ES2631 Critique and Communication of Thinking and Design

AY2022/2023 Semester 1

Week 7
Critical Analysis of Engineering Case Study

Lesson Objectives
By the end of this week’s lesson, you will be able to:
1. Apply the engineering reasoning framework to analyse a case study of an engineering
failure.
2. Express your analysis in an essay.
3. Review your peers’ analyses of such a case study and provide appropriate feedback
comments.

Recap
Based on this week’s lecture:
1. What three steps are there to take for Assignment 2?
2. What three steps are there to take for Assignment 3?

Activity 1
(1) Read the three articles below on the Hurricane Katrina disaster and note areas of failure that
could have contributed to the disaster.

Text A: New Orleans Hurricane Katrina levee failures

The failure of the levees and the flooding of New Orleans during Hurricane Katrina on August 29,
2005, represent the first time in history that an engineering failure has brought about the
destruction or near-destruction of a major U.S. city. The ASCE Hurricane Katrina External Review
Panel stated, “The catastrophic failure of New Orleans’s hurricane protection system represents
one of the nation’s worst disasters ever. A storm of Hurricane Katrina’s strength and intensity is
expected to cause major flooding and damage. However, a large proportion of the destruction
from Hurricane Katrina was caused not only by the storm itself, but also by the storm’s exposure
to engineering and engineering-related policy failures” (ASCE Review Panel 2007, p. v).
Hurricane Katrina made landfall in the early morning of August 29, 2005, in southeast Louisiana to
the east of New Orleans. Throughout the area, levees and flood walls failed or were breached in
more than 50 locations. Eighty percent of the city of New Orleans was flooded, to a depth of more
than 3 m (10 ft) in some neighborhoods. The extent of the destruction made it difficult to account
for the victims, but the toll a year later was listed as 1,118 dead people and 135 missing and
presumed dead. More than 400,000 citizens fled the city, many never to return. Property damage
reached tens of billions of dollars (ASCE Review Panel 2007, p. 1).
Wind and storm surge are the damaging agents of a hurricane, storm surge at the coast and the
wind away from the coast. Storm surge is a combination of wind-induced water motion, the
reduced atmospheric pressure in the storm, and possibly high tide. Hurricane Katrina,
unfortunately, came ashore at high tide, and the storm surge in Plaquemines Parish reached as
much as 6.1 m (20 ft) above sea level. In Lake Pontchartrain, directly to the north of New Orleans,
wind from the north piled water up as high as 3.7 m (12 ft) above sea level. The hurricane also
brought heavy rainfall, increasing the probability of flooding (ASCE Review Panel 2007, pp. 13-16).
“The Lake Pontchartrain and Vicinity Hurricane Protection Project system experienced the worst
damage during and after Hurricane Katrina and resulted in the most serious consequences to the
 ES2361 Critique and Communication of Thinking and Design

city and people of New Orleans. The massive, destructive flooding of New Orleans was caused by
ruptures at approximately 50 locations in the city’s hurricane protection system. Of the [457 km]
284 miles of federal levees and floodwalls-there are approximately [563 km] 350 miles in total-
[272 km] 169 miles were damaged” (ASCE Review Panel 2007, p. 25).
Failures of the system began even before Hurricane Katrina made landfall, with overtopping of the
Mississippi River-Gulf Outlet levees and flooding of parts of St. Bernard Parish. Shortly after
landfall, at 6:30 a.m., levees on the south side of the New Orleans East neighborhood were also
overtopped and breached. Shortly thereafter, waves reached 1.2 m (4 ft) in the Industrial Canal,
causing more overtopping and flooding. Four I-walls also breached, between about 5:00 and 8:00
a.m., even before the water rose high enough to overtop them (ASCE Review Panel 2007, pp. 25-
27).
With all of the breaches, some neighborhoods flooded to the rooftops in minutes. Even where the
flooding was slower, further from the sites of the breaches, the water rose approximately 0.3 m (1
ft) every 10 min. The deadliest breaches were in the Industrial Canal and the London Avenue
Canal. These canals extended south from Lake Pontchartrain into the heart of the city, adding to
the rapidity of the flooding (ASCE Review Panel 2007, pp. 28-31).
As the hurricane moved north that morning, the storm surge receded, but the damage had been
done. Once the I-walls failed, the city continued to flood until the water level was equal to that of
Lake Pontchartrain. By September 1, more than 80% of the city was flooded, much of it 2-3 m (6-
10 ft) deep. The pump stations were no longer working, and in any case, the water couldn’t be
pumped out until the levee breaches were repaired (ASCE Review Panel 2007, pp. 31-32).
The consequences of the failure are discussed in detail by the ASCE Review Panel (2007, pp. 33-
46). In essence, the city and its economy were destroyed, and much of the population moved
away permanently. A year and a half later, much of the city remained almost uninhabited and
uninhabitable. The failures also, understandably, shook the public’s faith in the civil engineering
profession.
The hurricane protection system for New Orleans was and remains badly flawed. Moreover, loss
of public confidence in the system has seriously hampered the reconstruction of the city. People
remain reluctant to move back and invest.
According to the ASCE Review Panel, “we must place the protection of public safety, health, and
welfare at the forefront of our nation’s priorities” (ASCE Review Panel 2007, p. 73).
Some specific deficiencies that need to be corrected were to establish mechanisms to incorporate
changing information, to make the levees functional even if overtopped, to strengthen or upgrade
the flood walls and levees, and to upgrade the pumping stations (ASCE Review Panel 2007, p. 78).

Adapted from: University of North Carolina, Charlotte. (n.d.). New Orleans Hurricane Katrina levee
failures. https://eng-resources.charlotte.edu/failurecasestudies/dam-failure-cases/new-orleans-
hurricane-katrina-levee-failures/

Text B: How levee failures made Hurricane Katrina a bigger disaster

On the morning of August 29, 2005, Hurricane Katrina—one of the strongest storms ever to hit
the coast of the United States—brought intense winds, high rainfall, waves, and storm surge to
the Gulf of Mexico shores of Louisiana, Mississippi, and Alabama. Communities in all three states
suffered damage, but this report focuses on the devastation to New Orleans and southeast
Louisiana.
New Orleans was built on low-lying marshland along the Mississippi River. Levees and floodwalls
were built around the city and adjacent parishes to protect against flooding. During and after

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Hurricane Katrina, many of those levees and floodwalls were overtopped and several were
breached, allowing billions of gallons of water from the Gulf of Mexico, Lake Borgne, and Lake
Pontchartrain to flow into New Orleans and flood major portions of the city.
As of August 2, 2006, 1,118 people were confirmed dead in Louisiana as a result of Hurricane
Katrina. Another 135 people are still missing and presumed dead. Thousands of homes were
destroyed. Direct damage to residential and non-residential property is estimated at $21 billion,
damage to public infrastructure another $6.7 billion. Nearly half the region’s population has not
yet returned after evacuating. Nearly 124 thousand jobs were lost, and the region’s economy was
crippled.
The catastrophic failure of New Orleans’s hurricane protection system represents one of the
nation’s worst disasters ever. The members of the American Society of Civil Engineers (ASCE)
Hurricane Katrina External Review Panel have conducted an in-depth review of the
comprehensive work of the United States Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) Interagency
Performance Evaluation Taskforce (IPET)—at the USACE’s request. The ASCE Hurricane Katrina
External Review Panel’s findings and conclusions are presented in this report.
A storm of Hurricane Katrina’s strength and intensity is expected to cause major flooding and
damage. A large portion of the destruction from Hurricane Katrina was caused not only by the
storm itself, however, but also by the storm’s exposure of engineering and engineering-related
policy failures. The levees and floodwalls breached because of a combination of unfortunate
choices and decisions, made over many years, at almost all levels of responsibility.
There were two direct causes of the levee breaches: collapse of several levees with concrete
floodwalls (called I-walls) because of the way they were designed, and overtopping, where water
poured over the tops of the levees and floodwalls and eroded the structures away. Furthermore,
the many existing pump stations that could have helped remove floodwaters were inoperable
during and after the storm.
The I-walls failed because the margin of safety used in the design process was too low—especially
considering that the hurricane protection system was a critical life-safety structure. The
engineering design did not account for the variability in the strength of soft soils beneath and
adjacent to the levees. The designers failed to take into account a water-filled gap that developed
behind the I-walls as they bowed outward from the forces exerted by the floodwaters.
Some overtopping of levees is to be expected in a major storm. However, the levees were not
armored or protected against erosion—an engineering choice of catastrophic consequences
because this allowed the levees, some constructed of highly erodible soil, to be scoured away,
allowing water to pour into New Orleans.
In addition to these direct causes of the levee breaches, a number of other factors also
contributed to the catastrophe:
 The risk to New Orleanians (i.e., the probability of failure combined with the consequences to
human health and safety if that failure were to occur) was much higher than many people are
generally willing to accept. Because these risks were not well understood or communicated
effectively to the public, the importance of evacuating people and protecting property was
under-estimated.
 The hurricane protection system was constructed as individual pieces—not as an
interconnected system—with strong portions built adjacent to weak portions, some pump
stations that could not withstand the hurricane forces, and many penetrations through the
levees for roads, railroads, and utilities. Furthermore, the levees were not designed to
withstand overtopping.
 The hurricane protection system was designed for meteorological conditions (barometric

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pressure and wind speed, for example) that were not as severe as the Weather Bureau and
National Weather Service listed as being characteristic of a major Gulf Coast hurricane.
 Levee builders used an incorrect datum to measure levee elevations—resulting in many
levees not being built high enough. Some levees were built 1 to 2 feet lower than the
intended design elevation. Furthermore, despite the acknowledged fact that New Orleans is
subsiding (sinking), no measures were taken into account in the design to compensate for the
subsidence by monitoring the levees and raising them up to the pre-subsidence design
elevation.
 No single agency was in charge of hurricane protection in New Orleans. Rather, responsibility
for the maintenance and operation of the levees and pump stations was spread over many
federal, state, parish, and local agencies. This lack of inter-agency coordination led to many
adverse consequences from Hurricane Katrina.
 The hurricane protection system was funded on a project-by-project basis over many years.
As a result, the system was constructed in a piecemeal fashion. In addition, there were
pressures for trade-offs and low-cost solutions that compromised quality, safety, and
reliability.
 The design of the New Orleans hurricane protection system was not subject to the rigorous
external review by senior experts that is often conducted for similar life-safety structures and
systems.

Adapted from The American Society of Civil Engineers. (2007). The New Orleans Hurricane Protection
System: What Went Wrong and Why, Executive Summary.
https://biotech.law.lsu.edu/katrina/reports/erpreport.pdf

Text C: Hurricane Katrina, in 7 essential facts

2) The levees failed because of bad engineering, not just because Katrina was too big
One reason Katrina and the floods it caused broke through New Orleans's levees was because the
storm was too strong. But reports since the hurricane have also exposed another culprit: shoddy
engineering.
More than six months after Katrina hit, the US Army Corps of Engineers released a report in which
they took blame for the levees breaking, flat-out admitting that the levees were built in a
disjointed fashion based on outdated data. Much of this, the report revealed, was due to a lack of
funding—resulting in a flawed system of levees that was inconsistent in quality, materials, and
design. Engineers also failed to account for the region's poor soil quality and sinking land, which
created more gaps in barriers.
The federal government was largely culpable for this mess, since it was largely on the Corps—a
federal agency—to oversee the construction of the levees after Hurricane Betsy flooded New
Orleans in 1965. As the New York Times's Campbell Robertson and John Schwartz reported,
a 2006 report placed some of the responsibility for the levees' failures on dysfunctional
interactions between local officials and the Corps. But a new paper published in the journal Water
Policy this year—and penned by one of the authors of the 2006 report—put the blame more
squarely on the Corps, which allegedly made poor decisions during the construction of the levees
to save money. The result was some short-term savings for taxpayers and the Corps, but
ultimately a bigger disaster through Katrina.
This is just one of the many ways the federal government failed to prevent a disaster in the lead-
up to Katrina. Even though there were always serious concerns about how a hurricane could
destroy New Orleans, the federal agency in charge of building better levees and flood walls was at
times more worried about money than about building proper protections, and relied on outdated
data to build what turned out to be deeply flawed structures.

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Extract taken from Lopez, G. (2015, August 28). Hurricane Katrina, in 7 essential facts.
https://www.vox.com/2015/8/23/9191907/hurricane-katrina

(2) Use the engineering reasoning framework to conduct a critical analysis of what might have
contributed to the disaster.
Element Analysis Failure Evidence
Purpose

Question

Information

Inferences

Concepts

Assumptions

Implications

Points of View

Activity 2
(3) Based on your critical analysis above, write one to two body paragraphs of a 500-600 word
essay.

Activity 3
Exchange your paragraph(s) with a group member. Use the Peer Review Checklist and the Peer
Review Form to provide feedback on your peer’s critical analysis essay.

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(1) Read your group member’s paragraph(s).

Checklist Evidence from the essay

Elements are correctly identified.

Intellectual standards are

The explanations use the key

The evidence, examples and

(3) Write a peer review report on the strengths and areas for improvement.

Essay writer:
Peer reviewer:

Feedback Comments

Section1: Strengths (150-200 words)

Section 2: Areas for improvement (150-200 words)