ART. 174 [168].

COMPULSORY COVERAGE
Coverage in the State Insurance Fund shall be compulsory upon all
employers and their employees not over sixty (60) years of age; Provided,
That an employee who is over sixty (60) years of age and paying contributions
to qualify for the retirement or life insurance benefit administered by the
System shall be subject to compulsory coverage. (As amended by Sec. 16,
P.D. No. 850).
ART. 175 [169]. FOREIGN EMPLOYMENT
The Commission shall ensure adequate coverage of Filipino employees
employed abroad, subject to regulations as it may prescribe.
ART. 176 [170]. EFFECTIVE DATE OF COVERAGE
Compulsory coverage of the employer during the effectivity of this Title
shall take effect on the first day of his operation, and that of the employee,
on the date of his employment.
ART. 177 [171]. REGISTRATION
Each employer and his employees shall register with the System in
accordance with its regulations.

COMMENTS

COVERAGE

Employees’ compensation law applies to all employers, public or private, and to all
employees, public or private, including casual, emergency , temporary or substitute
employee.

Also under the ECC rules, the employer may belong to either the public sector(GSIS),
or the private sector(SSS).

Benefits Claimable under the EC program

The EC Program provides the following benefits: Loss of Income

Benefit, Medical Benefit, Death & Funeral Benefits, and
Rehabilitation Services as administered by SSS and GSIS.

“Both private and public sector workers or employees who suffered

from work-related sickness, injury, or death

The Cash Assistance is a benefit that ECC provides and administers in

its central and regional offices. The amount of the EC Cash
Assistance is P10,000 or P15,000 for sickness or death, respectively.

Foreign employment

Filipinos working abroad for employers doing business in the Philippines

are covered by the employees’ compensation law. They are entitled to same
benefits as for those working in the Philippines.

The Employees' Compensation (EC) program aims to assist workers who

suffer work-connected sickness or injury resulting in disability or
death. The benefits under the EC program may be enjoyed
simultaneously with benefits under the social security program

Art. 178 limitations of liability

(Provides exceptions)

The employees’ compensation law is intended to assist innocent victims of

employment accident or work-related illness but not self-inflicted or self-courted
contingencies.

Under what conditions can an injury, sickness or death be deemed

incompensable under EC?

No compensation will be allowed to an employee or the dependents if the injury,

sickness, disability or death is due to:

1. drunkenness;
2. willful intention to injure or kill himself or another; or
3. notorious negligence.

Under what conditions can an injury, sickness or death be compensable under

EC?

A sickness, injury, disability or death resulting from an employment accident is

compensable if:

1. The employee is injured at the workplace;

2. The employee is performing official functions; and
3. If the injury is sustained elsewhere, the employee is executing an order for the employer.

1. Intoxication or Drunkenness
2. Self-inflicted Injuries
3. Suicide or Provoked Death Not Compensable
Mabuhay Shipping Services, Inc. and Skippers Maritime Co., Ltd. vs. Hon. National
Labor Relations Commission (First Division) and C. Sentina, G.R. No. 94167,
January 21, 1991 —
The employer is exempted from liability for burial expenses for a seaman
who commits suicide. How about in a case of one who ran amuck or who in a state
of intoxication provoked a fight as a result of which he was killed? Is the employer
similarly exempt from liability?

The mere death of the seaman during the term of his employment does not
automatically give rise to compensation. The circumstances which led to the death
as well as the provisions of the contract, and the right and obligation of the employer
and seaman, must be taken into consideration, in consonance with the due process
and equal protection clauses of the Constitution. There are limitations to the liability
to pay death benefits.
When the death of the seaman resulted from a deliberate or willful act on his own
life, and it is directly attributable to the seaman, such death is not compensable. No doubt
a case of suicide is covered by this provision.

By the same token, when as in this case the seaman, in a state of intoxication,
ran amuck, or committed an unlawful aggression against another, inflicting injury
on the latter, so that in his own defense the latter fought back and in the process
killed the seaman, the circumstances of the death of the seaman could be categorized
as a deliberate and willful act on his own life directly attributable to him. First, he
challenged everyone to a fight with an axe. Thereafter, he returned to the mess hall,
picked up and broke a cup and hurled it at an oiler Ero who suffered injury. Thus
provoked, the oiler fought back. The death of seaman Sentina is attributable to his
unlawful aggression and thus is not compensable.

Death Not the Result of Worker’s Willful Act

Interorient Maritime Enterprises, et al. vs. C. Pineda, G.R. No. 115497, September
16, 1996 —
The POEA Administrator ruled, and the Supreme Court agreed, that since the
worker, J. Pineda, attacked the Thai policeman when he was no longer in complete
control of his mental faculties, the provision of the Standard Format Contract of
Employment exempting the employer from liability (if death resulted from employee’s
own willful act on his life) should not apply in the instant case.

Firstly, the fact that the

deceased suffered from mental disorder at the time of his repatriation means that he
must have been deprived of the full use of his reason, and that thereby, his will must
have been impaired, at the very least. Thus, his attack on the policeman can in no
wise be characterized as a deliberate, willful or voluntary act on his part.
Secondly,
and apart from that, we also agree that in light of the deceased’s mental condition,
petitioners “should have observed some precautionary measures and should not
have allowed said seaman to travel home alone,” and their failure to do so rendered
them liable for the death of Pineda. Indeed, “the obligations and liabilities of the
(herein employer petitioners) do not end upon the expiration of the contracted
period as (petitioners are) duty bound to repatriate the seaman to the point of hire
to effectively terminate the contract of employment.”

The instant case should be distinguished from the case of Mabuhay, where
the deceased, R. Sentina, had been in a state of intoxication, then ran amuck and
inflicted injury upon another person, so that the latter in his own defense fought
back and in the process killed Sentina. Previous to said incident, there was no proof
of mental disorder on the part of Sentina. The cause of Sentina’s death is categorized
as a deliberate and willful act on his own life directly attributable to him. But seaman
Pineda was not similarly situated.

Suicide, When Compensable

NAESS Shipping Phil. vs. NLRC, G.R. No. 73441, September 4, 1987 —
Facts: While plying the seas from Brazil to Egypt, the vessel’s chief steward,
named Dublin, fatally stabbed Fernandez, the second cook, during a quarrel. Dublin
then ran to the deck from which he jumped or fell overboard. The body was never
recovered.

For the death of Dublin, his widow Zenaida collected the amount of P75,000
under the ITF Collective Bargaining Agreement. She also filed with the Philippine
Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) a complaint against NAESS for
payment of death benefits totalling US$74,512, under both the Special Agreement
and what she claimed to be also the applicable Singapore Workmen’s Compensation
Ordinance. Under the special agreement, a crewman of the vessel is entitled to
compensation for “loss of life.” The POEA rendered judgment for complainant,
holding Dublin’s death compensable under the Special Agreement.
NAESS went to the Supreme Court charging grave abuse of discretion by
POEA and raised the issue whether “death caused by suicide” (jumping overboard)
is compensable. 505

Ruling: No law or rule would make it illegal for an employer to assume

the obligation to pay death benefits in favor of his employee in their contract of
employment. Since NAESS freely bound itself to a contract which on its face makes
it unqualifiedly liable to pay compensation benefits for Dublin’s death while in its
service, regardless of whether or not it intended to make itself the insurer, in the
legal sense, of Dublin’s life, NAESS cannot escape liability.
Contracts which are the private laws of the contracting parties should be fulfilled
according to the literal sense of their stipulation, if their terms are clear and leave
no room for doubt as to the intention of the contracting parties, for contracts are
obligatory, no matter what their form may be, whenever the essential requisites for
their validity are present.

The argument — that to compel payment of death benefits would amount

not only to rewarding the act of murder or homicide, but also inequitably places
on NAESS the twin burdens of compensating both the killer and his victim, who
allegedly had also been employed under a contract with a similar death benefits
clause — confuses the legal implications and effects of two distinct and independent
agreements. It carries within itself the seeds of its own refutation. Entitlement of
Dublin to death benefits resulted from his death while serving out his contract of
employment. It was not a consequence of his killing of Fernandez. If the latter’s death
is also compensable, that is due to the solitary fact of his death while covered by a
similar contract, not precisely to the fact that he met death at the hands of Dublin.
That both deaths may be related by abuse and effect and NAESS is the single obligor
liable for compensation in both cases must, insofar as factual and legal basis of such
liability is concerned, be regarded as purely accidental circumstances.
According to American authorities, suicide is compensable in the following cases:
(a) When it results from insanity resulting from compensable work injury
or disease;

(b) When it occurs during a delirium resulting from compensable disease. 1

Self-destruction is not presumed. In cases where compensation is sought for a
violent death due to accident, our courts have refused so far to impute to the victim
an intention to end his life. The laborer is presumed to take the necessary precautions
to avoid injury to himself, unless an intention is attributed to him to end his life.
That presumption is based on the instinct of self-preservation. 2
______________
The court, in short, declares NAESS liable under the contract which covers
“loss of life” during the employment regardless of the cause of death.

Notorious Negligence
The degree of negligence of the employee that exempts the State Insurance
Fund from liability is notorious negligence.
Notorious negligence is something more than simple or contributory
negligence. It signifies a deliberate act of the employee to disregard his own personal
safety. Disobedience to rules and/or prohibition does not in itself constitute
notorious negligence, if no intention can be attributed to the injured to end his life. 1
In most cases where the defense of notorious negligence had been raised,
the primary consideration for not finding notorious negligence is usually (1)
lack of knowledge or awareness of the peril or the seriousness of the existing
danger; or (2) the unexpectedness, under the circumstances, of the accident.
Failure to avoid a known danger by a laborer engrossed in his work who
momentarily forgets it is not negligence; neither is his failure to exercise incessant
vigilance in avoiding a known danger.2
The employee’s disregard of warning that the banca was overloaded did
not constitute notorious negligence.3
On the other hand, a driver, injured by collision while overspeeding
on a descending slope approaching a curve with the front view obstructed by
vegetation, was held notoriously negligent.4
A laborer injured while boarding rear platform of train as it was moving
backwards was held notoriously negligent.5

Notorious Negligence
Solidum vs. GSIS, ECC Case No. 4061, promulgated on November 23, 1988 —
Facts: Solidum was an enlisted man of the Philippine Marines, assigned to the
10th Marine Battalion, stationed at Zamboanga City.
One morning in March 1987, Solidum, who was then resting after a patrol
mission, jokingly challenged his comrades to a duel, but they all ignored him. Pointing
the muzzle of his loaded rifle at his temple and, saying “Bahala na,” Solidum squeezed
the trigger. He died instantly.
His father filed a claim for death benefits under P.D. No. 626. The GSIS
denied his claim because the contingency did not arise out of and in the course of
employment. The System pointed out that the deceased was not performing his duties
as a soldier when the accident occurred. Moreover, it said, the deceased’s death was
caused by his notorious negligence and not by an accident or by “an act of God.”
After his request for reconsideration failed, the appellant elevated the case to
the Employees’ Compensation Commission.
Ruling: The ECC sustained the System’s decision. The ECC noted that the
deceased pointed the muzzle of his rifle to himself and squeezed its trigger causing
his death.
“Such an act, we believe, constitutes notorious negligence. The employees’
compensation program under which the appellant seeks relief is designed to
compensate only the working men who are victims of work-connected injuries and
other contingencies. In the case before us, the contingency did not arise out of and
in the course of employment, and therefore is not compensable.”

Not Notorious Negligence

Quizon vs. GSIS, ECC Case No. 3015, promulgated on October 26, 1987 —
Facts: A Philippine Army soldier died in December 1980 due to dynamite blast
at Tumalutab detachment in Ipil, Zamboanga City.
Investigation showed that after lunch that day, he asked permission from his unit to
test the dynamite they had earlier confiscated. He took a civilian pumpboat and proceeded
towards nearby Sinonog Island. Along the way, however, he accidentally ignited the fuse
of the dynamite, causing it to explode prematurely. The soldier died on the spot.
For his death, his father filed a claim for compensation benefits but the GSIS
denied it because the deceased at the time of accident was not performing his duties
aside from being notoriously negligent.
Appellant sought a reconsideration of the ruling. He averred that his son
belonged to the Ranger Training Group whose primary mission is to develop
selected soldiers in the field of specialized small unit tactics, particularly on weapons,
explosives, and hand-to-hand combat, among others. Thus, testing a dynamite was
part of the deceased’s training as a ranger. “In fact,” appellant said, “no less than
the Minister of National Defense through his legal chief, Brig. Gen. Samuel Soriano,
supported the line of duty status of his son’s death.”
“Moreover,” appellant added, “it was not the commanding officer of the
deceased as alleged in respondent’s adverse decision who advised him not to test
the dynamite, but merely a colleague of the same rank as the deceased.”
Ruling: We [the ECC] believe that there was indeed negligence on the part of
the deceased soldier. However, his negligence was not notorious as perceived by the
respondent. Notorious negligence is something more than simple or contributory
negligence. It signifies a deliberate act of the employee to disregard his own personal
safety. Disobedience to rules does not in itself constitute notorious negligence, if no
intention can be attributed to the injured to end his life.
Thus, in line with the principle of liberally construing compensation law, to
attain its purpose for which it was enacted, the correct view to be followed is that no
man in his right senses would deliberately court death. The presumption then to
be adopted is that any person by his instinct of self-preservation wants to avoid such
danger unless an intention is attributed to him to end his life.
Considering the soldier’s training on explosives as a ranger, his desire to test
the confiscated dynamite is but a natural reaction on his part to the extent that he
even ignored the advice of his colleague against his plan. Unfortunately, the dynamite
exploded prematurely causing his instant death.

“The ECC reversed the respondent System’s decision and ordered payment
of the claim”.

ART. 179 [173]. EXTENT OF LIABILITY

Unless otherwise provided, the liability of the State Insurance Fund
under this Title shall be exclusive and in place of all other liabilities of the
employer to the employee, his dependents or anyone otherwise entitled to
receive damages on behalf of the employee or his dependents. The payment
of compensation under this Title shall not bar the recovery of benefits as
provided for in Section 699 of the Revised Administrative Code, Republic
Act numbered eleven hundred sixty-one, as amended, Commonwealth Act
numbered one hundred eighty-six, as amended, Republic Act numbered six
hundred ten, as amended, and other laws whose benefits are administered
by the System, or by other agencies of the government. (As amended by Sec.
2, P.D. No. 1921.)