Cyber Security and Phisical Security
Cyber Security and Phisical Security
Version 1.0
I
of the primary requirements of a new system. In addition, all participants must
ensure security of any shared data. Finally, the entire supply chain must build
resilience into supply chain systems to minimize impact of both potential
security breaches and system failures for other reasons.
- In the Framework, security measures are shown which are commonly required
for all industries for the next-generation supply chain in “Society5.0” an
industrial society in which cyber space and physical space are highly
integrated. In order to ensure supply chain trustworthiness, security measure
are shown from three viewpoints (“Connections between organizations”,
“Mutual connections between cyberspace and physical space” and “Connections
in cyberspace”).
- Finally new threats will emerge with advances in AI technology in the unified
cyberspace and physical space. The Framework will evolve to manage new
threats, and will be reviewed appropriately.
II
Introduction
1. Society realized by “Society5.0” and “Connected Industries”
Practical uses of networking and IoT (Internet of Things) are advancing now
worldwide, and public and private sectors are beginning cooperation on highly
advanced IT in the field of manufacturing to lead the revolutionary changes
of “The Fourth Industrial Revolution” such as the “Industry 4.0” program in
Germany. In Japan, “The 5th Science and Technology Basic Plan”, approved
in a Cabinet meeting on January 22, 2016, the Government of Japan proposed
a next-generation smart society named “Society5.0” to produce products and
services that satisfy a variety of needs, and which also provides both economic
development and solutions for social challenges, by closely integrating
cyberspace and physical space. Furthermore, we the Ministry of Economy,
Trade and Industry (METI) need to develop a new industrial structure to
realize “Connected Industries”, which creates new added value for
“Society5.0”, focusing on increased and varied connections.
1 The illustration is quoted from the introduction of “Society5.0” by the Cabinet Office.
3
In the information society (Society4.0), sharing necessary knowledge and
information was not enough. It was difficult to create new value, and it was
also difficult and burdensome to find and analyze information in the huge
amounts of data created.
In “Society5.0”, all people and things are connected by IoT, a wide variety of
knowledge and information are shared, and new value is created. Moreover,
“Society5.0” relieves humans from the burdensome work of analyzing huge
amounts of data through the use using Artificial Intelligence (AI).
Furthermore, “Society5.0” is not a society where economic and organizational
systems are prioritized, but is instead a human-centered society in which AI,
robots, etc. will support work formerly done by humans, and provide people
with the goods and services they need, when needed, and as much as needed.
Figure i-2 Illustration of connections between components and data, etc. in Society5.0
4
people who need them when they need them. The starting point of a series of
activities to create added value is not fixed. In the past, suppliers planned
and designed the added value; from now on, there will be an increasing
number of cases where consumers will become the starting point of creating
added value. These activities may change during the process due to the
changes made in the requirements specified when starting the creation of
added value. If more effective data are obtained, the elements will be
incorporated into the new activities.
Supply chains straddle both cyber and physical spaces, and will change into
the creation of added value through various dynamically connected items and
data. In contrast with conventional standard and linear supply chain, these
changed supply chains need to be viewed as the “Society5.0” supply chain,
and existing systems and procedures are to be “value creation process” so that
it is distinguished from the conventional type.
5
important issues.
Threats to the supply chain are already arising as a real-life problem. In fact,
a case was reported in which equipment of a European company was infected
with ransomware. It infiltrated domestic enterprises in Japan via the supply
chain, expanded the infection, and stopped some operations as a result.
Given the situation, the necessity to protect IoT and Industrial Control
Systems (ICS) by supply chain management is becoming widely recognized in
other countries. In the United States, the framework (Cybersecurity
Framework), which provides the perspective of cybersecurity measures
especially for the critical infrastructure developed by NIST 2 in February
2014, was revised in April 2018. In these documents, they added a description
on supply chain risk management and requested to implement preventive
measures to the entire supply chain and to conduct audits as needed.
6
increasing threats.
Under such problem awareness, METI has decided to formulate the
“Cyber/Physical Security Framework,” build a model that appropriately
identifies the risks faced in creating added value in the new industrial society,
identify the risk sources, organize the overview of the required security
measures, and summarize examples of measures which the industrial
community can utilize as their security measures.
The Framework covers the entire model of the new industrial society and
targets all entities that are working to create added value in it.
In the contents of identifying risk sources and security measures, the
following are included;
(1) those applicable to conventional supply chains,
(2) those that need new measures in the new industrial society model,
Security measures can be customized to each enterprise.
In addition, even if a system is not connected to the Internet or other outside
networks, increased integration, convenience, and seamless interoperation
between the components of the system increase the possibility that a small
incident can spread system-wide. The reason is that most systems are
designed for general purpose operation and are not customized for the
increased security required. Therefore, you should recognize that the
electronic equipment and the systems you own can be within the scope of the
Framework, and you should take the necessary security measures for each of
them.
The reader should make use of the Framework and implement necessary
security measures according to the actual requirements of the enterprise etc.
to which the reader belongs.
7
・ Person in charge of security of the enterprises and groups involved in
the value creation process
・ Person in charge of development/quality assurance/design/construction
of information systems and control systems
・ Person in charge of data management
・ Person in charge of standardization of security guideline for industrial
associations
(1) Part I explains the Concept of the Framework , the followings are
specified:
- the model (the three-layer and the six elements) to identify the risk
sources in terms of cybersecurity in the value creation process
- an outline of the risks and risk sources
- approaching the risks to ensure trustworthiness.
(2) Part II uses the model shown in Part I to identify the risk sources and
presents measure requirements for these risk sources. This part clarifies
measure requirements (Policy) that each company or organization should
take.
The above three part structure is also suitable for timely and appropriate
review of necessary revisions. In other words, Part II will be updated in order
to take more new risk sources on the progress of integration between
cyberspace and physical space. Part III will be updated in order to take up
more valid measure instance by the progress of the security measure
8
technology.
In this way, by using the three part structure, the Framework can be updated
with any changes continuously and flexibly.
9
iii. Contribute to international harmonization
In order to ensure that the security measures in Japan for products
and services are accepted by other countries in the global supply
chains, Japanese policymakers and companies should understand
trends in foreign nations and include contents that will ensure
consistency with major standards in the United States and Europe,
including international standards (e.g., ISO/IEC 27001) and the
NIST Cybersecurity Framework, and promote mutual recognition
with the certification systems of each country based on these
standards.
In the Framework, there are correspondence tables between the
Framework and other standards. An enterprise which uses the
correspondence tables can make sure that it satisfies security
requirements of the other standards. A foreign enterprise can show
its sufficient security treatment based on the other standards
through the tables.
10
Through these materials, it is expected that new risk sources will be
identified regarding the following points by comparing with the
conventional perspective of risk assessment.
11
Part I (Concept): Industrial cybersecurity for connected cyber
and physical systems
1. Efforts for “value creation process,” a “Society5.0” supply chain in
an industrial society where cyberspace and physical space are highly
integrated
In the “Society5.0” and “Connected Industries” programs, the increased
connectivity, data creation by IoT devices, and data analysis using AI, will
result in very different supply chain and value creation models from today’s
practices.
In the Framework, a Society5.0 supply chain is defined as a “value creation
process” to distinguish it from the conventional supply chain. The Framework
provides a guide for security measures required by Society5.0 and Connected
Industries extended supply chain models.
In conventional supply chain models, security measures are based on the idea
that security of the entire process is ensured by business dealings with
entities who used proper security—in other words, the conventional idea that
trustworthiness of the supply chain is ensured if the organizational
governance and management of the participating entities is secure and
reliable. When a company entrusts its information processing work to other
company, security measures such as obtaining ISMS certification were
important. The basis for ensuring security was based on the trustworthiness
of the organization’s management.
However, in the value creation process, where cyberspace and physical space
are highly integrated, trustworthiness of the process cannot be assured
simply by the trustworthiness of the participating organizations’
management.
For example, in an integrated cyberspace and physical space, various
information such as environmental information (e.g., temperature, humidity)
and biological information (e.g., body temperature, heart rate) that once
would have been kept in physical space can be digitized and stored in large
quantities in cyberspace. Also unlike the conventional supply chain, trusted
entities are not the only ones involved with this process. To ensure
trustworthiness of the entire process, there is a limit to the approach of
ensuring trustworthiness of the participants.
In order to promote security and ensure trustworthiness in the value creation
12
process, a different approach is required, one which adopts alternate points
of view to ensure security across all the supply chain participants.
Part I shows a model with the points of the value creation process that need
security assurance, and describes policies to deal with risk sources in each of
its elements.
13
each detailed definitions are described in 2.2.
- Organization3
- People
- Components
- Data
- Procedure
- System
The basic structure of the Framework is to identify the risk source of the value
creation process based on the three layers, present security measures for each
risk source based on the six elements, and present specific examples of the
measures.
3 In order to distinguish it from "organization" of general usage, when using the term "organization"
as a unique meaning in this paper, " " is attached.
14
Three-layers Conceptual diagram
Figure 1.2-1 Three layers of the industrial society where value creation processes unwind
15
2.1. Significance of the three-layer approach
As already mentioned, it is no longer sufficient to ensure trust of the value
creation process by ensuring trustworthiness of an organization’s
management. In order to deal with new risks in the value creation process, it
is necessary to introduce additional requirements for trustworthiness. The
three-layer approach described in this section is the Framework approach of
ensuring trustworthiness. Trustworthiness to be verified in each layer is
explained below.
The first layer aims for a level that ensures trustworthiness in the
organization’s management.
This idea has been adopted to achieve security in the supply chain. It is based
on the idea that by confirming the trustworthiness of the enterprise’s
management and allowing only participants whose trustworthiness is
established, security can be ensured.
Certification programs such as ISMS (based on ISO/IEC 27001) center on
ensuring trustworthiness in the company’s management, division
management, and headquarters’ management, and provide a mechanism that
leads to connections between companies with confirmed trustworthiness to
ensure security in the supply chain. Using this approach, security policies are
shared, and the trustworthiness of management is confirmed and certified.
In summary, the first layer aims for a level that organizational management
with shared security policy is certified as a basis for ensuring trust.
However, in an industrial society where cyberspace and physical space are
integrated, it is impossible to ensure trust in the entire value creation process
by only confirming the trustworthiness of the organization’s management. In
the second layer and the third layer of the model, there are introduction of
further types of trustworthiness to ensure trustworthiness of the whole value
creation process.
16
integrated, physical data can be digitized, delivered to cyberspace, processed
and edited, analyzed, and returned to physical space. IoT seeks to connect
everything to the network, and create borders between cyberspace and
physical space. Connections between cyber and physical space are found in
many industrial and social activities.
On the other hand, unreliable interactions between cyberspace and physical
space could cause uncertainty in the entire industrial society. The value
creation process expands over the border of cyberspace and physical space.
Its trustworthiness cannot be ensured if accuracy of transcripted information
over the border cannot also be ensured.
The value creation process goes beyond the border between of the cyberspace
and the physical space. The interaction between the cyberspace and the
physical space, that is, the data exchange between both spaces, is required to
have high accuracy. In other words, the trustworthiness of the value creation
process is not ensured unless the accuracy of transcription and translation is
confirmed.
The second layer is based on the accuracy and trustworthiness of data
transcription and transfer (including accurate translation) between
cyberspace and physical space.
The actual border of cyberspace and physical space is established by the so-
called IoT system, which is made up of elements such as sensors that
transfers physical events (e.g., temperature, humidity and distance) to data,
actuators and controllers. The security of the systems that transfer data on
the border of cyberspace and physical space cannot be ensured by confirming
the trustworthiness of the organization’s management.
To ensure trustworthiness in transcription, in accordance with ISO/IEC
27036, all the elements of the system lifecycle, including construction and
maintenance, must also be trustworthy.
Another point to be understood is that existing systems will be incorporated
into the new frontier between cyberspace and physical space. It is important
to reevaluate the systems’ security and take measures to ensure security of
transcription functions.
17
of new value in cyberspace through exchange, analysis, and editing has
become commonplace.
18
2.2. The six elements
Through the three-layer model, it is necessary to identify the impact of the
threat on the elements that make up the value creation process, and to
identify the risk sources. The elements which make up the value creation
process must be organized to establish a policy for security measures and to
build specific measures.
In this point, it is necessary to understand that elements of the value creation
process should be abstracted because the value creation process is organized
dynamically and flexibly and it is difficult to grasp business assets fixedly.
Element Definition
Companies, groups and organizations that compose value
“Organization”
creation processes
People belonging to organizations. People directly participating
People
into value creation process
Components Hardware, software and parts including operating devices
Information collected in physical space. Edited information
Data
through sharing, analyzing and simulating above information
Procedure Sequences of activities to achieve defined purpose
Mechanisms or infrastructures configured with components for
System
defined purpose
The six elements are established to extract factors from the value creation
process and components of organizations based on the idea of quality control
“4M (Man, Machine, Material and Method)”. As Figure 1.2-3 shows,
organizations provide added values and outputs, as well as waste, through
inputs (material, information, and so on) from other entities. Also, there are
people, physical machines, IT/OT systems, and procedures like standards
included in the value creation process. Each element is produced from outputs
of other organizations as well. The six elements are related to each other in
complex ways. For example, an IT system is an output from a value creation
process composed of computer suppliers, system integrators, etc.
In an example of a value creation process of the manufacturing industry, the
relationship of six elements and three layers is shown in Figure 1.2-4. The
company "organization" on the left inputs "components", processes them, and
19
outputs “components". The company "organization" on the right inputs
"components" output by the company "organization" on the left, adds
processing, and outputs "components" of its own. Within each company
"organization", there are "components" such as processing machines, sensors
and actuators, “systems” such as systems to exchange data with other
organizations, “people” such as people who monitor and control the systems,
"procedures" such as procedures to establish each system activity, and “data”
such as various types of data flowing between the systems.
These are the elements which each organization manages and they make up
the first layer for each of companies. Within the elements of the first layer,
sensors and actuators transcribing between cyber space and physical space,
systems controlling them, and related procedures and data are organized as
the elements of the second layer. Between two organizations, the data
exchanged via the Internet and the related systems, procedures, and data are
organized as the elements of the third layer that connects in cyberspace.
These six elements do not have an exclusive relationship to each other. For
example, “organization” is formed of other elements such as "people",
"system", "procedure", but "organization" also has the meaning of the original
element in the value creation process. “People” is not only an element
contained in "organization", but also the element participating in a value
creation process directly. The trustworthiness of the value creation process is
secured by taking a security measure for the risk sources of six elements in
the value creation process, and in that way the trustworthiness of created
hardware, software, and services is ultimately secured.
20
Figure 1.2-4 Relationship of six elements in the three-layer model
3. Identifying the risk sources in the value creation process and its
policy
The risk sources in the value creation process will be identified and associated
policies will be developed in Part II based on the three-layer model and the
six elements. Part I especially shows that new risk sources appeared in the
value creation process, which are different from conventional supply chains.
In the first layer, management by the enterprise is the basis of
trustworthiness, and security measures are implemented based on the
management of each enterprise. However, as already mentioned, security
measures need to be taken in the second layer and the third layer for the
value creation process that spans both cyber and physical spaces.
The important point in security measures for the second layer is to ensure
correct transcription on the border of cyberspace and physical space. To
ensure trustworthiness of the transcription, any organization which is
directly or indirectly involved in the value creation process must cooperate.
This means that even organizations not directly involved in the value creation
process are required to participate in implementing security measures. A
multi-stakeholder approach is required.
For example, when an enterprise indirectly involved in a value creation
process provides secured products and services to a directly involved
21
enterprise, the trustworthiness of the transcription, which is the basis of
trustworthiness in the second layer, is ensured.
In addition, in the third layer, organizations participating in the value
creation process will use various data in cyberspace. Security of the process
is built on the premises that the data is handled appropriately and
trustworthiness is ensured.
Here also, although not directly involved in the value creation process, an
entity indirectly involved in distributing or handling the data is required to
play a vital role in ensuring security. Efforts on security measures using a
multi-stakeholder approach are necessary.
As an example, for a given data set, the same security measures must be
taken by all participants who handle the data. Security measures for the data
set from the first layer and the second layer will be based on the specific
measure in the third layer which ensures data trustworthiness.
The risk sources are viewed differently in each layer, and the policy for
managing risks also differs.
Taking these into account, the Framework will define and organize areas to
be protected and risk sources in each layer, as well as measures that will be
taken based on individual policies as shown in Figure 1.3-1.
22
4. Concepts of securing trustworthiness based on the Framework
The security of the entire value creation process is ensured by each entity
securing the security of each element that are the basis of trustworthiness
based on the three layers. In order to do so, it is necessary to confirm each
element’s security requirements satisfied (creation of trust), be inquired by
other subject except the subject of confirmation (proof of trust), structure and
maintain a chain of trustworthiness relationships (trustworthy chain) built
up in a chain by repeating creation and proof of trust (see Figure 1.4-2).
Examples of matters that are required to achieve creation of trust, proof of
trust and structuring and maintaining of trustworthy chain, are shown below.
23
・ Detection of/protection against external attacks to the trustworthy
chain.
・ Improvement of resilience against attacks.
The value creation process is dynamic and flexible. An approach that will
ensure security in a multilayered manner is required, such that it will ensure
trustworthiness through the entire value creation process by structuring a
trustworthy chain that can be traced and confirmed to its relationship, not
just verifying trustworthiness of each element.
However, building a value creation chain requires many technical and
system-related tasks, and requires the ongoing cooperation of public and
private sectors. The technical and system-related preparations must include
cybersecurity requirements, and they are described in Part II. Part II should
be improved in the case that new technologies and/or rules would be
introduced.
24
Figure. 1.4-2 Illustration of the relationship among Creation of Trust, Proof of Trust and Structuring
5. Conclusion
The Framework presents security measures common among all industries of
the value creation process in a proposed industrial society, “Society5.0,” where
cyberspace and physical space are highly integrated. However, there are wide
difference of practices and variations of allowable risks between industries,
and even between companies within an industry. Security measures must
take these variations into account.
Therefore, in each industry and each enterprise, please use the Framework
in order to adopt appropriate security measures internally.
Moreover, please use the Framework to identify gaps between existing
security measures and best practices.
25
Part II (Policy): Identification of risk sources and measure
requirements
In Part II, the risk sources for the Society 5.0 value creation process will be
presented. Risks are organized based on the three-layer model that forms the
basis of trustworthiness. Security measure requirements are also presented.
The followings steps are followed when scope, context, criteria, establishing
the contexts, assessing risks, and treating the risks.
26
■ Scope, context and criteria
i. Specifying the target of analysis (1.1)
The value creation process targeted for analysis is specified based on the
three-layer model, and elements in each layer are identified by
implementing this step.
ii. Defining assumed security incident and business damage level (1.2)
Security incidents which have high impact on the organization’s
business are identified, and the business damage level is defined
■ Risk assessment [Risk identification/Risk analysis/Risk evaluation]
iii.Analyzing risks (1.3)
Potential attack scenarios for the security incidents defined in ii. will be
studied, and risks are analyzed in terms of threats and vulnerabilities.
■ Risk treatment
iv. Managing risks (1.4)
Risks are addressed based on the risk analysis results.
5Created with reference to “Security Risk Assessment Guide for Industrial Control Systems 2nd
Edition” published by IPA
27
When implementing security risk management, it is necessary to understand
the concept of security risks shown in Figure 2.1-3. Here, risk is defined as
“the effect of uncertainty on objectives”, and security risk means the effect of
uncertainty regarding security on objectives. A security incident occurs due
to risk sources such as threats and vulnerabilities, and then security risks
become apparent. Therefore, in order to reduce security risks appropriately
and efficiently, it is necessary to appropriately analyze and treat security
incidents to be avoided and risk sources (for example, threats and
vulnerabilities) that may lead to security incidents.
28
iii. Cross-organizational data exchange
iv. Securing the basis of trustworthiness of each layer
(1) Process for identifying the target of analysis based on the three-layer
model
The target of analysis must first be identified when assessing risks.
“Security Risk Assessment Guide for Industrial Control Systems 2nd
Edition” (published by IPA6) prescribes the following for the identification
of the target of analysis.
29
detailed7.
In order to identify the target of analysis for assessing risks, characteristics,
and functions/roles of each layer should be understood. (See Tables 2.1-1,
2.1-2, 2.1-3) The scope of analysis and assets will be organized based on the
approach of accounting for these these functions/roles, and focusing on the
functions performed by each system.
All components to be managed in the enterprise etc. are included in the first
layer. Among them, those having functions of the second layer or/and the
third layer are analyzed as components related to the second layer or/and
the third layer. Note that some components have functions of both the
second layer and the third layer depending on the characteristics of the
system. At the same time, in implementing the risk assessment, it is
appropriate to pay attention to the “zone” where components and systems
are set, and instances where people are required to follow certain
procedures.
When using a cloud service, the resources provided by the service provider
via the network are located in the third layer, but in risk analysis you also
need to consider them as assets in the first layer if necessary, keeping in
mind the service usage form (e.g., SaaS / PaaS / IaaS).
7 When carrying out “identifying the system configuration” and “identifying the data flow”, it is
desirable to refer Section 3.2, 3.3 in “Security Risk Assessment Guide for Industrial Control Systems
2nd Edition” published by IPA.
30
Table 2.1-1 Characteristics, functions/roles, targets of analysis and concrete image of analysis
31
Table 2.1-2 Characteristics, functions/roles, targets of analysis and concrete image of analysis targets
32
Table 2.1-3 Characteristics, functions/roles, targets of analysis and concrete image of analysis targets
33
For example, although a personal computer or a smart meter can be thought
of as a component having both the function of the second layer and the third
layer, it is desirable to assign the components to the second layer, the third
layer or both layers considering the role of the device in the system to be
analyzed.
It is desirable to create a document for the scope of analysis and assets
identified based on the three-layer model and to be able to respond quickly
when changes are made in the structure.
As a model simplifying the above arrangement, Figure 2.1-4 shows
relationship of the target of analysis and assets in the first layer. In the first
layer, these are organized regardless of the value creation process, and
consider only the management of the organization that shares/implements
its security policies.
Figure 2.1-4 Targets of analysis and concrete image of analysis targets in the first layer
Next, Figure 2.1-5 shows the functions/roles and concrete image of analysis
targets in the second layer and the third layer, and Figure 2.1-6 shows a
concrete image of the analysis targets of the value creation process in which
the analysis targets of the first layer are associated with the functions of
the second layer and the third layer.
34
The organization’s assets are positioned in the first layer. However, when
the value creation process develops, not only the security policy of a single
organization but the security of the functions of the second layer
(transcription) and the third layer (data exchange etc.) as shown in Figure
2.1-5 should be ensured so that the trustworthiness is ensured.
It becomes possible to identify the elements related to the second layer and
the third layer in one organization by associating the components arranged
in the first layer with the functions of the second layer and the third layer.
By using this method it is possible to set the basis of trustworthiness of each
layer, and define what security measures should be taken with respect to
each component.
Appendix A gives examples of use case of applying the model shown in
Figure 2.1-6 in typical industrial fields. It is advisable for each organization
to refer to them if necessary when identifying the target of analysis.
Regarding the specification of the detailed system configuration and data
flow, the target of analysis is assumed to differ depending on industries and
enterprises, and it is necessary that each implementing entity should
identify the target of analysis.
Figure 2.1-5 Functions/roles and concrete image of analysis targets in the second layer and the
third layer
35
Figure 2.1-6 Concrete image of analysis targets based on the three-layer model and the six elements
36
providers who store, edit, and analyze the data in the third layer,
IoT device venders, and suppliers of parts of products and services
need to be identified. In addition, important business partners,
including contractors and subcontractors, should also be identified.
37
Figure 2.1-7 Model of security problems affecting safety8
8 Cited from IoT Acceleration Consortium, Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications, Ministry
38
iii. Cross-organizational data exchange
When exchange of data across organizations becomes active, it is
assumed that there is a greater possibility that inappropriate data is
provided to the organization from an unexpected element
(“organization”, person, component, etc.).
In addition, it is assumed that there is a higher chance that data is
provided to or by a third party beyond the organization and within a
limited range.
Therefore, it is necessary to list elements (“organization”, person or
component not belonging to “organization”) that are the source of data
assumed to be used by the organization and classify the list based on
the level such as importance which is determined by the organization
itself.
39
effect on functions” in Table 2.1-4.
The Second • Reading events in physical • Device function stop: operation of IoT
Layer space, translating them into device stops
digital data, and sending the data • Low trustworthiness operation: IoT
to the third layer in accordance device does not operate as intended
established rules
data cyberspace
(leakage/tampering/destruction/unintend
ed stop)
40
intended (malfunction, unintended stop,
etc.)
It is also important to consider each of the four points listed in 1 of this part.
If any of them are not considered sufficiently when identifying risks and, as
a result, protection measures are inadequate, there is a greater possibility of
disruption to the value creation process. The examples shown in Table 2.1-5
illustrate the impact on the organization and other relevant organizations.
Table 2.1-5 Risk when viewpoints that should be considered are unnoticed
Understanding new security Incidents that may affect safety L2_1_a, L2_1_b, L2_1_c,
incidents that may arise from the occur at the point of contact (IoT L2_2_a
device
Understanding the state of data Sensitive data is not properly L3_1_a, L3_1_b, L3_1_c,
9 For example, the security incident L1_3_b indicates the security incident (3) (b) assumed in the first
layer.
41
Table 2.1-6 Security incidents to be assumed in each layer
42
(3) Inaccurate transcription of physical data to cyberspace by IoT device (false measurement)
(a) Data is tampered with in the communication path between the IoT device and
cyberspace
(b) An unauthorized or tampered-with IoT device connects to the network and transmits
incorrect data
(c) An IoT device with low quality is connected to a network, causing failures and/or
transmission of inaccurate data or transmission to unauthorized entity.
(d) Inappropriate measurement occurs due to physical interference with measurement.
43
After the enterprise defines potential security incidents, it should estimate
the business damage resulting from those incidents. One example of an
approach is defined in Section 4.3, “Business damage and the business
damage level” of “Security Risk Assessment Guide for Industrial Control
System 2nd Edition” (IPA, 2018).
By assigning severity scores to the degree of damage for each possible security
incident, appropriately prioritized risk mitigations and security measures can
be realized.
44
Figure 2.1-9 Identification of vulnerabilities in terms of six elements
10 Cited from “Primer of safety & security design in the connected world” (IPA).
11 The types of risk treatment described correspond to the risk treatment options presented in ISO
31000: 2018 as follows.
Risk aversion: Include “avoid the risk”, “remove the source of the risk”.
Risk reduction: Include “change the probabilities”, “modify the consequences”.
Risk transfer: Include “share the risk with others”.
Risk retention: Include “increase the risk in order to pursue an opportunity”, “retain the risk”.
45
Appendix B provides a reference for risk sources corresponding to security
incidents introduced in Table 2.1-6 and action to be taken, especially when
the risk mitigation approach is selected from the above actions. The section
“Measure requirements” is a guideline for implementing security based on
the details of risk (threats and vulnerabilities). Appendix B also provides for
adaption of its guidance to the particular circumstances of the organization.
Since Appendix B matches specific vulnerabilities for each measure
requirement, it can be used as a completeness and quality check for the risk
analysis conducted by the organization.
It is particularly important to define measures for the four points of view
already mentioned in the Framework.
12 With reference to this point, ISO/IEC 27036:2014 and NIST SP 800-161 are formulated as standards
regarding the security measures relevant to the supply chain. In drafting this framework, NIST SP
800-161 is referred to for the identification of risk sources, and ISO/IEC 27036:2014 is referred to for
the description of measure requirements and examples of security measures. Regarding this point, if it
is deemed necessary to implement more enhanced measures, it is possible to refer to NIST SP 800-161
for security controls.
46
Figure 2.1-10 Life cycle in contracting with an individual supplier in ISO/IEC 27036-2:2013
Requirements for security measures in light of the above life cycle are
set out in the measure category “CPS.SC” (supply chain risk
management) described in Part III. Each organization must consider
stakeholder relationship management throughout the process life cycle
for all categories of security measure.
Related measure requirements include CPS.AM-5, CPS.AM-7,
CPS.BE-2, CPS.BE-3, CPS.SC-1, and CPS.SC-2. (Refer to Part III for
details on each measure requirement)
As stated in 1.1, when data inputs are received from cyberspace for
controlling components in physical space, security problems may lead to
safety problems including physical harm. To ensure security and safety
47
on the interface between physical and cyberspace, it is vital to establish,
at the design and procurement stages, a series of procedures to: analyze
safety hazards and the sources of these risks. It is also critical to identify,
based on the analysis, the business and technical processes on which
security has an impact. This enables an organization to take appropriate
courses of action, through the entire supplier lifecycle from planning and
design/procurement through operation/maintenance/disposal, according
to the analysis results.
Ensuring safety has the utmost priority. Hence, it is necessary to
combine measures taken for functional safety with cybersecurity
measures in order to achieve safety. Since consideration of both safety
and security aspects is required, close communication among the
persons in charge of both safety and cybersecurity is essential to take
appropriate actions.
Related measure requirements include CPS.RA-4, CPS.RA-6,
CPS.PT-3, and CPS.CM-3.
Integrated security for safety control has been discussed in recent
years in terms of international standardization. Documents
available for reference regarding this subject include IEC TR 63074
and IEC TR 63069 (cf. Figure 2.1-11).13
13In addition to the IEC standards mentioned above, reference may also be made to ISO TR 22100-4:
2018 (Guidance to machinery manufacturers for consideration of related IT-security (cyber security)
aspects) which deals with machine safety security as well as IEC TR 63074.
48
Figure 2.1-11 Status of discussion about integrated safety and security in the movement toward
international standardization14
14 Created based on “Guide for for considering safety/security requirements for control systems” (IPA)
and “Standard Activities of Functional Safety and Security” (Hiroo Kanamaru, “IPSJ Magazine”,
Vol.58, No.11, Nov.2017).
49
organization to consider the risks of theft and loss when taking security
measures15.
Related measure requirements include CPS.AC-2, CPS.DS-8,
CPS.IP-5, CPS.IP-6, CPS.PT-2, and CPS.CM-2.
15It is advisable to refer to the Main Point 6 in IoT Security Guidelines ver. 1.0 by the IoT Acceleration
Consortium, Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications, and the Ministry of Economy, Trade and
Industry.
50
An entity subject to regular checks and audits should collect the
information that proves their compliance and make it available in
advance or promptly upon request. This applies particularly to business
partners critical to the organization’s business continuity. The
organization should ensure that not only direct contractors, but
subcontractors and any organizations working for them, comply with the
established requirements, thereby developing a chain of trust.
Related measure requirements include CPS.SC-3, CPS.SC-4,
CPS.SC-6 and CPS.SC-8.
The second layer requires that an IoT device’s transcription function be
accurate. To ensure accuracy, it is vital to maintain and enhance the
soundness of security for the IoT device by taking measures throughout
the device life cycle, from the design and procurement stages through
the operation and disposal stages.
The organization should take measures such as adopting security-by-
design at the planning, design and procurement stages, testing security
functions for verification, managing vulnerability when the device is in
operation, and verifying the integrity of the device and software.
In the case of an IoT device that is extremely important to the
organization’s business continuity, security requirements for the
transcription functions should be in the agreement so that the
organization can check if these requirements are accurately met
throughout the series of processes performed by the contractor, or
subcontractors, or any organizations working for them (e.g., production,
transportation).
Security practice for IoT devices has some important differences from
security for traditional IT systems.16 Though it is essential to require
adequate security functions during procurement based on the principle
of Security by Design, alternative measures on the part of the system
should be considered if they are not available. In Appendix C, several
security measure requirements such as CPS.IP-10, CPS.CM-3, CPS.CM-
16 For example, Draft NISTIR 8228 suggests that, in order to implement security protection of IoT
devices in terms of device security, data security and privacy, the characteristics specific to IoT devices,
unlike traditional IT devices, should be considered with regard to the measures such as asset
management, vulnerability management, access management, incident detection, data flow
management.
51
6 describe the process of securing IoT devices. The organization should
refer to these items when considering security measures for IoT devices.
Related security measure requirements include CPS.RA-4, CPS.RA-
6, CPS.DS-10, CPS.DS-12, CPS.DS-15, CPS.CM-6 and CPS.CM-7.
The third layer requires that data in cyberspace and its processing,
analysis, and storage be reliable.
To ensure trustworthiness, it is essential that the data is reliable, in
addition to the important points in the first layer and the second layer
stated above. Specifically, the data should be checked to determine
whether it has been falsified, is in the acceptable range (e.g., the data
is free from attack code), and it has been generated by and sent from
authorized elements (e.g., “organization”, people, components).
Data that is particularly important to the organization’s business
continuity should be checked for trustworthiness by the entity that has
created and processed the data. Data sent to the organization should
be quality and security checked when received (e.g., checking the data
for falsification or attack code). The organization must also monitor
security compliance of data processing and analysis components and
systems.
Related measure requirements include CPS.DS-9, CPS.DS-14,
CPS.AE-1, CPS.CM-3, CPS.CM-4 and CPS.CM-5.
Table 2.1-7 An example of measure requirements corresponding to the points of view considered in
CPS.CO-1
52
2. Relationship between risk sources and measure requirements
Appendix B, as Table 2.2-1 below shows, lists the functions, assumed security
incidents, the risk sources (threats and vulnerability) and measure
requirements in each layer.
All of the - DoS attacks on - DoS attack on L3_3_b_ORG [Organization] Identify, prioritize, and evaluate CPS.SC-2
following computer computing - The organization does not the organizations and people that
functions; equipment and devices such as confirm the trustworthiness play important role relevant in
securely send devices (e.g., communication such as data providers or structure to sustaining the
and receive data servers) that devices, etc. data operation of the organization.
securely process system jamming waves before and after signing external organizations, check if
The system that - Services L3_3_c_SYS [System] Secure sufficient resources (Ex: CPS.DS-6
handles data provided by a - A system that contains IoT People, Components, System)
stops whether it system with low devices does not have for components and systems,
has been quality/trustworth adequate resources (i.e., and protect assets property to
capacity)
The column “Function” shows the functions of each layer summarized in Table
2.1-1, 2.1-2, 2.1-3 of 1.1 in Part II.
53
The column “Assumed Security Incident” shows incidents attributable mainly
to security issues. These incidents may damage the layer’s functions stated
in the left column, and are summarized in Table 2-1.6 of 1.1. The security
incident stated may be caused by the “threat” and/or “vulnerability” shown in
the “Risk Source” columns. An enterprise needs to manage any “risk source”
that may have a severe impact. The requirements for security measures for
the risk management action are included as “Measure Requirements.”
Instances of vulnerability and measure requirements are given unique
identifiers (Measure Requirement ID). They are available for reference in
Part III and Appendix C, which provides examples of detailed measures.
Simple as they may be, the above descriptions follow the form of risk
assessment so that enterprise can refer to them while they manage risks.
54
Part III (Method): Security measures – requirements and
examples
1. Risk management using security measure requirements and
examples of security measures
Using the analysis process for the identification of risks and security needs
built in Part II, Part III and Appendix C show security measure requirements,
examples of security measures corresponding to the measur requirements
and the relationship with other international standards.
Part III and Appendix C are guides to the risk response phase of the risk
management process. An enterprise can use the contents in this part for the
following purposes:
For (i), Appendix C classifies security measures into three levels: High-
Advanced/Advanced/Basic. Several factors dictate the classification,
including scope of the measure (e.g., implementation only within the
organization, or involving other relevant organizations), costs, and
domestic/international standards. The enterprise can use these factors and
classifications when deciding on the level of security measures to be
implemented.
The security measures described in Appendix C are just examples. They do
not exclude other security methods, nor are they absolute requirements for
all organizations. It is always necessary for any organization to make its
own determination of appropriate security measures based on risk
assessment and analysis.
For (ii), Part III and Appendix C include points of alignment between the
55
measure requirements and major international standards. Especially,
Appendix C organizes the comparison with the measure items of NIST
SP800-171, NIST SP800-53 Rev.4, ISO/IEC 27001:2013 and IEC 62443
according to the level of examples of security measures. In addition,
Appendix D organizes the correspondence relationship with the measure
requiements that the Framework presents based on major international
standards etc. in a table format. Implementation of the Framework is
intended to help the organization simultaneously comply with these
standards without requiring additional actions.
56
Table 3.2-1 Example of description in Appendix C
<H-Advanced>
○ ○
<Advanced>
○ ○ ○
<Basic>
○ ○
Table 3.2-2 Example of importance and evaluation criteria for classifying information asset based
17 In particular, with regard to industrial control systems, in addition to the effects that are generally
assumed in information systems in “Value” or “Evaluation criteria”, the effects on safety, environment,
and health are also desired to be considered.
57
1 There is a significant impact on the organization’s business if leaked.
0 There is almost no impact on the organization’s business even if leaked.
The law requires appropriate management (leakage, loss or damage
prevention).
2
There is a serious impact on the organization or a significant impact on
business partners and customers if it is tampered with.
Integrity
There is a significant impact on the organization’s business if it is
1
tampered with.
There is almost no impact on the organization’s business even if it is
0
tampered with.
There is a serious impact on the organization or a significant impact on
2
business partners and customers if it becomes unavailable.
There is a significant impact on the organization’s business if it becomes
Availability 1
unavailable.
There is almost no impact on the organization’s business even if it
0
becomes unavailable.
18 The notation is in accordance with “NIST SP 800-53 Rev.5 (DRAFT) APPENDIX D”.
58
“Examples of Security Measures” should be used for the implementation of
proper measures that take into account costs in each enterprise as well as for
comparisons with relevant international standards.
Table 3.3-1 List of measure requirement categories and related category of NIST Cybersecurity
Supply Chain Risk Management CPS.SC ID.SC (Supply Chain Risk Management)
59
RS.RP (Response Planning)
Response Planning CPS.RP
RC.RP (Recovery Planning)
RS.CO (Communications)
Communications CPS.CO
RC.CO (Communications)
RS.IM (Improvements)
Improvements CPS.IM
RC.IM (Improvements)
19 When using cloud services, it is desirable to also refer to the controls of ISO/IEC 27001: 2013 Annex
A that are mentioned in “Informative references.” and the items of ISO/IEC 27017: 2015 that correspond.
60
Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) and IPA “Cybersecurity
Management Guidelines Ver. 2.0”
IoT Acceleration Consortium, Ministry of Internal Affairs and
Communications, METI “IoT Security Guidelines Ver. 1.0”
Relating
ID Measure requirement Informative references
vulnerability ID
CPS.AM-1 Document and manage L1_1_a_COM, NIST Cybersecurity Framework Ver.1.1 ID.AM-1,
supply chain.
components depending on
61
store components for a certain
period of time.
CPS.AM-4 Create and manage appropriately L1_3_b_ORG, NIST Cybersecurity Framework Ver.1.1 ID.AM-3
CPS.AM-5 Create and manage appropriately a L1_1_a_COM, NIST Cybersecurity Framework Ver.1.1 ID.AM-4
where the organization’s assets are L1_1_c_COM, COBIT 5 APO02.02, APO10.04, DSS01.02
CPS.AM-6 Classify and prioritize resources L1_1_a_ORG, NIST Cybersecurity Framework Ver.1.1 ID.AM-5
to those resources in business NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 CP-2, RA-2, SA-14, SC-
CPS.AM-7 Define roles and responsibilities for L1_3_b_ORG, NIST Cybersecurity Framework Ver.1.1 ID.AM-6
parties. DSS06.03
62
3.2. CPS.BE – Business Environment
Understand and prioritize the mission, goals, stakeholders, and activities of
the organization. This information is used to convey cyber security roles,
responsibilities and risk management decisions.
Relating
ID Measure requirement Informative references
vulnerability ID
CPS.BE-1 Identify and share the role of the L1_3_b_ORG, NIST Cybersecurity Framework Ver.1.1 ID.BE-1,
CPS.BE-2 Define policies and standard L1_1_a_ORG, NIST Cybersecurity Framework Ver.1.1 ID.BE-3
are consistent with the high-priority L1_1_c_ORG ISA 62443-2-1:2009 4.2.2.1, 4.2.3.6
organization, and share them with NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 PM-11, SA-14
providers).
CPS.BE-3 Identify the dependency between L1_3_b_ORG, NIST Cybersecurity Framework Ver.1.1 ID.BE-4
the organization and other relevant L1_3_c_ORG COBIT 5 APO10.01, BAI04.02, BAI09.02
parties and the important functions ISO/IEC 27001:2013 A.11.2.2, A.11.2.3, A.12.1.3
of each in the course of running the NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 CP-8, PE-9, PE-11, PM-
operation. 8, SA-14
63
3.3. CPS.GV – Governance
Understand policies, procedures and processes for managing and monitoring
compliance with regulations, laws, risks, internal policies, and operational
requirements for the organization, and communicate them to cybersecurity
risk managers.
Table 3.3-4 Measure requirements in CPS.GV
Relating
ID Measure requirement Informative references
vulnerability ID
CPS.GV-1 Develop security policies, define L1_1_a_PRO, NIST Cybersecurity Framework Ver.1.1 ID.GV-1,
A.15.1.1
CPS.GV-2 Formulate internal rules L1_2_a_ORG, NIST Cybersecurity Framework Ver.1.1 ID.GV-3
laws, including the Act on the L1_2_a_SYS, COBIT 5 BAI02.01, MEA03.01, MEA03.04
well as industry guidelines, and NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 -1 controls from all
industry guidelines.
CPS.GV-3 Understand the level of data L1_1_a_SYS, NIST Cybersecurity Framework Ver.1.1 ID.GV-3
64
arrangements regarding handling L1_1_b_SYS, ISA 62443-2-1:2009 4.3.4.4.6, 4.4.3.7
CPS.GV-4 Develop a strategy and secure L1_1_a_PRO, NIST Cybersecurity Framework Ver.1.1 ID.GV-4
9, PM-10, PM-11
65
3.4. CPS.RA – Risk Assessment
The enterprise understands the cyber security risks to its own operations
(including mission, function, image, and reputation), assets, and individuals.
Relating
ID Measure requirement Informative references
vulnerability ID
CPS.RA-1 Identify the vulnerability of the L1_1_a_SYS, NIST Cybersecurity Framework Ver.1.1 ID.RA-1
4.2.3.12
CPS.RA-2 The security management team L1_1_a_SYS, NIST Cybersecurity Framework Ver.1.1 ID.RA-2,
internal and external sources L3_1_a_SYS, ISA 62443-2-1:2009 4.2.3, 4.2.3.9, 4.2.3.12
measures.
CPS.RA-3 Identify and document the L1_1_a_SYS, NIST Cybersecurity Framework Ver.1.1 ID.RA-3
66
NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 RA-3, SI-5, PM-12, PM-
16
CPS.RA-4 - Conduct risk assessments L1_1_a_SYS, NIST Cybersecurity Framework Ver.1.1 ID.RA-4,
applicable to the components for L2_1_a_PRO, ISA 62443-2-1:2009 4.2.3, 4.2.3.9, 4.2.3.11,
unacceptable known security NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 RA-2, RA-3, SA-14, PM-
devices.
CPS.RA-5 Consider threats, vulnerability, L1_1_a_SYS, NIST Cybersecurity Framework Ver.1.1 ID.RA-5
CPS.RA-6 - On the basis of the results of the L1_1_a_SYS, NIST Cybersecurity Framework Ver.1.1 ID.RA-6,
outcome from the scope and L2_2_a_SYS NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 PM-4, PM-9
security risks and the associated IoT Security Guidelines Key Concept 10, 12
67
the planning and design phase of
68
3.5. CPS.RM – Risk Management Strategy
Set priority, constraint, and risk tolerance assumptions for the organization
and use it to judge investment risk.
Relating
ID Measure requirement Informative references
vulnerability ID
CPS.RM-1 Confirm the implementation L1_1_a_PRO, NIST Cybersecurity Framework Ver.1.1 ID.RM-1
parties.
CPS.RM-2 Determine the organization’s risk L1_1_a_ORG, NIST Cybersecurity Framework Ver.1.1 ID.RM-2,
11
69
3.6. CPS.SC – Supply Chain Risk Management
Establish enterprise priorities, constraints, risk tolerances, and assumptions
and use them to assist in analysis of supply chain risk management.
Establish and implement the process of identifying, evaluating and managing
supply chain risks.
Relating
ID Measure requirement Informative references
vulnerability ID
CPS.SC-1 Formulate the standard of L1_1_a_ORG, NIST Cybersecurity Framework Ver.1.1 ID.SC-1
the business life cycle, and agree APO12.05, APO13.02, BAI01.03, BAI02.03,
CPS.SC-2 Identify, prioritize, and evaluate L1_1_a_ORG, NIST Cybersecurity Framework Ver.1.1 ID.SC-2
the organizations and people that L1_1_b_ORG, COBIT 5 APO10.01, APO10.02, APO10.04,
play important role in each layer L1_1_c_ORG, APO10.05, APO12.01, APO12.02, APO12.03,
CPS.SC-3 When signing contracts with L1_1_a_PRO, NIST Cybersecurity Framework Ver.1.1 ID.SC-3
properly comply with the security L2_3_c_ORG, ISO/IEC 27001:2013 A.15.1.1, A.15.1.2
70
requirements defined by the L3_1_b_ORG, NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 SA-9, SA-11, SA-12,
the objectives of such contracts L3_1_c_ORG, CC v3.1 Release5 Part 2 FCS, FDP, FIA, FMT
and results of risk management. L3_1_c_DAT, IoT Security Guidelines Key Concept 5, 11
L3_3_d_ORG,
L3_3_a_ORG,.
L3_3_b_ORG,
L3_3_c_ORG,
L3_4_a_DAT,
L3_4_b_DAT
CPS.SC-4 When signing contracts with L1_1_a_PRO, ISA 62443-2-1:2009 4.3.2.6.4, 4.3.2.6.7
products and services provided L1_1_c_PRO, CC v3.1 Release5 Part 2 FIA, FDP
management. L2_3_c_ORG,
L2_3_c_PRO,
L2_3_d_ORG,
L3_1_b_ORG,
L3_3_a_ORG,
L3_3_b_ORG,
L3_3_c_ORG,
L3_3_d_ORG
organization.
CPS.SC-6 Conduct regular assessments L1_1_a_DAT, NIST Cybersecurity Framework Ver.1.1 ID.SC-4
71
other checks of relevant parties L1_1_b_PRO, COBIT 5 APO10.01, APO10.03, APO10.04,
L3_1_c_ORG,
L3_1_c_DAT,
L3_3_a_ORG,.
L3_3_b_ORG,
L3_3_c_ORG,
L3_3_d_ORG,
L3_4_a_DAT,
L3_4_b_DAT
L2_3_c_PRO,
L3_1_b_ORG,
L3_1_c_ORG,
L3_3_a_ORG,
L3_3_b_ORG,
L3_3_c_ORG,
L3_3_d_ORG
CPS.SC-8 Collect and securely store data L1_1_d_ORG, COBIT 5 APO10.01, APO10.03, APO10.04,
72
L3_3_b_ORG, NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 AU-2, AU-6, AU-12, AU-
L3_3_d_ORG,
CPS.SC-9 Prepare and test a procedure for L1_3_b_PEO NIST Cybersecurity Framework Ver.1.1 ID.SC-5
7.3, SR 7.4
of support)
73
3.7. CPS.AC – Identity Management, Authentication and Access Control
Limiting logical and physical access to assets and related zone to approved
“organization”, people, goods and procedures and manage them to limit the
risk of unauthorized access and to ensure only approved activities and
transactions are accessible.
Relating
ID Measure requirement Informative references
vulnerability ID
CPS.AC-1 Establish and implement L1_1_a_COM, NIST Cybersecurity Framework Ver.1.1 PR.AC-1
10, IA-11
CPS.AC-2 Implement appropriate physical L1_1_a_SYS, NIST Cybersecurity Framework Ver.1.1 PR.AC-2
locking and limiting access to the L2_3_b_PEO, ISA 62443-2-1:2009 4.3.3.3.2, 4.3.3.3.8
areas where the IoT devices and L2_3_b_SYS, ISO/IEC 27001:2013 A.11.1.1, A.11.1.2, A.11.1.3,
servers are installed, using L2_3_c_SYS, A.11.1.4, A.11.1.5, A.11.1.6, A.11.2.3 1, A.11.2.3,
biometric authentication, L3_1_a_SYS NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 PE-2, PE-3, PE-4, PE-5,
and inspecting belongings and CC v3.1 Release5 Part 2 FIA, FMT, FDP
CPS.AC-3 Properly authorize wireless L2_3_c_SYS, NIST Cybersecurity Framework Ver.1.1 PR.AC-3
74
ISA 62443-3-3:2013 SR 1.1, SR 1.2, SR 1.6, SR
1.13, SR 2.6
A.13.1.1, A.13.2.1
AC-20, SC-15
16
CPS.AC-4 Prevent unauthorized log-in to L2_1_b_SYS, NIST Cybersecurity Framework Ver.1.1 PR.AC-3
20, SC-15
CPS.AC-5 Segregate duties and areas of L1_1_a_SYS, NIST Cybersecurity Framework Ver.1.1 PR.AC-4
responsibility properly (e.g. L1_1_b_SYS, CIS CSC 3, 5, 12, 14, 15, 16, 18
CPS.AC-6 Adopt high confidence methods L1_1_a_SYS, NIST Cybersecurity Framework Ver.1.1 PR.AC-
75
appropriate based on risk (e.g. L1_1_b_SYS, CIS CSC 3, 5, 14, 15, 16
combining more than two types L3_1_a_SYS ISA 62443-2-1:2009 4.3.3.7.3, 4.3.3.7.4
in to the system over the network ISO/IEC 27001:2013 A.6.1.2, A.9.1.2, A.9.2.3,
CPS.AC-7 Develop a policy about L2_1_b_SYS, NIST Cybersecurity Framework Ver.1.1 PR.AC-
incorporates IoT devices vs. NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 AC-4, AC-10, SC-7
organization).
CPS.AC-8 Restrict communications by IoT L2_1_b_SYS, NIST Cybersecurity Framework Ver.1.1 PR.AC-6
procedures. 4.3.3.7.4
PE-2, PS-3
76
Cybersecurity Management Guidelines Item 5
CPS.AC-9 Authenticate and authorize L1_1_a_SYS, NIST Cybersecurity Framework Ver.1.1 PR.AC-7
77
3.8. CPS.AT – Awareness and Training
Implement cybersecurity awareness education and training to internal
organization staff and partners to ensure fulfillment of contractual
obligations, based on relevant policies, procedures and contracts.
Table 3.3-9 Measure requirements in CPS.AT
Relating
ID Measure requirement Informative references
vulnerability ID
CPS.AT-1 Provide appropriate training and L1_1_a_PEO, NIST Cybersecurity Framework Ver.1.1 PR.AT-1,
record so that they can fulfill L1_1_d_PEO, ISA 62443-2-1:2009 4.3.2.4.1, 4.3.2.4.2,
severity of security incidents. L1_3_c_PEO, NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 AT-1, AT-2, AT-3, AT-4
CPS.AT-2 Provide appropriate training and L1_3_a_DAT NIST Cybersecurity Framework Ver.1.1 PR.AT-3,
manage the record of such NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 AT-4, PS-7, SA-9, SA-16
and other relevant parties of high L1_3_a_PEO, NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 AT-1
L3_3_a_PEO,
78
L3_4_a_PEO,
L3_4_b_PEO
79
3.9. CPS.DS – Data Security
Manage information according to the organization's risk strategy, using the
core security principles of confidentiality, integrity and availability of data.
Relating
ID Measure requirement Informative references
vulnerability ID
CPS.DS-2 Encrypt information with an L1_1_a_DAT, NIST Cybersecurity Framework Ver.1.1 PR.DS-1
CPS.DS-3 Encrypt the communication L1_1_a_SYS, NIST Cybersecurity Framework Ver.1.1 PR.DS-2
between IoT devices and servers L3_1_a_DAT, COBIT 5 APO01.06, DSS05.02, DSS06.06
CPS.DS-4 Encrypt information itself when L1_1_a_DAT, NIST Cybersecurity Framework Ver.1.1 PR.DS-2
80
L3_2_b_DAT, 4.2, SR 4.3
CPS.DS-6 Secure sufficient resources (e.g., L1_1_c_SYS, NIST Cybersecurity Framework Ver.1.1 PR.DS-4
cyberattack (e.g., DoS attack). NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 AC-4, AC-5, AC-6, PE-
CPS.DS-7 Carry out periodic quality checks, L1_1_c_SYS, NIST Cybersecurity Framework Ver.1.1 PR.DS-4
work, and update software for IoT NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 AC-4, AC-5, AC-6, PE-
devices, communication devices, 19, PS-3, PS-6, SC-7, SC-8, SC-13, SC-31, SI-4
CPS.DS-8 When handling information to be L1_1_d_COM, NIST Cybersecurity Framework Ver.1.1 PR.DS-5
81
CC v3.1 Release5 Part 2 FCS, FPT
CPS.DS-9 Properly control outbound L1_1_a_DAT, NIST Cybersecurity Framework Ver.1.1 PR.DS-5
A.13.2.1
CPS.DS-10 Conduct integrity checks of L2_3_b_SYS NIST Cybersecurity Framework Ver.1.1 PR.DS-6
CPS.DS-11 Perform integrity checking on L1_1_b_DAT, NIST Cybersecurity Framework Ver.1.1 PR.DS-6
3.8
82
CPS.DS-12 Introduce an integrity check L1_1_d_PRO, NIST Cybersecurity Framework Ver.1.1 PR.DS-8
CPS.DS-13 Confirm that IoT devices and L1_1_d_PRO, CC v3.1 Release5 Part 2 FIA, FDP, FCS
CPS.DS-14 Maintain, update, and manage L3_4_a_PRO, ISO/IEC 27001:2013 A.18.1.3, A.18.1.4
protection.
83
3.10. CPS.IP – Information Protection Processes and Procedures
Maintain security policies, processes, procedures, and use them to manage
system and asset protection (dealing with objectives, scope, roles,
responsibilities, management commitments, coordination among
organizations).
Table 3.3-11 Measure requirements in CPS.IP
Relating
ID Measure requirement Informative references
vulnerability ID
CPS.IP-1 Introduce and implement the L1_1_a_SYS, NIST Cybersecurity Framework Ver.1.1 PR.IP-1,
CPS.IP-2 Restrict the software to be added L1_1_a_SYS, NIST Cybersecurity Framework Ver.1.1 PR.IP-1
CPS.IP-3 Introduce the system L1_1_a_ORG, NIST Cybersecurity Framework Ver.1.1 PR.IP-2
BAI03.03
84
L2_1_d_SYS, ISA 62443-2-1:2009 4.3.4.3.3
A.14.2.5
CPS.IP-4 Perform a periodic system L1_3_a_DAT, NIST Cybersecurity Framework Ver.1.1 ID.BE-5,
A.17.1.3, A.18.1.3
FPT_TST
CPS.IP-5 Implement physical measures L1_1_a_SYS, NIST Cybersecurity Framework Ver.1.1 ID.BE-5,
to follow the policies and rules ISO/IEC 27001:2013 A.11.1.4, A.11.2.1, A.11.2.2,
environment, including the IoT NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 PE-10, PE-12, PE-13,
CPS.IP-6 When disposing of an IoT device L2_3_b_DAT NIST Cybersecurity Framework Ver.1.1 PR.DS-
85
private key and digital certificate), A.11.2.7
FPT
CPS.IP-7 Assess the lessons learned from L1_1_a_PRO, NIST Cybersecurity Framework Ver.1.1 PR.IP-7
internal and external attacks, and ISO/IEC 27001:2013 A.16.1.6, Clause 9, Clause
protecting the assets. NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 CA-2, CA-7, CP-2, IR-8,
PL-2, PM-6
CPS.IP-8 Share information regarding the L2_1_a_ORG NIST Cybersecurity Framework Ver.1.1 PR.IP-8
CPS.IP-9 Include items concerning security L1_1_a_PEO, NIST Cybersecurity Framework Ver.1.1 PR.IP-11
86
vulnerability of the components L3_1_a_SYS, CIS CSC 4, 18, 20
87
3.11. CPS.MA – Maintenance
Maintain and repair components of industrial control systems and
information systems according to policies and procedures.
Relating
ID Measure requirement Informative references
vulnerability ID
CPS.MA-1 - Discuss the method of L1_1_a_SYS, NIST Cybersecurity Framework Ver.1.1 PR.MA-1
apply those security updates with L3_3_a_SYS ISO/IEC 27001:2013 A.11.1.2, A.11.2.4, A.11.2.5,
timely manner while recording NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 MA-2, MA-3, MA-5, MA-
the history. 6
applicable.
CPS.MA-2 Conduct remote maintenance of L1_1_a_SYS, NIST Cybersecurity Framework Ver.1.1 PR.MA-2
88
3.12. CPS.PT – Protective Technology
Based on relevant policies, procedures, contracts, manage technical solutions
to ensure security and resilience of systems and assets, safety.
Relating
ID Measure requirement Informative references
vulnerability ID
CPS.PT-1 Determine and document the L1_1_a_SYS, NIST Cybersecurity Framework Ver.1.1 PR.PT-1
SR 2.11, SR 2.12
CPS.PT-2 Minimize funcions of IoT devices L1_1_a_SYS, NIST Cybersecurity Framework Ver.1.1 PR.PT-2,
network ports, USBs, and serial L2_1_b_COM, COBIT 5 DSS05.02, DSS05.05, DSS05.06,
89
NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 AC-3, CM-7, MP-2, MP-
CPS.PT-3 Introduce IoT devices that L2_2_a_ORG NIST Cybersecurity Framework Ver.1.1 PR.PT-5
90
3.13. CPS.AE – Anomalies and Events
Detect anomaly and understand the possible impact of the event.
Relating
ID Measure requirement Informative references
vulnerability ID
CPS.AE-1 Establish and implement the L1_1_a_COM, NIST Cybersecurity Framework Ver.1.1 DE.AE-1
people, goods, and systems. L1_3_c_ORG, NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 AC-4, CA-3, CM-2, SI-4
L3_3_a_SYS,
L3_3_d_SYS,
CPS.AE-2 Appoint a chief security officer, L1_3_a_ORG NIST Cybersecurity Framework Ver.1.1 DE.AE-2
CPS.AE-3 Identify the security events L1_1_b_SYS NIST Cybersecurity Framework Ver.1.1 DE.AE-
threat information obtained from NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 AU-6, CA-7, IR-4, IR-5,
CPS.AE-4 Identify the impact of security L1_3_b_PRO NIST Cybersecurity Framework Ver.1.1 DE.AE-4
91
ISO/IEC 27001:2013 A.6.1.4, A.16.1.4
CPS.AE-5 Specify the criteria to determine L1_3_a_PRO NIST Cybersecurity Framework Ver.1.1 DE.AE-5
92
3.14. CPS.CM – Security Continuous Monitoring
Detect security events and monitor systems and assets to verify the
effectiveness of protection measures.
Relating
ID Measure requirement Informative references
vulnerability ID
CPS.CM-1 Conduct network and access L1_1_a_SYS, NIST Cybersecurity Framework Ver.1.1 DE.CM-1
monitoring and control at the L1_1_c_SYS, CIS CSC 1, 7, 8, 12, 13, 15, 16
CPS.CM-2 Perform setting, recording, and L1_1_a_SYS, NIST Cybersecurity Framework Ver.1.1 DE.CM-2
importance of IoT devices and L2_3_b_SYS, ISO/IEC 27001:2013 A.11.1.1, A.11.1.2, A.11.1.3,
20
CPS.CM-3 - Use IoT devices that can detect L1_1_b_SYS, NIST Cybersecurity Framework Ver.1.1 DE.CM-
before any action based on the IoT Security Guidelines Key Concept 9
data.
93
CPS.CM-4 Validate the integrity and L3_3_a_DAT, NIST Cybersecurity Framework Ver.1.1 DE.CM-
CPS.CM-5 Monitor communication with L1_1_a_COM, NIST Cybersecurity Framework Ver.1.1 DE.CM-6
security events can be detected L1_1_b_COM ISO/IEC 27001:2013 A.13.1.2, A.14.2.7, A.15.2.1
L1_3_b_ORG, SI-4
L3_1_a_SYS,
L3_3_a_SYS,
L3_3_d_SYS,
CPS.CM-6 As part of the configuration L1_1_a_COM, NIST Cybersecurity Framework Ver.1.1 PR.AC-
constantly manage software L1_1_b_COM, CIS CSC 1, 2, 3, 5, 7, 9, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16
connections and access L1_3_c_ORG, CA-7, CM-3, CM-8, CM-10, CM-11, PE-3, PE-6,
systems. L2_3_b_SYS,
L2_3_c_SYS,
L3_1_a_SYS,
L3_3_a_SYS,
L3_3_d_SYS
CPS.CM-7 Confirm the existence of L1_1_a_SYS, NIST Cybersecurity Framework Ver.1.1 DE.CM-8
94
regular check-up in IoT devices L3_1_a_SYS, CIS CSC 4, 20
95
3.15. CPS.DP – Detection Process
Maintain and test detection processes and procedures to accurately detect
abnormal security events.
Table 3.3-16 Measure requirements in CPS.DP
Relating
ID Measure requirement Informative references
vulnerability ID
CPS.DP-1 Clarify the role and responsibility L1_3_a_ORG NIST Cybersecurity Framework Ver.1.1 DE.DP-1
CPS.DP-2 Detect security events in the L1_2_a_ORG, NIST Cybersecurity Framework Ver.1.1 DE.DP-2
standards, and other rules. NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 AC-25, CA-2, CA-7, PM-
CPS.DP-3 As part of the monitoring L1_3_a_ORG NIST Cybersecurity Framework Ver.1.1 DE.DP-3
CPS.DP-4 Continuously improve the L1_1_b_SYS, NIST Cybersecurity Framework Ver.1.1 DE.DP-5
5, SI-4, PM-14
96
3.16. CPS.RP – Response Planning
Respond to detected security incidents and implement and maintain response
and recovery processes and procedures so affected assets and systems can be
properly restored and business continues uninterrupted.
Relating
ID Measure requirement Informative references
vulnerability ID
CPS.RP-1 Develop and implement L1_1_a_SYS, NIST Cybersecurity Framework Ver.1.1 ID.BE-5,
People, Components, System to L2_2_a_PRO, NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 CP-2, CP-10, IR-4, IR-8
CPS.RP-2 As part of the security operation L1_3_a_PEO, NIST Cybersecurity Framework Ver.1.1 ID.BE-5,
CPS.RP-3 Include security incidents in the L1_3_a_PRO NIST Cybersecurity Framework Ver.1.1 ID.BE-5,
97
ISA 62443-2-1:2009 4.3.2.5.4, 4.3.3.3.10
98
3.17. CPS.CO – Communications
Mitigate the impact of security incidents on the organization and the whole
society, and coordinate communication and recovery activities with
stakeholders in and outside Japan (for example, business partners,
JPCERT/CC, CSIRT of other organizations, vendors) so that they can obtain
support from organizations such as law enforcement agencies.
Relating
ID Measure requirement Informative references
vulnerability ID
CPS.CO-1 Develop and manage rules L1_3_a_PRO NIST Cybersecurity Framework Ver.1.1 RC.CO-1
7.4
CPS.CO-2 Include the item in the business L1_3_a_PRO NIST Cybersecurity Framework Ver.1.1 RC.CO-2
plan to the effect that the ISO/IEC 27001:2013 A.17.1.1, Clause 7.4
incident.
CPS.CO-3 Include the item in the business L1_3_a_PRO NIST Cybersecurity Framework Ver.1.1 RC.CO-3
99
3.18. CPS.AN – Analysis
Analyze the incident and its effects to ensure efficient response and support
restoration activities.
Relating
ID Measure requirement Informative references
vulnerability ID
CPS.AN-1 Understand the impact of the L1_3_a_COM, NIST Cybersecurity Framework Ver.1.1 RS.AN-2
CPS.AN-2 Implement digital forensics upon L1_3_a_PRO NIST Cybersecurity Framework Ver.1.1 RS.AN-3
CPS.AN-3 Categorize and store information L1_3_a_PRO NIST Cybersecurity Framework Ver.1.1 RS.AN-4
100
3.19. CPS.MI – Mitigation
Implement activities to prevent the expansion of security events, mitigate the
effects, and resolve security incidents.
Relating
ID Measure requirement Informative references
vulnerability ID
CPS.MI-1 Take measures to minimize L1_3_a_PRO NIST Cybersecurity Framework Ver.1.1 RS.MI-1,
101
3.20. CPS.IM – Improvements
Improve response and recovery activities by incorporating lessons learned
from present and past decisions / response activities.
Relating
ID Measure requirement Informative references
vulnerability ID
CPS.IM-1 Review the lessons learned from L1_3_a_ORG NIST Cybersecurity Framework Ver.1.1 RS.IM-1,
CPS.IM-2 Review the lessons learned from L1_3_a_ORG NIST Cybersecurity Framework Ver.1.1 RC.IM-1,
102
Appendix A.Use case
~References for specifying the targets of analysis~
Use case #1: Connections of components, data etc. in “Society5.0”
■In “Society5.0”, cyberspace and physical space are highly integrated, and various components, data
etc. are distributed across companies and even among industries.
Building management
Automotive industry Smart home industry ・・・
industry
transcription
transcription
transcription
The Second Layer - Connections
between physical space and
cyberspace
Sensor, Sensor, Sensor, Sensor,
actuator actuator Device Device actuator actuator
etc. etc. etc. etc.
Distribution of Distribution of Distribution of
Components Components Components
Business
Server for management data
production Data on Data on
The Third Layer management procurementprocurement Business Server for Server for
information information management data production market
Server for Server for management trend
Server for Server for
Operation Production business procurement procurement business analysis
data data management information information management
Operation Production
data data
Trade of components which
have function of the third
layer (e.g. communication
device)
Machines
Machines
Production facilities Production facilities
Trade of components which
don’t have function of the
second and the third layer
Parts Processing Finished product Analytics service
… manufacturer company
(e.g. battery)
manufacturer company
The First Layer A-2
Point of view in the use case #2 - Manufacturing process
2.Features
Along with progress toward Society5.0, the number of IoT devices will significantly increase.
Also, there will be an increase of using external data such as market trend analysis data
Layer Example: Classification of elements to each layer in use case #2
• Parts manufacturer: An organization providing manufactured parts to processing company.
• Processing company: An organization processing parts supplied by parts manufacturer.
The First Layer • Finished product manufacturer: An organization completing the product by assembling parts.
• Analytics company: An organization providing finished product manufacturer with analytical data
about market trends etc.
• Sensor: A component monitoring the operation status of the production facilities and transducing
The Second that to electronic data.
Layer • Actuator: A component actuating the production facilities based on data about production
management.
• Communication device: A system component enabling connection of data among organizations.
• Server for data processing: A system component performing functions such as storage, processing
and analysis of data etc..
The Third Layer
• Data to be processed
-Data on procurement information: Data about order plans, transactions between organizations, etc..
-Analytical data: Analytical data about market trends etc., used for improvement of production plan. A-3
Use case #3: Example of connected car in the future
Probe data
(e.g. position information) Update data
GPS
ECU to be
Sensor for external updated
world recognition
The Second Layer
Accelerometer
Yaw rate sensor ECU for
integrated
… vehicle control
Layer Example: Classification of elements to each layer in use case #3
• Traffic information provider: An organization providing traffic control data and congestion data etc. for
dynamic map provider.
The First Layer • Dynamic map provider: An organization analyzing probe data (e.g. position information) and, providing the
result of analysis for automobiles.
• OTA center: An organization providing difference data for vehicles.
• ECU for driving control: A component controlling the motor, brake, steering, etc. based on information such
The Second as dynamic map.
• Car proximity sensor: A component measuring the distance to the surrounding obstacles using a camera,
Layer radar, etc..
• GPS︓A component for acquiring the location information of the vehicle.
• Transmitter/receiver: A system component enabling connection of data among vehicles.
• Server for data processing: A system component performing functions such as storage, processing and
analysis of data etc..
• Data to be processed
The Third Layer -Congestion data: Data about road congestion based on location information etc. of individual vehicle. Used
to create dynamic map.
-Dynamic map: Data combining map data, traffic congestion data, traffic control data, etc. used by vehicles
for automatic driving. A-5
Use case #4: Smart home
Telecommunications
carrier Communication network (Internet etc.)
Environmental Camera
Vital data
data data
Smart phone Provision of
information
Camera
data
The Second Layer Web camera
Vital data
Environmental
data Wearable device
Environmental
sensor Loan of devices
Trade of sensors Device
2.Features
While consumer appliance, security camera, health equipment, etc. are connected to the Internet and becoming IoT device, data
relating to daily life is exchanged through the network and, it is possible to operate IoT device via the network. So, it is important
to ensure trustworthiness in the transcript operation of IoT device connecting cyberspace and physical space.
In many cases, an administrator is not clearly determined in the maintenance of the IoT device and the management of the state.
Layer Example: Classification of elements to each layer in use case #4
• Residents: People that purchase or rent an IoT device and set it at home to provide data on their daily life
and enjoy services based on it.
• Service provider: An organization acquiring data from the household and implementing services based on it.
• Telecommunications carrier: An organization providing internet and LTE network by lending communication
The First Layer devices to residents etc..
• Business collaborator: An organization receiving information from service provider and providing services
based on it.
• Manufacturer: An organization manufacturing sensors connecting to the internet etc..
• Mass retailer: An organization selling sensors, etc. manufactured by manufacturer and setting them.
The Second • Sensor, Wearable device, Web camera, Network connected appliance: A component transcripting activities
in daily life into digital data.
Layer • Device: A component used for data browsing or input.
• HGW︓A system component enabling connection of data between a household and others.
• Server for data processing: A system component performing functions such as storage, processing and
analysis of data etc..
The Third Layer • Data to be processed
-Environmental data: Data such as temperature and humidity.
-Vital data: Data such as heart rate, body temperature and so on.
A-7
Use case #5: Building management
Data on Data from
Electricity Data about lighting, Data on crime disaster surveillance Data from
data air conditioning, etc. prevention prevention cameras elevators
Layer Example: Classification of elements to each layer in use case #5
• Building: Objective(s) monitored/managed by building system(s)
• Elevator management company: Organization that monitors/manages the operation status of
elevators built in the building from remote site(s)
The First Layer • Facility management company: Organization that monitors/manages the power usage of the
building(s) and others from remote site(s)
• Security company: Organization that monitors/manages the building(s) through surveillance
camera(s) or other(s)
System for smart
System for Server for
meter’s data
The Third DR
management Server for weather
Layer
DR control information
Data about
power Data about supply
generation and demand
Power System for Data about
generating supply and Server for incentives
system demand balance Data from Electricity electricity
Server for
meter reading consumption data consumption
incentive
processing
Smart
meter FEMS
/ BEMS
Power generation Lighting, air
Production Batteries,
facility (Generator) conditioning,
facilities, etc. etc.
etc.
power
electricity
transmission
facility
The First Electric power supplier Weather information
Consumer of electricity Aggregator
Layer company provider
EMS : Energy Management System BEMS : Building EMS FEMS : Factory EMS A-10
Point of view in the use case #6 – Electric power system
(Demand response)
1.Assumed “value creation process”
Process of demand-response toward reducing power supply through incentive
2.Features
Increase in various data handshake as per power supply due to increasing smart-meter(s)
Increase in the number of stakeholders in power supply due to evolution of de-regulation of power
Layer Example: Classification of elements to each layer in use case #6
• Electric power supplier company: An organization that requests aggregator toward reducing
power usage
• Consumer of electricity: An organization that executes reducing power consumption due to
The First Layer request toward reducing power consumption
• Aggregator: An organization that requires manufacturers (plants, buildings) to reduce electric
power consumption requested by electric company/companies.
• Weather information provider: An organization that provides weather information to aggregators
The Second • Smart meter: A component that convert(s) electric consumption into read data
Layer • FEMS/BEMS: A system that manages energy consumption in plants or in buildings
B-1-1
Appendix B - The Fisrt Layer
B-1-2
Appendix B - The Fisrt Layer
B-1-3
Appendix B - The Fisrt Layer
B-1-4
Appendix B - The Fisrt Layer
B-1-5
Appendix B - The Fisrt Layer
B-1-6
Appendix B - The Second Layer
L2_1_a_PRO [Procedure] When signing contracts with external parties, check if the products and services CPS.SC-4
- There is no procedure, at the time of procurement, provided by the other relevant organizations properly comply with the security
for checking whether the goods have appropriate requirements defined by the organization while considering the objectives of such
levels of security functions. contracts and results of risk management.
Use products that provide measurable security in order to ensure the availability of CPS.DS-15
security reporting and the trustworthiness of sensing data through integrity protection.
- Check the presence of unacceptable known security risks, including safety hazards, CPS.RA-4
from the planning and design phase of an IoT device and systems incorporating IoT
devices.
- React accordingly to the security risks and the associated safety risks identified as CPS.RA-6
a result of the assessment conducted at the planning and design phase of an IoT
device and systems incorporating IoT devices.
[Procedure] Develop and implement previously the procedure of response after detecting CPS.RP-1
- The response procedure after detecting malfunction incidents (securith operation process) that includes the response of Organization,
of the IoT device is not defined. People, Componens, System to identify the content of response, priority, and scope
of response taken after an incident occurs.
Unexpected behavior of the IoT - Identity spoofing using a stolen ID of a L2_1_b_ORG [Organization] Determine and document the subject or scope of the audit recording/log recording, CPS.PT-1
device due to unauthorized proper host - The organization has no mechanism for regularly and implement and review those records in order to properly detect high-risk security
access to its controls by - Unauthorized access that exploits checking proper use of its network. incidents.
impersonation of an authorized vulnerable protocols with no security means Establish and implement the procedure to identify and manage the baseline of CPS.AE-1
user results in unpredicted network operations and expected information flows between people, goods, and
systems.
operation
Conduct network and access monitoring and control at the contact points between CPS.CM-1
corporate networks and wide area networks.
L2_1_b_COM [Components] Introduce and implement the process to manage the initial setting procedure (e.g., CPS.IP-1
- Some settings are not robust enough in terms of password) and setting change procedure for IoT devices and servers.
security (e.g., passwords, ports). Minimize funcions of IoT devices and servers by physically and logically blocking CPS.PT-2
unnecessary network ports, USBs, and serial ports accessing directly the main
bodies of IoT devices and servers etc.
L2_1_b_SYS [System] Prevent unauthorized log-in to IoT devices and servers by measures such as CPS.AC-4
- Access control of communication partners is not implementing functions for lockout after a specified number of incorrect log-in
robust enough. attempts and providing a time interval until safety is ensured.
Develop a policy about controlling data flow, and according that protect the integrity CPS.AC-7
of the network by means such as appropriate network isolation (e.g., development
and test environment vs. production environment, and environment incorporates IoT
devices vs. other environments within the organization).
Restrict communications by IoT devices and servers to those with entities (e.g. CPS.AC-8
people, components, system, etc.) identified through proper procedures.
Authenticate and authorize logical accesses to system components by IoT devices CPS.AC-9
and users according to the transaction risks (personal security, privacy risks, and
other organizational risks).
L2_1_b_PRO [Procedure] Introduce and implement the process to manage the initial setting procedure (e.g., CPS.IP-1
- No procedure for security settings of an IoT device password) and setting change procedure for IoT devices and servers.
is established.
[Procedure] Develop and implement previously the procedure of response after detecting CPS.RP-1
- The response procedure after detecting malfunction incidents (securith operation process) that includes the response of Organization,
of the IoT device is not defined. People, Componens, System to identify the content of response, priority, and scope
of response taken after an incident occurs.
B-2-1
Appendix B - The Second Layer
An unauthorized or tampered-with - A stolen and illegally modified IoT device L2_3_b_ORG [Organization] Document and manage appropriately the list of hardware and software, and CPS.AM-1
IoT device connects to the connected to a network - The organization is unclear about the status of management information (e.g. name of asset, version, network address, name of
network and transmits incorrect - Tampering by internal or external people devices connected to its information system or asset manager, license information) of components in the system.
data with malicious intent industrial control system. Introduce and implement the process to manage the initial setting procedure (e.g., CPS.IP-1
- Tampering with sensor readings, password) and setting change procedure for IoT devices and servers.
As part of the configuration management of devices, constantly manage software CPS.CM-6
thresholds, and settings
configuration information, status of network connections (e.g., presence/absence of
connections and access destination), and information transmission/reception status
between other “organization”, people, components, and systems.
L2_3_b_PEO [People] Formulate and manage security requirements applicable to members of other CPS.SC-5
- Physical unauthorized acts to IoT devices by relevant organizations, such as business partners, who are engaged in operations
internal or external people can not be prevented. outsourced from the organization.
Implement appropriate physical security measures such as locking and limiting CPS.AC-2
access to the areas where the IoT devices and servers are installed, using entrance
and exit controls, biometric authentication, deploying surveillance cameras, and
inspecting belongings and body weight.
Perform setting, recording, and monitoring of proper physical access, considering the CPS.CM-2
importance of IoT devices and servers.
L2_3_b_COM [Components] When handling information to be protected or procuring devices that have an CPS.DS-8
- The devices used are not anti-tampering, which important function to the organization, useselect the IoT devices and servers
make it impossible to prevent physical falsification. equipped with anti-tampering devices.
L2_3_b_SYS [System] Conduct integrity checks of software runnning on the IoT devices and servers at a CPS.DS-10
- The organization does not regularly verify the time determined by the organization, and prevent unauthorized software from
integrity of connected devices. launching.
Introduce an integrity check mechanism to verify the integrity of hardware. CPS.DS-12
[System] Document and manage appropriately the list of hardware and software, and CPS.AM-1
management information (e.g. name of asset, version, network address, name of
- It is not properly detected that an unauthorized
device is connected to the network of the asset manager, license information) of components in the system.
organization. As part of the configuration management of devices, constantly manage software CPS.CM-6
configuration information, status of network connections (e.g., presence/absence of
connections and access destination), and information transmission/reception status
between other “organization”, people, components, and systems.
[System] Implement appropriate physical security measures such as locking and limiting CPS.AC-2
- The organization does not take physical security access to the areas where the IoT devices and servers are installed, using entrance
measures such as access control and monitoring of and exit controls, biometric authentication, deploying surveillance cameras, and
areas where its IoT devices are installed, inspecting belongings and body weight.
Implement physical measures such as preparing an uninterruptible power supply, a CPS.IP-5
fire protection facility, and protection from water infiltration to follow the policies and
rules related to the physical operating environment, including the IoT devices and
servers installed in the organization.
Minimize funcions of IoT devices and servers by physically and logically blocking CPS.PT-2
unnecessary network ports, USBs, and serial ports accessing directly the main
bodies of IoT devices and servers etc.
Perform setting, recording, and monitoring of proper physical access, considering the CPS.CM-2
importance of IoT devices and servers.
L2_3_b_DAT [Data] When disposing of an IoT device and server, delete the stored data and the ID CPS.IP-6
- The organization has no procedures for deleting (identifier) uniquely identifying the genuine IoT devices and servers as well as
data (or making data unreadable) in an IoT device important information (e.g., private key and digital certificate), or make them
before disposal. unreadable.
B-2-2
Appendix B - The Second Layer
L2_3_d_SYS [System] Implement appropriate physical security measures such as locking and limiting CPS.AC-2
- The organization does not take physical security access to the areas where the IoT devices and servers are installed, using entrance
measures such as access control and monitoring of and exit controls, biometric authentication, deploying surveillance cameras, and
areas where its IoT devices are installed. inspecting belongings and body weight.
Implement physical measures such as preparing an uninterruptible power supply, a CPS.IP-5
fire protection facility, and protection from water infiltration to follow the policies and
rules related to the physical operating environment, including the IoT devices and
servers installed in the organization.
Perform setting, recording, and monitoring of proper physical access, considering the CPS.CM-2
importance of IoT devices and servers.
B-2-3
Appendix B - The Third Layer
L3_4_a_PEO [People] Provide appropriate training and education to all individuals in the organization and CPS.AT-1
- People involved are not fully aware of how the manage the record so that they can fulfill assigned roles and responsibilities to
organization’s protected data should be handled for prevent and contain the occurrence and severity of security incidents.
security reasons. Improve the contents of training and education regarding security to members of the CPS.AT-3
organization and other relevant parties of high importance in security management
of the organization.
L3_4_a_PRO [Procedure] Understand the level of data protection required by laws and arrangements CPS.GV-3
- Necessary procedures for handling data are not regarding handling of data shared only by relevant organizations, develop data
established. classification methods based on each requirement, and properly classify and protect
data throughout the whole life cycle.
[Procedure] Maintain, update, and manage information such as the origination of data and data CPS.DS-14
- The organization does not confirm whether the processing history throughout the entire life cycle.
necessary procedures are followed regarding data
handling.
L3_4_a_DAT [Data] When signing contracts with external organizations, check if the security CPS.SC-3
- Personal data or other important information is management of the other relevant organizations properly comply with the security
distributed among multiple organizations or systems. requirements defined by the organization while considering the objectives of such
contracts and results of risk management.
Conduct regular assessments through auditing, test results, or other checks of CPS.SC-6
relevant parties such as business partners to ensure they are fulfilling their
contractual obligations.
[Data] If the organization exchanges protected information with other organizations, agree CPS.DS-1
- The organization is unaware that the data it in advance on security requirements for protection of such information.
handles is the specific type of data that must be
protected.
The security requirements for - Malware infection that takes advantage L3_4_b_ORG [Organization] Understand the level of data protection required by laws and arrangements CPS.GV-3
highly confidential data to be of a data storage system’s vulnerability - The organization is not fully aware of data regarding handling of data shared only by relevant organizations, develop data
shared only among authorized - Physical intrusion by an unauthorized protection laws and regulations with which it should classification methods based on each requirement, and properly classify and protect
parties has not been set or met. entity into the data storage area comply. data throughout the whole life cycle.
- Internal fraud by an authorized user L3_4_b_PEO [People] Provide appropriate training and education to all individuals in the organization and CPS.AT-1
- Identity spoofing using a stolen - People involved are not fully aware of how the manage the record so that they can fulfill assigned roles and responsibilities to
ID/password of a proper user organization’s protected data should be handled for prevent and contain the occurrence and severity of security incidents.
security reasons. Improve the contents of training and education regarding security to members of the CPS.AT-3
organization and other relevant parties of high importance in security management
of the organization.
L3_4_b_PRO [Procedure] Understand the level of data protection required by laws and arrangements CPS.GV-3
- Necessary procedures for handling data are not regarding handling of data shared only by relevant organizations, develop data
established. classification methods based on each requirement, and properly classify and protect
data throughout the whole life cycle.
[Procedure] Maintain, update, and manage information such as the origination of data and data CPS.DS-14
- The organization does not confirm whether the processing history throughout the entire life cycle.
necessary procedures are followed regarding data
handling.
L3_4_b_SYS [System] Develop a policy about controlling data flow, and according that protect the integrity CPS.AC-7
- The system is not designed according to the data of the network by means such as appropriate network isolation (e.g., development
confidentiality. and test environment vs. production environment, and environment incorporates IoT
devices vs. other environments within the organization).
Authenticate and authorize logical accesses to system components by IoT devices CPS.AC-9
and users according to the transaction risks (personal security, privacy risks, and
other organizational risks).
Encrypt information with an appropriate level of security strength, and store them. CPS.DS-2
L3_4_b_DAT [Data] When signing contracts with external organizations, check if the security CPS.SC-3
- Personal data or other important information is management of the other relevant organizations properly comply with the security
distributed among multiple organizations or systems. requirements defined by the organization while considering the objectives of such
contracts and results of risk management.
Conduct regular assessments through auditing, test results, or other checks of CPS.SC-6
relevant parties such as business partners to ensure they are fulfilling their
contractual obligations.
[Data] If the organization exchanges protected information with other organizations, agree CPS.DS-1
- The organization is unaware that the data it in advance on security requirements for protection of such information.
handles is the specific type of data that must be
protected.
3_1 Functions to securely procecss and The organization’s protected data - Malware infection that takes advantage L3_1_b_ORG [Organization] Identify, prioritize, and evaluate the organizations and people that play important role CPS.SC-2
analyze data is leaked from a data processing of the vulnerability of a data manipulation - The organization does not confirm the safeness in each layer of the three-layer structure to sustaining the operation of the
area managed by a related /analysis system managed by another and trustworthiness of data manipulation / analysis organization.
organization. organization organizations and/or systems before and after When signing contracts with external organizations, check if the security CPS.SC-3
- Physical intrusion by an unauthorized signing contracts. management of the other relevant organizations properly comply with the security
entity into the data manipulation / requirements defined by the organization while considering the objectives of such
analysis area managed by another contracts and results of risk management.
organization When signing contracts with external parties, check if the products and services CPS.SC-4
- Identity spoofing using a stolen provided by the other relevant organizations properly comply with the security
ID/password of a proper user requirements defined by the organization while considering the objectives of such
contracts and results of risk management.
- Protected data has been taken out
Conduct regular assessments through auditing, test results, or other checks of CPS.SC-6
improperly by another organization’s
relevant parties such as business partners to ensure they are fulfilling their
entity
contractual obligations.
Formulate and implement procedures to address noncompliance to contractual CPS.SC-7
requirements found as a result of an audit, test, or other check on relevant parties.
Collect and securely store data proving that the organization is fulfilling its CPS.SC-8
contractual obligations with other relevant parties or individuals, and prepare them
for disclosure as needed within appropriate limits.
L3_1_b_PEO [People] Formulate and manage security requirements applicable to members of other CPS.SC-5
- The organization does not confirm, before and after relevant organizations, such as business partners, who are engaged in operations
signing contracts, the trustworthiness of people in outsourced from the organization.
organizations that undertake data manipulation /
analysis.
L3_1_b_DAT [Data] When signing contracts with external organizations, check if the security CPS.SC-3
- The organization’s data that must be protected is management of the other relevant organizations properly comply with the security
distributed among multiple organizations at different requirements defined by the organization while considering the objectives of such
levels of security. contracts and results of risk management.
Conduct regular assessments through auditing, test results, or other checks of CPS.SC-6
relevant parties such as business partners to ensure they are fulfilling their
contractual obligations.
B-3-1
Appendix B - The Third Layer
B-3-2
Appendix B - The Third Layer
L3_1_c_DAT [Data] When signing contracts with external organizations, check if the security CPS.SC-3
- The organization’s data that must be protected is management of the other relevant organizations properly comply with the security
distributed among multiple organizations at different requirements defined by the organization while considering the objectives of such
levels of security. contracts and results of risk management.
Conduct regular assessments through auditing, test results, or other checks of CPS.SC-6
relevant parties such as business partners to ensure they are fulfilling their
contractual obligations.
Data in storage is tampered with - Identity spoofing using a stolen L3_2_a_DAT [Data] Perform integrity checking on information to be sent, received, and stored. CPS.DS-11
ID/password of a proper user - Data being stored do not have a mechanism to
detect falsifications.
3_3 Functions to securely send and receive Data in use is tampered with. - Identity spoofing using a stolen L3_2_b_DAT [Data] Encrypt the communication channel when communicating between IoT devices and CPS.DS-3
data ID/password of a proper user - Data are not protected enough in communication servers or in cyberspace.
- Man-in-the-middle attacks to falsify paths. Encrypt information itself when sending/receiving information. CPS.DS-4
data on communication paths [Data] Perform integrity checking on information to be sent, received, and stored. CPS.DS-11
- Data being used do not have a mechanism to
detect falsifications.
The system receives - Identity spoofing by an unauthorized L3_3_a_ORG [Organization] Identify, prioritize, and evaluate the organizations and people that play important role CPS.SC-2
inappropriate data from an organization/person/component/system - The organization does not confirm the in each layer of the three-layer structure to sustaining the operation of the
Organization/People/Components to use an ID of a proper entity trustworthiness of the data sender organizations organization.
(due to a spoofing attack etc.). - Inappropriate data from authorized such as data providers or data When signing contracts with external organizations, check if the security CPS.SC-3
components and system that have been manipulators/analyzers before and after signing the management of the other relevant organizations properly comply with the security
requirements defined by the organization while considering the objectives of such
tampered with contracts.
contracts and results of risk management.
When signing contracts with external parties, check if the products and services CPS.SC-4
provided by the other relevant organizations properly comply with the security
requirements defined by the organization while considering the objectives of such
contracts and results of risk management.
Conduct regular assessments through auditing, test results, or other checks of CPS.SC-6
relevant parties such as business partners to ensure they are fulfilling their
contractual obligations.
Formulate and implement procedures to address noncompliance to contractual CPS.SC-7
requirements found as a result of an audit, test, or other check on relevant parties.
Collect and securely store data proving that the organization is fulfilling its CPS.SC-8
contractual obligations with other relevant parties or individuals, and prepare them
for disclosure as needed within appropriate limits.
L3_3_a_PEO [People] Provide appropriate training and security education to members of the organization CPS.AT-2
- A contractor’s employees responsible for the and other relevant parties of high importance in security management that may be
outsourced work are not fully aware of how the involved in the security incident prevention and response. Then, manage the record
organization’s protected data should be handled for of such training and security education.
security reasons. Improve the contents of training and education regarding security to members of the CPS.AT-3
organization and other relevant parties of high importance in security management
of the organization.
L3_3_a_SYS [System] The security management team (SOC/CSIRT) collects information, including CPS.RA-2
- Vulnerabilities that should be handled is left vulnerability and threats from internal and external sources (through internal tests,
unaddressed in a data collection / analysis system. security information, security researchers, etc.), analyzes the information, and
establishes a process to implement and use measures.
Restrict the software to be added after installing in the IoT devices and servers. CPS.IP-2
Develop a vulnerability remediation plan, and modify the vulnerability of the CPS.IP-10
components according to the plan.
- Discuss the method of conducting important security updates and the like on IoT CPS.MA-1
devices and servers. Then, apply those security updateswith managed tools
properly and in a timely manner while recording the history.
- Introduce IoT devices having a remote update mechanism to perform a mass CPS.MA-1
update of different software programs (OS, driver, and application) through remote
commands, where applicable.
Conduct remote maintenance of the IoT devices and servers while granting CPS.MA-2
approvals and recording logs so that unauthorized access can be prevented.
As part of the configuration management of devices, constantly manage software CPS.CM-6
configuration information, status of network connections (e.g., presence/absence of
connections and access destination), and information transmission/reception status
between other “organization”, people, components, and systems.
Confirm the existence of vulnerability that requires a regular check-up in IoT devices CPS.CM-7
and servers managed within the organization.
[System] Encrypt the communication channel when communicating between IoT devices and CPS.DS-3
- Communication channel is not appropriately servers or in cyberspace.
protected.
[System] Determine and document the subject or scope of the audit recording/log recording, CPS.PT-1
- The organization’s system has no mechanism for and implement and review those records in order to properly detect high-risk security
detecting and handling any abnormality related to incidents.
security as soon as it arises. Establish and implement the procedure to identify and manage the baseline of CPS.AE-1
network operations and expected information flows between people, goods, and
systems.
Conduct network and access monitoring and control at the contact points between CPS.CM-1
corporate networks and wide area networks.
Monitor communication with external service providers so that potential security CPS.CM-5
events can be detected properly.
Develop and implement previously the procedure of response after detecting CPS.RP-1
incidents (securith operation process) that includes the response of Organization,
People, Componens, System to identify the content of response, priority, and scope
of response taken after an incident occurs.
[System] Establish and implement the procedure to issue, manage, check, cancel, and CPS.AC-1
- The system does not identify or authenticate the monitor identification and authentication information of authorized goods, people,
person on the other end of communication in and procedures.
cyberspace when the communication starts. Properly authorize wireless connection destinations (including users, IoT devices, CPS.AC-3
and servers).
Prevent unauthorized log-in to IoT devices and servers by measures such as CPS.AC-4
implementing functions for lockout after a specified number of incorrect log-in
attempts and providing a time interval until safety is ensured.
Restrict communications by IoT devices and servers to those with entities (e.g. CPS.AC-8
people, components, system, etc.) identified through proper procedures.
Authenticate and authorize logical accesses to system components by IoT devices CPS.AC-9
and users according to the transaction risks (personal security, privacy risks, and
other organizational risks).
L3_3_a_DAT [Data] - Use IoT devices that can detect abnormal behaviors and suspend operations by CPS.CM-3
- No mechanism for filtering data sent from the other comparing the instructed behaviors and actual ones.
endpoint of communication is installed or operated. - Validate whether information provided from cyberspace contains malicious code,
and is within the permissible range before any action based on the data.
Validate the integrity and authenticity of the information provided from cyberspace CPS.CM-4
before operations.
B-3-3
Appendix C: Examples of security measures according to measure requirements
- Examples of security measures for each of the High Advanced, Advanced, and Basic levels are stated for implementing measure requirements described in Part III. To implement High Advanced-level measures, there is a need to include not only High Advanced-level measures but also Advanced- and Basic-level measures.
- The level of a measure is determined according to the costs in implementing/operating the measure, the scope of the measure (e.g., whether the scope is applied only to the organization or other related organizations), etc., based on management measures stratified into levels.
- The subject that implements measures is classifed as “S” (implemented by a system through technical means), as “O” (implemented by an organization (e.g., by people through non-technical means)), and as “O/S” (implemented by both a system and an organization).
- In the description of the examples of measures, the documents described in “related standards, etc.” which are assigned to each requirement in Part 3 and a part of the corresponding items (shown as “Reference Guidelines” in the table) are referred.
- The measures described in this section are just examples and do not deny other implementation methods. Use this document as a reference for risk management according to the characteristics of the business of each organization, the results of the risk analyses, etc.
Reference Guidelines
Subject that
Measure Corresponding
Requirement ID
Measure Requirement Vulnerability ID
Examples of security measure implements NIST SP 800-53 ISO/IEC 27001:2013
NIST SP 800-171 IEC 62443-2-1:2010 IEC 62443-3-3:2013
measures Rev.4 Annex A
Document and manage appropriately the L1_1_a_COM, <High‐Advanced>
list of hardware and software, and L1_1_b_COM, ‐The organization identifies assets constituting its information systems and industrial control systems (hardware, including IoT devices; software; and information) ○
management information (e.g. name of L1_1_c_COM, uniquely, assigns a responsible person to each asset. And the organization maintains/manages lists periodically, or at the request of the operator including configuration (In addition to the
L2_1_a_ORG, ○
information of assets (e.g., names, version information, license information, and location) while recognizing situations in real time. O/S following, CM-8(1), - -
asset, version, network address, name of L2_3_b_ORG, (3.4.2)
‐ The information system regularly audits whether the actual configuration grasped conforms to the baseline configuration defined by the organization, and responds CM-8(2), CM-8(3),
asset manager, license information) of L2_3_b_SYS appropriately. (Example: blocking unplanned connections except those permitted by the organization as an exception) CM-8(5))
components in the system. ‐The information system and industrial control system implement and operate a mechanism which automatically detects and responses to unauthorized assets.
<Advanced> ○
‐ Maintain/manage lists including configuration information of assets (e.g., names, version information, license information, and location) by reviewing and updating (In addition to the
following, A.8.1.3)
them periodically.
‐ The organization makes a list of removable media (e.g., USB memory sticks) that can be used on system components (information system or industrial control system),
CPS.AM-1 and manages the use of them. O
‐ The organization uses only removable media (e.g. USB memory) permitted in the organization. Also, if there is no identifiable ownwer of portable storage devices, the
organization prohibits the use of such devices.
○ ○ ○ ○
‐ The organization controles access to the media that contain highly confidential data, and properly grasps and manages the usage of the media taken outside of the
(3.4.1, 3.8.5, 3.8.7, 3.8.8) (CM-8, PM-5) (4.2.3.4) (SR 7.8)
controlled areas.
<Basic>
‐ The organization identifies assets constituting its information system and industrial control system (hardware, software and information), assigns a responsible person
to each asset, and documents a list of them. ○
O
‐ It is desirable to list all the assets held, but if the target is huge, consider narrowing down the target assets through integration (grouping) of the analysis target and (A.8.1.1, A.8.1.2)
exclusion from the analysis target.
‐ The organization sets priorities to the identified assets based on the importance of them in its business operation.
Specify a method to ensure traceability L1_3_a_COM, <High‐Advanced>
based on the importance of the L1_3_b_COM ‐ When traceability is a requirement, the organization manages a unique identification to outputs (products) and maintains documented necessary information for
components produced by the organization’s enabling traceability.
・It is desirable for the organization to consider a method of unique identification in accordance with the rules applicable to different industries such as cross‐industry O - - - - -
supply chain.
common numbering rules.
[Reference] “ISO 9001:2015” 8.5.2 Identification and Traceability
CPS.AM-2 Common among <Advanced> and <Basic>
‐ The organization prioritizes the products of the organization into multiple stages from the viewpoint of the following example.
‐ Extent of the impact in the supply chain when problems (e.g. regarding product quality) are found.
‐ Magnitude of the impact on the business of the organization when problems (e.g. regarding product quality) are found.
O - - - - -
‐ The organization specifies an appropriate method of identifying outputs (e.g., adding serial numbers) such as adding numbers depending on the importance of the
components produced by the organization on its supply chain.
‐ The organization identifies the conditions of outputs related to the requirements for monitoring and measuring throughout the processes of manufacturing and
providing services.
Create records such as the date of L1_3_a_COM, <High‐Advanced>
production and condition of components L1_3_b_COM ‐ The organization prepares internal rules related to production activities, and based on the possibility that records of produced components may be later audited in
depending on importance, and prepare and accordance with its importance, shares awareness with partners regarding importance in prior, and ensures an appropriate level of record management. O - - - - -
adopt internal rules regarding records of ‐ It is desirable that records of production activities that are created and managed can be quickly searched by production date, classification of components (e.g.,
product name), and the like.
production activities in order to store
Common among <Advanced> and <Basic>
CPS.AM-3 components for a certain period of time. ‐ The organization creates a record such as the date of production and condition of components depending on the importance of the produced component on the
supply chain, and prepares and manages internal rules of production activities in order to store components for a certain period of time.
‐ The organization considers the following when creating or updating the above records. O - - - - -
‐Making an appropriate identification and description (eg title, date, documenter, reference number)
‐Recording in appropriate format (e.g., language, software version, charts) and media (e.g., paper, electronic media)
‐Obtaining appropriate reviews and approvals for relevance
Create and manage appropriately network L1_3_b_ORG, <High‐Advanced> ○
configuration diagrams and data flows L1_3_c_ORG ‐ The organization implements/manages an automated mechanism for monitoring and managing system configurations, communication network configurations, and (In addition to the
O - - -
within the organization. data flows of their information systems and industrial control systems in real time. following, CM-2(2),
CM-2(3))
<Advanced> ○
‐ The organization states the characteristics of the interface, security requirements, and characteristics of transmitted data for network connection in a diagram in the O - (In addition to the ○ - -
CPS.AM-4
associated documents. following, CA-9) (A.13.2.1, A13.2.2)
<Basic>
‐ The organization documents and stores system configurations, communication network configurations, and data flows of an information systems and an industrial
○ ○
control systems in a range managed by the organization (for example, in units of business establishments). O - -
(CM-2, CM-2(1)) (4.2.3.4, 4.2.3.5)
‐ The organization reviews related documents periodically or when there is a change in system configurations, network configurations, or data flows and updates them
as necessary.
C-1
Appendix C
Reference Guidelines
Subject that
Measure Corresponding
Requirement ID
Measure Requirement Vulnerability ID
Examples of security measure implements NIST SP 800-53 ISO/IEC 27001:2013
NIST SP 800-171 IEC 62443-2-1:2010 IEC 62443-3-3:2013
measures Rev.4 Annex A
Create and manage appropriately a list of L1_1_a_COM, <High‐Advanced>
○
external information systems where the L1_1_b_COM, ‐ The system makes a list of external information services in use and manages the users, devices as well as serviced in use in real time. ○
O/S (In addition to the - -
organization’s assets are shared. L1_1_c_COM, ‐ The system uses a mechanism to give notice to the system administrator when an unpermitted external information system service is detected. (3.12.4)
L1_3_b_ORG, following, SA-9(2))
‐ The organization identifies functions, ports, protocols, and other services which are necessary for using services offered by external providers. ○
L1_3_c_ORG <Advanced> (In addition to the
‐ The organization sets conditions for allowing other organizations which own or operate external information systems to do the following: ○ following, A.13.1.2)
○
a. Accessing an information system in the organization from an external information system O (In addition to the - -
CPS.AM-5 (3.1.20, 3.1.21, 3.12.4)
b. Processing, saving, or transmitting information under the control of the organization using an external information system following, AC-20)
‐ The organization restricts a use of storage in an external system the organization owns to an authorized one.
<Basic>
‐ The organization makes a list of external information system services in use and defines roles and responsibilities as users in each service.
○ ○
O - - -
(SA-9) (A.6.1.1)
[Reference] Appendix A "Concret examples of contract provisions and commentaries" of “Guidebook for using Cloud Security Guideline” (METI, 2013) could be referred
to regarding the points to consider when stipulating in the contract the roles and responsibilities of users especially in terms of usage of cloud service.
Classify and prioritize resources (e.g., L1_1_a_ORG, Common among <High‐Advanced> and <Advanced>
People, Components, Data, and System) by L1_1_b_ORG, ‐ The organization considers business requirements and legal requirements which share or restrict data when classifying resources of the information system and
○
function, importance, and business value, L1_1_c_ORG, industrial control system (data, components processing data, system, etc). O - - -
L3_1_a_ORG, (RA-2、SA-14)
and communicate to the organizations and ‐ The person responsible for an asset is responsible for the classification of the data.
L3_4_a_ORG ○
CPS.AM-6 ‐ The organization includes classification rules and classification review standards after time passes in a resource classification system.
people relevant to those resources in (A.6.1.1)
<Basic>
business. ‐ The organization sets priorities on identified information assets according to importance to the organization. ○ ○
O - -
‐ When related laws or regulations require us to follow a certain classification for resources of the organization (e.g., system and data), apply an appropriate (RA-2、SA-14) (4.2.3.6, 4.3.4.4.3)
classification to the asset.
Define roles and responsibilities for cyber L1_3_b_ORG, Common among <High‐Advanced> and <Advanced>
security across the organization and other L1_3_c_ORG ‐ In preparation for damages caused by security incidents, the organization considers risk transfer by using cyber insurance, etc., in addition to implementing security O - - - -
relevant parties. measures designated by business partners.
<Basic>
○
CPS.AM-7 ‐ In a contract with a contractor or an outsourcer, the organization specifies the scope of the responsibilities of the organization and that of the business partner (state
(A.6.1.1, A.15.1.1)
the disclaimer and an upper limit on agreed compensation for damages) in case of a damage caused by a security incident in the business. ○ ○
O - -
‐ To increase the effectiveness of the requirements related to security which a business partner requires or is required to satisfy in a contract, it is desirable that the (SA-4) (4.3.2.3.3)
organization makes an agreement in meeting the requirements, identifying deficiencies and details of actions, paying expenses, and using an alternative when they
cannot be satisfied at the time of the contract or in the early stage of the contract.
Identify and share the role of the L1_3_b_ORG, <High‐Advanced>
○
organizations in the supply chain. L1_3_c_ORG ‐ The organization estimates the details and scale of the impacts on direct partners and the entire supply chain in case of a security issue incident which has a harmful O - - - -
(CP-2, SA-14)
effect on the business in the organization.
<Advanced>
‐ The organization graphically represents the overview of a supply chain related to the organization, with clarification of the roles in the entire organization by
considering the component flow, data flow, etc., between organizations. O - - - - -
‐ The organization shares the above results with related organizations (suppliers to the organization, related departments within the organization, and customers of the
CPS.BE-1
organization).
<Basic>
‐ The organization graphically represents the overview of the business connections among suppliers to the organization, related departments within the organization,
and customers of the organization, with clarification of the roles in the organization by considering component flow, data flow, etc., between organizations.
O - - - - -
‐ The organization shares the above results with related organizations (suppliers to the organization, related departments within the organization, and customers of the
organization).
C-2
Appendix C
Reference Guidelines
Subject that
Measure Corresponding
Requirement ID
Measure Requirement Vulnerability ID
Examples of security measure implements NIST SP 800-53 ISO/IEC 27001:2013
NIST SP 800-171 IEC 62443-2-1:2010 IEC 62443-3-3:2013
measures Rev.4 Annex A
Develop security policies, define roles and L1_1_a_PRO, <High‐Advanced>
responsibilities for security across the L1_1_b_PRO, ‐ While sharing the basic policy with operations used in a conventional IT environment, the organization formulates security policies and operational procedures by fully
organization and other relevant parties, and L1_1_c_PRO considering the characteristics of a site on which an IoT device is installed. ○
O - -
clarify the information-sharing method (A.12.1.1)
[Reference] For example, IEC 62443‐2‐1, a security management standard for industrial automation and control systems (IACS), requires formulation of cyber security
among stakeholders.
policies at an upper level for an IACS environment.
<Advanced>
‐ The organization formulates a series of lower level security policies, such as the policies and implementation procedures of the following individual topics, to support
policies at a higher level.
a) Access control and authentication
b) Physical security measures
c) System development and maintenance ○ ○
CPS.GV-1 d) Management of external contractors (controls from all (4.3.2.3.3, 4.3.2.2.1,
○
e) Classification and handling of information O - security control families) 4.3.2.6) -
(A.5.1.1, A12.1.1)
‐ The organization formulates a series of security policies by fully considering the organization’s a) business strategies, b) related rules, laws, regulations, and contracts,
and c) environments under threats to security to sufficiently reflect the actual situation of the organization.
‐ The organization reviews and updates a security plan according to changes in its a) business strategies, b) related rules, laws, regulations, and contracts, and c)
environments under threats to security.
[Reference] To formulate a policy at a more detailed level, refer to related standards such as ISO/IEC 27002 for identification of fields which require the policy, and refer
to more detailed guidelines.
<Basic>
‐ The organization formulates a basic security policy at the highest level of its series of security policies, obtains an approval of the management, and operates it ○
O - -
appropriately. (A.5.1.1)
‐ The organization reviews and updates the security policy periodically (e.g., once a year).
Formulate internal rules considering L1_2_a_ORG, Common among <High‐Advanced>, <Advanced> and <Basic>
domestic and foreign laws, including the Act L1_2_a_COM, ‐ Within the organization’s business activities, clearly identify all related laws, regulations, and contractual requirements in the context of security as well as the
on the Protection of Personal Information L1_2_a_SYS, organization’s effort to fulfill these requirements, document them, and maintain those documents at their latest.
L1_2_a_PRO, ‐ The organization defines and documents detailed management measures and details of responsibilities to satisfy the requirements. ○
and Unfair Competition Prevention Act, as L1_2_a_DAT ○
‐ The controller identifies all laws and regulations which are applied to each organization to satisfy requirements related to the type of business. (A.6.1.3, A.18.1.1, ○
CPS.GV-2 well as industry guidelines, and review and O - (controls from all security -
‐ When the organization operates businesses in other countries, the controller considers to comply with the laws and regulations in all related countries. A.18.1.2, A.18.1.3, (4.4.3.7)
revise the rules on a continuing and timely control families)
A.18.1.4, A.18.1.5)
basis in accordance with any changes in
relevant laws, regulations, and industry
guidelines.
Understand the level of data protection L1_1_a_SYS, Common among <High‐Advanced>, <Advanced> and <Basic>
required by laws and arrangements L1_1_a_DAT, ‐ The organization identifies and documents all legal requirements and contract requirements related to data protection for each system and each organization and the
regarding handling of data shared only by L1_1_b_SYS, organization’s activities to satisfy these requirements, and update them to the latest.
L3_1_a_SYS, ○
relevant organizations, develop data ‐ The organization classifies its data appropriately according to the classification of the identified rules. ○
L3_1_a_DAT, ○ (A.8.2.1, A.18.1.1, ○
CPS.GV-3 ‐ The organization takes measures for systems, components, etc., handling the applicable data in accordance with the requirements of the identified rules. When the O (controls from all security -
classification methods based on each L3_4_a_ORG, (3.1.22) A.18.1.2, A.18.1.3, (4.3.4.4.6)
implementation of a measure is considered difficult, measures such as tokenization of an applicable data in the organization may be considered. (e.g., tokenization of control families)
requirement, and properly classify and L3_4_a_PRO, card information due to the Installment Sales Law)
A.18.1.4, A.18.1.5)
protect data throughout the whole life cycle. L3_4_b_ORG,
L3_4_b_PRO
Develop a strategy and secure resources to L1_1_a_PRO, Common among <High‐Advanced> and <Advanced>
○
implement risk management regarding L1_1_b_PRO, ‐ The organization formulates a comprehensive risk management strategy in the short to medium term (e.g. 1 to 5 years) to manage risks to the organization’s business, ○
L1_1_c_PRO (4.2.3.1, 4.2.3.3,
security. capital, persons, and other organizations caused by operating and using a system. O - (In addition to the -
4.2.3.8, 4.2.3.9, 4.2.3.11,
‐ The organization reviews and updates the risk management strategy in the short to medium term periodically or as necessary. following, PM-3, PM-9)
○ 4.3.2.4.3, 4.3.2.6.3)
CPS.GV-4
(Clause 6)
<Basic>
‐ The organization determines the security requirements in an information system, industrial control system or a system service and decides, documents, and assigns ○
O - - -
resources necessary for protecting the system or the system service. (SA-2)
‐ The organization states each security budget item in the organization’s plans and budget‐related materials.
Identify the vulnerability of the organization’ L1_1_a_SYS, <High‐Advanced>
s assets and document the list of identified L1_1_b_SYS, ‐ The organization conducts vulnerability diagnosis at planned timings such as planned stopping so as not to adversely affect the operation of the system managed by
○ ○
vulnerability with the corresponding asset. L1_1_c_SYS the organization. And then, identify and list vulnerabilities that exist in the system owned by the organization.
(In addition to the (In addition to the
‐ It is desirable to conduct a penetration test periodically to recognize an existing vulnerability in a system it manages. O - -
following, CA-8, following, 4.2.3.7,
‐ When conducting vulnerability diagnosis, it is desirable to use a vulnerability diagnosis tool that can immediately update the vulnerability of the system to be
RA-5(1), RA-5(5)) 4.2.3.9)
diagnosed.
‐ The organization develops mechanisms to temporarily permit privileged access to a inspector in vulnerability diagnosis to more thoroughly identify vulnerabilities.
<Advanced> ○
‐ The organization carries out a vulnerability diagnosis to recognize vulnerabilities existing in the information system which has high importance and makes a list of (A.12.6.1)
CPS.RA-1
them.
‐ In the operation phase of an information system owned by the organization, the organization uses a vulnerability diagnosis tool to periodically identify its system
○ ○
vulnerability within vulnerabilities collected from various sources, which are supposed to be related to the organization. The organization shall add the identified O - -
(RA-5, RA-5(2)) (4.2.3.12, 4.3.4.4.5)
vulnerability and its impact degree to a list.
[Reference] Japan Vulnerability Notes (https://jvn.jp/) and other sources of information are available for reference to obtain information regarding vulnerability. Also,
CVSS (https://www.ipa.go.jp/security/vuln/CVSS.html Illustrated by IPA) could be used as a referential indicator to evaluate the impact level of vulnerability.
<Basic>
O - - - - -
‐ The organization recognizes vulnerabilities in the information systems that the organization manages using documents which are baselines of security measures.
C-3
Appendix C
Reference Guidelines
Subject that
Measure Corresponding
Requirement ID
Measure Requirement Vulnerability ID
Examples of security measure implements NIST SP 800-53 ISO/IEC 27001:2013
NIST SP 800-171 IEC 62443-2-1:2010 IEC 62443-3-3:2013
measures Rev.4 Annex A
The security management team L1_1_a_SYS, <High‐Advanced>
(SOC/CSIRT) collects information, including L1_3_a_ORG, ‐ The organization establishes a security measure organization managing comprehensively the systems including industrial control systems, IoT systems, etc., and takes
○
vulnerability and threats from internal and L2_1_a_ORG, security measures integrally within the organization. ○
O - (In addition to the -
L2_1_c_SYS, ‐ The person in charge of security updates knowledge about security in both an information system and industrial control system to the latest by attending workshops (4.3.2.3.2)
external sources (through internal tests, L3_1_a_SYS, following, PM-15)
and meetings related to security and by maintaining an appropriate communication structure with security professional associations/institutions. ○
security information, security researchers, L3_3_a_SYS, ‐ Mainly analyze the products/services that the company offers to check if any new vulnerability is contained, and if detected, submit related information to IPA. (In addition to the
etc.), analyzes the information, and L3_3_d_SYS <Advanced> following, A.6.1.4)
CPS.RA-2 establishes a process to implement and use ‐ The organization, with a chief security officer at the center, establishes a security management team mainly for information systems and IoT systems with high ○
measures. ○
business importance, and prepares a structure for handling security measures within the organization. O - (In addition to the -
(4.2.3.9, 4.2.3.12)
‐ The organization collects information on vulnerabilities, threats, etc., from organizations, including the Information‐technology Promotion Agency (IPA), JPCERT/CC, following, PM-16)
industry ISAC, and business partners (device vendors and software vendors), and determines the necessity of actions by comparing to the organization’s asset list.
<Basic>
‐ For both information systems and industrial control systems, the organization appoints a chief security officer and a person responsible for security measures to clarify ○ ○ ○
O - -
the security roles and responsibilities within the organization. (SI-5) (A.6.1.1) (4.3.2.3.2)
‐ The organization checks security‐related cautions offered by device vendors and software vendors, and notifies stakeholders within the organization about them.
Identify and document the assumed L1_1_a_SYS, <High‐Advanced>
○ ○
security incidents, those impacts on the L1_1_b_SYS, ‐ The organization updates security knowledge to the latest by attending workshops and meetings related to security and by maintaining an appropriate communication
O - (In addition to the (In addition to the - -
oraganization’s assets, and the causes of L1_1_c_SYS structure with security professional associations/institutions.
following, PM-15) following, A.6.1.4)
those. ‐ As necessary, the organization utilizes services provided by experts, obtains information that only some experts can know, and uses them to identify threats.
<Advanced>
CPS.RA-3 ○
‐ The organization collects information including newly released attacking trends, malware behaviors, and malicious IP addresses/domains (external intelligence). ○
O - - -
‐ The organization evaluates the reliability of the obtained threat information, impacts on the organization, etc., selects vulnerabilities to be handled, and documents (PM-16) (4.2.3.9, 4.2.3.12)
threats to be handled.
<Basic> ○
O - - - -
‐ The orgainzation recognizes threats to the security of the organization and the possibility of occurrence using baseline documents for identifying security threats. (Clause 6.1.2)
- Conduct risk assessments regularly to L1_1_a_SYS, <High‐Advanced>
check if the security rules for managing the L1_1_b_SYS, ‐ When developing a new device or a new component which may have an impact on a physical space such as components of an industrial control system, the
components are effective and applicable to L1_1_c_SYS, organization collects/analyzes accident case studies of conventional products and others to identify safety‐related hazards.
L2_1_a_COM, ‐ The organization analyzes a situation where a hazard leads to harm and identifies the possibility of occurrence and the severity of the harm to estimate a possible risk O - - - -
the components for implementation. L2_1_a_PRO, especially regarding an industrial control system. At the time, it is desirable to check whether there is any hazard caused by a security issue.
- Check the presence of unacceptable L2_2_a_ORG, ‐ The organization updates the risk assessment if there is a significant change in the industrial control system or the environment in which it operates, or the other
known security risks, including safety L2_2_a_SYS change that affects the security state of the industrial control system. ○
hazards, from the planning and design <Advanced> (A.12.6.1, A.18.2.2,
phase of an IoT device and systems ‐ The organization updates a risk assessment when there is a big change in a system or an environment where a system is running (including identification of a new A.18.2.3)
incorporating IoT devices. threat or vulnerability) or when any situation which impacts the security status of a system occurs.
○
‐ When planning/designing a new system using an IoT device, the organization identifies existing assets and assets to be protected in the system to be implemented and ○
O (In addition to the -
organizes security measures according to use and configuration of the system. When handling a component or a system with a long life cycle and a component or a (3.11.1)
following, SA-12(2))
system requiring availability, consideration in security measures at a phase before designing is especially important.
‐ When considering security measures applied to purchased products and services, the organization makes sure that the levels of measures correspond to the
CPS.RA-4
importance of such products and services.
<Basic>
‐ The organization defines a security risk assessment process and applies it periodically (e.g., once a year).
○
‐ Establish and maintain security risk criteria.
(4.2.3.9, 4.2.3.12)
‐ Identify security risks in the following way.
1) Clarify the target of analysis.
2) Identify incidents (including changes in circumstances) and their causes. ○
○
‐ Analyze security risks in the following way. O - (Clause 6.1.2, A.18.2.2, -
(RA-3)
1) Evaluate possible results when the above identified risks occur. A.18.2.3)
2) Evaluate the possibility of the actual occurrence of the above identified risks.
‐ Refer to the risk criteria, determine a risk level, and prioritize the risk.
‐ The organization documents and stores the information security risk assessment process.
[Reference] An “asset‐based” method and a “business damage‐based” method are known as security risk assessment methods.
Consider threats, vulnerability, likelihood, L1_1_a_SYS, <High‐Advanced>
and impacts when assessing risks. L1_1_b_SYS, ‐ The organization uses automated mechanisms for risk assessment (e.g. assessment of the scope of impact) as they receive information about newly identified threats
L1_1_c_SYS and vulnerabilities. O - - - - -
‐ The organization securely shares with their stakeholders in the supply chain the information about threats and vulnerabilities that may have significant impacts on
relevant parties as well as the organization.
<Advanced>
‐ The organization updates a risk assessment when there is a big change in an information system or an environment where an information system is running (including
○
identification of a new threat or vulnerability) or when any situation which impacts the security status of a system occurs. In that case, give priority to an information O - - -
(A.12.6.1)
system or industrial control system with high importance.
* Implementation details common to CPS.RA‐4
<Basic>
CPS.RA-5
‐ The organization defines a security risk assessment process and applies it periodically (e.g., once a year).
‐ Establish and maintain security risk criteria.
○
‐ Identify security risks in the following way.
(RA-3)
1) Clarify the target of analysis.
2) Identify incidents (including changes in circumstances) and their causes. ○
O - - -
‐ Analyze information security risks in the following way. (Clause 6.1.2)
1) Evaluate possible results when the above identified risks occur.
2) Evaluate the possibility of the actual occurrence of the above identified risks.
‐ Refer to the risk criteria, determine a risk level, and prioritize the risk.
‐ The organization documents and stores the information security risk assessment process.
* Implementation details common to CPS.RA‐4
C-4
Appendix C
Reference Guidelines
Subject that
Measure Corresponding
Requirement ID
Measure Requirement Vulnerability ID
Examples of security measure implements NIST SP 800-53 ISO/IEC 27001:2013
NIST SP 800-171 IEC 62443-2-1:2010 IEC 62443-3-3:2013
measures Rev.4 Annex A
- On the basis of the results of the risk L1_1_a_SYS, <High‐Advanced>
assessment, clearly define the details of L1_1_b_SYS, ‐ On the basis of the results of the hazard analysis performed in CPS.RA‐4, mainly for the industrial control system, the organization appropriately treats the source of a
measures to prevent possible security risks, L1_1_c_SYS, risk which may lead to a critical hazard as necessary. ○
O - - - -
L2_1_a_COM, (A.5.1.2)
and document the organized outcome from L2_1_a_PRO,
[Reference] Security integration in safety control has been particularly discussed in recent years in terms of international standardization, and IEC TR 63074, IEC TR
the scope and priorities of the measures. L2_2_a_SYS 63069, etc., are available for reference.
- React accordingly to the security risks and <Advanced>
the associated safety risks identified as a ‐ The organization securely stores the documented information on security risk management processes.
result of the assessment conducted at the ‐ When the organization selects a measure according to the risk assessment results, it is desirable that the organization documents the measure to be taken and the
planning and design phase of an IoT device reason why the measure is adopted.
CPS.RA-6 and systems incorporating IoT devices. ‐ When applying the measure, the organization formulates a security risk management plan and obtains an approval from the risk owner.
○ ○
‐ The organization reviews the security risk handling plan and checks that the applicable plan conforms to the priority order of the entire organization’s risk management O - -
(3.12.4) (PM-4)
strategy. ○
‐ The organization informs applicable external business operators regarding security measures necessary for a new system including an IoT device which are extracted in (Clause 6.1.3, Clause
CPS.RA‐4 as required specifications. 8.3, A.5.1.2)
‐ The organization verifies whether the security measures defined in the required specifications and contracts are implemented at the time of deployment of the
systems including an IoT device via User Acceptance Test (UAT). If there is anything unclear, confirm with the external business operator.
<Basic>
‐ The organization considers the risk assessment results and selects handling measures to identified risks.
O - - - -
‐ The organization formulates a security risk treatment implementation plan.
‐ The organization obtain an approval from the risk owner for acceptance of the security risk.
Confirm the implementation status of the L1_1_a_PRO, <High‐Advanced>
organization’s’ cyber security risk L1_1_b_PRO, ‐ When formulating and revising a risk management strategy, the organization performs an interview regarding risk management strategies with highly important
management and communicate the results L1_1_c_PRO, business partners to align awareness on security risks and necessary measures. In that case, it is desirable to handle the following:
L1_3_b_ORG, ‐ Major security risks related to the business of the organization and continuance of the business O - - - -
to appropriate parties within the L1_3_c_ORG ‐ Details and scale of impact on the business partner when the above risks are manifested
organization (e.g. senior management).
‐ Handling policy for the above security risks
Define the scope of responsibilities of the ‐ (When the risk management strategy is revised) Changes in the internal and external conditions and important point to be changed from the previous versions
organization and the relevant parties (e.g. <Advanced>
subcontractor), and establish and ‐ The organization formulates a comprehensive risk management strategy to manage risks to the organization’s business, capital, persons, and other organizations
implement the process to confirm the caused by operating and using information system and industrial control system.
implementation status of security risk ‐ The organization implements the risk management strategy while keeping consistency in the entire organization.
management of relevant parties. ‐ The organization reviews and updates the risk management strategy periodically or when it is necessary to cope with an organizational change.
CPS.RM-1 ‐ The organization's management periodically reviews the following aspects of the organization's risk management strategy that are concerned with security.
‐ How many attacks are you facing (detected)
○ ○ ○
(Detection number by anti‐virus products/IDS, latest threat trends etc.) O - -
(PM-9) (Clause 9.3) (4.3.4.2)
‐ Is the status of security measures implimentation as planned?
(Application rate of security measures to be implemented such as anti‐malware and security patch application etc.)
‐Did you allow the attacker (including insider) to intrude?
(Description of an event suspected of external intrusion or internal fraud through security monitoring activities)
‐What is the state of security that is not directly related to information systems or industrial control systems
(Retirement, loss of PC and devices, occurrence of physical theft etc.)
‐ The organization documents and stores the results of reviews by the management.
<Basic>
‐ The organization identifies the person responsible for security risk management both in information systems and in industrial control systems. O - - - - -
‐ The organization identifies the scope of security risks responsible for in its business.
Determine the organization’s risk tolerance L1_1_a_ORG, <High‐Advanced>
level based on the result of the risk L1_1_a_SYS, ‐ The organization determines the risk tolerance level of the organization by capturing risk situations related to supply chains performed in CPS.BE‐1 and based on the
assessment and its role in the supply chain. L1_1_b_ORG, given results of the risk assessments performed in CPS.RA‐4. O - - - -
L1_1_b_SYS, ○
‐ The organization interviews important business partners who may have suffer from an undesirable impact because of a security incident in the organization to discuss
L1_1_c_SYS (In addition to the
about the organization’s risk tolerance level.
following, SA-14)
<Advanced>
CPS.RM-2
‐ The organization determines the risk tolerance level of the organization by capturing actual risk situations of supply chains performed in CPS.BE‐1 <Advanced> and O - -
based on the given results of the risk assessments performed in CPS.RA‐4. ○
○
<Basic> (Clause 6.1.3, Clause
(4.3.2.6.5)
‐ The organization determines the risk tolerance level based on the given results of the risk assessments performed in CPS.RA‐4. ○ 8.3)
O - -
‐ The organization obtains approvals to remaining risks from the owners of the risks. (PM-8)
‐ The organization documents the risk management results and safely maintains lists of risk tolerance criteria and accepted risks.
Formulate the standard of security L1_1_a_ORG, Common among <High‐Advanced> and <Advanced>
measures relevant to the supply chain in L1_1_b_ORG, ‐ The organization, in reference to security measure criteria regarding supply chain, prepares and provides to potential partners tender documents such as ITT (Invitation
consideration of the business life cycle, and L1_1_c_ORG To Tender) and RFP (Request For Proposal). Especially, it is advisable that the following items be included in the tender documents.
agree on contents with the business 1) Specifications of products or services to be procured
2) Security requirements that the supplie should comply with during the supply period of the products or services
partners after clarifying the scope of the ○ ○
3) Service levels and the indices to comply with during the supply period of the products or services
responsibilities. 4) Penalties that the purchaser may impopse if the supplier breach security requirements
O - (In addition to the (In addition to the - -
following, SA-9(2)) following, A.15.2.1)
CPS.SC-1 5) Confidentiality clauses to protect the data transmitted during the supplier selection process, the systems, etc.
‐ The organization prepares procedures for continuously monitoring the conditions in the business partners’ compliance with the security management measures.
‐ To take precautions against cases where a security incident in a business partner impacts the organization, in a written contract, clarify where responsibility lies
between the external business operator and the organization, and describe the compensation for a damage to the organization for which the external business operator
is responsible.
<Basic>
○ ○ ○
‐ The organization formulates security measure criteria applicable to business partners (especially those handling the organization’s data or providing a foundation for O - -
(SA-9) (A.15.1.1, A.15.1.2) (4.3.4.4.1)
handling the data) according to appropriate laws and regulations and makes agreement with the details.
C-5
Appendix C
Reference Guidelines
Subject that
Measure Corresponding
Requirement ID
Measure Requirement Vulnerability ID
Examples of security measure implements NIST SP 800-53 ISO/IEC 27001:2013
NIST SP 800-171 IEC 62443-2-1:2010 IEC 62443-3-3:2013
measures Rev.4 Annex A
Identify, prioritize, and evaluate the L1_1_a_ORG, <High‐Advanced>
○
organizations and people that play L1_1_b_ORG, ‐ The organization determines its core business that must continue/recover before any other operations in prior and identifies and prioritizes important resources (other
L1_1_c_ORG, (In addition to the
important role in each layer of the three- relevant organizations, employees, items, data, systems, etc.) and functions vital for continuing applicable businesses.
O - following, 4.2.3.3, -
L2_3_c_ORG, ‐ In case of the occurrence of a security incident in business partners which has harmful business impacts, the organization estimate the details of the impacts on the
layer structure to sustaining the operation of L3_1_b_ORG, 4.2.3.8, 4.2.3.9,
organization and its occurrence level and scale. ○
the organization. L3_1_c_ORG, 4.2.3.10)
* Related requirements of countermeasures include CPS.AM‐6 and CPS.BE‐2. (In addition to the
L3_3_a_ORG, <Advanced> following, SA-14) ○
L3_3_b_ORG, ‐ The organization identifies the business partners in the supply chains which can impact the organization’s missions/business processes and confirms whether (4.2.3.1, 4.2.3.2,
L3_3_d_ORG O - -
applicable partners can fulfill the security roles and responsibilities specified in the organization’s security policies. 4.2.3.4, 4.2.3.6, 4.2.3.12,
4.2.3.13, 4.2.3.14,
○ 4.3.4.2)
CPS.SC-2
<Basic> (A.15.1.1, A.15.1.2)
‐ The organization should identify in advance the core businesses that should be continued and restored in priority, and the operations considered to be important. In
addition, identify and prioritize important resources (relevant parties, People, Components, Data, System, etc.) and functions from the viewpoint of business continuity.
‐ When the organization is assumed to use an IoT device for a long period of time, the organization selects a business partner (device vendor) that has adequate
organizations of management (Ex: service desk(s), maintainance system) from which long‐term support can be expected.
○
‐ The organization confirms with the partner (the device vendor) whether to replace a device at the end of support before implementing a system. O - - -
(SA-4)
‐ When the organization selects a business partner (service provider), it is desirable to select a service provider who operates and manages IT services efficiently and
effectively.
‐ It has acquired ITSMS certification based on JIS Q 20000.
‐ It has implemented the equivalent measures to ITSMS certification based on self declaration of comformity.
<Basic>
‐ The organization requires business partners to implement security requirements that complies with applicable laws and regulations. ○
O - -
‐ The organization confirms that the business partner has declared "SECURITY ACTION" in the process of selecting and evaluating a contractor. (SA-9)
* "SECURITY ACTION" is an initiative in Japan that small and medium‐sized enterprises declare themselves to work on information security measures.
When signing contracts with external L1_1_a_PRO, <High‐Advanced>
○
parties, check if the products and services L1_1_b_PRO, ‐ The organization or a third party tests the procured devices to see whether the security requirements stipulated in the contract are fulfilled.
O - - (In addition to the - -
provided by the other relevant organizations L1_1_c_PRO, ‐ The organization checks throughout the entire relevant supply chain (including reconsigned organizations) as to whether the devices especially important for their
following, A.14.3.1)
L1_1_d_ORG, operation are manufactured under appropriate procedures by organizations that have quality and security management ability above a certain level.
properly comply with the security L1_1_d_COM, <Advanced>
requirements defined by the organization L2_1_a_COM, ‐ The organization specifies in the contract the security requirements that the products and services procured from the partner should comply with, such as the
while considering the objectives of such L2_1_a_PRO, following.
contracts and results of risk management. L2_2_a_ORG, ‐ Specific certifications related to security (e.g., ISMS certification 、ISASecure EDSA certification, Japan Information Technology Security Evaluation and Certification
L2_3_a_ORG, Scheme (JISEC) have been gained.
L2_3_c_ORG, ‐ The vendor itself confirms that it has implemented the security measures in accordance with the standards of specific certifications related to security
L2_3_c_PRO,
‐ It has implemented the necessary security requirements from the design phase (security by design) based on the results of risk analysis, etc., and test them.
L2_3_d_ORG,
‐ It is desirable that the organization should, at the phase of planning procurement, secure a budget for security requirements regarding products or services ○
L3_1_b_ORG,
themselves, or protection of assets used for procurement and supply of such products or services. O - - (A.8.3.3, A.14.1.1, - -
L3_3_a_ORG,
‐ The organization formulates, manages and improves security measurement rules to evaluate procurement or supply of products or services, including the following. A.14.2.9, A.15.1.3)
CPS.SC-4 L3_3_b_ORG,
L3_3_c_ORG, ‐ Target for measurement
L3_3_d_ORG ‐ Method and frequency of reporting on measures taken
‐ Measures to be taken when measures are not implemented
‐ The organization checks means of detecting (or preventing) falsifications and leakages during shipments and whether or not the IoT devices and software being
delivered have been operated without authorization.
‐ Goods: security courier, protection seal, etc.
‐ Digital transfer: encryption, hash of the entire transmitted data, etc.
<Basic>
‐ During procurement, the organization confirms whether the IoT devices which the organization possesses are genuine products by checking the label.
‐ By utilizing IDs, secret keys, and electronic certificates included in the IoT devices and software, an organization confirms that procured devices are genuine products.
‐ The organization will confirm the following when selecting relevant parties for the provision of products and services. O - - - - -
‐The product/service support period is sufficient, including the distribution of security patches.
‐The response after the support period has been identified.
C-6
Appendix C
Reference Guidelines
Subject that
Measure Corresponding
Requirement ID
Measure Requirement Vulnerability ID
Examples of security measure implements NIST SP 800-53 ISO/IEC 27001:2013
NIST SP 800-171 IEC 62443-2-1:2010 IEC 62443-3-3:2013
measures Rev.4 Annex A
Formulate and manage security L1_1_a_PEO, <High‐Advanced>
requirements applicable to members of L1_1_b_PEO, ‐ The organization prepares a procedure to continuously monitor whether the security requirements from the contractee are complied with by the staff of the O - - -
other relevant organizations, such as L1_1_c_PEO, contractor, and to enable notification to the organization's personnel in charge in the case where irregular behavior is found.
L2_3_b_PEO, <Advanced>
business partners, who are engaged in L3_1_b_PEO, ‐ The organization trains the staff on information security aspects of supplier relationships to particularly ensure that the handling of confidential information is
operations outsourced from the L3_1_c_PEO O - - -
correctly understood. ○ ○
CPS.SC-5 organization. ‐ The organization regularly confirms that it complies with the security requirements from the contractee in conducting the contracted work. (PS-7) (A.16.1.2, A.16.1.5)
<Basic>
‐ The organization identifies and evaluates the staff who access, disclose or change the data related to the contracted work that should not be disclosed or changed such
as confidential data or intellectual property. O - - -
‐ After the contract with the contractor is finished, the organization immediately terminates the rights that are temporarily granted to the personnel of the contractor
such as access rights to its facilities.
Conduct regular assessments through L1_1_a_DAT, <High‐Advanced>
auditing, test results, or other checks of L1_1_a_PRO, ‐ The organization adopts an automatic mechanism integrating review, analysis, and report that supports the investigation and addresses procedures for deviation or
relevant parties such as business partners L1_1_b_PRO, signs of deviation from contract matters.
L1_1_c_PRO, ‐ The organization uses a mechanism that allows it to list and check whether obligatory matters stipulated in the contract are fulfilled, matters which are concerned with ○
to ensure they are fulfilling their contractual L2_3_c_ORG, ○
security management of the organization and security functions implemented in the products and services that will be delivered, especially for important clients and (In addition to the
obligations. L2_3_c_PRO, O (In addition to the - -
reconsigned organizations. following, AU-6(1), AU-
L2_3_d_ORG, following, 3.3.5)
‐ State of compliance with security management measures of the external service provider is regularly checked by external audits and field surveys conducted by the 6(3))
L3_1_a_DAT, outsourcer.
L3_1_b_ORG, ‐ The important business partners and if possible their re‐contractors etc. investigate whether there is any sign of attack related or any fact of information leakage, and ○
L3_1_b_DAT, (A.12.7.1, A.14.3.1,
regularly report the result to the organization.
L3_1_c_ORG, <Advanced> A.15.2.1)
CPS.SC-6 L3_1_c_DAT,
‐ The organization checks whether requirements that are prescribed in the contract with the client can be audited on the system.
L3_3_a_ORG,.
‐ The information system provides a function that allows for audit records to be created for events defined above that can be audited on the system.
L3_3_b_ORG,
‐ The organization shall be able to maintain consistency in security audits with other organizations that require information on the audit. ○
L3_3_c_ORG, ○ ○ ○
‐ The organization regularly reviews and analyzes audit records that are made manually or automatically by the system, and checks whether there is any deviation or O (AU-2, AU-6, AU-12, SA-
L3_3_d_ORG, (3.3.1) (4.3.2.6.7, 4.3.4.3.1) (SR 6.1)
sign of deviation from contract matters. 9)
L3_4_a_DAT,
L3_4_b_DAT ‐ State of compliance with security management measures of the external service provider is regularly checked by internal audits that are conducted by the client using
a checklist.
<Basic>
‐ Acquisition certificate of various authentications and systems (e.g., ISMS, CSMS, privacy mark) are checked as an alternative method to confirm the implementation of O - - - - -
required security measures.
Formulate and implement procedures to L1_1_a_PRO, <High‐Advanced>
address noncompliance to contractual L1_1_b_PRO, ‐ The organization formulates and manages a procedure to execute the following when nonconformity by the partner is found at an audit or test.
requirements found as a result of an audit, L1_1_c_PRO, 1) Identify and assess the influence in terms of security arising from such nonconformity.
O - - - - -
L1_1_d_ORG, 2) Decide whether to review the security requirements defined in the contract.
test, or other check on relevant parties. L2_2_a_ORG, 3) Decide the corrective action to be taken to achieve the acceptable security level within the procured products and services.
L2_3_c_ORG, 4) Agree with the partner on the above .
L2_3_c_PRO, <Advanced>
CPS.SC-7 L3_1_b_ORG, ‐ The organization formulates and manages a procedure to, when nonconformity by the partner is found at an audit or test, require the partner to make a remediation O - - - - -
L3_1_c_ORG, plan and to confirm the implementation status of the plan as needed.
L3_3_a_ORG, <Basic>
L3_3_b_ORG, ‐ The organization is aware of the risk to its own organization due to the failure of its products and services when the non‐conformances in its audits or tests on
L3_3_c_ORG, O - - - - -
products and services occurs.
L3_3_d_ORG
[Reference] Violations in the security incidents of supply chain include violations on system components, IT products, development processes, developers, distribution
CPS.SC-9
processes, and warehouse facilities.
<Advanced>
○
‐ The organization adjusts the incident response process of an external service provider that contains important features in order to continue its business, as well as ○ ○
O (CP-2, CP-2(7)) - (SR 2.8, SR 6.1, SR
adjusting the organization’s incident response process to meet the incident response requirements. (3.6.1, 3.6.3) (4.3.2.5.7)
7.3, SR 7.4)
‐ The organization tests the incident response process that requires cooperation between the organization and external service providers.
<Basic>
O - - - - -
‐ The organization is aware of security incidents that may occur in the organization and their potential consequences.
C-7
Appendix C
Reference Guidelines
Subject that
Measure Corresponding
Requirement ID
Measure Requirement Vulnerability ID
Examples of security measure implements NIST SP 800-53 ISO/IEC 27001:2013
NIST SP 800-171 IEC 62443-2-1:2010 IEC 62443-3-3:2013
measures Rev.4 Annex A
Develop and manage a procedure to be L1_1_a_PRO, <High‐Advanced>
executed when a contract with other L1_1_b_PRO, ‐ The organization assures that, after a contract is finished, it deletes in a timely manner logical and physical access rights that are granted to the contractor to access O - - - - -
relevant organizations such as business L1_1_c_PRO and handle the organizations's resources necessary for the supply of products or services.
<Advanced>
partners is finished. (e.g., expiration of
‐ The organization agrees with the present business partner whether the supply of the products or services should be cancelled or they should be returned to the
contract period, end of support)
CPS.SC-10 organization or the other business partner.
O - - - - -
‐ The organization communicate with the stakeholders who are influenced by the supply of the products or services to provide information on the discontinuation.
‐ The organization executes the discontinuation of the supply of the products or services in accordance with the discontinuation plan.
‐ The organization agrees with business partners on the accomplishment of the discontinuation of the supplied products or services.
<Basic>
O - - - - -
‐ The organization always keeps track of when contracts with relevant parties, such as business partners, are terminated.
Continuously improve the standard of L1_1_a_PRO, Common among <High‐Advanced>, <Advanced> and <Basic>
CPS.SC-11 security measures relevant to the supply L1_1_b_PRO, ‐ The organization continuously monitor the performance of business partners related to security, review and amend as needed the security measure criteria regarding O - - - - -
chain, related procedures, and so on. L1_1_c_PRO the supply chain and related procedures based on the latest trends of security threats and regulations.
Establish and implement the procedure to L1_1_a_COM, <High‐Advanced>
issue, manage, check, cancel, and monitor L1_1_a_SYS, ‐ The organization introduces and operates, for example, the following automated mechanisms for managing accounts in their own information systems and industrial
identification and authentication information L1_1_b_COM, control systems.
L1_1_b_SYS, ○
of authorized goods, people, and ‐Automatically collect account information periodically from the system to be managed
L1_1_c_COM, (In addition to the
‐Automatically change password of privileged account O/S - - -
procedures. L2_3_c_SYS following, AC-2 (1), AC-2
‐ The industrial control system supports integrated account management.
L3_1_a_SYS, (2), AC-2 (3), AC-2(4))
‐ After a certain period of time, the system automatically invalidates temporary accounts, emergency accounts, and accounts not in use on their system.
L3_3_a_SYS ‐ The information system automatically audits and reports account validation and invalidation that is associated with creation, change, and deletion of accounts in the
system used by the organization. ○
<Advanced> (In addition to the
‐ The organization must obtain approval from the management supervisor when creating a system account. following, A.9.2.4,
‐ With regard to the shared user account, a user who can know authentication information is managed in a list or the like, and the range of using the account can be A.9.2.5)
identified.
‐ The organization monitors the usage of system accounts used in an information system.
‐ If an account needs change or becomes unnecessary, the organization notifies the management supervisor. O/S - - -
‐ The organization sets the expiration date of the credential and manages whether the password over the expiration date is used.
‐ The organization notifies the user (or the person in charge of management) when the password is changed in an information system and an industrial control system.
CPS.AC-1 ‐ If the information system resets the credentials for reasons such as user"s forgetting credentials, the information system confirms securely that the account is its own
to prevent unauthorized tampering with the credentials by a malicious party.
<Basic>
‐ The organization appoints a management supervisor for the accounts in its information system and industrial control system. ○
‐ The organization decides and selects types of system accounts necessary (e.g., general user/system administrator/shared user/temporary user), with consideration of (AC-2)
their mission and business functions.
‐ The organization creates and enables system accounts as per the procedure, and changes, disables and deletes them as needed.
‐ The organization develops a policy of credentials (e.g. password, security key) for its own information systems and industrial control systems, and implements a
○
function that cannot be set up unless the credential satisfies the policy. The following is an example of the content of the policy. ○
○ (SR 1.1, SR 1.2, SR
‐ Devolop and operate the requirements for passwords in order to ensure the minimum required complexity. O - (A.9.1.1, A.9.2.1, A.9.2.2,
(4.3.3.5.1) 1.3, SR 1.4, SR 1.5, SR
‐ When new credentials are created, change them to at least the number of characters defined by the organization. A.9.2.6)
1.7, SR 1.8, SR 1.9 )
‐ Store and transmit only cryptographically protected credentials.
‐ Prohibit reuse of the same credentials for the period that the organization defines.
‐ The organization allows its members to use temporary credentials exceptionally when logging on to the system when they have forgotten credentials, if they change
immediately to a strong password.
‐ The organization does not share user identification information among multiple system users in an information system and an industrial control system except when
multiple users function as a single group.
Implement appropriate physical security L1_1_a_SYS, <High‐Advanced> ○ ○
measures such as locking and limiting L1_1_c_SYS, ‐ The organization regulates service wires and transmission paths that are related to their IoT devices and servers by physical access. (In addition to the (In addition to the
O - -
access to the areas where the IoT devices L2_3_b_PEO, ‐ The organization regulates output devices of its system by physical access. following, PE-4, PE-5, following, A11.1.1.4,
L2_3_b_SYS, ‐ The organization monitors alarms and monitoring devices (e.g., surveillance cameras) for physical intrusions into the areas within the physical security boundaries. PE-6 (1)) A11.2.3)
and servers are installed, using entrance L2_3_c_SYS, <Advanced> ○
and exit controls, biometric authentication, L2_3_d_SYS, ○
‐ The organization monitors physical accesses to the areas within the physical security boundaries and regularly reviews the audit log. ○ (In addition to the
deploying surveillance cameras, and L3_1_a_SYS O (In addition to the
following, A.11.1.1, ○
-
‐ The organization keeps the records of visitor’s access to the areas within the physical security boundaries and regularly reviews them. (3.10.2, 3.10.4, 3.10.5)
CPS.AC-2 inspecting belongings and body weight. following, PE-6, PE-8)
A.11.1.5) (4.3.3.3.2, 4.3.3.3.8)
<Basic>
‐ The organization maintains upkeep of the access list for areas where their IoT devices and servers are located and issues permission certificates necessary for access. ○
‐ The organization defines physical security boundaries at its facilities, and implement access control according to the security requirements of assets placed within the ○ ○ (A.9.2.6, A.11.1.2,
O -
boundaries and the results of risk assessment. (3.10.1, 3.10.3) (PE-2, PE-3, PE-8) A.11.1.3, A.11.1.6,
‐ The organization monitors the work of temporarily authorized party within the physical security boundaries, such as by authorized attendants or monitoring cameras. A.11.2.8, A.11.2.9)
C-8
Appendix C
Reference Guidelines
Subject that
Measure Corresponding
Requirement ID
Measure Requirement Vulnerability ID
Examples of security measure implements NIST SP 800-53 ISO/IEC 27001:2013
NIST SP 800-171 IEC 62443-2-1:2010 IEC 62443-3-3:2013
measures Rev.4 Annex A
Properly authorize wireless connection L2_3_c_SYS, <High‐Advanced>
destinations (including users, IoT devices, L3_3_a_SYS ‐ The information system and the industrial control system automatically monitor or regulate remote access to its system.
and servers). ‐ The information system and the industrial control system allow only for remote access routed by the regulated access points. ○ ○
‐ The information system allows privileged command via remote access only for those purposes based on specified requirements. (In addition to the (In addition to the
○
‐ The information system records reasons why the users accessing the system which handles highly confidential data execute privileged commands and access security following, 3.1.12, 3.1,13, following, AC-17(1), AC-
S - - (In addition to the
information by remote access. 3.1.14, 3.1.15, 3.1.17, 17(2), AC-17(3), AC-
following, SR 1.13)
‐ The information system protects wireless access to the system which handles highly confidential data by using user and device authentication in addition to 3.1.19, 3.10.6, 3.13.12, 17(4), AC-18(1), AC-
encryption. 3.13.15) 19(5))
‐ The information system blocks remote activation of devices such as white boards, cameras, and microphones connected via networks which may handle highly
CPS.AC-3 confidential data. Signs of the devices in use are provided to the users of these devices.
<Advanced>
○ ○ ○
‐ The organization regulates the mobile devices used in the organization and establishes setting requirements, connection requirements, and implementation guidelines
O (In addition to the (In addition to the (In addition to the -
for mobile devices.
following, 3.1.18) following, AC-19) following, A.6.2.1)
‐ The organization establishes rules of approval for connecting mobile devices used in the organization to its system. ○
<Basic> (SR 1.1, SR 1.2, SR
‐ The organization establishes usage regulations, configuration requirements, and implementation guidelines for each type of approved remote access. 2.6)
○ ○ ○
‐ The organization in principle prohibits unauthorized wireless connections. O -
(3.1.16) (AC-17, AC-18) (A.6.2.2)
‐ The organization establishes rules of approval for remote access to an information system and an industrial control system.
‐ The organization authorizes wireless access to its system in advance of the approval.
Prevent unauthorized log-in to IoT devices L2_1_b_SYS, <High‐Advanced>
○
and servers by measures such as L3_3_a_SYS ‐ The information system and the industrial control system (excluding some cases where immediacy of response is required) sets a limit to the number of continuous S -
(SR 1.11)
implementing functions for lockout after a login attempts on its system. If the user fails to log in, he or she will only be able to re‐login after the administrator removes the restriction.
<Advanced>
specified number of incorrect log-in
‐ The information system and the industrial control system set a limit on the number of continuous login attempts on its system. If the user fails to log in, he or she will ○ ○ ○
attempts and providing a time interval until ○
not be able to re‐login for a certain period of time. (3.1.8) (AC-7) (A.9.4.2)
CPS.AC-4 safety is ensured. ‐ The information system and industrial control system lock the session manually or automatically if the system's non‐operation continues beyond the time set by the S - (SR 1.11, SR 1.13, SR
organization. 2.6)
* In the industrial control system, it may be desirable not to lock session when it is assumed that a session in which an operator is required to respond immediately in
an emergency may be conducted.
<Basic>
- - - - - -
‐ N/A
Segregate duties and areas of responsibility L1_1_a_SYS, <High‐Advanced>
properly (e.g. segregate user functions from L1_1_b_SYS, ‐ The organization specifies administrators who use the security functions (e.g., access authority setting) and regulates privileged accounts in its system.
system administrator functions) L2_1_c_SYS, ‐ The information system adopts a system monitoring mechanism to check the use of privileged functions. ○
L3_1_a_SYS ‐ The information system prohibits non‐privileged users from executing privileged functions on the system by invalidating, avoiding, and changing security measures ○ (In addition to the
that are changed and implemented by non‐privileged users. O/S (In addition to the following, AC-6(1), - -
‐ The organization can minimize the number of users who can use the system administrator's authority in an emergency to minimize the damage caused by the security following, 3.1.6, 3.1.7) AC-6(2), AC-6(5),
incident. AC-6(9), AC-6(10))
‐ The organization can prevent even system administrators from stopping critical services and protected processes through the server to minimize the damage caused by ○
security incidents. (A.6.1.2, A.9.2.3, A.9.4.1,
<Advanced> A.9.4.4)
‐ The organization implements access control in the information system and the industrial control system based on separation of duties (e.g., user / system
CPS.AC-5
administrator).
○
‐ The organization adopts a general rule on the minimum authority of specific duties. ○ ○
O (AC-3, AC-5, AC-6, SC- -
‐ Segregate authority of general user from that of administrator. (3.1.4, 3.1.5, 3.13.3) (4.3.3.2.7)
2)
(Require users to use the system with a non‐privileged account when using a non‐security function.)
‐ Minimize authority for duties not in charge.
‐ The organization separates and stipulates duties that are assigned by the person in charge.
<Basic>
‐ The organization implements access control based on separation of duties (e.g. user/system administrator) in the highly confidential information system of the
○
organization. O - - - -
(SR 2.1)
‐ If the separation of duties is difficult to implement due to the shortage of human resources, etc., it is desirable to take alternative measures such as, when a person
other than the pre‐designated official performs the specific duties, requiring another person to monitor the performance of such duties.
Adopt high confidence methods of L1_1_a_SYS, <High‐Advanced>
authentication where appropriate based on L1_1_b_SYS, ‐ The system uses a multifactor authentication in its system for access to the system or network with non‐privileged accounts. ○
L2_1_c_SYS, ○
risk (e.g. multi-factor authentication, ‐ Regarding an information system that handles highly confidential data, access to the system and network with privileged or non‐privileged accounts in the system, uses (下In addition to the
S (In addition to the -
L3_1_a_SYS an authentication mechanism that can tolerate attacks of replay. following, IA-2(2), IA-
combining more than two types of following, 3.5.4)
2(8), IA-2(9))
authentication) when logging in to the ○
[Reference] It is desirable to refer to NIST SP 800 63‐3 regarding strength of authentication methods and appropriate use cases.
system over the network for the privileged <Advanced>
(In addition to the
user. following, A.9.1.2,
‐ In consideration of the risk of unauthorized login to the privileged account in the system, the organization in principle prohibits login to the privileged account via the
○ A.9.2.3, A.9.4.1, A.9.4.4) ○
CPS.AC-6 network when it is not possible to implement a sufficient confidence methods of authentication. ○
(In addition to the (SR 2.1)
‐ The information system requires a multifactor authentication in its system for access to the system or network with privileged accounts when cannot implement S (In addition to the -
following, IA-2(1), IA-
actions such as invalidating the administrator account for the system. following, 3.5.3)
2(3))
‐ In principle, the organization invalidates the default administrator account in the information system.
‐ The information system permits the necessary minimum privileged authority to the user account when performing privileged operations.
<Basic>
‐ Regarding access to the system and network with privileged or non‐privileged accounts in the system, the organization uses an authentication method that uniquely ○ ○ ○
O/S -
identifies the access. (3.5.1) (IA-2) (A.9.2.1)
C-9
Appendix C
Reference Guidelines
Subject that
Measure Corresponding
Requirement ID
Measure Requirement Vulnerability ID
Examples of security measure implements NIST SP 800-53 ISO/IEC 27001:2013
NIST SP 800-171 IEC 62443-2-1:2010 IEC 62443-3-3:2013
measures Rev.4 Annex A
Develop a policy about controlling data L2_1_b_SYS, <High‐Advanced>
flow, and according that protect the L3_1_a_DAT, ‐ The information system and the industrial control system monitor and control communications on the networks composing internal business systems of the
integrity of the network by means such as L3_4_b_SYS organization.
○ ○
appropriate network isolation (e.g., ‐ Regarding the network which the system that handles highly confidential data is connected to, the organization shall deny network communications as a default and
(In addition to the (In addition to the
shall only allow connection of approved communication traffic. S ○ - -
development and test environment vs. following, 3.1.3, 3.13.6, following, SC-7(5), SC-
‐ The organization physically or logically separates the network of high importance industrial control systems from the network of control systems with lower (In addition to the
production environment, and environment importance.
3.13.7) 7(7))
following, A.13.1.1,
incorporates IoT devices vs. other ‐ If the information system that handles highly confidential data is connected to a remote device, the organization is to prevent multiple and simultaneous local A.13.1.3, A.14.1.2,
environments within the organization). connections between the device and the system, as well as prevent access to external network resources by other connections. A.14.1.3)
<Advanced>
CPS.AC-7 ○
○
‐ The information system and industrial control system monitor and regulate connection of external and internal boundaries of the network to which the system is
O/S - (In addition to the
connected (in the case of industrial control systems, boundaries with information systems). (4.3.3.4.2, 4.3.3.4.3)
following, SC-7)
‐ The organization installs boundary protection devices to promote effective security in the system and connects to external networks via the device.
<Basic>
○
‐ The organization establishes a data flow regulation policy that defines the range in which data flow within information systems and industrial control system is
(SR 3.1, SR 3.8)
permitted and the range in which data flow between systems is permitted, and regulates the flow by segregating the network appropriately.
○ ○ ○ ○
‐ The organization logically or physically segments the control system's network from the network composing of the information system. O/S
(3.1.3) (AC-4) (A.12.1.4, A.13.2.1) (4.3.3.4.1)
[Reference] Implement physical segmentation in environments physically separated from other networks. Alternatively, in environments physically close to other
networks, it is possible to implement logical segmentation in consideration of the cost of the measure.
Restrict communications by IoT devices L2_1_b_SYS, Common among <High‐Advanced>, <Advanced> and <Basic>
and servers to those with entities (e.g. L3_3_a_SYS ‐ The organization assigns identifiers to its IoT devices and servers, as well as managing the identification by preventing re‐use of identifiers and invalidating identifiers ○
○
people, components, system, etc.) after a certain period of time. ○ ○ ○ (SR 1.1, SR 1.2, SR
CPS.AC-8 O/S (4.3.3.2.2, 4.3.3.5.2,
identified through proper procedures. ‐ Before connecting their IoT devices and servers to the network, the information system and the industrial control system prepare a mechanism that uniquely identifies (3.5.5, 3.5.6, 3.8.2) (IA-4) (A.7.1.1, A.9.2.1) 1.4, SR 1.5, SR 1.9, SR
4.3.3.7.2, 4.3.3.7.3)
and authenticate these devices. 2.1)
‐ Communication using IoT devices is denied as default. The protocol to be used is authorized as an exception.
Authenticate and authorize logical accesses L1_1_a_SYS, <High‐Advanced>
to system components by IoT devices and L1_1_b_SYS, ‐ The information system and industrial control system require authentication using a public key infrastructure (PKI) , especially regarding login to a system that handles
users according to the transaction risks L2_1_b_SYS, highly confidential data. ○ ○
○ ○
L3_1_a_SYS, * When performing authentication using PKI in an industrial control system, ensure that the processing wait time that occurs does not degrade system performance. (In addition to the (In addition to the
(personal security, privacy risks, and other L3_4_b_SYS S (In addition to the (In addition to the
‐ The information system and industrial control system lay down conditions that require disconnection of the session for its system and implement a function that following, IA-2, IA-5(2), following, 4.3.3.6.3,
organizational risks). following, 3.1.11) following, 、SR 1.9)
automatically terminates a user’s session when it falls under these conditions. AC-12) 4.3.3.6.5, 4.3.3.6.7)
[Reference] For the strength of authentication schemes and appropriate use cases, it is advisable to refer to NIST SP 800‐63‐3. ○
<Advanced> (A.9.3.1, A.9.4.3, A.9.4.5)
‐ The organization checks the user’s identity and authenticates using a mechanism that has sufficient strength for the risk of the transaction (security‐related risks for
○ ○ ○
the user, privacy risks, etc.).
(3.1.1, 3.1.2, 3.1.9, ○
‐ The information system displays a notification message on the risk of the transaction (security‐related risks for the user, privacy risks, etc.) when a user logs into the (4.3.3.6.1, 4.3.3.6.2, (SR 1.1, SR 1.2, SR
O/S 3.1.10, 3.5.2, 3.5.7, (IA-5, IA-5(1), IA-6, AC-8,
system. 4.3.3.6.4, 4.3.3.6.6, 1.5, SR 1.7, SR 1.8, SR
CPS.AC-9 3.5.8, 3.5.9, 3.5.10, AC-11, AC-11(1))
‐ The information system and the industrial control system make the feedback on the authentication information invisible in its system during the authentication 4.3.3.6.8, 4.3.3.6.9) 1.10)
3.5.11)
process.
‐ The organization sets the expiration date of the credential and manages whether the password over the expiration date is used.
<Basic>
‐ The organization develops a policy of credentials (e.g. password, security key) for its own information systems and industrial control systems, and implements a
function that cannot be set up unless the credential satisfies the policy. The following is an example of the content of the policy.
‐ Devolop and operate the requirements for passwords in order to ensure the minimum required complexity.
‐ When new credentials are created, change them to at least the number of characters defined by the organization.
O/S - - - - -
‐ Store and transmit only cryptographically protected credentials.
‐ Prohibit reuse of the same credentials for the period that the organization defines.
‐ The organization allows its members to use temporary credentials exceptionally when logging on to the system when they have forgotten credentials, if they change
immediately to a strong password.
‐ Information system and industrial control system limit the transactions and functions that can be performed to authenticated users.
Provide appropriate training and education L1_1_a_PEO, <High‐Advanced> ○ ○
to all individuals in the organization and L1_1_b_PEO, ‐ The organization provides security awareness trainings to all necessary personnel so that they will recognize and report signs of internal fraud. O (In addition to the (In addition to the - -
manage the record so that they can fulfill L1_1_c_PEO, following, 3.2.3) following, AT-2(2))
L1_1_d_PEO, <Advanced>
assigned roles and responsibilities to L1_2_a_PEO, ‐ The organization regularly provides basic security awareness training to all members of staff. The organization can, for example, educate the following matters in
prevent and contain the occurrence and L1_3_a_PEO, addition to the contents explaining general matters.
severity of security incidents. L1_3_a_DAT, ‐Procedure to response when you receive a suspicious email ○
L1_3_c_PEO, ○
‐Notes on using mobile devices (e.g. Notes on connecting to a public wireless LAN) O (In addition to the ○ ○ -
CPS.AT-1 L3_4_a_PEO (3.2.1)
‐Notes on using SNS following, AT-3) (A.7.2.1, A.7.2.2) (4.3.2.3.4, 4.3.2.4.1,
‐ The organization creates a program for each role (e.g., system/software developper, purchasing personnel, system administrator, personnel in charge of security 4.3.2.4.2, 4.3.2.4.6,
measures) to train information security personnel and to improve their skills. The program is conducted regularly on applicable personnel. 4.3.3.2.5, 4.3.4.5.4,
‐ The organization regularly reviews records of security education and training. 4.3.4.5.11)
<Basic>
‐ The organization provides basic security awareness training to new staff, or when necessary due to changes made to the information systems and the industrial control ○
O - -
systems which the organization uses. (AT-2)
‐ The organization records and manages the contents and results of security education and training for member in the organization.
C-10
Appendix C
Reference Guidelines
Subject that
Measure Corresponding
Requirement ID
Measure Requirement Vulnerability ID
Examples of security measure implements NIST SP 800-53 ISO/IEC 27001:2013
NIST SP 800-171 IEC 62443-2-1:2010 IEC 62443-3-3:2013
measures Rev.4 Annex A
Provide appropriate training and security L1_3_b_PEO, <High‐Advanced>
education to members of the organization L1_3_a_DAT, ‐ The organization monitors its personnel and related organizations that may be involved in the security incident for the accomplishment status of the roles assigned to O - - - -
and other relevant parties of high L3_3_a_PEO the personnel in charge.
<Advanced>
importance in security management that ○
‐ The organization requests the giving of training (e.g. simulation assuming actual incident) and security education appropriate to execution of the roles assigned to the ○
may be involved in the security incident (In addition to the
personnel in charge to related organizations that may be involved in the security incident and confirms the training/education implementation status. O (In addition to the - - -
CPS.AT-2 prevention and response. Then, manage following, 4.3.2.4.3,
‐ The organization regularly reviews the records of education and training for persons in charge of relevant parties that are highly important in its own security following, 3.2.2)
the record of such training and security management.
4.3.4.5.11)
education. <Basic>
○
‐ The organization requests the giving of training (e.g. simulation assuming actual incident) and security education appropriate to execution of the roles assigned to the ○
O - - (4,3,2,4,1, 4.3.2.4.2, -
personnel in charge to their personnel, and confirms the training/education implementation status. (3.2.1)
4.3.2.4.6)
‐ The organization records and manages the contents and results of security education and training for member in the organization.
Improve the contents of training and L1_1_a_PEO, Common among <High‐Advanced> and <Advanced>
education regarding security to members of L1_1_b_PEO, ‐ The organization continuously verifies the effects of education and training in order to ensure that the member of the organization and persons of relevant parties in
○
the organization and other relevant parties L1_1_c_PEO, charge have a better understanding of security. O - -
L1_3_a_PEO, (4.3.2.4.4, 4.3.2.4.5)
‐ The organization refers to the results of the review of security education and training records and improves the contents of education and training in light of new or ○ ○
CPS.AT-3 of high importance in security management L1_3_b_PEO, changing threats and vulnerabilities. (AT-1) (A.7.2.2)
of the organization. L1_3_c_PEO, <Basic>
L3_3_a_PEO, ‐ The organization will conduct questionnaires and simple tests to confirm the subject's understanding of the content and confirm the results after conducting security O - - -
L3_4_a_PEO, education and training.
If the organization exchanges protected L3 4 b PEO
L3_1_a_PRO, Common among <High‐Advanced> and <Advanced>
information with other organizations, agree L3_4_a_DAT, ‐ The organization specifies concrete security measure requirements considering importance of exchanged data and assumed risks, and requires business partners to
in advance on security requirements for L3_4_b_DAT implent them. O - - - - -
protection of such information. ‐ The organization permits outsourcing of data handling operation to subcontractors only if it confirms that such subcontractors have implemented security measures
CPS.DS-1
whose level is equivalent to those required to direct business partners.
<Basic>
‐ The organization regulate how to handle the data that business partners may handle by concluding a non‐disclosure agreement. O - - - - -
‐ The organization prohibits direct business partners from subcontracting operations related to data management.
Encrypt information with an appropriate L1_1_a_DAT, <High‐Advanced>
level of security strength, and store them. ‐ The organization selects products that have been authenticated based on Cryptographic Module Validation Program (CMVP) in order to suitably implement selected ○ ○
L3_1_a_DAT, algorithms to software and hardware, and to protect keys, identification codes, and entity authentication information that is used to decrypt encrypted information or (In addition to the
L3_3_d_SYS,
O/S (In addition to the - -
to grant electronic signatures. following, 3.8.6, 3.13.11,
L3_4_b_SYS following, SC-12(1))
‐ The organization protects are encrypts data to the appropriate strength when that data is taken outside of the organization. 3.13.8)
‐ The organization uses IoT devices that can encrypt and store data in internal memory.
<Advanced>
‐ The organization examines safety and trustworthiness that are necessary, selects an algorithm, encrypts information (data) to the appropriate strength, and stores the
information. If an algorithm on the CRYPTREC Ciphers List can be selected, the organization uses it to encrypt information (data) to the appropriate strength and stores
the information.
CPS.DS-2 ○(A.8.2.3)
‐ The organization considers the level of security and trustworthiness required for the information, chooses an algorithm, and encrypts and stores high importance ○ ○
information handled by industrial control systems with appropriate strength without causing unacceptable impact on performance. O/S (In addition to the (In addition to the -
following, 3.13.16) following, SC-28) ○
[Reference] (SR 3.4, SR 4.1)
Regarding encryption technologies whose security and implementation performance are confirmed, "Cryptography Research and Evaluation Committees (CRYPTREC)
" releases to the public the list of such technologies recommended for use that are sufficiently used in the market or are considered to spread in the future. It is
desirable that the organization should refer to the list as needed when procuring systems that should implement encryption functions.
<Basic>
○ ○
‐ The organization examines safety and trustworthiness that are necessary, selects an algorithm, encrypts important information (data) handled by information systems O/S -
(3.13.10) (SC-12)
to the appropriate strength, and stores the information.
Encrypt the communication channel when L1_1_a_SYS, <High‐Advanced>
○ ○
communicating between IoT devices and L1_1_b_DAT, ‐ The organization protects th networks composing the information system and industrial control system that handles important data by implementing encrytion of O/S -
L3_1_a_DAT, (3.13.15) (下記に加えてSC-12(1))
servers or in cyberspace. communication channels or by alternative physical measures.
○ ○
L3_2_b_DAT, <Advanced>
L3_3_a_SYS, (A.10.1.1,A.13.2.1, (SR 3.1, SR 3.8, SR
‐ The information system employs an cryptographic mechanism and encrypt communciation paths.
CPS.DS-3 L3_3_d_SYS ○ A.13.2.3, A.14.1.2) 4.1, SR 4.2, SR 4.3)
S ○(SC-8(1), SC-12) -
(3.13.15)
[Reference] For encryption of communication paths, there are several methods such as IP‐VPN, Ipsec‐VPN, SSL VPN. It is desirable that the organization should select the
method considering the importance of the data transmitted in the communication paths, the budget, and so on.
<Basic>
- - - - - -
‐ N/A
Encrypt information itself when L1_1_a_DAT, <High‐Advanced>
sending/receiving information. L1_1_b_DAT, ‐ The system /IoT apparatus introduces the code module which it can implement without even little resource losing availability, and it is desirable to encrypt the
S - - ○ - ○
L3_1_a_DAT, communication data from a high apparatus of the importance at appropriate strength.
(A.10.1.1, A.13.2.1, (SR 3.1, SR 3.8, SR
L3_2_b_DAT, ‐ The information system encrypts all data transmitted outside the organization with appropriate strength, not limited to high or low importance.
CPS.DS-4 L3_3_d_SYS A.13.2.3, A.14.1.2) 4.1, SR 4.2, SR 4.3)
<Advanced>
O - ○ (SC-8(1)) -
‐ The organization encrypts information with appropriate strength when transmitting highly confidential information to an external organization or the like.
<Basic>
- - - - - -
‐ N/A
C-11
Appendix C
Reference Guidelines
Subject that
Measure Corresponding
Requirement ID
Measure Requirement Vulnerability ID
Examples of security measure implements NIST SP 800-53 ISO/IEC 27001:2013
NIST SP 800-171 IEC 62443-2-1:2010 IEC 62443-3-3:2013
measures Rev.4 Annex A
Securely control encryption keys throughout L1_1_a_DAT, <High‐Advanced>
their life cycle to ensure proper operation L3_1_a_DAT ‐ If the user loses the key, the organization maintains the availability of the information by reissuing key or the like. ○
and securely transmitted, received and ‐ It is desirable to consider authenticity of the public key as well as to securely control the secret key and private key. This authentication process is carried out using the O/S - (In addition to the - -
stored data. public key certificate issued normally by a certificate authority. It is desirable that the certificate authority should be a recognized organization that implements following, SC-12(1))
appropriate measures and procedures to provide the required reliablity.
<Advanced>
‐ It is desirable that the organization should set out a policy and procedure regarding the following items to take immediate and appropriate measures when the private
key is imperiled.
‐ A structure to take measures against imperilment of the private key (including the stakeholders, roles, cooperation with contractors)
CPS.DS-5 ○ (A10.1.2)
‐ Criteria to judge whether the private key is imperiled or is in danger of imperilment
‐ To investigate the cause of imperilment of the private key, and to attempt to remove the cause O -
○ ○ ○
‐ Suspension of the services using the key
(3.13.10) (SC-12) (SR 1.9, SR 4.3)
‐ To create a new pair of keys and issue a certificate for the new key
‐ Disclosure of information regarding imperilment of the private key (Notified parties, a method of notification, disclosure policy, etc.)
[Reference] It is desirable to refer to the group of standards of ISO/IEC 11770, NIST SP 800‐57 Part 1 Rev.4, and so on for the details about key management.
<Basic>
O -
‐ It is desirable that the organization should protect all encryption keys from modification and loss.
Secure sufficient resources (e.g., People, L1_1_c_SYS, Common among <High‐Advanced> and <Advanced>
Components, system) for components and L2_1_d_SYS, ‐ The information system and industrial control system manage spare storage space, bandwidth, and other spares (People, Components, System) and minimize the
systems, and protect assets property to L3_3_c_SYS impact of service denial attacks that send a large amount of information. For example, if services provided by an attacked system can not be stopped due to maintaining
minimize bad effects under cyber attack the level of availability, etc., in order to continue important functions, it is necessary to take the following measures.
‐ Automatic or manual migration to standby system ○
(e.g., DoS attack). ○
‐ Automatic or manual segregation of system components attacked by adversal actor (In addition to the
S - (In addition to the -
‐ In order to ensure that required system performance is satisfied, use of resources must be monitored and adjusted. In addition, storage capacity and performance following, SC-5(2)、
following, A.12.1.3) ○
CPS.DS-6 required in the future must be pre‐estimated. SC-5(3))
‐ The organization shall: (SR 5.2)
(a) Use a monitoring tool which the organization specifies in order to find signs of service jamming attacks on the information system.
(b) Monitor resources of information system and industrial control system identified by the organization and judge whether sufficient resource is secured to prevent
effective service jamming attacks.
<Basic>
‐ By implementing the security measures which the organization decides on, the information system and the industrial control system minimize the impact or protect ○
S - ○(SC-5) -
from the impact of service denial attacks which the organization specifies, or from attacks on references to sources of these information, while performing a fallback (A.17.2.1)
operation
Carry out periodic quality checks, prepare L1_1_c_SYS, Common among <High‐Advanced> and <Advanced>
○
standby devices and uninterruptible power L2_1_d_SYS, ‐ The organization prepares short‐term uninterrupted power supply which supports the switching of the information system to an alternative power source that can be O - ○(PE-11) -
L3_3_c_SYS (SR 5.2, SR 7.5)
supplies, provide redundancy, detect used for a long period of time when the primary power source is lost.
<Basic> ○
failures, conduct replacement work, and
‐ In order to ensure that required performance of an information system and an industrial control system is satisfied, use of resources must be monitored and adjusted. (A.11.2.2、A.11.2.3、
CPS.DS-7 update software for IoT devices,
In addition, storage capacity and performance that are required in the future are pre‐estimated. A.11.2.4、A.12.1.3,
communication devices, circuits, etc. O - - - -
‐ The organization protects devices from power outages and other failures that are attributable to malfunctions in the support utility. A.17.2.1)
‐ The organization protects communication cables and power cables that transmit data or that support information service from interception, interference, and harm.
‐ The organization properly maintaines devices to ensure continuous availability and integrity.
C-12
Appendix C
Reference Guidelines
Subject that
Measure Corresponding
Requirement ID
Measure Requirement Vulnerability ID
Examples of security measure implements NIST SP 800-53 ISO/IEC 27001:2013
NIST SP 800-171 IEC 62443-2-1:2010 IEC 62443-3-3:2013
measures Rev.4 Annex A
Perform integrity checking on information L1_1_b_DAT, <High‐Advanced>
○
to be sent, received, and stored. L1_1_d_PRO, ‐ The organization detects tampering with data transmitted from IoT devices, servers, etc. in industrial control systems, if possible, using integrity checking tools.
O - (In addition to the - -
L3_2_a_DAT, ‐ The organization incorporates detection capacity into its incident response capacity to detect unauthorized changes that are made to the settings and security, such as
L3_2_b_DAT following, SI-7(7))
an unauthorized promotion of system authority.
○
<Advanced>
(A.14.1.2, A.14.1.3)
CPS.DS-11 ‐ The organization uses an integrity verification tool in an information system to detect any unauthorized changes that are made to communications data transmitted ○
○
from IoT devices and servers. O/S - - (SR 3.1, SR 3.3, SR
(SI-7, SI-7(1))
‐ The information system regularly inspects the integrity of the stored data. 3.4, SR 3.8)
‐ The information system supports the technology of authenticating the sending domain in e‐mail, and detects spoofing and tampering of e‐mail.
<Basic>
- - - - - -
‐ N/A
Introduce an integrity check mechanism to L1_1_d_PRO, <High‐Advanced>
verify the integrity of hardware. L2_3_b_SYS ‐ The organization detects hardware tampering (insertion of hardware/trojan) based on the difference between the genuine and counterfeit side channel information of
the IC chip. O - - - - -
‐ The organization detects hardware tampering (insertion of a hardware trojan) through testing physically readable ID of chip generated with the technology of PUF
(Physically Unclonable Function).
CPS.DS-12 <Advanced>
‐ The organization uses tools that detect unauthorized changes made to hardware components, labels that cannot be replicated easily, and verifiable serial numbers so ○ ○
O - - -
that integrity can be verified. (PE-6, SA-10(3)) (4.3.4.4.4)
‐ By monitoring the site with surveillance cameras, the organization shall be able to detect physical tampering on the hardware that is significant to its operation.
<Basic>
- - - - - -
‐ N/A
Confirm that IoT devices and software are L1_1_d_PRO, <High‐Advanced>
genuine products during the booting-up L2_3_c_ORG, ‐ The organization utilizes a tool having an automated mechanism to periodically check that the IoT device and installed software are genuine, using the device serial O - - - - -
process. L2_3_c_SYS number, hash value, and the like.
<Advanced>
CPS.DS-13 O - - - - -
‐ The organization regularly checks that the IoT devices and the installed software are genuine products by using the serial numbers and hash values of the devices.
<Basic>
‐ During procurement and inventory count, the organization confirms that the IoT devices which the organization possesses are genuine products by checking the label. O - - - - -
C-13
Appendix C
Reference Guidelines
Subject that
Measure Corresponding
Requirement ID
Measure Requirement Vulnerability ID
Examples of security measure implements NIST SP 800-53 ISO/IEC 27001:2013
NIST SP 800-171 IEC 62443-2-1:2010 IEC 62443-3-3:2013
measures Rev.4 Annex A
Restrict the software to be added after L1_1_a_SYS, <High‐Advanced> ○
○ ○
installing in the IoT devices and servers. L2_1_a_ORG, ‐ The organization restricts software by using a list of software that is permitted to be executed on the information system and industrial control system (whitelist) or list (In addition to the
O/S (In addition to the (In addition to the - -
L2_1_c_SYS, of prohibited software (blacklist). Or, unpermitted software shall not be installed. following, CM-7(4), CM7-
L3_1_a_SYS, following, 3.4.8) following, A.12.5.1)
(5))
L3_3_a_SYS, <Advanced>
CPS.IP-2 L3_3_d_SYS ○ ○
‐ The organization adopts and manages a mechanism that manages software installation that is performed by users on the organization’s system (information system or O/S -
(3.4.9) (CM-11)
industrial control system) and monitors the events. ○ ○
<Basic> (A.12.6.2) (4.3.4.3.2, 4.3.4.3.3)
○
‐ The organization establishes a policy on software installation performed by users on the organization’s system (information system or industrial control system) and O - -
(SR 7.6)
has the users follow it.
Introduce the system development life cycle L1_1_a_ORG, <High‐Advanced>
to manage the systems. L1_1_b_ORG, ‐ The organization explicitly presents the following requirements when procuring the system;
L1_1_c_ORG, ‐ Requirements for security functions;
L2_1_d_SYS, ‐ Requirements for security strength; ○
L3_3_c_SYS ‐ Requirements for security warranty; O - (In addition to the ○ - -
‐ Requirements for security‐related documents; following, SA-4) (In addition to the
‐ Requirements for protection of security‐related documents; following, A.6.1.5,
CPS.IP-3 ‐ Description on the development environment of the system and the environment which the system is planned to operate under; A.14.2.2, A.14.2.5)
‐ Acceptance criteria
<Advanced> ○
‐ The organization manages the system in accordance with the system development lifecycle, which includes items of consideration regarding information security, and O - (In addition to the
undergoes an information security risk management process throughout the entire system development lifecycle. following, SA-3) ○ ○
<Basic> ○ (4.3.4.3.3) (SR 7.3, SR 7.4)
○ ○
‐ The organization applies the general rules of the system’s security engineering to specifications, design, development, introduction, and changes in building the O (A.14.1.1, A.14.2.1,
(3.13.2) (SA-8)
system. A.14.2.6)
Perform a periodical system backup and L1_3_a_DAT, <High‐Advanced> ○ ○
testing of components (e.g., IoT devices, L2_1_d_SYS, ‐ The organization confirms the trustworthiness of the medium and integrity of the information by regularly testing the backup information. O - (In addition to the (In addition to the -
communication devices, and circuits). L3_3_c_SYS following, CP-9(1)) following, A.14.3.1)
<Advanced> ○ ○
CPS.IP-4 ‐ The organization backs up their system documents according to the prescribed timing and frequency. O (In addition to the -
(4.3.4.3.9)
‐ The organization protects the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of the information backed up on the storage base. ○ ○ following, A.18.1.3)
<Basic> (3.8.9) (CP-9)
○
‐ The organization backs up information on user level and system level that is included in its information systems or industrial control systems according to the O -
(A.12.3.1)
prescribed timing and frequency.
Implement physical measures such as L1_1_a_SYS, <High‐Advanced>
O - -
preparing an uninterruptible power supply, a L1_1_c_SYS, ‐ The organization adopts an automatic fire suppression system if a staffer is not stationed full time at a facility where its system is located.
○
fire protection facility, and protection from L2_3_b_SYS, <Advanced> ○
L2_3_d_SYS, - (In addition to the
water infiltration to follow the policies and ‐ The organization maintains machine safety of equipment located within the area of their IoT devices and servers by using an uninterruptible power supply. ○ (4.3.3.3.1, 4.3.3.3.2,
L3_1_a_SYS O following, PE-13, PE-15) -
CPS.IP-5 ‐ The organization adopts and maintains equipment and systems that run on an independent power supply which detect and extinguishes fire. (A.11.1.4, A.11.2.1, 4.3.3.3.3, 4.3.3.3.5,
rules related to the physical operating
‐ The organization have shut‐off valves or isolation valves to protect areas with their IoT decides and servers from damages such as water leakages. A.11.2.2) 4.3.3.3.6)
environment, including the IoT devices and
<Basic>
servers installed in the organization. ○
‐ The organization adopts a system that maintains the temperature and humidity of the area with its IoT devices and servers being within the acceptable level. O - - -
(PE-14)
‐ The organization regularly monitors the temperature and humidity of the area with its IoT devices and servers.
When disposing of an IoT device and L2_3_b_DAT <High‐Advanced> ○
server, delete the stored data and the ID ‐ The organization defines classifications including security categories of data saved in an IoT device or server to be scrapped, and introduces a mechanism for using the O (In addition to the -
(identifier) uniquely identifying the genuine proper technique for deleting data with the strength and integrity needed or making the data unreadable according to the definition. following, A.8.2.3)
<Advanced> ○ ○ ○
CPS.IP-6 IoT devices and servers as well as
‐ The organization establishes a procedure for scrapping its equipment including IoT devices and servers, deletes data saved in the equipment or makes the data O (3.8.3) (MP-6) ○ - (SR 4.2)
important information (e.g., private key and
unreadable in accordance with the procedure, and makes sure that the action has been done successfully. (A.8.3.1, A.8.3.2,
digital certificate), or make them <Basic> A.11.2.7)
unreadable. O -
‐ The organization deletes data that has been saved in its IoT devices or servers to be scrapped, or makes the data unreadable.
Assess the lessons learned from security L1_1_a_PRO, <High‐Advanced> ○
incident response and the results of L1_1_b_PRO, ‐ The organization has its security assessed by a third party. O - (下In addition to the - -
monitoring, measuring, and evaluating L1_1_c_PRO, following, CA-2(1))
L2_1_a_ORG <Advanced>
internal and external attacks, and improve
‐ The organization draws up a security assessment plan before the assessment is carried out that includes the following so as to ensure that its security is assessed
the processes of protecting the assets. ○
properly and systematically:
(A.16.1.6, A.18.2.1,
‐ Security measures for assessment; O -
CPS.IP-7 Clause 9.1, Clause 9.2, ○
‐ Assessment procedures for measuring the effectiveness of security measures;
○ ○ Clause 10.1, Clause (4.4.3.2, 4.4.3.3,
‐ Settings and mechanisms for carrying out the security assessment;
(3.12.1) (CA-2) 10.2) 4.4.3.4, 4.4.3.5, 4.4.3.6,
‐ Methods of putting together the results of the security assessment and applications of the results.
4.4.3.7, 4.4.3.8)
<Basic>
‐ The organization regularly evaluates whether its security measures have achieved expected results (i.e., security assessment) and reports the conclusions to the chief
O -
security officer, in addition to the evaluation of whether the measures are correctly implemented and managed.
‐ The organization makes improvements on its security measures based on the results of the security assessment.
Share information regarding the L2_1_a_ORG <High‐Advanced>
effectiveness of data protection ‐ The organization prepares a setting through an automated mechanism at just the right time that enables it and its appropriate partners to interactively share new O - -
technologies with appropriate partners. information about data protection technologies or information about the effectiveness of the protection technologies. ○ ○
<Advanced> (3.14.4) (AC-21)
○
CPS.IP-8 ‐ The organization prepares a setting that enables it to share new information about data protection technologies or information about the effectiveness of the O - -
(A.16.1.6)
protection technologies with its partners at just the right time.
<Basic>
‐ The organization prepares a setting that enables it to acquire new information about data protection technologies or information about the effectiveness of the O - - - -
protection technologies from its appropriate partners.
C-14
Appendix C
Reference Guidelines
Subject that
Measure Corresponding
Requirement ID
Measure Requirement Vulnerability ID
Examples of security measure implements NIST SP 800-53 ISO/IEC 27001:2013
NIST SP 800-171 IEC 62443-2-1:2010 IEC 62443-3-3:2013
measures Rev.4 Annex A
Include items concerning security (e.g., L1_1_a_PEO, Common among <High‐Advanced> and <Advanced>
deactivate access authorization and L1_1_b_PEO, ‐ The organization makes changes to its staff members’ rights to access certain systems and/or rooms on the premises when they are reshuffled or transferred
personnel screening) when roles change in L1_1_c_PEO internally.
○ ○
due to personnel transfer. ‐ To minimize impacts when a staff member leaves the organization, designate backup members regarding important duties as a supplier including operation and ○
(In addition to the (下In addition to the
maintenance. O (In addition to the -
following, A.7.2.3, following, 4.3.3.2.3,
‐ The organization identifies conditions in which re‐screening is required such as changes in access authority to their own systems, and re‐screen if necessary. following, PS-5)
A.7.3.1) 4,3,3,2,4)
‐ The organization conducts an interview on information security when personnel leave.
‐ The organization ensures that responsibilities for security are met, particularly of personnel handling sensitive information, throughout the whole process from hiring
to retirement. ○
CPS.IP-9
<Basic> (3.9.1 3.9.2)
‐ The organization identifies the responsibility for security of personnel in the employment contract. The organization states that this responsibility should be sustained
for a reasonable period of time after the termination of employment, in order to prevent information leakage after the termination of employment.
‐ The organization reviews a staff member before granting him or her access to its systems. ○ ○
○
‐ The organization conducts the following when a staff member resigns or retires: O (A.7.1.1, A.7.1.2, A.7.2.1, (4.3.3.2.1, 4.3.3.2.2, -
(PS-3, PS-4)
‐ Disables the staff member’s access to its systems within a certain period; A.8.1.4) 4.3.3.2.6, 4.3.4.4.2)
‐ Disables the authentication and credentials related to the staff member;
‐ Collects all system‐related things for security that the staff member has used;
‐ Retains access to the information about the organization and information systems that have been managed by the individual who is leaving.
Develop a vulnerability remediation plan, L1_1_a_SYS, <High‐Advanced> ○
and modify the vulnerability of the L2_1_a_ORG, ‐ The organization adopts and administers an automated mechanism for managing the status of defect correction. O - (In addition to the - -
components according to the plan. L3_1_a_SYS, following, SI-2(2))
L3_3_a_SYS, ○
<Advanced>
L3_3_d_SYS (In addition to the
‐ The organization defines tolerable risk by identifying through investigations and tests the impacts of patch application on the functions of other software applications
○ ○ following, A.14.2.3)
and services on operations of IoT devices and servers. O -
(3.14.3) (SI-2)
‐ The organization conducts tests to measure the effectiveness of corrections and the possibility of any secondary adverse effects, corrects the defects, and manages the
corrections as part of the configuration management.
CPS.IP-10 <Basic>
‐ The organization systematically identifies, reports and responds to vulnerabilities in its own information systems and industrial control systems. The organization ○
considers the following when formulating a plan. (4.3.4.3.7)
‐ Seriousness of threats or vulnerabilities
○
‐ Risk in responding to vulnerabilities O - - -
(A.12.6.1)
[Reference] It may be difficult to carry out application of security patches in a timely manner or application of patches itself to IoT devices in consideration of availability
and functions of devices. In such cases, it is desirable to avoid occurrence of security incidents by thoroughly taking measures against threats (e.g. minimization of
functions, strengthening of network monitoring).
- Discuss the method of conducting L1_1_a_SYS, <High‐Advanced>
important security updates and the like on L2_1_a_ORG, ‐ The organization gives prior approval for the use of devices and/or tools needed for maintenance to update its IoT devices and servers, and conducts monitoring.
L2_1_c_SYS, ○
IoT devices and servers. Then, apply ‐ The organization inspects the devices and/or tools for maintenance brought in by the staff members who update its IoT devices and servers in order to make sure that
L3_1_a_SYS, ○ (In addition to the
no inappropriate or unauthorized changes will be made. O -
those security updateswith managed tools L3_3_a_SYS (3.7.1, 3.7.2, 3.7.4) following, MA-3, MA-
‐ The organization inspects the media used for maintenance to update its IoT devices and servers in order to make sure that the media contain no malicious code before
properly and in a timely manner while L3_3_d_SYS 3(1), MA-3(2))
they are used.
recording the history. ‐ The organization introduces an IoT device designed to remotely update different software programs (OS, driver, application) at the same time.
- Introduce IoT devices having a remote ○
<Advanced>
update mechanism to perform a mass (In addition to the
‐ The organization plans maintenance work such as updating its IoT devices and servers, implements the plan, checks the work done, and documents the entire
update of different software programs (OS, following, A.11.2.4,
maintenance.
A.11.2.5, A.11.2.6,
driver, and application) through remote ‐ The organization gives prior approval for maintenance work such as updating its IoT devices and servers, and conducts monitoring.
○
○ A.14.2.4)
CPS.MA-1 commands, where applicable. ‐ The organization gives prior approval for travel from its premises for any maintenance work away from its premises, such as updating its IoT devices and servers. It also ○
(In addition to the (4.3.3.3.7)
takes necessary actions before the travel, such as deleting relevant saved data. O (In addition to the -
following, 3.7.1, 3.7.2,
‐ The organization checks all security measures that may have been affected by maintenance work, such as updating its IoT devices and servers, after the work is following, MA-2)
3.7.4)
complete in order to make sure that the relevant equipment works correctly.
‐ The organization keeps the records of maintenance work done, such as updating its IoT devices and servers.
‐ The organization establishes a process for authorizing maintenance staff in order to keep the list of authorized maintenance organizations or staff members updated.
<Basic>
‐ The organization makes sure that a maintenance staff member sent unattended to do maintenance work on its information system and industrial control system has
○ ○ ○
the necessary access rights. O -
(3.7.6) (MA-5) (A.11.1.2)
‐ The organization appoints its staff member with the access rights and technical skills needed so as to supervise maintenance work done by a staff member without the
necessary access rights.
Conduct remote maintenance of the IoT L1_1_a_SYS, Common among <High‐Advanced> and <Advanced>
devices and servers while granting L2_1_a_ORG, ‐ The organization documents the policy and procedure relating to establishing and implementing a connection designed for remote maintenance, and implements the ○ ○
approvals and recording logs so that L3_1_a_SYS, connection in accordance with the policy and procedure. O (In addition to the (In addition to the - -
L3_3_a_SYS, ‐ The organization provides authentication required for network access that it specifies when remote maintenance is carried out. It also ensures that the session and following, MA-4(2)) following, A.15.1.1)
unauthorized access can be prevented. L3_3_d_SYS ○
CPS.MA-2 network connection are terminated when the remote maintenance is complete.
(3.7.5)
<Basic>
○
‐ The organization develops and agrees to an implementation plan for remote maintenance before carrying out the maintenance, and checks the results of the ○ ○
O (4.3.3.6.5, 4.3.3.6.6, -
maintenance done. (MA-4) (A.11.2.4, A.15.2.1)
4.3.3.6.7, 4.3.3.6.8)
‐ The organization keeps the records of remote maintenance done.
C-15
Appendix C
Reference Guidelines
Subject that
Measure Corresponding
Requirement ID
Measure Requirement Vulnerability ID
Examples of security measure implements NIST SP 800-53 ISO/IEC 27001:2013
NIST SP 800-171 IEC 62443-2-1:2010 IEC 62443-3-3:2013
measures Rev.4 Annex A
Determine and document the subject or L1_1_a_SYS, <High‐Advanced>
scope of the audit recording/log recording, L2_1_b_ORG, ‐ In addition to the detection of security incidents, the collected logs are considered to be useful in tracking the cause of security incidents after the fact. Therefore, the
and implement and review those records in L3_1_a_SYS, information system collects, if possible, detailed logs (e.g. OS command level) that do not remain in the OS function.
L3_3_a_SYS, ‐ If time stamps in multiple audit logs match, the audit logs of the subjects specified by the organization are managed as audit trails across the system, logically and
order to properly detect high-risk security ○
L3_3_d_SYS physically. ○ ○ ○ ○
incidents. (In addition to the
‐ The information system provides system functions designed to compare and synchronize internal system clocks by using an official source of information for O/S (In addition to the (In addition to the (In addition to the (In addition to the
following, AU-6(1),
generating time stamps for an audit record. following, 3.3.7) following, A.12.4.4) following, 4.4.2.4) following, SR 2.10)
AU-11(1))
‐ The information system adopts an automatic mechanism designed to handle an audit review, analysis, and report in an integrated manner.
‐ It may be difficult to generate security‐related audit logs for some of the IoT devices that an organization uses, or to connect some of those devices to the existing log
management system. Hence, it is necessary to take measures that consider the specs of the IoT devices, such as using a log management system different than the main
one or using an alternative measure on the part of the system, when collecting and analyzing audit logs from the relevant IoT devices.
CPS.PT-1
<Advanced> ○ ○
○
‐ The information system and the industrial control system uses a cryptographic mechanism in order to ensure the integrity of an audit log and audit tool each. (In addition to the (In addition to the
O/S (In addition to the
‐ The organization grants control over an audit log only to users assigned in accordance with the rules about security‐related internal responsibility. following, 3.3.4, 3.3.8, following, AU-9(3),
following, A.12.4.2)
‐ The information system issues an alert when an incident of failure takes place in the audit process. 3.3.9) AU-9(4))
○
<Basic> ○
(4.3.4.4.7, 4.4.2.1,
‐ The organization specifies what is to be audited based on its risk management strategy and risk assessment results, and sees if the systems can acquire audit logs that (SR 2.8, SR 2.9,
4.4.2.2, 4.3.3.3.9,
show who did what and when in connection with the subjects of an audit. ○ ○ SR 2.11, SR 2.12)
○ 4.3.3.5.8)
‐ The system generates an audit log prescribed from various system components. O/S (AU-2, AU-3, AU-6, AU- (A.12.4.1, A.12.4.3,
(3.3.1, 3.3.2, 3.3.3)
‐ The organization reviews and analyze a system’s audit log regularly to see if there are any signs of security incidents that may cause damage to the organization, and 11) A.12.7.1)
make a report to the system administrator where necessary.
‐ The organization confirms that the impact of audit activities on the performance of industrial control systems is tolerable.
Minimize funcions of IoT devices and L1_1_a_SYS, <High‐Advanced>
○
servers by physically and logically blocking L1_1_b_SYS, ‐ The organization identifies software programs that are not allowed to be executed on a system. ○
L1_1_c_SYS, (In addition to the
unnecessary network ports, USBs, and ‐ Manage a “black list” or "white list" so that the software programs not allowed on the system cannot be executed. O/S (In addition to the - -
L2_1_b_COM, following, CM-7(2),
serial ports accessing directly the main ‐ The organization regularly review and update the black list or the white list. following, 3.4.7, 3.4.8)
L2_3_b_SYS, CM-7(4))
‐ The system blocks the execution of these programs in accordance with the specified rules.
bodies of IoT devices and servers etc. L3_1_a_SYS, <Advanced>
L3_3_d_SYS ‐ The organization reviews the functions and services provided by its systems and items in order to identify the functions and services that could be deleted.
○ ○
‐ The organization uses network scanning tools, intrusion detection and prevention systems, and endpoint protection (e.g., a firewall, host‐based intrusion detection ○
CPS.PT-2 O (In addition to the (In addition to the -
system) in order to detect and prevent the use of banned functions, ports, protocols, and services. (A.8.2.2, A.8.3.1)
following, 3.4.6) following, CM-7)
‐ The organization minimizes the functions and services of devices connected to the network such as multifunction printers in additional to typical IoT devices and
○
servers.
(4.3.3.5, 4.3.3.7)
<Basic>
‐ The organization manages peripherals in use (e.g., USB flash drives) using a management ledger and keep them in a locked place.
○ ○ ○
‐ The organization checks external storage devices connected to IoT devices or servers (e.g., USB flash drives) using antivirus software, use USB flash drives that can be O
(3.8.1, 3.8.4) (MP-2, MP-3, MP-4) (SR 2.3, SR 7.7)
checked for viruses, or take any appropriate action.
‐ The organization plugs USB ports and serial ports out of use to physically block them.
Introduce IoT devices that implement safety L2_2_a_ORG <High‐Advanced>
○
functions, assuming that these devices are ‐ The organization adopt intrinsic safe designing to handle hazards of high severity, thereby minimizing damage (e.g., a design that lowers the energy of a hazard in order O - - - -
(A.16.1.6)
connected to the network. to limit an impact of an accident).
<Advanced>
‐ The organization carries out a security risk assessment that considers the aspect of safety (CPS.RA‐4) in order to be clear about whether or not to need measures to
ensure the physical safety of the assessed system, and to be clear about the levels of the measures.
○
CPS.PT-3 ‐ The organization reduces hazards through intrinsic safe designing. If any hazard of high severity persists through this process, it is advisable to take alternative
O/S - - - - (SR 3.6, SR 7.1, SR
measures such as the following:
7.2)
‐ Ensure safety using an add‐on such as safety a safety device;
‐ Adopt a space design that keeps staff members away from hazardous devices.
‐ The industrial control system operates in a predetermined manner when normal operation cannot be maintained due to a cyber attack etc.
<Basic>
- - - - - -
‐ N/A
Establish and implement the procedure to L1_1_a_COM, <High‐Advanced>
identify and manage the baseline of L1_1_a_SYS, ‐ The organization uses a mechanism for automatically collecting information about network configurations and the software configurations of devices in order to
network operations and expected L1_1_b_COM monitor the most recent status at all times.
L1_1_c_COM ○ ○
information flows between people, goods, ‐ The information system forces the application of users’ access rights approved (by the administrator) in order to control data flows within a system (and between
L1_3_b_ORG, (In addition to the (In addition to the
interconnected systems). O/S - - -
and systems. L1_3_c_ORG, following, 3.1.3, 3.14.1, following, AC-4,
‐ The organization physically or logically separates a network of industrial control systems with high importance from a network of industrial control systems with lower
L2_1_b_ORG, 3.14.6, 3.14.7) CM-2(2), SI-4, SI-4(13))
importance.
L3_1_a_SYS, ‐ The organization/system analyzes the regular patterns of its systems’ communication status and security alerts to create and use a profile that summarizes typical
L3_3_a_SYS, patterns of communication and security alerts, thereby enabling the detection of unknown threats and suspicious behavior (communication).
L3_3_d_SYS <Advanced>
‐ As part of its configuration management, the organization identifies and documents the configuration that serves as the latest baseline of an information system and
an industrial control system.
‐ If any changes are made to the baseline configuration of an information system and industrial control system, promptly update the baseline configuration so that the
CPS.AE-1 ○
most recent status is available at all times.
O/S - (In addition to the - -
‐ The organization allows one system to connect to a different system only after it determines that connecting the system to the other system is safe enough in terms of
following, CA-3)
security measures.
‐ The industrial control system provides services to the network of control systems without connecting to networks other than industrial control systems. ○
‐ The organization exercises discretionary access control according to the user’s access rights in order to control data flows within an information system (and between
(4.4.3.3)
interconnected systems).
<Basic>
‐ The organization documents information that serves as a baseline including an information system’s and an industrial control system's network configuration, assets,
information about device setups and configurations, and regularly checks the document to see if its content remains relevant.
○ ○
‐ The organization logically or physically segments the control system's network from the network composing of the information system. O - -
(3.4.1) (CM-2)
[Reference] Implement physical segmentation in environments physically separated from other networks. Alternatively, in environments physically close to other
networks, it is possible to implement logical segmentation in consideration of the cost of the measure.
C-16
Appendix C
Reference Guidelines
Subject that
Measure Corresponding
Requirement ID
Measure Requirement Vulnerability ID
Examples of security measure implements NIST SP 800-53 ISO/IEC 27001:2013
NIST SP 800-171 IEC 62443-2-1:2010 IEC 62443-3-3:2013
measures Rev.4 Annex A
Appoint a chief security officer, establish a L1_3_a_ORG <High‐Advanced>
security management team (SOC/CSIRT), ‐ The organization efficiently analyzes audit logs collected through 24‐h, 365‐day security monitoring by using an automated analysis tool.
○
and prepare a system within the ‐ It is desirable for the organization to include not only its conventional IT environment but also its control system and IoT devices in the scope of security monitoring.
(In addition to the
‐ It is desirable for the organization to regularly evaluate the maturity of its security measure organizations in order to continue improving its security‐related O/S - - -
organization to detect, analyze, and following, SI-4(2),
operations, including security monitoring and the ways incidents are handled.
respond to security events. SI-4(5))
[Reference] For example, SIM3 (Security Incident Management Maturity Model) is available as metrics for the evaluation of security organizations (SOC/CSIRT).
<Advanced>
‐ The organization refers to risk assessment results and, considering the following angles, establishes what to monitor and what to include in correlation analysis.
○
‐ The scope of systems to monitor
(In addition to the
‐ Which device logs should be collected for analysis (see CPS.AE‐3)
following, A.12.4.1,
‐ The organization regularly reviews audit logs collected through monitoring.
CPS.AE-2 A.16.1.5) ○
‐ The organization continues to collect and manage information about assets, device configurations, and network configurations in order to evaluate its security status.
○ ○ (SR 2.8, SR 2.9,
‐ The organization examines the results of correlation analysis and other data to accurately detect security events that must be addressed and take action in accordance ○
O/S (3.6.1, 3.12.2, 3.14.6, (4.3.4.5.6, 4.3.4.5.7, SR 2.10, SR 2.11,
with the security operation process. See CPS.RP‐1 for details of the process. (CA-7, IR-4, SI-4)
3.14.7) 4.3.4.5.8) SR 2.12, SR 3.9,
‐ The organization regularly reports the state of organizational and system security to the chief security officer or other appropriate staff members. It is desirable that
SR 6.1, SR 6.2)
the regular report should include the following shown below:
‐ Results of log analysis (e.g., the number of incidents handled; summaries of typical incidents that have been handled; threats that have emerged; issues in
monitoring);
‐ Policy for future improvements in monitoring.
<Basic>
○
‐ The organization identifies who the chief security officer/contact person is in both information system and industrial control system so that the officer/contact person O - - - -
(A.6.1.1)
can handle security‐related internal and external communications.
Identify the security events accurately by L1_1_b_SYS, <High‐Advanced>
implementing the procedure to conduct a L1_3_a_SYS ‐ The organization conducts a trend analysis examining the latest information about threats, vulnerability, and assessments of security management measures carried
correlation analysis of the security events out several times in order to determine whether the activities for continuous monitoring need any correction. ○ ○
‐ The organization carries out policy tuning (management of signatures to apply) and maintenance for devices such as IDS, IPS, and SIEM on its own. O (In addition to the (In addition to the - -
and comparative analysis with the threat
‐ The organization creates custom signatures used for sensors on its own. following, 3.14.4) following, CA-7(3))
information obtained from outside the
‐ In order to properly detect security events that are likely to adversely affect the organization, the organization collects and analyzes logs of edge devices such as IoT
organization. devices in addition to the logs of devices presented in <Advanced>, if possible.
<Advanced>
‐ It is desirable that the organization should monitor mainly logs of the devices listed below for real‐time analysis to appropriately detect security events highly likely to
○
CPS.AE-3 have an adverse effect on its own organization . This will require the handling of many different logs. Hence, it is necessary to normalize logs to store them in the same
(A.12.4.1)
database or to use SIEM for efficient analysis. It is also advisable to handle information about network flows if it is available.
○
‐ Logs and network flows from network systems, e.g., firewalls S -
(SR 6.1)
‐ Logs from security devices, e.g., IPS/IDS ○ ○
‐ Access logs of web servers (3.12.3) (CA-7)
‐ Logs from various systems, e.g., ActiveDirectory; DNS
‐ Logs related to users’ terminals
<Basic>
‐ The organization checks each notice from firewalls and endpoint security products in order to identify security events that may have an adversal impact on the O - -
organization.
Identify the impact of security events, L1_3_b_PRO <High‐Advanced>
including the impact on other relevant ‐ The organization adopts an automatic mechanism for quantifying and monitoring the form, scale, and cost of a security event that has occurred.
organizations. ‐ The organization has its security measure organizations (SOC/CSIRT) analyze the functions of the malware, or program, or script that is placed by an attacker if any is
found in a security event that has occurred.
○
‐ The organization constructs a hypothesis about the profile of the attacker (e.g., his/her organization; the purpose of the organization’s activities).
O/S - - (In addition to the - -
following, A.16.1.6)
[Reference] It is envisaged that the impact assessment of a security event would be difficult in an environment where multiple systems are interconnected to comprise a
“system of systems”. The document “Observations about the Impact Assessment of an Internet of Things (IoT) Incident” (Cloud Security Alliance, 2016) is an advanced
CPS.AE-4 attempt to examine issues relating to the impact assessment. It attempts to assess an impact according to the characteristics of the device or the service and to the
number of devices.
<Advanced>
‐ The organization works with IPA, JPCERT/CC, the industry’s ISAC, and a security vendor to collect information, thereby interlinking and sharing information about
○ ○ ○
threats and vulnerability to obtain a whole picture of the security event. O - -
(3.6.1) (IR-4, IR-4(8)) (A.6.1.4)
‐ The organization requests an external security vendor to analyze the functions of the malware, or program, or script placed by an attacker if any is found in a security
event that has occurred.
<Basic>
- - - - - -
‐ N/A
Specify the criteria to determine the risk L1_3_a_PRO <High‐Advanced>
degree of security events. ‐ The organization determines its core business that must continue/recover before any other operations in prior and identifies and prioritizes important resources (other ○
relevant organizations, employees, items, data, systems, etc.) and functions vital for continuing applicable businesses. * CPS.AM‐6 and CPS.BE‐2 include examples of (In addition to the ○
O - -
similar measures. following, CP-2(8), IR- (4.2.3.10)
‐ The organization uses an automated mechanism designed to help track security events and collect and analyze information about threats and vulnerability related to 5(1))
incidents, so that it applies the findings to classification (triage) of security events.
<Advanced> ○
○
CPS.AE-5 ‐ The organization classifies security events, taking into account the recovery time objectives for the systems, the order of priority in recovery, and metrics in the process O - (In addition to the - -
(A.16.1.4)
of its security operation. following, CP-2)
<Basic>
‐ The organization specifies security events that must be reported, considering the level of the impact the security event has.
○
O - - -
[Reference] For example, the following document is available for reference when an organization decides on a measure of the severity of the impact of a security event. (IR-8)
‐ “SP 800‐61 rev.1” (NIST, 2008) Prioritization of the 3.2.6 Incident
C-17
Appendix C
Reference Guidelines
Subject that
Measure Corresponding
Requirement ID
Measure Requirement Vulnerability ID
Examples of security measure implements NIST SP 800-53 ISO/IEC 27001:2013
NIST SP 800-171 IEC 62443-2-1:2010 IEC 62443-3-3:2013
measures Rev.4 Annex A
Conduct network and access monitoring L1_1_a_SYS, <High‐Advanced> ○
○
and control at the contact points between L1_1_c_SYS, ‐ The information system routes communications to the network to which a recipient’s IP address belongs via a proxy server authenticated on a controlled interface. (In addition to the
S (In addition to the - - -
corporate networks and wide area L1_3_a_SYS, ‐ The information system and the industrial control system monitor and control the use of mobile code. following, 3.13.13,
L2_1_b_ORG, following, SC-7(8))
networks. ‐ The information system monitors and controls the use of protocols used for audio and video transmission (e.g. VoIP). 3.13.14)
L2_3_c_SYS, <Advanced>
L3_1_a_SYS, ‐ The organization monitors and controls communications at the boundary between industrial control system and information system.
L3_3_a_SYS, ‐ The organization creates a network segment isolated from access to the internal network (“demilitarized zone [DMZ]”) between the internal network and external
L3_3_d_SYS networks (e.g., the Internet).
‐ The information system is connected to an external network or system only via a controlled interface that consists of a boundary protection system placed according ○
○
CPS.CM-1 to the organization’s security architecture. (In addition to the
O/S (In addition to the - -
‐ The information system ensures that each external communications service is provided via a controlled interface (e.g., a gateway, router, and firewall). following, SC-7(4),
following, 3.13.6) ○
‐ The organization establishes a communications control policy for each controlled interface (e.g., a gateway, router, and firewall). SC-7(5))
(SR 6.2)
‐ The system on a controlled interface rejects network communication by default and permits it as an exception.
‐ The organization monitors communications at the external boundaries of the information system and at major internal boundaries within the information system for
large amounts of communication from a particular source or multiple sources, and takes appropriate action when necessary (e.g., blocking of communication from a
specific IP address).
<Basic>
○ ○
‐ The organization monitors and controls communications on the information system’s external boundary as well as on the key internal boundary within the information O - -
(3.13.1, 3.13.5) (SC-7)
system.
Perform setting, recording, and monitoring L1_1_a_SYS, <High‐Advanced> ○
of proper physical access, considering the L1_1_c_SYS, ‐ The organization tracks and monitors the locations and relocation of important assets within the scope of its management of particularly important assets. O - (In addition to the - - -
importance of IoT devices and servers. L2_3_b_PEO, following, PE-20)
L2_3_b_SYS, <Advanced>
L2_3_d_SYS, ‐ The organization reviews the relevant audit log regularly or when an incident or a sign of an incident appears if a physical access log from access control is available
L3_1_a_SYS while 24‐h monitoring is not conducted through security cameras or by any other means.
‐ A person in charge accompanies a visitor into the area where the organization’s assets that must be protected are directly accessible (e.g., an office) in order to
monitor the visitor’s behavior.
O - -
‐ The organization monitors through security cameras or by other means physical access to its facilities that are vital for its operations and house IoT devices and
CPS.CM-2
servers, thereby enabling early detection of any physical security incidents and immediate action. ○
○ ○
‐ If the above physical security measures may be difficult to implement for items such as IoT devices and servers that may be critical to the organization’s operation [A.11.1.1, A.11.1.2,
(3.10.4, 3.10.5) (PE-3, PE-6)
because they are in a remote location or for any other reasons, consider using tamper‐resistant equipment (CPS.DS‐6) or taking any other appropriate measures to A.11.1.3]
enhance the physical security properties of the equipment itself.
<Basic>
‐ If the organization is unable to control access to, or provide video surveillance service for, the areas that should allow only limited physical access because of issues of
costs and other reasons, it takes alternative manual measures, such as that its employee in charge accompany a visitor on the premises. O - -
‐ The organization implements physical security measures to control access to designated areas in the facility that do not be allowed for the general public to access.
‐ The organization verifies the access authority of the personnel before permitting the physical access and collects and manages the records of entry and exit.
- Use IoT devices that can detect abnormal L1_1_b_SYS, <High‐Advanced>
behaviors and suspend operations by L2_2_a_COM, ‐ IoT devices, or systems that contain these devices, examine information output from software programs or applications to see if it matches the expected content in
comparing the instructed behaviors and L3_3_a_DAT, order to prepare for certain attacks that may have a consequence different to a normally expected outcome (e.g., command injection). ○ ○
L3_3_d_SYS ‐ The information system automatically updates the logic to detect malicious code through an IDS/IPS. S (In addition to the (In addition to the -
actual ones.
‐ The information system detects exploit codes that attacks unknown vulnerabilities by installing on endpoints (especially, IoT devices and servers with various functions) following, 3.14.4, 3.14.5) following, SI-10, SI-15)
- Validate whether information provided
detection/restoration software using technologies of behavioral detection of malware.
from cyberspace contains malicious code, ‐ The information system executes real‐time scanning of files from external sources.
and is within the permissible range before <Advanced>
any action based on the data. ○ ○
‐ The information system blocks or isolates any malicious code for it detected through an IDS/IPS, or notifies the administrator of the code.
(A.12.2.1) (SR 3.2)
CPS.CM-3 ‐ The information system detects exploit codes by installing on endpoints (IoT devices, servers, and so on) detection/restoration software using technologies of pattern
matching of malware.
‐ The organization considers implementing whitelist‐type malware protection for IoT devices with limited functions. ○ ○
S -
(3.14.2, 3.14.3) (SI-3)
* Especially regarding IoT devices and control devices, OS to which anti‐malware software can be applied may not be used. It is desirable for the organization to confirm
whether devices to be introduced are compatible with anti‐malware software at the phase of procurement and to select compatible ones. If it is difficult to procure
devices compatible with anti‐malware software, it is desirable to take alternative measures such as introducing/strengthening a malware detection mechanism on a
network.
<Basic> ○
S - - - -
‐ Information system and industrial control system verify the effectiveness of input data by checking whether the data conforms to a specified format or content. (SR 3.5)
Validate the integrity and authenticity of the L3_3_a_DAT, <High‐Advanced>
information provided from cyberspace L3_3_d_SYS ‐ The organization introduces the concept of “whitelisting” for data entry in order to specify known items and systems considered trustworthy as the sources of input
○ ○
before operations. data, and the format allowed for the input data.
S (In addition to the (In addition to the -
‐ IoT devices and servers begin communication with other IoT devices only after the devices are mutually authenticated successfully so that the source of data is always
following, 3.14.5) following, SI-10(5))
clear.
○ ○
‐ The information system and the industrial control system protect the authenticity of communications sessions.
(A.13.2.1, A13.2.3) (SR 3.2)
CPS.CM-4 <Advanced>
‐ The information system uses an integrity verification tool to detect any unauthorized changes that are made to communications data transmitted from IoT devices and ○
○
servers. S (In addition to the -
(3.14.5)
‐ IoT devices and servers that are acknowledged as critical to the organization’s operations begin communication with other IoT devices only after the devices are following, SI-7)
mutually authenticated successfully so that the source of data is always clear.
<Basic>
- - - - - -
‐ N/A
C-18
Appendix C
Reference Guidelines
Subject that
Measure Corresponding
Requirement ID
Measure Requirement Vulnerability ID
Examples of security measure implements NIST SP 800-53 ISO/IEC 27001:2013
NIST SP 800-171 IEC 62443-2-1:2010 IEC 62443-3-3:2013
measures Rev.4 Annex A
Monitor communication with external L1_1_a_COM, <High‐Advanced>
○
service providers so that potential security L1_1_a_SYS, ‐ The organization requires its provider of external information system services to make clear the functions, ports, and protocols needed for the use of the services,
O/S - (In addition to the - -
events can be detected properly. L1_1_b_COM along with other services.
L1_1_c_COM following, SA-9(2))
‐ The organization monitors whether the matters made clear as stated above are observed.
L1_3_b_ORG, <Advanced>
L1_3_c_ORG, ‐ The organization documents its security requirements for the staff from its external service provider and system developer, and includes the requirements in the
L3_1_a_SYS, ○
agreement.
L3_3_a_SYS, (In addition to the
‐ The organization requires its external service provider and system developer to contact it when any of its staff members who have authorizations for its system are
L3_3_d_SYS, following, A.13.1.2,
transferred or when their employment terminates. ○
○ A.15.2.2)
‐ It is desirable that the organization should manage changes to services offered by its external service provider, taking account of relevant information about O/S (In addition to the - -
(3.14.6, 3.14.7)
CPS.CM-5 operations, the importance of its business systems and processes, and re‐assessed risks. following, PS-7, SI-4)
‐ The organization monitors whether its external service provider and system developer complies with the requirements.
‐ The organization monitors access to its system by its external service provider and system developer in order to detect any unauthorized access by these external
businesses that results from an action or failure to act.
‐ The organization reports the results of the monitoring of activities by its external service provider and system developer to the appropriate system administrator.
<Basic>
‐ The organization requires its provider of external information system services and system developer to draw up and introduce security requirements such as those
related to the following in accordance with the rules which the organization is subject to or which apply to the provider and developer. ○ ○
O - - -
‐ Adequate security measures to take (e.g., measures that deserve ISMS Certification) (SA-9) (A.14.2.7)
‐ Proper management of data in operation
‐ Proper data erasure when the use of the services ends
As part of the configuration management of L1_1_a_COM, <High‐Advanced>
devices, constantly manage software L1_1_a_SYS, ‐ The organization uses a mechanism for automatically detecting unauthorized hardware, software, or firmware in a system, if any.
configuration information, status of network L1_1_b_COM ‐ The information system regularly audits whether the actual configuration grasped conforms to the baseline configuration defined by the organization, and responds
L1_1_c_COM appropriately. (Example: blocking unplanned connections except those permitted by the organization as an exception)
connections (e.g., presence/absence of L1_3_a_SYS, ‐ The information system and the industrial control system disable network access by any unauthorized components that have been detected, separate these
connections and access destination), and L1_3_b_ORG, components from the network, or take any primary action, and notify the system administrator of the components. ○
information transmission/reception status L1_3_c_ORG, O/S - - -
‐ The organization records past versions of baseline configurations (eg, hardware, software, firmware, configuration files, configuration records) to enable rollback of (In addition to the
between other “organization”, people, L2_1_a_ORG, baseline configurations of information systems. following, CM-8(3))
components, and systems. L2_1_c_ORG, ‐ When a control device or IoT device does not have a rollback function for firmware etc., it is desirable for an organization to have a spare control device or IoT device.
L2_1_c_SYS,
‐ It is envisaged that some IoT devices cannot connect to the existing asset management system. Hence, manage assets and configurations with the possibility of
L2_3_b_ORG,
operating more than one asset management system in mind, within the organization’s manageable bounds.
L2_3_b_SYS,
*A related measure requirement is CPS.AM‐1.
L2_3_c_SYS,
L3_1_a_SYS,
<Advanced>
CPS.CM-6 L3_3_a_SYS,
‐ It is desirable that the organization should update the list of information about its assets and configurations when it installs or deletes new assets or when it updates its
L3_3_d_SYS
system.
○
‐ The information system ensures that each external communications service is provided via a controlled interface (e.g., a gateway, router, and firewall). ○
(In addition to the
‐ The organization establishes a communications control policy for each controlled interface (e.g., a gateway, router, and firewall). (In addition to the
O/S following, CM-3, - -
‐ The system on a controlled interface rejects network communication by default and permits it as an exception. following, 3.4.1, 3.4.3,
CM-8(1), SC-7(4),
‐ The information system and the industrial control system terminate the network connection after a session ends, or when a session remains inactive for a certain 3.13.9, 3.14.6, 3.14.7)
SC-7(5), SI-4)
length of time.
‐ The organization monitors communication on controlled interfaces in order to detect any communication to unapproved items or systems, or communication that
conveys an inappropriate content.
<Basic>
‐ The organization creates a ledger to manage model numbers of assets that includes servers, software versions, and the expiration of support services. Take regular
○ ○
inventory. O - -
(3.4.1) (CM-8)
‐ The organization regularly checks whether necessary measures are taken during operation (e.g., checking IoT devices for any unauthorized use or theft; applying a
patch; checking logs) and the state of IoT devices.
Confirm the existence of vulnerability that L1_1_a_SYS, <High‐Advanced>
requires a regular check-up in IoT devices L2_1_c_SYS, ‐ The organization conducts vulnerability diagnosis at planned timings such as planned stopping so as not to adversely affect the operation of the system managed by
L3_1_a_SYS, ○
and servers managed within the the organization. And then, identify and list vulnerabilities that exist in the system owned by the organization. ○
L3_3_a_SYS, (In addition to the
‐ When using tools to conduct vulnerability diagnosis, the organization should use tools that can quickly update the vulnerability database of the system being O (In addition to the -
organization. L3_3_d_SYS following, RA-5(1),
diagnosed. following, 3.11.2)
RA-5(2), RA-5(5))
‐ The organization updates the vulnerability of scanned systems regularly, or when newly‐identified weaknesses are reported.
‐ The organization implements a system for authorizing privileged access to the relevant system components in connection with the specified vulnerability scanning.
<Advanced>
‐ The organization has its systems and applications scanned for vulnerability regularly, or when any newly‐found weaknesses that affect the systems and/or applications
are reported.
○
‐ The organization uses a tool for vulnerability scanning. Applying the standard methods that meet the following means that part of the vulnerability management
○ (下記に加えて, 4.2.3.7)
CPS.CM-7 process should be open to automation.
(A.12.6.1)
‐ List defects in the platform and software, and wrong setups.
‐ Format a checklist and test procedure.
O -
‐ Assess the impact of the vulnerability. ○ ○
‐ The organization corrects identified weaknesses through risk assessment within an appropriate period. (3.11.2, 3.11.3) (RA-5)
‐ The organization shares the information acquired through the above process with other system administrators in the organization, thereby learning about similar
weaknesses found in the other information systems, and correct them as necessary.
[Reference] Japan Vulnerability Notes (https://jvn.jp/) and other sources of information are available for reference to obtain information regarding vulnerability. Also,
CVSS (https://www.ipa.go.jp/security/vuln/CVSS.html Illustrated by IPA) could be used as a referential indicator to evaluate the impact level of vulnerability.
<Basic> ○
O -
‐ The organization regularly has its systems and applications scanned for vulnerability. (4.2.3.1)
Clarify the role and responsibility of the L1_3_a_ORG Common among <High‐Advanced>, <Advanced> and <Basic>
organization as well as service providers in ‐ The organization determines the log information that would help detect security events and thus should be collected based on its strategies relating to risk
detecting security events so that they can management and assessment results.
○ ○ ○ ○
CPS.DP-1 fulfill their accountabilities. ‐ The organization ascertains that its business partner (service provider) has an audit log that records activity of service users, exception handling, and security events O -
(3.12.3) (CA-7, PM-14) (A.6.1.1, A.12.4.1) (4.4.3.1)
that the provider has acquired.
‐ The organization ascertains that the audit log acquired by its service provider records activity of service users, exception handling, and security events, and is protected
in a proper way.
C-19
Appendix C
Reference Guidelines
Subject that
Measure Corresponding
Requirement ID
Measure Requirement Vulnerability ID
Examples of security measure implements NIST SP 800-53 ISO/IEC 27001:2013
NIST SP 800-171 IEC 62443-2-1:2010 IEC 62443-3-3:2013
measures Rev.4 Annex A
Detect security events in the monitoring L1_2_a_ORG, Common among <High‐Advanced>, <Advanced> and <Basic>
process, in compliance with applicable local L1_3_a_ORG ‐ The organization sees if any legal system, industry standards, or agreements with customers that are related to monitoring services exist and, if any do, learn what
○ ○ ○ ○
CPS.DP-2 regulations, directives, industry standards, constraints are imposed. O -
(3.12.3) (CA-7, PM-14) (A.18.2.2) (4.4.3.2)
and other rules. ‐ The organization conducts monitoring in accordance with the rules learned above to detect any security events.
‐ The organization regularly reviews its monitoring activities to make sure that they conform to the rules.
As part of the monitoring process, test L1_3_a_ORG <High‐Advanced>
regularly if the functions for detecting ‐ The organization conducts a trend analysis examining the latest information about threats, vulnerability, and assessments of security management measures carried ○
○
security events work as intended, and out several times in order to determine whether the activities for continuous monitoring need any correction. (In addition to the
O/S - (In addition to the - -
validate these functions. ‐ The organization introduces known and harmless test cases to its systems to test its mechanism for detecting malware. following, CA-7(3),
following, A.14.3.1)
‐ The organization regularly tests the mechanism it uses for intrusion detection monitoring. The frequency of the test depends on the type of tool the organization uses SI-3(6), SI-4(9))
and the way the tool is installed.
CPS.DP-3 <Advanced>
‐ The organization establishes and manages a procedure for a regular review of its system monitoring activities to see if they conform to the organization’s risk
○ ○ ○ ○
management strategy and the order of priority for actions to handle risks. O -
(CA-7, PM-14) (A.14.2.8) (4.4.3.2) (SR 3.3)
‐ The organization calculates the percentages of false detections and false negatives when correlation analysis of information pertaining to the security of network
devices or endpoints is conducted, thereby checking the validity of the detection mechanism regularly.
<Basic>
- - - - - -
‐ N/A
Continuously improve the process of L1_1_b_SYS, <High‐Advanced>
detecting security events. L1_3_a_ORG ‐ The organization creates and tunes detection rules based on various information as sources in order to improve its detection ability.
‐ Developing the rules of correlation analysis ○
‐ Developing own signature of IPSs or IDSs O/S - (In addition to the - -
‐ Developing the organization’s own black list following, SI-4(13))
‐ The organization/system analyzes the patterns of its system’s communication and security alerts to create and use a profile that summarizes typical patterns of
communication and security alerts, thereby tuning its efforts to reduce the numbers of false detections and false negatives.
<Advanced>
‐ The organization prepares and manages a procedure for regularly reporting the state of organizational and system security to its appropriate staff members (e.g.,
management). It is desirable that the organization should define the reporting as an occasion for becoming aware of the latest threats or threats to remaining risks so
that the organization acts to enhance its security. ○
‐ For example, if alerts such as those shown below are issued and there is a sign of increasing security risks, raise the level of the system’s monitoring activities based on (A.16.1.6)
CPS.DP-4
information from reliable sources. * The list below is an excerpt from “Six Ws on cybersecurity information sharing for enhancing SOC/CSIRT Version 1.0” (ISOG‐J,
2018).
○ ○ ○
・ Characteristics of the attack O -
(3.14.6, 3.14.7) (CA-7, SI-4) (4.4.3.4)
➢ Form of the attack; contents of relevant communications
➢ Core attack code
・ Traces of the attack
➢ Contents of the damaged communications
➢ Logs that remain in the server or the hands of clients
➢ Other characteristics that remain in the server or the hands of clients
・Detected names in the security products
<Basic>
- - - - - -
‐ N/A
Develop and implement previously the L1_1_a_SYS, <High‐Advanced> (In addition to the
procedure of response after detecting L1_3_a_PEO, ‐ If the information system and the industrial control system receive any invalid data, they operate as stated in an expected manner in conformity with the purpose of S - following, SI-10(3), - -
incidents (securith operation process) that L1_3_a_PRO, the organization and system. SI-17)
L2_1_a_PRO, <Advanced>
includes the response of Organization, L2_1_b_PRO, ○
‐ The organization includes contents regarding what to do to detect, analyze, contain, reduce, and recover from incidents in its security operation manual.
People, Componens, System to identify the L2_1_c_PRO, O - (In addition to the -
‐ Keep a record of all incidents and how they have been handled.
content of response, priority, and scope of L2_2_a_PRO, ‐ Decide whether the organization should report the fact to any external organization of an incident that has occurred and how it has been handled.'
following, IR-8)
response taken after an incident occurs. L3_1_a_SYS, <Basic>
L3_3_a_SYS, ‐ The organization develops and manages a process of security operation it should follow when a security incident arises that it must address. It is advisable to include
L3_3_d_SYS contents such as the following in the process:
○
CPS.RP-1 ‐ Response procedure for the person who received the incident report
(A.16.1.5)
‐ Instructions and orders, and how to prioritize actions in an emergency; ○
‐ Incident response; (4.3.4.5.1)
‐ Incident impact assessment and damage analysis; ○ ○
O/S -
‐ Information gathering, selecting information that the organization needs; (3.6.1) (IR-4)
‐ Communication and announcement to relevant internal personnel;
‐ Communication with relevant external organizations;
‐ The system (especially, industrial control system) shuts down, issues an alert to the administrator, or takes other fail‐safe actions if any abnormality (e.g., malfunction)
occurs in IoT devices or servers.
[Reference] “SP 800‐61 rev.1" (NIST, 2008) is available for reference to determine the process for handling security incidents that have arisen.
C-20
Appendix C
Reference Guidelines
Subject that
Measure Corresponding
Requirement ID
Measure Requirement Vulnerability ID
Examples of security measure implements NIST SP 800-53 ISO/IEC 27001:2013
NIST SP 800-171 IEC 62443-2-1:2010 IEC 62443-3-3:2013
measures Rev.4 Annex A
As part of the security operation process, L1_3_b_PEO, <High‐Advanced>
define the procedure and the division of L1_3_b_PRO, ‐ The organization assumes the course of action for security incidents of the supply chain and prepares a procedure that adjusts incident responses between the
roles with regard to cooperative relations L1_3_c_PEO, organization and other organizations that are concerned with the supply chain.
L1_3_c_PRO ‐ The organization adjusts the incident response process of an external service provider that contains important features in order to continue its business, as well as ○
with relevant parties such as partners, and
adjusting the organization’s incident response process to meet the incident response requirements. (In addition to the
implement the process. O - - -
‐ The organization interlinks information regarding threats and vulnerabilities with how individual security incidents have been handled so as to improve its following, CP-2(7),
understanding of the situations. IR-4(4), IR-4(10))
[Reference] Violations in the security incidents of supply chain include violations on system components, IT products, development processes, developers, distribution ○
processes, and warehouse facilities. (In addition to the
<Advanced> following, A.17.1.2)
CPS.RP-2
‐ The organization determines an alternative processing site in case the availability of its primary processing site has been compromised by a security incident.
‐ The organization sets forth in the service agreement that if its primary processing function becomes unavailable, certain operations are moved to resume at the
○ ○
alternative processing site within the recovery time objective that the organization specifies in order to ensure that it continues to perform its critical missions and
(In addition to the (4.3.2.5.2, 4.3.2.5.3,
operational functions. O - -
following, CP-7, CP-7(1), 4.3.4.5.1, 4.3.4.5.2,
‐ The organization designates an alternative processing site away from its primary processing site in order to mitigate the vulnerability to the same threats.
CP-7(2), CP-7(3), IR-7) 4.3.4.5.3, 4.3.4.5.5)
‐ The organization prepares internal resources for incident handling assistance (e.g., help desk; CSIRT). These resources offer advice and support related to security
incident handling and reporting for system users of the information system and industrial control system, and are an integral part of organizational ability to handle
incidents.
<Basic>
○ ○
‐ If any security incident that requires handling is found, report it promptly to relevant organizations such as IPA and JPCERT/CC in order to receive advice about O - - -
(IR-6) (A.16.1.1, A.16.1.2)
providing assistance in handling, identifying how the incident has occurred, analyzing the tactic, and preventing any recurrence.
Include security incidents in the business L1_3_a_PRO, Common among <High‐Advanced> and <Advanced>
continuity plan or emergency response plan L1_3_a_DAT ‐ The organization will establish a system of business continuity in emergency for information systems, industrial control systems and managers of related processes.
that outlines the action plans and response This system defines the priority of the system for recovering operation when an event occurs that causes interruption in business continuity.
procedures to take in case of natural ‐ The organization develops and manages a business continuity plan or an emergency response plan specifically for security incidents with certain characteristics, such as ○ ○ ○
O - -
that the damage the incident inflicts is less obvious than that caused by a disaster, making it difficult to specify when the business continuity plan should be carried out, (CP-2) (A.17.1.1) (4.3.2.5.4)
CPS.RP-3 disasters.
or that identifying the cause of the incident has high priority.
‐ The organization ensures that the business continuity plan or emergency response plan it develops specifically for security incidents goes along with the organization‐
wide policy on business continuity.
<Basic>
- - - - - -
‐ N/A
Take appropriate measures on goods L1_3_b_COM Common among <High‐Advanced> and <Advanced>
(products) whose quality is expected to be ‐ The organization provides an overview of a security incident for relevant external entities including business partners and end users, and collects detailed information ○
○
affected by some reasons, including its about damage inflicted by the incident. O (In addition to the - -
(3.6.2)
production facility damaged by the ‐ The organization coordinates actions related to recovery and post‐incident processing with relevant external entities involved in the supply chain. It is advisable to following, IR-4, IR-4(10)) ○
CPS.RP-4 identify the items for handling in accordance with the approaches included in CPS.AM‐2 and CPS.AM‐3.
occurrence of the security incident. (A.17.1.1)
<Basic>
‐ The organization considers stating what to do with items produced after the incident in the business continuity plan or emergency response plan, taking into account ○
O - - -
the type of the organization’s business. Note that the business continuity plan or emergency response plan may not be for security incidents. (CP-2)
comprise a “system of systems”. The document “Observations about the Impact Assessment of an Internet of Things (IoT) Incident” (Cloud Security Alliance, 2016) is an
CPS.AN-1 advanced attempt to examine issues relating to the impact assessment. It attempts to assess an impact according to the characteristics of the device or the service and
to the number of devices.
<Advanced>
‐ The organization works with IPA, JPCERT/CC, the industry’s ISAC, and a security vendor to collect information, thereby interlinking and sharing information about ○
○ ○ ○
threats and vulnerability to obtain a whole picture of the security incident. O (4.3.4.5.6, 4.3.4.5.7, -
(3.6.1) (IR-4, IR-4(8)) (A.6.1.4)
‐ The organization requests an external security vendor to analyze the functions of the malware, or program, or script placed by an attacker if any is found in a security 4.3.4.5.8)
incident that has occurred.
<Basic>
- - - - - -
‐ N/A
C-21
Appendix C
Reference Guidelines
Subject that
Measure Corresponding
Requirement ID
Measure Requirement Vulnerability ID
Examples of security measure implements NIST SP 800-53 ISO/IEC 27001:2013
NIST SP 800-171 IEC 62443-2-1:2010 IEC 62443-3-3:2013
measures Rev.4 Annex A
Implement digital forensics upon the L1_3_a_PRO <High‐Advanced> ○
occurrence of the security incident. ‐ The information system provides a procedure for processing an audit record regarding critical security incidents. S - (In addition to the
following, SR 2.10)
<Advanced>
‐ The organization establishes procedures for identifying, collecting, acquiring, and saving proof according to the medium, device, and the state of the device (e.g.,
○
whether it is switched on or off). ○ ○ ○
CPS.AN-2 (SR 2.8, SR 2.9, SR
‐ It is desirable that the organization should retain the following evidence after the occurrence of any serious security incident: O (3.3.6) (AU-7, AU-7(1)) (A.16.1.7) -
2.11, SR 2.12, SR 3.9,
‐ Identification data (e.g., the location of the incident, date and time of the occurrence, serial numbers on the items, host name, MAC address, IP address);
SR 6.1)
‐ The titles and names of the people who have collected and processed the evidence; their contact information;
‐ Date and time the evidence was saved.
<Basic>
O - -
‐ The organization establishes and manages procedures for identifying, collecting, acquiring, and saving data that may serve as proof.
Categorize and store information regarding L1_3_a_PRO <High‐Advanced> ○
the detected security incidents by the size ‐ The organization uses an automated mechanism designed to help track security incidents and collect and analyze information about threats and vulnerability related to
O -
(In addition to the
- -
of security-related impact, penetration incidents, so that it applies the findings to classification (triage) of security incidents. following, CP-2(8), IR-
vector, and other factors. 5(1))
<Advanced>
‐ The organization classifies security incidents, taking into account the recovery time objectives for the systems, the order of priority in recovery, and metrics in the
process of its security operation.
‐ The organization tracks and documents security incidents that may affect it. “SP 800‐61 rev.1” lists the following as examples of points of view that may be taken when
an organization documents a security incident.
○
‐ The present state of the incident ○
O (In addition to the -
‐ Overview of the incident (3.6.1)
following, CP-2, IR-5)
‐ The course of action the organization has taken to deal with the incident
‐ Other contact information of relevant personnel (e.g., the system owner, system administrator) ○
CPS.AN-3
‐ List of proof collected during the investigation (A.16.1.3, A.16.1.4)
‐ Comments by the staff in charge of dealing with the incident ○
‐ Next steps (4.3.4.5.6)
<Basic>
‐ The organization should identify in advance the core businesses that should be continued and restored in priority, and the operations considered to be important. In
addition, identify and prioritize important resources (relevant parties, People, Components, Data, System, etc.) and functions from the viewpoint of business continuity.
* Similar measures are described in CPS.AM‐6 and CPS.BE‐2.
‐ The organization specifies incidents that must be reported, considering the level of the impact the security event has. ○
O - -
(IR-8)
[Reference] For example, the following document is available for reference when an organization decides on a measure of the severity of the impact of a security
incident.
‐ “SP 800‐61 rev.1” (NIST, 2008) Prioritization of the 3.2.6 Incident
C-22
Appendix D: Relationship with major overseas standards
D.1 Mapping NIST Cybersecurity Framework v1.1 subcategories to Cyber/Physical Security Framework
NIST Cyberseucurity Framework Ver 1.1 Cyber/Physical Security Framework
Subcategory- Measure
Function Subcategory Measure Requirement
ID Requirement ID
Identify AM-1 Physical devices and systems within the organization are inventoried Document and manage appropriately the list of hardware and software, and management information
(ID) CPS.AM-1 (e.g. name of asset, version, network address, name of asset manager, license information) of
AM-2 Software platforms and applications within the organization are inventoried components in the system.
Create and manage appropriately network configuration diagrams and data flows within the
AM-3 Organizational communication and data flows are mapped CPS.AM-4
organization.
Create and manage appropriately a list of external information systems where the organizationʼs assets
AM-4 External information systems are catalogued CPS.AM-5
are shared.
Classify and prioritize resources (e.g., People, Components, Data, and System) by function, importance,
Resources (e.g., hardware, devices, data, time, personnel, and software) are prioritized
AM-5 CPS.AM-6 and business value, and communicate to the organizations and people relevant to those resources in
based on their classification, criticality, and business value
business.
Cybersecurity roles and responsibilities for the entire workforce and third-party stakeholders
AM-6 CPS.AM-7 Define roles and responsibilities for cyber security across the organization and other relevant parties.
(e.g., suppliers, customers, partners) are established
BE-1 The organizationʼs role in the supply chain is identified and communicated
The organizationʼs place in critical infrastructure and its industry sector is identified and CPS.BE-1 Identify and share the role of the organizations in the supply chain.
BE-2
communicated
Define policies and standard measures regarding security that are consistent with the high-priority
Priorities for organizational mission, objectives, and activities are established and
BE-3 CPS.BE-2 business and operations of the organization, and share them with parties relevant to the organizationʼs
communicated
business (including suppliers and third-party providers).
Identify the dependency between the organization and other relevant parties and the important
BE-4 Dependencies and critical functions for delivery of critical services are established CPS.BE-3
functions of each in the course of running the operation.
Provide appropriate training and education to all individuals in the organization and manage the record
CPS.AT-1 so that they can fulfill assigned roles and responsibilities to prevent and contain the occurrence and
severity of security incidents.
Provide appropriate training and security education to members of the organization and other relevant
CPS.AT-2 parties of high importance in security management that may be involved in the security incident
prevention and response. Then, manage the record of such training and security education.
Implement physical measures such as preparing an uninterruptible power supply, a fire protection
Resilience requirements to support delivery of critical services are established for all CPS.IP-5 facility, and protection from water infiltration to follow the policies and rules related to the physical
BE-5
operating states (e.g. under duress/attack, during recovery, normal operations) operating environment, including the IoT devices and servers installed in the organization.
Develop and implement previously the procedure of response after detecting incidents (securith
CPS.RP-1 operation process) that includes the response of Organization, People, Componens, System to identify
the content of response, priority, and scope of response taken after an incident occurs.
As part of the security operation process, define the procedure and the division of roles with regard to
CPS.RP-2
cooperative relations with relevant parties such as partners, and implement the process.
Include security incidents in the business continuity plan or emergency response plan that outlines the
CPS.RP-3
action plans and response procedures to take in case of natural disasters.
GV-1 Organizational cybersecurity policy is established and communicated
Develop security policies, define roles and responsibilities for security across the organization and other
Cybersecurity roles and responsibilities are coordinated and aligned with internal roles and CPS.GV-1
GV-2 relevant parties, and clarify the information-sharing method among stakeholders.
external partners
Formulate internal rules considering domestic and foreign laws, including the Act on the Protection of
Legal and regulatory requirements regarding cybersecurity, including privacy and civil Personal Information and Unfair Competition Prevention Act, as well as industry guidelines, and review
GV-3 CPS.GV-2
liberties obligations, are understood and managed and revise the rules on a continuing and timely basis in accordance with any changes in relevant laws,
regulations, and industry guidelines.
GV-4 Governance and risk management processes address cybersecurity risks CPS.GV-4 Develop a strategy and secure resources to implement risk management regarding security.
Identify the vulnerability of the organizationʼs assets and document the list of identified vulnerability
RA-1 Asset vulnerabilities are identified and documented CPS.RA-1
with the corresponding asset.
The security management team (SOC/CSIRT) collects information, including vulnerability and threats
RA-2 Cyber threat intelligence is received from information sharing forums and sources CPS.RA-2 from internal and external sources (through internal tests, security information, security researchers,
etc.), analyzes the information, and establishes a process to implement and use measures.
D-1-1
Appendix D.1 - Mapping NIST CSF to CPSF
AC-3 Remote access is managed Prevent unauthorized log-in to IoT devices and servers by measures such as implementing functions for
CPS.AC-4 lockout after a specified number of incorrect log-in attempts and providing a time interval until safety is
ensured.
Segregate duties and areas of responsibility properly (e.g. segregate user functions from system
CPS.AC-5
administrator functions)
Access permissions and authorizations are managed, incorporating the principles of least
AC-4 Adopt high confidence methods of authentication where appropriate based on risk (e.g. multi-factor
privilege and separation of duties
CPS.AC-6 authentication, combining more than two types of authentication) when logging in to the system over
the network for the privileged user.
Develop a policy about controlling data flow, and according that protect the integrity of the network by
means such as appropriate network isolation (e.g., development and test environment vs. production
AC-5 Network integrity is protected, (e.g., network segregation , network segmentation) CPS.AC-7
environment, and environment incorporates IoT devices vs. other environments within the
organization).
Restrict communications by IoT devices and servers to those with entities (e.g. people, components,
AC-6 Identities are proofed and bound to credentials and asserted in interactions CPS.AC-8
system, etc.) identified through proper procedures.
D-1-2
Appendix D.1 - Mapping NIST CSF to CPSF
D-1-3
Appendix D.1 - Mapping NIST CSF to CPSF
IP-8 Effectiveness of protection technologies is shared CPS.IP-8 Share information regarding the effectiveness of data protection technologies with appropriate partners.
Develop and implement previously the procedure of response after detecting incidents (securith
CPS.RP-1 operation process) that includes the response of Organization, People, Componens, System to identify
Response plans (Incident Response and Business Continuity) and recovery plans (Incident
IP-9 the content of response, priority, and scope of response taken after an incident occurs.
Recovery and Disaster Recovery) are in place and managed
As part of the security operation process, define the procedure and the division of roles with regard to
CPS.RP-2
cooperative relations with relevant parties such as partners, and implement the process.
Provide appropriate training and security education to members of the organization and other relevant
IP-10 Response and recovery plans are tested CPS.AT-2 parties of high importance in security management that may be involved in the security incident
prevention and response. Then, manage the record of such training and security education.
Cybersecurity is included in human resources practices (e.g., deprovisioning, personnel Include items concerning security (e.g., deactivate access authorization and personnel screening) when
IP-11 CPS.IP-9
screening) roles change in due to personnel transfer.
Develop a vulnerability remediation plan, and modify the vulnerability of the components according to
IP-12 A vulnerability management plan is developed and implemented CPS.IP-10
the plan.
- Discuss the method of conducting important security updates and the like on IoT devices and servers.
Then, apply those security updateswith managed tools properly and in a timely manner while
Maintenance and repair of organizational assets isare performed and logged with approved
MA-1 CPS.MA-1 recording the history.
and controlled tools
- Introduce IoT devices having a remote update mechanism to perform a mass update of different
software programs (OS, driver, and application) through remote commands, where applicable.
Remote maintenance of organizational assets is approved, logged, and performed in a Conduct remote maintenance of the IoT devices and servers while granting approvals and recording logs
MA-2 CPS.MA-2
manner that prevents unauthorized access so that unauthorized access can be prevented.
Audit/log records are determined, documented, implemented, and reviewed in accordance Determine and document the subject or scope of the audit recording/log recording, and implement and
PT-1 CPS.PT-1
with policy review those records in order to properly detect high-risk security incidents.
PT-2 Removable media is protected and its use restricted according to policy
Minimize funcions of IoT devices and servers by physically and logically blocking unnecessary network
The principle of least functionality is incorporated by configuring systems to provide only CPS.PT-2
PT-3 ports, USBs, and serial ports accessing directly the main bodies of IoT devices and servers etc.
essential capabilities
Develop a policy about controlling data flow, and according that protect the integrity of the network by
means such as appropriate network isolation (e.g., development and test environment vs. production
PT-4 Communications and control networks are protected CPS.AC-7
environment, and environment incorporates IoT devices vs. other environments within the
organization).
Mechanisms (e.g., failsafe, load balancing, hot swap) are implemented to achieve resilience Introduce IoT devices that implement safety functions, assuming that these devices are connected to
PT-5 CPS.PT-3
requirements in normal and adverse situations the network.
Detect A baseline of network operations and expected data flows for users and systems is Establish and implement the procedure to identify and manage the baseline of network operations and
AE-1 CPS.AE-1
(DE) established and managed expected information flows between people, goods, and systems.
Appoint a chief security officer, establish a security management team (SOC/CSIRT), and prepare a
AE-2 Detected events are analyzed to understand attack targets and methods CPS.AE-2
system within the organization to detect, analyze, and respond to security events.
Identify the security events accurately by implementing the procedure to conduct a correlation analysis
AE-3 Event data are collected and correlated from multiple sources and sensors CPS.AE-3 of the security events and comparative analysis with the threat information obtained from outside the
organization.
AE-4 Impact of events is determined CPS.AE-4 Identify the impact of security events, including the impact on other relevant organizations.
AE-5 Incident alert thresholds are established CPS.AE-5 Specify the criteria to determine the risk degree of security events.
Conduct network and access monitoring and control at the contact points between corporate networks
CM-1 The network is monitored to detect potential cybersecurity events CPS.CM-1
and wide area networks.
Perform setting, recording, and monitoring of proper physical access, considering the importance of IoT
CM-2 The physical environment is monitored to detect potential cybersecurity events CPS.CM-2
devices and servers.
D-1-4
Appendix D.1 - Mapping NIST CSF to CPSF
D-1-5
Appendix D.1 - Mapping NIST CSF to CPSF
D-1-6
D.2 Mapping NIST SP 800-171 controls to Cyber/Physical Security Framework
NIST SP 800-53 Relevant Security Controls
NIST SP 800-171 referred from NIST SP 800-171
Cyber/Physical Security Framework
Measure
FAMILY ID Security Requirements Security Controls Measure Requirement Example of Security Measures
Requirement ID
ACCESS CONTROL ‐ The information system and industrial control system require authentication using a public key infrastructure (PKI) , especially regarding login to
a system that handles highly confidential data.
* When performing authentication using PKI in an industrial control system, ensure that the processing wait time that occurs does not degrade
system performance.
H‐Advanced
‐ The information system and industrial control system lay down conditions that require disconnection of the session for its system and implement
Authenticate and authorize logical accesses to
Limit system access to authorized users, a function that automatically terminates a user’s session when it falls under these conditions.
・AC-2 Account Management system components by IoT devices and users
processes acting on behalf of authorized users, or
3.1.1 ・AC-3 Access Enforcement CPS.AC-9 according to the transaction risks (personal [Reference] For the strength of authentication schemes and appropriate use cases, it is advisable to refer to NIST SP 800‐63‐3.
devices
・AC-17 Remote Access security, privacy risks, and other organizational ‐ The organization checks the user’s identity and authenticates using a mechanism that has sufficient strength for the risk of the transaction
(including other systems). (security‐related risks for the user, privacy risks, etc.).
risks).
‐ The information system displays a notification message on the risk of the transaction (security‐related risks for the user, privacy risks, etc.) when
Advanced a user logs into the system.
‐ The information system and the industrial control system make the feedback on the authentication information invisible in its system during the
authentication process.
‐ The organization sets the expiration date of the credential and manages whether the password over the expiration date is used.
‐ The information system and industrial control system require authentication using a public key infrastructure (PKI) , especially regarding login to
a system that handles highly confidential data.
* When performing authentication using PKI in an industrial control system, ensure that the processing wait time that occurs does not degrade
system performance.
H‐Advanced
‐ The information system and industrial control system lay down conditions that require disconnection of the session for its system and implement
Authenticate and authorize logical accesses to
Limit system access to the types of transactions a function that automatically terminates a user’s session when it falls under these conditions.
・AC-2 Account Management system components by IoT devices and users
and functions that authorized users are
3.1.2 ・AC-3 Access Enforcement CPS.AC-9 according to the transaction risks (personal [Reference] For the strength of authentication schemes and appropriate use cases, it is advisable to refer to NIST SP 800‐63‐3.
permitted
・AC-17 Remote Access security, privacy risks, and other organizational ‐ The organization checks the user’s identity and authenticates using a mechanism that has sufficient strength for the risk of the transaction
to execute. risks).
(security‐related risks for the user, privacy risks, etc.).
‐ The information system displays a notification message on the risk of the transaction (security‐related risks for the user, privacy risks, etc.) when
Advanced a user logs into the system.
‐ The information system and the industrial control system make the feedback on the authentication information invisible in its system during the
authentication process.
‐ The organization sets the expiration date of the credential and manages whether the password over the expiration date is used.
‐ The information system and the industrial control system monitor and control communications on the networks composing internal business
systems of the organization.
‐ Regarding the network which the system that handles highly confidential data is connected to, the organization shall deny network
communications as a default and shall only allow connection of approved communication traffic.
Develop a policy about controlling data flow, and H‐Advanced
‐ The organization physically or logically separates the network of high importance industrial control systems from the network of control systems
according that protect the integrity of the network with lower importance.
by means such as appropriate network isolation ‐ If the information system that handles highly confidential data is connected to a remote device, the organization is to prevent multiple and
CPS.AC-7 (e.g., development and test environment vs. simultaneous local connections between the device and the system, as well as prevent access to external network resources by other connections.
production environment, and environment ‐ The organization establishes a data flow regulation policy that defines the range in which data flow within information systems and industrial
incorporates IoT devices vs. other environments control system is permitted and the range in which data flow between systems is permitted, and regulates the flow by segregating the network
Control the flow of CUI in accordance with within the organization). appropriately.
3.1.3 ・AC-4 Information Flow Enforcement Basic ‐ The organization logically or physically segments the control system's network from the network composing of the information system.
approved authorizations.
[Reference] Implement physical segmentation in environments physically separated from other networks. Alternatively, in environments physically
close to other networks, it is possible to implement logical segmentation in consideration of the cost of the measure.
‐ The organization uses a mechanism for automatically collecting information about network configurations and the software configurations of
devices in order to monitor the most recent status at all times.
Establish and implement the procedure to identify ‐ The information system forces the application of users’ access rights approved (by the administrator) in order to control data flows within a
system (and between interconnected systems).
and manage the baseline of network operations and
CPS.AE-1 H‐Advanced ‐ The organization physically or logically separates a network of industrial control systems with high importance from a network of industrial
expected information flows between people, goods, control systems with lower importance.
and systems. ‐ The organization/system analyzes the regular patterns of its systems’ communication status and security alerts to create and use a profile that
summarizes typical patterns of communication and security alerts, thereby enabling the detection of unknown threats and suspicious behavior
(communication).
‐ The organization specifies administrators who use the security functions (e.g., access authority setting) and regulates privileged accounts in its
system.
‐ The information system adopts a system monitoring mechanism to check the use of privileged functions.
‐ The information system prohibits non‐privileged users from executing privileged functions on the system by invalidating, avoiding, and changing
H‐Advanced security measures that are changed and implemented by non‐privileged users.
‐ The organization can minimize the number of users who can use the system administrator's authority in an emergency to minimize the damage
Segregate duties and areas of responsibility caused by the security incident.
Separate the duties of individuals to reduce the ‐ The organization can prevent even system administrators from stopping critical services and protected processes through the server to minimize
3.1.4 ・AC-5 Separation of Duties CPS.AC-5 properly (e.g. segregate user functions from
risk of malevolent activity without collusion. the damage caused by security incidents.
system administrator functions) ‐ The organization implements access control in the information system and the industrial control system based on separation of duties (e.g., user
/ system administrator).
‐ The organization adopts a general rule on the minimum authority of specific duties.
Advanced ‐ Segregate authority of general user from that of administrator.
(Require users to use the system with a non‐privileged account when using a non‐security function.)
‐ Minimize authority for duties not in charge.
‐ The organization separates and stipulates duties that are assigned by the person in charge.
D-2-1
Appendix D.2 - Mapping NIST SP 800-171 to CPSF
D-2-2
Appendix D.2 - Mapping NIST SP 800-171 to CPSF
D-2-3
Appendix D.2 - Mapping NIST SP 800-171 to CPSF
D-2-4
Appendix D.2 - Mapping NIST SP 800-171 to CPSF
D-2-5
Appendix D.2 - Mapping NIST SP 800-171 to CPSF
D-2-6
Appendix D.2 - Mapping NIST SP 800-171 to CPSF
D-2-7
Appendix D.2 - Mapping NIST SP 800-171 to CPSF
D-2-8
Appendix D.2 - Mapping NIST SP 800-171 to CPSF
D-2-9
Appendix D.2 - Mapping NIST SP 800-171 to CPSF
3.5.3 network access to privileged accounts and for (Organizational Users) CPS.AC-6 authentication, combining more than two types of ‐ In consideration of the risk of unauthorized login to the privileged account in the system, the organization in principle prohibits login to the
network access to non-privileged accounts. Network Access to Non-Privileged Accounts authentication) when logging in to the system over privileged account via the network when it is not possible to implement a sufficient confidence methods of authentication.
‐ The information system requires a multifactor authentication in its system for access to the system or network with privileged accounts when
・IA-2(3) Identification and Authentication the network for the privileged user. Advanced
cannot implement actions such as invalidating the administrator account for the system.
(Organizational Users) ‐ In principle, the organization invalidates the default administrator account in the information system.
Local Access to Privileged Accounts ‐ The information system permits the necessary minimum privileged authority to the user account when performing privileged operations.
D-2-10
Appendix D.2 - Mapping NIST SP 800-171 to CPSF
D-2-11
Appendix D.2 - Mapping NIST SP 800-171 to CPSF
[Reference] “SP 800‐61 rev.1" (NIST, 2008) is available for reference to determine the process for handling security incidents that have arisen.
D-2-12
Appendix D.2 - Mapping NIST SP 800-171 to CPSF
D-2-13
Appendix D.2 - Mapping NIST SP 800-171 to CPSF
D-2-14
Appendix D.2 - Mapping NIST SP 800-171 to CPSF
D-2-15
Appendix D.2 - Mapping NIST SP 800-171 to CPSF
D-2-16
Appendix D.2 - Mapping NIST SP 800-171 to CPSF
D-2-17
Appendix D.2 - Mapping NIST SP 800-171 to CPSF
[Reference] Japan Vulnerability Notes (https://jvn.jp/) and other sources of information are available for reference to obtain information regarding
vulnerability. Also, CVSS (https://www.ipa.go.jp/security/vuln/CVSS.html Illustrated by IPA) could be used as a referential indicator to evaluate the
impact level of vulnerability.
Basic ‐ The organization regularly has its systems and applications scanned for vulnerability.
‐ The organization securely stores the documented information on security risk management processes.
- On the basis of the results of the risk assessment, ‐ When the organization selects a measure according to the risk assessment results, it is desirable that the organization documents the measure to
clearly define the details of measures to prevent be taken and the reason why the measure is adopted.
‐ When applying the measure, the organization formulates a security risk management plan and obtains an approval from the risk owner.
possible security risks, and document the organized
‐ The organization reviews the security risk handling plan and checks that the applicable plan conforms to the priority order of the entire
outcome from the scope and priorities of the Advanced organization’s risk management strategy.
measures. ‐ The organization informs applicable external business operators regarding security measures necessary for a new system including an IoT device
CPS.RA-6
- React accordingly to the security risks and the which are extracted in CPS.RA‐4 as required specifications.
associated safety risks identified as a result of the ‐ The organization verifies whether the security measures defined in the required specifications and contracts are implemented at the time of
deployment of the systems including an IoT device via User Acceptance Test (UAT). If there is anything unclear, confirm with the external business
assessment conducted at the planning and design
operator.
phase of an IoT device and systems incorporating ‐ The organization considers the risk assessment results and selects handling measures to identified risks.
IoT devices. Basic ‐ The organization formulates a security risk treatment implementation plan.
‐ The organization obtain an approval from the risk owner for acceptance of the security risk.
Remediate vulnerabilities in accordance with
3.11.3 ・RA-5 Vulnerability Scanning ‐ The organization has its systems and applications scanned for vulnerability regularly, or when any newly‐found weaknesses that affect the
assessments of risk. systems and/or applications are reported.
‐ The organization uses a tool for vulnerability scanning. Applying the standard methods that meet the following means that part of the
vulnerability management process should be open to automation.
‐ List defects in the platform and software, and wrong setups.
‐ Format a checklist and test procedure.
Confirm the existence of vulnerability that requires Advanced
‐ Assess the impact of the vulnerability.
CPS.CM-7 a regular check-up in IoT devices and servers ‐ The organization corrects identified weaknesses through risk assessment within an appropriate period.
‐ The organization shares the information acquired through the above process with other system administrators in the organization, thereby
managed within the organization.
learning about similar weaknesses found in the other information systems, and correct them as necessary.
[Reference] Japan Vulnerability Notes (https://jvn.jp/) and other sources of information are available for reference to obtain information regarding
vulnerability. Also, CVSS (https://www.ipa.go.jp/security/vuln/CVSS.html Illustrated by IPA) could be used as a referential indicator to evaluate the
impact level of vulnerability.
Basic ‐ The organization regularly has its systems and applications scanned for vulnerability.
SECURITY ‐ The organization draws up a security assessment plan before the assessment is carried out that includes the following so as to ensure that its
security is assessed properly and systematically:
ASSESSMENT
・CA-2 Security Assessments Assess the lessons learned from security incident ‐ Security measures for assessment;
Periodically assess the security controls in Advanced
‐ Assessment procedures for measuring the effectiveness of security measures;
・CA-5 Plan of Action and Milestones response and the results of monitoring, measuring,
3.12.1 organizational systems to determine if the CPS.IP-7 ‐ Settings and mechanisms for carrying out the security assessment;
・CA-7 Continuous Monitoring and evaluating internal and external attacks, and
controls are effective in their application. ‐ Methods of putting together the results of the security assessment and applications of the results.
・PL-2 System Security Plan improve the processes of protecting the assets. ‐ The organization regularly evaluates whether its security measures have achieved expected results (i.e., security assessment) and reports the
Basic conclusions to the chief security officer, in addition to the evaluation of whether the measures are correctly implemented and managed.
‐ The organization makes improvements on its security measures based on the results of the security assessment.
D-2-18
Appendix D.2 - Mapping NIST SP 800-171 to CPSF
[Reference] An “asset‐based” method and a “business damage‐based” method are known as security risk assessment methods.
‐ The system makes a list of external information services in use and manages the users, devices as well as serviced in use in real time.
H‐Advanced ‐ The system uses a mechanism to give notice to the system administrator when an unpermitted external information system service is detected.
Create and manage appropriately a list of external ‐ The organization identifies functions, ports, protocols, and other services which are necessary for using services offered by external providers.
CPS.AM-5 information systems where the organizationʼs ‐ The organization sets conditions for allowing other organizations which own or operate external information systems to do the following:
assets are shared. Advanced
a. Accessing an information system in the organization from an external information system
b. Processing, saving, or transmitting information under the control of the organization using an external information system
Develop, document, and periodically update ‐ The organization restricts a use of storage in an external system the organization owns to an authorized one.
system security plans that describe system ・CA-2 Security Assessments - On the basis of the results of the risk assessment, ‐ The organization securely stores the documented information on security risk management processes.
boundaries, system environments of operation, ・CA-5 Plan of Action and Milestones clearly define the details of measures to prevent ‐ When the organization selects a measure according to the risk assessment results, it is desirable that the organization documents the measure to
3.12.4
how security requirements are implemented, and ・CA-7 Continuous Monitoring possible security risks, and document the organized be taken and the reason why the measure is adopted.
the relationships with or connections to other ・PL-2 System Security Plan outcome from the scope and priorities of the ‐ When applying the measure, the organization formulates a security risk management plan and obtains an approval from the risk owner.
‐ The organization reviews the security risk handling plan and checks that the applicable plan conforms to the priority order of the entire
systems. measures.
CPS.RA-6 Advanced organization’s risk management strategy.
- React accordingly to the security risks and the ‐ The organization informs applicable external business operators regarding security measures necessary for a new system including an IoT device
associated safety risks identified as a result of the which are extracted in CPS.RA‐4 as required specifications.
assessment conducted at the planning and design ‐ The organization verifies whether the security measures defined in the required specifications and contracts are implemented at the time of
phase of an IoT device and systems incorporating deployment of the systems including an IoT device via User Acceptance Test (UAT). If there is anything unclear, confirm with the external business
operator.
IoT devices.
D-2-19
Appendix D.2 - Mapping NIST SP 800-171 to CPSF
D-2-20
Appendix D.2 - Mapping NIST SP 800-171 to CPSF
[Reference] Implement physical segmentation in environments physically separated from other networks. Alternatively, in environments physically
Implement subnetworks for publicly accessible close to other networks, it is possible to implement logical segmentation in consideration of the cost of the measure.
‐ The information system routes communications to the network to which a recipient’s IP address belongs via a proxy server authenticated on a
3.13.5 system components that are physically or logically ・SC-7 Boundary Protection controlled interface.
separated from internal networks. H‐Advanced
‐ The information system and the industrial control system monitor and control the use of mobile code.
‐ The information system monitors and controls the use of protocols used for audio and video transmission (e.g. VoIP).
‐ The organization monitors and controls communications at the boundary between industrial control system and information system.
‐ The organization creates a network segment isolated from access to the internal network (“demilitarized zone [DMZ]”) between the internal
network and external networks (e.g., the Internet).
Conduct network and access monitoring and control ‐ The information system is connected to an external network or system only via a controlled interface that consists of a boundary protection
system placed according to the organization’s security architecture.
CPS.CM-1 at the contact points between corporate networks
‐ The information system ensures that each external communications service is provided via a controlled interface (e.g., a gateway, router, and
and wide area networks. Advanced
firewall).
‐ The organization establishes a communications control policy for each controlled interface (e.g., a gateway, router, and firewall).
‐ The system on a controlled interface rejects network communication by default and permits it as an exception.
‐ The organization monitors communications at the external boundaries of the information system and at major internal boundaries within the
information system for large amounts of communication from a particular source or multiple sources, and takes appropriate action when
necessary (e.g., blocking of communication from a specific IP address).
‐ The organization monitors and controls communications on the information system’s external boundary as well as on the key internal boundary
Basic
within the information system.
‐ The organization assigns identifiers to its IoT devices and servers, as well as managing the identification by preventing re‐use of identifiers and
Restrict communications by IoT devices and servers invalidating identifiers after a certain period of time.
CPS.AC-8 to those with entities (e.g. people, components, Basic ‐ Before connecting their IoT devices and servers to the network, the information system and the industrial control system prepare a mechanism
system, etc.) identified through proper procedures. that uniquely identifies and authenticate these devices.
‐ Communication using IoT devices is denied as default. The protocol to be used is authorized as an exception.
‐ The information system routes communications to the network to which a recipient’s IP address belongs via a proxy server authenticated on a
controlled interface.
H‐Advanced
‐ The information system and the industrial control system monitor and control the use of mobile code.
‐ The information system monitors and controls the use of protocols used for audio and video transmission (e.g. VoIP).
Deny network communications traffic by default ‐ The organization monitors and controls communications at the boundary between industrial control system and information system.
・SC-7(5) Boundary Protection
3.13.6 and allow network communications traffic by ‐ The organization creates a network segment isolated from access to the internal network (“demilitarized zone [DMZ]”) between the internal
Deny by Default / Allow by Exception
exception (i.e., deny all, permit by exception). Conduct network and access monitoring and control network and external networks (e.g., the Internet).
‐ The information system is connected to an external network or system only via a controlled interface that consists of a boundary protection
CPS.CM-1 at the contact points between corporate networks
system placed according to the organization’s security architecture.
and wide area networks. ‐ The information system ensures that each external communications service is provided via a controlled interface (e.g., a gateway, router, and
Advanced
firewall).
‐ The organization establishes a communications control policy for each controlled interface (e.g., a gateway, router, and firewall).
‐ The system on a controlled interface rejects network communication by default and permits it as an exception.
‐ The organization monitors communications at the external boundaries of the information system and at major internal boundaries within the
information system for large amounts of communication from a particular source or multiple sources, and takes appropriate action when
necessary (e.g., blocking of communication from a specific IP address).
Develop a policy about controlling data flow, and ‐ The information system and the industrial control system monitor and control communications on the networks composing internal business
Prevent remote devices from simultaneously according that protect the integrity of the network systems of the organization.
establishing non-remote connections with by means such as appropriate network isolation ‐ Regarding the network which the system that handles highly confidential data is connected to, the organization shall deny network
・SC-7(7) Boundary Protection communications as a default and shall only allow connection of approved communication traffic.
3.13.7 organizational systems and communicating via CPS.AC-7 (e.g., development and test environment vs. H‐Advanced
Prevent Split Tunneling for Remote Devices ‐ The organization physically or logically separates the network of high importance industrial control systems from the network of control systems
some other connection to resources in external production environment, and environment with lower importance.
networks (i.e. split tunneling). incorporates IoT devices vs. other environments ‐ If the information system that handles highly confidential data is connected to a remote device, the organization is to prevent multiple and
within the organization). simultaneous local connections between the device and the system, as well as prevent access to external network resources by other connections.
‐ The organization selects products that have been authenticated based on Cryptographic Module Validation Program (CMVP) in order to suitably
implement selected algorithms to software and hardware, and to protect keys, identification codes, and entity authentication information that is
H‐Advanced used to decrypt encrypted information or to grant electronic signatures.
‐ The organization protects are encrypts data to the appropriate strength when that data is taken outside of the organization.
‐ The organization uses IoT devices that can encrypt and store data in internal memory.
‐ The organization examines safety and trustworthiness that are necessary, selects an algorithm, encrypts information (data) to the appropriate
Implement cryptographic mechanisms to prevent ・SC-8 Transmission Confidentiality and Integrity strength, and stores the information. If an algorithm on the CRYPTREC Ciphers List can be selected, the organization uses it to encrypt information
(data) to the appropriate strength and stores the information.
unauthorized disclosure of CUI during ・SC-8(1) Transmission Confidentiality and Encrypt information with an appropriate level of
3.13.8 CPS.DS-2 ‐ The organization considers the level of security and trustworthiness required for the information, chooses an algorithm, and encrypts and stores
transmission unless otherwise protected by Integrity security strength, and store them. high importance information handled by industrial control systems with appropriate strength without causing unacceptable impact on
alternative physical safeguards. Cryptographic or Alternate Physical Protection performance.
Advanced
[Reference]
Regarding encryption technologies whose security and implementation performance are confirmed, "Cryptography Research and Evaluation
Committees (CRYPTREC)" releases to the public the list of such technologies recommended for use that are sufficiently used in the market or
are considered to spread in the future. It is desirable that the organization should refer to the list as needed when procuring systems that should
implement encryption functions.
D-2-21
Appendix D.2 - Mapping NIST SP 800-171 to CPSF
[Reference] It is desirable to refer to the group of standards of ISO/IEC 11770, NIST SP 800‐57 Part 1 Rev.4, and so on for the details about key
management.
Basic ‐ It is desirable that the organization should protect all encryption keys from modification and loss.
‐ The organization selects products that have been authenticated based on Cryptographic Module Validation Program (CMVP) in order to suitably
implement selected algorithms to software and hardware, and to protect keys, identification codes, and entity authentication information that is
H‐Advanced used to decrypt encrypted information or to grant electronic signatures.
‐ The organization protects are encrypts data to the appropriate strength when that data is taken outside of the organization.
‐ The organization uses IoT devices that can encrypt and store data in internal memory.
‐ The organization examines safety and trustworthiness that are necessary, selects an algorithm, encrypts information (data) to the appropriate
strength, and stores the information. If an algorithm on the CRYPTREC Ciphers List can be selected, the organization uses it to encrypt information
(data) to the appropriate strength and stores the information.
Employ FIPS-validated cryptography when used Encrypt information with an appropriate level of
3.13.11 ・SC-13 Cryptographic Protection CPS.DS-2 ‐ The organization considers the level of security and trustworthiness required for the information, chooses an algorithm, and encrypts and stores
to protect the confidentiality of CUI. security strength, and store them. high importance information handled by industrial control systems with appropriate strength without causing unacceptable impact on
performance.
Advanced
[Reference]
Regarding encryption technologies whose security and implementation performance are confirmed, "Cryptography Research and Evaluation
Committees (CRYPTREC)" releases to the public the list of such technologies recommended for use that are sufficiently used in the market or
are considered to spread in the future. It is desirable that the organization should refer to the list as needed when procuring systems that should
implement encryption functions.
‐ The information system and the industrial control system automatically monitor or regulate remote access to its system.
‐ The information system and the industrial control system allow only for remote access routed by the regulated access points.
‐ The information system allows privileged command via remote access only for those purposes based on specified requirements.
Prohibit remote activation of collaborative ‐ The information system records reasons why the users accessing the system which handles highly confidential data execute privileged commands
Properly authorize wireless connection destinations
3.13.12 computing devices and provide indication of ・SC-15 Collaborative Computing Devices CPS.AC-3 H‐Advanced and access security information by remote access.
(including users, IoT devices, and servers).
devices in use to users present at the device. ‐ The information system protects wireless access to the system which handles highly confidential data by using user and device authentication in
addition to encryption.
‐ The information system blocks remote activation of devices such as white boards, cameras, and microphones connected via networks which may
handle highly confidential data. Signs of the devices in use are provided to the users of these devices.
Conduct network and access monitoring and control ‐ The information system routes communications to the network to which a recipient’s IP address belongs via a proxy server authenticated on a
3.13.13 Control and monitor the use of mobile code ・SC-18 Mobile Code
controlled interface.
Control and monitor the use of Voice over CPS.CM-1 at the contact points between corporate networks H‐Advanced
3.13.14 ・SC-19 Voice over Internet Protocol and wide area networks.
‐ The information system and the industrial control system monitor and control the use of mobile code.
Internet Protocol (VoIP) technologies. ‐ The information system monitors and controls the use of protocols used for audio and video transmission (e.g. VoIP).
‐ The information system and the industrial control system automatically monitor or regulate remote access to its system.
‐ The information system and the industrial control system allow only for remote access routed by the regulated access points.
‐ The information system allows privileged command via remote access only for those purposes based on specified requirements.
‐ The information system records reasons why the users accessing the system which handles highly confidential data execute privileged commands
Properly authorize wireless connection destinations
CPS.AC-3 H‐Advanced and access security information by remote access.
(including users, IoT devices, and servers). ‐ The information system protects wireless access to the system which handles highly confidential data by using user and device authentication in
addition to encryption.
Protect the authenticity of communications
3.13.15 ・SC-23 Session Authenticity ‐ The information system blocks remote activation of devices such as white boards, cameras, and microphones connected via networks which may
sessions. handle highly confidential data. Signs of the devices in use are provided to the users of these devices.
‐ The organization protects th networks composing the information system and industrial control system that handles important data by
H‐Advanced
Encrypt the communication channel when implementing encrytion of communication channels or by alternative physical measures.
‐ The information system employs an cryptographic mechanism and encrypt communciation paths.
CPS.DS-3 communicating between IoT devices and servers or
in cyberspace. Advanced
[Reference] For encryption of communication paths, there are several methods such as IP‐VPN, Ipsec‐VPN, SSL VPN. It is desirable that the
organization should select the method considering the importance of the data transmitted in the communication paths, the budget, and so on.
‐ The organization selects products that have been authenticated based on Cryptographic Module Validation Program (CMVP) in order to suitably
implement selected algorithms to software and hardware, and to protect keys, identification codes, and entity authentication information that is
H‐Advanced used to decrypt encrypted information or to grant electronic signatures.
‐ The organization protects are encrypts data to the appropriate strength when that data is taken outside of the organization.
‐ The organization uses IoT devices that can encrypt and store data in internal memory.
‐ The organization examines safety and trustworthiness that are necessary, selects an algorithm, encrypts information (data) to the appropriate
strength, and stores the information. If an algorithm on the CRYPTREC Ciphers List can be selected, the organization uses it to encrypt information
(data) to the appropriate strength and stores the information.
Encrypt information with an appropriate level of
3.13.16 Protect the confidentiality of CUI at rest. ・SC-28 Protection of Information at Rest CPS.DS-2 ‐ The organization considers the level of security and trustworthiness required for the information, chooses an algorithm, and encrypts and stores
security strength, and store them. high importance information handled by industrial control systems with appropriate strength without causing unacceptable impact on
performance.
Advanced
[Reference]
Regarding encryption technologies whose security and implementation performance are confirmed, "Cryptography Research and Evaluation
Committees (CRYPTREC)" releases to the public the list of such technologies recommended for use that are sufficiently used in the market or
are considered to spread in the future. It is desirable that the organization should refer to the list as needed when procuring systems that should
implement encryption functions.
D-2-22
Appendix D.2 - Mapping NIST SP 800-171 to CPSF
3.14.5 and real-time scans of files from external sources ・SI-3 Malicious Code Protection
‐ The organization introduces the concept of “whitelisting” for data entry in order to specify known items and systems considered trustworthy as
as files are downloaded, opened, or executed. the sources of input data, and the format allowed for the input data.
H‐Advanced ‐ IoT devices and servers begin communication with other IoT devices only after the devices are mutually authenticated successfully so that the
Validate the integrity and authenticity of the source of data is always clear.
CPS.CM-4 information provided from cyberspace before ‐ The information system and the industrial control system protect the authenticity of communications sessions.
operations. ‐ The information system uses an integrity verification tool to detect any unauthorized changes that are made to communications data transmitted
from IoT devices and servers.
Advanced
‐ IoT devices and servers that are acknowledged as critical to the organization’s operations begin communication with other IoT devices only after
the devices are mutually authenticated successfully so that the source of data is always clear.
D-2-23
Appendix D.2 - Mapping NIST SP 800-171 to CPSF
D-2-24
Appendix D.2 - Mapping NIST SP 800-171 to CPSF
D-2-25
D.3 Mapping ISO/IEC 27001 controls to Cyber/Physical Security Framework
ISO/IEC 27001:2013 Annex A Cyber/Physical Security Framework
Measure
Security Controls ID Controls Measure Requirement Example of Security Measures
Requirement ID
A.5 A.5.1 A.5.1.1 A set of policies for information security Define policies and standard measures regarding
Information security Management direction Policies for information shall be defined, approved by security that are consistent with the high-priority
policies for information security security management, published and business and operations of the organization, and
‐ The organization defines its missions and business processes and gives priorities to actions, in consideration of risks to its business, its
communicated to employees and relevant CPS.BE-2 Advanced assets, persons, other organizations, etc.
share them with parties relevant to the ‐ The organization informs other organizations of their roles and responsibilities specified in its security policies.
external parties. organizationʼs business (including suppliers and
third-party providers).
‐ The organization formulates a series of lower level security policies, such as the policies and implementation procedures of the
following individual topics, to support policies at a higher level.
a) Access control and authentication
b) Physical security measures
c) System development and maintenance
d) Management of external contractors
e) Classification and handling of information
Develop security policies, define roles and Advanced ‐ The organization formulates a series of security policies by fully considering the organization’s a) business strategies, b) related rules,
responsibilities for security across the organization laws, regulations, and contracts, and c) environments under threats to security to sufficiently reflect the actual situation of the
CPS.GV-1
and other relevant parties, and clarify the organization.
information-sharing method among stakeholders. ‐ The organization reviews and updates a security plan according to changes in its a) business strategies, b) related rules, laws,
regulations, and contracts, and c) environments under threats to security.
[Reference] To formulate a policy at a more detailed level, refer to related standards such as ISO/IEC 27002 for identification of fields
which require the policy, and refer to more detailed guidelines.
‐ The organization formulates a basic security policy at the highest level of its series of security policies, obtains an approval of the
Basic management, and operates it appropriately.
‐ The organization reviews and updates the security policy periodically (e.g., once a year).
A.5.1.2 The policies for information security shall ‐ On the basis of the results of the hazard analysis performed in CPS.RA‐4, mainly for the industrial control system, the organization
Review of the policies be reviewed at planned intervals or if appropriately treats the source of a risk which may lead to a critical hazard as necessary.
H‐Advanced
for information security significant changes occur to ensure their
[Reference] Security integration in safety control has been particularly discussed in recent years in terms of international
continuing suitability, adequacy and standardization, and IEC TR 63074, IEC TR 63069, etc., are available for reference.
effectiveness. - On the basis of the results of the risk
‐ The organization securely stores the documented information on security risk management processes.
assessment, clearly define the details of measures
‐ When the organization selects a measure according to the risk assessment results, it is desirable that the organization documents the
to prevent possible security risks, and document measure to be taken and the reason why the measure is adopted.
the organized outcome from the scope and ‐ When applying the measure, the organization formulates a security risk management plan and obtains an approval from the risk
priorities of the measures. owner.
CPS.RA-6
- React accordingly to the security risks and the Advanced
‐ The organization reviews the security risk handling plan and checks that the applicable plan conforms to the priority order of the
associated safety risks identified as a result of the entire organization’s risk management strategy.
‐ The organization informs applicable external business operators regarding security measures necessary for a new system including an
assessment conducted at the planning and design
IoT device which are extracted in CPS.RA‐4 as required specifications.
phase of an IoT device and systems incorporating ‐ The organization verifies whether the security measures defined in the required specifications and contracts are implemented at the
IoT devices. time of deployment of the systems including an IoT device via User Acceptance Test (UAT). If there is anything unclear, confirm with the
external business operator.
‐ The organization considers the risk assessment results and selects handling measures to identified risks.
Basic ‐ The organization formulates a security risk treatment implementation plan.
‐ The organization obtain an approval from the risk owner for acceptance of the security risk.
A.6 A.6.1 A.6.1.1 All information security responsibilities ‐ The system makes a list of external information services in use and manages the users, devices as well as serviced in use in real time.
Organization of Internal organization Information security shall be defined and allocated. ‐ The system uses a mechanism to give notice to the system administrator when an unpermitted external information system service is
H‐Advanced detected.
information security roles and
‐ The organization identifies functions, ports, protocols, and other services which are necessary for using services offered by external
responsibilities providers.
‐ The organization sets conditions for allowing other organizations which own or operate external information systems to do the
following:
Create and manage appropriately a list of external
Advanced a. Accessing an information system in the organization from an external information system
CPS.AM-5 information systems where the organizationʼs
b. Processing, saving, or transmitting information under the control of the organization using an external information system
assets are shared. ‐ The organization restricts a use of storage in an external system the organization owns to an authorized one.
‐ The organization makes a list of external information system services in use and defines roles and responsibilities as users in each
service.
Basic
[Reference] Appendix A "Concret examples of contract provisions and commentaries" of “Guidebook for using Cloud Security
Guideline” (METI, 2013) could be referred to regarding the points to consider when stipulating in the contract the roles and
responsibilities of users especially in terms of usage of cloud service.
‐ The organization considers business requirements and legal requirements which share or restrict data when classifying resources of
Classify and prioritize resources (e.g., People, the information system and industrial control system (data, components processing data, system, etc).
Advanced
Components, Data, and System) by function, ‐ The person responsible for an asset is responsible for the classification of the data.
CPS.AM-6 importance, and business value, and communicate ‐ The organization includes classification rules and classification review standards after time passes in a resource classification system.
to the organizations and people relevant to those ‐ The organization sets priorities on identified information assets according to importance to the organization.
resources in business. Basic ‐ When related laws or regulations require us to follow a certain classification for resources of the organization (e.g., system and data),
apply an appropriate classification to the asset.
D-3-1
Appendix D.3 - Mapping ISO/IEC 27001 to CPSF
D-3-2
Appendix D.3 - Mapping ISO/IEC 27001 to CPSF
‐ The organization identifies assets constituting its information system and industrial control system (hardware, software and
information), assigns a responsible person to each asset, and documents a list of them.
‐ It is desirable to list all the assets held, but if the target is huge, consider narrowing down the target assets through integration
Basic
(grouping) of the analysis target and exclusion from the analysis target.
‐ The organization sets priorities to the identified assets based on the importance of them in its business operation.
‐ The system makes a list of external information services in use and manages the users, devices as well as serviced in use in real time.
‐ The system uses a mechanism to give notice to the system administrator when an unpermitted external information system service is
H‐Advanced detected.
‐ The organization identifies functions, ports, protocols, and other services which are necessary for using services offered by external
Create and manage appropriately a list of external
providers.
CPS.AM-5 information systems where the organizationʼs
‐ The organization sets conditions for allowing other organizations which own or operate external information systems to do the
assets are shared. following:
Advanced a. Accessing an information system in the organization from an external information system
b. Processing, saving, or transmitting information under the control of the organization using an external information system
‐ The organization restricts a use of storage in an external system the organization owns to an authorized one.
‐ The organization regulates the mobile devices used in the organization and establishes setting requirements, connection
Properly authorize wireless connection destinations
CPS.AC-3 Advanced requirements, and implementation guidelines for mobile devices.
(including users, IoT devices, and servers). ‐ The organization establishes rules of approval for connecting mobile devices used in the organization to its system.
‐ The organization restricts software by using a list of software that is permitted to be executed on the information system and
H‐Advanced
industrial control system (whitelist) or list of prohibited software (blacklist). Or, unpermitted software shall not be installed.
Restrict the software to be added after installing in ‐ The organization adopts and manages a mechanism that manages software installation that is performed by users on the organization’
CPS.IP-2 Advanced
the IoT devices and servers. s system (information system or industrial control system) and monitors the events.
‐ The organization establishes a policy on software installation performed by users on the organization’s system (information system or
Basic
industrial control system) and has the users follow it.
‐ The organization reviews the relevant audit log regularly or when an incident or a sign of an incident appears if a physical access log
from access control is available while 24‐h monitoring is not conducted through security cameras or by any other means.
‐ A person in charge accompanies a visitor into the area where the organization’s assets that must be protected are directly accessible
(e.g., an office) in order to monitor the visitor’s behavior.
Advanced ‐ The organization monitors through security cameras or by other means physical access to its facilities that are vital for its operations
and house IoT devices and servers, thereby enabling early detection of any physical security incidents and immediate action.
‐ If the above physical security measures may be difficult to implement for items such as IoT devices and servers that may be critical to
Perform setting, recording, and monitoring of
the organization’s operation because they are in a remote location or for any other reasons, consider using tamper‐resistant equipment
CPS.CM-2 proper physical access, considering the importance (CPS.DS‐6) or taking any other appropriate measures to enhance the physical security properties of the equipment itself.
of IoT devices and servers. ‐ If the organization is unable to control access to, or provide video surveillance service for, the areas that should allow only limited
physical access because of issues of costs and other reasons, it takes alternative manual measures, such as that its employee in charge
accompany a visitor on the premises.
Basic ‐ The organization implements physical security measures to control access to designated areas in the facility that do not be allowed for
the general public to access.
‐ The organization verifies the access authority of the personnel before permitting the physical access and collects and manages the
records of entry and exit.
‐ The information system blocks or isolates any malicious code for it detected through an IDS/IPS, or notifies the administrator of the
- Use IoT devices that can detect abnormal code.
behaviors and suspend operations by comparing ‐ The information system detects exploit codes by installing on endpoints (IoT devices, servers, and so on) detection/restoration
software using technologies of pattern matching of malware.
the instructed behaviors and actual ones.
‐ The organization considers implementing whitelist‐type malware protection for IoT devices with limited functions.
CPS.CM-3 - Validate whether information provided from Advanced
cyberspace contains malicious code, and is within * Especially regarding IoT devices and control devices, OS to which anti‐malware software can be applied may not be used. It is
the permissible range before any action based on desirable for the organization to confirm whether devices to be introduced are compatible with anti‐malware software at the phase of
the data. procurement and to select compatible ones. If it is difficult to procure devices compatible with anti‐malware software, it is desirable to
take alternative measures such as introducing/strengthening a malware detection mechanism on a network.
D-3-3
Appendix D.3 - Mapping ISO/IEC 27001 to CPSF
D-3-4
Appendix D.3 - Mapping ISO/IEC 27001 to CPSF
D-3-5
Appendix D.3 - Mapping ISO/IEC 27001 to CPSF
‐ The organization identifies assets constituting its information system and industrial control system (hardware, software and
information), assigns a responsible person to each asset, and documents a list of them.
Basic ‐ It is desirable to list all the assets held, but if the target is huge, consider narrowing down the target assets through integration
(grouping) of the analysis target and exclusion from the analysis target.
‐ The organization sets priorities to the identified assets based on the importance of them in its business operation.
A.8.1.2 Ownership of Assets maintained in the inventory shall be ‐The organization identifies assets constituting its information systems and industrial control systems (hardware, including IoT devices;
assets owned. software; and information) uniquely, assigns a responsible person to each asset. And the organization maintains/manages lists
periodically, or at the request of the operator including configuration information of assets (e.g., names, version information, license
information, and location) while recognizing situations in real time.
H‐Advanced ‐ The information system regularly audits whether the actual configuration grasped conforms to the baseline configuration defined by
the organization, and responds appropriately. (Example: blocking unplanned connections except those permitted by the organization as
an exception)
‐The information system and industrial control system implement and operate a mechanism which automatically detects and responses
to unauthorized assets.
Document and manage appropriately the list of ‐ Maintain/manage lists including configuration information of assets (e.g., names, version information, license information, and
hardware and software, and management location) by reviewing and updating them periodically.
CPS.AM-1 information (e.g. name of asset, version, network ‐ The organization makes a list of removable media (e.g., USB memory sticks) that can be used on system components (information
address, name of asset manager, license system or industrial control system), and manages the use of them.
information) of components in the system. Advanced ‐ The organization uses only removable media (e.g. USB memory) permitted in the organization. Also, if there is no identifiable
ownwer of portable storage devices, the organization prohibits the use of such devices.
‐ The organization controles access to the media that contain highly confidential data, and properly grasps and manages the usage of
the media taken outside of the controlled areas.
‐ The organization identifies assets constituting its information system and industrial control system (hardware, software and
information), assigns a responsible person to each asset, and documents a list of them.
Basic ‐ It is desirable to list all the assets held, but if the target is huge, consider narrowing down the target assets through integration
(grouping) of the analysis target and exclusion from the analysis target.
‐ The organization sets priorities to the identified assets based on the importance of them in its business operation.
A.8.1.3 Rules for the acceptable use of information ‐The organization identifies assets constituting its information systems and industrial control systems (hardware, including IoT devices;
Acceptable use of assets and of assets associated with information software; and information) uniquely, assigns a responsible person to each asset. And the organization maintains/manages lists
periodically, or at the request of the operator including configuration information of assets (e.g., names, version information, license
and information processing facilities shall
information, and location) while recognizing situations in real time.
be identified, documented and H‐Advanced ‐ The information system regularly audits whether the actual configuration grasped conforms to the baseline configuration defined by
implemented. the organization, and responds appropriately. (Example: blocking unplanned connections except those permitted by the organization as
Document and manage appropriately the list of an exception)
‐The information system and industrial control system implement and operate a mechanism which automatically detects and responses
hardware and software, and management
to unauthorized assets.
CPS.AM-1 information (e.g. name of asset, version, network
‐ Maintain/manage lists including configuration information of assets (e.g., names, version information, license information, and
address, name of asset manager, license location) by reviewing and updating them periodically.
information) of components in the system. ‐ The organization makes a list of removable media (e.g., USB memory sticks) that can be used on system components (information
system or industrial control system), and manages the use of them.
Advanced ‐ The organization uses only removable media (e.g. USB memory) permitted in the organization. Also, if there is no identifiable
ownwer of portable storage devices, the organization prohibits the use of such devices.
‐ The organization controles access to the media that contain highly confidential data, and properly grasps and manages the usage of
the media taken outside of the controlled areas.
D-3-6
Appendix D.3 - Mapping ISO/IEC 27001 to CPSF
D-3-7
Appendix D.3 - Mapping ISO/IEC 27001 to CPSF
‐ The organization defines classifications including security categories of data saved in an IoT device or server to be scrapped, and
H‐Advanced introduces a mechanism for using the proper technique for deleting data with the strength and integrity needed or making the data
When disposing of an IoT device and server, delete
unreadable according to the definition.
the stored data and the ID (identifier) uniquely
‐ The organization establishes a procedure for scrapping its equipment including IoT devices and servers, deletes data saved in the
CPS.IP-6 identifying the genuine IoT devices and servers as
Advanced equipment or makes the data unreadable in accordance with the procedure, and makes sure that the action has been done
well as important information (e.g., private key successfully.
and digital certificate), or make them unreadable.
Basic ‐ The organization deletes data that has been saved in its IoT devices or servers to be scrapped, or makes the data unreadable.
‐ The organization identifies software programs that are not allowed to be executed on a system.
‐ Manage a “black list” or "white list" so that the software programs not allowed on the system cannot be executed.
H‐Advanced
‐ The organization regularly review and update the black list or the white list.
‐ The system blocks the execution of these programs in accordance with the specified rules.
Minimize funcions of IoT devices and servers by ‐ The organization reviews the functions and services provided by its systems and items in order to identify the functions and services
that could be deleted.
physically and logically blocking unnecessary
‐ The organization uses network scanning tools, intrusion detection and prevention systems, and endpoint protection (e.g., a firewall,
CPS.PT-2 network ports, USBs, and serial ports accessing Advanced
host‐based intrusion detection system) in order to detect and prevent the use of banned functions, ports, protocols, and services.
directly the main bodies of IoT devices and servers ‐ The organization minimizes the functions and services of devices connected to the network such as multifunction printers in additional
etc. to typical IoT devices and servers.
‐ The organization manages peripherals in use (e.g., USB flash drives) using a management ledger and keep them in a locked place.
‐ The organization checks external storage devices connected to IoT devices or servers (e.g., USB flash drives) using antivirus software,
Basic
use USB flash drives that can be checked for viruses, or take any appropriate action.
‐ The organization plugs USB ports and serial ports out of use to physically block them.
A.8.3.2 Procedures shall be implemented for the ‐ The organization defines classifications including security categories of data saved in an IoT device or server to be scrapped, and
Disposal of media management of removable media in When disposing of an IoT device and server, delete
H‐Advanced introduces a mechanism for using the proper technique for deleting data with the strength and integrity needed or making the data
unreadable according to the definition.
accordance with the classification scheme the stored data and the ID (identifier) uniquely
adopted by the organization. CPS.IP-6 identifying the genuine IoT devices and servers as
‐ The organization establishes a procedure for scrapping its equipment including IoT devices and servers, deletes data saved in the
Advanced equipment or makes the data unreadable in accordance with the procedure, and makes sure that the action has been done
well as important information (e.g., private key successfully.
and digital certificate), or make them unreadable.
Basic ‐ The organization deletes data that has been saved in its IoT devices or servers to be scrapped, or makes the data unreadable.
D-3-8
Appendix D.3 - Mapping ISO/IEC 27001 to CPSF
D-3-9
Appendix D.3 - Mapping ISO/IEC 27001 to CPSF
D-3-10
Appendix D.3 - Mapping ISO/IEC 27001 to CPSF
D-3-11
Appendix D.3 - Mapping ISO/IEC 27001 to CPSF
D-3-12
Appendix D.3 - Mapping ISO/IEC 27001 to CPSF
D-3-13
Appendix D.3 - Mapping ISO/IEC 27001 to CPSF
D-3-14
Appendix D.3 - Mapping ISO/IEC 27001 to CPSF
‐ It is desirable that the organization should set out a policy and procedure regarding the following items to take immediate and
appropriate measures when the private key is imperiled.
‐ A structure to take measures against imperilment of the private key (including the stakeholders, roles, cooperation with
Securely control encryption keys throughout their
contractors)
CPS.DS-5 life cycle to ensure proper operation and securely ‐ Criteria to judge whether the private key is imperiled or is in danger of imperilment
transmitted, received and stored data. ‐ To investigate the cause of imperilment of the private key, and to attempt to remove the cause
Advanced
‐ Suspension of the services using the key
‐ To create a new pair of keys and issue a certificate for the new key
‐ Disclosure of information regarding imperilment of the private key (Notified parties, a method of notification, disclosure policy, etc.)
[Reference] It is desirable to refer to the group of standards of ISO/IEC 11770, NIST SP 800‐57 Part 1 Rev.4, and so on for the details
about key management.
Basic ‐ It is desirable that the organization should protect all encryption keys from modification and loss.
‐ The organization tracks and monitors the locations and relocation of important assets within the scope of its management of
H‐Advanced
particularly important assets.
‐ The organization reviews the relevant audit log regularly or when an incident or a sign of an incident appears if a physical access log
from access control is available while 24‐h monitoring is not conducted through security cameras or by any other means.
‐ A person in charge accompanies a visitor into the area where the organization’s assets that must be protected are directly accessible
(e.g., an office) in order to monitor the visitor’s behavior.
Advanced ‐ The organization monitors through security cameras or by other means physical access to its facilities that are vital for its operations
and house IoT devices and servers, thereby enabling early detection of any physical security incidents and immediate action.
Perform setting, recording, and monitoring of
‐ If the above physical security measures may be difficult to implement for items such as IoT devices and servers that may be critical to
CPS.CM-2 proper physical access, considering the importance
the organization’s operation because they are in a remote location or for any other reasons, consider using tamper‐resistant equipment
of IoT devices and servers. (CPS.DS‐6) or taking any other appropriate measures to enhance the physical security properties of the equipment itself.
‐ If the organization is unable to control access to, or provide video surveillance service for, the areas that should allow only limited
physical access because of issues of costs and other reasons, it takes alternative manual measures, such as that its employee in charge
accompany a visitor on the premises.
Basic ‐ The organization implements physical security measures to control access to designated areas in the facility that do not be allowed for
the general public to access.
‐ The organization verifies the access authority of the personnel before permitting the physical access and collects and manages the
records of entry and exit.
A.11.1.2 Secure areas shall be protected by ‐ The organization regulates service wires and transmission paths that are related to their IoT devices and servers by physical access.
Physical entry controls appropriate entry controls to ensure that H‐Advanced
‐ The organization regulates output devices of its system by physical access.
‐ The organization monitors alarms and monitoring devices (e.g., surveillance cameras) for physical intrusions into the areas within the
only authorized personnel are allowed Implement appropriate physical security measures physical security boundaries.
access. such as locking and limiting access to the areas ‐ The organization monitors physical accesses to the areas within the physical security boundaries and regularly reviews the audit log.
Advanced
where the IoT devices and servers are installed, ‐ The organization keeps the records of visitor’s access to the areas within the physical security boundaries and regularly reviews them.
CPS.AC-2
using entrance and exit controls, biometric ‐ The organization maintains upkeep of the access list for areas where their IoT devices and servers are located and issues permission
authentication, deploying surveillance cameras, certificates necessary for access.
‐ The organization defines physical security boundaries at its facilities, and implement access control according to the security
and inspecting belongings and body weight. Basic
requirements of assets placed within the boundaries and the results of risk assessment.
‐ The organization monitors the work of temporarily authorized party within the physical security boundaries, such as by authorized
attendants or monitoring cameras.
D-3-15
Appendix D.3 - Mapping ISO/IEC 27001 to CPSF
D-3-16
Appendix D.3 - Mapping ISO/IEC 27001 to CPSF
protection threats and hazards, and opportunities for Implement physical measures such as preparing ‐ The organization maintains machine safety of equipment located within the area of their IoT devices and servers by using an
‐ The organization prepares short‐term uninterrupted power supply which supports the switching of the information system to an
Advanced
Carry out periodic quality checks, prepare standby alternative power source that can be used for a long period of time when the primary power source is lost.
devices and uninterruptible power supplies, ‐ In order to ensure that required performance of an information system and an industrial control system is satisfied, use of resources
must be monitored and adjusted. In addition, storage capacity and performance that are required in the future are pre‐estimated.
CPS.DS-7 provide redundancy, detect failures, conduct
‐ The organization protects devices from power outages and other failures that are attributable to malfunctions in the support utility.
replacement work, and update software for IoT Basic
‐ The organization protects communication cables and power cables that transmit data or that support information service from
devices, communication devices, circuits, etc. interception, interference, and harm.
‐ The organization properly maintaines devices to ensure continuous availability and integrity.
A.11.2.4 Equipment shall be correctly maintained to Advanced
‐ The organization prepares short‐term uninterrupted power supply which supports the switching of the information system to an
Equipment maintenance ensure its continued availability and Carry out periodic quality checks, prepare standby alternative power source that can be used for a long period of time when the primary power source is lost.
devices and uninterruptible power supplies, ‐ In order to ensure that required performance of an information system and an industrial control system is satisfied, use of resources
integrity.
must be monitored and adjusted. In addition, storage capacity and performance that are required in the future are pre‐estimated.
CPS.DS-7 provide redundancy, detect failures, conduct
‐ The organization protects devices from power outages and other failures that are attributable to malfunctions in the support utility.
replacement work, and update software for IoT Basic
‐ The organization protects communication cables and power cables that transmit data or that support information service from
devices, communication devices, circuits, etc. interception, interference, and harm.
‐ The organization properly maintaines devices to ensure continuous availability and integrity.
D-3-17
Appendix D.3 - Mapping ISO/IEC 27001 to CPSF
D-3-18
Appendix D.3 - Mapping ISO/IEC 27001 to CPSF
[Reference] To formulate a policy at a more detailed level, refer to related standards such as ISO/IEC 27002 for identification of fields
which require the policy, and refer to more detailed guidelines.
A.12.1.2 Changes to the organization, business ‐ Before making changes to IoT devices and servers that are subjects of configuration management, the organization tests and approves
Change management processes, information processing facilities these changes as well as creates a document on the changes.
‐ The organization uses an automated mechanism to manage, apply, and confirm settings of IoT devices and servers from a single
and systems that affect information H‐Advanced
location.
security shall be controlled. ‐ The organization integrates security change management procedures particularly for industrial control systems, into existing process
safety management procedures.
‐ When changes are made to the IoT devices and servers that are subjects of configuration management, the organization analyzes the
impact the change has on security, decides whether the change can be made or not, and creates a document on the procedure.
Introduce and implement the process to manage ‐ The organization limits personnel who can make changes to approved IoT devices and servers (restricted access).
the initial setting procedure (e.g., password) and ‐ The organization makes changes to approved IoT devices and servers, as well as implements, records, and monitors those changes.
CPS.IP-1 Advanced
setting change procedure for IoT devices and ‐ The organization uses a secure recovery method (e.g. entering a security code known only to the user before the change is
servers. implemented) if they forget the password of their accounts, IoT device and servers.
‐ The organization regularly reviews policies and procedures for operation and change management to ensure that changes do not
adversely affect the availability or safety of information system and industrial control system.
‐ Upon determining the most restrictive setting criteria that conform to their operation, the organization creates a document on the
initial setting procedures and setting details for the IoT devices and servers that will be introduced and adjusts the settings according to
the document.
Basic
‐ The organization checks initial setting values of IoT devices before installing them, and adjusts the settings appropriately if they do not
comply with the policy stipulated in CPS.AC‐1.
‐ The organization checks and records software installed in IoT devices before introducing them.
A.12.1.3 The use of resources shall be monitored, ‐ The information system and industrial control system manage spare storage space, bandwidth, and other spares (People,
Capacity management tuned and projections made of future Components, System) and minimize the impact of service denial attacks that send a large amount of information. For example, if
services provided by an attacked system can not be stopped due to maintaining the level of availability, etc., in order to continue
capacity requirements to ensure the
important functions, it is necessary to take the following measures.
required system performance. Secure sufficient resources (e.g., People, ‐ Automatic or manual migration to standby system
Components, system) for components and ‐ Automatic or manual segregation of system components attacked by adversal actor
CPS.DS-6 Advanced
systems, and protect assets property to minimize ‐ In order to ensure that required system performance is satisfied, use of resources must be monitored and adjusted. In addition,
bad effects under cyber attack (e.g., DoS attack). storage capacity and performance required in the future must be pre‐estimated.
‐ The organization shall:
(a) Use a monitoring tool which the organization specifies in order to find signs of service jamming attacks on the information system.
(b) Monitor resources of information system and industrial control system identified by the organization and judge whether sufficient
resource is secured to prevent effective service jamming attacks.
‐ The organization prepares short‐term uninterrupted power supply which supports the switching of the information system to an
Advanced
Carry out periodic quality checks, prepare standby alternative power source that can be used for a long period of time when the primary power source is lost.
devices and uninterruptible power supplies, ‐ In order to ensure that required performance of an information system and an industrial control system is satisfied, use of resources
must be monitored and adjusted. In addition, storage capacity and performance that are required in the future are pre‐estimated.
CPS.DS-7 provide redundancy, detect failures, conduct
‐ The organization protects devices from power outages and other failures that are attributable to malfunctions in the support utility.
replacement work, and update software for IoT Basic
‐ The organization protects communication cables and power cables that transmit data or that support information service from
devices, communication devices, circuits, etc. interception, interference, and harm.
‐ The organization properly maintaines devices to ensure continuous availability and integrity.
D-3-19
Appendix D.3 - Mapping ISO/IEC 27001 to CPSF
[Reference] Implement physical segmentation in environments physically separated from other networks. Alternatively, in
environments physically close to other networks, it is possible to implement logical segmentation in consideration of the cost of the
measure.
A.12.2 A.12.2.1 Detection, prevention and recovery ‐ The organization uses an automated tool that notifies the information system administrator when an inconsistency is found during
Protection from Controls against controls to protect against malware shall integrity verification.
Conduct integrity checks of software runnning on H‐Advanced ‐ The organization uses tools to prevent the launch of the software if malicious software is detected.
malware malware be implemented, combined with
the IoT devices and servers at a time determined ‐ The organization incorporates detection capacity into its incident response capacity to detect unauthorized changes that are made to
appropriate user awareness. CPS.DS-10
by the organization, and prevent unauthorized the settings and security, such as an unauthorized promotion of system authority.
software from launching. ‐ The information system regularly inspects the integrity of the software and firmware.
Advanced ‐ The information system and the industrial control system prevent activation of unregistered software by registering in advance
software that is permitted to activate.
‐ IoT devices, or systems that contain these devices, examine information output from software programs or applications to see if it
matches the expected content in order to prepare for certain attacks that may have a consequence different to a normally expected
outcome (e.g., command injection).
H‐Advanced ‐ The information system automatically updates the logic to detect malicious code through an IDS/IPS.
‐ The information system detects exploit codes that attacks unknown vulnerabilities by installing on endpoints (especially, IoT devices
- Use IoT devices that can detect abnormal and servers with various functions) detection/restoration software using technologies of behavioral detection of malware.
behaviors and suspend operations by comparing ‐ The information system executes real‐time scanning of files from external sources.
the instructed behaviors and actual ones. ‐ The information system blocks or isolates any malicious code for it detected through an IDS/IPS, or notifies the administrator of the
CPS.CM-3 - Validate whether information provided from code.
cyberspace contains malicious code, and is within ‐ The information system detects exploit codes by installing on endpoints (IoT devices, servers, and so on) detection/restoration
the permissible range before any action based on software using technologies of pattern matching of malware.
‐ The organization considers implementing whitelist‐type malware protection for IoT devices with limited functions.
the data. Advanced
* Especially regarding IoT devices and control devices, OS to which anti‐malware software can be applied may not be used. It is
desirable for the organization to confirm whether devices to be introduced are compatible with anti‐malware software at the phase of
procurement and to select compatible ones. If it is difficult to procure devices compatible with anti‐malware software, it is desirable to
take alternative measures such as introducing/strengthening a malware detection mechanism on a network.
A.12.3 A.12.3.1 Backup copies of information, software ‐ The organization identifies the functions of the following support utilities for the continuation of its business and the dependence
Backup Information backup and system images shall be taken and relationship between them.
‐ Communication service
tested regularly in accordance with an
‐ Electrical power equipment (including power cables)
agreed backup policy. ‐ Among the above identified utilities, for those which have important roles for the continuation of its business, the organization
examines the possibility of taking measures as follows:
Identify the dependency between the organization H‐Advanced ‐ Establishment of alternative communication services
‐ Physical protection of electrical power equipment and power cables
and other relevant parties and the important
CPS.BE-3 ‐ Preparation of short‐term permanent power supply equipment
functions of each in the course of running the ‐ When examining the possibility of using an alternative communication service, the organization considers the following:
operation. ‐ Identify the requirements on the availability of the organization (including the target recovery time) when examining a contract with
a communication service provider.
‐ Reduce the possibility of sharing a single point of failure with a primary communication service.
‐ The organization identifies the requirements for the capacity/capability of an applicable system according to the requirements for its
availability stipulated in CPS.AM‐6.
Advanced
‐ In order to fulfill the required system performance, the organization monitors/adjusts the use of resources in the information systems
and industrial control systems in operation, and pre‐estimates the storage capacity/performance required in the future.
‐ The organization confirms the trustworthiness of the medium and integrity of the information by regularly testing the backup
H‐Advanced
information.
Perform a periodical system backup and testing of
‐ The organization backs up their system documents according to the prescribed timing and frequency.
CPS.IP-4 components (e.g., IoT devices, communication Advanced
‐ The organization protects the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of the information backed up on the storage base.
devices, and circuits). ‐ The organization backs up information on user level and system level that is included in its information systems or industrial control
Basic
systems according to the prescribed timing and frequency.
D-3-20
Appendix D.3 - Mapping ISO/IEC 27001 to CPSF
[Reference] For example, SIM3 (Security Incident Management Maturity Model) is available as metrics for the evaluation of security
organizations (SOC/CSIRT).
Appoint a chief security officer, establish a security ‐ The organization refers to risk assessment results and, considering the following angles, establishes what to monitor and what to
include in correlation analysis.
management team (SOC/CSIRT), and prepare a
CPS.AE-2 ‐ The scope of systems to monitor
system within the organization to detect, analyze,
‐ Which device logs should be collected for analysis (see CPS.AE‐3)
and respond to security events. ‐ The organization regularly reviews audit logs collected through monitoring.
‐ The organization continues to collect and manage information about assets, device configurations, and network configurations in
order to evaluate its security status.
Advanced
‐ The organization examines the results of correlation analysis and other data to accurately detect security events that must be
addressed and take action in accordance with the security operation process. See CPS.RP‐1 for details of the process.
‐ The organization regularly reports the state of organizational and system security to the chief security officer or other appropriate
staff members. It is desirable that the regular report should include the following shown below:
‐ Results of log analysis (e.g., the number of incidents handled; summaries of typical incidents that have been handled; threats that
have emerged; issues in monitoring);
‐ Policy for future improvements in monitoring.
‐ The organization conducts a trend analysis examining the latest information about threats, vulnerability, and assessments of security
management measures carried out several times in order to determine whether the activities for continuous monitoring need any
correction.
‐ The organization carries out policy tuning (management of signatures to apply) and maintenance for devices such as IDS, IPS, and SIEM
H‐Advanced
on its own.
‐ The organization creates custom signatures used for sensors on its own.
‐ In order to properly detect security events that are likely to adversely affect the organization, the organization collects and analyzes
Identify the security events accurately by logs of edge devices such as IoT devices in addition to the logs of devices presented in <Advanced>, if possible.
implementing the procedure to conduct a ‐ It is desirable that the organization should monitor mainly logs of the devices listed below for real‐time analysis to appropriately detect
CPS.AE-3 correlation analysis of the security events and security events highly likely to have an adverse effect on its own organization . This will require the handling of many different logs.
comparative analysis with the threat information Hence, it is necessary to normalize logs to store them in the same database or to use SIEM for efficient analysis. It is also advisable to
obtained from outside the organization. handle information about network flows if it is available.
Advanced ‐ Logs and network flows from network systems, e.g., firewalls
‐ Logs from security devices, e.g., IPS/IDS
‐ Access logs of web servers
‐ Logs from various systems, e.g., ActiveDirectory; DNS
‐ Logs related to users’ terminals
‐ The organization checks each notice from firewalls and endpoint security products in order to identify security events that may have
Basic
an adversal impact on the organization.
D-3-21
Appendix D.3 - Mapping ISO/IEC 27001 to CPSF
D-3-22
Appendix D.3 - Mapping ISO/IEC 27001 to CPSF
[Reference] Japan Vulnerability Notes (https://jvn.jp/) and other sources of information are available for reference to obtain
information regarding vulnerability. Also, CVSS (https://www.ipa.go.jp/security/vuln/CVSS.html Illustrated by IPA) could be used as a
referential indicator to evaluate the impact level of vulnerability.
‐ When developing a new device or a new component which may have an impact on a physical space such as components of an
industrial control system, the organization collects/analyzes accident case studies of conventional products and others to identify
safety‐related hazards.
‐ The organization analyzes a situation where a hazard leads to harm and identifies the possibility of occurrence and the severity of the
- Conduct risk assessments regularly to check if H‐Advanced
harm to estimate a possible risk especially regarding an industrial control system. At the time, it is desirable to check whether there is
the security rules for managing the components any hazard caused by a security issue.
are effective and applicable to the components for ‐ The organization updates the risk assessment if there is a significant change in the industrial control system or the environment in
implementation. which it operates, or the other change that affects the security state of the industrial control system.
CPS.RA-4
- Check the presence of unacceptable known ‐ The organization updates a risk assessment when there is a big change in a system or an environment where a system is running
security risks, including safety hazards, from the (including identification of a new threat or vulnerability) or when any situation which impacts the security status of a system occurs.
‐ When planning/designing a new system using an IoT device, the organization identifies existing assets and assets to be protected in
planning and design phase of an IoT device and
the system to be implemented and organizes security measures according to use and configuration of the system. When handling a
systems incorporating IoT devices. Advanced
component or a system with a long life cycle and a component or a system requiring availability, consideration in security measures at a
phase before designing is especially important.
‐ When considering security measures applied to purchased products and services, the organization makes sure that the levels of
measures correspond to the importance of such products and services.
‐ The organization updates a risk assessment when there is a big change in an information system or an environment where an
Consider threats, vulnerability, likelihood, and information system is running (including identification of a new threat or vulnerability) or when any situation which impacts the security
CPS.RA-5 Advanced
impacts when assessing risks. status of a system occurs. In that case, give priority to an information system or industrial control system with high importance.
* Implementation details common to CPS.RA‐4
H‐Advanced ‐ The organization adopts and administers an automated mechanism for managing the status of defect correction.
‐ The organization defines tolerable risk by identifying through investigations and tests the impacts of patch application on the functions
of other software applications and services on operations of IoT devices and servers.
Advanced
‐ The organization conducts tests to measure the effectiveness of corrections and the possibility of any secondary adverse effects,
corrects the defects, and manages the corrections as part of the configuration management.
Develop a vulnerability remediation plan, and ‐ The organization systematically identifies, reports and responds to vulnerabilities in its own information systems and industrial control
CPS.IP-10 modify the vulnerability of the components systems. The organization considers the following when formulating a plan.
according to the plan. ‐ Seriousness of threats or vulnerabilities
‐ Risk in responding to vulnerabilities
Basic
[Reference] It may be difficult to carry out application of security patches in a timely manner or application of patches itself to IoT
devices in consideration of availability and functions of devices. In such cases, it is desirable to avoid occurrence of security incidents by
thoroughly taking measures against threats (e.g. minimization of functions, strengthening of network monitoring).
D-3-23
Appendix D.3 - Mapping ISO/IEC 27001 to CPSF
[Reference] Japan Vulnerability Notes (https://jvn.jp/) and other sources of information are available for reference to obtain
information regarding vulnerability. Also, CVSS (https://www.ipa.go.jp/security/vuln/CVSS.html Illustrated by IPA) could be used as a
referential indicator to evaluate the impact level of vulnerability.
Basic ‐ The organization regularly has its systems and applications scanned for vulnerability.
A.12.6.2 Rules governing the installation of H‐Advanced
‐ The organization restricts software by using a list of software that is permitted to be executed on the information system and
Restrictions on software software by users shall be established and industrial control system (whitelist) or list of prohibited software (blacklist). Or, unpermitted software shall not be installed.
Restrict the software to be added after installing in ‐ The organization adopts and manages a mechanism that manages software installation that is performed by users on the organization’
installation implemented. CPS.IP-2 Advanced
the IoT devices and servers. s system (information system or industrial control system) and monitors the events.
‐ The organization establishes a policy on software installation performed by users on the organization’s system (information system or
Basic
industrial control system) and has the users follow it.
A.12.7 A.12.7.1 Audit requirements and activities involving ‐ The organization adopts an automatic mechanism integrating review, analysis, and report that supports the investigation and
Information systems Information systems verification of operational systems shall be addresses procedures for deviation or signs of deviation from contract matters.
‐ The organization uses a mechanism that allows it to list and check whether obligatory matters stipulated in the contract are fulfilled,
audit considerations audit controls carefully planned and agreed to minimise
matters which are concerned with security management of the organization and security functions implemented in the products and
disruptions to business processes. H‐Advanced services that will be delivered, especially for important clients and reconsigned organizations.
‐ State of compliance with security management measures of the external service provider is regularly checked by external audits and
field surveys conducted by the outsourcer.
Conduct regular assessments through auditing, ‐ The important business partners and if possible their re‐contractors etc. investigate whether there is any sign of attack related or any
test results, or other checks of relevant parties fact of information leakage, and regularly report the result to the organization.
CPS.SC-6
such as business partners to ensure they are ‐ The organization checks whether requirements that are prescribed in the contract with the client can be audited on the system.
fulfilling their contractual obligations. ‐ The information system provides a function that allows for audit records to be created for events defined above that can be audited
on the system.
‐ The organization shall be able to maintain consistency in security audits with other organizations that require information on the audit.
Advanced ‐ The organization regularly reviews and analyzes audit records that are made manually or automatically by the system, and checks
whether there is any deviation or sign of deviation from contract matters.
‐ State of compliance with security management measures of the external service provider is regularly checked by internal audits that
are conducted by the client using a checklist.
‐ In addition to the detection of security incidents, the collected logs are considered to be useful in tracking the cause of security
incidents after the fact. Therefore, the information system collects, if possible, detailed logs (e.g. OS command level) that do not remain
in the OS function.
‐ If time stamps in multiple audit logs match, the audit logs of the subjects specified by the organization are managed as audit trails
across the system, logically and physically.
‐ The information system provides system functions designed to compare and synchronize internal system clocks by using an official
H‐Advanced source of information for generating time stamps for an audit record.
‐ The information system adopts an automatic mechanism designed to handle an audit review, analysis, and report in an integrated
manner.
‐ It may be difficult to generate security‐related audit logs for some of the IoT devices that an organization uses, or to connect some of
Determine and document the subject or scope of those devices to the existing log management system. Hence, it is necessary to take measures that consider the specs of the IoT devices,
the audit recording/log recording, and implement such as using a log management system different than the main one or using an alternative measure on the part of the system, when
CPS.PT-1
and review those records in order to properly collecting and analyzing audit logs from the relevant IoT devices.
detect high-risk security incidents. ‐ The information system and the industrial control system uses a cryptographic mechanism in order to ensure the integrity of an audit
log and audit tool each.
Advanced ‐ The organization grants control over an audit log only to users assigned in accordance with the rules about security‐related internal
responsibility.
‐ The information system issues an alert when an incident of failure takes place in the audit process.
‐ The organization specifies what is to be audited based on its risk management strategy and risk assessment results, and sees if the
systems can acquire audit logs that show who did what and when in connection with the subjects of an audit.
‐ The system generates an audit log prescribed from various system components.
Basic
‐ The organization reviews and analyze a system’s audit log regularly to see if there are any signs of security incidents that may cause
damage to the organization, and make a report to the system administrator where necessary.
‐ The organization confirms that the impact of audit activities on the performance of industrial control systems is tolerable.
D-3-24
Appendix D.3 - Mapping ISO/IEC 27001 to CPSF
D-3-25
Appendix D.3 - Mapping ISO/IEC 27001 to CPSF
[Reference] Implement physical segmentation in environments physically separated from other networks. Alternatively, in
environments physically close to other networks it is possible to implement logical segmentation in consideration of the cost of the
‐ The organization protects th networks composing the information system and industrial control system that handles important data
H‐Advanced
by implementing encrytion of communication channels or by alternative physical measures.
Encrypt the communication channel when ‐ The information system employs an cryptographic mechanism and encrypt communciation paths.
CPS.DS-3 communicating between IoT devices and servers
or in cyberspace. Advanced [Reference] For encryption of communication paths, there are several methods such as IP‐VPN, Ipsec‐VPN, SSL VPN. It is desirable that
the organization should select the method considering the importance of the data transmitted in the communication paths, the budget,
and so on.
D-3-26
Appendix D.3 - Mapping ISO/IEC 27001 to CPSF
D-3-27
Appendix D.3 - Mapping ISO/IEC 27001 to CPSF
D-3-28
Appendix D.3 - Mapping ISO/IEC 27001 to CPSF
D-3-29
Appendix D.3 - Mapping ISO/IEC 27001 to CPSF
D-3-30
Appendix D.3 - Mapping ISO/IEC 27001 to CPSF
‐ The organization gives prior approval for the use of devices and/or tools needed for maintenance to update its IoT devices and
servers, and conducts monitoring.
‐ The organization inspects the devices and/or tools for maintenance brought in by the staff members who update its IoT devices and
servers in order to make sure that no inappropriate or unauthorized changes will be made.
H‐Advanced
- Discuss the method of conducting important ‐ The organization inspects the media used for maintenance to update its IoT devices and servers in order to make sure that the media
security updates and the like on IoT devices and contain no malicious code before they are used.
servers. Then, apply those security updateswith ‐ The organization introduces an IoT device designed to remotely update different software programs (OS, driver, application) at the
same time.
managed tools properly and in a timely manner
‐ The organization plans maintenance work such as updating its IoT devices and servers, implements the plan, checks the work done,
CPS.MA-1 while recording the history.
and documents the entire maintenance.
- Introduce IoT devices having a remote update ‐ The organization gives prior approval for maintenance work such as updating its IoT devices and servers, and conducts monitoring.
mechanism to perform a mass update of different ‐ The organization gives prior approval for travel from its premises for any maintenance work away from its premises, such as updating
software programs (OS, driver, and application) its IoT devices and servers. It also takes necessary actions before the travel, such as deleting relevant saved data.
Advanced
through remote commands, where applicable. ‐ The organization checks all security measures that may have been affected by maintenance work, such as updating its IoT devices and
servers, after the work is complete in order to make sure that the relevant equipment works correctly.
‐ The organization keeps the records of maintenance work done, such as updating its IoT devices and servers.
‐ The organization establishes a process for authorizing maintenance staff in order to keep the list of authorized maintenance
organizations or staff members updated.
A.14.2.5 Principles for engineering secure systems ‐ The organization explicitly presents the following requirements when procuring the system;
Secure system shall be established, documented, ‐ Requirements for security functions;
‐ Requirements for security strength;
engineering principles maintained and applied to any information
‐ Requirements for security warranty;
system implementation efforts. H‐Advanced
‐ Requirements for security‐related documents;
Introduce the system development life cycle to
CPS.IP-3 ‐ Requirements for protection of security‐related documents;
manage the systems. ‐ Description on the development environment of the system and the environment which the system is planned to operate under;
‐ Acceptance criteria
‐ The organization manages the system in accordance with the system development lifecycle, which includes items of consideration
Advanced regarding information security, and undergoes an information security risk management process throughout the entire system
development lifecycle.
A.14.2.6 Organizations shall establish and ‐ The organization explicitly presents the following requirements when procuring the system;
Secure development appropriately protect secure development ‐ Requirements for security functions;
‐ Requirements for security strength;
environment environments for system development and
‐ Requirements for security warranty;
integration efforts that cover the entire H‐Advanced
‐ Requirements for security‐related documents;
system development lifecycle. ‐ Requirements for protection of security‐related documents;
Introduce the system development life cycle to
CPS.IP-3 ‐ Description on the development environment of the system and the environment which the system is planned to operate under;
manage the systems. ‐ Acceptance criteria
‐ The organization manages the system in accordance with the system development lifecycle, which includes items of consideration
Advanced regarding information security, and undergoes an information security risk management process throughout the entire system
development lifecycle.
‐ The organization applies the general rules of the system’s security engineering to specifications, design, development, introduction,
Basic
and changes in building the system.
A.14.2.7 The organization shall supervise and ‐ The organization adopts an automatic mechanism integrating review, analysis, and report that supports the investigation and
Outsourced monitor the activity of outsourced system addresses procedures for deviation or signs of deviation from contract matters.
‐ The organization uses a mechanism that allows it to list and check whether obligatory matters stipulated in the contract are fulfilled,
development development.
matters which are concerned with security management of the organization and security functions implemented in the products and
H‐Advanced services that will be delivered, especially for important clients and reconsigned organizations.
‐ State of compliance with security management measures of the external service provider is regularly checked by external audits and
field surveys conducted by the outsourcer.
Conduct regular assessments through auditing, ‐ The important business partners and if possible their re‐contractors etc. investigate whether there is any sign of attack related or any
test results, or other checks of relevant parties fact of information leakage, and regularly report the result to the organization.
CPS.SC-6
such as business partners to ensure they are ‐ The organization checks whether requirements that are prescribed in the contract with the client can be audited on the system.
fulfilling their contractual obligations. ‐ The information system provides a function that allows for audit records to be created for events defined above that can be audited
on the system.
‐ The organization shall be able to maintain consistency in security audits with other organizations that require information on the audit.
Advanced ‐ The organization regularly reviews and analyzes audit records that are made manually or automatically by the system, and checks
whether there is any deviation or sign of deviation from contract matters.
‐ State of compliance with security management measures of the external service provider is regularly checked by internal audits that
are conducted by the client using a checklist.
D-3-31
Appendix D.3 - Mapping ISO/IEC 27001 to CPSF
D-3-32
Appendix D.3 - Mapping ISO/IEC 27001 to CPSF
‐ In addition to the detection of security incidents, the collected logs are considered to be useful in tracking the cause of security
incidents after the fact. Therefore, the information system collects, if possible, detailed logs (e.g. OS command level) that do not remain
in the OS function.
‐ If time stamps in multiple audit logs match, the audit logs of the subjects specified by the organization are managed as audit trails
across the system, logically and physically.
‐ The information system provides system functions designed to compare and synchronize internal system clocks by using an official
H‐Advanced source of information for generating time stamps for an audit record.
Determine and document the subject or scope of ‐ The information system adopts an automatic mechanism designed to handle an audit review, analysis, and report in an integrated
the audit recording/log recording, and implement manner.
CPS.PT-1
and review those records in order to properly ‐ It may be difficult to generate security‐related audit logs for some of the IoT devices that an organization uses, or to connect some of
detect high-risk security incidents. those devices to the existing log management system. Hence, it is necessary to take measures that consider the specs of the IoT devices,
such as using a log management system different than the main one or using an alternative measure on the part of the system, when
collecting and analyzing audit logs from the relevant IoT devices.
‐ The information system and the industrial control system uses a cryptographic mechanism in order to ensure the integrity of an audit
log and audit tool each.
Advanced ‐ The organization grants control over an audit log only to users assigned in accordance with the rules about security‐related internal
responsibility.
‐ The information system issues an alert when an incident of failure takes place in the audit process.
A.15 A.15.1 A.15.1 Information security requirements for Advanced
‐ In preparation for damages caused by security incidents, the organization considers risk transfer by using cyber insurance, etc., in
Supplier relationships Information security in Information security in mitigating the risks associated with addition to implementing security measures designated by business partners.
‐ In a contract with a contractor or an outsourcer, the organization specifies the scope of the responsibilities of the organization and
supplier relationships supplier relationships supplierʼs access to the organizationʼs
that of the business partner (state the disclaimer and an upper limit on agreed compensation for damages) in case of a damage caused
assets shall be agreed with the supplier Define roles and responsibilities for cyber security
CPS.AM-7 by a security incident in the business.
and documented. across the organization and other relevant parties. Basic ‐ To increase the effectiveness of the requirements related to security which a business partner requires or is required to satisfy in a
contract, it is desirable that the organization makes an agreement in meeting the requirements, identifying deficiencies and details of
actions, paying expenses, and using an alternative when they cannot be satisfied at the time of the contract or in the early stage of the
contract.
‐ The organization, in reference to security measure criteria regarding supply chain, prepares and provides to potential partners tender
documents such as ITT (Invitation To Tender) and RFP (Request For Proposal). Especially, it is advisable that the following items be
included in the tender documents.
1) Specifications of products or services to be procured
2) Security requirements that the supplie should comply with during the supply period of the products or services
3) Service levels and the indices to comply with during the supply period of the products or services
Formulate the standard of security measures
Advanced 4) Penalties that the purchaser may impopse if the supplier breach security requirements
relevant to the supply chain in consideration of the 5) Confidentiality clauses to protect the data transmitted during the supplier selection process, the systems, etc.
CPS.SC-1 business life cycle, and agree on contents with the ‐ The organization prepares procedures for continuously monitoring the conditions in the business partners’ compliance with the
business partners after clarifying the scope of the security management measures.
responsibilities. ‐ To take precautions against cases where a security incident in a business partner impacts the organization, in a written contract, clarify
where responsibility lies between the external business operator and the organization, and describe the compensation for a damage to
the organization for which the external business operator is responsible.
‐ The organization formulates security measure criteria applicable to business partners (especially those handling the organization’s
Basic data or providing a foundation for handling the data) according to appropriate laws and regulations and makes agreement with the
details.
D-3-33
Appendix D.3 - Mapping ISO/IEC 27001 to CPSF
D-3-34
Appendix D.3 - Mapping ISO/IEC 27001 to CPSF
D-3-35
Appendix D.3 - Mapping ISO/IEC 27001 to CPSF
‐ The organization documents the policy and procedure relating to establishing and implementing a connection designed for remote
Conduct remote maintenance of the IoT devices Advanced
maintenance, and implements the connection in accordance with the policy and procedure.
‐ The organization provides authentication required for network access that it specifies when remote maintenance is carried out. It also
and servers while granting approvals and
CPS.MA-2 ensures that the session and network connection are terminated when the remote maintenance is complete.
recording logs so that unauthorized access can be ‐ The organization develops and agrees to an implementation plan for remote maintenance before carrying out the maintenance, and
prevented. Basic checks the results of the maintenance done.
‐ The organization keeps the records of remote maintenance done.
‐ The organization requires its provider of external information system services to make clear the functions, ports, and protocols
H‐Advanced needed for the use of the services, along with other services.
‐ The organization monitors whether the matters made clear as stated above are observed.
‐ The organization documents its security requirements for the staff from its external service provider and system developer, and
includes the requirements in the agreement.
‐ The organization requires its external service provider and system developer to contact it when any of its staff members who have
authorizations for its system are transferred or when their employment terminates.
‐ It is desirable that the organization should manage changes to services offered by its external service provider, taking account of
Advanced relevant information about operations, the importance of its business systems and processes, and re‐assessed risks.
Monitor communication with external service
‐ The organization monitors whether its external service provider and system developer complies with the requirements.
CPS.CM-5 providers so that potential security events can be
‐ The organization monitors access to its system by its external service provider and system developer in order to detect any
detected properly. unauthorized access by these external businesses that results from an action or failure to act.
‐ The organization reports the results of the monitoring of activities by its external service provider and system developer to the
appropriate system administrator.
‐ The organization requires its provider of external information system services and system developer to draw up and introduce security
requirements such as those related to the following in accordance with the rules which the organization is subject to or which apply to
the provider and developer.
Basic
‐ Adequate security measures to take (e.g., measures that deserve ISMS Certification)
‐ Proper management of data in operation
‐ Proper data erasure when the use of the services ends
A.15.2.2 Changes to the provision of services by ‐ The organization requires its provider of external information system services to make clear the functions, ports, and protocols
Managing changes to suppliers, including maintaining and H‐Advanced needed for the use of the services, along with other services.
‐ The organization monitors whether the matters made clear as stated above are observed.
supplier services improving existing information security
‐ The organization documents its security requirements for the staff from its external service provider and system developer, and
policies, procedures and controls, shall be
includes the requirements in the agreement.
managed, taking account of the criticality ‐ The organization requires its external service provider and system developer to contact it when any of its staff members who have
Monitor communication with external service
of business information, systems and authorizations for its system are transferred or when their employment terminates.
CPS.CM-5 providers so that potential security events can be
processes involved and re-assessment of ‐ It is desirable that the organization should manage changes to services offered by its external service provider, taking account of
detected properly.
risks. Advanced relevant information about operations, the importance of its business systems and processes, and re‐assessed risks.
‐ The organization monitors whether its external service provider and system developer complies with the requirements.
‐ The organization monitors access to its system by its external service provider and system developer in order to detect any
unauthorized access by these external businesses that results from an action or failure to act.
‐ The organization reports the results of the monitoring of activities by its external service provider and system developer to the
appropriate system administrator.
D-3-36
Appendix D.3 - Mapping ISO/IEC 27001 to CPSF
[Reference] Violations in the security incidents of supply chain include violations on system components, IT products, development
processes, developers, distribution processes, and warehouse facilities.
As part of the security operation process, define ‐ The organization determines an alternative processing site in case the availability of its primary processing site has been compromised
the procedure and the division of roles with regard by a security incident.
CPS.RP-2
to cooperative relations with relevant parties such ‐ The organization sets forth in the service agreement that if its primary processing function becomes unavailable, certain operations
as partners, and implement the process. are moved to resume at the alternative processing site within the recovery time objective that the organization specifies in order to
ensure that it continues to perform its critical missions and operational functions.
Advanced
‐ The organization designates an alternative processing site away from its primary processing site in order to mitigate the vulnerability
to the same threats.
‐ The organization prepares internal resources for incident handling assistance (e.g., help desk; CSIRT). These resources offer advice and
support related to security incident handling and reporting for system users of the information system and industrial control system,
and are an integral part of organizational ability to handle incidents.
‐ If any security incident that requires handling is found, report it promptly to relevant organizations such as IPA and JPCERT/CC in order
Basic to receive advice about providing assistance in handling, identifying how the incident has occurred, analyzing the tactic, and preventing
any recurrence.
A.16.1.2 Information security events shall be ‐ The organization prepares a procedure to continuously monitor whether the security requirements from the contractee are complied
Reporting information reported through appropriate H‐Advanced with by the staff of the contractor, and to enable notification to the organization's personnel in charge in the case where irregular
behavior is found.
security events management channels as quickly as Formulate and manage security requirements ‐ The organization trains the staff on information security aspects of supplier relationships to particularly ensure that the handling of
possible. applicable to members of other relevant confidential information is correctly understood.
Advanced
CPS.SC-5 organizations, such as business partners, who are ‐ The organization regularly confirms that it complies with the security requirements from the contractee in conducting the contracted
engaged in operations outsourced from the work.
organization. ‐ The organization identifies and evaluates the staff who access, disclose or change the data related to the contracted work that should
not be disclosed or changed such as confidential data or intellectual property.
Basic
‐ After the contract with the contractor is finished, the organization immediately terminates the rights that are temporarily granted to
the personnel of the contractor such as access rights to its facilities.
‐ The organization includes contents regarding what to do to detect, analyze, contain, reduce, and recover from incidents in its security
operation manual.
Advanced ‐ Keep a record of all incidents and how they have been handled.
‐ Decide whether the organization should report the fact to any external organization of an incident that has occurred and how it has
been handled.'
‐ The organization develops and manages a process of security operation it should follow when a security incident arises that it must
Develop and implement previously the procedure address. It is advisable to include contents such as the following in the process:
of response after detecting incidents (securith ‐ Response procedure for the person who received the incident report
‐ Instructions and orders, and how to prioritize actions in an emergency;
operation process) that includes the response of
CPS.RP-1 ‐ Incident response;
Organization, People, Componens, System to ‐ Incident impact assessment and damage analysis;
identify the content of response, priority, and ‐ Information gathering, selecting information that the organization needs;
Basic
scope of response taken after an incident occurs. ‐ Communication and announcement to relevant internal personnel;
‐ Communication with relevant external organizations;
‐ The system (especially, industrial control system) shuts down, issues an alert to the administrator, or takes other fail‐safe actions if any
abnormality (e.g., malfunction) occurs in IoT devices or servers.
[Reference] “SP 800‐61 rev.1" (NIST, 2008) is available for reference to determine the process for handling security incidents that have
arisen.
‐ The organization assumes the course of action for security incidents of the supply chain and prepares a procedure that adjusts incident
responses between the organization and other organizations that are concerned with the supply chain.
‐ The organization adjusts the incident response process of an external service provider that contains important features in order to
continue its business, as well as adjusting the organization’s incident response process to meet the incident response requirements.
H‐Advanced ‐ The organization interlinks information regarding threats and vulnerabilities with how individual security incidents have been handled
so as to improve its understanding of the situations.
[Reference] Violations in the security incidents of supply chain include violations on system components, IT products, development
processes, developers, distribution processes, and warehouse facilities.
As part of the security operation process, define ‐ The organization determines an alternative processing site in case the availability of its primary processing site has been compromised
the procedure and the division of roles with regard by a security incident.
CPS.RP-2
to cooperative relations with relevant parties such ‐ The organization sets forth in the service agreement that if its primary processing function becomes unavailable, certain operations
as partners, and implement the process. are moved to resume at the alternative processing site within the recovery time objective that the organization specifies in order to
ensure that it continues to perform its critical missions and operational functions.
Advanced
‐ The organization designates an alternative processing site away from its primary processing site in order to mitigate the vulnerability
to the same threats.
‐ The organization prepares internal resources for incident handling assistance (e.g., help desk; CSIRT). These resources offer advice and
support related to security incident handling and reporting for system users of the information system and industrial control system,
and are an integral part of organizational ability to handle incidents.
‐ If any security incident that requires handling is found, report it promptly to relevant organizations such as IPA and JPCERT/CC in order
Basic to receive advice about providing assistance in handling, identifying how the incident has occurred, analyzing the tactic, and preventing
any recurrence.
D-3-37
Appendix D.3 - Mapping ISO/IEC 27001 to CPSF
[Reference] For example, the following document is available for reference when an organization decides on a measure of the severity
of the impact of a security incident.
‐ “SP 800‐61 rev.1” (NIST, 2008) Prioritization of the 3.2.6 Incident
A.16.1.4 Information security events shall be ‐ The organization determines its core business that must continue/recover before any other operations in prior and identifies and
Assessment of and assessed and it shall be decided if they are prioritizes important resources (other relevant organizations, employees, items, data, systems, etc.) and functions vital for continuing
H‐Advanced applicable businesses. * CPS.AM‐6 and CPS.BE‐2 include examples of similar measures.
decision on information to be classified as information security
‐ The organization uses an automated mechanism designed to help track security events and collect and analyze information about
security events incidents. threats and vulnerability related to incidents, so that it applies the findings to classification (triage) of security events.
Specify the criteria to determine the risk degree of ‐ The organization classifies security events, taking into account the recovery time objectives for the systems, the order of priority in
CPS.AE-5 Advanced
security events. recovery, and metrics in the process of its security operation.
‐ The organization specifies security events that must be reported, considering the level of the impact the security event has.
Basic [Reference] For example, the following document is available for reference when an organization decides on a measure of the severity
of the impact of a security event.
‐ “SP 800‐61 rev.1” (NIST, 2008) Prioritization of the 3.2.6 Incident
‐ The organization uses an automated mechanism designed to help track security incidents and collect and analyze information about
H‐Advanced
threats and vulnerability related to incidents, so that it applies the findings to classification (triage) of security incidents.
‐ The organization classifies security incidents, taking into account the recovery time objectives for the systems, the order of priority in
recovery, and metrics in the process of its security operation.
‐ The organization tracks and documents security incidents that may affect it. “SP 800‐61 rev.1” lists the following as examples of points
of view that may be taken when an organization documents a security incident.
‐ The present state of the incident
Advanced ‐ Overview of the incident
‐ The course of action the organization has taken to deal with the incident
Categorize and store information regarding the ‐ Other contact information of relevant personnel (e.g., the system owner, system administrator)
detected security incidents by the size of security- ‐ List of proof collected during the investigation
CPS.AN-3
related impact, penetration vector, and other ‐ Comments by the staff in charge of dealing with the incident
factors. ‐ Next steps
‐ The organization should identify in advance the core businesses that should be continued and restored in priority, and the operations
considered to be important. In addition, identify and prioritize important resources (relevant parties, People, Components, Data,
System, etc.) and functions from the viewpoint of business continuity.
* Similar measures are described in CPS.AM‐6 and CPS.BE‐2.
Basic ‐ The organization specifies incidents that must be reported, considering the level of the impact the security event has.
[Reference] For example, the following document is available for reference when an organization decides on a measure of the severity
of the impact of a security incident.
‐ “SP 800‐61 rev.1” (NIST, 2008) Prioritization of the 3.2.6 Incident
A.16.1.5 Information security incidents shall be ‐ The organization prepares a procedure to continuously monitor whether the security requirements from the contractee are complied
Response to information responded to in accordance with the H‐Advanced with by the staff of the contractor, and to enable notification to the organization's personnel in charge in the case where irregular
behavior is found.
security incidents documented procedures. Formulate and manage security requirements ‐ The organization trains the staff on information security aspects of supplier relationships to particularly ensure that the handling of
applicable to members of other relevant confidential information is correctly understood.
Advanced
CPS.SC-5 organizations, such as business partners, who are ‐ The organization regularly confirms that it complies with the security requirements from the contractee in conducting the contracted
engaged in operations outsourced from the work.
organization. ‐ The organization identifies and evaluates the staff who access, disclose or change the data related to the contracted work that should
not be disclosed or changed such as confidential data or intellectual property.
Basic
‐ After the contract with the contractor is finished, the organization immediately terminates the rights that are temporarily granted to
the personnel of the contractor such as access rights to its facilities.
D-3-38
Appendix D.3 - Mapping ISO/IEC 27001 to CPSF
[Reference] For example, SIM3 (Security Incident Management Maturity Model) is available as metrics for the evaluation of security
organizations (SOC/CSIRT).
Appoint a chief security officer, establish a security ‐ The organization refers to risk assessment results and, considering the following angles, establishes what to monitor and what to
include in correlation analysis.
management team (SOC/CSIRT), and prepare a
CPS.AE-2 ‐ The scope of systems to monitor
system within the organization to detect, analyze,
‐ Which device logs should be collected for analysis (see CPS.AE‐3)
and respond to security events. ‐ The organization regularly reviews audit logs collected through monitoring.
‐ The organization continues to collect and manage information about assets, device configurations, and network configurations in
order to evaluate its security status.
Advanced
‐ The organization examines the results of correlation analysis and other data to accurately detect security events that must be
addressed and take action in accordance with the security operation process. See CPS.RP‐1 for details of the process.
‐ The organization regularly reports the state of organizational and system security to the chief security officer or other appropriate
staff members. It is desirable that the regular report should include the following shown below:
‐ Results of log analysis (e.g., the number of incidents handled; summaries of typical incidents that have been handled; threats that
have emerged; issues in monitoring);
‐ Policy for future improvements in monitoring.
‐ If the information system and the industrial control system receive any invalid data, they operate as stated in an expected manner in
H‐Advanced
conformity with the purpose of the organization and system.
‐ The organization includes contents regarding what to do to detect, analyze, contain, reduce, and recover from incidents in its security
operation manual.
Advanced ‐ Keep a record of all incidents and how they have been handled.
‐ Decide whether the organization should report the fact to any external organization of an incident that has occurred and how it has
been handled.'
Develop and implement previously the procedure ‐ The organization develops and manages a process of security operation it should follow when a security incident arises that it must
of response after detecting incidents (securith address. It is advisable to include contents such as the following in the process:
‐ Response procedure for the person who received the incident report
operation process) that includes the response of
CPS.RP-1 ‐ Instructions and orders, and how to prioritize actions in an emergency;
Organization, People, Componens, System to ‐ Incident response;
identify the content of response, priority, and ‐ Incident impact assessment and damage analysis;
scope of response taken after an incident occurs. ‐ Information gathering, selecting information that the organization needs;
Basic
‐ Communication and announcement to relevant internal personnel;
‐ Communication with relevant external organizations;
‐ The system (especially, industrial control system) shuts down, issues an alert to the administrator, or takes other fail‐safe actions if any
abnormality (e.g., malfunction) occurs in IoT devices or servers.
[Reference] “SP 800‐61 rev.1" (NIST, 2008) is available for reference to determine the process for handling security incidents that have
arisen.
‐ The organization uses an automated mechanism for assisting with the process of security incident handling.
‐ The organization interlinks information regarding threats and vulnerabilities with how individual security incidents have been handled
so as to improve its understanding of the situations.
H‐Advanced [Reference] As examples of information expected to be useful in reducing the impact of an incident being handled and in recovery from
the incident, “Six Ws on cybersecurity information sharing for enhancing SOC/CSIRT Version 1.0” (ISOG‐J, 2018) lists the following:
‐ Configuration requirements for security products and related systems to block any attacks;
Take measures to minimize security-related ‐ How to disable attacks (e.g., patching; changing setups);
CPS.MI-1 damages and mitigate the impacts caused by such ‐ How to recover a damaged system;
incident. ‐ The organization (or its members) takes courses of action to reduce security incidents (e.g., shutting down the system; cutting off the
system from a wired/wireless network; cutting off a modem cable; disabling certain functions) in accordance with prescribed
procedures.
Basic
[Reference] Courses of action to reduce the impact of a security incident may vary according to the nature of the incident (e.g.,
according to the threat that has emerged, such as a denial‐of‐service attack, malware infection, or unauthorized access). For example, It
is advisable to refer to “SP 800‐61 rev.1" (NIST, 2008) for detailed information about courses of action to reduce the impact of an
incident.
A.16.1.6 Knowledge gained from analysing and H‐Advanced ‐ The organization has its security assessed by a third party.
Learning from resolving information security incidents ‐ The organization draws up a security assessment plan before the assessment is carried out that includes the following so as to ensure
information security shall be used to reduce the likelihood or Assess the lessons learned from security incident
that its security is assessed properly and systematically:
‐ Security measures for assessment;
incidents impact of future incidents. response and the results of monitoring, Advanced
‐ Assessment procedures for measuring the effectiveness of security measures;
CPS.IP-7 measuring, and evaluating internal and external ‐ Settings and mechanisms for carrying out the security assessment;
attacks, and improve the processes of protecting ‐ Methods of putting together the results of the security assessment and applications of the results.
the assets. ‐ The organization regularly evaluates whether its security measures have achieved expected results (i.e., security assessment) and
reports the conclusions to the chief security officer, in addition to the evaluation of whether the measures are correctly implemented
Basic
and managed.
‐ The organization makes improvements on its security measures based on the results of the security assessment.
‐ The organization prepares a setting through an automated mechanism at just the right time that enables it and its appropriate
H‐Advanced partners to interactively share new information about data protection technologies or information about the effectiveness of the
Share information regarding the effectiveness of protection technologies.
CPS.IP-8 data protection technologies with appropriate
Advanced
‐ The organization prepares a setting that enables it to share new information about data protection technologies or information about
partners. the effectiveness of the protection technologies with its partners at just the right time.
‐ The organization prepares a setting that enables it to acquire new information about data protection technologies or information
Basic
about the effectiveness of the protection technologies from its appropriate partners.
D-3-39
Appendix D.3 - Mapping ISO/IEC 27001 to CPSF
D-3-40
Appendix D.3 - Mapping ISO/IEC 27001 to CPSF
D-3-41
Appendix D.3 - Mapping ISO/IEC 27001 to CPSF
‐ The organization uses a trail storage system with the following features to flexibly fulfill the needs of clients and other related
organizations, such as a third‐party auditing institution, on a real‐time basis.
H‐Advanced ‐ Eligibility of the subject audit trail for the contract matter can be verified quickly.
‐ Only authorized entities such as clients and outsourced auditing agencies can access the system.
Collect and securely store data proving that the ‐ Stored data has reliable trails such as time stamps and electronic signatures.
organization is fulfilling its contractual obligations ‐ The organization takes measures so that those records among the audit records generated by the system that are acquired over a long
CPS.SC-8 with other relevant parties or individuals, and period of time can be obtained with certainty.
prepare them for disclosure as needed within ‐ In order to protect audit records from the following threats, it is desirable for the system to apply access control with high granularity
Advanced to the items and systems in which audit records are stored.
appropriate limits.
‐ Change format of recorded message
‐ Change or delete log file
‐ Exceed storage space of log file medium
Basic ‐ The organization preserves audit records for an appropriate period of time so as to satisfy the requirements of laws and regulations.
‐ The organization confirms the trustworthiness of the medium and integrity of the information by regularly testing the backup
Perform a periodical system backup and testing of H‐Advanced
information.
CPS.IP-4 components (e.g., IoT devices, communication
‐ The organization backs up their system documents according to the prescribed timing and frequency.
devices, and circuits). Advanced
‐ The organization protects the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of the information backed up on the storage base.
A.18.1.4 Privacy and protection of personally
Formulate internal rules considering domestic and ‐ Within the organization’s business activities, clearly identify all related laws, regulations, and contractual requirements in the context
Privacy and protection identifiable information shall be ensured as
foreign laws, including the Act on the Protection of of security as well as the organization’s effort to fulfill these requirements, document them, and maintain those documents at their
of personally identifiable required in relevant legislation and latest.
Personal Information and Unfair Competition
information regulation where applicable. ‐ The organization defines and documents detailed management measures and details of responsibilities to satisfy the requirements.
CPS.GV-2 Prevention Act, as well as industry guidelines, and Basic
‐ The controller identifies all laws and regulations which are applied to each organization to satisfy requirements related to the type of
review and revise the rules on a continuing and business.
timely basis in accordance with any changes in ‐ When the organization operates businesses in other countries, the controller considers to comply with the laws and regulations in all
relevant laws, regulations, and industry guidelines. related countries.
D-3-42
Appendix D.3 - Mapping ISO/IEC 27001 to CPSF
[Reference] An “asset‐based” method and a “business damage‐based” method are known as security risk assessment methods.
A.18.2.3 Information systems shall be regularly ‐ When developing a new device or a new component which may have an impact on a physical space such as components of an
Technical compliance reviewed for compliance with the industrial control system, the organization collects/analyzes accident case studies of conventional products and others to identify
safety‐related hazards.
review organizationʼs information security policies
‐ The organization analyzes a situation where a hazard leads to harm and identifies the possibility of occurrence and the severity of the
and standards. H‐Advanced
harm to estimate a possible risk especially regarding an industrial control system. At the time, it is desirable to check whether there is
any hazard caused by a security issue.
‐ The organization updates the risk assessment if there is a significant change in the industrial control system or the environment in
which it operates, or the other change that affects the security state of the industrial control system.
‐ The organization updates a risk assessment when there is a big change in a system or an environment where a system is running
(including identification of a new threat or vulnerability) or when any situation which impacts the security status of a system occurs.
- Conduct risk assessments regularly to check if
‐ When planning/designing a new system using an IoT device, the organization identifies existing assets and assets to be protected in
the security rules for managing the components the system to be implemented and organizes security measures according to use and configuration of the system. When handling a
are effective and applicable to the components for Advanced
component or a system with a long life cycle and a component or a system requiring availability, consideration in security measures at a
implementation. phase before designing is especially important.
CPS.RA-4
- Check the presence of unacceptable known ‐ When considering security measures applied to purchased products and services, the organization makes sure that the levels of
security risks, including safety hazards, from the measures correspond to the importance of such products and services.
[Reference] An “asset‐based” method and a “business damage‐based” method are known as security risk assessment methods.
D-3-43
Appendix E: Glossary
(1) Actuator
<Internet of Things> IoT device that changes one or more properties of a
physical entity in response to a valid input. [ISO/IEC 20924:2018]
(3) Audit
Systematic, independent and documented process for obtaining audit evidence
and evaluating it objectively to determine the extent to which the audit criteria
are fulfilled. [ISO/IEC 27000:2018]
(4) Authentication
Provision of assurance that a claimed characteristic of an entity is correct.
[ISO/IEC 27000:2018]
(5) Authenticity
Property that an entity is what it claims to be. [ISO/IEC 27000:2018]
(6) Availability
Property of being accessible and usable on demand by an authorized entity.
[ISO/IEC 27000:2018]
E-1
(9) CC (Common Criteria)
Framework to evaluate if products and systems related to information
technology are appropriately designed and properly implemented in terms of
security. These criteria are defined as the international standard ISO/IEC
15408.
(11) Confidentiality
Property that information is not made available or disclosed to unauthorized
individuals, entities, or processes. [ISO/IEC 27000:2018]
(14) Cyberattack
Attempt to destroy, expose, alter, disable, steal or gain unauthorized access to
or make unauthorized use of an asset. [ISO/IEC 27000:2018]
(15) Cybersecurity
To prevent the leak or falsification of electronic data as well as the malfunction
of IT or control systems against expected behavior.
(16) Cyberspace
Virtual space in computer systems or networks. It uses digital data to create
value.
E-2
(17) Digital certificate
Data which certifies that the public key for digital signature analysis is
authentic, and issued by a certification authority (CA).
(19) Entity
Thing (physical or non-physical) having a distinct existence. [ISO/IEC 15459-
3:2014]
(20) Firewall
Software, devices or systems installed at the border between a certain
computer/network and external network in order to protect the internal
network from external attack by relaying and monitoring the internal/external
communication.
(22) Harm
Injury or damage to the health of people, or damage to property or the
environment. [ISO/IEC Guide 51:2014]
(23) Hazard
Potential source of harm. [IEC 61508-4:2010]
E-3
(24) Hash function
Function which maps strings of bits of variable (but usually upper bounded)
length to fixed-length strings of bits, satisfying the following two properties:
— for a given output, it is computationally infeasible to find an input which
maps to this output;
— for a given input, it is computationally infeasible to find a second input
which maps to the same output. [ISO/IEC 10118-1:2016]
(26) Identifier
Information that unambiguously distinguishes one entity from other entities
in a given identity context. [ISO/IEC 20924:2018]
(29) Integrity
Property of accuracy and completeness. [ISO/IEC 27000:2018]
E-4
(31) IoT device
Entity of an IoT system that interacts and communicates with the physical
space through sensing or actuating.
NOTE: An IoT device can be a sensor or an actuator. [partly changes the
definition in ISO/IEC 20924:2018]
(35) Malware
Software or firmware intended to perform an unauthorized process that will
have adverse impact on the confidentiality, integrity, or availability of an
information system. A virus, worm, Trojan horse, or other code-based entity that
infects a host. Spyware and some forms of adware are also examples of
malicious code. [NIST SP 800-53 Rev.4]
E-5
(37) Multi-stakeholder process
Process in which three or more stakeholders have meetings to have discussions
on an equal footing, thereby understanding each other for consensus building
in order to solve a problem that could not be solved by one or two stakeholder(s).
[Cabinet Office of Japan]
(39) Objective
Result to be achieved. [ISO/IEC 27000:2018]
(42) Process
Set of interrelated or interacting logical or physical activities which transforms
inputs into outputs.
(43) Protocol
Predetermined mass of rules and steps for parties, so that more than one party
can smoothly transmit signals, data and information with one another.
E-6
(44) Public key
Key of an entity's asymmetric key pair, which can be made public.
NOTE: In the case of an asymmetric signature system the public key defines
the verification transformation. In the case of an asymmetric encipherment
system the public key defines the encipherment transformation. A key that is
'publicly known' is not necessarily globally available. The key can only be
available to all members of a pre-specified group. [ISO/IEC 19790:2012]
(45) Redundancy
Existence of a means in addition to the means which would be sufficient for a
functional unit to perform a required function or for data to represent
information. [ISO/IEC 2382:2015]
(46) Resilience
The ability of an information system to continue to: (i) operate under adverse
conditions or stress, even if in a degraded or debilitated state, while maintaining
essential operational capabilities; and (ii) recover to an effective operational
posture in a time frame consistent with mission needs. [NIST SP 800-53 Rev.4]
(47) Risk
Effect of uncertainty on objectives. [ISO/IEC 27000:2018]
(50) Safety
State of being protected from recognized hazards that are likely to cause harm.
[ISO/IEC Guide 51:2014]
E-7
(51) Security-by-design
To introduce the measures (e.g. threat analysis, security architecture, external
specification analysis and privacy impact assessment) to ensure security at the
planning and designing stages for a device or system.
E-8
(58) Security rule
What defines the details on the measures against possible security risks
clarifying each scope and priority.
(59) Sensor
<Internet of Things> IoT device that measures one or more properties of one or
more physical entities and outputs digital data that can be transmitted over a
network. [ISO/IEC 20924:2018]
(60) Service
Output of an organization with at least one activity necessarily performed
between the organization and the customer. [ISO 9000:2015]
(63) Stakeholder
Person or organization that can affect, be affected by, or perceive itself to be
affected by a decision or activity. [ISO/IEC 27000:2018]
(64) Supplier
Organization or an individual that enters into agreement with the acquirer for
the supply of a product or service. [ISO/IEC 27036-1:2014]
E-9
(65) Supply chain
Linked set of resources and processes between multiple tiers of developers that
begins with the sourcing of products and services and extends through the
design, development, manufacturing, processing, handling, and delivery of
products and services to the acquirer. [ISO 28001:2007, NIST SP 800-53 Rev.4]
(66) Threat
Potential cause of an unwanted incident, which can result in harm to a system
or organization. [ISO/IEC 27000:2018]
(67) Time-stamp
Time variant parameter which denotes a point in time with respect to a common
time reference. [ISO/IEC 18014-1:2008]
(68) Trust
Degree to which a user or other stakeholder has confidence that a product or
system will behave as intended. [ISO/IEC 25010:2011]
(69) Trustworthiness
Property of deserving trust or confidence. In the context of IoT, property of
deserving trust or confidence within the entire lifecycle of an Internet of Things
implementation to ensure security, privacy, safety, reliability and resiliency.
[ISO/IEC 20924:2018]
(70) Vulnerability
Weakness of an asset or control (3.14) that can be exploited by one or more
threats. [ISO/IEC 27000:2018]
E-10