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Critical Discourse Analysis: How the Washington Post

and Moscow Times Reported the Russian Airstrikes in
Syria

Laurie Knox
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction

2. Context of the Russian Air Strikes

3. Texts

4. Methodology
4.1 Critical Discourse Analysis
4.2 Intertextuality
4.3 Referencing Social Actors
4.4 Culture and Ideology

5. Findings
5.1 Intertextuality
5.2 Referencing Social Actors
5.3 Culture and Ideology

6. Summary of Findings

7. Conclusion
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1. Introduction
Although newspapers are commonly presented as an impartial representation of the facts,

all texts include some level of bias, and readers should be aware that their opinions can be

manipulated both blatantly (e.g. open support for a political party) and covertly through the use

of language. This paper will use Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) to demonstrate how two

seemingly neutral news reports leave their readers with vastly different interpretations of the

same event. The analysed articles discuss the September 2015 Russian air strikes in Syria and

were taken from the Moscow Times (MT) and the Washington Post (WP). They are examined

within the general framework of Fairclough (1992), with specific emphasis on intertextuality, the

representation of social actors, and the interconnectivity between the texts and society at large.

The reports are found to proffer differing slants, with the WP article demonstrating a strong

hostility to the Russian air strikes, while the MT has a slight pro-Russia bias.

2. Context of the Russian Air Strikes

Since 2011, the nation of Syria has been in a state of civil war. President Bashar al-

Assad’s government forces have faced multiple rebel groups, who in some instances have also

fought each other. A group commonly referred to as the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS)

has taken advantage of this chaos, seizing huge swathes of land in both countries. The emergence

of ISIS has internationalized the conflict, with its violent interpretation of Sharia law publicised

through numerous videos depicting brutal executions, often of foreigners. In September 2014,

the US and its coalition partners began air strikes against ISIS in Syria, while also funding anti-

Assad rebel forces. Assad, a long-time ally of Russia, requested help from Russian President
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Vladimir Putin, who had recently antagonised the West with his country’s annexation of Crimea,

followed by military support for pro-Russian groups in the 2014 Ukrainian Civil War. The

Russian air strikes in Syria began on 30 September 2015.

3. Texts

The two analysed texts are taken from 30 September 2015 and are the first reports in both

publications regarding the commencement of Russia’s bombing campaign:

1) Russia Begins Air Strikes in Syria (MT, Russia) – Appendix 1

2) Russia begins airstrikes in Syria; U.S. warns of new concerns in conflict (WP,

USA) – Appendix 2

These articles were chosen to represent the differing media reaction in two of the key

international agents in the Syrian Civil War: Russia and the United States. Importantly, both

publications are based in the capital cities of their respective countries, allowing the journalists

closer access to the decision makers and a better perception of the collective mood surrounding

the seat of government. The MT prides itself on its independence, having previously criticised

“US hegemony” and the western media, while also being labeled as a “militant anti-Putin”

publication (The Guardian, 2015). The WP has been accused of both left- and right-wing bias,

although the general consensus seems to be a centrist publication with a moderate leftist slant.

When the above articles were released, both publications were daily English language

newspapers, although the MT has since changed to a weekly format. The WP is sold nationally

across the United States, whereas the MT is distributed freely within the Moscow area only.

Gentzkow and Shapiro (2006) note the strong consumer demand for slant in newspapers, with

highly elastic sales figures when newspapers change bias. It could therefore be asserted that the
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WP is more likely to pander to the ideologies of its readership than the MT. With its status as

Russia’s only English-language newspaper, coupled with its free circulation policy, the MT has

no direct competition, inelastic demand, and thus less reason to tailor its slant to the market. This

is consistent with the findings of this report.

4. Methodology

4.1 Critical Discourse Analysis

To investigate language at the discourse level, Stubbs (1983: 1) advocates the

examination of text beyond the sentence, towards “larger linguistic units, such as conversational

exchanges or written texts,” while paying particular attention to “language in use in social

contexts.” For such an examination to be considered a CDA, Van Dijk (2003) contends it must

also focus on social or political problems, and that explanations of discourse structures within

their social narrative should be given priority over simple descriptions. CDA thus attempts “to

show how discourse is shaped by relations of power and ideologies” (Coulthard et al, 2000: 117-

118). Among the goals of such investigations are “to make more visible these opaque aspects of

social practice,” (Fairclough et al., 2011: 358) and to enforce change through the identification of

previously covert bias or prejudice.

Each CDA can use a completely different set of analytical approaches. Fairclough et al.

(2011: 357) note that, “CDA is not a discrete academic discipline with a relatively fixed set of

research methods.” It could be asserted that such flexibility allows CDA practitioners to utilise

the widest range of tools available and use their own judgment regarding which procedures best

reveal bias in text. However, CDA is not without opposition. The term critical is described as

“little more than a rallying cry demanding that researchers consider ‘whose side they are on.’”
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(Hammersley, 1997: 251). This claim is supported by Haig (2004), who warns discourse analysts

to avoid the pitfall of looking for exploitation and inequality where none exists.

This paper uses the analytical framework set out by Fairclough (1992). The texts are

examined in the following order:

Discourse Practice

Text

Social Practice

This analytical structure allows the texts to be examined within the context of a wider

running narrative, before analysing them at the sentence, phrase, or word level. These findings

are then assessed to see how the texts fit within society (1992: 231).

4.2 Intertextuality

Following Fairclough’s analytical framework, this paper first investigates intertextuality,

which Vahdani and Saeed (2015: 875) describe as the concept “that every text is interpretable

through the background knowledge of other texts.” More specifically, it investigates external

intertextuality, i.e. backstories mentioned within the text (Richardson, 2007). Carter and

Greenberg (1965: 33) note the importance of omission in the perceived accuracy of the media.

Thus, to examine the effects of external intertextuality on the reader, this paper first looks at
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which backstories were picked for inclusion and which were omitted. Following this analysis,

instances of external intertextuality common to both articles are assessed qualitatively by

determining whether the language used regarding the wider narratives is biased.

4.2 Referencing Social Actors

Section 5.2 is devoted to an analysis of the key social actors in the story. Every author

has to choose which social actors to include and how to represent them (Fairclough, 2003: 145).

The first part of this analysis deals with the frequency of representation, which allows us to draw

conclusions about the authors’ perceived importance of the main social actors. If one participant

in the story is mentioned significantly more than another, it is reasonable to assume she or he is

seen as being more central to the narrative. Richardson (2007) speaks of the importance in the

lexis used regarding the social actors, especially the metonymy, while Caldas-Coulthard (1992)

notes how writers distance themselves from concepts by giving voices to others rather than

reporting the thought or idea directly in the text. The final part of Section 5.2 is a qualitative

analysis of the metonymy, including an investigation regarding whether the terminology used to

describe social actors is dependent on thoughts being reported directly or via a third party.

4.3 Culture and Ideology

The final part of Section 5 investigates the interconnectivity between the texts and society.

The relationship between newspapers and the general public is two-way, with the views of both

affecting the other (Chibnall, 1977; Richardson, 2007). Furthermore, Blackwell (2005) claims

the story believed by the reader is partly down to the ideological framing of the event, and partly

imagined by the reader. The cultural differences in Russian and American society are therefore

hugely relevant when considering the texts. Enikolopov et al. (2010: 2) use statistical evidence
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from 1990s Russia to suggest there is a “larger effect of media on political outcomes in a country

with weak democratic institutions.” With Vladimir Putin acting as the de facto president of

Russia for the previous 15 years and showing no signs of losing that position, such democratic

weakness implies the Russian media holds more sway over the electorate than its western

counterparts and is therefore more likely to be strictly monitored by the government. From this,

one could postulate the MT is less likely to be overtly critical of Putin’s government without

strong evidence of wrongdoing.

Morris and Peng’s (1994) geopscyhological study on the fundamental attribution error

says that Americans have a strong tendency to blame others directly for their actions, rather than

taking into account situational factors, which is a psychological feature more common in

collectivist societies. They attribute this to the higher levels of individualism in capitalist

societies. Belin (2000: 4) notes “the media, like most citizens, tend to rally around their country's

political leaders in times of war.” Combining these findings suggests the WP is unlikely to

consider the story from Putin’s perspective, a finding made in this paper.

5. Findings

5.1 Intertextuality

Fairclough (1992: 117-118) refers to intertextuality as instances "where specific other

texts are overtly drawn upon within a text.” Due to the long-lasting and highly fragmented nature

of the conflict in Syria, there are multiple cases of what Richardson (2007) calls external

intertextuality, i.e. frequent referencing to events outside the main narrative of the Russian

airstrikes. All cases of intertextuality uncovered during this investigation are shown in Appendix

3, and a summary of the cases discussed in detail is included below.

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Table 5.1.1 – Intertextuality

Subject Washington Post Moscow Times

Russia's participation in anti-
terrorist operations in Syria is
being carried out on the basis
“Assad’s apparent request to
of international law and in
Moscow for military assistance
accordance with an official
Russia-Assad Dialogue seems a last-gasp appeal for
request from the Syrian
help from what was a dying
president," state news agency
regime,” he said.
RIA Novosti quoted Putin as
saying at his Novo-Ogaryovo
residence outside Moscow
The resolution came without
warning in the Federation
Air strikes began just hours after
Council, Russia’s higher body of
Putin received a fast-tracked
parliament, where 162 senators
Authorisation from voted unanimously in support
authorization to use force
Russian Parliament in Syria from the Federation
after a closed-door discussion —
Council.
similar to a vote last year to
green-light Russian military force
in Ukraine.
The Kremlin's stated political
“Amid the regime’s major
objectives are to fight terrorism
losses . . . Assad’s apparent
and prop up Assad's embattled
Assad’s Recent Military request to Moscow for military
government after a series
Defeats assistance seems a last-gasp
of setbacks against the Islamic
appeal for help from what was a
State and Western-backed
dying regime,” he said.
opposition groups.
The Defense Ministry
on Wednesday said that air
strikes would be coordinated
New Baghdad - with Syria, Iraq and Iran via
Intelligence Centre a recently established
intelligence center in Baghdad.

It also raises the stakes over

competing visions for Syria
outlined this week at the United
Nations, where Putin insisted In his address to the UN, Putin
that Syria’s embattled proposed the creation of a
Putin Talks to UN government is the key to broad international coalition
stability after four years of to fight the Islamic State
bloodshed and Obama warned in Syria.
that the “status quo” cannot
stand.

Predictably, the WP pays more attention to the role of the US in the conflict, with the MT

more concerned with Russian affairs. The WP references both the recent US-Russia military
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talks and the US bombing campaign in Syria, whereas neither of these backstories is deemed

worthy of inclusion in the MT article. Conversely, the MT seeks to legitimise Russia’s military

intervention by stating that, “air strikes would be coordinated with Syria, Iraq and Iran via

a recently established intelligence center in Baghdad.” The WP omits this information, glossing

over the element of international coalescence in Russia’s actions. This is a theme running

throughout the WP article: any suggestion of Russia helping the international community is

downplayed, and its role delegitimised.

When assessing the legality of Russia’s intervention, the WP uses more negative

language vis-à-vis the MT. While the MT describes “an official request from the Syrian

president” for Russian airstrikes, the WP opts for “an apparent request.” The use of the word

apparent immediately casts doubts on the existence of such an appeal, which leaves the reader

with the impression that one or both of the parties may be untrustworthy. Conversely, the MT’s

use of official conveys the lawfulness of Russia’s actions. When describing the Russian

Parliament’s approval process, the MT says “Putin received a fast-track authorization,” a

statement that hints at efficiency and legitimacy. Discussing the same process, the WP says “The

resolution came without warning.” Again, the linguistic differences are stark. Without warning

leaves the reader with the impression that Russia acted in a sneaky, deceitful manner, while the

word resolution suggests a mere expression of intent, rather than the legally-binding

authorization used by the MT.

Syrain President Bashar al-Assad’s position as both an ally of Moscow and an enemy of

Washington is also encapsulated within the interpretations of the wider narratives. The WP tells

of his “regime’s major losses,” whereas the MT uses the softer term “setbacks.” This is

consistent with the US view of Assad as a president in need of ousting, with major losses hinting
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at danger for his rule, potentially with a regime change to come. Conversely, setbacks are minor,

temporary inconveniences, concordant with Putin’s support of Assad remaining as president.

Such inconsistencies between the two texts are further highlighted when discussing Putin’s

recent appearance at the UN, with the MT referring to his speech as a proposal for “the creation

of a broad international coalition to fight the Islamic State in Syria.” This is a laudable goal, in

contrast with the WP’s description of “competing visions,” as “Putin insisted that Syria’s

embattled government is the key to stability.” By insisting, Putin is seen more as a unilateral

decision maker demanding his own way. The American newspaper chooses to highlight the

differences in international opinion, whereas the Russian article stresses Putin’s desire to reach a

solution. Lastly, while the MT describes “air strikes … against the Islamic State,” the WP casts

doubt on this, with its assertion that, “U.S. officials dispute Moscow’s claim that its aircraft

targeted the Islamic State.”

5.2 Social Actors

Table 5.2.1 shows the frequency of appearances each of the main social actors makes in

the texts, with all unique occurrences counted, regardless of the metonymy. Where the actor is

mentioned twice in the same sentence, it needs to be assessed whether it relates to two separate

thoughts (included) or whether it represents paraphrasing (not included). Although the total word

count is similar in both articles, separate columns showing (number of references/total word

count)*100 are included, ensuring fairness in the comparison of data between the articles.
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Table 5.2.1 - Frequency of Social Actors

WP – No. of WP - % of MT – No. of MT - % of
Social Actor
references total words references total words
Vladimir Putin 4 0.319 15 1.236

Barack Obama 4 0.319 1 0.082

Bashar al-Assad 12 0.957 7 0.577

Russia/Government/
23 1.834 19 1.565
Officials
US/Government/
19 1.515 6 0.494
Officials
Syria/Government/
3 0.239 4 0.329
Officials
Russian Military 7 0.558 15 1.236

American Military 2 0.159 1 0.082

Syrian Military 2 0.159 1 0.082

Anti-Assad Rebels 13 1.037 5 0.412

ISIS 13 1.037 9 0.741

Total number of words: WP – 1,254 MT – 1,214

The most telling difference between the two articles is the frequency with which the two

presidents are mentioned, a decision made by the authors either consciously or subconsciously,

as per Fairclough (2003). Vladimir Putin’s domination of Russian politics is evident in the MT

article, with 15 mentions, whereas the WP only refers to him on 4 occasions. US President

Barack Obama is spoken of only once by the MT, relegating him to a bit part in the story,

whereas the WP references Obama with the same frequency (4) that it references Putin. This

shows some degree of ethnocentrism on behalf of the WP, with the American president deemed

equally as worthy of inclusion as the man who ordered the air strikes that are the apparent focus
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of the story. The WP uses collective terms representing the nation of Russia (e.g. the Kremlin,

Moscow) 23 times, which could be an attempt to dehumanise the decision making process,

taking it away from Putin and attributing it to an ambiguous group, e.g. “Russia’s stated intention

to cooperate.”

When assessing the frequency of occurrence, the reader is also left with differing

explanations for why Russia entered the conflict. The Russian government’s claim that

intervention was in response to the growth of ISIS is supported by the MT, with almost twice as

many mentions for ISIS (9) as anti-Assad rebels (5). In the WP, unnamed US officials accuse

Russia of not targeting ISIS, but instead focusing their strikes on anti-Assad rebels. The WP

mentions these rebel groups 13 times, which suggests the newspaper is aligning itself with that

viewpoint, whereas the MT prefers to gloss over the possibility that Putin might be lying. The

WP mentions ISIS the same number of times (13) as it does the rebels, which on the surface

suggests equal importance in the story for both parties. However, this masks the reality behind

the numbers, with 5 of the WP’s references to ISIS casting doubt over whom the Russian Air

Force was actually targeting. This demonstrates the main limitation behind rudimentary

quantitative analyses of social actors: merely counting the frequency does not allow one to

differentiate in situations where a social actor is referenced for two or more different purposes.

Richardson (2007) speaks of the importance in assessing the lexis used to represent the

social actors, thus the metonymy of four selected parties was analysed: President Assad, ISIS,

the anti-Assad rebels, and the Russian Air Force. These actors were chosen because of their

importance in the conflict, and the differing phraseology used in both newspapers to represent

them. Table 5.2.2 shows a list of all terms used to describe these four actors.
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Table 5.2.2 Metonymy for Selected Social Actors

Washington Post Moscow Times

Russian warplanes
Russian air power
Russian air force
Its aircraft
Russian aircraft
Russian aircraft
Russian warplanes
Russian airplanes
Russian aviation
Islamic State
Islamic State Terrorists
Al-Qaeda offshoot Islamists
Islamic State

President Bashar Assad

A key Russian ally
Assad
Assad
An embattled ally
President Bashar al-Assad
Assad
Assad
Syrian President
President Assad

Hom’s civil defense force

Rebel factions backed by the West
Rebel group Other opposition groups
Factions against the Assad government Western-backed opposition groups
Anti-Assad rebels Anti-Assad rebels
Opponenets of Syria’s embattled president
U.S.-backed units
Tajammu al-Aaza

Non-italics denote the author’s voice.

Italics denote part of reported speech (direct or indirect).

Caldas-Coulthard’s (1992) assertion that writers use different voices to distance

themselves from opinions is demonstrated with the varying lexis used to describe the Russian

airplanes involved in the bombing. When the voice comes from the writers of the texts, the WP

refers to “Russian warplanes” and “Russian air power,” two terms that invoke images of the

destructiveness of war, but by quoting Russian sources, it distances itself from the more neutral

“aircraft,” “airplanes,” and “aviation.” This slant is consistent with the overall tone of the text:
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the WP is keen to link Russia’s actions with the chaos of war. The reverse is true of the MT,

which uses the softer terms “air force” and “aircraft” when voiced by the writer. Such language

mitigates the devastation in the mind of the reader.

The WP only refers to Assad as president when quoting from other sources, a sign the

newspaper is trying to distance itself from the thought of Assad as the legitimate president of

Syria. In the newspaper’s voice, he is only called “Assad,” or “a key Russian ally.” The MT

makes reference to “President Bashar Assad,” also calling him “an embattled ally.” This wording

suggests a desire to inform the reader of Assad’s status as both legal ruler of Syria and friend of

Russia. The metonymy used to describe the non-ISIS groups fighting Assad is also of interest.

The MT refers to them as “anti-Assad groups,” and “Western-backed groups,” which, coupled

with the language used to describe Assad, suggests they are Russian enemies. The WP uses more

varied language and names certain groups, possibly in an attempt to humanise them. Readers are

more likely to sympathise with “Hom’s defence force” than they are “other opposition groups.”

Another aspect of the WP’s phraseology is the omission of any variant of the word terror.

Despite 13 references to ISIS, the closest the WP comes to describing it as a terrorist group is the

phrase, “an Al-Qaeda offshoot.” Conversely, the MT refers directly to ISIS as “terrorists.”

Terrorism is a highly negative term, and its absence from the WP suggests an attempt to

underplay the potential benefits of Russia’s actions, while its inclusion in the MT could be an

aspiration to achieve the reverse effect.

5.3 Culture and Ideology

After investigating the discourse practice and text, the final part of Fairclough’s (1992)

analytical framework is the examination of the social practice. Chibnall (1977) and Richardson’s
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(2007) assertion of a two-way relationship between newspapers and society is examined by

gauging the ways in which the findings in Sections 5.1 and 5.2 are either restricted by societal

constraints, or intended to influence the general public.

Religion plays a major part in both American and Russian society. With this in mind, it is

interesting to note the use of the terms “Islamist” and “holy war,” which appear in the MT, but

not the WP. Such terms give the reader a strong indication that religion is a key factor in this

story. The lack of religiousness in the WP article could be another sign that the publishers are

keen not to be seen as supportive towards the Russian efforts. With the US being a

predominantly Christian nation, and religiosity seen as a prerequisite for holding power,

invoking the image of a Christian-Muslim holy war could evoke sympathy towards Russia,

another country with a Christian majority. The WP therefore avoids doing this, demonstrating

the importance of the framing of the event, as per Blackwell (2005). Future investigations could

use corpus analysis to confirm whether the WP consistently omits phrases relating to religion

when discussing the war in Syria.

Although some of the lexis used by the MT to describe the social actors and

intertextuality demonstrate signs of a pro-Russia slant, overall the article is reasonably balanced.

Russia is referenced negatively on occasion, and evidence that Putin lied about Russian ground

troops being used in Syria is discussed. This supports the suggestion of the MT being an

independent publication, although it is noticeably more sympathetic to Putin than the western

media. The WP shows virtually no attempt to consider events that could justify Russian

intervention, consistent with claims of Americans being more susceptible to making the

fundamental attribution error (Morris and Peng, 1994). Russia’s actions are viewed with regards

to their effects on the US, with the air strikes being called “an affront … (to) President Obama,”
 P a g e 17

with ethnocentric reasoning used throughout the article, e.g. “The introduction of Russian air

power … took place with scant notice to the U.S. government.” Presumably every government in

the world received “scant notice,” but the WP reports it as a direct insult to the US. Even in a

post-Cold War era, anti-Russian sentiment in the US remains high, and the WP appears keen to

gratify its readership with such slanted reporting.

6. Summary of Findings

This CDA provides evidence that both the WP and MT articles were written from

different ideological and cultural standpoints. Using Fairclough’s (1992) analytical framework,

the discourse practices employed by the two newspapers were first investigated through their

intertextuality. The WP includes more references to the US viewpoint, whereas the MT omits

these, preferring instead to focus on the international collaboration that preceded the airstrikes.

The reasons for such differences are likely to be multifarious and complex, but they do provide

evidence of ethnocentrism by the WP, and a desire from the MT to legitimise the actions of the

Russian government. These findings are strengthened further, with an analysis of the language

used in mutual cases of intertextuality: the MT describing Russian actions with more positive

words than the WP.

To fulfil the second section of Fairclough’s suggested framework, both the frequency and

the metonymy used to describe the social actors were investigated. This uncovered further

evidence of ethnocentrism on behalf of the WP, with American participants referenced more

frequently than in the MT. Evidence of covert bias in the WP was also discovered, with the

writers frequent use of negative terms to describe Russian or pro-Russian social actors.

Interestingly, ISIS is described by the WP in moderate terms, which could be a further sign of
 P a g e 18

bias. This story is largely about ISIS becoming an enemy of Russia, so the sudden softening of

language towards the group would suggest a desire to undermine Putin’s actions. An analysis of

the metonymy used to describe ISIS in WP articles relating to American bombing campaigns

against the group would help to clarify this.

Fairclough recommends finishing with an examination of the social and ideological

practices that affect the texts. Religion was introduced as a theme by the MT, but not the WP.

The omission of religion in the WP could be seen as an attempt to deflect support from an

opposing but predominantly Christian nation. Another potential reason for this omission is that

separation of religion and state is seen as fundamental to the American political process and

therefore irrelevant to a political discussion. Despite this possibility, the overall tone of the WP

article was slanted against Russia, with a tendency to consider every action based on how the US

would be affected. The MT article appears more balanced, although some of the lexis used

offered evidence of a mild pro-Moscow slant.

7. Conclusion

The findings in this study were consistent with expectations. The WP article

demonstrates bias in favour of the ideological position of the US government, while considering

all aspects of the story with regards to how they will affect the US. The MT article exhibits a

more independent outlook, although some of the language used is pro-Russian. Belin (2000: 4)

notes the tendency of media to “rally around” their countries in times of war, which provides the

possibility that all discoveries of ideolgical bias in this study could be temporary. A CDA of

texts regarding mutual US-Russian interests in a non-war setting would provide stronger

evidence of the ideological standpoints of the two newspapers.

 P a g e 19

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Appendix 1 – Moscow Times Article

http://www.themoscowtimes.com/article/russia-begins-air-strikes-in-syria/536327.html

Russia Begins Air Strikes in Syria

• By Matthew Bodner
• Sep. 30 2015 20:53
• Last edited 20:55

Alexei Nikolsky / RIA Novosti / Kremlin / ReutersPresident Putin said on Wednesday the only way to fight terrorists in Syria was to
act preemptively.

The Russian air force began to launch air strikes in Syria against the Islamic State and other
opposition groups on Wednesday, in a move that President Vladimir Putin described as an anti-
terrorist action conducted in accordance with international law.

"Russia's participation in anti-terrorist operations in Syria is being carried out on the basis
of international law and in accordance with an official request from the Syrian president," state news
agency RIA Novosti quoted Putin as saying at his Novo-Ogaryovo residence outside Moscow.

"The only true way to combat international terrorism … is through pre-emption, [by] fighting
and destroying terrorists in territories that they already occupy, instead of waiting for them to come
to our homes," Putin said.
 P a g e 22

Air strikes began just hours after Putin received a fast-tracked authorization to use force in Syria
from the Federation Council, Russia's upper house of parliament. The authorization came after weeks
of Russian military buildup at two bases in Syrian territory controlled by President Bashar Assad.

The Kremlin's stated political objectives are to fight terrorism and prop up Assad's embattled
government after a series of setbacks against the Islamic State and Western-backed opposition groups.

However, though the Russian rhetoric was aimed against Islamists, U.S. officials on Wednesday said
Russia's initial targets were located far from any Islamic State territory.

Russian aircraft have in recent weeks been deployed to an airfield in the government stronghold
of Latakia, while ships from the Black Sea Fleet have ferried men and hardware to a small Russian
naval station at Tartus, some 90 kilometers to the south.

Following the vote by the Federation Council, the head of the presidential administration, Sergei
Ivanov, said the request for authorization to deploy force in Syria came after "[Assad] asked
the leadership of our country for military assistance."

"We are talking only about the operation of the Russian air force. As our president has said, the use
of ground forces is excluded, and the military purpose of the operation is limited to providing air
support to the Syrian government forces in countering the Islamic State," Ivanov said, the Interfax
news agency reported.

The Defense Ministry on Wednesday said that air strikes would be coordinated with Syria, Iraq
and Iran via a recently established intelligence center in Baghdad.

Unidentified Defense Ministry sources told Interfax that only Russian officers and soldiers who
volunteer for duty in Syria would be sent. The head of Russia's General Staff, Colonel General
Nikolai Bogdanovsky, said no conscripts would be deployed, Interfax reported.

Support at Home
The Kremlin's announcement that it was taking the fight to the Islamic State, which has around 2,400
Russian citizens reportedly fighting for it — mainly from the predominantly Muslim-populated
republics of Chechnya and Dagestan — drew strong support from the Russian Orthodox Church.

The Church's head, Patriarch Kirill, said a "responsible decision" had been taken "for the protection
of the Syrian people from calamities inflicted by the iniquity of terrorists," according to a statement
published on the Church's website.

A spokesman for the Moscow Patriarchate, Vsevolod Chaplin, was quoted by the Interfax-Religion
news service as calling the flight against Islamic extremism "a holy war."
 P a g e 23

Likewise, Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov, a bombastic and outspoken supporter of Putin and his
policies and himself a Muslim, said he was happy to see Russia intervene in Syria, but was
disappointed ground operations were ruled out.

Kadyrov promised to join the first wave of ground forces, if they were deployed. Chechen fighters
loyal to Kadyrov and Putin are believed to have taken part in fighting in eastern Ukraine, where
Kremlin-backed rebels have been fighting Ukrainian government forces.

The last time the Federation Council authorized Putin to use force abroad was in March 2014, just
before Russia's annexation of Crimea from Ukraine. The authorization was revoked in late June 2014,
at Putin's urging.

Putin's request for permission to use force in Syria was unexpected and passed through
the Federation Council quickly, and with no dissenting votes. 162 of the 170-member body voted yes,
while eight legislators were not present for the vote.

The chairman of the Federation Council's defense and security committee, Viktor Ozerov, told
the Russian News Service on Wednesday that Putin submitted his request to the legislative body
on Monday while in New York attending the United Nations General Assembly.

In his address to the UN, Putin proposed the creation of a broad international coalition to fight
the Islamic State in Syria. Later, Putin met with U.S. President Barack Obama behind closed doors
to discuss Syria, among other things.

A Russian official in Baghdad notified the U.S. just one hour before Moscow launched air strikes
in Syria, and requested that U.S. aircraft avoid Syrian airspace, U.S. State Department spokesman
John Kirby said Wednesday.

Limited Action
The announcement that the Russian air force would begin air operations in Syria sparked a stream
of comments on social media comparing it to the Soviet Union's 1979 decision to send troops
to Afghanistan to support a struggling socialist regime there.

The Afghan war, which lasted more than nine years, saw around 15,000 Soviet troops die,
and prompted the rise of virulent and violent Islamist extremism in the region.

Russian officials of all stripes were adamant Wednesday that the country's military actions in Syria
would be limited to air strikes and that no Russian soldiers would be deployed to fight alongside
Assad's army against the Islamic State or Western-backed opposition forces.
 P a g e 24

"We won't enter a risk zone, where we would be dragged into a long-term conflict or when our
servicemen's lives are at stake," the head of the Federation Council's foreign affairs committee,
Konstantin Kosachyov, told the Rossiya-24 television channel, according to a transcript by the
Sputnik news agency.

However, there is already some indication that Russian forces are on the ground fighting for Assad's
survival. Videos appeared online earlier this month reporting to show Russian equipment operated
by Russian soldiers engaging in combat in Syria.

Following the strikes, U.S. officials said that the Russian warplanes had hit targets in the Homs
region, an area contested by anti-Assad rebels, but not the Islamic State.

Analysts polled by The Moscow Times on Tuesday about what Russia's so-called "red line" might be
for a full-scale open intervention in the four-year-old Syrian civil war said that operations were likely
to be restricted to air strikes.

However, Yuval Weber, an assistant professor of international relations at Moscow's Higher School
of Economics told The Moscow Times on Wednesday that by declaring limited involvement
in Assad's war, Russia was repeating U.S. mistakes early in the Vietnam war.

"By committing to an ally facing a determined and indigenous foe, President Putin is putting himself
in a similar position to President Johnson regarding South Vietnam in late 1964, early 1965," Weber
said.

Weber said that when nations commit limited military force, and stake their prestige on the outcome
of the conflict, the incentive becomes to increase their military commitment to protect their
reputation.

Though Russia's move might simply be a bid to save an embattled ally, it might also be a bid
to reverse Moscow's status as a global pariah after its actions in Ukraine. "The larger strategic issue is
whether [this] is an attempt to create issue linkage with Ukraine: genuinely help the U.S.-led
coalition in the Middle East to gain concessions in Europe," he said.
 P a g e 25

Appendix 2 – Washington Post Article

https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/russias-legislature-authorizes-putin-to-use-military-force-in-
syria/2015/09/30/f069f752-6749-11e5-9ef3-fde182507eac_story.html

Russia begins airstrikes in

Syria; U.S. warns of new
concerns in conflict
MOSCOW — Russian warplanes began airstrikes in Syria on Wednesday,
adding an unpredictable new element to a four-year-old war that has already
drawn in the United States and allies, fueled a refugee crisis and expanded the
reach of the Islamic State.

In Washington, the dramatic escalation of Russia’s military involvement was

viewed as an affront just two days after President Obama and Russian
President Vladimir Putin sat down to discuss means for negotiating the deep
differences in their countries’ approaches to the conflict in Syria.

The strikes sharply increase tensions with Russia as U.S. officials dispute
Moscow’s claim that its aircraft targeted the Islamic State, the brutal extremist
group that controls much of Syria and Iraq. Instead, U.S. officials said the
strikes appeared to target opponents of Syria’s embattled President Bashar al-
Assad, a key Russian ally. Those hit include U.S.-backed units that were
trained and armed by the CIA, officials said.

Accusing Russia of “pouring gasoline on the fire,” Defense Secretary Ashton B.

Carter vowed that U.S. pilots would continue their year-long bombing
 P a g e 26

campaign against the Islamic State in Syria, despite Moscow’s warning to keep
American planes away from its operations.

“I think what they’re doing is going to backfire and is counterproductive,”

Carter said.

Did the Russians really strike the Islamic State?VIEW GRAPHIC

The introduction of Russian air power — which took place with scant notice to
the U.S. government — threatens to upend U.S. strategy in Syria at a time
when U.S. military officials say they are beginning to discern hints of progress
against the Islamic State, a heavily armed al-Qaeda offshoot that is also known
as ISIS and ISIL.
 P a g e 27

It also raises the stakes over competing visions for Syria outlined this week at
the United Nations, where Putin insisted that Syria’s embattled government is
the key to stability after four years of bloodshed and Obama warned that the
“status quo” cannot stand.

[This is Russia’s air power in Syria]

U.S. officials were particularly irked that they didn’t get much warning of the
strikes, even as they make plans to resume military talks with Russia about
Syria as early as next week. Discussions have been halted since last year over
Russia’s support for separatists in Ukraine.

Earlier Wednesday, a Russian general posted in Baghdad showed up at the

U.S. Embassy there, officials said, and told the American defense attache that
airstrikes would begin about an hour later.

Russia’s Defense Ministry said Russian aircraft had conducted about 20

sorties targeting the Islamic State, according to the news agency Interfax.

The Syrian state-run news agency reported that Russian planes had attacked
“dens” of the Islamic State in Rastan, Talbiseh and other towns around Homs,
the strategic city that Assad hopes to claim as he seeks to defend areas
remaining under his control.

Ground level: On the scene of controversial Russian airstrikes in Syria

 P a g e 28

View Potos
The actions, quickly criticized by Washington, add an unpredictable element to a multilayered
war.

But U.S. officials expressed doubts in the hours after the strikes about Russian
claims that the sorties targeted the Islamic State. Areas around Homs, a
former hotbed of the popular revolt that began against Assad in 2011, are not
known as strongholds for the group, which controls a vast swath of territory
across Syria and Iraq.

[Ukraine’s president uses world stage to jab Putin]

Nidal Ezddin, a representative of Homs’s civil defense force, said a series of

Russian strikes killed 36 people around Homs. “These bombings were not
against ISIS,” he said. “They were for ISIS.”
 P a g e 29

Civil defense officials and activists also reported that some of the Russian
strikes were accompanied by barrel bomb attacks by Syrian air force
helicopters.

The strikes cap weeks of Russian military buildup in Syria, where Assad is
battling both the Islamic State and rebel factions backed by the West. Assad’s
forces are blamed for fueling the war that has forced more than 4 million
people to flee the country, many of whom are joining a wave of asylum seekers
and migrants flooding Europe.

Forces loyal to Assad hope to lay claim to Homs province, a key link between
the capital, Damascus, and government strongholds on the Mediterranean
coast, including the key port city of Latakia. Russia has a naval facility at
Tartus, about 50 miles south of Latakia.

Charles Lister, a visiting fellow at the Brookings Doha Center, said the strikes
may be an attempt to weaken Assad’s principal adversary rather than the
Islamic State.

“Amid the regime’s major losses . . . Assad’s apparent request to Moscow for
military assistance seems a last-gasp appeal for help from what was a dying
regime,” he said. “How far Russia is willing to go to defend its proxy interests
now remains to be seen, but certainly, the dynamics of the conflict have taken
a huge shift today.”

[Russia’s strategy in Syria could be work in progress]

The strikes appeared to have also hit groups backed by the United States,
including rebels who have been trained by the CIA. A U.S. official said there
was “no reason to doubt reports from the region that coalition-backed forces
 P a g e 30

from Hama were hit,” a reference to a rebel group known as Tajammu al-Aaza
based in that western Syrian province.

The leader of that group, Jamil al-Saleh, told the news organization
AlSouria.net that the Russian strikes had pounded his organization’s base in
Lataminah, a town roughly 30 miles north of Homs. Saleh was an officer in
the Syrian army before defecting.

The U.S.-backed group also posted a video that shows fighter jets streaking
across the sky seconds before the base is rattled by explosions.

[Graphic: Were Russian airstrikes really aimed at the Islamic State? ]

The CIA has trained thousands of fighters at secret bases in Jordan in an effort
to bolster moderate factions against the Assad government. A Russian strike
on U.S.-backed units will only intensify pressure on the Obama administration
to respond.

Speaking at the United Nations, Secretary of State John F. Kerry said the
United States would have “grave concerns” if Russian airstrikes hit moderate
U.S.-backed opposition forces fighting Assad rather than the Islamic State.

Also on Wednesday, Kerry told Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov that
the strikes run counter to Russia’s stated intention to cooperate on
“deconfliction,” or ensuring that mishaps do not happen in the air.

[Moscow vs. Washington amid the Syrian misery]

Putin spokesman Dmitry Peskov defended Russia’s actions after its

parliament approved a resolution authorizing the use of force in Syria. “Russia
 P a g e 31

will factually be the only country to carry out this operation on the legitimate
basis of the request of the legitimate government of Syria,” he said.

The resolution came without warning in the Federation Council, Russia’s

higher body of parliament, where 162 senators voted unanimously in support
after a closed-door discussion — similar to a vote last year to green-light
Russian military force in Ukraine.

Sergei Ivanov, the Kremlin chief of staff, said that the resolution was strictly
limited to the use of Russian aviation in Syria and that ground troops would
not be sent into battle.

[Putin defends Russian arms flow to Syria]

While Russia has supplied arms to Assad for years, direct intervention seemed
unlikely until early this month when Russian aircraft, tanks and troops were
spotted in Syria.

Speaking in Moscow, Putin said he hoped Assad would be open to political

compromise.

“I know that President Assad understands that and is ready for such a process.
We hope that he will be active and flexible and ready to compromise in the
name of his country and his people,” Putin told reporters, according to the
Reuters news agency.

Critics say that the Kremlin is using the Syrian crisis to escape international
isolation after its annexation of the Crimean Peninsula in March 2014, and to
divert attention at home from the conflict in eastern Ukraine.
 P a g e 32

The strikes also come as the Obama administration considers changes to its
Syria strategy, including a possible expansion of military assistance to anti-
Assad rebels and a new focus for a troubled effort to train an independent
force to fight the Islamic State.

Murphy and Ryan reported from Washington. Daniela Deane in London,

Hugh Naylor in Beirut, Carol Morello and Karen DeYoung at the United
Nations, and Greg Miller, Thomas Gibbons-Neff, Dan Lamothe and William
Branigin in Washington contributed to this report.
 P a g e 33

Appendix 3 - Intertextuality

Subject Washington Post Moscow Times

Russia's participation in anti-
terrorist operations in Syria is
being carried out on the
“Assad’s apparent request
basis of international law
to Moscow for military
and in accordance with
assistance seems a last-
Russia-Assad Dialogue gasp appeal for help from
an official request from the
Syrian president," state
what was a dying regime,” he
news agency RIA Novosti
said.
quoted Putin as saying at his
Novo-Ogaryovo residence
outside Moscow
The resolution came
without warning in the
Federation Council, Air strikes began just hours
Russia’s higher body of after Putin received a fast-
parliament, where 162 tracked authorization
Authorisation from
senators voted unanimously to use force in Syria from the
Russian Parliament in support after a closed-door Federation Council.
discussion — similar to a
vote last year to green-light
Russian military force in
Ukraine.
The authorization came
after weeks of Russian
military buildup at two
The strikes cap weeks of bases in Syrian territory
Russian military buildup in controlled by President
Syria, where Assad is battling Bashar Assad.
Russian Military Buildup both the Islamic State and
rebel factions backed by the Russian aircraft have
West. in recent weeks been
deployed to an airfield in the
government stronghold
of Latakia,
The Kremlin's stated political
objectives are to fight
“Amid the regime’s major
terrorism and prop up
losses . . . Assad’s apparent
Assad's embattled
Assad’s Recent Military request to Moscow for military
government after a series
Defeats assistance seems a last-gasp
appeal for help from what was
of setbacks against
a dying regime,” he said. the Islamic State
and Western-backed
opposition groups.
 P a g e 34

The Defense Ministry

on Wednesday said that air
strikes would be
New Baghdad coordinated with Syria,
- Iraq and Iran via a recently
Intelligence Centre
established intelligence
center in Baghdad.

A spokesman for the

Moscow Patriarchate,
Vsevolod Chaplin, was
quoted by the Interfax-
Religious War - Religion news service as
calling the flight (sic)
against Islamic extremism
"a holy war."

Critics say that the Kremlin is

using the Syrian crisis to
escape international The last time the Federation
isolation after its Council authorized Putin
annexation of the Crimean to use force abroad was
Crimea Peninsula in March 2014, in March 2014, just before
and to divert attention at Russia's annexation
home from the conflict in of Crimea from Ukraine.
eastern Ukraine.

It also raises the stakes over

competing visions for Syria
outlined this week at the
United Nations, where Putin In his address to the UN,
insisted that Syria’s Putin proposed
embattled government is the creation of a broad
Putin Talks to UN international coalition
the key to stability after
four years of bloodshed to fight the Islamic State
and Obama warned that the in Syria.
“status quo” cannot stand.

In Washington, the dramatic

escalation of Russia’s Later, Putin met with U.S.
military involvement was President Barack Obama
viewed as an affront just behind closed doors
Putin and Obama
two days after President to discuss Syria, among
Meeting Obama and Russian other things.
President Vladimir
Putin sat down to discuss
means for negotiating the
 P a g e 35

deep differences in their

countries’ approaches to the
conflict in Syria.
The announcement that
the Russian air force would
begin air operations in Syria
sparked a stream
of comments on social media
comparing it to the Soviet
Union's 1979 decision
to send troops
to Afghanistan to support
Soviet Union-Afghanistan a struggling socialist
-
1979 War regime there.
The Afghan war, which
lasted more than nine
years, saw around 15,000
Soviet troops die,
and prompted the rise
of virulent and violent
Islamist extremism in the
region.
However, there is already
Sergei Ivanov, the Kremlin some indication that Russian
chief of staff, said that the forces are on the ground
resolution was strictly limited fighting for Assad's
to the use of Russian survival. Videos appeared
Russian Ground Forces
aviation in Syria and that online earlier this month
in Syria reporting to show Russian
ground troops would not
be sent into battle. equipment operated
by Russian soldiers
engaging in combat
in Syria.
However, Yuval Weber,
an assistant professor
of international relations
at Moscow's Higher School
of Economics told
The Moscow Times
on Wednesday that
Vietnam War - by declaring limited
involvement in Assad's war,
Russia was repeating U.S.
mistakes early in the
Vietnam war.
 P a g e 36

Critics say that the Kremlin is

Though Russia's move might
using the Syrian crisis to
simply be a bid to save
escape international isolation
an embattled ally, it might
after its annexation of the
Ukraine War Crimean Peninsula in March
also be a bid to reverse
Moscow's status as
2014, and to divert attention
a global pariah after its
at home from the conflict
actions in Ukraine.
in eastern Ukraine.
Accusing Russia of “pouring
gasoline on the fire,” Defense
Secretary Ashton B. Carter
vowed that U.S. pilots
would continue their year-
long bombing campaign
US Bombing in Syria against the Islamic State in
-
Syria, despite Moscow’s
warning to keep American
planes away from its
operations.

The introduction of Russian

air power — which took place
with scant notice to the U.S.
government — threatens to
upend U.S. strategy in
Syria at a time when U.S.
military officials say they
are beginning to discern "The larger strategic issue is
hints of progress against whether [this] is an attempt
the Islamic State, a heavily to create issue linkage with
US Military Strategy in armed al-Qaeda offshoot that Ukraine: genuinely help
is also known as ISIS and the U.S.-led coalition in the
Syria
ISIL. Middle East to gain
concessions in Europe," he
The CIA has trained said.
thousands of fighters at
secret bases in Jordan in
an effort to bolster moderate
factions against the Assad
government.

U.S. officials were

particularly irked that they
Ongoing US-Russia didn’t get much warning of
-
Military Talks the strikes, even as they
make plans to resume
military talks with Russia
 P a g e 37

about Syria as early as

next week. Discussions
have been halted since last
year over Russia’s support
for separatists in Ukraine.
Assad’s forces are blamed
for fueling the war that has
forced more than 4 million
people to flee the country,
Asylum Seekers many of whom are joining a
-
wave of asylum seekers
and migrants flooding
Europe.