Contributions to Political Science

Karel B. Müller   Editor

Active
Borders in
Europe
Identity and Collective Memory in
the Cross-Border Space
Contributions to Political Science
The series Contributions to Political Science contains publications in all areas of polit-
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Karel B. Müller
Editor

Active Borders in Europe

Identity and Collective Memory
in the Cross-Border Space
Editor
Karel B. Müller
CEVRO Institute
Prague, Czech Republic

ISSN 2198-7289 ISSN 2198-7297 (electronic)

Contributions to Political Science
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Prologue:
Identities—Memories—Languages—Borders

There is perhaps somewhat of a dilemma when it comes to identity, which we have

been aware of from the very beginning. I remember it was discussed at one of the
first meetings of the Euroregion Presidium, and Jurek Nalichowski, then governor,
said a little jokingly in that company of three: “I am waiting for the birth of Euro-
regional patriotism.” He said: “For example, me, as a sports fan, I would be happier
if, for example, the footballers from Budyszyn [Bautzen] won than if it was someone
else from Warsaw or Lublin, because it is our Euroregion.” That was a bit of a
joke, but that way of thinking has been and continues to be here. But we have been
aware from the beginning that there are still three nations, three legal orders, three
histories, three mentalities, three different senses of humour, not to mention linguistic
differences, so it is virtually impossible to patch it together into a single whole. We
can only create the climate and the conditions to make it work, and I think we can
say that we are succeeding in doing so. But whether it will be possible to move on
to some higher level—I don’t think so. And I don’t think that there is any need for
that. I consider myself to be a bit of a right-wing patriot, and I respect, for example,
Polish traditions, Polish history, and so on. But there is no contradiction here. It is
true, of course, that for our Polish Warsaw, what happens there on the periphery, on
the border, is not important for them.
Jacek Jakubiec
Long-time director of the Polish part of the Nisa Euroregion
June 2018
It always surprises me that the generation that has lived through it, that they can
really live well with it. That they’ve dealt with it, they’ve gotten over it. Their kids,
they swear about how their father was kicked out of somewhere back then, how
he was treated there... These people are often more radical than those personally
affected. We have these regular meetings here... And I’m always very surprised at
how those who meet here can deal with it all. They’re sad, but they have no regrets.
I’d say they’re kind of saying to themselves: The Germans started the war, so they
blame themselves, not literally themselves, but a kind of primary (collective) blame.
And then I often hear them say: You younger people, don’t ever allow this to happen

v
vi Prologue: Identities—Memories—Languages—Borders

again. Cherish peace and good relations. We’ve seen those bad things that have
happened, and it just cannot be fixed entirely. And you can never rectify an evil with
further evil.
Mayor of a town in the Saxon borderland
July 2019
For example, there are all these different committees, monitoring committees, inter-
governmental commissions, I don’t even take my headphones anymore because they
get in the way. How did this happen? When there is a trilateral meeting, Polish-
Czech-German, the chairman must react immediately. And sometimes it is the case
that the interpretation runs from German into Czech and then only after from Czech
into Polish. Two or three minutes—the reaction is no longer adequate to the situation.
So, I set my radar so that I can react if necessary. And it just so happens that I at
least understand.
Andrej Jankowski
Director of the Polish part of the Nisa Euroregion
July 2018
It was a dad at my daughter’s kindergarten in Zittau in 1997 who was imbued with the
idea of allowing his children to grow up bilingual. He got in touch with a kindergarten
in neighbouring Hrádek nad Nisou. And from then on, we brought our children to
Hrádek once a week. In the beginning, we met with smiles or rejections from parents
and teachers. Today, the bilingual exchange of children from both facilities is normal
and part of the regular kindergarten program.
Regina Gellrich
Head of the Saxon State Office for Early Childhood Education in Neighbouring
Languages in Görlitz (Gellrich 2009)
There was a family living in Hartava, and their father wanted their daughter to go
to a Czech school so she could learn Czech. We accepted her, it was no problem,
although we didn’t get money for her from the state, but we didn’t mind. It was so
interesting that she was learning here. She didn’t know much Czech, but she was
smart, so she integrated within a short time. But then the German authorities came
and said that she was breaking the law by going to a Czech school and not educating
herself in Germany. Therefore, they were going to take her out of their custody. Her
dad took his sleeping bag and went to the Ministry of Education in Dresden, and
he said he was going to strike at the Ministry until they gave him permission. And
they finally gave him permission. The girl graduated and had a Czech school. They
didn’t really care what kind of school she was going to have, they just wanted to have
somebody who knew the Czech language ... I remember we had a Czech teacher
teaching German here, and they convinced her to come to their house and teach
them Czech. The parents wanted to learn Czech too. The border didn’t really exist
Prologue: Identities—Memories—Languages—Borders vii

for them, because they wanted to belong to this environment here and they didn’t care
if they spoke Czech or German. They didn’t know that much Czech, so they wanted
to learn it.
Jaroslav Poláček
Headmaster of Lidická Primary School in Hrádek nad Nisou
June 2018
Taking on the task of becoming mayor of a small municipality today is a lottery.
In terms of personal reputation, property, family. This is particularly evident in
the territory of the former Sudetenland. There has been such a shift of population,
both national and local, that several more generations need to grow up before the
inhabitants feel truly at home here.
Citizen of a Czech borderland town
April 2020
Czechs and Poles have different competences and different qualities than Germans.
I always like it when all three get together, learn from each other, and do certain
things together in a completely different way than when one meets just Germans or
just Czechs... by encountering other cultures, we are becoming more tolerant and
more mindful... I would like to have a vision that it will fuse again and grow together
like before the First World War, as I know from history books. I wish there was even
more permeability. Realistically, I can see that borders may be built again, and that
would be a great shame for this region. I really like when I am shopping in Görlitz
and I hear Polish and Czech around me, or when here in Zittau I can talk to Czechs
when shopping. And if we lose that, we lose a lot of our humanity.
Ute Wunderlich
Chairwoman of Schkola, the cross-border school association
May 2019
Contents

Introduction: Euroregions, Active Borders, and Europeanization . . . . . . 1

Karel B. Müller
Active Borders and the Europeanization of the Public Sphere:
How the Same Can Be Different and Vice Versa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Karel B. Müller
Borders and Identity. The Place Where Europe Lives! . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
Luděk Fráně, Daniel Kný, and Karel B. Müller
Borders and Language. Minor Misunderstandings, Big Troubles,
and the Fruits of Multilingualism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
Karel B. Müller and Luděk Fráně
Borders and Memory. From Historical Roots to Dialogical-Like
Routes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
Kamil Fleissner and Karel B. Müller
Conclusion or I Ja Za Tob˛a Polak . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131
Karel B. Müller

Primary Sources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141

Secondary Sources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145

ix
Introduction: Euroregions, Active
Borders, and Europeanization

Karel B. Müller

Under the pressure of current challenges such as immigration, climate change, and
epidemiological threats, Europeans more than ever need to reflect and critically assess
the issue of borders and the transformation thereof. This relates to both internal
borders between member states within Schengen, a symbol of freedom and pros-
perity, and the EU’s external borders, a symbol of unity and security. Both levels are
important since the EU derives its legitimacy both from the principle of a single legal
community and from the principle of the shared sovereignty of individual member
states. The issue of Schengen’s internal borders, therefore, remains a key element in
shaping European politics as well as European civil society. However, we must not
forget that the transformation of Schengen’s internal borders remains intrinsically
linked to the protection of external borders and the degree of permeability thereof
(De Genova, 2017; Follis, 2017a, 2017b; Jones, 2017; Skleparis, 2018).
Contemporary scholarly discourse is infused with general attempts to understand
borders transformations in a dynamic transnational environment.1 Border studies
have so far paid considerable attention to questions of the securitization of borders,
but considerably less attention has been paid to questions of the de-securitization of
borders and to understanding how various forms of civic participation and engage-
ment are treated and managed in cross-border spaces (Hataley & Leuprecht, 2018).
The present publication tries to fill this gap.
The theoretical framework for our research was provided by the concept of active
borders, which was born during the cooperation with the Saxon-Czech Higher Educa-
tion Initiative, at whose meetings and conferences we were welcomed guests. The
concept of active borders was first introduced in March 2011 in Oberwiesenthal at the

1See, e.g., Anderson et al. (2003), Borland et al. (2002), Paasi et al. (2018), Bufon et al. (2014),
and Perkmann (2003).

K. B. Müller (B)
CEVRO Institute, Jungmannova 17, Prague, Czech Republic
e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 1

K. B. Müller (ed.), Active Borders in Europe, Contributions to Political Science,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-23773-7_1
2 K. B. Müller

conference Cooperation Relations in the New Union, which was organized by this
university organization (Müller, 2012). Later, the concept was discussed at several
professional conferences and public forums and was also presented in professional
journals (Müller, 2014, 2018; Müller et al., 2019).
The beginning of our empirical research on cross-border cooperation (CBC) dates
to around 2014, when we discovered in our research on local politics the extraordinary
positive effects of intensive CBC on the quality of local government in Hrádek
nad Nisou, a small Czech border town near Saxony and Poland (Müller & Lisa,
2020). Research on local politics under conditions of intensive CBC reinforced our
hypothesis on the productive potential of bordering. The significance of borders as
a key tool of knowledge that mobilizes cognitive and social resources through a
comparative perspective is not an original idea (Sohn, 2015). However, the concept
of active borders seeks to interpret bordering and cross-border encounters in a way
that attempts to reconcile the dynamics of bordering with a need for cooperation.
The concept of active borders seeks to understand the preconditions, forms, and
mechanisms of social delimitation that does not lead to polarization and alienation,
but rather promote processes of public learning and social integration. Simply put,
active borders divide and unite at the same time. We suggest that the treatment of
active borders contributes to the transformation both of collective identities toward
social inclusion and of historical memories toward a more productive way of dealing
with the past. The transformation of collective identities and historical memories
presents a necessary precondition, source, and method for Europeanization.
The concept of active borders is anchored in the discourse of Europeanization,
as the post-war European community has more than sixty years of experience with
trans-nationalization (Prato, 2014). The system of multilevel governance as a delicate
balance between transnational, intergovernmental, regional, and local interests, insti-
tutions, and actors has become an integral part of the EU decision-making process
(Lachapelle & Oñate, 2018). Although the concept of active borders is based on a
specific European context, we argue that there are no significant limitations with
respect to why this conceptual approach could not inspire analytical and interpretive
attempts aimed at understanding the transformations of bordering processes also in
non-European contexts.
Our research had two general objectives. First, we wanted to comprehend the key
political, cultural, institutional, and economic preconditions and barriers in devel-
oping active borders. Second, we wanted to understand how specific actors of CBC,
in a specific multilateral context, participate in treating or managing an active border,
which we see as a significant form of horizontal Europeanization of the public sphere
and as one of the key catalysts of European integration. We have tried to build on
earlier studies of cross-border cooperation, especially in the field of political and
social geography and regional studies.2 Our aim was also to enrich the theoret-
ical discourse of border studies and to empirically test and elaborate some of its
conceptual findings.

2 See Branda (2009), Dokoupil (2004), Garsztecki et al. (2015), Havlíček et al. (2018), Jeřábek et al
(2021), Novotný and Reitinger (2020), and Zich (2001, 2007a, 2007b).
Introduction: Euroregions, Active Borders, and Europeanization 3

CBC is always first and foremost the activity of citizens of different political and
administrative units who seek—for example through the organization of sporting,
environmental or cultural events—to find shared interests and values that create
the potential for the formation of cross-border communities. However, borders can
also be seen as a kind of wound of history—whether in the form of barrier effects,
socioeconomic asymmetries, or historical injustices—that needs to be healed and
treated. The daily traffic of CBC is affected primarily by language and administrative
barriers and economic asymmetries, although conflicts of collective memory, mutual
grievances, and feelings of historical injustice should not be underestimated. Even
if they slumber in the deepest oblivion, history convinces us that even seemingly
completely extinguished injustices can be rekindled and that the care of historical
traumas and conflicting historical legacies requires sustained attention and care. One
of the tools of this care is the exploration of the supposedly self-evident conflation
of political borders with psychological ones. Political and psychological borders
have been shaped in mutual connection and interaction throughout the formation
of modern European nation-states, until they, in many cases, eventually overlapped
(Eder, 2006; Klusáková & Teulières, 2008). Gellner (1997) called this the marriage
of state and culture. This marriage of political and psychological borders plunged
Europe, thanks to advanced industrialization of warfare, into the greatest catastrophe
in its history. CBC should, therefore, be a key engine for bringing Europe together
and strengthening European publics or, to put it better, the sphere of European publics
(Müller, 2014; Risse, 2010).

1 Why Nisa and Šumava Euroregions?

Our empirical research focused on the cross-border areas of two trilateral Eurore-
gions: the Neisse-Nisa-Nysa (hereafter Nisa) and the Šumava/Bayerischer Wald-
Unterer Inn/Mühlviertel (hereafter Šumava). The Euroregions can be seen as both
products and generators of CBC. They can be regarded as one of the most developed
cross-border structures that seek to contribute to CBC. They represent an institution-
alized and highly structured platform for bringing together existing state authorities,
representatives of municipalities, and representatives of the private and non-profit
sectors. Unlike other forms of CBC, they are permanent, have their own administra-
tion and internal decision-making system, and have their own technical and financial
resources (Dołzbłasz, 2013; Medeiros, 2011; Schramek, 2014).
All our research suggests that the significance of each Euroregion (alongside
Czech borders) in actively promoting CBC and cross-border integration varies
considerably depending on the type of border region and the approach of municipal
leaders and other member organizations. The public perception of the significance
of Euroregions for CBC oscillates between the belief that they are redundant and
dysfunctional (either because of a rejection of CBC altogether or because of a pref-
erence for a less institutionalized form), through the perception of Euroregions as
a key mediating element of CBC, to the perception of Euroregions being a major
4 K. B. Müller

actor in CBC and European integration. The quality and legitimacy of individual
Euroregions are primarily determined by local (political, civic, cultural, business,
etc.) elites, who wield various cultural and social capital, which is a key asset for the
carriers of cross-border cooperation. Focusing on understanding an agency context
of CBC, and how its actors perceive borders and how they approach the issue of
CBC, constituted a central part of our research.
In the Czech Republic (or in Czechoslovakia), Euroregions began to emerge rela-
tively shortly after 1989 in connection with the increased permeability of borders
and the need to revive economic cooperation and to institutionalize cross-border
communication. The key impetus came in 1990 with the INTERREG initiative, which
economically stimulated the development of CBC and integration in a new (post-
cold war) open European. Another key impetus was the German (and Austrian)
experience from Western European CBC. German municipalities from the German-
Czech and German-Polish borderlands were better fit to apply for grants from the
European Regional Development Fund to implement the successful model of CBC
from Western Europe. These Euroregions had a two generational head start in devel-
oping CBC compared to the post-communist countries of Central Europe. The very
first Euroregion (Enschede/Gronau) was established in 1958 on the German-Dutch
border. This Euroregion, as well as some other Western European Euroregions, often
emerged spontaneously (bottom up) based on shared problems and interests. For the
foundation of Czech or Polish Euroregions, top-down dynamics with an important
initiating role to be played by central government has often been crucial, although
not exclusively so. The first post-communist cross-border contacts along the Czech-
German or Polish-German borders also did not lack spontaneous initiatives from
below. As František Vlček, long-time chairman and founder of the Šumava Eurore-
gion (and a long-time mayor of the small town of Běšiny), revealed during our
interview, for establishing the Šumava Euroregion, bottom-up initiatives were also
very important. However, these initiating bottom-up activities were not so much
motivated by shared problems or needs, since these were not easily recognized and
set off, due to the closure of the border over two generations. As Mr. Vlček aptly put
it, establishing the Šumava Euroregion was instead motivated “by a need to erase
sins of the past and by simple human curiosity. We were just impatient to know each
other, as we were looking at each other through barbed wire, so we couldn’t meet
each other”.
The Collapse of the Iron Curtain resulted in the incremental foundation of thir-
teen Euroregions along the Czech borderland. In 1991, the Nisa Euroregion was
founded in the Czech-German-Polish triangle. This Euroregion, which became a
part of our research, is the first Euroregion with Czech involvement. One year
later, two other Euroregions were founded between North Bohemia and Saxony—
the Elbe Euroregion and the Erzgebirge Euroregion. In 1993, the Šumava Eurore-
gion was founded in the Czech-German-Austrian triangle (1993), which was also
included in our research. In the same year, the Egrensis Euroregion was founded
on the Czech-German borders. Between 1996 and 1998 came a second wave. On
the Czech-Polish borders were established the Euroregions of Glacensis, Praděd,
Těšínské Slezsko, and Silesia. These Euroregions were to a great extent inspired by
Introduction: Euroregions, Active Borders, and Europeanization 5

Fig. 1 Euroregions with Czech participation

the oldest Czech Euroregion, being Nisa, as well as by older Euroregions on the
German-Polish borders, the Pomerania Euroregion, and the Pro Europa Viadrina
Euroregion. In a third wave, the Pomerania Euroregion was founded in 1999 on the
Czech-Austrian-Slovakian borders. In 2000, the Beskydy Euroregion was founded
on the Czech-Polish-Slovakian borders, and the Bílé Karpaty Euroregion on the
Czech-Slovakian borders. The last Euroregion, being Silva Nortica, was established
in 2002 on the Czech-Austrian borders. Nowadays, these thirteen Euroregions cover
the whole of the borderland of the Czech Republic (see Fig. 1).
For our research, we were initially considering—of these thirteen Euroregions—
four triangular Euroregions (Beskydy, Nisa, Pomoraví, and Šumava), the specifics of
which necessitate much greater complexity in terms of cross-border communication
and cooperation. These triangular Euroregions take on a multilateral character, and
in addition to the European and national frameworks, they need to reflect three
different local or regional political, legislative, economic, and social contexts. Thus,
the processes of comparative perception of otherness are inevitably more complex
under the conditions of trilateral Euroregions. The situation of these Euroregions
corresponds to some extent to one of the key challenges facing the EU today, namely,
how to ensure effective cooperation in a context of high diversity, which we want
to both strengthen and overcome at the same time. Treating active borders and the
processes of re/constructing social identities and historical memories in the trilateral
Euroregions, as well as maintaining CBC, involves many variables, with a greater
number of opportunities, but also a greater number of obstacles and risks. In this
sense, the trilateral Euroregions represent a suitable laboratory for research on the
horizontal Europeanization process at a local and regional level.
6 K. B. Müller

Ultimately, we selected—from among the four Czech trilateral Euroregions—a

sample for our research that included the Euroregions of Nisa and Šumava. Our
selection was primarily driven by an empirically verifiable assumption that these
two Euroregions involve the Czech-German and Czech-Austrian borders, which
produce stronger barrier effects than the Czech-Polish or Czech-Slovakian borders. In
these Euroregions, barrier effects are reinforced not only by political-administrative
borders, but also by strong economic asymmetries, linguistic barriers, and memory
schisms, which were further magnified by the two-generation border closure (until
1989) or the Iron Curtain (in the case of the Šumava region). On the other hand,
in the Czech-Polish cross-border area, and naturally even more noticeably in the
Czech-Slovak cross-border area, borders primarily represent political-administrative
barriers, and to a much lesser extent linguistic and psychological barriers, which the
concept of active borders primarily targets, and which were also the focus of our
research.
Our assumption that Nisa and Šumava are part of a cross-border area with very
strong barrier effects was also confirmed by the Eurobarometer survey that was
conducted in 2015. In many respects, Nisa and Šumava are the cross-border areas
with the strongest barrier effects within the entire EU. For example, in terms of
communication across borders, these two Euroregions were among the six cross-
border areas with the strongest language barriers. In the Polish-Saxon cross-border
area, 84% of respondents considered the language barrier as a problem for the devel-
opment of cross-border cooperation. In the Bavarian-Czech border region, 79%, and
in the Czech-Saxon and Czech-Austrian border regions, 78% of respondents consid-
ered the language barrier a problem for the development of cross-border cooperation.
Surprisingly, also on the Czech-Polish border, a high 68% of respondents said that
the language barrier was a problem for cross-border cooperation.
Also, in terms of the perception of barriers in general, the Nisa and Šumava
Euroregions belong to the category of EU cross-border areas with the strongest
barrier effects. On the Czech-Polish border, 87% saw a problem in at least one of
the aspects of cross-border cooperation, whereas 13% did not see any problem at all.
The other cross-border areas, which also include the Nisa and Šumava Euroregions,
were among those where people (again within the entire EU) perceived the presence
of barriers most strongly—whether justified or biased—to the development of cross-
border cooperation. Apart from the Czech-Polish border area, in all other cross-border
areas that we surveyed, over 90% of respondents indicated that they saw a problem
in at least one of the aspects of cross-border cooperation. The Austrian-Czech border
region was ultimately the very last of the EU cross-border regions (94% perceived
some problems and only 6% no problem at all), while the Polish-Saxon border region
was fourth from the bottom (93% perceived some problems and 7% no problem at
all), and the Bavarian-Czech border region (91% vs. 8%) and the Saxon-Czech border
region (92% vs. 8%) shared the fifth and sixth positions from the bottom.
Relatively strong barrier effects—and again among the strongest within the EU—
also emerged in the degree of openness (or closedness) to accept a member of a
neighboring ethnic group as a neighbor or family member (EB, 2015). The results of
this Eurobarometer survey thus suggest that the Nisa and Šumava Euroregions are
Introduction: Euroregions, Active Borders, and Europeanization 7

among those cross-border areas in which conditions for developing and treating active
borders are among the least favorable in the EU. This only reinforces our conviction
that these Euroregions deserve special attention, as the past has left us, as historian
Frank Boldt (1998) aptly puts it, “relentless and harsh symbols of anti-European
politics”.
In selecting the Nisa and Šumava Euroregions, we were also partly guided
by already an existing classification, which describes three types of cross-border
encounters that can be detected (after the Velvet Revolution in 1989) along the
Czech borderlands: coexistence, cooperation, and integration (Dokoupil, 2004).
Coexistence encompasses the Czech-Austrian borderlands. Cooperation can describe
the Czech-Bavarian, Czech-Saxon and Czech-Polish borderlands, while integration
refers to the Czech-Slovak borderlands, where, unlike the above borderlands, commu-
nities were divided by the new political borders only in 1993 due to the breakup of
Czechoslovakia.
This typology of cross-border relations could then be further divided into a
distinctly economically asymmetric sub/type (Czech-Bavaria and Czech-Austria)
and a more economically symmetric sub/type (Czech-Saxony and Czech-Poland).
Therefore, for the implementation of this two-case study, we preferred to select
the trilateral Euroregions of Nisa and Šumava, which hypothetically represent
the symmetric cooperative type (Nisa) and the cooperative-coexistent asymmetric
(Šumava) type of borderlands. The formation of a cross-border space of shared
communication, cooperation, and integration here—compared to the Czech-Slovak
border—requires more advanced intercultural competences to overcome great
economic asymmetries, linguistic barriers, collective prejudices, and historical
grievances.
The Nisa Euroregion is unique in several regards. It was founded as a voluntary
association of Czech, Polish, and German municipalities, districts, and other entities
at the Triangle Frontier Conference held in 1991 under the auspices of those three
countries’ presidents (Václav Havel, Lech Walesa, and Richard von Weizsäcker), and
as the first Czech Euroregion it has become an important symbol of the efforts for
a Europe without borders. Nisa is one of the largest Czech Euroregions in terms of
population and municipality members.
In 2021, the Czech part of the Nisa Euroregion had an area of approximately
2,500 km2 , 129 member municipalities and approximately 425,000 inhabitants. With
560,000 inhabitants in the Saxon part and 525,000 in the Polish part, the entire Nisa
Euroregion had over 1.5 million inhabitants (CBFD, 2017; CSO, 2021). At the same
time, it has long been the region with the highest income and the largest finan-
cial reserve. The fact that it is a Czech-Polish-East German cross-border region
implies relatively low economic asymmetries, at least if we compare Nisa with the
Czech-Bavarian or Czech-Austrian cross-border regions. A specific feature of this
Euroregion is also the more pronounced language barrier between Czechs and Poles,
on the one hand, and Germans, on the other. Cultural and linguistic barriers here,
on the other hand, are partly mitigated by the shared communist experience and the
identical contexts of socialization (Schramek, 2014), but also by the shared experi-
ence of the post-communist transition. A major challenge for the Nisa Euroregion
8 K. B. Müller

is certainly dealing with the past, and with the traumatic experience of the Second
World War, especially with the forced displacement of nearly the entire German
population, followed by the repopulation of newcomers. This experience burdens
not only these specific areas, but also the overall context of relationships between
these societies, including their institutional representations.
The Šumava Euroregion was founded in Český Krumlov in 1993, and it is also
a trilateral Euroregion. Unlike the Nisa Euroregion, it is one of the least populated
Czech Euroregions, although among the Czech Euroregions it has the largest territory.
This is certainly related to the rugged mountain character of these border areas, which
have been peripheral since the Habsburg monarchy, without larger economic centers.
In 2021, the Czech part of the Šumava Euroregion had 85 member municipalities and
approximately 146,000 inhabitants, with a total area of approximately 3,150 km2 . The
Bavarian part of the Šumava Euroregion had 900,000 inhabitants and the Austrian
part had 275,000 inhabitants, with about 1.33 million inhabitants living in the entire
Euroregion (CBFD, 2017; CSO, 2021). Similarly, to the Nisa Euroregion, language
barriers, economic asymmetries, and issues of dealing with the past are the main
challenges and limitations to cross-border cooperation. Recollections of the Second
World War and the forced displacement of people from the border region, as well as
the later presence of the Iron Curtain, have multiplied the barrier effects of borders.
The sometimes more reserved and formal quality of Czech-Austrian cross-border
relations is probably caused by the fact that the modern Czech national identity was
constructed at the end of the Habsburg monarchy in the name of de-Austrification,
and that such perception became the dominant narrative producing collective memory
and national identity after the establishment of an independent Czechoslovakia after
the First World War.

2 Structure and Methodology

This book consists of six chapters that (conceptually and empirically) complement
each other and deal with overlapping problems and challenges. At the same time,
the book is written in such a way that the individual chapters can be approached
independently. The fact that the chapters use different argumentative and stylistic
strategies adds to the diversity of the book. This diversity corresponds to the variety of
literary styles and research approaches of the individual members of the author team.
Specific research objectives and partial methodological approaches are presented in
the individual chapters.
The theoretical framework for the research was provided by the concept of active
border, which is introduced in second chapter. The lead author of this chapter is
Karel B. Müller, the editor of the book. The structure of both the questionnaire survey
and the semi-structured interviews were based on the structure of this concept. As
already mentioned, we interpret the active border as a key component of horizontal
Europeanization processes and situate it within the conceptual cluster of the public
Introduction: Euroregions, Active Borders, and Europeanization 9

sphere, identity, and democratic governance. Processes of horizontal Europeaniza-

tion, which should be distinguished from processes of vertical Europeanization, refer
to a bottom-up formation of the European public sphere, where a central role is also
played by cross-border regions and cross-border cooperation. Vertical Europeaniza-
tion (following a top-down trajectory) and horizontal Europeanization (of public
spheres) are distinct, but largely synergistic processes (Müller, 2018).
The third chapter, which is based mainly on data of our online questionnaire
survey, deals with the approach of mayors and mayoresses of the Euroregions of
Nisa and Šumava to cross-border cooperation, their perception of borders at large,
and the transformation of their collective identities. Among other things, this chapter
reinforces the claim that a higher level of identification with the EU positively corre-
lates to more active and intensive involvement in cross-border cooperation and to
a more optimistic perception of borders. The lead author of this chapter is Luděk
Fráně.
The fourth chapter (where the lead author is Karel B. Müller) explores a set
of problems related to linguistic borders. This chapter draws on semi-structured
interviews with well-situated and knowledgeable actors of cross-border cooperation
and combines conceptual and empirical strategies of interpretation. It focuses on the
issue of the language barrier and the high degree of asymmetry in language use along
the Czech-German linguistic border. The chapter presents several arguments that
point to the extraordinary potential that the proximity of the language border offers.
At the same time, it seeks to understand the specific institutions that are working to
break down the language barrier and straighten out the language asymmetry toward
the Czech-German intercultural competence and overall intercultural literacy.
The fifth chapter, which combines the interpretation of qualitative (interviews)
and quantitative data, focuses on issues of collective memory and on the problem
of dealing with the past. This chapter contends that the construction of cross-border
communities of memory represents an innovative catalyst for further development of
cross-border cooperation and for a qualitatively higher level of cross-border region-
alization. It also argues in favor of the claim that the cross-border dealing with the
past is a key to the productive management of threats and challenges that Europeans
face today, and therefore a necessary precondition for both building a more resilient
Europe and the successful development of the EU. The lead author of this chapter is
Kamil Fleissner.
As already mentioned, in pursuit of our research objectives, we combined qualita-
tive and quantitative methods. In the online questionnaire survey, we first contacted a
total of 592 mayors and mayoresses of municipalities of the Nisa and Šumava Eurore-
gions on all sides of the border. Data collection took place from April to October
2017. The set of more than thirty questions covered four thematic areas: (1) percep-
tions of the border, (2) perceptions of cross-border cooperation and communication,
(3) perceptions of institutional and political support for cross-border cooperation,
and (4) transformation of collective identity, including reflection on the conflictual
past.
The return rate of completed questionnaires was relatively low, just over 13% (i.e.,
79 mayors). However, after reweighting, it was possible to approach the statistical
10 K. B. Müller

data as a representative sample of mayors and mayoresses of the member munici-

palities of the Nisa and Šumava Euroregions, and to further analyze the data using
contingency tables. We considered the obtained statistical data to be representa-
tive mainly because the distribution of cases across different socio-demographic
variables (gender, age, education, number of terms in office, and population of the
municipality) appears to be quite probable. 79% of the respondents were male, 41%
were aged 45–55, 43% had achieved a university degree, and 41% had served as
mayor for more than two terms. Of the nine size categories of municipalities in the
questionnaire, we always obtained at least four responses for seven of them. For the
two largest categories (over 20,000 inhabitants), we did not obtain any response. In
contrast, the number of completed questionnaires for the Nisa Euroregion (40) and
the Šumava Euroregion (39) was almost identical. In addition, based on data on the
population size of all 592 municipalities and the gender of the political representatives
(mayors/mayoresses) of these municipalities, we constructed weights to ensure that
our sample is representative of the different parts (Czech/German/Austrian/Polish)
of the two Euroregions, the population of the municipalities and the gender of the
mayors/mayoresses.
In addition to the questionnaire survey, we conducted semi-structured interviews
with a total of 52 informants, who were all important, well-situated, and knowledge-
able Czech, Polish, Saxon, Bavarian, and Austrian actors of cross-border cooperation.
The interviews took place mostly during 2018, with the last six interviews taking
place in 2019. The selection of informants reflected, on the one hand, the principles
of so-called purposive sampling, which was based on the desire to find information-
rich and plural sources of knowledge and, on the other hand, followed the so-called
snowball method, reflecting the recommendations of our first informants. At the same
time, we also included in our interviews non-elected actors operating at different
positions and levels of cross-border cooperation to gain as diverse a perspective as
possible. Out of a total of 52 interviews with key actors of cross-border coopera-
tion, 24 were conducted within the Nisa Euroregion (9 Czech, 6 Polish, and 9 Saxon
informants); 18 within the Šumava Euroregion (7 Czech, 5 Austrian, and 6 Bavarian
informants); and 8 interviews were conducted with representatives of the Ministry
of Regional Development of the Czech Republic, who oversee cross-border coop-
eration. Due to the sensitive nature of some information, many of our informants
requested anonymization. A list of informants quoted or referred to in the book is
provided in the list of Sources (p. 141). The individual interviews had an average
length of 90 minutes and covered 9 topics: (1) perceptions of the border; (2) barriers
to cross-border cooperation; (3) asymmetries in cross-border cooperation; (4) actors
of cross-border cooperation; (5) institutional and political support for cross-border
cooperation; (6) the borderlands as a shared discursive space; (7) transformation
of identities and memories; (8) education, mutual knowledge and public learning;
and (9) transformations of cross-border cooperation and cross-border cooperation
projects.
Active Borders and the Europeanization
of the Public Sphere: How the Same Can
Be Different and Vice Versa

Karel B. Müller

The aim of this chapter is to introduce the concept of active borders as a specific
cultural form, which can strengthen public criticism, democratic integration, and
positive identity formation. We want to argue the validity of the proposition that
active borders can be interpreted as key tools for the horizontal Europeanization
(trans-nationalization) of the public sphere and as a measure of (post-Westphalian)
democratization. The concept of active borders, within the framework of the Euro-
peanization discourse, attempts to make a synergic connection, conceptual amend-
ment, and argumentative elaboration of a conceptual cluster of the public sphere,
collective identity, and democratic governance, which we have already introduced
and discussed (Müller, 2014, 2018). The concept of active borders seeks to contribute
to a Europeanization debate on building a transnational (European) civil public.
Simply put, this concept strives to contribute to the interpretation of relationships
between the need for social demarcation and democratic integration, on the one hand,
and cognitive openness, the capacity for public criticism and cultural pluralization,
on the other.
The complementary concept of the civil public, inspired primarily by
Tocqueville’s democratic theory and by Giddens’s theory of reflexive modernization
(Giddens, 1991; Müller, 2006; Tocqueville, 2002), posits that the democratization of
governance in a transnational framework raises the need to strengthen the attributes
of the civil public—which are historically tied to the nation-state—in the emerging
trans/national environment. The civil public is primarily seen as environments of

The concept of active borders was first introduced in March 2011 in Oberwiesenthal at the Confer-
ence on Cooperative Relations in the New Union organized by the Czech-Saxon Higher Educa-
tion Initiative (Müller, 2012). Later, the concept was discussed at several vocational conferences
and public forums and was also presented in peer-reviewed journals. This chapter is an expanded
adaption of these earlier versions (Müller, 2018).

K. B. Müller (B)
CEVRO Institute, Jungmannova 17, Prague, Czech Republic
e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 11

K. B. Müller (ed.), Active Borders in Europe, Contributions to Political Science,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-23773-7_2
12 K. B. Müller

European
Protection Public
Sphere

Integration
CIVIL Legitimacy
Positive Active Multilevel
PUBLIC Border Governance

Sphere of
Participation European
Publics
Europeanisation

Fig. 1 Dimensions of civil public and Europeanization thereof

advanced civil competences that entail a wide range of forms of civic and political
participation, which can shape patterns of democratic governance. Moreover, the civil
public is also seen as an essential legitimizing base for democratic power, as well
as the most reliable guarantee of civil rights and the protective bulwark against the
abuse of political power. Finally, the civil public works as an environment producing
a sufficient degree of social cohesion and democratic integration, which are based on
trust in rules that generally help in managing or preventing social conflicts. Figure 1
illustrates the forms of the Europeanization of the various dimensions of civil public
and the key role of active borders as a dynamic nexus between them (Müller, 2014,
2018).
The concept of active borders combines three respected theoretical approaches: (1)
the anthropological theory of collective identity of Edward Shils (1975), which draws
the distinction between primordial, sacred, and civil types of collective identity; (2)
the psychological theory of identity formation of Erik Erikson (1982), especially his
binary typology of positive and negative identities; and (3) Gerard Delanty’s (2011)
sociological theory of cultural encounter, which advocates a post-representational
(relational) concept of culture and distinguishes between four different outcomes of
encounters between social groups: polarization, homogenization, hybridization, and
unity in diversity.
The concept of active borders is based on a social constructivist position that
reflects the normative and social determination of social research and the circular
nature of knowledge. The concept of the circularity of knowledge reflects the assump-
tion that any social research not only classifies and interprets reality, but also impacts
and changes it (Giddens, 1991; Wallerstein, 1996). The concept of active (and
passive) borders is an ideal-type concept, which is imagined as a category with clear
(theoretical and empirical) analytical ambitions. These ambitions are founded in the
normative framework of the theory of civil society and democracy, which is exem-
plified in the analyses of the Europeanization of public sphere in relationship to the
Active Borders and the Europeanization of the Public Sphere: How … 13

transformation of both identity formation contexts and the institutional arrangement

of democratic governance.1

1 Forms, Functions, and Changing Borders

To think that borders could simply be removed (O’Dowd, 2010; Ohmae, 1990) is
perhaps a lofty expectation at first sight, but somewhat utopian. While we might
fully endorse this claim from a normative perspective, it is important to reflect
that bordering is arguably an irremovable and constitutive feature of human iden-
tity. It seems likely that no individual, nor any social agent (organization, commu-
nity, society) can exist without demarcation, however permeable and elastic (Booth,
1999). The consequences of bordering can be ambivalent, depending on the nature
of bordering and its social and political implications.
The interpretation of the concept of active borders (as a cultural form of Euro-
peanization) assumes general contextualization of the interpretation in the changing
context of border lining, linked to modernization and globalization. Since the dawn
of border studies (e.g., Boggs, 1940), thinking about borders has come a long way.
The study of borders is no longer confined to the realm of geography but has become
a significant area of both humanities and social sciences (e. g., political science,
anthropology, sociology, social psychology, and others). Each of these disciplines
follows a different conceptual approach, but the prevailing approach treats borders as
human constructs, created to control human agency and behaviors within a specific
spatial context (Popescu, 2012). There is a distinction to be made between territo-
rial (or political) borders, which are the work of land surveyors, and psychological
(or symbolic) borders, which are re/produced through discursive practices and insti-
tutional surveillance. Eder (2006) discusses hard and soft borders in relation to
this. During formation of modern nation-states, there was a marked amalgamation
of hard territorial and soft symbolic borders. If we borrow the poetic expression
of Gellner (1997), modernization has led to a marriage of state and culture. Hard
territorial borders and soft symbolic (or identity) borders were shaped in mutual
reflexivity and interactivity during modernization, which were part of both domestic
and international political processes and relations (Klusáková & Teulières, 2008).
The symbolism of soft borders has become a part of the hardness of political borders
to the extent that territorial borders were considered a given.
An important social function of the formation of borders was (and is) the strength-
ening social cohesion, which enables the development of complex political and
administrative systems. Borders encourage allegiance to others within them and to
political institutions, where politics and the public sphere within the borders organize

1 Beck (2006), Delanty and Rumford (2005), Eder (2006, 2007), Eder and Kantner (2000), Fraser
(2013), Habermas (2001, 2011), Koopmans (2007), Koopmans and Statham (2010), O’Mahony
(2013), Trenz (2008), and Risse (2010).
14 K. B. Müller

and protect against internal and external threats.2 Borders produce social solidarity
and the capacity for voluntary self-restriction or voluntary self-sacrifice as Habermas
(2001) puts it. Borders create preconditions for the formation of collective identity
and the building of experience of abstract definitions of Homeland/Heimat. The idea
of borders between nation-states (or nations) has been successful in generating feel-
ings of social solidarity and institutional loyalty for millions of people and has thus
made possible the achievement of a high level of social organization, including the
expansion of civil and criminal legislation and tax systems, and so on.
An important part of the integrating function of borders is also the self/reflection of
demarcated society (Bufon et al., 2014; Eder, 2006; Hannan, 2006). For this function,
it is essential, however, to cross borders (from time to time) and to be confronted
with the difference of what is outside the borders (Campbell, 1992; Hoover, 1997;
Morley, 2000). Each formative process of collective identity must be accompanied
by the building of a so-called the constitutive other/outside, and in the process of
creating modern nations, it was no different. As many social scientists repeatedly
argued, a significant (perhaps the most significant) nation-forming factor in Europe
has been war (Delanty, 1995; Held, 1992; Tilly, 1992). Internal integration has always
gone hand in hand with the exclusion of those behind borders. The cohesion of
groups can be strengthened by the creation of others who are labeled the enemy
and as such considered to be dangerous. As Delanty (1995) shows, for example,
Islam has played a key role in the historical evolution of European identity as a
constitutive other, which partly explains why many Europeans succumb so easily to
Islamophobia. The construction of a constitutive otherness easily degenerates into
an internal intolerance towards of those “within” who resemble those beyond the
borders. The self/reflection of society has also been historically accompanied by the
deterrent role of borders (Klusákova & Teulières, 2008). As Morley (2000: 248)
reminds us, territory (terra) defines a place which should intimidate (terrere—Latin)
those who are on the other side of the border. This deterring role of borders has
been, to a certain extent, both questioned, due to the industrialization of war and
development of weapons of mass destruction, and transformed, due to the increase
in information production and international media communication.
The formation of modern nation-states was based on the convergence of the afore-
mentioned functions of borders. The synergy of soft symbolic and hard territorial
borders, just like the “effectiveness” of hard borders today, has been undermined by
the influence of the disembedding mechanisms of globalized modernity and by the
mobility of people, symbols, and knowledge which accompany it (Bauman, 2000;
Giddens, 1991). The technological and economic strengths of modernity, which
earlier led to the creation of the modern state, today render them in crisis. The result
of globalization is not only a breakdown of faith in territorial borders, particularly
strong in Europe after the Second World War, but also the reinforcement of commu-
nicational means as part of deconstructing and reconstructing borders of identity and
their symbolic meanings.

2 See, e.g., Newman and Paasi (1998), Paasi (1999), and Passi et al. (2019).
Active Borders and the Europeanization of the Public Sphere: How … 15

As demonstrated at least by growth in the West, ethnical groups are today much
more territorially dispersed than previously, and we cannot easily take an equation
between citizenry, nationality, and territory for granted (Fraser, 2013). All states have
a growing number of noncitizens on their territory. The number of phenomena, such
as multiple citizenship or residency—which ultimately dispute the formula “demos
= ethnos = topos”—is rising, and the borders of national languages cease to coincide
to an ever-growing extent with state borders. This condition understandably brings
identity pressure and transformations. On the other hand, the synergy of soft and
hard borders is still reproduced to some extent by the political mobilization of the
masses and the persistent nationalism of the (above all tabloid) media (Koopmans &
Statham, 2010; Risse, 2010).
As Giovanni Moro (2011) argues, this social reality is gradually coming into
conflict with liberal principles of equality and freedom, and the current concepts of
citizenship come into tension with the EU antidiscrimination legislation. I, there-
fore, agree with Fraser (2013) who argues that current borders transformations
necessitate a critical reassessment of the concepts of legitimacy, citizenship, and
publicity particularly regarding the idea of “inclusiveness” and “affectedness”. As
Hataley and Leuprecht (2018) pertinently stated in relation to border transforma-
tions, the role of institutions and the conditions under which decisions are made
are no longer clear, as we used to think. It is precisely what the concept of active
borders is attempting to achieve, the overcoming of the conventional approach to the
idea of “inclusion” and “affectedness”. The inclusive character of political culture
is ultimately an essential condition of successful political integration in all liberal
societies, which have a natural inclination toward cultural pluralization and fragmen-
tation (Delanty, 2011; Habermas, 2001). As will be further discussed, treating active
borders might productively counterbalance a tendency toward cultural pluralization,
thanks to a strengthening of the social capacity for democratic integration and civic
learning.

2 Active Borders, Collective Identities, and Cultural

Encounters

The comprehension of the concept of active borders presupposes placing the inter-
pretation in the wider context of the collective identity theory. As was suggested
earlier, the core of each collective identity is the binary distinction “us” and “them”,
in other words, the constructing (and coding) the idea of ourselves, and the idea of
others behind borders. We can productively link the concept of active borders to
the typology of Shils (1975: 111–126), which distinguishes three codes of collective
identity: a primordial code, a sacred code, and a civil code. The first code corresponds
with what is also known as essentialism, and which corresponds most closely to the
racial concept of nation. Borders of a society like this are considered impermeable
(from both sides). The second code of collective identity is a sacred (cultural) code.
16 K. B. Müller

Here, a collective is defined in relationship to the unchanging and eternal sphere of

sacred “assets”. The universalist orientation of this code often leads to a missionary
stance on “others” and the border between what is inside and what is outside might be
overcome by cultural assimilation. At the core of the third (civil), code of collective
identity is everyday civil practices, traditions, and institutional mechanisms. This
code expresses hierarchical differences between the wearers of those civil patterns,
new members, and external individuals who are nevertheless ascribed neither positive
nor negative qualities. To be accepted as a member of a collective, means partici-
pating in those civil practices which in fact is the only condition of membership. The
civil code avoids the problem of borders by not referring too much to them. The core
of the civil code is not the portrayal of something external, but the tangibility of the
individual, of the locality, or of the historical event (e.g., Eisenstadt & Giesen, 1995).
Each code of collective identity, which we referred to above, implies a different
type of border. Active borders are distinguished by their porousness and the number
of accessible and penetrable points. Passive borders are characterized by communica-
tional impenetrability. While a primordial code of collective identity implies borders
that are passive in both directions, the sacred code of collective identity implies
borders that are active from the outside inward and passive from the inside outward;
integration is possible through assimilation. Assimilation presumes the adaptation
to cultural forms and patterns, without questioning or diluting established practices,
and without adherence to foreign practices and values. The civil code of collective
identity attempts to nurture active borders in both directions, which are both a precon-
dition and a tool for cross-border communication as an attempt at comprehending
cultural variety and differences. The codes of sacredness and primordiality, on the
other hand, assume the reproduction of borders, whose implementation in practice
involves a stereotyping construction of who is on the outside and who are others
(Campbell, 1992; Hoover, 1997; Shils, 1975).
Simply put, the assumption and affirmation of the point of departure of the civil
code, which favors active borders in both directions, are “distinction without fore-
closure”. Differentiation is a natural yet critical moment of any (collective) identity
formation (Hannan, 2006; Paasi, 1999; Zich, 2001). Differentiation may, however,
be both a result of communication and their hidden prejudice or a precondition. If
differentiation is a concealed precondition of communication, it results in cognitive
discordance and it inevitably reproduces foreclosure during (non)communication.
In this case, identity formation assumes and constructs upon the absence (or lack)
of understanding (Campbell, 1992; Outhwaite, 2008). The civil code of collective
identity is, by contrast, distinguished by differentiation, which is the consequence of
meaningful communication in the framework of shared discursive space (Medeiros,
2011; Risse, 2010; Terlouw, 2012). The hidden assumption of the civil code is the
idea of openness and permanence of shared discursive space, which enables the
comprehension of diversity and the experiencing and treating of active borders.
The active border allows cultural encounters and the comprehension of diversity
in a form that does not imply polarization and rejection but rather establishes and
involves the framework for ongoing communication and cooperation (Outhwaite,
2008; Risse, 2010). Differentiation is a natural but critical moment of (collective)
Active Borders and the Europeanization of the Public Sphere: How … 17

identity formation. Active borders thus (in their way) help to recognize differences
and construct unity at the same time, ensure and suggest conditions for cognitive
resonance, and permanently leave open opportunities for social consent or compro-
mise. As Outhwaite (2008) claims, we also need to consider unsuccessful resolutions
of conflicts as civil and sound. It is important to distinguish unsuccessful resolutions
to conflicts from unsolved conflicts. Therefore, the active border is not only the insti-
tutionalization of achieving agreements but also the civil institutionalization of not-
achieving agreements. Unsuccessful (yet peaceful) resolutions to conflicts increase
the possibility of resolutions to conflicts in the future (Coser, 1956).
The concept of active borders draws upon the relational approach to cultural
theory, which indicates that culture today cannot be understood as an integrated and
imbedded social and moral framework. Relational cultural theory does not approach
culture as a static or predefined framework but as a fluid, mobile, and always contested
outcome of social groups’ interactions (Delanty, 2011). The relational theory does
not interpret culture as something which is divided by definitive borders but as a
constantly open process of social self-construction. Relational theory of culture is a
post-representational conception, which does not define the inside and the outside.
It is also utterly in accordance with the liberal critique of multiculturalism, that
it cannot be understood as a dialogue of closed, unchanging moral frames, but as
pluralization of encountering, mobile, fragmented, and open moral frames, identi-
ties, and narratives. As Delanty (2011) shows, relational cultural theory emphasizes
the importance of the separation of normative, symbolic, and cognitive aspects of
culture, and places particular emphasis on cognitive aspects. Cultural experience is
deconstructed and reconstructed in cultural encounters, and for the concept of active
borders, it is most important that cultural encounters do not lead to the undermining
of civil domain as a set of cognitive orientations and institutions which guarantee
permanent common discursive space. The concept of active borders reinforces the
claim raised by Alexander (2006: 4), that “we need a new concept of civil society as a
civil sphere, a world of values and institutions that generates capacity for social crit-
icism and democratic integration at the same time. Such a sphere relies on solidarity,
on feelings for others whom we do not know but whom we respect out of principle,
not experience because of our persuasive commitment to a common secular faith”.
If we employ the typology of cultural encounter, which Delanty (2011) elabo-
rates, the concept of active borders corresponds in its dynamic to what Delanty calls
“unity in diversity”. Using the concept of active borders, we can characterize unity
in diversity as the existence of cultural plurality, imbued with common discursive
space and processes, which allow free re/construction of identities and continuing
cultural pluralization. Delanty (2011) defines four consequences of cultural encoun-
ters. Apart from unity in diversity, he talks about homogenization, hybridization,
and polarization.3 While the first three consequences can be considered as civil
outcomes of treating active borders, making possible the process of civic learning

3In addition to the four aforementioned consequences of culture encounter, Delanty (2011) further
distinguishes six forms of culture encounter: (1) rejection, (2) divergence, (3) assimilation, (4)
acceptance and cooperation, (5) cultural diffusion (overlapping), and (6) syncretion.
18 K. B. Müller

(cognitive openness), and stimulating democratic integration, polarization should be

interpreted as a risky and uncivil consequence of cultural encounter, which leads to
the strengthening and reproduction of passive borders.4
The question that the concept of active borders inevitably raises is whether we can
still talk about borders at all. Can active borders produce a source of feelings of home,
belonging, security, collective identity, and motivation for voluntary self-constraint
or even self-sacrifice, if needed? By introducing the idea of society without apparent
borders, are we not attempting to put a square peg in a round hole? I think not. The
idea of a cosmopolitan society (which treats active borders) does not assume that the
role of the “constitutional other” is extinguished. It rather assumes that this role will
fall to those who refuse to share a common discursive framework (Beck, 2006). In
the issue of the Europeanization of collective identities, the integration potential of
commonly perceived threats will undoubtedly play an important role.
What matters here, however, is to face relevant dangers and the strengthening
of collective identities through a priori rejecting participation in the process of
communication, which constitutes a very grave danger for civil society in Europe.
The dynamics between active borders and (collective) identity formation certainly
deserves deeper theoretical exploration and more empirical research. Now, let us look
at the concept of active borders through the prism of (individual) identity formation.

3 Active Borders and Positive Identities

In interpreting the concept of (active/passive) borders, we can productively employ

the agency approach of Erikson, which, in contrast to Shils’ approach, is not
concerned with the socially structural features of identity formation but is based
on lifelong clinical empirical research. His concept of identity has been validated in
more than 300 studies (Hoove, 1997). Erikson (1982) distinguishes between positive
and negative identity. Negative identity usually manifests itself by exploitation and

4 By this, I, of course, do not wish to state that passive borders are inevitably negative and active
strictly positive. In one discussion, I was asked why I do not simply talk about positive and negative
borders. The reason is the following. Apart from the fact that the terms positive and negative are
strictly normative and do not represent the necessary social dynamic of demarcation, we can no doubt
imagine a situation where active borders have negative consequences and vice versa. For example,
active borders between regions with great economic asymmetries can cause all sorts of problems;
stifling regional development due to one-directional brain drain or propping up drug production
and cross-border criminal networks. Numerous negative consequences of active bordering can be
observed, for example, between rich parts of Germany or Austria, on the one side, and poorer, post-
communist Poland or the Czech Republic, on the other. However, unfortunate the consequences of
cultural encounters may be, in concrete contexts, it is plausible to see the polarization of cultural
and discursive space as the only possible, nonviolent solution to a concrete encounter of moral
values, claims, and aspirations. As Dahrendorf (1991) said, the key to future democratization of
Europe is rooted in the answer to the question of how and where to demarcate borders between
rules which must be valid for all, and differences of opinion which can be disputed in the light of
the former. What extent of difference are we still able to tolerate and allow as legitimate and safe
for discussion?
Active Borders and the Europeanization of the Public Sphere: How … 19

pseudospeciation, and Erikson considers it as a pathological phenomenon in iden-

tity formation. There are two, usually connected levels of negative identity, negative
typing of oneself or others. Tendencies toward negative identity are often stronger
among ethnic minorities (e.g., Roma people in Central Europe, Native Americans
in the United States, or First Nations in Canada) who identify themselves against
members of dominant cultures. This reinforces mutual antagonisms or intergroup
aggression. The long-term consequences of negative identity formation are usually
hatred, frustration, and lack of self-esteem (Eisenstadt & Giesen, 1995; Erikson,
1982; Hoover, 1997; Pitch, 1993).
The aim of any democratic government should, therefore, above all, be an attempt
at reducing the pathological elements in identity formation and supporting condi-
tions for the strengthening of its positive aspects (Hoover, 1997). In this context,
Giddens (1991) talks about life politics, contrasting strongly with identity politics,
which presents a permanent seduction for any political power. The Erikson’s concept
provides a reliable perspective on how political processes and policies can foster the
formation of dominantly positive identities. Erikson’s central proposition is that the
common strand in human nature consists in striving for an identity based on two
elements. The first identity element is competence in productive, social, and personal
relations. These three areas of competence can be schematically limited by market
spheres, civil sphere, and family. That is why, when asked who we are, most of us
answer in terms of what we do—our vocations, avocations, or familial situations and
statuses that are attached to them. The second identity element rests on a sense of
integrity within a sensible world of meaning. So, when pressed further about identity,
we describe how we are situated in social context: as believers in a religion, natives
of a certain region, and so on. Both competence and integrity involve transactions
between the self and society (Taylor, 1989). Competence must be both achieved by
one’s effort and validated through social recognition (Aldort, 2009). Identity grows
and is nurtured or frustrated in a complex bonding of self and society (Erikson, 1982).
Identity formation is never straightforward. There is always a tension between
positive and negative identities. The risk of composing negative identities is always
present, but the key is to have the means of mastering the urge to give in to the negative
typecasting of oneself or others. Identities could be in a complementary or discrimi-
natory relationship and Erikson (1982) analyses discrimination (and chauvinism) as a
source of pathological and negative identity formation. Identity, when formed by the
victimization of others, leads to strife for dominance and violence. The nonneurotic
nature of positive identities, on the other hand, consists of skills to assert compe-
tence and integrity. Such identities generate feelings of self-mastery, gratification,
and openness to complementarities (Aldort, 2009; Hoover, 1997; Müller, 2007).
If we return to the concept of active/passive borders, it is apparent that passive
borders define a framework of communicative discourse, which fundamentally
undermines and limits our capacity for pursuing competence and thus for positive
identities formation. The recognition of competence assumes a certain extent of moral
integrity and mutuality within the given social context. Without a shared moral frame-
work, people refer to the same behavioral pattern with different moral interpretations,
it is difficult, even impossible, to try for recognition of competence. It is also one of
20 K. B. Müller

the reasons why many authors believe that an upwardly culturally pluralized society
is not able to adequately support the formation of positive identities (Taylor, 1989).
On the other hand, we should remember the generally accepted argument (Delanty,
2003; Eder, 2007) that social relations are often constructed in line with the “logic of
network” rather than with the “logic of territoriality”. In other words, many commu-
nities today are not necessarily defined by hard borders, but increasingly by soft
borders, which is not to say that hard borders become (symbolically) irrelevant or
inefficient (if needed).
Also, soft active borders can fulfill the integrating function of borders, without
being buttressed by borders’ hardness; soft active borders of a collective identity can
be defined as a (community) network of communication (Eder, 2007; Risse, 2010).
These borders are constituted by the result of communicative exercise and experi-
ence which remains open to further re/assessment and re/evaluation. Permeability of
borders is determined by the degree of willingness to share and participate in single
discursive space and by the necessary cultural and institutional preconditions on both
sides of these borders. Active borders create preconditions for communication with
those, who we don’t know, and allow the closing and reopening of their access points.
The closing and re/opening of access points are not a primary characteristic of the
softness or hardness of borders, but rather a result of the un/willingness of the actors
to accept common discursive space, its forms, roles, and consequences.
Also, hard borders can be a source of positive identities formation if they are
accompanied by constructing and treating it as a common discursive space. Commu-
nicating diversity, which presupposed readiness to share different historical narra-
tives and moral interpretations, presumes, develops, and enriches the common
communicative space (Eder, 2006; Fraser, 2013), as demonstrated in this book’s
chapter “Borders and Memory. From Historical Roots to Dialogical-Like Routes”
on collective memory. The shared space of communication can be both a source of
awareness of one’s specific identity and a source of tolerance to others, who are not
perceived as dangerous, but merely as other (yet unknown), but whom I can and
would want to know. The ability to distinguish different from dangerous, and reflex-
ively find and re-evaluate the limits of our tolerance (as in tolerance to others, who
are not dangerous), represents in liberal democracies a definite form of civic compe-
tence, which supports the development of other forms of competence (professional,
social, and personal), thus helping to form positive identities.
Summarizing the aforesaid, we can formulate the thesis that the civil code of
collective identity, which is characterized by active borders, offers the most favorable
conditions for the formation of positive identities. On the other hand, one can still
argue that positive identity, which creates open opportunities for complementary
collective identities, also creates favorable conditions for treating active borders and
for constructing collective identities based on the dominance of civil coding. Further
below, we discuss the question of what consequences this conclusion implies for the
formation of a European public sphere.
Active Borders and the Europeanization of the Public Sphere: How … 21

4 Active Border, Our Unknown, and Civic

Learning—Towards Democratic Integration

The active border is a necessary and productive component of the Europeaniza-

tion of public spheres, which would be imbued by efforts in unbiased and factual
confrontation with otherness, as well as a willingness to re/consider one’s own inter-
ests, positions, and identities. The active border should ensure communication that
is oriented, just as Offe and Preuss (1991) mentioned in relation to deliberative
democracy, toward facts, others, and toward the future, while disregarding partners’
affiliations or belonging to specific communicative discourse.
As mentioned above, the active border enables the strengthening of the discourse
of confidentiality and familiarity under conditions of cultural pluralization. The
plurality of interests and identities raises conflicts of course. The active border
enhances visibility of plurality and thus also potential conflicts. Where outbreaks of
destructive social or political conflicts are seen as a threat, it is necessary to attempt
to overcome conflicts by means of institutionalization, in other words, to subordinate
and manage conflicts by using formal rules. The main precondition for the institution-
alization of conflicts is a re/presentation of conflicting positions in shared discursive
space, whose guarantee in the pluralizing transcultural environment is the active
border. The active border (unlike the passive border) enables communication and
understanding of conflicting positions and interests in their contextual embedded-
ness. The public re/presentation of conflicting positions is not just a precondition of
the institutionalization of conflicts but also allows one to define the conflicting subject
matter and to separate it from matters where there is no conflict, thus establishing
the limits of the conflict and strengthening social integration. This increases the
predictability of participating stakeholders. By clearly identifying what we disagree
on, we can arrive at a better understanding of what we do agree on. The institutional
arrangement of active borders can help to anticipate conflicts such as that referred to
by Coser (1956) as unrealistic conflicts, where the purpose of the conflict becomes
itself an act of aggression. The active border can be seen as a key preventative tool
against pathological consequences of social and political conflicts.
The ability to manage social conflicts and to nurture the capacity to deal with
social and cognitive pluralism are major attributes of a liberal culture which, among
other things, allows—in accordance with Karl Popper’s falsification theory—the
development of human rationality. The capacity to resolve conflicts means, on the one
hand, sensitivity and openness to diversity, and on the other, ability to find and correct
shortcomings and mistakes in one’s own knowledge and understanding. Dealing with
conflicts through critical self-reflection (and discussions) can be seen as one of the
main conditions and means of the assertion of reason in the public sphere (Habermas,
2001; O’Mahony, 2013). Freedom of speech and openness to understanding the
unfamiliar others and the ability to learn from one’s own mistakes is also, according
to Popper (1992), one of the main causes and sources of societal progression. The
wealth of successful societies is the result of human rationality. Yet how should we
understand rationality? It is primarily the skill to learn from our mistakes and biased
conclusions. Deficiencies are easier to find in a pluralistic and critical environment
22 K. B. Müller

than in a homogeneous environment, which ritually and stereotypically reproduces

consensus. Deficiencies in our knowledge and action clearly arise on the surface in
the encounter with differences, which thus ensures higher quality of outputs of public
decision-making when resolving social problems.
This conviction was expressed by many experienced cross-border cooperation
informants we have interviewed. As Ute Wunderlich, chairwoman of the cross-border
school association, pointed out, “Czechs and Poles have different competences and
different qualities than Germans. I always like it when those three get together, learn
from each other, and do certain things together in a completely different way than
when one meets just Germans or just Czechs… by meeting other cultures we are
becoming more tolerant and more mindful”. In other words, conflict can in this sense
be considered as a key source of innovation, cognitive growth, and civic learning.
This requirement also asserts itself in the strategic perspective of the EU. Emphasis
on the innovative framework of the post-Lisbon strategy Europe 2020 counts with
key importance regarding the concept of a learning economy, which uses knowledge
and innovation to achieve an unconventional (smart) economic growth (Commission,
2010).
As Giddens (1991) put it, widespread abstract systems of radicalized modernity
overcome dependence on personal ties, and the opposite of friend is no longer enemy,
nor even foreigner, but rather someone we don’t know. The challenge of (European)
solidarity and citizenship lies in how to reconcile self/confidence with uncertain
feelings and how one can learn to approach unfamiliar and unknown others with
confidence and respect. But there is no doubt that to successfully cope with this
challenge, it should be supported by (Europeanized) political institutions and the
Europeanized public sphere, which promote a civil experience of differentiation and
productive encounters with otherness through treating active borders. Active borders
can provide an opportunity that the presence of others does not rule out the formation
of positive identity but can be an integral part of it. Confrontation with unknown after
all is part of every critical self-reflection and cognitive development (Aldort, 2009).
Emanuel Levinas, as referred to by Wessels (2008), employs in the context of cultural
and cognitive encounters, the concept of proper distance, which tries to find a balance
between ontological certainty of collective identity (Erikson, 1982; Giddens, 1991),
on the one hand, and cognitive openness to encounters with unknown, on the other.5
Communication (with those we don’t know) across porous active borders should
facilitate a balance between being too far and too close. Having these two positions
in balance should guarantee social inclusion and democratic integration which are
based on the formation of positive identities, on the one hand, and civic learning and
criticism based on knowledge and reasoning, on the other.

5 Erikson (1982) points to the connection between trust relationships and the feeling of so-called
ontological certainty. He considers the emotion of ontological certainty, which seems to be formed
in earliest childhood, as a prerequisite for personal integrity and healthy mental and personality
development. Ontological certainty represents a kind of trust in the permanence of one’s own
identity and in the stability of the social and material environment of our actions, a kind of basic
feeling of the reliability of persons and things around us. The feeling of ontological security is
considered by Erikson to be a basic prerequisite for establishing relationships based on trust in a
more complex sense and for the formation of positive identities.
Active Borders and the Europeanization of the Public Sphere: How … 23

The abovementioned line of argument accords with Ulrich Beck’s (2006) defini-
tion of reflexive modernization, which is characterized by the overcoming of binary
cognitive coding of the so-called simple modernization (either/or), with emphasis on
the complementarity of cognitive and identification codes (this and this) and a more
accurate reflection on the conditions and consequences of modernization processes.
As noted by Eder (2006), at the time of globalized modernity, which heralds an end
of others, values must go through a test of universality. European liberal and social
principles have cosmopolitan ambitions, and they strive for a missionary approach
toward their surroundings. But it is a kind of civil missionary, which sees patriotism
as a universal value. Everyone has the right to assert specific values, which she or he
cannot deny to others (the sacred code). In this context, Wallerstein (1996) raised the
claim of pluralist universalism. This is a perspective that recognizes plurality of opin-
ions and interests, while preserving the feeling that the possibility of constructing
and promoting a set of values and interests which may be common to all, still exists.
Such a missionary-like stance does, however, contain a relationship of respect and
recognition of those who acknowledge other values and identities, and assumes that
dialogue across different cultural discourses is possible (and meaningful), even if it
does not (yet) lead to a consensus. The concept of active borders represents, among
other things, a critical contribution to the discussion on Western cosmopolitanism,
or at least to one of the possible approaches to it, which respects the universal
culture of discursive rules (Delanty, 2011). In other words, such an approach to
cosmopolitanism believes in the possibility of attenuation of passive borders and to
the strengthening of the social capacity for reducing their dangerous social and polit-
ical consequences. Diversity of opinions should exclude neither meaningful dialogue
nor the possibility of mutual evaluations. Cosmopolitan orientation should not seek
the homogenous global culture, or diversity for diversity’s sake, but rather for the
space conducive to free and spontaneous sociocultural change, favorable to civic
learning.

5 Active Borders, European Public Sphere, and Illustrative

Support

The Europeanization of the public sphere is an undisputed prerequisite and a conse-

quence of democratization that goes beyond the nation-state. The claim of active
borders is part of the requirement of the trans-nationalization of the principle of
popular sovereignty (Habermas, 2011), which assumes not only the construction of
cross-border solidarity and collective (political) identity, but also the formation of
cross-border public opinion and political will. This normative requirement arises
because of the increase in social complexity and the increasingly limited capacity
of nation-states. It is ultimately part of the legitimation requirements that reconcile
the democratic nature and effectiveness of EU governance. Constructing a singular
European public sphere and the Europeanization of public spheres in Europe are
two different, but largely synergic processes. Many social scientists interpret the
24 K. B. Müller

Europeanization of public spheres as re/politicization of public spheres in Europe; in

other words, the deficit of a European public sphere represents the deficit of public
spheres in Europe (Müller, 2014). Vivian Schmidt (2006: 5) has aptly characterized
this situation by pointing out that nation-states became politics without policies and
the EU became policies without politics. By the same token, Thomas Risse (2010)
demands that EU politics should rail in normal tracks. The Europeanization of public
spheres (around all decision-making centers in the EU, which is constructed as the
multilevel and polycentric form of governance) means securing and treating active
borders across the EU.
A situation in which the same topics are discussed at the same time, in the same
frame of reference, is among the main criteria for the Europeanization of public
communication (Risse, 2010; Trenz, 2008). The “same frame of reference” means
agreement regarding conflictual interpretations of a concrete problem or issue. It
is a requirement for the moral integrity of the social environment, which creates
opportunities for the recognition of competence and positive identity formation. The
Europeanization of public spheres must inevitably assume, on which quite rightly
insists Risse (2010), that actors on both sides of a border respect each other as
legitimate partners in discussion, despite differences in their positions of interest
and collective identities. Simply put, participants of a European public sphere (or
a sphere of European publics) should be able to create a common discursive space
and a framework of communication that cuts across porous borders of competitive
public spheres (Fraser, 2013).
This requirement may cause or be perceived as breaking into established commu-
nication discourses. Therefore, actors of shared narratives become exposed to the
agency of actors with whom they do not share any narrative ties, or with whom,
on the contrary, they associate antagonistic historical interpretations, which may
lead to the rejection of those cross-border actors or to the delegitimization of the
common discursive framework. Europeans are undoubtedly divided by conflicting
historical interpretations that re/produce their discursive practices, including educa-
tional systems. These different narratives should, however, be communicated in a
common discursive space. In this matter, cross-border regions, as shown in chapter
“Borders and Language. Minor Misunderstandings, Big Troubles, and the Fruits of
Multilingualism”, on language barriers, provide extremely favorable opportunities.
We agree with Eder (2006) that the readiness today to participate in this common
discursive space defines Europeanness in the cultural sense. This Europeanness is
based on a discursive meta/narrative of deliberative democracy, freedom, and the
rule of law, which postulate the plurality of European narratives, which are not
antagonistic, but merely different and complementary.
Cross-border initiatives in which Europeans try to formulate (often through
commissions of historians) a shared view of conflicting histories can be seen as a
case of strengthening a shared discursive space, as a form of horizontal Europeaniza-
tion. These commissions seek to also look at their own history through the eyes of
their neighbors, who historically often played the role of rivals or even enemies.
According to Aleida Assmann (2010), there were approximately forty such commis-
sions operating around the world at the beginning of the millennium. In our case,
these were mainly the Common German-Czech Commission of Historians, which
Active Borders and the Europeanization of the Public Sphere: How … 25

in 1996 already published an important summary paper, “Conflicting Communities,

Catastrophe, Release”, or the Permanent Conference of Czech and Austrian Histo-
rians, which only very recently (in 2019) published a breakthrough publication,
the “Common Czech-Austrian History Book”. Some of these initiatives are aimed
directly at the education system, such as the bilingual educational publication “Saxon-
Czech Relations in Changing Times/Sächsisch-Böhmische Beziehungen im Wandel
der Zeit” (Kaiserová & Schmitz, 2013). This publication was produced as part of a
research project of the Faculty of Philosophy at the University of Jana Evangelisty
Purkyně in Ústí nad Labem and the Centre for European Studies at the Technical
University of Dresden. The project had financial support from the European Regional
Development Fund, while the main project partner was the Ústí nad Labem Region.
The main addressees of the project were teachers and students of history and other
social sciences at gymnasiums in Saxony and in the Ústí nad Labem region.
A similar regional initiative that we came across in our research, which is aimed at
the primary school level, is the bilingual interdisciplinary textbook Šumava without
Borders/Böhmerwald ohne Grenzen. According to the publisher’s note on the book’s
cover, it was a “supplementary textbook for primary school pupils in the Šumava
(Böhmerwald) districts on both sides of the border”. The publication was published
in 2000 with the support of the PHARE program by the Prachatice School Office as a
joint work of Czech, Bavarian, and Upper Austrian teachers and public administration
staff in education. In the same year, the Šumava Regional Association also published
it in digital form. It would certainly be interesting to find out what was the real
impact of this textbook. However, according to one of our informants (INF4), there
is currently no interest, and printed copies are still available in great numbers. There
are many similar initiatives in Europe that seek to overcome conflicting historical
interpretations, always on the margins of traditional European rivalries. The initia-
tives vary in the degree of public and political support, and therefore in the degree
of their impact and success in dealing with conflicting stereotypes and narratives.
The House of European History in Brussels is a notable attempt to contribute to the
formation of a shared discursive space and to construct a transnational perspective
on European history, a truly remarkable attempt to create a symbolic place of shared,
dialog-like European memory.
A classic example of the strengthening of passive borders in the case of symbolic
(soft) borders, which retain their imaginary territorial “hardness”, is a situation where
public representatives of two neighboring EU member states stop talking to one
another. Politicians’ sulking and the strengthening of passive borders as a means of
conflict resolution are not an exception in the EU, but we experience it more often in
newer member states. The prime ministers of Hungary and Slovakia did not maintain
official contact for 2 years (2006–2008) due to disputes regarding relations toward
the Hungarian minority in southern Slovakia. It was only pressure from the European
Commission that led to a change in approach toward communication between the
two countries’ leaders.
Also, Czech, and Bavarian political leaders “didn’t talk” to one another for about
20 years following the collapse of communism due to disputes over property confis-
cations of ethnic Germans who were displaced from Czechoslovakia after the Second
World War. It was only Bavarian Prime Minister Horst Seehofer’s visit to Prague in
26 K. B. Müller

2010 that represented the first friendly step towards establishing more open and
trustworthy Czech-Bavarian relations. This was followed in February 2013 by a
reciprocal step from the Czech side, when the then Czech Prime Minister Petr Nečas
gave a truly historic speech in the Bavarian parliament, in which he thanked “Prime
Minister Horst Seehofer for his courage and his conviction that the Czechs and the
Bavarians are able and willing to look together and openly not only to the future,
but also to the past”.6 In this ground-breaking speech, the Czech Prime Minister
expressed his regret for the post-war injustices caused by the expulsion and forced
displacement of Germans from Czechoslovakia, echoing years later the statement
made in the Czech-German Declaration of 1997. This cemented a new, more open,
and more European footing for Czech-Bavarian cooperation. This speech was one
of the best deeds that Petr Nečas ever did for Europe, and for the Czechs, when he,
together with Horst Seehofer, created a space in which Czechs and Bavarians could
start dealing with the past in the form of a dialogical remembering (ways of dealing
with the past is addressed in chapter “Borders and Memory. From Historical Roots
to Dialogical-Like Routes”).
We agree with Aleida Assmann (2010) that dialogical remembering posits an
extraordinary opportunity for the European project. At the same time, it can be seen as
a key prerequisite for the success of European integration itself. While national narra-
tives have historically been shaped on a monolithic and monologic principle, dialog-
ical remembering should lead to the pluralization and interweaving of monolithic
monologic national constructions, and thus open a window to a common (European)
future. European trauma cannot be processed within the framework of traditional
monological constructions of national memory. Europeans need pluralistic Euro-
pean narratives (not a European master narrative) that can be shared within discursive
practices and processes. These dialogical narratives are embedded in national narra-
tives, but they cross borders through a transnational perspective in the form of the
mutual recognition of victimhood. It is about taking active responsibility for a trau-
matic past, acknowledging a share of responsibility for the suffering inflicted on the
other ethnicity, which is included, by virtue of mutual remembering, into one’s own
collective memory. Particularly in the current Czech-German situation, when legal
means such as trial, punishment, and restitution can no longer be applied, due to the
time gap, symbolic means such as the public expression of regret and reconciliation
take on extraordinary significance (Assmann, 2010).
Similarly, to the Czechs and the Bavarians, the leaders of Poland and Lithuania
found themselves in a deadlock after 2010 due to purely symbolic language issues,
which, in comparison with the daily problems of citizens, appear truly mean spir-
ited. In 2012, Lithuania—where 8% of the inhabitants belong to a Polish minority—
ordered the exclusive use of their own alphabet in official documents (such as pass-
ports). It includes neither most Polish letters with diacritics nor the letter W, which
soured relations between the two countries and led to frustration among the Polish
minority in Lithuania. The strengthening of a passive border between the two states

6https://www.vlada.cz/cz/clenove-vlady/premier/vyznamne-projevy/projev-predsedy-vlady-pred-
poslanci-bavorskeho-zemskeho-snemu--21--unora-2013-103728/.
Active Borders and the Europeanization of the Public Sphere: How … 27

was also seen in the increasing pressure for linguistic assimilation in Polish schools
in Lithuania, as well as in restitution disputes related to conflicting interpretations
of the territorial claims of the two countries (Economist, 2012b). Another flagrant
and tragic example of the lack of a shared referential moral framework and the
strengthening of the passive border, we may consider the case of the Azerbaijani
Ramil Safarova, who killed an Armenian classmate Gurgen Margaryan in Budapest
in 2004 in a North Atlantic Treaty Organization language school. He was sentenced
to life in prison. By mutual agreement, Safarov was released in August 2012 from
Hungary to Azerbaijan, where instead of being sent to jail, as the convention assumed
he would, he was instead hailed at the airport in Baku as a hero, then promoted, and
reimbursed for his loss of salary. The affair of course sparked multilateral rifts, not
only between the two countries, but also between Armenia and Hungary and by
extension with the entire Union (Economist, 2012a).
The above examples show that it would be a mistake to take for granted the
dominance of cognitive cultural aspects over aspects of a symbolic and normative
nature. This is true even in Europe. Look at the disaster that is Brexit! An example
of the strengthening and treatment of active (both soft and hard) borders, contrasting
markedly with the aforementioned examples, is the situation of the Danish minority
(50,000) in Northern Germany. The experience of borders there leads to uncon-
ventional and innovative forms of cross-border cooperation. In this area, Denmark
finances about 50 schools and other cultural institutions (including a bilingual daily
newspaper in Flensburg). Most students from this area go on to study at universi-
ties in Denmark. The government of the German state of Schleswig-Holstein also
co-funds these institutions, and the political party representing the Danish minority
(Südschleswigscher Wählerverband, SSW) was exempted from the 5% threshold for
the state parliamentary elections. After the parliamentary election in May 2012,
when SSW gained 4.6% of the votes and three seats in the parliament, for the
first time in modern German history a member of a political party representing a
minority linguistic group gained a governmental position. Anke Spoorendonk of the
SSW (more than symbolically) became Minister of Schleswig-Holstein for affairs of
justice, Europe, and culture. It would be false to say that cultural encounters through
the treatment of the active border in this case are smooth or idyllic. It requires
constant readiness for negotiations. When the state government (led by the CDU)
cut subsidies to Danish schools in 2010, the Danish prime minister intervened with
Chancellor Angela Merkel, who subsequently compensated for the drop with federal
funds (Economist, 2012c).
It would, however, be misleading in the above case to talk about the dissolution
of borders. Neither active borders nor claims of cosmopolitanism mean to abolish
or dissolve borders. It instead means borders (or boundaries) that allow encoun-
tering and reconciling cultural pluralism through institutional provisions, which in
this case protect the “weaker” side from majorization and the “stronger” side from
the danger of indifference tending toward an unthoughtful expansion. The policies
of Denmark and Schleswig-Holstein neither seek nor achieve linguistic or cultural
unification. Differences remain clear and recognized, and due to their better visi-
bility within the processes of communication with others, differences are instead
28 K. B. Müller

reinforced, yet do not lead to polarization. The dynamics of these differences are
reliant on their interactivity, and cultural encounters therein lead to unity in diversity
with the help of divergence, acceptance, and cooperation. We can also speculate as
to whether in this case the active border produces other forms of cultural encounter
(cultural diffusion or syncretism), which Delanty (2011) talks about, and whether
there is a strengthening of appropriate preconditions for the formation of comple-
mentary positive identities. This would require further empirical research. However,
we can reasonably suppose that to some extent we would find these trends. It is not
an encounter of two ultimate totalities, but rather the oscillation of values, interests,
and identities, which—due to interactive plurality—can reflexively re/produce and
re/construct and lead to the elimination of social frustration, creating open opportu-
nities for individual self-realization and gratification. The active border in this case
thus reinforces the self/reflective function of European public spheres in favor of
cultural plurality, which strengthens the capacity for inclusion and civic learning.
Nick Stevenson (2003), in this context, discusses cultural citizenship, which
attempts to maintain an equilibrium between sameness and difference through the
medium of dialogue, that is, citizenship that secures and treats an active border.
An active border can be interpreted as “finding ways of being the same as and at
the same time different from”, as Stuart Hall mentions in connection with defining
and managing cultural pluralism (cited by Morley, 2000: 207). The openness to the
views and reasoning from “behind the border” and the capacity of actors to assess and
influence domestic affairs of “other countries” can today be considered as a matu-
rity criterion of democratic politics in Europe, because most current problems are
common European problems. In line with Beck’s (2006) statement that globalized
modernity means the end of local conflicts, we can reiterate the same about most
security, environmental, and socioeconomic problems in present-day Europe.
The example of the Danish minority points to the fact that the experience of the
active border is like that of identity or health; we don’t realize their value until we
feel their existence being threatened (Pitch, 1993). The active border is often simply
not perceived as a border, and we do not start to reflect on it until we experience
its transformation into a passive border. This is because the active border does not
usually invoke social and political tensions, and therefore, we tend not to perceive
it as a problem. Because people often do not perceive the active border as a border,
they are often also largely unaware of it as a cultural phenomenon and tend to take
it for granted. This may adversely affect their cultural and institutional capacity (in
terms of skills and tools) to maintain and treat this cultural phenomenon by way of
their actions.

6 Distinctioning Without Distanciating (Summary)

In this conceptual and normatively oriented chapter, we have introduced the concep-
tual cluster of the public sphere, identity, Europeanization, and active borders. We
have followed the argument that active borders can be interpreted as a distinct cultural
Active Borders and the Europeanization of the Public Sphere: How … 29

form that creates a sense of unity and belonging and enables the communication and
comprehension of difference. The concept of active borders represents a dynamic
nexus in the relationship between the trans/formation of the public sphere and critical
knowledge, on the one hand, and collective identity and political institutions, on the
other. Active borders are both a condition for and a measure of the Europeanization
of democracy and civil society.
Using Shils’s (1975) typology of collective identity and Erikson’s (1982) concept
of identity formation, we interpreted the process of the Europeanization of the public
sphere as the guaranteeing and treatment of active borders that allow the strength-
ening of the civil code of collective identity, the re/construction of positive identi-
ties, as well as the process of civic learning. The civil code of collective identity
reinforces conditions for social criticism and civic learning by enhancing cogni-
tive cultural aspects. Positive identities, based on the advocacy and recognition of
personal, social, and productive skills, produce complementary collective identi-
ties, imply communication and cooperation, and lead to self/gratification. We also
applied the typology of cultural encounter of Delanty (2011), which is based on a
post-representative (relational) concept of culture. This concept assumes that culture
is a relational phenomenon and arises from encounters of specific social groups.
Every culture undergoes a process of trans/formation and is by nature a changeable
and fluid social phenomenon, which is open to a permanent review and reappraisal.
The relational concept of culture favors cognitive cultural aspects over aspects of a
symbolic and moral nature. The proposed interpretation of the reflexive relationships
between borders, identities, social dynamics, and knowledge is summarized in Fig. 2.
The proper treatment of active borders can lead to the strengthening of a
cosmopolitan identity as a society with a porous border, which relativizes the differ-
ences between us and them and inside or outside. An active border is characterized
by several communication channels, with an emphasis on communicating cultural
pluralism through the provision and operation of a shared discursive space that consti-
tutes the European public sphere. The European public sphere should be an environ-
ment that encompasses distinguishing traits, rather than remoteness or distanciation.
Distinction is always the result of open communication or the assertion of compe-
tences, but distanciation, on the contrary, is a stereotypical assumption of commu-
nicational practices. Distanciation and passive borders lead to the construction of
otherness and polarization, while active borders on the contrary extend the limits of
tolerance and open up space for a more open re-evaluation of the borderline between
different and dangerous. Active borders assume encounters with otherness, taking
off the mask of a foreigner or even an enemy, and which does not imply a threat.
The concept of active borders follows a procedural perspective. The obvious posi-
tives of the approach followed here include the fact that it formulates the idea of an
inclusive and open-minded society, which is characterized by tolerance and cognitive
skepticism. That helps keep a society open to self-improvement, through rational
argument and critical deliberation. The management and resolution of conflict of
interests and values through public deliberation can lead not only to desirable reforms,
but also to more profound changes in the political culture of those participating in
discussions. The concept of active borders goes beyond the perception of society
30 K. B. Müller

BORDER
A. Active
B. Passive

KNOWLEDGE CODE
A. Public Criticism A. Civil
B. Stereotypes/Labelling B. Sacred

IDENTITY SOCIAL DYNAMICS

A. Positive/Gratification A: Complementarity/Inclusion
B. Negative/Frustration B: Discrimination/Exclusion

Fig. 2 Reflective relationships of borders, collective identities, social inclusion/exclusion, and

knowledge

as a morally and symbolically integrated social system and seeks sources of legit-
imacy and social integrity within the participation in the process of fair transcul-
tural communication. Parallel changes in the social sphere also correspond with this
concept where, under the influence of information and communication technologies
and because of the reorganization of spatial and temporal relationships, a significant
transformation of social interactions and relationships is achieved.
In short, active borders is a concept that seeks to link the need for borders and
the dynamics of democratic integration (of collective identity), with cognitive open-
ness, the strengthening of the capacity for public criticism, and cultural pluralization
(of the public sphere). A condition of every liberal society is the need to integrate
cultural pluralism, which in a sense is its inevitable consequence, and to link it
with the existence of a common discursive space (unity in diversity). Democracy
presupposes finding unity in an environment of cultural diversity in such a way that
promotes diversity (Delanty, 2011). An inclusive political culture after all protects
every free society against cultural fragmentation and polarization. The permeability,
productivity, and integrative capacity offered by the active border depend on the
willingness and readiness of actors to engage in open cross-border communication,
and on necessary cultural and institutional conditions (on both sides of the border).
Understanding these conditions represents a challenge both for empirical research
and for further theoretical research dealing with the process of Europeanization.
Preconditions of active borders include both specific agents of communication
and the compatibility of external conditions on both sides of the border. External
Active Borders and the Europeanization of the Public Sphere: How … 31

conditions, among which we can count cultural resources and infrastructure, must
provide a meaningful exchange of information and a permeability of knowledge and
reasoning across (in both directions) the border. The existence of active borders is
also dependent on specific institutional supports (e.g., cross-border projects such
as nongovernmental organizations, communication forums, grants, governmental
programs, media, mobility of students, professors, and public servants), which allow
treating borders as an open opportunity structure (Koopmans, 2007). Such a struc-
ture constitutes a permanent platform for encounters and communication between
heterogeneous actors from both sides of the border. A summary of characteristics
of active/passive borders toward the operationalization of the concept is shown in
Table 1. In the following chapters, we will discuss the relationships between cultural
encounters, language, identities, and collective memory, as well as their dynamic
transformations in the conditions of two examined Euroregions—Nisa and Šumava.

Table 1 Active and passive

Active border Passive border
border—summary of
operational characteristics Civic code of collective identity Sacred code of collective
identity
Positive Negative
identities/complementarity identities/discrimination
Inclusion/integration Exclusion/fragmentation
Self/satisfaction Frustration
Unity in diversity, Polarization
homogenization, hybridization
Cognitive cultural aspects Symbolic and normative
cultural aspects
Others-oriented Polarity us/them
Fact/reasoning-oriented Foreclosure
Future-oriented Past-oriented
Critical knowledge Stereotyping
Competence/cooperation Exploitation/refusal
Open opportunity structure Closed opportunity
structure
Life politics Identity politics
Reflexive modernization (this and Simple modernization
this) (either/or)
Proper distance “Too far” or “too close”
Dialogical dealing with the past Monologic dealing with the
past
Borders and Identity. The Place Where
Europe Lives!

Luděk Fráně, Daniel Kný, and Karel B. Müller

Cross-border cooperation, communication, and integration represent civic activities

across different political-administrative units. Cross-border cooperation takes place
at different levels, within different territorial frameworks and with the participation of
different actors (Chilla et al., 2018). Also, such forms of civic participation are often
institutionalized on different scales and levels. This leads to the formation of more
permanent structures that may in effect strengthen the ability to activate integration
processes between border regions and hypothetically contribute to the formation of
cross-border communities and identities (Zich, 2001). These structures also include
Euroregions, which represent one of the most advanced, durable, and institutionalized
cross-border structures that can contribute to the (horizontal) Europeanization of
the public sphere. However, the relevance and potential of Euroregions in actively
promoting cross-border cooperation depend strongly on the type of border region, as
well as on attitudes and activities of local actors. Central to the successful functioning
of individual Euroregions are specific local elites (political, economic, and civic)
and their social and human capital, as well as their willingness to participate in
cross-border activities.

L. Fráně
Faculty of Natural Science, Charles University, Albertov 2038, Prague, Czech Republic
e-mail: [email protected]
D. Kný
The Governmental Office of Czechia, Edvarda Beneše 4, Prague, Czech Republic
e-mail: [email protected]
K. B. Müller (B)
CEVRO Institute, Jungmannova 17, Prague, Czech Republic
e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 33

K. B. Müller (ed.), Active Borders in Europe, Contributions to Political Science,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-23773-7_3
34 L. Fráně et al.

The aim of this chapter is to map the opinions of the mayors and mayoresses of
the member municipalities of the Euroregions of Nisa and Šumava.1 These repre-
sentatives of the member municipalities of the Euroregions represent the key players
in cross-border cooperation. We sought to understand whether and to what extent
positive perceptions of the border and cross-border cooperation, as well as good
experiences with cross-border activities, contribute to the process of cross-border
horizontal Europeanization, i.e., to cross-border integration, transnational inclusive-
ness, and the strengthening of complementary cross-border identities. Specifically,
we asked questions about how local political elites perceive the border and border-
lands, how they view cross-border cooperation, how intensively they participate in
it, and whether it is possible to identify characteristic groups in the sample of mayors
that we studied in terms of their attitudes towards and experiences with cross-border
cooperation. If so, how are these groups similar or different from one another? We
also sought to test the assumption that there is a close link between positive percep-
tions of the border and active involvement in cross-border cooperation, on the one
hand, and higher self-identification with the EU and more open attitudes towards
people from across the border, on the other. In doing so, we tried to assess the extent
to which the above factors contribute to the transformation of local political elites’
identities towards cross-border openness and integration, i.e., Europeanization.
The theoretical underpinning of the research that influenced the structure of our
questionnaire survey was based on the concept of an active border (Müller, 2018),
which was introduced in detail in the previous chapter. The active border represents
a specific cultural form that contributes to fostering public reflexivity and learning,
while also promoting social inclusion and democratic integration. The active border
is a concept that seeks to link the need for delimitation and the dynamics of demo-
cratic integration (collective identity) with cognitive openness, strengthening the
capacity for public critique and cultural pluralization. The need to integrate cultural
plurality, which is in a sense an inevitable consequence of liberty, and to link it to the
existence of a common discursive space is a condition for any liberal society. The
notions of active and passive borders represent obvious ideal types that wish to offer
an innovative interpretive framework for both theoretical and empirical analysis. A
schematic summary of the characteristics of active and passive border towards their
operationalization is offered in Table 1 in chapter “Active Borders and the Euro-
peanization of the Public Sphere: How the Same Can Be Different and Vice Versa”.
The interpretation of the reflexive relationships between borders, identities, social
inclusion, and knowledge is summarized in Fig. 3 in the same chapter.

1 For the sake of simplicity, the term “mayor” will hereafter be used.
Borders and Identity. The Place Where Europe Lives! 35

1 Demarcation of Surveyed Area, Data Sources,

and Research Methodology

As already mentioned, for our research we have chosen the territory of two trilateral
Euroregions: the Nisa Euroregion in the Czech-Saxon-Polish border area and the
Šumava Euroregion in the Czech-Bavarian-Austrian area. The motives and reasons
for our choice are discussed in detail in the introduction of the book, but the trilateral
character of the Euroregions, which are characterized by greater complexity of cross-
border cooperation and communication, played an important role. Such Euroregions
are not limited to bilateral relations, but have a multilateral character, where three
different political, socioeconomic, and cultural contexts need to be reflected. The
operation of the trilateral Euroregions can thus be seen to some extent as analogous
to one of the main challenges of the EU: How do we find unity and ensure effective
and democratic governance in an environment of diverse ethnic plurality?
The research was primarily based on the evaluation of the results of an online
questionnaire survey, which was aimed at mayors of all member municipalities of
both Euroregions. In total, we approached 592 mayors. The data collection took
place from April to October 2017. We received a total of 79 fully completed ques-
tionnaires. The return rates ranged from 7% for Polish and German mayors, 13%
for Austrian mayors, to 21% for their Czech counterparts. The questions included
in the questionnaire were divided into four parts: (1) perception of the border and
the border area; (2) cross-border cooperation and communication; (3) evaluation of
the activities of the two Euroregions; and (4) re/construction of collective identity
(including collective memory) within this cross-border framework.
The interpretation of the questionnaire outputs was supplemented by the find-
ings of interviews with important actors of cross-border cooperation. In total, we
approached 52 informants. The interviews were conducted with direct actors of
cross-border cooperation in all parts of the two Euroregions, as well as with repre-
sentatives of the Euroregions themselves and representatives of public administration
at the regional and national level. The interviews mostly took place in the course of
2018, with a few in 2019. However, it should be reflected that the interviews with
informants and the questionnaire with respondents represent two different sets of
sources, who were asked thematically similar, but to some extent different questions.
Moreover, the informants’ interviews were often not about the municipalities them-
selves, but rather about cross-border cooperation and its importance for the border
region and cross-border relations in general.
However, the primary sources of the analyses in this chapter are the results of the
questionnaire survey among mayors. Although the overall questionnaire return rate
was relatively low (13%), it allows us to treat our sample as representative in relation
to the core group of mayors of member municipalities of the Euroregions of Nisa and
Šumava. This was partly due to the fact that the structure of the obtained sample—in
terms of various socio-demographic indicators (especially gender, age, and educa-
tion)—largely corresponded to the more general structure of mayors reported in
other works (Čermák & Mikešová, 2018); 79% of respondents were male, 41% were
36 L. Fráně et al.

aged 45–55, and 43% had attained a university degree.2 In Table 1, we then present
a comparison of the structure of the mayors of the baseline sample (592 mayors
of member municipalities of the two Euroregions contacted) and the sample of 79
mayors who completed the questionnaire, in terms of gender, municipality size and
Euroregion part. While in terms of gender and size of municipalities the structure of
the obtained sample corresponds to the baseline sample, in terms of nationality, Czech
mayors are overrepresented in our sample. In contrast, the number of completed ques-
tionnaires for the Nisa Euroregion (n = 40) and Šumava Euroregion (n = 39) was
almost identical. Given these facts, we constructed weights to ensure that our sample
is representative of the different national parts (Czech/German/Austrian/Polish) of
the two Euroregions, the number of inhabitants of the municipalities and the gender
of mayors. The weighted data was used in the case of the descriptive statistics and
contingency table analyses.3
In the following section, the basic attitudes and experiences of mayors of Eurore-
gions towards cross-border cooperation are examined based on the results of the
questionnaire survey. For this purpose, the basic tools of descriptive statistics (distri-
bution of relative frequencies of responses) and contingency table analysis were used
to outline the differences in the responses of representatives of municipalities from
the Euroregions of Nisa or Šumava and from their national parts.
We further applied cluster analysis. We tried to find—based on characteristic
orientations and attitudes towards cross-border cooperation—clearly distinguishable
groups (types) among the mayors of the member municipalities of the Euroregions.
The identified types of mayors were then further investigated using contingency
table analysis and the analysis of averages, in relation to other variables related to
the identity attitudes of the mayors: in relation to (1) identification with the EU; (2)
attitudes towards people on the other side of the border; and (3) attitudes towards
historical conflicts and injustices.

2 Borders in Perception of Key Actors of Cross-border

Cooperation

This section presents (weighted) clusters of responses to the most relevant (in terms of
the focus of this chapter) questions, which also form the variables for all subsequent
analyses. Using chi-square tests and contingency tables, we indicate for which ques-
tions statistically significant differences between actors of different nationalities can

2 However, a bias cannot be ruled out, because, as Čermák and Mikešová (2018) show, the general
makeup of all mayors in the Czech Republic is probably not known, and certainly not specifically
for border regions. Moreover, it is necessary to consider the fact that the research covers 4 different
national contexts. We are equally aware that mayors characterized in terms of unmeasured or
difficult to measure factors, e.g. their activity in general, more pronounced attitudes, etc., may be
overrepresented in the obtained sample.
3 A statistical technique called raking was used to create the weights. The maximum weight was

3.08, the minimum weight was 0.2.

Borders and Identity. The Place Where Europe Lives! 37

Table 1 Comparison of Relative Frequencies of Distribution of Municipalities in Baseline and

Sample
Variable Category Relative Frequency of Municipality Distribution
(%)
in Baseline Population in Our Sample (N = 79)
(N = 592)
Part of Euroregion Nisa-CZ 22.0 38.0
Nisa-D 18.6 8.9
Nisa-PL 7.6 3.8
Šumava-CZ 15.4 21.5
Šumava-D 19.1 11.4
Šumava-A 17.4 16.5
Number of Inhabitants of up to 200 3.4 5.1
Municipality 201 to 499 9.8 13.9
500 to 999 14.7 15.2
1,000 to 1,999 24.0 19.0
2,000 to 4,999 29.2 29.1
5,000 to 9,999 11.1 12.7
Up to 10,000 7.8 5.1
Gender Male 84.1 78.5
Female 15.9 21.5
Source Own questionnaire survey and data from publicly available online sources

be observed, which allows us to interpret how the Euroregions of Nisa and Šumava
differ. Due to the low number of responses, our analysis unfortunately did not include
Polish mayors.4 We follow the assumption formulated by Dokoupil (2004) that the
Czech-Saxon and Czech-Polish cross-border areas are closer to the cooperation and
integration model of the border than the Czech-Bavarian and Czech-Austrian cross-
border areas, which could point to qualitatively different features of cross-border
cooperation in the two Euroregions. At the same time, the categories of answers to
most questions had to be aggregated (or some categories eliminated altogether) due
to low expected frequencies (see more detailed descriptions for each question). The
don’t know answers were always discarded.5 For some questions, we supplement the
interpretation of survey outputs with interviews with our informants to illustrate the
plasticity and situatedness of specific findings.

4 Their inclusion would disturb the statistical assumptions of contingency table analysis. These
assumptions consist of the requirement that no more than 20% of cells have an expected number of
less than five and no cell has an expected number of less than one.
5 For each question or variable, two contingency tables were analyzed for Euroregions

(Nisa/Šumava) and nationality (Czech/German/Austrian). In the case of aggregation of response

categories, this usually resulted in a four-field contingency table (for both Euroregions) or a six-field
contingency table (for all countries).
38 L. Fráně et al.

Regarding the perception of the border, the results show that almost 60% of
municipal leaders perceive the border as an opportunity, and less than 20% of mayors
consider it more of an obstacle, while the remaining actors think that the presence
of the border has no impact at all.6 Chi-square tests and contingency tables show no
statistically significant differences on this question both between mayors from the
Euroregions of Nisa and Šumava and between mayors of different nationalities. The
interviews with our informants also yielded similar findings, since the perception
of the border as an opportunity and catalyst for cross-border cooperation clearly
prevailed. The perception of the border as an obstacle or as a threat was represented
to a much lesser extent. Some informants stated that borders no longer play any
significant role.
Another key question concerned the perceived benefits of cross-border cooper-
ation for their municipalities. Specifically, we asked mayors as follows: Do you
think that overall your municipality benefits from cross-border cooperation?7 Two-
thirds of mayors said that their municipalities had (absolutely or more so) benefited
from cross-border cooperation, while one-third had a rather negative opinion on
the matter (see Fig. 1). The chi-square test and contingency tables again revealed
no statistically significant difference between mayors from the Nisa and Šumava
Euroregions. However, in terms of differences between mayors from different coun-
tries, the results point to somewhat higher skepticism on the part of Czech mayors
compared to their German and Austrian counterparts.8 These findings are consistent
with some earlier research along the Czech-German border. For example, Christian
Schramek (2014), who examined the Egrensis and Elbe Euroregions, encompassing
both the Czech-Bavarian and Czech-Saxon borders, documented less readiness and
willingness of partners on the Czech side to take advantage of the opportunities
offered by the proximity of the border. As far as our interviews are concerned, it is
generally true that cross-border cooperation was perceived as beneficial by almost all
informants, which is, however, not mutually exclusive with the perception of several
barriers to cross-border cooperation. Economic benefits, including the weakening of
peripheral status, but also the breaking down of barriers (cultural/mental/linguistic),
mutual knowledge, enrichment, and the removal of stereotypes were mentioned most
frequently.9
We were also interested in the frequency of meetings between mayors and polit-
ical partners from the other side of the border. We asked the mayors the following

6 The question was: “In your opinion, living in a border area presents (1) more of an opportunity;
(2) more of an obstacle; (3) the presence of the border has no effect on your life; (4) I don’t know”.
7 Response scale: (1) absolutely yes; (2) rather yes; (3) rather no; (4) absolutely no; (5) don’t know.
8 Due to the statistical requirements of contingency table analysis, the four categories of the relevant

variable were combined into one positive and one negative category (except for category 5, which
was excluded). This resulted in a four- and six-field table, respectively. The chi-square test p-value
for the six-pole contingency table was 0.063, which is close to the generally accepted threshold of
0.05.
9 Here it should be borne in mind that the informants interviewed did not assess the benefits of

cross-border cooperation in relation to a specific municipality (as was the case with the mayors in
the questionnaire survey), but in relation to the wider border area or region.
Borders and Identity. The Place Where Europe Lives! 39

Fig. 1 Benefits of
Cross-border Cooperation 5.4%
for Municipality (Data
Source Authors’ survey) absolutely
30.7% yes
27.2% rather yes

rather no

36.7%

question: How often do you meet with your political partners from the other side of
the border to deal with your shared problems?10 Only 13% indicated that they do not
meet with partners from the other side of the border at all. Less than 18% of mayors
meet with partners from the other side of the border at least once a month to solve
their common problems, almost 40% of mayors do so at least once every six months,
and less than 30% less than once every six months. Analysis of the contingency tables
showed no statistically significant differences in the frequency of meetings between
mayors of different nationalities or between Euroregions. The great importance of
the meetings for the actors was also confirmed by our interviews. Many informants
perceive mutual meetings as the absolute basis of cross-border cooperation, as a main
source of breaking down mental barriers and historical injustices, and as a prereq-
uisite for mutual learning, developing intercultural competences, and strengthening
mutual (cross-border) trust.11
In the questionnaire, the municipal mayors also answered a question about the
frequency of events in their municipality with the participation of citizens from the
other side of the border. We asked the following question: Does your municipality
organize activities (cultural, social, sports, etc.) that involve people from the other
side of the border?12 The vast majority of mayors again stated that such events take
place at least occasionally in their municipality, while 35% of mayors even declared
that such joint events take place several times a year. Only 12% of mayors stated
that cross-border events are not organized in their municipalities (see Fig. 2). Chi-
square test and contingency table analysis shows no statistically significant difference

10 Range of answers: (1) at least once a week; (2) at least once a month; (3) at least once every
six months; (4) less than once every six months; (5) do not meet at all. For the analysis of the
contingency tables, the four categories were aggregated into two (category 1 was not reported by
any respondent).
11 It should be emphasized here that the interviews with informants did not specifically reflect

the frequency of meetings or meetings of mayors only, but related to the importance of mutual
cross-border meetings of citizens in general.
12 Range of answers: (1) yes, several times a year; (2) yes, about once a year; (3) yes, occasionally;

(4) no; (5) don’t know.

40 L. Fráně et al.

Fig. 2 Frequency of
Cultural, Social, Sport 11.8%
Events in Municipality (Data
Source Authors’ survey) yes, several times a
35.4% year
yes, about once a
year
32.4% yes, occasionally

20.4%

between the actors from the Euroregions of Nisa and Šumava in this respect. However,
it seems that German mayors declared a higher frequency of such events in their
municipalities compared to Czech and Austrian mayors.13 It can be assumed that
this is related to the strong tradition of association life on the German side. On the
Czech side, on the other hand, association life has been systematically suppressed for
40 years and, as some of our informants on the Czech side of the Šumava/Bohemian
Forest confirmed, it is still very weak compared to the Bavarian side. As also emerged
from the interviews with informants, the most frequent organizers of cross-border
events on the Czech side are usually municipalities. Of the cross-border events,
informants most often mentioned cultural and sporting events, but also religious
gatherings, such as joint services or pilgrimages.
The views of the mayors on the future development of cross-border cooperation
were also sought when we asked them how they saw the expected development of
cross-border cooperation. The weighted distribution of responses is shown in Fig. 3.
More than three-quarters of the mayors held positive attitudes in this context. Around
57% stated that in the future, cross-border cooperation will develop further, as it is
mutually beneficial. Almost 23% thought that cooperation will further dynamically
develop if sufficient political support is provided. Approximately 20% of mayors
had negative attitudes towards the further development of cross-border coopera-
tion. The results of the contingency table analysis indicate that in this case, mayors
from the Šumava Euroregion were somewhat more optimistic than mayors from
the Nisa Euroregion.14 Moreover, we conclude that the Czech mayors were more
pessimistic than their German and Austrian counterparts. These results seem fully
consistent with the historical legacy of the low level of institutional and interper-
sonal trust that has been documented across post-communist Central and Eastern

13 For the analysis of the contingency tables, the four categories (except for category 5) were
combined into two categories (“Yes, at least once a year”, “No, or sporadically”). The chi-square
test p-value for the six-pole table was 0.069.
14 For the contingency table analysis, the four categories were aggregated into two (“will

continue/will dynamically develop” and “will remain at current level/will weaken”). The chi-square
test p-values were 0.069 (four-field) and 0.028 (six-field table), respectively.
Borders and Identity. The Place Where Europe Lives! 41

Fig. 3 Expected Future it will further develop,

because it is mutually
Development of 12.0%
beneficial
Cross-border Cooperation
(Data Source Authors’ 8.4% it will dynamically
survey) develop if political
support is provided

it will weaken, it has

56.9% been rather temporary
22.6%
consequence of social-
political changes and
economic opportunities
it has already reached
its maximum, it will
remain at current level

Europe (Rose & Mishler, 2010). Also, a 2015 Eurobarometer survey showed that
both Czech and Polish border regions showed significantly lower levels of interper-
sonal trust compared to the Bavarian and Austrian border regions. In the Austrian-
Czech cross-border areas, 67% of residents on the Austrian side and 44% on the
Czech side resident said that most people could be trusted. In the Bavarian-Czech
cross-border areas, for the same question, the Bavarians scored 59% compared to
43% on the Czech side. As expected, the asymmetry in interpersonal trust between
the Saxon border areas, on the one hand, and the Czech and Polish border areas, on
the other, were not as salient. In the Saxon-Czech cross-border areas, the difference
was smaller, but still evident; 59% on the Saxon and 43% on the Czech side of the
border. In the Saxon-Polish cross-border areas, it was 59% for Saxony to 53% for
Czech. Finally, in the Czech-Polish cross-border areas, it was 41% on the Czech side
and 47% on the Polish (EB 2015).
The majority of our informants were also clearly optimistic about the future
overall development of cross-border cooperation, especially for small “soft” meeting
projects and for cultural and sporting events. Some of our informants also pointed
out that the future development of cross-border cooperation would need more robust
political representation and stronger institutional support. The European regions were
mentioned as forms of representative advocacy for larger and stronger cross-border
regional groupings, which could play a more significant role in the EU system of
multilevel governance. Some informants also repeatedly mentioned the European
Grouping for Territorial Cooperation (EGTC) as a progressive and novel form of
cross-border cooperation and integration. Its progressiveness lies in the possibility
of establishing a cross-border institution (actor) as a single legal entity. This could
significantly reduce the number of legal and administrative obstacles to planning and
implementing cross-border projects where, until now, agreements had to be adopted
at the national intergovernmental level.
The mayors also assessed the activity of their municipality in engaging in cross-
border cooperation in comparison with other municipalities in their Euroregions.15

15 The question was: “In your opinion, the approach of your municipality to cross-border cooper-
ation is (1) absolutely more active; (2) rather more active; (3) rather more passive; (4) absolutely
42 L. Fráně et al.

Almost 40% of them admitted that their municipality was rather (29%) or definitely
(10%) more passive than other municipalities in the Euroregion. On the other hand,
almost 15% of the mayors considered their municipalities to be “absolutely more
active”, and around 46% “rather active”. While the analysis of the contingency tables
again revealed no statistically significant differences between mayors from the Nisa
and Šumava Euroregions, German mayors believed that their municipalities were
more active in cross-border cooperation than their Czech and Austrian colleagues.16
Our informants did not comment on this specific question, as they mostly represented
different types of actors. However, they answered the question about the activity of
individual actors in cross-border cooperation, and in their opinion, the most active
actors were overwhelmingly municipalities, and to a lesser extent also other orga-
nizations such as schools or civic (sports and cultural) associations. For example,
according to one official from the Czech Ministry of Regional Development, in the
past, between 60 and 70% of all applications for funding for cross-border cooperation
projects came directly from municipal authorities (INF3).
The existence of the Schengen zone without border controls represents an impor-
tant aspect of cross-border cooperation. Therefore, we were interested in how the
mayors perceive the inclusion of their country in the Schengen zone (the CZR entered
in 2007) and how they evaluate the removal of border controls.17 A large majority
of mayors shared a positive view of participation in the Schengen zone. Specifically,
47% rated joining the Schengen zone as unequivocally positive, and 38% rather posi-
tive. In contrast, only 15% assessed their country’s participation as rather (13%) or
definitely (2%) negative. Analysis of the contingency tables again revealed no statisti-
cally significant difference between mayors from the Nisa and Šumava Euroregions.
However, Austrian mayors were more likely to choose the option unequivocally
positive than their Czech and German counterparts (see Fig. 4).18 We did not ask
our informants directly about their perception in the Schengen zone, but some of
them touched upon this issue in their interviews. Two different (but not mutually
exclusive) approaches can be identified in their statements: (1) Schengen as a posi-
tively perceived breakthrough that accelerated cross-border cooperation and led to
the removal of many legal and bureaucratic barriers; or (2) Schengen perceived in a
mixed way not only as a source of the free movement of people and goods, but also
as one of the causes of the increase in crime.
Based on the 7 questions presented above, variables were constructed and applied
in the cluster analysis as a source for deriving a typology of mayors (see the next

more passive; (5) don’t know.” Seven respondents answered that they did not know and were not
included in the analyses of the contingency tables.
16 For the contingency table analysis, the four categories were combined into one “active” and one

“passive” category. The chi-square test p-value for the six-pole table was 0.018.
17 The question was: “Do you perceive the Czech Republic’s participation in the Schengen zone

and the related removal of border controls as (1) unambiguously positive; (2) rather positive; (3)
rather negative; (4) unambiguously negative; or (5) don’t know”.
18 For the analysis of the contingency tables, the three categories (2, 3, and 4) have been combined

into one category, while the second category includes only strongly positive responses. The chi-
square test p-value for the six-pole table was 0.018.
Borders and Identity. The Place Where Europe Lives! 43

100%
5.1%
11.2% 22.5%
30.4%
80%

unambiguously
40.2%
60% negative
48.1% rather negative

rather positive
40%
69.6% unambiguously
positive
20% 43.5%
29.4%

0%
Czechia Germany Austria
Country

Fig. 4 Involvement in Schengen Zone (Data Source Authors’ survey)

subsection of this chapter). Before that, however, let us turn our attention to the
interpretation of the findings on the other three research questions that were chosen
for the follow-up contingency table analysis, which further works with the outputs
of the cluster analysis, i.e., the identified types of mayors.
The concept of an active border implies a higher attachment to the EU among
actors with more intensive involvement in cross-border cooperation. Therefore,
mayors were also asked how strong their feeling of belonging to the EU is.19 Almost
60% of actors from both Euroregions declared a strong feeling of belonging to the
EU, more precisely 20% stated a very strong and 38% a rather strong feeling of
belonging to the EU. On the contrary, 30% of mayors had a rather weak and around
12% a very weak feeling of belonging to the EU. The analysis of the contingency
tables showed that mayors from the Šumava Euroregion had a stronger feeling of
belonging to the EU than mayors from the Nisa Euroregion.20 Moreover, Czech
mayors expressed significantly weaker and Austrian mayors a significantly stronger
feeling of belonging to the EU compared to their German counterparts (see Fig. 5).
Another question was asked about the perception of cross-border relationships
between the people of the Euroregions. The question was put to the mayors as
follows: Do you perceive the cross-border relationships between the people of your
Euroregion as (1) unity and friendship, or (2) cooperation and partnership, or

19The question was: How strong is your feeling of belonging to the EU?
20For the contingency table analysis, the four categories were combined into two (strong and weak).
P-values for chi-square tests were 0.055 (four-field) and 0.005 (six-field table), respectively.
44 L. Fráně et al.

100%
12.2% 10.4%
20.8%
80%
very weak
34.8%

60% 60.1% rather weak

41.1%
rather
22.3% strong
40%
very strong

20% 35.6%
30.7% 29.6%

0% 2.5%
Czechia Germany Austria
Country

Fig. 5 Feeling of Belonging to EU (Data Source Authors’ questionnaire survey)

(3) coexistence and neighborliness, or as (4) conflict and adversity?21 Two types
of answers completely dominated, namely cooperation and partnership with 53%
and coexistence and neighborliness with 44%. Analysis of the contingency tables
revealed no statistically significant differences between the mayors of the munic-
ipalities from the Nisa and Šumava Euroregions. However, Austrian mayors were
more likely to mention cooperation and partnership and German mayors were more
likely to mention coexistence and neighborhood compared to Czech mayors, who
mentioned both options in a more balanced proportion (see Fig. 6). Our informants
also commented on this issue very frequently during the interviews. Questions about
relationships to neighbors and perceptions of others were among the most frequently
discussed issues. Critical reflections on the stereotypical perception of neighbors
that children adopt from their parents or grandparents and calls to break down these
harmful prejudices were very numerous.
We were also interested in mayors’ attitudes towards historical conflicts and feel-
ings of injustice among the people of the two Euroregions. We asked mayors, Which
of the following statements best describes your attitude towards the cross-border
historical conflicts and disputes among the people of your Euroregion?22 64% of

21 Six respondents who answered don’t know were not included in the analyses. For the contingency
table analysis, the underrepresented categories “Unity and Friendship” and “Conflict and Adversity”
were excluded from the analysis. The chi-square test p-value for the six-pole table was 0.037.
22 Range of responses were as followed: (1) it would be best not to remind ourselves too much of

historical injustices and not to burden cross-border relations with them in the future; (2) the focus
should be on developing cross-border relations with neighbors and dealing with and reminding
ourselves of historical injustices is a necessary part of this; (3) they need to be dealt with through
an objective understanding of historical events, including finding and condemning the culprits, even
though most of them are surely dead; (4) they need to be constantly reminded so that they remain
in living memory, and to be wary of neighbors from across the border; (5) I don’t know.
Borders and Identity. The Place Where Europe Lives! 45

100% 2.6%
18.8%

80% 38.0%

61.9% conflict and adversity

60%
coexistence and
neighborliness

40% 81.2% cooperation and

partnership
54.2%
unity and friendship
20% 38.1%

5.2%
0%
Czechia Germany Austria
Country

Fig. 6 Relationships between People of Euroregions (Data Source Authors’ questionnaire survey)

mayors said that “the focus should be on developing cross-border relations with
neighbors and dealing with and reminding ourselves of historical injustices is a
necessary part of this”. Less than 15% of the mayors said that “it is necessary to
deal with these conflicts and disputes through an objective understanding of histor-
ical events, including finding and condemning the culprits, even though most of them
are certainly dead by now”. These two above attitudes reflect a so-called critical
approach to historical conflicts and to dealing with historical injustices. In contrast,
the so-called uncritical approach to coming to terms with the past was represented
by two other response options. Over 21% of mayors thought that “it would be best
not to call to mind historical injustices too much and not to burden cross-border
relations with them in the future”. A completely negligible number of respondents
thought that “historical conflicts and disputes should be constantly remembered so
that they remain in living memory and that we should be wary of our neighbors from
across the border”.
The distinction of approaches to the past into critical (reflective) and non-critical
(non-reflective) was made based on the literature on dealing with the past (Assmann,
2010; Todorov, 1996). We specifically address this issue in the fourth chapter Borders
and Memory. However, this question from our questionnaire survey is important for
the following cluster analysis, so we will at least briefly introduce it here. Supporters
of the first (reflexive) approach strive for a so-called dialogical remembering or
objective dealing with the past. They see that as a prerequisite for the future formation
of good mutual relationships. Whereas the supporters of the second non-reflexive
approach (i.e., a thick line under the past or the imperative to always be on guard)
reject critical reflection on the past and thus directly or indirectly (in unintended
consequences) subordinate the present (and the future) to the past. In the analysis
46 L. Fráně et al.

of these critical and uncritical approaches to the past, no statistically significant

differences were found between mayors from the two Euroregions. However, the
contingency tables showed that Austrian mayors approach historical conflicts in a
noticeably more critical manner than their German and Czech counterparts.23 The
issue of reflection on the past and attitudes towards historical conflicts and disputes
resonated strongly in all interviews with our informants. As already mentioned, a
deeper analysis of the issue of dealing with the past is presented in the last Chapter 4.
The findings of the questionnaire survey can be summarized as follows: in line
with the weighted distribution of responses, the mayors interviewed seem to be
relatively positive in their assessment of the benefits of cross-border cooperation for
their municipality. Most of them see the border more as an opportunity and declare
that they meet political partners from across the border and organize events in their
municipality with the participation of partners from the other side of the border. A
significant majority of mayors also perceive positively the inclusion of their country
in the Schengen zone. A large majority of mayors are optimistic about the future
development of cross-border cooperation.
Analyses of the contingency tables revealed interesting differences, especially
between municipal mayors from different states. Compared to their Austrian and
German counterparts, Czech mayors were somewhat more pessimistic about the
future development of cross-border cooperation, they declared a weaker feeling of
belonging to the EU, and perceived cross-border cooperation as less beneficial for
their municipality. German mayors, on the other hand, reported higher activity of their
municipality in cross-border cooperation, more frequent events with partners from
the other side of the border, and perceived the cross-border relationships between the
people of their Euroregions slightly more positively compared to Czech and Austrian
mayors. Finally, Austrian mayors felt the strongest feeling of belonging to the EU
compared to Czech and German mayors, were more critical of historical conflicts
and injustices, and expressed the greatest satisfaction with their involvement in the
Schengen zone. As for the differences between the Euroregions, these differences
were not significant, but nevertheless noticeable. Mayors from the Šumava Eurore-
gion expressed a stronger feeling of belonging to the EU, felt their municipality bene-
fited more from cross-border cooperation, and were slightly more optimistic about
the future development of cross-border cooperation than municipal representatives
from the Nisa Euroregion.
If we compare the attitudes of the mayors with other interviewed informants
involved in cross-border cooperation, we can see that with respect to most issues the
attitudes are similar. Our informants were generally more positive about each issue,
which is probably because they have been involved in cross-border cooperation for
a long time, are more frequently involved in cross-border activities, and meet people
from the other side of the border more often. Whereas mayors show more diversity
in terms of their attitudes towards the border, cross-border cooperation, and contacts
with people from the other side of the border.

23 The chi-square test p-value for the six-pole table was 0.051.
Borders and Identity. The Place Where Europe Lives! 47

This brings us to the second central part of this chapter. At the same time, it
is necessary to reiterate that the questions in the questionnaire survey and in the
interviews with our informants were similar, but not identical. The two source groups
(respondents and informants) often answered partially different questions, because
of their different roles, the diversity of which we placed particular emphasis on when
selecting our informants. While the mayors answered for “their” municipality, so to
speak, the informants, drawing on their specific contexts and experiences, commented
in general terms on cross-border cooperation and its importance for the development
of the cross-border region. The next part of this chapter is again based primarily on
the results of our questionnaire survey with the mayors of the two Euroregions. The
findings from the interviews with our informants are used where appropriate only
for illustrative purposes and to strengthen the heuristic robustness of the interpreted
conclusions.

3 Cross-border Cooperation and Typology of Mayors

In this section, we apply cluster analysis to determine whether different groups of

mayors, in terms of their attitudes towards and experiences with cross-border coop-
eration, could be identified. And if so, what are the most distinctive features of
these various groups. The findings of the cluster analysis were then the basis for the
analysis of the complementarity and inclusiveness of mayors’ identities. The cluster
analysis drew upon the seven variables from our questionnaire, which were intro-
duced in the previous section. Specifically, the variables chosen were (V1) border as
an obstacle or opportunity; (V2) Schengen zone involvement; (V3) municipality’s
benefit from cross-border cooperation; (V4) frequency of meetings with partners
from the other side of the border; (V5) frequency of cross-border events; (V6)
expected future development of cross-border cooperation; and (V7) cross-border
activity of municipality.
Since the mayors’ responses expressed a range of intensity of both agreement and
disagreement, the variables analyzed in this section are kept in their original ordinal
form and the data is not weighted. In the cluster analysis, the method of within-groups
linkage was applied, which is one of the methods that can be used for ordinal scales
of variables (Gordon, 1999; Norušis, 2010).24
The clustering process resulted in the division of 79 mayors into four clusters,
with the number of units in these clusters being 15, 17, 28, and 10 municipalities
(9 mayors were excluded from the analysis during the clustering process because
of missing some data). To describe and interpret each cluster, a simple analysis of
averages was used, whereby the average values of each indicator for each cluster

24 Due to the ordinal type of variables, we chose chi-squared measure for distance measurements.
The variables have been standardized, since the different variables have different length scales of
values. So, the goal is for all variables to have the same weight in the clustering process. The
standardization was done using the mean of 1 parameter.
48 L. Fráně et al.

Table 2 Overview of Mayor Types Based on Cluster Analysis25

Number of Units V1 V2 V3 V4 V5 V6 V7
Cluster 1 15 0.67 1.40 1.53 2.67 1.47 1.80 1.93
Cluster 2 17 0.88 1.29 1.41 2.47 1.41 0.00 1.71
Cluster 3 28 0.32 0.11 0.50 1.96 0.68 0.14 1.04
Cluster 4 10 0.60 0.00 1.30 2.90 1.90 1.90 1.40
Unclassified Units 9 0.50 1.00 1.50 3.00 1.89 1.00 1.50
Overall Average 79 0.56 0.70 1.10 2.44 1.28 0.75 1.44
Source Authors’ calculations in IBM SPSS

were calculated, and these were then compared and evaluated against each other (see
Table 2).

3.1 Passive Pessimists (Cluster 1)

This group of 15 units includes more pessimistic mayors in terms of their attitude
towards cross-border cooperation compared to the other groups. The values of the
averages are more or lesser higher (more negative) for all variables. Having done a
more detailed analysis of these values, it could be said that Cluster 1 brings together
rather less active mayors who are not much in favor of cross-border cooperation, do
not see it as beneficial for their municipality and they expect the situation to worsen
in the future. They do not get involved in cross-border activities much, and meetings
with people from the other side of the border are neither regular nor frequent. If cross-
border cooperation does take place, it seems to be a random initiative without any
significant conviction of its benefits. In terms of nationality structure, the cluster is
made up of two-thirds Czech mayors and one-third German mayors. A vast majority
of mayors were from the post-communist Euroregion of Nisa—the representation
of the Euroregions of Nisa and Šumava was 11 to 4. Within the cluster, there are
different sizes of municipalities, from very small villages to smaller towns.

3.2 Passive Optimists (Cluster 2)

This type, which includes 17 mayors, is, relatively speaking, like the previous cluster.
Although these mayors’ municipalities were generally slightly more active, as the
frequency of meetings with people from the other side of the border and the frequency
of events were usually slightly higher than in the previous group. Mayors from this

25 Individual variables were scaled. The scale of the variables goes from 0 for the most positive
categories to 3/4/5 values for the negative options. Lower values of the means in the table correspond
to more positive attitudes.
Borders and Identity. The Place Where Europe Lives! 49

cluster also did not have a firmly established experience of cross-border cooper-
ation. It was somewhat surprising that the representatives of this group had very
optimistic expectations of future development. All of them stated that cooperation
should continue to develop because it is mutually beneficial. In summary, this cluster
can be interpreted as representing not very active mayors, with a more negative
perception of the border, but with significantly optimistic expectations for the future.
Interesting is also the evaluation of cooperation with partner municipalities, when 10
mayors from this group evaluated cooperation positively, while 6 municipalities did
not have a partner municipality from the other side of the border at all. In terms of
structure, 10 mayors were from the Šumava Euroregion and 7 from the Nisa Eurore-
gion. In terms of the nationality composition of this cluster, 12 cases were from
Czech municipalities, and only 3 from Austrian and 2 from Bavarian municipalities,
and none from Saxony. It was interesting to note that in this cluster, compared to the
other clusters, mayors with less experience were slightly overrepresented (half of
them were mayor in their first term), and this cluster was also composed to a greater
extent of mayors from smaller municipalities (more than half of these municipalities
in this cluster have fewer than 1,000 inhabitants). This may also be one of the reasons
for the stronger reticence towards the border and cross-border cooperation. Smaller
towns and villages generally have fewer resources and thus fewer opportunities to
engage in cross-border cooperation.

3.3 Active Optimists (Cluster 3)

This cluster, which included 28 municipalities, represents a group of mayors who are
very positive in their perception of the border, as well as their attitudes towards cross-
border cooperation. They have rich experience with cross-border cooperation and are
still actively engaged in it. This cluster has very low (usually even the lowest) average
values for all variables surveyed. Most mayors in this cluster see a clear benefit of
cross-border cooperation for their municipality. Compared to the other clusters, these
mayors have richer practical experience with cross-border cooperation, they are much
more likely to meet people from the other side of the border, and they also organize
events with people from the other side of the border much more often than mayors
from the other clusters. It is not really surprising that they also have very optimistic
expectations of the future cross-border cooperation. It can be said that this group is
clearly the most active and optimistic group of mayors, both in terms of perception
of the border and openness towards the other side, as well as in terms of practical
experience with cross-border cooperation and communication.
The intensity of involvement in cross-border activities is also illustrated by the
fact that only 3 of these 28 municipalities did not have any partner municipality
abroad, while 24 of them had such a partner, and mayors perceived this partnership
in a positive fashion. In terms of the structure of this cluster, the Euroregions of Nisa
and Šumava have an equal representation of 14 municipalities. As for nationality,
there are 12 Czech, 6 German, 7 Austrian, and 3 Polish mayors. This cluster is also
50 L. Fráně et al.

characterized by a richer political experience, as more than half of mayors have been
in office more than two terms; this group shows the longest time in office compared
to the other clusters. This may indicate another important conducive aspect for the
development of cross-border cooperation, being the rich experience of local actors.
This is also stressed by the size of the municipalities in this cluster. More than half
of the municipalities in this group have between 2 and 10 thousand people, another
eight were municipalities of up to 2 thousand people, and four were towns with
between 10 and 20 thousand people. For all other clusters, smaller municipalities
tended to be much more prevalent. Thus, at least in the sample, it appears that larger
municipalities generally have more opportunities and capacities, both financial and
material, as well as personnel, for establishing cross-border contacts and carrying
out cross-border projects and activities.

3.4 Pragmatic Pessimists (Cluster 4)

This cluster represents a group of only ten mayors who have a relatively positive
perception of the border, but are not very active in cross-border cooperation and are
highly skeptical about the future development. Based on a more detailed analysis of
the values of the individual variables, these mayors have a relatively positive view
of the border issue, have a clearly positive perception of Schengen zone integration,
and are to some extent open to cross-border cooperation (often referring to economic
factors, hence the derivation of pragmatic in the name). Nevertheless, they are not
very involved in cross-border cooperation and are significantly more pessimistic
about its future development. As regards the structure of this cluster, there are 8
Czech mayors, and only one from both Germany and Austria. The representation
of the Euroregions is even, i.e., 5 mayors from each of them. In terms of the size
of municipalities, there are different sizes of municipalities in this cluster, from the
smallest villages to towns with up to 5,000 people.
Regarding the mayors that were not included in the clustering (9 in total), apart
from the variable border influence (V1), this group of mayors showed more nega-
tive values above average for all other variables, i.e., these mayors (and their)
municipalities were generally classified as less active and more pessimistic.
To sum up this part, applying cluster analysis, we were able to identify four
different types of mayors. They differ to varying degrees in their perception of
the border and their attitudes towards cross-border cooperation, as well as in their
involvement in cross-border activities. Of these four groups, two groups are very
clearly discernable and, in line with Giddens’ (1991) typology of adaptive responses
to challenges of modernity, have been named as active optimists and passive
pessimists. The other two groups—which were named passive optimists and prag-
matic pessimists—are not so discernable, and in their attitudes they oscillate between
active optimists and passive pessimists. Nevertheless, they are specific in that they
are very different from each other in terms of perceptions of borders and expectations
of further development.
Borders and Identity. The Place Where Europe Lives! 51

4 Identity of Mayors as Key Prerequisite for Active Borders

In a more general sense, the cluster analysis has helped in outlining which groups of
mayors tend to remain in the context of a more closed/passive border, and which type
of mayors are more inclined towards a more open border, as well as to what extent
they consider cross-border cooperation to be helpful, productive, and beneficial. For
these four clusters of mayors, we attempted to assess the association with the so-
called identity variables, which are important indicators of the development of active
borders. As identity variables, we have identified those that may, to some extent,
reflect the impacts of cross-border cooperation and communication on the personality
of mayors, on the formation of their attitudes and relations towards neighbors from
across the border. These variables reflect, more generally, impacts of cross-border
cooperation on mayors’ identities, i.e., on their inclinations towards a positive identity
as feelings of cross-border openness and belonging, on the one hand, or tendencies
towards a negative identity as a process of demarcation against their neighbors and
phenomena from across the border, on the other. In this case, we do not assess
identity explicitly in terms of a geographical regional identity, which expresses a
relationship directly to a specific territory. In our case, if we can speak of identity as
a relationship to a region, it is more likely to be in the context of a Euroregion as a
common cross-border discursive space, as a Europeanized cross-border institutional
structure created to supporting cross-border communication and understanding, thus,
also to contributing to the Europeanization of collective identities.
Three questions from the questionnaire were chosen as identity variables, which
were introduced in the previous section: (V8) the feeling of belonging to the EU,
(V9) relations between the inhabitants of the Euroregion, and (V10) attitudes towards
historical conflicts and disputes between inhabitants. Characteristics of the individual
types of mayors in conjunction with other identity variables may indicate suitable
aspects or preconditions for developing and treating active borders.26 Of course,
we are aware that we are working with a limited number of cases, but we believe
that by way of the obtained sample it is possible to illustrate and explore in greater
detail the challenges of the formation (or decline) of active borders. Such analysis
can also indicate features of the reestablishment of passive borders and roots of
the persistence of embedded cognitive and behavioral stereotypes. We sought to
find out whether more positive attitudes towards cross-border cooperation, positive
experiences with it, and more frequent encounters with people from the other side of
the border are (1) related to greater attachment to the EU, whether they (2) improve
perceptions of relations between the people across the border, and (3) whether they
positively influence attitudes towards the challenge of dealing with the past. We
sought to answer the question of whether the characteristics of the identified groups
of mayors are closely related to the mayors’ feeling of belonging to the EU or, in
more general terms, to their perceptions of European integration. To a certain extent,
this allows us to assess the degree of manifestations of horizontal Europeanization
that occurs through networks of cross-border contacts and cooperation. To do this, we

26 Here again we are working with weighted data.

52 L. Fráně et al.

will primarily use contingency table analysis between the formed clusters of mayors
and the identity variables.
The first variable analyzed was the Feeling of Belonging to the EU. The variable
was again divided into two categories: very/rather strong and very/rather weak feeling
of belonging to the EU. As contingency Table 3 shows, there are differences in
the feeling of belonging to the EU between the different clusters of mayors. The
value of the Pearson chi-square test criterion (17.435) and its statistical significance
(<0.01) indicate a statistically significant relationship. It also indicates that the given
relationship between the variables can be identified at the level of all mayors of the
studied Euroregions. At the same time, the value of Cramer’s V (0.499) indicates that
the relationship is of substantial strength. It is evident that the feeling of belonging
to the EU is related to the characteristics of each cluster of mayors. Thus, it can be
concluded that mayors from Cluster 3 (active optimists) are much more likely to feel
(very/rather) strongly attached to the EU, and much less likely to feel (very/rather)
weakly attached to the EU. Among the mayors surveyed, these are the most European.
In contrast, mayors in both Cluster 1 (passive pessimists) and Cluster 2 (passive
optimists) are more likely to feel (very/rather) weakly attached to the EU. We can,
therefore, assume that they are not very open to a transnational (European) identity.
The mayors in Cluster 4 (pragmatic pessimists) are then somewhere in the middle
between the two groups. These results lead us to conclude that mayors’ positive
attitudes towards the border and cross-border cooperation, rich experience with cross-
border cooperation, and frequent contacts with people from the other side of the
border are closely related to the feeling of belonging to the EU. Conversely, mayors
with more negative attitudes towards cross-border cooperation and reticence to cross-
border contacts tend to have a weaker attachment to the EU.
The above-drawn conclusions are also supported by many of our informants.
For example, Martin Buršík from the Czech Ministry of Regional Development,
commenting on the relationship between cross-border cooperation and the European
integration, notes that “cross-border cooperation, for example, is held up as a model.
It has a great European added value, precisely because it helps to connect those
territories and those people and to build up the “Europeanness” in people, because
then, thanks to this cooperation, those people realize all the advantages they have
from membership in the Union, whether it is the free movement of people, capital,
labor on the single market. So, they realize all that, and if not, they at least break down
the prejudices and realize that there are people across the border with whom they can
also cooperate. There is then no reason to build those borders again, but rather to
try to suppress them”. Similarly, Jürgen Weber of the District Government of Lower
Bavarian sees a close link between cross-border cooperation and the manifestations of
European integration, stating that "cross-border cooperation needs to be strengthened
and intensified. Because where does Europe show itself most strongly? It is really
in those border areas. What matters is that if there is such a thing as European
belonging, then we must finally bring it to life in those border areas. This European
added value will play an important role. And this can be well expressed, above all,
in those border areas”.
Borders and Identity. The Place Where Europe Lives! 53

Table 3 Feeling of Belonging to EU by Four Groups of Mayors

Feeling Part of EU Total
Very/Rather Weak Very/Rather Strong
Group of 1 Count 10 6 16
Mayors Expected 5.9 10.1 16.0
Count
Row (%) 62.5 37.5 100.0
Adjusted 2.4 −2.4
Residual
2 Count 9 6 15
Expected 5.6 9.4 15.0
Count
Row (%) 60.0 40.0 100.0
Adjusted 2.1 −2.1
Residual
3 Count 3 27 30
Expected 11.1 18.9 30.0
Count
Row (%) 10.0 90.0 100.0
Adjusted −4.1 4.1
Residual
4 Count 4 5 9
Expected 3.3 5.7 9.0
Count
Row (%) 44.4 55.6 100.0
Adjusted 0.5 −0.5
Residual
Total Count 26 44 70
Expected 26.0 44.0 70.0
Count
Row (%) 37.1 62.9 100.0
Note Pearson Chi-Square = 17.435; statistical significance = 0.001; Cramer’s V = 0.499. Statistical
assumptions for contingency tables are met, because only one cell (i.e., 12.5% of cells) has an
expected count below 5. Source Own calculations in IBM SPSS

The second identity variable analyzed was the Perception of Relations Between
the People of the Euroregion. Here again, only two categories out of the original four
were created. We put together two closed alternatives: (1) unity and friendship with
cooperation and partnership, and (2) coexistence and neighborliness with conflict
and adversity. Here again, there are statistically significant differences between the
different clusters of mayors in the perceptions of relations between the people of
the Euroregions—this is evidenced by the Pearson chi-square test criterion value
54 L. Fráně et al.

(9.736) and the significance value (0.021). The value of Cramer’s V (0.381) indi-
cates a moderately strong relationship. Thus, it proves that the classification of mayors
into four clusters according to their approach to cross-border cooperation influences
their perception of the relations between the people of the Euroregion. This suggests
that mayors with positive attitudes towards cross-border cooperation and significant
involvement in cross-border activities (Cluster 3, active optimists) are much more
likely to perceive the relations between the people of the Euroregion as unity and
friendship or cooperation and partnership, and much less likely to perceive them in
a less positive sense as mere coexistence and neighborliness, or even as conflict and
adversity. They simply believe in stronger and warmer relations between the people
of the Euroregion. On the contrary, mayors in Cluster 2 (passive optimists) are much
more likely to perceive the relations between the people of the Euroregion as less
positive, as coexistence and neighborliness, or even conflict and adversity are signif-
icantly more prevalent within this cluster. Thus, they perceive cross-border relations
between the people of the Euroregion as cold and superficial. A statistically signif-
icant relationship cannot be clearly confirmed for the mayors in Clusters 1 (passive
pessimists) and 4 (pragmatic pessimists), while both these groups are approximately
in the middle between the two previous groups. It can, therefore, be said that mayors’
positive attitudes towards the border and cross-border cooperation, rich experience
with cross-border cooperation, and frequent contacts with people from the other side
of the border are closely positively related to the perception of cross-border rela-
tions between the people of the Euroregion. Conversely, mayors with more negative
attitudes towards cross-border cooperation and reticence to cross-border contacts
perceive cross-border relations as weaker and more superficial.
Like the previous variable, these conclusions support many interviews with our
informants. For instance, Veronika Tůmová, long-time project manager from the
Bavarian part of the Šumava Euroregion, stressed the significant difference in the
level of stereotyping between participants of cross-border cooperation, on the one
hand, and the general public, on the other. In her experience, the participants of cross-
border cooperation show a strong resistance to uncritical stereotyping of neighboring
ethnic groups, while the wider civil public is much more susceptible to succumbing to
false stereotypes and prejudices. In a similar vein, Jaroslaw Gromadzski, director of
the Cultural Centre in Jelenia Góra, Poland, mentions that the mutual prejudices that
occur, for example, in the media—and adds in the same breath that this phenomenon
is much stronger in the central regions of Poland—usually disappear with the first
mutual encounter. Slawomir Banaszak from the statistical office in Wrocław, Poland,
who has been a long-time participant in both professional and leisure cross-border
activities, also spoke at length about the importance of cross-border cooperation for
mutual relations. “It seems to me that our view of foreign neighbors is changing. It is
no longer us versus them. We have the same interests. For example, we like music or
sport, so it is about us, and we form a whole. And that is what we are about, that is
a very important thing. We have seen the tensions in Europe over the last few years
because of non-European immigrants. We see how little it takes for tensions between
countries to return. That is why I believe that this cross-border cooperation must
continue, that we must maintain this good partnership, that we must take care that
Borders and Identity. The Place Where Europe Lives! 55

it does not go wrong, because it can easily go wrong. So that is a group of social
reasons why I think cross-border cooperation is very important, it should happen on
all borders in Europe. Where people live next to each other, they necessarily depend
on each other, and they should meet and support each other”.
Some informants emphasized national differences and different mentalities.
However, these differences were almost never mentioned with bitterness, but rather
with a smile. For example, among the Polish informants, there was repeated a certain
friendly amusement toward the unnecessary thoroughness and advance planning of
cross-border events by their Saxon partners. This thoroughness was perceived (but
again, with a friendly smile) as a kind of shortcoming, as a weak capacity for flex-
ibility and improvisation. This readiness to improvise and flexibility was in turn
perceived by some Saxon informants as a certain organizational weakness or negli-
gence. However, there were also voices of mutual understanding among informants in
the Saxon-Polish cross-border region for this different perception of so-called orga-
nizational negligence, alas flexibility, and organizational thoroughness, alas impro-
visation deficit. As Jacek Jakubiec, the long-standing director of the Polish part of the
Nisa Euroregion, put it, “We already know this about ourselves, and we can adapt to
each other”. Petra Laksar-Modrok, cross-border project coordinator from the Upper
Lusatian region of Zittau, Saxony, made a very similar comment. Many informants,
however, did not perceive cultural differences as strong or significant, and instead
emphasized mutual similarities. In most interviews, however, the differences of the
other were not perceived as a barrier, but as an opportunity, as a source of mutual
enrichment, and as a compelling reason to intensify cross-border cooperation and
relationships. As one informant, a State Official from Upper Austrian, who oversaw
the evaluation of cross-border projects, aptly expressed, “Yes, there are also differ-
ences in the field of culture… But I do not see all these differences as a barrier, but
as an opportunity. So, I think this is exactly where it is possible to enrich each other,
after all, it makes no sense if we were culturally or economically or whatever field
the same, then we would not enrich each other” (INF8).
For the third identity variable, Dealing with the Past, four categories were again
aggregated in the contingency table analysis into two categories—uncritical atti-
tude and critical attitude towards the past. Here too, there are statistically signifi-
cant differences in attitudes towards historical conflicts, injustices, and grievances
between different groups of mayors, as proven by the Pearson chi-square test crite-
rion value (8.998) and the Significance Value Index (0.029).27 At the same time,
Cramer’s V indicates a moderately strong relationship (with a value of 0.361). This
suggests that mayors with positive attitudes towards cross-border cooperation and
with significant experience of cross-border activity (i.e., active optimists, Cluster 3)
were much more likely to adopt a critical attitude towards historical conflicts and
injustices, and less likely to adopt an uncritical attitude towards historical conflicts.
They are thus more likely to advocate a critical evaluation of the past, which leads to

27 Unfortunately, the statistical prerequisites for contingency tables are not met here, because three
cells (i.e. 37.5%) have an expected count of less than 5. We only interpreted cells with values greater
than 5.
56 L. Fráně et al.

more productive dealing with the past and forms stronger cross-border relationships.
Thus, again, it can be concluded that mayors with positive attitudes towards the border
and cross-border cooperation, with rich experience of cross-border cooperation, and
frequent contacts with the people from the other side of the border are more likely to
take a critical stance towards historical conflicts and grievances. Conversely, mayors
with more negative attitudes towards cross-border cooperation and more foreclosed
to cross-border contacts are more likely to take a less critical stance. The issue of
collective memory and coming to terms with the past is dealt with in detail in the
last Chapter 4, which also draws richly on interviews with our informants.

4.1 The Roads to Europe Lead Across Borders: Summary

In this chapter, the attitudes of the mayors of the Nisa and Šumava Euroregions
towards borders and cross-border cooperation were presented. These attitudes were
viewed through the lens of the concept of active borders, which was presented in
detail in the first chapter. The findings of our research provide several surprising and
stimulating insights concerning the relationships between the perceptions of borders
and cross-border cooperation, active engagement in cross-border activities, and the
transformation of identities in relation to cross-border communication, integration,
and Europeanization.
Using the methods of descriptive statistics and cluster analysis, firstly we found
that the mayors participating in our questionnaire survey seem to be quite positive
about the perception of borders, cross-border cooperation and its benefits for their
municipalities, involvement in the Schengen zone, as well as about the develop-
ment of cross-border cooperation in the future.28 Analyses of the contingency tables
revealed interesting differences, especially between mayors of different countries.
Compared to their Austrian and German counterparts, Czech mayors were somewhat
more pessimistic about the future development of cross-border cooperation, declared
a weaker feeling of belonging to the EU, and perceived cross-border cooperation as
less beneficial for their municipalities. German mayors, on the other hand, reported
higher activity of their municipalities in cross-border cooperation, more frequent
events involving the people from other side of the border, and perceived the rela-
tionships between the people of the Euroregion slightly more positively. Austrian
mayors felt the strongest sense of belonging to the EU, were more critical of histor-
ical conflicts and injustices, and expressed the greatest satisfaction with being part
of the Schengen zone.
Secondly, no significant differences were found between the two Euroregions
of Nisa and Šumava. For some of the surveyed indicators, such as the feeling of

28 Although the distribution of cases according to socio-demographic characteristics suggests that

the data obtained is representative of all member municipalities of the Euroregions of Nisa and
Šumava, and the data was weighted (for the purposes of some analyses), we acknowledge that there
may have been a bias in the sample due to the greater willingness of the selected mayors to answer
our questionnaire.
Borders and Identity. The Place Where Europe Lives! 57

belonging to the EU, the benefit of the municipality from cross-border coopera-
tion or the expected future development, the values are slightly more positive in
the Šumava Euroregion. We can speculate about the impact of the post-communist
legacy in the areas falling within the Nisa Euroregion, whereas the Šumava Eurore-
gion borders more developed areas of Bavaria and Austria, and the Euroregion, as
our semi-structured interviews with several informants experienced in cross-border
cooperation suggest, is more robustly institutionally supported, especially on the
Bavarian side of the border.
Thirdly, using cluster analysis, four distinct groups of mayors were identified.
These types of mayors were identified with respect to their attitudes towards borders
and cross-border cooperation, as well as the intensity of their involvement in cross-
border activities and their experience with cross-border cooperation. Two of these
groups, active optimists and passive pessimists, are very discernably separable from
each other in their attitudes towards cross-border cooperation.
Fourthly, the identified types of mayors correlate closely with the so-called identity
variables. This confirmed the assumption that mayors’ positive attitudes towards
borders and cross-border cooperation, their extensive experience with cross-border
cooperation, and frequent contacts with partners from the other sides of borders are
closely positively related to (1) the mayors’ self-identification with the EU, (2) their
more positive evaluation of relationships between the people of the Euroregion, and
also (3) their more open attitude towards historical conflicts and injustices, as well
as (4) their perception of cross-border cooperation as a suitable tool for dealing with
the past. On the contrary, mayors with more negative attitudes towards cross-border
cooperation and who are more foreclosed to cross-border contacts take more negative
or less explicit attitudes towards the abovementioned characteristics.
We believe that the results of our empirical survey confirm the productivity of the
applied concept of active borders, as these results indicate both the features of the
formation of active borders and positive identities, as well as preconditions for the
re/establishment of passive borders and the persistence of cognitive and behavioral
stereotypes. As no major differences were found between the two Euroregions, it
appears that not only external determinants are important for the further develop-
ment of cross-border cooperation, but the activity of local actors themselves plays
a crucial role, as they represent a key endogenous resource determining the devel-
opment of active borders. The human factor and the competence of local actors are
also considered crucial by many of our informants. Our research also reinforces the
weight of the belief that Euroregion institutions represent an important institutional
underpinning for the development of active borders as a form of the Europeanization
of civil society in border regions.
Borders and Language. Minor
Misunderstandings, Big Troubles,
and the Fruits of Multilingualism

Karel B. Müller and Luděk Fráně

Dana Biskup, representative of the Bavarian part of the Šumava Euroregion, aptly
described the Euroregion as “a place where Europe lives”. This interview took place
in the summer of 2018, at the end of a decade during which Europe was hit by count-
less crises. She argued that cross-border cooperation (CBC) represents the most
effective inoculation against contagious ideological viruses that have occasionally
spread from national centers. These ideological viruses are often accompanied by
ignorance or a condescending disinterest in the views and interests of one’s neigh-
bors across the border, and are often characterized by self-centered shallowness,
conformity, and innovative impotence.
Treating active borders presupposes several cultural and institutional precondi-
tions in addition to actors and an established structure for CBC, and in specific cases
faces several obstacles. These obstacles reinforce the permanent risk of strengthening
the tendency towards a passive border. The barrier effects of a passive border then
give rise to numerous social and political pathologies. In this chapter, we focus on
understanding the obstacles that hinder or complicate the treating of active borders,
particularly the problem of the language barrier. Indeed, as research on Czech Eurore-
gions shows, the persistence of the language barrier is perceived by CBC actors—
except for the Czech-Slovak cross-border area, of course—as the most significant
obstacle to the development of active borders (Jeřábek et al., 2021; Schramek, 2014).
Also, in our more than 50 interviews with interested and knowledgeable actors, the
language barrier was most frequently mentioned as the most difficult obstacle to
CBC. Our questionnaire survey among mayors of the member municipalities of
the Nisa and Šumava Euroregions yielded the same results. Approximately, 80% of

K. B. Müller (B)
CEVRO Institute, Jungmannova 17, Prague, Czech Republic
e-mail: [email protected]
L. Fráně
Faculty of Natural Science, Charles University, Albertov 2038, Prague, Czech Republic
e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 59

K. B. Müller (ed.), Active Borders in Europe, Contributions to Political Science,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-23773-7_4
60 K. B. Müller and L. Fráně

90%

80%
80%

70%

60%

50%

40% 38%
34%

30% 25%
20% 19%
20% 18%
14% 13%
10%

0%
Language Administrative Mutual Economic Legislative Insufficient Distrust based Different Different
barrier barriers ingmorance asymmetries barriers (e.g. transport on historical national mentalities and
and a lack of Lack of capacity infrastructure experience interests and political
information to form shared political cultures
exchange institutions) systems

Fig. 1 CBC barriers as perceived by representatives of member municipalities of Nisa and Šumava
Euroregions

them perceived the language barrier as one of the three most important obstacles to
cross-border cooperation. Administrative barriers came a close second with 38%,
and mutual ignorance came third with 34% (see Fig. 1).
The problem of the language barrier is neither trivial nor simple, but rather very
complex and complicated. The causes, forms, and consequences of the language
barrier have many facets and each language border has its own specificities. The
mayor of a small village in the Saxon border region described an unpleasant experi-
ence in which “a minor misunderstanding caused big troubles”, despite good trans-
lators being available. In translating the tender documents for a given project, terms
were confused. The term accountable costs was mistranslated as estimated costs.
Without any intention to do so, the German side was accused (by among others
the Czech press) of submitting incorrect documents. This allegedly led to consid-
erable inconvenience, with respect to which the mayor commented that “here one
wishes that we would remove these language barriers immediately. That we should
be completely bilingual and that this does not have to happen again. If we really
have bilingualism here in the region, it will help us a lot and we will be able to work
and cooperate without difficulties. If we don’t have this, then little trouble can lead
to these big misunderstandings” (INF2). A minor misunderstanding and some minor
trouble, as in this case, can result in a big misunderstanding and big trouble, especially
if these misunderstandings are exploited by identity politics or instrumentalized by
the media taking shortcuts.
Since the language barrier maintains a primary position among the obstacles
to active borders, it also deserves our primary attention. Several other barriers are
Borders and Language. Minor Misunderstandings, Big Troubles, … 61

directly or indirectly related to the language barrier—one could almost say all of them,
or at least most of them—and it is those that are ranked second and third in our survey
(see Fig. 1). The language barrier is undoubtedly directly related to the problem of
“mutual ignorance”, which is a consequence of the lack (or absence) of mutual
communication. Non-communication easily triggers prejudiced feelings of alien-
ation, reinforces mechanisms of ethnic demarcation, and creates a breeding ground
for intractable group conflicts (Gass & Varonis, 1991; Nelde, 1997). In this context,
it should be recalled that shared language is not only a practical medium of commu-
nication, but also an important symbolic token (Giddens, 1991). For many Euro-
pean nations—and certainly for the Czechs and Germans—language has become the
most important objective sign of national belonging, and it should be perceived and
assessed through this prism, i.e., as a constitutive element of collective identity.
But the language barrier is also directly linked to administrative barriers, as we
will show below. Strictly speaking, it can be assumed that weakening the language
barrier strengthens cross-border links and mutual (not only linguistic) understanding.
At the same time, our research supports the claim that administrative barriers pose
a significant difficulty precisely in efforts to overcome language (and thus cultural)
barriers.

1 Demand for European Citizenship, or Zoon Politikon

and Art of Agreement

The issue of linguistic permeability is central both to issues of everyday CBC and
mutual learning, but also to the formation of cross-border belonging, collective
memory, and cross-border dealing with the past, which reinforce immunity against
the political instrumentalization of historical memories and injustices (see chapter
“Borders and Memory. From Historical Roots to Dialogical-Like Routes”). All these
issues are fatally dependent on the creation and maintenance of a shared cross-border
communication space. It is therefore not an exaggeration to say that the issue of
cross-border linguistic permeability is crucial to the formation of a European society.
To justify this claim, we can use Aristotle’s argument that the purpose of human
beings is to live in a community. Humans are endowed with language that enables
them to think, to communicate effectively, and ultimately also to effectively run their
community. The mastery of language not only enables them to do all these things,
but in fact, humans have nothing else left; unless they want to degrade their humanity
and descend to the level of animal packs, or unless, on the contrary, they proudly and
naively think that they can rise among the gods (Aristotle, 2016). Shared existence
is, after all, also the fate of the European citizens of the Union if they want to think
and communicate reasonably, and ultimately also govern effectively over the only
recently created (and still very fragile) space of freedom, security, and prosperity.
We might argue that life in a national society is sufficient for the realization
of human needs and aspirations. Well, it is not. This can be supported by at least
62 K. B. Müller and L. Fráně

two compelling arguments. Firstly, by the historical argument, namely that national
societies in Europe have failed to prevent barbarization, and have fulfilled Aristotle’s
fears, when relationships among nations have degraded to the level of animal packs.
The second is the argument of globalization. Nation-states today are not able to
protect the freedom and security (not to mention the welfare) of their societies without
cooperation with other European societies, as shown in the second chapter. Thomas
Zenker, mayor of the German town Zittau, summed it up in our interview very
succinctly: “Europe is not just a norm for green cucumbers, Europe is a great project
that we need, because if we want to face globalization, we have to do it together”.
It is worth recalling James Millward’s (1992) thirty-year-old argument that Euro-
pean integration was motivated not by a desire to overcome, but to save nation-states
and their societies. However, national societies can only thrive if they are part of a
wider European society. Of course, it is legitimate to ask what the purpose of society
is. We start from the a priori assumption that the primary purpose of society is to
maintain suitable (i.e., free, safe, and prosperous) conditions for life. At the same
time, we know that without relationships of reciprocity, solidarity, and responsibility,
these conditions are hardly sustainable. We therefore consider whether we can also
defend the argument about the need to build a European society and belonging by the
Aristotelian claim that the objective of society should be to create the conditions for
the strengthening of civic virtues. Treating active borders is one of the most natural
forms of practicing European citizenship. It is precisely linguistic diversity where
Europeans face a major challenge that is both difficult to overcome and an extremely
fruitful opportunity.

2 Linguistic Asymmetry, or Why Germans Should

also Move a Little Towards the Other Side

Each linguistic border has its own specifics. Czech Euroregions operate along the
Czech-Slovak, Czech-Polish, and Czech-German linguistic borders. The Czech-
Slovak linguistic border is characterized—due to linguistic proximity and the heritage
of Czechoslovakia, which was officially a bilingual state—by the highest linguistic
permeability of all Czech borders to nearly the absence of linguistic barrier border
effects (although we should not take this situation for granted). The Czech-Polish
linguistic border is characterized by moderate permeability, and the Czech-German
border the lowest degree of linguistic permeability. It is perhaps worth recalling that
in past centuries, Czechs were almost exclusively surrounded by German-speaking
ethnic groups, which led American historian Gary Cohen (1981) to metaphorically
describe Czechs as the meat in a German sandwich. In our research, we focused
primarily on the Czech-German linguistic border—in the Šumava Euroregion with
Bavaria and in the Nisa Euroregion with Saxony—and partly also on the Czech-Polish
linguistic border in the Nisa Euroregion.
Borders and Language. Minor Misunderstandings, Big Troubles, … 63

A specific feature of the Czech-German linguistic border is the uneven status

between the neighboring languages, which results in a high degree of linguistic
asymmetry in their use (Holly et al., 2003). Characteristically, this asymmetry was
perceived to some extent by all participants of our interviews, including those from
German-speaking areas. Romana Sadravetz, then head of the Danube-Vltava Eurore-
gion office in the Austrian city of Linz, was not the only one who believed that
“people from the Czech Republic are much more active. I have the feeling that when
Austrians or Germans travel to the Czech Republic, they expect everyone to talk to
them in German. When Czechs come to Austria, on the other hand, they expect to
speak German or at least English to get along. Yes, it’s important to realize that
there is a language barrier, but on the other hand, it’s up to each of us to think about
whether we are really willing to learn the language of our neighbor. I think that this
willingness is often very low”. Regina Gellrich, the head of the Saxon Regional Office
for Early Education in Neighboring Languages (hereafter referred to as the Saxon
Office) from the Upper Lusatian town of Görlitz, was similarly outspoken, stating
that “even Germans have to move a little bit in the other direction, and that only goes
with language… we live together in one region that we have to shape somehow, and
we have to do it as equal partners”.
We can assume that the asymmetry of language use, however justifiable in specific
cases, represents a significant barrier to social integration. Katerina Černá (2009)
documented in her research among ten-year-old schoolchildren that a more symmet-
rical language environment balances the status of neighboring languages and weakens
group delineations. We can even contend that (in European settings), linguistic asym-
metries and the unequal status of neighboring languages hamper constructing cross-
border public spheres and transnational collective identities that ought to be primarily
formed on civil society principles. Thus, the language barriers indirectly contribute
to the difficulty of establishing effective pan-European institutions, i.e., institutions
that would be endowed with sufficient legitimacy. In terms of the ambitions of cross-
border integration, it is therefore the Czech-German linguistic border that deserves
the most attention and support, including a thorough analysis of attempts to overcome
it.

3 Language Killer, or How to Get Along with Your

Neighbors

The crucial question is how to motivate people to take an interest in the language and
culture of their neighbors, especially when it is such an exotic and difficult language
as Czech. Indeed, as our interviews show, in the border areas of Bavaria, children
(or rather their parents) almost always prefer Spanish or French to Czech. We can
assume that in other border areas, it will be similar. The vast majority of interviews,
our German and Austrian informants expressed a certain reticence in relation to
the Czech language and justified it by the difficulty and lessor applicability of the
64 K. B. Müller and L. Fráně

Czech language. Many of them stated that the role of the universal language, which
will serve, among other things, cross-border cooperation, will after all be provided
by English, and in many places, this is indeed the case. The Czech and German
partners of the Šumava and Nisa Euroregions very often rely on English. It is even
also not entirely unusual for the Czech and Polish partners of the Nisa Euroregion
to communicate with each other in English.
However, not all actors of cross-border cooperation perceived this as a beneficial
and desirable trend. For example, the former deputy mayor of Hrádek nad Nisou
admitted that she had deliberately stopped interpreting during meetings between
Czech and Polish partners. She is trying to ensure that her Czech colleagues also
learn to listen to the Polish language (by the way, the former deputy mayor is also
self-taught in Polish and today she can easily communicate with her Polish partners).
At the same time, it is often the case that communication in English often lacks the
necessary quality, and sometimes a knowledge of English is still completely absent,
although with the coming generation these cases will probably be less frequent.
The dominance of English, however, also carries a certain danger, which was
pointed out during our conversation with the mayor of the Upper Lusatian town of
Zittau, Thomas Zenker, when he said, almost prophetically, “I hope that English does
not become a language killer and suppress other languages”. Tellingly, he helped
himself with the use of the English term language killer (the interview was held
in German). English can certainly offer a tool for effective communication, and its
contribution as a contact language is undeniable. English helps to overcome any
initial embarrassment and creates an environment of linguistic equality that can be
crucial for a credible and productive partnership; communicative isolation tends to
alienate people. Similarly, significant linguistic asymmetry and the unequal status of
neighboring languages can create moral prejudices and communicative barriers. A
lingua franca can usefully prevent all of this. English can certainly become the first
second language, as in many European (or world) metropoles, or in some rural areas
inhabited by ethnic groups whose mother tongue is a language close to English (e.g.,
Scandinavia, the Netherlands).
However, the dominance of English may also represent certain (not necessary)
limitations to cross-border cooperation, belonging, and regionalization. In a sense,
it locks Europeans into entrenched linguistic and cultural patterns, and can blur the
extraordinary opportunities offered by a multilingual environment. Acquiring the
language of one’s neighbors (even if only at a passive level) creates the conditions for
a qualitatively higher level of cross-border cooperation and regionalization. Kaspar
Sammer, chairman of the Bavarian part of the Šumava Euroregion, commented on
the potential weaknesses of the pragmatic reliance on English, pointing out the limits
of such an approach in terms of an authentic understanding of one’s neighbors and
possible rapprochement of their minds and hearts. Similarly, a former mayor of a
border village in Šumava Euroregion, who sees the rise of English as an inevitable
but regrettable trend, commented that “… we will clearly be overturned in the future
by one universal language. On the other hand, I am convinced that this is wrong, that
we are impoverishing ourselves. I am convinced that we are not taking the chance
that we have here”.
Borders and Language. Minor Misunderstandings, Big Troubles, … 65

When discussing the nature of language barriers in cross-border cooperation, it

also depends on what expectations we associate with cross-border cooperation and
cross-border regionalism. With reference to our questionnaire survey (see Fig. 6 in
chapter “Borders and Identity. The Place Where Europe Lives!”), it can be concluded
that for the purposes of neighborly coexistence, the role of English as a universal
context-free language (Gellner, 1997) is probably sufficient. However, for the needs
of a closer and more productive partnership, the dominance of English has obvious
limitations. It is questionable whether the requirement of cross-border regionaliza-
tion can be based on a universal “context-free” (i.e., place-disembedded and supra-
regional) communication medium. We could perhaps formulate the hypothesis that
the degree of cross-border cohesion will depend not only on the degree of perme-
ability of the border, but also on the degree of cultural and linguistic symmetry or
reciprocity, i.e., mutual openness in accepting the language, interests, and values of
one’s neighbors. The requirement for linguistic symmetry has not only an ethical,
but also a purely practical justification. Orientation in the language and culture of
one’s neighbors naturally broadens the understanding of the living space, which
can thus be shaped and protected more effectively. If we use Delanty’s typology,
with which we worked in the second chapter, it is possible to conclude that neither
polarization (in the form of a strong language barrier) nor homogenization (in the
form of the dominance of the English language) represents the optimal outcome for
ethno-linguistic encounters. On the contrary, unity in diversity in the form of some
linguistic diffusion (overlapping) and the strengthening of multilingualism represent
the optimal outcome of such encounters, which are most conducive to active borders.
The director of the Saxon Office, Regina Gellrich, who was also the founder of
the cross-border learning network Pontes—Learning in and for Europe, which was
established in 2002, put it very succinctly when she summed up the ambitions of
the Saxon Office by saying that “we are not just about the language, but also about
intercultural competence…and ideally, if we can get native speakers in the kinder-
garten, it can lead to children growing up bilingual”. Strengthening bilingualism (or
its dominance) in border areas could then indeed lead to a much higher quality of
cross-border regionalization. In this context, Regina Gellrich pointed to the example
of the German Saarland, which profiles itself as part of a cross-border region focused
on fostering Franco-German linguistic and cultural competences.
The requirement for cross-border multilingualism does not, of course, suggest a
weakening of English in the educational curricula. In the process of (vertical) Euro-
peanization, the importance of English is crucial. It is even possible to argue that
English is becoming a kind of “symbolic token” of European (communicational)
unity. In the future, it will undoubtedly be an effective communication tool across
European linguistic contexts, and its importance in this sense will rather increase.
However, these processes entail exclusively European societal elites. The horizontal
dimension of Europeanization must also be part of the process. Metaphorically
speaking, English is the external skin without which the fruit will rot, but multi-
lingualism must be the internal pulp of a European society, which nourishes the
external skin, and which is both the expression and guarantee of freedom and Euro-
pean plurality. Cross-border cooperation platforms based on multilingualism and on
66 K. B. Müller and L. Fráně

the intercultural competences form, in a sense, a natural and indispensable part of

European integration, helping to shape the multi-layered and pluralistic sphere of
European publics (Müller, 2014).
It does not matter whether we call these processes trans/nationalization or Euro-
peanization. However, the term Europeanization fits. After all, the main purpose of
European integration from the outset was, above all, to get along peacefully with
their European neighbors. This also implies claims of mutual openness, trust, and
intercultural competence. The fact that this “getting along with one’s neighbors”
creates not only a peaceful, but also potentially productive seedbed of cross-border
social ties towards the declared “unity in diversity” that can be seen as a natural (and
to some extent unintended) consequence of the pacification of European nations and
their borders; and we should not forget that unneighborly antagonisms, which often
led to wars, were one of the central nation-building or state-building forces.

4 Europeanization of Homeland and Living World

The accessibility of different linguistic contexts presents an extraordinary opportu-

nity not only with respect to how to get along with your neighbors, but also how to
put on a “second pair of glasses”, which enhances the capacity for critical evalua-
tion and for a better understanding to oneself. The importance of English in shaping
the vertical public sphere in Europe is undeniable. However, if the predominance of
English were to undermine linguistic diversity in the processes of horizontal Euro-
peanization as well, Europe would not only be culturally impoverished, but it could
jeopardize the process of integration itself. It is up to Europeans themselves, their
political decisions, and educational policies to shape their linguistic environment and
to resist the growing trend towards English dominance, which is particularly evident
at the level of professional discourse.1

1 It is understandable that the cultivation of professional linguistic discourse in “exotic” languages

such as Czech or Finnish is costly and in many ways ambivalent; let us recall the controversial
question that Hubert Gordon Schauer (1886/1995) confidently raised at the height of the Czech
national “awakening”. Schauer thus pointed to the potentially retarding effects of Czech emanci-
pation on the basis of language, which was simultaneously accompanied by (among other things,
of course) a certain degree of exclusion and disintegration. Do we need, for example, to cultivate
Czech political science (each researcher, let him or her choose his or her own discipline) also in
the Czech language, which makes it at least more difficult for Czech political scientists to aspire to
cultivate “world” science? Personally, I believe that we do need to, because one of the important
contributions of political science is to bring an informed and factual understanding of democratic
governance in our republic, which takes place in Czech. Therefore, critical reflection on this political
operation, which should contribute to its evaluation and its quality, must of course also be carried
out in Czech. Otherwise, political science could not fulfill its public function. Schauer’s concerns
about the retarding consequences of Czech linguistic emancipation are thus also clearly visible in
the current situation. European integration is, of course, imbued with the aforementioned ethos of
“unity in diversity”, which conceives of (not only linguistic) diversity as an important value that
can be defended not only normatively, but also purposively. This diversity is a manifestation (a
consequence and a prerequisite) of freedom, a guarantee of critical reflexivity and openness, as
Borders and Language. Minor Misunderstandings, Big Troubles, … 67

However, we rather contend, like the staff of the Saxon Office, that multilingualism
also contributes to a better knowledge of the mother tongue and, in a sense, of one’s
own culture. As stated by Bettina Jungnickel (2017), a kindergarten teacher in the
Upper Lusatian town of Oderwitz, where children are also exposed to the Czech
language, “by learning a foreign language, one’s own language is strengthened.
This is confirmed by the speech therapist who regularly comes to our kindergarten”.
Multilingualism also promotes tolerance, empathy, and critical thinking. “The chil-
dren learn to accept each other. They also experience diversity. For example, when it
comes to holidays and celebrations, they find out that they are celebrated differently,
which makes them think about where the holiday comes from, about their own roots
… by encountering other cultures, we become more tolerant and more mindful”, said
Ute Wunderlich, chairwoman of the Saxon-Czech-Polish cross-border school associ-
ation, summarizing her experience. Particularly in liberal democracies, which often
tend towards blind individualism and conformity, tolerance and critical thinking are
scarce resources.
The EU’s language policy of 1 + 2 and the environment of active borders could
become a very effective tool for strengthening European civil society and the Euro-
peanization of collective identities. As a Czech saying aptly suggests: “As many
languages as you know that many times you are human”. By analogy, it can be said
that “as many languages as you know, that many times you are at home”. In his
short story The Riddel of the Ivy, first published in 1909, Gilbert Chesterton (2011)
points to the mostly unintended effect of travel and encounters with other places
and cultures. We travel to rediscover our home. To do that, we need to be able to
see our home through the eyes of a stranger. The same feelings were also expressed
by members of Bavarian families who for a year hosted Czech high school students
(as part of the Gastschuljahr project, which will be mentioned below). They were
pointing out that “one suddenly perceives one’s own culture in a completely different
way” (Niedermaier, 2018). This reflexive effect can be achieved without traveling
(or hosting strangers), but it takes a lot of self-control. It is not easy to observe
everyday trifles with fresh eyes. It requires the ability, which multilingualism (and
multi-ethnicity) naturally fosters, to change perspectives and step out of familiar
patterns of perception, thinking, and action. Charles Wright Mills (1959) has called
this capacity the sociological imagination.
Chesterton’s observation about the meaning of travel underlines the fact that the
concept of home is a relational concept. The relational counterpart of home, from the
perspective of the passive border, could be a foreign country, but from the perspective
of the active border, the counterpart is rather a concrete world, an environment that I
may not know, but thanks to my (linguistic and intercultural) skills, I can shine a light

well as an effective protection against monopolies of all kinds, as Popper (1994), for example, has
convincingly shown. However, the cultivation of diversity should go hand in hand with the cultiva-
tion of unity (Müller, 2014). This argument insists that if Europeans want to maintain their freedom
and diversity—to which they are so accustomed that many even take this situation for granted—they
must add in the application of the principle of unity. On the contrary, it is not self-evident to many,
many reject it, and even many of those who accept the principle of European unity lack the skills
to develop it.
68 K. B. Müller and L. Fráně

on things there. I can feel comfortable there. I can pick up and understand things in
the world and then apply them, if suitable, at home. Or I can just settle in the world. To
follow Chesterton’s phrase, those who do not experience the world, they also cease
to understand their home. Analogous to this reasoning, Anthony Giddens speaks of
how the conditions of globalized modernity have challenged the analytical usefulness
of the concept of the stranger. The proliferation of abstract systems associated with
modernity, according to Giddens (1991), overcomes the dependence on personal ties,
and the opposite of the word “friend” is no longer “stranger”, or even “enemy”; rather,
it is simply someone I do not know. The perception of the stranger is strengthened
not in an existential, but in a comparative perspective. The ability to approach the
unfamiliar with confidence is the ultimate feat of humanity. As Zygmunt Bauman
(1998: 59) stated, “morally mature people are those who like the otherness beside
them, who feel the need for the unfamiliar”. In other words, true home must always
be rediscovered through confrontation with difference. Such confrontation is a part of
any critical self-reflection, any effort to overcome one’s own failures and complexes,
any effort to learn from one’s own mistakes and shortcomings.
After all, ethnographic research on archaic communities shows that the greatest
danger to any culture is not having neighbors. By analogy to this, we could argue that
every society has its greatest cultural potential in its neighbors. The more neighbors,
the better! The productivity of cultural encounters is eloquently captured by the
experience of Ute Wunderlich, chair of Schkola, the cross-border association of
schools. “We have different cultures, and this is reflected in the people. And if we
wanted to put it in a box, both Czechs and Poles have different competences and
different qualities than Germans. I always like it when all three get together, learn
from each other, and do certain things together in a completely different way than
when one meets just Germans or just Czechs. They must actively listen to the other
and look at what the other brings, both linguistically and culturally, and what that
does to me, what that means to me. And that changes people”. But this experience,
which is extremely valuable, is by no means self-evident, as Regina Gellrich of the
Saxon Office succinctly summed up: “We have to explain over and over again that
what is possible here along the cross-border is an opportunity that we don’t have
everywhere, but also that we need special conditions”. Further, we will focus on
these “opportunities” and “special conditions”.

5 Language Immersion—A Lot Can Be Achieved Through

Children

The active border offers quite extraordinary opportunities for children to “acquire”
the language of a neighboring ethnicity. In both Euroregions that we have surveyed,
there exist a noticeable effort, and in some places already quite robust institutions, to
support the socialization of children in the language of their neighbors. In general,
the leitmotif or directly stated goal of most of these activities is to challenge the
Borders and Language. Minor Misunderstandings, Big Troubles, … 69

perception of the language of one’s neighbors as a foreign language. In the words of

Regina Gellrich from the Saxon Office, “the neighboring language (Nachbarsprache)
is something different from a foreign language (Fremdsprache)”. She believes that it
is not primarily a question of all children systematically learning Polish or Czech as a
foreign language at school, although she also considers this important and beneficial,
but rather a certain attitude. According to Regina Gellrich, “in pre-school pedagogy
it is important that [children] acquire a relationship with the world around them, and
neighboring countries in border areas belong to this world. That’s why they must be
open to things, and language is part of that [attitude]”.
The staff of the Saxon Office are convinced that strengthening linguistic compe-
tence in border areas (ideally achieving a certain degree of bilingualism) is a real key
to the formation of cross-border identities, to cross-border regionalization in the true
sense and to the long-term sustainability of border areas. “The age of two to ten is an
excellent age for language learning. We use this period to create the foundations for
the children’s encounters and for their later career prospects in the border region”,
summarized with confidence Bettina Jungnickel (2017), a kindergarten teacher from
Oderwitz in Saxony, where German children are also exposed to the Czech language.
Already starting to discover the culture and language of one’s neighbors at pre-school
age is quite optimal. Regina Gellrich, the director of the Saxon Office, believes that
“the great chance we see with preschool children [is] that … by being in contact
with children of another culture with whom they do activities together, they have the
opportunity to avoid prejudices that their parents might otherwise have”. Intercul-
tural experience as an effective inoculation against prejudice is also illustrated by
the statement of a student from Untergriesbach, Bavaria, who spent two weeks at a
Czech grammar school in Plasy in the spring of 2016 as part of a student exchange
(Gastschulaufenthalt, see below). Before her departure, she was “told many preju-
dices that were by no means valid and, if they were, they later showed in a rather
positive light” (Euregio, 2016: 42).
The belief that strengthening mutual linguistic and cultural competences re-
constructs identities by causing shifts in the use and experience of identity-forming
categories and weakening ethno-linguistic demarcation is shared by many social
scientists (Černá, 2009; Raasch, 2005; Winford, 2003). These findings are well
reflected in the relational (post-representational) conception of culture discussed
in chapter “Active Borders and the Europeanisation of the Public Sphere. How the
Same Can Be Different and Vice Versa”. This approach views identity as a dynamic
outcome of an interactive process, rather than a static framework of representation.
In other words, human identity in this view is the result of action, rather than a reflec-
tion of being or existence. As these are two interrelated levels of (dialogical) identity
formation that correspond to Erikson’s two basic principles of identity (competence
and social integrity), the post-representational conception of identity emphasizes the
principle of competence over the principle of social integrity; that is, what we do over
who we are. Whereas in traditional societies, identity was part of a system of social
roles, statuses, and bonds, today personal identity is less and less the result of pre-
determined historical and social contexts, and instead must be actively constructed.
Active participation in the process of communication has become an essential part
70 K. B. Müller and L. Fráně

of identity in contemporary social conditions (Giddens, 1991). The Saxon Office’s

ambition, as expressed by its director Regina Gellrich, to “instill in children from a
young age a piece of the homeland, in the sense that my homeland is not national,
but it is interesting because it is cross-border, and with a cultural richness that we
do not have elsewhere to this extent and in this sense”, can certainly be described as
an ambitious, but not naive goal.
With long-term institutional support, the language of one’s neighbors can easily
become a “second first” language, and the idea of a certain level of bilingualism in
cross-border regions is not at all unrealistic. This is illustrated by an interview with
the headmaster of the Lidická Primary School in Hrádek nad Nisou, who has more
than twenty years of experience with pupil exchanges. Since 1999, pupils from his
school and a German private school in Hartau have been meeting one day a week,
alternately on the Czech and German sides, for joint lessons. At the same time, they
organize joint trips and other leisure activities. Their first trigger for cooperation is
more than telling. In 1998, the German state school in Hartau was closed for a lack
of children, and the idea of bilingual education was accepted as a suitable innovation
to keep the school going. As it happens, they made a virtue out of a necessity, and
to this day have no regrets. The management of both schools developed a special
concept that states that “it is not about cultural adaptation, copying or mixing, but
about national identity, pride, mutual acceptance and knowledge about those other”
(Černá, 2009).2 In the experience of the Czech school, children who continue to
study German consistently can thus acquire a high degree of bilingualism, or even
reach the level of native speakers, as their “…huge advantage is that these children
… have the language, the intonation, the pronunciation down pat”.
From the point of view of developmental psychology, the age of first, second, or
third graders is still suitable for children to acquire another language or languages
in parallel with their mother tongue through lived experiences (i.e., not systemati-
cally). Professionally, the so-called immersion method is discussed in the context of
language teaching through a socialization approach (Cummins, 2009). These early
experiences can be constitutive to the extent that language competences that build
on these foundations can be developed to the level of native speakers. And even if
children do not consistently engage with the neighboring language later, it ceases to
be a foreign language for them, precisely because of their early experience of this
linguistic environment. A certain passive knowledge and ability to navigate in this
language environment usually remains with them.
At the same time, it is not an exaggeration to say that regular and methodically
well-managed exposure of children to the language and culture of their neighbors
(the Saxon Office staff metaphorically speak of a language bath) has an impact on the
wider social environment. The director of the Saxon Office summarized her experi-
ence as follows: “We start with young children, they are still open to everything, they
perceive everything, they are curious, and I hope that this does not lead to prejudice
at all, and I can say from experience that these activities within the kindergarten

2 Dabei geht es nicht um kulturelle Anpassung, Kopie oder Vermischung, sondern um nationale
Identität, um Stolz und um Akzeptanz und Wissen über ‘die Anderen’.
Borders and Language. Minor Misunderstandings, Big Troubles, … 71

also have an impact on the social environment of the children… Now the exchange of
children is at the capacity limit and does not meet the demand. A lot has changed and
developed since 1998. And when the children come back with positive impressions
and talk about it, then the parents are not so closed-minded. So, you can achieve a
lot through children… Positive experiences spread among people. Our experience
from the facilities where these projects have been running for a long time shows that
there is no need to convince parents, it is part of the concept of the kindergarten, and
it runs well. Parents tell each other about their children’s positive experiences and
then other parents want to join in, because if other children are doing it, they want
their children to be there too. It’s the little things, and maybe I’m too idealistic about
it, but it’s important. It’s better to start with prevention in children than to remove
prejudice, that’s our responsibility as adults”.
Donata Di Taranto, a worker from the Bavarian part of the Šumava Euroregion,
also pointed out during our interview that language immersion can help to stimu-
late interest (or at least overcome disinterest) in the culture and language of one’s
neighbors from the other side of the border. She paraphrased the thought process of a
potential parent whose young child is participating in programs with Czech language
animations and regular trips to Bohemia: “If our little one has already been further
inland, is learning Czech and even looking forward to Czech lessons and language
animation once a week, and thinks the Czech teacher is great, then there must be
something else than that somewhat unattractive border area with its cheap fuel and
Vietnamese markets, etc. Maybe I’ll go there with my kids too”.
In terms of socialization in the language of their neighbors in relation to the Czech-
Polish border areas, the effect of acquiring a neighbor’s language can be achieved
much more easily, as these are related languages. As clearly illustrated by Hedvika
Zimmeramannová, a former vice-mayor, a parish priest, and long-time organizer, as
well as interpreter of cross-border cooperation programs from Hrádek nad Nisou, who
deliberately refuses to translate any more for the Czech (adult!) partners on the Polish
side: “I just observe when something is needed… but normally I’ve already taught
them that they must talk with each other. I know they don’t understand everything, but
every meeting they understand more and more … I know they will gradually learn.
I’ve stopped, because I’ve found that if I don’t keep interpreting for them, eventually
it won’t be needed. And I’ve found that they really do get along, and we all know
that the language must be learned that way”. The language barriers in the case of
Czech-Polish border areas are much easier to overcome, even remove to the point
where one thinks that not taking this easy socialization step would be an unforgivable
mistake.
It is perhaps important to mention in this context that the feeling of linguistic
comfort and the experience of a certain degree of hospitality in a particular linguistic
environment does not necessarily depend on an active command of the language. It is
not true that people can only understand each other if they speak the same language.
In an environment of sufficient linguistic reciprocity, people can get along very well
in their different mother tongues if they have sufficient passive knowledge. The staff
of the Saxon Office also sees this as a desirable and achievable goal. Regina Gellrich
considers it crucial “to learn the basics of the language I need in everyday life to
72 K. B. Müller and L. Fráně

get along. I personally don’t speak enough Polish and Czech to be able to talk to
you, but I understand a lot, so I don’t even need an interpreter, or I’m able to say,
now you haven’t translated everything, so I passively understand the language. And
I think that’s an important level if we could achieve that. Everybody speaks their
own language, and we understand each other. If we manage to achieve that quality,
we would be very good”.
And indeed, if two people speak different languages together, it can be a clear,
effective, and quite natural communicational situation; you just need to create those
“special conditions” that Regina Gellrich talks about. Many people consider such a
situation to be non-normal to the point of being unnatural. My (KBM) wife Josie
is from London, she understands and speaks Czech very well, but sometimes she
doesn’t feel eloquent enough, so she spontaneously switches to her mother tongue. I
have it the other way round. So, she speaks to me in English, I answer her in Czech.
Sometimes people can’t take their eyes off us. It’s in their heads. Sometimes someone
even addresses us. How is that possible? How does it work?
Of course, this is in a way understandable. As the Renaissance philosopher Michel
de Montaigne (1958) laconically stated, everyone considers barbaric what one is
not used to. However, a more robust exposure of children to the experiences of
neighboring languages and cultures would in the medium term lead spontaneously
to the enforcement of the EU’s linguistic policy of the 1 + 2, i.e., one mother tongue
plus two other languages. Situations where two people speak different languages
and understand each other well would then not necessarily be unusual, but quite
normal, especially in border areas. As utopian as it may sound, a variation of EU
linguistic policy along these lines—one local mother tongue, a second neighborly
mother tongue, and a third global mother tongue—is not only highly desirable from
the point of view of border regions, but certainly an achievable policy goal, given
the extraordinary opportunities that the proximity of a linguistic border offers.

6 Best Practices in Education of Language and Culture

of Neighbors

While the effect of acquiring the language of their neighbors can be achieved rela-
tively easily in the case of Czech-Polish cross-border areas, in the case of the Czech-
German cross-border areas, more substantial institutional support is needed. Since
the 1990s, numerous educational initiatives of various scales and degrees of insti-
tutionalization have been developing along the Czech-German and German-Polish
language border in the Euroregions of Nisa and Šumava, which aim to overcome
linguistic and cultural barriers.
As far as overcoming the language barrier in the Nisa Euroregion is concerned, the
Saxon part seems to be the most active. There are several established institutions in
addition to numerous long-term school partnerships. This yet poorly understood and
institutionally insufficiently supported situation, the Saxon Regional Office for an
Borders and Language. Minor Misunderstandings, Big Troubles, … 73

Early Education in Neighboring Languages in Görlitz, mentioned repeatedly above,

seems to be a salient exception in the areas that we have surveyed. The cross-border
school association Schkola, based in Zittau, or the Language Competence Centre in
Lower Austria, which was not the primary focus of our research (as it lies outside
the Euroregion that we surveyed), was also relatively well-established—references
to the experience in Lower Austria, which we will mention below, were repeatedly
made in Šumava, Bavaria and in Nisa.
Many other examples of good practices from other parts of the Czech-German
linguistic border were mentioned during our interviews. In Nisa, the German-Czech
Friedrich Schiller Gymnasium in Pirna, which has been offering a bilingual educa-
tion program since 1998, was frequently mentioned. In Upper Austria, reference
was made to the achievements of the organization Vysočina Education, while in
Bavaria the contribution of the Czech-German Youth Exchange Coordination Centre
TANDEM, with a Czech branch in Pilsen and a German branch in Regensburg, was
repeatedly highlighted. This center was established in 1997, and its Czech branch is
an organizational unit of the Rector’s Office of the University of West Bohemia in
Pilsen. TANDEM is very active especially in the Pilsen and Karlovy Vary regions,
and its projects focus on, among other things, the issue of collective memory and
overcoming historical traumas and injustices. TANDEM organizes numerous events
that stimulate processes of dealing with the past among young people using the
method of so-called dialogical remembering, which is discussed in detail in the
following chapter “Borders and Memory. From Historical Roots to Dialogical-Like
Routes”, and which was also the subject of our research among mayors and other
actors involved in cross-border cooperation.3

6.1 Saxony Regional Office for Early Childhood Education

in Neighboring Languages (LaNa)

The Saxon Office was established in 2014 in the Upper Lusatian district town of
Görlitz, which lies on the German-Polish border. The office is primarily financed by
the Görlitz district and partly by tax funds approved by the Saxon state parliament.
In 2020, the office employed 6 staff. Mandated by the Saxon Ministry of Education,
the office functions as a coordination center linking and supporting all relevant actors
involved in early childhood education in the languages of their Saxon neighbors in
science, NGO, public administration, or in politics. The Saxon Office also coordi-
nates an advisory body of language education experts from major German institutions
and provides methodological and didactic support. They also focus on educating the

3 We know that in the Euroregions of Nisa and Šumava, there exist numerous initiatives and long-
term partnerships. We cannot exclude the possibility that we have omitted in our research some
established activities aimed at breaking down language barriers in our research, for which we
apologize. Our primary interest has been directed towards formal institutions, as we draw on the
Marxian principle that pathways to desired social change have little practical impact unless they
are coupled with opportunities for institutionalization (Giddens, 1991).
74 K. B. Müller and L. Fráně

2022 YEAR Outreach of Saxon Office

Fig. 2 Preschools in Saxon border regions with neighboring language program and/or partner
school in neighboring country (Source LaNa)

public, including teachers and the parental public. The director considers promoting
and explaining the benefits that bilingual education can bring for the development
of children and the region to be a key part of their job. Their main priority is kinder-
gartens, as from a developmental psychology perspective, language education for
preschoolers is the ideal foundation and starting point for acquiring multilingualism
and intercultural literacy. The office provides support to dozens of kindergartens. In
some of them, children are educated using the immersion method, which educates
children to understand the language and culture of their neighbors. According to a
survey conducted by the Saxon Office in 2015, 58 kindergartens in the Saxon border
region offered programs focusing on the language of their neighbors or also had a
(Czech or Polish) partner school on the other side of the border. According to their
website, in early 2022, this number exceeded 70 kindergartens on the German side
(see Fig. 2).
The objectives of the Saxon Office were summarized by its Director Regina Gell-
rich as follows. “Ideally, if we can get native speakers into the kindergarten, it can
lead to children growing up bilingual, ideally. But that is a vision we are far from
achieving. Now it’s first about getting the teachers and qualifying them to do this,
and we also want to adequately support the facilities that are already doing this,
because there are some that have been committed for a long time. We are trying to be
a partner for kindergartens and their founders throughout Saxony, also for munic-
ipalities and researchers, and we represent a bridge in this direction, and thus we
connect what already exists, both methodologically and didactically. Our aim is to
show ways, materials, methods, funding possibilities, and where to get staff, so quite
practical support on the one hand, and on the other hand also to show the public
what potential this has for children, for adults, for the region. It’s very interesting
work, because we as a team have a vision that we want to realize, but it’s also very
challenging mission”.
An extraordinary project of the Saxon Office in Görlitz aims at preschool teachers.
This project is implemented with a Polish partner and funded using European Union
money. Regina Gellrich, the director of the Office, described the project as being
“where we qualify together Saxon and Polish kindergarten teachers. We have a
Borders and Language. Minor Misunderstandings, Big Troubles, … 75

joint training course that lasts a whole year and where they learn the basics of
the neighboring language, while they also get acquainted with the methodology, for
example, of how to organize cross-border meetings with institutions from neighboring
countries, and they learn something from the homeland studies of the neighboring
country. We also have a joint event where they have to work out something together,
for example, a German-Polish coloring book for children, where the German and
Polish holidays are compared so that the children could see that we celebrate the same
thing, but in a little different way, or that we have a different concept of the first day of
school—in our case, with a cone full of sweets. I think that comparison is an important
thing in preschool. And then there is a teacher’s guide with the terminology of holidays
of a neighboring country, with material there with which I can explain to children,
for example, how Easter is celebrated in Poland. Next year, there will be a second
round of this training course, being 200 hours long, so it is very demanding, but we
are having success with it, for example, new partnerships between kindergartens are
forming”. Unfortunately, we have not seen a similar initiative between Saxony and
the Czech Republic.
The high political priority given to education in the languages of one’s neighbors
is also illustrated by the words of the Saxon Regional Councilor Bernd Lange, who
is also the chairman of the Saxon part of the Nisa region. “We are trying to overcome
this [the language barrier] … to make kindergarten teachers fit, to strengthen their
sensitivity and understanding of the culture of neighboring countries. It’s important,
because then they can pass on these competencies to the children themselves, so
that the children understand each other better. We need to make this cooperation
sustainable to bring the long-term benefits”.

6.2 Schkola

The second progressive institution of the Nisa Euroregion is the Schkola school
association, which was founded in 2007 in the Upper Lusatian town of Zittau as
part of the so-called Tri-lands region. The association currently brings together 15
partner schools from all three countries, while on the German side it brings together
non-state (frei) schools only (see Fig. 3). It also includes the already mentioned
partnership of schools in Hartau and Hrádek nad Nisou. The aim of the members
of the association is to offer language teaching in the partner school’s language
throughout the whole school attendance. The schools operate in a bilingual mode
to provide easy orientation for visitors from the other side of the border. At the
same time, they are committed to organizing regular joint activities, regular joint
staff meetings, trying to motivate their staff to improve themselves in the language
of their neighbors, and offering educational programs. The association also tries to
coordinate the schools’ cooperation in the field of PR and fundraising. In its founding
charter, the school association places special emphasis on environmental protection
and wants to strive for joint “cross-border” education in favor of environmental
protection, including its active use in everyday life, in which it also tries to involve
76 K. B. Müller and L. Fráně

Fig. 3 Members of cross-border school association Schkola founded in 2007 (Source https://sch
kola.de/die-schkola/schkola-schulverbund/)

parents and the wider school community. The partner schools are also committed
to educating children for cross-border solidarity and unity. In accordance with its
Constitutive Act, this cross-border educational association wants to gain a (singular)
legal entity.4
According to Ute Wunderlich, the chairwoman of the Schkola, the five partner
schools on the Saxon side have a total of about 500 pupils, who have three hours of
compulsory Czech or Polish per week in the first grade, four hours from the second
grade, and three hours of compulsory Czech or Polish per week from the seventh
grade. On the Saxon side, the school association has opened a subject called Neigh-
bors and Language, for which it has developed its own curriculum. These were
allegedly created by identifying the intersections between the Czech and German
curricula. As in the case of the primary school in Hrádek nad Nisou, which is
also a member of the school association, the subject includes weekly meetings,
because “learning the neighborhood language without meeting the neighbors is, in
my opinion, a dead language”, summarized Ute Wunderlich, the chairwoman of the
Schkola succinctly. In her opinion, Czech or Polish should be taught in all primary
schools in the border region, as in her experience this clearly strengthens intercul-
tural competences, but also tolerance, mindfulness, and a sense and appreciation of
plurality.

4https://schkola.de/wp/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/schkola-schulverbund-gruendungsurkunde-
2007.pdf.
Borders and Language. Minor Misunderstandings, Big Troubles, … 77

6.3 Bavaria: Gastschuljahr and Sprachkompetenzzentrum

Also, in the Šumava Euroregion, we can find cases of relatively well-established

programs for education in the language of their neighbors. The Gastschuljahr project
has been running here for more than 20 years. Students from grammar and secondary
schools can take part in short-term or long-term exchange stays between Czech
and Bavarian schools. The initiator of these exchanges was the European Gymna-
sium Leopoldinum in Passau, which has been hosting students every year since
1992, always for an entire school year. After 1996, the project grew larger and more
Bavarian and Czech schools joined in.
Around 20 Czech students aged 16 to 18 enter Bavarian grammar schools each
year from various grammar schools in southern and western Bohemia. They usually
spend the entire school year studying in Bavaria. At the beginning of the project, the
students lived in dormitories, but today they stay with host families, which intensifies
their experience of a neighboring country and makes the learning of intercultural
competences more effective. Although many host families have historically been
involved in the project, the number of students and the level of interest fluctuate,
and the organizers must find enough Bavarian host families each year, which is not
always easy. Host families receive a food and accommodation allowance (300 euros
per month), while Czech students pay a one-off fee of 500 euros. In addition to going
to school with German classmates, students can also attend an intensive German
course. Throughout the year, both their host families and their host schools organize
a rich program for visiting students, including trips and events. The aim is not only
to learn the language, but also to get to know the culture of their neighbors and to
strengthen intercultural competences. The program is financially supported by the
Bavarian State Office, the Czech-German Future Fund, and the Bavarian part of the
Šumava Euroregion.
The Euroregion tries to implement these student exchanges on both sides—since
2015, the project has also been reciprocally implemented on the Czech side. Here,
the organization of the project is very similar, although the Bavarian students only
come to the Czech grammar school in southern or western Bohemia for short stays
of one to three weeks (Gastschulaufenthalt). This is due to their poor (or absent)
knowledge of the Czech language, which makes their integration into the Czech
school program more difficult. The Bavarian students also live with Czech host
families and attend classes every day, including Czech language classes. Here too,
the stay usually includes an additional program (trips, events), which is provided for
the students by both the host families and their Czech grammar schools. So far, around
540 Czech students from 12 grammar schools have participated in this project. On the
Bavarian side, a total of 23 grammar schools have been involved in the project as host
institutions. However, the number of Bavarian students going to the Czech Republic
is only in the single digits. According to the Bavarian part of the Šumava Euroregion,
only eight students have gone from Bavaria to Czech grammar schools during the
project period (i.e., since the 2015/2016 school year). The significant asymmetry in
the number of mutual student exchanges tellingly reflects the asymmetrical status of
78 K. B. Müller and L. Fráně

the two neighboring languages, as well as the asymmetry in interest in the language
and culture of their neighbors.
The Gastschuljahr project is only aimed at secondary school students, but in recent
years the Bavarian language projects have also tried to target the youngest children.
Within the framework of the Language Competence Centre (Sprachkomptenezzen-
trum) project, which was founded in 2017 on the model of Lower Austria, which
will be discussed below, children from primary schools and from kindergarten were
able to experience the language of their neighbors through teachers from the other
side and through regular visits to neighboring countries. This was only a three-year
project, although the intention of the staff of the Bavarian part of the Šumava Eurore-
gion was to create a permanent educational institution. Only time will tell whether
this effort will be successful. A total of 148 educational institutions in Bohemia and
Bavaria participated in this three-year project and, according to the Bavarian part
of the Euroregion, many of these partnerships are continuing. The Centre offered
a complete educational package of 36 lessons (45 min each) for secondary schools
and primary schools, and 30 lessons (90 min each) of language animation for kinder-
gartens. Language animation is a method to facilitate first contact with the language
of their neighbors in a creative and playful way and, for example, to discover the
common features of the two neighboring languages. The language programs also
included excursions to a neighboring country, where participants had the opportu-
nity to get to know the neighboring country first-hand, meet peers from the other side,
and test their language skills. In total, 78 excursions were organized, involving 2,269
children from both countries (see Fig. 4). A team of professional tutors was created,
whose members participated in regular training sessions. The project also produced
several new educational publications for teaching Czech in Bavarian schools and
kindergartens. These can also be used in follow-up projects. The Czech guarantor of
the Language Competence Centre project was the Goethe Centre of the University
of South Bohemia in the city of České Budějovice.
In February 2020, a three-year follow-up project entitled Common Language—
Common Future was launched, but it no longer included kindergartens. This is
certainly a pity. The low interest of parents in teaching their kids the neighbor-
hood language on both sides of the border is probably the reason for this. Although
according to the representatives of the Bavarian part of the Euroregion, the interest
in Czech from the Bavarian kindergartens was not small. The greater organizational
requirements in terms of training teachers and their cross-border mobility probably
played a role. The project Common Language—Common Future continued to teach
Czech to 15 primary and 11 secondary schools on the Bavarian side and to teach
German to 14 primary and 14 secondary schools on the Czech side for another two
school years; in the previous project, these were only one-year packages.5 That will
allow them to build on and further deepen the already acquired linguistic and inter-
cultural competences. The project also included the creation of a digital application
for teaching the language of their neighbors, as well as the search for new Czech-
Bavarian school partnerships. Another innovative element of this project is the focus

5 http://gemeinsamesprache.de/cs/.
Borders and Language. Minor Misunderstandings, Big Troubles, … 79

Fig. 4 Number of participants in the Language Competence Centre project (2017–2019)

on being practice-oriented in the form of linking secondary schools with employers

on both sides of the border. The aim is to try to integrate the cross-border labor
market more closely and thus strengthen cross-border economic links. Due to the
greater degree of economic asymmetry, it will be particularly challenging for the
Czech side to attract Bavarian youth to Czech companies and organizations. The
risk will need to be taken care of, lest good intentions only lead to a reinforcing
effect of brain drain from the Czech border region, which would strengthen, rather
than weaken, economic and linguistic asymmetries. As project manager Donata Di
Taranto from Freyung, Bavaria realistically stated, “A high level of bilingualism in the
Bavarian-Czech border region is still an idealistic vision. However, our work should
contribute to moving closer to this vision and to further connecting Europe and its
people’s hearts. Increasing the sense of belonging on both sides of the border and
better understanding should, also by way of the support of our projects, contribute
to the idea of a higher level of bilingualism in the region”. In the follow-up program
Common Language—Common Future, the Czech guarantor of the project was the
University of Technology and Economics in České Budějovice, replacing the previous
sponsor, the Goethe Centre of the University of South Bohemia.
In our research, we did not focus so much on the university level of cross-border
language cooperation. However, its importance in breaking down language asym-
metries is probably not as crucial as early education through immersion or other
experiential methods. Although it is certainly not insignificant, not least because
of the continuities between the different educational levels, the absence of which
80 K. B. Müller and L. Fráně

is a significant obstacle in overcoming the language barrier. The impact of univer-

sity cross-border cooperation on the overall social environment cannot be under-
estimated either. At the level of higher education, a good example to follow is the
Academic Coordination Centre, which was established in 1991 in the Nisa Eurore-
gion to coordinate educational and research activities between Czech, German, and
Polish universities in the border areas. Currently, the Academic Coordination Centre
brings together 7 universities (https://acc-ern.tul.cz/).

7 Barriers to Bilingual Education in Cross-Border

Euroregions

Both the Saxon government and the Bavarian side are actively trying to meet the
extraordinary opportunities offered by the linguistic border and are attempting to
reduce linguistic asymmetry. The Saxon government is actively supporting the project
of teaching neighboring languages, especially through the Saxon Office in Görlitz and
the “language of neighbors” programs. Also, the Bavarian side has recently launched
two major language projects, the Language Competence Centre, and the follow-up
project Common Language—Common Future.
As far as the Czech side is concerned, it seems that the initiatives coming from
below (and there are many) do not have such sophisticated institutional support
that would be comparable to the institutional support for the teaching of neighbors’
language in Saxony or Bavaria. Judging by our interviews, but also by an analysis of
the web presentations of language programs and institutions, the Czech approach to
teaching the language of their neighbors seems to be less institutionally coordinated.
The general weaknesses of the lack of institutional arrangements for cross-border
cooperation were aptly pointed out by Bernd Lange, the Saxon Landrat and Chairman
of the Saxon part of the Nisa Euroregion. Although there is, according to him,
a relatively dense network of grassroots initiatives which are “… based on good
contacts between people on both sides of the border. However, these projects usually
end when one of these people can no longer participate. Therefore, we need something
that is sustainable, that will be here for a long time and that will bring positive effects
here in the border region in the long term”. Cross-border cooperation is undoubtedly,
like so much else, about people. But unless the operation of active borders is more
robustly supported by institutions, its future is not reliably assured.
The former mayor of a Šumava village (INF4) mentioned a very telling case of
an excellent, but unsustainable initiative. Years ago, he put together a 25-member
collective of Czech, Austrian, and German teachers who worked for a year on a
regional Czech-German textbook. “The textbook … didn’t even avoid displacement,
they managed to put in nature, history, everything. From my point of view, it is
timeless”. However, this extraordinary initiative did not have more generous and
long-term institutional support, and therefore it only “fell into the abyss of history”.
Reportedly, no one is interested in the textbook today, even though they have “full
Borders and Language. Minor Misunderstandings, Big Troubles, … 81

stocks of it”. Another such case was recounted during our interview with Václav
Vostradovský, the mayor of Kvilda, a village in Šumava. A group of ten Czechs and
ten Germans used to meet for joint activities, and “they would either meet at Bučina
(Czech) or go to Finsterau (Bavaria), …they would meet at a lady’s guesthouse and
for example cook dumplings”. The meetings reportedly worked for about two to three
years. It was “actually a kind of Czech-German course… It was about the fact that
the Czechs had to try to speak German and they in turn had to speak Czech… and
they did something together. That it wasn’t that they were sitting in a classroom”. So,
the equivalent of the immersion method, only for adults. One cannot but agree with
Mayor Vostrádecký that “it is a pity that it then died out before we got to this time”,
when it is becoming easier to secure funds for the sustainability of such beneficial
cross-border activities.
The Austrian part of the Šumava Euroregion also does not have an institution-
ally coordinated approach to the language issue; though this is not the case for the
other Austrian part of the Czech-Austrian borderlands further east, Lower Austria
(see below). Romana Sadravetz, the head of the Dunaj-Vltava European Region in
Linz, Austria, pointed out that “Upper Austria and perhaps even South Bohemia in
particular are much less active in the field of language teaching than, for example,
Lower Austria or the Czech Region of Vysočina. There is a very active institution in
this Region, Vysočina Education, which provides a lot of good activities”. The less
coordinated approach on the Czech side may be largely due to this asymmetry in
language use; that is, that Czechs are more actively interested in German language
and culture than Saxons, Bavarians, or Austrians in the Czech one, even without
institutional supports, as the mayor of a Saxon border municipality put it in our inter-
view: “We are very lucky in that especially in the border areas on the Czech side a
lot of people speak German, which makes things quite easy for us and makes us a
bit lazy” (INF2).
However, this situation is likely to change in the future, since interest in the
German language among Czechs has declined significantly in recent decades. As
Regina Gellrich from the Saxon Office also noted with somewhat of a sigh, “In
our experience from the Liberec region [along the German border], I have to say
that German is on the decline and is not as well supported in kindergartens as it
used to be, because English is coming to the fore”. The situation is likely to be
similar elsewhere along the Czech-German language border. The lack of interest in
German in the Czech border region of Šumava was laconically pointed out by one
of our informants, who raised a rhetorical question during our interview, to which
he himself gave a clear answer afterward: “How many schools are there here with
German teachers? I dare say I hardly know even one. Yeah, native speakers from New
York, you’ll find three of them in some high schools. And where are the Germans?
In Frenštát pod Radhoštěm [Czech region along the Polish border], they must have
trouble with the German, they have Poles behind their house. But here, we have them
here, it’s twenty kilometers away, that’s our stupidity” (INF4). Tomasz Sliwa, the
coordinator of the Polish part of the Nisa Euroregion from Jelenia Góra, also said
that “Polish children are more likely to learn English than German”.
82 K. B. Müller and L. Fráně

The trend of declining knowledge of and interest in the German language among
Czechs is also confirmed by the Eurobarometer (EB, 2012). When asked which
foreign languages respondents know well enough to be able to converse in them,
only 15% of Czechs reported German in 2012. In 2005, the figure was much higher
(28%). When asked which two foreign languages are most useful for your personal
development, 32% of Czechs mentioned German in 2012 (compared to 59% for
English), compared to 55% for German in 2005. Perhaps, even more telling are the
results for the question on which languages children should learn, as they are impor-
tant for their future development. German was mentioned in this context by 44% of
Czechs, while English was mentioned by 92%. The drop in German compared to the
previous measurement was again significant, as in 2005 66% of Czechs considered
German important for their children. The decline in the ability to understand the
German language (and thus culture), as well as the decline in interest in the German
language, is therefore very noticeable among the Czech public (EB, 2012).
This brings us back to the already discussed concern, which has been expressed
by, among others, the mayor of Zittau, Thomas Zenker, or the managing director of
the Bavarian part of the Euroregion, Kaspar Sammer, that English may become the
“killer” of European languages, and thus in a sense also of these specific cross-border
cultures. The authentic rapprochement of people from both sides of the border, when
conducted in English, has its obvious limitations, and the extraordinary civilizational
opportunities arising from the proximity of the linguistic border will thus lie fallow. In
the following discussion, we will focus on other identified (and interrelated) obstacles
that complicate the development of bilingual education across the Czech-German (or
Polish-German) linguistic border: (1) linguistic asymmetry, (2) administrative and
legislative obstacles, and (3) the lack of interest in the culture and language of their
neighbors.

8 Linguistic Asymmetry and Lower Austrian Offensive,

or Sorry, But Everyone Should Know How to Say “Hello”
and “Thanks”

One of the obstacles to the breaking down of the language barrier may be, perhaps
somewhat paradoxically, the high degree of asymmetry in language use and their
unequal status, as discussed above in the chapter whose title bears the authentic
statement of the informant from Saxony that “Germans should also move a little
towards the other side”. The question of linguistic asymmetry and status inequality
must also be perceived at a symbolic level, since language presents—in both the
Czech and German context—a constitutive element of collective identity. The high
determination to straighten out this linguistic asymmetry and to openness towards
Czech—despite difficulties, but also the allegedly poor progress in teaching—was
clearly expressed, for example, in an interview with the long-time mayor of a Saxon
border town. “Because we see language as the main barrier … we decided that as
Borders and Language. Minor Misunderstandings, Big Troubles, … 83

administrative employees we would learn the language of our neighbor, 20 colleagues

got voluntarily involved, we learn in our free time and pay for it ourselves, the
headmistress of the school in Warnsdorf teaches us in the evening school, one hour
a week. The result is not the best, but it is also good for opening one’s mind” (INF7).
Such a level of commitment and self-discipline sounds almost unbelievable. But even
if this was merely a normative statement with slightly counterfactual tones, one can
still feel from it a sense of respect, humbleness, and a determination to straighten out
the status of neighboring languages.
In this context, it is interesting to note, as we also pointed out above, that of all the
German-speaking parts of the Euroregions of Šumava and Nisa, the teaching of the
neighboring language probably has the most robust institutional support and public
response in the border regions of Saxony, where “German children choose Czech as
an optional language from time to time, so they are also interested” (INF2); certainly,
in comparison to Bavaria and Upper Austria, where we observed in our interviews a
somewhat stronger emphasis on the supposedly hard-to-overcome public reticence
towards Czech. While the conclusions of our research cannot be considered fully
representative, it can indeed be inferred from the interviews that Bavarian and Upper
Austrian interviewees were—compared to Saxon interviewees—considerably more
skeptical about the possibilities of overcoming the language barrier and thus about
the possibilities of straightening out this linguistic asymmetry. The lower degree
of economic asymmetry in the Czech-Saxon and Saxon-Polish cross-border areas
compared to the Czech-Bavarian and Czech-Austrian areas may also play a role.
However, this is not to say that there are no initiatives in Bavaria or Upper Austria to
reduce neighboring linguistic asymmetry, or that there is zero interest in the Czech
language among the Bavarian or Upper Austrian public. In any case, the emphasis
on Czech being a difficult language appeared to some extent in all interviews with
German-speaking informants. However, many of them also admitted that German is
not an easy language for Czechs either, and that constantly referring to the difficulty
of the language is not very productive, is a bit of an excuse, and is not very helpful
for developing neighborly relations. One can easily imagine that in relation to the
Czech language (but also other neighboring languages), a dynamic of self-fulfilling
prophecy may be at work in German-speaking border areas, contributing to the fact
that not only Saxons (INF2; INF5), but also Bavarians and “upper Austrians are
linguistically a bit lazy” (INF8).
Some of the interviewees then pointed to the symbolic level of communication and
to the fact that it is probably naive to expect a significant shift towards bilingualism in
the short term, but that it also depends on the manifest willingness of the neighbors to
use the language. Hedvika Zimmermannová, the former vice-mayor of Hrádek nad
Nisou, expressed this very clearly. “Everyone can learn to say hello and thank you,
right? I am sorry, but this ought to be. And you can tell if people come and say hello
in that local language, in the country foreign to them, suddenly everyone is willing
to help”. There is no doubt that this symbolic willingness to use the language of
one’s neighbors can have a positive impact on the rebalancing of the status between
these neighboring languages. Such willingness, as Hedvika Zimmermannová rightly
added, should also be accompanied by that “one must stop being afraid to speak
84 K. B. Müller and L. Fráně

in order to keep from making mistakes, or keep from embarrassing oneself ”. The
symbolic inequality of these two languages is also reproduced by symbolic speech
situations. The manifest willingness to use the language of one’s neighbors should
therefore be a part of the intercultural competence mentioned above.
A very similar tone resonated in an interview with Romana Sadravetz, head of
the European Region Danube-Vltava from Austrian Linz, who, in addition to the
symbolic level of communication, also named a certain aversion and prejudice that
she finds in the relations of some Germans, Austrians, and Czechs to the language
of their neighbors. “Repeatedly, and for many years, various representatives of the
border regions have drawn attention to the issue of the language barrier as a fact
that separates us. On the other hand, it is up to each of us to approach this issue
actively and learn the language of our neighbor. This in particular concerns the
Czech language, and I can confirm that the Czech language is not easy. However, if
someone decides to learn a new language, I think they are signaling an interest in
that country or culture. Maybe it is not essential to learn a language perfectly, but
when I come to a neighboring country, I can at least say hello, I can order lunch in
a restaurant, and I can say at least a few basic sentences”.
The greater asymmetry in the status and the use of languages along the Czech-
Bavarian and Czech-Austrian border, compared to the Czech-Saxon border, could be
explained by historical, geographical, and morphological factors. On the one hand,
the Czech-German linguistic border of the Šumava Euroregion carries the legacy
of the Iron Curtain, while on the other hand, it is characterized by greater spatial
distances and less permeability. In contrast, the Czech-Saxon border is the former
border between the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic and the (eastern) German
Democratic Republic, which was another socialist country within the East Bloc that
maintained border permeability, albeit with quite a strict regime of border controls.
Therefore, the density of settlements is also higher in the close Czech-Saxon border
than in the Czech-Bavarian border (Hardi & Uszkai, 2017). Also, the presence of
the Lusatian-Serbian population resulted in a stronger orientation of these Saxon
border areas towards Slavic language centers, especially Prague. This is evidenced,
for example, by the Lusatian Seminary, which was founded in Prague as early as
1724, and which made a significant contribution to the Lusatian national revival
(Elle, 2015).
A common feature of many interviews with Bavarian and Austrian informants was
the reference to the inspiration of the Lower Austrian so-called Sprache Offensive.
This has been carried out by the Language Competence Centre in Lower Austria, and
this Centre was mentioned across our informants as a role model worth following.
The Bavarian Language Competence Centre, which was only established in 2017,
was undoubtedly designed by the Lower Austrian Centre. Inspiration from the Lower
Austrian Sprache Offensive is also openly declared on the website of a Bavarian part
of another Euroregion on the Czech-German Border, the Egrensis Euroregion. This
Euroregion lies to the northwest of the Bavarian part of the Šumava Euroregion. On
its website, it states that “reticence towards the language of a neighboring country
greatly reduces the development opportunities that could arise from cross-border
Borders and Language. Minor Misunderstandings, Big Troubles, … 85

cooperation in the Egrensis Euregion. The aim of the ‘language offensive’ is there-
fore to increase intercultural competences in the Egrensis Euroregion. However, a
perfect knowledge of the language of a neighboring country is not necessary for
mutual understanding between Czechs and Germans. Even a basic knowledge of the
language is sufficient for cross-border cooperation”. Tellingly, it is the Saxon Office
from Görlitz that assists the Egrensis Euroregion in carrying out this task. And there
are positive spillover effects between these two Euroregions. The abovementioned
TANDEM Coordination Centre for Czech-German Youth Exchanges is also very
active within the Egrensis Euroregion and supports the mission of alleviating the
language barrier.
The Sprache Offensive was launched in 2003 by Lower Austrian Governor Erwin
Pröll to redress the asymmetry in the use of neighboring languages. The language
offensive consists primarily of offering Czech, Slovak, and Hungarian in dozens of
kindergartens, primary, and secondary schools in Lower Austria. According to the
latest figures from the Lower Austrian Language Competence Centre (founded in
2006 in Deutsch-Wagram), more than 50,000 children or students have already taken
advantage of this offer. Around 2,700 pupils reportedly learn Czech every school
year. Like the Saxon Office, the Lower Austria Competence Centre is involved in a
range of other activities, including promotion, teacher training, and the preparation of
teaching materials. In the context of language education, it is particularly significant,
as one can read on the website of the Lower Austrian Centre, that it has allegedly
“succeeded in sending signals that have made the often-mentioned difficult language
barrier be forgotten … The Sprachkompetenz project advocates modern and practice-
related foreign/neighboring language teaching for all age groups. We will be happy
to support your project and pass on our experience with projects in Lower Austria,
the Czech Republic or Slovakia to help you overcome the border”.
If this were true and the “difficult language barrier has been forgotten”, and reti-
cence towards neighboring languages has been weakened, this would be excellent
news for Europe; although there is a certain tension between the phrasing “signals that
have made it possible to forget” and “the oft-mentioned language barrier”. Never-
theless, it can be concluded that, by its sheer scale and duration, the Lower Austrian
Sprache Offensive represents an extraordinary attempt to disrupt this linguistic reti-
cence and the associated barriers to cross-border cooperation. It inspires other areas
alongside the Czech-German linguistic border by its example and serves as a model
of best practice to be followed.

9 Administrative and Legislative Obstacles, or Strike Until

They Give Up

One of the key obstacles to the alleviation of the language barrier is undoubtedly
legislative and administrative restrictions. A certain barrier to the effectiveness of
cross-border cooperation is the administrative asymmetry between the different parts
86 K. B. Müller and L. Fráně

of the Euroregions. The Czech or Polish Euroregions are made up of municipalities,

while the German Euroregions are made up of districts. The members of the German
Euroregions therefore do not find equally strong partners on the opposite side of
the border. In the Czech-German borderlands exist similar incompatibilities not only
at the level of the Euroregions, but also at higher levels of cross-border cooper-
ation. Individual cooperation formats often overlap strangely, and specific actors
often do not find on the other side of the border matching partners with similar (or
same) competences and capacities (Chilla et al., 2018). Moreover, state bureaucracies
on both sides sometimes amaze with their inventiveness in explaining why “things
cannot be done”, usually with reference to legislative and administrative constraints
such as different qualification requirements, mutual non-recognition of qualifica-
tions, incompatible educational curricula, different administrative conditions, and
many others.
It is historically justifiable and to some extent understandable that the bureaucra-
cies and political representations of many European states still cling to their educa-
tional monopoly and do not want to tolerate the education of their “own” children
in other European countries. However, in the context of current global challenges
and shared risks, which require close cooperation within Europe, this demand seems
not only archaic, but also irresponsible and uncivil. In fact, it seems dangerous for
a safe European future. To put it bluntly, the compatibility and greater intercon-
nectedness of European education systems, as well as shared responsibility for their
content and form, are a prerequisite for the formation of a European civil society;
the adjective “civil” could be dropped because European solidarity and belonging
is not thinkable in any other way than as a civil mode of collective identity. The
collective prejudices and stereotypically reproduced antagonisms that are part of the
educational curriculum clash with the requirement for “getting on peacefully with
our European neighbors”. This must also include dealing with the conflicting past
through mutual (i.e., cross-border) dialogical remembering, which will be discussed
in detail in chapter “Borders and Memory. From Historical Roots to Dialogical-Like
Routes”.
Some interviews suggest that the German authorities, in particular, are very sensi-
tive to the education of German children in non-German territory. Jaroslav Poláček,
the elementary school headmaster in Hrádek and Nisou, described a very curious
case. His school was approached by a German family living near the Czech border
who wanted to enroll their daughter in a Czech school. “We accepted her, it was
not a problem, although we did not receive money from the Czech state for her, but
that was no bother … but after a while the German authorities found out … that
she was breaking some law by going to a Czech school and not being educated in
the territory of the German state. So, they said she was breaking the law and they
were going to take her out of their custody. Her dad took a sleeping bag and went
to the Ministry of Education in Dresden and said that he was going to strike at the
Ministry until they allowed her to study there … well, they eventually allowed it.
So, the girl graduated from a Czech school. They didn’t care which kind of school
she was going to, they just wanted to have somebody who would know the Czech
language, because very often the whole family would take their bikes, get on their
Borders and Language. Minor Misunderstandings, Big Troubles, … 87

bikes, and come over here”. This quote aptly shows that if we want to take advantage
of the extraordinary opportunities offered by the proximity of the language border,
we also need extraordinary legislative and administrative conditions to facilitate that.
And that is exactly what Regina Gellrich, head of the Saxon Office, claimed above
in her interview (see p. 68).
Based on our interviews, it is undeniable that the number of cross-border school
exchanges and educational initiatives is limited by the fact that they require intergov-
ernmental agreements. For example, regarding the mass introduction of the immer-
sion method, which involves employing native speakers from across the border, the
fact that pre-school teaching qualifications do not require a university degree in
Germany poses a somewhat paradoxical problem. In the words of Regina Gellrich
of the Saxon Office, “Czech and Polish educators and teachers would be interested
in teaching here if their education was recognized, or otherwise they cannot be
paid. And this is the obstacle we are fighting here, and we want this to change”.
The mayor of a Saxon border town briefly described one such specific case. “The
daughter of a Czech colleague was in our kindergarten for an internship after grad-
uating from high school, and the children liked her very much… Then she went to
study at Charles University and when she came back to join us, it turned out that
her studies could not be recognized, and she would have to study here again. That
was really unfortunate, because in practical terms it worked very well. It’s a real
challenge … on the one hand, we all cheer ‘welcome to Europe’, but then we don’t
recognize the completion of university studies…” (INF7). This raises the question
of whether language (including immersion) education programs that socialize pre-
school children to understand the language and culture of their neighbors could (or
should) operate under the umbrella of European Groupings for Territorial Cooper-
ation (EGTCs), i.e., projects with cross-border legal status. In fact, the cross-border
schools association Schkola, which was founded 15 years ago, is striving (according
to its founding charter) to acquire cross-border legal status. But apparently, it is still
hampered by legislative obstacles.
Another barrier to a more massive impact of education in the language and culture
of one’s neighbors is funding through short-term (mostly 3 years) projects. Such
system entails many gaps and projects usually lack sufficient continuity in between
them. “Hard-established projects, contacts, and good intentions are very often inter-
rupted because of a lack of funding”. According to Regina Gellrich, for education
in the language (and culture) of one’s neighbors, it would be very beneficial for
long-term impact and sustainability if continuous financial support were provided.
Part of this lack of continuity created by the short time frames of the projects is
also the considerable expenditure of human and time resources on the processing
of applications, final reports, and other administrative tasks. At the same time, the
financial burden of cross-border cooperation platforms—within the framework of
national budgets—is small and negligible. “We are not talking about sums that would
bankrupt the state. And if something is available on a continuous basis, and if there
is a fixed dedication from the government that ‘we are funding this’, then there is a
different motivation to do it, because then it has real value” (Regina Gellrich).
88 K. B. Müller and L. Fráně

The Language Competence Centre in Freyung, Bavaria, which was set up between
2017 and 2019 as part of the project of the same name, is also an example of the
short-termism and low effectiveness of three-year funding frameworks. This Centre
aimed at strengthening language competences and offered educational support to
schools and kindergartens in the Czech-Bavarian cross-border area. However, in
the follow-up (again three-year) project Common Language—Common Future, the
whole initiative had to be (in some way) innovated, so the target groups were partly
changed, and kindergartens were no longer included. This is a great pity, as the
pre-school age is the most suitable age for acquiring language competences. One
can only hope that the three years of personal as well as didactic support provided
by the Centre will enable some kindergartens to commence deeper and more lasting
changes in the understanding of the language and culture of their neighbors. However,
to achieve more significant linguistic and cultural adaptive changes towards a certain
degree of functional bilingualism in the border areas, which is certainly a difficult
and relatively distant (but not utopian) goal, more permanent financial and political
support would clearly be needed, which is precisely what Regina Gellrich, a head of
the Centre, is calling for.
Another obstacle to a more robust impact and a more strategic approach towards
the education in the language and culture of one’s neighbors is the lack of continuity
between the different levels of education. “In Zittau, for example, there is a school
where all the children learn Czech from the first grade and all the children come out
of the fourth grade with knowledge of Czech, and then the next step, the children
go to the gymnasium and in the gymnasium, they start again with Czech from the
sixth grade, but from scratch. This is the problem, these gaps…We have many places
where there is a kindergarten, but no school, then again there are places where there
is a school and no kindergarten, where Polish or Czech is taught. So, there is still
a lot of work to be done here. And one of our goals or our vision is to work on the
fact that there is a general educational axis, a lineage, so that there is at least that
possibility, kindergarten, and school” (Regina Gellrich).

10 Lack of Interest Versus European Citizenship,

or Wanting to Belong to That Environment

We have already discussed the clinging of nation-states to their educational monop-

olies as a deficit of European citizenship. The monopolization of education systems
is directly linked to another major obstacle to the development of active borders,
namely the lack of interest in what is happening beyond the borders. As one project
manager of the Bavarian part of the Šumava Euroregion complained, little interest
in the language (and culture) of their Czech neighbors is a problem for them. “The
borders don’t really exist as such anymore, but it’s still not a reason for most Germans
or Bavarians to say ‘yeah, I’m going to go there’. Sure, the gas station was always
attractive, it’s cheaper there and we go there for some of that economic advantage,
Borders and Language. Minor Misunderstandings, Big Troubles, … 89

but not to get to know the people and the country”. She even mentioned a hard-to-
believe case where a boy was surprised after a trip to the Czech Republic that people
farther inland did not have Asian features, as his only experience of the Czechs had
been visits to Vietnamese border markets. “And he really must have thought that Asia
begins in the Czech Republic, or I don’t know”, she summarized cluelessly. Also, a
participant in the language program (Gastschuljahr) from Untergriesbach, Bavaria,
who took part in a two-week stay at the gymnasium in Plasy in spring 2016, was
astonished that “after announcing that I would take part in this program, I received
mainly negative feedback from the neighborhood because, to put it simply, there is
often very little interest in the neighboring Czech Republic” (Euroregio, 2016: 42).
This brings us to the question of how (and why?) to awaken or strengthen interest in
the culture (and language) of one’s neighbors.
One understands the reasons why German children (or rather their parents) prefer
Spanish or French to Czech. In addition, the Bavarian part of the Šumava Euroregion,
for example, is more advantageously situated for cross-border cooperation with the
Austrian part of the Euroregion, with which it is connected by seamless linguistic
permeability and slightly easier transport links. Nevertheless, one cannot help but
sense—like the quoted employee of the Bavarian Euroregion—a certain disdain,
or a certain moral deficit, which is also part of the unequal status of neighboring
languages. This founds in fact a kind of deficit of European citizenship.
Notwithstanding the positive effects of active borders discussed above, which,
thanks to diversity and cultural encounters, strengthens the capacity for self-
reflection, public learning and human creativity, the demand for interest in what is
happening on the other side can also be defended based on the (Aristotelian) ethical
argument discussed above, which in conditions of global risks also takes on global,
transnational, European dimensions. Interest in what is happening on the other side of
the border, i.e., not only in language and culture, but also in the opinions, interests,
and reasoning of one’s neighbors, can be seen as an expression of civil responsi-
bility for “both sides” of the border, as a manifestation of genuine Europeanism
and a horizontal form of Europeanisation. Ulrich Beck, whose analyses of border
transformations are among the most impressive, spoke—in the context of globalized
modernity—about the end of others and the end of local conflicts. During the last
three decades, nearly every important function of the border has been challenged.
As the unintended consequences of human action and behavior increase, so does
everyone’s responsibility for the environment in which they live. In the twenty-first
century, the border can no longer define the limits of human responsibility for the
world in which humans live. Just as a river cannot be divided into several parts but
must be cared for from source to mouth.
The ethical dimension of a border, which in border studies is often underestimated
(Paasi et al., 2019), was interestingly pitched by the headmaster of the school in
Hrádek and Nisou when he described an inspiring case of a German family who
sent their two children to a Czech school. “For them, the border didn’t really exist,
because they wanted to belong to this environment here and they didn’t care whether
they speak Czech or German. They didn’t know that much Czech, they wanted to
learn it, so they were willing to pay a private teacher to come to their home and to
90 K. B. Müller and L. Fráně

teach them Czech. They put the girl in [the Czech school in Hrádek nad Nisou], and
then they also put their son in, they had about six or seven children”. Their motivation
to learn Czech was simply driven by a desire to belong to this environment.
A very similar ethical dimension of the linguistic border and a need for its disman-
tling was boldly formulated by a German mother in the documentary film Encounters-
Begrenzte Begegnungen, made by students of cultural anthropology (Prochnow &
Buschmann, 2004). “Our motivation to learn Czech was quite simple … intuitive….
we are children of traditional borders, and we need Czech when we go on a trip or do
something [in Czechia] and then we are simply mute [the Czechia name for German
is ‘Muters’]; this should not happen to our children; it is important that they are able
to speak and get along”.
Simply put, today we find ourselves in a situation in which we can no longer afford
to have any border excluding people from this environment, to be muted or ignored.
This claim that people from over the border are treated as equal and legitimate
partners in a public debate is one of the fundamental characteristics of the European
public and a key requirement of European citizenship (Müller, 2014; Risse, 2010).
The border, which once referred to the periphery or to a corner of the (national) public
sphere, has now become a pivotal part of a European public sphere. Borders used to
be a mechanism for social exclusion, for confining social actions. But today borders
become a natural part of social interaction and an opportunity for a new quality of
social encounters and relationships. The European internal cross-borderlands are, due
to historical traumas, challenges, and opportunities, the real heart of Europe. The vast
majority our 52 informants of our survey firmly demonstrated that everyday cross-
border activities and cooperation represent the genuine cornerstone of European
integration and the key to a secure, civil, and free future for Europe.
A lack of interest and reticence towards neighbors clearly show a certain deficit of
European citizenship. Stronger political and institutional support is needed to over-
come this. Early socialization and education of young children towards the language
(and culture) of their neighbors is the most reliable, but a very long-term strategy.
The impact of these early educational or socialization methods on adults is also not
negligible. When kids are opening their minds and hearts, parents might follow.
Another strategy to increase interest in the culture and language of one’s neighbors,
a strategy with a more immediate impact and which also targets adults, is to create
conditions of linguistic comfort on both sides of the border. A generous linguistic
hospitality, not only in the form of signs, but also a variety of multilingual services,
including guides and tours in, let us say, museums, libraries, memorial, castles,
and other sites, is undoubtedly a reasonable attempt to stimulate interest in your
neighbors from the other side of the border. In the following, we will focus on the
issue of linguistic hospitality.
Borders and Language. Minor Misunderstandings, Big Troubles, … 91

11 Linguistic Hospitality. Notes on the Landscape’s

Europeanization

The issue of linguistic hospitality is an important prerequisite for strengthening

symbolic cross-border ties that work in favor of European belonging and European
identity. This argument is often underestimated, and therefore linguistic hospitality
is not consistently fulfilled. Provisions of linguistic hospitality can take different
forms. The simplest way, which the EU Commission rightly insists on, is to accom-
pany local and educational signs or other memorable plaques in the neighboring
languages from the other side of the border. It is a seemingly small thing. Perhaps
its impact is not so significant in terms of intensity, but it is certainly huge in terms
of its scope. It enables all citizens from the other side (we feel it inappropriate here
to use the term foreigners) to orient themselves linguistically, and to settle, however
superficially and temporarily, into the landscape of their neighbors. For an attempt
to increase an interest in the culture and language of one’s neighbors, this is a unique
opportunity that should not be left to lie fallow.
The question of linguistic hospitality, as well as the linguistic status and asym-
metry, should also be seen under the prism of the symbolic meaning of language as a
constitutive element of collective identity. Nevertheless, the psychological impact at
the level of individual identity is also important. Generally, people want to be able to
understand things, and when they do, it contributes to the feelings of personal comfort
and gratification. These are important for social inclusion. The installation of multi-
lingual signs or plaques may be a seemingly small thing, but the social construction
of national territory and the relationship to landscape has played an important role
in nation-building processes, perhaps everywhere in Europe. Romantic literature,
poetry, or paintings, as well as romantic philosophy and other humanities, combined
the rise of national sentiment with the worship of landscape. That is why Gellner
(1997) argued that the denationalization of European societies should follow the path
of de-territorialization of nationalism, and a certain de-fetishization of landscape. By
deconstructing the linguistic monopoly of the landscape and imbedding it with the
neighboring languages, the landscape also becomes hospitable to those from the
other side of the border. This is one way to partially fulfill Gellner’s claim.
There is a deeper symbolism in “inhabiting” the landscape with the neighboring
language than might appear at first glance. For many European nations—including
Czechs, Germans, and Poles—language has become the most important objective
feature of national belonging. During the processes of democratization that accom-
panied the rise of modern nationalism, language ceased to be seen as a mere tool
of communication. It became a kind of sacred idol (Rádl, 1993), or in the words of
Anthony Giddens (1991), a binding symbolic token that (naturally as well as arbi-
trarily) attributed to people their collective identities. Language was dis-embedding
people’s identity, as well as re-embedding masses of people into the imaginary of
national societies. This was in an age when reading newspaper, as Benedict Anderson
(2006) aptly (with reference to Hegel) noted, replaced the morning prayer.
92 K. B. Müller and L. Fráně

The demarcation of “our” territory was therefore also carried by linguistic demar-
cation, nationalization, and de-nationalization, which disembedded people (often
against their will) from social ties that had been formed over many generations.
Even in mountainous areas like Šumava, where people had long been resistant to the
nationalist rampage, and where “they lived together peacefully, and no one thought to
ask about the other’s nationality; no person was Czechized or Germanized” (Kloster-
mann, 1986: 89). As we read in the prose of Karel Klostermann, the famous writer
of the Šumava mountains, in the harsh conditions of the mountains people had to be
able to work together, regardless of language. As Klostermann adds with obvious
exaggeration, the highlanders did not speak much anyway, and their vocabulary was
limited to survival issues, which had to be understood in both (German and Czech)
mountain languages. The credibility of Klostermann’s descriptions was reified by
the mayor (Václav Vostradovský) of Kvilda, a mountain village, that the local people
“were always connected with the hard work here in Šumava, and they had no time
in those pre-war times, they rather inclined to social democrats, here there wasn’t
much room for nationalism”.
Incidentally, the work and the character of Karel Klostermann himself are
extremely inspiring in their appeal that, in environmental and social issues, it is
“the time to embark on the return journey”. His indomitable conviction that “us from
up hills and the green forests, we need a white book of understanding and not a
yellow book of hatred, because we all want to enjoy God’s nature, whether we are
Germans or Czechs” seems to have been a century ahead of its time. By the so-called
yellow book of hatred, Klostermann refers to tourist books that were allegedly filled
with “bilious expressions of proclaimed ethnic hostility”, which angered Kloster-
mann beyond words. “After all, Šumava belongs to all of us, and when a Frenchman
or anyone else comes, let him rejoice too, unless, of course, he wouldn’t shed bloody
tears over the sad devastation of the past years and over the petty people who, even
when they go to the most magnificent of all temples, the temple of nature, cannot
leave their hatred at home” (Klostermann, 1986: 89). However, the Šumava moun-
tains were also not ultimately spared of a national fury that escalated gradually. In
September 1908 in Bergreichenstein (in Czech Kašperské Hory), the administrative
and juridical center of the mountains, an open rift broke out between the German and
Czech residents. In 1890, this juridical district reported 7,356 inhabitants of Czech
and 9,585 of German language. During these riots, Czech inscriptions were being
torn down, and some Czech residents were beaten. A German innkeeper who was
trying to disarm one of the Czech gendarmes suffered a fatal injury (Judson, 2006:
177; Nikrmajer, 2003).
In 1913, we read in a prestigious Review for Science, Art, and Social Life,
published in Prague (then under the editorship of Tomáš G. Masaryk, later the
Czech president), that “the Czech and German press carried the news that the Czech
community of Neuraz had applied for the establishment of a German school. Great
indignation in the Czech camp over national ignorance…. The inhabitants of Neuraz
belong to the seasonal emigrants, the ‘worldlings’ who leave for Bavaria and Saxony
in the spring and here they feel the lack of German severely. Out of this social need
of theirs came their unreasonable request” (Naše doba, 1913: 377). A similar, but a
Borders and Language. Minor Misunderstandings, Big Troubles, … 93

more generalizing diction, was found in a quotation from the 1905 annual report of
the Czech Educational Association (Ústřední matice školská), which was empow-
ered with the authority to protect Czech language and culture. “We are indeed not far
from the truth when we say that the greatest damage to our nationality was caused by
those who preferred foreign culture over education in the Czech language… To put a
stop to these efforts to de-nationalize, whatever the reasons, our nation has imposed a
defensive unity” (Rádl, 1993: 187). Social and economic needs here are quite openly
and consciously contrasted, as we would say today, with populist identity claims.
The contradiction of the principles of “national consciousness” and “social needs”
aptly captures the retarding effect of the awakening movement of ethno-linguistic
nationalism.
In the Central European conditions, the linguistic inhabitation of the landscape
thus represents a secular analogue of the religionization of the landscape, which refers
to a specific relationship between the landscape, the inhabitants, and their transcen-
dental values (Jeřábek et al., 2021; Knippenberg, 2005). The linguistic sacraliza-
tion of the landscape may be symbolically more significant if the landscape has
been historically subjected—as indeed happened in the Euroregions of Nisa and
Šumava—to a violent de-religionization. This was also the case of all areas that saw
the displacement of ethnic Germans. Lower levels of religiosity are still evident in
the re-settled border areas of Moravia and Bohemia (Havlíček & Klingorová, 2018),
where the destruction of churches and chapels was more frequent after 1945 than
in the Czech inland (see Figs. 5 and 6). Thus, the Czech border areas after 1948
registered both a significant loss and a significant proportion of unmaintained sacral
buildings (Havlíček & Hubková, 2008).

Fig. 5 Destroyed churches and chapels between 1948 and 1989 (Source Havlíček & Hubková,
2008)
94 K. B. Müller and L. Fráně

Fig. 6 Religiosity of municipalities in 2011 (Source Jeřábek et al., 2021, from CSU data)

Similar sacred symbolism of the Europeanized landscape is also reflected in deco-

rating public spaces with (national, regional, municipal, associational, etc.) symbols
and signs that make reference to our neighbors or partners from across the border.
Hrádek nad Nisou, a town in the Czech borderland, is a good example. In front of the
Town Hall, five flags fly on an unmissable column. The lobby of the town hall is also
decorated with the emblems of the twin towns (Saxon Zittau and Polish Bogatynia).
These symbolic cross-border emblems break the stereotypically accepted conception
of the border as a supposedly natural border of one country, one people, one culture,
and one government. Publicly displaying symbols of one’s neighbors announces that
interests, opinions, and perspectives of the partners from across the border are natu-
rally considered and become an integral part of finding domestic interests, opinions,
and perspectives. The vice-mayor of Hrádek nad Nisou expressed it quite explicitly
in her interview (see Fig. 7).
Cross-border tourism is also an effective means of strengthening linguistic comfort
and a trigger as well as a carrier of active borders. Tourists are visitors, not foreigners.
Especially if they return repeatedly to the same place. They come of their own
free will, they are interested. Tourism can, of course, have severe negative effects.
However, local cross-border tourism has many positives, and one of its positive
consequences is the breaking down of mental borders, as Silvia Gullich, director of
the Tourist Information Centre in Zittau made it clear in her interview. As a result
of local cross-border tourism, cross-border linguistic syncretism is strengthened and
the linguistic comfort of speakers from both (all) sides of the border is enhanced
(Dołzbłasz, 2017; Novotný & Reitinger, 2020). At the very least, linguistic discomfort
is eroded, and situations of linguistic alienation towards people (and landscape) from
the other side of the border attenuate. As pointed out by Slawomir Banazsak, a long-
time participant in cross-border cooperation from Jelenia Gora, Poland, who has
been involved in professional cooperation in collecting statistical data, “It is easy
Borders and Language. Minor Misunderstandings, Big Troubles, … 95

Fig. 7 Town Hall and square in Hrádek nad Nisou (Note Hrádek nad Nisou is a town located near
the Czech-German-Polish corner. After the Second World War, the German-speaking population
was displaced from these areas. According to the former vice-mayor, today locals look at things
from several perspectives. This is symbolically illustrated by the five flags—township flag, German,
Czech, Polish, and European Union flag—placed in front of the Hrádek nad Nisou Town Hall. This
town is an excellent example that borders can work as a key source of progress)

for a Pole to speak in a shop or hotel in the Czech Republic, but to visit a castle or
chateau in Czech is already a problem … and if there was a possibility to take a tour
[the talk was about the Chateau of Frýdlant in North Bohemia] in Polish, many Poles
would take advantage of such an opportunity”, he said. The interview with Slawomir
took place in the spring of 2018, and as he told us in our later communication, in
the coming seasons, the Frýdlant Castle did indeed provide tours in Polish, which he
welcomed with appreciation. Certainly not only him.
Our interviews, as well as our own experience, show that the situation in Upper
Lusatia in Saxony, where Czechs like to go swimming (Olbernsdorf Lake) or cycling,
or on the Bavarian slopes of the southern Bavarian/Bohemian Forest, which are full
of Czech tourists, shows signs of partial cross-border linguistic intermingling or
diffusion (see chapter “Active Borders and the Europeanisation of the Public Sphere.
How the Same Can Be Different and Vice Versa”, footnote 4). Such situation provides
a monolingual visitor some linguistic comfort. During our research, when we visited
Zittau, Dresden or the Bavarian border region, we repeatedly found ourselves being
served in shops or other services in Czech. Often, there were Czechs working locally,
but not exclusively. On a few occasions, we spoke Czech with native (more likely to
be young) Germans who had a decent command of Czech language. These were very
specific situations, of course, but they point to the general premise of how linguistic
intermingling can support the development of active borders. Such borders contribute
to a cross-border regionalization that benefits the people on both sides of the border
(Fig. 8).
96 K. B. Müller and L. Fráně

Fig. 8 An example of linguistic comfort for Czech skiers at the ticket office of the ski lift in
Mitterdorf, Bavaria (Photo by Karel B. Müller)

12 Summary, or If We Lose This, We Lose a Lot of Our

Humanity

In this chapter, we have sought to understand the obstacles that hinder managing
and treating active borders. We focused on the linguistic barrier, which is by far—in
the perception of cross-border agents—the most significant obstacle to cross-border
cooperation. We stressed the problem of the high degree of asymmetry in language
use, administrative-legislative obstacles and difficulties resulting from little interest
in the language and culture of one’s neighbors from across the border. Language is an
essential element of individual identity. The ability to communicate effectively is a
key prerequisite for the formation of positive identities. Such identities tend to be open
and complementary and form preconditions for sound cross-border relationships and
productive cooperation.
The significance of the language barrier must be seen not only at the level of the
practical significance of language (as a communication tool), but also at the level
of symbolic significance. Language is a constitutive element of collective identity
and the medium of mutual (and neighborly) recognition. In liberal and democratic
societies, both these levels play an important role. It is reasonable to assume that the
asymmetry of language use, however understandable and justifiable it may be in some
Borders and Language. Minor Misunderstandings, Big Troubles, … 97

cases, constitutes a significant barrier for cross-border cooperation and integration.

Linguistically permeable cross-border areas, characterized by symmetry in the use
of neighboring languages and by a linguistic hospitality, contributes significantly
to the transformation of solidarity and belonging, to the reconstruction of collective
identities and a feeling of being at home. We believe that without this transformation,
it will be impossible to maintain legitimate and efficient pan-European institutions.
We have also sought to understand the challenges (i.e., not only the risks, but also
the opportunities) that the proximity of the language border offers. We surveyed and
critically evaluated concrete initiatives and institutions that are trying to work towards
breaking down the language barrier. Some of these presented institutions presented
what we perceive as examples of good practices. The proximity of a different
linguistic context proved to be a quite extraordinary opportunity to look at one’s
own culture and language through the eyes of “foreign” neighbors. Indeed, knowl-
edge of other languages and cultures expands the ability to see the world with fresh
eyes, enhances critical thinking, develops skills of self-reflection, and strengthens the
capacity for empathy too. As the famous (Czech) saying goes, the more languages
you know, the more human you are. All this creates a certain immunization against
uncritically succumbing to simplistic labeling and dangerous stereotypes.
Border areas are well-suited to introducing children, through immersion (or other
experiential learning methods), to the language and culture of their neighbors from
across the border, with whom they are connected not only by their Europeanness, but
also by a shared cross-border space offering opportunities to deal more productively
with common challenges and risks. Programs to socialize children in the language
of their neighbors, in the form of various school exchanges and the employment of
native speakers, are probably the most reliable method of strengthening active borders
and weakening prejudices, undue demarcation, and the risks of mutual alienation.
Of course, student exchanges are an expression of an already existing interest (of
children and mainly parents), but schools could (and should) play a more significant
role in initiating interest in the culture and language of their neighbors. It is far
from being just about language teaching. Encouraging an interest in their neighbors
should cut across school subjects. We imagine something like an Erasmus exchange
program for lower levels of education. If there were stronger political support for
such programs, including the political will to weaken legislative and bureaucratic
barriers, the impact of cross-border cooperation between preschools and schools
could be much more robust in the medium and long term than it is today. Both
the scope and intensity of cross-border cooperation between educational institutions
should be developed and further strengthened, and political (not only from the EU)
support for various forms of cross-border cooperation (school exchanges, summer
schools, sports competitions, professional seminars, student parliaments cooperation,
etc.) should be more encouraged. The support should not only be directed to border
areas, but also to partner towns further inland.
It also turned out that while on the Saxon side of the Nisa Euroregion, a deci-
sive tone such as “since I live near the Czech border, I should know the language
of my neighbors” (Jungnickel, 2017) was more often heard, while on the Bavarian
and Austrian side of the Šumava Euroregion, interest in Czech language and culture
98 K. B. Müller and L. Fráně

is probably more of an exception confirming the rule. The Language Competence

Centre, which has only recently (in 2017) been established in Freyung, Bavaria,
as well as the follow-up program Common Language—Common Future, is clearly
motivated by the desire to break down this entrenched asymmetry in the use of neigh-
boring languages. They confidently claim on their website that “fears about neigh-
borly language acquisition will gradually be removed”. Our research has shown that
these hope-invoking aspirations are rather counterfactual in the case of Bavaria and
Lower Austria. Much civic effort, political support, and time will still be needed
for this aspiration to materialize. But even elsewhere in the cross-border Eurore-
gions of Nisa and Šumava that we examined, early education in the language of
their neighbors is far from commonplace. Nevertheless, the diversity of committed
actors in individual kindergartens or schools and the numerous institutional cases of
good practice create promising potential for these cross-border regions to sustainably
utilize the extraordinary opportunities of multilingual education in the future.
It is also an undeniable truth, based on our interviews, that the number of cross-
border school exchanges and educational initiatives is limited by the fact that they
require intergovernmental agreements. In short, nation-states seek to protect their
educational monopolies. However understandable and historically justified this effort
may be, it is based on a rather atavistic concept of national education. Such education
contradicts the contemporary needs for transnational coping with global threats, but
also the needs for dealing in safe and productive manners with one’s own national
past (this topic will be discussed in the next chapter). Simply put, the fundamental
clinging to the educational monopolies of nation-states runs counter to European
interests, needs, and values.
The claim for extraordinary political and institutional support, which would help
in creating extraordinary conditions for education in the language and culture of
one’s neighbors, can also be defended at the two other levels of argumentation.
These two levels have not been discussed in the preceding analysis, as they reach
beyond presented research, as well as the authors’ expertise. However, it would be
a pity to omit them altogether. The first level of possible argumentation for multi-
lingual education is based on the findings of neuropsychology. Much research has
provided partial evidence that bilingualism, in short, benefits human health. Mainly
by promoting the creation of so-called cognitive reserve, which reduces the risk of
cognitive disorders such as dementia or Alzheimer’s disease (Costumero et al., 2020;
Spitzer, 2014).
The second level of the argument for stronger support of bilingual education (not
only in cross-border regions) is related to the fundamental problem in (and certainly
not only) the Czech education system. Experts have been pointing out many of
them for several decades. Thanks to the repeated closure of schools during 2020,
they have also become fully visible to the general parental public. The immersion
method could spontaneously compensate for many of the shortcomings of many
European education systems. Most parents would probably agree that schools should
encourage curiosity and self-confidence in children, foster creativity, skills of self-
expression, as well as a sense of responsibility and respect for others. Nevertheless,
it is a disheartening fact that many European education systems fail to systematically
Borders and Language. Minor Misunderstandings, Big Troubles, … 99

develop in children many of these skills. This task thus lies largely on the shoulders
of leisure activities and (of course!) the family. It can certainly be argued that this is
a very general and simplistic judgment, and yet there are numerous exceptions and
many efforts to reverse this unfortunate situation. We agree. However, the proximity
of the linguistic border offers quite extraordinary opportunities for children’s natural
curiosity to be supported by discovering linguistic and ethnic diversity that lie on
their doorsteps. Education systems should be imbued with an understanding of and
respect for cultural diversity, with a sense of pluralism and the capacity to get along
with others who are different, and yet fundamentally the same. Such a school would
be a true workshop of humanity.
After all, the claim of active borders and cross-border regionalization could be
perceived not only as a precious resource, but also as a European test of humanity.
The experience of a linguistically diverse border region as an experience of a certain
ideal of humanity was aptly described in our interview by Ute Wunderlich, chair of
the Schkola cross-border network of schools. When discussing her fragile vision, she
used a conditional tense that revealed both her concern and hope at the same time.
“I’d like to have a vision that it will grow again and come together like before the First
World War, as I know from history books. I wish there was even more permeability.
Realistically, I can see that borders may be built again, and that would be a great
shame for our region. I like it when I am shopping in Görlitz and I have Polish and
Czech around me, or here in Zittau I can talk to Czechs when shopping. And if we
lose this, we lose a lot from our humanity”.
Borders and Memory. From Historical
Roots to Dialogical-Like Routes

Kamil Fleissner and Karel B. Müller

“It is good to try to revive the past, but it usually ends up in mayhem”, said an offi-
cial of the European Territorial Cooperation Department of the Czech Ministry of the
Interior, when asked about cross-border cooperation projects aimed at weakening the
historical burden (INF3). Such a statement illustrates very well some of the funda-
mental dilemmas associated with the implementation of cross-border cooperation
in the context of the so-called memory fever (Boyd, 2008; Huyssen, 2003; Bond &
Rapson, 2014). This concept refers to an increase of moral appeals to revive the past
and to rethink the policies of collective memory and construction of national histor-
ical canons, which are also newly determined by processes of trans-nationalization
and Europeanization.1 In this context, Aleida Assmann speaks of a stage of thawing
frozen memories that began with the end of the Cold War. Its underlying ideological
polarization prevented the differentiation of collective narratives and hindered the
critical public discovering of the past and memories, including, for example, memo-
ries of the post-war displacement of ethnic Germans from Czechoslovakia or Poland
(Assmann 2007; Kreisslová 2016).
How should the conflicting past be reflected in these new conditions so that it
is not a source of conflicts between mutual memories and therefore not an obstacle
for developing cross-border cooperation? Would it be more conducive for the devel-
opment of cross-border cooperation to draw a thick line under the shadows of the
past and start from scratch, or would it better to try to deal with the past and rethink

1 See, e.g., Levy and Sznaider, 2002; Passerini, 2002; Delanty and Rumford, 2005; Assmann, 2007,

2010; Graves and Rechniewski, 2010; Levy et al. 2011; Breuer, 2014; Pakier and Wawrzyniak,
2016; Kucia, 2016.

K. Fleissner
Supreme Audit Office of the Czech Republic, Jankovcova 1518, Prague, Czech Republic
e-mail: [email protected]
K. B. Müller (B)
CEVRO Institute, Jungmannova 17, Prague, Czech Republic
e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 101
K. B. Müller (ed.), Active Borders in Europe, Contributions to Political Science,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-23773-7_5
102 K. Fleissner and K. B. Müller

it—to make a barrier of historical trauma an opportunity for cooperation and public
learning? And could the development of cross-border cooperation reciprocally be
a source of reconciliation of conflicting memories and the formation of an open
cross-border community of memory (Beattie, 2007)?
The intention of the following chapter is to try to understand how the key actors of
cross-border cooperation in the trilateral Euroregions of Nisa and Šumava perceive
the above issues. The assumption is that promoters of cross-border cooperation (i.e.,
mayors, representatives of Euroregions and ministries, representatives of the civil
society, educational institutions, or the business sector) contribute—often for prag-
matic2 reasons—by treating active borders (Müller, 2018) to the development of
self/critical reflection on the past and to so-called dialogical remembering (Assmann,
2010). We also assume that such cross-border exercise in reflection on conflicting
memories reciprocally contributes to the further strengthening and consolidation of
cross-border relationships in the two Euroregions.
However, the assumption that local elites prioritize—at least compared to the
population average—a self/critical reflection on their own past is not entirely self-
evident, and previous research on this issue in the borderlands of Western and Central
Europe has brought equivocal conclusions (Törnquist-Plewa, 2016; Houžvička, 2010;
Verheyen, 1993). At the same time, some studies point to significant local differences
in perceptions of (not only) elites of contentious past, as well as to the changing
dynamics of relationships to the past, which initiate the ongoing research and reeval-
uation of the past (Houžvička, 2010).3 There has been a considerable amount of
research from the Czech and Central European environment. In their conclusions, the
challenge of coming to terms with the past is met by the need for cross-border coop-
eration. These studies were mostly anchored in the discursive field of either memory
studies or border studies and were carried out in the context of the accession of
Central European states to the Schengen zone.4 Another interesting project is a series

2 Törnquist-Plewa (2016: 143) points to the fact that the willingness of mayors and other local
elites to self/critically reassess their own national history is reinforced by their pragmatic efforts
to build an international town or city brand, which is perceived in an increasingly globalized and
cosmopolitan European environment as an important prerequisite for attracting investment, tourism
development, and access to resources (subsidies) from institutions such as the EU, UNESCO, the
Council of Europe, etc. The result is the usual adaptation of the principles of European memory
policymaking at the local level and the preference of local elites to pursue a politics of reconciliation.
3 In 2004, the Sociological Institute of the Czech Academy of Science carried out a survey on local

elites in the Czech-German borderlands of the Euroregions of Nisa and Šumava. The subject of the
research was the relationship of local elites to the Sudeten German question. Most of the respondents
accepted the call of the 1997 Declaration on Mutual Czech-German Relations to orient relations
towards future cooperation, including cooperation with Sudeten German organizations with the aim
of the further development of cross-border regions. The study also highlighted differences between
respondents in the Euroregions of Nisa and Šumava. While 67% of the respondents in the Nisa
Euroregion considered an apology as a sufficient way of dealing with the past (i.e., displacement),
only 23% of the respondents in Šumava did so; 14% of the respondents from Nisa were also in favor
of financial compensation for the displaced, but only 3% of the respondents in Šumava (Houžvička,
2010: 177, 178).
4 See, e.g., Kopstein, 1997; Zich, 2001; Houžvička, 2010; Dokoupil et al., 2012; Törnquist-Plewa,

2016; Kreisslová, 2016; Andersen & Törnquist-Plewa et al., 2017; Kovařík, 2019.
Borders and Memory. From Historical Roots to Dialogical-Like Routes 103

of publications published with the support of the Czech civic association Antikom-
plex, which maps the biographical narratives of witnesses of the “depopulation” of
Czech borderlands (Fassl et al., 2015; Traska ed., 2017).
The limitation of most of the referenced studies is a certain lack of perspectives.
They usually present a one-sided position only that does not consider the process of
cross-border reflection on the past. They also usually view conflicting memory as a
barrier to cross-border cooperation, which was temporarily reduced (or increased)
depending on political will or, on the contrary, on the political instrumentalization of
sensitive historical topics (e.g., the so-called Sudeten question). In other words, most
of the previous studies have—quite legitimately—focused on the process of breaking
down historical mental barriers to cross-border cooperation. However, the issue of
the Europeanization of memory itself and the potential formation of a transnational
community of cross-border memory has so far been rather neglected. One of the leit-
motifs of earlier studies, for example, was the issue of so-called heimattourism, i.e.,
the nostalgic return of displaced individuals, or their descendants—heirs to the victim
status (Todorov, 1996)—to their former homes (Bretsschneider, 2018; Törnquist-
Plewa, 2016; Veijola, 2006). Such an approach, which emphasizes the communica-
tive (‘living’) dimension of social memory, understandably finds its justification in
the testimonies of the last witnesses of contested historical events.
The question is whether, in the current conditions of a certain generational turn, it
is not already time to direct more analytical efforts to the ongoing transformation of
communicative memory into institutionalized cultural memory. Such transformation
can be seen as a trigger and motivation for cross-border cooperation (Törnquist-
Plewa, 2016: 148). It can be expected that representatives of the younger generation,
who in recent years have begun to emerge as important carriers of cross-border coop-
eration, will treat the conflicted past with greater emotional and critical distance,
quite possibly with complete apathy. The dominant view of the past through the
lens of personal narratives of witnesses and the nostalgic search for roots, which
anticipates the need to deal with the past, could be replaced (or supplemented) by
efforts to develop an open dialogical remembering with the rise of a new genera-
tion of cross-border cooperation actors. As a result, a new shared memory canon
based on the acknowledgment of the contradictions and plurality of memories may
be formed and institutionalized. Indeed, several cross-border projects, research and
educational activities, newly established civic initiatives and associations that deal
with the conflicted past, as well as open polemics related to the construction of
memorials and sites of memory, anticipate, and often initiate the emergence of such
dialogical remembering (Kreisslová, 2016).
Our approach is fully in line with the so-called trans-cultural turn in memory
studies (Erll et al., 2014). We have asked the question whether and, if so, to what
extent the key actors of cross-border cooperation in the Euroregions of Nisa and
Šumava are real promoters of self/critical dialogical remembering. We addressed
this issue both in our questionnaire survey with mayors from all sides of the two
Euroregions, and in semi-structured interviews with other key actors of cross-border
cooperation. It is worth reiterating that the trilateral Euroregions of Nisa and Šumava
represent, due to the greater complexity of cross-border relations, a suitable choice
104 K. Fleissner and K. B. Müller

for exploring reflection on conflicted past in multilateral settings. These environ-

ments are characterized by greater political, cultural, and socio-economic diversity.
In this sense, the selected trilateral Euroregions resemble an analogous situation with
the EU, and are a kind of laboratory for research on the process of the Europeaniza-
tion of memory at the micro level of everydayness. The conclusions of our study
can also be seen as a contribution to more general discussions on the formation of
transnational memory in cross-border spaces and the search for a shared European
historical narrative. Constructing a European narrative is then unthinkable without
the construction of a European public sphere, or a sphere of European publics (see
chapter “Active Borders and the Europeanisation of the Public Sphere. How the Same
Can Be Different and vice versa”).5

1 Dialogical Remembering as a Prerequisite of Active

Borders

The theoretical discussions on the Europeanization of social memory in border areas

take place against the backdrop of broader debates on (1) the vertical and hori-
zontal Europeanization of the public sphere,6 (2) and on the re/conceptualization of
bordering in the context of globalization and the so-called reflexive modernization
(Beck et al., 1994). The reflexive modernization approach problematized a deeply
embedded dichotomy, borders as either a mere mechanism of division and exclusion
or as a mere space of encounter and enrichment (Balibar, 2002; Eder, 2006; Paasi,
1999; Rumford, 2006; Sohn, 2015). The concept of active borders that is presented
in chapter “Active Borders and the Europeanisation of the Public Sphere. How the
Same Can Be Different and vice versa” offers a suitable conceptual link that critically
reflects both discussed levels (Müller, 2018).
The concept of active borders advocates two basic assumptions that are conducive
to dialogical remembering as a means of dealing with the past. First, it is the assump-
tion of the possibility of differentiation without the necessity of alienation. In this
sense, the active border is a conceptual expression of the topos of “unity in diver-
sity” deeply embedded in the discursive, legislative, and political practice of Euro-
peanization processes (Delanty, 2011). This normative assumption removes political
and symbolic barriers between sameness and otherness that have been embedded

5 See, e.g., Passerini, 2002; Delanty and Rumford, 2005; Jarausch and Lindenberger, 2007;
Assmann, 2007, 2010; Risse, 2010; Levy et al. 2011; Fraser, 2013; Breuer, 2014; Leggewie, 2011;
Törnquist-Plewa, 2016; Kucia, 2016; Müller, 2018.
6 We consider “vertical Europeanisation” to be the top-down shaping of the European public sphere,

i.e., as an intention of European policies. We use the term “horizontal Europeanisation” to refer to
the process of mutual communication and socialization, primarily in cross-border areas, in line with
sociological discourse. However, it should be considered that the vertical formation of a singular
European public sphere and the horizontal Europeanization of public spheres are different, but
largely synergistic processes (for more, see chapter “Active Borders and the Europeanisation of the
Public Sphere. How the Same Can Be Different and vice versa”).
Borders and Memory. From Historical Roots to Dialogical-Like Routes 105

by modern nation-states. It also allows this sameness and otherness to coexist in

symbiosis—no longer with barriers—and sees them as necessary sources of onto-
logical certainty and positive identity (Hall, 1996; Müller, 2007).7 In an analogous
context, Emanuel Levinas uses the concept of proper distance to signify the need for
a balance between the ontological certainty of collective identity, on the one hand,
and the cognitive openness to cultural encounters with the unknown, on the other
(see Wessels, 2008). While differentiation is seen in this vein as the desirable and
mutable outcome of cognitive openness and communication that is free from bias
and reluctance to understand each other, alienation is the product of a delimitation
towards others that is based on stereotyping and mutual polarization.
A prime example of such a clash is the language policies implemented within a
shared cross-border discursive space, which on the one hand seek to overcome the
language barrier, but on the other hand do not seek linguistic unification (Rumelili,
2004: 428). As we have shown in the previous chapter in the case of the immersion
method of teaching the language of neighbors, the language policies can seek unity
(shared communicative tool) while preserving diversity (linguistic plurality). They
usually reject the homogenizing impacts caused by the dominance of English and
promote education towards multilingualism, which can also become a source of iden-
tity for the people of cross-border regions. For example, Kaspar Sammer, managing
director of the Bavarian part of the Šumava Euroregion, commented on this by saying
that while English enables effective communication, it also—in contrast to knowl-
edge of neighboring languages—hinders authentic understanding and “bringing
people and their hearts together”. Here comes the second important assumption
of active borders, which is directly related to the first. It would be naïve to think
that it is possible to completely erase or overcome borders, which are a constitutive
source of difference and thus of identity and the experience of home (Müller, 2018).
In recent decades, the field of border studies saw a theoretical dispute between
proponents of the hypothesis of a borderless world (Ohmae, 1990; O’Dowd, 2010)
and proponents of the hypothesis of ubiquitous borders (Balibar, 2002; Paasi, 1999;
Sohn, 2015). The former position accentuates the dissolution of borders under the
influence of globalization processes. The latter position understands borders in a
more processual and elastic way as bordering processes that are part of everyday
communication and discursive practice and not necessarily linked to a politically
defined territoriality. However, the processes of the dissolution of political borders
and delimitation occur synergistically and complement each other. The fact that
political borders lose their territorial support in the context of globalization, or that
soft and hard borders become disconnected again (see Eder, 2006), does not mean
that delimitation itself disappears. The confluence of these processes invokes the
need to rethink tense relations between the identarian need to distinguish certain
social groups and their mutual cognitive openness.

7 The terms are explained in the previous text: for ontological certainty, see p. 22 (footnote 5), and
for positive identity, see chapter “Active Borders and the Europeanisation of the Public Sphere.
How the Same Can Be Different and vice versa” pp. 18–20.
106 K. Fleissner and K. B. Müller

It seems obvious that social communities can hardly exist without some distinction
and delimitation (Booth, 1999: 253, 254). Such delimitation, however, can be active
and permeable on both sides, and (even if only) temporarily stabilized in a particular
context. The active border, which we place in opposition to the passive border, refers
to a symbolic bordering, whose defining features—relevant to the topic of coming to
terms with the past—are in particular (1) the formation of positive and complemen-
tary identities (Erikson, 1982) based on the civil code of collective identity (Shils,
1975); (2) preferring integration over exclusion; (3) preferring discursive strategies
of differentiating others, rather than discrediting them (van Dijk, 2005: 30); (4) a
superiority of critical knowledge and moral openness over naturalized knowledge
and stereotyping; (5) an orientation towards so-called life politics (Giddens, 1991),
rather than identity politics; and (6) an orientation towards the future, rather than the
past (see Table 1 in chapter “Active Borders and the Europeanisation of the Public
Sphere. How the Same Can Be Different and vice versa”). Treating active borders
defined in this way contributes to the formation of a transnational community with
mutually porous borders that relativizes and reconciles, but does not at the same time
abolish, the distinctions between us and them, inside and outside (Müller, 2018).
Let us now turn our attention to the issue of dealing with the past. Alongside the
dichotomy between the ideal types of active and passive border, we can interpret
either a reflexive (critical and exemplary) or a nonreflexive (noncritical and literal)
form. While the first case promotes a future-oriented construction of mutual relations
between two or more social groups, the second case subordinates the present to the
past and thus undermines the development of active borders. To elaborate and further
problematize this simplistic binary distinction, we utilized Aleida Assmann’s (2010)
classification of four models of dealing with the past. She talks about the following
models: (1) dialogic forgetting, (2) remembering in order to prevent forgetting, (3)
remembering in order to forget, and (4) dialogical remembering. Aleida Assmann
derives these models mainly from the German experience of dealing with collective
guilt after the Second World War. She sees them primarily in a diachronic trajec-
tory, i.e., as a certain phase—from dialogical forgetting to dialogical remembering.
However, the given models can be further elaborated and translated into a synchronic
plane as well, which makes it possible to use them to compare the simultaneous
perspectives of the bearers of cross-border cooperation on the past. To operationalize
and reinterpret these models for the purposes of our analysis and to adapt them to
the specific context of cross-border cooperation, we have defined them based on two
interlinked criteria (see Fig. 1); firstly, the criterion of the mode of communication
in relation to those others, i.e., whether the attitude towards the past is perceived
(by the actors of cross-border cooperation) as a monological (unilateral/national) or
dialogical (multilateral/cross-border) category; and secondly, the criterion of memory
self/reflection and the extent to which the presence is subordinated to the past, or to
which the reconstruction of the past is a future-oriented process.
We consider dialogical forgetting as a non-reflexive dialogical approach to the
past, based on a mutual agreement to silence memories in the name of not burdening
the common future. It is a memory approach that relies on the imperative of a thick
line drawn under the past. It reflects the premise that remembering historical traumas
Borders and Memory. From Historical Roots to Dialogical-Like Routes 107

Dialogical approach

Dialogic Dialogic
Forgetting Remembering
(Amnesia) (Syncresis)

Non-reflective Reflexive
approach Remebering in
approach
order to Rembering in
prevent order to forget
forgetting (Catharsis)
(Anamnesis)

Monologic approach

Fig. 1 Classification of Approaches to Past in Context of Cross-border Cooperation (Source

Authors elaboration [based on Assmann, 2010])

reinforces mutual antagonisms that prevent cooperation between antagonistic groups.

The essence of dialogical forgetting is therefore a voluntarily negotiated amnesia, a
cutting off from the past and not opening historical scars. The general political goal
of this approach is to achieve a so-called happy forgetting (Ricœur, 2000: 640).
According to Assmann (2010: 16), such forgetting is especially possible in the case
of historical disputes accompanied by symmetrical violence, rather than in the case
of asymmetrically felt injustices, where the call for forgiveness and forgetting is not
met with a demand for justice. This purely pragmatic and often politically advocated
approach rejects critical historical reflection and the search for justice. It often does
so in the name of achieving common goals (democratization, reintegration of society,
peace, etc.). At first glance—at least as far as declarations are concerned—the actors
advocating this attitude to the past are oriented towards the future, which is one
of the attributes of treating active borders. However, this future-oriented position
consists in not resolving disputes. It is not accompanied by a critical attitude and
cognitive openness. It lacks the willingness and readiness to acknowledge and share
different historical narratives, which are necessary for the development of a common
communicative space and for the formation of a cross-border community of memory
(Eder, 2006; Zich, 2007a, 2007b). In unintended consequences, efforts to temporarily
neutralize historical disputes and the so-called collective silencing (Assmann 2010:
16) lead to the opposite or to the subordination of the present to the past. The problem
lies mainly in the fact that amnesia is usually only a political agreement, which does
not translate into the communicative memory of the wider public.8 As a result, to put

8Aleida Assmann (2010: 15) points out that in the time of absolutist monarchies, forgetting was
much easier, as it was measured primarily by the personal interests of the rulers. However, with the
108 K. Fleissner and K. B. Müller

it with Ricœur (2000: 633), the private world of forgiveness is not aligned with the
public world of justice. Therefore, while dialogical forgetting may result in cross-
border communication and pragmatic cooperation led by political elites, it does
not result in the deconstruction of stereotypes, the reconciliation of memories and
the successful treating of active borders. Such dialogue recalls a silent household,
rather than a productive partnership in which transnational positive identities and
(complementary) historical memories, which can be shared with neighbors across
the border, are trans/formed.
Dialogical remembering, on the other hand, is a dialogical reflexive approach that
aims at a critical reassessment of historical memories and at their interconnected-
ness. It is not, however, about replacing different narratives with a concrete (e.g.,
European) historical master narrative, which would be the result of (European) iden-
tity politics aimed at eliminating territorial and symbolic national borders. Fully in
line with the essence of the concept of active border, which can be simplistically
expressed by the slogan “differentiation without alienation”, dialogical remembering
stands on the premise that national borders remain the baselines for the interpreta-
tive framework of the past. However, this is not an obstacle to strengthening the
openness and compatibility of specific national historical narratives. In other words,
dialogical remembering does not strive for a shared narrative, but for narratives that
can be shared (Passerini, 2002). The expected outcome of dialogical remembering
is a process of the syncretization of different perspectives on the past, a kind of
memory assemblage that results in the construction of a transnational perspective
from below.9 In this process, the predominantly monological national interpretations
of the past, which are often simple (self-)critical reflections, become interconnected,
multilevel, and dialogical, yet still anchored in the basic national framework; i.e.,
different, but not mutually alienated, views of the past.
A prerequisite for successful dialogic remembering is a broader contextualization
of memories and a mutual acknowledgment of participation in the traumatic event and
the inclusion of responsibility for historical harm in the cultural and communicative
dimensions of one’s own memory (Assmann, 2010: 19). This is not a moralizing, but
a pragmatic approach that makes the question of remembering a direct and necessary
part, even a catalyst, of cross-border communication and cooperation. On the level
of negotiations and possibilities of institutionalization, we can associate dialogical
remembering with demands for the creation of common history textbooks, for the

birth of democratic institutions, mass society, and the development of historical scholarship that
relied more on exact methods than on the interests of rulers, the tool of the “thick line under the
past” also faced the demand for (historical) truth and justice, as well as the challenge of a plurality
of memories. As an example, Assmann cites the political agreement on eternal oblivion (perpetua
oblivio et amnestia) as part of the so-called Westphalian peace treaties. This pragmatic approach to
the past was quite common and functional in conditions identifying the state with the sovereign.
9 The term assemblage is used here purely as a metaphor for the process of linking conflicting

(national) memories, which results in the “piecing together” of a broader multidimensional view
of the past with a dynamic configuration. It is not our intention to conceptualize social memory
from the perspective of so-called assemblage theory (Deleuze, 2004). In line with it, however, we
conceptualize (memory) difference as a productive and potentially unifying, rather than separating,
force.
Borders and Memory. From Historical Roots to Dialogical-Like Routes 109

functioning of cross-border historical commissions, museums, and archives, which

have already been discussed elsewhere in this publication (e.g., the aforementioned
Czech, Bavarian, and Upper Austrian textbook for primary schools Šumava without
borders/Böhmerwald ohne Grenzen, p. 25) Furthermore, we can associate dialogical
remembering with a demand for installing places of shared memory, with mutual
recognition of injustices and guilt, and especially with the willingness to include the
interpretive positions of the “others” in one’s own views of the past. These demands
undoubtedly contribute to the mutual cognitive openness that is a condition for any
functioning partnership, but also for simple peaceful coexistence with neighbors
from across the border.
Remembering in order to forget is a monologic, reflexive approach, based on
the premise that the past must be dealt with through an objective understanding of
historical events. An important element of such dealing with the past is the punishing
of any guilt and deriving of personal responsibility. These measures become symbols
of the political and legal quest for justice. Such processes present an important
milestone needed to reconcile and overcome historical disputes and mistrust, and
can thus work as a springboard for building new relations of trust between the two
sides of the conflict. In this case, remembering is not a normative instance or a
moral appeal to learn from history that seeks to permanently prevent forgetting,
but rather a future-oriented strategic tool that—under certain conditions—allows for
the reconstruction of mutual relations or social reintegration. The intention of this
approach is to achieve a kind of social relief, a catharsis, and a restoration of faith in
justice, which is necessary for the dismantling of collective traumas (Assmann, 2010:
17; Ricœur, 2000: 633). Hence the fact that, in this approach, critical reflection on
the past is primarily directed inwardly in a community. The main driving force here
is not the desire to strengthen cross-border relations, but an internal (monological)
search for justice that blunts traumas in collective memory and opens the way for a
new beginning.
If dialogical remembering makes the suffering inflicted by us on others part of our
own collective memory, remembering in order to forget puts our own suffering in the
spotlight and seeks to critically overcome it. It is not necessary to stress too much that
this internal self/reflection is both an important precondition to and manifestation
of dialogical remembering too. Understandably, a crucial factor that determines the
non/reflexive nature of this approach to the past is the appropriateness of the eventual
punishment (or reparation), as well as the institutionalized and transparent processes
within which the punishment or reparation was decided. Clearly, there is a fine line
between this approach to the past and the literal treatment of memory described
below, which is the source of hatred. Uncontrolled remembering in order to forget
can turn into an insurmountable series of memory conflicts and feelings of injustice,
a dialogue of the deaf or even a civil war of memories, as Péter Esterházy (2004) put
it. On the other hand, this approach can lead to a successful overcoming of divisive
traumatic events, to the vindication of a human rights ethos and to the acceptance of
political and civic responsibility for the past (Assmann, 2010: 18).
Finally, remembering in order to prevent forgetting is a revivalist approach to
the past, which can take two significantly different forms. These can be described,
110 K. Fleissner and K. B. Müller

using Todorov’s (1996) terms, as literal (non-reflective) and exemplary (reflective).

Both are linked by a moral and political imperative to revive memory in the sense of
learning from the past and being wary, i.e., an imperative to the need for anamnesis
that reflects the premise of the insurmountable traumatic moments (e.g., the assump-
tion that the Holocaust cannot be forgotten). In the case of literal memory recovery,
this imperative is projected in the form of prejudice and a discourse of discrediting the
other more in the spatial dimension, i.e., to learn from the past and be wary of the other
from beyond symbolic or political borders. In the case of the exemplary treatment of
memory, the imperative is projected (in the form of memento and discursive recalling
of trauma) more on the temporal dimension, i.e., to learn from and be wary of one’s
own traumatic past. The first approach results in reproducing a polarized memory
between the present us and them that prevents a treating of active borders, mutual
communication, and cooperation. Historical conflicts become an insurmountable
source of hatred, retribution, fear, and stereotyping the other (Todorov, 1996).
In contrast, the exemplary treatment of memory results in an agreement on remem-
bering between perpetrators and victims and their willingness to self/reflection. This
opens the way to the generalization of historical experiences into concrete lessons
and moral commitments, which can be accepted by younger generations (Todorov,
1996). In this case, too, the present is subordinated to the past, but only in the
sense that the past becomes an imaginary constitutive other or a starting point for
strengthening mutual relations of trust between the conflicting parties (Leggewie,
2011). This exemplary approach, which could also be metaphorically termed using
Pérez-Díaz (1998) as a “shared escape from a common conflicting history”, does
not necessarily prevent treating active borders with and is usually overlapping with
so-called dialogical remembering. On the other hand, it is important to note certain
differences from dialogical remembering. The exemplary approach to remembering
encourages the trans-nationalization of memory more in the sense of producing a
shared European (universal) memory narrative (Breuer, 2014; Passerini, 2002). The
driving force here is not a political project that seeks to critically reassess and recon-
cile different perspectives on the past while respecting their differences, but the fear
of the repetition of a traumatic experience that is constantly made present in public
discourse (whether in the form of political speeches, media outputs, textbooks, or
sites of memory). In the case of remembering in order to prevent forgetting, it is not
an expression of a life politics, which is pragmatically oriented towards the future (as
is the approach of dialogical remembering), but a moralizing expression of identity
politics attached to the past (e.g., built on the memory of the Holocaust). The fact
that such identity politics are somehow devoid of the tendency to search for specific
enemies (or to project enemies into one’s own past) and that they are implemented
in the name of universal principles of humanity, or that they serve as a source for
the formation of a unified European identity, does not change their past-oriented and
moralizing character.
For the purposes of our analysis, we conceptualize remembering in order to
prevent forgetting only in a one-dimensional way, i.e., exclusively as a “literal”
(non-reflexive) and monological approach to the past that makes it an insurmount-
able source of hatred, polarization, stereotyping, and discrediting the other (i.e., learn
Borders and Memory. From Historical Roots to Dialogical-Like Routes 111

from the past and beware of the other). The exemplary level of anamnesis, or the
moral appeal committing to an “eternal” demarcation in the face of an “insurmount-
able” traumatic experience, emphasized by Aleida Assmann (2010), we conceive
in the context of cross-border cooperation more as an initial phase. Such starting
point we see as an integral part of dialogical remembering that is—at least at its
beginning—prompted by a one-sided discursive disclosure of trauma, an acknowl-
edgment of wrongdoing and a moral commitment not to forget. In other words, the
path to dialogic remembering, and to successful management of active borders, is
through the articulation of fears about the recurrence of conflicting traumatic expe-
riences. This was the case with the already mentioned (p. 26) groundbreaking visits
of the Bavarian Prime Minister Seehofer to Prague in 2010 and of the Czech Prime
Minister Nečas to Munich in 2013, which opened a symbolic window of opportunity
for dialogical remembering in Czech-Bavarian relations.

2 Methodology of Research on Collective Memory

in Euroregions

As has been repeatedly mentioned, the trilateral Euroregions of Nisa and Šumava
were chosen for our research mainly due to their multilateral nature and the greater
complexity of cross-border cooperation, communication, and relating to the past.
This complexity certainly entails higher demands for intercultural competence,
dialogue, and cognitive openness. In this sense, both Euroregions can be considered
to be local laboratories for research on Europeanization processes. Moreover, the
choice of the Euroregions of Nisa and Šumava was determined by the fact that these
two represent very specific cases. They differ from each other in several aspects,
whether it is the presence of a significant natural barrier (mountains), the histori-
cally different degree of political and commercial interconnection of the two border
regions, the different degree of economic asymmetry, cultural and linguistic diversity,
or the different strength of the barrier effect and the resulting cooperative or coexis-
tence nature of border relations (Dokoupil, 2004: 137–147). The choice of these two
Euroregions as suitable cases for the study of the non/critical reflection of the past in
the context of cross-border cooperation is certainly supported by many quite specific
and very turbulent historical events: the annexation of the Sudetenland, World War
II and the post-war banishment and displacement of millions, subsequent attempts
to resettle the population in these border regions, the long-lasting effects of the Iron
Curtain on the Czech-Bavarian and Czech-Austrian borders, the political agreements
on Czech/Polish-German reconciliation after the collapse of communism, as well as
the later integration into the Schengen zone at the beginning of a new millennium. It
is not the intention of this chapter to conduct a historical analysis or overview of these
events (for more on this, see Houžvička, 2015; Heimann, 2011). However, personal,
or discursively mediated experience of these historical events and phenomena repre-
sents a significant factor that directly influences the normative approach of key actors
112 K. Fleissner and K. B. Müller

of cross-border cooperation to the past in both Euroregions. At least four factors are
important in this sense.
First is the factor of displaced memory, which is related to a smaller representa-
tion of original inhabitants and a greater degree of cultural and demographic hetero-
geneity of the newly resettled areas (Dokoupil, 2012; Houžvička & Novotný, 2007).
The second factor is silenced memory, i.e., the long-lasting formation of conflicting
memory during the time that Europe was divided by the Iron Curtain, which led to
the denial of critical reflection on the past and to its displacement from the public
sphere of civic justice into the private sphere of personal memories (Kreisslová,
2016). Thirdly, there is the imperative to revive memory, which has become a part
of the rising universal ethos of human rights. This regulates the approach of cross-
border cooperation actors to the past in terms of their (authentic and pragmatic)
acceptance of the need to remember, and which in the context of globalization
takes on a kind of post-national reflexive form (Assmann, 2010; Bond & Rapson,
2014). A fourth important factor is the attempts by some political representatives
to instrumentalize specific historical events that in recent decades have repeatedly
resonated in the public discourse of all the countries concerned; for example, debates
about the so-called Beneš Decrees, banishment and displacement, or the German-
Czech, respectively German-Polish settlement (Houžvička, 2015; Kreisslová, 2016).
These reactionary attempts to return to an entrenched national historical narrative is a
response—although to some extent understandable and socially defensive, but much
more often strategic and politically offensive—to the challenges of globalization and
postmodern identity disorientation. While the first factor operates more in favor of
forgetting and the second factor in favor of a demand for dealing with the memory,
the third factor is a call for dialogical remembering, and the fourth is an attempt to
return to a defensive national position of not forgetting and being wary.
In the context of these factors, we assume that local elites are, in the context
of memory fever, crucial agents of critical reflection on the past, thus reciprocally
strengthening cross-border cooperation. To test this assumption, we conducted empir-
ical research, combining quantitative and qualitative methods. With the intention of
finding out the extent to which mayors in the Euroregions of Nisa and Šumava are
a source of critical reflection on the past, we addressed them with an online ques-
tionnaire survey that relates to their attitudes towards mutual historical cross-border
wrongdoings and disputes. The answers offered to these questions were operational-
ized according to the classification scheme above: Remembering in order to prevent
forgetting (“It is necessary to constantly remind oneself of historical injustices in
order to keep them in living memory and to be wary of neighbors from across the
border”); Dialogical forgetting (“It would be best not to remind oneself of histor-
ical injustices and not to burden cross-border relations with this in the future”);
Remembering in order to forget (“Historical injustices must be dealt with through an
objective understanding of events, including finding and punishing those responsi-
ble”); and Dialogical remembering (“The focus should be on developing cross-border
relations, and historical injustices and their remembrance are part of this”). Through
contingency tables, other variables were related to this central question, to identify
factors related to different approaches of mayors to the past.
Borders and Memory. From Historical Roots to Dialogical-Like Routes 113

The semi-structured interviews conducted with a total of fifty-two prominent

Czech, Polish, Saxon, Bavarian, and Austrian actors (informants) of cross-border
cooperation also included a section devoted to the issues of reconstruction of collec-
tive identities and historical memory. The informants’ answers were subjected to open
and then axial coding in MAXQDA. The discursive approaches to the conflicted past
identified and classified in the interviews were then interpreted in the broader context
of the collected data on cross-border cooperation using the conceptual framework
of active border (see chapter “Active Borders and the Europeanisation of the Public
Sphere. How the Same Can Be Different and vice versa”) and approaches to the
processing of conflicted historical memory introduced above (Assmann, 2010).

3 Agents of Cross-Border Cooperation and Reflection

Thereof on Past

The first question we will focus on is the attitude of mayors and other non-elected
actors of cross-border cooperation from the Euroregions of Nisa and Šumava towards
the conflicting past. Our questionnaire survey shows that a total of 21.1% of mayors
supported dialogical forgetting (“historical wrongdoings better not to be remem-
bered”); 13.9% of mayors were in favor of remembering in order to forget (“objective
understanding of historical events, including finding and punishing the guilty”); 63%
of mayors preferred a position corresponding to dialogical remembering (“recalling
historical wrongdoings as an integral part of the development of cross-border rela-
tions”); and support for the variant of remembering in order to prevent forgetting
(“not to forget and to be wary of neighbors”) was negligible among the surveyed
mayors. Figure 2 shows the differences between the Nisa Euroregion and the Šumava
Euroregion.
At first glance, it is obvious that in both Euroregions, most mayors are supporters
of dialogical remembering; however, in the case of the Šumava Euroregion, their
share is higher (73.6%) than in the Nisa Euroregion (53.5%), where the share of
mayors supporting dialogical forgetting is higher. This difference is to a certain extent
determined by the preference of Austrian mayors, who, although they perceive the
conflicting past as a barrier to cross-border cooperation more often than German and
Czech mayors, also see the way to overcome this barrier in dialogical remembering
(85.7%), rather than dialogical forgetting.
Based on this data, we can conclude that the mayors of both Euroregions perceive
the relationship to the past as not a closed, monological, but primarily open, dialogical
matter that should in a pragmatic spirit support the future development of cross-border
cooperation. Most mayors of the municipalities of both Euroregions then prefer such
a dialogue about the past to be based on a critical agreement on the syncresis of
memories, rather than on an agreement on amnesia. In this sense, most of the mayors
who we interviewed in both Euroregions can be considered as bearers of critical
reflection on the past.
114 K. Fleissner and K. B. Müller

100%

90%

80%
53.5
70%
73.6
60%

50%

40%
17.9
30%
0.8
20% 11.2
27.8
10%
15.2
0%
Nisa Euroregion Šumava Euroregion
Dialogical forgetting Remebering in order to prevent forgetting
Remembering in order to forget Dialogical remembering

Fig. 2 Attitudes of Mayors from Šumava and Nisa Euroregions towards Conflicting Past

The attitudes of fifty-two informants, actors of cross-border cooperation from the

Nisa and Šumava Euroregions, towards the conflicting past, with whom we conducted
semi-structured interviews, were largely determined by their direct participation in
the development of cross-border relations. This resulted in responses in which—
similarly to the mayors—dialogical approaches to the past predominantly resonated.
These were most often situated within the broader interpretive framework of gener-
ational change (see the next subchapter). The predominant support for dialogical
remembering was not as pronounced in the speeches of the unelected cross-border
cooperation actors as it was for the mayors. This difference can be explained partly
by the possibly higher pragmatic motivation of mayors for dialogical remembering,
which is carried out through meetings and commemorating projects from which
towns and villages can benefit (Törnquist-Plewa, 2016: 143). Equally, however, this
may be the result of a stronger future orientation of mayors, driven by their interest in
the long-term development of their municipality. Dialogical remembering was most
often represented in the interviews by expressions such as: “being able to look at the
past together”, “working on this issue together”, “one has to deal with it thoroughly
while looking ahead”, “working with memories makes sense”, or by explicit calls to
support cross-border awareness-raising projects that will remind the younger gener-
ation of the past from a critical perspective. Martin Půta, the chairman of the Czech
part of the Nisa Euroregion and the governor of the Liberec region, puts it aptly:
“You cannot blame people who personally experienced the Second World War and
they or their loved ones felt a harm for not thinking about forgiveness. However, with
the next generations, this clear view of history is changing, and today we can look
Borders and Memory. From Historical Roots to Dialogical-Like Routes 115

at the past and tell each other clearly what went wrong and how to prevent it in the
future.”
Only slightly less frequent were the expressions of dialogical forgetting. These
were represented in the answers of our informants by various expressions, such
as: “no one is interested in these grievances anymore”, “no one plays around these
wrongdoings here anymore”, “it is not an issue anymore”, “let’s put that to bed”,
“the young generation does not want to hear about it anymore”, “let us not turn
our gaze back to the past anymore”, “historical injustices should not be brought to
the surface”, “we just want to start from scratch”, “everything has been said”, “this
has always been more of a problem for Prague”, “there are no such Sudeten things
over here”, “there must be an end to this topic”. A typical quote was that of Kaspar
Sammer, managing director of the Bavarian part of the Šumava Euroregion: “For
young people, for example for both my sons, it is not an issue at all. They don’t feel
burdened by this history at all. And I think that’s a good thing.”
On the contrary, the expressions of monological approaches to the past (remem-
bering in order to prevent forgetting and remembering in order to forget) were in the
interviews quite rare. Occasionally, these approaches were combined with dialogical
forgetting, e.g., in the speaker’s attempt to emphasize that the past should be forgotten,
and its objective assessment should be left to the historians. An apt example of such
an approach was the statement of one of our informants: “… What do we want?
Who took what from whom? Is it your farm that’s more worthy, or the life of my
dad, who got shot, or what’s more precious for you, you know? I didn’t get my dad
back. You got another farm in Germany or some money. Yeah, that’s why I say there
would never be an end to it. The generation that went through this, they dealt with it
together. Let’s leave it up to them to judge whether it was dealt with well or poorly,
but let’s deal with it now at the scientific level only, no longer at the civil level” (INF
11).
It is a pattern of thought that history belongs to historians, and to historians
only. While this does not sanctify the complete erasure of conflicting memories, it
does justify their transfer from the memory canon to the research archive, which in
principle postponed, but does not prevent reflexive dealing with the past in the future.
The monologic, non-reflective approach to the past in the sense of remembering
in order to prevent forgetting, i.e., “not to forget and to beware of others”, was iden-
tified only once in the entire corpus, namely with a Polish informant who, in relation
to cooperation with German partners, chose—albeit with a certain degree of exag-
geration—pejorative labels and expressions (“SS commando”, “I don’t paint it pink
with those Germans”). His view exemplarily combined the idea of Polish-German
difference with feelings of mutual alienation and even hostility. “The original owners
bought it [Łomnica Castle] first in the name of a Pole, because it was not allowed,
unfortunately, but now they have transferred it to themselves, because it is allowed.
So, people were afraid of it. We certainly don’t like Germans in general. We don’t
have much reason to like them either. I think they are quite different from us” (INF1).
116 K. Fleissner and K. B. Müller

4 Dealing with Past as Generational Question

Analysis of the data from our questionnaire survey showed no statistically signifi-
cant relationship between individual attitudes to the past and gender, the size of the
municipality and, somewhat surprisingly, also to the level of education of the mayors.
On the contrary, the factor that proved significant in this respect, as expected, was
the age of the mayors. The questionnaire survey reveals that younger mayors under
44 years of age are more likely to favor dialogical forgetting (56%), while mayors
of older ages favor other approaches to the conflicting past (83%), among which
dialogical remembering was particularly prevalent. In this context, we should bear
in mind that younger mayors are represented less frequently, both in our sample
and in the overall population. Nevertheless, we can still conclude from the data that
there is a noticeable generational difference among mayors in the approach to the
conflicting past. The age threshold around 45 years appears to be a turning point.
Monological approaches to the past are quite exclusively represented, but in compar-
ison to dialogical remembering quite rarely, among those mayors over 45 years of
age. The reasons for this trend may well be many and very complex: (1) the temporal
distance, which may be the source of the disinterest of the younger generation of
mayors in the conflicting past; (2) the so-called life cycle effect, i.e., usually lower
interest of younger people in the past due to future-oriented projects and expectations
(Šubrt & Vinopal, 2013); or (3) the global individualization processes, which cause
the dominant source of social identity formation to no longer be “roots” (roots), but
increasingly “routes” (routes) (Hall, 1999). The result is a tendency to reject the
weight of the past among the youngest generations, which also directly contrasts
with the memory fever mentioned above.
However, our survey also suggests that the explanation for generational differences
in the support for dialogic remembering/forgetting may be much simpler. We see it in
the length of time that neighboring mayors have known one another, the frequency
of their meetings, and the intensity of their cross-border socialization. The older
mayors (45 years and older) are more likely to have been in office for more than
two terms, often since the 1990s, which is also due to the longer length of a mayor’s
mandate in Germany. This factor emerges as significant in relation to the approach
to the past that they take. The mayors who have been in the office for more than
two terms are more inclined to support dialogical remembering. Similarly, it appears
that the more often mayors meet with their partners from across the border, the more
they encourage reflective approaches to the past, especially dialogical remembering.
A significant link can be identified between the frequency of cross-border meeting
with their colleagues and the promotion of dialogical remembering. For mayors who
meet at least once every six months, support for dialogical remembering is 76%;
for mayors who meet less frequently or not at all, it is only 47%. It is also true
that mayors who participate in cross-border events with the highest frequency have
the highest preference for dialogical remembering. In cross-border meetings, mutual
trust is formed and strengthened between mayors. This presents a valuable source
of positive identities (Giddens, 1991), which are also strengthened by the reflexive
Borders and Memory. From Historical Roots to Dialogical-Like Routes 117

approaches to the conflicting past. Corresponding to that mentioned above is also

the assessment of mutual (cross-border) ignorance and exchange of information as a
barrier to cross-border cooperation. Among the mayors who do not consider mutual
ignorance a problem, 74% of those are inclined towards dialogical remembering. In
contrast, among the mayors who perceived mutual ignorance between neighbors as
an obstacle to cooperation, only 45% were in favor of dialogical remembering.
Of course, our data does not necessarily represent some universally valid and
generalizable causality. However, it convincingly demonstrates that, at least in the
Euroregions that we studied, mutual recognition and cross-border socialization of
mayors is closely related to the adoption of a dialogical, reflective approach to the
past. We can assume that the inclination towards dialogical remembering among
mayors who fall into the age categories of over 45 years and who have been in
office for more than two terms is closely related to their immediate experience and
often personal participation in cross-border cooperation. These mayors also experi-
enced and participated in opening the borders and integrating the Czech Republic
and Poland into the EU, and subsequently into the Schengen zone. The youngest
generation of mayors lacks such an experience. This assumption is further supported
by the fact that among mayors over 45 years of age, there is a much higher propor-
tion of those who perceived involvement in the Schengen zone as “unequivocally
positive” (51% compared to 13% among mayors under 45). At the same time, as illus-
trated in Table 1 below, the attitudes towards the conflicting past are significantly
correlated with the feeling of belonging to the EU. It turns out that mayors with a
very/rather strong feeling of belonging to the EU are significantly more likely to
support dialogical remembering (75.6%). On the contrary, mayors with a very/rather
weak feeling of belonging to the EU are more likely to gravitate towards dialogical
forgetting or monological approaches that place the relations to the past primarily
within a national interpretive framework. In our opinion, the interplay between the
feeling of belonging to the EU and a critical dialogical approach to a divisive past
suggests the vital potential of dialogical remembering in the process of forming
European identities. Thus, these findings support the belief that (1) European inte-
gration cannot progress if the prevalence of monological constructions of national
identities continues, and that (2) dialogical remembering is an extraordinary cultural
and political opportunity offered by the project of European integration (Assmann,
2015: 250).
It seems that in the processes of opening the borders and the enlargement of the
EU and the Schengen zone, a generation of pro-European-minded mayors has been
formed in both Euroregions, who are also above-average committed local patriots.
These mayors are adopting an active cross-border identity (see Zich, 2007b: 59),
which is an expression of both their patriotism and local commitment and their cross-
border (transnational) commitment, which they realistically perceive as a pebble in
the mosaic of European integration. In other words, they are authentic representa-
tives of horizontal Europeanization. This type of mayor corresponds to the group
of “active optimists” discussed in chapter “Borders and Identity. The Place Where
Europe Lives!”. They are characterized by a longer-term political experience, active
participation in cross-border cooperation, and a positive evaluation of its contribution
118 K. Fleissner and K. B. Müller

Table 1 Dialogical Remembering and Feeling of Belonging to EU

Non/Critical Approaches to Past
Dialogical Dialogical Remembering Total
Forgetting Remembering in order to
forget
Feeling of Very/rather Number of 4 34 7 45
Belonging strong Line 8.9% 75.6% 15.6% 100.0%
to EU Percentages
Adjusted − 3.0 2.5 0.0
Residuals
Very/rather Number of 12 16 5 33
weak Line 36.4% 48.5% 15.2% 100.0%
Percentages
Adjusted 3.0 − 2.5 0.0
Residuals
Total Number of 16 50 12 78
Line 20.5% 64.1% 15.4% 100.0%
Percentages
Source Authors’ elaboration in IBM SPSS

to their municipality, but also by an open acceptance of the others (neighbors from
across the border) as partners and friends. These mayors overwhelmingly defend the
idea that not oblivion, but rather critical transnational reflection on a conflicted past
should be an imminent part of cooperation and can also be a source of cross-border
regional integration. However, the question is whether this generation of mayors,
now mostly in their fifties, who approach cross-border cooperation with curiosity
and enthusiasm, and who see it as their personal and professional life project and
commitment, will find successors. What consequences will this have for both the
perception of the past and cross-border cooperation if they will not be found?
Let us now look at the non-elected bearers of cross-border cooperation, who,
compared to mayors, can be expected to have a stronger orientation towards long-
term goals and future-oriented development. Although it must be said that we did not
observe a weak orientation towards long-term strategic goals among mayors either—
probably due to the high degree of defensibility of the mayor’s mandate—but rather
the opposite. Regarding the non-elected bearers of cross-border cooperation, we
collected the statements of fifty-two informants, which we analyzed with qualitative
methods. Almost half of all interviewees answered the questions about the role of
the conflicting past in cross-border relations and whether cross-border cooperation
is a source of redressing historical wrongs and rethinking views of the past, in the
sense that it is a generational issue, or that the memories have died out and that for
younger generations, it is not an issue.
This is not a surprising finding. However, informants’ interpretations of what this
generational change means for dealing with the past and for cross-border cooperation
differed significantly. For some, the disinterest of the young and the dying out of the
Borders and Memory. From Historical Roots to Dialogical-Like Routes 119

people who remembered a traumatic past was a positively perceived signal and often
a little cynically conceived as burying feelings of injustice in favor of successful
dialogical forgetting. For others, the generational distance above all represented a
challenge to an exemplary revival of memory in the sense of the need to develop
dialogical remembering. Very illustrative in this respect are the frequent denunci-
ations of the current strengthening of nationalist tendencies. For the proponents of
dialogical forgetting, the solution to such nationalistic reminiscences is to focus on
the current problems and challenges of the global world, without regard for the past,
in which supposedly the younger generation is not interested anyway. This was made
clear, for example, in the statement of Wolfgang Maier, head of the department for
cross-border cooperation applications in the government of Lower Bavaria: “I have
the impression that the younger generation no longer wants to hear about history.
We have the AfD in our country, it’s horrible. But I am optimistic and hope that this
is just a temporary phenomenon. One day the issue of the war and post-war events
must end, and we must focus on more important topics, like digitalization, economic
issues, regional development, and others. We must strive to thrive in our globalized
world, and not always look to the past.”
Whereas the promoters of dialogical remembering called for a mutually critical
reevaluation of the past and promoted the abovementioned exemplary dealing with
the memory. For the proponents of dialogical remembering, the emergence of the
younger generation does not represent an opportunity to forget and free oneself from
the oppressive past, but a challenge to foster mutual cognitive openness through
shared reflection on the past. Such shared reflection was placed by many partici-
pants in the context of growing nationalist tendencies in Europe—concerns about
the growing support for the German AfD were often voiced. They also perceived
such reflection as a guarantee of a liberal and democratic society, as well as a crucial
form of prevention against the political instrumentalization of contentious histor-
ical issues. As aptly mentioned by Franz Müller, mayor of a Bavarian border town
Lohberg, “It is also important, because in almost every European country today,
there are these nationalistic ideas, both in the Czech Republic and in Germany.
For this reason, I think it is important to support non-investment projects … to get
schools, young people, for example, more involved, and to bring them back to what
happened back then, why it happened and why it is so, and that in practical terms
there are completely normal people living on both sides, and not different-minded
ones, as is portrayed a lot nowadays. I consider this very important.”
In some cases, the ethos of generational renewal has taken on slightly fatalistic
contours among the supporters of dialogical forgetting, where the passing of the
older generations is conceived as a necessary and desirable condition for overcoming
historical trauma, because “… in the heads of those older people who remember what
the Poles did to them in ‘39, they just think that it is still going on… they just have
to die out. Otherwise, it won’t work” (INF3), or that “… the old people here think
like this: we don’t like Germans, and war, etc. … But not dramatically. They won’t
shout that out. If there are festivals, they’ll go drinking with everybody, but internally
there’s still something in there. But frankly, to put it bluntly, I don’t care what old
people think. I’m interested in the young ones” (INF4).
120 K. Fleissner and K. B. Müller

Directly related to this is the fact that in the responses of the proponents of dialog-
ical forgetting, the generational dimension of identity was almost always discursively
constructed and emphasized. That draws a distinguishing line between the present-us
and the past-them, thus justifying the strategy of a thick line drawn under the past.
One informant expressed it very succinctly: “It’s not our business anymore, their
generation they settled it among themselves … like this, one side by war, the other
side by displacement. That was their solution. The rest of us, we know shit about it.
That’s why it bothers me that some have long discussions about how to compensate.
No, just don’t compensate! It’s just the way it happened, that generation has dealt
with it, and we should let them sleep” (INF6).
From this almost historical nihilism (Šubrt & Vinopal, 2013) comes the conviction
that a memory trauma is not a communal, but mainly a personal problem—everyone
must deal with it on their own and not burden others with it. It is an example of
an approach of collective silencing, where the conflicting memory is displaced from
the public (interpersonal) level to the marginal (private) level. The problem with
this approach is that it hinders the integration of the past-them into the present-
us and inadvertently leads to the formation of a community without memory. The
past is perceived as something that binds us, which limits the individual freedom
of the young, and which even prevents the formation of a common cross-border
region, as expressed aptly in the interview with Kaspar Sammer, managing director
of the Bavarian part of the Sumava Euroregion: “I think we should try not to pass
it [historical memory] on to the young generation. But to let them really live freely
in the future. The borders are gone, and we should allow them to develop and grow
together. And then we will really become one region.”
On the contrary, the supporters of dialogical remembering conceive conflicting
memories not as a surmounted and personal matter, but rather as something deeply
embedded in social structures that needs to be gradually processed. One cannot “free
oneself” from the oppressive past, but one must critically confront it. The obvious
demand for dialogical remembering, and the acknowledgment that dialogical remem-
bering is not yet a widely recognized discursive practice, clearly echoed in the state-
ment of Donata Di Taranto, a worker in the Bavarian part of the Šumava Euroregion:
“There are also voices that say that Germans are tired of that issue, because they
have been discussing Nazism in schools for a very long time. But we need more
programs where Germans and Czechs start working on this topic together. Not us
as Germans separately and them as Czechs separately. But together. For example,
TANDEM organizes events in the concentration camps during which both sides get
together and discuss how they perceive it. It must be discussed. And not always to
separate it like this, just so that each side can keep reinforcing its views. Because the
subject simply hasn’t been worked out yet. You can just see that it sits very deeply
somewhere inside.”
The different framing of dialogical forgetting and dialogical remembering within
the discourse of generational renewal is also reflected in references to the period
of the nostalgic return of the displaced people and their search for roots, which was
particularly characteristic of the first decades after the fall of the Iron Curtain. Infor-
mants advocating dialogical forgetting perceived the nostalgic return of displaced
Borders and Memory. From Historical Roots to Dialogical-Like Routes 121

people or their descendants to their home villages or towns as a generally positive

experience. And although this is an outdated and marginal phenomenon, as “it is
no longer an issue today”, on the level of individual actions, these were symboli-
cally very significant situations, as was expressed, for example, in the interview with
the mayor of Kvilda, Václav Vostradovský: “In fact, since’89, when someone came
here, it was always just a friendly affair. If I take, for example, the family that lived
in Bučina and moved to Mauthu, and de facto they wanted a kind of symbolic return
of the village of Bučina (which was abandoned after WWII displacement).”
On the other hand, the proponents of dialogical remembering emphasized in their
interviews the mutual transformation of conflicting memories and narratives, the
formation of cross-border friendships and a kind of empathy or even an admiration
for how many displaced people have dealt well with the feeling of historical injustice.
Thus, the survivors themselves are perceived in a largely positive way as a source
of learning and exemplary handling of memory, and most importantly, they are not
excluded from the so-called present-us. Seen through the lens of some advocates of
dialogical remembering, more adamant supporters of the preservation of feelings of
injustice in communicative practices are often the descendants, who appropriate a
kind of victim status. They often perceive the bitter experience of their parents more
intensely than the victims themselves, and tend to defend the monological position of
remembering in order to prevent forgetting. One mayor of a small Saxon borderland
town summed it up in a prescient way: “It always surprises me that it is simply
the generation that has lived through it that really knows how to live with it. That
they have surmounted this, they have gotten over it. Their children then bemoan
how their father was thrown out of somewhere back then, how he was treated there,
etc. These people are often more radical than those directly affected. We have these
regular meetings here… And I’m always very surprised at how those who meet here
can deal with all that. They’re sad, but they have no regrets. I’d say they’re kind of
saying to themselves: The Germans started the war, so they blame themselves. Not
only themselves (personally), but the main (collective) blame that they are giving
themselves. Perhaps they see it as a consequence of something else. And then I often
hear from them: you younger people, don’t ever let this happen again. Care for peace
and good relations. We have experienced bad things that happened, and it just can’t
be completely undone. And you can never fix a wrong with a wrong” (INF2).
The perception of this generational transmission of conflict memory again demon-
strates that historical trauma is not conceived of by supporters of dialogical remem-
bering as an individual, but rather as a collective affair. From this awareness of the
structural and intersubjective nature of social memory arises the need to actively
work with trauma. It is not enough to wait passively for the passing of those who
were affected and who remember, since even after their passing, conflicting memory
does not completely disappear.
122 K. Fleissner and K. B. Müller

5 Conflicting Memories. Barriers or Catalysts

for Cross-Border Cooperation?

A key to our task is the question of the relationship between the approaches to the
conflicting past held by mayors and other non-elected informants and their percep-
tions of cross-border cooperation. Based on our questionnaire survey, it was found
that historical injustices are ranked among the three most important barriers to cross-
border cooperation by a relatively small proportion of mayors (14% for both Eurore-
gions), with a statistically significant difference between the Nisa Euroregion (only
3%) and the Šumava Euroregion (24%). If we look at this aspect through a national
lens, it is very interesting to see that historical injustices are perceived as an impor-
tant barrier to cross-border cooperation especially by Austrian mayors, even in most
cases (54%). In contrast, German (Saxon and Bavarian) mayors account for only
3%.
However, it can be said that in general a conflicting memory is not considered to
be a fundamental and burdensome problem in relation to cross-border cooperation. In
a way, it remains in the shadow of other barriers, which are perceived as much more
significant. According to the mayors of both Euroregions, (1) the language barrier
was the most significant (80%), followed by (2) administrative barriers (45%), (3)
mutual ignorance and a lack of information exchange (36%), (4) economic asymme-
tries (25%), (5) legislative barriers, e.g., lack of capacity to form shared institutions
(20%), (6) insufficient transport infrastructure (19%), (7) distrust based on histor-
ical experience (18%), (8) different national interests and political systems (14%),
(9) different mentalities and political cultures (13%) (see Fig. 1 in chapter “Borders
and Language. Minor Misunderstandings, Big Troubles and the Fruits of Multilin-
gualism”, p. 60). The most significant of these barriers were discussed in detail in
the previous chapter. Against the backdrop of the data presented above, the issue of
conflicting memories in the context of cross-border cooperation may therefore not
seem very relevant. In fact, even in interviews with non-elected actors of cross-border
cooperation, expressions such as “we don’t deal with these issues anymore, we live
on the border, we want to meet, we want to cooperate, and we don’t play on some old
wrongs here anymore” (Jaroslav Poláček, headmaster of the primary school) were
heard very often, especially from the supporters of dialogical forgetting.
However, this impression can be somewhat misleading. It is based on the well-
established and understandable, but at the same time simplistic assumption that
conflicting memory and historical injustices should be interpreted negatively as an
obstacle (attached to the past) and not positively as a (future-oriented) challenge
and opportunity for cross-border cooperation. The willingness and ability to face
this challenge and seize this opportunity can work as a strong catalyst for cross-
border cooperation. Together with Aleida Assmann (2007), we argue that dialog-
ical remembering represents an extraordinary cultural and political opportunity. In
conjunction with cross-border regions, it is a truly exclusive opportunity. A prerequi-
site is mutual cognitive openness and competence to reevaluate historical experience
jointly and critically. The high level of support for dialogical remembering in the two
Borders and Memory. From Historical Roots to Dialogical-Like Routes 123

surveyed Euroregions confirms this assumption. Although the interviewed actors did
not perceive historical injustices as a significant barrier to cross-border cooperation,
this does not mean that conflicting memory is not an important factor in cross-border
cooperation, perhaps no longer as an obstacle, but rather as an intrinsic part of
cross-border relations. Critical reflection on the divisive past becomes a constitutive
underpinning for building mutual trust and thus a starting point for the development
of cross-border cooperation and integration.
The fact that the issue of conflicting memories in the context of cross-border
cooperation cannot be simplified and considered only as communication and coop-
eration barriers, but that it is a more complex phenomenon, is supported by other
findings. The analysis of the questionnaire survey data showed that there is no signif-
icant correlation between different approaches to the past held by mayors and the
most strongly perceived barriers to cross-border cooperation—be they administra-
tive, political, cultural, linguistic, or economic barriers. The only exception is the
barrier caused by mutual ignorance. Mutual ignorance is perceived as a barrier to
cross-border cooperation by only 26% of mayors supporting dialogical remembering,
compared to 50% of those advocating dialogical forgetting, and even 64% of those
advocating the other monological approaches to the past. As we stated above, propo-
nents of dialogical remembering are more likely to meet, and it can be assumed
that they are generally more active in cross-border activities where they get to know
the other. These mayors are thus more likely to perceive other types of barriers,
such as administrative obstacles, as more problematic, which may be directly related
to their above-average involvement in cross-border cooperation projects. Also, no
correlation was identified in the relationship between individual non/reflective atti-
tudes towards the past and perceptions of barriers arising from historical burdens. In
other words, espoused non/reflective attitudes towards the past are not necessarily
related to whether those mayors perceive conflicting historical experience as a barrier
to cross-border cooperation.
Among the mayors who perceive cross-border cooperation as absolutely/rather
beneficial for the municipality, supporters of dialogical remembering are more repre-
sented (Table 2). Conversely, those mayors who believe that cross-border cooperation
is absolutely/rather not beneficial to the municipality are noticeably more likely to be
supporters of other monological, non-reflective approaches to the past. This shows
how mutual cognitive openness, here expressed by a willingness and competence to
reflect critically on the past, is related to positive perceptions of cross-border coop-
eration. Such openness is a key prerequisite for treating active borders as a source
of cross-border social development. Those who do not perceive cross-border coop-
eration as beneficial will hardly seek its further development. This is confirmed by
the data on the link between the promotion of dialogical remembering and expec-
tations for the future. It is true that 88% of supporters of dialogical remembering
had absolutely/rather positive expectations in relation to the future development of
cross-border cooperation. In contrast, for supporters of dialogical forgetting, this was
only a slight majority (58%).
It turns out that the overall perception of the benefits of cross-border coopera-
tion is also influenced by how mayors perceive whether such cooperation helps to
124 K. Fleissner and K. B. Müller

Table 2 Dialogical Remembering and Municipality Benefits from Cross-border Cooperation

Non/Critical Approaches to Past
Dialogical Other Total
Recollection Approaches
(incl. I don’t
know)
Municipalities Absolutely/Rather Number of 36 16 52
Benefit from Yes Line 69.2% 30.8% 100.0%
Cross-border Percentages
Cooperation
Adjusted 1.8 − 1.8
Residuals
Absolutely/Rather Number of 12 13 25
Not Line 48.0% 52.0% 100.0%
Percentages
Adjusted − 1.8 1.8
residuals
Total Number of 48 29 77
Line 62.3% 37.7% 100.0%
Percentages
Source Authors´ processing in IBM SPSS

remove historical burdens. Mayors who support dialogical remembering are also
more optimistic in this respect, as 90% of them believe that cross-border cooperation
absolutely/rather leads to the removal of historical burdens. Also, a noticeably higher
proportion of those in favor of reflexive approaches to the past perceive the post-war
displacement of ethnic Germans as absolutely unjustified (43%).
Two things should be added in this respect. Firstly, most proponents of dialog-
ical forgetting also perceive the displacement of ethnic Germans as negative, but
they usually choose the more moderate option of rather unjustified. Secondly and
understandably, the factor of national perspective resonates strongly in this specific
memory issue, causing statistically significant differences. While Czech mayors are
divided on this issue (48% of them consider the displacement to be absolutely/rather
justified and 52% absolutely/rather unjustified), both German and Austrian mayors
unanimously perceive the displacement as unjustified (96% in Germany, 92% in
Austria). This schism of opinion among Czech mayors, which is also present in
Czech society, suggests that the process of reflection on the conflicting past is very
slow, at least on this contentious issue.
After all, this is also evidenced by the regular surveys of the Czech Public Opinion
Research Centre (PORC), which have been focusing on the Czech perception of the
displacement of ethnic Germans after World War II. From 2002 until 2016, we
can note a steady decline in the assessment of the expulsion of ethnic Germans as
absolutely just. In 2002, 64% of the Czech population rated the displacement of
the German population like that, while in 2016 it was a record low of 37%, and
in 2019 it was again a bit higher at 41%. On the other hand, the number of those
Borders and Memory. From Historical Roots to Dialogical-Like Routes 125

who believe that the displacement was unjust and should be apologized for (3% in
2002; 9% in 2019) or that the victims should be compensated (1% in 2002; 4% in
2019) has increased just a tiny bit. Thus, the PORC (2019) data show a trend of a
slight strengthening of critical reflection on this historical event, which, it must be
mentioned, was for a long time censored and strictly taboo, until 1989.10
The reluctance toward critical historical reflection on the Czech political scene,
and the reticence of coming to terms with the issue of post-war displacement, is also
sometimes perceived by partners from across the border with astonishment, and as
an obstacle to the development of dialogical remembering. This was very clearly
formulated by the project manager of the Bavarian part of the Šumava Euroregion,
Veronika Tůmová, who is Czech herself. “For example, I am surprised that there are
still people on the political scene today who cannot openly say that the displacement
of the Germans was a mistake. Why do we still take it that the Germans did something
to us before? OK. That’s right. But everybody should admit their mistake, and not
keep making the excuse that we did it because… It’s just that both things were wrong.
And perhaps some things were very bad, some things were less evil, but both things
were bad enough. And why doesn’t the acknowledgement of the wrong work? That
certain people still resist to admit it openly.”
Other studies (Houžvička, 2010; CVVM, 2019) have shown that the factor of
generational change may play an important role in the perception of post-war
displacement. The younger generations in the Czech Republic perceive the displace-
ment of ethnic Germans less frequently as absolutely/rather justified. However, this is
not necessarily accompanied by a demand for stronger critical reflection on this issue
(the expulsion was absolutely/rather unjustified), but is more likely a consequence
of lower interest in this topic among the younger generation. That assumption is also
reinforced by the more frequent choice of I don’t know. However, in the sample of
mayors from the Euroregions of Nisa and Šumava, the link between the age of the
mayors and their views on post-war displacement was not statistically proven. One
possible explanation could be the proximity of the ethnic border, which represents
an extraordinary educational opportunity. It offers a kind of vaccine against both an
ostentatious disinterest in neighbors and against succumbing to stereotypical views
on such other from across the border. As Dana Biskup, representative of the Bavarian
part of the Šumava Euroregion, aptly put it, the cross-borderland is “the place where
Europe lives”.
For our informants (unelected actors) of cross-border cooperation, who defend
the position of dialogical forgetting, the conflicting past usually represents a barrier
to cross-border cooperation. However, this barrier is perceived as a practically over-
come issue or interpreted as a marginal personal matter, especially due to the almost
complete generational change. Within the forgetting of conflicting past, cross-border
cooperation plays a positive, but rather secondary role. This repeats a behavioral

10 E.g., Houžvička and Novotný (2007); Heimann (2011); Houžvička (2015); Kreisslová (2016)
deal in more detail with the issue of the Czech-German displacement and the changes of its social
reflection.
126 K. Fleissner and K. B. Müller

pattern that has also been identified among mayors advocating dialogical forgetting—
they perceive to a much lesser extent cross-border cooperation as an opportunity to
undo historical burdens.
On the contrary, the proponents of dialogical remembering place much greater
emphasis on the relationship between cross-border cooperation and critical reflection
on the past. They refer to concrete projects promoting cross-border cooperation and
mutual socialization, which—as a very important accompanying factor of genera-
tional renewal—trigger processes of cross-border dealing with the past. An important
element here is also the broader horizon of the common past, which is not reduced
to the conflicting relations of the twentieth century, but brings back the forgotten
everyday, as well as festive practices or events to the present. That might happen
through mapping or reconstructing forgotten monuments, reviving forgotten customs
or traditions, etc. (INF9). This makes it possible to interpret mutual centuries-old
coexistence as a normality, which we return to through critical reflection on contested
historical moments that caused the situation to deviate from normality. The impor-
tance of recalling the longevity of the mutual coexistence of Germans and Czechs was
clearly highlighted by Martin Buršík, head of the Czech Department of Cross-Border
Cooperation Programs at the Ministry of Regional Development: “In that very area
of Šumava, in Český Krumlov, there is the Fotoateliér Seidel Museum. The Seidels
were a family of photographers who collected a lot of photographs of the Šumava
area where they lived over a relatively long period of time. And it was also a joint
project. It was even in several phases, so the Czech-Austrian and Czech-Bavarian
program invested there. Again, to bring people closer to that common history, where
Germans and Czechs lived together in that border area. So, all these activities, in my
opinion, help. The point is that there was a period when the relations were just not
good. So yes, it should definitely be talked about, but at the same time these projects
help by saying that there was a period before that when, on the contrary, people lived
here for centuries in symbiosis, lived together and there were no problems.”

6 Europeanization of Memory Between Dialogue

of Memories and Happy Oblivion (Summary)

Most academic studies in the Czech and Central European context have been limited
to the conception of the conflicting past as an obstacle that to some extent hinders
cross-border cooperation. We have tried to break away from this perspective, which
is understandable and very common, but at the same time one-sided and simplistic. In
this chapter, it has been demonstrated through the cases of the trilateral Euroregions
of Nisa and Šumava that a conflicting past can work not only as a communication
and cooperation barrier, but also as an important commitment to and opportunity
for cross-border cooperation. Dealing with the conflicting past can strengthen cross-
border relations of trust, it can build a transnational community. The diminishing
Borders and Memory. From Historical Roots to Dialogical-Like Routes 127

perception of the historical barriers to cross-border cooperation should not be inter-

preted as a diminishing relevance of social memories, but rather as a change in the
role this factor plays in shaping cross-border relationships. In the context of borders,
the willingness and ability to critically reassess national interpretations of the past
become an important source of the Europeanization of memory, which further rein-
forces the demand and productivity of cross-border cooperation. That becomes, in
a reciprocal spirit, a source of stronger support for dialogical remembering and a
prerequisite for the treating of active borders.
The significant support for dialogical remembering by the mayors and other
unelected key actors of cross-border cooperation leads us to at least three impor-
tant conclusions. First, the relationship to the past is predominantly perceived by the
bearers of cross-border cooperation not as a one-sided, monological issue, but as a
multilateral and shared issue. This itself significantly manifests a cognitive openness,
mutual recognition, and the culture of trust. Second, reflection on the conflicting past
has become one of the important constitutive elements of cross-border cooperation
in the Euroregions of Nisa and Šumava. Historical traumas are conceptualized by
the supporters of dialogical remembering as both a commitment and a challenge to
critical dealing with the past, as a difficult and long-term process requiring mutual
encounters, knowledge, and learning. The perspective of the other becomes part of
one’s own historical memory. Thus, within the framework of the dialogue of memo-
ries, participants not only reconstruct a shared perspective on divisive traumatic
events, but also form positive and non-exclusive (complementary) social identities.
Mutual difference ceases to be a cause of alienation and becomes, on the contrary, a
motive for cooperation and rapprochement. Thirdly, if one of the objectives of cross-
border cooperation is to contribute to the Europeanization of collective identities, this
cannot be done without active critical reflection on the past and the reconstruction
of collective memory. Results of our research reinforce the belief that the feeling of
belonging to the EU is much stronger among supporters of dialogical remembering
than among supporters of dialogical forgetting. Indeed, within dialogues of diverse
and sometimes conflicting memories, authentic Europeanism is born and lives.
The findings from our questionnaire survey among the mayors of the two Eurore-
gions also raise the pertinent question of whether the current relatively high support
for dialogical remembering is sustainable, or whether it is merely a temporal gener-
ational issue associated with a thawing of frozen memories. These mayors and other
non-elected actors of cross-border cooperation were direct participants in major
historical events leading to major border transformations (the fall of the Iron Curtain,
integration into the EU, the Schengen area). They therefore more often identified with
the demand for opening and activating the border, of which critical reflection on the
past and the dealing with national historical wrongdoings is a part. These actors of
cross-border cooperation are directly responding to the previous Iron Curtain period,
which did not allow for open critical reflection on the conflicting past or displaced it
from the public space into the personal or family-based memories. This is also why, to
paraphrase Ricœur (2000: 633), they seek a new “happy memory” in the dialogue of
memory and are more open to the Europeanization of the memory canon. However,
128 K. Fleissner and K. B. Müller

the younger generation of mayors and a significant number of other unelected actors
of cross-border cooperation rely more on happy oblivion.
The combination of factors of generational change, such as increasing temporal
and emotional distance, weaker interest in the past, together with the displacement
of memory from border areas, migration processes, globalization, and the fluidity of
identity formation, all contribute to dialogical forgetting. Against the backdrop of
these factors, memory is often metaphorically perceived as a burden from which one
must free oneself. In the short term, this attitude towards the past does not significantly
hinder cross-border cooperation, but on the contrary, it frees it, albeit temporarily,
from the burden of the past. But in the long term, it limits the opportunities for the
formation of a cross-border community that could draw on its own authentic narrative,
reflecting a process of critical confrontation with its own past and involving processes
of public learning. It is possible to pragmatically shape cross-border partnerships
without memory or interest in the past. However, such relationships are usually
haphazard, episodic, more superficial, and fluid.
At the same time, dialogical forgetting, whether it is driven by passivity and disin-
terest in the past, or by active erasure of traces of the past, can never be perfect and
complete in a liberal society, and one might add, fortunately. However, the displace-
ment of memory poses considerable risks for the future of liberal society. The past
that has not been dealt with can easily seep unchecked to the surface (even memory is
more fluid in such a context) to serve political instrumentalization. This may uninten-
tionally lead to cross-border cooperation being repeatedly subordinated to the dictates
of the past. In the context of this danger, we see as very important and cautionary
the finding, which is also to some extent evidenced by our research (although not as
a dominant trend), that heirs to victim status may, under certain conditions, perceive
historical injustices more intensely than their direct participants. Thus, it appears
that younger generations may be more open to the political instrumentalization of
historical injustices than the actual victims in the face of adverse socioeconomic
or political developments, or when dealing with the past is neglected. In our judg-
ment, therefore, it is essential for the formation of cross-border relations of trust
and for productive European cooperation to deal with the past and memory actively,
dialogically, and critically, rather than passively and uncritically subordinating it to
monological national narratives or hoping for a happy oblivion.
Our research is only a modest and rather exploratory contribution to the ques-
tion of the Europeanization of memory in the context of cross-border cooperation in
Central Europe. Our conclusions are significantly limited by the selection of cases,
as well as the choice of actors and methods. In this context, for example, the question
arises as to how the support for non/reflexive approaches to the past differs between
the cross-border cooperation actors and the representatives of the wider civil public.
Similarly, the question of how the process of critical reflection on the conflicting
past and the Europeanization of memory is mirrored in cultural and media produc-
tion and in the practices of everyday life, including educational practices, deserves
more attention. Both pertinent questions represent a call for further research, which
we believe should already be moving beyond the horizon of the conception of the
Borders and Memory. From Historical Roots to Dialogical-Like Routes 129

conflict past as a barrier to cross-border cooperation. Research on the perception of

mutual historical injustices and nostalgic root-seeking would be more productive if
extended to practices of dialogical remembering and their role within processes of
the Europeanization of memory.
Conclusion or I Ja Za Tob˛a Polak

Karel B. Müller

This publication presents the results of several years of research on cross-border coop-
eration in the trilateral Euroregions of Neisse/Nisa/Nysa and Šumava/Bayerischer
Wald/Unterer Inn-Mühlviertel. The aim of our research was to identify the main
obstacles to cross-border cooperation. We also sought to understand how, in the
specific multilateral context of the two selected trilateral Euroregions, specific actors
of cross-border cooperation are involved in the treating of active borders. We see
an active border as an important form of horizontal Europeanization of the public
sphere, and as one of the features and prospective sources of European integration.
Thirty years separate us from the opening of the borders of Czechoslovakia. That
is not a short time. More than a generation has grown up in an environment of highly
permeable borders where previously there was either an Iron Curtain (the borders with
Bavaria and Austria), where many civilians and border guards died, or a strict border
regime. On the other hand, the period of thirty years is still too short for the borders
to have undergone a significant transformation, especially cognitive and symbolic
ones. The precondition for such a transformation is undoubtedly sufficient public
support from below and strong political support from above. As far as the territories
that we have studied are concerned, we can say that the degree of such support is
noticeably uneven in the individual parts of the Euroregions, and it can be reasonably
assumed that the degree thereof also fluctuates over time. We deliberately avoid
comparing individual countries or parts of Euroregions. However, there is no doubt
that the main factors that strengthen or weaken the readiness to treat an active border
include the degree of political and economic support, the degree of administrative,
economic, and linguistic asymmetry, as well as shared historical experience, the
role of historical traumas and the embeddedness of polarizing prejudices. In chapter
“Borders and Language. Minor Misunderstandings, Big Troubles and the Fruits of
Multilingualism”, we have presented specific cases in greater detail that we believe

K. B. Müller (B)
CEVRO Institute, Jungmannova 17, Prague, Czech Republic
e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 131
K. B. Müller (ed.), Active Borders in Europe, Contributions to Political Science,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-23773-7_6
132 K. B. Müller

in many ways it points the way forward. In any case, it can be concluded that a
stronger financial and institutional strengthening of cross-border cooperation would
be a valuable contribution to ensuring a secure and prosperous future for Europe. A
lot has changed in the Czech border region over the past thirty years. A lot of positive
cross-border activities have taken place and are still taking place in the cross-border
area that we have studied, and several service institutions have been established. Also,
the amount of funding (and EU funding in particular) that has flowed and continues
to flow into the Euroregions studied has reached unprecedented levels.
At the same time, however, it is fair to say that neither the intensity nor the
permanence of institutional and political support in overcoming the barrier effects
of the border have been such—in the last thirty years in the two studied Eurore-
gions—to change the perception and nature of the border towards a genuine cross-
border regionalization. Our research thus confirms the conclusions of some previous
research (Dołzbłasz, 2013; Schramek, 2014) that the degree of cross-border region-
alization along the Czech-German border is still relatively weak compared to other
cross-border regions in Western Europe. This is certainly not surprising. For one
thing, Western Europe is two generations ahead of Central Europe in cross-border
regionalization. At the same time, the Czech-German border, as shown above (EB,
2015), is one of the borders with the strongest barrier effects within the EU. The possi-
bility of establishing European Groupings for Territorial Cooperation (EGTCs) is a
certain hope for transforming the administrative and legal conditions of cross-border
cooperation, brought about by EU initiatives in the recent decades. In 2022, the Euro-
pean Committee of the Regions registered 84 EGTC across the EU. It is promising
that one of the two EGTCs with Czech participation (Novum) is also located in the
Czech-Polish cross-border area, and the Nisa Euroregion is one of its members; the
other EGTC with Czech participation (Tritia) is located on the Polish-Slovak-Czech
border (CoR, 2020). We also know from the interviews conducted, and this is also
mentioned in the evaluation report of the European Committee of the Regions, that
the Czech-Bavarian-Austrian border has for some time also been considering the
possibility of strengthening cooperation and cross-border integration through new
legal instruments, including the establishment of EGTCs. However, many obstacles
clearly remain.
The alpha and omega of treating active borders is primarily the removal of psycho-
logical and linguistic barriers; especially along the Czech-German language border,
these barriers remain strong and distinct. Removing them will still require a lot
of daily civic effort, political support, and time. Equally important in this effort is
a sound, critical, and innovative understanding of the meaning of borders and the
mechanisms of demarcation in a rapidly changing social environment. We can only
wish that this book will also be a productive contribution to the search for a Europe
that is both united and diverse, secure, and free, familiar, and inspiringly mysterious.
Europe is defined by cultural plurality. Europeanness is not a homogeneous element,
and European identity is only conceivable in terms of openness and shared plurality.
We therefore wish for a Europe of different Europes, which do not stand against
each other, but together, side by side. This short book is a defense of the ideal of an
open society characterized by porous borders. An open society is characterized by
Conclusion or I Ja Za Tob˛a Polak 133

openness to criticism and reasoning, to others, to the future. Its openness is made
possible by the nature of its demarcation. The secret of a happy society lies in finding
a balance between the values of security and freedom. Such a society can balance
the need for organizing and demarking, on the one hand, with the need for social and
cognitive openness, on the other, a triangular balance between ordering, bordering,
and othering. In other words, it is defined by an active border. The aim of our research
was to deepen our understanding of this active delimitation.
The concept of active border provided our research with a theoretical framework
and obvious normative starting points. It is an ideally conceptual binary category
whose antipole is the passive border. The active border creates opportunities not only
for international cooperation, but also for the formation of transnational social ties,
for transnational (European) solidarity and belonging. With the idea of a border—
whether hard territorial or soft symbolic—we usually associate a certain enclosure,
control, limited permeability, but also the limits of the living space and understanding
that we share with our compatriots or with people somehow close to us. These borders
provide us with security and a framework of social organization that we understand,
or at least can navigate effectively, in short, within which we feel comfortable. In
this context, Václav Havel (1993) spoke of the need for a home.
The classical notion of the border has been eroded by globalization and, in the
case of Europe, by the will of post-war political leaders and citizens to overcome
mutual demarcations and antagonisms between European societies and ethnic groups.
These delineations plunged Europeans into the greatest civilizational catastrophe in
modern history, and it was a stroke of luck or a miracle (not a historical necessity) that
Europe was given a second chance. Today, the cross-borderlands are the real heart
of Europe. The demand for active borders coincides with the challenge of a second
enlightenment, which offers an extraordinary opportunity for Europeans to follow up
on their lost history. Both the Czech-German and Polish-German linguistic borders
are at the very epicenter of this challenge. In these areas, Europe received one of its
most painful wounds, leaving behind a scarred society and landscape, and where the
unpalatable symbols of anti-Europeanism are still clearly visible. It would therefore
be an understandable outcome and historical satisfaction if the spirit of Europe were
to rise precisely where its denial was most frightening.
In post-war Europe, the atavistic notion of the territorial border as a barrier is
being overcome (in a sense, both at once and gradually). After all, the territory (from
the Latin terrere) is primarily meant to intimidate those on the other side. The notion
of the border as a tool and a public cultural asset that can help us in many ways is
being promoted. It can mediate knowledge and understanding to those others who are
still little known or unknown. Fear was gradually replaced by reticence, reticence
by curiosity, which opened the door to mutual communication. Under favorable
conditions, open curiosity could then be transformed into productive encounter and
cooperation, into public learning, and into the establishment of (hitherto unlikely)
relationships of familiarity and trust. As Hedvika Zimmermann, former deputy mayor
of Hrádek nad Nisou, a long-time champion of cross-border cooperation with Saxon
Zittau and Polish Bogatynia, put it succinctly, “We always look at the problems here
from all three sides”. We could not have found a better expression of the idea, but
134 K. B. Müller

also of the concrete experience, that borders can represent an important resource
whose potential is a productive combination of elements of reflexivity and public
learning with elements of social integration. All this in a transnational and historically
so explosive cross-border space. This certainly does not mean that the post-war
development of cross-border cooperation is a walk in the Garden of Eden. Border
demarcations, including collective identities and memories, remain sensitive and
potentially explosive material in many parts of the EU. Therefore, the potential
hidden in social phenomena related to bordering processes deserves our most careful
attention.
What we appreciate about the phenomenon of the active border is the comple-
mentarity of the principles of delimitation and the principles of inclusion, which
transcend delimitation in a way that both confirms and transcends it. Treating active
borders does not lead to, nor does it seek, cultural (linguistic or otherwise) unifica-
tion. Differences remain evident, acknowledged, and in a sense, in communicating
otherness, these differences, through their visibility, are in many ways rather rein-
forced, but do not lead to polarization (either, or). While the concept of an active
border has obvious normative connotations, it does not represent some intellectual
invention or idealistic dream. It is a conceptualization of the activities and contexts
of cross-border cooperation that exist in practice, which take a variety of forms and
contexts, and which are useful to explore and reflect on in their situatedness. At the
same time, the concept of active border does not want to be an advocate of a border-
less world. Our research raises numerous question marks over the notion, shared by
many (and of course not only) social scientists that trying to create a borderless world
is a naive idea of cosmopolitan and liberal-minded intellectuals and activists. Perhaps
it is, but not only for them. The mayor of one of the border villages, whom we will
kindly allow to be excluded from the category of cosmopolitan intellectuals, put it
very bluntly: “Actually, those people who are settled here, there is no borderland for
them. Unfortunately, somebody somewhere invented that there would be a border”
(INF6).
We offer a possible antithesis that the overemphasis on delimitation and demar-
cation is a stereotypical prejudice of unimaginative and nostalgically oriented intel-
lectuals, i.e., not only supporters of the far right, who may mostly be just passing
through the borderlands. As another of the Šumava cross-border cooperation advo-
cates, who also cannot be blamed for false liberal idle talk, summed it up even more
earthily: “The sooner we erase these stupid borders, the better” (INF4). Thomas
Zenker, mayor of Zittau, also called the high degree of border permeability “a desir-
able normality”. To paraphrase his words, if firefighters from Czechia are closer to a
fire in Germany, then Czech firefighters should be able to be there sooner. And vice
versa. That, he said, is without any doubt a normal and desirable situation. From his
words, we can also sense that reality is not always normal.
So far, the EU has played a leading role in both easing and regulating mobility
across national borders. This applies, albeit to varying degrees, to all four levels of EU
freedoms (people, goods, capital, services). The Union has also sought to strengthen
the permeability of the symbolic soft borders, which, however, have lost their hard-
ness in the case of the Schengen zone. However, this does not mean that these soft
Conclusion or I Ja Za Tob˛a Polak 135

borders cannot maintain or even strengthen their permeability precisely because of

feelings of threat associated with the permeability of territorial borders. The erosion
of local contexts often triggers a strongly felt need for collective identity and rein-
forces normative and symbolic cultural aspects. The commonly accepted argument
that the EU was and still is intended primarily as a mechanism for containing ethnic
nationalism can be translated precisely as a demand for the cultural and institutional
treatment of active borders. This requirement seems relevant in relation to both the
external and internal borders of the EU.
In the first chapter, we introduced the concept of active borders in detail. The
following chapters verified the analytical possibilities of the use thereof. Our empir-
ical research reinforced the assumption that the activity of local actors themselves
plays a crucial role in cross-border cooperation, representing a key resource influ-
encing the development of cross-border cooperation towards an active border. Simi-
larly, our research strengthens the weight of the belief that the institution of the
Euroregion is an important institutional underpinning in border regions for the devel-
opment of active borders, which are part and parcel of the Europeanization of civil
society. The permeability, productivity, and integrative capacity of active borders is
determined by the willingness and readiness of actors on both sides of the border to
integrate into a shared space of communication, as well as by their necessary cultural
and institutional preconditions.
The second chapter is based on our online questionnaire survey on the attitudes
towards cross-border cooperation of the mayors and mayoresses of the member
municipalities of the Euroregions of Nisa and Šumava. It turned out that most of
them perceive the border as an opportunity and are in regular contact with polit-
ical partners from across the border. A significant majority welcomes the integra-
tion into the Schengen zone and perceives the future development of cross-border
cooperation with a clear dose of optimism, although Czech mayors were less opti-
mistic and declared a weaker feeling of belonging to the EU than their Austrian and
German counterparts. German mayors showed a higher degree of involvement of
their municipalities in cross-border cooperation and were more likely to perceive
relations between the people of the Euroregions slightly more positively than their
Czech and Austrian counterparts. On the contrary, Austrian mayors felt the strongest
attachment to the EU compared to both Czech and German mayors and were also
more critical of historical conflicts and injustices. As for mayors from the Šumava
Euroregion, they expressed a slightly stronger feeling of belonging to the EU and
more optimism about the future development of cross-border cooperation than the
mayors from the Nisa Euroregion. The mayors’ feeling of belonging to the EU is
strongly linked to their perception of the usefulness of cross-border cooperation and
the intensity of their participation in cross-border cooperation. The findings from
statistical and cluster analysis confirmed one of the assumptions of the active border
about the link between knowledge (cognitive openness), social inclusion (inclusive-
ness), and identities (civic, positive, see Fig. 2 in chapter “Active Borders and the
Europeanisation of the Public Sphere. How the Same Can Be Different and vice
versa”). The mayors’ positive attitudes towards the border, rich experience in cross-
border cooperation, and frequent contacts with partners from the other side of the
136 K. B. Müller

border are closely positively related (1) to the mayors’ identification with the EU, (2)
to their more positive assessment of the relations between the people of the Eurore-
gion, (3) to their more open attitude towards historical conflicts and injustices, as well
as (4) to their perception of cross-border cooperation as a suitable tool for dealing
with conflicting historical memories. On the contrary, mayors with a more negative
attitude towards the border, who are more closed in relation to cross-border activities,
took more negative and less clear-cut positions in all the above mentioned respects.
In the third chapter, we focused on the issue of language barriers, which mayors
and mayoresses of border municipalities, as well as other informants, perceived as
clearly the biggest obstacle to cross-border cooperation. For this reason, we focused
on the Czech-German linguistic border. There we find a stronger practical and
symbolic asymmetry between the two neighboring languages compared to the Czech-
Polish linguistic border. The Czech-German, respectively Polish-German linguistic
border also has stronger barrier effects, again both practical and symbolic. We have
defended the argument that borderlands with higher mutual knowledge of neigh-
boring languages create a more symmetrical situation and weaken ethno-linguistic
demarcation. Along the Czech-German and German-Polish linguistic border, there
are a number of institutions and actors working to strengthen bilingualism, which
they rightly see as key to strengthening cross-border cooperation, to a more secure
pacification of the border, and to a stronger institutionalization of an active border,
in short, to a genuine cross-border regionalization. More robust support and promo-
tion of immersion education in the language and culture of neighbors—which is of
course most effective to start at pre-school age—would in the medium term lead to
stronger bilingualism in cross-border regions. These social changes would weaken
the linguistic and socio-psychological mechanisms of collective delineation and thus
strengthen the conditions suitable for the formation of complementary positive iden-
tities and the Europeanization of collective identities. A linguistically permeable
cross-border area, characterized by the symmetrical use of neighboring languages
and linguistic hospitality, contributes significantly to the transformation of relations
of solidarity and belonging. It also supports the reconstruction of collective identi-
ties and a sense of home, without which the European project is unlikely to succeed.
Thus, in the European context, linguistic asymmetry complicates the strengthening of
a civil mode of collective identity, which in fact also complicates the establishment
of EU political institutions that are endowed with sufficient legitimacy and enjoy
sufficient loyalty from their citizens. Overcoming language barriers is a way both of
overcoming national barriers and prejudices and of creating stronger cross-border ties
from which more resilient cross-border societies can grow. However, multilingual
education would also deserve stronger political support, because multilingualism
promotes critical thinking, fosters tolerance and empathy.
At the annual conference of the Czech-German Discussion Forum, held in Pilsen
in the autumn of 2008, Regina Gellrich, head of the Saxon Regional Office for an
Early Education in Neighboring Languages, in a paper aptly titled “Maternity + 2.
The Earlier—the better”, pointed out four major hurdles of multilingual education
in cross-borderlands: (1) labor market constraints for the new EU member states,
(2) mutual recognition of educational staff training, (3) qualifications of multilingual
Conclusion or I Ja Za Tob˛a Polak 137

education staff, and (4) issues of educational continuity between kindergartens and
schools (Gellrich, 2009). With a decade’s hindsight, our research suggests that most
of the obstacles to overcoming the language barrier along the Czech-German border
remain relatively firmly entrenched in their positions. In other words, the discourse
of the language border is characterized by a high degree of institutional resistance
and of a deep social embeddedness. Apart from the first mentioned obstacle, which
has been removed by the opening of the German labor market to Czech citizens, the
three remaining obstacles remain difficult to overcome and fundamentally limit the
treatment of active borders, which we believe represents a key means of shaping
European civil society.
In the fourth and final chapter, we focused on the issues of collective memory
and the problem of dealing with the past. We started from the normative assumption
that without a productive coming to terms with the past, the prospect of genuine
cross-border regionalization is not realistic. Against the background of the presented
typology of coming to terms with the past, we interpret the concept of dialog-
ical remembering. This concept finds understanding among a significant group of
mayors, mayoresses, and other actors of cross-border cooperation, and is perceived
as a progressive integrative element that takes the processes of Europeanization to a
qualitatively higher level. Dialogical remembering is embedded in national historical
narratives, but opens the door to a transnational perspective and enables the cross-
border formation of collective memory. The bearers of dialogical remembering can
listen to the traumatic experiences of others, including their expressions of injustice.
They can incorporate the memories of others into their own historical memory or
to acknowledge a share of responsibility for these injustices. To paraphrase Richard
Sennett, (1998: 14), they can listen to a multitude of contradictory memories and
accept unpleasant historical facts.
The practice of dialogic remembering was more strongly preferred by mayors
serving more than two terms. Those mayors who remember impenetrable borders also
proved to be more open to dialogic remembering than younger generation mayors,
who tend to take the permeability of borders for granted. Similarly, it appeared that
the more often mayors met with their counterparts from across the border, the more
open they were to a critical and reflective approach to collective memory. A more
significant link can be identified between the frequency of cross-border meetings
and the support for dialogical remembering. For mayors who met at least once every
six months, support for dialogical remembering was 76%. For mayors meeting less
frequently or not at all, it was only 47%. It is reasonable to assume that intensive cross-
border meetings foster mutual (cross-border) trust, which stimulates open listening
and more reflective approaches to the past. All this contributes to the formation of
more inclusive positive identities. We agree wholeheartedly with Aleida Assmann’s
(2010) argument that dialogical remembering presents a spectrum of extraordinary
cultural and political opportunities offered by the European integration project. Our
research findings also support the belief that European integration cannot progress
if the consolidation of monological constructions of memory and national identity
continues. The willingness and ability to critically reassess national interpretations
of the past becomes an important resource in the process of the Europeanization of
138 K. B. Müller

memory and identity, and further enhances the productivity of cross-border cooper-
ation and integration. At the same time, we argue that the diminishing perception of
historical barriers to cross-border cooperation would be misinterpreted as evidence
of the declining importance of collective memory. Rather, the role that collective
memory plays in shaping transnational relations is changing. Mutual differences in
perspectives on the past are no longer cause for polarization and alienation, and
are instead becoming a motive for rapprochement and cooperation. Indeed, for the
supporters of dialogical remembering, the feeling of belonging to the EU was much
stronger than for the supporters of dialogical forgetting. It is in the dialogue of diverse
and conflicting memories that authentic Europeanism can truly emerge.
It was something of a paradox that in the completion of this book, which advocates
active borders, the topic of border closure—in the context of protection against a viral
pandemic—dominated the European public space. Active borders also have their
risks. Concrete barriers are easy to put up and may have a temporary justification. It
is in the context of the viral pandemic that we have heard more often that European
integration (together with globalization) has failed, that we need to return to the
level of nation-states. Surely, it is appropriate to examine these processes carefully
and critically. However, we should not succumb to the atavistic notion of national
borders as reliable protection against the pitfalls of a risk society. That would be
foolish and would ultimately make us even more vulnerable, because the risks of
modern technology, and those who are willing to exploit them, will not disappear
from the world. Europe’s secure future lies in the cooperation of its members and in
their shared sovereignty.
The active border is a means of building a transnational public, a chance for
liberal and democratic governance within a transnational framework. It is only right
that there is a discovery or re-discovery of the local where it seems to make sense.
This is not inconsistent with the principle of European integration. On the contrary,
the principle of subsidiarity is a fundamental building block of European political
culture. From the outset, the processes of globalization have created pressure in both
directions, towards integration and towards decentralization and localization. After
all, over a quarter of a century ago, the British sociologist Ronald Robertson (1994)
introduced the new term glocalization in connection with the link between the local
and the global. The unifying pressures of globalization reinforce the urge towards
exclusivity and the revival of the local. In liberal societies that are committed to
nonviolent confrontation and enjoy affluence, these pressures are particularly evident.
The increase in demand for greater regional autonomy that we have seen for decades
is thus in some ways a consequence of the success of European integration, which
has brought peace, freedom, and prosperity, which have enabled the formation and
emancipation of regional and local communities.
The current regionalization and integration of Europe are two sides of the same
coin. We should not forget the other side for the sake of another side. It is equally
important to be able to distinguish the two sides of this coin correctly, which is proving
increasingly difficult in the current fragmented public debate, with unprecedented
opportunities for manipulation and the difficulty in verifying facts. The Union’s motto
of “unity in diversity” commits us to protecting diversity, but also to fostering unity.
Conclusion or I Ja Za Tob˛a Polak 139

Liberal democracy presupposes finding unity in an environment of cultural diversity

in a way that promotes cultural diversity. Both principles need to be balanced in a
safe and productive way.
Criticizing the EU for failing where political elites have long refused to empower
it is unfair. It shows the weakness of the pan-European public and democracy. The
response of Europeans to the pandemic and security crisis should be to prepare a
framework for more effective future cooperation, including strengthening cooper-
ation in research and innovation, in health and social services, in the creation of a
common labor market, and much more. Today, every closure of the EU’s internal
borders brings tangible (not only) economic losses, as well as restrictions on free-
doms and on the living world for millions of Europeans. Overcoming these economic
downturns, on the other hand, calls for a stronger and more politically active EU.
In many places in Europe, as well as in the cross-border area that we surveyed, the
forced closure of borders has brought, among other things, the useful realization of
how much people on both sides of the border depend on each other, how significantly
they would be impoverished if they were forced to give up this dependence. Thus,
the enforced isolation due to the waves of the pandemic that took place and the
sudden disruption of normal (also cross-border) traffic also had a few benefits. It
sharpened the distinction between the essential and the superfluous, opening a space
for more fundamental political and social change. It also showed how much many
people miss the ability to cross borders easily. Indeed, for many people, the closure of
the borders has made life much more difficult, limiting their activities, jeopardizing
projects and many other opportunities for coexistence and cooperation. And it is
far from being just about the daily cross-border commuters. Although face-to-face
contact has been replaced by various online tools and communication platforms, it
has become clear that this modus vivendi is neither optimal nor sustainable in the
long term. These positive findings make it clear that cross-border communication
and cooperation have become the norm in many ways and for many groups and
individuals. Only after people lost this normality have they fully realized its value.
They should cherish and nurture this unself-evident normality even more.
The active border is like our health. We only start taking care of it when it is threat-
ened, like in (Český) Těšín, a divided town, where a banner with the inscription, “I
miss you, Czechs”, appeared on the Polish side after the border was closed in spring
2020. The banner was put up by young Poles on a railing on the embankment of the
Olše, the border river. Within a few hours, the Czech side reacted to it and put up
a banner on the opposite bank with the inscription “I miss you too, Poles” (I ja za
tob˛a Polaku; see Fig. 1). It would be hard to find a better example of how an active
border is not only a means of free cooperation, travel, or shopping, but also opens the
human mind and heart, creating more resilient social relations, including emotional
relations of belonging and solidarity. The enforced loneliness that has so suddenly
deprived people of the obvious freedom and benefits of active borders can help them
to rediscover and appreciate the importance of relationships with people on the other
side, and to have a greater appreciation for Europe’s cross-border diversity. Perhaps
in the wake of pandemic isolation, people will discover a stronger need to culti-
vate closer cross-border partnerships. This would only be a good thing, as it would
140 K. B. Müller

Fig. 1 Reactions to border closure in divided town, Český Těsín, Spring 2020

strengthen the resilience of European society and democracy. Indeed, active borders
can create cross-border communities that are innately safely inoculated against the
dangers of stereotyping, narrow-minded conformity, or aggressive ignorance. These
psychological and cognitive viruses are perhaps far more dangerous than any natural
virus.
Figure 1 comment: In response to the closing of the border, a joint song
by the Czechoslovak band Izabel and the Polish band Bartnicky was created.
The song is called Dva břehy. It shows the common heart of two nations in
one divided city. (https://hitradioorion.cz/aktualne/styska-se-nam-po-tobe-cechu-i-
ja-za-toba-polaku-poslechnete-si-skvely-cesko)
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Jaroslaw Centre 2018 Góra
(continued)

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license 141
to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023
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applications Bundesland of
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(continued)
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