EN BANC

[G.R. No. 187883. June 16, 2009.]

ATTY. OLIVER O. LOZANO and ATTY. EVANGELINE J. LOZANO-

ENDRIANO , petitioners, vs . SPEAKER PROSPERO C. NOGRALES,
Representative, Majority, House of Representatives , respondent.

[G.R. No. 187910. June 16, 2009.]

LOUIS "BAROK" C. BIRAOGO, petitioner, v s . SPEAKER PROSPERO C.

NOGRALES, Speaker of the House of Representatives, Congress of
the Philippines , respondent.

RESOLUTION

PUNO , C.J : p

This Court, so long as the fundamentals of republicanism continue to guide it,

shall not shirk its bounden duty to wield its judicial power to settle "actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to
determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to a
lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
government." 1 Be that as it may, no amount of exigency can make this Court exercise a
power where it is not proper.
The two petitions, led by their respective petitioners in their capacities as
concerned citizens and taxpayers, prayed for the nulli cation of House Resolution No.
1109 entitled "A Resolution Calling upon the Members of Congress to Convene for the
Purpose of Considering Proposals to Amend or Revise the Constitution, Upon a Three-
fourths Vote of All the Members of Congress." In essence, both petitions seek to
trigger a justiciable controversy that would warrant a de nitive interpretation by this
Court of Section 1, Article XVII, which provides for the procedure for amending or
revising the Constitution. Unfortunately, this Court cannot indulge petitioners'
supplications. While some may interpret petitioners' moves as vigilance in preserving
the rule of law, a careful perusal of their petitions would reveal that they cannot hurdle
the bar of justiciability set by this Court before it will assume jurisdiction over cases
involving constitutional disputes.
It is well settled that it is the duty of the judiciary to say what the law is. 2 The
determination of the nature, scope and extent of the powers of government is the
exclusive province of the judiciary, such that any mediation on the part of the latter for
the allocation of constitutional boundaries would amount, not to its supremacy, but to
its mere ful llment of its "solemn and sacred obligation" under the Constitution. 3 This
Court's power of review may be awesome, but it is limited to actual cases and
controversies dealing with parties having adversely legal claims, to be exercised after
full opportunity of argument by the parties, and limited further to the constitutional
question raised or the very lis mota presented. 4 The "case-or-controversy"
requirement bans this court from deciding "abstract, hypothetical or
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 contingent questions", 5 lest the court give opinions in the nature of advice
concerning legislative or executive action. 6 In the illuminating words of the
learned Justice Laurel in Angara v. Electoral Commission : 7 ISDCHA

Any attempt at abstraction could only lead to dialectics and barren legal
questions and to sterile conclusions unrelated to actualities. Narrowed as its
function is in this manner, the judiciary does not pass upon questions of wisdom,
justice or expediency of legislation. More than that, courts accord the
presumption of constitutionality to legislative enactments, not only because the
legislature is presumed to abide by the Constitution but also because the judiciary
in the determination of actual cases and controversies must re ect the wisdom
and justice of the people as expressed through their representatives in the
executive and legislative departments of the government.

An aspect of the "case-or-controversy" requirement is the requisite of

"ripeness" . In the United States, courts are centrally concerned with whether a case
involves uncertain contingent future events that may not occur as anticipated, or indeed
may not occur at all. 8 Another approach is the evaluation of the t wo fo ld aspect of
ripeness: first, the fitness of the issues for judicial decision; and second, the hardship to
the parties entailed by withholding court consideration. 9 In our jurisdiction, the issue of
ripeness is generally treated in terms of actual injury to the plaintiff. Hence, a question
is ripe for adjudication when the act being challenged has had a direct adverse effect
on the individual challenging it. 1 0 An alternative road to review similarly taken would be
to determine whether an action has already been accomplished or performed by a
branch of government before the courts may step in. 1 1
In the present case, the tness of petitioners' case for the exercise of
judicial review is grossly lacking . In the rst place, petitioners have not su ciently
proven any adverse injury or hardship from the act complained of. In the second place,
House Resolution No. 1109 only resolved that the House of Representatives shall
convene at a future time for the purpose of proposing amendments or revisions to the
Constitution. No actual convention has yet transpired and no rules of procedure have
yet been adopted. More importantly, no proposal has yet been made, and hence, no
usurpation of power or gross abuse of discretion has yet taken place. In short, House
Resolution No. 1109 involves a quintessential example of an uncertain
contingent future event that may not occur as anticipated, or indeed may not
occur at all. The House has not yet performed a positive act that would
warrant an intervention from this Court.
Tan v. Macapagal presents a similar factual milieu. In said case, petitioners
led a petition assailing the validity of the Laurel-Langley resolution, which dealt with
the range of authority of the 1971 Constitutional Convention. The court resolved the
issue thus:
More speci cally, as long as any proposed amendment is still unacted on
by it, there is no room for the interposition of judicial oversight. Only after it has
made concrete what it intends to submit for rati cation may the appropriate case
be instituted. Until then, the courts are devoid of jurisdiction. That is the command
of the Constitution as interpreted by this Court. Unless and until such a doctrine
loses force by being overruled or a new precedent being announced, it is
controlling. It is implicit in the rule of law. 1 2
ESHAIC

Yet another requisite rooted in the very nature of judicial power is locus standi or
standing to sue. Thus, generally, a party will be allowed to litigate only when he can
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 demonstrate that (1) he has personally suffered some actual or threatened injury
because of the allegedly illegal conduct of the government; (2) the injury is fairly
traceable to the challenged action; and (3) the injury is likely to be redressed by the
remedy being sought. 1 3 In the cases at bar, petitioners have not shown the elemental
injury in fact that would endow them with the standing to sue. Locus standi requires a
personal stake in the outcome of a controversy for signi cant reasons. It assures
adverseness and sharpens the presentation of issues for the illumination of
the Court in resolving di cult constitutional questions. 1 4 The lack of
petitioners' personal stake in this case is no more evident than in Lozano's three-page
petition that is devoid of any legal or jurisprudential basis.
Neither can the lack of locus standi be cured by the claim of petitioners
that they are instituting the cases at bar as taxpayers and concerned citizens.
A taxpayer's suit requires that the act complained of directly involves the illegal
disbursement of public funds derived from taxation. 1 5 It is undisputed that there
has been no allocation or disbursement of public funds in this case as of yet.
To be sure, standing as a citizen has been upheld by this Court in cases where a
petitioner is able to craft an issue of transcendental importance or when paramount
public interest is involved. 1 6 While the Court recognizes the potential far-reaching
implications of the issue at hand, the possible consequence of House Resolution No.
1109 is yet unrealized and does not infuse petitioners with locus standi under the
"transcendental importance" doctrine.
The rule on locus standi is not a plain procedural rule but a constitutional
requirement derived from Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution, which mandates
courts of justice to settle only "actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable." As stated in Kilosbayan, Incorporated v. Guingona,
Jr., 1 7 viz.:
. . . [C]ourts are neither free to decide all kinds of cases dumped into their
laps nor are they free to open their doors to a ll parties or entities claiming a
grievance. The rationale for this constitutional requirement of locus standi is by
no means tri e. It is intended "to assure a vigorous adversary presentation of the
case, and, perhaps more importantly to warrant the judiciary's overruling the
determination of a coordinate, democratically elected organ of government." It
thus goes to the very essence of representative democracies.
xxx xxx xxx

A lesser but not insigni cant reason for screening the standing of persons
who desire to litigate constitutional issues is economic in character. Given the
sparseness of our resources, the capacity of courts to render e cient judicial
service to our people is severely limited. For courts to indiscriminately open their
doors to all types of suits and suitors is for them to unduly overburden their
dockets, and ultimately render themselves ineffective dispensers of justice. To be
sure, this is an evil that clearly confronts our judiciary today.

Moreover, while the Court has taken an increasingly liberal approach to

the rule of locus standi, evolving from the stringent requirements of
"personal injury" to the broader "transcendental importance" doctrine, such
liberality is not to be abused. It is not an open invitation for the ignorant and
the ignoble to file petitions that prove nothing but their cerebral deficit.
In the nal scheme, judicial review is effective largely because it is not available
simply at the behest of a partisan faction, but is exercised only to remedy a particular,
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 concrete injury. 1 8 When warranted by the presence of indispensible minimums for
judicial review, this Court shall not shun the duty to resolve the constitutional challenge
that may confront it.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petitions are dismissed.
SO ORDERED. HAIaEc

Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Carpio, Corona, Velasco, Jr., Nachura, Leonardo-de

Castro, Brion, Peralta and Bersamin, JJ., concur.
Carpio Morales, J., is on official leave.
Chico-Nazario, J., took no part.

Footnotes

1. Article VIII, Section 1, 1987 Constitution.

2. Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 2L. Ed. 60 [1803].
3. Angara v. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil. 139 (1936).
4. Ibid.
5. Alabama State Fed. of Labor v. McAdory, 325 U.S. 450 461 (1945).
6. Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346, 362 (1911).
7. Supra, see note 3.
8. Tribe, American Constitutional Law, 3d ed. 2000, p. 335.
9. Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136 (1967).
10. Guingona, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, 354 Phil. 415, 427-428 (1998).
11. Francisco, Jr. v. House of Representatives, 460 Phil. 830, 901-902 (2003).
12. G.R. No. L-34161, February 29, 1972, 43 SCRA 677, 682.
13. Tolentino v. COMELEC, 465 Phil. 385, 402 (2004).
14. Kilosbayan, Incorporated v. Morato, G.R. No. 118910, July 17, 1995, 246 SCRA 540.
15. Pascual v. Secretary of Public Works, 110 Phil. 331 (1960).
16. Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora, G.R. No. 141284, August 15, 2000, 338
SCRA 81.
17. See Dissent of then Associate Justice Reynato S. Puno, G.R. No. 113375, May 5, 1994,
232 SCRA 110.
18. Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 740-741, n. 16 (1972).

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