorism Act, that violated or threatened to
violate their protected rights. 156 To this end, petitioners failed
miserably.

162. To be sure, the mandate of implementing the

provisions of the Anti-Terrorism Act may be said to ultimately
lie in the hands of the President as the Chief Executive.
However, it bears to stress that, as of this writing, the
President’s only participation in said law was to affix his
signature in the enrolled bill. The law has not yet been
implemented, and there has never been an attempt by the
Executive Department to implement the same before its
effectivity.

163. Neither can the petitioners’ allusion to previous

acts allegedly committed by the President suffice to
incriminate the President in relation to the Anti-Terrorism Act.
These alleged acts have no factual and legal implications on
how the Executive Department will implement the law once it
becomes effective.

164. The foregoing disquisitions only tender one

conclusion: the incumbent President enjoys an absolute
immunity from suit. As such, he should be dropped as a
respondent in the subject Petitions.

156
Rubrico v. Macapagal Arroyo, G.R. No. 183871, February 18, 2010.

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The Sta. Maria, Lagman,

Zarate, Jurado, CTUHR,
Monsod and Sanlakas
Petitions suffer from formal
defects and procedural
infirmities which merit
their outright dismissal by
this Honorable Court.

165. This Honorable Court has repeatedly held that,

“procedural rules are not to be disdained as mere
technicalities. They may not be ignored to suit the
convenience of a party. Adjective law ensures the effective
enforcement of substantive rights through the orderly and
speedy administration of justice. Rules are not intended to
hamper litigants or complicate litigation. But they help
provide for a vital system of justice where suitors may be
heard in the correct form and manner, at the prescribed time
in a peaceful though adversarial confrontation before a judge
whose authority litigants acknowledge. Public order and our
system of justice are well served by a conscientious
observance of the rules of procedure.”157

166. A simple glance at the Sta. Maria and Monsod

Petitions would show that these failed to comply with the
requirement of Section 2(a), Rule 7 of the Revised Rules of
Court which provides:

Section 2. The body. — The body of the

pleading sets fourth its designation, the
allegations of the party’s claims or defenses, the
relief prayed for, and the date of the pleading.

(a) Paragraphs. — The allegations in

the body of a pleading shall be divided into
paragraphs so numbered to be readily
identified, each of which shall contain a
statement of a single set of circumstances so far
as that can be done with convenience. A
paragraph may be referred to by its number in
all succeeding pleadings.158

157
Levi Strauss & Co. v. Blancaflor, G.R. No. 206779, April 20, 2016.
158
Emphasis supplied.

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167. The Lagman Petition likewise suffers from

substantial infirmities. For one, the Verification and
Certification on Non-Forum Shopping159 was not signed. For
another, the Verification and Certification on Non-Forum
Shopping was not notarized. Also, the Lagman Petition failed
to state the required attestations found in Section 4, Rule 7 of
the Revised Rules of Court.

168. In this regard, Sections 1 and 2, Rule 65 of the

same Rules specifically require a petition for certiorari and a
petition for prohibition to be verified and accompanied by a
certification of non-forum shopping. Meanwhile, Section 4,
Rule 7 sets forth the manner by which a pleading is verified,
with emphasis on the requirement of a signature, as well as
the required attestations, to wit:

A pleading is verified by an affidavit of an

affiant duly authorized to sign said verification.
The authorization of the affiant to act on behalf
of a party, whether in the form of a secretary’s
certificate or a special power of attorney, should
be attached to the pleading, and shall allege the
following attestations:

(a) The allegations in the pleading are

true and correct based on his or her personal
knowledge, or based on authentic documents;

(b)The pleading is not filed to harass,

cause unnecessary delay, or needlessly increase
the cost of litigation; and

(c) The factual allegations therein have

evidentiary support or, if specifically so
identified, will likewise have evidentiary support
after a reasonable opportunity for discovery.

The signature of the affiant shall further

serve as a certification of the truthfulness of the
allegations in the pleading.

169. Additionally, under Section 5, Rule 7, the principal

party shall certify under oath or in a sworn certification: (a)

159
Lagman Petition, p. 54.

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that he or she has not commenced any action involving the

same issues in any court, tribunal, or quasi-judicial agency
and, to the best of his or her knowledge, no such other action
or claim is pending therein; (b) if there is a pending action, a
complete statement of the present status; and (c) if he or she
should learn that the same action has been filed or is pending,
he or she shall report that fact within five calendar days to the
court where the initiatory pleading has been filed.

170. The rules on verification and certification are

basic, necessary and mandatory for procedural orderliness.160
This Honorable Court elucidated on the importance of
compliance with the verification requirements, viz.:

The verification requirement is significant,

as it is intended to secure an assurance that the
allegations in the pleading are true and correct
and not the product of the imagination or a
matter of speculation, and that the pleading is
filed in good faith. Verification is deemed
substantially complied with when, as in this
case, one who has ample knowledge to swear to
the truth of the allegations in the complaint or
petition signs the verification, and when matters
alleged in the petition have been made in good
faith or are true and correct.161

171. Similarly, the filing of a certificate of non-forum

shopping is mandatory. Non-compliance cannot be excused
by the fact that petitioner is not guilty of forum-shopping.162
Even with the filing of such certificate, if it is not notarized,
the principal party is not deemed to have done so under oath.
Because Section 5, Rule 7 was not followed in terms of the
statement being under oath, there is no valid certification
against non-forum shopping to speak of.

172. In this case, the aforementioned defects in the

Lagman, Jurado Petition are not negligible. They constitute
blatant violations of the pertinent rules on verification and
certification on non-forum shopping.
160
Bank of the Philippine Islands v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 168313, October 6, 2010.
161
Martos v. New San Jose Builders, Inc., G.R. No. 192650, October 24, 2012; citations omitted.
162
Spouses Melo v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 123686, November 16, 1999.

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173. A pleading that lacks a proper verification shall be

treated as an unsigned pleading.163 The absence of a proper
verification results in the petition being dismissible.164
Likewise, failure to observe the rules on certification shall be
cause for the dismissal of the case.165

174. In line with Martos vs. New San Jose Builders,

166
Inc., one cannot gather with certainty whether the Lagman
Petition was filed in good faith. Because of the absence of
petitioner Lagman’s signature, there is no assurance that his
allegations are true and correct. Ultimately, the rules on
verification were not substantially complied with.

175. Petitioner Lagman did not cite any compelling

reason for his failure to sign the verification. He cannot rely
on a subsequent correction to cure the defective
certification.167 Worse, he cannot even invoke substantial
compliance with the rules on certification, simply because he
is the lone petitioner in the instant petition. As such, there is
no exceptional ground for this Honorable Court to liberally
apply the rules in petitioner Lagman’s favor.

176. As for the Zarate and Sanlakas Petitions, they

have no attached Verification and Certification of Non-Forum
Shopping in violation of the above mentioned Rules. Thus, the
unverified Zarate and Sanlakas Petitions must be treated too
as a mere scrap of paper. Additionally, pursuant to Section 5,
Rule 7 of the Revised Rules of Court, the glaring absence of a
Certification of Non-Forum Shopping in the Zarate and
Sanlakas Petitions is a clear ground for their dismissal.

177. Like the Lagman Petition, the Jurado, CTUHR and

Monsod Petitions failed to state the required attestations
under Section 4, Rule 7 of the Revised Rules of Court.

163
Section 4, Rule 7, Revised Rules of Court.
164
Chua v. Torres, et al., G.R. No. 151900, August 30, 2005.
165
Section 5, Rule 7, Revised Rules of Court.
166
Supra.
167
Argallon-Jocson, et al. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 162836, July 30, 2009.

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178. Surely, procedural rules exist for good reason—

they are tools designed to facilitate the adjudication of cases.
Courts and litigants alike are thus enjoined to abide strictly by
the rules.168 A tempering of their application is the exception
rather than the rule, and only upon a showing of justifiable
reasons and of at least a reasonable attempt at compliance
with them.169

179. At this juncture, it is evident that the Petitions are

riddled with procedural infirmities that warrant no less than
outright dismissal. Be that as it may, should this Honorable
Court subscribe to a liberal reading of its rules, the Petitions
are all devoid of merit for reasons which will be exhaustively
discussed hereunder.

SUBSTANTIVE ARGUMENTS

The enactment of Anti-

Terrorism Act is a
legitimate exercise of the
police power by the State
which has general welfare
as its object.

180. The enactment of the Anti-Terrorism Act is a valid

exercise of the State’s police power. In Zabal v. Duterte,170
this Honorable Court exhaustively described the nature of
police power:

Police power, amongst the three

fundamental and inherent powers of the state,
is the most pervasive and comprehensive. “It
has been defined as the ‘state authority to enact
legislation that may interfere with personal

168
Garbo v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 107698, July 5, 1996.
169
Rephrased from a passage in Mediserv, Inc. v. CA, G.R. No. 161368, April 5, 2010. The original reads: “It
is settled that liberal construction of the rules may be invoked in situations where there may be some
excusable formal deficiency or error in a pleading, provided that the same does not subvert the essence of
the proceeding and connotes at least a reasonable attempt at compliance with the rules. After all, rules of
procedure are not to be applied in a very rigid, technical sense; they are used only to help secure substantial
justice.”
170
Supra.

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liberty or property in order to promote general

welfare.” “As defined, it consists of (1)
imposition or restraint upon liberty or property,
(2) in order to foster the common good. It is not
capable of exact definition but has been
purposely, veiled in general terms to underscore
its all-comprehensive embrace.” The police
power “finds no specific Constitutional grant for
the plain reason that it does not owe its origin
to the Charter” since “it is inborn in the very fact
of statehood and sovereignty.” It is said to be
the “inherent and plenary power of the State
which enables it to prohibit all things hurtful to
the comfort, safety, and welfare of the society.”
Thus, police power constitutes an implied
limitation on the Bill of Rights. After all,
“the Bill of Rights itself does not purport to
be an absolute guaranty of individual
rights and liberties. ‘Even liberty itself, the
greatest of all rights, is not unrestricted
license to act according to one’s will.’ It is
subject to the far more overriding
demands and requirements of the greater
number.”171

181. The tests to determine the validity of a police

measure are as follows: (a) the interests of the public
generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class,
require the exercise of the police power; and (b) the means
employed are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment
of the purpose and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. 172
This is the rational basis test.

182. An intermediate review is warranted when the

statute is an economic legislation. Intermediate review
requires an important government interest. Here, it would
suffice if government is able to demonstrate substantial
connection between its interest and the means it employs. In
accordance with White Light, "the availability of less
restrictive measures [must have been] considered." This
demands a conscientious effort at devising the least
restrictive means for attaining its avowed interest. It is

171
Citations omitted and emphasis supplied.
172
Chavez v. Romulo, G.R. No. 157036, June 9, 2004.

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enough that the means employed is conceptually the least

restrictive mechanism that the government may apply. 173

183. For statutes that (a) interferes with the exercise

of fundamental rights, including the basic liberties guaranteed
under the Constitution, or (b) burdens suspect classes,; this
Honorable Court has utilized the strict scrutiny test. 174 Under
the strict scrutiny test, it must be shown that the challenged
law is narrowly tailored in order to achieve compelling
governmental interests and that the mechanisms it adopts are
the least burdensome or least drastic means to achieve its
ends:

Fundamental rights which give rise to

Strict Scrutiny include the right of procreation,
the right to marry, the right to exercise First
Amendment freedoms such as free speech,
political expression, press, assembly, and so
forth, the right to travel, and the right to vote.

Because Strict Scrutiny involves statutes

which either classifies on the basis of an
inherently suspect characteristic or infringes
fundamental constitutional rights, the
presumption of constitutionality is reversed;
that is, such legislation is assumed to be
unconstitutional until the government
demonstrates otherwise. The government
must show that the statute is supported by
a compelling governmental interest and
the means chosen to accomplish that
interest are narrowly tailored. Gerald
Gunther explains as follows:

…The intensive review associated

with the new equal protection imposed
two demands a demand not only as to
means but also as to ends. Legislation
qualifying for strict scrutiny required a
far closer fit between classification and
statutory purpose than the rough and
ready flexibility traditionally tolerated
by the old equal protection: means
had to be shown “necessary” to
achieve statutory ends, not merely

173
Separate Opinion of J. Leonen in SPARK v. Quezon City, supra.
174
SPARK v. Quezon City, supra.

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“reasonably related.” Moreover, equal

protection became a source of ends
scrutiny as well: legislation in the
areas of the new equal protection had
to be justified by “compelling” state
interests, not merely the wide
spectrum of “legitimate” state ends.

Furthermore, the legislature

must adopt the least burdensome
or least drastic means available
for achieving the governmental
objective.175

The State has a compelling

interest in the protection of its
citizens from terrorism.

184. A primordial duty of a State is the protection of

public order and the promotion of public safety. This duty is
enshrined in Section 4, Article II of the Consitution which
provides:

Section 4. The prime duty of the

Government is to serve and protect the people.
The Government may call upon the people to
defend the State and, in the fulfillment thereof,
all citizens may be required, under conditions
provided by law, to render personal, military or
civil service.

185. There is no doubt that the security of the Filipino

people is threatened by terrorism.

186. When the ISIS terror group began to lose ground

in the Middle East, its members and sympathizers brought the
fight to Southeast Asia. Eventually, the notoriety of ISIS
attracted the attention of local extremist groups. In fact, the
AFP has obtained an ISIS propaganda material, a document
entitled “Dabiq,” which stated that as early as November
2014, a number of groups in the Philippines had already
pledged their allegiance to the caliphate.176
175
Separate Opinion of Justice Marivic Leonen in SPARK v. Quezon City, supra.
176
Supra note 7.

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187. Recently, local terrorist groups perpetrated

bombing attacks in Mindanao: the January 27, 2019 Jolo
Cathedral bombing, the April 3, 2019 and September 7, 2019
Isulan bombings, and the June 28, 2019 and September 8,
2019 Indanan bombings.177

188. Senator Lacson laid down the state of terrorism in

the Philippines in his Sponsorship Speech delivered on
February 6, 2019,178 to wit:

(a) The menacing threat of terrorism

continues to spread with even more daring and
sophisticated means. While other countries
have long responded aggressively to protect
and safeguard their citizens, our existing laws
are neither sufficient nor responsive to the
threat.

(b) The Global Terrorism Index of 2018

ranked the Philippines as the 10th country most
negatively affected by terrorism. In fact, our
country experienced the highest negative
impact from terrorism among states in the Asia-
Pacific region. While other states across the
globe are starting to see a downtrend in the
number of deaths due to terrorism, we are
included in the top 10 countries with the largest
increase in deaths from terrorism from 2016-
2017.

(c) In 2017, despite the effectivity

Human Security Act of 2007, said law did not
prevent the armed conflict in Marawi, Lanao del
Sur, between government forces and pro-ISIS
militants. From this, the government reported
the death of 900 Maute-ISIS affliated fighters,
168 government forces, and 47 civilians. The
total damage and lost opportunities cost is
estimated at P18.23 billion, excluding the cost
of war material and other combat service
support operations, which was estimated at
more than P6 billion. Post-war, the

177
See Substantive and Procedural Facts of this Consolidated Comment.
178
Panfilo M. Lacson, Sponsorship Speech for the Anti-Terrorist Act (17th Congress),
https://pinglacson.net/2019/02/06/sponsorship-speech-anti-terrorism-act-of-2019/, last accessed on July 14,
2020.

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government’s conservative estimate for the cost

of Marawi’s rehabilitation is pegged at P72.58
billion. Furthermore, the fighting in Marawi
forced out around 72,000 families or 359,000
individuals, many of whom remain displaced to
this day.

(d) Since the passage of the Human

Security Act of 2007 more than a decade ago
and during its efficacy, it remained severely
underutilized. To illustrate, it took five long
years to finally declare the Abu Sayyaf Group a
terrorist or outlawed organization in 2015.
Despite the increasing number of deaths due to
terrorism, only one conviction179 was secured by
the State under said law.

189. Moreover, the UN Global Counter-Terrorism

Strategy recognizes that terrorism laws are fundamental
government obligations to safeguard human rights and the
protection of individuals, viz.:

Terrorism clearly has a very real and

direct impact on human rights, with devastating
consequences for the enjoyment of the right to
life, liberty and physical integrity of victims. In
addition to these individual costs, terrorism can
destabilize Governments, undermine civil
society, jeopardize peace and security, and
threaten social and economic development. All
of these also have a real impact on the
enjoyment of human rights.

Security of the individual is a basic human

right and the protection of individuals is,
accordingly, a fundamental obligation of
Government. States therefore have an
obligation to ensure the human rights of their
nationals and others by taking positive
measures to protect them against the threat of
terrorist acts and bringing the perpetrators of
such acts to justice.180

179
RTC of Taguig City, finding accused NUR A. SUPIAN guilty of committing acts falling under Section 3
of the Human Security Act.
180
Human Rights, Terrorism and Counter-terrorism,
https://www.ohchr.org/documents/publications/factsheet32en.pdf, last accessed July 10, 2020.

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190. Evidently, terrorism has a real and direct impact

on human rights, with devastating consequences on the
enjoyment of the right to life, liberty and physical integrity of
victims. In addition to these individual costs, terrorism can
destabilize governments, undermine civil society, jeopardize
peace and security, and threaten social and economic
development. All of these also have a real impact on the
enjoyment of human rights. 181 Terrorism is a very real
problem that ought to be decisively addressed on all fronts—
something that petitioners would surely readily agree with.

The Anti-Terrorism Act adopts

the least restrictive means in
its implementation.

191. It is beyond doubt that the susceptibility of a law

to potential abuse is a harsh reality. Fully aware of this,
Senator Lacson, in his February 6, 2019 Sponsorship
Speech182 for the Anti-Terrorism Act, made perfectly clear that
there are corresponding safeguards in the law to avoid the
threat of abuse; that every intrusion calls for checks from
the judiciary; and, that lengthy imprisonment penalties are
provided to deter exploitation of the law.

192. In his October 2, 2019 Sponsorship Speech 183 for

the same law, Senator Lacson emphasized that reinforcing the
country’s anti-terrorism laws and safeguarding the rights of
potential accused or suspects of terrorism are equally
important and must go hand in hand, viz.:

It is therefore incumbent upon the

legislature to amend the Human Security Act of
2007. Our country needs an anti-terror law that
would provide a strong legal backbone to

181
Available at https://www.ohchr.org/documents/publications/factsheet32en.pdf, last accessed July 10,
2020.
182
Panfilo M. Lacson, Sponsorship Speech for the Anti-Terrorism Act (17th Congress),
https://pinglacson.net/2019/02/06/sponsorship-speech-anti-terrorism-act-of-2019/, last accessed on July
16, 2020.
183
Panfilo M. Lacson, Sponsorship Speech for the Anti-Terrorism Act of 2019 (18th Congress),
https://pinglacson.net/2019/10/02/sponsorship-speech-for-the-anti-terrorism-act-of-2019-18th-congress/,
last accessed on July 16, 2020.

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support our criminal justice response to

terrorism, enable our law enforcers the much-
needed tools to protect our people from the
threat of terrorism, and at the same time,
safeguard the rights of those accused of
the crime. We need a strong legal structure
that deals with terrorism in order to exact
accountability, liability, and responsibility.
Those who have committed, are about to
commit, or are supporting those who commit
terrorist acts should be prosecuted and
penalized accordingly.

Lastly, Mr. President, I emphasize that

amending the Human Security Act does not
take away the intent and spirit of the
human rights safeguards provided by RA
9372 for persons accused of Terrorist Acts
and Preparatory Acts. Furthermore, by
amending RA 9372, we ensure that our anti-
terror law is clear, concise, and balanced. We
strive to provide the state a strong legal
backbone to protect the life, liberty and
property of the Filipino people against the evils
of terrorism.184

193. Senate deliberations reveal a deliberate intent on

the part of Congress to provide added measure of protection,
viz.:

Mr. Pimentel. Then another issue, Mr.

President. In the same section, immediately
after mentioning the penalty for committing a
terrorist act, there is a proviso that the
definition of terrorist acts shall not cover
legitimate exercises of rights and freedom of
expression.

Senator Lacson. That is correct, Mr.

President.

Senator Pimentel. Why was there a

need to immediately qualify? Is there a danger
or a close relationship between exercise of basic

184
Emphasis supplied.

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rights and some acts which can be mistaken for

as terrorist acts?

Senator Lacson. As pointed out by the

honorable lady senator from Panay during her
interpellations, iyong legitimate exercise ay
mayroong labor strike, and the laborers ay
nagkaroon ng violence, hindi sila mako-cover
dito. Kasi legitimate exercise of freedom of
expression or nag-e-express sila ng dissent.
Kung iko-cover pa rin natin sila, medyo lalong
magiging wayward.

Senator Pimentel. Yes, Mr. President.

Tama nga po iyon na hindi talaga sila covered.
Pero nag-aalala lamang ako na immediately
after defining terrorist acts, we have to clarify
that the exercise of fundamental rights will not
be covered. So, mayroon palang danger na
mapagkamalan ang exercise of basic rights as a
terrorist act kasi sinunod kaagad natin.

Senator Lacson. For clarity and for

emphasis, Mr. President, para lamang malinaw,
this is one of the safeguards. Kasi if we do not
include that proviso, I am sure the gentleman
will be interpellating along that line. Bakit
kulang? That is why we deemed it wise na i-
qualify na lamang natin na hindi kasama iyong
legitimate exercise of the freedom of
expression, et cetera.185

Senator Drilon. …

Now, let me cite some specific example

and try to draw an opinion from the good
sponsor. Currently, we see a lot of rallies,
protests in Hong Kong. That kind of protests has
led to the collapse of the economy of Hong Kong
practically. The anti-government protests have
gone on for six months and have really harmed
the economy. Now, assuming for the sake of
argument, that something similar happens
here, would that act or the act of the protesters
be considered as an act of terrorism because
they are compelling the government to do
something by force or intimidation?

185
TSN dated January 28, 2020; Annex “6”.

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Senator Lacson. No, Mr. President. It

will not be included because the
fundamental rights are always respected
even in this proposed measure.

Senator Drilon. Yes, but supposed as in

Hong Kong, there were instances of violence.

Senator Lacson. But we are always bound

by the purpose, Mr. President. If the purpose is
enumerated, then…

Senator Drilon. The purpose in Hong Kong

is to force the Hong Kong government…

Senator Lacson. To allow them to

exercise their fundamental rights, their
freedom, even to choose their leaders, to
exercise suffrage. If that is the purpose, it
does not constitute an act of terrorism, Mr.
President.

Senator Drilon. All right. Mr. President, it

is good that we have this on record because this
would guide us in attempting to make clearer
the provisions here so that it does not lead to
an overarching or overreach in terms of the
exposure to crimes of terrorism.186

194. The Anti-Terrorism Act’s Declaration of Policy

captured the foregoing intent:

Sec. 2 Declaration of Policy. – It is

declared a policy of the State to protect life,
liberty, and property from terrorism, to
condemn terrorism as inimical and dangerous to
the national security of the country and to the
welfare of the people, and to make terrorism a
crime against the Filipino people, against
humanity, and against The Law of the Nations.

In the implementation of the policy stated

above, the State shall uphold the basic
rights and fundamental liberties of the
people as enshrined in the Constitution.

186
TSN dated December 17, 2019, pp. 48-50; Annex “2”; Emphasis supplied.

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The State recognizes that the fight against

terrorism requires a comprehensive approach,
comprising political, economic, diplomatic,
militarily, and legal means duly taking into
account the root causes of terrorism without
acknowledging these as justifications for
terrorist and/or criminal activities. Such
measures shall include conflict management
and post-conflict peacebuilding, addressing the
roots of conflict by building state capacity and
promoting equitable economic development.

Nothing in this Act shall be interpreted as

a curtailment, restriction or diminution of
constitutionally recognized powers of the
executive branch of the government. It is to be
understood, however, that the exercise of
the constitutionally recognized powers of
the executive department of the
government shall not prejudice respect for
human rights which shall be absolute and
protected at all times.187

195. For a better appreciation of the safeguards under

the Anti-Terrorism Act, some of the most notable are listed
below, to wit:

a. Excluding from the definition of terrorism

legitimate exercises of civil and political
rights, including but not limited to engaging
in advocacy, protest, dissent, stoppage of
work, industrial or mass action which are not
intended to cause death or serious physical
harm to a person, to endanger a person’s
life, or to create a serious risk to public
safety.188

b. Prohibition on the surveillance and,

interception and recording of communication
and confidential business correspondence
between lawyers and clients, doctors and
patients, journalists and their sources.189

c. Limiting the period of judicial authorization of

surveillance to 60 days, extendible or
187
Emphasis supplied.
188
Section 4, Anti-Terrorism Act.
189
Section 16, Anti-Terrorism Act.

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renewable to a non-extendible period of 30

days from the expiration of the original
period.190

d. Requiring prior judicial authorization and

determination of probable cause for the
following:

i. Surveillance of suspects;191
ii. Interception and recording of
communications; 192

iii. Issuance of an order of proscription;193

iv. Issuance of a precautionary hold
departure order194

e. Submission/filing of a written notification to

the judge of the court nearest the place of
apprehension or arrest of a person suspected
of committing terrorism or any member of a
group of persons, organization or association
proscribed under Section 26.195

f. The written notice shall contain the following

facts: (a) the time, date, and manner of
arrest; (b) the location or locations of the
family detained suspect/s; and (c) the
physical and mental condition of the detained
suspect/s.196

g. The law enforcement agent or military

personnel shall likewise furnish the ATC and
the CHR of the written notice given to the
judge.197

h. Imposing upon the head of the detaining

facility the duty to ensure that the detained
suspects is informed of his/her rights as a
detainee and to ensure the access to the
detainee by his/her counsel or agencies and
entities authorized by law to exercise
visitorial powers over detention facilities.198

190
Section 19, Anti-Terrorism Act.
191
Section 16, Anti-Terrorism Act.
192
Section 16, Anti-Terrorism Act.
193
Section 26, Anti-Terrorism Act.
194
Section 34, Anti-Terrorism Act.
195
Section 29, Anti-Terrorism Act.
196
Ibid.
197
Ibid.
198
Ibid.

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i. Observance by law enforcement agents of

the custodial detention rights of an
apprehended or arrested and detained
person who is charged with or suspected of
committing any of the acts defined and
penalized under Sections 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10,
11, and 12 of the Anti-Terrorism Act .199

j. In case of need to extend the period of

detention of a suspected person, the
arresting officer must first establish the
presence of the following circumstances: (a)
That further detention of the suspected
person is necessary to preserve evidence
related to the terrorist act or to complete the
investigation; (b) That further detention of
the suspected person is necessary to prevent
the commission of another terrorist act; and
(c) That the investigation is being conducted
properly and without delay.200

k. Requiring the maintenance of an Official

Custodial Logbook by the law enforcement
custodial unit in whose care and control the
person suspected of committing any of the
acts defined and penalized under Sections 4,
5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, and 12 of the Anti-
Terrorism Act has been placed under
custodial arrest and detention. This logbook
shall record all important events bearing on
and all relevant details regarding the
treatment of the detained person while under
custodial arrest and detention and shall be
considered as a public document and opened
to and made available for the inspection and
scrutiny of the lawyer of the person under
custody or any member of his/her family or
relative by consanguinity or affinity within
the fourth civil degree or his/her physician at
any time of the day or night subject to
reasonable restrictions by the custodial
facility.201

l. Absolute prohibition on the use of torture and

other cruel, inhumane and degrading
treatment or punishment, as defined in
Sections 4 and 5 of Republic Act No. 9745
199
Section 30, Anti-Terrorism Act.
200
Section 29, Anti-Terrorism Act.
201
Section 32, Anti-Terrorism Act.

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otherwise known as the “Anti-Torture Act of

2009,” at any time during the investigation
or interrogation of a detained suspected
terrorist.202

m. Consequently, any evidence obtained from

said detained person resulting from such
treatment shall be, in its entirety,
inadmissible and cannot be used as evidence
in any judicial, quasi-judicial, legislative, or
administrative investigation, inquiry,
proceeding, or hearing. 203

n. In cases involving crimes defined and

penalized under the provisions of this Act,
the judge concerned shall set the case for
continuous trial on a daily basis from Monday
to Thursday or other short-term trial
calendar to ensure compliance with the
accused’s right to speedy trial.204

o. Formulation and adoption by the ATC of a

program that shall ensure respect for human
rights and adherence to the rule of law as the
fundamental bases of the fight against
terrorism. Such program shall guarantee
compliance with the same as well as with
international commitments to
counterterrorism-related protocols and
bilateral and/or multilateral agreements.205

p. With due regard for the rights of the people

as mandated by the Constitution and
pertinent laws, the ATC shall, among others:

i. Direct the speedy investigation and

prosecution and prosecution of all
persons detained or accused for any
crime defined and penalized under the
Act;206

ii. Monitor the progress of the

investigation and prosecution of all
persons accused and/or detained for

202
Section 33, Anti-Terrorism Act.
203
Ibid.
204
Section 44, Anti-Terrorism Act.
205
Section 45(d), Anti-Terrorism Act.
206
Section 46(c), Anti-Terrorism Act.

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any crime defined and penalized under

the provisions of the Act;207 and

iii. Investigate motu proprio or upon

complaint any report of abuse,
malicious application or improper
implementation by any person of the
provision of the Act.208

q. Granting the CHR the highest priority to the

investigation and prosecution of violations of
civil and political rights of persons in relation
to the implementation of the Act.209

r. There shall be due regard for the welfare of

any suspects who are elderly, pregnant,
persons with disability, women and children
while they are under investigation,
interrogation or detention.210

s. Unauthorized or malicious interception

and/or recordings by any law enforcement
agent or military personnel who conducts
surveillance activities without a valid judicial
authorization shall be punishable by
imprisonment of ten years.211

t. The penalty of imprisonment of ten years

shall be imposed upon the police or law
enforcement agent or military personnel who
fails to notify any judge in case of
warrantless arrests of a suspected person
under the Act.212

u. The penalty of imprisonment of ten years

shall be imposed upon any law enforcement
agent or military personnel who has violated
the rights of persons under their custody.
Unless the law enforcement agent or military
personnel who violated the rights of a
detainee or detainees is duly identified, the
same penalty shall be imposed on the head
of the law enforcement unit or military unit

207
Section 46, Anti-Terrorism Act.
208
Section 46(n), Anti-Terrorism Act.
209
Section 47, Anti-Terrorism Act.
210
Section 51, Anti-Terrorism Act.
211
Section 25, Anti-Terrorism Act.
212
Section 29, Anti-Terrorism Act.

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having custody of the detainee at the time

the violation was done.213

v. Any person who maliciously, or without

authorization, examines deposits,
placements, trust accounts, assets, or
records in a bank or financial institution, shall
suffer the penalty of four years of
imprisonment.214

w. Imprisonment of ten years shall be imposed

upon any person, law enforcement agent or
military personnel, judicial officer or civil
servant who, not being authorized by the
Court of Appeals to do so, reveals in any
manner or form any classified information
under the Act. The penalty imposed is
without prejudice and in addition to any
corresponding administrative liability the
offender may have incurred for such acts.215

x. Any public officer who has direct custody of

a detained person and, who, by his deliberate
act, misconduct or inexcusable negligence,
causes or allows the escape of such detained
person shall be guilty of an offense and shall
suffer the penalty of ten (10) years of
imprisonment.216

y. The penalty of imprisonment of six years

shall be imposed upon any person who
knowingly furnishes false testimony, forged
document or spurious evidence in any
investigation or hearing conducted in relation
to any violations under the Act.217

z. Establishment of a Joint Congressional

Oversight Committee which shall have the
authority to summon law enforcement or
military officers and the members of the ATC
to appear before it, and require them to
answer questions and submit written reports
about the implementation of the Act.218

213
Section 31, Anti-Terrorism Act.
214
Section 37, Anti-Terrorism Act.
215
Section 41, Anti-Terrorism Act.
216
Section 42, Anti-Terrorism Act.
217
Section 43, Anti-Terrorism Act.
218
Section 50, Anti-Terrorism Act.

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aa. Mandating the Bureau of Jail Management

and Penology (BJMP) and the Bureau of
Corrections (BuCor) to establish a system of
assessment and classification for persons
charged for committing terrorism and
preparatory acts punishable under the Act.
Said system shall cover the proper
management, handling, and interventions
for said persons detained. Persons charged
under the Act are mandated to be detained
in existing facilities of the BJMP and the
BuCor.219

196. Evidently, the Anti-Terrorism Act is brimming with

strong safeguards that can effectively prevent and dissuade a
law enforcer from perpetrating abuse in its implementation.
In addition, a person may find himself/herself a victim of a
wrongful implementation of the law may also find refuge in
several safeguards and remedies which are scattered in other
existing laws and rules, such as, but not limited to the
following:

a. The Anti-Torture Act of 2009 (R.A. No. 9745);

b. The Anti-Enforced or Involuntary Disappearance

Act of 2012 (R.A. No. 10353);

c. The Act Defining Certain Rights of Person

Arrested, Detained or Under Custodial
Investigation as well as the Duties of the
Arresting, Detaining and Investigating Officers,
and Providing Penalties for Violations Thereof
(R.A. No. 7438);

d. Article 32220 of the Civil Code of the Philippines;

and

219
Section 52, Anti-Terrorism Act.
220
Article 32. Any public officer or employee, or any private individual, who directly or indirectly obstructs,
defeats, violates or in any manner impedes or impairs any of the following rights and liberties of another
person shall be liable to the latter for damages:

(1) Freedom of religion;

(2) Freedom of speech;
(3) Freedom to write for the press or to maintain a periodical publication;
(4) Freedom from arbitrary or illegal detention;
(5) Freedom of suffrage;
(6) The right against deprivation of property without due process of law;
(7) The right to a just compensation when private property is taken for public use;
(8) The right to the equal protection of the laws;

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e. The Rules of this Honorable Court on the

human rights writs which are:

i. The Writ of Habeas Corpus (Rule 102 of the

Revised Rules of Court);

ii. The Writ of Amparo (A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC);

and

iii. The Writ of Habeas Data (A.M. No. 08-1-16-

SC).

197. Despite the above long list of safeguards,

petitioner Lagman claims that the Anti-Terrorism Act
abandoned the safeguards provided under the Human
Security Act and posits that the safeguards in the new law are
merely superficial and artificial recognition of civil and political
rights.221

198. The above claim is misleading.

199. Indeed, a few safeguards under the Human

Security Act are not retained in the Anti-Terrorism Act.

(9) The right to be secure in one's person, house, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures;
(10) The liberty of abode and of changing the same;
(11) The privacy of communication and correspondence;
(12) The right to become a member of associations or societies for purposes not contrary to law;
(13) The right to take part in a peaceable assembly to petition the Government for redress of grievances;
(14) The right to be a free from involuntary servitude in any form;
(15) The right of the accused against excessive bail;
(16) The right of the accused to be heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of the nature and cause
of the accusation against him, to have a speedy and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face,
and to have compulsory process to secure the attendance of witness in his behalf;
(17) Freedom from being compelled to be a witness against one's self, or from being forced to confess
guilt, or from being induced by a promise of immunity or reward to make such confession, except
when the person confessing becomes a State witness;
(18) Freedom from excessive fines, or cruel and unusual punishment, unless the same is imposed or
inflicted in accordance with a statute which has not been judicially declared unconstitutional; and
(19) Freedom of access to the courts.

In any of the cases referred to in this article, whether or not the defendant's act or omission constitutes a
criminal offense, the aggrieved party has a right to commence an entirely separate and distinct civil action
for damages, and for other relief. Such civil action shall proceed independently of any criminal prosecution
(if the latter be instituted), and may be proved by a preponderance of evidence.

The indemnity shall include moral damages. Exemplary damages may also be adjudicated.

The responsibility herein set forth is not demandable from a judge unless his act or omission constitutes a
violation of the Penal Code or other penal statute.
221
Lagman Petition, pp. 47-48.

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However, since this is a legislative discretion, due deference

must be given to the exercise thereof by Congress. This
political decision was made by Congress with the aim of
creating a well-balanced law that effectively combats
terrorism and, at the same time, duly preserves the civil
liberties and fundamental rights of the people and of the
person suspected or accused of violating the law.

200. The intent behind said legislative decision can be

gleaned from the following explanation by Senator Lacson:

Nations have made headway in amending

or passing new anti-terrorism laws. Sadly, we
could not say the same for our country. Since
its enactment in 2007, our country’s
legislative framework for anti-terrorism
has remained toothless, to say the least.

Only in the Philippines—as the expression

goes—where the anti-terror law has literally
more provisions restricting our law enforcers
than bringing terrorists to justice. That is not an
exaggeration. Under the current Human
Security Act, there are only four instances for
terrorists to be prosecuted under the law. These
are: commission of the actual crime of
terrorism; conspiracy to commit terrorism;
accomplice; and accessory. On the other hand,
there are a total of 20 instances where law
enforcers can be charged and penalized for
violations of the Human Security Act. I believe
this is not rational. Add to this the penalty of
P500,000 per day to be paid by the government
to anyone erroneously detained for possible
terrorism. This is not only irrational, Mr.
President; it borders on the absurd.

Sadly, the Human Security Act has proven

to fail in terms of its efficacy as an anti-
terrorism measure. Despite the real and present
threat presented by terrorist organizations,
groups, and individuals to the Filipino people,
we have had only one conviction for violation of
the law. Imagine that, time and again, and
seemingly more and more often, we hear of
terrorist attacks happening, with a mounting
number of those killed and injured. One
conviction, Mr. President. That alone is enough

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proof of the ineptness and inadequacy of the

current law.

It is therefore incumbent upon the

legislature to amend the Human Security Act of
2007. Our country needs an anti-terror law that
would provide a strong legal backbone to
support our criminal justice response to
terrorism, enable our law enforcers the much-
needed tools to protect our people from the
threat of terrorism, and at the same time,
safeguard the rights of those accused of the
crime. We need a strong legal structure that
deals with terrorism in order to exact
accountability, liability, and responsibility.
Those who have committed, are about to
commit, or are supporting those who commit
terrorist acts should be prosecuted and
penalized accordingly.222

201. To be sure, no provision in the Constitution was

transgressed when Congress decided not to adopt some of the
safeguards under the Human Security Act in the Anti-
Terrorism Act. This decision is a valid and reasonable exercise
of its legislative discretion which is entitled to deference,
pursuant to the pronouncement of this Honorable Court in
Council of Teachers and Staff of Colleges and Universities of
the Philippines v. Secretary of Education,223 wherein this
Honorable Court respected the choice of Congress to modify
the standards of basic education, viz.:

The enactment of the K to 12 Law was the

manner by which the Congress sought to realize
the right to education of its citizens. It is indeed
laudable that Congress went beyond the
minimum standards and provided mechanisms
so that its citizens are able to obtain not just
elementary education but also kindergarten and
high school. Absent any showing of a
violation of any Constitutional self-
executing right or any international law,
the Court cannot question the desirability,
wisdom, or utility of the K to 12 Law as this

222
Panfilo M. Lacson, Sponsorship Speech for the Anti-Terrorism Act of 2019 (18th Congress),
https://pinglacson.net/2019/10/02/sponsorship-speech-for-the-anti-terrorism-act-of-2019-18th-congress/,
last accessed on July 15, 2020; emphasis supplied.
223
Supra.

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is best addressed by the wisdom of

Congress.

It is thus clear from the deliberations that

it was never the intent of the framers of the
Constitution to use only Filipino and English as
the exclusive media of instruction. It is evident
that Congress has the power to enact a law that
designates Filipino as the primary medium of
instruction even in the regions but, in the
absence of such law, the regional languages
may be used as primary media of instruction.
The Congress, however, opted not to enact such
law. On the contrary, the Congress, in the
exercise of its wisdom, provided that the
regional languages shall be the primary media
of instruction in the early stages of schooling.
Verily, this act of Congress was not only
Constitutionally permissible, but was likewise an
exercise of an exclusive prerogative to which
the Court cannot interfere with. 224

202. While some of the safeguards provided under the

Anti-Terrorism Act are mere reaffirmation of constitutional
rights, statutory guarantees, and jurisprudential
pronouncements, this fact does not water-down the purpose
of these safeguards. On the contrary, the echoing of these
principles enhances the potency of the Anti-Terrorism Act in
deterring the commission of potential abuse in its
implementation.

203. Furthermore, contrary to petitioner Lagman’s

description, these safeguards are neither superficial nor
artificial recognition of civil and political rights. Without a
doubt, no law enforcement agent worth his salt is unaware of
the “threefold liability rule” which holds that the wrongful acts
or omissions of a public officer may give rise to civil, criminal,
and administrative liabilities. This simply means that a public
officer may be held civilly, criminally, and administratively
liable for a wrongful doing.225

224
Emphasis supplied.
225
Ramiscal v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 213716, October 10, 2017.

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204. Therefore, a law enforcer will be reluctant to

violate these safeguards blatantly, otherwise, he will expose
himself to the threefold liability rule which will arise not only
under the Anti-Terrorism Act, but also under other existing
laws.

205. Thus, the Anti-Terrorism Act passes muster when

analyzed under the strict scrutiny test. The State’s police
power constitutes an implied limitation to the Bill of Rights,
and that even liberty itself, the greatest of all rights, is subject
to the far more overriding demands and requirements of the
greater number.226

206. For the Anti-Terrorism Act, the undue restraint on

individual rights is illusory. The law has explicitly and
specifically provided for procedures and safeguards in order
that any curtailment of political and civil rights would not
occur.The perceived potential abuse in the implementation of
a law is feasibly preventable by the effective safeguards
incorporated into the law. And owing to these very same
safeguards, the impact of the law’s intrusion into the
enjoyment of fundamental rights by individuals – whether
innocent, suspected, accused, or convicted – will be
minimized.

207. Under the Anti-Terrorism Act is a valid enactment

by Congress that fully recognizes the individual rights
accorded by the Constitution.

The Anti-Terrorism Act cannot

be nullified based on
conjectural or anticipatory fear
that it will be abused by the
law enforcement agents of the
State.

208. Petitioners further posit that the alleged vagueness

and overbreadth of the law would necessarily lead to abuse

226
Zabal v. Duterte, supra.

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being committed by law enforcement agents. Petitioners

Calleja, et al. contend that the law provides the executive a
potent vehicle to repress activism and dissenting voices. 227
Petitioners Sta. Maria, et al. argue that allowing the law to
take effect will legitimize wrongdoings, allow transgressions
to constitutional liberties, and give license for wrongdoers to
act with impunity.228

209. For their part, petitioner Zarate, et al. worry that the
enforcers themselves are susceptible to become terrorists
themselves, terrorizing the members of the society by
depriving them of the mantle of protection accorded by the
fundamental law of the land.229 In addition, petitioner Lagman
maintains that, the more power given by this law to police and
military enforcers as well as to administrative implementors
like the ATC and Anti-Money Laundering Council (AMLC)
without or with diluted accountability, the more they are
emboldened to commit abuses and excesses derogating civil
liberties and fundamental freedoms. 230

210. It bears recalling that in the 2006 case of Randolf

David v. Pres. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo,231 this Honorable
Court held that “(t)he validity of a statute or ordinance is to
be determined from its general purpose and its efficiency to
accomplish the end desired.” This Honorable Court concluded
that “courts are not at liberty to declare statutes invalid
although they may be abused in the manner of application.”

211. The Anti-Terrorism Act makes clear that its

purpose is to protect life, liberty, and property from terrorism,
to condemn terrorism as inimical and dangerous to the
national security of the country and to the welfare of the
people. Its definition of terrorism accomplishes this purpose
because it provides notice that courts can punish specific acts
as crimes of terrorism if the violator possessed the necessary
criminal intent and the required attendant circumstances
existed. Therefore, petitioners’ allegations that the Philippine
government may be apt to abuse the Anti-Terrorism Act, most
227
Calleja Petition, p. 3.
228
Sta. Maria Petition, p. 2.
229
Zarate Petition, p. 2.
230
Lagman Petition, par. 17. p. 60.
231
G.R. No. 171396, March 3, 2006.

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of which are anchored on speculative situations, will certainly

not warrant the invalidation of the law. Well settled is the rule
that courts are not at liberty to declare statutes invalid,
although they may be abused or misabused, and may afford
an opportunity for abuse in the manner of application. 232

212. To stress, the invalidation of a law based on

speculative or hypothetical fears is never allowed. As
previously discussed, a requirement of judicial review is
justiciability. This Honorable Court is barred from rendering a
decision based on assumptions, speculations, conjectures,
and hypothetical or fictional illustrations. Apropos is the
Court’s ruling in Southern Hemisphere on the issue of
potential abuse:

The possibility of abuse in the

implementation of RA 9372 does not avail to
take the present petitions out of the realm of
the surreal and merely imagined. Such
possibility is not peculiar to RA 9372 since
the exercise of any power granted by law
may be abused. Allegations of abuse must
be anchored on real events before courts
may step in to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable
and enforceable.

213. Notably, even in the cases that this Honorable

Court had actually taken notice of police abuse, particularly in
the conduct of illegal drugs buy-bust operations, in no
instance that this Honorable Court hint that the nullification of
R.A. No. 9165 or the “Dangerous Drugs Act” is the suitable
remedy. In those cases, this Honorable Court, confronted with
issues about police abuse, looked into the safeguards
provided by R.A. No. 9165 and then determined if those
safeguards were observed. When the safeguards are found to
have been disregarded, a judgment of acquittal is rendered in
favor of the accused, without diminishing, in whatever extent,
the validity of the law.

232
Tondo Medical Center Employees Association v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 167324, July 17, 2007.

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214. Evidently, nullifying the Anti-Terrorism Act is not

the proper remedy to the potential abuses that might result
from its enforcement.

215. The Anti-Terrorism Act is not a novel piece of

legislation of its kind. Prior to its enactment, the Human
Security Act was in effect. Petitioners hardly mention of any
case in which law enforcement agents were convicted for
abusing the provisions of the Human Security Act. Corollarily,
sans tangible proof to the contrary, the State agents who are
tasked to enforce the Anti-Terrorism Act should be presumed
to perform their sworn duty in a regular manner. 233

216. Indeed, this Honorable Court already recognized

that most government actions are inspired with noble
intentions, all geared towards the betterment of the nation
and its people. It must be emphasized that the true enemies
of the people are the terrorists, some of whom have already
infiltrated our society, cunningly disguising themselves as law
abiding citizens, but are stealthily hatching atrocious plots to
cast an atmosphere of fear upon the people, to seriously
undermine public safety, or to destabilize the fundamental
political, economic, or social structure of the country, while
monitoring with pleasure the recent influx of petitions
assailing the Anti-Terrorism Act.

217. Verily, petitioners’ villainous depiction of the

State’s law enforcement agents is therefore extremely unfair,
factually baseless, and devoid of legal moorings.

The Anti-Terrorism Act

does not violate the “due
process” clause of the
Constitution.

218. Section 1, Article III of the Constitution ordains:

233
People v. Cabiles, G.R. No. 220758, June 7, 2017.

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Section 1. No person shall be deprived of

life, liberty or property without due process of
law, nor shall any person be denied the equal
protection of the laws.

219. The guaranty of due process of law is a

constitutional safeguard against any arbitrariness on the part
of the Government, whether committed by the legislature, the
executive, or the judiciary. It is a protection essential to every
inhabitant of the country, for, as a commentator on
Constitutional Law has vividly written:234

… If the law itself unreasonably deprives

a person of his life, liberty, or property, he is
denied the protection of due process. If the
enjoyment of his rights is conditioned on an
unreasonable requirement, due process is
likewise violated. Whatsoever be the source of
such rights, be it the Constitution itself or
merely a statute, its unjustified withholding
would also be a violation of due process. Any
government act that militates against the
ordinary norms of justice or fair play is
considered an infraction of the great guaranty
of due process; and this is true whether the
denial involves violation merely of the
procedure prescribed by the law or affects the
very validity of the law itself.

220. In the main, the majority of the consolidated

Petitions attempt to mount a facial challenge on the Anti-
Terrorism Act, particularly Sections 4, 5, 9, 10, 25 and 26
thereof, due to what they allege as “vague” and “overbroad”
definitions of acts constituting terrorism. These definitions
purportedly violate substantive due process, such that men of
common intelligence would supposedly guess as to their
meaning and differ as to their application.

221. To support their facial challenge, petitioners Sta.

Maria, et al. singled out Sections 6, 9, 10, and 12 which they
perceive to “penalize modes of speech, expression, and
234
Legaspi v. City of Cebu, G.R. No. 159110, December 10, 2013;citing Cruz, Constitutional Law, 2007 Ed.,
pp. 100-101.

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association, thereby equally subject to facial attack for being

unwarranted, excessive, and overbroad encroachments on
the freedom of expression.”235 On his end, Petitioner Lagman
asseverates that the Act criminalizes “proposal”, “threats”,
and “inciting” to commit terrorism which infringe on the right
to free speech, as well as the right to petition the government
for redress of grievances.”236 Additionally, petitioner Sanlakas
avers that the Act is not merely an ordinary penal statute, but
one that crosses into the constitutionally protected areas of
free speech, free expression, and free assembly, thereby
making it vulnerable and susceptible to a facial challenge. 237

222. Petitioners’ facial challenge on the

constitutionality of the Anti-Terrorism Act must be totally
rejected for two reasons: (a) the in terrorem effect inherent
in penal statutes preclude a facial challenge; and (b) the
ruling in Disini v. Executive Secretary238 is an exception to the
non-applicability of facial challenge to penal laws on the
ground of the void-for-vagueness doctrine because the
provisions of R.A. No. 10175, otherwise known as the
Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012, govern the novel medium
of cyberspace—a unique trait not shared by either the Anti-
Terrorism Act or the Human Security Act.

223. Thus, it is important to distinguish between a

“facial” challenge and an “as-applied” challenge to a statute.
One primary distinction between the two methods of
challenging legislation is that a facial challenge to a statute
seeks to invalidate it in its entirety because every application
is unconstitutional, whereas an as-applied challenge seeks to
invalidate a particular application of a statute. A second
distinction between the two is that a facial challenge may be
brought soon after a statute’s passage in a legislature;
however, an as-applied challenge, as the name suggests, can
only be brought once it has been enforced. In this sense, a
facial challenge is prospective, or forward looking, because it
seeks to prevent a law from being enforced and thus violating
someone’s constitutional rights, and an as-applied challenge

235
Sta. Maria Petition, pp. 34-35.
236
Lagman Petition, pp. 20-21.
237
Sanlakas Petition, p. 7.
238
Disini v. Executive Secretary, infra.

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is retrospective, or backward looking, because it seeks to

redress a constitutional violation that has already occurred.
Since facial challenges have the potential to invalidate a
statute in its entirety, they are said to be disfavored.239

224. A successful facial challenge carries greater

consequences than an as-applied challenge, i.e., the entire
legislation is invalidated. It is, therefore, disfavoredand
permitted to be used sparingly. In Washington State Grange
v. Washington State Republican Party,240 the U.S. Supreme
Court stated several reasons for disfavoring facial challenges,
to wit:

Claims of facial invalidity often rest on

speculation. As a consequence, they raise the
risk of “premature interpretation of statutes on
the basis of factually barebones records”.241
Facial challenges also run contrary to the
fundamental principle of judicial restraint that
courts should neither “anticipate a question of
constitutional law in advance of the necessity of
deciding it” nor “formulate a rule of
constitutional law broader than is required by
the precise facts to which it is to be applied.”242
Finally, facial challenges threaten to short circuit
the democratic process by preventing laws
embodying the will of the people from being
implemented in a manner consistent with the
Constitution. We must keep in mind that “[a]
ruling of unconstitutionality frustrates the intent
of the elected representatives of the people.”243

225. Procedurally, the present Petitions must fail for

being impermissible facial attacks on a penal statute. This
Honorable Court has succinctly declared that a facial
invalidation or an “on-its-face” invalidation of criminal
statutes is not appropriate.244 Estrada v. Sandiganbayan245
explained that penal statutes have general in terrorem effect

239
Washington State Grange v. Washington State Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442, 7 (2008).
240
Ibid.
241
Sabri v. United States, 541 U.S. 600, 609 (2004). Internal quotation marks and brackets omitted.
242
Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U.S. 288, 347
243
Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of Northeren New Eng., 546 U.S. 320, 329 (2006).
244
Spouses Romualdez v. Comelec, supra.
245
Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, supra.

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resulting from its very existence, and if a facial challenge is

allowed for this reason alone, the State may well be prevented
from enacting laws to deter socially harmful conduct.246 The
constitutionality of a criminal statute such as the Anti-
Terrorism Act cannot be challenged on the basis of
“overbreadth” and “void-for-vagueness” doctrines, which
apply only to free-speech cases.

226. In Romualdez v. Sandiganbayan,247 this

Honorable Court, in no uncertain terms, has declared that
facial invalidation of criminal statutes is not appropriate, thus:

It is best to stress at the outset that the

overbreadth and the vagueness doctrines have
special application only to free-speech cases.
They are not appropriate for testing the
validity of penal statutes. Mr. Justice Vicente
V. Mendoza explained the reason as follows:

“A facial challenge is allowed to be

made to a vague statute and to one
which is overbroad because of possible
‘chilling effect’ upon protected speech.
The theory is that ‘[w]hen statutes
regulate or proscribe speech and no
readily apparent construction
suggests itself as a vehicle for
rehabilitating the statutes in a single
prosecution, the transcendent value to
all society of constitutionally protected
expression is deemed to justify
allowing attacks on overly broad
statutes with no requirement that the
person making the attack
demonstrate that his own conduct
could not be regulated by a statute
drawn with narrow specificity.’ The
possible harm to society in permitting
some unprotected speech to go
unpunished is outweighed by the
possibility that the protected speech of
others may be deterred and perceived
grievances left to fester because of
possible inhibitory effects of overly
broad statutes.

246
Romualdez v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 152259, July 29, 2004.
247
Ibid.; citations omitted.

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This rationale does not apply to

penal statutes. Criminal statutes
have general in terrorem effect
resulting from their very
existence, and, if facial challenge
is allowed for this reason alone,
the State may well be prevented
from enacting laws against
socially harmful conduct. In the
area of criminal law, the law
cannot take chances as in the area
of free speech.

In sum, the doctrines of strict

scrutiny, overbreadth, and vagueness
are analytical tools developed for
testing “on their faces” statutes in free
speech cases or, as they are called in
American law, First Amendment
cases. They cannot be made to do
service when what is involved is a
criminal statute. With respect to
such statute, the established rule
is that ‘one to whom application of
a statute is constitutional will not
be heard to attack the statute on
the ground that impliedly it might
also be taken as applying to other
persons or other situations in
which its application might be
unconstitutional. As has been
pointed out, ‘vagueness challenges in
the First Amendment context, like
overbreadth challenges typically
produce facial invalidation, while
statutes found vague as a matter of
due process typically are invalidated
[only] ‘as applied’ to a particular
defendant.’”

Indeed, an “on-its-face”
invalidation of criminal statutes
would result in a mass acquittal of
parties whose cases may not have
even reached the courts. Such
invalidation would constitute a

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departure from the usual

requirement of “actual case and
controversy” and permit decisions
to be made in a sterile abstract
context having no factual
concreteness. In Younger v. Harris,
this evil was aptly pointed out by the
U.S. Supreme Court in these words:

“[T]he task of analyzing a

proposed statute, pinpointing its
deficiencies, and requiring correction
of these deficiencies before the statute
is put into effect, is rarely if ever an
appropriate task for the judiciary. The
combination of the relative
remoteness of the controversy, the
impact on the legislative process of
the relief sought, and above all the
speculative and amorphous nature of
the required line-by-line analysis of
detailed statutes, x x x ordinarily
results in a kind of case that is wholly
unsatisfactory for deciding
constitutional questions, whichever
way they might be decided.”

For this reason, generally

disfavored is an on-its-face
invalidation of statutes, described
as a “manifestly strong medicine”
to be employed “paringly and only
as a last resort.” In determining the
constitutionality of a statute,
therefore, its provisions that have
allegedly been violated must be
examined in the light of the conduct
with which the defendant has been
charged.

As conduct – not speech – is its

object, the challenged provision
must be examined only “as
applied” to the defendant, herein
petitioner, and should not be
declared unconstitutional for
overbreadth or vagueness.”248

248
Emphasis supplied.

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227. In Southern Hemisphere,249 this Honorable Court

reiterated that a facial challenge against a criminal statute on
either ground of vagueness or overbreadth is impermissible:

Distinguished from an as-applied

challenge which considers only extant facts
affecting real litigants, a facial invalidation is an
examination of the entire law, pinpointing its
flaws and defects, not only on the basis of its
actual operation to the parties, but also on the
assumption or prediction that its very existence
may cause others not before the court to refrain
from constitutionally protected speech or
activities.

Justice Mendoza accurately phrased the

subtitle in his concurring opinion that the
vagueness and overbreadth doctrines, as
grounds for a facial challenge, are not applicable
to penal laws. A litigant cannot thus
successfully mount a facial challenge
against a criminal statute on either
vagueness or overbreadth grounds.

The allowance of a facial challenge in free

speech cases is justified by the aim to avert the
“chilling effect” on protected speech, the
exercise of which should not at all times be
abridged. As reflected earlier, this rationale is
inapplicable to plain penal statutes that
generally bear an “in terrorem effect” in
deterring socially harmful conduct. In fact, the
legislature may even forbid and penalize acts
formerly considered innocent and lawful, so long
as it refrains from diminishing or dissuading the
exercise of constitutionally protected rights.

The Court reiterated that there are

“critical limitations by which a criminal statute
may be challenged” and “underscored that an
‘on-its-face’ invalidation of penal statutes x x x
may not be allowed.”250

249
Supra.
250
Emphasis in the original.

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228. As above stated, this Honorable Court provides an

exception in Disini.251 To be clear, Disini is an exception to the
rule. Petitioners’ mere invocation that the law would create a
“chilling effect” is insufficient to bring their claims under this
narrow exception. In Disini, this Honorable Court explained:

As already stated, the cyberspace is an

incomparable, pervasive medium of
communication. It is inevitable that any
government threat of punishment regarding
certain uses of the medium creates a chilling
effect on the constitutionally-protected freedom
of expression of the great masses that use it. In
this case, the particularly complex web of
interaction on social media websites would give
law enforcers such latitude that they could
arbitrarily or selectively enforce the law.252

229. In contrast to the Cybercrime Prevention Act, the

Anti-Terrorism Act does not regulate speech made in a novel,
incomparable or pervasive medium of communication.
Petitioners have not shown, much less alleged, that the
communication or medium of communication targeted by the
Anti-Terrorism Act is incomparable or pervasive. Disini is
therefore inapplicable.

230. Moreover, the Anti-Terrorism Act, like its

predecessor, the Human Security Act, regulates and penalizes
conduct. Southern Hemisphere elucidates:

Utterances not elemental but inevitably

incidental to the doing of the criminal conduct
alter neither the intent of the law to punish
socially harmful conduct nor the essence of the
whole act as conduct and not speech. This
holds true a fortiori in the present case where
the expression figures only as an inevitable
incident of making the element of coercion
perceptible. [Emphasis in the original.]

251
Supra.
252
Emphasis and underscoring supplied.

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[I]t is true that the agreements

and course of conduct here were as in
most instances brought about through
speaking or writing. But it has never
been deemed an abridgement of
freedom of speech or press to make a
course of conduct illegal merely
because the conduct was, in part,
initiated, evidenced, or carried out by
means of language, either spoken,
written, or printed. Such an expansive
interpretation of the constitutional
guaranties of speech and press would
make it practically impossible ever to
enforce laws against agreements in
restraint of trade as well as many
other agreements and conspiracies
deemed injurious to society.253

231. By embarking on a facial challenge, petitioners

have imposed upon themselves the burden of proving that
there can be no instance when the assailed law may be valid—
a burden that they miserably failed to discharge. Thus, in
David v. Macapagal Arroyo,254 this Honorable Court held:

And third, a facial challenge on the

ground of overbreadth is the most difficult
challenge to mount successfully, since the
challenger must establish that there can be
no instance when the assailed law may be
valid. Here, petitioners did not even attempt to
show whether this situation exists.

Petitioners likewise seek a facial review of

PP 1017 on the ground of vagueness. This, too,
is unwarranted.

Related to the “overbreadth” doctrine is

the “void for vagueness doctrine” which holds

253
Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network, Inc. v. Anti-Terrorism Council, supra; citing Giboney v.
Empire Storage and Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490, 93 L. Ed. 834, 843-844 (1949); Cf Brown v. Hartlage, 456 U.S.
45, 71 L. Ed 2d 732, 742 (1982) that acknowledges: x x x The fact that such an agreement [to engage in
illegal conduct] necessarily takes the form of words does not confer upon it, or upon the underlying
conduct, the constitutional immunities that the First Amendment extends to speech. Finally, while a
solicitation to enter into an agreement arguably crosses the sometimes hazy line distinguishing conduct
from pure speech, such a solicitation, even though it may have an impact in the political arena, remains in
essence an invitation to engage in an illegal exchange for private profit, and may properly be prohibited;
italics and underscoring supplied.
254
David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, G.R. Nos. 171396, 171409, 171485, 171483, 171400, 171489, and 171424, May 3,
2006.

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that “a law is facially invalid if men of common

intelligence must necessarily guess at its
meaning and differ as to its application.” It is
subject to the same principles governing
overbreadth doctrine. For one, it is also an
analytical tool for testing “on their faces”
statutes in free speech cases. And like
overbreadth, it is said that a litigant may
challenge a statute on its face only if it is vague
in all its possible applications. Again, petitioners
did not even attempt to show that PP 1017 is
vague in all its application. They also failed to
establish that men of common intelligence
cannot understand the meaning and application
of PP 1017.”255

232. Invariably, facial invalidation or “on-its-face”

invalidation on the basis of “overbreadth” or “vagueness” is
wholly inappropriate under the Anti-Terrorism Act, a penal
statute the object of which is conduct coupled with intent, not
speech.

233. Thus, petitioners’ facial challenge must fail.

Section 4 of the Anti-Terrorism

Act is neither intrinsically
vague nor impermissibly
overbroad.

234. Section 4 of the Anti-Terrorism Act defines the

crime of terrorism in this manner:

SEC. 4. Terrorism. - Subject to Section 49

of this Act, terrorism is committed by any
person who within or outside the Philippines,
regardless of the stage of execution:

(a) Engages in acts intended to cause

death or serious bodily injury to any
person, or endangers a person’s
life;

255
Emphasis supplied.

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(b) Engages in acts intended to cause

extensive damage or destruction to
a government or public facility,
public place or private property;

(c) Engages in acts intended to cause

extensive interference with,
damage or destruction to critical
infrastructure;

(d) Develops, manufactures,

possesses, acquires, transports,
supplies or uses weapons,
explosives or of biological, nuclear,
radiological or chemical weapons;
and

(e) Release of dangerous substances,

or causing fire, floods or explosions

when the purpose of such act, by its

nature and context, is to intimidate the general
public or a segment thereof, create an
atmosphere or spread a message of fear, to
provoke or influence by intimidation the
government or any of its international
organization, or seriously destabilize or destroy
the fundamental political, economic, or social
structures of the country, or create a public
emergency or seriously undermine public
safety, shall be guilty of committing terrorism
and shall suffer the penalty of life imprisonment
without the benefit of parole and the benefits of
Republic Act No. 10592, otherwise known as “An
Act Amending Articles 29, 94, 97, 98 and 99 of
Act No. 3815, as amended, otherwise known as
the Revised Penal Code”: Provided, That,
terrorism as defined in this Section shall not
include advocacy, protest, dissent, stoppage of
work, industrial or mass action, and other
similar exercises of civil and political rights,
which are not intended to cause death or serious
physical harm to a person, to endanger a
person’s life, or to create a serious risk to public
safety.”

235. Petitioners assail the constitutionality of Section 4

on the ground that the definition of “terrorism” is unclear,
such that people cannot reasonably know whether they are

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committing terrorism,256 thereby violating the right to due

process enshrined in Section 1, Article III of the Constitution.

236. Petitioners Calleja, et al. contend that due to the

Anti-Terrorism Act’s failure to define terrorism, “anyone can
be pointed to as a suspect of terrorism even if the person is
not engaged in any illegal activity.” They impute vagueness:
on item (a) for not qualifying the terms “serious bodily injury”
and “endangers”; item (b) for the lack of a metric as to what
constitutes “extensive damage;” item (c) for not providing
parameters as to the meanings of “extensive interference” or
“critical infrastructure;” item (d) for lacking a definition and
scope anent the term “weapons;” and item (e) for the alleged
vagueness of the acts punished therein, as well as what
appears to be the lack of a definition of “dangerous
substance.”257

237. Petitioners Sta. Maria, et al. posit that the

definition of terrorism in Section 4 is so vague and broad such
that it can be read to include legitimate and lawful gatherings
and demonstrations where people assemble to exercise their
freedom of speech, of expression, and of the press. They
claim, like the other petitioners, that there was a failure to
define the predicate acts in items (a) to (e) of Section 4, which
would “indubitably [give] law enforcement agents and military
personnel unbridled discretion to arbitrarily flex their muscle
in carrying out [the law’s] provisions merely on the basis of
their ‘suspicion’, intuition, or understanding.”258

238. For his part, petitioner Lagman claims that Section

4 is vague in that “what is criminalized are mere intentions to
commit certain acts.” He similarly alleges that the portion in
Section 4 that begins with “when the purpose of such act, by
its nature and context, …” only qualifies item (e).259

239. For their part, petitioners Zarate, et al., they decry

how the deletion of the elements of “predicate crime” and
“actual effect” in the Human Security Act would make anyone

256
Zarate Petition, par. 70, p. 26.
257
Calleja Petition, pp. 32-35.
258
Sta. Maria Petition, p. 27.
259
Lagman Petition, pp. 24-26.

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and everyone susceptible to being considered as terrorist

despite not being punished under existing laws or without
regard to its actual effects. To their minds, the property or
infrastructure subject of interference, damage, or destruction
in items (b) and (c) of Section 4, can be “anything, anywhere,
… public or private.”260

240. Meanwhile, petitioners Monsod, et al. assert that

the definition of terrorism under Section 4, in itself, and as
basis for holding a person liable under Sections 5, 6, 7, 8, 9,
10, 11, 12 and 14, is unconstitutional for being overbroad.
They maintain that the acts defined in the said provisions
cover legitimate activity necessary for the people to exercise
their constitutionally protected rights to free speech and
expression.261

241. Petitioners’ assertions lack merit.

242. For emphasis, “vague” and “overbroad” standards

apply only to speech and not conduct. The plain and simple
language used in Section 4 debunks any allegation of
vagueness as to what acts are penalized. Also, there is
nothing in the said section which punishes speech. On the
contrary, Section 4 clearly punishes conduct, the purpose of
which and by its nature and context, produces the qualifying
circumstances mentioned in the succeeding paragraph that
qualify the acts enumerated from (a) to (e) to terrorism.

243. In determining whether a statute or act suffers

from the defect of vagueness, petitioners must show that the
law lacks comprehensible standards that men of common
intelligence must necessarily guess its meaning and differ as
to its application. The law must be demonstrated to be
repugnant to the Constitution in two respects: (a) it violates
due process for failure to accord persons, especially the
parties targeted by it, fair notice of the conduct to avoid; and
(b) it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out
its provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the
Government muscle.262
260
Zarate Petition, pp. 24-30.
261
Monsod Petition, p. 16.
262
Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network, Inc. v. Anti-Terrorism Council, supra.

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244. Paragraphs (a) to (c) of Section 4 explicitly begin

with “engages in acts.” On the other hand, Paragraphs (d) and
(e) clearly describe action words, i.e., “develops,
manufactures, possesses, acquires, transports, supplies or
uses…”, “release of…”, or “causing…” Finally, the general
modifier to all paragraphs state that “when the purpose of
such act…”

245. Going to the substance of Section 4, its provisions

are neither intrinsically vague nor impermissibly overbroad
contrary to what petitioners gratuitously assert.

246. One of the primary rules in statutory construction

is that where the words of a statute are clear, plain, and free
from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and
applied without attempted interpretation.263

247. Likewise, words must not only be taken in

accordance with their plain meaning alone, but also in relation
to other parts of the statute.264 It is a rule in statutory
construction that every part of the statute must be interpreted
with reference to the context, i.e., that every part of the
statute must be considered together with the other parts, and
kept subservient to the general intent of the whole
enactment.265 Because the law must not be read in truncated
parts, its provisions must be read in relation to the whole law.
The statute’s clauses and phrases must not, consequently, be
taken as detached and isolated expressions, but the whole
and every part thereof must be considered in fixing the
meaning of any of its parts in order to produce a harmonious
whole.266 Consistent with the fundamentals of statutory
construction, all the words in the statute must be taken into
consideration in order to ascertain its meaning.267

248. Here, petitioners nitpicked particular words or

phrases in Section 4, interpreted them in isolation, and railed
263
Chavez v. Judicial and Bar Council, G.R. No. 202242, July 17, 2012.
264
Philippine International Trading Corporation v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 183517, June 22, 2010.
265
Land Bank of the Philippines v. AMS Farming Corporation, G.R. No. 174971, October 15, 2008.
266
Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority v. Urgello, G.R. No. 162288, April 4, 2007.
267
Smart Communications, Inc. v. City of Davao, G.R. No. 155491, September 16, 2008.

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against their supposed vagueness or overbreadth. Contrary to

petitioners’ strained assertions, however, it takes no prophetic
skill to divine the clear, plain, and unambiguous meaning of
the words in Section 4. A simple resort to their ordinary
meaning suffices.

249. Section 4 clearly defines five distinct acts. These

are:

1. Acts intended to cause

death or serious bodily injury
to any person, or endangers
a person’s life when the purpose of such
2. Acts intended to cause act, by its nature and
extensive damage or context, is to intimidate
destruction to a government the general public or a
or public facility, public place segment thereof, create
or private property an atmosphere or spread
a message of fear, to
3. Acts intended to cause
provoke or influence by
extensive interference with,
intimidation the
damage or destruction to
government or any
critical infrastructure
international organization,
4. Development, or seriously destabilize or
manufacture, possession, destroy the fundamental
acquisition, transportation, political, economic, or
supply or use of weapons, social structures of the
explosives or of biological, country, or create a public
nuclear, radiological or emergency or seriously
chemical weapons undermine public safety
5. Release of dangerous
substances, or causing fire,
floods or explosions
Provided, That, terrorism as defined in this section shall
not include advocacy, protest, dissent, stoppage of work,
industrial or mass action, and other similar exercises of
civil and political rights, which are not intended to cause
death or serious physical harm to a person, to endanger
a person’s life, or to create a serious risk to public safety.

250. These enumerated acts must be taken together

with the general qualifier of specific intent which succeeds
them. Said differently, it isconduct, coupled with specific
intent, which clearly comprises the crime of terrorism. This

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was the clear import of the Senate deliberations on Section 4,

to wit:

Senator Drilon. Mr. President, if we read

the provision carefully, the acts enumerated in
(A) to (E) when the purpose of such act, by its
nature and context, is to intimidate and put fear
except an actual bombing because that would
be covered by other sections. It is just the
purpose to induce government by force to do or
to abstain from doing such an act.

Our question here, Mr. President, what is

the difference between this and the crime of
grave threats under the Revised Penal Code?

Senator Lacson. It is the purpose, Mr.

President. A simple crime of grave threats
without the purpose of sowing terrorism or
committing terroristic act, iba po iyon. We are
always bound by the intent and purpose of the
act.

Senator Lacson. As we defined it and as

the gentleman mentioned earlier, ito iyong
Section 4, iyong fundamental. Ito po, “The
purpose of such act, by its nature and context,
is to intimidate, put in fear, force or induce the
government or any international organization,
or the public to do or to abstain from doing any
act, or seriously destabilize or destroy the
fundamental political economic or social
structures of the country…”

Senator Drilon. So, just in answer to my

question, what distinguishes an ordinary crime
of grave threat is the purpose of the offender in
committing the crime.

Senator Lacson. That is correct, Mr.

President.

Senator Drilon. So that, if it is for the

purpose of intimidating, put in fear, force or
induce the government or any international
organization, or the public to do or abstain from

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doing an act, that is considered a terrorist

act.268

Senator Drilon. Mr. President, the

definition of Terrorist Acts under pages 5, 6, and
7 of the measure would clearly define when it is
applicable to ordinary crimes, to act of
terrorism, or freedom fighters. In other words,
the difficulty in the definition of anti-terrorism is
that it is either an ordinary crime, an act of
terrorism, or acts committed by freedom
fighters. Would the good sponsor agree with
that?

Senator Lacson. It all depends on the

intent and the purpose of the act, Mr. President.

Senator Drilon. That is correct, Mr.

President. Yes, that is the purpose of the act,
and I agree with that. That is why by the
definition on page 7, from line 6 down, it is very
clear that when the purpose of such act, by its
nature or context, is to intimidate, put in fear,
force or induce the government or any
international organization, or the public to do
any act or abstain from doing any act, or
seriously destabilize, et cetera, et cetera.269

Senator Lacson. We have to refer back

to the intent and purpose of the commission of
that particular act, Mr. President. Naka-define
naman po iyan under Section 4. Kung nasa
labas na ng definition at ang effect is on an
individual or a group of individuals na wala
naman itong bearing on the acts as
enumerated, specifically iyong intent and
purpose, baka po mahirapan tayong i-justify.

Senator Tolentino. Again, Mr. President,

with due respect, I ask again the question: Are
we protecting, primarily, the State, or are we
protecting the people, or are we protecting
both?

268
TSN dated December 17, 2019, pp. 48-49; Annex “2”.
269
TSN dated January 21, 2020, p. 15; Annex “3”.

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Senator Lacson. The answer is both, Mr.

President. Ang nakalagay, “The purpose of such
act by its nature and context, must be
committed to, (1) intimidate, put in fear, force
or induce the government.” Everything depends
on the circumstances bound by the intent and
purpose of such act. Kung papasok naman po
roon sa category ng mine-mention dito sa
proposed measure, then, probably… it depends
on the appreciation of evidence pertaining to the
intent of the act as committed.270

Senator Pimentel. So, in this new Anti-

Terrorism Act, we will always look at the intent
and purpose of the perpetrator, of the accused,
Mr. President.

Senator Lacson. That is correct, Mr.

President.271

251. Petitioners Calleja, et al. fault Section 4(c) as

vague in relation to the terms “extensive interference” and
“critical infrastructure.” To recall, Section 4(c) contemplates
extensive interference to critical infrastructure. However, it is
plain that “extensive” means “having a wide or
considerable extent.”

252. Furthermore, Section 3(a) of the Anti-Terrorism

Act provides a clear definition of “critical infrastructure,” to
wit:

SEC. 3. Definition of Terms. –

(a) Critical Infrastructure shall refer to an

asset or system, whether physical or
virtual, so essential to the
maintenance of vital societal functions
or to the delivery of essential public
services that the incapacity or
destruction 8 of such systems and
assets would have a debilitating
impact on national defense and

270
TSN dated January 27, 2020, pp. 30-31; Annex “5”.
271
TSN dated January 28, 2020, p. 20; Annex “6”.

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security, national economy, public

health or safety, the administration of
justice, and 11 other functions
analogous thereto. It may include, but
is not limited to, an asset or system
affecting telecommunications, water
and energy supply, emergency
services, food security, fuel supply,
banking and finance, transportation,
radio and television, information
systems and technology, chemical and
nuclear sectors. …

253. Moreover, and particularly in response to

petitioner Lagman’s second contention, under the rules on
syntax, the conjunctive word “and” denotes a “joinder or
union” of words, phrases, or clause.272 The word “and,”
whether used to connect words, phrases or full sentences,
must be accepted as binding together and as relating to one
another.273 “And” in statutory construction implies conjunction
or union.274 Taking the words into proper account, it is
sufficiently clear that the phrase “when the purpose of such
act” is a qualifier applicable to items (a) all the way to (e).

254. Petitioner Lagman hastens to add that the

vagueness and overbreadth of Section 4 are supposedly
compounded by the deletion of the inculpatory element of
“political motive” which is internationally prescribed, citing the
Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Fact
Sheet No. 32. According to him, the clear purpose of deleting
the element of political motive in the Anti-Terrorism Act is to
“facilitate the apprehension, prosecution, and conviction of a
suspected terrorist without imputing and proving any political
or ideological motive.”275

255. Petitioner Lagman’s contentions are misplaced

and misinformed.

272
Microsoft Corp. v. Manansala, G.R. No. 166391, October 21, 2015; citing Agpalo, Statutory Construction,
(4th Ed. 1998), p. 203.
273
Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Ariete, G.R. No. 164152, January 21, 2010; citing Laurel, Statutory
Construction Cases & Materials, (1999 Revised Edition), p. 139.
274
LICOMCEN, Inc. v. Foundation Specialists, Inc., G.R. No. 167022, August 31, 2007.
275
Lagman Petition, pars. 97-99.

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256. Petitioner Lagman seems oblivious to the fact that

the words in Section 4 were in fact largely patterned from
international standards defining terrorism.

257. In 2011, the Appeals Chamber of the Special

Tribunal for Lebanon—the world's first international court with
jurisdiction over the crime of terrorism 276—declared after a
review of international law sources that the customary law
definition of terrorism consists of the following key elements,
to wit:277

a. the perpetration of a criminal act (such as

murder, kidnapping, hostage-taking, arson,
and so on), or threatening such an act;

b. the intent to spread fear among the

population (which would generally entail
the creation of public danger) or directly or
indirectly coerce a national or international
authority to take some action, or to refrain
from taking it; and

c. when the act involves a transnational

element.278

258. Granting that the presence of the third element

lent more credence to the notion that what the Special Tribune
for Lebanon sought to define was international/transnational
terrorism, it did show a continuing slant vis-à-vis the world’s
understanding of terrorism—from purpose-based to effect-
based.279 Incidents like the October 2017 mass shooting at a
music festival in the United States of America, killing at least
59 and injuring as many as 527—an act devoid, from all

276
The Special Tribunal for Lebanon has jurisdiction over persons responsible for the attack of February 14,
2005 leading to the death of former Lebanese prime minister Rafik Hariri and the deaths or injury of other
persons, as well as other related attacks from October 1, 2004 and December 12, 2005. It is the first tribunal
of its kind with jurisdiction to deal with terrorism as a discrete crime. About the STL. Special Tribunal
for Lebanon. https://www.stl-tsl.org/en/about-the-stl, last accessed on July 17, 2020.
277
Interlocutory Decision on the Applicable Law: Terrorism, Conspiracy, Homicide, Perpetration,
Cumulative Charging (Appeals Chamber), STL-11-01/I, February 16, 2011.
278
Emphasis supplied.
279
Lazreg, H. B., The debate over what constitutes terrorism, The Conversation,
https://theconversation.com/the-debate-over-what-constitutes-terrorism-86812, last accessed on July 13,
2020.

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appearances, of any political motive—trigger constant

conversation on the shift in what acts are terroristic.

259. Back in 1998, the Arab Convention for the

Suppression of Terrorism 280 formulated the following
definition of terrorism:

Any act or threat of violence, whatever

its motives or purposes, that occurs in the
advancement of an individual or collective
criminal agenda and seeking to sow panic
among people, causing fear by harming
them, or placing their lives, liberty or security in
danger, or seeking to cause damage to the
environment or to public or private
installations or property or to occupying or
seizing them, or seeking to jeopardize
national resources.281

260. Published in 2004, UNSC Resolution 1566,282 which

delved on threats to international peace and security caused
by terrorist acts, proffered the following definition for
terrorism:

Criminal acts, including against civilians,

committed with the intent to cause death or
serious bodily injury, or taking of hostages,
with the purpose to provoke a state of
terror in the general public or in a group of
persons or particular persons, intimidate a
population or compel a government or an
international organization to do or to
abstain from doing any act.283

280
A PDF translated from the original Arabic by the UN English Translation Service (unofficial
translation) can be perused at https://www.unodc.org/images/tldb-f/conv_arab_terrorism.en.pdf, last
accessed on July 14, 2020.
281
Emphasis and underscoring supplied.
282
S/Res/1566 (2004), available at https://www.un.org/ruleoflaw/files/n0454282.pdf, last accessed on
July 14, 2020.
283
Emphasis and underscoring supplied.

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261. In November that same year, a UN Report284

hearkened to UNSC Resolution No. 1566 in describing
terrorism as:

any act intended to cause death or serious

bodily harm to civilians or non-combatants with
the purpose of intimidating a population or
compelling a government or an
international organization to do or abstain
from doing any act.285

262. Meantime, the European Union (EU) defined

terrorism in Article 1 of its 2002 Framework Decision on
Combating Terrorism as:

[…] given their nature or context, may seriously

damage a country or an international
organization where committed with the aim of:
seriously intimidating a population; or
unduly compelling a Government or
international organization to perform or
abstain from performing any act; or
seriously destabilizing or destroying the
fundamental political, constitutional,
economic or social structures of a country
or an international organization.286

263. Verily, the influence of these definitions on the

wording of Section 4 is undeniable. It cannot be gainsaid,
then, that the provision is well-couched in international
standards.

264. Furthermore, Section 4 is peculiar in the sense

that quite apart from other penal laws that simply define a
crime, this particular provision has built-in specific safeguards
to protect fundamental rights, a substantial protection which
petitioners conveniently disregarded or dismissed as
“apparent-than-real.”

284
United Nations, UN Reform, March 21, 2005. Archived from the original on April 27, 2007.
https://web.archive.org/web/20070427012107/http://www.un.org/unifeed/script.asp?scriptId=73, last
accessed July 14, 2020.
285
Emphasis supplied.
286
Emphasis supplied.

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265. The proviso, however, far from being illusory,

expressly protects the very freedoms which petitioners claim
to be endangered, i.e., “advocacy, protest, dissent, stoppage
of work, industrial or mass action, and other similar exercises
of civil and political rights which are not intended to cause
death or serious physical harm to a person, to endanger a
person’s life, or to create a serious risk to public safety.”

266. From the foregoing, it is clear that Section 4 of the

Anti-Terrorism Act is neither intrinsically vague nor
impermissibly overbroad. It is not intended to restrain political
rights, especially the freedom of speech, expression, and of
the press. Petitioners’ facial challenge, which rests on mere
speculation, surmises, and conjecture, must be rejected in
order not to short-circuit the democratic process by
preventing laws embodying the will of the people from being
implemented in a manner consistent with the Constitution.

267. Petitioner Lagman questions the constitutionality

of Sections 5, 8, and 9 of the Anti-Terrorism Act, claiming, on
the premise that Section 4 defining terrorism is void for
vagueness, that “(i)t is inordinately strange that there is a
culpable threatener, (sic) proponent, or inciter but there is no
terrorist.”287

268. Petitioners Calleja, et al. allege the same for

Sections 5, 9, 10, 25, and 26. They assail how Section 5
appears to “punish mere threats,” on top of its vagueness
arising from Section 4’s own—a characteristic they purport to
be shared with Section 9. They also impinge upon Section 10
for the vagueness of the acts constituting terrorism
enumerated therein,; Section 25 for alleged failure to indicate
how the ATC will proceed with the designation of terrorist
individuals and groups,; and Section 26 for the vagueness and
overbreadth of the term “terrorist organization.”288

287
Lagman Petition, p. 20.
288
Calleja Petition, pp. 42-50.

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269. Petitioners Zarate, et al., Sta. Maria, et al., and

Monsod, et al. claim that Sections 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11,289 and
12290 are vague because Section 4, from which the provisions
rely vis-à-vis the definition of terrorism, is allegedly vague.291
Petitioners Sta. Maria, et al. further maintain that Sections 25,
26, and 27 are equally vague and overbroad for their reliance
on Sections 4 to 12.292

270. Petitioners Calleja, et al. insist that Sections 25

and 26 are vague since they do not afford the adversely
affected person or group any opportunity whatsoever to be
represented or heard, or to present contravening evidence in
their defense as the ATC makes its finding of probable cause
as basis for the terrorist designation. 293

271. Petitioners Monsod, et al. claim that Section 25

violates the constitutional right to due process as it grants the
ATC the authority, upon its own determination of probable
cause, to designate individuals or groups as terrorists without
any formal finding of guilt or judicial intervention.294

272. Petitioners CTUHR, et al., on the other hand, posit

that Section 25 is unconstiutional as it infringes upon the right
to form associations without granting a person the
opportunity to show that the association he/she has joined is
289
SEC. 11. Foreign Terrorist. — The following acts are unlawful and shall suffer the penalty of life
imprisonment without the benefit of parole and the benefits of Republic Act No. 10592:
(a) For any person to travel or attempt to travel to a state other than his/her state of residence or
nationality, for the purpose of perpetrating, planning, or preparing for, or participating in terrorism,
or providing or receiving terrorist training;
(b) For any person to organize or facilitate the travel of individuals who travel to a state other than their
states of residence or nationality knowing that such travel is for the purpose of perpetrating,
planning, training, or preparing for, or participating in terrorism or providing or receiving terrorist
training; or
(c) For any person residing abroad who comes to the Philippines to participate in perpetrating, planning,
training, or preparing for, or participating in terrorism or provide support for or facilitate or receive
terrorist training here or abroad.
290
SEC. 12. Providing Material Support to Terrorists. — Any person who provides material support to any
terrorist individual or terrorist organization, association or group of persons committing any of the acts
punishable under Section 4 hereof, knowing that such individual or organization, association, or group of
persons is committing or planning to commit such acts, shall be liable as principal to any and all terrorist
activities committed by said individuals or organizations, in addition to other criminal liabilities he/she or
they may have incurred in relation thereto.
291
Zarate Petition, p. 53; Sta. Maria Petition, p. 30.
292
Sta. Maria Petition, pp. 30, 40-43.
294
Monsod Petition, p. 21.

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a legal one.295 For their part, petitioners Sta. Maria, et al.

claim that Section 25 is unclear and vague as to what quantum
of evidence must be present to meet the standard of probable
cause.296

273. Petitioners are all sorely mistaken. Sections 5 to

12 and 25 to 27 of the Anti-Terrorism Act are neither vague
nor impermissibly overbroad.

274. Sections 5 to 12 refer to the conduct and specific

intent mentioned in Section 4; hence, the earlier discussion
on Section 4 pertaining to its sufficiency and clarity also
applies to Sections 5 to 12.

275. Specifically, Sections 5, 8, and 9 deal with

unprotected expression as they involve advocacy of imminent
lawless action and danger to national security,297 and are thus
permissibly restricted. Sections 5, 8, and 9 provide:

SEC. 5. Threat to Commit Terrorism. —

Any person who shall threaten to commit any of
the acts mentioned in Section 4 hereof shall
suffer the penalty of imprisonment of twelve
(12) years.

SEC. 8. Proposal to Commit Terrorism. -

Any person who proposes to commit terrorism
as defined in Section 4 hereof shall suffer the
penalty of imprisonment of twelve (12) years.

SEC. 9. Inciting to Commit Terrorism. -

Any person who, without taking any direct part
in the commission of terrorism, shall incite
others to the execution of any of the acts
specified in Section 4 hereof by means of
speeches, proclamations, writings, emblems,
banners or other representations tending to the
same end, shall suffer the penalty of
imprisonment of twelve (12) years.

295
Central Petition, p. 49.
296
Sta. Maria Petition, p. 43.
297
Chavez v. Gonzales, G.R. No. 168338, February 15, 2008.

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276. As correctly cited by Senator Lacson during the

Senate deliberations, the prohibitions under these Sections
fall within the same class of crimes already punished under
the Revised Penal Code, such as Grave Threats under Article
282, Inciting to War or Giving Motives for Reprisal under
Article 118, Proposal to Commit Rebellion under Article 136,
Inciting Rebellion or Insurrection under Article 138, and
Inciting to Sedition under Article 142.298

277. Moreover, a parallel analysis from jurisprudence

can be drawn as held by this Honorable Court in Espuelas v.
People,299 viz.:

Writings which tend to overthrow or

undermine the security of the government or to
weaken the confidence of the people in the
government are against the public peace, and
are criminal not only because they tend to incite
to a breach of the peace but because they are
conducive to the destruction of the very
government itself (See 19 Am. Law Rep. 1511).
Regarded as seditious libels they were the
subject of criminal proceedings since early times
in England. (V op. cit.).

Analyzed for meaning and weighed in its

consequences the article cannot fail to impress
thinking persons that it seeks to sow the seeds
of sedition and strife. The infuriating language
is not a sincere effort to persuade, what with the
writer’s simulated suicide and false claim to
martyrdom and what with is failure to
particularize. When the use irritating
language centers not on persuading the
readers but on creating disturbances, the
rationale of free speech cannot apply and
the speaker or writer is removed from the
protection of the constitutional
guaranty. 300

298
See TSNs dated January 28, 2020, at p.32, and February 3, 2020, pp. 14-19.
299
G.R. No. L-2990, December 17, 1951.
300
Emphasis supplied.

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278. Section 10, on the other hand, is not subject to

scrutiny under the doctrines of “void for vagueness” or
“overbreadth,” considering that, as previously discussed,
these standards apply only to speech and not conduct.
However, a plain reading of Section 10 shows that it proscribes
conduct and not speech, e.g., recruitment, organization, or
facilitation of travel.

279. As Sections 25, 26 and 27 were mentioned in

relation to the above provisions, the same conclusion can be
reached. They were neither vague nor overbroad. In any case,
these sections shall be thoroughly discussed in the latter part
of this Consolidated Comment.

280. Again, Sections 5 to 12 and 25 to 27 of the Anti-

Terrorism Act do not suffer from vagueness or overbreadth.
Petitioners’ arguments in this regard are bereft of legal
support and tenuous at best.

281. As to petitioners Calleja, et al.’s allegation, it must

be borne in mind that the absence of any in-statute remedy
is not constitutionally proscribed and a basis for declaring a
penal statute vague. Again, a statute is considered vague
when a person of common intelligence must guess at its
meaning and not when the law does not have a method of
controverting an executive function.

282. At any rate, petitioners anchor the vagueness of

Sections 5, 6, 7, 78, 9, 10, 11, 12, 25, 26 and 27 on the alleged
vague definition of terrorism in Section 4. As has been
discussed, Section 4 is clear and and does not suffer from
vagueness or overbreadth.

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The Anti-Terrorism Act

does not violate the
constitutional right against
unreasonable searches and
seizure.

283. Section 2, Article III of the Constitution provides:

The right of the people to be secure in

their persons, houses, papers and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures of
whatever nature and for any purpose shall be
inviolable, and no search warrant of warrant of
arrest shall issue, except upon probable cause
to be determined personally by a judge, after
examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce,
particularly describing the place to be searched,
or the persons or things to be seized.

284. The Anti-Terrorism Act contains sufficient

safeguards to protect the inherent right of the people against
unreasonable searches and seizures.

Section 17 of the Anti-

Terrorism Act does not violate
the requirement that a search
warrant shall only issue upon a
finding of probable cause
determined personally by a
judge.

285. Petitioners Calleja, et al. assert that Sections 16

and 17 of the Anti-Terrorism Act violate a person’s right
against unreasonable searches and seizures by authorizing
collection of private communication and data from designated
and suspected persons without judicial determination of
probable cause.301

301
Calleja Petition, p. 53.

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286. Contrary to petitioners’ claims, however, it is

apparent from a simple reading of Sections 16 and 17 that a
judicial determination of probable cause by a special division
consisting of three justices of the Court of Appeals precedes
any act of collecting communications and other data.

287. To emphasize, Section 17 requires a finding of

probable cause for purposes of surveillance, interception, and
recording of communications under Section 16. Likewise,
Section 25 adopted the same threshold in the designation of
individuals, groups, organizations, or associations as
terrorists. When it comes to the issuance of order of
proscription, finding of probable cause is still required under
Section 27. So too, probable cause is a requisite for the AMLC
to investigate, inquire, and examine bank deposits under
Section 35302 of the Act.

288. Further, Section 2 of the same law which was cited

above, shows that the intent—indeed, the animating spirit—
behind the Anti-Terrorism Act is to stand consistent and in
harmony with the Constitution and the fundamental rights
and liberties it protects. Taken in this light, simply because
Section 29303 uses the word “suspected” does not mean that
302
SEC. 35. Anti-Money Laundering Council Authority to Investigate, Inquire into and Examine Bank
Deposits. - Upon the issuance by the court of a preliminary order of proscription or in case of designation
under Section 25 of this Act, the AMLC, either upon its own initiative or at the request of the ATC, is
hereby authorized to investigate:
(a) any property or funds that are in any way related to financing of terrorism as defined and penalized
under Republic Act No. 10168, or any violation of Sections 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11 or 12 of this Act; and
(b) property or funds of any person or persons in relation to whom there is probable cause to believe that
such person or persons are committing or attempting or conspiring to commit, or participating in or
facilitating the financing of the aforementioned sections of this Act.

The AMLC may also enlist the assistance of any branch, department, bureau, office, agency or
instrumentality of the government, including government-owned and -controlled corporations in
undertaking measures to counter the financing of terrorism, which may include the use of its personnel,
facilities and resources.

For purposes of this section and notwithstanding the provisions of Republic Act No. 1405, otherwise
known as the “Law on Secrecy of Bank Deposits”, as amended; Republic Act No. 6426, otherwise known
as the "Foreign Currency Deposit Act of the Philippines”, as amended; Republic Act No. 8791, otherwise
known as “The General Banking Law of 2000” and other laws, the AMLC is hereby authorized to inquire
into or examine deposits and investments with any banking institution or non-bank financial institution
and their subsidiaries and affiliates without a court order.
303
SEC. 29. Detention Without Judicial Warrant of Arrest. - The provisions of Article 125 of the Revised
Penal Code to the contrary notwithstanding, any law enforcement agent or military personnel, who, having
been duly authorized in writing by the ATC has taken custody of a person suspected of committing any
of the acts defined and penalized under Sections 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12 of this Act, shall, without
incurring any criminal liability for delay in the delivery of detained persons to the proper judicial
authorities, deliver said suspected person to the proper judicial authority within a period of fourteen (14)

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the “probable cause” threshold has been supplanted and that

arrest can now be undertaken under mere suspicion when the
entirety of the Act is in fact geared toward protecting the
same fundamental rights.

289. Taking a step further, the use of “suspected” in

Section 29 simply refers to a person who is not charged or
under process issued by a court. This especially becomes
obvious when Section 29 is read in consonance with the
following provisions:

Sec. 17. Judicial Authorization,

Requisites. – The authorizing division of the
Court of Appeals shall issue a written order to
conduct the acts mentioned in Section 16 of this
Act upon:

that there is probable cause to believe

based on personal knowledge of facts or
circumstances that the crimes defined and
penalized under Sections 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11
and 12 of this Act has been committed, or is

calendar days counted from the moment the said suspected person has been apprehended or arrested,
detained, and taken into custody by the law enforcement agent or military personnel.

The period of detention may be extended to a maximum period of ten (10) calendar days if it is
established that:
(1) further detention of the person/s is necessary to preserve evidence related to terrorism or complete
the investigation;
(2) further detention of the person/s is necessary to prevent the commission of another terrorism; and
(3) the investigation is being conducted properly and without delay.

Immediately after taking custody of a person suspected of committing terrorism or any member of a
group of persons, organization or association proscribed under Section 26 hereof, the law
enforcement agent or military personnel shall notify in writing the judge of the court nearest the
place of apprehension or arrest of the following facts:
(a) the time, date, and manner of arrest;
(b) the location or locations of the detained suspect/s and
(c) the physical and mental condition of the detained suspect/s.

The law enforcement agent or military personnel shall likewise furnish the ATC and the Commission on
Human Rights (CHR) of the written notice given to the judge.

The head of the detaining facility shall ensure that the detained suspect is informed of his/her rights as a
detainee and shall ensure access to the detainee by his/her counsel or agencies and entities authorized by
law to exercise visitorial powers over detention facilities.

The penalty of imprisonment of ten (10) years shall be imposed upon the police or law enforcement agent
or military personnel who fails to notify any judge as provided in the preceding paragraph.

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being committed, or is about to be committed;

and

that there is probable cause to believe

based on personal knowledge of facts or
circumstances that evidence, which is essential
to the conviction of any charged or suspected
person for, or to the solution or prevention of,
any such crimes, will be obtained. (underscoring
and emphasis supplied)

Sec. 18. Classification and Contents of the

Order of the Court. – [. . .] The written order of
the authorizing division of the Court of Appeals
shall specify the following: (a) the identity, such
as name and address, if known, of the person
or persons whose communications, messages,
conversations, discussions, or spoken or written
words are to be tracked down, tapped, listened
to, intercepted, and recorded; and in the case
of radio, electronic, or telephonic (whether
wireless or otherwise) communications,
messages, conversations, discussions, or
spoken or written words, the electronic
transmission systems or the telephone numbers
to be tracked down, tapped, listened to,
intercepted, and recorded and their locations or
if the person or persons suspected of
committing any of the crimes defined and
penalized under the provisions of this Act
are not fully known, such person or persons
shall be the subject of continuous surveillance…

Sec. 30. Rights of a Person under

Custodial Detention. – The moment a person
charged with or suspected of committing any
of the acts defined and penalized under Sections
4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12 of this Act is
apprehended or arrested and detained, he/she
shall forthwith be informed, by the arresting law
enforcement agent or military personnel to
whose custody the person concerned is brought,
of his/her right…304

304
Emphasis supplied.

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290. Sections 16 and 17 are clear that a law

enforcement agent or military personnel may “secretly
wiretap, overhear and listen to, intercept, screen, read,
surveil, record or collect” “private communications,
conversation, discussion/s, data, information, and messages”
between members of a judicially declared and outlawed
terrorist organization, members of designated person, and
suspected terrorists, only upon a written order from the Court
of Appeals.

291. Such written order shall be issued only upon

showing of the existence of probable cause, based on the
examination of the applicant and the witnesses he/she may
produce, that terrorism as defined and penalized under
Sections 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12 has been committed,
or is being committed, or is about to be committed by the
suspected terrorist.

292. As such, it is the Justices of the Court of Appeals

seated in special division, not the members of the ATC, who
shall discern whether or not a written order for surveillance of
suspects and interception and recording of communications
shall be issued. Significantly, the assailed Sections 16 and 17
should be read in conjunction with Section 45 of the law, which
explicitly states that, “(n)othing herein shall be interpreted to
empower the ATC to exercise any judicial or quasi-judicial
power or authority.”

293. As an added safeguard—and as mentioned

earlier—the law provides in Section 24305 that any surveillance
made by a law enforcement agent or military personnel
without the necessary surveillance order from the Court of
Appeals will merit the offender an imprisonment of ten years,
in addition to declaring any evidence gathered as inadmissible
as evidence in any court or proceeding.

305
Sec. 24. Unauthorized or Malicious Interceptions and/or Recordings – Any law enforcement agent or
military personnel who conducts surveillance activities without a valid judicial authorization pursuant to
Section 17 of this Act shall be guilty of this offense and shall suffer the penalty of imprisonment of ten
(10) years. All information that have been maliciously procured should be made available to the aggrieved
party.

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294. Interestingly, while arguing for the lack of judicial

determination of probable cause, petitioners Calleja, et al.
admitted that Section 17 is in the nature of a judicial
warrant,306 thereby contradicting their own argument.

295. Clearly, there is no violation of the requirement

that a search warrant shall issue only upon a finding of
probable cause determined personally by the judge.

Section 17 of the Anti-

Terrorism Act does not prohibit
the quashal of a warrant
issued under the same
Section.

296. Petitioners Calleja, et al. and Zarate, et al. argue

that the Anti-Terrorism Act does not provide the suspected
terrorist the remedy of quashal of the warrant. They claim
that the written order, being a classified information under
Section 18307 thereof, lacks transparency, thereby denying the
suspected terrorist of an opportunity to contest the same.

297. Petitioners’ assertions are baseless.

306
Calleja Petition, p. 53.
307
SEC. 18. Classification, and Contents of the Order of the Court, - The written order granted by the
authorizing division of the Court of Appeals as well as the application for such order, shall be deemed and
are hereby declared as classified information. Being classified information, access to the said documents
and any information contained in the said documents shall be limited to the applicants, duly authorized
personnel of the ATC, the hearing justices, the clerk of court and duly authorized personnel of the hearing
or issuing court.

The written order of the authorizing division of the Court of Appeals shall specify the following:
(a) the identity, such as name and address, if known, of the person or persons whose communications,
messages, conversations, discussions, or spoken or written words are to be tracked down, tapped,
listened to, intercepted, and recorded; and, in the case of radio, electronic, or telephonic (whether
wireless or otherwise) communications, messages, conversations, discussions, or spoken or written
words, the electronic transmission systems or the telephone numbers to be tracked down, tapped,
listened to, intercepted, and recorded and their locations or if the person or persons suspected of
committing any of the crimes defined and penalized under the provisions of this Act are not fully
known, such person or persons shall be the subject of continuous surveillance;
(b) the identity of the law enforcement agent or military personnel, including the individual identity of
the members of his team, judicially authorized to undertake surveillance activities;
(c) the offense or offenses committed, or being committed, or sought to be prevented; and,
(d) the length of time within which the authorization shall be used or carried out.

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298. There is nothing in the law which prohibits the

suspected terrorist from availing themselves of the
appropriate remedies in questioning the validity of the written
order of surveillance after the filing of the case in court.

299. The declared policy of the State to protect life,

liberty and property, and the nature of terrorist attacks
necessarily require the conduct of surveillance. Declaring as
classified information the Court of Appeals’ written order for
surveillance is necessary to preserve the truthfulness of the
information intended to be gathered. To declare otherwise
would defeat the very objective of surveillance, which is to
monitor the activities and communications of suspected
terrorists for the purpose of gathering information for a
possible case of terrorism.

300. The conduct of surveillance is likened to a search

warrant proceeding.

301. This Honorable Court clearly explained in United

Laboratories, Inc. v. Isip308 the nature of a search warrant
proceeding, to wit:

A search warrant proceeding is, in no

sense, a criminal action or the commencement
of a prosecution. The proceeding is not one
against any person, but is solely for the
discovery and to get possession of personal
property. It is a special and peculiar remedy,
drastic in nature, and made necessary because
of public necessity. It resembles in some respect
with what is commonly known as John Doe
proceedings. While an application for a search
warrant is entitled like a criminal action, it does
not make it such an action.

302. Notably, during the conduct of surveillance, no

case has yet been filed against the suspected terrorist.
His/her right to avail of legal remedies shall commence from
the time of filing of the appropriate case in court.

308
G.R. No. 163858, June 28, 2005.

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303. After the filing of a case for any violation of the

Anti-Terrorism Act, the accused shall then have the right to
file the appropriate motion to question the validity of the
written order or warrant and pray for the suppression of
evidence seized.309 If there is indeed a violation of the right of
the accused against unreasonable searches and seizure, any
information obtained during the conduct of the surveillance
shall be inadmissible in evidence in any court or
proceeding.310 On the other hand, if no case has been filed,
and there is a finding that the information gathered during
the conduct of surveillance has been maliciously procured, the
same shall be made available to the aggrieved party.311

304. Indeed, Section 17 does not prohibit the quashal

of the warrant/written order issued under authority of the
Court of Appeals.

The Anti-Terrorism Act

does not violate the
constitutional right to
privacy.

305. The right to privacy is a constitutionally enshrined

right, a component of personal liberty protected by the due
process clause.312 Section 3(1), Article III of the Consitution
reads:

SEC. 3. (1) The privacy of communication

and correspondence shall be inviolable except
309
Sec. 19. Effective Period of Judicial Authorization. — … the applicant law enforcement agent or military
personnel shall have thirty (30) days after the termination of the period granted by the Court of Appeals
as provided in the preceding paragraphs within which to file the appropriate case before the Public
Prosecutor’s Office for any violation of this Act.
310
Sec. 23. Evidentiary Value of Deposited Materials. – Any listened to, intercepted, or recorded
communications, messages, conversations, discussions, or spoken or written words, or any part or parts
thereof, or any information or fact contained therein, including their existence, content, substance, purport,
effect, or meaning, which have been secured in violation of the pertinent provisions of this Act, shall be
inadmissible and cannot be used as evidence against anybody in any judicial, quasi-judicial, legislative,
or administrative investigation, inquiry, proceeding, or hearing.
311
Sec. 24. Unauthorized or Malicious Interceptions and/or Recordings – Any law enforcement agent or
military personnel who conducts surveillance activities without a valid judicial authorization pursuant to
Section 17 of this Act shall be guilty of this offense and shall suffer the penalty of imprisonment of ten
(10) years. All information that have been maliciously procured should be made available to the
aggrieved party. (Emphasis supplied.)
312
Gamboa v. Chan, G.R. No. 193636, July 24, 2012.

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upon lawful order of the court, or when

public safety or order requires otherwise as
prescribed by law.

306. The right to privacy is just as well-ensconced in

statutes, such as the Civil Code, the Revised Penal Code, and
special laws, including R.A. No. 10173 or the Data Privacy Act
of 2012. Many of these laws provide penalties for their
violation in the form of imprisonment, fines, or damages.
These laws will serve, as they always have, as powerful
deterrents not only in the establishment of any administrative
rule that will violate the constitutionally protected right to
privacy, but also to would-be transgressors of such right. 313

307. Petitioners Calleja, et al., Sta. Maria, et al.,

Lagman, Zarate, et al., and CTUHR, et al. all argue that the
Anti-Terrorism Act violates this right. In particular, petitioners
Zarate, et al., quoting Barnicki v. Vopper,314 decry how “(f)ear
or suspicion that one’s speech is being monitored by a
stranger, even without the reality of such activity, can have a
seriously inhibiting effect upon the willingness to voice critical
and constructive ideas.”315 Here, the petitions paint the
purported chilling effect of the law on the freedom of
expression, speech, and the press as “all too real.”

308. Petitioners’ concerns are unfounded.

309. To start, in a number of cases, like in the case of

Sps. Hing v. Choachuy, 316 this Honorable Court affirmed the
use of the “reasonable expectation of privacy” test in
determining whether a person has a reasonable expectation
of privacy and whether the expectation has been violated. As
expounded in Ople v. Torres,317 the reasonableness of a
person’s expectation of privacy depends on a two-part test,
to wit: (a) whether, by his conduct, the individual has
exhibited an expectation of privacy; and (b) this expectation
is one that society recognizes as reasonable.

313
J. Kapunan’s dissent in Ople v. Torres, et al., G.R. No. 127685, July 23, 1998.
314
532 U.S. 514 (2001).
315
Zarate Petition, pp. 41-42.
316
G.R. No. 179736, June 26, 2013.
317
G.R. No. 127685, July 23, 1998.

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310. On the heels of this premise, it follows that where

a person does not have an expectation of privacy or one's
expectation of privacy is not reasonable to society, the alleged
intrusion is not a “search” that would impinge upon privacy
rights.318 For one, in People v. Johnson,319 this Honorable
Court recognized that increased concern over terrorist activity
justifies a concomitant lowering of expectations of privacy vis-
à-vis airport security procedures.

311. One need not look far to see the realities that
necessitated the passage of the Anti-Terrorism Act. The string
of suicide bombings in the country and the hard-fought
Marawi siege are but recent reminders of this. Sometime in
January 2019, an Indonesian couple blew themselves up at a
cathedral in Jolo, killing 23 and wounding more than 100
innocent Filipinos who were only there to pray.320 On April 3,
2019, an explosion rocked a restaurant in Kalawag 3, Isulan,
Sultan Kudarat, resulting in one casualty and 17 injured.321

312. On June 28, 2019, twin bombings took place at a

military checkpoint in Sitio Tanjung, Barangay Kajatian,
Indanan, Sulu—the first case in Philippine history of suicide
bombing perpetrated by local terrorists.322 This was followed
by another suicide bombing attempt on September 8, 2019 in
the same barangay in Sulu, which sought to target a
detachment manned by the Philippine Army’s 35th Infantry
Battalion.323 Petitioners simply cannot deny that the
worsening problem of terrorism is existing, immediate,
apparent, and unfortunately, “all too real.”

318
Saluday v. People, G.R. No. 215305, April 3, 2018.
319
G.R. No. 138881, December 18, 2000
320
Mendoza, R., & Romano, D. The Diplomat, The Philippines Anti-Terrorism Act: Who Guards the
Guardians?, https://thediplomat.com/2020/07/the-philippines-anti-terrorism-act-who-guards-the-guardians/,
last accessed on July 10, 2020.
321
18 hurt in Isulan blast, https://www.mindanews.com/top-stories/2019/04/18-hurt-in-isulan-blast/, last accessed
on July 11, 2020.
322
5 killed, 9 hurt in Sulu military camp attack, https://www.pna.gov.ph/articles/1073596, last accessed July 11,
2020.
323
Suicide bomber dies in Philippines; no other casualties,
https://apnews.com/023e299742f84d1188d9fb032a955eb9, last accessed on July 11, 2020.

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313. Of course, as with any matter under the Bill of

Rights, the “reasonable expectation of privacy” test implies
constant weighing and balancing of competing values and
priorities.324 On one hand, the right to be left alone is “the
most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by
civilized men.”325 On the other, as espoused by the theory of
the social contract, “[humanity gains] civil rights in return for
accepting the obligation to respect and defend the rights of
others, giving up some freedoms to do so.”326

314. Petitioners ought to make no mistake—the

provisions of the Anti-Terrorism Act should allay any fear of
intrusion or disrespect, if at all, of the people’s privacy rights.
In the first place, the core parameters for the implementation
of the law are clear-cut and unequivocally spelled out in its
Declaration of Policy under Section 2 which pertinently states
that “that the exercise of the constitutionally recognized
powers of the executive department of the government shall
not prejudice respect for human rights which shall be absolute
and protected at all times.”

315. The plain letter of Section 2 militates against

petitioners’ fear-mongering. Verily, the Anti-Terrorism Act
makes a hardline, no-compromise stance in its respect and
protection of fundamental human rights “absolute[ly, and] at
all times”—rights which include the right to privacy.327 Verba
legis non est recedendum.328 On this alone, petitioners’ claims
fail.

316. More significantly, the Anti-Terrorism Act is

possessed of safeguards that ensure rightful acquisition and
handling of surveilled information as above discussed. Thus,
as will be shown hereunder, the Anti-Terrorism Act, as a shield

324
Gorospe, Constitutional Law: Notes and Readings on the Bill of Rights, Citizenship and Suffrage, Vol. 1,
p. 665.
325
Morfe v. Mutuc, G.R. No. L-20387, January 31, 1968.
326
Rivers, N., International Security Studies (2019 ed.), p. 36.
327
Article 17, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. The passage reads: “1. No one shall
be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his privacy, family, home[,] or correspondence, nor
to unlawful attacks on his honour or reputation. 2. Everyone has the right to the protection of the law
against such interference or attacks.”
328
From the words of a statute, there should be no departure. Bolos v. Bolos, G.R. No. 186400, October 20,
2010.

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that protects Filipino life and liberty, present and future, does
not infringe on constitutionally protected privacy rights.

A secret tap of
communications under Section
16 can only be done after a
determination of probable
cause by the Court of Appeals
and therefore does not violate
the right to privacy.

317. Petitioner Lagman asserts that the maximum

period of ninety days for the wiretapping of a suspected
terrorist is “inordinately long and repressive.” According to
him, after law enforcers have secured an authority to wiretap
from the Court of Appeals on the basis of probable cause, it
does not stand to reason that the period for a secret tap would
extend to ninety days unless the evidence was “contrived and
manufactured to justify a fishing expedition or a witch hunt.”
This, he decries as offensive to a person’s privacy rights.329

318. Relatedly, petitioner Lagman compares Section 16

of the Anti-Terrorism Act with Section 8330 of the Human
Security Act which provides that surveillance and wiretapping
can only be authorized by the Court of Appeals if “there is no
other effective means readily available for acquiring such
evidence.” Petitioner Lagman claims that the latter safeguard
was “completely obliterated” in the Anti-Terrorism Act, and

329
Lagman Petition, p. 29.
330
SEC. 8. Formal Application for Judicial Authorization. — The written order of the authorizing division
of the Court of Appeals to track down, tap, listen to, intercept, and record communications, messages,
conversations, discussions, or spoken or written words of any person suspected of the crime of terrorism
or the crime of conspiracy to commit terrorism shall only be granted by the authorizing division of the
Court of Appeals upon an ex parte written application of a police or of a law enforcement official who has
been duly authorized in writing by the Anti-Terrorism Council created in Section 53 of this Act to file
such ex parte application, and upon examination under oath or affirmation of the applicant and the
witnesses he may produce to establish:
(a) that there is probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that
the said crime of terrorism or conspiracy to commit terrorism has been committed, or is being
committed, or is about to be committed;
(b) that there is probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that
evidence, which is essential to the conviction of any charged or suspected person for, or to the
solution or prevention of, any such crimes, will be obtained; and,
(c) that there is no other effective means readily available for acquiring such evidence.

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concludes that “it is [now] open season for the invasion of

one’s privacy of communication.”331

319. Petitioner Lagman’s assertions do not hold water.

320. To assume that the application to the Court of

Appeals to wiretap as provided under Section 16 is for “fishing
expedition or witch hunt” or the evidence proffered by the
applicant is “contrived and manufactured” simply implies a
lack of faith in the Philippine judicial system and a
prejudgment on the intelligence and integrity of the Justices
of the Court of Appeals who are tasked to determine the
existence of probable cause for the issuance of the written
order allowing the conduct of wiretapping. Section 16 vests
upon the Court of Appeals exclusive authority to issue the
written order, thus:

Sec. 16. Surveillance of Suspects and

Interception and Recording of Communications.
– The provisions of Republic Act No. 4200,
otherwise known as the “Anti-Wire Tapping
Law” to the contrary notwithstanding, a law
enforcement agent or military personnel may,
upon a written order of the Court of
Appeals secretly wiretap, overhear and listen
to, intercept, screen, read, surveil, record or
collect, with the use of any mode, … any private
communications, conversation, discussions,
data, information, messages in whatever form,
kind or nature, spoken or written words (a)
between members of a judicially declared and
outlawed terrorist organization, as provided in
Section 26 of this Act; (b) between members of
a designated person as defined in Section 3(e)
of Republic Act No. 10168; or (c) any person
charged with or suspected of committing any of
the crimes defined and penalized under the
provisions of this Act: Provided, That,
surveillance, interception and recording of
communications between lawyers and clients,
doctors and patients, journalists and their
sources and confidential business
correspondence shall not be authorized.

331
Lagman Petition., p. 30.

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…332

321. The crucial role of the Judiciary here serves as a

safeguard against the so-called fishing expeditions and
ensures that the authority to conduct a secret tap shall only
be granted if the Court of Appeals finds probable cause for it.

322. Anent Petitioner Lagman’s gripes on what he

perceives as “open season” against the people’s privacy
rights, it would appear that he is connecting nonexistent dots.
The fact that Section 8 of the Human Security Act was not
adopted and carried in Section 16 of the Anti-Terrorism Act
does not equate to automatic abuse—a clear case of non
sequitur. No order of priority is ever established to follow in
obtaining evidence in terrorist activities. To iterate, the acts
or damage sought to be prevented is catastrophic and
immediate. Hence, urgency is imperative.

323. Petitioner Lagman likewise insists that the Anti-

Terrorism Act imposes no sanction whatsoever on law
enforcers who maliciously and baselessly secure an order
authorizing a secret tap. Here, petitioner Lagman asseverates
that the “lack” of penalty would embolden law enforcers to
arbitrarily contrive an ex-parte application to obtain a written
order authorizing a wiretap.333

324. This claim is patently untrue.

325. Notably, Section 24 of the Anti-Terrorism Act

penalizes any law enforcement personnel who conducts
surveillance activities without a valid judicial authority or who
maliciously obtains interceptions or recordings.

326. Petitioner Lagman argues, as well, that under

Section 9334 of the Human Security Act, the person subjected

332
Emphasis supplied.
333
Ibid.
334
SEC. 9. Classification and Contents of the Order of the Court. — The written order granted by the
authorizing division of the Court of Appeals as well as its order, if any, to extend or renew the same, the
original application of the applicant, including his application to extend or renew, if any, and the written
authorizations of the Anti-Terrorism Council shall be deemed and are hereby declared as classified

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to the wiretap had the right to be informed that wiretapping

is being conducted against him so that he can move to quash
the order authorizing the said wiretap. Petitioner Lagman
denounces the deletion of this “safeguard” in the Anti-
Terrorism Act, thereby allowing the wiretapping to persist for
a maximum of ninety days without the person subjected
thereto having any opportunity to object to the same.335
Similarly, petitioners CTUHR, et al. assert that the ex parte
nature of the application for surveillance deprives the person
whose conversation is to be recorded the chance to oppose
the same.336

327. The deletion of a particular provision of the Human

Security Act lies on the wisdom of the legislators who crafted
the Anti-Terrorism Act. Thus, petitioners Lagman and CTUHR,
et al.’s claim here is problematic. Such deletion even bolsters
why the Human Security Act has failed to curtail terrorism in
the country.

328. The essence of wiretapping is to “secretly”

overhear and listen to, intercept, screen, read, surveil, record
or collect private communications, conversation, discussion/s,
data, information, messages between (a) members of a
judicially declared and outlawed terrorist organization as

information: Provided, That the person being surveilled or whose communications, letters, papers,
messages, conversations, discussions, spoken or written words and effects have been monitored, listened
to, bugged or recorded by law enforcement authorities has the right to be informed of the acts done by the
law enforcement authorities in the premises or to challenge, if he or she intends to do so, the legality of
the interference before the Court of Appeals which issued the written order.

The written order of the authorizing division of the Court of Appeals shall specify the following:
(a) the identity, such as name and address, if known, of the charged or suspected person whose
communications, messages, conversations, discussions, or spoken or written words are to be tracked
down, tapped, listened to, intercepted, and recorded and, in the case of radio, electronic, or telephonic
(whether wireless or otherwise) communications, messages, conversations, discussions, or spoken or
written words, the electronic transmission systems or the telephone numbers to be tracked down,
tapped, listened to, intercepted, and recorded and their locations or if the person suspected of the
crime of terrorism or conspiracy to commit terrorism is not fully known, such person shall be subject
to continuous surveillance provided there is a reasonable ground to do so;
(b) the identity (name, address, and the police or law enforcement organization) of the police or of the
law enforcement official, including the individual identity (names, addresses, and the police or law
enforcement organization) of the members of his team, judicially authorized to track down, tap, listen
to, intercept, and record the communications, messages, conversations, discussions, or spoken or
written words;
(c) the offense or offenses committed, or being committed, or sought to be prevented; and,
(d) the length of time within which the authorization shall be used or carried out.
335
Lagman Petition, p. 30.
336
CTUHR Petition, p. 32.

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declared in the Anti-Terrorism Act; (b) members of a

designated person as defined in Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 10168
otherwise known as the “Terrorism Financing Prevention and
Suppression Act”; or (c) any person charged with or
suspected of committing any of the crimes defined and
penalized under the Anti-Terrorism Act.337

329. To illustrate, former U.S. President George W.

Bush has once pointed out that “two of the September 11
hijackers who flew the plane into the Pentagon—Khalid
Almihdhar and Nawaf Alhazmi—communicated while they
were in the United States to other members of Al Qaeda who
were overseas, but [the U.S. federal government did not]
know they were [there] until it was too late.”338 In recognizing
wiretapping as a crucial part of the U.S. counter-terrorism
effort, it was noted that if the programs implemented in the
PATRIOT Act, the U.S. anti-terrorism law, were already in
place prior to the September 11 attacks, programs which
included wiretapping and interception of communications, the
hijackers may have been identified, located, and stopped.339

330. Naturally, wiretapping, as authorized under

Section 16 of the Anti-Terrorism Act, would be useless if
judicially declared, designated, or suspected terrorists knew
that they were being listened to. It strips its strategic value.
Therefore, the claim of petitioners to disclose the application
to wiretap in order for the target or targets to contest the
wiretapping is downright nonsensical, absurd, and defeats its
very purpose.

337
Section 16, Anti-Terrorism Act.
338
Hewitt, M., Wiretapping: A Necessity for Effectively Combating Terrorism in the 21st Century, Liberty
University (2008), https://digitalcommons.liberty.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1040&context=honors ,
last accessed on July 11, 2020.
339
Ibid.

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The production of customer

information and records by
virtue of a surveillance order
from the Court of Appeals
under Section 16 does not
intrude upon the private
sphere of an individual.

331. Petitioners Calleja, et al. argue that law enforcers

may compel telecommunications and internet service
providers to produce all customer information and
identification records without qualification. According to them,
this requirement is broad as it will give law enforcers
unqualified access to the personal data, information, and
records of a person without any compelling interest on the
matter. Thus, this method, according to them, being an
“intrusion to the private sphere of an individual” should not
be allowed.340

332. This argument is misleading.

333. In the first place, law enforcers or military

personnel cannot require the telecommunications companies
and internet service providers to produce customer
information and identification records without a written order
from the Court of Appeals. Moreover, law enforcers are
required to make a Return and that evidence obtained under
the judicial authorization shall be sealed in envelopes and
turned over to the Court of Appeals which issued the written
authorization. Section 20 is clear in this regard, to wit:

SEC. 20. Custody of Intercepted and

Recorded Communications. – All tapes, discs,
other storage devices, recordings, notes,
memoranda, summaries, excerpts and all
copies thereof obtained under the judicial
authorization granted by the Court of Appeals
shall, within forty-eight (48) hours after the
expiration of the period fixed in the written
order or the extension or renewal granted

340
Calleja Petition, p. 57.

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thereafter, be deposited with the issuing

court in a sealed envelope or sealed
package, as the case may be, and shall be
accompanied by a joint affidavit of the
applicant law enforcement agent or
military personnel and the members of his
team. …341

334. Furthermore, law enforcers must execute a joint

affidavit stating that no duplicates have been made, or if
duplicates were made, that the same are included in the
deposited envelope to the Court of Appeals, viz.:

SEC. 21. Contents of Joint Affidavit. —

The joint affidavit of the law enforcement agent
or military personnel shall state: (a) the number
of tapes, discs, and recordings that have been
made; (b) the dates and times covered by each
of such tapes, discs, and recordings; and (c) the
chain of custody or the list of persons who had
possession or custody over the tapes, discs and
recordings.

The joint affidavit shall also certify under

oath that no duplicates or copies of the whole or
any part of any of such tapes, discs, other
storage devices, recordings, notes,
memoranda, summaries, or excerpts have been
made, or, if made, that all such duplicates and
copies are included in the seeded envelope or
sealed package, as the case may be, deposited
with the authorizing division of the Court of
Appeals.

It shall be unlawful for any person, law

enforcement agent or military personnel to omit
or exclude from the joint affidavit any item or
portion thereof mentioned in this Section.

Any person, law enforcement agent or

military officer who violates any of the acts
proscribed in the preceding paragraph shall
suffer the penalty of imprisonment of ten (10)
years.

341
Emphasis supplied.

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335. As an additional safeguard, law enforcers can

only open the deposited envelope through a written order of
the Court of Appeals upon written application of the DOJ and
with notice to the party concerned, thus:

SEC. 22. Disposition of Deposited

Materials. – The sealed envelope or sealed
package and the contents thereof referred to in
Section 20 of this Act, shall be deemed and are
hereby declared classified information. The
sealed envelope or sealed package shall not be
opened, disclosed, or used as evidence unless
authorized by a written order of the authorizing
division of the Court of Appeals which written
order shall be granted only upon a written
application of the Department of Justice (DOJ)
duly authorized in writing by the ATC to file the
application with proper written notice to the
person whose conversation, communication,
message, discussion or spoken or written words
have been the subject of surveillance,
monitoring, recording and interception to open,
reveal, divulge, and use the contents of the
sealed envelope or sealed package as evidence.

The written application, with notice to the

party concerned, for the opening, replaying,
disclosing, or using as evidence of the sealed
package or the contents thereof shall clearly
state the purpose or reason for its opening,
replaying, disclosing, or its being used as
evidence.

Violation of this section shall be penalized

by imprisonment of ten (10) years.

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A surveillance order issued by

the Court of Appeals under
Section 16 does not vest upon
the Executive a perpetual
authority to probe into a
person or organization’s
communications.

336. Section 19 of the Anti-Terrorism Act ensures that

judicial authorizations to wiretap a judicially declared,
designated, or suspected terrorist would not be abused, viz.:

SEC. 19. Effective Period of Judicial

Authorization. — Any authorization granted by
the Court of Appeals, pursuant to Section 17 of
this Act, shall only be effective for the length of
time specified in the written order of the
authorizing division of the Court of Appeals
which shall not exceed a period of sixty (60)
days from the date of receipt of the written
order by the applicant law enforcement agent or
military personnel.

The authorizing division of the Court of

Appeals may extend or renew the said
authorization to a non-extendible period, which
shall not exceed thirty (30) days from the
expiration of the original period: Provided, That
the issuing court is satisfied that such extension
or renewal is in the public interest: and
Provided, further. That the ex parte application
for extension or renewal, which must be filed by
the original applicant, has been duly authorized
in writing by the ATC.

In case of death of the original applicant

or in case he is physically disabled to file the
application for extension or renewal, the one
next in rank to the original applicant among the
members of the team named in the original
written order shall file the application for
extension or renewal; Provided, finally, That,
the applicant law enforcement agent or military
personnel shall have thirty (30) days after the
termination of the period granted by the Court

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of Appeals as provided in the preceding

paragraphs within which to file the appropriate
case before the Public Prosecutor’s Office for
any violation of this Act.

For purposes of this provision, the issuing

court shall require the applicant law
enforcement or military official to inform the
court, after the lapse of the 30-day period of the
fact that an appropriate case for violation of this
Act has been filed with the Public Prosecutor’s
Office.

337. Under the aforementioned Section, the judicial

authorization to wiretap is effective only for a period of sixty
days and a maximum of ninety days, after which the law
enforcement officer concerned must, within thirty days from
the expiration of the judicial authorization to wiretap, file the
appropriate case with the Public Prosecutor’s Office and make
a report to the Court of Appeals.

The Anti-Terrorism Act does

not prohibit making
surveillance data available to
the aggrieved party should he
or she be absolved of
suspicion.

338. The Anti-Terrorism Act does not prohibit making

surveillance data obtained by law enforcement officers or the
military personnel available to the suspected terrorist once he
or she is absolved of suspicion, or when the data was obtained
maliciously or without authority. In fact, Section 24 not only
makes unauthorized or malicious surveillance a crime
punishable by ten years’ imprisonment, it also categorically
provides that surveillance data acquired maliciously or
without authority should be made available to the aggrieved
party, viz.:

Sec. 24. Unauthorized or Malicious

Interceptions and/or Recordings. – Any law
enforcement agent or military personnel who
conducts surveillance activities without a valid
judicial authorization pursuant to Section 17 of

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this Act shall be guilty of this offense and shall

suffer the penalty of imprisonment of ten (10)
years. All information that have been
maliciously procured should be made available
to the aggrieved party.342

339. Furthermore, Section 15 mandates the filing of

administrative charges of grave misconduct and/or disloyalty
to the Republic and the people against a public officer found
guilty of any of the acts defined and punished under the Anti-
Terrorism Act, which includes Section 24:

SEC. 15. Penalty for Public Official. – If

the offender found guilty of any of the acts
defined and penalized under any of the
provisions of this Act is a public official or
employee, he/she shall be charged with the
administrative offense of grave
misconduct and/or disloyalty to the
Republic of the Philippines and the Filipino
people, and be meted with the penalty of
dismissal from the service, with the
accessory penalties of cancellation of civil
service eligibility, forfeiture of retirement
benefits and perpetual absolute
disqualification from running for any
elective office or holding any public
office.343

340. Moreover, Section 23 adds an additional layer of

protection, providing that surveillance data obtained in
violation of the Anti-Terrorism Act shall be inadmissible and
cannot be used as evidence against anybody:

Sec. 23. Evidentiary Value of Deposited

Materials. – Any listened to, intercepted, and
recorded communications, messages,
conversations, discussions, or spoken or written
words, or any part or parts thereof or any
information or fact contained therein, including
their existence, content, substance, purport,
effect, or meaning, which have been secured
in violation of the pertinent provisions of
this Act, shall be inadmissible and cannot

342
Emphasis supplied.
343
Emphasis supplied.

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be used as evidence against anybody in

any judicial, quasi-judicial, legislative, or
administrative investigation, inquiry,
proceeding, or hearing.344

341. Putting all these aside, it would appear that what

is left are but petitioners’ fears that the enforcement of the
law—Sections 16 and 17 in particular—would be prone to State
abuse.

342. Petitioners’ villainous depiction of law

enforcement is extremely unfair, factually baseless, and
devoid of legal moorings.

343. As already established, the Anti-Terrorism Act is

brimming with provisions that serve to prevent and dissuade
the perpetuation of abuse in its implementation. When these
are pit against the fear of potential abuse, petitioners’ fear
becomes trivial.

344. Thus, in light of the lowered expectation of privacy

that comes with theState’s constitutional duty to serve and
protect the people 345 and the protective measures in the law,
it is safe to conclude that Sections 16 and 17 of the Anti-
Terrorism Act do not transgress on the constitutional right to
privacy.

The Anti-Terrorism Act

does not violate the
constitutional freedoms of
speech, expression, of the
press, and of association,
the rights to peaceably
assemble and petition the
government for redress of
grievances.

345. Section 4, Article III of the Constitution provides:

344
Emphasis supplied.
345
Section 4, Article II of the Constitution provides, in no uncertain terms: “Section 4. The prime duty
of the Government is to serve and protect the people. …” (Emphasis supplied.)

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No law shall be passed abridging the

freedom of speech, of expression, or of the
press, or the right of the people peaceably to
assemble and petition the government for
redress of grievances.

346. Petitioners Calleja, et al, Zarate, et al., Lagman,

Monsod, et al. and Sanlakas claim that the Anti-Terrorism Act
is unconstitutional supposedly due to its vague and overbroad
definitions of acts constituting terrorism. 346 Petitioners Sta.
Maria, et al. meanwhile argue that Section 4 is utterly vague
on its face for failing to specify a standard in ascertaining the
acts penalized as terrorism. 347 Petitioners Monsod, et al.
likewise contends that Section 9 of the Anti-Terrorism Act is
unconstitutional because it directly stifles free speech.348

347. Petitioners’ claims are incorrect.

348. The Anti-Terrorism Act does not violate the

Constitutional freedoms of speech and expression, of the
press and of association, and the rights to peaceably
assemble and petition the government for redress of
grievances.

Section 4 regulates conduct

and not speech.

338. As previously discussed, terrorism seeks to

penalize conduct, not speech nor freedom of expression.

339. In the case of United States v. O'Brien,349 the U.S.

Supreme Court clearly made a distinction between speech and
conduct. It determined that “when a person's speech, directed
to another person or group of persons, is of a quality that is
likely to engender violent conduct, that communication,
346
Calleja Petition, par. 57. p. 32; Zarate Petition, pars. 64 and 70, pp. 24 and 26; Lagman Petition, par. 93,
p. 24.
347
Sta. Maria Petition, p. 29.
348
Monsod Petition, p. 15.
349
391 U.S. 367 (1968).

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though verbal, is not speech as a part of a dialogue.”350 Such

speech is more akin in nature to conduct, because it is more
likely to provoke conduct, than dialogue. 351 Therefore, it may
be restricted as fighting words without regard to the message
being communicated.352

340. Notably, the U.S. Supreme Court articulated a four-

prong test to determine whether the government regulation
was sufficiently important to justify the limitation on free
speech.353 The elements of the test are as follows: (a) the
conduct is such that it may be constitutionally regulated; (b)
the regulation furthers a substantial government interest; (c)
the government interest is unrelated to the suppression of
free speech; and (d) the limitations on speech are no greater
than what are essential to further the asserted government
interest.354

342. The Anti-Terrorism Act satisfies the foregoing tests.

343. For the first test, the acts constituting the elements
of the crime terrorism fall within the same class of crimes
already punished under the Revised Penal Code, such as
Grave Threats under Article 282, Inciting to War or Giving
Motives for Reprisal under Article 118, Proposal to Commit
Rebellion under Article 136, Inciting Rebellion or Insurrection
under Article 138, and Inciting to Sedition under Article 142.
Indeed, these are conducts that are already regulated. Hence,
the first element is present.

345. Section 4 of the same Act clearly defines and

delimits the crime of terrorism. Again, it likewise explicitly
states “the nature and context” of terrorism, i.e., those that
are committed for specific objectives, namely – “(a) to
intimidate, put in fear, force or induce the government or any
international organization, or the public to do or to abstain
from doing any act; (b) to seriously destabilize or destroy the

350
Aviva O. Wertheimer, The First Amendment Distinction Between Conduct and Content: A Conceptual
Framework for Understanding Fighting Words Jurisprudence, 63 Fordham L. Rev. 793 (1994), available
at https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3142&context=flr;The..
351
Id.
352
Id.
353
O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 377.
354
Id.

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fundamental political, economic or social structures of the

country, and (c) to create a public emergency or undermine
public safety”.

346. In Southern Hemisphere,355 this Honorable Court

ruled:

… What the law seeks to penalize is

conduct, not speech.

Before a charge for terrorism may be filed

under RA 9372, there must first be a predicate
crime actually committed to trigger the
operation of the key qualifying phrases in the
other elements of the crime, including the
coercion of the government to accede to an
“unlawful demand.” Given the presence of the
first element, any attempt at singling out or
highlighting the communicative component of
the prohibition cannot recategorize the
unprotected conduct into a protected speech.

347. In other words, the enumerated qualifying

objectives determine whether the criminal acts fall under the
realm of terrorism. In Lagman v. Medialdea,356 this Honorable
Court easily distinguished terrorism from the crime of
rebellion:

In determining what crime was

committed, we have to look into the main
objective of the malefactors. If it is political,
such as for the purpose of severing the
allegiance of Mindanao to the Philippine
Government to establish a wilayat therein, the
crime is rebellion. If, on the other hand, the
primary objective is to sow and create a
condition of widespread and extraordinary fear
and panic among the populace in order to
coerce the government to give in to an unlawful
demand, the crime is terrorism.

355
Supra.
356
G.R. Nos. 231658, 231771, and 231774, July 4, 2017.

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348. During the Senate deliberations,357 Senator Lacson

clearly pointed out that the law delimits what acts are
constitutive of terrorism:

Senator Drilon. Mr. President, the

definition of Terrorist Acts under pages 5, 6, and
7 of the measure would clearly define when it is
applicable to ordinary crimes, to act of
terrorism, or freedom fighters. In other words,
the difficulty in the definition of anti-terrorism is
that it is either an ordinary crime, an act of
terrorism, or acts committed by freedom
fighters. Would the good sponsor agree with
that?

Senator Lacson. It all depends on the

intent and the purpose of the act, Mr. President.

Senator Drilon. That is correct, Mr.

President. Yes, that is the purpose of the act,
and I agree with that. That is why by the
definition on page 7, from line 6 down, it is very
clear that when the purpose of such act, by its
nature or context, is to intimidate, put in fear,
force or induce the government or any
international organization, or the public to do
any act or abstain from doing any act, or
seriously destabilize, et cetera, et cetera. Now,
in the United States, the statute that defines
terrorism clearly indicates that it is the use of
violence or threat of violence in the pursuit of
political, religious, ideological, or social
objectives. Would that standard be applied also
to the proposed measure which would
distinguish it from an ordinary criminal?

Senator Lacson. That could qualify but

not necessarily, Mr. President, because we are
bound by the purpose of the act being
committed.

Senator Drilon. Well, precisely, in the

United States statute, the purpose is in pursuit
of political, religious, or ideological objectives.
Would this be the same purpose that would

357
Senate TSN dated January 21, 2020, pp. 15-18; Annex “3”.

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qualify the act as an act of terrorism under our

proposed measure?

Senator Lacson. We removed that

provision actually, Mr. President. We did not
apply. We are not applying the provision under
the US statute on the definition of Terrorist Acts.

Senator Drilon. So that we spread that

into the Record that the act of terrorism need
not be in pursuit of a political, religious,
ideological, or social objective.

Senator Lacson. That is correct, Mr.

President. And in lieu of that, we substituted the
purpose of the act by its nature and context. It
must be committed to: (1) intimidate, put in
fear, force or induce the government or any
international organization, or the public to do or
to abstain from doing any act; (2) seriously
destabilize or destroy the fundamental political,
economic or social structures of the country,
and (3) create a public emergency or undermine
public safety. So, we substituted what are
stated under the US statute.

Senator Drilon. There is an effort to

broaden the applicability; it need not be for
political, religious, ideological, or social
objectives. So, that need not be alleged in the
information and not proven in the course of the
trial that this is the purpose, is that correct?

Senator Lacson. That is correct, Mr.

President.

Senator Drilon. In fact, this definition is

more consistent with the pending convention in
the UN, the proposed Comprehensive
Convention on International Terrorism, which
does not indicate that political motivation is
essential.

Senator Lacson. Exactly, Mr. President.

Senator Drilon. Now, under the

proposed definition in the Comprehensive
Convention on International Terrorism, when
the purpose of the conduct by its nature or
context is to intimidate a population or compel
a government or international organization to

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do or abstain from doing any act, that is in

substance adopted in the proposed measure. Is
that correct?

Senator Lacson. That is correct, Mr.

President.

341. Anent the second and third tests, it cannot be

overemphasized that the Anti-Terrorism Act was enacted to
protect individuals from terrorist attacks. This stems from the
general duty of States to protect individuals under their
jurisdiction against interference in the enjoyment of human
rights. More specifically, this part of the Philippines’
obligations to ensure respect for the right to life and the right
to security. It is therefore a regulation of conduct to protect a
compelling state interest and is unrelated to the suppression
of free speech.

349. As for the fourth test, the Anti-Terrorism Act’s

limitations on speech are no greater than what are essential
to further the asserted government interest. Section 4(e) of
the Act expressly states that terrorism does not include
advocacy, protest, dissent, stoppage of work, industrial or
mass action, and other similar exercises of civil and political
rights, which are not intended to cause death or serious
physical harm to a person, to endanger a person life, or to
create a serious risk to public safety.

350. From foregoing, it is well established that the

definition of terrorism and its corresponding penal provisions
pass the O’brien tests.

350. To iterate, Section 4 clearly defined and delimited

the crime of terrorism. Hence, the Anti-Terrorism Act does not
abridge the constitutionally enshrined rights—the freedoms of
speech, expression, of the press, and of association, and the
right to peaceably assemble and petition the government for
redress of grievances.

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Sections 5, 9, 10, 25 and 26 of

the Anti-Terrorism Act pass
the clear and present danger
test.

351. Petitioners Calleja, et al. assail the

constitutionality of Sections 5, 9, 10, 25 and 26 for supposedly
failing the strict scrutiny test. They contend that there is no
compelling State interest to curtail and/or regulate protected
rights. Thus, they claim that “the fears these very sections try
to address are already being prevented and/or addressed by
the Revised Penal Code and special penal laws in the status
quo, while Constitutional rights are safeguard and
guaranteed.” 358

352. Petitioners are utterly mistaken.

353. The assailed provisions pass the clear and present

danger test.

354. The clear and present danger doctrine, first

formulated by Justice Holmes, accords protection for
utterances so that the printed or spoken words may not be
subject to prior restraint or subsequent punishment unless
their expression creates a clear and present danger of
bringing about a substantial evil which the government has
the power to prohibit.359 Under the doctrine, freedom of
speech and of press is susceptible of restriction when and only
when necessary to prevent grave and immediate danger to
interests which the government may lawfully protect. As it
were, said doctrine evolved in the context of prosecutions for
rebellion and other crimes involving the overthrow of
government. It was originally designed to determine the
latitude which should be given to speech that espouses anti-
government action, or to have serious and substantial
deleterious consequences on the security and public order of
the community.360

358
Calleja Petition, par. 84, p. 52.
359
See Soriano v. Laguardia, G.R. Nos. 164785 & 165636, April 29, 2009.
360
Soriano v. Laguardia, supra.

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355. In Eastern Broadcasting Corporation v. Dans,

361
Jr., this Honorable Court stated:

All forms of media, whether print or

broadcast, are entitled to the broad protection
of the freedom of speech and expression clause.
The test for limitations on freedom of expression
continues to be the clear and present danger
rule - that words are used in such circumstances
and are of such a nature as to create a clear and
present danger that they will bring about the
substantive evils that the lawmaker has a right
to prevent.

356. Such danger must not only be clear but must also
be present.362 There should be no doubt that what is feared
may be traced to the expression complained of.363

357. In Chavez v. Gonzales,364 this Honorable Court

held:

From the language of the specific

constitutional provision, it would appear that
the right to free speech and a free press is not
susceptible of any limitation. But the realities of
life in a complex society preclude a literal
interpretation of the provision prohibiting the
passage of a law that would abridge such
freedom. For freedom of expression is not
an absolute, nor is it an “unbridled license
that gives immunity for every possible use
of language and prevents the punishment
of those who abuse this freedom.

Thus, all speech are not treated the same.

Some types of speech may be subjected to
some regulation by the State under its
pervasive police power, in order that it may
not be injurious to the equal right of others
or those of the community or society. The
difference in treatment is expected because the

361
G.R. No. L-59329, July 19, 1985.
362
See Gonzales, et al. v. Katigbak, G.R. No. L-69500, July 22, 1985.
363
Ibid.
364
G.R. No. 168338, February 15, 2008.

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relevant interests of one type of speech, e.g.,

political speech, may vary from those of
another, e.g., obscene speech. Distinctions
have therefore been made in the treatment,
analysis, and evaluation of the permissible
scope of restrictions on various categories of
speech. We have ruled, for example, that in our
jurisdiction slander or libel, lewd and obscene
speech, as well as “fighting words” are not
entitled to constitutional protection and may be
penalized.365

358. While indeed Section 4, in defining terrorism listed

acts already punishable as regular crimes, it qualified such
acts to be committed for a specific purpose. As discussed
above, such purpose distinguishes terrorism from other
crimes. Given that terrorism is committed to either intimidate
the general public or segment, create an atmosphere or
spread a message of fear, provoke or influence by intimidation
the government or any international organization, seriously
destabilize or destroy the fundamental political, economic, or
social structures of the country, or create a public emergency
or seriously undermine public safety, it poses an existential
threat to the government and the security of the people.
Hence, it meets the clear and present danger test.

The Anti-Terrorism Act

does not violate the
freedom of religion and
belief.

359. The freedom of religion and belief is enshrined in

Section 5, Article III of the Constitution:

No law shall be made respecting an

establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof. The free exercise and enjoyment of
religious profession and worship, without
discrimination or preference, shall forever be allowed.
No religious test shall be required for the exercise of
civil or political rights.

365
Emphasis supplied.

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360. Petitioners Zarate, et. al assail Sections 16, 17,

366
18, 19, 20,367 and 22 of the Anti-Terrorism Act for allegedly
violating the constitutionally protected right to freedom of
religion and belief as revered in the above cited provision.
They anchor this battle on the supposed non-inclusion of
priest-penitent relationship from the itemized
communications in Section 16 which cannot be a subject of a
clandestine surveillance. This non-inclusion, according to
petitioners Zarate, et al. violates a person’s right to freedom
of religion and belief.368

361. Petitioners are mistaken.

366
SEC. 18. Classification, and Contents of the Order of the Court, - The written order granted by the
authorizing division of the Court of Appeals as well as the application for such order, shall be deemed and
are hereby declared as classified information. Being classified information, access to the said documents
and any information contained in the said documents shall be limited to the applicants, duly authorized
personnel of the ATC, the hearing justices, the clerk of court and duly authorized personnel of the hearing
or issuing court.

The written order of the authorizing division of the Court of Appeals shall specify the following:
(a) the identity, such as name and address, if known, of the person or persons whose communications,
messages, conversations, discussions, or spoken or written words are to be tracked down, tapped,
listened to, intercepted, and recorded; and, in the case of radio, electronic, or telephonic (whether
wireless or otherwise) communications, messages, conversations, discussions, or spoken or written
words, the electronic transmission systems or the telephone numbers to be tracked down, tapped,
listened to, intercepted, and recorded and their locations or if the person or persons suspected of
committing any of the crimes defined and penalized under the provisions of this Act are not fully
known, such person or persons shall be the subject of continuous surveillance;
(b) the identity of the law enforcement agent or military personnel, including the individual identity of
the members of his team, judicially authorized to undertake surveillance activities;
(c) the offense or offenses committed, or being committed, or sought to be prevented; and,
(d) the length of time within which the authorization shall be used or carried out.
367
SEC. 20. Custody of Intercepted- and Recorded Communications. - All tapes, discs, other storage devices,
recordings, notes, memoranda, summaries, excerpts and all copies thereof obtained under the judicial
authorization granted by the Court of Appeals shall, within forty-eight (48) hours after the expiration of
the period fixed in the written order or the extension or renewal granted thereafter, be deposited with the
issuing court in a sealed envelope or sealed package, as the case may be, and shall be accompanied by a
joint affidavit of the applicant law enforcement agent or military personnel and the members of his/her
team.

In case of death of the applicant or in case he/she is physically disabled to execute the required affidavit,
the one next in rank to the applicant among the members of the team named in the written order of the
authorizing division of the Court of Appeals shall execute with the members of the team
that required affidavit.

It shall be unlawful for any person, law enforcement agent or military personnel or any custodian of the
tapes, discs, other storage devices recordings, notes, memoranda, summaries, excerpts and all copies
thereof to remove, delete, expunge, incinerate, shred or destroy in any manner the items enumerated above
in whole or in part under any pretext whatsoever.
Any person who removes, deletes, expunges, incinerates, shreds or destroys the items enumerated above
shall suffer the penalty of imprisonment of ten (10) years.
368
Zarate Petition, p. 66.

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362. The Human Security Act, the progenitor of the

Anti-Terrorism Act, was also questioned on the ground that it
violated the privileged nature of priest-penitent relationships
through a petition for declaratory relief before the trial court.
When the case reached this Honorable Court, the petition for
declaratory relief was dismissed on the ground, among
others, that the issues raised were not ripe for adjudication,
viz:

As to the fifth requisite for an action for

declaratory relief, neither can it be inferred that the
controversy at hand is ripe for adjudication since the
possibility of abuse, based on the above-discussed
allegations in private respondents’ petition, remain
highly-speculative and merely theorized. It is
well-settled that a question is ripe for adjudication
when the act being challenged has had a direct
adverse effect on the individual challenging it. 369

363. Verily, the foregoing principle should likewise

apply here. Petitioners’ apprehension that Sections 16, 17, 18,
19, 20, and 22 will violate the sanctity of priest-penitent
relationship is highly-speculative and merely theorized and,
therefore, deserves scant consideration.

The Anti-Terrorism Act

does not violate the
constitutional freedom of
association.

364. Section 8, Article III of the Constitution states:

The right of the people, including those

employed in the public and private sectors, to
form unions, associations, or societies for
purposes not contrary to law shall not be
abridged.370

369
Republic vs. Roque, G.R. No. 204603, September 24, 2013; emphasis supplied.
370
Emphasis supplied.

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365. Petitioners’ assertion that Sections 10, 25, and 26

violate freedom of association is fallacious.

366. Again, the definition of terrorism does not include

advocacy, protest, dissent, stoppage in work, industrial or
mass action, and other similar exercise of civil and political
rights if their specific intent is not as mentioned in Section 4.

367. Section 10 reads:

Sec. 10. Recruitment to and Membership

in a Terrorist Organization. – Any person who
shall recruit another to participate in, join,
commit or support terrorism or a terrorist
individual or any terrorist organization,
association or group of persons proscribed
under Section 26 of this Act, or designated by
the United Nations Security Council as a
terrorist organization, or organized for the
purpose of engaging in terrorism, shall suffer
the penalty of life imprisonment without the
benefit of parole and the benefits of Republic Act
No. 10592.

The same penalty shall be imposed on any

person who organizes or facilitates the travel of
individuals to a state other than their state of
residence or nationality for the purpose of
recruitment which may be committed through
any of the following means:

(a) Recruiting another person to serve in any

capacity in or with an armed force in a foreign
state, whether the armed force forms part of the
armed forces of the government of that foreign
state or otherwise;
(b) Publishing an advertisement or propaganda for
the purpose of recruiting persons to serve in any
capacity in or with such an armed force;
(c) Publishing an advertisement or propaganda
containing any information relating to the place
at which or the manner in which persons may
make applications to serve or obtain information
relating to service in any capacity in or with such
armed force or relating to the manner in which
persons may travel to a foregoing state for the

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purpose of serving in any capacity in or with such

armed force; or
(d) Performing any other act with the intention of
facilitating or promoting the recruitment of
persons to serve in any capacity in or with such
armed force.

Any person who shall voluntarily and

knowingly join any organization,
association or group of persons knowing
that such organization, association or
group of persons is proscribed under
Section 26 of this Act, or designated by the
United Nations Security Council as a
terrorist organization, or organized for the
purpose of engaging in terrorism, shall
suffer the penalty of imprisonment of twelve
(12) years.371

368. Clearly, the acts being punished are: (a) recruiting

another to participate in, join, commit or support terrorism or
a terrorist or any terrorist organization, association or group
of persons proscribed under Section 26 of the Act, or
designated by the UNSC as a terrorist organization, or
organized for the purpose of engaging in terrorism; and (b)
organizes or facilitates the travel of individuals to a state other
than their state of residence or nationality for the purpose of
recruitment; and (c) voluntarily and knowingly joining any
organization, association or group of persons knowing that
such organization, association or group of persons is
proscribed under Section 26 of this Act, or designated by the
UNSC as a terrorist organization, or organized for the purpose
of engaging in terrorism.

369. Essentially, the law contemplated classification of

organizations. The first involves the organization proscribed
under Section 26 or designated by the UN as a terrorist
organization while the second involves the armed forces of a
foreign state. 372

370. As to the first classification, said organizations

are contrary to law, and associating with them is unlawful and
is thus prohibited.
371
Emphasis supplied.
372
Section 10, par. 1.

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371. As for the second one, it is evident that the

recruitment and membership in the armed forces of a foreign
state is, for all intents and purposes, outrightly criminal and
illegal. A citizen or subject owes, not a qualified and
temporary, but an absolute and permanent allegiance, which
consists in the obligation of fidelity and obedience to his
government or sovereign; and that this absolute and
permanent allegiance should not be confused with the
qualified and temporary allegiance which a foreigner owes to
the government or sovereign of the territory wherein he
resides, so long as he remains there, in return for the
protection he receives, and which consists in the obedience to
the laws of the government or sovereign. 373

372. The Constitution is very clear that while the

freedom to associate is a protected right, it is not absolute.
Hence, anyone is free to associate with any group,
organization, society or association, provided that the
purpose of such group, organization, society or association is
not contrary to law.

373. During the deliberation on HB No. 6875,374 one of

the proponent-authors, Rep. Biazon, cited an illustration:

(PO – Deputy Speaker Estrella)

REP. BROSAS. Mr. Speaker, Ginoong

Sponsor, kaya po natin tinututulan iyong
pagtanggal sa predicate crimes dahil po alam
naman natin na magagamit talaga ito sa mga
ordinaryong sirkumstansya at ordinaryong
mamamayan. Bahagi, sinabi po ninyo kaninam
bahagi ng definition ng “terrorism” iyong
“Engage in acts intended to cause extensive
interference with damage or destruction to
critical infrastructure” at kabilang sa critical
infrastructure ang transportation.

Kung halimbawa, Ginoong Speaker,

nagsagawa ng road blockades ang mga jeepney
drivers na ayaw pa ring pahintulutan ng

373
Anastacio Laurel v. Eriberto Misa, G.R. No. L-409, 30 January 1947.
374
Dated June 2, 2020, 6:35 pm, pp. 1-3; Annex “9Error! Reference source not found.”.

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gobyerno na pumasada kahit pa tatlong buwan

na silang walang kita sa ilalim ng community
quarantine, maitutring silang terorista sa batas
na ito. Tama ba, Mr. Sponsor, Ginoong
Speaker?

REP. BIAZON. Mali po. Hindi po

saklaw iyong pagkilos noon gating mga
jeepney drivers na magkaroon ng
blockades tungkol doon sa kanilang
kabuhayan. Masasakop po iyan doon sa
sinasabi nating “exclusion” na sinasabi
nga pong mayroong ibinibigay na leeway
para hindi isama ang protest, dissent,
stoppage of work, and mass action na ang
purpose ay mag-exercise ng civil and
political rights.

Hindi ho totoo o hindi tama na

sabihing ordinaryong mamamayan ay
nasasakop ng Anti-Terror Bill sapagkat
doon pa lamang po sa definition ng
“terrorism”, alam natin po na hindi
ordinaryong mamamayan ang tinutukoy ng
panukalang batas kung hindi iyong mga
tao na nais maghasik ng violence, ng
disorder doon po sa way of life or iyong
peaceful living ng lahat ng mga
mamamayan.

REP BIAZON. Mr. Speaker alam ninyo po

isa ako doon sa naging proponent ng Human
Security Act of 2007. Noong tinatalakay naming
iyong batas noong panahon na iyon, noong
panukalang batas pa siya, pareho rin po iyong
mga apprehensions na nanaririnig nating
ginagamit dito sa kasalukuyang tinatalakay
natin, iyong improvement ng Security Act,
similar apprehensions. But ano ho ang nakita
natin? Halos hindi nga ho nagamit iyong batas
dahil hindi naman po kasi ma-a-apply sa
ordinaryong mamamayan iyong definition na
inilalagay natin dito sa mga ipinapanukala
nating batas, Tulad po nito nga, hindi po natin
masasabing kasama sa sakop iyong jeepney
drivers na nag-blockade dahil gusto nilang i-
improve ang kabuhayan nila dahil wala naman
po silang ginagawang acts intended to cause
death, wala naman ho silang ginagawag

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acts intended to cause extensive damage

and destruction to government facilities.
So, mayroon hong nakalista na mga
requirements para pumasok ka at isaklaw na
magamit iyong batas na ito sa iyo. Kaya po,
again, isinasama natin iyong nakalagay
ditto exclusively na mga exclusions

…375

374. Another proponent-author Rep. Nograles,

iilustrated the limitation as follows:376

REP. CABATBAT. Thank you, Mr. Speaker.

Base sa narinig ko, mukhang wala yatang

magiging amendment, but I will still try my luck.
Mr. Speaker, Mr. Sponsor, kung nabalitaan
natin iyong mga nangyayari ngayon sa Amerika,
nagkakaroon ngayon ng riot, looting dahil sa
ginawang pagpatay kay George Floyd. At kung
maaalala din natin, noong bago magkaroon ng
COVID, si Archie Paray ay nang-hostage sa
Greenhills dahil sa mga hinaing niya sa kanyang
employer.

Ngayon sa parehong sitwasyon na ito, ang

paniniwala naming ay hindi terorismo iyong
mga pangyayaring iyon, kaya naman, Mr.
Speaker, Mr. Sponsor, I would like to (inaudible)
the following words in Section 4, to wit: MASS
ACTIONS, VIGILS, PROTESTS AND
SIMILAR MASS MOVEMENT THAT
SUDDENLY EVOLVED INTO RIOTS,
DISORDERLY ACTIONS, AND LOOTING
WITHTOUT PROOF THAT THE SAME WAS
PREMEDITATED OR THAT IT WAS
COORDINATED SHALL NOT BE
CONSIDERED AS ACTS OF TERRORISM.

SIMILARLY, ILLEGAL ACTS DUE TO

OUTBURST OF EMOTIONS OR ISOLATED ACTS
OF PEOPLE WHO GOES BERSERK DUE TO
POLITICAL FRUSTRATIONS, MEDICAL
CONDITIONS, OR OTHER PERSONAL MOTIVES
SHALL NOT BE CONSIDERED AS ACTS OF
TERRORISM, BUT SHOULD RATHER BE

375
Emphasis supplied.
376
HB No. 6875, House Deliberation dated June 2, 2020, 8:10 p.m., pp. 1-2; Annex “10”.

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CONSIDERED AS AILMENTS OF OUR SOCIETY

THAT NEED TO BE ADDRESSED THROUGH
REFORMS AND OTHER CONSTRUCTIVE
LEGISLATION TO ALLEVIATE THE CONDITION
OF OUR POOREST SECTORS.

Isa po ito sa aking mga amendments, Mr.

Speaker, Mr. Sponsor, and would the Sponsor
be amenable?

REP. NOGRALES (J.B.) Thank you Mr.

Speaker, I agree with the analysis of the
honorable – my fellow Party-List Congressman
Argel. However, we don’t need to amend it
for that implied – those actions are already
implied that they are not acts of terrorism.
So, we don’t see any necessity to amend the
current bill as it is.377

375. As held in Dennis v. United States,378 "the

formation … of such a highly organized conspiracy, with rigidly
disciplined members subject to call when the leaders … felt
that the time has come for action, … disposes of the
contention that a conspiracy to advocate, as distinguished
from the advocacy itself, cannot be constitutionally restrained
because it comprises only the preparation. It is the existence
of the conspiracy which creates the danger … If the
ingredients are present, we cannot bind the Government to
wait until the catalyst is added."

376. From the foregoing, it is clear that Section 10 does

not infringe the right to form association nor does it limit a
citizen’s exercise of civil and political rights. Again, what the
law curtails are those acts that are intended to cause death
or serious physical harm to a person, to endanger a person’s
life, or to create a serious risk to public safety.

377. As for Sections 25 and 26, the immediately

succeeding paragraphs will exhaustively discuss how these
provisions could not possibly contravene the freedom of
association, among others.

377
Emphasis supplied.
378
341 U.S. 494 (1951).

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Under the Anti-Terrorism

Act, the ATC’s powers,
duties and responsibilities
are purely executive in
nature. Hence, it does not
violate the separation of
powers.

378. Petitioners Calleja, et al. argue that Section 25 of

the Anti-Terrorism Act sanctions the usurpation by the
executive department of judicial authority to determine
probable cause for the issuance of an arrest warrant.
According to them, this specific provision gives the ATC the
sole discretion to determine who the terrorists are and what
acts constitute terrorism.379

379. Petitioners Calleja et al. further argue that the law

merely tags who are terrorists. They specifically quoted
Retired Justice Antonio T. Carpio, viz.:

How will the ATC makes such designation?

Is a hearing required where the individual or
organization is represented? The only
requirement under section 25 is “upon probable
cause” which means that the ATC must have
reasonable grounds to believe, based at least on
affidvaits of government witnesses, that the
individual or organization is engaged in
terrorism. However, probable cause does not
require a hearing where the individual or an
organization can be heard to rebut the
government witnesses. Thus under Section 25,
the ATC can make the designation ex parte,
without hearing the person or organization to be
designated as engaged in terrorism. 380

380. The above queries are misguided, if not downright

disingenuous.

381. Section 25 of the Anti-Terrorism Act states:

379
Calleja Petition, pp. 58-59.
380
Calleja Petition, p.50

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Pursuant to our obligations under the

United Nations Security Council Resolution
(UNSCR) No. 1373, the ATC shall automatically
adopt the United Nations Security Council
Consolidated List of designated individual,
group of persons, organizations, or associations
designated and/or identified as a terrorist, one
who finances terrorism, or a terrorist
organization or group.

Request for designation by other

jurisdictions or supranational jurisdictions may
be adopted by the ATC after determination that
the proposed designee meets the criteria for
designation of UNSCR No. 1373.

The ATC may designate an individual,

group of persons, organization, or association,
whether domestic or foreign, upon a finding of
probable cause that the individual, groups of
persons, organization, or association commit, or
attempt to commit, or conspire in the
commission of the acts defined and penalized
under Sections 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12 of
this Act.

The assets of the designated individual,

group of persons, organization or association
above-mentioned shall be subject to the
authority of the Anti-Money Laundering Council
(AMLC) to freeze pursuant to Section 11 of
Republic Act No. 10168.

The designation shall be without prejudice

to proscription of terrorist organizations,
associations, or group of persons under Section
26 of this Act.

382. Notably, there is nothing in the above-quoted

Section which confers authority on the ATC to determine
probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest.
Indubitably, the Act did not intend to constitute the ATC as a
judicial body.

383. In addition, two points must be emphasized here.

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384. First, probable cause is itself the legal standard

and quantum of evidence. 381 Probable cause is the existence
of such facts and circumstances as would excite the belief in
a reasonable mind, acting on the facts within the knowledge
of the prosecutor, that the person charged was guilty of the
crime for which he was prosecuted. The term neither means
“actual or positive cause” nor imports absolute certainty. It is
merely based on opinion and reasonable belief. Thus, a finding
of probable cause does not require an inquiry into whether
there is sufficient evidence to procure a conviction. It is
enough that it is believed that the act or omission complained
of constitutes the offense charged. 382

385. Second, it is common understanding in remedial

law that while on one hand, executive determination of
probable cause is for purposes of the filing of an information,
and on the other, judicial determination of probable cause is
for the issuance of a warrant of arrest, in both of these
instances, the evidence necessary to establish probable cause
is based only on the likelihood, or probability, of guilt 383 or, in
the case of Section 25, the probability that an individual or a
group commits, attempts to commit, or conspires in the
commission of acts of terrorism under Sections 4 to 12 of the
Anti-Terrorism Act. This will be further elucidated below.

The determination of probable

cause in designation is
consistent with international
practice and is grounded on
legal standards.

386. Under Section 25 of the Anti-Terrorism Act, there

are three ways to designate individuals, groups of persons, or
organizations: (a) by automatic adoption of the UNSC
Resolution; (b) through a request from other jurisdictions or

381
Lagman v. Medialdea, G.R. No. 231658, July 4, 2017. “[Probable cause] merely necessitates an “average
man [to weigh] the facts and circumstances without resorting to the calibration of the rules of evidence of
which he has no technical knowledge. xxx”” (Emphasis supplied.)
382
Estrada v. Ombudsman, G.R. Nos. 212140-41, January 21, 2015.
383
Ibid.

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supranational jurisdictions; and (c) through a determination

by the ATC.

387. It is readily apparent from the first two methods

that the ATC does not have sole control over the designation
of individuals, organizations, or groups of persons. For the
first method, the ATC has adopted the UNSC Consolidated
List,384 without need of an independent positive act on its part.
For the second method, the ATC is guided by the criteria found
in UNSC Resolution No. 1373. Reference of these two methods
to instruments emanating from the Security Council confirms
the state’s compliance with its international obligation,
particularly the International Convention for the Suppression
of the Financing of Terrorism, which the Philippines ratified.385

388. Indeed, designation is an accepted international

practice. There is nothing unusual in designating individuals,
groups of persons, organizations or associations as a terrorist
or financier. As a matter of fact, and as mentioned earlier,
there is already a UNSC Consolidated List to this effect. The
Philippines has never manifested its objection or reservation
to the basis and procedure for including certain individuals
and organizations in the list, a clear indication that it has duly
recognized the authority of an international body such as the
UNSC.

389. On an international scale, designation facilitates

the ATC’s smooth performance of another function – taking
action on relevant resolutions issued by the UNSC and on
foreign requests to designate terrorist individuals,
386
associations, organizations or groups of persons. Likewise,
it is a manifestation of how the ATC accomplishes its task of
ensuring compliance with international commitments to
counterterrorism-related protocols and bilateral and/or
multilateral agreements.387

384
https://scsanctions.un.org/fop/fop?xml=htdocs/resources/xml/en/consolidated.xml&xslt=htdocs/resources/xsl/e
n/consolidated.xsl, last accessed on 10 July 2020.
385
https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=IND&mtdsg_no=XVIII-11&chapter=18#EndDec, last
accessed on 10 July 2020.
386
Section 46(i), Anti-Terrorism Act.
387
Section 45, Anti-Terrorism Act.

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390. Contrary to petitioners’ claim, the ATC does not

have unfettered discretion, under Section 25 of the Anti-
Terrorism Act, to determine who the terrorists are and what
acts constitute terrorism. A careful reading of the provision
reveals that the ATC is guided by the standard of probable
cause. Again, under Philippine law, probable cause needs only
to rest on evidence showing that more likely than not, a crime
has been committed and was committed by the suspect.388

391. The standard of probable cause is further limited

by explicit reference to specific offenses in the Anti-Terrorism
Act. In other words, the determination of probable cause, for
the purpose of designation, is hinged on the commission,
attempt to commit, or conspiracy to commit nine acts,
namely: terrorism, threat to commit terrorism, planning,
training, preparing, and facilitating the commission of
terrorism, conspiracy to commit terrorism, proposal to
commit terrorism, inciting to commit terrorism, recruitment
to and membership in a terrorist organization, being a foreign
terrorist, and providing material support to terrorists.389

392. Accordingly, before the ATC designates an

individual, group of persons, organization, or association,
there must be a reasonable belief that one of the nine offenses
has been committed and that the subject committed the act.
Observance of this quantum of evidence ensures that the ATC
cannot designate on mere suspicion.

393. The scope of a “designated person”390 in the law’s

definition of terms validates the particularity of who or what
can be categorized as such. To note, the “designated person”
is limited to those identified by the UNSC, those included in
paragraph 3, Section 25 of the law, and, in addition, those
enumerated in Section 3(e)391 of R.A. No. 10168 or the
388
Estrada v. Office of the Ombudsman,supra..
389
Sections 2-12, Anti-Terrorism Act.
390
Section 3(b), Anti-Terrorism Act.
391
(1) any person or entity designated and/or identified as a terrorist, one who finances terrorism, or a terrorist
organization or group under the applicable United Nations Security Council Resolution or by another
jurisdiction or supranational jurisdiction; (2) any organization, association, or group of persons proscribed
pursuant to Section 17 of the Human Security Act of 2007; or (3) any person, organization, association, or
group of persons whose funds or property, based on probable cause are subject to seizure and sequestration
under Section 39 of the Human Security Act of 2007.

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Terrorism Financing Prevention and Suppression Act of 2012.

Therefore, in no way will designation cover a random
individual, organization, group of persons, or association.

394. Ultimately, the ATC’s designation follows a

statutory threshold. Guided by this quantum of evidence, the
ATC can proceed with the performance of its executive
function of implementing the law and developing mechanisms
to combat terrorism. This is the hallmark of separation of
powers, as embodied in the last paragraph392 of Section 45 of
the Anti-Terrorism Act.

There are three kinds of

designation under Section 25.

395. The three kinds of designation are: (a) by

automatic adoption of the UNSC Resolution; (b) request for
designation by other jurisdictions or supranational
jurisdictions; and (c) designation by the ATC.

396. For the first classification, upon release by the

UNSC of a designation list, the ATC shall adopt the list and
request the AMLC to freeze without delay the property or
funds of said designated person or entity in accordance with
Section 11 of R.A. No. 10168. This same provision is
incorporated under Section 36 393 of the Anti-Terrorism Act.
392
“Nothing herein shall be interpreted to empower the ATC to exercise any judicial or quasi-judicial power
or authority.”
393
SEC. 36. Authority to Freeze. - Upon the issuance by the court of a preliminary order of proscription or
in case of designation under Section 25 of this Act, the AMLC, either upon its own initiative or request of
the ATC, is hereby authorized to issue an ex parte order to freeze without delay:
(a) any property or funds that are in any way related to financing of terrorism as defined and penalized under
Republic Act No. 10168, or violation of Sections 4, 6, 7, 10, 11 or 12 of this Act; and
(b) property or funds of any person or persons in relation to whom there is probable cause to believe that such
person or persons are committing or attempting or conspiring to commit, or participating in or facilitating
the financing of the aforementioned sections of this Act.

The freeze order shall be effective for a period not exceeding twenty (20) days. Upon a petition filed by
the AMLC before the expiration of the period, the effectivity of the freeze order may be extended up to a
period not exceeding six(б) months upon order of the Court of Appeals: Provided, That, the twenty-day
period shall be tolled upon filing of a petition to extend the effectivity of the freeze order.

Notwithstanding the preceding paragraphs, the AMLC, consistent with the Philippines’ international
obligations, shall be authorized to issue a freeze order with respect to property or funds of a designated
organization, association, group or any individual to comply with binding terrorism-related resolutions,
including UNSCR No. 1373 pursuant to Article 41 of the charter of the UN. Said freeze order shall be
effective until the basis for the issuance thereof shall have been lifted. During the effectivity of the freeze

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397. Again, designation under this system is the

country’s compliance with its international obligations. This is
a necessary consequence of our adherence to the principle of
pacta sunt servanda codified under Article 26 of the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties394 and embodied in in
Section 2, Article II of the Constitutionwhich provides that the
Philippines “adopts the generally accepted principles of
international law as part of the law of the land and adheres to
the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation,
and amity with all nations.” Thus, in Landbank v. Atlanta
Industries,395 this Honorable Court said:

[T]he Government of the Philippines is therefore

obligated to observe its terms and conditions
under the rule of pacta sunt servanda, a
fundamental maxim of international law
that requires the parties to keep their
agreement in good faith. It bears pointing out
that the pacta sunt servanda rule has
become part of the law of the land through
the incorporation clause found under
Section 2, Article II of the 1987 Philippine
Constitution, which states that the Philippines
"adopts the generally accepted principles of
international law as part of the law of the land
and adheres to the policy of peace, equality,
justice, freedom, cooperation, and amity with all
nations."

order, an aggrieved party may, within twenty (20) days from issuance, file with the Court of Appeals a
petition to determine the basis of the freeze order according to the principle of effective judicial protection:
Provided, That the person whose property or funds have been frozen may withdraw such sums as the
AMLC determines to be reasonably needed for monthly family needs and sustenance including the
services of counsel and the family medical needs of such person.

However, if the property or funds subject of the freeze order under the immediately preceding paragraph
are found to be in any way related to financing of terrorism as defined and penalized under Republic Act
No. 10168, or any violation of Sections 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11 or 12 of this Act committed within the
jurisdiction of the Philippines, said property or funds shall be the subject of civil forfeiture proceedings as
provided under Republic Act No. 10168.

394
United Nations, Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 23 May 1969, United Nations, Treaty Series, vol.
1155, p. 331, available at: https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetailsIII.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXIII-
1&chapter=23&Temp=mtdsg3&clang=_en [accessed July 15, 2020].

395
G.R. No. 193796, 02 July 2014.

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398. Indeed, designation under this system allows the

Philippines to comply with its obligations under UNSC
Resolution No. 1373 and the FATF Recommendations.

399. UNSC Resolution No. 1373, a counter-terrorism

measure passed in the wake of the September 11, 2001
terrorist attacks on the United States of America,396
designates and/or identifies individuals, groups of persons,
organizations, associations as terrorists, one who finances
terrorism, or a terrorist organization or group.

400. UNSC Resolution No. 1373 directs memberStates,

such as the Philippines, to “prohibit their nationals from
making funds, financial services, or economic resources
available to those who commit terrorist acts”, among others.

401. The success of a terrorist enterprise is based on

its ability to sanitize and conceal its finances. This allows
terrorists to operate freely, using their financial gains to
expand their criminal pursuits and can have devastating
economic and social consequences for countries, especially
those in the process of development and those with fragile
financial systems. The economy, society, and ultimately the
security of countries used as terrorist financing platforms are
all therefore imperiled. Thus, every means should be exerted
to uncover the financial network of terrorists and undermine
the flow of their funds, with the end goal of preventing and
suppressing the further commission of terrorist acts.

402. Moreover, the designation of terrorist individuals,

groups of persons, organizations, or associations, that is,
Section 25 of the Anti-Terrorism Act, is considered as one of
the non-negotiables as per the Philippines’ Mutual Evaluation
findings.397
396
United Nations, Security Council unanimously adopts wide-ranging anti-terrorism resolution; calls for
suppressing financing, improving international cooperation,
https://web.archive.org/web/20011003002542/https://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2001/sc7158.doc.htm
/, last accessed on July 11, 2020.
397
The Mutual Evaluation (ME) is an assessment of a country’s levels of (1) technical compliance with
international anti-money laundering/counter-terrorism financing (AML/CTF) standards; and (2)
effectiveness of the country’s existing AML/CTF mechanisms. The ME is one of the Philippines’
commitments pursuant to the Terms of Reference of the Asia Pacific Group (APG) on Money
Laundering. According to APG rules, members mutually evaluate their peers to assess compliance with

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403. To be exact, in 2019, the Philippines underwent its

Mutual Evaluation where it was rated as only partially
compliant of the FATF’s Recommendation 6.398 Thus, it cannot
be over-emphasized that the Philippines needs to amend its
legal frameworks: (a) to be able to take ex parte action
against persons or entities proposed UNSC Resolution No.
1373 for designation; (b) to introduce the preliminary asset
preservation orders; to allow individuals to be designated as
terrorists under Section 17 of the Human Security Act; and (c)
to allow for an evidentiary standard of “reasonable
grounds/basis” for proposing designations under UNSC
Resolution No. 1267 and deciding whether or not to make a
designation under UNSC Resolution No. 1373.

404. Highlighting on this premise, should the

Philippines fail to enact the necessary laws and demonstrate
effective implementation of the same, it will be grey-listed.
The FATF shall then publicly identify the Philippines as a high-
risk jurisdiction with strategic AML/CTF deficiencies. Grey-
listing will have a negative impact on the reputation of the
economy and the cost of doing business with its citizens, both
as individuals and through juridical entities.

405. Some of the adverse effects of grey-listing are:

(a) The European Union (EU) will require its

members to immediately impose
enhanced due diligence (EDD) on Filipino
nationals and businesses that are
transacting through EU channels.

(b) Subjecting an individual or entity to

Enhanced Due Diligence (EDD) will entail
additional costs and additional paperwork
or justification.

(c) Additional costs and paper work could

push banks and financial institutions to

international AML/CTF standards, particularly the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) Forty
Recommendations
398
Recommendation 6 - Targeted financial sanctions related to terrorism and terrorist financing. See The
Philippines’ Measures to Combat Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing, October 2019.
http://www.fatf-gafi.org/publications/mutualevaluations/documents/mer-philippines-2019.html.

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do a cost-benefit analysis in determining

whether or not to continue doing
business. If costs outweigh the benefits,
it could result to de-risking or de-
banking.

(d) If the relationship is continued, these

additional costs will naturally be charged
to Filipino nationals and businesses in the
form of higher interest rates or higher
processing fees.

(e) Additional paperwork and justifications

likewise mean delays in processing
transactions.

406. With these additional cost of transactions, the

OFW remittances will have higher costs entailing additional
expenses and less money for living and educations expenses
for the family.

407. For Philippine financial institutions (FIs), the

possible effects may include:

(a) Prohibiting FIs from establishing

subsidiaries or branches or
representative offices, or otherwise
taking into account the fact that the FI is
from a co u n try that does not have
adequate AML/CTF systems;

(b) Prohibiting FIs from relying on third

parties located in the listed country to
conduct elements of the Customer Due
Diligence (CDD) process;

(c) Requiring FIs to review and amend, or, if

necessary, terminate correspondent
relationships with FIs in the country
concerned;

(d) Requiring increased supervisory

examination and/or external audit
requirements for branches and
subsidiaries of FIs based in the listed
country; and

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(e) Requiring increased external audit

requirements for financial groups with
respect to any of their branches and
subsidiaries located in the listed country.

408. Certainly, grey-listing would have an effect on

international trade, remittances, and humanitarian financial
flows that support economic growth and development.
Sections 24 and 25 of the Anti-Terrorism Act serve as a lifeline
to the continued strength of the Philippine financial system.

409. For the second type of designation, the ATC, upon

receipt of the request to designate, shall determine if the
proposed designee meets the criteria for designation under
UNSC Resolution No. 1373.

410. The third kind of designation is the determination

made by the ATC. Pursuant to Section 25, the ATC shall
designate an individual, groups of persons, organization, or
association, whether domestic or foreign, upon finding of
probable cause that the individual, groups of persons,
organization, or association commits or attempt to commit,
or conspires to commit terrorism. It is worthy to mention that
these acts fall within the designation criteria provided under
UNSC Resolution No. 1373.

411. Verily, designation is a preventive measure

intended to trigger the issuance of a freeze order and the
conduct of a bank inquiry. The freeze order is intended to
prevent designated terrorists from accessing funds that may
be used to carry out a terrorist attack. A bank inquiry allows
an investigation into the behavior of the account and
determine potential links. Designation will enable the
Philippines to comply with its obligations under UNSC
Resolution 1373, which among others, requires the provision
of targeted financial sanctions to prevent terrorism financing.

412. The freezing of assets contemplated in the Anti-

Terrorism Act is in reference to pertinent provisions of theR.A.
No. 10168. Section 11 thereof provides:

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SEC. 11. Authority to Freeze. – The AMLC, either

upon its own initiative or at the request of the
ATC, is hereby authorized to issue an ex parte
order to freeze without delay: (a) property or
funds that are in any way related to financing of
terrorism or acts of terrorism; or (b) property or
funds of any person, group of persons, terrorist
organization, or association, in relation to whom
there is probable cause to believe that they are
committing or attempting or conspiring to
commit, or participating in or facilitating the
commission of financing of terrorism or acts of
terrorism as defined herein.

413. To emphasize, the ATC’s designation of terrorists

merely serves as a preventive measure intended to trigger
the issuance of the “freeze order” and a “bank inquiry” by the
AMLC to prevent designated terrorists from accessing funds
or assets that can be used to carry out a terrorist attack.

414. Also, pursuant to the provisions of R.A. No.

10168, an aggrieved party is not left without recourse in the
wake of an order to freeze assets. During the effectivity of
the freeze order, an aggrieved party may, within twenty days
from issuance, file with the Court of Appeals a petition to
determine the basis of the freeze order according to the
principle of effective judicial protection. 399 In addition, partial
withdrawal of the frozen funds/assets may be allowed for
humanitarian reasons as well as for reasonable family needs
and sustenance of the designated person.

415. To recapitulate, in the first two instances, the

ATC’s act of designation finds its ground in the Philippines’
responsibilities as a UN member-State. In the third, no vagary
exists in what petitioners Calleja, et al. and Sta. Maria, et al.
perceive as a “failure” to afford potential designees the right
to be heard. In fact, the provision is clear that designation is
as intrusive to due process rights in the same way as getting
placed on the immigration watchlist.

399
Section 11 of the TFPSA.

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Designation is an executive
function.

416. Designation is essentially an executive function.

It involves the faithful enforcement of the Anti-Terrorism Act.

417. The enforcement of the law against terrorism

entails a determination of facts constituting an infraction.
Once the factual background has been ascertained based on
probable cause, the ATC can utilize the tools within its disposal
to prevent the proliferation of terrorist acts.

418. Further, as mentioned above, designation serves the

function of triggering and facilitating the issuance of a freeze
order to prevent the designees from accessing funds. Also,
designation allows the ATC to authorize the conduct of
surveillance of identified individuals, group of persons, or
organizations, pursuant to Section 16 of the Act.

419. To allay the fear of petitioners Monsod, et al., 400

mere designation does not automatically result in the freezing
of assets. The determination of the propriety of freezing
assets is within the authority of the AMLC, with the
intervention of the Court of Appeals. 401 Hence, the appropriate
sanctions will be ascertained and imposed by a government
entity other than the AMLC. This confirms the lack of penal
sanctions which may be imposed by the ATC under the law.
More importantly, this validates the fact that no judicial power
has been granted to the ATC.

420. Hence, the position of petitioners Monsod, et al. is

based on a wrong premise that under the Anti-Terrorism Act,
the ATC has been authorized to impose penal sanctions,
effectively assuming functions reserved for the judiciary.

421. Indeed, the issuance of freeze orders and the

conduct of surveillance operations help the ATC in fulfilling its
400
Monsod Petition, pp. 21-22.
401
Section 11, R.A. No. 10168.

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mandate to implement the Act and to “assume the

responsibility for the proper and effective implementation of
the policies of the country against terrorism.”402 These
preventive measures become possible through the ATC’s
performance of executive function of designation.

422. Clearly, designation is strictly an act of law

enforcement and implementation, which is purely an
executive function.403

423. Contrary to petitioner Calleja’s plaint, the ATC’s

discretion to designate is not like nor equal to the judicial
function of determination of probable cause for the issuance
of a warrant of arrest. In fact, the Anti-Terrorism Act
categorically states that the duties of the ATC should not be
construed to be an exercise of judicial or quasi-judicial
function.404 This definitely confirms the nature of the ATC as
an entity under the executive department, possessing the
duty of implementing the law. 405

424. Furthermore, designation is likewise an

administrative function of the ATC. Administrative functions
pertain to the regulation and control over the conduct of
individuals.406They also involve the promulgation of rules to
carry out the policy of the legislature, 407 which, in this case,
is to “protect life, liberty, and property from terrorism.”408 An
administrative function does not entail an opportunity to be
heard. Neither does it require the production and weighing of
evidence, and the corresponding resolution of issues. 409

425. Based on the above-mentioned scope of an

administrative function, designation connotes regulating the
conduct of individuals and groups involved in terrorist acts. It
402
Section 45, Anti-Terrorism Act.
403
City Engineer of Baguio, et al. v. Baniqued, G.R. No. 150270, November 26, 2008.
404
Section 45, Anti-Terrorism Act.
405
See Meralco vs. Energy Regulatory Board, G.R. No. 145399, March 17, 2006.
406
In Re: Designation of Judge Rodolfo U. Manzano as Member of the Ilocos Norte Provincial Committee
on Justice, A.M. No. 88-7-1861-RTC, 5 October 1988; citing Nasipit Stevedoring Services, Inc. v. Tapucar,
SP-07599-R, 29 September 1978, and Blacks Law Dictionary.
407
Ibid.
408
Section 2, Anti-Terrorism Act.
409
Villarosa vs. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 133927, November 29, 1999; citing the Concurring
Opinion of J. Antonio in University of Nueva Carceres, et. al. v. Martinez, et. al., G.R. No. L-31152, March
27, 1974.

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is a means towards achieving the policy of securing lives and

ensuring the safety of the people from terrorism. As a matter
of fact, and to validate its performance of an administrative
function, the ATC does not conduct a hearing and does not
resolve an issue before designation.

426. Correlatively, an examination of the specific

functions of the ATC is in order. Designation is a realization of
the ATC’s duty to “establish and maintain comprehensive
database information systems on terrorism, terrorist
activities, and counterterrorism operations”.410 Additionally,
designation is a mechanism for the ATC to “establish and
maintain coordination with and the cooperation and
assistance of other states, jurisdictions, international entities
and organizations in preventing and combating international
terrorism.”411

427. Moreover, the ATC has technical expertise

especially in the context of the assailed designation. The ATC
consists of the Executive Secretary, the National Security
Adviser, Secretary of Foreign Affairs, the Secretary of National
Defense, the Secretary of Interior and Local Government, the
Secretary of Finance, the Secretary of Justice, the Secretary
of Information and Communications Technology, and the
Executive Director of the Anti-Money Laundering Council
Secretariat.412 Without question, these are key officials of vital
government agencies. Prior to their membership in the ATC,
these government agencies are in-charge of delivering
essential services to the people. These include national
security, international relations, peace and order, prosecution
for crimes, and information technology.

428. These fields of governance cover matters that are

very much pertinent to combatting terrorism. Courts will not
interfere in matters within the sound discretion and special
technical knowledge of government agencies.413

410
Section 46(e), Anti-Terrorism Act.
411
Section 46(h), Anti-Terrorism Act.
412
Section 45, Anti-Terrorism Act.
413
Energy Regulatory Board vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 113079, April 20, 2001.

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429. Indeed, the foregoing confirms that designation is

an executive and administrative function geared towards the
effective implementation of the law. Consequently, it does not
amount to usurpation of judicial power.

Designation, being an
administrative process under
the Anti-Terrorism Council, is
distinct from proscription,
which is a judicial function of
the Court of Appeals.

430. Designation under Section 25 and proscription

under Section 26 are different in definition and application.

431. Section 26 of the Anti-Terrorism Act provides:

SEC. 26. Proscription of Terrorist

Organizations, Association, or Group of Persons.
– Any group of persons, organization, or
association, which commits any of the acts
defined and penalized under Sections 4, 5, 6, 7,
8, 9, 10, 11 and 12 of this Act, or organized for
the purpose of engaging in terrorism shall, upon
application of the DOJ before the authorizing
division of the Court of Appeals with due notice
and opportunity to be heard given to the group
of persons, organization or association, be
declared as a terrorist and outlawed group of
persons, organization or association, by the said
Court.

The application shall be filed with an

urgent prayer for the issuance of a preliminary
order of proscription. No application for
proscription shall be filed without the authority
of the ATC upon the recommendation of the
National Intelligence Coordinating Agency
(NICA).

432. As a corollary to Section 26, Section 27 provides

for the procedure for the issuance by the Court of Appeals of
a preliminary order of proscription. It reads:
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SEC. 27. Preliminary Order of Proscription.

- Where the Court has determined that probable
cause exists on the basis of the verified
application which is sufficient in form and
substance, that the issuance of an order of
proscription is necessary to prevent the
commission of terrorism, he/she shall, within
seventy-two (72) hours from the filing of the
application, issue a preliminary order of
proscription declaring that the respondent is a
terrorist and an outlawed organization or
association within the meaning of Section 26 of
this Act.

The court shall immediately commence

and conduct continuous hearings, which should
be completed within six (6) months from the
time the application has been filed, to determine
whether:
(a) The preliminary order of proscription
should be made permanent;
(b) A permanent order of proscription should
be issued in case no preliminary order was
issued; or
(c) A preliminary order of proscription should
be lifted.

It shall be the burden of the applicant to

prove that the respondent is a terrorist and an
outlawed organization or association within the
meaning of Section 26 of this Act before the
court issues an order of proscription whether
preliminary or permanent.

The permanent order of proscription

herein granted shall be published in a
newspaper of general circulation. It shall be
valid for a period of three (3) years after which,
a review of such order shall be made and if
circumstances warrant the same shall be lifted.

433. Again, it is imperative to stress that designation

under Section 25 is an executive and administrative function
of designating a person, group, or association as a terrorist.
Designation is not judicial in nature, the process and outcome
of which does not amount to indictment or conviction and will
not necessarily lead to proscription under Section 26.

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434. Proscription, on the other hand, entails a judicial

process and remains a province of the court. 414 In filing a
petition, the court is requested to declare as terrorists or
outlawed organization or association individuals or groups
which commit terrorism or are organized for the purpose of
committing terrorism, after giving them due notice and
opportunity to be heard.

435. An application for proscription cannot be filed

without an authority from the ATC. In addition, before the
grant of authority by the ATC, there must be a corresponding
recommendation from the National Intelligence Coordinating
Agency (NICA).415

436. Furthermore, the last paragraph of Section 25 of

the Act sets forth a clear distinction between the two. It says
that “the designation shall be without prejudice to the
proscription of terrorist organizations, associations or groups
of persons under Section 26 of this Act.” However, lest it may
be understood, it bears stressing that designation will not
automatically result to proscription.

437. From the foregoing, it is readily apparent that

designation is an executive function of the ATC. It cannot be
confused with the performance of judicial functions, such as
proscription or issuance of a warrant of arrest. Consequently,
Section 25 of the Anti-Terrorism Act does not contravene the
principle of separation of powers.

Proscription is a judicial
process.

438. As previously discussed, proscription is a judicial

process, embodied in Section 26 of the Anti-Terrorism Act.

415
Section 26, R.A. No. 11479.

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439. Proscription is a judicial process duly recognized

under the Human Security Act. Section 17 of the said Act
spells out the process of proscription, thusly:

SEC. 17. Proscription of Terrorist

Organizations, Association, or Group of
Persons. — Any organization, association, or
group of persons organized for the purpose of
engaging in terrorism, or which, although not
organized for that purpose, actually uses the
acts to terrorize mentioned in this Act or to
sow and create a condition of widespread and
extraordinary fear and panic among the
populace in order to coerce the government to
give in to an unlawful demand shall, upon
application of the Department of Justice
before a competent Regional Trial Court, with
due notice and opportunity to be heard given
to the organization, association, or group of
persons concerned, be declared as a terrorist
and outlawed organization, association, or
group of persons by the said Regional Trial
Court.

440. There are three manifest differences between the

Anti-Terrorism Act’s and the Human Security Act’s versions of
proscription, as follows: (a) the definition of terrorism upon
which proscription is based; (b) the court of jurisdiction; and
(c) and the requirement that an application for proscription
must be filed with the authority of the ATC upon the
recommendation of the NICA.

441. As laid out in Section 26 of the Anti-Terrorism Act,

proscription must now be filed before the Court of Appeals
and not just the Regional Trial Court. In addition, the DOJ can
no longer apply for an application for proscription absent
authority of the ATC upon recommendation of the NICA. These
changes establish multiple layers of checks and balances to
avoid the indiscriminate application for proscription against
organizations, associations, or groups of persons.

442. The proscription of a group of persons, an

organization, or an association, which commits any of the acts
of terrorism is a central feature in legal regimes aimed at the

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suppression of terrorism. Without such feature, a State is at

the mercy of terrorists and terrorist organizations who are
insulated from suit absent an actual commission of a terrorist
act. By the time the legal framework comes into play, lives
have already been lost, properties destroyed and national
security compromised.

Section 29 provides for

measures against persons
validly arrested and not a
license to arrest any person
based on mere suspicion.

443. Save for petitioners Sanlakas, et al. and CTUHR, et

al., petitioners unanimously contend that Section 29 violates
the right to due process insofar as it supposedly allows the
ATC to authorize warrantless arrest upon mere suspicion. 416
Petitioners maintain that this is contrary to the Constitution
and to the prevailing jurisprudence requiring finding of
“probable cause”—as opposed to mere suspicion—before
conduct of arrest.

444. Petitioners’ arguments are misguided.

445. Related to the exercise of judicial power, as quoted

in the previous section, is the protection of the right of the
people against unreasonable searches and seizures, viz.

The right of the people to be secure in

their persons, houses, papers, and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures of
whatever nature and for any purpose shall be
inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of
arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to
be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce,
and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the persons or things to be
seized.417

416
Calleja Petition, pp. 22-23; Sta. Maria Petition, pp. 47-49; Zarate Petition, pp. 69-70; Lagman Petition, p.
49.
417
Article III, Section 2, 1987 Philippine Constitution.

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446. Meanwhile, the questioned Section 29 of the Anti-

Terrorism Act reads:

The provisions of Article 125 of the

Revised Penal Code to the contrary
notwithstanding, any law enforcement agent or
military personnel, who, having, been duly
authorized in writing by the ATC has taken
custody of a person suspected of committing
any of the acts defined and penalized under
Sections 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12 of this
Act, shall, without incurring any criminal liability
for delay in the delivery of detained persons to
the proper judicial authorities, deliver said
suspected person to the proper judicial
authority within a period of fourteen (14)
calendar days counted from the moment the
said suspected person has been apprehended or
arrested, detained, and taken into custody by
the law enforcement agent or military
personnel. The period of detention may be
extended to a maximum period of ten (10)
calendar days if its is established that (1)
further detention of the person/s is necessary to
preserve evidence related to terrorism or
complete the investigation; (2) further
detention of the person/s is necessary to
prevent the commission of another terrorism;
and (3) the investigation is being conducted
properly and without delay.

Immediately after taking custody of a

person suspected of committing terrorism or
any member of a group of persons, organization
or association proscribed under Section 26
hereof, the law enforcement agent or military
personnel shall notify in writing the judge of the
court nearest the place of apprehension or
arrest of the following facts: (a) the time, date,
and manner of arrest; (b) the location or
locations of the detained suspect/s and (c) the
physical and mental condition of the detained
suspects. The law enforcement agents or
military personnel shall likewise furnish the ATC
and the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) of
the written notice given to the judge.

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The head of the detaining facility shall

ensure that the detained suspect is informed of
his/her rights as a detainee and shall ensure
access to the detainee by his/her counsel or
agencies and entities authorized by law to
exercise visitorial powers over detention
facilities.

The penalty of imprisonment of ten (10)

years shall be imposed upon the police or law
enforcement agency or military personnel who
fails to notify any judge as provided in the
preceding paragraph.

447. It is apparent at once that petitioners reached a

similar conclusion based on a literal and truncated reading of
the law. Petitioners concluded that the law abrogated
“probable cause” as threshold and supplanted it with
“suspicion” just because Section 29 uses the latter instead of
the former. Petitioners Sta. Maria, et al.’s exposition best
exemplifies this truncated reading of the law that is behind
petitioners’ arguments. They opine:

The use of the term “suspected” in

relation to committing terroristic acts as the
determining factor for the ATC to direct the law
enforcement agents of the PNP and the military
personnel of the AFP to arrest and detain
persons in VERY CLEAR. Also, the term
“suspected” is used in three distinct provisions
of the Anti-Terrorism Act (Sections 29, 30 and
32) which clearly shows that the legislators’ use
of the word is deliberate and intentional.

Moreover, Section 30 (Rights of a Person

Under Custodial Detention) refers to a person
“charged with or suspected,” clearly indicating
that there are two situations that are involved
in the law. (i) One involves being “charged,”
which may involve being charged via a criminal
information that is based on a finding of
probable cause; and (ii) the other involves being
merely “suspected” where no probable cause is
involved.

In the interpretation of statutes, words

shall be used in their ordinary signification
unless the law itself provides for another import

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or meaning. A cardinal rule in statutory

construction is that when the law is clear and
free from any doubt or ambiguity, there is no
room for construction or interpretation. There is
only room for application. As Section 29’s use of
“suspected” is clear, plain, and free from
ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning
and applied without attempted interpretation.
This is what is known as the plain-meaning rule
or verba legis.

The Merriam-Webster Dictionary defines

“suspicion” as the “act or an instance of
suspecting something wrong without proof or
on slight evidence” The word “suspected”
does not even rise to the level of probable
cause; “suspected” can even proceed from mere
hearsay evidence.418

448. The rule on verba legis notwithstanding, it is an

even paramount rule in statutory construction that every part
of a statute must be read and interpreted with reference to
its context. As this Honorable Court pronounced in Philippine
International Trading Corporation vs. Commission on Audit:419

It is a rule in statutory construction that

every part of the statute must be interpreted
with reference to the context, i.e., that every
part of the statute must be considered together
with the other parts, and kept subservient to the
general intent of the whole enactment. Because
the law must not be read in truncated parts, its
provisions must be read in relation to the whole
law. The statute’s clauses and phrases must
not, consequently, be taken as detached and
isolated expressions, but the whole and every
part thereof must be considered in fixing the
meaning of any of its parts in order to produce
a harmonious whole. Consistent with the
fundamentals of statutory construction, all the
words in the statute must be taken into
consideration in order to ascertain its meaning.

418
Sta. Maria Petition, pp. 47-48.
419
Supra.

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449. Indeed, when read as a whole, there is nothing in

the Anti-Terrorism Act that abrogates the threshold of
probable cause.

450. What becomes readily apparent from a closer

reading of the following provisions is that the phrases
“charged with” and “suspected of” are used as antithesis—a
direct converse—of each other such that a person “suspected
of” is one who is simply not yet been “charged with” for
violation of the Anti-Terrorism Act before a court.

451. Indeed, a warrantless arrest of a person who has

not been charged before a court is in fact sanctioned by law.
Under Section 5, Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Court,
warrantless arrest is allowed under the following instances:

(a) When, in his presence, the person to

be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an
offense;

(b) When an offense has just been

committed, and he has probable cause to
believe based on personal knowledge of facts or
circumstances that the person to be arrested
has committed it; and

(c) When the person to be arrested is a

prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final
judgment or is temporarily confined while his
case is pending, or has escaped while being
transferred from one confinement to another.

452. Under the Anti-Terrorism Act, the person arrested

and detained after a warrantless arrest is suspected of
committing the crime of terrorism. This is to differentiate him
from the person who, after a preliminary investation, is
charged with the crime of terrorism. This interrelation
between a suspect and a charged person (or accused) is also
seen in the Philippine Act on Crimes Against International

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Humanitarian Law, Genocide and other Crimes Against

Humanity.420 Section 17, Chapter VII of which provides:

CHAPTER VII
JURISDICTION

Section 17. Jurisdiction.- The State shall

exercise jurisdiction over persons, whether
military or civilian, suspected or accused of a
crime defined and penalized in this Act,
regardless of where the crime is committed,
provided, any one of the following conditions is
met:

(a) The accused is a Filipino

citizen;
(b) The accused, regardless of
citizenship or residence, is present in
the Philippines; or
(c) The accused has committed the
said crime against a Filipino citizen.

453. This Honorable Court also has, in its Decisions,

equated a suspect with a detained person but not yet charged
with a crime. For example, in People v. Muleta421 this
Honorable Court enumerated the rights of a suspect during
custodial investigation:

An extra-judicial confession extracted in

violation of constitutionally enshrined rights is
inadmissible in evidence. During custodial
investigation, suspects have the rights,
among others, (1) to remain silent, (2) to have
an independent and competent counsel, (3) to
be provided with such counsel, if unable to
secure one, (4) to be assisted by one in case of
waiver, which should be in writing, of the
foregoing; and (5) to be informed of all such
rights and of the fact that anything he says can
and will be used against him.

420
R.A. No. 9851.
421
People v. Muleta, G.R. No. 130189, June 25, 1999; emphasis supplied.

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454. More pointedly, in Remegio v. People,422 this

Honorable Court described a person arrested without a
warrant under the parameters of Section 5, Rule 113 as a
suspect, thus:

A lawful arrest may be effected with or

without a warrant. With respect to the latter, the
parameters of Section 5, Rule 113 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure should - as
a general rule - be complied with:

The aforementioned provision identifies

three (3) instances when warrantless arrests
may be lawfully effected. These are: (a) an
arrest of a suspect in flagrante delicto; (b) an
arrest of a suspect where, based on personal
knowledge of the arresting officer, there is
probable cause that said suspect was the
perpetrator of a crime which had just been
committed; and (c) an arrest of a prisoner who
has escaped from custody serving final
judgment or temporarily confined during the
pendency of his case or has escaped while being
transferred from one confinement to another.

455. Contrary to petitioners’ interpretation, therefore,

the use of “suspected” in Section 29 does not at all signify an
abandonment of probable cause as threshold in warrantless
arrest under Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of
Court. Neither does Section 29 seek to carve out a new
exception to the rules governing valid warrantless arrests.
Instead, consistent with the context of the entire law, the
provision must be construed to contemplate warrantless
arrest under the circumstances mentioned in Section 5(b),
Rule 113 of the same Rules like in Remegio v. People.423

422
G.R. No. 227038, July 31, 2017.
423
Supra.

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The fourteen-day detention

period under Section 29 of the
of the Anti-Terrorism Act is
neither arbitrary nor
unjustified.

456. Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution states:

Section 18. […] During the suspension of

the privilege of the writ, any person thus
arrested or detained shall be judicially charged
within three days, otherwise he shall be
released.424

457. Except for petitioner Sanlakas, et al., petitioners

next contend that the fourteen days of detention sanctioned
under Section 29 of the Act is not only arbitrary and
unreasonable but also unconstitutional. 425 Petitioner Lagman
perhaps best captures the gist of the argument. He opines:

Since a person cannot be detained beyond

three days even if the privilege of the writ of
Habeas Corpus is suspended, the more reason
that no one can be detained beyond three days
at any other time, and, especially if, the writ is
not suspended. No law can provide what the
Constitution prohibits. 426

458. Once again, the argument is misguided.

459. It escapes respondents how Section 18, Article VII

of the Constitution finds application in this case. Precisely,
Section 29 does not contemplate an extraordinary situation
where the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus has been
suspended. Otherwise, and in such case, the three-day rule
in Section 18 of Article VII would certainly apply.

424
Emphasis supplied.
425
Monsod Petition, pp. 21-22; Jurado Petition, pp. 16-17; CTUHR Petition, pp. 47-49; Calleja Petition, pp.
35-39; Sta. Maria Petition, pp. 53-55; Zarate Petition, pp. 71-74; Lagman Petition, pp. 41-16.
426
Lagman Petition, p. 72.

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460. Quite apparent too, petitioners fail to point to any

other provision in the Constitution setting a limit on the
duration of detention in situations other than that
contemplated in Section 18, Article VII. That is because there
is none. Contrary to petitioner Lagman’s position, there is
nothing in the Constitution that prohibits a period of detention
longer than three days. What the law does not prohibit, it
allows.427

461. Furthermore, as can be gleaned from the

discussions during the deliberations of the Senate, the
fourteen-day detention period which may be extended for ten
more days, is far from arbitrary:

Senator Hontiveros. Thank you, Mr.

President.

I would like to proceed now to Section 23

of the bill which amends Section 27 and
increases the period of detention from three
days to 14 days. What is the rationale, Mr.
President, for increasing the period of detention
from three days to 14 days? So, from half week
to two weeks. In the worst case scenarios, is it
so that subjects might possibly be subjected to
14 days of enhanced investigation or
interrogation until they crack?

Senator Lacson. Mr. President, in his

cosponsorship speech, Sen. Ronald dela Rosa
shared with the members of this Body his first-
hand experience in Davao City. The 36-hour
reglementary period is not enough to build up a
case against the suspected terrorist.

With the permission of the lady senator,

let us hear directly from Senator Dela Rosa what
he experienced; and it created more damage
when he was not able to file or make the inquest
proceedings on the arrested suspects.

Senator Dela Rosa. Thank you, and [sic]

Mr. President.

427
In the Matter of the Adoption of Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia, G.R. No. 148311, March 31, 2005.

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Based on my personal experience, indeed,

the spirit of this bill is to secure the state and
protect our people from terrorism by giving
more teeth to our law enforcement in its anti-
terror campaign. Then, I think we should extend
the reglementary period from the maximum 36
hours to what is being peened in this bill.
Because as per my experience, ISIS terrorist
Muhammad Reza, which I presented during my
cosponsorship speech, I was able to arrest him
in Davao City, but I had to release him before
36 hours because I do not have enough
evidence to hold him further or beyond 36
hours. But I was fully convinced and the
intelligence committee was fully convinced and
they were forcing me, they were pleading before
me not to release this guy because he was very
dangerous. But I told them that I cannot do
otherwise; I cannot break the law. So, I had to
release him. But months later, Mr. President,
the intelligence committee showed me the video
from YouTube the three of them, including
Mohammad Reza were holding the head of the
European victim and slashing the throat of the
victim. So, from being local black flag terrorist
here in the Philippines, in Lanao del Sur, he
travelled to Raqqa, Iraq and became an ISIS
member. So, he was able to slash a lot more
throats of ISIS victims in Iraq and Syria. If there
was a law allowing me to hold him beyond 36
hours, then many more lives could have been
saved.

Senator Hontiveros. The current Human

Security Act already provides not just 36 hours,
but 72 hours—doble po—or three days. Ang
tinatanong ko lamang ay hindi ba sapat na iyong
tatlong araw, doble sa panahon na mayroon?
Kailangan pa ba talagang dagdadan hanggang
dalawang lingo? In fact, should not the case
built up before arrest? Noong naaresto sa wakas
iyong Mohammad Reza and definitely, persons
like him should be arrested and subjected to our
laws, bago pa siya inaresto, hindi po ba
nabigyan ng ebidensya ang good gentleman
from Davao ng intelligence community? Ano po
iyong evidence na mayroon that prompted the
good gentleman to make the arrest in the first
place? It must have been substantive enough.

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Senator Dela Rosa. For the information

of the good lady from Panay, ibang-iba po iyong
intelligence reports from investigative reports.
Intelligence reports have no evidentiary value
but they are classified as A1, meaning, coming
from the direct source and from first-hand
information. Iba po iyon. Alam natin na iyan na
iyan talaga, but legally, it cannot stand in court.
So iyan po ang dilemma ngayon ng law
enforcers…428

462. This exchange between Senators Dela Rosa and

Hontiveros shows that the increase in detention period from
three days under the Human Security Act to fourteen days
under the Anti-Terrorism Act is intended to address the need
of law enforcement agencies for adequate time to obtain
sufficient evidence that will hold against judicial scrutiny. The
fourteen-day period, therefore, is a policy decision reached
after considering the unique nature of terrorism. It needs
emphasis at this point that terrorism is not just an ordinary
crime. The UNSC itself declared that “terrorism in all forms
and manifestations constitutes one of the most serious
threats to international peace and security and that any acts
of terrorism are criminal and unjustifiable regardless of their
motivation…”429

463. As Senator Lacson explained during the Senate

deliberations, terrorism is such a serious threat to
international peace and security that even our neighboring
countries provide for a much longer period of detention:

Senator Lacson. … On top of what

Senator Dela Rosa has shared with us, during
the committee hearings, the members of the
law enforcement agencies shared with us their
experience na kulang talaga iyong three days
and they need, more or less, 14 days. That is
the reason why we incorporated in this
measuring iyong reglementary period na 14
days.

We are just trying to be at par with other

ASEA neighbors or ASEA countries—Sri Lanka,

428
TSN dated January 22, 2020, pp. 28-30; Annex “4”.
429
United Nations Security Council Resolution No. 2178 (2014), p. 1.

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14 days; Australia, 14 days; Bangladesh, 15

days; Indonesia, 21 days; Pakistan, 30 days,
Malaysia, 59 days; and Singapore, 730 days. Ito
yung reglementary periods…430

464. Equally important, Section 29 431 of the same Act

provides for safeguards against possible abuse, most
significantly through judicial intervention.

465. Given that the imposition of the fourteen-day

detention period is already subject to judicial intervention, it
follows that even the ten-day extension is subject to the same
judicial process. In fact, this intent can be gleaned from the
following exchange between Senators Drilon and Lacson
during the Senate deliberations:

Senator Drilon. Now, in the previous

answer of the good sponsor, he says that he is
amenable to 14 calendar days provided that an
application for an extension can be provided.

Senator Lacson. That is correct, Mr.

President.

Senator Drilon. That should be before

the court.

Senator Lacson. Before the court, Mr.

President

Senator Drilon. Not just the Anti-

Terrorism Council.

Senator Lacson. No, Mr. President.

Senator Drilon. In other words, it must

be a judicial process.

430
TSN dated January 22, 2020, p. 31; Annex “4”.
431
Immediately after taking custody of a person suspected of committing terrorism or any member of a group
of persons, organization or association proscribed under Section 26 thereof, the law enforcement agent or
military personnel shall notify in writing the judge of the court nearest the place of apprehension or arrest
of the following facts: (a) the time, date, and manner of arrest; (b) the location or locations of the detained
suspect/s and (c) the physical and mental condition of the detained suspect/s. The law enforcement agent
or military personnel shall likewise furnish the ATC and the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) of the
written notice given to the judge.

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Senator Lacson. It should be by the

court, Mr. President.432

466. Section 29, therefore, strikes the balance between

the need to strengthen counter-terrorism measures whilst
protecting the fundamental rights of a suspect from potential
abuse.

Section 29 of the Anti-

Terrorism Act does not
authorize the ATC to issue
warrants of arrest.

467. In all petitions, petitioners equate the written

authority issued by the ATC under Section 29 of the Anti-
Terrorism Act to a warrant of arrest.

468. They are gravely mistaken.

469. The Anti-Terrorism Act does not encroach on the

exclusive judicial function to issue warrants of arrest on the
basis of probable cause.

470. Again, Section 45 of the Act is clear when it says

that “(n)othing herein shall be interpreted to empower the
ATC to exercise any judicial or quasi- judicial power or
authority.” Indeed, the ATC cannot exercise functions
exclusively reserved for the judiciary.

471. Senator Lacson expressed the intent of this

provision in a letter to the National President of the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines. 433 He unequivocally explained that the
written authority mentioned in Section 29 is not meant to
expand the existing rules on arrest found in Rule 113, Section
5 of the Revised Rules of Court.

472. In the first place, nothing in the law allows the ATC
to issue an order of arrest. The issuance of a warrant of arrest
432
TSN dated February 3, 2020, p. 40; Annex “7”.
433
Senator Panfilo Lacson’s letter to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines dated June 15, 2020.

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remains to be a judicial process. The written authority issued

by the ATC should not be equated to a judicial warrant. The
said authorization is a law enforcement tool that enables the
arresting officer to detain a person who is arrested without a
judicial warrant for a period of fourteen days without incurring
any criminal liablity for arbitrary detention under Article 125
of the Revised Penal Code.

473. Verily, Section 29 is intended to be read in

conjunction with the current rules on warrantless arrest.
Currently, there are three grounds that will justify a
warrantless arrest. As explained earlier, these situations are
enumerated in Section 5, of Rule 113.

474. The first kind of warrantless arrest sanctioned by

Section 5, Rule 113 is known as an in flagrante delicto arrest.
For this warrantless arrest to maintain its constitutionality, the
arresting office or person must pass the overt-act test by
proving concurrence with two essential elements to wit: (a)
the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating
that he [or she] has just committed, is actually committing,
or is attempting to commit a crime; and (b) such overt act is
done in the presence or within the view of the arresting
officer.434

475. The second kind of warrantless arrest is known as

a hot pursuit arrest. The rule requires that an offense has just
been committed. It connotes “immediacy in point of time.” It
is important to note that when a crime was in fact committed,
it does not automatically bring the case under this rule. An
arrest under Section 5(b) of Rule 113, entails a time element
from the moment the crime is committed up to the point of
arrest. For a hot pursuit arrest to be appreciated, the arresting
officer or person must have personal knowledge of the
circumstances indicating that the person sought to be
arrested committed the crime. 435

476. Law enforcers need not personally witness the

commission of a crime. However, they must have personal
434
Veridiano vs. People, G.R. No. 200370, June 7, 2017.
435
Ibid.

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knowledge of facts and circumstances indicating that the

person sought to be arrested committed it. 436

477. Thus, for an arrest to be effected under the Anti-

Terrorism Act, only two scenarios are contemplated: (a) the
person suspected to be a terrorist must have executed an
overt act indicating that he or she has just committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit the crime of
terrorism and that such overt act is done in the presence or
within the view of the arresting officer; or (b) that an act of
terrorism has, in fact, just been committed and the arresting
officer has personal knowledge of that fact of the crime of
terrorism as well as circumstances indicating that the person
sought to be arrested committed the crime.

478. Additionally, Section 29 mandates that notice be

sent immediately to the nearest judge, the ATC and the
Commission on Human Rights (CHR). It particularly states
that “the law enforcement agent or military personnel shall
notify in writing the judge of the court nearest the place of
apprehension or arrest of the following facts: (a) the time,
date, and manner of arrest; (b) the location or locations of
the detained suspect/s and (c) the physical and mental
condition of the detained suspect/s. The law enforcement
agent or military personnel shall likewise furnish the ATC and
the CHR of the written notice given to the judge.”

479. This requirement safeguards the rights and

physical being of the arrested person since it is an official
acknowledgment from the government that it has custody of
the person suspected of committing a crime under the Anti-
Terrorism Act, thereby preventing the suspect or detainee
from being detained for a period longer than what the law
allows. To ensure compliance, Section 29 437 thereof imposes
a penalty for failure to notify any judge of an arrest under this
law.

480. So too, petitioner Jurado argues that Section 29

of the authorizes the ATC, through the law enforcement
436
Ibid.
437
The penalty of imprisonment of ten (10) years shall be imposed upon the police or law enforcement agent
or military personnel who fails to notify any judge as provided in the preceding paragraph.

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agents, to waive the rights of the accused under Article 125 of

the Revised Penal Code, as amended. He opines:

In the guise of supposedly amending

Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, Section
29 of R.A. No. 11479 vests upon the ATC the
authority to allow the law enforcement
operatives to effectively disregard Article 125 of
the Revised Penal Code, without the express
consent of the person who actually “owns”
the right - the detainee. Thus, first paragraph
of Section 29 R.A. No. 11479 provides: …438

481. Additionally, petitioner Jurado insists that the

written authority by the ATC in favor of law enforcement
agents, as referred to in Section 29, likewise authorizes said
agents to waive the rights of an accused under Article 125 of
the Revised Penal Code.

482. This is far from the truth.

483. For emphasis, Article 125 of the Revised Penal

Code, in relation to Section 7, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules
of Court, states:

(Revised Penal Code)

ART. 125. Delay in the delivery of

detained persons to the proper judicial
authorities. - The penalties provided in the next
preceding article shall be imposed upon the
public officer or employee who shall detain any
person for some legal ground and shall fail to
deliver such person to the proper judicial
authorities within the period of; twelve (12)
hours, for crimes or offenses punishable by light
penalties, or their equivalent; eighteen (18)
hours, for crimes or offenses punishable by
correctional penalties, or their equivalent and
thirty-six (36) hours, for crimes, or offenses
punishable by afflictive or capital penalties, or
their equivalent.

438
Jurado Petition, p. 43.

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In every case, the person detained

shall be informed of the cause of his
detention and shall be allowed, upon his
request, to communicate and confer at any
time with his attorney or counsel.

(Revised Rules of Court)

Section 7. When accused lawfully arrested

without warrant. - When a person is lawfully
arrested without a warrant involving an offense
which requires a preliminary investigation, the
complaint or information may be filed by a
prosecutor without need of such investigation
provided an inquest has been conducted in
accordance with existing rules. In the absence
or unavailability of an inquest prosecutor, the
complaint may be filed by the offended party or
a peace officer directly with the proper court on
the basis of the affidavit of the offended party
or arresting officer or person.

Before the complaint or information is

filed, the person arrested may ask for a
preliminary investigation in accordance
with this Rule, but he must sign a waiver of
the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended, in the presence of
his counsel. Notwithstanding the waiver, he
may apply for bail and the investigation must be
terminated within fifteen (15) days from its
inception.

After the filing of the complaint or

information in court without a preliminary
investigation, the accused may, within five days
from the time he learns of its filing, ask for a
preliminary investigation with the same right to
adduce evidence in his defense as provided in
this Rule. 439

484. Most pertinently, there is nothing in Section 29, or

anywhere in the Anti-Terrorism Act for that matter, which
provides that the written authority referred therein shall
likewise contain a waiver of a suspect’s rights under Article
125 of the Revised Penal Code much less authorize said law
enforcement agents to execute such waiver. Very simply, as

439
Emphasis supplied.

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Section 29 states, the written authority only allows the law

enforcement agents to detain the arrested person for fourteen
days subject to the conditions stated in the same provision.

485. Second, under Section 29, even when a person is

detained for fourteen days, the rights of the detainee remains
intact. Nothing in the law removes the detainee’s right to sign
a waiver of the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal
Code. In other words, the implementation of Section 7 of Rule
112 of the Rules of Court is not altered. The Anti-Terrorism Act
simply extends the number of days within which he may sign
the waiver.

486. Illustratively, when a person is arrested under this

law, he may, at any time within fourteen days, sign a waiver
of the provisions of Article 125 with the assistance of his
counsel or attorney. By doing so, he may ask that a
preliminary investigation be conducted instead of an inquest
proceeding. Contrary to what petitioner Jurado’s claim, the
right to ask for the waiver is maintained even with this law.

487. In fact, the law ensures that the rights of a

detainee are respected. The third paragraph of Section 29
provides:

The head of the detaining facility shall

ensure that the detained suspect is informed of
his/her rights as a detainee and shall ensure
access to the detainee by his/her counsel or
agencies and entities authorized by law to
exercise visitorial powers over detention
facilities.

488. Notably, these are the very same rights also

mentioned in Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code. Equally
important, under the last paragraph of Section 29, the failure
on the part of the law enforcement agent to notify the judge
in accordance with Section 29 shall merit imprisonment of ten
years.

489. In fine, there is no violation of the principle of

separation of powers as the ATC was never authorized, in the

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first place, to issue a warrant of arrest. Given the foregoing,

Section 29 of the Act is constitutional.

The Anti-Terrorism Act

recognizes the
constitutional right to bail
and does not alter any rules
on the grant thereof.

490. Section 13 of Article III of the Constitution

provides:

Section 13. All persons, except those

charged with offenses punishable by reclusion
perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall,
before conviction, be bailable by sufficient
sureties, or be released on recognizance as may
be provided by law. The right to bail shall not be
impaired even when the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall
not be required.

491. As defined in Rule 114, Section 1 of the Revised

Rules of Court, bail is the security required and given for the
release of a person who is in the custody of the law, that he
will appear before any court in which his or her appearance
may be required as stipulated in the bail bond or
recognizance.440 Its object is to relieve the accused of
imprisonment and the state of the burden of keeping him/her,
pending the trial, and at the same time, to put the accused as
much under the power of the court as if he/she were in
custody of the proper officer, and to secure the appearance of
the accused so as to answer the call of the court and do what
the law may require of him. 441

492. Furthermore, Section 4 of Rule 114 of the same

Rules states that “all persons in custody shall be admitted to
bail as a matter of right, with sufficient sureties, or released
on recognize as prescribed by law or this Rule (a) before or
after conviction by the Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial

440
Supra.
441
6 Am. Jur. [Rev. Ed.], Bailment, S6.

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Court, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, or Municipal Circuit Trial

Court, and (b) before conviction by the Regional Trial Court of
an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life
imprisonment.”

493. The general rule is that any person, before being

convicted of any criminal offense, shall be bailable, unless he
is charged with a capital offense, or with an offense
punishable with reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, and
the evidence of his guilt is strong. Hence, from the moment
he is placed under arrest, or is detained or restrained by the
officers of the law, he can claim the guarantee of his
provisional liberty under the Bill of Rights, and he retains his
right to bail unless he is charged with a capital offense, or
with an offense punishable with reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment, and the evidence of his guilt is strong. Once it
has been established that the evidence of guilt is strong, no
right to bail shall be recognized.442

494. As a result, bail is a matter of right prior to

conviction by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) for any offense
not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life
imprisonment, or even prior to conviction for an offense
punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment
when evidence of guilt is not strong.443

495. Petitioners Zarate, et al. and CTUHR, et al., submit

that Section 34 of the Anti-Terrorism Act impairs the
constitutional right to bail.444

496. Petitioners are wrong.

497. The Anti-Terrorism Act reinforces the right of an

accused to apply for and granted bail, when it is considered
as a matter of right under our Rules.

442
Enrile v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 213847, August 18, 2015; citing Government of the United States of
America v. Purganan, G.R. No. 148571, September 24, 2002.
443
Enrile v. Sandiganbayan, supra..
444
Zarate Petition, par. 248; CTUHR Petition, par. 7.11.

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498. Section 34 thereof states in clear and irrefutable

terms:

Sec. 34. Restriction on the Right to

Travel.—…

In cases where evidence of guilt is not

strong, and the person charged is entitled to
bail and is granted the same, the court, upon
application by the prosecutor, shall limit the
right of travel of the accused to within the
municipality or city where he/she resides or
where the case is pending, in the interest of
national security and public safety, consistent
with Article III, Section 6 of the Constitution.
The court shall immediately furnish the DOJ and
the Bureau of Immigration (BI) with the copy of
said order. Travel outside of said municipality or
city, without the authorization of the court, shall
be deemed a violation of the terms and
conditions of his/her bail, which shall be
forfeited as provided under the Rules of
Court.445

499. Relevantly, the following are the crimes punished

under the Anti-Terrorism Act and their corresponding
penalties:

Legal Crime Imposable

Provision Penalty

Section 4 Terrorism Life Imprisonment

Section 5 Threat to Commit 12 years of
Terrorism imprisonment
Section 6 Planning, Training, Life Imprisonment
Preparing and Facilitating
the Commission of
Terrorism
Section 7 Conspiracy to Commit Life Imprisonment
Terrorism
Section 8 Proposal to Commit 12 years of
Terrorism imprisonment
Section 9 Inciting to Commit 12 years of
Terrorism imprisonment

445
Emphasis supplied.

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Section 10 Recruitment to and Life Imprisonment

Membership in a Terrorist or 12 years of
Organization imprisonment
Section 11 Foreign Terrorist Life Imprisonment
Section 12 Providing Material Support As a principal
to Terrorists

500. Thus, those who are charged under Sections 5, 8,

9 and 10 of the Anti-Terrorism Act, where the imposable
penalty is twelve years of imprisonment, may still apply for
and may be granted bail in accordance with the Revised Rules
of Court, prior to their conviction.

501. On the other hand, those who are criminally

charged for violation of Sections 4, 5, 6, 10, 11 and 12, where
the imposable penalty is life imprisonment and where the
evidence of guilt is not strong, are also not effectively
precluded under the assailed law to apply for bail.
Nevertheless, it must be remembered that since these
individuals are charged for a capital offense, then the
accused’s prayer for bail is subject to the discretion of the trial
court.446

502. Evidently, petitioners’ contention that the Anti-

Terrorism Act impairs an accused’s right to bail is devoid of
any merit. An accused, under the above-mentioned
circumstances, may still seek temporary liberty by applying
for bail.

503. Petitioners Zarate, et al. and CTUHR, et al. also

staunchly maintain that the house arrest and restriction of an
accused’s right to communicate is an arbitrary, unreasonable
and unjustified restriction on the right to bail. Additionally,
they argue that such restriction may be considered as a
detention similar to secret detention places and solitary
incommunicado which are prohibited under our
447
Constitution.

504. Petitioners are patently mistaken.

446
People v. Escobar, G.R. No. 214300, July 26, 2017.
447
Zarate Petition, par. 258; CTUHR Petition, par. 7.15.

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505. First, it must be remembered that these

restrictions were merely lifted from the Human Security Act
which was not found by this Honorable Court to be
unconstitutional from the time of its passage until its repeal.

506. Second, the placing of an accused or even a

convict on house arrest is legally permissible. Under the
Revised Penal Code, one who is convicted for a crime
punishable by the penalty or arresto menor may serve his or
her sentence at his or place of residence under the
surveillance of an office of the law. 448 Thus, when an accused
is placed under house arrest, the same is done pursuant to an
order lawfully issued by the court. In stark contrast, detention
in secret places and solitary incommunicado are outlawed
under our Constitution and R.A. No. 9745, otherwise known
as the Anti-Torture Act of 2009, as these are done covertly to
subject an individual to mental or psychological torture with
impunity.

507. Third, the ban on the use of telephones,

cellphones, e-mails and other similar communications by the
accused with people outside his or her residence may be lifted
upon his application and by virtue of an order from the court.
Otherwise stated, an accused is not barred from proving to
the satisfaction of the court the necessity and reasonableness
of communication with a person outside his or her residence.

508. From the foregoing, there can be no other

conclusion than the Anti-Terrorism Act neither impairs the
constitutional right to bail nor does it alter the prevailing rules
in the grant thereof.

The Anti-Terrorism Act

imposes a valid restriction
on the the right to travel of
an accused.

509. Section 6, Article III of the Constitution provides:

448
Section 88, Revised Penal Code.

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Sec. 6. The liberty of abode and of

changing the same within the limits prescribed
by law shall not be impaired except upon lawful
order of the court. Neither shall the right to
travel be impaired except in the interest of
national security, public safety, or public
health, as may be provided by law.449

510. Petitioners Zarate, et al. likewise question the

imposition of a limit on the right to travel of an accused who
is released on bail to within the municipality or city where he
or she resides or where the case is pending. 450

511. The question, however, does not merit the

attention of this Honorable Court.

512. The right to travel is not absolute. There are

constitutional, statutory and inherent limitations regulating
the right to travel. Our Constitution provides that the right to
travel may be impaired only in the interest of national security,
public safety or public health, as may be provided by law.451
In Silverio vs. Court of Appeals, this Honorable Court
elucidated, thus:

Article III, Section 6 of the 1987

Constitution should be interpreted to mean that
while the liberty of travel may be impaired even
without Court Order, the appropriate executive
officers or administrative authorities are not
armed with arbitrary discretion to impose
limitations. They can impose limits only on the
basis of “national security, public safety, or
public health” and “as may be provided by law,”
a limitive phrase which did not appear in the
1973 text (The Constitution, Bernas, Joaquin
G.,S.J., Vol. I, First Edition, 1987, p. 263).
Apparently, the phraseology in the 1987
Constitution was a reaction to the ban on
international travel imposed under the previous
regime when there was a Travel Processing

449
Emphasis supplied.
450
Zarate Petition, par. 253.
451
Genuino v. De Lima, G.R. No. 197930, April 17, 2018.

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Center, which issued certificates of eligibility to

travel upon application of an interested party.

513. In the assailed law, it cannot be denied that the

purpose for curtailing the right to travel of an accused is for
national security and public safety. As opined by Justice
Antonio T. Carpio in Genuino v. De Lima,452 “the phrases
‘national security’ and ‘public safety,’ which recur in the text
of the Constitution as grounds for the exercise of powers or
curtailment of rights, are intentionally broad to allow
interpretative flexibility, but circumscribed at the same time
to prevent limitless application. At their core, these concepts
embrace acts undermining the State’s existence or public
security. At their fringes, they cover acts disrupting individual
or communal tranquility. Either way, violence or potential of
violence features prominently.”

514. Undeniably, acts of terrorism severely undermine

our country’s national security and the safety of every Filipino.
As a matter of fact, the Philippines ranked 9th among the
countries in the world that were negatively impacted by
terrorism based on the Global Terrorism Index released in
2019.453

515. Significantly, in Leave Division v. Heusdens,454 this

Honorable Court has already recognized that there are
constitutional, statutory and inherent limitations regulating
the right to travel. Some of these statutory limitations are the
following:

The Human Security Act of 2010 or

Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9372. The law
restricts the right to travel of an individual
charged with the crime of terrorism even
though such person is out on bail.

The Philippine Passport Act of 1996 or

R.A. No. 8239. Pursuant to said law, the
Secretary of Foreign Affairs or his authorized

452
Concurring Opinion of Justice Antonio Carpio in Genuino v. De Lima, supra.
453
Global Terrorism Index: PH 9th most affected by terrorism in 2018,
https://cnnphilippines.com/news/2019/11/21/ph-global-terrorism-index-2019.html, last accessed on July 11,
2020.
454
A.M. No. P-11-2927, December 13, 2011.

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consular officer may refuse the issuance of,

restrict the use of, or withdraw, a passport of a
Filipino citizen.

The “Anti- Trafficking in Persons Act of

2003” or R.A. No. 9208. Pursuant to the
provisions thereof, the Bureau of Immigration,
in order to manage migration and curb
trafficking in persons, issued Memorandum
Order Radjr No. 2011-011, allowing its Travel
Control and Enforcement Unit to “offload
passengers with fraudulent travel documents,
doubtful purpose of travel, including possible
victims of human trafficking” from our ports.

The Migrant Workers and Overseas

Filipinos Act of 1995 or R. A. No. 8042, as
amended by R.A. No. 10022. In enforcement of
said law, the Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration (POEA) may refuse to issue
deployment permit to a specific country that
effectively prevents our migrant workers to
enter such country.

The Act on Violence against Women and

Children or R.A. No. 9262. The law restricts
movement of an individual against whom the
protection order is intended.

Inter-Country Adoption Act of 1995 or

R.A. No. 8043. Pursuant thereto, the Inter-
Country Adoption Board may issue rules
restrictive of an adoptee’s right to travel “to
protect the Filipino child from abuse,
exploitation, trafficking and/or sale or any other
practice in connection with adoption which is
harmful, detrimental, or prejudicial to the
child.”455

516. Moreover, the curtailment of the right of an

accused to travel requires an application by the prosecutor
and a corresponding order from the trial court. The issuance
of such order is inarguably within the power of the courts:

A court has the power to prohibit a person

admitted to bail from leaving the Philippines.

455
Emphasis supplied.

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This is a necessary consequence of the nature

and function of a bail bond.456 As explained in
Santiago v. Vasquez:457

Courts possess certain inherent powers

which may be said to be implied from a general
grant of jurisdiction, in addition to those
expressly conferred on them. These inherent
powers are such powers as are necessary for the
ordinary and efficient exercise of jurisdiction; or
essential to the existence, dignity and functions
of the courts, as well as to the due
administration of justice; or are directly
appropriate, convenient and suitable to the
execution of their granted powers; and include
the power to maintain the court’s jurisdiction
and render it effective in behalf of the litigants.

Therefore, while a court may be expressly

granted the incidental powers necessary to
effectuate its jurisdiction, a grant of jurisdiction,
in the absence of prohibitive legislation, implies
the necessary and usual incidental powers
essential to effectuate it, and, subject to
existing laws and constitutional provisions,
every regularly constituted court has the power
to do all things that are reasonably necessary
for the administration of justice within the scope
of its jurisdiction. Hence, demands, matters, or
questions ancillary or incidental to, or growing
out of, the main action, and coming within the
above principles, may be taken cognizance of by
the court and determined, since such
jurisdiction is in aid of its authority over the
principal matter, even though the court may
thus be called on to consider and decide matters
which, as original causes of action, would not be
within its cognizance.

Furthermore, a court has the inherent

power to make interlocutory orders necessary
to protect its jurisdiction. Such being the case,
with more reason may a party litigant be
subjected to proper coercive measures where
he disobeys a proper order, or commits a fraud
on the court or the opposing party, the result of
which is that the jurisdiction of the court would

456
Manotoc, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-62100, May 30, 1986.
457
G.R. Nos. 99289-90, January 27, 1993.

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be ineffectual. What ought to be done depends

upon the particular circumstances.

Turning now to the case at bar, petitioner

does not deny and, as a matter of fact, even
made a public statement that she had every
intention of leaving the country allegedly to
pursue higher studies abroad. We uphold the
course of action adopted by the Sandiganbayan
in taking judicial notice of such fact of
petitioner’s plan to go abroad and in thereafter
issuing sua sponte the hold departure order, in
justified consonance with our preceding
disquisition. To reiterate, the hold departure
order is but an exercise of respondent court’s
inherent power to preserve and to maintain the
effectiveness of its jurisdiction over the case and
the person of the accused.458

517. Holding an accused in a criminal case within the

reach of the Courts by preventing his/her departure from the
Philippines must be considered as a valid restriction on his
right to travel so that he/she may be dealt with in accordance
with law. The offended party in any criminal proceeding is the
People of the Philippines. It is to the People’s interest that
criminal prosecutions should run their course and proceed to
finality without undue delay, with an accused holding
himself/herself amenable at all times to Court Orders and
processes.459

518. Verily, the limitations imposed by the assailed law

on an accused’s right to travel under the Anti-Terrorism Act is
a valid restriction, as it serves a legitimate purpose, that is,
the preservation of our national security and safety of
Filipinos.

458
Citations omitted.
459
Silverio v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 94284, April 8, 1991.

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The Anti-Terrorism Act

does not infringe the
academic freedom of
institutions of higher
learning, teachers and
students.

There is nothing in the Anti-

Terrorism Act which prohibits
the free exercise of academic
freedom.

519. Pararagraph 2 of Section XIV, Article V of the

Constitution provides:

Academic freedom shall be enjoyed in all

institutions of higher learning.

520. Academic freedom, or to be precise, the

institutional autonomy of universities and institutions of
higher learning, is enshrined in the Constitution. It includes
the freedom to determine for themselves, on academic
grounds, (a) who may teach, (b) what may be taught, (c) how
it shall be taught, and (d) who may be admitted to study.460

521. Petitioners Sta. Maria, et al. fear that the Anti-

Terrorism Act may infringe on academic freedom. They
contend that free and robust academic discussion may be
hindered by a threat or danger of being interpreted as falling
within the five enumerated acts of terrorism in Section 4 of
the law. To illustrate their point, petitioners Sta. Maria, et al.
present several scenarios: What if a professor is charged with
inciting to terrorism for discussing the concept of revolutions?
Is it possible for a teacher who discusses the El Filibusterismo
to be charged with proposing to commit terrorism? What if a
professor is charged with proposal to commit or inciting to
terrorism for discussing concepts related to the justification of
war? What if professors discuss socialism, Marxism, or

460
Cudia v. The Superintendent of the Philippine Military Academy, G.R. No. 211362, February 24, 2015;
1987 Constitution, Article XIV, Section 5(2).

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liberation theology? Would law professors be prevented from

discussing Constitutional rights and freedoms?461

522. Petitioners attempt to frame these scenarios in a

manner that unduly causes alarm and concern. In doing so,
however, they conveniently overlooked the clear language of
Section 4.

523. The law itself provides an answer to petitioners’

imagined concerns.

524. Specifically provided under Section 4 is that an act

of terrorism shall only by punishable if, “by its nature and
context”, the act intimidates the general public or segment
thereof, creates an atmosphere or spreads a message of fear,
or provokes or influences by intimidation the government or
any international organization, or seriously destabilizes or
destroys the fundamental political, economic, or social
structures of the country, or creates a public emergency or
seriously undermines public safety.

525. Conversely, if the exercise of academic freedom is

in the nature of a legitimate exercise of civil and political
rights, and is “not intended to cause death or serious physical
harm to a person, to endanger a person’s life, or to create
a serious risk to public safety,” then it is not nor will it be
penalized as an act of terrorism.

526. The legislature, not unmindful of the dangers of

petitioners’ imagined scenarios, specifically framed Section 4
to uphold the cherished rights and freedoms embodied in the
Constitution, including academic freedom.

527. However, academic freedom, like any other

freedom, is not unbridled. “Even liberty itself, the greatest of
all rights, is not unrestricted license to act according to one’s
will. It is subject to the far more overriding demands and
requirements of the greater number.”462

461
Sta. Maria Petition, pp. 66-67.
462
Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. v. Drilon, G.R. No. 81958, June 30, 1988.

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528. Indeed, “academic freedom has never been

meant to be an unabridged license. It is a privilege that
assumes a correlative duty to exercise it responsibly.”463
Academic freedom cannot be used as an excuse to create a
superclass of citizens and exempt them from the State’s
legitimate exercise of police power. To hold otherwise would
be to subvert this freedom into degenerate license.

529. Petitioners Sta. Maria, et al. further suggest that

the designation of the Department of Education (DepEd) and
the Commission on Higher Education (CHED) as support
agencies of the ATC would enable the latter to dictate on what
academic institutions can and cannot teach.464

530. Petitioners Sta. Maria, et al. are wrong.

531. A plain reading of Section 45 of the Anti-Terrorism

Act reveals the purpose for designating DepEd and CHED as
support agencies, to wit:

… implement [the] Act and assume the

responsibility for the proper and effective
implementation of the policies of the country
against terrorism …

… formulate and adopt comprehensive,

adequate, efficient, and effective plans,
programs, or measures to prevent, counter,
suppress, or eradicate the commission of
terrorism in the country and to protect the
people from such acts … create such focus
programs to prevent and counter terrorism as
necessary, to ensure the counterterrorism
operational awareness of concerned agencies,
to conduct legal action and to pursue legal
and legislative initiatives to counter terrorism,
prevent and stem terrorist financing, and to
ensure compliance with international

463
Cudia v. The Superintendent of the Philippine Military Academy, supra; 1987 Constitution, Article XIV,
Section 5(2).
464
Sta. Maria Petition, p. 68.

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commitments to counterterrorism-related
protocols and bilateral and/or multilateral
agreements, and identify the lead agency for
each program …

532. The above-cited provision does not sanction ATC’s

interference in the academic institutions’ legitimate exercise
of academic freedom through DepEd or CHED.

533. Hence, it is evident that the Anti-Terrorism Act

does not contravene the academic freedom.

OPPOSITION TO PETITIONERS’
PRAYER FOR THE ISSUANCE OF
TEMPORARY RESTRAINING
ORDER AND WRIT OF
PRELIMINARY
INJUNCTIONAND/OR OTHER
INJUNCTIVE REMEDIES

Petitioners are not entitled

to a temporary restraining
order (TRO), writ of
preliminary injunction
and/or other injuctive
remedies.

Petitioners do not possess a

clear and unmistakable right
which will be violated by the
passage of the Anti-Terrorism
Act.

534. Petitioners primarily rest their entitlement to the

issuance of a TRO and a writ of preliminary injunction on
general allegations that the implementation of the Anti-
Terrorism Act will cause grave and irreparable injury to their
constitutional rights.465

Calleja Petition, p. 62; Lagman Petition, p. 53, par. 144; Sta. Maria Petition, p. 70; and Zarate, 2020, p.81.
465

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535. Petitioners’ contentions are bereft of merit.

536. Section 3, Rule 58466 of the Revised Rules of Court

prescribes the instances when a writ of preliminary injunction
may be issued. Pursuant to said provision, to be entitled to a
writ of preliminary injunction, petitioners must establish the
following requisites: (a) the applicant must have a clear and
unmistakable right, that is a right in esse; (b) there is a
material and substantial invasion of such right; (c) there is an
urgent need for the writ to prevent irreparable injury to the
applicant; and (d) no other ordinary, speedy, and adequate
remedy exists to prevent the infliction of irreparable injury.467

537. The primary requirement in issuing a writ of

preliminary injunction is the existence of a clear and
unmistakable right in favor of the applicant.468 An injunction
will not issue to protect a right not in esse, or a right which is
merely contingent and may never arise since. To be protected
by injunction, the alleged right must be clearly founded on or
granted by law or is enforceable as a matter of law.469

538. In the present case, petitioners do not have the

right to the issuance of a TRO or writ of preliminary injunction
because they do not possess a clear and unmistakable right
that is to be violated by the passage of the Anti-Terrorism Act.
As thoroughly discussed above, none of petitioners’
constitutional rights are impaired with the passage and the
impending implementation of said law. Again, petitioners’
allegations are merely based on pure speculation.
466
Section 3. Grounds for issuance of preliminary injunction. — A preliminary injunction may be granted
when it is established:
(a) That the applicant is entitled to the relief demanded, and the whole or part of such relief consists in
restraining the commission or continuance of the act or acts complained of, or in requiring the
performance of an act or acts either for a limited period or perpetually;

(b) That the commission, continuance or non-performance of the act or acts complained of during the
litigation would probably work injustice to the applicant; or

(c) That a party, court, agency or a person is doing, threatening, or is attempting to do, or is procuring
or suffering to be done some act or acts probably in violation of the rights of the applicant respecting
the subject of the action or proceeding, and tending to render the judgment ineffectual.
467
DPWH v. City Advertising Ventures Corporation, G.R. No. 182944, November 9, 2016.
468
Office of City Mayor of Parañaque v. Ebio, G.R. No. 156303, December 19, 2007.
469
Heirs of Yu, et al. v. Honorable Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 182371, September 4, 2013.

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539. Evidently, there exists no clear legal right upon

which petitioners anchor their application for preliminary
injunctive relief. As succinctly put by this Honorable Court,
“‘(c)lear legal right,’ within the meaning of Rule 58
contemplates a right ‘clearly founded in or granted by law.’
Any hint of doubt or dispute on the asserted legal right
precludes the grant of preliminary injunctive relief.”470 In the
absence of a clear legal right, the issuance of the injunctive
writ will constitute grave abuse of discretion.471

Petitioners also failed to prove

that they will sustain grave
and irreparable injury from the
implementation of the Anti-
Terrorism Act.

540. Aside from their failure to prove a clear and

unmistakable right or a right in esse, petitioners likewise
miserably failed to prove the element of grave and irreparable
injury. The element of irreparable injury must be such that is
frequent, recurring, incapable of pecuniary estimation, and
one which leaves the aggrieved party without other adequate
modes of redress.472

541. Jurisprudence tells us when an injury is

considered irreparable:

Respecting the element of irreparable

injury, the landmark case of Social Security
Commission v. Bayona teaches:

Damages are irreparable within the

meaning of the rule relative to the issuance
of injunction where there is no standard by
which their amount can be measured with
reasonable accuracy (Crouc v. Central Labor
Council, 83 ALR, 193). “An irreparable injury
which a court of equity will enjoin includes that
degree of wrong of a repeated and continuing

470
Bicol Medical Center, et al v. Botor, et al, G.R. No. 214073, October 4, 2017.
471
See Ocampo v. Sison, G.R. No. 164529, June 19, 2007.
472
Philippine Virginia Tobacco Administration v. De Los Angeles, et al, G.R. No. L-27829, August 19, 1988.

Page 219 of 223

CONSOLIDATED COMMENT
Calleja, et a. v. Executive Secretary, et al.
GR. Nos. 252578-80, 252585, 252613, 252623-24 and 252646
x-------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

kind which produce hurt, inconvenience, or

damage that can be estimated only by
conjecture, and not by any accurate standard of
measurement”. An irreparable injury to
authorize an injunction consists of “a serious
charge of, or is destructive to, the property it
affects, either physically or in the character in
which it has been held and enjoined, or when
the property has some peculiar quality or use,
so that its pecuniary value will not fairly
recompense the owner of the loss thereof”.473

542. Applying the above principle, petitioners failed to

show and prove that they will suffer damage and injury with
such grave and irreparable nature, resulting in manifest
injustice. Perforce, this Honorable Court must not issue a TRO
or a writ of preliminary injunction.

543. To stress, a TRO or a writ of preliminary injunction

are preservative remedies for the protection of substantive
rights and interests. A TRO is of the same nature as an
injunction, it is not designed to protect contingent or future
rights; the possibility of irreparable damage without proof of
actual existing right is not a ground for the issuance
thereof.474 A TRO issues only if the matter is of such extreme
urgency that grave injustice and irreparable injury would arise
unless it is issued immediately.475

544. Furthermore, it is the public, not the petitioners,

who will actually suffer grave and irreparable injury if the
injunctive relief prayed for is issued. The Anti-Terrorism Act is
the embodiment of years of hard work towards peace as one
of the major objectives of this nation is the total eradication
of terrorist groups, which have always considered the
Philippines as a “safe haven”. Through its enactment, the
Philippine Government is finally given an opportunity to
address and eliminate all traces of terrorism, and to attain
meaningful self-governance within the framework of the

473
Ermita v. Aldecoa-Delorino, supra; citations omitted and emphasis supplied.
474
Brizuela v. Dingle and Legaspi, G.R. No. 175371, April 30, 2008; citing Heirs of Asuncion v. Gervacio,
Jr., et al., G.R. No. 115741, March 9, 1999; emphasis supplied.
475
Australian Professional Realty, Inc. v. Municipality of Padre Garcia Batangas Province, G.R. No. 183367,
March 14, 2012.

Page 220 of 223

CONSOLIDATED COMMENT
Calleja, et a. v. Executive Secretary, et al.
GR. Nos. 252578-80, 252585, 252613, 252623-24 and 252646
x-------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

Constitution and the national sovereignty as well as territorial

integrity of the Republic of the Philippines.

545. If this Honorable Court were to grant the

injunctive relief prayed for by petitioners, the enjoinment of
the implementation of the assailed law will deny our law
enforcement agents the opportunity to fight and prevent
terrorism. Inevitably, an injunctive writ would only further
stall the years of meaningful investigation and crime-
detection.

546. Beyond cavil, it is ultimately the Filipino people

who will suffer grave and irreparable injury if the injunctive
relief prayed for by petitioners is issued.

The issuance of a TRO or a writ

of preliminary injunction would
operate as a prejudgment of
the case.

547. In determining whether or not petitioners are

entitled to the issuance of injunctive relief, this Honorable
Court would have to pass upon the inevitable issue of whether
the Anti-Terrorism Act is constitutional, which is the very main
issue of this case. This is because petitioners’ prayer for TRO
hinges on their alleged rights which would be violated
supposedly by the implementation of the same Act.

548. In Searth Commodities Corporation, et al. v. Court

of Appeals,476 this Honorable Court warned the courts that a
premature issuance of an injunction may result to the virtual
acceptance of the claimant’s main claim, to wit:

The prevailing rule is that courts

should avoid issuing a writ of preliminary
injunction which would in effect dispose of
the main case without trial. In the case at
bar, if the lower court issued the desired writ to
enjoin the sale of the properties premised on the
aforementioned justification of the petitioners,

476
G.R. No. 64220, March 31, 1992.

Page 221 of 223

CONSOLIDATED COMMENT
Calleja, et a. v. Executive Secretary, et al.
GR. Nos. 252578-80, 252585, 252613, 252623-24 and 252646
x-------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

the issuance of a writ would be a virtual

acceptance of their claim that the foreclosure
sale is null and void. There would in effect be
a prejudgment of the main case and a
reversal of the rule on the burden of proof
since it would assume the proposition
which the petitioners are inceptively
bound to prove.477

549. In Evy Construction and Development Corporation

v. Valiant Roll Forming Sales Corporation,478 this Honorable
Court denied the prayer for TRO because “no injunctive writ
could be issued pending a final determination of petitioner’s
actual and existing right over the property. The grant of an
injunctive writ could operate as a prejudgment of the main
case.”

550. Hence, in deciding whether petitioners are entitled

to injunctive relief, this Honorable Court would have to pass
upon the constitutionality of the Anti-Terrorism Act. Indeed,
the issuance of a TRO or a writ of preliminary injunction would
operate as a prejudgment of the case.

551. Finally, courts must exercise utmost caution,

prudence and judiciousness in the issuance of temporary
restraining orders and injunctive writs. The issuance of a writ
of preliminary injunction is an extraordinary peremptory
remedy available only on grounds provided by law.479 There is
no power the exercise of which is more delicate, which
requires greater caution, deliberation and sound discretion, or
more dangerous in a doubtful case, than the issuance of an
injunction. The writ should not be granted lightly or
precipitately, but only when the court is fully satisfied that the
law permits it and the emergency demands it.480

552. In the absence of the most essential preconditions

for the issuance of an injunctive relief, petitioners’ prayer for

477
Emphasis supplied and citations omitted.
478
Evy Construction and Development Corporation v. Valiant Roll Forming Sales Corporation, G.R. No.
207938, October 11, 2017.
479
Valley Trading v. CFI Isabela, G.R. No. L-49529, March 31, 1989.
480
Garcia v. Burgos, G.R. No. 124130, June 29, 1998.

Page 222 of 223

CONSOLIDATED COMMENT
Calleja, et a. v. Executive Secretary, et al.
GR. Nos. 252578-80, 252585, 252613, 252623-24 and 252646
x-------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

the issuance of a TRO and writ of preliminary injunction

and/or other injunctive reliefs must be denied.

PRAYER

Respondents respectfully pray that this Honorable Court:

1. NOTE this Consolidated Comment;

2. DENY petitioners’ prayer for the issuance of a

temporary restraining order and writ of
preliminary injunction; and

3. DENY due course to and DISMISS the

Petitions for utter lack of merit.

Respondents also ask for other forms of relief that the

Court may deem just and equitable under the premises.

Makati City for Manila City, July 17, 2020.

Signatures on the following page…

Page 223 of 223

CONSOLIDATED COMMENT
Calleja. et al. v. Exccutive Secretarl. et al
GR. Nos. 252578-80. 252585. 252613.252623-21. arld 2526t6
\ \

J DA c.c
o licI eneral
o. 24852
IBP Lifetime No. 015360, 0B-18-16
MCLE Exemption No. VII-OSG0O0228, 11-08-19

)
MA. ANTON A D A C. DIZON
Assistant Solici r General
Roll No. 33774
IBP Lifetime No. 010284, lz-t2-LL
MCLE Exemption No. VII-OSG0OO219, 11-05-19

tr- { il41/.r.1*,
MARISSA B. DELA CRUZ.GALANDINES
Ass ista nt So I i cito r Gen era I
Roll No. 37023
IBP No. 1L3527, 0L-L4-20
MCLE Exemption No. VII-OSGOOO214, tl-05-L9

BERNARD G. HERNANDEZ
Ass ista nt So I icito r Gen era I
Roll No. 34618
IBP Lifetime No. 08866, 2-t-70
MCLE Exemption No. VII-OSGO00218, 11-05-19

vrDA (ffitdrr.ENrE
Assista nt ". S o I i cito r Gen era I
Roll No. 33995
IBP Lifetime No. 09503, 01-07-11
MCLE Exemption No. VI-000380, 04-02-18
CONSOLIDATED COMMENT
Calleja. ct al. r'. Executive Secrcta{'. et al
GR. Nos. 252578-80. 252585. 252613.252623-24. arrd 252646
\ \

JO HN EMMA . MADAMBA
Ass i sta nt S o I i cito r Gen e ra I
Roll No. 37363
IBP No. 086444, 07 -24-t9
MCLE Exemption No. VII-OSGO0O220, 7l-05-19

REX BERN L. CUAL

Assista nt So I icito r Ge n era I
Roll No. 38914
IBP Lifetime No. 01997, 10-30-00
MCLE Exemption No. VII-OSGO02251, 01-14-20

M ANGGOL TRO
A o licitor General
Roll No. 35970
IBP No. 105263, 01-01-20
MCLE Exemption No. VII-OSG000222, LL-05-t9

byncmba:
570
c412
c808-4 75A57rE4EBfS
)\ o.te m2007.16 l{{5r0 +0E&'
ERIC REMEGIO O. PANGA
Assista nt Sol icitor Gene ral
Roll No. 39377
IBP Lifetime No. 04291, 01-09-03
MCLE Exemption No. VII-OSG000212, tl-05-t9

Wt''raJ
ELLAINE {OSE,A. SANCHEZ-CORRO
Assista nt So I i cito r Ge n e ra I
Roll No. 365t4
IBP Lifetime No. 02444, 06-08-01
MCLE Exemption No. VIi-OSG000216, 11-05-19
CONSOLIDATED COMMENT
Callcja. cl al. \'. Exccutiye Sccrelae. et al
GR. Nos. 252578-80. 25258-5. 252613.252623-24. and 252616.
x---------------------- -------------\

MARIA CIELO G. SE.RONDAIN

Ass i sta nt S o I i cito r Gen e ra I
Roll No. 35028
IBP Lifetime No. 08902, 02-16-10
MCLE Exemption No. VI-000882, 09-17-18

THOMAS M. LARAGAN
r
Assista nt Solicitor Genera I
Roll No. 38842
IBP Lifetime No. 09144, 04-29-tO
MCLE Exemption No. VII-OSGO00215, 11-05-19

0""''-' L fr A''*-
ANNA ESPERANZA R. SOLOMON
Ass ista nt So Ii cito r G en era I
Roll No. 33927
IBP Lifetime No. 014623, 03-01-16
MCLE Exemption No. VI-000371, 04-02-18

f*/
MYRN"A NvAGNO-CANUTO
c,*fi
Assista nt So I i cito r Gen era I
Roll No. 39183
IBP Lifetime No. 014623, 03-01-16
MCLE Exemption No. Vi-000373, 04-02-18
CONSOLIDATED COMMENT
Calleja. et al. r,. Executive Secretary. et al
GR. Nos. 252578-80. 252585. 252613,252623-24. and 252616
\ \

MAR I LEN
Assistant Solicito eneral
Roll No, 33725
IBP Lifetime No. 00253
MCLE Exemption No. VII-OSGOOO229, tt-08-t9

Drr,o-
RMES L. OCAMPO
Ass ista nt So Ii cito r Gen era I
Roll No. 40L69
IBP Lifetime No. 09135, 4-28-tO
MCLE Exemption No. VI-000633, 05-24-18

I
^#<,*fuq
NYRIAM SUSAN S. HERNANDEZ
Ass i sta nt So I i cito r Gen e ra I
Roll No. 35338
IBP Lifetime No. 07708, 8-13-08
MCLE Exemption No. VII-OSG000221, ll-05-L9

h,r* '! l'/'/*

RAYMUND I. RIGODON
Assista nt So Ii cito r Gen e ra I
Roll No, 39730
IBP Lifetime No. 013395, 2-12-15
MCLE Exemption No. VII-OSG00O2L7, 7L-05-L9

MARIA HAZEL
ln I
\Vl o*it t,
V. ACANTILADO
Assista nt S o I i cito r Gen era I
Roll No. 43682
IBP Lifetime No. 02780
MCLE Exemption No. VI-000375, 04-02-18
CONSOLIDATED COMMENT
Calleja- et al. \,. Executive Secrelary ct al
GR. Nos. 252578-80. 252585, 252613.252623-24, and252646
x----------------- \

t,
A V. MI
s n t Solicitor General
Roll No. 42949
IBP Lifetime No.02113
MCLE Exemption No. VII-OSG0OO211, 11-05-19

HENRY d
AssistantrlMrr*
Roll No, 45837
IBP Lifetime No. 016075, 4-2t-17
MCLE Exemption No. VI-002494, 04-24-t9

ALEXANDER S. SALVADOR
Ass ista nt So Ii ci to r Gen era I
Roll No, 42940
IBP Lifetime No. 013968
MCLE Exemption No. VII-OSGOO2L46, l2-L9-L9

PENAFRAN C. CARPI
Assistant Solicitor Ge ral
Roll No. 37203
IBP Lifetime No. 018148, 77-07-17
MCLE Exemption No. VII-OSG-O00136, 09-10-19

J GUEVARRA
Iicitor General
Roll No. 36854
IBP Lifetime No. 010364, 01-06-12
MCLE Compliance No. VI-0026445, 05-31-19
CONSOLIDATED COMMENT
Caueja. et al. \,. Executive Secretary'. et al
GR. Nos. 252578-80. 252585. 252613- 252623-24. and 252616.
x--------------------- -----------\

9tq'Ltn"1,''t1oru4 u
MARIA VICTORIA V SARDILLO
Ass ista nt So I icito r Gen era I
Roll No. 47226
IBP Lifetime No. 07223
MCLE Compliance No. VI-0029360, 11-19-19
2-*tL-b e
/^z; /*'
l'"*; Aj'*L ol/'-
DIANA C. DE VERA
Ass ista nt So I icito r Gen era I
Roll No. 42974
IBP Lifetime No. 08543
MCLE Compliance No. V-0008863, 07-01-15

h,UtU*r tu),l/
GILBERT U. MEDRANO
Ass i sta nt S o I i cito r Ge n era I
Roll No. 47392
IBP Lifetime No, 03598
MCLE Compliance No. VI-0021105, 03-26-19

ttrc Cl-J"no^
JAMES LEE CUNDANGAN
Senior State Solicitor
(Officer-in-Charge)
Roll No. 47487
IBP Lifetime Membership No. 09142, 04-29-lO
MCLE Compliance No. VI-0023137, 04-Lt-79

LEEN T. EYES
enior State So licitor
Roll No. 41324
IBP Lifetime No. 1885, 05-17-00
MCLE Compliance No. VI-0021131, 03-26-19
CONSOLIDAIED COMMENT
Catleja. et al. i. Executi\e Secretary. ct al
GR. Nos. 252 578-80. 25258 . 252613. 252623 -21. and, 252(t16

L N. VILLASERAN
J
enior State Solicitor
Roll No, 55935
IBP Lifetime No. 08748
MCLE Compliance No. VI-0021160

4,
EDU .POQ Utz, JF..
State Solicitor II
Roll No. 56036
IBP No. 713526, 04-10-19
MCLE Compliance No. VI-0024683, 04-10-19

AN C. ABALOS
JOSEP
te Solicitor I
Roll No. 56952
IBP Lifetime No. 08282
MCLE Compliance No. VI-0020782, O3-26-L9

RON CH v ANUEVA
State So itor I
Roll No, 2239
IBP Lifetime No. 012240
MCLE Compliance No. VI-0021159, 03-26-19

KAMILLE EAN . LAG A-MAHIG

Asso cl licitor
Roll No. 64279
IBP Lifetime No. 013913, 06-t7-15
MCLE Compliance No. VI-0021088, 03-26-19
CONSOLIDATED COMMENT
Calleja. ct al. l: Executiye Secretar): et al
GR. Nos. 252578-80, 252585, 252613,252623-24, and 252646.
x--------------------- -----------x

AL IS JOS H R. NOB
Associate olicitor III
Roll .64777
IBP No. 121543, 01-0 20
MCLE Compliance No, VI-0028L61, 07-29-19

JUS NRY D. MORILLA

Associa Solicitor III
Roll No, 67042
IBP Lifetime No. 029305, O9-24-tB
MCLE Compliance No, VI-0021111, 03-26-19

MA. CARI EZ
Associate Solicitor II
Roll No. 66417
IBP No. 114140, 02-04-20
MCLE Compliance No, VI-0001789, O3-t5-77

MINA N EA D. BATUNGBACAL
Associate Solicitor III
Roll No. 64290
IBP Lifetime No. 018737
MCLE Exemption No. VI-C1002959

HACE G CE T. RUZ
ssoc te Solicitor
Roll No. 69359
IBP Life Member Roll No. 002566, 05-tl-2017
MCLE Compliance No. VI-0021040,03-26- 2OL9
CONSOLIDAIED COMMENT
Callcja. et al. v. Executive Secretan. el al
GR. Nos. 252578-8O. 252585. 252613 - 252623 -24. :urd 2 52 64(r
\ \

KYLE BRY UERRERO

Associate Solicitor I
Roll No. 7L564
IBP No. 108579, 01-08-20
MCLE Compliance No. VI-0021066

STEVEN G. ELO
Associate rI
Roll No. 40
IBP No. 058930, 0t-22-20
MCLE Compliance No. VI-0030055, L2-22-19

JOSE DO . CLAVANO IV
AS s a teS olicitor I
Roll No. 77330
IBP Member No. 088588, 05-14-19
Admitted to the Bar in 2019

OFFICE OF THE SOLICITOR GENERAL

134 Amorsolo Street, Legaspi Village,
1229 Makati City
Tel. No.: 9BB-1674 (Trunkline)
Fax No.; 813-4585
Website: www,osq.qov.Dh
Email : o_sgatateam@osg. gov. ph

Copy furnished:

Atty. Leonard Peejay V. Jurado Law Office

G/F Unit C, Dona Enriqueta Building
No. 46 Kamias Road, Quezon City

Ateneo Human Rights Center

4/F Ateneo Professional Schools Building
20 Rockwell Drive, Rockwell Center
Makati City
CONSOLIDAIED COMMENT
Ca eja. et al. r,. Executive Secretary et al
GR. Nos. 252578-E0.25258 . 252613.252623-24. and 252646
\

Calleja Law Office

Unit 2904-C, West Tower, PSE Centre
Exchange Road, Ortigas Center
Pasig City

Dean J.V. Bautista

Suite 906, The Richmonde Plaza
21 San Miguel Avenue cor. Lourdes Avenue
Ortigas Center, Pasig City

MAKABAYAN National Headquarters

Block 31, Lot 13, A. Bonifacio Street
New Capitol Estates 1, Batasan Hills
Quezon City

Melencio S. Sta. Maria

6/F Far Eastern University Makati Campus
Sen. Gil Puyat Avenue cor. Malugay Street
Makati City

Pro-Labor Legal Assistance Center

No. 33-B, E. Rodriguez Sr. Avenue
Brgy. Dona Josefa, Quezon City

Rep. Edcel C. Lagman

Rm. N-411, House of Representatives
Quezon City

EXPLANATION
The foregoing Commenf will be electronically filed and
served to this Honorable Court and to the parties due to
limited office personnel.

G LBERT U. MEDRANO
Assista nt So I icito r Genera I
 INDEX OF ANNEXES
ANNEX DESCRIPTION
1 Dabiq: Remaining and Expanding (Muharram
1436 or November 2014; Annex “1”
Senate Records
2 TSN dated December 17, 2019; Annex “2”
3 TSN dated January 21, 2020; Annex “3”
4 TSN dated January 22, 2020; Annex “4”
5 TSN dated January 27, 2020; Annex “5”
6 TSN dated January 28, 2020; Annex “6”
7 TSN dated February 3, 2020; Annex “7”
8 TSN dated February 19, 2020; Annex “8”
House Records
9 TSN dated June 2, 2020, 6:35 p.m.; Annex “9”
10 TSN dated June 2, 2020, 8:10 p.m.; Annex “10”
11 United Nations Security Council Resolutions;
Annex “11”
12 UNSC 1373, Threats to International Peace and
Security Caused by Terrorist Acts; Annex “12”
13 UNSC 1456, High-Level Meeting of the Security
Council: Combating Terrorism; Annex “13”
14 UNSC 1566, Threats to International Peace and
Security Caused by Terrorist Acts; Annex “14”
 II
ANNEX 1II

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 i\ND EXI|Atll)llJ(;

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A}.ID HXPANffING
On 1l)e 17"'of IVlttltattattt l4lt', llle \^/orl(l lrear(l
llre l(lrali,alt ar,,l rlllllxrrl lrrrr rlr olr'r(lleri(€' [o
announcettlellts fto rr llre tIrtri;iIritIiIrof Ilre Ata
nll.rl .rt,l I rrr)1..,rtr.,,, ,1 i,' rrrl'F"lP'l ''blrPd
bian Peninstrla, Yerlrerl, Sllrai. lilrya ,rlt(l AlSerra
pronotlllcirlg Illeir t'ay',1t to llrc l(lrali{ah ol tlrrl
Al)ll Bakr nl lltrsayrll irl llaBlrtl'(ll (lla llreV llrerr ('ar lr ra.r". llrr I1 " irr i)ie( " r)i 'dvl(:e
Muslirns,
fidhahulldlr) atrtl urisrlrrrrt ( ol rr t't t titttl l l .,' r'i )lii{all{'llr r)l lrl rl[y
ill,{ tlll(ler llre l,errrrei ol tlr" l lril;ll;rlr
All of thettr arlnollllr el I rllli[!ri ltrly'
llre tttttialrirlirr lr,rrrr r\l;1,'ri'r ,rrlvisr:rl tlrl tttu
jalrirlrr ev. l yv'/lrlr {rl
'Allah - the Fxal(c(l ;ai(l lArr(l lr()lrl filllrlY lo
the rope of Allalr all ()grrtlrer arrrl d. rrrrt l)e'(rrrre
"Weesp€rr irllY lrt rrirrr l tlr" trrrriallirlirl rrlro sal:ri
dividedl IAl 'lt]lrarr ll)ll Alrrl /\llalr's lvlesserrBel
(sallallrhu 'alaylliw. sallarrr) sai(l, "Wlroever
(lies li.e,iall llrnl is (l(rar arrrlI er rrlrrs. ollered tlreir
wliile itot llavinB a l)lLirlge ol nlleginllrre (lies a .ol|ls \,villr)rll lr('iilalirrrr nrrrl I all-'(l rlrr( 'l)tlr
dedllr of j5l)iliyyalr' l!rl'ilr N4rrslirrr orr llre atr nri5sion arrl go.ll l! 1o ('rl.rl1li'ill Allall's !liarialr
(rr llre Earllr arrrl I llilalalr I lrr)lr llle rllelfr(r{lol
thorityof 'lllrrerrl llrerP[ole, irrobe(lierr'elr)ll]e
order of Allalt ('azza \/a iall) alrd itt olretlietrce ttr i)gy r)l l)rol)lrellrlr)rl. -\o 'rlr! rlo y{rll delAY illis
His A,4essetrger {sall;rllahrl 'alaylri \'lrn sallarlr),
(rl n.r\! I \1/e,t-(l yl,r r I r'1 r\ll,rlr, l,'es I llis (lelaY l)l ing
irry lr) llre lre liF u('r s alrrl ,rlrrl|r llrc l(Lr[[Al
l'l]r ihe
derillg not lo divi(]€ arr,l l.r sti( k t llte ,arrra'al)
vL'e (le(lare tlle l)a\ all to llrp l(ltalilalr ll)r'llilrr oPl)r)sile.l
lbn 'Awwed lbn llrtilritrr al (l(rraslri 'rl llrrsayrri
pledging to selflessl/ lrPat arrrl olreY irr Iirrres ol Ille rrrialrl(lirl lr,,rrr llr' ,r'rlriarr l'elllrlilllar ill
hardship an{l ease, alrll irl lirrres ol rleliglll alr(l lor rrrer I llrt rrr ,, lltltirll r ii ll {rrr lar t{l'j llrn I llrey
r r

dislike. We pledge I ()t lo dislrrrte llre rrrallPr I't rrir irrrger rree,['rl l',1r, " ]l'rr l(, t)crlorrrr iilra(l
those in arrLhority e{r:et)l iI we see rrlrviorrs krrfr I rlt,r rlle l)a|l , L)i llr, I r lalrlr
concerninE whiclr !!" lr'lve ptrr0f ftorrr l\llalr We

l i
?
 AIJD EXI'ANI)IIIG

Fenirrsrrla,the ttlrttl lla! aplleale(l alld l)revailell l)lI(lerl alry()tlrt wltll vvlrtl I\ lrlryr)ll(llllerl 'cope'
(liltL' alrll r.lllY y{)llr All.rlr .r) iAr,,llln li.r r, I t lr' p l'rt""r rrrrt il,
5o conre to yoiir 'rotlrlrl
Khalifalr. O nruwaljlrl(li11 irr llre l'rrrds rrt 'l ll;r
11,,. r p1,8r,,,' dr,,"rrllr"rlr ; l/'l I l4rl't(l
ramavo, glad titlirtg, Ioi tlre iilr'(l {lrat Yorr pre
pared your sadrlles trrr llas allive(l lo tlre (lrxrl
steps of yoLll hotrte;, atld rrrl lrorrlt:ts vrill irrlrilril
you frortl reachirrg l. rlor will rlly lrassl)()rt; (rl

visas prevent yoll fr )rrl acllievilrg il

The nruialli(lirl ftrrrt libya .lire' lerl tlre lu4rlslilrrs

to tlre obligaliorr r I rr{rity .rrt,l relrrle(l (lo(rl'ts
against lhis obligali0r l

"We plerlgecl allegiarrr e beratt;tl lllele i\ Irr) I ( ll e

for khilaf (differirg) ,llrer tharr llre lilrilafalr liltP
wise, we call ever) l"llrslilrr lrrvral(ls lllis il(x)(1,
for indeed, il is evetrrriore lllIL]riillillE fol llle erl
enries of Allah. Uy /\llalr, {)rll rallyilrg rttlrlr:t otte
leader is harder orr llre errerrlles ()l Allal) lllarl a
tholrsand victor ies ( tt llle l)alllefiel(l Arl(l d() rlol Ilrc rtrrrialrirli ,i 5irai n'rirrrrlerl llre rllrrilhidin
be deceived by llr€ rleserljorr of llle rleserlers of tlre olrligaliorr rrl flllil!, IrJor tlrel(lril;rfah
lbn Ha2rn (rahirtralrrrllzrh) sairl, As for lre rrylro
says that the imal|r.lris Iot vali(lexrePt wltll llre ''As lr)r rrl\, In(,\\.rfe lr) rrrl rrrrrjalritl hll,llrers rlrl
approval of the l,r,rrrlalr's (ligirllaiies all a(loss all llre frollts, ,,vlral (|] fl,r rle"irP,'\A/lt.rl (lo Yorr
the vatious lan(ls, Illl]n llti! Ialse, her:arrsr it asgriro fot i'AIl{,r .r stalL, ,rin\ esl:ll)lislre(l for ls
is askirrg fot sorrlellrirrlt tltirl rrlar lrie',alrl,r, is larll arrrl tlre l\lr.ilirn-< .rlir -r l lral!falr allr Amir
not within anyo e" (apability, anrl is llle rosl for tlrr, lrelievr,r,; !,/as atit,!)rrle(1, sull(l('rliy yotr

2
 ,l
I
i
'
t:l : I
,
I i ' I r r AND EXPANIIING

it by not stan(lirtg Lr( tlentlr ils l)allrlel, aI a liltle ir I wilayat, arlrl llre rrrrllili(nrr(,rr {rI all partrr]s and
which the wor ld lla! r r)rnpl,otely galllelecl aga in sl gt1) !s llrereilr lll orle 1[ Ille lllost no\^/e!'fUl
it. What is wrong willrVoul Wllal is yotrr Pxrr(lse, a(l(lresses Eivelr sitri e tlll'uslalrlislrnlerrl of the
O mujahidirr? YoLlr lrrrity is !trerlAlll alr(l.yotlr lsle|tri. State. lrc 'j.rirl "(;l,r(l lirlilrgs, t] Nltlslilrls,
divisior is weaknes'. lls llllellt is yorrr tltiSlri, if for wt give yotr g(){,(l lle\ /:' lry irr}rlr)url(irl8 the
only you understoo l Illere is llo grrod ilr yrrrl if exl)allsiort (rl llle lslarrtir ',lale Ir) Ilew larlds kr
lhey rParh it arrrl lrr',r' ll $,rrlle Y'rr' lra"'o a ''rr lhe lan(ls ol al llatatrtaVll rrr(l ielllerr tr) tgVllt,
gle hreath letl. Arrd l{lo llot llrinl( y()(r will allow tihya, all{l l\lgeria. We ,rlrrrolllr(e the ntcep
such k) hapPerr. 5,i s.rttle Yrrlll llrnller' gdtller tall( (i of the l).Y alr ()l tlro.r'!vlr() g.rve (l\ l)aY'al)
your5elveS, arlcl supl){)lt yollr stale, [ot yort de i|l llrose la rls, llre rrtrllilr( ali{rlr {)f tlre Srollps
pend orr it arrd it d.l)€r1rds (,rr yotl llyAllalr,ilis therei tlre alrrlollllrellrl,rll ')f rl{1w wilayat for
upon the clear trutl, arrd slll)porterl hy All'lr, the tlle lslanli. 5lale. alr(l llle ll)lloillllllerlt ol \n/lllaI
Mighty, the Slrorrg. 5o fear n llalr, yorrr lor(l Do ior llretrl."
not let Shayterr dec,rive yorl !vith llis Itopagartda
and slanrler lndeed lre is a t lear etretrty to yor " Prior lo tlre arttlolillaeIrerll of llre rlel'v v\'ilayat,
a flIrll)er ofHlotll)s ill (lrl]lasarl, al Llav"qaz, ln
(lohesia, NiBer ia, tlJe l)hilil)l)lrles, ;rlld elsewhere
l'he 11rtriahidill of '/errrell i()l]llselerl llre lvius
lirrrs witlt the prol)ll'lli( a{lvr( e arl(l t)rIler fu)r tlt{l Irarl Dlerigetl llleir allegi,rrr.e to tlle Kllalilah,
tirnes r)f divisionl ar(l .olltilllle 1o (lr) so (lnily Tl]e lslalllic State
arln()uIce(l llle a{ ( eptallr c r)l tlle bay'al fronl
all of tllese grrrtllls arld itrrlivicltrals rrtay Allall
'Allah's Messenger (s;illallallrr 'alaylri wa sal
lam) had given rrs glad tidirrBs ot l(llil'falr trt:lrrll a.cel)l llreir lt()[)lr: r)atlr alr(] ke{lp llr':llr firnl
the nrethodology of ptophetlror'rtl Arrd irrtleed' lli]r)ntlreir I(rverlirlrt, hee )tlalter bttttlelayetl
by Allah, we have srrerl it as a l(lrilAfah ul)on tlre
the arrnoltrl(ietlrelll of lll( ir respective v'/ilaYat,
nletho.lology of prol)llethoo(l Atrrl whetr we wllile recoBrtizirlg lllat s(,llle grI)llps fl()rll the
afor e n lerlli()tleLl larltls arI latger arld stronger
heard the trtlmpet: of the Jews all(l Christialrs
the callers opon llr{: gates crf llelltire we tlrall a few ol tll se relalerl t{r llre riewly an
answered the order trf Allalr's Messeilgel that no{rr(ed wilay.l lllis (l{ liy sll{)llld erl(l \^/ith
obliged sticking to llre jarlle'alr ol lhP ['4llslirl)s eill)er llre al)lnllllllllenl (rl lea()tlllilioll o{ lead
and iheir lnrem, f,)r llrl{lhayfalr (radiyall6lru ersllil) l)y tlle (lralrlalr lr'r lllose larl(ls wlrere
'anh) said,'Tlle peolrle use{l l{) arik Allalr's N'4es rrrrlliple Elolll)s llave giv('rl l)ay'al an(l rllerBed,
sedger (sallallShu 'alaylli wa sallanr) abotrt goo(1, orllre estahlislllllerll ota'lile(I lilleoIIrJnr ]u
and I used to ask lrrrrr aboLrt evil, Iearing tlrat it ni.alioh l)elweetl llre l(llil;ilall attrl tlte rrtr.tjihitl
leadetslrip of latrrls ra/ll{) ll,l\/c yel lo conlact Lhe
might overtake rne ' l11 tlre lla.litlr, lle says,
'ls
there any evil after this 8o(xll' lle responded, lslal ia State all(l llrrs re( eive irlJr)rrnalion iln(l
'Yes, callers upo,l tlle Eates of llellfire- Wlloev
dire.tives lll)lll llre l(halilalt lvlay Allalr bring
'er answers tllem will be tlll ow irlto it bY tllerll ' Ela(l ti(li g5 fl(rttt llrese l,rlrds arlrl otlrelt soon
He said, 'o Allah's 14esserlter, de5( rille tlrerlr lo an(l Iill tlre l)elievers' llearls !vitlr Itrrther Jo]'
me.'lle said, ' lhev ate front r)lrl skill arld sl)eak
with otrr tong(les.' lle $ai.l,'5() wllat (lo y()tr or
der me with if I reaclr tllat lirrlei' lle sai(1, 'sti.k
to the jama'alt of tlre M(lslirrrs arrrl tlreir llnanr'
lAl-Bukheri and Mrr'tlirrrl."

Therr orr the 20rr'of Irlulrarrarrr I43(j, tlle Klralifdlr

lbrahirn ihafidlrahullalr) officially ar)norrrr(e(l tlre

1
 ANNEX "2"

TUESDAY, DECEMBER 17, 2019

OPENING OF THE SESSION

At 3:00 p.m., the Senate President, Hon. Vicente C. Sotto III, called the
session to order.

The President. The 41st session of the Senate in the First Regular
Session of the Eighteenth Congress is hereby called to order.

Let us all stand for a minute of silent prayer.

Everybody rose for a minute of silent prayer.

ROLL CALL

The Secretary will please call the roll.

The Secretary, reading:

Senator Sonny Angara…………………………………Present
Senator Maria Lourdes Nancy S. Binay................Present
Senator Pia S. Cayetano......................................Present
Senator Leila M. de Lima…………………………….. 

Senator Ronald “Bato” M. dela Rosa……………….Present

Senator Franklin M. Drilon…………………………..Present
Senator Win Gatchalian……………………………….Present
Senator Christopher Lawrence T. Go.……………..Present
Senator Richard J. Gordon….............................. Absent
Senator Risa Hontiveros………………………………Present
Senator Panfilo M. Lacson……………………………Present
Senator Manuel “Lito” M. Lapid...........................Present
Senator Imee R. Marcos………………………………Present
Senator Emmanuel “Manny” D. Pacquiao………..Present
Senator Francis “Kiko” Pangilinan………………… Present
Senator Aquilino “Koko” Pimentel III ……………. Present
Senator Grace Poe…............................................Present
Senator Ralph G. Recto.......................................Present
Senator Ramon Bong Revilla Jr…………………… Present
Senator Francis “Tol” N. Tolentino……………….. Present
Senator Joel Villanueva…………………………….. Present


Under detention

1
 Senator Cynthia A. Villar................................... Present
Senator Juan Miguel F. Zubiri ……………………. Present
The President………………………………… Present

The President. With 15 senators present, the Chair declares the

presence of a quorum.

Before I recognize the Majority Leader, I would just like to, again, make

mention of the importance of this day. Aside from being the birthday of our

champion, Senator Pacquiao, it is also the 14th wedding anniversary of our

Majority Leader, Senator Zubiri, and his lovely wife, Audrey. Labing-apat na

taon na palang nagtitiis si Audrey. [Laughter]

So, congratulations.

The Majority Leader is recognized.

Senator Zubiri. Thank you, Mr. President.

Mr. President, we would like to greet our dear colleague, Senator

Pacquiao, a happy birthday.

THE JOURNAL
(Consideration Deferred)

Mr. President, I move that we defer the consideration of the Journal of

the 40th session, Monday, December 16, 2019, to a later hour.

The President. Is there any objection? [Silence] There being none, the
motion is approved.

ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF GUESTS

Senator Zubiri. Mr. President, we have a few guests here. We have

athletes, gold medalists, and medalists from the Southeast Asian Games. I

have two particular athletes whom I am pretty much proud and honored

2
because they come from Bukidnon—Ms. Christine Hallasgo of the women’s

marathon and Sarah Dequinan of women’s heptathlon. They are both gold

medalists from my province.

The President. Welcome to the Senate.

Senator Zubiri. Mr. President, Christine is our marathon winner. She is

the fastest in the long-distance running.

The President. Congratulations.

Senator Zubiri. Mr. President, we also have with us the SEA Games

medalists from the City of Valenzuela. Mayroon ba itong cash gift? Kasi ako,

mayroon ako sa Bukidnon.

Mr. President, bibigyan ni Senator Gatchalian iyan.

We have Mr. Jose Fernando Casares, gold medalist, Philippine triathlon;

Noelito Jose Jr., bronze medalist of men’s fencing individual epee; Baby Jessica

Canabal, bronze medalist of women’s taekwando; Brandhon Kyrielle Aquino,

bronze medalist of sailing; Jeniel “Haze” Bata-anon, gold medalist of e-sports;

and John Michael Pasco, bronze medalist of beach handball.

Please rise to be recognized.

The President. Congratulations to our SEA Games medalists from

Valenzuela.

Senator Zubiri. Reminder po sa senator from Valenzuela iyong kanilang

cash gifts po, Mr. President. [Laughter]

Mr. President, we have resolutions that we would like to take up for

adoption.

3
 The President. Are these part of the Reference of Business?

Senator Zubiri. Mr. President, if resolutions can be pulled out, but if the

Senate President wishes, we can have the Reference of Business.

I move that we proceed to the Reference of Business.

The President. Is there any objection? [Silence] There being none, the
motion is approved.

The Secretary will read the Reference of Business.

REFERENCE OF BUSINESS

BILLS ON FIRST READING

The Secretary. Senate Bill No. 1238, entitled

AN ACT GRANTING CIVIL SERVICE ELIGIBILITY TO

GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES WHOSE STATUS OF
APPOINTMENT IS EITHER CASUAL OR CONTRACTUAL,
AND WHO HAVE CONTINUOUSLY RENDERED AT LEAST
SEVEN (7) YEARS OF EFFICIENT SERVICE

Introduced by Senator Marcos

The President. Referred to the Committee on Civil Service, Government

Reorganization and Professional Regulation

The Secretary. Senate Bill No. 1239, entitled

AN ACT ESTABLISHING THE PHILIPPINE BUILDING ACT OF

2019, THEREBY REPEALING PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO.
1096, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES

Introduced by Senator Lacson

The President. Referred to the Committees on Public Works; and

Finance

RESOLUTIONS

The Secretary. Senate Concurrent Resolution No. 4, entitled:

4
CONCURRENT RESOLUTION URGING THE BANGSAMORO
TRANSITION AUTHORITY TO DESIGNATE ITS
REPRESENTATIVES TO THE PHILIPPINE CONGRESS-
BANGSAMORO PARLIAMENT FORUM TO BE CREATED
PURSUANT TO ARTICLE VI, SECTION 3 OF REPUBLIC ACT
NO. 11054, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE “ORGANIC LAW
FOR THE BANGSAMORO AUTONOMOUS REGION IN
MUSLIM MINDANAO” AND TO MEET WITH THE
DELEGATES DESIGNATED BY THE SENATE AND THE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES FOR THE PURPOSE

Introduced by Senator Zubiri

The President. Referred to the Committee on Rules

The Secretary. Proposed Senate Resolution No. 277, entitled:

A RESOLUTION HONORING AND COMMENDING THE PHILIPPINE

WINDSURFING TEAM FOR GARNERING GOLD MEDALS IN
THE 30TH SOUTHEAST ASIAN (SEA) GAMES

Introduced by Senator Pacquiao

The President. Referred to the Committee on Rules

The Secretary. Proposed Senate Resolution No. 278, entitled:

RESOLUTION COMMENDING AND CONGRATULATING THE

MEMBERS OF THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL TEAM WHO
HAVE COMPETED AND WON MEDALS FOR THEIR
ASTONISHING PERFORMANCE, PLACING THE COUNTRY
AS THE TOP OVERALL CHAMPION IN THE 30TH
SOUTHEAST ASIAN GAMES

Introduced by Senator Go

The President. Referred to the Committee on Rules

The Secretary. Proposed Senate Resolution No. 279, entitled:

A RESOLUTION COMMENDING THE OUTSTANDING YOUNG MEN

OF 2019

5
 Introduced by Senator Pacquiao

The President. To the Archives

The Secretary. Proposed Senate Resolution No. 280, entitled:

A RESOLUTION COMMENDING AND CONGRATULATING

JOHNRIEL CASIMERO FOR WINNING THE WBO
BANTAMWEIGHT WORLD CHAMPIONSHIP AT THE ARENA
BIRMINGHAM IN BIRMINGHAM, UNITED KINGDOM

Introduced by Senator Pacquiao

The President. Referred to the Committee on Rules

The Secretary. Proposed Senate Resolution No. 281, entitled:

RESOLUTION CONGRATULATING AND COMMENDING THE

MEDALISTS FROM THE CITY OF VALENZUELA AT THE
30TH SOUTHEAST ASIAN GAMES

Introduced by Senator Gatchalian

The President. Referred to the Committee on Rules

COMMITTEE REPORTS

The Secretary. Committee Report No. 31, prepared and submitted

jointly by the Committees on Trade, Commerce and Entrepreneurship; Ways
and Means and Finance, on Senate Bill No. 1240, with Senators Villar, Zubiri
and Pimentel III as authors thereof, entitled:

AN ACT INSTITUTIONALIZING BAMBOO INDUSTRY

DEVELOPMENT IN THE PHILIPPINES, CREATING THE
BAMBOO INDUSTRY DEVELOPMENT CENTER (BIDC),
APPROPRIATING FUNDS THEREFOR, AND FOR OTHER
PURPOSES

recommending its approval in substitution of Senate Bill Nos. 337 and 524.

Sponsor: Senator Pimentel

The President. To the Calendar for Ordinary Business

6
 The Secretary. Committee Report No. 32, prepared and submitted
jointly by the Committees on Trade, Commerce and Entrepreneurship; and
Local Government, on Senate Bill No. 1241, with Senators Recto and Pimentel
III as authors thereof, entitled:

AN ACT INSTITUTIONALIZING THE ESTABLISHMENT OF

TIMBANGAN NG BAYAN CENTERS IN PUBLIC AND
PRIVATE MARKETS, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE
CHAPTER II, TITLE III OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 7394
OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE “CONSUMER ACT OF THE
PHILIPPINES”

recommending its approval in substitution of Senate Bill No. 761.

Sponsor: Senator Pimentel

The President. To the Calendar for Ordinary Business

The Majority Leader is recognized.

Senator Zubiri. Thank you very much, Mr. President.

I have an omnibus sponsorship of two resolutions, Mr. President,

Proposed Senate Resolution Nos. 245 and 246. Should we proceed one by one,

Mr. President?

The President. The Majority Leader may do so, unless there is an

objection on the Floor.

Senator Zubiri. Thank you, Mr. President.

So, if I may be allowed to be recognized, Mr. President.

The President. Yes, Senator Zubiri is recognized.

Senator Zubiri. With the permission of the Body, I move that we take up

Proposed Senate Resolution Nos. 245 and 246.

7
 CONSIDERATION OF P.S. RES. NO. 245
(Congratulating and Commending Christine Hallasgo)

Senator Zubiri. Mr. President, I move that we consider Proposed Senate

Resolution Nos. 245 as reported out by the Committee on Rules.
The President. Is there any objection? [Silence] There being none, the
motion is approved.
Consideration of Proposed Senate Resolution No. 245 is now in order.
With the permission of the Body, the Secretary will read only the title of the
resolution without prejudice to inserting in the Record the whole text thereof.
The Secretary. Proposed Senate Resolution No. 245, entitled

RESOLUTION CONGRATULATING AND COMMENDING

CHRISTINE HALLASGO FOR WINNING A GOLD MEDAL IN
THE 30TH SOUTHEAST ASIAN GAMES AFTER EMERGING
VICTORIOUS IN THE WOMEN’S MARATHON AT THE NEW
CLARK CITY IN CAPAS, TARLAC ON 6 DECEMBER 2019

_______________________________________________________________________
The following is the whole text of the resolution:

P. S. Res. No. 245

[Insert]
_______________________________________________________________________

CONSIDERATION OF P.S. RES. NO. 246

(Congratulating and Commending Sarah Noveno Dequinan)

Senator Zubiri. Mr. President, I move that we consider Proposed Senate

Resolution Nos. 246 as reported out by the Committee on Rules.
The President. Is there any objection? [Silence] There being none, the
motion is approved.
Consideration of Proposed Senate Resolution No. 246 is now in order.
With the permission of the Body, the Secretary will read only the title of the
resolution without prejudice to inserting in the Record the whole text thereof.
The Secretary. Proposed Senate Resolution No. 246, entitled

RESOLUTION CONGRATULATING AND COMMENDING SARAH

NOVENO DEQUINAN FOR WINNING A GOLD MEDAL IN THE
30TH SOUTHEAST ASIAN GAMES AFTER EMERGING
VICTORIOUS IN THE WOMEN’S HEPTATHLON AT THE

8
 ATHLETICS STADIUM IN THE NEW CLARK CITY IN CAPAS,
TARLAC ON 8 DECEMBER 2019

_______________________________________________________________________
The following is the whole text of the resolution:

P. S. Res. No. 246

[Insert]
_______________________________________________________________________

Senator Zubiri. Mr. President, if I may be recognized.

The President. The Majority Leader is recognized.

SPONSORSHIP SPEECH OF SENATOR ZUBIRI

Senator Zubiri. Mr. President, I take the Floor today to congratulate two

women from Bukidnon who brought pride to our province and to the nation by

netting gold medals at the Southeast Asian Games.

For the women’s marathon held at New Clark City on 6 December 2019,

27-year-old Christine Hallasgo from Malaybalay City, Bukidnon, stormed

through the competition to a triumphant gold medal finish, completing the 42-

kilometer race in only 2 hours, 56 minutes, and 56 seconds. This win was an

underdog surprise and a stunning upset, coming from a first-time SEA Games

competitor.

For the women’s heptathlon held at Clark City on 8 December 2019,

Sarah Noveno Dequinan brought the country’s name to similar acclaim. The

23-year-old athlete from Valencia, Bukidnon collected 5,101 points throughout

the 100-meter hurdles, the high jump, the shot put, the 200-meter run, the

running long jump, the javelin throw, and the 800-meter run to ultimately

score the gold. With this feat, Sarah has claimed a win that has eluded us
9
since the legendary Elma Muros achieved it in 2001. Almost two decades later,

we can once again proudly claim that the “toughest woman in Asia” is a

Filipina.

Both Christine and Sarah had to do the difficult thing of leaving their

families in Bukidnon for a while in order to put in the necessary training for

the SEA Games. Their sacrifice, suffice it to say, has paid off immensely. We,

in Bukidnon, could not be more proud of them. They have put our beloved

province on the map, and they have brought great pride to the nation.

For all of this, Mr. President, it is my honor to commend Christine and

Sarah, who are testament to the astounding capabilities of the empowered

Filipina.

ADOPTION OF P. S. RES. NOS. 245 AND 246

Mr. President, there are no amendments and no interpellators, I move,

with the permission of the Body, that we adopt Proposed Senate Resolution
Nos. 245 and 246.

The President. Is there any objection? [Silence] There being none,

Proposed Senate Resolution No. 245, taking into consideration Proposed
Senate Resolution No. 246, is hereby adopted.

MANIFESTATION OF SENATOR ZUBIRI

(Cosponsorship and Coauthorship of All Members of
P.S. Res. Nos. 245 and 246)

Senator Zubiri. Mr. President, for the record as well, could we make all

members of the Senate as cosponsors and coauthors of the measures?

The President. We make that on record.

Senator Zubiri. Thank you, Mr. President.

10
 Before we pause to recognize and give them the resolutions, I would like

to move forward with the other resolutions on the SEA Games athletes so that

we can pause quickly and have photo with all of them together.

The President. Yes, the Majority Leader may do so.

CONSIDERATION OF P. S. RES. NO. 281

(Congratulating and Commending the Medalists from the City of Valenzuela)

Senator Zubiri. Mr. President, I move that we consider Proposed Senate

Resolution No. 281 as reported out by the Committee on Rules.
The President. Is there any objection? [Silence] There being none, the
motion is approved.
Consideration of Proposed Senate Resolution No. 281 is now in order.
With the permission of the Body, the Secretary will read only the title of the
resolution without prejudice to inserting in the Record the whole text thereof.
The Secretary. Proposed Senate Resolution No. 281, entitled

RESOLUTION CONGRATULATING AND COMMENDING THE

MEDALISTS FROM THE CITY OF VALENZUELA AT THE
30TH SOUTHEAST ASIAN GAMES
_______________________________________________________________________
The following are the whole texts of the resolutions:

P. S. Res. No. 281

[Insert]
_______________________________________________________________________

Senator Zubiri. Mr. President, may we recognize the sponsor of the

measure, Sen. Win Gatchalian.

The President. Former Mayor Win Gatchalian of Valenzuela is

recognized.

SPONSORSHIP SPEECH OF SENATOR GATCHALIAN

Senator Gatchalian. Thank you, Mr. President.

11
 Mr. President, distinguished colleagues, good afternoon.

I am in high spirits as I stand before all of you this afternoon. Only one

week has passed since the Philippines clinched the overall championship at

the 30th Southeast Asian Games, but up to now, we are still elated with the

historic win that our athletes delivered for our country.

By the time our athletes have hauled 149 gold, 117 silver, and 121

bronze medals, we all knew how it felt to win as one. Mr. President, today, I am

proud to pay tribute to Valenzuela’s athletes who took part in making history

and showed our Southeast Asian neighbors that Filipino talent is truly world-

class.

Let us recognize my fellow kababayans from Valenzuela who are here

with us this afternoon, two of them bagged gold medals: Mr. Fernando Jose

Casares in the triathlon-mixed relay; and Jeniel “Haze” Bata-Anon in e-sports.

Four Valenzuelanos also clinched bronze medals: Noelito Jose Jr. of the

Philippine Fencing Team, and coincidentally, he is also a Pio Valenzuela

scholar—that is a very coveted scholarship program in Valenzuela; Brandhon

Kyrielle Aquino of the Sailing International Men’s Event; Baby Jessica Canabal

of the Taekwondo Women’s Team; and John Michael “Amay” Pasco of the Men’s

Beach Handball Team.

Bilang isang mamamayan at dating alkalde ng Lungsod ng Valenzuela,

lubos kong ipinagmamalaki ang tagumpay ng aking mga kababayan sa

nagdaang SEA Games. Commending our players from Valenzuela is not just an

acknowledgment of their talent and triumph, but it also proved to us that hard

12
work, determination, and love for sports have led them to greater heights. Hindi

po biro, Mr. President, ang pinagdaanan nilang sakrispisyo sa pagsasanay para

lamang maiuwi ang medalya. Mas lalong hindi biro ang maging malayo sa

kanilang mga mahal sa buhay para lamang mag-ensayo.

Hindi lamang po sila ang nagbibigay ng inspirasyon sa akin.

Nagpapasalamat din po ako sa lahat ng mga taga-Valenzuela na taos-pusong

nagbibigay ng suporta sa ating mga manlalaro.

Our very own players received an outpouring of well wishes and other

forms of support from our local government officials to every kababayan on the

streets of Valenzueala City. At sa kanilang pagwawagi, hindi lamang sila nag-

uwi ng karangalan para sa kanilang sarili. Ang kanilang tagumpay ay

tagumpay ng Lungsod ng Valenzuela at ng ating bansa.

Mr. President, our winning athletes remind us that it is time for us to

write a new chapter in the history of sports development in our country. They

inspire us to create a nurturing environment that will help them develop their

talents, exceed their limits, and achieve their dreams.

I strongly believe that the greatest honor we can give them is to boost

sports development in our country so that athletes like them could reach their

full potential and be well-equipped for the world stage. Let us both maintain

and sustain the enthusiasm and energy we showed at the Southeast Asian

Games and support the next generation of Filipino athletes.

13
 Looking forward to the new year, I am very excited on our proposed

Philippine High School for Sports that will help us develop more world-class

Filipino athletes.

It is my dream to see more young Valenzuelanos develop their talents

and become global athletes.

Sa mga kapwa kong Valenzuelano na nagdala ng karangalan sa aming

mahal na lungsod at sa buong bansa, alam kong malayo pa ang inyong

mararating upang makapag-uwi ng mas marami pang karangalan. Sa

pagpapatuloy ng inyong paglalakbay, makakaasa kayo na katuwang po ninyo

ako.

Mr. President, dear colleagues, I urge you to join me in congratulating

and commending our Southeast Asian Games medalists from the City of

Valenzuela who brought honor and pride to our country.

Mabuhay ang mga atletang Pinoy! Mabuhay ang mga manlalaro ng

Valenzuela City!

Maraming Salamat po.

The President. The Majority Leader is recognized.

Senator Zubiri. Mr. President, may we recognize Senator dela Rosa.

The President. Senator dela Rosa is recognized.

MANIFESTATION OF SENATOR DELA ROSA

Senator Dela Rosa. Thank you, Mr. President, for allowing me to

present my short manifestation on the same topic—the performance of our

athletes in the last SEA Games.

14
 Mr. President, I join my colleagues in this august Chamber in

commending all our Filipino athletes who have actively and excellently

participated in the recent Southeast Asian Games. Not only did they reap gold,

silver, and bronze medals for our country, but they also won the hearts of

other SEA Games competitors and the whole world, for demonstrating the

highest degree of sportsmanship, discipline, and supreme distinction of what

Filipino athletes are made of.

Being a sportsperson myself, I feel the joy and the triumph of our local

athletes whose hours of tireless practice and indefatigable sacrifices paved the

way to success.

I was once a varsity player of the Philippine Military Academy. I was into

boxing, judo, and wrestling during my PMA days, and almost made it to the

national team in wrestling during the Gintong Alay days of Michael Keon.

Being into sports not only enhances the physical stamina and well-being

of an individual, but likewise nurtures one's emotional and mental discipline in

achieving the personal goal of excelling in one's chosen sports.

Maraming salamat sa ating mga atleta na naging magandang huwaran sa

ating mga kabataan na magtuon ng panahon sa sports.

Saludo ako sa ating mga atletang Pilipino! Salamat sa karangalang

ipinagkaloob ninyo sa ating bansa at mamamayang Pilipino!

Thank you, Mr. President.

The President. The Majority Leader is recognized.

MANIFESTATION OF SENATOR ZUBIRI

(Cosponsorship and Coauthorship of All the Members
15
 of P. S. Res. No. 281)

Senator Zubiri. Mr. President, with the permission of the sponsor,

Senator Gatchalian, I ask that all members of the Senate be made cosponsors

and coauthors of the measure.

The President. Place that on record.

ADOPTION OF P. S. RES. NO. 281

Senator Zubiri. Mr. President, there are no other members who wish to

interpellate and there are no amendments as well. I move that we adopt

Proposed Senate Resolution No. 281.

The President. Is there any objection? [Silence] There being none,

Proposed Senate Resolution No. 281 is adopted.

SUSPENSION OF SESSION

Senator Zubiri. Mr. President, may I ask for a one-minute suspension

of the session to give the resolution of congratulations to our medalists.

The President. Is there any objection? [Silence] There being none, the
session is suspended.

It was 3:23 p.m.

RESUMPTION OF SESSION

At 3:29 p.m., the session was resumed.

The President. The session is resumed.

The Majority Leader is recognized.

Senator Zubiri. Mr. President, I know in the agenda today, we marked

the Anti-Terrorism Act as number one priority.

The President. Yes.

16
 Senator Zubiri. But my assistant Majority Leader has been badgering

me today if he can just read his three-page sponsorship speech, to which

Senator Lacson graciously acceded to allow the sponsorship of the good

gentleman from Bulacan.

SPECIAL ORDER
Senator Zubiri. Mr. President, I move that we transfer from the

Calendar for Ordinary Business to the Calendar for Special Orders Committee

Report No. 30 on Senate Bill No. 1233, entitled

AN ACT EXPANDING THE USE OF THE LEGAL ASSISTANCE

FUND, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE SECTION 26 OF
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 8042, AS AMENDED, OTHERWISE
KNOWN AS THE MIGRANT WORKERS AND OVERSEAS
FILIPINOS ACT OF 1995

The President. Is there any objection? [Silence] There being none, the

motion is approved.

BILL ON SECOND READING

S. No. 1233—Migrant Workers
and Overseas Filipinos Legal Assistance Fund

Senator Zubiri. Mr. President, I move that we consider Senate Bill No.

1233 as reported out under Committee Report No. 30.

The President. Is there any objection? [Silence] There being none, the

motion is approved.

Consideration of Senate Bill No. 1233 is now in order. With the

permission of the Body, the Secretary will read only the title of the bill without

prejudice to inserting in the Record the whole text thereof.

The Secretary. Senate Bill No. 1233, entitled

17
 AN ACT EXPANDING THE USE OF THE LEGAL ASSISTANCE
FUND, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE SECTION 26 OF
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 8042, AS AMENDED, OTHERWISE
KNOWN AS THE MIGRANT WORKERS AND OVERSEAS
FILIPINOS ACT OF 1995
______________________________________________________________________________

The following is the whole text of the bill:

S. No. 1233

[Insert]
______________________________________________________________________________

The President. The Majority Leader is recognized.

Senator Zubiri. Thank you, Mr. President.

Mr. President, I ask that we recognize the sponsor, Sen. Joel Villanueva,

to sponsor the measure.

The President. Sen. Joel Villanueva is recognized.

SPONSORSHIP SPEECH OF SENATOR VILLANUEVA

Senator Villanueva. Thank you, Mr. President; thank you, Mr. Majority

Leader.

Maganda at mapagpalang hapon po sa ating lahat.

Mr. President and my distinguished colleagues, it is my honor as

chairman of the Committee on Labor, Employment and Human Resources

Development to sponsor Senate Bill No. 1233 under Committee Report No. 30

or “An Act Expanding the Use of the Legal Assistance Fund, Amending for the

Purpose Section 26 of Republic Act No. 8042, as Amended, Otherwise Known

as the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act.”

18
 G. Pangulo, tatlong buwan na po ang nakararaan nang magbaba ng hatol

ang Syrian District Criminal Court na guilty sa kasong murder si Mouna Ali

Hassoun, ang employer ng kababayan nating inabuso, pinaslang, at itinago sa

loob ng freezer sa isang inabandonang apartment sa Kuwait na si Joanna

Demafelis. Halos tatlong taon pong paghihintay mula nang una nating

mabalitaan ang pagkawala ni Joanna Demafelis noong 2017.

Habang nakikipaglaban para sa hustisya ang kaniyang mga pamilya at

mahal sa buhay ang ating gobyerno, isang kababayan din natin ang kinidnap at

ginahasa naman noong ika-4 ng Hunyo 2019 ng isang Kuwaiti police officer na

si Fayed Naser Hamad Alajmy. Nangyari po ito pagdating na pagdating sa

Kuwait ng ating kababayan para magtrabaho bilang household service worker.

Dalawang linggo matapos ang insidenteng ito, isang kababayan naman

nating biktima ng illegal recruitment at human trafficking ang namatay sa

Morocco matapos siyang tumalon diumano mula sa ikatlong palapag ng

tinitirhang apartment matapos daw ang mainit na pakikipagtalo sa kaniyang

employer noong ika-22 ng Hunyo 2019.

Ang tatlong pangyayaring ito ay napakaliit na porsiyento lamang ng hindi

po mabilang na kaso ng pang-aabuso sa ating mga OFWs. Noong ika-6 lamang

ng Oktubre, 158 Pilipino mula sa United Arab Emirates na biktima ng illegal

recruitment at human trafficking ang sapilitan ding umuwi at ipinauwi dito sa

ating bansa.

Bukod po sa physical abuse, marami rin sa ating mga kababayan ang

nakaranas ng psychological abuse kaya nga po isinulong at ipinasa natin noong

19
nakaraang Kongreso ang Social Welfare Attaché Law; hindi pagbabayad ng

tamang suweldo o delayed na pagbayad ng suweldo; contract alteration tulad

ng nangyari sa mga Pinoy truck drivers sa Poland at Germany, at sa iba pang

lugar sa Europa.

Maging sa atin pong opisina, G. Pangulo, araw-araw po tayong

nakatatanggap ng mga liham, sulat, at e-mail mula sa mga OFWs sa iba’t-ibang

panig ng mundo; humihingi ng tulong upang ma-rescue sila sa kanilang mga

mapang-aping employers, o upang matulungan sila sa mga kasong

nasasangkutan nila sa ibang bansa.

Kaya nga po, G. Pangulo, kailangan natin ng makabuluhang reporma sa

ating batas upang paigtingin pa ang proteksiyon para sa ating mga bagong

bayani, para sa ating mga OFWs, gayundin ang mga programang

magpapatingkad ng pagkalinga ng gobyerno sa kanila.

This is in line with the 1987 Constitution, Mr. President, which decrees

the full protection of labor, both local and overseas, as a primary social

economic force. To be sure, however, full protection of labor under the

Constitution does not simply mean and end at mere provision by the State of

work and equal employment opportunities for its workforce. Full protection of

labor more significantly implies a continuing positive duty on the part of the

Senate to ensure that the rights of its workers are at all times protected and

their welfare promoted and improved at every chance possible.

According to the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE), as of

June 2019, there are approximately 8,985,377 Filipinos abroad—3,352,188 of

20
which are Filipino migrant workers. Meanwhile, according to the Department

of Foreign Affairs (DFA), the number of overseas Filipinos who have sought the

help of the DFA for legal assistance has been on a steady increase. In 2018,

there are approximately 3,735 overseas Filipinos who have been assisted by the

DFA through the legal assistance fund. Meanwhile, as of August 31, 2019,

approximately 4,116 have already benefited from the legal assistance fund.

These data reflect not only the practical utility of the legal assistance

fund and its advantages, but also and more importantly, Mr. President, the

existence of the actual need for immediate and prompt legal assistance to the

thousands of migrant workers and Filipinos abroad.

Mr. President, it is in this context that I am sponsoring Senate Bill No.

1233 under Committee Report No. 30, which aims to amend Section 26 of the

Migrant Worker’s Act, and aims to achieve the following:

First, this measure seeks to strengthen and expand the use of the legal

assistance fund to include bonds required not just by the courts, but also by

other agencies or tribunal. The law’s application, thus, is not only limited to

payment of bonds for purposes of securing provisional liberties, but also to

such other bonds required by courts, tribunals, or government agencies.

Second, the proposed amendment to Section 26 of the Migrant Workers

Act authorizes our foreign posts to engage the services of paralegals with

special knowledge and familiarity with the language, laws, rules, procedures,

customs, and traditions of the foreign country. Mr. President, this allows our

foreign posts to immediately provide, at the very least, such basic or first aid

21
legal services that migrant workers and overseas Filipinos in distress may

need. The aim is to advance and improve not only the quality, but also the

promptness of the delivery of these services to our migrant workers and

overseas Filipinos.

Third, the amendments mandate in no uncertain terms that legal

support and the legal assistance fund shall immediately and at all times be

made available to distressed migrant workers and Filipinos abroad. It further

clarifies that such assistance shall be given from the moment the case is

initiated, or the proceeding is commenced, until its termination, promulgation,

and execution. This assistance extends further to all appeals taken on these

cases, thereby guaranteeing full and complete support to distressed Filipino

overseas.

Lastly, Mr. President, the measure clarifies that the implementing rules

and regulations of the Act may authorize the secretary of foreign affairs to

delegate the authority to approve an expenditure chargeable to the fund to the

head of post, subject, of course, to existing rules and regulations of the

Commission on Audit (COA). Mr. President, this is to address the concern

raised during our technical working group discussions that actions on

requests for legal assistance by some OFWs are delayed because of the

bureaucratic approval process in availing of the fund. Accordingly, before a

legal expense can be charged to the fund, an approval from the main office of

the Department of Foreign Affairs is still needed, which sometimes, may be

22
detrimental to the welfare, not to mention mental health, of migrant workers

and overseas Filipino in distress.

Therefore, Mr. President, we urge our esteemed colleagues to rally

behind this noble effort to further strengthen the protection afforded by the

State to our migrant workers and overseas Filipinos. The risks and

vulnerabilities suffered by our countrymen overseas cannot be

overemphasized.

Indeed, the proposed amendments to the Migrant Workers Act are a

testament to the State’s continuing effort to give true meaning to the

constitutional edict of giving “full protection” to our migrant workers and

distressed overseas Filipinos.

As the eminent Associate Justice of the Supreme Court Abraham

Sarmiento once observed, “It is bad enough that the country has to send its

sons and daughters to strange lands because it cannot satisfy their

employment needs at home. Under these circumstances, the Government is

duty-bound to ensure that our toiling expatriates have adequate protection,

personally and economically, while away from home.” It is, thus, just fitting

and appropriate and in line with the celebration of the “Month of Overseas

Filipinos,” that this Chamber fully and immediately approve Senate Bill No.

1233 under Committee Report No. 30.

Before I end my speech, Mr. President, please allow me to reiterate our

thanks and appreciation to all our colleagues for their interest and support to

this measure, most especially our coauthors, Senators Nancy Binay and

23
Ronald “Bato” dela Rosa, and the members of the Committee on Labor and

Employment who actively participated during the deliberations of this bill.

Maraming salamat po, at muli, pagpalain tayong lahat ng ating

Panginoong Diyos.

The President. Majority Leader.

MANIFESTATIONOF SENATOR ZUBIRI

(Insertion of the Sponsorship Speeches of Senators Dela Rosa and Binay
on S. No. 1233 Into the Record)

Senator Zubiri. Thank you, Mr. President.

Sen. Ronald “Bato” M. dela Rosa and Sen. Nancy Binay would like to

insert into the Record their cosponsorship speeches.

The President. The cosponsorship speeches of Senators Dela Rosa and

Binay be inserted into the Record.

MOTION OF SENATOR ZUBIRI

(Cosponsorship of All the Members Present of Senate Bill No. 1233)

Senator Zubiri. Mr. President, there are requests from our colleagues,

Senators Angara, Poe, Pacquiao, and myself, to be made coauthors of the

measure.

The President. Senators Gatchalian and Pimentel also, and all those

present.

Senator Zubiri. With the permission of the Body, Mr. President, I move

that all members present be made cosponsors of Senate Bill No. 1233.

The President. Is there any objection? [Silence] There being none, the

motion is approved.

SUSPENSION OF CONSIDERATION OF S. NO. 1233

24
 Senator Zubiri. Mr. President, to allow our colleagues to study the
measure further, I move that we suspend consideration of Senate Bill No. 1233.

The President. Is there any objection? [Silence] There being none, the
motion is approved.

ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF GUESTS

Senator Zubiri. Mr. President, we have in the gallery Mayor Haron

Omar of Magsaysay, Lanao del Norte, and his party.

The President. Welcome to the Senate.

BILL ON SECOND READING

S. No. 1083 – Anti-Terrorism Act of 2019
(Continuation)

Senator Zubiri. Mr. President, I move that we resume consideration of

Senate Bill No. 1083 as reported out under Committee Report No. 9.

The President. Is there any objection? [Silence] There being none,

resumption of consideration of Senate Bill No. 1083 is now in order.

Senator Zubiri. Mr. President, we are in the period of interpellations.

I ask that we recognize the distinguished senator from Cavite, Sen.

Panfilo M. Lacson; and to interpellate, our distinguished Minority Leader, Sen.

Franklin M. Drilon.

The President. The gentleman from Cavite, chairman of the Committee

on National Defense and Security, Peace, Unification and Reconciliation, Sen.

Ping Lacson, is recognized; and to interpellate, the Minority Leader, Sen. Frank

Drilon.

Senator Drilon. Thank you, Mr. President.

25
 Mr. President, given the importance of this measure, I do hope that I can

attract the attention of our colleagues in the period of interpellations, where we

will seek to clarify certain issues.

This is just a manifestation on record.

Thank you, Mr. President.

Mr. President, will the gentleman from Cavite, sponsor of the measure,

yield the Floor for a few questions?

Senator Lacson. To the distinguished Minority Leader, one of the

acknowledged better minds in this Chamber, any intervention coming from him

to enhance this measure is very much appreciated. So, willingly, Mr. President.

Senator Drilon. Thank you very much, Mr. President.

We wish to assure the good sponsor that the questions we will raise here

and the amendments that we will submit later during the period of

amendments are aimed to make the provisions clear, remove the ambiguities,

both in substance and procedure, to make the law and its implementation and

prosecution more effective.

It is in this context that we are availing of this period of interpellations in

order that we can submit to the good sponsor our views as to how to improve

the bill so that the prosecution arm and the law enforcement agencies of this

government can be more effective in their task to secure our borders and our

national security.

So, to start with, Mr. President, the gentleman is fully familiar with the

concept and principle of civilian supremacy in our Constitution.

26
 Senator Lacson. That is an assurance, Mr. President.

Senator Drilon. Yes, it is found in Article II, Declaration of Principles,

Section 3 of our Constitution which says and I quote: “Civilian authority is, at

all times, supreme over the military. The Armed Forces of the Philippines is the

protector of the people and the State. Its goal is to secure the sovereignty of the

State and the integrity of the national territory.” These are the very clear terms

of our Constitution and reiterate the principle of civilian supremacy.

We note, Mr. President, that the bill proposed gives an expansive role to

our military establishment in the fight against terrorism. Just to give a few

examples of amendments in the proposed measure which gives an expansive

role to our armed forces would be: 1) The military is given the authority to

undertake surveillance activities upon the order of the Court of Appeals; 2) The

military establishment can also apply with the Court of Appeals to compel

telecommunications service providers and internet service providers to produce

customer information and identification records; 3) The military can also apply

for an order to undertake surveillance activities; 4) The military can execute a

joint affidavit in connection with the deposit of intercepted and recorded

communications with the issuing court; 5) The military can also take into

custody a person charged with or suspected of committing any terrorist act or

any attempt or conspiracy to commit terrorist acts, or any member of the

proscribed group of persons, organization or association without need of

judicial warrant of arrest and subject to certain conditions; 6) The Armed

Forces of the Philippines may also conduct, upon authority of the court,

27
examination of bank records. This expansive role of the military is found in

various sections of the proposed measure.

Our question, Mr. President, is, given this role given by the bill to the

military, if it becomes a law, does this impinge on the principle of civilian

supremacy enshrined in our 1987 Constitution?

Senator Lacson. Definitely not, Mr. President, because the primary

function of law enforcement rests on the police organization. The military will

play a supportive role to assist our police officials in the implementation of this

proposed measure.

Senator Drilon. Very good. In other words, the primacy of the PNP is

recognized under the proposed measure, notwithstanding the expansive role

given to the Armed Forces of the Philippines.

Senator Lacson. That is correct, Mr. President.

In the performance of law enforcement functions, it is still the PNP and

the NBI that will play the lead role. But, of course, in some areas where

terrorism is, shall we say, abundant in its activities and the military presence

is needed, then they are also allowed to exercise or to secure judicial

authorization in monitoring or conducting surveillance against the terrorist

groups or terrorist individuals, Mr. President.

Senator Drilon. Mr. President, should we not give the Armed Forces of

the Philippines a more extensive role where the situation or the act constitutes

serious threat to national security?

28
 Senator Lacson. That is correct, Mr. President. But the primacy of the

civilian authority is still there because if they conduct surveillance, they still

need to get judicial authorization from the civilian court. In this case, in our

proposal, not from an ordinary regional trial court but from the Court of

Appeals.

Senator Drilon. Yes, that is the present law. What we are really saying,

Mr. President, is that when it involves a suppression of insurgency and other

serious threats to our national security, I think it should be accepted that the

military should play a bigger role and maybe even take a lead.

Let me cite to the good sponsor Section 12 of Republic Act No. 6975.

SEC. 12. Relationship of the Department of the Interior and

Local Government with the Department of National Defense. – The
Department of the Interior and Local Government shall be relieved
of the primary responsibility on matters involving the suppression
of insurgency and other serious threats to national security. The
Philippine National Police shall, through information gathering and
performance of its ordinary police functions, support the Armed
Forces of the Philippines on matters involving suppression of
insurgency, except in cases where the President shall call on the
PNP to support the AFP in combat operations.

In other words, Mr. President, what we are saying is, under our present

law and practice, the AFP is given a lead role even on matters involving

national security. Is that a correct proposition?

Senator Lacson. That is the impression of the good gentleman under

Republic Act No. 6975. That is correct, Mr. President. But the military operate

mostly in the rural areas where insurgency is so prevalent that the police

cannot handle alone the situation or the security threat. But by and large,

generally speaking, the Armed Forces of the Philippines will be in charge of

29
external threats, while internal threats are taken care of by the Philippine

National Police.

Senator Drilon. We are raising this question, Mr. President, because

whether the armed forces or the police would have jurisdiction over an offense

would depend really on the purpose for which the act is being committed where

it threatens national security. It is our submission that this is within the

purview of a terrorist activity which should be within the jurisdiction and

primary responsibility of the armed forces as right now defined under our

existing laws.

Senator Lacson. As I said, Mr. President, if it involves external threats

then the Armed Forces of the Philippines takes the lead role. But as far as

internal threats, it is a rather complex situation because we can consider acts

of terrorism as borderless crimes because a terroristic act may be committed

outside of our jurisdiction and, precisely, we intended to make the application

of the law proactive to prevent any massive damage on our infrastructure, on

the social, political, and even economic structure of the country.

Senator Drilon. Just to be clear and it should be spread on the record,

that in the view of the sponsor, the Philippine National Police has the primary

obligation and duty to suppress terrorism and the AFP will play a secondary

role and only in those instances which are specified in the proposed law.

Senator Lacson. That is correct, Mr. President.

Senator Drilon. Thank you, Mr. President.

Let us go to some specific issues in the bill, Mr. President.

30
 Let us go to Section 4, Mr. President. First, a comment: I believe that the

noun “terrorism” as a description of the crime is better than “terrorist acts.” So,

at the appropriate time, maybe we can retain the noun “terrorism” to describe

the offense rather than “terrorist acts.” In any case, that will come later on. I

am just submitting that this early for the consideration of the good sponsor.

Senator Lacson. Yes, Mr. President.

Senator Drilon. Section 4 provides, “Any person who commits any of

the following unlawful acts, in or outside of the Philippines, regardless of its

stage of execution” is guilty of terrorism. First, this is the extraterritoriality

principle because of the phrase “in or outside the Philippines.”

Mr. President, the present law clearly indicates when the

extraterritoriality will apply and, in those instances, it is very clear that the

nexus of the offense or an element of the offense takes place within the

boundaries of the Philippines, or concerns Filipinos, or an establishment

recognized as part of the Philippine territory. In other words, it is not simply

because a terrorist act was committed but because of the fact that it concerns

the Philippines.

Senator Lacson. That is not quite accurate, Mr. President. Even a

foreigner who comes to the Philippines or a foreign terrorist…that is why we

had dedicated one section defining a foreign terrorist because even if he is not

a Filipino and he commits acts of terrorism abroad and he attempts to come to

the Philippines, then, he may be put under the jurisdiction of this proposed

measure.

31
 Senator Drilon. Firstly, Mr. President, I am just talking about the

present law.

Senator Lacson. The present law. I am sorry, Mr. President.

Senator Drilon. Mr. President, the present law, under Section 58,

defines the principle when extraterritoriality will apply: 1) when the person

who commits crimes defined and punished under this Act within the terrestrial

domain of the Philippines; 2) when the individual persons who, although

physically outside the territory of the Philippines, commit, conspire or plot to

commit any of the offenses punished by this Act inside the territorial limits of

the Philippines; 3) persons who, although physically outside the territorial

limits of the Philippines, commit any of the said crimes on a board Philippine

ship; 4) when the person, although outside the territorial boundaries of the

Philippines, commits crimes against a Filipino citizen; 5) when the individuals

who, while physically outside the territorial jurisdiction of the Philippines,

commit said crimes directly against the Philippine government.

So, if we will note, Mr. President, in the present law, there is always a

relation to the security of the Philippines, or the security of its territory, or the

security of a Filipino citizen.

Senator Lacson. That is correct, Mr. President.

Senator Drilon. Now, is there a change in that concept? Because it

would appear under Section 4 that there is no longer a need for a nexus in the

Philippines.

32
 Senator Lacson. That is still the principle applied under the proposed

measure, Mr. President. It is the interest or the safety and security of the

Philippines and any Filipino residing this country.

Senator Drilon. Yes. I agree with that, Mr. President. That is when the

principle of extraterritoriality clearly applies. So, at the appropriate time, would

the good sponsor agree to maybe reinstate those instances when

extraterritoriality applies, and the important factor is that there must be an

element or the objective must involve a Philippine national, Philippine territory,

et cetera.

Senator Lacson. Definitely, Mr. President. We will maintain that same

principle.

Senator Drilon. Yes, because the way it is phrased here, Mr. President,

right now, the way the bill is phrased, especially in the case of foreign terrorist

who is punished when they cross boarders—that is found in the bill—when

they go from one country to the other with a purpose of committing terrorist

acts, he is punishable by life imprisonment by Philippine courts.

Senator Lacson. Under the proposed measure, Mr. President.

Senator Drilon. Yes, under the proposed measure. So, theoretically, if a

Malaysian terrorist will travel to Indonesia to commit acts of terrorism in

Indonesia, it can be punished under the definition of a “foreign terrorist” under

the law?

Senator Lacson. Theoretically, yes, Mr. President. But the long arm of

the Philippine law cannot overreach to a country like Indonesia or Malaysia.

33
When they are here, then we acquire jurisdiction. In the first place, even if we

have the capability to arrest them in Indonesia, we cannot apply this proposed

measure in Indonesia.

Senator Drilon. All right.

Senator Lacson. But if they attempt to come here, even if they

committed the crime of terrorism in Indonesia or Malaysia, or elsewhere, then

they can be punished with the maximum penalty of life imprisonment without

the benefit of parole, Mr. President.

Senator Drilon. All right. Let me clarify that, Mr. President.

Senator Lacson. What we are trying to avoid here is to make the

Philippines a safe haven for terrorists. If the gentleman remembers the Maute

fighters, they were influenced by foreign terrorists. We do not want that to

happen again in the Philippines, Mr. President.

Senator Drilon. Right. But did they not commit a punishable offense

while in Philippine territory? For example, if they intended to commit terrorist

acts in the Philippines, yes, they can be punished.

Senator Lacson. Yes, they can be punished.

Senator Drilon. But if there is no such act committed or no overt act is

committed in the Philippines, I think, it is a little difficult to accept that we will

punish them. Maybe we should deport or extradite them to the country where

the offense was committed. But I do not think it is a correct legal principle that

they should be punished in the Philippines for acts done in another country

which does not affect the Philippines at all.

34
 Senator Lacson. But if they attempt to come here, then, as I said, once

they are here, they may be punished under this proposed measure.

Precisely, we intend to expand the coverage of terrorist acts, Mr.

President. Even if the terrorist act was committed outside of our jurisdiction,

once they attempt to come here, and we have sufficient evidence to show that

he is a foreign terrorist who is coming to the Philippines, then, by all means,

the proposed measure will be giving the authority to arrest and punish. But, of

course, it depends on the intent and purpose of coming here.

Senator Drilon. Yes. If he just comes here to go to Boracay and…

Senator Lacson. If he is a foreign terrorist?

Senator Drilon. Yes, theoretically.

Senator Lacson. Yes, Mr. President. He can still be covered under the

proposed measure.

Senator Drilon. That is a little difficult to accept, Mr. President. Are we

saying that terrorism is a continuing offense so that a foreign terrorist who

crosses the border but has no intention whatsoever of doing anything or

violating Philippine law, or committing any acts of terrorism—and there is no

evidence—will he be subject to life imprisonment here?

Senator Lacson. Under the territoriality principle, yes, Mr. President?

Senator Drilon. No. Well, the way it is defined…

Senator Lacson. If he goes to Boracay on R&R but he is a foreign

terrorist who has committed acts of terrorism abroad, then he is simply

covered under the proposed measure under the principle of territoriality.

35
 Senator Drilon. There is no nexus or point of contact for the

Philippines. Why should we punish him with life imprisonment when there is

no point of contact?

May I yield the Floor to Senator Tolentino who wants to contribute.

Senator Tolentino. Mr. President.

The President. Senator Tolentino is recognized.

MANIFESTATION OF SENATOR TOLENTINO

Senator Tolentino. Mr. President, with the permission of the good

sponsor and the Minority Leader. Perhaps, I would just like to interject an item

as the Minority Leader interjected Article 2 of the Revised Penal Code, which is

correct. The provision mentioned states “Should commit an offense while on a

Philippine ship,” et cetera, among others. But, perhaps, the good sponsor is

now referring to a new customary international law which is generally

accepted. And I am now referring to the universality principle. And I would

like to quote this and, probably, as part of this parliamentary conversation,

this would clarify what the good sponsor is saying that, indeed, even without

the nexus being posited by the good Minority Leader, there is indeed

jurisdiction, and I quote, Mr. President, “A universal jurisdiction would apply,

and it refers to an idea that a national court may prosecute individuals for

serious crimes against international law such as crimes against humanity, war

crimes, genocide, torture, terrorism, based on the principle that such crimes

harm the international community.”

36
 I heard of a crime committed in Indonesia without a connection to

Philippine penal laws or international order itself which individual States may

also protect, Mr. President.

Generally, universal jurisdiction is invoked when other traditional bases

of criminal jurisdictions are not available. For example, the defendant is not a

national of the State; the defendant did not commit a crime in that State’s

territory or against its nationals; or the State’s own national interests are not

adversely affected, Mr. President.

The norm suggests that States are obligated to intervene diplomatically

or even to the extreme, militarily, to prevent the commission of such crimes,

Mr. President. That is probably the missing link that the good Minority Leader

is trying to find out--where is the nexus, where is the connection? The

connection lies in the disruption of the general peace, of the general

international legal order, when someone commits a crime whether it is within

the territory or outside the territory of the Philippines by a foreign national, by

a Filipino, if it effects crimes such as terrorism, Mr. President. I am quoting

this, this will be part of the parliamentary exchange when, probably, the good

sponsor would be in the period of individual amendments. I just retorted this

because the good Minority Leader was looking for a nexus or a legal

connection.

So, the umbilical cord, so to speak, is found in the universality principle

which I have just stated, Mr. President.

Senator Lacson. Thank you, Mr. President.

37
 What the gentleman from Cavite has pointed out is the definition of

universal jurisdiction. The Institute of International Law in its resolution on

universal jurisdiction provides that, and I would like to quote, “Universal

jurisdiction in criminal matters, as an additional ground of jurisdiction, means

the competence of a State to prosecute alleged offenders and to punish them if

convicted irrespective of the place of commission of the crime and regardless of

any link—nexus—of active or passive nationality, or other grounds of

jurisdiction recognized by international law.”

That is what he just pointed out and rightly so, Mr. President, because in

our case, we are invoking the extrajudicial application provided that this clause

could be justified by one of the recognized principles: 1) active nationality

principle; 2) protective principle; 3) passive principle; and 4) the universality

principle under international law.

Senator Drilon. Well, Mr. President, the present Revised Penal Code

very clearly outlines when extraterritoriality can be evoked. Let me read Article

2: “Application of its provisions. - Except as provided in treaties and laws of

preferential application, the provisions of this Code shall be enforced not only

within the Philippine archipelago, including its atmosphere, its interior waters

and maritime zone, but also outside of its jurisdiction, against those who:

(5) Should commit any of the crimes against national security and the

law of nations.”

What are the crimes against national security? Treason, conspiracy and

proposal to commit treason, misprision of treason, and espionage, and crimes

38
against the law of nations include inciting to war or giving motives for reprisals,

violation of neutrality, correspondence with a hostile country, flight to the

enemy country, piracy in general, and mutiny on the high seas or in Philippine

waters.

In the case of People vs. Lol-lo and Saraw decided by the Supreme Court,

the Supreme Court held that piracy is not a crime against any particular State

but against all mankind. That is why even when not one of the elements—

where there is no point of contact in the Philippines—they are punished

because by tradition and by practice, piracy is a crime against humanity. But if

we will notice, Mr. President, extraterritoriality is an exception to the general

rule.

Senator Lacson. That is correct, Mr. President.

Senator Drilon. And, therefore, that exception must be clearly justified

because a very broad and loose application of extraterritoriality can result in

many difficult legal questions to resolve. And in this particular case, the

gentleman is saying that even if there is no point of contact in the Philippines,

the terrorist can be imprisoned for life in the Philippines.

Mr. President, looking at this proposed measure, somewhere here is a

definition that when a foreign terrorist crosses international boarders—not

even going to the Philippines—he can be punished by life imprisonment in the

Philippines.

Senator Lacson. That is correct, Mr. President.

39
 Senator Drilon. In other words, if a foreign terrorist would move from

one country to another or abroad, sowing terrorist acts in foreign countries and

has nothing to do with the Philippines, it is still a crime under the Philippine

law.

Senator Lacson. As clearly pointed out by Senator Tolentino, Mr.

President, we are now applying the definition of “universal jurisdiction”

because the provision under the Revised Penal Code is very limiting and that is

the reason why we included the phrase “in or outside of the Philippines.”

During the committee hearing, Mr. President, last August 13, General

Monteguda, the NICA director general, raised one problem that the law must

address. Kaya nga isiningit natin dito ito, Mr. President. For example, and this

is theoretical, what do we do to a Filipino who joined the ISIS abroad and is

planning to come back here sa Pilipinas? And in the same manner, we are also

faced with the parallel question: What should we do with foreigners who

commit terrorist acts abroad and then come to the Philippines to evade

prosecution in the place where they committed their terrorist acts? Kaya

medyo in-expand nga natin to cover foreign terrorists; and even those who

committed terroristic acts abroad may be covered or may be punished under

the proposed measure, Mr. President.

Senator Drilon. Well, our submission, Mr. President, is that there are

remedies available in those instances other than life imprisonment. I am not

saying that we should be helpless, but what we are saying is, to punish that

person with life imprisonment when he had absolutely no intention to violate

40
the integrity of the national territory or the national sovereignty or the security

of the Philippines. We should impose life imprisonment because, Mr. President,

in case of conflict of laws, for example, in order that it applies, there must be a

point of contact in one country. That is our problem with a very broad and, to

our mind, overarching jurisdiction.

I am sorry, Mr. President, but my little knowledge of the law would not

accept the proposition that he who had nothing to do with the Philippines, not

plotting against the Philippines, not doing act which would undermine our

national security, who comes here--even if he does not come here--the bill

would punish crossing borders abroad in the way it is phrased now.

Senator Lacson. Hindi applicable.

Senator Drilon. Yes, Mr. President.

Senator Lacson. This will not apply, Mr. President. The general

principle that would apply is that, if a foreign terrorist commits the crime

abroad and he does not come to the Philippines, then we cannot really reach

him. We cannot acquire jurisdiction. But under the proposed measure, he can

be punished once he attempts to come to the Philippines even on R&R.

Senator Drilon. Mr. President, to our mind, those are two different

issues--the matter of ability to enforce the law and the law itself. Let me cite to

the good gentleman page 10, Section 10 of the proposed measure. Let me

read it, and we invite the sponsor to this. It says:

“SEC. 10. FOREIGN TERRORIST. – THE FOLLOWING ACTS ARE

UNLAWFUL AND SHALL BE PUNISHED WITH THE PENALTY OF LIFE

41
IMPRISONMENT WITHOUT THE BENEFIT OF PAROLE AND THE BENEFITS

OF R. A. NO. 10592:

(A) FOR ANY PERSON TO TRAVEL OR ATTEMPT TO TRAVEL TO A

STATE OTHER THAN HIS/HER STATE OF RESIDENCE OR NATIONALITY,

FOR THE PURPOSE OF PERPETRATING, PLANNING, OR PREPARING FOR, OR

PARTICIPATING IN TERRORIST ACTS, OR PROVIDING OR RECEIVING

TERRORIST TRAINING.”

Here, Mr. President, it is very clear that a foreign terrorist who is

planning to commit such acts abroad, nothing to do with the Philippines, the

fact that he crosses borders would make him liable for life imprisonment in the

Philippines.

Senator Lacson. Not for crossing borders but for planning a terrorist

act in any country outside of his area of residence.

Senator Drilon. Mr. President, maybe we should clarify that because

on page 10, line 6, letter (A), the following acts are unlawful and is punished by

life imprisonment for any person to travel or attempt to travel to a state other

than his/her state of residence or nationality for the purpose of perpetrating,

planning, or preparing for, or participating in terrorist acts, or providing or

receiving terrorist training. Here, we are punishing somebody who travels.

Senator Lacson. No, Mr. President. We are punishing his purpose of

perpetrating, planning, or preparing for, or participating in terrorist acts, or

providing or receiving terrorist training, et cetera, not the act of traveling.

42
 Senator Drilon. No, Mr. President. If that is the intention, first of all,

that is not how it is written because what is punished is traveling or attempting

to travel to a state other than his or her state of residence for purposes of. So,

it is the act of traveling which is punished, and the act of traveling is for the

purpose of committing terrorism.

Senator Lacson. The act of traveling per se will not be punishable. But

if he travels for the purpose of committing the following acts as enumerated,

then that is the one we are punishing.

Senator Drilon. And that act has nothing to do with the Philippines.

Senator Lacson. Even if it has nothing to do with the Philippines, yes,

Mr. President. Because that is why we are applying the definition of universal

jurisdiction, Mr. President.

Senator Drilon. Yes, Mr. President.

Senator Lacson. Let me point out, Mr. President. The basis for this is a

UN Security Council Resolution 2178 in 2014. It says, “Calls upon all Member

States, in accordance with their obligations under international law, to

cooperate in efforts to address the threat posed by foreign terrorist fighters,

including by preventing the radicalization to terrorism and recruitment of

foreign terrorist fighters, including children, preventing foreign terrorist fighters

from crossing their borders, disrupting, and preventing financial support to

foreign terrorist fighters, and developing and implementing prosecution,

rehabilitation, and reintegration strategies for returning foreign terrorist

fighters.” That is the basis of this provision, Mr. President.

43
 Senator Drilon. Yes, Mr. President. I am sorry but I did not

comprehend.

Senator Lacson. It is qualified by the purpose. Traveling per se is not

punishable, Mr. President.

Senator Drilon. All right. It is traveling for the purpose.

Senator Lacson. For the purpose, Mr. President.

Senator Drilon. Right, Mr. President. But what is punished is the

traveling.

Senator Lacson. No, Mr. President. The purpose of committing such

acts—iyon po ang pinaparusahan—not the traveling. Traveling is incidental to

the purpose of committing the acts as enumerated.

Senator Drilon. All right. Anyway, may we have a copy of what the

gentleman just read, Mr. President?

Senator Lacson. This one? Yes, Mr. President.

If the person does not commit the purpose as enumerated and he keeps

on traveling, we would not mind him, Mr. President. He can travel for all he

cares. But if he travels for the purpose of committing the acts as enumerated,

then that is the act that we are punishing, Mr. President.

Senator Drilon. The gentleman is interpreting the call on Member

States to cooperate in efforts to address the threat posed by foreign terrorist by

punishing the foreign terrorist with life imprisonment.

Senator Lacson. Mr. President, puwede nating pag-usapan kung ang

isyu rito ay iyong penalty.

44
 Senator Drilon. All right, Mr. President.

Senator Lacson. Puwede natin i-negotiate iyan, Mr. President. If the

point being raised by the distinguished Minority Leader is bakit pareho ng

penalty doon sa actual commission of the terrorist acts dito sa traveling for the

purpose of committing some acts as enumerated, then I am amenable to some

amendments in this regard.

Senator Drilon. Well, thank you, Mr. President. But also the fact that

he travels from, say in my example, from Malaysia to Indonesia for the purpose

of committing terrorist acts in Indonesia, he is subject to the penalty of life

imprisonment under Philippine law.

Senator Lacson. Understood, Mr. President.

Senator Drilon. That is a little difficult for me to accept as a penalty.

Senator Lacson. That is a little harsh, Mr. President.

Senator Drilon. Yes. All right, Mr. President.

Now, under Section 4 also, it enumerates the acts which are considered

unlawful. We are going beyond now the extraterritorial issue. The following

acts which are considered unlawful and it enumerates under page 6 the

unlawful acts that are punishable. What I note significant here is on page 7,

line 4, “threat to commit any of the acts listed in paragraphs (A) to (D) of this

section.” In other words, a threat is considered a punishable act. Would the

gentleman sponsor confirm that, Mr. President?

Senator Lacson. That is correct, Mr. President. Threat to commit any of

the acts listed in paragraphs (A) to (D) of the section, meaning, the previous

45
paragraphs. But it is qualified again when the purpose of such act, by its

nature and context, is to intimidate and so forth and so on.

Senator Drilon. Yes, we understand that, Mr. President. But what we

are referring to would be connecting the threat to commit any of the acts listed

in paragraphs (A) to (D) of the section where the purpose is as so stated. With

Section 6 of the measure, which proposes to amend Section 4 of the present

law, it punishes an attempt to commit.

Let me read Section 6, Mr. President. Section 4 of the Act is hereby

renumbered and amended to read as follows:

"SEC. 6. ATTEMPT OR Conspiracy to Commit A TERRORIST

ACT. - ANY ATTEMPT TO COMMIT ANY OF THE ACTS DEFINED
AND PENALIZED UNDER SECTION 4 OF THIS ACT SHALL BE
PENALIZED BY LIFE IMPRISONMENT…”

Senator Lacson. I see the Minority Leader’s point, Mr. President.

Senator Drilon. One who is guilty of an attempt is sentenced…

Senator Lacson. Life imprisonment without parole, et cetera, Mr.

President.

Senator Drilon. Without parole, Mr. President. Under Section 4, an

attempt to commit any of the acts listed in paragraphs (A) to (D), a threat to

commit is a crime, is that correct?

Senator Lacson. That is correct, Mr. President, under subparagraph “E.

THREAT TO COMMIT ANY OF THE ACTS LISTED IN PARAGRAPHS (A) TO (D)

OF THIS SECTION.”

Senator Drilon. Yes, Mr. President. Also an attempt to commit is also a

crime.

46
 Senator Lacson. Under Section 6, Mr. President.

Senator Drilon. Under Section 6?

Senator Lacson. Yes, Mr. President.

Senator Drilon. Now, may we know what is an attempt to threaten?

What is an attempted threat because that is what it means. [Laughter]

Senator Lacson. It is not attempting to threaten, Mr. President.

Senator Drilon. Yes, Mr. President, but what is it.

Senator Lacson. Attempting to commit and threatening to commit, Mr.

President. Anyway, if there is a problem in the language, then, we are open to

amendments along this line. But what we have intended under these two

provisions, Sections 4 and 6, iba iyong threatening to commit at iba iyong

attempting to commit. Hindi ito iyong “attempting to threaten.”

Senator Drilon. Iyon po ang labas, “attempt to threaten.”

Senator Lacson. Anyway, we are open to amendment. There is no

perfect bill, Mr. President.

Senator Drilon. I am sorry, Mr. President?

Senator Lacson. There is no perfect bill.

Senator Drilon. And there is no pride of authorship.

Thank you, Mr. President, for that very welcome manifestation.

My reading of Section 4 (E), particularly on line 9, when the act that has

been punished seriously destabilized or destroyed the fundamental political,

economic or social structures of the country, or created a public emergency or

undermined public safety, can we be a bit more specific than such description?

47
 Senator Lacson. All right, Mr. President.

One example is, if this hall is bombed…

Senator Drilon. I am sorry, Mr. President?

Senator Lacson. If this Senate Session Hall is bombed, right now as we

debate on the measure, then they have successfully destabilized, or seriously

destabilized, or destroyed the fundamental political, even the economic and

social structures of the country, Mr. President. That is one example.

Senator Drilon. All right.

Senator Lacson. Imagine if this hall is bombed, we are all gone, Mr.

President, and the fundamental political structure has been destroyed, has

been damaged. Iyong parang nangyari sa Designated Survivor.

Senator Drilon. Mr. President, if we read the provision carefully, the

acts enumerated in (A) to (E) would be punished when the purpose of such act,

by its nature and context, is to intimidate or put fear except an actual bombing

because that would be covered by other sections. It is just the purpose to

induce government by force to do or to abstain from doing such an act.

Our question here, Mr. President, what is the difference between this

and the crime of grave threats under the Revised Penal Code?

Senator Lacson. It is the purpose, Mr. President. A simple crime of

grave threats without the purpose of sowing terrorism or committing terroristic

acts, iba po iyon. We are always bound by the intent and purpose of the act.

Senator Drilon. In other words, it is a national security issue that

makes it an act of terrorism or not?

48
 Senator Lacson. Not necessarily, Mr. President.

Senator Drilon. Yes, but…

Senator Lacson. As we defined it and as the gentleman mentioned

earlier, ito iyong Section 4, iyong fundamental. Ito po, “The purpose of such

act, by its nature and context, is to intimidate, put in fear, force or induce the

government or any international organization, or the public to do or to abstain

from doing any act, or seriously destabilize or destroy the fundamental

political economic or social structures of the country…”

Senator Drilon. So, just in answer to my question, what distinguishes

an ordinary crime of grave threat is the purpose of the offender in committing

the crime.

Senator Lacson. That is correct, Mr. President.

Senator Drilon. So that, if it is for the purpose of intimidating, put in

fear, force or induce the government or any international organization, or the

public to do or abstain from doing an act, that is considered a terrorist act.

Now, let me cite some specific example and try to draw an opinion from

the good sponsor. Currently, we see a lot of rallies, protests in Hong Kong.

That kind of protests has led to the collapse of the economy of Hong Kong

practically. The anti-government protests have gone on for six months and

have really harmed the economy. Now, assuming for the sake of argument,

that something similar happens here, would that act or the act of the

protesters be considered as an act of terrorism because they are compelling

the government to do something by force or intimidation?

49
 Senator Lacson. No, Mr. President. It will not be included because the

fundamental rights are always respected even in this proposed measure.

Senator Drilon. Yes, but supposed as in Hong Kong, there were

instances of violence.

Senator Lacson. But we are always bound by the purpose, Mr.

President. If the purpose is enumerated, then…

Senator Drilon. The purpose in Hong Kong is to force the Hong Kong

government…

Senator Lacson. To allow them to exercise their fundamental rights,

their freedom, even to choose their leaders, to exercise suffrage. If that is the

purpose, it does not constitute an act of terrorism, Mr. President.

Senator Drilon. All right. Mr. President, it is good that we have this on

record because this would guide us in attempting to make clearer the

provisions here so that it does not lead to an overarching or overreach in terms

of the exposure to crimes of terrorism.

Senator Lacson. We are grateful that the gentleman is pointing this out,

so that we can further enlighten our colleagues that such acts, no matter how

violent, if the purpose is not as enumerated under the proposed measure, then

those are not acts of terrorism.

For example, even if there is violence on the streets to call for freeing

Senator De Lima, that is not terrorism, Mr. President. That is a legitimate

exercise of the freedom to assemble. But they may be punished under a

separate--

50
 Senator Drilon. Under the Revised Penal Code.

Senator Lacson. Yes, under the Revised Penal Code, Mr. President.

Senator Drilon. There is no question about that.

Now, for example—again, I just want to cite examples in order to draw

the intent of the author—if we recall, after the MOA-AD was rejected as

unconstitutional, there was some violence in Mindanao, and the objective was,

very clearly, to press for the passage of the Bangsamoro Basic Law. If this

measure was law at that time, would the members of the Bangsamoro be liable

for terrorism?

Senator Lacson. If the purpose does not fall under the provision as

stated here, then--

Senator Drilon. The purpose, Mr. President, is to compel the

government to enact the Bangsamoro Basic Law.

Senator Lacson. I do not think it will fall under the provisions of this

proposed measure, Mr. President.

Senator Drilon. Why is that, Mr. President? The proposed measure says

“to induce the government or the public to do or abstain from doing any act.”

Compelling the government to pass the Bangsamoro Basic Law, would that put

us in danger of being labelled as terrorists?

Senator Lacson. Well, I suppose what they are fighting for is their right

to self-determination, Mr. President. So, it may not constitute a terrorist act.

Senator Drilon. We must be very careful because I agree with the good

sponsor that if we look at history, there were struggles for independence that

51
were attended by violence. And I do not think history will be kind to us if we

call them terrorists.

Senator Lacson. No, Mr. President, we will not call them terrorists. I

repeat, we will always be bound by the purpose, as enumerated.

Senator Pimentel. With the permission of the two gentlemen, Mr.

President, a little interjection.

The President. Senator Pimentel is recognized.

Senator Pimentel. Just to pursue the example of the Minority Leader,

Mr. President, if I may. For example, even if in the end, they are cleared of

terrorism charges because they were ruled to have just exercised their

fundamental right—wanting to exercise their right to self-determination—but in

the meantime, some or many of them would have spent time in jail being held.

So, that is probably one danger that we should guard against. Because, maybe

in the end, sabi nga, it did not amount to a terrorist act, but there is some

suffering which will be inflicted upon our people because of some vagueness in

the law.

Senator Lacson. Let me cite, Mr. President, the existing jurisprudence

in Lagman vs. Medialdea. Ang sabi ng Korte Suprema po rito, “In determining

what crime was committed, we have to look into the main objective of the

malefactors. If it is political, such as for the purpose of severing the allegiance

of Mindanao to the Philippine Government to establish a wilayat therein, the

crime is rebellion. If, on the other hand, the primary objective is to sow and

create a condition of widespread and extraordinary fear and panic among the

52
populace in order to coerce the government to give in to an unlawful demand,

the crime is terrorism.”

Senator Pimentel. That is under the present law, Mr. President.

Senator Lacson. That is a jurisprudence covering the Human Security

Act.

Senator Pimentel. Yes, that is why. That is a jurisprudence based on

present law which the bill seeks to overhaul.

Senator Lacson. Yes, Mr. President.

Senator Pimentel. That is why I am appreciating the interpellation of

the Minority Leader because we are testing now the concepts in this overhauled

bill.

Senator Lacson. Same here, Mr. President.

Senator Pimentel. The present law has been interpreted by the

Supreme Court. So, if we are happy with that…

Senator Lacson. We are not happy.

Senator Pimentel. Precisely. The next question is, why did we

overhaul? So, if we are overhauling, we must be very clear with concepts

because we might endanger fundamental freedoms or rights even though we

say that they are protected. I hope I am clear because even at the end of the

trial, let us say, the persons are acquitted but the length of the trial, they

suffered.

Senator Lacson. That is correct. That is a correct observation and a

valid concern, Mr. President.

53
 Senator Pimentel. Thank you, Mr. President.

Senator Lacson. I am glad to be interpellated by a bar topnotcher and

another placer in the bar, Mr. President. Being a non-lawyer, I am so proud to

be in the midst of these two gentlemen.

Senator Drilon. And if we notice, Mr. President, the questions are

without malice. It is an attempt to clarify the provisions of the proposed bill.

Senator Lacson. And, we are very grateful, Mr. President.

Senator Drilon. Thank you.

Mr. President, one naughty question. Was Sen. Gregorio Honasan…

Senator Lacson. A terrorist? [Laughter]

Senator Drilon. ...would have been a terrorist? [Laughter]

If we have the law, would Senator Honasan been a terrorist?

Senator Lacson. No, Mr. President. Senator Honasan would be guilty of

violation of coup d’etat, Article 134-A, because the elements are different.

Senator Drilon. I do not know. That is subject to a debate. But from

the way I read the sponsor’s present bill, Senator Honasan would be a terrorist.

Senator Lacson. Not really, Mr. President. But he would be a coup

plotter who always failed, by the way, who never succeeded.

The President. No, he succeeded at the first time.

Senator Lacson. EDSA I, Mr. President. After that, he was a consistent

failure. [Laughter]

Senator Drilon. Mr. President, may I request that I suspend my

interpellation because if we look at the hall, there are only six of us and these

54
are very important issues that we are raising which I had hoped would be

listened to by our colleagues so that when we come to a vote, it will be an

intelligent vote.

And, at this point, Mr. President, with the indulgence and probably with

the consent of the sponsor, we would like to suspend.

Senator Lacson. I agree with the observation of the gentleman.

Anyway, it is better that we discuss this very deliberately, Mr. President.

Senator Drilon. So, we move to suspend our interpellation.

The President. We suspend the interpellation or the session?

Senator Lacson. I move that we suspend the session for one minute,
Mr. President.

The President. We will suspend the interpellation of Senator Drilon.

SUSPENSION OF SESSION

The session is suspended for one minute, if there is no objection. [There

was none].

It was 4:44 p.m.

RESUMPTION OF SESSION

At 5:41 p.m., the session was resumed.

The President. The session is resumed.

The Majority Leader is recognized.

Senator Zubiri. Mr. President, I ask that we recognize the Minority

Leader.

The President. Sen. Frank Drilon, the Minority Leader, is recognized.

55
 Senator Drilon. Mr. President, after we suspended the session, Senator

Lacson and I had a conversation. And given the fact that the House of

Representatives is still far from coming up with the bill, in fact, it is just in the

committee, we have agreed that we will suspend our interpellation until next

month when we come back for our session.

With that agreement with the good sponsor, this representation

suspends, with the consent of the Chamber, our availment of the period of

interpellations, Mr. President.

The President. Majority Leader, we would like to entertain a motion to

suspend consideration of the measure.

SUSPENSION OF CONSIDERATION OF S. NO. 1083

Senator Zubiri. Yes, Mr. President. With that, I move that we suspend
consideration of Senate Bill No. 1083 under Committee Report No.9.

The President. Is there any objection? [Silence] There being none, the
motion is approved.

Senator Zubiri. Thank you, Mr. President.

Mr. President, we have another measure to tackle and a couple of more

measures, particularly on a bill that is close to my heart and the heart of
Senator Pimentel. This is on the bamboo industry.

SPECIAL ORDER

Mr. President, with the permission of the Body, I move that we transfer
from the Calendar for Ordinary Business to the Calendar for Special Orders
Committee Report No. 31 on Senate Bill No. 1240, entitled
AN ACT INSTITUTIONALIZING BAMBOO INDUSTRY
DEVELOPMENT IN THE PHILIPPINES, CREATING THE
BAMBOO INDUSTRY DEVELOPMENT CENTER (BIDC),
APPROPRIATING FUNDS THEREFOR, AND FOR OTHER
PURPOSES

56
 The President. Is there any objection? [Silence] There being none, the
motion is approved.
BILL ON SECOND READING
S. No. 1240—Bamboo Industry Development Center

Senator Zubiri. Mr. President, I move that we consider Senate Bill No.

1240 as reported out under Committee Report No. 31.

The President. Is there any objection? [Silence] There being none, the

motion is approved.

Consideration of Senate Bill No. 1240 is now in order. With the

permission of the Body, the Secretary will read only the title of the bill without

prejudice to inserting in the Record the whole text thereof.

The Secretary. Senate Bill No. 1240, entitled

AN ACT INSTITUTIONALIZING BAMBOO INDUSTRY

DEVELOPMENT IN THE PHILIPPINES, CREATING THE
BAMBOO INDUSTRY DEVELOPMENT CENTER (BIDC),
APPROPRIATING FUNDS THEREFOR, AND FOR OTHER
PURPOSES
___________________________________________________________________________

The following is the whole text of the bill:

Senate Bill No. 1240

[Insert]

________________________________________________________________________

Senator Zubiri. Mr. President, I ask that we recognize our distinguished

sponsor, no other than my kababayan from Mindanao, Sen. Aquilino “Koko”

Pimentel III, chairman of the Committee on Trade, Commerce and

Entrepreneurship.

57
 The President. The gentleman from Mindanao, former Senate President

Aquilino Pimentel III, is recognized.

SPONSORSHIP SPEECH OF SENATOR PIMENTEL

Senator Pimentel. Thank you, Mr. President and Majority Leader.

Mr. President and my esteemed colleagues, and our honored guests,

ladies and gentlemen, good afternoon.

Bamboo is a quick-growing versatile non-timber forest product which is

often used as a wood substitute. It is found in different regions of the world,

and is utilized extensively for a wide range of purposes such as walls, panels,

handicrafts, consumer products, and novelty products.

There are over a thousand bamboo species in the world and bamboo

industries are now thriving not only in Asia but also in other continents as

well. In the Philippines, there are about 62 species of bamboo, 21 of which are

endemic or native to the country while the rest were introduced from other

countries such as China.

The bamboo provides environmental benefits to the society. It is a

sustainable resource that can grow under a range of climatic conditions. It

provides approximately 35% more oxygen and absorbs 40% more carbon

dioxide as compared to trees, which results in improvement in the air quality.

Further, cultivation of bamboo provides organic matter, controls soil erosion,

and regulates water levels in watersheds.

In 2018, the global bamboo market is valued at US$68.8 billion and is

expected to grow about 5% more from 2019 to 2025. This industry has so

58
much more potential. However, despite the bamboo’s importance, statistics on

its resources, production, and trade in the Philippines remain scarce and

inconsistent; hence, unreliable. The lack of reliable and comprehensive data on

Philippine bamboo resources and utilization hinders its sustainable

development and limits bamboo’s potential to contribute to the Philippine

economy.

The DTI, DOST, DENR, and DA, under their respective mandates have

tried to address the issue of insufficiency of bamboo information and resources

through various research and studies. The aim is to provide a comprehensive

assessment of the Philippines’ bamboo resources. However, the lack of a

specific body concentrated on studying and developing the bamboo industry

makes it harder for the government to unlock its true potential. There is a need

to properly gather data and information on the production and commercial use

of bamboo products in order to tap its full potential. This will not only provide

additional resources to boost our economy, but also livelihood opportunities for

many individuals, groups, and communities in our country.

Therefore, the Committee on Trade, Commerce and Entrepreneurship,

jointly with the Committees on Finance; and Ways and Means, are proposing

Committee Report No. 31 or the Bamboo Industry Development Act of 2019.

This report or substitute bill is the result of hearings by the committee on

Senate bills authored by Sen. Cynthia A. Villar and Sen. Juan Miguel “Migz” F.

Zubiri. So, this representation sincerely thanks the authors of the bills for

59
focusing our attention on the bamboo industry and opening our eyes to the

importance of the said industry and of bamboo as a plant, Mr. President.

Mr. President, this representation would also like to thank the

supporters of this effort who are here with us—some of them are here with us

this afternoon—from the DENR Ecosystems Research and Development

Bureau, Mr. Cer Jay Jimenez; from the Bamboo Industry Development and

formerly from DOST-FPRDI, Dr. Florentino Tesoro; from Bambuhay, Mr. Mark

Gersava; and from DTI-BOI, Ms. Graciela Juatco, among others.

This bill seeks to institutionalize bamboo industry development in the

Philippines by strengthening the Philippine Bamboo Industry Development

Council (PBIDC), which shall be administratively attached to the DTI, and

creating the Bamboo Industry Development Center (BIDC), the one-stop shop

for all bamboo industry-related activities, from research and development to

trade promotion and education.

The bill also highlights the duty of the DENR to ensure the production

and propagation of bamboo for commercialization, and to collect accurate data

on bamboo species in the Philippines. The Department of Science and

Technology-Forest Products Research and Development Institute (DOST-

FPRDI) is also designated as the main research and development arm for

bamboo utilization. It is hoped that through this initiative, we will be able to

maximize the full potential of our bamboo resources. Furthermore, to

encourage investors in bamboo nurseries and plantations, incentives are

provided such as the exemption from payment of any government share for the

60
use of public lands for commercial bamboo plantation for a period of 10 years,

among others. Through these initiatives, the government will be able to collect

complete and accurate data on bamboo for commercialization to maximize the

benefits of producing and developing the bamboo industry.

Mr. President, and my distinguished colleagues, I would like to seek your

full support for the immediate passage of this bill. I believe that through this

initiative, the bamboo industry will benefit the Filipino people.

Before I end, I would like to give our dear colleagues bamboo straws

given to us by our friends in the bamboo industry.

Maraming salamat po sa inyong lahat.

The President. The Majority Leader is recognized.

Senator Zubiri. Thank you, Mr. President.

Mr. President, may I be allowed also to cosponsor the measure?

The President. Yes.

SPONSORSHIP SPEECH OF SENATOR ZUBIRI

Senator Zubiri. Mr. President, with somewhere between 44,000 to

53,000 hectares of bamboo stand across our islands, the bamboo industry is

one of the biggest areas of agricultural potential for the country. Even now,

without a dedicated institution and development plan to guide the growth of

the industry, bamboo has somehow managed to weather the storm—like the

grass itself, the industry has proven itself resilient in the face of many

challenges.

61
 Despite all odds, the bamboo has managed to keep its relevance as one of

our most defining cultural signifiers, bringing a uniquely Filipino stamp to

such things as the humble bahay kubo, or the 200-year-old Bamboo Organ of

Las Piñas, or the innovative works of celebrated architects and designers like

Bobby Mañosa or Kenneth Cobonpue.

But we cannot let the future of the bamboo plant lie entirely on its

cultural cachet. Right now, we are the fifth biggest bamboo industry in the

world, but our numbers pale in comparison to the billion-dollar bamboo

industries of China and Vietnam. This is unfortunate, given that we have 21

bamboo species native to the country, in addition to the 60 to 80 introduced

species that we also grow on our lands. We really could and should be going

toe-to-toe with the bamboo-exporting heavyweights that are currently leaving

us in the dust.

Instead, we have left the industry to its own devices and given its very

little support. We do not even have a dedicated institution to oversee the

development of the industry, equivalent to the role of the Philippine Coconut

Authority, or the Sugar Regulatory Administration, for instance. Our bamboo

development initiatives are pursued by different entities, who are unable to

synergize their efforts toward the development of the industry as a whole.

Without a governing institution in place, the bamboo industry continues

to grow stagnant. The necessary research and development toward the

modernization of the field is not prioritized and funded, leaving us with dated

processing and utilization technologies. The performance of the sector is also

62
left unassessed, given that no institution is in charge of collecting and

analyzing data regarding the industry’s raw materials, employment rates, and

economic impact.

In order to truly champion agricultural development, we need to grant

proper support to all our agricultural industries, which means ensuring that

the bamboo industry gets its due. This bill aims to do just that. Under this

bill, the creation of the Philippine Bamboo Industry Roadmap will set the

industry on track for sustainable growth, as overseen and supported by the

proposed Philippine Bamboo Industry Development Council, which will operate

under the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI). The Council will be

attached to the DTI so it can prioritize the economic potential of the industry,

and take advantage of the rising demands in the international bamboo market.

But while DTI fulfills that mandate, the Department of Environment and

Natural Resources will also be heavily involved in the Council’s programs,

tasked to ensure that the industry’s economic growth will not come at the cost

of ecological destruction.

With the Council in place, the industry will no longer have to struggle to

succeed as a fractured sector.

And I would like to add that in my many years of trying to push this

measure, whenever we asked the agency in charge, ang itinuturo nila ay DA.

Pagdating sa DA, DENR—hinihingi ng DENR, hinihingi ng DA. And yet, they

give very little to the promotion of bamboo. So, we are happy that the DTI has

63
taken its place and has taken the cudgels for the promotion of the bamboo

industry.

So now, Mr. President, we will, with this measure, have a coordinating

body that will bring disparate industry players together and guide them toward

unified success. And with the roadmap as guide, as formulated by the Council,

the industry will have a clear and focused path to carving its place as one of

the bamboo heavyweights of the world market.

A strengthened bamboo industry will also be immensely beneficial to the

environment. Bamboo prevents soil erosion and flooding, and it is known to be

a particularly effective agent of carbon capture, meaning it traps and isolates

carbon dioxide from the atmosphere. A healthier bamboo sector then will

mean a healthier environment for us all.

As we know, Mr. President, in my farm in Batangas, I put up a bamboo

farm which I got from the Carolina Farms of Mrs. Jimenez, the wife of Meynard

Jimenez of GMA 7, and we were able to buy the so-called Buddha Bamboo

which is a very cute pygmy bamboo and it grows only by about 10 feet and it

has little ripples like the stomach of a Buddha, so it is called Buddha Bamboo.

And we also have iron bamboo. It is all black, super matigas, kapag

ginagamitan mo ng itak o bolo ay nasisira at napupurol iyong itak. Mayroon

pong mga variegated bamboo that I like as well, one of my favorites, which is

green and yellow bamboo, and many, many others.

64
 We have in Bukidnon, Mr. President, what we call the giant bamboo. It

is about this thick like a tree and it grows as high as 100 feet tall and is found

in the areas between Pasugong and Malaybalay in Bukidnon.

So, there is so much potential in the bamboo industry, so much so that

the flooring of my house, Mr. President, was made out of bamboo. It looks like

wood panels, but it is actually bamboo. So, it is what we call “engineered

wood” but made out of bamboo slats.

So, there is so much potential in the industry, Mr. President, and there is

such a great demand for it in the local and international markets, especially in

architecture and design, in chemical and medical industries, and in the

culinary industry. These markets are hungry and waiting, we just need to help

the local bamboo industry get on track to fulfil that demand, and that help will

come in the form of the development roadmap and the development council.

The growth of the bamboo industry will mark a huge win for the nation—

economically, culturally, and even environmentally.

And even, Mr. President, the Province of Iloilo, for example, they have a

huge bamboo industry. Wherever I go from the mountains of Iloilo up to the

coastal areas, mayroon po silang kawayan doon.

In the Island of Panay, they also utilize a lot of bamboo. And, of course,

in Mindanao. And, as I said, it is so easy to grow and siya po ang naiiwan

kapag may bagyo. We all know, of course, the fabled story on the bamboo

where the mighty tree, once the typhoon comes, sometimes succumbs to its

65
winds and falls to the ground, but it is the bamboo, with its elasticity,

survivability and resilience, that remains and survives.

As such, Mr. President, I urge our colleagues to join us in seeing the

passage of this important measure.

Mabuhay po at maraming salamat po, Mr. President.

The President. The Majority Leader is recognized.

MANIFESTATION OF SENATOR ZUBIRI

(Coauthorship of Senator Gatchalian of S. No. 1240)

Senator Zubiri. Mr. President, there is a request from our colleague,

Senator Gatchalian, that he be made coauthor of the measure.

The President. All right, we place that on record.

SUSPENSION OF CONSIDERATION OF S. NO. 1240

Senator Zubiri. With that, Mr. President, to allow our colleagues to

study the measure further, I move that we suspend consideration of Senate Bill

No. 1240.

The President. Is there any objection? [Silence] There being none, the
motion is approved.

SUSPENSION OF SESSION

Senator Zubiri. Thank you, Mr. President.

Mr. President, I move that we suspend the session for one minute.

The President. Is there any objection? [Silence] There being none, the
session is suspended for one minute.

It was 5:59 p.m.

RESUMPTION OF SESSION

66
 At 6:01 p.m., the session was resumed.

The President. The session is resumed.

The Majority Leader is recognized.

CONFERENCE COMMITTEE ON S. NO. 1074/H. NO. 1026

(Excise Tax on Alcohol Products)

Senator Zubiri. Mr. President, I move that we proceed to the Senate

President’s designation of an additional conferee to the Bicameral Conference

Committee on the disagreeing provisions of Senate Bill No. 1074 and House Bill

No. 1026.

The President. Is there any objection? [Silence] There being none, the

motion is approved.

For the Bicameral Conference Committee on the disagreeing provisions

on Senate Bill No. 1074, Sen. Ronald “Bato” dela Rosa is designated as an

additional member of the committee.

MOTION OF SENATOR ZUBIRI

(Referral of the Speech of Senator Go on November 25, 2019 to the Blue
Ribbon Committee; and to the Committee on Sports as the Secondary
Committee)

Senator Zubiri. Mr. President, before we adjourn, the Minority Leader

and I had spoken earlier and he presented to me the speech made last

November 25 by the distinguished member of this Chamber, Senator Go, and it

was a speech about the Southeast Asian Games. The Minority Leader pointed

out correctly that we did not refer the speech to any committee. Therefore, Mr.

President, I move that we refer the said speech to the Blue Ribbon Committee

as well as to the Committee on Sports, as the secondary committee.

67
 The President. Is there any objection? [Silence] There being none, the

motion is approved.

MANIFESTATION OF SENATE PRESIDENT SOTTO

(That P.S Res. No. 245 and P.S. No. 246 are Two Separately Approved
Resolutions)

And just for the record, related to the approval of the two resolutions

that we passed earlier for the two gold medalists in the recent SEA Games, I

made a mispronouncement by saying that Proposed Senate Resolution No.

245 was taking into consideration Proposed Senate Resolution No. 246.

Senator Zubiri. These are two separate resolutions, Mr. President.

The President. These are two separately approved resolutions. So, what

we approved, for the record, is Proposed Senate Resolution No. 245. And,

thereafter, we are correctly manifesting that we are also approving Proposed

Senate Resolution No. 246, and not what the presiding officer mentioned as

taking into consideration. For the record.

Senator Zubiri. Yes, Mr. President.

The President. So we ask that the Record reflect in today’s session.

SUSPENSION OF SESSION

Senator Zubiri. Mr. President, I move that we suspend the session for
one minute.

The President. Is there any objection? [Silence] There being none, the
session is suspended for one minute.

It was 6:04 p.m.

RESUMPTION OF SESSION

At 6:10 p.m., the session was resumed.

68
 The President. The session is resumed.

CONFERENCE COMMITTEE ON S. NO. 1074/H. NO. 1026

(Excise Tax on Alcohol Products)

Majority Leader, there is an even number in the Bicameral Conference

Committee, therefore, we would like to designate an additional member. Sen.

Koko Pimentel is also an added member of the Bicameral Conference

Committee on Senate Bill No. 1074.

So designated.

Senator Zubiri. Mr. President, before we adjourn, I would just like to

greet also Sen. Manny Pacquiao, once again, a happy, happy birthday. I can go

early to my dinner with my wife.

The President. Happy wedding anniversary to the Majority Leader.

Senator Zubiri. Thank you, Mr. President.

ADJOURNMENT OF SESSION

Mr. President, I move that we adjourn the session until three o’clock
tomorrow afternoon, Wednesday, December 18, 2019.

The President. Is there any objection? [Silence] There being none, the
session is adjourned until three o’clock tomorrow afternoon, Wednesday,
December 18, 2019.

It was 6:11 p.m.

69
 ANNEX "3"

TUESDAY, JANUARY 21, 2020

OPENING OF THE SESSION

At 3:00 p.m., the Senate President, Hon. Vicente C. Sotto III, called the
session to order.

The President. The 44th session of the Senate in the First Regular
Session of the Eighteenth Congress is hereby called to order.

Let us stand for the opening prayer to be led by Sen. Joel Villanueva.

Everybody rose for the prayer.

PRAYER

Senator Villanueva. Tayo po ay manalangin.

Dakilang Diyos, Ama naming sumasalangit, Diyos na may

gawa ng langit at lupa, kami po ay lumalapit at naninikluhod sa Iyo,

humihingi ng kapatawaran ano mang kasalanan sa isip, sa salita at

sa gawa. Hugasan Ninyo po kami ng Inyong banal na dugo na

nabuhos sa krus ng kalbaryo, at damitan Mo kami ng damit ng

katwiran upang makalapit sa Iyo.

Inilalapit po namin ang aming mga kababayan lalo na ang

mga biktima ng nag-alborotong Bulkang Taal. Yakapin Mo po sila ng

Iyong pagmamahal, tulungan, at maging ang aming pamahalaan

para matulungan at mabigyan ng tamang tulong para makabangon

ang aming mga kababayan.

Tulungan Ninyo rin po ang bawat isa sa amin dito sa Senado

sa paggawa ng aming tungkulin. At higit sa lahat, magampanan

1
namin ang aming responsibilidad bilang Iyong mga lingkod para sa

aming minamahal na bayang Pilipinas.

Sa Inyo po ang lahat ng papuri at pasasalamat, at maingat po

naming ibinabalik ang lahat ng papuri’t pasasalamat.

Sa tanging pangalan po ng aming Panginoong Hesus, ang

lahat po ay makiisa at magsabi ng Amen.

ROLL CALL

The President. Amen.

The Secretary will please call the roll.

The Secretary, reading:

Senator Sonny Angara……………………………………………..

Senator Maria Lourdes Nancy S. Binay............................... Present
Senator Pia S. Cayetano...................................................... Present
Senator Leila M. de Lima….………………………………………. *
Senator Ronald “Bato” M. dela Rosa.…………………………… Present
Senator Franklin M. Drilon..……………………………………… Present
Senator Win Gatchalian.……………………………………………
Senator Christopher Lawrence T. Go..………………………….. Present
Senator Richard J. Gordon...................................................
Senator Risa Hontiveros.……………………………………………. Present
Senator Panfilo M. Lacson.…………………………………………. Present
Senator Manuel “Lito” M. Lapid............................................. Present
Senator Imee R. Marcos..……………………..…………………….. Present
Senator Emmanuel “Manny” D. Pacquiao ………………………. Present
Senator Francis “Kiko” Pangilinan ……………………………….. Present**
Senator Aquilino "Koko" Pimentel III …………..………….......... Present
Senator Grace Poe …............................................................. Present
Senator Ralph G. Recto ........................................................ Present
Senator Ramon Bong Revilla Jr. ………………………………… Present
Senator Francis “Tol" N. Tolentino……………………………….. Present
Senator Joel Villanueva ……………………………….……………. Present
2
 Senator Cynthia A. Villar ...................................................... Present
Senator Juan Miguel F. Zubiri …………………………………….. Present
The President ………………………………………………………….. Present

The President. With 19 senators present, the Chair declares the

presence of a quorum.

The Majority Leader is recognized.

Senator Zubiri. Thank you, Mr. President.

Before we take up official business, we would like to greet our colleague,

Sen. Ronald “Bato” dela Rosa, a very happy birthday, Mr. President. We can see

from his outfit that it is a special day today. Nagpaburda po ng barong for his

birthday.

SUSPENSION OF SESSION

The President. Happy birthday to Sen. Ronald “Bato” dela Rosa.

The Chair declares a one-minute suspension to greet Senator Dela Rosa,

if there is no objection. [There was none.]

It was 3:04 p.m.

RESUMPTION OF SESSION

At 3:05 p.m., the session was resumed

The President. The session is resumed.

________________
* Under detention
** Arrived after the roll call

3
 ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF GUESTS

Senator Zubiri. Mr. President, we have very special guests in the

gallery today.

We have with us the New Zealand Opposition National Party delegation

headed by the Hon. Simon Bridges, leader of the Opposition National Party;

Hon. Gerry Brownlee, Shadow leader of the House of Representatives and

member of the Ilam National Party; Hon. Mark Mitchell, member of the

Parliament for Rodney and member of the National Party; Hon. Paulo Garcia,

district member of the National Party and the only Filipino in the New Zealand

Parliament; and Hon. David Strachan, New Zealand ambassador to the

Philippines.

The President. We welcome all our guests from New Zealand to the

Philippine Senate. Thank you for joining us this afternoon.

Senator Zubiri. Mr. President, I have had a wonderful experience of

visiting New Zealand and celebrated the new year in Auckland about three

years ago, and I must say that their country is a very beautiful country.

The President. And they also have very delicious agricultural products.

Senator Zubiri. Yes, Mr. President, especially lamb and milk. Actually,

a lot of our milk and butter come from New Zealand.

We have also other guests in the gallery: Mr. Greco Belgica of the

Presidential Anti-Corruption Commission and company; Tita Bing Pimentel,

4
the mother of Sen. Koko Pimentel; and students from Our Lady of the

Abandoned Catholic School in Muntinlupa City.

The President. Welcome to the Senate.

THE JOURNAL

Senator Zubiri. Mr. President, I move that we dispense with the reading
of the Journal of the 43rd session, Monday, January 20, 2020, and consider it
approved.

The President. Is there any objection? [Silence] There being none, the
motion is approved.

Senator Zubiri. Mr. President, I move that we proceed to the Reference

of Business.

The President. Is there any objection? [Silence] There being none, the
motion is approved.

The Secretary will read the Reference of Business.

REFERENCE OF BUSINESS

BILLS ON FIRST READING

The Secretary. Senate Bill No. 1264, entitled

AN ACT PROMOTING INTEGRATED URBAN AGRICULTURAL

DEVELOPMENT IN ALL METROPOLITAN AREAS
NATIONWIDE TO ADDRESS FOOD SECURITY CONCERNS
AND APPROPRIATING FUNDS THEREFOR

Introduced by Senator Revilla

The President. Referred to the Committees on Agriculture, Food and

Agrarian Reform; and Finance

The Secretary. Senate Bill No. 1265, entitled

AN ACT REGULATING THE DONATION AND TRANSPLANTATION

OF HUMAN ORGANS AND TISSUES FROM LIVING DONORS

5
 Introduced by Senator Revilla

The President. Referred to the Committees on Health and Demography;

and Finance

The Secretary. Senate Bill No. 1266, entitled

AN ACT STRENGTHENING MEANINGFUL YOUTH PARTICIPATION

IN LOCAL GOVERNANCE AND FURTHER AMENDING
REPUBLIC ACT 10742 OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE
“SANGGUNIANG KABATAAN REFORM ACT OF 2015”

Introduced by Senator Revilla

The President. Referred to the Committees on Youth; Local Government;

and Finance

The Secretary. Senate Bill No. 1267, entitled

AN ACT INCREASING THE MONTHLY SOCIAL PENSION OF

SENIOR CITIZENS, EXPANDING THE COVERAGE
THEREOF

Introduced by Senator Revilla

The President. Referred to the Committees on Social Justice, Welfare

and Rural Development; and Finance

The Secretary. Senate Bill No. 1268, entitled

AN ACT SIMPLIFYING THE CONFIRMATION OF IMPERFECT

TITLES, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE PRESIDENTIAL
DECREE NO. 1529, COMMONWEALTH ACT NO. 141 AND
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9176, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES

Introduced by Senator Angara

The President. Referred to the Committee on Justice and Human

Rights

The Secretary. Senate Bill No. 1269, entitled

AN ACT AMENDING REPUBLIC ACT NO. 11232 OTHERWISE

KNOWN AS, “AN ACT PROVIDING FOR THE REVISED
6
 CORPORATION CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES,” AND FOR
OTHER PURPOSES

Introduced by Senator Marcos

The President. Referred to the Committees on Constitutional

Amendments and Revision of Codes; Trade, Commerce and Entrepreneurship;
and Finance

The Secretary. Senate Bill No. 1270, entitled

AN ACT AMENDING SECTION 2 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 10868,

OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE CENTENARIANS ACT OF
2016 AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES

Introduced by Senator De Lima

The President. Referred to the Committees on Social Justice, Welfare

and Rural Development; and Finance

The Secretary. Senate Bill No. 1271, entitled

AN ACT REGULATING THE USE OF MOBILE PHONES AND

OTHER ELECTRONIC GADGETS TO STUDENTS FROM
KINDERGARTEN TO SENIOR HIGH SCHOOL IN ALL PUBLIC
AND PRIVATE SCHOOLS

Introduced by Senator De Lima

The President. Referred to the Committee on Basic Education, Arts and

Culture

RESOLUTION

The Secretary. Proposed Senate Resolution No. 287, entitled

RESOLUTION DIRECTING THE APPROPRIATE COMMITTEE TO

INVESTIGATE, IN AID OF LEGISLATION, THE HIGH-
HANDED, ARROGANT, AND IRRESPONSIBLE ACTS OF ONE
ANGELINE XIWEN THAM, A FOREIGN NATIONAL DOING
BUSINESS IN THE PHILIPPINES FOR THE PURPOSES OF
(1) REVIEWING CURRENT LAWS IN ORDER TO PREVENT
SIMILARLY MINDED PERSONS FROM BULLYING AND
MISLEADING PHILIPPINE GOVERNMENT AGENCIES AND
7
 OFFICIALS AND (2) DECLARING ANGELINE XIWEN THAM
AS PERSONA NON GRATA

Introduced by Senator Pimentel

The President. Referred to the Committees on Public Services; and

Foreign Relations

ADDITIONAL REFERENCE OF BUSINESS

BILLS ON FIRST READING

The Secretary. Senate Bill No. 1272, entitled

AN ACT AMENDING REPUBLIC ACT NO. 10121, OTHERWISE

KNOWN AS ‘PHILIPPINE DISASTER RISK REDUCTION AND
MANAGEMENT ACT OF 2010’ BY REINFORCING LOCAL
GOVERNMENT COORDINATION AND RESPONSE EFFORTS,
AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES

Introduced by Senator Tolentino

The President. Referred to the Committees on National Defense and

Security, Peace, Unification and Reconciliation; and Local Government

The Secretary. Senate Bill No. 1273, entitled

AN ACT ESTABLISHING THE REVISED CHARTER OF THE

GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM

Introduced by Senator Revilla

The President. Referred to the Committees on Government

Corporations and Public Enterprises; Civil Service, Government Reorganization
and Professional Regulation; Ways and Means; and Finance

The Secretary. Senate Bill No. 1274, entitled

AN ACT CREATING THE PROVINCE OF WESTERN MAGUINDANAO

Introduced by Senator Revilla

8
 The President. Referred to the Committees on Local Government; and
Electoral Reforms and People’s Participation

The Secretary. Senate Bill No. 1275, entitled

AN ACT CREATING THE TAAL VOLCANO REHABILITATION AND

DEVELOPMENT COMMISSION, ESTABLISHING THE TAAL
VOLCANO REHABILITATION AND DEVELOPMENT FUND
FOR THE PURPOSE OF EXTENDING AID, RELIEF,
RESETTLEMENT, REHABILITATION, LIVELIHOOD, AND
DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS AND SERVICES TO
COMMUNITIES ADVERSELY AFFECTED BY THE TAAL
VOLCANO ERUPTION, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES

Introduced by Senator Recto

The President. Referred to the Committees on National Defense and

Security, Peace, Unification and Reconciliation; Local Government; and
Finance

The Secretary. Senate Bill No. 1276, entitled

AN ACT ADJUSTING THE MINIMUM AMOUNT FOR DEATH

INDEMNITY, MORAL AND EXEMPLARY DAMAGES UNDER
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 386 OR THE CIVIL CODE OF THE
PHILIPPINES

Introduced by Senator Drilon

The President. Referred to the Committee on Justice and Human

Rights

The Secretary. Senate Bill No. 1277, entitled

AN ACT AUGMENTING THE EMPLOYEE BENEFITS FOR THE

SOLICITORS OF THE OFFICE OF THE SOLICITOR
GENERAL BY PROVIDING RETIREMENT, DEATH AND
SURVIVORSHIP BENEFITS, AND APPROPRIATING FUNDS
THEREFOR

Introduced by Senator Dela Rosa

9
 The President. Referred to the Committees on Civil Service,
Government Reorganization and Professional Regulation; Justice and Human
Rights; and Finance

RESOLUTIONS

The Secretary. Proposed Senate Resolution No. 288, entitled

RESOLUTION DIRECTING THE APPROPRIATE SENATE

COMMITTEE TO CONDUCT AN INQUIRY, IN AID OF
LEGISLATION, ON THE IMPACT AND EFFECTIVENESS OF
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 10121 OR THE ‘PHILIPPINE DISASTER
RISK REDUCTION AND MANAGEMENT ACT OF 2010’ AND
EXISTING INTER-AGENCY COORDINATION MECHANISMS
AND MEASURES OF THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT, THE
LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNITS AND THE PRIVATE SECTOR
ON DISASTER RISK REDUCTION, RESPONSE AND
RECOVERY IN THE COUNTRY WITH THE END VIEW OF
STRENGTHENING DISASTER RISK REDUCTION,
RESPONSE AND RECOVERY AND MANAGEMENT PLANS
AND PROGRAMS OF THE GOVERNMENT THROUGH
APPROPRIATE LEGISLATION

Introduced by Senator Gatchalian

The President. Referred to the Committees on National Defense and

Security, Peace, Unification and Reconciliation; and Local Government

The Secretary. Proposed Senate Resolution No. 289, entitled

RESOLUTION URGING THE GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE

SYSTEM, THE SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM, AND THE
HOME DEVELOPMENT MUTUAL FUND TO EXTEND
CALAMITY OR EMERGENCY LOANS TO AND/OR IMPOSE A
ONE YEAR MORATORIUM ON LOAN AMORTIZATIONS OF
MEMBERS WHO ARE RESIDENTS OF THE TAAL VOLCANO
ERUPTION CALAMITY AREAS; THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT
UNITS TO BE MORE LENIENT TO AFFECTED BUSINESSES
ON THE PAYMENT OF REAL PROPERTY TAXES, RENEWAL
OF BUSINESS PERMITS AND IMPOSITION OF PENALTIES;
AND THE PRIVATE AND GOVERNMENT BANKS TO DEFER
LOAN PAYMENTS OF AFFECTED BORROWERS

10
 Introduced by Senator Gatchalian

The President. Referred to the Committees on Government

Corporations and Public Enterprises; Local Government; and Ways and Means

The Secretary. Proposed Senate Resolution No. 290, entitled

RESOLUTION URGING THE IMMEDIATE RELEASE OF FUNDS

FOR THE AID, RELIEF, RESETTLEMENT, REHABILITATION,
LIVELIHOOD, DEVELOPMENT AND SOCIAL PROGRAMS
AND SERVICES TO COMMUNITIES ADVERSELY AFFECTED
BY THE TAAL VOLCANO ERUPTION, AND DIRECTING THE
APPROPRIATE SENATE COMMITTEE TO IMMEDIATELY
CALL THE NATIONAL DISASTER RISK REDUCTION AND
MANAGEMENT COUNCIL (NDRRMC) FOR A SENATE
BRIEFING TO ASSESS THE SITUATION AND DETERMINE
THE NEEDS OF THE AFFECTED LOCALITIES AND THE
TOTAL BUDGET REQUIREMENTS TO ADDRESS THE
CALAMITY

Introduced by Senator Recto

The President. Referred to the Committees on Finance; and National

Defense and Security, Peace, Unification and Reconciliation

The Majority Leader is recognized.

Senator Zubiri. Thank you, Mr. President.

In compliance with Section 26 of Republic Act No. 10121, which is the

Philippine Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Act of 2010, and also the

request of the chairman of the Committee on National Defense and Security,

Peace, Unification and Reconciliation, Sen. Panfilo Lacson, I move, Mr.

President, that we constitute the oversight committee of the said measure.

May I ask the chairman on who he would want to designate as members

of his committee.

The President. Senator Lacson is recognized.

11
 MOTION OF SENATOR LACSON
(Nomination and Election of the Members of the
Joint Congressional Oversight Committee
on Republic Act No. 10121)

Senator Lacson. Thank you, Mr. President.

I move that the following be made members of the Joint Congressional

Oversight Committee on Republic Act No. 10121: for the majority, Sen. Francis

“Tol" N. Tolentino, Sen. Ronald “Bato” dela Rosa, and Sen. Christopher

Lawrence T. Go, Mr. President. And since under the provision of the Act, the

minority shall have at least two members and since there are only two

members, not including the Minority Leader who is already an ex officio

member, with the permission of the Minority Leader, I ask that Sen. Francis

“Kiko” Pangilinan and Sen. Risa Hontiveros be made as members.

The President. And His Honor as chairman.

Senator Lacson. And this representation as chairman, Mr. President.

The President. Is there any objection? [Silence] There being none, the

enumerated names are hereby elected as members of the oversight committee.

BILL ON SECOND READING

S. No. 1083—Anti-Terrorism Act of 2019
(Continuation)

Senator Zubiri. Thank you, Mr. President. With that, I move that we

resume consideration of Senate Bill No. 1083 as reported out under Committee

Report No. 9.

The President. Is there any objection? [Silence] There being none, the

motion is approved.
12
 Senator Zubiri. Mr. President, may we recognize Sen. Panfilo M. Lacson;

and to interpellate, the distinguished Minority Leader, Sen. Franklin Drilon.

The President. The consideration of the measure is in order. Senator

Lacson, chairman of the Committee on National Defense and Security, Peace,

Unification and Reconciliation, is recognized; and the Minority Leader Sen.

Franklin Drilon, for the interpellation,.

Senator Drilon. Thank you very much, Mr. President. Will the

gentleman from Cavite, the sponsor of the measure, yield for further questions

on this proposed measure?

Senator Lacson. This is just a continuation of the suspended

interpellation of the distinguished Minority Leader. Willingly, Mr. President.

Senator Drilon. Thank you very much, Mr. President. Once more, allow

us to spread into the Record our commendation to the gentleman from Cavite

for exerting effort in order to amend the present Human Security Act which

admittedly can stand improvement and would have to respond to what we have

experienced in this area in the last several years since its enactment.

The most significant portion of the measure, Mr. President, is the

definition of acts of terrorism under Section 4 of the measure. This is

important because it defines the crime that is sought to be punished under the

law. The first issue we note is that by the definition of Terrorist Acts, it

includes “any person”—this is found on lines 20 and 21 of page 5. By this

13
definition of “any person” that is covered by this Act, this would include state

actors or agents of the law. Is that a correct definition?

Senator Lacson. That is a correct definition because it states any

person without exception, Mr. President.

Senator Drilon. Is that the intention, Mr. President, that it would

include any person? That it would include members of the armed forces, just

for the record?

Senator Lacson. As long as they fall under the categories as stated in

the succeeding paragraphs, Mr. President.

Senator Drilon. We have to examine this closely, Mr. President, because

this is a criminal act. And therefore, as the sponsor being the former chief of

the Philippine National Police would agree, we must have a precise legal

definition, otherwise, the police agencies would find difficulty in providing the

kind of evidence to the prosecutor in order to prosecute the crime.

Now, in international law, there is yet no precise definition of terrorism,

is that correct?

Senator Lacson. That is correct, Mr. President. As a matter of fact,

there are at least 10 definitions.

Senator Drilon. I am sorry, Mr. President?

Senator Lacson. There are at least 10 definitions of terrorism, Mr.

President.

14
 Senator Drilon. From my readings, there are over a hundred definitions

of what constitutes terrorism.

Senator Lacson. There are over 109 definitions. I stand corrected, Mr.

President.

Senator Drilon. We are reading the same material, Mr. President.

Senator Lacson. Wikipedia. [Laughter]

Senator Drilon. Mr. President, the definition of Terrorist Acts under

pages 5, 6, and 7 of the measure would clearly define when it is applicable to

ordinary crimes, to act of terrorism, or freedom fighters. In other words, the

difficulty in the definition of anti-terrorism is that it is either an ordinary crime,

an act of terrorism, or acts committed by freedom fighters. Would the good

sponsor agree with that?

Senator Lacson. It all depends on the intent and the purpose of the act,

Mr. President.

Senator Drilon. That is correct, Mr. President. Yes, that is the purpose

of the act, and I agree with that. That is why by the definition on page 7, from

line 6 down, it is very clear that when the purpose of such act, by its nature or

context, is to intimidate, put in fear, force or induce the government or any

international organization, or the public to do any act or abstain from doing

any act, or seriously destabilize, et cetera, et cetera.

Now, in the United States, the statute that defines terrorism clearly

indicates that it is the use of violence or threat of violence in the pursuit of

15
political, religious, ideological, or social objectives. Would that standard be

applied also to the proposed measure which would distinguish it from an

ordinary criminal?

Senator Lacson. That could qualify but not necessarily, Mr. President,

because we are bound by the purpose of the act being committed.

Senator Drilon. Well, precisely, in the United States statute, the purpose

is in pursuit of political, religious, or ideological objectives. Would this be the

same purpose that would qualify the act as an act of terrorism under our

proposed measure?

Senator Lacson. We removed that provision actually, Mr. President. We

did not apply. We are not applying the provision under the US statute on the

definition of Terrorist Acts.

Senator Drilon. So that we spread that into the Record that the act of

terrorism need not be in pursuit of a political, religious, ideological, or social

objective.

Senator Lacson. That is correct, Mr. President. And in lieu of that, we

substituted the purpose of the act by its nature and context. It must be

committed to: (1) intimidate, put in fear, force or induce the government or any

international organization, or the public to do or to abstain from doing any act;

(2) seriously destabilize or destroy the fundamental political, economic or social

structures of the country, and (3) create a public emergency or undermine

public safety. So, we substituted what are stated under the US statute.

16
 Senator Drilon. There is an effort to broaden the applicability; it need

not be for political, religious, ideological, or social objectives. So, that need not

be alleged in the information and not proven in the course of the trial that this

is the purpose, is that correct?

Senator Lacson. That is correct, Mr. President.

Senator Drilon. In fact, this definition is more consistent with the

pending convention in the UN, the proposed Comprehensive Convention on

International Terrorism, which does not indicate that political motivation is

essential.

Senator Lacson. Exactly, Mr. President.

Senator Drilon. Now, under the proposed definition in the

Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism, when the purpose of

the conduct by its nature or context is to intimidate a population or compel a

government or international organization to do or abstain from doing any act,

that is in substance adopted in the proposed measure. Is that correct?

Senator Lacson. That is correct, Mr. President.

Senator Drilon. Now, what bothers me in this definition, Mr. President,

is that on Section 4 of the measure, the definition of what constitutes terrorist

acts are basically based on the proposed convention but letter (E) of the

measure refers to “THREAT TO COMMIT ANY OF THE ACTS LISTED IN

PARAGRAPHS (A) TO (D) IN THIS SECTION” which is not included in all these

conventions. And to me, this poses a little difficulty because--allow me to

17
explain--if we relate this Section 4 to Section 6, Section 6 is attempt or

conspiracy to commit a terrorist act. It says: “ANY ATTEMPT TO COMMIT ANY

OF THE ACTS DEFINED AND PENALIZED UNDER SECTION 4 OF THIS ACT

SHALL BE PENALIZED BY LIFE IMPRISONMENT WITHOUT THE BENEFIT OF

PAROLE AND THE BENEFITS OF R.A. NO. 10592.”

When we combine these two provisions, we will come up with a crime

called “attempted threat” to commit terrorism which is a little difficult for me to

accept and we will find difficulty defining what is an attempt to threaten.

Senator Lacson. Actually, Mr. President, I already read the gentleman’s

mind before we even rose to the podium. And I am willing to bargain to

remove the word “attempt.”

Senator Drilon. Thank you very much, Mr. President. Because that

really confuses. Thank you for that response so that we can remove that letter

(E).

Senator Lacson. At the proper time.

Senator Drilon. At the proper time so that we can make the definition

more precise.

Also included in the definition is when the purpose of the act is to

seriously destabilize or destroy the fundamental political, economic or social

structures of the country, this qualification is not found in the proposed

convention. What exactly does this mean?

Senator Lacson. That is still on Section 4, Mr. President?

18
 Senator Drilon. Yes, it is still on Section 4, on page 7, lines 9 to 11. In

other words, it is an act of terrorism “WHEN THE PURPOSE OF SUCH ACT, BY

ITS NATURE AND CONTEXT, IS TO...”

Senator Lacson. “DESTABILIZE OR DESTROY THE FUNDAMENTAL

POLITICAL, ECONOMIC OR SOCIAL STRUCTURES.”

Senator Drilon. As we said, this is not found in the proposed

convention. May we be benefited by an explanation for the record on exactly

what this means when and if a prosecutor would want to prosecute a crime

under this definition?

Senator Lacson. This particular provision, Mr. President, or portion of

the purpose, we culled this from the different provisions of other ASEAN

countries. This is a combination of all available anti-terrorism acts in other

countries, particularly ASEAN countries. And we got this particular provision

from most of the ASEAN countries’ anti-terrorism statutes, Mr. President.

Senator Drilon. The reason why we are asking that, Mr. President, is

that, to our mind, the qualification is a little bit broad. What kind of acts would

fall under the description of “seriously destabilize or destroy the fundamental

political, economic, or social structures of the country?”

Senator Lacson. Well, if businesses cannot function anymore or cannot

do their usual activities anymore because of threats of terrorism or terrorist

acts itself, then that could fall under this category, Mr. President. Or if a

government agency—say, the Senate as an institution—cannot function

19
because of a terrorist act or a threat of a terrorist act, then that would affect

the fundamental political structure of the country. Or even the Philippine Stock

Exchange, if it is a subject of a terrorist act, then it will hinder or even affect

adversely the economic activities of that country, in this case, the Philippines.

Senator Drilon. Mr. President, is that not covered by the preceding line

which states would intimidate the public to do or abstain from doing a

particular act?

Senator Lacson. It may be different, Mr. President, because in the

preceding paragraph, it involves the public at large, but in this case, we are

hampering the business activities of, as I mentioned earlier, the Philippine

Stock Exchange, for example.

Senator Drilon. Mr. President, Senator Tolentino wishes to intervene. I

am willing to yield the Floor to him.

The President. With the permission of the two gentlemen, Senator

Tolentino is recognized.

Senator Tolentino. Mr. President, with the sufferance of Senator

Lacson, I would like to direct my questions to the interpellator, the Minority

Leader.

Senator Drilon. I do not think that is proper, Mr. President.

Senator Tolentino. Just for clarificatory purposes.

Senator Lacson. Just to clarify.

20
 Senator Tolentino. Just to clarify and for the information of this Body.

And it has been done…

The President. Well, perhaps, the best way for the gentleman from

Cavite is to make a manifestation. The interpellator is Senator Drilon.

Senator Tolentino. Yes, Mr. President. Just a point of clarification.

The President. If the gentleman wants to ask a question, he may ask

the sponsor.

Senator Tolentino. Of course that is if the good interpellator would like

to clarify, Mr. President. Because this is germane to the issue previously

discussed as regards the sovereign agent which, I think, is very critical in

Section 4 and Section 6. Or if the good sponsor can answer, I will…

Senator Drilon. Mr. President, for an orderly proceeding, maybe the

principal sponsor can attempt to answer and we would react to that as an

interpellator. But it is a little difficult to accept a process wherein the

interpellator would be asked questions, Mr. President.

Senator Tolentino. No, Mr. President. Just for the information of the

Body and the general public. I just wish the Body to be clarified regarding an

item—of course, with the permission of the Minority Leader—relative to Section

4 and Section 6 which we have skipped.

Senator Drilon. The gentleman may go ahead, Mr. President.

Senator Tolentino. And if the good sponsor will answer, with more

reason that I will pursue this, with the permission of the gentleman, of course.

21
 The discussion is anchored on an agent acting in behalf of a State. Mr.

President, if the two gentlemen could probably clarify to this representation, if

an agent or a military officer or a police officer is acting pursuant to his duties,

is it not included in the state immunity doctrine? Considering that he is an

agent of the State, he cannot be sued even if an act is considered as a

terroristic act; he is not bound to be hailed in a foreign court or in a national

court because he is acting in behalf of the State. Is my proposition correct

from the two gentlemen?

The President. The sponsor may react or answer.

Senator Lacson. As I responded to the distinguished Minority Leader

earlier, the law does not exempt anyone. But the person committing the act of

terrorism must be bound by the purpose as stated under the measure, Mr.

President. If the purpose is different or outside of the mission or the mandate

assigned to that particularly military officer or agent of the government, then

he should be, likewise, held accountable or criminally liable for such act

terrorism.

Senator Drilon. Mr. President, with the permission of the good sponsor,

in my humble view, this bill and the law should not apply to state agents

because they are governed by some other law--the Penal Code or some other

act.

In fact, in the United States, Mr. President, the Anti-Terrorism bill as

defined in Title 22, Chapter 38, U.S. Code No. 2656, specifically includes only

22
acts committed by non-state actors. So that a state actor, although he is liable

for the crime committed, the crime is not under the Anti-Terrorism Law but

under another statute—the Revised Penal Code.

Senator Lacson. The gentleman may be referring to the Articles of War,

Mr. President. If we are members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, then

we are covered by the Articles of War instead of some criminal acts covered by

the civil courts. The gentleman may be referring to that.

Senator Drilon. Yes. Well, because also…

Senator Lacson. But, what about members of the PNP or some

uniformed services who are not covered by the Articles of War? Does it also

mean that…

Senator Drilon. Well, that is the way with the gentleman from Cavite…

Senator Tolentino. Mr. President, perhaps the example cited by the

good Minority Leader refers to, perhaps, the overall umbrella covering consular

officers, diplomatic officers, who are probably exempt from suit. But, there are

peculiarities, and the good sponsor is familiar with this, when our PNP officer is

made a police attaché and as a police attaché, he has a diplomatic immunity

likewise.

So, I am referring to a person who might probably be involved in

espionage, who will later on claim that he is not part of this because he is a

diplomat. And because of that, he is immune from suit and, therefore, cannot

23
be subjected to the provisions of this proposed bill. I would like to clarify that,

Mr. President, or should it be expressly stated in the proposed bill?

Senator Drilon. Mr. President, if I recall, in the previous session when

this bill was calendared, I specifically asked the question of the good sponsor.

It was a question asked in jest but very applicable to what we are debating

today. And, I asked a specific question: Was Senator Honasan a terrorist?

Remember, he was a member of the armed forces at the time when the coup

d’état was launched, and he did acts which will compel the government to do

something.

Now, in other words, by ordinary definition, because the law says “any

person,” Senator Honasan would have been covered. But the gentleman from

Cavite, the good sponsor, said, “No, Senator Honasan would have been covered

by the Revised Penal Code, including the coup d’état, if that was existing at

that time, but not by the Anti-Terrorism Law because he was a state actor. He

was a member of the armed forces.” That is how the debate went on. Of

course, it is a matter for this Body to decide later on how to precisely define

this. I am just basing my questions and interpellations on the phrase “any

person.” That means, whether or not one is a state agent or a law enforcement

officer, if he commits acts which fall under the definition, he can be prosecuted

under the Anti-Terrorism Law. That is how I understood it, Mr. President.

The President. Did the Minority Leader concur with the answer of the

gentleman from Cavite, Senator Lacson?

24
 Senator Lacson. I do not think so, Mr. President.

Senator Drilon. Mr. President, under the present wording of the bill,

Senator Honasan could have been prosecuted if this was law because the law

says “any person.”

Senator Lacson. Except that there is no retroactive effect, Mr. President.

Senator Drilon. No, no. I mean, assuming…

Senator Lacson. And at that time, it is hypothetical.

Senator Drilon. …assuming that at that time they were committed, this

was already in existence. By the phrase “any person,” Mr. President, that would

include Senator Honasan because it does not exempt state agents, meaning,

public officers, who could be prosecuted for another crime but not under the

Anti-Terrorism bill. That is all I am saying.

It is not that we are exempting from criminal prosecution the acts

committed, but the prosecution should be under another statute, not under

this statute. That is all we are saying.

But, of course, it is a policy issue. Right now, the good sponsor is saying

“any person” is covered. And, at a certain point, the Chamber would have to

vote on such policy issue, Mr. President.

The President. All right.

Senator Tolentino. Mr. President, one last point before I yield the Floor.

The President. Yes.

25
 Senator Tolentino. Relative to Section 4--which I recall was exhaustively

discussed during that December session; I forgot the date--and it has

something to do with the unlawful acts committed in or outside of the

Philippines, Mr. President.

Senator Drilon. Yes, we will come into that later.

Senator Tolentino. Just one last question, Mr. President, before I yield

the Floor.

This is something to do with the long-arm statute and the possibility of

this jurisdiction serving summons or placing into its jurisdiction persons

outside the territory of the Philippines, Mr. President.

I did my research during the Christmas break. And for the information of

this Body, it appears, and perhaps the Committee on Foreign Relations should

take cognizance of this, that the Philippines is not even a signatory to a very

important convention, not related to criminal law, but civil or commercial

matters. It is entitled “The Hague Convention on Service Abroad of Judicial and

Extrajudicial Documents,” Mr. President.

What I am trying to say, Mr. President, is, how do we acquire jurisdiction

of a person outside of the Philippines who, apparently, is planning to commit or

attempting to commit any terroristic act if we cannot even serve the necessary

processes or documents to acquire jurisdiction over that person? To highlight

the matter, we are very familiar with the Ghosn case which involves a Brazilian

president of Nissan, who was prosecuted in Japan, went to Turkey, and then,

26
finally, settled in Lebanon, and even Japan, with the help of the Interpol,

cannot acquire jurisdiction over Mr. Ghosn, who, apparently, posted bail in

Tokyo and then escaped before Christmas.

I am looking at the administrative difficulty of enforcing Section 4 insofar

as acts committed outside of the Philippines, Mr. President. That is my last

question. And if the good sponsor, or if the Minority Leader, can help clarify

this predicament on how our courts will acquire a long-arm jurisdiction over a

person outside the Philippines is for us to really analyze.

Senator Lacson. Well, the answer to that is yes and no. If it is outside

of the jurisdiction of the Philippines, then we cannot acquire jurisdiction. But

once he steps into our territory, then we can acquire jurisdiction under the

proposed provision in this measure, Mr. President.

And as we also mentioned last December, we are applying the

territoriality principle. And the gentleman himself clarified that when he

interjected that we can actually acquire jurisdiction over foreign terrorists, but

only when they step on the shores of the country, Mr. President.

Senator Tolentino. One last point, Mr. President. In terms of the

prescription of crimes committed here. Because we might reach a point that

the perpetrators might be in the Philippines, the other conspirators might be

outside of the Philippines, and the period of prescription for those outside of

the Philippines will start only once the court acquires jurisdiction. So, we

might be placed in an administrative dilemma wherein some of the co-

27
conspirators are already in jail, or perhaps released, or perhaps the crime has

prescribed. But for the other participants coming from outside of our territory,

it will only commence once they enter our territory. Am I correct?

So, this would entail a very difficult administrative, judicial, and

prosecutorial proceedings insofar as our criminal justice system is concerned,

Mr. President.

Senator Lacson. I think the law on prescription will apply. For capital

offenses, it is 20 years. So, if that terrorist does not come to our country to be

prosecuted, and after a lapse of 20 years, the crime against him shall

prescribe.

I hope I am correct with my response, Mr. President.

Senator Tolentino. Thank you, Mr. President. Thank you to the two

gentlemen for allowing me to interject. I just have some administrative

nuances that I will probably expound during the period of amendments,

especially as regards the jurisdiction on criminal cases and the long-arm

jurisdiction of our courts, if there is any.

I would like to thank the two gentlemen. Salamat po.

Senator Lacson. Anything that will enhance this measure is, of course,

welcome, Mr. President.

Senator Drilon. Thank you, Mr. President. Thank you to the gentleman

from Cavite, Senator Tolentino.

28
 Mr. President, on the issue of extraterritoriality, a cardinal principle of

criminal law is that the criminal law applies only within the territory of the

State which enacts this criminal law. I repeat that: As a general principle,

penal statutes are only applicable within the territory of the State which enacts

the criminal statutes. An exception is extraterritoriality. Meaning, even if the

offense was committed outside of the country which enacts the law, the

principle of extraterritoriality can be extended even on those acts committed

outside of the jurisdiction. And under our Revised Penal Code, there are very

specific application of extraterritoriality when the code can be made to apply

as, for example, when an offense is committed while on Philippine ship or

airship, where it is to counterfeit a currency note of the Philippines, or where

the acts are committed by public officers in the exercise of their functions. So,

there is a point of contact with the Philippines.

My problem with the way the present law is worded, it does not anymore

require a point of contact with the Philippines. So that, with due respect to the

good sponsor, it may or it can lead to absurd situations and the administrative

difficulties which the good gentleman, Senator Tolentino, mentioned.

Just to cite an example, Mr. President.

A Malaysian who plans to commit a terrorist act in Indonesia and crosses

the border to Indonesia, would have nothing to do with the Philippines, when

he comes to the country, he can be charged and sentenced to life

imprisonment.

29
 It is a little difficult that apart from the over extension of the principle of

extraterritoriality which is premised on the interest of the State being

prejudiced by an act outside of its jurisdiction, that is the principal premise.

Even if the Philippines has nothing to do with it, the person who commits a

terrorist act can be liable for life imprisonment.

In the previous period of interpellations, the good sponsor said, we do not

want to be a party or we want to make sure that we do our share as an

obligation to the community of nations that we should punish those guilty of

terrorist acts even if there has no relation to the Philippines.

If that is the purpose, Mr. President, would the gentleman agree to first

limit the extraterritoriality exception to those which are enumerated in the

Revised Penal Code and under Section 58 of the present law? Instead of a

criminal offense, once the terrorist comes to our country, he is stopped at the

border and deported to the place where he committed the terrorist act.

Senator Lacson. The distinguished Minority Leader is correct because

in the customary international law scheme of jurisdiction, the territoriality

principle serves as the basic principle of jurisdiction. Exceptionally, however,

Mr. President, national laws may be given extraterritorial application provided

that these laws could be justified by one of the recognized principles of

extraterritorial jurisdiction under public international law; active personality

principle, passive principle, protective principle, and universality principle.

And because of the global nature of terrorism, we can apply the universality

30
principle to cover even foreign terrorists who have committed acts of terrorism

outside of the Philippine jurisdiction. That is what we are applying here, to

apply the provisions of the Revised Penal Code, maybe to delimit.

Senator Drilon. At the end, this is a policy issue. I believe that as a

lawyer, I cannot subscribe to that proposal and even considering the

administrative difficulties pointed out by Senator Tolentino.

We can imagine, Mr. President, how difficult it is to gather evidence

abroad in order to prosecute this case in our jurisdiction. I think, we will be

fulfilling our obligation if we make sure, if we exert every effort and make sure

that our laws would allow us to hold in our borders a terrorist and deport him

or her to the country where he or she is facing a case for anti-terrorism acts

rather than prosecuting him/her here with all the difficulties attendant to such

prosecution. I think, it is more effective if we deport the person to the country

where the acts were committed because if we incarcerate the person here, it is

entirely possible that it becomes his base to recruit Filipino terrorists.

So, that is why our humble suggestion is that, yes, if these are foreign

terrorists who come to the shore of the country or to our boarder, do not allow

them entry; deport them immediately to the country where they are facing

criminal charges. The gentleman from Cavite should be fully familiar with this

being the former chief of the Philippine National Police that there are so-called

“red alerts” when an accused from a foreign country comes to our shores and

the Interpol red alert is on record to deport him immediately.

31
 To me, policy consideration would dictate that we should follow that

same process because of the difficulties that we would encounter. And,

regrettably, I cannot agree that even if no element of the crime concerns the

Philippines, we can impose a life imprisonment here. Because in the first place,

we may not even be able to prove this offense because of the difficulty of the

evidence. If I were the counsel for a foreign terrorist, the first thing I will do is

to ask for a speedy trial, and if the prosecution cannot present evidence, then

that terrorist is released. And the difficult deportation proceedings would have

to be instituted.

Senator Lacson. May I respond, Mr. President?

Senator Drilon. Yes, please, Mr. President.

Senator Lacson. Times have changed, Mr. President. Terrorism is a new

phenomenon. And having said that, the Revised Penal Code does not

contemplate because it was passed in 1932.

Senator Drilon. Yes, Mr. President.

Senator Lacson. And terrorism was non-existent, never heard of, at that

time, Mr. President. So, to limit the definition or the coverage of terrorist acts

within the provisions of the Revised Penal Code, would be a disservice to the

safety and security of our people.

Senator Drilon. What we are talking here is the principle of

extraterritoriality.

Senator Lacson. That is correct, Mr. President.

32
 Senator Drilon. It is the applicability of the law outside of our

jurisdiction. The general principle is, the laws apply only within the territory of

the enacting State. The exception is extraterritoriality. Whether or not it is

terrorism or another crime, that principle will still apply—extraterritoriality. It

is not because a person has a particular crime.

Senator Lacson. We are only introducing the extraterritoriality principle

in the proposed measure, Mr. President. In ordinary crimes, we are not…

Senator Drilon. I know, Mr. President. But may we know why we are

making an exception or removing all the conditions basically from the

application of extraterritoriality in case of terrorism? Because under the

present law, there is a provision which allows extraterritorial application.

Senator Lacson. We are not removing, Mr. President, we are precisely

including or applying the principle of extraterritoriality.

Senator Drilon. No, Mr. President. On pages 56 and 57 of the bill,

Section 58 of the present law on extraterritorial application of the act, it is

bracketed, and, therefore, proposed to be deleted.

Senator Lacson. Let me check, Mr. President.

Senator Drilon. Yes, please.

I move that we suspend the session for one minute, Mr. President.

SUSPENSION OF SESSION

The President. Is there any objection? [Silence] There being none, the
session is suspended.

It was 3:39 p.m.

33
 RESUMPTION OF SESSION

At 4:00 p.m., the session was resumed.

The President. The session is resumed.

Senator Lacson. We bracketed that particular provision because it is

too limiting, Mr. President. It delimits the power of the State. And precisely,

we bracketed that to replace it with a new provision that would expand.

Senator Drilon. The sponsor bracketed it and inserted the phrase “IN

OR OUTSIDE OF THE PHILIPPINES” without any qualification whatsoever so

that we can prosecute everybody.

Senator Lacson. That is correct, Mr. President.

Senator Drilon. I mean, we can prosecute anyone, a member of the ISIS

or a terrorist in Indonesia, et cetera. But one thing that we can see is that we

cannot enforce administratively this power. What I would like to point out and

support the administrative difficulties as pointed out by Senator Tolentino is

that terrorist acts are committed in different States, how do we propose to

prosecute these under the principle of extraterritoriality? In other words, the

act does not in any way compel the Philippine government to do any particular

act because it has nothing to do with the Philippines. But we are imposing, if

convicted, a life imprisonment which is a little stretched.

I repeat, we are punishing somebody for committing a terrorist act which

has nothing to do with the country and would even punish by life

34
imprisonment a person guilty of terrorism who would cross borders. So that a

member of the ISIS who would cross to…

Senator Lacson. I am glad the gentleman mentioned ISIS, Mr.

President. A case in point. What do we do to a Filipino who goes abroad, joins

the ISIS, and comes back here? Will we just let him go?

Senator Drilon. No, Mr. President. We deport him to the place.

Senator Lacson. But he is a Filipino. How can we deport a Filipino?

We cannot deport a Filipino, Mr. President.

Senator Drilon. No, Mr. President, I disagree with that. That is why

we have extradition treaties, and depending on the terms of the extradition

treaty, we can have our own citizens deported to a foreign country to face the

criminal case filed in that other country.

I will repeat. The mere fact that one is a Filipino does not exempt him

from being brought to the other country wherein he committed a crime. That is

what an extradition treaty is all about.

The President. But what if the Filipino did not commit any crime in

that country? He just made himself a member of some organizations.

Senator Lacson. Terrorist organization that is proscribed, then that is

already a criminal act, Mr. President.

The President. Here in the Philippines.

Senator Lacson. Even abroad, Mr. President.

The President. In all of the countries abroad?

35
 Senator Lacson. Countries where the laws on terrorism provide for

proscription of terrorist organizations. Then, just being a member is already a

criminal act.

The President. What if he comes from a country that does not

proscribe?

Senator Lacson. We can extradite him, Mr. President.

Senator Drilon. Yes, Mr. President, we can extradite him.

The President. We can extradite him.

Senator Drilon. In that example, Mr. President, assuming that in the

United States, an organization is deemed a terrorist organization and a Filipino

joins that organization, then we can deport him to the United States.

The President. All right. If the Filipino is in Iran or Syria and he joins

a terrorist group there, and then he comes over to the Philippines?

Senator Drilon. The remedy that I am proposing is that if it is a crime

in the place where he came from, we should arrest him at the border.

The President. No. In my example, he is not. He did not commit a

crime in that particular place. I am just using Syria as an example. But what

if he did not commit any crime and terrorism is not illegal in that particular

country and when he comes over to the Philippines, he is now a member of

that certain terrorist group?

Senator Drilon. Well, Mr. President, a few years back, we repealed the

Anti-Subversion Law which punished a person by a simple membership in the

36
Communist Party of the Philippines. That was a principle that we have

accepted—mere membership in any subversible organization is not punishable.

Now, we can debate on that here should the terrorist organization is

based in the Philippines. But if the terrorist organization is based abroad, I

cannot accept that a territoriality principle would be made to apply. As we

said, the better remedy could be, in our mind, not to allow the entry of the

foreigner in our shores and deport him to the place where the…

Senator Lacson. With the permission of the Minority Leader.

The President. Yes.

Senator Lacson. What we are trying to avoid here is to make the

Philippines a safe haven for terrorists.

Senator Drilon. We know, Mr. President.

Senator Lacson. What if the country where the Filipino came from does

not have an extradition treaty with the Philippines? What will we do with the

Filipino, Mr. President? He is here to commit the crime of terrorism precisely

because he is already a member of a terrorist organization like the ISIS which

happened in Marawi City.

Senator Drilon. Well, in Marawi City, that is not a good example, Mr.

President, because there were acts of terrorism.

Senator Lacson. No, without the actual terroristic activities perpetrated

there. The members of ISIS who landed in Marawi City to plan to commit

37
terrorism, we cannot do anything about them because of the absence of this

provision, Mr. President. We are trying to be proactive.

Senator Drilon. We accept that, Mr. President, but the purpose of

being proactive, to our mind, can be served if we exclude the criminal or the

terrorist from our territory. If he is a Filipino, then we can bring him to the

jurisdiction where he faces this crime.

Well, because if he is recruited here, Mr. President, that is already a

terrorist act under our proposal. We are talking about acts committed outside

of the Philippines. If he is recruited here, he commits a crime here, right?

The President. But if he goes abroad and becomes a member in Syria,

for example, and then we do not have extradition treaties with Syria, but he is

here now in the Philippines and here he is a member of a…

Senator Drilon. Well, he can be prosecuted here.

The President. Here. Yes, precisely.

Senator Drilon. Because he committed a crime here when he became a

member of a proscribed organization.

The President. All right. Then we concur with the answer then.

Senator Tolentino. Mr. President, again, with the permission of the

two gentlemen, just a manifestation.

Senator Drilon. Maybe the good gentleman, Senator Tolentino, can

avail of the period of interpellation at the appropriate time so that our train of

thought will not be interrupted. Just as a matter of better procedure.

38
 Senator Tolentino. Mr. President, just one line here. Relative to the

crimes committed outside, perhaps the good sponsor—with due respect—

should be made aware of the current trend that most Latin American countries

now have blocking statutes. Meaning to say, if we file a case against a

Nicaraguan in the United States, the Nicaraguan court will not assume

jurisdiction if we file again another case against that Nicaraguan national.

That goes the same with citizens coming from Costa Rica, Guatemala, Ecuador,

and Dominican Republic. What these Latin American countries are doing is,

they file a case in the United States as the forum; we will no longer assume

jurisdiction because the United States has more resources. “Go ahead, try it in

the United States.” But here we are, with due respect, in our proposed bill, we

are willing to assume more cases to be filed in our home court, so to speak,

though we might lack the resources.

With due respect, Mr. President, this is against the current trend of

unloading cases and giving it to courts, to forum with more resources, such as

the United States. They can try in their federal courts the terrorists and the

Latin American countries will no longer accept that. So, I am looking at the

situation wherein we file a case against a Nicaraguan terrorist and, thereafter,

the evidence sprouted in Nicaragua. Nicaragua will no longer accept that and

it probably will undermine our own case. Just a manifestation to further

highlight the difficulty of having a long-arm statute with grave administrative

difficulties.

39
 Salamat po, Minority Leader; salamat po, good sponsor.

Senator Lacson. I would like to posit a situation, Mr. President. What if

a Filipino participated in the planning abroad of a terroristic act in the

Philippines with the assistance of some foreign terrorists? With the

gentleman’s proposition, we cannot do anything about him when he comes

back to our country having planned the terrorist act abroad to be perpetrated

in the Philippines.

Senator Drilon. No, Mr. President. He could be prosecuted here even if

he planned it abroad because it involves the Philippines.

Senator Lacson. That is correct, Mr. President.

Senator Drilon. So, therefore, the extraterritoriality is squarely

applicable because there is a contact point— the Philippines. That is all what

we are saying because the way it is phrased now under the bill, our courts can

acquire jurisdiction over all acts of terrorism all over the world.

Senator Lacson. That is correct, Mr. President.

Senator Drilon. So, it is a little difficult to accept Mr. President, because

it simply runs contrary to the basic principles of territoriality. Anyway, we will

be submitting this amendment in the course of the period of amendments

because, apparently, the sponsor is not willing to yield at this particular point.

Senator Lacson. Well, I cannot accept that a Filipino ISIS member

trained abroad would come back to the Philippines and we just welcome him,

not doing anything to proactively prevent any possible act of terrorism. That is

40
what I cannot accept, Mr. President, because it entails loss of lives, destruction

of properties, destruction of the economy, and the destruction of the

fundamental political structure of the country. Shall we wait for the act to be

consummated before we act?

Senator Drilon. No, Mr. President, we are not waiting for that. We will

not be waiting for that. The moment he becomes a member of ISIS which

under the conventions are considered a terrorist organization, once he joins

that--

Senator Lacson. And then comes back to the Philippines, he can be

arrested?

Senator Drilon. --and comes back to the Philippines, we can protect

ourselves by not allowing him entry into our boarders and deport him to a

place…

Senator Lacson. Mr. President, that is if we are able to monitor that he

is coming back. But if we are not able to monitor that he has already come

back; he has already mingled with the community…

The President. Passed through the back door.

Senator Lacson. …what can we do, Mr. President, kill him?

Senator Drilon. No, Mr. President. We are talking here about principles

of territoriality and extraterritoriality.

Senator Lacson. That is correct, Mr. President.

41
 Senator Drilon. The first principle is that a criminal statute is only

applicable and enforceable within the borders of the country which enacted the

law; exception--extraterritoriality. Therefore, the exception must be fully

understood and qualified because it is an exception to the territoriality

principle under our criminal laws. That is all that we are saying. We are saying

that in order to justify the applicability for acts committed outside of the

country, it must have a point of contact with the Philippines. Whether the plan

is against a Philippine official or committed on board a Philippine ship, we

should have that principle of extraterritoriality present. Because a system that

would make us the venue for terrorist acts all over the world is simply not

something that, as a principle, we can agree with, Mr. President.

Senator Lacson. That is the reason why I enumerated the different

principles under the territoriality principle, Mr. President—active, passive,

protective, and universality—and any of those principles can apply.

Senator Drilon. Mr. President, on the questions raised about a Filipino

citizen, the international law, particularly on conflict of laws, would allow

jurisdiction over acts committed outside of the borders by the citizen of that

country on the principle of nationality which accords jurisdiction to the

country where the criminal is its citizen. And in the enumeration, maybe what

we can do is amend Section 58 of the present law by including, as an

application of the principle of extraterritoriality, where the terrorist act is

committed by a Filipino.

42
 Senator Lacson. How about if it is committed by a foreign terrorist who

would come to the Philippines, Mr. President?

Senator Drilon. When it is committed by a foreign terrorist abroad with

no point of contact for the Philippines, the principle of territoriality will apply,

and if he comes to the Philippines, the remedy should be to deport him and not

allow entry into the country rather than letting him undergo trial in our

jurisdiction when we have nothing to do with it. I think we fulfill our

international obligation by denying him entry. Now, we can agree to the

proposition that if he is a Filipino, who committed terrorist acts outside by the

nationality theory--we can prosecute him here.

Senator Lacson. I am afraid that there would be a situation that we will

be too late to act, Mr. President. That foreign terrorist may have already

committed a terrorist act before we even proceed with the deportation

proceedings.

Senator Drilon. No, Mr. President. Because as he enters our border, he

is immediately deprived of liberty.

Senator Lacson. If we are able to detect and monitor him, Mr. President.

Senator Drilon. Well, precisely. The same concern would be on a foreign

terrorist who…

Senator Lacson. I am referring to a foreign terrorist, Mr. President.

Senator Drilon. No, Mr. President. Because this would apply to all.

Whether a foreign terrorist who commits an act of terrorism outside of a

43
country with no relation to the Philippines or if he even crosses borders

internationally would be liable for life imprisonment here. He has nothing to do

with the Philippines.

Senator Gordon. I think, I am lost. I agree with everything that the

Minority Leader said. But I just want to clarify, are we talking about a foreign

terrorist who commits an act of terrorism abroad and comes in here? The

Minority Leader is correct; he will immediately be deported. He will not be

allowed here. But if he gets in here, he has already violated a terrorism

provision.

Senator Lacson. Yes, that is correct.

Senator Gordon. Here in our country. Even if he is a foreign terrorist

who attacks another country.

Senator Lacson. That is correct, Mr. President.

Senator Gordon. Is that the principle that the gentleman is trying to…

Senator Lacson. Yes, Mr. President.

Senator Gordon. So, Mr. President…

Senator Lacson. Under the territoriality principle, that is correct, Mr.

President.

Senator Drilon. No, that is not it.

Senator Gordon. I just want to be clarified because if he committed an

act against a foreign entity abroad, under the principle of this measure, any

44
Filipino or foreigner who commits an act in or outside the Philippines is liable.

Is that correct?

Senator Lacson. That is correct.

Senator Drilon. We are amenable to punishing him if he is a Filipino on

the principle of nationality.

Senator Gordon. That is correct, follows him wherever he is.

Senator Drilon. Yes, but when he is a foreigner, committing a terrorist

act abroad which targets any and not the Philippines, I do not think that the

principle of extraterritoriality should apply, but we are not without any

remedy. Our remedy is to exclude him from our jurisdiction.

Senator Gordon. I see the point of Senator Lacson, if he comes in here,

he becomes a threat because he is skilled; he is a bomb maker.

Senator Drilon. He becomes a threat. That is why we have the right to

exclude him at our border.

Senator Gordon. We have a very porous country…

Senator Lacson. May I ask a simple question, Mr. President? Is

terrorism a crime against humanity and the law of nations? It is.

Senator Drilon. Yes, it is.

Senator Lacson. And that we should apply. Even if he commits a crime

of terrorism abroad and he comes to the Philippines, then he must be

prosecuted.

45
 Senator Gordon. Under the IHL, hindi ba? If he commits barbaric acts,

kills a lot of people, and he tries to come in here, we have a solemn duty to

arrest him not under the terrorism law but under the IHL.

Senator Lacson. That is what we are proposing under this measure.

Senator Gordon. Hindi ba under the IHL?

Senator Drilon. International Humanitarian Law. There is no authority

to arrest somebody who violates an international convention, Mr. President.

Senator Lacson. That is why we are including it in the amendment of

the Human Security Act. We are trying to strengthen the law against

terrorism.

Senator Drilon. Yes, I commend the effort of the good sponsor to

strengthen but we have a principle in law that we should not interpret the law

to the point of absurdity. And it is our humble proposition that to make the

extraterritoriality principle apply to every act of terrorism all over the world.

Senator Gordon. Mr. President, with the permission of the Minority

Leader, I agree with Senator Lacson. Because, I think, if somebody like that

guy from Baghdad...Baghdad was bombed by the Americans which was

considered a crime. He was training people to bomb camps of the Americans.

And he comes to our country. What can we do about him? Deport him,

correct?

Senator Drilon. Deport him, yes, to the place where he is facing the

criminal case.

46
 Senator Gordon. He is already here like the bomb maker Marwan.

Senator Drilon. Deport him.

Senator Gordon. But we have to arrest him first, right?

Senator Drilon. No, deport him. The moment we filed a deportation

proceedings, we can already hold him in detention under our laws.

Senator Gordon. Let me argue my point of it. We have 7,647 islands at

last count, if I remember. And he can come in here; he becomes a clear and

present danger here because he can train, he can bomb, he can maim people

here. So, the point here is, perhaps, the debate is not on extraterritoriality

alone but the very fact that it is practically self-defense on the part of the

country to have him arrested.

Senator Lacson. That is correct, Mr. President.

Senator Gordon. And if we put that in the terrorism law, I think, that

might be acceptable. Because for example in Britain, they have a lot of

Muslim guys who leave their country and go to Syria--even bomb other people

in Syria and other places--go to Turkey and sometimes they are arrested. I

think we should look at that. When they come back, are they arrested in

Britain? I think, they are.

Senator Lacson. My concern, Mr. President, if we do not include that

provision, then the Philippines will be a safe haven of terrorists.

Senator Gordon. That is my point exactly.

47
 Senator Lacson. Mag-aalisan sila roon, pupunta silang lahat sa

Pilipinas.

Senator Drilon. Pero ang sinasabi ko nga, our remedy, instead of

prosecuting them here where the prosecution is very difficult and almost

impossible, exclude them from the Philippine territory, deport them to the

place where they committed the offense and where they are facing charges, and

not allow them entry into the country. That is all that we are saying, Mr.

President.

Senator Gordon. I just have two problems with that, Mr. President.

Senator Drilon. Mr. President, maybe at the appropriate time, when

Senator Gordon has the Floor. [Laughter]

Senator Gordon. Now, the Minority Leader is bullying me. [Laughter]

The President. Following the thesis of the Minority Leader, yes, indeed,

that can be so, but we will have to arrest him in order to deport him.

Senator Drilon. Yes, that is correct, Mr. President.

The President. Manlalaban iyon. [Laughter]

Senator Gordon. I get the point here.

Senator Lacson. That is a different concept, Mr. President.

Senator Drilon. Well, because when we charge him, we also have to

arrest him.

The President. Yes.

48
 Senator Drilon. So, the point is, we can deprive that terrorist of his

liberty, whether through a warrant of arrest in a case filed or through a

deportation proceeding when we would deport him to the country where he is

facing criminal charges.

Senator Gordon. Or in a special operation like Mamasapano.

SUSPENSION OF SESSION

Senator Drilon. Mr. President, may we ask for a suspension of the

session?

The President. Is there any objection? [Silence] There being none, the
session is suspended for a few minutes.

It was 4:27 p.m.

RESUMPTION OF SESSION

At 5:07 p.m., the session was resumed.

The President. The session is resumed.

Senator Zubiri. Thank you, Mr. President. We would like to suspend

the interpellation of Sen. Franklin Drilon. He asked to suspend for the
meantime and he will raise a few questions a bit later in the deliberations for
the record.

The President. All right.

Senator Zubiri. Mr. President, I believe we have two colleagues who

want to interpellate, one is Sen. Richard Gordon, and the other is Sen. Risa
Hontiveros.

SUSPENSION OF SESSION

Mr. President, I move that we suspend the session for one minute
because they are still not in the Session Hall.

The President. Is there any objection? [Silence] There being none, the
session is suspended for one minute.
49
 It was 5:07 p.m.

RESUMPTION OF SESSION

At 5:09 p.m., the session was resumed.

The President. The session is resumed.

Senator Zubiri. Mr. President, our colleagues have requested if they can
continue the interpellation of the bill tomorrow.

SUSPENSION OF CONSIDERATION OF S. NO. 1083

Therefore, Mr. President, I move that we suspend consideration of Senate

Bill No. 1083.

The President. Is there any objection? [Silence] There being none,

consideration of Senate Bill No. 1083 is suspended.

COMMITTEE REPORT NO. 17

(Re: P.S. Res. Nos. 106, 107, 108, and 123, taking into Consideration the
Privilege Speech on the Good Conduct Time Allowance of Senator Gordon
Delivered on August 27, 2019)
(Continuation)

Senator Zubiri. Mr. President, I move that we resume consideration of

Proposed Senate Resolution Nos. 106, 107, 108, 123 and the Privilege Speech

on the Good Conduct Time Allowance of Sen. Richard Gordon delivered on

August 27, 2019 as reported out under Committee Report No. 17.

The President. Is there any objection? [Silence] There being none,

consideration of Proposed Senate Resolution Nos. 106, 107, 108, 123 and the

Privilege Speech on the Good Conduct Time Allowance of Sen. Richard Gordon

delivered on August 27, 2019 are now in order.

Senator Zubiri. May we now recognize Sen. Richard Gordon.

50
 The President. Sen. Richard Gordon, chairman of the Committee on

Justice and Human Rights and Blue Ribbon, is recognized.

Senator Gordon. Yes, Mr. President. We are ready to accept any

interpellations.

The President. The Majority Leader is recognized.

Senator Zubiri. Mr. President, I ask that we recognize the Minority

Leader.

The President. The Minority Leader is recognized.

Senator Drilon. Just a parliamentary inquiry, Mr. President.

The President. Yes.

PARLIMENTARY INQUIRY OF SENATOR DRILON

Senator Drilon. This report is a partial report of the resolution.

Senator Gordon. That is correct, Mr. President.

Senator Drilon. For the record, there will be another report which is to

complete the report on the resolution.

Senator Gordon. Yes, Mr. President.

Senator Drilon. Thank you very much, Mr. President.

The President. All right, we place that on record.

Senator Zubiri. I think, this is Part I, Mr. President.

The President. So, this is Part I of the report.

Senator Zubiri. That is correct, Mr. President. There is still a Part II.

51
 The President. The committee will have, in a future time, a committee

report on the GCTA.

Senator Zubiri. I believe so, Mr. President.

With that, Mr. President, I move that we close the period of

interpellations.

The President. Is there any objection? [Silence] There being none, the
motion is approved.

Senator Zubiri. I move that we open the period of amendments, Mr.

President.

The President. Is there any objection? [Silence] There being none, the
motion is approved.

Senator Gordon. Mr. President, we have no amendments.

Senator Zubiri. There being no member who wishes to propose

amendment, I move that we close the period of amendments.

The President. Is there any objection? [Silence] There being none, the
motion is approved.

ADOPTION OF COMMITTEE REPORT NO. 17

Senator Zubiri. With that, Mr. President, there being no interpellation, I

move that we adopt Proposed Senate Resolution Nos. 106, 107, 108, 123 and
the Privilege Speech on the Good Conduct Time Allowance of Sen. Richard J.
Gordon.

The President. Is there any objection? [Silence] There being none, the
motion is approved.

Senator Zubiri. Thank you, Mr. President.

Senator Gordon. Mr. President, just a very short privilege speech.

Senator Zubiri. Mr. President, may we allow Senator Gordon to deliver

his privilege speech.

The President. Sen. Richard Gordon is recognized.

52
 PRIVILEGE SPEECH OF SENATOR GORDON

Senator Gordon. Thank you, Mr. President.

I would like to rise on a point of personal privilege, Mr. President,

principally because of the rising threat of a mysterious disease in the form of

coronavirus that is now raging in Wuhan, China. In view of the fact that it is a

novel coronavirus first reported in Wuhan when more than 40 individuals were

taken ill, apparently from their exposure in a seafood market in Wuhan.

On January 20, 2020—and this is what is disconcerting—no less than

Chinese President Xi Jinping said that it is extremely crucial to take every

possible measure to combat a new coronavirus that has infected 217 people in

China.

At the point of the reports a week ago, no human-to-human transmission

was documented—that is good. However, in the past few days, some countries

have confirmed the spread of this virus—one confirmed case in Seoul, South

Korea; two confirmed cases in Bangkok, Thailand; one confirmed case in

Tokyo, Japan; and other countries have suspected cases—two suspected in

Vietnam; six suspected in Singapore; and one pending further tests.

In the Philippines, the Department of Health (DOH) just disclosed today

that it is currently investigating cases here. One is the case of a five-year-old

who traveled from Wuhan, China and was admitted in Cebu City for

manifesting fever, throat irritation, and cough prior to entering the Philippines.

53
 DOH is also monitoring three individuals with flu-like symptoms upon

entering the country via the Kalibo International Airport from China, but

without any history of travel to Wuhan and without any known contact with a

confirmed 2019 novel coronavirus (2019-nCoV) case, Severe Acute Respiratory

(SARS) Illness case, or sick animals.

Coronaviruses are a large family of viruses ranging from the common

cold to more serious infections such as MERS-CoV and SARS-CoV. Common

signs of coronavirus infection include respiratory symptoms, fever, cough,

shortness of breath and breathing difficulties. In severe cases, it can cause

pneumonia, acute respiratory syndrome, kidney failure, and even death.

It is but natural that we all be concerned in the Philippines about this

virus, not only because we have heavy traffic of travelers from China, but we

are on the coast of Chinese New Year, Mr. President, which is on January 25,

and this is one of the longest holidays in China where everybody travels.

Lahat po ay nagbibiyahe riyan. They travel within China and they also travel

beyond China and the Philippines is one of their favorite destinations.

In 2019, there are about 1.5 million Chinese tourists in the country. In

January 2019 alone, 131,196 Chinese flew to the Philippines. That is so far in

January last year.

This is serious and we must act swiftly and boldly. I have been informed

that, as we speak, there is a global emergency meeting regarding this

outbreak.

54
 It is our duty to prepare for a possible spread of the coronavirus in our

country. Airports and seaports need to be on full alert. Beyond this, every

hospital, every health facility--public, private or run by local governments--

have to put in place contingency plans for patients who are consulting for

runny nose, cough, sore throat, and fever.

We should put a firewall in the hospitals which can prevent the virus

from spreading. We could also designate specific hospitals to cater to these

kinds of cases.

First, as we know, when they go in, if there are suspected cases, they

should not be allowed to go to the main hospital. There should be an isolation

ward that will receive them so it does not spread.

We know that it can easily mutate. We also know that in outbreaks of

coronavirus like SARS and MERS, hospitals have had to close down and

health workers who see the patients are at high risk for disease and even

death.

Unfortunately, as we may have noticed, many people are experiencing

flu-like symptoms already. So what are the plans? What are the protocols for

hospitals? What measures are in place to prepare for an outbreak?

With more than half a million people also in evacuation sites in

Batangas, one could imagine how a contagious virus could wreck havoc on our

people who are displaced.

55
 I would like to call on the leadership of all government agencies to

immediately put in place the preparedness plans for this weekend, a time of

high risk – travelling of people from China to all parts of the world –

information is critical, and all the mandatory quarantine and contact tracing

machinery need to be in place. They are already in place in our major airports,

but certainly, we are in archipelagic country, maaaring pumasok iyan sa

maliliit na bayan at sa maliliit na port natin.

Let us not wait for this to go out of hand. I am glad that the DOH is

already on hand. They had a press conference today and I am happy that they

are alerted to this. Let us sound the alarm now and prepare for a worst case

scenario. We must always do that. Through timely preparedness, we will save

lives and protect our people. Therefore, there must be a very good

communication plan so that people will not panic and would know what to do.

Communication plan that would turn an unthinkable and preventable illness

that could cause serious disease and unexpected death to a better result, Mr.

President.

Thank you very much, Mr. President.

The President. The Majority Leader is recognized.

MOTION OF SENATOR ZUBIRI

(Referral of the Privilege Speech of Senator Gordon to the Committee on Health
and Demography)

56
 Senator Zubiri. Mr. President, I move that we refer the privilege speech

of the distinguished gentleman from Zambales, Senator Gordon, to the

Committee on Health and Demography.

The President. Is there any objection? [Silence] There being none, the

motion is approved.

We have a Second Additional Reference of Business.

Senator Zubiri. Yes, Mr. President. I move that we proceed to the

Second Additional Reference of Business.

The President. Is there any objection? [Silence] There being none, the

motion is approved.

The Secretary will read the Second Additional Reference of Business.

SECOND ADDITIONAL REFERENCE OF BUSINESS

BILLS ON FIRST READING

The Secretary. Senate Bill No. 1278, entitled

AN ACT AMENDING SECTION 16 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 7160,

OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE OF
1991, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES

Introduced by Senator Villanueva

The President. Referred to the Committee on Local Government

The Secretary. Senate Bill No. 1279, entitled

AN ACT STRENGTHENING TECHNICAL VOCATIONAL EDUCATION AND

TRAINING (TVET) IN THE PHILIPPINES BY INCORPORATING
APPRENTICESHIP AND DUAL TRAINING SYSTEM, PROVIDING
FOR CONTINUOUS TRAINING OF THE UNEMPLOYED, AND
EXPANDING THE PROVISION OF ENTERPRISE-BASED
EDUCATION AND TRAINING, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES
57
 Introduced by Senator Villanueva

The President. Referred to the Committees on Higher, Technical and

Vocational Education; Labor, Employment and Human Resources
Development; Ways and Means; and Finance

The Secretary. Senate Bill No. 1280, entitled

AN ACT MANDATING FOOD MANUFACTURERS TO DISPLAY COLOR-

CODED NUTRITIONAL INFORMATION ON FOOD PACKAGING
AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES

Introduced by Senator Villanueva

The President. Referred to the Committees on Health and Demography;

and Trade, Commerce and Entrepreneurship

The Secretary. Senate Bill No. 1281, entitled

AN ACT PROVIDING FOR THE LIFETIME VALIDITY OF BIRTH

CERTIFICATES ISSUED BY THE PHILIPPINE STATISTICS
AUTHORITY AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES

Introduced by Senator Villanueva

The President. Referred to the Committees on Civil Service, Government

Reorganization and Professional Regulation

The Secretary. Senate Bill No. 1282, entitled

AN ACT INTEGRATING ENVIRONMENTAL EDUCATION IN THE

SENIOR HIGH SCHOOL (SHS) CURRICULUM

Introduced by Senator Villanueva

The President. Referred to the Committee on Basic Education, Arts and

Culture

The Secretary. Senate Bill No. 1283, entitled

AN ACT PROVIDING SCHOLARSHIP TO QUALIFIED STUDENTS

TAKING MEDICAL EDUCATION PROGRAMS,
APPROPRIATING FUNDS THEREFOR AND FOR OTHER
PURPOSES
58
 Introduced by Senator Villanueva

The President. Referred to the Committees on Higher, Technical and

Vocational Education; Health and Demography; and Finance

The Secretary. Senate Bill No. 1284, entitled

AN ACT GRANTING DISASTER RESPONSE VOLUNTEERS LEAVE

WITH PAY TO QUALIFIED EMPLOYEES IN THE
GOVERNMENT SECTOR AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES

Introduced by Senator De Lima

The President. Referred to the Committee on Civil Service, Government

Reorganization and Professional Regulation

The Secretary. Senate Bill No. 1285, entitled

AN ACT ENCOURAGING VOLUNTEERISM DURING

EMERGENCIES BY PROTECTING VOLUNTEERS FROM
LIABILITY AND PROVIDING MANDATORY INSURANCE
COVERAGE TO THE VOLUNTEERS

Introduced by Senator De Lima

The President. Referred to the Committees on Social Justice, Welfare

and Rural Development; and Justice and Human Rights

RESOLUTIONS

The Secretary. Senate Concurrent Resolution No. 5, entitled

CONCURRENT RESOLUTION URGING THE BANGSAMORO

TRANSITION AUTHORITY TO DESIGNATE ITS
REPRESENTATIVES TO THE PHILIPPINE CONGRESS-
BANGSAMORO PARLIAMENT FORUM TO BE CREATED
PURSUANT TO ARTICLE VI, SECTION 3 OF REPUBLIC ACT
NO. 11054, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE ‘ORGANIC LAW
FOR THE BANGSAMORO AUTONOMOUS REGION IN
MUSLIM MINDANAO’ AND TO MEET WITH THE
DELEGATES DESIGNATED BY THE SENATE AND THE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES FOR THE PURPOSE

Introduced by Senator Zubiri

The President. Referred to the Committee on Rules

59
The Secretary. Proposed Senate Resolution No. 291, entitled

RESOLUTION DIRECTING THE PROPER SENATE COMMITTEE TO

CONDUCT AN INQUIRY, IN AID OF LEGISLATION, TO
DETERMINE THE PREPAREDNESS OF THE PHILIPPINE
GOVERNMENT ON THE DETECTION, PREVENTION,
MINIMIZATION, TREATMENTS, AND CONTAINMENT
MEASURES ON THE REPORTED POTENTIAL OUTBREAK
OF AN UNKNOWN PNEUMONIA VIRUS IN CHINA, AND THE
CAPACITY OF OUR HEALTH WORKERS AND
PROFESSIONALS TO HANDLE SAID DISEASE

Introduced by Senator Villanueva

The President. Referred to the Committee on Health and Demography

The Secretary. Proposed Senate Resolution No. 292, entitled

RESOLUTION DIRECTING THE SENATE COMMITTEE ON

COOPERATIVES TO CONDUCT AN INQUIRY, IN AID OF
LEGISLATION, ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF REPUBLIC
ACT NO. 11364 OR THE COOPERATIVE DEVELOPMENT
AUTHORITY CHARTER OF 2019 AND THE FORMULATION
OF ITS IMPLEMENTING RULES AND REGULATIONS WITH
THE END IN VIEW OF STRENGTHENING THE
COOPERATIVE SECTOR AND THE FULL IMPLEMENTATION
OF THE PROVISIONS OF THE LAW

Introduced by Senator Zubiri

The President. Referred to the Committee on Cooperatives

The Secretary. Proposed Senate Resolution No. 293, entitled

RESOLUTION DIRECTING THE APPROPRIATE SENATE

COMMITTEES TO CONDUCT AN INQUIRY, IN AID OF
LEGISLATION, ON THE UNKNOWN STRAIN OF
CORONAVIRUS FIRST DETECTED IN WUHAN, CHINA,
WITH THE INTENTION OF DETERMINING APPROPRIATE
MEASURES AND NECESSARY FUNDING REQUIREMENTS
TO ENSURE A QUICK AND EFFICIENT GOVERNMENT
RESPONSE TO ADDRESS A POSSIBLE OUTBREAK OF THE
MYSTERIOUS RESPIRATORY VIRUS IN THE COUNTRY

Introduced by Senator Binay

60
 The President. Referred to the Committees on Health and Demography;
and Finance

COMMITTEE REPORT
The Secretary. Committee Report No. 33, submitted jointly by the
Committees on Public Order and Dangerous Drugs; and Justice and Human
Rights, on P. S. Res. No. 47, introduced by Senator Hontiveros, entitled

RESOLUTION URGING THE SENATE COMMITTEES ON PUBLIC

ORDER AND DANGEROUS DRUGS AND JUSTICE TO
CONDUCT AN INVESTIGATION IN AID OF LEGISLATION ON
THE SPATE OF KILLINGS THAT DEVASTATED THE ISLAND
OF NEGROS AND THE CIRCUMSTANCES THAT ALLOWED
FOR THE LAWLESS VIOLENCE THAT CLOAKED THE
PROVINCE, WITH THE END IN VIEW OF ATTAINING
JUSTICE FOR THE SLAIN VICTIMS AND CREATING
POLICIES THAT WILL ADEQUATELY ADDRESS THE ROOT
CAUSE OF THE CONFLICT IN THE PROVINCE”;

and P. S. Res. No. 65 introduced by Senator De Lima, entitled

RESOLUTION DIRECTING THE APPROPRIATE SENATE

COMMITTEE TO CONDUCT AN INQUIRY, IN AID OF
LEGISLATION, INTO THE IMPLEMENTATION OF
MEMORANDUM ORDER NO. 32, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS
‘OPLAN SAURON’, IN RELATION TO THE RECENT SPATE OF
KILLINGS IN THE PROVINCE OF NEGROS ORIENTAL, IN
PARTICULAR, AND OTHER AFFECTED AREAS

recommending its adoption of the recommendations and their immediate

implementation.

Sponsor: Senator Dela Rosa

The President. To the Calendar for Ordinary Business

The Majority Leader is recognized.

Senator Zubiri. Mr. President, we have some housekeeping matters.

We have been officially informed by the House of Representatives that it

will hold its plenary session tomorrow, Wednesday, the 22nd of January 2019,

at the Batangas City Convention Center at 1:00 p.m.

61
 The President. I think they just want to inform us. So, we place that on

record. We take note of the manifestation of the House of Representatives.

Senator Zubiri. We have a few change of referrals, Mr. President.

MOTION OF SENATOR ZUBIRI

(Change of Referral of Senate Bill No. 1 from the Committee on Health and
Demography to the Committee on Higher, Technical and Vocational Education
as the Primary Committee)

With the consent of the Body, I move that we transfer the referral of

Senate Bill No. 1, the Medical Scholarship bill, from the Committee on Health

and Demography to the Committee on Higher, Technical and Vocational

Education as the primary committee. Similar bills were filed and referred to the

Committee on Higher, Technical and Vocational Education, and the committee

wants to set the hearing already, Mr. President. So, for the record.

The President. Is there any objection? [Silence] There being none, the

motion is approved.

MOTION OF SENATOR ZUBIRI

(Change of Referral of S. No. 1259 from the Committee on Basic Education,
Arts and Culture to the Committee on Civil Service, Government
Reorganization and Professional Regulation as the Primary Committee)

Senator Zubiri. Also, Mr. President, Senate Bill No. 1259, Teacher’s

Salary Upgrading Act. With the consent of the Body, I move that we transfer

the referral of Senate Bill No. 1259 from the Committee on Basic Education,

Arts and Culture to the Committee on Civil Service, Government

Reorganization and Professional Regulation as the primary committee since

62
similar bills of the same nature were referred to the Committee on Civil Service,

Government Reorganization and Professional Regulation.

The President. Is there any objection? [Silence] There being none, the

motions is approved.

Senator Zubiri. Thank you, Mr. President.

CONSIDERATION OF S. CT. RES. NO. 5

(Representatives to the Philippine Congress-Bangsamoro Parliament Forum)

Mr. President, I move that we consider Senate Concurrent Resolution No.

5.

The President. Is there any objection? [Silence] There being none, the

motion is approved.

Consideration of Senate Concurrent Resolution No. 5 is now in order.

With the permission of the Body, the Secretary will read only the title of the bill

without prejudice to inserting into the Record the whole text thereof.

The Secretary. Senate Concurrent Resolution No. 5, entitled

CONCURRENT RESOLUTION URGING THE BANGSAMORO

TRANSITION AUTHORITY TO DESIGNATE ITS
REPRESENTATIVES TO THE PHILIPPINE CONGRESS-
BANGSAMORO PARLIAMENT FORUM TO BE CREATED
PURSUANT TO ARTICLE VI, SECTION 3 OF REPUBLIC ACT
NO. 11054, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE “ORGANIC LAW
FOR THE BANGSAMORO AUTONOMOUS REGION IN
MUSLIM MINDANAO” AND TO MEET WITH THE
DELEGATES DESIGNATED BY THE SENATE AND THE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES FOR THE PURPOSE

________________________________________________________________________
The following is the whole text of the resolution:

63
 Senate Concurrent Resolution No. 5
________________________________________________________________________

Senator Zubiri. Thank you, Mr. President.

Mr. President, as sponsor of the measure, I am willing to take any

interpellation. I believe the good chairman of the Committee on Local

Government would like ask to a few questions on the measure.

The President. Senator Tolentino is recognized.

Senator Tolentino. Yes, Mr. President. With the permission of the

Majority Leader.

Senator Zubiri. Yes, Mr. President.

Senator Tolentino. When the Bangsamoro Law was passed, may I

inquire if it is the intention of Congress to supersede the constitutional

oversight functions of Congress over a creature of Congress itself because

apparently, Mr. President, under Section 2 in said law, there is an

intergovernmental relations mechanism which, in the resolution just proposed,

in Section 3, the succeeding section, calls for the creation of a Philippine

Congress-Bangsamoro Parliament Forum. Am I correct to state that this forum

would picture Congress itself or even the Senate as a coequal body in terms of

juridical and legislative relationships would be concerned?

Senator Zubiri. Not at all, Mr. President. Not a coequal body because

the idea for the intergovernmental relations system or setup was really to

harmonize particular programs of government. For example, if there is a

64
problem between the Department of Health and BARMM with the Ministry of

Health, the intergovernmental relations body headed by their minister and our

secretary will meet to iron out these problems. But, on oversight functions,

there is no question that the Constitution is very clear that Congress has an

oversight function when it comes to measures emanating from these chambers.

Senator Tolentino. So, Mr. President, it is still correct to reaffirm and

validate that in the constitutional sphere of things, executive, legislative and

judicial would still be the legal axis so to speak.

Senator Zubiri. Yes, Mr. President. And, also I have here the transcript

of records, the discussions during the debate: “When asked by Senate

President Pimentel at that time to sight an example on how an issue can be

resolved through the intergovernmental regulations mechanism, Senator Zubiri

cited how the Philippine Congress and the Bangsamoro Parliament Forum

could help in the creation of a new separate province. Also, if the Bangsamoro

Parliament Forum could approach Congress through the said forum to ask for

assistance in the creation of new LGU.” So, that was the idea on the

mechanism.

I think, to put it in proper context, the good gentleman from Cavite had

approached me yesterday and, basically, had said that they would want to have

a hearing under the Committee on Local Government on the updates on the

Bangsamoro Organic Law which, I think, is a very laudable hearing. I would

attend it myself to also see what is going on on the ground.

65
 Unfortunately, there was a letter sent to the good senator which I also

retrieved just now. Basically, the chief minister had asked that the only time

that they could meet with us is through the intergovernmental relations

mechanism. In other words, through the forum, which I feel is unfortunate

because there is nothing wrong for them to come. We actually asked private

sectors to come here. We have heads of private corporations come here to shed

light on particular issues. They are not even part of government. So, I think, we

have to relay the message, Mr. President, as a Body, that that was not the

intent of that particular section or that particular provision of the Bangsamoro

Law.

We, at any time, can still call out a government agency to come, and to

shed light, and to report to us what is going on in these particular agencies.

Even at times, we ask the Executive department, even the Judiciary, when we

have cases and the chairman of the Committee on Justice and Human Rights

takes up issues on the Judiciary--on their budget, on bills pertaining to them.

Even an independent member of government attends these particular hearings.

So, that is why this concurrent resolution is very important, Mr.

President, because we will now form our delegates because I would like to relay

this as part of the leadership and author of the measure, together with the

Senate President. And, as a matter of fact, I recommended the chairman of the

Committee on Local Government and the chairman of the Committee on

National Defense and Security, Peace, Unification and Reconciliation in

66
particular, to be members of this intergovernmental body which is the

Bangsamoro Parliament Forum. Because on the first meeting, I would like us

to inform them that that was not the intent of the creation of this Body. We can

still invite them to attend, and they should actually. We should encourage

them to attend these hearings in the Senate, if that would satisfy the good

gentleman.

Senator Tolentino. So, the proposed resolution, as crafted, would

reaffirm the supremacy of Congress insofar as the constitutional mechanism is

concerned and that a mere creation of Congress cannot be considered as a

coequal. Perhaps, in Section 3, the purpose of the law was related to the

administrative details which would remove an extra amount of time from

Congress itself in convening as a Body, a committee perhaps, and asking some

details from the Bangsamoro entity. So we now have Section 3, which will have

a Philippine Congress Bangsamoro Parliament Forum, wherein the details that

would not need the intercession of Congress, or the Senate as a Body, would be

needed. Am I correct in that interpretation, Mr. President?

Senator Zubiri. Definitely, Mr. President. The Constitution supersedes

all measures passed by Congress.

Senator Tolentino. Thank you, Mr. President.

Senator Zubiri. I ask that we recognize the Minority Leader, Mr.

President.

The President. The Minority Leader, Senator Drilon, is recognized.

67
 Senator Drilon. If we can help clarify the issue, Mr. President.

If we recall, Mr. President, when the bill was passed in our Chamber, it

contained a lot of powers which were supposedly shared by the national

government and the Bangsamoro regional government. And when we sat down

in the bicameral conference committee, we pointed out that these powers being

shared can cause a lot of confusion and a lot of conflict because by the very

nature of its being a shared power, then the two bodies—the Bangsamoro

government and national government—will try to exercise that power. So, the

issue was, who will resolve the dispute or the disagreements? That is why in

the course of the bicameral conference, we said, “Okay, we want a clear

delineation of authority. What is the Bangsamoro authority? What is the

national government authority? So that we avoid this confusion.”

And I concur with the good gentleman from Cavite that we should not be

giving up the powers of Congress. And this interparliament forum, or whatever

it is, should not be interpreted as a diminution of the power of Congress

because that is never the intention.

Senator Zubiri. Yes, Mr. President.

Senator Drilon. Just to repeat, we veered away from shared powers

because precisely this inter-government agencies would be the forum where the

power is shared to discuss what will happen or how it will be resolved.

68
 So, it is in that sense that there is no more shared power, and this

Bangsamoro Legislative Forum should only be used like any committee

deliberation in Congress, Mr. President, so just to clarify.

Senator Zubiri. I completely agree with the two gentlemen, Mr.

President. And, as we know, the distinguished Minority Leader was actually in

charge of the legal issues of the Bangsamoro Organic Law. Definitely, during

the discussions, there was no way that we were going to diminish our powers of

oversight. That was never the intention, and, for the record, we would like to

put that on record during the discussions. And, as I said earlier, no law that

we passed here can substitute the Constitution or is higher than the

Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines.

Actually, we are just constituting this, Mr. President, so that we can

already start the dialogue with them, and we would like to remind them that

Congress has oversight functions. So, iyon lamang po ito, which is under

Section 3 of the law.

The President. Thank you. I am, indeed, starting to believe that you

are really a tag team. [Laughter]

Senator Zubiri. Hindi naman po. Because, Mr. President, as we know,

the Minority Leader is a legal luminary. And there is only a few legal

luminaries in the Senate.

So, with that, I reiterate that I share the view of the good chairman of the

Committee on Local Government and our distinguished Minority Leader.

69
 Mr. President, no other member wishes to interpellate on the measure. I

move that we close the period of interpellations.

The President. Is there any objection? [Silence] There being none, the

motion is approved.

Senator Zubiri. Mr. President, no amendments as well. I move that we

close the period of amendments.

The President. Is there any objection? [Silence] There being none, the

motion is approved.

Senator Zubiri. Mr. President, before we move to adopt, under the law,

aside from the leadership, which is the Senate President Pro Tempore, Majority

Leader, and the Minority Leader, the Senate President may also designate other

members he deems fit to be part of this parliament forum.

I would make a suggestion, Mr. President, at a later hour, to include our

chairman of the Committee on National Defense and Security, Peace,

Unification and Reconciliation; and the chairman of the Committee on Local

Government.

The President. I will submit to the suggestion of the Majority Leader.

ADOPTION OF S. CT. RES NO. 5

Senator Zubiri. Mr. President, I move that we adopt Senate Concurrent

Resolution No. 5.

The President. Is there any objection? [Silence] There being none, the
motion is approved.

ADJOURNMENT OF SESSION

70
 Senator Zubiri. Mr. President, since there being no other matters to be
taken up today, I move that we adjourn the session until three o'clock
tomorrow afternoon, Wednesday, January 22, 2020.

The President. Is there any objection? [Silence] There being none, the
session is adjourned until three o'clock tomorrow afternoon, Wednesday,
January 22, 2020.
It was 5:39 p.m.

71
 ANNEX "4"

WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 22, 2020

OPENING OF THE SESSION

At 3:00 p.m., the Senate President, Hon. Vicente C. Sotto III, called the
session to order.

The President. The 45th session of the Senate in the First Regular

Session of the Eighteenth Congress is hereby called to order.

Let us stand for the opening prayer to be led by Sen. Cynthia A. Villar.

Everybody rose for the prayer.

PRAYER

Senator Villar.
Let us put ourselves in the presence of God.
Dahil sa ang ating buong bansa, lalo na ang ating mga
kababayan na lubos na apektado sa Batangas, Tagaytay, at sa
kalapit na mga lugar sa Calabarzon Region, ay patuloy na
nababahala at nag-aalala sa napipintong pagputok ng Taal
Volcano, ating dasalin ang panalangin ni Cardinal Luis Antonio
Tagle:
“Diyos na makapangyarihan, muli kaming humaharap sa
pagsubok dulot ng pagsabog ng Bulkang Taal. Napakaliit namin
upang harapin ang lakas ng bulkan. Subalit naniniwala kaming
mapapahupa ng Iyong kamay ang bangis nito. Iligtas Mo po kami
sa kapahamakan, lalo na ang mga mahihirap, may karamdaman,
mga bata at nakatatanda at nag-iisa.
Paigtingin Mo rin sa amin ang pagdadamayan,
pagmamalasakit at pangangalaga sa kapwa at kalikasan.
Hinihiling namin ito sa ngalan ni Hesukristo kasama ng Espiritu
Santo.

1
 Amen.”
ROLL CALL

The President. The Secretary will please call the roll.

The Secretary, reading:

Senator Sonny Angara……………………………………………..

Senator Maria Lourdes Nancy S. Binay............................... Present
Senator Pia S. Cayetano...................................................... Present
Senator Leila M. de Lima….………………………………………. *
Senator Ronald “Bato” M. dela Rosa.…………………………… Present
Senator Franklin M. Drilon..……………………………………… Present
Senator Win Gatchalian.……………………………………………
Senator Christopher Lawrence T. Go..………………………….. Present
Senator Richard J. Gordon................................................... Present
Senator Risa Hontiveros.……………………………………………. Present
Senator Panfilo M. Lacson.…………………………………………. Present
Senator Manuel “Lito” M. Lapid............................................. Present
Senator Imee R. Marcos..……………………..…………………….. Present**
Senator Emmanuel “Manny” D. Pacquiao ………………………. Present
Senator Francis “Kiko” Pangilinan ……………………………….. Present
Senator Aquilino "Koko" Pimentel III …………..………….......... Present
Senator Grace Poe ….............................................................
Senator Ralph G. Recto ........................................................
Senator Ramon Bong Revilla Jr. ………………………………… Present
Senator Francis “Tol" N. Tolentino……………………………….. Present
Senator Joel Villanueva ……………………………….……………. Present
Senator Cynthia A. Villar ...................................................... Present
Senator Juan Miguel F. Zubiri …………………………………….. Present
The President ………………………………………………………….. Present

The President. With 17 senators present, the Chair declares the

presence of a quorum.

The Majority Leader is recognized.

__________________________________________
*Under detention
**Arrived after the roll call

2
 THE JOURNAL

Senator Zubiri. Mr. President, I move that we dispense with the reading

of the Journal of the 44th session, Tuesday, January 21, 2020, and consider it

approved.

The President. Is there any objection? [Silence] There being none, the

motion is approved.

ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF GUESTS

Senator Zubiri. Mr. President, before we take up other matters, we

would like to greet guests who are here with us.

We have Board Member Nestor “Bobot” Fongwan Jr. of Benguet, guest of

Sen. Bong Go; and ASEZ (Save the Earth from A to Z), World Mission Society

Church of God, a university student volunteers group from South Korea.

The President. We welcome all our guests to the Senate.

Senator Zubiri. Mr. President, I move that we proceed to the Reference

of Business.

The President. Is there any objection? [Silence] There being none, the

motion is approved.

The Secretary will read the Reference of Business.

BILL ON FIRST READING

The Secretary. Senate Bill No. 1286, entitled

AN ACT APPROPRIATING THE SUM OF THIRTY BILLION PESOS

(P30,000,000,000) AS SUPPLEMENTAL APPROPRIATIONS
FOR FY 2020, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES

3
 Introduced by Senator Recto

The President. Referred to the Committee on Rules

COMMUNICATIONS

The Secretary. Letters from the Office of the President of the Philippines
transmitting to the Senate two (2) original copies of the following Republic Acts
which were signed by President Rodrigo Roa Duterte:

Republic Act No. 11462, entitled

AN ACT POSTPONING THE MAY 2020 BARANGAY AND

SANGGUNIANG KABATAAN ELECTIONS, AMENDING FOR
THE PURPOSE REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9164, AS AMENDED BY
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9340, REPUBLIC ACT NO. 10632,
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 10656, REPUBLIC ACT NO. 10923 AND
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 10952, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES;

Republic Act No. 11463, entitled

AN ACT ESTABLISHING MALASAKIT CENTERS IN ALL

DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH (DOH) HOSPITALS IN THE
COUNTRY AND IN THE PHILIPPINE GENERAL HOSPITAL
(PGH), PROVIDING FUNDS THEREFOR AND FOR OTHER
PURPOSES;

Republic Act No. 11464, entitled

AN ACT EXTENDING THE AVAILABILITY OF THE 2019

APPROPRIATIONS TO DECEMBER 31, 2020, AMENDING
FOR THE PURPOSE SECTION 65 OF THE GENERAL
PROVISIONS OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 11260, THE GENERAL
APPROPRIATIONS ACT OF FISCAL YEAR 2019;

and Republic Act No. 11466, entitled

AN ACT MODIFYING THE SALARY SCHEDULE FOR CIVILIAN

GOVERNMENT PERSONNEL AND AUTHORIZING THE
GRANT OF ADDITIONAL BENEFITS, AND FOR OTHER
PURPOSES

The President. To the Archives

4
 The Secretary. Letters from the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas,
transmitting to the Senate copies of the following certified and authenticated
BSP issuances, in compliance with Section 15 (a) of Republic Act No. 7653 (The
New Central Bank Act):

Circular Letter Nos. CL-2019-084, 085, 086, 087, 088 and CL-2020-001
dated 21, 22 November 2019; 2, 19, 23 December 2019 and 2 January 2020;

Circular Nos. 1061, 1062, 1063, 1064, 1065, 1066, 1067, 1068, 1069
and 1070 dated 25, 26 November 2019; 3, 4, 13, 26 and 27 December 2019;
and

Memorandum Nos. M-2019-027, 028, 029 and 030 dated 15, 26

November 2019; 12 and 18 December 2019

The President. Referred to the Committee on Banks, Financial

Institutions and Currencies

The Secretary. Letter from the Union of Local Authorities of the

Philippines, Inc. furnishing the Senate a copy of the ULAP National Executive
Board Resolution No. 2019-21, entitled

A RESOLUTION CONSTITUTING THE UNION OF LOCAL

AUTHORITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES (ULAP) INTERIM
NATIONAL EXECUTIVE BOARD (NEB) AND ITS INTERIM
OFFICERS TO PERFORM THEIR DUTIES AND FUNCTIONS
UNTIL SUCH TIME THAT THE REGULAR NEB HAS BEEN
DULY CONSTITUTED AND ITS REGULAR OFFICERS
ELECTED AND SWORN INTO OFFICE

The President. Referred to the Committee on Local Government

The Majority Leader is recognized.

ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF GUESTS

Senator Zubiri. Thank you, Mr. President.

Mr. President, we would like to recognize our guests in the gallery.

We have the multi-awarded mayor of Cauayan, Isabela, Mayor Bernard

Dy.

5
 We also have with us the ladies of the Immaculate Conception Academy.

The President. Welcome to the Senate.

BILL ON SECOND READING

S. No. 1083—Anti-Terrorism Act of 2019
(Continuation)

Senator Zubiri. Mr. President, I move that we resume consideration of

Senate Bill No. 1083 as reported out under Committee Report No. 9.

The President. Is there any objection? [Silence] There being none,

resumption of consideration of Senate Bill No. 1083 is now in order.

Senator Zubiri. Mr. President, I ask that we recognize the sponsor of the

measure, Sen. Panfilo M. Lacson; and to interpellate, our distinguished

colleague, Sen. Risa Hontiveros.

The President. Senator Hontiveros is recognized to interpellate the

sponsor, Sen. Panfilo Lacson.

Senator Hontiveros. Thank you, Mr. President; thank you, good

sponsor.

Mr. President, let me begin by assuring the good sponsor that I am one

with him in finding durable solutions to the scourge of terrorism which

remains a serious global threat. According to the Global Terrorism Database,

the annual death toll caused by terrorism stands at about 21,000 people

worldwide mostly in the Middle East, Africa, and South Asia.

Therefore, Mr. President, my questions do not aim to question the

fundamental rationale of bearing down strongly against terrorism. Our people

6
do need to be protected from acts of terrorism. However, it is equally important

that we do not, in our zeal, unintentionally provide tools that can be abused to

stifle legitimate political dissent and criticism, remove safeguards already

enshrined in our Bill of Rights, and inadvertently create uncertainty and

imprecision in our laws.

So, to start off, Mr. President, in Section 2, I noticed that the third and

fourth paragraphs of the “Declaration of Policy” were deleted. The third

paragraph spoke of a comprehensive approach in the fight against terrorism

including post-conflict peace-building and promoting equitable economic

development. While the fourth paragraph, on the other hand, guaranteed that

human rights remain absolute and protected.

As both a peace advocate and a human rights advocate, may I know from

the good sponsor why these paragraphs were deleted?

Senator Lacson. First of all, I would like to thank the distinguished lady

from Panay Island for expressing her full support for the passage of this

measure.

Yes, Mr. President, we proposed to delete the paragraph of the

“Declaration of Policy” for the simple reason that we want the goal of this

proposed legislation to focus on the empowerment of the government to

address terrorism as a crime. We removed the paragraph to emphasize the

focus of law on anti-terrorism efforts. The proposed law clearly differentiates

between anti-terrorism and human security. Nevertheless, let me assure the

7
distinguished lady that all human rights safeguards are retained in the bill as

these are embedded in the relevant provisions.

Senator Hontiveros. Mr. President, I welcome and thank the good

sponsor for that categorical assurance that all human rights safeguards remain

embedded in the bill. However, alam naman po natin and alam naman po ng

good sponsor as a veteran lawmaker, na madalas na kung ano iyong sinasabi

talaga ng isang batas ay iyon ang itinuturing na mahalaga. At iyong hindi

sinasabi, bagamat maaaring sabihing embedded diyan ay maaaring ituring na

hindi kasing-halaga. That is the reason I asked this first question because I am

hoping that we are not sending our people the message that we are looking at

less comprehensive solutions to terrorism sa pagtatampok lamang ng law

enforcement and not anymore explicitly mentioning human rights and peace.

I hope that we are not sending the message that we are willing to

compromise fundamental freedoms in the interest of more effectively

implementing law enforcement approaches, Mr. President.

Senator Lacson. That is also the reason why we did not include in any

of the provisions the right of citizens to peaceably assemble. Wala na po iyon

doon, inalis na namin. Basta legitimate expression of the exercise of freedom of

speech or expression, hindi po namin isinama rito at walang punishment doon.

Senator Hontiveros. Thank you, Mr. President.

8
 I will get to a related question to the point just mentioned by the good

sponsor in terms of the fundamental civil and political rights of our people a

little later.

Mr. President, in Section 4 of the committee report, in the definition of

“TERRORIST ACTS,” the phrase “REGARDLESS OF ITS STAGE OF

EXECUTION” was introduced. I would like to ask the good sponsor this

question: Does it mean that an attempted act of terrorism is punished in the

same way as a consummated act of terrorism? Dahil po in the Revised Penal

Code, the penalty of a consummated offense differs from the penalty for a

frustrated or an attempted offense. Are we changing this in this bill? And if

so, why?

Senator Lacson. We want to be as much as possible proactive, Mr.

President. But as taken up during the interpellation of the distinguished

Minority Leader, we are willing to take out the word “attempted” and instead,

retain the word “conspiracy” to commit terrorist acts. Of course, we retain the

phrase “at any stage” either in preparation, planning, training, et cetera.

Senator Hontiveros. I thank the good sponsor, Mr. President, for that

reiteration of his commitment in the interpellation of the Minority Leader to

remove the term “attempted.” But perhaps, at the proper time, I will continue

to try to tease out possible alternative ways of formulating this provision to

address my concern about the implications of the phrase “regardless of its

stage of execution.” In this same section, Mr. President--and this was also

9
discussed by the good sponsor with the good Minority Leader--under

paragraph B of Section 4: “ATTACKS THAT RESULT IN MAJOR ECONOMIC

LOSS” and “DESTROY THE FUNDAMENTAL POLITICAL, ECONOMIC OR

SOCIAL STRUCTURES OF THE COUNTRY” are considered terrorism. A threat

to commit the same is also considered terrorism in paragraph E.

Doon sa pag-uusap din po ng good sponsor at ng Minority Leader na-

point out na ayaw nating magpasa ng batas na may provision which may be

interpreted or implemented to the point of absurdity. So, let me see po. If, for

example, a labor group threatens to strike or to conduct work stoppage, and

said strike or work stoppage may be argued by some to result in major

economic loss, even destroy the economic structure of the country, could

members of this labor group be considered terrorists?

Senator Lacson. Mayroon pong proviso rito na basta legitimate exercise

of the freedom of expression or mag-express ng dissent, hindi po kasama rito,

hindi mako-cover. Explicitly provided po iyan sa Section 4, iyong last paragraph

po. Nandiyan.

Senator Hontiveros. Salamat po, Mr. President. Siyempre laging

sasabihin ng labor group kung mag-i-strike or magwo-work stoppage na, “Ito

legitimate expression namin.”

Senator Lacson. If I may read for the record.

Senator Hontiveros. Yes, Mr. President.

10
 Senator Lacson. “PROVIDED, THAT, TERRORIST ACTS AS DEFINED

UNDER THIS SECTION SHALL NOT COVER LEGITIMATE EXERCISES OF THE

FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION AND TO PEACEABLY ASSEMBLE, INCLUDING

BUT NOT LIMITED TO ENGAGING IN ADVOCACY, PROTEST, DISSENT OR

MASS ACTION WHERE A PERSON DOES NOT HAVE THE INTENTION TO USE

OR URGE THE USE OF FORCE OR VIOLENCE OR CAUSE HARM TO

OTHERS.” Guaranteed po iyon, Mr. President.

Senator Hontiveros. Salamat po sa garantiyang iyan, Mr. President.

Pero gaya po ng sinabi ko kanina, siyempre laging sasabihin ng ating mga

kababayang manggagawa kapag nagwelga sila, kapag nag-work stoppage sila

na ito ay legitimate expression, freedom of expression, at freedom of association

iyong karapatan ng paggawa. Pero kung kunwari sa welga nila or work

stoppage nila sasabihin ng Department of Labor and Employment, halimbawa,

na dahil sa welgang ito o dahil sa work stoppage na ito ay magkakaroon ng

serious or major economic loss, o kung sasabihin na ang work stoppage or

welga na ito would actually destroy the economic structure of the country,

kung ganoong klaseng claims ang gawin, puwede bang magamit itong

panukalang batas para ituring silang mga terorista?

Senator Lacson. Unang-una po, we are bound by the intent or motive,

iyong purpose po, at saka kung wala naman pong violence na nangyari ay hindi

naman po puwedeng makasuhan under this proposed measure.

11
 Senator Hontiveros. Thank you, Mr. President. Indeed, the intent, very

clearly articulated also in the bill, is important.

Lastly, on that question of violence, what if in the process of strike or

work stoppage nagkaroon ng dispersal, nagkaroon ng karahasan? The good

chairman of the Committee on Labor, Employment and Human Resources

Development could cite a few examples of recent incidents na dininig nila sa

komite. Kung magkaroon ng violence not instigated by the workers but in the

course of the strike or work stoppage, could this bill be stretched to determine

that they are terrorists?

Senator Lacson. Hindi po kasi, unang-una, hindi naman iyon ang intent.

Ang intent ng mga nagprotesta, mga laborers ay mag-strike, mag-express ng

kanilang sariling dissent o iyong expression ng kanilang pagprotesta sa

puwedeng sabihin na nating mga bad labor practices. So, hindi po papasok dito

sa probisyong ito. Malinaw po iyon.

Senator Hontiveros. Salamat, good sponsor; salamat, Mr. President,

para sa paglilinaw na iyon.

In Section 5, Mr. President, “IT SHALL BE UNLAWFUL FOR A PERSON

TO X X X POSSESSING OBJECTS CONNECTED IN THE COMMISSION OF A

TERRORIST ACT OR COLLECTING OR MAKING DOCUMENTS LIKELY TO

FACILITATE THE COMMISSION OF A TERRORIST ACT.”

So, first question about this Section 5, Mr. President--the mere act of

possession of documents likely to facilitate a terrorist act is punishable or

12
would be punishable under this act, would be punishable by life

imprisonment? Is it then mala prohibita?

Senator Lacson. Yes, Mr. President. Kasi kung maliwanag naman na

may explosives, may bomba iyong materials na hinahawakan nito, maliwanag

na ang kaniyang intent ay para mag-commit ng terrorist acts, puwede po

talaga siyang makasuhan under this proposed measure.

Senator Hontiveros. Ibig pong sabihin ng good sponsor, ito ay parang

manuals, instructional materials kung paano magbuo ng explosives to conduct

a terrorist act?

Senator Lacson. Tama po, Mr. President. Kung halimbawa, manual na

paggawa ng bomba, manual kung paano mag-operate ng weapons of mass

destruction; or puwedeng sabihin natin na mga poisonous substances na ang

intent ay maliwanag na para mag-sow ng terror, ay puwede po talagang

makasuhan.

Senator Hontiveros. Salamat, Mr. President.

At konektado sa follow-up question ko na what kind of materials are

likely to facilitate the commission of a terrorist act? So, nasimulan na po

nating pag-usapan iyong mga manuals to conduct terrorist acts or to

manufacture iyong mga material sa pagsasagawa ng mga terrorist acts.

Pero kung, halimbawa, a person collects handbooks, say, on military

matters or even textbooks on basic chemical procedures; if a person reads

Marxist or Marxian literature or materials that call for a revolution pero purely

13
for reading pleasure, will that person get a life imprisonment without parole?

Hindi ko maiwasang isipin kung paano kaya itong probisyon. Ito ay maaaring

gamitin sa mga maya’t mayang pinag-iinitan nating student activists sa mga

unibersidad, mga academicians, mga intelektuwal, kahit pa mga fans ng

progresibong banda tulad ng U2. What kind of materials, Mr. President?

Senator Lacson. I would say, Mr. President, that that is a matter of

defense. Kasi kung maipakikita naman niya na, “Hindi, itong mga materials na

ito ay gusto ko ring mag-aral to counter terrorism,” or sa ibang kadahilanan, it

is a matter of defense when it comes to that.

Senator Hontiveros. Fair enough, Mr. President, that it is a matter of

defense. And I wish, in fact, the good sponsor would have been willing to

extend this principle that it is a matter of defense in the case of any and all

documents. But I suppose that we will have to agree to disagree on that.

Senator Lacson. We are always bound by the intent of the person, Mr.

President.

Senator Hontiveros. And siguro, Mr. President, just to express at this

point in time of my interpellation of the good sponsor, dahil ito siguro iyong

thread leading through all my questions; ito iyong thought behind all my

questions. We need to craft laws assuming the most despotic of implementors

dahil hindi po natin alam kung sino-sino ang mamumuno at magpapatupad ng

ating mga batas. We need to craft laws assuming not the most benign of

leaders, not the most enlightened sa mga policymakers at law enforcers, not

14
the most benign of leaders. We need to assume the most despotic of

implementors. Kaya iyong medyo matinding degree of caution at voice ko sa

pagtatanong ng mga tanong na ito.

To continue, Mr. President, and related doon sa naunang pinag-usapan

namin ng good sponsor--Section 8 penalizes, and I quote, “ANY PERSON WHO

DISTRIBUTES OR OTHERWISE MAKES A MESSAGE AVAILABLE TO THE

PUBLIC WITH THE INTENT TO INCITE ANOTHER BY ANY MEANS, DIRECTLY

OR INDIRECTLY TO COMMIT A TERRORIST ACT WHERE SUCH CONDUCT

CAUSES A DANGER OF SUCH ACTS BEING ACTUALLY COMMITTED.” So,

medyo mahaba po, Mr. President. Ang una pong tanong ko sa good sponsor,

how do we make a message available to the public with the intent to incite

another by any means directly or indirectly to commit a terrorist act? And let

us note the word “indirectly.” Puwede ba nating kasuhan ang U2 para sa

protest songs nila? Para mas lokal, puwede ba natin i-charge ang Buklod o si

Bamboo for inciting us na baliktarin ang tatsulok?

Senator Lacson. Kapag sinabi nating “inciting,” directed against the

general public, ito iyong puwedeng mag-lead doon sa pag-commit ng terrorist

acts. Pero kung wala namang call to commit violence or to commit terrorist

activities or terrorist acts, then hindi naman po siguro puwedeng masaklaw

nitong batas. Kung maliwanag naman na nagtatawag na na tayo ay

magpasabog o kaya ay pumatay sa pamamagitan ng pagsagasa ng truck tulad

15
ng nangyari sa Nice, France nang walang ibang intent kung hindi mag-sow ng

terror, papasok po iyon dito.

Senator Hontiveros. Iyon po, Mr. President, mga halimbawa ng mga

directly inciting another to commit a terrorist act. Nagiging mas mahirap po,

mas subject to interpretation, at sa ilalim nga noong sinabi kong posibleng most

despotic of implementors, mas magiging problematic posible iyong paggamit

noong salitang “indirectly.”

At the proper time, Mr. President, I will propose and would like to seek

the opinion of the good sponsor at this point in time if he would accept an

amendment removing the word “indirectly.”

Senator Lacson. We can talk about that, Mr. President.

Senator Hontiveros. Again, fair enough. Thank you for that possibility,

Mr. President.

And further to this provision, how do we determine when the conduct

causes a danger of such acts actually being committed? How do we measure

danger? Paano po sinusukat iyong panganib lalo na po kung “indirectly inciting”

na sinasabi?

Senator Lacson. I am sorry, Mr. President, I did not quite hear the…

Senator Hontiveros. No problem, Mr. President. Paano po natin

susukatin iyong panganib? How do we measure danger? How do we determine

when the conduct, lalo na kung indirect conduct, actually causes a danger of

such acts being committed?

16
 Senator Lacson. Well, it redounds to the violence that will be created.

Babalik na naman tayo roon sa intent at saka iyong purpose noong pag-i-incite

to commit terrorist acts, Mr. President.

Senator Hontiveros. So, again, just to reiterate, at this point in time,

Mr. President, na ipu-pursue ko sa good sponsor iyong sinabi nilang puwede

naming pag-usapan iyong posibleng pag-delete noong salitang “indirectly.”

Because it would tend to create situations na ma-interpret at ma-i-apply itong

Section 8 excessively.

Senator Lacson. We will be guided by the existing jurisprudence in this

regard and there are many, Mr. President. Iyong Chavez vs. Raul Gonzales,

marami po ito na puwede natin gawing reference at the proper time.

Senator Hontiveros. Yes, Mr. President, at the proper time.

Salamat po.

I would like to go now, Mr. President, to the provisions on proscription.

So, Section 21 amends Section 24 of the Human Security Act and states that:

“Any GROUP OF PERSONS, organization, OR association, COMMITS ANY OF

THE ACTS DEFINED AND PENALIZED UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF THIS

ACT, OR EXISTS FOR THE PURPOSE OF ENGAGING IN TERRORIST ACTS

shall, upon application of the Department of Justice before a competent

Regional Trial Court, with due notice and opportunity to be heard given to the

GROUP OF PERSONS, organization OR association, be declared as a terrorist

17
and outlawed GROUP OF PERSONS, organization OR association, by the said

Regional Trial Court.”

In the next section, Section 22, the court is required within 72 hours

from filing of the application to issue a preliminary order of proscription. The

respondent has the right to be heard and to show why the order of proscription

should be set aside, and the court is required to schedule a hearing within a

six-month period from the filing of the verified application to determine whether

the order of prosecution should be made permanent, set aside, modified or

lifted.

Now, Mr. President, am I understanding it correctly that while the RTC

must act on the urgent prayer within 72 hours--tatlong araw lamang--it is given

the leisurely period of six months within which to schedule a hearing to give

the proscribed group or organization its day in court. Samakatuwid, within this

six-month period, the proposed amendments give the State and its agents a

freehand to, perhaps, wiretap, conduct surveillance, arrest, and detain any of

its members without a warrant, examine bank records and accounts, freeze

and seize properties, et cetera. And these are all legally possible even before the

organization or any of its members is given a chance to be heard. Kasi sa

tatlong araw ay kailangang maaksiyunan, pero anim na buwan bago puwedeng

dinggin iyong kabilang panig. Is my understanding of the proposed

amendments what was intended, Mr. President?

18
 Senator Lacson. Hindi po ganoon, Mr. President. Iyong order of

proscription ay ginawa nating time-bound because of the experience in the

case of the Abu Sayyaf. It took, I think, 11 or 12 years before the court

rendered a decision to proscribe Abu Sayyaf as a terrorist organization. In the

meantime, so many kidnappings were committed in Basilan,

Tawi-Tawi, and Sulu. Kaya po natin naisip na gawing time-bound iyong gawain

ng korte para mag-render ng decision to proscribe or not. But in the meantime,

we are also giving them the authority to issue a temporary order of proscription

within 72 hours.

Thank you, Mr. President.

Senator Hontiveros. Yes, Mr. President. So, tama po iyong pagkaintindi

ko. Sa loob ng tatlong araw ay kailangang maaksiyunan kahit through a

preliminary order of proscription pero iyong na-proscribe kahit preliminarily ay

sa loob pa ng anim na buwan puwedeng mag-set ng date at time iyong korte

para sa summary hearing. Hindi naman siguro lahat ng posibleng ma-

temporarily proscribed or preliminarily proscribed na mga organisasyon ay

kasing tindi ng Abu Sayyaf. What about groups who may later be proven na

maling na-proscribe bilang terrorist or outlawed organization, sa loob ng anim

na buwan wala silang day in court? Samantalang iyong action which was taken

against them ay naaksiyunan within just three days. Paano po iyong proportion

doon?

19
 Senator Lacson. Mr. President, it does not necessarily mean that every

time a petition is filed for proscription that the court will issue a temporary

order of proscription, puwedeng outright denied iyong temporary order of

proscription. And we are giving the court, under this proposed measure, six

months within which they should make the proscription order final or it could

also be dismissed at any time within the six-month period.

Senator Hontiveros. Opo, Mr. President. Pero posibleng ma-preliminarily

proscribed within three days.

Senator Lacson. Puwede po, Mr. President.

Senator Hontiveros. And what if nga po na pagkatapos nang pagdinig

nitong kaso ay mapatunayang mali pala ang na-proscribe, hindi pala siya

terrorist organization, hindi siya dapat na-outlaw, its members had to wait six

months to present their side for the consideration of the court? So, the court

does not have to do it. The court does not have to act on the request for a

preliminary order of proscription, but it can, it may.

So, paano po iyong balanse roon, Mr. President?

Senator Lacson. Iyong temporary order of proscription, hindi ito

arbitrary. Kailangan ay mayroong ma-establish na probable cause iyong korte,

iyong RTC. In the same manner, when a suspect is brought before a prosecutor

under inquest proceedings, unless mag-waive ng preliminary investigation

iyong respondent or iyong suspect, iyong prosecutor is mandated to establish

probable cause or to outright dismiss the case or release the respondent in the

20
meantime that further investigation is being conducted by law enforcement. So,

hindi naman ganoon ka-harsh na basta nag-file ng petition for proscription ay

puwede na kaagad paghuhulihin at arbitrarily the court can just issue the

temporary order of proscription. Instead, the court must first determine if there

is probable cause before issuing such temporary order of proscription. So,

mayroon pong due process ito.

Senator Hontiveros. Thank you, Mr. President.

Totoo nga na dapat may due process sa pag-implementa ng anumang

batas. Pero gaya ng nasabi ko po kanina, if we assume na posibleng sa

anumang panahon magkaroon ng despotic implementor, hindi laging benign

leader ang magpapatupad; hindi laging itataguyod iyong due process.

Senator Lacson. Mr. President, let me correct the impression that iyong

Judiciary natin is independent of the Executive branch. And if we question the

wisdom of the court, then we are questioning the integrity of the Judiciary.

Let us assume that the RTC judges are competent enough to determine

whether there is or there is no probable cause before they will issue a

temporary order of proscription.

Senator Hontiveros. Certainly, Mr. President. I am presuming the

independence and competence of our Judiciary. At kung mapapansin po nila,

hindi ko kasi itinatanong iyong 72-hour period, iyong three-day period. Ang mas

ko pong itinatanong talaga ay iyong parang disproportionately at

napakahabang six-month period within which time puwede namang dinigin

21
iyong posibleng preliminarily proscribed. Dahil kapag ang sitwasyon ay nasa

ilalim ng isang despotic implementor, and I am not referring to the Judiciary

here, Mr. President, iyon na nga. Paano na po iyong sitwasyon noong na-

proscribe tapos posibleng maghihintay ng kalahating taon bago siya…

Senator Lacson. Ganito po iyong analogy. A better analogy is a

common criminal case. A respondent or an accused is arrested. And then the

law enforcement is mandated to deliver that person before a prosecutor within

a reglementary period, say, in the case of capital offenses—36 hours.

Pagdating sa fiscal, pag may probable cause, ipa-file iyong Information.

And it will take a while before the Court can determine guilt or acquittal ng

suspects. So, ganoon din po ang takbo ng pangyayari dito. Before the court

could issue a temporary order of proscription within 72 hours, kailangang ma-

establish clearly na mayroong probable cause. And mayroong six months ang

judge to issue a final proscription order.

If there is no sufficient evidence to sustain or to support a final

proscription order, then idi-dismiss din ng court iyon. But as the lady senator

said, as we have discussed earlier—tama po iyon, within three days, nag-isyu

ng temporary order of proscription, pero ang safeguard naman doon ay

kailangang maka-establish muna ng probable cause iyong RTC.

Remember, this is a judicial determination of probable cause, it is even

higher than the ordinary probable cause established by a prosecutor.

22
 Senator Hontiveros. Yes, Mr. President. But, of course, hindi tulad ng

mga ordinaryong criminal case, itong proscription sa usapin ng terrorism is for

the entire group. So, it would allow the state a free hand, iyon na nga po, to

surveil or to wiretap, et cetera, all its members.

So, perhaps, at the proper time, Mr. President, I could propose an

amendment for the consideration of the good sponsor, with emphasis on that

six-month period being so much longer than the 72-hour period.

Thank you, Mr. President.

I am still here in Section 22. One amendment is to include groups of

persons and not just organizations and associations. So, could I test this with

the good sponsor? “Any member of such a proscribed group of persons can be

made subject of warrantless arrest and detention, seizure and forfeiture of

property, et cetera, even without committing the specific acts that caused

death or destruction or other circumstances defining an act of terror.”

Senator Lacson. I am sorry, Mr. President.

Senator Hontiveros. Yes, Mr. President. I would like to clarify with

the good sponsor if my understanding is correct na any member of a

proscribed group of persons can be made subject of warrantless arrest and

detention, seizure and forfeiture of property, et cetera, even without committing

the specific acts that caused death or destruction?

23
 Senator Lacson. That is correct, Mr. President, as long as it is clearly

established that such person is a member of that proscribed terrorist

organization.

Senator Hontiveros. And since these are individuals, Mr. President, can

these include conjugal or family assets or only assets held by terrorist groups

because, as the proposed amendments are written, they do not seem to

distinguish between and among such classes of property?

Senator Lacson. I would like to assume that kapag conjugal property

and one of the spouses is an established member of that proscribed terrorist

organization, then subject sa forfeiture iyon kasi co-owner siya noong

properties na iyon, iyong assets.

Senator Hontiveros. Thank you, Mr. President.

Now, ito naitanong din po ni Minority Leader, kasama ng good sponsor:

terror organizations that existed for the purpose of committing what could

arguably, in some other setting, be defined under this bill as acts of terror,

such as the Reform the Armed Forces Movement or even the Magdalo Group.

However, it appears that they no longer do so since existing or being organized

for engaging in terrorist acts can be interpreted as permanent characteristics of

such groups. Could they be made the subject of this proscription order?

Senator Lacson. Which one, Mr. President?

24
 Senator Hontiveros. Earlier, the good sponsor discussed with the

Minority Leader the RAM or the Reform the Armed Forces Movement or even in

an earlier administration, itinuturing na terrorist movement.

Senator Lacson. Iba po iyong intent. Kasi iyong Reform the Armed

Forces Movement, ang intent nila is to overthrow and it is a criminal act called

coup d'état. So, iba po iyon.

So, we will just go back to the definition of a terrorist act, Mr. President.

Senator Hontiveros. At hindi rin naman po na-contemplate ng good

sponsor na ang isang grupo katulad ng Magdalo Group ay masama sa

definition ng terrorist group sa bill na ito.

Senator Lacson. Ang jurisprudence naman po rito ay iyong Lagman vs.

Medialdea. May mga existing naman pong Supreme Court rulings na puwede

nating gawing reference, Mr. President.

Senator Hontiveros. Thank you, Mr. President.

Now, what is the standard of evidence that will be used to prove

membership considering that many such organizations ay hindi naman po sila

exactly nagme-maintain ng roster of members, hindi naman sila nagme-

maintain ng records katulad ng ganitong membership rule.

The danger of a too lax standard of evidence is that we are giving, at ito

nga iyong sabi ko thread winding through all my questions, Mr. President,

about possibly the most despotic of implementors, we are giving future

authoritarian regimes carte blanche to arrest or detain any one it can link to a

25
terrorist organization no matter how tenuous the connection. So, ano pong

standard of evidence ang gagamitin?

Senator Lacson. We will always be guided by the rule of evidence, Mr.

President. Kung hindi naman ma-establish clearly na miyembro siya ng

proscribed terrorist organization, he would not be subject to arrest.

Mr. President, I noticed that every time the lady senator mentions the

word “despotic,” she always looks beyond me. [Laughter]

Senator Hontiveros. I am waving to my mistah, Mr. President.

Senator Lacson. She is always looking at her classmate.

Senator Hontiveros. Thank you, Mr. President.

Napag-usapan natin ang korte kanina, Mr. President. Now, what is the

rationale for letting the RTC rule on applications for proscription? Bakit hindi

po iyong Supreme Court or iyong Court of Appeals considering that the Court

of Appeals is the one with jurisdiction to authorize wiretapping and

surveillance activities? Related po itong tanong na ito sa usapin ng freedom of

association at iyong kabuuang Bill of Rights natin. So, bakit hindi po iyong

Supreme Court na lamang o iyong Court of Appeals?

Senator Lacson. Unang-una po, iyong accessibility. Pangalawa, under

the existing law which is RA 9372, RTC talaga iyong nagga-grant ng petition for

proscription.

26
 Senator Hontiveros. At the proper time, would the good sponsor

consider laying the responsibility for proscribing on a higher level of the

Judiciary than the RTC?

Senator Lacson. Baka lalong magtagal, Mr. President. Unlike iyong sa

judicial authorization to wiretap, we are amenable. In fact, we have already

included in the committee report to elevate it to the level of the Court of

Appeals, as suggested by the distinguished Minority Leader.

Senator Hontiveros. Thank you, Mr. President.

Lastly, on these sections--Sections 20 and 21--what is the venue for the

application? The law does not even specify the venue. So, technically, can the

application be filed with any RTC in the country? I believe this has the

potential to be abused.

Senator Lacson. Magde-designate po iyong Supreme Court ng special

courts for the purpose.

Senator Hontiveros. So, the Supreme Court will designate which RTCs

may receive such?

Senator Lacson. Special courts for this purpose, Mr. President.

Senator Hontiveros. Special courts at the level of the RTC.

Senator Lacson. Parang mga heinous crime courts na nag-designate

iyong Supreme Court. In this particular case, the Supreme Court will designate

special courts to hear proscription petitions on anti-terrorism cases, Mr.

President.

27
 Senator Hontiveros. Thank you, Mr. President.

I would like to proceed now to Section 23 of the bill which amends

Section 27 and increases the period of detention from three days to 14 days.

What is the rationale, Mr. President, for increasing the period of detention from

three days to 14 days? So, from half week to two weeks. In the worst scenarios,

is it so that subjects might possibly be subjected to 14 days of enhanced

investigation or interrogation until they crack?

Senator Lacson. Mr. President, in his cosponsorship speech, Sen.

Ronald dela Rosa shared with the members of this Body his first-hand

experience in Davao City. The 36-hour reglementary period is not enough to

build up a case against the suspected terrorist.

With the permission of the lady senator, let us hear directly from Senator

Dela Rosa what he experienced; and it created more damage when he was not

able to file or make the inquest proceedings on the arrested suspects.

Senator Dela Rosa. Thank you, and Mr. President.

Based on my personal experience, indeed, the spirit of this bill is to

secure the state and protect our people from terrorism by giving more teeth to

our law enforcement in its anti-terror campaign. Then, I think we should

extend the reglementary period from the maximum period of 36 hours to what

is being penned in this bill. Because as per my experience, ISIS terrorist

Muhammad Reza, which I presented during my cosponsorship speech, I was

able to arrest him in Davao City, but I had to release him before 36 hours

28
because I do not have enough evidence to hold him further or beyond 36 hours.

But I was fully convinced and the intelligence community was fully convinced

and they were forcing me, they were pleading before me not to release this guy

because he was very dangerous. But I told them that I cannot do otherwise; I

cannot break the law. So, I had to release him. But months later, Mr.

President, the intelligence committee showed me the video from YouTube the

three of them, including Mohammad Reza were holding the head of the

European victim and slashing the throat of the victim. So, from being local

black flag terrorist here in the Philippines, in Lanao del Sur, he travelled to

Raqqa, Iraq and became an ISIS member. So, he was able to slash a lot more

throats of ISIS victims in Iraq and Syria. If there was a law allowing me to hold

him further beyond 36 hours, then many more lives could have been saved.

Senator Hontiveros. The current Human Security Act already provides

not just 36 hours, but 72 hours--doble po—or three days. Ang tinatanong ko

lamang ay hindi ba sapat na iyong tatlong araw, doble sa panahon na

mayroon? Kailangan pa ba talagang dagdagan hanggang dalawang linggo? In

fact, should not the case be built up before arrest? Noong naaresto sa wakas

iyong Mohammad Reza and definitely, persons like him should be arrested and

subjected to our laws, bago pa siya inaresto, hindi po ba nabigyan ng

ebidensiya ang good gentleman from Davao ng intelligence community? Ano po

iyong evidence na mayroon that prompted the good gentleman to make the

arrest in the first place? It must have been substantive enough.

29
 Senator Dela Rosa. For the information of the good lady from Panay,

ibang-iba po iyong intelligence reports from investigative reports. Intelligence

reports have no evidentiary value but they are classified as A1, meaning,

coming from the direct source and from first-hand information. Iba po iyon.

Alam natin na iyan na iyan talaga, but legally, it cannot stand in court. So,

iyan po ang dilemma ngayon ng law enforcers.

Babalik lamang ako sa sinabi ng ating interpellator, the good senator

from Panay, that instead of using the 72 hours as provided by the Human

Security Act, the law enforcers are more inclined to use the 36 hours provided

by ordinary laws other than the Human Security Act because we find more

convenience in using the other laws and because we find the Human Security

Act very anti-police. Instead of giving more teeth to the police, it is giving more

fear to the police because of that provision.

Senator Lacson. Because of the P500,000 per day fine, Mr. President.

So, instead of filing cases for violation of the Human Security Act, the police

would instead file ordinary violations of the Revised Penal Code to avoid this,

sasabihin natin, sword of Damocles.

Senator Hontiveros. I understand, Mr. President.

Senator Lacson. Pagbabayarin sila ng P500,000 per day once the

suspected terrorist is acquitted.

On top of what Senator Dela Rosa has shared with us, during the

committee hearings, the members of the law enforcement agencies shared with

30
us their experience na kulang talaga iyong three days and they need, more or

less, 14 days. That is the reason why we incorporated in this measure iyong

reglementary period na 14 days.

We are just trying to be at par with other ASEAN neighbors or ASEAN

countries--Sri Lanka, 14 days; Australia, 14 days; Bangladesh, 15 days;

Indonesia, 21 days; Pakistan, 30 days; Malaysia, 59 days; and Singapore, 730

days. Ito iyong reglementary periods. Tapos tayo, non-extendible iyong 14

days.

In other countries or in other jurisdictions, like Thailand, puwede pa

silang mag-extend ng another 30 days; Indonesia, extendable hanggang 120

days; Malaysia, extendible hanggang dalawang taon; Maldives, extendible to

an indefinite period; and Singapore, indefinite period. Mabait po tayo kasi alam

ko po nandiyan kayo kaya ang sabi ko 14 days, tama na.

Senator Hontiveros. Thank you, Mr. President.

Mr. President, I understand na ganito po ang trend sa iba at karamihan

ng mga bansa sa region natin. Mas gusto ko pa nga na hindi tayo manatiling

mabait pero…

Senator Lacson. So, we value human rights, Mr. President.

Senator Hontiveros. Exactly, Mr. President.

Senator Lacson. That is what I meant by saying na mabait tayo.

Senator Hontiveros. Yes, exactly, Mr. President.

31
 Kahit na nagmumukha tayong odd man out, mas gusto ko po sanang

manatili tayong nagtataguyod ng mahabang track record ng ating bansa

struggling to uphold human rights and civil liberties even under very

challenging circumstances tulad nitong global threat nga ng terrorism na

humanap ng mga creative pero effective na paraan. I was even surprised doon

sa sinabi ng good gentleman from Davao na walang evidentiary value bilang

investigation report iyong intelligence report. Because I know even as a civilian

at bilang mistah ng good gentleman from Davao, and the good sponsor knows

this even more as a former chief-PNP, how hard our police and military

intelligence units work to gather iyong sinabi nga ng good gentleman from

Davao—A1 intelligence information which will enable our law enforcement

officers to arrest these suspected terrorists or these terrorists. Kaya ko

itinanong na hindi ba iyong pag-aresto roon kay Mohammad Reza was actually

backed up by solid evidence that could stand in court in the prosecution of the

case, Mr. President.

Senator Lacson. Well, the bottom line here is, Mr. President, had

Senator Dela Rosa, or Colonel Dela Rosa at that time been, accorded this

particular provision extending the reglementary period for terrorist, sana na-

save natin iyong na-slash na leeg doon sa Iraq.

On top of that, Mr. President, let me just inform the gentlelady that there

are safeguards that are put in place to prevent abuses under this particular

provision. Number one, the law enforcer taking custody shall notify in writing

32
the judge nearest the place of arrest of the following facts: time, date, manner

of arrest, location or locations of the detained suspects, physical and mental

condition of the detained suspects. These are the additional safeguards na

naisip naming ilagay para mabawasan or mawala iyong possible abuses ng law

enforcement agents.

So, hindi puwede iyong itago-tago because they will be answerable. They

are also mandated to furnish with a written notice iyong anti-terrorism council,

Mr. President. Ito iyong mga safeguards.

Senator Hontiveros. Thank you, Mr. President.

Of course, we also believe that we have to consider the rationale behind

the original provision in the Human Security Act which is to prevent or

frustrate an imminent attack. Because if an attack is already being carried

out, then is it not correct to say that not only can our security forces arrest the

perpetrators in flagrante delicto but they can also use deadly force to preserve

public order or save lives?

Senator Lacson. Well, we should not wait for the destruction or the

killing to happen before we conduct the arrest, Mr. President. We want to be

proactive because malalakas na po iyong mga anti-terrorism laws in other

jurisdictions. If we are left behind, we are opening up our country to be a safe

haven for these terrorists. Ito pa po, Section 20, iyong penalty for failure to

deliver suspect to the proper judicial authority, mayroon po tayong provision na

puwede silang makulong. Of course, it is already provided for under existing

33
laws, iyong tinatawag na “arbitrary detention” pero nai-emphasize pa rin po

natin iyon.

Senator Hontiveros. Salamat po, Mr. President.

At sa totoo lamang po, itong pinag-uusapan nating longer period of

detention na sinasabi na global trend at nakikita natin sa ating rehiyon ay

ginagamit laban sa mga estudyante, mga pro-democracy activists, pati mga

human rights lawyers na lahat po ay hindi mga terorista and there is no

evidence that it contributes meaningfully against terrorism. Ito po ay mula sa

Amnesty International.

Senator Lacson. On the other hand, let us look at it from another

perspective, Mr. President. Itong mga countries na ito, they are adequately

equipped. Tayo po ay hindi masyado. And iyong existence ng batas na umiiral

sa kanila that provides for a longer reglementary period could be contributory

kung bakit kakaunti marahil iyong nangyayaring mga terroristic activities in

their areas. Sa atin, nagiging laboratory, nagiging training ground just like

Marwan and the other terrorists sa Marawi. Kaya po nangyayari iyon kasi mas

magaan sila sa Pilipinas because of our weak laws on terrorism.

Senator Hontiveros. Mr. President, I think it would be arguable na roon

sa mga bansa na mas may mahahabang reglementary period, lalo na iyong mga

mauunlad na bansa sa kanila ay posibleng humuhupa ang terorismo because

they are addressing the root causes of terrorism in a balanced way kasama ng

34
effective law enforcement. So, hindi lamang heavily sa law enforcement, may

kasama po.

Senator Lacson. And effective laws, Mr. President.

Senator Hontiveros. Which is the argument of the good sponsor that

we do not have right now. And effective laws which, I know, is what we are all

seeking to.

Senator Lacson. Which we do not have right now, Mr. President.

Senator Hontiveros. Which is the argument of the good sponsor that

we do not have right now, Mr. President. At the proper time, I will propose

some possible amendments to achieve that objective as part of the community

of nations, to address the threat of terrorism while still unequivocally

upholding our commitments to human rights and civil liberties.

Further, Mr. President, if our security forces are still in the process of

investigating a terrorist conspiracy, can they not build their case using the

mechanisms already provided, for example, in the Terrorism Financing

Prevention and Suppression Act? Secondly, the surveillance order provision in

the current HSA or applying for a good old-fashioned search warrant under the

Rules of Court?

Senator Lacson. It is time to improve or enhance the Human Security

Act by way of amending it, Mr. President, including all these provisions

because right now, there is only one conviction. Imagine, when did we pass the

Human Security Act? It is in 2007. We are now in 2020. So far, there is only

35
one conviction and one difficulty which we suggested that we delete, iyong

predicate crimes. Ito iyong one of the handicaps. We have to prove first the

predicate crimes before we can even proceed to prosecute the terrorist for

violating the Human Security Act. That is why, we deemed it necessary to just

delete the predicate crimes.

Senator Hontiveros. I see, Mr. President. If the State needs 14 days

with the suspect to get anything useful from him or her, hindi po ba fishing

expedition na iyon?

Senator Lacson. Definitely no, Mr. President. Sa amin nga pong

committee hearing, ito iyong common experience ng mga law enforcement

agencies present, ang sabi nila ay kulang na kulang talaga iyong three days.

Ang hinihingi pa po nila ay 90 days na hindi nga ako pumayag dahil naalala ko

kayo. [Laughter]

Senator Hontiveros. Salamat pong muli, Mr. President. I will count on

that kapag magpo-propose na ng mga amendments.

Last follow-up question, Mr. President, doon sa pinag-usapan natin

kanina kung ano ba ang mala prohibita. Marami po kasi sa naging pag-uusap

natin ang naging sagot ay, “Let us always look at the intent.” Ano nga po ba

iyong mala prohibita? Ano po ba iyong mga offenses sa ilalim ng batas na ito na

hindi kailangan iyong intent? Ano iyong mala prohibita at ano naman iyong

mga kailangan ng intent? Kasi doon sa pinag-usapan natin kaninang

possession of documents, ang sabi ay mala prohibita siya.

36
 Senator Lacson. Iyong intent po is an indispensable element.

Kailangan ay ma-establish natin na iyong intent is really to commit a terrorist

act, Mr. President. We cannot deviate from that.

Senator Hontiveros. Pero ang sabi ng good sponsor kanina, iyong

“possession of documents likely to facilitate a terrorist act” ay mala prohibita,

so hindi kailangan iyong intent.

Senator Lacson. Kasi po may intent siya, Mr. President. Hintayin pa ba

natin na maisagawa niya iyong kaniyang terrorist activities?

Senator Hontiveros. Perhaps, Mr. President, in closing my

interpellation and thanking the good sponsor, ilan po sa mga punto na ito na

hindi po tayo sang-ayon sa posisyon ay susubukan kong balikan at the proper

time sa period of amendments. Para din pong gawing mas malinaw ang mga

probisyon ng isang napaka-importanteng panukala which is interpreted and

implemented excessively, or because of lack of clarity could actually do more

harm than good. At isang susubukan kong linawin ay itong tungkol sa mga

punto rito na may kinalaman sa mala prohibita which does not require intent.

Senator Lacson. Rest assured, Mr. President, that at the proper time, I

am with the lady senator in really further strengthening, especially the

safeguards to protect human rights but not to the point na isa-sacrifice naman

natin iyong safety ng karamihan ng ating mga kababayan.

Senator Hontiveros. Let us search for that balance, Mr. President, with

the help of the good sponsor, probably a difficult balance, pero tingin ko

37
necessary talaga kung saan magtatagpo iyong human rights at iyong public

safety o kung saan magtatagpo ang public safety at human rights.

So, by way of ending, gusto ko lamang ulitin ito: We do craft laws

assuming the possible worst in our future implementors. Democracy demands

a healthy distrust of power at alam po natin iyan bilang legislature na maya’t

maya nagtse-check and balance sa dalawa pang branches of government. So,

let us continue to deliberate on this measure but let us also keep these tenets

in mind. At the very least, let us make our laws as clear as possible and remove

all possible ambiguity.

Marami pong salamat, good sponsor; salamat po, Mr. President.

Senator Lacson. Thank you very much, Mr. President.

Senator Villanueva. Mr. President.

The President. The Majority Leader is recognized.

Senator Villanueva. At this juncture, to continue the interpellation, may

we recognize Sen. Bong Revilla to ask questions to the good gentleman from

Cavite, Senator Lacson.

The President. Senator Revilla is recognized.

Senator Revilla. Thank you, Mr. President.

May the gentleman from Cavite, my kababayan, yield for some

clarificatory questions?

Senator Lacson. Willingly to my kababayan from Bacoor City, Mr.

President.

38
 Senator Revilla. Thank you, Mr. President.

Mr. President, the 2019 Global Terrorism Index (GTI) ranked the

Philippines ninth among the 163 countries in the world. Ayon po sa report na

ito, kahit na bumaba sa ating bansa ang terror-related deaths at terror-related

incidents, the Philippines remains the only Southeast Asian country to be

included in the top 10 list most impacted by terrorism. Nakababahala po ang

report na ito kaya naman napapanahon ang panukala ng aking kababayan na

si Senator Lacson na amyendahan ang Human Security Act at ito po ay aking

sinusuportahan. Mayroon lamang po akong ilang katanungan.

Now, Mr. President, under the Human Security Act of 2007, the

commission of acts of terrorism is anchored on the commission of certain

predicate crimes like piracy, kidnapping, rebellion, et cetera. Pero dito po sa

proposed anti-terrorism act, particularly Section 4, I noticed that the predicate

crimes have been removed. May I know the reason for removing the predicate

crimes? Have we not made the definition of terrorism or terrorist act overbroad,

thereby making prosecution of the crime difficult? O mas pinadali natin ang

pag-prosecute dahil sa bagong definition, Mr. President?

Senator Lacson. Thank you for that question, Mr. President.

Based on our experience, after the Human Security Act was passed in

2007, there is only one conviction and one of the identified handicaps is the

presence of predicate crimes. We have had just only one conviction since that

time because we have to prove first the existence of the predicate crime or

39
crimes identified before we can even proceed to prosecute under the Human

Security Act. So we deemed it wise to just remove the predicate crimes.

Senator Revilla. So, mas madali na po ang prosecution, Mr. President.

Senator Lacson. Hindi pa natin alam dahil hindi pa naipapasa ang

batas.

Senator Revilla. Hindi pa natin nasusubukan. So, sa pananaw po ng

sponsor, mas mapadadali ba?

Senator Lacson. Iyon po talaga ang isang handicap kung bakit isa pa

lamang iyong nagiging conviction. At tinanong namin iyong judge mismo na

nag-convict, si Judge Felix Reyes ng Taguig, at sinabi niyang nahirapan talaga

siya dahil kailangang i-prove niya muna iyong predicate crime bago pa lamang

mai-prove iyong violation ng Human Security Act.

Senator Revilla. Mr. President, the Philippine Human Security Act was

enacted more than 10 years ago--miyembro po ako ng Thirteenth Congress

noong naipasa ang batas na ito--maaari po bang malaman kung mayroon na

bang na-convict sa kasalukuyan nating batas laban sa terorismo?

Senator Lacson. Iisa lamang po. Ang na-proscribe na terrorist

organization ay iisa pa lamang din, iyong Abu Sayyaf. Kaya talagang

napakahina po ng batas. Unang-una, natatakot po at nag-aalala iyong ating

law enforcement agencies na bakit pa tayo magpa-file ng violation ng Human

Security Act, samantalang kapag na-acquit iyan, pagbabayarin tayo ng

P500,000 per day of detention. So, ang ginagawa po nila, maski nahuli nila

40
iyong maliwanag na terorista, like in Marawi City, ang pina-file nila ay multiple

murder. Kung ano-anong mga violation na lamang ng Revised Penal Code kasi

nga nangangamba sila na kapag nagkamali iyong prosecution at na-acquit,

saan sila kukuha ng pangmulta? Isipin na lamang natin na kung makulong ng

sampung araw, iyong P500,000 a day, P5 million po iyon na manggagaling sa

bulsa ng law enforcement agents na humuli at nag-detain. Napakahirap po

talagang gamitin bilang weapon against terrorism ang Human Security Act of

2007. Kaya kailangan po talagang i-amend.

Senator Revilla. Dapat amyendahan talaga.

Ang susunod ko pong katanungan ay patungkol sa Sections 21 at 22 ng

Anti-Terrorism Act regarding proscription of terrorist organizations,

association, or group of persons. Naitanong na po ito kanina ni Senator

Hontiveros tungkol sa proscription; mayroon lamang po akong ilang

karagdagang tanong, Mr. President. Ang probisyon na ito para sa proscription

ng terrorist organizations, association, or group of persons ay hindi po bagong

probisyon. Mayroon din pong ganitong probisyon under the Human Security

Act of 2007, tama po ba?

Senator Lacson. Tama po iyon, Mr. President.

Senator Revilla. What is new here is the issuance of a preliminary

order of proscription under Section 22 of the proposed Anti-Terrorism Act, is

this correct, Mr. President?

Senator Lacson. Tama po iyon, Mr. President.

41
 Senator Revilla. May I know, Mr. President, the purpose why we added

this specific provision? What is the importance of the immediate issuance of a

preliminary order of proscription?

Senator Lacson. Tulad po ng nasabi ko kanina, iyong Abu Sayyaf group

na alam naman nating lahat na talagang a band of terrorists, it took the RTC

to issue the order of proscription after 12 years. In the meantime,

namamayagpag po iyong Abu Sayyaf sa pangki-kidnap, pagputol ng ulo, pagte-

terrorize. So, naisipan po natin itong probisyon na ito na aside from making the

order of proscription time-bound on the part of the RTC, iyong six months,

binigyan pa rin natin ng poder o ng kapangyarihan iyong korte na mag-issue ng

preliminary order of proscription na within 72 hours puwede siyang mag-issue

ng preliminary order of proscription. That will be made permanent by way of a

final order of proscription within six months kung mayroong sufficient ground

to order the proscription.

Senator Revilla. Once the preliminary order of proscription has been

issued, ano po ba ang epekto nito? May law enforcement or military personnel

conduct surveillance on the preliminarily proscribed terrorist organizations,

associations, or group of persons?

Senator Lacson. Marami pong puwedeng magawa. Puwedeng i-freeze

na iyong assets, iyong accounts, pagkatapos puwede ring arestuhin iyong mga

established na mga miyembro ng terrorist organization na na-proscribe na o na-

isyuhan ng preliminary order of proscription. Na puwede naman pong

42
mabalewala kung hindi mag-i-issue ng permanent within six months.

Halimbawa, after one month, nakita na kulang talaga iyong basehan para

ipagpatuloy iyong temporary or preliminary order of proscription, puwedeng i-

lift iyon.

Senator Revilla. Mr. President, ano po ang mangyayari kung

pagkatapos maaresto ang mga suspects, pagkatapos mag-surveillance ng mga

awtoridad, pagkatapos ma-examine o mabuksan ang mga bank accounts ay

ise-set aside o ipawalang bisa ng korte ang preliminary order of proscriptions,

will our law enforcement or military personnel face charges from these

organizations, associations, or groups? Ano po ba ang mangyayari sa mga

nakalap na impormasyon, Mr. President?

Senator Lacson. Hindi naman puwedeng makasuhan na po iyong ating

law enforcement kasi valid naman iyong grounds nila for arresting and mag-

freeze ng mga accounts or assets noong mga persons.

Senator Revilla. Doon po sa mga information, G. Pangulo, ano po ang

mangayayari doon? Ano ang gagawin nila?

Senator Lacson. May confidentiality iyon. Hindi puwedeng kung kani-

kanino ibibigay. Nasa provision po iyon na talagang limitado lamang po ang

makaaalam noong mga information na iyon.

Senator Revilla. Under the said section, the order of proscription

issued by the RTC is valid for three years. Thereafter, the order shall be

reviewed. May I know the procedure for the review, Mr. President? Will the

43
court motu proprio review it, or the law enforcement or the military personnel

has to file a petition?

Senator Lacson. Tama po iyon. Within three years puwedeng ma-lift na

iyong proscription.

Senator Revilla. Papaano po iyong procedure ng review?

Senator Lacson. The normal course of due process, Mr. President, will

apply--iyong filing, lahat kompleto po iyon.

Senator Revilla. Mr. President, may I just go back to the GTI report I

mentioned earlier?

Under the report, GTI noted the New People’s Army (NPA) as the terror

group responsible for over 36% of terror-related deaths and 39% of terror-

related incidents recorded. Still according to GTI, NPA is the Philippines’

deadliest terror group followed by the Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Movement

(BIFM).

Mr. President, mayroon po bang proscription case na isinampa laban sa

NPA o laban sa BIFM?

Senator Lacson. Mayroon pong pending na petition pero hindi pa po

nakakapag-decide iyong RTC.

Senator Revilla. So, wala pong…

Senator Lacson. Wala pa po, Mr. President. Hindi pa declared na

terrorist organization ang CPP-NPA dito sa ating bansa.

44
 Senator Revilla. Mayroon din po akong ilang katanungan tungkol sa

Section 26, Mr. President.

Section 26 of the proposed Anti-Terrorism Act of 2019 speaks of Anti-

Terrorism Commission. Is this the same as the Anti-Terrorism Council under

Section 41 of the proposed act or a different entity?

Senator Lacson. Ano po iyon?

Senator Revilla. Is this the same Anti-Terrorism Council under Section

41 of the proposed act or a different entity?

Senator Lacson. Mayroon pong mga additional members ng Anti-

Terrorism Council. Iyong secretary ng DICT, secretary ng DOST, DOTr, DOLE,

DSWD, iyong Presidential Adviser for Peace, Reunification and Unity, at saka

iyong chief minister ng BARMM ay ginawang miyembro rin ng Anti-Terrorism

Council.

Senator Revilla. Mr. President, may I recommend the inclusion of the

executive director of AMLC as member of the Anti-Terrorism Council,

considering the important role that they play in the counter-terrorism

financing? Mukhang hindi po yata sila nakasama.

Senator Lacson. Member po ang Department of Finance. At iyon namang

Anti-Money Laundering Council…

Senator Revilla. Pasok sa Department of Finance.

Senator Lacson. Opo, Mr. President. Kaya puwede rin siya ang mag-

represent sa secretary of finance doon sa Anti-Terrorism Council.

45
 Senator Revilla. So, puwede rin pong ilagay natin doon sa batas para

mas klaro?

Senator Lacson. Well, at the proper time, if the gentleman will introduce

the amendment, we will consider, Mr. President.

Senator Revilla. Thank you, Mr. President. Again, I support this

measure.

Mabuhay po kayo.

Senator Lacson. Maraming salamat po, Mr. President.

Senator Gordon. Mr. President.

The President. The gentleman from Zambales, Sen. Richard Gordon, is

recognized.

Senator Gordon. Thank you very much, Mr. President.

Will the good gentleman yield for just a few questions?

Senator Lacson. Willingly to the distinguished gentleman from Zambales

and Cavite, of course.

Senator Gordon. Mr. President, there are bound to be good Samaritans,

let us say, in an encounter between terrorist or what have you. There will be

good Samaritans who could probably be a doctor, could be a Red Cross

volunteer who would provide first aid. Would that be considered material

support?

Senator Lacson. No, Mr. President. Basta humanitarian aid under the

auspices of the United Nations o kaya iyong Philippine National Red Cross.

46
 Senator Gordon. International Red Cross.

Senator Lacson. Maski po sa giyera, puwede silang tumulong sa

kalaban.

Senator Gordon. Yes, that is correct, Mr. President.

Senator Lacson. Ganoon din po rito, basta humanitarian aid exempted

po.

Senator Gordon. I am constrained to make sure that this is clarified

because to the uninitiated, they might need that support.

So, would the gentleman be willing to accept an amendment later on

during the period of amendment.

Senator Lacson. Of course, Mr. President.

Senator Gordon. Thank you very much, Mr. President.

Senator Lacson. And thank you for that input because hindi namin

naisama sa committee report and I am glad that the gentleman mentioned that

because as an afterthought, naisip namin na iyong trabaho nila sa Philippine

National Red Cross, humanitarian aid, hindi dapat masaklaw noong pagbibigay

ng material support, Mr. President.

Senator Gordon. Opo, Mr. President. Iyon ay talagang by international

convention—International Committee of the Red Cross, International

Federation—or for that matter the Philippine Red Cross ay covered iyon.

Pero ang sinasabi ko, halimbawa--and the gentleman already answered

it, I just wanted to clarify it further, all the questions we are asking, like

47
Senator Drilon and all the others here--is to make sure that when the court

gets a case here, they can go back to the records para malinaw kung ano ang

intensiyon natin, para malinaw na malinaw.

So, having said that, iyong good Samaritan na doctor or first aider na

tinulungan iyong terrorist to save his life or to alleviate his suffering, he is not

covered by that because that is a humanitarian act.

Senator Lacson. That is correct, Mr. President.

Senator Gordon. There will be occasions, for an example, where the Red

Cross will go—and we do this—even to the NPA camps or even to the Abu

Sayyaf. We talked about that with them. I personally have done that. And we

tell them, “Hey, you are bound also by International Humanitarian Law and

huwang ninyo kaming guguluhin dahil magbibigay kami ng dugo.” All

combatants are involved in our franchise na dapat tulungan ang combatants

whether legal or illegal, legitimate government or the rebels.

Obviously, in this particular case, that will also not be considered as

giving material support or comfort to the enemy.

Senator Lacson. I would like to reiterate, yes, Mr. President.

Senator Gordon. Thank you, Mr. President. I appreciate that very much.

Now, I just want to have some questions clarified especially on the matter

of proscription. “Proscription” is a big word, not very common.

Senator Lacson. Yes, Mr. President.

48
 Senator Gordon. And, therefore, para lamang maliwanagan ang mga

nakikinig sa atin, iyong “proscription” is an application para ma-identify natin

lahat iyong mga terrorist organizations. Tama po ba iyon?

Senator Lacson. Tama po iyon.

Senator Gordon. Para sa ganoon, kapag na-identify sila, pag hinuli sila

ay puwede silang ma-detain for certain number of hours na hindi na magwo-

worry ang mga tauhan natin.

Senator Lacson. Tama po iyon.

Senator Gordon. Of course, legitimately done.

So, the process is, they apply for proscription which must be granted or

not granted by the court within 72 hours. Would that be correct, Mr.

President?

Senator Lacson. That is just the preliminary order of proscription; iyong

six months, iyon po ang final.

Senator Gordon. And the final, within six months, with hearing.

Senator Lacson. Yes. Due process, Mr. President.

Senator Gordon. So, that is a very good proposition here because that

means that we are really being careful in the matter of whom to proscribe, that

the government is a respecter of human rights.

Senator Lacson. Ang ayaw lamang po natin dito is iyong “one to sawa.”

Senator Gordon. That is correct, Mr. President.

49
 Senator Lacson. Kaya nilagyan natin ng period na within six months,

kailangang mag-decide na iyong court whether to grant or not iyong petition for

proscription.

Senator Gordon. Thank you very much, Mr. President.

And having said that, let me now go into another aspect of it. There are

such things as principal, accomplice, and accessory. Those who give material

support, iyon ang unang objective para malaman. Ngayon, kapag nagbigay ka

ng material support, how will we determine kung sino ang principal or kung

sino ang accomplice? Because iyong principal, obviously, indispensability ang

kailangan. He cannot do it without the help of the principal, the supporter. Is

that correct, Mr. President?

Senator Lacson. That is correct, Mr. President.

Senator Gordon. Now, the accomplice is kind of hard because material

support iyan. Could the gentleman give us some examples, for the benefit of

posterity, when somebody becomes a principal and when somebody becomes

an accomplice?

Senator Lacson. Kapag principal po, either by direct participation or by

inducement.

Senator Gordon. That is correct, Mr. President.

Senator Lacson. Iyon po ang principal. Kung co-conspirator ka, part ka

ng conspiracy, principal ka.

50
 Senator Gordon. And the common denominator will be indispensable

iyong ginagawa mo.

Senator Lacson. Indispensable, tama po.

Senator Gordon. Tama po iyan. In other words, hindi magagawa kung

hindi ka kasama.

Senator Lacson. Opo.

Senator Gordon. Now, iyong accomplice po pareho iyon, nagbibigay ng

material support. When does he become an accomplice? Because parang

mahirap ang definition na lalayo ka sa principal kung tumutulong ka. When

does helping describe as an accomplice?

Senator Lacson. Well, at any stage of the execution, puwede kang

maging accomplice, Mr. President.

Senator Gordon. Mr. President, may I make an example, if the

gentleman does not mind?

Supposing there are terrorist organizations and they are going to conduct

bombing activities or whatever, and everbody is assigned, “Ikaw ay tagadala ng

bomba, ikaw ay tagasuot ng bomba.” Those are principals.

Senator Lacson. Yes, Mr. President.

Senator Gordon. But supposing in the course, nadaanan ng isang tao

iyong mga taong kakilala niya, “Pare, puwede ko bang hiramin iyang sasakyan

mo at ihatid mo ako doon sa lugar?” And without him knowing it or even on the

51
way there, he gets to know it and he wants to get out but he can no longer get

out, what is he now? Is he a principal or an accomplice?

Senator Lacson. I think papasok po iyon sa accomplice.

Senator Gordon. Accomplice.

Senator Lacson. Opo.

Senator Gordon. I am just clarifying because that is a very thin line.

In other words, he is unwilling pero nandiyan na, isinakay niya, naibigay niya

ang tulong. Pero baka nga hindi pa rin accomplice dahil under duress siya,

hindi ba?

Senator Lacson. That is a matter of defense, Mr. President.

Senator Gordon. Yes, that is correct, of course, Mr. President.

So, ito, accomplice siya kapag tinawag ang tricycle, “Halika, kunin mo ito,

samahan mo ako at pupunta ako roon.” Napasama siya—accomplice.

Senator Lacson. Kung alam niya iyong intent at willingly sumama siya

at naghatid, puwede siyang makasuhan as an accomplice, Mr. President.

Senator Gordon. Naghatid siya pero ayaw niya, pero takot siya.

Mayroong intimidation factor.

Senator Lacson. Depensa niya po iyon kung tinututukan siya ng baril at

kung hindi niya isasakay ay papatayin siya, under duress.

Senator Gordon. Kahit ipinakita lamang ang baril, “Sumama ka.”

Senator Lacson. Under duress na rin po iyon.

52
 Senator Gordon. Under duress na rin iyon. So, may lusot siya. Iyon

ang depensa.

Senator Lacson. Depensa niya iyon.

Senator Gordon. Kasi I just want to be clear iyong sa accomplice. Basta

ang principal distinction is, sa principal ay talagang the crime could not be

committed without him, which is basic in the Revised Penal Code.

Now, sa accomplice, medyo nahihilo ako nang kaunti dahil this is a

continuing process lalo na kung conspiracy iyan at naisama siya. When does

one become an accomplice? Parang mahirap maging hindi siya ang principal.

Senator Lacson. Kung nahihirapan po ang ginoo at abogado siya,

lalong mahihirapan ako. [Laughter]

Senator Gordon. In other words, kung nagkakaalaman na, mahirap na

hindi kasi he is adding moral support.

Senator Lacson. Mr. President, it all depends on the appreciation of

first, the prosecutor, and eventually, the judge.

Senator Gordon. Yes.

Senator Lacson. Again, it depends on how the prosecution and the

defense will present their arguments, Mr. President.

Senator Gordon. I am glad that the sponsor took away the provision of

P500,000 per day.

Senator Lacson. Naku, malungkot, opo.

53
 Senator Gordon. Tinanggal na natin iyan, hindi ba? Because talagang

makagugulo. Pero, on the other hand, kailangan din. Ang ating ginawa riyan

ay inilagay natin ang definition ng proscription para there is a process para

they are allowed how long now to detain somebody. Fifteen days or fourteen

days?

Senator Lacson. Fourteen, Mr. President.

Senator Gordon. Non-extendable?

Senator Lacson. Non-extendable, Mr. President.

Senator Gordon. Non-extendable. So, if we do not file a case within 14

days…

Senator Lacson. We have to release.

Senator Gordon. We have to release.

Senator Lacson. Without any penalty.

Senator Gordon. Without any penalty or any sanction. I am glad that

that is clear and this makes the military or the police bolder. Wala na iyong

cloud of threat na puwede silang ma-fine ng malaki. But how do we protect the

citizen from gulang? Magulang iyong enforcer. In other words, hahabaan niya,

gagawa siya ng paraan para maitago iyong prisoner.

Senator Lacson. Mahirap po iyan kasi may provision po tayo rito na

kailangang i-inform niya iyong judge sa pinakamalapit na lugar kung saan

nangyari iyong arrest. Susulatan pa niya iyong Anti-Terrorism Council na

54
iyong taong inaresto, pangalan ng tao, lahat ng circumstances ay nakasulat po

roon.

Senator Gordon. Again, this is a matter of defense. If he says, “Wala po

akong kuwan, hindi ako makapunta roon sa judge.”

Senator Lacson. Pero malinaw po ang depensa riyan dahil may written

notice sa ATC. Kung wala pong maipakitang written notice, medyo malabo

iyong depensa.

Senator Gordon. When does the written notice come in? On the first

day he arrested him? Kailangan bang maibigay iyong notice on the first day of

arrest?

Senator Lacson. Sa Anti-Terrorism Council po.

Senator Gordon. So, first day.

Senator Lacson. Yes, Mr. President, upon arrest.

Senator Gordon. So, talagang hindi siya makakagulang doon.

Senator Lacson. At saka iyong judge in the nearest location where the

arrest was conducted, kailangang ma-inform din. May mga penalty po iyan

kapag hindi niya ginawa.

Senator Gordon. Of course. Now, my next question would be iyong

sinasabi nga natin kanina, hindi sila maka-aresto dahil natatakot sila kaya ang

ginagawa nila, Revised Penal Code na lamang. So, ito ngayon, wala nang takot

diyan. The problem now is when the arresting personality, whether he be a

policeman or a military or anybody in charge with authority to arrest, is how he

55
prevents himself from being accused of being arbitrary and capricious because

there is still room for arbitrariness and capriciousness and for abuse.

Senator Lacson. In the conduct of the arrest, Mr. President, that is

correct.

Senator Gordon. He would have to explain to the court that he did

everything possible to make sure that in the performance of duty, he was able

to do that. Would there be any requirement like that?

Senator Lacson. Hindi na rin po natin pinapalitan iyong provision sa

citizen’s arrest in this case. Kaya lamang, ang in-expand natin ay iyong period.

In ordinary crimes, hindi puwede iyong nasa planning stage, hindi naman niya

ginawa, hindi naman siya nag-commit ng crime. Pero dahil iyong tinatawag

nating inchoate offense, hindi pa nangyari, nasa simula pa lamang, puwede na

nating arestuhin because we want to be proactive because this is a new

phenomenon, Mr. President, which is global in nature, and we are trying to

avoid for this phenomenon to become a new normal. Kaya gusto nating bigyan

ng special treatment dito sa batas iyong ngipin ng law enforcement agencies

natin to really implement the law on terrorism.

Senator Gordon. This is a fact of reality nowadays that we are infested

by possible terrorists who are bound to do ill will with impunity and they do

not care.

56
 Now, let us put it this way—I am not necessarily agreeing with what I am

saying here—the penalty of life imprisonment or death might be too large and

too big, so much so that it opens the avenue for bribery.

Senator Lacson. Of course, Mr. President.

Senator Gordon. So, how do we rerun that? Dapat, like what the

sponsor have said, first day pa lamang ay alam na natin na inaresto na niya.

So, the commanding officer, the superintendent in charge, or whoever is in

charge of this gentleman should be able to make sure that he is not doing this

to intimidate others for bribery, hindi ba? Kasi kapag masyadong malaki ang

penalty, baka ang mangyari ay maging hanapbuhay.

Senator Lacson. Mas malaki iyong bribery kasi mas malaki ang penalty.

Senator Gordon. Yes, Mr. President. Iyon ang isang concern. I can see

where the good sponsor is headed here and I support it, but I am just trying to

find out ways to avoid that.

Senator Lacson. It is important that we are discussing these things

because it will be part of our record. And when the time comes, we will have

enough reference to go back to, Mr. President.

Senator Gordon. That is right, Mr. President. That is the whole object of

the exercise—to make sure that there is sufficient discussion here so that when

the courts ask, “Ano ba ang intention nila?” Malinaw.

Senator Lacson. Yes, Mr. President.

57
 Senator Gordon. So, really, the penalty of life imprisonment is severe

because a terrorist will exact either to follow or not to follow because they are

intimidated to do something that a government will be forced to do something.

Because, otherwise, he will kill people or he will crash a plane or something

like that, and that is why it has to be heavy.

Senator Lacson. By the way, Mr. President, iyong 14-day reglementary

period is not arbitrary or whimsical. There are grounds to be followed or to be

complied with. Before one can be detained for 14 days, it must be established

that: “(1) further detention of the person/s is necessary to preserve evidence

related to the terrorist act or complete the investigation; (2) further detention of

the person/s is necessary to prevent the commission of another terrorist act;

and (3) the investigation is being conducted properly and without delay.” So,

without these grounds, the law enforcement agent or agents cannot just

arbitrarily apply the 14-day reglementary period. Mayroong mga grounds pa po

iyan.

Senator Gordon. Thank you very much for that, Mr. President.

Now, in the case of terrorism, these have been probably taken up in the

original security act--there will be such things as torture reduction, iyong mga

ganiyan. Has that been taken into consideration in the hearings?

Senator Lacson. Opo. Bawal po iyon, Mr. President.

Senator Gordon. Bawal mag-torture, Mr. President.

58
 Senator Lacson. That will be covered by another provision of the Revised

Penal Code or any anti-torture act--iyong mga naipasa nating batas, Mr.

President.

Senator Gordon. How does one prove kung wala namang testigo? Kayo-

Sila-sila lamang noong nahuli siya, and then na-torture siya; there are no

marks; talo na siya, wala siyang testigo.

Senator Lacson. Magaling po iyong pulis kapag ganoon.

Senator Gordon. Oo nga, Mr. President. So, I am just trying to figure a

way out na hindi tayo basta-basta maa-accuse na we are being irresponsible

here.

Senator Lacson. Nandiyan po sa Section 29 ng ating proposed

measure—Penalty for Threat, Intimidation, Coercion, or Torture in the

Investigation and Interrogation of a Detained Person.

Senator Gordon. Yes, Mr. President, I am aware of that.

Senator Lacson. From 12 years and one day hanggang 20 years of

imprisonment ang aabutin ng ating law enforcement agents kapag nag-violate

sila rito under Section 29.

Senator Gordon. But, precisely, for so much as we are trying to

preempt terrorists, we are giving high penalties and we are going to

proscription, the other side of the coin is to prevent and make sure that the law

enforcement agent will be true to his oath, true to his code, and what are the

59
things that we have done to make sure that he is not able to do so, over and

above the penalties that we are going to assign to him.

Senator Lacson. Mabuti at nandito pa si Senator Hontiveros. Mayroon

pa pong concurrent jurisdiction ang Commission on Human Rights. Isinama

po natin under Section 40.

Senator Gordon. Yes, Mr. President.

Senator Lacson. Para talaga ma-safeguard iyong human rights ng

detained suspects, Mr. President.

Senator Gordon. And they are supposed to inform them also on the

first day.

Senator Lacson. Yes, Mr. President.

Senator Gordon. If the gentleman wants to introduce an amendment,

then we can also include because, anyway, we are informing the council, the

judge, and we might as well include the Human Rights Commission doon sa

pag-notify.

Senator Gordon. I am just trying to ask these questions so that we can

see that the playing field is level. Tagilid tayo, and then iyong nagte-terrorize,

walang qualms iyan about killing and crashing a plane. Pero, on the other

hand, tayo we play by the rules. We have to tell the court on the first day. We

have to tell the Human Rights Commission.

I think in the Human Security Act of the United States, ang ginagawa

nila, dinadala nila sa Uzbekistan. Dinadala nila sa ibang areas para hindi sila

60
mako-cover niyan. Dinadala nila sa Guantanamo. Pero dito, walang

magdadala sa atin sa ibang lugar diyan, and we do not have the resources to

do that either. Would that be correct, Mr. President?

Senator Lacson. Yes, Mr. President. Mayroon pang additional

consequence kapag nangyari iyong cruel, inhuman, degrading treatment,

talagang absolutely prohibited, mababalewala lahat iyong ebidensiya. Magiging

inadmissible.

Senator Gordon. Fruit of the poisonous tree.

Senator Lacson. Yes, Mr. President.

Senator Gordon. Lahat ng kinuha nila, because they did that, erased.

Senator Lacson. Erased lahat iyong ebidensiya maski malakas.

Senator Gordon. One more question which I hope I can remember right

now on the matter of…. Well, it will come back to me later. I am just so darn

tired that we are not having had too much sleep. Maybe at some time, if the

interpellations are not finished yet.

Senator Lacson. Ako rin po, Mr. President, medyo pagod na rin. Puwede

tayong mag-break muna.

Senator Gordon. That is correct, Mr. President. We have been working

since this morning and we have been doing a good law actually.

Senator Lacson. That is correct, Mr. President.

Senator Gordon. So, I would request that my interpellation be

suspended, Mr. President. Anyway, Senator Drilon is still going to ask. And

61
with the permission of the good sponsor, I would like to be able to ask some

questions should it come back to me, just a few questions just to make sure

that it will be all right.

Thank you very much, Mr. President.

Senator Lacson. There is another bill under consideration, and I am

excited to hear the interpellation of Senator Drilon to Senator Tolentino.

SUSPENSION OF SESSION

Senator Zubiri. Our distinguished colleague from Cavite is going to ask

the sponsor a few questions, but maybe we can take a break, Mr. President.

May I ask that the session be suspended for a few minutes?

The President. Is there any objection? [Silence] There being none, the

session is suspended for a few minutes.

It was 4:43 p.m.

RESUMPTION OF SESSION

At 5:31 p.m., the session was resumed.

The President. The session is resumed.

The Majority Leader is recognized.

Senator Zubiri. Mr. President, we will continue the interpellations on

Senate Bill No. 1083, with the permission, of course, of the sponsor.

62
 The President. I understand that they would want to suspend

consideration of the measure so that we can proceed to the next item in the

agenda.

SUSPENSION OF SESSION

Senator Zubiri. May I ask for a one-minute suspension of the session,

Mr. President.

The President. Is there any objection? [Silence] There being none, the
session is suspended.

It was 5:32 p.m.

RESUMPTION OF SESSION

At 5:32 p.m., the session was resumed.

The President. The session is resumed.

SUSPENSION OF CONSIDERATION OF S. NO. 1083

Senator Zubiri. Mr. President, I move that we suspend consideration of

Senate Bill No. 1083.

The President. Is there any objection? [Silence] There being none, the

motion is approved.

BILL ON SECOND READING

S. No. 1211—LGU Transportation Act
(Continuation)

Senator Zubiri. Mr. President, I move that we resume consideration of

Senate Bill No. 1211 as reported out under Committee Report No. 25.

The President. Is there any objection? [Silence] There being none,

resumption of consideration of Senate Bill No. 1211 is now in order.

63
 Senator Zubiri. Mr. President, may we recognize Sen. Francis “Tol”

Tolentino; and to interpellate, the distinguished Minority Leader, Sen. Franklin

Drilon.

The President. The sponsor of the measure, Sen. Francis Tolentino, is

recognized; and to interpellate, the Minority Leader, Sen. Franklin Drilon.

Senator Drilon. Thank you, Mr. President. Will the gentleman sponsor

yield for a few questions?

Senator Tolentino. Willingly, Mr. President, to the erudite Minority

Leader.

Senator Drilon. Mr. President, there is an old adage which says

“Necessity is the mother of all inventions.” It is because of the necessity to

have a solution to our horrendous traffic problem in Metro Manila that the

Angkas issue is now on the forefront of our news. The effort to provide

convenient transportation to our riding public, even if it is fraught with some

danger, is being pushed because of the necessity of looking for a solution. It is

because of the adage “necessity is the mother of all inventions” that there is an

effort to provide emergency powers to our secretary of transportation. It is in

that aspect that I see the effort of the good sponsor to pass this provision which

seeks to amend Section 17 of the Local Government Code or Republic Act No.

7160.

So, Mr. President, may I know what this provision seeks to address? We

were going through the sponsorship speech and it would appear that indeed it

64
is the traffic issue which is being highlighted and so this amendment is being

proposed.

Our first question is, what can be done by the LGU under the proposed

amendment which they cannot do at present? In other words, are the LGUs

prohibited under the Local Government Code from engaging in the activity

outlined in the proposed measure?

Senator Tolentino. Yes, Mr. President. The question really calls to my

mind the relevance of the provisions of the Local Government Code as applied

to the current situation which the good gentleman termed as “a requirement for

necessity.”

Mr. President, under the current Local Government Code, our LGUs,

while basically empowered to have their own measures to alleviate the traffic

conditions, are more or less shackled by existing regulation or the nonexistence

of a legal mandate that would empower them, so to speak, to have their own

traffic solutions. Principally, I refer to highly urbanized cities endeavoring to

have their own rail-based transport systems within their jurisdiction. For

instance, I mind the situation of Makati, they want to have their own subway

system but the present governing laws, specifically Republic Act No. 7718 or

the BOT Law, and all other existing regulations would limit their capacity to

enter into such projects without going through the rigorous, burdensome

process of going to the NEDA, the ICC, and perhaps taking more years before a

project from conceptualization to operation is approved.

65
 If I may add, Mr. President, since the enactment of the Local Government

Code, only one LGU was able to have its own project but it is not related to

transportation. It is a slaughterhouse rehabilitation of the Municipality of

Kalibo, Aklan, since the BOT and PPP regulations were enacted.

Senator Drilon. Mr. President, yes, so much was said in the sponsor’s

sponsorship speech. For the record, we just want to understand this bill.

When the sponsor says that the local governments are seeking to be

empowered to have their own measures since they are today shackled in

coming up with solutions particularly on transportation matter, is the

gentleman saying that the purpose of the bill is to unshackle the local

government units from these restrictive provisions and revise the present

regulatory framework for transportation projects?

So, that is the question, we want to be clarified. Because the reason for

that, Mr. President, is the way we read the measure as worded, it is not

obligatory; it is permissive. It is encouraging the local government units to go

into transportation projects and, therefore, to point out that they have this

power to do so because right now it would appear that only the city

governments would have this power. We are trying to understand what issue

or what policy is being addressed.

To be more specific, is the intention to remove what the good sponsor

calls as the “restrictions in the exercise of power,” the restrictions being the

regulations and laws which allow national government to interfere in the

66
execution of these projects? That is what we want to be clarified of because at

this point, with the responses of the good sponsor, we are not clear as to what

it should be. In fact, in the sponsorship speech of the good sponsor--let me

quote on page 38, “It is the view of the committee that it is now crucial to

turbocharge the functions and capabilities of the LGUs in addressing road

congestion and creating a balanced transport system.”

Again, in that context, Mr. President, what do we exactly intend to

achieve by this bill? Do we empower the local government units without regard

to the present regulatory framework? Or are we just encouraging them to get

into these projects and still be subjected to the regulatory framework that is

found in the present law?

Senator Tolentino. Yes, Mr. President, that is a very good question.

But if the good gentleman would look at the proposed measure, the word

“shall” was expressly mentioned. It stated, “All local government units ‘shall’

endeavor to provide…”

Senator Drilon. Allow me to interrupt, Mr. President.

Shall and yet endeavor, Mr. President. In other words, what is required

of the local government is to plan out and attract investors in this area. That is

how I understand the provision, and I do not understand it to mean that the

local government unit is now obliged to come up with a transport system using

local government funds. We are trying to clarify what exactly is meant by this

proposal.

67
 Senator Tolentino. Yes, Mr. President.

The word mentioned a while ago by the good Minority Leader is

consistent with the word I mentioned during my sponsorship speech which

refers to “turbocharging.” It will unleash the creative and innovative spirit of

the LGUs especially in answering the necessity, not just the current

transportation requirements, but even the future requirements of a local

government unit.

Precisely, Mr. President, this bill is addressed to the highly urbanized

LGUs which would give them the legal cloak insofar as entering into

agreements with private transportation or mass transportation companies

which right now is not present. Because based on experience, if an LGU, for

instance, Cebu, would want to have its own monorail system, even if we have a

back-to-back city council resolution coming from two city administrations, no

foreign investor or partner would endeavor to enter because there seems to be

a legal obstacle here. We are precisely in a twilight legal zone because while

they have autonomy, but in reality, they do not have because projects more

than P200 million, for instance, have to go through the NEDA-ICC.

Senator Drilon. Just to interrupt, if the good sponsor does not mind,

just to bring home the point and we will understand what is the purpose here,

will the projects that will be undertaken by the local government units designed

to address road congestion and creating a balanced transport system now

dispensed with the approval of NEDA? Just to be clear.

68
 Senator Tolentino. Yes, Mr. President.

Senator Drilon. So, they do not need to go to NEDA anymore?

Senator Tolentino. Yes, Mr. President.

Senator Drilon. All right. To me, we should specify that if that is the

policy. That policy, I am sorry, but I do not read it in the present amendment. I

am not saying that I have objections to that but I just want to know that that is

the purpose.

So, the gentleman is confirming that the purpose is to empower the

LGUs to undertake these projects without regard to the present regulatory

framework? Just for the record.

Senator Tolentino. That is correct, Mr. President. That is why in the

amendment, there is a phrase there “whether domestic or national without any

sovereign guarantee.”

Senator Drilon. No, the sovereign guarantee is completely separate. As

pointed out by the good sponsor, presently, if the project is over P200 million, it

will go to NEDA.

Senator Tolentino. Yes, Mr. President.

Senator Drilon. If the project is over… I cannot memorize.

Senator Tolentino. P20 million, local sanggunian; P50 million,

provincial sanggunian…

Senator Drilon. No, that is the authorization.

Senator Tolentino. Yes, Mr. President.

69
 Senator Drilon. I am talking about, say, a project costing P1 billion. Let

us say the Makati project which costs over a billion pesos. Firstly, the present

project in Makati would require NEDA approval and all that stuff?

Senator Tolentino. That is correct, Mr. President.

Senator Drilon. It did so?

Senator Tolentino. That is correct, Mr. President.

Senator Drilon. Now, if we pass this law, that project will not need

NEDA approval?

Senator Tolentino. That is correct, Mr. President.

Senator Drilon. And it can be done by the city.

Senator Tolentino. That is correct, Mr. President. Of course, the law

envisions a consultation with relevant national government and transportation

planning agencies, and this would involve NEDA, for planning; DOTr, for

intermodal and connectivity purposes. Perhaps the national government has a

plan to have a link within that area, so it is envisioned to interconnect future

national government projects with what the LGUs will be doing.

Senator Drilon. This representation has no problem with that, Mr.

President. I will just rely on the expertise of the good sponsor who is a former

chairman of the MMDA to make sure that the intention of the law is clear. Para

po hindi magkagulo ang LGU at saka iyong national government, unless we so

specify.

70
 Right now, projects worth P2.5 billion and above would require approval

of the NEDA—first, to the ICC and then the NEDA board. Let me highlight this

because if a local government unit, for example, would seek foreign financing

without warranties of the national government, the first question that the

funder will ask is: Have you secured NEDA approval? And then the local

government will say, “No. Under Section 17 of the law, I do not need NEDA

approval.” If I were the counsel for the funder, I would not be comfortable with

that because the way I read Section 17(K), it does not imply that NEDA

approval is necessary. So, I am pointing this out so that we will be clear as to

what the intent is. I am not objecting to it but I am just pointing this out. Now,

having said that, what does the NEDA itself say?

Senator Tolentino. Mr. President, regarding the previous point for

possible amendment, this representation is willing to clarify that in a phrase or

two with this proposed amendment to Section 17 at a later date.

Mr. President, I received a letter—it is in my folder—coming from the

NEDA director general. It is somewhere in my files--and apparently, even

during the budget hearings of NEDA, I conferred with Secretary Pernia, and

they do not have any objection because all of these, as in the words of the

President Pro Tempore, would catalyze a local Build, Build, Build. It will spur

regional economic growth which is supposed to be anchored on the

transportation system, Mr. President. So, NEDA is amenable.

71
 Senator Drilon. NEDA is amenable probably with the way it is worded

now because they may have the same reading as I have that this does not

require a change in the regulatory framework, meaning, NEDA can be

disregarded so long as there is no national fund involved. That could be their

frame of mind, Mr. President. And, therefore, it is best that, first, we clarify

what the intention is and what the policy of Congress is by stating clearly what

the law is. So, at that point, NEDA can react properly. If it is okay with them,

we want to hold them to their word and not have it vetoed by the President

because it is entirely possible that they will object to the revision of the

regulatory framework and recommend a veto from the President. That is why,

to me, it is very important that we state clearly what our intention is, and if we

can secure the concurrence of the Cabinet, particularly NEDA, then it would

be best. But, otherwise, we will do it by ourselves as policymakers of this

government.

Now, still on the issue of the regulatory framework, would the transport

system that is put up still require a certificate of public convenience and

Necessity (CPCN)?

Senator Tolentino. Mr. President, I do believe that a concurrence

coming from the DOTr would still be needed, and under the umbrella,

probably the LTFRB would come. That is why, Mr. President, in the bill itself,

the consultation process has been highlighted with the national government

agencies concerned.

72
 My reading, Mr. President, correct me if I am wrong, is that a CPC would

be very applicable for those who are interested in a public convenience

certificate which is being offered to the general public as a privilege granted

but in a situation wherein it is the government itself giving the imprimatur by

virtue of this law to the LGUs. I would surmise that that is the general

certificate of public convenience itself, the authority given to the local

government units to operate by itself because surely, in an LGU jurisdiction,

there will be no three or four or five competitors competing in one subway

system unlike, perhaps, the Tokyo metropolitan railways. So, in itself, the law

will be providing the CPC, my reading, correct me if I am wrong, to the LGU

concerned.

Senator Drilon. Mr. President, that is a matter that can be subjected to

a further study. But under the present system, a private sector can be

authorized on a PPP setup to operate the transport facility authorized by the

LGU. In that instance where the private sector operates and given the

statement of the good sponsor that the regulatory framework is being set

aside, the question is, would the operator of an LGU project in a joint venture

or in a build-operate-transfer system be required to secure a CPCN?

Senator Tolentino. No, Mr. President. I am not directly saying that it

should be set aside. The provisions of existing laws specifically relative to

common carriers, the duties…

73
 Senator Drilon. No, I am just talking about the regulatory framework,

Mr. President

Senator Tolentino. Yes, Mr. President. That is why, in the bill, we

never shunned the regulatory powers of the relevant national government

transportation agency but we espoused the national government agency-LGU

cooperation through a system of consultation. Before we can proceed with this

project, we must know if the DOTr has a pending plan or a future plan for this

route, for this neighborhood, for this highly densified area. So that, in itself,

Mr. President, will not do away with the regulatory functions of the national

government but it is different with the usual franchise given, for instance, to a

bus company because, here, we are talking of an LGU exercising its functions.

And with the huge investments involved, probably, it cannot be compared with

the usual public hearings conducted by LTFRB or another regulatory agency,

even Marina for that matter. So, I would suppose that this is a hybrid

empowerment of the LGUs. As correctly stated by the good Minority Leader, it

is borne out of the necessity and then my speech spoke of a turbocharging the

LGUs concerned.

Senator Drilon. Mr. President, up to this point, this representation is

not clear as to whether or not we are repealing the powers of the national

agencies insofar as the present transportation system is concerned. We have

already pointed out NEDA, the need of the requirement of NEDA approval when

74
the project goes beyond a certain amount; the LTFRB, for the franchising; the

DOTr which has the mandate under that law; the MMDA; the LTO.

Now, what I am just saying, Mr. President, is, we should clarify the roles

of these national agencies vis-à-vis the powers that will be exercised by the

LGU in relation to the proposed amendment.

In order to hasten the approval of this act, may I propose that the good

sponsor recast Section 17 in order to already enumerate and be precise as to

the intent. And we are willing to terminate the period of interpellation for our

part so long as we can go back to the interpellation period for purposes of the

amendments that will be introduced by the good sponsor, taking into

consideration the debate that we have for the past one hour.

Senator Tolentino. Yes, Mr. President. I would seem to agree with the

good Minority Leader that in terms of safety standards, the rail gauges, the

systems to be implemented by the LGU in conjunction with the private

operator, the national safety standards of a railroad system, or even a subway,

even though we do not have a subway yet, should be of national standards.

Bearing in mind that whatever projects the LGUs may propose or implement, it

would reflect on the national transport system. So, I agree with the good

gentleman, Mr. President, that this can still be amended to include the safety

standards, the matter of providing the consent of the national government,

specifically as to the relevant, if we call it franchise or authority, to be secured

75
first from the appropriate government agency and, in this case, I reckon that to

be the DOTr, Mr. President.

Senator Drilon. So, is it the intention to dispense with this permit

required?

Senator Tolentino. No, Mr. President. I am amenable to the proposal

and that will be part of our amendments to have the permitting process as part

and with due regard to the safety standards. But I would also surmise that no

legitimate, even foreign railroad company with a background to speak of, would

put in place a defective or even a below standard transport system. But I agree

with the gentleman.

Senator Drilon. So, Mr. President, I am amenable to terminating my

interpellation having already drawn from the good sponsor the answers that I

would like to hear although not reflected in my interpretation in the present

bill. So that if we can be given a copy of the proposed amendments and we

understand that we will be permitted to ask questions after the amendments

are submitted in order to clarify the intent of the law, on our part, we have no

problems with terminating the period of interpellations on this bill and await

the amendment which, we hope, will reflect the discussion this afternoon.

Just one more point, Mr. President. Will the law, once passed, also

require the local government unit to earmark local funds for this project?

Senator Tolentino. Yes, Mr. President. It is now part of the autonomous

powers of the local government unit but subject, of course, to existing fiscal

76
restraints because there appears to be a 20% cap on the expenditures that a

local government unit can do for this purpose.

Senator Drilon. I understand that, Mr. President.

Senator Tolentino. But as regards the amendments, willingly, Mr.

President, we will provide the good Minority Leader the amendments as part of

his interpellation.

Senator Drilon. In existence today is Memorandum Circular No. 2016-

120 or the Guidelines for the Implementation of the Public-Private Partnership

for the People Initiative for Local Governments (LGU P4). This circular expands

the modalities for public/private partnerships beyond those provided in the

BOT Law. May we know if this will still apply once the bill becomes a law?

Senator Tolentino. Yes, Mr. President. The cited regulation, probably,

will be superseded insofar as the transportation aspect is concerned. But as

regards slaughterhouses, municipal libraries, city hospitals and clinics, that

would still be applicable because this bill is anchored on the transportation

problem which we are experiencing right now, and which we will still

experience in the near future. Because I have stated this several times over

that there is always a threshold of urban congestion and population. And

most of our growing regional urban centers and cities in the Visayas, of

course, we have Iloilo; in Cebu, we have Lapu-Lapu-Mandaue Growth Center;

the Angeles-San Fernando area; the Butuan-Cagayan de Oro-Davao area; of

course, not to mention Metro Manila, will always be confronting this problem of

77
traffic congestion. And we really think, Mr. President, that it is not only

because of the transport demand which exceeds the transport supply that we

really have to prepare. And I think it behooves upon the Congress to prepare,

through the appropriate legislative measures, the measures that we should be

doing 10 years from now doing it today.

And I thank the good Minority Leader for allowing me to expand this by

specifying the provisions that would really be needed to avoid the

uncertainties, so to speak, in case this might be subjected to a judicial

question, Mr. President.

Senator Drilon. All right. With that, Mr. President, we can terminate

our interpellation on the understanding that the amendments will be given to

us in advance so that we can raise questions during the period of

interpellations or in the period of amendments in order to clarify the new

regime once a bill becomes a law.

With that, Mr. President, I manifest that we no longer have questions at

this stage.

Senator Tolentino. Thank you, Mr. President. I thank the good Minority

Leader himself for the very enlightening clarificatory questions.

The President. The Majority Leader is recognized.

Senator Zubiri. Thank you to the good gentlemen on the Floor, Mr.

President.

78
 Mr. President, no other member wishes to interpellate on the measure.

Therefore, I move that we terminate the period of interpellations.

I so move, with the permission of the Body, and without prejudice to

asking clarificatory questions during the period of amendments.

The President. Is there any objection? [Silence] There being none, the

motion is approved.

SUSPENSION OF CONSIDERATION OF S. NO. 1211

Senator Zubiri. I move that we suspend consideration of Senate Bill

No. 1211.

The President. Is there any objection? [Silence] There being none, the

motion is approved.

ADJOURNMENT OF SESSION

Senator Zubiri. With that, Mr. President, I move that we adjourn the

session until three o'clock in the afternoon of Monday, January 27, 2020.

The President. Is there any objection? [Silence] There being none, the

session is adjourned until three o'clock in the afternoon of Monday, January

27, 2020.

It was 6:08 p.m.

79
 ANNEX "5"

MONDAY, JANUARY 27, 2020

OPENING OF THE SESSION

At 3:00 p.m., the Senate President, Hon. Vicente C. Sotto III, called the
session to order.

The President. The 46th session of the Senate in the First Regular
Session of the Eighteenth Congress is hereby called to order.

Let us stand for the opening prayer to be led by Sen. Juan Miguel “Migz”
F. Zubiri.

Everybody rose for the prayer.

PRAYER

Senator Zubiri.

Our Lady of Guadalupe, Mother of the True God, our

Merciful Mother, we Thy children come today in an act of filial
homage of faith, love and trust, to solemnly consecrate our nation,
the Philippines, to Thy Immaculate Heart. Take it from our fragile
hands into Thy own; defend it and guard it as Thy own property;
make our Lord Jesus reign, conquer and rule in it. Outside of Him
there is no salvation.

We, Thy people, feel a terrible storm raging around us,

threatening to disperse and destroy the faithful flock of those who
bless Thee because Thou art the Mother of our Lord Jesus.
Afflicted, we stretch out our suppliant hands towards Thy Divine
Son, as we cry out: Save us, O Lord, for we perish!

Intercede for the Philippines, Our Lady, in this grave hour

when evil winds blow, bringing cries of death against Thy Son and
against the civilization founded on His teachings, deceiving minds,
perverting hearts, and lighting the fires of hatred and revolution in
the world. Help of Christians, pray for us!

Intercede for the Philippines, Our Lady, in this troubled hour

when the unclean waves of an open immorality, which has even
lost the notion of sin, exalt the rehabilitation of the flesh in the face
of the very Cross of Thy Divine Son, threatening to choke in this

1
 world the lily of virtue nourished by the Eucharistic Blood of Jesus
Christ. Virgin most Powerful, pray for us!

Intercede for the Philippines, Our Lady, in this hour of

passions and doubts when even the good run the risk of being lost.
Unite all the Filipino people around Thy Divine Son, in the love of
the Church and also in cultivation of virtue, in respect for order
and fraternal charity. Queen of Peace, pray for us!

Our Lady of Guadalupe, please pray for us.

Our Lord Jesus, please pray for us.

Amen.

The President. The MMDA Chorale will lead us in the singing of the
Philippine national anthem. The Group will also render another song entitled
Bayan Ko.

NATIONAL ANTHEM
Everybody remained standing for the singing of the national anthem.
ROLL CALL

The President. The Secretary will please call the roll.

The Secretary, reading:

Senator Sonny Angara……………………………………… Present

Senator Maria Lourdes Nancy S. Binay....................... Present
Senator Pia S. Cayetano ............................................. Present
Senator Leila M. de Lima..…………………………………. *
Senator Ronald "Bato" M. dela Rosa........................... Present
Senator Franklin M. Drilon………………………….…….. Present
Senator Win Gatchalian……………………………………. Present
Senator Christopher Lawrence T. Go.......................... Present
Senator Richard J. Gordon…………………………………
Senator Risa Hontiveros……………………………………. Present
Senator Panfilo M. Lacson…………………………………. Present
Senator Manuel "Lito" M. Lapid................................... Present
Senator Imee R. Marcos…………………........................ Present
Senator Emmanuel “Manny” D. Pacquiao……………… Present
Senator Francis “Kiko” Pangilinan..…………………….. Present
Senator Aquilino "Koko" Pimentel III ....…………….….. Present
Senator Grace Poe….................................................. Present**

2
 Senator Ralph G. Recto.............................................. Present
Senator Ramon Bong Revilla Jr…………………………. Present
Senator Francis "Tol" N. Tolentino………………………. Present
Senator Joel Villanueva…………………………………….. Present
Senator Cynthia A. Villar............................................. Present
Senator Juan Miguel F. Zubiri ……………………………. Present
The President………………………………………………….. Present

The President. With 21 senators present, the Chair declares the

presence of a quorum.

The Majority Leader is recognized.

ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF GUESTS

Senator Zubiri. Thank you, Mr. President.

Mr. President, we would just like to recognize some guests in the gallery.

We have with us from the National Intelligence Coordinating Agency

(NICA), Deputy Director General Abelardo P. Villacorta, together with Assistant

Director General Theodore Libardo and Director Candido Bontogon.

We also have Director Florentino P. Manalastas Jr. of the Anti-Terrorism

Council-Program Management Center (ATC-PMC); And, of course, our PLLO

Assistant Secretary Orville A. Ballitoc.

The President. Welcome to all our guests.

Thank you.

Senator Zubiri. Mr. President, we would like to recognize Sen. Manny

Pacquiao for a manifestation on the celebration of National Bible Day today.

The President. Sen. Manny Pacquiao is recognized.

--------------------------
* Under detention
** Arrived after the roll call

3
 MANIFESTATION OF SENATOR PACQUIAO

Senator Pacquiao. Thank you, Mr. President. Good afternoon.

Today, we celebrate the National Bible Day.

Every last Monday of January, we gather as a nation to reaffirm our

faith. By virtue of Republic Act No. 11163, we take time to unite in professing

the teachings of our Lord.

As we rejoice in the Word of God, may we take this opportunity to find

more meaningful conversations with one another, Mr. President. Let us

endeavor to be bearers of the good news throughout the world and allow the

wisdom of His Word fill our hearts with love, hope, and joy.

For the longest time, our nation has faltered by trying to live by bread

alone. While it is important to nourish our body to attain physical strength,

feeding our spirit and soul by witnessing the Living Truth in the way towards

growing in faith.

Today, let us pause and communicate with our God to express our

overflowing gratitude for the multitude of blessings we receive as a nation. Let

us strive towards unity. In Mark 3:24, the Holy Bible says, “If a kingdom is

divided against itself, that kingdom cannot stand.” Let these words of our Lord

resonate in our actions. With wisdom and courage, let us abandon our earthly

ways that divide us. In the midst of all the problems and trials that we are

facing, let us choose to live with courage and compassion, Mr. President.

Together, let us choose to fix our eyes on our God because apart from Him, we

are nothing.

4
 Before I end this manifestation, Mr. President, I would like to leave these

verses in Jeremiah 9:23 and 24, “This is what the Lord says: ‘Let not the wise

boast of their wisdom or the strong boast of their strength or the rich boast of

their riches, but let the one who boasts boast about this: that they have the

understanding to know me, that I am the Lord, who exercises kindness, justice

and righteousness on earth, for in these I delight,’ declares the Lord.”

Thank you, Mr. President.

Senator Villanueva. Mr. President.

The President. Senator Villanueva is recognized.

MANIFESTATION OF SENATOR VILLANUEVA

Senator Villanueva. Thank you, Mr. President.

This is in relation to the manifestation made by our distinguished

colleague who principally authored and sponsored the National Bible Day that

we passed, I think, three or four years ago. It is important indeed that we go

back to the word of God as Matthew 4:4 says: “Man shall not live by bread

alone, but on every word that comes from the mouth of God.” And in John 15:5

God said, “I am the vine; you are the branches. If you remain in Me and I in

you, you will bear much fruit; for without Me you can do nothing, apart from

Me, you can do nothing.” That is why I join, not only the distinguished

gentleman from Saranggani but our brothers and sisters in Christ, in

celebrating the National Bible Day. It is important that we be reminded of the

word of God which gives light, guidance, and direction for our everyday living.

Thank you, Mr. President, and may God bless us all.

5
 The President. All right. The Majority Leader is recognized.

Senator Zubiri. Happy National Bible Day to everyone, Mr. President.

THE JOURNAL

Mr. President, I move that we dispense with the reading of the Journal of

the 45th session, Wednesday, January 22, 2020, and consider it approved.

The President. Is there any objection? [Silence] There being none, the

motion is approved.

Senator Zubiri. Mr. President, I move that we proceed to the Reference

of Business.

The President. Is there any objection? [Silence] There being none, the
motion is approved.

The Secretary will read the Reference of Business.

REFERENCE OF BUSINESS

BILLS ON FIRST READING

The Secretary. Senate Bill No. 1287, entitled

AN ACT ENSURING THE FUNDAMENTAL EQUALITY OF MEN AND

WOMEN UNDER THE LAWS ON MARRIAGE AND FAMILY
RELATIONS, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE ARTICLES 14,
96, 124, 211, AND 225 OF EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 209,
OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE “FAMILY CODE OF THE
PHILIPPINES”

Introduced by Senator Hontiveros

The President. Referred to the Committee on Women, Children, Family

Relations and Gender Equality

The Secretary. Senate Bill No. 1288, entitled

AN ACT CREATING THE OFFICE OF THE SURGEON GENERAL

OF THE PHILIPPINES, PROVIDING ITS FUNCTIONS,

6
 APPROPRIATING FUNDS THEREFOR AND FOR OTHER
PURPOSES

Introduced by Senator Tolentino

The President. Referred to the Committees on Health and Demography;

and Finance

The Secretary. Senate Bill No. 1291, entitled

AN ACT INCREASING THE BED CAPACITY OF THE EAST AVENUE

MEDICAL CENTER FROM SIX HUNDRED (600) TO ONE
THOUSAND (1,000) BEDS AND APPROPRIATING FUNDS
THEREFOR

Introduced by Senator Angara

The President. Referred to the Committees on Health and Demography;

and Finance

The Secretary. Senate Bill No. 1292, entitled

AN ACT PROMOTING ENVIRONMENTAL CONSCIOUSNESS

THROUGH EDUCATION AND CIVIC ENGAGEMENT IN
ORDER TO INCREASE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY AMONG
THE YOUTH, APPROPRIATING FUNDS THEREFOR AND
FOR OTHER PURPOSES

Introduced by Senator Sotto

The President. Referred to the Committees on Basic Education, Arts and

Culture; Higher, Technical and Vocational Education; and Finance

RESOLUTIONS

The Secretary. Proposed Senate Resolution No. 294, entitled

RESOLUTION CONGRATULATING AND COMMENDING EMIL Q.

JAVIER, Ph.D. FOR BEING NAMED NATIONAL SCIENTIST
OF THE PHILIPPINES BY VIRTUE OF PROCLAMATION No.
781

Introduced by Senator Binay

The President. Referred to the Committee on Rules

7
 The Secretary. Proposed Senate Resolution No. 295, entitled

RESOLUTION DIRECTING THE PROPER SENATE COMMITTEES

TO CONDUCT AN INQUIRY IN AID OF LEGISLATION ON
THE STATUS OF THE ANIMALS LEFT BEHIND DURING THE
TAAL ERUPTION, WITH THE END IN VIEW OF PROVIDING
FOR THEIR INCLUSION IN EVACUATION AND DISASTER
RISK REDUCTION PLANS

Introduced by Senator Binay

The President. Referred to the Committee on National Defense and

Security, Peace, Unification and Reconciliation

COMMUNICATIONS

Letters from the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas transmitting to the Senate copies
of the following certified and authenticated BSP issuances in
compliance with Section 15(a) of Republic Act No. 7653 (The New
Central Bank Act):

Circular Letter Nos. CL-2020-002, 003, 004, 005 and 006 dated 8 and
10 January 2020;

and Circular No. 1071 dated 8 January 2020.

The President. Referred to the Committee on Banks, Financial

Institutions and Currencies

ADDITIONAL REFERENCE OF BUSINESS

BILLS ON FIRST READING

The Secretary. Senate Bill No. 1293, entitled

AN ACT INCREASING THE PENALTIES OF DECEPTIVE, UNFAIR,
AND UNCONSCIONABLE SALES ACTS OR PRACTICES,
PARTICULARLY IN TIMES OF CALAMITY, EMERGENCY
CONFLICT AND DISTRESS, THEREBY AMENDING
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 7394 OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE
“CONSUMER ACT OF THE PHILIPPINES”

Introduced by Senator Marcos

The President. Referred to the Committee on Trade, Commerce and

Entrepreneurship

8
 The Secretary. Senate Bill No. 1294, entitled

AN ACT DECLARING DECEMBER 12 EVERY YEAR A SPECIAL

WORKING HOLIDAY IN THE ENTIRE COUNTRY TO
COMMEMORATE THE FEAST OF OUR LADY OF GUADALUPE

Introduced by Senator Lapid

The President. Referred to the Committee on Basic Education, Arts and

Culture

The Secretary. Senate Bill No. 1295, entitled

AN ACT ESTABLISHING THE TAX REGIME OF PHILIPPINE

OFFSHORE GAMING OPERATORS, AMENDING FOR THIS
PURPOSE SECTIONS 27, 28, 42 AND 199 OF THE NATIONAL
INTERNAL REVENUE CODE OF 1997, AS AMENDED

Introduced by Senator Recto

The President. Referred to the Committee on Ways and Means

RESOLUTIONS

The Secretary. Proposed Senate Resolution No. 296, entitled

RESOLUTION URGING THE EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT TO

ENSURE EFFICIENT IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PLANS
AND MEASURES ON THE REPATRIATION OF OVERSEAS
FILIPINO WORKERS IN LIGHT OF THE MIDDLE EAST
TENSIONS, THEREBY SAFEGUARDING PUBLIC WELFARE
AND INTEREST

Introduced by Senator Marcos

The President. Referred to the Committees on Labor, Employment and

Human Resources Development; and Foreign Relations

The Secretary. Proposed Senate Resolution No. 297, entitled

RESOLUTION DIRECTING THE SENATE COMMITTEE ON URBAN

PLANNING HOUSING AND RESETTLEMENT, IN AID OF
LEGISLATION AND IN THE EXERCISE OF THE SENATE’S
OVERSIGHT FUNCTIONS, TO URGENTLY CALL UPON THE
DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SETTLEMENTS AND URBAN
DEVELOPMENT AND OTHER RELEVANT AGENCIES TO

9
 FORMULATE A SUSTAINABLE TAAL VOLCANO
RESETTLEMENT AND REHABILITATION PROGRAM

Introduced by Senators Tolentino and Dela Rosa

The President. Referred to the Committee on Urban Planning, Housing

and Resettlement

COMMUNICATIONS

The Secretary. Letter from the Office of the President of the Philippines
transmitting to the Senate two (2) original copies of Republic Act No. 11465,
entitled

AN ACT APPROPRIATING FUNDS FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF

THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES FROM JANUARY ONE
TO DECEMBER THIRTY-ONE, TWO THOUSAND AND
TWENTY, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES

which was signed by President Rodrigo Roa Duterte

The President. To the Archives

The Secretary. Letter from the Office of the President of the Philippines
transmitting to the Senate two (2) original copies of Republic Act No. 11467,
entitled

AN ACT AMENDING SECTIONS 109, 141, 142, 143, 144, 147, 152,
263, 263-A, 265, AND 288-A, AND ADDING A NEW
SECTION 290-A TO REPUBLIC ACT NO. 8424, AS
AMENDED, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE NATIONAL
REVENUE CODE OF 1997, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES

which was signed by President Rodrigo Duterte, together with his line-veto
message in accordance with Article 6, Section 27(2) of the Constitution, which
provides that “the President shall have the power to veto any particular items
in an appropriation, revenue or tariff bill.”

The President. To the Archives

COMMITTEE REPORT

The Secretary. Committee Report No. 34 prepared and submitted

jointly by the Committees on Energy; Science and Technology; Ways and
Means; and Finance on S. No. 1296 with Senator Gatchalian as author thereof,
entitled

10
 AN ACT ESTABLISHING THE PHILIPPINE ENERGY RESEARCH AND
POLICY INSTITUTE, DEFINING ITS OBJECTIVES, POWERS,
AND FUNCTIONS, PROVIDING FUNDS THEREFOR, AND
FOR OTHER PURPOSES

recommending its approval in substitution of S. No. 172.

Sponsor: Senator Gatchalian

The President. To the Calendar for Ordinary Business

Majority Leader.

Senator Zubiri. Thank you, Mr. President.

BILL ON SECOND READING

S. No. 1083 – Anti-Terrorism Act of 2019
(Continuation)

Mr. President, with the permission of the Body, I move that we resume

consideration of Senate Bill No. 1083 as reportd out under Committee Report

No. 9.

The President. Is there any objection? [Silence] There being none,

resumption of consideration of Senate Bill No. 1083 is now in order.

Senator Zubiri. This is An Act Amending Certain Provisions of Republic

Act No. 9372, Otherwise Known as An Act to Secure the State and Protect our

People from Terrorism.

May we recognize the sponsor, Senator Lacson; and to interpellate,

Senator Tolentino.

The President. The gentleman from Cavite, chairman of the Committee

on National Defense and Security, Peace, Unification and Reconciliation,

Senator Lacson, is recognized; and to interpellate, another gentleman from

Cavite, Senator Tolentino.

11
 Senator Tolentino. With the permission of the good gentleman, Mr.

President.

Senator Lacson. From the distinguished gentleman from Cavite,

anything that will enhance or improve the proposed measure, of course, it is

most welcome, Mr. President.

Senator Tolentino. And I likewise seek the permission of the good

sponsor if I may be allowed to recite a list of cases that would probably serve as

the fulcrum of my interpellation, Mr. President. These are cases which are

known and which will probably be the center of my interpellation.

Senator Lacson. The gentleman may go ahead, Mr. President.

Senator Tolentino. Thank you, Mr. President.

I would like to place on record the following cases that would probably be

of interest to the good sponsor and this honorable Body relative to the bill

under consideration, the Senate bill amending the Human Security Act, Mr.

President.

There is a case, Alejandre vs. Republic of Cuba. On February 24, 1996,

the Cuban air force shot down two unarmed US civilian aircraft over

international waters, killing all four occupants. Three of them were US

nationals.

In 1997, the families of the three US victims obtained a judgement

against Cuba for approximately US$187.6 million in compensatory and

punitive damages.

12
 My second case, Mr. President, Flatow vs. Islamic Republic of Iran. On

April 9, 1995, a suicide bomber drove a van loaded with explosives into a bus

to the Gaza strip, killing seven Israeli soldiers and one US national, Alisa

Michelle Flatow, a 20-year-old college student spending a semester abroad in

Israel. A terrorist group, the Shaqaqi faction of Palestine Islamic Jihad, which

was funded by the government of Iran, claimed responsibility for the explosion.

On March 11, 1998, the family of Miss Flatow obtained a judgement in the US

court against Iran for US$247 million in compensatory and punitive damages.

My third case, Mr. President, Cicippio vs. Islamic Republic of Iran. Two

US nationals associated with the American University of Beirut and a third US

national who operates two private schools in Beirut were kidnapped in May

1985 in Lebanon by the Hezbollah, a group receiving material support from the

government of Iran. The three men were imprisoned in extreme conditions and

tortured until their release ranging from one and a half years to five years. On

August 27, 1998, Mr. President, the three US nationals, along with their

spouses, obtained a judgment against Iran for US$65 million in compensatory

damages.

My final case, Mr. President, Eisenfeld vs. Islamic Republic of Iran. On

February 25, 1996, two US citizens, Matthew Eisenfeld and Sara Duker were

killed in Israel by a bomb placed on a bus by the militant Palestinian

organization Hamas, which was funded by the government of Iran. On July 11,

2000, the families of the victims obtained a judgment against Iran for US$327

million in compensatory and punitive damages.

13
 Finally, one more case, Mr. President, Abu Khattala, the alleged

conspirator behind the 2014 attack in Benghazi, Libya which resulted in the

death of US Ambassador J. Christopher Stevens, was also held in a court in

the United States which resulted in damages, likewise.

Bakit ko po sinasabi ito, Mr. President? Dito po sa panukalang batas,

with all due respect, napuna ko po na parang nakaligtaan po natin iyong civil

damages. I support this measure. I think this is one of the vital pieces of

legislation that will be produced by the Eighteenth Congress, and I

congratulate the good sponsor, Senator Lacson, for having authored this act

amending the Human Security Act of 2007. Napuna ko lamang, Mr. President,

bakit parang wala po iyong civil damages?

Senator Lacson. The point of the gentleman from Cavite is well-taken

except that, probably, the reason is we are a weak nation. Unlike the United

States, they can implement by seizing assets or properties of these foreign

nationals involved in acts of terrorism. Maybe that is one of the reasons. I am

just thinking aloud, Mr. President, having in mind that we do not have the

capacity or the capability to implement or actually award the damages that are

supposed to be awarded to the victims of acts of terrorism kaya hindi po

naisama siguro. But the point of the gentleman is well-taken. We should really

include even damages or the civil liabilities of not only the terrorists but if it is

State-sponsored, probably even the state or states involved.

Senator Tolentino. Mr. President, recently--and I probably would beg to

14
disagree insofar as the weakness of our legal institution is concerned, recently,

the whole country witnessed the promulgation of the decision relative to the

Maguindanao massacre case. Inilatag na po ng husgado iyong desisyon at

nakita natin, Mr. President, na napakaraming binigyan ng damages. To cite one

example, for victim Napoleon Salaysay, the heirs were awarded civil indemnity

of P100,000; moral damages of P100,000; exemplary damages of P100,000;

and loss of earning capacity of P2,250,004.50.

Mr. President, I would like to place this on record, even our good friend

Rep. Toto Mangudadatu was given the following amount for the death of Bai

Genalyn Mangudadatu: civil indemnity of P100,000; moral damages of

P100,000; exemplary damages of P100,000; and temperate damages of

P100,000.

Will the gentleman agree na we really need to include a provision on

damages insofar as this proposed law is concerned?

Senator Lacson. We may, Mr. President, except that under Article 100.

Civil liability of a person guilty of felony, the judge can actually include in the

decision the award of damages to victims of crimes. So, it may still be applied

on the victims of acts of terrorism.

Senator Tolentino. That is correct, Mr. President. Article 100 of the

Revised Penal Code states that: “Every person criminally liable for a felony is

also civilly liable.”

Senator Lacson. That is correct, Mr. President.

15
 Senator Tolentino. So, it would mean, Mr. President, na automatic na

iyon na kapag nag-file ng criminal case, the civil case is likewise instituted.

Senator Lacson. That is correct, Mr. President.

Senator Tolentino. My only concern with that provision, Mr. President,

is that there is also a complementing provision found in our Rules of Court

that in cases where it involves Article 33 of the Revised Penal Code which deals

with physical injuries--and the term “physical injuries” includes death—a

separate civil action can be filed.

So, again, Mr. President, probably the gentleman would be agreeable,

during the period of amendments, to have this as part of the proposed law.

Senator Lacson. At the proper time, Mr. President, if the gentleman will

introduce the appropriate amendments, then we can consider. Although Article

33 is a separate provision na unless waived, kasama na rin po iyon.

Senator Tolentino. Mr. President, the reason why I have this line of

questioning is that this is very basic that in criminal cases, we have to prove

guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

Senator Lacson. Yes, Mr. President.

Senator Tolentino. In civil cases, all we need is preponderance of

evidence.

If I may ask the good sponsor, if in the event that a crime filed under this

proposed bill is dismissed, can the offended parties—the victims and the

relatives—still file another civil case?

16
 Senator Lacson. As the gentleman clearly stated, the threshold in the

decision-making of the judge are different. For criminal cases, it is guilt beyond

reasonable doubt, while in civil cases, it is only preponderance of evidence. So,

yes, the victims of crimes, even if the criminal aspect of the case has been

dismissed, can also pursue civil damages, Mr. President.

Senator Tolentino. Then again, Mr. President, I would want to have the

exact rationale of this law. Are we trying to protect the State because this is a

criminal case, or are we also attempting to protect the civilians, the victims of

the terroristic acts. So, we have now a venue for civil actions, Mr. President.

Senator Lacson. Both, Mr. President.

Senator Tolentino. Which is more important, Mr. President, the

criminal aspect or the civil aspect?

Senator Lacson. I would say that they are both important. But coming

from the perspective of national security which is included in our national

interest, then the protection of the State should come first before the

protection of individuals, although they are both equally important, Mr.

President.

Senator Tolentino. But, again, Mr. President, relative to the recital of

cases I mentioned a while ago, even in other jurisdictions, it would appear

that the trend right now is to have the offending party, the terrorist

organizations, be held to account civilly. That is the current trend. I forgot to

mention the case of Pan Am Flight 103, the Lockerbie bombing, which

17
happened in Libya, but the plane fell somewhere in Scotland and the award of

damages was given in the United States.

So, would the gentleman agree with me that inasmuch as we are

protecting the State by having a strict anti-terrorism law, we also have to

protect the rights of our residents here in the Philippines?

Senator Lacson. Yes, Mr. President, although we may have to update the

damages because outdated na masyado iyong ating Revised Penal Code. At

napapansin ko na kapag nag-a-award ng damages iyong mga korte, minsan,

isandaang piso; minsan singkuwenta pesos. Kung ganoon kalaki iyong damage

inflicted on victims of terrorism, maybe we can incorporate civil damages by

updating the amount, maybe as an amendment. I am not sure about this, Mr.

President, as an amendment also to Article 100 or Article 33 of the Revised

Penal Code on civil liability.

Please help me out because I am not a lawyer, Mr. President, if that can

be done as an amendment to both articles by way of the passage of a stronger

anti-terrorism act.

Senator Tolentino. Yes, Mr. President. That is why I would like to

deposit the current trend of the award of treble damages. Because I see in

Section 42 of the proposed law, there is a provision which allows the Anti-

Money Laundering Council to freeze and forfeit the funds, banks deposits,

placements, trust accounts, assets and property of whatever kind and nature

belonging to a person suspected or charged of any crime defined and

penalized under the provisions of this Act.

18
 What I am trying to point, Mr. President, is that-- I have been asking

around, what would happen if we freeze the bank accounts of supposed-to-be

terrorist organizations or terrorists? Hindi po ba dapat ay sa halip na i-freeze

ay i-allocate na lamang natin? We should earmark this for the victims under a

civil liability regime na mayroon pong pagkukunan. Because the apprehension

of the good sponsor is that, probably, we might not have enough funds to

award the victims. But here, we have under Section 42, I think, it is paragraph

6, that the Anti-Money Laundering Council is authorized to freeze and forfeit

the funds.

So, is the gentleman amenable to a future amendment that probably

would allocate whatever is frozen to answer for the needs of the victims’

families, the victims of the explosions, not to mention the livelihood, the

scholarship, the education of the children of those who lost their lives?

Senator Lacson. Yes, Mr. President. But we should clarify this because

freezing is different from confiscation. When a final decision is rendered, that

is the time, or if the Anti-Money Laundering Council, after freezing, and the

criminal aspect of the case proceeds, thereby convicting the respondents who

committed the acts of terrorism, then probably it could proceed to that

situation, Mr. President.

Senator Tolentino. That is why, Mr. President, I think I got the

concurrence, if I heard it right…

Senator Lacson. That is correct, Mr. President.

19
 Senator Tolentino. …of the good sponsor that a civil liability suit can

proceed independently of the criminal aspect. The civil liability will just have a

mere preponderance of evidence as the quantum of proof. So, a case might

transpire that mauuna pa ho iyong civil case na matapos kaya puwede nang

mag-award si judge coming from the frozen assets. Puwede kaya iyon, Mr.

President?

Senator Lacson. I would agree with the gentleman from Cavite.

Senator Tolentino. So, what would happen now, Mr. President, is that

we will have an amount that can be granted by the court even prior to the

conclusion of the criminal case, am I correct, Mr. President?

Senator Lacson. After due process, that is correct, Mr. President.

Senator Tolentino. So, perhaps, with the permission of the good

gentleman, in a later date, during the period of amendments, I might propose a

similar amendment.

But going back again, Mr. President, to the venue which, I think, the

good Minority Leader has been trying to extrapolate from the good sponsor, if I

may be permitted to give an example. If a terrorist group would meet—no

offense to the places and the LGU heads in those areas—perhaps in Lamitan,

Basilan, and plan to have a terrorist attack and, thereafter, meet again in

Zamboanga City to finalize the details, meeting perhaps some members of the

Jemaah Islamiyah, and then, probably executing the terrorist attack through a

terroristic act in Pagadian and, thereafter, escaping to the jungles of Sulu.

Where exactly is the venue of the criminal case that should be filed by the

20
prosecutor? Is it in Lamitan? Is it in Zamboanga City? Is it in Pagadian? Or is

it in Sulu?

Senator Lacson. There will be special courts constituted or established

in this regard, Mr. President.

Senator Tolentino. So, special courts will be established, Mr. President.

Senator Lacson. Like the heinous crime courts, Mr. President.

Senator Tolentino. So, again, the general jurisdiction of the regional

trial court would be set aside in favor of the…

Senator Lacson. Special court.

Senator Tolentino. Special courts.

The reason, Mr. President, why I am mentioning this… I would like to

take this opportunity likewise to remember a colleague of the previous

Congress who just died, Rep. Edgar Mendoza. He was a resident of Batangas

and he went to visit some clients in Calamba City, probably, to collect some

legal fees, as far as the newspaper accounts would show, and then his body,

together with his driver and one security aid, was found burned in Tiaong,

Quezon. Reports would now show that the planning was done in Bilibid,

Muntinlupa.

Again, for purposes of venue, Mr. President, I do not know where the

Department of Justice will file the case. Is it in Muntinlupa where the planning

was done? Or is it in Calamba City where Representative Mendoza—God bless

his soul—met the clients? Or will it be in Tiaong, Quezon where his body was

found? Or is it in Batangas where he resides? I am saying this because, Mr.

21
President, in criminal cases, venue is jurisdictional. If a court does not have

jurisdiction, the case can be dismissed.

Senator Lacson. Under the principle of a continuing crime, Mr.

President, any of the special courts in those areas that the gentleman

mentioned may acquire jurisdiction.

Senator Tolentino. I agree, Mr. President, and this buttresses the claim

of the good sponsor that this law can have an extraterritorial effect and that is,

probably, what I will try to figure out. If we are in agreement that the case can

be filed anywhere where the essential ingredients of the crime were committed,

then, probably, Mr. President, there is a need, with due respect, to reevaluate

and to revisit the plan to have a special court. Because in some instances, in

the case I mentioned, some witnesses would probably come out in Zamboanga

City, some evidence would be in Zamboanga City, and it is easier to get the

witnesses from Zamboanga City rather than in Basilan and Sulu. So, probably,

if the gentleman would agree, there is a need to revisit that provision of having

a special court. Because there are probably some nuances and details that can

be gotten from the place where the essential ingredient of the terroristic act

was hatched, Mr. President.

Senator Lacson. Special courts are also jurisdictional, Mr. President,

because the Supreme Court may create special courts in different areas. So,

jurisdiction can also apply in case of special courts.

Senator Tolentino. So, Mr. President, would the good sponsor agree

that perhaps we can place in one of the provisions here that this terroristic act

22
or terrorist act can be declared as a transitory crime? Because, I have glanced

over several laws passed by the recent congresses relative to this, and if given a

chance by the good sponsor, I can cite one, Mr. President.

Senator Lacson. Yes, please, Mr. President.

Senator Tolentino. There was a law passed in 1995, Republic Act No.

8042, the “Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995.” It states that

a criminal action arising from illegal recruitment shall be filed not only in the

Regional Trial Court of the province or city where the offense was committed,

but it can also be filed where the offended party actually resides at the time of

the commission of the offense. Verily, Mr. President, the reason for this is

probably for the convenience of the offended party to file the case in her or his

place of residence, lalong-lalo na kung na-illegal recruitment iyong ating

kababayang OFW. So, dito po sa Anti-Terrorism Law, puwede rin po kaya

siguro, Mr. President, if the good sponsor will agree, na kung saan mas marami

iyong ebidensiya, mas madaling kumuha ng testigo, doon na lamang i-file?

Senator Lacson. There are factors to be considered, like the security of

witnesses, because some witnesses maybe under threat in areas where they

are appearing. So, that is probably one of the reasons why special courts are

necessary to be created for purposes of this offense--for violation of the Anti-

Terrorism Act.

It is so stated in Section 46 of the proposed measure, Mr. President.

“TRIAL OF PERSONS CHARGED UNDER THIS ACT. — ANY PERSON

CHARGED FOR THE COMMISSION OF TERRORIST ACTS AND THE

23
PREPARATORY ACTS PUNISHED UNDER THIS ACT SHALL BE TRIED IN

SPECIAL COURTS CREATED FOR THIS PURPOSE. IN THIS REGARD, THE

SUPREME COURT SHALL DESIGNATE CERTAIN BRANCHES OF THE

REGIONAL TRIAL COURTS AS ANTI-TERROR COURTS WHOSE

JURISDICTION IS EXCLUSIVELY LIMITED TO TRY VIOLATIONS OF THE

PROVISIONS OF THIS ACT.”

Senator Tolentino. I agree, Mr. President, that we have to have a

functioning judicial body even in places where terrorist plots are being hatched.

Pero, Mr. President, we look at our recent experience. The Maguindanao

massacre case took how many years to be completed? Lahat po ng testigo ay

dinala sa Bicutan, doon na po nag-hearing. We created a special court; all the

lawyers will go to that court; and the accused were all imprisoned in that area.

But, again, even with that special system, it took several years for that case to

be concluded, Mr. President.

Would the gentleman agree that even if we have special courts, if the

available witnesses and evidence would be coming from far-flung areas, it

would still be hard for a competent judge to conclude the case, more so with

several death threats, and what have you, Mr. President?

Senator Lacson. There is a second paragraph under Section 46, Mr.

President. It states: “Persons charged under the provisions of this Act shall be

allowed to remotely appear and provide testimonies through the use of

videoconferencing and such other technologies now known or may hereafter be

known to science as approved by the Supreme Court.”

24
 So, that will take care of the concern of the gentleman, Mr. President.

Senator Tolentino. I thank the good sponsor for that clarification. But

then again, probably in the period of amendments, I would hasten to include

the transitory nature of a terroristic act similar again to a very clear example—

Batas Pambansa Blg. 22.

In Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, the offended party has several options where

to file it. We can file it where the check was drawn; we can file it where the

check was issued; we can file it where the check was delivered; and, we can file

it where the check was dishonored. So, if we issue a check in Cavite City, that

can be filed in Cavite City; if it bounced in Batangas, we can file again a case in

Batangas.

And the same is the nature of an act of terrorism because I agree with

the good sponsor that terrorism, which is, the ability to project and instill fear

and terror, is not just located to a certain locality. It can be through the use of

social media which can be done in a split second nationwide. I think the

effects of a terroristic act will not just be felt in the place where the bombing

was committed. It will even be felt in far-flung areas or islands of this country.

Senator Lacson. At the proper time, during the period of amendments,

once the distinguished gentleman proposes these amendments, then we will

consider, Mr. President.

Senator Tolentino. Again, if the good sponsor will agree with me that

the purpose of terrorism is to instill fear and make a political and ideological

statement.

25
 Having said that, Mr. President, I now go to the aspect of

extraterritoriality principle.

Alam po natin na dito talaga tayo mahihirapan. And this probably would

reach the Supreme Court at some point in time because the proposed law

would acknowledge even if a terroristic act was initiated abroad, in or outside

of the Philippines, regardless of its stage of execution, the person can be held

liable.

Senator Lacson. Yes, Mr. President. There is one principle called aut

dedere aut judicare. It is an obligation to extradite or prosecute. It is contained

in the United Nations Security Council Resolution No. 1373 in 2001,

paragraphs (2-E) and (3-D); United Nations Security Council Resolution No.

1456 in 2003, paragraph (3); and United Nations Security Council Resolution

No. 1566 in 2004, paragraph (2).

The principle expresses the common objective of states in fighting serious

forms of crimes, terrorism included. If this is challenged before the Supreme

Court, we have enough jurisprudence, even resolutions issued by the United

Nations, to support our contention that the principle of territoriality can apply.

Senator Tolentino. So, that would mean, Mr. President, let us say, if I

change now my example, instead of hatching the plot in Lamitan, Basilan, it

was hatched in Singapore. Even if the planning stage was done in Singapore,

the perpetrators, the conspirators can be held liable under this law, am I

correct, Mr. President?

Senator Lacson. That is correct, Mr. President.

26
 Senator Tolentino. Mr. President, to further aid this august Chamber

in navigating this extraterritoriality precept which was well explained by the

good sponsor, I would like to place on record a law likewise passed by this

Congress, although in a different manner, which probably would help the good

gentleman and the committee revise, refine, retune or retool the contents of the

proposed bill, it is Republic Act No. 9262. Republic Act No. 9262 is called the

“Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004.”

Mr. President, although this is off-tangent to the bill under

consideration, but given the concurrence of the good sponsor that a terroristic

act is designed to instill fear, I would propose in future amendments that we

include in the definition of “terrorist acts” psychological violence, if the good

gentleman will agree. Because, if I may be given a chance to explain this,

under that Republic Act No. 9262, there is a portion relative to psychological

violence.

There is a case—I have it with me—dated January 11, 2018. It is “AAA”

because that is how they captioned this—“AAA, Petitioner vs. BBB,

Respondent”, G.R. No. 212448, dated January 11, 2018. The ponente is

Justice Tijam.

Ito po iyong nangyari: There was a couple residing in Pasig and the

husband, apparently, works as an OFW in Singapore. The husband was found

by the wife as having committed an act of adultery, having a relationship with a

certain Singaporean woman named Lisel Mok and produced photographs and

other acts in violation of the marriage between husband and wife. Because of

27
this, Mr. President, the wife sued the husband. The husband said, “No, the

court cannot have jurisdiction over me because I am in Singapore.” The court

said—and this probably might be related to the advocacy of my kababayan

from Cavite—that psychological violence is the means employed by the

perpetrator while mental anguish or emotional anguish is the effect caused to

or damage sustained by the affected party; therefore, it is an element of the

crime and the Pasig Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction.

Having said that, Mr. President, are we in agreement that acts of terror

are forms of psychological violence? Because even if we are not part of the area

that was bombed, even if we are not a family member of that person whose

limbs were cut or who was beheaded, the psychological violence instilled in

society is more than enough to produce fear among the members of the

populace.

Therefore, Mr. President, if we apply this, and if the good gentleman is

willing to have psychological violence as part of the terroristic acts, then

probably we can have extraterritoriality.

If I may get response from the good sponsor? Mr. President.

Senator Lacson. Mr. President, I may have a problem with that because

ang terrorist act should be direct, more at the public at large, and doon sa

State. Pero iyong na-cite na ng gentleman example masyadong personal na

yata. So, baka ma-overextend iyong coverage ng Anti-Terrorist Act, doon pa

tayo ma-strike down sa Supreme Court kung mayroong magku-question.

28
 Senator Tolentino. Hindi po, Mr. President. Ang gusto ko lamang

palabasin doon is that the form of psychological violence, even if, in my

example, it just involved the wife, is probably tantamount to eliciting fear.

If I may add, Mr. President, as a personal experience, when I was a

mayor, Mr. President, that was during the height of Wakaoji case—bata pa po

ako noon, bata pa rin si General Gualberto, major ng CIS—iyong mga

kidnappers ay naglabas lamang po ng litrato na putol na ang kamay ni Mr.

Wakaoji, natakot na ang lahat-- Natakot na ang Crame, natakot na iyong

pinagtatrabahuhan niya sa Tokyo--at ang akala po ay talagang pinutulan na ng

daliri si Mr. Wakaoji pero tinupi lamang pala para piktyuran.

Again, Mr. President, violence need not be physical. It can be

psychological. That is why I am asking, for purposes of enhancing the

extraterritoriality concept here is that if we include psychological violence,

perhaps, there is a chance that we can surmount any constitutional challenge

knowing that we already have a Supreme Court decision on this.

Senator Lacson. May I invite the gentleman’s attention to Section 2

under the proposed measure, Declaration of Policy, Mr. President. I think it is

enough that we are stating here: “It is declared a policy of the State to protect

life, liberty, and property from acts of terrorism, to condemn terrorism as

inimical and dangerous to the national security of the country and to the

welfare of the people, and to make terrorism a crime against the Filipino

people, against humanity, and against the law of nations.” That is exactly the

29
reason why we are applying the principle of territoriality because it is a crime

against humanity.

Kung isasama po natin pati iyong psychological effect on a private person

or on an individual, baka masyado nang ma-extend iyong coverage nitong ating

proposed measure, Mr. President.

Senator Tolentino. I agree, Mr. President. Hindi po sa private

individual, for instance, to make another…

Senator Lacson. Psychological violence may only be applied on

individuals, Mr. President. It may not be applied on a…Medyo mahirap yatang

i-interpret along that line.

Senator Tolentino. Again, if I may deviate that, Mr. President. For

example, if a video is shown to the family members of the kidnapped victim

wherein the kidnapped victim is about to be beheaded and asking for the help

of the government, and even the President, not just the family, to agree to the

demands of the terrorists, would that be an act that would have an effect not

just on the family members but even society at large?

Senator Lacson. We have to refer back to the intent and purpose of the

commission of that particular act, Mr. President. Naka-define naman po iyan

under Section 4. Kung nasa labas na ng definition at ang effect is on an

individual or a group of individuals na wala naman itong bearing on the acts as

enumerated, specifically iyong intent and purpose, baka po mahirapan tayong i-

justify.

30
 Senator Tolentino. Again, Mr. President, with due respect, I ask again

the question: Are we protecting, primarily, the State, or are we protecting the

people, or are we protecting both?

Senator Lacson. The answer is both, Mr. President. Ang nakalagay,

“The purpose of such act by its nature and context, must be committed to, (1)

intimidate, put in fear, force or induce the government.” Everything depends on

the circumstances bound by the intent and purpose of such act. Kung

papasok naman po roon sa category ng mine-mention dito sa proposed

measure, then, probably… it depends on the appreciation of evidence

pertaining to the intent of the act as committed.

Nothing is absolute naman dito, Mr. President. We have to prove the

intent of the commission of such act.

Senator Tolentino. Then again, Mr. President, I leave that to the

plenary to decide because my thinking here—that is why I recited a litany of

cases when I first had the Floor—was that to strengthen our civil liability

regime insofar as terrorism is concerned.

Senator Lacson. Iyong example po ng gentleman, Mr. President, ay

puwedeng pumasok under terrorist acts, puwede ring hindi. Depende nga po

kung ano iyong masasaklaw roon sa kaniyang intent—in accordance with the

intent or purpose of the commission of the act.

Senator Tolentino. One last point, Mr. President, before I yield the floor,

and it has something to do with how the court here, be it a special court or the

general regional trial court, would acquire jurisdiction over the person of an

31
offender who is outside the territory of the Philippines. Because we all know

that jurisdiction over a person would only happen in two instances: upon his

arrest or apprehension, with or without a warrant of arrest; and the voluntary

submission or appearance to the jurisdiction of the court. Kung nasa labas po

siya ng Pilipinas, halimbawa po nasa Indonesia, papaano po tayo magkakaroon

ng jurisdiction over that person in this proposed bill?

Senator Lacson. Wala po. Kapag pumunta siya rito, mamalasin siya,

pero kung nasa Indonesia siya, we cannot acquire jurisdiction. That is so

stated in the bill, Mr. President. For example, he hatched the plan to commit

terrorist acts in the Philippines, but he is in Indonesia. Until and unless he

lands or he comes to the Philippines, then we cannot acquire jurisdiction.

Senator Tolentino. So, then again, Mr. President, it opens the wide

array of possibilities for a civil action to have a greater long arm reach.

Senator Lacson. Kapag civil action, Mr. President, we can. Although it

may be more difficult to prove, but we can.

Senator Tolentino. Yes, Mr. President. Mr. President, we are all in

agreement-- and as I validated this with General Bato—that seldom do we meet

a stand-alone terrorist. He must be a member of an organization, that

organization is well-funded, and that well-funded organization must be based

somewhere in a part of this planet where they are doing business and where

they have corporate residence perhaps.

So, is it possible for the gentleman to agree to an amendment that would

strengthen the civil liability regime that will enable Philippine authorities, or

32
even the offended party, to file a case against a foreign national, a foreign

group, or a foreign corporation, based somewhere and secure a civil damages

award? Because we all know, Mr. President, even Osama bin Laden has a

recruitment agency before, functioning in the Philippines and functioning in

the Middle East. And, for the record, several courts have already awarded

damages to the victims of the 911. So, is it possible that we also pursue that

line of judicial legal legislative trend of exerting a long arm outreach to enable

us to acquire jurisdiction over a foreign national, not in a criminal process but

in a civil process?

Senator Lacson. As far as civil liability, yes, Mr. President.

Senator Tolentino. So, ang ibig sabihin, baka mas madali pa dahil a

mere preponderance of evidence po tayo. And if we can identify their properties

abroad, their assets abroad…

Senator Lacson. No, if we can identify their properties or assets here, we

can run after these people civilly, in accordance with the provision that we

discussed earlier, Mr. President.

Senator Tolentino. Because, Mr. President, we have under the Rules of

Court, Rule 14, “Section 15. Extraterritorial service. — When the defendant

does not reside and is not found in the Philippines, and the action affects the

personal status of the plaintiff or relates to or the subject of which is, property

in within the Philippines, in which the defendant has or claims a lien or

interest, actual or contingent xxx,” the court can summon the defendant either

33
by publication in a newspaper of general circulation or by sending a copy of the

summons to the last known address of the defendant.

Senator Lacson. Or, through the Regional Trial Court having

jurisdiction.

Senator Tolentino. Yes, Mr. President. So, what I am saying, and the

good sponsor would probably…

Senator Lacson. I have experienced that, Mr. President, when Blanquita

Pelaez sued me in the United States for some supply contract that I did not

implement because it was onerous and grossly disadvantageous to the

Philippine National Police. She sued me. And I was invoking that the service of

summons should be coursed through a regional trial court here which will,

instead, issue the summons to me. But it did not happen Mr. President.

Senator Tolentino. One last point, Mr. President—I think the records

would show that I already mentioned this during the previous session.

Nakalulungkot po, Mr. President—and probably this is also a reason for the

non-service of summons, but no offense—there is a Hague Service Convention

which was entered into by 120 nations in November 1965, hindi po pumirma

ang Pilipinas. Iyong Hague Service Convention, mayroon po roong transnational

service of process—puwede tayong magpadala ng summons sa attorney

general ng Amerika; tatanggapin nila; sila na ang magde-deliver. Iyon namang

Japan, puwedeng magpadala sa atin. Ganoon po ang ginagawa ng Japan

ngayon—nagpapadala na lamang sila ng summons para mahuli iyong dating

34
president ng Nissan. Nakakalungkot po, we are not a member of that Hague

Service Convention.

I think the good gentleman will personally support this representation in

this endeavor that, perhaps, the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations,

through the Department of Foreign Affairs, can have this untangled. Why are

we not a member of that very important Hague Service Convention when

matters such as civil, commercial, and even acts of terrorism are now of a

global nature?

Ayaw ko na pong pahabain ito, Mr. President, dahil pangako ko po kay

Senator Lacson that I will be brief. But again, having said all of those things,

there is another way—civil regime—that can strengthen this law. There are

other existing measures that can be added up to buttress the provisions of this

proposed bill. And I truly support the good sponsor on this measure. I have

mentioned and I will repeat it again, this is one of the more vital legislative

measures that will be passed by this Eighteenth Congress, Mr. President.

Mr. President, I thank the good sponsor and I yield the Floor.

Senator Lacson. Thank you, Mr. President.

I appreciate the input of the good gentleman from Cavite.

SUSPENSION OF SESSION

The President. The session is suspended for one minute if there is no

objection. [There was none]

It was 4:07 p.m.

RESUMPTION OF SESSION

35
 At 4:13 p.m., the session was resumed.

The President. The session is resumed.

Senator Zubiri. Thank you, Mr. President.

Mr. President, to allow our colleagues to interpellate further on Senate

Bill No. 1083 tomorrow, I move that we suspend consideration of the same.

The President. Is there any objection? [Silence] There being none, the

motion is approved.

Senator Zubiri. Before we take up the second item on the Agenda, Mr.

President, just some housekeeping measures.

MOTION OF SENATOR ZUBIRI

(Transfer of Referral of S. No. 147 from the Committee on Basic Education, Arts
and Culture to the Committee on Agriculture, Food and Agrarian Reform as the
Primary Committee)

With the consent of the Body, Mr. President, after consulting with the

chairpersons of the affected committees, I move that we transfer the referral of

Senate Bill No. 147, Establishment of Instructional Gardens in All Elementary

and Secondary Schools, from the Committee on Basic Education, Arts and

Culture to the Committee on Agriculture, Food and Agrarian Reform as the

primary committee.

The Committee on Basic Education, Arts and Culture shall remain as the

secondary committee. It has the consent of Senator Gatchalian.

The President. Is there any objection? [Silence] There being none, the

motion is approved.

SPECIAL ORDER

36
 Senator Zubiri. Mr. President, with the permission of the Body, I move

that we transfer from the Calendar for Ordinary Business to the Calendar for

Special Orders Committee Report No. 34 on Senate Bill No. 1296, entitled

AN ACT ESTABLISHING THE PHILIPPINE ENERGY RESEARCH

AND POLICY INSTITUTE, DEFINING ITS OBJECTIVES,
POWERS, AND FUNCTIONS, PROVIDING FUNDS
THEREFOR, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES

The President. Is there any objection? [Silence] There being none, the

motion is approved.

BILL ON SECOND READING

S. No. 1296—Philippine Energy Research and Policy Institute Act

Senator Zubiri. Mr. President, I move that we consider Senate Bill No.

1296 as reported out under Committee Report No. 34.

The President. Is there any objection? [Silence] There being none, the

motion is approved.

Consideration of Senate Bill No. 1296 is now in order. With the

permission of the Body, the Secretary will read only the title of the bill without

prejudice to inserting in the Record the whole text thereof.

The Secretary. Senate Bill No. 1296, entitled

AN ACT ESTABLISHING THE PHILIPPINE ENERGY RESEARCH

AND POLICY INSTITUTE, DEFINING ITS OBJECTIVES,
POWERS AND FUNCTIONS, PROVIDING FUNDS THEREFOR,
AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES
________________________________________________________________________

The following is the whole text of the bill:

37
 Senate Bill No. 1296

[Insert]

________________________________________________________________________

The President. The Majority Leader is recognized.

Senator Zubiri. Mr. President, I ask that we recognize the sponsor, the

distinguished chairman of the Committee on Energy, Sen. Win Gatchalian.

The President. Sen. Win Gatchalian, chairman of the Committee on

Energy, is recognized to sponsor the measure.

SPONSORSHIP SPEECH OF SENATOR GATCHALIAN

Senator Gatchalian. Thank you, Mr. President.

Mr. President, distinguished colleagues, a pleasant afternoon to all.

During the time I served as the chairman of the Senate Energy

Committee of the Seventeenth Congress, I had the privilege of studying the best

case practices of well-performing energy sectors in developed countries across

the world. One element they had in common was the presence of academe-

based energy institute.

Energy is one of the most research-intensive fields within the public

policy arena, characterized by rapidly evolving technologies which redefine the

parameters of the game at a blistering pace. Institutes such as the Stanford

Precourt Institute for Energy of Stanford University, the Solar Energy Research

Institute of Singapore at the National University of Singapore, and the Energy

Institute at Haas Berkeley in the University of California, Berkeley engage in

38
research and development, training and education, and policy development.

These independent, multidisciplinary, and collaborative institutions serve as

the backbone for innovation and progress in the energy sectors of their host

countries. These institutes play essential roles in the field of energy by

contributing to knowledge creation and industry development, disseminating

policy recommendations backed by rigorous empirical evidence, and training

the students of today to become the key decision makers of tomorrow.

Unfortunately, no such institute exists in the Philippines at the present.

Hence, Mr. President, the bill I am sponsoring today—Senate Bill No. 1296

under Committee Report No. 34—seeks to establish the Philippine Energy

Research and Policy Institute (PERPI). PERPI will perform critical research and

policy development, and capacity building work to steer the Philippine energy

sector towards greater energy security, equity, and sustainability. We envision

PERPI to stand at the forefront of Philippine energy research and policy

development, as an institution solely devoted to these pursuits.

To be established at the country’s national university, the University of

the Philippines, PERPI will serve as an independent body which will undertake

multidisciplinary research, explore and develop cutting-edge technologies, and

provide autonomous and objective policy output for the benefit of private and

public energy players alike. PERPI will be a think-tank, a laboratory, an

innovation incubator, and a sparring partner of the government energy policy

apparatus, all in one. As a publicly-funded institute, PERPI will be charged

with ensuring that the results of its energy research and policy development

39
activities can be utilized to craft energy sector reforms for the benefit of the

national economy and the lives of the Filipino people.

To achieve the worthy motivations for its establishment, PERPI will

exercise the following functions:

1. Formulate and conduct research and development on energy,

energy technology, public policy issues in energy markets, and

other pressing issues and problems all backed by rigorous

empirical evidence;

2. Establish linkages with government agencies, other universities,

and private and public institutions on existing energy research and

policy studies;

3. Establish research and policy development programs and capacity

building trainings on energy;

4. Enhance the masters and doctoral pool of researchers and faculty

in the field of energy;

5. Establish local and foreign linkages in energy research and policy

development; and

6. Serve as the repository of all energy-related researches, studies,

and data to be generated by the institute and other academic,

public, and private groups, organizations, and institutions.

Mr. President, the functions of the Institute will be carried out by an

illustrious team of seasoned academicians and energy sector professionals

under the direction of a full-time executive director who will be a recognized

40
expert in energy policy and research development. Further guidance will be

given by the executive board composed primarily of representatives from the

academe and the private sector, from the fields of engineering, law, science,

statistics, economics, and public health. To fund PERPI’s research, a special

account for energy research shall be established which will recognize and

accept grants, contributions, and donations for such purpose, while PERPI’s

operations shall be initially funded through a budget of one hundred million

pesos.

Mr. President, it is my sincere belief that the development of a stable,

affordable, and sustainable energy supply will be critical to meeting the

country’s ambitious long-term socioeconomic goals. The research output of the

Philippine Energy Research and Policy Institute, in turn, will be essential to

turning this vision into a reality.

With this in mind, Mr. President, distinguished peers, I urge you to

support the passage of this legislation.

Thank you, Mr. President. Maraming salamat po.

The President. The Majority Leader is recognized.

Senator Zubiri. Mr. President, I ask that we recognize Senator Tolentino.

The President. Senator Tolentino is recognized.

MANIFESTATION OF SENATOR TOLENTINO

Senator Tolentino. Mr. President, I would like to cast my support to

this very much needed piece of legislation for our country to achieve energy

security and self-sufficiency which is a key item in the Philippine Development

41
Plan of 2017 to 2022. This is very important because energy consumption

drives economic growth and is a key input for socioeconomic development. In

particular, access to clean energy is considered vital for modern living and

necessary element for all production sectors to function, even during crises and

calamities.

Our country’s self-sufficiency program, however, remains to be a

challenge as we continue to rely heavily on fossil fuels such as natural gas and

coal and imported energy.

As a result, Philippine electricity prices are the highest in Southeast Asia

at roughly P0.20 per kilowatt or P10 per kilowatt. There is also much more to

be done in our renewable energy sector which has been officially

institutionalized only in 2008 with the passage of Republic Act No. 9513 or the

Renewable Energy Act.

However, the root of the matter is the scarcity of energy research and

policy programs in the country, especially that we are now in the era of rapidly

growing scientific and technological discoveries. Resolving our country’s

energy situation will not just require a single solution, but a multidisciplinary

approach that will cut across energy regulations and fiscal constraints.

With the passage of this bill, this humble representation believes that not

only the future of energy but the energy sector of the present will be further

empowered as we continue to strive towards self-sufficiency for the good of the

whole country.

I congratulate the good sponsor, Sen. Win Gatchalian.

42
 The President. The Majority Leader is recognized.

Senator Zubiri. Thank you, Mr. President.

SUSPENSION OF CONSIDERATION OF S. NO. 1296

Mr. President, with that, I move that we suspend consideration of Senate

Bill No. 1296.

The President. Is there any objection? [Silence] There being none, the
motion is approved.

ADJOURNMENT OF SESSION

Senator Zubiri. We have no other matters to take up today, Mr.

President, I move that we adjourn the session until three o'clock in the
afternoon, Tuesday, January 28, 2020.

The President. Is there any objection? [Silence] There being none, the
session is adjourned until three o'clock in the afternoon of Tuesday, January
28, 2020.

It was 4:24 p.m.

43
 ANNEX "6"

TUESDAY, JANUARY 28, 2020

OPENING OF THE SESSION

At 3:00 p.m., the Senate President, Hon. Vicente C. Sotto III, called the
session to order.

The President. The 47th session of the Senate in the First Regular
Session of the Eighteenth Congress is hereby called to order.

Let us all stand for a minute of silent prayer.

Everybody rose for a minute of silent prayer.

ROLL CALL

The Secretary will please call the roll.

The Secretary, reading:

Senator Sonny Angara……………………………………… Present*

Senator Maria Lourdes Nancy S. Binay....................... Present
Senator Pia S. Cayetano ............................................. Present
Senator Leila M. de Lima..…………………………………. **
Senator Ronald "Bato" M. dela Rosa........................... Present
Senator Franklin M. Drilon………………………….…….. Present
Senator Win Gatchalian……………………………………. Present
Senator Christopher Lawrence T. Go.......................... Present
Senator Richard J. Gordon………………………………… Present
Senator Risa Hontiveros……………………………………. Present
Senator Panfilo M. Lacson…………………………………. Present
Senator Manuel "Lito" M. Lapid................................... Present
Senator Imee R. Marcos…………………........................ Present*
Senator Emmanuel “Manny” D. Pacquiao……………… Present
Senator Francis “Kiko” Pangilinan..…………………….. Present
Senator Aquilino "Koko" Pimentel III ....…………….….. Present*
Senator Grace Poe…..................................................
Senator Ralph G. Recto.............................................. Present*
Senator Ramon Bong Revilla Jr…………………………. Present
Senator Francis "Tol" N. Tolentino………………………. Present
Senator Joel Villanueva…………………………………….. Present*
Senator Cynthia A. Villar............................................. Present
Senator Juan Miguel F. Zubiri ……………………………. Present
The President………………………………………………….. Present
--------------------------
* Arrived after the roll call
** Under detention

1
 The President. With 17 senators present, the Chair declares the

presence of a quorum.

The Majority Leader is recognized.

THE JOURNAL

Senator Zubiri. Mr. President, I move that we dispense with the reading

of the Journal of the 46th session, Monday, January 27, 2020, and consider it

approved.

The President. Is there any objection? [Silence] There being none, the

motion is approved.

ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF GUESTS

Senator Zubiri. Mr. President, we have several guests in the gallery

today.

We have Mayor Arth Bryan Celeste from the City of Alaminos,

Pangasinan.

We also have Gov. Santiago B. Cane Jr. from Agusan del Sur, together

with his mayors: Mayor Phoebe L. Corvera of San Luis, Mayor Leonida P.

Manpatilan of Esperanza, Mayor Sylvia Elorde of Bunawan, Mayor Myrna S.

Mondejar of Veruela, Mayor Lorife Magadan Otaza of Loreto, Mayor Symond

Caguiat of Santa Josefa, and Mayor Frederick Mark Mellana of Prosperidad.

These are my neigbors, Mr. President; we share the same boundary with this

beautiful Province of Agusan del Sur.

The President. We welcome all our friends from Agusan del Sur to the

Senate this afternoon. Thank you for the visit.

2
 Senator Zubiri. Mr. President, I move that we proceed to the Reference

of Business.

The President. Is there any objection? [Silence] There being none, the

motion is approved.

The Secretary will read the Reference of Business.

REFERENCE OF BUSINESS

BILLS ON FIRST READING

The Secretary. Senate Bill No. 1297, entitled

AN ACT ESTABLISHING A DIAGNOSTIC LABORATORY FOR

LIVESTOCK-RELATED DISEASES IN EVERY PROVINCE
WHERE THE LIVESTOCK INDUSTRY IS A MAJOR ECONOMIC
ACTIVITY, APPROPRIATING FUNDS THEREFOR AND FOR
OTHER PURPOSES

Introduced by Senator Lapid

The President. Referred to the Committees on Agriculture, Food and

Agrarian Reform; and Finance

The Secretary. Senate Bill No. 1298, entitled

AN ACT PROVIDING FOR THE DESIGNATION OF COMMUNITY

SHELTERS IN TIMES OF NATURAL DISASTERS, CALAMITIES
AND OTHER EMERGENCIES

Introduced by Senator Lapid

The President. Referred to the Committees on Urban Planning, Housing

and Resettlement; and Local Government

The Secretary. Senate Bill No. 1299, entitled

AN ACT EXEMPTING QUALIFIED OVERSEAS FILIPINO WORKERS

(OFWS) FROM THE COVERAGE OF REPUBLIC ACT NO.
10912, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE CONTINUING
PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT ACT OF 2016

Introduced by Senator Lapid

3
 The President. Referred to the Committee on Civil Service, Government
Reorganization and Professional Regulation

RESOLUTIONS

The Secretary. Proposed Senate Resolution No. 298, entitled

RESOLUTION DIRECTING THE APPROPRIATE SENATE

COMMITTEES TO CONDUCT AN INQUIRY ON THE TOTAL
DAMAGE OF THE TAAL VOLCANO ERUPTION IN ORDER TO
ASSESS THE TOTAL FINANCIAL REQUIREMENTS FOR THE
AID, RELIEF, RESETTLEMENT, REHABILITATION,
RECONSTRUCTION, AND LIVELIHOOD SUPPORT TO
COMMUNITIES ADVERSELY AFFECTED BY THE NATURAL
CATASTROPHE

Introduced by Senator Angara

The President. Referred to the Committees on National Defense and

Security, Peace, Unification and Reconciliation; and Finance

The Secretary. Proposed Senate Resolution No. 299, entitled

RESOLUTION EXPRESSING THE SENSE OF THE SENATE THAT

THE VALIDITY AND IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ENHANCED
DEFENSE COOPERATION AGREEMENT (EDCA) BETWEEN
THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES AND THE UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA BE URGENTLY REVIEWED

Introduced by Senator Marcos

The President. Referred to the Committee on Rules

The Secretary. Proposed Senate Resolution No. 300, entitled

RESOLUTION URGING THE APPROPRIATE SENATE COMMITTEE

TO CONDUCT AN INQUIRY, IN AID OF LEGISLATION, INTO
THE CONTINUED INCAPACITY OF THE SUGAR
REGULATORY AND ADMINISTRATION (SRA) IN
STRENGTHENING THE SUGAR INDUSTRY

Introduced by Senator Marcos

The President. Referred to the Committee on Agriculture, Food and

Agrarian Reform

4
 ADDITIONAL REFERENCE OF BUSINESS

RESOLUTION

The Secretary. Proposed Senate Resolution No. 301, entitled

RESOLUTION DIRECTING THE APPROPRIATE SENATE

COMMITTEES TO CONDUCT AN INQUIRY ON THE
PREPAREDNESS OF THE CONCERNED GOVERNMENT
AGENCIES, PARTICULARLY THE DEPARTMENT OF
HEALTH (DOH), IN THE EVENT THAT THE NOVEL
CORONAVIRUS (2019-nCoV) SPREAD IN THE PHILIPPINES
AND BECOME AN EPIDEMIC, WITH THE END IN VIEW OF
UPDATING AND INFORMING THE SENATE OF THE
PHILIPPINES AND THE GENERAL PUBLIC

Introduced by Senator Zubiri

The President. Referred to the Committee on Health and Demography

The Majority Leader is recognized.

Senator Zubiri. Thank you, Mr. President.

SUSPENSION OF SESSION

Mr. President, I move that we suspend the session for one minute to
confer with the interpellators of the measure.

The President. Is there any objection? [Silence] There being none, the
session is suspended for one minute.

It was 3:06 p.m.

RESUMPTION OF SESSION

At 3:06 p.m. the session was resumed.

The President. The session is resumed.

ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF GUESTS

5
 Senator Zubiri. Mr. President, before we tackle the official business of

the day, we would like to recognize the presence of the students from the

Manila Adventist College School of Law and Jurisprudence.

The President. Welcome to the Senate.

BILL ON SECOND READING

S. No. 1083 — Anti-Terrorism Act of 2019
(Continuation)

Senator Zubiri. Mr. President, I move that we resume consideration of

Senate Bill No. 1083 as reported out under Committee Report No. 9.

The President. Is there any objection? [Silence] There being none,

resumption of consideration of Senate Bill No. 1083 is now in order.

Senator Zubiri. Mr. President, the parliamentary status of this measure

is that we are in the period of interpellaions. May I ask that we recognize the

sponsor of the measure, Sen. Panfilo M. Lacson, and to interpellate, the

distinguished former Senate President, Sen. Aquilino “Koko” Pimentel III.

The President. The gentleman from Cavite and the gentleman from

Mindanao are recognized, Sen. Panfilo M. Lacson and Sen. Aquilino “Koko”

Pimentel III.

Senator Pimentel. Thank you, Mr. President. With the permission of the

honorable sponsor, this representation would just like to ask some clarificatory

questions about the pending measure.

Senator Lacson. On this sixth day of interpellation, Mr. President, still

willing and able.

6
 Senator Pimentel. Well, important measures, Mr. President, are really

subjected to intensive and extensive examination. So, karangalan ng isang

panukala na tawagin siyang “walang kamatayang panukala” kasi talagang

importante po ito. [Laughter]

Mr. President, I noticed that this is an act to amend an existing law, the

Human Security Act. And yet, I noticed that we amended the title from—

because if this measure becomes law it will now no longer be the Human

Security Act, it will now be the Anti-Terrorism Act. And then we also amended

the entire definition. Before, it was called terrorism in the existing law. Now, we

call this terrorist acts but the substance will be overhauled. Although the

measure is entitled as an amendment, practically, we are really overhauling the

Human Security Act, with the effect of actually repealing the Human Security

Act and enacting an entirely new law which we will now call the Anti-Terrorism

Act.

Senator Lacson. The gentleman is correct in his observation that we are

actually overhauling and effectively repealing the Human Security Act, Mr.

President. As a matter of fact, there is a suggestion—although this will be

brought up during the period of amendments—that we will just insert the

existing provisions under the Human Security Act and rename the bill, once it

is enacted into law, as the Anti-Terrorism Act of 2020.

Senator Pimentel. So, what will happen during the period of

amendments, Mr. President? We will also overhaul this measure?

7
 Senator Lacson. That is correct, Mr. President. But we will insert the

existing provisions under RA 9732. So, as suggested by the distinguished

Minority Leader, it will no longer be known as RA 9732, as amended by

whatever RA number this will be known after we pass the measure.

Senator Pimentel. Yes, I get it. So, what we will do is, we will write the

new concepts and then we will insert the uncontested sections of the existing

law in the proper places?

Senator Lacson. That is correct, Mr. President.

Senator Pimentel. I get it, Mr. President. That would be easier.

Senator Lacson. And that is not without reason, Mr. President. We

found out during committee hearings that “human security” is too broad a

concept. Masyadong broad po ito, ang laki ng nako-cover. And we want to focus

on terrorism. So, that is one of the reasons why we decided to rename the title

of the existing law.

Senator Pimentel. All right. So, if the purpose of the measure now is to

focus on fighting terrorism, all the more that we have to carefully, properly,

and clearly define that very specific purpose of the law, which is to fight

terrorism.

Senator Lacson. That is correct, Mr. President.

Senator Pimentel. In the existing law, Mr. President, there is a joint

oversight committee, as I understand. Was it ever convened, and what were the

findings of this committee?

8
 Senator Lacson. Yes, there is an oversight committee but it has never

been convened, Mr. President.

Senator Pimentel. So, unfortunately, we do not have with us

information or data from the joint oversight committee on how the law has

been implemented, the achievements of the existing law, and the difficulties in

implementing the existing law?

Senator Lacson. That will be taken care of by the oversight function of

Congress, and the Anti-Terrorism Council will regularly review and find out the

effectiveness of this act, Mr. President.

Senator Pimentel. Yes, but I want to refer to the existing act. Because

right now, we have this law which is called the Human Security Act, and we

are overhauling it--completely changing its face, its character, and its focus.

So, there must be a reason why we are doing this. What has been the feedback

about the implementation of the Human Security Act? Has it been a dead letter

law?

Senator Lacson. Actually, the proposal came from the Anti-Terrorism

Council, Mr. President. But we also endeavored to study the different anti-

terrorism laws of the different countries, so we came up with this new

definition under the proposed measure.

Senator Pimentel. Correct me if my understanding is misplaced, Mr.

President. When we looked at the trend in other countries, because I think I

heard in the previous interpellation that there are more than 109 definitions of

9
the concept of terrorism, so I am assuming that these are legal definitions. So,

there are at least 109 different laws maybe in 109 different jurisdictions.

Senator Lacson. Not necessarily. Our reference is the Wikipedia, Mr.

President.

Senator Pimentel. But, anyway, many definitions. So, meaning to say

that when the council looked at the trend worldwide, they saw that the trend

was to focus specifically on terrorism.

Senator Lacson. Yes, Mr. President, taking into consideration three

elements: iyong acts, intent, at saka iyong safeguards. Doon na lamang tayo

nag-compress, nag-focus sa tatlo--acts, intent, and safeguards.

Senator Pimentel. Acts, intent, and safeguards. Are these main

categories also present in the anti-terrorism laws of the countries which the

council cites.

Senator Lacson. That is our observation, Mr. President.

Senator Pimentel. But why cannot we live with the current Human

Security Act? Why the need to overhaul it?

Senator Lacson. We want to be compliant with the existing

international standards, Mr. President, and State obligations.

Senator Pimentel. Was there something wrong with our definition of

terrorism in the Human Security Act?

Senator Lacson. Very wrong, Mr. President. That is the reason why

there is only one conviction so far after so many years because we passed the

Human Security Act in 2007. It is now 2020 and so far, there is only one

10
conviction. We also invited as one of our resource persons the judge himself

who rendered that guilty verdict. Ang sabi niya, napakahirap talaga because of

the predicate crimes. And besides, the law enforcement agencies themselves

refused to file violations or to file cases against persons for violation of the

Human Security Act because there is a sword of Damocles hanging over their

heads. Because if the respondents are acquitted, then they are mandated

under the existing law to pay a fine of P500,000 per day. So, sa halip na mag-

file po sila ng violation ng Human Security Act, nagpa-file na lamang sila ng

multiple murder or whatever other offenses covered by the Revised Penal Code.

Senator Pimentel. So, as I understand it, Mr. President, the record of

the Human Security Act is one conviction.

Senator Lacson. One conviction, one proscription, Mr. President.

Senator Pimentel. One proscription. May we know which

organization?

Senator Lacson. It is the Abu Sayyaf, Mr. President. And it took them

at least seven years after the passage.

Senator Pimentel. But on the other side of the coin, Mr. President,

there is no record of any wrongful detention or imprisonment?

Senator Lacson. I do not have the records; no data, Mr. President. But

I assume that for every apprehension or every arrest, or arrests made by law

enforcement agencies, mayroon talagang lalabas at lalabas na puwedeng

wrongful detention. But if we are referring to that provision of providing for a

fine of P500,000, then wala namang naparusahan ng ganoon.

11
 Senator Pimentel. Among the law enforcers?

Senator Lacson. Yes, Mr. President. Because they refuse to file under

this act and our colleague here who just retired from the PNP will attest to that.

Senator Pimentel. So, maybe the Human Security Act was only

invoked once and in one conviction, there is a 100% batting average.

Senator Lacson. There is 100% conviction rate, probably, Mr. President.

Senator Pimentel. But, Mr. President…

Senator Lacson. So, added information, according to the Anti-Terrorism

Council, mayroong mga cases na na-dismiss. And now, those arrested are

claiming for damages, iyong invoking that provision of P500,000 fine.

Senator Pimentel. In the measure we are discussing, Mr. President, we

are going to delete the sections providing for this P500,000 fine.

Senator Lacson. Definitely, Mr. President.

Senator Pimentel. And this is supposed to be a safeguard. So, what

safeguards are we now going to replace this with?

Senator Lacson. Imprisonment. Medyo matagal ang imprisonment of

the law enforcer. Iyon lamang sa arbitrary detention. At saka tinaasan natin

iyong penalty up to 20 years—12 years and one day to 20 years. Maraming

safeguards ang na-retain but we are not including anymore the P500,000 fine.

Senator Pimentel. But if we look at the, let us say, victim of a wrongful

application of the Anti-Terrorism Act, he was really wrongfully detained without

basis.

Senator Lacson. I do not know the details, Mr. President.

12
 Senator Pimentel. Is there any mechanism to compensate that person

for lost income, the suffering, the moral damages during the…

Senator Lacson. Puwedeng pumasok sa damages, Mr. President.

Senator Pimentel. But we do not recognize it in the current measure.

He will have to base his cause of action from the Civil Code or some other…

Senator Lacson. We would rather leave it to the court, Mr. President.

There is another law that covers it.

Senator Pimentel. Yes, there is a victim’s compensation fund. If I

remember correctly, there is a ceiling. I think the total amount that can be

given is P10,000.

For as long as we can make that clear that although the new law deletes

the section providing for an amount of damages per day, it does not mean that

the person aggrieved by wrongful implementation of the law has no more

recourse to claim for damages. He can still claim for damages, if we can make

that very clear.

Senator Lacson. Of course, Mr. President.

Senator Pimentel. If this representation can come up with wording,

although not in the amount of P500,000, is the sponsor open to

accommodating such a section in the measure?

Senator Lacson. Is the gentleman intending to put an amount again but

not P500,000? Baka maging arbitrary na naman po, Mr. President. Anyway,

there is another law that covers compensation or damages.

13
 Senator Pimentel. We will take a look into that other law, Mr. President,

should it be sufficient.

Senator Lacson. May kasama pa po itong perpetual disqualification

from public office kung public officer iyong involved, Mr. President.

Senator Pimentel. But that is the deterrent from the point of view of the

law enforcer from abusing his powers under the law.

Senator Lacson. Mr. President, hindi compensatory.

Senator Pimentel. But I am looking at the compensation for the victim

of the abuse.

Senator Lacson. At the proper time, let us talk about it, Mr. President.

Senator Pimentel. Mr. President, I noticed that Section 2 of the measure

amends Section 2 of the existing law, and deletes the last two paragraphs of

Section 2, Declaration of Policy.

Are these two paragraphs no longer meaningful or relevant?

Senator Lacson. They are still relevant, Mr. President.

Senator Pimentel. Or are they obstacles to better law enforcement?

Senator Lacson. Ang talagang objective lamang is to focus on terrorism--

how to fight terrorism, Mr. President. Anyway, lahat ng human rights

safeguards ay present dito sa proposed measure. Retained naman po iyan lahat

doon sa mga succeeding provisions.

Senator Pimentel. Nakasama ba itong last two paragraphs sa

Declaration of Policy?

Senator Lacson. Na-delete na po natin, Mr. President.

14
 Senator Pimentel. Iyong third paragraph, “the State recognizes that the

fight against terrorism.” So, it is about terrorism.

Why are we deleting them if they are not doing any damage, why can we

not just leave them there?

Senator Lacson. Our objective is just to focus on terrorism pero lahat

naman ng safeguards, if we go through the different provisions under the

different paragraphs, nandiyan po, retained lahat. Dinagdagan pa natin, Mr.

President.

Senator Pimentel. Will retaining the last two paragraphs of Section 2,

destroy the new intent and new emphasis or focus of the measure?

Senator Lacson. Hindi naman po pero wala namang problema. We just

want to focus on terrorism kaya we decided to delete, Mr. President.

Senator Pimentel. Yes, Mr. President. The third paragraph, which is

recommended for deletion, talks about terrorism.

Senator Lacson. Well, no problem, Mr. President.

Senator Pimentel. So, at least, when the time comes, maybe the motion

is not to…

Senator Lacson. Not to delete?

Senator Pimentel. Unless, these are responsible for the non-invocation

of the Human Security Act. Hindi naman siguro.

Senator Lacson. No, Mr. President. As I said, if we go through the rest

of the provisions, nandoon naman lahat iyong human rights safeguards, Mr.

President.

15
 Senator Pimentel. In the definition of terms, Mr. President, have we

addressed the concern raised by the Minority Leader about foreign terrorist?

Okey na po ba ito? We will amend this at the proper time?

Senator Lacson. I am sorry, Mr. President.

Senator Pimentel. Mr. President, the definition of “foreign terrorist?”

Senator Lacson. Yes, it is there, Mr. President.

Senator Pimentel. Is there already an agreement that, at the proper

time, we will amend the “foreign terrorist,” Mr. President?”

Senator Lacson. No, there is no agreement, Mr. President.

Senator Pimentel. Because if we are to go to the section on “foreign

terrorist,” can a Filipino be considered a foreign terrorist?

Senator Lacson. Well, a foreign terrorist should be a foreigner, Mr.

President.

Senator Pimentel. Yes, precisely, Mr. President.

Senator Lacson. But a Filipino who has hatched a plan to commit a

terrorist act in the Philippines or has committed terrorist acts abroad, once he

comes back to the Philippines, may be covered under this Act, Mr. President.

Senator Pimentel. Yes, Mr. President. But is he going to be under

Section 10, a foreign terrorist?

Senator Lacson. Well, a Filipino cannot be a foreign terrorist, Mr.

President.

Senator Pimentel. Precisely, because as written, if I look at Section 10,

paragraph (C), that could be a Filipino, or any person residing abroad…

16
 Senator Lacson. Well, a Filipino who has become a resident abroad may

be categorized as a foreigner, Mr. President, if he has lost his Filipino

citizenship. By origin, he is a Filipino, but he has…

Senator Pimentel. Not necessarily because “residing” is the word. That

is why maybe during the amendment, if we can clarify what a foreign terrorist

is.

And may we know, Mr. President, where we got this? This is a new

section, ano? This is a new concept, Mr. President?

Senator Lacson. This is a new section, Mr. President.

Senator Pimentel. Did we get this from any model law that we

examined?

Senator Lacson. Yes, Mr. President. This is being practiced in other

countries.

Senator Pimentel. Which country, Mr. President?

Senator Lacson. United States, Mr. President. Ang basis po rito sa

definition ng “foreign terrorist fighters” ay ang UN Security Council Resolution

2178. This was adopted in 2014. It says, “(c)alls upon all member States in

accordance with their obligations under international law to cooperate in

efforts to address the threat posed by foreign terrorist fighters, including, by

preventing the radicalization to terrorism and recruitment of foreign terrorist

fighters, including children, preventing foreign terrorist fighters from crossing

their borders, disrupting and preventing financial support to foreign terrorist

17
fighters, and developing and implementing prosecution, rehabilitation, and

reintegration strategies, for returning foreign terrorist fighters.”

Ito po iyong definition ng “foreign terrorist”, “individuals who travel to a

State other than their State of residence or nationality for the purpose of the

perpetration, planning or preparation of, or participation in, terrorist acts or

the providing or receiving of terrorist training, including in connection with

armed conflict and resolving to address this threat.” Iyon po iyong definition

doon sa Resolution.

Senator Pimentel. Yes, Mr. President.

So, is the sponsor open to filipinizing the definition by stating that a

foreign terrorist is not a Filipino?

Senator Lacson. In-adopt po natin dito sa mismong…Iyong definition ng

United Nations ay eksakto.

Senator Pimentel. Yes, Mr. President. Nakita ko nga. But in the

context of a Philippine law when we define a foreign terrorist, we should add

that “that person who is not a Filipino,” et cetera, et cetera, makes him a

foreign terrorist. Otherwise, if he is a Filipino, can he be a foreign terrorist?

Senator Lacson. As I said, we just adopted the definition under the UN

Resolution that I stated earlier, Mr. President. And clearly, it stated here, iyon,

nag-travel sa isang State other than their states of residence or nationality for

the purpose of…Kung ang purpose niya in traveling is to perpetrate, plan, or

prepare for, or participate in terrorist acts, et cetera, et cetera, Mr. President.

18
 Senator Pimentel. And then I noticed that in the definition of “foreign

terrorists” under paragraph…

Senator Lacson. I think the operative phrase here is “other than their

states of residence or nationality,” Mr. President. So, kung Filipino national

siya, he may not fall under the category of a foreign terrorist.

Senator Pimentel. Yes, Mr. President. So, we can make that

categorically clear, Mr. President.

Senator Lacson. This falls under Section 3, doon sa definition ng

“foreign terrorists.”

Senator Pimentel. Yes, it is letter (C), Mr. President.

And then, the definition under letter (D), Mr. President, “INCITING TO

COMMIT TERRORIST ACTS.”

Senator Lacson. Is that still under Section 10, Mr. President?

Senator Pimentel. Hindi, Mr. President. It is in Section 3, DEFINITION

OF TERMS, letter (D). Does the effort have to be credible or convincing for it to

fall under inciting to commit terrorist acts?

Senator Lacson. Yes, inciting to commit terrorist acts, Mr. President?

Senator Pimentel. Yes, Mr. President, page 3, letter (D). If a person, let

us say, goads another individual to commit any of the crimes punishable under

the act by, let us say, by verbally…

Senator Lacson. Verbal, written, or visual.

19
 Senator Pimentel. But do we need to assess whether the person is

credible or convincing enough, or a mere mention of inviting another person to

commit a terrorist act, is that already inciting?

Senator Lacson. I do not think credibility should be a major factor in

determining if he… Because being convincing would mean that he was able to

convince. Medyo palayo na po tayo siguro. We are always bound by the intent

and purpose of that individual in committing that particular act, para hindi po

tayo maligaw, Mr. President. Kasi kapag hindi naman pumapasok doon sa

intent or iyong purpose of that individual in goading or provoking, instigating,

persuading another individual, hindi po papasok iyon dito. But as long as the

intent and purpose ay klaro, it does not matter if he is convincing enough,

because parang medyo subjective yata iyong pag-determine kung convincing o

hindi.

Senator Pimentel. So, in this new Anti-Terrorism Act, we will always

look at the intent and purpose of the perpetrator, of the accused, Mr. President.

Senator Lacson. That is correct, Mr. President.

Senator Pimentel. If we have a problem with the things being

subjective, is it not looking at the intent and purpose also subjective because

those two things reside in the mind of the perpetrator? How can we penetrate

the mind of the perpetrator?

Senator Lacson. Mr. President, it is so provided under Section 4 after

enumerating the acts because we have already removed the predicate crimes.

For a better definition, in-specify na po natin dito from letters (a) to (e). Pero

20
mayroon po ritong succeeding paragraph: “WHEN THE PURPOSE OF SUCH

ACT, BY ITS NATURE AND CONTEXT, IS TO INTIMIDATE, PUT IN FEAR,

FORCE OR INDUCE THE GOVERNMENT OR ANY INTERNATIONAL

ORGANIZATION OR THE PUBLIC TO DO”--government, international

organization at saka iyong public, ito po iyong ina-address dito. Tapos,

mayroon po ritong “TO DO OR TO ABSTAIN FROM DOING ANY ACT, OR

SERIOUSLY DESTABILIZE OR DESTROY THE FUNDAMENTAL POLITICAL,

ECONOMIC OR SOCIAL STRUCTURES OF THE COUNTRY, OR CREATE A

PUBLIC EMERGENCY OR UNDERMINE PUBLIC SAFETY, SHALL BE GUILTY.”

Nandiyan po ang boundaries and parameters.

Senator Pimentel. So, we will derive the purpose by looking at the

nature of what was done and then the effect, the context, the implication, iyon

po ba iyon?

Senator Lacson. Opo.

Senator Pimentel. So, titingnan natin.

Senator Lacson. Kasi sa Revised Penal Code, nandiyan din iyong Art.

118, Inciting to war or giving motives for reprisals; Art. 138, Inciting a rebellion

or insurrection; and Art. 142, Inciting to sedition. Ito po in-specify na natin iyong

paragraph na na-mention ng ginoo about incitement.

Senator Pimentel. Since nandiyan na po tayo sa Section 4, mayroon

kasing napansin dito na as far as purposes of the terrorist act is concerned,

am I correct in my understanding that there are four possible purposes? “TO

INTIMIDATE” iyong isa, et cetera; “SERIOUSLY DESTABILIZE” iyong isa;

21
“CREATE A PUBLIC EMERGENCY” iyong pangatlo; and then “UNDERMINE

PUBLIC SAFETY” iyong pang-apat. Iyon po ba iyon? Basta anyone of these four,

kapag present siya, then that is your purpose. And then we look at your acts,

the acts should…

Senator Lacson. Any of the four, Mr. President.

Senator Pimentel. Any of the four?

Senator Lacson. Yes, Mr. President.

Senator Pimentel. My problem is, iyong fourth kasi, if the purpose of

the act, “BY ITS NATURE AND CONTEXT, IS TO xxx UNDERMINE PUBLIC

SAFETY”, and then all of the acts enumerated before that paragraph are

“ATTACKS xxx WEAPONS, EXPLOSIVES xxx DANGEROUS SUBSTANCES”. So,

hindi po ba catch-all na iyon? Whatever you do, you undermine public safety,

pasok ka na sa definition ng terrorism.

Senator Lacson. Well, iyon ang consequence, iyon ang resulting factor.

Pero kapag tiningnan natin sa purpose of such act, any of those acts—nandiyan

iyong “TO INTIMIDATE, PUT IN FEAR, FORCE OR INDUCE THE

GOVERNMENT”…

Senator Pimentel. Yes, Mr. President. But the act must not fulfill all the

four purposes. Any one of the four purposes is enough, tama po ba iyon?

Senator Lacson. Tama po iyon kasi “OR” iyong nakalagay rito.

Senator Pimentel. Kaya nga po. So, but all of the acts before that

paragraph can be said to undermine public safety. So, pasok na parati. If there

is an attack that caused death…

22
 Senator Lacson. Hindi po all the acts, any of the acts, Mr. President.

Senator Pimentel. Yes, but I am referring to paragraph (A), before that

paragraph which says, “ATTACKS THAT CAUSE DEATH xxx OR ENDANGERS

A PERSONS’ LIFE”, that undermines public safety. And then letter (B),

“ATTACKS THAT CAUSE EXTENSIVE DAMAGE OR DESTRUCTION”, that

undermines public safety. Number three, you have “WEAPONS, EXPLOSIVES

OR OF BIOLOGICAL OR CHEMICAL WEAPONS”, that undermines public

safety.

Senator Lacson. Ang limitation po nito ay nandoon sa unahan ng

paragraph: “WHEN THE PURPOSE OF SUCH ACT, BY ITS NATURE AND

CONTEXT, IS TO INTIMIDATE, PUTTING FEAR”, hindi naman ito as if stand-

alone iyong “UNDERMINE PUBLIC SAFETY”, mayroon pa ring qualification.

Senator Pimentel. But, Mr. President, as I understand it, actually we

can skip the three other purposes. If the purpose of undermining public safety

can be derived from the context, then terrorism has occurred. Kasi not all

purposes must be achieved, tama po ba iyon? Any one, Mr. President.

Senator Lacson. Any one, Mr. President.

Senator Pimentel. And in my reading of the measure, undermining

public safety is one independent purpose.

Senator Lacson. That is correct, Mr. President.

When the purpose is to undermine public safety, and it is precipitated by

any of the acts as enumerated, papasok po iyon.

23
 Senator Pimentel. Yes, Mr. President, but the acts enumerated before

that paragraph always involve public safety. So, in the context, we can always

use the fourth purpose.

Senator Lacson. Parang catch-all.

Senator Pimentel. Wala ka nang lusot sa terrorism.

Senator Lacson. “OR CREATE A PUBLIC EMERGENCY OR UNDERMINE

PUBLIC SAFETY”, yes, the gentleman is correct.

Senator Pimentel. In my reading, Mr. President, separate pa rin iyon or

is that one?

Senator Lacson. Hindi alternative, Mr. President.

Senator Pimentel. Yes, creating a public emergency is one purpose,

undermining public safety is another purpose. There are actually four

purposes. If the sponsor is willing to revisit because this is the heart and soul

of the new measure.

Senator Lacson. The definition.

Senator Pimentel. Yes, Mr. President. Otherwise, kung wala ito, we

will stay with the Human Security Act. But this is the heart and soul of the

new measure, and this is a penal law. We have to be precise and very clear

about what acts we are punishing.

Then another issue, Mr. President. In the same section, immediately

after mentioning the penalty for committing a terrorist act, there is a proviso

that the definition of terrorist acts shall not cover legitimate exercises of rights

and freedom of expression.

24
 Senator Lacson. That is correct, Mr. President.

Senator Pimentel. Why was there a need to immediately qualify? Is

there a danger or a close relationship between exercise of basic rights and

some acts which can be mistaken for as terrorist acts?

Senator Lacson. As pointed out by the honorable lady senator from

Panay during her interpellations, iyong legitimate exercise ay mayroong labor

strike, and the laborers ay nagkaroon ng violence, hindi sila mako-cover dito.

Kasi legitimate exercise of freedom of expression or nag-e-express sila ng

dissent. Kung iko-cover pa rin natin sila, medyo lalong magiging wayward.

Senator Pimentel. Yes, Mr. President. Tama nga po iyon na hindi

talaga sila covered. Pero nag-aalala lamang ako na immediately after defining

terrorist acts, we have to clarify that the exercise of fundamental rights will not

be covered. So, mayroon palang danger na mapagkamalan ang exercise of

basic rights as a terrorist act kasi sinunod kaagad natin.

Senator Lacson. For clarity and for emphasis, Mr. President, para

lamang malinaw, this is one of the safeguards. Kasi if we do not include that

proviso, I am sure the gentleman will be interpellating along that line. Bakit

kulang? That is why we deemed it wise na i-qualify na lamang natin na hindi

kasama iyong legitimate exercise of the freedom of expression, et cetera.

Senator Pimentel. So, in the legitimate exercise of a right, can there be

an attack?

Senator Lacson. Yes, Mr. President. Puwedeng mag-erupt.

25
 Senator Pimentel. Attacks, manufacture or possession of weapons, et

cetera.

Senator Lacson. Iyong legitimate exercise of the freedom of expression,

et cetera, might result in some violence that could result in destruction of

properties or loss of lives, hindi po mako-cover iyon, and that is the reason why

we included that proviso or that qualification. Para lamang malinaw, Mr.

President.

Senator Pimentel. In that scenario where there is a legitimate exercise

of fundamental rights, who made the attack?

Senator Lacson. Those expressing dissent in the exercise of their

freedom of expression. Kung mag-result regardless of who initiated, that could

be initiated by their act of expressing their freedom of dissent or expression na

nag-result sa violence, then they should not be covered under the definition of

a terrorist act because, again, babalik na naman tayo sa intent and purpose.

Senator Pimentel. Definitely, ang intent niya is legitimate exercise of

fundamental rights. So, we just made it doubly clear, Mr. President.

Senator Lacson. For clarity, Mr. President.

Senator Pimentel. Mr. President, have we addressed paragraph (E) of

Section 4 about the threats? Tatanggalin na po ba natin iyong threats?

Senator Lacson. “THREAT TO COMMIT ANY OF THE ACTS LISTED IN

PARAGRAPHS (A) TO (D).”

Senator Pimentel. Yes, Mr. President.

Senator Lacson. Hindi po.

26
 Senator Pimentel. Hindi po. Because paragraph (C) mentions

“RESEARCH INTO, AND DEVELOPMENT OF, BIOLOGICAL AND CHEMICAL

WEAPONS”. So a threat to research will be punishable if we will not refine the

language, Mr. President.

Senator Lacson. Again, as suggested by Senator Drilon, iyong attempt

inalis po natin doon sa succeeding paragraphs na attempt or conspiracy. We

are removing or deleting the word “attempt.”

Senator Pimentel. Well, I am just pointing that out, Mr. President.

Maybe we can take a second look because if we will read paragraph (E) with

paragraph (C), then a “threat to research” masyado na po yatang malayo iyon

sa terrorism.

Senator Lacson. A “threat to research?”

Senator Pimentel. Yes, Mr. President. Because paragraph (C) punishes

“AS WELL RESEARCH INTO, AND DEVELOPMENT OF, BIOLOGICAL AND

CHEMICAL WEAPONS”. That is in paragraph (C). If we read it with paragraph

(E), a “THREAT TO COMMIT ANY OF THE ACTS LISTED IN PARAGRAPHS (A)

TO (D) OF THIS SECTION” including paragraph (C)…

Senator Lacson. Even the attempt to research.

Senator Pimentel. The threat, hindi pala attempt.

Senator Lacson. Threat to research.

Senator Pimentel. Kapag mayroong nagsabi, “I will research into”...

[Laughter] I mean because this is a penal provision that is why we are

concernED about the wording, Mr. President.

27
 Senator Lacson. That is where the gentleman is coming from, Mr.

President.

Senator Pimentel. Kaya kanina sinabi ko to the credit of the Human

Security Act wala namang wrongfully sigurong na-detain. Ayaw naman natin

na this will now be the black mark or record of this new measure na marami

namang naapektuhan sa wide net na cast niya.

Senator Lacson. We can craft a language to further clarify this, Mr.

President.

Senator Pimentel. Yes, Mr. President.

How about “attacks?” Is that a clear concept, “attack?” Do we not need

to define what an attack is?

Senator Lacson. An attack is an attack, Mr. President.

Senator Pimentel. Yes, Mr. President. That is why when I raised…

Senator Lacson. I really cannot think of anymore…

Senator Pimentel. What is an attack?

Senator Lacson. Well, if I attack the gentleman now, that is an attack,

Mr. President. [Laughter]

Senator Pimentel. How did it amount to an attack? Is it because there

was a physical contact?

Senator Lacson. Yes. That is one form of an attack, Mr. President.

Senator Pimentel. Because there is another kind of attack. Paragraph

(A) is a person-to-person attack. Paragraph (B) is an attack on facilities.

28
 Senator Lacson. Pero na-qualify na natin ito, Mr. President, attacks that

cause death or serious bodily injury to a person; attacks that cause extensive

damage or destruction to a government or public facility, and so on and so

forth.

Senator Pimentel. Because, actually, when I raised this with my staff,

we were also divided. Some said that an attack is clear but for me, I think, I

need to define what an attack is, Mr. President.

Senator Lacson. Anyway, that is the purpose of this interpellation, and

we are open to any suggestion, any amendment later on to further clarify or

enhance, or make this law more applicable and effective, Mr. President.

Senator Pimentel. For example, Mr. President, since we are now

defining terms, if I go back to “Section 3. DEFINITION OF TERMS”, do we not

think that we need to define international organization which is mentioned in

Section 4? Importante rin po iyon kasi one purpose is to intimidate or force the

government or any international organization. Do we need to define?

Senator Lacson. If the gentleman would like to further clarify what an

international organization is, then we are open to that.

Senator Pimentel. Yes, Mr. President, thank you.

And then Section 26 mentions supranational jurisdiction. Is the

sponsor open to also inserting a definition of what is a supranational

jurisdiction?

Senator Lacson. Yes, Mr. President.

29
 Senator Pimentel. And then SECTION 45 mentions extraordinary

rendition.

Senator Lacson. Mr. President, any term or any phrase that may be

deemed vague or not clear, we are open to further clarification.

Senator Pimentel. Another phrase not clear to me but which may be

clear to the sponsor is extraordinary rendition found in SECTION 45. Iyan po

ba ang practice ng ibang bansa? Wala naman po yata tayong ganiyan. Is the

good sponsor also open to defining extraordinary rendition?

Senator Lacson. Yes, Mr. President.

Senator Pimentel. Actually, talking about Extraordinary Rendition of

SECTION 45, I think there is really no need to mention extraordinary rendition

because we do not need to resort to that, especially if we have a mutual legal

assistance treaty with the requesting State, Mr. President. Because in our

mutual legal assistance treaties, one common provision or feature there is, “A

person detained by Philippine authorities may be sent to the requesting State

to testify in a case where they need that person.” And then, ibabalik din po

siya sa atin.

I do not think we need to resort to the concept of allowing extraordinary

rendition, Mr. President.

Senator Lacson. My understanding of extraordinary rendition, Mr.

President, is covertly sending a foreign criminal or terrorist suspect to be

interrogated in another country with less rigorous regulations for the humane

30
treatment of prisoners. Iyon po ang understanding ko kaya nilagyan natin ng

“Ban.”

Senator Pimentel. Covertly, pero may “unless” kasi tayo, mayroong

exception. Ang point ko, Mr. President, sa mutual legal assistance treaties,

puwede na iyon. We do not need to, siguro, link it or connect it with

extraordinary rendition.

Senator Lacson. “(u)nless his or her testimony”…

Senator Pimentel. Yes, Mr. President.

Senator Lacson. We are open, Mr. President.

Senator Pimentel. And then, in the DEFINITION OF TERMS, paragraph

(E) on page 3…

Senator Lacson. What section is that, Mr. President?

Senator Pimentel. It is on Section 3, Mr. President, page 3, paragraph

(E), there is this phrase “EXPERT ADVICE”, kasi material support iyon, hindi

ba, which is, if a person extends material support to a terrorist, that person is

punished also.

Senator Lacson. That is correct, Mr. President.

Senator Pimentel. The phrase “MATERIAL SUPPORT” is being

explained or defined. There is this phrase “EXPERT ADVICE.” Natakot lamang

po ako sa mga pañero/pañera, Mr. President. Is legal advice…

Senator Lacson. Of course not, Mr. President. Even an advice coming

from a doctor cannot be covered. It should be in relation to perpetrating an act

of terrorism.

31
 Senator Pimentel. Because mayroon kasi sa dulo, Mr. President,

“EXCEPT MEDICINE OR RELIGIOUS MATERIALS.”

Senator Lacson. So, lagyan na natin ng legal, Mr. President.

Senator Pimentel. Yes, Mr. President. This is a new section, the

“PROPOSAL TO COMMIT TERRORIST ACTS”?

Senator Lacson. What section is that, Mr. President?

Senator Pimentel. It is on Section 7, Mr. President.

Senator Lacson. It is “PROPOSAL TO COMMIT TERRORIST ACTS”, Mr.

President.

Senator Pimentel. This is a new section, a new idea, Mr. President?

Senator Lacson. Yes, Mr. President. We want to be proactive before a

terrorist act occurs because we are considering the tremendous impact on the

destruction of lives and properties and even on humanity. This is a crime

against humanity that is why we are proposing to include “PROPOSAL TO

COMMIT TERRORIST ACTS” as a punishable act.

Senator Pimentel. My worry, Mr. President, is the evidence and how to

prove this. The charge can easily be made and it might be a word versus word

scenario.

Senator Lacson. Not necessarily because it depends on the

circumstances, Mr. President. Remember, the good gentleman knows this as a

lawyer, hindi naman puwedeng stand-alone ang isang ebidensiya. It must be

corroborated by other pieces of evidence: circumstantial or direct, even

32
testimonial, as long as there are pieces of evidence that are supportive of one

another, then it is up to the judge to determine.

Senator Pimentel. Anyway, the penalty is bailable.

Senator Lacson. Yes, it is eight years. Kung ako ang masusunod, Mr.

President, dapat hindi bailable ito.

Senator Pimentel. Pero baka dito tayo magkakaroon ng clogging of our

dockets sa proposal kasi ang dali pong mag-charge, mahirap i-prove pero

bahala na ang korte. Baka ganoon ang magiging attitude.

Senator Lacson. We are always bound by the Rules of Evidence, Mr.

President, so…

Senator Pimentel. Yes, the accused may eventually be acquitted, but in

the meantime, there will be a case. That is my worry.

Senator Lacson. Hindi naman po ito novel. Sa RPC, mayroon din tayong

conspiracy and proposal to commit coup d’etat, rebellion or insurrection.

Senator Pimentel. For those chosen, yes. For those chosen crimes, we

punish proposal and then conspiracy. And terrorism is at that level as grave as

those crimes where we punish conspiracy and proposal, Mr. President.

Senator Lacson. Yes, Mr. President.

Senator Pimentel. Another new concept is inciting to commit terrorist

act, Mr. President.

Senator Lacson. Yes, we have discussed this earlier, Mr. President.

Senator Pimentel. How is this different from proposal?

33
 Senator Lacson. By its definition, even under the Revised Penal Code,

magkaiba naman po iyong proposal at saka iyong inciting.

Senator Pimentel. Ang proposal po ba ay mayroon siyang specific na

kino-convince? Si inciting ba ay parang just a shotgun appeal?

Senator Lacson. Ang proposal po ay puwedeng nasa planning na. One is

proposing to commit a terrorist act. Then iyong inciting, ang audience dito ay

hindi specific person. Parang we are addressing the communication to the

general public.

Senator Pimentel. Pero sa inciting, Mr. President, the conduct causes a

danger of such act being actually committed. So, iyon ang sinasabi ko kanina,

iyong credibility of the person. So, ito, we will only be charged of inciting if the

prosecutor believes that one’s call is going to be actually committed. Hindi pa

ba iyon?

Senator Lacson. Not necessarily. So that if we make that as a

requirement that the one inciting to commit a terrorist act should be able to

convince the public at large or goad to do it parang medyo kailangan na ma-

commit pa iyong terrorism. We want to be proactive nga, Mr. President.

Senator Pimentel. So, can we revisit this phrase? Unless I am

misappreciating its meaning, may phrase po sa Section 8, “…WHERE SUCH

CONDUCT CAUSES A DANGER OF SUCH ACTS BEING ACTUALLY

COMMITTED”, hindi ba iyon ang ibig sabihin? “SUCH ACTS” ang ibig sabihin

noon ay terrorist acts po, hindi ba?

Senator Lacson. Terrorist iyan, Mr. President.

34
 Senator Pimentel. So, incorporated into inciting to commit terrorist acts

is the credibility of the person inciting because there is now a danger of such

terrorist acts being actually committed, which is not in the earlier section on

the definition of “inciting” in Section 3.

Senator Lacson. In this case, Mr. President, I think the “clear and

present danger rule” should apply, and we have jurisprudence in this regard.

Senator Pimentel. But it is just the phrase, Mr. President. Maybe we

can revisit that. Because if that is not the intention, but it is there, we better

review why it is there.

Senator Lacson. Yes, Mr. President.

Senator Pimentel. Then, another new concept, Mr. President, “SEC. 9.

RECRUITMENT TO AND MEMBERSHIP IN A TERRORIST ORGANIZATION.” Is this

new? I believe so. It is new.

Senator Lacson. Yes, this is a new concept, Mr. President.

Senator Pimentel. There is a phrase here, Mr. President, the

organization or association or group of persons is organized for the purpose of

engaging in terrorist acts. Mayroon po iyan. Kasi either the person is recruited

to support any terrorist act or individual or any organization, association or

group of persons—doon lamang po ako sa pangatlo naka-focus—“WHICH IS

PROSCRIBED UNDER SECTION 24”—klaro po iyon—or declared by the United

Nations Security Council as a terrorist organization—okey po iyon. But

mayroon ding “association organized for the purpose of engaging in terrorist

35
acts.” How will we know that an organization is organized for the purpose of

engaging in terrorist acts? Kasi life imprisonment din po ito.

Senator Lacson. That is not necessarily proscribed, Mr. President.

Senator Pimentel. That is correct, Mr. President; not necessarily

proscribed. So, walang court pronouncement that this is a terrorist

organization. So, our justification in charging a recruiter is that we are

recruiting someone into an organization organized for the purpose of engaging

in terrorist acts. Paano kaya ma-prove iyon, Mr. President? Baka masyadong

mahirap.

Senator Lacson. That is a matter of evidence, Mr. President.

Senator Pimentel. Yes, but puwede ring ma-acquit ang accused.

Senator Lacson. A terrorist organization which is not yet proscribed,

because iyong proscription, although ni-limit na natin sa six months, but there

is a period within which that terrorist organization may not be formally

proscribed or judicially proscribed. So, we included that for that reason, Mr.

President.

Senator Pimentel. So, do we not lose the value of proscribing? Because

there will be no need to proscribe.

Senator Lacson. Not really, Mr. President, even if it is not proscribed

but if it is a terrorist organization that is capable of committing terrorist acts.

That is the reason why we included that. Function na ng evidence iyan, Mr.

President. Not necessarily at the level of the court, but it is a matter of evidence

as far as law enforcement or prosecution.

36
 Senator Pimentel. Because they can always allege that “this group has

been organized for the purpose of engaging in terrorist acts. You are recruiting

someone to join that group. We will charge you with recruitment.” Ultimately,

they may be acquitted, but then, in the meantime, may kaso. My concern is,

how do we prove? But then, Mr. President, if there is an organization organized

for the purpose of engaging in terrorist acts, do we not already have an existing

conspiracy, Mr. President?

Senator Lacson. As I said, it is a matter of evidence, Mr. President.

Senator Pimentel. Ang point ko is, kahit tanggalin ito, hindi ba sa

conspiracy na siya papasok? Kasi another crime na naman. May crime kasi na

conspiracy in another section, may crime naman dito na membership in a

terrorist organization or recruitment. So, hindi ba…

Senator Lacson. Ang conspiracy is more on the planning stage, Mr.

President.

Senator Pimentel. Kasi, Mr. President, when the organization is

organized for the purpose of engaging in terrorist acts, hindi ba conspiracy na

po iyon?

Senator Lacson. No. We are talking here of an organization, terrorist

organization.

Senator Pimentel. Na nagsama-sama sila to…

Senator Lacson. No, Mr. President. Conspiracy may involve at least two

or more persons. This section, Section 9, pertains to an organization. And if

they are recruiting somebody to join that organization, regardless of whether it

37
is already proscribed or not, then they may be committing a crime. But, again,

we will be guided by the rules on evidence in this regard.

Senator Pimentel. Well, kung defense counsel ka, tatanungin mo na

lamang sa fiscal, “Why did you not have this organization proscribed if you

already know that the organization was organized for the purpose of engaging

in terrorist acts?” That is my only concern, Mr. President.

Senator Lacson. What the gentleman is saying, Mr. President, once it is

established as a terrorist organization, may conspiracy na. That is the point of

the gentleman?

Senator Pimentel. My point is, parang this is to lose a ground to

charge somebody for recruiting a person into an organization and the allegation

is that organization is for the purpose of engaging in terrorist acts. Wala

naman iyan sa articles nila, definitely. So, iyong proscribed, okey na iyon, nag-

hearing na ang korte noon at alam na na this is a terrorist organization. But,

this one...

Senator Lacson. Not yet proscribed.

Senator Pimentel. So, ang daming puwedeng i-charge under that

ground. Ultimately, they may be acquitted, but the point is mayroong kaso

because the allegation is that their group is organized for terrorist activities.

Paano nalaman iyon?

Senator Lacson. Not just an accusation or allegation, Mr. President.

There should be enough evidence to show that that organization is a terrorist

organization but not yet proscribed.

38
 Senator Pimentel. Yes, Mr. President.

Senator Lacson. And if they are recruiting somebody to join that

terrorist organization, regardless of whether or not na-proscribe na, then they

may be committing an act under this proposed measure, Mr. President.

Senator Pimentel. But the logical subsequent acts of the DOJ must be

to proscribe that organization, have that proscribed.

Senator Lacson. Eventually, Mr. President.

Senator Pimentel. Dapat ganoon, Mr. President. Kasi, otherwise, sa

trial, idedepensa na kaagad noong defense attorney nila. Then, what steps

have they taken to proscribe this organization as a terrorist organization?

Kung wala, therefore sasabihin noong defense attorney sa prosecution, “You

yourselves are in doubt of whether or not this organization was organized for

terroristic activities.”

Senator Lacson. As I have said, Mr. President, one major amendment

that we are introducing or new concept is to be proactive because a terrorist

act is a terrorist act. As much as possible, we want to prevent it from being

committed. So, iyon po iyong underlying reason kung bakit we want to be

proactive in several provisions.

Senator Pimentel. Yes, Mr. President. When we look at the structure

of the measure we are considering, huli na nga lahat.

What will happen to attempt? Are we deleting attempt?

Senator Lacson. We are removing that, Mr. President.

39
 Senator Pimentel. So, huli na lahat—proposal, inciting, conspiracy,

recruitment, membership, even if they are outside.

Senator Lacson. Tama po iyon.

Senator Pimentel. Yes, nakita ko po iyon. The intention is really to

deter by making everyone understand that…

Senator Lacson. Kasi a terrorist act that has caused tremendous

damage, largely on properties, cannot be undone, Mr. President. And it has

already succeeded in putting in fear, intimidating the government or any

international organization which the gentleman proposed to be more finely

defined. Then, that is the purpose of this measure.

Senator Pimentel. We join in the effort to streamline, make clear the

concept of terrorism, and make all acts connected with terrorism punishable in

the Philippines in solidarity with the rest of the world. I think that is what is

happening with the rest of the world, Mr. President.

Senator Lacson. Yes, Mr. President.

Senator Pimentel. My only worry is that even if we have a section to

penalize abuse of the law enforcer, for as long as the abuse cannot be proven,

the law enforcer may not be punished and yet the aggrieved person spent x

number of days under detention.

Talking about detention, because I have read in some countries, for

example--hindi ko na babanggitin iyong bansa, mayroong isa--a person in a

country spent a thousand days in jail without any charges. Siguro, presumably,

40
sa anti-terrorism law nila iyon. What is the longest possible detention period of

an accused in a terrorist act without charges?

Senator Lacson. Under the proposed measure, 14 days, non-extendible,

Mr. President. In other countries: Malaysia, 59 days; Indonesia, 21 days;

Singapore, two years, renewable pa for an unlimited period; Pakistan, 30 days;

et cetera.

Senator Pimentel. So, at least, hindi natin kinopya iyong mga draconian

measures. Hindi naman po natin kinopya.

Senator Lacson. Those law enforcement agencies that we invited, ang

gusto nila ay 90 days.

Senator Pimentel. Why did we end up with 14 days? Is it 14 calendar

days or 14 working days?

Senator Lacson. Working days, Mr. President.

Senator Pimentel. What kind of days, Mr. President, calendar days or

working days?

Senator Lacson. Working days, Mr. President.

Senator Pimentel. So, policy na lamang iyong 14 days?

Senator Lacson. Yes, Mr. President.

Senator Pimentel. But is it automatic that every time we detain, we will

extend it to 14 days?

Senator Lacson. No, Mr. President. May mga qualifications. Iyong

necessity of detaining them for a maximum period of 14 working days,

kailangan na i-prove pa iyon.

41
 Senator Pimentel. Kung sa Christmas period ito, mahaba iyong 14

working days na iyon.

Senator Lacson. When I was still with law enforcement, medyo

sinasadya namin iyan, Mr. President. Hinuhuli namin ng Sabado ng umaga.

Because during the committee hearings, we asked our law enforcement

agencies, those who acted, ano ba iyong reasonable time for them to be able to

gather enough evidence to successfully, at least, maka-comply sila roon sa

inquest proceedings, of course, na reasonable iyong time. And they came up

with iyong 14 days should be enough although some of them were suggesting

or proposing a 90-day reglementary period.

Senator Pimentel. Basta klaro po, Mr. President, na hindi ibig sabihin

noon…

Senator Lacson. Hindi automatic, Mr. President.

Senator Pimentel. Sundin pa rin iyong nasa Revised Penal Code na since

this is a grave crime, 72 hours, iyan yata ang pinaka…

Senator Lacson. Ito po iyong mga grounds for the 14-working day period

of preventive detention. It must be established that: 1) the further detention of

the person or persons is necessary to preserve evidence related to the terrorist

act or complete the investigation; 2) the further detention of the person or

persons is necessary to prevent the commission of another terrorist act; and 3)

that investigation is being conducted properly. Mayroong mga qualifications,

Mr. President.

42
 Senator Pimentel. I noticed the word “further.” So, ang ibig sabihin, the

further detention will only extend up to a maximum of 14 days. So, what is the

original detention period as a general rule?

Senator Lacson. Thirty-six hours, Mr. President. Iyon ang nasa Revised

Penal Code.

Senator Pimentel. We follow the Revised Penal Code.

Senator Lacson. Tapos, mayroon pa pong safeguards iyan. Law enforcer

taking custody shall notify in writing the judge nearest the place of arrest. Ito

pa po, lalagyan pa ng time, date, manner of arrest, location or locations of the

detained suspects, physical and mental condition of the detained suspects.

Tapos, mandated pa to report in writing iyong Anti- Terrorism Council. There

are safeguards available, Mr. President.

Senator Pimentel. So, as I have stated earlier, I really notice the

structure of the measure. Talagang walang lusot, talagang lahat. And then,

pati iyong stages of…ano ang tawag dito?

Senator Lacson. And the state of execution.

Senator Pimentel. Not only that, but the level of criminal participation,

from principal, accomplice, accessory, lahat po.

Senator Lacson. Yes, Mr. President.

Senator Pimentel. Ang problema ko lamang po is, for an accomplice, for

example, found in Section 8, page 12 of the report, since we have also another

concept—may bago rin tayong concept, Section 5—PLANNING, TRAINING,

PREPARING AND FACILITATING THE COMMISSION OF A TERRORIST ACT.

43
Are the concepts overlapping? Because an accomplice is “someone who, by

previous or simultaneous acts, cooperated in the execution of the terrorist

act.” That is the Revised Penal Code’s definition. We just applied it to the

terrorist acts.

Senator Lacson. We made reference to Article 17 of the Revised Penal

Code.

Senator Pimentel. Yes, Mr. President. But our measure introduces a

new crime—Section 5—the planning, training, preparing, and facilitating the

commission of a terrorist act.

So, did the accomplice not, through simultaneous acts, facilitate the

commission of terrorism? Hence, sa Section 5 siya hahabulin which is life

imprisonment.

Senator Lacson. Without the benefit of parole, Mr. President.

Senator Pimentel. Yes, Mr. President. Life imprisonment—that is a

maximum penalty. Ang accomplice ay 17 years, four months, and one day to

20 years. And maybe this is Revised Penal Code adjustment.

Senator Lacson. Yes, Mr. President.

Senator Pimentel. One degree lower ba?

Senator Lacson. It is 17 years, four months, and one day to 20 years.

Senator Pimentel. So, iyon po iyon. So, since we are covering all

bases—ang daming acts na punishable, stages na punishable, criminal

liability—baka, Mr. President, may nag-overlap. But the accomplice—

simultaneous act—can be part of facilitating Section 5, an independent crime.

44
 Senator Lacson. Yes, Mr. President.

But if one is an accomplice and he has participated under Section 5,

then, that will not qualify one as an accomplice.

Senator Pimentel. Oo, kasi Section 5 naman, Mr. President, ay ano…

Senator Lacson. Ang Section 5 is preparatory iyon. Being an accomplice

doon sa execution na iyon, Mr. President.

Senator Pimentel. Sa Section 5, if one participated in the facilitation, in

the commission of a terrorist act—life.

Senator Lacson. That is correct, Mr. President, kasi part of the planning.

Kapag accomplice, ibang stage na po iyon. Wala na iyon sa preparatory.

Senator Pimentel. In Section 5, “and” po ba iyan? “You must have

participated in the planning AND training…

Senator Lacson. Preparatory.

Senator Pimentel. …AND preparation.

Senator Lacson. That is correct, Mr. President.

Ang understanding ko sa accomplice is, ang stage niyan ay execution.

Senator Pimentel. All right. Because I have the same problem pagdating

sa ”accessory.” An “accessory” is someone who conceals or destroys the body of

the crime or the effects or instruments thereof. Ang sabi ay accessory ko siya.

But balik na naman ako sa Section 5, if one is possessing objects connected in

the commission of a terrorist act, then, he is in Section 5. He is not an

accessory. One is a principal sa Section 5.

45
 Senator Lacson. Mr. President, let us read again “SEC. 5, PLANNING,

TRAINING, PREPARING AND FACILITATING THE COMMISSION OF A TERRORIST

ACT. - IT SHALL BE UNLAWFUL FOR ANY PERSON TO PARTICIPATE IN THE

PLANNING, TRAINING, PREPARATION AND FACILITATION IN THE

COMMISSION OF A TERRORIST ACT, POSSESSING OBJECTS CONNECTED

TO THE COMMISSION OF A TERRORIST ACT OR COLLECTING OR MAKING

DOCUMENTS LIKELY TO FACILITATE XXX.”

Senator Pimentel. So, independent po iyong “POSSESSING OBJECTS.”

Senator Lacson. Yes, independent, Mr. President, because it says here,

“OR.”

Senator Pimentel. Yes. So, an instrument of the crime or effects…

Senator Lacson. Mere possession connected in the commission of a

terrorist act.

Senator Pimentel. That is right, Mr. President. So, paano iyon?

Principal siya roon--life iyon. But ang accessory who does it by concealing the

effects or instruments of the crime is an accessory. But principal siya sa

Section 5, as far as my understanding is concerned.

Senator Lacson. Pero magkaiba iyong context, Mr. President. As I

mentioned earlier, Section 5 refers to preparatory kaya papasok bale sa

principal. Iyong accessory is after the commission.

Senator Pimentel. So, the possession of the objects connected in the

commission of a terrorist act was before the commission.

46
 Senator Lacson. Before, yes--to facilitate the commission of a terrorist

act.

Senator Pimentel. Section 5 siya; Section 5, principal, life siya.

Senator Lacson. Yes, Mr. President.

Senator Pimentel. But if it is after, inabot lamang sa kaniya for him to

ano…

Senator Lacson. Itinago niya.

Senator Pimentel. So, that is the normal definition of the accessory.

So, maybe, if we can clarify because…

Senator Lacson. Yes, that is a case in point, Mr. President. For

example, hindi naman siya kasama sa planning; hindi naman siya ang nag-

facilitate; na-commit nga iyong terrorist act, nilapitan siya ng terrorist, sinabi

sa kanya, “Pakitago mo nga itong explosives kasi baka madisgrasya ako rito,”

and he conceals it, then, accessory ang labas niya.

Senator Pimentel. Yes, Mr. President.

Balik ako roon sa accomplice na may simultaneous act ang accomplice--

previous pa. Ang accomplice kasi yata is by previous or simultaneous act, so,

the accomplice can really be mistaken for a principal in Section 5.

Senator Lacson. Previous or simultaneous, Mr. President.

Senator Pimentel. Yes, Mr. President. That is the danger, Mr.

President, that the accomplice may be mixed with the principals in Section 5.

But, anyway, we will reexamine…

47
 Senator Lacson. Mr. President, I am very appreciative of the effort of the

good gentleman because we are also aiming at a near perfect if not a perfect

legislation in this regard because I consider this as an important piece of

legislation and the sponsor really appreciates the intervention of the good

gentleman no matter how tedious and how detailed. [Laughter]

Senator Pimentel. This measure already qualifies under the “walang

kamatayan” category. So, it is an honor, Mr. President, to have sponsored a

walang kamatayan na bill.

Last na lamang siguro ito, Mr. President. Siguro sa amendment na

lamang if we can qualify our amendments with some explanation.

Senator Lacson. Yes, Mr. President.

Senator Pimentel. In the accessory, we are deleting the standard

paragraph for accessory found in the Revised Penal Code na although he did all

of these things, except profiting from the crime, if he is a close relative of the

criminal, he cannot be an accessory. Dinilete (delete) natin, so, does that not

mean that a close relative who…

Senator Lacson. Kasama pa rin iyon, Mr. President.

Senator Pimentel. A close relative now who harbors or assists in the

escape of the principal which is--if I remember correctly, in the Revised Penal

Code for other crimes, he is not an accessory because he is a close relative.

Here, he will be an accessory for terrorism. Kasi dinilete (delete) natin, Mr.

President, naka-delete iyong ano. Is that the intention?

Senator Lacson. That is correct, Mr. President, we deleted that portion.

48
 Senator Pimentel. Are we not going against human nature, Mr.

President?

Senator Lacson. The gentleman can say that, Mr. President, but this is

a crime that we should all abhor.

Senator Pimentel. But the accessory never participated, iyon ang

assumption doon, na wala nga siyang alam beforehand; nalaman na lamang

niya after. But profiting, siyempre punishable talaga iyon. But, of course, the

human nature or instinct to help their close relative, are we going against that?

And then we will now be charging a lot more people for being accessory to

terrorist, human nature nga kasi.

Senator Lacson. Well, to respond to that, Mr. President, iyong ordinary

crime is a crime against person or persons, but we are talking here of a crime

against humanity. So, I would like to think that this is a special case. And to

harbor a terrorist fighter maski kamag-anak mo, medyo mahirap din.

Senator Pimentel. Pero close naman, Mr. President, it must be a really,

really close relative. Iyan na iyong rule. Is there any other crime where we also

changed the rule on accessory? Only for this one, hindi ba?

Senator Lacson. This is novel, Mr. President

Senator Pimentel. Kaya nga, this is a new feature of the measure. So,

maybe…

Senator Lacson. We can discuss this further, Mr. President. I just asked

my staff if in other jurisdictions mayroong ganoong provision, and as of now,

wala. So, this is being introduced only under this proposed measure.

49
 Senator Pimentel. For the first time, yes.

Anyway, this is a policy question, Mr. President.

Senator Lacson. Yes, Mr. President.

Senator Pimentel. No right or wrong answer. We are establishing a new

policy as far as terrorism is concerned, Mr. President.

Senator Lacson. I agree, Mr. President.

Senator Pimentel. So, Mr. President, I would like to thank the good

sponsor for his patience.

Senator Lacson. And I thank the good gentleman more, Mr. President. I

thank the good gentleman more for all the…

Senator Pimentel. Marami pa sana, Mr. President.

Senator Lacson. I am still open, Mr. President. Anything that will really

make this measure, as I have said, if not perfect, near perfect, then I am all for

it.

Senator Pimentel. Ako naman, I am only after a workable law where the

batting average for conviction is high or a respectable batting average.

Senator Lacson. We are overhauling the Human Security Act kasi it is a

dead letter law, Mr. President, walang silbi.

Senator Pimentel. Thank you, Mr. President; thank you, good sponsor.

Senator Lacson. Thank you, distinguished gentleman from Cagayan de

Oro.

The President. The Majority Leader is recognized.

50
 Senator Zubiri. Thank you, Mr. President.

Mr. President, we still have a few interpellators, one of them is Senator

Gordon and a few others. But we can allow them some more time to study. We

can take this up once again tomorrow.

SUSPENSION OF CONSIDERATION OF S. NO. 1083

Mr. President, I move that we suspend consideration of Senate Bill No.

1083.

The President. Is there any objection? [Silence] There being none, the
motion is approved.

SUSPENSION OF SESSION

Senator Zubiri. Mr. President, may I ask for a one-minute suspension of

the session?

The President. Is there any objection? [Silence] There being none, the
session is suspended for one minute.

It was 4:28 p.m.

RESUMPTION OF SESSION

At 4:33 p.m., the session was resumed.

The President. The session is resumed.

Senator Zubiri. Mr. President, our distinguished colleague, the sponsor

of Senate Bill No. 1240, the second item in our agenda, Senator Pimentel, will

be tackling the measure tomorrow after consulting with the stakeholders on

particular provisions that we have discussed together with the Minority Leader.

Mr. President, there are no other items to take up. We would just like to

remind our colleagues on who will interpellate on Senate Bill No. 1083
51
tomorrow—Senator Gordon, Senator Pangilinan, and the Minority Leader who

has some further clarificatory questions.

ADJOURNMENT OF SESSION

Mr. President, I move that we adjourn the session until three o’clock in
the afternoon of Wednesday, January 29, 2020.

The President. Is there any objection? [Silence] There being none, the
session is adjourned until three o’clock in the afternoon of Wednesday,
January 29, 2020.

It was 4:34 p.m.

52
 ANNEX "7"

MONDAY, FEBRUARY 3, 2019

OPENING OF THE SESSION

At 3:00 p.m., the Senate President, Hon. Vicente C. Sotto III, called the
session to order.

The President. The 49th session of the Senate in the First Regular
Session of the Eighteenth Congress is hereby called to order.

Let us all stand for the opening prayer to be led by Sen. Pia S. Cayetano.

Everybody rose for the prayer.

PRAYER

Senator Cayetano. Let us all put ourselves in the presence of the Lord.

Heavenly Father,

Amid the perils that hound the world today, we ask for Your
continues protection. We remember Your Holy Words from Isaiah
41:10, “So do not fear, for I am with you; do not be dismayed, for I
am your God. I will strengthen you and help you, I will uphold you
with my righteous right hand.”

We take comfort in these Holy Words as we continue to pray for the

safety of our entire nation and the world. As social media has
given us the means to have information at our fingertips, give us
the wisdom to filter the right information from the wrong ones.
Give us the humility to listen to the real experts and different
opinions, and to even be able to undertake the unpopular route, if
that is the right one.

All of these, we lift up to You, O Lord,

Amen.

The President. Amen.

Please remain standing for the singing of the national anthem. The
Senate Choir will lead us in the singing of the national anthem, and then the
group will also render a song entitled Ako ay Pilipino.
NATIONAL ANTHEM

1
 Everybody remained standing for the singing of the national anthem.

[Choir Singing Ako ay Pilipino]

ROLL CALL

The President. The Secretary will please call the roll.

The Secretary, reading:

Senator Sonny Angara…………………………………Present

Senator Maria Lourdes Nancy S. Binay................Present
Senator Pia S. Cayetano...................................... Present
Senator Leila M. de Lima……………………………… 

Senator Ronald “Bato” M. dela Rosa………………..Present

Senator Franklin M. Drilon…………………………..Present
Senator Win Gatchalian……………………………….Present
Senator Christopher Lawrence T. Go.……………..Present
Senator Richard J. Gordon….............................. Present
Senator Risa Hontiveros………………………………Present
Senator Panfilo M. Lacson……………………………Present
Senator Manuel “Lito” M. Lapid...........................Present
Senator Imee R. Marcos………………………………Present
Senator Emmanuel “Manny” D. Pacquiao………..Present
Senator Francis “Kiko” Pangilinan………………… Present
Senator Aquilino “Koko” Pimentel III ……………..Present
Senator Grace Poe…............................................Present
Senator Ralph G. Recto.......................................
Senator Ramon Bong Revilla Jr……………………..Present
Senator Francis “Tol” N. Tolentino……………….. Present
Senator Joel Villanueva…………………………….. Present
Senator Cynthia A. Villar................................... Present
Senator Juan Miguel F. Zubiri ……………………. Present
The President………………..………………………… Present

The President. With 22 senators present, the Chair declares the

presence of a quorum.

Senator Zubiri. Mr. President.

The President. The Majority Leader is recognized.

*Under detention

2
 MANIFESTATION OF SENATOR ZUBIRI
(On the Implementation of Stricter Protocols on Visitations Relative to
Coronavirus Outbreak)

Senator Zubiri. Mr. President, just for the information of our colleagues

who were not in the meeting earlier at 1:30 this afternoon, with the permission

of the Senate President, we would just like to inform the Body and all the staff,

together with our colleagues that we will be implementing stricter protocols on

visitations due to the outbreak of the coronavirus all over the world with the

alarming contamination rate.

The Senate majority and minority had agreed to implement stricter

protocols on visitations, especially those seeking financial assistance, due to

health requirements, as well as asking our colleagues to limit visits to official

matters, Mr. President. Just for the information of the Body.

If there are questions, of course, from our colleagues who were not able

to attend the meeting, they can approach either myself or the Senate President

for any protocols.

The President. Thank you, Majority Leader.

We will issue an official memorandum to this effect within the day.

Senator Zubiri. That is correct, Mr. President.

I spoke earlier, Mr. President, to the members of the House of

Representatives, headed by Speaker Alan Cayetano, and the latter said that

they will also do the same protocols.

It is not just one house of the Legislative body but both Houses to make

sure that we do not add to the spreading of the disease in our country.

3
 The President. Yes. This is what we call “precautionary measures.”

Senator Zubiri. Temporarily, Mr. President, until we see a light at the

end of this very dark tunnel of this coronavirus problem.

ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF GUEST

Mr. President, before we move to other matters, we just like to recognize

the Speaker of the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao
(BARMM), Atty. Pangalian Balindong. He is with us.

The President. Welcome to the Senate.

THE JOURNAL

Senator Zubiri. Mr. President, with the permission of the Body, I move
that we dispense with the reading of the Journal of the 48th session,
Wednesday, January 29, 2020, and consider the same as approved.

The President. Is there any objection? [Silence] There being none, the
motion is approved.

Senator Zubiri. Mr. President, I move that we proceed to the Reference

of Business.
The President. Is there any objection? [Silence] There being none, the
motion is approved.
The Secretary will read the Reference of Business.

REFERENCE OF BUSINESS

BILLS ON FIRST READING

The Secretary. Senate Bill No. 1300, entitled

AN ACT PROTECTING INDIVIDUALS WITH MIXED FILIPINO

HERITAGE FROM DISCRIMINATORY ACTS

Introduced by Senator Tolentino

The President. Referred to the Committee on Women, Children, Family

Relations and Gender Equality

The Secretary. Senate Bill No. 1301, entitled

4
 AN ACT INSTITUTIONALIZING GOVERNMENT SUPPORT TO
GIFTED AND TALENTED STUDENTS, APPROPRIATING
FUNDS THEREFOR AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES

Introduced by Senator Tolentino

The President. Referred to the Committees on Basic Education, Arts

and Culture; Higher, Technical and Vocational Education; and Finance

The Secretary. Senate Bill No. 1302, entitled

AN ACT MANDATING THE INSTALLATION OF GRAY WATER

TREATMENT SYSTEMS/FACILITIES IN BUILDINGS AND
IMPOSING PENALTIES FOR VIOLATION THEREOF

Introduced by Senator Poe

The President. Referred to the Committee on Public Works

RESOLUTIONS

The Secretary. Proposed Senate Resolution No. 303, entitled

RESOLUTION DIRECTING THE PROPER SENATE COMMITTEES,

TO CONDUCT AN INQUIRY, IN AID OF LEGISLATION, ON
THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE TERMINATION OF RP-US
VISITING FORCES AGREEMENT

Introduced by Senator Binay

The President. Referred to the Committees on Foreign Relations; and

National Defense and Security, Peace, Unification and Reconciliation

The Secretary. Proposed Senate Resolution No. 304, entitled

RESOLUTION CONGRATULATING AND COMMENDING HIDILYN F.

DIAZ FOR SUCCESSFULLY DOMINATING THE 2020 ROMA
WEIGHTLIFTING WORLD CUP WITH THREE GOLD MEDALS
ON 28 JANUARY 2020 IN ROME, ITALY, SECURING FOR
THE COUNTRY A SPOT IN THE 2020 SUMMER OLYMPICS
IN TOKYO, JAPAN

Introduced by Senator Zubiri

The President. Referred to the Committee on Rules

5
 The Secretary. Proposed Senate Resolution No. 305, entitled

RESOLUTION EXPRESSING THE SENSE OF THE SENATE THAT

TERMINATION OF, OR WITHDRAWAL FROM, TREATIES
AND INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS CONCURRED IN BY
THE SENATE SHALL BE VALID AND EFFECTIVE ONLY
UPON CONCURRENCE BY THE SENATE

Introduced by Senator Drilon

The President. Referred to the Committees on Foreign Relations; and

National Defense and Security, Peace, Unification and Reconciliation

The Secretary. Proposed Senate Resolution No. 306, entitled

RESOLUTION EXPRESSING THE SENSE OF THE SENATE THAT

THE VALIDITY AND IMPLEMENTATION OF THE VISITING
FORCES AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES AND THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
SHOULD BE URGENTLY REVIEWED

Introduced by Senator Marcos

The President. Referred to the Committees on Foreign Relations; and

National Defense and Security, Peace, Unification and Reconciliation

The Secretary. Proposed Senate Resolution No. 307, entitled

RESOLUTION URGING THE APPROPRIATE SENATE COMMITTEE

TO CONDUCT AN INQUIRY, IN AID OF LEGISLATION, ON
GARBAGE IMPORTED INTO THE COUNTRY, WITH THE
GOAL OF FORMULATING POLICY INTERVENTIONS TO
RESOLVE GARBAGE IMPORTATION ISSUES

Introduced by Senator Cayetano

The President. Referred to the Committees on Environment, Natural

Resources and Climate Change; and Foreign Relations

The Secretary. Proposed Senate Resolution No. 308, entitled

RESOLUTION DECLARING 2020 AS THE SUSTAINABLE

DEVELOPMENT GOALS DECADE OF ACTION

Introduced by Senator Cayetano

6
 The President. Referred to the Committee on Sustainable Development
Goals, Innovation and Futures Thinking

COMMUNICATION

The Secretary. Letter from the Office of the President of the Philippines
transmitting to the Senate two (2) original copies of R.A. No. 11468, entitled:

AN ACT DESIGNATING THE THIRD SUNDAY OF NOVEMBER

EVERY YEAR AS THE NATIONAL DAY OF REMEMBRANCE
FOR ROAD CRASH VICTIMS, SURVIVORS, AND THEIR
FAMILIES

which were signed by President Rodrigo Roa Duterte.

The President. To the Archives.

There is an Additional Reference of Business.

ADDITIONAL REFERENCE OF BUSINESS

BILLS ON FIRST READING

The Secretary. Senate Bill No. 1303, entitled

AN ACT ESTABLISHING THE SCIENCE FOR CHANGE PROGRAM

Introduced by Senator Lacson

The President. Referred to the Committees on Science and Technology;

and Finance

The Secretary. Senate Bill No. 1304, entitled

AN ACT AMENDING ARTICLES 14, 19, 124, 211 AND 225 OF

EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 209, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS
THE FAMILY CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES

Introduced by Senator De Lima

The President. Referred to the Committee on Women, Children, Family

Relations and Gender Equality

The Secretary. Senate Bill No. 1305, entitled

7
 AN ACT AMENDING SECTION 9 OF PRESIDENTIAL DECREE
NO. 651, ENTITLED “REQUIRING THE REGISTRATION OF
BIRTHS AND DEATHS IN THE PHILIPPINES WHICH
OCCURRED FROM JANUARY 1, 1974 AND THEREAFTER”

Introduced by Senator De Lima

The President. Referred to the Committee on Justice and Human

Rights

The Secretary. Senate Bill No. 1306, entitled

AN ACT REDEFINING THE MANDATE OF THE PUBLIC

ATTORNEY’S OFFICE (PAO), AMENDING FOR THE
PURPOSE REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9046 AND PERTINENT
PROVISIONS OF EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 292,
OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE “ADMINISTRATIVE CODE
OF 1987” AS AMENDED, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES

Introduced by Senator De Lima

The President. Referred to the Committees on Justice and Human

Rights; and Civil Service, Government Reorganization and Professional
Regulation

The Secretary. Senate Bill No. 1307, entitled

AN ACT REDEFINING THE CRIME OF SYNDICATED ESTAFA,

AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE SECTION 1 OF
PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 1689

Introduced by Senator De Lima

The President. Referred to the Committee on Justice and Human

Rights

RESOLUTION

The Secretary. Proposed Senate Resolution No. 309, entitled:

RESOLUTION DIRECTING THE PROPER SENATE COMMITTEES,

TO CONDUCT AN INQUIRY AND ASSESSMENT, IN AID OF
LEGISLATION, ON THE VISA UPON ARRIVAL POLICY FOR
CHINESE NATIONALS WITH THE END IN VIEW OF
ENSURING THAT THE VISA UPON ARRIVAL SCHEME

8
 WOULD NOT POSE HEALTH RISKS AND FACILITATE THE
PROLIFERATION OF SEX TRAFFICKING AND
PROSTITUTION IN THE COUNTRY

Introduced by Senator Binay

The President. Referred to the Committees on Foreign Relations; and

Women, Children, Family Relations and Gender Equality

The Majority Leader is recognized.

Senator Zubiri. Thank you, Mr. President.

ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF GUEST

We also have with us in the gallery, Mr. President, Gov. Miguel Luis
Villafuerte of Camarines Sur. He is here with us today.

The President. Welcome to the Senate.

BILL ON SECOND READING

S. No. 1083--Anti-Terrorism Act of 2019
(Continuation)

Senator Zubiri. Mr. President, with the permission of the Body, I move
that we resume consideration of Senate Bill No. 1083 as reported out under
Committee Report No. 9.
The President. Is there any objection? [Silence] There being none,
resumption of consideration of Senate Bill No. 1083 is now in order.

Senator Zubiri. Mr. President, I move that we recognize the sponsor,

Sen. Panfilo M. Lacson; and to interpellate, the distinguished Minority Leader,

Sen. Franklin M. Drilon.

The President. For the nth time, Sen. Panfilo M. Lacson is recognized,

the chairman of the Committee on National Defense and Security, Peace,

Unification and Reconciliation; and to interpellate, the Minority Leader, Sen.

Franklin M. Drilon.

9
 Senator Lacson. Thank you, Mr. President.

As long as Senator Lapid has not interpellated yet, all interpellations are

welcome. [Laughter]

Senator Drilon. Thank you, Mr. President.

With the permission of the Chamber and with the consent of Senator

Lacson, allow us to take the Floor once more.

Senator Lacson. Thank you to the distinguished Minority Leader.

Anything that will improve the final version of this measure, definitely, we will

welcome the Minority Leader, Mr. President.

Senator Drilon. Thank you very much Mr. President.

I would just like to place of record that maybe we can finish today given

the comments of the Senate President, at least, on my part. But we cannot

guarantee that the interpellation will finish because in the list is Senator

Gordon. [Laughter]

Mr. President, our interpellation this afternoon will touch on the

definition of terrorism.

Mr. President, the acts being punished here must have legal precision

because in many of the acts punished, the penalty is life imprisonment.

Therefore, we must be very clear of what acts are being punished. As I said, we

must have legal precision and certainty in the definition of terrorism which we

are punishing by life imprisonment.

The issue, therefore, is, when will one be charged with violation of the

Anti-Terror Act, when will he be charged with rebellion, when is it coup d'état,

10
when is it sedition? And the reason for that is, in our statute books right now,

there are acts which can qualify under any of these four laws. We take note

that terrorism itself in the definition internationally in many fora is that the

main objective of terrorism is to sow fear and spread violence. But the bill that

we are proposing today and we are debating on would include, as an element,

the fact that the purpose of the terror acts would be qualified through their

purpose, namely, to intimidate, put in fear, force or induce the government or

any international organization, or the public to do or to abstain from doing any

act, or seriously destabilize or destroy the fundamental political, economic or

social structures of the country, or create a public emergency or undermine

public safety.

We are reading this, Mr. President, because the reality is, when a fiscal is

confronted with a complaint by the law enforcement authorities, he has to

judge what information will be filed in court, especially, that the elements of

terrorism, for example, coup d'état, rebellion, sedition, would have similar

elements.

So, the question in general that we have, Mr. President, is, how does one

distinguish and how does a fiscal decide whether the act is punishable, let us

say, under rebellion, sedition, coup d’etat, or anti-terrorism? What are the

distinguishing factors?

Senator Lacson. I am glad that distinguished gentleman from Iloilo

asked that question, Mr. President.

11
 To further clarify, aside from the definition as contained in Section 4 of

this proposed measure, further guidance may be taken from existing

jurisprudence, Mr. President. I am referring to G.R. No. 231658, decided by the

Supreme Court only on July 4, 2017. This is Lagman vs. Medialdea. It says

that, I am quoting from the decision, “In determining what crime was

committed, we have to look into the main objective of the malefactors. If it is

political, such as for the purpose of severing the allegiance of Mindanao to the

Philippine Government to establish a wilayat therein, the crime is rebellion. If,

on the other hand, the primary objective is to sow and create a condition of

widespread and extraordinary fear and panic among the populace in order to

coerce the government to give in to an unlawful demand, the crime is

terrorism. Here, we have already explained and ruled that the President did not

err in believing that what is going on in Marawi City is one contemplated under

the crime of rebellion.”

Senator Drilon. Yes, Mr. President. Thank you for that citation. But let

me read into the Record, the definition of rebellion under Art. 134 of the

Revised Penal Code. It says: “The crime of rebellion or insurrection is

committed by rising publicly and taking arms against the Government for the

purpose of removing from the allegiance to said Government or its laws, the

territory of the Republic of the Philippines or any part thereof, of any body of

land, naval or other armed forces, or depriving the Chief Executive or the

Legislature, wholly or partially, of any of their powers or prerogatives.”

12
 This is exactly what also the act of terrorism would have as a purpose

when it says, seriously destabilize or destroy the fundamental political,

economic, or social structures of the country and force or induce the

government or any international organization or the public to do or to abstain

from doing any particular act.

We find the definition broad enough to include rebellion, and, that is, I

guess, where our difficulty is. Because the reality is, the fiscal would have to

judge what crime or what information to file. And we do hope that we can

spread into the Record the difference because this is what the fiscal will be

looking at—what is the intention of Congress?

Senator Lacson. Mr. President, that is the reason why we inserted a

phrase under the second paragraph, after enumerating the acts that would

constitute acts of terrorism. We cited in the second paragraph, “WHEN THE

PURPOSE OF SUCH ACT, BY ITS NATURE AND CONTEXT, IS TO INTIMIDATE,

PUT IN FEAR,” so forth and so on.

Now, let me go further in my citation of the Supreme Court ruling in

Lagman vs. Medialdea: “Besides, there is nothing in Art. 134 of the RPC and

RA 9372 which states that rebellion and terrorism are mutuality exclusive of

each other or that they cannot coexist together. RA 9372 does not expressly or

impliedly repeal Art. 134 of the RPC. And while rebellion is one of the predicate

crimes of terrorism, one cannot absorb the other as they have different

elements.” Mr. President. That is quoting again from Lagman vs. Medialdea.

13
 Further, Mr. President, under the Revised Penal Code, the elements of

rebellion are as follows: “(1) That there be (a) public uprising, and (b) taking

arms against the government;

(2) That the purpose of the uprising or movement is either: (a) to remove

from the allegiance to said government or its laws: (1) the territory of the

Philippines or any part thereof, or (2) any body of land, naval, or other armed

forces; or (b) to deprive the Chief Executive or Congress, wholly or partially, of

any of their powers or prerogatives,” Mr. President.

Senator Drilon. Thank you, Mr. President.

In our view, those elements of rebellion would be encompassed in the

general purpose which would qualify an act as an act of terrorism and what is

that? An act of terrorism is done for the purpose of forcing or inducing the

government or any international organization or the public to do or to abstain

from doing any act.

I think, the definition is broad enough to certainly cover rebellion. We

are raising this only for the guidance of those who will implement this law, Mr.

President.

Senator Lacson. Thank you, Mr. President.

In our definition, there is no public uprising involved in the crime of

terrorism as in the case of rebellion, Mr. President. There is no public uprising.

That is an element present in the crime of rebellion that is not present in the

crime as proposed under this bill, Mr. President.

Senator Drilon. There is no public uprising.

14
 Senator Lacson. That is correct, Mr. President. So, mayroon pong

delineation.

Senator Drilon. Yes, Mr. President.

Senator Lacson. Kung wala naman pong public uprising, hindi po

masasaklaw ng terrorism.

Senator Drilon. Now, an act of violence would have to be something

that will not qualify as rising publicly?

Senator Lacson. Those are two different elements, in my view, at least,

Mr. President. Kasi malinaw naman doon sa rebellion under Article 134 iyong

public uprising. In the case of this proposed measure, hindi po kailangan iyong

element ng public uprising.

Senator Drilon. The Marawi siege, Mr. President, is that rebellion or is

that an act of terrorism?

Senator Lacson. Kindly state the question again, Mr. President.

Senator Drilon. The Marawi siege, if it happened after we passed this

law and the sponsor is the prosecutor, Mr. President, which crime will the

sponsor charge those who staged the Marawi siege? Is it rising publicly,

therefore, rebellion or is it an act of violence which would be under terrorism?

Senator Lacson. It will depend on the evidence as presented by the

prosecutor, Mr. President. Assuming that we have passed this measure, kung

ang elements ay magpo-fall under the provisions of the proposed measure,

then the prosecutor may file for violation of Anti-Terrorism Law. But if the

nature and context, by which the crime was committed, would not constitute

15
violation of this act, as in the case of Marawi siege, then the case that was filed

was rebellion, Mr. President.

Senator Drilon. Yes, Mr. President. In fact, what took place in the

Marawi siege could very well fall under the definition of the purpose for which

terrorism is committed and that is to force or induce the government or the

public to do or abstain from doing any act or seriously destabilize or destroy

the fundamental, political, economic, and social structure of the country.

When they tried to remove Marawi from the country, would that be rebellion or

would that be terrorism?

Senator Lacson. The Minority Leader is correct, Mr. President. I will

not argue the point. However, the law that is still existing when the Marawi

siege was committed, mayroong predicate crimes. That is why the government

agents chose to file the case of rebellion.

Senator Drilon. Yes, Mr. President.

Senator Lacson. Because they will have to prove first the crime of

rebellion being committed before they can proceed to…

Senator Drilon. I guess our question says, Mr. President--if I may

interrupt--we are assuming a situation where the Marawi incident took place

when we have already passed this law.

Senator Lacson. Then I suppose that the government would have filed a

case of terrorism instead of rebellion, Mr. President. Because if we agree to

remove or delete the predicate crimes, then it would encourage the government

to file the case of terrorism instead of rebellion.

16
 Senator Drilon. All right, Mr. President.

Senator Lacson. I think that is the primary reason why the government

chose to file the case of rebellion against the attackers in Marawi instead of

terrorism, aside from the P500,000 penalty or fine.

Senator Drilon. Which we are deleting, Mr. President.

Senator Lacson. Which we are deleting, Mr. President.

By the way, Mr. President, in the case of terrorism, maski isang

individual ay puwedeng mag-commit. But ang rebellion, there must be public

uprising, so it necessitates the participation of other individuals, not just one

person. Because I cannot imagine one person or an individual committing

public uprising.

Senator Drilon. All right. If I were the defense counsel and my client is

being charged with anti-terrorism…

Senator Lacson. Under this proposed measure?

Senator Drilon. Under this proposed measure, Mr. President.

We know that the crime of rebellion does not carry the penalty of life

imprisonment, does it? Just to check, Mr. President.

Senator Lacson. I think it is also a capital offense, Mr. President. I may

be wrong, I stand corrected.

Senator Drilon. I do not know, Mr. President, that is why I am also

asking.

But assuming, for the sake of argument that rebellion is not a capital

offense--we can check that--if I were the defense counsel, I will try to prove that

17
the act committed was rebellion and not terrorism. Question: Assuming that I

am able to prove rebellion, but the charge is terrorism, can I be convicted for

rebellion?

Senator Lacson. Yes, Mr. President, because that is another offense. I

do not think the second jeopardy will set in.

Senator Drilon. Yes, Mr. President.

Senator Lacson. Because even if the crime of terrorism under this

measure is dismissed for some reason, the crime of rebellion can still be

pursued.

Senator Drilon. Yes, Mr. President. I have no question in my mind that

the crime of rebellion can still be pursued because there is no double jeopardy.

Senator Lacson. That is correct, Mr. President.

Senator Drilon. But can the judge, having heard the evidence and

having seen that the element of terrorism has not been proven but, in fact, all

the evidence point to rebellion, can the judge convict the accused of rebellion in

a charge sheet or Information which charges terrorism?

Let me premise this, Mr. President. As we lawyers know, in the Revised

Penal Code where we are charged with murder and we cannot prove an

element, let us say, of treachery, we can still be convicted of homicide because

they fall within the same class of crimes, or whatever. Now, would that same

theory be applicable here? Because here, rebellion is punished under the

Revised Penal Code and terrorism is punished under a special law. Can we

18
convict one for terrorism or for rebellion under the Revised Penal Code when, in

fact, we are charging him under terrorism which is a special law?

Senator Lacson. As the Minority Leader clearly stated, Mr. President,

this is a special law. In the case of murder downgraded to homicide, iba po

iyong rule. Yes, the judge cannot convict him for another crime which is

rebellion, if he deems it wise or he does not find sufficient evidence to convict

the person or the suspect or the respondent for the crime of terrorism because

he has been arraigned for the crime of terrorism, not the crime of rebellion. So,

hindi puwedeng ma-convict sa rebellion kasi ang arraignment niya ay

terrorism.

Senator Drilon. Anyway, just to end the debate there, in the example

that I gave under the Revised Penal Code, so long as the crimes fall under the

same title, he can be convicted of a lesser crime. But I will not tarry any further

there, Mr. President, I would just request the good sponsor to study this very

well.

Senator Lacson. Yes, Mr. President.

Senator Drilon. And find out how we can provide in the law elements

which can distinguish one from the other, so that the prosecutor and the judge

will not be in a quandary. As I said, when the committee amendments are

proposed, I do hope that the good sponsor can take this interpellation into

account.

19
 Senator Lacson. Of course, Mr. President. Except that this is a

substitute bill so I would leave it to the distinguished gentleman to introduce

the amendments.

Senator Drilon. Or maybe we can waive the rule so that we can have a

better understanding of it.

Senator Lacson. Baka mapagalitan tayo ng Majority Leader, Mr.

President.

Senator Drilon. Ako ang bahala riyan. [Laughter]

The other question, Mr. President, is: What is the difference in the

elements of a coup d’etat and an act of terrorism, for the record?

Senator Lacson. Ang coup d’etat po under Art. 134-A, ang purpose niya

is, “cease or diminish state power,” as amended by RA 6968.

Senator Drilon. Is it not that the purpose of a coup d’etat is to cease or

diminish state power?

Senator Lacson. Iyon nga po.

Senator Drilon. That would also fall under the broad definition of

terrorism.

Senator Lacson. But babalik tayo uli roon sa intent and purpose. Iyong

objective ng malefactors, Mr. President, will be guided or will be bound by the

definition as to the intent and purpose of the act being committed.

Senator Drilon. Yes, Mr. President. Because the way the definition is

now crafted, whether or not one is a public officer or a military or a police, he

20
can be convicted under the anti-terrorism measure. Whereas, in coup d’etat,

unless one is a public officer, he cannot fall under this.

Senator Lacson. Iyon na nga po, Mr. President, the elements of coup

d’etat, and may I enumerate, especially No. 1, that the offender is a person or

persons belonging to the military or police or holding any public office or

employment...

Senator Drilon. That is correct, Mr. President. My problem is that the

sponsor’s definition of terrorism covers “any person.”

Senator Lacson. Yes, Mr. President.

Senator Drilon. In the debate last time, it was not clear. I will cite

Senator Honasan only by way of example because he is a classic example. Now,

if he is still a member of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and he commits

what he had committed, will he be charged as a terrorist or a coup d’etat? I am

not saying that there is proof against Senator Honasan, just on a theoretical

discussion. If Senator Honasan was still a coronel and he committed what he

did commit and we have already the Anti-Terrorism Law, with what crime will

he be charged?

Senator Lacson. It is coup d’etat, Mr. President, kasi klaro naman ang

kaniyang purpose. Ang purpose ni Senator Honasan, assuming that he is

guilty, is to cease or diminish state power.

Senator Drilon. Yes, Mr. President. The purpose is to diminish state

power which is also covered by the broad definition of forcing or inducing the

government to…

21
 Senator Lacson. I see the point of the gentleman, Mr. President. But,

the evidence will clearly show the objective, the intent, or purpose of the person

committing the act.

Senator Drilon. Mr. President, would not this position of the person be

more crucial? Meaning, if he committed the acts of terrorism while he was a

public officer, he would be charged under coup d’état under Article 134-A

rather than a terrorist.

Senator Lacson. To seize or diminish the state power, magkaiba naman

po iyon doon sa we are preventing government to perform its function, Mr.

President. We are always guided by the intent and purpose.

Senator Drilon. Kaya nga po. That is why I thought, Mr. President,

that the clearer guide would be whether or not…

Senator Lacson. Yes, I understand where the gentleman is coming

from, Mr. President.

Senator Drilon. …whether or not the person being charged is a public

officer or a military or police officer which, therefore, qualifies him under coup

d’état. But if he is not a public officer, then it can be under the act of

terrorism. But my problem is, in the definition of the sponsor, terrorism covers

any person. And that is why I asked this question because I remember that

the first time I took the Floor on the period of interpellations, the sponsor

clearly stated that Senator Honasan, under the circumstances, cannot be

charged under terrorism because he is a public officer and, therefore, he

commits a coup d’état.

22
 On the other hand, in the second session, on the same period of

interpellations, the sponsor said that Senator Honasan can be charged for

terrorism. Which is which now, Mr. President?

Senator Lacson. I wish Senator Honasan were here, Mr. President, so

he can interject and state for the record his purpose at that time.

Senator Drilon. Well, my problem with that is, the purpose could be the

same whether it is an act of terrorism or a coup d’état.

Senator Lacson. I think, the operative phrase is “seize or diminish state

power,” Mr. President. I think, it was clear when Senator Honasan reportedly

embarked on several adventures, as a matter of fact, was to seize power or

diminish state power. Hindi naman po ang purpose niya was to terrorize.

Senator Drilon. No, Mr. President.

Senator Lacson. Klaro po iyon.

Senator Drilon. Well, that is precisely my problem. Hindi naman ang

purpose niya is only to terrorize. But the purpose is to seize and diminish

state power and to destabilize political structure.

Anyway, as I said, I would like to see this clearer definition or clarity in

this area because I see this as an area of confusion and difficulty. Of course,

that is our view. The sponsor may take another view. But, I think, there is

nothing wrong with clarifying so that the intent of the….

Senator Lacson. Of course, I am in full agreement, Mr. President. That

is why this discussion might establish the proper language in defining the acts

of terrorism as it appears in the proposed measure.

23
 Senator Drilon. So, again, just to summarize, we would earnestly

request the good sponsor that, in the period of amendment, he will now make it

clearer in the language what are the elements of terrorism, rebellion, sedition,

or coup d’état, which would distinguish one from the other so that the

prosecutor and the judge can see clearly which direction they should take in

punishing the acts being committed.

Senator Lacson. With the active help and support of the gentleman, I

think we can come up with a… I understand where the gentleman is coming

from because medyo encompassing ang mga elements dito as proposed, Mr.

President.

Senator Drilon. I can sympathize with the sponsor. It is not easy.

Senator Lacson. Thank you for sympathizing with me, Mr. President.

Senator Drilon. That is why my luck, however, is that I am the one

asking the questions. [Laughter]

Senator Lacson. We are dealing here with at least 109 definitions of

terrorism. That is why we really have to clarify each and every word that is

used in defining--only in the definition of terrorism, Mr. President.

Senator Drilon. Yes, Mr. President.

Again, the general question: When is a liberation or democracy

movement an act of terrorism, if it is? In other words, how does one distinguish

between a liberation movement or a democracy movement from terrorism? For

example, Nelson Mandela, was he a terrorist or was he a leader of a liberation

movement?

24
 Assuming that we have a Nelson Mandela in the country at some future

time, would that person be considered as the leader of a liberation movement

or a democratic movement?

Because, Mr. President, this is not a theory. It actually happens as we

talk.

Senator Lacson. Even in the Philippines, Mr. President, in 1986.

Senator Drilon. Yes, it actually happens. In 1986, it happened. In Hong

Kong, there are democracy movements; the violence takes place. If that

happens here, is he a terrorist or a leader of a democracy movement?

Senator Lacson. Mr. President, I was handed this quote: “One man’s

terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter.”

Senator Drilon. That is correct, Mr. President. So, where does that

prove us?

Senator Lacson. As articulated by Senator Hontiveros, I think, if I recall

it correctly, halimbawa, “legitimate” iyong purpose in expressing dissent, let us

say, under the condition of a martial rule where maraming mga abuses--I am

not trying to put on the spot. Wala naman pala rito. Ayun. [Laughter]

Senator Drilon. Nandiyan. [Laughter]

Senator Lacson. And people would rise up in arms to correct an abusive

regime and nanalo sila, then iyon nga iyong quote na, “One man’s terrorist is

another man’s freedom fighter.”

Senator Drilon. Kung hindi sila nanalo?

25
 Senator Lacson. Patay sila, Mr. Presisdent—terrorists sila or mga rebels

sila. And they will be answerable criminally for their acts. And that is a fact of

life.

As in the case of Nelson Mandela, the reason why he is now being

acclaimed as a hero ay dahil nanalo sila, Mr. President. That is a fact of life.

But going back to our discussion, I would like to believe that we have to

really consider and look seriously at the intent and purpose of the act. Kaya

nga idinagdag pa natin iyong “by its nature and context,” Mr. President

Senator Drilon. Yes, Mr. President. I do not disagree with that generally,

except that if we analyze it deeper, the broad definition of terrorism would

include rebellion, sedition, and coup d’état.

In any case, we have already manifested that and at the appropriate

time, maybe the good sponsor can look at the definition more closely and see

how this vagueness or broad definition can be better addressed.

So, absent the purpose or the intent that would qualify it as an act of

terrorism, it would be punished under the Revised Penal Code?

Senator Lacson. That is correct, Mr. President.

Senator Drilon. Rebellion.

Senator Lacson. Or coup d’etat.

Senator Drilon. All right. One more issue and then I will yield the Floor

to Senator Gordon; and this is the issue of proscription.

Mr. President, under the proposed measure, it is a mandatory

requirement for the judge to issue a preliminary order of proscription within

26
72 hours after the filing of the application should the judge determine that

there is probable cause to show that a group is a terrorist organization, is

that correct?

Senator Lacson. That is correct, Mr. President.

Senator Drilon. And this preliminary order based on probable cause

under the measure can be the basis for the detention of the alleged members

of the organization.

Senator Lacson. As listed, Mr. President. Each and every member ay

kailangang mayroon ding makitang probable cause ng membership of a

proscribed organization, even in the preliminary order of proscription.

Senator Drilon. We are just talking first about the order of

proscription.

Senator Lacson. All right, Mr. President.

Senator Drilon. And based on probable cause, a preliminary order can

be the basis of detention of the alleged members of the organization. Is that a

correct reading, Mr. President?

Senator Lacson. That is correct, Mr. President, even the freezing of the

assets.

Senator Drilon. And then, the burden of proof is shifted from the

government to the proscribed group because it imposes upon the group the

burden of showing, for good cause, why a preliminary order of proscription

must be set aside.

27
 In other words, the one who is charged will be the one to show that the

order has no basis. Is that not a little difficult in terms of our Constitution

because the burden of proof is shifted to the defendant? The law creates a

presumption that it is a proscribed organization and, therefore, he must now

prove that it is not.

To my mind, it is a little contrary to what we understand to be the

presumption of innocence when we have that kind of a system. The concern

is that the preliminary order of proscription may be used to justify the random

detention of the individuals under the guise of their membership in a

preliminarily proscribed group.

In other words, once the judge has ruled on the basis of the preliminary

submission that XYZ organization is a terrorist group, then on that basis of

the order of proscription, the detention may had and the defendant has to

show that the order has no basis because the burden of proof is shifted to

him, rather than the burden being in the prosecutor and the government. Do

we not find this a little difficult?

Senator Lacson. Mr. President, it is akin to a respondent against whom

a warrant of arrest was issued by the judge on the basis of probable cause. On

this basis, he is not being convicted yet. And while undergoing trial, since the

crime is unbailable, then he is detained until such time that the judge grants

bail or the prosecution fails to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Pareho rin

po iyong principle na iyon. It does not necessarily mean na iyong burden of

proof has shifted to the respondent to prove that he should not be detained

28
because, remember, the threshold that the judge would follow before he will

issue a preliminary order of proscription is probable cause, in the same

manner that when a prosecutor files the Information, clearly, the prosecutor

has already found probable cause against the individual; and the judge,

necessarily, after judicial determination of probable cause, would issue a

warrant of arrest. Pareho rin iyon, wala pong pagkakaiba roon sa regular due

process that we are following or observing.

In this case, tama po iyon, detained iyong person because the judge

himself has already found probable cause to proscribe the organization to

include the members who have been established to be members of that

proscribed or preliminarily proscribed organization. And within six months,

the judge will have to determine if iyong preliminary order of proscription will

be a permanent order, Mr. President. So, I do not see any deviation from the

regular practice of detaining a person after finding probable cause. Of course,

under the new rules, hindi porke at may probable cause iyong prosecutor,

iyong judge will automatically follow. There is such a thing as judicial

determination of probable cause which, I believe, is also similar in this

situation.

Senator Drilon. The present procedure is that when the information is

filed, the judge, on the basis of his own personal examination, would determine

that a warrant of arrest should be issued.

Senator Lacson. There is indeed a probable cause. We call it judicial

determination of probable cause.

29
 Senator Drilon. That is correct, Mr. President.

Senator Lacson. Before, during our time when I was still with law

enforcement, hindi na kailangan. Kapag sinabi ng prosecutor na, “We are filing

this Information on the basis of probable cause,” the judge had no other

option.

Senator Drilon. That is correct. That is how the jurisprudence

developed.

Senator Lacson. Evolved.

Senator Drilon. Evolved. So that at a certain point, the Supreme Court

has ruled that the judge would have to examine personally and determine

whether or not there is probable cause. Is that procedure applicable here?

Senator Lacson. Yes, Mr. President.

Senator Drilon. So that when the application is filed for declaring an

organization as a proscribed organization, the judge would have to determine.

Senator Lacson. Yes, Mr. President.

Senator Drilon. Maybe we can include. In other words, the provision in

the Constitution will apply insofar as that is concerned.

Senator Lacson. Yes, Mr. President. Without the judge finding probable

cause, he would not issue a preliminary order of proscription.

Ito iyong process, if I may, Mr. President.

Senator Drilon. Yes, Mr. President.

Senator Lacson. As provided for, under the proposal, with the authority

of the Anti-Terrorism Council, upon the recommendation of the NICA, the DOJ

30
shall file an application before a competent RTC for the proscription of any

group.

Senator Drilon. Yes, Mr. President.

Senator Lacson. Tapos, puwede ring gumawa ng preliminary order of

proscription, but kailangang sundin pa rin ng judge iyong judicial

determination of probable cause before he issues the preliminary order of

proscription. Iyon pa rin po ang threshold.

Senator Drilon. All right, Mr. President. I will eagerly await how that will

be phrased in the amendments that I assume will be submitted, so that that

kind of situation will be clearly enunciated in the law.

All right. The judge determines that there is probable cause to declare an

organization as a proscribe organization and issues the order. That is fine.

What about the individuals who are supposed to be members of that? What

kind of safeguards can we include in the law so that the mere fact that it is a

proscribed organization should not result in every alleged member to be

arrested?

Senator Lacson. Indiscriminate, yes, Mr. President.

Senator Drilon. Remember that under the proposed measure, Mr.

President, one can be detained for 14 working days, so there could be some

degree of arbitrariness. For example, I am alleged to be a member of a

proscribed organization and, therefore, I am arrested and detained for 14

working days on the allegation that I am a member of an organization which is

proscribed, how do we guard against abuses?

31
 Senator Lacson. That is a different matter, Mr. President.

To arrest an alleged member of a proscribed organization, it is incumbent

upon the government to prove that he is really a member before he can be

arrested.

Iyon naman pong warrantless arrest, iba naman po iyon.

Senator Drilon. No, I am not talking about that.

Senator Lacson. Hindi dahil sa mayroong reasonable ground or

mayroong ground iyong police officer to arrest a person just because he is

reportedly a member or allegedly a member, hindi siya pupuwedeng basta

arestuhin. The government should prove that the person to be arrested is

indeed a member of that proscribed organization.

Senator Drilon. Not only he is a member, but he knowingly, under the

measure, became a member.

Senator Lacson. That is correct, Mr. President.

Senator Drilon. So that unless there is proof that he knowingly became a

member, knowing that it is a terrorist organization, he cannot be arrested.

Senator Lacson. Yes, Mr. President.

Senator Drilon. We make that clear because that is very critical for the

appreciation of the measure.

Senator Gordon wishes to intervene. I have no problem with Senator

Gordon…

Senator Lacson. Mr. President, with the indulgence of Senator Gordon.

Ito po iyong sa Section 9, second paragraph, “ANY PERSON WHO SHALL

32
VOLUNTARILY AND KNOWINGLY JOIN ANY ORGANIZATION, ASSOCIATION

OR GROUP OF PERSONS KNOWING THAT SUCH ORGANIZATION,

ASSOCIATION OR GROUP OF PERSONS IS PROSCRIBED UNDER SECTION 24

OF THIS ACT, OR THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL-DESIGNATED

TERRORIST ORGANIZATION, OR ORGANIZED FOR THE PURPOSE OF

ENGAGING IN TERRORIST ACTS, SHALL SUFFER THE PENALTY OF xxx.”

Senator Drilon. So, just for the record, it is not mere membership in the

proscribe organization, but it must be shown that he knowingly and

voluntarily, with full knowledge of the nature of the organization, joined it. In

other words, it is not automatic that one who is a member of a proscribed

organization could be arrested.

Senator Lacson. Yes, Mr. President. That is correct. That is expressly

provided under Section 9.

Senator Drilon. Mr. President, I yield the Floor to Senator Gordon.

Senator Gordon. The gentleman from Iloilo read my mind. This time he

has the correct reading of my mind, Mr. President, that mere membership is

not a ground for arrest. He has to knowingly join the organization.

Senator Drilon. And it must be proven before the court that he is a

member who knowingly joined that organization.

Senator Gordon. It is very important for the Supreme Court later on

when they interpret.

Thank you, Mr. President.

33
 Senator Lacson. As a matter of fact, Mr. President, there is a pending

petition from DOJ to declare CPP-NPA as a proscribed terrorist organization.

And the government has submitted a list of members. So, doon lamang po

naka-limit iyong mga puwedeng arestuhin and, later on, if they can submit or

file supplemental petition to include additional members, kailangang i-prove pa

rin nila na iyon nga, knowingly, voluntarily and so forth and so on, Mr.

President.

Senator Drilon. But is there not a phrase somewhere in the proposed

measure, “is presumed to know”? One is qualified for arrest if he is presumed

to know.

Senator Lacson. Let me check but as far as I am concerned, wala po

iyong presumption of knowing.

Senator Drilon. It is in providing material support.

Senator Lacson. In providing material support, Mr. President.

Senator Drilon. Yes, mayroon po, Mr. President.

I yield the Floor to Senator Tolentino, Mr. President.

Senator Tolentino. With the permission of the gentleman, just one

clarificatory question, Mr. President.

The President. Senator Tolentino is recognized.

Senator Tolentino. Mr. President, the United Nations declared

proscribed organizations. Will this need a court determination or validation

whether these are really terrorist fronts or organizations, or we just rely on the

declaration of the United Nations?

34
 Senator Lacson. I suppose it should require an act of a court in the

Philippines to formalize the United Nations’ resolution declaring a terrorist

organization as a proscribed organization, Mr. President.

Senator Tolentino. Mr. President, may we know from the good sponsor

that at this stage, preliminarily, do we have a listing of the said United Nations

proscribed organizations? Will this include the well-known Middle Eastern

terrorist fronts that this representation mentioned during the interpellation

granted by the good sponsor?

Senator Lacson. The gentleman is referring to the UN list?

Senator Tolentino. Yes, Mr. President.

Senator Lacson. There is a list, Mr. President. Al-Qaeda is one; ISIS is

another, Mr. President. There is a list under the United Nations’ resolution of

these proscribed terrorist organizations.

Senator Tolentino. So, Mr. President, from the answer of the good

sponsor, it would now mean that even if there is a prior list coming from the

United Nations, it is not automatic that knowingly becoming a member of the

proscribed organizations by the United Nations would merit an offense as

enunciated by the proposed law.

Senator Lacson. It should be formalized by a competent regional trial

court, Mr. President, to formally proscribe the… yes, it must be brought before

a court which will now formally issue an order of proscription, Mr. President.

Senator Tolentino. My final query again to reiterate my previous

interpellation and which, I think, was already answered. If the court

35
determination would come out during that hearing, how would the accused,

the member, exculpate himself? Because the declaration probably might come

out during the hearing and the timing of his membership might be a priori or

probably it was done before the declaration of the court that said organization

is a terrorist organization. Just last one point, Mr. President.

Senator Lacson. Hindi ko na po nasundan sa haba ng tanong ninyo, Mr.

President.

Senator Tolentino. To rephrase, Mr. President, maaari po ba kaya na

roon sa hearing lamang nalaman noong naging miyembro na iyon palang

nasalihan niya ay isang terrorist front? So, how can he now…

Senator Lacson. Hindi po papasok sa knowingly, Mr. President.

Senator Tolentino. Hindi na, Mr. President.

Senator Lacson. But, of course, kung kaya namang i-prove ng gobyerno

na knowingly, then problema niya iyon, Mr. President—matter of evidence.

Senator Tolentino. I thank the good gentleman and the Minority Leader

for the time given. I yield the Floor.

Senator Drilon. Mr. President, may I suggest that on page 24, Section

22 which includes a new Section 25, that the good sponsor should examine

closely the paragraph starting on line 22 which says: “THE COURT WILL

SCHEDULE A SUMMARY HEARING AT A DATE AND TIME WITHIN A SIX-

MONTH PERIOD FROM THE FILING OF THE VERIFIED APPLICATION, WHEN

THE RESPONDENT MAY, FOR GOOD CAUSE, SHOW WHY THE ORDER OF

PROSCRIPTION SHOULD BE SET ASIDE.” This is where I was saying that we

36
have shifted the burden of proof to the one who is arrested because he has now

to show that the order of proscription should be set aside rather than the

government justifying why it should be maintained—something that would not

be acceptable as a principle of fair play and justice.

Senator Lacson. Ganito po iyan, Mr. President. Iyong burden of proof

stays with the government, but after 72 hours and the judge determines

probable cause for the issuance of preliminary order of proscription against the

organization concerned, what is shifted is the burden of evidence from the

government to the other party.

Senator Drilon. Mr. President, the burden on the government is only to

show probable cause.

Senator Lacson. Within the six-month period, Mr. President.

Senator Drilon. Yes, Mr. President. Therefore, that standard of proof is

not that high but then, under the proposal, we already shifted the burden to

the accused. Is it not better if the order is reversed so that within that period

the prosecution must show that, indeed, the preliminary order is valid and

supported by evidence rather than shifting the burden to the defendant?

Because, remember, this is a summary hearing and this is just for the

establishment of a probable cause. The standard of evidence is low or the

hurdle, for purposes of evidence, is low but yet, the burden is shifted to the

accused.

We would like to see a revision of this provision so that it will be

consistent with fair play, Mr. President.

37
 Senator Lacson. I agree, Mr. President. I would like to cite here another

jurisprudence, Corpus vs. Sarmiento, G.R. No. L-45137, it says here: “When a

prima facie case is established by the prosecution in a criminal case, as in the

case at bar, the burden of proof does not shift to the defense. It remains

throughout the trial with the party upon whom it is imposed—the prosecution.

It is the burden of evidence which shifts from party to party depending upon

the exigencies of the case in the course of the trial. This burden of going

forward with the evidence is met by evidence which balances that introduced

by the prosecution. Then the burden shifts back.”

I am open to amendment or open to further improving the language

under Section 25, paragraph 2, Mr. President.

Senator Drilon. Thank you, Mr. President.

Senator Lacson. Pero nakalagay rin naman dito na, “WHEN THE

RESPONDENT MAY, FOR GOOD CAUSE, SHOW WHY THE ORDER OF

PROSCRIPTION SHOULD BE SET ASIDE.” So, naroon pa naman iyong

provision na iyon. But, anyway, as I have stated earlier, I am open to further

improving this particular provision.

Senator Drilon. On page 25, Mr. President, who is the “Deputized law

enforcement agency or military personnel?” My impression is that only certain

officials are authorized to file charges. Who is the deputized law enforcement

agency or military personnel? May we be merited with an explanation on this,

Mr. President?

38
 Senator Lacson. It is rather vague, Mr. President. I would like to believe

that it is the Anti-Terrorism Council (ATC) that will issue the authority. The

gentleman is correct, we should be more specific.

Senator Drilon. So, conceptually, it is the Anti-Terrorism Council which

is the source of deputization.

Senator Lacson. Yes, Mr. President.

Senator Drilon. Now, the good sponsor, on page 20, specified 14

working days. This is actually three weeks if we will consider this on a calendar

basis, because if we will exclude Saturday and Sunday, this is actually three

weeks, Mr. President.

Senator Lacson. Yes, Mr. President, five, five, and four working days.

Senator Drilon. That is 19 days, Mr. President.

Senator Lacson. It should be equivalent to seven, Mr. President.

Another five, which should be equivalent to seven; another four…Yes, Mr.

President.

Senator Drilon. Yes, Mr. President. Fourteen working days can be

subject to various interpretations. It may happen that there are special

nonworking holidays, et cetera.

Senator Lacson. Holy week, Mr. President.

Senator Drilon. Holy week, yes. Will this be vigorously altered if we talk

about calendar days? So that there is no more debate as to whether it is a

working day or a nonworking day.

Senator Lacson. We can strike a bargain, Mr. President.

39
 Senator Drilon. Yes, Mr. President.

Senator Lacson. Fourteen calendar days, subject to an extended period

of, let us say, another four days or maybe five days.

Senator Drilon. Who determines that, Mr. President?

Senator Lacson. The court, Mr. President.

Senator Drilon. All right. While we are willing to consider that…

Senator Lacson. Because in other jurisdictions, Mr. President, mayroon

silang extension—Singapore, as I mentioned earlier, 732 days, tapos puwedeng

i-extend indefinitely. In other jurisdictions, mayroong ganoon.

Senator Drilon. We are open to that, Mr. President, as long as it is

reasonable.

Senator Lacson. Yes, Mr. President.

Senator Drilon. So, we will await the proposed amendment. Also, on

page 20, lines 11 to 14, the provision is proposed to be deleted. The existing

provision would provide “that the arrest of those suspected of the crime of

terrorism or conspiracy to commit terrorism must result from the surveillance

under Section 7, or examination of bank deposits under Section 27 of this Act.”

Senator Lacson. What section, Mr. President?

Senator Drilon. This is on page 26—I am sorry—lines 11 to 14, which is

a provision of the existing law but which is now bracketed and, therefore,

proposed to be deleted. May we spread into the Record the rationale of this

deletion?

SUSPENSION OF SESSION

40
 Senator Lacson. I move for a one-minute suspension of the session, Mr.
President.

The President. Is there any objection? [Silence] There being none, the
session is suspended for one minute.

It was 4:20 p.m.

RESUMPTION OF SESSION

At 4:20 p.m., the session was resumed.

The President. The session is resumed.

Senator Lacson. Actually, pandagdag sa safeguards ito, Mr. President.

Senator Drilon. I am sorry, Mr. President?

Senator Lacson. This is additional safeguard because under Republic

Act No. 9372, if we will read the proviso or the provision that we propose to

delete, “[Provided, That the arrest of those suspected of the crime of terrorism

or conspiracy to commit terrorism must result from the surveillance under

Section 7and examination of bank deposits under Section 27 of this Act.]”

Senator Drilon. Yes. That is proposed to be deleted, Mr. President.

Senator Lacson. Yes, Mr. President.

Senator Drilon. Our question is, can the good sponsor spread into the

Record the rationale for this deletion?

Senator Lacson. It is additional safeguard, Mr. President.

Senator Drilon. In fact, this is a safeguard and it is proposed to be

deleted, Mr. President. So, we just want the record to reflect the rationale for

the deletion of the safeguard.

SUSPENSION OF SESSION

41
 Senator Lacson. Mr. President, I move that we suspend the session for
one minute.

The President. Is there any objection? [Silence] There being none, the
session is suspended for one minute.

It was 4:21 p.m.

RESUMPTION OF SESSION

At 4:23 p.m., the session was resumed.

The President. The session is resumed.

Senator Lacson. This is proposed to be deleted para maging proactive,

Mr. President. Because as stated in the previous paragraphs, what we are

aiming here is to prevent the occurrence of acts of terrorism because the

damage is so huge--loss of lives and properties. So in lieu of that, we inserted

the phrase under Section 27, “PERSONNEL OR DEPUTIZED LAW

ENFORCMENT AGENCY OR MILITARY personnel IF IT IS ESTABLISHED THAT

(1) FURTHER DETENTION OF THE PERSON/S IS NECESSARY TO PRESERVE

EVIDENCE RELATED TO THE TERRORIST ACT OR COMPLETE THE

INVESTIGATION; (2) FURTHER DETENTION OF THE PERSON/S IS

NECESSARY TO PREVENT THE COMMISSION OF ANOTHER TERRORIST ACT;

AND (3) THE INVESTIGATION IS BEING CONDUCTED PROPERLY AND

WITHOUT DELAY.”

Senator Drilon. Anyway, again, this is one area probably which the

good sponsor, if he is minded to, can clarify in the period of amendments.

Senator Lacson. Yes, Mr. President.

Senator Drilon. Just for the record.

42
 Senator Lacson. This can be balanced by the inclusion of several

additional safeguards under the proposed measure, Mr. President.

It says, “the law enforcer taking custody shall notify in writing the judge

nearest the place of arrest of the following facts: time, date, and manner of

arrest; location or locations of the detained suspects; physical and mental

condition.” And then also furnished din iyong Anti-Terrorism Council (ATC). We

agreed earlier to the proposal of Senator Hontiveros to include the Commission

on Human Rights.

Senator Drilon. Now, in the previous answer of the good sponsor, he

says that he is amenable to 14 calendar days provided that an application for

an extension can be provided.

Senator Lacson. That is correct, Mr. President.

Senator Drilon. That should be before the court.

Senator Lacson. Before the court, Mr. President.

Senator Drilon. Not just the Anti-Terrorism Council.

Senator Lacson. No, Mr. President.

Senator Drilon. In other words, it must be a judicial process.

Senator Lacson. It should be by the court, Mr. President.

Senator Drilon. Again, just for the record, why is the requirement for an

official custodial logbook under Section 23 of the present law being deleted?

Senator Lacson. In lieu of that, Mr. President, those that I have

enumerated earlier, ang ipinalit natin ay iyong “The judge nearest the place of

arrest must be informed.”

43
 Senator Drilon. All right.

Senator Lacson. So, mas effective pa iyon, Mr. President, than the

custodial logbook.

SUSPENSION OF SESSION

Senator Drilon. Mr. President, I move that we suspend the session for
one minute.

The President. Is there any objection? [Silence] There being none, the
session is suspended for one minute.

It was 4:27 p.m.

RESUMPTION OF SESSION

At 4:28 p.m., the session was resumed.

The President. The session is resumed.

Senator Drilon. Just a few more minutes, with the indulgence of the

sponsor, before I yield the Floor to Senator Gordon.

On page 34, we are deleting Sections 27 and 28 on the Judicial

Authorization Required to Examine Bank Deposits, Accounts, and Records. Does

this mean that the bank deposits can be examined even without court

authorization? Or is that covered by other sections?

Senator Lacson. It is just a restatement of terrorist financing under

Republic Act No. 10168, Mr. President, iyong effectively amending the Anti-

Money Laundering Act, Mr. President.

Sa language nga nila, Mr. President, surplusage, already provided by

other laws.

Senator Drilon. Yes, Mr. President.

44
 On page 40, Section 32, which is on bank inquiry and examination,

does the law enforcer need authority from the court to examine bank accounts

in case the court declares an organization as a terrorist organization? In other

words, would mere designation as a terrorist organization authorize the law

enforcement to examine and open bank accounts?

Senator Lacson. The provision under RA 10168 is applicable here, Mr.

President.

Senator Drilon. For the education of this representation, what are

those, Mr. President? Because the way I read this Section 32, as amended, it

says, “UPON ORDER OF THE COURT DECLARING AN ORGANIZATION,

ASSOCIATION, OR GROUP PERSONS AS TERRORIST OR AN OUTLAWED

ORGANIZATION OR ASSOCIATION IN ACCORDANCE IN SEC. 24 x x x LAW

ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS OR MILITARY PERSONNEL, THRU THE ANTI-

MONEY LAUNDERING COUNCIL, MAY CONDUCT AN INQUIRY AND

EXAMINATION INTO THE BANK ACCOUNTS AND INVESTMENTS OF SUCH

ORGANIZATION, ASSOCIATION, GROUP OF PERSONS OR INDIVIDUAL.” In

other words, the situation here is, upon being declared as a terrorist

organization without any further need of a court authorization, the bank

accounts may be opened through the Anti-Money Laundering Council.

Senator Lacson. Mr. President, under Sec. 11 of the Anti-Money

Laundering Act, ATC “is hereby authorized to issue an ex parte order to freeze

without delay.” Nandoon po iyon. This is with reference to the Anti-Money

Laundering Act.

45
 Senator Drilon. So, there is an act of the court to freeze?

Senator Lacson. Yes, Mr. President.

Senator Drilon. But would that requirement be dispensed with the

way Section 32 is proposed to be amended? Because the way I envisioned

Section 32 is, to declare an organization as a proscribed organization, the law

enforcement, through the Anti Money Laundering Council, may conduct an

inquiry and examine the bank accounts and investments of such organization,

then, it says, “SUCH INQUIRY AND EXAMINATION SHALL BE IN

ACCORDANCE WITH REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9160.”

The problem here, Mr. President, that I see is, while one sentence

already implies that it can be done without any court order, the second

sentence says, the inquiry shall be in accordance with Republic Act No. 9160

which requires a court order. Can the good sponsor clarify this?

Senator Lacson. We are not amending the provisions under the Anti-

Money Laundering Act, as amended by RA 10168 or the Terrorism Financing

Act. Wala po tayong ginagalaw doon.

Senator Drilon. I know, but what does that mean, Mr. President? Just

for the record, for the education of this representation. Once an organization is

declared as an outlawed organization in accordance with Section 24 and an

order of proscription is issued, that authority would be enough for the AMLC to

open the accounts of the terrorist organization.

Senator Lacson. That is correct, Mr. President, as provided under

Section 11 of the Terrorism Financing Act or RA 10168.

46
 Senator Drilon. Now, is it not the court order in those instances

refers…

Senator Lacson. No more, Mr. President. It says here: “Authority to

Freeze. – The AMLC, either upon its own initiative xxx.” I am quoting Section

11 of RA 10168.

Senator Drilon. Yes, but that is the authority to freeze, Mr. President.

Senator Lacson. That is correct, Mr. President.

Senator Drilon. But what about the authority to examine?

Senator Lacson. That is under Section 10, Mr. President. Section 10

states that: “Section 10. Authority to Investigate Financing of Terrorism. - The

AMLC, either upon its own initiative or at the request of the ATC, is hereby

authorized to investigate xxx.”

Senator Drilon. All right. I guess I have exhausted the good portion of

our issues, may we just be permitted to raise additional clarificatory question

once the amendments are introduced in accordance with our interpellation this

afternoon.

Senator Lacson. Certainly, Mr. President. My mindset and attitude

have not changed. Anything that will improve the final version of this measure

is most welcome.

Senator Drilon. That is good, Mr. President, because, indeed, we have a

common purpose here--to strengthen our ability to fight terrorism. But at the

same time, we are conscious of our obligation to make sure that abuses are not

committed in the name of fighting terrorism because the line is not very clear

47
and so, therefore, we will just await the period of amendments and we reserve

the right, with the permission of the good sponsor, to raise clarificatory

questions when the amendments are introduced.

Senator Lacson. Mr. President, we thank the distinguished Minority

Leader in that regard.

Senator Drilon. Mr. President, para hindi na po sabihin na walang

kamatayan, wala na akong itatanong. [Laughter]

Thank you, Mr. President.

Senator Lacson. Thank you, Mr. President.

The President. All right. Is Senator Gordon going to interpellate?

Senator Gordon. Yes, Mr. President.

The President. Can we have a few minutes of break before we do so?

Senator Gordon. All right, Mr. President.

SUSPENSION OF SESSION

The President. With the permission of the Body, the session is

suspended for a few minutes, if there is no objection. [There was none].

It was 4:39 p.m.

RESUMPTION OF SESSION

At 5:17 p.m., the session was resumed.

The President. The session is resumed.

Before the break, Senator Lacson was still on the Floor, still on the Anti-

Terrorism bill, Senate Bill No. 1083, and the Minority Leader terminated his

interpellation.

48
 I would like to take this opportunity to correct myself in the last session

that the Minority Leader did not give me a bamboo tray. He did give me a

bamboo tray last December but I lost it. So, he is giving me another one today.

Senator Zubiri. I would like to also thank him, Mr. President, because

he is apparently giving me one today.

The President. Thank you very much.

Yes, Senator Pimentel.

Senator Pimentel. I confirm receipt of the bamboo tray.

Senator Zubiri. Mr. President, iniimbestigahan ko pa kung sino ang nag-

uwi ng aking bamboo tray. [Laughter] Kaya talagang delikado siya sa akin. Is

it there? Can I see it?

The President. So, again, to continue the interpellation, Mr. President.

Senator Zubiri. Mr. President, I ask that we recognize Senator Gordon.

The President. Sen. Richard J. Gordon is recognized to interpellate.

Senator Gordon. Thank you very much, Mr. President.

I think a few questions have already been clarified.

This is really for further clarification in case the matter gets into the

Supreme Court sometime in the future. Hopefully, if we clarify this, the

Supreme Court will have an easier time.

Now, Mr. President, in the matter of proscription, when proscription

occurs--just a very quick question--does that automatically or, at least, at the

very least, allow the government to start freezing assets?

Senator Lacson. Yes, Mr. President.

49
 Senator Gordon. And, Mr. President, under the Dangerous Drugs Act,

when assets are frozen after a case, it is immediately forfeited in favor of the

government. Now, in this particular case, we are following the AMLA

procedure.

Senator Lacson. That is correct, Mr. President.

Senator Gordon. We go to AMLA and then we go to the courts?

Senator Lacson. The AMLA will file ex parte, too, Mr. President. And

the Court of Appeals will issue the freeze order.

Senator Gordon. Now, my final question, Mr. President: Where did the

frozen assets go?

Senator Lacson. It will go to AMLA in the meantime, Mr. President.

Senator Gordon. AMLA pa rin.

Senator Lacson. Yes, Mr. President.

Senator Gordon. So, it is under the AMLA.

Senator Lacson. It is under the AMLA, Mr. President.

Senator Gordon. All right, just to be clarified, Mr. President.

Thank you, Mr. President. That is all.

Senator Lacson. Thank you, Mr. President.

The President. We have just witnessed a miracle. [Laughter]

Senator Zubiri. We should have the doctor checked our distinguished

senator from Zambales, Mr. President.

Senator Gordon. I know that everyone misses my interpellation, so I

wanted to disappoint everyone this time. [Laughter]

50
 Senator Zubiri. Mr. President, since no other member wishes to

interpellate, I move that we close the period of interpellation of Senate Bill No.

1083.

The President. Is there any objection? [Silence] There being none, the

motion is approved.

Senator Zubiri. Mr. President, I ask that we recognize the Minority

Leader, Sen. Franklin Drilon.

The President. The Minority Leader, Sen. Franklin Drilon, is recognized.

MOTION OF SENATOR DRILON

(Suspension of the Rules of the Senate)

Senator Drilon. Mr. President, we have extensively studied the measure

and it is extremely difficult. There are a lot of implications on every provision

and it involves the study of so many laws. The good sponsor is the one who is

most familiar with the bill as he is the one who drafted it. It is a substitute bill

and under our Rules, there can be no committee amendments and, therefore,

we proceed with the individual amendments.

May I move, Mr. President, that in the period of amendments, the Rules

be suspended in order to allow the committee to introduce committee

amendments so that we can have a better appreciation of how the bill will look

like with the amendments submitted by the committee. Otherwise, if we

proceed with the individual amendments, we will find it very difficult, and

would hardly understand what the bill is all about.

The President. All right.

51
 Senator Drilon. So, that is, if it is in order, Mr. President, I would so

move.

The President. All right. With the approval of the members, we may do

so. So the motion of the Minority Leader may be approved by the Body.

Technically, it is the individual amendment of the sponsor, but given the

manifestation that the Minority Leader has placed on record, I do not see any

problem at all.

Is there any objection? [Silence] There being none, the motion of the

Minority Leader is approved.

Senator Zubiri. Thank you, Mr. President.

The President. We will recognize Senator Lacson during the period of

amendments.

Senator Zubiri. We would like to ask Senator Lacson if he would ask for

another day?

Senator Lacson. I concur, Mr. President. It would be a privilege.

Senator Zubiri. Is the good sponsor ready to open the period of

amendments or not yet?

Senator Lacson. Not yet, Mr. President. We have to consolidate and

review the interpellation.

Senator Zubiri. Actually, that makes a lot of sense, Mr. President. All

the discussions that we had on the Floor, we will incorporate them into

amendments so that we will have a proper flow of the amendments from page

one up to the last page. Unlike, if individually, if we all provide our

52
amendments, ang mangyayari niyan, magkakagulo tayo; back to page one

every time somebody stands up. So, that makes sense, Mr. President.

The President. Of course, it will become a new working draft from the

sponsor.

Senator Zubiri. That is correct, Mr. President.

SUSPENSION OF CONSIDERATION OF S. NO. 1083

Mr. President, while waiting for the committee amendments, I move that

we suspend consideration of Senate Bill No. 1083.

The President. Is there any objection? [Silence] There being none, the

motion is approved.

BILL ON SECOND READING

S. No. 1240—Bamboo Industry Development Act of 2019
(Continuation)

Senator Zubiri. Mr. President, with the permission of the Body, I move

that we resume consideration of Senate Bill No. 1240 as reported out under

Committee Report No. 31.

The President. Is there any objection? [Silence] There being none,

resumption of consideration of Senate Bill No. 1240 is now in order.

Senator Zubiri. Mr. President, the parliamentary status of this measure

is that we are in the period of interpellations.

We still have one more interpellator but I believe Sen. Bong Revilla has

agreed to no longer interpellate and just provide amendments on this measure.

53
We thank the good senator for that. Therefore, we move to close the period of

interpellations.

The President. Is there any objection? [Silence] There being none, the

motion is approved.

Senator Zubiri. Mr. President, I ask that we recognize the sponsor of the

measure, Sen. Aquilino “Koko” Pimentel III, for his committee amendments.

The President. Senator Pimentel is recognized for the period of

amendments.

Senator Pimentel. Actually Mr. President, we are still in the period of

interpellation, so, my motion is if we can close it…

The President. It is closed already. We already closed it.

MANIFESTATION OF SENATOR PIMENTEL

(Coauthorship of Senators Revilla, Binay, Gordon, and Drilon
of S. No. 1240)

Senator Pimentel. Before I proceed, I would like to manifest the request

of Senators Revilla and Binay to be recorded as coauthors of the measure,

including Senator Gordon, Mr. President.

The President. All right, we place it on record.

How about the bamboo guy from Iloilo?

Senator Pimentel. They are originally coauthors already, Mr. President.

Senator Zubiri, Senator Drilon, and Senator Villar are original authors.

Senator Zubiri. Mr. President, for the record, this is the beautiful

bamboo tray from Iloilo made by the Carmelite Missionaries gifted to us by the

distinguished Minority Leader. It is very beautiful.

54
 The President. All right. Thank you again.

Senator Pimentel. So, I stand corrected, Mr. President, we include

Senator Drilon as coauthor.

The President. All right. Thank you.

Senator Pimentel. So, at this point, Mr. President, there are not less

than nine proposed amendments. We have not yet finalized the exact wording

of that nine, Mr. President. So, if we can schedule this for tomorrow, we will be

ready by tomorrow.

The President. Majority Leader, the sponsor is requesting for a

postponement for tomorrow on the period of amendments.

Senator Zubiri. Yes, Mr. President. I believe the distinguished sponsor

was approached by the chairman of the Committee on Agriculture, Food and

Agrarian Reform, Sen. Cynthia Villar, in the lounge to include certain

amendments and to include programs on the measure. So, I believe the good

gentleman will still have to review that and probably be able to propose

tomorrow.

Senator Pimentel. I will be proposing nine individual amendments but

the authorship can be traced back to… four of them from the Minority Leader,

four from Senator Villar, and then one is a joint amendment by Senators Binay

and Revilla. That is the case, Mr. President.

So, the bottom line is, can we schedule this for tomorrow?

Senator Zubiri. Yes, absolutely, Mr. President.

The President. Yes.

55
 Senator Pimentel. Thank you, Mr. President.

Senator Zubiri. Right now, the Senate President is the only one in the

agenda tomorrow until our other committee chairperson can come up with

their committee reports. [Laughter] Wala na tayong topic.

May I make an appeal to my colleagues to fast-track their committee

reports.

The President. To hasten their committee reports.

Senator Zubiri. Yes, Mr. President.

MANIFESTATION OF SENATOR PIMENTEL

(Coauthorship of Senators Villanueva and Tolentino of S. No. 1240)

Senator Pimentel. Mr. President, Senator Villanueva also requested to

be a coauthor and Senator Tolentino has also manifested.

The President. All right. We place that on record.

Senator Pimentel. Thank you, Mr. President.

SUSPENSION OF CONSIDERATION OF S. NO. 1240

Senator Zubiri. Mr. President, I move that we suspend consideration of

Senate Bill No. 1240.

The President. Is there any objection? [Silence] There being no

objection, the motion is approved.

MOTION OF SENATOR ZUBIRI

(Transfer of Referral of S. No. 1138 from the Committee on
Local Government to the Committee on Agriculture, Food and Agrarian Reform
as Primary Committee and Committee on Local Government
as the Secondary Committee)

Senator Zubiri. Just administrative matters, Mr. President. With the

consent of the Body, after consulting the chairpersons of the concerned

56
committees, I move that we transfer the referral of Senate Bill No. 1138--this is

An Act Strengthening Local Government Participation in Agriculture

Development by Institutionalizing a Ten Percent (10%) Budgetary Allocation

from their Internal Revenue Allotment--from the Committee on Local

Government to the Committee on Agriculture, Food and Agrarian Reform as

primary committee and the Committee on Local Government will become the

secondary committee.

I believe the chairman of the Committee on Local Government agrees to

the change of referral, Mr. President.

The President. Is there any objection? [Silence] There being none, the
motion is approved.

Senator Zubiri. Thank you, Mr. President.

There is a Second Additional Reference of Business, Mr. President. This

is just a short list.

The President. The Secretary will proceed with the Second Additional
Reference of Business.

SECOND ADDITIONAL REFERENCE OF BUSINESS

RESOLUTIONS

The Secretary. Proposed Senate Resolution No. 310, entitled

RESOLUTION CREATING A SELECT OVERSIGHT COMMITTEE ON

INTELLIGENCE AND CONFIDENTIAL FUNDS, PROGRAMS
AND ACTIVITIES

Introduced by Senators Sotto III and Lacson

The President. Referred to the Committee on Rules.

The Secretary. Proposed Senate Resolution No. 311, entitled

57
 RESOLUTION DIRECTING THE PROPER SENATE COMMITTEE TO
CONDUCT AN INQUIRY, IN AID OF LEGISLATION AND
WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF THE PROGRAMME FOR
INTERNATIONAL STUDENT ASSESSMENT (PISA) RESULTS,
IN ORDER FOR THE SENATE TO ALIGN ITS LEGISLATIVE
INITIATIVES AND BUDGETARY PRIORITIES WITH THE
VISION OF THE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION AS IT
PIVOTS ITS FOCUS FROM ACCESS TO QUALITY IN THE
BASIC EDUCATION SECTOR, AND TO SUSTAIN THE BOLD
EFFORTS OF OTHER STAKEHOLDERS TO IMPROVE THE
EDUCATION SYSTEM AND MAKE IT INSTRUMENTAL TO
DEVELOPING THE COUNTRY’S HUMAN CAPITAL AND
SERVE AS A MAJOR CATALYST TO NATIONAL
DEVELOPMENT

Introduced by Senator Gatchalian

The President. Referred to the Committee on Basic Education, Arts and

Culture

The Secretary. Proposed Senate Resolution No. 312, entitled

RESOLUTION EXPRESSING THE SENSE OF THE SENATE FOR

THE PRESIDENT TO RECONSIDER HIS PLAN TO
UNILATERALLY WITHDRAW FROM THE VISITING FORCES
AGREEMENT WITH THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Introduced by Senators Sotto, Lacson, and Drilon

The President. Referred to the Committees on Foreign Relations; and

National Defense and Security, Peace, Unification and Reconciliation

The Majority Leader is recognized.

ADJOURNMENT OF SESSION

Senator Zubiri. With that, Mr. President, there being no other matters to
take up today, I move that we adjourn the session until three o'clock in the
afternoon, Tuesday, February 4, 2020.
The President. Is there any objection? [Silence] There being none, the
session is adjourned until three o'clock in the afternoon, Tuesday, February 4,
2020.
It was 5:30 p.m.

58
 ANNEX "8"

WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 19, 2020

OPENING OF THE SESSION

At 3:00 p.m., the Senate President, Hon. Vicente C. Sotto III, called the
session to order.

The President. The 57th session of the Senate in the First Regular
Session of the Eighteenth Congress is hereby called to order.

Sen. Imee R. Marcos will lead the Chamber in prayer.

Everybody rose for the prayer.

PRAYER

Senator Marcos.
Father, You are the Lord and the one true master of our

beautiful nation. Nothing that happens in this country, may it be

good or evil, ever escapes You. Nor are You ever caught by

surprise, like us, hapless and vulnerable.

It is thus that we beseech You today to protect us from all

evil, from enemies both natural and human, from new and

mutating diseases, from nature’s calamities and endless conflict.

Protect us, O Lord, from the greed and avarice of men and nations.

Lord, by the authority You have given us, the senators of

this blessed republic, we beg for Your mercy and the protection of

our people, for every Filipino in pain, in poverty, and in sickness.

Today, we declare and decree that with You, we shall fight

the enemies, illegal drugs, corruption, terrorism, and the scourge

of godlessness that plague our nation.

1
 Take charge, O Lord; protect and guide us so that once again

Your glory will fill our islands, the Philippines.

In the name of Jesus we believe and pray.

Amen.

ROLL CALL

The President. The Secretary will please call the roll.

The Secretary, reading:

Senator Sonny Angara…………………………………………….. Present

Senator Maria Lourdes Nancy S. Binay............................... Present
Senator Pia S. Cayetano...................................................... Present
Senator Leila M. de Lima….………………………………………. *
Senator Ronald “Bato” M. dela Rosa.…………………………… Present
Senator Franklin M. Drilon..……………………………………… Present
Senator Win Gatchalian.…………………………………………… Present
Senator Christopher Lawrence T. Go..………………………….. Present*
Senator Richard J. Gordon................................................... Present
Senator Risa Hontiveros.……………………………………………. Present
Senator Panfilo M. Lacson.…………………………………………. Present
Senator Manuel “Lito” M. Lapid............................................. Present
Senator Imee R. Marcos..……………………..…………………….. Present
Senator Emmanuel “Manny” D. Pacquiao ………………………. Present
Senator Francis “Kiko” Pangilinan ……………………………….. Present
Senator Aquilino "Koko" Pimentel III …………..…………..........
Senator Grace Poe …............................................................. Present
Senator Ralph G. Recto ........................................................ Present
Senator Ramon Bong Revilla Jr. ………………………………….. Present
Senator Francis “Tol" N. Tolentino………………………………… Present
Senator Joel Villanueva ……………………………….…………….. Present
Senator Cynthia A. Villar ...................................................... Present
Senator Juan Miguel F. Zubiri …………………………………….. Present
The President ………………………………………………………….. Present

The President. With 20 senators present, the Chair declares the

presence of a quorum.

2
 The Majority Leader is recognized.

Senator Zubiri. Thank you, Mr. President.

ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF GUESTS

Mr. President, before we take up official matters, we just have some

guests in the gallery.

The chairperson of the Commission on Higher Education (CHEd), our

dear friend, Dr. J. Prospero E. De Vera III, is here with us.

We have also Mayor Jennifer “Ina Alegre” Cruz of Pola, Oriental Mindoro

and our Binibining Pilipinas 2020 candidate, Patricia Garcia—the guests of

Senator Recto and Senator Go.

The President. We welcome all our guests to the Senate this afternoon.

THE JOURNAL

Senator Zubiri. Thank you, Mr. President.

Mr. President, I move that we dispense with the reading of the Journal of
the 56th session, Tuesday, February 18, 2020, and consider it approved.

The President. Is there any objection? [Silence] There being none, the
motion is approved.

The Majority Leader is recognized.

_____________________________
* Under detention

Senator Zubiri. While we are waiting for the guest of Sen. Pia Cayetano
to enter the gallery for her sponsorship speech, I move that we proceed to the
Reference of Business.

The President. Is there any objection? [Silence] There being none, the
motion is approved.

The Secretary will read the Reference of Business.

3
 REFERENCE OF BUSINESS

MESSAGE FROM THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

The Secretary.
February 17, 2020

The Honorable
VICENTE C. SOTTO III
President of the Senate
Room 606, 211 & 24
New Wing 5th Floor, GSIS Building
Financial Center, Diokno Boulevard
Pasay City

Mr. President:

I have been directed to inform the Senate that the House of

Representatives on even date passed House Bill No. 137, entitled:

“AN ACT IMPOSING STIFFER PENALTIES FOR CHILD

ABUSE, EXPLOITATION AND DISCRIMINATION,
AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE REPUBLIC ACT NO.
7610, AS AMENDED”

to which it requests the concurrence of the Senate.

Respectfully yours,

(Sgd.) JOSE LUIS G. MONTALES

Secretary General

The President. Referred to the Committees on Justice and Human

Rights; and Women, Children, Family Relations and Gender Equality

BILLS ON FIRST READING

The Secretary. Senate Bill No. 1360, entitled

AN ACT MAKING THE POSITION OF A COOPERATIVE OFFICER

MANDATORY IN THE MUNICIPAL, CITY AND PROVINCIAL
LEVELS, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE REPUBLIC ACT
NO. 7160, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE LOCAL
GOVERNMENT CODE OF 1991

4
 Introduced by Senator Hontiveros

The President. Referred to the Committees on Local Government; and

Cooperatives

The Secretary. Senate Bill No. 1361, entitled

AN ACT MANDATING BANKING INSTITUTIONS TO STRENGTHEN

THE FINANCING SYSTEM FOR AGRICULTURAL, FISHERIES,
AND RURAL DEVELOPMENT IN THE PHILIPPINES AND FOR
OTHER PURPOSES

Introduced by Senator Angara

The President. Referred to the Committees on Agriculture, Food and

Agrarian Reform; and Banks, Financial Institutions and Currencies

The Secretary. Senate Bill No. 1362, entitled

AN ACT CREATING A FRAMEWORK FOR THE SUSTAINABLE

DEVELOPMENT GOALS

Introduced by Senator Cayetano

The President. Referred to the Committee on Sustainable Development

Goals, Innovation and Futures Thinking

The Secretary. Senate Bill No. 1363, entitled

AN ACT PROVIDING FOR PROTECTION OF THE REMITTANCES

OF OVERSEAS FILIPINO WORKERS (OFWs), AND FOR
OTHER PURPOSES

Introduced by Senator Pacquiao

The President. Referred to the Committees on Banks, Financial

Institutions and Currencies; and Labor, Employment and Human Resources
Development

The Secretary. Senate Bill No. 1364, entitled

AN ACT REDUCING FOOD WASTE THROUGH FOOD DONATIONS

AND FOOD WASTE RECYCLING

Introduced by Senator Pacquiao

5
 The President. Referred to the Committees on Agriculture, Food and
Agrarian Reform; Social Justice, Welfare and Rural Development; and Ways
and Means

RESOLUTIONS

The Secretary. Proposed Senate Resolution No. 326, entitled

RESOLUTION DIRECTING THE APPROPRIATE SENATE

COMMITTEE TO CONDUCT AN INQUIRY, IN AID OF
LEGISLATION, ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF MARTIAL
LAW IN MINDANAO PURSUANT TO PROCLAMATION NO. 26,
ISSUED BY PRESIDENT RODRIGO R. DUTERTE ON 23 MAY
2017, WITH THE END IN VIEW OF CHRONICLING THE
ACCOMPLISHMENTS AND LEARNINGS DURING THE
PERIOD, DETERMINING WHETHER OR NOT THE
REBELLION IN THE REGION WAS PUT UNDER CONTROL,
AND EXACTING ACCOUNTABILITY ON HOW PUBLIC FUNDS
WERE SPENT, THE NUMBER OF ARRESTS MADE AND
CASES FILED, HOW THE GOVERNMENT DEALT WITH
HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS IN THE REGION, AND HOW
THE GOVERNMENT IS HELPING IN THE REHABILITATION
OF THE REGION

Introduced by Senator De Lima

The President. Referred to the Committee on National Defense and

Security, Peace, Unification and Reconciliation

The Secretary. Proposed Senate Resolution No. 327, entitled

RESOLUTION DIRECTING THE APPROPRIATE SENATE COMMITTEE

TO CONDUCT AN INQUIRY, IN AID OF LEGISLATION, INTO
THE ALLEGED REPORTS OF HISTORICAL REVISIONISM
PROPAGATED USING THE OFFICIAL GAZETTE, AND INTO
THE REPORTED DELETION AND INACCESSIBILITY OF
DOCUMENTS AND VITAL INFORMATION THEREIN, TO
ENSURE THAT THE RELIABILITY AND VERACITY OF
MATTERS CONTAINED THEREIN ARE HELD SACRED AND
PRESERVED WITH UTMOST DILIGENCE

Introduced by Senator De Lima

The President. Referred to the Committee on Public Information and

Mass Media
6
 The Secretary. Proposed Senate Resolution No. 328, entitled

RESOLUTION URGING THE APPROPRIATE SENATE COMMITTEE TO

CONDUCT AN INQUIRY, IN AID OF LEGISLATION, INTO THE
CONTINUED FLIGHTS FROM CHINA AND ITS SPECIAL
ADMINISTRATIVE REGIONS, IN VIOLATION OF THE TRAVEL
BAN AND PUTTING FILIPINOS AT RISK

Introduced by Senator Marcos

The President. Referred to the Committee on Public Services

The Secretary. Proposed Senate Resolution No. 329, entitled

RESOLUTION DIRECTING THE APPROPRIATE SENATE

COMMITTEES TO CONDUCT AN INQUIRY, IN AID OF
LEGISLATION, ON THE NATIONAL WATER PROGRAMS,
ACTIVITIES, AND PROJECTS BEING IMPLEMENTED BY THE
GOVERNMENT TO ENSURE ADEQUATE SUPPLY OF WATER
THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY AND TO ENSURE THAT A
WATER CRISIS IS AVERTED

Introduced by Senator Villanueva

The President. Referred to the Committees on Public Works; and

Environment, Natural Resources and Climate Change

COMMUNICATIONS

The Secretary. Letters from the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas,

transmitting to the Senate copies of the following certified and authenticated
BSP issuances in compliance with Section 15 (a) of Republic Act No. 7653 (The
New Central Bank Act):

Memorandum Nos. M-2020-001 and 002 both dated 30 January 2020;

and Circular No. 1072 dated 31 January 2020.

The President. Referred to the Committee on Banks, Financial

Institutions and Currencies

COMMITTEE REPORT

The Secretary. Committee Report No. 51, prepared and submitted

jointly by the Committees on Basic Education, Arts and Culture; Youth; Ways
7
and Means; and Finance, on Senate Bill No. 1365, with Senators Gatchalian
and Binay as authors thereof, entitled

AN ACT INSTITUTIONALIZING THE ALTERNATIVE LEARNING

SYSTEM IN BASIC EDUCATION FOR OUT-OF-SCHOOL
YOUTH, ADULTS, AND CHILDREN IN SPECIAL EXTREME
CASES AND APPROPRIATING FUNDS THEREFOR

recommending its approval in substitution of Senate Bill No. 740.

Sponsor: Senator Gatchalian

The President. To the Calendar for Ordinary Business

The Majority Leader is recognized.

ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF GUESTS

Senator Zubiri. Thank you, Mr. President.

Mr. President, we would just like to acknowledge the guests of Sen. Pia

Cayetano in the gallery.

We have with us the distinguished secretary of the Department of

Finance, Sec. Carlos G. Dominguez; former Prime Minister Cesar Virata;

former DOF Sec. Margarito Teves; Sec. Ramon M. Lopez of the DTI, my good

friend; Sec. Ernesto Pernia of the NEDA; Usec. Karl Kendrick T. Chua; Usec.

Ceferino S. Rodolfo of the DTI; the governor of the Management Association of

the Philippines (MAP); chairman of the Tax Committee of PCCI, Atty. Benedicta

A. Du-Baladad; Mr. Jeffrey T. Ng, chairman of the Subdivision and Housing

Developers Association, Incorporated; Mr. Filomeno Sta. Ana, coordinator of

the Action for Economic Reforms; Dr. Epictetus Patalinghug, professor

emeritus of the UP Virata School of Business; and Dr. Recide, professor of the

UP School of Economics.

8
 We also have with us guests from Dagupan City, Coun. Cisco Jay Flores

and Atty. Idel Morales, Mr. President.

The President. We would like to welcome our distinguished guests to

the Senate this afternoon.

SPECIAL ORDER

Senator Zubiri. Mr. President, with the permission of the Body, I move
that we transfer from the Calendar for Ordinary Business to the Calendar for
Special Orders Committee Report No. 50 on Senate Bill No. 1357, entitled

AN ACT REFORMING THE CORPORATE INCOME TAX AND

INCENTIVES SYSTEM, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE
SECTIONS 4, 20, 27, 28, 34 AND 290 OF THE NATIONAL
INTERNAL REVENUE CODE OF 1997, AS AMENDED, AND
CREATING THEREIN NEW TITLE XIII, AND FOR OTHER
PURPOSES

The President. Is there any objection? [Silence] There being none, the
motion is approved.

BILL ON SECOND READING

S. No. 1357―Corporate Income Tax and Incentives Reform Act or CITIRA
Senator Zubiri. Mr. President, I move that we consider Senate Bill No.

1357 as reported out under Committee Report No. 50 by the Committee on

Ways and Means.

The President. Is there any objection? [Silence] There being none, the

motion is approved.

Consideration of Senate Bill No. 1357 is now in order. With the

permission of the Body, the Secretary will read only the title of the bill without

prejudice to inserting in the Record the whole text thereof.

The Secretary. Senate Bill No. 1357, entitled

9
 AN ACT REFORMING THE CORPORATE INCOME TAX AND
INCENTIVES SYSTEM, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE
SECTIONS 4, 20, 27, 28, 34 AND 290 OF THE NATIONAL
INTERNAL REVENUE CODE OF 1997, AS AMENDED, AND
CREATING THEREIN NEW TITLE XIII, AND FOR OTHER
PURPOSES
________________________________________________________________________

The following is the whole text of the bill:

Senate Bill No. 1357

[Insert]

________________________________________________________________________
The President. Majority Leader.

Senator Zubiri. Mr. President, may we recognize the distinguished

sponsor, the chairperson of the Committee on Ways and Means, Sen. Pia

Cayetano.

The President. The distinguished lady from Taguig and Pateros is

recognized to sponsor the measure.

Senator Cayetano. Thank you, Mr. President.

SUSPENSION OF SESSION

Mr. President, may I ask for a one-minute suspension of the session

while we set up the screen?

The President. Is there any objection? [Silence] There being none, the
session is suspended for one minute.
It was 3:11 p.m.

RESUMPTION OF SESSION

At 3:14 p.m., the session was resumed.

The President. The session is resumed.

The Majority Leader is recognized.

10
 ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF GUESTS

Senator Zubiri. Before we recognize the distinguished sponsor, we

would just like to recognize the guests in the gallery.

We have with us Representative Suarez and Representative Suansing.

The President. Yes, we would like to welcome to the Senate

Representative Suansing and the debonair governor of Quezon who is now a

congressman, Representative Suarez.

Senator Zubiri. Mr. President, I ask that we recognize Sen. Pia Cayetano.

The President. Yes, Sen. Pia Cayetano has the Floor.

SPONSORSHIP SPEECH OF SENATOR CAYETANO

Senator Cayetano. Thank you, Mr. President.

Mr. President, distinguished colleagues, today I rise to sponsor and seek

your support for Senate Bill No. 1357, per Committee Report No. 50, also

known as the CITIRA bill, which has two main objectives: 1) lowering the

corporate income tax rate; and 2) modernizing the tax incentive system,

making it more fair, efficient, and accountable.

Mr. President, from the onset, let me clarify a major issue. A major

source of resistance to this bill is the fear that incentives will be removed once

this measure is enacted. This will not be the case. In truth, what we intend to

do is to continue a sound investment scheme, the details of which this

representation will explain as we go along.

Having said that, allow me to start with a bit of history.

11
 I am sure that both Senate President Sotto and Senate Minority Leader

Drilon, the leaders of both sides of this Chamber, would also know from their

experience that since a bill on rationalizing tax incentives was first proposed in

1995, the Department of Finance and the Department of Trade and Industry

have urged Congress to finally make this crucial reform happen.

But even further down memory lane, when I was a college student in the

School of Economics in the University of the Philippines, my father, the late

Sen. Rene Cayetano, was a member of the Batasan and was appointed as the

deputy minister for Trade and Industry and concurrently administrator of the

Export Processing Zone Authority (EPZA). I had the opportunity to visit the

export processing zones in Bataan, Baguio, and Cebu. In fact, my thesis was

on fiscal incentives. This was in 1985.

But here we are today in the year 2020. Mr. President, in the series of

hearings and meetings we conducted, we gave members of the business

community, civil society, the academe, government, and business associations

the opportunity to share their views in depth. The DOF and the DTI also held

their own briefings with key stakeholders. The bill before us is a new and fairer

deal between businesses and the Filipino people.

So, Where Are We Now and What Are We Doing?

We are cognizant that Philippine enterprises are the backbone of the

economy and that they contribute to national development by supplying much-

needed employment and livelihood. And yet, companies doing business in the

12
Philippines are slapped with a 30% corporate income tax rate, the highest in

the region.

May I direct the Body’s attention to the screen where it shows the

Philippines on the far rate with the highest corporate income tax.

To address this, we will bring down the corporate income tax rate from

30% to 20% over the next 10 years. This should result in some 1.5 million

more jobs, a feat I am certain that we can accomplish. So far, we have already

provided millions of jobs to the economy. We believe that the reduction of 1%

per year is the pace that does not compromise the country’s vital fiscal

resources.

However, Mr. President, we cannot talk about the corporate tax regime

without earnestly discussing the tax regime for companies that have received

unreviewed, and almost unconditional special tax treatment for decades.

From 2015 to 2017, the Philippine government granted more than P1

trillion in tax incentives in the form of exemptions and tax discounts to various

companies.

In 2017 alone, the government granted billions of pesos to a select group

of some 3,150 businesses. These companies pay an effective rate of 6% to 13%

of corporate income tax as opposed to other enterprises that pay the regular

30% corporate income tax.

Let me make this clear again, I mentioned the amount of incentives, Mr.

President, not to say that we will scrap them. All we want to do is rationalize

them.

13
 Incentives should not be given out to any corporation without the proper

conditions. They should be performance-based and targeted, and granted in

such a way that would benefit the public by way of providing employment,

boosting needed industries, and promoting the growth of less developed areas

in the country.

When we give out incentives on behalf of the people, then we are duty

bound to ascertain that we get what is rightly due to them. That is the essence

of this bill: a fair deal for all, and the best deal for Filipinos.

My point, Mr. President, is that true incentives yield results, like the

situation with our neighbors, Singapore and Malaysia. If a tax perk is given

without a clear set of conditions, without a time limit, and without adequate

oversight, it is not an incentive. It is a giveaway, and our country cannot afford

corporate giveaways.

The billions of incentives we granted are equivalent to more than 10% of

our 2020 national government budget, around 80% of the budget of the

Department of Education (DepEd), and more than four times the amount

allocated to the Department of Health.

So, Let Us Discuss the Tax Incentive Principles

With billions of pesos on the line, we need to ensure that the incentives

which the government provides are in accordance with the following principles

based on international good practices:

1. Performance-based: There should be clear attainment of actual

investment, job creation, export, countryside development, and

14
 research and development commitments; else, incentives will only

be wasted. Parang scholarship grant, dapat may resulta, pasado sa

exam, at maka-graduate.

2. Targeted: To minimize leakage and to avoid spreading our scarce

resources too thinly, tax incentives should be given to activities

with significant positive contribution to the economy, or those that

really matter for the future, as specified in the Strategic Investment

Priorities Plan (SIPP), to be determined by the Board of Investments

(BOI);

3. Time-bound: There should be a reasonable time frame for the

enjoyment of incentives, and an extension period for companies

that perform and contribute to the economy. Parang allowance na

ibinibigay ng magulang sa anak, hindi puwedeng habang buhay;

and, finally,

4. Transparent: Monitoring and evaluation of tax incentives should be

institutionalized and reported by the government to the public.

Iyong pinaghihirapang buwis ng ordinaryong taxpayer ang

ginagamit nating pampondo sa incentives, kaya nararapat lamang

na alam ng taumbayan kung saan napupunta ang buwis nila.

Let me add another principle: the incentive system should be governed

well. Currently, there are 13 different investment promotion agencies (IPAs),

each with its own charter and mandate that offer different menus of incentives

to various industries, sometimes not in line with national priorities, and often

15
without the DOF or the DTI knowing. As a result, there is no one simple set of

incentives that the country may promote to potential investors. This can be

very confusing and definitely not investor-friendly.

Another concern is that the number of industries that could potentially

get incentives from these IPAs, which is some two-thirds of the economy, also

make our incentive system indiscriminately open to just about any activity,

and thus open to abuse.

This representation thus proposes that there be: (1) a set of incentives for

different projects or activities, depending on the location and industry; and (2)

incentives that shall be based on the Strategic Investment Priorities Plan

(SIPP), which will be determined by the BOI, in coordination with the Fiscal

Incentives Review Board, IPAs, government agencies administering tax

incentives, and the private sector. We also propose to expand the functions of

the Fiscal Incentives Review Board, a body that currently grants incentives to

government-owned or controlled corporations, to also approve all incentives

given to private companies, as recommended by the IPAs. We also recommend

that this board oversee the IPAs. This much needed governance reform is at the

heart of the CITIRA bill.

Before I proceed with more details of the proposed bill, allow me to

acknowledge the work of some of our predecessors such as Senator Recto, who

filed the first Fiscal Incentives Review Board expansion bill in 2001 and

Senator Drilon, who authored the Tax Incentives Management and

Transparency Act, or the TIMTA Law, passed in 2015. The law mandates

16
companies to provide the government with data to estimate the tax incentives

they receive, which is now being used to objectively assess our tax incentives.

Both senators, along with Senators Lacson and Villar, have also filed in

previous congresses bills on fiscal incentives rationalization. We are now

building on their ideas to move the reform forward.

I would also like to put on record that our team painstakingly took the

time to ease the transition period for investors and minimize the drastic

changes the new incentive scheme could bring to their businesses.

Let me now discuss the salient points of the reform as proposed by this

representation.

Reduction in the Corporate Income Tax Rate

As mentioned earlier, the corporate income tax rate shall be lowered

gradually by one 1% point each year, from the current 30% to 20% by 2029.

We have made the reduction of corporate income tax automatic in our

version for the first five years to ensure predictability. By 2025, the reduction

can be suspended by the President upon recommendation of the secretary of

finance, if the projected deficit target as a percentage of GDP exceeds the

programmed deficit.

Modernization of the Fiscal Incentive System

The centerpiece of the country’s current tax incentives regime is the

income tax holiday or ITH for 4 to 6 years, and the special 5% tax on gross

income earned or GIE, in lieu of all taxes, both national and local.

17
 The 5% tax on GIE is granted forever without conditions, even if the firm

does not contribute to the economy in terms of jobs and exports at a level

commensurate to the amount of incentives given. My dear colleagues, no other

country gives incentives forever like we do.

Dear colleagues, it is time to end a regime that distributes costs to the

many, and concentrates benefits to the few.

Sunset Provisions

After listening to the concerns and apprehensions of existing investor

groups that will be affected by this bill, we came up with terms that address

their request for a smoother transition period. This addresses our objective,

which is to keep companies and investors here in the country while

rationalizing the incentives that we give them.

For Those Granted ITH Only

Existing registered activities granted the income tax holiday shall be

allowed to complete the remainder of their income tax holiday period.

For Those Granted 5% GIE But Not Yet Enjoyed

These are the firms with unfinished ITH and a succeeding gross income

earned (GIE) of 5%. In their case, their ITH will be allowed to expire on

schedule and will be followed by a 5% GIE, with a maximum of 5 years. If the

firm has no ITH but is about to go into 5% GIE, they will also enjoy 5% GIE for

a maximum of 5 years.

Granted and Currently Enjoying 5% of GIE Forever

18
 Existing registered activities that were granted the 5% tax on GIE, in lieu

of all taxes, will be allowed 2 to 7 more years as a transition period, while

paying the same rate of 5% GIE. The duration of the proposed transition

period is as follows:

 2 years for those who have been receiving the GIE incentive for more
than 10 years;
 3 years for those who have been receiving the GIE incentive for between 5
and 10 years;
 5 years for those who have been receiving the GIE incentive for below 5
years, and
 A special 7 years for those that meet any of the following conditions:
a. Exporting 100% of their goods and services,
b. Employing at least 10,000 Filipino workers, or
c. Engaging in highly footloose activities.

In addition, Mr. President, after the sunset period, they will be allowed

to apply under the new incentive package where they will be assessed under

the new package created by virtue of this bill.

What is the New Incentives Package?

Under our version of CITIRA, a registered activity may be granted an

income tax holiday of 2 to 4 years, followed by a special corporate income tax

(SCIT) rate that is based on gross income earned (GIE). The special corporate

income tax rate will be equivalent to 8% GIE for 2020, 9% for 2021, and 10%

for 2022 and onwards.

Like the current system, this shall be in lieu of all other taxes, and can

be availed of for 3 to 4 years, depending on the location and activity. This

provision preserves the one-stop shop nature of present incentives. We hear

19
the concerns of investors that they do not want to deal with many government

agencies when paying taxes. This is why we retained the “in lieu of” provision

and one-stop shop. Based on my discussion with the firms, this particular

provision already addresses 90% of their concern.

The initial availment of tax incentives, which includes income tax holiday

(ITH) plus the special corporate income tax (SCIT) rate is from 5 to 8 years,

depending on the category of the registered activity as indicated on the screen.

There are three categories: basic, enhanced, and advance. This is our

response to the need to make incentives more targeted to locations that need

them and industries that we want to promote.

Duration of the income tax holiday (ITH) and special corporate income

tax (SCIT) per category is already shown on the screen, and there is more good

news in our version. The availment of special corporate income tax may be

extended by 3 to 4 years at a time or more than once, up to a maximum of 12

years, depending on the category, so long as the firm remains true to its

performance commitments.

In lieu of the special corporate income tax, the registered activity may

instead be granted enhanced deductions shown on the screen subject to the

regular prevailing corporate income tax rate. These enhanced deductions

incentivize good behavior such as local job creation, exports, and investment in

hi-tech. As proposed by the DTI, our enhanced deductions menu was expanded

to include deductions for power costs to account for the country’s challenges in

this area. The expanded deductions list is shown on the screen.

20
 Like the income tax holiday (ITH) and the special corporate income tax

(SCIT), the availment of the enhanced deduction may be extended also for up to

12 years.

And to attract the big investors, like what Vietnam did with Samsung,

the President may give incentives for a longer period of up to 40 years for

highly desirable projects, provided that the benefit that the public could derive

from such investment is clear and convincing and far outweighs the cost of the

incentives that will be granted.

Governance of Fiscal Incentives

To ensure that incentives granted are performance-based, time-bound,

targeted, and transparent, the present Fiscal Incentives Review Board’s

function is expanded so that it can provide proper oversight over the IPAs, in

the same way that the GCG Law of 2011 created the Governance Commission

on GOCCs to oversee the GOCCs and ensure better performance and

accountability.

Under our proposal, the Board will be chaired by the DOF and co-chaired

by the DTI, with representatives from the Office of the President, DBM, and

NEDA.

Let me assure all the officials and employees of the IPAs that we are not

abolishing their agencies or cutting down jobs. IPAs will continue to perform

their function of promoting investments in the Philippines, receive and process

applications, and recommend to the Fiscal Incentives Review Board worthy

incentives for approval by the Board. None of them shall lose their jobs

21
because of this reform. Section 9 of Senate Bill No. 1357 specifically provides:

The IPAs shall maintain their functions and powers as provided under the

special laws governing them except on the approval of incentives.

Mr. President, esteemed colleagues, allow me to underscore one final

point, and this is the urgency of our task ahead. Let us end the uncertainty.

As an economics graduate, Mr. President, I was trained to think of

resources, including our fiscal space, as limited. With limited fiscal resources

derived from the hard work of our countrymen, we must ask ourselves the

following questions as we deliberate on this measure:

1. Should we cut taxes for many, or should we keep conditions loose for

the few?

2. Should we move incentives towards Philippine labor and Philippine

products, or should we continue privileges that have gained our

economy little value-added?

3. When we spend our country’s fiscal resources, do we prefer more

accountability or less?

On these basic questions of principle, I trust that this Senate of the

people has seen the merits of this reform.

Further, as part of our commitment to the United Nations 2030 Agenda

for Sustainable Development, all efforts must be exerted to achieve the

Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) by 2030. This is the ideal future, a

future where there is no poverty, and where our people and economy thrive.

22
 Rationalizing incentives and lowering the corporate income tax will bring

in more investments and provide more jobs for Filipinos. This ensures that we

remain on target with SDG 8, which promotes decent work and economic

growth; SDG 9, promoting inclusive and sustainable industrialization and

fostering innovation; and, of course, SDG 1, which calls for ending poverty in

all its forms. This is only the beginning, as working on just one SDG creates a

ripple effect on all the other SDGs, especially on hunger, health, education,

and equality. A flourishing economy driven by the Filipino people will

safeguard the country’s future, even beyond 2030.

Dear colleagues, the Body appointed me to be the chair of the

Committee on Ways and Means and trusted to study the matter and make

recommendations. I humbly ask that we review these proposals, keeping in

mind that the greater majority will benefit from the lowering of the corporate

income tax and that a rationalized incentives scheme that rewards

investments that are result-based will lead to greater prosperity for our nation.

Thank you, Mr. President.

The President. Thank you, Senator Cayetano.

The Majority Leader is recognized.

SUSPENSION OF CONSIDERATION OF S. NO. 1357

Senator Zubiri. Mr. President, to allow our colleagues to study the

measure further, I move that we suspend consideration of Senate Bill No. 1357.

The President. Is there any objection? [Silence] There being none, the

motion is approved.

23
 BILL ON SECOND READING
S. No. 1083—The Law on the Prevention of Terrorist Acts of 2020
(Continuation)

Senator Zubiri. Mr. President, I move that we resume consideration of

Senate Bill No. 1083, as reported out under Committee Report No. 9.

The President. Is there any objection? [Silence] There being none,

resumption of consideration of Senate Bill No. 1083 is now in order.

Senator Zubiri. Mr. President, the status of this measure is that we are

in the period of individual amendments.

I ask that we recognize the sponsor, Sen. Panfilo M. Lacson; and to

propound amendments, our Minority Leader, Sen. Franklin Drilon.

The President. The gentleman from Cavite, Senator Lacson, chairman of

the Committee on National Defense and Security, Peace, Unification and

Reconciliation, is recognized; and the Minority Leader, Sen. Franklin Drilon,

the gentleman from Iloilo, is recognized to continue with the period of

individual amendments.

We will now be using the amended copy as of February 18, 2020.

Senator Drilon. That is correct, Mr. President.

The President. Thank you.

DRILON AMENDMENT

Senator Drilon. Mr. President, on page 1, Section 1, we propose to go

back to the text of the original title of the Anti-Terrorism Act as contained in the

committee report and change the year to “2020”. If accepted, Section 1 will now

24
read as follows: SECTION 1. Short Title. – This Act shall henceforth be known as

“THE ANTI-TERRORISM ACT OF 2020.”

We submit, Mr. President.

The President. What does the sponsor say?

SUSPENSION OF SESSION
Senator Drilon. Mr. President, may we request for a one-minute
suspension of the session?
The President. Is there any objection? [Silence] There being none, the
session is suspended for one minute.
It was 3:39 p.m.

RESUMPTION OF SESSION

At 3:40 p.m., the session was resumed.

The President. The session is resumed.

Senator Drilon. Mr. President, we have proposed the amendment to

Section 1 on the premise that in our discussion with the good sponsor, he has

agreed to use the noun “terrorism” to describe the crime rather than “terrorist

act” as we explained to the good sponsor that the crimes under the Revised

Penal Code are in nouns rather than adjectives. Except for acts of

lasciviousness, I do not find any crime in the Revised Penal Code which

describes it as an act and always as a noun. It is in that regard that we are

proposing amendment to Section 1 so that it is now called the “Anti-Terrorism

Act of 2020,” a shorter version which will make reference to the law easier.

Senator Lacson. Thank you, Mr. President.

Initially, I expressed some reservations in using the word “terrorism” as it

was revealed during the interpellations that there are at least 109 definitions of

25
terrorism. However, with the assurance that the word “terrorism” will be

adequately and appropriately described in the acts as listed in the measure,

then I accept the amendment, Mr. President.

Senator Drilon. Yes, Mr. President. As we explained to the good

sponsor, we are not defining “terrorism” as a word but we are defining it by the

enumeration of the acts which is the same concept as originally proposed by

the good sponsor.

Senator Lacson. Thank you, Mr. President.

I accept the amendment.

The President. The amendment is accepted.

Is there any objection? [Silence] There being none, the amendment is

approved.

Senator Drilon. On page 2, delete lines 16 to 22, and replace the same

with the following:

(A) CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE SHALL REFER TO AN ASSET OR

SYSTEM, WHETHER PHYSICAL OR VIRTUAL, SO ESSENTIAL TO THE

MAINTENANCE OF VITAL SOCIETAL FUNCTIONS OR TO THE DELIVERY OF

ESSENTIAL PUBLIC SERVICES THAT THE INCAPACITY OR DESTRUCTION OF

SUCH SYSTEMS AND ASSETS WOULD HAVE A DEBILITATING IMPACT ON

NATIONAL DEFENSE AND SECURITY, NATIONAL ECONOMY, PUBLIC

HEALTH OR SAFETY, THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, AND OTHER

FUNCTIONS ANALOGOUS THERETO. IT MAY INCLUDE, BUT IS NOT LIMITED

TO, AN ASSET OR SYSTEM AFFECTING TELECOMMUNICATIONS, WATER

26
AND ENERGY SUPPLY, EMERGENCY SERVICES, FOOD SECURITY, FUEL

SUPPLY, BANKING AND FINANCE, TRANSPORT, RADIO AND TELEVISION,

INFORMATION SYSTEMS AND TECHNOLOGY, CHEMICAL AND NUCLEAR

SECTORS.

That is the end of the proposed amendment.

Senator Lacson. It is accepted, Mr. President.

The President. The amendment is accepted.

Is there any objection? [Silence] There being none, the amendment is

approved.

Senator Drilon. Thank you, Mr. President.

On page 5, delete lines 8 and 9, and replace the same with the following:

SECTION 4. TERRORISM. – SUBJECT TO SECTION 48 OF THIS ACT,

TERRORISM IS COMMITTED BY ANY PERSON WHO, WITHIN OR OUTSIDE

THE PHILIPPINES, REGARDLESS OF THE STAGE OF EXECUTION:

And we retain the rest of the enumeration.

The President. Lines 11 to 19.

Senator Drilon. Yes, Mr. President.

The President. What does the sponsor say?

Senator Lacson. We accept, Mr. President, except, of course… Are we

tackling already letter (C) or not yet?

The President. Not yet.

Senator Lacson. Only the first paragraph, Mr. President.

The President. Yes, only the first line.

27
 Senator Lacson. We accept, Mr. President.

The President. Is there any objection? [Silence] There being none, the

amendment is approved.

Senator Drilon. On the same page, line 11, delete the words “Acts that

may cause”, and replace the same with ENGAGES IN ACTS INTENDED TO

CAUSE. So that line 11 will now read: A. ENGAGES IN ACTS INTENDED TO

CAUSE.

Senator Lacson. We accept, Mr. President.

The President. Is there any objection? [Silence] There being none, the

amendment is approved.

Senator Drilon. On the same page, line 12, add letter S at the end of

the word “endanger”. It will now read: ENDANGERS.

Senator Lacson. We accept, Mr. President.

The President. Is there any objection? [Silence] There being none, the

amendment is approved.

Senator Drilon. On the same page, line 13, delete the phrase “Acts that

may cause”, and replace the same with ENGAGES IN ACTS INTENDED TO

CAUSE.

Senator Lacson. We accept, Mr. President.

The President. Is there any objection? [Silence] There being none, the

amendment is approved.

Senator Drilon. On the same page, line 14…

Senator Lacson. On line 16, letter (C), Mr. President.

28
 SUSPENSION OF SESSION

Senator Drilon. Mr. President, I move that we suspend the session for
one minute.

The President. Is there any objection? [Silence] There being none, the
session is suspended for one minute.

It was 3:47 p.m.

RESUMPTION OF SESSION

At 3:47 p.m., the session was resumed.

The President. The session is resumed.

Senator Drilon is recognized.

Senator Drilon. On page 5, line 14, we propose to delete the phrase

“critical infrastructure” because we will propose later on to create a separate

paragraph for “critical infrastructure”.

Senator Lacson. We accept, Mr. President.

The President. Is there any objection? [Silence] There being none, the

amendment is approved.

Senator Drilon. Still on page 5, delete lines 16 to 17 starting with the

word “Development” until the phrase “use of”, and replace the same with

DEVELOPS, MANUFACTURES, POSSESSES, ACQUIRES, TRANSPORTS,

SUPPLIES OR USES.

I so move, Mr. President.

Senator Lacson. I am inclined to accept, except that I will have to refer

this to Senator Marcos because we have adopted the proposed amendment of

29
Senator Marcos. We would just like to hear her comment, Mr. President. This

is about CBRN or the chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear terrorism.

The President. Senator Marcos is recognized.

Is the lady senator amenable to the proposed amendment which slightly

amends her proposed amendments?

Senator Marcos. In principle, Mr. President, I am, but subject to

language, inclusion, and prioritizing of cyber terrorism.

Senator Lacson. Wala pa roon; CBRN pa lamang ito, Mr. President.

Senator Drilon. Wala pa tayo riyan, Mr. President.

The President. Letter (C) pa lamang.

Senator Lacson. It is about CBRN pa lamang. Wala pang cyber

terrorism.

Senator Marcos. CBRN, sa chemical, biological, radiological, and

nuclear terrorism pa lamang po?

Senator Lacson. Yes, Mr. President.

Senator Marcos. All right, Mr. President.

Senator Lacson. We accept, Mr. President.

The President. Is there any objection? [Silence] There being none, the

amendment is approved.

So, we retain.

Senator Drilon. On the same page, line 17, delete the comma (,) after the

word “weapons” and insert the word OR.

Senator Lacson. It is accepted, Mr. President.

30
 The President. What about the next “or”, is the Minority Leader going to

amend that? There must be an editorial amendment then.

Senator Drilon. Subject to style, Mr. President.

The President. Puwede na iyong comma.

Senator Lacson. Kindly continue, Mr. President, naputol sa “or”.

The President. Oo nga, “or” lamang. We need to edit this, “weapons OR

explosives or of biological, nuclear, radiological or chemical weapons”.

Senator Drilon. We are going to propose the deletion of the phrase “or

of biological, nuclear, radiological or chemical weapons” on lines 17 and 18.

The President. Is the Minority Leader going to propose to replace it or

not?

Senator Drilon. Yes, Mr. President. We are going to propose to delete

that portion.

The President. Yes. But will the Minority Leader replace it or not?

Senator Drilon. No, Mr. President.

The President. That is the problem of Senator Marcos because that is

her amendment.

Senator Marcos. Mr. President, inasmuch as it is, in principle, retained,

I am amenable to the amendment.

The President. No, it is…

Senator Drilon. We withdraw the amendment if it causes difficulty, Mr.

President.

The President. Yes, it will cause.

31
 Senator Drilon. Yes, Mr. President. We are withdrawing the

amendment.

The President. All right. The proposed amendment is withdrawn.

Senator Marcos. Thank you very much, Mr. President.

The President. The Minority Leader may proceed with the next

amendment.

Senator Drilon. On the same page, after (B), insert the following new

paragraph as paragraph (C): ENGAGES IN ACTS INTENDED TO CAUSE

EXTENSIVE INTERFERENCE WITH, DAMAGE OR DESTRUCTION TO

CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE.

Senator Lacson. It is accepted, Mr. President.

The President. It becomes letter what?

Senator Drilon. Letter (C), Mr. President. So, letter (C) on line 16

becomes letter D and letter (D) becomes letter E.

Senator Lacson. It is accepted, Mr. President.

The President. All right. Is there any objection? [Silence] There being

none, the amendment is approved.

The Minority Leader may proceed.

Senator Drilon. On line 21 of the same page, after the word

“intimidate”, insert the phrase THE GENERAL PUBLIC, OR A SEGMENT

THEREOF.

Senator Lacson. Then continue with the word “put”?

Senator Drilon. Yes, Mr. President.

32
 The President. Just inserting the phrase.

Senator Drilon. Yes, Mr. President.

The President. What does the sponsor say?

Senator Lacson. Kindly read again the proposed amendment, Mr.

President.

Senator Drilon. On page 5, line 21, after the word “intimidate”, insert

the words THE GENERAL PUBLIC, OR A SEGMENT THEREOF.

Senator Lacson. It is accepted, Mr. President.

The President. Is there any objection? [Silence] There being none, the

amendment is approved.

Senator Drilon. On the same page, line 21, delete the words “put in”,

and replace it with CREATE AN ATMOSPHERE OR SPREAD A MESSAGE OF

FEAR.

Senator Lacson. That is accepted, Mr. President.

The President. Is there any objection? [Silence] There being none, the

amendment is approved.

Senator Drilon. On the same page, line 22, delete the phrase “force or

induce”, and replace it with PROVOKE OR INFLUENCE BY INTIMIDATION.

Senator Lacson. What is the word again, Mr. President?

Senator Drilon. PROVOKE OR INFLUENCE BY INTIMIDATION.

Senator Lacson. That is accepted, Mr. President.

The President. Is there any objection? [Silence] There being none, the

amendment is approved.

33
 Senator Drilon. On the same page, lines 22 to 23, delete the phrase “or

the public to do or to abstain from doing any act”.

Allow me to explain this, Mr. President, because this is a substantial

amendment. We are proposing to delete the phrase “or the public to do or to

abstain from doing any act” as this phrase makes it difficult to distinguish this

with political crimes under the Revised Penal Code. We repeat that, Mr.

President: The use of the phrase “or the public to do or to abstain from doing

any act” will make this also an act of rebellion. And, therefore, the amendments

are aimed to differentiate terrorism from coup d’ etat, rebellion, and sedition.

That is the only purpose, Mr. President.

The President. Can the Minority Leader read now how it will read from

lines 21 to 23?

Senator Lacson. Kindly read again, Mr. President, because I want to be

clarified if we are retaining the phrase “or seriously destabilize or destroy the

fundamental political, economic…”

Senator Drilon. Yes, we are retaining that, Mr. President.

Senator Lacson. All right.

The President. Yes. That is why we want to listen how it will come out.

Senator Drilon. All right. We start from line 21, to read: “when the

purpose of such act, by its nature and context, is to intimidate THE GENERAL

PUBLIC OR A SEGMENT THEREOF, CREATE AN ATMOSPHERE OR SPREAD

A MESSAGE of fear, PROVOKE OR INFLUENCE BY INTIMIDATION the

government or any of its international organization or seriously destabilize or

34
destroy the fundamental political, economic, or social structures of the

country, create a public emergency or SERIOUSLY undermine public safety,

shall be guilty of committing TERRORISM and shall suffer the penalty of life

imprisonment without the benefit of parole and the benefits of R.A. No. 10592;

PROVIDED, THAT TERRORISM…” Well, we can introduce this later.

The President. All right. So, what does the sponsor say?

Senator Lacson. It is accepted. But I would like to hear the comment of

Senator Villanueva because he is the proponent of the proviso, Mr. President.

“Provided, That, terrorist acts as defined”, et cetera.

The President. Pero mamaya pa iyon. We are not there yet. We are

still on line 24 pa lamang.

Senator Lacson. It is accepted, subject to style, because of the comma

(,).

Is there any objection? [Silence] There being none, the amendment is

approved.

SUSPENSION OF SESSION

Senator Drilon. Mr. President, may I ask for a one-minute suspension

of the session?

The President. Is there any objection? [Silence] There being none, the

session is suspended for one minute.

It was 4:01 p.m.

RESUMPTION OF SESSION

At 4:01 p.m., the session was resumed.

35
 The President. The session is resumed.

Senator Drilon. On line 29, delete the following: “terrorist acts as

defined under this Section” until the word “others” on page 6.

I repeat that. On page 5, delete starting with the word “terrorist” on line

29 until the word “others” on page 6, line 2, and replace the same with the

following: TERRORISM AS DEFINED IN THIS SECTION SHALL NOT INCLUDE

ADVOCACY, PROTEST, DISSENT, STOPPAGE OF WORK, INDUSTRIAL OR

MASS ACTION, AND OTHER SIMILAR EXERCISES OF CIVIL AND POLITICAL

RIGHTS, WHICH ARE NOT INTENDED TO CAUSE DEATH OR SERIOUS

PHYSICAL HARM TO A PERSON, TO ENDANGER A PERSON’S LIFE, OR TO

CREATE A SERIOUS RISK TO PUBLIC SAFETY.

Senator Lacson. I am inclined to accept except that this is the

amendment introduced by Senator Villanueva which we initially adopted, Mr.

President.

So, we would like to hear from Senator Villanueva.

The President. Senator Villanueva is recognized.

Senator Villanueva. Thank you, Mr. President; thank you,

distinguished sponsor.

Upon consultation with the distinguished sponsor and upon hearing the

statements and the amendments propounded by our distinguished Minority

Leader, it looks to me that we are not deviating with the intention of this

particular provision, but we are telling out and detailing this particular

provision. So, I am amenable, Mr. President, and thank you.

36
 The President. All right. So, there is no objection from the proponent

earlier.

Senator Lacson. It is accepted, Mr. President.

The President. Is there any objection? [Silence] There being none, the

amendment is approved.

What did the gentleman do with the “terrorist act” on line 25? Is he

changing that to TERRORISM?

Senator Lacson. As proposed by Senator Drilon, Mr. President.

Senator Drilon. An omnibus amendment, Mr. President, all references

to “terrorist acts” will be replaced with TERRORISM.

The President. Is there any objection? [Silence] There being none, the

amendment is approved.

Senator Drilon. Consistent with what we have just proposed as an

omnibus amendment, on page 6, line 4, “Terrorist Acts” will be replaced with

TERRORISM.

The President. Sunod-sunod iyan, all sections―omnibus. So, carried

already.

Senator Drilon. Yes, Mr. President.

The President. All right.

Senator Drilon. On line 6, we propose to delete the phrase “and one day

to twenty (20) years”. So, that it is just “twelve (12) years”, Mr. President.

Senator Lacson. Straight 12 years. We accept, Mr. President.

Senator Drilon. For the record, this is to standardize the penalties.

37
 The President. The same rationale as in the previous proposed

amendment.

Is there any objection? [Silence] There being none, the amendment is

approved.

Senator Drilon. On line 25, delete the phrase “eight (8) years and one

day to”. So, it will now read:

SECTION 8. Proposal to Commit TERRORISM. - Any person who proposes

to commit TERRORISM as defined in Section 4 hereof shall suffer the penalty

of imprisonment of twelve (12) years.

Senator Lacson. We accept, Mr. President.

The President. Is there any objection? [Silence] There being none, the

amendment is approved.

Senator Drilon. On Section 9, again, “Terrorist Acts” should simply read

as TERRORISM, and we propose to reword Section 9 as follows:

ANY PERSON WHO, WITHOUT TAKING ANY DIRECT PART IN THE

COMMISSION OF TERRORISM, SHALL INCITE OTHERS TO THE EXECUTION

OF ANY OF THE ACTS SPECIFIED IN ARTICLE 4 HEREOF, BY MEANS OF

SPEECHES, PROCLAMATIONS, WRITINGS, EMBLEMS, BANNERS OR OTHER

REPRESENTATIONS TENDING TO THE SAME END, SHALL SUFFER THE

PENALTY OF IMPRISONMENT OF TWELVE (12) YEARS.

Senator Lacson. We accept, Mr. President.

The President. Is there any objection? [Silence] There being none, the

amendment is approved.

38
 Senator Drilon. On page 7, line 5, instead of “26”, it should be 27.

Senator Lacson. It is already stated in the latest copy, Mr. President.

Senator Drilon. All right. I am sorry.

We propose to insert before line 9 the following:

THE SAME PENALTY SHALL BE IMPOSED ON ANY PERSON WHO

ORGANIZES OR FACILITATES THE TRAVEL OF INDIVIDUALS TO A STATE

OTHER THAN THEIR STATE OF RESIDENCE OR NATIONALITY FOR THE

PURPOSE OF RECRUITMENT WHICH MAY BE COMMITTED THROUGH ANY

OF THE FOLLOWING MEANS:

i. RECRUITING ANOTHER PERSON TO SERVE IN ANY CAPACITY IN OR

WITH AN ARMED FORCE IN A FOREIGN STATE, WHETHER THE
ARMED FORCE FORMS PART OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE
GOVERNMENT OF THAT FOREIGN STATE OR OTHERWISE;

ii. PUBLISHING AN ADVERTISEMENT OR PROPAGANDA, FOR THE

PURPOSE OF RECRUITING PERSONS TO SERVE IN ANY CAPACITY IN
OR WITH SUCH AN ARMED FORCE;

iii. PUBLISHING AN ADVERTISEMENT OR PROPAGANDA CONTAINING

ANY INFORMATION RELATING TO THE PLACE AT WHICH, OR THE
MANNER IN WHICH, PERSONS MAY MAKE APPLICATIONS TO SERVE,
OR OBTAIN INFORMATION RELATING TO SERVICE, IN ANY CAPACITY
IN OR WITH SUCH ARMED FORCE OR RELATING TO THE MANNER IN
WHICH PERSONS MAY TRAVEL TO A FOREIGN STATE FOR THE
PURPOSE OF SERVING IN ANY CAPACITY IN OR WITH SUCH ARMED
FORCE; OR

iv. PERFORMING ANY OTHER ACT WITH THE INTENTION FACILITATING

OR PROMOTING THE RECRUITMENT OF PERSONS TO SERVE IN ANY
CAPACITY IN OR WITH SUCH ARMED FORCE.

Senator Lacson. Did the gentleman say five, Mr. President? It should

be four, after iii, iv.

Senator Drilon. Is it accepted, Mr. President?

39
 Senator Lacson. It is accepted, Mr. President.

The President. Is that the usual practice, we use “i” instead of

numbers and “iv” as four?

Senator Lacson. IV, Mr. President.

The President. All right, accepted. Is there any objection? [Silence]

There being none, the amendment is approved.

Senator Drilon. We are now on page 7, Mr. President, Section 11 on

line 16, instead of “Foreign Terrorist”, we say TERRORIST TRAVEL so that…

SUSPENSION OF SESSION

Senator Lacson. Mr. President, I move that we suspend the session for
one minute.
The President. Is there any objection? [Silence] There being none, the
session is suspended for one minute.
It was 4:11 p.m.

RESUMPTION OF SESSION

At 4:13 p.m., the session was resumed.

The President. The session is resumed.

Senator Drilon. Mr. President, can we restate the proposed

amendments on page 7, line 13, delete the phrase “eight (8) years and one day

to” so that the imprisonment is 12 years.

The President. All right. What does the sponsor say?

Senator Lacson. It is accepted, Mr. President.

The President. Is there any objection? [Silence] There being none, the

amendment is approved.

40
 Senator Drilon. Mr. President, we withdraw the amendment on line 16.

So, it will retain the present wording of “Foreign Terrorist.”

On page 8…

The President. Page 8, “Providing Material Support to Terrorists.” Is the

gentleman amending that?

SUSPENSION OF SESSION

Senator Drilon. Mr. President, I move that we suspend the session for
one minute.
The President. Is there any objection? [Silence] There being none, the
session is suspended for one minute.

It was 4:14 p.m.

RESUMPTION OF SESSION

At 4:15 p.m., the session was resumed.

The President. The session is resumed.

Senator Drilon is recognized.

Senator Drilon. Still on page 7, lines 29 to 31, delete the phrase starting

with the words “including acts of” as we have transposed this in an earlier

section.

The President. So, we put a period (.) after the word “training”.

Senator Drilon. Yes, Mr. President.

Senator Lacson. It is semicolon (;), Mr. President.

The President. Yes, semicolon (;).

Senator Drilon. Yes, semicolon (;), Mr. President. So, on lines 29 to 31,

we delete the phrase “including acts of recruitment which may be committed

41
through any of the following means:” and insert a semicolon (;) after the word

“training”.

Senator Lacson. Up to line 31, Mr. President.

Senator Drilon. Yes, Mr. President.

Senator Lacson. It is accepted, Mr. President.

The President. Is there any objection? [Silence] There being none, the

amendment is approved.

Senator Drilon. On page 8, delete lines 1 to 17 as these were transposed

to another section.

The President. I expected that—lines 1 to 17.

Senator Drilon. Yes, Mr. President.

Senator Lacson. That is under Section 10, Mr. President?

Senator Drilon. Yes, Mr. President.

Senator Lacson. It is accepted.

The President. It is already in Section 10 or we are inserting it in

Section 10?

Senator Lacson. It is already in Section 10, Mr. President.

The President. All right. Is there any objection? [Silence] There being

none, the amendment is approved.

Senator Drilon. On Section 12, “Providing Material Support to Terrorists”,

we propose to delete the word “knowingly”, a matter of style. It is also referred

to on line 27, the word “known”, et cetera. So, it is just a matter of style, Mr.

President.

42
 The President. So, on line 25, delete the word “knowingly”.

Senator Drilon. Yes, Mr. President. We are not changing anything, a

matter of style.

The President. “Any person who provides…”

Senator Lacson. Delete the word “knowingly”, Mr. President.

The President. Remove the word “knowingly”.

Senator Drilon. That is correct, Mr. President, because it is also found

in the subsequent…

The President. On line 27, “or who should have known”.

Senator Drilon. Just to complete this amendment, Mr. President, on the

same page, line 27, delete the phrase “or who should have known” and replace

the same with the word KNOWING.

Senator Lacson. It is better, Mr. President. It is accepted.

The President. All right. So, remove the word “knowingly” on line 25,

and on line 27, make it KNOWING, replacing the phrase “or who should have

known”.

Is there any objection? [Silence] There being none, the amendment is

approved.

SUSPENSION OF SESSION

Senator Drilon. Mr. President, I move that we suspend the session for
one minute.
The President. Is there any objection? [Silence] There being none, the
session is suspended for one minute.
It was 4:19 p.m.

43
 RESUMPTION OF SESSION

At 4:20 p.m., the session was resumed.

The President. The session is resumed.

Senator Drilon is recognized.

Senator Drilon. Mr. President, on page 9, lines 5 to 10, we propose to

delete this provision because any person who participates or cooperates in the

execution of the crimes of terrorism under Section 4 is guilty of terrorism.

We note that persons who provide material support to terrorists are liable

as principals. Therefore, there is no reason why a person who actually

cooperated in the execution of the act should be punished with a penalty lower

than life imprisonment.

Senator Lacson. It is better, Mr. President. It is accepted.

The President. The Minority Leader does not want a second class

criminal? [Laughter]

All right. Is there any objection? [Silence] There being none, the

amendment is approved.

SUSPENSION OF SESSION

Senator Drilon. Mr. President, I move that we suspend the session for
one minute.

The President. Is there any objection? [Silence] There being none, the
session is suspended for one minute.

It was 4:22 p.m.

RESUMPTION OF SESSION

At 4:23 p.m., the session was resumed.

44
 The President. The session is resumed.

Senator Drilon is recognized.

Senator Drilon. Mr. President, just as a matter of style, please

renumber the provisions with the deletion of lines 5 to 10.

The President. The new Section 14.

All right. So renumbered.

Senator Lacson. To avoid confusion, for the purpose of discussion, can

we just refer to the old numbering in the meantime, Mr. President?

The President. In the meantime, all right--the one as of February 18.

Senator Drilon. Yes, I agree, Mr. President.

The President. All right.

Senator Drilon. On page 9, line 14, delete the word “and”, as a matter

of style.

Just to continue on the same page, lines 14 and 15, after the word

“therein”, delete the following phrase: “either as principal or accomplice under

Articles 17 and 18 of the Revised Penal Code”.

On the same page, line 21, delete “ten (10) years and one day to”.

On the same page, lines 22 to 23, and up to page 9A, delete lines 24 to

25, and replace the same with the following: NO PERSON, REGARDLESS OF

RELATIONSHIP OR AFFINITY, SHALL BE EXEMPT FROM LIABILITY UNDER

THIS SECTION.

Senator Lacson. It is accepted, Mr. President.

The President. Is there any objection? [Silence] There being none, the
amendment is approved.
45
 Senator Drilon. We now turn to page 12.

The President. Page 12.

Senator Drilon. On page 12, as line 32, insert the following:

IF NO CASE IS FILED WITHIN THE THIRTY (30)-DAY PERIOD, THE

APPLICANT LAW ENFORCEMENT OR MILITARY OFFICIAL SHALL

IMMEDIATELY NOTIFY THE PERSON SUBJECT OF THE SURVEILLANCE,

INTERCEPTION AND RECORDING OF THE TERMINATION OF THE SAID

SURVEILLANCE, INTERCEPTION AND RECORDING. THE PENALTY OF

IMPRISONMENT OF SIX (6) YEARS SHALL BE IMPOSED UPON THE

APPLICANT LAW ENFORCEMENT OR MILITARY OFFICIAL WHO FAILS TO

NOTIFY THE PERSON SUBJECT OF THE SURVEILLANCE, MONITORING,

INTERCEPTION AND RECORDING, AS SPECIFIED ABOVE.

FOR PURPOSES OF THIS PROVISION, THE ISSUING COURT SHALL

REQUIRE THE APPLICANT LAW ENFORCEMENT OR MILITARY OFFICIAL TO

INFORM THE COURT AFTER THE LAPSE OF THE 30-DAY PERIOD OF THE

FACT THAT AN APPROPRIATE CASE FOR VIOLATION OF THIS ACT HAS

BEEN FILED WITH THE PUBLIC PROSECUTOR’S OFFICE. IF NO SUCH CASE

HAS BEEN FILED, SAID APPLICANT LAW ENFORCEMENT OR MILITARY

OFFICIAL SHALL BE REQUIRED WITHIN THE SAME PERIOD TO INFORM

THE ISSUING COURT THAT THE PERSON SUBJECT OF THE SURVEILLANCE,

INTERCEPTION AND RECORDING HAS BEEN NOTIFIED OF THE

TERMINATION THEREOF.

46
 Senator Lacson. We are expressing some reservation on the proposed

amendment, Mr. President, simply because we conferred with some law

enforcement officials and they maintained that there might be some sleeper

cells, that if we inform the person, the subject of the surveillance after the

lapse of the 60-day or the 90-day period including the extension, there may be

sleeper cells that can still operate and they could be warned by the person who

was subject of the surveillance.

Senator Drilon. So, the objection is on the first paragraph?

Senator Lacson. Inform. The notification or on first paragraph, “SHALL

IMMEDIATELY NOTIFY THE PERSON SUBJECT OF THE SURVEILLANCE,

INTERCEPTION AND RECORDING OF THE TERMINATION.”

Senator Drilon. In other words, if no case is filed within the 30-day

period, the applicant law enforcement shall immediately notify, et cetera, et

cetera.

Senator Lacson. If we can just go away with the notification for the

reason that I advanced earlier. This is an appeal from the law enforcement

officers.

Senator Drilon. We maintain the second paragraph.

Senator Lacson. Except the last portion. It is all right to inform the

issuing court.

Senator Drilon. Yes, Mr. President.

47
 Senator Lacson. Mr. President, but the phrase “THAT THE PERSON

SUBJECT OF THE SURVEILLANCE, INTERCEPTION AND RECORDING HAS

BEEN NOTIFIED OF THE TERMINATION THEREOF.”

Senator Drilon. All right. The first paragraph is not accepted. We are

withdrawing the first paragraph, Mr. President.

The President. All right.

Senator Lacson. Informing the court is fine with us, Mr. President.

Senator Drilon. Informing the court, yes, Mr. President. We retain the

first sentence of the second paragraph and delete the remaining of the second

paragraph.

The President. Perhaps, the Minority Leader is pertaining to starting

from “FOR PURPOSES OF THIS PROVISION” all the way to “OFFICE” period (.).

Senator Drilon. If we will just read the second paragraph, it will read:

FOR PURPOSES OF THIS PROVISION, THE ISSUING COURT SHALL

REQUIRE THE APPLICANT LAW ENFORCEMENT OR MILITARY OFFICIAL TO

INFORM THE COURT AFTER THE LAPSE OF THE 30-DAY PERIOD OF THE

FACT THAT AN APPROPRIATE CASE FOR A VIOLATION OF THIS ACT HAS

BEEN FILED WITH THE PUBLIC PROSECUTOR’S OFFICE.

That is all, Mr. President. The other proposed amendments are

withdrawn.

The President. All right.

Senator Lacson. That is very much appreciated. It is accepted, Mr.

President.

48
 The President. Is there any objection? [Silence] There being none, the

amendment is approved.

Senator Drilon. On page 13, line 18, delete the phrase “and one day to

twelve (12) years”.

Senator Lacson. It is accepted, Mr. President.

The President. Is there any objection? [Silence] There being none, the

amendment is approved.

Senator Lacson. Starting with the phrase “six (6) years”.

The President. Is it “imprisonment of six (6) years period(.)”?

Senator Drilon. Yes, Mr. President.

The President. He is removing the “one day to twelve (12) years”.

Is the distinguished sponsor accepting that? Will the gentleman adopt

it?

Senator Lacson. Mr. President, just for uniformity and consistency, can

we retain the ten years?

The President. Will we consider just the amended line?

Senator Drilon. So that the proposal on line 17 is to delete the phrase

“six (6) years” and on line 18, the phrase “and one day to twelve (12) years”.

And in lieu of that, TEN (10) YEARS period (.)

Senator Lacson. It is accepted, Mr. President.

The President. Is there any objection? [Silence] There being none, the

amendment is approved.

49
 Senator Drilon. On page 14, line 6, delete the phrase “eight (8) years

and one day to ten (10) years”, and replace the same with SIX (6) YEARS.

Senator Lacson. Can we make it 10 years, Mr. President?

Senator Drilon. Remove the phrase “eight (8) years and one day to ten

(10) years” and replace the period with SIX (6) YEARS.

The President. He is proposing a much lower penalty of six years. This

is on the Disposition of Deposited Materials.

Senator Lacson. That is the subject of our discussion with Senator

Pangilinan, Mr. President.

The President. And?

Senator Lacson. And we agreed on 10 years to make it consistent with

the other violations of law enforcement officers, Mr. President.

Senator Drilon. So, what is the proposed penalty?

Senator Lacson. Ten years, Mr. President.

The President. So we can remove “eight (8) years and one day to” on

lines 23 and 24. So, it shall read: penalized by imprisonment of TEN (10)

YEARS.

Senator Drilon. Whenever a violation of law enforcement officer is

involved, we should want to retain 10 years, Mr. President, as an added

safeguard as proposed by Senator Pangilinan.

The President. All right. Is the amendment to the amendment

acceptable to all?

50
 Is there any objection? [Silence] There being none, the amendment is

approved.

Senator Drilon. Consistent with that, Mr. President, on page 20, line 9,

delete the phrase “and one day to twelve (12) years”.

Senator Lacson. It is accepted, Mr. President.

The President. Is there any objection? [Silence] There being none, the

amendment is approved.

Senator Drilon. On page 15, line 7, delete the phrase “and one day to

twelve (12) years”. So, we will just retain “ten (10) years”.

The President. All right.

What does the sponsor say?

Senator Lacson. It is accepted, Mr. President.

The President. Is there any objection? [Silence] There being none, the

amendment is approved.

Senator Drilon. On page 15A.

Senator Lacson. Mr. President, before proceeding to page 15A, I recall

Senator Pangilinan wanted to restate the provision under RA 9372 on

Unauthorized or Malicious Interceptions and/or Recordings. Since I accepted

the amendment, subject to style, I would like to ask Senator Pangilinan to

submit the proposed amendment so we can harmonize it with the other

provisions.

The President. That is still on line 15, Section 25.

51
 Senator Lacson. Line 15, Section 25, Unauthorized or Malicious

Interceptions and/or Recordings.

Senator Pangilinan was proposing to notify the person, subject of the

surveillance, if there are illegal or malicious interceptions, and that would be

tantamount to violating the principle against self-incrimination. Because if the

police officer will notify the subject of the surveillance due to illegal interception

or recording of communication, it might amount to that. So, I would like to

clarify the specific amendment to be submitted by Senator Pangilinan, but he

is not here.

The President. What is this highlighted sentence on lines 8 and line

8a—ALL INFORMATION THAT HAVE BEEN MALICIOUSLY PROCURED

SHOULD BE MADE AVAILABLE TO THE AGGRIEVED PARTY?

Senator Lacson. This is found on page 15, line 8, Mr. President.

The President. Yes.

Senator Lacson. ALL INFORMATION THAT HAVE BEEN MALICIOUSLY

PROCURED SHOULD BE MADE AVAILABLE TO THE AGGRIEVED PARTY.

The President. Yes, this is now incorporated in our February 18 copy.

Senator Lacson. That is correct, Mr. President.

Senator Lacson. Is this the Pangilinan amendment?

Senator Lacson. Yes, Mr. President, but we want to be clarified on the

intent of this proposed amendment. While I accepted the proposed

amendment, I also indicated that it should be subject to style.

52
 My understanding when he introduced the amendment is that after the

court has been informed and all the materials can be disposed of, that is the

time that the person may be informed of, say, if a particular number has been

subject of wiretapping and the law enforcement officer included another mobile

number, then that is tantamount to malicious or illegal… But the point is, who

will determine if the person was subjected to illegal wiretapping? We should

not require the law enforcement officer to submit to the aggrieved party or to

the person who was the subject of interception of communication the

information.

The President. I see the point, but the proposed amendment here

which is highlighted, was this introduced during that time?

Senator Lacson. It was introduced, but I accepted conditionally, Mr.

President. I said, subject to style, and we would now like to be clarified.

The President. According to the Secretariat, this was subject to style.

This was styled based on the proposed amendment of Senator Pangilinan and

the sponsor. This is how they worded it.

Senator Lacson. Yes, Mr. President, and we would like to be clarified

on the intent of the amendment of Senator Pangilinan.

The President. We will probably table this and ask Senator Pangilinan

to join us here in the Session Hall.

Senator Lacson. So we can proceed with the amendments of Senator

Drilon, in the meantime.

The President. Senator Drilon is recognized.

53
 Senator Drilon. Thank you, Mr. President.

We go now on page 16, line 2, delete the phrase “competent Regional

Trial Court”, and replace the same with AUTHORIZING DIVISION OF THE

COURT OF APPEALS.

Mr. President, the reason is that the order of proscription has very

serious consequences and in all of the provisions here, it is always the

designated division of the Court of Appeals. So, just for consistency, we

propose that instead of the RTC, it should be the Court of Appeals. That is also

the present system insofar as the Anti-Money Laundering Law is concerned.

The President. So, the gentleman wants to replace the phrase

“competent Regional Trial Court” with…

Senator Drilon. After the word “before”, replace the phrase “competent

Regional Trial Court” with the phrase AUTHORIZING DIVISION OF THE

COURT OF APPEALS, Mr. President.

The President. So, the gentleman wants to use an article “an” instead

of “a”?

Senator Drilon. No, Mr. President. It should read: “before THE”.

The President. All right. We replace the article “a” also. We remove the

phrase “a competent Regional Trial Court”, and replace it with the phrase THE

AUTHORIZING DIVISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS.

What does the sponsor say?

Senator Lacson. I have no problem with that, except that I would just

like to remind the Minority Leader that also included under the proposed

54
measure is the designation by the Supreme Court of special courts. It is not

any RTC, Mr. President.

Senator Drilon. Yes, we are aware of that. So, with that, Mr. President,

can we ask for the approval of our proposed amendment on line 2?

The President. What does the sponsor say?

Senator Lacson. Grudgingly, Mr. President, it is accepted. [Laughter]

The President. With a grieving heart, he has accepted.

Is there any objection? [Silence] There being none, the amendment is

approved.

Senator Drilon. Mr. President, on the same page, line 5, the heart of the

sponsor need not grieve because this is on the same subject, just delete the

words “Regional Trial”, so that it will just read: BY THE SAID COURT.

Senator Lacson. We accept, Mr. President.

The President. That will suffice as far as the sponsor is concerned.

Is there any objection? [Silence] There being none, the amendment is

approved.

The Majority Leader is recognized.

Senator Zubiri. Mr. President, with the permission of Senator Drilon, I

was approached by one of our colleagues, Senator Marcos, that she has a

proposal. She has an anterior amendment on the earlier pages. So, para hindi

na magkagulo at babalikan pa natin, maybe we can recognize her as well, with

the permission of the two gentlemen.

The President. Senator Marcos is recognized.

55
 Senator Marcos. Yes, Mr. President. Earlier on, part of sufferance of

Senator Drilon who clearly has the Floor, I have been waiting for the mention of

cybercrime and cyber terrorism.

The President. What page is that?

Senator Marcos. There is no mention as I see it, although I want a

clarification from Senator Lacson if indeed it was included. It was originally

under Sections 11 and 12. I was told that this is included under “CRITICAL

INFRASTRUCTURE” in Section 3(A). But to my mind, that definition is grossly

inadequate given that cyber terrorism is the prime mode of the commission of

this crime today.

It only indicates that critical infrastructure should be felled, including

information services. I think that is grossly inadequate given the attacks that

we suffer that result in violence against noncombatant targets which glorify

terrorists with staged beheadings on Facebook. That is a prime method of

recruitment that tends to sow and create a condition of fear and panic among

the populace. Kung tatanggapin sana ni Senator Lacson na may sarili ng

provision iyong cyber terrorism.

The President. Where does the lady senator propose to place it? May we

hear the proposal?

Senator Marcos. The inclusion was originally under Sections 11 and 12

because I had hoped that Section 11 would be inserted after Section 10 to

define “CBRN” and a new Section 12 to define “cyber terrorism.”

56
 So, I would just like to clarify with Senator Lacson if those were

acceptable since CBRN was mentioned earlier but I was assured that cyber

terrorism would be included at some point in time. But we are already towards

the end, and in defining penalties and jurisdiction, we are not yet there.

The President. So the proposal, if the sponsor will look into it, would be

on page 7 after Section 10 and a new Section 11?

Senator Marcos. A new SECTION 11 for CBRN, Mr. President.

The President. And the title is?

Senator Marcos. And the title would be CBRN TERRORISM as well as

CYBER TERRORISM, depending on the sponsor’s wisdom, Mr. President.

The President. So, would the lady senator want to incorporate it in one

section or…

Senator Lacson. Is it a separate section, Mr. President?

Senator Marcos. It is up to the good sponsor, Mr. President.

Senator Lacson. Although under the definition of Senator Drilon, he

made mention of “INFORMATION SYSTEMS AND TECHNOLOGY” which is

more encompassing, Mr. President, than just cyber…

Senator Marcos. My concern, Mr. President, is the use of cyber

terrorism in the glorification of criminals, the Facebook beheadings that are

used for recruiting terrorists, the fake news that spreads all sorts of rumors

throughout the population that panics everyone and, certainly, the system that

coerces government or institutions. This does not include the felling of an

entire information structure which is what is considered traditionally but the

57
untraditional and the new methods of terrorism such as the drone attack and

the drone assassination were clearly cyber terror, and the use of digital and

electronic technology was essential to the commission of the crime. I think

these need to be encompassed.

Senator Lacson. Can we ask for some time to review this, Mr. President,

because it might affect the freedom of expression as guaranteed under the

Constitution?

Senator Marcos. Certainly, Mr. President, provided we give some

priority to cyber terrorism because that is clearly the way of the uncertain

terrorist future.

Senator Lacson. Well-taken, Mr. President. Just give us some time to

just review so we can be assured that we are not running afoul of the provision

of the Constitution.

The President. All right. Then we will be having two points to review:

One is found on page 15 which is the proposal of Senator Pangilinan, which we

cannot determine today; and the proposal of Senator Marcos which will have to

be found after Section 10 on page 7.

In the meantime, we will ask the sponsor to review both proposals.

Senator Marcos. Thank you very much, Mr. President, our sponsor, as

well as, of course, our distinguished Minority Leader for his sufferance and

forbearance. I will also do my very best to come up with language that abides

closely by the Constitution.

58
 The President. Yes. It might be easier if the lady senator will submit to

the sponsor already the proposed amendment later on.

Senator Marcos. Yes, Mr. President. I have actually submitted it in

writing but I will review.

The President. All right.

Senator Marcos. Thank you, Mr. President.

The President. The Minority Leader may continue. We are still on page

16.

Senator Drilon. Still on page 16, Mr. President. On line 11, delete the

words “Regional Trial”, consistent with the amendment in the preceding lines.

The President. What does the sponsor say?

Senator Lacson. It is accepted, Mr. President.

The President. Is there any objection? [Silence] There being none, the

amendment is approved.

Senator Drilon. On line 12, delete the word “judge”.

The President. What does the sponsor say?

Senator Lacson. We delete the whole phrase “Regional Trial Court

judge”, Mr. President?

The President. No. He is retaining the word “Court”.

Senator Drilon. Yes, Mr. President, retain “Court”.

Senator Lacson. That is accepted, Mr. President.

The President. Is there any objection? [Silence] There being none, the

amendment is approved.

59
 Senator Drilon. On the same page, line 13, after the word “substance”,

insert the following: THAT THE ISSUANCE OF AN ORDER OF PROSCRIPTION

IS NECESSARY TO PREVENT THE COMMISSION OF TERRORISM. So, it will

now read:

SECTION 28. Preliminary Order of Proscription. - Where the Court has

determined that probable cause exists on the basis of the verified application

which is sufficient in form and substance THAT THE ISSUANCE OF AN ORDER

OF PROSCRIPTION IS NECESSARY TO PREVENT THE COMMISSION OF

TERRORISM, he/she shall, within seventy two (72) hours after the filing of the

application, issue a preliminary order of proscription declaring the respondent

as a terrorist and an outlawed organization or association within the meaning

of Section 27 of this Act.

The President. “…declaring that the respondent as—is—a terrorist…”

both are acceptable, subject to style. What does the sponsor say?

Senator Lacson. May we be clarified on the word “necessary”, Mr.

President? Necessary to prevent?

Senator Drilon. No, that the order of proscription is necessary to prevent

the commission of terrorism. Let me read the sentence for clarity.

SECTION. 28. Preliminary Order of Proscription. - Where the Court has

determined that probable cause exists on the basis of the verified application

which is sufficient in form and substance THAT THE ISSUANCE OF AN ORDER

OF PROSCRIPTION IS NECESSARY TO PREVENT THE COMMISSION OF

TERRORISM.

60
 Senator Lacson. That is accepted, Mr. President. Are we withdrawing the

word “prima facie”?

Senator Drilon. No, Mr. President. I am just reading probable cause.

Senator Lacson. So, the gentleman is no longer introducing…

Senator Drilon. No more.

Senator Lacson. All right, Mr. President, accepted. So, it is still based on

probable cause?

Senator Drilon. That is correct, Mr. President.

The President. Is there any objection? [Silence] There being none, the

amendment is approved.

Senator Drilon. On the same page, delete lines 17 to 21 and replace the

same with the following: THE COURT SHALL CONDUCT CONTINUOUS

HEARINGS, WHICH SHOULD BE COMPLETED WITHIN SIX (6) MONTHS

FROM THE TIME THE APPLICATION HAS BEEN FILED, TO DETERMINE

WHETHER: (A) THE PRELIMINARY ORDER OF PROSCRIPTION SHOULD BE

MADE PERMANENT; (B) A PERMANENT ORDER OF PROSCRIPTION SHOULD

BE ISSUED IN CASE NO PRELIMINARY ORDER WAS ISSUED; OR (C) A

PRELIMINARY ORDER OF PROSCRIPTION SHOULD BE LIFTED. IT SHALL BE

THE BURDEN OF THE APPLICANT TO PROVE THAT THE RESPONDENT IS A

TERRORIST AND AN OUTLAWED ORGANIZATION OR ASSOCIATION WITHIN

THE MEANING OF SECTION 26 OF THIS ACT, BEFORE THE COURT ISSUES

AN ORDER OF PROSCRIPTION, WHETHER PRELIMINARY OR PERMANENT.

The President. As of now Section 27.

61
 Senator Lacson. Provided that we follow the renumbering later on, Mr.

President, that is accepted.

The President. Is there any objection? [Silence] There being none, the

amendment is approved.

Senator Drilon. On the same page, line 22, insert the word PERMANENT

before the word “proscription”.

The President. What does the sponsor say?

Senator Lacson. It is accepted, Mr. President.

The President. Is there any objection? [Silence] There being none, the

amendment is approved.

Senator Drilon. On page 17, this is on “Detention Without Judicial

Warrant of Arrest,” line 5, delete the phrase “charged with or”.

Senator Lacson. It is accepted, Mr. President.

The President. Is there any objection? [Silence] There being none, the

amendment is approved.

Senator Drilon. On the same page, line 10, delete the phrase “charged

or”.

Senator Lacson. It is accepted, Mr. President.

The President. Is there any objection? [Silence] There being none, the

amendment is approved.

Senator Drilon. On the same page, line 20, delete the phrase “charged

with or”.

Senator Lacson. It is accepted, Mr. President.

62
 The President. Is there any objection? [Silence] There being none, the

amendment is approved.

Senator Drilon. On the same page, line 12, place a period (.) after the

word “personnel” and insert the following phrase: THE PERIOD OF

DETENTION MAY BE EXTENDED TO A MAXIMUM PERIOD OF TEN (10)

CALENDAR DAYS.

Senator Lacson. It is accepted, Mr. President.

The President. Is there any objection? [Silence] There being none, the

amendment is approved.

Senator Drilon. On the same page, line 16, delete the semicolon (;) after

the word “delay” and the phrase…

SUSPENSION OF SESSION

Mr. President, may I ask for a one-minute suspension of the session?

The President. Is there any objection? [Silence] There being none, the

session is suspended for one minute.

It was 4:57 p.m.

RESUMPTION OF SESSION

At 4:58 p.m., the session was resumed.

The President. The session is resumed.

Senator Drilon. On page 17, line 16, replace the semicolon (;) after the

word “delay” with a period (.) and delete the rest of the sentence until line 19

with the word “order” as the previous amendment was already accepted.

Senator Lacson. It is accepted, Mr. President.

63
 The President. Is there any objection? [Silence] There being none, the

amendment is approved.

Senator Drilon. On page 18, line 1, delete the phrase “and one day to

twelve (12) years”.

Senator Lacson. It is accepted, Mr. President.

The President. Is there any objection? [Silence] There being none, the

amendment is approved.

Senator Drilon. A matter of style, on the same page, line 26, delete the

phrase “Penalty for”. The title of the provision there shall now read: “Violation

of the Rights of a Detainee.”

Senator Lacson. We accept, Mr. President.

The President. Is there any objection? [Silence] There being none, the

amendment is approved.

Senator Drilon. On line 27, delete the phrase “and one day to twelve

(12) years”.

Senator Lacson. We accept, Mr. President.

The President. Is there any objection? [Silence] There being none, the

amendment is approved.

Senator Drilon. On page 19, line 4, matter of style, Mr. President. We

propose to delete the phrase “Requirement for an”. The title should simply be

Official Custodial Logbook and Its Contents.

Senator Lacson. We accept, Mr. President.

64
 The President. Is there any objection? [Silence] There being none, the

amendment is approved.

Senator Drilon. On page 19, lines 5 and 6, delete the phrase “charged

with or”.

Senator Lacson. We accept, Mr. President.

The President. Is there any objection? [Silence] There being none, the

amendment is approved.

Senator Drilon. On page 20, line 9, replace the phrase “ten (10) years

and one day to twelve (12) years” with the phrase SIX (6) YEARS.

Senator Lacson. Ten years or 12 years, Mr. President?

The President. Six ang proposal niya.

Senator Drilon. Just for consistency, Mr. President, it should be TEN

(10) YEARS.

The President. Remove “and one day to twelve (12) years”?

Senator Drilon. Yes, Mr. President.

Senator Lacson. We accept, Mr. President.

The President. Is there any objection? [Silence] There being none, the

amendment is approved.

Senator Drilon. Senator Hontiveros has an anterior amendment, Mr.

President.

The President. Senator Hontiveros is recognized.

HONTIVEROS AMENDMENT

Senator Hontiveros. Thank you, Mr. President.

65
 With the indulgence of the good sponsor and the good Minority Leader, I

would like to propose an anterior amendment.

On page 16, line 21, to make a further amendment to the amendment

proposed by the Minority Leader and accepted by the good sponsor, that it

would now read: THE COURT SHALL IMMEDIATELY COMMENCE AND

CONDUCT CONTINUOUS HEARINGS and so on and so forth.

The President. This was deleted by the Minority Leader, page 16, lines

17 to 21.

Senator Lacson. It was already deleted, Mr. President.

Senator Hontiveros. Yes, Mr. President. And then he proposed an

amendment which, if I recall correctly, was accepted by the good sponsor,

which, as of now, reads: THE COURT SHALL CONDUCT CONTINUOUS

HEARINGS, if I remember correctly.

Senator Lacson. Yes, that is correct, Mr. President.

Senator Hontinveros. Thank you, Mr. President. If that is correct, then

I wish to propose an anterior amendment to this accepted amendment that

would now read: THE COURT SHALL IMMEDIATELY COMMENCE AND

CONDUCT CONTINUOUS HEARINGS and so on and so forth.

I so move, Mr. President.

Senator Lacson. Anong page iyan, Mr. President?

Senator Hontiveros. Page 16, Mr. President, line 21, replacing the

previous lines 17 to 21.

66
 Senator Lacson. With the permission of Senator Drilon, the sponsor

accepts, Mr. President.

Senator Hontiveros. Thank you, Mr. President.

Senator Drilon. No objection, Mr. President.

Senator Hontiveros. Thank you, Mr. President; thank you, Minority

Leader.

The President. Is there any objection? [Silence] There being none, the

amendment is approved.

We go back to page 20.

DRILON AMENDMENTS

Senator Drilon. On page 20, line 22, Section 35, Restriction on the Right

to Travel, insert the word INVESTIGATING before “prosecutor”, and delete the

phrase “handling the case”. Matter of style, Mr. President.

Senator Lacson. We accept, Mr. President.

The President. Is there any objection? [Silence] There being none, the

amendment is approved.

Senator Drilon. On line 24, after the acronym “PHDO”, insert a comma

(,) and the phrase UPON A PRELIMINARY DETERMINATION OF PROBABLE

CAUSE IN THE PROPER REGIONAL TRIAL COURT.

Senator Lacson. It is accepted, Mr. President.

The President. Is there any objection? [Silence] There being none, the

amendment is approved.

67
 Senator Drilon. And on the same page, line 23, delete the phrase “in

accordance with the Supreme Court Rule on PHDO”, matter of style. This

presumed that the PHDO is in accordance with the Supreme Court rules

issued.

Senator Lacson. It is accepted, Mr. President.

The President. So, the proposal of the gentleman comes after the word

“respondent”?

Senator Drilon. Yes, Mr. President.

The President. All right. Is there any objection? [Silence] There being

none, the amendment is approved.

Senator Drilon. On page 21, line 19, delete the title…Sorry.

SUSPENSION OF SESSION

Senator Lacson. Mr. President, I move that we suspend the session for
one minute.

The President. Is there any objection? [Silence] There being none, the
session is suspended for one minute.

It was 5:06 p.m.

RESUMPTION OF SESSION

At 5:07 p.m., the session was resumed.

The President. The session is resumed.

Senator Drilon. On page 21, line 14, delete the phrase “to cancel the

passport of the accused” and replace it with the following: TO INITIATE THE

PROCEDURE FOR THE CANCELLATION OF THE PASSPORT OF THE

ACCUSED.

68
 Senator Lacson. It is accepted, Mr. President.

The President. Is there any objection? [Silence] There being none, the

amendment is approved.

Senator Drilon. On page 21, line 19, change the title to ANTI-MONEY

LAUNDERING COUNCIL AUTHORITY TO INVESTIGATE, INQUIRE INTO AND

EXAMINE BANK DEPOSITS.

Senator Lacson. It is accepted, Mr. President.

The President. Is there any objection? [Silence] There being none, the

amendment is approved.

Senator Drilon. On page 23, line 11, the provision on Republic Act No.

9372 or the Human Security Act is being deleted in the bill. We propose to

reinstate the amendment on Section 37, which shall read as follows:

SECTION 37. MALICIOUS EXAMINATION OF A BANK OR A FINANCIAL

INSTITUTION. ANY PERSON WHO MALICIOUSLY, OR WITHOUT

AUTHORIZATION, EXAMINES DEPOSITS, PLACEMENTS, TRUST ACCOUNTS,

ASSETS, OR RECORDS IN A BANK OR FINANCIAL INSTITUTION IN RELATION

TO SECTION 36 SHALL SUFFER THE PENALTY OF FOUR (4) YEARS.

Senator Lacson. It is accepted, Mr. President.

The President. Simply SUFFER THE PENALTY OF FOUR (4)YEARS?

Senator Drilon. This is in line with the Bank Secrecy Law, Mr.

President.

Senator Lacson. It is accepted, Mr. President. And since this is a new

provision, a new section, I move that we renumber the succeeding sections.

69
 The President. All right, subject to style. Is there any objection?

[Silence] There being none, the amendment is approved.

Senator Drilon. On the same page, line 12, remove the word “Provision”,

matter of style; “Safe Harbor” should be the title of the measure.

The President. Before the Minority Leader continue, it bothers me—

when we say SHALL SUFFER THE PENALTY OF FOUR (4) YEARS, four years of

what? Four years of massage or four years of imprisonment? [Laughter]

Senator Drilon. PENALTY OF FOUR (4) YEARS OF IMPRISONMENT—I

am sorry, Mr. President.

The President. So, IMPRISONMENT. Is there any objection? [Silence]

There being none, the amendment is approved.

Senator Lacson. Thank you, Mr. President.

The President. Please proceed.

Senator Drilon. On the same page, lines 12 to 14, we will just read the

provision now as follows: Safe Harbor.—No administrative, criminal or civil

proceedings shall lie against any person acting in good faith when

implementing the TARGETED FINANCIAL SANCTIONS AS PROVIDED UNDER

PERTINENT United Nation Security Resolutions.

Senator Lacson. It is accepted, Mr. President.

The President. Is there any objection? [Silence] There being none, the

amendment is approved.

Senator Lacson. I was just tempted to say earlier that when three people

of the same age discuss, when two forget, one remembers. [Laughter]

70
 The President. Agreed.

We are still on page 23.

Senator Drilon. Still on page 23, line 16, delete the words “Penalty of”, a

matter of style, Mr. President.

Senator Lacson. It is accepted, Mr. President.

The President. Is there any objection? [Silence] There being none, the

amendment is approved.

Senator Drilon. On the same page, line 20, after the word “Section”,

insert 26 AND, Mr. President.

The President. So, it becomes Section 26 AND 27.

Senator Lacson. Subject to renumbering, Mr. President.

Senator Drilon. Renumbering, yes, Mr. President.

The President. All right, subject to renumbering.

Senator Drilon. Yes, Mr. President.

The President. Is there any objection? [Silence] There being none, the

amendment is approved.

Senator Drilon. Still on the same page, line 21, replace “ten (10) years

and one day to twelve (12) years” with FOUR (4) YEARS, Mr. President.

Senator Lacson. It is accepted, Mr. President.

The President. Is there any objection? [Silence] There being none, the

amendment is approved.

Senator Drilon. Still on the same page, line 23, after the title, insert the

phrase THE IMMUNITY AND PROTECTION OF GOVERNMENT WITNESSES

71
SHALL BE GOVERNED BY. I will just read the whole sentence with the

amendment: Immunity and Protection of Government Witnesses. – THE

IMMUNITY AND PROTECTION OF GOVERNMENT WITNESSES SHALL BE

GOVERNED BY the provisions of R.A. No. 6981, otherwise known as the ‘”The

Witness Protection, Security and Benefits Act”, and then delete the rest of the

sentence, Mr. President.

The provisions of the Witness Protection, Security and Benefits Act is

more liberal in application rather than Sections 17 and 18 of Rule 119. This is

because under the Witness Protection, Security and Benefits Act, it is the

secretary of justice who can determine who are the witnesses and exclude the

proposed witnesses from the filing of the Information.

Under Rule 119, Sections 17 and 18 of the Revised Rules of Court, it is

the court which will have to rule and that ruling is subject to appeal. And,

therefore, to strengthen the prosecution, instead of basing it on the Rules of

Court, we should base it on the Witness Protection Program, Mr. President.

The President. What does the sponsor say?

Senator Lacson. It is accepted, Mr. President.

The President. Is there any objection? [Silence] There being none, the

motion is approved.

Senator Drilon. On page 24, lines 7 to 8, delete the phrase “twelve (12)

years and one day to twenty (20) years” and replace it with SIX (6) YEARS.

Senator Lacson. It is accepted, Mr. President.

72
 The President. Is there any objection? [Silence] There being none, the

motion is approved.

Senator Drilon. On the same page, line 5, we propose to reinstate

Section 44 of the Human Security Act on Infidelity in the Custody of Detained

Persons. We propose to reinstate, with amendments, the deleted Section 44,

and it will read as follows: SECTION [BLANK] . - Infidelity in the Custody of

Detained Persons. ANY PUBLIC OFFICER WHO HAS DIRECT CUSTODY OF A

DETAINED PERSON UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF THIS ACT AND WHO BY

HIS DELIBERATE ACT, MISCONDUCT OR INEXCUSABLE NEGLIGENCE,

CAUSES OR ALLOWS THE ESCAPE OF SUCH DETAINED PERSON SHALL BE

GUILTY OF AN OFFENSE AND SHALL SUFFER THE PENALTY OF: (A) TEN (10)

YEARS OF IMPRISONMENT IF THE DETAINED PERSON HAS ALREADY BEEN

CONVICTED AND SENTENCED IN A FINAL JUDGMENT OF A COMPETENT

COURT; (B) SIX (6) YEARS OF IMPRISONMENT IF THE DETAINED PERSON

HAS NOT YET BEEN CONVICTED AND SENTENCED IN A FINAL JUDGMENT

OF A COMPETENT COURT.

The President. What does the sponsor say?

Senator Lacson. So, in committing infidelity in the custody of detained

persons, there is a distinction between a detained person who has already

been convicted, and a person that has not yet been convicted? So, there are

two levels of punishment. Is that the suggestion, Mr. President?

73
 Senator Drilon. This is basically a provision of the Revised Penal Code,

Mr. President. The distinction is in the Revised Penal Code; we just followed

it.

The President. The Minority Leader just followed the distinction in the

RPC?

Senator Drilon. Yes, Mr. President.

The President. Well, this is an improvement because in the Revised

Penal Code, infidelity in custody of a prisoner is very light.

Senator Lacson. But my concern, Mr. President, is, a terrorist,

regardless of whether he has been convicted or still undergoing trial, is

potentially a threat to humanity.

The President. That is right. So, what does the sponsor think?

Senator Lacson. My proposal is to impose the same penalty regardless

of the status of the case, Mr. President.

The President. Kung detained or kung convicted na.

Senator Lacson. Convicted or otherwise, my suggestion is to impose the

same penalty because of the gravity of the offense.

Senator Drilon. Mr. President, we should consider that this is a penalty

on the police officer who has custody, and to impose life imprisonment maybe

a…

Senator Lacson. No, not that, Mr. President.

The President Not life; lighter. Huwag daw mas magaan.

74
 Senator Lacson. Not that, Mr. President. There should be no

distinction in an inexcusable release of a prisoner who has been convicted and

who is still undergoing trial.

The President. Whether detained or convicted, pareho.

Senator Drilon. All right, Mr. President.

Senator Lacson. A similar penalty should be imposed on the custodian

who deliberately released a suspected terrorist undergoing trial.

Senator Drilon. So, there is no distinction between a detention prisoner

and a convicted prisoner insofar as infidelity is concerned?

Senator Lacson. That is correct, Mr. President.

Senator Drilon. Then, we have no objection to that amendment, and we

can place probably 10 years.

Senator Lacson. Ten years, yes, Mr. President.

The President. All right, subject to style. Accepted, sponsor?

Senator Lacson. Yes, thank you, Mr. President.

The President. Is there any objection? [Silence] There being none, the

amendment is approved.

Senator Lacson. I just move to renumber again the sections.

The President. Yes, this will probably be the new Section 43 instead,

subject to renumbering.

Senator Drilon. We turn now to page 24.

The President. Page 24 pa rin?

Senator Drilon. Anti-Terrorism Council, Mr. President.

75
 Senator Lacson. Yes, Mr. President.

Senator Drilon. On page 24.

The President. Page 24, Anti-Terrorism Council.

Senator Drilon. All right. The amendment will be to delete on lines 23

to 28, Mr. President.

The President. Lines 23 to 28.

Senator Drilon. So, from line 23, starting with the phrase “the Secretary

of Science and Technology” up to the number “(16)” on line 28. So, the ninth

member is “the Executive Director of the Anti-Money Laundering Council

(AMLC) Secretariat”. We do not see really the need to have this many,

especially the Secretary of Science and Technology, the Secretary of Labor and

Employment…

The President. So, the Minority Leader is removing all from number (9),

“the Secretary of Science and Technology”, all the way to “(BARMM), and” on

line 28.

Senator Drilon. And number (16), Mr. President.

The President. Yes, making number (16) a number (9).

Senator Drilon. No, Mr. President, number (9) is retained.

The President. Yes, it becomes number (9).

Senator Drilon. Yes, Mr. President.

The President. All right. To remove all these number of members in the

Anti-Terrorism Council that is starting to sound like a Bamboo Council.

[Laughter]

76
 What does the sponsor say?

Senator Drilon. Labing-anim po iyong miyembro.

Senator Lacson. It is accepted, Mr. President, except that I propose that

we retain them as members of the support agencies. Their agencies will be

retained in the support agencies.

Senator Drilon. All right.

The President. What does that mean?

Senator Lacson. Support agencies as mentioned on page 25, line 13.

The President. All right. So, the sponsor accepts as is now.

Is there any objection? [Silence] There being none, the amendment is

approved.

It is nine lamang.

Senator Drilon. It is nine lamang, Mr. President.

The President. So, we can proceed to line…

Senator Drilon. This is not the Bamboo Council, Mr. President.

[Laughter]

Mr. President, on page 27, lines 7 and 8, delete the phrase “alleged

violation of any of the acts defined and penalized under Sections 4, xxx” until

line 9.

We repeat that, Mr. President. On lines 7 and 8, delete the phrase

starting from the words “alleged violation” on line 7 until the word “Act” on line

9.

The President. Until “Act” on line 9.

77
 Senator Drilon. Yes, Mr. President, line 9. From the word “alleged” on

line 7 up to the “Act” on line 9, and replace the same with FOR ANY CRIME

DEFINED AND PENALIZED UNDER THIS ACT.

Senator Lacson. It is accepted, Mr. President.

The President. Is there any objection? [Silence] There being none, the

amendment is approved.

Senator Drilon. On page 27, lines 11 to 13, delete the phrase “for alleged

violation of any of the acts defined and penalized under Sections 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9

10, 11 and 12 of this Act” and replace with FOR ANY CRIME DEFINED AND

PENALIZED UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF THIS ACT.

Senator Lacson. It is accepted, Mr. President.

The President. Is there any objection? [Silence] There being none, the

amendment is approved.

Senator Drilon. On page 28, lines 11 to 13, delete the phrase starting

with the words “such as” on line 11, ending with the acronym “AMLC” on line

13.

The President. No replacement, just deletion?

Senator Drilon. Yes, Mr. President.

The President. So, a comma (,) after the word “destruction”.

What does the sponsor say?

Senator Lacson. Is it a comma (,) or a semicolon (;), Mr. President?

Senator Drilon. That is semicolon, after the phrase “mass destruction”

Mr. President.

78
 Senator Lacson. It is accepted, Mr. President.

The President. Is there any objection? [Silence] There being none, the

amendment is approved.

Senator Drilon. On the same page, lines 17 to 18, matter of style,

remove the phrase starting with “Sections 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10…” up to the words

“said crimes” on the next line and replace the same with the words THIS ACT.

Senator Lacson. It is accepted, Mr. President.

The President. Is there any objection? [Silence] There being none, the

amendment is approved.

Senator Drilon. On the same page, line 27, just remove the phrase “Role

of the”, just say Commission on Human Rights (CHR), matter of style.

The President. What does the sponsor say?

Senator Lacson. It is accepted, Mr. President.

The President. Is there any objection? [Silence] There being none, the

amendment is approved.

Senator Drilon. Mr. President, on pages 30…

LACSON AMENDMENT

Senator Lacson. Before that, Mr. President. On page 28, “Role of the

Commission on Human Rights”, this is found on the present law. I have an

issue with the phrase “concurrent jurisdiction to prosecute public officials, law

enforcers”, et cetera. I maintain that the Commission on Human Rights has no

prosecutorial powers, so, I will move to amend or delete the phrase “concurrent

jurisdiction to prosecute public officials”, et cetera.

79
 The President. So, we put period (.) after the phrase “implementation of

this Act”.

Senator Lacson. Yes, Mr. President.

The President. May word na “prosecution” din sa umpisa—“The CHR

shall give the highest priority to the investigation and prosecution…” et cetera.

Senator Lacson. That is all right, Mr. President, because they can

assist in the prosecution, but they should not have concurrent jurisdiction to

prosecute.

The President. So, we put a period (.) after the word “Act”, and we

delete all the way until line 2 of page 29.

Senator Lacson. From the word “and” on line 29 all the way to line 2

on page 29.

The President. Is there any objection? [Silence] There being none, the

amendment is approved.

DRILON AMENDMENT

Senator Drilon. On page 30, line 26, Promoting Peace and Industry in

Schools, Learning Centers and Training Institutions, this provision has no place

in an Anti-Terrorism bill. I do not know why this is here. So, we propose to

delete the entire section.

The President. Delete the entire Section 50. What does the sponsor

say?

Senator Lacson. Before I accept, I would like to defer to the proponent

of this amendment, Mr. President.

80
 The President. Senator Marcos is recognized.

Senator Marcos. Yes, Mr. President. This was borne out of the

experience that we just endured in the lumad schools in the Cotabato area as

well as the recruitment by the NPA in PUP and in other schools here in Metro

Manila. As a result, I think this amendment was put together. But, perhaps,

there are other laws that can take care of that, we concede that this

amendment may be sacrificed.

Thank you, Mr. President.

The President. With that manifestation, what does the sponsor say?

SUSPENSION OF SESSION

Senator Lacson. May I ask for a one-minute suspension of the session,

Mr. President.

The President. Is there any objection? [Silence] There being none, the
session is suspended.

It was 5:32 p.m.

RESUMPTION OF SESSION

At 5:33 p.m., the session was resumed.

The President. The session is resumed.

Senator Drilon. The proposal is to delete the entire section.

The President. What does the sponsor say?

Senator Lacson. It is accepted, Mr. President.

The President. It is accepted.

Is there any objection? [Silence] There being none, the amendment is

approved.

81
 Senator Drilon. On page 29, line 9, delete the phrase “of this Act”, just

a matter of style.

The President. We delete the phrase “of this Act” in the title of Section

48.

Senator Lacson. It is accepted, Mr. President.

The President. It is accepted.

Is there any objection? [Silence] There being none, the amendment is

approved.

Senator Drilon. On page 30, lines 7 and 8, delete the phrase “Republic

of the Philippines, without exception whatsoever, shall submit the case without

undue delay to the DOJ for the purpose of prosecution”, and replace the same

with the following phrase: ANTI-TERRORISM COUNCIL SHALL REFER THE

CASE TO THE BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION FOR DEPORTATION OR TO THE

DOJ FOR PROSECUTION.

I repeat, on page 30, lines 7 and 8, delete the phrase “Republic of the

Philippines, without exception whatsoever, shall submit the case without

undue delay to the DOJ for the purpose of prosecution”, and replace the same

with the phrase: ANTI-TERRORISM COUNCIL SHALL REFER THE CASE TO

THE BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION FOR DEPORTATION OR TO THE DOJ FOR

PROSECUTION. The option is given to the Anti-Terrorism Council where to

refer the matter.

Mr. President, the reason why we are doing this is, in case there is really

no evidence and there is no option to refer it to the Bureau of Immigration,

82
referring it to the DOJ may result in a situation where, because of lack of

evidence, the terrorist is released. To foreclose that possibility, we are

proposing to give the Anti-Terrorism Council the option of either referring it to

the Bureau of Immigration or to the prosecuting fiscal…

The President. For deportation.

Senator Drilon. …for deportation or to the DOJ for prosecution.

The President. That is correct. What does the sponsor say?

Senator Lacson. Mr. President, under the principle of aut dedere aut

judicare, Mr. President—prosecute or extradite.

Senator Drilon. Yes, Mr. President.

Senator Lacson. We accept, Mr. President.

The President. Is there any objection? [Silence] There being none, the

amendment is approved.

Senator Drilon. On page 32, delete lines 8 to 12, Applicability of the

Revised Penal Code. Anyway, if it is applicable, the Revised Penal Code itself

contains a similar provision.

Senator Lacson. We accept, Mr. President.

The President. Is there any objection? [Silence] There being none, the

amendment is approved.

Senator Drilon. Finally, on the same page, delete lines 14 to 18. This is

Appropriations; again, it has no place in this bill. It can certainly deserve this

appropriation but it should be in the budget, Mr. President, not here. That is

why we propose to delete lines 14 to 18.

83
 Senator Lacson. We accept, Mr. President.

The President. Is there any objection? [Silence] There being none, the

amendment is approved.

Senator Drilon. We have no more amendments, Mr. President.

Senator Lacson. Thank you, Mr. President.

The President. All right. May we direct the Secretariat to produce

another clean copy.

Senator Zubiri. Mr. President, may I just ask a question? Is this the

same law that we filed? [Laughter]

The President. Why? Does the Majority Leader not recognize it?

Senator Zubiri. Parang hindi na, Mr. President. Let me see. We will

wait for the clean copy, Mr. President.

The President. Well, it probably has become better.

SUSPENSION OF SESSION

Senator Zubiri. Yes, Mr. President. May I just ask for a one-minute

suspension to confer with the sponsor because one of our colleagues wants to

propose amendments but he is not here today. So, I will have to ask the

pleasure of the sponsor. I will always follow the pleasure of the sponsor.

The President. Is there any objection? [Silence] There being none, the

session is suspended for one minute.

It was 5:39 p.m.

RESUMPTION OF SESSION

At 5:44 p.m., the session was resumed.

84
 The President. The session is resumed.

The Majority Leader is recognized.

Senator Zubiri. Mr. President, after conferring with the author and

sponsor, I completely agree that we have put this on the agenda for several

weeks now, ang loko nga natin dito ay walang kamatayang Anti-Terrorism Act

and today is supposed to be the final day of deliberations.

To give our colleagues a chance to be able to propose some amendments,

the good sponsor…

The President. If they still have some amendments.

Senator Zubiri. Yes, Mr. President.

The good sponsor is willing to wait until the end of the session which is

about another hour from now while we are deliberating on the bill of Senator

Gatchalian and sponsorships of about three other members. That would be one

hour from now. May we ask the staff of Senator Tolentino and Senator Pimentel

to please give us the proposed amendments, if possible now, so that we can

study this and if the sponsor will agree to further sponsor these amendments.

The President. All right. Because there had been a number of days

already for the period of amendments. We have had several revised copies

already.

Senator Zubiri. Yes, Mr. President.

The President. And once a bill has passed through the washing machine

of the Minority Leader-- [Laughter]

Senator Zubiri. The improvements of the Minority Leader.

85
 The President. --it could probably be a good bill already.

Senator Zubiri. Yes, Mr. President.

The President. So, what is the pleasure of the Majority Leader?

SUSPENSION OF CONSIDERATION OF S. NO. 1083

Senator Zubiri. So, with that, Mr. President, I move that we suspend

consideration temporarily of Senate Bill No. 1083 for an hour while awaiting

the proposed amendments.

The President. But we are promising the sponsor that we will pass it on

Second Reading today.

Senator Zubiri. Yes, Mr. President, I am not going home today without

making the motion.

The President. All right, very good. So, in the meantime, there is a

motion to temporarily suspend consideration of Senate Bill No. 1083.

Is there any objection? [Silence] There being none, the motion is

approved.

Senator Zubiri. Thank you, Mr. President.

Mr. President, I move that we take up some other matters.

Sen. Cynthia Villar would like to sponsor Senate Bill No. 1342.

At this juncture, Sen. Vicente C. Sotto III relinquished the Chair to Sen. Joel
Villanueva.

SPECIAL ORDER
Mr. President, I move that we transfer from the Calendar for Ordinary
Business to the Calendar for Special Orders Committee Report No. 47 on
Senate Bill No. 1342, entitled

86
 AN ACT ADDRESSING FOOD SECURITY CONCERNS THROUGH
INTEGRATING INSTRUCTIONAL GARDENS IN PRIMARY AND
SECONDARY SCHOOL CURRICULA AND PROMOTING THE
USE OF URBAN AGRICULTURE, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES

The Presiding Officer [Senator Villanueva]. Is there any objection?

[Silence] There being none, the motion is approved.

BILL ON SECOND READING

S. No. 1342 – Instructional Gardens and Urban Agriculture Act of 2020

Senator Zubiri. Mr. President, I move that we consider Senate Bill No.
1342 as reported out under Committee Report No. 47.
The Presiding Officer [Senator Villanueva]. Is there any objection?
[Silence] There being none, the motion is approved.
Consideration of Senate Bill No. 1342 is now in order. With the
permission of the Body, the Secretary will read only the title of the bill without
prejudice to inserting in the Record the whole text thereof.
The Secretary. Senate Bill No. 1342, entitled

AN ACT ADDRESSING FOOD SECURITY CONCERNS THROUGH

INTEGRATING INSTRUCTIONAL GARDENS IN PRIMARY AND
SECONDARY SCHOOL CURRICULA AND PROMOTING THE
USE OF URBAN AGRICULTURE, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES

The following is the whole text of the bill:

Senate Bill No. 1342

[Insert]

Senator Zubiri. May we recognize the sponsor, the distinguished lady

senator from Las Piñas, the chairperson of the Committee on Agriculture, Food

and Agrarian Reform, no other than Sen. Cynthia Villar.

The Presiding Officer [Senator Villanueva]. The lady senator from Las

Piñas, Sen. Cynthia Villar, is recognized.

SPONSORSHIP SPEECH OF SENATOR VILLAR

87
 Senator Villar. Mr. President, my esteemed colleagues, a pleasant

afternoon to all.

Mr. President, as the chairperson of the Committee on Agriculture, Food

and Agrarian Reform, together with the Committees on Basic Education, Arts

and Culture; Finance; and Ways and Means, I am pleased to submit Committee

Report No. 47. This Committee Report is the result of Senate Bill Nos. 147,

257, 280, 587, and 1264, which were primarily referred to the Committee on

Agriculture, Food and Agrarian Reform.

This bill aims to address the issue of food security starting with teaching

the youths the fundamental concepts about nutrition, the cultural and

historical aspects of food supply, as well as the rudiments of planting through

the integration of instructional gardens in primary and secondary schools all

over the country.

Under this bill, local government units will have a crucial role in

promoting food security, improved health, addressing poverty, and creating

savings in household expenditures through institutionalizing urban

agriculture.

It is the intention of this bill to address the problems revealed by recent

studies, which show the increase in number of Filipino children suffering from

malnutrition, stunted growth, and obesity. Dearth of government policies

providing for access to information on nutrition will continue to be an obstacle

in promoting healthy growth and development of children. Towards this end, I

seek the approval of Committee Report No. 47 on Senate Bill No. 1342.

88
 Thank you very much, Mr. President.

The Presiding Officer [Sen. Villanueva.] Thank you, Senator Villar.

The Majority Leader is recognized.

SUSPENSION OF CONSIDERATION OF S. NO. 1342

Senator Zubiri. Mr. President, to allow our colleagues to study the

measure, I move that we suspend consideration of Senate Bill No. 1342.

The Presiding Officer [Sen. Villanueva.] Is there any objection?

[Silence] There being none, the motion is approved.

SPECIAL ORDER

Senator Zubiri. Mr. President, I move that we transfer from the

Calendar for Ordinary Business to the Calendar for Special Orders Committee

Report No. 51 on Senate Bill No. 1365, entitled

AN ACT INSTITUTIONALIZING THE ALTERNATIVE LEARNING

SYSTEM IN BASIC EDUCATION FOR OUT-OF-SCHOOL
YOUTH, ADULTS, AND CHILDREN IN SPECIAL EXTREME
CASES AND APPROPRIATING FUNDS THEREFOR

The Presiding Officer [Sen. Villanueva.] Is there any objection?

[Silence] There being none, the motion is approved.

BILL ON SECOND READING

S. No. 1365—Alternative Learning System Act

Senator Zubiri. Mr. President, I move that we consider Senate Bill No.
1365 as reported out under Committee Report No. 51.

The President. Is there any objection? [Silence] There being none, the
motion is approved.

Consideration of Senate Bill No. 1365 is now in order. With the

permission of the Body, the Secretary will read only the title of the bill without
prejudice to inserting in the Record the whole text thereof.

89
 The Secretary. Senate Bill No. 1365, entitled

AN ACT INSTITUTIONALIZING THE ALTERNATIVE LEARNING

SYSTEM IN BASIC EDUCATION FOR OUT-OF-SCHOOL
YOUTH, ADULTS, AND CHILDREN IN SPECIAL EXTREME
CASES AND APPROPRIATING FUNDS THEREFOR
___________________________________________________________________________

The following is the whole text of the bill:

Senate Bill No. 1365

(Insert)
___________________________________________________________________________

Senator Zubiri. Mr. President, may we recognize the distinguished

gentleman from Valenzuela, the chairman of the Committee on Basic

Education, Arts and Culture, no other than Sen. Win Gatchalian.

The Presiding Officer [Sen. Villanueva.] The dashing bachelor from

Valenzuela, Senator Gatchalian, is recognized.

Senator Gatchalian. But I am just second to the trabahador ng Senado,

Mr. President.

SPONSORSHIP SPEECH OF SENATOR GATCHALIAN

Mr. President, esteemed fellow senators, I bid this Body good afternoon.

Over the past decade, Mr. President, the Philippines has enacted a

number of landmark laws which have achieved substantial reforms within our

education system. However, despite the gains we have made, we must also

remember the millions of Filipinos who continue to be left behind by our

education system.

According to the May 2018 Philippines Education Note of the World

Bank Group, at least 24 million Filipinos over the age of 15 have not completed

90
basic education. There are an additional 2.4 million children between ages five

and 14 who are not in school. In essence, this means that 26.4 million

Filipinos—roughly one-fourth of the Philippine population—have been denied

the right to basic education enshrined in the 1987 Constitution.

The Department of Education’s Alternative Learning System (ALS) is the

government’s primary means of providing accessible education to out-of-school

youth, adult Filipinos, and children in special extreme cases whose right to

basic education has been denied. Through the non-formal module-based

lessons of the Accreditation & Equivalency Program, ALS allows these learners

to make up for the lost time and earn basic and secondary education

credentials by passing the A&E assessments and certifications. In theory, the

goal of ALS is to achieve a 100% high school graduation rate among Filipinos.

Unfortunately, ALS has not been able to live up to this admittedly

ambitious goal. Between 2016 to 2018, a little over two million Filipinos

enrolled in ALS. Only 1.4 million completed the A&E Program, and just

390,057 passed the A&E Test. This means that during that three-year period,

only 7.6% of all eligible Filipino learners enrolled in ALS. Worse, only 1.5% of

them were able to earn their basic or secondary education equivalency through

the program.

Mr. President, the anemic rate of engagement of eligible children, OSYs,

and adult learners in the Alternative Learning System is simply unacceptable.

To deny their right to education is to deny these vulnerable citizens a second

chance at creating better lives for themselves and their families. We must act

91
now to reverse this injustice and provide our countrymen with the education

they deserve.

With this in mind, Mr. President, the bill we are sponsoring today seeks

to institutionalize and reform the Alternative Learning System of the

Department of Education. This legislation was crafted to address in careful

detail the gaps and weaknesses within the current ALS framework, in close

coordination with the Department of Education and other critical stakeholders.

First, the Alternative Learning System Act seeks to institutionalize the

Alternative Learning System as a parallel learning system complementary to

the formal education system through the establishment of the Bureau of

Alternative Education (BAE) within the Department of Education. In 2016, the

reorganization of the DepEd caused the dissolution of the Bureau of

Alternative Learning System, with its functions being integrated into other

bureaus of the Department. Previously, non-formal education had always had

its own bureau under the DepEd since the 1940s.

Based on the input of DepEd and other stakeholders, the lack of a

dedicated ALS bureau has negatively impacted the DepEd’s capacity to operate

alternative learning programs and regulate its Accreditation and Equivalency

(A&E) Programs. Thus, the re-establishment of a separate bureau within the

DepEd will enhance the institutional and technical capacities of the

department to operate alternative learning programs that meet high standards

of educational quality, learner access, and learner outcomes regarding both

basic literary and more advanced equivalency and accreditations.

92
 Second, this bill seeks to expand and strengthen the ALS teacher

program. According to the DepEd, there are only 9,535 ALS teachers

nationwide. With 840,446 learners enrolled in ALS in the year 2018, this

means that the learner-to-teacher ratio was 88 to 1. And considering that as

many as 26.4 million Filipinos qualify to enroll in the Alternative Learning

System, this means that there is only one teacher for every 2,768 potential ALS

learners.

To address this problem by facilitating the recruitment of new ALS

teachers and facilitators, as well as promoting the professional growth of

existing ALS teachers, Section 10 of the bill mandates the Department of

Budget and Management to work with the DepEd and the Civil Service

Commission to create teaching positions for ALS teachers and allocate the

corresponding salary grades.

In addition, the DepEd shall also hire ALS literacy volunteers and

instructional managers to be ALS teachers through a contracting scheme to

augment the needed human resource requirements for the implementation of

the ALS programs. The bill also provides allowances to ALS teachers, who are

mostly mobile, for transportation and teaching aids.

This bill also mandates the establishment of at least one ALS Community

Learning Center or CLC in every municipality and city throughout the country.

Unlike the formal education system, which has school buildings, there is no

dedicated learning space for ALS programs to hold classes or give tests. This

was a major problem identified by the DepEd in the prior implementation of

93
ALS. Through the establishment of ALS CLCs across the country, ALS teachers

and learners will finally have access to the physical infrastructure needed to

facilitate learning.

Lastly, the ALS Act will empower the private sector to partner with the

government in the delivery of ALS services by mandating the formulation of

standards for service delivery, including teacher qualifications, teacher

deployment, teacher trainings, remuneration, and system of rewards and

incentives which are responsive to the needs and distinct situations of the

particular areas serviced by these non-governmental actors.

All in all, Mr. President, the reformed and revitalized Alternative Learning

System envisioned by the ALS Act is poised to provide millions of Filipino

learners with a second chance to obtain a quality education. The potential of

this legislation to uplift the lives of millions of our fellow citizens is boundless.

Just ask our colleague, one of the most famous ALS graduates, Sen. Many

Pacquiao. Unfortunately, wala po siya rito. Our senator and boxing champion

was a first year high school dropout, who took and passed the A&E Test under

the ALS program in 2007. He got his high school diploma and is now an

inspiration and model for out-of-school youth and adults who are determined

to learn and gain functional literacy skills outside of formal schooling.

Mr. President, panahon na para tutukan natin ang mga pangangailangan

ng mga kabataang Pilipino na nangangailangan ng tamang edukasyon sa ating

lipunan. Isang malaking kapabayaan kung hindi natin pagtutuunan ng pansin

ang milyon-milyong Pilipino na hindi nag-aaral. Ang panukalang batas na

94
inihain ng inyong lingkod ay naglalayong mailapit sa kanila ang pagkakataon

para magkaroon ng mas maganda at mas masaganang kinabukasan.

As the chairman of the Senate Committee on Basic Education, Arts and

Culture, I hope you will all join me in advocating for the swift passage and

enactment of this bill into law.

Thank you, Mr. President.

The Presiding Officer [Senator Villanueva]. Thank you, Senator

Gatchalian.

Majority Leader.

Senator Zubiri. Thank you, Mr. President.

Actually, Senator Pacquiao did not just finish high school, but he

recently got his college diploma from the University of Makati (UMak).

The Presiding Officer [Senator Villanueva]. How is that? Because of

the ALS?

Senator Zubiri. Yes, Mr. President, because of his ALS, he was able to

finish high school to be able to take up his college course. So, congratulations

as well to the sponsor.

MOTION OF SENATOR ZUBIRI

(Cosponsorship of Senators Revilla, Recto, Pacquiao, and Binay and Insertion
of their Cosponsorship Speeches into the Record)

Mr. President, we have four members who wish to cosponsor the

measure and they requested that their cosponsorship speeches be inserted into

the Record and deemed as read in the Senate. These are Senators Revilla,

95
whose speech is already here for submission to the Secretariat, Senator Recto,

Senator Pacquiao, and Senator Binay.

The Presiding Officer [Sen. Villanueva]. Is there any objection?

[Silence] There being none, motion is approved.

- --------------------------------------------------
The following are the text of the Sponsorship Speeches of Senators Revilla, Recto,
Pacquiao and Binay:
(INSERT)

------------------------------------------------------

SUSPENSION OF CONSIDERATION OF S. NO. 1365

Senator Zubiri. Mr. President, to allow our colleagues to study the

measure further, I move that we suspend consideration of Senate Bill No. 1365.

The Presiding Officer [Sen. Villanueva]. Is there any objection?

[Silence] There being none, the motion is approved.

BILL ON SECOND READING

S. No. 1086--The Philippine High School for Sports Act of 2019
(Continuation)

Senator Zubiri. Mr. President, I move that we resume consideration of

Senate Bill No. 1086 as reported out under Committee Report No. 12.
The Presiding Officer [Sen. Villanueva]. Is there any objection?
[Silence] There being none, resumption of consideration of Senate Bill No. 1086
is now in order.

Senator Zubiri. This is a very important measure as far as I am

concerned, Mr. President, creating the Philippine High School for Sports. The
parliamentary status of the measure is that we are in the period of
amendments. One of our colleagues has an amendment to make, Sen. Richard
Gordon.

So, may we suspend for one minute to be able to contact Senator Gordon.

96
 The Presiding Officer [Sen. Villanueva]. Senator Gordon is at the
lounge.

Senator Zubiri. Instead of suspending, Mr. President, let us continue so

that the proposed amendment submitted by Senator Tolentino may be tackled

by the sponsor. So, I ask that we recognize Senator Gatchalian.

The Presiding Officer [Sen. Villanueva]. The distinguished gentleman

from Valenzuela is recognized.

TOLENTINO AMENDMENT

Senator Gatchalian. Thank you, Mr. President.

I would just like to manifest the amendment of Senator Tolentino.

Apparently, he is sick today and he sent me his amendment for this

representation to put on record.

So, on page 2A, line 19, add a new paragraph which shall read as

follows:

THE PHSS SHALL LIKEWISE ENSURE AN ALTERNATIVE AND

EQUITABLE ADMISSION PROCESS TO ENHANCE THE ACCESS OF

INDIGENOUS PEOPLES, PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES, AND STUDENTS

FROM OTHER MARGINALIZED GROUPS.

I so move, Mr. President.

The Presiding Officer [Sen. Villanueva]. Is there any objection?

[Silence] There being none, the amendment is approved.

SUSPENSION OF SESSION

Senator Gatchalian. Mr. President, I move that we suspend the session

for one minute.

97
 The Presiding Officer [Sen. Villanueva]. Is there any objection?
[Silence] There being none, the session is suspended for one minute.

It was 6:02 p.m.

RESUMPTION OF SESSION

At 6:04 p.m., the session was resumed.

The Presiding Officer [Sen. Villanueva]. The session is resumed.

Just to remind the Body that we are using the amended copy as of

February 18, 2020 of Senate Bill No. 1086.

Senator Gatchalian. Yes, Mr. President.

The Presiding Officer [Sen. Villanueva]. The distinguished gentleman

from Zambales, Sen. Richard J. Gordon, is recognized.

Senator Gordon. Thank you very much, Mr. President.

I would request my colleague and seatmate, Senator Gatchalian, if he will

accept some amendments.

Senator Gatchalian. Yes, Mr. President.

Senator Gordon. Then, we are done. He has already accepted all the

amendments. [Laughter]

GORDON AMENDMENTS

Mr. President, I will address the amendments to my good colleague.

On page 1, line 7, after the word “shall”, insert the phrase ESTABLISH A

NATIONAL SPORTS PROGRAM.

Senator Gatchalian. It is accepted, Mr. President.

98
 The Presiding Officer [Sen. Villanueva]. Is there any objection? [Silence]

There being none, the amendment is approved.

Senator Gordon. On the same page, line 7, after the word “programs”,

insert the word INTRAMURALS and add a comma (,), Mr. President.

Senator Gatchalian. It is accepted, Mr. President.

The Presiding Officer [Sen. Villanueva]. Is there any objection? [Silence]

There being none, the amendment is approved.

Senator Gordon. On Section 2, with respect to the Declaration of

Principles, Mr. President, it shall now read: Sec. 2. Declaration of Principles. –

ARTICLE XIV OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION RECOGNIZES THE ROLE OF THE

STATE TO PROTECT AND PROMOTE THE RIGHT OF ALL CITIZENS TO

QUALITY EDUCATION AT ALL LEVELS AND TO TAKE APPROPRIATE STEPS

TO MAKE SUCH EDUCATION ACCESSIBLE TO ALL. The State ALSO

recognizes the vital role of the youth in nation-building and shall promote and

protect their physical, moral, spiritual, intellectual, and social well-being.

Towards this end, the State shall ESTABLISH A NATIONAL SPORTS PROGRAM

WHICH shall promote physical education and encourage sports programs,

INTRAMURALS, comma (,)—that is the amendment, Mr. President.

The Presiding Officer [Sen. Villanueva]. What does the sponsor say?

Senator Gatchalian. It is accepted, Mr. President.

The Presiding Officer [Sen. Villanueva]. Is there any objection? [Silence]

There being none, the amendment is approved.

Senator Gordon. Thank you, Mr. President.

99
 Just for purposes of history, Mr. President. The rationale, of course, is

that the State shall establish a national sports program to ensure that all

schools are promoting physical education, intramurals, and other league

competitions to foster teamwork, discipline, and camaraderie. That is in the

Constitution.

The Presiding Officer [Sen. Villanueva]. Yes.

Senator Gordon. Now, on page 3A, line 29c, after the word “SYSTEM”,

insert the phrase IN ACCORDANCE WITH A NATIONAL SPORTS PROGRAM.

The Presiding Officer [Sen. Villanueva]. What does the sponsor say?

Senator Gatchalian. It is accepted, Mr. President.

The Presiding Officer [Sen. Villanueva]. Is there any objection? [Silence]

There being none, the amendment is approved.

Senator Gordon. Mr. President, just to be sure, it will now read: (A) TO

FORMULATE POLICIES, GUIDELINES AND CRITERIA IN ORDER TO

RATIONALIZE THE ESTABLISHMENT, ADMINISTRATION AND OPERATION OF

THE SPORTS HIGH SCHOOLS UNDER THE PHILIPPINE HIGH SCHOOL FOR

SPORTS SYSTEM IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE NATIONAL SPORTS

PROGRAM.

The Presiding Officer [Sen. Villanueva]. All right.

Senator Gordon. Thank you, Mr. President.

And then, the last amendment, Mr. President, is on page 4, line 26,

insert a new paragraph (I), to read as: (I) TO RECRUIT THE BEST STUDENT

ATHLETES FOR THE DIFFERENT REGIONS OF THE PHILIPPINES TO BE

100
ENROLLED IN THE PHSS TO BETTER HONE THEIR SKILLS AND TALENTS

semi-colon (;).

Senator Gatchalian. It is accepted, Mr. President.

The Presiding Officer [Sen. Villanueva]. Is there any objection? [Silence]

There being none, the amendment is approved.

Senator Gordon. That is all, Mr. President. I thank the good sponsor for

facilitating all the amendments because these are meant to follow what Sen.

Risa Hontiveros stated that we should have a national sports program

accompanying the Philippine high school.

Senator Gatchalian. I also thank the good gentleman from Zambales,

my seatmate, and my chairman in the Red Cross for enhancing the bill and

putting in the bill that a national program is indeed a necessary activity to

make sure that everything is in line in terms of our sports agenda.

Thank you, Mr. President.

The Presiding Officer [Sen. Villanueva]. Thank you, Senators Gordon

and Gatchalian.

The Majority Leader is recognized.

Senator Zubiri. Mr. President, with that, I move that we close the period

of amendments.

The Presiding Officer [Sen. Villanueva]. Is there any objection? [Silence]

There being none, the motion is approved.

MOTION OF SENATOR ZUBIRI

(Coauthorship of Senators Gordon, Zubiri, Hontiveros, Villanueva, and
Dela Rosa of S. No. 1086)

101
 Senator Zubiri. Mr. President, with the permission of the good sponsor,

if we can be made as coauthors of the measure: Senator Gordon, myself,

Senator Hontiveros…

The Presiding Officer [Sen. Villanueva]. And this representation.

Senator Zubiri. Senator Villanueva, the presiding officer, and Senator

Dela Rosa, who is also a sportsman, a great combat shooter, Mr. President.

The Presiding Officer [Sen. Villanueva]. Is there any objection?

[Silence] There being none, the motion is approved.

Senator Zubiri. Thank you, Mr. President.

APPROVAL OF S. NO. 1086 ON SECOND READING

Mr. President, I move that we vote on Second Reading on Senate Bill No.
1086.

The Presiding Officer [Sen. Villanueva]. Is there any objection? [Silence]

There being none, we shall now vote on Second Reading on Senate Bill No.
1086.

As many as are in favor of the bill, say aye.

Several Members. Aye.

The Presiding Officer [Sen. Villanueva]. As many as are against the

bill, say nay. [Silence]

Senate Bill No. 1086 is approved on Second Reading.

SUSPENSION OF CONSIDERATION OF S. NO. 1086

Senator Zubiri. Mr. President, I move that we suspend consideration of

Senate Bill No. 1086.

The Presiding Officer [Sen. Villanueva]. Is there any objection?

[Silence] There being none, the motion is approved.

SUSPENSION OF SESSION

102
 Senator Zubiri. While we are waiting for our colleagues for two more
measures, may we ask for a one-minute suspension of the session.

The Presiding Officer [Sen. Villanueva]. Is there any objection?

[Silence] There being none, the session is suspended for one minute.

It was 6:11 p.m.

RESUMPTION OF SESSION

At 6:19 p.m., the session was resumed.

The Presiding Officer [Sen. Villanueva]. The session is resumed.

The Majority Leader is recognized.

BILL ON SECOND READING

S. No. 1296 - Philippine Energy Research and Policy Institute Act
(Continuation)

Senator Zubiri. Mr. President, I move that we resume consideration of

Senate Bill No. 1296 as reported out under Committee Report No. 34.

The Presiding Officer [Sen. Villanueva]. Is there any objection?

[Silence] There being none, resumption of consideration of Senate Bill No. 1296
is now in order.

Senator Zubiri. Mr. President, the parliamentary status of this measure

is that we are in the period of interpellations. No other colleague would like to

interpellate the distinguished gentleman from Valenzuela, unless the presiding

officer would want to.

The Presiding Officer [Sen. Villanueva]. I am being tempted but…

[Laughter]

Senator Zubiri. I believe it is just really a policy institute, Mr. President.

The Presiding Officer [Sen. Villanueva]. Yes, I have seen this.

103
 Senator Zubiri. Mr. President, I move to close the period of

interpellations.

The Presiding Officer [Sen. Villanueva]. Is there any objection?

[Silence] There being none, the motion is approved.

Senator Zubiri. And also for the record, Sen. Franklin M. Drilon, our

distinguished Minority Leader, is listed here. I sought his position on this and

he says that he will no longer interpellate. Just for the record, Mr. President.

The Presiding Officer [Sen. Villanueva]. Well, we already decided on

terminating the period of interpellations.

Senator Zubiri. Yes, Mr. President.

So, the next motion is to move for the period of amendments, I believe

the good sponsor has amendments. So, I move to open the period of

amendments.

The Presiding Officer [Sen. Villanueva]. Is there any objection?

[Silence] There being none, the motion is approved.

The distinguished gentleman from Valenzuela is recognized.

GATCHALIAN AMENDMENTS

Senator Gatchalian. Mr. President, for the record, this bill has been

approved in the Seventeenth Congress. Unfortunately, our counterpart in the

Lower House never approved their version. So, I refiled it during the Eighteenth

Congress, and now I am seeking the approval of the Body.

To proceed with the amendments, Mr. President, I have only a few

amendments.

104
 On page 7, delete lines 18 to 28.

I so move, Mr. President.

The Presiding Officer [Sen. Villanueva]. Is there any objection?

[Silence] There being none, the motion is approved.

Senator Gatchalian. On page 7, lines 30 to 31, delete the phrase “For

the organizational and operational requirements of the Institute”, such that the

section now starts with THERE IS HEREBY APPROPRIATED OUT OF THE

GENERAL APPROPRIATIONS ACT.

I so move, Mr. President.

The Presiding Officer [Sen. Villanueva]. Is there any objection?

[Silence] There being none, the motion is approved.

Senator Gatchalian. On page 7, line 32, delete the words and figure

“One Hundred Million Pesos (100,000,000.00)”, and replace it with the words

and figure TWO HUNDRED MILLION PESOS (P200,000,000.00).

I so move, Mr. President.

The Presiding Officer [Sen. Villanueva]. Is there any objection?

[Silence] There being none, the motion is approved.

Senator Gatchalian. That is all, Mr. President. Thank you very much.

The Presiding Officer [Sen. Villanueva]. Thank you Senator

Gatchalian.

The Majority Leader is recognized.

MOTION OF SENATOR ZUBIRI

(Coauthorship and Cosponsorship of Senators Villanueva, Zubiri, Hontiveros,
and Dela Rosa of S. No. 1296)

105
 Senator Zubiri. Mr. President, with the permission also of the sponsor, I

move that Sen. Joel Villanueva, myself, Sen. Risa Hontiveros, and Sen. Ronald

“Bato” dela Rosa be made cosponsors and coauthors.

The Presiding Officer [Sen. Villanueva]. Is there any objection?

[Silence] There being none, the motion is approved.

Senator Zubiri. Mr. President, I move to close the period of

amendments.

The Presiding Officer [Sen. Villanueva]. Is there any objection?

[Silence] There being none, the motion is approved.

APPROVAL OF S. NO. 1296 ON SECOND READING

Senator Zubiri. Mr. President, I move that we vote on Second Reading

on Senate Bill No. 1296, as amended.

The Presiding Officer [Sen. Villanueva]. Is there any objection? [Silence]

There being none, we shall now vote on Second Reading on Senate Bill No.

1296, as amended.

As many as are in favor of the bill, say aye.

Several Members. Aye.

The Presiding Officer [Sen. Villanueva]. As many as are against the

bill, say nay. [Silence]

Senate Bill No. 1296, as amended, is approved on Second Reading.

SUSPENSION OF CONSIDERATION OF S. NO. 1296

Senator Zubiri. Mr. President, I move that we suspend consideration of

Senate Bill No. 1296.

106
 The Presiding Officer [Sen. Villanueva]. Is there any objection?

[Silence] There being none, the motion is approved.

Senator Zubiri. Before we go back to the measure of Senator Lacson,

just a housekeeping matter, Mr. President. I am not sure if I was made a

coauthor of Senate Bill No. 1365, the Alternative Learning System bill.

MOTION OF SENATOR ZUBIRI

(Cosponsorship and Coauthorship of Senators Zubiri, Villanueva, Drilon,
Hontiveros, and Dela Rosa of S. No. 1365)

With the permission of the sponsor, I move that Sen. Joel Villanueva,

together with this representation, Sen. Franklin M. Drilon, Sen. Risa

Hontiveros, and Sen. Ronald “Bato” dela Rosa be made as cosponsors and

coauthors of Senate Bill No. 1365.

The Presiding Officer [Sen. Villanueva]. Is there any objection?

[Silence] There being none, the motion is approved.

SUSPENSION OF SESSION

Senator Zubiri. Mr. President, may I ask for a one-minute suspension

of the session?

The Presiding Officer [Sen. Villanueva]. Is there any objection?

[Silence] There being none, the session is suspended.

It was 6:26 p.m.

RESUMPTION OF SESSION

At 6:27 p.m., the session was resumed with Senate President Vicente C.
Sotto III presiding.

The President. The session is resumed.

BILL ON SECOND READING

S. No. 1083—The Law on the Prevention of
Terrorist Acts of 2020
107
 (Continuation)

Senator Zubiri. Mr. President, I move that we resume consideration of

Senate Bill No. 1083 as reported out under Committee Report No. 9.

The President. Is there any objection? [Silence] There being none,

resumption of consideration of Senate Bill No. 1083 is now in order.

Senator Zubiri. Mr. President, we are still in the period of

amendments. I believe Senator Tolentino has already submitted his proposed

amendments to the distinguished sponsor.

May I ask that we recognize the sponsor, Sen. Panfilo Lacson.

The President. The gentleman from Cavite, Sen. Panfilo Lacson, is

recognized.

Senator Lacson. Mr. President, may I ask that we now close the period

of amendments.

The President. I thought there were some amendments from Senator

Tolentino.

Senator Lacson. Mr. President, nobody is here to introduce

amendments.

There is an understanding which was relayed to the staff of the senators

concerned that we will just take up their proposed amendments during the

bicameral conference committee.

Senator Zubiri. If that is the agreement, Mr. President, I move that we

close the period of amendments.

108
 The President. Is there any objection? [Silence] There being none, the

period of amendments is closed.

APPROVAL OF S. NO. 1083 ON SECOND READING

Senator Zubiri. Mr. President, I move that we vote on Second Reading

on Senate Bill No. 1083, as amended.

The President. Is there any objection? [Silence] There being none, we

shall now vote on Second Reading on Senate Bill No. 1083, as amended.

As many as are in favor of the bill, say aye.

Several Members. Aye.

The President. As many as are against the bill, say nay. [Silence]

Senate Bill No. 1083, as amended, is approved on Second Reading.

Senator Zubiri. Mr. President, so that Senator Tolentino would have

peace of mind, probably in the bicameral conference committee, we can appoint

him as a member thereof. Anyway, he should be.

The President. Yes, after we approve this on Third Reading.

Senator Zubiri. Yes, Mr. President, because he is the chairman of the

Committee on Local Government.

SUSPENSION OF CONSIDERATION OF S. NO. 1083

I move that we suspend consideration of Senate Bill No. 1083.

The President. Is there any objection? [Silence] There being none,

consideration of the measure is suspended.

109
 Senator Zubiri. Mr. President, on Monday, we have very important

hearings. I believe they would like to borrow the Session Hall for these

important hearings.

Mr. President, with the permission of the Body, we sought the approval of

all our colleagues on this and it was 99% approved that we adjourn the session

until the 26th of February, 2020 because on the 25th, we have no work. It is a

declared national holiday.

ADJOURNMENT OF SESSION

So, Mr. President, to allow our colleagues to utilize all our rooms on
Monday for very important hearings, particularly the Session Hall, we move to
adjourn the session until three o’clock in the afternoon, Wednesday, February
26, 2020.

The President. Is there any objection? [Silence] There being none, the
session is adjourned until three o’clock in the afternoon, Wednesday, February
26, 2020.

It was 6:31 p.m.

110
 ANNEX "9"
CABANOS – 4 June 2, 2020 6:35 p.m.

(PO – Deputy Speaker Estrella)

REP. BIAZON. … iyong mga predicate crimes, nagiging balakid din po

iyong pag-specify pa ho ng mga batas na iyon dahil ang lalabas ay kailangan pa

ho nilang patunayan iyong violation noong batas na iyon bago pa natin sila ihabla

o bago natin ituloy iyong sa pag-violate ng Human Security Act.

So, sa pagpasa natin nitong batas na ito, pinaliliit po natin ang mundo ng

mga terorista, pinapamadali natin ang pag-prosecute po sa kanila.

REP. BROSAS. Mr. Speaker, Ginoong Sponsor, kaya po natin tinututulan

iyong pagtanggal sa predicate crimes dahil po alam natin na magagamit talaga

ito sa mga ordinaryong sirkumstansya at ordinaryong mamamayan. Bahagi,

sinabi po ninyo kanina, bahagi ng definition ng “terrorism” iyong “Engages in acts

intended to cause extensive interference with damage or destruction to critical

infrastructure” at kabilang sa critical infrastructure ang transportation.

Kung halimbawa, Ginoong Sponsor, nagsagawa ng road blockades ang

mga jeepney drivers na ayaw pa ring pahintulutan ng gobyerno na pumasada

kahit pa tatlong buwan na silang walang kita sa ilalim ng community quarantine,

maituturing silang terorista sa batas na ito. Tama ba, Mr. Sponsor, Ginoong

Speaker?

REP. BIAZON. Mali po. Hindi po saklaw iyong pagkilos noong ating mga

jeepney drivers na magkaroon ng blockade tungkol doon sa kanilang kabuhayan.

Masasakop po iyan doon sa sinasabi nating “exclusion” na sinasabi nga pong

mayroong ibinibigay na leeway para hindi isama ang protest, dissent, stoppage

1
CABANOS – 4 June 2, 2020 6:35 p.m.

of work, and mass action na ang purpose ay mag-exercise ng civil and political

rights.

Hindi ho totoo o hindi tama na sabihing ordinaryong mamamayan ay

nasasakop ng Anti-Terrorism Bill sapagkat doon pa lamang po sa definition ng

“terrorism”, alam natin po na hindi ordinaryong mamamayan ang tinutukoy ng

panukalang batas kung hindi iyong mga tao na nais maghasik ng violence, ng

disorder doon po sa way of life or iyong peaceful living ng lahat ng mga

mamamayan.

REP. BROSAS. Mr. Speaker, Mr. Sponsor, madali pong sabihin ng

Sponsor na hindi covered or covered ng terrorist act ito pero sa aktwal po,

halimbawa, hindi naman ganoon iyong nangyayari. Halimbawa, ngayon nga lang

po sa pagkakaroon ng complaint ng ating mga jeepney drivers banda sa

Caloocan ay hinuli na sila. So, what more pa kapag magkakaroon ng batas na

magwe-weaponize pa na lalo, na pupuwede silang pumasok dito sa mga

definition na ito, “critical infrastructure”—transportation? So, napakalawak po

nito at pupuwede pong magamit. Kaya po sinasabi namin na ang dali-dali nating

sabihin pero sa aktwal na mga pangyayari, pupuwede talagang gamitin, Mr.

Sponsor, Mr. Speaker.

REP. BIAZON. Mr. Speaker, alam ninyo po isa ako doon sa naging

proponent ng Human Security Act of 2007. Noong tinatalakay namin iyong batas

noong panahon na iyon, noong panukalang batas pa siya, pareho rin po iyong

mga apprehensions na naririnig nating ginagamit dito sa kasalukuyang

2
CABANOS – 4 June 2, 2020 6:35 p.m.

tinatalakay natin, iyong improvement ng Security Act, similar apprehensions. But

ano ho ang nakita natin? Halos hindi nga ho nagamit iyong batas dahil hindi

naman po kasi ma-a-apply sa ordinaryong mamamayan iyong definition na

inilalagay natin dito sa mga ipinapanukala nating batas. Tulad po nito nga, hindi

po natin masasabing kasama sa sakop iyong jeepney drivers na nag-blockade

dahil gusto nilang i-improve ang kabuhayan nila dahil wala naman po silang

ginagawang acts intended to cause death, wala naman ho silang ginagawang

acts intended to cause extensive damage and destruction to government

facilities. So, mayroon hong nakalista na mga requirements para pumasok ka at

isaklaw na magamit iyong batas na ito sa iyo. Kaya po, again, isinasama natin

iyong nakalagay dito exclusively na mga exclusions na exercise on civil and

political rights.

So, mayroon ho naman tayong mga nakikita na ginamitan ng ibang batas,

depende na ho kasi sa mga …

/atc

3
 ANNEX "10"
GUERRA – 6 June 2, 2020 8:10 p.m.

(PO – Deputy Speaker Estrella)

REP. TADURAN. … I move that we recognize the Honorable Argel Joseph

Cabatbat of MAGSASAKA Party-List for his individual amendments.

So moved, Mr. Speaker.

THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Rep. Estrella). The distinguished Gentleman

representing the MAGSASAKA Party-List is hereby recognized. (Gavel) Please

proceed.

REP. CABATBAT. Ako na ba? Hello. Mr. Speaker, can you hear me?

THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Rep. Estrella). Yes, loud and clear. The

Gentleman representing the MAGSASAKA Party-List is hereby recognized. (Gavel)

REP. CABATBAT. Thank you, Mr. Speaker.

Base sa narinig ko, mukhang wala yatang magiging amendment, but I will still

try my luck. Mr. Speaker, Mr. Sponsor, kung nabalitaan natin iyong mga nangyayari

ngayon sa Amerika, nagkakaroon ngayon ng riot, looting dahil sa ginawang

pagpatay kay George Floyd. At kung maaalala din natin, noong bago magkaroon ng

COVID, si Archie Paray ay nang-hostage sa Greenhills dahil sa mga hinaing niya sa

kanyang employer.

Ngayon sa parehong sitwasyon na ‘to, ang paniniwala namin ay hindi

terorismo iyong mga pangyayaring iyon, kaya naman, Mr. Speaker, Mr. Sponsor, I

would like to (inaudible) the following words in Section 4, to wit: MASS ACTIONS,

VIGILS, PROTESTS AND SIMILAR MASS MOVEMENT THAT SUDDENLY

EVOLVED INTO RIOTS, DISORDERLY ACTIONS, AND LOOTING WITHOUT

GUERRA – 6 June 2, 2020 8:10 p.m.

PROOF THAT THE SAME WAS PREMEDITATED OR THAT IT WAS

COORDINATED SHALL NOT BE CONSIDERED AS ACTS OF TERRORISM.

SIMILARLY, ILLEGAL ACTS DUE TO OUTBURST OF EMOTIONS OR

ISOLATED ACTS OF PEOPLE WHO GOES BERSERK DUE TO POLITICAL

FRUSTRATIONS, MEDICAL CONDITIONS, OR OTHER PERSONAL MOTIVES

SHALL NOT BE CONSIDERED AS ACTS OF TERRORISM, BUT SHOULD

RATHER BE CONSIDERED AS AILMENTS OF OUR SOCIETY THAT NEED TO

BE ADDRESSED THROUGH REFORMS AND OTHER CONSTRUCTIVE

LEGISLATION TO ALLEVIATE THE CONDITION OF OUR POOREST SECTORS.

Isa po ito sa aking mga amendments, Mr. Speaker, Mr. Sponsor, and would

the Sponsor be amenable?

REP. NOGRALES (J.B.). Thank you, Mr. Speaker. I agree with the analysis

of the honorable—my fellow Party-List Congressman Argel. However, we don’t

need to amend it for that implied those actions are already implied that they are not

acts of terrorism. So, we don’t see any necessity to amend the current bill as it is.

REP. CABATBAT. Thank you, Mr. Speaker, Mr. Sponsor. Although I

disagree, but thank you, thank you for that concession and admission that it is

implied. Nonetheless, Mr. Speaker, Mr. Sponsor, another proposed amendment,

doon po sa Section 4(a) that says, “Engages in acts intended to cause death or

serious bodily injury to any person, or endangers a person’s life”, baka naman po

puwede natin ma-amend, “bodily injury to or endangers AT LEAST ONE OR MORE

RANDOM PERSONS”.
GUERRA – 6 June 2, 2020 8:10 p.m.

So, para ma-differentiate lang po natin iyong murder or multiple murder at

serious physical injuries sa terrorism. Would the distinguished Sponsor be

amenable to that amendment?

REP. NOGRALES (J.B.). Mr. Speaker, to read Section 4(a) means you have

to read Section 4 in toto which includes the very much intent in subsection (e) …

/cmg
 ANNEX "11"

United Nations S/RES/1373 (2001)

Security Council Distr.: General

28 September 2001

Resolution 1373 (2001)

Adopted by the Security Council at its 4385th meeting, on
28 September 2001

The Security Council,

Reaffirming its resolutions 1269 (1999) of 19 October 1999 and 1368 (2001) of
12 September 2001,
Reaffirming also its unequivocal condemnation of the terrorist attacks which
took place in New York, Washington, D.C. and Pennsylvania on 11 September 2001,
and expressing its determination to prevent all such acts,
Reaffirming further that such acts, like any act of international terrorism,
constitute a threat to international peace and security,
Reaffirming the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence as
recognized by the Charter of the United Nations as reiterated in resolution 1368
(2001),
Reaffirming the need to combat by all means, in accordance with the Charter of
the United Nations, threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist
acts,
Deeply concerned by the increase, in various regions of the world, of acts of
terrorism motivated by intolerance or extremism,
Calling on States to work together urgently to prevent and suppress terrorist
acts, including through increased cooperation and full implementation of the
relevant international conventions relating to terrorism,
Recognizing the need for States to complement international cooperation by
taking additional measures to prevent and suppress, in their territories through all
lawful means, the financing and preparation of any acts of terrorism,
Reaffirming the principle established by the General Assembly in its
declaration of October 1970 (resolution 2625 (XXV)) and reiterated by the Security
Council in its resolution 1189 (1998) of 13 August 1998, namely that every State
has the duty to refrain from organizing, instigating, assisting or participating in
terrorist acts in another State or acquiescing in organized activities within its
territory directed towards the commission of such acts,
Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

01-55743 (E)
*0155743*
S/RES/1373 (2001)

1. Decides that all States shall:

(a) Prevent and suppress the financing of terrorist acts;
(b) Criminalize the wilful provision or collection, by any means, directly or
indirectly, of funds by their nationals or in their territories with the intention that the
funds should be used, or in the knowledge that they are to be used, in order to carry
out terrorist acts;
(c) Freeze without delay funds and other financial assets or economic
resources of persons who commit, or attempt to commit, terrorist acts or participate
in or facilitate the commission of terrorist acts; of entities owned or controlled
directly or indirectly by such persons; and of persons and entities acting on behalf
of, or at the direction of such persons and entities, including funds derived or
generated from property owned or controlled directly or indirectly by such persons
and associated persons and entities;
(d) Prohibit their nationals or any persons and entities within their territories
from making any funds, financial assets or economic resources or financial or other
related services available, directly or indirectly, for the benefit of persons who
commit or attempt to commit or facilitate or participate in the commission of
terrorist acts, of entities owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, by such persons
and of persons and entities acting on behalf of or at the direction of such persons;
2. Decides also that all States shall:
(a) Refrain from providing any form of support, active or passive, to entities
or persons involved in terrorist acts, including by suppressing recruitment of
members of terrorist groups and eliminating the supply of weapons to terrorists;
(b) Take the necessary steps to prevent the commission of terrorist acts,
including by provision of early warning to other States by exchange of information;
(c) Deny safe haven to those who finance, plan, support, or commit terrorist
acts, or provide safe havens;
(d) Prevent those who finance, plan, facilitate or commit terrorist acts from
using their respective territories for those purposes against other States or their
citizens;
(e) Ensure that any person who participates in the financing, planning,
preparation or perpetration of terrorist acts or in supporting terrorist acts is brought
to justice and ensure that, in addition to any other measures against them, such
terrorist acts are established as serious criminal offences in domestic laws and
regulations and that the punishment duly reflects the seriousness of such terrorist
acts;
(f) Afford one another the greatest measure of assistance in connection with
criminal investigations or criminal proceedings relating to the financing or support
of terrorist acts, including assistance in obtaining evidence in their possession
necessary for the proceedings;
(g) Prevent the movement of terrorists or terrorist groups by effective border
controls and controls on issuance of identity papers and travel documents, and
through measures for preventing counterfeiting, forgery or fraudulent use of identity
papers and travel documents;

2
 S/RES/1373 (2001)

3. Calls upon all States to:

(a) Find ways of intensifying and accelerating the exchange of operational
information, especially regarding actions or movements of terrorist persons or
networks; forged or falsified travel documents; traffic in arms, explosives or
sensitive materials; use of communications technologies by terrorist groups; and the
threat posed by the possession of weapons of mass destruction by terrorist groups;
(b) Exchange information in accordance with international and domestic law
and cooperate on administrative and judicial matters to prevent the commission of
terrorist acts;
(c) Cooperate, particularly through bilateral and multilateral arrangements
and agreements, to prevent and suppress terrorist attacks and take action against
perpetrators of such acts;
(d) Become parties as soon as possible to the relevant international
conventions and protocols relating to terrorism, including the International
Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism of 9 December 1999;
(e) Increase cooperation and fully implement the relevant international
conventions and protocols relating to terrorism and Security Council resolutions
1269 (1999) and 1368 (2001);
(f) Take appropriate measures in conformity with the relevant provisions of
national and international law, including international standards of human rights,
before granting refugee status, for the purpose of ensuring that the asylum-seeker
has not planned, facilitated or participated in the commission of terrorist acts;
(g) Ensure, in conformity with international law, that refugee status is not
abused by the perpetrators, organizers or facilitators of terrorist acts, and that claims
of political motivation are not recognized as grounds for refusing requests for the
extradition of alleged terrorists;
4. Notes with concern the close connection between international terrorism
and transnational organized crime, illicit drugs, money-laundering, illegal arms-
trafficking, and illegal movement of nuclear, chemical, biological and other
potentially deadly materials, and in this regard emphasizes the need to enhance
coordination of efforts on national, subregional, regional and international levels in
order to strengthen a global response to this serious challenge and threat to
international security;
5. Declares that acts, methods, and practices of terrorism are contrary to the
purposes and principles of the United Nations and that knowingly financing,
planning and inciting terrorist acts are also contrary to the purposes and principles
of the United Nations;
6. Decides to establish, in accordance with rule 28 of its provisional rules of
procedure, a Committee of the Security Council, consisting of all the members of
the Council, to monitor implementation of this resolution, with the assistance of
appropriate expertise, and calls upon all States to report to the Committee, no later
than 90 days from the date of adoption of this resolution and thereafter according to
a timetable to be proposed by the Committee, on the steps they have taken to
implement this resolution;
7. Directs the Committee to delineate its tasks, submit a work programme
within 30 days of the adoption of this resolution, and to consider the support it
requires, in consultation with the Secretary-General;

3
S/RES/1373 (2001)

8. Expresses its determination to take all necessary steps in order to ensure

the full implementation of this resolution, in accordance with its responsibilities
under the Charter;
9. Decides to remain seized of this matter.

4
 ANNEX "12"

United Nations S/RES/1456 (2003)

Security Council Distr.: General

20 January 2003

Resolution 1456 (2003)

Adopted by the Security Council at its 4688th meeting, on
20 January 2003

The Security Council,

Decides to adopt the attached declaration on the issue of combating terrorism.

03-21605 (E)
*0321605*
S/RES/1456 (2003)

Annex

The Security Council,

Meeting at the level of Ministers for Foreign Affairs on 20 January 2003
reaffirms that:
– terrorism in all its forms and manifestations constitutes one of the most serious
threats to peace and security;
– any acts of terrorism are criminal and unjustifiable, regardless of their
motivation, whenever and by whomsoever committed and are to be
unequivocally condemned, especially when they indiscriminately target or
injure civilians;
– there is a serious and growing danger of terrorist access to and use of nuclear,
chemical, biological and other potentially deadly materials, and therefore a
need to strengthen controls on these materials;
– it has become easier, in an increasingly globalized world, for terrorists to
exploit sophisticated technology, communications and resources for their
criminal objectives;
– measures to detect and stem the flow of finance and funds for terrorist
purposes must be urgently strengthened;
– terrorists must also be prevented from making use of other criminal activities
such as transnational organized crime, illicit drugs and drug trafficking,
money-laundering and illicit arms trafficking;
– since terrorists and their supporters exploit instability and intolerance to justify
their criminal acts the Security Council is determined to counter this by
contributing to peaceful resolution of disputes and by working to create a
climate of mutual tolerance and respect;
– terrorism can only be defeated, in accordance with the Charter of the United
Nations and international law, by a sustained comprehensive approach
involving the active participation and collaboration of all States, international
and regional organizations, and by redoubled efforts at the national level.
* * *
The Security Council therefore calls for the following steps to be taken:
1. All States must take urgent action to prevent and suppress all active and
passive support to terrorism, and in particular comply fully with all relevant
resolutions of the Security Council, in particular resolutions 1373 (2001), 1390
(2002) and 1455 (2003);
2. The Security Council calls upon States to:
(a) become a party, as a matter of urgency, to all relevant international
conventions and protocols relating to terrorism, in particular the 1999
international convention for the suppression of the financing of terrorism
and to support all international initiatives taken to that aim, and to make
full use of the sources of assistance and guidance which are now
becoming available;

2
 S/RES/1456 (2003)

(b) assist each other, to the maximum extent possible, in the prevention,
investigation, prosecution and punishment of acts of terrorism, wherever
they occur;
(c) cooperate closely to implement fully the sanctions against terrorists and
their associates, in particular Al-Qaeda and the Taliban and their
associates, as reflected in resolutions 1267 (1999), 1390 (2002) and 1455
(2003), to take urgent actions to deny them access to the financial
resources they need to carry out their actions, and to cooperate fully with
the Monitoring Group established pursuant to resolution 1363 (2001);
3. States must bring to justice those who finance, plan, support or commit
terrorist acts or provide safe havens, in accordance with international law, in
particular on the basis of the principle to extradite or prosecute;
4. The Counter-Terrorism Committee must intensify its efforts to promote the
implementation by Member States of all aspects of resolution 1373 (2001), in
particular through reviewing States’ reports and facilitating international
assistance and cooperation, and through continuing to operate in a transparent
and effective manner, and in that regard the Council;
(i) stresses the obligation on States to report to the CTC, according to
the timetable set by the CTC, calls on the 13 States who have not
yet submitted a first report and on the 56 States who are late in
submitting further reports to do so by 31 March, and requests the
CTC to report regularly on progress;
(ii) calls on States to respond promptly and fully to the CTC’s requests
for information, comments and questions in full and on time, and
instructs the CTC to inform the Council of progress, including any
difficulties it encounters;
(iii) requests the CTC in monitoring the implementation of resolution
1373 (2001) to bear in mind all international best practices, codes
and standards which are relevant to the implementation of
resolution 1373 (2001), and underlines its support for the CTC’s
approach in constructing a dialogue with each State on further
action required to fully implement resolution 1373 (2001);
5. States should assist each other to improve their capacity to prevent and fight
terrorism, and notes that such cooperation will help facilitate the full and
timely implementation of resolution 1373 (2001), and invites the CTC to step
up its efforts to facilitate the provision of technical and other assistance by
developing targets and priorities for global action;
6. States must ensure that any measure taken to combat terrorism comply with all
their obligations under international law, and should adopt such measures in
accordance with international law, in particular international human rights,
refugee, and humanitarian law;
7. International organizations should evaluate ways in which they can enhance
the effectiveness of their action against terrorism, including by establishing
dialogue and exchanges of information with each other and with other relevant
international actors, and directs this appeal in particular to those technical
agencies and organizations whose activities relate to the control of the use of

3
S/RES/1456 (2003)

or access to nuclear, chemical, biological and other deadly materials; in this

context the importance of fully complying with existing legal obligations in
the field of disarmament, arms limitation and non-proliferation and, where
necessary, strengthening international instruments in this field should be
underlined;
8. Regional and subregional organizations should work with the CTC and other
international organizations to facilitate sharing of best practice in the fight
against terrorism, and to assist their members in fulfilling their obligation to
combat terrorism;
9. Those participating in the Special Meeting of the Counter-Terrorism
Committee with international regional and subregional organizations on 7
March 2003 should use that opportunity to make urgent progress on the
matters referred to in this declaration which involve the work of such
organizations;
* * *
The Security Council also:
10. emphasizes that continuing international efforts to enhance dialogue and
broaden the understanding among civilizations, in an effort to prevent the
indiscriminate targeting of different religions and cultures, to further
strengthen the campaign against terrorism, and to address unresolved regional
conflicts and the full range of global issues, including development issues, will
contribute to international cooperation and collaboration, which by themselves
are necessary to sustain the broadest possible fight against terrorism;
11. reaffirms its strong determination to intensify its fight against terrorism in
accordance with its responsibilities under the Charter of the United Nations,
and takes note of the contributions made during its meeting on 20 January
2003 with a view to enhancing the role of the United Nations in this regard,
and invites Member States to make further contributions to this end;
12. invites the Secretary General to present a report within 28 days summarizing
any proposals made during its ministerial meeting and any commentary or
response to these proposals by any Security Council member;
13. encourages Member States of the United Nations to cooperate in resolving all
outstanding issues with a view to the adoption, by consensus, of the draft
comprehensive convention on international terrorism and the draft
international convention for the suppression of acts of nuclear terrorism;
14. decides to review actions taken towards the realization of this declaration at
further meetings of the Security Council.

4
 ANNEX "13"

United Nations S/RES/1566 (2004)

Security Council Distr.: General
8 October 2004

Resolution 1566 (2004)

Adopted by the Security Council at its 5053rd meeting, on
8 October 2004

The Security Council,

Reaffirming its resolutions 1267 (1999) of 15 October 1999 and 1373 (2001)
of 28 September 2001 as well as its other resolutions concerning threats to
international peace and security caused by terrorism,
Recalling in this regard its resolution 1540 (2004) of 28 April 2004,
Reaffirming also the imperative to combat terrorism in all its forms and
manifestations by all means, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations
and international law,
Deeply concerned by the increasing number of victims, including children,
caused by acts of terrorism motivated by intolerance or extremism in various
regions of the world,
Calling upon States to cooperate fully with the Counter-Terrorism Committee
(CTC) established pursuant to resolution 1373 (2001), including the recently
established Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate (CTED), the
“Al-Qaida/Taliban Sanctions Committee” established pursuant to resolution 1267
(1999) and its Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team, and the
Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004), and further calling upon
such bodies to enhance cooperation with each other,
Reminding States that they must ensure that any measures taken to combat
terrorism comply with all their obligations under international law, and should adopt
such measures in accordance with international law, in particular international
human rights, refugee, and humanitarian law,
Reaffirming that terrorism in all its forms and manifestations constitutes one of
the most serious threats to peace and security,
Considering that acts of terrorism seriously impair the enjoyment of human
rights and threaten the social and economic development of all States and undermine
global stability and prosperity,
Emphasizing that enhancing dialogue and broadening the understanding among
civilizations, in an effort to prevent the indiscriminate targeting of different

04-54282 (E)
*0454282*
S/RES/1566 (2004)

religions and cultures, and addressing unresolved regional conflicts and the full
range of global issues, including development issues, will contribute to international
cooperation, which by itself is necessary to sustain the broadest possible fight
against terrorism,
Reaffirming its profound solidarity with victims of terrorism and their families,
Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,
1. Condemns in the strongest terms all acts of terrorism irrespective of their
motivation, whenever and by whomsoever committed, as one of the most serious
threats to peace and security;
2. Calls upon States to cooperate fully in the fight against terrorism,
especially with those States where or against whose citizens terrorist acts are
committed, in accordance with their obligations under international law, in order to
find, deny safe haven and bring to justice, on the basis of the principle to extradite
or prosecute, any person who supports, facilitates, participates or attempts to
participate in the financing, planning, preparation or commission of terrorist acts or
provides safe havens;
3. Recalls that criminal acts, including against civilians, committed with the
intent to cause death or serious bodily injury, or taking of hostages, with the purpose
to provoke a state of terror in the general public or in a group of persons or
particular persons, intimidate a population or compel a government or an
international organization to do or to abstain from doing any act, which constitute
offences within the scope of and as defined in the international conventions and
protocols relating to terrorism, are under no circumstances justifiable by
considerations of a political, philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic, religious or
other similar nature, and calls upon all States to prevent such acts and, if not
prevented, to ensure that such acts are punished by penalties consistent with their
grave nature;
4. Calls upon all States to become party, as a matter of urgency, to the
relevant international conventions and protocols whether or not they are a party to
regional conventions on the matter;
5. Calls upon Member States to cooperate fully on an expedited basis in
resolving all outstanding issues with a view to adopting by consensus the draft
comprehensive convention on international terrorism and the draft international
convention for the suppression of acts of nuclear terrorism;
6. Calls upon relevant international, regional and subregional organizations
to strengthen international cooperation in the fight against terrorism and to intensify
their interaction with the United Nations and, in particular, the CTC with a view to
facilitating full and timely implementation of resolution 1373 (2001);
7. Requests the CTC in consultation with relevant international, regional
and subregional organizations and the United Nations bodies to develop a set of best
practices to assist States in implementing the provisions of resolution 1373 (2001)
related to the financing of terrorism;
8. Directs the CTC, as a matter of priority and, when appropriate, in close
cooperation with relevant international, regional and subregional organizations to
start visits to States, with the consent of the States concerned, in order to enhance

2
 S/RES/1566 (2004)

the monitoring of the implementation of resolution 1373 (2001) and facilitate the
provision of technical and other assistance for such implementation;
9. Decides to establish a working group consisting of all members of the
Security Council to consider and submit recommendations to the Council on
practical measures to be imposed upon individuals, groups or entities involved in or
associated with terrorist activities, other than those designated by the
Al-Qaida/Taliban Sanctions Committee, including more effective procedures
considered to be appropriate for bringing them to justice through prosecution or
extradition, freezing of their financial assets, preventing their movement through the
territories of Member States, preventing supply to them of all types of arms and
related material, and on the procedures for implementing these measures;
10. Requests further the working group, established under paragraph 9 to
consider the possibility of establishing an international fund to compensate victims
of terrorist acts and their families, which might be financed through voluntary
contributions, which could consist in part of assets seized from terrorist
organizations, their members and sponsors, and submit its recommendations to the
Council;
11. Requests the Secretary-General to take, as a matter of urgency,
appropriate steps to make the CTED fully operational and to inform the Council by
15 November 2004;
12. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.

3
 ANNEX "14"

United Nations S/RES/1624 (2005)

Security Council Distr.: General
14 September 2005

Resolution 1624 (2005)

Adopted by the Security Council at its 5261st meeting, on
14 September 2005

The Security Council,

Reaffirming its resolutions 1267 (1999) of 15 October 1999, 1373 (2001) of
28 September 2001, 1535 (2004) of 26 March 2004, 1540 (2004) of 28 April 2004,
1566 (2004) of 8 October 2004, and 1617 (2005) of 29 July 2005, the declaration
annexed to its resolution 1456 (2003) of 20 January 2003, as well as its other
resolutions concerning threats to international peace and security caused by acts of
terrorism,
Reaffirming also the imperative to combat terrorism in all its forms and
manifestations by all means, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations,
and also stressing that States must ensure that any measures taken to combat
terrorism comply with all their obligations under international law, and should adopt
such measures in accordance with international law, in particular international
human rights law, refugee law, and humanitarian law,
Condemning in the strongest terms all acts of terrorism irrespective of their
motivation, whenever and by whomsoever committed, as one of the most serious
threats to peace and security, and reaffirming the primary responsibility of the
Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security under the
Charter of the United Nations,
Condemning also in the strongest terms the incitement of terrorist acts and
repudiating attempts at the justification or glorification (apologie) of terrorist acts
that may incite further terrorist acts,
Deeply concerned that incitement of terrorist acts motivated by extremism and
intolerance poses a serious and growing danger to the enjoyment of human rights,
threatens the social and economic development of all States, undermines global
stability and prosperity, and must be addressed urgently and proactively by the
United Nations and all States, and emphasizing the need to take all necessary and
appropriate measures in accordance with international law at the national and
international level to protect the right to life,
Recalling the right to freedom of expression reflected in Article 19 of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights adopted by the General Assembly in 1948
(“the Universal Declaration”), and recalling also the right to freedom of expression

05-51052 (E)
*0551052*
S/RES/1624 (2005)

in Article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights adopted by

the General Assembly in 1966 (“ICCPR”) and that any restrictions thereon shall
only be such as are provided by law and are necessary on the grounds set out in
paragraph 3 of Article 19 of the ICCPR,
Recalling in addition the right to seek and enjoy asylum reflected in Article 14
of the Universal Declaration and the non-refoulement obligation of States under the
Convention relating to the Status of Refugees adopted on 28 July 1951, together
with its Protocol adopted on 31 January 1967 (“the Refugees Convention and its
Protocol”), and also recalling that the protections afforded by the Refugees
Convention and its Protocol shall not extend to any person with respect to whom
there are serious reasons for considering that he has been guilty of acts contrary to
the purposes and principles of the United Nations,
Reaffirming that acts, methods, and practices of terrorism are contrary to the
purposes and principles of the United Nations and that knowingly financing,
planning and inciting terrorist acts are also contrary to the purposes and principles
of the United Nations,
Deeply concerned by the increasing number of victims, especially among
civilians of diverse nationalities and beliefs, caused by terrorism motivated by
intolerance or extremism in various regions of the world, reaffirming its profound
solidarity with the victims of terrorism and their families, and stressing the
importance of assisting victims of terrorism and providing them and their families
with support to cope with their loss and grief,
Recognizing the essential role of the United Nations in the global effort to
combat terrorism and welcoming the Secretary-General’s identification of elements
of a counter-terrorism strategy to be considered and developed by the General
Assembly without delay with a view to adopting and implementing a strategy to
promote comprehensive, coordinated and consistent responses at the national,
regional and international level to counter terrorism,
Stressing its call upon all States to become party, as a matter of urgency, to the
international counter-terrorism Conventions and Protocols whether or not they are
party to regional Conventions on the matter, and to give priority consideration to
signing the International Convention for the Suppression of Nuclear Terrorism
adopted by the General Assembly on 13 April 2005,
Re-emphasizing that continuing international efforts to enhance dialogue and
broaden understanding among civilizations, in an effort to prevent the
indiscriminate targeting of different religions and cultures, and addressing
unresolved regional conflicts and the full range of global issues, including
development issues, will contribute to strengthening the international fight against
terrorism,
Stressing the importance of the role of the media, civil and religious society,
the business community and educational institutions in those efforts to enhance
dialogue and broaden understanding, and in promoting tolerance and coexistence,
and in fostering an environment which is not conducive to incitement of terrorism,
Recognizing the importance that, in an increasingly globalized world, States
act cooperatively to prevent terrorists from exploiting sophisticated technology,
communications and resources to incite support for criminal acts,

2
 S/RES/1624 (2005)

Recalling that all States must cooperate fully in the fight against terrorism, in
accordance with their obligations under international law, in order to find, deny safe
haven and bring to justice, on the basis of the principle of extradite or prosecute,
any person who supports, facilitates, participates or attempts to participate in the
financing, planning, preparation or commission of terrorist acts or provides safe
havens,
1. Calls upon all States to adopt such measures as may be necessary and
appropriate and in accordance with their obligations under international law to:
(a) Prohibit by law incitement to commit a terrorist act or acts;
(b) Prevent such conduct;
(c) Deny safe haven to any persons with respect to whom there is credible
and relevant information giving serious reasons for considering that they have been
guilty of such conduct;
2. Calls upon all States to cooperate, inter alia, to strengthen the security of
their international borders, including by combating fraudulent travel documents and,
to the extent attainable, by enhancing terrorist screening and passenger security
procedures with a view to preventing those guilty of the conduct in paragraph 1 (a)
from entering their territory;
3. Calls upon all States to continue international efforts to enhance dialogue
and broaden understanding among civilizations, in an effort to prevent the
indiscriminate targeting of different religions and cultures, and to take all measures
as may be necessary and appropriate and in accordance with their obligations under
international law to counter incitement of terrorist acts motivated by extremism and
intolerance and to prevent the subversion of educational, cultural, and religious
institutions by terrorists and their supporters;
4. Stresses that States must ensure that any measures taken to implement
paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 of this resolution comply with all of their obligations under
international law, in particular international human rights law, refugee law, and
humanitarian law;
5. Calls upon all States to report to the Counter-Terrorism Committee, as
part of their ongoing dialogue, on the steps they have taken to implement this
resolution;
6. Directs the Counter-Terrorism Committee to:
(a) Include in its dialogue with Member States their efforts to implement this
resolution;
(b) Work with Member States to help build capacity, including through
spreading best legal practice and promoting exchange of information in this regard;
(c) Report back to the Council in twelve months on the implementation of
this resolution.
7. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.

3
 Republic of the Philippines
Office of the Solicitor General

AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE
(Revised pursuant to A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC)

I, JOEL N. VILLASERAN, Senior State Solicitor, OFFICE OF THE

SOLICITOR GENERAL, with Office address at 134 Amorsolo St., Legaspi
Village Makati City, after being sworn to depose and say:

That on 07/17/2020, I served a copy of the following pleading/paper:

NATURE OF THE PLEADING

CONSOLIDATED COMMENT

In G.R. Nos. 252578, 252579, 252580, 252585, 252613, 252623,

252624 and 252646, entitled:

ATTY. HOWARD M. CALLEJA, ATTY. JOSEPH PETER J. CALLEJA,

ATTY. CHRISTOPHER JOHN P. LAO, DE LA SALLE BROTHERS, INC., as
represented by Br. Armin A. Luistro, FSC, DR. REYNALDO J. ECHAVEZ,
NAPOLEON L. SIONGCO, and RAEYAN M. REPOSAR, Petitioners, - versus
- EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER, SECRETARY
OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE,
SECRETARY OF INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT, SECRETARY OF
FINANCE, SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, SECRETARY OF INFORMATION
AND COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGY, and EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR OF
THE ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING COUNCIL (AMLC), Respondents;

REP. EDCEL C. LAGMAN, Petitioner, - versus - EXECUTIVE

SECRETARY SALVADOR C. MEDIALDEA, ANTI-TERRORISM COUNCIL
(ATC), ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING COUNCIL (AMLC), SENATE OF THE
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by SENATE PRESIDENT
VICENTE C. SOTTO III, and THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
represented by SPEAKER ALAN PETER S. CAYETANO, Respondents;

MELENCIO S. STA. MARIA, EIRENE JHONE E. AGUILA, GIDEON V.

PEÑA, MICHAEL T. TIU, JR., FRANCIS EUSTON R. ACERO, PAUL
CORNELIUS T. CASTILLO, and EUGENE T. KAW, Petitioners, - versus -
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY SALVADOR C. MEDIALDEA, SECRETARY OF
JUSTICE MENARDO I. GUEVARRA, THE ANTI-TERRORISM COUNCIL,
ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES CHIEF OF STAFF FILEMON
SANTOS, JR., PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE CHIEF ARCHIE
FRANCISCO F. GAMBOA, NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER
HERMOGENES C. ESPERON, JR., SECRETARY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
TEODORO L. LOCSIN, JR., SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR AND LOCAL
GOVERNMENT EDUARDO M. AÑO, SECRETARY OF DEFENSE DELFIN N.
LORENZANA, SECRETARY OF FINANCE CARLOS G. DOMINGUEZ III,
SECRETARY OF INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGY
GREGORIO HONASAN II, and ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING COUNCIL
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR MEL GEORGIE B. RACELA, Respondents;

BAYAN MUNA PARTY-LIST REPRESENTATIVES CARLO ISAGANI

T. ZARATE, FERDINAND GAITE AND EUFEMIA CULLAMAT; GABRIELA
WOMEN’S PARTY REPRESENTATIVE ARLENE D. BROSAS; ACT-
TEACHERS PARTY-LIST REPRESENTATIVE FRANCE L. CASTRO;
KABATAAN PARTYLIST REPRESENTATIVE SARAH JANE I. ELAGO;
BAYAN MUNA PARTY-LIST PRESIDENT, SATURNINO OCAMPO;
MAKABAYAN CO-CHAIRPERSON LIZA LARGOZA MAZA; BAYAN MUNA
PARTY-LIST CHAIRPERSON NERI J. COLMENARES; ACT-TEACHERS
PARTY-LIST PRESIDENT ANTONIO TINIO, AND ANAKPAWIS PARTY-
LIST VICE-PRESIDENT ARIEL CASILAO, and MAKABAYAN SECRETARY
GENERAL, NATHANAEL SANTIAGO, Petitioners, - versus -PRESIDENT
RODRIGO DUTERTE, EXECUTIVE SECRETARY SALVADOR MEDIALDEA,
AND THE ANTI-TERRORISM COUNCIL, REPRESENTED BY ITS
CHAIRMAN SALVADOR MEDIALDEA, Respondents.

RUDOLF PHILIP B. JURADO, Petitioner, - versus - THE ANTI-

TERRORISM COUNCIL, THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, SECRETARY OF
JUSTICE, SECRETARY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, SECRETARY OF
NATIONAL DEFENSE, THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR AND LOCAL
GOVERNMENT, SECRETARY OF FINANCE, THE NATIONAL SECURITY
ADVISER, CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE
PHILIPPINES, DIRECTOR GENERAL OF THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL
POLICE, THE SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, AND THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.

CENTER FOR TRADE UNION AND HUMAN RIGHTS (CTUHR),

REPRESENTED BY DAISY ARAGO, PRO-LABOR LEGAL ASSISTANCE
CENTER (PLACE), REPRESENTED BY ATTY. NOEL V. NERI, ARMANDO
TEODORO, JR., VIOLETA ESPIRITU, and VIRGINIA FLORES, Petitioners,
- versus - HON. RODRIGO R. DUTERTE, IN HIS CAPACITY AS
PRESIDENT AND COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, HON. SALVADOR MEDIALDEA, AS EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY, ANTI-TERRORISM COUNCIL (ATC), ARMED FORCES OF
THE PHILIPPINE (AFP), REPRESENTED BY LT. GEN. FELIMON SANTOS
JR. and the PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE (PNP), REPRESENTED BY
LT. GEN. ARCHIE GAMBOA, Respondents.

CHRISTIAN S. MONSOD, FELICITAS A. ARROYO, RAY PAOLO J.

SANTIAGO, AMPARITA STA. MARIA, MARIA ILSEA W. SALVADOR,
MARIANNE CARMEL B. AGUNOY, XAMANTHA XOFIA A. SANTOS,
MARIA PAULA S. VILLARIN, PAULA SOPHIA ESTRELLA, IGNATIUS
MICHAEL D. INGLES, ERNESTO B. NERI, FR. ALBERT E. ALEJO, S.J.,
PAULA ZAYCO ABERASTURI, WYANET AISHA ELIORA M. ALCIBAR,
SENTRONG MGA NAGKAKAISA AT PROGRESIBONG MANGGAGAWA
(SENTRO), represented by its Secretary-General JOSUA T. MATA,
Petitioners, - versus - EXECUTIVE SECRETARY SALVADOR C.
MEDIALDEA, NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER HERMOGENES C.
ESPERON, JR., DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS SECRETARY
TEODORO L. LOCSIN, JR., DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENSE
SECRETARY DELFIN N. LORENZANA, DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR AND
LOCAL GOVERNMENT SECRETARY EDUARDO M. AÑO, DEPARTMENT OF
FINANCE SECRETARY CARLOS G. DOMINGUEZ III, DEPARTMENT OF
JUSTICE SECRETARY MENARDO I. GUEVARRA, DEPARTMENT OF
INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGY GREGORIO B.
HONASAN II, ANTI-MONEY-LAUNDERING COUNCIL EXECUTIVE
DIRECTOR MEL GEORGIE B. RACELA, ALL MEMBERS OF THE ANTI-
TERRORISM COUNCIL, ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES CHIEF OF
STAFF GENERAL FILEMON SANTOS, JR., PHILIPPINE NATIONAL
POLICE CHIEF GENERAL ARCHIE FRANCISCO F. GAMBOA, Respondents.

SANLAKAS, represented by Marie Marguerite M. Lopez,

Petitioner,- versus - RODRIGO R. DUTERTE, as President and
Commander-in-Chief of All the Armed Forces, SENATE, and HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, Respondents.

pursuant to Section 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9, Rule 13 of the 2019 Proposed

Amendments to the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as follows:

By Electronic Mail:

REP. EDCEL C. LAGMAN (/) By simultaneously sending an e-mail to the

Petitioner and Counsel parties or to their counsel, copy furnishing
House of Representatives, Batasan Complex, them in the email filing the pleading, on17 July
Quezon City 2020 via [email protected] as
Email: [email protected] evidenced by a screenshot of the Sent email.
[email protected]

MELENCIO S. STA. MARIA

Petitioner and Counsel
Far Eastern University – Institute of Law
6/F Far Eastern University Makati Campus
Sen. Gil Puyat Avenue cor. Malugay St.,
Makati City
Email: [email protected]

MAKABAYAN NATIONAL HEADQUARTERS

Counsel for the Petitioners (Zarate
et.al.)
Block 31 Lot 13 A. Bonifacio St.,
New Capitol Estates I, Batasan Hills,
1126 Quezon City
Email: [email protected]

CALLEJA LAW OFFICE

Counsel for the Petitioner
Unit 2904-C, West Tower, PSE Centre,
Exchange Road, Ortigas Center,
Pasig City, 1605
Email: [email protected]

PRO-LABOR LEGAL ASSISTANCE CENTER

Counsel for the Petitioner (Center for Trade
Union)
No. 33-B E. Rodriguez Sr. Avenue
Brgy. Doña Josefa, Quezon City
Email: [email protected]
ATTY. LEONARD PEEJAY V. JURADO LAW
OFFICE
Counsel for the Petitioner (Rudolf Philip B.
Jurado)
G/F Unit C, Dona Enriqueta Bldg.
No. 46 Kamias Road, Quezon City 1102
Email: [email protected]

ATENEO HUMAN RIGHTS CENTER

Counsel for the Petitioners (Monsod et. al.,)
4/F Ateneo Professional School Building
20 Rockwell Drive, Rockwell Center, Makati City
1200
Email: [email protected]

DEAN J.V. BAUTISTA

Counsel for the Petitioners (SANLAKAS)
Suite 906 The Richmonde Plaza
21 San Miguel Ave. cor. Lourdes Ave.
Ortigas Center, Pasig City 1605
Email: [email protected]

JOEL N. VILLASERAN
Senior State Solicitor

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 07/17/2020 of at Makati

City, Philippines, affiant exhibiting to me his OSG Employee ID No. 2008-
11117 issued at Makati City, Philippines.

OMAR T. GABRIELES
State Solicitor I
 Republic of the Philippines
Office of the Solicitor General

VERIFIED DECLARATION
FOR E-FILING

I, JOEL N. VILLASERAN, Senior State Solicitor of the

Office of the Solicitor General, with office address at 134
Amorsolo St., Legaspi Village, Makati City 1229, hereby
declare that the foregoing Consolidated Comment in G.R.
Nos. 252578, 252579, 252580, 252585, 252613,
252623, 252624 and 252646, entitled:
ATTY. HOWARD M. CALLEJA, ATTY. JOSEPH PETER J. CALLEJA,
ATTY. CHRISTOPHER JOHN P. LAO, DE LA SALLE BROTHERS, INC., as
represented by Br. Armin A. Luistro, FSC, DR. REYNALDO J. ECHAVEZ,
NAPOLEON L. SIONGCO, and RAEYAN M. REPOSAR, Petitioners, - versus
- EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER,
SECRETARY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, SECRETARY OF NATIONAL
DEFENSE, SECRETARY OF INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT,
SECRETARY OF FINANCE, SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, SECRETARY OF
INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGY, and
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR OF THE ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING COUNCIL
(AMLC), Respondents;

REP. EDCEL C. LAGMAN, Petitioner, - versus - EXECUTIVE

SECRETARY SALVADOR C. MEDIALDEA, ANTI-TERRORISM COUNCIL
(ATC), ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING COUNCIL (AMLC), SENATE OF THE
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by SENATE PRESIDENT
VICENTE C. SOTTO III, and THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
represented by SPEAKER ALAN PETER S. CAYETANO, Respondents;

MELENCIO S. STA. MARIA, EIRENE JHONE E. AGUILA, GIDEON

V. PEÑA, MICHAEL T. TIU, JR., FRANCIS EUSTON R. ACERO, PAUL
CORNELIUS T. CASTILLO, and EUGENE T. KAW, Petitioners, - versus -
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY SALVADOR C. MEDIALDEA, SECRETARY OF
JUSTICE MENARDO I. GUEVARRA, THE ANTI-TERRORISM COUNCIL,
ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES CHIEF OF STAFF FILEMON
SANTOS, JR., PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE CHIEF ARCHIE
FRANCISCO F. GAMBOA, NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER
HERMOGENES C. ESPERON, JR., SECRETARY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
TEODORO L. LOCSIN, JR., SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR AND LOCAL
GOVERNMENT EDUARDO M. AÑO, SECRETARY OF DEFENSE DELFIN N.
LORENZANA, SECRETARY OF FINANCE CARLOS G. DOMINGUEZ III,
SECRETARY OF INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGY
GREGORIO HONASAN II, and ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING COUNCIL
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR MEL GEORGIE B. RACELA, Respondents;
 BAYAN MUNA PARTY-LIST REPRESENTATIVES CARLO ISAGANI
T. ZARATE, FERDINAND GAITE AND EUFEMIA CULLAMAT; GABRIELA
WOMEN’S PARTY REPRESENTATIVE ARLENE D. BROSAS; ACT-
TEACHERS PARTY-LIST REPRESENTATIVE FRANCE L. CASTRO;
KABATAAN PARTYLIST REPRESENTATIVE SARAH JANE I. ELAGO;
BAYAN MUNA PARTY-LIST PRESIDENT, SATURNINO OCAMPO;
MAKABAYAN CO-CHAIRPERSON LIZA LARGOZA MAZA; BAYAN MUNA
PARTY-LIST CHAIRPERSON NERI J. COLMENARES; ACT-TEACHERS
PARTY-LIST PRESIDENT ANTONIO TINIO, AND ANAKPAWIS PARTY-
LIST VICE-PRESIDENT ARIEL CASILAO, and MAKABAYAN SECRETARY
GENERAL, NATHANAEL SANTIAGO, Petitioners, - versus -PRESIDENT
RODRIGO DUTERTE, EXECUTIVE SECRETARY SALVADOR MEDIALDEA,
AND THE ANTI-TERRORISM COUNCIL, REPRESENTED BY ITS
CHAIRMAN SALVADOR MEDIALDEA, Respondents;

RUDOLF PHILIP B. JURADO, Petitioner, - versus - THE ANTI-

TERRORISM COUNCIL, THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, SECRETARY OF
JUSTICE, SECRETARY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, SECRETARY OF
NATIONAL DEFENSE, THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR AND LOCAL
GOVERNMENT, SECRETARY OF FINANCE, THE NATIONAL SECURITY
ADVISER, CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE
PHILIPPINES, DIRECTOR GENERAL OF THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL
POLICE, THE SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, AND THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents;

CENTER FOR TRADE UNION AND HUMAN RIGHTS (CTUHR),

REPRESENTED BY DAISY ARAGO, PRO-LABOR LEGAL ASSISTANCE
CENTER (PLACE), REPRESENTED BY ATTY. NOEL V. NERI, ARMANDO
TEODORO, JR., VIOLETA ESPIRITU, and VIRGINIA FLORES, Petitioners,
- versus - HON. RODRIGO R. DUTERTE, IN HIS CAPACITY AS
PRESIDENT AND COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, HON. SALVADOR MEDIALDEA, AS EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY, ANTI-TERRORISM COUNCIL (ATC), ARMED FORCES OF
THE PHILIPPINE (AFP), REPRESENTED BY LT. GEN. FELIMON SANTOS
JR. and the PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE (PNP), REPRESENTED BY
LT. GEN. ARCHIE GAMBOA, Respondents;

CHRISTIAN S. MONSOD, FELICITAS A. ARROYO, RAY PAOLO J.

SANTIAGO, AMPARITA STA. MARIA, MARIA ILSEA W. SALVADOR,
MARIANNE CARMEL B. AGUNOY, XAMANTHA XOFIA A. SANTOS,
MARIA PAULA S. VILLARIN, PAULA SOPHIA ESTRELLA, IGNATIUS
MICHAEL D. INGLES, ERNESTO B. NERI, FR. ALBERT E. ALEJO, S.J.,
PAULA ZAYCO ABERASTURI, WYANET AISHA ELIORA M. ALCIBAR,
SENTRONG MGA NAGKAKAISA AT PROGRESIBONG MANGGAGAWA
(SENTRO), represented by its Secretary-General JOSUA T. MATA,
Petitioners, - versus - EXECUTIVE SECRETARY SALVADOR C.
MEDIALDEA, NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER HERMOGENES C.
ESPERON, JR., DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS SECRETARY
TEODORO L. LOCSIN, JR., DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENSE
SECRETARY DELFIN N. LORENZANA, DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR AND
LOCAL GOVERNMENT SECRETARY EDUARDO M. AÑO, DEPARTMENT
OF FINANCE SECRETARY CARLOS G. DOMINGUEZ III, DEPARTMENT
OF JUSTICE SECRETARY MENARDO I. GUEVARRA, DEPARTMENT OF
INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGY GREGORIO B.
HONASAN II, ANTI-MONEY-LAUNDERING COUNCIL EXECUTIVE
DIRECTOR MEL GEORGIE B. RACELA, ALL MEMBERS OF THE ANTI-
TERRORISM COUNCIL, ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES CHIEF
OF STAFF GENERAL FILEMON SANTOS, JR., PHILIPPINE NATIONAL
POLICE CHIEF GENERAL ARCHIE FRANCISCO F. GAMBOA,
Respondents; and

SANLAKAS, represented by Marie Marguerite M. Lopez,

Petitioner, - versus - RODRIGO R. DUTERTE, as President and
Commander-in-Chief of All the Armed Forces, SENATE, and HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, Respondents;

hereto submitted electronically via email and in accordance

with the Efficient Use of Paper Rule is complete and true
copy of the said pleading filed with the Supreme Court.

Makati City, Philippines, 17 July 2020.

JOEL N. VILLASERAN
Senior State Solicitor

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this

07/17/2020 of at Makati City, Philippines, affiant exhibiting
to me his OSG Employee ID No. 2008-11117 issued at
Makati City, Philippines.

OMAR T. GABRIELES
State Solicitor I