MANILA LAW COLLEGE

LABOR LAW I 2022 CASES

 MANILA LAW COLLEGE LABOR LAW CASE DIGESTS NOV. 2020-SEP. 2022

TABLE OF CONTENTS

2020-2021 CASES
1) OSG SHIPMANAGEMENT MANILA, INC., MICHAELMAR SHIPPING SERVICES, INC., and/or MA. CRISTINA
PARAS vs. VICTORIO B. DE JESUS
G.R. No. 207344, November 18, 2020 .................................................................................................... 5
2) JEROME D. PALADA vs. CROSSWORLD MARINE SERVICES KAPAL
G.R. No. 247778, FEBRUARY 17, 2021 .................................................................................................... 8
3) DIONISIO M. REYES vs. MAGSAYSAY MITSUI OSK MARINE INC., MOL SHIP MANAGEMENT CO., LTD.,
AND/OR CAPT. FRANCISCO MENOR
G.R. No. 209756, JUNE 14, 2021 .......................................................................................................... 11
4) CROWN SHIPPING SERVICES/ DOLPHIN SHIP MANAGEMENT, INC., et.al. vs. JOHN P. CERVAS
G.R. No. 214290, JULY 6, 2021 ............................................................................................................ 14
5) PETER ANGELO N. LAGAMAYO vs. CULLINAN GROUP, INC., AND RAFAEL M. FLORENCIO G.R. No. 227718,
NOVEMBER 11, 2021 ........................................................................................................................... 17
2022 CASES
JANUARY 2022 ...................................................................................................21
6) CONQUEROR INDUSTRIAL PEACE MANAGEMENT COOPERATIVE vs. JOEY BALINGBING, et. al.
G.R. No. 250311, January 5, 2022 ........................................................................................................ 21
FEBRUARY 2022 .................................................................................................25
7) ROMMEL S. ALENAJE vs. C.F. SHARP CREW MANAGEMENT, INC. REEDEREI CLAUS-PETER OFFEN (GMBH &
CO.) AND ROBERTO B. DAVANTES
G.R. No. 249195, February 14, 2022..................................................................................................... 25
8) TRAVELOKA PHILIPPINES, INC. and YADY GUITANA, vs. PONCEVIC CAPINO CEBALLOS
G.R. No. 254697, February 14, 2022..................................................................................................... 29
9) SRL INTERNATIONAL MANPOWER AGENCY, represented by SEVILLA SARAH SORITA and AKKILA CO., LTD.,
UAE and/or AL SALMEEN, vs. PEDRO S. YARZA, JR.
G.R. No. 207828, February 14, 2022..................................................................................................... 32
10) PUREGOLD PRICE CLUB, INC. (PPCI) vs. COURT OF APPEALS AND RENATO M. CRUZ, JR. G.R. No. 244374,
February 15, 2022 ............................................................................................................................... 36
11) LUISITO C. REYES vs. JEBSENS MARITIME, INC., AND ALFA SHIP & CREW MANAGEMENT GMBH
G.R. No. 230502, February 15, 2022..................................................................................................... 40
12) REYNALDO P. CABATAN vs. SOUTHEAST ASIA SHIPPING CORP./ATTY. ROMEO DALUSONG AND/OR
MARITIME MANAGEMENT SERVICES
G.R No. 219495., February 28, 2022 ................................................................................................... 47
13) RODELIO R. ONIA vs. LEONIS NAVIGATION COMPANY, INC., WORLD MARITIME CO. LTD., CAPT. HERNANI
P. FEUSCA, FELIX ANDRADA, RICARDO NOLLEDO, RYO MATSUNAGA, TAKASHI UTO, VALERIANO R. DEL
ROSARIO, MARY JEAN MADRENERO, and JENNIFER E. CERRADA
G.R No. 256878, February 14, 2022...................................................................................................... 51
14) PHILIPPINE BANK OF COMMUNICATIONS vs. PHILIPPINE BANK OF COMMUNICATIONS EMPLOYEES
ASSOCIATION (PBCOMEA)
G.R. No. 254021, FEBRUARY 14, 2022 .................................................................................................. 55
MARCH 2022.......................................................................................................59
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15) NELSON M. CELESTINO vs. BELCHEM PHILIPPINES, INC., BELCHEM SINGAPORE PTE., and/or JASMIN D.
SALVADOR
G.R. No. 246929, March 2, 2022 .......................................................................................................... 59
16) PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MILDRED COCHING LIWANAG
G.R. No. 232245, March 2, 2022 .......................................................................................................... 62
17) MARLOW NAVIGATION PHILS., MARLOW NAVIGATION CO. LTD., AND/OR MR. ANTONIO GALVEZ, JR., et al.
vs. HEIRS OF THE LATE ANTONIO O. BEATO
G.R. No. 233897, March 09, 2022 ......................................................................................................... 66
18) GEROME B. GINTA-ASON vs. J.T.A. PACKAGING CORPORATION AND JON TAN ARQUILLA
G.R. No. 244206, March 16, 2022 ......................................................................................................... 69
19) CELESTINO M. JUNIO vs. PACIFIC OCEAN MANNING, MEGA CHEMICAL TANKER, and ERLINDA S. AZUCENA
G.R. No. 220657, March 16, 2022 ......................................................................................................... 74
20) PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. REGINA WENDELINA BEGINO Y ROGERO, et.al.,
G.R. No. 251150, March 16, 2022 ......................................................................................................... 77
21) PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MARY JANE DELA CONCEPCION y VALDEZ a.k.a. "JUDITH A. VALDEZ"
a.k.a. "OFELIA ANDAYA,"
G.R. No. 251876, March 21, 2022 ......................................................................................................... 79
22) ARIEL M. REYES vs. RURAL BANK OF SAN RAFAEL (BULACAN) INC., FLORANTE VENERACION, CELERINA
SABARIAGA, ALICA FLOR KABILING, FIDELA MANAGO, CEFERINO DE GUZMAN, and RIZALINO QUINTOS
G.R. No. 230597, March 23, 2022 ......................................................................................................... 82
23) COLEGIO SAN AGUSTIN-BACOLOD AND/OR FR. FREDERICK C. COMENDADOR vs. MELINDA M. MONTAÑO
G.R. No. 212333, March 28, 2022 ......................................................................................................... 87
24) SERVFLEX, INC. vs. LOVELYNN M. URERA, SHERRYL I. CABRERA, PRECIOUS C. PALANCE AND JOCO JIM L.
SEVILLA
G.R. No. 246369, MARCH 29, 2022 ....................................................................................................... 91
25) EDNA LUISA B. SIMON vs. THE RESULTS COMPANIES AND JOSELITO SUMCAD,
G.R. Nos. 249351-52, MARCH 29, 2022 ................................................................................................ 95
26) NOEL G. GUINTO vs. STO. NIÑO LONG-ZENY CONSIGNEE, ANGELO SALANGSANG, AND ZENAIDA
SALANGSANG
G.R. No. 250987, MARCH 29, 2022 ...................................................................................................... 101
27) BENHUR SHIPPING CORPORATION/SUN MARINE SHIPPING S.A. AND EDGAR B. BRUSELAS vs. ALEX
PENAREBONDA RIEGO
G.R. No. 229179, March 29, 2022 ........................................................................................................ 105
28) ABS-CBN CORPORATION vs. CLARITA MAGNO
G.R. No. 203876, March 29, 2022 ........................................................................................................ 111
APRIL 2022 ....................................................................................................... 115
29) DMCI PROJECT DEVELOPERS, INC. vs. NELIA BERNADAS, NOEL BATANES, EDUARDO NONSOL, JOSE BALDE,
ELM OR MABATAN, and LILIO M. REBUENO,
G.R. No. 221978, April 4, 2022 ............................................................................................................ 115
30) EDGARDO M, PAGLINAWAN vs. DOHLE- PHILMAN AGENCY INC.,
G.R. NO. 230735, APRIL 4, 2022 ......................................................................................................... 118
31) CATTLEYA R. CAMBIL vs. KABALIKAT PARA SA MAUNLAD NA BUHAY
G.R. No. 245938, April 05, 2022 ................................................................................................. 120APRIL

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32) RICHARD N. WAHING, RONALD L. CALAGO AND PABLO P. MAIT vs. SPOUSES AMADOR DAGUIO AND ESING
DAGUIO
G.R. No. 219755, April 18, 2022 .......................................................................................................... 124
33) ALLAN S. NAVARETTE vs. VENTIS MARITIME CORPORATION
G.R. No.246871, APRIL 19,2022 .......................................................................................................... 128
34) VIBAL COMPANY/VIRTUALIDAD, INC., GASPAR VIBAL AND ESTHER VIBAL vs. APRIL GRACE C. MORQUIN
G.R. No. 247879, April 19, 2022 .......................................................................................................... 132
35) MARLON BUTIAL AGAPITO vs. AEROPLUS MULTISERVICES, INC. G.R. No.248304, April 20, 2022 .......... 137
36) WESTMINSTER SEAFARER MANAGEMENT PHILIPPINES, INC. vs. ARNULFO C. RAZ
G.R. No. 249344, April 5, 2022 ............................................................................................................ 142
37) SYSTEMS AND PLAN INTEGRATOR AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION AND/OR ENGR. JULIETA CUNANAN
vs. MICHELLE BALLESTEROS, ELVI C.
G.R. No. 217119, April 25, 2022 ......................................................................................................... 145
38) JULES KING PAITON vs. ARMSCOR GLOBAL
G.R. NO. 255656, APRIL 25, 2022 ....................................................................................................... 150
JUNE 2022 ........................................................................................................ 155
39) NANCY CLAIRE PIT CELIS vs. BANK OF MAKATI (A SAVINGS BANK), INC.
G.R. No. 250776, JUNE 15, 2022 ......................................................................................................... 155
40) SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM vs. VIOLETA A. SIMACAS
G.R. No. 217866, JUNE 20, 2022 ......................................................................................................... 158
41) CATHERINE DELA CRUZ-CAGAMPAN vs. ONE NETWORK BANK, INC.
G.R. No. 217414, JUNE 22, 2022 ......................................................................................................... 161
42) PHILIPPINE PIZZA, INC., vs. ELVIS C. TUMPANG
G.R. No. 231090, JUNE 22, 2022 ......................................................................................................... 164
JULY 2022 ......................................................................................................... 167
43) ADSTRATWORLD HOLDINGS, INC. vs. CHONA A MAGALLONES
G.R. No. 233679, JULY 6, 2022 ........................................................................................................... 167
44) MUSAHAMAT WORKERS LABOR UNION-1-ALU vs. MUSAHAMAT FARMS, INC.
G.R. No. 240184, JULY 6, 2022 ........................................................................................................... 170
45) C.F. SHARP CREW MANAGEMENT, INC. AND/OR REEDEREI CLAUS-PETER OFFEN (GMBH & CO.) vs.
ROBERTO DAGANATO
G.R. No. 243399, JULY 6, 2022 ........................................................................................................... 174
46) PHILIPPINE TRANSMARINE CARRIER AND SEASPAN CREW AND CARLOS SALINAS vs. ALAN N TENA-E
G.R. No. 234365, JULY 6, 2022 ........................................................................................................... 177
47) PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. PERLITA CASTRO URQUICO
G.R. No. 238910, JULY 20, 2022 ......................................................................................................... 180
AUGUST 2022 ................................................................................................... 183
48) CORNWORLD BREEDING SYSTEMS CORPORATION vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 204075, AUGUST 17, 2022 .................................................................................................... 183
SEPTEMBER 2022 ............................................................................................. 186
49) G&S TRANSPORT CORPORATION vs. REYNALDO A. MEDINA
G.R. No. 243768, SEPTEMBER 06, 2022 ............................................................................................... 186

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2020-2021 CASES

OSG SHIPMANAGEMENT MANILA, INC., MICHAELMAR SHIPPING SERVICES,

INC., and/or MA. CRISTINA PARAS vs. VICTORIO B. DE JESUS
G.R. No. 207344, November 18, 2020
GAERLAN, J.:

FACTS:
Victorio B. De Jesus (respondent) alleged while working as Second Cook, he noticed
that the drinking water is salty and dirty. During the voyage, he experienced sudden pain all
over his body and experienced nausea. Thus, when the ship anchored in Rotterdam,
Netherlands, he consulted a doctor who diagnosed him with Costen Syndrome. Despite taking
medication, the respondent's condition did not improve. Hence, he was sent to a doctor in
Singapore and then in China, who diagnosed him with urethritis and kidney stones.

Respondent further averred that when he was repatriated to the Philippines on

November 14, 2008, petitioner refused to let him undergo a medical examination due to the
absence of a master's medical pass. He was, thus, constrained to seek treatment from his
personal doctor. He then underwent Nephrectomy, a surgery to remove one of his kidneys.
On August 26, 2009, a doctor at the Intellicare Makati Clinic certified that respondent is no
longer fit for maritime duties. Thus, he filed a complaint for full disability compensation
against petitioners.

For their part, petitioners averred that respondent was repatriated due to a finished
contract. Upon his arrival, respondent did not report for a post-employment medical
examination. They were, thus, surprised when, after nine months after respondent's
repatriation, they learned that a complaint for full disability compensation was lodged by
respondent before the Labor Arbiter.

Petitioners further contended that respondent's illnesses are not occupational diseases
and not work-related; respondent, therefore, is not entitled to disability compensation.

Labor Arbiter dismissed respondent's complaint for lack of merit. The Labor Arbiter
ratiocinated that respondent was repatriated not because of any medical condition but due
to a finished contract, and the respondent failed to prove that his illnesses were work-related.
Respondent filed an appeal to the NLRC which later affirmed Labor Arbiter’s dismissal of the
complaint. Later, respondent filed a petition for certiorari with the CA which granted petition
concluding that the ailments of the respondent were caused and/or aggravated by the nature
of his employment. The CA further explained that, although his illnesses resulting in the
removal of his kidney are not among those listed in Section 32-A (Occupational Disease) of
the 2000 Philippine Overseas Employment Administration-Standard Employment Contract
(POEA-SEC), such ailments are presumed to be work-related. Accordingly, petitioners have
the burden of proof to overturn such presumption. Petitioners, however, failed to do so.

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ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent Victorio should be awarded total and permanent disability
benefits.

RULING/RATIO DECIDENDI:
Entitlement to disability benefits by seamen on overseas work is a matter governed,
not only by medical findings but also by law and by contract. The material statutory provisions
are Articles 197-199 (formerly Articles 191 to 193) under Chapter VI (Disability Benefits),
Book IV of the Labor Code, in relation to Rule X of the Rules and Regulations Implementing
Book IV of the Labor Code. By contract, Department Order No. 4, series of 2000 of the
Department of Labor and Employment or the POEA-SEC (the governing POEA-SEC at the
time the petitioners employed respondent in 2008), and the parties' Collective Bargaining
Agreement, bind the relationship between the seaman and his employer.

The list of occupational diseases, however, is not exclusive. Meaning, even those
diseases or injuries not enumerated in Section 32-A may still be compensable. Thus, in
situations where the seafarer seeks to claim the compensation and benefits that Section 20-
B grants to him, the law requires the seafarer to prove that: (1) he suffered an illness; (2)
he suffered this illness during the term of his employment contract; (3) he complied with the
procedures prescribed under Section 20-B; (4) his illness is one of the enumerated
occupational diseases or that his illness or injury is otherwise work-related; and (5) he
complied with the four conditions enumerated under Section 32-A for an occupational disease
or a disputably-presumed work-related disease to be compensable.

The respondent failed to prove that he and the other crew members were made to
drink saline and rusty water. Records also show that petitioners sufficiently proved that there
was adequate water supply, mineral water, onboard the vessel for the consumption of the
whole crew, not only of the officers. Furthermore, records reveal that respondent was
repatriated for "finished contract," not for medical reasons. He chose to complete his
employment contract with the petitioners instead of being medically repatriated, even as he
experienced nausea and body pains on board an indication that the injury or illness is not
work-related.

Even if this Court were to consider that respondent was repatriated for health reasons,
his failure to submit himself to a post-employment medical examination by a company-
designated physician within three working days upon his return militates against his claim for
disability benefits.

Under Section 20-B(3), paragraph 233 of the 2000 POEA SEC, a seafarer who was
repatriated for medical reasons must, within three working days from his disembarkation,
submit himself to a post-employment medical examination (PEME) to be conducted by the
company-designated physician. Failure of the seafarer to comply with this three-day
mandatory reporting requirement shall result in the forfeiture of his right to claim the POEA-
SEC granted benefits.

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Under these considerations, this Court holds and so rules that respondent's claim must
fail. He failed to substantially satisfy the prescribed requirements to be entitled to disability
benefits.

FALLO/DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
The instant petition is GRANTED. The January 31, 2013 Decision and the May 28,
2013 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 120916, are SET ASIDE.

The May 7, 2010 Decision of the Labor Arbiter and March 31, 2011 Decision of the
National Labor Relations Commission, both dismissing the complaint for lack of merit, are
REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.

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MANILA LAW COLLEGE LABOR LAW CASE DIGESTS NOV. 2020-SEP. 2022

JEROME D. PALADA vs. CROSSWORLD MARINE SERVICES KAPAL

G.R. No. 247778, FEBRUARY 17, 2021
INTING, J.:

FACTS:
On May 6, 2016, Crossworld Marine Services, Inc., on behalf of its foreign principal,
Kapal (Cyprus) Limited (collectively, respondents), hired petitioner as an ordinary seaman on
board the vessel MIV Eurocargo Venezia with a contract duration of eight months. Petitioner's
employment was covered by the ITALIAN CBA for NON DOMS, a collective bargaining
agreement (CBA).

Petitioner was deployed to board the vessel on May 20, 2016. On July 11, 2016,
petitioner was accidentally hit by a moving vehicle on board the vessel while he was loading
and parking a trailer. After medication in Malta he was repatriated on July 18, 2016.

He underwent examination and treatment by the company-designated physician from

July 21-October 27, 2016. Afterwards, the company designated physician gave him an
assessment of Grade 11 disability and was declared fit to work. The petitioner thus consulted
another physician and concluded permanently UNFIT in any capacity to resume his sea duties
as a Seaman.

Ruling of the Panel of Voluntary Arbitrators. The Panel of Voluntary Arbitrators

rejected the fit-to-work assessment made by Dr. Bergonio given that: (a) the assessment
was inconclusive and open to inquiries as it was without the relevant supporting test results;
and (b) despite the declaration of fitness to work, petitioner was not redeployed to resume
his sea duties as an Ordinary Seaman. The NCMB thus concluded that the company-
-designated physician had failed to make a definite and final assessment on petitioner's
fitness to work within the 120 to 240-day periods; and that for this failure, petitioner is
deemed totally and permanently disabled and entitled to the benefits corresponding thereto
in accordance with the CBA and the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA)-
Standard Employment Contract (SEC).

Ruling of the CA. The CA reversed the decision.

First, petitioner had been given a Grade 11 disability rating by the company-
designated physician because he was only suffering from a slight rigidity, or 1/3 loss of
motion or lifting power of the trunk. As such, he should be deemed to be 12% disabled under
Annex 5 of the CBA on account of his back pains with some reduction of mobility. Secondly,
the findings of the company-designated physician should prevail over those of Dr. Magtira,
petitioner's private physician, in the absence of an opinion of a third doctor to resolve the
conflicting findings as to petitioner's fitness to resume his sea duties.

ISSUE:
Whether the petitioner seafarer is entitled to total and permanent disability benefits.

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RULING/RATIO DECIDENDI:
Yes, the court ruled in favor of the petitioner.

The law that governs a seafarer's disability benefits claim is Article 198 (c) (l) of the
Labor Code of the Philippines. Moreover, Section 2, Rule X of the Amended Rules on
Employees' Compensation provides that the income benefit shall be paid beginning on the
first day of such disability. If caused by an injury or sickness it shall not be paid longer than
120 consecutive days except where such injury or sickness still requires medical attendance
beyond 120 days but not to exceed 240 days from onset of disability in which case benefit
for temporary total disability shall be paid.

The employment of seafarers, including claims for disability benefits, is governed by

the contracts they executed at the time of their engagement. While it is true that the seafarer
and his or her employer are bound by their mutual agreement, the POEA Rules and
Regulations require that the applicable POEA-SEC be deemed integrated in every seafarer's
employment contract.

In this case, the parties executed the employment contract on May 6, 2016. Thus, the
2010 POEA-SEC is applicable in order to determine petitioner's entitlement to disability
benefits. The disability shall be based solely on the disability gradings provided under Section
32 of this Contract, and shall not be measured or determined by the number of days a
seafarer is under treatment or the number of days in which sickness allowance is paid.

As for the medical findings, it is settled that the medical assessment or report of the
company-designated physician must be complete and appropriately issued; otherwise, the
disability grading contained therein will not be seriously appreciated.

In this case, the company-designated physicians appear to have issued two conflicting
findings regarding petitioner's medical condition as follows:

The first medical assessment was issued by Dr. Bondoc on October 27, 2016. The pertinent
portion of the report states:

Patient reports upper back and chest pain when lifting weights.

A careful perusal of both medical reports reveals that they cannot be considered as
complete, final, and definite as neither one showed exactly how the disability rating or the
fit-to-work assessments were arrived at. There is no question that the first medical report
was merely provisional given Dr. Bondoc's usage of the term "interim assessment" in issuing
petitioner a Grade 11 disability rating. As for Dr. Bergonio's medical report, it should be
pointed out that the supposed Functional Assessment of petitioner's medical condition by a
certain Dr. Basuil referenced therein was not attached to the report. The Functional
Assessment is also not in the records of the case which, in itself, renders the existence of the
medical assessment doubtful.

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Given the absence of a definitive assessment of petitioner's disability or fitness to work

within the 120-day or 240-day periods, it is clear that the CA committed another serious error
when it ruled that petitioner's failure to demand for his reexamination by a third doctor was
fatal to his cause. After all, it is settled that "[t]he third doctor rule does not apply when there
is no final and definitive assessment by the company-designated physicians," as in this case.

In conclusion, the Court rules that petitioner is deemed to be suffering from a total
and permanent disability for failure of the company-designated physicians to issue a valid,
definite, and final assessment of his medical condition within the prescribed periods under
the law. As such, he is rightfully entitled to the benefits corresponding thereto.

FALLO/DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated February 18, 2019 and
the Resolution dated June 11, 2019 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 156886 are
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the Decision dated April 2, 2018 of the
Panel of Voluntary Arbitrators is hereby REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.

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DIONISIO M. REYES vs. MAGSAYSAY MITSUI OSK MARINE INC., MOL SHIP
MANAGEMENT CO., LTD., AND/OR CAPT. FRANCISCO MENOR
G.R. No. 209756, JUNE 14, 2021
LOPEZ, J., J.:

FACTS:

Dionisio M. Reyes is a seafarer by profession.

On August 20, 2009 during his deployment, petitioner figured in an accident while
climbing the stairs on board, falling from a height of 15 meters. He was immediately rushed
to the St. Elizabeth Hospital in General Santos City for emergency treatment. Thereafter, he
was referred to the company-designated physicians for further medical attention.

Petitioner alleges that after several months of therapy, he was contacted by

respondents, informing him that they could no longer keep him in their pool of seafarers due
to the extent of his injuries. He then demanded to examine his medical records, which went
unheeded.

The inattentiveness from the respondents prompted him to seek a second medical
opinion from a private physician, Dr. Renato P. Runas, on November 9, 2009, who found him
permanently disabled and unfit to return to sea duty.

Ruling of the Labor Arbiter. The LA favored the petitioner’s claim for disability
benefits as he was on board the vessel when the accident occurred. The LA gave more weight
to the findings of the petitioners’ physician-of-choice that due to the extent of his injuries -
he can no longer return to sea duty and is entitled to 100% permanent disability
compensation.

Ruling of the NLRC. The NLRC reversed the decision of the Labor Arbiter. It cited
jurisprudence declaring the company-designated physician as the authority who must
proclaim that the seafarer suffered a permanent disability whether total or partial due to
either injury or illness during the term of the latter's employment.

Ruling of the Court of Appeals. The CA affirmed the decision of the NLRC. It ruled
that while the seafarer may dispute the initial assessment of the company-designated
physician by seeking a second opinion and consult a doctor of his/her choice, he/she must
comply with the mandatory procedure to dispute such findings. The CA contends that as the
respondents has not yet issued a medical assessment, there is nothing to contest by the
petitioner’s physician of choice.

The CA further stressed that as there was no disputed medical assessment from the
company-designated physician, there is absolutely no basis for petitioner's insistence to
subject him to a third doctor's final and binding opinion.

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ISSUE:
Whether the petitioner is entitled to permanent and total disability benefits.

RULING/RATIO DECIDENDI:
The Supreme Court resolves to grant the petition, ruling that the petitioner
is entitled to permanent and total disability benefits.

Applying the relevant law and jurisprudence to the facts of the case, the SC held that
it cannot consider the company-designated physicians' finding of petitioner's fitness to work,
because it is deficient. It is deficient because there was no clear indication as to what kind
of rehabilitation was necessary. There is also no specific period within which the petitioner
should abide by the home therapy as instructed by the company-designated physician. The
effect is that the guidelines for the issuance of a definite medical assessment and the
timeliness of such issuance was not followed. Moreover, such a definite medical assessment
was not furnished to the petitioner-employee, hence there was no proper notice and thus
denying the latter the benefit of due process.

Therefore, for the respondents' failure to provide a conclusive medical report and to
inform petitioner of his medical assessment within the prescribed period, the disability
grading is, by operation of law, becomes total and permanent.

Also, the Supreme Court, in debunking the theory of the CA that the petitioner did not
comply with the procedural guidelines set forth in Section 20 of POEA-SEC, categorically
declared that the mandatory procedure as outlined in the above-mentioned rule presupposes
an issuance by the company-designated physician of a valid, final and definite assessment
as to the seafarer's fitness or unfitness to work before the expiration of the 120-day period.
As there was no definite medical assessment issued, the rules in Section 20 of the POEA-SEC
are not applicable in this case, as it is the issuance and the corresponding conveyance to the
employee of the final medical assessment by the company-designated physician that will
trigger the application of Section 20(A)(3) of the 2010 POEA-SEC.

In summary, by operation of law arising from the failure of the company-designated

physician to issue a complete, final, and definite assessment, petitioner is rightfully entitled
to total and permanent disability benefits.

FALLO/DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition is GRANTED. The assailed
August 1, 2013 Decision and the November 5, 2013 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. SP No. 122004 are hereby REVERSED AND SET ASIDE.

Magsaysay Mitsui OSK, Inc. and MOL Shipmanagement Co., Ltd. are jointly and
severally ORDERED to pay Dionisio Reyes the amount of ONE HUNDRED EIGHTEEN
THOUSAND DOLLARS (US$ 118,000.00) as disability benefits or its peso equivalent at the
time of payment and attorney's fees equivalent to ten percent (10%) of the award.
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The monetary awards shall earn interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum
from the finality of this Decision until full payment.

SO ORDERED.

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CROWN SHIPPING SERVICES/ DOLPHIN SHIP MANAGEMENT, INC., et.al. vs.

JOHN P. CERVAS
G.R. No. 214290, JULY 6, 2021
GAERLAN, J.:

FACTS:
The instant case is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court, challenging the CA Resolution and the NLRC Resolution in granting herein respondent,
John P. Cervas, total and permanent disability benefits. Respondent Cervas was hired as an
Able Seaman by Carisbrooke Shipping Ltd., through its local manning agent, Crown Shipping
Services/ Dolphin Ship Management, Inc. (petitioners) on September 12, 2012. The following
day, Cervas boarded MV Vectis Falcon. On December 20, 2012, he met with an accident
resulting in his left leg injury while on board during a Life Boat Drill which is being conducted
on the high seas amidst bad weather and big waves. He was advised not to work for more
or less a week. His injured leg remained untreated and swollen; and it was only until January
8, 2013, that he was brought to a hospital in Guyaquid. He was there then diagnosed with
“Fibular Diaphral Fracture” and his injured leg was plastered and was prescribed to take
medications. His immediate repatriation was likewise recommended.

Respondent Cervas was repatriated on January 23, 2013. Upon his arrival, he was
referred by the petitioners to the company-designated physician, Dr. Carlos Lagman of St.
Jude Hospital, for further evaluation and management. In the Medical Report dated January
28, 2013, Dr. Lagman confirmed that Cervas was suffering from a “Fibular Diaphral Fracture”
and declared the injury to be work-related and that Cervas is unfit to work. The respondent
went to his treatment religiously. On Cervas’ return for medical treatment, he was advised
to rest and that his condition was for further observation. Respondent Cervas was still
diagnosed to be unfit to work and was advised to report back on May 20, 2013. However,
Cervas did not go back on the said date. Cervas contended that he has been going for medical
treatment for more or less four months already with Dr. Lagman but his condition has not
improved. He also lives in Aklan and his treatment with the company-designated physician
was being done in Manila. Thus, treatment was becoming a financial burden to him already.

Respondent Cervas filed a Complaint on May 2, 2013, against petitioners for total and
permanent disability benefits, medical expenses, moral and exemplary damages, and
attorney’s fees before the NLRC.

Ruling of the LA. The LA dismissed the complaint and held that Cervas had no cause
of action when he filed the instant case for having discontinued his treatments with the
company-designated physician, for it was only ninety-three (93) days that had lapsed from
the time Cervas was initially seen by the company-designated physician up to the time he
filed his complaint.

Ruling of the NLRC. The NLRC found merit in Cervas’ appeal and set aside the LA
Decison, ruling that that the absence of an assessment by the company doctor, will not
automatically bar the latter from claiming disability or death benefit, thus is entitled to total
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and permanent disability benefits. Petitioners timely filed their MR, however, the same was
denied by the NLRC, so they elevated their case to the CA thru a Petition for Certiorari under
Rule 65. They asseverated that Cervas is not entitled to the disability claim as he unilaterally
terminated his medical treatment, thus preventing the company-designated physician from
giving his disability assessment.

Ruling of the CA. The CA denied the petition for they find no reversible error with
the NLRC decision, granting Cervas his disability claim considering that his Fibular Diaphral
Fracture prevented him from regaining full use of his leg and returning to his usual work as
a seafarer for more than 120 days. The petitioners filed their MR but the same was likewise
denied by the CA. Hence, the present petition.

ISSUE:
Whether the respondent, John P. Cervas, is entitled to total and permanent disability
benefits.

RULING/RATIO DECIDENDI:
The SC finds the petition meritorious. John P. Cervas is not entitled to total
and permanent disability benefits due to medical treatment abandonment and
noncompliance of the 120/240 day-period rule.

On medical assessment and effect of medical abandonment. There are

requisites for a determination of a seafarer's medical condition. In Elburg Shipmanagement
Phils., Inc., et al. v. Quiogue, the rules regarding the duty of the company-designated
physician to issue a final medical assessment on the seafarer's disability grading is provided,
to wit: 1) an assessment must be issued within the 120/240 window, and 2) the assessment
must be final and definitive. Following the cited jurisprudence, the employer must give an
assessment of the seafarer disability within one hundred twenty (120) days or two hundred
forty (240) days as the case maybe, otherwise, the disability shall be deemed total and
permanent. The 120/240 days shall be counted from the time of the seafarer's repatriation.
It is but the seafarer's duty to comply with the medical treatment as provided by the
company-designated physician, otherwise, when a sick or injured seafarer abandons his or
her treatment, such may result to the forfeiture of his/her right to claim disability benefits
(Maunlad Trans, Inc. v. Rodelas, Jr., G.R. No. 225705, April 1, 2019 ). It was undisputed that
the injury was sustained by Cervas while he was doing his job as an Abled Seaman on board
the vessel; and that it is clear that Cervas’ injury is work-related and such being the case,
the injury is compensable, pursuant to Sec. 20(A) of the 2010 (POEA--SEC). However, Cervas
is remiss of his duty to complete his medical treatment. Although his reason for discontinuing
treatment may be valid, this must still be clearly presented and proven before the Court. A
mere allegation will not suffice. Verily, it was Cervas who abandoned his treatment.

120/240 day-period rule. In the case at bar, Cervas filed his claim on the ninety-
ninth (99th) day. The declaration of total and permanent disability must still observe the
120/240 day-period provided by the rules. A seafarer may only be declared to be permanently
incapacitated if he is still unable to work for more than 120 days. Not only that, the seafarer
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must provide substantial proof that his injury caused him to be incapacitated to do his usual
work. There was no clear finding that Cervas was not able to work for more than 120 days.
To reiterate, he stopped his treatment prior the expiration of the 120-days period. At most,
the rules provides that Cervas is entitled to sickness benefit and medical allowance which
herein petitioners had already provided in the span of his treatment. However, the SC
recognized the plight Cervas underwent and the injury he sustained during his employment.
Thus, the SC granted the respondent financial assistance as a measure of social and
compassionate justice is proper. For the balancing the interest of the employer and the
worker, financial assistance may be allowed as a measure of social justice and exceptional
circumstances, and as an equitable concession (Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc., and/or
Chingbian v. Sedan, G.R. No. 159354, April 7, 2006 ).

FALLO/DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, herein petition is hereby GRANTED. The
Resolutions dated July 11, 2014, and September 12, 2014, respectively by the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 135983, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The ruling of the Labor
Arbiter dated October 30, 2013, is hereby REINSTATED with MODIFICATION by awarding
herein respondent, John P. Cervas the amount of ₱200,000.00 as a form of financial
assistance.

SO ORDERED.

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PETER ANGELO N. LAGAMAYO vs. CULLINAN GROUP, INC.,

AND RAFAEL M. FLORENCIO
G.R. No. 227718, NOVEMBER 11, 2021
LOPEZ, J., J.:

FACTS:
Cullinan Group. Inc. a company engaged in the production of jewelry, which
respondent Rafael M. Florencio, as its president. CGI hired Peter Angelo N. Lagamayo
(petitioner) as a workshop supervisor on April 2, 2007, with the following basic pay and
benefits: 1) P16,100.00 as basic salary, plus P7,900.00 “non-tax”; 2) P500.00 communication
allowance; 3) 13th month pay; and 4) the cash equivalent of unused nine sick days leave
and nine days vacation leave.

Sometime in 2011, CGI called the attention of petitioner regarding several company
violations reported in the workshop under his supervision, such as gambling; imbibing
alcoholic beverages; theft of .10 gram of gold on the Job Orders; and taking of excess gold
from the workplace. On February 8, 2011, the manager/oic of the Human Resources (HR)
office informed petitioner that he was placed under preventive suspension, thinking that
petitioner tolerated the said violations, CGI representatives sent him a Notice to Explain dated
February 11, 2011, where he was informed that he committed the following offenses on
account of his negligence: a) breach of trust and confidence, dishonesty; b) improper conduct
and behavior, and c) negligence towards work responsibilities.

On February 18, 2011, petitioner submitted a written explanation denying the charges
against him. In a hearing held on March 1, 2011, CGI informed petitioner that he was found
guilty of the company charges. However, the latter implored that he be allowed to resign, to
keep his record clean. CGI agreed, but declined to give him separation pay owing to the fact
the offenses against him were proven. On March 3, 2011, petitioner asked in writing for the
lifting of his preventive suspension, but the same was unheeded. Later, he wrote a letter
dated March 11, 2011, where he signified his intention to resign, but he asked the company
to pay his unpaid wages, fringe benefits and separation pay. The pertinent portion of the
letter reads:

“Should you allow me to resign, let's observe strictly the requirements of

the Labor Code. Please also consider my unpaid wages, fringe benefits and
separation pay.”

On April 4, 2011, the HR representative told the petitioner to submit his resignation
letter immediately. On July 11, 2011, petitioner filed a complaint for illegal dismissal, payment
of backwages and separation pay in lieu of reinstatement. He alleged that more than 30 days
had lapsed from his preventive suspension, yet he was not reinstated. He also averred that
the changes against him were unfounded and intended to remove him from his work, which
constitutes constructive dismissal.

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Quite the contrary, respondents maintained that the petitioner was not constructively
dismissed, but terminated for a just cause. They claimed that the employee in the jewelry
workshop under his supervision were involved in various irregularities such as theft, gambling
and drinking of alcohol within company premises, as attested to by other employees. As a
supervisor, his duty was to prevent such infractions, but he failed to do so on account of his
negligence for which he was charged with “breach of trust and confidence, dishonesty” and
“negligence towards work responsibilities”. Upon further investigation, CGI discovered that
small amounts of gold were being stolen in each work job order since 2008, for which
respondents suffered a loss of P533,500.00. During the internal investigation, respondents
found that petitioner was complicit with or tolerated the employees, which led CGI to file
criminal charges against them for qualified theft.

Respondents asseverated that while they found just cause to support petitioner’s
termination, they allowed him to resign instead to keep his employment record clean, but
they did not heed his request for payment of separation pay because he was found remiss
in his duties as workshop supervisor. On February 29, 2012, the labor arbiter rendered a
Decision which dismissed petitioner’s complaint for illegal dismissal. Aggrieved, he appealed
to the National Labor Relations Commission. On appeal to the NLRC the dismissal of the
Complaint but with modification that petitioner is entitled to the payment of wages and
benefits from March 11, 2011 up to July 31, 2012 the fallo of which reads:

“Wherefore, the decision dated February 29, 2012 is hereby AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION that the Complainant is entitled to his wages and other benefits
beginning March 11, 2011 up to July 11, 2011, computed as follows:
a). Basic
P18,000.00 x 4 = P72,000.00

b). Allowance
P6,000.00 x 4 - P24,000.00
Total = P96,000.00

Petitioner moved for a reconsideration of the ruling aforesaid, but it was denied by
the NLRC in its Resolution dated September 18, 2012. As mentioned, the CA held that
petitioner was constructively dismissed but based on just cause which is loss of trust and
confidence. It was not disputed that petitioner, being a workshop supervisor, was a
managerial employee and therefore enjoyed the position of trust and confidence. The
evidence showed that some employees committed theft and violated company policies in the
workshop that was under his direct supervision. Respondents presupposed that petitioner
was either negligent in supervising the workers or tolerated the irregularities. For this reason,
he was among those charged in the criminal complaint for Qualified Theft, although the trial
court dismissed the case as to him. This notwithstanding, the CA affirmed his dismissal in its
assailed decision.

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ISSUE:
Whether the CA committed grave abuse of discretion when it ruled that petitioner was
dismissed for just cause even when it found that petitioner was constructively dismissed.

RULING/RATIO DECIDENDI:
No. The CA did not commit grave abuse of discretion when it ruled that
petitioner was dismissed for just cause even when it found that petitioner was
constructively dismissed.

Notably, despite the presence of just cause for his dismissal, petitioner even admitted
that he did not receive any notice of termination, written or otherwise. In fact, petitioner did
not even state the actual date of his alleged dismissal. Subsequently, he asserted that he
was constructively dismissed solely on the fact that he was not reinstated, to his position or
in the payroll, after his 30-day preventive suspension.

Settled is the rule that "a claim of constructive dismissal must be substantiated by
clear, positive and convincing evidence." With this in mind, the Court finds that petitioner
failed to relay how respondents created a hostile working environment which compelled him
to make such offer to resign. As a matter of fact, petitioner is silent whether he tried reporting
back for work and whether he was barred from entering the company premises after the
reconciliation hearing, which lends credence to respondents' claim that petitioner offered to
resign out of his own volition. While petitioner laments respondents' decision regarding the
payment ofhis separation pay, the Court in Castromero v. Red Mane Security Agency,
stressed that "[t]he fact that [the employees] were dissatisfied or discontented
with their employment xxx cannot be equated with unbearable working
conditions." Indeed, "[n]ot every inconvenience, disruption, difficulty, or
disadvantage that an employee must endure sustains a finding of constructive
dismissal."

On the contrary, the Court held that there was constructive dismissal in the following
cases: (1) when the employer appointed another person to the position which the employee
then still occupied, the latter felt he was being eased out and this perception made him
decide to leave the company; (2) the employee was forced to resign because his salary was
abruptly cut, his living conditions were unbearable, he was made to do illegal acts for his
employer and he was reported as abscondee when he filed a complaint before the Philippine
consulate; and (3) when the employer wanted the employee to sign the prepared resignation
letter which contained his name and details, so that it could effortlessly get rid of him.
Nevertheless, none of the circumstances aforesaid were shown to be present in this
case. All told, petitioner failed to present any proof to substantiate his claim of constructive
dismissal.

FALLO/DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review is DENIED. The Decision dated January 29,
2016 and Resolution dated October 17, 2016 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
127383 are hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. in. that petitioner Peter Ar1gelo N.
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Lagamayo was not constructively dismissed but had voluntarily severed his employment.
Meanwhile, the rest of the assailed Decision and Resolution pertaining to the award of his
unpaid wages and benefits amounting to P96,000.00 stands.

SO ORDERED.

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2022 CASES

JANUARY 2022

CONQUEROR INDUSTRIAL PEACE MANAGEMENT COOPERATIVE vs.

JOEY BALINGBING, et. al.
G.R. No. 250311, January 5, 2022
SAGARA METRO PLASTICS INDUSTRIAL CORPORATION vs.
JOEY BALINGBING, et. al.,
G.R. No. 250501, January 5, 2022
INTING, J.:

FACTS:
Sagara is a domestic corporation engaged in the manufacture of various plastic parts
and tubes for automotive wiring harness, non-automotive applications, and fabrication of
molding dies.

Conqueror, on the other hand, is a service cooperative engaged in performing specific

jobs which require special services to different clientele.

On June 8, 2015, respondents Joey Balingbing, Ernesto Quing, Ariel Velasquez, Elvin
John Fernandez, and Lean Dennis Osena, for themselves and on behalf of 149 other
employees including respondents, filed a Sama Samang Sinumpaang Reklamong Salaysay
para sa Complaint for Inspection (Complaint for Inspection) against Sagara and Conqueror
for alleged violation of labor laws, particularly DOLE Department Order No. (DO) 18-A, Series
of 2011 (18-A-11).

According to respondents, Conqueror was a mere labor-only contractor, and that

Sagara was their true employer for the following reasons:
1. Conqueror was not registered with the DOLE;
2. It had no substantial capital or investment in the form of tools or equipment; and
3. It was Sagara which exercised control and supervision over them.

Respondents prayed that they be declared as regular employees of Sagara and be

entitled to the benefits enjoyed by its regular employees according to their existing Collective
Bargaining Agreement.

Ruling of the Regional Director of DOLE. The DOLE Regional Director dismissed
the Complaint for Inspection of respondents and found Sagara and Conqueror compliant with
DO l 8-A-11.

Ruling of the Secretary of DOLE. The Secretary of DOLE affirmed the ruling of the
DOLE Regional Director that Conqueror proved the following: (1) it met the substantial capital
to operate as a legitimate labor contractor; and (2) it exercised control and supervision over
the means and methods of respondents' work.
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Ruling of the CA. The CA reversed and set aside the Decision of the Secretary of
DOLE and held that the labor officials committed grave abuse of discretion when they found
Conqueror as a legitimate job contractor. According to the CA, Conqueror is a mere labor-
only contractor and Sagara was the actual employer of respondents.

In holding that respondents were employees of Sagara and that it exercised control
over the means and methods of respondents' work, the CA considered the following
evidence: (1) the inspection hourly monitoring report showing that Sagara monitored the
output of respondents; (2) Sagara's list of employees who did not render overtime work; and
(3) certifications showing that of the respondents were former contractual/project-based
employees of Sagara.

ISSUES:
1. Whether the respondents performed activities which were directly necessary to the
line of business of Sagara;
2. Whether Conqueror is a legitimate job contractor; and
3. Whether the respondents were employees of Conqueror or Sagara.

RULING/RATIO DECIDENDI:
1. No, the activities performed by the respondents are non-core services.
Conqueror deployed them to Sagara to perform the following: (1) manually transport
materials from the storage warehouse to the workstation; (2) load finished goods to the
delivery trucks; (3) label products; and (4) recycle waste materials.

2. Yes, Conqueror is a legitimate job contractor.

To be considered as a labor-only contractor, the lack of substantial capital of the
contractor must concur with the fact that the employees ' work directly relates to the main
business of the principal.

Article 106 of Labor Code provides:

There is " labor-only" contracting where the person supplying workers to an employer
does not have substantial capital or investment in the form of tools, equipment, machineries,
work premises among others, and the workers recruited and placed by such person are
performing activities which are directly related to the principal business of such employer.

Here, the Conqueror has a substantial capital of 3,000,000 and his employees are
performing non-core services to Sagara. Further, this can be gleaned from the use of the
conjunction "or" in Article 106 of the Labor Code and Section 5(i) of DO 18-02, viz.: "[t]he
contractor or subcontractor does not have substantial capital or investment which relates to
the job, work or service to be performed."

If the objective was to oblige the contractor to prove that he has both capital and the
requisite investment, then the conjunction "and" should have been used.

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3. The respondents were employees of Conqueror.

To determine whether an employer-employee relationship exists, the four-fold test
can be used. The elements of the four-fold test are the following: (1) the selection and
engagement of the employee; (2) the payment of wages; (3) the power of dismissal; and (
4) the power of control, which is the most important element.

Conqueror selected. engaged, and deployed respondents to Sagara. The

respondents were directly recruited and hired by Conqueror. Respondents themselves stated
under paragraph S of their Complaint for Inspection: "Marami din sa amin kinuha (ni-recruit)
ng manpower agency na CONQUEROR at ipinadala (deployed) sa loob ng pagawaan ng
SAGARA upang magtrabaho sa iba[ ']t ibang trabaho o gawaing aming nabanggit sa itaas sa
loob ng pagawaan ng SAGARA.

Payment of wages. The Conqueror was the one who paid the wages of respondents:
(a) it faithfully remitted the SSS, Philhealth, and Pag-IBIG contributions of respondents which
are the usual deductions from employees' salaries; and (b) the supervisors of Conqueror
were the ones who monitored respondents' attendance and released their pay slips.

Power of dismissal. Conqueror exercised the power of dismissal including the power
to discipline, suspend and reprimand, as shown by the two cases of Mr. Paplona and Mr.
Aragona on suspension and notice of explanation respectively. Likewise, Conqueror was
expressly recognized on the resignation letters of Mr. Barrameda, Mr. Corpuz, and Mr.
Velasquez year 2015.

Power of control. In ruling that Conqueror is a labor-only contractor, the CA however

held that Sagara exercised control over the means and methods of respondents' work that
established an employer-employee relationship between them. The CA considered the
following evidence adduced by respondents: (1) Sagara's list of employees who did not
render ove1iime work; and (2) Sagara's inspection hourly monitoring report, which
purportedly showed the hourly reports of respondents. That Sagara had a list of employees
who did not render overtime work and inspected the hourly outputs of respondents through
its inspection hourly monitoring report does not sufficiently establish that Sagara exercised
control over them.

The Court takes note of the general practice wherein principals in a service agreement
take cognizance of the outputs and accomplishments of the contractors to ascertain their
compliance with the production quota required in the service agreement. The ruling of the
Court in Orozco v. Court of Appeals is instructive:

Logically, the line should be drawn between rules that merely serve as guidelines
towards the achievement of the mutually desired result without dictating the means or
methods to be employed in attaining it, and those that control or fix the methodology and
bind or restrict the partly hired to the use of such means. The first, which aim only to promote
the result, create no employer-employee relationship unlike the second, which address both
the result and the means used to achieve it.
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Moreover, Conqueror retained control over the respondents through its supervisors,
namely: Arnold Edrozo (Edrozo), Jayson Fos (Fos), and Michelle Carino (Carino). According
to the labor officials, Conqueror deployed them to Sagara to regularly monitor and supervise
respondents' attendance and performance. This is consistent with the [Pinagsama-samang]
Sinumpaang Salaysay at Position Paper of respondents wherein they stated that Conqueror
appointed and assigned supervisors at Sagara who monitored their attendance, checked their
timecards, and issued their payslips. Respondents likewise stated that the supervisors of
Conqueror periodically coordinated with the representatives of Sagara to ascertain the
manpower needs and service requirements of Sagara.

Particularly, Edrozo inspected the number of materials which respondents, working

under the Plastic Parts Department, would bring to the production area. He also conducted
random ocular inspections of the workstations of respondents assigned as encoders and label
counters to ensure that stickers attached to each package correspond to the product
contained in the package. Likewise, Fos visited and inspected the workstations of
respondents, who were assigned as production operators under the Tube Parts Department,
to ensure promptness in the cutting and bundling of the tube products in conformity with the
prescribed length and quantity of Sagara. As for Carino, she monitored and directed the work
of respondents assigned as warehousemen in maintaining and updating the movement of
the stock inventory to ensure an efficient and systematic manner of warehousing.

FALLO/DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated June 28, 2019 and the
Resolution dated October 29, 2019 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 148896 are
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the Resolution dated May 16, 2016 of the
Secretary of Department of Labor and Employment m OS-LS-0455-0425- 2016/RO4A-LPO-
CV-0615-0017 is REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.

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FEBRUARY 2022

ROMMEL S. ALENAJE vs. C.F. SHARP CREW MANAGEMENT, INC. REEDEREI

CLAUS-PETER OFFEN (GMBH & CO.) AND ROBERTO B. DAVANTES,
G.R. No. 249195, February 14, 2022
INTING, J.:

FACTS:
Working 18 years as a Seaman, Rommel S. Alenaje entered into a new Contract of
Employment with Reederei Claus-Peter Offen (GMBH & Co.) KG (respondent foreign principal)
through its local agent, C.F. Sharp Crew Management, Inc. (respondent local agency)
represented by Roberto B. Davantes, as a steward on board the vessel M/V CPO New York
for a period of 6 months with basic salary of USD644.00.

He was the only steward assigned in the vessel so he worked as a steward for the
officers and as a mess man assigned to the crew, from 6am to 1am or just 5 hours to arrange
the food in the provision room. He was then instructed by the Chief Mate Kucharz to strip
and wax the navigational bridge floor from 10am to 11am even if it was not part of his duties
and responsibilities as a steward. He politely told the Chief Mate Kucharz, if possible, to clean
it in the afternoon because before 11am, he would start to prepare and serve food to the
officers, the crew and the additional 10 persons who were repairing the vessel. Chief Mate
Kucharz accused him of insubordination and threatened him that he would work out for his
dismissal.

The next day, petitioner received a Show Case Notice with the charge of
insubordination wherein a hearing was conducted on the same day. He explained what
happened, after which, he received a Notice of Formal Warning that if his future behavior
would not be compliant with the code of conduct, he would be dismissed from the vessel.

After the hearing, Chief Mate Kucharz kept on harassing him of his dismissal from
employment which he was constrained to tender his resignation on April 21, 2015 which was
accepted on the same date through an email from Jan Wehner, the Senior Personnel of
respondent foreign principal. After a month, he received a Notice of Dismissal was issued to
him which subsequently repatriated him and was paid his salary equivalent to one month
and eight days. He then filed a complaint against the respondents.

Labor Arbiter ruled that the complainant was constructively dismissed, ordered the
respondent to pay Alenaje the amount comprising the payment of the unexpired portion of
his employment contract, moral and exemplary damages and attorney’s fees. LA found that
Alenaje was ordered to do the work which was not part of his duties and responsibilities of
a steward. LA also found that Chief Mate Kucharz threatened him with dismissal because,
despite the issued warning to him on April 18, 2015, a Notice of dismissal was also issued on
May 20, 2015.

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NLRC reversed the LA’s Decision as they found that petitioner tendered resignation on
April 21, 2015 which was accepted on the same day by the foreign principal, thus, declaring
that it was Alenajo who pre-terminated his contract with respondents and Notice of Dismissal
was delivered a month after his resignation. NLRC further found that petitioner failed to
discharge his burden of proving that his continued employment with respondents was
rendered impossible and/or unreasonable by the acts of the respondents that under the POEA
Standard Contract provision, he is bound to obey the lawful commands of the master or any
person who shall lawfully succeed him and that stripping and waxing of the navigational
bridge, which involved the maintenance and cleanliness of a part of the vessel, was part of
his duties which the master or the chief officer may assign to him. Petitioner also failed to
narrate the specific acts of the alleged harassment done to him by Chief Mate Kucharz.

CA affirmed the NLRC Decision.

ISSUE:
Whether the petitioner was constructively dismissed from his employment.

RULING/RATIO DECIDENDI:
No, the petitioner was not constructively dismissed from his employment.

Petitioner tendered his resignation on April 21, 2015, and it was accepted on the same
day through an email from respondents' Senior Personnel Officer, Jan Wehner. As petitioner
admittedly resigned, it is incumbent upon him to prove that his resignation was involuntary
and that it was actually a case of constructive dismissal with clear, positive, and convincing
evidence. Bare allegations of constructive dismissal, when uncorroborated by the evidence
on record, cannot be given credence.

In Gan v. Galderma Philippines, lnc., the Court elucidated on the meaning of

constructive dismissal and resignation as follows:

xxx Constructive dismissal is defined as quitting or cessation of work because

continued employment is rendered impossible, unreasonable or unlikely; when there
is a demotion in rank or a diminution of pay and other benefits. It exists if an act of
clear discrimination, insensibility, or disdain by an employer becomes so unbearable
on the part of the employee that it could foreclose any choice by him except to forego
his continued employment. There is involuntary resignation due to the harsh, hostile,
and unfavorable conditions set by the employer. The test of constructive dismissal is
whether a reasonable person in the employee's position would have felt compelled to
give up his employment/position under the circumstances.

On the other hand, "Resignation is the voluntary act of an employee who is in a

situation where one believes that personal reasons cannot be sacrificed in favor of the
exigency of the service, and one has no other choice but to dissociate oneself from
employment. It is a formal pronouncement or relinquishment of an office, with the intention
of relinquishing the office accompanied by the act of relinquishment. As the intent to
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relinquish must concur with the overt act of relinquishment, the acts of the employee before
and after the alleged resignation must be considered in determining whether he or she, in
fact, intended to sever his or her employment.

After a careful review of the evidence presented and applying the foregoing principles
as a guide, the Court finds that the CA committed no reversible error in upholding the findings
of the NLRC that there was voluntary resignation on the part of petitioner. The Court finds
that petitioner failed to prove his allegations of constructive dismissal with clear and positive
evidence.

In his letter of resignation dated April 21, 2015, petitioner wrote:

“In as much as you forced me to work not in accordance with my duties and responsibilities
under my contract of employment and due to unbearable working condition/and or
atmosphere and in consideration of my safety, I am tendering my resignation effective today
(April 21, 2015). Hence, I am requesting my repatriation to my home country.”

It had been established that petitioner was instructed by Chief Mate Kucharz, on behalf
of the captain, to strip and wax the navigational bridge floor. However, petitioner alleged
that such job was not part of his work as a steward. Notably, Section l(B)(3) of the POEA
Standard Contract provides that the seafarer has the duty to be obedient to the lawful
commands of the master or any person who shall lawfully succeed him and to comply with
company policy including the safety policy and procedures and any instructions given him in
connection therewith. The order to strip and wax the navigational bridge floor was a lawful
command of Chief Mate Kucharz, on behalf of the captain, and it concerned the safety policy
in the ship; thus petitioner had the duty to follow such order. There are three seafarers who
had worked on-board international container ships as stewards for years where they all stated
that stripping and waxing or cleaning of navigational bridge floor was an occasional duty
which may be assigned to them by the chief officer on behalf of the master and that such
work was not unlawful nor beyond their duties as steward. Therefore, the assigned task may
also be done occasionally by a steward, if the need arises, as instructed by the Master or the
Chief Officer. Petitioner, however, tendered his resignation because he did not want to do
the waxing or cleaning of navigational bridge floor as ordered by Chief Mate Kucharz, citing
that it was not part of his duty. The fact that he did not do the assigned task proved that he
did not want to do it believing that it was not part of his duty as a steward.

Moreover, the fact that petitioner did not want to do the assigned task was also proved
by the Minutes of Hearing held on April 18, 2015, to wit:

Mr. Alenaje admitted that he had disregarded the order about stripping and waxing of
navigational bridge floor. He claimed that it is not his duty and would not do it. Mr.
Alenaje demanded repatriation. We must add that manner of expression of Mr. Alenaje
was unacceptable he was raising voice in aggressive way.

Petitioner's allegation of unbearable working conditions/atmosphere because Chief

Mate Kucharz kept on telling him that he will be dismissed and that he was maltreated and
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insulted were all self-serving due to lack of evidentiary support. In fact, his claim was
contradicted by the Debriefing Report dated May 22, 2015 which he himself filled up in
respondents' local manning office after his repatriation.

Petitioner's allegation of fear for his safety which made him tender his resignation was
also not substantiated. The Court agrees with the CA when it adopted the NLRC's findings
that petitioner was onboard the vessel for more than a month after he submitted his
resignation and before he was repatriated without any untoward incident.

FALLO/DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is DENIED. The Decision dated March 28, 2018
and the Resolution dated August 29, 2019 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 10288
are hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

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TRAVELOKA PHILIPPINES, INC. and YADY GUITANA, vs.

PONCEVIC CAPINO CEBALLOS
G.R. No. 254697, February 14, 2022
PERLAS-BERNABE, J:

FACTS:
Poncevic Ceballos, respondent herein, was employed as country manager by
Traveloka, the local branch of a multi-national travel corporation headquartered in Indonesia.
As head of the company's Philippine operations, respondent directly reported to petitioner
Yady Guitana (Guitana), the head of Traveloka's mother company.

Respondent alleged that Guitana informed him of complaints lodged by several

company officers and employees against him for his purported poor management style.
Further, Guitana immediately relieved him of his duties and authority without giving him a
chance to explain his side, despite his protestations. He was told that there would be no
possibility of his continued employment in the Philippine operations. Guitana then mentioned
that he will look for an alternative but unguaranteed position for respondent in Indonesia.
However, a new employee was immediately appointed to fill respondent's former position.

Respondent continued to report for work, and informal meetings were conducted,
wherein respondent was allegedly pressured by Guitana to sign a quitclaim in exchange for
a generous separation package. He was then served with a Notice to Explain and Order of
Preventive Suspension detailing the charges against him, and was made to return his
identification card and other company paraphernalia by Guitana in front of his subordinates.

Respondent no longer responded to the written notice against him, claiming that he
was already dismissed. Later on, Traveloka issued a Notice of Decision which provides for his
termination. Respondent then filed a complaint for illegal dismissal, motion for production,
and issuance of subpoena ad testificandum, against the Traveloka and Guitana, claiming that
he was constructively dismissed, and prayed for reinstatement. Petitioners denied such
allegations made by the respondent and claimed that he was validly terminated on just
grounds of serious misconduct and loss of trust and confidence. Petitioners submitted four
(4) affidavits to support their claims which were executed by Traveloka employees, Binuya
being one therein. However, it was later recanted by Binuya attesting that he was forced to
sign the pre-drafted affidavit.

The Labor Arbiter (LA) dismissed the respondent's claim, ruling that his dismissal was
justified on the ground of serious misconduct and loss of trust and confidence. On appeal,
the NLRC affirmed the decision of LA. The Court of Appeals (CA) found that the NLRC
committed a grave abuse of discretion when it ruled that there was no constructive dismissal.
Thus, the CA reinstated the respondent and further awarded damages to the latter. Hence,
this petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent was constructively dismissed.
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RULING/RATIO DECIDENDI:
Yes, the petitioner was constructively dismissed.

Constructive dismissal is defined as quitting or cessation of work because continued

employment is rendered impossible, unreasonable or unlikely; when there is a demotion in
rank or diminution of pay and other benefits. It exists if an act of clear discrimination,
insensibility, or disdain by an employer becomes so unbearable on the part of the employee
that it could foreclose any choice by him except to forego his continued employment.

In this case, Traveloka claims that respondent was validly terminated on the grounds
of serious misconduct and loss of trust and confidence. As evidence, Traveloka submitted
four (4) affidavits executed by its employees. Aside from self-serving assertions contained in
these affidavits, there is nothing in the record to further corroborate the imputations therein
stated. The affidavits mainly contain general claims of respondent's undesirable. Certain
incidents ascribed to respondent did not involve any of the affiants and hence, are not of
their personal knowledge.

The burden of proof rests on the employer to establish that the dismissal is for cause
in view of the security of tenure that employees enjoy under the Constitution and the Labor
Code. Loss of trust and confidence, to be a valid cause for dismissal must be related such
that the employee concerned is shown to be unfit to continue working for the employer; it
must also be based on a willful breach of trust and founded on clearly established facts. For
misconduct or improper behavior to be a just cause for dismissal: (a) it must be serious; (b)
it must relate to the performance of the employee's duties; and (c) it must show that the
employee has become unfit to continue working for the employer.

Further, it is well-settled that doubt shall be resolved in the employee's favor in line
with the policy under the Labor Code to afford protection to labor and construe doubts in
favor of labor.

One of the affiants, Binuya, recanted his affidavit against respondent and even
attested to the fact that Traveloka merely forced him to sign the pre-drafted affidavit. Thus,
these circumstances cast a cloud of doubt on the veracity of the other affidavits. Respondent
was already relieved of his duties prior to the disciplinary hearings by the immediate hiring
of his replacement, and was, without prior warning, demanded to return his assigned
company paraphernalia in full view of his subordinates.

It appears that all that Traveloka managed to prove was that internecine office politics
played a hand in respondent's removal as country manager. It did not present evidence which
is substantial enough to prove that it did not constructively dismiss the respondent in
unceremonious manner. Further, it has not been denied that respondent was already relieved
of his duties prior to the disciplinary hearings by immediate hiring of his replacement.

The foregoing unrebutted circumstances sufficiently demonstrate that respondent was

constructively dismissed. Finally, both labor tribunals never addressed the claim that he was
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deprived of due process when his motion for production and request for subpoena remained
unresolved.

Nevertheless, the Court is constrained to modify the CA ruling with respect to the
order of reinstatement. Reinstatement presupposes that the previous position from which
one had been removed still exists, or that there is an unfilled position which is substantially
equivalent or of similar nature as the one previously occupied by the employee. In the event
that reinstatement is no longer possible, separation pay is awarded to the employee. Here,
respondent's position as country manager was already filled up. Since respondent's
reinstatement is no longer viable, then the payment of separation pay in lieu of reinstatement
is warranted.

FALLO/DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated June 29, 2020 and the
Resolution dated November 25, 2020 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 162588 are
hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in that in lieu of reinstatement, petitioner Traveloka
Philippines, Inc. is ordered to pay respondent Poncevic Capino Ceballos, Jr. separation pay
equivalent to one (1) month salary for every year of service, with a fraction of at least six (6)
months to be considered as one (1) whole year, to be computed from the date of his
employment up to finality of this Resolution. The rest of the Court of Appeals' Decision
STANDS.

SO ORDERED.

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SRL INTERNATIONAL MANPOWER AGENCY, represented by SEVILLA SARAH

SORITA and AKKILA CO., LTD., UAE and/or AL SALMEEN, vs.
PEDRO S. YARZA, JR.
G.R. No. 207828, February 14, 2022
HERNANDO, J.:

FACTS:
SRL International Manpower Agency is a recruitment agent of Akkila Co. Ltd. UAE.
Pedro Yarza submitted his application as Project Manager to SRL, which it forwarded to
Akkila. SRL also forwarded Yarza's documents to Akkila for the processing of his employment
visa.

However, unknown to SRL, Akkila and Yarza directly contacted each other regarding
Yarza's deployment. Akkila sent a visit visa for Yarza instead of an employment visa. SRL
protested and informed Akkila that Yarza cannot be deployed under a visit visa since it
violates the rules of POEA. Nevertheless, Akkila and Yarza insisted on using the visit visa and
had a mutual and voluntary agreement.

SRL turned over to Yarza all of his documents including the visit visa but from then
on, SRL did not facilitate Yarza's deployment under the visit visa as Yarza handled it on his
own. Akkila and Yarza then entered into "Offer of Employment" for 2 years from October
2010, with 8,000 AED salary per month.

On April 4, 2011, Yarza returned to the Philippines under his visit visa. Akkila informed
SRL taht Yarza will apply for deployment anew under an employment visa. SRL told Akkila
and Yarza that Yarza cannot obtain the Overseas Employment Certificate on his own as he
needs SRL, the authorized local agency of Akkila, to secure it for him.

Unfortunately, when SRL started processing Yarza's documents, Yarza failed the
medical examination and he was assessed as unfit for work due to Uncontrolled Diabetes
Mellitus II. Akkila then informed that Yarza cannot be hired due to medical reasons.

Due to this, Yarza filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against Akkila and SRL. The
Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaint for lack of merit, finding that there was no employer-
employee relationship between Yarza and the petitioners.

On appeal, the NLRC, in its March 29, 2012 Decision, reversed the ruling of the LA at
first, however, upon reconsideration, the NLRC later affirmed the ruling of the LA and
dismissed the complaint.

On its appeal to the Court of Appeals, the CA reversed the decision of the NLRC.
Hence, this petition.

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ISSUES:
1. Whether or not there is an employer-employee relationship between Akilla and
Yarza;
2. Whether or not Yarza was illegally dismissed;
3. Whether or not SRL is liable to Yarza; and
4. Whether or not Yarza is entitled for his salaries for the unexpired portion of his
contract.

RULING/RATIO DECIDENDI:
1. Yes, there is an employer-employee relationship between Akkila and
Yarza since the elements of employer-employee are present.

Even though the Offer of Employment is invalid for not being compliant with the rules
of the POEA, there is still an employer-employee relationship between Akkila and Yarza.
To ascertain the existence of this association, the following elements should be
evident: "(l) the selection and engagement of the employee; (2) the payment of wages; (3)
the power of dismissal; and (4) the employer's power to control the employee's conduct.

For the first element, Akkila selected and engaged the services of Yarza, precisely
because he was deployed through a visit visa under Akkila's instruction and endorsement.
For the second element, Akkila did not deny that it paid Yarza' s wages with the "Offer of
Employment'' as reference. Likewise, the third element exists since Akkila has the power to
dismiss Yarza. In fact, it did so when it issued the termination letter dated May 22, 2011.
Lastly, the fourth element is present since Akkila had control over Yarza's work conduct,
which included the means and methods he would employ to produce the results required by
the company. Akkila did not show proof that it took no part in directing Yarza's job output.
More importantly, Akkila did not appeal the finding of employer-employee relationship before
the CA. Hence, it is bound by such a conclusion. Thence, an employer-employee relationship
was established notwithstanding the absence of a valid and POEA-approved contract.

2. Yes, Yarza was illegally dismissed as he was not accorded both

substantial and procedural due process.

There is no substantial due process since Yarza was dismissed without a just or
authorized cause. His dismissal for medical reason is untenable because under the Omnibus
Rules Implementing the Labor Code, where the employee suffers from a disease and his
continued employment is prohibited by law or prejudicial to his health or to the health of his
co-employees, the employer shall not terminate his employment unless there is a certification
by competent public health authority that the disease is of such nature or at such a stage
that it cam1ot be cured within a period of six ( 6) months even with proper medical treatment.

Since there was no certificate from a competent health authority, the dismissal is
invalid.

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On the other hand, there was also no procedural due process accorded to Yarza. It
is settled that "the employer must give the concerned employee at least two notices before
his or her termination. Specifically, the employer must inform the employee of the cause or
causes for his or her termination, and thereafter, the employer's decision to dismiss him.
Aside from the notice requirement, the employee must be accorded the opportunity to be
heard."

In this case, Akkila did not give Yarza any form of notice or opportunity to explain his
side.

3. Yes, SRL is liable as the recruitment agency.

Under the law, the liability of the principal/employer and the recruitment/placement
agency for any and all claims under this section shall be joint and several.

As found by the NLRC, which the CA quoted with approval, SRL participated in Yarza's
initial deployment despite its insistence that it ceased to process his documents after
discovering that a visit visa was secured instead of a work visa. According to the time stamps
and the contents of the e-mail correspondence, SRL participated, one way or another, and
acted as Akkila's local manning agent.

The CA correctly found that Yarza's predicament was caused by SRL and Akkila, which
should not be countenanced. As the local placement agency, SRL should have employed
measures to ensure that Yarza's deployment would be in accordance with existing policies,
from the beginning of the employment until its end.

4. Yes, Yarza is entitled to his salaries for the unexpired portion of his
contract.

Even if the "Offer of Employment" is invalid, the existence of an employer-employee

relationship entitles Yarza to claim for the payment of his salaries for the unexpired portion
of his contract. Relevantly, both the NLRC and the CA rendered their rulings before the Court
resolved anew the issue on the constitutionality of the cap of three-month pay for every year
of service on an overseas worker's money claims. To recall, the Court, in Serrano, already
declared such provision unconstitutional. Yet, Congress enacted RA 10022 which reinstated
the same notwithstanding the Court's earlier pronouncement in Serrano. Specifically, Section
7 of RA 10022 amended Section 1 O of RA 8042, viz.:

In case of termination of overseas employment without just, valid or authorized cause

as defined by law or contract, or any unauthorized deductions from the migrant worker's
salary, the worker shall be entitled to the full reimbursement if his placement fee and the
deductions made with interest at twelve percent (12%) per annum, plus his salaries for the
unexpired portion of his employment contract or for three (3) months for every year of the
unexpired term, whichever is less.

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Hence, the Court, in Sameer Overseas Placement Agency, Inc. v. Cabiles (Sameer),
again "declared unconstitutional the cap of three-month pay for every year of service. It also
upheld the imposition of interest rate of 12% per annum on the placement fee specifically
set by law, nay, unaffected by Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas Circular No. 799 setting the rate
of interest at 6% per annum."

Sameer stresses that "when a law or a provision of law is null because it is inconsistent
with the Constitution, the nullity cannot be cured by reincorporation or reenactment of the
same or a similar law or provision. A law or provision of law that was already declared
unconstitutional remains as such unless circumstances have so changed as to warrant a
reverse conclusion. However, there are no noted relevant changes in the surrounding
circumstances, as RA 10022 merely reinstated the provision after the Court already declared
it unconstitutional in Serrano.

Additionally, the Court declared that an unconstitutional clause in the law, being
inoperative at the outset, confers no rights, imposes no duties and affords no protection.
Withal, even if Yarza's dismissal became effective on May 22, 2011, or when RA 10022 was
already in force, "the declaration of unconstitutionality found in the Serrano case
promulgated in March 2009 [and subsequently the Sameer case promulgated in August 5,
2014] shall retroactively apply."

Thus, Yarza should receive his unpaid salaries corresponding to the unexpired portion
of his contract. (based on the "Offer of Employment")

FALLO/DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The March 25, 2013 Decision and
June 18, 2013 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 126776 are AFFIRMED
with MODIFICATIONS in that the petitioners SRL International Manpower Agency,
represented by Sevilla Sarah Sorita, and Akkila Co., Ltd., UAE and/or Al Salmeen, are hereby
ORDERED to indemnify, jointly and severally respondent Pedro S. Yarza, Jr. the following
amounts:
1. His unpaid salaries amounting to AED 152,000.000 or its Philippine Peso equivalent
at the time of payment, corresponding to the unexpired portion of his employment
contract ("Offer of Employment");
2. Moral damages in the amount of One Hundred Thousand Pesos (Pl 00,000.00);
3. Exemplary damages in the amount of One Hundred Thousand Pesos (Pl00,000.00);
4. Attorney's fees equal to ten percent (10%) of the total monetary award; and;
5. Costs of a suit.

SO ORDERED.

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PUREGOLD PRICE CLUB, INC. (PPCI) vs.

COURT OF APPEALS AND RENATO M. CRUZ, JR.
G.R. No. 244374, February 15, 2022
LOPEZ, J.:

FACTS:
On January 16, 2013, Puregold Price Club, Inc. (PPCI) hired Renato M. Cruz, Jr.
(Renato) as a probationary store head. On July 16, 2013, PPCI appointed Renato as store
officer/manager at Puregold Extra Ampid (Puregold Extra) in San Mateo, Rizal. Renato's
tasks include the activation of the Intruder Alarm System (IAS) located in the treasury office
of the branch before store closure and its deactivation upon store opening. The IAS was
programmed to send message alerts on the mobile phones of Renato and two other officers
whenever an intruder is detected in the premises. Among them, Renato was the principal
officer expected to respond when the IAS sent alerts because he lived nearest to the branch.

On May 15, 2015, PPCI's Human Resource Manager Jona Pinky J. Cafiete (HR Manager
Cafiete) served Renato with a notice to explain why he should not be dismissed for failing to
promptly respond to the IAS and for stealing/taking the plastic pails out of the store. In his
reply, Renato admitted the receipt of alerts and text messages but he only saw them after
waking up at 5:00 a.m. Anent the alleged stealing, Renato explained that he merely borrowed
the pails because there was a scheduled water interruption in their area. Renato even
informed SG Mejaran that he took the pails. After the administrative hearing, the PPCI served
Renato a notice of termination dated June 16, 2015 for gross and serious omission to do vital
management duty and responsibility, serious and willful breach of trust, abuse of position,
and stealing.

On February 1, 2016, Renato filed a request for assistance under the Single Entry
Approach (SEnA) Program of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) indicating
Puregold Extra and Noel Groyon (Groyon) as respondents. The notices of conciliation-
mediation conference were sent to the address of Puregold Extra at San Mateo, Rizal. At the
conferences, HR Manager Canete and PPCI's counsel Atty. Emma Rhea B. Sadural-Capistrano
(Atty. Sadural-Capistrano) attended before the SEnA desk officer. However, the parties failed
to reach an amicable settlement. On April 8, 2016, Renato filed a complaint for illegal
dismissal against Puregold Extra, Lucio Co {Co) and Groyon before the Labor Arbiter (LA).

On May 31, 2016, the LA rendered a decision based solely on Renato's position paper
because the respondents failed to appear. The LA held that Renato was illegally dismissed
and ordered PPCI to pay his back wages and separation pay. On July 15, 2016, Renato
moved for the issuance of a writ of execution alleging that the LA's ruling became final and
executory after PPCI received a copy of the judgment on July 1, 2016 and did not appeal.
On even date, the LA issued a notice of pre-execution conference.

On July 18, 2016, PPCI moved to annul the LA's decision claiming that it was not
properly joined as a respondent in the complaint and did not receive summons. As such, the
LA did not acquire jurisdiction over PPCI and any decision against it is void. On July 25,
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2016, PPCI submitted a supplemental motion with Groyon' s affidavit denying receipt of
summons. On July 29, 2016, the LA noted the motions without action and pointed out that
PPCI's proper remedy is to appeal with the NLRC. Accordingly, PPCI filed on August 8, 2016
a petition to annul the LA's Decision and Order before the NLRC docketed as LER Case No.
08-216-16. PPCI maintained that it had no knowledge of Renato's complaint for illegal
dismissal until the receipt of his motion for issuance of writ of execution.

On September 8, 2016, the Fourth Division of the NLRC remanded the case for further
proceedings for failure of the LA to acquire jurisdicti0n over PPCI due to improper service of
summons. Renato sought reconsideration and the inhibition of the members of division. On
October 28, 2016, the NLRC denied Renato's motions. On March 13, 2017, Renato elevated
the case through a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals (CA). Renato insisted
that the service of SEnA notices to the address of Puregold Extra in San Mateo, Rizal was
sufficient to vest jurisdiction over PPCI. In his petition, Renato stated that he received on
January 12, 2017 the NLRC Resolution denying his motion for reconsideration, hence, the
petition for certiorari was timely filed on March 13, 2017.

Meantime, the LA issued summons dated March 28, 2017 and served it to PPCI' s
address at Paco, Manila in compliance with the NLRC' s Resolutions dated September 8, 2016
and October 28, 2016 which remanded the case for mandatory conciliation. Yet, the parties
failed to arrive at any settlement and were ordered to submit their position papers. On
January 30, 2018, the LA ruled that PPCI dismissed Renato for just cause with observance
of procedural due process. Renato appealed to the NLRC but was denied. On December 2,
2018, the NLRC decision became final and executory absent a timely appeal.

On the other hand, the CA gave due course to Renato's petition for certiorari. On
August 24, 2018, the CA held that there was substantial compliance with the rules on service
of summons and that PPCI failed to establish any fraud, which supposedly prevented it from
appearing before the LA proceedings. The CA also ratiocinated that PPCI owned and
operated Puregold Exitra. Relatively, it would be absurd for Puregold Extra not to inform PPCI
about Renato's complaint for illegal dismissal. Lastly, the CA ruled that PPCI cannot use
technicalities to escape the negative consequences of an adverse decision.

On September 6, 2018, PPCI moved for reconsideration. On January 29, 2019, the
CA denied PPCI's motion. On February 13, 2019, PPCI received the CA's Resolution denying
the motion for reconsideration and has fifteen (15) days or until February 28, 2019 to file a
petition for review. On February 19, 2019, PPCI moved for an additional period of thirty (30)
days from February 28, 2019 or until March 30, 2019 within which to file a petition for review.
Also, PPCI paid the docket and other lawful fees and the deposit for costs. On March 15,
2019, however, PCCI filed a petition for certiorari.

Mainly, PPCI asserts that the CA's Decision dated August 24, 2018 and Resolution
dated January 29, 2019 in CA-G.R. SP No. 149917 were rendered with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. PPCI avers that the CA gravely erred
in giving due course to Renato's petition for certiorari despite being filed out of time or
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beyond the 60-day reglementary period. PPCI explains that the Bailiffs Return showed that
the counsel of Renato received on December 29, 2016 the NLRC Resolution dated October
28, 2016 denying his motion for reconsideration. As such, Renato had until February 27,
2017 to avail a petition for certiorari. However, Renato filed the petition for certiorari only on
March 13, 2017 or fourteen (14) days late. In his comment, Renato contends that he timely
filed his petition for certiorari within the 60-day reglementary period reckoned from his
receipt on January 12, 2017 of the NLRC Resolution denying his motion for reconsideration.
Moreover, Renato insists that PPCI was validly served with summons through Puregold Extra.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Renato M. Cruz, Store/Office Manager of Puregold Extra, Ampid, San
Mateo Rizal was illegally dismissed by the Puregold Price Club Inc.

RULING/RATIO DECIDENDI:
No, Renato M. Cruz, Jr. was not dismissed illegally by Puregold Price Club
Inc. and the Supreme Court found the petition of PPCI meritorious.

A petition for certiorari must be filed strictly within sixty (60) days from the notice of
judgement or from the order denying a motion for reconsideration. There can be no
extension granted from the 60-day period within which to file a petition for certiorari except
meritorious cases anchored on special compelling reasons.

The reglementary period to avail the remedy of certiorari must be reckoned on

December 29, 2016 or the date Renato’s counsel received the NLRC Resolution denying the
motion for reconsideration. Renato’s counsel was validly notified of the assailed NLRC
resolution on December 29, 2016.

When a party is represented by a counsel, service of orders and notices must be made
upon such counsel. Notice to the client or to any other lawyer other than the counsel of
record, is not notice in law. Moreover, while decisions, resolutions, or orders are served on
both parties and their counsel or representative, for purposes of appeal, the period shall be
counted from receipt of such decisions, resolutions, or orders by the counsel representative
of record.

Likewise, Section 4(b), Rule III of the 2011 NLRC Rules of Procedure provides that for
purposes of appeal, the period shall be counted from receipt of the decisions, resolutions, or
orders by the counsel of representative of record.

Applying these precepts, Renato had sixty (60) days counted from the date his counsel
received on December 29, 2016 the NLRC Resolution denying the motion for reconsideration
or until February 27, 2017 within which to avail petition for certiorari. As intimidated earlier,
Renato filed his petition for certiorari before the CA only on March 13, 2017 or fourteen (14)
days beyond the reglementary period. Notably, Renato neither moved for an extension of
time nor presented any exceptional or meritorious circumstances to exempt him from the
strict application of the 60-day period rule.
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FALLO/DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Court of Appeals' Decision dated
August 24, 2018 in CA-G.R. SPI No. 149917 is REVERSED. The National Labor Relations
Commission's Resolutions dated September 8, 2016 and October 28, 2016 are
REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.

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LUISITO C. REYES vs. JEBSENS MARITIME, INC.,

AND ALFA SHIP & CREW MANAGEMENT GMBH
G.R. No. 230502, February 15, 2022
Gesmundo, C.J.:

FACTS:
Petitioner was hired by Alfa as Second Officer on September 16, 2013, through its
local manning agent, Jebsens. His employment was covered by a standard employment
contract for a period of six months with the vessel MV Pacific Fantasy, which was later
renamed as MV Voge Fantasy.

On December 26, 2016, Petitioner allegedly figured in an accident while on board the
vessel. He slipped and fell, hitting his buttocks on the floor while releasing the tug line of the
ship. He felt pain in his lumbar area, but he continued to work. He self-medicated and
experienced slight relief. However, his lower back pain persisted; hence, he requested a
medical consultation.

On March 21, 2014, he was brought to a hospital in Sweden. Radiographs and CT

scan of his lumbar spine revealed a L1 vertebra fracture. He was given pain medications and
was advised to undergo physical therapy and to only take light jobs. In view of his medical
condition, he was declared unfit to work and was repatriated on March 29, 2014.

On April 2, 2014, he underwent an x-ray of his lumbar spine with UPMC Philippines
(UPMC), the result of which showed a "compression deformity of the L1 vertebral body," and
was advised to undergo magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) of the lumbar area for further
evaluation. On April 21, 2014, petitioner returned to UPMC for MRI of his lumbosacral spine
which revealed the following findings: (1) mild to moderate chronic compression fracture of
the L1 vertebra body; (2) nonspecific signal abnormality involving the posterior aspects of
the T12-L1 invertebral disc; and (3) minimal L1-L2 and L4-L5 disc bulge. On April 26, 2014,
petitioner was subjected to bone mineral density measurement which found that he had low
bone mass density (osteopenia). Thereafter, he had a total of 12 sessions of physical therapy
in June and July 2014. Petitioner felt slight relief immediately after said sessions, but the pain
returned a few hours after each session.

On July 14, 2014, or 108 days from petitioner's repatriation, he was issued a final
medical report wherein it recommended that there was a maximal medical improvement and
he is fit to work for the condition referred; hence, case closure. Petitioner was paid his
sickness allowance for the duration of his treatment from March 29 until June 30, 2014.

Petitioner was unsatisfied with the findings of the company-designated physician;

hence, he sought the opinion of a physician of his choice. On July 23, 2014, he consulted
with the Department of Orthopedics at the Armed Forces of the Philippines Medical Center,
through Dr. Manuel Fidel Magtira, due to recurring lower back pain, where he was declared
as permanently unfit in any capacity for further sea duties after thorough history taking and
physical examination. After three months, petitioner consulted another physician who is an
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expert in the field, Dr. Noel Trinidad, a Fellow of the Philippine Orthopedic Association and
the Philippine College of Surgeons. After his examination, Dr. Trinidad issued a Medical
Certificate declaring that petitioner was permanently unfit to go back to work as a seaman.

Respondent’s Contention. Respondents averred that petitioner already finished his

contract on March 19, 2014, when the latter complained of back pains. They denied that
petitioner suffered an injury due to an accident that occurred on board the vessel.

When petitioner complained of back pains, he was advised to undergo medical

examination. Upon his repatriation and arrival in the Philippines on April 1, 2014, respondents
immediately referred petitioner to the company-designated doctors at Shiphealth, Inc. led by
Dr. Maria Gracia Gutay. Petitioner was submitted to thorough medical tests which revealed
that he had compression fracture L1 secondary to osteoporosis. Respondents further claimed
that petitioner was given medications and advised to follow up with an orthopedic surgeon.
He likewise underwent physical therapy. After a month, petitioner claimed reduction in his
back pain; however, he was still given further treatments. Repeat laboratory tests yielded
normal results and that petitioner's compression fracture had healed. Thus, declaring
petitioner fit to work.

Respondents paid petitioner's sickness allowance, but denied his claim for maximum
disability benefits under a purported Collective Bargaining Agreement (CEA) because
petitioner was declared fit to work and his condition was not the result of an accident. The
CBA applied only in cases of accidents.

Respondents, for their part, countered the fact of petitioner's contract completion,
that he did not suffer from any accident while on board the vessel, and that his illness was
degenerative in nature.

Petitioner’s Argument. Petitioner filed a complaint with the Arbitration Branch of

the NLRC. Mediation conferences were held, but no amicable settlement was reached.
Petitioner argued that he is entitled to, among others, US$235,224.00 as total permanent
disability benefits under the CBA, citing the injury he sustained during an alleged accident
that took place while he was working on board the vessel, and that such injury impaired his
earning capacity.

Ruling of the Labor Arbiter. On March 27, 2015, the Labor Arbiter (LA) rendered a
Decision dismissing petitioner's complaint for lack of merit. The LA ruled that petitioner failed
to prove by substantial evidence that he suffered a work related injury during the term of his
employment. Even assuming petitioner suffered compression fracture, he failed to show that
such was related to his work on board the vessel as a seafarer.

Ruling of the NLRC. Petitioner appealed to the NLRC which rendered a Resolution
dismissing the appeal for lack of merit. It observed that nowhere in the medical reports of
the company-designated physician was it stated that petitioner's illness had anything to do
with his duties on board respondents' vessel. It was noted that his fracture had been treated
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and healed, and that he was cleared for work on July 14, 2014, less than the 120/240-day
period required since repatriation for maximum disability benefits.

The NLRC subscribed to the observation of the LA that petitioner was a high-ranking
official of the vessel who would have known the significance of putting the accident on record,
but he did not. The logbook entry only confirmed that petitioner's illness started on December
26, 2013, when he felt low back pain.

The NLRC did not lend credence to the declaration of permanent disability and work-
related injury made by petitioner's doctors of choice, Dr. Magtira and Dr. Trinidad, because
they were made much later on July 23, 2014 and October 21, 2014, respectively, long after
petitioner had disembarked from the vessel on March 29, 2014. They were also based on
single consultations without adequate tests to support the same.

Ruling of the Court of Appeals. The CA denied the petition and affirmed the
resolutions of the NLRC. Similarly, the CA held that petitioner's assertion that he figured in
an accident on board the vessel was not substantiated; thus, the provisions of the CBA were
not applicable. However, even if the accident was not substantially proven, petitioner could
still seek relief from the provisions of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration-
Standard Employment Contract (POEA-SEC), which are deemed incorporated in the
employment contract between petitioner and respondents. Pursuant to Section 20(B) of the
Standard Terms and Conditions Governing the Employment of Filipino Seafarers On-Board
Ocean-Going Vessels, the employer is liable for disability benefits when the seafarer suffers
from a work-related injury or illness during the term of the contract.

The POEA-SEC defines work-related illness as those which result in disability or death
by reason of an occupational disease listed under Sec. 32- A thereof. The burden is placed
upon the claimant to present substantial evidence that his work conditions caused or at least
increased the risk of contracting the disease. Only a reasonable proof of work-connection is
required.

In this case, there was a huge disparity between the findings of the company-
designated physician and that of the private doctors chosen by petitioner. The POEA-SEC
provides that, in such a case, the opinion of a third doctor may be jointly agreed upon by the
employer and the seafarer which opinion would be final; and binding on them. Non-
observance of the procedure would mean that the assessment of the company-designated
physician prevails.

Unfortunately, the CA held that petitioner failed to observe the third doctor referral
provision. Moreover, the diagnoses and findings of petitioner's doctors of choice were issued
much later and after single consultations with petitioner without adequate tests to support
the same. As between the company-designated doctor, who had all the medical records of
petitioner for the duration of his treatment, and petitioner's private doctors who merely
examined him for a day, the former's finding must prevail.

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ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the petitioner is entitled to total and permanent disability benefits;
and
2. Whether or not the petitioner is entitled to total and permanent disability benefits
under the alleged CBA provision he invoked.

RULING/RATIO DECIDENDI:
1. Yes, the petitioner is partly entitled to total and permanent.

For disability to be compensable under Sec. 20(A) of the 2010 POEA SEC, two
elements must concur: (1) the injury or illness must be work related; and (2) the work-
related injury or illness must have existed during the term of the seafarer's contract.

The Court, in Sestoso v. United Philippine Lines, Inc., citing More Maritime Agencies,
Inc. v. NLRC, held that compensability of an illness or injury does not depend on whether
the injury or disease was pre-existing at the time of employment but rather on whether the
injury or illness is work related or had been aggravated by the seafarer's working condition

Under POEA Memorandum Circular No. 10, Series of 2010, referred to as the Standard
Terms and Conditions Governing the Employment of Filipino Seafarers On-Board Ocean-
Going Vessels (MC No. 10) and deemed incorporated in every employment contract of
seafarers, work-related illness is defined as any sickness as a result of an occupational
disease listed under Sec. 32-A of the contract with the conditions set therein; while work-
related injury is an injury arising out of and in the course of employment.

In the same MC No. 10, Sec. 20, par. A(4) categorically provides that those illnesses
not listed in Sec. 32 of the contract are disputably presumed as work-related.

The law clearly laid down a legal presumption of work-related illness or injury in favor
of seafarers. This legal presumption was borne by the fact that the said list cannot account
for all known and unknown illnesses/diseases that may be associated with, caused or
aggravated by such working conditions, and that the presumption is made in the law to
signify that the non-inclusion in the list of occupational diseases does not
translate to an absolute exclusion from disability benefits. Thus, the burden is on
the employer to disprove the work-relatedness, failing which, the disputable presumption
that a particular injury or illness that results in disability is work-related stands.

Nonetheless, the presumption of work-relatedness does not extend to the matter of

compensability. Compensability pertains to the entitlement to receive compensation and
benefits upon a showing that work conditions caused or at least increased the risk of the
injury or illness.

A seafarer's entitlement to disability benefits is not automatic simply because of a

finding that his illness or injury is compensable. In Gamboa v. Maun/ad Trans, Inc., the Court
reiterated the settled rule that the entitlement of a seafarer on overseas employment to
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disability benefits is governed by law, by the parties' contracts, and by the medical findings.
By law, the relevant statutory provisions are Articles 197 to 199 (formerly Arts. 191 to 193)41
of the Labor Code in relation to Sec. 2(a), Rule X42 of the Amended Rules on Employee
Compensation. By contract, the material contracts are the POEA-SEC, which is deemed
incorporated in every seafarer's employment contract and considered to be the minimum
requirements acceptable to the government, the parties' CBA, if any, and the employment
agreement between the seafarer and the employer.

Medical findings of the company-designated physician are given weight as such

physician is, under the law, obligated to arrive at a definite assessment of the seafarer's
fitness or degree of disability within a period of 120 days from repatriation, subject to
extension of up to 240 days when further medical attention is necessary. It is the company-
designated physician's duty to issue a final medical assessment of the seafarer's disability
grade or his fitness to work. On the other hand, the law also requires the seafarer to submit
himself to a post-employment medical examination by a company-designated physician
within three working days upon his return except when he is physically incapacitated to do
so; in which case, a written notice to the agency within the same period is deemed as
compliance.

As corollary, the seafarer may also consult a physician of his choice. The same law
expressly provides that in case of disagreement or conflict between the findings of the
company-designated physician and the seafarer's physician of choice, a third doctor may be
jointly agreed upon by the parties. The findings of the third doctor shall be final and binding
on both employer and seafarer. The Court has repeatedly emphasized that referral to a third
doctor is mandatory, and the party who fails to abide thereby would be in breach of the
POEA-SEC.

To reiterate, referral to a third doctor is mandatory in case of disagreements between

the findings of the company-designated physician and the employee's physician of choice.
Jurisprudence further holds that upon notification by the seafarer of his intention to refer the
conflicting findings to a third doctor, the company carries the burden of initiating the process
for referral to a third doctor commonly agreed upon between the parties.

Respondents clearly failed to abide by the mandatory referral procedure under the
law. As a result, the findings of the company-designated physician cannot be automatically
deemed conclusive and binding. Accordingly, the Court must now weigh the inherent merits
of the medical findings presented by both sides.

The certification of the company-designated physician would defeat petitioner's claim

while the opinion of the independent physicians would uphold such claim. The law looks
tenderly on the laborer. Thus, where the evidence may be reasonably interpreted in two
divergent ways, one prejudicial and the other favorable to him, the balance must be tilted in
his favor consistent with the principle of social justice.

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2. No, the Court finds that petitioner is not entitled to total and
permanent disability benefits under the alleged CBA provision.

Petitioner, a Second Officer, invoked Sec. 21 of the CBA in claiming total and
permanent disability benefits in the amount of $235,224.00, which provides:

Disability
§21
a. A Seafarer who suffers injury as a result of an accident from any cause whatsoever whilst in
the employment of the Company or arising from her/his employment with the Company,
regardless of fault including accidents occurring while traveling to or from the Ship, and
whose ability to work as a Seafarer is reduced as a result thereof shall, in addition to sick
pay, be entitled to compensation according to the provisions of the Agreement.

b. The disability suffered by the Seafarer shall be determined by a Doctor appointed by the ITF,
and the Company shall provide disability compensation to the Seafarer in accordance with
the percentage specified in the table below which is appropriate to this disability.

Degree of 2012
Disability Rate of Compensation
RATINGS OFFICERS & RATINGS
% AB & below above AB
50-100 US $
xxxx 156, 816

with any differences, including less than 10% disability, to be pro-rata.

The compensation provided under this paragraph for 100% disability shall not exceed
US$235,224 for Officers and $156,816 for Ratings for 2012, with lesser degrees of disability
compensated for pro-rata.

Petitioner refers to Sec. 21 to support his claim for disability benefits due to his
accident while employed by respondents. It is, thus, incumbent upon petitioner to prove by
substantial evidence that he figured in an accident on board the vessel. It is basic that
whoever alleges a fact has the burden of proving it because a mere allegation is not evidence.

Petitioner failed to prove the fact of accident, either by documentary or testimonial

evidence. Petitioner claimed that on December 26, 2013, he slipped and fell on the floor on
his buttocks while releasing a tug line of the ship. Surprisingly, no such accident was recorded
in the ship records to validate petitioner's assertion; neither was it corroborated by anyone
on the ship.

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Consequently, petitioner must indeed convincingly prove the fact of accident in order
to claim total and permanent disability benefits under the CBA. Unfortunately, he failed to do
so. The CBA provision, therefore, cannot apply here.

Nonetheless, petitioner is not without any recourse as the POEA-SEC also governs his
employment contract. The POEA-SEC is imbued with public interest and is deemed
incorporated in every employment contract of seafarers. As the Court gives credence to the
assessment of petitioner's physicians of choice, he is entitled to the maximum total and
permanent disability benefit of $60,000.00 provided under the POEA-SEC.

FALLO/DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The November 16, 2016
Decision and March 9, 2017 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 142799,
which affirmed the June 18, 2015 and July 30, 2015 Resolutions of the National Labor
Relations Commission, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Respondents are jointly and
severally liable to PAY Luisito C. Reyes the following:

1. Permanent and total disability benefit in the amount of US$60,000.00, or its peso
equivalent at the time of payment; and
2. Attorney's fees at the rate of ten percent (10%) of the total monetary award.

Respondents are likewise liable for legal interest at six percent (6%) per annum of
the foregoing monetary awards computed from the finality of this Decision until full
satisfaction.

SO ORDERED.

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REYNALDO P. CABATAN vs. SOUTHEAST ASIA SHIPPING CORP./ATTY. ROMEO

DALUSONG AND/OR MARITIME MANAGEMENT SERVICES
G.R No. 219495., February 28, 2022
Hernando, J.:

FACTS:
Petitioner Reynaldo P. Cabatan (Cabatan) was employed as an oiler by Southeast Asia
Shipping Corp. (SEASCORP) on behalf of its principal, Maritime Management Services
(Maritime Management) from 2006 to 2010. Before deployment, he underwent his Pre-
Employment Medical Examination (PEME) and was certified to be fit for sea duty.

On January 30, 2010, the petitioner boarded M/V BP Pioneer under a three month
contract and that on March 29, 2010, while he was on duty, the ship swayed by the waves
that causes him to fall in his knees and later on felt excruciating pain and numbness on his
scrotal/ inguinal area. Despite the pain he felt, he continued to work. After his duty, he then
went to his room and took a pain reliever before he went to the ship’s doctor to have himself
checked and was ruled out that what he experienced was hernia and trauma and was advised
to rest until further observation. On May 19, 2010, The petitioner was re examined and
despite feeling pain, the doctor concluded that it was normal due to his age and advised to
take pain relievers instead.

On May 25, 2010, Cabatan disembarked the vessel at the port of Takoradi, Ghana and
was repatriated back to the Philippines due to his contract being expired. Believing what the
doctor advised on him on board the ship, that the pain he felt in his scrotal/inguinal area was
normal, he took a complete rest for a month.

The petitioner was eventually called by the SEASCORP for possible deployment. He
underwent PEME at Merita Diagnostic Clinic which is the company accredited clinic. During
the examination, Cabatan told the doctor of the clinic, of his injury which he acquired during
his last deployment on board the vessel. The doctor then advised him to underwent x-ray on
his lumbar spine and scrotal/inguinal area which yielded result unfavorable to the petitioner.
The same goes for his other test which resulted with mild chronic lumbar radiculopathy
involving the L4-5 and L5-S1 spinal roots. Dr. David M. Cabata, Jr, an Orthopedic and Spine
surgeon, advised him to underwent surgery upon the doctor’s findings and that the estimated
total surgery cost is amounting to P 473,000. The petitioner asked for financial assistance
from SEASCORP through its crewing manager, Mr. Aguinaldo, which promised him to relay it
to its principal, Maritime Management but the request was left unheeded.

On March 1, 2011, Cabatan filed a complaint against the respondents for permanent
and total disability benefits. On the other hand, respondents maintained that during Cabatan'
s last employment contract, he underwent PEME and was certified fit for sea duty. Upon
completion of his contract on May 25, 2010, Cabatan disembarked the vessel. When he
arrived in Manila, Cabatan did not report to the manning agency for the mandatory post-
employment medical examination, nor request for medical assistance for any injury or illness.
After almost a year following the termination of his contract, Cabatan suddenly filed a
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complaint against respondents before the NLRC and claimed for total and permanent
disability benefits, moral and exemplary damages, and attorney's fees.

The Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of Cabatan, stating that the petitioner suffered an
injury while performing his duties as an oiler. Being a work related, it must be compensable
and that the petitioners failure to comply with the mandatory three (3) day reporting from
PEME is untenable. The petitioner was repatriated not because of medical conditions but
because of his expired contract.

Aggrieved, the respondent filed an appeal before the NLRC, and in its decision dated
April 26, 2010, the NLRC reversed and set aside the LA’s Decision and dismissed Cabatan’s
claim for disability benefits for lack of merit. Cabatan’s failure to report within the mandatory
period after his repatriation for PEME, without justifiable cause resulted in his forfeiture of
his right to claim compensation and disability benefits under POEA-SEC. Cabatan filed for
Motion for Reconsideration but later denied by NLRC on its resolution dated June 18, 2010.

Aggrieved, the petitioner filed for certiorari before the CA and on it’s Decision dated
January 23, 2015, the CA denied Cabatan’s appeal which held that Cabatan’s failure to comply
with the mandatory reporting requirement resulted in the forfeiture of his right to claim
compensation and benefits for injury and illnesses. Cabatan’s Motion for Reconsideration was
also denied by the CA on it’s Decision dated July 20, 2015.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner is entitled to disability compensation for injury/illness
suffered during the term of his employment pursuant to Section 20 (B) paragraph 6 of the
2000 POEA-SEC. Likewise, petitioner is entitled to 10% of the award for and as attorney’s
fees.

RULING/RATIO DECIDENDI:
No, the petitioner is not entitled to disability compensation for injury/illness he suffered
during the term of his employment pursuant to Section 20 (B) paragraph 6 of 2000 POEA-
SEC. The petition is without merit.

It is undisputed that Cabatan's employment contract with SEASCORP executed on

January 30, 2010 is governed by the 2000 Amended Standard Terms and Conditions
Governing the Overseas Employment of Filipino Seafarers On-Board Ocean-Going Ships
(2000 POEA-S EC). Paragraph 3, Section 20 (B) thereof regarding disability benefits provides:

Upon sign-off from the vessel for medical treatment, the seafarer is entitled to sickness
allowance equivalent to his basic wage until he is declared fit to work by the company-
designated physician or the degree of permanent disability has been assessed by the
company-designated physician but in no case s hall it exceed one hundred twenty (120)
days.

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For this purpose, the seafarer shall submit himself to a post-employment medical
examination by a company-designated physician within three working days upon his return
except when he is physically incapacitated to do so, in which case, a written notice to the
agency within the same period is deemed as compliance. Failure of the seafarer to comply
with the mandatory reporting requirement shall result in his forfeiture of the right to claim
the above benefits.

Thus, in order to claim compensability under the forgoing section, it is required that
the seafarer must have: (1) suffered a work-related illness or injury during the term of his
contract; and (2) submitted himself to a mandatory post-employment medical examination
within three (3) working days upon his arrival.

As pointed out by Cabatan, the three-day mandatory reporting requirement is not

absolute. In Wallem Maritime Services v. National Labor Relations Commission, the Court
explained that if the seafarer is physically incapacitated from complying with the requirement
for being terminally ill and is in need of immediate medical attention, the mandatory reporting
period may be dispensed with.

However, the three-day reporting requirement is not absolute as correctly pointed out
by Cabatan. Paragraph 3, Section 20 (B) of the POEA-SEC also provides that a seafarer who
is physically incapacitated to report for a post-employment examination may send a written
notice to its agency within the same period. In Status Maritime Corp. v. Spouses Delalamon.
We recognized the deteriorating condition of the seafarer who cannot be reasonably expected
to report to his employer's office considering the physical strain caused by his illness.
Moreover, the employer was already notified of the failing health condition of the seafarer
upon finding out he was diagnosed with a serious illness abroad.

Based on the foregoing, Cabatan's claim for disability benefits and other monetary
awards prayed for by him must be denied. It is evident that Cabatan was repatriated due to
the expiration of his contract. Regardless of the cause of his repatriation, he was required to
submit himself to a post-employment medical examination by the company-designated
physician within three working days upon his return in order to ascertain if he was really
suffering from a work-related injury or illness. Cabatan may only be excused from such
requirement if he was physically incapacitated to do so. However, such is not the case at bar.

Here, Cabatan complained of pain in the scrotal/inguinal area while on board which is
why the initial diagnosis by the ship doctor was epididymorchitis. Aside from his bare
assertion, there is nothing on record to show that he felt pain or numbness on his lower
extremities while on board or that the ship doctor concluded that he contracted
spondylolisthesis. It was only on July 2010 or after his repatriation that the said findings were
made by a doctor, which is well-beyond the three-day mandatory reporting period.

While this Court commiserates with petitioner's plight, non-compliance with the
requirements set forth in Section 20 (B), paragraph (3) of the 2000 POEA-SEC renders it

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difficult to ascertain if his injury or illness was work-related. In view of the foregoing, the
Court finds no need to discuss the other issues raised by Cabatan.

FALLO/DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari is DENIED for lack of
merit. The January 23, 2015 Decision and July 20, 2015 Resolution of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. SP No. 126155 are hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

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RODELIO R. ONIA vs. LEONIS NAVIGATION COMPANY, INC., WORLD MARITIME

CO. LTD., CAPT. HERNANI P. FEUSCA, FELIX ANDRADA, RICARDO NOLLEDO,
RYO MATSUNAGA, TAKASHI UTO, VALERIANO R. DEL ROSARIO, MARY JEAN
MADRENERO, and JENNIFER E. CERRADA
G.R No. 256878, February 14, 2022
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

FACTS:
Petitioner in this case was employed by World Maritime through LNCI as an oiler for
a period of nine (9) months. He underwent PEME prior to his deployment wherein the
company-accredited physician declared him as fit to work despite prescribing him
maintenance medicines for his hypertensive cardiovascular disease and diabetes mellitus.
Later on, he was medically repatriated and was diagnosed with Cerebrovascular infarct, Left
Pons, Hypertensive Cardiovascular Disease and Diabetes Mellitus.

Petitioner consulted with his personal physicians, Dr. Petrarch B. Bravo and Dr. Carlos
L. Chua when LNCI denied him medical assistance. After some tests, said physicians declared
him permanently and totally disabled. This prompted the petitioner to file a complaint for
payment of total disability benefits, damages, and attorney's fees before the NLRC against
respondents.

Initially, the labor arbiter ruled in favor of the petitioner. LA held that the petitioner's
illness was work-related and compensable. Also, there is no concealment on his part since it
is the company physician who declared him fit to work despite the pre-existing illness
discovered during PEME. Lastly, company physician findings cannot be considered as final
since he requires further medical examination.

However, NLRC reversed such ruling on the ground that the illness was not work-
related and that the assessment of the personal physician of the petitioner does not explain
how the illness was attributable to his work as an oiler. Also, petitioner was barred from
claiming any disability compensation or benefits, since he knowingly concealed that he was
already diagnosed with hypertensive cardiovascular disease and diabetes mellitus during his
PEME.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling of the NLRC. Hence, this petition.

ISSUES:
1. Whether the petitioner is barred from claiming disability benefits due to
concealment;
2. Whether the twin-requirements of work-relatedness and compensability is present
in the case; and
3. Whether the petitioner is entitled for total and permanent disability benefits and
exemplary damages, and attorney's fees.

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RULING/RATIO DECIDENDI:
1. No, the Court finds that concealment cannot be appreciated against the
petitioner; hence, he cannot be deemed barred from claiming disability benefits.

Under Section 20 (E) of the 2010 Philippine Overseas Employment Administration

(POEA) - Standard Employment Contract (2010 POEA-SEC), "[a] seafarer who knowingly
conceals a pre-existing illness or condition in the Pre-Employment Medical Examination
(PEME) shall be liable for misrepresentation and shall be disqualified from any compensation
and benefits." In this regard, jurisprudence expounds that an illness is considered pre-
existing within the contemplation of Section 20 (E) of the 2010 POEA-SEC if, among others,
the seafarer had been diagnosed and has knowledge of such illness or condition but failed
to disclose the same during the PEME, and such cannot be diagnosed during the PEME.

In this case, it clearly appears that petitioner's alleged pre-existing illnesses, i.e.,
hypertension and diabetes mellitus, are conditions which are easily discoverable during his
PEME; thus, they cannot be deemed pre-existing within the contemplation of Section 20 (E)
of the 2010 POEA-SEC. Indeed, records show that petitioner underwent the required PEME,
and his hypertension could have been easily detected by standard/routine tests conducted
during the said examination, i.e., blood pressure test, electrocardiogram, chest x-ray, and/or
blood chemistry. It is also undisputed that despite being pronounced to be "FIT FOR SEA
DUTY," the company-accredited physician even prescribed maintenance medicines, i.e.,
Metformin, Glebenclamide and Amlodipine Besilate to petitioner for his hypertensive
cardiovascular disease and diabetes mellitus. This only confirms the fact that respondents
were already put on notice of petitioner's medical condition as early as his PEME.

2. Yes, the twin-requirements of work-relatedness and compensability is

present in the case.

Under Section 20 (A) of the 2010 POEA-SEC, the employer is liable for disability
benefits when the seafarer suffers from a work-related injury or illness during the term of his
contract. A work-related illness is defined as "any sickness as a result of an occupational
disease listed under Section 32-A of this Contract with the conditions set therein satisfied."
The provision reads:

SECTION 32-A. OCCUPATIONAL DISEASES

For an occupational disease and the resulting disability or death to be compensable,
all of the following conditions must be satisfied:
1. The seafarer's work must involve the risks described herein;
2. The disease was contracted as a result of the seafarer's exposure to the described
risks;
3. The disease was contracted within a period of exposure and under such other
factors necessary to contract it; and
4. There was no notorious negligence on the part of the seafarer.

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It should be stressed that petitioner's diagnosed illnesses of "Cerebrovascular infarct,

Left Pons, Hypertensive Cardiovascular Disease and Diabetes Mellitus" are presumed to be
work-related, since these are listed under Section 32-A (Occupational Diseases) of the 2010
POEA-SEC. Particularly, they are listed under paragraphs 12 and 13, respectively referring to
"Cerebra-vascular events" and "End Organ Damage Resulting from Uncontrolled
Hypertension."

Meanwhile, for cerebrovascular disease to be deemed compensable under paragraph

12, Section 32-A of the 2010 POEA-SEC and he complied with requirements under paragraph
13, Section 32-A of the 2010 POEA-SEC for hypertension to be deemed compensable.

Here, petitioner suffered a brain stroke which eventually led to a diagnosis for
"Cerebrovascular infarct, Left Pons, hypertensive Cardiovascular Disease and Diabetes
Mellitus." It is not difficult to discern that the nature of the duties performed by petitioner as
an oiler and his exposure to various elements while on board the vessel have contributed to
the onset or aggravation of his illnesses. To highlight, it is undisputed that petitioner's duties
on board were to "maintain, clean, and at times, operate ship engine parts, including blowers,
compressors, motors, gears, ejectors, and other equipment." Petitioner likewise operated the
lubricant filtering and purifying equipment and kept logs of the vessel's oiling. In doing his
work, petitioner stayed for a considerable period at the vessel's engine room which
experienced fluctuating and extreme temperatures. Moreover, he was exposed to engine
fumes and chemicals which all the more contributed or at least aggravated his illness. In fact,
it was while in the performance of his duties on board the MV Navios Koyo that petitioner
experienced the major symptoms of a cerebrovascular event, i.e., blury vision, dizziness,
numbness in the right side of the body and speech becoming slurred. Clearly, a linkage
between petitioner's illnesses and work exists in this case. To be sure, jurisprudence provides
that the existing nature of the seafarer's illness does not bar compensation if the same was
aggravated due to his working conditions.

3. Yes, the petitioner is entitled for total and permanent disability benefits
and exemplary damages, and attorney's fees.

Records disclose that petitioner was medically repatriated on June 13, 2016, had
undergone assessment before June 22, 2016 when he was discharged, and eventually was
issued a Medical Report" dated July 5, 2016 by the company-designated physician. Notably,
apart from such report, no other medical report appears on record. However, the medical
report by the company-designated physician, while issued within the prescribed period, failed
to contain any statement-much less an assessment- on the degree of petitioner's disability.
Hence, the same cannot be considered as a final and definite disability assessment. The
medical report states in relevant part:

Cerebrovascular Infarct risk factors are age smoking, alcohol intake, Hypertension and
Hypercholesterolemia - All of which are not work-related.

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The etiology/cause of Hypertensive Cardiovascular Disease is not work-related. It is

multifactorial in origin which includes genetic predisposition; poor lifestyle, high salt
intake, smoking, Diabetes Mellitus, age and increased sympathetic activity.

Diabetes Mellitus is usually familial/hereditary and is not work related.

As may be gleaned above, the medical report merely contained a general description
of the risk factors and etiology of petitioner's illnesses, and a simple conclusion that
petitioner's illnesses were not work-related. It does not, however, contain any final and
definite disability assessment as to petitioner's medical condition, degree of disability, and
whether he was fit to work. As per prevailing jurisprudence, such omission renders
petitioner's disability as total and permanent by force of law.

Aside from the foregoing, it is also well to note that certain facts appearing on record
further bolsters the conclusion that the Medical Report dated July 5, 2016 cannot, by any
stretch of the imagination, be deemed the final and definite assessment of petitioner's
medical condition. These are: (1) the fact that petitioner was still medically examined by the
company-designated physician the following day, i.e., on July 6, 2016; and (2) the fact that
petitioner was made to write an undertaking to return on July 20, 2016 for further medical
examination.

Verily, the failure of the company-designated physician to issue a final and definite
assessment. within the prescribed periods gave rise to the conclusive presumption that
petitioner's disability was total and permanent; thus, entitling him to total and permanent
disability benefits. In this regard, it bears emphasizing that the issuance of a final and definite
disability assessment by the employer within the prescribed periods is strictly necessary in
order to determine the true extent of a seafarer's sickness or injury and his or her capacity
to resume work as such. Without such assessment, the extent of a seafarer's sickness or
injury remains an open question and thus, prejudicial to claims for disability benefits. As such,
in line with the general policy of our laws to afford protection to labor, the failure to comply
with this mandatory requirement renders the seafarer's disability as total and permanent by
operation of law.

FALLO/DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The Decision dated September
30, 2020 and the Resolution dated June 11, 2021 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
154448 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the Decision dated June 30,
2017 of the Labor Arbiter in NLRC NCR Case No. (M) 02-01694-17 awarding petitioner Rodelio
R. Onia the amount of US$60,000.00 representing his total and permanent disability benefits
and ten percent (10%) attorney's fees is hereby is REINSTATED WITH MODIFICATION,
deleting the awards of moral and exemplary damages and imposing on said monetary awards
interest at the legal rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the finality of this Decision until
full payment.

SO ORDERED.
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PHILIPPINE BANK OF COMMUNICATIONS vs. PHILIPPINE BANK OF

COMMUNICATIONS EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION (PBCOMEA)
G.R. No. 254021, FEBRUARY 14, 2022
INTING, J.:

FACTS:
Philippine Bank of Communications (petitioner), an entity engaged in the commercial
banking business, adopted a policy granting multi-purpose loan benefits to its qualified
employees. The program allowed employees to avail themselves of several loans
simultaneously, subject to the debt service ratio (i.e., the overall debt servicing for all types
of loans should not exceed 35% of the employee's net pay). It also allowed employees who
would avail themselves of loans to pledge or utilize their mid-year and year-end bonuses,
regardless of whether their monthly salary could still accommodate the loan amortizations
without upsetting the allowable debt service ratio.

A new group of investors took over the management of petitioner and redefined the
multi-purpose loan program. Under the latest loan policy, employees can no longer avail
themselves of additional loan using their mid-year and year-end bonuses as pledges in case
the amortization can still be accommodated by their take-home pay. The new management
unilaterally enforced the latest multi-purpose loan program.

Moreover, petitioner had the policy of recognizing the long service of its employees
by giving out service awards on its anniversary, or every September 4 of each year. The
service award policy took effect on January 1, 1998 and was given to employees who
completed 10 years of service and continued to serve every five years. Thereafter. it covered
even those who retired under petitioner's mandatory retirement policy but completed the
required number of years in service. Resigned employees were given the same arrangement
as the retired employees

However, on September 18, 2015, under its new management, petitioner modified
the service award policy in that an employee must be "on board as of release date or
September 4 of each year" to be entitled to it. Consequently, at least three employees were
unable to receive the service award as they were no longer "on board'' as of the release date.

Respondent asked for the recall of the policies on loan and service award but to no
avail. Hence, the matter was brought under voluntary arbitration.

The OVA decreed that the subject policies were incorporated in the CBA of the parties.
Thus, they cannot be changed, altered, or modified without the consent of both the
contracting parties. Hence, the OVA directed petitioner to maintain the practice of allowing
the pledge of bonus as payment of the employees' loans and declared void the requirement
that employees should be "on board" on the date of petitioner's anniversary to be entitled to
the service award.

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Aggrieved, petitioner filed a Petition for Review with the CA. In its Decision, the CA
Partly Granted the petition the amendment on the payment of loans through
pledges/deductions from mid-year/year-end bonuses, subject to an employee's length of
service and the amount of his Net Take Home Pay, is DECLARED a valid imposition. The
declaration as void, of the requirement that employees should be on board on the date of
[petitioner's] anniversary to be entitled to the Service Award, is SUSTAINED on the premise
that petitioner modified the CBA which is violative of the Labor Code. It decreed that the
grant of service awards to retired and resigned employees ripened into a vested right as it
was a benefit which was given by petitioner to qualified employees who rendered the
required years dating back to 1998.

Petitioner seeks a partial reconsideration of the CA decision insofar as the issue of the
service award policy is involved.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the petitioner violated the CBA when it did not allow participation
of respondent in the modification of the terms and conditions of the granting of service
award; and
2. Whether or not the modification of the terms and conditions of the grant of service
award requiring resigned or retired employees to be "on board" at the time of release
of the service award amounted to a diminution of benefits.

RULING/RATIO DECIDENDI:
1. Yes, the petitioner violated the CBA when it did not allow
participation of respondent in the modification of the terms and conditions of the
granting of service award.

The petition is denied. The CBA is the norm of conduct or the law between the
parties. When the terms of a CBA are clear and there is no doubt as to the parties' intention,
the literal meaning of its stipulations shall prevail, as in the present case. To illustrate, in
finding for respondent, the OVA and the CA made reference to the Service Award Policy
dated January I, 1998, the pertinent provisions of which read:

I. POLICY:
The Bank shall give due recognition to employees who have shown both loyalty and
integrity in the service of the Bank upon completing at least ten (10) years of employment
and every five (5) years thereafter. The awarding ceremonies shall be held on the anniversary
date of the Bank.

II. ELIGIBILITY:
The following shall be eligible to receive the Service Award:
1. Regular Officers and Staff who have completed the required number of years
in any award category.
2. Candidate has no pending administrative easels xxx
3. Overall work performance is at least average during the preceding year.
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For purposes of this award, length of service shall be reckoned from date of the
employee's appointment (date of hiring) in the Bank. In case an employee retires under the
mandatory retirement policy of the Bank prior to the date of the Bank anniversary alter
completing the required number of years in any award category, the employee shall receive
his award in a special ceremony on the date of his retirement.

In case an employee becomes eligible to a certain award category but resigns prior to
the scheduled awarding ceremony, the employee shall receive his award together with his
separation benefits.
Xxx

IV. IMPLEMENTING GUIDELINES:

xxx MANAGEMENT IN THE EXERCISE OF ITS SOLE AND EXCLUSIVE PREROGATIVE
MAY ADD, DELETE, AMEND AND/OR REVERSE THIS POLICY.

By the Service Award Policy dated January l, 1998 above, the award shall cover
incumbent employees, as well as retired and resigned employees, and petitioner may modify
the policy in the exercise of its management prerogative. Subsequently, the service award
policy was incorporated in the CBA. This time, the participation of both petitioner and
respondent is necessary in revising the terms and conditions for the service award.
Specifically, Section 2, Article XII of the CBA provides for the review of petitioner, as the
management, and respondent, as the employees' union, in determining and granting the
service award.

The wordings of the CBA are clear and unequivocal. Petitioner could revise the service
award policy only with the knowledge and participation of respondent. Indeed, the CBA must
be construed in the context in which it is negotiated and the purpose for which it is intended
to serve. Here, the CBA aims to allow respondent to provide its input on how the standards
and procedure for the grant of the service award shall be made. It follows that petitioner
cannot unilaterally alter its terms without consulting respondent. Thus, when petitioner
decided to require that only those who are "on board" at the time of awarding can be granted
the service award, without consulting respondent with the change in policy, petitioner
violated the CBA which is not allowed by the law.

Stated differently, where the CBA is clear and unambiguous, it becomes the law
between the parties and compliance with it is mandated by the express policy of the law.
This principle is highlighted by the Court in Coca-Cola Bottlers Philippines, Inc. v. Iloilo Coca-
Cola Plant Employees labor Union:

A CBA is the negotiated contract between a legitimate labor organization and the
employer concerning wages, hours of work, and all other terms and conditions of
employment in a bargaining unit. It incorporates the agreement reached after negotiations
between the employer and the bargaining agent with respect to terms and conditions of
employment.

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It is axiomatic that the CBA comprises the law between the contracting parties, and
compliance therewith is mandated by the express policy of the law. The literal meaning of
the stipulations of the CBA, as with every other contract, control if they are clear and leave
no doubt upon the intention of the contracting parties. Thus, where the CBA is clear and
unambiguous, it becomes the law between the parties and compliance therewith is mandated
by the express policy of the law. Moreover, it is a familiar rule in interpretation of contracts
that the various stipulations of a contract shall be interpreted together, attributing to the
doubtful ones that sense which may result from all of them taken jointly.

In sum, parties are bound by the terms and conditions, stipulations and clauses under
the CBA, with the sole limitation that they are not contrary to law, morals, public order, or
public policy. Therefore, where the terms of the CBA are clear, its literal meaning must
prevail. The Court sustains the decision of the CA to affirm the ruling of the OVA that the
requirement for employees to be "on board" on the date of the release of the service award
is void.

2. Yes, the modification of the terms and conditions of the grant of

service award requiring resigned or retired employees to be "on board" at the
time of release of the service award amounted to a diminution of benefits.

The act of petitioner of modifying the terms and conditions of the grant of service
award amounted to a diminution of benefits. Such is the case because petitioner unilaterally
withdrew a benefit enjoyed by the employees and founded on a company policy; thus,
petitioner's act must be corrected.

FALLO/DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated October 18, 2019 and the
Resolution dated September 17, 2020 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 155585 are
AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

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MARCH 2022

NELSON M. CELESTINO vs. BELCHEM PHILIPPINES, INC., BELCHEM SINGAPORE

PTE., and/or JASMIN D. SALVADOR
G.R. No. 246929, March 2, 2022
LAZARO-JAVIER, J.:

FACTS:
This is a case of Nelson M. Celestino, a Third officer for nine months for Belchem
Philippines Inc and Belchem Singapore Pte. Ltd. The petitioner hired on June 22, 2012 and
underwent pre-employment medical exams before deployment and asked his conditions
among medical problems like heart problem, diabetes, endocrine disorders kidney or bladder
trouble, etc and his answer is negative. After the preliminary process, he got deployed on
July 1, 2012. As his regular responsibility, he maintained operational readiness of life rafts
and firefighting equipment, wrote navigational logs, operated navigational equipment,
trained other seafarers in lifesaving operation and firefighting and acted as supervisor for
seafarers in cleaning, painting and repairing the vessel.

After quite a month, December 8, 2012, he experiences severe discomfort with his
body together with high fever and chills. As persisted despite of medication, the petitioner
admitted that he was diagnose with diabetic de Novo on December 11, 2012 at Fiden Medical
Center in west Africa. Right after, we was repatriated on December 14, 2012, same day he
arrived in the country. The petitioner also reported for post-employment and examination at
the Metropolitan Medical Center, Manila, and after series of test, he was diagnosed with
Diabetes Mellitus and prescribed to medicate and manage illness. Under the care of expert
medical doctor, the petitioner continued his treatment and accidentally find other illness.

July 1, 2013, he filed a complaint for total and permanent disability benefits, damages
and attorneys fee against the respondents. Two months after the filing, petitioner decided to
consult his own physician, who issued a medical certificate diagnosing him with permanent
disability. Petitioner alleged that his illness cause were work related, and acquired due to his
vigorous work and responsibility, and emphasizing that initially, pre-employment medical
exams declared him “fit to work”, and now he cant work because of this illness for more than
120 days form repatriation and he should to have suffered total and permanent disability.
The respondent, on the other hand, maintained that the diabetes is a metabolic and genetic
disease and not work-related and cant be considered as an occupational disease under the
settled jurisprudence and thus, it is not compensable. He might developed those diseases
regardless of his deployment as third officer and prematurely filed his claim since he did it
without seeking the opinion of his own physician and still undergoing treatment when he
filed the complaint.

Labor arbiter find the petitioner entitled with total and permanent dis ability benefits
but dismissed his other claims. National Labor Relations Commission reversed and ruled that
petitioner was not entitled for total and permanent disability benefits. Petitioner filed an
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appeal and the Court of appeals affirmed and explained that the fact the petitioner admitted
that he was still under medication is the fact that his disability is temporary and his illness
“Diabetes Mellitus’ and its complications are not listed as occupational diseases under section
32-A of the POEA-SEC and not compensable.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner is entitled to total and permanent disability benefit.

RULING/RATIO DECIDENDI:
Yes, petitioner is entitled to its total and permanent disability benefit.

The employment of seafarers are governed by their contracts that contract has to be
enforced between the two parties and not contrary with the POEA’s rules and regulations.
According to POEA-SEC, employees who suffered from occupational diseases or illness listed
under section 32 (A), which is work related illness provided that conditions are satisfied, the
burden to prove the contention is with employer because of the presumption that the illness
or disease is work-related. As being the third officer, the petitioner was exposed with hazards
and stresses as he worked sixteen (16) hours a day and constrained to eat foods from the
vessel that consisted of preserved meats which are high in fats and cholesterol. After almost
6 months, the petitioners body broke as he experienced fever and convulsion until he rush
to the hospital and diagnosed with Diabetic De Novo, which he rendered three (3) days of
confinement and repatriated back to his country. Prior to his deployment, he was declared
fit to work by PEME and during his work therein, he got diagnosed with such illness. Even
this illness was not listed under Section 32 (A) as occupational diseases, still the said ailments
are presumed to be work-related under section 20(B)(4) of the contract and the petitioner
has the burden to prove his evidence of proving his claim.

The Supreme Court disagreed with argument that PEME presented by petitioner is not
ipso facto. PEME is not conclusive proof of showing he is free from any illness prior to his
deployment but it is concluded that the ailment of disability only shows during employment
and presumed that the petitioner’s illness are work related and compensable (Magat vs.
Interorient Maritime Enterprises, Inc).

The Supreme Court also ruled that the petitioner is entitled to attorney’s fee and can
recover damages pertaining to wages of laborers and actions for indemnity under employer’s
liability laws and imposes total monetary award of six (6) percent per annum as legal interest
until its full payment.

FALLO/DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
ACCORDINGLY, the Decision dated August17, 2018 and Resolution dated March12,
2019 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 145564 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

The Decision dated June 4, 2015 of the Labor Arbiter is REINSTATED. Respondents
Belchem Philippines, Inc. and Belchem Singapore Pte. Ltd. are ORDERED TO PAY jointly
and solidarily petitioner Nelson M. Celestino the peso equivalent based on the exchange rate
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at the time of actual payment of US Dollar Ninety Thousand Eight Hundred Eighty-Two
(US$90,882.00) representing his total and permanent disability benefits plus ten percent
(10%) thereof as attorney's fees. Further, they shall pay six percent (6%) legal interest per
annum of the total monetary amount from finality of this Decision until full payment.

SO ORDERED.

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PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MILDRED COCHING LIWANAG

G.R. No. 232245, March 2, 2022
Perlas-Bernabe, S.A.J:

FACTS:
This is an appeal filed by the Accused-Appellant, Mildred Coching Liwanag from the
January 31, 2017 Decision of the Court of Appeals that affirmed the May 19, 2015 Judgment
of the Regional Trial Court of Muntinlupa City. The RTC found the accused-appellant guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of Illegal Recruitment in Large Scale and Estafa.

Accused-appellant was charged with the following criminal violations under the
following Informations:

a) Criminal Case No. 10-443 for Illegal Recruitment in Large-Scale, accused-appellant

did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, canvass, enlist, contract and
promise employment in Japan to four (4) persons, namely, Carol Pagulayan Sepina,
Jennifer Claudel y Reynante, Allan Sepina y Porciuncula and Christopher Claudel y
Reynante, for a fee without first security license and/or permit to recruit workers for
overseas employment from the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration
(POEA).

b) Criminal Case No. 10-444, 10-445, 10-446, and 10-447, respectively, for Estafa,
accused-appellant with intent to defraud by means of deceit, false pretenses and
fraudulent representations executed prior to or simultaneous with the commission of
the fraud, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud complaint
Carol Pagulayan Sepina, Jennifer Claudel y Reynante, Allan Sepina y Porciuncula and
Christopher Claudel y Reynante, respectively. Accused-appellant represented herself
with qualification and capacity to deploy Carol Pagulayan Sepina in Japan as factory
working in a noodles factory and demanded from her the total amount of P40,500.00
as application and processing fee and for the visa and air plane ticket promising the
complainant that she can leave for Japan on October 4, 2009. Accused-appellant
thereafter misappropriated and converted the said amount to her personal use and
benefit.

Ruling of the RTC. On May 19, 2015, the RTC rendered its judgment convicting
accused-appellant of Illegal Recruitment in Large Scale and four counts of Estafa.

The accused-appellant were guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Illegal
Recruitment committed in Large Scale as denied and penalized under Article 13(b) in relation
to Articles 38(b), 34, and 39 of the Labor Code, as amended. She was sentenced to suffer
the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a fine of P500,000.00.

The accused-appellant on the four (4) criminal cases were found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Estafa and sentences her to an indeterminate penalty of six
(6) years of prison correcional, as the minimum, to twelve (1) years of prison mayor, as the
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maximum, with additional one year for the exceeding amount of P10,000.00 of thirteen (13)
years as the maximum.

And as to the civil liability, the accused is ordered to indemnify the private
complainants the amount of P40,500.00 each.

Ruling of the Court of Appeals. In its January 31, 2017 Decision, the CA denied
the appeal and affirmed the RTC’s judgment, with modification only with respect to the
penalty on Criminal Case Nos. 10-444 to 10-447. The appellate court imposed the
intermediate penalty of four years and two months of prison correcional, as the minimum, to
seven years, eight months, and 21 days of prison mayor, as maximum for each count of
Estafa, coupled with legal interest on accused-appellant’s civil liability from July 22, 2010 and
until the said amount is fully paid.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the accused-appellant is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
Illegal Recruitment in Large Scale.

RULING/RATIO DECIDENDI:
Yes, the accused-appellant is guilty beyond reasonable donut of Illegal
Recruitment in Large Scale.

Accused-appellant was charged with Illegal Recruitment in Large Scale, which is

defined under Section 6 of Republic Act No. (RA) 8042,37 also known as the "Migrant Workers
and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995," to wit:

SECTION 6. Definition. For purposes of this Act, illegal recruitment shall mean any
act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring, or procuring
workers and includes referring, contract services, promising or advertising for
employment abroad, whether for profit or not, when undertaken by a nonlicensee or
non-holder of authority contemplated under Article 13(f) of Presidential Decree No.
442, as amended, otherwise known as the Labor Code of the Philippines: Provided,
That any such non-licensee or non-holder who, in any manner, offers or promises for
a fee employment abroad to two or more persons shall be deemed so engaged. It
shall likewise include the following acts, whether committed by any person, whether
a non-licensee, nonholder, licensee or holder of authority:

xxx
(1) Failure to actually deploy without valid reason as determined by the
Department of Labor and Employment; and

(m) Failure to reimburse expenses incurred by the worker in connection with

his documentation and processing for purposes of deployment, in cases
where the deployment does not actually take place without the worker's

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fault. Illegal recruitment when committed by a syndicate or in large scale

shall be considered an offense involving economic sabotage.

Illegal recruitment is deemed committed by a syndicate if carried out by a

group of three (3) or more persons conspiring or confederating with one another.
It is deemed committed in large scale if committed against three (3) or more
persons individually or as a group.

The persons criminally liable for the above offenses are the principals,
accomplices and accessories. In case of juridical persons, the officers having
control, management or direction of their business shall be liable. (Emphasis
supplied)

Illegal Recruitment may be undertaken by either non-license or license holders. Non-

license holders are liable for the simple act of engaging in recruitment and placement
activities, while license holders may also be held liable for committing the acts prohibited
under Section 6 ofRA 8042. Further, Illegal Recruitment is deemed done in large scale and
is considered as an offense involving economic sabotage if it is committed against three or
more persons individually or as a group.

The essential elements for Illegal Recruitment in Large Scale are that: (1) the person
charged undertook any recruitment activity as defined under Section 6 of RA 804; (2) accused
did not have the license or the authority to lawfully engage in the recruitment of workers;
and (3) accused committed the same against three or more persons individually or as a
group.

The Court finds that all three elements have been established beyond reasonable
doubt by the prosecution. Accused-appellant's acts of offering and promising to deploy the
four complainants to Japan on October 4, 2009 to work as factory workers in a noodle factory,
as well as collecting money for passports, plane tickets, visa processing, and placement fees,
clearly constitute a recruitment activity as defined under Section 6 of RA 8042. Moreover,
the POEA certification dated September 4, 2012 sufficiently established that accused-
appellant is neither licensed nor authorized to recruit workers for overseas employment.

The accused-appellant contention that the private complainants failed to present any
receipt to establish that she received money from them must fail. The absence of receipts
to evidence payment does not automatically warrant acquittal of the accused since a person
charged with the offense of Illegal Recruitment may be convicted on the strength of the
testimonies of the complainants, if found to be credible and convincing. Moreover, the
testimony of the prosecution witnesses on the matter is bolstered by the barangay blotter,
wherein accused-appellant admitted having received certain amounts from private
complainants and promised to repay the said amounts.

The law does not require that at least three victims testify at the trial to convict an
accused for Illegal Recruitment in Large Scale, for so long as there is sufficient evidence
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proving that the offense was committed against three or more persons. The testimony of the
prosecution witnesses was positive and categorical, and corroborated each other on material
points, particularly that: (1) the four private complainants were made to believe that accused-
appellant was capable of securing them work in Japan in noodle factories; (2) accused-
appellant exacted processing and placement fees and required them to submit various
documents; and (3) she failed to secure overseas employment for them as promised nor did
she reimburse them for the fees paid. Without any evidence to show that the witnesses were
propelled by any ill motive to testify falsely against appellant, their testimonies deserve full
faith and credit.

Finally, it is settled that factual findings of the trial courts, including their assessment
of the witnesses' credibility, are entitled to great weight and respect by the Court, particularly
when the CA affirmed such findings. After all, the trial court is in the best position to
determine the value and weight of the testimonies of witnesses. The absence of any showing
that the trial court overlooked certain facts of substance and value that, if considered, might
affect the result of the case, or that its assessment was arbitrary, impels the Court to defer
to the trial court's determination according credibility to the prosecution evidence. In fine,
the Court finds no cogent reason to disturb the finding of the courts a quo that all of the
elements for Illegal Recruitment in Large Scale are present in the instant case.

FALLO/DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED. The January 31, 2017 Decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 07838 is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS,
viz.:
In Criminal Case No. 10-443, accused-appellant MILDRED COCHING LIWANAG is
found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of Illegal Recruitment in Large-Scale,
constituting economic sabotage, as defined and penalized in Sections 6 and 7 (b) of Republic
Act No. 8042. She is sentenced to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a fine
in the increased amount of Pl,000,000.00;

xxxx
SO ORDERED.

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MARLOW NAVIGATION PHILS., MARLOW NAVIGATION CO. LTD., AND/OR MR.

ANTONIO GALVEZ, JR., et al. vs. HEIRS OF THE LATE ANTONIO O. BEATO
G.R. No. 233897, March 09, 2022
HERNANDO, J:

FACTS:
Antonio O. Beato was a seafarer engaged by Marlow Navigation Phils., Inc. (Marlow),
for and in behalf of its foreign principal, Marlow Navigation Co. Ltd. For a contract period of
10 months. Prior to embarkation, he underwent a Pre-Employment Medical Examination and
was declared “Fit for Sea Duty”. While on board on November 2012, Antonio felt severe
abdominal pain, back ache, chest pain, and coughs. Due to absence of medical facilities at
the port clinic, he did not receive the proper medical assistance and did not undergo any
laboratory test, until he was repatriated to the Philippines on December 1, 2012 due to his
health condition.

Petitioner referred him to Dr. Hosaka of the Notre Dame Medico-Dental Clinic, the
company-designated physician, who referred him to the company specialists. Antonio’s x-ray
results showed that he has negative infiltrates and he was diagnosed with hypertension
secondary to upper respiratory tract infection. He was advised to return for further treatment
and examination, but he did not; instead, he went home to Aklan and was confined there
where he was diagnosed with functional dyspepsia and pancreatic cancer. He became
bedridden at home until he died on April 6, 2013 due to cardio respiratory failure with
underlying cause of pancreatic cancer.

Thus, his surviving heirs filed a complaint for death benefits, payment for burial
expenses, reimbursement of medical expenses, airfare expense, damages and attorney's
fees, against Marlow on the ground that the cause of his death, pancreatic cancer, is a work-
related illness. Marlow contended that the heirs are not entitled to death benefits since
Antonio’s death occurred after the termination of his employment contract and his cause of
death is not a work-related illness.

The Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaint and ruled that there is no causal relation
between Antonio’s work and his pancreatic cancer, but ordered Marlow to pay for sickness
allowance of the Late Antonio. The NLRC affirmed the LA Decision. The Court of Appeals
reversed the LA and NLRC rulings and held that respondents are
entitled to death benefits.

ISSUE:
Whether the death of the late Antonio is compensable.

RULING/RATIO DECIDENDI:
No. The death of the late Antonio is not compensable since he or his heirs
failed to prove, by substantial evidence, its work-relatedness and his compliance
with the parameters that the law has set out with regard to claims for disability
and death benefits.
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Since Antonio was employed in 2012, Section 20-A of the 2010 POEA SEC applies in
determining the factual issues of compensability of his pancreatic cancer. Such provision shall
be read together with Section 32-A of the same Contract which enumerates the various
diseases deemed to be occupational and compensable. In short, in order for a seafarer to be
entitled to the compensation and benefits under Section 20-A, the disability causing the
illness, injury or death must be one of those listed under Section 32. Other diseases not
included in the list under Section 32 may also be considered, if the seafarer has proven with
substantial evidence that such illness is work-related.

The heirs established that Antonio suffered an illness during the term of his
employment contract. However, he failed to comply with the procedures prescribed under
the POEA-SEC, particularly Section 20-A(3), paragraph 3, which requires the seafarer to
submit himself to a post- employment medical examination within three days upon his return.
Further, he must report regularly to the company-designated physician specifically on the
dates prescribed by the latter. When the seafarer is physically incapacitated to do so, he
must submit a written notice to the agency. Otherwise, his failure to do so will result in
forfeiture of his right to claim his benefits.

In this case, Antonio went to the Dr. Hosaka, but failed to report back for follow-up
check-up. He and his family also failed to provide written notice Marlow or Dr. Hosaka that
he had already gone home to Aklan and he is physically-incapacitated to report back for
follow-up check-up.

Paragraph 4 of the same section further states that if the doctor selected by the
seafarer disagrees with the assessment of the company-designated physician, the parties
may jointly appoint a third doctor whose decision shall be final and binding on both parties.

The records reveal an indisputable disagreement between the findings of the

company-designated physician and the physician Antonio approached in Aklan; thus, a need
for the opinion of a third doctor. However, Antonio did not request for such. Failure to comply
therewith is considered a breach of the POEA-SEC, and renders the assessment by the
company-designated physician binding on the parties.

The Court also held that pancreatic cancer is not an occupational disease under
Section 32-A and Antonio and his family failed to prove that his illness is compensable as he
failed to satisfy all the conditions under Section 32-A which are:
1. The seafarer's work must involve the risks described herein;
2. The disease was contracted as a result of the seafarer's exposure to the described risks;
3. The disease was contracted within a period of exposure and under such other factors
necessary to contract it; and
4. There was no notorious negligence on the part of the seafarer.

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FALLO/DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby GRANTS the petition. Accordingly, the Court
REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the May 12, 2017 Decision and the August 23, 2017 Resolution
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP. No. 137624, and REINSTATES the National Labor
Relations Commission Decision dated May 30, 2014 in NLRC LAC No. 02-000176-14. The
complaint filed by the heirs of the late Antonio 0. Beato, represented by his wife, Jonabel D.
Beato, is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

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GEROME B. GINTA-ASON vs. J.T.A. PACKAGING CORPORATION

AND JON TAN ARQUILLA
G.R. No. 244206, March 16, 2022
HERNANDO, J.:

FACTS:
On January 30, 2017, Gerome Ginta-Ason (petitioner) filed a complaint for illegal
dismissal, non-payment of salary/wages, service incentive leave, 13th month pay, separation
pay and ECOLA, with claims for moral and exemplary damages, and attorney's fees against
respondents J.T.A. Packaging Corporation (JTA) and Jon Tan Arquilla (Arquilla collectively,
respondents).

Petitioner's Version: Petitioner alleged that he was hired by J.T.A on December 26,
2014 as an all-around driver until his constructive dismissal on September 5, 2016. He
claimed that on September 5, 2016, he had driven home respondents' officers and thereafter
parked the car at JTA's office at around 10:00 p.m. Petitioner then asked his live-in partner
Chancie Andea (Chancie) to follow him in the office as it was his pay day. After receiving his
salary, petitioner asked permission from Arquilla to leave since Chancie was waiting for him
outside of the office premises. However, instead of allowing petitioner to leave, Arquilla
allegedly instructed Rodil, his personal collector, to bring Chancie inside the office. According
to petitioner, Arquilla was under the influence of alcohol at that time.

Without any reason, Arquilla hit petitioner with a gun and kicked him several times.
Thereafter, Arquilla asked petitioner to leave. At this juncture, Chancie arrived. Arquilla then
turned his ire on Chancie and hurled invectives at her. He commanded Chancie to kneel, and
he also threatened to kill her and petitioner. Arquilla then illegally detained Chancie and
petitioner in the office and were released only the next day. Out of fear, petitioner decided
not to report to work anymore. Petitioner claimed that he was constructively dismissed
because Arquilla made his continued employment impossible, unbearable, and unlikely.

Respondents' Version. J.T.A averred that petitioner was not its employee. In
support thereof, J.T.A submitted 1) copies of its alpha list of employees as filed with the
Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) for the years 2014-2016; 2) payroll monthly reports and
13th month pay it paid for the years 2015-2016; 3) reports on Social Security System (SSS)
contributions of its employees remitted for the year~ 2015-2016; 4) Philhealth remittance
reports on contributions of its employees in 2016; and 5) Pag-Ibig fund membership and
registration/remittance forms indicating the names of its employees and their contributions
for the period of 2015-2016. All of the foregoing documents did not include petitioner's
name. Further, JTA claimed that Arquilla is not the owner of J.T.A as evidenced by its articles
of incorporation which shows that Arquilla was neither a stockholder nor connected in any
capacity with the company.

Ruling of the Labor Arbiter. On June 28, 2017, the LA rendered a Decision
declaring petitioner to have been constructively dismissed

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Ruling of the National Labor Relations Commission. On appeal, the foregoing

LA Decision was reversed and set aside in the September 29, 2017 Resolution of the NLRC.
The NLRC did not give evidentiary weight to the pay slips submitted by petitioner not only
because there was no indication as to who issued the same but also due to the apparent
discrepancy in the dates they were issued.

Ruling of the Court of Appeals. Dissatisfied, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari
under Rule 65 with the CA averring grave abuse of discretion, tantamount to lack or excess
of jurisdiction, on the part of the NLRC in issuing its assailed Resolutions.

On October 11, 2018, the CA rendered the herein assailed Decision, affirming the
NLRC's September 29, 2017 Resolution and denying the petition for lack of merit. The CA
held that petitioner failed to substantiate his claim that he is an employee of J.T.A. Petitioner's
motion for reconsideration was likewise denied by the CA in a Resolution dated January 24,
2019.

Hence, petitioner comes before the Supreme Court via the instant petition for review
on certiorari.

ISSUE:
Whether or not an employer-employee relationship existed between petitioner and
J.T.A at the time of petitioner's dismissal.

RULING/RATIO DECIDENDI:
There is no employer-employee relationship existed between petitioner and
J.T.A at the time of petitioner's dismissal. The issue of petitioner's employment
status is essentially a question of fact.

Whether petitioner is an employee of J.T.A, or whether he was constructively

dismissed from employment, are essentially questions of fact, which, as a rule, cannot be
entertained in a petition for review on certiorari filed under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
Consistent therewith is the doctrine that this Court is not a trier of facts, and this is strictly
adhered to in labor cases. However, where, like in the instant case, there is a conflict between
the factual findings of the LA, on one hand, and those of the NLRC and the CA, on the other,
it becomes proper for this Court, in the exercise of its equity jurisdiction, to review the facts
and re-examine the records of the case. Thus, this Court shall review and pass upon the
evidence presented and draw its own conclusions therefrom.

The petition is denied. No employer-employee relationship existed between

petitioner and JTA. Settled is the rule that allegations in the complaint must be duly proven
by competent evidence and the burden of proof is on the party making the allegation. In an
illegal dismissal case, the onus probandi rests on the employer to prove that its dismissal of
an employee was for a valid cause. However, before a case for illegal dismissal can prosper,
an employer-employee relationship must first be established. In this instance, since it is
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petitioner here who is claiming to be an employee of J.T.A, the burden of proving the
existence of an employer-employee relationship lies upon him. Unfortunately, petitioner
failed to discharge this burden.

Applying the "four-fold test" in determining the existence of an employer-employee

relationship, to wit: (a) the selection and engagement of the employee; (b) the payment of
wages; (c) the power of dismissal; and (d) the power to control the employee's conduct, the
NLRC, as affirmed by the CA, found that petitioner failed to prove, by competent and relevant
evidence that he is an employee of J.T.A.

To prove the element of payment of wages, petitioner submitted pay slips allegedly
issued by J.T.A. Significantly, the pay slips presented by petitioner bore no indication
whatsoever as to their source. Absent any clear indication that the amount petitioner was
allegedly receiving came from J.T.A, we cannot concretely establish payment of wages. In
Valencia v. Classique Vinyl Products Corporation, the Court rejected the pay slips submitted
by the petitioner employee because they did not bear the name of the respondent company.
Thus, we cannot sustain petitioner's argument that the failure to indicate who issued the pay
slips should not be taken against him. Moreover, a perusal of the pay slips submitted by
petitioner would show that he had been receiving compensation as early as February 2014.
This clearly belies petitioner's allegation in his complaint that he was hired by JT A only on
December 26, 2014. To Our minds, the wide gap between February 2014 and December
2014 cannot be dismissed as a trivial inconsistency.

Additionally, there were no deductions from petitioner's supposed salary such as

withholding tax, SSS, Philhealth or Pag-Ibig Fund contributions which are the usual
deductions from employees' salaries. Thus, the alleged pay slips may not be treated as
competent evidence of petitioner's claim that he is J.T. A’s employee. In contrast, the
voluminous documentary evidence adduced by J.T.A, i.e., alpha list of employees submitted
to the BIR for the period of 2014, 2015 and 2016, the years during which petitioner claims
to have been employed by J.T.A, the payroll monthly reports as well as the remittances
made by JTA of its employees' monthly contributions to the SSS, Philhealth and Pag-Ibig
Fund, which were duly signed by J.T.A's authorized representative and stamp received by
the concerned government agencies, indubitably show that petitioner was not among its
employees. To reiterate, not even a single document showed petitioner's name on it.

As to the power of control, petitioner insists that the copies of driver's itinerary issued
by J.T.A clearly manifest that it exercised control over the means and methods by which
petitioner performed his tasks.

While it is true that the purported driver's itineraries presented by petitioner prescribed
the manner by which his work as a driver is to be carried out, the NLRC pertinently observed
that the said driver's itineraries were not signed by JTA's authorized personnel. In other
words, the said driver's itineraries failed to give details on who specifically dispatched
petitioner. Moreover, the company name appearing thereon is "J.T.A. Packaging" while the
name of respondent company in its certificate of incorporation is "J.T.A. Packaging
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Corporation". Too, the address appearing on the driver's itineraries is different from the
actual office address of respondent J.T.A as reflected in petitioner's own complaint before
the LA. To our minds, the determination of the identity of the authorized personnel of J.T.A
who actually dispatched petitioner gains more importance in light of the unexplained
discrepancies in the company name and address appearing on the driver's itineraries. Absent
this, it cannot be ascertained who actually exercised control over petitioner. Thus, we find
that the herein driver's itineraries did not adequately establish the element of control.

In sum, petitioner failed to sufficiently discharge the burden of showing with legal
certainty that employee-employer relationship existed between him and J.T.A. On the other
hand, it was clearly shown by J.T.A that petitioner was not among its employees.
Consequently, the allegation that he was illegally dismissed by J.T.A must necessarily fail.
Settled is the rule that quasi-judicial bodies, like the NLRC, have acquired expertise in
the specific matters entrusted to their jurisdiction. Thus, their findings of facts are accorded
not only respect but even finality if they are supported by substantial evidence. Such factual
findings are given more weight when affirmed by the CA.

Finally, petitioner's reliance in the case of Opulencia v. National Labor Relations

Commission (Opulencia) is misplaced as the said case is not on all fours with the present
case. In Opulencia, the petitioner company likewise submitted its payroll to prove that the
respondent employee Esita was not among its employees. The Court, however, rejected the
payroll in view of the rebuttal testimonies of witnesses admitting that not all the names of
the employees were reflected in the payroll. The Court explained that for a payroll to be
utilized to disprove the employment of a person, it must contain a true and complete list of
the employees.

Our ruling in Opulencia is not squarely applicable in the instant case for the following
reasons: (1) unlike in Opulencia, there was no testimony of witnesses stating that the payroll
did not contain a true and complete list of the employees of J.T.A; (2) in contrast with
Opulencia, the payroll submitted by J.T.A covered the entire period during which petitioner
claimed to have been employed by them and not only a particular period; and (3) far from
Opulencia where only the payroll was submitted to disprove Esita' s employment, J.T.A in
this case presented corroborating evidence to negate petitioner's claim of employment, i.e.,
alpha list of employees from 2014-2016 and remittances and registration of its employees
with the SSS, Philhealth and Pag-Ibig, which were all duly signed by J.T.A's authorized
representative and properly filed with the concerned government agencies, all of which did
not include petitioner's name.

All told, we find no reversible error on the part of the CA in holding that the NLRC did
not act with grave abuse of discretion in finding that no employer-employee existed between
petitioner and JTA.

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FALLO/DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DENIED. The Decision dated October
11, 2018 and Resolution dated January 24, 2019 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
154362 are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

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CELESTINO M. JUNIO vs. PACIFIC OCEAN MANNING, MEGA CHEMICAL TANKER,

and ERLINDA S. AZUCENA
G.R. No. 220657, March 16, 2022
M. LOPEZ, J.:

FACTS:
Celestino worked for Pacific Ocean Manning, Inc. (Pacific Manning) for 16 years, when
on January 24, 2011, Celestino entered into another 9-month Employment Contract on behalf
of its foreign principal, Mega Chemical Tanker (Mega Tanker), to serve as a Fitter onboard
MCT Monte Rosa, where Celestino underwent a pre-medical employment examination and
found to be fit to work and boarded the MCT Monte Rosa on January 30, 2011. On June 15,
2011, an accident occurred that resulted in Celestino reporting to his Chief Engineer about
the injury to his left eye, but his request for a medical examination was denied as they were
about to leave for the next port. On September 11, 2011, Celestino collapsed in the engine
room where his supervisor made an Accident/Incident Report, prompting the Ship Captain to
refer him to an offshore physician, Dr. Daniel Jenkins III who have him underwent magnetic
resonance imaging with attention to his left eye, blood and urine tests resulting to the
issuance of a health insurance claim form indicating that the findings were not work-related.

Celestino was repatriated on September 21, 2011, and he reported to Pacific Manning
after 2 days where his request for medical treatment was denied. During his debriefing,
Celestino made another request for medical treatment, but the Pacific Manning Crewing
Manager ignored him prompted Celestino to file a Complaint on February 10, 2012, against
the respondents for payment of permanent total disability benefits, sickness allowance,
damages, and attorney’s fees. On April 19, 2012, Celestino sought the medical opinion of Dr.
May S. Donato-Tan (Dr. Tan) who diagnosed him with trauma to the left eye, hypertension,
and hypertensive arteriosclerotic cardiovascular disease, and concluded that Celestino was
unfit for duty as a seaman and advised him to consult an ophthalmologist and a cardiologist.

The Labor Arbiter dismissed Celestino’s petition, taking into consideration that the
Respondent’s alleged that the petitioner was cleared during his medical check-up in Houston,
Texas and his injury and illnesses are not work-related nor arising from an accident,
supported by the completion of the petitioner of his contract, having submitted the Sign Off
Crew Reporting Details as an indication of his EOD or end of duty, and that Celestino did not
request for post-employment medical examination within 3 days from his repatriation nor did
he mention during his debriefing and that the petitioner refused for a physical examination
to verify his condition on April 24, 2012.

On Appeal, the NLRC reversed the Decision rendered by the Labor Arbiter by giving
credence to Celestino’s claim that his left eye was accidentally injured while performing work
that caused him to pass out and that his diagnosis from the partial tear in his posterior
retinae, sinusitis, hyperlipidemia, and acute gastroduodenitis were found during his MRI and
the reason for his medical repatriation, a month before Celestino completed his 9-month
contract, and that the petitioner requested for a post-employment medical examination 3-
days upon repatriation but Pacific Manning turned him down. NLRC also sustained Dr. Tan’s
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assessment that Celestino was permanently unfit to work as a seafarer. NLRC denied the
motion for reconsideration of the respondents in a Resolution dated May 9, 2013, and
awarded Celestino permanent total disability.

Respondents filed a petition for certiorari with the CA who ruled in their favor,
reversing the resolution of NLRC and reinstating the LA’s Decision for finding that Celestino
failed to observe the mandatory 3-day reporting requirement by his failure to establish that
he immediately informed Pacific Manning of his medical condition upon his return to the
Philippines and that Celestino failed to prove that he suffered an accident on June 15, 2011,
that caused his eye injury. The Sign-Off Crew Reporting Details form, the absence of an eye
injury in the Debriefing of Personnel form, and the crewing manager’s affidavit are the basis
of CA to bar Celestino from claiming disability benefits. Celestino’s motion for reconsideration
was denied by CA on August 26, 2015.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Celestino is entitled to the payment of permanent total disability
benefits after suffering injuries while performing work within the 9-month contract with the
Pacific Manning.

RULING/RATIO DECIDENDI:
Yes, the petitioner is entitled to the payment of permanent total disability
benefits.

The petitioner was medically repatriated and was able to report to Pacific Manning
within the mandatory 3-day period under the POEA-SEC and proved that he suffered an eye
injury while onboard MCT Monte Rosa. The absence of a valid post-employment medical
examination due to Pacific Manning refusal to refer Celestino to a company-designated
physician cannot shield them from their liability. Celestino, in addition to his award of
permanent total disability benefits, sickness allowance, and attorney’s fees, SC stated that
the Petitioner shall have a legal interest of 6% per annum from the finality of the Resolution
of the monetary award.

The petition is granted. The rulings of the labor authorities based on the finding
that Celestino’s medical condition is not work-related are seriously flawed just because Dr.
Jenkins certified that his injury was not work-related and that the Petitioner did not comply
with the mandatory 3-day mandatory post-medical examination requirement nor did the
petitioner mentioned his medical condition during his Debriefing.

It bears to stress that there is no issue as to the compensability of the petitioner's health
condition since the parties do not dispute that it is work-related. What remains to be resolved
is whether he is entitled to the payment of permanent total disability benefits or to that which
corresponds to Disability Grade 11 of the POEA-SEC.

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FALLO/DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
FOR THESE REASONS, the Court GRANTS the petition. The Decision dated January
5, 2015 and Resolution dated August 26, 2015 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
130892 are REVERSED. The Decision dated March 27, 2013 of the National Labor Relations
Commission in NLRC LAC No. OFW (M) 11-000007-13, awarding US$60,000.00 permanent
total disability benefits, US$2,792.00 sickness allowance, or their peso equivalent at the time
of payment, plus ten percent (10%) thereof as attorney's fees in favor of petitioner Celestino
M. Junio is REINSTATED with MODIFICATION in that respondents Pacific Ocean Manning,
Inc., represented by its President/Manager Erlinda S. Azucena, and Mega Chemical Tanker
are ORDERED to likewise pay interest on the monetary awards at the rate of six percent
(6%) per annum from the date of finality of this Resolution until full payment.

SO ORDERED.

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PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. REGINA WENDELINA

BEGINO Y ROGERO, et.al.,
G.R. No. 251150, March 16, 2022
LOPEZ, M., J.:

FACTS:
In September 2011, Milagros Olila received a phone call from Regina Begino and
Darwin Arevalo, who were purportedly conducting interviews for applicants who were willing
to work as apple pickers in Canada. Milagros, who was interested in the opportunity, met
with the two in Tabaco, Albay to discuss the terms of the engagement. Darwin interviewed
her and gave her a list of requirements. Among them were fees amounting to approximately
ten thousand (10,000) pesos. Regina recorded the said amount in an index card.

Elated, Milagros shared the job opportunity to her nieces, Maelene and Geraldine, and
her friend Gloria. The three women, on several dates likewise gave placement fees to Regina
and Darwin, with the promise of them earning high compensation abroad.

However, the four women neither get to leave for Canada nor get their money back,
since the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) conducted an entrapment operation and
arrested Regina for illegal recruitment activities. The operatives recovered from Regina
several index cards evidencing the payments made by Milagros and the others. Regina and
Darwin were charged with large-scale illegal recruitment and three (3) counts of Estafa before
the RTC.

During trial, the Petitioners offered in evidence a certification from the POEA stating
that Respondent had no license to recruit workers abroad. On the contrary, Regina denied
the accusations and claimed that she did not promise overseas employment nor receive
money from Petitioners. She further claims to have also been a victim of Darwin’s
machinations.

The RTC convicted Regina of large-scale illegal recruitment and 3 counts of Estafa.
The RTC opined that Regina represented having authority to send the complainants abroad,
but it never materialized. Aggrieved, Respondent elevated the case to the Court of Appeals,
questioning only her conviction of large scale illegal recruitment. Later, the CA affirmed
Regina’s guilt.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Regina committed large-scale illegal recruitment

RULING/RATIO DECIDENDI:
Yes, Regina committed large-scale illegal recruitment.

Republic Act No. 8042, or the Migrant Workers and Migrant Overseas Filipino Act of
1999, amended by RA No. 10022, broadened the concept of illegal recruitment under the

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Labor Code and provided stiffer penalties, especially those that constitute economic
sabotage. Here, all the elements of large-scale illegal recruitment are present, to wit:

1. The offender has no valid license or authority required by law to enable him to
lawfully engage in recruitment and placement of workers;

2. The offender undertakes any of the activities within the meaning of “recruitment
and placement,” under Article 13 (b) of the Labor Code, or any of the prohibited
practices enumerated under Article 34 of the Labor Code (now section 6 of RA 8042);

3. The Offender commits any of the acts of recruitment and placement against three
(3) or more persons, individually or as a group.

The prosecution sufficiently established that Regina engaged in recruitment activities

and gave the complainants the impression that she had the power to send them abroad for
work. Regina directly transacted with the Complainants regarding the job prospect in Canada
and personally assisted them in completing the requirements for deployment. She likewise
received money as placement fees and gave assurances that they will earn high
compensation for their purported jobs overseas.

Further, Regina had no authority to engage in recruitment activities. She did not
contest the POEA certification that she was not duly licensed to deploy workers for overseas
employment. Finally, there were 4 individuals who testified against her, which qualified the
economic sabotage element of the crime.

FALLO/DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED. The Court of Appeals’ Decision dated
March 27, 2019 in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 10477 is AFFIRMED. The accused-appellant Regina
Wendelina Begino y Rogero is found guilty of large-scale illegal recruitment and is sentenced
to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a fine of Php 5,000,000.00.

SO ORDERED.

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PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MARY JANE DELA CONCEPCION y VALDEZ

a.k.a. "JUDITH A. VALDEZ" a.k.a. "OFELIA ANDAYA,"
G.R. No. 251876, March 21, 2022
LEONEN, J.:

FACTS:
Accused-Appellant Mary Jane Dela Concepcion, along with a certain Vecita Sabacan
Villareal, represent themselves to have the capacity to contract, enlist and transport Filipino
workers for employment abroad.

From July 2012 to February 19, 2014, Mary Jane promised employment abroad to
more than 30 applicants, in exchange for the payment of processing their necessary
documents. By showing some proof of processed documents, applicants were swayed into
applying for jobs abroad. They were convinced that within months they were to be employed
and secure job abroad, thus, they paid the fees collected by accused.

However, upon payment of the required processing fees, Mary Jane instructed them
to wait, but never heard from her again. They tried to contact her and to follow up about the
status of their employment but to no avail. The fees paid by the applicants were not returned.

Due to this, the victims filed criminal complaints against Mary Jane for illegal
recruitment, large-scale illegal recruitment and estafa.

In its March 23, 2018 Consolidated Decision, the Regional Trial Court found Mary Jane
guilty of simple illegal recruitment, illegal recruitment committed in large scale, and estafa.

On appeal to the Court of Appeals, Mary Jane insisted that the trial court erred since
not all the elements of the crimes charged were proven. In its assailed August 23, 2019
Decision, the Court of Appeals sustained Mary Jane’s conviction.

Hence, this appeal to the Supreme Court wherein Mary Jane is arguing that the
prosecution failed to prove all the elements of simple illegal recruitment, illegal recruitment
in large scale, and estafa.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Mary Jane is guilty of simple illegal recruitment, illegal recruitment on
a large scale, and estafa.

RULING/RATIO DECIDENDI:
Yes, Mary Jane is guilty of simple illegal recruitment, illegal recruitment on
a large scale, and estafa, as all the elements for each crime were present.

Under Republic Act No. 8042, as amended by Republic Act No. 10022, illegal recruitment is
defined as any act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring, or
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procuring workers and includes referring, contract services, promising or advertising for
employment abroad, whether for profit or not, when undertaken by non-licensee or non-
holder of authority. Also, it is deemed committed in large scale if committed against three
(3) or more persons individually or as a group.

In this case, all the elements are present for illegal recruitment and for a large-scale
illegal recruitment. Accused-appellant admitted collecting fees for processing documents like
medical requirements and Department of Foreign Affairs documents, preparatory to the
supposed deployment of private complainants. Apart from this, accused-appellant had no
license or authority to recruit and deploy workers abroad. Accused-appellant's acts gave the
impression that she could deploy private complainants overseas.

It is also proven that apart from all the elements of simple illegal recruitment, she
committed the crime against more than three (3) persons, therefore, it qualified as a large-
scale illegal recruitment.

On the other part, accused-appellant is also guilty of estafa when her false pretenses
led private complainants to part with various amounts of money, hoping for a job abroad,
which unfortunately never deployed and were never reimbursed. Thus, they suffered
damage.

FALLO/DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the August 23, 2019 Decision of the Court of
Appeals in C.A.G.R. CR HC No. 11451 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION:

1. In Criminal Case No. 15-316295, accused-appellant Mary Jane Dela Concepcion y

Valdez a.k.a. “Judith A. Valdez” a.k.a. “Ofelia Andaya” is found GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of simple illegal recruitment as defined and penalized under Sections
6 and 7, paragraph (a) of Republic Act No. 8042, as amended. She is sentenced to
suffer the penalty of twelve (12) years and one (1) day, as MINIMUM, to twenty (20)
years, as MAXIMUM, and is ordered to pay a fine of P1,000,000.00;

2. In Criminal Case No. 15-316296, accused Mary Jane Dela Concepcion y Valdez
a.k.a. “Judith A. Valdez” a.k.a. “Ofelia Andaya” 1s found GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt of illegal recruitment in large scale, constituting economic sabotage, as defined
and penalized under Sections 6 and 7, paragraph (a) of Republic Act No. 8042, as
amended. She is sentenced to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment, and is ordered
to pay a fine of P5,000,000.00;

3. In Criminal Case No. 15-316311, accused Mary Jane Dela Concepcion y Valdez
a.k.a.“Judith A. Valdez” a.k.a. “Ofelia Andaya” is found GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt of estafa as defined and penalized under Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of the
Revised Penal Code. She is sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of four
(4) months of arresto mayor, as MINIMUM, to one (1) year and one (1) day of
prision correccional, as MAXIMUM, and is
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ordered to indemnify private complainant Mary Grace Dulay y Diap in the amount
of P60,000.00 as actual damages, with legal interest of 6% per annum from the
finality of this Decision until full payment;

4. In Criminal Case No. 15-316314, accused Mary Jane Dela Concepcion y Valdez
a.k.a. “Judith A. Valdez” a.k.a. “Ofelia Andaya” is found GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt of estafa as defined and penalized under Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of the
Revised Penal Code. She is sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of four
(4) months of arresto mayor, as MINIMUM to one (l) year and one (1) day of prision
correccional as MAXIMUM, and is ordered to indemnify private complainant
Meonardo Parial y Garinggan in the amount of P45,000.00 as actual damages, with
legal interest of 6% per annum from the finality of this Decision until full payment;

5. In Criminal Case No. 15-316330, accused Mary Jane Dela Concepcion y Valdez
a.k.a. “Judith A. Valdez” a.k.a. “Ofelia Andaya” is found GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt of estafa as defined and penalized under Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of the
Revised Penal Code. She is sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of six (6)
months of arresto mayor, and is ordered to indemnify private complainant Aileene D.
Laureano in the amount of P40,000.00 as actual damages, with legal interest of 6%
per annum from the finality of this Decision until full payment;

6. In Criminal Case No. 15-316332, accused Mary Jane Dela Concepcion y Valdez
a.k.a. “Judith A. Valdez” a.k.a. “Ofelia Andaya” is found GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt of estafa as defined and penalized under Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of the
Revised Penal Code. She is sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of six (6)
months of arresto mayor and is ordered to indemnify private complainant Jennifer D.
Laureano in the amount of P40,000.00 as actual damages, with legal interest of 6%
per annum' 0’ from the finality of this Decision until full payment.

SO ORDERED.

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ARIEL M. REYES vs. RURAL BANK OF SAN RAFAEL (BULACAN) INC., FLORANTE
VENERACION, CELERINA SABARIAGA, ALICA FLOR KABILING, FIDELA MANAGO,
CEFERINO DE GUZMAN, and RIZALINO QUINTOS
G.R. No. 230597, March 23, 2022
HERNANDO, J.:

FACTS:
Petitioner, Ariel M. Reyes was the Compliance Officer of respondent, Rural Bank of
San Rafael (Bulacan) Inc. (RBSR). An anomaly happened in the bank wherein, there are
discrepancies in the amounts of the purchase price of stock subscriptions from the original
receipts against the duplicate receipts.

An investigation was conducted by the bank and discovered the discrepancies. As

mandated by the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP) the prompt report of anomalies is
required. Hence, the Board of Directors required Reyes to certify the approved Report on
Crimes and Losses, which he refused for the reason that he cannot completely validate said
report for lack of material data and evidence, and that he was being pressured to certify the
report.

RBSR instead of furnishing Reyes of the hard copies of the reports and its original
attachments, issued Reyes two show cause orders and put him on preventive suspension for
neglect of duty. Respondent contends that Reyes ignored all scheduled administrative
hearings.

Reyes, together with Bognot and Eusebio were principally accused of

theft/misappropriation of funds by the RBSR. Together, they filed a Complaint on March 25,
2013, against respondents for illegal suspension and money claims and subsequently file an
Amended Complaint to include illegal dismissal.

The Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of Reyes and held that the RBSR is guilty of illegally
dismissing them. The respondents failed to file its Position Paper and submit evidence during
proceedings; hence, the Labor Arbiter was constrained to rule on the case based solely on
the complainant’s evidence which shows that they were dismissed without a valid cause and
that they were denied due process for having summarily dismissed. The burden of proof
showing that the employee was dismissed for a valid cause is incumbent upon the employer.
The LA directed the respondent to pay the complainants their backwages, separation pay,
accrued leave benefits and proportionate 13 th month pay.

Respondents elevated the case to NLRC which reversed the LA’s ruling. It held that in
applying a liberal interpretation and relaxing the procedural rules, the substantial justice must
prevail over technicalities. It allowed respondents to submit countervailing evidence on
appeal and found that complainants were not illegally dismissed. It ruled that respondents
were able to discharge the burden of proving that they had a just cause to terminate
complainant’s employment.

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On appeal, the CA affirmed the Decision of NLRC and held that the latter did not
commit grave abuse of discretion in relaxing its procedural rules. The respondents’ failure to
file their Position Paper and submit their evidence was justified and satisfactorily explained
since they were not given summons, nor notified of the scheduled preliminary conference
and further hearings after the amended complaint was filed. The CA also ruled that
petitioners were validly dismissed for a just and valid cause.

Reyes and Bognot filed a Motion for Reconsideration but was denied on March 08,
2017.

Reyes then elevated the case to the Supreme Court via a Petition for Review on
Certiorari, while Bognot did not joined Reyes on his petition.

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the CA erred in affirming the NLRC Decision which reversed the
ruling of the Labor Arbiter; and
2. Whether or not Reyes was illegally dismissed.

RULING/RATIO DECIDENDI:
1. Yes, the CA erred in affirming the NLRC Decision.

The Court does not agree to the assertion of the respondents that the NLRC and CA
were correct in allowing them to present evidence, albeit belatedly; otherwise, their right to
due process would have been denied.

As observed by the Labor Arbiter, respondents have unjustifiably missed at least two
settings (1) on June 4, 2013, after complainants filed their amended complaint, they filed
their Position Paper. The respondents failed to appear but their counsel and representative
appeared much earlier than the scheduled date of hearing and secured a photocopy of
amended complaint; and (2) respondents missed the hearing on June 19, 2013 despite
having been directed prior by the arbiter to attend. It must also be noted that at this point
in time, respondents have already obtained a copy of the amended complaint which would
have enabled them to intelligently respond.

The Court also, does not agree with the ruling of CA that the failure to file the Position
Paper and adduced their evidence is due to the failure of the arbiter to issue summons or
lack of notice, because the fact remains that respondents have already obtained a copy of
the amended complaint, and have been duly notified of the June 19, 2013 hearing.

The issuance of summons is done in order to apprise the respondent of the case filed
and as means to furnish them a copy of the complaint so they can intelligently respond.

However, the findings of facts of both the Labor Arbiter and NLRC both revealed that
they are in accord with and complement each other on the following points: (1) that
respondents were able to earlier secure a copy of the amended complaint; and (2) that
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respondents were absent during the June 4, 2013 and June 19, 2013 hearings; and third,
the respondents’ absences are unexplained.

The Court also took note that since early June 2013, up to the promulgation of the
arbiter’s Decision on February 24, 2014, respondents made no initiative to demand their day
in court or have at least pleaded for the arbiter to reopen the proceedings and admit their
Position Paper, if there ever was one. If respondents truly hold sacred their right to due
process, they would have wasted no time nor missed no opportunity to assert such right as
early as during the initial stages of the proceeding. Respondents, at the very least knew that
a complaint was filed against them which should have prompted to be more proactive in the
proceedings. In the Court’s view, this cavalier attitude exhibited by respondents reeks of
negligence and disrespect to duly instituted authorities and rules of procedures, either of
which the Court can never tolerate.

It was already discussed earlier that respondents failed to adequately explain and justify
their non-participation in the proceedings before the arbiter; hence, the application of more
liberal policy is unwarranted. Besides, the policy of relaxed procedural rules in labor
proceedings is mainly for the benefit of the employee, and not the employer.

The labor force is a special class that is constitutionally protected. The principles
embodied by all prevailing labor rules, legislations and regulations are derived from the
Constitution, which intensely protects the working individual and deeply promotes social
justice. It recognizes the reality that normally, the laborer stands on unequal footing as
opposed to an employer. Even labor proceedings are amicably conducted without a need to
avail for a counsel because it recognizes the sad fact that a common employee does not or
have extremely limited means to secure legal services nor the mettle to endure the extremely
antagonizing and adversarial atmosphere of a formal legal battle or to expect them to be
perfectly compliant at all times with every single twist and turn of legal technicality. However,
the same cannot hold true with employer who has the capacity to hire the services of a
counsel. Indeed, those who have less in life, should have more in law.

A liberal interpretation of the technical rules of procedure may be allowed if only to further
bridge the gap between an employee and an employer. However, it does not mean that the
rules may never be relaxed in favor of the employer and that labor dispute will be
automatically decided in favor of labor.

A liberal approach may be afforded by an employer; however, it must be measured

against standards stricter than that imposed against the worker, and only in compelling and
justified cases where the employer will definitely suffer injustice should such liberal
interpretation be disallowed.

2. Yes, Reyes was illegally dismissed by RSBR.

In dismissing Reyes, the RBSR sent him the following:

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a) First, a “Show Cause Order and Preventive Suspension” dated March 22, 2013 on
the grounds of refusal of Reyes to do his duty and failure to observe his principal
function to oversee and coordinate the implementation of the Compliance System
which caused significant prejudice and damage to the Bank.

b) Second, a document was issued with the subject “Administrative Case” dated April
14, 2013 notifying Reyes of a hearing schedule on Aril 10, 2013;

c) Third, another “Show Cause Order” directing him to explain within five (5) days
from receipt, why he should not be held administratively accountable and liable for
participation in the theft/misappropriation of the funds invested by and due to Mrs.
Fidela M. Mañago with the RBSR and for covering up such anomaly/offense; and

d) Finally, a Notice of Termination dated April 26, 2013.

Book Five, Rule XXIII, Section 2 of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code
provides:

SECTION 2. Standard of due process; requirements of notice. – In all cases of

termination of employment, the following standards of due process shall be
substantially observed:

1. For termination of employment based on just causes as defined in Article 282 of the
Code:

a) A written notice served on the employee specifying the ground or grounds for
termination and giving to said employee reasonable opportunity within which to
explain his side;

b) A hearing or conference during which the employee concerned, with the assistance
of counsel if the employee so desires, is given opportunity to respond to the charge,
present his evidence or rebut the evidence presented against him;

c) A written notice of termination served on the employee indicating that upon due
consideration of all the circumstances, grounds have been substantially established to
justify his termination.

d) It is true that Reyes was given sufficient opportunity to explain his side during
investigation; however, it cannot be determined with reasonable certainty on what
grounds the charges pressed against Reyes were based on, and which ones were
proven. Reyes was initially charged of insubordination or neglect of duty, but the show
cause order surprisingly accused him of participation in the alleged
theft/misappropriation, and neither is there any showing that the same has been
established nor is it specifically mentioned as the reason for his dismissal. Clearly, this
is not the kind of notice contemplated by the Labor Code and its implementing rules.
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The Court also finds that there is no valid cause to dismiss Reyes. Thus, it cannot agree
in the ruling of CA that there is a valid cause to dismiss Reyes since he has no valid
justification to refuse to certify the report; hence, an act of willful disobedience which is a
just cause for the termination of an employee based on Article 297 of the Labor Code.

There is no question that Reyes’ refusal to certify the Report on Crimes and Losses
was intentional and a clear disobedience. However, based on the findings of CA, Reyes refusal
to make the attestation on the reason that no independent investigation was conducted and
that he cannot completely validate the report for lack of material data and evidence is based
on his honest assessment.

FALLO/DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby GRANTED. The July 22, 2016 Decision of the
Court of Appeals and March 8, 2017 Resolution in CA-G.R. SP No. 139099, are REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. The February 24, 2014 Decision of the Labor Arbiter in NLRC Case No. RAB-
III-03-19924-13, is REINSTATED with MODIFICATION in the petitioner Ariel M. Reyes’
backwages shall be computed from the time of dismissal up to the finality of this Decision.
All other matters not otherwise modified stand.

SO ORDERED.

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COLEGIO SAN AGUSTIN-BACOLOD AND/OR FR. FREDERICK C. COMENDADOR

vs. MELINDA M. MONTAÑO
G.R. No. 212333, March 28, 2022
HERNANDO, J:

FACTS:
This case arose from a complaint for illegal suspension, illegal dismissal separation
pay, diminution of benefits, moral and exemplary damages, and attorney’s fees filed by
respondent Dr. Melinda M. Montano (respondent) against petitioners Colegio San Agustin-
Bacolod (CSA-Bacolod) and its president Fr. Frederick C. Comendador. CSA-Bacolod is an
educational institution duly organized and existing under the laws of the Philippines. CSA-
Bacolod first employed respondents as a chemistry instructor in 1973. In 2003, she was
appointed school registrar, her appointment was renewed several times.

Respondent alleged that in her reappointment letter for the 2009-2011 term, there was
a diminution of her salary; her basic salary was reduced from P33, 319.00 to P26,658.20.
She thus wrote to the Human Resource Director to seek an explanation. It was the school
president who responded, and he stated that her total gross pay did not change as the school
merely opted to break down the amount of honorarium. Respondent claimed that this was
the time when the president started to show his bias against her. Thereafter, the respondent
was suspended, and her employment was eventually terminated due to complaints from two
faculty members alleging that she allowed some students to attend the graduation ceremony
despite not meeting the requirements.

These events led to her filing of a complaint. Respondent admitted that she allowed
certain students to join the March 2009 graduation ceremony in CSA-Bacolod even if they
did not pass some of their subjects. She claimed that she merely continued the practice of
previous registrars; she even imposed more stringent rules in determining when ineligible
students may join the rights. She added that she allowed these students to participate due
to humanitarian reasons.

Respondent claimed that the management did not consider her explanation and she
was instead served with a notice of charges on January 20, 2010. She asserted that the basis
of the notice was not really the letter complaints but mere letters seeking for clarification of
the school’s policy regarding graduation. She also questioned the jurisdiction of the
Disciplinary Committee created by the president.

CSA-Bacolod, for its defense, posited that the respondent’s suspension and eventual
dismissal were due to gross misconduct resulting in loss of trust and confidence. Respondent
had been reminding the college deans that students with academic deficiencies should not
be allowed to participate in the graduation exercises. As a result, the president ordered that
a report be submitted regarding the matter. The concerned faculty members submitted
reports naming four students who were allowed to participate despite failing in some of their
subjects.

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A notice of charges was issued to respondents for gross misconduct, tampering of school
records, and willful breach of trust and confidence or gross negligence. At the same time,
she was placed under preventive suspension for 30 days. Although, the respondent submitted
her response to the notice, she refused to attend the hearing of the Ad Hoc Committee.
Another hearing was held and the respondent attended this time. The Ad Hoc Committee
deliberated and thereafter recommended the termination of the respondent’s employment
for gross misconduct and willful breach of trust and confidence. The president issued a notice
of termination dated February 20, 2010.

Ruling of the Labor Arbiter. In its November 23, 2010 Decision, the LA ruled in
favor of the respondent, finding her suspension and dismissal illegal. This resulted in the
award of backwages, separation pay, damages, and attorney’s fees. It also awarded salary
differentials due to diminution of benefits.

In ruling the respondent’s preventive suspension was illegal, the LA found that her
continued presence in the school during the investigation would not have posed a serious
and imminent threat to the life or property of the school and its employees.

As to the respondent’s dismissal, the LA found that her act cannot be construed as
gross or serious misconduct. Respondents had basis in allowing the ineligible students to
attend the graduation rites: a long-standing practice as also observed by the previous
registrars.

The LA concluded that respondent’s offense is just simple misconduct for which the
penalty of dismissal is not commensurate.In addition to backwages, the LA awarded
separation pay in lieu of reinstating respondent because of the strained relations brought
about by the incidents that led to this case.

Ruling of the Court of Appeals. In its July 10, 2013 Decision, the CA reversed the
NLRC Decision and reinstated the LA Decision with modification on the award of money
claims.

The CA ruled that respondent’s act was indeed an act of misconduct; however, it was
not serious enough to warrant the penalty of dismissal. There was no wrongful intent. This
was shown by the respondent’s argument that she acted in accordance with a long-standing
practice, that she was prompted by humanitarian reasons, and that the process of allowing
the ineligible students was well documented by letter requests consented to by their parents
and endorsed by the respective deans.

The CA did not award moral damages as the findings of illegal dismissal does
automatically warrant moral damages—bad faith on the part of the employer was not proven.
Notably, the CA did not elaborate on the legality of the preventive suspension and award of
salary differential.

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ISSUES:
1. Whether the respondent was illegally dismissed from service; and
2. Whether the respondent is entitled to a salary differential as a result of the alleged
diminution of benefits.

RULING/RATIO DECIDENDI:
1. Yes, the respondent was validly dismissed from employment. The petition
is partially meritorious. The court finds that the respondent was validly dismissed
from employment. Resultantly, she is not entitled to back wages, separation pay,
moral and exemplary damages, and attorney’s fees.

For the dismissal from the employment to be valid, substantive and procedural due
process must be observed. Substantive due process provides that the employee must not be
dismissed without just or authorized cause as provided by law. A procedural due process on
the other hand provides for the employer’s compliance with the procedure set out by the
Labor Code and related rules.

The Labor Code provides for the just causes for the valid termination of employment:

Article 297. [282] Termination by Employer- An employer may terminate an

employment for any of the following causes:

(a) Serious misconduct or willful disobedience by the employee of the lawful orders of
his employer or representative in connection with his work;
(b) Gross and habitual neglect by the employee of his duties;
(c) Fraud or willful breach by the employee of the trust reposed in him by his employer
or duly authorized representative;
(d) Commission of a crime or offense by the employee against the person of his
employer or any immediate member of his family or his duly authorized representative;
and
(e) Other causes are analogous to the foregoing.

Absent a just cause, or broadly, failure to comply with the substantive due process, an
employer’s dismissal of an employee becomes illegal and entitles the employee to
reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and other privileges, full back wages inclusive
of allowances, and to other benefits or their monetary equivalent computed from the time
compensation was withheld up to the time of actual reinstatement.

With the finding that the respondent is validly dismissed from employment, it follows
that she is not entitled to back wages, separation pay, moral and exemplary damages, and
attorney’s fees.

2. Yes, the respondent is entitled to the salary differential as a result of the

diminution of benefits.

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The Court finds that the respondent is entitled to the salary differential as a result of
the diminution of benefits.

There is a diminution of benefits when the following are present: (1) the grant or benefit
is founded on a policy or has ripened into practice over a long period of time; (2) the practice
is consistent and deliberate; (3) the practice is not due to error in the construction or
application of a doubtful or difficult question of law; and (4) the diminution or discontinuance
is done unilaterally by the employer. In addition to policy or company practice, the grant or
benefit may also be founded on a written contract. Consistent with the constitutional mandate
of protecting the rights of workers and promoting their welfare, benefits enjoyed by
employees cannot be reduced, diminished, discontinued or eliminated.

The Court, therefore, awards a salary differential due to the diminution of benefits in
the total amount of P54,218.16, as determined by the LA and the CA. Further, the Court
imposes a legal interest of six percent (6%) per annum on this amount from the finality of
this Decision to full payment thereof.

FALLO/DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
WHEREFORE, the Petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The July 10, 2013 Decision and
April 11, 2014 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP. No. 06330 are REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. The April 12, 2011 Decision and June 28, 2011 Resolution of the National
Labor Relations Commissions in NLRC Case No. VAC-01-000069-2011 are REINSTATED
which MODIFICATION in that petitioners Colegio San Agustin-Bacolod and its President,
Fr. Frederick C. Comendador are ORDERED to pay respondent Dr. Melinda M. Montano salary
differential in the amount of P54, 218.16, which shall be subject to the legal interest of six
percent (6%) per annum from the finality of this Decision to full payment thereof.

SO ORDERED.

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SERVFLEX, INC. vs. LOVELYNN M. URERA, SHERRYL I. CABRERA, PRECIOUS C.

PALANCE AND JOCO JIM L. SEVILLA
G.R. No. 246369, MARCH 29, 2022
INTING, J.:

FACTS:
Servflex, Inc. has a contract of service with PLDT for three (3) years commencing on
January 1, 2014 to December 31, 2016. However, even before the commencement of the
said contract, the petitioner had already assigned the respondents at PLDT.

A complaint was filed against the Petitioner. Respondents alleged that petitioner was
a mere labor-only contractor considering that: (1) it had no independent business for which
it hired respondents; (2) respondents' work was integral to the business of PLDT; and (3)
their work performance was under the control of PLDT. PLDT, petitioner, and their officers
countered and averred that petitioner was a legitimate job contractor as shown by: (1) its
registration and certification issued by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and
the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE), respectively; (2) certifications showing
that it had no pending case with the DOLE; (3) its General Information Sheet for the year
2016; and (4) petitioner's goodwill and established clientele.

The Labor Arbiter (LA) ruled declaring Servflex, Inc. as a labor only contractor and
considered merely as an agent of PLDT and the respondents as regular employees of PLDT.
The LA explained that:

One, in the absence of proof that the assets or capital of petitioner was used in the
service it provided to PLDT, petitioner's registration with the DOLE could not be considered
as conclusive proof that it possessed substantial capital for a job contracting services.
Moreover, it was PLDT, not petitioner, which exercised control over respondents as shown
by the following circumstances: (1) respondents were required to work at the premises of
PLDT and the latter required them to follow a work schedule; (2) the Manager and the Section
Head of PLDT supervised and gave work instructions to respondents; and (3) PLDT gave
training and seminars intended for the work development of respondents.

Two, the over-reliance of petitioner and PLDT on the language of their contract of
service, where it was stipulated that petitioner had control over the contract workers, was
"more apparent than real. The determination of whether or not one is carrying an
independent business is not by stipulations in the contract, but on the nature of the activities
performed by [the] employees."

Three, the award of moral and exemplary damages was warranted as the referral of
respondents to petitioner as a condition of employment -to circumvent their security of tenure
was a reflection of bad faith on the part of petitioner and PLDT. Attorney's fees must likewise
be awarded because respondents were forced to file the case to protect their rights and
interest.

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Petitioner and PLDT filed their separate appeals before the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC) and NLRC reversed and set aside the LA Decision and accordingly
dismissed the complaint for lack of merit. The NLRC declared that petitioner was the employer
of respondents as shown by the latter's application for employment, contract of employment,
payslips, leave applications and remittances to government institutions. It ruled that
petitioner was engaged in legitimate job contracting as: (1) it was registered as such with
the DOLE; (2) it was registered with the SEC as a corporation with "contracting" as one of
its purposes; (3) it had an independent business and had clients; and (4) respondents
performed their work in their own manner and method free from control and supervision of
PLDT.

Respondents filed a petition for certiorari with the CA. The CA granted the petition for
certiorari. The CA ruled as follows:

First, respondents were working for PLDT since 2013, or prior to the effectivity
of the service agreement between petitioner and PLDT that only commenced on
January 1, 2014. The arrangement between petitioner and PLDT, if allowed, would
permit them to avoid hiring regular employees and enable them to deny the employees
the right to security of tenure and just keep them indefinitely on a temporary status.

Second, respondents were regular employees of PLDT because petitioner

deployed them to perform activities directly related to the principal business of PLDT.
More particularly, their work as Database Engineers were necessary and indispensable
to the business of PLDT.

Last, the award of moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees was in
order in view of bad faith on the part of petitioner and PLDT in entering the service
agreement to purposely disregard respondents' security of tenure and benefits, and
the latter were compelled to litigate to protect their rights and interests.

Petitioner and PLDT filed their separate motions for reconsideration, which the CA
denied in its Resolution. Aggrieved, petitioner filed the present petition to this court.

ISSUE:
Whether petitioner is an independent contractor or a mere labor-only contractor.

RULING/RATIO DECIDENDI:
No, the petitioner is not an independent contractor but a mere labor-only
contractor.

Labor-only contracting refers to an arrangement whereby a person who does not have
substantial capital or investment deploys workers to the employer for them to perform tasks
that are directly necessary to the employer's principal business. It is present where: (1) a
person who supplies workers to an employer does not possess substantial capital or
investment in the form of tools, pieces of equipment or machinery, work premises, among
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others; and (2) the workers are made to perform tasks which are directly related to the
employer's principal business. Under the circumstances, the intermediary or the person who
assigned the workers to the employer shall be deemed as the latter's agent, and the employer
shall be responsible for the workers, as if it directly hired them.as the latter's agent, and the
employer shall be responsible for the workers, as if it directly hired them.

The presence of a labor-only contracting is evident due to the following reasons:

First, it bears stressing that in the context of labor-only contracting, substantial capital
or investment rests not only on the capitalization indicated in the financial documents but on
the pieces of equipment and machinery, and work premises a person or entity actually and
directly used in the performance of the work or service it contracts out. Here, petitioner did
not at all specify any tool or equipment it owned and supplied respondents for them to
perform their work for PLDT. On the contrary, PLDT provided the relevant tools and the
premises for the performance of respondents' work. More importantly, respondents have
been performing tasks central and necessary to the business of PLDT. Undeniably, all these
matters indicate that PLDT is the employer of respondents. This is as properly observed by
the CA.

Second, there is no clear showing that petitioner had the power of control over
respondents.

Right of control is defined as such "right reserved to the person for whom the services
of the contractual workers are performed, to determine not only the end to be achieved, but
also the manner and means to be used in reaching that end.” The element of control is
indicative of an employer-employee relationship. It does not only relate to a mutually
desirable end intended by the agreement but it is of such a nature as to dictate the means
and methods to be done to achieve the work result.

In the case, PLDT not only possessed, but actually wielded and exercised the power
of control over the work performance of respondents. This is made evident by the following
circumstances duly noted by the LA.

At the same time, the reliance of petitioner on the stipulation under the contract of
service that it has the right of control over respondents is untenable. This is especially true
given that respondents, as stressed by the CA, started working for PLDT since 2013 or even
prior to the execution of the contract of service between petitioner and PLDT. Undoubtedly,
respondents were already under the control and supervision of PLDT and the latter did not
transfer such function by the mere execution of the contract of service with petitioner.

Petitioner's reliance on its certificate of registration is not sufficient to establish that it

is an independent labor contractor. Notably, a certificate of registration with the DOLE is not
a conclusive proof of legitimacy as a manpower provider. The certificate only prevents the
presumption of labor-only contracting from arising. The presumption cannot prevail in this
case, there being overwhelming evidence supporting the conclusion that petitioner is a mere
labor-only contractor.
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FALLO/DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated July 5, 2018 and the
Resolution dated April 1, 2019 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 148586 are
AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in that all the monetary awards shall earn interest at the
rate of 6% per annum from the finality of this Decision until full payment.

SO ORDERED.

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EDNA LUISA B. SIMON vs. THE RESULTS COMPANIES AND JOSELITO SUMCAD,
G.R. Nos. 249351-52, MARCH 29, 2022
INTING, J.:

FACTS:
The instant case stemmed from the Complaint dated October 18,2016 filed by Edna
Luisa B. Simon (petitioner) against The Results Companies (Results), a corporation engaged
in business process outsourcing (BPO), and Joselito Sumicad for illegal dismissal,
underpayment of salaries, nonpayment of separation pays, and discrimination; with claims
for moral damages, exemplary damages, and attorney's fees.

In her Position Paper, petitioner alleged that Results hired her as a Customer Service
Representative on October 6, 2012 until it forced her to resign on December 13, 2012. To
prove her employment, she submitted copies of her identification card and payslips.

In defense, Results averred in its Position Paper that after being notified of petitioner's
Complaint, it conducted a thorough search of her employment records but found none.
Results attributed petitioner's lack of employment records to her short stint of service in the
company, which was only two months and seven days, and the fact that she filed her
complaint four years after her alleged dismissal from service.

Results argued that petitioner's allegation of being forced to resign was incredible for
the reason that if she was truly aggrieved by her alleged constructive dismissal, she should
have immediately filed her Complaint; and she should have not waited for three years and
ten months to lodge it. Results explained that it could not have terminated petitioner from
employment because a two-month probationary employment was insufficient for the
company to assess her fitness for regularization. As such, her separation from work was
possibly brought by her voluntary resignation or absence without official leave (AWOL), a
common occurrence among call center agents transferring from one BPO company to
another.

In the Decision dated January 31, 2017, the LA ruled in favor of petitioner and held
that Results illegally dismissed her from employment. However, the LA ruled that considering
petitioner was a mere probationary employee, she was entitled to backwages only for the
remaining months of her probationary period.

The LA further held that petitioner's monetary claims already prescribed as the
complaint was filed beyond the three-year prescriptive period from the time the cause of
action accrued. Both parties appealed before the NLRC.

Results argued that petitioner was not entitled to backwages as she failed to prove
the fact of her dismissal from employment. For her part, petitioner questioned the LA's
computation of her backwages and her non-entitlement to moral damages, exemplary
damages, and attorney's fees.

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In the Decision dated March 21, 2017, the NLRC agreed with the LA that petitioner
was a probationary employee of Results and that she was illegally dismissed from
employment. As such, the NLRC held that her backwages should be computed only for the
remaining period of her probationary employment. Nevertheless, the NLRC partially granted
the appeal of petitioner by adjusting the rate of her backwages from P13,500.00 to
P15,200.00 a month.

On the other hand, the NLRC dismissed the appeal of Results for lack of merit.
Petitioner and Results both moved for reconsideration of the NLRC ruling, but the NLRC
dismissed their respective motions in the Resolutions dated April 17, 2017 and June 29, 2017.
Aggrieved, both parties filed their respective Petitions for Certiorari before the CA.

In the assailed Decision dated March 28, 2019, the CA reversed and set aside the
ruling of the NLRC and held that petitioner was actually a regular employee of Results for
the following reasons: (1) her job was necessary and desirable to the line of business of
Results; and (2) Results did not inform petitioner of the reasonable standards for her
regularization. However, while the CA found that petitioner was a regular employee of
Results, it ruled that she failed to prove the fact of her dismissal from employment and held
that "the present case falls under a situation wherein there is neither dismissal nor
abandonment. There being no dismissal nor abandonment to speak of, the status quo
between employer and employee should be maintained as a matter of course."

Thus, the CA ordered Results to reinstate petitioner to her previous position without
payment of backwages. Hence, the instant petition before the Court.

ISSUE:
Whether the CA erred in declaring that petitioner was a regular employee of Results
and that she was illegally dismissed from employment.

RULING/RATIO DECIDENDI:
Yes, CA correctly imputed grave abuse of discretion on the part of the NLRC
insofar as the latter ruled that petitioner was a mere probationary employee.

While the Court may resolve only questions of law in a petition for review on certiorari
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, an exception may be made when the factual findings of
the CA and the labor tribunals are contradictory, such as in the case. Here the labor tribunals
found that petitioner was a probationary employee of Results when she was illegally
dismissed from her employment. On the other hand, the CA held that petitioner is deemed a
regular employee of Results but failed to prove the fact of her dismissal from employment.

There is grave abuse of discretion on the part of the NLRC when its findings and
conclusions are not supported by substantial evidence, i.e., that amount of relevant evidence
which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion. Such grave
abuse of discretion on the part of the NLRC warrants the grant of the extraordinary remedy
of certiorari.
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A probationary employee is one who is placed on trial by an employer, during which

the employer determines whether such employee is fit for regularization.

During the period of probationary employment, the objective of the employer is to

observe the fitness of the employee, while the purpose of the latter is to prove his or her
qualification for permanent employment. To accomplish these goals, it is essential in
probationary employment that the employer informs the employee of the reasonable
standards for his or her regularization at the time of engagement. An employer is deemed
to have made known the regularization standards when it has exerted reasonable efforts to
apprise the employee of what he or she is expected to do or accomplish during the trial
period of probation. Otherwise, the probationary employee shall be considered a regular
employee.

Thus, Section 6(d), Rule I, Book VI of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor
Code of the Philippines (Labor Code), as amended by Department Order No. 147-15,
provides:

Section 6. x x x x

(d) In all cases of probationary employment, the employer shall make known to the
employee the standards under which he will qualify as a regular employee at the
time of his engagement. Where no standards are made known to the employee at
that time, he shall be deemed a regular employee.

In Moral v. Momentum Properties Management Corp., the Court, expounding on the

said provision declared:

In other words, the employer is mandated to comply with two requirements when
dealing with a probationary employee, viz.: (1) the employer must communicate the
regularization standards to the probationary employee; and (2) the employer must
make such communication at the time of the probationary employee's engagement.
If the employer fails to abide by any of the aforementioned obligations, the employee
is deemed as a regular, and not a probationary employee. An employer is deemed to
have made known the regularization standards when it has exerted reasonable efforts
to apprise the employee of what he or she is expected to do or accomplish during the
trial period of probation. The exception to the foregoing is when the job is self-
descriptive in nature, such as in the case of maids, cooks, drivers, and messengers.
(Emphasis supplied)

In the case, Results initially denied that petitioner was its employee. However, after
petitioner presented her identification card and payslips, Results took a different stance and
argued that petitioner was its former probationary employee who either voluntarily resigned
or abandoned her job. Having admitted that petitioner was its probationary employee, it was
incumbent upon Results to prove or at least allege that it communicated to petitioner the
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standards under which she would qualify as a regular employee. However, Results neither
presented any evidence such as policy handbook, operations manual, performance appraisal
document nor at least alleged that it informed petitioner of the criteria for regularization.
Indubitably, the ruling of the NLRC that petitioner was a mere probationary employee was
not supported by substantial evidence. Thus, the CA correctly imputed grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the NLRC insofar as the latter ruled that petitioner was merely on
probation is concerned. The Court agrees with the CA that petitioner was deemed a regular
employee of Results by operation of law.

However, the CA erred in concluding that petitioner was not able to prove the fact of
her dismissal for her failure to state the name of the Operations Manager who allegedly
ordered her termination. On this score, the Court agrees with the labor tribunals that Simon
was indeed illegally dismissed from employment.

While it is an established rule that the employer bears the burden of proof to prove
that the employee's dismissal was for a valid or authorized cause, the employee must first
establish by substantial evidence that indeed he or she was dismissed. If there is no
dismissal, then there can be no question as to the legality or illegality thereof.

To prove the fact of her dismissal, petitioner alleges that the Operations Manager of
Results verbally informed her not to report to work anymore. To support her allegation,
petitioner presented the photocopy of her SMS conversation with a certain Lester, her
supervisor, wherein the latter explained that it was the managers of Results who decided to
terminate her.

While petitioner never knew the name of the particular manager who decided to
dismiss her from work, it could be gleaned from the above-quoted text messages that she
was included in the list of the non-rehirable call center agents. To the Court, this itself proves
the fact of petitioner's dismissal from employment. The name of the specific manager who
verbally terminated her or placed her in the list of those to be dismissed is inconsequential.

Moreover, as Results did not present a copy of petitioner's resignation letter or any
evidence that petitioner went on AWOL, the Court cannot consider its allegations that
petitioner voluntarily resigned or abandoned her work. The Court also disagrees with the
finding of the CA that petitioner could have stopped reporting to work for having the mistaken
belief that she was dismissed from employment. If such were the case, Results could have
directed her to report back to work or charged her with abandonment.

All told, there is substantial evidence to support the finding of the NLRC that
"[petitioner] was forced to resign, nay simply left her job without benefit of a written letter
because she was dismissed in a casual manner." Thus, the CA erred in imputing grave abuse
of discretion against the NLRC insofar as the latter ruled that petitioner was illegally dismissed
from employment is concerned. The Court agrees with the labor tribunals that petitioner was
illegally terminated from her job.

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The right of employees to security of tenure, as enshrined under Article XIII, section
3 of the Constitution, is further guarded by Article 294 (formerly Article 279) of the Labor
Code, which states:

Art. 294. Security of tenure. - In cases of regular employment, the employer shall not
terminate the services of an employee except for a just cause or when authorized by
this Title. An employee who is unjustly dismissed from work shall be entitled to
reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and other privileges and to his full
backwages, inclusive of allowances, and to his other benefits or their monetary
equivalent computed from the time his compensation was withheld from him up to
the time of his actual reinstatement.

From the foregoing, employees who are illegally dismissed are entitled to full
backwages, inclusive of allowances and other benefits, computed from the time their actual
compensation was withheld from them up to the time of their actual reinstatement. But if
reinstatement is no longer possible, the backwages shall be computed from the time of their
illegal termination up to the finality of the decision.

Still separation pay may be awarded to an illegally dismissed employee in lieu of

reinstatement when reinstatement can no longer be effected in view of the long passage of
time or because of the realities of the situation.

In the case, reinstatement is no longer possible for petitioner. As she was born on
August 19, 1955, she is now 66 years old and therefore well over the statutory compulsory
retirement age of 65. For this reason, the Court grants her separation pay in lieu of
reinstatement. Consequently, the computation of her backwages should be from the time of
her illegal dismissal on December 13, 2012 up to her compulsory retirement age on August
19, 2020.

It should be stressed that the award of moral and exemplary damages is not justified
by the sole fact that the employer dismissed its employee without just or authorized cause
and due process. While a dismissal may be considered illegal, it does not, by itself, establish
bad faith to automatically entitle the dismissed employee to moral and exemplary damages.
To be entitled to such, there must be proof of a dishonest purpose or conscious doing of
wrong on the part of the employer. Here, there is no evidence or at least a narration of facts
showing that petitioner's dismissal was tainted with some moral obliquity. Thus, the Court
finds that petitioner was not entitled to moral and exemplary damages.

However, for having been compelled to litigate, petitioner is entitled to reasonable

attorney's fees at the rate of 10% of the total monetary award pursuant to Article 2208(2)
of the Civil Code.

The Court hereby imposes legal interest rate on the monetary awards of 6% per
annum reckoned from the finality of this Decision until its full payment.

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FALLO/DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated March 28, 2019 and
the Resolution dated September 12, 2019 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP Nos. 151219
and 151323 are hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Respondent The Results
Companies is declared liable for illegal dismissal and is ordered to pay petitioner Edna Luisa
B. Simon separation pay, in lieu of her reinstatement; backwages computed from the time
of her dismissal on December 13, 2012 up to her compulsory retirement on August 19, 2020;
and attorney's fees at the rate of 10% of the total monetary award.

The total monetary award shall earn legal interest rate of 6% per annum from the
date of finality of this Decision until full satisfaction.

The case is hereby REMANDED to the Labor Arbiter for the proper computation of
the monetary awards.

SO ORDERED.

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MANILA LAW COLLEGE LABOR LAW CASE DIGESTS NOV. 2020-SEP. 2022

NOEL G. GUINTO vs. STO. NIÑO LONG-ZENY CONSIGNEE, ANGELO

SALANGSANG, AND ZENAIDA SALANGSANG
G.R. No. 250987, MARCH 29, 2022
INTING, J.:

FACTS:
Petitioner, Noel G. Guinto filed a complaint against respondents for illegal dismissal
with prayer for the payment of separation pay and attorney’s fee against respondents: Sto.
Niño Long-Zeny Consignee; its owner Angelo Salangsang (Angelo); and his wife
Zenaida Salangsang (Zenaida). Meanwhile, the petitioner amends the complaint and
includes the monetary claim for service incentive and 13th-month pay.

Respondents, the consignee is engaged in the brokerage/trading of various aquatic

animals, including but not limited to crabs, shrimps, prawns, milkfish, and tilapia. It is located
at the Orani Fishport in Orani, Bataan. According to the petitioner, he was employed by the
respondents since 1997 and initially occupied the position of a warehouseman later on
appointed by them as a “sizer” or the one who selects, sorts, and arranges the aquatic
animals.

Petitioner averred that on Nov. 15, 2015 at the house of Zenaida, the latter illegally
dismissed him by uttering him words “Wag ka nang papasok at lumayas ka na” which further
flame with the text message he received the next morning from certain “Nam-nam” saying
“Pare, wag ka nang pumasok pati ang anak mo”.

Petitioner claimed that he was a regular employee of the respondents based on the
following evidence: (1) A Certification issued by Angelo, Pertinently stating that the petitioner
has been employed as a warehouseman of the Consignee “From August 1997 up to present”;
(2) the work schedule posted at respondent’s work premises; (3) sinumpaang salaysay of
Rizaltio Alfonso, the dispatcher of the other consignee; (4) the pay slips issued by
respondents and; (5) Katunayan executed by porters Alejandro Romano and other vouching
that the petitioner was an employee of respondents and not a member of any association of
porters in Orani Fishport.

On contrary, the respondents denied the petitioner’s allegation and firmly asserted
that there was no employee and employer relationship between them; Petitioner was a porter
at Orani Fishport and the porter and sizer had never been considered as under the employ
of such consignation.

The Labor Arbiter rendered a decision stating that the petitioner indeed was the
respondent’s employee based on the certification issued by Angelo as he presented in
evidence and he was illegally dismissed from his employment and must be entitled to the
payment of service incentive leave pay and 13th-month pay.

Aggrieved by the decision of the Labor Arbiter, the respondents filed an appeal before
the NLRC. Based on the findings of the NLRC, the petitioner was the respondent’s employee
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considering the evidence he presented such as certification, affidavits of witnesses, work

schedule, attendance sheet, and pay slips as well as the fact that the petitioner occupied a
position that was usually necessary and desirable in the usual trade of the respondents’
business. However, in the case of illegal dismissal, the NLRC reversed the findings of LA.
According to the NLRC, the petitioner failed to adduce corroborating evidence to prove that
he was actually dismissed from employment by respondents. Thus, it ruled that the petitioner
must be reinstated without back wages and be awarded SIL and 10% attorneys fee. The
award of the 13th month was denied since the petitioner was paid on a commission basis.

The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but the NLRC denied it. Thereafter,
the aggrieved petitioner filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals. The CA
dismissed said petition and sustain all aspects of the decision rendered by the NLRC. The CA
agreed as well to the findings of the Labor Arbiter as to the employee-employer relationship
that exists in both parties. But it sustains the decision of NLRC in reversing the illegal dismissal
case adopting the findings of NLRC that the petitioner failed to establish substantial evidence
of the fact of his dismissal from work, which was fatal to his cause.
Hence, this petition.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not petitioner Noel Guinto was illegally dismissed by the respondents;
2. Whether or not he is entitled to 13th-month pay

RULING/RATIO DECIDENDI:
1. Yes, the petitioner was illegally dismissed by the respondents.

The rule in illegal dismissal cases, the burden of proof is on the employer to prove the
validity of dismissal. However, the fact of dismissal , if disputed, must be duly proven by the
complainant.

In relation thereto, Sec. 3, Rule 1 of the 2011 NLRC Rules of Procedure provides for
the suppletory application of the Rules of Court for proceedings before the LA and NLRC. It
states:

SECTION 3. SUPPLETORY APPLICATION OF THE RULES OF COURT-

In the absence of any applicable provision in these Rules, and in order to effectuate
the objectives of the Labor Code, as amended, the pertinent provisions of the Rules
of Court of the Philippines, as amended, may, in the interest of expeditious
dispensation of labor justice and whenever practicable and convenient, be applied by
analogy or in a suppletory character and effect.
Sec. 11, Rule 8 of the Rules of Court, in turn, provides that “material averment[s] in
the complaint, other than those as to the amount of unliquidated damages, shall be
deemed admitted when not specifically denied”

Thus, in illegal dismissal cases, it follows that when the employer fails to specifically
deny the complainant employee’s material averments as to the circumstances of his
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dismissal, the employer is deemed to have admitted the fact of dismissal and must
then discharge his burden of proving that the dismissal of the employee was valid.

Likewise, in the case of Fernandez, the Court deemed as an admission by silence the
employer’s failure to rebut the petitioner employee's allegation that on a specific date, he
was informed by the employer’s personnel who exercised control over the petitioner’s means
and methods that he could no longer report for work. The Court held:

Indeed, Kalookan Slaughterhouse failed to specifically deny that on July 22, 2014, the
petitioner was informed that he could no longer report for work. De Guzman only alleged
that he merely barred the petitioner from entering the slaughterhouse in several instances
because of his failure to wear I.D. and uniform but he failed to state that this was done on
July 22, 2014. De Guzman’s silence on this matter is deemed as an admission by Kalookan
Slaughterhouse that the petitioner was indeed dismissed on July 22, 2014. As the Court held
in Masonic Contractors:

x x x By their silence, petitioners are deemed to have admitted the same. Sec. 11 of
Rule 8 of the Rules of Court, which supplements the NLRC Rules, provides that an
allegation not specifically denied is deemed admitted. x x x

In this case, the respondents did not specifically deny and rebut the petitioner’s
allegations as to the fact of dismissal from employment. To recall, the petitioner alleged in
his complaint that on November 27, 2015, respondent Zenaida told him to leave and not
come to work anymore. Additionally, the following morning, he received a text message from
Zenaida’s representative telling him “Pare, wag ka nang pumasok pati ang anak mo”. As the
defense, the respondents only raised that there was no employee-employer
relationship between the consignee and petitioner. In other words, respondents did not
specifically deny that Zenaida and her representative, on separate occasions, told the
petitioner to leave and stop going to work. Thus, respondents are deemed to have admitted
the petitioner’s allegation as to his dismissal from work.

Under the circumstances, the Court finds that the petitioner, who was a regular
employee of the respondents, had been illegally dismissed from his employment considering;
first, the latter’s deemed admission of the fact of dismissal; and second the absence of any
clear showing of just or valid cause for such dismissal. Consequently, the court held that the
petitioner is entitled to the payment of his full back wages under Art. 294 of the Labor Code
of the Philippines.

2. With respect to the petitioner’s prayer for the award of 13th-month pay,
the CA is correct that the NLRC did not gravely abuse its discretion when it ruled
against his entitlement thereto.

Under Sec. 3 (e) of the Rules and Regulations Implementing PD 851, employers of
those who paid on purely commission boundary, or task basis, among others, are exempted
from the payment of 13th-month pay to its employees.

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The petitioner alleged in his complaint that he was paid on a commission basis.
Seemingly realizing his mistake, it appears that he changed his theory in the present petition,
alleging instead that he was paid on a piece-rate basis in an effort to make himself qualified
to receive 13th-month pay under PD 851. But the petitioner cannot now be allowed to change
his theory of the case on appeal before the Court. After all, it is settled that “[p]oints of law,
theories, issues, and arguments not brought to the attention of the trial court are barred by
estoppel and cannot be considered by a reviewing court, as these cannot be raised for the
first time on appeal”.

FALLO/DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The Decision dated May 24, 2019
and the Resolution dated December 12, 2019 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
157156 are hereby SET ASIDE. Let a new judgment be entered as follows:

Petitioner Noel G. Guinto is found to have been illegally dismissed. Respondents

Angelo Salangsang and Zenaida Salangsang are ORDER to:

1. Reinstate petitioner Noel G. Guinto, to his former position without loss of seniority
rights; and

2. Solidarily pay petitioner Noel G. Guinto his full backwages from the time of his
illegal dismissal until the finality of this Decision, in his service incentive leave pay
in the amount of P4,500.00, 10 % attorney’s fees of the total amount due to
petitioner, and legal interest of 6% per annum on the total monetary awards
computed from the time of finality of this Decision until fully paid.

The Labor Arbiter is DIRECTED to recompute the monetary awards in favor of the
petitioner Noel G. Guinto in accordance with this Decision.

SO ORDERED.

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BENHUR SHIPPING CORPORATION/SUN MARINE SHIPPING S.A.

and EDGAR B. BRUSELAS vs. ALEX PENAREBONDA RIEGO
G.R. No. 229179, March 29, 2022
GESMUNDO, C.J.:

FACTS:
On October 8, 2013, Benhur Shipping Corporation (BSC) engaged Riego’s work as
Chief Cook on board the vessel MV Hikari I, an ocean-going vessel of its foreign principal,
Sun Marine Shipping S.A (SMS).

On the first week of December 2013, Riego suffered from abdominal and lower back
pain while on board the vessel. After he was examined by a doctor in Thailand and given
medications, he was recommended for repatriation for further medical evaluation. Riego
returned to the Philippines on December 15, 2013 and was endorsed by BSC to Marine
Medical Services wherein he was attended to by the company-designated physician for
further medical care and treatment.

On December 16, 2013, the company-designated physician issued the first Medical
Report stating that Riego was referred to a gastro-enterologist and orthopedic surgeon. The
specialist recommended that Riego undergo laboratory exam, gastroscopy, ultrasound of the
whole abdomen and magnetic resonance imaging, or MRI, of the lumbosacral spine.

Subsequently, the company-designated physician issued four more Medical Reports

until the same issued the final Medical Report on May 26, 2014, stating that on follow-up
check-up, Riego still complained of lower back pain radiating to the left lower extremity with
no significant improvement with physical therapy, and there was still sensory deficit on his
left leg. The company-designated physician further stated that if respondent is entitled to
disability benefits, his final disability grading under the POEA schedule of disabilities remains
at Grade 11 – 1/3 loss of lifting power. The same issued on May 30, 2014 a certification that
Riego “has under medical/surgical evaluation treatment from Dec. 16, 2013 to present due
to Hiatal Hernia; L4-L5, L5-S1 Disc Bulge.”

On June 5, 2014, Riego consulted a physician of his choice for a second medical
opinion. His physician of choice issued a Medical Report stating that he was permanently
disabled and permanently unfit to work in any capacity. Subsequently, on two occasions, he
sent a letter-request to the petitioners for referral to a third doctor, but the latter ignored his
request. This prompted him to file a case with the LA especially after the shipping firm
stopped shouldering his medical treatment.

The LA partially granted Riego’s complaint for disability benefits and gave credence to
the medical assessment provided by the company-designated physician. The NLRC affirmed
the LA’s ruling and held that Riego’s claim for permanent and total disability benefits was
without basis at all.

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On appeal, the CA reversed and set aside the NLRC ruling. The CA held that if the
treatment of 120 days is extended to 240 days, but still no medical assessment is given, the
finding of permanent and total disability becomes conclusive. It held that respondent Riego
should be granted total and permanent disability benefits since no assessment was issued
for a disability grade before the lapse of the 120-day period.

ISSUE:
Whether or not he is entitled to the payment of permanent total disability benefits or
to that which corresponds to Disability Grade 11 of the POEA-SEC.

RULING/RATIO DECIDENDI:
Yes, the petitioner is entitled to the payment of permanent total disability
benefits.

The petitioners aver that the CA erred when it held that the respondent is permanently
disabled simply because the company-designated physician issued the final disability
assessment of Grade 11 beyond the 120-day period without any justification for the extension
of treatment. The mere lapse of the 120 days is not a sufficient ground to warrant the award
of permanent/total disability benefits to seafarers. Petitioners maintain that the disability shall
be based solely on the disability gradings provided under Sec. 32 of the POEA-SEC, and shall
not be measured or determined by the number of days a seafarer was under treatment or
the number of days in which sickness allowance was paid. Petitioners further aver that non-
referral to a third physician, whose decision shall be considered as final and binding,
constitutes a breach of the POEA-SEC. Petitioners assert that respondent failed to initiate
third doctor referral. Petitioners argue that while respondent, indeed, sent a letter to BSC to
refer him for a third medical opinion, he failed to disclose and include therein the
contradicting findings of his physician of choice.

The petition lacks merit. In the case at bar, there is no question that respondent
suffered an injury while working on board the ship of petitioners. As a result of said injury,
respondent was rendered disabled to perform his usual work and lost earning capacity.

Under the 2010 POEA-SEC, the company-designated physician is primarily vested with
responsibility to determine the seafarer's disability grading or fitness to work. In Elburg
Shipmanagement Phils., Inc. v. Quiogue (Elburg), the Court set forth the following rules
whenever there is a claim for total and permanent disability benefits by a seafarer:

1. The company-designated physician must issue a final medical assessment on the

seafarer's disability grading within a period of 120 days from the time the seafarer
reported to him;
2. If the company-designated physician fails to give his assessment within the period
of 120 days, without any justifiable reason, then the seafarer's disability becomes
permanent and total;
3. If the company-designated physician fails to give his assessment within the period
of 120 days with a sufficient justification (e.g. seafarer required further medical
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treatment or seafarer was uncooperative), then the period of diagnosis and treatment
shall be extended to 240 days. The employer has the burden to prove that the
company-designated physician has sufficient justification to extend the period; and
4. If the company-designated physician still fails to give his assessment within the
extended period of 240 days, then the seafarer's disability becomes permanent and
total, regardless of any justification.

Here, respondent was repatriated on December 15, 2013 and was immediately
referred to the company-designated physician. Petitioners claim that the 120-day period was
extended to 240 days as respondent still required further medical treatment, which was
implied in several Progress Notes stating that respondent needed further medical attention
and/or rehabilitation beyond the lapse of the 120-day period. Petitioners add that since the
final medical report was issued after 156 days from repatriation, then it is within the extended
240-day period. Accordingly, the May 26, 2014 Medical Report issued by the company-
designated physician cannot be treated as the final medical assessment contemplated by the
POEA-SEC and the Elburg case. Thus, even if the 120-day period is extended to 240 days,
there was still no proper final medical assessment issued. As provided in Elburg, if the
company- designated physician still fails to give his assessment within the extended period
of 240 days, then the seafarer’s disability becomes permanent and total, regardless of any
justification.

As reiterated in Razonable v. Maersk-Filipinas Crewing, Inc., the Court held that the
failure of the company-designated physician to issue a final and valid assessment transforms
the temporary total disability to permanent total disability, regardless of the disability grade.
Hence, it was unnecessary for the seafarer to even refer the findings of the company-
designated doctors to his own doctor. Such conflict-resolution mechanism only takes effect
if the company-designated physician issues a valid and definite medical assessment. Without
such valid final and definitive assessment from the company-designated physicians, the law
considers the seafarer's disability as total and permanent.

Sec. 20(A)(3) of the POEA-SEC provides that if a doctor appointed by the seafarer
disagrees with the assessment of the company designated physician, a third doctor may be
agreed jointly between the employer and the seafarer. The third doctor’s decision shall be
final and binding on both parties.

On the other hand, in Carcedo v. Maine Marine Philippines, Inc., the Court stated that:
To definitively clarify how a conflict situation should be handled, upon notification that the
seafarer disagrees with the company doctor’s assessment based on the duly and fully
disclosed contrary assessment from the seafarer’s on doctor, the seafarer shall then signify
his intention to resolve the conflict by the referral of the conflicting assessments to a third
doctor whose ruling, under the POEA-SEC, shall be final and binding on the parties. Upon
notification, the company carries the burden of initiating the process for the referral to a
third doctor commonly agreed between the parties.

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Analyzing Sec. 20(A)(3) of the POEA-SEC and Carcedo, it was neither stated nor
required therein that when the seafarer sends a request for a referral to a third doctor to the
employer, the seafarer must mandatorily attach the medical report of his own medical doctor
to such request. Notably, it is not the employer who will assess the medical report of the
seafarer's chosen physician; rather, it will be the labor tribunals where the complaint for
disability benefits is filed that would assess the medical report. As the record shows, the
medical report of respondent's chosen physician was indeed attached to his position paper
before the LA, thus, it could be fully assessed by the labor tribunals. Succinctly, the argument
of petitioners that the letter-request of respondent was improper, because the medical report
of his chosen physician was not attached, deserves scant consideration.

In this case, the Court finds that the letter-requests of respondent to petitioners were
sufficient compliance with Sec. 20(A)(3) of the POEA-SEC. The letters stated that the chosen
medical expert of respondent stated that he was permanently unfit, referring to the seafarer's
fitness to work. The June 25, 2014 Letter even expressly stated that the medical opinions of
the company-designated physician and respondent's chosen doctor differ. As a result, both
letters requested that a third medical opinion be considered which constitute as sufficient
notification to proceed with the process of referral to the third doctor.

Regrettably, petitioners did not reciprocate respondent's good faith-compliance.

Instead, they displayed indifference to the prescribed mandatory rules of the POEA-SEC.
They tried to rationalize their inaction by providing an afterthought excuse that the letter-
requests should have contained the medical report of respondent's chosen physician, when
the POEA-SEC does not even mandate such requirement. Accordingly, petitioners'
obliviousness to the mandatory procedure of referral to a third doctor must be taken against
them.

As discussed in the case of Rodelas v. MST Marine Services (Phils.), when the employer
fails to act on the seafarer's valid request for referral to a third doctor, the tribunals and
courts are empowered to conduct its own assessment to resolve the conflicting medical
opinions of the company-designated physician and the seafarer's chosen physician based on
the totality of evidence. The employer simply cannot invoke the conclusiveness of the
company-designated physician's medical opinion vis-a-vis the seafarer's chosen physician's
medical opinion when it is because the employer's own inaction and neglect that the medical
assessment was not referred to a third doctor.

In the present case, the May 26, 2014 Final Medical Report of the company-
designated physician, and both the June 5, 2014 and July 2, 2014 Medical Reports of the
seafarer’s chosen physician, consistently held that respondent indeed suffered a disability.
These reports merely differ on the extent of the disability suffered by respondent. The Court
finds that respondent is suffering from permanent disability, which renders him unfit to work
in any capacity as a seafarer.

The May 26, 2014 Final Medical Report of the company-designated physician stated
that respondent still complains of low back pain radiating to the left lower extremity with no
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significant improvement with physical therapy, and that there is still senso ry deficit on the
left leg. It also stated that “the specialist opines that if patient is entitled to a disability, his
final disability grading remains at Grade 11-1/3 loss of lifting power. But such report never
identified the particular specialist who gave such disability rating. Further, the final medical
report of the company- designated physician did not indicate whether respondent was fit to
work or whether he could return to his previous occupation as a seafarer despite suffering
such disability.

As pointed out, the recommendations of the company-designated physician on the

May 12, 2014 Report, that respondent be referred to neurosurgery to assess the degree of
nerve compression and, if possible, the decompression of the spine to prevent further
damage to his spine, was never addressed by the final medical report of the company-
designated physician. Even after the said physician issued his final medical report on May
26, 2014, he still issued a Certification dated May 30, 2014 to the effect that respondent’s
evaluation and treatment was still continuing. Accordingly, the Court cannot give full
credence to the May 26, 2014 Final Medical Report issued by the company-designated
physician regarding the extent of respondent’s disability.

After respondent underwent an MRI on June 30, 2014, his chosen physician issued
another Medical Report confirming his findings that respondent was indeed permanently
disabled and unfit to work as a seafarer. Indeed, with respondent’s disability, he cannot
anymore return to his occupation as a seafarer. He will be unable to perform the tasks
required of him as a seafarer.

The Court emphasizes anew that in disability compensation, it is not the injury which
is compensated, but rather, the incapacity to work resulting in the impairment of one’s
earning capacity. Considering respondent’s condition, it is highly improbable for him to
perform his usual tasks as seafarer on any vessel which effectively disables him from earning
wages in the same kind of work or that of a similar nature for which he was trained.

The Court reminds both the employees and the employers of every crew or manning
industry to strictly observe the mandatory procedure on the referral to a third doctor in cases
of conflict between the medical opinions of the company-designated physician and the
seafarer's chosen physician. It is only through this compulsory procedure that assessment of
the disability of the seafarer can be resolved with finality. Consequently, the procedure laid
down by the POEA-SEC requires mandatory fulfillment by both the employer and the seafarer.
If either of the parties disregards the good faith compliance of the other, the legal
consequences shall be borne by the erring party.

FALLO/DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The September 30, 2016 Decision and
January 6, 2017 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 142911 are AFFIRMED
with MODIFICATION. Petitioners are hereby ORDERED to PAY respondent Alex
Peñaredonda Riego total and permanent disability benefits in the amount of US$60,000.00
at the prevailing rate of exchange at the time of payment, as well as attorney’s fees
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equivalent to ten percent (10%) of the total monetary award. Finally, all monetary awards
shall earn legal interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from finality of this Decision
until full payment.

SO ORDERED.

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ABS-CBN CORPORATION vs. CLARITA MAGNO

G.R. No. 203876, March 29, 2022
GAERLAN J.:

FACTS:
ABS-CBN Corporation employed Clarita Magno since 1992 as VTR playback operator
for its various program. In 2002, Magno placed under Internal Job Market System without
Magno’s consent. She was placed under the program of Revillame which is Wowowee which
she works for several years. Eventually, Revillame left ABS CBN and moved to different
network bringing his former staff to him. ABS CBN later on launched PWNW in replacement
of the former program which was hosted by Revillame, Magno provide services under PWNW
starting July 2010.

One night Revillame hosted a dinner to his former staff in Wowowee which Magno
attended, her former colleagues induced her to join Revillame. Consequently, her supervisor
and manager learned on the said dinner and allegedly forced her to resign for being unworthy
and disloyal to network. Magno alleged that she was constructively dismiss because she was
not given prior assignment and duties.

Magno thereafter filed against ABS CBN for illegal dismissal, non-payment of holiday
pay, premium pay, overtime pay, and 13th month pay, separation pay, rest day premium,
night shift differential and even claim for moral damages and attorney’s fees.

ABS-CBN responded and debunked the claims and allegations of Magno that she was
not illegally dismissed by proving to her resignation letter and that there was no employee-
employer relationship between Magno and ABS CBN since Magno is a talent not an employee.

Labor Arbiter rendered decision in favored of ABS CBN dismissing the case for lack of
cause of action and merit and that there was no employee employer relationship between
the two parties.

Aggrieved on the decision of LA, Magno filed an appeal to the NLRC insisting that she
was illegally dismissed which also denied. Undeterred on denial of NLRC, Magno then filed
for petition to certiorari to CA, which eventually granted by CA.

ISSUE:
Whether or not there was an employee-employer relationship between Magno and
ABS CBN.

RULING/RATIO DECIDENDI:
Yes. There is an employee-employer relationship between Magno and ABS
CBN.

Court has established the four-fold test in determining the existence of an employer-
employee relationship. The elements of the four-fold test include: (1) the selection and
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engagement of employees; 2) the payment of wages; the power of dismissal; and 4) the
power to control the employee’s conduct. It is recognized that “[t]here is no hard and fast
rule designed to establish it the aforesaid elements. Any competent and relax any evidence
to prove the relationship may be admitted. Identification cards, cash vouchers, social security
registration, appointment letters or employment contracts, payrolls, organization charts, and
personnel lists, serve as evidence of employees status.”'

It bears stressing that this Court sitting en banc in Del Rosario v. ABS-CBN
Broadcasting Corporation" (Del Rosario) already established that there is an employer-
employee relationship between ABS-CBN and its talents under IJM as follows:

The workers here are employees of ABS-CBN.

In the same vein, the workers received their salaries from ABS-CBN twice a month, as
proven through the pay slips bearing the latter’s corporate name. Their rate of wages was
determined solely by ABS-CBN. ABS-CBN likewise withheld taxes and granted the workers
PhilHealth benefits. These clearly show that the workers were salaried personnel of ABS-
CBN, not independent contractors.

Likewise, ABS-CBN wielded the power to discipline, and correspondingly dismiss, any
errant employee. The workers were continuously under the watch of ABS-CBN and were
required to strictly follow company rules and regulations in and out of the company premises.

Finally, consistent with the most important test in determining the existence of an
employer-employee relationship, ABS-CBN wielded the power to control the means and
methods in the performance of the employees’ work. The workers were subject to the
constant watch and scrutiny of ABS-CBN, through its production supervisors who strictly
monitored their work and ensured that their end results are acceptable and in accordance
with the standards set by the company. In fact, the workers were required to comply with
ABS-CBN’s company policies which entailed the prior approval and evaluation of their
performance. They were further mandated to attend seminars and workshops to ensure their
optimal performance at work. Likewise, ABS-CBN controlled their schedule and work
assignments (and re-assignments). Furthermore, the workers did not have their own
equipment to perform their work. ABS-CBN provided them with the needed tools and
implements to accomplish their jobs.

And just like in Beeino, the fact that the workers signed a Talent Contract and/or
Project Assignment Form.' does not ipso facto make them talents. It is settled that a talent
contract does not necessarily prevent an employee from acquiring a regular employment
status. The nature of the employment does not depend on the word of the employer or on
the procedure for hiring and the manner of designating the employee, but on the activities
performed by the employee in relation to the employer’s business.

Besides, it must be remembered that labor contracts are subject to the police power
of the State and are placed on a higher plane than ordinary contracts. Court shall not hesitate
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to strike down any contract that is designed to circumvent an employee’s tenurial security.
Accordingly, ABS-CBN’s Talent Contract, which deprives the workers of regular employment,
cannot stand."

Court further clarified that these IJM talents hired by ABS-CBN regular employees of
ABS-CBN pursuant to Article 280 of the Labor Code. This is mainly because they perform
functions necessary and desirable to overall business and trade of ABS CBN.

In this case, it is undisputed that respondents had continuously performed the same
activities for an average of assigned tasks are necessary or desirable in the usual five years.
Their business or trade of the petitioner. The persisting need for their services is sufficient
evidence of the necessity and indispensability of such services to petitioner’s business or
trade.

While length of time may not be a sole controlling test for project employment, it can
be a strong factor to determine whether the employee was hired for a specific undertaking
or in fact tasked to perform functions which are vital, necessary and indispensable to the
usual trade or business of the employer. We note further that petitioner did not report the
termination a of respondents’ employment in the particular “project” to the Department of
Labor and Employment Regional Office having juris diction over the workplace within 30 days
following the date of their separation from work, using the prescribed form on employees’
termination/dismissals/suspensions.

In conjunction therewith, paragraphs 3, 4, and 5 of the same Articles of Incorporation

reveal that ABS-CBN is likewise engaged in the business of the production of shows:

1. To engage in any manner, shape or form in the recording and reproduction of the
human voice, musical instruments, and sound of every nature, name and description;
to engage in any manner, shape or form in the recording and reproduction of moving
pictures, visuals and stills of every nature, name and description; and to acquire and
operate audio and video recording, magnetic recording, digital recording and electrical
transcription exchanges, and to purchase, acquire, sell, rent, lease, operate, exchange
or otherwise dispose of any and all kinds of recordings, electrical transcriptions or
other devices by which sight and sound may be reproduced.

2. To carry on the business of providing graphic, design, videographic, photographic and

cinematographic production services and other creative production services; and to
engage in any manner, shape or form in post-production mixing, dubbing,
overdubbing, audio-video processing, sequence alteration and modification of every
nature of all kinds of audio and video productions.

3. To carry on the business of promotion and sale of all kinds of advertising and
marketing services and generally to conduct all lines of business allied to and
interdependent with that of advertising and marketing services.

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Based on the foregoing, the recording and reproduction of moving pictures, visuals,
and stills of every nature, name, and descriptions or simply, the production of shows are an
important component of ABS- CBN’s overall business scheme.

ABS-CBN likewise exercised control over the means and methods of Magno’s work. It
controlled her work assignments and transfers, and monitored her closely in the
accomplishment of her work through its production supervisors and producers.

Consequently, based on the totality of evidence and consistent with

prevailing jurisprudence, Magno was a regular employee of ABS CBN.

FALLO/DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
WHEREFORE, that petition for certiorari is GRANTED. The decision dated June 29,
2012 and the Resolution dated October 5, 2012 of the Court of Appeals in CA-GR SP NO.
123028 are REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. Respondent Corporation is hereby ordered Magno
to reinstate to her former position without payment of backwages and monetary claims.

SO ORDERED.

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APRIL 2022

DMCI PROJECT DEVELOPERS, INC. vs. NELIA BERNADAS, NOEL BATANES,

EDUARDO NONSOL, JOSE BALDE, ELM OR MABATAN, and LILIO M. REBUENO,
G.R. No. 221978, April 4, 2022
LOPEZ, J.:

FACTS:
The instant case involves a certain parcel of land (subject lot) which became the
subject of a labor case filed with the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) instituted
by the petitioners entitled "Nelia Bernadas, et al. v. Liberty Transport Corp." Eventually, the
NLRC resolved the case in favor of the respondents, prompting a Notice of Levy to be
annotated on TCT of the subject lot.

An auction sale was conducted for the subject lot where the respondents emerged as
the winning bidder. Respondents executed a Deed of Sale and/or Certificate of Redemption
of Real Property, ceding the ownership of the subject lot to DMCI after having received the
sum of P1,915,800.00, representing respondents ' total monetary award. On the same date,
respondents likewise executed a Release and Quitclaim, discharging DMCI from all liabilities
arising from their instituted labor case.

Thereafter, both DMCI and respondents filed a petition before the Register of Deeds
seeking to cancel the Notice of Levy on Execution wherein Taguig Land Development
Corporation (Taguig Land) acquired the subject lot. Thereafter, Taguig Land transferred the
subject lot to DMCI by virtue of a merger.

Contrary to their previous actions, respondents filed a Motion to Nullify the Deed of
Sale and/or Certificate of Redemption of Real Property and Release and Quitclaim before the
NLRC.

In the motion, respondents asserted that the Deed of Sale and/or Certificate of
Redemption of Real Property and Release and Quitclaim was spurious and had been falsified.
In advocating for its falsity, respondents further argued that one of the signatories, had
already died long before the execution of the said documents. Similarly, another signatory
was no longer part of the judgment and can no longer be found. Worse, respondents claimed
to have been prejudiced for not having been paid their monetary claims amounting to
P1,915,800.00. In lieu thereof, they received a mere sum of P100,000.00 from collections
from a surety company. As a way to stealthily collect their signatures for the Deed of Sale
and/or Certificate of Redemption of Real Property and Release and Quitclaim, respondents
were made to sign a piece of paper while making them believe that it was a document
representing their receipt of the P100,000.00.

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DMCI opposed the motion and argued that a certain Evelyn Insilay-Rebueno, the
alleged attorney-in-fact who filed the motion on behalf of the respondents, lacked the
requisite authority. As Evelyn had already collected respondents claims. DMCI insisted that
the Labor Arbiter should dismiss the motion by virtue of the full payment and satisfaction of
the judgment award in favor of the respondents.

The Labor Arbiter issued an Order granting the respondents' motion, nullifying the
Deed of Sale and/or Certificate of Redemption of Real Property and Release and Quitclaim.
The Labor Arbiter found that DMCI had no personality to redeem the subject lot as it was
not a redemptioner as contemplated under Section 11, Rule VII of the NLRC Manual on
Execution of Judgment (NLRC Manual), which lays down specific parties and/persons entitled
to redeem. The Labor Arbiter likewise held that DMCI cannot claim that it possesses a lien,
judgment, or mortgage on the property sold, having only acquired the property through a
merger with Taguig Land. The LA was inclined to nullify the assailed documents, as quitclaims
and releases have been jurisprudentially disfavored for being contrary to public policy.

DMCI filed a Memorandum of Appeal with the NLRC but the NLRC rendered a
Resolution affirming the issued by the Labor Arbiter.

Respondents filed a letter-request with the Register of Deeds of Taguig City, praying
that the Order of the Labor Arbiter be implemented and registered pursuant to the Register
of Deeds' ministerial duties. The Register of Deeds elevated the matter to the Land
Registration Authority (LRA) via Consulta.

Meanwhile, the regional trial court issued a preliminary injunction was subsequently
issued against the respondents, the RTC was convinced that between DMCI and respondents,
DMCI had clearly shown a better right over the subject lot by virtue of the evidence it
proffered. DMCI filed a Manifestation with the LRA, attaching the Order of the RTC.
Subsequently, the LRA issued a Resolution in Consulta ruling that the NLRC Order and Entry
of Judgment are registrable.

DMCI elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals (CA), maintaining that the LRA
gravely erred in ruling that the Order of the LA is registrable. It contended that, given such
recall and the absence of a writ of execution, the basis for registration ceased to exist but
the CA ruled in favor of the respondents.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the NLRC has the power to issue an Order for the cancellation of a
title already issued in the name of Taguig Land Development Corporation.

RULING/RATIO DECIDENDI:
Yes, the NLRC has the power to issue an Order for the cancellation of a title
even if it was already issued in the name of Taguig Land Development
Corporation.

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In determining the significance of a writ of execution in enforcing orders of the NLRC, the
NLRC Manual shall govern any question regarding the execution of a judgment of that body.
It is well settled that regular courts have no jurisdiction to hear and decide questions arising
from and are incidental to the enforcement of decisions, orders, or awards rendered in labor
cases by officers and tribunals of the Department of Labor and Employment. The Rules of
Court shall then only apply by analogy or in a suppletory character. As emphasized in Balais
v. Velasco, "to hold otherwise would be to sanction split jurisdiction which is obnoxious to
the orderly administration of justice."

The petition is denied. The NLRC, or the LA, is clothed with the power to motu
proprio, or upon motion of any interested party, issue a writ of execution on a judgment only
within five (5) years from the date it becomes final and executory. Notably, no motion for
execution shall be entertained nor a writ be issued unless the NLRC or the LA is in possession
of the records of the case which shall include an entry of judgment where the case has been
appealed, except in certain cases.

In this case, however, the writ of execution has yet to be issued, considering that the
action had just been disposed of with finality, given the Entry of Judgment dated May 16,
2012. Contrary to petitioner's presumptuous postulations, the LRA, in Consulta No. 5208, did
not mention dispensing with the requirement of the writ. In other words, the consulta was
not positioned to do away with the writ of execution. To be precise, it merely declared that
the January 4, 2011 Order, together with the July 19, 2011 Entry of Judgment, was
registrable.

Nevertheless, even if this Court were to indulge petitioner, its arguments deserve scant
consideration given the July 31, 2009 Decision of the CA, dismissing its claim of ownership
over the subject lot, which it insists was acquired from Taguig Land. This Court notes that
such Decision lapsed into finality pursuant to an Entry of Judgment dated September 3, 2009.
It also goes without saying that the finality of the July 31, 2009 Decision would belie yet
another claim of ownership by petitioner in its pending action for quieting of title before the
RTC. To iterate the principle in Vargas v. Cajucom, petitioner may not do indirectly, by
assailing the absence of a writ of execution, what they cannot do directly, which is to attack
a final, immutable, and unalterable judgment.

FALLO/DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition is DENIED. The Decision
dated June · 5, 2015 and the Resolution dated December 15, 2015 of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. SP No. 132268, affirming the April 3, 2013 Resolution and the September 26,
2013 Order of the Land Registration Authority in Consulta No. 5208, are AFFIRMED. The
National Labor Relations Commission's Order dated January 4, 2011 and the Entry of
Judgment dated July 19, 2011 are registrable.

SO ORDERED.
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MANILA LAW COLLEGE LABOR LAW CASE DIGESTS NOV. 2020-SEP. 2022

EDGARDO M, PAGLINAWAN vs. DOHLE- PHILMAN AGENCY INC.,

G.R. NO. 230735, APRIL 4, 2022
HERNANDO, J.:

FACTS:
Petitioner Edgardo Paglinawan was hired as an engine and deck fitter on a foreign
principal DOHLE- IOM (Limited). His contract started March 19, 2013. His work included long
hours of duty and was exposed to dust and chemicals. Sometime during his stay in his duty,
he fell sick and suffered loose bowel movement. He was hospitalized in Mexico and
underwent laboratory and CT scan. Due to this, he was discharged as of August 2013. Upon
repatriation, he was checked by the designated physician by DOHLE in which he was
diagnosed with several complications. While being treated, the petitioner got a second
opinion through his choice of physician. In which, the petitioner was opined to be unfit to
work. Upon his request for compensation for disability benefits, DOHLE declined hence the
complaint was filed.

Labor arbiter ruled in favor of the petitioner and had ordered DOHLE to pay $60,000
for permanent total disability and $6,000 for attorney’s fee in 2014.

Respondent appealed to the National Labor Relations Commission and got a decision
to reverse the LA’s ruling and dismissed the case due to no connection between petitioner’s
work and illness.

Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari to the Court of Appeals yet affirmed the NLRC
decision in 2016.

ISSUE:
Whether petitioner is entitled to permanent disability benefits.

RULING/RATIO DECIDENDI:
No, the petitioner is not entitled to permanent disability benefits.

Upon review of the Supreme court, the petition lacks merit hereby affirms the CA’s
ruling on the following grounds,

Under Sec 20 (A) of the POEA SEC provides that for an illness to be compensable, 2
elements should be met.

1) The injury/illness should be work related

2) The work-related injury or illness must have existed during the term of the
seafarer’s contract.

Sec 32-A of this contract includes the listing for occupational diseases. But it doesn’t
only follow if the disease isn’t included that it will not be compensable.

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In this section as well, provides the conditions of compensability for listed occupational
diseases.
1. The seafarers work must involve the risks described herein
2. The disease was contracted as a result of the seafarer’s exposure to the
described risks.
3. The disease was contracted within a period of exposure and under such other
factors necessary to contract it
4. There was no notorious negligence on the part of the seafarer.

The court finds the petitioner’s claim to be premature due to the following:
1. Even though the company physician failed to issue a declaration for his fitness
lapsed beyond the 120 day period, no indication was needed for a 240 day
extension to his state.
2. Company physician declared petitioner was fit to work for duty within the 120
day rule but insisted the opinion of petitioner’s choice of physician
3. There was a dispute on the disability rating provided by 2 physicians.

The Court notes the 120-day rule as immaterial to this case. The company- designated
physician rendered a final assessment on September 27, 2013 ,which is well within 120 days
from petitioner’s medical repatriation in August 2013. The Court also finds the petitioner is
not entitled to disability benefits for his failure to timely procure a second physician’s opinion
and for failing to show his illness is work-related or work-aggravated.

FALLO/DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The December 14, 2016 Decision and March
21, 2017 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-GR. SP No. 141363 are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

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MANILA LAW COLLEGE LABOR LAW CASE DIGESTS NOV. 2020-SEP. 2022

CATTLEYA R. CAMBIL vs. KABALIKAT PARA SA MAUNLAD NA BUHAY

G.R. No. 245938, April 05, 2022
INTING, J.:

FACTS:
On May 30, 2016, petitioner Cattleya R. Cambil was hired by respondent Kabalikat
Para sa Maunlad na Buhay, Inc. (KMBI) as Program Officer for Credit Group on a probationary
basis. Eventually, KMBI terminated petitioner's services. Both parties then had conflicting
dates as to when KMBI terminated petitioner’s contract.

According to the petitioner, she reported for work on July 19, 2016 despite not feeling
well. Her condition got worse, and thus, she texted her co-program officer that she was going
straight home. Upon the advice of the Physician, she did not report for work for the next two
days.

On July 22, 2016, she returned to work and immediately presented herself to her
supervisor. To her surprise, the latter told her that her services had been terminated. Her
supervisor told her that she will receive a text if she needed to report for work on Monday,
July 25, 2016. She waited for the text message, but she did not receive a single text message
from him. From July 25 to 28, 2016, KMBI did not allow her to go to her centers and did not
give her any task.

On the other hand, KMBI alleged that they directed petitioner to accomplish the self-
evaluation section of the Performance Evaluation Report on July 22, 2016 after she left her
station on July 19, 2016 without informing any of her superiors. Thereafter, her supervisor
evaluated petitioner's performance on July 25, 2016 and gave her an overall rating of
67.50%. Consequently, the Branch Manager, through an Interoffice Memo addressed to the
KMBI's Acting Area Manager, recommended that petitioner's probationary contract be
terminated.

KMBI maintained that petitioner's probationary contract was terminated due to her
failure to meet the prescribed rating and standards made known to her at the start of her
employment. It stressed that petitioner did not create new centers during her probationary
employment-all of petitioner's five (5) centers were turned over to her by other program
officers. In addition, there were no new loan disbursements on her record.

To counter petitioner's allegation that she was not allowed to go to her centers and
was not given any task starting July 25, 2016, KMBI presented her attendance record for the
month of July 2016 which showed that she reported for work from July 25 until July 28, 2016.

On July 28, 2016, petitioner received a show cause letter dated July 20, 2016. On the
same date, KMBI served petitioner with an interoffice memo entitled Proof of talk about End
of Contract which she refused to sign. Petitioner, upon learning that her supervisor and the
Branch Manager recommended the termination of her probationary contract, became hostile.
By reason thereof, the Branch Manager issued another interoffice memo. Apparently
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aggrieved, petitioner filed a Single Entry Approach complaint with the Department of Labor
and Employment on the very same day.

Meanwhile, petitioner failed to comply with the show cause letter and the interoffice
memo with the subject title Disrespect, hence, on August 1, 2016, KMBI sent a notice of
termination of her probationary employment.

The Labor Arbiter (LA) rendered a Decision in favor of the petitioner. According to the
LA, the show cause letter issued to petitioner stating that she is being charged with
abandonment of work is contrary to KMBI's allegation that petitioner was dismissed due to
her failure to qualify as a regular employee. With respect to petitioner's absences, the LA
found that it cannot be categorized as an abandonment from work because it was due to
illness as evidenced by a medical certificate.

Respondent KMBI appealed to the NLRC. However, the NLRC affirmed the LA's
Decision.

KMBI moved for reconsideration, but the NLRC denied it in their Resolution.
Undeterred, respondent filed a Petition for Certiorari with the CA. The CA reversed the
Decisions of the NLRC and the LA. The CA ruled that KMBI did not illegally dismissed
petitioner and that it complied with the due process requirement when it issued a written
notice informing her of her failure to meet the performance standards of KMBI.

Hence, the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari was filed before the Supreme
Court.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA erred in finding that the NLRC gravely abused its discretion
when it ruled that petitioner was illegally dismissed.

RULING/RATIO DECIDENDI:
No, the CA did not err in finding that the NLRC gravely abused its discretion
when it ruled that petitioner was illegally dismissed.

There is grave abuse of discretion on the part of the NLRC when its findings and
conclusions are not supported by substantial evidence, i.e., that amount of relevant evidence
which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion. Such grave abuse
of discretion on the part of the NLRC warrants the grant of the extraordinary remedy of
certiorari.

The CA correctly imputed grave abuse of discretion on the part of the NLRC when the
latter ruled that petitioner was not dismissed due to her failure to qualify as a regular
employee.

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A probationary employee under Article 296 of the Labor Code is one "who for a given
period of time, is being observed and evaluated to determine whether or not he is qualified
for permanent employment." Although probationary employees enjoy security of tenure,"
they do not enjoy permanent status and thus may be terminated on two grounds: (1) just
cause; and (2) when they fail to qualify as a regular employee in accordance with reasonable
standards prescribed by the employer

The petition is denied. In Dusit Hotel Nikko v. Gatbonton, the Supreme Court
clarified the requisites for a valid termination of a probationary employee on the basis of
failure to meet the employer's reasonable standards: (1) this power must be exercised in
accordance with the specific requirements of the contract; (2) the dissatisfaction on the part
of the employer must be real and in good faith, not feigned so as to circumvent the contract
or the law; and (3) there must be no unlawful discrimination in the dismissal."

The Supreme Court finds that the LA and the NLRC misapprehended details which are
crucial and significant in the proper disposition of the case. Ruling in favor of petitioner, the
LA leaned heavily on his finding that petitioner is not guilty of work abandonment without
addressing KMBI's allegations regarding her work attitude and performance. Worse, the NLRC
mistook the centers turned over to petitioner at the start of her employment as centers
formed by her, and thus, came up with the wrong conclusion that petitioner reached the
target set forth in the performance standards. For its part, the NLRC dwelled on the absence
of the word "standards" in the Proof of talk about End of Contract dated July 28, 2016 in
ruling that petitioner was not dismissed due to her failure to meet KMBI's standards. It
disregarded the reasons, aside from petitioner's unauthorized absences, that prompted
petitioner's dismissal, i.e., her work attitude and character, among others, which Espos and
Hembrador stated on the same document. Lastly, both the LA and the NLRC erred when they
willfully ignored petitioner's demeanor towards her superiors and the 67.50% rating she got
in her Performance Evaluation Report."

At any rate, petitioner was negligent when she took three (3) days of sick leave
without notifying any of her superiors. At the very least, petitioner should have sent an
electronic mail or a text message to Espos (OIC-Program Unit Supervisor Unit B) or
Hembrador (Branch Manager) when she decided to go home during office hours and absent
herself for two consecutive days thereafter. More, it goes without saying that shouting and
hurling threats at one's superior is disrespectful. Petitioner cannot brush aside her misconduct
by faulting KMBI for its one-page Code of Ethics.

Verily, the NLRC's ruling that petitioner's dismissal was not due to her failure to qualify
as a regular employee was not supported by substantial evidence. Consequently, the CA
correctly held that the NLRC acted with grave abuse of discretion in ruling that the cause of
petitioner's dismissal was solely due to her unauthorized absences.

The Supreme Court agrees with the CA that the termination of petitioner's
probationary contract is just a matter of time in view of her overall rating of 67.50%. This
was further exacerbated by the verbal altercation she had with Hembrador on July 28, 2016.
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Hembrador cited other reasons for her recommendation aside from her unauthorized
absences: (1) she would neither notify Espos of her whereabouts nor give updates on the
status of her center collection; and (2) she would leave her center without completing her
collection." In the Proof of talk about End of Contract dated July 28, 2016, Hembrador and
Espos also mentioned their dissatisfaction with petitioner's work attitude and character as
some of the factors which prompted their recommendation for the termination of her
probationary contract." These factual assertions were never denied or controverted by
petitioner.

In International Catholic Migration Commission v. NLRC , the Supreme Court held that
if the purpose sought by the employer is neither attained nor attainable within the trial period,
the employer is not precluded from terminating the probationary employment on justifiable
causes."

Considering petitioner's poor performance, KMBI cannot be compelled to keep

petitioner in its employ until the end of the six-month probationary period. Notably, petitioner
was not able to create a new center or disburse a single loan from May 30, 2016 to July 28,
2016. In addition, petitioner's propensity to defy company rules as gleaned from the records
is a sufficient ground for the termination of her probationary employment. Her argument on
the insufficiency of KMBI's one-page Code of Ethics is a strained justification of her
unacceptable conduct towards her superiors. Probationary employees who refuse to behave
in accordance with a simple code of ethics have no right to expect, much less demand
permanent employment.

From the foregoing, KMBI was able to show that petitioner's dismissal is not arbitrary,
fanciful, or whimsical and that its dissatisfaction with petitioner is real and in good faith.
Thus, the Supreme Court rules that the CA is correct in finding that the NLRC gravely abused
its discretion in sustaining the LA and ordering the payment of petitioner's salary for the
unexpired portion of her probationary employment in view of the validity of her dismissal.
Petitioner's dismissal predicated on her failure to meet the standards made known to her
negates the award of salary for the unexpired portion of her probationary employment.

The Supreme Court emphasizes that while the policy of social justice and protection
of the working class is entrenched in our Constitution, management also has its own rights
which are entitled to great respect. It is well settled that the employer has the right or is at
liberty to choose who will be hired and who will be denied employment and that a
probationary employee's failure to perform the duties and responsibilities which have been
clearly made known to them constitutes a justifiable basis for non-regularization.

FALLO/DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated January 31, 2019 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 154165 is hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

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MANILA LAW COLLEGE LABOR LAW CASE DIGESTS NOV. 2020-SEP. 2022

RICHARD N. WAHING, RONALD L. CALAGO AND PABLO P. MAIT vs.

SPOUSES AMADOR DAGUIO AND ESING DAGUIO
G.R. No. 219755, April 18, 2022
Leonen, J.:

FACTS:
Wahing et al, worked as rubber tree tappers for the Daguio Spouses until Mait was
ordered to “stop tapping the rubber tree” on October 15, 2006. On February 6, 2006, Wahing
and Calago were similarly ordered to stop working on the Daguio Spouses’ trees.

Wahing et al, then filed a complaint for illegal dismissal, reinstatement or separation
pay, underpayment of wages, labor standards benefits, damages, and attorney’s fees.
However, the Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaint “after finding that the relationship
between [the parties] was that of a landlord and tenant and not of employer – employee.”

Thereafter, Wahing et al. Appealed the Labor Arbiter’s ruling before the National Labor
Relations commission which then vacated and set aside their complaint’s dismissal and
ordered the Labor Arbiter to decide the complaint on the merits. In its September 28 decision,
the Labor Arbiter ruled that Wahing et al were illegally dismissed from employment. The
Labor Arbiter then ordered the Daguio Spouses to pat Wahing et al. A total monetary award
of P777,090.52.

The Daguio Spouses appealed the Labor Arbiter’s findings to the National Labor
Relations commission, arguing that they neither received the Labor Arbiter’s Orders to submit
their position paper nor Wahing et al.’s position paper. The Daguio Spouses also moved to
have their appeal bond reduced, which was partially granted, subject to an additional posting
of P50,000.00 in cash or surety, as appeal bond. The case was then remanded to the
Executive Labor Arbiter.

Wahing et al. then moved for the reconsideration of the August 24, 2011 Resolution,
but were denied relief. Afterwards, they filed a Petition for Certiorari before the Court of
Appeals, arguing that: (1) the National Labor Relations Commission had no jurisdiction to
render the assailed Resolution because Daguio Spouses failed to perfect their appeal; and
(2) that contrary to the assailed Resolution, the Labor Arbiter respected the Daguio Spouses’
right of due process by giving them adequate time and notice to submit their evidence, which
they allegedly disregarded.

Instead on ruling on the procedural defects raised in the Petition for Certiorari, the
Court of Appeals decided the case on the merits. It found that the Daguio Spouses’ evidence
adequately refuted the existence of an employer-employee relationship, while Wahing et al.
Merely relied on procedural technicalities and self-serving allegations.

The CA held that Wahing failed to overcome their burden of proving the existence of
the employee-employer relationship; thus, they could not have been illegally dismissed from
employment.
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Wahing et al filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the CA’s Decision but were again
denied relief. Hence this petition.

ISSUES:
1. Whether an employee-employer relationship exists between the parties; and
2. Whether the respondents were illegally terminated.

RULING/RATIO DECIDENDI:
1. Yes, there exists an employer-employee relationship between the parties.

Contrary to the Court of Appeals’ findings, respondents employed petitioners as farm

workers and are, thus, subject to the rules governing an employer-employee relationship.
Consulta v. Court of Appeals, citing Viana v. Al-Lagadan discusses the four-fold test for
determining the existence of the employer-employee relationship.:

In Viaña v. Al-Lagadan, the Court first laid down the four-fold test to determine the
existence of an employer- employee relationship. The four elements of an employer-
employee relationship, which have since been adopted in subsequent jurisprudence, are:
(1) the power to hire; (2) the payment of wages; (3) the power to dismiss; and (4) the
power to control. The power to control is the most important of the four elements.

Respondents consistently argued before the labor tribunals that petitioners were not
their employees because the latter “only share[d] in the proceeds of rubber sales from their
tapping activities instead of earning wages. Respondents also deny exercising control over
the mean and methods of petitioners’ work as rubber tappers. The case of De los Reyes v.
Espineli discussed that such a relationship maybe classified as agricultural tenancy instead of
agricultural employment. Incidentally, De Los Reyes pointed out that the existence of
agricultural employment may be determined by the same four elements of: (1) the selection
and engagement of the employee; (2) the payment of wages; (3) the power of dismissal;
and (4) the employer’s power to control the employee’s conduct. In De Los Reyes, the Court
held that there is no existence of employer-employee relationship between land holder and
tenant:

Since the relationship between farm employer and agricultural laborer is that of
employer and employee, the decisive factor is the control exercised by the former. On the
other hand, the landholder has the “right to require the tenant to follow those proven
practices which have been found to contribute towards increased agricultural production and
to use fertilizer of the kind and kinds shown by proven farm practices to be adapted to the
requirements of the land.” his is but the right of a partner to protect his interest, not control
exercised by an employer. If and holder and tenant disagree as to farm practices, the former
may not dismiss the latter. It is the court that shall settle the conflict according to the best
interest of the parties.

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In this case, petitioners submitted testimonies from their co-workers detailing: (1)
their daily wages for their required hours of work; (2) respondents’ constant supervision of
their workers during work hours; and (3) the possibility of dismissal from work for failing to
serve three consecutive work days. On the other hand, respondents submitted the
testimonies of their “former caretaker,” a local rubber merchant, and several local
government officials who all testified that petitioners “only share[d] in the proceeds” of
rubber sales and were not engaged as agricultural employees.

The court held that there is sufficient corroborating testimony to support petitioners’
claim that they served as employees on respondents’ rubber plantation. In deciding the
subject case, the court considered the testimonies of the petitioners’ colleagues who were
similarly asked to leave the plantation who illustrated that they: (1) were required to work
at set hours per day; (2) were paid a set rate per day of work; () worked under the
respondents’ constant supervision; and (4) could be dismissed for violating the work
standards set by respondents.

As to the element of control, the SC opined that rubber tapping does not lend itself to
the usual standard of assessing an employer’s control over the “means and methods” of an
employee’s work. As discussed in the CA Decision, petitioners’ work only required the
collection of “rubber lumps from the ‘bagol’ or small containers attached to the trunk” and
their placement in another container. It believed that the activity may be better assessed
for employer control through an alternative test, as provided by Francisco v. National Labor
Relations Commission. This approach is the adoption of a two-tiered test involving: (1) the
putative employer’s power to control the employee with respect to the means and methods
by which the work is to be accomplished; and (2) the underlying economic realities of the
activity or relationship.

As discussed in Francisco, the two-tiered test provides a framework of analysis, which

would take into consideration the totality of circumstances surrounding the true nature of
the relationship between the parties. This is especially appropriate in this case where there
is no written agreement or terms of reference to base the relationship on; and due to the
complexity of the relationship based on the various positions and responsibilities given to the
worker over the period of the latter’s employment.

It was further discussed in Francisco that the “economic reality” test requires proof of
the totality of economic circumstances of the worker in order to determine the existence of
an employer-employee relationship. The determination of the relationship between employer
and employee depends upon the circumstance of the whole economic activity. One of these
circumstances to be considered is the degree of dependency of the worker upon the employer
for his continued employment in that line of business:

The proper standard of economic dependence is whether the worker is dependent on

the alleged employer for his continued employment in that line of business. In the United
States, the touchstone of economic reality in analyzing possible employment relationship for
purposes of the Federal Labor Standards Act is dependency. By analogy, the benchmark of
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economic reality in analyzing possible employment relationships for purposes of the Labor
Code ought to be the economic dependence of the worker on his employer.

Hence, the testimonies submitted by petitioners established the totality of economic

circumstances required by Francisco’s economic reality test. Petitioners perform services
integral to respondents’ business of running a rubber plantation. While there was no proof
on record of petitioners’ investment in their own work tools and facilities, the simplicity of
the physical labor involved in their work renders this element inconclusive.

Likewise, it was established that (1) respondent exercised control over the petitioners
by constantly supervising them during their required work hours; (2) petitioners had no
opportunity to exercise initiative or control their own profit or loss from their work, as they
were paid a set daily wage; and (3) petitioners could be dismissed for repeatedly violating
their required daily work engagements.

The foregoing circumstances, when applied to the two-tier test in Francisco, show that
respondents exercised control over petitioners’ hours, means, and methods of work.
Petitioners were also shown to be economically dependent upon respondents for their
livelihood, Thus, there exists an employer-employee relationship between the parties.

2. Yes, respondents were illegally terminated.

In view of the employer-employee relationship between the parties, respondents

illegally terminated petitioners’ employment by ordering them to stop their work without just
or authorized cause. Petitioners are entitled to reinstatement, and the payment of back wages
and labor standards benefits from the time of their dismissal from employment until the
finality of the subject Decision. Should reinstatement be impossible or impractical due to
strained relations between parties, respondents shall pay petitioners separation pay.
Attorney’ fees of ten percent (10%) of the total monetary award are warranted in view of
the litigation costs incurred by Petitioners as a result of their illegal dismissal.

FALLO/ DISPOSITIVE PORTION:

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari is GRANTED. The Court of
Appeals’ January 23, 2015 Decision, and its July 7, 2015 Resolution, are hereby REVERSED
and SET ASIDE.

The September 28, 2010 Decision of the Labor Arbiter finding the existence of the
employer-employee relationship and petitioners’ illegal dismissal, and awarding back wages
and other benefits is hereby REINSTATED, subject to the possibility of reinstatement in lieu
of separation pay. Petitioners are likewise entitled to Attorney’s Fees at the rate of ten percent
(10%) of the entire monetary award.

SO ORDERED.

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MANILA LAW COLLEGE LABOR LAW CASE DIGESTS NOV. 2020-SEP. 2022

ALLAN S. NAVARETTE vs. VENTIS MARITIME CORPORATION

G.R. No.246871, APRIL 19,2022
INTING, J.:

FACTS:
Petitioner underwent a subsequent PEME on January 19,2016. However, respondent
did not deploy him despite medical clearances and certification that he was fit for sea duty.
Confused, petitioner consulted a cardiologist, Dr. Efren R. Vicaldo declared him unfit to
resume work as a seaman in any capacity. After his examination of the petitioner and his
medical history, Dr. Vicaldo concluded that his illness was work- related.

In a letter to respondent, petitioner requested for a meeting in order to settle his claim
for disability benefits, medical reimbursement and other related benefits, but to no avail. This
prompted the petitioner to file a Notice to Arbitrate before the NCMB for payment of full
disability benefits, sickness allowance, moral and exemplary damages, and attorney’s fees.
He asserted that: (1) the fit to work assessment by the company doctors were inconclusive
and must be disregarded because his illness was still existing and he was still under
medication when he was declared to be fit to work; (2) his unfitness to work was bolstered
by his non-deployment; (3) his illness completely restricted his ability to effectively discharge
his duties as chief cook; (4) his continued work would result in his discomfort and pain
because of intermittent chest pain and tightness; and (5) the Certificate of Fitness for Work
should not be given weight as he was only compelled to sign it because of the promise of
deployment.

In the assailed Decision dated 14, 2019, The CA set aside the Decision dated February
1, 2017 of the NCMB and found petitioner has not totally and permanently disabled. The fallo
of the assailed Decision Reads:

WHEREFORE, The Petition for review filed by the petitioner is hereby GRANTED. The
Decision dated February 1,2017 and Resolution dated July 12,2017 which were both
rendered by the National Conciliation and Mediation Board in the case docketed as
MVA-089-RCMB-NCR-241-12-11-2016 are hereby Reversed.

Respondent Allan S. Navarrette is hereby found not to be totally and permanently

disabled. As such, the award of full disability benefit and attorney’s fees to Respondent
Allan S. Navarette are hereby DELETED.

SO ORDERED.

The CA held in the assailed Decision that:(1) the burden of proof was upon petitioner
to show by substantial evidence that he was entitled to receive his disability benefits, (2) the
cause for the exacerbation of petitioners condition can be attributed to the nature of his work
as a chief of cook which was physically demanding and exposed him to extreme
temperatures; (3) there was nothing in the records that would show that petitioner had vices
that could have significantly contributed to the aggravation of his pre-existing heart
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condition; and (4) petitioners working environment overburdened his already defective
cardiovascular system in just a quick span of four years.

Nonetheless, the CA reversed the finding of the NCMB and declared petitioner as not
totally and permanently disabled. In ruling for the respondent, the CA gave credence to the
medical attention given to petitioner by the company-designated physician who gave a more
accurate diagnosis of his medical condition and fitness to resume work.

Petitioner adds that: (1) his chosen doctors examined him and reviewed the test done
by the company doctor and his previous medical conditions; (2) the CA erred when it
accorded outright credence to the assessment of the company- designated physician on the
basis of the amount of time given in monitoring his condition; ; (3) he was still advised to
continue his medication despite assessing him to be fit for work;(4) the medical assessment
of the company-designated physician is biased and self-serving; (5) with his present
condition, he can no longer fully, efficiently and properly discharge his customary and usual
duties as chief cook and as a seafarer without serious discomfort and pain; and (6) his present
condition had prevented him from landing any gainful employment on an ocean vessel for a
period of more than 240 days thereby making him permanently and totally disabled.

In its Comment, respondent counters that petitioner was already suffering from
hypertension and possible heart condition prior to boarding the vessel. As his condition was
pre-existing, it was not suffered or acquired during the term of the contract hence, it cannot
be considered as compensable. Respondent denies any unusual strain in the nature of
petitioner work and dismisses the latter’s allegation as self-serving.

Respondent likewise points out that:(1) the company-designated Physicians were the
ones who treated and monitored petitioner which resulted in his successful treatment and
fitness to work; (2) petitioner signed a Certificate of Fitness for Work acknowledging his
condition;(3) petitioner underwent a subsequent PEME where he was determined to be fit
for sea duty; and (4) petitioner is not entitled to any disability benefits because his condition
was fully resolved by respondent.

ISSUE:
Whether or not he is entitled to the payment of permanent total disability benefits.

RULING/RATIO DECIDENDI:
No, the petitioner is not entitled to the payment of permanent total
disability benefits.

Resolves to deny the petition. At the outset, there is no more question as to whether
the illness of petitioner was work-related and contracted on board as the issue was no longer
raised in the petition. At any rate, the court agrees with the finding of both the NCMB and
the CA that it is work-related.

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To determine whether a seafarer is entitled to total and permanent disability benefits,

the court takes into consideration the law, the employment contract which governs his or her
overseas employment, and the finding as to his or her medical condition in accordance with
the pertinent rules.

The law and rules that govern permanent total disability benefits of seafarers.

The law that governs a seafarer's disability benefits claim is Article 198 [Formerly
Article 192] (c) (1) of the labor Code of the Philippines. It provides:

ART. 198.[192] Permanent total Disability-xxxx

(c) The following disabilities shall be deemed total and permanent:

(1) Temporary total disability lasting continuously for more hundred twenty days,
except as otherwise provided for in the Rules;
xxxx

Moreover, Section 2(b) of Rule VII of the Amended Rules on Employees Compensation
(AREC) defines disability as follows:

Section.2 Disability. _ xxxx

(b) A disability is total and permanent if as a result of the injury or sickness the
employee is unable to perform any gainful

For this purpose, the seafarer shall submit himself to a post-employment medical
examination by a company-designated physician within three working days upon his return
except when he is physically incapacitated to do so, in which case, a written notice to the
agency within the same period is deemed as compliance. In the course of the treatment, the
seafarer shall also report regularly to the company-designated physician specifically on the
dates as prescribed by the company-designated physician and agreed to by the seafarer.
Failure of the seafarer to comply with the mandatory reporting requirement shall result in
the forfeiture of the right to claim the above benefits.

If a doctor appointed by the seafarer disagrees with the assessment, a third doctor
may be agreed jointly between the Employer and the seafarer. The third doctor’s decision
shall be final and binding on both parties.

The Court in Elburg Shipmanagement Phils., Inc. v. Quioque explained the foregoing
rules governing a claim for total and permanent disability benefits, viz.:

In summary, if there is a claim for total and permanent disability benefits by a seafarer,
the following rules (rules) shall govern:

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1. The company-designated physician must issue a final medical assessment of the

seafarer’s disability grading within a period of 120 days from the time the seafarer
reported to him;

2. If the company-designated physician fails to give his assessment within the period
of 120 days, without any justifiable reason, then the seafarer’s disability becomes
permanent and total;

3. If the company-designated physician fails to give his assessment within the period
of 120 days with a sufficient justification (e.g., seafarer required further medical
treatment or seafarer was uncooperative), then the period of diagnosis and
treatment shall be extended to 240 days. The employer has the burden to prove
that the company-designated physician has sufficient justification to extend the
period.

In the case, petitioner entered into a Contract of Employment with respondent on

January 21,2015 for a period of four months. He was repatriated for medical reasons on June
11, 2015 and the respondent referred him to its company-designated physician for further
management. Petitioner was initially diagnosed to be suffering from hypertension and acute
gastritis. After a series of tests and work-ups, the company designated physician diagnosed
him with “ischemic heart disease, hypertension and acute gastritis”

The Medical Reports reveal that petitioner was regularly seen and managed by the
company-designated physicians from June 24,2015 to November 20,2015 for at least 18
times. In his Medical Report dated November 20,2015, it was stated that ischemic heart
disease and acid peptic ulcer disease were treated while his hypertension was controlled. It
was thus recommended that he was already fit to resume sea duties effective November 20,
2015. In fact, petitioner signed a Certificate of Fitness for Work on the same day stating,
among others, that he was releasing respondent “of all claims, demands, etc. in connection
with my being released on this date as fit for duty” and holding respondent free from any
and all liabilities as a consequence thereof.

Petitioner thereafter underwent another PEME on January 19,2016 and he was again
declared fit for sea duty. He was issued medical clearances by Dr. Jane Campos, Liver and
Gastrointestinal Disease Specialist, on January 22, 2016 and Dr. Sison, a Cardiologist, on
January 25, 2016. Both doctors assessed petitioner is fit to work with advice from Dr. Sison
to continue with his medication.

FALLO/DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

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VIBAL COMPANY/VIRTUALIDAD, INC., GASPAR VIBAL AND ESTHER VIBAL vs.

APRIL GRACE C. MORQUIN
G.R. No. 247879, April 19, 2022
GAERLAN, J.:

FACTS:
Vibal employed respondent as a Staff Writer for the Science and Technology Digest
(S&T Digest) Magazine, one of Vibal's publications under the SD Publications Department.
Initially, Vibal hired respondent on a contractual basis, therefore she became a probationary
employee. The Vibal Managing Editor, told respondent that the latter had to undergo a
written examination for her regularization and assured her that the exam was just a formality.
Respondent thereafter took the exam.

Months later, the Human Resource (HR) Manager, informed Michelle Cristobal, The
Vibal Managing Editor that the respondent failed to pass the said exam, therefore she can
no longer continue with her employment. she found out that her score did not match with
the number of checks in her paper. Due to the discrepancy, respondent underwent another
exam but she failed again. They sent respondent a Notice of Retrenchment informing
respondent that her employment had become redundant as a result of the termination of
Vibal' s textbook project with the Department of Education (DepEd), therefore her
employment shall be terminated. Because of this, the respondent filed a complaint for illegal
dismissal with prayer for payment of separation pay, moral and exemplary damages, and
attorney's fees against petitioners.

Respondent alleged, among others, that the reason cited by petitioners in the notice
of retrenchment, particularly that the textbook project had already ended, should not affect
her because she was not even assigned to the Textbook Department but to the S&T Digest
Magazine. On the other hand, petitioners alleged that they suffered a severe decline in the
sales of their magazines for the school year 2015-2016 with the termination of their textbook
project with the DepEd. In an attempt to sustain their business operations, they introduced
digital editors and senior high school magazines but were eventually stopped in order to
prevent further losses. Ultimately, they decided to reduce their staff writers from nineteen to
eight. To determine who among the employees should be retained, they conducted an on-
the-spot written examination for their staff writers.

Petitioners further alleged that they duly informed respondent and the Department of
Labor and Employment (DOLE) of the redundancy program and offered to pay respondent
separation pay of one month for every year of service. Thus, they insist that respondent was
validly dismissed.

The LA held that: (1) the decrease in the volume of petitioners' business brought
about by the termination of their textbook project constitutes a valid ground to implement
the redundancy program and (2) the results of respondent's exams show that petitioners
employed fair and reasonable criteria in declaring her position as redundant. Nonetheless,

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the LA awarded respondent separation pay and 13th month pay on the ground that
petitioners have not yet paid her the same.

Respondent appealed to the NLRC wherein the NLRC granted respondent's appeal,
and thus, declared her illegally dismissed. NLRC ratiocinated that petitioners failed to
substantially comply with the requirement of notice to the DOLE. In particular, petitioners
filed the notice dated July 18, 2016 to the DOLE (DOLE Notice) before they conducted the
exams on August 2, 2016 and August 12, 2016. Thus, it is evident that they had not yet
determined the employees who would be affected by the redundancy at the time they filed
the DOLE Notice. Moreover, the NLRC held that the DOLE Notice did not contain the details
necessary to effect a redundancy program.

The CA dismissed the petition for certiorari for lack of merit. It ratiocinated that
because petitioners alleged that the surplus of employees resulted from the over-hiring of
workers and the termination of the textbook project with the DepEd, redundancy should have
been limited only to the employees working on the textbook project. It further held that
respondent's position as staff writer for the S& T Digest Magazine cannot be considered
redundant because she was the lone staff writer for S&T Digest Magazine. Lastly, the CA
held that all monetary awards shall earn legal interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per
annum from the finality of this decision until full payment. Petitioners insist that the DOLE
Notice sufficiently complied with the notice requirement for a valid termination of
employment due to redundancy; and that the CA improperly disregarded evidence on record
which shows that Vibal exercised utmost good faith in implementing its redundancy program.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the respondent was legally dismissed on the ground of redundancy;
and
2. Whether or not the petitioners failed to prove that it acted with good faith in
abolishing the redundant positions.

RULING/RATIO DECIDENDI:
No, the petitioners failed to comply with the requirements for a valid
dismissal due to redundancy and failed to prove that it acted with good faith in
abolishing the redundant positions and that it employed fair and reasonable
criteria in its redundancy program.

Redundancy exists where the services of an employee are more than what is
reasonably demanded by the actual requirements of the enterprise. As a rule, a declaration
of redundancy is ultimately a management prerogative, and the employer is not obligated to
keep in its payroll more employees than are needed for its day-to-day operations.
Nonetheless, it is well settled that management, in the exercise of its prerogative, must not
violate the law or declare redundancy without sufficient basis.

The following requirements for a valid redundancy program: (a) written notice served
on both the employees and the DOLE at least one (1) month prior to the intended date of
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termination of employment; (b) payment of separation pay equivalent to at least one (1)
month pay for every year of service; (c) good faith in abolishing the redundant positions;
and (d) fair and reasonable criteria in ascertaining what positions are to be declared
redundant and accordingly abolished, taking into consideration such factors as (i) preferred
status; (ii) efficiency; and (iii) seniority, among others.

Under Article 298 (formerly 283) of the Labor Code, redundancy is recognized as an
authorized cause for dismissal, viz.:

Article 298. [283] Closure of Establishment and Reduction of Personnel. - The employer may
also terminate the employment of any employee due to the installation of labor-saving
devices, redundancy, retrenchment to prevent losses or the closing or cessation of operation
of the establishment or undertaking unless the closing is for the purpose of circumventing
the provisions of this Title, by serving a written notice on the workers and the Ministry of
Labor and Employment at least one (1) month before the intended date thereof. In case of
termination due to the installation of labor-saving devices or redundancy, the worker affected
thereby shall be entitled to a separation pay equivalent to at least his one (1) month pay or
to at least one (1) month pay for every year of service, whichever is higher. In case of
retrenchment to prevent losses and in cases of closures or cessation of operations of
establishment or undertaking not due to serious business losses or financial reverses, the
separation pay shall be equivalent to one (1) month pay or at least one-half (1 /2) month
pay for every year of service, whichever is higher. A fraction of at least six (6) months shall
be considered one (1) whole year.

The court agreed with the ruling of the CA that the petitioners failed to comply with
all of the mentioned requisites. To begin with, while petitioners did serve a written notice on
both respondent and the DOLE at least one (I) month before the intended date of
termination, the DOLE Notice merely stated petitioners' decision to implement a redundancy
program. It failed to contain the necessary details necessary to effect the redundancy
program, such as the reasons for finding certain positions as redundant, the name of the
employees to be terminated, and the actual date of termination.

The Court's ruling in Caltex (Phils.), Inc. v. NLRC, is instructive on the matter:
Petitioner's insistence that its written notice of redundancy program per its October
1996 letter addressed to DOLE is a substantial compliance with the notice requirement, is
not persuasive since the said letter merely stated its plan of implementing a redundancy
program but did not contain the details necessary to effect the program such as the reason
for finding certain portions as redundant, the name of the employees to be terminated and
the actual date of termination.

Also, to establish good faith, it is not enough for a company to merely declare that
the said position has become redundant. Petitioners must provide substantial proof that the
services of the employees are in excess of what is required by the company.

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To support their contention, petitioners presented a Sales Report for the years 2015
and 2016 showing that they have suffered a 50% loss in their net sales, along with various
affidavits executed by several of their officers. Unfortunately, the sales report and the
affidavits, other than being self-serving, failed to show how respondent's position as a staff
writer had become superfluous. Notably, petitioners merely alleged that they suffered a
considerable decline when the DepEd textbook project was terminated which led to their
decision to terminate respondent's services on the ground of redundancy. Petitioners,
however, failed to show proof that its textbook project with DepEd was actually terminated.
Besides, assuming arguendo that the DepEd textbook project was terminated, petitioners still
failed to show how the termination of the textbook project affected respondent's position
considering that respondent worked for Vibal' s magazine publication, and not for the
textbook project.

Similarly, petitioners failed to convincingly show that fair and reasonable criteria were
indeed employed in ascertaining what positions are to be abolished. Considering that
petitioners claimed that the redundancy emanated from the termination of the textbook
project and that the positions of those employees who were hired for the DepEd project had
become redundant, respondent should not have even been considered as one of the
employees whose positions have become redundant because she was not even a part of the
textbook project. Petitioners, as employer, bear the burden of proving the factual and legal
basis for the dismissal of its employees on the ground of redundancy. Its failure to do so
would necessarily lead to a judgment of illegal dismissal, as in this case.

The absence of any request from him, the employer-company cannot be expected to
respond. As the party seeking to impugn the certification that the law itself recognizes as
prevailing, Constantino bears the burden of proof that respondent was illegally dismissed.
The CA did not err in finding no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the NLRC. Thus, the
Court finds no compelling reason to depart from the findings of the CA Considering the NLRC's
finding that reinstatement is not feasible, the Court sustains the award of separation pay
equivalent to one month pay for every year of service and the award of backwages pursuant
to Article 294 of the Labor Code which substantially provides that illegally dismissed
employees are entitled to full backwages, inclusive of allowances and other benefits,
computed from the time of their illegal termination up to the finality of the decision.

FALLO/DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated September 21, 2018 and
the Resolution dated June 14, 2019 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 154020 are
hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in that Vibal Company / Virtualidad, Inc., Gaspar
Vibal and Esther Vibal are ORDERED to pay April Grace C. Morquin attorney's fees equivalent
to 10% of the total monetary award. The total judgment award shall be subject to interest
at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the finality of this Resolution until its full
satisfaction.

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The case is REMANDED to the Labor Arbiter for a detailed computation of the
amounts due to April Grace C. Morquin, which must be paid without delay, and for the
immediate execution of the Resolution.

SO ORDERED.

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MANILA LAW COLLEGE LABOR LAW CASE DIGESTS NOV. 2020-SEP. 2022

MARLON BUTIAL AGAPITO vs. AEROPLUS MULTISERVICES, INC.

G.R. No.248304, April 20, 2022
Lazaro-Javier, J.:

FACTS:
Respondent Aeroplus Multi-Services, Inc. is engaged in janitorial and manpower
services. It hired the petitioner, Marlon Butial Agapito in February 2004 as a housekeeper
with a daily wage of P466.00 less P200.00 a month as a cash bond.

On December 30, 2014, when Aeroplus conducted a meeting with its employees, the
petitioner asked his immediate supervisor George Constantino for unfair treatment of him.
However, the said supervisor answered and defended some of his subordinates. He also said
to the petitioner that if he does not like his policy, he is free to leave the company. The
petitioner explained that he was merely raising a valid concern.

On January 5, 2015, the petitioner reported what happened during the meeting to the
Aeroplus personnel office. Constantino, however, found out about it and gave Marlon a letter
memorandum for insubordination. Thereafter, Aeroplus suspended Marlon from February 13
to March 3, 2015. Unknown to the petitioner, he reported for work, only to be told by
Aeroplus' OIC-Personnel Darrel Mendoza, "Wala na tiwala sayo ang Management kaya
tanggal ka na! respondent tried to explain his side but Mendoza merely responded, "Basta
tanggal ka na!" and ordered him to get out of the office.

Consequently, the petitioner filed with the National Labor Relations Commission a
complaint for illegal dismissal, illegal suspension, and money claims.

The petitioner essentially alleged that he was initially suspended and subsequently
dismissed without just cause and due process, with no ground to terminate him, he is entitled
to monetary claims/benefits such as 13th Month Pay, Service Incentive Leave,
Reimbursement of Cash Bond, Attorney's Fees, Moral and Exemplary Damages.

On the part of the respondent, Aeroplus riposted that the petitioner’s complaint is
factually baseless, he was terminated due to continuously violating company policies, and
lastly, his claims for Separation Pay and other monetary benefits were baseless.

The Labor Arbiter ruled that Marlon Butial Agapito has been ILLEGALLY DISMISSED.
Accordingly, respondent Aeroplus Multi-Services, Inc. is liable to pay the complainant the
following:

a) Back wages computed from March 4, 2015, up to the actual payment of his separation
pay;
b) Separation pay, in lieu of reinstatement, equivalent to one (1) month pay for every
year of service computed from February 2004 up to March 3, 2015;
c) Service incentive leave pay and 13 th-month pay reckoned three (3) years back from
March 3, 2015;
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d) Cash bond in the amount of Php200.00 a month computed from February 2004 to
February 2015;
e) Moral and exemplary damages in the amount of Php20,000.00 each;
f) Attorney's fees are equivalent to ten percent (10%) of his total monetary award.

On appeal by Aeroplus, the NLRC reversed the decision. Dismissed the complaint for
illegal dismissal and ordered petitioner to return to work within five (5) days from notice,
without back wages. The NLRC gave credence to the respective sworn statements of
Mendoza and Constantino, albeit the same were submitted only for the first time on appeal.

According to the NLRC, the submission of these affidavits shifted the burden of proof
to the petitioner to establish that the alleged statements were truly spoken by Constantino.
NLRC concluded that other than the petitioner's allegations, he failed to present any
substantial evidence to support his claim of illegal dismissal. The NLRC Farther pronounced
that the rules of evidence in courts of law and equity are not controlling in labor cases.

Petitioner's subsequent motion for reconsideration was denied in the main, but the
grant of service incentive leaves, 13th-month pay, and cash bond was affirmed.

On a Petition for Certiorari, the petitioner charged the NLRC with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it admitted and accorded weight
to the belatedly submitted affidavits of Constantino and Mendoza; and for pronouncing that
petitioner was not illegally dismissed nor entitled to the monetary award given by the labor
arbiter.

Court of Appeals affirmed. It further denied the petitioner's motion for reconsideration.

Petitioner now faults the Court of Appeals for allegedly ignoring the fact that he was
illegally dismissed. He asserts that although strict adherence to technical rules is not required
in labor cases, still, the requirements of equity and due process must be complied with. The
belated and unjustified submission of the Sinumpaang Salaysay of Constantino and Mendoza
should not have been allowed, aside from the fact that the same is utterly self-serving.
Petitioner contends he is entitled to the monetary benefits granted by the labor arbiter.

Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the Court of Appeals and the National Labor Relations Commission
rendered a valid decision.
2. Whether or not Marlon Butial Agapito was illegally dismissed.

RULING/RATIO DECIDENDI:
1. No. The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals
and the National Labor Relations Commission.

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Court's function is to analyze or weigh evidence all over again in view of the corollary
legal precept that the Court is not a trier of facts. The Court, nonetheless, may proceed to
probe and resolve factual issues presented here because the findings of the Court of Appeals
and NLRC are contrary to those of the labor arbiter.

XXX In labor cases, strict adherence to technical rules is not required. This
liberal policy, however, should still conform to the basic principles of fair play,
justice, and due process.

Time and again, we have allowed evidence to be submitted for the first time on appeal
with the NLRC in the interest of substantial justice. We have consistently supported the rule
that labor officials should use all reasonable means to ascertain the facts in each case speedily
and objectively, without regard to technicalities of law or procedure, in the interest of due
process. But this liberal policy must still conform to the basic principles of fair play, justice,
and due process.

In Wilgen Loon, ef al. v. Power -Master, Inc., et al. the Court ordained that "the
liberality of procedural rules is qualified by two requirements: (1) a party should adequately
explain any delay in the submission of evidence; and (2) a party should sufficiently prove the
allegations sought to be proven. For the liberal application of the rules before quasi-judicial
agencies cannot be used to perpetuate injustice and hamper the just resolution of the case.
Neither is the rule on liberal construction a license to disregard the rules of procedure.

Guided by these principles, we hold that the Court of Appeals committed reversible
error when it affirmed the admission of and the weight assigned to the belatedly submitted
sworn statements of Constantino and Mendoza against the petitioner.

XXX Aeroplus did not offer any explanation for the delayed submission of
the Sinumpaang Salaysay of Mendoza and Constantino.

Aeroplus submitted to the NLRC its Memorandum of Appeal. Note that starting with
his position paper before the labor arbiter and up until now, the petitioner has invariably
anchored his cause of action for illegal dismissal on the aforesaid utterances of Constantino
and Mendoza. Verily, the delayed submission of the supposed controverting affidavits of
Constantino and Mendoza for the first time on appeal, sans any valid justification is repugnant
to the basic tenets of justice, fair play, and due process. More so since these affidavits
containing a plain denial of the otherwise prompt, positive, and detailed narrative of the
petitioner are simply self-serving, hence, devoid of any probative weight

2. Yes, Marlon Butial Agapito was illegally dismissed.

We now resolve the issue of illegal dismissal based on the remaining untainted
evidence on record. In illegal dismissal cases, before the employer must bear the burden of
proving that the dismissal was legal, the employee must first establish by substantial evidence

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the fact of his dismissal from service. Obviously, if there is no dismissal, then there can be
no question as to its legality or illegality.

Here, as found by the labor arbiter, the petitioner categorically recounted the
circumstances surrounding the unlawful termination of his employment by Aeroplus. The
words spoken by Aeroplus OIC-Personnel Mendoza to petitioner — "Wala na tiwala sayo ang
Management kaya tanggal ka na!" and "Basta tanggal ka na! " Immediately followed by an
unequivocal order for petitioner to get out of the office, speak for themselves. It was an
outright termination of employment without just cause and due process.

Aeroplus is liable for the petitioner's money claims and moral and
exemplary damages.

On the consequences of the illegality of the petitioner's dismissal, Noblado v.

Alfonso held:

In fine, the respondent's lack of just cause and non-compliance with the procedural
requisites in terminating the petitioners' employment taints the latter's dismissal with
illegality.

Thus, an illegally dismissed employee is ordinarily entitled to the following under

Article 279 of the Labor Code, as amended, mandates that the employee is entitled to (a)
reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and other privileges, or in lieu thereof,
separation pay equivalent to one (l) month pay for every year of service, with a fraction of
at least six (6) months considered as one (1) whole year, from the time of the employee's
illegal dismissal up to the finality of the judgment; and (b) full backwages inclusive of
allowances and other benefits or their monetary equivalent computed from the time
compensation was not paid to the time of his actual reinstatement.

Here, Aeroplus is liable for the petitioner's full back wages from March 4, 2015, up to
the finality of this Decision. It is also liable for the petitioner's service incentive leave pay and
13th-month pay reckoned three (3) years back from March 3, 2015, as it failed to prove that
it already paid these benefits to the petitioner.
As for reinstatement, while it is a normal consequence of illegal dismissal, where
reinstatement, however, is no longer viable as an option, separation pay equivalent to one
(l) month pay for every year of service should be awarded as an alternative. The payment of
separation pay is in addition to the payment of back wages. As correctly ruled by the labor
arbiter, the petitioner is entitled to separation pay of one (1) month pay per year of service
in lieu of reinstatement due to the parties' strained relation considering the manner by which
the petitioner got dismissed from his employment.

The petitioner showed the requisite elements for the award of moral and exemplary
damages in his favor. He adduced evidence that his dismissal was done in a wanton,
oppressive, or malevolent manner. As correctly found by the labor arbiter, the spiteful and

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wanton manner by which the petitioner was illegally dismissed entitles him to moral and
exemplary damages in the amount of P20,000.00 each.

Following both statutory and case law, the petitioner should be paid attorney's fees
equivalent to ten percent of the total monetary award. This is because he was forced to
litigate and incur expenses to protect his rights and interest.

FALLO/DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated
March 14, 2019 and Resolution dated July 9, 2019 of the Court of Appeals in CA-GR. SP No.
147411 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Respondent Aeroplus Multi-Services, Inc. is found
liable for the illegal dismissal of petitioner Marlon Butial Agapito. It is ordered to PAY him
the following: separation pay under Article 279 of the Labor Code, 13th Month Pay, Service
Incentive Leave, Reimbursement of Cash Bond, Attorney's Fees, Moral and Exemplary
Damages.

SO ORDERED.

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MANILA LAW COLLEGE LABOR LAW CASE DIGESTS NOV. 2020-SEP. 2022

WESTMINSTER SEAFARER MANAGEMENT PHILIPPINES, INC. vs.

ARNULFO C. RAZ
G.R. No. 249344, April 5, 2022
INTING, J:

FACTS:
Arnulfo C. Raz, respondent, entered into a Contract of Employment on November 10,
2014 to work as a Fitter for the vessel NOCC Kattegat for a period of nine months. In the
contract, Wallem Shipmanagement Limited was represented by petitioner as its agent. As a
Fitter, respondent's duties included repairing and maintaining the vessel engine, assisting in
its overhauling, welding, cleaning, carrying and lifting, and pulling heavy equipment and
engine parts.

Respondent experienced right shoulder soreness on May 15, 2015, as a result of lifting
a hefty cylinder head. He could no longer extend his arm without experiencing pain that
traveled to his back as the discomfort grew greater over time. He brought up the issue with
his superiors, who then suggested he get checked out by a doctor in Southampton, London.
After being deemed unable to work, they repatriated him on May 31, 2015.

On November 11, 2015, the respondent was diagnosed with Grade 9 ankylosis of one
shoulder on, by Dr. Nicomedes G. Cruz (Dr. Cruz), the company's designated physician. The
shoulder blade was still movable. Respondent was qualified for disability payments worth
US$25,313.00 under the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) between the petitioner and
respondent's union, the Associated Marine Officers' and Seamen's Union of the Philippines.
Additionally, according to Dr. Cruz, Arnulfo Raz is not permanently unsuitable to work as a
seafarer.

The aforementioned antecedents prompted respondent to file a complaint against

petitioner before the National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB) of the Department
of Labor and Employment for payment of total permanent disability benefits, medical
reimbursement, damages, and attorney's fees.

The Ruling of National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB). The NCMB
ordered petitioner to pay respondent total and permanent disability benefits in the amount
of US$129,212.00, moral damages amounting to US$10,000.00, and 10% of the total
monetary award as attorney's fees.

In ruling for respondent, the NCMB gave credence to the findings of Dr. Magtira that
respondent remained incapacitated despite continuous physiotherapy and that he was no
longer capable of working at his previous occupation due to his impairment. It held that
petitioner's failure to refer respondent to a third doctor pursuant to the CBA worked against
its interest and showed bad faith, which entitled respondent to moral damages.

The Ruling of the Court of Appeals. In the herein assailed Decision dated May 6,
2019, the CA set aside the Decision dated June 20, 2017 of the NCMB and lowered the
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award of disability benefit in favor of respondent to US$25,313.00. The fallo of the assailed
Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition for Certiorari is GRANTED.

The Decision dated 20 June 2017 and Resolution dated 10 August 2017 of the
Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) National Conciliation and Mediation
Board-Office of the Voluntary Arbitrator (NCMB) in AC-944-RCMB-NCR-MVA-095-01-
05-2016 (RCMB-NCR-MAK-NTA-01-0011-2016[)] are hereby SET ASIDE. Petitioner
Westminster Seafarer Management Phil., Inc. is hereby ORDERED to pay to Private
Respondent Arnulfo C. Raz the amount of Twenty-Five Thousand Three Hundred and
Thirteen US Dollars (USD25,313.00) as Grade 9 Disability benefit, plus Attorney's Fees
equivalent to ten percent (10%) of his monetary award.

Legal interest shall be computed at the rate of six percent ( 6%) per annum of
the total award from date of finality of judgment until full satisfaction.

SO ORDERED.

ISSUES:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in: (1) imposing 6% legal interest on the
award of partial disability benefits to respondent; and (2) awarding attorney’s fees in his
favor.

RULING/RATIO DECIDENDI:
Yes, The CA was correct in imposing 6% legal interest on the award of
partial disability benefits to respondent and awarding attorney’s fees in his favor.

In Nacar v. Gallery Frames, the Court laid down the rule that when the judgement of
the court awarding a sum of money becomes final and executory, the rate of legal interest
shall be 6% per annum from such finality until its satisfaction, this interim period being
deemed equivalent to a forbearance of credit.

Petitioner alleges that the NCMB Decision dated June 20, 2017 was already executed
and that petitioner paid respondent the amount of P7,548,241.70 on December 6, 2017; and
consequently, it should no longer be liable for the 6% legal interest. However, apart from its
bare allegations, petitioner did not adduce any proof nor attach in the petition relevant
documents in support thereof.

Section 4, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, which provides:

Section 4. Contents of petition. — The petition shall be filed in eighteen (18) copies,
with the original copy intended for the court being indicated as such by the petitioner
and shall (a) state the full name of the appealing party as the petitioner and the
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adverse party as respondent, without impleading the lower courts or judges thereof
either as petitioners or respondents; (b) indicate the material dates showing when
notice of the judgment or final order or resolution subject thereof was received, when
a motion for new trial or reconsideration, if any, was filed and when notice of the
denial thereof was received; (c) set forth concisely a statement of the matters
involved, and the reasons or arguments relied on for the allowance of the petition; (d)
be accompanied by a clearly legible duplicate original, or a certified true copy of the
judgment or final order or resolution certified by the clerk of court of the court a quo
and the requisite number of plain copies thereof, and such material portions of the
record as would support the petition; and (e) contain a sworn certification against
forum shopping as provided in the last paragraph of section 2, Rule 42.

Section 5, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court further states that the failure of petitioner to
comply with any of the foregoing requirements, including the documents which should
accompany the petition, shall be sufficient ground for the dismissal thereof.

The Court emphasizes that the documents which were not attached to the petition are
pivotal in the case and form part of the crux of petitioner’s arguments. While petitioner claims
having paid the judgment award, it did not attach any document that would prove such claim
or even a document that makes a reference thereto.

Thus, for lack of basis, the Court sees no reason to modify the ruling of the CA insofar
as the imposition of 6% legal interest.

Anent the award of attorney’s fees, considering that respondent was forced to litigate
to protect his rights and interests, he is entitled to a reasonable amount pursuant to Article
2208(8) of the Civil Code of the Philippines. The Court agrees with the NCMB and the CA that
payment of attorney’s fees is warranted in an amount equivalent to 10% of the total amount
awarded to respondent.

FALLO/DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated May 6, 2019 and the
Resolution dated September 12, 2019 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 152165 are
AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

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SYSTEMS AND PLAN INTEGRATOR AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION AND/OR

ENGR. JULIETA CUNANAN vs. MICHELLE BALLESTEROS, ELVI C.
G.R. No. 217119, April 25, 2022
HERNANDO, J.:

FACTS:
Ballesteros started working for SPID Corp. on June 15, 2005 as a Customer Service
Representative. She was eventually promoted to administrative staff with a basic salary of
P9,900.00, Emergency Cost of Living Allowance (ECOLA) of P2,200.00, and transportation
allowance of P1,000.00, totaling to P14,300.00. During the first week of February 2011,
Kristine Castro, Personnel Officer of SPID Corp., talked to Ballesteros and told her that
Cunanan, President and Chief Executive Officer of SPID Corp., was asking for her resignation
because she was pregnant, and was going to have two children to take care of. Castro even
told Ballesteros that she was going to be terminated anyway so resignation would be a better
option. Disturbed by this imposition, Ballesteros talked to Ronniel Cunanan, SPID Corp.'s
Administration and Finance Officer, who confirmed that the company is indeed asking
Ballesteros to tender her resignation, saying that although she did not have a bad record
that would justify her termination, the company decided to terminate her for the same
reasons provided.

On March 25, 2011, Ballesteros gave birth and availed of the maternity leave.
Sometime in April 2011, she went back to the office and told Castro that she did not want to
resign. On May 31, 2011, while still on maternity leave, Ballesteros discovered that her salary
for the period of May 15 to 31, 2011 was not deposited to her account even if her maternity
leave was until June 21, 2011. Alarmed, she contacted Castro and found out that the
company withheld her salary and would only be released if Ballesteros would process her
SSS maternity benefits and tender her resignation letter. Still, Ballesteros refused to resign.
On June 5, 2011, Ballesteros received a letter from the company informing her of her
termination from the service.

On the other hand, the company alleged that Ballesteros' employment was terminated
based on her incompetence and inefficiency in the performance of duties. Also, SPID Corp.
lost its confidence and trust in Ballesteros because of her continued neglect of duty and
habitual absences and tardiness. SPID Corp. further alleged that Ballesteros offered to resign
after she gives birth as a graceful exit from the company, and requested to be given a
certificate of employment to find a new job. This offer was accepted by Cunanan, subject to
the condition that Ballesteros submits a formal response to the memorandum to explain.
However, Ballesteros failed to submit the explanation within the given period, thus, was
deemed to have waived her right to due process.

Thus, on January 16, 2012, Ballesteros filed a Complaint for illegal dismissal, non-
payment of wages, service incentive leave pay, 13th month pay, damages, and attorney's
fees.

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In a Decision dated June 5, 2012, the arbiter dismissed the complaint for lack of merit.
The Labor arbiter find complainant's dismissal to be attended by just cause, there is no
evidence on record showing that complainant was duly informed of the charges levelled
against her and given the opportunity to answer the same. The lack of procedural due process
should not nullify complainant's dismissal. The respondent company should, however,
indemnify complainant for violating her statutory rights.

On appeal, the NLRC reversed the LA's ruling. The NLRC sets aside the appealed
decision and a new one is hereby entered declaring the dismissal of the complainant illegal.
As a consequence, respondent Systems and Plan Integrator and Development Corporation is
ordered to reinstate complainant Michelle C. Ballesteros to her former position without the
loss of seniority rights and to pay her back wages and other benefits.

The June 26, 2014 Decision of the CA dismissed the company's case for lack of merit.
The CA held that in the absence of substantial evidence, the contentions of petitioners are
self-serving and incapable of showing that the dismissal of the private respondent was
justified. Further stating that the requirement of procedural due process, particularly, the
notice rule, was observed. Notice to explain is validly served upon the private respondent.
Kristine Castro, Personnel Officer of petitioner SPIDC, indicated on the said notice that the
private respondent "refused to receive because she wanted to talk to Mr. Ronniel Cunanan."
Castro also executed an Affidavit attesting that she personally served the February 21, 2011
memorandum to the private respondent but the latter refused to receive it, but she (private
respondent) got a copy anyway.

Thus, a Petition for Review on Certiorari which seeks to reverse and set aside the CA
Decision, and for the termination from employment of Ballesteros to be declared legal.

ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner Ballesteros was validly terminated from employment.

RULING/RATIO DECIDENDI:
No, the petitioner was not validly terminated from employment.

In this case, considering that the findings and rulings of the NLRC and the CA, on one
hand, and those of the LA, on the other, are conflicting, the Court finds sufficient basis for a
review of the factual matters in this case in conjunction with the questions of law involved.

Substantial Due Process: Just causes for a valid dismissal from

employment. For a dismissal from employment to be valid, it must be pursuant to either a
just, or an authorized cause, under Articles 297,298, or 299 of the Labor Code, as amended.
Furthermore, the burden of proving that the termination of an employee was for a just or
authorized cause lies with the employer. If the employer fails to meet this burden, the
dismissal is unjustified, thus, illegal. To discharge this burden, the employer must present
substantial evidence, or the amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might
accept as adequate to justify a conclusion, and not based on mere surmises or conjectures.
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Here, the company dismissed Ballesteros based on three just causes: (a) habitual leaves
of absence or gross habitual neglect of duty; (b) open and willful disobedience; and (c)
money shortage, thus, loss of trust and confidence.

Gross and Habitual Neglect of Duty. As to her habitual leaves of absence, the CA
ruled that the company failed to present substantial evidence to prove that Ballesteros,
indeed, was habitually absent, thus, neglected her duty. The presentation of the certified
true copies of Ballesteros' leave ledger does not sufficiently establish the required habituality
of neglect that would merit her dismissal. For one, all the leaves she incurred were deducted
from earned leave credits, meaning, credits she was entitled to over the course of her work.
This Court has held that only habitual absenteeism without leave constitutes gross
negligence. Secondly, such leaves were so few to be characterized as a reckless disregard
for the safety of the company.

As to her habitual tardiness and undertime for the years of 2010 and 2011, the CA
found that the company only charged Ballesteros in her notice of termination with habitual
leaves of absence from January 2008 to July 7, 2008, not for the years 2010 and 2011. A
perusal of the records of the case would show that the first notice, which is the "Notice to
Explain Why Ballesteros should not be terminated" dated February 21, 2011, enumerated as
Ballesteros' fourth offense "Habitual tardiness and undertime for more than one hour and
more than ten days in a month for the last 6 months resulting to gross neglect of duty.
“However, the second notice, which is the Notice of Termination dated June 3, 2011, showed
that the company failed to include the habitual tardiness and undertime of Ballesteros from
2010 to 2011. Habitual tardiness alone is a just cause for termination. Punctuality is a
reasonable standard imposed on every employee, whether in government or private sector,
whereas habitual tardiness is a serious offense that may very well constitute gross or habitual
neglect of duty, a just cause to dismiss a regular employee.

Here, the Court finds that although habitual tardiness is a just cause for termination,
the company failed again to substantiate Ballesteros' habitual tardiness and undertime, as
the generated print-outs presented to the NLRC were mere photocopies and unauthenticated.
Further, the handwritten listing and unsigned computer print-outs were unauthenticated and,
hence, unreliable. Mere self-serving evidence of which the listing and print-outs are of that
nature should be rejected as evidence without any rational probative value even in
administrative proceedings.

Open and Willful Disobedience. SPID Corp. argues that Ballesteros' dismissal was
due to her open and willful disobedience of company procedure in the preparation of deposit
slips.

The Court agrees with the CA. The records show no proof that the company made
known to Ballesteros instructions on preparation of deposit slips, except the February 11,
2009 Memorandum reprimanding her for her negligence. Neither did the company present
proof that Ballesteros' transgression was coupled with a wrongful intent, or a wrongful and
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perverse attitude, both very different from mere simple negligence, or a mere error in
judgment. Again, the burden is on the employer to present substantial evidence, or the
amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a
conclusion.

Loss of Trust and Confidence. Loss of trust and confidence may be a just cause
for termination of employment only upon proof that: (1) the dismissed employee occupied a
position of trust and confidence; and (2) the dismissed employee committed "an act justifying
the loss of trust and confidence.”

The first element was met because Ballesteros, an administrative officer at the time
of her termination, held a position of trust and confidence. Her tasks included
"answering/endorsement of telephone calls, preparation of deposit slips, handling of petty
cash fund, front-lining duties, and other related tasks. "However, the second element,
pertaining to the act that breached the company's trust and confidence, was never
established in the NLRC and CA proceedings. For loss of trust and confidence to be a valid
ground for dismissal, it must be substantial, and not arbitrary, whimsical, capricious, and
concocted. It demands that a degree of severity attends the employee's breach of trust.

The Court agrees with the CA that Ballesteros' monetary shortage in the amount of
P1,100.00 cannot be considered substantial and severe, as to justify the company's loss of
trust and confidence in her. Furthermore, not only did Ballesteros admit that she was
negligent in not counting the money before returning the same, the amount was even
deducted from her salary and returned to the company. To dismiss Ballesteros over such an
insignificant amount which she duly returned would amount to a clear injustice.

Procedural Due Process. Finally, the Court agrees with the CA that the company
exercised procedural due process in accordance with Philippine labor laws which was
elaborated in the case of Dela Rosa v. ABSCBN Corporation, as follows:

As a rule, the employer is required to furnish the employee with two (2) written notices
before termination of employment can be effected: a first written notice that informs the
employee of the particular acts or omissions for which his or her dismissal is sought, and a
second written notice which informs the employee of the employer's decision to dismiss him.
Anent the second notice, the written notice of termination should indicate that: (a) all
circumstances involving the charge against the employees have been considered; and (b)
grounds have been established to justify the severance of their employment.

In this case, the two notices were validly served upon Ballesteros, despite the fact
that she refused to receive the first notice "because she wanted to talk to Mr. Ronnie
Cunanan."

FALLO/DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review is hereby DENIED. The June 26, 2014
Decision and February 5, 2015 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA GR. SP No. 130935,
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which affirmed with modification the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) January
10, 2013 Decision declaring respondent Michelle Elvi C. Ballesteros illegally dismissed, are
AFFIRMED. Petitioner Systems and Plan Integrator and Development Corporation is ordered
to REINSTATE respondent Michelle Elvi C. Ballesteros to her former or equivalent position
without the loss of seniority rights, and to PAY her backwages and other benefits reckoned
from the time her salaries were withheld.

SO ORDERED.

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JULES KING PAITON vs. ARMSCOR GLOBAL

G.R. NO. 255656, APRIL 25, 2022
KHO, JR., J.:

FACTS:
Jules King M. Paiton, James C. Adriatico, Isagani M. Ubalde, Roland A. Agustin, Mario
S. Manahan, Jr., and Jesrome C. Siega (Siega; collectively, petitioners) were employed as
Machine Operators by respondent Armscor Global Defense, Inc. (Armscor).

On separate dates between 2016 and 2017, petitioners filed separate complaints for
regularization and payment of benefits against Armscor and respondent Manpower
Outsourcing Services, Inc. (MOSI) with the Arbitration Branch of the NLRC alleging that: (a)
they are regular employees of Armscor by operation of law after having performed work that
is necessary and desirable to Armscor's business for over one (1) year; (b) to prevent them
from attaining regular status, Armscor transferred their employment to different manpower
agencies, including MOSI, which is a labor-only contractor; and (c) their true employer is
Armscor which hired them and paid their salaries, further pointing out that they are
performing work under the direct control and supervision of Arrnscor's managers and
supervisors.

Based on the records, petitioners filed the following cases before the NLRC, praying
to be declared regular employees of Armscor as respondents Armscor, Martin Tuason, Atty.
Ermilando 0. Villafuerte, MOSI, and Diogenes Jaurique were alleged to be engaged in illegal
labor-only contracting, as follows: (a) Paiton and Adriatico filed NCR Case No. NCR-12-14953-
16; (b) Siega filed NCR Case No. NCR-11-14762-16; (c) Ubalde filed NCR Case No. NCR-12-
14906-16; and (d) Agustin and Manahan filed NLRC Case No. NCR-03-03052-17 (collectively
referred to as the regularization cases). At the time the present petition was filed, these
regularization cases were on their respective appeals with the CA, with the exception of
petitioners Paiton and Adriatico's regularization case which is already pending before the
Court.

During the pendency of the regularization cases, petitioners alleged that on June 16,
2017, Armscor refused to allow them entry in the work premises as MOSI had pulled them
out from the company after the expiration and non-renewal of the service contract between
Arsmcor and MOSI. Thus, on July 6, 2017, petitioners filed the instant illegal constructive
dismissal case, NCR Case No. NCR-07-09884-17, with a claim for damages and attorney's
fees against respondents before the NLRC. In their complaint, petitioners reiterated their
allegation that they are regular employees of Armscor who enjoy security of tenure, and as
such, they cannot be terminated without any just or authorized cause.

For their part, Armscor and its officers, Tuason and Villafuerte, asserted that
petitioners were employed by MOSI, and not by Armscor and that they are not liable to
petitioners for their claims of illegal constructive dismissal. They also alleged that the service
contract between Armscor and MOSI expired and petitioners were validly pulled out by MOSI.

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Meanwhile, MOSI prayed for the dismissal of the complaint due to forum shopping.
considering that the earlier filed regularization cases with the NLRC shared similar facts,
issues, and arguments as that of the illegal constructive dismissal case. It also asserted that
it was a legitimate contractor and that petitioners' dismissal was due to redundancy.

In a Decision dated May 8, 2018, the LA ruled in favor of respondents, and accordingly,
dismissed the instant illegal constructive dismissal case on the ground of litis pendentia or
forum shopping. The LA ruled that the regularization cases and the illegal constructive
dismissal case filed by petitioners are similar in parties, issues, and causes of action, such
that the judgment in either case would be determinative of the other. In this regard, the LA
opined that in resolving the issue of whether or not petitioners were indeed constructively
dismissed, there is a need to determine whether they are regular employees of Armscor
which, in turn, is the matter in inquiry in the regularization cases and would preempt the
regularization cases which, to date, have not attained finality. It must be noted that since
the LA dismissed petitioners' complaint on the aforesaid grounds, it no longer delved on the
merits thereof.

ISSUE:
Whether or Not LA's dismissal of the instant illegal, constructive dismissal case due to
litis pendentia or forum shopping valid.

RULING/RATIO DECIDENDI:
No, the Labors Arbiter’s dismissal of the instant illegal constructive
dismissal case due to litis pendentia or forum shopping were not valid.

Forum shopping exists "when one party repetitively avails of several judicial remedies
in different courts, simultaneously or successively, all substantially founded on the same
transactions and the same essential facts and circumstances, and all raising substantially the
same issues either pending in, or already resolved adversely, by some other court." What is
truly important to consider in determining whether it exists or not is the vexation caused the
courts and parties-litigants by a party who asks different courts and/or administrative
agencies to rule on the same or related causes and/or grant the same or substantially the
same reliefs, in the process creating the possibility of conflicting decisions being rendered by
different for a upon the same issues.

Thus, case law instructs that forum shopping exists where the elements of litis
pendentia are present, namely: (a) identity of parties, or at least such parties who represent
the same interests in both actions; ( b) identity of rights · asserted and relief prayed for, the
relief being founded on the same facts; and (c) the identity with respect to the two preceding
particulars in the two (2) cases is such that any judgment that may be rendered in the
pending case, regardless of which party is successful, would amount to res judicata in the
other case. Verily, the test to determine whether the causes of action are identical is to
ascertain whether the same evidence would support both actions, or whether there is an
identity in the facts essential to the maintenance of the two actions. If the same facts or

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evidence would support both actions, then they are considered the same; a judgment in the
first case would be a bar to the subsequent action.

In this regard, the Court takes particular note of the case of Del Rosario v. ABS-CBN
Broadcasting Corporation (Del Rosario), which involved a group of employees who filed an
illegal dismissal case against their employer during the pendency of a regularization case
which they earlier filed against the latter. In ruling that the employees are not guilty of forum
shopping, the Court explained that the reliefs sought and the causes of action, as well as;
the evidence to be presented, in the earlier filed regularization case is different from the
illegal dismissal case which was filed at a later time, viz.:

ABS-CBN seeks the dismissal of the petitions, claiming that the workers are guilty of
forum shopping for filing their complaint for illegal dismissal during the pendency of their
regularization case.

The Court is not persuaded. Forum shopping exists when one party repetitively
avails of several judicial remedies in different courts, simultaneously or successively. The
remedies stern from the same transactions, are founded on identical facts and circumstances,
and raise substantially similar issues, which are either pending in, or have been resolved
adversely by another court. Through forum shopping, unscrupulous litigants trifle with court
processes by taking advantage of a variety of competent tribunals, repeatedly trying their
luck in several different fora until they obtain a favorable result. Because of this, forum
shopping is condemned, as it unnecessarily burdens the courts with heavy caseloads, unduly
taxes the manpower and financial resources of the judiciary, and permits a mockery of the
judicial processes. Absent safeguards against forum shopping, two competent tribunals may
render contradictory decisions, thereby disrupting the efficient administration of justice.

Here, although it is true that the parties in the regularization and the illegal dismissal
cases are identical, the reliefs sought and the causes of action are different. There is no
identity of causes of action between the first set of cases and the second set of cases.

The test to determine whether the causes of action are identical is to ascertain whether
the same evidence would support both actions, or whether there is an identity in the facts
essential to the maintenance of the two actions. If the same facts or evidence would support
both actions, then they are considered the same; a judgment in the first case would be a bar
to the subsequent action. This is absent here. The facts or the pieces of evidence that would
determine whether the workers were illegally dismissed are not the same as those that would
support their clamor for regularization.

Besides, it must be remembered that the circumstances obtaining at the time the
workers filed the regularization cases were different from when they subsequently filed the
illegal dismissal cases. Before their illegal dismissal, the workers were simply clamoring for
their recognition as regular employees, and their right to receive benefits concomitant with
regular employment. However, during the pendency of the regularization cases, the workers
were summarily terminated from their employment. This supervening event gave rise to a
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cause of action for illegal dismissal, distinct from that in the regularization case. This time,
the workers were not only praying for regularization, but also for reinstatement by
questioning the legality of their dismissal. The issue turned into whether or not ABS-CBN had
just or authorized cause to terminate their employment. Clearly, it was ABS-CBN's action of
dismissing the workers that gave rise to the illegal dismissal cases. And it is absurd for it to
now ask the Court to fault the workers for questioning ABS-CBN's actions, which were done
while the regularization cases were pending. The Court cannot allow this.

Simply stated, in a regularization case. the question is whether the employees are
entitled to the benefits enjoyed by regular employees even as they are treated as talents bv
ABS-CBN. On the other hand, in the illegal dismissal case, the workers likewise need to prove
the existence of employer-employee relationship, but ABS-CBN must likewise prove the
validity of the termination of the employment. Clearly, the evidence that will be submitted in
the regularization case will be different from that in the illegal dismissal case.

Applying Del Rosario, which is on all fours to the instant case, then the Court reaches
the conclusion that petitioners did not commit forum shopping in filing the instant illegal
constructive dismissal case despite the pendency of the regularization cases which they filed
earlier. Pursuant to Del Rosario, there is no identity of causes of action between petitioners'
regularization cases and the instant illegal constructive dismissal case, considering that the
regularization cases involved a determination of whether petitioners are regular employees
of Armscor as respondents were alleged to be engaged in labor-only contracting, and as
such, petitioners prayed for the award of payment of benefits from the first day of
engagement with Armscor. On the other hand, the instant illegal constructive dismissal case
questioned the propriety of petitioners' dismissal and prays for their reinstatement with
Armscor. Notably, while the latter case will also inevitably touch upon the issue of whether
or not petitioners are indeed regular employees of Armscor, the issue it ultimately seeks to
address is whether or not petitioners were constructively dismissed without any just or
authorized cause under the law. Otherwise stated, the issue in the regularization cases is
merely limited to whether or not petitioners should be deemed as regular employees of
Armscor, and hence, entitled to the benefits accorded to regular employees; whereas in the
instant illegal constructive dismissal case, the issue is whether or not Armscor constructively
dismissed petitioners without any just or authorized causes. It is apparent that the evidence
to be presented in these two (2) cases are distinct even if they may overlap in certain points.

More importantly, at the time the regularization cases were initiated, the facts which
spawned the instant illegal constructive dismissal case have not yet occurred, and therefore,
petitioners' only existing cause · of action during that time was their entitlement to benefits
enjoyed by regular employees. It was only after Armscor refused to allow them entry into
the work premises as MOSI had pulled them out from the company after the expiration and
non-renewal of the service contract between Arsmcor and MOSI that petitioners were
constrained to file the instant illegal constructive dismissal case. Under the foregoing
circumstances, petitioners had no choice but to avail of different fora.

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FALLO/DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated June 30, 2020 and the
Resolution dated January 8, 2021 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 160018 are
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the Illegal Constructive Dismissal case is
REMANDED to the Labor Arbiter a quo for a resolution on the merits with reasonable
dispatch.

SO ORDERED.

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JUNE 2022

NANCY CLAIRE PIT CELIS vs. BANK OF MAKATI (A SAVINGS BANK), INC.
G.R. No. 250776, JUNE 15, 2022
INTING, J.:

FACTS:
Petitioner was hired as Account Officer for Bank of Makati Pasay City Branch on July
15 2013. After 3 years, she was assigned to the Legal and External Agency Department as
an Administrative Officer of the latter bank. At the end of 2017, respondent’s Human
Resource Department received a report that petitioner was involved in a case concerning
embezzlement of funds when she was previously employed at the Bank of Placer and she did
not disclose it in her job application to the respondent’s bank.

Respondent issued a Notice of Explanation to the petitioner and thereafter, placed her
under preventive suspension for 30 days. The latter admitted that she indeed failed to
disclose her past employment with the Bank of Placer but such omission was due to her
excitement in filling up her job application with the respondent and denied being involved in
an embezzlement case.

Respondent bank conducted a conference/hearing where the petitioner personally

explained her side. However, the respondent resolved to terminate the employment of
petitioner for violation of the Bank’s Code of Conduct and Discipline (respondent’s Code of
Conduct) for “[k]nowingly giving false or misleading information in applications for the
employment as a result of which employment is secured” (subject infraction); and Serious
Misconduct, Fraud or Willful Breach of Trust and Loss of Confidence under Article 297 of the
Labor Code.

Petitioner Nancy filed a Complaint for illegal dismissal, monetary claims, and damages
against respondent. She alleged that her dismissal from employment was only precipitated
by her discovery of the corrupt practices in which her division head and her department head
were involved. She further maintained that her failure to disclose her past employment was
done in good faith, and respondent failed to prove her involvement in the embezzlement
case. The Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of the petitioner and held that the respondent was
illegally dismissed her.

Aggrieved, the respondent partially appealed to the NLRC. However, the NLRC
dismissed the appeal of the respondent. And then, filed a motion for reconsideration, but the
NLRC denied it.

Respondent appealed at the Court of Appeals, CA found grave abuse of discretion on

the part of the NLRC and held that respondent validly dismissed petitioner from employment.
Explaining that, without any doubt, the bank’s Code of Conduct and Discipline is an
established and definite rule of action which all employees must abide by. In no uncertain
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terms, said code of conduct prohibits the act of “Knowingly giving false or misleading
information in information in applications for employment.” To our mind, the private
respondent’s act of not disclosing her previous employment with the Rural Bank of Placer
violated said provision.

Aggrieved, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the CA Decision, but the CA
denied it. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent validly dismissed the petitioner from employment.

RULING/RATIO DECIDENDI:
No. The dismissal of the respondent to the petitioner was considered
invalid.

Dismissal from employment has two aspects: (1) the justness of the cause of
dismissal, which constitutes substantive due process; and (2) the validity of the manner of
dismissal, which constitutes procedural due process.

In line with the Constitutional policy of giving protection to labor, the Civil Code and
the Labor Code provides that doubts in the interpretation of labor legislation and contracts
shall be construed in favor of labor. Likewise, the Court has consistently held that doubts in
the appreciation of evidence in labor cases shall work to the advantage of labor.

In this case, the court reiterated that, to be liable under the subject, infraction, i.e.,
“knowingly giving false or misleading information in applications for employment as a result
of which employment is secured,” the employee must have performed an overt or positive
act, i.e.,giving false information in the application for employment. Considering that petitioner
did not actually state any false information in the application but merely omitted to reflect
her past employment with the Bank of Placer, she could not have committed the alleged
infraction.

At any rate, it is of no moment that petitioner had omitted to reflect her past
employment with the Bank of Placer or was allegedly implicated in the purported
embezzlement case thereat. Significantly, the Bank of placer neither found petitioner liable
nor meted out any disciplinary actions against her in the case. The record actually shows that
the Bank of Placer allowed the petitioner to gracefully exit from the company without any
derogatory record.

The court held that it is merely a case of an omission to disclose former employment
in a job application, a fault which does not justify petitioner’s suspension and eventual
termination from employment. It is well settled that “there must be a reasonable
proportionality between the offense and the penalty. The penalty must be commensurate to
the offense involved and to the degree of the infraction” To dismiss petition on account of
her omission to disclose former employment is just too harsh penalty.
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Also, in illegal dismissal cases, the employee has the right to security of tenure, as
enshrined under Section, Article XIII of the Constitution and further guarded by Article 294
of the Labor Code which states:

Article 294. Security of tenure-In cases of regular employment, the employer shall not
terminate the services of an employee except for a just cause or when authorized by
this Title. An employee who is unjustly dismissed from work shall be entitled to
reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and other privileges and to his full
backwages, inclusive of allowances, and to his other benefits or their monetary
equivalent computed from the time his compensation was withheld from him up to
the time of his actual reinstatement.

Employees who are illegally dismissed are entitled to full backwages, inclusive of
allowances and other benefits, computed from the time their actual compensation was
withheld from them up to the time of their actual reinstatement.” However, if reinstatement
is no longer possible, the backwages shall be computed until the finality of the decision.

The Petitioner is entitled to separation pay as well as to full backwages computed from
the time respondent withheld her compensation until the finality of the decision. Here, the
dismissal of the respondent, although considered invalid. Respondent dismissed petitioner
from employment for her alleged act of knowing stating untruthful information in her job
application. Respondent’s act having a semblance of reason, the Court holds the petitioner
not entitled to either moral damages or exemplary damages.

FALLO/DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated June 7, 2019 and the
Resolution dated December 6, 2019 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 158988 are
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision dated July 13, 2018 and the Resolution dated
October 26, 2018 of the National Labor Relations Commission in NLRC LAC No. 06-002270-
18/NLRC Case No, NCR-02-02488-18 are hereby REINSTATED with MODIFICATION in
that the total monetary award in favor of petitioner Nancy Claire Pit Celis shall earn legal
interest at the rate of 6% per annum from the date of finality of this Decision until full
satisfaction.

The case is remanded to the Labor Arbiter for the proper computation of the monetary
awards.

SO ORDERED.

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SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM vs. VIOLETA A. SIMACAS

G.R. No. 217866, JUNE 20, 2022
LEONEN, J.:

FACTS:
Irnido L. Simacas (Irnido) was a Fabrication Helper at Fieldstar Manufacturing
Corporation (Fieldstar) for 15 years where he assisted the welder and machinist in cutting
steel materials. He was retired by Fieldstar in February 2010 as he was no longer able to
perform his job due to his worsening back pains and incessant coughing which started in
2008.

On February 20, 2010, Irnido was hospitalized and diagnosed with Benign Prostatic
Hypertrophy (BHP) TIC (to consider) Prostatic Cancer and Pneumonia vs. Pulmonary
Tuberculosis. Just months later, he was again hospitalized due to severe chest and back
pains as well as difficulty in breathing. He died on July 13, 2010 due to Cardiopulmonary
Arrest probably secondary to Metastatic Prostatic Adenocarcinoma.

Violeta A. Simacas (Violeta), Irnido's surviving spouse, filed a claim for employees'
compensation benefits under Presidential Decree No. 626. Social Security System (SSS) Sta.
Maria Branch denied the claim on the ground that the cause of Irnido's death was a non-
occupational disease. SSS’ Medical Operations Department (MOD) upheld the denial adding
that prostatic adenocarcinoma of prostate cancer had no causal relationship with Irnido's job
as a fabrication helper.

On May 21, 2012, SSS MOD elevated the case to the Employees Compensation
Commission which also affirmed the denial ruling that since prostate cancer is a non-
occupational disease, Violeta was required to prove that Irnido's work increased the risk of
him contracting prostate cancer.

Aggrieved, Violeta appealed before the Court of Appeals (CA) which reversed the
Commission’s decision.

According to the CA, Presidential Decree No. 626 is a social legislation designed to
protect workers from loss of income by reason of the hazards of disability and illness. It
underscored that for this purpose to be realized, the implementing authorities must adopt a
liberal attitude in deciding compensability claims.

The CA applied Government Service Insurance System v. Court of Appeals and held
that it was impossible for Violeta to present evidence of causal relation since the specific
cause for prostate cancer is medically unknown. It decreed that given the present state of
scientific knowledge, "the obligation to present such impossible evidence must, therefore, be
deemed void. The Social Security System moved for reconsideration, but it was denied by
the CA on April 8, 2015.

Dissatisfied, SSS filed a Petition for Review before the Supreme Court.
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ISSUE:
Was Violeta able to discharge the burden of proving compensability despite the lack
of direct causal relation between prostate cancer as Irnido’s cause of death and his work or
working conditions as a Fabrication Helper?

RULING/RATIO DECIDENDI:
Yes. P.D. 626 only requires a reasonable work-connection, not a direct
causal relation.

In establishing compensability, the claimant need only present substantial proof that
the nature of the deceased's work or working conditions increased the risk of them
contracting prostate cancer. In Sarmiento v. Employees' Compensation Commission, the
Court held that strict rules of evidence are not applicable in claims for compensation. There
are no stringent criteria to follow. The degree of proof required under P.D. 626, is merely
substantial evidence, which means, such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might
accept as adequate to support a conclusion.

Still quoting Sarmiento, the Court held that the claimant must show, at least, by
substantial evidence that the development of the disease is brought largely by the conditions
present in the nature of the job. What the law requires is a reasonable work-connection and
not a direct causal relation. It is enough that the hypothesis on which the workmen's claim
is based is probable. Medical opinion to the contrary can be disregarded especially where
there is some basis in the facts for inferring a work-connection. Probability not certainty is
the touchstone.

In the present case, Violeta was able to prove by substantial evidence that Irnido’s
working conditions increased the risk of his contracting prostate cancer.

The established risk factors for prostate cancer are advanced age, ethnicity, genetic
factors and family history. However, several studies have suggested that work-related
exposures to certain substances, such as chromium, have the potential of affecting the risk
of getting prostate cancer. A recent study revealed a small but significant increase in prostate
cancer risk for chromium exposure.

Irnido is exposed to chromium due to the nature of his work. It is undisputed that his
work included assisting the welder and machinist in cutting steel materials. It is said that
workers engaged in the manufacturing or handling of stainless steel are exposed to chromium
in varying degrees. Thus, it is not unlikely that Imido's work increased the risk of him
contracting the disease. This probability suffices to warrant the grant of the claimed benefits.

The Court stressed that while Presidential Decree No. 626 has not incorporated the
presumption of compensability and the theory of aggravation prevalent under the 'Workmen's
Compensation Act, it continues to be an employees' compensation law or social legislation
that should be liberally construed in favor of labor.
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FALLO/DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The Court of Appeals' August 29, 2014
Decision and April 8, 2015 Resolution in CA-G.R. SP No. 126890 are hereby affirmed.

SO ORDERED.

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CATHERINE DELA CRUZ-CAGAMPAN vs. ONE NETWORK BANK, INC.

G.R. No. 217414, JUNE 22, 2022
LEONEN, J.:

FACTS:
On June 11, 2004, respondent One Network Bank, Inc. (respondent Bank) hired
petitioner Catherine Dela Cruz-Cagampan (petitioner Dela Cruz-Cagampan) as an Accounting
Specialist. On May 1, 2006, respondent Bank implemented its so-called Exogamy Policy which
states that: “Effective May 1, 2006, when two employees working for One Network Bank are
subsequently married through Church or Civil Court rites, one must terminate employment
immediately after marriage. This policy shall not affect co-employees of the bank who are
already married to each other as of the end of April 2006.” On October 31, 2009, petitioner
Dela Cruz-Cagampan married her co-worker, Audie Angelo A. Cagampan, who served as Loan
Specialist in respondent Bank.

On November 4, 2009, the couple asked respondent Bank's President, Alex V.

Buenaventura, for permission to continue working for the bank, as had other couples in its
office. Audie Angelo may be reassigned to other branches of the bank, they said. Myrna S.
Viado, the Human Resources Head, refused the plea and fired petitioner Dela Cruz-
Cagampan. The latter sought reconsideration but was unsuccessful. As a result, petitioner
Dela Cruz-Cagampan filed an illegal dismissal case with the Labor Arbiter.

The Labor Arbiter ruled that Catherine was unlawfully dismissed and ordered
respondent to immediately reinstate complainant to her former position and pay her full back
wages, tentatively amounting to P100, 690.85 (P12,009 X 8 months and 10 days), as well as
her proportionate 13th month pay for 2010. On appeal, the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC) affirmed the Labor Arbiter's ruling on June 30, 2011, stating that
respondent Bank's "mere fear that the spouses may divulge to each other information with
respect to client's accounts is speculative, unfounded, and imaginary." Furthermore, the
NLRC denied One Network Bank's motion for reconsideration on August 24, 2011.

One Network Bank filed a Petition for Certiorari with an Application for Issuance of
Temporary Restraining Order before the Court of Appeals. Court of Appeals denied One
Network Bank’s prayer for lack of merit on May 2, 2012.

July 31, 2014, Court of Appeals granted One Network Bank’s petition when they found
that One Network Bank’s Policy was a valid exercise of management prerogative, therefore
there was a just cause in dismissing Catherine. However, due to the absence of procedural
due process, One Network Bank, Inc. is ordered to pay Catherine P30,000 and separation
pay equivalent to one month salary at the time of her dismissal.

February 20, 2015, Catherine filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but Court of Appeals
denied it. Hence, she filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari. On July 13, 2015, the Court
required One Network Bank, Buenaventura, and Viado for their comments.

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ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals' reversal of the National Labor Relations
Commission's affirmation of the Labor Arbiter's pronouncement that the petitioner was
illegally dismissed and the respondent's "exogamy policy" was unreasonable is correct.

RULING/RATIO DECIDENDI:
No. The Court of Appeals is not right. The National Labor Relations
Commission’s ruling was proper and not in grave abuse of discretion.

Court reversed and set aside the ruling of the Court of Appeals and struck down
respondent Bank’s policy as discriminatory. The Court cited the Magna Carta of Women which
mandates the State to eliminate discrimination against women and ensures their right to
freely choose a spouse.

The Court also cited Article 136 of the Labor Code which states that:
“It shall be unlawful for an employer to require as a condition of employment or continuation
of employment that a woman employee shall not get married, or to stipulate expressly or
tacitly that upon getting married, a woman employee shall be deemed resigned or separated,
or to actually dismiss, discharge, discriminate or otherwise prejudice a woman employee
merely by reason of her marriage.”

The Court held that an employer’s dismissal of a female employee solely because of
her marriage is precisely the discrimination the Labor Code expressly prohibits.

Citing the case of Star Paper Corporation vs. Simbol, G.R. No. 164774 (April 12, 2006),
the Supreme Court held that bona fide occupational qualification may justify a “no-spouse
employment policy” as long as the following elements are present: 1) the employment
qualification is reasonably related to the essential operation of the job involved; and 2) that
there is factual basis for believing that all or substantially all persons meeting the qualification
would be unable to perform the duties of the job.

On the first element, the Court held that the no-spouse qualification of respondent
Bank is not reasonably related to the bank’s essential operation of its business. The Court
held that there is no iota of proof that supports respondent Bank’s assertion that petitioner’s
marriage to her co-employee places the bank’s funds at risk of embezzlement. The Court
also held that the Court of Appeals erred in heavily relying on the bank’s fiduciary duty and
high standards of diligence as justification for immediate dismissal of an employee who
marries a co-employee. The Court held that the respondent Bank could have transferred one
of them to another branch and/or implement stronger confidentiality measures.

As to the second element, the Court held that there is no factual basis to conclude
that that all their employees who marry each other would be unable to perform their duties,
entailing one’s dismissal. The Court held that the policy was couched in a general manner,
that whenever any two of their employees marry, one must terminate his or her employment
immediately after marriage. The Court held that there is a host of employees in a bank that
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have varying functions, duties, and responsibilities. The general articulation allows
respondent Bank to whimsically enforce its policy, as petitioner Cagampan-Dela Cruz alleged
that others had been spared.

In this case, the Supreme Court also cited the case of Duncan Association of
Detailman-PTGWO vs. Glaxo Wellcome Philippines, Inc., G.R. No. 162994 (September 17,
2004), wherein the Supreme Court justified the exercise of management prerogative of Glaxo
when it reassigned a medical representative to another place because he married his
counterpart in Astra. The occupation qualification exception was anchored on the business
necessity to avoid conflict of interest and protect trade secrets of Glaxo. Hence, for an
exercise of management prerogative to be valid on policies anchored on employee’s marital
status or act of marriage, the employer must be able to justify its business necessity showing
that the requisites laid down in Star Paper Corporation vs. Simbol, supra, are present.

The petition for Review on Certiorari is GRANTED. Contrary to the Court of

Appeals’ Decision, the Court find that respondent’s no-spouse employment policy cannot
justify petitioner’s dismissal. The National Labor Relations Commission did not gravely abuse
its discretion, as nothing was whimsical, capricious, or arbitrary in finding that petitioner was
illegally dismissed. A reasonable business necessity must be clearly shown to excuse a
discriminatory exercise of management prerogative.

Thus, this Court compelled to reinstate the Labor Arbiter’s ruling, which the National
Labor Relations Commission affirmed. Under the Labor Code, an illegally dismissed employee
is entitled to reinstatement, with payment of backwages from dismissal (Art. 279. Security of
tenure).

The prayer for moral and exemplary damages is denied for lack of factual basis.
However, for having been forced to litigate to protect her rights, petitioner is awarded
attorney’s fees, which is 10% of the total monetary award. Additionally, legal interest shall
be 6% per annum from the date of promulgation of this judgement until fully paid.

FALLO/DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
WHEREFORE, the petition for Review on Certionrari is GRANTED. The Court of
Appeals’ July 31, 2014 Decision and February 10, 2015 Resolution in CA-G.R SP No. 04589-
MIN are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

The Labor Arbiter’s October 29, 2010 Decision in NLRC MAC-02-011915-2011 (RAB-X-
04-00198-2010) is REINSTATED with MODIFICATION. Respondent One Network Bank,
Inc. is ordered to reinstate petitioner Catherine Dela Cruz-Cagampan to her former position,
and to pay her backwages, including 1, 501.13 pesos, her proportionate 13th month pay for
2010 allowances, and other benefits or their monetary equivalent from the time she was
illegally dismissed on February 17, 2010, up to her actual reinstatement. She is also entitled
to attorney’s fees of 10% of the total monetary award, subject to legal interest at the rate
of 6% per annum from finality of this Decision until full payment. SO ORDERED.

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PHILIPPINE PIZZA, INC., vs. ELVIS C. TUMPANG

G.R. No. 231090, JUNE 22, 2022
INTING, J.:

FACTS:
Philippine Pizza Inc, franchisee and operator of Pizza Hut chain of restaurants, hired
respondents as delivery riders in 2003, 2004, and 2008. The respondents filed a case before
the Labor Arbiter claiming that they are regular employees of the petitioner because of the
years they rendered and their work as delivery rider is a one that is necessary and desirable
to the petitioner's business. Also, they averred that Consolidated Building Maintenance, Inc
(CBMI), a business providing janitorial, kitchen, messengerial, elevator maintenance, and
allied services to various clients such as petitioner, is a labor only contractor because it was
Philippine Pizza Inc who exercise control and supervision over them and owned the tools and
motorcycles they used.

The Labor Arbiter dismissed the case in favor of Philippine Pizza Inc and found that
CBMI exercised all the aspects of being an employer over respondents through its Supervisor
and the legitimate job contractor.

The NLRC dismissed the case and agreed with the Labor Arbiter that CBMI is a
legitimate job contractor.

The Court of Appeals ruled that CBMI is a labor-only contractor as respondents' duties
as delivery riders were necessary and desirable· in the usual trade and business of the
petitioner. They failed to cite specific instances where CBMI exercised actual control over
petitioners. Also, proof on the manner and method used in supervision and control are
lacking.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Consolidated Building Maintenance, Inc., is a legitimate job contractor.

RULING/RATIO DECIDENDI:
Yes, Consolidated Building Maintenance, Inc is a legitimate job contractor
and the employer of the respondents.

In Asprec case, CBMI attached for the Court's reference, its Certificate of Registration
with the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE). Furthermore, it cites that it has been
in operation for almost 50 years, counting various institutions among its clients.

Under the premises and based on the evidence presented by the parties, the Court is
inclined to sustain the position of CBMI that it is an independent contractor.

It is not disputed that CBMI is a duly licensed labor contractor by the DOLE. xxx The
Certificate of Registration issued by DOLE recognizes CBMI as an independent contractor as

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of February 13, 2008, and regards the validity of the latter's registration as such until
February 14, 2011, well within the period relevant to this appeal.

Per documentary evidence attached by CBMI, the company's total assets at the time
of filing of the respondents' complaint before the NLRC in 2010 amounted to
Php84,351,349.00. Based on its attached Audited Financial Statements for the years 2008
and 2009, its total assets, which consists of cash, receivables, and property and equipment,
amounted to Php79,203,902.00 and Php76,189,554.00, respectively.

Clearly, CBMI has substantial capital to maintain its manpower business. From the
evidence adduced by CBMI, it is also clear that it runs a business independent from the PPI.
Based on its registration with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), CBMI has been
in existence since 1967; and has since provided a variety of services to entities in various
fields, such as banking, hospitals, and even government institutions. CBMI counts among its
clients, De La Salle University (DLSU), Philippine National Bank (PNB), Smart
Communications, Inc., SM Supermalls, and the United States (US) Embassy. In the case of
the US Embassy for instance, CBMI has been a service contractor for seven years.

Above all, CBMI maintains the "right of control" over the respondents. Without
necessarily touching on the respondents' status prior to their employment with CBMI, in the
instant controversy, [CBMI's J control over the respondents is manifested by the fact that
they wield and exercise the following powers over them: "selection and engagement,
payment of wages, dismissal, and control over the employees' conduct.”

All these, without doubt indicate that CBMI possesses the power of control over the
respondents; which in tum supports the conclusion that CBMI carries a business independent
of PPI.

Similarly, the Court in Cayetano held the following: (1) CBMI has complied with all the
requirements of a legitimate job contractor, given the certificates of registration issued to it
by the Department of Labor and Ernployment;61 (2) CBMI has substantial capital to properly
carry out its obligations with petitioner, and to sufficiently cover its own operational
expenses;62 (3) CBMI retained control over respondents, as shown by the deployment of at
least one CBMI supervisor in each petitioner branch to regularly oversee, monitor, and
supervise the employees' attendance and performance; 63 ( 4) CBMI subjected therein
respondents to disciplinary sanctions for violations of company rules and regulations as
shown by the various offense notices and memoranda issued to them;64 (5) respondents
applied for work with CBMI and were consequently selected and hired by the latter;65 and
(6) during the course of their employment, CBMI paid their wages and remitted/paid their
SSS, PhilHealth, and Pag-IBIG contributions.

With the foregoing findings, the Court in Cayetano similarly concluded that CBMI is a
legitimate job contractor, and thus, the employer of therein respondents.

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FALLO/DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated September 30, 2016
and the Resolution dated March 3, 2017 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 142490
are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the Resolutions dated June 25, 2015
and July 28, 2015 of the National Labor Relations Commission in NLRC LAC No. 04-001027-
15 are REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.

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JULY 2022

ADSTRATWORLD HOLDINGS, INC. vs. CHONA A MAGALLONES

G.R. No. 233679, JULY 6, 2022
INTING, J.:

FACTS:
Respondents Magallones and Lucino filed for illegal dismissal, reinstatement and
payment of full backwages against petitioner Adstratworld Holdings, Inc., a domestic
corporation engaged in advertising business. The latter hired the former as events marketing
and logistics officers on probationary status. Respondents were tasked to organize events,
their performance of which shall be evaluated on the third to fifth month of their probationary
status that shall be the basis whether they would qualify as regular employees. However,
after being (1) reprimanded for bring singlets in the company premises without an entry
pass; and (2) suspended for tardiness, petitioners notified respondents that they failed to
qualify as regular employees. Their probationary status was terminated pursuant to “a valid
exercise of management prerogative.” They were advised not to report for work.

The Labor Arbiter (LA) dismissed the complaint and held that (1) respondents showed
clear disregard of company rules and unsatisfactory performance; and thus, (2) they were
unfit and unqualified for permanent employment.

The NLRC affirmed the LA decision. Adstratworld merely exercised its statutory
prerogative when it refused to hire respondents after the expiration of the probationary
period. It is within the exercise of the right to select his employees that the employer may
set or fix a probationary period within which the latter may test and observe the conduct of
the former before hiring him permanently. Likewise, it denied respondents claims for (1)
overtime pay and holiday pay, and (2) night shift differential pay for lack of proof.
Adstratworld was exonerated from liability.

The Court of Appeals (CA) reversed and set aside the NLRC ruling, and ruled that
respondents were regular employees of Adstratworld as their work was necessary and
desirable in its advertising business; that respondents were neither engaged as fixed term
employees nor as probationary employees because Adstratworld employed them without the
benefit of a contract in January 2012; that the subsequent “engagement" of respondents as
probationary employees on July 16, 2013 could not alter the fact that they were already
regular employees of the company; and that even granting that their engagement in January
2012 was merely probationary, respondents should be deemed as regular employees on July
16, 2013 as they had been in the service of Adstratworld for more than one year. Thus,
respondents were illegally dismissed. Failure to qualify with the standards for regularization;
that such basis, however, is not one of the valid grounds for the dismissal of an employee.
The procedural due process of notice and hearing was not observed. Hence, the petition

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ISSUES:
1. Whether respondents were regular employees; and
2. Whether they were illegally dismissed.

RULING/RATIO DECIDENDI:
1. Yes. Respondents are regular employees. They performed tasks
necessary and desirable in the usual business of Adstratworld.

As CA pointed out, Adstratworld needs the expertise of marketing personnel whose

primary task is to conceptualize advertising products and services to promote its advertising
business and products. For this reason, respondents' work as events marketing and logistics
officers is vital in the advertising business of Adstratworld making them its regular employees
from the very beginning of their employment. Even assuming that the engagement of
respondents in January 2012 was merely probationary, by July 16, 2013 (or at the time their
probationary contracts were issued), they were already regular employees. As noted, the
employment for at least one year, with respect to the activity that the employee had been
engaged, makes one a regular employee. Considering that respondents were in the service
of Adstratworld for more than a year doing the usual tasks that they were engaged to
perform, then they are regular employees of the company.

2. Yes. Petitioners failed to discharge their burden to establish compliance

with the substantive and procedural due process in terminating respondents.

To validly dismiss a regular employee, the employer must observe substantive and
procedural due process. Substantive due process requires that the dismissal must be
pursuant to any of the just or authorized causes under the law. Specifically, a "dismissal
based on a just cause implies that the employee has committed some violation against the
employer, hence, it can be said that the employee initiated the dismissal process.” Article
297 of the Labor Code provides for the instances when the employer may dismiss the
employee due to a just cause. Meanwhile, procedural due process requires that the employee
must be given notice of the reason for one's dismissal, an opportunity to be heard and defend
himself or herself, and a notice of the employee's termination.

FALLO/DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated November 29, 2016 and
the Resolution dated July 10, 2017 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 140702 are
AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS.

(1) the grant of premium pay for holidays and for rest days, overtime pay, and night
shift differential pay is DELETED; and

(2) Petitioner Adstratworld Holdings Inc. is ordered to pay each respondent, Chona A.
Magallones and Pauline Joy M .. Lucino, moral and exemplary damages in the respective
amounts of P50,000.00 and attorney's fees equivalent to 10% of the total monetary awards.

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All the monetary awards shall earn interest at the rate of six percent ( 6%) per annum from
the finality of this Decision until paid in full.

SO ORDERED.

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MUSAHAMAT WORKERS LABOR UNION-1-ALU vs.

MUSAHAMAT FARMS, INC.
G.R. No. 240184, JULY 6, 2022
CAGUIOA, J.:

FACTS:
Ernesto, Elvin, Jhonel, Nanding, and Nonito (watchmen) were hired as watchmen by
respondent Musahamat Farms, Inc. Farm 1 (respondent), a corporation based in Davao City
which is engaged in the plantation and exportation of Cavendish bananas.

In February 2016, the Security Officer of respondent, announced that all watchmen
would be reassigned to farm operations effective the following day. According to the
petitioners, they are children of landowners who leased their farms to respondent, hence,
they should not be farm workers or assigned to do production work.

There were reports of several banana bunches chopped down on a block of the farm
the following day. Thereafter, the respondent issued a notice to preventively suspend the
watchmen for 15 days. At the grievance meeting only one (Ernesto) attended. The next day,
the respondent issued another notice of preventive suspension for 15 days.

After the investigation, the respondent issued a notice of termination to the watchmen
and their termination was made effective on April 14, 2016. This notwithstanding, a second
grievance conference was still held where the parties ultimately agreed to elevate their issues
to a third party for resolution.

According to the watchmen, they were not afforded with due process of law and that
the respondent relied on mere hearsay evidence in terminating their employment. The
respondent, on the other hand, disagreed and maintained that the watchmen’s dismissal was
legal.

Ruling of the Voluntary Arbitrator. The Voluntary Arbitrator ruled in favor of the
watchmen and declared their dismissal illegal, finding that the respondent was not able to
discharge its burden to prove by substantial evidence the allegations of serious misconduct
and loss of trust and confidence against the watchmen on the basis of mere affidavits of
witnesses who allegedly overheard them plan the attack, but whose credibility and personal
acquaintances with the watchmen were not established and proved. According to the
Voluntary Arbitrator, the notices of preventive suspension sent to the watchmen as
inadequate to satisfy the twin notice requirements under the law.

The VA ordered the reinstatement of the watchmen as well as payment of their back
wages, other benefits and 10% attorney’s fees. However, if reinstatement is no longer
possible, the watchmen should be paid backwages, separation pay, nominal damages as well
as attorney’s fees.

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Ruling of the CA. The Court of Appeals, however, reversed the decision of the VA,
holding that the testimonies of another witness Florentino may be used as circumstantial
evidence to establish the fact in issue and which, when taken together with other pieces of
evidence like the watchmen's reaction after the announcement, may lead to the reasonable
conclusion that they, indeed, committed the act. According to the CA, the respondent called
for a grievance meeting to specifically give the watchmen an opportunity to explain their
side. After the said meeting, respondent did not terminate the watchmen just yet, but issued
another notice of preventive suspension to them. It was only on April 12, 2016, after a
thorough investigation, that the watchmen were finally terminated.

ISSUES:
1. Whether the dismissal of the watchmen was for a just and valid cause; and
2. Whether due process of law was observed in their dismissal.

RULING/RATIO DECIDENDI:
1. No, there was no just cause to terminate the watchmen.

Misconduct, is a transgression of some established and definite rule of action, a

forbidden act, a dereliction of duty, willful in character, and implies wrongful intent and not
mere error in judgment.

To constitute a valid cause for the dismissal within the text and meaning of Article 297
of the Labor Code, the following elements of misconduct must concur:
(a) it must be serious;
(b) it must relate to the performance of the employee's duties showing that the employee
has become unfit to continue working for the employer; and
(c) it must have been performed with wrongful intent.

Additionally, to be a valid cause for dismissal, the act that betrays the employer's trust
must be real, i.e., founded on clearly established facts, and the employee's breach of the
trust must be willful, i.e., it was done intentionally, knowingly and purposely, without
justifiable excuse. Mere uncorroborated assertions and accusations by the employer will not
be sufficient.

Significantly, in illegal dismissal cases, the burden of proof is on the employer in

proving the validity of the dismissal. The Court finds that the respondent has failed to
discharge this burden.

It is true that 260 banana plants are cut down. The incident was discovered in the
early morning of February 15, 2016. However, nobody actually witnessed what happened
and the respondent merely relied on circumstantial evidence in ascribing fault to the
watchmen and dismissing them.

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Circumstantial evidence is "proof of collateral facts and circumstances from which the
existence of the main fact may be inferred according to reason and common experience."
Here, respondent relied on the sworn affidavits of three witnesses to establish circumstantial
evidence against the watchmen. These affidavits, however, lack credibility and
conclusiveness.

The Court affirms the apt observation of the Voluntary Arbitrator that the alleged
existence of the February 19, 2016 meeting was not supported by any document, such as a
letter inviting the watchmen to attend the same, an attendance sheet, or any minutes.

2. Yes, due process of law was observed in terminating the watchmen.

The Court finds that there was substantial compliance with the twin notice
requirements under the law.

In dismissing employees, procedural due process consists of the twin requirements of

notice and hearing. As for the notice requirement, the employer must furnish the employee
with two written notices before the termination of employment can be effected: (1) the first
apprises the employee of the particular acts or omissions for which his/her dismissal is
sought; and (2) the second informs the employee of the employer's decision to dismiss
him/her. As for the requirement of a hearing, this is complied with as long as there was an
opportunity to be heard, and not necessarily that an actual hearing was conducted.

Indeed, the Court instructs that the first written notice to be served on the employees
should contain the specific causes or grounds for termination against them, and a directive
that the employees are given the opportunity to submit their written explanation within a
reasonable period. Moreover, in order to enable the employees to intelligently prepare their
explanation and defenses, the notice should contain a detailed narration of the facts and
circumstances that will serve as basis for the charge against the employees. Lastly, the notice
should also specifically mention which company rules, if any, are violated and/or which
among the grounds under the Labor Code is being charged against the employees.

The primordial purpose of the first notice is to sufficiently apprise the employee of the
acts complained of and to enable the employee to prepare his/her defense.

The Court has ruled that the watchmen were accorded the opportunity to be heard.
The failure to confront the witnesses against them was not fatal as confrontation of witnesses
is required only in adversarial criminal prosecutions, and not in company investigations for
the administrative liability of the employee.

The Court, however, has ruled that reinstatement is no longer possible. The watchmen
certainly held positions of trust and confidence, where greater trust was placed by
management and from whom greater fidelity to duty was correspondingly expected. Finally,
the watchmen are also entitled to back wages and other benefits from the time of their
dismissal until finality of this judgment.
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FALLO/DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The
Decision dated January 22, 2018 of the Court of Appeals, Twenty-First Division and its
Resolution dated May 31 , 2018 in CA-G.R. SP No. 07812-MIN are REVERSED and SET
ASIDE insofar as they hold that Ernesto Suril, Jr., Elvin Suril, Jhonel Suril, Nanding Abana,
and Nonito Cabillon were validly dismissed. The Decision of the Voluntary Arbitrator dated
September 28, 2016 is REINSTATED to the extent that respondent is ORDERED to PAY
Ernesto Suri 1, Jr., Elvin Suril, Jhonel Suril, Nanding Abana, and Nonito Cabillon:

a. FULL BACKWAGES, inclusive of allowances and other benefits or their monetary equivalent,
computed from April 14, 2016, or from the time that their compensation was withheld from
them, until finality of this judgment; and

b. SEPARATION PAY in lieu of reinstatement at one-month salary for every year of service, with
a fraction of at least six (6) months considered as one whole year computed from the date
of hiring until finality of this judgment.
c. The monetary award shall earn legal interest of six percent (6%) per annum from the date
of finality of this Decision until full satisfaction of the award.

SO ORDERED.

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C.F. SHARP CREW MANAGEMENT, INC. AND/OR REEDEREI CLAUS-PETER OFFEN

(GMBH & CO.) vs. ROBERTO DAGANATO
G.R. No. 243399, JULY 6, 2022
HERNANDO, J.:

FACTS:
On June 25, 2014, Roberto B. Daganato (respondent) signed a Contract of
Employment (Contract) with CF Sharp (petitioners) as Chief Cook for six months on board
the vessel MV Vancouver Express, owned by Reederei (petitioners), with a total monthly
salary of USD 1,805.00. The contract expressly incorporated the provisions of the current ITF
Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA). After undergoing pre-medical examination, the
respondent was declared fit to work.

On December 27, 2014, while carrying a heavy provision of food, respondent claimed
that he suddenly slipped and fell causing a mild to moderate pain on his lower back area.
The pain persisted and his condition worsened until he was medically repatriated on January
10, 2015. He was subjected to Magnetic Resonance Imaging (MRI) and Computed
Tomography (CT) Scan of the Lumbar Spine. The results showed that he was suffering from
“MILD POSTERIOR DISC BULGE, L4-L5 FACET HYPERTROPHY, L4-L5 THORACOLUMBAR
SPONDYLOSIS.”

Due to the findings, the respondent underwent a series of physiotherapy and medical
procedures, but despite this, he never regained the necessary fitness to resume seafaring
duties. He then sought the opinion of Dr. Manuel Magtira. In summary, the medical report
stated that the respondent has lost his pre-injury capacity and is unfit to work back at his
previous occupation, and is now permanently disabled. Considering these medical findings,
respondent sent CF Sharp a letter dated August 14, 2015 where he claimed for total and
permanent disability benefits and expressed his willingness to undergo another examination
to confirm his physical condition. According to respondent, CF Sharp simply ignored his letter,
thus, he was constrained to file a grievance before the Associated Marine Officer’s and
Seamen’s Union of the Philippines (AMOSUP) but did not yield a positive result. Thus, the
respondent filed a Complaint for permanent disability benefits, medical reimbursement, moral
and exemplary damages, and attorney’s fees against petitioners. Petitioners argued that the
respondent is only entitled to partial disability compensation of Grade 11 as assessed by the
company-designated physician, and he also failed to present proof of accident that occurred
on board the vessel.

The PVA granted the respondent’s claim for total permanent disability benefits and
attorney’s fees, but dismissed his claims for damages. It held that it was incumbent upon
petitioners to prove that no accident happened on the date alleged by respondent since they
are in possession of accident reports. It also justified the respondent's claim for attorney’s
fees since he was compelled to prosecute his claim to protect and assert his rights. The CA
affirmed the PVA’s Decision but deleted the award of attorney’s fees of the respondent. It
also held that the company-designated physician failed to issue a certification as to

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respondent’s disability and capacity to work within the 120-day period required under the
rules. Thus, the petitioners filed this instant petition.

ISSUE:
Whether the respondent, Roberto Daganato, is entitled to total and permanent
disability benefits.

RULING/RATIO DECIDENDI:
The respondent is entitled to total and permanent disability benefits,
however, the scale of compensation falls under the “Ratings” and not within the
Junior Officers.

Article 198 of the Labor Code provides that a “temporary total disability lasting
continuously for more than one hundred twenty days, except as otherwise provided in the
Rules.” Meanwhile, the IRR of the Labor Code provides in Rule X, Section 2 that “the System
may declare the total and permanent disability status at any time after 120 days of continuous
temporary total disability..” As held in the case of Pastrana v. Bahia Shipping Services, citing
the Elburg case, the 120 or 240 day periods shall be reckoned “from the time the seafarer
reported to the company-designated physician”, subsequent cases consistently counted said
periods from the date of the seafarer’s repatriation for medical treatment.

In the case at bar, the records show that the respondent was medically repatriated
on January 10, 2015, the company-designated physician was able to issue a certification of
disability rating of Grade 11-slight rigidity or ⅓ loss of lifting power of the trunk only on June
15, 2015 which is the 157th day reckoned from the time respondent was medically
repatriated without any assessment or indication as to his capacity to resume to work, or any
justification to extend the 120-day period. Clearly, respondent’s disability has become total
and permanent upon failure of the company-designated physician to issue a final and
determinative assessment within the 120-day period required under the rules.

Meanwhile, the Court has recognized the application of the CBA over the POEA-SEC
provisions on disability compensation because a contract of labor is so impressed with public
interest that the more beneficial conditions must be endeavored in favor of the laborer. Here,
the parties’ employment contract is clear that the current ITF Collective Agreement (ITF
Berlin IMEC IBF Collective Bargaining Agreement CBA) shall be considered incorporated to,
and shall form part of the contract. Notably, petitioners do not question the existence of the
CBA, or denied having signed the same.

Respondent’s position as a Chief Cook falls under “Ratings” based on CBA.

A perusal of the CBA discloses that the scale of compensation for disability is classified into
three groups, namely, ratings, junior officers, and senior officers, with the last group to
compose of Master, Chief Officer, Chief Engineer, and 2nd Engineer. Based on the 1997
Philippine Merchant Marine Rules and Regulations, "ratings" are those members of the ship's
crew other than the master or officers. No evidence was presented by the respondent to
prove that his rank is that of a Junior Officer. Respondent likewise failed to deny or rebut
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petitioners' claim that his position falls under "Ratings." In Teodoro v. Teekay Shipping
Philippines, as well as in Marlow Navigation Phils., Inc. v. Quijano, where the CBA Degree of
Disability Rate for Ratings was applied to the seafarers therein who were employed as chief
cook, as respondent in this case. Thus, consistent with these rulings, the respondent is
entitled to total and permanent disability benefits but reduced the award from USD
121,176.00 to USD 95,949.00, which corresponds to the rate of Ratings.

FALLO/DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The
January 25, 2018 Decision and the November 21, 2018 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. SP No. 147111 are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in that the award of USD
121,176.00 is REDUCED to USD 95,949.00, while the award of attorney’s fees equivalent to
ten percent (10%) of the award is REINSTATED. A legal interest rate at the rate of six
percent (6%) per annum is also imposed on the monetary award for permanent and total
disability benefits due Roberto B. Daganato, to be reckoned from the finality of this Decision
until full satisfaction thereof.

SO ORDERED.

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PHILIPPINE TRANSMARINE CARRIER AND SEASPAN CREW AND CARLOS

SALINAS vs. ALAN N TENA-E
G.R. No. 234365, JULY 6, 2022
HERNANDO, J.:

FACTS:
Petitioner hired Allan as seafarer in behalf of Seaspan crew management under a nine-
month contract after complying with medical examination, respondent boarded the vessel
M/V Mol efficiency.

Respondent while on cargo-watch duty an accident was occurred when a turnbuckle

was fell on his right shoulder after the medical treatment Allan was declared unfit for sea
duty and was repatriated to the Philippines the following day, he was immediately referred
to Ship Shore Medical and St. Lukes for examination and treatment with a designated
company doctors Dr Sanes and Dr De Guzman.

Respondent continued with his therapy and rehabilitation from November 2014 to
March 2015. In a medical report dated March 16, 2015 respondent was advised by the
attending physician to continue his usual activities and to report for re-evaluation tentatively
on April 13, 2015. On march 26, 2015 respondent through his counsel initiated a letter to Dr.
Sanez asking if further treatment was still needed beyond the 120 days period after his
repatriation, he requested a response but his query was left unanswered.

Allan consulted his physician of his choice and declared him unfit and with permanent
disability.Respondent then filed a complaint before the Labor Arbiter claiming for permanent
and total disability benefits.

In petitioners defense it alleged that Allan can no longer claim because he abandoned
his treatment by not showing on the date of his follow up check up as a result his right to
claim pursuant to section 20 (a), no 3, par (3) of the POES-SEC is forfeited.

In Allan’s claimed that he is entitled to total and permanent disability benefits he

argued that 181 days have lapsed and PTCI was failed to issue final assessment of his
disability considering that after 120 days have lapsed and the company attending physician
was failed to issue a final disability assessment thus disability became final and permanent.

Ruling of the Labor Arbiter. The LA ruled in favor of Allan and that the respondent
did not abandon his treatment since he was not informed whether his follow up check up on
April 13, 2015 would push through, the absence of final assessment by the company
designated physician after the 240 days Allan is entitled to total and permanent disability by
operation of law. Accordingly, the Petitioners are ordered to pay the respondents.

Ruling of the NLRC. Petitioners appealed before NLRC, which affirmed the decision
of the LA.

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Ruling of the CA. The CA denied the appeal, it agreed to the decisions of lower
tribunals, that the respondent did not abandon the treatment of the company physician, Allan
inquired to company by the letter through his counsel asking for the confirmation of his
evaluation and treatment which was left unanswered, and the CA held that the word tentative
is uncertain whether may or may not push through. Dr. Sanez failure to issue final assessment
within the 120/240 days period resulted in the entitlement of the respondent to total and
permanent disability.

ISSUE:
Whether the respondent is entitled to Total and permanent disability benefits.

RULING/RATIO DECIDENDI:
No, the respondent is not entitled to total and permanent disability benefits.

Sec. 20 Compensation and Benefits—

A. Compensation and benefits for injury or illness, the liabilities of the employer
when the seafarer suffers work-related injury or illness during the term of his contract
are as follows:

xxx

2. However, if after repatriation, the seafarer still requires medical attention

arising from said injury or illness, he shall be provided at cost to the employer until
such time he is declared fit or the degree of his disability has been established by the
company-designated physician.

3. In addition to the above obligation of the employer to provide medical

attention, the seafarer shall also receive sickness allowance from his employer in an
amount equivalent to his basic wage computed from the time he signed off until he is
declared fit to work or the degree of disability has been assessed by the company
designated physician, the period within which the seafarer shall be entitled to his
sickness allowance shall not exceed 120 days, payment of sickness allowance shall be
made on a regular basis, but not less than once a month.

Claim for total and permanent disability benefits shall be governed as follows:
1. The company designated physician must issue a final medical assessment on the
seafarer’s disability granting within the period of 120 days from the time the seafarer
reports to him.
2. If the company designated physician fails to give his assessment within a period of
120 days, without any justifiable reason, then the seafarers become permanent and
total;
3. If the company designated physician fails to give assessment within the period of
120 days with sufficient justification, then the period of diagnosis and treatment shall
be extended to 240 days

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4. The employer has the burden to prove that the company designated physician has
sufficient justification to extend the period.

If the company designated physician still fails to give his assessment within the
extended period of 240 days, then the seafarer’s disability becomes permanent and total,
regardless of any justification.

In this case the respondents were placed under the designated company doctors from
October 2014 to March 2015 and advised to continue with his usual activities while using the
prescribed medicated patch, at this point Allan’s treatment went beyond 120 days period,
and the doctor’s findings and evaluation clearly constitutes a significant act that justified the
extension of treatment to 240 days.

Allan made no appearance on the scheduled re-evaluation on April 13, 2015 making
it impossible for Dr Sanez to examine him and issue a final and definitive assessment.

Under POE-SEC section 20 (d) of 2000 provides that no compensation and benefits
shall be payable in respect of an injury, incapacity, disability, or death of the seafarer resulting
from his willful or criminal act or intentional breach of his duties, a seafarer is duty bound to
complete his medical treatment until declared fit to work or assessed with a permanent
disability rating by the designated physician.

The respondents failed to comply with the provision of the law by abandoning the
treatment which effectively prevented the company designated doctor from making an
assessment when he failed to show up on the scheduled appointment.

FALLO/DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is GRANTED. The April 4, 2017 Decision and the
September 14, 2017 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 147227 awarding
Allan N. Tena-e total and permanent disability benefits, are SET ASIDE. Petitioners Philippine
Transmarine Carriers, Inc. and Seaspan Crew Management LTD. are hereby ORDERED to
jointly and severally pay ALLAN N. TENA-E the amount of US$5,225.00 (US$50,000.00 x
10.45%) or its equivalent in Philippine Currency at the time of payment, corresponding to
Grade 12 Disability under the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration-Standard
Employment Contract. The original award of attorney's fees in respondent's favor is
DELETED.

The amounts due to ALLAN N. TENA-E shall earn interest at the rate of six percent (
6%) per annum from the date of finality of this Decision until fully paid.

SO ORDERED.

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PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. PERLITA CASTRO URQUICO

G.R. No. 238910, JULY 20, 2022
HERNANDO, J.:

FACTS:
Sometime in the months of November 2009 to May 2010, accusedappellant and her
co-accused, Perlita Castro Urquico a.k.a. "Fhey" (Urquico ), and Carlo Villavicencio, Jr. a.k.a.
"Boyet'' (Villavicencio), operating under Mheyman Manpower Agency (MMA ), had a series of
transactions that involved the collection of money from at least 31 individuals who were
looking for employment abroad. However, despite paying all the supposed fees, none of
these individuals were actually able to go abroad, and hence, resulted in the filing of several
complaints against the accused trio.

Five information charging the accused with violation of RA 8042 and Estafa under
Article 315, par. 2 (a) of the RPC were filed by the Office of the Prosecutor.

Upon arraignment on April 25, 2011, accused-appellant pleaded not guilty. The RTC,
upon motion of the prosecution and without objection from the defense, also ordered that
these cases be tried jointly.

On February 15, 2012, the RTC granted the accused-appellant's Motion for Leave of
Court to File Demurrer to Prosecution's Evidence. On March 6, 2012, accused-appellant filed
a Demurrer to Evidence (With Leave of Court) to which the prosecution filed its
Comment/Opposition (To Demurrer to Evidence) arguing that it established accused-
appellant's guilt for violation of RA 8042 and Estafa. On March 16, 2012, the RTC issued an
Order14 denying accused-appellant's demurrer to evidence in Criminal Case Nos. 17318,
17326, 17327, 17332, and 17346. However, in the same Order, the RTC granted her
demurrer to evidence.

The RTC ruled against the accused-appelant guilty beyond reasonable doubt and that
her defenses of denial and alibi cannot prevail over the categorical and affirmative
testimonies presented by the prosecution.

The CA affirmed the ruling of RTC.

ISSUE:
Whether the Court of Appeals erred in their ruling against the accused-appellant for
the crime charged.

RULING/RATIO DECIDENDI:
No, the prosecution has successfully established the accused-appellant's
guilt beyond reasonable doubt for the crime Illegal Recruitment of a Large Scale
and with a separate crime of estafa.

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As applied in this case, the records would show that the prosecution has
indeed proven beyond reasonable doubt each of the elements constituting the
crime of Illegal Recruitment of a Large Scale.

1. Regarding the first element that the accused undertook any recruitment activity
defined under Article 13(b), or any prohibited practice enumerated under Article 34 of
the Labor Code, the prosecution was able to prove through the testimony of its
witnesses that accused-appellant was introduced by her co-accused as the job broker
for Cyprus, "Lathea Estefanos Stellios." There is no doubt that the accused-appellant
participated in recruitment or placement activities.

2. For the second element, it was satisfactorily established that the accused-appellant
clearly did not have a license or authority to lawfully engage in the recruitment and
placement of workers. Merrera, a Senior Labor and Employment Officer of the POEA,
Satellite Office III, San Fernando City, Pampanga, testified that Dir. Dizon, POEA's
Director for Licensing and Adjudication Branch, issued a certification dated May 25,
2011 stating the following, among others:
Aside from this public document issued by the POEA, Merrera also testified that he
personally verified in their system whether the persons mentioned in the certification
were licensed or not, but he found no records of them having authority to recruit
workers for overseas employment. Clearly, the prosecution was able to show that the
accused-appellant and her cohorts have no lawful authority to engage in recruitment
and placement activities.
3. Lastly, the prosecution has established that there were at least four victims in this
case - Galendez, Lozano, Lopez, and Calma.

It is established that a person, for the same acts, may be convicted separately for
Illegal Recruitment under RA 8042 (or under the Labor Code) and Estafa under
Article 315, par. 2 (a) of the RPC.7

Estafa (Criminal Case Nos. 17326,17327,17332,17346). In this case, all the

elements of Estafa are present. The testimonies of the private complainants, coupled with
the documentary and object evidence, demonstrated that accused-appellant, under the false
pretense of being a legitimate overseas worker recruiter, fraudulently induced private
complainants to part with their money as part of the supposed recruitment process. Given
that none of the private complainants was deployed abroad as they were just being
scammed, they clearly suffered damage.
The RTC and the CA were correct in finding that accused-appellant deceived private
complainants into believing that she had the authority and capability to send them to Cyprus
for employment. Particularly, the RTC aptly found that Mandelma used a fictitious-sounding
name, "Lathea Estefanos Stellos," to conceal her true identity and spoke English with a
feigned foreign accent or diction to induce private complainants, who relied on these false
pretenses, to part with their money amounting to PSl,500.00 each in exchange for the
promise of future work abroad. However, this promise of overseas employment was never
fulfilled.
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Mandelma's defenses of denial and alibi failed to overturn the positive and
categorical testimonies of the prosecution's witnesses. It must be reiterated that the
factual findings of the trial court, especially those which revolve around matters of credibility
of witnesses deserve to be respected when no glaring errors bordering on a gross
misapprehension of the facts, or where no speculative, arbitrary and unsupported
conclusions, can be gleaned from such findings. The evaluation of the credibility of witnesses
and their testimonies are best undertaken by the trial court because of its unique opportunity
to observe the witnesses' deportment, demeanor, conduct, and attitude under grueling
examination. Such findings of the trial court are even more convincing when affirmed by the
CA, as in this case.

With the above in mind, the Court finds that the RTC correctly held that the bare
denial of accused-appellant must yield to the categorical statements of the prosecution
witnesses. Jurisprudence has held that denial and alibi as defenses are negative and self-
serving evidence undeserving of weight in law, unless substantiated by clear and convincing
evidence. It is considered with suspicion and always received with caution, not only because
they are inherently weak and unreliable, but also because they are easily fabricated and
concocted.

As applied in this case, accused-appellant was not able to present any clear and
convincing evidence to support her self-serving statements.88 In fact, she did not even
present any other witness to corroborate her alibi that she was not in the house ofUrquico
on December 27, 2009 because she was in Samar, and that she was not in the MMA office
on January 11, 2010 because she was at Santiago City. If she was confident in the truth of
her statements, there is no reason as to why she could not even present another witness to
vouch for her presence or absence.

Moreover, there is no proof of ill intent on the part of the private complainants to
falsely impute the crime charged against the accused. Verily, the accused-appellant's self-
serving testimonies without any other corroborating evidence cannot overcome the positive
testimonies of the prosecution's witnessess that were corroborated by the other evidence on
record, i.e., acknowledgement receipts. Accused-appellant's denial and alibi are nothing but
a desperate attempt to escape the clutches of the law.

FALLO/DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby DISMISSED. The September 14, 2017 Decision
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 07170 is AFFIRMED WITH
MODIFICATIONS that, insofar as Criminal Case Nos. 17326, 17327, 17332, and 17346,
accused-appellant Elnora Mandelma @ Lathea Estefanos Stellios, is sentenced to suffer the
indeterminate penalty of two (2) months and one (1) day of arresto mayor, as minimum, to
one (1) year and (1) day of prision correccional, as maximum, is hereby imposed for each
count of Estafa.

SO ORDERED.
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AUGUST 2022

CORNWORLD BREEDING SYSTEMS CORPORATION vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 204075, AUGUST 17, 2022
HERNANDO, J.:

FACTS:
Sometime in August 1982, Cornworld hired Lucena as a field worker. After rising
through the ranks, she was eventually chosen to be the company's Vice President for
Research and Development. Then, on January 16, 2009, Cornworld's then-President Benito
M. Domingo suffered a stroke, and petitioner Laureano C. Domingo assumed the
organization's management.

A special meeting of some of the company's employees, including Lucena, was called
by Laureano on January 24, 2009. The latter asserted that before the meeting began, several
workers overheard Laureano criticizing her for missing some of the company meetings and
failing to return his calls and letters.

Lucena then described some of the verbal interactions that took place during the
above mentioned meeting. Her absence from the meeting was cited as a result of her desire
to prevent any conflicts or issues between the management. In response, Laureano laid the
blame at Lucena and stated that it is her duty as the department head to attend all the
meetings conducted. These words were spoken in a high-pitched voice, pointing at Lucena
and yelling for her to leave the area.

Lucena then alleged that the previous incident caused her confinement at the
Cabanatuan Family Hospital due to hypertension and forced her to submit a seven-day sick
leave. She sent Laureano a letter requesting payment of her salary and sales incentive
compensation. But on that same day, Ms. Rizalina C. Domingo, the officer in charge of
Cornworld, sent a memorandum to every employee notifying them of the appointment of Mr.
Alan Canama as Overseer of every office under the Research and Development department
in accordance with a Board Resolution issued on January 22, 2009. Lucena asserted that with
the appointment of Canama, her employment with Comworld was left on a floating status as
she had no more personality to attend meetings and head the Research and Development
Department. And as a result, Lucena filed a complaint for constructive dismissal against
Comworld and Laureano on June 23, 2009.

On the other hand, petitioners contended that the company had lost the confidence it
had placed in the respondent. Neither a formal nor informal dismissal from service was given
to Lucena. Contrarily, Lucena was the one who, despite holding a crucial and sensitive
position in the organization, refused to work with the new management under Laureano

Prior to the filing of the case, Lucena submitted three different applications for sick
leave covering the period from January 24, 2009 to March 16, 2009, but subsequently did
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not communicate with the company even after the expiration of her approved leave period.
Petitioners made many attempts to contact Lucena by calling her, but these efforts were
ineffective because she’s not answering any of it. Therefore, the petitioner insisted that it
was Lucena who abandoned her job and was not dismissed either actually or constructively

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Cornworld Breeding Systems Corporation constructively dismissed
Lucena.

RULING/RATIO DECIDENDI:
Yes, the Court held that the Cornworld constructively dismissed Lucena.

In order for a dismissal from employment to be valid, it must be for a just or authorized
cause and procedural requirements to process, through notice or hearing, must be complied.
The employer must furnish the employee with two written notices before termination of the
employment. The first notice apprises the employee of the particular acts or omissions for
which dismissal is sought, while the second notice informs the employee of the employer’s
decision to dismiss him/her. The requirement of the hearing is complied with as long as there
was an opportunity to be heard, and not necessarily that an actual hearing was conducted.

In addition, the determination of whether the employee was validly dismissed on the
ground of abandonment is a factual matter because it requires this Court to review evidence
presented by both parties. As a rule, factual issues are beyond the purview of the petition
for review on certiorari under Rule 45, which covers the questions of law.

In order to dismiss an employee some grounds must be considered. Article 297 of the
Labor Code enumerated the just causes for the dismissal of an employee. First, through
serious misconduct or willful disobedience by the employee of the lawful order of his
employer or representative in connection with his work, second through gross and habitual
neglect by the employee of his duties, third , through fraud or willful breach by the employee
of the trust reposed In him by his employer or duly authorized representative, fourth, by the
commission of the crime or offense against the person of his employer or any immediate
member of his family or his duly authorized representatives and all the other causes
analogous to the foregoing.

In the instant case, Cornworld contends that there was no constructive dismissal of
Lucena since she was guilty of abandonment of work, and therefore she is not entitled to
any monetary reward. But the Court disagrees.

In this case, the Court finds some instances supporting the claim of Lucena that she
was constructively dismissed. First, the January 22, 2009 Board Resolution appointing
Canama as Overseer of all offices under Research and Development clearly implied that it
was meant to take Lucena’s position which made her employment under floating status.
Second, Cornworld withheld Lucena’s salaries and benefits as early as February 2009 while
she was still on leave but still employed with the company and thus entitled her to pay and
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lastly the public ridicule and humiliation during meetings which caused a toll on her medical
condition. These circumstances made Lucena’s employment impossible and unbearable on
her part as to effectively force her to forego her continued employment.

FALLO/DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is hereby DISMISSED. The assailed February 8,
2012 Decision and the July 24, 2012 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
116391 are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

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MANILA LAW COLLEGE LABOR LAW CASE DIGESTS NOV. 2020-SEP. 2022

SEPTEMBER 2022

G&S TRANSPORT CORPORATION vs. REYNALDO A. MEDINA

G.R. No. 243768, SEPTEMBER 06, 2022
HERNANDO, J.:

FACTS:
G&S a.k.a. “Avis-Rent-A-Car” is a corporation engaged in the business of renting cars.
In 2008, Medina was hired for the position of a driver. He was employed by the company for
7 yrs. with no derogatory record. However, there was this instance where he was involved
in misconduct for the first time in his career. He was engaged in a heated argument with a
co-employee. He averred that he was on his shift from 6am to 3pm on Feb. 12, 2015. He left
the premises of G&S at around 5pm but came back later at around 10pm to retrieve his
personal belongings. At the gate, he chanced upon co-employee, Felix Pogoy (Pogoy), who
was staring sharply at him. He accosted Pogoy and asked if there was a problem to which
the latter fired back and asked Medina the same question.

A heated argument with shoving then ensued. Another employee, Jose Viggayan
(Viggayan), broke up the melee and led Medina away from Pogoy. G & S, however countered
that Medina was drunk, when he assaulted Pogoy to the point of boxing and strangling the
latter. In fact, the two had to be restrained by the company’s security guards. However,
Medina allegedly refused to be controlled, until [Viggayan] arrived, and led [Medina] outside
the garage. After the submission of various written explanations, Medina was placed under
preventive suspension. An administrative hearing was conducted, and the company
concluded that Medina violated the Code of Discipline when he fought with a co-employee
inside the work premises, thus, he was terminated from employment. Aggrieved, he filed for
a Complaint for illegal dismissal, actual, moral and exemplary damages, and attorney’s fees.

Ruling of the Labor Arbiter. In April 2016, the LA found that there was no illegal
dismissal because fighting with co-employee within the work premises is considered serious
misconduct and a valid ground for termination. There was no discussion on Medina’s
monetary claims. Aggrieved, Medina appealed the La Decision before the NLRC.

Ruling of the National Labor Relations Commission. In Sept. 2016, the NLRC
rendered its Decision affirming the LA. Medina sought for reconsideration for the NLRC
Decision but it was denied for lack of merit but was denied in a Resolution dated Nov. 2016.
Undaunted, Medina filed a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court before
the CA. He contended that the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion when it ruled that
he was validly terminated from employment and was not entitled to his money claims.

Ruling of the Court of Appeals. On April 2018, the Appellate Court rendered its
assailed decision. The CA reversed the findings of the labor tribunals and found that Medina
was illegally dismissed from employment since “what transpired between the two [Medina]
and Pogoy x x x was a petty quarrel that merely involved shoving or slight pushing. The
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incident did not cause any bodily harm, except a minor scratch in [Medina’s] knee, nor did
it in any manner interfere with fellow employees, or the operations of the business. For this
reason, the CA found the penalty of dismissal too harsh and not commensurate with the act
committed.

Aggrieved, G & S sought for reconsideration from the appellate court but however was
denied the same. They interposed its appeal before the Sc praying for the setting aside of
the CA’s Assailed Decision and argues that the appellate court gravely erred in reversing the
findings of the labor tribunals and makes much of the fact that the assailed CA Decision
“accorded more weight to the testimony of Viggayan x x x” Furthermore, g &S argues that
‘[t]he assailed [D]ecision is littered with quoted testimonies of witnesses, their credibility and
determination of their weight. There are no doubt in the nature of findings of facts and
therefore, beyond the province of a writ of certiorari under Rule 65.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Medina was illegally dismissed by G & S Transport Corporation.

RULING/RATIO DECIDENDI:
No. The petition is without merit. The appellate court did not commit grave
abuse of discretion nor did it exceed its jurisdiction when it concluded that Medina
was illegally dismissed from employment by G & S.

Serious misconduct, as a just cause for termination of employment under the Labor
Code of the Philippines (Labor Code) is absent in the case at bar.

Misconduct is generally defined as a “transgression of some established and definite

rule of action, forbidden act, a dereliction of duty, willful in character, and implies wrongful
intent and not mere error in judgment. Under Art. 297 of the Labor Code, an employer may
terminate the services of an employee on the ground of serious misconduct committed in
connection with or relative to the performance of his duties:

Art. 297 [282] Termination by Employer. – An employer may terminate an employment for
any of the following causes:

(a) Serious misconduct or willful disobedience by the employee of lawful orders of his
employer or representative in connection with his work;

xxx

In labor cases, misconduct, as a ground fro dismissal, must be serious or such grave
and aggravated character and not merely trivial or unimportant. To justify termination on the
ground of serious misconduct, the following requisites must concur: (1) the misconduct must
be serious; (2) it must relate to the performance of the employee’s duties, showing that the
employee has become unfit to continue working for the employer; and (3) it must have been
performed with wrongful intent.
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Here, none of the requisites for serious misconduct was present. To reiterate, the CA
found that only a petty quarrel involving shoving or slight pushing transpired between Medina
and Pogoy. It did not cause work stoppage nor posed a threat to the safety of the other
employees. [G&S] did not show how Medina’s misconduct has adversely affected its business.
Or how the latter has become unfit to continue working for the company. Thus, there was
no just cause for the termination of Medina’s employment with G & S.

The penalty of dismissal is not commensurate with the act committed. The
SC agrees with the appellate court considering that Medina had been employed for 7 yrs.
and only recently became involved in any form of misconduct. Absent any evidence showing
the seriousness and aggravated character of the misconduct, the xtreme penalty of dismissal
should not have been imposed. As the appellate court stated, ‘[a] lighter penalty, such as
suspension would have been more just.” They likewise agree with the appellate court that
there is no basis to award Medina moral and exemplary damages. Although Medina’s
dismissal is illegal, there is nothing to show that G & S was motivated by bad faith in
terminating his employment.

Art. 294 of the Labor Code states that illegally dismissed employees are entitled to
reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and other privileges and monetary equivalent
from the time their compensation was withheld from them up to the time their actual
reinstatement. Medina deserves no less.

The Court adds that, following the Nacar v. Gallery Frames, the total monetary award
shall earn legal interest at the rate of six percent (6%0 per annum from the date of finality
of this Decision until fully paid by G & S.

FALLO/DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review of Certiorari is DENIED. The April 27, 2018
Decision and the December 17, 2018 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
149274 holding that respondent Reynaldo A, Medina was illegally dismissed and entitled to
full backwages, inclusive of allowances, and to other benefits of their monetary equivalent
from the time his compensation was withheld from him p to the time of his actual resentment
is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION ad that the petitioner G & S Transport
Corporation is ORDERED to PAY respondent Reynaldo A. Medina legal interest on the total
monetary award at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the date of finality of this
Decision until fully paid. Accordingly, the case is REMANDED to the Labor Arbiter for the re-
computation of respondent’s backwages.

SO ORDERED.

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