Executive

Outcomes

Against all Odds

Eeben Barlow

GALAGO
 Acknowledgements

The men of Executive Outcomes who read and corrected what I had written and
who also gave me access to their photographs; the ex-SADF generals who added
to what I have long suspected; the ex-Military Intelligence men who pleaded
forgiveness for what they had done; the agents who ferreted out infonnation for us;
the UN officials who gave me some glimpse of the organisation's duplicity; the
governments that hired EO; publishers Peter and Francis Stiff for their input and
indulgence; Peter Stiff who guided me and allowed me to quote from his works;
and editor Tony Lavine and proofreader Rina Minervini for their assistance and
guidance.
· In particular, I would also like to thank the following people who gave me their
time, opinions, accounts of their experiences and who were able to fill in many
gaps: General Witkop Badenhorst, Riaan Bellingham, Rennie Blaauw, Louwrens
Bosch, Harry Carlse, Carl Dietz, General Jannie Geldenhuys, Dries Hanekom,
Mike Herbst, Renier Hugo, Bertie Jackson, Sonny Janeke, Juba Joubert, Craig
Kotze, Jonathan Leach, Lafras Luitingh, Nico Palm, Rufan Palm, Pine Pienaar,
Piers Pigou, Duncan Rykaardt, Lt Col Shikufa (Namibian Defence Force) General
Phillip Sibanda (Zimbabwe Defence Force), Charlie Tait, Nic van den Bergh, Tony
Viera, Arthur Walker-· and those who preferred to remain anonymous.

Photographic credits

Eeben Barlow archives, Rennie Blaauw, Jim Hooper, Sonny Janeke, Arthur Walker,
Renier Hugo, Nico Palm, Kallie Coetzee, Nie van den Bergh, Al J Venter, Jannie Wools,
Armed Forces, Raids, New African, Molotov Cocktail, New American and Sinar. The
copyright of a few photographs are not acknow!edged, although the publishers have made
every effort to establish authorship which has been lost in the mists of time or blown
away by the winds of a changing South Africa. However, the publishers will amend or
add credits in subsequent additions and make the necessary arrangements with those
photographers not known at the time of going to print, or who have not been traced.

Maps
Riaan Bosch
 Contents

Chapter Page
Picture credits ..............................................................................................6
Acknowledgements................................................................................ 6
In-text maps and illustrations, diagrams and picture sections ............... 9
Foreword. .................................................................................................. 10
1 In the beginning. .................................................................................. 13
2 Ambush at Cahama. ............................................................................. 19
3 I spy with my little eye ......................................................................... 32
4 My life as a 'Civil Co-operator' ........................................................... 52
5 Rising from the dust. ........................................................................... 77
6 Angola: tom apart by war. ................................................................... 94
7 A little town called Soyo .......................................................................... 99
8 Battle for Soyo and surrounding area. ............................................... 107
9 The investigation. .............................................................................. 124
10 A brief respite .................................................................................... 127
11 Planning for victory ........................................................................... 133
12 Preparing for war on several fronts ................................................... 142
13 Planning the redeployment of forces. ................................................ 177
14 The start of the 1994 offensive. ......................................................... 189
15 The beginning of the end ................................................................... 212
16 UNITA attack on Saurimo ................................................................. 228
17 Prelude to Cafunfu .................................................................................. 240
18 Fall of Cafunfu ........................................................................................ 258
19 Tragedy in Lunda Norte Province .......................................................... 269
20 The war continues .............................................................................. 282
21 Staggering towards peace ....................................................................... 290
22 Angola returns to war. ............................................................................ 301
23 Epilogue to the Angolan War: blood diamonds and blood money... 308
24 The tragedy of Sierra Leone. ............................................................. 315
25 Help us save Sierra Leone.................................................................. 321
26 Move to Mile 91 ................................................................................ 327
27 Relief of Freetown ............................................................................. 333
28 Retaking the Koidu diamond fields ................................................... 356
29 Dominating the diamond areas .......................................................... 361
30 Change of government in Sierra Leone ................................................. 368
31 We leave Sierra Leone ....................................................................... 377
32 Enter the United Nations ................................................................... 389
33 Illegal support of RUF rebels and breaches of UN resolutions by
South Africa, Israel and Liberia ............................................................. 397
34 Taking and releasing hostages in Sierra Leone ................................. 401
35 An assassination to order!. ..................................................................... 408
36 Rescue in Irian Jaya ................................................................................ 411
37 United Nations investigates .................................................................... 422
38 Executive Outcomes: the Great Lakes myth ......................................... 439
39 The not so mysterious Dr Schultz .......................................................... 450
40 Papua New Guinea fiasco .................................................................. 453
41 Executive Outcomes at IDEX '97...................................................... 463
42 Blowing the lid off past operations .................................................... 467
43 Saudi Arabia ...................................................................................... 471
44 Leaving what I had started ................................................................. 480
45 The disinformation war. ..................................................................... 490
46 Sting of the Scorpion.......................................................................... 506
47 Vindication ......................................................................................... 509
48 Betrayal, closure and aftermath ......................................................... 514
49 Rewards of disinformation................................................................. 523
50 Looking back in 2007 ........................................................................ 527
51 Afterword ........................................................................................... 532
Executive Outcomes: Roll of Honour ............................................... 533
Bibliography ...................................................................................... 534
Abbreviations ..................................................................................... 536
Appendix A: Corporations Mission .................................................. 538
Appendix B: Counting the cost. ........................................................ 540
Appendix C: Companies associated with Executive Outcomes ........ 543
Index .................................................................................................. 544
 Photographs, in-text maps, illustrations and diagrams

Page
Colour and black and white photographs................... 161-176 and 337-352
Map of Africa showing where Executive Outcomes had interests. ........................... 12

Map of ambush at Cahama. ........................................................................................... 23

The author's army paybook indicating that his danger pay while on border
duty was the princely sum of R4.50 per day. ................................................................ 31
The author's Military Intelligence identity card. Was the 'K9' meant
as a portent of what was to come after he left Military Intelligence?. .......................... 49

Map of Angola. .............................................................................................................. 93

Map illustrating capture of Soya. ................................................................................ 122

Executive Outcomes: training programme for FAA ................................................... 143

A 'secret' DCC list translated from Afrikaans containing so-called
'essential elements of information on Executive Outcomes'. ..................................... 196

Executive Outcomes: advance from Saurimo ............................................................. 204

Map of Sierra Leone. ....................................................................................... 328

Executive Outcomes' business permit issued by the Secretary

for Defence, Pretoria. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .................·. ; . . . 518

Schedules showing comparative costs of Executive Outcomes'

operations. ................................................................................................ 540-542
 Foreword

I first met Eeben Barlow in 1982.

As a young and eager reconnaissance officer with 32-Battalion, he was tasked to
conduct an operation in my area of interest, Angola. It therefore came as no great
surprise to me to learn that he remained active in the sphere of security and military
operations after leaving the SADF. I would only much later discover the extent of his
activities.
He established Executive Outcomes (EO) in 1989 as a private security-and-advisory
company but, through circumstance, changed its direction to become a military advisory
company, or, to use the current term, a private military company. Apart from giving
specialist covert training to the SADF's Special Forces, EO provided high-level security
advice, and training, to numerous foreign governments and large multi-national
corporations. In addition, the company provided advice to a few NATO armed forces. It
also became involved in fighting crime in South America.
After the Cuban withdrawal from Angola, the situation in that country deteriorated to
such an extent that UNITA gained almost total control of Angola's oil and diamond
fields. This became a crisis for the Angolan government who were dependent on these
natural resources. The election results of the 1992 Angolan election were rejected by
UNITA, with some apparent encouragement by outside forces, which instead opted for
a return to war.
By 1993, Executive Outcomes had just completed a high-risk security operation in
Angola on behalf of numerous international oil companies. It was at the time that a
desperate Angolan government urgently needed help to end a decades-old conflict. The
world had already turned its back on Angola. The Angolan government thus contracted
EO to reorganise, retrain and provide a strategy for ending the Angolan civil war. This
contract called on a private South African company to support a legitimate government
to ensure its sovereignty, all by means of a legitimate contract. The contract was,
however, in direct opposition to the previous South African government's policy because
South Africa had, for years, supported UNITA.
Strictly speaking,. South Africa could not object to EO's contract with the MPLA,
because South Africa no longer had an interest in the battle between FAPLA (and later
FAA) and UNITA. The Cubans had long since withdrawn from Angola, and a democratic
Namibia had been established. There was thus no longer a SWAPO threat. This was,
however, still unacceptable to South Africa, and it had to devise a new method of attack
on the company.
Initially, oblivious to the concern it was creating, and in order to carry out its contractual
obligations, EO recruited a number of men from the SADF's elite units such as the
Reconnaissance Regiments, 32-Battalion, the Parachute Battalion as well as men from the
South African Air Force. The majority of these men had already been retrenched from the
SADF. Retrenched personnel from the police's elite Koevoet counter-insurgency unit
were also recruited as well as former members of the ANC's military wing, Umkhonto we
Sizwe.
EO's strong points lay in its strategy development, planning, training and execution of
strategy and tactics. The men at EO realised that they could not help to end the war unless
the FAA were able to regain control over the country's natural resources and thus deprive
UNITA of the revenue it needed to fuel the war. With their training, they re-established
the Angolan 16-Brigade.
With an element of EO acting as a combat team for the brigade, they promptly set about
implementing their strategy, which was approved at the highest level. This strategy led
to UNITA being defeated on the battlefield and suing for peace.
 Members of Military Intelligence as well as the Department of Foreign Affairs had,
however, tried continuously to stop EO's activities in Angola. The other intelligence
services, as well as the South African Police, were eventually drawn into a disinformation
war against the company. Massive intelligence gathering operations were launched
against it. Disinformation was generated and spread as far afield as the UN and other
international parties and governments. Why, no-one knows - perhaps it was for their
own gains? The onslaught against EO was brutally fierce and their antagonists eventually
succeeded, with assistance from the Americans, to bring pressure on the MPLA
government to terminate EO's contract. By then, fortunately, EO had already fulfilled its
contractual obligations.
The company went on to assist the government of Sierra Leone in a likewise manner
and succeeded where few others had dared to tread. Again, this brought massive South
African condemnation against EO. Ironically, ex-members of the SADF were engaged in
training members of the Sierra Leoncan rebels in Liberia to continue the terror against the
Sierra Lconean population, yet nothing was said about these men or the result of their
actions.
When EO's small contingent left Sierra Leone, the UN brought in many thousands of
peacekeepers to do what a handful of men had accomplished. The UN's entrance into
Sierra Leone, however well intentioned, allowed the situation to slide back into anarchy
and chaos, at a cost of many millions of dollars and thousands of unnecessary deaths and
mutilations.
Despite intense media and political pressure on the company, Executive Outcomes then
went on to assist several other governments with great success. Their successes in Angola,
Sierra Leone and other countries can further be ascribed to brilliant intelligence,
outstanding logistics, dynamic flexibility as well as constantly maintaining the initiative.
Despite continuous allegations by the media of so-called atrocities being committed by
EO, not a single shred of such evidence ever came to light. One can reasonably assume
that this was part of the campaign to discredit and close the company down.
EO, however, continued with its contracts and can be justly proud of what it achieved
around the world.
The company made a huge difference and directly helped to contribute to peace in
southern Africa. EO has since been replaced by many thousands of UN troops who just
stand by idly and watch the massacres of peoples continue.
Of interest, Executive Outcomes never invaded another country, and always entered as
guests and left as friends, something very few companies or even governments can boast
about. They followed their own policy of client selection to the letter and never betrayed
the governments they worked for.
At a time when much has been written and said about EO, the author, Eeben Barlow,
succeeds in validating events precisely in Executive Outcomes. It reads like an incident
book that contains the sweet and sour of what was arguably one of the world's most
controversial yet efficient private military companies.
I am honoured to write the foreword to this book and proud to have once commanded
some of these men, a number of whom died while honouring their word.

Lieutenant-General R (Witkop) Badenhorst, SSAS, SD, SM, MMM

Chief of Staff Intelligence, South African Defence Force, April 1989-Nov 1991
 DUGANDA

t,"RWAND
Atlantic
BURUNDI
Ocean

Indian
Ocean

Map of Africa showing areas where Executive Outcomes had an interest

 1

In the beginning

I became a soldier in the South African Defence Force in 1974.

For years I had secretly longed to d.on the uniform ofmy adopted country's anned
forces and my only dream was to become a soldier. I had always considered the
profession of arms to be an honourable one, charged with loyalty and devotion to duty
- a profession where honour was held in high esteem. I believed that the military was
free from the hypocrisy of politics and evil. Over the coming years I was to sadly learn
that the reality was far removed from my idealistic notions.
As a young boy I was keen to learn about the roles of my father and his brothers during
World War II. My mother's brothers had also fought with distinction in the war. In
addition to the normal campaign medals, my uncles brought home several decorations for
gallantry, including the British Am1y's Military Medal and the American Bronze Star.
From an undated yellowed-with-time newspaper clipping my mother gave me, I learned
that US General Mark Clark had personally pinned the Bronze Star on my one uncle's
chest. The action was thus described:

Sergeant Bob Roselt was also awarded the Bronze Star. He belongs to an anti-
tank battery. On the night of November 11-12 last, while leading a patrol into
enemy territory to secure information, he was fired on at close range by a
machine gun and pinned down. Immediately three Germans attacked him, two
tackling his arms and legs while the third clubbed him on the head with a rifle.
Although beaten to his knees Sgt Roselt fought back and knocked two of them
unconscious ... It is estimated that there were ten Germans in the ambush and that
several of them were wounded by him before he led his men to safety. His action
reflects great credit and bravery.

Although Ineverreallyknewmysoldier-uncles, they, along with my father, weremyreal-

life heroes.
We played many games of war as children, and even then I imagined I could smell the
stench of gunpowder and see the blur of movement across our smoke-filled mock
battlefields. I couldn't wait to become a real soldier, wear the uniform of the country that
had become my home and defend it with pride and honour - even with my life if
necessary.
I was fortunate for I was able to realise my dream.
T was commissioned into the South African Army's Engineer Corps (SAEC) in 1975.
In the same year the South African Defence Force (SADF) went to war in Angola - a
war that would continue for several years and still remains the cause of much anger,
bitterness and pain to many people in southern Africa. It was also a war filled with
betrayals that can never truly be forgotten or forgiven.
Angola, strategically located on the western coast of the African continent, became a

13
colony of Portugal in 1491 and was declared an Overseas Territory of Portugal in 1951.
Resenting Portuguese colonial rule, an organisation known as the People's Movement
for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) in 1956 set its sights on achieving complete
independence from Portugal. In 1961 the National Front for the Liberation of Angola
(FNLA) entered into the fray. In 1964 it was joined by a third movement known as the
National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA). It was a stmggle that
would lead to a bloody and protracted war between Portugal and the three vastly different
liberation movements.
This war for independence lasted from 1961 until 1975 when the Portuguese
metropolitan government, unable to continue with a sustained guerrilla war in Angola and
brought to its knees by its own communist-infiltrated armed forces, decided to relinquish
power to the Angolans and get out of Africa as fast as it could.
There were numerous clashes between the MPLA and UNITA as both sides vied for
power in the struggle to take control once the Portuguese had left Angola.
To compound matters, a power struggle developed between the president of the MPLA,
Augustinho Neto, and the commander of the MPLA's army, Daniel Chipenda. This
internal squabble eventually culminated in Chipenda defecting to the FNLA with a large
portion of the MPLA's army, which by then was known as FAPLA, which bolstered the
FNLA's military position considerably.
FNLA and UNITA, despite regarding the MPLA as a common enemy, were in no way
allied. The FNLA, under the leadership of Holden Roberto, chose to operate from both
the Congo and the power base Chipenda had established in the south of Angola while he
was still with the MPLA.
UNITA, under the control of Dr Jonas Savimbi - a supporter and student of China's
Mao Ze Dong - also operated from southern Angola.
Apart from fighting for a slice of Angola, Savimbi's UNITA was also supporting the
South West African Peoples Organisation (SWAPO) which in turn was fighting for
independence in South West Africa.
SWAPO's cross-border activities were the reason that South African troops were
deployed on the northern border of South West Africa (later Namibia).
When the Portuguese granted independence to Angola in November 1975, they decided
to relinquish power either to a coalition or to the strongest of the three movements. This
could only lead to a chaotic result as each faction fought to grab as much territory as it
could and achieve as much influence as possible. The help of Cuba was obtained by the
communist-infiltrated Portuguese armed forces to restructure, re-equip and retrain
FAPLA. The first Cuban military contingents had arrived in Angola bymid-1975. These
units supported the well-equipped and retrained FAPLA, and it was not long before they
were able to dominate central and most of southern Angola. They also had a strong
presence in the east and north. The MPLA soon proved itself to be the strongest of the
three factions fighting for power.
Into this maelstrom of civil war and violence, stepped the super powers - the United
States and the Soviet Union - and South Africa.
America initially provided assistance to the FNLA but later, for reasons of its own,
switched its support to UNITA. At that time it was speculated that it was because UNITA
controlled the Angolan diamond-rich areas.
South Africa also chose to assist UNITA, despite the fact that UNITA was supporting
SWAPO. Again rumours were rife that it was because of diamonds.
The bloody civil war that followed would finally culminate in an MPLA government
under Augustinho Neto grabbing control of much of Angola. The FNLA and UNITA
proclaimed a short-lived coalition government in the town of Nova Lisboa.
It was against the background of this mess that Colonel Jan Breytenbach, the founder
ofthe SADF's Reconnaissance Commandos, was tasked in 1975 with establishing contact

14