LEADERSHIP OF

PUBLIC
BUREAUCRACIES
This page intentionally left blank
LEADERSHIP OF
PUBLIC
BUREAUCRACIES
Second Edition

The Administrator
as Conservator

Larry D. Terry

Foreword by
Douglas F. Morgan
 First published 2003 by M.E. Sharpe

Published 2015 by Routledge

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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Terry, Larry D.
Leadership of public bureaucracies : the administrator as conservator / by Larry D.
Terry.— 2nd ed.
p. cm.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 0-7656-0958-4 (cloth : alk. paper) ISBN 0-7656-0959-2 (pbk. : alk. paper)
1. Leadership. 2. Bureaucracy. 3. Public administration. I. Title

JF1525.L4.T47 2002
352.3 '9 — dc21
2002067037

ISBN 13: 9780765609595 (pbk)

ISBN 13: 9780765609588 (hbk)
 Dedicated to
Larry, Feliz, Jacob, and Gavin
This page intentionally left blank
 Contents

Foreword
Douglas F. Morgan ix
Preface to First Edition xiii
Preface to Second Edition xix

1. Bureaucratic Leadership in a Democratic Republic 3

The Neglect of Bureaucratic Leadership 4
Leadership in Administration 16
The Concept of Administrative Conservatorship 24

2. A Model of Administrative Conservatorship 33

Growth as a Secure Social Value 33
The Anticonservative Bias of Public Administration and
Organization Theory 35
The Heroic Conception of Leadership 39
The Preservation of Institutional Integrity 43
The Continuum of Leadership Roles and the Preservation
of Institutional Integrity 58
The Functions of Administrative Conservatorship 62

3. Conserving Mission 67
The Authority of Public Bureaucracies 72
Preserving Executive Authority 76
Preserving Nonexecutive Authority 94
Summary 104

4. Conserving Values 107

A Viable Executive Cadre 108
Summary 131

vii
viii Contents

5. Conserving Support 135

Conserving External Support 135
The Binding of Parochial Group Egotism 151
Summary 155

6.The Administrator as Conservator 159

The Janus-Faced Nature of Conservatorship 160
The Leadership of Public Bureaucracies 168

Bibliography 171
Index 187
 Foreword

THE RELATIONSHIP BETW EEN leadership and democracy is much

like our metaphorical dances with wolves. Each dance is spiritually
mysterious; short, but episodic; and, above all, always filled with uncer-
tainty and danger. However, unlike Native American dances with wolves,
our metaphorical dance represents tension and conflict rather than har-
mony and peace. If democratic leadership is a conflict-laden notion,
perhaps even something of an oxymoron, how much more so is bureau-
cratic leadership. In fact, bureaucratic leadership has been character-
ized by one observer as a history of sheep in wolves’ clothing (Karl
1987). Neither leadership in general nor bureaucratic leadership in par-
ticular fits easily with our American system of constitutional governance.
Both are seen as somehow antidemocratic— a fundamental violation of
the principle of accountability, of being “on tap, not on top.”
In this book, Larry D. Terry seeks to legitimate the exercise of bu-
reaucratic leadership. He accomplishes this task by drawing on three
bodies of research and writing that have not traditionally been joined:
the legal, the managerial, and the sociological. The legal body of research
and writing locates the legitimacy of bureaucratic authority in our rule-of-
law system of constitutional governance. The managerial body of research
and writing emphasizes the efficient and effective functioning of organi-
zational systems as the basis for legitimating the exercise of administra-
tive discretion. Finally, the sociological body of research and writing sees
legitimacy as an evolutionary and socially constructed process that oc-
curs interactively with other social entities over an extended period of
time. Terry argues that bureaucratic leadership requires a careful cultiva-
tion of each of these three different sources of legitimacy.
The American legal framework is for Terry’s bureaucratic leadership
what the Constitution was for Lincoln’s Declaration of Independence: a
frame of silver encompassing a picture of gold. Leadership, like the
Declaration of Independence, evokes images of taking risks and moving
ix
x Foreword

from the known to the unknown. On the other hand, the Constitution
also evokes somewhat contrary images of staying on course, erring on
the side of caution, and resolving doubt about what to do by choosing
the known over the unknown. For Terry, bureaucratic leadership in the
first instance requires adherence to both the spirit and the letter of the
law, grounding all that one does as an agency within this universe of
discourse. Terry argues that this skill is critical to conserving a success-
ful agency mission in the face of ambiguity, uncertainty, and protracted
political conflict.
In contrast to the legal tradition, the managerial body of research and
writing locates the legitimacy of bureaucratic authority in the efficiency
and effectiveness of public organizations and managerial systems. Draw-
ing from the managerial tradition, Terry argues that bureaucratic leader-
ship requires careful attention to the conventional instruments of
managerial control, such as executive recruitment, training, constitu-
ency support and cultivation, organizational design, and policy devel-
opment and implementation. Although his categories of analysis differ
from those found in more conventional management-oriented texts, the
instruments of organizational control necessary for the successful exer-
cise of leadership are all given their just due.
The challenge of legitimating bureaucratic leadership does not end
with managerial and legal success. Both sources of legitimating author-
ity get translated into administrative practice through the medium of
public organizations that have long-standing existence as social enti-
ties. Terry draws heavily on Philip Selznick to remind us that public
bureaucracies acquire much of their presumptive moral authority through
the incremental social process of developing unifying values that meet
the needs and expectations of the community. Thus, in addition to being
successful on the managerial and legal fronts, bureaucratic leadership
requires cultivating and guarding what Terry (drawing from Selznick)
calls institutional integrity. Like personal integrity, institutional integ-
rity cannot be understood by reducing it to a simple summary list of
interests or of moral principles and values. Integrity cannot be discov-
ered by looking at mission statements, strategic plans, and organiza-
tional structures or practices. Although it includes all of these things, it
is not reducible to any one of them or, for that matter, to any single
combination. Integrity is what gives both organizations and individuals
their distinctive unifying “life course.”
According to Terry, bureaucratic leaders must pass the legitimacy
 Forew ord xi

tests in all three areas— legal, managerial, and institutional— before they
can properly be regarded as legitimate stewards of the public trust. Only
when each of these three sources of bureaucratic authority is properly
cultivated is a career administrator exercising leadership or what the
author calls administrative conservatorship.
To some, administrative conservatorship may conjure up images of
leaders of public bureaucracies who are excessively predisposed to pro-
tecting the status quo. Others, however, may take offense at the wide
latitude Terry gives administrators to alter institutional structures and
practices in order to preserve the integrity of the organization in the face
of significant external changes. This latitude is discussed in chapter 2
under the topic of initiating leadership. In short, Terry’s notion of ad-
ministrative conservatorship embodies a complex mixture of legal, mana-
gerial, and institutional sources of legitimating authority, a mixture too
complex to be accurately captured by formulaic summaries that describe
it as either too static or too centralized.
Terry’s effort to reconcile bureaucratic leadership with democratic
governance is not an easy undertaking. It is made even more difficult by
widespread ideological dissensus about the proper role of our institu-
tions of governance and by a pervasive social anomie that deprives pub-
lic agents of the assistance of mediating social structures in carrying out
their work. The traditional institutions of the family, schools, churches,
and social and political associations are either in widespread disarray or
have Balkanized into warring camps. But these challenges make Terry’s
book that much more timely, especially as we attempt to better address
the following three questions central to current activities at the bureau-
cratic level. First, what role can and should bureaucratic leadership play
in redefining the role of state and local governmental entities within our
system of federalism? Second, what role can and should bureaucratic
leadership play in redefining the service-delivery relationship between
governmental organizations and entities in the nonprofit sector? Finally,
what role should administrators play in deciding what can and should be
entirely privatized?
Although it does not offer a final answer to these critical questions,
Terry’s book gives career administrators the necessary grounding to
participate proactively in the discussion by providing them with le-
gitimating authority in two critical domains of democratic governance.
First, at the level of democratic process, bureaucratic life embodies
practices that in the past have been central to our system of democratic
xii Foreword

governance. Whether it be the practices of affirmative action or the eq-

uitable and fair treatment of clients and employees, no amount of reor-
dering, privatization, or contracting out will cause these concerns to
disappear. Second, at the substantive policy level, bureaucratic life em-
bodies the weighty purposes and goals of our democratic order. These
too will not disappear in the current process of taking stock. On both
procedural and substantive grounds, Terry’s notion of administrative
conservatorship makes bureaucratic participation in this debate not only
a right, but a democratic duty. His ultimate goal is to transform bureau-
cratic leadership into the kind of dance with wolves that begins to look
more like the Native American dance of peace and harmony than a con-
tinued history of sheep in wolves’ clothing.

Douglas F. Morgan
Portland State University

Reference

Karl, B. (1987). “The American Bureaucrat: A History of Sheep in Wolves’ Cloth-

ing.” Public Administration Review 47 (January): 26-34.
 Preface to the First Edition

TWENTY YEARS BEFORE THE “excellence in leadership” move-

ment stormed America, a collection of writings under the auspices of
the Academy of Arts and Sciences was published as Excellence and
Leadership in a Democracy (Graubard and Holton 1962). These writ-
ings by prominent scholars from many disciplines addressed topics rang-
ing from “Excellence and Leadership in President and Congress” to “The
Psychodynamic Aspects of Leadership.” In his chapter on administra-
tive leadership, Don K. Price ( 1962), dean of the former Harvard Graduate
School of Public Administration (now JF K School of Government), ar-
gued that we as a nation must accept that excellence in “high adminis-
trative positions” is essential if our government is to meet the challenges
of an increasingly complex society. Price suggested that government
must enlarge its share of the nation’s best administrators because “a
great empire and little minds go ill together” (172).
After arguing persuasively for excellence in high-level administra-
tive positions, Price concluded by stating that “ we do not really want
administrative leadership: we want political leadership which requires a
strong administrative underpinning.” The professional administrator
“must try to reconcile our technology with our democratic values. . . .
The purpose of his profession is to carry, with a high degree of concen-
trated responsibility, the moral burden that in a free society must be
shared by all citizens” (184).
Price’s comments reflect many Americans’ ambivalence about the
idea of administrative leadership. On one hand, we demand excellence
from high-level administrative officials. We expect them (as we should)
to be responsive to elected and appointed political elites, the courts,
interest groups, and the citizenry. We expect administrative officials to
“bridge the great gap between the way the scientists think and work and
that of the politician” (184). We expect them to assume a significant
share of moral responsibility for preserving the values of the American
political regime. On the other hand, we expect ranking administrative
xiii
xiv Preface to the First Edition

officials wholeheartedly to accept and fulfill their complex responsi-

bilities without exercising broad discretionary power and authority. We
expect them to accept the notion that they do not have a legitimate role
in governance. We expect administrative officials to pretend that what
we ask of them requires anything but leadership.
The ambivalence expressed by Price and others toward administrative
leadership is understandable, especially in view of the American founders’
concern about the arbitrary use of political power. The founders worried
that the exercise of substantial discretion by government officials would
lead to arbitrariness and, in turn, the inevitable decline of individual free-
dom. The expansion of the administrative state since the New Deal has
prompted many observers to renew the founders’ concern. Prominent schol-
ars, most notably Theodore Lowi (1979) and David Schoenbrod (1993),
have warned that the increased delegation of broad discretionary power
from the legislature to administrative agencies is a threat to democracy.
Lowi (1993b), in particular, argues that the delegation of broad discre-
tionary power (and the exercise of such power by nonelected administra-
tive officials) “deranges virtually all constitutional relationships and
prevents attainment of the constitutional goals of limitation on power,
substantive calculability, and procedural calculability” (150).1
Although the concerns of Lowi and his colleagues deserve careful
consideration, I do not share their concerns for several reasons. First,
the delegation of broad discretionary powers to administrative agencies
and career civil servants is not some type of aberration. Even Lowi
(1993b) concedes this point when he states that “delegation of power is
an inevitable and necessary practice in any government. No theory of
representative government is complete without it” (149). Second, ca-
reer civil servants in general and high-ranking administrative officials
in particular must exercise broad discretionary power to fulfill their agen-
cies’ legally mandated responsibilities. I doubt that anyone would take
the Internal Revenue Service, the Virginia Department of Child Support
Enforcement, or the Cleveland Department of Housing and Building
Inspections seriously if they did not have broad discretionary powers to
enforce their respective laws. Third, the delegation of broad discretion-
ary power to administrative officials is essential if they are to pursue
and protect the public interest. The National Park Service needs broad
discretionary power to preserve the beautiful national parks for future
generations. The Federal Aviation Administration needs broad discre-
tionary power to regulate air traffic in the interest of safety.
 Preface to the First Edition xv

The fact that administrative officials are delegated and exercise broad
discretionary power reserves for them a seat at the table of governance.
Governance requires statesmanship, and statesmanship requires leader-
ship. Because administrative officials are active participants in governance,
I must conclude that they are engaged in the art and practice of leadership.
Thus, contrary to what Price asserts, Americans do want administrative
leadership. In fact, we need administrative leadership if the United States
is to address effectively the challenges of the twenty-first century.
This book is about administrative or bureaucratic leadership. Although
career civil servants provide leadership at all levels within public bu-
reaucracies, I am especially interested in institutional or executive-level
leadership.2 In the following pages, I offer a normative theory of bu-
reaucratic leadership that gives administrative executives an active and
legitimate leadership role in governance. I characterize administrative
executives as conservators because they are entrusted with the respon-
sibility of preserving the integrity of public bureaucracies and, in turn,
the values and traditions of the American constitutional regime. Admin-
istrative executives are actively engaged in a special type of leadership
I call administrative conservatorship, which is, to use George Will’s
(1983) term, a form of “conservative soulcraft” (156).3
I argue that public bureaucracies are national treasures because it is
through these institutions that the authoritative allocation of resources
is made to sustain the Republic’s cohesion and moral balance. The need
to protect the integrity of these valuable institutions has never been
greater. In recent years, public bureaucracies have become a laboratory
for politicians, “policy wonks,” and academicians determined to test
their abstractly conceived innovations under the guise of improving
government performance. There is certainly room for improving the
performance of public bureaucracies, but these improvements must be
made with care and must be guided by the accumulated knowledge,
experience, and traditions of the political community.
In chapter 1, I argue that the subject of bureaucratic leadership has
not received the scholarly attention it deserves. I attribute this neglect to
America’s deeply rooted fear of bureaucratic power, the myopia created
by Progressive Era reforms and scientific management and the schol-
arly quest to reconcile bureaucracy with democracy. I also establish a
normative foundation for my theory and introduce the concept of ad-
ministrative conservatorship.
Chapter 2 presents a model of administrative conservatorship. I discuss
xvi Preface to the First Edition

the idea of preserving institutional integrity and how it relates to the

theory of administrative conservatorship. Next, I outline a continuum of
leadership roles performed by administrative conservators as well as
their three primary functions: conserving mission, conserving values,
and conserving support.
In chapters 3,4, and 5 ,1 offer prescriptions for maintaining the integ-
rity of public bureaucracies. Rather than offering innovative strategies,
I draw on the experience, knowledge, and intellectual tradition of schol-
ars and practitioners who have preceded me. My prescriptions are based
on an organization of the existing literature as well as on my own docu-
mentary research and interviews with administrative executives.
Chapter 3 focuses on conserving mission. The mission of public bu-
reaucracies is defined by legislative mandates and other legally binding
acts. I argue that the concept of authority is central to the notion of
conserving mission. I suggest that the administrative conservator is en-
trusted with the responsibility of preserving and nurturing authority
embodied in legal mandates that determine the mission of public bu-
reaucracies. Strategies for conserving mission focus on preserving the
executive and nonexecutive authority granted to public bureaucracies.
Conserving values is the topic of chapter 4. Contrary to the views of
many organization and leadership theorists, I argue that preserving the
core values of public bureaucracies is a task that exceeds the capacity of
any one individual. The administrative conservator needs assistance,
especially from the agency’s executive cadre. Consequently, my pre-
scriptions for conserving values concentrate on building and maintain-
ing a viable executive cadre.
In chapter 5 , 1 offer strategies for conserving support, both external
and internal. The preservation of external support is discussed within
the context of maintaining a favorable public image and sustaining
strength with salient publics. To preserve internal support, special atten-
tion is devoted to building and maintaining commitment among internal
interest groups.
Chapter 6 presents an overview of my theory. I use this opportunity
to discuss the potential dark side of administrative conservatorship. I
illustrate how the prescriptions outlined in chapters 3, 4, and 5 can be
distorted and abused by those who hide behind the shield of administra-
tive conservatorship. Nevertheless, I conclude, more positively, that
conscientious administrative executives are friends of the Republic and
protectors of the American political regime.
 Preface to the First Edition xvii

The idea for this book germinated when I was a doctoral student at
Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University. During my first year
of graduate studies, I took a course titled “Leadership and Complex
Organizations.” Two books from the extensive reading list made a par-
ticular impression on me: Eugene Lew is’s Public Entrepreneurship
(1980) and Philip Selznick’s Leadership in Administration (1957).
Lewis’s account of the organizational lives of J. Edgar Hoover, Hyman
Rickover, and Robert Moses enlivened classroom discussions. All of
the students were fascinated by the characters and the stories behind
their rise to power and eventual fall. Selznick’s book also generated
excitement. What he had to say made sense to me, partly because I had
recently resigned from an administrative position with a state agency to
return to graduate school. Selznick spoke to my experiences; his theo-
ries and concepts also seemed to explain the actions of my former agency
director, Frederick O. McDaniel, and other administrators whom I re-
spected during my tenure in state government. Most of the administra-
tors I knew or had observed from a distance, however, did not fit Lew is’s
profile of a public entrepreneur. These observations, coupled with the
entrepreneurial craze that ushered in the 1980s, prompted me to ques-
tion the long-term value, relevance, and applicability of the entrepre-
neurial model to public administration. Although I appreciated the
importance of building institutions (Lewis’s entrepreneurs were mas-
ters at this task), I concluded that Selznick was right; institutional lead-
ers must also maintain institutions through time. During the early 1980s,
the maintenance of public bureaucracies (or any organization, for that
matter) was not something leadership scholars spent much time writing
about. This lack of interest in maintaining institutions led me to write a
dissertation on administrative conservatorship. Many of the core ideas
and some of the material from my dissertation are included in this book.
I would like to express my gratitude to the people whose support,
encouragement, and critical comments were essential to the completion
of this book. First, I thank the faculty of the Center for Public Adminis-
tration and Policy at Virginia Tech for providing an intellectually stimu-
lating and supportive environment for pursuing ideas. I also thank several
scholars who took time from their busy schedules to read the manu-
script in its various stages over the years. Some tried to show me the
error of my ways, whereas others tried to prepare me for the inevitable
attacks by critics taking issue with my classical or Burkean conserva-
tive position. I am indebted to Herbert Kaufman, Lawrence F. Keller,
xviii Preface to the First Edition

Laurence J. O’Toole, Anne-Marie Rizzo, John A. Rohr, Philip Selznick,

Michael Spicer, James Stever, Camilla Stivers, and Dwight Waldo.
My children (Larry, Feliz, Jacob, and Gavin) have been a source of
strength. They have tolerated my preoccupation with the manuscript for
more years than any of us would like to remember. Their love, patience,
and understanding made it much easier for me to complete this project.
I have dedicated this book (first edition) to Charles T. Goodsell and
Gary L. Wamsley, two scholars who have profoundly influenced my
intellectual growth and development. Charles has been a source of in-
spiration. It was in his living room one evening in Blacksburg, Virginia,
that the term administrative conservatorship was coined. Charles’s cre-
ativity, high standards, and demand for intellectual quality have pro-
vided me with a lifelong example of what constitutes a true scholar. His
kindness and willingness to give advice and counsel to students as well
as peers are qualities I admire a great deal.
Gary founded the Center for Public Administration and Policy at Vir-
ginia Tech. Largely because of Gary’s leadership, it has gained an inter-
national reputation as a place where questions of governance are taken
seriously. Gary has helped me understand the value of building as well
as maintaining an institution— he has been successful at both. He is a
creative theoretician who understands and appreciates the relationship
between theory and practice. Gary is a friend and a mentor whose low-
keyed demeanor, sense of humor, and, most important of all, love o f
tradition are truly special.
To Charles and Gary, I say, thanks. I love you both.

Larry D. Terry

Notes
1. A version of Low i’s chapter was first published in the American University
Law Review (Lowi 1987).
2. Douglas Morgan brought to my attention that managers and operators, to use
Jam es Q. Wilson’s (1989) classifications, also provide leadership in preserving the
integrity of public bureaucracies. I think he is correct. Public administration theo-
rists should devote more attention to leadership at these levels.
3. Will (1983) argues that “ statecraft” is “ soulcraft.” According to Will, conser-
vative soulcraft “pertains to the conservation of values and arrangements that are
not subjects of day-to-day debate” (156).
 Preface to the Second Edition

WHEN LEADERSHIP OF PUBLIC BUREAUCRACIES was first pub-

lished in 1995, reform was a rapidly reemerging topic among people who
talked and wrote about public management. Like their predecessors, the
reformers of the early twentieth century, contemporary scholars and prac-
titioners communicated a sharply honed message: Government ought to
run like an efficient and effective business enterprise. To achieve this,
radical reform was needed to challenge and banish what they called the
bureaucratic paradigm (Barzelay 1992; Osborne and Plastrik 1997).
The reformist message resonated with many and was quickly em-
braced by governments worldwide. Countries as diverse as New Zealand,
Belgium, Malaysia, Turkey, the United Kingdom, Zambia, Portugal,
Japan, France, and Singapore aggressively pursued sweeping govern-
mental reforms (Haque 2001; Hood 1995; OECD 1995). These reforms
shared common characteristics and were conveniently organized under
the label of the new pubic management or NPM (Aucoin 1996; Borins
1995; Hood 1991).
At this writing, scholars continue to debate the origin and theoretical
foundation of the NPM (see Gruening 2001). Although this debate is far
from over, it is widely acknowledged that managerialism (Enteman 1993;
Pollitt 1990), public choice theory (Buchanan and Tullock 1962; Downs
1957; Niskanen 1971), transaction-cost economics (Williamson 1985),
and principal-agent theory (Jensen and Meckling 1976; Mitnick 1975;
Terry Moe 1984; Woods 1989) are important influences. The complex
fusion of these theoretical perspectives produced what I have described as
“the neo-managerialist ideology” or “neo-managerialism” (Terry 1998).1
Neo-managerialism provides the philosophical foundation for two
distinct approaches associated with the NPM. The first of these, libera-
tion management, is guided by the notion that public managers are highly
skilled individuals who already know how to manage. Consequently,
managerial malfeasance is a misguided explanation for the supposed
xix
xx Preface to the Second Edition

poor performance of public bureaucracies. But if managerial incompe-

tence does not explain public bureaucracies’ shortcomings, what does?
Critics of liberation management offer a host of different answers, but
its proponents give a clear, unambiguous response: The bureaucratic
system, with its burdensome rules, controls, and procedures, is largely
responsible for poor government performance. In other words, the
dysfunctional bureaucratic system has imprisoned public managers, re-
stricting their capacity to improve government performance (see Gore
1993). To achieve better results, public managers must be freed (“liber-
ated,” if you will) from what is condemned as senseless red tape. Advo-
cates of liberation management argue with evangelistic zeal that
politicians and others must “let managers manage” (Aucoin 1996; B os-
ton, et al. 1996; Kettl 1997).
Another approach, market-driven management, is the focal point
o f contention in scholarly discussions o f the NPM (Hood 1991;
Gawthrop 1999; deLeon and Denhardt 2000; Box et al. 2001; Stivers
2000). Market-driven management is influenced by two basic ideas:
(1) competition and (2) the perceived superiority of private-sector
technologies and practices. With respect to competition, proponents
of market-driven management rely on neoclassical econom ics’ be-
lief in the efficiency of markets (B. Guy Peters 1996). In this con-
text, competition refers to the “ creation of internal markets in an
attempt to reform the public sector from the inside” (Loffler 1997, 7;
also see B. Guy Peters 1996, 28; Considine 2001, 28). Competition
is the strategy of choice because it is said to lower costs and increase
the efficiency o f public bureaucracies (Hood 1995). Champions of
market-driven management make the compelling argument that ex-
posing public managers to market forces motivates them to improve
their performance (Boston, et al. 1996; Kettl 1997). In the world of
market-driven management, competition is a proven strategy to make
managers manage (Kettl 1997).
The perceived superiority of private-sector practices and technolo-
gies has a tradition that can be traced at least as far back as 1868 (see
Nelson 1982; Haber 1964). Advocates of market-driven management
argue that the distinction between public and private management is an
illusion and that public-sector managers would do well to learn from
their private sector counterparts. After all, “management is management”
(B. Guy Peters 1996, 28) and private-sector managers have an enviable
track record.
 Preface to the Second Edition xxi

Under the influence of the neo-managerialist ideology, proponents of

both liberation management and market-driven management have sought
a radical transformation of the public manager’s role (see Borins 2000;
Barzelay 1992; Roberts and King 1996; Bellone and Goerl 1993;
Schneider, et al. 1995). Public managers are strongly encouraged to re-
invent themselves, relying primarily on private-sector management theory
rather than theories of democratic governance. They are instructed to
become innovators and risk takers. They must develop the capacity to
alter institutional structures, practices, and norms in order to produce
radical change. In short, public managers are expected to assume the
leadership role of the entrepreneur.
The public entrepreneurship model is extremely popular in the United
States. It is difficult to explain precisely why this is so, but it would be
safe to say that David Osborne and Ted Gaebler’s influential book, Re-
inventing Government: How the Entrepreneurial Spirit Is Transforming
America (1992), and the Clinton administration’s National Performance
Review (a variant of the NPM) were important in enhancing public
entrepreneurship’s visibility. Despite its popularity, public entrepreneur-
ship has been subjected to intense criticism (see deLeon and Denhardt
2000; Gawthrop 1999; Terry 1998, 1993; Ronald Moe 1994; Goodsell
1993; Reich 1990; Stever 1988). Its critics argue that public entrepre-
neurship conflicts with democratic theory. Colin Diver (1982, 404) ex-
presses the concerns of many:

The entrepreneurial model has considerable a p p e a l. . . however, its nor-

mative status is . . . problematic. In the ethical realm, the entrepreneurial
model confronts m assive resistance. The principal obstacle, o f course, is
its conflict with democratic theory. Public m anagers are, after all, public
servants. Their acts must derive their legitimacy from the consent o f the
governed, as expressed through the Constitution and laws, not from any
personal system o f values, no matter how noble. Entrepreneurial manipu-
lation o f public authority in pursuit o f personal gain offends this principle.

Champions of public entrepreneurship have not let such criticism go

unanswered. For example, Bellone and Goerl (1993), arguing that the
critics’ case is overstated, suggest instead that public entrepreneurship
does not pose a threat to democracy, especially if it is “civic-regarding”
(130). Roberts and King (1996) assert that “concerns about the darker
side of public entrepreneurship may be misplaced” and “it is not the
public entrepreneur in general we should be concerned about; it is the
xxii Preface to the Second Edition

public entrepreneur who lacks socioemotional maturity who warrants

our concern” (154).
Finally, Sanford Borins (2000) argues that critics have provided little
or no empirical evidence to support their contention that public entre-
preneurship poses a threat to democracy. He asserts that the debate con-
cerning public entrepreneurship “has been conducted in the abstract or
on the basis of a small number of examples” (499). Relying on data
from the Ford Foundation-Kennedy School of Government’s Innova-
tions in America program, Borins concludes that public-sector entrepre-
neurs are not “ loose canons, rule breakers, self-promoters, power
politicians, and manipulators of public authority for private gain” (506).
He confidently asserts that critics have exaggerated the dangers of pub-
lic entrepreneurship and that such exaggerations may have a chilling
effect: Policy-makers may overreact to unsubstantiated claims and take
measures that discourage innovation in public bureaucracies.
The robust debate concerning public entrepreneurship has primarily
focused on the extent to which the model undermines or strengthens
values highly prized in the U.S. constitutional democracy. While effec-
tiveness, efficiency, and economy are certainly given their due, the pro-
tection o f values such as accountability, fairn ess, ju stice, and
representation is at the heart of the controversy. What the debate notice-
ably lacks, however, is discussion of the long-term effects of entrepre-
neurial actions and behaviors on the integrity of public bureaucracies.
This is an important question within the context of NPM and reform
efforts to reinvent government. Public entrepreneurs, especially those
who embrace the neo-managerialist ideology— and with it the principles
and practices of liberation and market-driven management— are con-
temptuous of established institutional structures, practices, and norms.
Armed with a multitude of reform strategies such as privatization, con-
tracting out, user chargers and vouchers, decentralization, and
downsizing, to name a few, the new public manager (the entrepreneur)
is expected to radically transform public bureaucracies. The reformist
impulse is strong, demanding immediate results. This is understand-
able, given the realities of the American political system, that is, elec-
tion pressures on public policy-makers (see Derthick 1990). But
preoccupation with political expediency can lead us astray and under-
mine public bureaucracies’ integrity (Dobel 1999). Our constitutional
democracy obliges us to take a long-term perspective and to resist the
“quick return” mentality aptly described by Philip Selznick (1984, vi):
 Preface to the Second Edition xxiii

[W]e have com e to understand that the American penchant for quick
returns has undermined our prosperity and weakened our institutions.
When business leaders indulge in unproductive conglom erations, or tie
the rewards o f highly m obile executives to last quarter’s bottom line,
they overem phasize immediate financial gain to the detriment o f solid
investment. But m yopia in business is only part o f the shortsightedness
that afflicts the whole o f Am erican society. Our m ajor institutions—
political, legal, educational, industrial— are under pressure to perform in
the short run and have little support, from within or without, for a longer
view o f what they are doing and where they are going.

The intense scrutiny given to the institutional capacity of some pub-

lic agencies, in the aftermath of the September 11, 2001, terrorist at-
tacks, is a somber reminder of what is at stake. Some agencies did not
perform well before, during, and or after the crisis (the Department of
Transportation, the Federal Aviation Administration, the Immigration
and Naturalization Service, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the
Central Intelligence Agengy immediately come to mind). Even before
September 11, there was growing concern that entrepreneurial strate-
gies were weakening the capacity of administrative agencies (U.S. GAO
1996, 1999, 2000). While the verdict is still out, evidence is accumulat-
ing that the reinvention or NPM paradigm may have produced unantici-
pated consequences (see Piotrowski and Rosenbloom, 2002). In fact,
one can argue that entrepreneurial actions have contributed to the phe-
nomenon I describe as the thinning of administrative institutions. Thin
institutions’ capacity is seriously reduced because of extensive erosion
of their regulatory, normative, and cognitive systems. Thin institutions
are “fragile” (Comfort 2002) in that they are approaching the point where
their ability to function effectively is sorely compromised. When this
occurs, they become vulnerable, and their integrity is threatened. As
Christine Oliver (1992) puts it, they are “de-institutionalized.”
In the intellectual tradition of Selznick, Carl J. Friedrich, Chester
Barnard, and Edmund Burke, Leadership o f Public Bureaucracies en-
courages public managers to take the long-term view and to examine their
actions in the context of preserving the integrity of public bureaucracies.
The book reminds public managers that administrative agencies are na-
tional treasures that must be protected from shortsighted reformers intent
on marketing ill-conceived innovations with the promise of improving
government performance. Finally, Leadership o f Public Bureaucracies
calls on public managers to assume their legitimate role in governance.
The U.S. Constitution and the American people expect no less.
xxiv Preface to the Second Edition

Because the theoretical arguments and related illustrations included

in the first edition of this book remain relevant today, I have resisted the
temptation to make substantial modifications. This will not surprise those
who are familiar with my intellectual and ideological orientation. I have,
however, made a few modest changes, updating the text and literature
where necessary. I have also strengthened arguments in response to criti-
cism offered by scholars, practitioners, and students.
I wish to acknowledge, once again, the scholars who have influenced
my intellectual growth and development: Charles Goodsell, Herbert
Kaufman, Lawrence Keller, David Rosenbloom, John Rohr, Philip
Selznick, Michael Spicer, Camilla Stivers, the late Dwight Waldo, and
Gary Wamsley. I also thank the students in the Leadership of Public
Bureaucracies course I taught at Cleveland State University. Their criti-
cal comments, questions, and suggestions provided insights into my work
that I did not know existed.
Special thanks go to Harry Briggs of M.E. Sharpe, for his interest in
publishing a second edition of Leadership o f Public Bureaucracies. I
would also like to thank B. Hobson Wildenthal, executive vice presi-
dent and provost at the University of Texas at Dallas, for his encourage-
ment and Peggy Woodmansee for her attentiveness to detail in preparing
the book for publication.
Finally, I am grateful for my children, Larry, Feliz, Jacob, and Gavin,
whose unconditional love and support have made life worth living. They
are, indeed, my alpha and omega. For this reason and more, I have dedi-
cated this new edition to them. I love you, guys.

Larry D. Terry
The University of Texas at Dallas
Richardson, Texas

Note

1. The discussion of neo-managerialism and the new public management draws

on my article “Administrative Leadership, Neo-Managerialism and the Public Man-
agement Movement,” Public Administration Review 58:194-200.
LEADERSHIP OF
PUBLIC
BUREAUCRACIES
This page intentionally left blank
 Bureaucratic Leadership
in a Democratic Republic

AS THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY begins, the United States is con-

fronted with a host of complex problems that touch every segment of
society. The nation’s urban communities are in crisis as homelessness,
crime, and severe poverty continue to take their toll. Once again, our
public education system is under attack. The embarrassing discovery
that millions of adults are illiterate has stoked the fires of education
reformers who believe that massive changes are needed for the United
States to compete successfully in a rapidly changing, increasingly inter-
dependent world. The number of Americans who lack adequate health
care because of prolonged unemployment or underemployment has be-
come a national disgrace as U.S. corporations continue to move their
operations abroad. Although labor officials and the general public have
expressed outrage over the loss of well-paying jobs and the displace-
ment of thousands of blue-collar and white-collar workers, they seem
virtually helpless in dissuading corporations from pursuing this “com-
petitive” cost-saving strategy.
The nature and scope of these and countless other problems and the
perception that public and private institutions are ineffective in solving
them have sparked a renewed interest in leadership. Americans from
Wall Street to Main Street are expressing dissatisfaction with the per-
formance of leaders in government, business, and labor. In fact, it seems
that the United States is in the midst of a leadership reform movement.

3
4 Bureaucratic Leadership in a D em ocratic Republic

From all indications, this movement is gaining momentum and has turned
into a referendum on the quality of leadership in this country. A consen-
sus is emerging that more effective leadership is needed to rescue the
United States from the valleys of decline. There is a perception that if
only leaders were up to the challenges, our complex problems would
somehow disappear.

The Neglect of Bureaucratic Leadership

In all this talk about more effective leadership, the topic of bureaucratic
leadership is conspicuously absent. By bureaucratic leadership, I mean
institutional leadership in the administration of public bureaucracies
within the executive branch of all levels of government.1 More specifi-
cally, bureaucratic leadership is an active process that emanates from
the executive branch and entails the exercise of power, authority, and
strategic discretion in pursuit of the public interest.
The lack of scholarly interest in bureaucratic leadership seems odd
given the prominent role of public bureaucracies in our democratic so-
ciety. Even scholars in the fields of public administration and political
science have focused little attention on leadership in public bureaucra-
cies.2 The question immediately comes to mind: Why has there been so
little scholarly interest in the role and function of bureaucratic leaders?
Jameson Doig and Erwin Hargrove (1987) offer several reasons. First,
scholars (particularly political scientists) have emphasized the influence
of interest groups in the public policy process. Second, a great deal of
negative attention has been devoted to studying the consequences of
“bureaucratic routine and institutional processes” (2). Third, political
scientists and others in their quest to understand leaders have not expe-
rienced much success in discovering “regularities in the messy data of
political life” (2). Fourth, influential scholars, most notably Herbert
Kaufman (1981a), have perpetuated the belief that powerful forces be-
yond the control of individual leaders guide public bureaucracies. Ca-
reer executives are viewed as making little difference in how their
agencies perform.
Although D oig and H argrove’ s explanations seem reasonable
enough, other reasons merit serious consideration. The neglect of bu-
reaucratic leadership may arise from a combination of related factors,
including Americans’ deeply rooted fear of bureaucracy, the myopia
created by Progressive Era reforms and scientific management, and
 The N eglect of Bureaucratic Leadership 5

the unintended consequences of scholarly attempts to reconcile bu-

reaucracy with democracy.

The Fear o f Bureaucratic Power

The rise and expansion of public bureaucracies, especially at the na-

tional level, have generated a great deal of hostility toward public bu-
reaucracies and career civil servants. Although such growth has been in
response to a complex mixture of socioeconomic and political condi-
tions, many view the expansion of public bureaucracies as a threat to
democracy (see Crenson and Rourke 1987; Nelson 1982; Skowronek
1982). Public bureaucracies have been aggressively attacked by seg-
ments of the general public, the news media, the academic and business
community, the judiciary, and the political establishment (see Meier 2000;
West 1995). These attacks have contributed to a legitimacy crisis for
public bureaucracies. James O. Freedman (1978) goes straight to the
heart of the matter when he says that “the growth of the administrative
process has raised troubling questions concerning its implications for
the character of American democracy, the nature of American justice
and the quality of American life” (260).
Although critics offer different arguments to substantiate their attacks,
the fear of bureaucratic power is a common theme. Public bureaucra-
cies are perceived as wielding too much power. Critics charge that ca-
reer civil servants have accumulated vast amounts of power and thus
are no longer responsive and accountable to elected political authori-
ties. This so-called unaccountable power is regarded as incongruent with
the values of the American democratic system.
The fear of governmental power is inextricably interwoven into the
fabric of our society. As noted by Samuel P. Huntington (1981), the
“opposition to power, and suspicion of government as the most danger-
ous embodiment of power are central themes in American political
thought” (33; quoted in Kellerman 1984,66; see also J.Q. Wilson 1975).
Critics of bureaucracy quickly point out that the enormous power exer-
cised by bureaucrats in the so-called fourth branch of government is
incompatible with the constitutional design envisioned by the founders.
They suggest that the founders did not anticipate nor would they ap-
prove of a powerful, largely autonomous political institution controlled
by nonelected and non-politically appointed public officials. The
founders were deeply concerned, so the argument goes, about the possi-
6 Bureaucratic Leadership in a D em ocratic Republic

bility of substantial power residing in one person or political institution.

This explains their rejection of the notion of the president as “ leader” as
well as their preoccupation with the need to check the exercise of politi-
cal power.3
Kenneth J. Meier (2000), a scholar who has devoted considerable
attention to the issue of bureaucratic power, raises many of the afore-
mentioned concerns. According to Meier, the bureaucracy has been trans-
formed into a political institution. This transformation is the result of
several factors, including the nature of American politics, which forced
the legislative branch to share its policy-making powers with career
public servants; the fragmentation of political power among govern-
mental institutions; the task demands and organizational requirements
of modem public policy; and the nature of the bureaucratic function that
gives administrative officials considerable discretion in implementing
public policy (see Meier, chap. 3). Meier contends that because the bu-
reaucracy is indeed a fourth branch of government, its enormous power
should be controlled and checked in a way similar to that of the other
branches of government.
Meier is not alone in his concern about bureaucratic power. The omi-
nous specter of a powerful, imperial bureaucracy controlled by a cadre
of unaccountable technocrats has heightened the concerns of many other
Americans as well. The fear of bureaucracy has become so pervasive
that Herbert Kaufman (1981b) describes the situation as a “raging pan-
demic” (1). Antibureaucratic forces have responded to such fears by
devising strategies to strip public bureaucracies of their power. These
strategies include, among others, extensive politicization of bureaucracy ;
constant reorganization; extensive use of deregulation and budget, pro-
gram, and personnel cuts to reduce the size of government; the exclu-
sion of career executives from policy discussions and formal processes;
and expansion of the size of both executive and legislative staffs to re-
duce the expertise gap between these branches of government and pub-
lic bureaucracies (see Farazmand 1989; Lane and Wolf 1990; F.E. Rourke
1987). These strategies are guided by the assumption that severely re-
ducing and tightly controlling the discretion and authority of adminis-
trative officials can curtail bureaucratic power.
Supporters of public bureaucracies contend that the aforementioned
power-stripping strategies have caused serious long-term damage and
have undermined the capacity of administrative institutions of govern-
ment to serve the public good (e.g., Adams 1984; Rosen 1983, 1986;
 The N eglect of Bureaucratic Leadership 7

Piotrowski and Rosenbloom, forthcoming; Wildavsky 1988; Wolf 1987).

Supporters argue that such strategies not only have weakened public
institutions but also have relegated the notion of bureaucratic leadership
to a meaningless status. Critics respond that the concept of bureaucratic
leadership is a contradiction in terms and thus deserves the dubious sta-
tus of oxymoron. Why should anyone be concerned about bureaucratic
leaders if there is no need for them? After all, the weakening of public
bureaucracies is intended to limit the power, authority, and strategic dis-
cretion of career executives. Moreover, because the founders were re-
luctant to use the term “ leader” when referring to the president, an elected
political official, it stands to reason that the notion of bureaucratic lead-
ership would have little intellectual currency.

The Progressive Legacy

In addition to the fear of bureaucratic power, the Progressive legacy has

contributed significantly to the neglect of bureaucratic leadership. Laurence
O’Toole (1984) argues that American public administration is deeply rooted
in the reform tradition. “American public administration,” writes O’Toole,
“has retained an orthodoxy— an orthodoxy of reform— in its continuing
series of attempts to reconcile the tensions which democracy and bureau-
cracy pose for each other” (143). O’Toole and other scholars attribute the
reformist character of public administration to the Progressive Era, that
seemingly optimistic period that gave birth to the self-conscious public
administration movement (see Karl 1987; Stever 1988; Stivers 2000).
The Progressive Era stands as a paradox when examined from the
perspective of bureaucratic leadership. Although this era had a positive
influence on the development of American public administration, it also
created a myopic outlook on the development of bureaucratic leader-
ship theory. Progressive Era political reforms, especially those designed
to make administration of public bureaucracies more “efficient” and
“businesslike,” were largely antibureaucratic leadership in nature.
After the Civil War, the United States invested a substantial portion
of its physical and intellectual resources in industrial and technological
development. Although this investment yielded high returns in the form
of material development, it was not without costs. In the eyes of many
Progressive reformers, America’s addiction to material development had
a devastating effect on the nation’s morality as well as on its natural
resources.4 This reckless pursuit o f m aterialism was considered
8 Bureaucratic Leadership in a D em ocratic Republic

dangerous; it placed the country on the brink of moral bankruptcy. The

Progressives believed that immediate action was needed to save America
and that the state should assume a primary role in this rescue operation.
Although Progressives were extremely critical of what they perceived
as the moral deterioration of American institutions, they were by no
means revolutionaries. Many reformers had a great deal of respect for
institutions, especially governmental institutions, and favored reforms
that would produce orderly social change. Because the Progressive move-
ment relied heavily on a positive conception of liberalism in which the
state played a primary role in achieving social progress, it became pain-
fully clear to many reformers that the movement’s long-term success
hinged on eliminating the political corruption that permeated every level
of government. This realization prompted reformers to direct their ener-
gies to changing the political system.
Progressive political reform began at the municipal government level
and spread rapidly to the state and national levels. Reformers sought
sweeping changes in the processes by which political officials were se-
lected as well as in the structure of government itself. The latter reforms
are of special interest in this discussion because of their direct bearing
on bureaucratic leadership.
Reformers intent on modifying the structure of government embraced
efficiency as a normative criterion forjudging the “goodness” of gov-
ernment. They believed that “good government,” one free of graft and
corruption, and “efficient government” were so closely linked that a
distinction between the two was difficult to discern. It was generally
presumed that a more efficient government would eliminate opportuni-
ties for dishonesty (see Karl 1963, especially chap. 1).
Progressive reformers were not always consistent in their use or ap-
plication of the term “efficiency.” When political reformers spoke of
efficiency, however, they usually meant commercial efficiency, or the
output-input ratio of dollars. More specifically, governmental efficiency
meant providing public services with a minimum amount of waste, du-
plication, and expenditure of tax dollars. Political reformers were ob-
sessed with the idea of commercial efficiency. This obsession was directly
linked to their love for the business enterprise model, which should come
as no surprise because many reform ers were businesspersons.
Businesspeople-reformers were fond of comparing government with a
business corporation. At least as far back as 1868, the National Associa-
tion of Manufacturers affirmed in a resolution that it was “indispensable
 The N eglect of Bureaucratic Leadership 9

that public affairs be conducted on business principles” (as quoted in

Nelson 1982, 120). Thus, reformers sought to apply the business enter-
prise model to government. In many respects, this logic made sense. It
was difficult to argue with the unprecedented success that businesses
experienced during the post-Civil War years. If business principles and
practices enhanced efficiency and, in turn, the profitability of private
enterprises, why could they not work in government? Businesspersons-
reformers were convinced that government ought to be run as an efficient
business enterprise. As Samuel P. Hays (1964) has shown, the business
enterprise model became the guiding light of political reformers:

The guide to alternative action lay in the model o f the business enter-
prise. In describing new conditions which they wished to create, reform -
ers drew on the analogy o f the “ efficient business enterprise,” criticizing
current practices with the argument that “ no business could conduct its
affairs that way and remain in business,” and calling upon business prac-
tices as the guides to improvement. (168)

The business enterprise model advocated by political reformers con-

tained three basic elements. First, the model placed a heavy emphasis
on the application of scientific methods as a means of achieving com-
mercial efficiency. This deep abiding faith in science was a reflection of
the times.

Reformers . .. turned to science to accomplish their reconstructive task. . . .

This new scientific spirit permeated every discipline related to the art o f gov-
ernment. . . . Historians, econom ists, political scientists and lawyers all
assum ed that if they could successfully use neutral and objective scien-
tific methods to ascertain the facts, their knowledge o f the facts would
guide them to proper solutions o f the problem s the nation faced. (Nelson
1982, 82-84)

Second, the model promoted the use o f experts who possessed skills,
knowledge, and technical training in the application of scientific meth-
ods. The idea of scientific experts was appealing to political reformers
because of its widespread acceptance in private industry. Such accep-
tance was largely because of the success of Frederick W. Taylor’s (1911)
system of scientific management. Reformers adopted Taylor’s argu-
ment that the scientific expert was the key to efficiency because the
expert possessed technical know-how essential for the discovery and
application of the scientific laws of work.
10 Bureaucratic Leadership in a D em ocratic Republic

Third, the business enterprise model relied on the concept of a strong

executive who exerted control over the enterprise by centralizing the
decision-making process. Reformers assumed that a strong executive
could provide direction to government activities and thus eliminate cor-
ruption, waste, and inefficiency (Haber 1964, especially chap. 6).

The Influence o f Scientific Management

The Progressives’ love affair with the business enterprise model ob-
scured the vision of bureaucratic leadership. The business enterprise
model contained strong antibureaucratic leadership biases. As mentioned
earlier, the business enterprise model incorporated Taylor’s philosophy
of scientific management, which was inherently antiexecutive leader-
ship in nature. Often overlooked is that Taylor distrusted management
as much as he distrusted the workers. Taylor was explicit about his de-
sire to perfect a factory that operated efficiently without guidance from
top-level managers. This partially explains why Taylor’s system vested
power and authority in the planning department, that enclave of scien-
tific experts who placed method over human abilities (Haber 1964). It
was not until 1919 when H.S. Person, president of the Taylor Society
and dean of Dartmouth’s Amos Tuck School of Administration and Fi-
nance, proposed a distinction between administration and management
that Taylorites acknowledged the importance of executive leadership.
In a clear separation of facts from values, Person asserted that the “moral,
social, and political aspects of an enterprise” (quoted in Haber 1964,
160) were the exclusive domain of administration and the responsibility
of executives. Because of the functions associated with administration,
Person conceded that people of special qualities were probably needed.
In Person’s conceptual scheme, management involved the use of scien-
tific methods and therefore was the responsibility of scientific experts.
In strict adherence to the scientific management doctrine, he argued that
correct methods, not extraordinary talents of humans, were of utmost
importance.
When political reformers transferred the business enterprise model
to government, they modified aspects of Taylor’s scientific manage-
ment system to conform to Progressive ideology. They retained, how-
ever, the idea that scientific experts, the new prototype of public
administrators, were solely responsible for facts and not values. More-
over, reformers had warmly embraced the notion that correct methods
 The N eglect of Bureaucratic Leadership II

were superior to the extraordinary talents of humans. These principles

were often integrated into the design of executive training programs for
administrative officials. Samuel Haber (1964) points out that the Bu-
reau of Municipal Research’s prestigious Training School for the Public
Service was heavily influenced by scientific management:

The Bureau proposed to aid the public servant and eventually replace
him with a new and better type. A Training School for Public Service was
established for training administrative executives and to “ help make the
public service a profession o f equal standing with law and m edicine.”
Bureau officials were quick to urge the use o f principles o f scientific
management. Like Taylor, the Bureau directors argued that correct meth-
ods rather than extraordinary persons opened the way to lasting reform.
In the Bureau’s training school, the “ literature on efficiency” becam e re-
quired reading and Saturday luncheon meetings were set up for discus-
sions o f it. (112-113)

By accepting the fact/value dichotomy as well as the primacy of cor-

rect methods over the special qualities of individuals, political reform-
ers also disregarded leadership in the realm o f administration.
Bureaucratic leadership as envisioned here involves more than a preoc-
cupation with facts, scientific assessment, and commercial efficiency,
as Person and later organization theorists acknowledged. Bureaucratic
leadership entails a broad understanding of organizational functions and
social processes; it requires a keen awareness of the moral, social, and
political aspects of the enterprise. In other words, bureaucratic leader-
ship is concerned with values.
Political reformers also sought to put into practice the concept of a
strong executive. In doing so, they further diminished the need and im-
portance of bureaucratic leaders. When political reformers referred to a
strong executive, they usually meant a strong political executive rather
than a strong administrative executive. The strong political executive
was regarded as one who possessed high moral standards as well as
executive know-how and political savvy needed to direct the activities
of governmental institutions (Haber 1964).
Political reformers were blinded by the notion of a strong political
executive; they could not see the need or value of bureaucratic leader-
ship as conceptualized here. Leadership was a slippery phenomenon
that could be seen and observed only outside the realm of administra-
tion. Political reforms, such as those recommended by Theodore
12 Bureaucratic Leadership in a D em ocratic Republic

Roosevelt’s Keep Commission (1905-9), the Taft Commission on

Economy and Efficiency (1912), and later Franklin Roosevelt’s Commit-
tee on Administrative Management (1937), reinforced this perception.

The Scholarly Quest for Reconciliation:

Traditional Hierarchical Theory

Ironically, scholarly attempts to reconcile bureaucracy with democracy

have deflected attention from the importànce of bureaucratic leader-
ship. Many writers in their quest to answer the nagging question regard-
ing the legitimate role of bureaucracy in democratic government have
offered prescriptions that deny public administrators an active adminis-
trative leadership role. This is especially true for scholars who embrace
either the hierarchical or the pluralist interpretive framework for under-
standing public bureaucracies.5
Writers from the hierarchical perspective acknowledge that the value
orientations of bureaucracy (efficiency) and democracy (responsiveness
to the public will) are at odds.6 This does not, however, lead to the fore-
gone conclusion that bureaucracy cannot be squared with democracy.
The conflict created by different value orientations can be resolved or at
least minimized if the roles and responsibilities of bureaucracy can be
clearly defined within the boundaries of the democratic system. Propo-
nents of the hierarchical approach suggest that a complementary rela-
tionship can and should exist between bureaucracy and democracy. There
are, however, strings attached. First, bureaucracy must occupy and re-
main in a subordinate position with respect to other democratic pro-
cesses and institutions. Second, career civil servants who administer the
bureaucracy must assume a subservient role and faithfully execute the
commands of political superiors. Career executives must concern them-
selves with only the nuts and bolts of administration and leave the im-
portant questions of policy to elected political authorities. This
perspective is best reflected in the classic works of Woodrow Wilson
(1887/1978) and Frank Goodnow (1900), which have contributed sig-
nificantly to the famous politics/administration dichotomy.
For nearly half a century, the Wilson-Goodnow line of demarcation
between politics and administration has been criticized by prominent
theorists, beginning with Leonard D. White (1939), followed by Dwight
Waldo (1948) and Paul Appelby (1949). Critics of the politics/adminis-
tration dichotomy contend that when viewed in a descriptive sense, the
 The N eglect of Bureaucratic Leadership 13

dichotomy fails to comport with the realities of the political system.

Career executives are more than mere executors of public policies for-
mulated by elected officials; they participate actively in both formulat-
ing and implementing public policy.
Although many scholars were preoccupied with discrediting the poli-
tics/administration dichotomy, the question of bureaucratic leadership
received little serious attention. This oversight is unfortunate, because a
careful reading of Wilson (1887/1978), in particular, suggests that he
was not at all uncomfortable with an active administrative leadership
role for public administrators. Although Wilson initially restricted this
role to what in retrospect is a narrowly defined sphere of administration,
he nevertheless saw administrators as active individuals who could and
should use their ingenuity, power, and discretion in the “detailed and
systematic execution of public law” (11). Wilson observed:

The broad plans o f governmental action are not adm inistrative; the de-
tailed execution o f such plans is administrative. . . . This is not quite the
distinction between Will and answering Deed, because the administrator
should and does have a will o f his own in the choice o f means for accom -
plishing his work. He is and ought not be a mere p assive instrument [ital-
ics added]. The distinction is between general and special means. (12)

Once the relationship between bureaucracy and democracy was de-

fined in complementary, yet hierarchical terms, scholars shifted atten-
tion to ensuring that public bureaucracies remained in their rightful,
subordinate position. Because the concept of subordination embodies
the notion of control by higher authorities, scholars sought ways to regu-
late and constrain the activities of bureaucracy and, in turn, the behavior
of career civil servants.
The issue of controlling bureaucracy emerged as a salient topic dur-
ing the 1930s and 1940s and was frequently discussed within the con-
text of bureaucratic responsiveness and accountability. It was generally
assumed that public bureaucracies were “ under control” if (1) they were
responsive, that is, they strictly adhered to the dictates of political supe-
riors and other democratic processes and institutions; and (2) they could
answer for their actions if required to do so (Gruber 1987; Romzek and
Dubnick 1987; West 1995). To ensure bureaucratic responsiveness and
accountability, the strategy of choice for many was the imposition of
formal external controls in the form of laws, rules, detailed procedures,
and regulations— in vernacular, red tape.
14 Bureaucratic Leadership in a D em ocratic Republic

The emphasis on formal external controls fueled a debate concerning

the nature and extent of such controls and their influence on the discre-
tion of administrative officials.7Although scholars debated at great length
the question of just how much discretionary power and authority these
officials should have, the issue of bureaucratic leadership remained in
the background. Presidential and congressional leadership occupied cen-
ter stage, whereas providing direction and control over public bureau-
cracies became essential elements of the political leadership experience.
Charles Hyneman (1950) expresses this point of view:

If administrative officials and em ployees are expected to conduct them-

selves within limits that are acceptable to the American people as a whole,
there must be authoritative ways o f telling them what the American people
want them to do. The authority on these matters, as I have already pointed
out, must be in the political branches of government— Congress and Presi-
dent. The direction and control which the political branches o f govern-
ment exercise over the administrative branch is what m akes government
in operation government according to the will o f the people. (47-48)

The hierarchical approach provided, at least in theory, an attractive

solution to the bureaucracy/democracy problem. Nevertheless, this ap-
proach had an adverse effect on the development of theory concerning
bureaucratic leadership for several reasons. First, most hierarchical theo-
rists patently reject the notion of an active administrative leadership
role for career executives. Consequently, career executives are denied
the right to exercise power, authority, and strategic discretion in pursuit
of the public interest. Second, the inherently mechanistic nature of tra-
ditional hierarchical theory reduces career executives to merely “instru-
ments” or “tools” that could and should be used by elected and politically
appointed elites to accomplish some externally defined end. The purely
instrumental nature of this perspective leaves little room for the exer-
cise of administrative leadership; career executives are restricted solely
to the rational coordination of means. As a result, they are excluded
from serious discussions regarding the determination of means as well
as ends, an indispensable part of the leadership experience.

The Quest Continues:The Pluralist Alternative

The foundation of traditional hierarchical theory started to crack as schol-

ars began to realize that formal external controls could not eliminate the
 The N eglect of Bureaucratic Leadership 15

discretion of administrative officials. Regardless of how cleverly crafted

these formal controls were, administrative officials often found ways to
retain and exercise a certain degree of discretion. Moreover, it became
clear that administrators did not conform to the passive, instrumental
role prescribed for them by many hierarchical theorists. Administrative
officials were active participants in informal political activities designed
to build and sustain support for their programs and policies. These rev-
elations prompted scholars to continue searching for ways to legitimate
the role of bureaucracy in the democratic system. Many turned to the
pluralist model of politics as a viable alternative to the hierarchical ap-
proach (e.g., Dahl 1956; Leiserson 1942; Truman 1951).
The pluralist model draws heavily on the Madisonian conception of
democracy. It emphasizes the active participation of multiple interest
groups in the political process as well as the dispersion and counterbal-
ancing of governmental power. From the pluralist perspective, public
bureaucracies are legitimate to the extent to which they (1) provide in-
terest groups ample access and opportunities to participate in the politi-
cal process and (2) function as a forum for interest group competition
and bargaining, which produce policies in the public interest. When con-
trasted with the hierarchical approach, the pluralist model seems to pro-
vide a more palatable description of bureaucratic behavior within the
American political system (Burke 1986). Even so, the pluralist model is
subject to the same criticism leveled against the hierarchical approach,
although it includes public administrators’ involvement. It denies pub-
lic administrators an active administrative leadership role in the politi-
cal process. Although pluralist scholars such as Robert Dahl (1956),
David Truman (1951), and Avery Leiserson (1942) describe a meaning-
ful role for public administrators as active mediators, they stop consid-
erably short of advocating the type of leadership role advanced here.
Administrative officials are cast in a passive role of referees in an arena
in which interest group competition and bargaining occurs. According
to J.R Burke (1986), the administrator “ is not an active responsible agent
making a positive contribution to policy formulation and implementa-
tion; rather, he is a blank slate upon which are written the demands of
external groups and interests” (19). Instead of exercising power, author-
ity, and strategic discretion in pursuit of the public interest, the
administrator’s principal responsibility is to “register whatever com-
promise or accommodation results from the competition of relevant in-
terests” (19). Given this image of public administrators, it is not difficult
16 Bureaucratic Leadership in a D em ocratic Republic

to understand why the subject of bureaucratic leadership remained on

the periphery of scholarly discussions.

Leadership in Administration

Despite the objections and concerns of many commentators, public bu-

reaucracies will continue to occupy a dominant role in the American
political system. As the American people place more and more demands
on government, it is clearer with each passing day that democracy is
dependent on bureaucracy. We can no longer afford to ignore the leader-
ship role of administrative officials. The manner in which public bu-
reaucracies are organized and administered has a profound effect on
their capacity to serve the public good. As James Q. Wilson (1989) puts
it, “organization matters” (14).
It is time to put leadership back into the administration of public bu-
reaucracies. This is not an easy task because of the long legacy described
above. To succeed at this task, scholars need to develop a normative
theory of bureaucratic leadership— a theory that is grounded in the
American constitutional tradition and accords certain legitimacy to the
role of public bureaucracies and career civil servants in the democratic
system of government. The purpose of this book is to offer such a theory.
I begin this challenging task by developing a normative foundation that
creates a legitimate role for public bureaucracies in the American politi-
cal system. Works by John A. Rohr (1986), Brian J. Cook (1992), and
Michael W. Spicer and me (1993) are used for guidance. I briefly re-
view each work and then summarize prescriptive elements that provide
the foundational building blocks for developing a theory of bureaucratic
leadership. Using these building blocks, I offer a theory of bureaucratic
leadership that provides career executives with a legitimate role in the
system of democratic governance.

The Constitutional Legitimacy o f the

Administrative State

In To Run a Constitution: The Legitimacy o f the Administrative State,

Rohr (1986) sets out to “legitimate the administrative state in terms of
constitutional principles” (ix). Rohr builds his case by constructing a
complex three-part argument. First, he attempts to illustrate that the ad-
ministrative state is compatible with the constitutional design envisioned
 Leadership in Administration 17

by the founders. Characteristic of Rohr’s style of presentation, this ar-

gument has a tripartite structure. He begins by asserting that the separa-
tion-of-powers criticism levied against public bureaucracies is often
based on “an excessively rigid interpretation of this venerable doctrine”
(18). In a careful examination of the Constitution as well as the Federal-
ist Papers, Rohr demonstrates that the founders applied a much more
relaxed standard in their interpretation of the separation-of-powers doc-
trine. Public bureaucracies’ exercise of combined executive, legislative,
and judicial powers is not, in and of itself, unconstitutional. Rohr be-
lieves that the founders would not have been disturbed by the existing
administrative arrangements.
Rohr advances his discussion by arguing that the upper echelons of
the career civil service fulfill many functions the framers originally pro-
posed for the Senate. The Senate was designed to be part of the execu-
tive establishment as well as a legislative body. After reviewing several
attributes of the Senate considered by the founders (e.g., expertise, sta-
bility, permanency, and combined executive, legislative, and judicial
powers), Rohr concludes that “today’s Senate is not the sort of institu-
tion that the Federalists wanted and the Anti-Federalists feared” (39).
He further states that “the closest approximation to such an institution
today is the career civil service, especially its higher reaches” (39).
Rohr ends the first part of his argument by suggesting that the admin-
istrative state corrects a constitutional defect with respect to representa-
tion. He suggests that the modem career civil service best reflects the
representation scheme advocated by the Anti-Federalists. Rohr offers
evidence that the Anti-Federalists believed the House of Representa-
tives “ should be a microcosm of the society as a whole” and that “repre-
sentatives should be close to and resemble the people they represent”
(41). He also points out that the Constitution makes it difficult to put
this theory into practice because of the restrictions placed on the num-
ber of representatives that compose the House of Representatives. Rohr
asserts, however, that the “personnel distribution” of public bureaucra-
cies “comes much closer to the microcosm the Anti-Federalists had in
mind than the House of Representatives ever could” (45). Thus, he con-
cludes that the career public service remedies the representation defect
in the Constitution.
The second part of Rohr’s (1986) argument is devoted to what he
refers to as “Founding the Administrative State in Word” (55). Rohr
critically examines the works of Woodrow Wilson and Frank Goodnow,
18 Bureaucratic Leadership in a D em ocratic Republic

leading theoreticians of the self-conscious public administration move-

ment. Rohr argues that the constitutional theories of both Wilson and
Goodnow are “fundamentally at odds with the principles of the found-
ing of the Republic” because they favored legislative supremacy and,
therefore, rejected the separation-of-powers doctrine ( 56). Because of
the tendency to rely on the works of Wilson and Goodnow as the found-
ing philosophy of public administration in the United States, Rohr ar-
gues, Americans have developed a tradition that is founded on principles
that are inconsistent with our constitutional heritage. This partially ex-
plains the administrative state’s recurring legitimacy crisis. Administra-
tive practice is not in line with the theory that legitimates this practice.
Rohr’s goal is to alter the legitimating theory rather than to hopelessly
try to bring practice into conformance with an unrealistic theory.
The third part of Rohr’s argument focuses on the New Dealers of the
1930s and their attempts to build a modem administrative state. He sug-
gests that the actions and views of these founders indeed were compat-
ible with original constitutional principles.
Rohr concludes that the role of public bureaucracies in the structure
of American government is consistent with the intentions of the founders.
In pursuing this argument, he offers a normative theory of public ad-
ministration that is grounded in constitutional principles. Rohr’s theory
is of special interest because it provides a foundation on which to build
my theory of bureaucratic leadership.
Rohr’s constitutional theory of public administration revolves around
three major themes. First, public administrators have a moral obligation
to preserve and sustain constitutional principles because they took the
oath of office to “uphold the Constitution of the United States” (181).
Second, public bureaucracies occupy a subordinate, yet autonomous
position with respect to the Congress, the president, and the courts. Fi-
nally, public bureaucracies, similar to the Senate envisioned by the fram-
ers, exercise all three powers of government without violating the
framers’ understanding of separation of powers. Unlike powers of the
Senate envisioned by the framers, however, these powers should be ex-
ercised in a subordinate capacity. Public bureaucracy should exercise
such powers by

choosing which o f its constitutional m asters it will favor at a given time

on a given issue in the continued struggle among the three branches as
they act out the script o f Federalist 57, wherein ambition counteracts
 Leadership in Administration 19

ambition and “ the interest o f the man . . . [is] connected with the consti-
tutional rights o f the place.” (182)

Rohr’s constitutional theory of public administration gives public

administrators an active leadership role in governance. Public adminis-
trators are not passive instruments that exercise little, if any, power,
authority, and strategic discretion in pursuit of the public interest. As
Rohr points out, the ongoing process of choosing which constitutional
master to favor to maintain the “constitutional balance of power in sup-
port of individual rights” is anything but passive (181).

The Representative Function o f Bureaucracy

Cook provides additional arguments that seek to legitimate the role of

public bureaucracies in the American system. In his article “The Repre-
sentative Function of Bureaucracy: Public Administration in a Consti-
tutive Perspective” (1992), Cook seeks to legitimate public bureaucracies
by drawing on Nancy L. Swartz’s constitutive theory of representation
as well as on arguments offered by Rohr and others. The constitutive
perspective focuses on what makes a polity. As such, this perspective
addresses the question, “How do you frame and form a people, making
them what they are?” (Swartz 1988, 128). Cook’s main thesis is that
although political foundings and popular representative elections have
constitutive qualities, it is important to acknowledge that all political
institutions, including public bureaucracies, possess such qualities as
well. To illustrate this point, Cook argues that administrative institu-
tions of government fulfill the representation and separation-of-powers
doctrines of the Constitution and assist in defining the polity on an on-
going basis.
With respect to representation, Cook concentrates on the Federalists’
conception of representation and their preoccupation with designing
political institutions that ensured serious and sustained deliberations on
public policy issues. According to Cook, the Federalists feared that the
citizenry would succumb to passion and demagoguery rather than retain
reason during heated debates on public policy issues. They were also
concerned that such passion would make the people extremely vulner-
able to the influences of those whose self-interests were not aligned
with the polity’s larger interest. The Federalists feared that this would
produce public policies that undermined the long-term interest of the
20 Bureaucratic Leadership in a D em ocratic Republic

political community. Cook asserts that because of their participation in

public policy debates, public bureaucracies help ensure that reason will
prevail. They do so through a variety of activities ranging from holding
public hearings to conducting research on proposed policy initiatives.

A modern executive establishment that participates in, indeed adds to,

reasoned deliberation and “ sedate reflection” on m ajor public issues is
quite consistent with the theory o f representation em bodied in the C on-
stitution. More fundamentally, the republicanism o f the Constitution holds
that the people, who are the ultimate sovereigns, and the institutions of
government in their representative and governing capacities, together
constitute the regime. If C ongress, the president, and the judiciary can be
said to be constitutive o f the American regime, then that must also be said
o f the bureaucracy. (420-421)

Cook then proceeds to illustrate the constitutive qualities of public

bureaucracies by linking administration to the separation-of-powers
doctrine as interpreted by Jeffrey K. Tulis (1987) in his work The Rhe-
torical Presidency. Guided by Tulis’s arguments that the founders di-
vided powers among the three branches of government to equip them to
perform different functions and to make effective governance more likely,
Cook concludes that public bureaucracies are best suited to fulfill the
function of ensuring “ steady administration of law” (422). According to
Tulis, this function is assigned to the presidency along with security and
self-preservation of the nation. As Cook sees it, the “presidency cannot
give first priority to both self-preservation and steady administration”
(422). He suggests that public bureaucracies are best equipped to give
priority to this function because of their stability and permanence.
Cook argues that public bureaucracies have constitutive qualities be-
cause they “help form or define the polity on an ongoing basis” (422).
They do so in at least two ways. First, public bureaucracies contribute to
the continuous process of determining and defining citizenship in our
liberal democratic society. Second, public bureaucracies give “ substance
and an organized existence to the values, aspirations and purposes they
help the citizenry articulate” (427).
Cook makes a persuasive argument. The role he describes and pre-
scribes for public bureaucracies makes it clear that public administra-
tors share with all others in governing the American Republic. The
continuing process of fostering citizenship, increasing opportunities for
citizens to participate in policy deliberations, and assisting elected po-
 Leadership in Administration 21

litical officials and the citizenry determine what is in the public interest
requires more than a mere preoccupation with the coordination of means
or specialized activities. These regime-sustaining tasks dictate that pub-
lic administrators become actively involved in governance, the exclu-
sive domain of leadership. (For discussion of leadership and governance,
see Selznick 1992, chap. 11)

The Logic o f a Constitution: Public Administration and

the Checking of Power

In our article “Legitimacy, History and Logic: Public Administration

and the Constitution,” Spicer and I (1993) seek to legitimate the admin-
istrative state in terms of the “logic of a constitution” (242).8 We con-
struct an argument that the “method of empathetic understanding” (240),
an approach to historical explanation used by Rohr and others to legiti-
mate the administrative state, is problematic because it fosters an in-
complete and romanticized view of the founders.9 Such romanticization
inevitably leads to questions about the founders’ conduct and character.
Spicer and I assert that this poses a problem for Rohr and others because
of the founders’ position on slavery, the moral issue of their day. Al-
though Spicer and I are critical of Rohr’s romanticization of the founders,
we do see our work as an extension of his efforts. Instead of relying
solely on a historical approach to legitimate public administration, Spicer
and I offer an alternative approach that concentrates on the logic of a
constitution. We explain our approach this way:

An alternative approach is to make explicit the central logic o f a constitu-

tion in general and to see to what extent the constitutional argument of
the founders reflects that logic. Im plications o f the logic can then be de-
rived. This approach differs from that taken by the Constitutional School,
which draws on a variety o f arguments made by the founders to legiti-
mize public administration. Whereas the Constitutional School seeks sim -
ply to develop an argument about the constitutional role o f public admin-
istration that is consistent with arguments made by the founders, our ap-
proach seeks to exam ine the role o f public administration in light o f the
logic or purpose o f a constitution. In short we seek to explain the logic
rather than the history o f constitutions. (242)

What is the “ logic of a constitution” ? Spicer and I (1993) suggest that

it is the “reason or reasons why a community of rational individuals
22 Bureaucratic Leadership in a D em ocratic Republic

would agree in the first place to develop a constitution to guide their

political order at all” (242). Guided by classical constitutional theory,
we offer two primary reasons that rational individuals would establish a
constitution. First, because constitutions by their very nature determine
the ground rules and structure the dialogue of the political process, ra-
tional individuals agree to be bound by such rules because they want to
limit the discretion of government officials. Spicer and I contend that
limits are needed because government officials are inclined to pursue
their own economic self-interest and to engage in other opportunistic
behaviors. This poses a threat to the citizenry because government offi-
cials may use their powers to exploit them. The second reason relates to
the unanticipated consequences of public policy errors. Because a great
deal of uncertainty surrounds the effects of public policies, rational in-
dividuals prefer constitutional rules that restrict the discretionary power
of government officials. These rules minimize the cost that citizens must
bear because of significant public policy errors.
Spicer and I continue by demonstrating that the arguments made by
the founders, both the Federalists and the Anti-Federalists, are concerned
with checking the abuse of political power and, thus, are consistent with
the logic of a constitution. With the preceding discussion as a backdrop,
Spicer and I conclude that public administrators have an active and le-
gitimate role in governance. This role, grounded in the logic of a consti-
tution, permits public administrators to use their discretion to check the
power of elected political officials, especially if the exercise of such
power leads to exploitation of citizens or results in public policy errors.
Spicer and I state:

If it is accepted that the logic o f a constitution is about restraining discre-

tionary power, then an active role for public administration may be ju sti-
fied on the constitutional grounds that it som etim es enables public ad-
ministrators to modify, delay, or resist the directives o f political leaders
in a lawful manner . . . . If checks on the power o f political leaders are
justified because even leaders are prone to human w eaknesses, then there
is no a p rio ri reason why such checks should not include the exercise o f
significant administrative discretion. (244)

Although the logic of a constitution sanctions checking the power of

elected political officials, Spicer and I quickly point out that this does
not necessarily mean that public administrators should disregard the
dictates of political superiors. Nor does this mean that the discretion of
 Leadership in Administration 23

public administrators should go unchecked. Both instances would under-

mine the legitimacy of public administrators in our democratic system.

A Synthesis o f Prescriptive Elements

By combining the important prescriptive elements contained in these

works by Rohr (1986), Cook (1992), and Spicer and me (1993), I draw
the following conclusions with respect to the problem of legitimizing
the role of public bureaucracies in the American political system:

1. The role of public bureaucracies in the structure of American

government is compatible with original constitutional principles.
2. The role of both public bureaucracies and career civil servants
is to sustain and preserve constitutional principles. Public ad-
ministrators have a moral obligation to sustain such principles
because they took an oath to uphold the Constitution of the
United States.
3. Although public bureaucracies must occupy a subordinate yet
autonomous role with respect to other democratic institutions
and processes, the performance of this role does not mean that
career civil servants should become passive participants in gov-
ernance. Guided by classical constitutional theory and, in turn,
the logic of a constitution, public administrators have a legiti-
mate right to check the power of elected political leaders.
4. Public bureaucracies heal the constitutional defect with respect
to representation. They also serve as a representative institution
that participates in and ensures reasoned deliberations on pub-
lic policy issues.
5. Although public bureaucracies exercise combined executive, leg-
islative, and judicial powers, the exercise of such powers in a
subordinate capacity is consistent with the framers’ relaxed in-
terpretation of the separation-of-powers doctrine. Public bureau-
cracies also fulfill the constitutional design with respect to
separation of powers because of their permanency and stability;
they are equipped to give priority to “ steady administration of
law” (Cook 1992, 422).
6. Public bureaucracies play an important role by helping form
the character of citizens by contributing to the ongoing process
of making the American regime what it is.
24 Bureaucratic Leadership in a D em ocratic Republic

With these conclusions in mind, it is now possible to make some

statement of theory about leadership in the administration of public bu-
reaucracies. Because (1) the role of public bureaucracies in the Ameri-
can political system is consistent with original constitutional principles,
(2) public bureaucracies perform an important role in sustaining such
principles, and (3) public bureaucracies help form the character of the
citizenry as well as contribute to the continuous process of shaping a
political way of life that is unique to the American regime, I argue that
public bureaucracies must be preserved so they can serve the public
good. Thus, the primary function o f bureaucratic leaders is to protect
and maintain administrative institutions in a manner that promotes or is
consistent with constitutional processes, values, and beliefs. If this is
indeed the case, then leadership in administration of public bureaucra-
cies is similar to what Carl J. Friedrich (1961) describes as “maintaining
leadership,” a type of political leadership concerned with stability of the
regime and based on authority— authority defined as the “capacity for
reasoned elaboration based upon the recognized beliefs, values, and in-
terest of the community” (21). According to Friedrich, the maintaining
leader is a conservator because his or her primary function is to protect
and preserve the existing government and its traditions.
The concept of maintaining leadership, when applied to public bu-
reaucracies, sheds some light on the notion of bureaucratic leadership.
Grounded in this concept, then, public administrators are administrative
conservators. As such, they are actively engaged in a special type of
leadership: administrative conservatorship.

The Concept of Administrative Conservatorship

The concept of administrative conservatorship is consistent with the

American constitutional tradition and provides a perspective for con-
ceptualizing the leadership role of career executives in governance.
Administrative conservatorship is statesmanship in the tradition of
Edmund Burke, the eighteenth-century British politician and philoso-
pher, because it requires a “disposition to preserve and an ability to im-
prove.” Administrative conservatorship is also an intellectual progeny
of the institutional leadership school in sociology, particularly as mani-
fest in the work of Philip Selznick (1957).
The term “conservatorship” was coined to characterize an active lead-
ership role for public administrators in governance. The term is derived
 The C on cep t of Administrative C on servatorsh ip 25

from the Latin word conservare, meaning to preserve. Someone who

engages in the act of preserving is defined as a conservator. More spe-
cific, a conservator is a guardian, someone who conserves or preserves
from injury, violation, or infraction. From an institutional perspective,
administrative conservatorship is an active and dynamic process of
strengthening and preserving an institution’s special capabilities, its
proficiency, and thereby its integrity so that it may perform a desired
social function.
Administrative conservatorship is not an attempt to preserve a com-
fortable or static state and should not be confused with administrative
“conservatorship” as described by Anthony Downs (1967, chaps. 8 and
9). Rather, controlled adaptation to changing circumstances is obviously
an ongoing necessity. As prudently stated by Selznick (1957), “To the
essentially conservative posture of the responsible leader we must add a
concern for change and reconstruction” (149).
Because it is linked to much broader considerations, administrative
conservatorship concentrates on more than solely fulfilling the needs of
organizational members. Properly conceptualized, administrative con-
servatorship is the willingness of administrative elites, out of traditional
loyalty and moral principles, to preserve authority and distribution of
power with regard to the propriety of an institution s existence, its func-
tional niche, and its collective institutional goals. In the final analysis,
administrative conservatorship is concerned with the preservation of
institutional integrity.
The significance and meaning of the terms “ institution,” “institutional
integrity,” and “administrative elites” used in the above definition of
administrative conservatorship must be clarified. The term “ institution”
as conceptualized here is consistent with the definition offered by insti-
tutional school theorists and is best represented by the works of Selznick
(1957, 1952, 1992) and W. Richard Scott (1995). For analytical pur-
poses, Selznick differentiated the institution from an organization, which
is a rational, means-oriented instrument guided by the “cult” of effi-
ciency. In contrast, the institution is considered a creation of social needs
and aspirations; it is an adaptive, responsive, cooperative system that
embodies cultural values. The cultural values and moral commitments
of a society are implanted in its institutions. In short, institutions repre-
sent the “ethos of the culture, its particular way of self fulfillment”
(Selznick 1952, 295).
Although some critics, most notably Charles Perrow (1986), question
26 Bureaucratic Leadership in a D em ocratic Republic

Selznick’s distinction between organization and institutions, their criti-

cisms are weak. Perrow argues that Selznick’s distinction was the prod-
uct of an era (the 1950s) preoccupied with order and stability. He does
not, however, address the substance of Selznick’s conceptualization of
the institution. Moreover, a careful review of Perrow’s overall critique
suggests that he may have ignored the original purpose of the organiza-
tion/institution distinction. Selznick (1957) explicitly states that the dis-
tinction is a “matter of analysis and not direct description” and was not
intended to suggest that any cooperative system is exclusively one or
the other (5). In fact, it is quite possible for the social entity to be a
combination of both. This distinction was offered as an alternative to
the rationalist school of organization theory that embraced efficiency as
its dominant value.
Building on the work of Selznick and others, W. Richard Scott (1995)
joins a growing list of scholars contributing to the revitalization of insti-
tutional theory (Powell and DiMaggio 1991; Meyer and Rowan 1977;
Oliver 1991, 1992; Suchman 1995; Zucker 1977, 1987; Tolbert and
Zucker 1996). Scott’s definition of institutions is especially useful for
our purposes. According to Scott (1995), any definition of institution
must take into account the “ importance of psychological, social, and
political elements in the study of social phenomena generally and orga-
nizations specifically” (xiii). Guided by this notion, Scott (1995) sug-
gests that institutions consist of “cognitive, normative, and regulative
structure and activities that provide stability and meaning to social be-
havior” (33). He further notes that “institutions are transported by vari-
ous carriers-cultures, structures, and routines— and they operate at
multiple levels of jurisdiction” (33). I will rely on both Selznick’s and
Scott’s definitions throughout the book when referring to institutions.
The next term, “institutional integrity,” is central to the concept of
administrative conservatorship. The idea of institutional integrity has
not received the scholarly attention it deserves. Chester I. Barnard (1948)
alludes to this:
The primary efforts o f leaders need to be directed to the maintenance and
guidance o f organizations as whole system s. I believe this to be the most
distinctive characteristic sector o f leadership behavior, but it is the least
obvious and least understood. The leader has to guide all in such a way to
preserve organization as the instrument o f action. (89, italics added)

Institutional integrity is related to the notion of “distinctive compe-

tence” (Selznick 1957, 139), the special capacities, abilities, and
 The C on cept of Administrative C onservatorship 27

proficiencies possessed by an agency in the performance of particular

functions. An institution’s distinctive competence is developed by a com-
bination of value commitments made by administrative conservators.
Value commitments are decisions that obligate and bind institutional
activities and processes to specific courses of action. They are “choices
that fix the assumptions of policymakers as to the nature of the enter-
prise” (55). Administrative decisions relating to institutional purpose,
the means for its accomplishment, and the social composition of the
members are examples of areas bound by value commitments. Value
commitments vary in terms of their importance to the formation and
maintenance of an institution’s distinctive competence. Because they
provide the foundation of an institution’s distinctive competence, some
value commitments may be considered hypersensitive.
The notion of distinctive competence is the heart of institutional in-
tegrity. The word “ integrity” refers to the completeness, wholeness, and
intact quality of an entity. In the context of administrative conservator-
ship, institutional integrity refers to the completeness, wholeness, sound-
ness, and persistence of cognitive, normative, and regulative structures
that provide meaning and stability to social behavior (see Scott 1995). It
also refers to the strength of administrative processes, value commit-
ments, and unifying principles that determine an institution’s distinc-
tive competence. The preservation of institutional integrity is an important
area of administrative concern. As noted by Selznick (1957), “the pro-
tection of integrity is more than an aesthetic or expressive exercise, more
than an attempt to preserve a comforting, familiar environment. It is a
practical concern of the first importance because the defense of integ-
rity is also a defense of the organization’s distinctive competence” (139).
The final term, “administrative elites,” does not necessarily mean or
imply aristocrats in the traditional sense; rather, it refers to those indi-
viduals or groups who are responsible for the promotion and conserva-
tion of social values. Although egalitarians may find the term “elite”
somewhat unsettling, I advocate that elites are essential to the perpetua-
tion and preservation of society because they are the bearers and conser-
vators of cultural values.
In the context of administrative conservatorship, elites are public of-
ficials who are neither elected nor politically appointed but who hold
administrative positions by virtue of a merit system. These officials in-
fluence public policy by exercising their administrative discretion. Ad-
ministrative elites are bureaucrats as honorably defined by Rohr (1978).
28 Bureaucratic Leadership in a D em ocratic Republic

As administrative elites, career civil servants are responsible for the

perpetuation and conservation of “regime values,” that is, “values of the
political entity that [was] brought into being by ratification of the Con-
stitution that created the present American republic” (59). The Constitu-
tion is the foundation of our society and symbolizes the society’s frame
of mind. According to George Will (1983):

The Constitution does not ju st distribute power, it does so in a cultural

context o f principles and beliefs and expectations about appropriate so-
cial outcome o f the exercise o f those p o w e rs.. . . A Constitution not only
presupposes a consensus o f “ view s” on fundamentals; it also presupposes
concern for its own continuance. Therefore, it presupposes efforts to pre-
dispose rising generations to the “ view s” and habits and dispositions that
underlie institutional arrangements. In this sense, a constitution is not
only an allocator o f power; it is also the polity’s fram e o f mind. (79)

When public administrators take an oath to uphold the Constitution,

they are making a moral commitment to the continuance of constitu-
tional processes that encompass particular values, beliefs, and interests.
This commitment is expressed in practical terms through their fidelity
to duty in the administration of governmental institutions, including the
values embodied in the Constitution. Through such institutions, the au-
thoritative allocation of resources is made to sustain the Republic’s co-
hesion and moral balance. As a repository of regime values, governmental
institutions must be conserved especially because the strength of cul-
tural values is contingent on the capacity of primary institutions to trans-
mit them without serious distortion.
The perpetuation of cultural values depends on the security of key
institutions. Security in this context implies stability, strength, and overall
integrity. Ensuring security of governmental institutions is, to a large
extent, the responsibility of public administrators because they are vital
in providing continuity and stability. This role is especially important in
a democratic system in which political appointees are merely temporary
custodians of governmental institutions (see Heclo 1977).
The efforts of administrative executives to preserve the integrity of
public bureaucracies afford them the distinction of being called ad-
ministrative conservators. As conservators of public bureaucracies, ad-
ministrative executives are active and legitimate participants in
“ statecraft.” Statecraft, as coined by Will (1983), is “ soulcraft” in that
it involves the “conversation of values and arrangements that are not
 The C on cept of Administrative C on servatorship 29

subjects of day-to-day debate” (156). Soulcraft does not imply the con-
servation of values espoused by a particular political party, nor does it
suggest the preservation of passing whims. Rather, soulcraft entails the
conservation of regime values, which is a moral obligation. The preser-
vation of public bureaucracies and, in turn, regime values reflect the
normative quality of administrative conservatorship.
If a regime is fundamentally unjust and even immoral, it will be dif-
ficult for the public administrator to be a “good human being and a good
citizen [of that regime] at the same time” (Rohr 1978, 61). Nazi
Germany’s Third Reich was an extreme case. Not all regimes are so
unjust. It is also possible for administrative executives to circumvent
regime values, as illustrated by the actions of J. Edgar Hoover at the end
of his reign at the Federal Bureau of Investigation. His actions did not
constitute administrative conservatorship.
Administrative conservatorship may be regarded as a type of states-
manship. It requires balancing the inherent tension in the political sys-
tem between the need to serve and the need to preserve. Public
administrators must be responsive to the demands of political elites, the
courts, interest groups, and the citizenry and at the same time must pre-
serve the integrity of public bureaucracies. Public administrators must
not be weak or subservient, nor must they be empire builders or public
entrepreneurs conceptualized in a pejorative sense. Rather, public ad-
ministrators must honorably hold up the administrative side of the gov-
ernance equation. Paul Appelby (1949) said it best:

Administrators share with all others in places o f special responsibility the

special obligation o f leadership. They can, in all innocence, contribute to
organizational practices and form elements that are inimical to popular
government. They can help “ take things out o f politics”— or take them-
selves too far out o f politics. They, like citizens and legislators, are ca-
pable o f yielding too much to the prestige o f military or other experts, too
little to the politician who is the central factor in civilian control and
popular government. B y dealing with the legislature too directly, they
may undermine and confuse executive responsibility; by the sam e tactics
they may inadvertently substitute control by members o f C ongress for
control by C ongress as a body. B y failing to be im aginative about legisla-
tive needs, attitudes, and prerogatives, they may overburden, and thus
degrade the legislature. Their sp ecial duty is in part to help clear the way
so that other parts o f government and the other political processes may
function well. (199; italics added)
30 Bureaucratic Leadership in a D em ocratic Republic

The concept of administrative conservatorship provides a valuable

perspective by which public administrators and others may view their
administrative leadership role in the American political system. It is
offered as a means of restoring respectability to public administrators
and the public service. The concept of administrative conservatorship is
also offered as a framework for measuring administrative leadership
effectiveness.

Notes

Some of the material in this chapter has been drawn from my article “Leadership
in the Administrative State,” Administration & Society 21, no. 4 (1990): 395-412.
Copyright © 1990 by Sage Publications, Inc.
1. The term institutional leadership is used in the manner suggested by Philip
Selznick (1957, 1992). According to Selznick (1992), “ institutional leadership” is
concerned with governance. The institutional leader is responsible for “ the whole
life of the institution” and “ takes account of all the interests that affect the viabil-
ity, competence, and moral character of an enterprise” (290). Quotations from
Selznick, The M oral Commonwealth: Social Theory and the Promise o f Commu-
nity (1992), are reprinted by permission of the University of California Press,
Berkeley.
2. See Moore (1995), Moore and Sparrow (1990), Behn (1991, 1998), Denhardt
(1993), Doig and Hargrove (1987), Meier (2000), and Hargrove (1989). Herbert
Kaufman (personal communication, May 28, 1992) brought to my attention that
some commentaries on bureaucratic leadership go back at least half a century. I
agree with this basic point. The type of active leadership stressed here, however,
is seldom explored in the literature.
3. As noted by Rohr (1986), the Federalists used the term “ leadership” in a pejo-
rative manner. The term was closely associated with “favorite” or “demagogue.”
4. Jam es Stever points out that the Progressives were not in total agreement in
their diagnosis of the ills afflicting the quality o f American institutions. Accord-
ing to Stever (personal communication, May 26, 1992), some Progressives be-
lieved that there were moral problems, whereas others such as the pragmatists
held that institutions were poorly structured. Stever (1990) devotes considerable
attention to this issue. See also Douglas Morgan (1994) and Camilla Stivers (2000).
5. I have benefited from J.P. Burke’s (1986) discussion and critique of the
hierarchical and pluralist approaches (see Bureaucratic Responsibility, especially
chap. 1).
6. For a discussion of the different value orientations of bureaucracy and de-
mocracy, see David Nachmias and David H. Rosenbloom (1980, chap. 2). Also
see Douglas Yates (1982, chap. 2).
7. The famous Friedrich-Finer debate is illustrative. See Carl J. Friedrich (1940)
and Herman Finer (1941). Later contributions to this debate include Kenneth Cup
Davis (1969) and Theodore Lowi (1969).
8. Rejoinders (to Spicer and Terry 1993) by John A. Rohr, Kenneth Warren,
 The C on cep t of Administrative C onservatorship 31

Camilla Stivers, Charles Wise, and Theodore Lowi are also included in the same
issue of Public Administration Review.
9. This method, often used by those described as the “Idealists,” requires that the
historian “ seek to understand the motives, intentions, and in turn the character of
persons involved in the events they wish to explain.” This necessitates that histori-
ans “ imagine themselves in the place of the person involved in the event; try to
realize as completely as possible the circumstance under which they acted, and the
motives that influenced their actions” (Spicer and Terry 1993, 240).
This page intentionally left blank
 2

A Model of Administrative
Conservatorship

DESPITE A FEW NOTABLE exceptions (Chester I. Barnard, Philip

Selznick, and James Q. Wilson among them), the idea of conserving
public bureaucracies has not been welcomed with enthusiasm by many
who study organizations and administrative leadership. It is difficult to
explain why scholars have given conservation such a lukewarm recep-
tion. Very likely it has something to do with the emphasis Americans
place on growth, the anticonservative bias of public administration and
organization theory, and the widely held heroic view of leadership. From
the perspective of administrative leadership theory, each factor has done
much to diminish the importance and value of conservation. In the sec-
tions that follow, I explore these factors in greater detail.

Growth as a Secure Social Value

Many Americans typically think of growth with the concepts of progress

and change in mind. Growth is often equated with progress, and progress
seems to imply beneficial changes or improvements in the way of life.
Indeed, this understanding of growth and progress has changed little
since the Progressive Era. We often long for and feel good about news
relating to growth. Whether such news pertains to economic growth or
to one’s spiritual and emotional growth, the concept is still held in high
regard in the United States.

33
34 A Model of Administrative C on servatorship

Organization theorists also find growth attractive. David A. Whetten

(1980) noted that “ organizational theories in general are based on the
assumption of growth and hence researchers are preoccupied with study-
ing growth and its effects” (577). Whetten offers several other reasons.
First, growth is a desirable organizational goal because it reinforces the
notion that “bigger is better.” Second, growth is a commonly used mea-
sure of organizational effectiveness. Third, growth is a prevailing ideol-
ogy in American society, and thus it has a significant influence on how
theorists perceive and interpret organizational phenomena.
When juxtaposed with growth, conservation is viewed unfavorably
by organization theorists. There is a perception that the concept of con-
servation embodies values in conflict with the pro-growth, utilitarian
beliefs held by many American scholars (see Scott 1974). Because con-
servation involves the act and process of preserving tradition, it is criti-
cized for favoring stability at the expense of change and progress. To
many leadership theorists, “ stability” is a pejorative term. Critics con-
tend that stability conveys an image of a static, unalterable entity. Sta-
bility is also criticized for its inherently conservative qualities. As a
consequence, scholars have not felt an urgent need to write about the
virtues of stability. In fact, anyone contemplating such a task would
most likely be accused of professional heresy, as Scott seems to think.
In a critique of the premises and values underpinning the classical man-
agement paradigm, Scott concludes that one is hard-pressed to find any
serious discussion in the professional literature extolling the virtues of
organizational stability. Why? Because the concept of organizational
stability “reflect[s] values that are foreign to American expectations,
and thereby are foreign to the mainstream of management thought and
practice” (247).
Contrary to what many writers propound, conservation is not anti-
thetical to growth, progress, or change. When viewed in a broader con-
text, conservation incorporates each of these concepts. Conservation is
based on the premise that traditional values, beliefs, and customs do not
remain the same: They evolve gradually over time as Edmund Burke,
Joseph de Maistre, and other traditionalists so wisely point out. This
suggests that preserving traditional views and values is, to a large ex-
tent, an evolutionary process. The key word here is “evolutionary.” Plac-
ing the concepts of growth, progress, and change under a microscope
soon brings into focus that evolution is a unifying theme. For example,
organization theorists acknowledge that growth has both quantitative
 Anticonservative Bias of Public Administration 35

and qualitative dimensions (see Ford 1980). Quantitative dimensions

are classified under the heading size, which refers to an increase in “physi-
cal capacity, number of people, inputs or outputs, or discretionary re-
sources” (590). The qualitative dimension of growth focuses on the
organization’s gradual process of historical development. More specifi-
cally, it examines an organization’s development as it moves from “ear-
lier to later or from simpler to more complex stages of evolution”
(American Heritage Dictionary 1982, 389).1Because organization theo-
rists have focused almost exclusively on the quantitative dimension of
growth, it is not difficult to understand why conservation is considered
at odds with growth.
Conservation and progress are also linked together by evolution.
Progress is defined as “development, unfolding; steady improvement; to
advance toward a more desirable form” (American Heritage Dictionary
1982, 990). James March and Johan P. Olsen (1989) criticize the contem-
porary use of the term “progress” because it is thought to imply that insti-
tutions “evolve through some form of efficient historical process” (7).2
Progress should be understood neither in this way nor as “historical effi-
ciency” (207) but rather, as March and Olsen observe, that institutions are
not always efficient in their response to historical change.
Conservation does not necessarily suggest an antagonism toward
change. In fact, conservation may require change, as Edmund Burke
(1789/1987) advised. A fierce defender of tradition, Burke recognized
the need and importance of gradual, evolutionary change. This is re-
flected in his distinction between reform and change. Burke favored
reform and defined it as the preservation of tradition by necessary change.
In contrast, change (especially change for the sake of change) can de-
stroy an institution and thus should be avoided at all costs. The essential
link between necessary change and conservation is revealed in Burke’s
oft-quoted statement: “We must all obey the law of change. A state with-
out some means for change is without the means for its conservation ’
(19; italics added).

The Anticonservative Bias of Public Administration

and Organization Theory

The anticonservative bias of public administration and organization

theory also explains why scholars have not devoted much time to con-
serving public bureaucracies. The act and process of conserving public
36 A Model of Administrative C on servatorship

bureaucracies is by its very nature a conservative enterprise. As I argued

in the previous section, many scholars who write about public organiza-
tions in general and leadership in particular regard conservatism as some-
thing to be avoided, much like the plague. There is an anticonservative
bias among many public administration and organization theorists. This
bias is reflected in scathing critiques of conservative scholarship and in
negative characterizations of conservative bureaucratic officials. Sheldon
Wolin’s (1960, chap. 10) critique of Philip Selznick’s theories of orga-
nization and leadership and Theodore Low i’s (1993a) critical commen-
tary on Michael W. Spicer’s and my 1993 article provide excellent
examples of the former. Anthony Downs’s (1967, chap. 9) description
of the “conserver” is a classic example of the latter.
In a caustic critique of organizational theories, Wolin (1960) attacks
Selznick for his “fondness for large scale organization” (427) and for
relying on philosophical organicism and the ideas of Edmund Burke to
develop theories of organization and leadership.3 Wolin is convinced
that Selznick’s treatment of large and powerful bureaucracies as evolv-
ing, natural communities with specific needs is misguided. He contends
that the use of Burkean language and concepts such as spontaneity, natural
processes, adaptive organism, and nonrational behavior is odd, espe-
cially when used to describe large bureaucracies such as General Mo-
tors and the Pentagon.
Wolin also criticizes Selznick’s theory of elite autonomy, which he
directly links to Burke’s idea of a natural aristocracy. In his book Lead-
ership in Administration (1957), Selznick argues that elites must be pro-
tected because they are responsible for maintaining and protecting social
values. Although Selznick is careful to define elites as “any group re-
sponsible for a social value” (120), Wolin ignores this definition and
offers his own. He argues that Selznick’s notion of elite appears at first
glance related to Platonism, which suggests that “those few who have
the qualifications for exercising the highest social functions should be
in the positions of highest authority” (420). But on close inspection,
says Wolin, another dominant form of elitism becomes apparent— a form
that conceptualizes an elite as “a group whose superiority rests on its
excellence in manipulation” of the masses (420). According to Wolin,
Selznick’s work and other “conservatively-oriented literature of organi-
zation theory” (427) provide a blueprint for elite manipulation of the
masses. As complex systems of domination, large bureaucracies are in-
struments of control; they are used by elites to shape the behavior of the
 Anticonservative Bias o f Public Administration 37

masses. Wolin considers this employment dangerous because Selznick’s

conservative theories are nothing more than “Leninism clothed in the
language of Burke” (427). Wolin continues by asserting that the “con-
servative cast to the thought of Selznick and, earlier, Elton Mayo sug-
gests how hopelessly anachronistic are the contemporary romantic
conservative writers” (510, n. 283).
It is obvious that Wolin has difficulty with the inherent conservatism
o f Selzn ick’s work. It is no stretch to say that this pronounced
anticonservative bias has an influence on his interpretation of Selznick’s
theories. The same can be said about Low i’s (1993a) critique of the
article by Spicer and me.
As I discussed in chapter 1, Spicer and I (1993) attempt to legitimate
the role of public administrators in governance by grounding our argu-
ments in classical constitutional theory.4 In the tradition of the Federal-
ists, Michael Oakeshott (1975), James Buchanan and Gordon Tullock
(1962), and Friedrich A. Hayek (1944), and Spicer and I argue that an
important purpose of a constitution is to limit the abuse of political power
and that public administration has a rightful place in governance if it
performs this regime-sustaining function.
Lowi (1993a), “disturbed” by this argument, counters with two main
criticisms.5 First, Lowi makes his familiar argument that the discretion
and power of administrative officials has increased immensely since the
New Deal largely because of poorly crafted and imprecise laws. This
has created a situation that shakes the foundation of the American po-
litical system. To suggest that public administrators should have more
discretion, especially when such discretion is used to check the power
of elected political officials, undermines the values and principles of the
American democratic form of government.
Low i’s second major criticism pertains to the conservative nature of
the article by Spicer and me. He views our work as representative of a
band of conservative scholars who seek to establish public administra-
tion as the “core of modem government” and of the “constitution it-
self.” Lowi argues that our approach to public administration is “totally
bizarre” ; it is “pessimistic about democracy— if not downright hostile
to it.” Lowi suggests that our approach is “farther to the right wing side
of American politics than the New Deal was to the Left.” He also states
that our position is “not libertarian but genuinely conservative ” (263-
264; italics added). In short, it is the conservatism that annoys Lowi the
most, as the following statement reveals:
38 A Model of Administrative C on servatorship

The position o f Spicer and Terry in this article is neither ludicrous nor, in
its own way, illogical. It is to me frightening___Conservatism has emerged
and is coalescing around an effort to provide Am erica with a new ap-
proach to public administration as the core o f a new, more conservative
regime. We see elements o f this effort in Spicer and Terry and in Rohr,
despite som e disagreem ents between them. Taking the whole group to-
gether, they are pushing us in theory, and eventually in practice, toward
the Third Republic. It is a republic that I would like even less than the
second. (264)

In addition to the attacks on conservative scholarship by Wolin, Lowi,

and others, the anticonservative bias of public administration and or-
ganization theory is reflected in the negative portrayal of administra-
tive officials who actively seek to maintain public bureaucracies and,
in turn, the American regime. Nowhere is this more obvious than in
the work of Anthony Downs (1967). In building a theory of bureau-
cratic decision-making, Downs describes five ideal types of bureau-
cratic officials: “climbers,” “conservers,” “zealots,” “ advocates,” and
“ statesmen” (88). Each type is driven by a range of self-interested
motives and behaviors. According to Downs, climbers and conservers
are the most self-interested because they are not “ altruistic” nor do
they have any “loyalty to larger values” (88). Of interest here is Downs’s
characterization of the conserver, which should not be confused with
the administrative conservator.
Downs paints an unflattering portrait of the conserver and acknowl-
edges that his characterization of the conserver is based in part on
Robert Prethus’s (1975, chap. 7) concept of “ indifferents” (185). This
alone warns of the inherently negative quality of Downs’s conserver
concept. Prethus’s description of the indifferents indicates a prejudice
against bureaucratic officials from working- and lower-middle-class
backgrounds. The following comments by Prethus certainly lead to
this conclusion:

Turning to the indifferents’ accom m odation to the bureaucratic situa-

tion, we find that they are typical o f w orking-class or lower-middle
class origin. This im plies a distinctive style o f early socialization. Not
only will they rarely have been inculcated with the desire to excel, but
class status and limited education have not usually prepared them for the
graceful acceptance o f authority which has becom e so critical for organi-
zational mobility. W hereas m iddle-class child training has em phasized
 The H eroic Conception of Leadership 39

self-direction, respect for authority, and the muffling o f aggression, lower-

class socialization has stressed conformity and been rather more tolerant
o f fighting, truancy, haphazard toilet training, and the like. (196)

Under the influence of Prethus’s concept, Downs (1967) proceeds to

demean bureaucratic officials who perform the valuable function of
maintaining administrative institutions of government. The conserver is
portrayed as a pathetic bureaucratic official who is afraid of and resists
most, if not all, types of change. Downs’s conservers are “timorous,
self-effacing, extremely cautious, plagued by inferior feeling or just in-
different about their occupations” (97). They also have a defeatist out-
look on life, possess “mediocre abilities,” and are confined to their official
positions because of a lack of ambition.
Downs’s description of the conserver has successfully created what
Doris Graber (1976) describes as “reality-sleeves”— “conceptual straight-
jackets which tightly enclose the minds of individuals or groups and
prevent them from accepting conflicting perceptions” (53). Consequently,
it should come as no surprise that Downs’s negative image of the con-
server has had a profound influence on how theorists perceive bureau-
cratic officials who preserve the integrity of public bureaucracies.
Unfortunately, administrative officials dedicated to this regime-sustain-
ing function are viewed, more often than not, with a jaundiced eye.

The Heroic Conception of Leadership

The heroic conception of leadership may explain why scholars have

shied away from the idea of conserving public bureaucracies. Conserv-
ing the organization does not conform with the heroic image of leaders
promoted by many theorists. Writers tend to overemphasize the impor-
tance of leaders, creating what is nearly a “great man” theory of admin-
istration (see Meindl et al. 1985).
The business management literature, in particular, is saturated with
images of a powerful, heroic leader (e.g., Bass 1984,1985;Bennis 1989;
Tichy and Devanna 1986; Tichy and Ulrich 1984). This literature con-
tains several dominant themes. One readily apparent theme is that lead-
ers of private-sector institutions are cast in a role larger than life. These
leaders are viewed as having (or as those who should have) enormous
power, derived primarily from charisma, to alter organizational events
at their discretion. Lee Iacocca, the former chairman of the Chrysler
40 A Model of Administrative C onservatorship

Corporation, and Michael Blumenthal, the former head of Burroughs

Corporation, are offered as illustrations. Implicit in this heroic view of
leadership is a coercive conception of authority that is based on domi-
nation and forced submission.
A second theme found in business management literature relates to
the measurement of leadership effectiveness. Leaders are considered
effective if they successfully implement revolutionary changes that re-
sult in the radical reconstruction of an organization’s technical, politi-
cal, and cultural systems. A propensity for risk-taking, opportunism, and
innovation is also factored into the effectiveness equation. Leaders who
fulfill these requirements are said to have “made a difference.”
A third theme found in the business management literature revolves
around the concept of tradition. The term “tradition” has ecclesiastical
roots and is defined as a “ set of established values and beliefs having
persisted over several generations” (C.J. Friedrich 1972, 18). Contem-
porary organization theorists tend to portray leaders as antitraditionalists.
Organizational values and traditions that have endured through time are
viewed with disdain and suspicion. Heroic leaders are encouraged to
abandon tradition in their urgent search for new ways of doing things.
As has often been the case, public administration theorists have bor-
rowed concepts from the business management field. Most, if not all, of
the aforementioned themes have surfaced in recent discussions concern-
ing leadership in public bureaucracies. For example, Jameson Doig and
Erwin Hargrove (1987), in an edited volume on leadership in public
bureaucracies, seek to counteract what they call a “pessimistic view”
that leaders of public agencies “make very little difference” (4). They
adopt a conceptual framework governed by the principles of entrepre-
neurship and innovation. Leaders of public bureaucracies are character-
ized as entrepreneurs.
Given the conceptual framework employed by Doig and Hargrove, it
is no surprise that they emphasize many of the dominant themes found
in the business management literature. For example, leaders of public
agencies are depicted as individuals who possess unusual powers and
qualities that enable them to dominate and conquer others:

Our thirteen entrepreneurs were strongly motivated to place their im-

prints on the com plex world o f public policy. For som e such as Nancy
Hanks and Elm er Staats the personal style was low-keyed but assertive.
Others like Lilienthal and Rickover were more competitive, even com -
 The H eroic C onception of Leadership 41

bative reminding us o f Schum peter’s characterization o f the entrepre-

neur as a person who has the “ will to conquer: the im pulse to fight, to
prove on eself superior to others.” For all o f our chosen leaders, probably
the will to conquer was there; som e sought to only conquer challenging
political and technical problem s; while others were motivated as well by
the need to dominate people inside and beyond their organization. (12)

Doig and Hargrove also imply that leadership effectiveness is mea-

sured by the leader’s ability to reconstruct organizational structures, func-
tions, and processes. Effective leaders, that is, those who make a
difference, “ identify new missions and programs,” “create and nourish
external constituencies to support new goals,” “create internal constitu-
encies through changes in organizational structures,” and “enhance the
organization’s technical expertise to implement new goals and programs”
(8). The emphasis on new can be interpreted to mean that existing orga-
nizational structures, functions, and processes are inadequate and thus
require radical reconstruction.
The notion that effective bureaucratic leaders are risk-takers and op-
portunists is central to Doig and Hargrove’s conception of leadership.
Leaders are viewed as high-stake players in the organizational game
who are willing to sacrifice everything to “make a difference.” They are
said to have a burning desire to throw their “energies and personal repu-
tations into the fray in order to bring about change” (11). The
organization’s established value system is perceived as a formidable foe
that challenges the creation and institutionalization of innovation. En-
trepreneurial leaders are encouraged to disassociate themselves with
established traditions and reformulate their self-concept in terms of a
new value system. In other words, effective leaders must destroy orga-
nizational traditions in order to “ make a difference.” In quoting
Schumpeter, Doig and Hargrove state:

In one sense, he may indeed be called the most rational and m ost egotis-
tical o f all . . . and the typical entrepreneur is more self-centered than
other types, because he relies less than they do on tradition and connec-
tion with the past and because his characteristic task— theoretically as
well as historically— consists o f precisely in breaking up old, and creat-
ing new, traditions. (11)

Innovative leaders are almost always needed at some point in an

organization’s history. Nevertheless, the depiction of these leaders as
42 A Mode! of Administrative C on servatorship

heroes and high-flying risk-takers is a distortion of reality. The heroic

conception of leadership is dangerous for several reasons. First, the he-
roic conception perpetuates a romanticized view of leadership. The view
that leaders of public bureaucracies must impose their will on the world
to make a difference is a myth, a reflection of “poetic exaggeration bet-
ter suited for song and legend” (C.J. Friedrich 1961, 21). Bureaucratic
leaders are not obliged to accept the challenges of fulfilling unrealistic
role expectations that require that they become a “cross between super-
man and knights of the Round Table” (Drucker 1985, 139).
Second, the heroic perspective focuses exclusively on the radical re-
construction of public bureaucracies. Although drastic changes may be
necessary at times, such changes are the exception rather than the rule.
Bureaucratic leadership more often requires the ongoing management
of evolutionary and incremental changes.
Third, the heroic view depreciates the valuable contributions made
by many bureaucratic leaders. The so-called nonheroic leader is ridi-
culed and labeled a manager. Unfortunately, the manager is seen as an
ineffective individual who is threatened by change and whose main call-
ing in life is to defend the status quo, regardless of changing circum-
stances. Surely it is possible that something more exists between the
“great man” who is capable of heroic acts and the pathetic, unimagina-
tive technocrat incapable of taking risk, who avoids conflict and is driven
by narrow purposes. The heroic view of leadership makes it virtually
impossible to conceive of other possibilities.
Last, the heroic conception of leadership encourages the abandon-
ment of tradition, the normative anchor that governs the rational action
of administrative officials. This is especially troublesome because, as
Selznick (1987) writes, “the rational action of individuals must be an-
chored in some way” (458). Consistent with the views of Edmund Burke,
Selznick argues that rational action must be grounded in tradition. When
public administration theorists encourage bureaucratic leaders to disre-
gard tradition, they are in a sense asking them to abandon their rational
basis of authority. Authority in this context is defined as the capacity for
reasoned elaboration grounded in the funded experience or tradition of
the political community (C.J. Friedrich 1958a, 39).
The heroic conception of leadership deflects attention from the im-
portance of conserving public bureaucracies. Conserving viable and le-
gitimate governmental institutions is equally important to transforming
bad institutions or building new ones. Meindl et al. (1985) are correct in
 The Preservation of Institutional Integrity 43

asserting that leadership theorists have “elevated the concept [leader-

ship] to a lofty status and level of significance. . . . It has gained a bril-
liance that exceeds the limits of normal scientific inquiry” (78).

The Preservation of Institutional Integrity

In light of the heroic model’s commitment to radical change and the

conserver’s opposition to any change at all, the notion of institutional
integrity, at the core of the theory of administrative conservatorship, has
both heuristic as well as practical value. As indicated in chapter 1, institu-
tional integrity is related to the concept of distinctive competence. Ad-
ministrative agencies, like all other institutions, develop special capabilities
and proficiencies in the performance of their tasks. Through time, these
proficiencies solidify into a distinctive competence that is maintained by
a combination of value commitments made by institutional leaders con-
cerning the nature of the enterprise. To say that an institution has integrity
is to suggest that it is faithful to the functions, values, and distinctive set
of unifying principles that define its special competence and character.
The term “preservation” has special significance when discussed in
relationship to institutional integrity. Preservation, according to Webster's
Tenth Collegiate Dictionary (1993), involves the process of keeping from
injury, destruction, or decay or the protection or maintenance of an en-
tity. In the context of administrative conservatorship, the preservation
of institutional integrity involves protecting the institution’s regulatory,
normative, and cognitive systems from injury, destruction, or decay. It
also involves protecting institutional processes, values, and unifying prin-
ciples that determine an institution’s distinctive competence. For ex-
ample, if a university develops a distinctive competence as an institution
dedicated to teaching, the administrative conservator must protect val-
ues, processes, and activities relating to the teaching function. Func-
tions and processes relating to recruitment and selection of faculty
members are a case in point. The administrative conservator must en-
sure that recruitment and selection processes and procedures are gov-
erned by values that consistently result in the hiring of faculty members
who have a demonstrated commitment to teaching. The conservator must
also pay close attention to other institutional policies and procedures
(i.e., those relating to faculty evaluation, faculty/student ratio, class-
room size and design, and so forth) that may have a direct bearing on the
teaching function.
44 A Model of Administrative C onservatorship

Selznick (1957) pointed out that “few aspects of organization are so

important, yet so badly neglected by students of the subject, as the prob-
lem of institutional integrity” (130). He also stated that the defense of
institutional integrity is “one of the most important and least understood
functions of leadership” (63).6 Since Selznick wrote these words, little
has changed. Organization and leadership theorists continue to devote
scant attention to this important concept. Because institutional integrity
occupies a central place in the theory of administrative conservatorship,
I will discuss the concept in more detail. I review Selznick’s treatment
of the subject in two of his prominent works, Leadership in Administra-
tion: A Sociological Interpretation (1957) and The Moral Common-
wealth: Social Theory and the Promise of Community (1992). I then
draw on Selznick’s conceptualization to advance this discussion of ad-
ministrative conservatorship.

Selznick’s Theory o f Autonomy and Responsiveness

Selznick (1952) introduced the concept of institutional integrity in a

study of communist organization. But not until the publication of Lead-
ership in Administration (1957) did the concept attract serious atten-
tion. In describing what he means by the “ institutional embodiment of
purpose” (90), Selznick explains the meaning and importance of institu-
tional integrity. He suggests that it is the responsibility of the leader as
statesman to protect the “institution’s distinctive values, competence
and role” (119). This is what he means by the defense of institutional
integrity. Selznick contends that an institution’s integrity is vulnerable
to corruption when its values are “tenuous or insecure” (120).
Selznick (1957) draws attention to the dangerous internal forces that
undermine institutional integrity. He also discusses strategies that insti-
tutional leaders can use to prevent or minimize the destruction by such
forces. A viable strategy is elite autonomy. When Selznick speaks of
autonomy, he is referring to “a condition of independence sufficient to
permit a group to work out and maintain distinctive identity” (121). As
indicated earlier, elites are responsible for the preservation of the
institution’s distinctive competence, values, and role. To effectively per-
form this function, they must be protected from dangerous extraneous
pressures. According to Selznick, autonomy can be achieved through
the isolation o f elites.
 The Preservation of Institutional Integrity 45

Thirty-five years later, in The Moral Commonwealth: Social Theory

and the Promise o f Community, Selznick (1992) offers a more complex
and developed notion of institutional integrity. Although the essence of
the concept remains the same, Selznick examines integrity from the
perspective of the “moral institution” (229). After discussing the con-
cepts of identity and character and their relationship to institutional in-
tegrity, Selznick carefully explains the idea of integrity this way:

A test o f moral character is the idea o f integrity. This idea brings morality
to bear in a way that respects autonomy and plurality o f persons and
institutions. The chief virtue o f integrity is fidelity to self-defining prin-
ciples. To strive for integrity is to ask: What is our direction? What are
our unifying principles? And how do these square with the claim s o f
morality? . . . Integrity involves both wholeness and soundness. It is som e-
thing we associate with moral coherence, not with coherence o f every
sort. Integrity has to do with principles, and therefore with principled
conduct. Not every belief is a principle, nor may every action in the name
o f belief be considered principled conduct. A po litical, administrative or
judicial decision is principled if it is guided by a coherent conception o f
institutional morality, that is, o f appropriate ends and means. . . . What
counts as integrity, and what affects integrity, will be different for a uni-
versity press and a com mercial publisher; for a constitutional court and a
lower court; for a regulatory agency and a highway department. Each
institution, or type o f institution, has special functions and values; each
has a distinctive set o f unifying principles. When a lack o f integrity is
charged, there is alw ays an explicit conception o f what the institution is
or should be. (3 22-324, italics in original)7

As he had done in previous discussions of institutional integrity,

Selznick addresses the notion of autonomy. But this time the emphasis
is on institutional autonomy rather than elite autonomy. The theory of
.elite autonomy is not discarded; many of its elements remain intact and
are embodied in the idea of institutional autonomy. Instead of explicitly
discussing elite autonomy within the institution, Selznick shifts the dis-
cussion to institutional autonomy within the larger community. This is a
subtle but important shift because now the dialogue focuses on a differ-
ent level of analysis (institutional vs. group) and addresses both exter-
nal and internal forces that threaten institutional integrity.
In Selznick’s (1992) recent formulation, autonomy and integration
are viable strategies for preserving institutional integrity. “Autonomy,”
46 A Model of Administrative C on servatorship

writes Selznick, “ safeguards values and competencies by entrusting them

to their most committed agents and by insulating them from alien pres-
sures and temptations” (334). In contrast, institutional integration builds
and “widens support for the institution and provides opportunities for
growth and adaptation.” It also checks the power of institutions and
serves as a buffer against “perverse and self-defeating isolation” (334).
The idea of responsiveness and its bearing on institutional integrity is
also moved front and center in Selznick’s recent work. In the earlier
work Leadership in Administration (1957), responsiveness is discussed
in the concluding chapter under the heading of the “responsible leader.”
A responsible leader is one who understands, among other things, the
dangers of both opportunism and utopianism. Opportunism is the “pur-
suit of immediate, short-run advantage in a way inadequately controlled
by considerations of principle and ultimate consequence” (143), whereas
utopianism is the avoidance of difficult institution-sustaining decisions
because of a “flight to abstractions” (147; i.e., the overgeneralization of
mission and an overreliance on technical solutions to resolve institu-
tional problems).
In The Moral Commonwealth (1992), responsiveness is examined
in a much broader context as Selznick once again shifts the level of
analysis to the institution. The responsive institution is one that “avoids
insularity without embracing opportunism” ; it preserves institutional
integrity “while taking into account new problems, new forces in the
environment, new demands and expectations” (336). Selznick empha-
sizes that the responsive institution is “ selective” in its adaptation to
external demands; the institution must resist pressures and demands
that weaken institutional integrity. This is a complex task, for the threat
of opportunism is always present. He also stresses that the responsive
institution is a “responsible institution” (338). The moral institution is
responsible to the extent that it is open to changes and revisions in its
functions and process. Such changes are and should be guided, how-
ever, by a fidelity to the values and unifying principles that determine
institutional integrity.
Selznick’s discussion of institutional integrity and, in turn, autonomy
and responsiveness is relevant to the theory of administrative conserva-
torship. To examine administrative leadership in public bureaucracies
and the distinctions between public institutions and the modem busi-
ness enterprise, Selznick’s notion of autonomy and responsiveness re-
quires some additional clarification.
 The Preservation of Institutional Integrity 47

Institutional Autonomy and Administrative

Conservatorship

The concept of autonomy raises several important questions in connec-

tion with public bureaucracies. The first question relates to the meaning
of autonomy. What does the term mean when used in relation to public
bureaucracies? Does it, as Herbert Kaufman (1981a) asks, mean that
career administrative officials and public bureaucracies have the free-
dom to do whatever they desire, regardless of what others want? Does it
mean that public bureaucracies have the ability to “act independently of
some of or all of the groups that have authority to constrain it?” (J.Q.
Wilson 1978,165; quoted in Kaufman 1981a, 161). Does it mean protect-
ing the “relatively undisputed jurisdiction” or turf of public bureaucracies
(J.Q. Wilson 1989, 183)? Or does autonomy mean institutional insulation
from political intrusion? It appears that autonomy has a variety of differ-
ent meanings and, thus, is subject to multiple interpretations.
The second question relates to the so-called bureaucracy/democracy
problem. Is there, or should there be, a legitimate place for autonomous
administrative institutions in the American democratic form of govern-
ment? This important question goes straight to the heart of our constitu-
tional system of government. The American political regime is founded
on principles that emphasize the checking of political power. The sepa-
ration of powers among the three political institutions is intended, in
part, to achieve this purpose. If one accepts the argument of Rohr (1986)
and others that public bureaucracies should be subordinate yet autono-
mous institutions, does this not undermine the rationale and principles
of our constitutional democracy? Is it possible for administrative insti-
tutions to be subordinate and autonomous at the same time? In other
words, is there an inherent contradiction in the notion of subordinate-
autonomous? The answers to these and related questions are no doubt
complex. Nevertheless, it is necessary to deal with the autonomy issue
directly if the theory of administrative conservatorship is to have any
persuasive appeal.
The moral and political philosopher Gerald Dworkin (1988, chap.
1) traces the etymology of the term “autonomy” back to the Greek
city-state. According to Dworkin, a city had autonomia when the citi-
zenry made and administered their own laws. He points out that be-
cause auto means self and nomos refers to rule of law, autonomy
embodies the concept of self-rule or independence. The operative word
48 A Model of Administrative C on servatorship

here is independence. The Compact Oxford English Dictionary (1991)

defines independence as the “condition or quality of being independent”
(847). The term “independent” means “not depending on the authority
of another, not in a position of subordination or subjection; not subject
to external control or rule, self governing, autonomous, free” (847).
When the meaning of autonomy is based on a strict and literal inter-
pretation of the term, it is easy to understand why political theorists
such as Herbert Kaufman, Theodore Lowi, Herman Finer, and Charles
Hyneman, among others, vehemently opposed any theory that advo-
cates the autonomy of public bureaucracies. It is also easy to understand
why organization theorists such as Philip Selznick, James D. Thomp-
son, Jeffrey Pfeifer, and Gerald Salancik view autonomy as a desirable
and valuable organizational quality. The holding of different views by
political theorists and organization theorists regarding the desirability
of autonomy is, in and of itself, an issue to ponder. Why do political and
organization theorists have diametrically opposing views on autonomy?
One answer might be that theorists are caught in what Gary L. Wamsley
(1990) describes as the “conceptual no-man’s-land” that exists between
political theory and organization theory (127). This answer has merit
and seems plausible, but it appears incomplete. I argue that there is some-
thing more to this notion of autonomy: The meaning o f autonomy is
contextual, that is, the condition o f independence or self-rule is condi-
tioned by the context. Literary, legal, and philosophical scholars con-
cerned with the interpretation of texts offer persuasive arguments that
the complete meaning of words and phrases cannot be ascertained with-
out regard to their context. This so-called contextualist doctrine applies
here as well.
Autonomy has particular meaning within the context of the Ameri-
can political system. The executive, legislative, and judicial branches of
government are autonomous only insofar as they have primary (but not
exclusive) responsibility for specific functions as well as the protection
of values related to such functions. From a constitutional perspective,
each political institution is independent, but not one has absolute au-
tonomy in the strictest sense of the word. Because of the interdepen-
dency of constitutional functions and the sharing of power among the
three branches, one must speak of a measure or degree of autonomy.
This suggests that autonomy is a relative state; it is not an all-or-nothing
condition. The lack of complete independence does not necessarily pro-
hibit an entity (in this case, political institutions) from acquiring some
 The Preservation of Institutional Integrity 49

degree of autonomy. It is difficult to determine how far one can stretch

the concept before crossing the line of demarcation separating autonomy
from dependence. One suspects that this critical point is contingent on
the context as well as on the specific circumstances occurring within
that context. For example, the executive branch can lose a significant
amount of autonomy because of the action or inaction of a weak presi-
dent. If a president concedes to Congress on a majority of substantive
foreign policy and military matters, the executive branch loses autonomy
as the principal political institution responsible for security or self-
preservation of the Republic.8 The legislative branch can also lose au-
tonomy if Congress, because of a lack of political will to make difficult
decisions, continuously delegates its policy-making powers to adminis-
trative agencies as a means of resolving important or fundamental policy
issues (McGowan 1977).9
Returning to public bureaucracies and the question of autonomy, I
concur with Rohr (1986) that “the public administration neither con-
stitutes nor heads any branch of government, but is subordinate to all
three of them” (182). The constitutional democracy demands no less.
I also agree that public bureaucracies require and indeed should have
a sufficient amount of autonomy to exercise delegated authority within
a specific realm of social action. This leads back to the subordinate-
autonomous question: Does the subordinate-autonomous concept, when
used to describe the role of public bureaucracies in the American politi-
cal system, pose a threat to constitutional democracy? My answer to
this question is no. The subordinate-autonomous concept is no more
problematic than the idea of superior-autonomous (or some other varia-
tion) used to describe the role of the three political institutions. I have
already mentioned that autonomy in the strictest sense does not and
cannot exist within the American political system.
The basic tenets of Rohr’s subordinate-autonomous concept are use-
ful for advancing the theory of administrative conservatorship, but some
clarification is in order. Rohr views autonomy as the freedom to choose
among competing constitutional masters. Although some scholars in-
corporate the term “freedom” as part of a baseline definition of autonomy,
Rohr’s use suggests a benefit o f the condition rather than a precise state-
ment o f the essential nature o f the condition, a requirement for any defi-
nition. (For a discussion of the various meanings and definitions of
autonomy, see G. Dworkin 1988.) In other words, autonomy is an ad-
vantage; it gives public administrators the flexibility (a benefit and the
50 A Model of Administrative C on servatorship

freedom) to choose among the three constitutional masters. But know-

ing the benefits of autonomy does not indicate much about the essential
nature of the condition. Needed is a definition that captures the essence
of the phenomenon.
Selznick’s (1957) definition, with minor modifications, is helpful here.
Autonomy, as used in relation to administrative conservatorship, is de-
fined as a condition o f independence sufficient to permit public bureau-
cracies to preserve their distinctive values, competence, and role. To
create and sustain this condition of independence and, in turn, to pre-
serve the integrity of public bureaucracies, the administrative conserva-
tor must engage in a wide range of actions that address both the internal
state of the institution and its position in the larger political community.
This discussion thus far suggests that institutional autonomy is a com- ·
plex, multifaceted concept with fine and subtle distinctions. As previ-
ously indicated, there are the essential properties of the condition itself
(i.e., independence and self-governing). There is also a range of strate-
gies for achieving and maintaining institutional autonomy (i.e., insula-
tion from dangerous external pressures and the protection of jurisdictional
boundaries) and the benefits of institutional autonomy: “long range, flex-
ibility, purposive nonpolitical management” (Selznick 1992, 344). The
different aspects of autonomy should be kept in mind throughout this
discussion.
I must emphasize once again that the autonomy of public bureaucra-
cies is contextual. The condition of independence sufficient for public
bureaucracies to preserve their distinctive value, competence, and role
is determined by the overarching framework of the American political
system in general and the specific public policy domain in particular. To
drive this point home, I use two concrete examples; one involves the
Federal Reserve Bank and the other the National Endowment for the
Arts (NEA).
The Federal Reserve (the “Fed,” as it is commonly called) is often
characterized as the “independent” central bank of the United States— a
designation its governing board is quick to clarify. In referring to the Fed’s
independent status, an official publication states: “Because the Federal
Reserve works within the framework of the overall objectives of eco-
nomic and financial policy established by the government, it is more ac-
curate to characterize the System as ‘independent within government’”
(Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System 1985, 2).
The Fed is primarily responsible for fostering a “flow of money and
 The Preservation of Institutional Integrity 51

credit that will facilitate orderly economic growth, a stable dollar, and
long-run balance in our international payments” (Board of Governors
1963, 1). The dominant value governing the Fed’s operation is the eco-
nomic and financial security and stability of the United States. Because
the Fed’s policies and actions have a significant influence on the U.S.
economy, the institution is insulated from extraneous political pressures.
Although the Fed was established by an act of Congress in 1913, it is a
privately owned nonprofit institution. Private ownership was established
to eliminate political control of the Federal Reserve system. The central
bank’s seven-member governing body and its chair are appointed to
fixed terms by the president of the United States with the advice and
consent of Congress (the chair and vice chair serve a four-year term;
other board members serve fourteen-year terms). The appointment pro-
cess and tenure of the Board of Governors buffer the Fed from political
interference. The Fed generates income from services offered to banks
and thus does not depend on Congress for budgetary appropriations.
The Fed’s insulation from extraneous political pressures gives the
Board of Governors and its chair the flexibility to establish long-range
monetary policy. It also allows the Fed to effectively administer its other
responsibilities such as supervision of member banks and custodianship
of required reserves without direct involvement of partisan politics (“non-
political management” ).
The public policy domain or institutional context of the NEA is dif-
ferent from that of the Federal Reserve Bank. Consequently, the condi-
tion of independence sufficient for the NEA to preserve its distinctive
values, competence, and role is also different. The NEA is and should be
concerned with the degree o f control it exercises over decision-making
processes in awarding financial support to art institutions and individual
artists. A core value governing this process is artistic freedom. Conse-
quently, matters concerning NEA’s autonomy are inextricably interwo-
ven with functions and processes that promote and protect this value.
Since its establishment in 1965, the NEA has relied on a grant-mak-
ing process that uses peer review panels. The peer review panel’s struc-
ture and composition are intended to ensure that grants are awarded on
the basis of artistic quality rather than their content. The NEA’s autonomy
(and possibly survival) is threatened when policies or actions interfere
with its capacity to award grants on the basis of the peer review panel’s
judgment of artistic quality. This became readily apparent in the late
1980s when the NEA became embroiled in a bitter controversy over the
52 A Model of Administrative C on servatorship

works of two artists who received financial support from the agency.10
In the spring of 1989, Senators Alfonse D ’Amato (R-New York),
Jesse Helms (R-North Carolina), and several other lawmakers waged a
widely publicized campaign against government involvement in fund-
ing art. The lawmakers attempted to restrict the NEA’s ability to give
grants to artists whose work they considered indecent or obscene. Sena-
tor Helms severely criticized the NEA in particular for supporting the
works of Andres Serrano (whom he characterized as a “jerk” ) and Rob-
ert Mapplethorpe. Serrano’s work Piss Christ, a photograph illustrating
a crucifix immersed in a vessel filled with urine, was described as offen-
sive, blasphemous, and a form of religious bigotry. Mapplethorpe’s trav-
eling exhibition of photographs, Robert Mapplethorpe: The Perfect
Moment, created a stir because it included many homoerotic and sado-
masochistic images. Anti-NEA forces in Congress characterized the
photographs as antifamily and threatened to prohibit the NEA from pro-
viding financial support to any art institution that showed the exhibi-
tion. (Apparently the Corcoran Gallery in Washington, D.C., took this
threat seriously; it canceled an announced showing of the exhibition.)
In the NEA 1990 appropriation bill, Senator Helms introduced an
amendment that prevented the agency from funding:

1. obscene or indecent materials, including but not limited to de-

pictions of sadomasochism, homoeroticism, the exploitation of
children, or individuals engaged in sex acts;
2. materials which denigrate the objects or beliefs of the adherents
of a particular religion or non-religion; or
3. material which denigrates, debases, or reviles a person, group,
or class of citizens on the basis of race, creed, sex, handicap,
age, or national origin. (Congressional Record 1989)

After a heated debate in Congress and an intense lobbying effort on

the part of the art community, the Helms amendment was defeated. A
watered-down version of the Helms amendment became law as Con-
gress reached a compromise and substituted the Supreme Court’s ob-
scenity standard handed down in Miller v. California (1973).11 To comply
with Public Law 101-21 (the 1990 NEA appropriation bill), the NEA
stipulated that grant recipients sign a statement pledging not to use pub-
lic funds for the creation of obscene works of art. (This requirement was
abandoned a year later after a successful court challenge.) Congress also
 Institutional Responsiveness and Administrative C on servatorship 53

adopted a modified provision contained in the Senate version of the bill

that reprimanded the Institute for Contemporary Art and the Southeast-
ern Center for Contemporary Art for showing the Serrano and
Mapplethorpe exhibits. The Senate bill denied both art institutions NEA
funding for five years. In the compromise bill, the NEA was required to
inform Congress thirty days in advance before awarding grants to either
institution.
The NEA case is illuminating in several respects. First, it illustrates
that the condition of independence necessary for an agency to preserve
its distinctive competence is intimately related to its public policy do-
main or institutional context and the prevailing values operating within
that domain. For example, by the very nature of its function, the NEA is
embedded in the public cultural policy domain, which is governed by
values related to artistic freedom. The NEA case also provides addi-
tional evidence that insulation from political interference is a common
strategy for achieving and maintaining institutional autonomy and that
this strategy is operationalized in a variety of ways. The way that the
NEA attempts to insulate itself from political pressures is distinct from
that of the Federal Reserve. The Fed’s autonomy was achieved through
its private nonprofit status, the appointment process and long-term ten-
ure of its governing board, and its independent funding status. In con-
trast, the NEA tries to achieve and maintain political insulation by
adopting a narrow set of artistic criteria for renewing funding alterna-
tives and by using a peer review panel that consists of professionals
within the various art disciplinary forms.
The NEA case demonstrates that institutional autonomy is not per-
manent or guaranteed. Consequently, the administrative conservator
should carefully monitor and evaluate strategies used to acquire and
maintain institutional autonomy. Such actions are needed on an ongoing
basis to buffer public bureaucracies against what Selznick (1992) re-
ferred to earlier as “perverse and self-defeating isolation” (334).

Institutional Responsiveness and Administrative

Conservatorship

Similar to other complex organizations, public bureaucracies must adapt

to a constantly and rapidly changing political, economic, and social en-
vironment to prosper. The term “adapt” is emphasized because it has
special meaning in organizational analysis. In the business management
54 A Model of Administrative C onservatorship

literature, for example, “ adapt” and its cognates (“adaptation” and

“ adaptiveness” ) typically refer to an organization’s capacity and will-
ingness to respond to environmental changes that threaten its survival.
The key word here is “ survival.” Business management scholars speak
a matter-of-fact language and make no apologies that long-term organi-
zational survival is the bottom line; organizational adaptiveness and, in
turn, responsiveness are merely means to achieve this end.
There is some merit to this purely instrumental mode of thinking.
Organizations do perish in large numbers, as Herbert Kaufman (1991)
observes:

There is no doubt that organizations do, in significant numbers, cease to

exist. We know that business failures in thousands occur every year. We
know that government agencies, such as those that flourished in the days
o f the New D e a l. . . and World War I I . . . are no longer around. Indeed,
whole civilizations have virtually disappeared. Sm all wonder that em i-
nent students o f organizations, such as Chester Barnard, concluded that
long-lived organizations are atypical and that most organizations disinte-
grate after com paratively short periods o f existence. To be sure, there is
som e evidence that long life may not be quite as unusual as is commonly
assum ed; the weight o f the evidence and o f informed opinion, however,
is on the other side. (12)

But an overemphasis on organizational survival can lead down the

dangerous path of opportunism. As Selznick (1957) cautions, the perils
of traveling down this path are real. The shortsightedness and reckless-
ness that is so much a part of opportunism poses a serious threat to
institutional integrity. The institution’s character may become “attenu-
ated and confused” (145); its leadership cadre may allow the institution
to drift by relinquishing policy- and decision-making authority to pow-
erful external forces; and foreign elements may infiltrate the institution
and eventually control major functions and processes, thus leading to a
complete lose of autonomy. Any one of these events could undermine
institutional integrity. For example, during the 1989 controversy, the
leadership of the NEA could have easily pursued opportunistic strate-
gies that undermined the agency’s integrity. If the NEA’s leadership had
succumbed to political pressures exerted by Senator Jesse Helms and
others and had allowed Congress to determine the aesthetic quality and
content of art in exchange for guaranteed statutory reauthorization and a
substantial budget increase, the agency could have more easily survived
 The Preservation of Institutional Integrity 55

but would have sacrificed its integrity in the process. The NEA also
would have seriously undermined its integrity if the agency’s leadership
surrendered all of its authority over determining the composition and
structure of the peer review panels.
I noted earlier in the discussion of Selznick’s theory of autonomy and
responsiveness that selective adaptation is needed to avoid opportunism
and its destructive consequences. Selective adaptation requires that those
entrusted with the preservation of institutional integrity resist the temp-
tation to respond to every environmental pressure. All environmental
pressures are not created equal when measured against their effect on
institutional integrity. The determination of which pressure to seriously
consider and when to do so is a complex process that should be guided
by a fidelity to the institution’s distinctive competence, values, and role.
When successful, selective or controlled adaptation translates into re-
sponsiveness. In this context, responsiveness refers to the “reconstruc-
tion of self and outreach to others” (Selznick 1992, 338). For example,
the Federal Reserve is responsive when the chair of the Board of Gover-
nors reaches out to the president, the Congress, the secretary of the trea-
sury, and the Council of Economic Advisers in an effort to provide and
solicit information that assists in the development of long-term (and, in
some instances, short-term) monetary policy objectives.
It is obvious that the Federal Reserve example addresses only the
outreach component of the responsiveness definition. But what about
the reconstruction of self, the other essential component of responsive-
ness? When should administrative officials make substantive revisions
in established institutional structures, processes, policies, and rules? This
question is controversial, especially when raised in connection with the
topic of bureaucratic responsiveness.
Writers concerned with the role of public bureaucracies in American
constitutional democracy have passionately debated for some time the
question of bureaucratic responsiveness (see Saltzstein 1985).12 The line
of demarcation is sharply drawn between two opposing factions. On one
side are the traditional hierarchical theorists. As mentioned in chapter 1,
scholars such as Theodore Lowi, Herman Finer, and Charles Hyneman
argue that administrative officials are responsive to the extent that they
strictly follow the dictates and commands of elected officials. Traditional
hierarchical theorists operate under the assumption that elected political
officials (especially legislative officials) have a privileged or superior role
in the American political system because they are elected by the people.
56 A Mode! of Administrative C onservatorship

On the other side of the line are scholars who reject the idea that
supremacy rests with elected political officials. Scholars such as David
Truman, Norton Long, Robert Dahl, Herbert Storing, and John Rohr
argue that public bureaucracies and their administrative officials are re-
sponsible for, as well as accountable to, the public. In describing the
public-oriented perspective, Grace Hall Saltzstein (1985) writes that
“ supremacy rests with the people and the object of their choice as sover-
eign people is [quoting Rohr] not a group of legislators who will carry
out their will, but rather a constitutional order which balances the pow-
ers they have delegated to all three equal branches” (290).
Despite the fundamental differences that exist between the hierarchi-
cal and nonhierarchical conceptions of bureaucratic responsiveness, there
are several important similarities. For example, implicit in each con-
ception is the principle of immediate action. Public bureaucracies and
administrative officials are considered responsive if they take immedi-
ate action to address the expressed needs, wishes, and desires of either
elected political officials or the public. Each conception also places a
heavy emphasis on the willingness and capacity of public bureaucracies
to respond to current or popular policy initiatives.
The similarities between the two dominant conceptions of bureau-
cratic responsiveness are far more revealing than their differences. By
overemphasizing immediate action and a receptiveness to current policy
initiatives, each approach ignores or downplays the significance of pre-
serving past public policy commitments that have been translated into
law and entrusted to public bureaucracies for their care. This is unfortu-
nate because public bureaucracies and administrative officials should
be sensitive to both current and past public policy commitments. B. Dan
Wood (1988) makes a similar point:

T h e o r ie s o f b u r e a u c r a c i e s m u s t m a k e c l e a r the dual c a p a c i ty in which

ad m in is t ra t iv e institutions o perate. B u r e a u c r a c i e s tran slate curr ent e v e n ts
an d i d e o l o g y into c h a n g e , m a k i n g g o v e r n m e n t r e s p o n s i v e to p o p u l a r in i-
tiatives. T h e y a l s o m a n i f e s t p a s t e v e n ts and i d e o l o g i e s , thereb y in su la t -
ing g o v e r n m e n t fro m the con tin ual p r o g r e s s i o n o f p a s s i n g stim uli. T h e y
are re f le c tio n s o f both p o lic y in the pre se n t and in the past. In this dual
ro le, they o p e r a t e as a g e n ts o f the law w h o , by virtue o f d e l e g a t e d au th or-
ity, are tr a n s f o r m e d into q u a s i p r in c ip a ls.
P u b l i c b u r e a u c r a c i e s are l e g i t i m a t e p r in c i p a l s c h a r g e d with the o b l i -
g a t i o n s o f p r o v i d i n g r e s p o n s i v e n e s s and stability. L i k e e l e c t e d in stitu -
tion s o f g o v e r n m e n t , they h a v e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n a l t a s k s . T h e y re p re se n t
 The Preservation of Institutional Integrity 57

all o f those static coalitions from the past that successfu lly had their
policy am bitions transform ed into law. Bureaucracy derives its legiti-
mate claim to principality from the laws and regulations that flow ed
from past coalitions. (231)

If public bureaucracies have, to use Wood’s words, a “dual capacity,”

as presumably they do, then it is possible to conclude that preserving
institutional integrity is and should be another form o f bureaucratic re-
sponsiveness. Thus, there are now three dominant conceptions of bu-
reaucratic responsiveness: (1) responsiveness to elected political officials,
(2) responsiveness to the public, and (3) responsiveness to an institution’s
legally embodied practices and traditions. Administrative conservator-
ship not only involves outreach to others but also entails a receptivity
and openness to changes in established institutional functions and pro-
cesses as prescribed by elected political officials and the public, while
at the same time remaining faithful to the values and unifying principles
that define an agency’s distinctive competence. This conception of bu-
reaucratic responsiveness is complex and captures the essence of the
necessity of balancing the inherent tension in the political system be-
tween the need to serve and the need to preserve. Different orientations
may at times conflict. In such situations, what is the administrative con-
servator to do? The answer to this question is this: The conservator should
take orders from the situation: The “law o f the situation * governs what
should be done.13 The conservator should exercise prudence in the man-
ner advocated by J. Patrick Dobel (1999). According to Dobel, “pru-
dence dictates that public officials should work to get the best knowledge
possible about the situation and to acquire the power and resources to
achieve their goal” (18). Public officials must, in the words of Dobel,
“exercise leadership” since they have an obligation to “ sustain the insti-
tutional foundations necessary for political achievement” (18 and 19).
The previously discussed case regarding the NEA provides a con-
crete example that helps make my point. The NEA seeks to preserve
institutional autonomy by exerting as much control as possible over the
grant decision-making process. During the Serrano and Mapplethorpe
controversy, critics attacked the agency’s system of peer review panels.
Critics charged that NEA’s peer review panels were exclusive and in-
cestuous because they consisted of “individuals from a small number of
cultural centers who share similar aesthetic values and who promote
each other’s artistic interests and careers” (Mulcaly 1992, 78). This
58 A Model of Administrative C on servatorship

charge led to related questions concerning panel representation and the

public interest.
To respond to the desires and criticisms of elected political officials,
segments of the American public, and the independent commission es-
tablished by Congress, the NEA’s leadership revised established poli-
cies and procedures relating to the peer review panel. Peer advisory
panels now consist of informed laypersons as well as discipline-based
artists. By changing the composition of the peer review panels, the NEA’s
leadership was responsive to elected political officials and to the public.
The agency’s leadership was also responsive from the standpoint of the
institutions because they successfully resisted attempts to diminish the
role of peer review panels in determining artistic excellence. In doing
so, the NEA’s leadership protected the value of artistic freedom and
preserved the agency’s integrity.

The Continuum of Leadership Roles and the

Preservation of Institutional Integrity

As the preceding discussion suggests, the preservation of institutional

integrity is a complex process that involves maintaining institutional
autonomy while at the same time remaining responsive to elected po-
litical officials, the public, and the institution itself. The preservation of
institutional integrity may be best understood by examining leadership
in public bureaucracies from a historical perspective, focusing on the
evolution of institutions during long periods. Special attention is de-
voted to the critical tasks and roles performed by leaders in response to
prevailing historical conditions (see March and Olsen 1989; Selznick
1957; Tushman et al. 1988).
As public bureaucracies evolve and develop through time, the ad-
ministrative conservator is called on to perform different leadership
roles. These roles may be placed along a continuum and differenti-
ated by the type and scope of institutional change involved as illus-
trated in Figure 2.1. At one end of the continuum is what Carl J.
Friedrich (1961) describes as “ initiating leadership” (21). The initiat-
ing leadership role requires that the administrative conservator pursue
innovative courses of action to preserve institutional integrity. When
it is essential for conservation of the principles underlying its distinc-
tive competence, the conservator seeks to create or establish a new
system of institutional values. The institution builder, innovator, and
 The Continuum of Leadership Roles 59

transformational leader are identifiable forms of initiating leadership

discussed in the literature.14 Change and innovation sought by the ad-
ministrative conservator is not the same as the heroic administrator’s
reckless abandon because it is done not for its own sake or to boost the
administrator’s image as a “mover and a shaker” but to respond to
new forces and demands in the environment and to preserve an
institution’s integrity. This type of change is equivalent to the Burkean
notion of reform. The change and innovation initiated by the adminis-
trative conservator is guided by a fidelity to the institution’s values
and unifying principles.
Initiating leadership is concerned primarily with strategic change.
This type of change addresses the entire institution, including its mis-
sion, values, personnel, and technologies. Strategic change consists of
two analytically distinct types: fram e breaking and frame bending (see
Tushman et al. 1988). Frame-breaking changes are initiated in response
to internal pressures and external events that threaten the institution’s
integrity. These changes require a radical break from an institution’s
established conduct. Because frame-breaking changes are revolution-
ary, they are hard to implement and are inherently shattering to the
organization. They should probably be carried out quite rarely. The
administrative conservator who breaks frames will realize that great
costs are incurred. Public agencies, like private organizations, tend to
resist innovations that are inconsistent with the performance of exist-
ing tasks, and overcoming this resistance will drain energy in and of
itself (see J.Q. Wilson 1989, chap. 12). In addition, revolutionary
changes are often close to impossible to implement because of the far
greater number of external constraints (laws, regulations, rules, inter-
est groups, legislative committees, etc.) that govern the activities of
public agencies.
Frame-bending changes are also made in response to external events.
These events, however, are typically seen coming over the horizon. Frame-
bending changes differ from frame-breaking changes in that they do not
require a drastic departure from the past. Rather, these changes build on
tradition as they “emphasize continuity with the past, particularly values
of the past” (Nadler 1988, 72). Frame-bending change may be large scale
and may be made within the existing institutional frame. Public bureau-
cracies are more inclined to implement frame-bending changes for the
same reasons that prompt them to resist frame-breaking changes.
At the other end of the continuum is protecting leadership, another
60 A Model of Administrative C onservatorship

Figure 2.1 A Continuum of L e ad e rsh ip R o le s Perform ed by A dm inistra-

tive C o n serv ato r an d C o rresp o n d in g T y pes of C h an ge

L eadersh ip role Initiating leadership Protecting leadership

T ype o f change Strategic Incremental

(Fram e breaking/ (Fine-tuning/adaptation

fram e bending) and zero-change)

leadership role discussed by C.J. Friedrich (1961). Protecting lead-

ership provides security for an institution and its “ particular way of
life, its culture, its values, beliefs, and interest” (21). Protecting lead-
ership seeks to strengthen institutional functions, processes, and val-
ues and at the same time guards against excessive opportunism. This
form of leadership is best reflected in Selznick’s institutional leader
who defends the institution’s integrity after it is firmly established
over time.
Protecting leadership concentrates on either incremental change
or what I call zero-change. Incremental change addresses specific
aspects of the institution and also consists of two types: fine-tuning
and adaptive (Nadler 1988). Fine-tuning changes are designed to in-
crease efficiency and coordination of institutional functions and pro-
cesses as well as to reinforce values, beliefs, and myths. Such changes
are made on an ongoing basis. For example, the administrative con-
servator might seek to refine existing policies and procedures relat-
ing to the hiring and promotion of personnel.
Adaptive changes are pursued in response to external events. These
changes are relatively minor in the scheme of things because they
require small-scale adjustments in how the institution performs its
existing tasks. Both fine-tuning and adaptive changes are add-ons—
they are “ added on to existing tasks without changing the core tasks”
of an institution (J.Q. Wilson 1989, 225).
Zero-change means exactly what the term implies. Strategic or
incremental changes are resisted, especially if such changes threaten
to undermine an institution’s integrity and result in opportunism.
Many writers tend to labor under the erroneous assumption that
change is inherently good. Sir Francis Bacon’s dictum “ He who will
not apply new remedies must expect new evils, for time is the great-
 The Continuum of Leadership Roles 61

est innovation” deserves attention, but we must remember that some

changes may do more harm than good.15
The effective performance of both the initiating and protecting lead-
ership role is not necessarily contingent on particular personality ori-
entations or traits. Although it is true that some individuals may possess
certain personality characteristics that favor one role over another, they
may be capable of effectively performing both. Nor am I ruling out
the possibility that some individuals may be overly committed to
particular outlooks and orientations and thus are less adaptable to
changing conditions.
Yet there is a dark side to both the initiating and protecting leadership
roles. Each role can undermine an institution’s integrity if taken to ex-
tremes or employed at inappropriate times in an institution’s history.
For example, scholars have documented that institutions experience “rela-
tively long periods of stability (equilibrium) punctuated by compact,
qualitative, metamorphic change (revolution)” (Gersick 1991, 12).16
From these findings, one can conclude that the role of initiating leader-
ship may not be well suited for periods of relative stability. Stable con-
ditions require a different role orientation, as Chester I. Barnard (1948)
suggests:

Stable conditions . . . may be com plex and very large scale; but they are
com paratively free from violent changes and extreme uncertainties o f
unusual character or implying important hazards. The behavior o f lead-
ers under such conditions may be calm, deliberate, reflective, or anticipa-
tory o f future consequences. . . . Leadership . . . must be carried on with-
out the aid o f emotional drives and obvious necessities and against the
indifference often accom panying lack o f danger, excitement and senti-
ment. Stable conditions call for self-restraint, deliberation, and refine-
ment techniques, qualities that som e men who are good leaders under
tense conditions are unable to develop. (91)

In contrast, the role of protecting leadership may be destructive dur-

ing periods of instability and uncertainty. Because protecting leadership
entails guarding traditional views and values that exist at a particular
time, the leader may resist all types of change, even though some form
of change is needed to address internal and external events that threaten
institutional integrity. Moreover, the leader may rely on past strategies
and practices that are no longer appropriate for changing conditions.
62 A Model of Administrative C onservatorship

The lesson here is that the forces that preserve an institution through
time may be the same ones that undermine its integrity.

The Functions of Administrative Conservatorship

The foregoing discussion suggests that the administrative conservator

is summoned to perform different leadership roles ranging from initi-
ating to protecting as a means of preserving institutional integrity. These
roles specify, in a general way, the behaviors and orientations needed
to address conditions and problems associated with a given institution’s
stage of historical development. How these roles relate to the preser-
vation of institutional integrity becomes more apparent when examin-
ing some of the critical functions performed by the administrative
conservator.

Conserving Mission

The concept of mission occupies a central place in the analysis of com-

plex organizations. It is indeed rare to find any serious discourse on
executive leadership that does not pay homage to the mission’s spe-
cial function in organizational affairs. Although theorists employ a
multitude of terms to describe the concept (e.g., purpose, official goals,
etc.), mission in its most basic form determines the institution’s rea-
son for existence.
The symbiotic relationship between the task of mission definition
and responsible leadership behavior is well documented. Writers dis-
cuss at great length the connection between mission definition and lead-
ership effectiveness. Selznick (1957) writes that “ leadership is
irresponsible when it fails to set goals and therefore lets the institution
drift” (25).
The concept of mission takes on significant and complex meaning
when discussed in the context of public bureaucracies, especially be-
cause administrative executives are not given the responsibility for
mission definition. They “ may have no presumptive right to set pur-
pose” (Bower 1977, 132). The mission of administrative institutions
is supposedly determined by legislative mandate, judicial decisions,
and executive orders that delegate authority to administrative officials
to act as agents in the administration of policy objectives. Administra-
tive officials must, of necessity, use their discretion to make concrete
 The Functions of Administrative C onservatorship 63

decisions that provide meaning to a multiplicity of diverse, conflict-

ing, and ambiguous policy objectives. It is the responsibility of ad-
ministrative executives to ensure that the spirit as well as the letter of
statutory mandates, executive orders, and judicial decrees is fully re-
alized. In other words, administrative executives have an obligation to
preserve the values that the constitutional masters have granted legiti-
macy by enshrining in law, albeit vague and contradictory. With this
in mind, conserving the mission of public bureaucracies is a critical
function of administrative conservatorship.

Conserving Values

The second function performed by the administrative conservator

involves conserving the values of public bureaucracies. The conser-
vator is responsible for the protection of values that help establish
and maintain an agency’s distinctive competence and role. Conserv-
ing the values of public bureaucracies is largely the responsibility of
the executive cadre, that group of individuals who “reflect the basic
policies of the organization in their own outlooks” (Selznick 1957,
105). Selznick describes the executive cadre as the institutional core.
The executive cadre performs a vital function in preserving the in-
tegrity of public bureaucracies because its members are entrusted
with the transmittal and protection of core agency values. Because
the executive cadre members have an indispensable role in preserv-
ing core institutional values, maintaining their viability is a critical
function of administrative conservatorship. The term “ viability” re-
fers to the executive cadre’s strength and thereby capacity to protect
core institutional values that are intensely held and widely shared
from serious corruption. The maintenance of a viable executive cadre
requires that the administrative conservator control the members’
demographic composition, protect their autonomy, and maintain their
commitment to core agency values.

Conserving Support

The maintenance of both external and internal support is the third criti-
cal function performed by the administrative conservator. The preserva-
tion of external support is of great importance. Public bureaucracies are
influenced by an external environment composed of individuals, groups,
64 A Model of Administrative C onservatorship

and organizations of stakeholders interested in and affected by the

activities of bureaucracies. These stakeholders represent a variety of
actors who may be either allies or adversaries. Moreover, stakehold-
ers differ in the amount of influence and control they exert on the
institution. Because the survival of public bureaucracies is contin-
gent on the steady flow of needed resources, the administrative con-
serv ato r m ust d ev elo p and su stain good re latio n sh ip s with
stakeholders who provide resources and necessary support for insti-
tutional activities (see March and Simon 1958; Pfeffer and Salancik
1978; Thompson 1967).
To secure and preserve external support, the administrative conser-
vator must provide inducement for stakeholders to participate actively
in advancing institutional goals (see Barnard 1938; March and Simon
1958). In exchange for these inducements, stakeholders make contri-
butions in the form of behaviors, resources, and capabilities necessary
to sustain the institution’s integrity— and thereby distinctive compe-
tence. As a result, the administrative conservator is continuously in-
volved in both formal and informal exchange relationships with external
stakeholders to secure and maintain resources and support for institu-
tional activities. These relationships are evaluated, renewed, honored,
and serviced on an ongoing basis to ensure that they are in the long-
term interest of the agency. Although external support is critical to
agency survival, securing it can also lead to a loss of discretion and
limited autonomy (see Selznick 1957; Thompson 1967; J.Q. Wilson
1989, especially chap. 4). The administrative conservator must con-
tinually monitor and evaluate external arrangements and inducements
offered to secure contributions from influential stakeholders without
losing autonomy.
The administrative conservator must also sustain support among in-
ternal interest groups for larger institutional aims. Because organiza-
tions are composed of a multitude of formal and informal groups seeking
to promote their own vested interests that may or may not be consistent
with larger organizational goals, this is not an easy task. Internal interest
groups are not “wholly controllable by official authority” and thus may
“ subvert the enterprise or lend it strength” (Selznick 1957, 94). The ad-
ministrative conservator must constantly engage in activities that instill
in organizational members a sense of loyalty and identification with the
enterprise. In other words, he or she must “bind parochial group ego-
tism to larger loyalties and aspirations” (94).
 The Functions of Administrative C on servatorsh ip 65

Notes
Some of the material in this chapter has been drawn from my article “Leadership in
the Administrative State,” Administration & Society 21, no. 4 (1990): 395-412.
Copyright © 1990 by Sage Publications, Inc.
1. For a discussion of the distinction between the quantitative and qualitative
dim ensions of growth, see Starbuck (1965), who describes changes in an
organization’s qualitative dimension as development.
2. March and Olsen (1989) describe an efficient historical process as “ one that
moves rapidly to a unique solution, conditional on current environmental condi-
tions, and is thus independent of the historical path” (8). For an excellent critique of
progress, see Lasch (1991).
3. Wolin (1960) specifically attacks Selznick’s works of 1948, 1952, and 1957.
4. Because Spicer and I (1993) ground our arguments in classical constitutional
theory, it makes sense that we are labeled (and rightly so) conservative. Classical
constitutional theory has been criticized by some political scientists for its inherent
conservatism. See, for example, James W. Ceaser 1993.
5. Many of the ideas expressed by Lowi (1993a) in this article are included in
several of his other works (1979, 1993b).
6 . 1 use the word “preservation” instead of “defense” because of its proactive
(as opposed to reactive) qualities.
7. From The Moral Commonwealth: Social Theory and the Promise o f Commu-
nity, by P. Selznick (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992), 322-324. Copy-
right ©1992 by University of California Press. Reprinted by permission granted by
the Regents of the University of California and the University of California Press.
8 . 1 would like to thank John Rohr (personal communication, n.d.) for suggest-
ing this example concerning his use of the term “ autonomy.”
9. The debate among legal scholars concerning the “ delegation doctrine” sug-
gests that there is a genuine concern about the legislative branch’s potential loss of
autonomy. In April 1986, the journal American University Law Review organized a
symposium on this subject (see “ Symposium on Administrative Law: The Uneasy
Constitutional Status of Administrative Agencies” 1987). Symposium participants
included, among others, Theodore Lowi, Ernest Gellhorn, David Schoenbrod, and
Richard Pierce.
10. For excellent discussions of the NEA controversy, see Andrew Buchwalter
(1992) and Richard Bolton (1992). My discussion of the NEA controversy draws
heavily on these works.
11. For discussion of the Miller v. California (1973) decision and its bearing on
the NEA, see Carole S. Vance (1992) and Gloria C. Phares (1992).
12. Saltzstein (1985) analyzes how scholars use the concept of bureaucratic re-
sponsiveness as well as the difficulties associated with such use.
13. The idea of the “law of the situation” was developed by Mary Parker Follett.
See Henry C. Metcalf and L. Urwick (1940).
14. For a discussion of leaders who effectively performed the “ initiating leader-
ship” role, see Terry L. Cooper and N. Dale Wright (1992) and Jameson Doig and
Erwin Hargrove (1987). Although Doig and Hargrove describe the leaders in their
book as entrepreneurs (a concept I have criticized on numerous occasions), some of
the figures profiled in the book seem to fit the description of the administrative
66 A Model of Administrative C on servatorship

conservator. Nancy Hanks, the former director of the National Endowment for the
Arts, and Elmer Staats, former Comptroller General, General Accounting Office,
are cases in point.
1 5 .1 am indebted to the late John Gardner (personal communication, August 8,
1986) for bringing this quote to my attention.
16. Gersick’s (1991) “punctuated equilibrium” paradigm is currently challeng-
ing the traditional, Darwinian notion of gradual evolution. Although I agree with
proponents of punctuated equilibrium that institutions experience relatively long
periods of stability punctuated by abrupt change, I do not agree with the contention
that such change is always revolutionary. Abrupt changes can produce reforms. R e-
form and revolution are not synonymous.
 3

Conserving Mission

I DOUBT THAT ANYONE who studies administrative leadership would

voice much opposition to the statement that leaders have primary re-
sponsibility for the organization’s mission. But when there is serious
discussion about the exact nature and scope of this responsibility, the
silence abruptly ends. Many of those who write about private business
leadership assert that administrative leaders are responsible for defining
and redefining the organization’s mission as well as for ensuring its ac-
ceptance by employees (see Andrews 1987; Bennis and Nanus 1985;
Kotter 1988, 1990; Tichy and Devanna 1986). The mission is consid-
ered a cornerstone in the formulation of a competitive organizational
strategy and thus demands the undivided attention of administrative lead-
ers. Leaders who fail to define what business the enterprise should be in
and why it exists are harshly criticized and accused of defaulting in their
responsibility (see Drucker 1985; Selznick 1957).
Scholars of public administration and political science voice a differ-
ent opinion. They contend that administrative executives do not, and
should not, have responsibility for defining the mission of public bu-
reaucracies: The Constitution assigns this responsibility primarily to
elected political leaders (for discussion, see Perry and Kraemer 1983).
Through legislative mandates and other legally binding acts, political
leaders determine the mission of public bureaucracies, their reason for
existence, and their principal products and services. This line of argu-
ment leads many writers to the seemingly inescapable conclusion that
administrative executives are delegated authority and responsibility for
simply interpreting the mission of public bureaucracies in relating
67
68 Conserving Mission

appropriate means to ends. Although this idea informs the thinking and
theorizing of many scholars, it must be viewed with a degree of skepti-
cism for several reasons.
First, the assertion that administrative executives are responsible sim-
ply for mission interpretation reflects the influence and limitations of
the traditional hierarchical view of public administrators in the Ameri-
can democratic system. Unfortunately, the task of mission interpreta-
tion from this traditional view is m isconceived as a sim plistic,
instrumental, and mechanical exercise. There is an underlying assump-
tion that the intentions of political leaders are (or should be) clearly
stated in legal mandates, and, thus, all administrative executives need to
do is to “read the text” and act accordingly. They are not to assume an
active role by reading anything into the text of mandating statutes be-
cause the interpretive enterprise is merely a matter of doing what the
law says. In this view, mission interpretation is guided by the same logic
and rationale used to justify what constitutional law scholars describe as
mechanical jurisprudence and others refer to as “originalism.” In its
most extreme forms, originalism suggests that strict adherence to the
text and intentions of the Republic’s founders is necessary to constrain the
discretion of decision-makers and to guarantee that constitutional inter-
pretations remain consistent over time. Strict originalism has been re-
jected by constitutional law scholars because the approach fails to consider
the “open-textured quality of language” and its “social and linguistic con-
text” (Brest 1980, 223). Moreover, strict originalism is based on a flawed
assumption that one can interpret the intentions of the founders with a
certain degree of mechanical precision (I will return to this matter shortly).
Public administration scholars should also question this narrow, instru-
mental view of mission interpretation for similar reasons.
The second reason that the purely instrumental view of mission inter-
pretation is problematic results from the complexity of mission inter-
pretation. Implicit in the instrumental notion of mission interpretation is
the assumption that the task of mission definition is more complex and
thus holds a more prominent position in the realm of administration. It
is true that the mission cannot be interpreted if it is not defined. But the
ordering of a task is not, and should not be, the sole criterion for decid-
ing its importance and complexity. The tasks of mission definition and
mission interpretation are equally important and inherently complex in
nature. Interpreting the intent of political leaders as embodied in legal
mandates is extremely important in a representative democracy because
 Conserving Mission 69

such mandates reflect the values and aspirations of the citizenry. Fur-
thermore, the act and process of interpreting legal mandates with any
degree of certainty and precision is a complex and difficult undertaking
(Eskridge 1987, 1989; Eskridge and Frickey 1990). As scholars from a
variety of disciplines have argued, interpreting the text of any document
is a complicated intellectual endeavor because of the ambiguous, in-
complete, and contradictory nature of most, if not all, texts and because
of the difficulty of determining an author’s intent and purpose. Legal
scholar James Boyd White (1982) makes the argument that “there are in
both legal and nonlegal texts enough real ambiguities and uncertainties
to make i t . . . absurd to speak as if the meaning of a text were simply
there to be observed and demonstrated in some quasi-scientific way”
(417). He further observes:

Intention can, after all, be stated with generality or particularity, as a matter

o f motive or a matter o f aim; and we are alw ays subject to conflicts in our
intentions, many o f which are somewhat unconscious and out o f our con-
trol. To try to follow the intention o f the writer seem s an inherently un-
stable procedure, leading to a radical conceptual collapse. (4 1 9 )1

The complexity of the interpretive task is also compounded because

the “one best way” to interpret the textual meaning of a document does
not exist. A text is subject to multiple interpretations, each guided by
different theories, schools of thought, and traditions of interpretation
(see Brest 1980; R. Dworkin 1982). Authors can neither control nor
predict all the various ways a text may be interpreted. This reality ap-
plies to the text of mandating statutes drafted by political leaders. It is
true that the intents of political leaders, once embodied within the text
of a statute, determine the ground rules about how the text may be inter-
preted. This fact does not, however, lead to the foregone conclusion that
they have a monopoly on knowledge or superior insight into the “correct”
reading of the statute. The very nature of legal statutes precludes such
possibilities. Austin Sarat (1987) makes a cogent argument along these
lines. In quoting Stanley Fish, the English and humanities scholar who
has written extensively in the area of legal and literary theory, Sarat states:

Any text, whatever its conditions o f production, is capable o f being ap-

propriated by any number o f persons and read in relation to concerns the
speaker could not have foreseen. Indeed, it is standard strategy in literary
criticism to detach a text from what might have seem ed to be its severely
70 Conserving Mission

limiting original situation and turn it into the kind o f text that speaks to
all men in all circum stances. The author and his intentions are not ig-
nored, but neither are they accorded primacy. Texts are not owned by
their authors. Indeed, authors assum e the position o f participants in a
discourse about textual meaning and significance. Texts invite and pro-
voke interpretive disputes; authors provide no final resolution. L egal texts
in general, and the Constitution in particular, are no exception although
they, perhaps somewhat more than other texts, are invested in the effort
to m anage the terms on which such disputes occur. (257-258)

The third reason that the narrow view of mission interpretation is

flawed relates to the idea of authority. When writers say that public
administrators are “delegated authority” for mission interpretation and
implementation, they often rely on the hierarchical model’s prescrip-
tion of how authority and responsibility are transferred, delegated, and
exercised within the American political system (see DeGeorge 1985,
especially chap. 5). This is understandable considering the structure of
our constitutional government. Although the hierarchical model of au-
thority has been criticized by legal scholars, it is generally accepted
because the courts have traditionally used the model in “ adjudicating
the legitimacy of administrative authority” (Bayles 1987, 290). Unfor-
tunately, the same cannot be said with respect to how public administra-
tion scholars apply the model to explain the responsibility and actions
of administrative executives.
When discussing delegated authority, it is not uncommon for public
administration theorists to focus exclusively on the notion of delega-
tion, that is, “the act of empowering to act for another” (.Merriam
Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary 1993, 305), ignoring the idea of au-
thority. This error is committed by a broad cross section of scholars,
especially those who champion a hybrid version of economic agency
theory to legitimate the role of public administrators in governance.2 In
its purest form, agency theory suggests that social relationships can be
explained as a series of contractual arrangements involving two parties:
a principal and an agent. The agent acts for and on behalf of the princi-
pal, who delegates some of his or her authority to the agent. Because it
is only a matter of time until the agent resorts to his or her natural self-
serving behaviors, agency theorists assert that specific mechanisms
should be adopted to ensure that the agent continues to act for and on
behalf of the principal. If cleverly designed and instituted, these mecha-
nisms can minimize “agency loss,” that is, the degree to which the agent
 Conserving Mission 71

deviates from adhering to the desires of the principal (Donaldson 1990,

369; Perrow 1986).
Despite agency theory’s heavy emphasis on methodological individu-
alism, its narrow view of human behavior and motivation, and its pre-
dominantly negative moral characterization of the individual, a cadre of
public administration scholars has borrowed the theory to explain the
role and responsibilities of public administrators in democratic govern-
ment (Kass 1990; Wamsley 1990). In transferring agency theory to the
public sector, theorists have created a hybrid version of the theory by
modifying several of its basic assumptions. The “acting for” relation-
ship has been extended beyond the individual level of analysis to in-
clude organizations and society. And the inherently negative, self-serving
view of the administrator has been replaced with the Hegelian notion
that public administrators are (or should be) trustworthy and noble indi-
viduals who work for the good of society.3
Both the pure and hybrid forms of agency theory concentrate on the
agent’s obligation in fulfilling his or her responsibility with respect to
acting for and on behalf of the principal. In the purest form, the relation-
ship is viewed primarily from the vantage point of the principal. In the
hybrid form, the relationship is viewed from the agent’s perspective.
Little, if any, systematic attention is devoted to the concept of authority,
although it is central to the principal-agent relationship. If the concept
of authority is discussed, it is often confused with related concepts, es-
pecially power.4 Writers take for granted that the agent must have a
sufficient amount of authority to fulfill the responsibilities to the princi-
pal. Consequently, there is no need to focus on the concept of authority.
This is an egregious error because the concept of authority is too impor-
tant from a practical and theoretical perspective to be given only pass-
ing attention.
I am not objecting to the assertion that public administrators act for
and on behalf of others, because obviously they do. My point is that
acting for another is only one component of the administrative leader-
ship equation. Another significant part of the equation relates to the con-
cept of authority. When political leaders delegate authority to public
administrators, they are not only empowering them to act for and on
behalf of others but also conferring the responsibility to preserve and
nurture the authority of public bureaucracies to act within a specific
realm of social action and to pursue specific policy objectives. In other
words, public administrators are also entrusted with the responsibility
72 Conserving Mission

of preserving and nurturing the authority embodied in legal mandates

that determine the mission of public bureaucracies. This is what I mean
when I speak of conserving the mission of public bureaucracies. B e-
cause the concept of authority is central to the notion of conserving
mission, it is necessary to explain what authority is and how the concept
relates to the preservation of institutional integrity and, in turn, admin-
istrative conservatorship.

The Authority of Public Bureaucracies

Scholars across a spectrum of disciplines have attempted to discover the

hidden secrets of the phenomenon known as authority (see DeGeorge
1976; C.J. Friedrich 1958b; Pennock and Chapman 1987; Raz 1979).
They have attempted to define and describe the nature of authority as
well as identify its various types, sources, and functions. These schol-
arly efforts have produced a vast and impressive body of literature on
authority in general and political authority in particular. The lack of
consensus on a single definition, theory, or classification scheme of au-
thority should not be interpreted to mean that scholars know little about
authority. In fact, we know a great deal about it. We know that authority
embraces several other concepts such as power, reason, legitimacy, obe-
dience, and consent, as well as advice and command. We also know that
authority can be vested in an impersonal entity such as a constitution or
in a person by virtue of his or her knowledge, competence, or position
within a particular system. We know that authority must be justified and
recognized as legitimate if it is to be accepted by those subject to it.
Therefore, it is possible to clarify the nature and types of authority vested
in public bureaucracies. Several scholars, including C.J. Friedrich and
Richard T. DeGeorge, have organized this knowledge into various co-
herent frameworks.
Friedrich (1958a, 1963, 1972) argues that the prevailing view of au-
thority is erroneous, resulting in confusion and misunderstanding. He
asserts that the contemporary view of authority and its preoccupations
with power, domination, and forced submission have led scholars astray
from its ancient and meaningful origin. Friedrich is critical of writers
who attempt to build a concept of authority based solely on power.5 As
far as he is concerned, they have missed the point because authority on
the basis of power alone is weak and unlikely to endure through time.
Friedrich makes a convincing argument that authority must be grounded
 The Authority of Public Bureaucracies 73

in reason. He goes to great lengths to illustrate how reason and author-

ity are wedded together and that any effort to divorce the two concepts
is profoundly misguided.
In building his case, Friedrich examines the etymology of “ author-
ity,” which he traces to the Latin word auctoritas (meaning to enlarge,
augment). The term is linked to the Roman senate, which used its wis-
dom, guided by superior knowledge, insight, and experience, to enlarge
and augment the popular will through reasoning. Friedrich observes that
the Romans were a conservative people who relied on tradition— the
values, beliefs, and disposition of the community— to guide policy de-
cisions. Tradition constituted the foundation on which reasoning was
based and provided a means for determining the acceptability of popu-
lar will. Once the senate bestowed its blessings on the popular will, it
became law and thus acquired authority. In noting the important role of
reason in the ancient conception of authority, Friedrich (1972) writes:

The ancient connotation brings out the crucial role o f reasoning in situa-
tions where men follow other men without being com pelled to do so.
When there are good reasons for doing or believing something, such ac-
tion or thought gets a quality that is otherwise lacking; it becom es “ au-
thoritative.” What m akes a particular course o f action authoritative, that
is to say, vested with authority, is that convincing reasons may be offered
in support o f it. (48)

Friedrich underscores the importance of putting reason back into the

concept of authority and offers his assistance in this effort. According to
Friedrich, “authority rests upon the ability to issue communications which
are capable of reasoned elaboration” (46). He adds:

What we must ask is what enables a man to get his proposal accepted,
that is to say, “ to gain another’s assent.” Our reply would be that when
such ability to gain assent springs from his capacity for reasoned elabora-
tion we have authority. It inheres in his communication! Only when what
is com manded or asserted can be reasoned upon and defended is author-
ity real. . . . He who obeys authority does so because he who orders him
to obey appears to have a very sufficient reason to do so. Authority is not
an alternative to reason, but is grounded in it. (55)

Friedrich makes it clear that commonly the actual giving of reasons

need not occur, only the potentiality for doing so must be present and
recognized as such.
74 Conserving Mission

Friedrich’s conception of authority is illuminating in two significant

respects. First, it reveals that acceptance is the central criterion of au-
thority. Second, it helps in understanding that authority requires justifi-
cation to be seen and accepted as legitimate by those subject to it. The
giving of reasons by definition is an act or process of justification be-
cause it is intended to show that a communication, law, or decision ren-
dered is just, rightful, and reasonable. Friedrich makes an important
contribution by observing that authority must be justified, that is, those
persons affected by it have good reasons for accepting it. He does not,
however, say much about the different types of authority. Because all
authority is not the same, one can assume that there are differences in
the types of justifications offered. Other scholars, particularly DeGeorge,
have illuminated the relationship between the different types of justifi-
cation and the different forms of authority.
DeGeorge (1985) begins his in-depth analysis by reviewing the ordi-
nary uses of the term “authority.” He concludes that any discussion of
authority must take into consideration the types of authority and their
different kinds of justifications. He argues that one must differentiate
between a “person or a thing that is an authority and the authority— that
is, the quality or power— that he has or exercises” (13). He also argues
that a “person may be an authority within a certain field of knowledge,
or he may occupy a certain position which carries with it certain pow-
ers” (13). With these preliminary observations as a backdrop, DeGeorge
offers a general working model of authority that he schematically pre-
sents in the time-honored philosophical tradition: “ Someone or some-
thing (X) is an authority if he (she, it) stands in relation to someone else
(Y) as superior stands to inferior with respect to some realm, field, or
domain (R)” (14). The model accentuates two prominent attributes of
authority: (1) It involves some type of relational quality, and (2) it is
limited to a particular realm or context. DeGeorge uses the model as a
foundation for differentiating between two types of authority that he
describes as executive and nonexecutive authority.
DeGeorge defines an executive authority as someone having the
“power and right to act for and on someone else” (22). A nonexecutive
authority lacks this right or power. Executive authority is further di-
vided into imperative and performatory authority. Imperative author-
ity “ involves the right or the power of some bearer to command
someone who is subject to authority to act or to forbear from acting in
certain ways.” In contrast, performatory authority is the “right or power
 The Authority of Public Bureaucracies 75

of someone to perform some action, sometimes on or for another person”

(63-68). Stated more succinctly, executive authority encompasses the right
and power to issue commands as well as to perform specific acts.
DeGeorge argues that the very nature of executive authority suggests
that it must be linked to some system or context to make any sense. This
context or system may be established by a “ set of laws, a constitution, a
tradition, a position or a set of personal qualities that are appropriate for
a set of circumstances” (64). Specific rules govern the context or system
and, in turn, determine the scope and limits of executive authority. For
example, Congress, by enacting tax laws, determines the context for the
Internal Revenue Service (IRS). The IRS has the right and power to
command and perform specific acts within the realm of revenue collec-
tion. Congress not only specifies the context but also determines the
rules concerning the scope and limits of the IR S’s executive authority.
The agency does not have the right or power to issue directives and
perform specific acts within the realm of foreign policy, for example. To
do so would be a violation of its executive authority.
DeGeorge also divides nonexecutive authority into two types,
epistemic and competence. Epistemic authority is based on superior
knowledge in a particular field or area. Epistemic authority is consid-
ered legitimate if what someone says is believed and, therefore, accepted
by those for whom that person is an authority. For example, the general
public is likely to believe officials of the U.S. Food and Drug Adminis-
tration (FDA) when they report that a drug is unsafe because of its po-
tential side effects. FDA officials are believed because they are presumed
to have specialized knowledge that is relevant in judging the safety of
the drug in question. It is also presumed that FDA officials are telling
the truth and are accurately reporting test results.
Authority based on competence is closely related to epistemic au-
thority. Officials have competence authority if they have the capacity or
ability to perform certain tasks in a particular field or area. DeGeorge
quickly points out that a thin line exists between epistemic authority
and competence authority and that their relationship may be examined
from a couple of different perspectives:

A ccording to one view, epistemic authority is a broad type o f authority,

and competence authority is one kind o f epistem ic authority. The argu-
ment in support o f this view holds that implicitly Y believes that X has
the requisite knowledge in R [realm] to do a [a specific action]. . . .
76 Conserving Mission

According to the other view, competence authority is a broad type of

authority o f which epistem ic authority is one kind. Thus someone is com -
petent in R if he has knowledge o f it. His knowledge may be theoretical
or practical. (44)

When consolidated, the works of Friedrich and DeGeorge provide a

coherent conceptual framework for understanding the authority of pub-
lic bureaucracies. With benefit of the previous discussion, I draw the
following conclusions: The mission of public bureaucracies is estab-
lished by legislative mandates and other legally binding acts that grant
authority to administrative agencies to act within a designated realm or
field of action and to pursue specific policy objectives. This authority
must be justified; those persons affected by an agency’s authority must
have good reasons for accepting it. The authority vested in public bu-
reaucracies consists of two mutually reinforcing types, executive and
nonexecutive. Because public administrators are entrusted with the re-
sponsibility of preserving the authority of public bureaucracies, admin-
istrative conservators should preserve both executive and nonexecutive
authority as a means of conserving the missions of administrative agen-
cies and their capacity to act. By doing so, administrative conservators
are preserving the integrity of public bureaucracies because the mission
represents the institution’s “true commitments” (Selznick 1957, 73).
These internal and external commitments determine an agency’s dis-
tinctive competence and character.
Administrative conservators may use a variety of strategies to pre-
serve the authority of public bureaucracies. In the remainder of this chap-
ter, these strategies are discussed within the context of preserving both
executive authority and nonexecutive authority.

Preserving Executive Authority

As previously discussed, executive authority involves the right and power

to issue commands and to perform certain acts in a given realm. As with
other types of authority, there are limits to the scope of executive au-
thority vested in public bureaucracies. These limits vary according to
the specific realm or field of action, the purposes of administrative ac-
tivity, and the types of acts performed by the agency. For example, the
executive authority of the National Park Service is (or should be) re-
stricted to the realm of park preservation and public recreation because
 Preserving Executive Authority 77

these two functions are a part of the agency’s legally mandated mission.
Administrative officials of the Park Service should sanction and engage
in only those activities that achieve these purposes. Activities such as
stocking the streams with game fish and restricting the use of certain
areas of the park are certainly acceptable. There are limits to how far the
National Park Service can and should go in performing these acts. Park
officials should not, for example, go overboard in encouraging park de-
velopment and ignore park preservation.
The administrative conservator should be sensitive to the limits placed
on the executive authority of public bureaucracies. The conservator
should remember that gross or consistent violations of these limits can
erode an agency’s executive authority and thus render such authority
unacceptable to those subject to it. The administrative conservator should
prevent or reduce violations directly related to the law(s) granting an
agency its executive authority. These include violations of the spirit of
the law and violations of the letter of the law.

The Spirit o f the Law

It is not uncommon in political circles to hear policy-makers, scholars,

and others refer to “the spirit of the law” when discussing the actions of
governmental agencies. This phrase is used so often that people seldom
give it a second thought. The Compact Oxford English Dictionary (1991)
defines “ spirit” as the “broad or general intent of meaning of a state-
ment, enactment, etc.” (1855). Another definition suggests that spirit is
the “real sense or significance of something; the spirit of the law” (Ameri-
can Heritage Dictionary 1982, 1178). Using these definitions as a guide-
post, one can say that an agency has violated the spirit of the law when
its actions and activities are unfaithful to the broad purposes, intent, and
unifying principles that provide the basis for the law that determine its
reason for existence. Note that administrative officials can violate the
spirit of the law without violating the letter of the law.
Violations of the spirit of the law consist of at least three different
types. First, an agency may violate the spirit of the law when its activi-
ties cease to make sense and thus are unacceptable to its employees and/
or external stakeholders because they are perceived as inconsistent with
the agency’s reason or purpose for existence. For example, the U.S.
Department of Agriculture’s Cooperative Extension Service has been
aggressively attacked by politicians and agricultural interest groups for
78 C onserving Mission

expanding its programs and activities into urban areas (see Terry 1995).
Critics charge that the Cooperative Extension Service has violated the
spirit of the Smith-Lever Act of 1914, which established the nationwide
system, because Congress did not intend for the Extension Service to be-
come involved in urban areas. When Congress instructed the Extension
Service to “give good leadership and direction along all lines of rural
a c t iv it ie s this is exactly what they meant (U.S. Congress House Com-
mittee on Agriculture 1913,5; emphasis added). The image of a 4-H youth
specialist teaching an inner-city youth how to raise a prize-winning steer
for the county fair conflicts with images of the Extension Service held in
the minds of many Americans. Activities of this nature do not seem to
make a lot of sense in view of the reasons given for the Extension Service’s
existence. It seems that neither the American public nor agricultural inter-
ests as a whole willingly accept the notion that rural, agriculturally based
programs are legitimate in the urban environment. This may partially ex-
plain why the Extension Service has experienced a weakening of popular
support for its programs and services throughout the country.
The second type of violation of the spirit of the law relates to the
manner in which the agency fulfills its mandated responsibilities. An
agency can violate the spirit of the law when it is overly zealous in
carrying out statutory provisions. Herman Finer (1941), the distinguished
British political scientist, labels this type of violation “ overfeasance.”
He suggests that overfeasance occurs when “a duty is undertaken be-
yond what law and custom oblige or empower” (337-338). Finer fur-
ther states that “overfeasance may result from dictatorial temper, vanity
and ambition of the jack in office, or genuine, sincere, public-spirited
zeal” (337-338). When critics say that an agency has exceeded, over-
stepped, or overreached its authority, they often mean that its officials
have engaged in some form of zealotry. The following cases involving
questionable tax collection activities of the IRS illustrate overzealousness.
The Internal Revenue Code of 1954 gives the IRS the executive au-
thority for the collection of taxes in the following words: “The Secre-
tary shall collect taxes imposed by internal revenue law” [26 U.S.C.A.
Sec. 6302(b) (USCA 1989)]. In carrying out tax collection activities, the
IRS has the right and power to use discretionary methods, that is, those
methods not specifically outlined in the tax law, to collect unpaid taxes:

Whether or not the method o f collecting any tax im posed by Chapter 21,
31, 32, 33, § 4481 o f Chapter 36, [or] § 450(a) o f Chapter 37, is specifi-
 Preserving Executive Authority 79

cally provided for by this title, any such tax may, under regulations pre-
scribed by the Secretary, be collected by means o f returns, stam ps, cou-
pons, tickets, books, or other such reasonable devices and methods as
may be necessary or helpful in securing a complete and proper collection
o f the tax. [26 U .S.C .A . Sec. 6302(b) (U SC A 1989)]

Thus, the IRS possesses wide discretion, as evidenced by the phrase

“other such reasonable devices and methods.” But even with such broad
authority, unreasonable methods of collection can be used, as was re-
vealed when the press reported that the IRS, as a common practice, in-
tercepts and cashes the personal checks of delinquent taxpayers sent
through the mail and made payable to other parties. Letters with en-
closed checks were confiscated from U.S. post offices, opened, altered,
and deposited by IRS agents into U.S. government bank accounts. The
legitimacy of such practices has been questioned on the grounds that the
IRS is exceeding its statutory authority because Congress did not intend
for the agency to go to such extremes in collecting delinquent taxes.
Other collection practices of the IRS have also been called into ques-
tion, most notably those pertaining to the seizure of bank accounts as
payment for back taxes. The Internal Revenue Code authorizes the agency
to levy the account of individuals as a means of collecting unpaid taxes:

The Secretary may authorize Federal R eserve banks, and incorporated

banks, trust com panies, dom estic building and loan associations, or credit
unions which are depositories or financial agents o f the United States, to
receive a tax im posed under the internal revenue laws. . . . He shall pre-
scribe the manner, times, and conditions . . . which the receipt o f such tax
. . . is to be treated as payment o f such tax to the Secretary. [26 U .S.C .A .
Sec. 6302(c) (U SC A 1989)]

This provision essentially means that the IRS has the executive au-
thority to seize bank accounts to collect back taxes. The agency has
been accused of being overly zealous in using this aspect of the law.
One such accusation stemmed from the IR S’s seizure of bank accounts
held by children as a means of collecting back taxes of their parents. A
stir was created when the Washington Post reported that the IRS seized
the life savings ($694) of a ten-year-old girl and wanted proof that the
money was not her father’s, an unemployed carpenter (see “IRS Seizes
Life Savings” 1987). In another case, the agency seized the savings ac-
count of a young boy who raised money by recycling aluminum cans.
80 Conserving Mission

The actions of the IRS, in both cases, were perceived by the public as
unacceptable and well beyond the limits of the spirit of the law. As a
result of widespread public opinion against such actions, the IRS insti-
tuted a new policy that bans the seizure of bank accounts containing
$100 or less.
The third type of violation of the spirit of the law is closely related to
the second in that it also pertains to the manner in which the agency
fulfills its statutory responsibilities. An agency can violate the spirit of
the law if it is “unenergetic,” “inattentive,” or “negligent” in carrying
out its legally mandated responsibilities. Finer (1941) calls this type of
violation “nonfeasance” (337). Nonfeasance occurs when administra-
tive officials “have not done what law or custom required them to do
owing to laziness, ignorance, or want of care for their charges, or cor-
rupt influence” (337). The Occupational Safety and Health Admini-
stration’s (OSHA) management of its whistle-blowers protection program
illustrates nonfeasance. OSHA is required by law to investigate com-
plaints from employees of interstate transportation companies who claim
that they were retaliated against for refusing to violate or for reporting
that their employer disobeyed federal motor vehicle safety regulations.
After an internal investigation, the U.S. General Accounting Office (U.S.
GAO 1988b) criticized OSHA for not devoting “enough management
attention to the whistle-blowers protection program for employees in
the interstate motor vehicle industry” (1) as mandated by law. The GAO
reported that OSHA “did not investigate and issue findings on 56 per-
cent of the whistle-blower cases in 1986 and the first eight months of
Fiscal 1987 within the 60 days required by law” (1).
In another case, the GAO was critical of the Department of Justice’s
management of defense procurement fraud investigations. In 1982 the
department’s Criminal Division was given responsibility for prosecut-
ing fraud cases within the defense establishment. As a means of fulfill-
ing this responsibility, the Criminal Division established the Defense
Procurement Fraud Unit. At the request of Senator William Proxmire,
the GAO was called in to investigate the department’s handling of pro-
curement fraud cases. The GAO (1988a) report portrayed an adminis-
trative agency that was extrem ely “ n egligen t” in fu lfillin g its
responsibilities. The Justice Department was criticized for not having
“complete or timely information on a significant number of defense pro-
curement fraud referrals” and for not knowing “the amount of attorney
resources spent in the effort” (2).
 Preserving Executive Authority 81

So far I have focused exclusively on violations of the spirit of the

law. Although important, this is only one aspect of a complex process
required to preserve an agency’s executive authority. As I mentioned
earlier, the administrative conservator should also ensure that the agency’s
actions and activities do not violate the letter of the law. But what ex-
actly does this mean?

The Letter o f the Law

The administrative conservator should ensure that the agency’s actions

and activities consistently comply with the primary, ordinary, and plain
meaning of the language used in mandating statutes and other legally
binding acts that specify its field of action, the purpose of its activity,
and the type of tasks it is designated to perform. Unlike violations of the
spirit of the law, violations of the letter of the law may be illegal. This
alone necessitates that the law’s language be observed. Despite lengthy
discussions by public administration theorists on the problems posed by
the ambiguous language contained in statutory mandates and other le-
gally binding acts, the language for the most part is quite clear. If this
were not the case, administrative agencies would be paralyzed and un-
able to perform their functions. Consider the following section of the
Aviation Safety Research Act of 1988:

The Administrator shall prepare, review, revise, publish, and transmit a

national aviation research plan to the Committee on Com merce, Science,
and Transportation o f the Senate and the Com mittee on Science, Space,
and Technology o f the H ouse o f Representatives no later than the date o f
the subm ission to C ongress o f the President’s budget for fiscal year 1990,
and for each fiscal year thereafter. The plan shall describe, for a 15 year
period, the research, engineering, and development considered by the
A dministrator necessary to ensure the continued capacity, safety, and ef-
ficiency o f aviation in the United States, considering emerging technolo-
gies and forecasted needs o f civil aeronautics, and provide the highest
degree o f safety in air travel. The plan shall cover all research conducted
under this section and section 316 o f this Act and shall identify com ple-
mentary and coordinated research efforts conducted by the National Aero-
nautics and Space Administration with funds specifically appropriated to
such Administration. [49 App. U .S.C .A . Sec. 1353(d)(1) (U SC A 1994)]

This language is relatively straightforward. The administrator of the

Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) is required (as indicated by the
82 Conserving Mission

word shall) to prepare, publish, and submit a national aviation research

plan to specific committees of Congress every fiscal year beginning
with fiscal year 1990. The act is also explicit about the nature and con-
tents of the plan. If the FAA administrator failed to comply with direc-
tives specified in the act, the administrator would be accused of violating
the letter of the law. This is exactly what happened to officials of the
Office of Human Development Services (OHDS).
An agency within the Department of Health and Human Services, OHDS
is responsible for awarding grants related to prevention of child abuse and
neglect. The National Center on Child Abuse and Neglect is the agency’s
vehicle through which such grants are awarded. OHDS became the focus
of an investigation because of accusations that it had engaged in arbitrary
and inequitable decision-making in awarding nearly $37 million in dis-
cretionary grants. These charges were substantiated because OHDS “fre-
quently did not justify in writing its decisions to approve applications out
of ranking order” (U.S. GAO 1987, 20). Moreover, “none of the applica-
tions rejected within ranking order was justified in writing, nor were 93
percent of the decisions to select grant applicants for administrative re-
view rather than competitive review” (20). In this case, officials of OHDS
violated provisions of the Administrative Procedures Act of 1946, which
specifically states that “ [a]n agency or commission must articulate with
clarity and precision its findings and reasons for its decisions” (sec. 71).
This is especially so in cases in which there appears to be a difference in
treatment among interested parties.
Similar to violations concerning the spirit of the law, violations of the
letter of the law may occur as a result of overfeasance or nonfeasance.
The covert activities of Lt. Col. Oliver L. North, the so-called action
officer on President Reagan’s National Security Council staff, is a clas-
sic case of overfeasance in violation of the letter of the law.7 North man-
aged both the Iran and Contra affairs, which involved secret arms
transactions with the government of Iran and secret military assistance
to the Nicaraguan Contras (the armed opposition to the Sandinista re-
gime in Nicaragua). North diverted funds, generated from profits made
on the sale of arms to Iran, to the Contras, despite congressional man-
dates prohibiting such activities. The Defense Appropriations Act (1984)
specifically stated:

N o appropriation or funds made available pursuant to this joint resolu-

tion to the Central Intelligence Agency, the Department o f D efense or
 Preserving Executive Authority 83

any other agency entity o f the United States involved in intelligence ac-
tivities may be obligated or expended for the purpose o f which would
have the effect o f supporting, directing or indirectly, military or param ili-
tary operations in N icaragua by any nation, group, organization, m ove-
ment or individual. (Boland II amendment)

It is clear from this language that North’s clandestine activities vio-

lated the letter of the law. Whether North’s actions and activities were a
result of “vanity and ambition” or “genuine, sincere, public-spirited zeal”
(driven by the desire to secure the release of American hostages held by
Islamic fundamentalist groups) is still an open question (recall Finer
1941, 337-338). One thing is certain: His covert activities were con-
trary to authorized congressional policy.
The actions and activities of Anne M. Gorsuch, administrator of the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) during the first Reagan ad-
ministration, provide an illustration of nonfeasance. Gorsuch was criti-
cized for the performance of one of her subordinates, Rita M. Lavelle,
an assistant administrator of the EPA, for the manner in which she en-
forced the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act. This act covers
the handling and disposal of toxic wastes and the so-called Superfund
for cleaning up abandoned hazardous waste sites. Lavelle was sharply
criticized by members of Congress and environmentalists because she
failed to “vigorously” enforce the letter of the law.8

Maintaining Compliance with Spirit and Letter o f Law

To say that the administrative conservator should prevent violations of

the spirit and letter of the law indicates what must be done to preserve
an agency’s executive authority. But this does not say much about how
the administrative conservator should minimize or prevent such viola-
tions. Certainly there is something more than merely knowing the dif-
ferent types of violations and their possible causes. The administrative
conservator may employ a variety of strategies, the more important of
which are discussed below.

Strategy: The Interpretation o f Legal Mandates

The administrative conservator should develop the capacity to interpret

the text o f legal mandates in a consistently meaningful and responsible
84 Conserving Mission

manner.9 This ability requires a sophisticated understanding of mandat-

ing statutes and other legally binding acts that grant the agency its ex-
ecutive authority. Such an understanding should be based on extensive
knowledge in several areas.10First, the administrative conservator should
become familiar with the meaning of the language used in the text of
legal mandates because this will aid in the interpretive endeavor. The
conservator should be “ sensitive to any special senses the words have
acquired, and should also consider the placement of words in the sen-
tence, and even the punctuation of the sentence” (Eskridge and Frickey
1990, 355). The administrative conservator should also have a clear idea
of the general structure of legal mandates and how the various provi-
sions of the law fit together.
Second, the administrative conservator should know the specific and
general legislative history of an agency’s legal mandates. This will pro-
vide important insights into the original intent and purpose of the legis-
lative body that enacted the law. The administrative conservator can
discover such information by reviewing various versions of the law prior
to its enactment, legislative committee reports, and other public records
such as the Congressional Record. For example, evidence of what the
authors of the previously mentioned Aviation Safety Research Act of
1988 intended can be found in the House of Representatives Bill 4686
(1988); Senate Bill 2746 (1988); House Report no. 894 (1988), pre-
pared by the Committee on Science, Space, and Technologies; Senate
Report no. 584 (1988), prepared by the Committee on Commerce, Sci-
ence, and Transportation; and the Congressional Record (1988).
If the administrative conservator administers a federal agency, locat-
ing information regarding the agency’s legislative history is relatively
straightforward. Unfortunately, this is not true for the conservator op-
erating at the state level. The search for legislative history, and in turn
intent, is more complicated because many states do not maintain com-
plete public records of legislative hearings and debates. This lack of docu-
mentation presents a significant but not insurmountable problem. What is
the administrative conservator to do in such instances? The first and most
obvious strategy is to read the law, particularly its preamble. Examining
the preamble to the law can provide important insights into why the law
was enacted (Friedrich 1972; Terry 1995). Preambles often begin with
the word “Whereas.” Statements immediately following the “whereas”
usually describe the theory behind the law. If the intent of the law re-
mains unclear, the administrative conservator should contact the spon-
 Preserving Executive Authority 85

sor directly to obtain historical information and ascertain what he or she

had in mind. There are, however, difficulties with this strategy. The pos-
sibility exists that the sponsor may have died or left political office for
an extended period of time. Relying solely on the sponsor’s memory is
a risky proposition because recalling actual facts becomes more diffi-
cult with the passage of time. Moreover, sponsors may succumb to the
temptation of reconstructing past events for the purposes of being por-
trayed in a favorable light (Berger and Luckmann 1966; Weick 1979).
The administrative conservator can guard against such problems by also
soliciting historical accounts from long-time legislative staff members.
Legislative staff members, or “staffers” as they are sometimes called,
have a wealth of knowledge. Their institutional memory (see Walsh and
Ungson 1991) is growing in importance as more states impose term
limits on elected legislative officials.
In addition to understanding the agency’s legislative history, the ad-
ministrative conservator should remember that interpretations of the law
evolve over time and thus are subject to change. These changes are de-
sirable and necessary to conform with the changing habits, dispositions,
and values of the constitutional order. Hence, the administrative conser-
vator must, of necessity, adjust the interpretation of legal mandates to
conform with changing circumstances. Such adjustments require the
prudent use of administrative discretion,11 as illustrated by the follow-
ing case involving the IRS and Bob Jones University.
The Internal Revenue Code of 1954 permits tax-exempt status for
“corporations . . . organized and operated exclusively for religious, chari-
table . .. or educational purposes . . [ 2 6 U.S.C.A. Sec. 501(c)(3) (USCA
1989)]. In 1970, six years after the passage of the Civil Rights Act, the
IRS abandoned a long-standing policy of granting tax-exempt status to
private schools that practiced racial discrimination. This action was in-
stituted in response to a court injunction that prohibited the agency from
granting tax-exempt status to private schools in Mississippi that denied
African Americans admission because of their race. In light of changing
societal values and public policies that prohibited racial discrimination,
officials of the IRS issued the following revised policy statement:

Both the courts and the Internal Revenue Service have long recognized
that the statutory requirement o f being “ organized and operated exclu-
sively for religious, ch aritable,. . . or educational purposes” was intended
to express the basic common law concept [of charity]. . . . All charitable
86 Conserving Mission

trusts, educational or otherwise, are subject to the requirement that the

purpose o f that trust may not be illegal or contrary to public policy. (Bob
Jon es v. United States, 461 U .S. 574, 579 [1983]).

IRS officials justified the policy change on the grounds that private
schools that practiced discrimination in admissions did not meet certain
common law requirements of charity. As such, these educational insti-
tutions did not serve the public good because their policies were incon-
sistent with the national policy to discourage racial discrimination. Bob
Jones University was immediately affected by this interpretation be-
cause of its policy that discriminated against unmarried African Ameri-
cans and those who condoned interracial dating or marriages. The IRS
revoked the university’s tax-exempt status. The university then chal-
lenged the IR S’s modified interpretation of Section 501(c)(3) of the In-
ternal Revenue Code in court and argued that the agency had exceeded
its statutory authority. The case was eventually heard by the U.S. Su-
preme Court, which upheld the IR S’s interpretation of the law. The Court
stated that Congress grants the IRS the authority and responsibility to
interpret the tax laws to “meet changing conditions and new problems”
(Bob Jones v. United States, 596). Moreover, the Court indicated that
the change in policy was consistent with the intent of Congress.

Strategy: The Education of Personnel

The administrative conservator must understand the nature and limits of

the agency’s executive authority. But this is not enough to ensure com-
pliance with the spirit and letter of the law; he or she must help others
understand their mandated responsibilities as well. Such an understand-
ing may be achieved through education (Scott and Meyer 1991). The
term “education” as used here encompasses more than what is normally
associated with socialization (see Van Maanen and Schein 1979; Van
Maanen 1978; Schein, 1968). Education includes those processes that
are not only “ socializing but personalizing and humanizing as well”
(C.J. Friedrich 1972, 19). In conjunction with other strategies, educa-
tion may be used to cultivate a nourishing sense of purpose by instilling
important organizational values (Scott and Meyer 1991; Klein and
Weaver 2000).
The administrative conservator may use an assortment of educational
strategies ranging from formal institutionalized training programs to
 Preserving Executive Authority 87

informal on-the-job experience. For example, the Federal Bureau of

Prisons (1985) conducts an institution familiarization program for new
employees. The four-week program is designed to “give new employ-
ees critical skills which they must have before receiving a specific job
assignment” (5). The bureau’s institution familiarization program is a
means of educating new employees to the agency’s reason for existence
and of conveying what actions are acceptable in this context.
The U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service has a long-standing policy of
requiring all prospective regional directors to spend several months at
the Washington headquarters as condition for promotion. This policy
is designed to “ sensitize would-be directors and to assist them to ac-
quire a greater appreciation of activities at the national level” (F.E.
Hester, former deputy director of the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service,
personal communication, January 9, 1987). This essentially means that
would-be regional directors are made aware of the acceptable bound-
aries of administrative action. In other words, they are educated on the
nature and limits of the agency’s executive authority. In a study of
federal bureau chiefs, Herbert Kaufman (1981a) alludes to the value
of this type of education:

A host o f understandings develop inside a bureau, and between the people

with whom it com es in contact, regarding the course the bureau will fol-
low— the practices it will render— in its job. So long as everybody in-
volved, including the chief, remains within the boundaries o f those un-
derstandings, things tend to go on routinely and quietly. But let anyone
step over the boundaries, and the reactions— o f em ployees, other offi-
cials, politicians, interest groups, or the press— are likely to be explosive.
(1 26-127)

Kaufman’s comments also point to another significant role of em-

ployee education: It helps (or should help) employees understand and
avoid those actions and behaviors that will undermine the agency’s
credibility and incur high political costs. Once again, the acceptability
of an agency’s actions and activities is determined by its specific field
of action, the purpose of its activities, and the type of acts performed.
For example, inadequate safety procedures in launching manned space
vehicles can cause a credibility problem for the National Aeronautics
and Space Administration (the explosion of the space shuttle Chal-
lenger immediately comes to mind); the publication of inaccurate and
biased investigative reports by the GAO can undermine its credibility;
88 Conserving Mission

and widespread corruption in the form of drug smuggling by Drug En-

forcement Administration officials can have an adverse effect on the
agency’s reputation.

Strategy: The Judicious Use of Rule-Making and

Adjudication

A final strategy for preserving executive authority involves agency rule-

making and adjudication. Legislative bodies grant most administrative
agencies executive authority for rule-making and adjudication. These
two analytically distinct yet mutually reinforcing functions give gov-
ernmental agencies their quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial qualities.12
According to Cornelius M. Kerwin (1994), “rulemaking is the single
most important function performed by agencies of government” (xi).
Rule-making activities entail the development of broad policies that may
be consistently applied to all within a designated category. As stated
earlier in the discussion of the Bob Jones University case, the IR S’s
Revenue Ruling 71-447, 1971-1972 (which addresses racially discrimi-
natory practices of “charitable” organizations) denies tax-exempt status
to “all charitable trusts, educational or otherwise” if their purposes are
“illegal or contrary to public policy” {Bob Jones v. United States, 596).
Agency rule-making consists of two types, formal and informal. For-
mal rule making-mandates that an agency conduct a public hearing,
whereas informal rule-making does not impose this requirement. Ad-
ministrative officials may, unless mandated otherwise by law, use their
discretion to determine whether a public hearing is necessary. If it is
determined that a formal hearing would enhance fair and effective ad-
ministration of a law, then administrative officials must follow the rule-
making provisions outlined in the Administrative Procedures Act of 1946.
Adjudicatory action taken by an agency is “directed at least in part at
determining the legal status of persons who are named as parties, or of
the acts or practices of those persons” (Shapiro 1965, 924). Adjudica-
tion differs from rule-making in several ways. First, adjudicatory pro-
ceedings are comparable to those used in the courtroom and thus are
more formal than rule-making proceedings. Second, decisions emerg-
ing from adjudicatory proceedings can establish a precedent that can be
applied to others in similar situations. Third, “rules made in adjudica-
tive proceedings are retroactive and those made in rule making are pro-
spective only” (933). The administrative conservator often has a choice
 Preserving Executive Authority 89

of using either rule-making or adjudication in giving content to general

statutory provisions. Decisions regarding which approach to use require
careful consideration. There are advantages to each, conditioned by pre-
vailing institutional circumstances. Hence, the administrative conserva-
tor must be a good diagnostician as well as an adept strategist. For
example, the administrative conservator may wish to use formal rule-
making to provide all interested parties an opportunity to voice their
opinion, especially if it is anticipated that a proposed policy will cause
controversy or affect a large number of groups or individuals. Agency
rule-making may also be used to generate support for proposed policies,
as A. Lee Fritschler points out in his book Smoking and Politics (1989).
Fritschler illustrates how the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) frequently
used formal rule-making to establish policy regarding cigarette labeling
and advertising. According to Fritschler, administrative officials of the
FTC “knew that if they adopted the rule without hearings, the cigarette
manufacturers could seize upon the secretiveness of their action to ar-
gue that the FTC was undemocratic, arbitrary and dangerous” (69).
In some instances, the administrative conservator may decide to
use informal rule-making if substantial agreement exists that the pro-
posed policy is not contrary to public policy or if the policy is routine
and relatively benign. The conservator may also use informal rule
making for another reason: to change existing policies that are, for
one reason or another, no longer applicable because of changing cir-
cumstances. The previously mentioned 1RS rule that denied tax-exempt
status to so-called charitable institutions that adopted discriminatory
policy is a case in point.
The administrative conservator could elect to use adjudication if a
case-by-case approach is sufficient for establishing policies. This deci-
sion is largely influenced by the nature of the problem (e.g., industrywide
vs. specific activities or practices of selected parties) and the scope of
the policy needed. For example, the FTC had to abandon the adjudica-
tory approach in addressing the industrywide problem of deceptive ciga-
rette advertising. The agency could not “ state authoritatively a general
policy of what constituted deception in cigarette ads for all advertisers”
because the “procedures employed in adjudicatory actions narrowly
defined the scope of admissible evidence” (Fritschler 1989, 61).
Regardless of the approach selected, the administrative conservator
must ensure that the end results of rule-making and adjudication pro-
ceedings are consistent with the spirit and letter of the law. With respect
90 Conserving Mission

to federal agencies, Congress made this clear in the Administrative Pro-

cedures Act of 1946, as the following statement indicates: “Although
weight must be given to an administrator’s interpretation of a particular
statute, where an administrative regulation is plainly inconsistent with
the statute and operates in a manner which frustrates congressional in-
tent, it can be given no force and effect and must be declared invalid” [5
U.S.C.A. Sec. 557, n. 80 (USCA 1977)].

Beyond Compliance

To preserve an agency’s executive authority, the administrative conser-

vator must do more than ensure that its actions and activities comply
with the spirit and letter of the law. Other areas of administrative con-
cern must be considered. These include, among others, being respon-
sive to the various constitutional masters and the citizenry as well as
protecting the agency’s jurisdictional boundaries.

Strategy: Responsiveness and the Exercise

o f Strategic Discretion

Public administration scholars are quick to note that legislative man-

dates and other legally binding acts that grant authority to public bu-
reaucracies contain a multitude of diverse, conflicting, and ambiguous
policy objectives. These unique characteristics are perceived by many
scholars as a constraint or burden that makes administration of public
bureaucracies more difficult and complex. In this context, complexity is
considered a serious problem. It is true that the distinctive character of
mandating statutes contributes to administrative complexity, but it does
not necessarily follow that complexity is a serious problem (see H. Wil-
son 1975). Indeed, the multifaceted and complex nature of mandating
statutes can be viewed as an asset because it is a manifestation of the
constitutional tradition of a compound democratic republic and an op-
portunity that broadens the administrative conservator’s discretion. This
discretion must be prudently and strategically exercised to be respon-
sive to the executive, legislative, and judicial branches as well as to
those interest groups that are committed to the common good. The ad-
ministrative conservator’s responsiveness strengthens communal bonds
and loyalty to the agency and thereby to the constitutional order.
To be responsive to the constitutional masters and the citizenry, the
 Preserving Executive Authority 91

administrative conservator must exercise strategic discretion to shift the

relative emphasis placed on different policy objectives (contained in le-
gal mandates) to correspond to changing priorities. This does not imply
that the administrative conservator should abandon certain policy ob-
jectives because of changing political priorities. To do so would under-
mine the agency’s executive authority and, in turn, its integrity. As C.J.
Friedrich (1958a) states, “No authority can be legitimate that fails to
fulfill the function for which it has been created— the public good” (40).
The administrative conservator must act responsibly when shifting the
emphasis placed on different policy objectives. This requires ongoing
attention to those policy objectives deemphasized during the changing
political climate.
The importance of shifting the emphasis on policy objectives to ac-
commodate the changing political climate is often reflected in the lan-
guage of governmental administration. Phrases such as “change the
thrust,” “make important course correction,” “change the focus,” and
“make programmatic adjustments” are a few of those commonly heard
expressions that reflect sensitivity to the larger political forces at work
in society. The statements of F. Eugene Hester, former acting director of
the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, illustrate the point. In a memoran-
dum distributed to all agency employees at the outset of the first Reagan
administration, Hester (1981) states:

The new administration came to Washington recognizing a mandate from

the public. It was a mandate for a new beginning, for a stronger national
economy, for less Federal regulation and bureaucratic red tape, for a better
partnership and good neighbor attitude and less Federal domination, unre-
sponsiveness and arrogance. . . . The Federal Government had been per-
ceived as burdensome, overly restrictive and high-handed and political lead-
ers were elected and appointed to overcome these problems. . . . So, the
administration came to town with a pu rp ose. . . and a determination to take
bold action that would be required to make the change. . . . Changes in
government are sometimes thought o f as like the pendulum. If it gets too
far from center, it then swings back in a corrective action. I think that is a
good analogy. I like to compare it to a sailboat. It can’t sail directly into the
wind, but it can definitely go on that general course by sailing to one side
and then the other in a somewhat zig-zag course, with the net effect being
progress in the desired course. I believe government sometimes makes
progress in a similar manner, and a parallel type o f course correction is
essential to keep us, as a Nation, headed in the right direction. (2)
92 Conserving Mission

Examining public bureaucracies from a historical perspective makes

it readily apparent that the emphasis placed on different policy objec-
tives does shift from time to time. For example, the National Park Ser-
vice is mandated to pursue two seemingly contradictory policy objectives:
(1) to promote public use of the parks and (2) to preserve the parks
(Freemuth 1991). Alston Chase (1987) demonstrates that the agency
has throughout its history shifted back and forth between the two policy
objectives:

During the periods when the Service was most anxious to please the rec-
reation industry and serve the public, it tended to encourage park devel-
opment, stocking the streams with gam e fish and building hotels, resorts,
and even g o lf courses. This em phasis on public use inevitably affected
the wildlife. Seeking to please the public, the Park Service immediately
after its creation inaugurated a program to exterminate the “ bad” ani-
m als, predators such as wolves and mountain lions, in order to increase
the number o f “ good” anim als, such as elk and bison, that the new agency
believed would bring in more people. But when conservationism was
ascendent in America, the Service tended to put higher value on preser-
vation. During the 1930s, for exam ple, when the railroads— once a po-
tent influence in national park policy— were declining and environmen-
talism was on the rise, the Park Service terminated the predator-control
program and established an ecological think tank known as the Wild L ife
Division. (36)

The foregoing discussion suggests that the administrative conser-

vator’s responsiveness to the constitutional master and the citizenry is a
requisite for preserving an agency’s executive authority.

Strategy: The Protection o f Jurisdictional Boundaries

When an agency is granted executive authority, its officials are given

the legal right and power to perform certain acts within some desig-
nated realm. The concept of realm implies that an agency’s actions are
restricted to a specific area of interest, that there are “boundaries.”
Although these boundaries define the agency’s jurisdiction, they are
not, however, rigid, permanent, or clear-cut lines o f demarcation.
Rather, they are permeable, fuzzy, and constantly changing. The ad-
ministrative conservator should be sensitive to the agency’s jurisdic-
tional boundaries and aggressively defend them against encroachment
 Preserving Executive Authority 93

by bureaucratic rivals. This may be accomplished by developing and

maintaining a high degree of agency autonomy. According to James Q.
Wilson (1989), autonomy is an agency’s “relatively undisputed juris-
diction” (183). He goes on to say that “agencies ranking high in au-
tonomy have a monopoly jurisdiction (that is, they have few or no
bureaucratic rivals and a minimum of political constraints imposed on
them by superiors)” (183). Wilson offers several strategies for achiev-
ing agency autonomy, many of which may be used by the administra-
tive conservator.
First, the administrative conservator should “fight other organizations
that seek to perform” the agency’s tasks (189). This is exactly what ad-
ministrative officials of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) did
when the U.S. Marshals Service (USM S) became more aggressive in
federal fugitive investigations. At one time, the FBI had a monopoly
jurisdiction over pursuing federal fugitives. But as the USM S became
more active in hunting key narcotic fugitives, the FBI had to fight this
new bureaucratic rival to protect its jurisdiction (the FBI lost).
Second, the administrative conservator should “avoid taking on tasks
that differ significantly from those that are at the heart of the organization’s
mission” (190). Officials of the U.S. Department of Agriculture’s Coop-
erative Extension Service did just the opposite when they took on social
welfare programs in urban areas. As previously mentioned, this decision
has caused the agency to lose a great deal of autonomy.
Third, the administrative conservator should not participate in joint
or cooperative ventures with other agencies unless such arrangements
protect the agency’s autonomy. But this can be done. For example, the
U SM S uses both its Boeing 727 aircraft as part of the National Prison
Transportation System to assist other agencies in the long-distance move-
ment of prisoners. The agency coordinates and schedules the majority
of long-distance prisoner transfers between institutions operated by the
Federal Bureau of Prisons. The U SM S also transports prisoners for the
Immigration and Naturalization Service as well as for a variety of state
and local agencies. These cooperative ventures do not pose a threat to
the agency’s autonomy because of the nature of the relationships. The
other agencies depend on the U SM S for their transportation services.
The U SM S gains much and loses nothing by cooperation.
Fourth, the administrative conservator should “ avoid tasks that will
produce divided or hostile constituencies” (191). This may be difficult
to do because legislative bodies are prone to draft mandating statutes in
94 Conserving Mission

such a manner as to appease multiple and distinct interests. But in most

instances, the various stakeholders who have a history of working out
formal and informal arrangements, or “rules of the game,” tend to get
along quite well until other players enter the game. This changes the
nature of existing relationships by creating a degree of suspicion and
increased speculation about the allocation of scarce agency resources.
The administrative conservator should not consciously pursue additional
tasks that will bring with them a different set of stakeholders whose
interests are totally foreign to those who have a traditional stake in the
agency’s product or services. Returning to the example of the National
Park Service, it is safe to assume that the agency’s two traditional con-
stituencies— environmentalists and those who represent the recreation
industry— have learned to live together. This does not mean that they
will agree on all issues. It does mean, however, that they have agreed to
disagree and that the manner in which disagreements are handled is
most likely governed by a set of ground rules. These ground rules struc-
ture the actions and behavior of environmentalists and the recreational
industry as they compete for benefits accrued from the allocation of the
agency’s resources. But if the National Park Service were to add, for
example, the task of managing the use of public parks for fossil fuel
exploration, then an entirely different set of players enters the game—
each with a different agenda. Possible players would include the oil,
natural gas, and other interests related to the fossil resource industry;
the Departments of Defense and Energy; and the Bureau of Land Man-
agement, the U.S. Geological Survey, and the Fish and Wildlife Service,
to name a few. This does not include the various congressional commit-
tees and subcommittees that have oversight responsibility. The new play-
ers who have entered the game may not honor the ground rules established
by environmentalists and those representing the recreational industry.

Preserving Nonexecutive Authority

As stated earlier, nonexecutive authority is distinguished from execu-

tive authority in that it “does not involve any right to command or to act
on or for another (DeGeorge 1985, 22). Nonexecutive authority consists
of two different types, epistemic and competence. Epistemic authority
consists of superior knowledge in a particular area, whereas compe-
tence authority results from the ability to perform certain tasks in a given
area. Because the relation of epistemic and competence authority can be
 Preserving N onexecutive Authority 95

viewed in different ways, it is necessary to clarify how the concepts are

used here. For purposes of this discussion, epistemic authority is viewed
as a “broad type of authority and competence authority is one kind of
epistemic authority” (44). An administrative agency has legitimate
epistemic authority if it possesses and is perceived by others to have
superior knowledge and competence in a particular field or realm. The
belief that administrative agencies have (or can acquire and develop)
such knowledge and competence is one of the primary reasons they are
delegated authority to perform certain tasks. For example, the National
Aeronautic and Space Administration (NASA) has and is perceived by
Congress and the American people to have superior knowledge and com-
petence in the realm of space exploration.
As with executive authority, there are limits to an agency’s epistemic
authority. And, as noted by DeGeorge (1985), violation of these limits
“help[s] erode the general justification of such authority and undermines
the use of authority in the specific instances in question” (46). The ad-
ministrative conservator should be cognizant of these limits and guard
against violations. Violations of an agency’s epistemic authority tend to
revolve around questions concerning the public trust.

Violations o f the Public Trust

Legitimate epistemic authority is based on the notion that what some-

one says is believed and therefore accepted by those for whom that indi-
vidual is an authority. In this formulation, the concept of belief is central
to the notion of epistemic authority. Belief is a spacious concept be-
cause it embraces several other concepts such as confidence, faith, and
trust. Consider the following definitions {Merriam-Websters Collegiate
Dictionary 1993):

Belief— “ a state or habit o f mind in which trust or confidence is placed

in som e person or thing; something believed” (104)
Confidence— “faith or belief that one will act in a right, proper, or
effective way; reliance on another’s discretion” (241)
Faith— “ allegiance to duty or person; fidelity to one’s prom ises; firm
belief in something for which there is no proof; complete trust” (418)
Trust— “one in which confidence is placed; a charge or duty im posed
in faith or confidence or as a condition o f som e relationship; som e-
thing committed or entrusted to one to be used or cared for in the
interest o f another” (1269)
96 Conserving Mission

Guided by these definitions, I can say that violations of an agency’s

epistemic authority occur when there are sufficient reasons not to be-
lieve what is said by administrative officials because of a loss of public
confidence, faith, and trust. Thus, it is possible to conclude that viola-
tions of an agency’s epistemic authority involve those infractions that
undermine the public’s trust in the agency’s capacity to serve the com-
mon good. These violations tend to be of at least two types: (1) the
deliberate deception of those for which the agency is an epistemic au-
thority (i.e., legislative, executive, and judicial bodies as well as the
general public) and (2) the use of epistemic authority for personal or
group benefit.13 The administrative conservator should be concerned
with both types of violations.

Violation: Deliberate Deception

The administrative conservator must remain trustworthy and honest in

carrying out his or her official duties and must ensure that agency em-
ployees do the same. This simple, seemingly self-evident statement
should not be taken lightly. Deliberate acts of deception can undermine
an agency’s epistemic authority and create a credibility gap between the
agency and those for whom it is an epistemic authority. The concept of
a credibility gap has special significance because of its etymological
link to the concept of belief. The Compact Oxford English Dictionary
(1991) says that a credibility gap is the difference between what is pre-
sented as truth and the amount of it believed to be true by the public.
The word “credibility” is derived from the Latin term credere, meaning
to believe. One who is capable of being believed is described as cred-
ible, or worthy of trust and confidence. This is what journalists often
mean when they speak of a “credible source.” Credibility implies truth,
“one of the key values to which authority in many contexts is vitally
linked” (C.J. Friedrich 1958a, 46).
When a credibility gap exists between governmental agencies and
those for whom they are an epistemic authority, what administrative
officials say is received with a degree of skepticism and doubt. When
communications or decisions by administrative officials are consistently
questioned or openly challenged, then the agency’s epistemic authority
is weakened. Because an agency’s epistemic authority is inextricably
interwoven with its executive authority, the latter is also eroded. When
this occurs, the agency is apt to experience a “legitimacy crisis”— the loss
 Preserving N onexecutive Authority 97

of public confidence, faith, and trust in the agency’s ability to perform the
functions for which it was established (D.O. Friedrich 1980). Thus, it is
easy to understand why deliberate acts of deception are viewed as betray-
als of the faith, confidence, and trust placed in administrative agencies
and, in turn, in those entrusted with the responsibility for their care.
The administrative conservator should institute preventive measures
to ensure that agency functions and processes adhere to standards and
practices that sustain the public’s trust in the agency’s capacity to per-
form its delegated function. The conservator must inspect, monitor,
and adjust the agency’s functions and processes as the need arises. For
example, consider the bureaucratic propaganda activities of govern-
mental agencies.
As a standard practice, government agencies issue official reports
documenting activities and accomplishments. These reports perform an
important function in articulating, reinforcing, and shaping the percep-
tions of those who have an interest in the agency’s programs, services,
or activities. They are also useful in creating a favorable public image
that may be transformed into prestige, a viable strategy for controlling
external dependencies (see Perrow 1961). Official documents transmit
information that engenders confidence in stakeholders by assuring them
that the agency’s activities are legitimate and, thereby, consistent with
the spirit and letter of the law.
The institutionalized dissemination of information in the form of of-
ficial reports is often referred to as “bureaucratic propaganda” (Altheide
and Johnson 1980). Such propaganda is intended not only to inform but
also to convince relevant audiences of the legitimacy of an agency’s
activities. According to Altheide and Johnson:

The purpose o f modern propaganda is to maintain the legitimacy o f an

organization and its activities. The practical and day-to-day aspects o f
the organization are well understood by their workers but all actions are
sym bolically changed when placed in the context o f an official report.
These accounts, subject to evaluation by superiors and other organiza-
tions, are constructed to reflect what an organization is presumed to do
and how well it does it. In hoping to satisfy evaluations and thereby le-
gitim ize the organization’s activities and purposes, official reports have
inadvertently presented contrived, m anaged, and essentially decon-
textualized pictures o f their respective portions o f social life. Thus, the
overriding purpose o f bureaucratic propaganda is not to dupe everyone,
but it is intended to convince relevant persons. (18)
98 Conserving Mission

Official documents disseminated by the GAO illustrate the type of

propaganda activities carried out by governmental agencies. The Bud-
get and Accounting Act of 1921 established the GAO for the explicit
purpose of investigating “all matters relating to the receipt, disburse-
ment and application of public funds” (25).
Under the leadership of Comptroller Elmer Staats, the agency expanded
its conception of auditing to include program evaluation. In documenting
its audit and evaluation activities, the GAO issues a series of official docu-
ments through its Office of Public Information, ranging from an annual
report to a Congressional Source Book, which includes information pre-
pared by the agency to assist Congress and other relevant audiences. In its
monthly publication, Reports Issued, the GAO documents audit and evalu-
ation activities as well as congressional testimony given by agency offi-
cials. The publication is complete with reports whose titles reflect the
agency’s responsibilities, thus further reinforcing the perception that it is
adhering to the spirit and letter of the law. For example, reports cited in
the June 1987 issue of Reports Issued include “Financial Audit: Com-
modity Credit Corporation’s Financial Statement for 1986 and 1987” (15),
“School Lunch Program: Evaluation of Alternatives to Commodity Do-
nations” (15), “Small Business: Evaluation of a Study on Access to Capi-
tal” (16), and “Aviation Safety: Needed Improvements in FAA’s Airline
Inspection Program Are Underway” (17).
Official documents issued by the GAO are believed and therefore
accepted by Congress, the news media, and the general public because
they are presumed to be accurate and objective, that is, true. Comptrol-
ler General Charles A. Bowsher (1992), the agency’s former chief ex-
ecutive, was very attentive to internal standards governing the accuracy
of official documents prepared for public consumption. In addressing
this matter, Bowsher stated:

GA O has rigorous standards. It checks and rechecks its facts carefully,

and its em ployees report-review techniques to make sure that its reports
will stand up to the closest scrutiny. The accuracy and objectivity o f the
agency’s products are the m ajor reason G A O enjoys widespread cred-
ibility in an era when other agencies o f the government are often subject
to public distrust and suspicion. (6, italics added)

Bowsher’s comments are revealing because they emphasize the im-

portance of establishing policies and procedures to maintain the truth-
fulness of information contained in official reports. His leadership of
 Preserving N onexecutive Authority 99

the GAO provides an example of what the administrative conservator

should do. Another case involving the U.S. Army Armament Materiel
Development and Readiness Command (DARCOM) demonstrates what
the administrative conservator should not do.
DARCOM has jurisdiction over the nation’s government-owned, con-
tractor-operated facilities specializing in the production of propellants
and explosives. DARCOM ’s largest ammunition plant for many years
was the Radford Army Ammunition Plant (RAAP), located forty miles
southwest of Roanoke, Virginia. At one time, RAAP produced about 98
percent of all propellants used for Army ammunition rockets. The plant
is owned and operated by Hercules Inc.
Because the risk of explosion is always present, the manufacture of
explosives is a hazardous enterprise. Nitroglycerine, for example, is a
highly volatile processing ingredient that is routinely used in the pro-
duction of such ammunition. Because of the high probability of detona-
tion, nitroglycerine is very unforgiving— there is little margin for error.
Given the dangers associated with the production of explosives, safety
is of utmost importance.
Many of its official public statements reflected that RAAP had made
safety the cornerstone of its public relations campaign. According to an
official plant document,

During the 35 years o f existence, R A A P ’s total commitment to safety has

been m agnified as com pared with that o f the U .S. chemical industry, as a
whole. In the m id-1960’s, R A A P recorded an 815-day period without an
injury, an industry record. Recent years show an average o f well below
half an injury per million man-hours worked. (R A A P n.d., 4)

RAAP measures safety in terms of lost-time injuries, excluding an

explosion. The number of days linked without injuries that require time
off is often well publicized in official documents. The Powder Press, the
plant’s internal newsletter, often carries a front-page column titled “Safety
Scoreboard,” which lists the number of days and hours worked without
an injury requiring time off. The publication also frequently carries head-
lines highlighting its safety record, for example, “Proactive Safety Wins
Again,” “One, Two, Three, We Are Injury Free,” and “Proactive Safety
Has Won Us Another Award.”
Over time, RAAP developed an impressive aerospace industry record
of 18 million work-hours worked without a lost-time injury. This record
 100 Conserving Mission

ended in 1985 with an explosion that killed two workers and resulted in
several million dollars in property damage. An Army investigation into
the cause of the explosion revealed numerous safety violations ranging
from the failure to follow safety procedures to faulty equipment. In an
investigative report, the Roanoke Times and World News (a Virginia news-
paper) questioned how RAAP could maintain its impressive safety record
under such conditions. The article also questioned how, in view of the
seriousness of reported violations, the plant maintained around-the-clock
shifts with nearly 4,000 workers for three and one-half years without a
lost-time injury on the job (“ Is the Arsenal S afe ?” 1986; see also
“Arsenal’s Lost-Time Injury Figures Vary” 1986).
The newspaper concluded, after interviews with plant workers, U.S.
Army and Hercules officials, state safety officials, and others, that man-
agers at the plant ignored injuries to workers as a means of maintaining
the safety record. The highly publicized safety record was maintained
despite employees receiving injuries that required them to miss work.
In “When an Accident Isn’t” (1986), the newspaper stated,
Arsenal officials overlooked broken bones, torn ligam ents, burns, and
disabling injuries that occurred on the job over the past three and one half
years. The record was maintained by the arsenal despite rulings by the
Virginia Industrial Com m ission that the plant had to pay em ployees for
work-related injuries that kept them o ff the job. The record was main-
tained even though som e em ployees were required to report to work to
avoid lost time after being seriously injured. The record was maintained
even as som e em ployees were required to schedule their surgery for job-
related injuries on their days o ff in order to avoid lost time. ( A l ) 14

The highly publicized safety record included in official plant publi-

cations and the actual day-to-day activities were inconsistent, resulting
in a credibility gap. Since then, the news media, union officials, and the
general public have expressed doubt about the plant’s safety record-
keeping procedures. Safety figures included in official documents and
public pronouncements by RAAP officials are no longer considered a
credible source of information. They are no longer believable.

Violation:The Use o f Epistemic Authority for Personal

or Group Benefit

The administrative conservator should ensure that the epistemic author-

ity acquired by virtue of his or her official position is exercised with the
 Preserving N onexecutive Authority 101

common good in mind. This is extremely important, because the proper

use of epistemic authority (or any other type of authority, for that mat-
ter) is a prerequisite for its preservation. The phrase “proper use” is
emphasized because it has direct bearing on this discussion. The word
“proper” suggests appropriateness and correctness, whereas the term
“use” (when employed as a noun) is defined as the “utilization or em-
ployment for or with some aim or purpose, application or conversion to
some (especially good or useful) end” (The Compact Oxford English
Dictionary 1991, 2204). In relation to epistemic authority, proper use
suggests that such authority must be appropriate and used for some good
or useful end. It is reasonable to assume that the epistemic authority
vested in public bureaucracies and exercised by those who occupy offi-
cial positions should be employed for the common good. The failure to
do so is a violation of the limits placed on such authority and is espe-
cially troublesome in a democratic society. Flagrant and widespread
abuses provide constant reminders of how easy it is for legitimate au-
thority to become perverted and thus transformed into a form of
authoritarianism (see Henderson 1991). People need not look beyond
the regrettable actions and activities of J. Edgar Hoover, former director
of the FBI, and Senator Joseph McCarthy, a member of the U.S. Con-
gress who persecuted citizens for their supposedly communist sympa-
thies, to understand the dangers of authoritarianism.
The administrative conservator should be acutely aware that the abuse
of authority is a proved formula for disaster. As a consequence, the con-
servator must be on the alert for any abuses that may undermine the
agency’s epistemic authority. Although there are different types of abuse,
of special concern are those abuses that involve an official’s use of spe-
cialized knowledge and competence (acquired largely as a result of or
directly related to the formal position) for personal gain. This type of
abuse is malpractice.15
The term “malpractice” as used here differs from the ordinary uses of
the word. In common use, malpractice typically refers to the “failure to
exercise an accepted degree of professional skill or learning by one . . .
rendering professional services which results in injury, loss, or damage”
(Merriam Webster's Collegiate Dictionary 1993, 705). But there is an-
other meaning of malpractice. According to The Compact Oxford En-
glish Dictionary (1991), malpractice is “ illegal action by which a person
seeks to benefit at the cost of others while in a position of trust” ( 1026).
I will rely on this definition because of its relevance to this discussion,
102 Conserving Mission

but a few modifications are in order. First, malpractice may or may not
involve illegal acts. It is often possible for someone to find loopholes in
a law that are, for all practical purposes, legal in that they do not violate
the letter of the law. Whether such acts violate the spirit of the law is
another question. Nevertheless, the action taken is suspect and likely to
raise questions that can undermine the individual’s epistemic authority
exercised on behalf of the agency.
Second, administrators or other employees need not necessarily oc-
cupy official positions at the time they use their specialized knowledge
and competence (derived from direct involvement with the agency) for
personal benefit. For example, an individual may develop a sophisticated
understanding of an agency’s internal operation by having worked in an
official position for an appreciable time. This understanding includes both
the formal and the informal ways of getting things done. Such knowledge
is invaluable to outsiders who have a vested interest in having access to
key figures in the agency and in knowing how the agency operates. When
an official decides to leave an agency, that individual should resist the
temptation to use insider information for personal gain. Of course, the use
of this knowledge cannot be realistically restricted or prohibited forever
without violating an individual’s rights. But there seems to be an accept-
able time lapse between when a person leaves an agency and when that
individual can do business with the agency without being perceived as
engaging in influence peddling. The length of this period is an open ques-
tion. Federal law, for example, uses one year as a benchmark, but there is
nothing magical about this number (see Zimmerman 1994, chap. 9). The
acceptable time is influenced by a number of important considerations,
such as the type of position held by the individual and the degree of access
the individual had to privileged information. A scandal involving senior
officials of the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development
(HUD) provides an illustration. Established in 1965, HUD is the primary
federal agency charged with addressing the nation’s housing needs (see
Office of the Federal Register 1992).
Early in the administration of President George H.W. Bush, HUD In-
spector General Paul A. Adams released the findings of an investigation
focusing on several of the agency’s programs. During the Reagan ad-
ministration, Adams reported, the Section 8 Moderate Rehabilitation
Program, which provides developers long-term rent subsidies if they
agree to bring substandard housing for low-income families up to ac-
ceptable levels, was rife with political favoritism. A substantial number
 Preserving N onexecutive Authority 103

of ranking Republicans and former HUD officials benefited financially

from the program, either as developers or as high-priced consultants who
lobbied senior HUD officials (see Kuntz 1989). In view of these revela-
tions and the speculation of a widespread scandal, HUD secretary Jack F.
Kemp ordered an investigation of the agency’s forty-eight major programs.
The preliminary results were not encouraging. It was disclosed that a
majority of the programs were plagued by abuse or serious mismanage-
ment during the Reagan administration. Although several officials and
lobbyists were accused of influence peddling, a case involving Lance
Wilson, a ranking HUD official and protégé of Samuel L. Pierce Jr. (the
former HUD secretary), provides a textbook example of malpractice.16
Edward T. Pound (1989), a staff reporter for the Wall Street Journal,
raised numerous questions about the conduct of Lance Wilson, a young,
up-and-coming attorney who held a high-level political post at HUD. In
his article “Good Connections: How HUD Aide Used Ties to Help Him-
self, Later PaineWebber,” Pound paints a picture of a politically astute,
wheeling-and-dealing public official who used his position and inside
knowledge of the agency for personal advantage. Wilson’s activities at
HUD and later as a first vice president at PaineWebber (the billion-
dollar financial services corporation) were the focus of congressional
investigations into possible wrongdoings at the agency. Wilson was ac-
cused of using his influence while still at HUD to assist a developer
(and later business partner) to secure funds from the agency. He was
also accused of making millions of dollars from HUD-related transac-
tions shortly after he left the agency. Commenting on Wilson’s ques-
tionable activities at HUD, Pound writes:

What has most aroused congressional investigators about Mr. Wilson are
his dealings . . . with Texas-based developer Leonard Briscoe. In 1983,
when Mr. Wilson was still at HUD, he supported $7 million in federal aid
for a B riscoe apartment project in Texas, according to H ouse investiga-
tors. Then in 1984, only a few months after he left the agency, Mr. Wilson
and Mr. B riscoe formed a Texas consulting company, Urban Community
Consultants---- In 1985, a little more than a year after leaving the agency,
Mr. Wilson received a 15% interest— then valued at $750,000— in a HUD-
backed Florida apartment project in which Mr. B riscoe was the general
partner. (A 4 )17

Pound also portrays Wilson as an influence peddler who used his

connections at HUD to assist PaineWebber to make profitable business
104 C onserving Mission

deals. One such deal involved assisting the firm in securing a contract to
serve as a financial adviser for HUD as they sold off loan assets. Despite
a review panel selecting another firm, PaineWebber was awarded the
contract. Pound speculates that Wilson used his influence and inside
knowledge to win the contract for the firm:

Mr. Wilson was opening other doors to help admit PaineWebber to a lu-
crative business involving the sale o f H UD loan assets. The agency, un-
der a mandate from the White House to sell o ff assets for cash to help
reduce the federal deficit, wanted a financial advisor on hundred o f m il-
lions in assets sales— an agreement potentially worth $1.3 million. Mr.
Wilson provided “ technical advice” on PaineW ebber’s 100-page proposal
and kept the firm abreast o f how the com petition was going. . . . A
seven-m em ber H U D advisory panel recom m ended another concern,
Chem ical Bank. . . . The panel’s choice, however, was rejected by Mr.
Pierce’s under-secretary, Carl C ovitz, who in an April 1988 m emo d es-
ignated PaineW ebber because o f its “ extensive, direct experience with
H U D program s” and its financial expertise. Mr. Covitz says he d oesn ’t
rem ember whether Mr. Pierce ever voiced a preference on the matter.
Mr. Covitz also says he d oesn ’t recall ever being lobbied by Mr. Wilson
for the job. But som eone close to Mr. W ilson says that Mr. Wilson spoke
to a Covitz aide shortly before Mr. C ovitz picked PaineW ebber over
Chem ical. (A 4 )18

The actions of Lance Wilson and others had a profound effect on

HUD’s integrity. The scandal raised serious questions about the agency’s
capacity to represent the nation’s housing interest. The public’s trust
and confidence in HUD reached an all-time low.

Summary

Conserving the mission of public bureaucracies is a complex and mul-

tifaceted function. It requires that the administrative conservator de-
vote energies to preserving both executive and nonexecutive authority
vested in public bureaucracies. With respect to preserving executive
authority, the administrative conservator must ensure that the agency’s
activities and actions do not violate the spirit or letter of the law. Strat-
egies useful for this purpose include the responsible interpretation of
legal mandates, the education of employees, and the judicious use of
rule-making and adjudication. The administrative conservator should
 Summ ary 105

prudently and strategically exercise discretion as a means of being

responsive to the constitutional masters and the citizenry. The conser-
vator should also protect the agency’s jurisdictional boundaries.
The preservation of the agency’s nonexecutive authority is also a re-
quirement for conserving the mission of public bureaucracies. The ad-
ministrative conservator should guard against violations of the public
trust. These violations include deliberate deception and the use of
epistemic authority for personal gain.

Notes
1 .1 first discovered this quotation in Austin Sarat (1987).
2. Although agency theory has its roots in commercial law, the theory has at-
tracted a great deal of attention in recent years partly because of its identification as
one of two models of competitive self-interest classified under the theoretical para-
digm of organizational economics. See, for example, Lex Donaldson (1990) and
Charles Perrow (1986, chap. 7).
3. These modifications are readily apparent in Henry D. K ass’s (1990) work on
stewardship. For a discussion of the Hegelian notion of the civil service, see Georg
Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (trans. 1952).
4. This is not surprising because agency theory owes much to the philosophy of
Thomas Hobbes. In discussing authority, Hobbes uses the term “ author” instead of
“principal,” and “actor” instead of “ agent.” Hobbes defines authority as the actor’s
“right of doing an action.” Hobbes does not make a distinction between right and
authority. They are treated as synonymous concepts. See his Leviathan (ed. 1957,
105-116). R .S. Peters (1967) also raises this point.
5. C.J. Friedrich uses Thomas D. Wheldon’s (1953) The Vocabulary o f Politics
as an illustration.
6. Several state Extension Services have been the focus of intense criticism. For
example, the Virginia Extension Service was severely criticized by the Joint L egis-
lative and Audit Review Commission, an oversight agency of the Virginia General
Assembly, for expanding its activities into urban areas. See Virginia Joint Legisla-
tive and Audit Review Commission (1979). The Georgia Cooperative Extension
Service has also come under attack. In 1991, Governor Zell Miller recommended
that the state reduce extension spending by 42 percent, or $13.9 million. Georgia’s
Agriculture Commissioner, Tommy Irvin, indicated that the Extension Service had
lost a great deal of political support because it had “ gotten into areas where it didn’t
belong.” [See “Farm Extension Programs Withering,” 1991, in The Plain Dealer, a
Cleveland (Ohio) paper, A 12,.] In 1994, the federal extension service was abolished
as part of the reorganizaton of the Department of Agriculture. See the U .S. Depart-
ment of Agriculture Secretary’s memorandum 1010-1, October 20,1994, Reorgani-
zation o f the Department o f Agriculture, 8.
7. For a detailed description and analysis of the Iran-Contra affairs, see Theodore
Draper (1991).
8. The EPA scandal and the dispute between the Reagan administration and
Congress about turning over documents concerning the Superfund program was
106 Conserving Mission

headline news during the first half of 1982. The Washington Post and the New York
Times devoted considerable attention to this story.
9. In discussing the topic of statutory interpretation, I have benefited from the
work of William N. Eskridge Jr. and Philip P. Frickey (1990).
10. Knowledge and competence are integral components of nonexecutive au-
thority. The argument advanced here does not undercut the analytical distinction
offered by DeGeorge. According to DeGeorge (1985), the “possession of such au-
thority [nonexecutive] is frequently the basis for conferring executive authority on
an individual” (26).
11. The term “discretion” as used here is consistent with the conceptualization
offered by C.J. Friedrich (1972). He suggests that discretion generally involves a
decision among alternatives that can and must be implemented. He further states
that such decisions cannot be made “ arbitrarily, wantonly or carelessly, but in accor-
dance with the requirements of the situation” (68).
12. My discussion on rule-making and adjudication is based primarily on A. Lee
Fritschler’s (1989) book Smoking and Politics: Policy Making and the Federal Bu-
reaucracy (especially chap. 5) and David L. Shapiro’s (1965) classic article, “The
Choice of Rulemaking or Adjudication in the Development of Administrative Policy.”
Other works on rule making include Gary Byner (1987), Cornelius M. Kerwin (1994),
and James O’Reilly (1983).
13. These violations are derived from DeGeorge’s (1985, especially chap. 3)
discussion of the limits of nonexecutive authority.
14. From “When an Accident Isn’t,” March 30, 1986, Roanoke Times and World
News, A l. Reprinted by permission of the Roanoke Times and World News.
15.1 am indebted to Lawrence F. Keller (personal communication, n.d.) of Cleve-
land State University for suggesting the term “malpractice” during one of our dis-
cussions on epistemic authority.
16. Other key figures implicated in the HUD scandal include former Massachu-
setts senator Edward W. Brook; Frederick M. Bush, former aide and fund-raiser to
President George Bush (no relation); Deborah Gore Dean, former executive assis-
tant to HUD Secretary Samuel Pierce; Paul J. Manafort, prominent Republican po-
litical consultant; Richard Shelby, political director, Republican Senatorial Com-
mittee and former White House personnel aide; and James G. Watt, former secre-
tary of interior, to name a few. See Kuntz (1989).
17. From “ Good Connections: How HUD Aide Used Ties to Help Himself, Later
PaineWebber,” by E.T. Pound, September 22, 1989, The Wall Street Journal, A l,
A4. Reprinted by permission of The Wall Street Journal, © 1989 Dow Jones and
Company, Inc. All rights reserved worldwide.
18. From “ Good Connections: How HUD Aide Used Ties to Help Himself, Later
PaineWebber,” by E.T. Pound, September 22, 1989, The Wall Street Journal, A l,
A4. Reprinted by permission of The Wall Street Journal, © 1989 Dow Jones and
Company, Inc. All rights reserved worldwide.
 4

Conserving Values

BECA U SE ADMINISTRATIVE LEADERSHIP and organizational val-

ues are closely linked in the leadership literature, it is difficult to discuss
one without the other. This bond has been strengthened as scholars and
practitioners have become enthralled with the idea of organizational
culture (Hall 1995; Hofstede et al. 1990; Martin 1992; Ott 1989; Parker
2000; Schein 1985).1 Many writers, especially champions of the so-
called excellence theories of leadership, state with an evangelical zeal
that successful executives know (or should know) how to create, man-
age, and manipulate their organization’s value system (see Bennis and
Nanus 1985; T. Peters 1981; Zaleznick 1989; for a critique of this litera-
ture, see Rost 1991). This value system or culture is said to consist of an
assortment of elements, such as organizational myths, ideology, lan-
guage, and rituals.
As one reads the voluminous literature on leadership and organiza-
tional culture, a recurrent theme emerges: Writers overestimate the
amount of power that administrative leaders have with respect to man-
aging an organization’s culture. The organization’s value system is treated
much like clay in the hands of a skilled artist; it is to be molded and
shaped in accordance with the wishes and desires of its creator. Admin-
istrative leaders are conferred the power to single-handedly create, trans-
form, and protect core institutional values against all comers.
As noted in chapter 2, this larger-than-life concept of leadership does
not hold up under close scrutiny. Consequently, I reject the notion that
administrative leaders have the power and intellectual ability to conserve
institutional values alone; the task is too complex and exceeds the capacity
107
108 Conserving Values

and skill of any one individual. It is more realistic to say that conserving
the values of public bureaucracies is a shared responsibility; a multitude
of actors both inside and outside the agency play an important role in
performing this function. These include, among others, agency personnel
from the street-level bureaucrat to the executive cadre, members of Con-
gress, individual citizens, and external professional organizations.
In this chapter, I examine the administrative conservator’s role and
responsibility for conserving the values of public bureaucracies. When I
speak of values, I am referring to “objects of desire that are capable of
sustaining group identity,” including “any set of goals or standards that
can form the basis of shared perspective and group feelings” (Selznick
1957, 121).2 This discussion concentrates on the conservator’s relation-
ship with the agency’s executive cadre and examines strategies designed
to maintain a viable executive cadre. Special attention is devoted to
maintaining commitment among the executive cadre and to ensuring
that it is appropriately composed in terms of skills, attitudes, and behav-
iors needed to preserve institutional integrity.

A Viable Executive Cadre

The executive cadre within most public bureaucracies consists of senior

career executives representing various functional and administrative
support areas. The exact composition and size of the executive cadre
varies from agency to agency. The executive cadre is identified by sev-
eral different names such as the “executive team” (O’Reilly et al. 1995),
“top management team” (Finkelstein and Hambrick 1996; Eisenhardt et
al. 1998), “inner circle” (Thompson 1967), “ upper echelon” (Hambrick
and Mason 1984), and “dominant coalition” (Cyert and March 1963).
The fascination that many organization and leadership theorists have
had with the powerful heroic leader has contributed to the neglect of the
executive cadre’s role in preserving institutional values (see Hambrick
1989). This is an unfortunate oversight because the executive cadre plays
an important role in preserving institutional integrity (Ancona 1990;
Hambrick and D ’Aveni 1992). Members of the executive cadre are “cus-
todians of policy” ; they are responsible for the “persistence of an
organization’s distinctive values, competence and role” (Selznick 1957,
105). According to Selznick, the executive cadre can (and should) “per-
form the essential task of indoctrinating newcomers along desired lines.”
He also asserts “they can provide assurance that decision making will
 A Viable Executive C ad re 109

conform, in spirit, as well as letter, to policies that may have to be for-

mulated abstractly and vaguely” (105).
Because of the central role in protecting the values of public bureau-
cracies, the administrative conservator should focus on maintaining a
viable executive cadre. The term “viable” has special significance and
refers to the executive cadre’s strength and thereby capacity to protect
the values of public bureaucracies from serious corruption. The mainte-
nance of a viable executive cadre requires that the administrative con-
servator devote special attention to at least two important areas of
concern. First, the conservator should maintain commitment among the
executive cadre to core institutional values. Second, the conservator
should ensure that the executive cadre is appropriately composed in terms
of skills and perspectives.

Commitment and the Executive Cadre

The executive cadre is more inclined to protect the core values of public
bureaucracies if it is committed to them. This commitment is evidenced
by the willingness of cadre members to identify, accept, and devote per-
sonal energies to the protection of agency goals and values because of a
strong sense of loyalty.3 The administrative conservator should not take
for granted that members of the executive cadre are, or will remain,
committed to the goals and values of the agency. Indeed, there is too
much at stake— namely, the integrity of public bureaucracies. The con-
servator should continuously explore ways to build and maintain com-
mitment among the executive cadre to larger institutional aims. Although
scholars have identified a wide range of useful strategies, of special
interest are using inducements and persuasion, minimizing dissension
among members of the executive cadre, and building and maintaining
high levels of trust between the administrative conservator and mem-
bers of the executive cadre.

Strategy: Using Inducements and Persuasion

The use of inducements and persuasion as a commitment strategy was

given intellectual currency by Chester I. Barnard (1938) in his seminal
work, The Functions o f the Executive. Although organization theorists
have attempted to extend Barnard’s theory, I will rely on his original
work for guidance.
I 10 C onserving Values

Barnard suggests that securing cooperation (a prerequisite for build-

ing and maintaining commitment) from organizational members is
achieved by “objective inducements” and by “changing states of mind.”
He refers to the former as the “method of incentive” and the latter as the
“method of persuasion.” Barnard asserts that the method of incentive
consists of two analytically distinct types. The first type he calls specific
inducements because they are addressed to the individual. Specific in-
ducements include material things such as money and other forms of
compensation; opportunities for acquiring personal power and prestige;
“desirable physical working conditions” such as office space; and the
satisfaction of “personal ideals relating to non-material, future, or altru-
istic relation” (142-146). The second type of incentive is termed gen-
eral incentives because they are not offered to the individual as such.
General incentives include providing opportunities for “ social compat-
ibility and comradeship” (147-148).
Barnard contends that organizations cannot offer all the necessary
incentives needed to secure cooperation. Consequently, executives must
use persuasion in conjunction with the incentives they can provide. He
identifies three forms of persuasion. The first form is coercion. Coer-
cion can be used to secure cooperation or to exclude an individual from
participating as a member of the organization. Barnard concedes that
coercion is not well suited for securing cooperation over time, espe-
cially if it is the only method employed. Forced exclusion appears to
work quite well if used with some discretion. Exclusionary practices
may include demotion, dismissal, the withholding of rewards, and ex-
communication for those who do not abide by the rules. Forced exclu-
sion is a means of getting the message across that some modes of behavior
are not acceptable.
The second mode of persuasion is the rationalization o f opportunity.
Using his characteristic style of presentation, Barnard separates this form
of persuasion into two types, specific and general. Specific rationaliza-
tions are designed to persuade organizational members that cooperation
is in their “best interest.” General rationalizations appeal to high ideals
reflected, for example, in political or religious doctrines.
The final method of persuasion cited by Barnard is the inculcation o f
motives. This refers to the indoctrination of organizational members with
desirable behaviors. Indoctrination is accomplished through education
and propaganda.
Barnard’s reliance on incentives and persuasion provides important
 A Viable Executive C ad re III

clues to how the administrative conservator might build and maintain

commitment among the executive cadre. With the previous discussion
in mind, I conclude the following: The conservator should offer a com-
bination of incentives in conjunction with appropriate forms of persua-
sion as a central strategy for maintaining commitment among the
executive cadre. In doing so, the administrative conservator should con-
sider that members of the executive cadre are “moved by different in-
centives or combination of incentives, and by different incentives or
combination of incentives at different times” (148-149). In other words,
the use of incentives and persuasion must be well suited for the behav-
iors and dispositions of cadre members. They should also be employed
at the appropriate time in relation to prevailing organizational circum-
stances. The following example examines the offering of financial com-
pensation as a specific inducement to members of an executive cadre
within a federal administrative agency.
Financial compensation, in and of itself, does not seem to be much of
an incentive within federal administrative agencies. In his study of fed-
eral bureau chiefs, Herbert Kaufman (1981a) found that the chiefs he
observed could not “rely on the pay structure to keep the work force at a
high pitch intensity” (79). The pay ceiling imposed by Congress on high-
ranking, career civil servants, as well as extended periods of inflation,
makes it virtually impossible to use financial compensation as an effec-
tive incentive. Other types of incentives, both specific and general, should
be provided instead. For example, the administrative conservator could
offer cadre members more opportunities for acquiring prestige by wid-
ening their discretion and participation in the decision-making process.
This is a proved strategy, as Selznick (1957) points out: “Morale is closely
related to the possibility of increasing participation as a way of develop-
ing personal commitment to the organization” (98).
The administrative conservator should keep in mind that incentives
must be used in conjunction with persuasion to secure cooperation. Again,
in the federal government, the threat of dismissal (persuasion of a coer-
cive nature) is not an effective method of securing cooperation. The
chance of being dismissed from federal government services is rela-
tively small (Kaufman 1981a). Although the fear of dismissal may not
work well, excommunication or ostracism from participation in high-
level decision-making is a viable alternative. In addition, other modes
of persuasion such as rationalization of opportunities and the inculca-
tion of motives are appropriate. For example, the U.S. Forest Service
I 12 Conserving Values

uses a rotation strategy as a means of educating personnel on what it

means to be a member of the service. It is safe to assume that members
of the Forest Service’s executive cadre have held a variety of different
field positions throughout the service and are well socialized in its tradi-
tions and values.

Strategy: Minimizing Dissension Within

the Executive Cadre

The administrative conservator should also minimize dissension among

members of the executive cadre to maintain commitment to larger insti-
tutional values. Conflict within the cadre, however, should not be sup-
pressed or discouraged. A certain amount of conflict or creative tension
is a normal state of organizational affairs. Students of organization theory
and behavior have suggested that a degree of conflict is even necessary
and useful for increasing organizational performance (Eisenhardt et al.
1998; Raben and Spencer 1998). But dissension within the executive
cadre is an entirely different matter. By dissension I mean widespread
dissatisfaction, petty jealousy, anger, discord, and strife. Dissension
within the executive cadre is a sure way to circumvent commitment to
larger agency goals and values.
The administrative conservator should be on the lookout for two com-
mon sources of dissension: (1) unhealthy competition among cadre
members and (2) loss of faith in the agency’s ability to perform its func-
tion. With regard to the first source, unhealthy competition is detrimen-
tal to cultivating a spirit of cooperation, an essential condition for building
and maintaining commitment. The unhealthy competition among com-
peting factions within the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms
(ATF) is a case in point.
The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (n.d.-a) is responsible
for “law enforcement; regulation of the alcohol, tobacco and firearm
industries; and ensuring the collection of federal taxes imposed on dis-
tilled spirits and tobacco products” (l).4 For most of its history, ATF
was a division of the IRS. The agency achieved bureau status within the
Department of Treasury in 1972. As such, ATF is a relatively new agency
compared with other federal bureaus such as the Bureau of Land Man-
agement or the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Despite its newness as
a bureau, many of ATF’s functions and responsibilities can be traced
back to the Prohibition Unit of the IRS created in response to the Volstead
 A Viable Executive C ad re I I3

Prohibition Enforcement Act of 1919. This act, which prompted ratifi-

cation of the eighteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, gave the
1RS enforcement authority relating to the illegal manufacture, sale, and
transportation of alcoholic beverages.5
A close examination of ATF’s history indicates that the agency adapted
quite well for most of its existence despite assuming responsibility for a
variety of diverse functions. Although ATF was delegated more respon-
sibility for administering a multitude of diverse functions, many activi-
ties associated with such functions required a similar orientation.
Functions assigned to ATF tended to fall within two distinct categories:
(1) the collection of taxes and (2) the regulation of specific industries
through registration, licensing, and permit requirements. Underpinning
the agency’s functions and processes in each area is the policy of volun-
tary compliance. Consequently, ATF emphasized those aspects of its
mission related to tax and regulatory compliance in the alcohol, tobacco,
and firearms industries.
Although ATF was given law enforcement responsibilities, much of
the criminal enforcement activities revolved around the compliance
value. The agency’s emphasis on voluntary compliance is not surpris-
ing, especially because the agency was a division of the 1RS for most of
its existence. Prior to the late 1970s and early 1980s, ATF special agents
devoted a substantial portion of their time to the investigation of illicit
manufacture of alcohol and firearms licensing violations.
The emphasis on voluntary compliance served the agency well. Nev-
ertheless, the 1980s marked a turning point. ATF’s emphasis on com-
pliance in light of changing priorities on stricter criminal enforcement
of firearms violations jeopardized the agency’s existence. In 1982, the
Reagan administration recommended the abolishment of ATF and the
transfer of its firearms, explosive, and arson functions to the Secret
Service.6 The alcohol and tobacco functions were to be turned over to
the Customs Service. The administration’s recommendation was based
on the premise that the transfer of ATF functions to other agencies
would reduce cost, enhance efficiency in government operations, and
result in a more effective enforcement of firearms, explosive, and ar-
son statutes. The Reagan administration argued that ATF functions
relating to alcohol were incompatible with the agency’s law enforce-
ment responsibilities. In building its case, the administration argued that
ATF had been unsuccessful in reconciling the differences between these
two diverse functions. John Walker, assistant secretary of Enforcement
I 14 Conserving Values

and Operations, U.S. Treasury Department, argued this point at the Sen-
ate hearing on the proposed abolishment of ATF:

The proposal to reassign ATF functions to other bureaus was based on the
fact that the functions o f alcohol and tobacco have no commonality o f
interest with the criminal enforcement function o f firearm s, explosives
and arson. There are no identifiable reasons for the diverse functions to
be performed in a single agency. I would stress no identifiable reason for
the diverse functions to be performed in a single agency. This fact has
been previously recognized within the Department. The diversity o f func-
tion has led to an inefficient organizational structure and to unhealthy
competition for resources between criminal enforcement activities and
revenue protection and regulation in a declining budget picture. (U .S.
Senate Subcom m ittee o f the Committee on Appropriations 1982, 265)

It was no secret among agency personnel and other attentive observ-

ers that ATF’s senior administrative staff was tom by dissension and
strife because of conflict between supporters of tax compliance (rev-
enue protection) and proponents of criminal enforcement. In fact, when
the proposal was made to abolish the agency, there was speculation that
some of ATF’s career officials (those supposedly unhappy with law
enforcement’s status within the agency) covertly supported the reas-
signment of the firearms and explosive functions to the Secret Service.
From the perspective of those who favored a more vigorous law en-
forcement role for the agency, such actions seemed to make sense be-
cause the reassignment of the law enforcement function also meant the
reassignment of personnel to what many in the law enforcement com-
munity considered a prestigious organization.
The competition and dissension within the executive cadre between
members who advocated tax compliance and those who supported law
enforcement were not healthy. In addition to public statements made by
Assistant Secretary Walker, the dissension between the two factions is
also noted in an ATF document titled Long Term Management Change
(1988), which describes changes made in the agency since its proposed
abolishment:

For the previous 10 years, since being broke o ff from the IR S, ATF had
tried to find its direction, its focus. Yet management could never resolve
the dilemm a o f having two separate functions, tax com pliance and law
enforcement. B ecau se a relatively destructive relationship [italics added]
 A Viable Executive C ad re I 15

existed between the two functions responsible for the m ission o f the bu-
reau, the administrative function often filled the power vacuum that was
created. This only caused more acrimony. Existing problem s were fur-
ther exacerbated by the sensitivity o f the B ureau’s m ission and its being
the target o f special interest groups. (7, italics added)

The ATF illustration points out the dangers of unhealthy competition

and how such competition can weaken the commitment of a leadership
cadre to organizational values. The ongoing dissension within the ex-
ecutive cadre regarding the agency’s mission and the allegation that some
members of the administrative staff worked behind the scene to support
the reassignment of the law enforcement function to the Secret Service
raise serious questions about how strongly ATF’s executive cadre was
committed to core agency values.
In thinking about the ATF example, the question arises: How can the
administrative conservator prevent or minimize unhealthy competition
among members of the executive cadre? Several strategies can be used
to accomplish this purpose. First, the administrative conservator can
cultivate a sense of pride in the agency and in its larger aims and aspira-
tions. This strategy can be put into practice through one-on-one conver-
sations with members of the executive cadre, pep talks at executive
meetings and team-building retreats, and, on unusual occasions such as
an agency crisis, appeals for greater cooperation through formal inter-
nal correspondence. Another strategy is to give public recognition to
those who exhibit cooperative behaviors. Public pronouncements made
at executive staff meetings, at formal ceremonies, and in internal com-
munication organs such as agency newsletters are several useful ways
to reward cooperative behaviors. For example, Harry Wiggins, former
director of the Virginia Division of Child Support Enforcement, often
used the agency’s statewide conference, management team retreats, and
the agency newsletter, The Support Reporter, to reward members of the
management team for demonstrating cooperative behaviors.7
The administrative conservator can also withhold praise as a way of
expressing dissatisfaction when members of the executive cadre do not
exhibit cooperative behaviors. Stanley E. Morris (personal communica-
tion 1987), former director of the USMS, said it best: “Sometimes silence
or what you don’t say is more effective than chewing someone . . . out for
not playing by the rules. What you need to understand is that people
who get to this level are smart. They are good at reading cues.”
Another source of dissension concerns the executive cadre’s loss of
I 16 Conserving Values

faith in the agency’s capacity to perform its mandated function. When

cadre members lose faith in their agency’s abilities, the motivation to
cooperate is greatly diminished. Without a sufficient level of coopera-
tion, the chances of building or maintaining commitment among the
executive cadre are slim (see Wilkins 1989). Of several factors that can
destroy the executive cadre’s faith in the agency’s abilities, a critical
one is “administrative disinvestments” (Wolf 1987, 209). Administra-
tive disinvestment occurs when an agency’s administrative capacity to
act is severely weakened as a result of deliberate or unconscious ac-
tions. According to Larry M. Lane and James F. Wolf (1990), the pri-
mary causes of weakened capacity are “continuous resource cutbacks;
constant manipulation of administrative structure through reorganiza-
tion; the failure to maintain key administrative processes such as bud-
geting, personnel, and policy making; and the loss in the strength of
relationships among critical actors in administrative agencies” (4).
Administrative disinvestment presents a challenge for the conserva-
tor because it is much easier to cultivate harmonious relationships among
cadre members and, in turn, maintain their commitment to core organi-
zational values under favorable conditions. But conditions are not fa-
vorable during periods of administrative disinvestment. The uncertainty
and agency wide disruptions created by administrative disinvestment raise
the stress and frustration level of cadre members, increasing the poten-
tial for dysfunctional conflict and dissension. In extreme cases of ad-
ministrative disinvestment, cadre members are likely to give up and to
disinvest themselves because of a feeling of helplessness. As Lane and
Wolf (1990) point out,

the vagaries o f political leadership at the agency level create insecurities,

uncertainties, and arbitrary program changes which disrupt the stable and
continuing processes and relationships o f public organizations. . . . The
effects o f continuing budgetary restrictions, anti-bureaucratic rhetoric,
reorganizations, reductions in force, and various administrative retrench-
ments have adversely affected the quality o f work life and sent the m es-
sage that a public agency is the wrong place to invest personal energy
and identity. A s a result, organization and program capacity is being lost
daily as workers invest less o f themselves in their work, make fewer com -
mitments, and seek ways out o f the system. (3)

What should the administrative conservator do to maintain the ex-

ecutive cadre’s faith in the agency’s abilities during periods of admin-
 A Viable Executive C ad re I 17

istrative disinvestment? The answer to this question is by no means simple.

The ideal strategy would be to stop administrative disinvestment before it
begins. But this is not always possible, especially given the political and
economic realities of twenty-first century America. Nevertheless, the con-
servator is not at the total mercy of political and economic forces. For
example, in addressing proposed resource cutbacks in a declining budget
environment, the administrative conservator could formulate strategies to
protect the agency’s budget. Many of the strategies identified by Aaron
Wildavsky (1990) are relevant here. These include, among others, pad-
ding the budget in anticipation of cuts, restructuring budget categories
from the previous year to disguise differences in spending, protesting bud-
get cuts by arguing that the program needs all the money or should not be
funded at all, and reacting to requests for cuts by suggesting that cuts be
taken on programs that enjoy a great deal of political support.
These and other tactics are not 100 percent successful, however. The
administrative conservator must formulate strategies to cope with the
adverse effects of administrative disinvestment when it does occur. These
strategies should take into consideration the causes of administrative
disinvestment and their potential influence on the agency’s integrity.
Returning to the previous example of resource cutbacks, assume, for
example, that strategies to protect the agency from budget cuts were
unsuccessful because of fiscal crisis and that the administrative conser-
vator is forced to make cuts in agency programs and services. What
strategies should the conservator use? The extensive literature on cut-
back management offers a smorgasbord of possibilities ranging from
even percentage cuts across-the-board to cutting low-prestige programs
or those programs with politically weak clients (Levine 1978). In se-
lecting strategies to cope with this hypothetical situation, the adminis-
trative conservator should be apprised of the trade-offs between two
central values governing the allocative decision-making process— equity
and efficiency. In describing the difference between these two values,
Charles Levine writes that equity refers to the “distribution of cuts across
the organization with an equal probability of hurting all units and em-
ployees irrespective of impacts on the long-term capacity of the organi-
zation” (320). In contrast, efficiency means the “ sorting, sifting, and
assignment of cuts to those people and units in the organization so that
for a given budget decrement, cuts are allocated to minimize the long-
term loss in the total benefit to the organization as a whole, irrespective
of their distribution” (320).
I 18 Conserving Values

Because there are trade-offs in using either equity- or efficiency-driven

strategies, the administrative conservator should not only know what
strategies to use, he or she should also know when to use them. This
suggests that the conservator should use prudence in selecting strate-
gies; the blind application of strategies governed by either value can
undermine the integrity of public bureaucracies and thus destroy the
executive cadre’s faith in the agency’s abilities. For example, strategies
governed solely by equity, such as across-the-board cuts, may do more
harm than good when an agency’s capacity to act has already been se-
verely weakened. Despite the appeal of equity-based strategies, pro-
grams and services central to the agency mission should not be required
to “ share the suffering” with other units. Not all programs and units are
created equal; nor should they be treated as such when it comes to pro-
tecting an agency’s integrity. Should academic departments within a
university be required to share an equal burden of budget cuts with the
athletic department when they have reached a threshold level whereby
their teaching and research capacity is severely weakened? Should the
establishment of paternity and enforcement units of a state child sup-
port agency, having already endured significant reduction in staff de-
spite a rapidly increasing caseload, share an equal burden of budget cuts
with administrative support units? Most would agree that the answer to
these questions is no.
Strategies governed by the efficiency value can also do more harm
than good if applied inappropriately. If the process of sorting, sifting,
and targeting of programs for cuts is mismanaged or driven purely by
short-term considerations, the executive cadre is likely to lose faith in
the agency’s abilities. Examples of mismanagement include failure to
communicate the reasons for budget cutbacks; random, ad hoc, or arbi-
trary decision-making; failure to develop support among controlling
coalitions within the organization; poor planning and the absence of a
cutback strategy; creating winners and losers by pitting units against
each other; and establishing a committee to recommend budget cuts and
then totally ignoring the committee’s recommendations.
I have focused on only one source of administrative disinvestment
and its potential adverse affects on the executive cadre. The administra-
tive conservator should give the same thoughtful consideration to other
sources of administrative disinvestment as well.
 A Viable Executive C ad re I 19

Strategy: Building and Maintaining Trust

The third strategy for maintaining the executive cadre’s commitment to

larger institutional goals relates to trust. The administrative conservator
should constantly work to foster and maintain a trusting relationship
with members of the executive cadre. The term “trust” in this context
refers to “faith or confidence in the intentions or actions of a person or
group, the expectation of ethical, fair and nonthreatening behavior, and
concern for the rights of others in exchange relationships” (Camevale
and Wechsler 1992,473). A trusting relationship is absolutely necessary
if the conservator and executive cadre are to work cooperatively in pre-
serving the values of public bureaucracies. This is because trust is an
“integrative mechanism that creates and sustains solidarity in social sys-
tems” ; it also provides the “lubrication that makes it possible for the
organization to work” (471).
High levels of distrust between the conservator and executive cadre
spell trouble. This is an explosive situation that can set into motion a
range of dysfunctional behavioral dynamics that threaten institutional
integrity. Samuel Culbert and John McDonough (1985), two authors
who have written extensively about trust in organizations, warn of this
possibility. According to Culbert and McDonough, “without trust, indi-
viduals over-personalize criticism and seek to hide weak spots in their
performance. . . . Communication becomes wordy and defensive as in-
dividuals fight over issues that need to be open-mindedly discussed”
(17-18).
The administrative conservator can and should use a variety of strat-
egies to cultivate and maintain a trusting relationship with members of
the executive cadre. The following strategies are worthy of serious con-
sideration. (For discussion of additional strategies for developing trust,
see Britton and Stallings 1986; Culbert and McDonough 1985; Fairholm
1994; Kramer and Tyler 1996; The Academy o f Management Review,
Special Topic forum, 1998; Organization Studies, Special Issue 2001).
The conservator should honor both formal and informal commit-
ments made with cadre members. The executive cadre must have con-
fidence that the conservator will keep his or her word. There is certainly
nothing novel about this strategy, and one wonders why it is worth
mentioning. But keeping one’s word is basic to any discussion of trust.
Most people need not think too hard to recall a situation in which a
120 Conserving Values

person in a position of authority did not keep (or appeared not to have
kept) his or her word.
Another strategy is to take up causes that are important to cadre mem-
bers. There are times when the administrative conservators should spend
some of their political capital to obtain resources cadre members want,
even though it is not a top priority. Kaufman (1981a, chap. 2) suggests
the value of this strategy in his study of federal bureau chiefs. Kaufman
recounts a situation in which IRS commissioner Jerome Kurtz persuaded
an assistant secretary of the treasury (a political appointee) to abandon
plans to exercise direct authority over revenue agents. Members of
Kurtz’s executive cadre were afraid that changing the reporting rela-
tionship would set a precedent and eventually change the nature and
scope of the revenue agents’ role. Although this was not a burning issue
for Kurtz, Kaufman suggests that the commissioner’s willingness to fight
for something the executive cadre valued was an important symbolic
act; it demonstrated unity with the executive cadre and instilled a sense
of confidence in the commissioner.
The next strategy involves supporting the decisions and actions of
cadre members when called on to do so. There are at least two instances
in which the conservator’s support is essential: (1) when the decision of
a cadre member is called into question by individuals or groups ad-
versely affected by the decision and (2) during an organizational crisis.
With regard to the first instance, it is not uncommon for a dissatisfied
party to maneuver to have a particular decision overturned by appealing
to higher authority. This tactic, sometimes described as “going over the
head” of the administrative official who made the decision, is and should
be available to parties both inside and outside public bureaucracies. Al-
though overturning a decision of a cadre member may be necessary in
some instances, such action should be the exception rather than the rule.
If the decisions of cadre members are consistently overruled because of
stylistic (how one approaches a decision) rather than substantive (policy
and key process values) concerns and differences, they are likely to feel
undermined. Such feelings can breed resentment and, in turn, create an
environment of distrust. Executive cadre members should feel that they
have the responsibility as well as the authority to make decisions with-
out interference from the administrative conservator. They should not
feel as if “the rug will be pulled from underneath them” once they make
a decision.
The second instance, an organizational crisis, is a crucial period that
 A Viable Executive C ad re 121

tests the level of trust between the conservator and the executive cadre.
The term “crisis” is used in a narrow sense and refers to a period of
difficulty experienced by an agency. For example, the explosion of the
space shuttle Challenger created an organizational crisis for NASA. The
administrative conservator should provide public and private support
for cadre members (and their staff) during an organizational crisis when
it is determined that they have faithfully fulfilled their duties and re-
sponsibilities according to the spirit and letter of the law and to other
acceptable standards of conduct. If a search begins for a scapegoat be-
fore all the facts are in or if the conservator is perceived as engaging in
career-saving actions (e.g., creating distance or disassociating from par-
ticular cadre members), the conservator stands a chance of losing the
executive cadre’s faith and confidence. During an organizational crisis,
the conservator should give cadre members the benefit of the doubt that
they have acted appropriately. It is during such times that the trust be-
tween the conservator and executive cadre is put on the line, as shown in
the following example of an organizational crisis involving the Cuyahoga
County (Ohio) Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS).
The Cuyahoga County DCFS is responsible for investigating and pro-
viding services related to child abuse and neglect (the city of Cleveland
and several adjacent municipalities are located in Cuyahoga County).8
In 1993, DCFS employed approximately 939 people. Of the agency’s
employees, 240 were social workers who handled about 180 cases on an
ongoing basis. Caseworkers provide a variety of services for children
and their families. These services include but are not limited to assisting
families locate food, clothing, shelter, and medical care; linking parents
with professional counseling services and support groups to cope with
domestic violence and substance abuse; and locating adoptive homes
for children who had been removed from their families.
In 1992, Judith Goodhand, a veteran social service administrator,
became D C FS’s executive director. When Goodhand assumed the di-
rectorship, she immediately began to institute a different philosophy for
handling cases of child abuse and neglect. Instead of embracing the
widely held philosophy that the best way to assist abused or neglected
children is to remove them from their homes, Goodhand adopted the
position that children should be removed from their homes only as a last
resort. She advocated a family preservation approach that focused on
making dysfunctional families work. In a newspaper article outlining
this philosophy, Goodhand (1993) states:
122 Conserving Values

• We believe that most fam ilies love their children and want to do the
best for them;
• We believe that children have the right to live with their own fam i-
lies and should be deprived o f that right only when their safety de-
m ands it;
• We believe that children and fam ilies are harmed when they are sepa-
rated, and we feel we must exercise our legal authority with great cau-
tion and with full knowledge o f its potential for dam age;
• We believe that fam ilies need and deserve the support and the resources
o f the community to help them raise their children;
• We believe that no child should be separated from the fam ily for rea-
sons o f poverty;
• M ost o f all, we believe that fam ilies do a much better jo b o f raising
children than agencies do, so our commitment— our vision— is to en-
sure that all children have fam ilies. (B 7 )9

Goodhand was well aware of the risks associated with the family
preservation philosophy. Although the agency developed a detailed sys-
tem of policies and procedures to assist caseworkers in determining when
a child should be removed from the home, the system was not fool-
proof. Because of the nature of D C FS’s business, the possibility exists
that a caseworker could, after having faithfully followed agency proce-
dures and other appropriate guides for action (e.g., experience and intu-
ition), make a decision that jeopardizes a child’s safety. This possibility
was real and firmly imprinted on the mind of many of the agency’s
social workers. Prior to Goodhand’s arrival, a ten-year-old boy commit-
ted suicide after DCFS caseworkers failed to remove him from the home
after numerous reports of abuse.
In August 1993, Goodhand’s worst nightmare became a reality. A
twenty-one-month-old Cleveland girl died of internal bleeding caused
by an injury to the abdomen. Her mother was charged with the crime.
During the same month the toddler was bom, DCFS took custody of the
child after the agency received complaints that the mother, an alcoholic
and crack cocaine addict at the time, was neglecting the child. After a
court hearing in July 1993, DCFS returned the child to her mother. The
agency did so because caseworkers determined that the mother had ad-
dressed the issues that prompted removal of the child from the home.
The mother had been drug-free for eighteen months and attended Alco-
holics Anonymous meetings on a regular basis. She was described by an
agency official as a model patient. The Cuyahoga County Juvenile Court
 A Viable Executive C ad re 123

judge called for an investigation to determine why the child had been
returned to her mother.
During this organizational crisis, Goodhand publicly supported the
actions of her staff. For example, she held a news conference to defend
the agency, members of the executive cadre, and the caseworkers di-
rectly involved in the case. In responding to questions about the agency’s
decision to return the child to her mother, Goodhand confidently re-
plied: “My feeling is that at this point, we have indeed followed good
practice in not taking custody of the girl. There had never been an indi-
cation of abuse in the fam ily” (Dubail and Gillispie 1993, A l ) .10
Goodhand also insulated agency caseworkers from the press, which had
begun a search for a villain to blame for the child’s death. She prohib-
ited agency personnel from revealing the names of those intimately in-
volved with the case. A ccordin g to a casew orker (personal
communication, November 25, 1993) who supported the decision to
return the child to the mother, Goodhand was very supportive in public
and private discussions. He commented that Goodhand “always made
herself available. . . . She always made the time to talk during these
difficult times.” The caseworker also stated that his coworkers were
“pleased to see that Judith Goodhand supported him because this had
not been the agency’s practice in the past.” He explained that “ in the
past, the practice was to blame the worker for everything. . . . We were
hung out to dry.” He also stated that Goodhand’s actions “lifted the morale
and reduced the amount of fear they [the caseworkers] had in perform-
ing their jobs.”
Goodhand’s actions illustrate the positive benefits of supporting cadre
members and their staff during an organizational crisis. From the per-
spective of administrative conservatorship, Goodhand’s actions provide
a textbook example of what should be done. But supporting the deci-
sions of cadre members is not without risk, especially in the midst or
immediate aftermath of a crisis, when all the facts are not in. Consider
the case of Stephen Higgins, former director of the Bureau of Alcohol,
Tobacco and Firearms.
On February 28, 1993, ATF agents raided the seventy-seven-acre
Branch Davidian compound located near Waco, Texas. ATF conducted
the raid because it had accumulated firm evidence that the religious cult
had committed numerous federal weapons violations and that the cult’s
charismatic leader, David Koresh, had made statements encouraging cult
members to kill citizens in nearby Waco (Department of the Treasury
124 Conserving Values

1993). Because members of the cult were heavily armed, APT officials
responsible for planning and executing the commando operation were
given explicit instructions not to proceed with the raid if they lost the
element of surprise.
The operation was a disaster, and, from all accounts, it will go down
in history as one of the worst chapters in U.S. law enforcement his-
tory.11 Four ATF agents and six members of the religious sect were
killed and fifteen others wounded during the initial shoot-out. In the
immediate aftermath of the botched raid, ATF director Higgins pub-
licly assumed total responsibility for his agency’s actions. He also made
public statements supporting the decision of certain cadre members
and their staff.
The Department of the Treasury investigation (1993) into the raid
revealed that three members of the ATF’s executive cadre (Daniel
Hartnett, associate director of law enforcement; Edward Conroy, deputy
associate director of law enforcement; and David Troy, intelligence chief)
and the raid commanders (Phillip Chojnacki and Charles Sarabyn) made
misleading or deliberately deceptive statements. The report stated that
Chojnacki and Sarabyn “appear to have engaged in a concerted effort to
conceal their errors in judgement” (193). They lied to their superiors
and investigators. Both had been informed by an undercover agent in-
side the compound that the element of surprise was lost, but they ig-
nored this information and decided to proceed with the raid. To make
matters worse, Chojnacki and Sarabyn then tried to cover up their er-
rors in judgment by making significant revisions in the document out-
lining the operation’s plans and by reconstructing events to give the
impression that the raid failed because of a surprise ambush. Higgins,
apparently giving those in charge of the operation the benefit of the
doubt, unknowingly perpetuated this misleading version of events and
steadfastly supported the actions of ATF administrators and agents.
On two different appearances on network television, Higgins publicly
defended the actions of ATF executives and agents. Higgins’s exchange
with reporters on C B S ’s Face the Nation, a weekly news program, is
illustrative:

Q. [reporter] There has been som e suggestion that perhaps your agents
knew beforehand that the security had been com prom ised, that they were
aware that Mr. Koresh had received som e sort o f phone call. Can you just
give us your side o f that?
 A Viable Executive C ad re 125

A. [H iggin s] Without being too specific, let me say as I did earlier, this
plan was based on the element o f surprise. It had to be done quickly, and
it had to be a surprise. We would not send our agents into a situation
where we didn’t think we had the element o f surprise.
Q. [reporter] But your bottom line is that you absolutely did not believe
the security had been com prom ised when the agents went into the com -
pound?
A. [H iggin s] A bsolutely not, because as you can see, we walked into an
ambush, and there’s no way that our people, from the team m embers to
the leadership, would have allowed that to happen had they had known it.
(quoted in Department o f the Treasury 1993, 199)

On March 29, 1993, Higgins made similar statements on N B C ’s To-

day Show, a morning news and talk show:

Q. [talk show host] L e t’s talk about one o f the other charges, and that is
that you have, in fact, said that cult members were tipped off, and now
there are reports that bureau supervisors knew that the element o f sur-
prise had been lost and yet decided to go ahead with the raid anyway. Is
that correct?
A. [H iggin s] This was a plan which depended on the element o f surprise.
We could not have executed the plan if our supervisors felt like we had
lost that element. S o my position has been and continues to be we did not
believe that we had lost that element o f surprise, (quoted in Department
o f the Treasury 1993, 205)

In addition to the statements above, the Treasury Department’s report

speculates that Higgins, Hartnett, and other ATF officials may have per-
petuated the misleading version of the raid in testimony before a con-
gressional subcommittee reviewing the agency’s actions.
It is clear from all accounts that Higgins did not know members of
his executive cadre were deceiving him. He trusted ATF executives and
assumed that they had acted responsibly. Higgins’s loyalty and unwa-
vering support of ATF executives eventually cost him the directorship
of ATF. After thirty-two years of service, this highly respected and dedi-
cated administrative executive left the government under a dark cloud.
Higgins was removed from his post along with several ATF officials.
The Department of the Treasury (1993) report was critical of Higgins
and stated that he “must accept responsibility for continuing to take
public positions on the issue when repeated questions from the media
and information readily available to him should have made it clear that
126 Conserving Values

he was on shaky ground” (205). The reported also stated that “Higgins
never questioned his subordinates to determine the facts until early
April” (205).

An Appropriately Composed Executive Cadre

The executive cadre’s capacity to protect core organizational values is

also strengthened when the group is appropriately composed in terms of
skills and perspectives (O’Reilly et al. 1995). The phrase “appropriately
composed” refers to the suitability of the cadre’s structure as measured
by the commonality and complementary character of skills, attitudes,
and behaviors required to preserve the integrity of public bureaucracies.
Many who write about organizational demography suggest that attributes
of organizational members such as age, gender, educational background,
race, experience, and time of entry into the organization have an influ-
ence on the willingness of individuals to voluntarily cooperate. (See
McNeil and Thompson 1971; Pfeffer 1985; Pfeffer and O’Reilly 1987;
Wiersema and Bantel 1992). The concept of organizational demogra-
phy provides important insights into maintaining the executive cadre’s
capacity to protect core organizational values. The demographic com-
position of the executive cadre is an area worthy of the administrative
conservator’s time and energy. Common demographic characteristics
cultivate particular habits, dispositions, and attitudes necessary for
achieving social integration, cohesion and, thereby, cooperation among
cadre members (Wamsley and Zald 1976).
Stuart Gilman (1996), a respected ethics scholar and experienced fed-
eral administrator, raises an interesting issue regarding the demographic
composition of the executive cadre. According to Gillman, administra-
tive leaders do not have “unbounded freedom in selecting an executive
cadre in organizations” (393). He argues that the “nooks and crannies of
the selection process in public organization are filled with compromise,
coercion, calamity constraint and chance” (393). The crux of Gilman’s
argument is that administrative leaders have little control over the ex-
ecutive cadre demographic composition. I agree with his basic point
regarding the complexity of the cadre selection process. I do not, how-
ever, agree with the contention that the administrative conservator is
totally helpless in this situation. He or she can use a variety of strategies
to ensure that the executive cadre is appropriately composed in terms of
skill and perspectives. These strategies include, among others, filling
 A Viable Executive C ad re 127

executive cadre positions through attrition, promotion, and the reassign-

ment of personnel.
The maintenance of functions and processes that determine the ex-
ecutive cadre’s demographic composition should be of utmost impor-
tance to the administrative conservator. The cadre’s composition assists
in the cultivation of a distinctive orientation that is vital to sustaining a
shared perspective. Agency functions and processes relating to recruit-
ment, selection, and socialization of cadre members are cases in point
(see Van Maanen 1978). These functions and processes are designed to
promote a shared perspective of the nature of the enterprise. Their ef-
fectiveness is measured by the extent to which they produce conformity
in particular habits, attitudes, and dispositions of cadre members. In
other words, the effectiveness of socialization processes is shown by the
degree to which cadre members fit in. Socialization failures can have
far-reaching implications for the organization because such failures may
prompt desirable employees to leave the organization or encourage those
who stay to engage in sabotage (see Schein 1985).
The maintenance of a shared perspective through conformity is not
an end in itself; rather, it is a means of sustaining conditions necessary
for cooperation. Although excessive conformity has a restrictive effect
on the executive cadre’s capacity to adapt to evolutionary changes (see
O’Reilly et al. 1995), too little conformity may make social integration,
compatibility, and the development of a shared perspective difficult.
The net result may be the creation of conditions that hinder cooperation
(see Barnard 1938).
The administrative conservator should maintain the suitability of the
executive cadre’s demographic composition with respect to the agency’s
field of action, its core technology, its stage of historical development,
and the level of administrative action. The demographic composition of
the executive cadre must reflect the agency’s values and field of action.
The term “field of action” refers to an area or sphere of action. Hence,
one can speak of the fields of health, law, education, agriculture, and so
forth. The executive cadre’s composition should remain consistent with
or tailored to fit the agency’s field of action. An examination of the
executive cadre of most governmental agencies with respect to demo-
graphic composition makes it clear that the skill and perspectives of
cadre members reflect their respective agency’s field of action. For ex-
ample, Harold Siedman (1980) observes that the executive cadre of
Department of Agriculture agencies such as the Soil Conservation
128 Conserving Values

Service, Farmers Home Administration, and Cooperative Extension Ser-

vice are largely composed of individuals who received their formal edu-
cation from land grant universities. These individuals also have
considerable experience and advanced training in an agriculture-related
area. Thus, it is safe to conclude that the executive cadre of Department
of Agriculture agencies is largely composed of individuals whose skills
and perspectives are tailored to agricultural functions and values. Agri-
culture-related skills and perspectives would not be well suited for an
executive cadre of, for example, the FBI or HUD.
The administrative conservator should also ensure that the cadre’s
composition remains well suited for the dominant core technology em-
ployed by the agency. Governmental agencies employ a variety of dif-
ferent technologies to transform inputs into outputs. According to James
D. Thompson (1967, chap. 2), organizational technologies consist of
three major varieties: long-linked, mediating, and intensive. Long-linked
technologies involve serially interdependent tasks with activities geared
to the requirements of the next— for instance, the mass-production as-
sembly line. Mediating technologies embody the linking of clientele
who are interdependent with goods and services. For example, state child
support enforcement agencies seek to link responsible parents to their
children through support payments. Intensive technologies entail the
use of multiple techniques to create change in some object (human or
nonhuman). The selection and application of techniques are guided by
responses received from the object. For example, a state juvenile cor-
rectional agency may use a variety of techniques in the treatment and
rehabilitation of a youthful offender. The agency may use diagnostic
testing, individual counseling, family counseling, or a host of other tech-
niques specifically designed to treat the youth. The order and combina-
tion of such techniques is conditioned by the feedback received from
the youth.
The type of technology employed by the agency has an influence on
the type of skills and perspectives needed within the executive cadre. As
noted by Thompson (1967), “differences in the technical function should
also make for differences at the managerial and institutional levels of
the organization” (12). This suggests that the executive cadre’s demo-
graphic composition should be appropriate for the specific technologies
operated by the agency. For example, the skills and perspectives needed
to operate core technologies of the U.S. Army’s Radford Army Ammu-
nition Plant are different from those required to operate technologies of
 A Viable Executive C ad re 129

the Farmington State Mental Hospital in the Missouri Department of

Mental Health. In a general way, the mass production of army ammuni-
tion (a long-linked technology) requires skills and perspectives that are
mainly oriented toward instrumental efficiency. In contrast, the treat-
ment of a mentally ill patient (intensive technology) requires skills and
perspectives that are oriented toward ongoing assessment of problems
and the application of multiple techniques.12
The executive cadre’s demographic composition should also be well
suited to cope with developmental problems facing the agency as a re-
sult of its stage of historical development.13 Different skills and orienta-
tions are needed within the executive cadre to cope with different types
of developmental problems precipitated by the agency’s stage of his-
torical development. For example, the nature of some developmental
problems may require a highly technical orientation and related skills,
whereas others may require a broader generalist orientation. When con-
fronted with developmental problems of a technical nature (or vice versa),
a predominant generalist’s orientation within the executive cadre can
weaken the cadre’s capacity to protect shared organizational values.14
The GAO provides a concrete example of this argument.
For most of its institutional life, the GAO performed the role of fiscal
and management auditor for Congress. In performing this oversight func-
tion, the GAO concentrated its efforts on examining the extent to which
government agencies adhered to legally binding mandates and whether
they used the most effective administrative practices to ensure that pub-
lic funds were wisely spent. The skills and perspectives of GAO person-
nel reflected a concern with the nitty-gritty aspects of government. The
executive cadre and middle- and entry-level staff were composed of
individuals who possessed technical expertise and experience in either
law or accounting.
During the fifteen-year tenure of Comptroller General Elmer Staats
(1966-81), the GAO’s activities evolved to include program auditing, a
euphemism for program evaluation. Expansion into the realm of policy
analysis was a significant milestone in the GAO’s institutional life, thus
marking a transition to a new stage of historical development. Because
this new approach required a different orientation among agency per-
sonnel, the program evaluation function created developmental prob-
lems for the GAO. The skills and perspectives required to perform
traditional auditing are distinct from those needed to conduct program
evaluations. The types of questions involved in the two activities reflect
 130 Conserving Values

this difference. In traditional auditing, GAO personnel attempt to an-

swer such questions as “Are funds being spent legally?” and “Is it pos-
sible to eliminate waste and inefficient use of public funds?” (J.T. Rourke
1978, 454; Walker 1986). These questions focus on managerial effi-
ciency and the legal expenditure of public funds. Extensive knowledge
of an agency’s procedures is required to answer such questions. In con-
trast, GAO personnel conducting program evaluations raise a different
set of questions, including “Are federal programs achieving their objec-
tives?” and “Are there other ways of accomplishing program objectives
at lower costs?” (J.T. Rourke 1978, 454). These questions are not so
much concerned about how an agency’s program operates in a proce-
dural sense; rather, they concentrate on the extent to which the agency
has achieved programmatic goals, which requires a much broader un-
derstanding of an agency’s functions and operations.
As stated earlier, the program evaluation function posed developmen-
tal problems for the GAO because the skills and perspectives of its per-
sonnel were not entirely well suited for the agency’s new stage of historical
development. Numerous institutional changes were needed to ensure that
the GAO’s executive cadre and other staff had the skills and perspectives
to cope with developmental problems confronting the agency. Adminis-
trative changes instituted by Comptroller General Staats in the mid-1970s
can be interpreted as an attempt to align the agency’s skills and orienta-
tions with its new stage of historical development. Writing during the
GAO’s transition, John T. Rourke (1978) noted that Staats restructured
the organization along functional lines as opposed to agency lines, changed
personnel policies to conform to the new shift in direction, and filled sev-
eral key executive positions with people from outside the GAO. Rourke
concludes that Comptroller General Staats recognized that the skills and
perspectives of GAO personnel, especially within the executive cadre,
did not mesh well with the agency’s stage of historical development.
The administrative conservator should make certain that the execu-
tive cadre’s demographic composition is appropriate for the institutional
level of organizational action. Organization theorists have identified three
different levels of organizational action: technical, managerial, and in-
stitutional (see Thompson 1967; also see J.Q. Wilson 1989). The techni-
cal level is the locale of the agency’s economy or production systems.
As such, efficient operation of the technical function is of primary im-
portance. The managerial level performs a service function for the tech-
nical level. This typically includes the acquisition of needed resources
 Summ ary I3 I

to ensure the efficient and effective operation of the technical task as well
as mediating between users of the agency’s products and the technical
operation. The third level is the institutional level, which focuses prima-
rily on overall direction and legitimacy of the agency. Administrative ac-
tions at this level are “marked by a concern for the evolution of the
organization as a whole, including its changing aims and capabilities”
(Selznick 1957, 5). Although functions performed at each level are inter-
dependent, they are qualitatively different. This suggests that the skills
and perspectives needed to successfully perform the functions at each
level are different. For example, specialized expertise is needed at the
technical level, whereas a “deeper more comprehensive understanding of
social organization is needed at the institutional level (4). Failure to un-
derstand the qualitative differences among levels may result in an inap-
propriately composed executive cadre that can undermine the integrity of
public bureaucracies. Thompson (1967) warns of such consequences:
If the powerful inner circle is com posed solely o f individuals with re-
sponsibilities in the managerial layer, we would expect problemistic search,
not opportunistic surveillance, to prevail. The sam e result can be obtained
when non-managerial members o f the inner circle are personally intoler-
ant o f ambiguity. Default at the institutional level, however, is more likely
to com e because o f a lack o f a sharp distinction, conceptually between
m anagerial and institutional matters. . . . The conversion o f adm inistra-
tors from m anagerial to institutional responsibilities is more than a pro-
motion, for it entails a shift in attention from technical to organizational
rationality, from instrumental to social assessm ents. (153)

In summary, the administrative conservator should maintain an ap-

propriately composed executive cadre as a means of protecting core
organizational values. In performing this task, the conservator ensures
that the executive cadre’s demographic composition is well suited for
the agency’s field of action, its dominant technological core, its stage of
historical development, and the appropriate level of organizational ac-
tion. The administrative conservator should continually take stock of
the executive cadre’s demographic composition and make the neces-
sary adjustments to preserve the integrity of public bureaucracies.

Summary

The maintenance of a viable executive cadre is essential for conserving

the values of public bureaucracies. In this context, a viable executive
132 Conserving Values

cadre has the capacity to protect the organization’s core values from
serious corruption. The maintenance of a viable executive cadre requires
that the administrative conservator build and sustain commitment among
cadre members to larger agency goals and values. Strategies useful for
such purposes include using incentives and persuasion, minimizing dis-
sension among cadre members, and building and maintaining trusting
relationships with cadre members. The administrative conservator should
also constantly monitor and adjust the executive cadre’s demographic
composition to ensure that it is well suited for preserving the integrity of
public bureaucracies.

Notes
1. During the 1980s, several prominent journals published special issues on
organization culture. These included Journal o f Management Studies (1982), Ad-
ministrative Science Quarterly (1983), Organization Dynamics (1983j, Journal of
Management (1985), Organization Studies (1986), and Industrial Studies o f Man-
agement and Organization (1986).
2 .1 selected this definition because it contains many of the common features
associated with the value phenomenon. For a discussion of the concept of values
and its intrinsic characteristics, see Robin M. Williams Jr. (1969).
3. This view of commitment is consistent with the individual-organizational
goal congruence perspective. For an extensive review of theoretical and empirical
work concerning the concept of organization commitment, see Richard Mowday et
al. (1982). Also see Arnon Reicher (1985). The organizational commitment litera-
ture has grown considerably since Mowday et al. published their work in 1982.
Current research is too voluminous to report here.
4. Much of the historical information used in this discussion is drawn from
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms pamphlets ATF Facts: Mission and Re-
sponsibilities (n.d.-a) and Bureaucratic Breakdown (n.d.-b).
5. In 1930, the Prohibition unit was transferred to the Justice Department and
was given full bureau status. The move was designed to strengthen the federal
government’s capacity to combat the illicit manufacture, sale, and transportation of
alcoholic beverages by organized-crime syndicates. The Bureau of Prohibition’s
enforcement efforts were popularized in Oscar Fraley’s novel The Untouchables,
which highlighted the exploits of Eliot Ness and the special unit he directed in Chi-
cago. ATF has proudly made Ness one of its organizational heroes.
6. The Clinton administration made a similar proposal as part of Vice President
Gore’s reinventing government initiative. The Clinton administration abandoned the
idea when the Brady Bill was passed by both houses of Congress. The bill, named
after James Brady, President Reagan’s press secretary who was wounded in an at-
tempted assassination of the president, requires a five-day waiting period prior to
the purchase of a handgun. ATF is to assume a major role in enforcing the new law.
7. These observations are based on my personal experiences as a consultant
with this agency during a two-year period.
 Summ ary 133

8. Most of the information used to describe the DCFS case is based on a series
of articles printed in the Cleveland (Ohio) newspaper The Plain Dealer. See
Goodhand’s “ A County Agency Just for Children” (1993), Dubail and Gillispie’s
“Removing Children Is the Last Resort” (1993a), Dubail’s “Childhood Lost” (1993),
“Police Probe Death of 1 Year Old” (1993), Gillispie’s “ Toddler Died After Mother
Punched Her, Police Say” (1993), and Dubail and Gillispie’s “Girl’s Death Starts
Feud Over Custody Action” (1993b). © The Plain Dealer; used with permission.
9. J. Goodhand (May 27, 1993). A county agency just for children. The Plain
Dealer, Cleveland, Ohio, B7; reprinted by permission.
10. J. Dubail and M. Gillispie (April 11, 1993). Removing children is the last
resort. The Plain D ealer, Cleveland, Ohio, B3; reprinted by permission.
11. The ill-fated raid, siege, and eventual fire on April 19, 1993, which destroyed
the compound and killed eighty-five men, women, and children, including David
Koresh, the cult’s leader, were prominent news during much of 1993.
12. James Q. Wilson (1989, chaps. 9 and 11) offers additional support for the
arguments advanced here. In his discussion of executives and agency types, Wilson
identifies four types of agencies: coping, craft, procedural, and production. Each
requires a specific type of executive.
13. The term “ stage of historical development” is used instead of the more com-
mon term “ life cycle.” These terms are not synonymous. The life-cycle framework
is concerned with the proper sequencing of an agency’s action in relationship to its
age or period of existence. Public bureaucracies are presumed to pass through pre-
dictable stages (i.e., childhood, adolescence, maturity, etc.). The difficulty with the
life framework is that agencies do not follow predictable stages. The stage of his-
torical development framework focuses on developmental problems, the evolution-
ary circumstances confronting the agency created by a series of changes. As such,
the stage of historical development refers to a portion of time marked by a series of
changes that result in the institution’s evolving to a different state. See Selznick
(1957) for a discussion of this point.
14. Selznick (1957) makes this point when he observes, “As new problems emerge,
individuals whose way of thinking and responding served the organization well in
an early stage may be ill-fitted for the new tasks. Characteristically, this is not so
much a matter of technical knowledge as of attitudes and habits. . . . The more
firmly set the personal pattern— the less adaptable the individual” (108).
This page intentionally left blank
 5

Conserving Support

ADMINISTRATIVE CONSERVATORS HAVE little chance of preserv-

ing the integrity of public bureaucracies if they fail to build and main-
tain a sufficient level of support for their programs and activities.1Support
is a key source of power, and, as Norton Long (1949) advises, power is
the “lifeblood of administration” (257).2 This discussion of conserving
support concentrates on the administrative conservator’s efforts to build
and sustain support among an agency or program’s key external con-
stituencies as well as among internal interest groups. First, I examine
conserving external support within the context of sustaining a favorable
organizational image and maintaining strength with key external con-
stituencies. Second, with respect to internal support, I briefly discuss
the maintenance of commitment among internal interest groups by us-
ing the strategy of cooptation.

Conserving External Support

A Favorable Public Image

The notion that organizations depend on the external environment for

their existence is a dominant and well-established perspective in the
field of organization theory. In this view, the external environment is a
constraint that interferes with the attainment of organizational goals.
Interest in the external environment and its relationship to organiza-
tional performance has prompted theorists to investigate a multitude of
topics that relate to the management of environmental dependency. To
135
136 C onserving Support

avoid straying from the task at hand, in this chapter I do not review this
voluminous literature or engage in an extended discussion of the topic.
Here it is enough to say that organizations, both public and private, are
not self-sufficient and, therefore, are dependent on their external envi-
ronment for support. This support ranges from financial and human re-
sources to social legitimacy (see Pfeffer and Salancik 1978).
For public bureaucracies, creating and sustaining a favorable public
image are especially crucial for success. Charles Perrow (1961) sug-
gests that a “predominately favorable public” image translates into “pres-
tige,” which, in turn, increases the likelihood that administrative agencies
will continue to secure vital resources from the external environment
(335). The extent to which an agency successfully acquires necessary
resources is an indicator of external support. A review of Perrow’s work
on organizational prestige is useful for advancing this discussion.
Perrow asserts that organizational prestige may be based on intrinsic
or extrinsic characteristics of the product or service. Intrinsic character-
istics pertain to the quality of the product or service as determined by
those capable of evaluating it. The extrinsic quality of an organization’s
product or service is measured against established standards highly prized
in a particular field of action. Extrinsic characteristics have little to do
with the quality of the product per se. Instead, prestige may be based on
association with “value laden symbols” (336) or characteristics of the
organization that are not directly related to the quality of the product or
service itself. Examples of extrinsic characteristics include the physical
quality of the building in which the organization is located and the type
of publicity generated by the organization.
Perrow suggests that prestige based on the intrinsic quality of a prod-
uct or service is most desirable if it can withstand scrutiny and is easy to
evaluate by those who use it. There are, however, circumstances that
make external evaluation difficult. The highly technical nature of the
product or service is a case in point. Outside validating groups may be
used to “certify” the intrinsic quality of the product or service. As Perrow
observes, “the more difficult it is to establish the intrinsic quality, the
more the organization needs other groups for validation” (337). Repu-
table accrediting bodies or professional associations are established for
such purposes. Outside groups used to validate intrinsic characteristics
either must be users of the product or must have sufficient expertise to
evaluate it.
In addition to validating groups, Perrow contends that organizations
 Conserving External Support 137

may use indirect indexes to cultivate and maintain a favorable public

image.3 The use of indirect indexes involves “publicizing of character-
istics of the organization which are thought to insure quality” (337). For
example, an academic department within a university might use as indi-
rect indexes the number of articles published by faculty members in
scholarly journals, the number and amount of research grants funded,
and the placement of graduate students at nationally recognized institu-
tions. Indirect indexes of quality are often included in official docu-
ments prepared for public consumption, such as annual reports and other
publicity-generating documents.
Perrow warns that an overemphasis on indirect indexes or extrinsic
characteristics of the organization can result in unintended consequences.
Preoccupation with stressing extrinsic characteristics or flaunting indi-
rect indexes of quality may take precedence over maintaining the qual-
ity of products and services. Such actions may ultimately have an adverse
affect on an organization’s favorable public image.
Perrow’s analytical construct of prestige on the basis of intrinsic and
extrinsic characteristics provides important insights into how the ad-
ministrative conservator might maintain an agency’s favorable public
image. Such maintenance requires that the administrative conservator
(1) protect the agency’s reputation for consistent compliance with stan-
dards used to measure the intrinsic quality of its products and services
and (2) ensure that indirect indexes of quality included in official docu-
ments remain accurate and meaningful.

Strategy: Complying with Established Standards

The agency’s reputation for consistently receiving favorable evaluations

on the intrinsic quality of its products and services is an essential re-
quirement for maintaining its favorable public image. The concept repu-
tation has special significance and is defined as a “general estimation in
which a person or a thing is held by the public” {American Heritage
Dictionary 1982, 1050). The key word in this definition is “estimation,”
which implies judgment or opinion. The judgment and opinions of an
agency’s key constituents are influenced by the consistent quality of its
products or services over time.
The administrative conservator should ensure that the agency consis-
tently receives favorable evaluations on the intrinsic quality of products
and services. It is this perception of consistency, or lack thereof, that
138 C onserving Support

determines an agency’s reputation and thus contributes to its public im-

age (Caruana 1997; Bromley 1993). The failure of an agency to receive
consistently favorable evaluations can lead to a lack of public trust and,
consequently, a “bad reputation.” Such a perception, especially if it be-
comes widespread, can create an unfavorable public image and ulti-
mately result in withdrawal of support by the agency’s key constituents
(Suchman 1995).
The administrative conservator should constantly monitor, inspect, and
update agency operations to maintain a reputation for uniform compli-
ance with established standards. Professional associations often play an
important role in developing and institutionalizing standards. These stan-
dards vary according to the nature of the agency’s business as well as its
field or realm of action. For example, the standards used to measure the
intrinsic quality of dams and bridges built by the U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers are different from those used to measure the intrinsic quality of
the services provided by the U.S. Postal Service or the National Institutes
of Health Centers for Disease Control. As far as professional associations
are concerned, the American Society of Civil Engineers has a great deal
of influence on standards used to measure the intrinsic quality of dams
and bridges built by the Army Corps of Engineers.
To ensure consistent compliance with established standards, the ad-
ministrative conservator could use several strategies ranging from peri-
odic detailed inspections to strict regulation of agency activities. Although
these strategies are useful, I am especially interested in maintaining com-
pliance with established standards through the adoption of innovations.
The administrative conservator should be prepared to update the
agency’s operation through the adoption of innovations when the need
arises. Such decisions, however, should be implemented at the appro-
priate pace. The phrase “ appropriate pace” refers to a regulated speed at
which agency operations are updated. The administrative conservator
should know when to update agency operations as a means of preserv-
ing its integrity. In other words, timing is an important consideration in
the adoption of innovations.
The question of timing is multifaceted in nature in that the adminis-
trative conservator should (1) minimize the premature adoption of inno-
vations and (2) avoid the perception (real or imagined) of lagging in
making changes. The premature adoption of innovations can result in
the incorporation of programs, policies, and technologies that may not
add much to an agency’s performance or reputation. In fact, they can
 C onserving External Support 139

have just the opposite effect. Once innovations are adopted and incor-
porated as part of the formal structure, they constrain the agency in terms
of pursuing future courses of action (see DiMaggio and Powell 1983;
Hannan and Freeman 1984). The premature adoption of some innova-
tions is also a problem because the shakeout period may result in the
elimination of some innovations and the institutionalization of others.
For example, an agency may be saddled with an innovation it adopted,
although its value is eventually depreciated during the shakeout period.
The early adoption of computer systems as a strategy for making orga-
nizations more efficient and modem is such a case.
Many organizations were early adopters of computers. This technol-
ogy was incorporated into the formal structure of organizations to im-
prove efficiency and to convey the message of being rational and modem.
Organizations invested substantial sums of money in computer systems
that became obsolete because of rapid technological developments. B e-
cause of the huge costs tied up in these investments, many organizations
are now stuck with antiquated equipment. The very use of these systems
conveys the image that the organization is outdated, the perception it
ironically attempted to avoid by incorporating the system in the first
place. The IRS and the FAA have been caught in this predicament. For
at least twenty-five years, the IRS tax-processing system has been criti-
cized as old-fashioned, unwieldy, and indifferent to the needs of taxpay-
ers as well as the agency itself (U.S. GAO 1991c; see also U.S. GAO
1991b). After numerous failures to modify the system, the IRS has initi-
ated an $8 billion computer modernization project called the Tax Sys-
tem Modernization Program designed to update its information system.
The FAA has also been criticized for failing to modernize its com-
puter operations at an appropriate pace. FAA officials have been ac-
cused of negligence for not upgrading the agency’s computer system:

To ensure safe air travel, establish regulatory standards, maintain secu-

rity, and promote air commerce, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)
requires vast amounts o f information technology. Computers are espe-
cially critical in controlling over 200,000 flights across the nation daily.
Although FA A has recently m ade som e limited improvements, it has not
implemented a com prehensive management program for its m ajor auto-
mated system s because such a program is not a priority. A s a result, FAA
lacks adequate computer capacity policies, procedures, expertise, and
tools. Without a com prehensive program , FA A does not know how long
current systems, such as those air traffic controllers use to separate aircraft,
140 Conserving Support

will continue to meet capacity requirements, nor does it know its future
capacity needs. (U .S. G A O 1991b, p. 16; see also U .S. GA O 1991a)

The other aspect of the timing issue relates to a perception of delay-

ing the implementation of innovations. The image as a laggard may
adversely affect an agency’s favorable public image (see Rogers and
Shoemaker 1971; Rogers 1995). Innovations should be adopted in a
timely manner to avoid claims of irresponsibility, which is what hap-
pened to the Department of Labor’s Wage and Hour Division (WHD).
The Department of Labor is mandated to determine the market rate and
wages and benefits for service employees working under government
contracts of $2,500 or more. The Department’s Wage and Hour Divi-
sion is delegated responsibility for wage rate calculations.
The accurate calculation of wage and benefit rates is important for
two reasons. First, accurate determinations of the market rate ensure
that service employees are fairly compensated for the labor. Second,
accurate determinations ensure that tax dollars are wisely saved by elimi-
nating overpayment to service employees. In a report issued by the GAO
(1987), the WHD was cited for inaccurate assessment of wage rates:

A potential problem may exist with the accuracy o f w age rate calcula-
tions in S C A [Service Contract Act] determinations. Inaccuracies in the
Department o f L ab o r’s Wage and Hour D ivision both overstate and un-
derstate w age rates. The inaccuracies were due to incorrect copying of
rates from source documents, incorrect use o f source data in calculations,
and mathematical errors. WHD is taking steps to correct the record keep-
ing problem s, including designing a computerized system for preparing
and tracking S C A determinations. (19)

The GAO evaluation revealed that the WHD’s use of manual record-
keeping procedures resulted in inefficiencies in the agency’s operations.
Administrative executives of the agency were accused of being laggards
because they did not adopt computerized record-keeping systems in a
timely manner.
Two major factors can trigger the need to update the agency’s op-
erations: recognition of emerging trends and reaction to major events.
The administrative conservator should establish functions and processes
to identify and monitor trends that may ultimately have an impact on
the agency’s operation. For example, Stanley Morris, the former di-
rector of the U.S. Marshals Service, established a threat analysis unit
 Conserving External Support 141

to identify and monitor trends. The administrative conservator should

also be sensitive to major events that could affect the agency’s opera-
tions. Examples of major events include changes in mandating stat-
utes, critical evaluation of a companion agency’s operations by an
oversight body or the press, a widely publicized scandal within the
agency’s field of action resulting from the inefficient operation of tech-
nologies, and disaster or tragedy. There is little novel about the notion
that administrative executives seek to update their agency’s operations
in response to emerging trends or major events. In fact, executives of
private-sector firms engage in similar actions. The modernization of a
governmental agency’s operation through the adoption of innovations
is a more complex process, however, because these agencies depend
on legislative appropriations. Adequate knowledge of when to mod-
ernize an agency’s operation is only one part of the equation; securing
sufficient support to do so is another. The administrative conservator
must convince legislative appropriations committees of the need to
revise the agency’s operations to secure funding. The political process
can make this a difficult task at times (see Schick 1980; Wildavsky
1990). But as Dobel (1999) points out, public officials must secure
adequate budgets and resources if they are to build institutional capac-
ity and credibility.
The failure of administrative executives to secure adequate funding
for updating operations in a timely manner can negatively affect their
agency’s favorable public image. The Department of Justice’s defense
procurement fraud unit is a case in point. The unit was established in
1982 to investigate fraud in the procurement of defense contracts. The
criminal division of the Justice Department is delegated responsibility
for prosecuting fraud cases. In the wake of the defense procurement
scandal, the GAO was called in to investigate the Justice Department’s
handling of defense procurement fraud cases. The GAO (1988a) was
extremely critical of the department’s operations in the investigation
and prosecution of fraud cases. Justice Department officials argued that
they had requested an increase in appropriations from Congress to ad-
dress many of the problems identified by the GAO. But Congress re-
jected Justice’s request and substantially cut the department’s budget.
Although department officials recognized the need to enhance the ca-
pacity of the defense procurement fraud unit, their inability to secure
adequate funding to do so had an adverse effect on the department’s
public image.
 142 C onserving Support

Strategy: Maintaining Accuracy o f indirect Indexes o f Quality

In addition to maintaining the agency’s reputation for compliance with

established standards, the administrative conservator may also use in-
direct indexes of quality to sustain the agency’s favorable public im-
age. As previously discussed, this strategy involves publicizing in
official documents characteristics of the agency that symbolize qual-
ity. Although the use of indirect indexes is an effective means of mar-
keting the quality of an agency’s products or services, the administrative
conservator should ensure that such indexes remain accurate and mean-
ingful once they are included in official documents for public con-
sumption. The accuracy of an indirect index is measured by the degree
to which it conforms to the truth, that is, a close approximation of the
reality that exists within the agency. An indirect index is considered
meaningful when it has significance and importance in a specific in-
stitutional context.
Governmental agencies commonly include indirect indexes in offi-
cial documents (especially annual reports) to publicize the quality of
their programs and services. In fact, indirect indexes are integral com-
ponents of many agencies’ “propaganda” efforts (for a discussion of
agency propaganda, see Altheide and Johnson 1980). In its fourteen-
page official document Outline o f U.S. M arshals Activities, the U SM S
(n.d.) skillfully uses several indirect indexes to promote its activities.
The document devotes, on the average, half a page to describing each of
the U SM S’s major duties and responsibilities. These include, among
others, court security, the receipt and processing of federal prisoners,
fugitive investigations, transportation and movement of prisoners, and
the management of assets seized as a result of law enforcement actions
by other federal agencies. In describing each of its major duties and
responsibilities, the U SM S uses a variety of indirect indexes of quality.
For example, the “number of weapons confiscated from individuals prior
to entering Federal courthouses” is used as an indirect index to publi-
cize the quality of the U SM S court security program. The document
states, “each year, court security officers discover more and more dan-
gerous weapons during routine security screening at Federal courthouses.
In FY 1987, they prevented 14,000 illegal and 53,000 legal weapons
from being carried into Federal courthouses” (4, italics added).
The “number of court appearances made by prisoners transported” is
another indirect index that markets the quality of the USM S prisoner
 Conserving External Support 143

transportation program. In a section of the document describing the trans-

portation and movement of prisoners, the U SM S (n.d.) states:
The U .S. M arshals [Service] is responsible for: (1) the timely produc-
tion o f federal prisoners for legal hearings or m eetings with counsel;
(2) the production o f prisoners at trial (in FY 1987, the Service p ro -
duced p riso n ers f o r 29 0 ,0 0 0 court ap p earan ce s); (3) the movem ent o f
sentenced prisoners to institutions for service o f sentence and transfer
o f sentenced prisoners between institutions; and (4) ensuring the rights,
safety, and security o f pretrial detainee and sentenced prisoners in cu s-
tody. (6, italics added)

The document includes a host of other indirect indexes of quality,

such as the number of federal arrest warrants received in a given year,
the number of prisoners received and processed, the number of protec-
tive service details established because of judicial threats, the number
of witnesses protected, and the dollar amount of assets managed as a
result of seized and forfeited property.
The administrative conservator should encourage and, indeed, sup-
port the inclusion of indirect indexes in official documents to publicize
the quality of an agency’s programs and services. These indexes, how-
ever, must be accurate and meaningful if they are to contribute to the
maintenance of the agency’s favorable public image. In the previous
examples, it is fair to say that the indirect indexes of quality used by the
USM S are presumed to be accurate. If, however, the GAO discovered
that the number of prisoners produced for court appearances was grossly
inaccurate, for example, the agency’s public image would be adversely
affected.4 Or, if the USM S used a meaningless indirect index such as the
“ average height and weight of individuals searched during routine secu-
rity screening at Federal courthouses,” questions concerning the quality
of its operation would emerge. Such questions may be prompted by the
perception that overemphasis on meaningless indirect indexes signals a
lack of confidence in the quality of the agency’s operation. The agency
may be perceived as merely reaching for straws to justify its existence.
Perceptions of this nature would no doubt tarnish the agency’s favor-
able public image.
The administrative conservator should constantly monitor and inspect
information prepared for public consumption to ensure that indirect in-
dexes of quality are meaningful and accurate. Failure to do so can result
in a credibility gap that could severely damage the agency’s favorable
public image.
144 Conserving Sup port

The Maintenance o f External Alliances

The preceding discussion suggests that the maintenance of a favorable

public image is an effective strategy for sustaining support for an agency’s
programs and services. Although effective, this strategy alone is insuffi-
cient to sustain external support over time. It is possible for an agency to
enjoy a favorable public image and yet lack sufficient support among
legislative bodies to secure funding for its programs. In addition to build-
ing and maintaining a favorable public image, the administrative con-
servator should sustain strength with key constituents to ensure support
(see F.E. Rourke 1969, chap. 2). Sustaining strength refers to the ongo-
ing efforts of the administrative conservator to cultivate and maintain
supportive relationships among an alliance of individuals, groups, and
organizations who are willing to take action on behalf of the agency.
This alliance consists of a multitude of actors, both inside and outside of
government, who are affected by or have an interest in the agency’s
activities.
The maintenance of a strong alliance of external supporters requires
that the administrative conservator provide, on an ongoing basis, in-
ducements and related rewards in exchange for support. This exchange
relationship is governed by a set of explicit or implicit understandings
that establish expectations for the parties involved. These expectations
define in a broad sense the behaviors needed from supporters to ad-
vance agency aims as well as the rewards pledged by the conservator
for support. Inducements and related rewards available to the adminis-
trative conservator include agency services, benefits, and favors. The
conservator’s capacity to dispense agency services and benefits valued
by supporters is vital to the maintenance of agency support. According
to Francis E. Rourke (1969), “Agencies that are not in a position to
dispense important benefits or favors to any segment of the community
are in a disadvantageous position with respect to their ability to attract
organized support” (14-15).
Agency services, benefits, and favors provided by the conservator in
exchange for support should be appropriate. In other words, such ser-
vices and benefits should be within the legitimate and legal realm of the
agency’s activities. For example, the director of the Higher Education
Management Services, U.S. Department of Education, should not pro-
vide special favors to a congresswoman that give an unfair advantage to
a university within her district in competing for research grants awarded
 Conserving External Support 145

by the agency. If the director, for example, disregarded internal proce-

dures (in exchange for support on favorable agency legislation) and
awarded a multimillion-dollar grant to the university in the congress-
woman’s district, such action would be inappropriate, if not illegal. The
director could, as a way of rendering an appropriate service to the con-
gressional supporter, instruct the staff to provide technical assistance to
the university in proposal development. This service is within the legiti-
mate and legal scope of the agency’s activities.
The administrative conservator should exercise discretion when dis-
pensing agency benefits in exchange for support. Agency benefits ren-
dered should be enough to secure and maintain support but not too much
to earn the disrespect and envy from others. In the previous illustration
concerning the Higher Education Management Services, the director
should ensure that the staff is not perceived as providing excessive tech-
nical assistance to the university in the congresswoman’s district. The
failure to do so may lead to accusations by others that the agency is
giving preferential treatment and therefore is engaged in inequitable
decision-making in the awarding of research grants.
The administrative conservator has at his or her disposal a variety of
appropriate services, benefits, and favors that can be rendered to sup-
porters. These include, among others, sharing agency expertise and re-
sources with supporters, responding quickly to requests for information,
giving public recognition to supporters as a means of generating posi-
tive publicity for them, and publicly endorsing supporters’ activities.
Agency expertise can be shared through formal training programs or by
providing direct technical assistance. For example, the USM S often con-
ducts seminars for sheriffs to improve their court security operations.
The USM S also provides direct financial support to sheriff departments
through its Cooperative Agreement Program, which provides financial
assistance to upgrade jail facilities and expand jail capacity. In exchange
for such assistance, the USM S is guaranteed jail space for federal pris-
oners. As noted in chapter 3, the USM S uses both of its Boeing 727
aircraft as part of the National Prison Transportation System to assist
other agencies in the long-distance movement of prisoners. The USM S
coordinates and schedules the majority of long-distance transfers be-
tween institutions operated by the Federal Bureau of Prisons. The agency
also transports prisoners for the Immigration and Naturalization Ser-
vice and for a variety of state and local agencies (USM S n.d.).
Quick response to requests for information is another service that can
146 Conserving Support

be rendered by the administrative conservator to supporters. Adminis-

trative agencies are inundated daily with inquiries from the executive
and legislative branches, interest groups, other agencies, clients, and the
general public. A timely and reasonable response to such inquiries is
important to avoid giving the impression that the conservator or the
agency is unresponsive. The appearance of unresponsiveness is a for-
mula for disaster. In the words of W. Michael Blumenthal (1979), former
Treasury secretary and former chairman of the Bendix Corporation,
“Appearance is as important as reality” (37). The type of information
sought and who requested it influences what constitutes a timely and
reasonable response. For example, if a request for an agency publica-
tion routinely takes three weeks to process once received, the response
time for a supporter could be reduced by as much as two weeks or less
depending on the urgency of the request. Although a quick response is a
desirable goal for handling requests from supporters, there are times
when circumstances prevent significant reduction in the normal response
time. In such instances, the administrative conservator should keep sup-
porters informed by providing information on the process involved in
handling the request, on when action on the request is most likely to
occur, and on when supporters can expect a partial or complete response
on the matter. In addition, periodic updates are useful to let supporters
know that their request is getting attention.
Another service is giving credit and recognition to supporters to gen-
erate positive publicity for them. One finds little disagreement with the
assertion that political elites, interest groups, and governmental agen-
cies seek to exploit opportunities that publicize their activities and ac-
complishments. This behavior is easy to understand, especially because
positive publicity can enhance an individual or organization’s public
image. I have already discussed the symbiotic relationship between a
favorable public image and the maintenance of external agency support.
Although receiving public credit and recognition is a service highly val-
ued by political elites and interest groups alike, this service has special
significance for governmental agencies. This is because such agencies
are restricted from engaging in public relations activities that promote
their interest. Consequently, governmental agencies seek alternative
means of publicizing their activities. As mentioned earlier, governmen-
tal agencies skillfully use official documents to publicize their accom-
plishments. Although such use can be effective, there are limitations to
this approach, especially because a thin line exists between public infor-
 Conserving External Support 147

mation and public relations activities.5 Governmental agencies assidu-

ously attempt to avoid giving the impression that they are actively in-
volved in propagandizing the public or lobbying the legislature as a means
of gaining support for their activities.
Public credit and recognition can be rendered as a service in several
ways. One way is for the administrative conservator to give supporters
prestigious awards at highly publicized formal ceremonies and large
public gatherings such as conferences and conventions. For example, at
its annual conference and exhibition, the National Sheriffs’ Association
(NSA) presents a president’s award in recognition of professional ef-
forts taken by an individual to improve the cooperation between sheriff
departments and other criminal justice organizations. At the NSA’s Forty-
eighth Annual Convention and Exhibition held in 1988, the director of
the USM S received the president’s award in recognition of his agency’s
assistance to sheriff departments in improving courtroom security. The
award was presented at a formal ceremony by the NSA president and
George Bush, then vice president of the United States and the Republi-
can Party presidential candidate. Of course, the national press coverage
of this event generated a great deal of positive publicity for the USMS.
The administrative conservator may also give supporters public credit
in interviews with journalists and others seeking information on the
agency’s activities. These interviews may be either public or private.
Public interviews often take place at press conferences called by agency
officials to publicize significant events, whereas private interviews usu-
ally occur on a one-on-one basis. Federal law enforcement agencies in-
volved in preventing the illegal sale and distribution of narcotics and
other controlled substances often use this method. For example, in an
article published by The Odessa American (a Texas newspaper) con-
cerning the seizure of property that federal officials suspected was used
for drug trafficking, a U SM S official gives public credit and recognition
to several of the agency’s supporters:
L a Morenita— a grocery, laundromat, gift shop, and pool hall— has been
closed by federal officials enforcing a statute that allow s them to seize
property suspected o f being used for drug trafficking, reports said. Deputy
U .S. M arshall Edw ard D eC oste said today that a join t investigation by
the M idland County Sh eriff's Departm ent, M idland Police Departm ent,
and the U.S. D rug Enforcement Administration led to the closure o f the
business through federal court action. (“ O fficials Seize Midland Store”
1988, 13A, italics added)6
148 C onserving Support

The preceding discussion suggests that sheriff departments are im-

portant supporters of the USM S. The U.S. Drug Enforcement Adminis-
tration is also recognized in law enforcement circles as one of the agency’s
allies. Statements appearing in the Drug Enforcement Report, a Wash-
ington newsletter devoted to drug enforcement activities, provide evi-
dence of this supportive relationship. In an article devoted to a dispute
between the U SM S and the FBI concerning federal fugitive investiga-
tion, the newsletter states:

The U .S. M arshals Service and its frequent ally in the capture o f drug
fugitives, the D rug Enforcement Adm inistration, apparently have with-
stood a m ajor challenge by the Federal Bureau o f Investigation to keep
their key role in pursuing fugitives. . . . The D E A has been somewhat
caught in the middle in the internal dispute, because it is subordinate to
the F B I within the Justice Department hierarchy, yet it also team s up
often and successfully with the M arsh als Service in the pursuit o f key
narcotic fugitives. . . . The M arshals Service has grown increasingly ag -
gressive and more creative, in finding ways to locate fugitives and bring
them home for prosecution. When the investigation involves a drug fugi-
tive, the Service often has the D E A as a prim e ally. Indeed, D EA itself
som etim es takes the lead in a fugitive pursuit, as it did when U .S. authori-
ties arranged the capture in Colom bia o f M edellin Cartel drug-lord Carlos
Lehder Rivas. Once the D EA brought Lehder back to the U .S., however,
he was immediately handed over to the M arshals Service. (“ U .S. M ar-
shals Preserve R ole” 1988, 1, italics added)

The administrative conservator can also publicly endorse supporters’

activities as a way of providing an appropriate service. These endorse-
ments consist of two types, broadly categorized as direct and indirect
expressions of approval. Direct expressions of approval involve favor-
able public pronouncements made on behalf of a supporter. Public pro-
nouncements can be made before a public audience that typically
includes, among others, journalists, members of legislative committees,
agency personnel, and members of professional associations. Written
statements of support are expressed in official letters and in resolutions
passed by formally recognized bodies. For example, officials represent-
ing several state agencies submitted official letters in support of the
ATF when the agency was targeted for abolishment in 1982. A letter
prepared by L. Joyce Hampers, commissioner of the Massachusetts
Department of Revenue, is illustrative.7 The commissioner states in a
 C onserving External Support 149

February 2, 1982, letter to the Subcommittee on Treasury, Postal Ser-

vice, and General Government:

As I did previously in a Novem ber 2, 1981 letter to Treasury Secretary

Regan, I would like to express my concern over plans to curtail the To-
bacco Enforcement Program o f the Bureau o f Alcohol, Tobacco and Fire-
arms (ATF) and enforcement o f the Federal Contraband Cigarette Act
(P L . 95-575).
While statistical research on M assachusetts tax losses due to cigarette
bootlegging vary from the 1975 A C IR (Advisory Com m ission on Inter-
governmental Relations Study) projection o f $12.5 million annually, to a
1980 M assachusetts Legislative Research Bureau Study that projects an-
nual losses at $17 million, our cigarette excise tax revenue has increased
in both fiscal years 1980 and 1981, $2.7 million and $4.1 million, respec-
tively. We attribute these increases, in part, to ATF and M assachusetts
combined enforcement efforts.
Having awareness that the National Tobacco Tax Association (NTTA)
plans to submit a statement, reflecting Association resolutions express-
ing support o f ATF activity against cigarette sm uggling, I only wish to
em phasize local concerns over this national problem.
I wish to strongly suggest appropriations for contraband cigarette en-
forcement in the ATF and enforcement o f P L . 95-575.
I remain concerned that the withdrawal o f ATF from its Tobacco En-
forcement Program will result in a revival o f the cigarette bootlegging
problem.
Thank you for your consideration o f my statement. (U .S. Senate Su b-
committee o f the Committee on Appropriations 1982, 126)

Several resolutions were also presented as written statements of sup-

port on behalf of ATF activities. For example, the National Association
of State Liquor Administrators passed this resolution:

W hereas p roposals have been advanced to dism em ber the Treasury

Department’s Bureau o f Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearm s, drastically re-
duce the staffing, and reassigning its regulatory functions to other agen-
cies o f the Federal Government; and;
Whereas coinciding with such dismemberment o f the Bureau o f A lco-
hol, Tobacco and Firearms is a proposal to amend the Federal Alcohol
Administration Act to such an extent that many o f the regulatory principles
embraced by the National Conference o f Liquor Administrators will no
longer be adhered to by the federal agencies ultimately charged with regu-
lation o f the various aspects o f beverage alcohol traffic; and . . .
150 Conserving Support

Whereas it is recognized that the occurrence o f either one or both fed-

eral proposals, that is, the revision o f the Federal Alcohol Administration
Act or the dismemberment o f the Bureau o f A lcohol, Tobacco and Fire-
arms, could be disastrous in terms o f the “ sp in o ff’ issue and problem s
which could be faced by the individual states:
Now, therefore be it Resolved, That the Executive Com mittee o f the
National Conference o f State Liquor Administrators meeting in Scottsdale,
Arizona, on Novem ber 13, 1981:

1. O ppose any plan to dism ember the activities, reduce the funding, re-
assign responsibilities, or in any way lessen or alter the ability o f the
Bureau o f Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearm s to conduct its duties and
responsibilities as currently defined and conducted; and
2. Oppose any effort to amend the Federal Alcohol Administration Act
in such a manner as to alter the existing substantive law that presently
provides protection against the abuses and problem s which occurred
early in this century and led to the institution o f national prohibition,
the repeal o f which was brought about wholly or partially on the basis
that the federal government would operate a strong program o f en-
forcement and regulation.

Done in Scottsdale, Arizona, this 13th day o f Novem ber 1981. (U .S. Sen-
ate Subcom mittee o f the Committee on Appropriations 1982, 13)

The next type of endorsement, indirect expressions of approval, in-

volves tacit acts of support. Such endorsements are implied without be-
ing directly stated. For example, when the administrative conservator
agrees to serve on the board of directors of a supporter’s organization,
he or she is indirectly expressing approval of its activities.
Another example of an indirect expression of approval is the sanc-
tioning of participation by agency personnel in events sponsored by sup-
porters, such as conferences, special ceremonies, educational programs,
and other public gatherings.8 Again, the U SM S provides an illustration.
As previously indicated, the NSA is an important supporter of the USMS.
The U SM S director, as a means of endorsing the NSA’s activities, sanc-
tioned the participation of agency personnel at the association’s annual
conference and exhibition, as reflected by statements appearing in an
internal USM S newsletter. On the first page of the newsletter, under the
heading “National Sheriffs’ Association Conference” (1988), the direc-
tor states:
 The Binding of Parochial G roup Egotism 151

The National Sh eriffs’ A ssociation (N SA ) held its Forty-eighth Annual

Conference and Exhibition last week in Louisville, Kentucky. M arshals
Service representatives attended and participated in numerous sessions,
including a Court Security Seminar. . . . The U S M S exhibit occupied a
prime position with the exhibition from other law enforcement agencies
and various vendors o f police and security products. (1)

Although the director did not explicitly state in the newsletter that
agency personnel had his blessing to participate in the event, it is im-
plied that he sanctioned such actions. By noting the participation of
agency personnel in the conference, the director in fact communicated
his approval. As Edgar Schein (1985) observes, “what leaders pay at-
tention to, measure, and control” is a powerful method of communicat-
ing what is important to them (225).
A last example of an indirect expression of approval is the accep-
tance of invitations to deliver keynote addresses at events sponsored by
supporters. It is generally well known that ranking government officials
receive numerous requests to provide this service. The administrative
conservator should be selective in accepting public speaking engage-
ments. Requests made by supporters should be given priority. In accept-
ing such requests, the administrative conservator is indirectly endorsing
the supporters’ activities. For example, it is inconceivable to think that a
ranking government official would accept an invitation to address a for-
mal gathering of the Ku Klux Klan. Doing so would convey the mes-
sage that the official endorses the activities of this organization.

The Binding of Parochial Group Egotism

For some time now, organization theorists have argued that organizations
are composed of a multitude of formal and informal groups that seek to
promote their own vested interests. These entities have been described by
such names as internal interest groups, coalitions, constituencies, and stake-
holders. Despite the diversity of terminology, writers agree that it is the
task of administrative leadership to “bind parochial group egotism to larger
loyalties and aspirations” (Selznick 1957, 93-94). Stated another way, it
is the responsibility of administrative leaders to build and sustain com-
mitment among internal interest groups to core agency values. This is not
always an easy task, especially because organizational members experi-
ence multiple commitments (see Reicher 1985).
152 Conserving Support

There are several useful strategies for building and sustaining commit-
ment among internal interest groups. Many of these strategies have al-
ready been mentioned in the previous discussion of the executive cadre.
These include selectively recruiting and choosing organization members,
offering incentives, using persuasion, minimizing dissension, and build-
ing and maintaining high levels of trust. Rather than commenting further
on these strategies, I will discuss the use of cooptation as a strategy.
The term cooptation is defined as the “process of absorbing new ele-
ments into the leadership or policy determining structure as a means of
averting threats to its stability or existence” (Selznick 1948, 34). From
this perspective, cooptation is an adaptive or adjustment strategy used
by administrative executives to cope with perceived threatening organi-
zational circumstance. There are two different forms of cooptation: for-
mal and informal. Formal cooptation involves absorbing new elements
into leadership or policy-determining structure to lend legitimacy and
respectability to formal authority. This form of cooptation is used when
the confidence in formal authority is questioned. For example, to in-
crease their legitimacy, urban police departments frequently may ap-
point leaders from minority communities to advisory boards. In many
minority communities, police departments are held in low esteem be-
cause of the perception of racism, which results in a lack of trust and
confidence. As a result, the legitimacy and authority of these police de-
partments as advocates of law and order are called into question.9
Informal cooptation has little to do with legitimacy per se; rather, this
form of cooptation is undertaken in response to demands for the sharing
of power. Selznick (1948) describes informal cooptation this way:

Cooptation may be a response to specific centers o f power. This is not a

matter o f legitim acy or o f a general and diffuse lack o f confidence. They
may be well established; and yet organized forces which are able to
threaten the formal authority may effectively shape its structure and policy.
The organization in respect to its institutional environment— or the lead-
ership in respect to its rank— must take these forces into account---- This
form o f cooptation is expressed in informal terms, for the problem is not
one o f responding to a state o f im balance with respect to “ people as a
whole” but one o f meeting the pressure o f specific individuals or interest
groups which are in a position to enforce demands. (34-35)

Cooptation is considered informal when formal authority never pub-

licly acknowledges that concessions have been made to share power in
 The Binding of Parochial G roup Egotism 153

response to pressure. To make such concessions would “undermine the

sense of legitimacy of the formal authority within the community” (35).
An example of informal cooptation is the incorporation of more women
into the leadership or policy-determining structure of an organization in
response to pressure from organized women’s groups.
Although adm inistrative conservators may use both forms of
cooptation as a response to external and internal pressures, organization
theorists tend to focus primarily on the cooptation of elements in the
external environment. Little attention is devoted to cooptation within
the organization.10 Moreover, cooptation seems to carry a negative con-
notation and is seen as merely an exercise in elite manipulation. This is
unfortunate because cooptation is a viable strategy for securing coop-
eration from internal interest groups. Let us consider informal cooptation
within public bureaucracies, specifically designed to maintain support
among internal interest groups.
Cooptation is a useful strategy for securing commitment and, thereby,
maintaining support among internal interest groups. But the intended
consequences of informal cooptation (internal security, stability, and
broader administrative discretion) are not permanent or guaranteed. The
effectiveness of informal cooptation is contingent, in part, on the suc-
cessful integration of coopted groups into the decision-making struc-
ture. Successful integration refers to the degree to which coopted groups
perceive (in a real or imagined way) that they legitimately share the
power with those in authority. This perception is cultivated and sus-
tained by the “accumulating history of power outcomes” (Olson and
Cromwell 1975, 6). The term power outcome refers to the consequences
of negotiations that determine the allocation and control of scarce orga-
nizational resources. In other words, coopted groups must perceive that
they are periodic recipients of benefits allocated through the decision-
making structure. I will substitute the term “benefits” for “power” out-
comes because it is better suited for this discussion.
The administrative conservator should ensure that coopted groups
receive an equitable share of benefits allocated through the policy-making
structure. Equitable share refers not to the distribution of resources on a
one-to-one basis but rather to the quantity and quality of benefits accu-
mulated over time. Quantity suggests the number of benefits accumu-
lated during a period, whereas the quality of benefits stems from the
degree of “organizational slack” (March and Simon 1958, 126). The
term “ organizational slack” refers to the extent to which the agency has
 154 C onserving Support

an abundance or excess of resources to achieve a minimal level of effec-

tiveness. For example, a large degree of slack increases opportunities
for the acquisition of resources, making their acquisition less valuable
to the recipient. In contrast, a limited degree of slack results in tighter
restrictions on the allocation of scarce organizational resources, thus
making benefits acquired via cooptation seem more valued to the
coopted. The quality of a benefit is, thus, measured by the scarcity of
critical resources. The ability of administrative executives to acquire
several new positions during periods of retrenchment is an example of
a quality benefit.
To reiterate, the administrative conservator should ensure that coopted
interest groups receive, on an ongoing basis, an equitable share of ben-
efits allocated through the decision-making structure. Failure to do so
may undermine the usefulness of cooptation as a strategy for maintain-
ing support. This assertion is based on the premise that coopted groups
are more likely to perceive a breach of contract if formal agreements
made in exchange for internal security and stability are not honored. If
this occurs, coopted groups may withdraw support and become antago-
nistic toward those within the policy-determining structure. This poses
a threat to the agency’s integrity because coopted groups are in a strate-
gic position to restrict the available mode of administrative action if
they so desire (Thompson 1967). The erosion of internal support, espe-
cially if it becomes widespread, is dangerous.
How should the administrative conservator ensure that coopted groups
are periodic recipients of valued benefits allocated through the policy-
making structure? The answer to this question is twofold. First, the ad-
ministrative conservator should be fully aware of who is getting what in
the allocation of scarce organizational resources. In other words, the
administrative conservator should keep score on the quantity and qual-
ity of benefits received by the various internal interest groups over time.
Second, the administrative conservator should at times exercise control
over the decision-making process to prevent or minimize the inequities
in the allocation of benefits. In reference to the first point, the comments
of Stephen F. Higgins (personal communication 1987), former ATF di-
rector, revealed the importance of keeping score on who is receiving
what type of benefit. When recounting a situation in which he created a
deputy director position in response to internal criticism that law en-
forcement interests were not sufficiently represented at the national head-
quarters level, Higgins commented that he wanted law enforcement
 Sum m ary 155

personnel to “feel like part of the game” so that they could help “sell the
agency’s programs.” He went on to say: “You must strike a balance
when making decisions. You must first do what is right. You must also
make sure that the goodies are spread around.”
By creating a deputy director of law enforcement, Higgins responded
to demands for the sharing of power as a means of securing support
from those who advocated a stronger role for law enforcement within
the agency. If this is indeed the case, Higgins used informal cooptation
as a strategy for building and maintaining support among the law en-
forcement faction. Higgins’s comments are also interesting in that they
reflect an explicit concern for how the agency’s benefits are allocated.
The phrases “ strike a balance” and “ spread the goodies around” can be
interpreted to mean that Higgins was interested in ensuring that sup-
porters of the law enforcement function received an equitable share of
benefits allocated through the policy-making structure.
Norman Carlson (personal communication October 3, 1986), former
director of the Federal Bureau of Prisons, made a similar point when
discussing the agency’s annual awards program. Carlson mentioned the
importance of what he termed the “equitable distribution of awards.”
He indicated that although the equitable distribution of awards was not
an explicitly stated criterion for selecting award recipients, the awards
committee was encouraged to consider gender, race, geographical re-
gion, tenure, occupational group (line vs. staff), and so forth.
The conservator can exercise control over the decision-making pro-
cess as a means of ensuring that coopted groups receive an equitable
share of benefits. For example, control may be instituted by influencing
the criteria on which decisions are based (see Pfeffer 1981). In the above
discussion concerning the selection of award recipients, Carlson exer-
cised control over the decision-making process by influencing the crite-
ria on which awards were made; he encouraged the selection committee
to consider gender, race, geographical region, tenure, and occupational
group when making award selections.

Summary

Building and maintaining support for an agency’s programs and activi-

ties are critical leadership functions that warrant the administrative
conservator’s undivided focus. The administrative conservator should
give special attention to preserving both external and internal support.
 156 C onserving Support

In conserving external support, the administrative conservator should

concentrate on maintaining a favorable public image as well as sustain-
ing strength with key constituents. The maintenance of a favorable pub-
lic image requires that the administrative conservator ensure that the
agency sustains a reputation for consistent compliance with standards
used to measure the intrinsic quality of its product, services, and activi-
ties. The conservator should also ensure that indirect indexes of quality
included in official documents remain accurate and meaningful. As a
mean of sustaining strength with the agency’s key constituents, the ad-
ministrative conservator should provide inducements and related rewards
in exchange for support. These inducements and rewards should be ap-
propriate agency benefits, services, and favors.
In an effort to build and maintain internal support, the administrative
conservator should “bind parochial group egotism to larger loyalties
and aspirations” (Selznick 1957, 93-94). This essentially means that the
conservator should sustain commitment among internal interest groups
to core agency values. Cooptation is an effective strategy for this pur-
pose. The effectiveness of cooptation, however, is contingent on the suc-
cessful integration of coopted groups into the policy-determining
structure. Successful integration is measured by the degree to which
adopted groups perceive that they are periodic recipients of benefits
allocated through the policy-determining structure. The administrative
conservator should ensure that coopted groups receive an equitable share
of benefits. This is achieved, in part, by keeping score on the quantity
and quality of benefits received by the various internal interest groups
as well as exercising control over the decision-making process.

Notes
1. The term “ support” is used in the manner advocated by David Easton (1965).
Easton suggests that support consists of two forms: overt and covert. Overt support
is defined as favorable actions taken on behalf of a person, group, or institution.
Overt support consists of externally observable behaviors. In contrast, covert sup-
port involves favorable attitudes or sentiments toward a person, group, or institu-
tion. Easton says that covert support is a “ frame of mind” that involves a “readiness
to act on behalf of someone or something.” Such support is an “internal form of
behavior” (159-160).
2. Francis E. Rourke (1969, chap. 2) also notes the symbiotic relationship be-
tween support generated by administrative agencies and power.
3. Perrow uses the term “ indexes” as opposed to “indices.” To avoid confusion,
I use Perrow’s term.
 Summ ary 157

4. The Radford Army Ammunition Plant case discussed in chapter 3 provides a

textbook example. The number of work-hours without lost-time injury proved to be
an inaccurate indirect index, thereby adversely affecting the plant’s public image.
5. Theoretically speaking, public information activities are designed to inform
salient publics about an agency’s activities. In contrast, public relations activities
are initiated solely to sell and promote an agency’s programs. For a discussion of
this point, see F.E. Rourke (1961, chap. 8).
6. From “Officials Seize Midland Store,” April 13, 1988, Odessa American,
13A. Reprinted by permission of The Odessa American.
7. Other governmental agencies that submitted official letters of support on
behalf of ATF include the Arizona State Department of Liquor, Licenses, and Con-
trol; Florida State Department of Business Regulation; New Jersey Division of Taxa-
tion; New York Office of Taxation and Finance; Comptroller of the State Treasury,
State of Maryland; and the Texas Alcohol Beverage Commission.
8. The term “sanctioning” as used here refers to authoritative approval and should
not be confused with coercive measures employed to punish a party, as in interna-
tional law.
9. The videotaped beating of motorist Rodney King, an African American, by
Los Angeles police officers in 1991 merely reinforces this perception. The trial,
subsequent acquittal, and rioting in Los Angeles received major news coverage dur-
ing 1992.
10. The work of Pfeffer (1981) is a notable exception. There are at least two
reasons that organization theorists have not paid much attention to cooptation within
the organization. First, Selznick (1949), the person perhaps most responsible for
popularizing the term “cooptation,” places an emphasis on the external environ-
ment. Although Selznick was concerned with the external environment, he does
recognize the value of cooptation within the organization as indicated by this pas-
sage from his previously cited article, “Foundations of the Theory of Organiza-
tion” (1948): “ The representation of interest through administrative constituen-
cies is a typical example o f this process. Or, within an organization individuals
upon which the group is dependent for funds or other resources may insist upon
and receive a share in the determination of policy” (35). Second, the influential
work of Thompson (1967) has deflected attention from cooptation within the or-
ganization. Thompson discusses cooptation exclusively from an external environ-
ment perspective. He contends that cooptation is a cooperative strategy for man-
aging dependency in the task environment. Many organization theorists have not
deviated from this tradition.
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 6

The Administrator as C onservator

THE FEAR OF A powerful bureaucracy controlled by a cadre of non-

elected and unresponsive civil servants is a matter that should concern
all who embrace democratic values. The unfortunate legacy of J. Edgar
Hoover and Robert Moses, among others, provides a constant reminder
of what can happen when bureaucratic leaders accumulate enormous
power and then use such power to dominate those inside and outside
their respective organizations (see Lewis 1980). But the actions of a
small handful of powerful executives should not preclude an apprecia-
tion of the importance and value of bureaucratic leaders. Contrary to the
views held by many scholars, bureaucratic leaders do not pose a threat
to democracy. When guided by constitutional principles, they help main-
tain stability of the American regime by preserving the integrity of pub-
lic bureaucracies and, in turn, constitutional processes, values, and beliefs.
Viewed from this perspective, bureaucratic leaders are administrative
conservators, and they are actively engaged in a special type of leader-
ship called administrative conservatorship.
Throughout this book, I have emphasized that administrative con-
servatorship is a form of statesmanship. It requires professional ex-
pertise, political skill, and a sophisticated understanding of what it
means to be an active participant in governance. The conservator not
only should be responsive to the various constitutional masters but
also must preserve the executive and nonexecutive authority invested
in public bureaucracies, maintain commitment among the executive
cadre to core agency values, and sustain support among key external
constituents and internal interest groups. Given the complexity and
159
160 The A dm inistrator as C o n se rv ato r

scope of these requirements, more intellectual resources should be de-

voted to trying to understand bureaucratic leadership instead of pre-
tending that it does not or should not exist. We as a nation can no longer
afford to remain complacent about the role and function of bureaucratic
leaders in our democratic government.

The Janus-Faced Nature of Conservatorship

Nothing would be more gratifying than to authoritatively state that the

ideas and concepts discussed here are immune from distortion. Unfor-
tunately, I cannot make this claim. The potential exists that some indi-
viduals, in the name of maintaining stability of the American regime,
will use the power, authority, and resources of public bureaucracies for
purposes other than the common good. At one extreme, administrative
conservatorship may be reduced to merely administrative conservership,
as bureaucratic leaders ignore the expressed desires of the citizenry and
other democratic institutions and processes to maximize their personal
power and position. At the other extreme, stability of the regime may be
used by public entrepreneurs to justify the dismantling of public bu-
reaucracies in their misconceived quest to “reinvent government” (see
Osborne and Gaebler 1992; see also critique by Goodsell 1993). Al-
though both the conserver and the entrepreneur pose a serious threat to
democratic government, they are not the primary concern. Of special
concern are the potential abuses of those who march under the banner of
administrative conservatorship.
Similar to other models of administrative leadership, administrative
conservatorship is Janus-faced.1 One face reflects a virtuous civil ser-
vant who is a friend of the Republic and a guardian of the public good.
The other face is frightening. It reflects a civil servant who is a notori-
ously dangerous individual whose intentions and actions are antithetical
to democracy. This side of conservatorship emerges when prescriptions
outlined in preceding chapters are distorted and abused. Although it is
virtually impossible to anticipate or predict all the potential abuses, I
can, however, speculate on a few.

The Abuse o f Executive and Nonexecutive Authority

In chapter 3, I noted that the administrative conservator is responsible

for preserving both the executive and the nonexecutive authority vested
 The janus-Faced N ature of C on servatorship 161

in public bureaucracies to conserve the mission. Executive authority

involves the right and power to issue commands and to perform certain
acts in a specified realm, whereas nonexecutive authority “does not in-
volve any right to command or to act on or for another” (DeGeorge
1985, 22). Nonexecutive authority is derived from superior knowledge
and competence in a particular field or realm.
With respect to executive authority, I suggested that the administra-
tive conservator should be sensitive to the limits placed on such author-
ity because flagrant violations of these limits could undermine the
agency’s authority. Two violations in particular merit attention: viola-
tions of the spirit of the law and violations of the letter of the law. Viola-
tions of the spirit of the law occur when an agency’s activities are
unacceptable to its employees and other external stakeholders because
they are perceived as inconsistent with its reason for existence; when
administrative executives and other agency officials are overly zealous
in carrying out statutory provisions; and when officials are unenergetic,
inattentive, or negligent in carrying out legally mandated responsibili-
ties. Violations of the letter of the law arise when officials of public
bureaucracies disregard the primary, ordinary, and plain meaning of the
language used in statutory mandates and in other legally binding acts
that specify an agency’s field of action, the purpose of its activity, and
the type of tasks it is designated to perform.
Because coercive power often accompanies executive authority, one
need not be very creative to envision how bureaucratic leaders might
abuse such authority. Indeed, the potential or actual misuse of an agency’s
executive authority partially explains the ambivalence many Americans
feel toward bureaucratic power. The disgraceful and gestapo-like ac-
tions of the U.S. Postal Inspection Service, for example, have done little
to allay such fears. The U.S. Postal Inspection Service became the focus
of a congressional investigation when it was disclosed that the agency
had botched a drug sting operation.2 Inspectors Tim Marshall and Daniel
Kuack directed a year-long investigation that was supposed to identify
and prosecute Postal Service employees in the Cleveland (Ohio) area
involved in the illegal distribution of controlled substances. Marshall
and Kuack used five informants (most of whom had criminal records)
to purchase drugs primarily from Postal Service employees. The sting
operation backfired when it was discovered that the Postal Inspection
Service itself had become the victim of a scam orchestrated by its own
informants. The informants organized phony drug deals, fabricated audio
162 The A dm inistrator as C o n serv ato r

recordings of drug transactions, and pocketed over $200,000 in wages

and funds used to purchase narcotics. By the completion of the opera-
tion, the Postal Inspection Service had ruined the lives of more than
thirty innocent Postal Service employees, all of whom were African
American. The falsely accused postal employees lost their jobs and faced
criminal drug trafficking charges.3
The Postal Inspector Service case illustrates an egregious abuse of an
agency’s executive authority. Some forms of abuse are much more subtle.
Intimidation, for example, refers to unjustifiable actions taken by bu-
reaucratic leaders for the sole purpose of creating fear among those af-
fected by an agency’s activities. Fear is created by implicit or explicit
threats to use an agency’s coercive powers (see Buzan 1983, chaps. 1-3).
For example, officials of the 1RS can engage in intimidation by ordering
an audit of an individual’s or a company’s tax records without sufficient
justification. The threat of fines or imprisonment is enough to create
fear in most persons, even when we have faithfully complied with fed-
eral tax laws. Administrative officials of a local or state health depart-
ment can engage in intimidation by consistently ordering unannounced
inspections of a particular eating establishment for reasons other than
those related to public health and safety. The threat of closing the estab-
lishment, with the resulting loss of revenue, creates fear in any business
owner. Administrative officials of the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission can intimidate investment firms by frequently ordering a re-
view of transactions by stockbrokers (without ample justification) under
the pretext of ensuring compliance with federal laws that prevent fraudu-
lent sales practices.
The potential abuse of an agency’s nonexecutive authority also de-
serves serious consideration. The discussion in this book of nonexecutive
authority focused on epistemic authority. Epistemic authority (a spe-
cific form of nonexecutive authority) is legitimate if what an adminis-
trative executive says is believed and, therefore, accepted by those for
whom he or she is an authority. The statements of bureaucratic leaders
are believed and accepted because it is assumed that they have superior
knowledge and competence in a particular field and that they are telling
the truth. As with all types of authority, epistemic authority is limited.
Violation of these limits can undermine an official’s epistemic authority
and adversely affect the agency’s credibility. Violations are readily ap-
parent when there are sufficient reasons not to believe what is said by
bureaucratic leaders because of a loss of confidence and trust. Thus,
 The Janus-Faced N ature of C on servatorship 163

violations of an agency’s epistemic authority consist of those infrac-

tions that undermine the public’s trust in the agency’s capacity to serve
the common good. Two types of violations are deliberate deception and
the use of epistemic authority for personal benefit. Deliberate deception
involves conscious actions taken by administrative officials to mislead
legislative, executive, and judicial bodies, as well as the general public.
For example, Lieutenant Colonel Oliver L. North engaged in deliberate
deception when he misled Congress about the Reagan administration’s
secret arms transactions with the government of Iran. David M. Hartnett,
Edward D. Conroy, Phillip Chojnacki, and Charles Sarabyn, ATF offi-
cials responsible for the ill-fated raid on the Branch Davidian compound,
deliberately deceived Stephen Higgins (the agency’s director), investi-
gators, and the American public (Department of the Treasury 1993).
The other improper use of epistemic authority involves a bureaucratic
leader’s abuse of specialized knowledge and competence (acquired
largely as a result of or directly related to his or her formal position) for
personal gain. As the case involving Lance Wilson (the HUD official
accused of questionable conduct) illustrates, abuses of epistemic au-
thority can create a credibility problem for public bureaucracies in gen-
eral (Kuntz 1989).
Although the bureaucratic leader’s abuse of epistemic authority does
not involve the exercise of an agency’s coercive powers, the damage of
such abuse to the public good should not be underestimated. For ex-
ample, if an official of the FDA deliberately deceived the public by fab-
ricating, falsifying, or disregarding test results concerning the safety of
a drug to ensure its approval, the public’s health and safety are placed in
jeopardy. If it were discovered that the same administrative official had
financial interests in the pharmaceutical company authorized to distrib-
ute the drug once approved, the public trust and confidence in the agency
would be severely shaken. This would no doubt undermine the FDA’s
integrity and, thereby, adversely affect the agency’s capacity to act.

Misplaced Priorities: Personal Loyalty Versus

Institutional Fidelity

In chapter 4, I argued that the executive cadre performs an important

role in conserving the core values of public bureaucracies. Because of
its value protection role, I suggested that the administrative conservator
should concentrate on building and maintaining a viable executive cadre.
164 The Adm inistrator as C o n serv ato r

This entails sustaining commitment among the executive cadre to core

agency values as well as ensuring that the cadre is appropriately com-
posed in terms of skills and perspectives. To maintain commitment among
the executive cadre, the administrative conservator should use induce-
ments and related incentives in conjunction with persuasion, taking into
consideration individual differences as well as prevailing organizational
circumstances. Because inducements and incentives alone are insuffi-
cient to sustain commitment among the executive cadre, the administra-
tive conservator should rely on persuasion as well.
The administrative conservator should also seek to minimize dissen-
sion within the executive cadre. Dissension within the executive cadre
destroys commitment to larger agency goals and values. Thus, the con-
servator should be aware of and devise strategies to address two sources
of dissension: unhealthy competition among cadre members and loss of
faith in the agency’s abilities to perform its function.
I also suggested that the conservator should constantly work to build
and maintain trust among members of the executive cadre. Strategies
useful for such purposes include honoring formal and informal commit-
ments with cadre members, fighting for issues that are important to cadre
members, and supporting decisions and actions of cadre members when
they have acted appropriately.
Last, I noted that the administrative conservator should pay close
attention to the cadre’s demographic composition to ensure that it is
well suited for preserving the integrity of public bureaucracies. The ex-
ecutive cadre’s demographic composition has an effect on the willing-
ness of cadre members to cooperate. The suitability of the cadre’s
demographic composition is influenced by several factors, including
the agency’s field of action, core technology, stage of historical devel-
opment, and level of administrative action.
The opportunity to build and maintain a viable executive cadre can
be undermined if bureaucratic leaders are solely driven by narrow self-
interests. It is possible that the bureaucratic leader may confuse per-
sonal loyalty with fidelity to the agency and its core values. Of course,
administrative executives should expect a degree of loyalty from mem-
bers of the executive cadre. Chester I. Barnard (1938) makes this clear
when he states that loyalty is an “essential condition of organization”
and without it, “there can be no sustained personal effort as a contribu-
tion to cooperate” (84). But loyalty to the bureaucratic leader (or politi-
cal executive, for that matter) should not take precedence over or become
 The Janus-Faced N ature of C onservatorship 165

confused with fidelity to the agency, its values, and its unifying prin-
ciples. In other words, excessive demands for personal loyalty are dan-
gerous when such demands serve to undermine the integrity of public
bureaucracies.
The tension between loyalty to the bureaucratic leader and fidelity to
the agency is visibly manifested in cases involving whistle-blowers (see
C. Peters and Branch 1972). Those who decide to go public with infor-
mation alleging questionable or illegal activities involving their superi-
ors are often confronted with a dilemma: Should they remain so-called
loyal team players and ignore irregularities, or should they expose ques-
tionable acts of superiors to preserve the agency’s integrity? On one
hand, the answer to this question appears relatively straightforward.
Selznick (1992) certainly seems to think so.

In a (rational-legal) bureaucracy fidelity runs to the institution, not to the

leader. Indeed it is useful to distinguish “ fidelity” from “ loyalty.” Fidelity
suggests a broad context o f ideals and responsibilities; loyalty is more
narrowly focused allegiance. The two ideas converge when loyalty m oves
from mindless to principled particu larism , that is, from uncritical support
o f a group or leader to appreciation o f the moral prem ises that justify or
reinforce allegiance. . . . The norm o f institutional fidelity governs the
place o f disobedience in official conduct. Directives from above are prop-
erly resisted if they offend the morality o f the institution, and every bu-
reaucratic official has some responsibility for interpreting that morality.
It does not follow, however, that disobedience is ju stified by a personal
policy agenda. Fidelity has to do with the premises o f official conduct,
not with parochial interests or individual preferences.4 (2 8 3 -2 8 4 ; italics
in original)

On the other hand, things are a bit more complex. Because whistle-
blowers publicly report questionable acts of their superiors, they are
vulnerable to acts of retaliation. Examples of retaliatory acts include
denial of promotions and of pay increases, harassment through the reas-
signment to less desirable positions, ostracism, and extensive criticism
for being “disloyal.” It is safe to say that bureaucratic leaders who de-
mand excessive personal loyalty are more likely than not to resort to
retaliation. This possibility exists whether one blows the whistle or not.
Bureaucratic leaders who fit the above description are not adminis-
trative conservators. They bear scrutiny and cannot be expected or trusted
to function as guardians of the broader public interest.
 166 The Adm inistrator as C o n servator

The Interests of a Powerful Few and Tokenism

As pointed out in chapter 5, the administrative conservator should build

and maintain support for the agency’s program and activities. This sup-
port is essential if public bureaucracies are to accomplish their legally
mandated functions. I suggested that the administrative conservator
should concentrate on preserving both external and internal support. To
sustain external support, the administrative conservator should main-
tain the agency’s favorable public image and sustain strength among
key external constituencies. The maintenance of a favorable public im-
age requires that the administrative conservator protect the agency’s repu-
tation for consistent compliance with standards used to measure the
intrinsic quality of its products or services. It also requires that the ad-
ministrative conservator ensure that indirect indexes of quality included
in official documents remain accurate and meaningful.
I also noted that the administrative conservator should maintain sup-
portive relationships among an alliance of individuals, groups, and or-
ganizations who willingly take action on behalf of the agency. To maintain
a strong alliance of supporters, the administrative conservator should
offer supporters inducements and related rewards in exchange for sup-
port. Inducements and rewards available to the administrative conser-
vator include appropriate agency services, benefits, and favors.
The discussion of preserving internal support concentrated on build-
ing and maintaining commitment among internal interest groups to core
agency values. I suggested that informal cooptation is a useful strategy
that can be used by the administrative conservator for such purposes.
Informal cooptation involves the incorporation of new elements into the
policy-determining structure as a means of “meeting the pressures of
specific individuals or interest groups which are in a position to enforce
demands” (Selznick 1948, 34-35). The effectiveness of informal co-
optation is contingent, to a large extent, on the successful integration of
coopted groups into the policy-making structure.
The efforts of administrative executives to maintain both external
and internal support can go awry. It becomes readily apparent that bu-
reaucratic leaders may, to ensure external support for their agency’s ac-
tivities, cater to the interests and desires of a powerful few while ignoring
the broader public interest. Scholars of public administration and politi-
cal science have long been concerned about this problem— for good
reasons. The danger is indeed real, as Nick Kotz (1969) illustrates in his
 The Janus-Faced N ature of C on servatorship 167

discussion of Congressman Jamie Whitten and the power he wielded over

officials in the U.S. Department of Agriculture during the administration
of President Lyndon B. Johnson. Kotz describes how both political and
career officials abandoned national public policy initiatives designed to
fight hunger in rural America to maintain Whitten’s support.

From Freeman [the Secretary o f Agriculture] on down, every Agriculture

Department official knew that hunger spelled “ hound d og” to Jam ie
Whitten. (In Southern country jargon, a “ hound dog” is alw ays hanging
around, useless, waiting to be thrown scraps.) Years before, the chairman
[Whitten] had killed a sm all pilot project to teach Southern N egroes how
to drive tractors. “ Now that’s a hound dog project, and I don’t want to see
any more o f them.” W hitten’s opposition to any program resem bling so -
cial welfare— or aid to N egroes— contributed to the failure o f War on
Poverty program s for rural America. When President Johnson signed an
executive order, giving the A griculture Department responsibility for
coordinating the rural war on poverty, Secretary Freeman created a Rural
Community Development Service (R C D S) to give the Department a fo-
cal point for helping the poor. . . . Within a year, the Rural Community
Developm ent Service was dead. “ Whitten thought the Service sm acked
o f social experimentation and civil rights,” a Department o f Agriculture
official said. (124)

Whitten, the so-called permanent secretary of agriculture, chaired the

appropriations subcommittee that funded every item in the Department
of Agriculture’s budget. This alone makes it easy to understand why
agriculture officials wanted and, indeed, needed Whitten’s support. But
by catering to Congressman Whitten’s personal desires and prejudices
in exchange for his support, Department of Agriculture officials ignored
and undermined the broader public interest. I doubt that many public-
spirited individuals would disagree with the assertion that the elimina-
tion of hunger among the rural poor, regardless of their race, creed, or
color, is the broader public interest.
Strategies intended to build and maintain internal support are also
subject to abuse by administrative executives. The strategy of informal
cooptation is certainly no exception. As indicated earlier, the effective-
ness of informal cooptation is contingent on the extent to which coopted
groups are successfully integrated into the policy-determining structure.
Successful integration occurs when coopted groups perceive that their
demands are given serious consideration as evidenced by receiving an
168 The A dm inistrator as C o n serv ato r

equitable share of benefits allocated through the policy-determining struc-

ture. When this does not happen, integration failures occur. Integration
failures may be a result of intended or unintended actions taken by ad-
ministrative executives. Regardless of the reason, the results are the same:
Integration failures undermine the effectiveness of informal cooptation
because such failures create a perception of tokenism. Although minori-
ties and women have received the most attention from researchers inter-
ested in the question of tokenism, these groups do not hold exclusive
rights to the concept. Token status may be bestowed on any group, re-
gardless of its social composition. If coopted groups perceive that they
are merely afforded token status, they are likely to take action to restrict
the available modes of administrative action. Coopted groups are cer-
tainly in a position to do so, as Thompson (1967) points out: “ Coopting
is a more constraining form of cooperation . . . for the extent that
cooptation is effective it places an element of the environment in a posi-
tion to raise questions and perhaps exert influence on other aspects of
the organization” (35).

The Leadership of Public Bureaucracies

The abuses discussed above (as well as others not mentioned) are no
doubt troublesome. They indicate how bureaucratic leaders, guided
by the theory of administrative conservatorship, can resort to behav-
iors and actions that pose a threat to the public good. But no model
of administrative leadership is perfect; it is virtually impossible to
ensure that all career civil servants will always act with the public
good in mind. Nevertheless, we Americans should not throw our hands
up in despair. Our political system has several built-in safeguards
that protect the citizenry from widespread abuses emanating from
the actions of administrative agencies. These safeguards, or instru-
ments of administrative accountability, include control by political
institutions (legislative, executive, and judicial); normative restraints;
pressure group activity; and scrutiny by the press.5 Although schol-
ars point out the inherent limitations of each method, collectively
these instruments of accountability seem to work quite well (B.G.
Peters 1989; see also J.P. Burke 1986). Administrative agencies in
the United States are “ more open and responsive than their counter-
parts in other countries and perhaps more so than other American
political institutions” (Cook 1992, 425).
 The Leadership of Public Bureaucracies 169

I began this book by arguing that the subject of bureaucratic leader-

ship has not received the scholarly attention it deserves. This lack of
interest is somewhat ironic, especially when the skills and professional
expertise of career civil servants are needed more than ever. Political
leaders cannot and should not be expected to solve alone the complex
problems facing our Republic. Indeed, this is too much to ask of any one
person or institution: In a free society, the responsibility must be shared
by all citizens. Bureaucratic leaders have much to offer, and political
leaders can benefit from their assistance, counsel, and advice.
It is time to put leadership back into the administration of public
bureaucracies. The theory of administrative conservatorship is a modest
step in this direction. I have offered a set of lenses that will enable a better
appraisal and prescription for leadership in the administrative state. This
set of lenses provides vivid images of leadership based on authority con-
ceived as the “capacity for reasoned elaboration” grounded in the values
of our constitutional order, images of bureaucratic leaders faithfully ful-
filling their oath to uphold the Constitution, images of bureaucratic lead-
ers leading in the same vein advocated by Aristotle and Plato as they seek
to maintain stability of the polis, images of bureaucratic leaders who are
active participants in governance, and images of bureaucratic leaders who
are responsive to the various constitutional masters.
Administrative conservatorship is not a risk-free enterprise because
preserving the integrity of public bureaucracies and, in turn, our consti-
tutional processes is filled with risk. Nor is it leadership guided by fear
of change and innovation. Rather, administrative conservatorship is
statesmanship guided by a moral commitment to preserve the constitu-
tional balance of power in support of individual rights. Bureaucratic
leaders are protectors of our Republic and democratic way of life. They
are administrative conservators, a distinction and vocation worthy of
honor and respect.

Notes
1. According to The Compact Oxford English Dictionary (1991), Janus is the
“name of an ancient Italian deity, regarded as the doorkeeper of heaven and guard-
ian of doors and gates, and as presiding over the entrance upon or beginning of
things; represented with a face in the front and another on the back of the head”
(890). The term “Janus-faced” often means duplicitous or two-faced.
2. The botched undercover operation was given extensive coverage during 1993
in The Plain Dealer, a Cleveland (Ohio) newspaper. A series of articles written by
Ulysses Torassa (1993a, 1993b), a staff reporter for the newspaper, outline in detail
170 The A dm inistrator as C on serv ato r

how the Postal Inspection Service’s sting operation backfired. Torassa also provides
an account of the congressional hearings chaired by Congressman William Clay (D-
Missouri).
3. Marshall and Kuack claimed that they had been misled by their informants,
but it was later determined in court that the inspectors had lied to local prosecutors
about aspects of the undercover operation. Marshall and Kuack were eventually
fired and the chief of the Cleveland Division of the Inspection Service was trans-
ferred to another position with significantly reduced managerial and supervisory
responsibilities. In addition, the House Post Office Committee, the congressional
committee that oversees the U.S. Postal Service operations, widened its probe be-
cause of accusations that race played a significant role in the botched sting opera-
tion. The charges against the Postal Service employees were dismissed; most em-
ployees were reinstated with back pay, were reimbursed for legal expenses, and
received a letter of apology. In a public statement on the scandal, Ira T. Carle, in-
spector in charge of the Cleveland office, said: “We apologize for the pain and in-
dignity that was brought to these employees and their families. . .. We realize that
financial compensation alone cannot fully erase the stigma of being falsely accused
of these crimes” (Torassa 1993b, A l; see also Torassa 1993a).
4. From The Moral Commonwealth: Social Theory and the Promise o f Commu-
nity, by P. Selznick, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992), 283-284. Copy-
right © 1992 by University of California Press. Reprinted by permission granted by
the Regents of the University of California and the University of California Press.
5. B. Guy Peters (1989) uses these broad categories to classify the various in-
struments of control.
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 Index

A Agriculture Department (continued)

demographic com position o f
Accountability, 168 agencies, 127-128
A dam s, B ., 6 Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearm s
Adam s, Paul A ., 102 (ATF), Bureau of
Adaptive changes, 60 cooptation strategy in, 154-155
Adjudication, agency, 8 8 -9 0 deliberate deception in, 125, 163
Administrative conservatorship, 30 dissension within, 112-115
abuses of, 160-168 executive cadre support in, 123-126
administrative elites and, 2 7 -2 8 external alliances of, 148-150
defined, 2 4 -25 Altheide, D., 97, 142
functions of, 6 2 -6 4 Ancona, D., 108
growth and, 34-35 Andrews, K., 67
heroic leader concept and, 39-43 Anti-Federalists, 17, 22
institution vs. organization, 2 5 -2 6 Appelby, Paul, 12, 29
as statesmanship, 2 8 -2 9 , 159 ATF. See Alcohol, Tobacco and
See also Institutional integrity; Firearm s, Bureau o f
M ission; Support strategies; Authoritarianism, 101
Value system Authority
Adm inistrative conserver, D ow ns’ competence, 7 5 -7 6 , 94-9 5
concept of, 38 -3 9 conceptual framework for, 7 2 -7 6
Adm inistrative disinvestment, delegation of, 7 0 -7 2
116-117 epistem ic, 7 5 -7 6 , 94 -9 5
Adm inistrative elites, 2 7 -2 8 violations of, 95 -1 0 4 , 162-163
Adm inistrative Procedures Act o f executive. See L egal mandate
1946, 82, 90 reason and, 7 3 -7 4
Agency theory, 7 0 -7 2 Autonomy
Agriculture Department elite, 4 4 -45
abuse o f support strategies, institutional, 45^46, 4 7 -5 3 , 93
166-168 Aviation Safety Research Act o f
Cooperative Extension Service, 1988, 8 1 -82, 84
7 7 -7 8 , 93 Awards, 147, 155

187
188 Index

B Bureaucratic leadership
theories o f (continued)
Bacon, Francis, 60-61 constitutive, 19-21
Bantel, K ., 126 hierarchical approach to, 12-14
Barnard, Chester I., 26, 33, 61, 64, neglect of, 4 -5 , 169
109-111, 127, 164 pluralist approach to, 14-16
B a ss, B., 39 See also Adm inistrative
B ayles, M .D ., 70 conservatorship
Belief, concept of, 9 5 -9 6 Bureau o f M unicipal Research, 11
Bennis, W., 39, 67, 107 Burke, Edmund, 24, 34, 35, 36, 42
Berger, P., 85 Burke, J.P., 15, 168
Blumenthal, M ichael, 40 Bush, George H.W., 147
Blumenthal, W. M ichael, 146 B u siness enterprise model, 8 -1 0
B ob Jones University case, 85-86,
88 C
Bower, J., 62
Bowsher, Charles A., 9 8 -9 9 Carlson, Norman, 155
Branch Davidian raid, 123-126, 163 Carnevale, D .G ., 119
Branch, T., 165 Caruana, A., 138
Brest, P., 68 Changes
Britton, P., 119 frame-bending/breaking, 59
Bromley, D., 138 incremental (zero-change), 60
Buchanan, Jam es, 37 Chapman, J.W., 72
Budget and Accounting Act o f Chase, Alston, 92
1 9 2 1 ,9 8 Chojnacki, Phillip, 124, 163
Budget cutbacks, equity vs. Coercion, 110, 111, 161
efficiency-based strategies in, Commitment strategies
117-118 cooptation, 151-155, 166
Bureaucratic leadership dissension m inimization, 115-118,
accountability of, 168 164
culture and, 107-108 inducements and persuasion,
expansion of, 5 109-112, 164
fear of, 5 -7 selective recruitment as, 126-131,
function of, 24 164
heroic conception of, 3 9 ^ 3 trust-building, 119-126, 164
initiating role, 5 8 -5 9 , 61 Com mittee on Adm inistrative
Progressive bias against, 7, 10-11 M anagem ent, 12
protecting role, 5 9 -6 2 Com petence authority, 7 5 -7 6 ,
reform of, 3 -4 9 4 -9 5
in stability/instability conditions, C ongressional Record, 84
6 1 -6 2 C ongressional Source Book, 98
theories o f Conroy, Edward D., 124, 163
business enterprise model, 8 -1 0 Conservative theory, bias against,
constitutional, 16-19, 21-23 3 5 -3 9
 Index 189

Conservatorship. See Administrative Dem ocracy (continued)

conservatorship institutional autonomy and,
Constitution 4 7 -4 8
administrative efficiency and, 16-19 Devanna, M .A ., 39, 67
checking o f power and, 21-2 3 Developm ent and Readiness
institutional autonomy and, 4 8 -4 9 Com mand (D A R C O M ), 99
originalism , 68 D iM aggio, P.J., 26, 139
Cook, Brian J., 16, 19-21, 23, 168 Disinvestment, administrative,
Cooperative Extension Service, 116-117
77 -7 8 , 93 D ism issal, fear of, 111
Cooptation strategy D issension, within executive cadre,
abuses of, 167-168 112-118, 164
formal, 152 Distinctive competence, 26 -2 7 ,
informal, 152-155, 166 43
Corcoran Gallery, 52 D obel, J. Patrick, 57, 141
Covitz, Carl, 104 D oig, Jam eson, 4, 40-41
Credibility gap, 96 D onaldson, L ., 71
Crenson, M .A ., 5 D owns, Anthony, 25, 36, 38
Cromwell, R .E ., 153 Drucker, P , 42, 67
Culbert, Sam uel, 119 Drug Enforcement Administration
Culture. See Value system (D EA ), 148
Cut-back management, 117 Dubail, J., 123
Cuyahoga County Department o f Dubnick, M ., 13
Child and Fam ily Services Dworkin, Gerald, 4 7 -4 8 , 49, 69
(D C F S), 121-123
Cyert, R ., 108 E

D Easton, D avid, 156n.l

Educational strategies, for legal
Dahl, Robert, 15, 56 com pliance, 86-88
D ’Amato, Alphonse, 52 Efficiency-based strategies, in
D ’ Aveni, R ., 108 budget cutbacks, 117-118
Deception, deliberate, 9 6 -1 0 0 , Eisenhardt, K ., 108
125, 163 Elite autonomy theory, 36, 4 4 ^ 5
D efense Appropriations Act o f 1984, Elites
82-83 administrative, 2 7 -2 8
D efense Procurement Fraud Unit, defined, 36
80 -8 1 , 141 isolation of, 44
DeGeorge, Richard T., 70, 72, manipulation o f m asses, 36-37
74-76, 94 Em ployee education, 86-88
D elegated authority, 7 0 -7 2 Environmental Protection Agency
D em ocracy (EPA), 83
administrative conservatorship Epistem ic authority, 7 5 -7 6 , 94-95
and, 159, 160 violations of, 95 -1 0 4 , 162-163
190 Index

Equitable share of benefits, 153, Food and Drug Administration

15 4 ,155 (FD A ), 163
Equity-based strategies, in budget Forced exclusion, 110
cutbacks, 117-118 Frame-bending changes, 59
Eskridge, W.N., Jr., 69, 84 Frame-breaking changes, 59
Excellence theories o f leadership, Freedman, Jam es O., 5
107 Freeman, J.H ., 139
Exclusionary practices, 110, 111 Freemuth, J., 92
Executive cadre Frickey, P.P., 69, 84
demographic com position of, Friedrich, Carl J., 24, 42, 84, 86,
126-131, 164 9 1 ,9 6
dissension within, 112-118, 164 on authority, 7 2 -7 4 , 91
function of, 63 on leadership roles, 5 8 -5 9 , 60
incentives and persuasion for, Friedrich, D.O., 97
109-112, 164 Fritschler, A. L ee, 89
personal loyalty vs. institutional Functions o f the Executive, The
fidelity, 163-165 (Barnard), 109-111
trust relationships with, 119-126,
164 G
viability of, 108-109
Extrinsic quality o f products and General Accounting O ffice (GAO),
services, 136, 137 80, 87, 140, 143
executive cadre com position,
F 129-130
official reports of, 9 8 -9 9
Fairholm, G.W., 119 Georgia Cooperative Extension
Farazm and, A., 6 Service, 105n.6
Federal Aviation Administration Gersick, C., 61
(FAA), 81-82, 139-140 Gillispie, M ., 123
Federal Bureau o f Investigation Gilman, Stuart, 126
(FBI), 29, 93, 101 Goodhand, Judith, 121-123
Federal Bureau o f Prisons, 87, 155 Goodnow, Frank, 12, 17-18
Federalist Papers, 17, 18-19 Gorsuch, Anne M., 83
Federalists, 17, 19-20, 22, 37 Graber, Doris, 39
Federal R eserve Bank, 5 0 -5 1 , 53, 55 Growth, 33, 34-35
Federal Trade Com m ission (FT C ), Gruber, J.E ., 13
89
Fidelity vs. loyalty, 163-165 H
Financial incentives, 111
Finer, Herman, 48, 55, 78, 80, 83 Haber, Sam uel, 10, 11
Fine-tuning changes, 60 Hall, W., 107
Finkelstein, S., 108 Hambrick, D., 108
Fish, Stanley, 69 Hampers, L. Joyce, 148-149
Fish and W ildlife Service, 87, 91 Hannan, M., 139
 Index 191

Hargrove, Erwin, 4, 40-41 Institutional responsiveness, 46,

Hartnett, Daniel, 124 5 3 -5 8
Hartnett, D avid M ., 163 Institutions
Hayak, Friedrich A., 37 defined, 25
H ays, Sam uel P., 9 vs. organizations, 2 5 -2 6
Heclo, H., 28 Interest groups, internal, 151-155
Helm s, Jesse, 52, 54 Internal Revenue Code o f 1954,
Heroic concept o f leadership, 39-43 7 8 -7 9 , 85-86
Hester, F. Eugene, 91 Internal Revenue Service (IR S)
Hierarchical theory o f bureaucratic executive cadre support in, 120
leadership, 12-14 interpretation o f legal mandate,
H iggins, Stephen F., 123-126, 85-86, 88
154-155, 163 modernization of, 139
Higher Education M anagem ent Prohibition Unit of, 112-113
Services, 144-145 violation o f authority, 7 8 -8 0
Hobbes, Thom as, 105 n 4 Intrinsic quality o f products and
Hofstede, G., 107 services, 136, 137-138
Hoover, J. Edgar, 29, 101, 159 Iran-Contra affair, 82, 163
H ousing and Urban Developm ent Irvin, Tommy, 105n.6
(HUD) Department, 102-104,
163 J
Huntington, Sam uel P., 5
Hyneman, Charles, 14, 48, 55 Johnson, J., 97, 142
Jurisdictional boundaries, 9 2 -9 4
I Justice Department, Defense
Procurement Fraud Unit,
lacocca, Lee, 3 9 -4 0 8 0-81, 141
Immediate action principle, 56 Justification o f authority, 74
Incentives, executive, 110-112, 164
Incremental change, 60 K
Indirect indexes o f quality, 137,
142-143 Karl, B.D ., 7, 8
Inducements, 110 K ass, H., 43
Influence peddling, 102, 103-104 Kaufm an, Herbert, 4, 6, 47, 48, 54,
Initiating leadership, 5 8 -5 9 87, 111, 120
Innovations, adoption of, 138-141 K eep Com m ission, 12
Institutional autonomy, 4 5 -4 6 , Kellerman, B ., 5
4 7 -5 3 Kem p, Jack F., 103
Institutional integrity Kerwin, Cornelius M ., 88
autonomy and, 4 4 -5 3 Klein, H., 86
defined, 2 6 -2 7 , 43 Kotter, J., 67
importance o f preservation, 4 3 -4 4 Kotz, Nick, 166-167
leadership roles and, 5 8 -6 2 Kraemer, K .L ., 67
responsiveness and, 46, 5 3 -58 Kramer, R ., 119
192 Index

Kuack, Daniel, 161 M

Kuntz, P., 103, 163
Kurtz, Jerom e, 120 McCarthy, Joseph, 101
M cDonough, John, 119
L M cGow an, C., 49
M cN eil, K., 126
Labor Department, W age and M aistre, Joseph de, 34
Hour D ivision (W HD), M alpractice, 101-102
140 M applethorpe, Robert, 52, 57
Lane, Larry M ., 6, 116 March, J.G ., 35, 58, 64, 153
L avelle, Rita M ., 83 March, S., 108
Leadership. See Administrative M arshall, Tim, 161
conservatorship; Bureaucratic Martin, J., 107
leadership M ason, P., 108
Leadership in Administration M ayo, Elton, 37
(Selznick), 44, 46 Meier, Kenneth J., 5, 6
L egal mandate M eindl, J.R ., 39, 42
com plex nature of, 90 Meyer, J., 26, 86
com pliance with, 8 3 -9 0 M iller, Zell, 105n.6
em ployee education and, M iller v. C aliforn ia, 52
86-88 M ission
interpretation and, 8 3 -86 instrumental view of, 6 7 -7 2
rule-making/adj udication leadership effectiveness and, 62-63
and, 8 8 -9 0 See also Authority; L egal mandate
jurisdictional boundaries of, M oral Commonwealth: Social
9 2 -9 4 Theory and the Prom ise o f
limits on, 7 6 -7 7 Community (Selznick), 45, 46
policy objective shifts, 9 0 -9 2 M organ, D., 43
violation o f letter of, 81-83, M orris, Stanley E., 115, 140-141
161-162 M oses, Robert, 159
violation o f spirit of, 77-81 M otives, inculcation of, 110
“Legitim acy, History and L ogic: Mulcaly, K.V., 57
Public Administration and
the Constitution” (Terry N
and Spicer), 2 1 -2 3 , 37-38
Legitim acy crisis, 9 6 -9 7 Nadler, D .A ., 59, 60
Lei ser son, Avery, 15 Nanus, B ., 67, 107
Levine, Charles, 117 National Aeronautic and Space
Lew is, E., 159 Administration (N A SA ), 95, 121
Life-cycle framework, 133n.l3 National A ssociation o f State Liquor
Long, Norton, 56, 135 Administrators, 149-150
Low i, Theodore, 37, 48, 55 National Endowment for the Arts
Loyalty vs. fidelity, 163-165 (NEA)
Luckmann, T., 85 autonomy of, 5 1 -5 3 , 54-55
 Index 193

National Endowment for the Arts P

(N EA) (continued)
responsiveness of, 5 7 -5 8 Paine Webber, in influence peddling
National A ssociation of scandal, 103-104
M anufacturers, 8-9 Parker, M., 107
National Park Service Parochial group egotism , 151-155
authority of, 7 6 -77 Pennock, J.R ., 72
jurisdictional boundaries of, 94 Perrow, Charles, 2 5 -2 6 , 97, 136
policy objective shifts and, 92 Perry, J.L ., 67
National Sh eriff’s A ssociation Person, H .S., 10
(N SA ), 147, 150-151 Personnel education, 86-88
Nelson, W.E., 5, 9 Persuasion, executive, 110-111,
N onfeasance, 80, 83 164
North, Oliver, 8 2 -83, 163 Peters, B .G ., 168
Peters, C ., 165
O Peters, T., 107
Pfeffer, Jeffrey, 48, 64, 126, 136,
Oakeshott, M ichael, 37 155
Objective inducements, 110 Pierce, Sam uel L ., Jr., 103
Occupational Safety and Health Piotrowski, S., 7
Administration (O SH A ), 80 Platonism, 36
Office o f Human Developm ent Pluralist model o f bureaucratic
Services (O H D S), 82 leadership, 14-16
Oliver, C., 26 Policy objectives, shifts in, 9 0 -9 2
Olsen, Johan P , 35, 58 Politics/administration dichotomy,
Olson, D.H., 153 12-13
Opportunistic strategy, 54 Postal Inspection Service, 161-162
Opportunity, rationalization of, 110 Pound, Edward T., 103-104
O ’Reilly, C .A . Ill, 108, 126, 127 Powell, W.W., 26, 139
Organization, vs. institution, Power outcome, 153
2 5 -2 6 Prestige, organizational, 136
Organizational crisis, executive Prethus, Robert, 38-39
cadre support during, Professional associations, standards
120-126 of, 138
Organization theory Progress, in organization theory, 33,
anticonservative bias of, 35-3 9 35
antitraditionalist leader and, 40 Progressive reform, 7 -1 0
on autonomy, 48 Prohibition Unit, o f Internal
on growth and progress, Revenue Service, 112-113
33-35 Propaganda, bureaucratic, 9 7 -1 0 0 ,
Originalism , 68 142
O ’Toole, Laurence, 7 Proper use o f epistem ic authority,
Ott, J.S ., 107 101
Overfeasance, 82 Protecting leadership, 5 9 -6 0
194 Index

Proxmire, William, 80 S
Public administration
anticonservative bias of, 3 5 -39 Salancik, Gerald, 48, 64, 136
See also Bureaucratic leadership Saltzstein, Grace Hall, 55
Public credit and recognition, Sarabyn, Charles, 124, 163
146-147 Sarat, Austin, 6 9 -7 0
Public im age, 135-143, 166 Schein, E., 86, 127, 151
Public trust, violations of, 9 5 -1 0 4 Schick, A., 141
Punctuated equilibrium, 61 Schumpeter, J., 41
Scientific management, 9, 10-12
R Scott, W.G., 34
Scott, W. Richard, 25, 26, 27, 86
Radford Army Ammunition Plant Schwartz, Nancy L ., 19
(R A A P), 99 -1 0 0 , 157n.4 Securities and Exchange
R az, J., 72 C om m ission, 162
R eason, authority and, 7 3 -7 4 Selective adaptation, 46, 55
Reicher, A., 151 Selznick, Philip, 21, 24, 25, 33, 42,
Reports Issued, 98 4 8 ,5 3 ,5 4 ,5 8 , 60, 6 7 ,7 6 , 111,
“ Representative Function o f 131, 151
Bureaucracy, The: Public on administrator conservator
Administration in a Constitu- functions, 62, 63, 64
tive Perspective” (Cook), autonomy defined by, 50
19-21 autonom y/responsiveness theory
Reputation, 137 of, 4 4 -4 6 , 55
R esource Conservation and on cooptation strategy, 152, 156,
Recovery Act, 83 157n.l0, 166
R esponsiveness, bureaucratic, 46, on distinctive competence,
5 3 -5 8 , 90 -9 2 2 6 -2 7
Rhetorical Presidency, The on executive cadre, 108-109
(Tulis), 20 on fidelity to institution, 165
Rogers, E., 140 on institutional leadership, 30n.l
Rohr, John A., 16-19, 21, 27, 29, Wolin’s critique of, 36-37
47, 49, 56 Separation-of-powers doctrine, 17,
Rom zek, B .S ., 13 19, 20, 47
R oosevelt, Franklin, 12 Serrano, Andres, 52, 57
R oosevelt, Theodore, 11-12 Shapiro, D .L., 88
Rosen, B ., 6 Shoemaker, F.F., 140
Rosenbloom , D., 7 Siedm an, Harold, 127-128
Rost, J., 107 Sim on, H., 64
Rourke, Francis E., 5, 6, 144 Situation, law o f the, 57
Rourke, John T., 130 Sm ith-Lever Act o f 1914, 78
Rowan, B ., 26 Soulcraft, 2 8 -2 9
Rule-m aking, agency, 8 8 -9 0 Specific inducements, 110
 Index 195

Spicer, M ichael W., 16, 2 1 -2 3 , 36, Training School for the Public
3 7 -38 Service, 11
Staats, Elmer, 98, 129, 130 Truman, David, 15, 56
Stability, in organization theory, 34 Trust relationships, with executive
Stallings, J., 119 cadre, 119-126
Standards, compliance with, Tulis, Jeffrey K ., 20
137-141 Tullock, Gordon, 37
Statesm anship, 2 8 -2 9 Tushman, M .L., 58, 59
Stever, J.A ., 7 Tyler, C., 119
Storing, Herbert, 56
Strategic change, 59 U
Strong executive concept, 10, 11
Subordinate-autonomous concept, 49 U .S. M arshals Service (U SM S)
Suchman, M ., 26, 138 external alliances of, 145, 147-148,
Support strategies, 6 3 -6 4 , 135-156 150-151
abuses of, 166-168 indirect indexes of, 142-143
benefits in exchange, 144-151, jurisdictional boundaries of, 93
166 modernization of, 140-141
internal interest groups and,
151-155, 166 V
overt and covert, 156n.l
public im age, 135-143, 166 Value system , 63, 107-133
defined, 108
T shared responsibility for, 107-108
See also Executive cadre
Taft C om m ission on Econom y and Van Maanen, J., 86, 127
Efficiency, 12 Virginia Extension Service, 105n.6
Taylor, Frederick W., 9, 10 Volstead Prohibition Enforcement
Technologies Act o f 1919, 112-113
executive cadre com position and,
128-129 W
modernization of, 138-141
Terry, L .D ., 2 1 -2 3 , 3 7 -3 8 , 78, 84 Wage and Hour D ivision (W HD),
Thompson, Jam es D., 48, 64, 108, 140
126, 130, 131, 154, 157n.l0, Waldo, Dwight, 12
168 Walker, John, 113-114
Tichy, N., 39, 67 Walker, W.E., 130
Token status, 168 Wamsley, Gary L ., 48, 126
Tolbert, P., 26 Weaver, N., 86
To Run a Constitution: The Wechsler, B ., 119
Legitimacy o f the Administrative West, W., 13, 90
State (Rohr), 16-19 Whetten, David A., 34
Training program s, 11, 86-88 W histleblowers, 165
196 Index

White, Jam es Boyd, 69 Wilson, Woodrow, 12, 13, 17-18

White, Leonard D., 12 Wolf, Jam es F., 6, 116
Whitten, Jam ie, 167 Wolin, Sheldon, 36-37
Wiersema, M ., 126 Wood, B . Dan, 56 -5 7
W iggins, Harry, 115
Wildavsky, Aaron, 117, 141 Z
W ilkins, A .L ., 116
Will, George, 2 8 -2 9 Zald, M .M ., 126
Wilson, H., 90 Zaleznick, A., 107
Wilson, Jam es Q., 5, 33, 47, 59, Zero-change, 60
60, 64, 130 Zimmerman, J., 102
Wilson, Lance, 103-104, 163 Zucker, L .G ., 26
 About the Author

Larry D. Terry is Vice President of Academic Affairs and Professor of

Public Administration at The University of Texas at Dallas. He is also
Editor-in-Chief of Public Administration Review and a fellow at the
National Academy of Public Administration. His research interests in-
clude public administration theory, the role of bureaucratic leaders in
governance, the works of Carl J. Friedrich, and statutory interpretation
from the perspective of public administrators.
In addition to his academic career, he has held a variety of adminis-
trative positions at the federal, state, and local levels. He has also served
as a consultant to diverse organizations including the U.S. Department
of the Army, U.S. Forest Service, U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs,
the Ohio Department of Mental Health, and the Communication Work-
ers of America (international headquarters).