1. In re will of Riosa., 39 Phil., 23, No.

14074 November 7, 1918

FACTS: Jose Riosa died and left a will. The will was executed in accordance with the
law in force which is section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
Act No. 2645 has amended section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure prescribing
certain additional formalities for the signing and attestation of wills, in force on and after
July 1, 1916. The will is not executed in accordance with Act No. 2645.
The court has held through by Justice Torres, as to a will executed by a testator whose
death took place prior to the operative date of Act No. 2645, the amendment is
inapplicable. Here, the will was executed prior to the enactment of Act No. 2645 and the
death occurred after the enactment of this law.
ISSUE: Whether the law existing on the date of the execution of a will controls.
HELD: Yes. The law existing at the date of the execution of a will is controlling.
The rule laid down by the courts in many jurisdictions is that the statutes in force at the
testator's death are controlling, and that a will not executed in conformity with such
statutes is invalid, although its execution was sufficient at the time it was made.
As a general rule of statutory construction, that "all statutes are to be construed
prospectively unless the purpose and intent of the Legislature is expressly declared or
impliedly to be retroactive. In case of doubt, it must be resolved against the
retrospective effect.
Thus, the will is valid.
The order of the Court of First Instance for the Province of Albay disallowing the will of
Jose Riosa, is reversed, and the record shall be returned to the lower court with
direction to admit the said will to probate.
 2. Aznar vs. Garcia, 7 SCRA 95, No. L-16749 January 31, 1963
FACTS:
Helen filed a petition opposing the distribution of Edward E. Christensen’s will.
Arguing (a) that the distribution should be governed by the laws of the Philippines, and
(b) that said order of distribution is contrary thereto insofar as it denies to Helen
Christensen, one of two acknowledged natural children, one-half of the estate in full
ownership.
The Court found that the testator was a citizen of the United States and of the
State of California at the time of his death. Thus, the will is governed by the law of
California, in accordance with which a testator has the right to dispose of his property in
the way he desires, because the right of absolute dominion over his property is sacred
and inviolable

ISSUE: Whether the governing law is the Civil Code of the Philippines.

HELD: Yes. The conflict of law rule in California, Article 946 Civil Code, refers back the
case, when a decedent is not domiciled in California, to the law of his domicile, the
Philippines in the case at bar. The court of domicile cannot and should not refer the
case back to California, as such action would leave the issue incapable of
determination, because the case will then be tossed back and forth between the two
states. If the question has to be decided, the Philippine court must apply its own law as
the Philippines was the domicile of the decedent, as directed in the conflict of law rule of
the state of the decedent, California, and especially because the internal law of
California provides no legitime for natural children, while the Philippine law (Articles
887(4) and 894, Civil Code of the Philippines makes natural children legally
acknowledged forced heirs of the parent recognizing them).
In arriving at the conclusion that the domicile of the deceased is the Philippines, we are
persuaded by the fact that he was born in New York, migrated to California and resided
there for nine years, and since he came to the Philippines in 1913 he returned to
California very rarely and only for short visits.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed and the case returned to
the lower court with instructions that the partition be made as the Philippine law on
succession provides.
 3. Bellis v. Bellis, G.R. No. L-23678, June 6, 1967
FACTS: Amos G. Bellis, Born in Texas, was a citizen of State of Texas and the United
States. He has several illegitimate children.
Amos G. Bellis executed a will in the Philippines in which he directed that his
distributable estate should be divided to his first wife; his three illegitimate children
Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis, Miriam Palma Bellis and to his seven surviving
children by his first and second wives.
Amos G. Bellis died a resident of San Antonio, Texas, USA. His will was admitted to
probate in the Court of First Instance of Manila.
On January 17, 1964, Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis filed their
oppositions to the project of partition on the ground that they were deprived of their
legitimes as illegitimate children and, therefore, compulsory heirs of the deceased.
ISSUE: Whether the Philippine law be applied in the case in the determination of the
illegitimate children’s successional rights.
HELD: No. Texas law must be applied.
In Aznar v. Garcia, said doctrine is usually pertinent where the decedent is a national of
one country, and a domicile of another. In the present case, it is not disputed that the
decedent was both a national of Te
xas and a domicile thereof at the time of his death.2 So that even assuming Texas has
a conflict of law rule providing that the domiciliary system (law of the domicile) should
govern, the same would not result in a reference back (renvoi) to Philippine law, but
would still refer to Texas law. Nonetheless, if Texas has a conflicts rule adopting the
situs theory (lex rei sitae) calling for the application of the law of the place where the
properties are situated, renvoi would arise, since the properties here involved are found
in the Philippines. In the absence, however, of proof as to the conflict of law rule of
Texas, it should not be presumed different from ours.3 Appellants' position is therefore
not rested on the doctrine of renvoi. As stated, they never invoked nor even mentioned
it in their arguments. Rather, they argue that their case falls under the circumstances
mentioned in the third paragraph of Article 17 in relation to Article 16 of the Civil Code.
 4. PECSON vs. MEDIAVILLO, 28 Phil. 81, No. 7890 September 29, 1914
FACTS: Defendant-appellee filled a petition to annul the clause disinheriting Rosario
Mediavillo.
Testator’s daughter Teresa Pecson married to Basillo Mediavillo, had 2 children,
Joaquin and Rosario. Joaquin died unmarried and childless before the death of testator.
Rosario became insane in 1895 when she went to Nueva Caceres to study in college,
and it has been proved that it was previous to this date that she disobeyed her
grandfather and raised her hand against him, and, as the testator states in the third
paragraph of his will, he disinherited her.
This court understands that this Rosario, who was then 14 years of age, and who
shortly afterwards became insane, was not responsible for her acts and should not have
been disinherited by her grandfather.
ISSUE: Whether the lower court erred in finding' that the part of the will which disinherits
Rosario Mediavillo is contrary to law.
HELD: No. Article 848 of the Civil Code provides that disinheritance shall only take
place for one of the causes expressly fixed by law Arts. 848, 756, 853, and 849 Civil
Code. Such disinheritance can only be effected by a will in which shall be mentioned the
legal grounds or causes for such disinheritance. Article 850 of the Civil Code provides
that the reason for the disinheritance shall be established by the heirs of the testator. In
other words, if the person disinherited shall deny the truthfulness of the cause of
disinheritance, he may be permitted to support his allegations by proof. (Art. 851, Civil
Code.) In accordance with the foregoing provisions of the Civil Code, courts may inquire
into the justice of a disinheritance, and if they find that the disinheritance was without
cause, that part of the will may be pronounced null and void.
 5. Roxas vs. De Jesus, Jr., 134 SCRA 245, No. L-38338 January 28, 1985
FACTS: Petitioner, Simeon R. Roxas, the brother of the deceased Bibiana Roxas de
Jesus found a notebook belonging to Bibiana and written on its pages was a letter-will
dated “FEB./61” addressed to her children and entirely written and signed in the
handwriting of the Bibiana. The will is dated authenticated and submitted to the Court
for probate.
Respondent Judge Colayco allowed the probate of the holographic will. However,
Respondent, Luz Henson filed a Motion for Reconsideration arguing that the
holographic was not dated as required by Article 810 of the Civil Code stating that it
must contain the day, month, and year of its execution and that this should be strictly
compiled with.
Respondent Judge reconsidered and disallowed the probate of the holographic will
because the word “dated” has generally been held to include the month, day, and year.
Thus a Petition for Certiorari is filed to set aside the order of the CFI disallowing the
probate of the holographic will of Bibiana Roxas de Jesus.

ISSUE: Whether the date “FEB./61” appearing on the holographic Will of the deceased
Bibiana Roxas de Jesus is a valid compliance with the Article 810 of the Civil Code.

HELD: Yes. As a general rule, the “date” in a holographic Will should include the day,
month, and year of its execution to guard against fraud, bad faith, undue influence and
pressure. However, in this case, there is no appearance of fraud, bad faith, undue
influence and pressure nor was there any substitution of Wills and Testaments. The
authenticity of the Will is established.
The objection interposed by the oppositor-respondent Luz Henson is that the
holographic Will is fatally defective because the date “FEB./61” appearing on the
holographic Will is not sufficient compliance with Article 810 of the Civil Code. This
objection is too technical to be entertained.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The order appealed from is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the order allowing the probate of the holographic Will
of the deceased Bibiana Roxas de Jesus is reinstated.
 6. Dorotheo vs. Court of Appeals, 320 SCRA 12, G.R. No. 108581 December 8,
1999
FACTS: Aniceta Reyes died in 1969 without her estate being settled. Then, her
husband Alejandro died in 1977. Petitioner then submitted the Alejandro’s will for
probate. The children of the spouses filed their opposition.
In 1983, RTC declared the Will Intrinsically Void since Lourdes Legazpi not the
wife of the late Alejandro Dorotheo and that the oppositors Vicente, Jose and Nilda
Dorotheo Quintana as the only heirs of late Alejandro Dorotheo and Aniceta Reyes.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration arguing that although not married
she is entitled to compensation since she took care of Alejandro. But was denied by the
court. Then, petitioner appealed but was also dismissed for failure to file its brief on
time.
On February 3, 1989 the dismissal became final and executory. Thus a writ of
execution was issued by the lower court. Private respondents filed a case to surrender
the Transfer Certificate of Titles that was in possession of petitioner but the latter
refused.
The lower Court set aside the final order and the order directing the issuance of
the writ of execution on the ground that the order was merely “interlocutory” hence not
final in character.
Private respondents appealed to the Court of Appels which nullified order of the
lower court.
Petitioner argued that the will which was declared intrinsically void was earlier
admitted to probate.
ISSUE: Whether a will be admitted to probate but declared intrinsically void in an order
that has become final and executory still be given effect.
HELD:
No. A final and executory decision or order can no longer be disturbed or
reopened no matter how erroneous it may be. In setting aside the January 30, 1986
Order that has attained finality, the trial court in effect nullified the entry of judgment
made by the Court of Appeals. It is well settled that a lower court cannot reverse or set
aside decisions or orders of a superior court, for to do so would be to negate the
hierarchy of courts and nullify the essence of review. It has been ruled that a final
judgment on probated will, albeit erroneous, is binding on the whole world.
It has been consistently held that if no appeal is taken in due time from a judgment or
order of the trial court, the same attains finality by mere lapse of time. Thus, the order
allowing the will became final