FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 175195. September 15, 2010.]

VIRGILIO BUG-ATAN, BERNIE LABANDERO and GREGORIO

MANATAD, petitioners, vs. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
respondent.

DECISION

DEL CASTILLO, J : p

The testimony of a co-conspirator is not sufficient for the conviction of

the accused unless such testimony is supported by other evidence. As an
exception, however, the testimony of a co-conspirator, even if
uncorroborated, will be considered sufficient if given in a straightforward
manner and contains details which could not have been the result of
deliberate afterthought. 1
This petition for review on certiorari 2 assails the Decision 3 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) dated May 25, 2006 which upheld the Judgment 4
dated September 20, 1994 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 28,
Mandaue City finding petitioners guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
homicide.
For the death of Pastor Papauran (victim) on April 15, 1993, Norman
Maramara (Maramara) was indicted for murder. 5 After pleading not guilty
but before his trial, Maramara moved and was allowed by the trial court to
enter into a plea bargaining with the prosecution and the victim's next of kin.
Accordingly, Maramara, upon re-arraignment, pleaded guilty to a lesser
offense of homicide, a crime necessarily included in the charge of murder. 6
It would appear, however, that before he was indicted or thereabout,
Maramara executed an extrajudicial confession 7 wherein he admitted
shooting the victim to death and implicated as his co-conspirators herein
petitioners Gregorio Manatad (Manatad), Virgilio Bug-atan (Bug-atan) and
Bernie Labandero (Labandero).
Based on the account of Maramara, petitioners were accordingly
charged with murder in an Information dated August 25, 1993, the
accusatory portion of which reads: TaCDcE

The State accuses GREGORIO MANATAD, VIRGILIO BUG-ATAN

and BERNIE LABANDERO of MURDER, committed as follows:

That on or about the 15th day of April 1993, in the City of

Mandaue, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the aforenamed accused in conspiracy with NORMAN
MARAMARA whose information for murder was filed on June 9, 1993,
docketed as Criminal Case No. DU-3721 who was convicted on July 19,
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 1993, and with others who shall be prosecuted separately once
sufficient and/or corroborative evidence are gathered and secured, and
proper preliminary investigation is conducted thereon, with deliberate
intent to kill and with treachery and evident premeditation, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously conspire, confederate
and help one another in inducing and causing the said NORMAN
MARAMARA to attack, assault and shoot Pastor Papauran with a
handgun, thereby inflicting upon the latter mortal wound at his vital
portion which caused his death soon thereafter.

CONTRARY TO LAW. 8

Petitioners, when arraigned, pleaded not guilty. Thereafter, trial ensued.

Factual Antecedents
The CA, in its assailed Decision, chronicled the facts in this sequence:
On April 14, 1993, at around 12:00 o'clock noon, accused-
appellants Manatad and Bug-atan arrived at La Paloma, Labangon,
Cebu City to meet with Maramara [whom] they instructed . . . to go to
Mandaue City and kill Pastor Papauran. Accused-appellants Bug-atan
and Manatad gave Maramara a .38 caliber revolver with three
reserve[d] bullets and P500.00 for transportation money. The sum of
P30,000.00 was also offered to Maramara as part of the considerations
for his killing Pastor Papauran, together with a promise that accused-
appellant Bug-atan would move for the dismissal of Criminal Case No.
CBU-24099, a case for murder filed against Maramara which was
pending before the sala of then Judge Portia Hormachuelos.
Sometime in the morning of April 15, 1993, Maramara met with
accused-appellants Bug-atan and Labandero at Labangon, Cebu City.
Thereafter, Maramara and accused-appellant Labandero boarded a
passenger jeepney and proceeded to Mandaue City to carry out the
task of killing Pastor Papauran. Accused-appellant Bug-atan, on the
other hand, road [sic ] his motorcycle to Labogon, Mandaue City and
waited in the corner outside Pastor Papauran's house to act as back-up.
Maramara and accused-appellant Labandero arrived at Labogon and
proceeded to the house of Pastor Papauran. Maramara shot Pastor
Papauran once in the head and then he and accused-appellant
Labandero walked away and ran towards the highway. They boarded a
passenger jeepney towards Consolacion. Three days later, accused-
appellant Bug-atan and Maramara went to Labogon on a motorcycle to
confirm if Pastor Papauran was really dead. When they saw that Pastor
Papauran was already dead, accused-appellant Bug-atan told
Maramara to keep silent about the killing and that he would pay the
latter on April 21, 1999. 9 However, Maramara was already arrested by
the police on April 21, 1999. 10 ASTDCH

Petitioners denied the accusation against them. They respectively

interposed the defense of denial and alibi and ascribed ill-motive on
prosecution principal witness Maramara. Thus:
. . . . In denying criminal liability, accused-appellant Manatad
interposed the defense of alibi. He testified that, on April 11 to 15,
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 1993 he was allegedly in Luyag, San Remegio and Tigbawan, Labuelan,
all places located in the province of Cebu. The accused-appellant
Labandero declared that he was an eye-witness for the State in the
case of "People v. Nicolas Yolen and Norman Maramara, Criminal Case
No. CBU-24099," and accordingly, after testifying against Maramara,
he immediately left for Manila since he had received death threats that
he would be the next to be killed. Thus, accused-appellant Labandero
claims that he was in Manila at the time of the killing of Pastor
Papauran and that the extrajudicial confession and testimony of
Maramara is false, fabricated and was concocted by the latter as a
means of revenge. Accused-appellant Bug-atan, on the other hand,
simply denied having participated in the commission of the offense
charged. 11

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

The trial court accorded full faith and credence to the testimonies of
the prosecution witnesses particularly that of Maramara and found the
existence of conspiracy among the petitioners in the commission of the
crime. It rejected their alibi holding that the same is self-serving and
uncorroborated. Thus, on September 20, 1994, judgment was rendered
against the petitioners:
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, judgment is hereby
rendered finding the accused, Gregorio Manatad, Virgilio Bug-atan and
Bernie Labandero guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of
Homicide, the said accused are hereby [each sentenced] to undergo an
indeterminate penalty [of] imprisonment of Eight (8) Years, One (1)
Day of Prision Mayor as minimum to Fourteen (14) Years, Eight (8)
Months and One (1) Day of Reclusion Temporal as Maximum with the
accessories of the law and to indemnify jointly and severally the legal
heirs of Pastor Papauran in the amount of P50,000.00 without
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay their
proportionate share of the cost.

All accused being detention prisoners shall be credited in the

service of their respective sentences full time during which they have
undergone preventive imprisonment.
SO ORDERED. 12

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

On appeal, the CA affirmed the trial court's Decision. Like the trial
court, the appellate court found the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses
credible and sustained the trial court's finding of conspiracy. It noted that
petitioners' identities were duly established by Maramara's positive
identification and, thus, disregarded petitioners' denial and alibi. On May 25,
2006, the appellate court disposed the appeal: HDATSI

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, judgment is

hereby rendered by us DISMISSING the appeal filed in this case and
AFFIRMING the Decision dated September 20, 1994 of the RTC in
Mandaue City in Criminal Case No. DU-3938.

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 SO ORDERED. 13

The appellate court, in the challenged October 4, 2006 Resolution 14

denied petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration prompting the latter to
institute before this Court the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari. We
note that petitioners did not enumerate any specific assignment of errors
but instead presented arguments on procedural and substantive matters.
Issues
As we gleaned from the arguments of the petitioners, the main issues
formulated thereon for resolution are: (1) whether Maramara is a credible
witness; (2) whether conspiracy was proven; and, (3) whether the guilt of
petitioners was proven beyond reasonable doubt. But before dwelling on
these matters, we opted to tackle an issue brought beforehand by
petitioners concerning a procedural point. Though it is our opinion that the
discussion on this point is not relevant in the resolution of the guilt or
innocence of petitioners, we still find it necessary to determine what crime
was actually committed and its corresponding penalty.
Our Ruling
Preliminarily, petitioners are challenging, on procedural standpoint, the
manner in which the proceeding in Criminal Case No. DU-3721 entitled
People v. Norman Maramara was conducted. They point out that after
Maramara was arraigned in the morning of July 19, 1993, the trial court
hastily heard and approved a plea bargain motion in the afternoon leading to
his immediate conviction on the same day. They also fault the trial court in
concluding that there were no aggravating or mitigating circumstances to
appreciate despite Maramara's confession to the murder of the victim. They
likewise question why the filing of Criminal Case Nos. DU-3721 and DU-3938
15 was done separately and not simultaneously. According to petitioners, the
conviction of Maramara in Criminal Case No. DU-3721 was precipitately done
following a skewed procedure.
We disagree. We find no legal flaw in the assailed actions of the trial
court in Criminal Case No. DU-3721.
At the outset, it is easily discernable that petitioners failed to point out
any rule of procedure or provision of law that was transgressed by the trial
court. On the contrary, the plea bargain was validly acted upon despite the
fact that all the proceedings, i.e., arraignment, plea bargaining and
conviction, occurred on a single day. Section 2, Rule 116 of the Rules of
Court, which authorizes plea bargain for a lesser offense in a criminal case,
is explicit on how and when a plea bargain may be allowed. The rule
pertinently provides:
Sec. 2. Plea of guilty to lesser offense. — At arraignment, the
accused, with the consent of the offended party and the prosecutor,
may be allowed by the trial court to plead guilty to a lesser offense
which is necessarily included in the offense charged. After arraignment
but before trial, the accused may still be allowed to plead guilty to said
lesser offense after withdrawing his plea of not guilty. No amendment
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 of the complaint or information is necessary. TaDIHc

As clearly worded, there is nothing in the law which expressly or

impliedly prohibits the trial court from allowing an accused to change his
plea, on a plea bargain, immediately after a previous plea of not guilty. In
approving the plea bargaining agreement, the trial court undoubtedly took
into consideration the timeliness of the plea bargaining and its compliance
with the requirements of the law.
Neither do we see any error in the trial court's holding that there were
no aggravating or mitigating circumstances to appreciate even with
Maramara's confession of murder for the obvious reason that introduction of
evidence became no longer necessary after entering a plea of guilty.
Respecting the non-simultaneous filing of Criminal Case Nos. DU-3721
and DU-3938, suffice it to say that at the time Maramara pleaded guilty, the
present charge against petitioners was still in the initial stage of preliminary
investigation.
We now proceed to the substantive arguments raised in the petition.
Evaluation of the witnesses' credibility is
a matter best left to the trial court.
Indubitably, the credibility of the testimony of prosecution's prime
witness Maramara is the meat of the instant controversy. Petitioners
postulate that he is not a credible witness. They point out that there were
inconsistencies in his testimonies vis-à-vis his confession, and that his
declarations should be totally rejected considering his questionable
reputation and personal background as evidenced by his previous
conviction. Being a confessed conspirator, his testimony was procured from
a polluted source. Moreover, he had the ill-motive of revenge against
Labandero and Bug-atan considering that Labandero was a witness against
Maramara in the killing of Lanogan while Bug-atan was responsible for his
arrest on April 21, 1993.
We are not convinced.
Petitioners try to discredit Maramara by highlighting his alleged
inconsistent statements in his extrajudicial confession and his testimony in
court, i.e., he allegedly averred in his confession that Manatad and Bug-atan
went to see him on April 9, 1993 whereas in his direct examination, he
merely stated that there was only one person who went to him. Petitioners
also invite our attention to the variance regarding the place where the
meeting was held, whether it was at the house of Maramara's aunt or at the
pier.
These perceived inconsistencies provide no persuasive reason for us to
distrust the credibility of Maramara. They refer to minor details and not to
the central fact of the crime. They are too trivial to affect his straightforward
account of the killing of the victim and the complicity of the petitioners. It is
settled that inconsistencies relating to minor details do not affect the
creditworthiness of the witness testifying and that minor inconsistencies
tend to show that the witnesses were not coached or rehearsed. This is a
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 well-settled doctrine which need not require much documentation. The
testimony of a witness must be considered in its entirety instead of in
truncated parts. The technique in deciphering a testimony is not to consider
only its isolated parts and anchor a conclusion on the basis of said parts. 16
At any rate, Maramara had adequately explained and properly corrected
himself regarding these alleged inconsistencies during his examination in
court. 17 TEAaDC

Maramara's previous conviction neither detracts his competency as a

witness nor necessarily renders his testimony totally untrustworthy and
inadmissible. While Maramara admitted to having been previously convicted
in Criminal Case No. DU-3721, this circumstance does not necessarily make
him or his testimony ipso facto incredible. The determination of the
character of a witness is not a prerequisite to belief in his testimony. 18 His
alleged bad reputation, even if true, should not sway the court in the
evaluation of the veracity of his testimony. Other important factors should
be considered in determining the inherent probability of his statements for a
convicted person is not necessarily a liar. After all, conviction of a crime,
unless otherwise provided by law, shall not be a ground for disqualification
of witnesses. 19 More importantly, the testimony of Maramara who
undeniably pleaded guilty in killing the victim should definitely be given
more weight inasmuch as his testimony pertains in not insignificant points to
the specific incident. It is to be noted that Dr. Crisostomo Abbu, the medical
officer who conducted the post-mortem examination on the body of the
victim, provided collaborating testimony regarding the location of the
inflicted wound, thereby rendering more credible the testimonial account of
Maramara. In fine, we defer to the trial court's finding, sustained by the
appellate court, giving full weight and credit to Maramara's testimony. The
trial court's findings regarding the witness's credibility are accorded the
highest degree of respect. 20
The Court finds the supposed enmity of Maramara not sufficient reason
to impel him to implicate petitioners in the killing of the victim. While it may
be conceded that Labandero was a witness against Maramara in a murder
case while Bug-atan was instrumental in Maramara's arrest, still, the defense
was unable to conclusively establish that Maramara was ill-motivated in
denouncing petitioners as his co-conspirators in the commission of the
crime. There is no proof that Maramara had the intention to pervert the truth
and prevaricate just to implicate petitioners in so serious a crime as murder.
In fact, the trial court did not perceive such improper motivation on his part.
All that petitioners had are pure speculation and afterthought. The absence
of evidence of improper motive tends to indicate that a witness's testimony
is worthy of full faith and credence. 21
We see no reason to deviate from the trial court's keen observation
that the credibility of Maramara as witness has remained intact
notwithstanding the attempts of the defense to demolish it. Hence, his
testimony should be given full weight and credit. We likewise agree with the
appellate court in holding that the trial court did not err in appreciating the
testimony of Maramara since it was corroborated by the testimonies of other
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 witnesses and was given unhesitatingly in a straightforward manner and full
of details which could not have been the result of deliberate afterthought.
His testimony is too rich in details brought out during his examination in
court which cannot simply be swept aside as mere fabrication. The
declarations of the other prosecution witnesses, individually considered, may
have been circumstantial and lacking in full details. But their combined
testimonies somehow supplement in no small measure the testimonial
account of Maramara. As we and the courts below cautiously determined,
they strengthen the prosecution's evidence not only with respect to the fact
of killing but also on the conspiracy angle of the case.
Conspiracy was duly proven.
Like the courts below, we are equally convinced that there is sufficient
evidence of conspiracy as convincing as the evidence of the participation of
each of the petitioners. The records teem with circumstances correctly
outlined by the trial court clearly indicating the collective and individual acts
of the petitioners which reveal their common purpose to assault and
liquidate the victim. For emphasis, we need to quote a portion of the
ratiocination of the appellate court in this regard: ATSIED

In the case at bench, as categorically attested to by witness

Maramara, accused-appellants asked him to kill Pastor Papauran in
exchange for money and dropping an earlier case, Criminal Case No.
24099, filed against him. They also accompanied him on the day of the
shooting to see to it that the job was done. The concerted acts of
accused-appellants reveal a consciously adopted plan and clearly
demonstrate their joint design to exterminate Pastor Papauran.
Conspiracy having been established, the act of one is the act of all. 22

Needless to stress, these circumstances are clear enough to show that

petitioners acted in concert in the implementation of a common objective —
to kill the victim. In conspiracy, proof of the agreement need not rest on
direct evidence. Conspiracy may be deduced from the acts of the accused
before, during and after the commission of the crime which indubitably point
to and are indicative of a joint purpose, concert of action and community of
interest. 23 To be a conspirator, one need not participate in every detail of
the execution nor take part in every act and may not even know the exact
part to be performed by the others in the execution of the conspiracy. 24 But
once conspiracy is shown, as in this case, the act of one is the act of all.
Defense of alibi and denial was correctly
rejected.
For alibi to prevail, the established doctrine is that the accused must
prove not only that he was at some other place at the time of the
commission of the crime but also that it was physically impossible for him to
be at the locus criminis or within its immediate vicinity. 25 Physical
impossibility means that the accused was at such other place for such a
length of time that it was impossible for him to have been at the crime scene
either before or after the time he was at such other place. 26
Manatad's alibi is that from April 11 to 15, 1993, he was in Cuyang, San
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 Remigio and Tigbawan, Tabuelan, doing faith healing. His alibi, assuming it
to be true, cannot be given merit. He could have easily been at the scene of
the crime at the time of its commission considering that San Remigio and
Tabuelan are municipalities located in the province of Cebu. His presence
therein did not, therefore, render impossible his being at the scene of the
killing at Labogon, Mandaue City, a place also located in the province of
Cebu.
To corroborate his exculpatory tale, Manatad presented, among others,
Patrocino Vaflor and Rafaela Maglinte to support his alleged alibi. However,
these witnesses were shown to be biased since they have the tendency to
falsely testify in Manatad's favor for they admittedly owed him a great debt
of gratitude. 27 HCaDET

For his part, Labandero posits that he was in Manila at the time of the
incident because of a previous death threat on him after giving his testimony
in Criminal Case No. 24099 such that it was physically impossible for him to
be at the locus criminis. Considering that his alibi and supposed death threat
were uncorroborated and unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence,
the Court finds the same self-serving and deserving of no weight in law.
Moreover, the fact that he has no derogatory record will not affect the
outcome of his case since it does not disprove his complicity in the
commission of the offense.
Respecting the denial of Bug-atan, suffice it to state that a mere denial
constitutes negative evidence and warrants the least credibility or none at
all. Absent any strong evidence of non-culpability, a denial crumbles in the
face of positive declarations. 28
In fine, petitioners failed to rebut the prosecution's evidence and their
defense of alibi and denial must be rejected.
The foregoing notwithstanding, this Court has perused the lengthy
discussion of the trial court and the assailed Decision of the appellate court.
Prosecution's evidence sufficiently
established the presence of treachery
and evident premeditation.
Treachery qualifies the crime to murder. There is treachery when the
offender commits any of the crimes against persons, employing means,
method or forms which tend directly and especially to ensure its execution,
without risk to the offender arising from the defense that the offended party
might make. 29 The essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected
attack by an aggressor on the unsuspecting victim depriving the latter of any
chance to defend himself and thereby ensuring its commission without risk
to himself. 30
In the present case, the presence of the qualifying circumstance of
treachery was indubitably established. The attack on the unarmed victim
was so sudden, unexpected, without preliminaries and provocation. The
victim was totally unprepared and oblivious of the attack since he was
peacefully resting inside his house. The single shot found its mark at the
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 back portion of his head indicating that he was shot from behind with his
back turned to the assailant. This position was disadvantageous to the victim
since he was not in a position to defend himself or to retaliate. Moreover, the
location of the wound obviously indicates that the assailant deliberately and
consciously aimed for the vital part of the victim's body to ensure the
commission of the crime. The attack from the rear is treacherous. As has
been held many times, treachery exists since the defenseless victim was
shot from behind. The fact that Bug-atan furnished the deadly weapon used
in the shooting eloquently shows that they made a deliberate and conscious
adoption of the means to kill the victim. These facts, established by evidence
on record, clearly constitute treachery as defined in Article 14 (16) of the
Revised Penal Code.
Before evident premeditation may be appreciated, the following
elements must be proved: a) the time when the accused determined to
commit the crime; b) an act manifestly indicating that the accused has clung
to his determination; and, c) sufficient lapse of time between the
determination and execution to allow him to reflect upon the consequences
of his act.
The foregoing requisites were fulfilled. First, it was on April 14, 1993
when Manatad and Bug-atan gave Maramara a .38 caliber revolver and
P500.00 as expenses for transportation, instructing the latter to proceed to
Mandaue City and kill the victim. Undisputedly, these presuppose planning.
Second, the execution of the crime was done the following morning of April
15, 1993 where Bug-atan and Labandero accompanied Maramara to the
house of the victim. Third, the more than one day period, at the very least,
was substantial interval of time clearly sufficient to afford a full opportunity
for meditation and reflection upon the consequences of their nefarious acts.
These proved their premeditated design to end the life of the victim which
was accomplished. aHECST

Crime committed and proper penalty

While the Decision of the trial court recognized the guilt of the
petitioners for the offense as charged to have been proven beyond
reasonable doubt, the trial court went on to hold them guilty to a lesser
offense of homicide citing the Court's ruling in People v. Tapalla. 31 In said
case, this Court declared that if the prosecution accepts from any of the
defendants charged with conspiracy in the commission of a crime, a plea of
guilty to a lesser offense included in the one alleged in the information, such
acceptance will benefit his co-defendants. In arriving at this conclusion, the
trial court was of the impression that Maramara's plea of guilty to a lesser
offense of homicide in Criminal Case No. DU-3721 should benefit the
petitioners in this case.
The case of Tapalla,32 invoked by the trial court as authority in arriving
at such conclusion, is not applicable in the present case. The information in
Criminal Case No. DU-3721 indicting Maramara alone of murder is distinct
and separate from the information charging petitioners for the same offense
in the instant case. Moreover, Maramara was neither charged as co-accused
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 of petitioners nor of conspiring to commit a crime in either case. As correctly
observed by the trial court, Maramara was only a principal witness in this
case 33 though admittedly a conspirator in the commission of the crime.
These circumstances provide a distinction from the Tapalla case where the
accused Tingzon, who pleaded guilty to the lesser offense of homicide, was a
co-accused in the same information charging him along with others of
conspiring to commit murder. We therefore cannot agree with the trial
court's conclusion drawn from the principle laid down in the Tapalla case and
neither can we give imprimatur on the appellate court's affirmation thereof.
The basis thus used is, in our opinion, wrong.
As the evidence stands, the crime committed by petitioners is murder
in view of the attending circumstances of treachery and evident
premeditation. Murder, as defined under Article 248 of the Revised Penal
Code is the unlawful killing of a person which is not parricide or infanticide,
provided that treachery or evident premeditation, inter alia, attended the
killing. The presence of any one of the enumerated circumstances under
Article 248 is enough to qualify a killing as murder punishable by reclusion
perpetua to death. When more than one qualifying circumstance is proven,
as in this case, the rule is that the other must be considered as generic
aggravating. 34 In the present case, the qualifying circumstance of evident
premeditation will be considered as a generic aggravating circumstance
warranting the imposition of the penalty of death in the absence of any
mitigating circumstance. 35 Since the imposition of the death penalty has
been prohibited by Republic Act No. 9346, 36 a law favorable to petitioners
which took effect on June 24, 2006, the penalty that should be imposed on
petitioners is reduced to reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole.
Sections 2 and 3 of the Act provide:
Section 2. In lieu of the death penalty, the following shall be
imposed:
a) The penalty of reclusion perpetua, when the law violated
makes use of the nomenclature of the penalties of the Revised Penal
Code;

xxx xxx xxx

Section 3. Person convicted of offenses punishable with
reclusion perpetua or whose sentences will be reduced to reclusion
perpetua by reason of this Act, shall not be eligible for parole under Act
No. 4103 otherwise known as the Indeterminate Sentence Law, as
amended. cAaETS

Civil Liability
When death occurs due to a crime, the following damages may be
recovered: (1) civil indemnity ex delicto for the death of the victim; (2) actual
or compensatory damages; (3) moral damages; (4) exemplary damages; (5)
attorney's fees and expenses of litigation; and, (6) interest, in proper cases.
37

The Decision of the trial court as affirmed by the appellate court only
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 awarded P50,000.00 to the legal heirs of the victim without stating the
nature of this grant. As held in People v. Zamoraga, 38 civil indemnity and
moral damages, being based on different jurat foundations are separate and
distinct from each other. Thus, it becomes imperative for this Court to rectify
the error and award additional damages following precedents.
In line with prevailing jurisprudence, we award the fixed amount of
P75,000.00 for the death of the victim 39 as civil indemnity ex delicto without
any need of proof other than the commission of the crime. An award of
moral damages is also in order even though the prosecution did not present
any proof of the heirs' emotional suffering apart from the fact of death of the
victim, since the emotional wounds from the vicious killing of the victim
cannot be denied. 40 The award of P75,000.00 is proper pursuant to
established jurisprudence.
Although the prosecution presented evidence that the heirs had
incurred actual expenses, no receipts were presented in the trial court. An
award of temperate damages in lieu of actual damages in the amount of
P25,000.00 to the heirs of the victim is warranted because it is reasonable to
presume that when death occurs, the family of the victim suffered pecuniary
loss for the wake and funeral of the victim although the exact amount was
not proved. 41
In addition, exemplary damages in the amount of P30,000.00 should
be awarded considering the attendance of the aggravating circumstance of
treachery that qualified the killing to murder and evident premeditation
which served as generic aggravating circumstance. Exemplary damages are
awarded when treachery attended the commission of the crime. 42
WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment is AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATIONS. Petitioners Gregorio Manatad, Virgilio Bug-atan and
Bernie Labandero are found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of murder,
not homicide, qualified by treachery, and sentenced to suffer reclusion
perpetua without eligibility for parole.
Petitioners are ORDERED to pay the heirs of victim Pastor Papauran
the amounts of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral
damages, P25,000.00 as temperate damages and P30,000.00 as exemplary
damages. Costs against petitioners. DAcaIE

SO ORDERED.

Corona, C.J., Carpio Morales, * Velasco, Jr. and Perez, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

*In lieu of Associate Justice Teresita J. Leonardo-De Castro per Special Order No.
884 dated September 1, 2010.
1.People v. Mamarion , 459 Phil. 51, 76-77 (2003) citing People v. Sala, 370 Phil.
323, 363 (1999).

2.Rollo , pp. 10-56.

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 3.CA rollo, pp. 252-260; penned by Associate Justice Isaias P. Dicdican and
concurred in by Associate Justices Ramon M. Bato, Jr. and Apolinario D.
Bruselas, Jr.

4.Records, pp. 215-277.

5.Criminal Case No. DU-3721.

6.Decision dated July 19, 1993, records pp. 144-145.

7.Records, pp. 3-6.

8.Id. at pp. 1-2.

9.Should be 1993.
10.CA rollo, pp. 254-255.

11.Id. at 255.
12.Id. at 260.

13.Id. at 66.

14.Id. at 290-291.
15.The instant case.

16.Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Chiong, G.R. No. 155550, January 31, 2008, 543 SCRA
308, 324.
17.TSN, Maramara, October 28, 1993, pp. 8-12.

18.People v. Cuadra, 175 Phil. 72, 82 (1978).

19.RULES OF COURT, Rule 130, Section 20, par. 2.

20.People v. Bajada, G.R. No. 180507, November 20, 2008, 571 SCRA 455, 467.

21.People v. Dela Cruz, G.R. No. 174371, December 11, 2008, 573 SCRA 708, 720.
22.CA rollo, p. 259.

23.Olalia, Jr. v. People, G.R. No. 177276, August 20, 2008, 562 SCRA 723, 735-736.

24.People v. De Jesus, 473 Phil. 405, 429 (2004).

25.People v. Santos, G.R. No. 176735, June 26, 2008, 555 SCRA 578, 600.

26.People v. Santos, G.R. No. 171452, October 17, 2008, 569 SCRA 544, 574.
27.TSN, Vaflor, February 23, 1994, pp. 10-11; TSN, Maglinte, February 23, 1994, p.
20.

28.Fernandez v. Rubillos, A.M. No. P-08-2451, October 17, 2008, 569 SCRA 283,
289.
29.People v. Ballesteros, G.R. No. 172696, August 11, 2008, 561 SCRA 657, 670.

30.People v. Dela Cruz, G.R. No. 168173, December 24, 2008, 575 SCRA 412, 443.
31.45 Official Gazette 3418.
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 32.Id.
33.TSN, December 6, 1993, p. 3.

34.People v. Reynes, 423 Phil. 363, 384 (2001).

35.Article 63. Rules for the application of indivisible penalty — . . . In all cases in
which the law prescribes a penalty composed of two indivisible penalties, the
following rules shall be observed in the application thereof:

1. when in the commission of the deed there is present only one aggravating
circumstance, the greater penalty shall be applied.
xxx xxx xxx

36.An Act Prohibiting the Imposition of Death Penalty in the Philippines.

37.Nueva España v. People, 499 Phil. 547, 557 (2005).

38.G.R. No. 178066, February 6, 2008, 544 SCRA 143, 154.

39.People v. Sanchez, G.R. No. 188610, June 29, 2010.

40.People v. Caraig, 448 Phil. 78, 98 (2003).

41.People v. Ballesta, G.R. No. 181632, September 25, 2008, 566 SCRA 400, 423.
42.Olalia, Jr. v. People, supra note 23 at 725.

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