~~ ORDER OF BATTLE I11III

THE ARDENNES

OFFENSIVE

USVII &VIII CORPS AND BRITISH XXX CORPS

With a father and grandfather

who served with distinction in
two world wars, BRUCE
QUARRIE grew up with a
fascination for military history.
Born in 1947, he graduated
with honours from Cambridge
University in 1968 and started
work as a journalist with the
Financial Times. He is now
established as a full -time
writer and until recently was
also editor of the monthly
magazine Military Illustrated.
Bruce's principal interest is in
World War 2 and his definitive
Encyclopaedia of the German
Army was even translated and
published in German!
 SERIES EDITOR : JOHN MOORE

THE ARDENNES OFFENSIVE

US VII & VIII CORPS and BRITISH XXX CORPS

CENTRAL SECTOR

BRUCE QUARRIE
First published in Great Britain in 2000 by Osprey Publishing, Elms Court, Chapel Way,
Series style
Botley, Oxford OX2 9LP United Kingdom
Email: [email protected]
The style of presentation adopted in the Order of Battle series is designed to
provide quickly the maximum information for the reader.
© 2000 Ravelin Limited
Exclusive publishing rights Osprey Publishing Limited
Order of Battle Unit Diagrams - All 'active ' units in the ORBAT, that is those
present and engaged on the battlefield , are shown in black. Unengaged and
All rights reserved. Apart from any fair dealing for the purpose of private study, research ,
detached units, as well as those covered in previous and subsequent volumes,
criticism or review , as permitted under the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act , 1988, no
are 'shadowed'.
part of this publication may be reproduced , stored in a retrieval system , or transmitted
in any form or by any means, electronic, electrical, chemical, mechanical , optical ,
Unit Data Panels - T hese provide a ready reference for all regiments ,
photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior written permission of the
battalions, companies and troops forming part of each division or battlegroup
copyright owner. Enquiries should be addressed to the Publishers.
and present during the battle, together with dates of attachment where relevant.

ISBN 1 85532 858 5

Battlefield Maps - In this volume , German units are shown in red and Allied
units in blue.
Osprey Series Editor: Lee Johnson
Ravelin Series Editor: John Moore
Research Co-ordinator: Diane Moore
Design: Ravelin Limited , Braceborough, Lincolnshire, United Kingdom Order of Battle Timel i nes
Cartography: Chapman Bounford and Associates , London, United Kingdom
Origination by Va lhaven Ltd , Isleworth, United Kingdom Battle Page Timelines - Each volume concerns the Order of Battle for the
Printed in China through World Print Ltd armies involved . Rarely are the forces available to a commander committed
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00 01 02 03 04 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 a Timeline is provided at the bottom of each 'battle ' page. This Timeline gives
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VISIT OSPREY AT www.ospreypublishing.com ,

0800 hrs 0900 1000 1100 1200

1
pp45-47 / 48-49 & 52-551 50-51
J
Key to Military Series symbols

Ouoo
Army Corps Division Brigade

DODD
Regiment Battalion Company Platoon
Author ' s Acknowledg e ments
This book would not have been possible without the generous support of Bob
Kane , Chairman of Presido Press, Novato, California , for supplying and permitting
the use of material from Shelby l. Stanton 's landmark book World War If Order of
Battfe (1984). Captain (rtrd) Stanton has also been of considerable personal
Armour Cavalry Infantry Airborne
help in the preparation of this volume , as has Mr Stuart Kohn of Maplewood , New

8
Artillery
~ ~ IT] I ~ I
Anti-Tank
Artillery
Anti-Aircraft
Artillery
Mortar Rockel
Artillery
rn Fortress
Artillery
Jersey.

In'l I<.~I I~I I~I

Engineers Armoured
Engineers
Bridging
Engineers
Bridging
Column
Ed itor ' s note

~ Q 0 EE ~
All individual battle maps are based on Government Survey 1 :50,000 G .S . 4040
series dated 1938 and 1939, revised from aerial reconnaissance 1943, by
Signals Supply Ordnance Medical Quartermaster permission of The British Library.

Unit ~ Parent
Identifier IL::::::J Unit
Commander
 CONTENTS

'ALL QUIET .. .' - 'THEN OUT OF THE MIST .. .' 4

U.S. FIRST ARMY 8
U.S. FIRST ARMY - U.S. VII Corps 12
2nd Armored Division 'Hell on Wheels' 17
3rd Armored Division 'Spearhead' 20
83rd Infantry Division 'Thunderbolt' 23
84th Infantry Division 'Railsplitters' 25
U.S. VII CORPS' BATTLES - CCB, 3rd Armored Division - StoumontlLa Gleize 27
CCR, 3rd Armored Division - Hotton 31
333rd and 334th Infantry Regiments - MarcheNerdenne 33
CCB, 2nd Armored Division - Foy-Notre-Dame/Celies 35
111/335th and 329th Infantry Regiments - Rochefort 39
U.S. THIRD ARMY 41
U.S. THIRD ARMY - U.S. VIII Corps 44
9th Armored Division 49
11th Armored Division 'Thunderbolt' 52
28th Infantry Division 'Keystone' 54
87th Infantry Division 'Golden Acorn' 56
106th Infantry Division 'Golden Lions' 58
17th Airborne Division 'Golden Talon' 60
101st Airborne Division 'Screaming Eagles' 62
Combat Command B, 10th Armored Division 65
U.S. VIII CORPS' BATTLES -106th Infantry Division - Schnee Eifel 66
112th Infantry Regiment, 28th Infantry Division - Sevenig/Ouren 68
1/110th Infantry Regiment, 28th Infantry Division- Marnach/Clervaux 70
44th Engineer Combat Battalion - Wiltz 73
CCA, 9th Infantry Division - ErmsdorflSavelborn 75
CCR, 9th Armored Division and Team 'Cherry' - Longvilly/Mageret 77
501st Parachute Infantry Regiment, 101st Airborne Division - Neffe/Bizory 79
Team 'O'Hara', Company I, 111/501st PIR and 705th Tank Destroyer Battalion - Wardin/Marvie 81
11/327th Glider Infantry Regiment, 101 st Airborne Division - Marvie 83
Team 'Desobry' and 1/506th Parachute Infantry Regiment, 101st Airborne Division - Noville 85
1/401st (1II/327th) Glider Infantry Regiment, 101st Airborne Division - Flamierge/Hemroulle 87
II and 11/502nd Parachute Infantry Regiment, 101st Airborne Division - Champs/Longchamps 89
BRITISH 21 st ARMY GROUP - British XXX Corps 91
29th Armoured Brigade 93
BRITISH XXX CORPS' BATTLE - 3rd Royal Tank Regiment - DinantlFoy-Notre-Dame 94
WARGAMING THE ARDENNES 96
SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY 96
 'ALL QUIET ... '

'Then out of the Mist ... '

O n 15 December 1944 it was 'all quiet on the

western front' - at least, in the Ardennes -
and the Gis in their snow-covered fox
these divisions in particular needed rest.
In addition , First Army's ranks had recently been
swelled by the arrival of two fresh and untried infantry
holes surrounded by white-garbed pine trees were divisions, the 99th and 106th, which would benefit
anticipating a peaceful Christmas. Ever since First from having time to acclimatise before being thrown
Army had occupied the region in September/October into the impending onslaught through the West Wall
and reached the West Wall , this had been the sector towards the Rhein planned for early in the New Year.
where nothing happened apart from some desultory Like most of the higher-numbered divisions in the
shelling and the occasional brush with a German U.S. Army formed during 1942-43, these divisions had
patrol. There had been heavy fighting in the north , at been used as manpower pools and , once they were
Aachen and Geilenkirchen and in the HOrtgen Forest, trained , many of their men had been fed into other
as well as to the south at Metz, but this part of Belgium front-line divisions as casualty replacements. Before
and the Duchy of Luxembourg had become a backwa- they shipped to Europe, the 99th and 106th had their
ter of the war. numbers made up by 'press ganging ' men from the
Lieutenant-General Courtney Hodges, CO of First USAAF or from anti-aircraft units. The result was that,
Army, was as grateful as any of his men for the when they arrived on the Continent, these divisions
respite , because he and they had fought long and were only half trained and few of the officers knew
hard since D-Day. This particularly applied to the their men really well.
1st Infantry Division , which had landed at 'bloody Another result of the deceptive tranquillity of the
Omaha' on 6 June and suffered nearly half the total Ardennes front was that many officers had been
D-Day casualties ; to the 4th Infantry, which had come granted leave, which meant that when the German
ashore on 'Utah' and captured Cherbourg; and to the Volksgrenadiers began looming out of the pre-dawn
28th , which had endured the horrors of the HOrtgen mist on 16 December, some regiments , battalions
Forest, losing 5,000 men in a fortnight. All three of and companies were led by officers more used to

The lull before the storm:

Gis of the 28th Infantry
Division enjoy local
hospitality in Bastogne in
September 1944. After
their ordeal in the
HUrtgen Forest, this is
the sort of atmosphere
(if not weather!) that the
men on furlough were
looking forward to over
Christmas.
(U.S. Signal Corps)

4
 Montgomery Bradl ey Devers
21 Army Group 12 Army Group 6 Army Group

xxxx xxxx xxxx

r::::::::7I
IL:::::J Si mpson
U.S. 9 Army
r::::::::7I
IL:::::J Hodges
U. S. 1 Army
r::::::::7I
IL:::::J Patton
U.S. 3 Army

xxxx xxxx xxxx xxxx

r::::::::7I
IL:::::J Crerar
Canadia n 1 Army
r::::::::7I
IL:::::J Demsey
British 2 Army
r::::::::7I
IL:::::J Patch
U.S. 7 Army
r::::::::7I
IL:::::J de Lattre
French 1 Army

implementing orders issued from above than to a number of crack German divisions had 'disappeared '
initiating them . That most of them coped well , and from sight, it was believed they were remustering in
several of them superbly, belies the common myth the Bonn-K6ln region for a counter-attack through
that American infantry were 'soft' and could not exist Roermond to recapture Aachen.
without candies , cookies and ice cream . Nevertheless, if SHAEF remained inactive, further
There was plenty of ice of a different sort in the down the chain of command others were less
steep, densely forested slopes of the Ardennes in sanguine . On 14 December, for example, the CO of
December, making the narrow, tortuously twisting the 4th Infantry Division , Major-General Raymond
country roads impassable in places. Even Barton , recalled all men on furlough to their units and
3D-ton Sherman tanks could lose traction and slide into had a precautionary conference with his regimental
a ravine or slew sideways and block a road . Wheeled commanders on the 15th . But elsewhere , few
transport, even when snow chains were fitted , could preparations were taken and bored sentries peered
only crawl cautiously at best. This would cause blindly into the pitch-black night until , suddenly , at
considerable delays after 16 December when units 0530 hrs on the 16th the horizon lit up with the flashes
redeploying to meet the German threat were delayed from hundreds of guns and heavy artillery shells
for hours en route to their destinations. Fortunately, the began landing all along the thin line of foxholes. Then
same conditions slowed the advance of the Panzer searchlights stabbed the air, their reflection from the
divisions, seriously disrupting the German timetable clouds creating a ghostly moonlit effect, and the
and giving the Allies a short breathing space. shadowy shapes of thousands of German infantry
As the hours ticked down towards what the began emerging from the mist.
Germans called 'Null-Tag' (Day Zero) , there were
indications that something was afoot, but not all Pages 6-7: Allied intelligence really did not know what
reports were passed upward and many were ignored . opposed them east of the Schnee Eifel and river Our in
As a result, although some officers had premonitions December. Warnings of significant enemy troop
of disaster, for the most part Allied intelligence movements tended to be disregarded because SHAEF
discounted a major German push. The testimony of expected no more than a spoiling attack in response to
the occasional talkative prisoner was taken as the Rur and Urft dams offensive in the north, and/or a
Teutonic bragging. Reports of vehicle movements response to Patton's impending attack in the Saar
being heard in the middle of the night were ascribed to region further south. Recent claims that Eisenhower
'jitters'. There had been no aerial reconnaissance over and Bradley deliberately left First Army's centre weak
this sector of the front since November and , although as bait in a trap are merely media 'hype'. 5
f U.S. FIRST ARMY
-
....
I I)

u:::
en
::)

I t was the misfortune of Courtney Hodges' U.S. First

Army to bear the brunt of the German onslaught
in the Ardennes, with its main weight falling on
U.S. FIRST ARMY
Lieutenant-General Courtney H. Hodges
Major-General Troy Middleton's thinly spread 28th and Chief of Staff:
106th Infantry Divisions. The 99th Infantry Division Major-General William G. Kean
of Major-General Leonard Gerow's V Corps on First
Army's left flank was also hit hard by the strongest of V CORPS (Gerow)
the three attacking German armies, Sixth Panzer, but VII CORPS (Collins)
fortunately the 1st and 2nd Infantry Divisions were VIII CORPS (Middleton)
close at hand. The 30th Infantry Division, 'borrowed' (to Third Army 20 December)
from Lieutenant-General William Simpson's Ninth Army, XVIII (AIRBORNE) CORPS (Gavin pp, Ridgway)
was also brought into play and stopped 1 SS-Panzer (attached from SHAEF Reserve)
526 Armored Infantry Battalion
Lieutenant-General 99 Infantry Battalion CNorwegia'ns')
Courtney Hodges was a 740 Tank Battalion (Rubel)
veteran of World War 1 (C Troop detached to 30 Infantry Divi sion)
who did consider the 741 Tank Battalion (Skaggs)
needs of his Gis and 612 Tank Destroyer Battalion (Towed)
knew their lines were 644 Tank Destroyer Battalion (M10) (Graham)
over-extended, but could 825 Tank Destroyer Battalion (M10)
do little to alleviate their 143 Anti-Aircraft Artillery Gun Battalion (Mobile) (90mm)
precarious position until 413 Anti-Aircraft Artillery Gun Battalion (Mobile) (90mm)
after the Germans struck. 51 Engineer Combat Battalion
(U .S. Signal Corps) 158 Engineer Combat Battalion
299 Engineer Combat Battalion
Division 's drive west along the Ambleve valley. 300 Engineer Combat Battalion
There were no such immediate reserves which could 1278 Engineer Combat Battalion
be rushed to the aid of Troy Middleton's hard-hit B Troop, 125 Cavalry Reconnai ssance Squadron,
infantry, although each had a combat command from Mechanized
9th Armored Division as a backstop. Hodges promptly 9 Forestry Company (Canadian)
recalled CCB from temporary attachment to V Corps and 5 Fusilier Battalion (Belgian)
rushed it to St Vith , but that was all he could personally 29 & 11 /118 Infantry Regiments (Lee)
do to help Middleton other than appeal to 12th Army (duties included arresting deserters and black marketeers and
Group commander Omar Bradley for assistance. covering Meuse river crossings south from Namur to Sedan)
Once the scale of the German offensive became
apparent late on 16 December, Bradley reacted
promptly to Hodges' request and ordered Simpson's were cut off in the Schnee Eifel and forced to
7th Armored Division to St Vith ; this began arriving surrender on the 19th, Bradley also alerted Simpson's
mid-afternoon on the 17th . It was already too late for 2nd Armored Division , and Ninth Army's 84th Infantry
8 two of the 106th Infantry Division's regiments which Division would also follow later, Similarly, Bradley
 HODGES
U.S. 1 Army

XXX XXX
~ Ge row ~ Ri dgway
~ v corps ~ XVIII (Airborn e) Corp s

r------------------+--------------~
xxx
~;.;.;.;.;.,. Collins
VII Corps cgJ Middleton
VIII Corps
(to 3 Army 20 Dec)

~4 ~ 14 ~
II 70
707
~II 802
630
803
811
820
XX XX
xx
[Q]' [Q]"
XX
cgJ" cgJ" cgJ cgJ 28 106

,--------------+----,-------,

~ 9 ~ 78 XX X
~ 1011( )1 ~gBI
III II II II

r:;J]
• 18
142
188
~
\...!.....I 87 ~18
• 83 ~
183
rTl 298
342
366
III II II II

~
193 392 1 74 8 687 ~467 ~ 635
957 1308
• 333
402
· ~ ~ 778
987 1313 422
991

II

cgJ (Belgian) D
I I

~canadian) ~ B/125 II I q
III
11 02
III

\!...!...!I
l(?rTl' r 107
1128

~ 526 ~ 29 ~ 2/118 ~ 99 ~
II 740
741
~II
•
143 ~II 612 ~II
41 3 644 (i I I) n8
825 299
300
1278

asked his Third Army commander, Lieutenant-General It was an emergency and there was little time to think
George Patton , for help, and CCB of 10th Armored beyond the present, but in the meantime the Germans
Division arrived at the other critical road junction at were still pushing steadily west through the snow,
Bastogne on 18 December. sleet and fog which were keeping the Allied tactical air
Meanwhile, Eisenhower had reluctantly agreed to forces grounded. A new player now entered the field .
release the sole two divisions of SHAEF Reserve , the On D-Day, and up until 1 September, Field Marshal
82nd and 101 st Airborne . The 82nd was deployed to Bernard Law Montgomery had commanded all Allied
Werbomont both to stop Kampfgruppe 'Peiper' from ground forces. The increasing rift between him and
getting any further west, and to provide a safety net Bradley in the end caused Eisenhower to remove
for the garrison of St Vith if evacuation proved Montgomery from overall command. Ever since , he
neces-sary. Meanwhile, the 101 st arrived at Bastogne had been chafing to regain control of U.S. forces , and
on 19 December, in the nick of time to avert disaster. the Ardennes crisis gave him the perfect opportunity.
All this while , Hodges and the other American Having said that, it did not take long for Eisenhower
commanders were merely reacting to German moves. to see the sense of Monty's suggestion , relayed to him 9
 The flash bulb is not kind
to Lieutenant-General

-...
I /)

u:::
William Simpson (right)
and most accounts of
'the Bulge' give him
en
:::i insufficient credit for his
contribution towards
the success of the
counter-offensive. Seen
with, from left, Bradley,
Tedder, Eisenhower and
Montgomery on
7 December, the third
anniversary of Pearl
Harbor. (U.S. Army)

after a meeting with Bradley in Verdun on 19 December. First and Ninth Armies' response to the situation.
The weakness of the American position which So, much to Bradley's and Hodges' disgust,
Montgomery had spotted and which Eisenhower Montgomery got his way and was given command of
immediately recognised, was that Bradley, south of the all ground forces north of the growing 'bulge', while
new main battlefield, could not exercise competent Bradley retained Patton's Third Army , to ·which
control over the First, Third and Ninth Armies which Middleton 's VIII Corps was reassigned. Thus, First
constituted 12th Army Group. Communications Army passed 'for the duration ' to 21 st Army Group.
between Bradley and Hodges, in particular, were While Hodges abhorred the idea of being
insecure and unreliable, and likely to become more so subordinated to 'Monty', the field marshal did grasp
the further west the Germans pushed. It would be much the nettle firmly, even though his lack of social graces
easier for Montgomery, comparatively closer to the shocked Hodges' staff. The prompt re-alignment of
action just over the border in Holland, to co-ordinate VII Corps to guard the western flank, behind the river

u.s. INFANTRY RIFLE COMPANY*

Company HQ - 1 Captain, 2 Lieutenants (each 1 x .45 Colt Machine-gun Section - Sergeant & 9 men (2 x .50 HMG,
automatic & 1 x .45 Thompson M1 /M1AI or .45 M3/M3A1 1 x M3 SMG & 9 x .30 M1 /M2 carbine)
SMG); 1 Technical Sergeant (SMG) & 27 men (2 x .30 HMG,
7 x .30 M1 /M2 carbine & 20 x .30 M1 'Garand' rifle)

1st Rifle Platoon - Platoon Sergeant & 54 men

(1 x 60mm mortar, 1 x .30 BAR & 3 x bazooka) *Note that the published TO&E (1942) was subsequently
Section 1 -18 men (18 x .30 M1) amended for European and Pacific theatres. This table is based
Squad 1 - 9 men upon U.S. Government Publishing Office Field Manual 7-20 of
Squad 2 - 9 men 1944 but with amendments to reflect a possibly more accurate
Section 2 (as above) picture of the situation in the Ardennes. It cannot be taken as
Section 3 (as above) either infallible or universal because many battalions and
companies involved in the Ardennes were seriously under-
2nd Rifle Platoon - Three sections as above strength (several at half strength or less, in fact) , had
3rd Rifle Platoon - Three sections as above lieutenants standing in for captains and sergeants standing in
for lieutenants due to officers either being on leave (this being
Weapons Platoon - Lieutenant and/or Sergeant) the 'quiet fron!') or casualty replacements ('reinforcements') not
Mortar Section - Sergeant & 9 men (2 x 81 mm mortar, yet having arrived . Equipment levels also varied widely but
1 x .30 M3 SMG & 9 x M1 carbine) reflect an average.
10
 U.S. 'HEAVY' ARMORED DIVISION >-
(c. 14,488 men) E
Division HQ (c. 164 men) & HQ Company (c. 138 men)
(3 x M5 Stuart or M24 Chaffee, 16 x M3 half-track, 3 x 57mm M1 , 8 x .50 HMG , 10 x .30 LMG & 14 x bazooka)
-...
~
In

u...
COMBAT COMMAND A (HQ c. 100 men) ARMORED RECONNAISSANCE BATTALION (c. 860 men) en
HQ Troop (1 x M8, 2 x M3, 2 x .50 HMG & 2 x bazooka) :::i
COMBAT COMMAND B (HQ c. 100 men) A, B & C Troops (each 14 x M8, 7 x M3, 1 x 81mm mortar
M3, 9 x 60mm mortar, 7 x .50 HMG , 18 x .30 LMG &
COMBAT COMMAND R (No separate HQ - very ad hoc) 9 x bazooka)
Light Tank Troop (17 x M5/M24)
ARMORED REGIMENT (x 2) (c. 2,050 men) Support Troop (6 x 75mm M3 GMC)
HQ Company
I Medium Tank Battalion (c. 750 men) ARMORED ENGINEER BATTALION (c. 690 men)
HQ Company (1 x M4 [75mm]) HQ Company (2 x M3, 2 x .50 HMG & 2 x bazooka)
A, B & C Companies (each 17 x M4 [75mm] & 2 x M4 A, B & C Companies (each 5 x M3, 6 x .50 HMG, 6 x .30 LMG
[105mm]) & 9 x bazooka)
II Medium Tank Battalion (c. 750 men)
HQ Company (as above) ARMORED MEDICAL BATTALION (c. 415 men)
D, E & F Companies (as above) HQ Company
Light Tank Battalion (c. 550 men) A & B Companies (each 2 x M3 ambulance & 3 x surgical
HQ Company (2 x M5/M24) truck)
A, B & C Companies (each 19 x M5/M24)
ARMORED SIGNAL COMPANY (c. 300 men)
ARMORED INFANTRY REGIMENT (c. 2,600 men) (19 x M3, 13 x .50 HMG , 13 x .30 LMG & 24 x bazooka)
HQ Company
I Battalion (c. 860 men) ARMORED MAINTENANCE BATTALION (c. 760 men)
HQ Company (1 x 81 mm mortar, 1 x .50 HMG, 2 x .30 LMG & HQ Company (1 x M3, 8 x .50 HMG, 4 x .30 LMG &
2 x bazooka) 5 x bazooka)
A, B & C Companies (each 1 x 75mm M3 GMC , 1 x 81mm A, B & C Companies (each 1 x M3, 10 x .50 HMG,
mortar M3, 18 x M3, 3 x 57mm M 1, 3 x 60mm mortar, 8 x .30 LMG & 10 x bazooka)
12 x .50 HMG , 10 x .30 HMG , 6 x .30 LMG & 18 x bazooka)
II Battalion (c. 860 men) ARMORED SUPPLY BATTALION
HQ Company (as above) (HQ Company c. 100 men)
D, E & F Companies (as above) (c. 35 xl - 2fi-ton trucks)
III Battalion (c. 860 men)
HQ Company (as above) COUNTER-INTELLIGENCE CORPS DETACHMENT
G, H & I Companies (as above) (Data unavailable)

ARMORED FIELD ARTILLERY BATTALION (x3)

(c. 540 men each)
HQ Company (2 x M3 half-track)
A, B & C Batteries (each 6 x 105mm M7 GMC & 10 x M3)

Ourthe, was purely Montgomery 'playing safe', as was adopted for a counter-blow to take the pressure off the
his redeployment of his own XXX Corps to protect the Bastogne corridor, retake St Vith , reunite First and Third
line of the river Meuse. Major-General Lawton Collins' Armies , and drive the Germans back where they had
VII Corps, therefore, found itself as a new backstop for come from.
VIII Corps, while Matthew Ridgway's XVIII (Airborne) By this time, Hodges' First Army was in the mood for
Corps found itself in a similar position for V Corps. fighting back rather than falling back. His VII Corps
Montgomery was , by nature, a conservative was assembled , poised and raring to go, as was
strategist and tactician and, once it was clear soon after XVIII (Airborne). Middleton's VIII Corps, even though
Christmas that the crisis was over, Hodges and his now part of Patton 's Third Army, had survived the worst
peers began to wonder when the Field Marshal would do the enemy could throw at it and had been significantly
something more positive than ensure the Germans did reinforced. In warfare, a fortnight can be either an
not get any further west than they already had . incred-ibly long or short time, and the speed of the
Eisenhower, too, chafed at Montgomery's inaction and Allied response to Operation 'Herbstnebel' had been
began thumping the table in a gentlemanly manner. everything Hitler's generals had feared . The Germans
Eventually, suggestions for regaining the initiative had sown the whirlwind ; now it was Hodges' and
proposed by VII Corps' commander Lawton Collins were Patton's chance to reap it with a vengeance . 11
 u.s.
I/)

...oCo FIRST ARMY

u
:>
I
>-
E

-...
~
I /)

u:::
o u.s. VII
::::l CORPS

T hree days before Feldmarschall Walter Model

launched Heeresgruppe B against the U.S. First
Army's lines from Monschau in the north to
U.S. VII CORPS
Major-General Joseph Lawton Collins
Echternach in the south, Major-General Joseph Chief of Staff:
'Lightning Joe' Collins had his own VII Corps' forces Brigadier-General Williston Palmer
arrayed to support V Corps' attack towards the Rur
1 Infantry Division (Andrus)
and Urft dams. The German onslaught brought a
(to V Corps 16-19 December)
virtual stop to all offensive operations north of 2 Armored Division (Harmon)
Monschau and within a few days would see Collins' (from XIX Corps 20-23 December)
corps redeployed en masse further south to cope with 3 Armored Division (Rose)
9 Infantry Division (Craig)
(to V Corps 18 December)
Major-General Joseph 78 Infantry Division (Parker)
Lawton Collins did not (from V Corps 18 December)
earn his nickname of 83 Infantry Division (Macon)
(from XIX Corps 26 December)
'Lightning Joe' in either
84 Infantry Division (Bolling)
Normandy or the (from XIII Corps 21 December)
Ardennes, as often 4 Cavalry Group, Mechanized (MacDonald) :
assumed, but much 4 & 24 Cavalry Squadrons, Mechanized
18 Field Artillery Group: 188, 666 & 981 Field Artfllery
earlier on Guadalcanal.
Battalions
(U .S. Signal Corps) 142 Field Artillery Group 195 & 266 Field Artillery Battalions
188 Field Artillery Group 172, 951 & 980 Field Artillery
Battalions
18 Field Artillery Battalion
83 Field Artillery Battalion
the breakthrough in the Schnee Eifel and along the line 87 (Armored) Field Artillery Battalion
of the river Our which had wreaked havoc amongst 183 Field Artillery Battalion
Troy Middleton's VIII Corps' infantry divisions - from 193 Field Artillery Battalion
957 Field Artillery Battalion
north to south the 106th, 28th and 4th, backed up by the
987 Field Artillery Battalion (-)
three combat commands of the 9th Armored Division. 991 Field Artillery Battalion
The initial attack barely affected Collins' own troops 298 Engineer Combat Battalion
directly. The 78th Infantry Division in the centre of 342 Engineer General Service Regiment
366 Engineer General Service Regiment (Colored)
his line was part of V Corps anyway, and manfully
392 Engineer General Service Regiment (Colored)
resisted the assault by 272 Volksgrenadier Division at 1308 Engineer General Service Regiment
Kesternich. To its north, the uncommitted 1st Infantry 1313 Engineer General Service Regiment (Colored)
Division was rushed south to help the defenders
south and west of Elsenborn ridge and reassigned to
Major-General Leonard Gerow's V Corps. The Lieutenant-General William Simpson's Ninth Army to
3rd Armored Division, which had been positioned to the north , 7th Armored and 30th Infantry Divisions
support the 78th Infantry, also moved south, part of it going to the newly arrived XVIII (Airborne) Corps , and
to complete the destruction of Kampfgruppe 'Peiper', 2nd Armored and 84th Infantry Divisions to VII Corps .
and its other elements to Eupen and Hotton. They Later, Collins' command would also be reinforced by
12 would shortly be joined by other units stripped from the 83rd Infantry Division .
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13
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~ U.S. VII CORPS TROOPS

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:> 4 Cavalry Group (c. 1,500 men)
I Group HQ and HQ Troop
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E 4 & 24 Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadrons, Mechanized
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HQ Troop (4 x M8, 2 x M3, 1 x .50 HMG & 1 x bazooka)
A, B & C Troops (each 12 x M8, 8 x M3, 1 x 81mm mortar,
LL. 9 x 60mm mortar, 8 x .50 HMG, 18 x .30 LMG &
en 10 x bazooka)
::::i Light Tank Troop (17 x M5/M24)
Support Troop (6 x 75mm M3 GMC)

18 Field Artillery Group

188 Field Artillery Battalion (12 x 155mm M1 gun ,

tractor-drawn) The architects of First Army's eventual victory in
666 Field Artillery Battalion (12 x 155mm M1A1 howitzer,
the northern sector of 'the Bulge'. From right,
tractor-drawn)
981 Field Artillery Battalion (12 x 155mm M1 gun , XVIII (Airborne) Corps' CO Matthew Ridgway, Field
truck-drawn) Marshal Bernard Law Montgomery and VII Corps'
commander Joe Collins. It was, of course, 'Monty' who
142 Field Artillery Group
claimed the credit, for which he was publicly censured
195 Field Artillery Battalion (12 x 8" M1 howitzer, tractor- and nearly sacked. (U.S. Signal Corps)
drawn)
266 Field Artillery Battalion (6 x 240mm M1 howitzer, nickname while commanding the 25th 'Tropic
tractor-drawn)
Lightning' Infantry Division on Guadalcanal and New
188 Field Artillery Group Georgia in 1942-43. In January 1944 he was given
command of VII Corps, and on 6 June had the
172 Field Artillery Battalion (12 x 4.5" M1 gun, tractor-drawn) satisfaction of getting the whole of the 4th Infantry
951 Field Artillery Battalion (12 x 155mm M1A1 howitzer,
Division ashore across 'Utah' beach by midnight;
tractor-drawn)
980 Field Artillery Battalion (12 x 155mm M1 gun , its leading regiment , the 8th , had suffered just
truck-drawn) 12 fatalities . Later, VII Corps completed clearing the
Cotentin peninsula and captured Cherbourg, then
Field Artillery Battalions
played a major role in the breakout from Normandy
18 (12 x 105mm M2A1 howitzer, truck-drawn) during Operation 'Cobra'. In the autumn, Collins'
83 (data unavailable, believed 12 x 105mm M2A1 1st Infantry and 3rd Armored Divisions were largely
howitzer, truck-drawn) instrumental in finally capturing Aachen on 21 October
87 (despite being designated 'Armored ' in 1942,
before moving up to the Rur river line in November.
12 x 105mm M2A1 howitzer, truck-drawn)
183 (12 x 155mm M 1AI howitzer, tractor-drawn) When his 1st, and then 9th, Infantry Divisions went
193 (12 x 105mm M2A1 howitzer, truck-drawn) to V Corps over 17-19 December, Collins got the
957 (12 x 155mm M1A1 howitzer, tractor-drawn) 78th back but this remained in the northern ,
987 (6 x 155mm M12 GMC)
Monschau, sector opposite elements of the German
991 (12 x155mm M12 GMC)
Sixth Panzer and Fifteenth Armies . His forces for the
battle west of the Ourthe and during the subsequent
On 23 December, the day St Vith was evacuated , counter-offensive were still amongst the strongest in
Lawton Collins was entrusted by Montgomery with the Europe, with two 'heavy' armored divisions and two
conduct of all operations west of the river Ourthe. fresh infantry divisions at virtually full establishment.
(Eisenhower had given the field marshal command of Collins faced the new challenge with , if not
the U.S. First and Ninth Armies on the 20th, leaving equanimity, at least confidence . And, when the time
Omar Bradley with 'just' Patton's Third Army, which came to begin planning the Allied comeback to regain
now included VIII Corps.) the initiative, it was Collins to whom Eisenhower,
Collins himself was one of the most experienced Bradley and Montgomery listened.
and audacious corps commanders in the Ardennes. At a meeting with both Hodges and Patton at First
Neither as methodical as Troy Middleton nor as Army headquarters on 27 December, which the
14 impetuous as Leonard Gerow, he had won his SHAEF chief of staff, Lieutenant-General Walter
 I/)

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Bedell Smith , also attended , Collins proposed three After the battle of Foy-Notre-Dame, an M3 of the
alternative plans. By this time , Fifth Panzer Armee's 82nd Armored Reconnaissance Battalion, 2nd Armored
drive to the Meuse.had been permanently stopped at Division, passes .one of von Bohm's PzKpfw IVs, which
Celles , the north=ern and southern shoulders of the appears undamaged, and may simply have run out of
Allied line were secure , and only Bastogne remained fuel. (u.s. Army)
under threat even though Patton 's III Corps had
broken the siege. The whole situation was entirely Montgomery, of course, demurred , seeing an
different to what it had been 10 days earlier. The Allies erosion of his authority. Although he was ready to
were no longer simply responding to German moves. consider counter-attack plans by the 27th (which
Two of Collins' plans aimed at a junction between elicited a spontaneous 'Praise God from whom all
III and VII Corps in the Bastogne region , while the third blessings flow! ' from Eisenhower), he wanted to 'tidy
had St Vith as its objective. All , in Patton 's view, were up' the battlefield first, and bring more British reserves
limited and he offered a much more ambitious into play because he felt the Germans still had more
proposal for major armoured thrusts by First and Third cards up their sleeves. (British intelligence supported
Armies from north and south to cut off the whole Montgomery's caution , but Eisenhower placed more
salient at the shoulders, trapping all German units still reliance on 'Ultra' intercepts, which revealed the heavy
in the Ardennes . This , however, would have meant German losses in men and armour.)
closing the jaws on an 80-mile (120-km) front along Reluctantly , then , Montgomery acceded to
narrow roads in rugged terrain in the middle of winter, pressure , seeing his command of the U.S. First and
with adequate air support a constant question mark. Ninth Armies slipping from his grasp again , and a date
In the end the two Army commanders thrashed out was set: 3 January. Within 24 hours of the beginning
a compromise using elements of all three of Collins' of the counter-offensive there was no longer any threat
plans. VII Corps would initiate a First Army drive to link to Bastogne . Four days later Hitler authorised
up with III and VIII Corps east of Houfalize, while Feldmarschall Walter Model to begin a limited
XVIII (Airborne) Corps would attack from north and withdrawal. And on 16 January patrols from Collins'
west towards St Vith . The plan was very similar in 84th Infantry and Middleton's 11th Armored Division
concept, in fact, to the 'small solution ' proposed by the shook hands on the heights outside Houffalize. A few
three German Armee commanders when they were first days later, XVIII Corps' troops recaptured St Vith.
briefed about Operation 'Herbstnebel '. Unlike Hitler, Collins' plan had worked , with VII Corps playing a
however, Eisenhower accepted Collins' modified plan. leading role , and the enemy was in full retreat. 15
U.S. First Army - VII Corps
 c:
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O n 16 December 1944 Major-General Ernest

Harmon's 2nd Armored Division was resting in
Ninth Army reserve northeast of Maastricht,
2nd ARMORED DIVISION
Major-General Ernest M. Harmon
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having reached the Rur river line on 28 November. HQ Company and HQ Companies, o
Combat Commands A (Collier), B (White) & R (Hinds) (,)
The peace did not last long . As soon as Montgomery
was given command of both Hodges' First and :>
66 Armored Regiment (Collier) I
Simpson 's Ninth Armies on 20 December, he began 67 Armored Regiment (White) >.
E
stripping the latter to reinforce the threatened sector 41 Armored Infantry Regiment (Hinds)
~
in the Ardennes , and 2nd Armored moved to the 14 Armored Field Artillery Battalion (M7)
78 Armored Field Artillery Battalion (M7)
Maj or-General Ernest 92 Armored Field Artillery Battalion (M7)
Harmon was highly 82 Armored Reconnaissance Battalion
experienced, having 17 Armored Engineer Battalion
48 Armored Medical Battalion
commanded
142 Armored Signal Company
2nd Armored twice, once
2 Armored Maintenance Battalion
in Tunisia and now in the
2 Armored Supply Battalion
Ardennes. In between he 502 Counter-Intelligence Corps Detachment
was CO of 1st Armored in 702 Tank Destroyer Battalion (M10/M36) (attached)
Italy. (u.s. Army) 195 Anti-Aircraft Artillery Auto-Weapons Battalion (M 151M16)
(attached)

vicinity of Durbuy/Marche over the 22nd-23rd . This succeeded by none other than George S. Patton , Jr.
fortuitously put it in just the right place to inflict a Harmon assumed command in September 1944,
singular defeat on its namesake, 2 Panzer Division. taking over from Major-General Edward Brooks, who
Ninth Army's 2nd Armored Division, now had led the division ashore in Normandy in June. In
reassigned to Collins' VII Corps , was one of the two fact, Harmon felt quite at home in his new appointment
strongest formations in northwest Europe. Both the because he had earlier commanded 2nd Armored
2nd and 3rd , alongside 1st Armored (which was in during Operation Torch' in 1942.
Italy) , had escaped the army reorganisation of Only part of the division was involved in this
September 1943 and retained the old 'heavy' format of Anglo-American invasion of French northwest Africa
March 1942. This gave them each 232 medium and which was designed to provide an 'anvil ' on to which
158 light tanks in two armoured regiments compared Montgomery's Eighth Army could 'hammer' the Afrika
with the 186 medium and 77 light in the three tank Korps . The 66th Armored Regiment landed at Mehdia
battalions of a 'triangular' light armoured division such and the 67th at Fedala/Safi on 8 November. Three
as the 9th or 11th. days later they took the surrender of Mazagan
The 2nd Armored had been activated at Fort and subsequently fought in the Tunisian campaign ,
Benning, Georgia, on 15 July 1940 under Major- avoiding the fate of 1st Armored Division, which was
General Charles Scott; six months later he was severely mauled at Kasserine.
The division did not fight as a whole until the
VII Corps was redeployed after Montgomery was given invasion of Sicily in July 1943, now commanded by
command of all Allied ground forces north of the Major-General Hugh Gaffey (who would lead 4th
'Bulge' and Lawton Collins was entrusted with the Armored Division to the relief of Bastogne in December
conduct of all operations west of the river Ourthe. Later 1944). Harmon himself, meanwhile, had taken over the
the corps advanced to Houffalize to link up with troops 1st Armored Division, which he led successfully in Italy,
of Third Army advancing northward. playing a prominent role in saving the day at Anzio. 17
 c: Back on Sicily, 2nd Armored Division ' s Combat amongst its Shermans. Crossing the river Wurm at
o
'iii Command A landed at Licata and CCB east of Gela. Marienburg on 3 October, CCB attacked from Obach
'> On 15 July the two commands were reunited at next day and had to be reinforced by CCA, but was still
C
"t:I Campobello and spearheaded the drive on Palermo. stopped short of Geilenkirchen. There was further
...o
(1)
After the last German and Italian troops evacuated the heavy fighting at Basweiler and Oidtweiler before the
E island , 2nd Armored shipped to England to begin division started moving towards the Aachen Gap at
<
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intensive training for D-Day. Wurselen in the middle of the month . A month later the
c: Now commanded by Edward Brooks, who had led division had taken Paffendorf and was pushing at the
N
I the 11 th 'light' Armored Division from its formation until strong Julich defences; again CCA had to reinforce
II)
March this year, 2nd Armored was part of XIX Corps, CCB in the face of a counter-attack, but it took
...o
Co
which came ashore across 'Omaha' beach on 9 June, Apweiler and held it against determined efforts to
u and advanced alongside the 30th Infantry Division throw them out.
:> through Isigny to the Taute river line south of Renewing its advance through heavy rain on
Carentan . After helping to seal off the Cotentin 20 November, the division took Merzenhausen on the
peninsula and repulsing the German counter-attack 27th after a five-day battle and reached the river Rur
towards Avranches on 7 August, the division captured next day. It was now relieved in the line to recuperate
Domfort and then advanced west of Dreux to help cut and was in Ninth Army reserve when it was rushed
off those German forces still south of the river Seine south over 22-23 December, CCA reaching
between Paris and Elbeuf. Buissonville on Christmas Eve and CCB inflicting a
By the beginning of September the division was near major defeat on 2 Panzer Division at Celles next day.
Cambrai; a fortnight later it was across the Albert Canal After clearing Humain, 2nd Armored was relieved
and assaulted across the river Maas under heavy fire, by the 83rd Infantry Division on 28 December but took
with CCA at Valkenburg and CCB at Meerseen. The part in the counter-attack towards Houffalize beginn ing
2nd Armored consolidated its bridgehead and drove the on 3 January 1945. After fighting its way through
Germans back to Sittard, but then faced a determined Odeigne, the division reached the river Ourthe and
counter-attack, which forced the division into defensive captured Houffalize on the 16th. Withdrawn to rest and
positions near Geilenkirchen. make good its losses, the division was not in action
With German resistance intensifying now they were again until 1 March, attacking across the Kbln Plain to
on their own soil , 2nd Armored fought several major reach Verdingen on the Rhein three days later. It
battles over the next two months, with heavy losses crossed on 27 March, relieved the 17th Airborne
Division and attacked towards the Teutoburger Wald
An M4 of 2nd Armored Division advances through a at the beginning of April. The division reached the river
Christmas card landscape, but the ambulance travelling Elbe on 11 April, assaulted Magdeburg and finished
in the opposite direction testifies to the real brutality of mopping up before the official German surrender on
the situation, (u .s. Signal Corps) 7 May 1945.

18
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W hile it was the 2nd Armored Division 's
privilege to demolish 2 Panzer Division
almost on the bank of the river Meuse, it was
3rd ARMORED DIVISION
Major-General Maurice Rose
o 3rd Armored 's prerogative to administer the coup HQ Company and HQ Companies,
u
de grace to Kampfgruppe 'Peiper', the spearhead Combat Commands A (Hickey), B (Boudinot) & R (Howze)
:> battlegroup of 1 SS-Panzer Division Leibstandarte
I
>- 'Adolf Hitler' , at La Gleize. 32 Armored Regiment (Hickey)
...E
- Rated by many soldiers and historians the best 33 Armored Regiment (Boudinot)
« 36 Armored Infantry Regiment (Howze)
American tank commander of the war, Major-General
...
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Maurice Rose drove everywhere in an unarmoured 54 Armored Field Artillery Battalion (M7)
LL.
67 Armored Field Artillery Battalion (M7)
en Jeep, and the Ardennes in December 1944 were no
391 Armored Field Artillery Battalion (M7)
:::::l exception. He arrived in the lines of the 82nd Airborne
83 Armored Reconnaissance Battalion (Yeomans)
Division's 325th Glider Infantry Regiment near 23 Armored Engineer Battalion
Werbomont shortly before midnight on 19 December 45 Armored Medical Battalion
while Brigadier-General Truman Boudinot's Combat 143 Armored Signal Company
Command B was only just beginning to assemble 3 Armored Maintenance Battalion
further north at Theux before its assault on Peiper. 3 Armored Supply Battalion
After conferring with the commander of XVIII 503 Counter-Intelligence Corps Detachment
(Airborne) Corps, Matthew Ridgway, Rose drove on to 643 Tank Destroyer Battalion (M18)
Hotton, where he established his forward command (attached 22-26 December)
486 Anti-Aircraft Artillery Auto-Weapons Battalion (M15/M16)
post alongside that of Colonel Robert Howze' s
(attached)
CCR. (Unlike Combat Commands in the 'triangular'

Major-General Maurice was also brought south to help in the Allied

Rose's skilful conduct of counter-attack, which would begin on 3 January 1945.
the counter-offensive in The 3rd Armored Division was not as experienced
January 1945 was as the 2nd but had already had an eventful war.
followed by his untimely Formed at Fort Beauregard, Louisiana , on 15 April
death in action in March. 1941 under Major-General Alvin Gillem, it was not
He was succeeded by his deployed in North Africa even though it had undergone
CCA commander, Doyle rigorous desert training in California. Nor was it
Hickey. (U .S. Army) destined for Italy, but instead shipped to England in
September 1943 to begin further training for the
European theatre of operations.
Now commanded by Major-General Leroy Watson ,
divisions, which were more or less identical , CCR the division landed in Normandy as part of VII Corps
in the three 'heavy' divisions was ad hoc, and in on 23 June 1944 and was immediately thrown into
3rd Armored's case consisted of just the battle northeast of st La against the German salient at
83rd Reconnaissance Battalion , one battalion of Villiers-Fossard , while the corps' infantry completed
infantry, one company of Shermans, two of M5s and a clearing the Cotentin peninsula and finally captured
com-pany from the 23rd Engineer Battalion .) Cherbourg on the 27th .
Combat Command A, under Brigadier-General Montgomery, still at this time in overall command of
Doyle Hickey, had been deployed in defence of all Allied ground forces in France, wanted Bradley to
Eupen, where V Corps' commander, Leonard Gerow, pivot his First Army's left flank (V Corps) on Caumont
had his headquarters. A few days later, when it and begin to drive north with his remaining three corps
20 became clear that Eupen was not threatened , CCA (VII, VIII and XIX) from the base of the Cotentin
 c::
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M4s of 3rd Armored advancing towards Houffalize keep but was then thrown out of Donnerburg.
their turret machine-guns trained on the woods for During most of October and early November the
enemy infantry armed with Panzerfausts. (U.S. Army) division was heavily involved in the battle around
Aachen , taking heavy losses from minefields as well
peninsula across the Carentan Plain . On the right as accurate and determined enemy fire . When the city
flank, Troy Middleton's VIII Corps would lead off on finally fell , 3rd Armored pushed on rapidly to the river
3 july through La Haye du Puits towards Coutances; Rur and captured Geich on 11 December. There was
Collins' VII Corps would follow next day along the still no respite because the division, its elements
Carentan-Periers highway, while Charles Corlett's widely separated, was hastily called south to help deal
XIX Corps would advance on St La. with the German Ardennes offensive.
Not all of the attacks went anything like according After the battles at StoumonULa Gleize, Hotton,
to plan , largely as a result of the dense bocage Manhay/Grandmenil and Sadzot, the division attacked
countryside. Nevertheless, 3rd Armored reached the towards Houffalize to reunite First and Third Armies.
Hauts-Vents crossroads by 11 July, whereupon CCB Its men reached the river Ourthe on 19 January 1945
captured Marigny and CCA fought its way across the and captured Gouvy and Beho on the 22nd. The
river Sienne at the end of the month . 'Battle of the Bulge' was, to all intents and purposes ,
Early in August the division re-mustered and helped over by this time, and a month later the division had
close the neck of the Falaise Pocket in which the secured two bridgeheads over the river Erft at Glesch
Germans lost so many men and vehicles. Crossing the and Paffendorf.
river Seine towards the end of the month, 3rd Armored Shrugging off determined counter-attacks ,
pursued a disintegrating enemy over the rivers Marne 3rd Armored took the battle back to the enemy and,
and Aisne to capture the little town of Huy on the with the help of substantial air support, captured
Meuse on 6 September. The division helped clear Stomeln on 3 March . Next day the weary troops could
Liege, overran the defenders at Verviers, and arrived look down on the Rhein . The city of Koln fell after a
at the Siegfried Line (West Wall) at Schmidthof on two-day battle in which the 3rd Armored was greatly
12 September. assisted by the 104th Infantry Division , which had
Pressing into Germany towards Aachen, which newly joined VII Corps.
would be the first major German city to fall into Allied Crossing the Rhein on 23 March the division
hands, CCB broached the formidable West Wall's reached Marburg on the river Lahn five days later and ,
concrete and steel barriers near Rotgen on seething with fury at their popular commander's death
13 September while CCA pushed through similar in action , helped seal off the Ruhr pocket with victory
obstacles to reach Nutheim and Eilendorf. Over the at Paderborn on 1 April. CCA commander Doyle
next few days the division was stalled at Geisbach and Hickey led the division across the rivers Weser and
22 Mausbach and could not take Stolberg until the 22nd, Mulde to Dessau before the end of hostilities.
 c:
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!II
16 December 1944, Robert Macon's division Major-General Robert C. Macon
...a.o
played its decisive part in the 'battle of the bulge' after HQ Company
u
it was reassigned to VII Corps on the 26th . Prior to that
it contained a German attack towards Guerzenich on 329 Infantry Regiment
:>
I
the 16th, relieved the 5th Infantry Division (XIX Corps) 330 Infantry Regiment >-
331 Infantry Regiment E
on the 22nd and fought a major battle for Winden over ~
322 Field Artillery Battalion (105mm)
Christmas before being transferred to VII Corps and
323 Field Artillery Battalion (105mm)
moved to the Havelange area , where it relieved
324 Field Artillery Battalion (155mm)
2nd Armored Division . Heavy fighting followed at
908 Field Artillery Battalion (105mm)
Rochefort and in January at Langlir and Bovigny 83 Reconnaissance Troop, Mechanized
before the division was pulled back to Holland for 308 Engineer Combat Battalion
rehabil itation at the end of the month. 308 Medical Battalion
The 83rd had been activated at Camp Atterbury, 83 Signal Company
Indiana , on 15 August 1942, commanded by 83 Quartermaster Company
Major-General Frank Milburn . Robert Macon took over 783 Ordnance Light Maintenance Company
in January 1944 and shipped his division to England in Military Police Platoon
April. It landed in Normandy across 'Omaha' beach on 453 Anti-Aircraft Artillery Auto-Weapons Battalion (40mm)
(attached)
19 June and took part in the VII I Corps' attack across
774 Tank Battalion (detached 24 December)
the Carentan Plain towards Periers on 4 July.
629 Tank Destroyer Battalion (M 10) (Anderson)
After regrouping, the division took part in the 'Cobra'
(detached 23 December)
breakout on the 26th , crossed the river Taute and 772 Tank Destroyer Battalion (towed)
followed 6th Armored Division into Brittany, reaching (attached 22 December)
the heavily fortified port of St Malo on 4 August. The
determined German commander evacuated the
French civilian population before the siege began in 4th Infantry Division west of the river Rur and captured
earnest, and it was a bitter struggle for strongpoint Strass and Gey on 10 December. Four days later it
after strongpoint. The last, The Citadel, did not fall until contained a further counter-attack towards Guerzenich
17 August after the defenders were warned that they before being briefly assigned to XIX Corps for the
were about to be bombed with napalm . attack on Winden over 23-25 December.
While the bulk of the division now left Brittany and After fighting in the Ardennes with VII Corps from
moved south to the river Loire west of Orleans on 26 December, the division moved to a rest area at
27 August, a rearguard remained behind and made an the end of January before rejoining XIX Corps on
amphibious assault on the lie de Cezembre, off 16 February for the remainder of the war. It took part
St Malo, on 2 September. Reunited, the division in Operation 'Grenade', crossing the river Erft before
patrolled the banks of the Loire south of Rennes until it reaching the Rhein at Oberkassel on 3 March .
was reassigned to XX Corps and moved east to the river Crossing the river south of Wesel on the 29th
Mosel at Remich on the 25th. There was further heavy and driving across the MOnster Plain , the division
fighting as the 83rd crossed the Sauer and advanced established a bridgehead over the Lippe at Hamm at
towards the West Wall , with the 329th Regiment the beginning of April, captured Neuhaus, crossed the
involved in a pitched battle at Grevenmacher at the Weser and overran Halle. Pushing on into the Harz
beginning of October before capturing Echternach. Mountains, the 83rd reached the river Elbe on 12 April.
Transferred back to VIII Corps, the division took Repulsing counter-attacks, the division made contact
Le Stromberg hill at Basse Knoz on 5 November with Red Army troops on the 28th and finished
and held it against counter-attack, then relieved the mopping up around Zerbst. 23
 ~=:..,. MACON
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 c:
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84th Infantry Division "iii
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on 21 December 1944 and moved to the 84th INFANTRY DIVISION I
(/)
vicinity of Marche , where it established a Brigadier-General Alexander R. Bolling ...a.
o
perimeter defence. Although its lines were pierced HQ Company u
between Marche and Hotton during a fierce battle in
333 Infantry Regiment (Pedley)
:>
sleet and snow on the 23rd, the division recaptured I
Verdenne on Christmas Day and repulsed attacks 334 Infantry Regiment (Hoy) >.
E
335 Infantry Regiment (Parker)
towards Memil. On 3 January it followed 2nd Armored
Division towards Houffalize as part of the counter-
offensive to reunite First and Third Armies and restore
325 Field Artillery Battalion (105mm)
326 Field Artillery Battalion (105mm)
327 Field Artillery Battalion (155mm)
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control of the former to Bradley, who , along with
84 Reconnaissance Troop, Mechanized o
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Eisenhower, had been chafing at Montgomery's 309 Engineer Combat Battalion
indecision. The division recaptured the Baraque Fraiture 309 Medical Battalion
crossroads southeast of Manhay and captured Laroche 84 Signal Company
on 11 January. After a brief respite , the 84th then retook 84 Quartermaster Company
Gouvy, Beho and Ortheuville over the 22nd-23rd. 784 Ordnance Light Maintenance Company
The 84th had been formed at Camp Howze, Texas, Military Police Platoon
on 15 October 1942 under Major-General John 557 Anti-Aircraft Artillery Auto-Weapons Battalion (40mm)
Hildring . Its next CO in February 1943 was (attached)
701 Tank Battalion (detached 20 December)
Major-General Stonewall Jackson, and there were two
771 Tank Battalion (attached 20 December)
other changes in command before Alexander Bolling
638 Tank Destroyer Battalion (M 18) (attached)
took over in June 1944. The division sailed to England
in September and landed in France across 'Omaha'
beach on 1 November. Temporarily attached to the
British XXX Corps at Gulpen in Holland, the division in the line on the flank of XVIII (Airborne) Division, at
fought in the Wurselen area before, now with the U.S. the time only lightly held by elements of 3rd Armored
XIII Corps, attacking towards Geilenkirchen to reduce Division . It harassed the flank of 2 Panzer Division as
the salient north of Aachen. the German column headed towards Dinant and, in
Supported by British flail tanks, the division began conjunction with CCA of 2nd Armored Division, was
its attack on 18 November and captured Prummern involved in heavy fighting around Rochefort.
two days later. The 334th Regiment captured After the conclusion of the 'Battle of the Bulge', the
Mahogany Hill on the 22nd but the 333rd lost heavily 84th relieved the 102nd Infantry Division, XIII Corps, on
in its own attack on Mullendorf the same day, and on 7 February 1945 and assaulted across the Rur
the 23rd the attack was called off when all attempts to at Linnich on the 23rd . After capturing Krefeld in a
take Wurm and Beeck failed . These were shortlived two-day battle over 2-3 March, the division reached the
setbacks. Launching a surprise assault without the Rhein on the 5th . After very nearly capturing bridges at
usual prior artillery bombardment to alert the Rheinhausen and Homberg , the 84th went on to the
enemy, the 335th Regiment finally took Beeck on defensive and did not get across the river until 1 April.
30 November. Moving swiftly up to the Weser, the division
At the beginning of December the 84th began established a bridgehead south of Neesen , then over
driving towards the river Rur but, on the day the the Leine near Gummer. Hannover fell on 10 April and
German Ardennes offensive started, the 16th, the the 84th relieved the 5th Armored Division on the Elbe
division's lines were pierced at Leifarth . Rallying on the 16th. After mopping up the sector, the division
rapidly, the 84th responded aggressively and finally made contact with advancing Red Army troops near
took Wurm two days later. Below on 2 May and finished the war on occupation
Reassigned to VII Corps, the division took its place duties. 25
 s:::
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 CI)

U.S. VII CORPS' BATTLES N

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K amPfgruppe 'Peiper', the spearhead not just of

1 SS-Panzer Division Leibstandarte 'Adolf
Hitler' but also of the whole of Sixth Panzer
'Knittel' and 'Sandig', This meant that no further
supplies could get through to Peiper from the east, and
the only hope of salvation lay with the division's fourth
...Co
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Armee , had become something of a 'bogeyman ' to the battlegroup, Kampfgruppe 'Hansen', which reached ::)
Allies as Christmas approached . After the massacre of the heights between Wanne and Trois Ponts during
American prisoners near Malmedy, it was no longer a the night of 20-21 December.
matter of stopping the battlegroup's westward Trois Ponts by now was occupied by a battalion of
advance ; it had to be exterminated. The result, for the 82nd Airborne, while other paras were hacking at
Brigadier-General Raymond Boudinot's CCB of Peiper's rearguard at Cheneux. With a breakthrough
3rd Armored Division , was a difficult battle since both no longer possible, Peiper was forced to withdraw
the terrain and interior lines of communication were in the bulk of his battlegroup to the hills and woods
the enemy's favour. surrounding La Gleize. On the way, however, he had
Peiper's force had managed to get as far as captured an interesting prisoner,
Stoumont by 19 December but was prevented from Earlier, acting on instructions to delay Kampfgruppe
getting any further by the 119th Regiment of 'Peiper' long enough to allow the 82nd Airborne
30th Infantry Division. By this time the Kampfgruppe Division time to deploy, Major Hal McCown's
was so low on fuel, as well as ammunition and food , 11/119th had established a blocking position between
that Peiper had abandoned all thought of any further Werbomont and Trois Ponts. When the paras of
advance anyway. The town of Stavelot to his east was 1I/505th PIR relieved them, McCown led his men back
securely in American hands despite attempts to north to rejoin their regiment. On a reconnaissance
dislodge it by the Leibstandarte's Kampfgruppen on 21 December, he became perhaps the most

3rd Armored Division

M4s with 105mm guns-
a modified version of the
standard field piece - fire
either by radio direction
or from map grid
references over a
wooded hill. American
artillery was a decisive
factor throughout the
campaign. (u.s. Army)

I-
16/12/1944 17/12 18/12 19/12 20/12 21/12 22/12 23/12 24/12 25/12 26/12 27/12 28/12 29/12
pages 66-72 177-78 173-76 179-82,85-86 131-34,83-84 187-88,94-95 139-40 135-38,89-90 27
 U.S. VII Corps' Battles - Stoumont/La Gleize

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celebrated prisoner of the battle, and even later The spoils of victory: Gis labour to refuel one of
featured in Stars & Stripes. Peiper's abandoned Tiger lis on a farm just outside
That evening Peiper - who spoke good English - La Gleize. (U.S. Army)
talked with him over a cup of coffee in the flickering
candlelight of his command post. McCown later said The largest task force , under Lieutenant-Colonel
that although he found Peiper's fanaticism to the Nazi William Lovelady, was given the most easterly
cause difficult to understand , he gradually came to assignment of cutting the road between Stavelot and
admire him , and believed his assurance that the other La Gleize, splitting Kampfgruppe 'Peiper' off from the
American prisoners he had - many of them wounded remaining elements of Kampfgruppe 'Knittel' still trying
- would be treated well. By this time the village of to retake Stavelot from the west. In so doing, Lovelady
La Gleize was being gradually pounded to rubble by ran into elements of Kampfgruppe 'Hansen' heading
U.S. field artillery and the conversation went on all northwest from Wanne to help Peiper. The German
night because it was impossible to sleep. column was shot up and Lovelady established
Boudinot's combat command had arrived at Theux , roadblocks to complete sealing Peiper in from all but
just to the northwest of Spa and about 10 miles his last possible escape route southeast.
(16 km) directly north of Stoumont, during the morning Boudinot's third battlegroup, commanded by Major
of the previous day, 20 December. Sizing up the Kenneth McGeorge, headed almost due south from
situation, which was pretty clear-cut, Boudinot prompt- Spa, in the middle of the other two CCB task forces,
ly split CCB into three task forces. The smallest, under and reached the outskirts of La Gleize before it was
Captain John Jordan , headed directly south from thrown back and forced to retire for the night to the
Theux and attempted to help 1/119th Infantry's attack hamlet of Bourgoumont.
towards Stoumont. Jordan 's tanks came under The shortest day of the year, 21 December, was a
enfilading fire from hull-down Panzers and the two sparring match. Peiper's tanks and assault guns,
leading Shermans were knocked out, blocking the unable to move because of lack of fuel , were well
road. By this time it was almost dark, and there was dug-in with plenty of infantry armed with Panzerfausts
nothing more to be done until the morning . to deter any American tanks that ventured too close.
Boudinot could not deploy his Shermans effectively
While Task Force 'Jordan' helped recapture Stoumont anyway because the terrain restricted them to the
on 22 December, and Task Force 'Lovelady' cut off narrow, sunken roads.
Peiper's eastward escape route, Task Force 'McGeorge' On 22 December Stoumont was finally recaptured.
bottled off the northern exit from La Gleize. Peiper had withdrawn everything into the La Gleize

16/12/1944 17/12 18/12 19/12 20/12 21/12 22/12 23/12 24/12 25/12 26/12 27/12 28/12 29/12
r------
pages 66-72 77-78 173-76 79-82,85-86 131-34,83-84 187-88,94-95 139=40 135=38,89-90 29
 enclave, leaving behind just those wounded unable rearguard behind to destroy them , as well as a
to walk. Task Force Lovelady had a fierce , detachment with the German wounded and American
predominantly infantry, skirmish west of Stavelot, and prisoners. McCown , warning Peiper that his
Task Force McGeorge beat back a reconnaissance agreement could not be binding on his superiors ,
sortie north of La Gleize. Meanwhile, the artillery, which signed a paper saying that, in return for Peiper
had not ceased firing all night, continued to pound the releasing the Americans, the United States would
village into rubble. Then , at about 2000 hrs, in response return the German wounded when they had recovered .
to Peiper's pleas for fuel , food and ammunition , 20 As surety, McCown gave his parole and accompan ied
Luftwaffe Ju 52s attempted to drop him some supplies. the remaining survivors of the Kampfgruppe as they
Almost all fell into American hands in Stoumont. stole into the night at about 0200 hrs on Christmas Eve.
By the 23rd Peiper knew for a certainty that his After hiding out in the woods during daylight,
mission had failed , but all his requests to be allowed to Peiper's men resumed their eastward trudge after
try to fight his way out southeast fell on stony ground . dark. At some point, they brushed against a column of
The top German commanders were buoyed up by the 82nd Airborne paras marching in the opposite
excellent progress being made by Fifth Panzer direction . During the brief firefight, McCown threw
Armee's spearheads and were convinced that if Peiper himself flat and escaped when Peiper's men moved
could just hold out for a couple of days, his problems on , the 770 survivors of the original 5,000 reaching the
would remove themselves . Kampfgruppe 'Hansen' lines at about 1000 hrs on
As a day of battle , the 23rd was inconclusive. The Christmas Day.
shelling continued , with most of Peiper's infantry Meanwhile, their quarry having flown , the 'mudfeet'
huddling in cellars , while the infantry of 3rd Armored of 3rd Armored and 30th Infantry Divisions had an
and 30th Infantry Divisions tightened the noose around anti-climactic Christmas Eve. Though expecting heavy
them , hampered by minefields and dug-in tanks and opposition , they were able to walk into La Gleize,
assault guns. CCB 's tanks could not move effectively capture about 300 Germans, mostly wounded , and
and , in light of more critical battles developing further congratulate the 170 prisoners freed by Peiper on their
south around Hotton , Boudinot was forced to withdraw escape. Needless to say, the German prisoners were
some of his strength . not repatriated! However, although denied a true
The end , when it came, came quickly, and Hal battlefield victory , Boudinot's CCB could count, in the
McCown re-enters the story. Peiper had finally, at village of La Gleize itself, 28 tanks , 70 half-tracks and
about 1700 hrs, obtained perm ission from his Korps 25 guns, not to mention those littering the surrounding
commander to evacuate La Gleize. With no fuel , he countryside. Kampfgruppe 'Peiper' had , indeed, been
knew he had to abandon his tanks , and left a small 'exterminated ' .

Peiper was forced to o Panthers

abandon more than o Tigers

90 vehicles when he
o P31Vs
evacuated his surviving F6ret de
Bassenge
men from the La Gleize
pocket, including a large
number of half-tracks
(not shown) just to the
southwest.

16/12/1944 17/12 18/12 19/12 20/12 21/12 22/12 23/12 24/12 25/12 26/12 27/12 28/12 29/12
30 pages 66-72 177-78 73-76 [79-82,85-86 131-34,83-84 87-88,94-95 T39-40 35-38,89-90
U.S. VII CORPS' BATTLES
CCR, 3rd Armored Division

Hotton - December 20-26

A t about the same time on 20 December that

Brigadier-General Raymond
was organising CCB for its assault
Boudinot
Howze's CCR with its command post at Soy, and
Lieutenant-Colonel Prentice Yeomans' 83rd Armored
Reconnaissance Battalion . At this point the incomplete
on Kampfgruppe 'Peiper', the commander of division temporarily fell under XVIII (Airborne) Corps'
3rd Armored , Major-General Maurice Rose , arrived in command , on the right flank of 82nd Airborne Division.
the vicinity of Hotton . Since CCA was still at Eupen , all Ridgway asked Rose to reconnoitre towards the
that Rose had at his disposal was Colonel Robert main Liege-Bastogne road (N 15) and try to re-

.. x
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The defence of Hotton and the bridge over the Ourthe establish contact with VIII Corps.
depended on a scratch force under Major Jack Fikessen With the very limited strength at his disposal , Rose
while CCR/3rd Armored's small task forces sallied out spl it his command into three task forces plus a
to give battle to 116 Panzer Division. reserve , knowing full well he was running a risk

16/12/1944 17/12 18/12 19/12 20/12 21/12 22/12 23/12 24/12 25/12 26/12 27/12 28/12 29/12
pages 66-72 77-78 73-76 -~-7-9--8-2-
,8-
5--8-
6 ~1-
27--3-0-,3-3-
- 3-
4 ,-
83---
84~'-
8-7 --88- ,9- 4--9-5-''--
39-40 35-38,89-90
31
c: because anyone of them could be wiped out if it ran After he rejected a
o
:::o into a strong Panzer formation . But he knew the old German surrender
J: maxim that 'reconnaissance is never wasted '. Each demand, the USAAF
of the task forces comprised a mechanised attempted unsuccessfully
reconnaissance troop with M8s, a company of M4s, a to resupply Sam Hogan's
platoon of M5s and a battery of M7s. In reserve , task force , and he
between Hotton and Soy, Howze retained one infantry followed his men back
battalion , the remaining company of M4s , two through the woods to
companies of M5s and two companies of engineers. In safety. (u .S. Signal Corps)
the north , the task force under Lieutenant-Colonel
Matthew Kane headed towards Manhay and
Malempre. In the centre , that under Major John Tucker believed he was in a cul-de-sac. LVIII Korps '
headed through Dochamps towards Samree, with the commander Walter KrOger concurred so, incredibly,
intention of then veering northeast towards Baraque while the bridge at Hotton was within his grasp,
Fraiture. In the south the force under Lieutenant- von Waldenburg pulled back his leading Kampfgruppe
Colonel Sam Hogan headed for La Roche. and sent it through La Roche towards Marche instead .
Task Force Tucker' ran into immediate problems 560 Volksgrenadier Division smoothly filled the gap
because Samree was already in the hands of the during the night of 22/23 December.
leading Kampfgruppe from 116 Panzer Division . After Task Force 'Orr' attempted to retake Dochamps but
losing six Shermans, he fell back behind Dochamps. was rebuffed with the loss of six M4s, and a flanking
Rose promptly organised a fourth task force , attack by 'Kane' was also unsuccessful because the
comprising two companies of armoured infantry from tanks could not manoeuvre off the road as a result of
Howze's reserve under Lieutenant-Colonel William the marshy ground . The fact that 3rd Armored was
Orr, and sent them off to assist Tucker in retaking being reinforced now that it was again part of VII Corps
Samree . During the night of 20/21 December, had little immediate effect, because Brigadier-General
however, the CO of 116 Panzer Division , Doyle Hickey's CCA, when it arrived from Eupen, had
Generalmajor Siegfried von Waldenburg , stole a to be split to counter the threat from 2 SS-Panzer
march on Rose by sending his leading Kampfgruppe Division near Manhay, and throw out a screen towards
along a minor road through the hamlet of Beffe, smack St Hubert in the south . All that Rose received to
in between Task Forces 'Hogan ' and 'Tucker/Orr'. This reinforce Howze's CCR was one battalion of M4s and
debouched on to the main road between Soy and a company of infantry under Lieutenant-Colonel
Hotton . Rose , at his command post in Erezee, heard Walter Richardson . There was other help, though : the
the news at 0850 hrs, by which time the German attack 50 9th and 1/517th Parachute Infantry Battalions and
on Hotton had already begun. the 188th Field Artillery Battery with a dozen 155mm
Apart from Task Force 'Kane' east of Manhay, which guns from Corps reserve .
was unaffected by these events but which had It was not enough to resume any offensive
2 SS-Panzer Division bearing down on it, the others action for the time being , other than to force
were forced to fall back, 'Tucker' and 'Orr' to Amonines 560 Volksgrenadier Division to vacate the heights
and 'Hogan ' to a wooded hill east of Marcouray. Hotton overlooking Hotton. Task Force 'Hogan ', trapped in
and its bridge over the Ourthe were only defended the woods outside Marcouray, had to spike its guns
by a couple of hundred headquarters clerks, a few and tanks and retire to friendly lines on foot during
engineers and two M4s. The Shermans were Christmas night. Task Force 'Orr', even with
destroyed almost immediately and one platoon of Richardson 's reinforcement , could not yet retake
engineers was overrun, but three German tanks Dochamps or Samree , and even though
succumbed to bazookas and, amazingly, the remainder 560 Volksgrenadier Division was not making
of the tiny garrison held on throughout the day. any overtly hostile moves, the threat posed by
The German commander did not know how weak 2 SS-Panzer Division in the north and 2, 9, 116 and
the American forces opposing him were , he saw 130 Panzer Divisions to the south precluded more
American tanks on just about every hill around and than hanging on with clenched teeth .

16/12/1944 17/12 18/ 12 19/12 20/12 21/12 22/12 23/12 24/12 25/12 26/12 27/12 28/12 29/12
32 pages 66-72 77-78 73-76 79-82,85-86 127-30,33-34,83-84 87-88,94-95 [39-40 1 35-38,89-90
U.S. VII CORPS' BATTLES
333rd and 334th Infantry Regiments

MarcheNerdenne - December 20-27

L eading elements of Brigadier-General

Alexander Bolling's 84th Infantry Division began
arriving in Marche a couple of hours before
What First Army commander Courtney Hodges,
and Ridgway and Collins, urgently needed was
information about German movements south and west
midnight on 20 December, and their commander of the VII Corps' deployment area. During the
himself next morning. About midday he sent a couple 23rd, Bolling sent out patrols and put a rifle company
of platoons from Lieutenant-Colonel Charles Hoy's into Rochefort. Later, on Corps orders , he extended
334th Regiment to ascertain the situation in Hatton , his perimeter bastions by sending 1/333rd far
and when they reported that the town and its bridge southwest to Wanlin, and 11i/335th to Rochefort.
over the Ourthe were apparently safe for the time By this time, 116 Panzer Division had disengaged
being, Bolling asked for orders . His assigned task was at Hotton and, re-routed through La Roche , was
to screen the assembly area for VII Corps to the west approaching Marche. The commander of Fifth Panzer
but he was now told to hold on the Hotton-Marche line. Armee, General von Manteuffel (who was driving right
As the rest of the division, plus the attached up front with Panzer Lehr), was concerned about the
771 st Tank Battalion, arrived over the 21 st-22nd, threat to his flank posed by the 84th Infantry.
Bolling deployed them along a 12-mile (19-km) front Accordingly, leaving Lehr to take Rochefort, he drove
with the 334th on his left, anchored on Hotton , and personally to order 116 Panzer's commander, von
Colonel Hugh Parker's 335th in front of Marche itself. Waldenburg, to attack and cut the road north of
Colonel Timothy Pedley's 333rd was kept in reserve Marche so as to interdict American reinforcements.
around Baillonville. Bolling, who at this time was under the temporary

The ground was frozen

so hard in places that the
infantry could only dig
shallow foxholes .
The men of the
334th Regiment deployed
between Hotton and
Verdenne, where the
116 Panzer Division
attack took place, could
only be thankful that the
German artillery was low
~
~ -...•." ,\
on ammunition.
(u.s. Army)

16/12/1944 17/12 18/12 19/12 20/12 21/12 22/12 23/12 24/12 25/12 26/12 27/12 28/12 29/12
pages 66-72 ~77-78 173-76 I 79-82 ,85-86 I 27-32,83-84 187-88,94-95 I 39-40 135-38,89-90 33
 Q)
c:
c: ••
Q)
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31Z1 VII t•
Harmon
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(deploying) CCAlol3
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Although grenadiers of 116 Panzer Division got to The village fell after bitter house-to-house fighting and
within sight of the Hotton-Marche highway north of von Waldenburg brought up artillery to help extend the
Verdenne, they were pinned down by Bolling's infantry wedge in 84th Infantry's lines.
and artillery and could make no further headway. Bolling counter-attacked at midnight with two
companies of the 334th and one of the 333rd . One
command of Ridgway's XVIII (Airborne) Corps while company of the 334th blundered into half a dozen
Collins was deploying 2nd Armored and CCA of German tanks and was decimated by high explosive
3rd Armored Division to his south and west, knew that and machine-gun fire, but the others pressed on and
a strong German armoured force was approaching up by dawn had cleared Verdenne , taking 289 prisoners .
the west bank of the Ourthe from La Roche (which the This, though, was not the end , for at noon on
7th Armored Division trains had just escaped from), Christmas Day von Waldenburg sent in a company of
and extended his perimeter well forward of the vital nine tanks from 16 Panzer Regiment. Company B of
Hotton-Marche road, which had now become the the 771 st Tank Battalion accounted for all of them .
German LVIII Panzer Korps' objective. Then , on the next day, Bolling launched two fresh
Von Waldenburg began his attack by infiltrating two companies from the 333rd into the saucer-like
rifle companies through the woods towards Verdenne, depression which had become the battlefield. They
at the junction of the 84th Infantry Division's 334th were beaten back by 1/60 Panzergrenadier Regiment,
and 335th Regiments. However, the German troop so for the remainder of the day Bolling contented
movements had been spotted and at about midday on himself by pounding the German positions with artillery
Christmas Eve Bolling sent 1/334th, supported by fire . During the night, however, von Waldenburg pulled
M4s from the 771st Tank Battalion , to drive the his troops out because they were more urgently
intruders out. The victory was shortlived because, an needed elsewhere following the defeat of 2 Panzer
hour later, von Waldenburg launched another force of Division at Celles , and the 84th Infantry patrols found
grenadiers, supported by tanks, against Verdenne . deserted foxholes on the 27th.

16/12/1944 17/12 18/12 19/12 20/12 21/12 22/12 23/12 24/12 25/12 26/12 27/12 28/12 29/12
34 pages 66-72 ' 77_78 73-76 79-82 ,85-86 27-32,83-84 r87-88,94-99 r39-40 35-38,89-90
u.s. VII
f/)

CORPS' BATTLES ~
a;
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ra
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Foy-Notre-Dame/Celies - December 24-26 LL
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Era

M
al
oved south in great secrecy from its rest area 'von Bohm', the reinforced reconnaissance battalion in
east of Maastricht, with orders to maintain which was leading 2 Panzer Division's advance towards ...oCo
strict radio silence, Major-General Ernest the Meuse. And, as more and more reports began to u
Harmon's 'Hell On Wheels' division completed its come in of German armour west of Marche, Harmon :>
70-mile (110-km) march from Ninth Army reserve began deploying the rest of his division to the south en
::::>
to the vicinity of Durbuy, north of Marche, on and west of Brigadier-General Alexander Bolling's
23 December. The move had been accomplished with 84th Infantry Division.
only minor mishaps as a result of the slippery On 24 December CCA became involved in a
roads, and the division officially became part of the skirmish with the Panzer 'Lehr' Division near
reconstituted VII Corps. At 1630 hrs the same day Rochefort; this division was forming the left flank
the corps officially assumed responsibility for the support for 2 Panzer Division's advance and , as a
50-mile (80-km) sector of front from the right flank of result of the encounter with CCA, was unable to give
XVIII (Airborne) Corps, on the river Ourthe in the north , that support. This had a significant effect on CCB's
to Givet, on the Meuse, in the south. own battle further west over the next two days, as did
The original plan was that the 2nd Armored was to CCA's capture of Buissonville and Humain , also on the
spearhead a major counter-attack against the leading 24th . This isolated the main body of 2 Panzer Division
columns of Fifth Panzer Armee on 24 December, but from its two leading Kampfgruppen , 'von Bohm' and
events dictated otherwise. At lunchtime on the the reinforced 304 Panzergrenadier Regiment 'von
23rd, while Harmon was conferring with his regimental Cochenhausen'. These had reached Foy-Notre-Dame
officers, a report came in that an armoured car had and the area Celles-Conneux late on the 23rd with the
been shot up near Ciney. Harmon decisively Meuse just a proverbial stone's throwaway.
despatched Brigadier-General John Collier's Combat All through Christmas Eve Harmon had been
Command A towards this important junction with its getting reports of a strong concentration of German
main roads pointing straight towards Dinant and
Namur, telling Lawton Collins what he had done
afterwards. (The incident turned out to have been an
accidental brush with a British patrol.)
Heading towards Buissonville and Rochefort, the
leading battalions of Collier's 66th Armored Regiment
and 41 st Armored Infantry Regiment ran into a road-
block in the village of Leignon set up by Kampfgruppe

The bridge too far for 2 Panzer Division was the one at
Dinant. If 2nd Armored Division and the British
29th Armoured Brigade had not stopped it just short of
here, Bruxelles was just down the road.
(Imperial War Museum)

16/12/1944 17/12 18/12 19/12 20/12 21 /12 22/12 23/12 24/12 25/12 26/12 27/12 28/12 29/12
pages 66-72 77-78 73-76 79-82 ,85-86 27-34,83-84 89-90 35
 u.s. VII Corps' Battles - Fo y-Notre-Dame/Celies

x
ccslol2
White

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2 101 XLVII
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xx
Lehr 101 XLVII
Sayerlein

ROChefort \
For the counter-attack against the 2 Panzer Division had bumped into 2nd Armored Division patrols south
pockets at Foy-Notre-Dame and Celles, Brigadier- of Ciney, forcing it to deviate.
General Isaac White's CCB/2nd Armored was split into The Panzer 'Lehr' Division, having come up behind
two task forces which attacked from Achene and and south of 2 Panzer Division, now overlapped its
Leignon, surrounding the Germans. rear from the direction of Rochefort, while 116 was
near Hotton and 9 still trying to get closer to the action
armour in the west which had forced British but delayed through lack of fueL The swarms of Allied
reconnaissance patrols to retire behind the Meuse at fighters over the impending battlefields could not pass
Dinant. The planned VII Corps attack was turning into on any reliable information to the men on the ground
a purely defensive battle, and the exact strength and because they had enough difficulty distinguishing
location of the German battlegroups approaching the friend from foe, let alone which German columns were
Meuse was speculative. exactly where . The pilot of a single-seater, flying low
It is no wonder that Allied intelligence was confused and at high speed, can't take down map references!
at this point, because the analysts were actually trying Harmon's decision to use CCB to attack what
to pinpoint the movements of four German Panzer seemed to be the spearhead of the German forces,
divisions advancing almost parallel and sometimes while CCA appeared to have things under control
overlapping: 2, 9, 116 and (130) Lehr. All had further east, was a calculated risk, However, he did not
reconnaissance elements well out both to the front and feel he could do so, having already risked CCA
the flanks, a,nd were feeling their way around the without permission, so in mid-afternoon he telephoned
American defences, probing for weak spots, This is VII Corps' headquarters for an OK,
why, for example, the leading Kampfgruppe of The following sequence of events is something of a
2 Panzer Division, 'von Bohm', took a slightly different comedy of errors, Lawton Collins was actually on his
route towards Dinant to that of the following, much way to visit Harmon, and his deputy, Brigadier-
stronger, Kampfgruppe 'von Cochenhausen', General Williston Palmer, told Harmon to wait until he
Marching by night, 2 Panzer's 'von Bohm' battlegroup arrived. Moments after putting the phone down,
Palmer received another call, this time from the First
M4 Shermans of Major-General Ernest Harmon's Army chief of staff, Major-General William Kean , who
2nd Armored Division advance eastward from Celles had been advised that Montgomery wanted to pull
after their Christmas victory. (Imperial War Museum) 2nd Armored back towards Andenne and Huy. Not

16/12/1944 17/12 18/12 19/12 20/12 21/12 22/12 23/12 24/12 25/12 26/12 27/12 28/12 29/12
--~--~-------,-------.----------,--------,--

pages 66-72 77-78 73-76 179-82,85-86 27-34.83-84 187-88.94-95 139-40 189-90 37

 Pockmarked, scarred and
blistered, a PzKpfw IV
and Panther from
2 Panzer Division's
Kampfgruppe
'von Cochenhausen'
destroyed in the battle
around Celles.
(U .S. Signal Corps)

wanting to be too specific on an open line, Kean reached the ridge southeast of Celles at about the
mentioned a 'pivoting move' towards towns 'A' and 'H' same time. Meanwhile, the 82nd Reconnaissance
- which Palmer misinterpreted as AchE'me and Battalion had run into a fusilade of fire from Foy, but a
Houisse, just where Harmon wanted to send CCB. combination of British artillery fire from the other side
The phone line to Harmon had gone down, so Palmer of the Meuse and another air attack took out
sent a messenger telling Harmon to go ahead. Kampfgruppe 'von B6hm's four remaining Panthers,
By this time , Lawton Collins had arrived at and the 82nd 's light tanks and armoured cars made
Harmon's command post and the two men began short work of the remaining defences. Some Germans
planning their attack for Christmas Day. Then Kean , managed to escape east to Celles , but the rema ining
perhaps sensing that Palmer may have misinterpreted 148, including the battlegroup commander, raised their
him, phoned again to clarify his orders. Horrified , hands in surrender.
Palmer sent a second messenger chasing after the Meanwhile, Hillyard's and Batchelder's two task
first. Collins nevertheless told Harmon to go ahead as forces had closed in on Celles, finding it virtually
planned . This was not the first time during the 'Battle deserted apart from local villagers who had gathered
of the Bulge' that a corps' commander had defied in the illusory safety of the church. A couple of hundred
an order; Leonard Gerow had done the same to dispirited Panzergrenadiers from Kampfgruppe 'von
strengthen the defence of Elsenborn Ridge . Cochenhausen ' quickly gave up the unequal struggle ,
The attack began at 0800 hrs on 25 December. but CCB had completely missed the main force of
Harmon had split Brigadier-General Isaac White's the battlegroup, which was dispersed in the woods
CCB into two battlegroups. Task Force A, under surrounding Celles. With darkness now falling , White
Lieutenant-Colonel Harry Hillyard , was to attack from told his two task force commanders to consolidate and
Achene across the high ground northwest of Celles. finish mopping up in the morning.
Task Force B, under Major Clifton Batchelder, was to The last act was soon over. American L-5 spotter
strike from Leignon and envelop the two 2 Panzer aircraft drew down heavy and accurate artillery fire
Division Kampfgruppen from the southeast. while P-38s attacked targets of opportunity. Then
Simultan-eously, the 82nd Armored Reconnaissance CCB's infantry and tanks advanced in a long sweep
Battalion was to attack towards Foy-Notre-Dame. line, killing about 150 Germans and capturing another
By mid-afternoon Task Force A had reached the 200, alongside a mixed bag of vehicles and guns.
high ground , losing three half-tracks but destroying About 800 got away , including von Cochenhausen ,
three Panthers, while P-38s from the 370th Fighter their commander, but the effective strength of
Group accounted for four more. Task Force B brushed 2 Panzer Division had been halved , for very few
aside a small pocket of resistance in Conjoux and American casualties.

16/12/1944 17112 18/12 19/12 20/12 21 /12 22/12 23/12 24/12 25/12 26/12 27/12 28/12 29/12
T39-40
----~-

38 pages 66-72 77-78 73-76 179-82,85-86 127-34,83-84- - "8-7--88,94-95 89-90

 1::
U.S. VII CORPS' BATTLES .EQ)
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11i/335th and 329th Infantry Regiments o

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1/1
Q)

E(\I
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Rochefort - December 22-29 ....a.
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:>
o
O n 29 December men of the 329th Regiment
from Major-General Robert Macon's freshly
arrived 83rd Infantry Division finally retook
Less than a week before its recapture by the
329th , the little town of Rochefort had suddenly
assumed strategic importance because of its bridge
:::J

Rochefort. Newly transferred from XIX Corps of Ninth over the river L'Homme which gives westward access
Army, with whom it had been battling around Winden north of the broader river Lesse towards Dinant. On
only a couple of days earlier, the 83rd was the last 22 December the CO of the 84th Infantry Division ,
major formation to join VII Corps in 1944, and only gets Brigadier-General Alexander Bolling, had put
four mentions in all 720 pages of the U.S. official Company I of Major Gordon Bahe's 3rd Battalion,
history of the battle! To set the record straight, 335th Regiment, into Rochefort. Later, on corps
therefore, it was the men of the 329th Infantry Regiment orders, he sent the remainder of the battalion after
who forced the remnants of 2 Panzer Division to fall them . This ran into a firefight with a German column at
back during the night of 29/30 December, recaptured Marloie and had to detour, arriving in Rochefort early
Malempre to the northeast of Hotton four days later and on the 23rd. But, apart from some shelling during the
Langlir on 9 January, then kicked 9 SS-Panzer Division afternoon as Fritz Bayerlein deployed Panzer Lehr,
out of Courtil over the 17th-18th before being returned the rest of the short daylight hours passed quietly.
to XIX Corps. In fact, Bayerlein was deceived into believing that
the town was unoccupied, because there was no
Christmas Eve in Rochefort. After the battle, Fritz return artillery fire and a patrol he sent out reported
Bayerlein said that, 'owing to the exhaustion and heavy it empty. One has to wonder how close the scouts
casualties of our attack forces, the pursuit had to be really got, because from a single infantry company the
abandoned'. (U.S. Army) morning before, the American garrison had swollen

16/12/1944 17/12 18/12 19/12 20/12 21/12 22/12 23/12 24/12 25/12 26/12 27/12 28/12 29/12
pages 66-72 , 77-78 73-76 I 79-82.85-86 127-34.83-84 87-88.94-95 1 135-38,89-90 39
 III :' .........
291Z1 Fi,lst Army i,
Lee (.
+--- (+) ~Lehr
130 ~
von Falla),

-_.- ......

\ .. .....
· · · . ... . . . . . . . .. .~e+ 1C)~xtVI I
\ ,,' Bayerlein

-- _
o
M

o
_ M
····. t :

··

."" 1kilometres
\t[lli1es
....

The capture of Rochefort, with its bridge over the river Bayerlein later credited his opponents with courage as
L'Homme giving access toward Givet and Dinant, was great as that shown at Bastogne.
vital to Panzer Lehr, but their victory was shortlived. The defence was concentrated around the Hotel du
Centre, where a pair of little 57mm anti-tank guns
considerably. Apart from Gordon Bahe's 111/335th, plus and half a dozen .50 machine-guns protected Bahe's
two platoons from the regimental anti-tank company, it command post. Elsewhere around the little town, Gis
now also included a platoon of M18s from the division's used every stone wall for shelter from the incessant
attached 638th Tank Destroyer Battalion; a platoon of machine-gun and mortar fire , and the fight became a
engineers from the 309th Battalion; and a solitary close-quarters one from house to house. About
platoon from Major-General John Lee's 29th Separate 0900 hrs, Bahe's radio went on the blink, and the
Infantry Regiment, which had been tasked with battle raged from street to street for another four hours
guarding the radio repeater station at Jemelle, just to before it was repaired and he received the welcome
the east. order from Bolling to withdraw.
The defenders gave Panzer Lehr's leading battalion Using the early nightfall as cover, Bahe's men
of 902 Panzergrenadier Regiment a hot time as it 'made a concerted dash, firing wildly as they went
approached Rochefort down the defile of the St Hubert and hurling smoke grenades'. The cost, for a
road. Expecting a walkover, the grenadiers were 24-hour battle against far superior forces, was
caught in crossfire and fell back in disorder. Now incredibly light: 25 dead and 15 wounded. No wonder
warned , Bayerlein planned his next attack more a dispirited Panzergrenadier later chalked a message
carefully, but again Gordon Bahe's men were waiting. on an abandoned gun shield : 'Aus der Traum ' - 'the
The assault, by grenadiers supported by Panther dream is over'. It certainly was when the 329th Infantry
tanks , began at 0200 hrs on Christmas Eve, and Regiment retook Rochefort four days later.

16/12/1944 17/12 18/12 19/12 20/12 21 /12 22/12 23/12 24/12 25/12 26/12 27/12 28/12 29/12
r-----------~------------,------,--------------------,_-------- -----
40 pages 66-72 77-78 73-76 179-82,85-86 127-34,83-84 87-88,94-95 1 ,35-38,89-90
u.s. THIRD ARMY

P atton was probably better known to the

American public during World War 2 than even
Eisenhower or Marshall. His flamboyant
u.s. THIRD ARMY
Lieutenant-General George Smith Patton, Jr.
showmanship and outspoken arrogance made him the Chief of Staff
darling of the media , to the frequent embarrassment of Brigadier-General Hobart R. Gay
his superiors , and his rivalry with Montgomery became
legendary. But it is not for these factors that soldiers III Corps (Millikin)
remember him : it is for the unhesitant aggression and VIII Corps (Middleton) (from First Army 20 December)
tireless drive which win battles. There are few better XII Corps (Eddy)
XX Corps (Walker) (to Seventh Army [Patch], 6th Army Group
[Devers], 20 December)
Lieutenant-General
109 Anti-Aircraft Gun Battalion (Mobile) (90mm)
George Patton was the
115 Anti-Aircraft Gun Battalion (Mobile) (90mm)
American commander
217 Anti-Aircraft Gun Battalion (Mobile) (90mm)
whose abilities were 456 Anti-Aircraft Artillery Auto-Weapons Battalion (40mm)
most respected by the 465 Anti-Aircraft Artillery Auto-Weapons Battalion (40mm)
Germans. He was not, 550 Anti-Aircraft Artillery Auto-Weapons Battalion (40mm)
however, always 565 Anti-Aircraft Artillery Auto-Weapons Battalion (40mm)
'flavour of the month' 777 Anti-Aircraft Artillery Auto-Weapons Battalion (M15/M16)
with his peers. 16 & 30 Bataillons Chasseurs (-) , 2 Regiment Parachutistes
(U.S . Signal Corps) (Puech-Samson) (French) (attached 21 December as liaison
with British XXX Corps)

examples of this than the way in which he responded with his sights firmly set on the Third Army's Saar
to the crisis in the Ardennes in December 1944. offensive planned to begin on 19 December, began to
Patton was one of the first men to see the ghastly think that those forces - if, indeed, they existed - east
risk (Bradley later called it 'calculated ') of leaving the of the Ardennes would be used for spoiling attacks.
Ardennes so thinly manned . A diary entry from as From where they sat, they could either be launched
early as 24 November reads : 'First Army is making a north into the flank of First Army's offensive towards
terrible mistake in leaving the VII I Corps static, as it is the Rur and Urft dams, scheduled to begin a few days
highly probable that the Germans are building up east before his own; or against Third Army's flank in
of them '. Patton 's G-2 , Colonel Oscar Koch , shared the south . This would fit in with experiences in
his concern and by 9 December estimated that there Normandy. SHAEF generally concurred that limited
were at least four infantry and two Panzer divisions counter-attacks were likely, but that a major offensive
facing Middleton 's front, with three more close at hand. was not, although Eisenhower confessed his worry
Koch 's warnings were listened to, then largely about 'a nasty little Kasserine' .
dismissed. The consensus was that the Germans, like George Smith Patton, Jr. was not, as he has
the Americans , were using the sector to give depleted sometimes been portrayed, like a bull in a china shop
divisions a respite and new ones a limited taste of on the battlefield. His nickname, 'blood and guts' (for
combat experience to acclimatise them . Even Patton , our blood, his guts) was not idle, and as many men 41
 XXX X
r":7I PATTON
IL:::::J U.S. 3 Army

I I I I
XXX XXX XXX XXX
r":7I Milli kin
IL:::::J III Corps ~ VIII
Mi d dl elo n
Corps r":7I XIIEddyCorps ~ XX Corps
IL:::::J
wa lke r

(from 1 Army 20 Dec) (10 7 Army 20 Dec)

~ III I~
I I

II
~ V01 m rzIl
456 ll 16
109
• 115 • 465 30
217 550 (French)
565

probably loathed him as loved him . But he did have the Montgomery would remain in overall command of all
experience and the talent to win battles, and was the Allied ground forces for another month , until
one Allied general whom the Germans feared most. Eisenhower established SHAEF headquarters in
It was partly for this reason that he had been given France and assumed the responsibility himself - albeit
'command ' of the phantom army in East Anglia prior to 400 miles (640 km) behind the front line.
D-Day, convincing Hitler that the assault would come Originally Patton's Third Army was to have swept
in the Pas de Calais because Patton had to lead it. into Brittany to capture the major ports of St Malo,
In fact, of course , the invasion came in Normandy Brest and Lorient, but the German collapse after the
and the U.S. effort was spearheaded not by Patton 's 'Cobra' breakout through Avranches meant this was
Third Army but by Bradley's First on 'Omaha' and no longer necessary, and the task could be entrusted
'Utah' beaches. Third Army did not get ashore until to VIII Corps from First Army instead . Patton 's
July and did not become operational until 1 August. mission , exclusive of Brittany, was to drive to the river
At this point, Bradley moved up to become CO of Mayenne and sweep the area south of First Army to
12th Army Group , his deputy, Courtney Hodges, the Loire. Major-General Wade Haislip's XV Corps
taking over First Army. This gave Bradley parity with headed through Avranches towards the Mayenne
Montgomery , commander of 21 st Army Group while Major-General Walton Walker's XX Corps
(Canadian First and British Second Armies) but reached Nantes and Angers on the Loire. By 8 August

A rather different
Bastogne street scene to
that shown earlier.
Refugees straggle west
out of the little town,
already showing the
scars of German shelling ,
before the siege which
Patton's Third Army
finally lifted.
(U.S. Signal Corps)

42
After the battle: refugees
return to their town in
January 1945 while
jubilant American
officers, including
(centre) Major-General
Maxwell Taylor,
congratulate each other
on survival and victory.
(U .S. Signal Corps)

Haislip had reached Le Mans after a 75-mile (120-km) severe state of disrepair, and could therefore only
drive in just four days which had outflanked the compensate partially.
German Seventh Armee . Third Army got moving again on 5 September after
The day before this , the Germans had launched a replenishments finally reached them and , crossing
determined Panzer attack against the junction the Meuse and advancing through Belgium and
between First and Third Armies at Mortain. This Luxembourg, finally reached the West Wall in October
penetrated VII Corps' lines but a massive air raid cou- while First Army was fighting its own battle at Aachen
pled with a counter-attack against the German flank by and towards the river Rur. By this time Third Army had
tanks from Lieutenant-General Henry Crerar's changed shape slightly because, after the battle of
Canadian First Army sealed the Germans' fate and led Falaise and the advance across the Seine, corps and
to the encirclement at Falaise. divisions had become so mixed up that they had to be
While part of Patton 's XV Corps helped close the reorganised .
neck of the Falaise Pocket, other elements drove XV Corps had disappeared to become part of
rapidly north through Dreux to secure crossings over Patch's Seventh Army and in its place Patton now had
the Seine at Mantes-Gassicourt on 19 August. Major-General John Millikin's III Corps. This included
Meanwhile, XX Corps had raced through Chartres on the 4th Armored Division, which would be rushed to
the 16th to capture Melun and Fontainbleau east of Bastogne alongside the 26th Infantry Division plus the
Paris on the 20th . Patton's third corps, XII, had since 80th, hastily transferred from Eddy's XII Corps
been brought into play and , after reaching Orleans because it was close. Millikin was a good choice for a
on the 17th, was heading for Troyes. Originally variety of reasons to lead the Bastogne relief column ,
commanded by Major-General Gilbert Cook, it was not least because - like Patton himself - he was
now led by the man who had commanded the a former cavalryman, and had commanded the
9th Infantry Division in Tunisia , Sicily and across 'Utah' 2nd (Horse) Cavalry Division at the time of Pearl
beach , Major-General Manton Eddy. Harbor before moving on.
Patton's Third Army rapidly outstripped the rest of After 20 December 1944 Patton also assumed
12th Army Group in the eastward drive across France control of Troy Middleton's VIII Corps from First Army.
after the various corps and divisions which had been Third Army, thus reconstituted , remained part of
intermingled around Falaise were sorted out. Soon, he Bradley's 12th Army Group, while First and Ninth
was threatening Metz, but already a disconcerting gap became reluctant components in Montgomery's
was opening between First and Third Armies in 21 st Army Group. However, it was to prove a
September. In the middle lay the Ardennes. And shortlived arrangement, because Eisenhower's
Patton 's tanks were running out of fuel , as the agreement with 'Monty' was that it would cease as
'Mulberry' harbours in Normandy, almost demolished soon as Bastogne was safe and First and Third Armies
by a storm , could not cope with the load. The Channel joined hands. Here the story continues - Manton Eddy
ports that had been captured were also in a and John Millikin will have to wait their turn. 43
u
~ u.s. THIRD ARMY
:>
I
>-
E
~

«
"E
.r:.
I-
en
::::)
u.s. VIII CORPS

W hen General der Panzertruppen Hasso von

Manteuffel launched his Fifth Panzer Armee
through the Schnee Eifel and across the
U.S VIII CORPS
Major-General Troy H. Middleton
river Our on 16 December 1944, he had three Korps ,
two of them Panzer, totalling nine divisions, four of
4 Infantry Division (Barton)
them armoured. All that Major-General Troy Middleton (to Iii Corps 20 December)
had to oppose this might was three infantry 9 Armored Division (Leonard)
divisions, one of them totally 'green' and the other (CCB attached to V Corps)
11 Armored Division (Kilburn)
two battle-weary and understrength, backed up by
(from England 17-23 December)
a single 'light' armoured division. The length of the 17 Airborne Division (Miley)
line they held, some 85 miles (130 km), was far too (from XViii (Airborne) Corps 1 January 1945)
28 Infantry Division (Cota)
(112 Infantry Regiment to V Corps 20 December)
Mild-mannered and
87 Infantry Division (Culin)
courteous to peers and (from XV Corps 28-29 December)
subordinates alike, the 101 Airborne Division (McAuliffe pp Taylor)
bespectacled Troy (from SHAEF Reserve 17 December)
106 Infantry Division (Jones/Perrin)
Middleton was an
(survivors to V Corps 20 December)
experienced although CCB , 10 Armored Division (Roberts)
unambitious commander 14 Cavalry Group1 Mechanized (Devine/Duggan) :
who inspired loyalty from 18 & 32 Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadrons
70 Tank Battalion (Davidson)
his men and fought hard
707 Tank Battalion
on their behalf. 630 Tank Destroyer Battalion (A Company towed ; B & C M36)
(U.S. Signal Corps) 802 Tank Destroyer Battalion (towed)
803 Tank Destroyer Battalion (M10/M36)
811 Tank Destroyer Battalion (-) (M18)
820 Tank Destroyer Battalion (M18)
long for them to defend adequately, and the Panzers 174 Field Artillery Group: 965, 969 & 770
and Volksgrenadiers had broken through quite Field Artillery Battalions
decisively in several places within a couple of days. 333 Field Artillery Group: 333 & 771
Field Artillery Battalions
The defence of St Vith, behind the line defended by
402 Field Artillery Group: 559, 561 & 740
the 106th Infantry Division on the north, or left flank, of Field Artillery Battalions
Middleton's corps , was taken over by the newly arrived 422 Field Artillery Group: 81 & 174 Field Artillery Battalions
XVIII (Airborne) Corps' 7th Armored Division . The 687 Field Artillery Battalion
4th Infantry Division in the south was absorbed by
Patton's XII Corps. Only remnants of the 28th Infantry
and 9th Armored Divisions remained to protect the on Bastogne to deny it to the enemy in the face of
centre - and the critical road junction at Bastogne - overwhelming odds.
until the arrival of reinforcements. The most crucial of VIII Corps' commander, Troy Middleton , mild and
these in the first few days were the 101 st Airborne bespectacled , was regarded by some of his peers as
Division from SHAEF reserve and Combat Command a 'plodder', but was tireless, resourceful and not given
44 B from Patton's 10th Armored, which both converged to panic. In November 1943 he had commanded the
 U.S VIII CORPS - continued U.S. VIII CORPS TROOPS I/)

...c.
o
174 Field Arti lIery Group u
447 Anti-Aircraft Artillery Auto-Weapons Battalion (M15/M16) 770 Field Artillery Battalion (12 x 4.5" M 1 gun , tractor-drawn)
635 Anti-Aircraft Artillery Auto-Weapons Battalion (40mm)
:>
965 Field Artillery Battalion (12 x 155mm M 1A 1 howitzer, I
778 Anti-Aircraft Artillery Auto-Weapons Battalion (40mm) tractor-drawn) >.
11 02 Engineer Group : 341 Engineer General Service Battalion
1107 Engineer Combat Group: 159, 168 (Nungesser)
969 Field Artillery Battalion (Colored) (12 x 155mm M1A1 ...E
«
11 28 Engineer Combat Group: 35, 44 & 158 Engineer
howitzer, tractor-drawn)
...
'C

Combat Battalions ..c:

333 Field Artillery Group I-
178 Engineer Combat Battalion
333 Field Artillery Battalion (Colored) (12 x 155mm M1A1
u;
249 Engineer Combat Battalion ::i
howitzer, tractor-drawn)
771 Field Artillery Battalion (12 x 4.5" M1 gun , tractor-drawn)

45th Infantry Division during its crossing of the river 402 Field Arti lIery Group
Volturno in Italy, a 10-day battle under atrocious 559 Field Artillery Battalion (12 x 155mm M 1 gun ,
conditions which proved he was no 'slouch '. He was truck-drawn)
561 Field Artillery Battalion (12 x 155mm M1 gun,
rewarded with command of VIII Corps which came
truck-drawn)
ashore across 'Utah' beach in the second wave of the
740 Field Artillery Battalion (12 x 8" M1 howitzer, tractor-
Normandy landings. It spearheaded the breakout
drawn)
from the base of the Cotentin peninsula across the
Carentan Plain in July 1944, reaching Avranches on 422 Field Artillery Group
the 30th before swinging right into Britanny, with its 81 Field Artillery Battalion (12 x 155mm M1A1 howitzer,
major ports of St Malo, Brest and Lorient. tractor-drawn)
Middleton drove his corps on through France and 174 Field Artillery Battalion (12 x 155mm M12 GMC)
Belgium until his divisions reached the proximity of the
West Wall in October/November. At this time the corps Field Artillery Battalions
found itself in the centre of First Army's eastward 687 (12 x 105mm M2A 1 howitzer, truck-drawn)

march with , in effect, little to do. The Ardennes had

been cleared of opposition and salients - albeit
shallow ones - established through the West Wall in could recuperate and those new to the European
front of the Schnee Eifel and at Sevenig a little further theatre of operations could acclimatise. In fact, the
south. The main effort was being put in north and corps mission was , in the words of the U.S. official
south , with drives towards the Rur and Urft dams, and history, to 'train, rest, re-equip and observe the enemy'.
the Saar, respectively. The VIII Corps' sector was thus Allied planners totally misread German intentions,
regarded as a quiet region where battle-weary troops although both Eisenhower and his chief of intelligence,

Typifying the weakness

of VIII Corps' sector, an
M5 Stuart light tank
escorts a convoy of
'soft-skin' vehicles
westward while a trio of
Gis wait, apparently
impassively, for the
Germans.who will soon
follow. (u.s. Signal Corps)

45
 I/)

...o
Co
MIDDLETON
<.J U.S. VIII Corps
w;....~:1111

:> I
I III xx

<
:>.
E
Devine
~ (Mechanized)
14 Cavalry Group C8J Barton
4 Infantry
Division ~
II
630
802
803
811
"E 820
......c:
en Leonard Kilburn
::i 9 Armored Division 11 Armored Division

II II II I II II II I

~ 4122 ~ 5521
Igr4~~i ~ ~6 ~
~ 89 490
491 ~ 41
19 60 73 42 63 492

I I I I I I I I
II I II II II I II II

10 I 01 9(-) lSi 149 ~811 ~1 482 ~ 56 lSi 151 ~ 602 ~ 575

~..;.;.;~" Cota
28 Infantry Division

II II II II II II

Ie )1 707 ~ 602 1'-'11 44

~ 820 ~ 440 IT.'h 563
L..:...J ~ 634

~
III
109
110
112
[:;J I' , '11031Si
II

•
107
108
109
II I

28
~
III
422
423
424
[::J] II

•
589
590
591
1'-1"11
II

81 lSi I
106

229 592
I I

~ 28 ~ 106

McAuliffe Roberts
101 Airborne Division CCB, 10 Armored Division

II II I II III I I I
~ 705 ~ 755
~ ~ 969
10 I 01 C/919
1%1 509 1QJJ ~7 Ie )I C/21 ~ C/609 ~ B1796
I
II
~ 20
I

W •••
ICD
III III

P
501 [ % ] 327
502 G
[ Z j (101) ~ 54 1
420
10 I O~ g~~5
506

II II II II I
r=;=-l 377 r=;=-l 321 ~ 81 ~ 326 ~101
~ 463 ~ 907 L.!....J L..!:!:!J

46
 u.s. VIII Corps (con tinued)

XX
~ Miley
~ 17 Airborne Division

III III II II
~ 507 ~ 193 1
~ 513 ~ 194
.p 1 466 680
681
f7"':"""\1. 549
~
"====i::::::::!I
III II II I

II I
m ~ ~~~I.lh ~~6
II II I

1..-• .1 139
11 312 1 S ] 87
155 ~517 ~ 347 ~ 336
I

~ 87
III III III III

1 - 1 174 1 - 1 333 1 - 1 402 1 - 1 422 II II II

T

II
FAGP T

II
FAGP T FAGP

II
T
FAGP
8 687
P01 467
~ 635
r...!..J 778

[::J 965 c : : J 333

969 771
~
559 r : : - , 81
561 ~ 174 III III III II
770 740
II: 11 1102 10;-01 1107 10-l ')11 128
j
Ic
rn)1178
249

II II II

II I 11 341 10 1 01 ~~~
202
10 1 01 ~ 158

Major-General Kenneth Strong , were worried about tanks , and the 7th Armored Division was ordered to
the possibility of a spoiling attack to disrupt the St Vith . Patton similarly detached a combat command
Rur/Urft offensive. They did not expect at all the major from 10th Armored Division towards Bastogne, and
onslaught which reduced VIII Corps to tatters. more would follow as rapidly as the road and weather
In the north , Volksgrenadiers exploited the gap conditions permitted over the next few days. But
caused by the premature withdrawal of the Middleton 's corps was only saved by a hair's breadth
14th Cavalry Group to outflank and envelop two of the and the sheer guts and determination of small groups
106th Infantry Division 's regiments and go on , helped of Gis shivering in frozen foxholes or sheltering behind
by the arrival of the elite Fuhrer Begleit Brigade, to snow-laden trees which turned the whole landscape
capture St Vith. In the centre , the 110th Regiment of into a Teutonic mythological nightmare.
the 28th Infantry Division was overwhelmed - Troy Middleton played little part in directing the
although not without a determined and effective course of the battle, other than by informing others of
struggle - while its two flanking regiments had to give what appeared to be happening . This is no reflection
ground steadily , retiring northwest and southwest on his abilities. Few could have done so much to keep
respectively. In the south , only one regiment of the tabs on such a confused and constantly shifting
4th Infantry Division was affected at first, around battlefield . But there are limits and , in fact, when
Echternach , and fought a series of company-sized Patton visited Middleton on 20 December, he reported
actions which bought time for swift retaliation. that the corps was 'in such shape that it could not be
Seeing what was happening within hours of the used offensively'. What Middleton and the men under
German attack, Troy Middleton quite sensibly and his command did achieve was to cause the Germans
honourably appealed to his army commander, sufficient delay, particularly east of Bastogne, that all
Courtney Hodges, for help. In particular, he asked for their subsequent efforts proved ultimately futile. 47
 u.s. Third Army - VIII Corps

xx

20 kilometres miles
;'=======~ii~~~~~~1~0~~~~:::~15
10 C8J4
9th Armored Division c:
o
'iii
'>
C
't:I
f!!
o
...
E
«
T he unfortunate 9th Armored Division found its
three combat commands widely dispersed down 9th ARMORED DIVISION
-
.s::.
0)
I
1/1
almost the whole of VIII Corps' front when the Major-General John W. Leonard
o
...a.
German offensive opened on 16 December. Furthest HQ Company and HQ Companies, u
north , Brigadier-General William Hoge's CCB was Combat Commands
rushed to St Vith , where to all intents and purposes it A (Harrold) , B (Hoge - attached to V Corps)
:;:
I
became part of V and then XVIII (Airborne) Corps. In & R (Gilbreth) >-
E
the centre , Colonel Joseph Gilbreth's CCR became
involved in the defence of Bastogne. Furthest south
<...
't:I
and east, Colonel Thomas Harrold's CCA around 2 Tank Battalion (Harper) .s::.
14 Tank Battalion (Engemann) I-
Savel born virtually became part of Patton's XII Corps.
The 'bulge' was , in fact, 9th Armored's first battle 19 Tank Battalion (Harrold) o::::>
27 Armored Infantry Battalion (Seeley)
and , under the circumstances, Major-General John
52 Armored Infantry Battalion (Booth)
Leonard's men acquitted themselves well - as did
60 Armored Infantry Battalion (Collins)
3 Armored Field Artillery Battalion (M7)
Major-General John 16 Armored Field Artillery Battalion (M7)
Leonard (profile, left) 73 Armored Field Artillery Battalion (M7)
confers with his corps 89 Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron , Mechanized
commander, Troy 9 Armored Engineer Battalion
Middleton, before the (- C Company attached to CCB, 10 Armored Division)
battle, some time in 2 Medical Battalion, Armored
November. Also present 149 Armored Signal Company
131 Armored Ordnance Maintenance Battalion
at this meeting were
Military Police Platoon
Eisenhower and Bradley,
482 Anti-Aircraft Artillery Auto-Weapons Battalion (M15/M16)
(u.s. Army)
(attached)
811 Tank Destroyer Battalion (M18) (attached)

many other newcomers to the European battlefield of the war in Europe. The division was originally
during this last desperate gamble of Hitler to regain the earmarked for III Corps of Ninth Army, but after it
initiative in the west. (Three months later, the men of arrived in France on 3 October 1944 it was reassigned
9th Armored would win undying fame and even have a to VIII Corps and its components given a roughly
Hollywood film made about their exploits, but for the 40-mile (60-km) stretch of front to patrol.
moment their thoughts were far from California!) When the German offensive broke on
The division had been activated at Fort Riley, 16 December, Hoge's CCB was on loan to V Corps,
Kansas , on 15 July 1942 under Major-General deployed around Faymonville in readiness to support
Geoffrey Keyes. John Leonard took over in October the 2nd Infantry Division's attack through the West
the same year and remained in command until the end Wall at Wahlerscheid towards the Rur and Urft dams.
When this operation was called off in response to the
The thin line held loosely by Middleton's 106th and, in emergency and 2nd Infantry redeployed on Elsenborn
particular, 28th Infantry Divisions on 16 December is Ridge, First Army commander Courtney Hodges
clearly apparent from the scale of the map. The arrival placed CCB under the command of the 106th Infantry
of CCB from Patton's 10th Armored Division and that of Division, which occupied positions in the Schnee Eifel
the 101st Airborne from SHAEF reserve came just in recently vacated by the 2nd Infantry Division.
time to retrieve victory from disaster, The CO of the 106th, Major-General Alan Jones, 49
 c: initially wanted to use Hoge's tanks to counter-attack On 7 March an astonished platoon of CCR
.2 towards Schonberg , but when he heard that the whole commanded by Lieutenant Emmet Burrows reached
III
'> of 7th Armored Division was also on its way to his aid, the heights overlooking the Rhein at Remagen , to see
C
"C he postponed the plan . In fact, it never happened a rail bridge miraculously still intact. As soon as
e! because , when 7th Armored's CCB commander, he heard the news, CCB commander William Hoge
o
E Brigadier-General Bruce Clarke , took over the defence reacted promptly and sent tanks plunging down the
~
-
.r;
OJ
I
III
of St Vith , the situation had deteriorated to such a point
that it would have been futile . Instead , he deployed
Hoge's tanks to the southeast of St Vith with his own
slope to capture the bridge before the astonished
Germans could destroy it. Their demolition charges
were set off belatedly, but the bridge still stood and the
...o
Co completing a 'horseshoe' defence into which the delighted Americans charged across. Even though
(...) survivors of the 106th could retire. Remagen was far from where the main Rhein
Meanwhile, Gilbreth's CCR had been deployed as a crossings were to take place later in the month,
:> backstop for the 28th Infantry Division on 'Skyline Drive' Eisenhower told Bradley to put at least five divisions
I
>- but, split into 'penny packet' task forces, was unable to across and hold a bridgehead. (The Ludendorff bridge
...
E
oCt
do more than help to hinder Fifth Panzer Armee's actually collapsed on 17 March but by this time
advance, and the survivors filtered back towards pontoons had taken over most of the load.)
"E
.r; Bastogne, where they joined CCB of 10th Armored After consolidating the bridgehead , 9th Armored
I-
Division as CCX under command of the 101 st Airborne renewed its eastward drive on the 26th, reached the
m
::J Division. Harrold's CCA, down south in the river Lahn , established contact with Third Army on the
Ermsdorf-Savelborn area on the left flank of Frankfurt-Koln autobahn and , by the end of the
4th Infantry Division, facing only a single poorly equipped month , had established another bridgehead across the
Volksgrenadier Division, had a much easier time of it. river Diemel near Warburg . Moving up to a new
On 30 December, after the evacuation of St Vith assembly area east of the river Weser on 8 April , the
and the relief of Bastogne by Patton's forces , the division spearheaded the drive towards the river
component commands of 9th Armored were pulled Saale, consolidating near Pegau on the 13th. German
back into reserve at Sedan and took no part in the resistance was intensifying all the time as the
Allied counter-offensive in January 1945. Instead, the desperate troops found themselves in between the
division received replacements for its casualties and closing jaws of the Red Army and the western Allies,
spent February retraining before attacking across the and 9th Armored struggled through factory districts at
river Rur through Wollersheim and Langendorf on
2 March. Two days later the division was on the west Tiny specks in a desolate landscape, a troop of
bank of the river Erft around Euskirchen and on the Shermans from 9th Armored Division's CCR deployed
5th launched an offensive towards the confluence of on a ridge to help cover the retreat of survivors from
the rivers Ahr and Rhein . the 28th Infantry Division. (U.S. Signal Corps)

. _ror- r

50
 xx r:::
o
I,C)~I LEONARD 'iii
I' ,I 9 Armored Division '>
~~...I
i5
:
rHOl
I
I
I
I
~Harrold ~HOge
I
I
"C
e
o
~CCR
Gilbreth
rP.iTl ~CCA ~CCB E
.;;:
~
-
..r:::
0)
I
til
...o
a.
<..>

:>

I
II II
IIC)~I H
19arrold
I' '1 Tank Battalion

rQ]D
I

~A-C
I I I
II II II
~ Seeley ~ Booth ~collins
~ 27 Armored Infantry Battalion ~ 52 Armored Infantry Battalion ~ 60 Armored Infantry Battalion

~g ~~ ~g
I I I
II II II

Ie ~ )hAArmd Ie ~ )h1 Armd Ie ~ )b Armd

l~mM
I

~A-C ~A-C
I I I I I I
I
~482AA IS)
89 Cavalry Reece Squadron
~(SP)
149

$' C$J'"
83AB r!Jj]'c
Deutzen before CCR reached the river Mulde and taken into reserve on 21 April and moved to Jena. It
seized bridges in the Lastau region on the 15th. Next did not fight as a whole again, but CCA was attached
day it crossed the river and captured Colditz with its to the 1st Infantry Division on 3 May for the drive
mountain-top PoW fortress. towards Karlsbad and its famous caverns, and had
After mopping up along the Mulde, the division was reached Rudolec when hostilities ended on the 7th. 51
 c:
o 11th Armored Division
·iii
.;;
C
"C
'Thunderbolt'
~
o
E
.:c
-T
.s:::.
.....
.....
t/)
he 11th Armored Division had a very short war
as it did not land in France until 17 December
1944, and lost 'only' 522 men in five months of
11th ARMORED DIVISION
Major-General Charles S. Kilburn
...Co
o combat. Immediately thrown into the 'Battle of the HQ Company and HQ Companies,
()
Bulge' as a mobile reserve for VIII Corps, it was Combat Commands A (Holbrook) , B (Yale) & R (Bell)
:> moved up to the Neufch~Heau region between
I 23-29 December and found the going difficult as it 22 Tank Battalion
>- 41 Tank Battalion (Sagaser)
E battled alongside the almost equally inexperienced
.:c 87th Infantry Division towards Houffalize over the next 42 Tank Battalion
"E 21 Armored Infantry Battalion
few days.
.s:::. 55 Armored Infantry Battalion
I- The division had not been activated until 15 August
o
:::::l
1942, at Camp Polk, Louisiana. Its first commander
63 Armored Infantry Battalion
490 Armored Field Artillery Battalion (M7)
was Major-General Edward Brooks, who later led 491 Armored Field Artillery Battalion (M7)
2nd Armored Division ashore in Normandy in June 492 Armored Field Artillery Battalion (M7)
1944. Brooks had been succeeded as CO of the 41 Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron, Mechanized
11th earlier in the year by Charles Kilburn , who led it 56 Armored Engineer Battalion
until March 1945 before himself bring succeeded by 81 Medical Battalion , Armored
Major-General Holmes Dager. 151 Armored Signal Company
During the Ardennes offensive , CCB attacked 133 Armored Ordnance Maintenance Battalion
Chenogne on 31 December and captured Senochamps Military Police Platoon
575 Anti-Aircraft Artillery Auto-Weapons Battalion (M15/M16)
on 2 January, while CCR assaulted Acul and CCA
(attached 23 December)
drove east of Rechrival. Thrown into the defence of the
602 Tank Destroyer Battalion (M18)
Bastogne corridor over the next 10 days, the division
(from 28 Infantry Division 29 December)
surrounded the German garrison in Bertogne on the
13th, but CCA was forced back from Velleroux by a
determined counter-attack on the 15th. Next day,
Brigadier-General Willard Holbrook's command An attack against the West Wall on the 6th was only
stormed the village and retook it. Taking up positions on a partial success , but on the 18th a surprise assault
the line Bourcy-Hardigny, the division pursued the won through and CCR captured Herzfeld. Sengerich,
retreating Germans from 20 January, crossed into Roscheid , Eschfeld and Reiff fell in quick succession ,
Luxembourg on the 22nd and relieved the 90th Infantry then CCA assisted the 87th Infantry Division in
Division on the river Our over 4-5 February. its assault through the heavily defended West Wall
pillboxes and other obstacles around Ormont at the
A patrol from the 11th Armored Division gingerly end of the month. CCB next crossed the river Pruem
paddles across the icy river Ourthe. (U.S. Army) and attacked through light resistance towards the river
Kyll , which it reached on 4 March near Lissingen. Five
days later the division had reached the Rhein and on
the 21 st completed the capture of the city of Worms.
Now commanded by Holmes Dager and reassigned
to XII Corps, the 11th Armored moved to Hanau on the
river Main at the end of the month and attacked
through the lines of the 26th Infantry Division towards
the Fulda Gap, battling through the Thuringer Wald at
the beginning of April. On the 10th the division
attacked the city of Coburg , which fell next day, before
52 establishing bridgeheads over the river Hasslach at
 c::
o
'iii
101 11 KILBURN
Armored Division
'S:
is
: : : : 'C
e!
o
~Bell
CCR
I ~i~ 1
~HOlbroOk
HQ CCA ~yale
HQ CCB
<
E

I
II
-
.s::.
.....
(/)

~""k
(from 28 Infantry
OM""'"Division 29 December)
' ...."'" ...a.o
(,)

I I
:>
I
A- C
~D >-
E

I I
<
'E
II II II .s::.

10122 Tank Battalion

101 41 Sagaser
Tank Battalion 10142 Tank Battalion
I-
o:::>
I
I I I
I
I
I

Q A-C
(Medium) Ie )1
I

flight) ~A-C
I

go I I

~A-C
I I I
II II II
~ 21 Armored Infantry Battalion ~ 55 Armored Infantry Battalion ~63Armored Infantry Battalion

I I I

~A-C ~A-C ~A-C

I I I
II II II

Ie ~ )h2° Armd Ie ~ )h21 Armd Ie ~ )h22

Armd

I I I

~A-C ~A-C ~A-C

I I I I I I
I
41 ~575AA IS] 151
Cavalry Recce Squadron
~(SP)
$"C$J'"
A-C
83"[!J] AC

Kronach and Marktzeuln. Bayreuth surrendered on capturing Wegscheiden on the 30th after a major
14 April, then 11th Armored relieved the 71 st Infantry battle. On 5 May the 11th Armored Division captured
Division and attacked to capture Grafenwohr on Linz and established contact with Red Army troops at
the 19th . Kreuzberg fell on the 25th and the Amstetten the day after hostilities ended , 8 May.
division advanced rapidly towards the Austrian border, 53
 t:
o 28th Infantry Division
'iii
':;
is
'Keystone'
-~
t:
~
t:

-
.c
00
N
I T he 28th well and truly lived up to its nickname
in December 1944 because it really was the 28th INFANTRY DIVISION
til
...o
Co 'keystone' of the defence in the centre of Major-General Norman O. Cota

()
VIII Corps' front, and its defence of the Our and Clerf HQ Company
crossings on 'Skyline Drive' bought the vital time
:> needed to reinforce Bastogne and deny this pivotal 109 Infantry Regiment (Rudder)
I
>. town to the Germans. The 25-mile (40-km) front held 110 Infantry Regiment (Fuller)
E by Major-General Norman Cota's three infantry 112 Infantry Regiment (Nelson) (to V Corps 20 December)
4: regiments, battered and understrength after their long 107 Field Artillery Battalion (10Smm)
"E 108 Field Artillery Battalion (1SSmm)
.c ordeal in the HOrtgen Forest, was too long to defend in
I- 109 Field Artillery Battalion (10Smm)
any depth. As a result, Cota used individual villages as
o::::> strong points , establishing a form of 'hedgehog'
229 Field Artillery Battalion (10Smm)
28 Reconnaissance Troop, Mechanized
defence. He also had CCR of 9th Armored Division 103 Engineer Combat Battalion
as a backstop. That this was inadequate to stop a 103 Medical Battalion
determined assault was known to everyone from 28 Signal Company
Bradley down - but this was the 'quiet' front. .. 28 Quartermaster Company
Omar Bradley had , in fact, a soft spot for the 728 Ordnance Light Maintenance Company
28th , because he had commanded it during 1942-43. Military Police Platoon
Orig inally a Pennsylvania National Guard formation , 707 Tank Battalion (attached)
the division was inducted into Federal service on 602 Tank Destroyer Battalion (M 18)
(attached 24-29 December)
17 February 1941 at Philadelphia, but did not
44 Engineer Combat Battalion (Kjeldsetb)
see action until , as part of XIX Corps, Third Army, it
(attached from corps reserve 18 December)
landed in France on 22 July 1944. Its commander,
Major-General Lloyd Brown, was killed during the

Major-General Norman battle the 28th broke through and captured Roscheid ,
Cota enjoys a rare but then German resistance caused the offensive to
moment of relaxation grind to a halt.
before he and his men After containing counter-attacks, the division was
were thrown into the moved north to Elsenborn on 1 October. At the end of
battles of the Hiirtgen the month the 28th relieved the 9th Infantry Division
Forest and 'Skyline and on 2 November launched an attack towards
Drive', (U.S, Army) Schmidt through the HOrtgen Forest. The official U.S.
history describes the following fighting as 'one of the
most costly division actions in the whole of World War
11' , with the small villages of Vossenack and Schmidt
changing hands several times.
Reassigned to VIII Corps and given a 'quiet' sector
bocage fighting north and west of st La on 12 August. of front in which to recuperate , the division suffered
Norman Cota succeeded him for the rest of the war. further heavy losses during the 'battle of the bulge' and
Now reassigned to V Corps, the division paraded the survivors were pulled back behind the Meuse. The
through Paris on 29 August before crossing the river reconstituted division was reassigned to XXI Corps
Oise northeast of the capital two days later. Continuing and helped in the capture of Colmar at the beginning
across France, Belgium and Luxembourg , it entered of February 1945. Advancing alongside French
Germany near Binfeld on 11 September and attacked armour, the division reached the river Ahr in early
54 the West Wall at Grosskampenberg. After a two-day March and saw no further action.
 c:
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28 Infantry Division o
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 c:
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87th Infantry Division
C

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'Golden Acorn'

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I M ajor-General Frank Culin's 87th had landed in
France only at the beginning of December 87th INFANTRY DIVISION
fIj
Co
L-
1944 and, assigned to Manton Eddy's Major-General Frank L. Culin
o XII Corps , moved up to the Saar-German border for HQ Company
U
Third Army's planned offensive. The division had
:> begun its attack through the West Wall on 345 Infantry Regiment (Sugg)
14 December and captured Rimling and Oberailbrach 346 Infantry Regiment (Wheeler)
after a fierce fight before operations were halted on the 347 Infantry Regiment (Tupper)
334 Field Artillery Battalion (105mm)
18th in response to the German Ardennes offensive.
335 Field Artillery Battalion (155mm)
The division was taken into SHAEF reserve on the
336 Field Artillery Battalion (105mm)
24th and five days later, reassigned to VIII Corps, it
912 Field Artillery Battalion (105mm)
re-assembled between Bertrix and Libramont, 87 Reconnaissance Troop, Mechanized
entrusted, alongside the 11 th Armored Division , with 312 Enginer Combat Battalion
the southern hook to rejoin First and Third Armies . 312 Medical Battalion
The division had been activated at Camp McCain, 87 Signal Company
Missouri, on 15 December 1942 under Major-General 87 Quartermaster Company
Percy Clarkson. Commanded since April 1944 by 787 Ordnance Light Maintenance Company
Frank Culin, it shipped to England in November and Military Police Platoon
arrived on the Continent on 5 December. Now, nearly 549 Anti-Aircraft Artillery Auto-Weapons Battalion (40mm)
(attached 24 December)
four weeks later, it had an important role to play in
761 Tank Battalion (Colored) (George)
re-establishing the front and driving the Germans back
(attached 20-23 December)
behind their start lines for Operation 'Herbstnebel'.
610 Tank Destroyer Battalion (M36) (detached 22 December)
On the morning of 30 December the 345th and 691 Tank Destroyer Battalion (M36) (attached 22 December)
346th Infantry Regiments trucked north to their start
line near Bras, their first objective to sever the German
supply route between St Hubert and Bastogne . division across the river Ronce and up to the Ourthe,
They took Moircy later in the day, then lost it to a where it made contact with British forces.
counter-attack on New Year's Eve, but recaptured it on Transferred back to XII Corps next day, the division
1 January. Further seesaw battles east of St Hubert at relieved the 4th Infantry on the Sauer south of
Bonnerue and Tillet over the next 10 days took the Echternach and captured Wasserbilling on the
23rd . The transfer was shortlived because , on the
Triumphant Gis of Culin's 87th Infantry Division meet 25th , the division reverted to VIII Corps . The
up with a British patrol in a village on the banks of the 87th relieved the 17th Airborne on the 26th and took
river Ourthe. (Imperial War Museum) over the St Vith sector. Attacking across the river Our
through the West Wall at the end of the month , the
division took Manderfeld and Auw, fought the battle for
the 'Schnee Eifel Crossroads' east of Kobscheid over
6-7 February, and then went over to the defensive.
The division returned to the attack at the end of the
month , helping capture Ormont and seizing a bridge
over the river Ahr on 8 March. In the middle of the
month it reached the Mosel and , after fierce hand-to-
hand fighting, captured Koblenz and the imposing Fort
Constantine. The division crossed the Rhein on the
25th, helped clear the Thuringer Wald during April and
56 ended the war on the Czech border at Falkenstein .
 c:
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87 Infantry Division
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Wheeler
346 Infantry Regiment o::::>
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57
 s:::
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'iii 106th Infantry Division
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'Golden Lions'
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..... T he 106th had only newly arrived in Europe on
6 December and its commander, Alan Jones, 106th INFANTRY DIVISION
tJ) was not at all happy about the position it was Major-General Alan w.Jones/
...oc.. placed in when he relieved Major-General Walter Brigadier-General Herbert T. Perrin
u Robertson's 2nd Infantry Division in the Schnee Eifel. HQ Company
:> This broad but shallow salient east of the West Wall,
I 422 Infantry Regiment (Deschenaux)
with its wooded valleys and hillsides, was a tempting
>-
E target for a German counter-attack, and Jones' fears 423 Infantry Regiment (Cavender)
~ were to be realised all too soon. 424 Infantry Regiment (Reid)
...
'C
The 106th was the last of the 66 U.S. infantry 589 Field Artillery Battalion (-) (105mm)
..r:. 590 Field Artillery Battalion (105mm)
I- divisions to be activated during World War 2. Formed on
u) 591 Field Artillery Battalion 105mm)
15 March 1943 at Fort Jackson, South Carolina, under
=i 592 Field Artillery Battalion (155mm)
Alan Jones, it was one of those unfortunate higher- 106 Reconnaissance Troop, Mechanized
numbered divisions whose ranks had been repeatedly 81 Engineer Combat Battalion (Riggs, see OOB 5)
stripped to provide replacements (,reinforcements') for 331 Medical Battalion
106 Signal Company
Major-General Alan Jones 106 Quartermaster Company
was one of the victims of 806 Ordnance Light Maintenance Company
the 'Battle of the Bulge'. Military Police Platoon
Unable to cope with the 440 Anti-Aircraft Artillery Auto-Weapons Battalion (40mm)
(attached 17 December)
situation, he sought
563 Anti-Aircraft Artillery Auto-Weapons Battalion (40mm)
reassurance rather than
(detached 18 December)
responsibility and had to
634 Anti-Aircraft Artillery Auto-Weapons Battalion (40mm)
be relieved of command. (detached 18 December)
(U.S. Signal Corps) 820 Tank Destroyer Battalion (M18) (attached)

other divisions. When it departed from Boston on Only the 424th Regiment, furthest south at Winterspelt,
10 November 1944, most of its men were only partially and elements of the 820th Tank Destroyer Battalion,
trained, but, unlike the equally raw 99th Infantry Division escaped westward to friendly lines.
on Elsenborn Ridge, they were unable to withstand the After the evacuation of St Vith the 424th, attached to
German onslaught. The result was the worst American 7th Armored Division, fought at Manhay before being
defeat in the whole of the European campaign, with withdrawn to Belgium. As an interim measure, the
6,697 men entering German captivity (of whom unattached 517th Parachute Infantry Regiment was
6,500 survived) . added to the 424th to constitute a 'new' 106th under Alan
To add insult to injury, the attack on the Schnee Jones' deputy, Brigadier-General Herbert Perrin. This
Eifel and the subsequent assault on St Vith were arrangement was shortlived and the 424th was
almost afterthoughts in German planning, designed re-attached to 7th Armored during the recapture of
just to close the gap between Fifth and Sixth Panzer St Vith in January 1945, fighting at Meyrode. Briefly
Armees. But, due to bad luck for the 106th, the attached to the 99th Infantry Division in February, the
Volksgrenadiers were able to exploit the breach 424th was withdrawn to St Quentin in March, where the
created by the withdrawal of the 14th Cavalry Group 3rd and 159th Infantry Regiments replaced the captured
in the Losheim Gap and surround the unfortunate units. However, the 106th saw no further action and was,
422nd and 423rd Infantry Regiments before there were with black humour, relegated to processing German pris-
58 sufficient reserves for a counter-attack to rescue them. oners for the rest of the war.
 c:
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106 Infantry Division
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59
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'iii 17th Airborne Division
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O n 16 December 1944 Major-General William
Miley's untried division was still in England , 17th AIRBORNE DIVISION
t/)
being inspected by the CO of XVIII (Airborne) Major-General William M. Miley
...c.
o Corps, Matthew Ridgway , to ensure its readiness for HQ Company
(,)
battle. Two days after the beginning of the German
:> offensive, Eisenhower ordered both it and the 507 Parachute Infantry Regiment (Raff)
I (attached to 82nd Airborne Division)
>- 11th Armored Division, which had just arrived in
E France, to proceed to the Meuse without delay . 513 Parachute Infantry Regiment (Coutts)
.d: (Ridgway himself had already flown post-haste to 193 Glider Infantry Regiment
'E join his deputy, James Gavin, in the 82nd Airborne
194 Glider Infantry Regiment (Pierce)
.s::. 466 Parachute Field Artillery Battalion (75mm)
I- headquarters at Werbomont.)
o::::> The division had been activated under Miley's
680 Glider Field Artillery Battalion (75mm)
681 Glider Field Artillery Battalion (75mm)
command on 15 April 1943 at Camp Mackall , North 155 Airborne Anti-Aircraft Battalion (37mm)
Carolina (named after one of the U.S. airborne corps' 139 Airborne Engineer Battalion
first fatal battle casualties during Operation 'Torch'). 224 Airborne Medical Company
The 17th arrived in England in August 1944 and 517 Airborne Signal Company
was flown by emergency night flights to Reims over 411 Airborne Quartermaster Company
23-25 December, bad weather having grounded its 717 Airborne Ordnance Maintenance Company
C-47s earlier than this. It immediately moved by road Military Police Platoon
to Charleville, but the threat of the Germans actually

Major-General Matthew and Watermal before it was relieved by the 87th

Ridgway was in England Infantry Division on the 26th. After assaulting across
inspecting Miley's new the river Our north of Dasburg in early February, the
17th Airborne Division on division was pulled out of the line back to Chalons-sur-
16 December, but flew Marne because it was needed for the assault across
back immediately to join the Rhein in a month.
his deputy, Jim Gavin, at Operation 'Varsity' began on 24 March and , after
XVIII (Airborne) Corps' the mishaps which had occurred during large-scale
command post in airborne missions earlier in the war, went off to near
Werbomont. (U.S. Army) perfection . The 17th dropped alongside the British
6th Airborne Division north of the little town of Wesel ,
rapidly cleared the Schappenberg Heights, captured
Diersfordt and Hamminkeln and pushed east
getting across the Meuse had now been eliminated. across the river IsseI. The amphibious follow-up by
The 17th was accordingly placed in the line near conventional infantry and armour was well executed
Neufchateau to relieve the shattered 28th Infantry and the 513th Parachute Infantry Regiment helped the
Division. British 6th Guards Armoured Brigade to capture
The division launched its first attack on 3 January Dorsten while the 507th overran Wulfen .
1945 and captured Flamierge on 7 January, but was On 5 April the division was moved to the Duisburg
forced out again the next day. However, the Germans area, assaulted across the Rhein-Herne and Berne
began purposefully retiring on the 11th, and the village Canals and captured Essen against only slight
returned to the paras' control. Salle, Bertogne and opposition. Two days later Major-General Miley
Givroulle followed in quick succession and by the end accepted the surrender of Duisburg and for the short
of the month the division had crossed the Ourthe, remainder of the war the 17th Airborne was engaged
60 occupied Steinbach and Limerle and captured Espeler in military government duties.
 I:
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193 Glider Regiment 194 Glider Regiment
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61
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'iii 101st Airborne Division
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'Screaming Eagles'
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he defence of Bastogne, and Brigadier-General
Anthony McAuliffe's reply when called upon to 101 st AIRBORNE DIVISION
fI)
surrender, have achieved the same sort of Brigadier-General Anthony C. McAuliffe
...a.o status in history as the battle of the Alamo. The parallel pp Major-General Maxwell B. Taylor
u is, in fact, quite close, because what the outnumbered HQ Company
defenders did in both cases was buy time.
:>
I The 101 st was unprepared for another battle so 502 Parachute Infantry Regiment (Chappuis)
>. 327 Glider Infantry Regiment (Harper)
E soon in December 1944. Like the 82nd 'All Americans',
1/401 Glider Infantry Regiment (Allen)
~ it had been enjoying a well-deserved respite at
377 Parachute Field Artillery Battalion (75mm) (Elkins)
'E Reims after its arduous struggle in Holland
..c: 463 Parachute Field Artillery Battalion (75mm) (Cooper)
I- through September and October. The two American
321 Glider Field Artillery Battalion (75mm) (Carmichael)
o
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airborne divisions constituted SHAEF's sole reserve
907 Glider Field Artillery Battalion (75mm) (Nelson)
81 Airborne Anti-Aircraft Battalion (37mm) (Cox)
Brigadier-General 326 Airborne Engineer Battalion (Mozley)
Anthony McAuliffe was 326 Airborne Medical Company (Barfield)
awarded the 101 Signal Company (Johnson)
Distinguished Service 426 Airborne Quartermaster Company (Horn)
Cross for his defence of 801 Airborne Ordnance Maintenance Company (Patterson)
Bastogne and, promoted Reconnaissance Platoon
to Major-General, given Military Police Platoon
101 Counter-Intelligence Corps Detachment
command of first the
501 Parachute Infantry Regiment (Ewell) (attached)
103rd and then the
506 Parachute Infantry Regiment (Sink) (attached)
79th Infantry Divisions in
509 Parachute Infantry Battalion (Tomasik)
1945. (u.S. Army)
(detached to XVIII (Airborne) Corps 18 December)
CCB, 10 Armored Division (Roberts) (attached)
37 Tank Battalion , 4 Armored Division
in mid-December 1944, although there were other (attached to CCB, 10 Armored Division , 20 December)
units on their way or on standby. For that reason, C Company, 9 Armored Engineer Battalion ,
Eisenhower was at first reluctant to release them until 9 Armored Division (attached)
the shape and the extent of the new German offensive 705 Tank Destroyer Battalion (M18) (Templeton)
was better understood. (attached 20 December)
The 82nd, which was better rested and better 755 Field Artillery Battalion (155mm) (Hartmann) (attached)
969 Field Artillery Battalion (Colored) (155mm) (Barnes)
prepared for immediate combat when Eisenhower
(attached)
acceded to Bradley's request to release the two
divisions, headed off first. Originally destined for
Bastogne, while the 101 st was going to assembie at
Houffalize, it was diverted to Werbomont to halt 506th northeast towards Fay, and the 501 st directly
Kampfgruppe 'Peiper' in the Ambleve valley. The 101 st east between Bizory and Neffe. The 327th Glider
went to Bastogne in its place, arriving on 19 December. Infantry Regiment (GIR) took over the southern sector,
It was commanded by McAuliffe because the regular with 111/327 at Flamierge and 1/327 at Senochamps,
CO, Major-General Maxwell Taylor, was in Washington . while the 326th Airborne Engineer Battalion filled in
On the morning of the 19th the division arrived in an the gap between 1/327 and 11/327 at Marvie. Combat
area to the west of the town bordered by the villages Command B from 10th Armored Division, which Patton
of Mande St-Etienne, Hemroulle and Champs. From had detached from XX Corps , had arrived the
here McAuliffe deployed the 502nd Parachute Infantry previous day and thrown out blocking forces at
62 Regiment (PIR) north towards Longchamps , the Noville, Longvilly and Wardin. The garrison was also
 r:::
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101 Airborne Division '5O
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Heavily festooned with bazookas, men of the On 6 June 1944 the 101 st was dropped before
501st Parachute Infantry Regiment march out of daylight, alongside the 82nd , in a broad triangle inland
Bastogne to an encounter with elements of Panzer Lehr from 'Utah' beach, the objective being to secure the
at Bizory. (U.S. Army) right flank of the Allied front while the British
6th Airborne similarly secured the left. The 502nd PIR
reinforced by surviving elements from CCR of quickly seized the beach exits at St-Martin-de-
9th Armored Division which had been supporting the Vareville and Pouppeville, but the 501st, landing
28th Infantry Division behind 'Skyline Drive'. around St-C6me-du-Mont, quickly ran into problems
These preparations complete, McAuliffe could only with 6 Fallschirm Regiment outside Carentan. Even
await events and pray for the swift arrival of Patton's reinforced by the 502nd PIR and the 327th GIR, it took
III Corps. He had the equivalent of only two battalions until the 11th to force the defenders out. The division
of tanks and two armoured infantry battalions to then assumed a defensive posture and repelled
reinforce his paras , plus one battalion of M7s with counter-attacks until relieved by the 83rd Infantry
105mm guns to support his own four field artillery Division on the 27th. It then returned to England.
battalions with their inadequate 75mm pack howitzers. The 101 st's next operation took place unexpectedly
Further reinforcements were essential if the vital town in September, after Montgomery conceived the
was to be held for more than a few days. audacious plan to seize a crossing over the Rhein at
It was an unusual situation for the men of the Arnhem by laying an 'airborne carpet' across Holland
101 st Airborne who were more used to attacking than for the tanks of XXX Corps. The division dropped
defending, and to being dropped from the air around Eindhoven on 17 September and captured the
rather than carried in trucks, but morale was high. bridge at Veghel , but failed to take the bridges intact
Although less combat experienced than the 82nd , the over the Wilhelmina Canal at Best and Son. Although
'Screaming Eagles' had already played a decisive role the British Guards Armoured Division managed to get
in influencing the outcome of the war in France and through Eindhoven and up to Nijmegen, seized by the
Holland. 82nd, they failed to get to Arnhem in time to secure the
The second U.S. airborne division to be created, 'bridge too far' captured by the British 1st Airborne
the 101 st had been activated at Camp Claiborne, Division.
Louisiana , on 15 August 1942 and moved to join the After fighting off counter-attacks in Holland during
82nd at Fort Bragg , North Carolina , a month later. Its October and November, the division was sent to
first commander, until Maxwell Taylor took over in Reims to recuperate before being sent to Bastogne in
March 1944, was Major-General William Lee, who December. After the 'Battle of the Bulge' it saw no
shipped the division to England in September 1943, further real action but enjoyed the distinction of
64 destination Normandy. reaching Berchtesgaden on 7 May 1945.
 t::
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Combat Command B, 10th Armored Division 'iii
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T he 10th Armored Division was moved from
Merzig on the river Saare to Luxembourg on COMBAT COMMAND B,
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17 December and William Roberts' CCB 10th ARMORED DIVISION 'C
reached Bastogne the following day. Under orders to Colonel William L. Roberts t::
(\I

protect the eastern approaches until the arrival of the HQ Company E

E
101 st Airborne next day, Roberts assigned each of his o
tank and infantry battalion commanders a village to 3 Tank Battalion (Cherry)
C Company, 21 Tank Battalion (Devereaux)
20 Armored Infantry Battalion (Desobry)
-
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Colonel William Roberts' o
54 Armored Infantry Battalion (O'Hara) U
skilful deployment of the I
420 Armored Field Artillery Battalion (M7) (Browne)
limited forces at his fJ)
c.
C Company, 55 Armored Engineer Battalion ~
disposal played a o
B Battery, 796 Anti-Aircraft Battalion (M15/M16) u
significant part in
C Company, 609 Tank Destroyer Battalion (M18)
denying Bastogne to the D Troop, 90 Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron, :>
I
Germans until help Mechanized (M5) >.
arrived. (U .S. Signal Corps) 37 Tank Battalion , 4 Armored Division (attached) E~

C Company, 9 Armored Engineer Battalion, «

'C
9 Armored Division (attached) ~

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defend, reinforcing them with parts of 9th Armored's as part of Patton's XX Corps. Back with its parent
CCR as they trickled west. Although one by one driven corps in February 1945, CCB crossed the Saar under
back into the main Bastogne perimeter, Roberts' heavy fire , captured a bridge intact across the Mosel at
battalions accomplished their task with distinction. the beginning of March and crossed the Rhein at the
The division had landed in France only in end of the month. It ended the war on the Danube at
September and CCB's first battle had been at Merzig Innsbruck.

101
)(

ROBERTS
?gtmored Division

I I I I
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65
 u.s. VIII CORPS' BATTLES
106th Infantry Division

Schnee Eifel - December 16-19

W hat went wrong? Given that the three infantry

regiments of Major-General Alan Jones'
106th Division were thinly spread, their
294 Grenadier Regiment exploited the vacuum in the
appropriately named Losheim Gap caused by the
precipitate withdrawal of the covering 14th Cavalry
positions were nothing like the skirmish line held by the Group. Sweeping through Roth and capturing Auw, it
28th to their south. They occupied well dug-in field debouched on to the flank and rear of Colonel George
fortifications with felled trees and shovelled earth Deschenaux's 422nd Regiment on the 106th's left
protection against artillery and mortar fire - prepared flank. Simultaneously, the German 293 Grenadier
over the previous month by the 2nd Infantry Division, Regiment exploited the thinly held boundary
which had vacated its relatively comfortable billet for the between the lines of Colonel Charles Cavender's
attack towards the Rur and Urft dams. The 106th was 423rd Regiment in the centre, and Colonel Alexander
fresh, having arrived on the Continent only 10 days Reid's 424th on the right flank.
earlier; and its opponents were predominantly equally While Reid's regiment was able to fall back through
'green' troops from a rehabilitated Luftwaffe field Winterspelt to join CCB of 9th Armored Division on the
division, the 18th. Yet, when the assault began on southeastern shoulder of the St Vith horseshoe, there
16 December, the 106th failed to respond to the was no salvation for the 106th's other two regiments.
challenge. The division's records are incomplete, for The division 's indecisive CO, Alan Jones, delayed
obvious reasons, and survivors' accounts are full of using CCB in a counter-attack because he had been
accusations of other people's incompetence, but what promised the support of the entire 7th Armored
actually happened was very simple. Division as well. Unsurprisingly, given the distance,
The German 18 Volksgrenadier Division's the weather and the roads, this did not begin

Survivors from the 106th:

Sergeant Slashy and
Private Phillips of the
424th Infantry Regiment,
which escaped
envelopment, roll up their
sleeping bags, weariness
and disappointment
written on their faces.
(U.S. Army)

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66 pages 68-72 77-78 173-76 1 79-82 ,85-86 127-34,83-84 187-88,94-95 139-40 135-38,89-90
deploying until late on 17 December, and by the and also started heading for Schonberg . The jaws had
18th a counter-attack was no longer feasible. closed , the trap was complete and , lacking firm
On the 106th's left flank, the Volksgrenadiers began direction from Alan Jones, the 422nd and 423rd,
by trying to take out the division's artillery , but a in effect, did nothing. Only the 424th in the south
counter-attack by the reserve 11/423rd stopped them; continued its fighting withdrawal towards the Our.
while in the centre, the village of Bleialf, which had Alan Jones finally, at about 0730 hrs on
been briefly captured, was retaken by B Company 18 December, ordered the two trapped regiments to
of the 81st Engineer Combat Battalion. Both small attempt a southwesterly retreat. Only Cavender still had
victories were shortlived . On 17 December radio contact, so he had to pass the word to Deschenaux
294 Grenadier Regiment captured Schonberg and its by hand. As the two columns were approaching Bleialf at
bridge over the river Our, blocking the two American about midday, Jones countermanded his earlier order
regiments' line of retreat towards St Vith. At around the and sent them backtracking towards Schonberg. The
same time , 293 Grenadier Regiment recaptured Bleialf last message they got from him, just before midnight,
was an order to recapture Schonberg! Although the men
Deschenaux's 422nd and Cavender's 423rd Infantry still had spirit, it was 'mission impossible' because they
Regiments were trapped by 18 Volksgrenadier had virtually no ammunition left. At about 1600 hrs on
Division's bold pincer attack which captured Bleialf and 19 December, after ordering their men to disable
Schonberg behind them. They waited in vain for the their weapons, Cavender and Deschenaux ordered
promised counter-attack by 7th Armored. surrender.

16/12/1944 17/12 18/12 19/12 20/12 21/12 22/12 23/12 24/12 25/12 26/12 27/12 28/12 29/12
pages 68-72 f 77-78 35-38,89-90
67
 u.s. VIII CORPS' BATTLES
112th Infantry Regiment, 28th Infantry Division

Sevenig/Ouren - December 16-18

T he German LVIII Korps' attack on 16 December

drove a wedge between Colonel Gustin
Nelson 's 112th and Colonel Hurley Fuller's
happening in their own sector. This was deliberate on
the part of the German Korps' commander, General
KrOger, who was banking on surprise to get his men
110th Regiments, and for the next four days Nelson across the Our. Thus , the first Woodward's men knew
fought a private war more or less completely out of the attack was when the false dawn revealed the
of touch with the 28th Infantry Division 's CO, shadowy shapes of German infantrymen almost on
Major-General Norman Cota. Nelson 's regiment, badly top of their lines. They were the assault companies
mauled in the HOrtgen Forest but now back up to of 1130 Volksgrenadier Regiment. Simultaneously,
strength , occupied a six-mile (10-km) stretch of front 60 and 156 Panzergrenadier Regiments attacked
between LOtzkampen , where it abutted on to the Lieutenant-Colonel William Allen's 1/112th on
424th Regiment of 106th Infantry Division, and Kalborn Woodward 's left.
on the left flank of the 11 Oth . Roughly in the centre of The German assault companies at Sevenig broke
its line, 111/112th occupied a small salient east of the into the 3rd Battalion's lines but then faltered under
river Our into Germany itself at Sevenig . From here, heavy fire from the 229th Field Artillery Battalion
sentries had heard enemy troop movements over the and were thrown out when Nelson launched two
preceding two nights, but nothing which appeared companies of Lieutenant-Colonel J.L. MacSalka 's
untoward . In fact, it was 116 Panzer and 560 Volks- reserve 2nd Battalion in a counter-attack. In the north,
grenadier Divisions moving into their attack positions. the assault company of 60 Panzergrenadier Regiment
At 0530 hrs the men of Major Walden Woodward 's came under enfilading fire from the 424th Regiment
II !/112th were woken by the sound of heavy artillery and went to ground, while 156 Panzergrenadier
fire to their north and south , but nothing seemed to be Regiment broke through to the 112th's artillery

Before the assault: men

of Colonel Gustin
Nelson's 112th Infantry
Regiment's headquarters
company carefully fuse
anti-tank mines. This
took great care with
fingers half numbed by
the cold.
(Imperial War Museum)

16/12/1944 17/12 18/12 19/12 20/12 21 /12 22/12 23/12 24/12 25/12 26/12 27/12 28/12 29/12
-

68 pages 66-67,70-72 77-78 73-76 179-82,85-86 27-34,83-84 187-88,94-95 39-40 35-38,89-90

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Although the German grenadiers broke through the had accounted for four Panthers, and the anti-tank
112th Infantry Regiment's lines and eventually forced guns on the west bank of the Our now accounted for
them to fall back behind the Our, they then found the four more. A counter-attack by 1I/112th could only
Ouren bridge would not bear the weight of their tanks. slow, not halt, the German build-up , and at 1400 hrs
Colonel Nelson had to order the 229th Field Artillery
positions at Welchenhausen but was repulsed by Battalion to redeploy west of the river.
the quad .50 machine-guns on the supporting M16 111/112th, which had not been attacked by tanks,
half-tracks. The first round had gone to the 112th, but was still holding on by the skin of its teeth , helped
the Germans had a sally port at Lotzkampen and by the Germans' own West Wall pillboxes. 1/112th,
1128 Volksgrenadier Regiment to the south had however, was in a precarious position following the
severed communications with the 110th Regiment at withdrawal of the 424th on its northern flank, and the
Heinerscheid. Germans' steady advance. After a messenger finally
With German tanks now in Uitzkampen , Colonel got through to General Cota mid-afternoon on the
Nelson deployed the towed 76mm guns of 17th, Nelson received permission to fall back behind
C Company, 630th Tank Destroyer Battalion, west of the Our. 1II/112th circled south and west and rejoined
the Our overlooking Ouren , reinforced by four M18s the rest of the regiment around Weiswampach , while
from 9th Armored Division 's 811th Tank Destroyer the remnants of 1/112th marched straight through
Battalion . It was none too soon because, about an Ouren under cover of darkness, while an officer
hour before dawn on 17 December, German artillery shouted commands in German!
began pounding at the 229th Field Artillery Battalion 's The regiment had a respite during the 18th because
positions, while a full company of Panthers began Kruger had redirected 116 Panzer Division to exploit
rolling towards the bridge at Ouren . the hole in 110th Infantry Regiment's lines further
Companies A and D of Allen 's 1/112th were overrun south . On the 19th, however, Nelson had no option but
and by 0930 hrs German tanks were overlooking to fall back further through Beiler and thence to join the
Nelson's command post in Ouren . The 811th 's M18s defenders in front of St Vith.

16/i271944 17/12 18/12 19/12 20/12 21/12 22/12 23/12 24/12 25/12 26/12 27/12 28/12 29/12
f-p-ag-e-s -
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0--72----r1-77---
78~7-3--7-6--'1-79--82,85-86 127-34,83-84 187-88.94-95 1 39-40 35-38,89-90 69
 U.S. VIII CORPS' BATTLES
1/110th Infantry Regiment, 28th Infantry Division

Marnach/Clervaux - December 16-18

C hateau Clervaux has a convincing ring to it as

the name on the label of a decent bottle of vin
rouge, but the only 'rouge' on the flagstones of
26 Volksgrenadier Division, but despite the disparity in
strength they would not find the battle a walkover.
Their attack began before the artillery barrage opened
the 12th-century castle in the centre of Clervaux on the up at 0530 hrs on 16 December, with German assault
morning of 18 December 1944 was the blood red of companies infiltrating the woods on the west bank of
the victims of the battle which had almost consumed the Our while it was still pitch dark. The first inkling
the ancient crenellated fortress. Colonel Fuller had that Germans were already across
The little town of Clervaux, nestling in the valley of the river was a radio message from Harold Milton 's
the river Clerf just a couple of miles (3 km) east of the 11I/110th at about 0615 hrs saying that enemy troops
German border at Dasburg, became central to Colonel were already at Holzthum. Fuller immediately notified
Hurley Fuller's defence of the 10-mile (16-km) front General Cota at the divisional headquarters in Wiltz.
allocated to the 110th Regiment of the 28th Infantry The assault against the 1st Battalion led
Division . However, he had only two battalions in the by 28 Panzer Pionier Abteilung and 11/304
line because Lieutenant-Colonel Ross Henbest's Panzergrenadier Regiment was delayed by a minefield,
2nd was in divisional reserve halfway back to but by 0800 hrs they were up to the well dug-in men of
Bastogne at Donnange. Lieutenant-Colonel Donald Company B at Marnach. Here, they were hotly received
Paul's 1/110th thus held the northern sector from but rapidly infiltrated the woods north and south of the
Heinerscheid via Marnach to Hosingen, where Major village, so Colonel Paul ordered Companies A and C to
Harold Milton's 1II/110th continued the line south to counter-attack their flanks north and south from
Weiler. Beyond that, the division 's 109th Regiment Heinerscheid and Munshausen . Both the relieving
took over, although this would be hit not by Fifth forces ran into heavy fire and could make only slow
Panzer but by Seventh Armee . headway.
Because two infantry battalions could not possibly Meanwhile - it was now about 1000 hrs - General
hold such a stretch of front in any depth , Colonel Fuller Cota had not been idle despite the very limited
had constructed a form of 'hedgehog' line using the resources available to him. Notwithstanding Fuller's
villages along the ridge which bisects the rivers Our pleas, he refused to release the reserve 11/11Oth, but
and Clerf (known to the Americans as 'Skyline Drive') did order Companies A and B of the 707th Tank
as strongpoints. Company A was furthest north , abut- Battalion to the regiment's aid. Company A, leaving a
ting the right flank of the 112th Regiment at platoon in Munshausen, moved out towards Marnach
Heinerscheid . Company B and a platoon from the in the wake of Company C's infantry, while Company
630th Tank Destroyer Battalion held the centre at B went to the aid of the 3rd Battalion. For the time
Marnach, with Colonel Fuller's regimental command
post a mile behind at Clervaux; while Company C was Lieutenant-Colonel Donald Paul's isolated companies
a little to the southwest at Munshausen . on 'Skyline Drive' suffered heavily in trying to deny 2
Opposing Donald Paul's 1st Battalion on the Panzer Division westward access across the river Clerf,
east bank of the Our behind Dasburg was the whole but their defence at Marnach and Clervaux delayed the
of 2 Panzer Division and a substantial part of Germans long enough for Bastogne to be reinforced.

-
16/12/1944 17/12 18/12 19/12 20/12 21/12 22/12 23/12 24/12 25/12 26/12 27/12 28/12 29/12

70 pages 66-69 1 77-78 in-76 179-82,85-86 127-34,83-84 187 -88,94-95 139-40 135-38,89-90
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After the battle, the little town of Clervaux lies in ruins. companies ran straight into the arms of 2 Panzer
The chateau defended by Captain Claude Mackey's Division and were stopped dead in their tracks. The
headquarters company of the 11 Oth is to the right of the third sortie , by the platoon of M4s still in Munshausen ,
twin-spired church. (U.S. Signal Corps) reached Marnach only to find no one left alive. The
battle for Clervaux itself was about to begin .
being , though, the struggle remained an infantry one, Although the tanks of 3 Panzer Regiment could
because German engineers were still struggling to approach only along the narrow road winding tortuously
erect the 60-ton bridge at Dasburg so that 2 Panzer down towards the river Clerf, they soon overcame the
Division 's tanks could advance. one remaining platoon of the 707th Tank Battalion which
Of N707th's platoons of M4s, one caught up with advanced to meet them , and German infantry were
the Company C infantry and returned with them to quickly into the southeastern parts of Clervaux. Further
Munshausen because of the plight of 111/11 Oth to the help for the 11 Oth arrived at about midday: the 19 M4s of
south . One platoon remained in Clervaux while the Company B of the 2nd Tank Battalion from 9th Armored
third pressed on to Marnach. Radio contact was lost at Division's CCR. Again , however, their effectiveness was
dusk. Company B had finally been overrun, as had dissipated by sending one troop to Heinerscheid and
Battery A of the 109th Field Artillery Battalion which one to Reuler. By late afternoon the companies in both
had been supporting them. Battery B, protected by a villages had been overrun . At 1825 hrs Colonel Fuller
scratch 'Company D' which Fuller assembled from reported that he was evacuating Clervaux , whose
men who had been on leave in Clervaux, continued streets were now full of German tanks and grenadiers.
firing. By this time, however, the German engineers Only minutes later, he was captured . The final round
had completed the bridge over the Our and 2 Panzer went to the little garrison of headquarters troops
Division 's tanks were on the march. acommanded by Captain Claude Mackey still in the
Still believing that some hope existed for Company chateau . While one GI played a piano, according to a
B in Marnach, early on the morning of 17 December Belgian refugee sheltering in the fortress, snipers fired
Colonel Fuller launched a three-pronged attack through the ancient arrow slits , and a solitary M4 in the
towards the village. From Heinerscheid , the courtyard exchanged fire with the approaching Panthers
707th Tank Battalion 's light company of M5s headed until a return shot blew its turret off. The last bastion of
south at about 0700 hrs; within 10 minutes they had 1/110th held out until noon on 18 December but, with
lost 11 tanks , which ended that sortie. General Cota flames consuming half the castle, when a German tank
had also agreed to release the reserve 11/11 Oth at long finally blasted its way into the courtyard and began firing
last, less one company which was ordered to Wiltz. at close quarters, Mackey had no option other than to
Attacking east from Clervaux , the remaining two raise a white flag .

16/ 12/1944 17/12 18/12 19/12 20/12 21 /12 22/12 23/12 24/12 25/12 26/12 27/12 28/12 29/12
72 pages 66-69 77-78 173-76 79-82,85-86 27-34,83-84 I 87-88,94-95 139-40 35-38,89-90
u.s. VIII CORPS' BATTLES
44th Engineer Combat Battalion

Wiltz - December 18-19

B y midday on 18 December it was clear to both

Major-General Norman Cota and to VIII Corps'
commander, Troy Middleton , that the
to remove his headquarters back to Sibret, southwest
of Bastogne. Before he left, Cota organised a
scratch defence for Wiltz comprising men from
28th Infantry Division's remaining positions east of the headquarters and quartermaster companies ,
the river Clerf were untenable, and any thought of bandsmen and stragglers. The latter included half a
counter-attack with the meagre forces available was dozen M4s from the 707th Tank Battalion ; a few
out of the question. M18s and towed guns from the 630th Tank Destroyer
On the north of the division's front , the Battalion; some M15s and M8s from the 447th Anti-
112th Regiment was falling back in line with the Aircraft Battalion and 28th Reconnaissance Troops;
424th towards 9th Armored Division's CCB at St Vith. plus a couple of understrength batteries of the
In the centre, the 110th Regiment had evaporated 687th Field Artillery Battalion's 105mm howitzers from
as a fighting force apart from elements of the VIII Corps' reserve. Overall command was vested in
3rd Battalion which were gradually giving ground back Cota's executive officer, Colonel Dan Strickler.
through Consthum . In the south, the 109th Regiment The mainstay of the defence, however, was
was in a similar position to the 112th, out of contact Lieutenant-Colonel Clarion Kjeldseth 's 600-strong
and retiring towards the lines of 9th Armored Division's 44th Engineer Combat Battalion, also from corps
CCA, while the remnants of CCR were urgently reserve . Two companies set up blocking positions in
needed at Bastogne. the hamlets of Eschweiler and Erpeldange, right in the
In the light of the rapidly deteriorating situation on path of Panzer Lehr, while the third remained in Wiltz.
the afternoon of 18 December, General Cota decided The irony of the whole situation is that, if Middleton

Despite the small number

of troops engaged, the
street fighting in Wiltz
was intense, with troops
on both sides taking
advantage of stone walls
for cover. Note the
fortunate GI in the
foreground carries a
Thompson M1A1, a
simplified version of the
famous M1928 with
straight foregrip and box
magazine.
(Imperial War Museum)

16/12/1944 17/12 18/12 19/12 20/12 21/12 22/12 23/12 24/12 25/12 26/12 27/12 28/12 29/12
-pa- g-es- 6-6--7-2 - - , -7-7--7-8- 7-5--76----;1-7-9-8-2,-85--8-6- 27- --34-,8-3--8-4 -~87 -88,94-95 I 39-40 I 35-38,89-90
73
 III

110C8J28
Fuller
(all depleted
battalions retiring)

- -
o

Wiltz was not a prime objective to the Germans and its engineers back to Weidingen . The German recce
defence, unlike that at Clervaux, Hosingen, Consthum battalion did not attack but rejoined the rest of Panzer
and Holzthum, did not delay them. Lehr, leaving infantry of the 26th Volksgrenadier
Division to keep the defenders of Wiltz pinned down.
had not ordered that Wiltz be defended , it would not Early on the morning of 19 December the sadly
have been attacked because it lay south of Panzer depleted 1I1/110th trudged from the southeast to
Lehr's Rollbahn . However, because the garrison swell the garrison , but it was hotly followed
posed a threat to the German flank, it could not be by paratroops from 5 Fallschirm Division . Then ,
ignored . mid-afternoon , infantry and assault guns from
Having driven the 200-odd survivors of Major Harold 26 Volksgrenadier Division also attacked from the
Milton's 111/11 Oth southwest out of Consthum to Nocher, northeast, driving the engineers in Erpeldange back
Panzer Lehr's Aufklarungs Abteilung turned left at the across the river Wiltz into the town. Kjeldseth's battalion
road junction east of Eschweiler and headed for Wiltz, had already lost over 25 per cent of its original strength
while 902 Panzergrenadier Division, accompanied and, by the time night fell, the American perimeter was
personally by Generalleutnant Fritz Bayerlein, headed as full of holes as Swiss cheese. Colonel Strickler
west through Eschweiler. They quickly disposed of four ordered all his men to fall back as best they could
M18s supporting the company of engineers in the towards Sibret and Bastogne, but the countryside in
village , but Kjeldseth's men held their fire until the between was swarming with Germans by this time and
German tanks had passed, then opened up on the precious few who made it safely were cold , wet,
the infantry. The Panzergrenadiers rallied quickly, starving and exhausted. It was a big price to pay for a
however, and by dusk had driven the outnumbered little town the Germans did not want in the first place.

16/12/1944 17112 18/12 19/12 20/12 21/12 22/12 23/12 24/12 25/12 26/12 27/12 28/12 29/12
74 pages 66-72 177-78 175-76 179-82,85-86 127-34,83-84 187-88,94-95 1 39-40 135-38,89-90
 c:
U.S. VIII CORPS' BATTLES
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O n 18 December, after two days of reverses

with only minor local successes, Combat
Command A had straightened its lines some
Sauer. The Volksgrenadiers' main assault across the
river took place north and south, through Wallendorf
and Bollendorf, encircling three companies of Collins'
Co
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(,)

:>
3 miles (5 km) east of the river Sauer and was men and forcing him to withdraw the remainder to (J)
:::l
preparing to counter-attack . Unfortunately, the Beaufort, which also had to be abandoned shortly after
opposing 276 Volksgrenadier Division had the same dark on the 17th.
idea and, in effect, Colonel Thomas Harrold's men ran By the 18th, however, Colonel Harrold felt more
into a nasty ambush. secure, having brought forward his own 19th Tank
At the beginning of the German offensive on the Battalion to reinforce the 3rd Armored Field Artillery
16th, CCA occupied a 3-mile (5-km) front linking and Battalion, Battery A of the 482nd Anti-Aircraft Battalion
supporting 4th Infantry Division on its right and the and Troops A and B of the 89th Cavalry
109th Regiment of 28th Infantry Division on its left. Its Reconnaissance Squadron which, with Collins'
most forward element was Lieutenant-Colonel 60th Infantry, constituted the main 'teeth' of the
Kenneth Collins' 60th Armored Infantry Battalion just command. In addition, Harrold had the M18s of the
east of Beaufort, around Dillingen, overlooking the attached 811th Tank Destroyer Battalion's Company B.
On 18 December, therefore, feeling secure that
Engineers moving damaged 9th Armored Division M4s there was no more danger of being outflanked,
to a field workshop. A surprising number of tanks Colonel Harrold prepared to counter-attack the
abandoned on battlefields could be repaired within a 276th Volksgrenadiers, whose commander,
few hours. (u.S. Army) Generalleutnant Kurt Mohring, had actually been killed

16/12/1944 17/12 18/12 19/12 20/12 21 /12 22/12 23/12 24/12 25/12 26/12 27/12 28/12 29/12
pages 66-72 1 77-78 173-74 179-82,85-86 127-34,83-84 187 -88,94-95 1 39-40 135-38,89-90 75
 ...oc: the previous evening while preparing his own latest almost to a man by wicked crossfire from both sides.
.c assault. He had assembled a battalion of grenadiers Hall's main force , following the same path after
Q)
> and an anti-tank company (with no fewer than daybreak, was led by the light tanks . The fi rst M5 was
C1l
en 54 Panzerfausts ) in the woods east of the hit by a Panzerfaust round , blocking the road , and the
't Ermsdorf-Savelborn road with the intention of striking second task force under Major Tommie Philbeck
o
"C
VI towards Medernach . arrived in the middle of a firefight. After six more tanks
...E
W
Colonel Harrold's intention was to rescue the three had been destroyed , both groups retired to Savelborn .
60th Armored Infantry companies northeast of That the Germans did not pursue their advantage is
I
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Beaufort. He assembled what small reserve he had - due to the fact that the Volksgrenadiers' new CO, Oberst
EC1l one company of M4s, a platoon of M5s, a cavalry Hugo Dempwolff, wanted to take stock. He spent
aJ platoon , the intelligence and reconnaissance platoon 19 December reorganising his forces for a new attack
-VI
and a company of combat engineers - and formed towards Christnach , which gave about half the men of
...oc.. them into two task forces. The leading one , under the three surrounded companies of the 60th Armored
()
Captain John Hall , was preceded by the I&R platoon , Infantry a chance to rejoin their battalion. By the evening
:> which set off before dawn along the narrow track lead- of the 19th, Dempwolff had actually received four of the
o::::> ing to Berens through the woods where the precious StuG assault guns assigned to Seventh Armee.
Volksgrenadiers were assembled. It was wiped out Using his one uncommitted regiment, the 987th, he
attacked towards Christnach next afternoon, but by th is
The German 276 Volksgrenadier Division enjoyed a very time CCA's artillery and tank destroyers were well
shortlived victory over CCAl9th Armored east of dug-in and the attack failed . Smoke from the burning
Medernach on 18 December and its later attack toward StuGs marked the high tide level of what turned out to be
Christnach was a disaster. 276 Volksgrenadier Division 's last assault.

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o .. i);iome1re

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76
U.S. VIII CORPS' BATTLES
CCR, 9th Armored Division and Team 'Cherry'

Longvilly/Mageret - December 17-19

D uring 18 December the defences around

Bastogne were gradually beginning to take
shape , although they were still full of holes.
101 st Airborne Division time to deploy.
He had , in fact, already begun putting this process
into action a day earlier by assigning those elements
There was , as yet, no cohesive line except for a weak of Colonel Joseph Gilbreth 's CCR , 9th Armored
eastern perimeter established by Lieutenant-Colonel Division , which were not already engaged in
Sam Tabets' 158th Engineer Combat Battalion immediate support of the 28th Infantry Division , to
running from Foy through Bizory to Neffe. What block the roads from Clervaux and Wiltz. A task force
General Middleton had arranged before he departed under Captain Lawrence Rose , comprising his
for his new corps headquarters at Neufchateau on the own Company A of the 2nd Tank Battalion plus a
19th was a series of delaying actions in the villages company from Lieutenant-Colonel Robert Booth 's
north , east and so uth of Bastogne to give the 52nd Armored Infantry Battalion and a platoon of
engineers , was placed at the Antoniushof farm road
Even though they suffered grievous losses, junction just north of Lullange. A second task force ,
CCR/9th Armored's roadblock teams did delay 2 Panzer comprising Company C of Lieutenant-Colonel Ralph
Division's westward advance and forced it to veer Harper's 2nd Tank Battalion and another company of
northwest of Bastogne at a time when the town itself armoured infantry, established itself further back at
lay wide open. Baraque d'Alierborn. Already there they found about

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I-- ----------------~--
pages 66-72 73-76 179-82 ,85-86 27-34,83-84 87-88,94-95 139-40 135-38,89-90 77
 Photographed in January
1945 during the Allied
counter-offensive, the
road between Longvilly
and Mageret was still
strewn with abandoned
M4s and wrecked trucks
from CCR of 9th and
CCB of 10th Armored
Divisions. (U.S. Army)

100 stragglers from the 28th Infantry Division 's At Longvilly itself, welcome reinforcements arrived
110th Regiment which had been rallied by a divisional during the evening of the 18th. Colonel Will iam
staff officer, Colonel Theodore Seely. Behind these Roberts' CCB of Patton 's 10th Armored Division had
two task forces , at Longvilly itself, Gilbreth set up his begun deploying at Bastogne during the day and was
headquarters and put Colonel Booth , with his third split into three main task forces , 'Cherry', 'Desobry'
infantry company and the remainder of CCR (including and 'O'Hara '. That commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel
most of the 73rd Armored Field Artillery Battalion 's Henry Cherry , CO of the 3rd Tank Battalion ,
M7s) on the ridge to the north . established its headquarters in Neffe. From here he
Task Force 'Rose ' did not survive long. By despatched an advance guard under 1st Lieutenant
mid-morning on the 18th the reconnaissance battalion Edward Hyduke towards Longvilly. This encountered
of 2 Panzer Division which had broken through at a scene of indescribable confusion with men and
Clervaux had reached the road junction. By 1400 hrs it vehicles streaming back towards Mageret, an d
was reinforced by a company of 3 Panzer Regiment Hyduke threw out his four M4s and five M5s as a
PzKpfw IVs, and within half an hour Rose had lost screen. Behind him the main task force , Captain
seven M4s. The remaining five broke out after dark Will iam Ryerson 's Company A of the 3rd Tan k
towards Houffalize but were ambushed and only a Battalion , deployed defensively, under orders not to
handful of men made it back to Bastogne. At about the venture further east than Longvilly.
same time, Task Force 'Harper' at Baraque d'Alierborn German troops from Panzer Lehr occupied Mageret
came under attack. Two of Company C's platoons during the night of the 18th/19th and Colonels Cherry
of Shermans were wiped out and the supporting and Gilbreth ordered their forces to fight their way
com-pany of infantry lost heavily to machine-gun fire . through back to Bastogne, leaving Hyduke's advance
Harper himself was killed and the survivors trudged guard as a rearguard . This resulted in a massive
back to Longvilly. Task Force 'Booth ' fared no better. traffic jam on the narrow road , and there were so many
Although it was not attacked during the night of the Germans now in Mageret that a breakthrough was
18th/19th, German tanks got behind it through Bourcy. impossible. Led by Ryerson , however, the bulk of
Booth had lost communications with Gilbreth and Team 'Cherry' managed to fight its way cross-country
decided to pull back northwest to avoid encirclement. to relative safety at Bizory , which was now
However, he was ambushed near Hardigny and only occupied by men of the 101st Airborne Division 's
225 of his men eventually made it back to Bastogne. 501 st Parachute Infantry Regiment.

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I-p-ag-e-s -
66--7-2--~-~17-3--7-6--~1-
79--8-2 ,85-86 127 -34,83-84 -~18-
7 --88,9-4--9-5-~13-9-
-40 T35-38 ,89-90
78
u.s. VIII CORPS' BATTLES
~
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ii5
501st Parachute Infantry Regiment, 101st Airborne Division ~CI)
Z

1/1
CI)

EC\I
al
Neffe/Bizory - December 19-20 -1/1
...o
Co

(.,)

:>
A bout an hour after the weak winter sun had
lightened the clouds overhanging Bastogne on
the morning of 20 December, the men of Major
After conferring with VIII Corps' commander, Troy
Middleton , and the 101 st Airborne Division's acting
CO, Brigadier-General Anthony McAuliffe, Colonel
en
:::)

Sammie Homan's 2nd Battalion, 501 st Parachute Ewell got the 501st PIR on the road at 0600 hrs on
Infantry Regiment (11/501 st PIR), welcomed into their 19 December with Major Ray Bottomly's 1st Battalion
ranks the nine M4s (some sources say seven) and in the van . Soon after daybreak the leading platoons
other battered, weary but still confident survivors of closed in on the chateau just west of Neffe, from which
Captain William Ryerson's task force from Team could be heard intense small-arms fire and the chatter
'Cherry'. Forty-eight hours earlier the paras had been of heavier automatic weapons.
resting at Camp Mourmelon, outside Reims, France. After the Germans had effectively broken Team
Now, after an eight-hour, 107-mile (170-km) journey 'Cherry's forces at Longvilly, a detachment from
by truck through rain, sleet and snow, 11/501st was Panzer Lehr (after losing one tank to a bazooka round)
deployed on the left flank of Lieutenant-Colonel Julian had driven its reconnaissance platoon back from its
Ewell's regiment east of Bastogne. The 501 st was the roadblock near the railway station in Neffe to the
first of the 101 st Airborne Division's four regiments to stone-walled chateau. Stripping his vehicles of their
reach the town , at around midnight on 18 December. .50 machine-guns and mounting them in the castle
By this time the battle for the roadblocks east of the windows , Colonel Cherry and his tiny garrison had
town was in full swing, and there was a grave danger held out for four hours before the paras' timely arrival.
that a determined German armoured thrust could Later in the day, however, incendiaries set the chateau
seize Bastogne before the remainder of the ablaze and it had to be evacuated, the survivors falling
101st could be deployed . In fact, the commander of back to Mont.
2 Panzer Division, Oberst Meinrad von Lauchert, had The only other troops left defending the
suggested just this , but was ordered in no uncertain Neffe-Bizory line were some engineers from Sam
terms to press on to the river Meuse. Tabets' 158th Battalion on the left and Lieutenant-
Colonel Paul Symbol's 35th on the right. Colonel Ewell
Lieutenant-Colonel Julian wasted no time rectifying the situation but it was
Ewell, CO of the fortunate that Panzer Lehr did not pursue its
501st PIR at Bastogne, advantage. (The division's commander,Generalieutnant
had commanded its Fritz Bayerlein, confessed after the war that the
3rd Battalion on D-Day unexpected opposition east of Bastogne had caused
and at Eindhoven during him a temporary loss of nerve.)
Operation 'Market Positioning Bottomly's 1/501 st in the centre of his
Garden' before taking line, Ewell sent the second battalion to arrive ,
over the regiment. He Homan's 11/501 st, towards Bizory, and positioned
ended the war with the Lieutenant-Colonel George Griswold's 111/501 st on his
rank of major-general. right with orders to secure Mont and the ridge south of
(u.S. Army) Neffe. Griswold 's Company I was on the far right of the

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pages 66-72 177-78 173-76 81-82,85-86127-34,83-84 1 87 -88,94-95 T 39-40 135-38,89-90 79
 xx :
Lehr l o rXLVU.
Bayerler

.~h==W4~· · ··. .. (-) ~

~ "~02 ~Lehr
t : ". I

.... ~ - 1~-J IOI Lehr

(,i ~ 101
7.O5 ~
~:i -
(-V~
CCB
II

10
'

;: I ... ...
(-)~1.ehr
902 ~ '.
Poschinger '···..
..
Templeton
O'Hara I ~ III ...... .
Wallace

Although 902 Panzergrenadier Regiment forced the the combat engineers and waited for the onslaught.
defenders out of Neffe, the arrival of the Panzer Lehr attacked during the night of the
501 st Parachute Infantry Regiment securely blocked 19th, two battalions of 902 Panzergrenadier Regiment
eastern access to Bastogne, forcing Panzer Lehr to supported by a company of tanks moving against
detour southwest. 1II/501st south of Neffe, Colonel Ewell called down
artillery fire while Griswold 's paras , well dug-in on the
line at Wardin , where it had a tough fight before ridge east of Mont, poured a withering hail of fire into
establishing contact with CCB/1 Oth's Team 'O'Hara', the ranks of the grenadiers, who were literally
In the centre of the line between Neffe and Bizory, hamstrung by Belgian farmers ' barbed wire fences,
the enemy remained strangely silent, although further Flares fired by a platoon of M 18s from Lieutenant-
east Panzer Lehr was busy destroying what remained Colonel Cliff Templeton 's 705th Tank Destroyer
of CCR/9th and Ryerson 's task force between Battalion outside Marvie illuminated the scene , and
Longvilly and Mageret. At Bizory, on the left flank , after three Panzers had been destroyed , the rest
26 Volksgrenadier Division 's 78th Regiment tried retired with the infantry following. It had , in truth , been
probing towards Luzery , intending to get into Bastogne a half-hearted attack because by this time Bayerlein
down the Noville road , The grenadiers , already had decided the best way into Bastogne was from the
exhausted from trying to keep up with the Panzer south and west. For the time being , therefore , Ewell's
divisions , came under heavy flanking fire from 501st would be left in peace . By 21 December,
11/501 st's Company F, forcing them to veer north , however, Bastogne was completely encircled and
using the woods as cover. Meanwhile, all along the the siege began in earnest. However, Patton 's
line the paras extended the foxholes already dug by 4th Armored Division was on its way ",

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pages 66-72 77-78 73-76 81-82 ,85-86 27-34,83-84 87-88,94-95 39-40 35-38 ,89-90
80
u.s. VIII CORPS' BATTLES
Team 'O'Hara', Company I, 1II/501st Parachute Infantry Regiment and
705th Tank Destroyer Battalion

Wardin/Marvie - December 19-20

L ieutenant-Colonel Clifford Templeton 's

705th Tank Destroyer Battalion, activated a
week after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor
Before the arrival of the 705th, and the
101 st Airborne, the defence on the southeastern flank
of Bastogne rested almost solely with the second of
in December 1941 and shipped to France in July 1944, 10th Armored Division Combat Command B's task
deserves a bigger part in the story of the 'Battle of the forces, Team 'O'Hara'. Commanded by Lieutenant-
Bulge' than it usually receives. Transferred from Ninth Colonel James O'Hara, CO of the 54th Armored
Army and ordered to Bastogne on 18 December 1944, Infantry Battalion, this comprised Company B of the
its commander dropped off eight M18s at Ortheuville 54th; the M4s of Company C, 21st Tank Battalion; a
en route which had a significant effect on the speed platoon of M5s from Company D of the 3rd Tank
of the German LVIII Korps' advance. So did the Battalion; a platoon of engineers; and a cavalry
battalion's lightly armoured but fast-moving 'Hellcat' platoon . O'Hara had a 'watching brief on the villages of
tank destroyers in the ensuing battle around Bastogne Wardin and Marvie on the south bank of the river Wiltz,
itself after they arrived during the evening of overlooking the main Diekirch-Ettelbruck-Eschdorf
19 December, just in time to help repel Panzer Lehr road . His men therefore had a predominantly quiet day
south of Neffe and playa part in the battles for Noville on the 19th, because the main German forces were
and Champs to the northeast and west. north of the river, heading west from Wiltz and
Clervaux through the tatters of the 110th Regiment,
Abandoned but still looking defiant, one of the Team 28th Infantry Division.
'O'Hara' M4s beside the road between Wardin and The first O'Hara's men knew of any Germans in
Marvie after Panzer Lehr struck out at the threat to its their immediate vicinity was when a Jeep driven by
southern flank, (u.S. Signal Corps) Company C commander Lieutenant John Devereaux

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pages 66-72 177-78 173-76 I 79-80,85-86 127-34,83-84 187-88,94-95 I 39-40 135-38,89-90 81
 was fired on just outside Wardin . Even as he hastily an accident than a planned move. Bayerlein had no
reversed , paras of Company I, 1I1/501st, started interest in Wardin until American troops moved in. Then
entering the village from the northwest, unseen in it became a potential threat to his southern flank and an
the thick morning mist. Part of Panzer Lehr's obstacle to his drive towards the Meuse.
reconnaissance battalion moved in from the northeast at The next attack towards O'Hara's position started at
the same time , and the two groups inevitably about 0645 hrs on 20 December with an artillery
collided in the middle. The 130-odd men of Captain barrage which brought a prompt response from the
Claude Wallace's company made a brave effort of it, supporting 420th Field Artillery Battalion . Neither side
fighting from house to house and disabling a Jagdpanzer could actually see what they were firing at because
IV with a bazooka round . But the paras were quickly it was foggy again , so there was little damage. As
overwhelmed , losing all their officers including Wallace the weak wintry sun began to disperse the mist, a
amongst the 45 killed or badly wounded , and the Jagdpanzer IV opened up, seeming to aim directly at
survivors retreated southwest towards Marvie, past O'Hara's command post. It was actually firing at some
O'Hara's position on the wooded hill overlooking the of his M5s outside Marvie! Then , as more German
highway. Like so many small-scale actions in the tanks and infantry half-tracks of 901 Panzergrenadier
Ardennes, the whole tragic skirmish had been more of Regiment appeared , heading west, O'Hara 's M4s had
a field day; two shots disposed of two Panzers , a
Lieutenant-Colonel James O'Hara's blocking position bazooka round got a third and the fourth fled . The
outside Wardin, on the flank of Panzer Lehr's westward Jagdpanzer also tried to turn back, but was hit and
route, forced the bulk of the division to take a more burst into flames. The battle of Wardin was over, but
southerly road, leaving just one regiment behind . that for Marvie had only just begun.

.. ... t-..
III :

901 ~Lehr
Hauser! \

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.....[,="'"
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1~1\c;?!~' 901 ~l~' /

=~~iiiif~.~,"c:=:::il m"'..i\:... .....

.... lkilometre

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~~-

pages 66-72 77-78 173-76 179-80 ,85-86 I 27-34,83-84 87-88,94-95 39-40 35-38,89-90
82
u.s. VIII CORPS' BATTLES
1I/327th Glider Infantry Regiment, 101 st Airborne Division ",
CII
E(IJ
III
-",

o
...Co
Marvie - December 20-24 u
:>
en
::i
, NutS!' The story of the German surrender During 20 December the bulk of 2 Panzer Division
demand to the Bastogne garrison, and to the north and Panzer Lehr to the south bypassed
Brigadier-General Anthony McAuliffe's Bastogne in their westward drive towards the river
reply, has been repeated and embellished so many Meuse, but 26 Volksgrenadier Division was tightening
times that it will not be reiterated here. It would not its hold on the perimeter and would soon be
have been included at all apart for the facts that the reinforced. By midnight all roads in and out of the town
German emissaries delivered their ultimatum into the were closed, and Troy Middleton entrusted McAuliffe
lines of Lieutenant-Colonel Roy Inman's 2nd Battalion with command of all the troops within the ravelins of
of the 327th Glider Infantry Regiment (1I/327th GIR) the surrounding villages. To put that in perspective,
at 1130 hrs on 22 December; and that it was the Bastogne was a 'fortress' with a curtain wall roughly
regiment's CO, Colonel Joseph Harper, who returned two and a half miles (4 km) in diameter. At Marvie and
with McAuliffe's reply and his own translation, 'Go to the other outposts, this was of little concern. The
Hell!' Forever afterwards, he could not understand night had turned bitterly cold and snow flurries were
why he added, 'And good luck'. beginning to drift. The battle had become a pure one
Inman 's battalion relieved Company A of the of endurance and survival.
35th Engineer Combat Battalion just west of Marvie at Fortunately for 11/327th GIR the next two days
the same time in the morning of 20 December that passed almost without incident, apart from some
Panzer Lehr inadvisably launched its four tanks, shelling and the surrender demand on the 22nd . Many
solitary Jagdpanzer and a company of infantry against of the paras seriously believed that the Germans were
the Team 'O'Hara ' M5s, with the result already offering to surrender, and started relaxing. They knew
described. However, Inman himself was wounded by that Patton 's Third Army was on its way, so maybe the
an HE round from one of the German Panzers. In the 'krauts' did too!
meanwhile, half a dozen half-tracks had sped ahead The daylight hours of 23 December also passed
of the tanks and deposited the company of without major incident apart from the waves of
901 Panzergrenadier Regiment right in the middle of C-47 Skytrains which began parachuting in food ,
the little village. medical supplies and ammunition now that the skies
Inman's executive officer, Major R.B . Galbreaith, had fi-nally cleared . The airlift would last for six days
took charge and organised a counter-attack. Whether and include Waco gliders carrying heavier Christmas
it was the paras' ferocity, or German lack of the same 'goodies' - especially shells for the artillery and fuel for
quality in this instance, which counted most in the the tanks. But there was still no sign of Patton , and
hand-to-hand fighting which followed is impossible to 11/327th's delusion that the ordeal was nearly over was
say, but the result by 1300 hrs was 30 German dead rudely shattered at 1725 hrs when concentrated
to five Americans. The rest of the Panzergrenadiers shellfire began landing on Marvie.
either fled or were taken prisoner. Marvie now Having advanced west, chasing 2 Panzer Division,
belonged to 11/327th and, for the rest of the day, they the commander of Panzer Lehr, General Bayerlein,
were mercifully left alone to consolidate their had left behind his 901 Panzergrenadier Regiment
hard-earned gains. reinforced by Kompanie 6 from the Panzer Abteilung.

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pages 66-72 77-78 T73-76 79-82,85-86 127-34 187 -88,94-95 I 39-40 135-38,89-90 83
 The shellfire came from these tanks , and some NQw, the Panzers started infiltrating on the 11/327th's
self-propelled guns, hidden behind a crest in the right flank. About a dozen attacked Company F but
woods southeast of the village . Then came the were stopped by O'Hara's M4s and Templeton's M18s.
I/) German infantry, stealthily to begin with, hoping to Another pair of O'Hara's Shermans , braving the

-
CI)
;:;
RI
III
in
catch the battalion 's outlying platoons unawares, and
one indeed was soon surrounded. Colonel O'Hara
sent an M 15 half-track to their assistance, but there
Panzerfausts, ventured into Marvie itself. They
knocked out one Panzer when it ran into the accidental
roadblock, which helped stabilise the situation
...oCo were four German tanks in the way. The half-track somewhat although the infantry battle continued .
u driver hared back into Marvie, where the men of the By this time it was the morning of Christmas Eve.
:> 327th , thinking the vehicle German, blew it to bits. But Colonel 'Bud' Harper, who had assumed personal
en it blocked the road for the following real German command of the battle, could still not relax, though .
::i vehicles . Not so their infantry, who by 2000 hrs were The second assault against Marvie had been
into the south side of Marvie and working their way contained and at least eight German tanks destroyed.
from house to house. The 11/327th GIR's line was dented but not broken.
However, Harper and his men knew they could not
The German attacks at Marvie, designed to give them hold out forever like this, and the question in all their
entry into Bastogne from the southwest, were only minds was , 'Where's Patton?' They were not alone in
narrowly beaten off by 11/327th Glider Infantry Regiment their anxiety, because the Bastogne perimeter was
and Team 'O'Hara', under threat at every point.

i .. •••·
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-

84 pages 66-72 1 77-78 1 73-76 T

T79-82,85-86 27 -34 r87-88,94-95 39-40 [ 35-38,89-90
u.s. VIII CORPS' BATTLES
~
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z
Team 'Desobry' and 1/506th Parachute Infantry Regiment, I
til
Q)

EC'a
101 st Airborne Division III
"'en
...oc..
Noville - December 19-20 u
:>
cr.i

T
:::J
he two-day battle for Noville, north and slightly The main German assault began at 1030 hrs on
east of Bastogne on the Houffalize road , was 19 December. The German commander, Oberst
costly , but had the effect of so delaying Meinrad von Lauchert, had brought up almost the
2 Panzer Division that, by the time it reached the whole of 3 Panzer Regiment supported by most of the
Meuse, 2nd Armored Division was there to greet it. division 's self-propelled artillery pieces. As the fog
Noville was the third village assigned by Middleton which had obscured the battlefield suddenly lifted, all
to Colonel William Roberts' CCB, 10th Armored Desobry's men in the roadblocks on the Vaux and
Division, and the team sent there under Major William Houffalize roads could see was tanks, at least 30 of
Desobry (CO of 20th Armored Infantry Battalion) them. Artillery fire crashed into Noville as the Panzers
included a company of 15 M4s from the 3rd Tank clattered forward. Nine were knocked out by
Battalion and a platoon of four M18s from the Desobry's M4s and M18s at ranges of between
609th Tank Destroyer Battalion. They arrived in Noville 1,000 and 200 yards but two got into Noville itself. One
at about 2300 hrs on 18 December and six hours later was destroyed by a Sherman at 75 yards range and
had no problem deterring a German reconnaissance the second by an M7 at 30 yards!
patrol scouting westward from Bourcy. What they did The battle lasted about an hour before the
not realise was that this was merely the vanguard of Germans withdrew to rethink, but Desobry had only
the entire 2 Panzer Division, which was in a hurry after eight Shermans left and knew he could not withstand
having already been held up by CCR, 9th Armored a second similar assault, so asked for permission to
Division, and Team 'Cherry' on the Longvilly road. withdraw to the high ground at Foy. Colonel Roberts

Men of Lieutenant-
Colonel James LaPrade's
1/506th Parachute Infantry
Regiment march north
out of Bastogne on the
morning of 19 December
towards Noville, past an
M3 half-track and
105mm M7 GMC of
Colonel William Roberts'
CCB, 10th Armored
Division. (U.S. Army)

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pages 66-72 I 77-78 173-76 I 79-82 127-34.83-84 187 -88.94-95 1 39-40 1 35-38,89-90 85
~ ( .... 1 mile
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Major William Desobry's spirited defence at Noville held Noville, and both sides afterwards claimed that they
up 2 Panzer Division's advance to the Meuse for a vital had halted enemy counter-attacks!
24 hours which resulted in their almost total defeat at As the short day drew to a close , the Germans
Celles five days later, contented themselves with shelling the village .
LaPrade was killed during the night and Desobry badly
told him to use his own judgement, but advised him wounded , their places being taken respectively by
that a battalion of paras and a platoon of tank Majors Robert Harwick and Charles Hustead, Harwick
destroyers from the 705th Battalion were on their way. assumed overall command,
Lieutenant-Colonel James LaPrade's 1/506th PIR Von Lauchert resumed his attack at 0530 hrs on
began arriving at about midday, warmly welcomed by 20 December, this time deploying his tanks in small
the German artillery. The main problem the defenders packets each accompanied by grenadiers. Artillery
faced was that the Germans occupied the high ground fire from batteries northwest of Bastogne caused
around Noville, so by 1430 hrs LaPrade had organised casualties among the German infantry but did not dent
his paras for a counter-attack towards the northeast. the tanks. The problem was that Hustead's Shermans
One of his assault companies ran into a hail of fire and had run out of armour-piercing ammunition, and by
was stopped cold with heavy casualties , but the other mid-morning Harwick had to report to Roberts ,
two reached the ridge . From there they could count 'Situation critical. ' By this time , however, 11 /506th and
32 Panzers forming up for another attack. The surprise 11I/502nd PIRs occupied good positions either side of
on both sides was complete, and the German tanks, Foy and , using the swirling fog and smoke as cover,
apparently fearful of bazookas, contented themselves Harwick's paras and Hustead's remaining tanks were
with firing from long range. The paras fell back towards able to fight their way back to safety.

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pages 66-72 1 77-7-8-1'7-3--7-6 - - ' -
79---82- - ' - 1
27--3
- 4-,8-3--84 187-88,94-95 39-40 135-38,89-90
86
u.s. VIII CORPS' BATTLES
1/401 st (111/327th) Glider Infantry Regiment, 101 st Airborne Division

Flamierge/Hemroulle - December 21-25

A lthough carried in the books as the 3rd Battalion

of the 327th Glider Infantry Regiment, the men
of Lieutenant-Colonel Ray Allen's command
garrison 's 105 and 155mm artillery pieces were
concentrated behind him in a circle just west of the
town . Allen planned that Company C, furthest west
still regarded themselves as the 1st Battalion of the guarding the main road to Marche and St Hubert,
401st, having fought as such in Normandy and Holland would fall back through Company B at Flamizoulle,
before being assigned to their sister regiment on join up with Company A near Champs and form the
28 November 1944. The last battalion of the battalion reserve for a new line in front of Hemroulle.
101 st Airbome to arrive in the Ardennes , 1/401 st was In the light of subsequent events, it was as well that
given the job of guarding the 'back door' into Bastogne Allen was so farsighted .
west of Mande-St Etienne. The battalion was actually On 23 December he was forced to pull Company C
out on quite a limb with a wide gap between its own left back from Flamierge and established a new line
and the right flank of 1/327th at Senochamps, and just west of Champs and Grandes-Fanges. To the
between its right and the left flank of the 502nd PIR at battalion 's south , Mande-St Etienne was also
Champs. Thus, although the battalion had a relatively abandoned , closing the gap between the 1/401 st,
quiet time at the beginning of the siege , there was no 1/327th and Team 'Roberts', defending the
'peace on earth ' this Christmas. artillery. However, the reconnaissance battalion of
Even before the German attacks began in earnest, 26 Volksgrenadier Division moved into the vacated
Colonel Allen had carefully planned a line of retreat to area , closing the net around Bastogne still more tightly.
shorten the line and secure his flanks . He was very Meanwhile, Hitler had authorised the release of two
conscious of the fact that the bulk of the Bastogne fresh divisions from reserve , 9 Panzer and the veteran

After being ignominiously

transported to Bastogne
by truck, these were a
sight for sore eyes to the
men of the 327th . Sixty
Waco CG-4A gliders took
part in the Bastogne
airlift, 42 of them landing
safely within the
perimeter. Amongst their
heavier loads were fuel
drums and 155mm shells.
(u.s. Army)

16/12/1944 17/12 18/12 19/12 20/12 21/12 22/12 23/12 24/12 25/12 26/12 27/12 28/12 29/12
pages 66-72 177-78 173-76 1 79-82,85-86 127-34,83-84 194-95 139-40 135-38,89-90 87
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McDonald 's Company B, but the paras stayed in

After falling back from Flamierge and Flamizoulle as their foxholes to deal with the following grenadiers,
planned, 1/401st Glider Infantry Regiment was then capturing 92 of them - nearly half their own number of
assaulted west of Hemroulle, but Kampfgruppe 'Maucke' men. Then, at 0710 hrs Allen received a radio call from
only got a few hundred yards further. the commander of his reserve Company C, Captain
Preston Towns. 'If you look out of your window,' he
15 Panzergrenadier, which had earlier distinguished told Allen , 'you 'll be looking right down the muzzle of
itself in North Africa and Italy. A reinforced battlegroup an 88 .' Allen hastily left through the back door of his
from the latter, Kampfgruppe 'Maucke', was assigned command post! After reaching the lines of the
to the battle for Bastogne. Oberst Heinz Kokott, the 463rd Parachute Field Artillery Battalion , he continued
scholarly 50-year-old CO of 26 Volksgrenadier Division to direct the battle by radio.
in charge of co-ordinating the siege, moved the Amazingly, his men were still holding . Once it had
battlegroup into the line at Flamierge late on Christmas broken through Companies A and B, the Panzer
Eve. The 'big show' was about to begin. column had split, half heading towards Hemroulle and
At 0500 hrs on Christmas morning the commander the rest north towards Champs, where they were dealt
of 1/401 st's Company A, 1st Lieutenant Howard with by the 502nd PIR. Two of the tanks had been
Bowles, phoned Allen to say that 18 German tanks blown apart by tank destroyers from the 705th and
were approaching from east of Mande-St Etienne. The Allen 's infantry dealt with the remainder. Not one of the
spearhead of Kampfgruppe 'Maucke' broke clear tanks or infantrymen from Kampfgruppe 'Maucke'
through between Company A and Captain Bob returned to tell the tale .

16/ 12/1944 17/12 18/12 19/12 20/12 21/12 22/1 2 23/12 24/12 25/12 26/12 27/12 28/12 29/12
~----------,----,-------,,--
pages 66-72 177-78 173-76 79-82 ,85-86 27-34,83-84 194-95 139-40 135-38,89-90
88
 en
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I t was Christmas Eve in the Chateau Rolle. Many of

the officers of Lieutenant-Colonel Steve Chappuis'
502nd PI R celebrated Mass in the 10th-century
justified because daybreak saw the beginning of the
last major German attack on Bastogne before the
belated arrival of Patton's 4th Armored Division on
en
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chapel. It was a time for prayer, and all the combat Boxing Day. General Heinrich von LOttwitz had ordered :>
diaries of those locked inside the Bastogne perimeter that the town finally be taken . The main effort was to be en
=i
show the same sense of unease that the lack of enemy made by the 77th Regiment of Oberst Heinz Kokott's
aggression during the day boded ill for the morrow. 26 Volksgrenadier Division from Givry towards
'For the first time all around the perimeter men felt Champs, with the newly arrived 115Panzergrenadier
fearful ,' recorded Colonel (later Brigadier-General) Regiment (Kampfgruppe 'Maucke') on its right towards
Sam Marshall. 'It seemed to them that the end was at Hem-roulle. Opposing them between Champs and
hand. That night many of them shook hands with their Long-champs was Major John Hanlon's 1/502nd PIR,
comrades .' The sombre feeling of nostalgia was with Colonel Allen 's 1/401st GIR holding the line to his
shared in the German lines, and the carol 'Heilige southwest and Lieutenant-Colonel Tom Sutcliffe 's
Nacht' seemed more than usually poignant. 11/502nd on his right.
The fears of all the men on both sides were The first assault by 77 Volksgrenadier Regiment hit

PzKpfw IV from
Kampfgruppe'Maucke',
probably destroyed by an
M18 from the 705th Tank
Destroyer Battalion in
between Hemroulle and
Champs on Christmas
morning. Not a single
one of the tanks from
115 Panzer Abteilung
survived the battle. The
502nd PIR's CO, Colonel
Chappuis, was awarded
the Distinguished Service
Cross for his action here.
(U .S. Army)

16/12/1944
pages 66-72
17/12
177-78
18/12
73-76
19/12 20/12
I 79-82.85-86 127-34,83-84
21/12
87 -88,94-95
22/12
I 39-40
23/12
-
24/12 25/12 26/12 27/12 28/12 29/12
135-38 89
I/)
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327 ~ 101
Gilbreth

While Company A battled against the assault troops of weapons and took up positions on the high ground
77 Volksgrenadier Division the other forces engaged overlooking the road to the west, leaving just Colonel
made short work of Kampfgruppe 'Maucke'. Chappuis with his deputy, Lieutenant-Colonel Patrick
Cassidy, and a radio operator in the chateau.
Hanlon's Company A just northwest of Champs at Chappuis alerted Hanlon to the threat to Company B's
0330 hrs after a half-hour artillery barrage. By 0400 rear and told him to bring Company C north in support.
the grenadiers were into the village itself and a fierce The company joined two M18s of the 705th Tank
hand-to-hand battle was raging. Chappuis ordered Destroyer Battalion on the edge of the wood just south
Hanlon to move Company B from Hemroulle to of Rolle. Their machine-gun and rifle fire swept the
establish a roadblock south of Champs, but not to get German tanks clear of the grenadiers who had been
engaged in the fight until there was enough light to riding on them , and the Panzers veered left towards
distinguish friend from foe. Meanwhile, another Champs, where Company A was still hanging on by the
battalion of grenadiers had infiltrated the woods west skin of its teeth. This manoeuvre exposed the PzKpfw
of Longchamps and engaged Sutcliffe's Company E. IVs' more thinly armoured flanks to Templeton's M18s
The next bad news was that tanks had penetrated and three succumbed instantly to well-aimed shots.
the lines of 1/401 st and that a group of seven , Bazookas got two more. The brave crew of one tank
accompanied by about a battalion of infantry, was got into Champs before being hit from all sides, while the
heading straight towards the regimental command more prudent crew of the seventh abandoned their
post in the Chateau Rolle. All the men in the castle, vehicle and surrendered. Apart from mopping up, it was

-
including the walking wounded, grabbed their the end of the battle,

16/12/1944 17/12 18/12 19/12 20/12 21/12 22/12 23/12 24/12 25/12 26/12 27/12 28/12 29/12
pages 66-72 177-78 173-76 179-82.85-86 27-34.83-84 187-88,94-95 139-40 35 -38
90 1
 II)

BRITISH 21 5t ARMY GROUP ...c.

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BRITISH XXX CORPS

A t the beginning of December 1944, Lieutenant-

General Brian Horrocks' XXX Corps was
fighting in the bogs and swamps of southwest
BRITISH XXX CORPS
Lieutenant-General Brian G. Horrocks
Holland, attacking alongside the U.S. 84th Infantry

Lieutenant-General (later, 6 Airborne Division (Bois)

51 (Highland) Infantry Division (Rennie)
Sir) Brian Horrocks was
53 (Welsh) Infantry Division (Ross)
an old-style cavalryman.
29 Armoured Brigade (Harvey)
When he heard the
33 Armoured Brigade (Scott)
Germans were 34 Army Tank Brigade (Clarke)
approaching Bruxelles, 2 Household Cavalry Regiment
he wanted to carry on so 11 Hussars & Cavalry Regiment
that XXX Corps could 53 Reconnaissance Regiment
fight them at Waterloo! 61 Reconnaissance Regiment
(Imperial War Museum) 73 Antitank Regiment
4 Royal Horse Artillery Regiment (25pdr)
5 Royal Horse Artillery Regiment (25pdr)
7 Royal Artillery Regiment (5.5")
Division towards Geilenkirchen . Its adversary was
64 Royal Artillery Regiment (5.5")
General der Panzertruppen Heinrich Freiherr von
84 Royal Artillery Regiment (5.5")
Luttwitz's XLVII Panzer Korps, which Horrocks' men
106 Anti-Aircraft Brigade (3.7" & 40mm)
would re-encounter at Christmas east of the river 27 Light Anti-Aircraft Regiment (40mm)
Meuse. Special Air Service Squadron (Belgian)
One of the first things that Field Marshal Bernard 16 & 30 Bataillons Chasseurs (-), 2 Regiment Parachutistes
Law Montgomery did, as soon as Eisenhower had (Puech-Samson) (French) (attached to U.S. Third Army
given him command of the U.S. First and Ninth 21 December as liaison between British 6 Airborne and
Armies, was promise British support in halting the U.S. 87 Infantry Divisions)
German Ardennes offensive. On the morning of Corps Reserve:
20 December, while news of the change in command 43 (Wessex) Infantry Division (Thomas)
Guards Armoured Division (Adair)
was still being disseminated, a major from
Montgomery's staff arrived at Courtney Hodges' First
Army headquarters with news that at least took one
worry off Hodges' shoulders. He was told that the field Guards Armoured Division and the 43rd , 51st and
marshal was moving Horrocks' XXX Corps south from 53rd Infantry Divisions. In particular, Hodges was
Holland into the Hasselt-Louvain-St Trond area to told , the British would assume responsibility for
ensure that if any German spearheads did reach the safeguarding the Meuse crossing points at Liege,
Meuse, they would not get across. Namur, Huy and Givet. In his memoirs, Montgomery
The first units to move out would be the 29th and was later to write that, at this stage, there was 'little to
33rd Armoured Brigades with Shermans, some of prevent German armoured cars and reconnaissance
them Fireflies, followed by the 34th Army Tank elements [from] bounding the Meuse and advancing
Brigade with heavily armoured Churchills, then the on Brussels' . British troops accordingly began setting 91
 1/1
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up hasty roadblocks to protect the Belgian capital Division. This put it on the right (southern) flank of the
while others began moving towards Liege . British line, with the 53rd (Welsh) Division on the left.
Apart from the 29th Armoured Brigade, British The 53rd cleared the area south of Marche and
forces saw little action until the counter-offensive reached La Roche, where the division was opposed by
began in earnest on 3 January 1945. By then 116 Panzer Division, which counter-attacked several
XXX Corps had moved up to the vicinity of Marche, times. The 51 st (Highland) Division now took the lead
joined just after Christmas by the 6th Airborne Division, and finally captured La Roche on 11 January.
which took over the lines of the U.S. 84th Infantry On XXX Corps' right, 6th Airborne supported by the
23rd Hussars from 29th Armoured Brigade had to
British Shermans, believed to be from the 23rd Hussars, battle against Panzer Lehr at Bures over 3-4 January.
29th Armoured Brigade, near Rochefort in January Casualties were heavy, and the driver of one stretcher
1945. (Imperial War Museum) Jeep, Sergeant Scott from the Hussars, might easily
have become another when a Jagdpanther from
559 schwere Panzerjager Abteilung rounded a corner
in the village. Instead , the unknown German
commander told the medic, 'Take the wounded away
this time , but don 't come back. It's not safe. '
This individual act of chivalry turned sour soon after-
wards when men of the 6th Airborne's
9th Parachute Battalion discovered the bodies of the
menfolk from the little village of Bande lying in a heap,
all shot through the back of the head . By this stage of
the war, most British soldiers were hardened veterans
well used to most of war's brutalities, but a sight like
this - not uncommon in the Ardennes - sickened them
all. However, they were not to stay long because on
16 January, once the U.S. First and Third Armies were
reunited at Houffalize, Montgomery began withdrawing
92 XXX Corps to rejoin 21 st Army Group in Holland.
 Q)
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T he men of the 29th Armoured Brigade had been
looking forward to spending Christmas in
Bruxelles when news of the German offensive
29th ARMOURED BRIGADE
Brigadier C. B. C. Harvey
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reached them. After the mauling they had received HQ Company ...o
Co

during the battle for Caen in the summer, and the U

miles they had driven in the subsequent pursuit, 2 Fife & Forfar Yeoman ry
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men and vehicles were both tired out. In fact, at the 3 Royal Tank Regiment (Brown)
23 Hussars .s::.
beginning of December the three tank regiments had II)

been ordered back from Holland to turn their Shermans 8 Rifle Brigade ..:::
al
over to the Armoured Replacement Group outside the
capital and await delivery of the new Comet tanks , of
which they were to be the first recipients . Harvey's men reckoned they were in for another
A British armoured 'regiment' in fact equated 'shambles' when , instead of collecting their new
approximately to an American or German battalion , Comet tanks after a relaxing Christmas , they were
with 666 officers and men , 61 Shermans and 11 light ordered to retrieve their old Shermans, get them
tanks. The 29th Armoured Brigade's three armoured running again and move east to the Meuse. Colonel
regiments (3rd Royal Tanks , 23rd Hussars and Alan Brown 's 3rd Royal Tank Regiment went to Dinant
2nd Fife & Forfar) were supported by a reinforced and reaped all the glory for halting 2 Panzer Division 's
motorised infantry regiment, the 8th Rifle Brigade, with reconnaissance battalion at Foy-Notre-Dame, while
a nominal complement of 818 officers and men . In the 23rd Hussars and 2nd Fife & Forfar Yeomanry
fact, in December 1944, manpower was seriously Regiments guarded the Meuse river crossings at Givet
down after six months of continuous fighting and only and Namur, before joining in the counter-offensive in
50 of the brigade's Shermans were serviceable. January 1945.
After suffering heavy casualties during Operations Once back in Holland , 29th Armoured Brigade did
'Epsom ' and 'Goodwood ' in the summer, even though finally receive its new Comet tanks and ended the war
they did result in the capture of Caen , Brigadier in Germany.

xx
1<:::::>1 29HARVEY
Armoured Brigade

I I I
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93
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...a.o A t 0200 hrs on Wednesday 21 December
the duty officer of 29th Armoured Brigade,
11th Armoured Division , received a phone call
infantry from 8th Rifle Brigade to laying mines on the
approaches to the crucial bridge over the Meuse and ,
reta ining the bulk of his battalion west of the river,
8
..r::
from Montgomery's 21st Army Group headquarters in
Holland telling him to waste no time getting the brigade
put a troop of M4s on the other side. One tank was
positioned to guard each of the roads from the east.
til
:.;:: moving . After picking up the serviceable vehicles from Theirs was not quite a suicide mission, although the
'':::
III among their discarded Shermans at the replacement crews knew they were not expected to return with their
depot outside Bruxelles, and putting fuel , food and tanks , but to leave their hulks as roadblocks .
ammunition on board , the brigade had a squadron of Lacking any hard intelligence regarding German
tanks apiece at Namur, Dinant and Givet by 1630 hrs. forces or dispositions, 3 RTR's first encounter with the
At Dinant, Colonel Alan Brown , CO of 3rd Royal enemy came as a shock. A Jeep manned by three
Tank Regiment , got the supporting company of Germans with American greatcoats over their uniforms
was blown to pieces on a mine. They were part of
Sherman Fireflies (this vehicle is actually from the Fife Otto Skorzeny's Operation 'Greif' kommando.
& Forfar Yeomanry at Namur) with high-velocity 17 pdr The second encounter was a different kind of
guns were the most effective tanks the Western Allies shock, because the crew of a dug-in Sherman had
possessed . (u.s. Army) fallen asleep during the night of 23 December, and

16/12/1944 17/12 18/12 19/12 20/12 21/12 22/12 23/12 24/12 25/12 26/12 27/12 28/12 29/12
f---- --~

94 pages 66-72 77-78 73-76 179-82 ,85-86 . 27-34,83-84 T87-88 , 39-40 [35-38 ,89-90
 1 mile .... .... Q)
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Harvey

After repulsing one attempt by Kampfgruppe 'yon At dawn on Christmas Day Alan Brown led the
B6hm' to cross the Meuse at Dinant, 3 RTR bounced battalion forward in two columns , driving a German
back and counter-attacked alongside the 82nd Armored picket out of Boiselles before reaching Foy-Notre-
Reconnaissance Battalion at Foy, capturing yon B6hm Dame on the flank of the U.S . 82nd Armored
himself and 147 of his men. Reconnaissance Battalion. Although they were met
with a brief flurry of fire, the battle was soon over and
only woke up at the sound of engines and tank tracks most of Kampfgruppe 'von B6hm ' went 'in the bag '.
as Kampfgruppe 'von B6hm ' headed for Dinant. The 3 RTR now moved to the ridge west of Celles , from
half-awake gunner's first shot blew up an ammunition which they had a grandstand view as 2nd Armored
truck and his second a PzKpfw IV, before the arrival Division swept through the village , supported by
of 'a self-propelled 88mm ' (probably in reality a swarms of fighter-bombers . An over-enthusiastic
Jagdpanzer IV, because 2 Panzer Division had no P-38 pilot strafed the British column , but fortunately
Jagdpanthers) caused the crew prudently to retire . there was only one casualty . The rest of
Other individual 3 RTR Shermans knocked out 29th Armoured Brigade had also moved east by this
another PzKpfw IV and two Panthers that night, time and , reunited , it took its place alongside
convincing von B6hm that he would have to wait for 6th Airborne paras on the right of First Army, clearing
reinforcements. Dinant was safe , and the 'death or St Hubert after a costly six-day battle at the
glory' boys had postponed their final reckoning. It was beginn ing of January and linking up with men of Third
now time to take the battle to the enemy. Army's 87th Infantry Division on 11 January 1945.

16/12/1944 17/12 18/12 19/12 20/12 21/12 22/12 23/12 24/12 25/12 26/12 27/12 28/12 29/12
-----,--------
pages 66-72 77-78 73-76 79-82 ,85-86 27-34,83-84 87-88 39-40 35-38,89-90
95
 WARGAMING - THE ARDENNES
ALLIED CENTRAL SECTOR
The Ardennes Offensive of December '44 represents the 15-mm Scale:
last desperate gasp in the West by a defeated and crippled Skytrex
Germany. Recent anniversaries and commemorations, Old Glory
events in the cinema (as well as the reminiscences of Tin Soldier
relatives) have brought the war into sharper focus in the 20-mm Scale:
public mind with a consequent increase in interest. All these SHQ
factors make World War II a must for many wargamers . Skytrex
Wargaming with model figures offers the budding general Platoon 20
possibly the most visually satisfying medium for refighting Figures Armour and Artillery (FAA)
World War II battles - particularly the Ardennes Campaign. Wargames Foundry (limited ranges)
Plus many plastic kits by Matchbox , Airfix, Hasagawa, Esci
Figures and models etc ...
Below is a list, by no means comprehensive, of the main 25mm Scale:
figure manufacturers. Many can be obtained from good 1st Corps
model shops or the addresses of the individual Battle Honours
manufacturers can be found in most wargamers magazines.
6-mm 11/300th Scale: Computer Games
Heroics and Ross Empire Interactive's 'Battleground Ardennes '
1/285th Scale: Microsoft's 'Close Combat - Normandy to the Ardennes'
GHQ via Chiltern miniatures Strategic Simulation Inc's 'Panzer General'
10-mm/1/200th Scale: Strategic Studies Group's 'Ardennes Offensive'
Skytrex
Wargames South

SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY
Cole, Hugh M. The Ardennes: Battle of the Bulge. United Pallud , Jean Paul. Battle of the Bulge Then and Now.
States Army in World War II , Office of the Chief of Battle of Britain Prints International, London, 1984.
Military History, Washington D.C., 1965. Parker, Danny S. Battle of the Bulge. Greenhill Books,
Crookenden , Lieutenant-General Sir Napier. Battle of the Lionel Leventhal Ltd , London , 1991.
Bulge 1944. Ian Allan, Shepperton, 1980. Stanton, Shelby L. World War /I Order of Battle. Presidio
Eisenhower, John SD . The Bitter Woods. Robert Hale, Press, Novato, California , 1984.
London , 1969. Quarrie, Bruce. Airborne Assault. Patrick Stephens,
Elstob , Peter. Hitler's Last Offensive, Secker & Warburg , Wellingborough , 1991 .
London, 1971. Strawson , John. The Battle for the Ardennes. B.T. Batsford ,
MacDonald, Charles B. The Battle of the Bulge. George London, 1972.
Weidenfeld & Nicolson , London , 1984. Strong, Major-General Sir Kenneth. Intelligence at the Top.
Marshall , Colonel S.L.A. Bastogne: The Story of the First Cassell , London , 1968.
Eight Days. U.S. Army in action series, Center of Military
History, Washington D.C., 1946, reprinted 1988.

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Concise, authori tative accounts of history's decisive mili tary encounters. aircraft types flo wn. Each 96-page vol ume conta ins up to 40 speciall y
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orders of battle, colour plates, and three-dimensional battle maps. photography ava ilable.

96
OSPREY
MILITARY

ORDER OF
BATTLE

ARDENNES
OFFENSIVE
BATTLE MAP

CENTRAL
SECTOR

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RELATED TITLES FROM OSPREY PUBLISHING
Order of Battle 4:The Ardennes Men-at-Arms 70: The US Army
Offensive VI Panzer Armee 1941-45
Northern Sector
Rather than attempt to find one
It was remarkable strategic effrontery to al l-purpose uniform, the US Army
con sider a major offensive even as the designed special-purpose dress for
German Army was in the midst of its every possible duty, from combat in cold
most punish ing losses in five years of war. climates to dress parades in hot ones.
Dietrich's VI Panzer Armee was to Phi lip Katcher provides an extensive
spearhead the attack in t he Northern examination of the different types of
Sector, with the Volksgrenadiers - an uniform and equipment which saw
offensive that would prove decisive. servi ce during World War 2.
ISBN I 85532 853 4 ISBN 0 85045 522 7
Order of Battle 5:The Ardennes !"ttI 0'.68'9'_ ] I NewVanguard 3: Sherman Medium
Offensive V US Corps & XVIII US Tank 1942-1945
(Airborne) Corps Northern Sector SHElMAN The M4 Sherman tank was the mainstay
Hitler had no respect for the American of the Western all ies between 1942 and
fighting man: he believed a blitzkrieg assault 1945. Fast and modern, it was better than
backed by special units would quickly crack most of the tanks Britain had to offer.
the American line in the Ardennes. Yet the Steven Zaloga details its development,
stubborn defence on the Elsenborn Ridge operational history, and how it remained
and across the front by green US Gis an effective weapon right up unti l the end
brought the blitzkrieg attack to a of the war.
gri nding halt. ISBN I 85532 296 X
ISBN I 85532 854 2

Order of Battle 8:The Ardennes Warrior 26: US Paratrooper

Offensive V Panzer Armee Central 1941-45
Sector From the fields of Normandy, to the
Hit le r's counter-offensive in the west relied frozen hills of the Ardennes, America's
on two 55-Panzer Korps to break through airborne fighters proved themselves some
in t he northern secto r. They fai led dismally of the toughest and most determined
and t he Schwerpunkt, o r axis, was soldiers of World War 2.This t itle details
switched to the central sector, where what it was like to be one of the United
Manteuffel's V Panzer Armee was fairly States' airborne e lite , through the
scything through the Allied lines. experiences of the soldiers themselves.
ISBN I 85532 857 7 ISBN I 85532 842 9
'.'Ii"eni""'''"

SELECTED WORLD WAR II TITLE LISTING

MEN·AT-ARMS (MAA) 1855327961 330 GERMAN ARMY 1939-45 (4) EA5T FRONT 2 1855323397 051 U5 ARMY AIR FORCE 2
0850454255 034 WAFFEN-SS 1855324970 059 US MARINE CORPS 1941-45
NEW VANGUARD (NVG)
0850455227 070 US ARMY 1941-45 1855325799 064 ARMY COMMANDOS 1940-45
185532282X 00 I KINGTIGER HEAVY TANK 1942- 1945
0850453593 103 GERMANY'S SPANISH VOLUNTEERS 1941-45
185532296X 003 SHERMAN MEDIUM TANK 1942-45 CAMPAIGN (CAM)
0850453879 112 BRITISH BATTLEDRE5S 1937-61
1855322978 004 CHURCHILL INFANTRY TANK 1941 -51 0850459214 001 NORMANDY 1944
0850454174 117 POLl$HARMY 1939-45
1855323370 oo5TIGER I HEAVY TANK 1942-45 0850459583 003 FRANCE 1940
0850454204 120 ALUED COMMANDERS WORLD WAR 11
1855323966 007 IS 2 HEAVY TANK 1944-1973 0850459591 oo5ARDENNES 1944
0850454336 124 GERMAN COMMANDERS WORLD WAR II
1855324571 008 MATILDA INFANTRY TANK 1938-45 185S322110 016 KURSK 1943
0850454751 131 GERMAN EA5TERN FRONT ALlIE5 1941·45
1855323826 OO9T-3406 MEDIUM TANK 1941-45 1855322536 018 GUADALCANAL 1942
0850454808 I 39 GERMAN AIRBORNE TROOPS
1855324679 011 M3 INFANTRY HALFTRACK 1940-73 1855323028 024 ARNHEM 1944
0850455138 142 PARTISAN WARFARE 1941-45
1855325128 014 CRUSADER CRUISER TANK 1939-45 1855323354 030 MIDWAY 1942
0850455243 147 FOREIGN VOL WfHRMACHT 1941-45
1855325470 015 FLAMMPANZER GERMAN 1855324784 042 OPERATION BAGRATION 1944
08S045638X 169 RESISTANCE WARFARE 1940-45
1855324962 017 KV 1&2 HEAVY TANKS 1941-45 1855327384 060THE EBRO 1938
0850457394 187 BRITISH BATTLE INSIGNIA 21939-45
1855325357 020T 34/85 MEDIUM TANK 1944-94 1855327988 062 PEARL HARBOR 1941
0850459028 213 GERMAN MILITARY POLICE UNITS
1855325373 019 STUG III ASSAULT GUN 1940-42
0850459664 225 RAF 1939-45 WARRIOR (WAR)
1855324768 022 PANTHER VARIANTS 1942-45
1855321009 229 LUFTWAFFE FIELD DIV5 1855322889 oo2WAFFEN 55 SOLDIER 1940-45
1855328461 025 5DKFZ 251 HALF·TRACK (REV)
0850459524 234 GERMAN COMBAT EQUIP 1939·45
1855328445 026 GERMAN LIGHT PANZERS (REV) SPECIAL EDITIONS
185532136X 238 FOREIGNVOLUNTEER5 ALLIED FORCE5
1855328453 027 PANZERKAMPFWAGEN III (REV) 1855327112 OSTFRONT: HITLER'S WAR ON RUSSIA
1855321696 246 ROMANIAN ARMY OFWWII 1941-45
1855328437 028 PANZERKAMPfWAGEN IV MEDTANK (REV) 1855326930 AIRLIFT MILITARY AIR TRANSPORT
1855322579 254 WEHRMACHT AUXILIARY FORCES
1855328496 029 GERMAN ARMOURED CARS (REV)
1855323583 266 ALLGEMEINE 55 TRADE EDITIONS
185532850X 030 AMTRAC5 (REV)
1855324466 270 FLAGS THIRD REICH I WEHRMACHT 1855329166 GUADALCANAL 1942 (CAM)
1855329581 032 LONG RANGE DE5ERT GROUP (REV)
1855324318 274 FLAGS THIRD REICH 2 WAFFEN-SS 1855329492 NORMANDY 1944 (CAM)
1855324598 278 FLAGS THIRD REICH 3 PARTY 7 POLICE ELITE (Ell) 1855329387 AFRJKAKORPS 1941·1943 (Ell)
1855324733 282 AXIS IN YUGOSLAVIA 1941-45 0850455731 00 I PARAS 1940-84 185532931 X WAFFEN-SS SOLDIER 1940-1945 (WAR)
1855326396 311 GERMAN ARMY 39-45 I BLITZKRIEG 0850457408 011 ARDENNES 1944 1855329409 GERMAN U-BOAT CREWS 1914-1945 (Ell)
1855326663 315 FRENCH ARMY 1939-45 (I) 0850457955 013 US ARMY RANGERS 7 LRRP UNITS 1942-87 1841760277 THE BATTLE OFTHE BULGE (CAM)
185532640X 316 GERMAN ARMY 39-45 (2) NORTH AFRICA 0850459486 031 us ARMY AIRBORNE 1940-49 1841760382 5TORMTROOPER 0NAR)
1855327074 318 FRENCH ARMY 1939-45 (2) 1855321300 034AFRIKAKORPS 1941-43 184 1760757 PEARL HARBOR (CAM)
1855327953 326 GERMAN ARMY 1939-45 (3) EAST FRONT 185532295 I 046 us ARMY AIR FORCE I 184 1760374 BLITZKRIEG: FRANCE 1940 (CAM)

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 THE ARDENNES OFFENSIVE USVII &VIII CORPS AND BRITISH XXX CORPS

..... 'First Army is ~aking a terrible mistake in

leaving the VII Corps static, as it is highly
probable that the Germans are building up
....... ::\ ..

east of them.'
The entry of 24 November in the diary of Gen
George Patton, commander of US Third Army,
expressed a justified concern - yet SHAEF failed to
heed the warnings. At 5.30am on 16 December
1944, Gen Courteney Hodges' VII and VIII Corps
faced the gravest crisis to confront the Allies since
D-Day - and their 'quiet' sector became a bloody
arena of all-out fighting. US First Army bore the
brunt of it, as Von Manteuffel's V Panzer Armee
pushed the 'bulge' deeper into Allied territory.
106th Infantry Division, defending the frontline in
the Schnee Eiffel, suffered terribly. Miraculously,
28th Infantry Division stalled the German drive,
just in time for reinforcements, in the shape of 101st
Airborne, to be rushed to the key road junction of
Bastogne. The surrounded defenders now faced a
grueling siege - but further re-inforcements were
essential if the town was to be held.

ORDER OF BATTLE SERIES

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