Normative Ethical Theories

GREEK VIRTUE ETHICS

One of the major problems ancient Greek philosophers thought deeply about, is this: What makes
a human life good -- what makes it worth living and what must we do, not just merely to
live, but to live well? The answer they provide is that if a person lives virtuously his or her life
would be worth living. Aristotle was the main proponent of virtue ethics. However, Socrates and
Plato also talk about the role of virtue in human life.

“Virtue as knowledge” according to Socrates

The basic idea of Socrates‘ ethical teaching is his identification of virtue with knowledge.
―Virtue is Knowledge‖ and ―no one errs willingly‖ are the two important sayings of Socrates. To
Socrates, virtue and knowledge are one in the sense that the wise man, who knows what is right, will
also do what is right. A man cannot act rightly unless he knows what is right, unless, in fact, he
knows the concept of ―right.‖ Moral action is thus founded upon knowledge and must spring from
it. But not only does Socrates think that if a man has not knowledge he cannot do right; he also
maintains that if a man has knowledge he cannot do wrong. All wrongdoings arise from ignorance.
If a man knows what is right he must and infallibly do whatever is right. Moreover, Socrates
maintains that no man intentionally does wrong. He does wrong because he does not know the true
concept of ‗right‘ and being ignorant thinks that what he is doing is good. ―If a man intentionally
does wrong, he is better than a man who does so unintentionally‖, says Socrates. For the former has
in him the essential condition of goodness, the knowledge of what goodness is, but the latter,
lacking that knowledge, is hopeless.

Justice as the main virtue in Plato

The most comprehensive statement of Plato's mature philosophical views appears in The
Republic, an extended treatment of the most fundamental principles for the conduct of human life.
Using the character "Socrates" as a fictional spokesman, Plato considers the nature and value of
justice and the other virtues as they appear both in the structure of society as a whole and in
the personality of an individual human being. Plato was highly dissatisfied with the prevailing
degenerating conditions in Athens. The Athenian democracy was on the verge of ruin and was
ultimately responsible for Socrates' death. The amateur meddlesomeness and excessive individualism
became main targets of Plato's attack. This attack came in the form of the construction of an ideal
society in which justice reigned supreme, since Plato believed justice to be the remedy for curing
these evils. After criticizing the conventional theories of justice presented differently by Cephalus,
Polymarchus, and Thrasymachus Plato gives us his own theory of justice according to which,
individually, justice is a 'human virtue' that makes a person self-consistent and good; socially, justice
is a social consciousness that makes a society internally harmonious and good.
In Book I of the Republic, Socrates and his interlocutors discuss the meaning of justice. Some
definitions that report how the word ―justice‖ (dikaiosune) is actually used are offered. The first
definition is given by the elderly, wealthy Cephalus who suggests that justice involves nothing
more than telling the truth and repaying one's debts. But Socrates points out that in certain
(admittedly unusual) circumstances, following these simple rules without exception could produce
disastrous results. Returning a borrowed weapon to an insane friend, for example, would be an
instance of following the rule but would not seem to be an instance of just action. The presentation
of a counter-example of this sort tends to show that the proposed definition of justice is incorrect,
since its application does not correspond with our ordinary notion of justice. In an effort to avoid
such difficulties, Cephalus‘ son Polemarchus offers a refinement of the definition by proposing that
justice means "giving to each what is owed." He explains this statement by defining justice as
―treating friends well and enemies badly.‖ Under the pressure of Socrates‘ objections that one
may be mistaken in judging others and thus harm good people, Polemarchus modifies his definition
to say that justice is ―to treat well a friend who is good and to harm an enemy who is bad‖.
However, when Socrates finally objects that it cannot be just to harm anyone, because justice cannot
produce injustice, Polemarchus is completely confused. He agrees with Socrates that justice cannot
produce any harm, which can only be caused by injustice. Like his father, he withdraws from the
dialogue.
At this point in the dialogue, Plato introduces Thrasymachus, the sophist, another
fictionalized portrait of an historical personality. After impatiently dismissing what has gone before,
Thrasymachus recommends that we regard justice as the advantage of the stronger; those in
positions of power simply use their might to decree what shall be right. But of course Socrates has
other ideas. For one thing, if the ruling party mistakenly legislates to its own disadvantage, justice
will require the rest of us to perform the (apparently) contradictory feat of both doing what they

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decree and also doing what is best for them. More significantly, Socrates argues that the best ruler
must always be someone who knows how to rule, someone who understands ruling as a craft. But
since crafts of any sort invariably aim to produce some external goal, good practitioners of each craft
always act for the sake of that goal, never in their own interest alone. Thus, good rulers, like good
shepherds, must try to do what is best for those who have been entrusted to them, rather
than seeking their own welfare.
Beaten down by the force of Socratic questioning, Thrasymachus lashes out bitterly and then
shifts the focus of the debate completely. If Socrates does happen to be right about the nature of
justice, he declares, then it follows that a life devoted to injustice is be more to one's advantage
than a life devoted to justice.. For Thrasymachus, injustice is better than justice. His arguments
are: (a) An unjust is superior to a just in character and intelligence. (b) Injustice is a source of
strength. (c) Injustice brings happiness. Socrates attacks these points of Thrasymachus and throws
light on the nature of justice. (a) Justice implies superior character and intelligence while injustice
means deficiency in both respects. Therefore, just men are superior in character and intelligence and
are more effective in action. As injustice implies ignorance, stupidity and badness, it cannot be
superior in character and intelligence. A just man is wiser because he acknowledges the principle of
limit. (b) Unlimited self-assertion is not a source of strength for any group organized for common
purpose. Unlimited desire and claims lead to conflicts. (3) Life of just man is better and happier.
There is always some specific virtue in everything, which enables it to work well. If it is deprived of
that virtue, it works badly. The soul has specific functions to perform. When it performs its specific
functions, it has specific excellence or virtue. If, it is deprived of its peculiar virtue, it cannot possibly
do its work well. It is agreed that the virtue of the soul is justice. The soul, which is more virtuous,
or in other words, more just, is also the happier soul. Therefore, a just man lives happy. A just soul,
in other words, a just man, lives well; an unjust cannot.
Next Plato tries to prove that justice really is valuable for its own sake alone. Plato must
show that a life of the second sort is superior to a life of the first sort. Plato realizes that all theories
propounded by Cephalus, Polemarchus, and Thrasymachus, contained one common element: that
all of them treated justice as something external "an accomplishment, an importation, or a
convention, they have; none of them carried it into the soul or considered it in the place of its
habitation." Plato proves that justice does not depend upon a chance, convention or upon external
force. It is the right condition of the human soul by the very nature of man when seen in the
fullness of his environment.
After Book I of the Republic, the entire dialogue is pervaded by an extended analogy between
the justice of individual human beings and that of an entire society or city-state. Since the crucial
elements of justice may be easier to observe on the larger scale, Plato began with a detailed analysis
of the formation, structure, and organization of an ideal state before applying its results to a
description of personal life.

THE IDEAL STATE: In the Republic, the vision of the ideal state is used to illustrate the main
thesis of the dialogue that justice, understood traditionally as virtue and related to goodness, is the
foundation of a good political order, and as such is in everyone‘s interest. Justice, if rightly
understood, Plato argues, is not to the exclusive advantage of any of the city‘s factions, but is
concerned with the common good of the whole political community, and is to the advantage of
everyone. It provides the city with a sense of unity, and thus, is a basic condition for its health.
Virtues in the State: Plato believed that the ideal state comprises members of three distinct
classes: rulers, soldiers, and the people. The first two classes are termed by Plato as Guardian
class. Plato held that effective social/political life requires guardians of two distinct sorts: there must
be both soldiers whose function is to defend the state against external enemies and to enforce its
laws, and rulers who resolve disagreements among citizens and make decisions about public policy.
The guardians collectively, then, are those individuals whose special craft is just the task of
governance itself.
Having developed a general description of the structure of an ideal society, Plato maintained
that the proper functions performed by its disparate classes, working together for the common
good, provide a ready account of the need to develop significant social qualities or virtues. Since the
rulers are responsible for making decisions according to which the entire city will be governed, they
must have the virtue of wisdom, the capacity to comprehend reality and to make impartial
judgments about it. Soldiers charged with the defense of the city against external and internal
enemies, on the other hand, need the virtue of courage, the willingness to carry out their orders in
the face of danger without regard for personal risk. The rest of the people in the city must follow its
leaders instead of pursuing their private interests, so they must exhibit the virtue of moderation, the
subordination of personal desires to a higher purpose. When each of these classes performs its own
role appropriately and does not try to take over the function of any other class, Plato held, the entire
city as a whole will operate smoothly, exhibiting the harmony that is genuine justice.

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 We can therefore understand all of the cardinal virtues by considering how each is embodied
in the organization of an ideal city.
 Rulers: Wise Decisions
 Soldiers: Courageous Actions
 Farmers, Merchants, and other People: Moderated Desires
Justice itself is not the exclusive responsibility of any one class of citizens, but emerges
from the harmonious interrelationship of each component of the society with every other.
Plato then applied this conception of the virtues to the lives of individual human beings.
The Virtues in Human Souls
The basic plan of the Republic is to draw a systematic analogy between the operation of society as a
whole and the life of any individual human being. So, Plato supposed that people exhibit the same
features, perform the same functions, and embody the same virtues that city-states do. In addition to
the physical body, which corresponds to the land, buildings, and other material resources of a city,
Plato held that every human being includes three souls (psychê) [or metaphorically speaking, three
parts of the soul] that correspond to the three classes of citizen within the state, each of them
contributing in its own way to the successful operation of the whole person.
The rational soul (mind or intellect) is the thinking portion within each of us, which
discerns what is real and not merely apparent, judges what is true and what is false, and wisely makes
the rational decisions in accordance with which human life is most properly lived. The spirited soul
(will or volition), on the other hand, is the active portion; its function is to carry out the dictates of
reason in practical life, courageously doing whatever the intellect has determined to be best. Finally, the
appetitive soul (emotion or desire) is the portion of each of us that wants and feels many things,
most of which must be deferred in the face of rational pursuits if we are to achieve a salutary degree
of self-control. In the Phaedrus, Plato presented this theory even more graphically, comparing the
rational soul to a charioteer whose vehicle is drawn by two horses, one powerful but unruly
(desire) and the other disciplined and obedient (will).
On Plato's view, then, an human being is properly said to be just when the three souls
perform their proper functions in harmony with each other, working in consonance for the good of
the person as a whole.
 Rational Soul (Thinking): Wisdom
 Spirited Soul (Willing): Courage
 Appetitive Soul (Feeling):Moderation
As in a well-organized state, the justice of an individual human being emerges only from the
interrelationship among its separate components. Justice is thus a sort of specialization. It is
simply the will to fulfill the duties of one's station and not to meddle with the duties of another
station, and its habitation is, therefore, in the mind of every citizen who does his/her duties in
his/her appointed place. It is the original principle, laid down at the foundation of the State, "that
one man should practice one thing only and that the thing to which his nature was best adopted".
True justice to Plato, therefore, consists in the principle of non-interference.
After determining the nature of justice both in the state as well as in an individual, Plato now
has the answer to the question of why justice is better than injustice. On the view developed here,
true justice is a kind of good health, attainable only through the harmonious cooperative effort of
the three souls. In an unjust person, on the other hand, the disparate parts are in perpetual turmoil,
merely coexisting with each other in an unhealthy, poorly-functioning, dis-integrated personality.

Aristotle: Happiness as the Ultimate Purpose of Human Existence

One of Aristotle‘s most influential works is the Nicomachean Ethics, where he presents a
theory of happiness that is still relevant today, over 2300 years later. The key question Aristotle seeks
to answer in these lectures is: what is the ultimate purpose of human existence? What is that
end or goal for which we should direct all of our activities? Everywhere we see people seeking
pleasure, wealth, and a good reputation. But while each of these has some value, none of them can
occupy the place of the chief good for which humanity should aim. To be an ultimate end, an act
must be self-sufficient and final, ―that which is always desirable in itself and never for the sake of
something else,‖ and it must be attainable by man. Aristotle claims that nearly everyone would agree
that happiness is the end which meets all these requirements. It is easy enough to see that we desire
money, pleasure, and honor only because we believe that these goods will make us happy. It seems
that all other goods are a means towards obtaining happiness, while happiness is always an end in
itself.
The Greek word that usually gets translated as ―happiness‖ is eudaimonia, and like most
translations from ancient languages, this can be misleading. The main trouble is that happiness
(especially in modern America) is often conceived of as a subjective state of mind, as when one says
one is happy when one is enjoying a cool beer on a hot day, or is out ―having fun‖ with one‘s
friends. For Aristotle, however, happiness is a final end or goal that encompasses the totality of

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one‘s life. It is not something that can be gained or lost in a few hours, like pleasurable sensations. It
is more like the ultimate value of your life as lived up to this moment, measuring how well you have
lived up to your full potential as a human being. For this reason, one cannot really make any
pronouncements about whether one has lived a happy life until it is over, just as we would not say of
a football game that it was a ―great game‖ at halftime. For the same reason we cannot say that
children are happy, anymore than we can say that an acorn is a tree, for the potential for a
flourishing human life has not yet been realized. As Aristotle says, ―for as it is not one swallow or
one fine day that makes a spring, so it is not one day or a short time that makes a man blessed and
happy.‖ (Nichomachean Ethics, 1098a18)
The Hierarchical View of Nature
In order to explain human happiness, Aristotle draws on a view of nature he derived from
his biological investigations. If we look at nature, we notice that there are four different kinds of
things that exist in the world, each one defined by a different purpose: (1) Mineral: rocks, metals and
other lifeless things. The only goal which these things seek is to come to a rest. They are ―beyond
stupid‖ since they are inanimate objects with no soul. (2) Vegetative: plants and other wildlife. Here
we see a new kind of thing emerge, something which is alive. Because plants seek nourishment and
growth, they have souls and can be even said to be satisfied when they attain these goals. (3) Animal:
all the creatures we study as belonging to the animal kingdom. Here we see a higher level of life
emerge: animals seek pleasure and reproduction, and we can talk about a happy or sad dog, for
example, to the extent that they are healthy and lead a pleasant life. (4) Human: what is it that makes
human beings different from the rest of the animal kingdom? Aristotle answers: Reason. Only
humans are capable of acting according to principles, and in so doing taking responsibility for their
choices. We can blame a human being for stealing the car since s/he knows it is wrong, but we
wouldn‘t blame an animal since it doesn‘t know any better.
It seems that our unique function is to reason: by reasoning things out we attain our ends,
solve our problems, and hence live a life that is qualitatively different in kind from plants or animals.
The good for a human is different from the good for an animal because we have different capacities
or potentialities. We have a rational capacity and the exercising of this capacity is thus the
perfecting of our natures as human beings. For this reason, pleasure alone cannot constitute
human happiness, for pleasure is what animals seek and human beings have higher capacities than
animals. The goal is not to annihilate our physical urges, however, but rather to channel them in
ways that are appropriate to our natures as rational animals.
We call people ―good‖ if they perform their function well. For instance, a person who plays
the flute well is a good flutist. Playing the flute is the flutist‘s function because that is his or her
distinctive activity. The distinctive activity of humans generally—what distinguishes us from plants
and animals—is our rationality. Therefore, the supreme Good should be an activity of the rational
soul in accordance with virtue. This definition aligns with popular views of happiness, which see the
happy person as virtuous, rational, and active.
Thus Aristotle gives us his definition of happiness: ― …the function of man is to live a
certain kind of life, and this activity implies a rational principle, and the function of a good man is
the good and noble performance of these, and if any action is well performed it is performed in
accord with the appropriate excellence: if this is the case, then happiness turns out to be an activity
of the soul in accordance with virtue.‖ (Nichomachean Ethics, 1098a13)
Happiness as the Exercise of Virtue
In this quote we can see another important feature of Aristotle‘s theory: the link between the
concepts of happiness and virtue. Aristotle tells us that the most important factor in the effort to
achieve happiness is to have a good moral character — what he calls ―complete virtue.‖ But being
virtuous is not a passive state: one must act in accordance with virtue. Nor is it enough to have a
few virtues; rather one must strive to possess all of them. As Aristotle writes: ―He is happy who lives
in accordance with complete virtue and is sufficiently equipped with external goods, not for some
chance period but throughout a complete life.‖ (Nichomachean Ethics, 1101a10)

The Doctrine of the Mean:

The doctrine of mean is Aristotle‘s answer to the question ―How ought men, as moral
beings, to act?‖ His answer, in effect, is that men ought to live moderately, in accordance with the
dictates of practical reason. If they will do this, he argues, he will be happy. Being happy, according
to Aristotle, is something like being properly nourished. The question ―What ought a man to do in
order to be happy?‖ is thus like the question ―How much food should a man eat in order to be
properly nourished?‖ The answer to this question depends on all sorts of empirical factors. It will
depend on the weight of the person involved, on the work he does, on whether he is sick or healthy,
and so forth. A man who is a professional athlete will, in general, require more nourishment than a
man who is a clerk in an office. A large man will generally require more food than a small man – but
not always. The proper amount of nourishment which any given person will need can therefore only

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be established by trial and error: if a person eats a certain amount of food and still remains hungry,
he should eat more; if another person were to eat the same amount and were to feel satiated, he
should eat less. The correct amount of food one should consume is thus a ―mean‖ between the
extremes of too much and too little. ―Mean‖ to Aristotle does not mean ―average‖; it means
―proper‖.
According to Aristotle, virtues of character are dispositions to act in certain ways in response
to similar situations, the habits of behaving in a certain way. Virtue is the appropriate response to
different situations and different agents. Thus, good conduct arises from habits that in turn can
only be acquired by repeated action and correction. Each of the virtues is a state of being that
naturally seeks its ―mean‖ relative to us. According to Aristotle, the virtuous habit of action is always
an intermediate state between the opposed vices of excess and deficiency: too much and too little
are always wrong; the right kind of action always lies in the mean. Thus, for example: with respect
to acting in the face of danger, courage is a mean between the excess of rashness and the deficiency of
cowardice; with respect to the enjoyment of pleasures, temperance is a mean between the excess of
intemperance and the deficiency of insensibility; with respect to spending money, generosity is a mean
between the excess of wastefulness and the deficiency of stinginess; with respect to relations with
strangers, being friendly is a mean between the excess of being ingratiating and the deficiency of being
surly; and with respect to self-esteem, magnanimity is a mean between the excess of vanity and the
deficiency of pusillanimity.

Immanuel Kant’s Deontological Ethics/Moral Law

There are mainly three important concepts in Kant‘s moral philosophy: GOOD WILL,
DUTY, and CATEGORICAL IMPERATIVE. Kant argues that moral law is categorical. But before
you proceed on to discuss his concept of moral law, we need to focus on his notions of ‗Good Will‘
and ‗Duty‘ first. Kant‘s two main ethical writings include Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals and
Critique of Practical Reason.

KANT’S CONCEPT OF GOOD WILL (mw`”Qv)

Kant begins the First Section of the Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals with a statement
that is one of the most memorable in all his writings: ―Nothing in the World – indeed nothing even
beyond the world – can possibly be conceived which could be called good without qualification
except a GOOD WILL.‖ (393) Here Kant indicates that the identifying mark of a good will is that it
is good ―without limitation or qualification.‖ In order to explain what he means by this expression
Kant contrasts it (Good Will) with other goods. All other goods, he tells us, are good only relatively.
He mentions three sets of relative or conditional goods and classifies the first two under the heading
―gifts of nature.‖ Among the many gifts of nature are those he refers to as ―talents of mind.‖
Understanding, wit (imÁvb), and judgment (wePvi¶gZv) count as gifts of nature, presumably, because
we owe our possession of them, at least in part, to some inborn capacity. They are goods insofar as
they provide some benefit either to those who have them or to others. Kant likewise categorizes
―qualities of temperament (m¡fveMZ ¸Yvewj)‖ as gifts of nature. These include character traits such as
―courage (mvnwmKZv), resolution (msKíwPËZv), and perseverance (mn¨¶gZv) in one‘s plans.‖
Kant refers to the second kind of relative good as ―gifts of fortune.‖ These gifts are
bestowed upon us not by nature but by circumstance. Some of us, at some point in our lives, are
fortunate enough to enjoy goods such as power, riches (abm¤ú`), honor, health, and happiness. But
not even happiness, which Kant defines here as the ―complete well-being and satisfaction with one‘s
condition,‖ is an unconditional good, on his account.
Qualities such as courage and kindness play no part in giving our wills unqualified value and
so no part in making us morally good persons. Further, Kant lists other qualities many of which
associate with being a good person, qualities such as ―moderation in affects and passions, self-
control and calm reflection‖, and declares these and like qualities are ―conducive to this good will
itself‖ and that they ―can make its work much easier‖ (Groundwork 4:393–4). Kant writes:
Even if, by some special disfavour of destiny, or by the niggardly endowment of
stepmotherly nature, this will is entirely lacking in power to carry out its intentions, if
by its utmost effort it still accomplishes nothing, and only good will is left . . . even
then it would still shine like a jewel for its own sake as something which has its full
value in itself. (Groundwork, 394)
Indeed, Kant claims that a good will, because of the weakness of the character in which it is
housed, might be utterly unable and unsuited to carry out any of its noble goals, goals such as
fostering the well-being of those around her and improving herself and her own character (G 4:394).
Nevertheless, and again surprisingly, the person possessed of such a will would be a morally
good person.
Kant‘s point is that conditional or relative goods can become ―extremely evil and harmful‖ if
the will which is to make use of them ―is not good.‖ His claim here is that these goods are only
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conditionally good because they are not necessarily accompanied by a good ―character‖ or will.
Unless they are accompanied by a good will, they can become ―extremely evil.‖ Even goods that are
―conducive‖ to the good will and ―make its work easier‖ (goods such as ―moderation in affects and
passions‖ and ―self-control‖) lack unconditional worth, on this account. They lack unconditional
worth because it may happen that these traits are accompanied by a will that is not good. As Kant
observes, a ―scoundrel (`yóRb ev cvwR)‖ may possess qualities of self-control and calmness of
reflection, qualities that aid him in achieving his ends. But these qualities are only relatively good. Far
from necessarily attaching to a will that is good, they attach to the will of a scoundrel (394). This is
also the reason why Kant claims that not even happiness is unconditionally good; even happiness
can be achieved by persons of bad character. What is unconditionally good, in Kant‘s view, is the
person who, because of her admirable character, is worthy of happiness (393). Such a person is
motivated in the right kind of way. That is to say, happiness is good only insofar as one is worthy of
it, and one is worthy of happiness only by possessing a good will.
Kant claims that the effects of our actions are of no relevance in our assessments of
character. In his words, the worth of a good will has to do ―only‖ with its volition. A good will‘s
―usefulness or fruitlessness‖ can neither add nor subtract from its worth. Kant holds that the
unconditional goodness of a good will is a function of what motivates (D‡Ïk¨ ev Awfcªvq) it. He is
explicit about this point when he writes that a good will is unconditionally good not because of
―what it effects or accomplishes . . . but only because of its volition (B”Qve„wË)‖ (394). Kant
distinguishes between conditional goodness and unconditional goodness. Something is conditionally good
just in case there is some condition that must be met for it to be good. Its value depends on a
condition, typically on the condition that some other thing is good. So a given good thing is conditionally
good when some other thing’s goodness is a condition of the given good thing’s goodness. For instance, surgery is a
good thing – but only on the condition that some other thing, the thing it produces, is good, such as
health. Money is a good thing – but, again, only on the condition that there are other valuable things,
things that it can be exchanged for. Otherwise, it is just paper and metal, as it might become were
one stranded on a deserted island with a fat wallet. In each case, there is some good thing – health,
things to buy – whose value is the condition of the value of some other good thing – surgery and
money. Kant claims that, in some such way, everything other than a good will has a condition of its
goodness. The will‘s goodness, additionally, is supposed to be the condition of the goodness of
everything that has value. That is, Kant believes that nothing is good unless the will of the person who
possesses it is good. And, unlike every other valuable thing, there is no further condition of a good will’s value. That is,
there is no other thing distinct from the good will such that its value is the condition of the good will’s value.
Another aspect of Kant‘s views on the value of a good will is that it is intrinsically good, in
the sense that it is ―good in itself‖ (G 4:394). Kant clarifies what he means in saying that a good will
is good in itself by saying that it is good ―only by virtue of its willing (volition)‖ (G 4:394). Being
disposed to volition seems to be an intrinsic property of the will. So at least part of his meaning in
saying that a good will is ―good in itself‖ and ―only by virtue of its willing‖ is that a will is
intrinsically valuable when its intrinsic properties are what make it valuable. A thing‘s intrinsic
properties are those properties that it could still have regardless of how we might change the
circumstances around the spatio-temporal region inhabited by the thing. And the only intrinsic
property of a will is the volition that characterizes it.
In light of Kant‘s claim that the goodness of a good will derives not from what it ―effects or
accomplishes‖ but from its ―volition,‖ it is easy to understand why his moral theory is often
classified as deontological. It is indeed accurate to attribute to him the view that the actual
consequences of an agent‘s willing are irrelevant in determining the goodness of that agent‘s willing.

KANT’S CONCEPT OF DUTY (KZ©‡e¨i aviYv)

For Kant, a good will, then, is a will that acts from duty. In order to clear what Kant means by
saying that a good will is a will that acts from duty he distinguishes a will that acts from duty from a
will that is motivated in other ways. Kant sets aside, in the first place, ―all actions which are
recognized as opposed to duty‖ (396), and, secondly, ―actions which are really in accordance with
duty and to which no one has direct inclination, rather doing them because impelled to do so by
another inclination.‖ (396) Kant provides examples of four kinds of motivational grounds of action.
Only the fourth describes a will that acts from duty. Only the fourth, then, is an example of the
motivation of a good will. Kant discusses the other three kinds of cases for purposes of contrast.
Case 1: Acting in a way that is obviously contrary to duty (KZ©‡e¨i ms‡M we‡ivac~Y©) (Groundwork
397)
Kant writes that he will ―pass over‖ actions that are ―already recognized as contrary to duty.‖
Although Kant provides no examples, he probably has something like the following in mind:
Suppose that, while taking an exam, you notice a classmate engaged in an act of cheating.
Presumably, she does so because she believes this may help her get a good grade. In cheating, she is

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clearly not much bothered by the fact that she is stealing the work of another and very likely
upsetting the fair distribution of grades. In a case like this, Kant says, the question ―never arises‖
whether the action is performed from duty. The question never arises, because no one would for a
moment consider it appropriate to characterize the cheater‘s will as good. Her cheating behavior is
clear evidence that she acts contrary to duty.
Case 2: Acting in conformity with duty (KZ©e¨ Abyhvqx) but not from immediate inclination
(mv¶vr ev cªZ¨¶ cªeYZv n‡Z bq) (Groundwork 397)
Second kinds of actions are not performed from duty, for Kant; they are nevertheless ―in
conformity with duty‖ (KZ©e¨ Abyhvqx). Example: ―[I]t certainly conforms with duty that a shopkeeper
not overcharge an inexperienced customer, and where there is a good deal of trade a prudent
merchant does not overcharge but keeps a fixed general price for everyone, so that a child can buy
from him as well as everyone else. People are thus served honestly; but this is not nearly enough for
us to believe that the merchant acted in this way from duty and basic principles of honesty.‖ (397)
Merchant‘s actions conform with duty because he keeps a ―fixed general price for everyone‖
and does not overcharge. His customers are thus ―served honestly,‖ as Kant says. Kant goes on to
point out that the reason why the merchant keeps a ―fixed general price for everyone‖ is because
―his advantage required it.‖ The merchant has established that honesty pays. He calculates that,
should it become public knowledge that he overcharges his inexperienced customers, he risks
damaging his reputation and thus also his business. He charges a fair price not because he is
committed to ―principles of honesty,‖ but ―merely for purposes of self-interest.‖ Had he no reason
to fear that he might be exposed for overcharging, he would overcharge. Kant‘s here is focusing on
merchant‘s behavior, not on his intention or principle of volition.
Kant tells us that these kinds of actions are those ―to which human beings have no
inclination immediately and which they still perform because they are impelled to do so through
another inclination.‖ The merchant in Kant‘s example receives no immediate gratification from
treating his customers honestly. He does not really want to serve them honestly; he is not at this
point in time particularly inclined to do so. He certainly is not honest, Kant says, ―from love‖ for his
customers. He acts honestly only because he is ―impelled to do so through another inclination‖ –
the thought that his good behavior will eventually benefit him. He acts from inclination, but the
inclination that motivates him is for a future reward. In this sense, the inclination is not
―immediate.‖ Kant turns his attention to examples of acting from immediate inclination in Case 3.
Case 3. Acting in conformity with duty (KZ©e¨ Abyhvqx) and from immediate inclination (mv¶vr ev
cªZ¨¶ cªeYZv n‡Z) (Groundwork 397–398)
At least most of the time, everyone has an ―immediate inclination,‖ Kant says, to preserve
his own life (397). But there is an important difference between preserving one‘s life from
immediate inclination and doing so from duty. He wants to convince us that the person who
preserves his life from immediate inclination has ―no inner worth,‖ and his principle of intention has
―no moral content.‖ Why not? Kant asks us to contrast the case of a person who preserves his life
because he enjoys it, with that of a person who preserves his life even though he suffers from
―adversity and hopeless grief.‖ If this second person preserves his life ―without loving it,‖ he does
so for some reason other than to gratify immediate inclination. What motivates him, Kant says, is
duty.
To further clarify the contrast between acting from duty and acting from immediate
inclination, Kant describes a sympathetic soul who, ―without any other motive of vanity or self-
interest‖ finds ―inner satisfaction in spreading joy.‖ In spreading joy, this ―philanthropist (gvbe-
wn‰Zlx)‖ indeed acts in conformity with duty. His behavior is certainly in line with what duty
demands. Nonetheless, his beneficent actions have ―no true moral worth,‖ on Kant‘s account. As in
the example of the merchant, what motivates the beneficent philanthropist is not duty but
inclination. The only difference is that the philanthropist acts from immediate inclination. The
philanthropist genuinely enjoys spreading joy. He derives gratification from doing so now;
unlike the merchant, he is not merely counting on some eventual reward. Kant grants that the
philanthropist‘s kindness and generosity deserve ―praise and encouragement‖; but Kant also thinks
we will all agree that actions of this kind are not worthy of ―esteem.‖
Case 4: Acting from duty – Duty for Duty’s Sake (KZ‡©e¨i LvwZ‡i KZ©e¨) (Groundwork 398)
Kant finally introduces us to examples of actions performed from duty. He asks us to
imagine that the philanthropist‘s circumstances change and he is overcome with grief. Because the
philanthropist is now preoccupied with his own troubles, he no longer has the inclination to
sympathize with the plight of others. Kant asks us to suppose that, even though the philanthropist
now lacks the desire to do so, he nonetheless ―tears himself out of this deadly insensibility‖ and
reaches out to help others. Here, for the first time, Kant says, we have an example of what is
involved in acting ―simply from duty.‖ Here, finally, is an instance of ―genuine moral worth (weky× ev
LuvwU ‰bwZK g~j¨).‖

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 Notice that in describing this as a case of ―genuine moral worth,‖ Kant refers to the
philanthropist‘s will. Kant is concerned to emphasize the sense in which this fourth case differs
from the other cases. What is different is the grieving philanthropist’s will – the fact that he is
motivated by duty. This is likewise true of the example Kant next considers. In this example, a man
is ―by temperament cold and indifferent to the sufferings of others.‖ If he nonetheless finds ―within
himself a source from which to give himself a far higher worth than what a mere good-natured
temperament might have,‖ then, in being beneficent from duty, the man demonstrates his good
character. Like the grieving philanthropist, this man has a good will.
Based on the above analysis, we can now formulate Kant‘s first proposition of duty as: An
action has moral worth, not because it is done from inclination, but because it is done for
the sake of duty (399).
Kant‘s second proposition about duty is: “An action done from duty does not have its
moral worth in the purpose which is to be achieved through it but in the maxim whereby it
is determined.” (399) If an action does not derive its moral worth from results sought, it must
derive its worth from its motive, and this motive must be other than a mere desire to produce
certain results. Kant expresses this by saying that an action derives its moral worth from its maxim.
A maxim is a principle upon which we act. Kant calls it ‗subjective‘ principle, meaning by this a principle
on which a rational agent does act – a principle manifested in actions which are in fact performed. An
‗objective‘ principle, on the other hand, is one on which every rational agent would necessarily act if
reason has full control over his passions. Objective principles are thus valid for every rational agent,
and they may be called ‗principles of reason‘ or ‗practical laws.‘
Kant‘s third proposition about duty is: “Duty is the necessity of an action done from
respect for the law.” (400) The third proposition asserts that a will that is good acts ―from respect
for law‖ (400). By law Kant means law as such. To act for the sake of duty is to act out of the respect
for law as such. And the essential characteristic of law as such is universality, that is to say, strict
universality which must hold for all cases and admit of no exceptions.

KANT’S CONCEPTION OF MORAL LAW OR CATEGORICAL

IMPERATIVE
In our discussion thus far, we determined that the law of reason that commands our will,
according to Kant, is the law that expresses our duty. But this still does not inform us about the
content of the law. That is, it tells us nothing about what the law specifically requires. In Section II
Kant prepares the way for the account he will eventually provide of the content or meaning of the
supreme law of practical reason, the law he comes to identify as the ―categorical imperative.‖ As a
first step, he introduces a distinction between imperatives that are ―categorical‖ and those that are
―hypothetical.‖
Hypothetical versus Categorical Imperatives: All imperatives command actions in the service of
achieving some purpose or end. In Kant‘s more technical terms, an imperative is a “practical
law” that ―represents a possible action as good and thus as necessary for a subject practically
determinable by reason‖ (414). When defining an imperative, Kant makes a distinction between
command and imperative. ―The conception of an objective principle, in so far as it is obligatory
for a will, is called a command (of reason), and the formula of the command is called an imperative.‖
(413) All imperatives are expressed by an ‗ought‘. Now, for Kant all imperatives command either
hypothetically or categorically.
Generally speaking, hypothetical imperatives, for Kant, have merely conditional or relative
validity. They are of the following form: ―Given that I will to achieve X, I ought to do Y.‖ Kant
rejects all hypothetical imperatives as qualifying for the title of moral imperative. It remains,
therefore, that the moral imperative must be categorical. That is to say, it must command actions,
not as means to any end, but as good in themselves.

First Formula of the Categorical Imperative: Formula of Universal Law (FUL)

Kant formulates the principle of moral law in the following way: “[A]ct only in accordance with
that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it become a universal law.” (421) Kant provides
another expression of the categorical imperative, which may be termed as the Formula of Nature:
“[A]ct as if the maxim of your action were to become by your will a universal law of nature.” Why did Kant
introduce the Formula of Nature in addition to the Formula of Universal Law? The reason seems to
be that Kant wanted to clarify the command of the Formula of Universal Law. Formula of Universal
Law commands that we act only on maxims we can universalize. Kant wants us to understand that
to universalize a maxim is, in effect, to raise it to the status of a law of nature. When I ask myself
whether I could will a maxim as a universal law, I am thus asking whether I could will a world in
which my maxim governed as a law of nature. This would be a world in which everyone necessarily
acted on that maxim.

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 Kant discusses the Formula of Universal Law with four examples of specific duties. First,
duties are divided into duties we have to ourselves, and duties we have to others. Second, duties are
either ―perfect‖ or ―imperfect.‖
(1) Perfect duty to oneself: The duty to preserve one‘s own life (422)
A man is ―sick of life‖ because of a ―series of troubles‖; he is in a state of ―despair.‖ His
despair is not so debilitating, however, that he is unable to ask himself whether it would be ―contrary
to his duty‖ to take his own life. He first formulates his ―maxim,‖ that is, his ―subjective principle of
volition‖. He then considers whether his maxim ―could … become a universal law of nature.‖ He
performs this thought experiment in order to determine whether his maxim has moral worth. In this
example, the man employs the Formula of Nature version of the categorical imperative. Kant
formulates the man‘s maxim as follows: [F]rom self-love I make it my principle to shorten my life when its
longer duration threatens more troubles than it promises agreeableness.
What motivates the man in this case is ―self-love‖ or what Kant sometimes also refers to as
―personal advantage.‖ The point now to consider whether the man‘s maxim of self-love could
become a ―universal law of nature.‖ Kant‘s answer is that it could not, because universalizing the
maxim would produce a contradiction. What contradiction does Kant have in mind? He gives us the
following clue: [A] nature whose law it would be to destroy life itself by means of the same feeling whose destination
is to impel towards the furtherance of life would contradict itself and would therefore not subsist as nature.
Kant‘s point here is that a law of nature that commanded the destruction of life would be
self-contradictory. If we universalized the man‘s maxim (that is, raised it to the status of a law of
nature), we would produce a contradiction. But why would a law of nature that commanded the
destruction of life be self-contradictory? Kant argues that the purpose of laws of nature is to
preserve life. Because the aim expressed in the man‘s maxim is to destroy life, the maxim cannot
even be thought as a law of nature. It contradicts the very idea of a law of nature.
Perfect duty to others: The duty to not tell a false promise (422)
In this second case, a man needs to borrow money. He knows he will succeed in borrowing
only if he promises to repay the money within a set time. He also knows, however, that he in fact
will never repay it. The man‘s maxim is this: [W]hen I believe myself to be in need of money I shall borrow
money and promise to repay it, even though I know that this will never happen.
Kant classifies the kind of contradiction that results when the man tries to universalize his
maxim to tell a false promise as a contradiction in conception. He means by this that the maxim
cannot even be thought or conceived as a law of nature. Universalized, the maxim becomes the law
that everyone is either permitted or required to make false promises in the service of self-love or
personal advantage. The contradiction in conception becomes apparent as soon as we note that the
law at once affirms and undermines the practice of making promises. The universalized maxim
affirms the practice of making promises in that it affirms the practice of a particular kind of promise
(a false promise). At the same time, the law destroys the possibility of making promises in that it
asserts either the universal permissibility or necessity of making false promises.
Imperfect duty to oneself: The duty to develop one‘s talents (423)
This man has a talent the cultivation of which ―could make him a human being useful for all
sorts of purposes.‖ But he enjoys comfortable circumstances and prefers to indulge his desire for
pleasure rather than bother with ―enlarging and improving‖ his ―fortunate natural predispositions.‖
The man chooses, in other words, to neglect his talents. His maxim is something like this: Because I
wish to enjoy life, I will not put myself to the trouble of developing my talents. Kant asks us to consider whether
this maxim is ―consistent with what one calls duty.‖ His answer, once again, is that it is not.
Although a ―nature could indeed always subsist with such a universal law,‖ he says, it is not possible
to ―will‖ the maxim as universal law.
In the previous cases, the question was whether the maxims could be conceived as universal
law. Now the question is whether the maxim could be willed as universal law. In his discussion of
this third case, Kant claims that although the man‘s maxim to neglect his talents could be conceived
as law without contradiction, it nonetheless fails the categorical imperative test because it could not
be willed as law without contradiction. Although the man‘s maxim in this case produces no
conceptual contradiction if universalized, Kant claims that it nonetheless cannot be willed as
universal law without contradiction. Kant‘s sole explanation for this conclusion is contained in the
following sentence: [A]s a rational being (the man) necessarily wills that all the capacities in him be developed,
since they serve him and are given to him for all sorts of possible purposes.
Imperfect duty to others: The duty of benevolence (423)
A fourth man simply has no interest in providing assistance to those in need. His maxim is
thus once again a maxim of indifference – not to the cultivation of his own talents (as in the third
case), but this time to the welfare of others.
Kant asks whether this ―way of thinking‖ could become a universal law of nature. As in the
third example, he tells us that nature could ―subsist‖ were this maxim to be made a universal law.
Nonetheless, he says it is ―impossible to will that such a principle hold everywhere as a law of
nature.‖ He makes his reasoning explicit in the following remark: For, a will that decided this would
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conflict with itself, since many cases could occur in which one would need the love and sympathy of others and in which,
by such a law of nature arisen from his own will, he would rob himself of all hope of the assistance he wishes for
himself.
Summary: To test one's maxims by the Categorical Imperative test, do the following:
Suppose that I am trying to decide whether or not to perform a particular action, say A. Then I
must go through the following steps:
1. Formulate the maxim of the action. That is, figure out what general principle you would be acting
on if you were to perform the action. The maxim will have something like this form: "in
situations of sort S, I will do A." (For example: "in situations in which I need money and
know I can't pay it back, I will falsely promise to pay it back.")
2. Universalize the maxim. That is, regard it not as a personal policy but as a principle for
everyone. A universalized maxim will look something like this: "in situations of sort S,
everyone will do A." (For example: "in situations in which anyone needs money and knows
he or she cannot pay it back, he or she will falsely promise to pay it back.")
3. The contradiction in conception test: Determine whether the universalized maxim could be a universal law,
that is, whether it is possible for everyone to act as the universalized maxim requires. (Kant
argues that this maxim could not be a universal law: if everyone started making false
promises, the institution of promising would disappear, so no one would be able to make a
false promises, since there would be no such thing as a promise to falsely make.) If the
universalized maxim could not be a universal law, you have a perfect obligation not to
perform the action.
4. The contradiction in the will test: But perhaps the maxim could be a universal law. Then we need
to ask a further question: could we will that the maxim be a universal law? (For example, Kant
thinks that it could be the case that everyone refused to ever help others in distress, but that
we could not will that this be the case because that would mean no one would help us when
we were in distress.) If the maxim could be a universal law, but you could not will that it be a
universal law, you have an imperfect duty not to perform the action.

Second Formula of the Categorical Imperative: Formula of Humanity (“FH”) or Formula of

End in Itself (FEI)
Formula of Humanity: So act that you use humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of
any other, always at the same time as an end, never merely as a means.
Here we see Kant clearly formulating the categorical imperative as a demand to serve a
certain end, namely the ‗end in itself‘ that is ‗rational being, or ‗humanity.‘ What is this end, and what
exactly are we to do to serve it? An end is that in virtue of which an agent determines herself to
action, an object out of concern for which she acts. An end in itself is an objective end, meaning that
its status as an end is grounded in reason, independent of inclination, and thus is an end for all
rational beings. It is an existent end, meaning that it is not a goal to be effected, but rather an already
existing thing that is to be respected, honored, supported, and enhanced. Finally, it has absolute
worth, meaning that its value does not depend on inclination.
Notice the inclusion of the word ―merely‖ in the above formulation. The formula does not
state that it is impermissible to use oneself or others as a means. Instead, it commands us never to
use ourselves or others merely as a means. There is an important difference. When my tooth aches, I
seek a dentist‘s help in alleviating the pain. I use my dentist as a means to pain reduction. What the
second formula commands is that I not treat my dentist merely as a means. Although I need to rely
on her special skills to treat my symptom, I am commanded to treat her ―at the same time as an
end.‖ I am commanded to bear in mind that she is a creature endowed with the special capacity of
self-determination, and that she is for that reason entitled to respect. I am not to treat her merely as
an object to be used in the service of my desires. The same goes for how I am to treat myself. I am
not to forget that as a creature endowed with the capacity of self-determination, I must treat myself
with respect as well.
In Kant's theory of value dignity is the supreme value; thus ends in themselves are to be
valued morally above all other entities. Kant argues that rational beings are the only entities that are
ends in themselves and that all rational beings are ends in themselves. The term ―person‖ means a
being whose rational nature ―already marks them out as ends in themselves...and an object of
respect‖ (4: 428). In particular, persons must never be treated merely as means, as things that we
may use however we want in order to advance our interests, and they must always be treated as the
supremely valuable beings that they are. Note that it is not wrong to treat persons as means to our
ends; indeed we could not get along in life if we could not make use of the talents, abilities, service,
and labor of other people. What we must not do is to treat persons as mere means to our ends, to
treat them as if the only value they have is what derives from their usefulness to us. We must always
treat them ―at the same time as an end.‖ To respect persons is thus to regard them as absolutely,
unconditionally, and incomparably valuable, to value them in themselves and not just in comparison to others or

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insofar as they are valuable to someone or could be useful as a means for furthering some purpose, and to acknowledge
in a practical way that their dignity imposes absolute constraints on our treatment of them.

Utilitarianism
As a form of Altruistic Hedonism Utilitarianism claims that the moral worth of an action is
solely determined by its contribution to overall utility in maximizing happiness or pleasure as
summed among all people. It is, then, the total utility of individuals which is important here, the greatest
happiness for the greatest number of people. Utility, after which the doctrine is named, is a measure in
economics of the relative satisfaction from, or desirability of, the consumption of goods.
Utilitarianism can thus be described as a quantitative approach to Ethics.
Utilitarianism starts from the basis that pleasure and happiness are intrinsically valuable, that
pain and suffering are intrinsically disvaluable, and that anything else has value only in its causing
happiness or preventing suffering (i.e. "instrumental", or as means to an end). This focus on
happiness or pleasure as the ultimate end of moral decisions, makes it a type of Hedonism (and it is
sometimes known as Hedonistic Utilitarianism).
Utilitarians support equality by the equal consideration of interests, and they reject any
arbitrary distinctions as to who is worthy of concern and who is not, and any discrimination between
individuals. It is a form of Consequentialism (in that the moral worth of an action is determined by
its outcome or consequence - the ends justify the means), as opposed to Deontology (which
disregards the consequences of performing an act, when determining its moral worth), and to Virtue
Ethics (which focuses on character, rather than rules or consequences).

History of Utilitarianism
The origins of Utilitarianism are often traced back to the Epicureanism of the followers of
the Greek philosopher Epicurus. It can be argued that David Hume and Edmund Burke were proto-
Utilitarians.
But as a specific school of thought, it is generally credited to the English philosopher Jeremy
Bentham. Bentham found pain and pleasure to be the only intrinsic values in the world, and this he
derived the rule of utility: that the good is whatever brings the greatest happiness to the greatest
number of people. Bentham himself, however, attributed the origins of the theory to Joseph
Priestley (1733 - 1804), the English scientist, theologian and founder of Unitarianism in England.
Bentham's foremost proponent was James Mill (1773 - 1836) and his son John Stuart Mill,
who was educated from a young age according to Bentham's principles. In his famous 1861 short
work, "Utilitarianism", John Stuart Mill both named the movement and refined Bentham's original
principles. Mill argued that cultural, intellectual and spiritual pleasures are of greater value than mere
physical pleasure as valued by a competent judge (which, according to Mill, is anyone who has
experienced both the lower pleasures and the higher).
In his essay "On Liberty" and other works, Mill argued that Utilitarianism requires that any
political arrangements satisfy the liberty principle (or harm principle), according to which the only
purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community
against his will, is to prevent harm to others, a cornerstone of the principles of Liberalism and
Libertarianism. Some Marxist philosophers have also used these principles as arguments for
Socialism.
The classic Utilitarianism of Bentham and Mill influenced many other moral philosophers
and the development of many different types of Consequentialism.

Bentham’s Hedonic Calculus

―Nature has placed mankind under two sovereign masters, pain and pleasure.‖ - Bentham
began An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation by defining human nature as something
fundamentally driven by the pleasure/pain principle. He believed that from observing the way
people operate in the world, it could be reasonably demonstrated that humans naturally seek
pleasure, and naturally seek to avoid pain. Therefore, he believed that morality (and the laws derived
from this), could be grounded in what he believed to be a fundamental and 'objective' truth of our
existence - maximizing pleasure, and minimizing pain!
In his An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation (1789) Jeremy Bentham defines
utilitarianism as: "By the principle of utility is meant that principle which approves or disapproves of
every action whatsoever, according to the tendency it appears to have to augment or diminish the
happiness of the party whose interest is in question: or, what is the same thing in other words, to
promote or to oppose that happiness." Bentham's moral theory was founded on the assumption that
it is the consequences of human actions that count in evaluating their merit and that the kind of
consequence that matters for human happiness is just the achievement of pleasure and avoidance of
pain. Bentham‘s hedonistic utilitarianism states that we always ought to perform that act that leads

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to the greatest pleasure. This raises the question as to how we are to quantify pleasure; if we cannot
put a value on the quantity of pleasure that an act produces, then we cannot compare it to other acts
in order to decide which of them we ought to perform.
To overcome this difficulty, Bentham proposed the hedonic calculus. The hedonic calculus
lists seven features of pleasure to which attention must be paid in order to assess how great it is:
intensity, duration, certainty, propinquity, fecundity, purity, and extent.
Intensity: The intensity of the pleasure caused by an act is reasonably self-explanatory. Mild pleasure
is less valuable than intense pleasure, and so acts leading to the latter are to be preferred to acts
leading to the former, other things being equal.
Duration: The duration of the pleasure caused by an act must also be taken into account when
assessing the goodness of the act. Transient pleasure is less valuable than lasting pleasure, and so
acts leading to the latter are to be preferred to acts leading to the former, other things being equal.
Certainty: The certainty criterion refers to the probability of the pleasure resulting from the act; how
likely is it that the act will bring about the anticipated pleasure? If we must choose between an act
that will definitely cause pleasure and an act that will only possibly bring about pleasure, then we do
better to perform the former.
Propinquity: When deciding what to do, Bentham thought, we should bear in mind how distant are
the anticipated benefits of each possible course of action. The more distant the benefits, in either
space or time, the less weight we should give them in making our decision.
Fecundity: The fecundity of an act is the likelihood that the pleasures or pains that it causes will be
followed by similar pleasures or pains. If the happiness that an act causes is likely to be followed by
yet more happiness, then that act is better than a similar act that will cause only one isolated instance
of happiness. Similarly, if the pain that an act causes is likely to be followed by still more pains, then
that act is worse than it would otherwise be.
Purity: It is also important to be attentive to the purity of the pleasure and pain caused by an act. An
act that causes only pleasure is better than one that causes the same amount of pleasure mixed with
a little pain. When pleasure or pain are unmixed with their opposites, their purity is high; when they
are so mixed, their purity is diminished.
Extent: The final criterion for quantifying the pleasure caused by an act is its extent: the more people
enjoy the pleasure, the better. This criterion, unlike the previous six, was not among the original
criteria described by Bentham, but was added by John Stuart Mill.
Bentham incorporates all 7 dimensions in the following mnemonic song:

Intense, long, certain, speedy, fruitful, pure -

Such marks in pleasures and in pains endure.
Such pleasures seek if private be the end:
If it be public, wide let them extend.
Such pains avoid, whichever be thy way:
If pains must come, let them extend to few.

John Stuart Mill’s Qualitative Utilitarianism

A generation later, utilitarianism found its most effective exponent in John Stuart Mill.
Raised by his father, the philosopher James Mill, on strictly Benthamite principles, Mill devoted his
life to the defence and promotion of the general welfare. Mill's Utilitarianism (1861) is an extended
explanation of utilitarian moral theory. In an effort to respond to criticisms of the doctrine, Mill not
only argued in favor of the basic principles of Jeremy Bentham but also offered several significant
improvements to its structure, meaning, and application. Although the progress of moral philosophy
has been limited by its endless disputes over the reality and nature of the highest good, Mill assumed
from the outset, everyone can agree that the consequences of human actions contribute importantly
to their moral value.
In his An Introduction to Ethics, William Lillie has summarized Mill‘s utilitarianism in the
following five statements: (a) Pleasure is the only thing that is desirable. (b) The only proof that a
thing is desirable is the fact that people do actually desire it. (c) Each person‘s own pleasure or
happiness … is a good to that person, so the general happiness is a good to everybody. (d) Men do
desire other objects, but they desire them as a means to pleasure. (e) If one of two pleasures is
preferred by those who are competently acquainted with both we are justified in saying that this
preferred pleasure is superior in quality to the other.
Mill says the Fundamental Principle of Morality is the Principle of Utility, or Greatest Happiness
Principle: pick the course of action that is most likely to produce the greatest good (satisfaction,
pleasure, happiness) of the greatest number of people. This is and has always been the fundamental
principle of morality, per Mill.

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 As Mill says, ―actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness, wrong as
they tend to produce the reverse of happiness. By happiness is intended pleasure, and the absence of
pain; by unhappiness, pain and the privation of pleasure.‖ And ―the standard is not the agent's own
greatest happiness, but the greatest amount of happiness altogether.‖
But he did not agree that all differences among pleasures can be quantified. On Mill's view,
some kinds of pleasure experienced by human beings also differ from each other in qualitative ways,
and only those who have experienced pleasure of both sorts are competent judges of their relative
quality. This establishes the moral worth of promoting higher (largely intellectual) pleasures among
sentient beings even when their momentary intensity may be less than that of alternative lower
(largely bodily) pleasures.
If I am asked, what I mean by difference of quality in pleasures, or what makes one pleasure more
valuable than another, merely as a pleasure, except its being greater in amount, there is but one
possible answer. Of two pleasures, if there be one to which all or almost all who have experience of
both give a decided preference, irrespective of any feeling of moral obligation to prefer it, that is the
more desirable pleasure. If one of the two is, by those who are competently acquainted with both,
placed so far above the other that they prefer it, even though knowing it to be attended with a greater
amount of discontent, and would not resign it for any quantity of the other pleasure which their
nature is capable of, we are justified in ascribing to the preferred enjoyment a superiority in quality, so
far outweighing quantity as to render it, in comparison, of small account.
It is better to be a human being dissatisfied than a pig satisfied; better to be Socrates dissatisfied than
a fool satisfied. And if the fool, or the pig, are a different opinion, it is because they only know their
own side of the question. The other party to the comparison knows both sides.

Mill is confident that the pleasures which will emerge from this test as higher in value (and
thus ―worth more‖ in a utilitarian calculus) will be the ―noble‖ pleasures, the pleasures one derives
from the use of one‘s ―higher faculties.‖
In Chapter Four of his Utilitarianism, Mill offers as "proof" of the principle of utility an
argument originally presented by his father, James Mill.
The only proof capable of being given that an object is visible, is that people actually see it. The only
proof that a sound is audible, is that people hear it: and so of the other sources of our experience. In
like manner, I apprehend, the sole evidence it is possible to produce that anything is desirable, is that
people do actually desire it. If the end which the utilitarian doctrine proposes to itself were not, in
theory and in practice, acknowledged to be an end, nothing could ever convince any person that it
was so. No reason can be given why the general happiness is desirable, except that each person, so far
as he believes it to be attainable, desires his own happiness. This, however, being a fact, we have not
only all the proof which the case admits of, but all which it is possible to require, that happiness is a
good: that each person's happiness is a good to that person, and the general happiness, therefore, a
good to the aggregate of all persons. Happiness has made out its title as one of the ends of conduct,
and consequently one of the criteria of morality

Proof that happiness is desirable and a good

1. The only proof capable of being given that an object is visible is that people actually see it.
2. The only proof capable of being given that an object is desirable, is that people actually
desire it.
3. People do desire their own happiness.
4. So, happiness is desirable.
5. If something is desirable, then it is good.
6. So, happiness is a good

Proof that aggregate happiness is a good for the totality of persons

1. Happiness is a good.
2. For all x, if x is a person, then x‘s happiness is a good for x.
3. Therefore, for the totality of persons P, general happiness is a good for P

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